

**TO CONSIDER THE NOMINATION OF GENERAL
PAUL J. SELVA, USAF, FOR REAPPOINTMENT
TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND REAPPOINT-
MENT TO BE VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF**

HEARING

BEFORE THE

**COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE**

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

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TO CONSIDER THE NOMINATION OF GENERAL PAUL J. SELVA, USAF, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND REAPPOINTMENT TO BE VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

TUESDAY, JULY 18, 2017

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in Room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator James M. Inhofe (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.

Committee Members present: Senators Inhofe, Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Cruz, Graham, Reed, Nelson, McCaskill, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King, Heinrich, Warren, and Peters.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

Senator INHOFE. The meeting will come to order.

I think, first of all, we all have on our minds and in our prayers Senator McCain. He is going through some recovery right now and will not be able to come back this week. So that will change the way we are doing business a little bit. But, nonetheless, he will be back with us very soon.

Our Committee meets this morning to consider the nomination—I should say the renomination—of General Selva for the appointment to be the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I think since we have already been through this drill on the eight required questions, we are going to forego that. I am assuming you have not changed your mind since the last time we asked the eight questions. Is that correct?

General SELVA. I have not changed my mind.

Senator INHOFE. Do you have any family here you would like to introduce?

General SELVA. I do, sir. I will do that in my opening statement.

Senator INHOFE. All right. That is good.

General Selva, your record of service to our Nation is well known to this committee. Your first 2 years at the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been marked by great challenges to our national security: the advance of ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] in the Middle East; the Russian aggression in Ukraine and actions against others

in that region; North Korea's pursuit of both nuclear and long-range missiles capability. Meanwhile, our young men and women continue to serve on the battlefield in Afghanistan, ensuring that that country never again serves as a safe haven for terrorists.

Moving forward, new leadership at the Department of Defense (DOD) and military services presents renewed opportunities for our armed forces. As we work to meet the threats of today and prepare for the threats of the future, crises around the world only continue to multiply. Our servicemembers face the most complex and diverse array of global threats since the end of World War II.

Leading our military during such challenging times requires strong leadership, and this committee looks forward to your testimony about how you plan to guide our men and women.

Senator Reed?

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I, too, want to join you in wishing Senator McCain a speedy recovery and a rapid return to his responsibilities. In fact, this might be one of the few times I can say sincerely "Go Navy" because I certainly do. I want to see him back, as we all do.

Senator INHOFE. I might observe, though, it cannot go unnoticed that the first three that were here on time were all three Army. [Laughter.]

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I want to join you in welcoming General Selva. Thank you, sir, for your service. As we consider your reappointment to Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, we recognize and thank you for your many years of service to the Nation and your willingness to continue to serve. Also, I want to recognize your wife, Ricki, for her many years of support.

The United States faces a wide range of multifaceted and varied challenges around the world. If you are reconfirmed as the Vice Chairman, you will be an integral player in addressing these complex international issues facing our national interest.

Russia's malign influence and active measures activities have been aimed at undermining the American people's faith in our election process, as well as other Western elections. Furthermore, Russia continues to threaten its neighbors and our NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies and has failed to end its interference in Ukraine by complying with its commitments under the Minsk cease-fire agreement. Finally, Russia has refused to withdraw its support for the Assad regime.

North Korea's nuclear missile program is an immediate and grave national security threat, and the United States continues to grapple with the fact that there is no set of quick and certain options. China has not demonstrated its willingness to enforce effective sanctions against North Korea and, in addition, continues to threaten the rules-based order in the Asia-Pacific region by economic coercion of its smaller, more vulnerable neighbors, and by undermining the freedom of navigation.

Iran continues their aggressive weapons development activities, including ballistic missile development efforts, as well as other destabilizing activities in the region.

Finally, while we continue to make steady military progress against ISIS, the Administration has yet to publicly articulate a broader whole-of-government strategy for addressing the issues that gave rise to ISIS in the first place.

General Selva, the aforementioned challenges are urgent and pressing, and the committee looks forward to hearing from you on how the Department of Defense plans to address these issues.

In addition, the Vice Chairman is assigned a number of specific responsibilities. For example, the fiscal year 2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) strengthened the Vice Chairman's role on the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, JROC, by making the Vice Chairman the principal adviser to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs on joint planning capabilities and joint performance requirements. Given the important function of the JROC in reviewing requirements for acquisition programs to ensure they are reasonable and necessary, I look forward to your thoughts on the effectiveness of these new authorities and whether you believe additional changes are warranted.

The Vice Chairman is a key player in the interagency process, a role that often requires working closely with senior policymakers within the Department and at the National Security Council on critical national security issues. In light of the strategic challenges I referenced earlier, the committee looks forward to hearing from you on the effectiveness of the current interagency process.

Finally, General Selva, you have been a partner with Deputy Secretary Work in developing and fostering the Department's innovation strategy, including the so-called Third Offset, the Strategic Capabilities Office, the Defense Innovation Unit Experimental, or DIUx, and other special projects. If confirmed to a second term as the Vice Chairman, you will provide vital continuity between the last Administration and the present Administration. It is imperative that the Department of Defense under Secretary Mattis continue this effort to learn how to leverage the most dynamic sectors of our economy to harness new technology and ways of thinking to solve our difficult and diverse global challenges.

Thank you again, General Selva, for your willingness to serve our Nation, and I look forward to the hearing.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Senator Reed.

You are recognized, General Selva.

STATEMENT OF GENERAL PAUL J. SELVA, USAF, FOR RE-APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND RE-APPOINTMENT TO BE VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

General SELVA. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.

Before I begin, I would like to also recognize Chairman McCain's service to our Nation both in and out of uniform. On behalf of the Joint Staff, I wish him a complete and speedy recovery, and I look forward to him being back here at work soon.

Senator Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to be considered for a second term as the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I am grateful to the President and the Sec-

retary of Defense for their continued trust and faith in my ability to serve.

I would like to make three brief points before I continue and look forward to your questions.

First, I want to commend those who wear the cloth of our Nation. During my 2 years as the Vice Chairman, I have had the opportunity to visit servicemembers and their families around the globe, and I am continually impressed by their dedication, their selfless service, and their exceptional talents. It has been my distinct honor to serve the men and women of the United States Armed Forces as the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If reconfirmed, I will strive to keep faith with them.

Second, as you have already mentioned, Senator Inhofe, it is important to acknowledge the highly complex challenges that face our joint force today. The combination of external challenges presented by adversaries and competitors and internal challenges such as readiness and modernization, amplified by continual budget instability, are all issues with which this committee is very familiar. Please know that I value the dialogue that I and other senior military leaders have with this committee, and I thank the committee for your work on behalf of this Nation's soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and coast guardsmen, particularly the swift passage of this year's National Defense Authorization Act. I hope through my work and our discussions that I have conveyed to you the seriousness with which I take my responsibilities as the Vice Chairman.

Finally, I would like to recognize my wife Ricki, the love of my life, who is with me today and who has shared my 37-year career and our 37-year marriage. As many of you know, she was a classmate when we attended the United States Air Force Academy. She is not only a lifelong friend and partner, but she provides me with the counsel that only someone in her position can. For that I will forever be grateful.

Senator Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, members of the committee, thank you again for the opportunity to appear before this committee to be considered for a second term as the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I look forward to your questions.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, General Selva.

I would like to start off with one that has been foremost on my mind and I think on the minds of most of the members here, as well as the uniforms. I applaud the uniforms for being straightforward and honest about the threats that we are facing right now, and that would be North Korea.

You know, they successfully tested a ballistic missile on the Fourth of July. The country also completed a successful nuclear test earlier on May 14th. The experts consider North Korea's missile test on July Fourth to be the most significant advancement toward a nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile.

We have had a lot of witnesses talk about this prior to July Fourth. They were talking about when this happens, what that will mean in terms of a threat to the United States. If you take the projected range of that, that would actually be somewhere around 5,000 miles, which would put parts of the United States into range. So it is a scary thing.

We had an Armed Services Committee hearing on the Asia-Pacific strategy on April 25th. We had a panel of experts, and they were good. They agreed with me that North Korea currently represents the most imminent threat to our national security.

I would like to have you go ahead and start with three questions concerning that.

One, do you agree with the experts who have come to that conclusion concerning our national security?

Secondly, North Korea is known to export ballistic missile technology to other adversaries like Iran. Do you believe that they are in the process of doing that? They have done that. And then what other countries might pose a threat as a result of what they are receiving from North Korea?

Thirdly, what is your level of confidence in terms of our intelligence community's ability to monitor what is really going on there? Those three things to start off with.

General SELVA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I do agree in principle with the assessment that the North Koreans are moving quickly to develop an intercontinental ballistic missile capability. I, however, am not saying the test on the Fourth of July demonstrates that they have the capacity to strike the United States with any degree of accuracy or reasonable confidence of success. What the experts tell me is that the North Koreans have yet to demonstrate the capacity to do the guidance and control that would be required—

Senator INHOFE. I was only referring to range.

General SELVA. Yes, sir. On range, they clearly have the capability.

Senator INHOFE. You know, if they have the capability in range, the other improvements are perhaps not too far behind.

General SELVA. Yes, sir. We will have to watch very carefully with the IC [Intelligence Community] the developments on those particular capabilities.

I do agree with the Intelligence Community and others that the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea is an arms proliferators. There is no evidence that they have engaged in proliferation of their long-range ballistic missile technology, but they have proliferated every other weapons system that they have ever invented. It is a pretty clear pathway to the potential proliferation of these kinds of weapons systems.

Senator INHOFE. The third question was on the capability of our intelligence.

General SELVA. I am reasonably confident in the ability of our Intelligence Community to monitor the testing but not the deployment of these missile systems. Kim Jong-un and his forces are very good at camouflage, concealment, and deception. We have a series of programs that I would be happy to talk about in a classified setting that talk to the ability of our Intelligence Community both military and civilian to monitor those activities.

Senator INHOFE. Yes. I think it has been said outside of a classified hearing that the things that he has been doing make him—the nicest thing I can say about Kim Jong-un is he is totally unpredictable and the most unpredictable of anyone I have ever had any kind of experience with or even reading about. And that is what

has been scary to most of the people, and I assume you agree with that.

General SELVA. Yes, sir. I do agree with that assessment.

Senator INHOFE. Okay.

Now, getting down to our threats, this committee has received the testimony from the uniforms and from the experienced people outside of the uniforms that only a third of our Army brigade combat teams, only a fourth of our combat aviation brigades are ready. We hear about 62 percent of our F-18s that the marines use do not work. We recognize when we are going through what we have been going through in the last few years that the first thing to go is maintenance and then, of course, modernization.

I would like to have your assessment whether or not you do agree with General Stephen Wilson, USAF, Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, for example, when he testified before this committee, that fewer than 50 percent of the Air Force combat force are sufficiently ready for a highly contested fight against peer adversaries. He is going beyond just equipment. We are getting down to our individuals.

Then another Wilson, Secretary of the Air Force Heather Wilson, and General David Goldfein, USAF have told us that they will be short 1,500 pilots, most of them fighters, by the end of this year.

Do you agree with this assessment? Would you want to elaborate on anything that they have said?

General SELVA. Senator, I agree with both assessments. Both speak to the availability of funds and resources to do the high-end training that is required to make our forces ready for what we call high intensity combat against a peer competitor. The budget in 2017 is helpful. The proposed budget for 2018 will move us down the pathway to being able to restore much of that training. But it will be a 2-year process beyond the initial insertion of those resources before you see the readiness improve.

Senator INHOFE. I agree with that.

Senator Reed?

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, General Selva, again for your service.

One of the issues in terms of the Third Offset is creating some different agency. One is the Defense Innovation Unit Experimental, DIUx. They are working in the public knowledge on sort of very cheap satellites—inexpensive I should say—and also exploiting them with artificial intelligence (AI). It is something that we really need for many places, particularly Korea, for constant dwell.

We are told that they are about to run out of money, and we have not received the reprogramming yet. I would think this would be an urgent need. Can you explain why they are in this distress and what we can do?

General SELVA. Yes, sir, I can. We actually put tremendous demands on the defense experimental unit. In the programs that they are working for us, we were notified early last week by Director Raj Shah that they had been cash flowing into two programs. We have a reprogramming proposal that is in staff as we speak that will address the balance of their requirements for this fiscal year, and we will actually begin some of the funding for programs that

will extend into next fiscal year. They will be able to do that with year-end money.

Senator REED. Thank you very much.

One of the areas of concern—and there are many—is the situation in Iraq. I was there about 4 weeks ago. They are making progress on the ground. General Stephen Townsend, USA, is doing a superb job as the commander on the ground, along with, when I was up at Q-West, the 82nd Airborne Division, 2nd Brigade was leading the advisory effort.

But the issue now becomes, as we reduce their effectiveness—ISIS—our long-term presence there. Do you have views on that?

Also, I heard there were claims at least by Revolutionary Guards of Iran that if they are designated a terror group, they will retaliate against our forces. Can you give us any insights there?

General SELVA. Sir, on Iraq, the fighting is far from over. ISIS has lost their sanctuary in Mosul but they still have a handful of small towns that they control in and around the province. President Abadi has a plan with the Iraqi Security Forces to begin a campaign, with Steve Townsend's help and consent, to clear those towns and move into Anbar Province to secure their border with Syria, all important work as that will deny ISIS sanctuary on both sides of the Syrian-Iraqi border.

I share your concern. I read in this morning's papers about the Iranian Republican Guard's Quds Force making a statement that if they are declared an international terrorist organization, that they will retaliate against our forces in Iraq. We will have to posture ourselves to be ready for that, but I do not think we should take that threat and keep it from taking action against the Quds Force.

Senator REED. Thank you.

In another area in your advance policy questions, you indicated, which is something that has been seconded by so many, that our adversaries in anti-access and area denial technologies have eroded what used to be a tremendous overmatch by the United States. The question is, what are we doing to get back way ahead not just a few inches ahead, metaphorically?

General SELVA. Thank you, Senator. You alluded to the work that we have been doing over the past couple years in the advanced concepts development arena, as well as working what Deputy Secretary Robert Work called the Third Offset strategy. Those are concepts that would allow us to contest what we call the anti-access/area denial strategies that many of our adversaries have attempted to impose upon us by making our basing and our forces more resilient and able to survive under the kinds of attacks that are associated with the area denial strategies, particularly that China and North Korea are attempting to impose upon us. It allows us to project force into areas that otherwise would be presumed denied.

Senator REED. Thank you.

Just finally and quickly, we have been working for several different Congresses on acquisition reform. We have passed legislation. We still have a long way to go. I think we both recognize that, honestly. As Chairman of JROC, you have been given additional responsibility both actual and also kind of referential or symbolic. But can you tell us what you are doing to kind of help the service

chiefs jump start acquisition and get it so we can deliver systems. The Army is commendable for many things, their timeliness, et cetera. But they have had a tough record in getting systems from the drawing board into the field. So can you comment?

General SELVA. Yes, sir. We are implementing the guidance that we received in last year's NDAA. Two specific things that give the Vice Chairman's office a little bit more flexibility. One is the direct requirement to be the advisor to the Chairman for readiness and the deployment of systems that support readiness.

The second is a building relationship with the service chiefs and the service secretaries in their acquisition authority roles. So the JROC is now providing requirements directly to the service acquisition authorities not only for the basic design and integration capabilities that would go into systems but actual performance along the line of buying systems. One really striking example of that capability was a piece of work that we did to move counter-unmanned systems technologies into Iraq from idea to fruition, measured in months, from delivery to deployment, measured in weeks, and those are numbers that are actually quite useful.

Senator REED. Thank you.

Senator INHOFE. Senator Ernst?

Senator ERNST. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much, General Selva. Mrs. Selva, thank you for your support and service to our Nation as well.

General Selva, in your answers to advance policy questions regarding Southeast Asia, you suggest that short-term stressors can be managed within the alliance construct. A few weeks ago referring to the Philippines specifically, Secretary of Defense James Mattis testified that in 2014 we canceled our named counterterrorism operation with a premature view of success, causing us to lose funding lines that we would have otherwise been able to offer.

Do you agree with me and Secretary Mattis that reestablishing a named operation is something we should consider as part of our alliance obligations in order to make sure that those short-term stressors do not turn into a prolonged or long-term catastrophe?

General SELVA. Yes, ma'am. In every case where we see the resurgence of terror networks, particularly in the fragile areas of the southern Philippines, I think it is worth considering whether or not we reinstate a named operation not only to provide for the resources that are required but to give the Pacific Command commander and the field commanders in the Philippines the kinds of authorities they need to work with indigenous Philippine forces to actually help them be successful in that battle space.

Senator ERNST. Excellent. I hope that we can work with Secretary Mattis on this issue.

Moving on to another topic, you have been openly critical of Congress about the budget process. I agree that it is long past time for us to break the cycle of these continuing resolutions. We are not doing ourselves any favor. However, budgets are also a two-way street. DOD has not been able to conduct or pass a clean audit for a very, very long time. That is not helping our cause either.

What specifically will you do in your next 2 years to achieve a clean audit that you have not maybe been able to accomplish in the last 2 years?

General SELVA. I have found over the last several years that achieving the clean audit goal is a really vexing journey. In particular, the discussions over the valuation of real property are an obstacle in the way of getting that work done, the debates over what we own and what it is actually worth. I will share with you that in advance of his confirmation, I spent several hours with the new Deputy Secretary of Defense, Patrick Shanahan, discussing how we might get at this issue of valuing capital property so that we can, in fact, clear a clean audit. We will commit to working that together through the Defense Management Action Group to try and come to resolution.

Senator ERNST. I appreciate that. I hope that we can move forward on that, especially when it comes to the real property. We have to own this, and we absolutely must get this done to know how the dollars are being spent so that we can reassure our taxpayers that we as Congress and you as DOD are doing the right thing. So thank you for that. I hope we are successful.

You also support providing lethal defensive assistance to Ukraine, something I have been pushing for a number of years as well. Other than being actively engaged with the interagency on this issue, what specific steps are underway in DOD in order to make this happen?

General SELVA. We are working very closely between the Joint Staff and United States European Command to actually put requirements on the table for an inventory of what that lethal defensive aid might look like. It will be more than just a military recommendation. This will be a policy choice on whether or not we are going to give the Ukrainian Government the tools they need to defend themselves against what we believe to be a Russian-supported insurgency movement in the Donbas.

Senator ERNST. I think it is really important.

In light of Russia's recently thwarted attempt to deny Montenegro's accession to NATO, what steps should we be taking to reaffirm our commitment to nations like Ukraine and Kosovo and other candidates just in reassuring them that we will assist them should they wish to become NATO members?

General SELVA. Ma'am, I think one of the tools that we can bring to bear as the Joint Staff and as the military team is our mil-to-mil contacts with the chiefs of defense and the leaders of their militaries to make sure that all those countries, in spite of what is going on internally with or without the interference of the Russian Government, actually are able to make the military reforms that are necessary so that they can move towards a path to membership in NATO.

Senator ERNST. I appreciate that. We have a lot of State partnership programs out there and those countries need our reassurance. So thank you, General Selva, again.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Senator INHOFE. Senator Gillibrand?

Senator GILLIBRAND. Hello, General. Thank you for being here. Thank you for your service. I welcome your family.

I want to talk to you a little bit about where we are on trying to combat military sexual assault. In 2013, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, said a majority of

the Senate of the United States expressed a lack of confidence in our ability to solve this ourselves. We are currently on the clock, if you will. The President of the United States said to us in December, you know what? You have a year to review this thing and show me you can make a difference. We understand that just because Senator Gillibrand's vote was defeated yesterday does not mean that a year from now it may not be reintroduced, and if we have not been able to demonstrate we are making a difference, you know, then we deserve to be held to the scrutiny and standard.

This is now 4 years later. We do not see a change in the overall numbers. We do not see a change in the rate of prosecution. We do not see a change in the rate of conviction, and we do not see a change in the rate of retaliation. I am really worried that in these measurables where commanders are entirely responsible for outcomes, they have not met the level of scrutiny and oversight that is really necessary to really tackle this problem effectively.

Do you agree that more needs to be done to create environments where victims and bystanders can report and not be retaliated against?

General SELVA. Senator, I believe that survivors of sexual assault and bystanders should be given an environment where they can report the events that have happened, and we can provide an unbiased investigation and potential prosecution of the wrongdoers who perpetrated the crime.

Senator GILLIBRAND. Do you agree that despite the Department's efforts, we have not achieved enough progress?

General SELVA. I do not agree that we have not achieved enough progress, but perfection is the only standard that can be allowed in this space. Sexual assault is contrary to the notion that we treat all soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines with the dignity and respect they deserve because they wear the uniform of this Nation.

Senator GILLIBRAND. I do not think we are going for perfection. I think we are going for a climate where men and women can serve without being sexually assaulted, a climate where they can report their crimes and know that they will be prosecuted, that they can report their crimes and know that they will not be retaliated. We are not even close. I mean, the estimate of last year was 15,000 sexual assaults, unwanted sexual contact, and rape. That is nowhere where we need to be. We still have almost a 60 percent retaliation rate, and our rate of conviction has not moved in 5 years.

I do not think we are achieving enough progress. I think we have done a lot of good things in terms of getting better evidentiary records, getting better evidentiary standards, making sure there is special counsel for the individuals who do report. But our rate of unrestricted reports, the ones where you are willing to put your name and make it public, is going down. Our rate of restricted reports percentage is going up. The confidence in the system just is not there.

I really hope that you will commit to me to do a full look at this issue, look for new solutions, look for untried solutions because what we are doing today is not working. We have done every small ball recommended reform we could possibly do by every committee that has offered them.

General SELVA. Ma'am, I will commit to working with the services and the service secretaries to take a deep dive into all of the programs that they have implemented and to take a look at whether or not they will be effective in supporting the survivors of sexual assault and in making sure that we get to unbiased investigations and prosecutions.

Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you.

I would now like to talk a bit about our transgender servicemembers. I have been pleased by the advances the Department of Defense policies had made to be more inclusive to transgender servicemembers who are twice as likely to serve, according to one study, than the general population. But I am concerned that the recent 6-month delay the Department has approved before letting transgender people enlist in the services will have some unintended consequences.

What have you learned so far in your review of this issue, and how is the implementation going so far?

General SELVA. Thank you, Senator. I am an advocate of every qualified person who can meet the physical standards to serve in our uniformed services to be able to do so.

Our decision to delay the accessions of transgender individuals into the services was largely based on a disagreement on the science of how mental health care and hormone therapy for transgender individuals would help solve the medical issues that are associated with gender dysphoria. There are a host of other issues that involve the potential physical standards that the service chiefs asked for additional time to assess so that they can make the necessary changes to infrastructure, as well as training curricula, for our basic trainees who come in transgender status, particularly those who have not undergone gender reassignment surgery and, while they present as their target gender, are physiologically still in their birth gender. Those issues will have to be dealt with before we can actually begin to assess those individuals into Active service.

Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand.

Senator Cotton?

Senator COTTON. General Selva, welcome back. Congratulations on your reappointment.

I would like to discuss the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, a treaty between the United States and the then Soviet Union, now Russia, that prohibits land-based cruise missiles or ballistic missiles with a range of 500 to 5,500 kilometers. Russia, it has been widely known, is cheating on this treaty. The State Department found that 3 years ago.

You testified at the House Armed Services Committee that to your knowledge, Russia does not intend to return to compliance with the INF Treaty. Do you remain of the same opinion today?

General SELVA. I do, sir, and there is no new intelligence that says that the Russians are either inclined to return or to abrogate the treaty. They are still trying to walk the middle line.

Senator COTTON. I have to say I agree that as long as Vladimir Putin gets to eat his cake and have it too, why would he change?

I assume that he is somewhat ambivalent about the treaty. On the one hand, he benefits much more from the prohibition on intermediate-range missiles in Europe since the one country that could rapidly produce those missiles and deploy them, the United States, is restrained from making those missiles and deploying them.

On the other hand, I assume that he does not like the fact that countries on his periphery, in particular, China, can produce and deploy them. The way to square that circle is simply to cheat, and as long as we let him get away with it, then there is no reason not to keep cheating.

Is there anything in your mind that we could do to put pressure on Russia to bring them back into compliance to change their current mindset?

General SELVA. The diplomatic tools that exist inside of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty allow us to put a modicum of pressure on the Russians through the bilateral consultative committee to try and get them to return to compliance.

The other tools that exist in the treaty include beginning research and development efforts to field but not test intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles within the boundaries of the treaty. It is our assessment that the Russians have gone beyond that provision in the treaty and have actually fielded an intermediate-range cruise missile that could be either nuclear or conventional capable. We do have some options inside the treaty to put pressure on the Russians not only diplomatically but also inside the military realm.

Senator COTTON. I am glad that you raised that because my legislation, the INF Treaty Preservation Act, would authorize money for just that and, in fact, with the House and the Senate passed versions of the NDAA, it would start a program of record. The Administration put out a statement of Administration policy last week that had some issue with that provision and another, but I suspect we will work it out in the end since we all want to see Russia come back into compliance with this treaty.

Putting aside its impact on our relationship with Russia, though, I want to bring your attention to Commander, U.S. Pacific Command Admiral Harry Harris' testimony. He stated a few months ago in this committee that over 90 percent of China's land-based missile forces fall between the range of 500 and 5,000 kilometers. Of course, China is not in violation of the treaty because China is not a signatory to the treaty. Only the United States and Russia are.

We do not have any matching offensive capability due to our treaty obligations. Do you interpret this as a possible offensive imbalance in the Asia-Pacific?

General SELVA. Senator, it would be easy to interpret that as an offensive imbalance but for that fact that we are not restricted from fielding ballistic missile or cruise missile systems that could be launched from ships or airplanes under the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. It is specific to land-based missiles. With respect to whether or not we use the INF Treaty as a reason to say targets inside of China might not be held at risk I think is a bridge too far. I believe we can assert that the deployment of missile sys-

tems on aircraft and ships would allow us to hold those targets at risk.

Senator COTTON. They do, although the obvious disadvantage of ships and aircraft is that they are relatively small compared to land, which is why China has 90 percent of their missile forces in that range from land. We are limited to what we can do based on our ships and our aircraft.

Do you think that we should consider extending offensive capabilities to allies in the Asia-Pacific who are also not bound by this treaty to help counterbalance China's offensive capabilities?

General SELVA. I think those are options we should look at as people who provide sound military advice to political leaders, but that would be a policy choice on whether or not to use that leverage against the Chinese.

Senator COTTON. Thank you.

One final question about this area. Both Chief of Staff of the Army, General Mark Milley, USA, and General H. R. McMaster, USA, Deputy Commanding General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, in his previous job have testified the Army is outranged and outgunned. When they say that, that the Army is outranged and outgunned, they are speaking about missile systems that have this prohibited range. Correct? The 500 to 5,500 kilometer range?

General SELVA. Senator, that is part of their argument but it is not all of their argument. Many of our multiple launch rocket systems are outranged by the Russians within the ranges that are stipulated—

Senator COTTON. Below the 500 kilometers.

General SELVA. Yes, sir.

Senator COTTON. So it is both below the 500 kilometer, which is a bad thing and we should address, but also that we cannot get beyond the 500 kilometer range.

General SELVA. Yes, sir.

Senator COTTON. Thank you very much, and thank you again for your service.

General SELVA. Thank you, sir.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Senator Cotton.

Senator King?

Senator KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to join everyone today who has mentioned our hopes and prayers for Senator McCain to get back so he can harass the witnesses, as he is accustomed to do.

General Selva, I know that you are interested in innovation, and that is an important part of acquisition and how we get where we are. I am concerned. We have had testimony before this committee that small companies in Silicon Valley, for example, will not even bid, will not even interact with the Pentagon because the process is so cumbersome and lengthy and burdensome. Now we are at a point where some significant majority of the Defense Department funds go to four or five major contractors.

How do we deal with the system itself, the structure, the infrastructure of acquisition so that we can open up to greater innovation coming very frequently from smaller companies?

General SELVA. Senator, for large programs, our small companies in Silicon Valley are likely not going to be the competitors we are looking for.

However, that said, two very innovative programs are actually underway as we speak. The first is a venture capital incubator at National Defense University that helps our acquisition professionals learn the ins and outs of the venture capital business. Venture capital is what runs Silicon Valley. It is the willingness to take risks on new programs, on new technologies, on rapid prototyping that might or might not deliver at relatively small amounts of money. That is the reason we established in part the Defense Innovation Unit Experimental in Silicon Valley not only to have a point of presence to interact with these new technology companies but to actually have a funding vehicle where we can essentially engage in rapid prototyping and venture capital-like activities with those companies.

Senator KING. Is that far enough along to determine whether it is working?

General SELVA. Sir, I think it is far enough along to determine that it is working. In fact, we have expanded the concept to technology centers in Boston and Austin, Texas as well because we are finding the kinds of companies that can bring us the innovative ideas that can then be scaled into major programs.

Senator KING. Let me talk about the Third Offset. The first two were focused largely on the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. Talk about the Third Offset as it would relate to the multiplicity and diversity of threats that we face today.

General SELVA. Thank you, Senator.

The threats we face today are largely based on mimicking our command and control philosophies but adding to them long-range precision strike munitions that can deny us access to the areas that we previously had free access to.

The projection of power is fundamental to our ability to fight wars. As we look at the Third Offset, the principal things we were examining and continue to examine are artificial intelligence and the ability to team humans with machines to speed our understanding of the complex battle space that is represented by these new adversaries and competitors and then react inside of that battle space faster than they can respond to our actions.

It also involves building around our bases and our forces a degree of resiliency through camouflage, concealment, deception, as well as distributed operations that prevent our opponents from being able to hold the whole force at risk using their ballistic and cruise missile systems. That is a snapshot of what the Third Offset would bring us.

Senator KING. I assume part of this is resiliency as a defense against cyber. One would assume that if a conflict was to begin, the first phase would be cyber to take out communications systems and those kind of things. Is that part of the thinking?

General SELVA. Yes, sir. In fact, implicit in the Third Offset thinking is the partnership between humans and machines, and in that space, machine-to-machine defense of cyber networks is actually an absolute requirement. It is not an implied task. It is an explicit task. If we cannot defend our networks at machine speed, we

are giving our opponents maneuvering space in that domain to defeat us in detail.

Senator KING. A final question. There really is not time for an answer, and perhaps you could take it for the record. I recently finished General McMaster's book about Vietnam, "Dereliction of Duty". It is very critical, as you know, both the political decision-making structure and the Joint Chiefs. I would like your thoughts not now but in writing on what the role of the Joint Chiefs are in a situation where the political leadership is either not listening or taking a position that you feel is contrary to the country's interests in terms of its military capabilities. General McMaster does a masterful job of outlining the problem, but I am interested in some thinking about what is the solution to the problem that he illuminates so brilliantly in that book.

General SELVA. In short, Senator, I would say our obligation is to provide blunt, honest, best military advice. In the absence of a rule that forces our policymakers to actually follow that advice, we continue to give it loud and long.

[The information referred to follows:]

General SELVA. Senator, I believe the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have an obligation to advise our elected leaders with truth, candor and discretion. Like McMaster, I believe we owe honest and expert military advice at every stage of policy making, including when our civilian leaders may disagree or signal they do not want to hear it. Goldwater-Nichols gave us a clearer and more focused voice than the Joint Chiefs had, during that time period, in McMaster's book. But it is still our obligation to use that voice with clarity and courage, while supporting our elected leaders' roles and responsibility in setting policy.

Senator KING. Thank you. Appreciate it.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Senator King.

Senator Warren?

Senator WARREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Like my colleagues, I want to say for the record how much we miss Senator McCain and wish him a speedy recovery.

I also note that Senator Reed and Senator King talked about DIUx. So I will not go back through this. But I do want to express my very strong support for the work you are doing there and how much more we can do with DIUx.

What I wanted to focus on, General Selva, I have heard you publicly describe the main global threats that we face as challenges: Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and violent extremism. I want to ask you about another global threat, and that is climate change.

A Defense Department report from 2 years ago observed—and I am going to quote it here—"Global climate change will have wide-ranging implications for U.S. national security interests over the foreseeable future because it will aggravate existing problems such as poverty, social tensions, environmental degradation, ineffectual leadership, and weak political institutions." In short, this DOD report described climate change as a threat multiplier.

General Selva, what impact do you believe that the change in climate will have on the military services? What do you believe the Department of Defense should be doing now to prepare for this impact?

General SELVA. Thank you, ma'am.

The dynamics that are happening in our climate will drive uncertainty and will drive conflict. I will just provide one example of how that can happen, and this is a manmade problem. The dams along the Nile River control the flow of water into what was the Fertile Crescent of Egypt. Any change to that water flow causes the Egyptians to become more hostile to their neighbors who are putting dams upstream of the Egyptian stretch of the Nile River. I could build that argument in a variety of countries around the world, and those are manmade problems not directly related to climate change but related to how we as humans change our environment.

If you extend that argument to the kinds of things that might happen if we see tidal rises, if we see increasing weather patterns of drought and flood and forest fires and other natural events that happen inside of our environment, then we are going to have to be prepared for what that means in terms of the potential for instability in regions of the country where those impacts happen, particularly today places where there is massive food instability.

The Sahel in Africa is a classic example where a small drought over a limited period of time can decimate the crops and cause instability and make that an area fertile for recruitment of extremists because they see no other way.

Similarly, you could look at the decimation of the fisheries off Somalia that contributed to piracy because the fishermen could not make their livelihood by doing what they do best, which is fishing on the fishing grounds off of Somalia.

I think we need to be prepared for those. It will cause us to have to address questions like humanitarian disaster relief. It will also cause us to have to focus on places where climate instability might cause actual political instability in regions of the world we had not previously had to pay attention to.

Senator WARREN. As climate change is an ongoing phenomenon, one that right now is worsening, the climate change is going to have a profound impact directly on our military and on our military infrastructure and on how the military is able to carry out its mission. I really hope, in addition to all the other global challenges that you have in front of you—and I know they are many and I know they are serious—we need you to lead today on this challenge, General. Tomorrow may be too late.

I want to follow up in just the little bit of time I have remaining on Senator King's question about the Third Offset. I know you have made this a priority all during your first term, and I assume you will do the same if you are there for a second term.

But what I am concerned about is that we do not appear to be moving very fast. Many of the technologies that we are talking about here are still in the development phase. Meanwhile, our near-peer competitors are continuing to improve their capabilities. It can take years, sometimes decades from the time we first sign a contract for a new technology to actually make it out into the field.

Let me just ask you if you can say something very briefly because we are really over time and you can take this for the record. What can we do about this to speed up our response time here?

General SELVA. I would make two quick points.

Senator WARREN. Okay, and let us make them quick.

General SELVA. First is rapid prototyping. We have to be willing to invest and fail in systems that might not work.

The second is we cannot be bashful about bringing new software into our architectures. We have worked very closely with some of the companies in Silicon Valley to do rapid prototyping, testing, and deployment of software that helps with things like automatic target recognition and change detection.

I think those are two things that we could do right now and be quite successful.

Senator WARREN. Good. I know you share my concern about being outpaced by technology and how much you make this a priority. You will have, I think, everyone's support here as you make that a priority. Thank you.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you.

Senator Rounds?

Senator ROUNDS. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

General Selva, first of all, let me begin by just thanking you for your service to our country.

Your previous work before you took your current position—you were the Commander of the U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM). I know that in your statement for the record, you stated that our military strategy is predicated on our ability to deploy and sustain forces. Based upon your previous position, you understand the need to be able to get to where the fight is at.

I understand that you appreciate the reliance that we have on commercial air carriers in order to do that within our current plans. As you already know, right now DOD has no means to extend the cyber protection to these critical commercial carriers. I have talked about this at a few hearings, including just last week.

My question for you is that if you were an adversary nation, how would you exploit this? How would that impede the ability of the United States to deploy forces? I realize that you may be limited in what you can say about this in an open session, but I think it would be really good for this committee and the American people to hear a few general comments on the issue because unless we continue to focus and gain public support for what I think we need to do with regard to cyber protection, it is going to be very difficult to where we have to be. We have to have the commercial air carriers available in times of an airlift. Could you comment about what that means and how our adversaries might exploit the current situation?

General SELVA. Senator, I am cautious other than echoing what you said about the potential vulnerabilities of commercial networks in an open session. But I will add the following.

It is not just our air carriers that make us successful at projecting force overseas. It is our air carriers, our over ocean merchant marine, as well as the rail and trucking industry in this country. All three together, land, sea, and air, are the capability that we bring to be able to deploy force around the world. All of those capabilities I just described are dependent on the quality and veracity of the data that they use to move our forces. So that data, those networks are just as important as the trucks, trains, ships, and planes that move our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines.

Senator ROUNDS. Thank you, sir.

I think solving this public-private cybersecurity vulnerability would give us insights and experience to really build the framework to use on the countless other cyber seams between organizations in and outside of government.

Can you give me an update at least in general terms on how the security gap is being addressed today? Clearly, it is not a case of where we are just planning for the future. We have things in place today. Can you give us some reassurances?

General SELVA. Again, this is based on my experience in my prior job. The TRANSCOM J-6 Director of Communications is given the authorities and responsibilities of protecting not only the TRANSCOM network but extending through contract vehicles to our civilian providers those data standards and network standards that allow them to subscribe to many of the protections that are afforded to the TRANSCOM network. That may be a model upon which we could build a continuing public-private partnership into critical infrastructure in other sectors of the economy.

Senator ROUNDS. Thank you, sir.

Just in the minute or so I have remaining, in your experience is 2 years enough time to maximize the Vice Chief's potential to provide optimal strategic guidance, as well as maintain continuity for your large portfolio?

General SELVA. No, sir, it is not, and that is why I am so encouraged to see the work that was done in the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act that actually makes the Chairman and the Vice Chairman positions 4-year tours with only one potential renomination for a 2-year extension. That 4-year term will allow the Chairman and the Vice Chairman to have the strategic impact that you expect of uniformed members in those positions.

Senator ROUNDS. Thank you, sir.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Senator Rounds.

Senator PETERS?

Senator PETERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Selva, it is great to have you here before us again. I certainly appreciate the opportunities to have some discussions with you both here, as well as in my office. I want to thank you for your focus on advanced technologies and the understanding of how we need to be at the forefront of that to continue to keep our competitive edge.

I just want to say, before I ask you a question, we have heard a lot about Silicon Valley and other places like Boston when it comes to advanced technology, but we have all of that in Michigan as well. In fact, when the U.S. Patent Office opened their first field office outside of Washington, DC, they did it in Detroit, Michigan because more patents are filed there than anywhere in the country. Given the fact that we have more engineers per capita than any other area, it leads to that. So I certainly hope as you are looking at innovative technology, you continue to focus on a wide geographic space and understand that we have incredible capabilities throughout our country.

I recently met with General Robert Dyess, USA, the acting Director of the Army's Capabilities Integration Center, as well as Dr. Thomas Russell from the Army's Acquisition, Logistics, and Tech-

nology, to discuss the Army's robotics and autonomous systems strategy. During that meeting, we discussed the challenges of fielding these capabilities within troop formations and the efficacy of employing autonomous and semi-autonomous systems in future conflicts.

I know the Army's strategy calls for the investment in specific technology areas over the next 5 years in autonomy, robotics, artificial intelligence, as well as common control.

I would just like to hear your assessment and analysis as to the status of each of the services and the Department in researching and utilizing particularly autonomy and robotics.

General SELVA. Thank you, Senator.

All of the services are actually quite engaged in a campaign to understand where advanced artificial intelligence and autonomy can be inserted into current concepts of operations and how they might be used in new and imaginative concepts of operations to help defeat adversaries across the spectrum of potential conflicts that we might find ourselves in.

I am very careful in public settings about the discussion of the very specifics of some of those autonomy initiatives, particularly as they relate to advanced air defense and the projection of force into denied areas because they will actually expose some of the vulnerabilities we believe our opponents have and they will actually expose some of the tools that we think we can bring to bear.

But if you allow me to use shorthand, it is very compelling when one looks at the capabilities that artificial intelligence can bring to the speed and accuracy of command and control and the capabilities that advanced robotics might bring to a complex battle space, particularly machine-to-machine interaction in space and cyberspace where speed is of the essence. I will stop there at the risk of exposing things that we are actually doing.

Senator PETERS. No. I fully understand, General.

The DOD Directive 3000.09 governs the Department's approach to autonomous weapons systems and is due to be renewed this year, as you know. This directive specifically assigns responsibilities for the development and use of autonomous and semi-autonomous functions and weapons systems, including both manned as well as unmanned platforms. In doing so, the Department has stated that it will not allow any robot or machine to take lethal action without a human operator in the decision-making loop. I know you are well aware of the moral and ethical issues associated with that.

However, our adversaries often do not consider the same moral and ethical issues that we consider each and every day. In fact, a recent article in "Defense One" highlights Russia's ambition to employ AI-directed weapons equipped with a neural network capable of identifying and engaging targets and even suggesting that Russian weapon makers see robotics and AI as a key for their future sales for adversaries of ours around the world.

Given that DOD directive is due to expire later this year, can you provide us some update on the process to update and renew the process and your thoughts regarding what seems to be Russian developments in AI targeting?

General SELVA. Yes, sir, I will.

First of all, there will be a raucous debate in the Department about whether or not we take humans out of the decision to take lethal action. I will tell you in this forum that I am an advocate for keeping that restriction. Because we take our values to war and because many of the things that we must do in war are governed by the laws of war, which say we must take proportional and discriminate action against an enemy to achieve our objectives, I do not think it is reasonable for us to put robots in charge of whether or not we take a human life. That does not mean that we do not have to address the development of those kinds of technologies and potentially find their vulnerabilities and exploit those vulnerabilities to our own defense. But publicly I think we should all be advocates for keeping the ethical rules of war in place, lest we unleash on humanity a set of robots that we do not know how to control. That is way off in the future, but it is something we need to deal with right now.

Senator PETERS. Thank you, General.

Senator INHOFE. Senator Fischer?

Senator FISCHER. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.

Good morning, General.

General, when do you expect the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) to be complete?

General SELVA. My expectation is it will take several more months to complete the Nuclear Posture Review, and the Ballistic Missile Defense Review will follow it because the second review is actually informed by many of the strategic choices that will be made in the Nuclear Posture Review.

Senator FISCHER. You testified earlier this year that the NPR would be examining response options to Russia's violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Is that correct?

General SELVA. Yes, ma'am.

Senator FISCHER. By that, do you mean that the NPR will describe potential response options, or will it contain a decision that we pursue a particular course of action?

General SELVA. The design of the NPR is to provide the President with options. We will provide him with a set of options that might be reasonable responses to the Russian activity with respect to the INF.

Senator FISCHER. With no decision on those, just options?

General SELVA. Yes, ma'am.

Senator FISCHER. I know that we have conferred with the Russians about their violation, and what has their response been?

General SELVA. They have been mute on how they intend to respond.

Senator FISCHER. Have you seen any indication that they intend to come back into compliance with this treaty?

General SELVA. No, ma'am.

Senator FISCHER. As you provide options to the President, will you be including the Russian response or non-response in those options that you give him?

General SELVA. Yes, ma'am. The Russian activities are a part of the strategic environment within which we will present options to the President.

Senator FISCHER. If they would, all of a sudden, step forward and begin a dialogue with us, would that change then the options that you present to the President?

General SELVA. It would likely change those options, but if the Russians step forward and said they were willing to return to compliance with the INF, we would have to have a method of actually verifying that compliance, which would require inspections of the weapons systems they have deployed.

Senator FISCHER. So you would anticipate the options still would contain that they have not responded.

General SELVA. Yes, ma'am.

Senator FISCHER. There has been some suggestion that Russia does not really get any kind of military advantage from the deployment of their ground launched cruise missile. Do you agree with that view?

General SELVA. Given the location of the specific missile and the deployment, they do not gain any advantage in Europe, and that is as close as I will get to agreeing with that view, ma'am.

Senator FISCHER. Beyond the direct military implications, do you believe there are broader strategic implications when it comes to confronting violations of an arms control agreement and that failing to respond could have a negative consequence on those broader implications when it comes to nonproliferation?

General SELVA. I think, ma'am, with respect to any given treaty on nonproliferation, the inability to enforce the standards to which parties have agreed, whether bilaterally or multilaterally, renders all other agreements less compelling.

Senator FISCHER. Can you tell us your opinion on where we go from here?

General SELVA. I think we should use all of the tools that exist within the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty to negotiate with and try to compel the Russians to return to compliance. I am not saying that they will. We should also take a look inside of the treaty, as we present options to the President, at those research and development programs that are available to us to actually increase pressure on the Russians.

Senator FISCHER. Thank you.

As you know, Russia maintains far more tactical nuclear weapons than the United States, and they are deploying more nuclear-capable sea, air, and now ground launched cruise missiles. Do you believe that the line between strategic nuclear weapons and tactical nuclear weapons is eroding, and what implications does this have for any future arms control talks?

General SELVA. I think as we discuss nuclear deterrence with the Russians and now the Chinese and likely in the future other countries, we need to make very clear that there is no firebreak between strategic nuclear weapons and, "non-strategic nuclear weapons", that the use of nuclear weapons in war crosses a threshold that will require a response.

Senator FISCHER. Is this advice that the present Administration has received?

General SELVA. It is the standing advice we have given every President that I know of in recent history.

Senator FISCHER. Do you believe that future agreements must include limitations on those tactical nuclear weapons?

General SELVA. I think it would be a useful diplomatic exercise and useful initiative to attempt to negotiate with all holders of tactical nuclear weapons, their reduction and potential elimination to avoid the potential for miscalculation in the future.

Senator FISCHER. Should it be more than just an exercise? Should it be part of the goals that we are trying to attain in any treaty?

General SELVA. Yes, ma'am. Let me be clear with my terms. I did not mean that as an exercise as an intellectual exercise. I meant it as an act of force of diplomacy to actually get that work done.

Senator FISCHER. Thank you very much, General.

Thank you, Senator Inhofe.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Senator Fischer.

Senator Heinrich?

Senator HEINRICH. Welcome back, General.

I want to follow up on the questions on the Third Offset that Senator King and Senator Warren raised, and specifically I want to talk a little bit about directed energy.

As the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, you have unique insight into the Joint Requirements Oversight Council which identifies capability gaps for the military and generates the requirements to fill those gaps. For the purposes of things like base protection, counter-rocket, counter-artillery, counter-mortar, counter-UAS [unmanned aerial systems], directed energy weapons systems have significant advantages but seem to be unable to enter the requirements setting process largely because alternative kinetic options already exist.

What do you think is preventing the transition of these technologies to the warfighter? Is it simply the pursuit of perfection over fielding something today or are directed energy weapons being held to a different standard?

General SELVA. Thank you for the question, Senator.

I do not believe they are being held to a different standard. The introduction of directed energy weapons into particularly defensive capabilities has proven a difficult task in order to produce the power and the concentration of energy on targets to destroy them, particularly artillery and ballistic missiles. We have had significant progress in the counter unmanned aircraft systems area in bringing directed energy weapons into either defeating the sensors or defeating the actual aircraft themselves.

I think the promise is there for directed energy. It is going to be a matter of the concentration of that energy to have lethal effect. Back to your original point, I do not believe we are holding the directed energy technology to a different standard, but we need to continue to investigate whether or not it does give us the advantages that the technology advocates promise specifically with respect to the necessity to kill an incoming kinetic vehicle.

Senator HEINRICH. You know, I have been following this for a long time. As you know, I started out my career at Air Force research labs, and I would just encourage you to take a close look at where these are today both in terms of high-energy lasers and high-powered microwaves. You know, once you see artillery shells

shot out of the sky, unmanned aerial vehicles, I think we are at a point today where this is ready for prime time as opposed to continuing to chase perfection. I think the solutions that it offers avoid many of the collateral damage issues that inherently plague kinetic munitions and missiles. I would just urge you to sort of stay at the cutting edge of what we can offer right now within this technology.

I want to shift a little bit to the issue of Russia. You and I have talked before about that. But to me and to many of my colleagues, I think the pattern of behavior from Russia is painfully obvious, that they will do what it takes to achieve their objectives with very little limitations. Whether it is interfering in United States elections, interfering with European elections, formulating an assassination plot like in Montenegro, Russia is treating the West right now like it is the wild, wild West with no norms, no laws, no consequences.

Should there be consequences for the kind of hostile actions that we have seen from Russia both directed at the United States and at our allies in Europe?

General SELVA. Senator, I believe there should be consequences. The Russians have adopted a philosophy of operating below what they believe what is the West's threshold to respond.

Senator HEINRICH. Exactly.

General SELVA. We need to understand what that strategy means and how to counter it and impose the kinds of consequences that are necessary to prevent them from being successful or to deter them from the activity in the first place. Part and parcel of that is understanding how they are doing what they are doing.

Senator HEINRICH. Absolutely.

Do you have thoughts on what those consequences should look like if we want Russia to change their current pattern of behavior?

General SELVA. I think this is going to require that we bring all of the tools of government to bear. The military tool is not going to be enough particularly given the kinds of circumstances where the Russians attempt to operate, as I mentioned earlier, below our threshold to respond.

Senator HEINRICH. A whole-of-government approach that includes things like sanctions, that includes things like the removal of properties that we have seen here in the United States. We should consider all of those things working in concert.

General SELVA. All of those, among others, yes, sir.

Senator HEINRICH. Thank you.

General SELVA. To your question on directed energy, I will commit to having a meeting with the JROC and bring in the technology experts who can bring us up to date to make sure we are not missing something.

Senator HEINRICH. I would deeply appreciate that. I think there is a handful of projects that are sort of on the shelf and ready to go right now, that there is a great deal of interest in moving forward directly to the warfighter.

General SELVA. Yes, sir.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Senator Heinrich.

Senator Sullivan?

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, congratulations on your renomination.

I want to talk about readiness here for a minute. From 2010 to 2016, the Department of Defense budget was cut by 24 percent, a quarter of the budget gone. Did you support that drastic cut?

General SELVA. Sir, I was not in the position I am in during that period of time. I was the executor of the cuts at the receiving end as both a fielded commander and a combatant commander.

My caution is those cuts hurt. They hurt not only our ability to respond with respect to purchasing new weapons systems and being ready for what we are facing today, but they also caused us to balance readiness and procurement. Because readiness is something you can defer to the future, we deferred a lot of training during that time period in order to make those numbers work.

Senator SULLIVAN. I agree with that, and I think that these drastic cuts are coming home to roost in terms of readiness. Do you believe that a lack of readiness can be deadly for our military members?

General SELVA. A lack of readiness in high-end combat can be deadly. It is important to understand that what we did during that time period was focus on the fight that was right ahead of us. We made sure our forces were ready to deploy to the places they were going, and we deferred most of the high-end training, the complex maneuver exercises, the joint exercises that make us ready to face peer competitors.

Senator SULLIVAN. Let me just go into more specifics. There was an article in the "Marine Corps Times" a year and a half ago. It talked about Marine Corps aviation and how the lack of readiness is not only harmful to our national interests but it is actually threatening the safety of our aviators. When they are not able to fly, the article said, more Marine aviation-related deaths are going up.

We had a horrible, horrible accident just 2 weeks ago with the C-130 refueler. The 16 brave souls were killed in that.

What are we doing about those kind of training accidents that in my view are undermining the ability of the force to operate and risking the lives of the men and women who volunteer to defend their country? It is outrageous.

General SELVA. First of all, Senator, I mourn the loss of the 16 marines last week as well. But it is way too premature to make any conclusions about the cause of that accident. In deference to the bravery of those 16 marines, I think we should reserve judgment on whether or not training was an issue in that accident.

It is common among aviators, of which I am one, that training does have value in increasing the safety and efficacy of our force. During those time periods where we compromise on training, we do assume risk. That is a consequence of having to balance within a budget that we are given to operate. I think we should be careful about making conclusions about last week's accident or using a single article to make conclusions about the viability of training for aviators inside the Marine Corps.

Senator SULLIVAN. In 2015, marine aviation-related deaths hit a 5-year high. Something needs to change. To me, it relates to training. Are our aviators in the Marine Corps and Air Force flying less hours right now?

General SELVA. Sir, I am not disputing that we need to focus on training and safety within all of our aviation services. Please do not get me wrong. With reference to the specific accident we are talking about—

Senator SULLIVAN. I am not talking about that. That is an example of what is happening too often, and I think it relates directly to a 25 percent decline in military spending. Nobody talks about this Congress approved that the previous Administration cut a quarter of the defense budget.

General SELVA. It is reasonable to draw the conclusion that reductions in training are potentially the cause of an increase in the risk we take to do the work we do.

Senator SULLIVAN. Let me ask just a follow-up on Chairman Inhofe's question about North Korea. The testimony in front of this committee has been consistently in an open setting it is no longer a matter of if but when Kim Jong-un is going to have an intercontinental ballistic nuclear missile that can threaten not just Alaska, my State, and Hawaii, Senator Hirono's State, but the entire Lower 48 continental United States.

Can you describe succinctly what our North Korea strategy is, what the goal is, and how we are trying to achieve it, and how we in the Congress can help you? Is the goal to prevent at all costs Kim Jong-un having that capability? Because, as you know, General, he is rapidly, rapidly getting it. What is the goal. What is the end state? How can we support it?

General SELVA. Senator, I think we have to have two parallel lines of effort. The first is to attempt diplomatically and militarily to prevent him from achieving his goal of having a nuclear weapon on an intercontinental ballistic missile.

Senator SULLIVAN. Would we preemptively launch military operations?

General SELVA. I think we have to entertain that potential option. That would be a policy choice by the President of the United States to execute or not execute that option.

Senator SULLIVAN. Which would need the authorization of Congress. Do you believe that?

General SELVA. We would. We need to think seriously about what the consequences of that action might be.

A parallel line of effort is to make sure that as he continues along a path to developing weapons that can strike the continental United States, that we have a parallel effort to provide for the defense of the United States with a suitable ballistic missile defense system that can handle the low volume at this point of missiles that he might be able to deploy that could strike us here across all of U.S. territory, Alaska, Hawaii, and the Lower 48.

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.

Senator HIRONO?

Senator HIRONO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, it is good to see you again. Thank you very much for your continuing service.

As we sit here discussing the threats posed by both Russia and North Korea, they are two very different countries that we try to

figure out what is it going to take for us to alter the behavior of both of these countries.

In the case of Russia, it appears as though maintaining sanctions and possibly imposing more sanctions has some kind of salutary effect. Would you agree with that?

General SELVA. Yes, ma'am. I think in concert with our NATO allies and other partners, that targeted sanctions on Russia do actually have effect and can affect their behavior.

Senator HIRONO. It is a lot harder to figure out what will incentivize North Korea to alter their push to become a nuclear power. We seem to be placing a lot of emphasis on our hope that China will play a pivotal role in reining in North Korea's ambitions. Do you think that we are placing too much emphasis on China? If so, you mentioned diplomatic solutions or diplomatic approaches. I do not know that we even have a confirmed ambassador to South Korea, for example.

What are your thoughts about what more we can do, i.e., to incentivize China to do more with regard to North Korea or for us to pursue some other avenues, long shots as they may be, because Kim Jong-un does not appear to respond to the usual approaches?

General SELVA. Thank you, ma'am.

I think the work that is being done to pressurize the situation with respect to North Korea in terms of economic sanctions and broad trade sanctions is helpful. It is also quite useful to get the Chinese to do whatever they can diplomatically and use whatever leverage they have.

A point that is not lost on me and I do not think on any of you is the fact that Kim Jong-un, who has possession of nuclear weapons that can threaten the United States, clearly has possession of weapons that could threaten his relationship with China and fundamentally change the power structure in the region. That makes a Kim Jong-un armed with nuclear weapons a threat to China as well. I think we should leverage as much of that as we can to try and get the Chinese not only to work on what they believe is maintaining the stability of North Korea, but to put pressure on him not to deploy nuclear weapons should he continue their development. I think that accrues to our benefit because it avoids open conflict with North Korea, although we need to continue to be prepared in the event that they are not successful.

Senator HIRONO. Do you think that our best bet with regard to North Korea is to come to a much better understanding with China? Because you say that economic sanctions has an impact on North Korea, although it is hard to see that as having much of a deterrent effect at all. We all recognize that, yes, a nuclear-armed North Korea is a threat to China, but it is very hard to tell when China will deem that there has been a tipping point reach with regard to North Korea where some kind of a much more concerted effort will come into play.

Do we have the kind of relationship with China right now that will enable us very quickly to identify what I would deem a tipping point and do something in a concerted way with the United States and China?

General SELVA. I can only give you an assessment as an observer of the activities of the State Department and our Secretary of

State. They are giving a tremendous amount of effort to building that relationship with China. The early indications were that China was willing to put pressure on North Korea, although we have not seen that pressure be successful.

Senator HIRONO. I am keeping my fingers crossed.

With regard to the Asia-Pacific region, there are some who argue that or observe that we do not have a current overarching strategy to address the challenges in this part of the region, which has some of the largest militaries and four of the five most significant threats to the United States are in the Asia-Pacific area. Do you agree that we do not have an overarching strategy to address the challenges in the Asia-Pacific arena?

General SELVA. I do not agree that we do not have a strategy. The question is whether the critics of that strategy believe it is fulsome enough to deal with the threats of a resurgent North Korea, an emerging China, and a resurgent Russia, three of the principal threats in the region, in addition to violent extremism.

Senator HIRONO. I am running out of time, General. If we do have a strategy, very succinctly what is that strategy with regard to the Asia-Pacific threats?

General SELVA. We manage some of our longest standing alliances in the Pacific with Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and others. We have relationships with Australia, New Zealand, and likeminded nations that are putting pressure on China not to destabilize the region. Those are not specifically aimed at North Korea, but they could be. We are a nation that exists on trade and economic relationships in the region and very strong diplomatic relationships and alliances across the Pacific. Those are the sum pieces of the strategy without actually trying to outline all of it.

Senator HIRONO. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Senator Hirono.

Senator WICKER?

Senator WICKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, General Selva. I appreciate you being here.

There is a lot of bipartisanship on this committee, and I think you know that based on the legislation that we are putting forward. The senior Senator from Hawaii serves as Ranking Member of the Seapower Subcommittee, a committee that I have the honor of chairing.

We recommended to the full committee and this committee has reported language which is contained in the SHIPS Act which sets as a policy of the United States of America that we move to a 355-ship fleet. The House of Representatives has also taken this issue up and has put that in their bill, and that bill is further along over there than here.

This 355-ship requirement, General—and I hope you will take this back to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This 355-ship requirement is not something the shipbuilding industry came up with, although I am sure they are delighted about it. It is not something that we invented as people in States that build ships, although we would like to see the idea of defending our Nation and military manufacturing. This is a requirement that came from the people out in the field looking at the seas and saying what do we need to make

America safe at this particular time. Basically they took the requirements, sent them in, and it was way more than 355. It was about twice that much. Then they said, resource-constrained, what should be the requirement? The considered opinion of the best minds in the military came up with the 355.

I just want to emphasize to you before I ask another question that we take that requirement seriously. We have been in a position this year, both in the House and Senate committees, to give you what you need, and we want to communicate to you that we take this seriously and we want to be your partner there and actually give substance to what has been stated as the requirement. So please know that.

Now, also in the area of bipartisanship, I want to applaud what Senator Heinrich said about Russia. I think I am quoting him correctly. Russia will do whatever they feel is necessary and they look at the threshold of what we in the West are sort of willing to tolerate and kind of stay under that threshold. That has been a pretty good strategy for President Putin. I am getting tired of it. I hope the American people and the Pentagon and this Committee are getting tired of it because it threatens international security.

Now, you answered a question to Senator Ernst about providing lethal weapons to Ukraine. As I understand it, in eastern Ukraine, the Government of Ukraine has troops there, and they are engaged in kinetic activity against Russian-backed forces. Is that correct, General Selva?

General SELVA. Yes, sir, that is correct, along the line of contact between the Donbas and the rest of the Ukraine.

Senator WICKER. Would it be helpful to those Ukrainian troops if they had better lethal weapons in which to defend their country and defend the Government of Ukraine?

General SELVA. Sir, that is a policy choice. The kinds of lethal defensive weapons that have been advocated for Ukraine would allow them to defend themselves along the line of contact against those forces supported by the Russians.

Senator WICKER. There is a discussion among the Joint Staff about this I understand from your earlier answer. You are working with the European Command to identify what types of weapons are necessary. So when can we expect a decision about that, and how can we be helpful in exhorting our government to provide the kind of weapons that I think Senator Ernst and I and others are advocating?

General SELVA. Sir, those discussions are ongoing. I think within the coming months you will have an answer to that question. But we have advocated, for example, for lethal means like anti-tank weapons, so not tanks and offensive capability, but defensive capability—

Senator WICKER. We have advocated. Who is the “we” there?

General SELVA. We being the European Command and the Joint Staff.

Senator WICKER. Now, months. It could be 11 months. It could be 2 months. Can you give us a little more specific idea of when we might actually be able to make a decision and do something that would help these people defend themselves and stand up to

the sort of activity that Senator Heinrich was talking about in his question?

General SELVA. Sir, if I can take that back and get you the actual timeline for the discussions. I do not have it with me, but I am happy to do that.

[The information follows:]

General SELVA. The decision is a subject for interagency discussion at the Principals Level. Additional work is being done now to refine option packages. I anticipate a decision on a specific option to be made soon, with the potential to begin execution as early as the fall of this year. Congress will be notified once the decision is made.

Senator WICKER. Okay. Thank you very much. Please be advised that this Senator for one thinks that it is time for us to give these people what they need to defend their own country. Thank you, sir.

Senator INHOFE. Senator Wicker, let me add that currently the Oklahoma 45th Guard is over there training them, and they are a little bit perplexed on what they are training them with. Excellent question.

Senator Blumenthal?

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to follow those questions asked by my colleague from Mississippi, and first to overwhelmingly endorse his view—and I have championed it on this committee—that this Nation should be providing the kind of lethal defensive weapons, including anti-tank armaments, that are necessary for the Ukrainians to defend their own nation. You would agree with me that they are defending their nation against Russian aggression. Correct?

General SELVA. Yes, sir. They are defending their sovereignty.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. You said I think a moment ago that the question of whether to provide that type of weaponry is a policy choice. But perhaps you can tell us in as graphic terms as possible what the difference it would make if we provide those kinds of weapons to the Ukrainians. They would be far more effective on the battlefield in defending their country. Correct?

General SELVA. Yes, sir. Let me make sure that I am clear on the discussion of the policy question. The policy question is not whether or not to provide lethal defensive assistance but the kinds and quantities of that lethal defensive assistance to the Ukrainians so that they can defend their sovereignty.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Maybe you can give us some examples of that choice.

General SELVA. How advanced would the anti-tank weapons be and in what quantities would they be delivered as an example of that conversation.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Why not give them the most advanced kind of anti-tank weapons or the most advanced kind that they need to counter—why give them second rate anti-tank weapons?

General SELVA. I do not want to be argumentative. Some of the weapons that we have have technology controls on them that we do not transfer them to other countries unless we can have assurances that the technology will not be exploited. Even in your question, you actually qualified by saying the lethal capabilities they need versus the best possible available. That is the policy choice we

have to make with respect to the types and amounts of aid that we provide.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. I would agree with you that we should not transfer technology that could be compromised or that could be captured by our Russian adversaries. They are our adversaries too. But I just want to join in the expression of impatience, very strong impatience with the delays that we seemed to have encountered.

I met just last Sunday with a group of Ukrainian Americans who, in effect, said to me, you know, you have been coming to us saying these weapons are going to be provided. Is there some kind of barrier or obstacle? I am at a loss to give them the kind of answer they deserve. I think we are at a loss to understand what the barriers or obstacles are. I am not directing this question or my impatience at you personally because I recognize there are other factors at issue here.

With respect to Russian interference in our elections, you have no reason to question the overwhelming unanimous views of the Intelligence Community that they interfered in our elections. Do you?

General SELVA. I have no reason to question their views, but I have no firsthand knowledge of the information that they are examining.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Would you agree with me that having some kind of cybersecurity pact with the Russians seems foolhardy at best?

General SELVA. Not having the details of the potential agreement, it is hard for me to say that they would be any more reasonable about a cyber pact than they are about INF or any of the other treaties without some ironclad method of verification and validation of their intentions. So it is worth a conversation. The question is without any detail, we are having a hypothetical discussion about whether or not they would comply.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Their record in the cyber domain is one of attacking this Nation. Would you agree?

General SELVA. Yes, sir.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. So sharing any information with them is just going to give them additional, in effect, keys to our cyber kingdom?

General SELVA. If that is the foundation of such an agreement, that would be true.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Well, any kind of information sharing would be involved in a pact or agreement, and it seems highly foolhardy and dangerous to our national security.

General SELVA. Again, without the context of the actual agreement, it is hard to know what information would or would not be shared.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you.

I want to end where I should have begun by thanking you for your service and congratulations on your reappointment and your new position. Thank you very much, sir.

Senator INHOFE. Senator Graham?

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you.

General, I want to echo that too. You have served well and I look forward to keeping you in the job.

I associate myself with Senator Wicker and Blumenthal and Inhofe about helping the Ukraine.

Do you agree that given the threats we face—and we have just been talking about a few of them—the Air Force needs to be bigger and more capable in the out-years?

General SELVA. Yes, sir. I believe that is the proposal that the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and the Secretary brought forward in the last budget.

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you.

Let us talk about three battlefields right quickly. Iraq. Do you support a residual force once ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant] is defeated in Iraq, if the Iraqis would agree, of United States Forces?

General SELVA. Yes, sir. If the Iraqis will agree, we will likely need to do continued advising and assisting and training of the Iraqi Security Forces.

Senator GRAHAM. Is that true for the Air Force particularly?

General SELVA. Yes, sir.

Senator GRAHAM. The Iranians are there in fairly large numbers I hear. Is that correct? Or having influence in fairly substantial ways.

General SELVA. As a consequence of a long relationship between Iraqi Shia and the Iranian Government, there are Iranians present in Iraq. That does not mean that they necessarily have to be a controlling influence in Iraq. Continuing to build our relationship with the Iraqi Government and the Iraqi Security Forces I believe is in our interests.

Senator GRAHAM. Offering Iraq something they would want from us, not from Iran, like helping train the Air Force would probably give us leverage in Iraq.

General SELVA. It quite possibly would, yes, sir.

Senator GRAHAM. Afghanistan. What is the state of the Afghan Air Force in terms of the capability to support their forces in the field?

General SELVA. They are beginning to be able to support their forces in the field with a modicum of lift and with light attack aircraft, which are very useful in the theater. Their helicopter force is subject to the maintenance woes of old Russian aircraft. We have a proposal in place to actually replace their aging Russian vintage helicopters with UH-60s. Those are the helicopters that the Afghan Air Force trains on here in the United States.

Senator GRAHAM. Until that happens, do you agree that it would be in our interest to provide some air power that is missing to the Afghan Security Forces as they fight international terrorists?

General SELVA. Yes, sir, particularly as a bridge to their capability to provide long-term support for their ground force.

Senator GRAHAM. Do you support additional troops going into Afghanistan?

General SELVA. I think that would be a determination of what specific tasks those forces would be doing, but as we look at Afghanistan today—

Senator GRAHAM. Counterterrorism would be—

General SELVA. Counterterrorism would be one of those missions. Supporting the Afghan National Security Forces with train, advise, and assist would be another one of those missions.

Senator GRAHAM. Have some air power at their disposal they do not have today?

General SELVA. Yes, sir.

Senator GRAHAM. Syria. The day we take Raqqa back, we better have a plan post-Raqqa. Right?

General SELVA. Yes, sir.

Senator GRAHAM. What role do you think the United States should play in terms of stabilizing Syria when Raqqa falls?

General SELVA. It is actually I think a bigger task than that, Senator. Raqqa is the current center of external planning for ISIS in Syria, but they have already begun a migration towards the middle Euphrates Valley. Until we have worked either by, with, and through partners on the ground or the Syrian Government shows a willingness to actually deny sanctuary to ISIS, they will continue to be a threat to stability in Iraq and in the region. We will not be done when we are done in Raqqa.

Senator GRAHAM. A very good point.

Air power is being deployed in Syria against ISIL today. Right? American air power?

General SELVA. American and coalition air power from 69 nations are being used in Iraq and Syria today, as well as a very small number of ground forces that are providing advice and assistance to those elements that are willing to fight ISIS in Syria.

Senator GRAHAM. Would you be open to adding more air power into Afghanistan? I was shocked to hear the number of F-16s we have was pretty small.

General SELVA. I would have to look at the numbers, to be honest with you, Senator. The capacity of those airplanes to range most of Afghanistan and to service the targets in Afghanistan with the help of tankers and bombers from the Gulf is actually a pretty compelling amount of air power in the region, as we speak.

Senator GRAHAM. When I left, I was shocked at the few that we had given the task that we face in Afghanistan.

So from the American military point of view, a lot of hard fighting yet to be done in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan?

General SELVA. Yes, sir.

Senator GRAHAM. Can you see a scenario where American air power is not absolutely essential to deciding the outcome of these battles?

General SELVA. No, sir.

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you very much, and to all those who serve in the Air Force, thank them.

General SELVA. Thank you, sir.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Senator Graham.

Senator Cruz?

Senator CRUZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will say at the outset that our thoughts and prayers are with Chairman McCain as he recovers from his surgery, and we look forward to his being back at the committee very soon.

General, thank you for your service.

I want to talk to you about several different topics, but I want to start with the Iran certification.

Yesterday, the Administration certified to Congress that Iran is in compliance with the nuclear deal. I have very significant concerns with that certification. I want to ask you in your judgment do you believe Iran is in compliance with the deal?

General SELVA. Based on the evidence that has been presented by the Intelligence Community, it appears that Iran is in compliance with the rules that were laid out in the JCPOA.

Senator CRUZ. Are they testing ballistic missiles?

General SELVA. They are testing ballistic missiles, but those were not covered under the agreement.

Senator CRUZ. How serious do you assess the threat of Iran developing nuclear weapons?

General SELVA. I think without the controls of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran has the technical expertise to be able to continue down the path to development of nuclear weapons.

Senator CRUZ. As you know, a similar deal was negotiated with North Korea in the Clinton administration, and it resulted in North Korea acquiring a substantial number of nuclear weapons. What do you believe makes this deal likely to result in any outcome different from what happened in North Korea?

General SELVA. I think there are two substantial differences at the outset. That does not mean that will not be setbacks in the agreement. The first is the inspection regime that went into the agreement that allows for international inspectors to inspect all of the areas that the Iranians used in their development and storage of enriched uranium and potentially the development of nuclear weapons. The second is—

Senator CRUZ. How much advance notice does Iran get before those notifications?

General SELVA. I do not have the details of how much advance notice they get, but we are reasonably confident that the inspectors are able to randomly inspect. They have installed technical measures that allow for constant surveillance of those same sites.

The second is the provisions that allow for sanctions outside of the agreement to continue to be in place on those areas of the Iranian economy, as well as leadership that engage in activities that are not governed by the treaty—or by the agreement. It is not a treaty.

Senator CRUZ. Last week we also discovered that Iran had sentenced an American citizen and a Princeton graduate student to 10 years in prison. Does it concern you that we are certifying they are in compliance with the deal in the wake of their imprisoning yet another American?

General SELVA. It concerns me whenever an American citizen is imprisoned overseas, particularly in a regime that is not transparent with their judiciary system. But again, the specifics of the agreement are directed explicitly at the development of and storage of nuclear weapons.

Senator CRUZ. We will continue this conversation, but I will say that I think the Iran deal is wholly inadequate. The inspection regime is designed to facilitate cheating. It requires effectively 3

weeks advance notice, and for the most sensitive sites, the Iranians self-inspect. The American people received numerous assurances that North Korea would abide by an agreement very, very similar to this, and North Korea, Kim Jong-il, happily took the billions of dollars the Clinton administration sent to them and used it to develop nuclear weapons. I believe the Ayatollah Khamenei intends to do the exact same thing.

I think the certification yesterday was unfortunate and is dangerous. There is another certification that is due in October I believe, and there is also an upcoming deadline for waiving sanctions. Let me say I would urge the Administration there is no greater threat on the face of the earth to the United States than the threat of a nuclear Iran. I think the certification yesterday was very hard to justify with the facts on the ground.

Let me shift to another topic. There is right now a disagreement going on between the Department of Defense and the House Armed Services Committee concerning whether a separate military branch should be created for space. I would be interested in your thoughts on that question.

General SELVA. Thank you, Senator.

I do not believe now is the right time to have a discussion about developing a space force with all of the leadership and infrastructure that would go with it. It would also complicate the command and control of the space constellation which is critical to our military operations. So I believe the time is not right for a conversation about a separate space corps or space force.

Senator CRUZ. How do we do a better job defending ourselves in space, given the vulnerabilities and our dependence on satellite technology for virtually every aspect of our military?

General SELVA. Senator, I think there are three things that we need to do. Actually two are in progress. One is in work.

The first was the consolidation of our national military defense of space in a single command and control center in Colorado Springs that allowed us to operate the entire constellation as opposed to satellites in the aegis. The National Defense Space Center I believe it is called is functioning at Schriever Air Force Base in Colorado as we speak.

The second is to vest the Commander of Air Force Space Command with the components and responsibilities to manage the entire constellation vice trying to manage it through subcomponents of his own headquarters. U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), under General John Hyten's leadership, has implemented that change in the command and control arrangements just in the last few months. It is time to let that play out and see if we can get some efficiencies out of it.

The third is to continue to vest in the Secretary of the Air Force the acquisition authority for satellite constellations that are critical to military defense.

Senator CRUZ. Thank you, General.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Senator Cruz.

Senator Nelson?

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

At the outset, I want to say on behalf of so many of us that have not had a chance to register our wishes that Chairman McCain have a speedy recovery and return as quickly as possible.

You know, you have had, General, an extraordinary career, very distinguished. I suspect that there is not a problem in the world with you continuing that service, and I thank you for your willingness to be able to do it.

Because of that experience, do you want to comment on the fact that Russia has a history of meddling in other people's elections going way back, as far back as what we saw and what they did in Georgia, what obviously we have seen that they have done in Ukraine and using cyber? I am asking this for your perspective because I think Putin understands he cannot beat us on land. He cannot beat us in the air. He cannot beat us on the sea or under the sea, and he cannot beat us in space. But he thinks he can beat us in cyber. He has had a number of successes going back to Georgia, Ukraine, now in the European elections, several European countries.

Do you want to comment about how serious this cyber attack problem from Russia is, including our own country and the attacks that we have seen here?

General SELVA. Thank you, Senator.

I indicated earlier that I do not have any firsthand knowledge of the Russian activity that is alleged in our elections from the Intelligence Community. However, as a person who has spent a lot of time thinking about the security of the data that represents our electoral system, I think we ought to think very carefully about how we protect that data and how we use that data to facilitate the democratic process in our United States.

An example that I have used publicly and, if you will forgive me, I will use now is it is much easier to tamper with registration data than it is to tamper with voting data. If I wanted to complicate an American election or I wanted to complicate an election anywhere in the world, I would simply make it more difficult for people to vote as opposed to trying to get in after the fact and change the record of their votes. As we look at our system, which is distributed across 50 States and every precinct and municipality in those 50 States, we need to be really careful that we do not make the assertion that that inherently distributed system is protected because of its diversity and distribution.

I think we as a Nation ought to think carefully about the value of the data on all of us, our voting records in terms of how we register and where we register, and how protecting that matters for future elections. That way no one, not Russia, not China, not anybody else who wants to intervene in an election will have the capacity to change our willingness and ability vote and our willingness and ability to vote our conscience for those democratically elected leaders of our country.

Senator NELSON. For example, it could be something as simple as going into the registration records and deleting registrations. So a person shows up and they say, Mr. Jones, I am sorry you are not registered. Show up on election day or something as easy as going in and changing addresses so that it fouls up the registration system of what precinct that you are in. It could be something as sim-

ple as this, and it would hugely complicate, especially in a place like Florida that has had tremendous complications with its voting, which has produced long lines that are sometimes as long as 7 hours. That is recent history, by the way. You can imagine with people trying to contest the fact that they show up on election day and they say they are not registered and they know they are and they are trying to prove that they are and how that would foul up all of the other voters standing in line. It is an extraordinary and scary thought.

Since I am the last one here seeking recognition, I just want to ask you another question. What is your experience? Would you share with the committee your experience where your own privacy has been invaded on your personal accounts? Is that something that you feel comfortable in sharing? I think it would be very helpful for the committee to either know that publicly or privately.

General SELVA. Yes, sir. I would share this small amount of information publicly.

Immediately following the OPM [Office of Personnel Management] breach, where significant amounts of personal identifying information were made available through a loss of data, about 48 hours later I was locked out of one of my bank and investment accounts as a consequence of a third party attempting to enter that account using information that was likely garnered from that personally identifying information that was the consequence of the OPM breach. I subsequently received a letter from OPM that notified me that my personal data was, in fact, part of the breach. That is an example.

I can guarantee you for that hour and a half to 2 hours it took for me to work with my bank and brokerage company to make sure my data and my investments were secure that my attention was not entirely devoted to the task at hand, which was being the Commander of the United States Transportation Command.

Senator NELSON. Are you aware that that has happened to other high-ranking United States military officers?

General SELVA. Yes, sir.

Senator NELSON. I think that states it, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Senator Nelson.

Senator REED, did you want to add anything?

Senator REED. No.

Senator INHOFE. Let me say, General Selva, you have been an excellent witness. We appreciate very much your straightforward answers, and we thank you for your service.

We stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:22 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to General Paul J. Selva by Chairman McCain prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. On previous occasions you have answered this Committee's policy questions on the reforms brought about by the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the last time being in connection with your prior nomination to be Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. You indicated that you did not see a need for modifications to Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions.

Has your view of the importance, implementation, and practice of these reforms changed since you testified before the Committee at your last confirmation hearing?

Answer. I have not changed my views on the importance, implementation, and practice of reforms since I last appeared before this committee.

Question. In light of your experience as Vice Chairman, do you see any need for modifications to Goldwater-Nichols? If so, what modifications do you believe would be appropriate?

Answer. The most recent modifications to Goldwater-Nichols have helped the Joint Force by increasing flexibility in force development and acquisition. I look forward to working with the department and this committee on policy reforms that continue to improve our Joint Force's warfighting ability.

DUTIES

Question. Based on your experience during your tenure as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, what recommendations, if any, do you have for changes in the duties and functions set forth in sections 152 through 155 of title 10, United States Code, and in regulations of the Department of Defense, that pertain to the Chairman and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the organization and operation of the Joint Staff in general?

Answer. Implementation is ongoing for the foundational reforms you directed in fiscal year 2017. It is too early to assess whether future reforms are warranted. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary, Joint Chiefs, and Combatant Commanders to identify additional reforms as part of a continuing dialogue with the committee.

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

Question. What do you consider to be the most significant challenges you expect to face if you are confirmed again?

Answer. The current security environment is extraordinarily dynamic and complex. We face simultaneous challenges from Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and violent extremist organizations. We are directly confronting ISIS in Iraq and Syria and are in the midst of a critical transition in Afghanistan. While dealing with these pressing challenges, we must also modernize the military. Over the last decade, sustained operational commitments, budgetary instability, and advances by our adversaries have threatened our ability to project power and eroded our competitive advantage in key warfighting areas.

Question. If confirmed again, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to advocate for a framework for deterrence that addresses the threats we face today. I will work closely with the Services and combatant commanders to ensure we meet operational requirements, retain strategic flexibility, and ensure our competitive advantage now and in the future. Given the challenges we confront, it remains critical that we enhance our integration with other elements of the Interagency in partnership with Congress.

Question. Recognizing that challenges, anticipated and unforeseen, will drive your priorities to a substantial degree, if confirmed again, what other priorities, beyond those associated with the major challenges you identified above, would you set for your second term as Vice Chairman?

Answer. If confirmed, my priorities will remain focused on developing and advancing the capabilities, posture, operating concepts, and human capital necessary to assure our allies and partners, deter adversaries, compete on a day-to-day basis, and respond across the spectrum of conflict. This includes continuing efforts to modernize our aging nuclear enterprise, advancing innovation across the Department,

developing the right mix of capabilities with sufficient capacity, rebuilding readiness, balancing risk, and optimizing our ability to respond to crises.

ADVICE OF THE SERVICE CHIEFS, COMBATANT COMMANDERS, AND CHIEF OF THE NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU

Question. Section 163 of title 10, United States Code, provides that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff serves as the spokesman for the Combatant Commanders, especially on the operational requirements of their commands. Section 151 of title 10 provides for the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to submit their advice or opinion, in disagreement with or in addition to the advice or opinion of the Chairman, and requires the Chairman to provide that advice at the same time that he presents his own advice to the President, National Security Council, or Secretary of Defense.

Based upon your experience and observations in your first term as Vice Chairman, what changes to section 151 or 163, if any, do you believe may be necessary to ensure that the views of the individual Service Chiefs, Combatant Commanders, and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau are presented and considered?

Answer. Reflecting on my recent experience, I do not believe changes to Sections 151 or 163 of Title 10 (as they relate to the provision of military advice) are necessary at this time. If confirmed, I will remain alert to opportunities or shortcomings that might indicate changes to the legislation are warranted.

UNITED STATES MILITARY FORCE SUFFICIENCY

Question. America will likely never have the resources to assign all the forces each combatant commander believes they need, which leads the Department of Defense to apportion forces in operations planning. As U.S. military forces are already severely challenged in terms of capacity, there are consequences when it comes time to allocate them for a given contingency.

If we remain a global power, does our niche remain our global power projection capabilities?

Answer. Promptly and decisively projecting military power to meet multiple challenges is the sine qua non of a 21st Century global power.

Question. Do you believe the United States must retain the capability to strike any global target (hold any target at risk), both in the nuclear and conventional sense, and use it if our strategic vital interests are threatened?

Answer. Yes, I believe the United States must maintain a set of capabilities to hold any target at risk.

Question. In your opinion, does power projection include our ability to deploy and sustain forces anywhere on the planet, across the full range of military operations? Do you believe this is a unique characteristic of the American way of war?

Answer. Yes. Our military strategy is unique in the world and is predicated on our unparalleled ability to project power and act decisively across the full range of military operations.

Question. Do you believe we must also have a sufficient strategic and operational reserve, national mobilization capability, and robust defense industrial base to provide a second echelon of follow-on forces if a contingency arises in a particular region, especially against a near peer, great power state?

Answer. Yes. Faced with multiple simultaneous global contingencies, the Joint Force will deploy and sustain trained and ready active and reserve component forces. The industrial base must be capable of surging spare parts, end items, and critical munitions to support wartime demands. Innovation during conflict is equally important; the industrial base must be capable of developing and deploying new systems in the midst of a fight.

Question. In light of current and future threats to the United States' strategic vital interests, what do you believe should be the U.S. military's posture and capacity to address these threats?

Answer. America today faces strategic challenges broadly in scope, threat, and geography. As such, our posture must provide flexible response options while also allowing us to quickly mass at the right time and place. Power projection is critical because it allows us to avoid excessively deployed combat power while maintaining enough forward-deployed forces to assure our allies while deterring our enemies.

Our ability to deter and assure depends on our production and maintenance of a Joint Force right-sized for defense strategy across capacity, capability and readiness. The Joint Force must continue investing in capacity to ensure that the right forces with the right capabilities are available when required.

UNITED STATES MILITARY CAPABILITY DOMINANCE

Question. The Committee has received sobering briefings on the status of the United States' military technological lead over potential adversaries that have "gone to school" on the way our military has conducted warfare over the past quarter century, and are rapidly closing the gap in various capability areas where we previously enjoyed a large overmatch.

In your view, what are the top operational challenges our warfighting commanders are facing currently, and will face in the future?

Answer. Our adversaries have studied the American way of war and pursued capabilities to specifically counter our historic advantages, straining Joint Force capabilities at both the high and low technology ends of the warfighting spectrum, as well as challenging our warfighting commanders to operate below the threshold of traditional armed conflict. Specific operational challenges arise from our decreasing technological overmatch and playing an away game against potential adversaries. This frequently gives potential adversaries advantages in decision speed and capacities that they can bring to bear. The Joint Force's ability to fight into these environments and sustain efforts in them is threatened due in part to massed salvos of ballistic/cruise missiles coupled with non-kinetic attacks against our integrated air and missile defense networks. Subsequently, commanders are forced into early repositioning of theater war reserves and moving logistic operations further from desired operational locations exacerbating potential vulnerabilities to our fighting force.

Question. What is your assessment of the capability and capacity of our current and planned military forces to achieve success with respect to these operational challenges?

Answer. Today's Joint Force is the most capable, professional military force in the world, and can successfully defend the homeland, prosecute the fight against violent extremist organizations, and defeat any adversary in the world. However, we assess the trend of the Joint Force's ability to fulfill our requirements is increasingly challenging, particularly in our ability to compete below the level of armed conflict and respond to multiple, overlapping contingencies. In specific areas we have limited capacity to compete against adversaries. However, increasing capacity alone will not regain ground lost due to our decreasing technological overmatch.

Question. Do you believe our military is shaped properly to achieve success with respect to these challenges with respect to the optimal size and mix of long-range versus short-range, stand-off versus stand-in, and manned versus unmanned capabilities?

Answer. While our military is shaped properly to achieve success with respect to these challenges, our adversaries Anti-Access and Area-Denial investments have eroded U.S. overmatch in global power projection and long-range, stand-off, manned capabilities, while aging infrastructure limits our ability to sustain a protracted conflict.

BUDGET CONTROL ACT

Question. How would our Armed Forces be affected if Congress fails to repeal the budget caps in the 2011 Budget Control Act?

Answer. BCA funding levels are insufficient to meet our worldwide commitments. The tradeoffs required to balance capability, capacity, and readiness are no longer sustainable. Without relief, our competitive advantage will continue to erode.

Question. How would our Armed Forces be affected if Congress does not conform to the budget caps of the 2011 Budget Control Act and sequestration is triggered?

Answer. BCA funding levels are insufficient to meet our worldwide commitments. Sequestration further damages the Armed Forces due to the arbitrary nature of implementation. Across the board cuts remove the Department's ability to balance capability, capacity, and readiness.

Question. How would our Armed Forces be affected if Congress passes a continuing resolution, instead of a fiscal year 2018 appropriation bill?

Answer. A year-long continuing resolution would pose a greater risk to the Armed Forces than the BCA spending cap in 2018, significantly challenging our ability to maintain our competitive advantage and accomplish our national military strategy in acceptable timelines at acceptable cost. Fiscal year 17 base funding, which we would receive under a continuing resolution, effectively matches BCA levels (\$522B in FY18). Unlike the BCA, a CR would misallocate resources and prohibit new starts, damaging both the immediate and long term readiness of the Joint Force. Repeated continuing resolutions have hampered long-term investment and often resulted in increased costs. Nine of the last ten fiscal years began under a continuing resolution, forcing the Department to delay critical new starts for acquisition pro-

grams, installation and infrastructure modernization, and to cancel major training events. Continuing resolutions also come with significant opportunity costs generated by their inherent lack of flexibility and predictability. Finally, a continuing resolution will challenge our ability to resource Congress' intended force structure growth.

MIDDLE EAST / STRATEGY TO DEFEAT THE ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND SYRIA (ISIS)

Question. President Trump ordered a 30-day review of the strategy to combat ISIS at the end of January. He signed a formal executive memorandum declaring, "It is the policy of the United States that ISIS be defeated," to "convey to the world and to our allies the strength of our resolve," according to a senior administration official. The battlefield in Syria, however, has become increasingly complicated as United States-backed forces liberate ISIS-held territory and come into contact with pro-regime forces.

How do you define the "defeat" of ISIS?

Answer. The "defeat" of ISIS has three primary components: the threat posed is localized and not exportable; it is degraded into smaller disaggregated organizations that can be addressed by law enforcement and partner nation security forces; and the group can no longer hold territory or achieve safe haven.

Question. In what ways does the United States strategy to defeat ISIS take into account the Syrian regime, Iranian-backed forces, and Russia?

Answer. Our focus in Syria is to defeat ISIS. As ISIS loses territory, the shrinking battlespace means our operations to defeat ISIS occur in close proximity to pro-regime forces. To ensure the safety of United States and coalition personnel, we are making efforts to de-conflict with Russian military forces, who can influence Regime-aligned forces. We are also working to prevent Iranian-backed forces from gaining a permanent foothold and achieving their strategic goals.

Question. Apart from the counter-ISIS campaign, what are United States objectives in Syria with respect to the civil war and regional security?

Answer. United States objectives in Syria beyond the defeat of ISIS include de-escalation of the ongoing civil war, addressing the humanitarian crisis created by the conflict, helping our partners in the region strengthen their borders, and supporting a political process that allows the Syrian people to select new leadership.

Question. Do you believe the military should have a role in increasing pressure on the Assad regime with the goal of bringing about a political solution in Syria? If so, what are the benefits and risks of such an approach?

Answer. The focus of our military campaign in Syria is the defeat of ISIS, working with and in support of our local partner forces. We support the current de-escalation agreement in southwest Syria and ongoing United States diplomatic efforts to further U.S. interests.

Question. How does the military contribute to a strategy in Syria?

Answer. The military component of the current strategy in Syria is focused on defeating ISIS and ending the humanitarian crisis. Currently, the military is destroying ISIS physical presence and developing partner forces.

IRAQ

Question. The Iraqi Security Forces, with significant enabling support by United States and coalition forces, have made great progress over the past year in liberating territory controlled by ISIS. However, significant questions about the presence and role of United States troops remain.

What do you envision the roles and missions of United States forces in Iraq will need to be in the short, medium, and long term in order to prevent the resurgence of ISIS and emergence of other destabilizing groups?

Answer. I believe the roles and missions of United States forces in the short- and medium-term will remain the same: training, advising, and assisting the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to defeat ISIS forces, regain territory, secure and hold territory, and develop as a legitimate security provider to the Iraqi people. Over the long-term, we will continue to train, advise, and assist the Government of Iraq to ensure its sovereignty.

Question. What is the appropriate size and composition of an enduring United States presence in Iraq given these roles and missions?

Answer. We will continue our by, with, and through strategy by working with Iraqi political leaders to develop a force level that will be sufficient to accomplish the necessary missions while respecting Iraqi sovereignty and the legitimacy of the Government of Iraq.

Question. How does United States strategy seek to mitigate Iranian malign influence in Iraq?

Answer. The best counterbalance to Iranian malign influence in Iraq is a strong United States—Government of Iraq relationship and an Iraqi Government that is stable and functioning. Our strategy in Iraq cultivates this security partnership while developing Iraqi Security Force capabilities and empowering the Government of Iraq. The United States is encouraging neighboring countries like Jordan and those of the Gulf Cooperation Council, who have shared interests with the United States, to reduce Iran's ability to negatively affect outcomes in Iraq.

AFGHANISTAN

Question. At a February 2017 Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on Afghanistan, General Nicholson stated, “we’re in a stalemate.” He also said that what will break the stalemate in Afghanistan are the further development of key offensive Afghan capabilities such as special forces and the Afghan Air Force to allow them to overmatch the Taliban or any other group on the battlefield. He also said, “... I have adequate resourcing in my counter-terrorism mission. In my Train, Advise, and Assist mission, however, we have a shortfall of a few thousand [troops].” Although none of the district centers are held by the enemy, it is reported that at the end of 2016, the Taliban held about 15 percent more territory than it did in 2015.

Do you agree with General Nicholson that the security situation is in a stalemate in Afghanistan after more than 15 years of fighting?

Answer. Yes.

Question. When do you expect we will have a strategy that supports the Afghan efforts to break the stalemate?

Answer. We are developing a strategy and are in discussions within the inter-agency in order to provide recommendations to the President.

Question. What are the key elements of this strategy?

Answer. The strategy is conditions based. We will remain partnered with the Afghans to ensure terrorists in that region that wish to attack the United States do not have the capability to do so. The strategy will also feature close coordination of military, diplomatic, economic, and informational actions.

Question. Will you commit to briefing the strategy to the Committee?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree with General Nicholson’s assessment that there is a need for more troops?

Answer. Along with interagency partners, we are working on a strategy for Afghanistan and the South Asia region, which will be presented to the President and will include recommendations on force levels.

Question. Much has been made of the potential increase in United States troops. At the same time, however, numerous diplomatic positions, to include the Ambassadorships in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, remain unfilled.

In your view, what are the ramifications to our mission in Afghanistan of allowing State Department and United States Agency for International Development efforts to be under-manned and under-resourced?

Answer. Under-resourcing the State Department and USAID in Afghanistan undermines our strategy as they will drive long term success.

Question. Is this a conflict that can be resolved militarily?

Answer. There must ultimately be a political solution; the best means to bring a resolution of the conflict is an Afghan-led peace process.

Question. Do high profile terrorist attacks in Kabul by the Taliban and similar attacks by ISIS elsewhere in the country, represent a terrorist organization losing and trying to present a picture of relevance, or does it signal an organization increasing in strength?

Answer. While the threat persists, the total number of high-profile attacks in Kabul decreased by 20 percent compared to the same time period last year, and by 11 percent in the rest of the country. The Taliban and ISIS-Khorasan continue to perpetrate high-profile attacks to generate media attention, create the perception of insecurity, and undercut the legitimacy of the Afghan Government.

Question. In your view, what should be the role of the United States in any reconciliation negotiations with the Afghan Taliban and other insurgent groups?

Answer. The United States’ role is to help facilitate the peace process, but in the end, it must be an Afghan-led process.

Question. What additional steps, if any, should the United States take to advance the reconciliation process?

Answer. The United States continues to support an Afghan-led political process to determine the future of their country, and continues to support the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) through train, advise, and assist mis-

sions in order to enable stability and set conditions for a political solution to end the conflict.

Question. In your view, what should be the role of Afghanistan's neighbors, in particular Pakistan, in facilitating stability in Afghanistan and throughout the region?

Answer. It is critical that Pakistan and other neighboring countries support the legitimate Afghan Government, the United States and NATO missions, and take positive steps to fight terrorism and achieve stability in the region.

IRAN

Question. In your view, what is the nature of the threat posed by Iran?

Answer. Iran seeks to achieve regional power and influence in the Middle East through a variety of means. To advance its strategic interests, it is pursuing more advanced missile systems and a more capable naval presence that could be used to threaten the Arabian Gulf region and Strait of Hormuz in the event of conflict. It is also developing proxy forces, supporting Shi'a movements, and promoting other pro-regime elements throughout the region.

Question. What is the role of our Armed Forces in countering Iran's proxy networks specifically, and Iran's malign influence more broadly, throughout the Middle East?

Answer. The armed forces' primary role is to support United States diplomatic efforts to apply pressure against Iran and its proxy networks' destabilizing activities, and, through security assistance, help build our partners' resiliency against Iran's malign influence. Throughout the Middle East, the United States Armed Forces continue to maintain the plans, posture, and preparations to assure our partners and respond to Iran and its proxies' activities that directly threaten United States interests.

Question. In your view, is Iran complying with its obligations under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)?

Answer. I do not have any indications that Iran is currently failing to meet its commitments under the JCPOA. The IC is well-positioned to detect malign activity related to Iran's nuclear program that may violate this nuclear agreement.

Question. Since the signing of the JCPOA, do you believe there has been any change in Iran's malign activities?

Answer. No, Iran continues its malign activities regionally.

YEMEN

Question. The war in Yemen is a complex conflict involving different Yemeni factions backed by the Gulf States and Iran, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and other actors.

What are United States interests in Yemen and what role do United States forces play in safeguarding those interests?

Answer. The United States national interests in Yemen are to protect the United States Homeland, United States persons, and our allies from terrorist attacks, to ensure freedom of navigation, and to disrupt Iranian malign activity. Our military forces complement broader United States Government efforts to support our Gulf partners and the international community in their drive to deny safe havens for terrorists and restore security in Yemen.

Question. Do you believe a political resolution to the situation in Yemen is necessary and, if so, what needs to occur for such a resolution to be achieved?

Answer. Yes, a political solution in Yemen is required and we are working with our regional partners to reduce ungoverned spaces and deny safe haven to terrorists. For example, we continue to work with our partners in the region to maintain pressure on Al-Aq'eda in the Arabian Peninsula and the Islamic State in Yemen, to contain threats to freedom of navigation in the Bab Al-Mandab, and to help partners pursue long-term political resolution in the region.

Question. What is the nature of United States support to the Saudi-led coalition and what is being done to help the coalition minimize civilian casualties and suffering as a result of the conflict?

Answer. The United States provides support to the Saudi-led coalition through sales of military hardware and institutional advice and assistance, as well as limited direct support to operations through aerial refueling, intelligence sharing, and operational advising to promote compliance with the law of armed conflict. These actions enable more effective Saudi operations with an aim to minimize civilian casualties and suffering.

RUSSIA AND EUROPE

Question. At his nomination hearing, General Dunford was asked what he considered the greatest threat to our national security. General Dunford said, “My assessment today, Senator, is that Russia presents the greatest threat to our national security.”

Do you still agree with General Dunford’s assessment that Russia is the “greatest threat to our national security”?

Answer. Yes, I agree that today Russia poses the greatest threat to our national security.

Question. If so, why in your view is Russia the greatest threat compared to China, North Korea, Iran, and ISIS?

Answer. While North Korea, Iran, and ISIS clearly have malign intentions and pose regional as well as global threats, none of these pose an existential threat to the Nation. Russia and China are in a different category; they are capable of engaging the United States across the full spectrum of nuclear and conventional conflict. They continue to relentlessly invest in a full-range of modern capabilities. What makes Russia a more immediate threat at this time is its nuclear capability, demonstrated aggressive behavior, and willingness to employ its military forces.

Question. How do we deter Russian aggression and defend NATO?

Answer. The United States is committed to article 5, which is the bedrock principle of NATO. That United States commitment is backed by the readiness of the U.S. Joint Force. U.S. Forces are postured forward to provide an immediate response, either separately or collectively with the other NATO Allies, to any acts of aggression against any NATO member. The United States maintains a safe, reliable, and effective nuclear capability to deter Russian nuclear attack.

RUSSIA DETERRENCE CONCEPT

Question. During General Dunford’s nomination hearing, he said, “we need an effective deterrent model for the 21st Century to deal with the kind of threats that we are now seeing in Russia because, quite frankly, I think that kind of asymmetric threat is one we will continue to see in the future and certainly we are going to continue to see that in the European context.”

Do you agree with General Dunford’s assessment on the need to “update our deterrence and response model to deal with the kind of threat that we have today, which has been described as a hybrid threat from Russia”?

Answer. Yes.

Question. What has been done to update our deterrence and response model to deal with the Russian hybrid warfare threat?

Answer. We are enhancing our capacity to compete below the level of armed conflict, to include in the diplomatic, information, and economic realms, in order to impose costs for disruptive Russian behavior while denying them the benefits of malign activities. We are continuing to enhance our military capabilities for protecting U.S. interests, are encouraging our Allies to do the same, and are strengthening our capacity to reinforce those Allies in the event of conflict.

Question. What more in your view needs to be done in this regard?

Answer. We continue to refine our strategy to countering Russian malign influence operations and we resource these efforts appropriately. Responding to hybrid warfare is an inherently whole-of-government proposition. In conjunction with the interagency, we are continuing to build partner capacity while ensuring our allies are resourced and focused on the Russian hybrid threat.

RUSSIA’S VIOLATION OF THE INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR FORCE (INF) TREATY

Question. Russia’s deployment of a nuclear ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) in violation of the 1987 INF Treaty: 1) poses a risk to our NATO allies and United States forces in Europe; and 2) is part of a wider deployment by Russia of sea, air, and ground-launched nuclear capable missiles. You told the House Armed Services Committee on March 8, 2017, that “we believe that the Russians have deployed a land-based cruise missile that violates the spirit and intent of the [INF] Treaty ... the system itself presents a risk to most of our facilities in Europe ... I don’t have enough information on their intent to conclude other than that they do not intend to return to compliance ...”

How should the United States address the military implications of this new nuclear ground-launched cruise missile?

Answer. The Intermediate Range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty is only in our national security interest if all parties comply with their Treaty obligations. We must continue to engage Russia, both directly and together with our allies, to pressure

Russia to return to full and verifiable compliance. However, we must be prepared if Russia fails to return to compliance.

Question. Should we initiate a program to determine the need for strike systems comparable to the GLCM?

Answer. The Administration is in the final stages of reviewing the United States response to Russia's INF violation, including potential military measures to increase pressure on Russia to return to full and verifiable compliance with its Treaty obligations. At this point, it is premature to identify any particular systems we may develop.

Question. Should we increase NATO's defenses against these new ground-based cruise missiles, as well as Russia's air and sea-launched cruise missiles? If so, please specifically describe systems being considered.

Answer. Russian investments and demonstrated cruise missile capability in the Syrian conflict highlight the need for the United States and NATO to increase defenses against the cruise missile threat. The Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) will examine all threats—North Korea, Iran, China, and Russia. The policy statements in the BMDR will recommend the proper balance between Homeland and regional missile defense, and specifically speak to our policy regarding Russia's threat systems in Europe.

UNITED STATES FORCE POSTURE IN EUROPE

Question. General Breedlove told the Committee in 2015 that, "our current force posture in Europe has been based on Russia as a strategic partner . . ." In 2016, General Scaparrotti's written testimony stated, "the ground force permanently assigned to EUCOM is inadequate to meet the combatant command's directed mission to deter Russia from further aggression."

What changes have we made and should we make to our current military posture in Europe to adjust to the current threat reality?

Answer. The United States leads an enhanced forward presence mission in Poland, which is one of four NATO multinational Battle Groups in the Baltic States and Poland. In addition, outside the NATO framework, the United States Army provides a rotational presence of an Armored Brigade Combat Team in Eastern Europe. We're also placing additional Army Prepositioned Stock (APS) in Europe. The United States will maintain its commitment to a persistent rotational presence of air, land, and sea forces in Europe.

Question. Will you revisit the European Infrastructure Consolidation (EIC) initiative that was developed prior to the resurgence of Russian adventurism to determine whether its implementation remains consistent with our efforts with the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) to bolster military capabilities and reassure our allies?

Answer. We continue to evaluate the strategic situation and, in close coordination with our allies and partners, adapt our posture and capabilities to secure U.S. interests.

RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES OUTSIDE EUROPE

Question. What is your assessment of Putin's objectives and operations in Libya? How do Putin's actions in Libya compare to Russia's intervention in Syria?

Answer. Russia's activities in Libya are generally aimed at gaining influence, and it is pursuing various strategies to bolster its regional influence in the Middle East. In direct contrast to Russia's actions in Syria, it is using regional engagement rather than direct military intervention to strengthen its position.

Question. From your interactions with Russian General Gerasimov, how sincere do you believe the Russians are about cooperating against ISIS in Syria and how does that square with their actions to date?

Answer. I would caution against us trying to determine Russian sincerity or motives in Syria. We operate consistent with our national security objectives, and Russia has its own calculus. Our experience has been that we have mutual objectives in ensuring the safety of our respective forces operating in close proximity. These operational deconfliction requirements remain a critical interest that we will continue to pursue through established channels.

UKRAINE LETHAL ASSISTANCE

Question. Do you believe we should provide lethal assistance to Ukraine?

Answer. I support the provision of lethal defensive security assistance to Ukraine, and the Department of

Defense is actively engaged with the interagency on this issue. Despite readiness improvements enabled through United States training, Ukraine still has significant capability shortfalls as it faces a technologically superior adversary.

NATO

Question. Ahead of the NATO Defense Ministers meeting in February, NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg said, “After many years with steep cuts in defense spending, we have turned a corner,” announcing that defense spending in real terms increased by 3.8 percent or about \$10 billion in 2016 among our NATO Allies, but qualifying it with, “This makes a difference but it is absolutely vital that we keep up the momentum.”

From your perspective, what are the other dimensions of burden sharing, besides the 2 percent of GDP defense spending, that are important to keep in mind when discussing defense contributions of our allies and partners?

Answer. NATO Allies and partners have served shoulder-to-shoulder with the United States, and over the past 20 years they have contributed significantly to both NATO and non-NATO operations in and outside of Europe. These include combat operations where partners fought alongside United States forces in Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and other locations. Their contributions across the spectrum—military, economic, and humanitarian—have been essential to our successes. Further, our allies and partners are a critical component of our ability to project power globally.

Question. If Turkey purchases a Russian or Chinese air and missile defense system, how would that affect its ability to be integrated into NATO’s air and missile defense architecture?

Answer. If Turkey purchased a Russian or Chinese air and missile defense system, there would be significant integration issues because the systems likely are built on different infrastructure platforms. This would also place significant restraints on interoperability and system integration due to the counter-intelligence risk.

ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

Question. The Defense Department’s January 2012 strategic guidance, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century,” states “while the United States military will continue to contribute to security globally, we will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region.” Likewise, the 2010 report of the Quadrennial Defense Review states that the United States needs to “sustain and strengthen our Asia-Pacific alliances and partnerships to advance mutual security interests and ensure sustainable peace and security in the region,” and that, to accomplish this, the Department “will augment and adapt our forward presence” in the Asia-Pacific region.

Would you recommend the current Administration continue the rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region? If so, what does the term “rebalance” mean to you in terms of force structure, posture, basing, capabilities, and funding?

Answer. The Joint Force will continue to sustain and strengthen our approach toward Asia-Pacific in a way that complements all other aspects of United States engagement (including diplomatic, information, and economic) and supports key multilateral institutions in the region. The Department has made and will continue to make adjustments to the regional posture of the military component including the locations and type of forces in regions as the operational needs pertain to the five key challenges. The Department must continue to enhance U.S. Force posture and capabilities in the Pacific while preserving the ability to protect U.S. National interest globally.

Question. How do you assess the strength and health of our military alliances in the region? Are they on solid footing or do we have reason to be concerned?

Answer. The five formal treaty alliances in Asia (Japan, Republic of Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand) are all on solid footing. Short-term stressors develop, but are managed within the alliance constructs.

Question. There are increasing calls from members of Congress for an Asia-Pacific Stability Initiative, similar to the European Deterrence Initiative. Would you recommend such an Asia-Pacific Stability Initiative?

Answer. The Joint Staff supports efforts to improve and reinforce U.S. military capabilities across the region and strengthen our alliances.

Question. If so, what would be the objectives and priorities and how would you recommend the Department use the funding, if appropriated?

Answer. If appropriated, the Joint Force will use funding in accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act to invest in operationally relevant infrastruc-

ture, increase air and sea assets available in theater, improve resiliency, expand and diversify munitions, and enhance capabilities to improve and reinforce U.S. military capabilities across the region.

NORTH KOREA

Question. The deployment of the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile system to South Korea is a highly visible and concrete action to counter the North Korean missile threat.

If deterrence fails with North Korea, can we respond decisively and win?

Answer. Yes, in partnership with our South Korean ally, we can respond decisively to defeat North Korea. We continually re-evaluate required follow-on force flow, risk to operations in other theaters, and the significant loss of life, both military and civilian, that will likely result in the event of a military campaign on the Korean Peninsula.

What other steps would you recommend we prepare to take to deter Kim Jong-Un and ensure the safety and security of South Korea and United States forces stationed in the region?

Answer. We continue to support our Japanese and South Korean counterparts in strengthening their respective defense capabilities against the North Korean nuclear and missile threat. We have also made significant progress in promoting trilateral cooperation with Japan and South Korea.

CHINA

Question. What military actions do you recommend to deter war with China, maintain free passage through the global commons, and assure our Pacific allies and friends?

Answer. Deterring war is an exercise in influencing China's decision calculus, making diplomacy preferable to conflict and managing crises in such a manner that they do not unintentionally escalate. To do this, the Joint Force will engage with the Chinese military within congressionally mandated limits, build alliance capacity through close cooperation, and uphold international law through appropriate operations.

Question. From your perspective, what effect is China's expanding economy and growing military having on the region at-large and how does that growth influence the United States security posture in the Asia-Pacific region?

Answer. The Chinese have shown their willingness to exploit their economic leverage as a way to advance their regional political objectives. As China's military modernization continues, the United States and its allies and partners will continue to be challenged to balance China's influence.

Question. What can the United States do, both unilaterally and in coordination with allies and partners, to militarily counter the increasing challenge posed by China in the East and South China Seas?

Answer. Long-term, sustained presence is critical to demonstrating that the United States is committed to the region. The United States will continue to develop a security network through multilateral partnerships. Unilaterally, we will continue to develop capabilities to counter China's improving military capabilities.

Question. China's defense budget seems to be increasing at an alarming rate year after year. However, China's plans and strategies do not seem aimed at military domination outside of its immediate neighborhood.

How do you explain this discrepancy and why China is engaged in such a massive military build-up?

Answer. China's leaders remain focused on developing the capabilities to increase its regional influence and to counter any third-party intervention—including by the United States—during a crisis or conflict. China is also seeking resources and economic opportunities outside of the region to support continued domestic economic growth and prosperity. China's growing military is being designed and postured to be able to protect its interests both in the Asia-Pacific region and abroad. China's military modernization emphasizes development of capabilities with the potential to degrade core United States military-technological advantages.

FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION OPERATIONS

Question. While we have continued conducting freedom of navigation operations, the Committee has heard from several high-ranking officials from within the Pentagon and combatant commands that they are constrained from carrying out critical tier three freedom of navigation operations because of the lack of a timely decision-making and approval process in Washington. While the Committee understands the need to have broad interagency agreement on such operations to ensure they are

effective and not counterproductive, extended delays for approval of these requests seems excessive.

Can increased authority be delegated to Combatant Commanders to carry out freedom of navigation operations? If not, what can be done to streamline the process to prevent unnecessary delay in considering such requests?

Answer. The existing authorities for freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) are sufficient to enable the Joint Force to effectively achieve its objectives globally and regionally.

INDIA

Question. Congress and this Committee strongly support an enhanced defense relationship between the United States and India. Over the coming years, India could be one of our strongest and most dependable military partners in the region. Bolstering and strengthening the relationship, and encouraging enhanced engagement by India in the Asia-Pacific region should be a top priority of the Defense Department.

What is your view of the current state of the United States-India military cooperation relationship?

Answer. The United States-India military relationship is strong and getting stronger. Our two countries cooperate through complex exercises as well as robust engagement through defense trade and technology cooperation.

Question. What are your recommendations for bolstering the overall defense relationship between our two countries?

Answer. The United States and India should continue to expand cooperation in areas of mutual interest like maritime security in the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean Region that increase our ability to work together to maintain stability. We should also continue to strengthen our defense relationship with India by pursuing opportunities to co-develop and co-produce defense technology that is in the interests of both countries under the United States-India Defense Technology and Trade Initiative.

PAKISTAN

Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend for our military-to-military relations with Pakistan?

Answer. We need to continue mil-to-mil cooperation with Pakistan in order to improve Pakistan's capacity to combat terrorist organizations, while working with Pakistan on ways to enhance security along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and help bring stability in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

INCREASED ROLE OF GROUND FORCES IN THE PACIFIC

Question. Admiral Harris, the Commander of U.S. Pacific Command, and Deputy Secretary Work, have repeatedly articulated a need for the Army to develop myriad capabilities to "project power" beyond the ground domain into the air and maritime domains to anchor defenses in the Pacific, and provide mutually supporting relationships among ground, naval, and air forces in the theater. The ability of ground forces to hold at risk adversary ships and aircraft; intercept missiles aimed at our ships, and at airfields, ports and other fixed facilities; and to provide electronic warfare and communications support for our air and naval forces could enable the United States to present adversaries with our own "anti-access/area denial" challenge.

Do you believe United States defense policy would be better served if the Army were to develop the capabilities and operational concepts for such a role, both for the European and the Pacific theaters?

Answer. Yes. We are exploring operational concepts for ground forces outside of traditional roles to expand our anti-access/area denial globally. More broadly, we are examining the role of every Service in addressing multi-domain threats.

Question. Do you believe our current ground forces posture in the Asia-Pacific region is adequate? If not, what actions would you recommend to improve it?

Answer. Our ground forces in the Asia-Pacific are postured appropriately to meet today's challenges, yet we continuously assess the evolving threat environment and our respective force posture.

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Question. What roles do United States forces play in addressing transregional threats in the Western Hemisphere, including the threats posed by transnational criminal networks and terrorist groups?

Answer. The Joint Force protects the United States from any nation state attack against our Homeland. DOD provides aerial, maritime, and cyber detection and monitoring of illicit trafficking into the United States, which facilitates interdiction by law enforcement entities. Upon request, the Joint Force is poised and ready to support U.S. law enforcement and federal agencies responsible for addressing threats to our Homeland by criminal networks and terrorist groups.

Working with our allies and partners, the United States disrupts external attack operations and denies terrorist groups from exploiting criminal and other threat networks. U.S. forces provide equipment, training, infrastructure and intelligence to build the capacity, capability, and professionalism of partner nation security forces to assist in countering shared transnational threats.

READINESS OF THE ARMED FORCES

Question. How would you assess the current state of readiness?

Answer. Today, each service faces significant readiness challenges from manpower shortfalls to delays in infrastructure investment and ground systems required to build, train, and launch combat ready forces. While we maintain a competitive advantage over any potential adversary in the world, that advantage is eroding and the Joint Force is challenged to meet operational requirements while sustaining investment in capabilities.

Question. How would you plan to restore full spectrum readiness and under what timeline? Additionally, how would you enforce those timelines to ensure that goals are met?

Answer. Predictable and sufficient funding is key to restore full spectrum readiness. The FY17 appropriation addresses the Department's most pressing near-term readiness requirements and places us in a better position to begin restoring readiness to the joint force in FY18. The FY18 budget supports ongoing operations and continues the rebuilding of warfighting readiness by increasing funding for critical training, depot maintenance, and munitions with the purpose of restoring capacity and lethality. In FY19, we will begin to realize full spectrum readiness recovery in capability, capacity, and infrastructure.

COUNTERING CYBER-ENABLED INFORMATION OPERATIONS

Question. Russia has conducted ambitious and aggressive cyber-enabled information operations against the United States and our European allies aimed at influencing election outcomes, and undermining democracy and collective security. Since the attack on America's 2016 election, the U.S. election systems and networks have been designated as critical infrastructure. General Rogers, Commander of U.S. Cyber Command, has testified to this Committee that he has not been tasked to counter such operations.

Do you believe that U.S. Cyber Command should be prepared to take action against foreign actors attempting to influence the 2018 U.S. election cycle through cyberspace?

Answer. DOD must be prepared to defend the U.S. Homeland and its interests against cyberattacks of significant consequence as outlined in the 2015 Cyber Strategy. Any U.S. response should involve a whole-of-government approach employing all the tools at our disposal.

Question. The Defense Science Board Task Force on Cyber Deterrence testified to the Committee that the best way to deter cyber-attacks and foreign information warfare operations is to demonstrably "hold at risk" those things that the elites in adversary nations value most highly. The Task Force specifically recommends that each Combatant Commander be tasked with developing a strategy for accomplishing this that is tailored to specific potential adversaries.

Do you agree with these conclusions and recommendations?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you think that the Department of Defense needs to better integrate its capabilities and planning for cyber operations and information warfare?

Answer. Yes. The Department must continue to improve its ability to exploit cyberspace as a pathway for Information Operations to affect adversary perceptions, decisions, and actions in support of strategic ends. We must also enhance our ability to support allies and partner efforts to defend against and defeat adversary propaganda, misinformation, and disinformation delivered in cyberspace.

Question. If so, how would you recommend that this goal be achieved?

Answer. Effective information and cyber operations require integration across all warfighting domains to ensure efforts are working collectively to achieve effects. As our fluency continues to mature, we are refining new operational and organizational

constructs and advanced tools to outpace competitors. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress to continue to advance our capability.

OFFICER MANAGEMENT ISSUES

Question. As the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, you wield significant influence over joint officer management policies. Despite numerous changes in the law, the requirements and the process for attaining joint officer qualifications are still beset by systemic challenges. Some of these challenges require the Services to make officer assignments to “check the box” for joint qualifications at the cost of assignments to other career enhancing and professional development opportunities. Also, officers assigned to a designated joint billet on an operational staff receive joint credit while other officers performing substantially the same duties supporting the same joint commander do not receive joint credit unless they submit a package to have their assignments qualify for joint service.

If confirmed again, what steps will you take to review the joint qualification requirements to ensure that the qualification process is matched to the increasingly joint service environment in which many officers serve throughout their careers?

Answer. I appreciate the committee's recent work in improving the joint qualification process. As we implement the recent statutory changes, I firmly believe that the joint officer qualification process provides a tested and flexible means to ensure officers develop the skills necessary for successful service at the operational and strategic levels. If reconfirmed, I will work with the relevant Joint and Service components and the Congress to ensure that the joint qualification process continues to hone joint officer qualification requirements through programs like Joint Force Development.

Question. How would you assess the Department of Defense's progress in providing the military services the force management tools necessary to meet the needs of the 21st Century joint, all-volunteer force?

Answer. The Department, the Joint Staff, and the Services have positively worked together over the past 10 years to develop a set of flexible force management tools needed to shape the joint force to meet the challenges of the 21st Century. If reconfirmed, I will continue to examine the strategic environment to ensure that the tools remain relevant.

Question. Do you believe the current Department and service procedures and practices for reviewing the records of officers pending nomination by the President are sufficient to ensure the Secretaries of the military departments, the Secretary of Defense, and the President can make informed decisions?

Answer. Yes, it is my understanding that the Services evaluate officer qualifications, past performance, future potential, and any available adverse or reportable information, and have a rigorous process in place to ensure all decisions are fully informed.

Question. In your view, are these procedures and practices fair and reasonable for the officers involved?

Answer. Yes.

Question. What modifications, if any, to the requirements for joint officer qualifications are necessary to ensure that military officers are able to attain meaningful joint and service-specific leadership experience and professional development?

Answer. I believe that the current combination of Joint Professional Military Education and requisite experience gained through joint assignments, training, and exercises prepares officers to operate effectively at both the strategic and operational levels. I do not currently recommend any modifications to the requirements for joint officer qualification.

Question. In your view, what is the impact of joint qualification requirements on the ability of the Services to select the best qualified officers for promotion and to enable officer assignments that will satisfy service-specific officer professional development requirements?

Answer. In the conflicts of both today and tomorrow, it is critical that officers are prepared to operate effectively as senior leaders in both Service and joint environments. Although satisfying joint qualification requirements may affect the time available for officers to develop Service-specific skill sets, doing so produces a cadre of well-rounded and competitive leaders who are capable of integrating Service functions with other Services in support of national directives in both strategic and operational environments. In my opinion, officers with these capabilities possess the greatest potential for success in positions of senior leadership across the force and therefore are the most qualified for promotion.

HEADQUARTERS STREAMLINING

Question. Congress has previously directed reforms to consolidate the headquarters functions of the Department of Defense and the military departments.

How would you describe your progress in identifying and implementing streamlining and reductions in the Joint Staff?

Answer. The Joint Staff took the lead for both the Joint Staff and the Combatant Commander in applying Major DOD Headquarters Activities (MHA) reductions. Our re-baselining actions were conducted in accordance with the OSD MHA framework and will achieve compliance by FY20.

Question. What Joint Staff areas, specifically and if any, do you consider to be the priorities for further consolidation or reductions?

Answer. The Joint Staff is currently reorganizing, with the intent of meeting current legislative guidance on MHA reductions and authorized personnel, while simultaneously supporting the Chairman's responsibility for global integration. While I do not believe there are any additional areas for further consolidation or reduction within the Joint Staff at this time, we are constantly reviewing our structure and process to find efficiencies and improve integration.

Question. What are the negative impacts, if any, of headquarters streamlining on Department missions and capabilities?

Answer. We are still assessing what negative impacts headquarters reduction may have created. DCMO is leading a DOD-wide reform initiative review which should conclude later this year.

DEFENSE ACQUISITION REFORM

Question. Over the past two years, Congress has implemented a number of acquisition reform measures designed to reduce the costs and development timelines of major systems to improve the process of moving programs from Department research efforts into operational capabilities, and to streamline access to innovative commercial technologies and systems. The Department has been slow to implement most of these reforms.

What are your views regarding acquisition reform and the need for improvements in the Defense acquisition process?

Answer. I am fully supportive of the reforms put in place by Congress in the 2016 & 2017 NDAA's, and would only caution that further reform should be considered only after we successfully implement and then benchmark these most recent changes, to ensure DOD acquisition outcomes are actually improving in response to these reforms.

Question. If confirmed again, what actions would you take from your position to accelerate the implementation of these reforms?

Answer. Once the Department completes the assessment of the impact of the 2016 and 2017 reforms, whatever actions are taken to accelerate reform should be based upon the following key principals: 1) The responsibility and authority for acquisition system outcomes should be clearly identified within the DOD; 2) The requirements' sponsor should be an integral part of delivering needed capability and remains accountable throughout the acquisition process, and; 3) There is a continued effort to reduce overhead and increase efficiencies across defense acquisition.

Question. If confirmed again, what actions would you propose, if any, to ensure that requirements are realistic, technically achievable, and prioritized?

Answer. I believe that recent legislation better aligns responsibility for performance requirements with Service and Joint priorities. If reconfirmed, I will work to ensure the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System achieves the goals of the legislation and remains a solid foundation for validating realistic, technically achievable, and prioritized requirements.

Question. What should be the role of the Combatant Commanders, Service Chiefs, and Joint Staff in the acquisition process?

Answer. Service Chiefs, Combatant Commanders and the Joint Staff play a vital role in achieving success throughout the acquisition process by proactively engaging with Service and Defense Acquisition Executives during the acquisition life-cycle.

Question. Are there specific new roles or responsibilities that should be assigned to the Service Chiefs or Combatant Commanders in the acquisition process?

Answer. While I do not believe there are new roles or responsibilities that should be assigned to the Service Chiefs or Combatant Commands, I am supportive of changes that promote Service accountability in acquisitions and further streamline the bureaucratic processes.

Question. In what ways do you believe the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System needs to be reformed in order to better respond to rapid changes by our competitors and the pace of technological change more generally?

Answer. I agree with the changes addressed in the 2017 NDAA. We are currently in the process of drafting a new requirements policy and associated Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System Instruction and Manual to reflect Congressional reforms and improve the process. These will ensure the system is more responsive to the speed of technology in order to keep pace with our competitors. The JCIDS process is also being adapted to accommodate rapidly changing threat environments, allowing for more robust intelligence and requirements integration and to introduce Joint Performance Requirements. These enhancements will allow the Services the authority and autonomy to quickly develop capabilities and deliver those to the warfighter.

Question. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 made a number of changes in the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and the role of the Vice Chairman, including elevating the role of the Vice Chairman to be the principal adviser to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on joint military capabilities and joint performance requirements.

To what extent have these changes been implemented?

Answer. The Joint Staff is updating the JROC and JCIDS guidance documents to implement the congressionally-directed modifications to the requirements process. The Services are currently implementing their requirements pilot programs which accommodate all aspects of the Acquisition Agility Act—promoting interoperability of technology with emphasis on Modular Open Systems Architecture.

Question. What is your assessment of the positive and negative impact of these changes?

Answer. As implementation is in its early stages, it is too early to assess the impact. If re-confirmed, I look forward to sharing my assessment of future impacts with the committee.

Question. Do you recommend making additional changes to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and Defense Acquisition Board in terms of composition and staffing, authority, scope of responsibility, and associated processes?

Answer. I do not recommend making any additional changes to the requirements or acquisition processes until already mandated changes are further implemented and the Department has time to evaluate the results of those changes.

Question. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 made a number of changes in acquisition policy, allowing the Department to take greater advantage of rapid prototyping opportunities.

To what extent have these changes been implemented?

Answer. The Services and the Department have moved deliberately in both practice and policy to take advantage of greater rapid prototyping authorities granted in the 2017 NDAA. Current initiatives along with future opportunities are being considered for rapid prototyping applicability and I expect the number of rapid prototyping actions to increase over time.

Question. What is the appropriate role that prototyping should play in helping to establish better requirements, more rapidly, for the acquisition process? Are there additional reforms you believe are required to capitalize on the opportunities associated with prototyping for improved requirements definition?

Answer. Prototyping is a key part of the requirements/acquisition process and should continue to be leveraged to ensure that requirements are realistic and technically achievable. This is especially important early in the lifecycle of capability development. There were significant legislative changes made to the acquisitions process in FY17, including prototyping. If reconfirmed, I look forward to assessing the impact of those changes and providing feedback to the committee on opportunities.

Question. What steps will you take to ensure that systems are not prematurely deployed before they have had their technical risk removed and before they have been tested and found to be operationally effective and suitable for operational use?

Answer. Capabilities, whether or not developed as a result of rapid prototyping, will continue to meet the practices and standards in existence today that assure they are suitable, effective, and reliable.

RESEARCH, TECHNOLOGY, INNOVATION, AND TESTING CAPABILITIES

Question. The Department of Defense has a number of organizations and thousands of technical personnel working on internal and contracted research programs to develop next generation warfighting capabilities. These include the \$13 billion science and technology programs, the \$1 billion Small Business Innovation Research program, and the network of over 50 Department labs and test ranges that develop and test all systems before they are deployed. It also includes newer efforts at prototyping in the Strategic Capabilities Office and outreach to commercial companies through DARPA and the Defense Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUx).

Are you satisfied with the quality of the facilities and workforce at the Department's labs and test ranges?

Answer. Yes, but new, emerging capabilities will require adaptation and expansion of facility capabilities.

Question. What steps will you take to improve the effectiveness of the Department's technology development and testing community to support near term and future operational needs?

Answer. I will continue to work with our Combatant Commanders to ensure that Department level S&T is prioritized to meet both near- and far-term operational needs. I am also highly supportive of efforts within the operational test community to streamline and leverage development testing in order to expedite system fielding.

SPACE

Question. The House Armed Services Committee-version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 contains a provision directing the establishment of a separate Space Corps within the Department of the Air Force.

What are your views on the establishment of such a corps?

Answer. Establishing a space corps at this time will not effectively address concerns with the management and organization of the national security space enterprise. This proposal currently is without adequate study of the root causes of the identified problems, and assumes that a space corps will resolve space challenges without acknowledging the ongoing effort between the Air Force and USSTRATCOM to optimize management and integration to compete more effectively in a contested space environment. Establishing a space corps at this time could disrupt these current lines of effort and exacerbate existing issues rather than improving our effectiveness in space operations.

Question. Do you support making the Air Force Space Command a subordinate Unified Command of the U.S. Strategic Command with joint staffing?

Answer. I support USSTRATCOM's recent decision to elevate his component commander for space operations from a three-star to a four-star general officer who will be dual-hatted as the commander of Air Force Space Command. It will require time to evaluate the impact of this increased level of oversight, affecting both the provision of joint space forces and the conduct of joint space operations. Further, DOD is currently conducting an NDAA-directed review more broadly of the overall space enterprise, which will provide greater insights on this particular matter. I support allowing time to implement this reorganization and to evaluate its efficacy.

Question. If you oppose such a move, what actions would you recommend to improve perceived issues with the management and operations of the national security space enterprise from a military perspective?

Answer. I am awaiting the results of the review of the DOD space enterprise, which is examining the root causes of the shrinking of our operational advantage in space, and I will be glad to provide my views to the committee once we finish evaluating those results.

COMMERCIAL SPACE CAPABILITIES

Question. In support of the Department's technology innovation agenda, and to address reconnaissance needs in Northeast Asia, the Middle East, and elsewhere, you and the Deputy Secretary of Defense have sponsored through DIUx a two-part effort with small, innovative commercial space companies to try to (1) build very inexpensive radar imaging satellites that could be deployed in large numbers to provide nearly constant coverage of specific areas of interest, and (2) make effective use of such collection capabilities, and exploit advances in artificial intelligence and machine learning software to determine "patterns of life" and automated detection and identification of mobile targets.

What do you intend to accomplish with this initiative and when do you expect to have results?

Answer. This initiative will allow the Department to leverage less expensive radar imaging satellites to fill gaps in space-based reconnaissance by encouraging commercial development in space-based radar imaging. This will allow the Joint Force to deploy the right capability for a given situation, allow us to flex and adapt to the threat, respond to the situation, and be unpredictable across an increasingly contested space environment. However, commercial radar imaging by no means replaces the need for exquisite government satellites capable of focusing on specific targets of interest; rather, it provides capacity and broader focus for countrywide patterns of life that in turn can provide indications and warning to tip exquisite assets or posture forces.

Against certain targets, radar also lends itself well to machine processing, which accelerates our ability to close the kill chain from detection to engagement. The first of three pathfinder satellites is scheduled to launch in late 2017, with immediate access to a portion of its data. As constellations quickly build out over the next few years, much more imagery will be available for government purchase similar to how we purchase electro-optical imagery today. Artificial intelligence and machine learning increases the amount of imagery that can be distilled into patterns of life at machine speed and does not require more imagery analysts to exploit the data. The first of the machine vision algorithms will be demonstrated in early 2018, and algorithms that can be run on multiple radar imagery sources for a host of government organizations will be available by the end of 2018.

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

Question. The Vice Chairman has traditionally served as the Joint Staff's senior subject matter expert on nuclear deterrence.

Do you support the current triad of delivery systems?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you support the timely replacement for the AGM-86 cruise missile? If so, why?

Answer. Yes. A nuclear air-launched cruise missile contributes significantly to every element of U.S. nuclear strategy and is therefore an essential component of our future nuclear capability. The AGM-86 Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM), initially fielded in 1982, is well beyond its intended service life. The Department has undertaken several Service Life Extension Programs to sustain ALCM, but they are not sufficient to meet long term operational requirements.

Do you support the timely replacement of the LGM-30 Minuteman III system? If so, why?

Question. Yes. The current Minuteman III weapon system was initially fielded in 1970. Some of the supporting command and control system and infrastructure date back to the 1960s. Our intercontinental ballistic missile force requires recapitalization and modernization as a result of critical sub-systems age-out and booster asset depletion from surveillance and flight testing. The Ground Based Strategic Deterrent will replace the Minuteman III and provide a fully integrated weapon system to include new flight systems, command and control sub-systems, and launch systems.

Do you support the timely replacement of the E-4B National Airborne Operations Center? If so, why?

Answer. Yes. The National Airborne Operations Center, the NAOC, is the most survivable command center within the National Military Command System supporting command and control for the Secretary of Defense and the President. The E-4B fleet, which supports the NAOC missions, will continue to face availability issues due to aircraft age and resulting maintenance and modification requirements. Efforts are underway to replace the aging fleet.

Question. Do you support the Council on Oversight of the National Leadership Command, Control, and Communications System? If so, why?

Answer. Yes. I support the Council's responsibilities to provide the highest level of oversight, integration, and advocacy across the DOD and with other agencies.

SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE

Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and resources the Services have in place to investigate and respond to allegations of sexual assault?

Answer. The Services continue to take steps to provide increased training and resources to respond to and investigate allegations of sexual assault, such as a newly established 24/7 response capability available everywhere the military operates.

Question. What is your assessment of the potential impact, if any, of proposals to remove the disposition authority from military commanders over violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, including sexual assaults?

Answer. I firmly believe that the commander's role is indispensable in the military justice process. We trust commanders with the lives of their subordinates, and we must trust them to address misconduct in the ranks. The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) establishes a criminal justice system that is a critical part of commanders' authority and responsibility to maintain good order and discipline in each unit. Misconduct in the military, including sexual assault, is best addressed when commanders are accountable for addressing it, not when their responsibility and authority are diminished. The FY17 NDAA's revision of the UCMJ preserved the critical role of military commanders in the military justice process. The military services and DOD are now focused on implementing the many UCMJ changes and

properly training convening authorities, judge advocates, and other servicemembers on the new law and associated rules and policies.

Question. What is your assessment of the military's protections against retaliation for reporting sexual assault?

Answer. DOD and the military services are committed to ensuring that servicemembers who report sexual assault have appropriate protection from retaliation. The Department has enhanced its sexual assault prevention and response training to emphasize the prohibitions against retaliation and the protections available to those who experience retaliation. DOD released a Retaliation Prevention and Response Strategy in 2016 to further define policies and procedures to protect from retaliation those who report, witnesses, or respond to sexual assault. Additionally, the military Services are implementing the additional notification, training, and reporting requirements relating to retaliation that were established in recent NDAs.

Question. In response to advance policy questions regarding the Department of Defense's sexual assault prevention and response program when you were first nominated to be Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, you responded that, "We have taken strong action to address the climate within the military and to bring perpetrators to justice. We hold commanders accountable for both."

What is your view of the role of the chain of command in maintaining a command climate where sexual harassment and sexual assaults are not tolerated?

Answer. The chain of command is fundamental to maintaining a command climate where sexual harassment and sexual assault are not tolerated. Commanders are accountable for what happens in their units and must foster a climate of dignity, respect, and trust for all servicemembers, where sexual harassment and sexual assault are never condoned or ignored.

Question. How are commanders held accountable for failing to adequately address the command climate with respect to sexual harassment and sexual assault?

Answer. Commanders are responsible for promoting equal opportunity and the elimination of unlawful discrimination, sexual harassment, and sexual assault within their commands. DOD and the services focus on supporting all commanders' efforts to establish positive command climates, and DOD policy requires the military departments to hold commanders accountable when they fall short. Commanders who fail to adequately address their command climate could face a range of consequences, to include complaints from members of their commands and follow-up inquiries under Article 138 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and subsequent investigations, Inspector General complaints and subsequent investigations, administrative counseling and corrective measures, adverse performance evaluations, and punitive action.

Question. Can commanders be held accountable for failing to bring perpetrators to justice without exercising unlawful command influence?

Answer. Yes, commanders are held accountable in that they are responsible for implementing and fully supporting sexual assault prevention and response efforts in their commands, for ensuring each report of sexual assault is investigated, for making an appropriate disposition decision on each unrestricted report of sexual assault, and for taking any necessary disposition actions. They are also required to report the disposition of each unrestricted report of sexual assault to Congress. A commander's disposition decision is a discretionary judgement that must be free of any unlawful command influence from superior authorities. Senior officers in the chain of command who have concerns about the handling of sexual assault cases by their subordinates may lawfully withhold disposition authority at their level for certain types of cases.

Question. In your view, do military and civilian leaders in the Department of Defense have the tools and resources needed to hold commanders accountable for these issues? If not, what additional authority do they need?

Answer. Yes. Our leaders have the tools and resources needed to hold commanders accountable for sustaining positive command climates and maintaining good order and discipline in their commands.

SUICIDE PREVENTION AND MENTAL HEALTH RESOURCES

Question. The numbers of suicides in each of the Services continue to concern the Committee.

In your view, what role should the Joint Chiefs of Staff play in shaping policies to help prevent suicides both in garrison and in theater and to increase the resiliency of all servicemembers and their families, including members of the reserve components?

Answer. Preventing suicide among members of the Armed Services and their families is one of the most important challenges within the Joint Force. We are working

with OSD, Defense Agencies, the private sector, and civil society to better understand the factors leading to suicidal thoughts and the most effective prevention techniques. We are shaping policy to foster a culture of Total Force Fitness that enhances wellness, promotes resilience, and sustains a military force fit in mind, body, and spirit. In addition to educating the force on suicide prevention, we are providing additional training and support to our first responders (chaplains, senior enlisted leaders, legal counsel, and mental health providers) to ensure they are as equipped as possible to prevent suicides. Working together with the Services, we will continue to improve effectiveness and enhance the accessibility of support.

Question. What actions have been taken since your last confirmation to reduce the stigma associated with servicemembers seeking mental health care? In your view, are these actions sufficient, or must more be done to encourage servicemembers to seek mental health care when needed?

Answer. If reconfirmed, I will do everything in my power to continue the Department's progress in encouraging servicemembers to seek mental health care when they are in crisis. The Department has taken a number of actions to reduce the stigma associated with mental health care. The Services have been most successful by embedding behavioral health specialists within operational units. These embedded specialists become trusted agents that are both readily visible and accessible to servicemembers well before they reach the point of despair. We have seen increased provider-patient contacts since embedding these specialists, as well as decreased behavioral health hospitalizations.

Question. If confirmed again, what additional actions will you take to ensure that sufficient mental health resources are available to servicemembers in theater, and to the servicemembers and their families, including Guard and Reserve members, upon return to their home stations?

Answer. We will continue to address areas that build resilience among our servicemembers and their families, improve early identification of unduly stressed individuals, and enhance ready access to embedded licensed professional behavioral health specialists.

MILITARY QUALITY OF LIFE

Question. The Committee is always concerned about the sustainment of key quality of life programs for military families, such as family support, child care, education, employment support, health care, and morale, welfare and recreation services.

After the experience of your first tour as Vice Chairman, what further enhancements, if any, to military quality of life programs would you consider a priority in an era of intense downward pressure on budgets?

Answer. We recognize quality-of-life programs that support child care, spousal employment, and special-needs families are often top concerns for our military families and enable our servicemembers to continue and succeed in their missions. It is important that we continue to focus on program evaluation and outcomes to ensure we prioritize core programs that address the greatest needs and produce the greatest impact on joint force readiness.

Question. In a constrained budget environment, should the Services downsize or eliminate certain legacy quality of life programs that are less important to servicemembers and their families in the 21st Century?

Answer. Quality of life programs are important to the servicemember and their family and directly contribute to readiness and retention. I will continue to review existing programs and, with proper analysis, seek efficiencies in existing legacy programs where possible, to include examining our current service delivery models.

AUDIT, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, AND OVERSIGHT

Question. The Department of Defense has been incapable of obtaining a clean audit opinion for over 25 years, despite billions of dollars being spent on the effort. The Department is also on a number of GAO High Risk lists for management failures, including in financial management, weapons systems acquisition, and supply chain management. The Department is also in the midst of a number of investigations regarding waste, fraud, and abuse, as well as continuing to be unable to assert control over millions of dollars in improper and unauthorized payments.

Should it be a priority for the Department to address these management issues, especially in times of perceived budget constraints?

Answer. Yes, auditability is a DOD priority and in 2018, all major elements of the Department will be under audit. This will include standalone audits for many organizations and an overarching audit of the entire Department. Clearly under-

standing where and how money is spent will help address our fiscal management challenges and allow us to implement a process of remediation and accountability.

Question. How should Congress view these financial management weaknesses when contemplating increased budgets for the Department?

Answer. The Department has made—and will continue to prioritize—financial management and business transformation improvements. These improvements increase the Department's ability to make sound decisions through improved data accuracy and accountability. Despite improvements, financial management challenges will continue. If confirmed, I will remain focused on addressing these challenges.

Question. What steps will you take to improve financial management within the Department?

Answer. I will continue to support financial management improvements and the transformation of business processes through my role as the Chair of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), Co-Chair of the Deputy's Management Action Group (DMAG), and other management and oversight bodies. Specifically, I will continue to address a DOD-wide audit, human capital issues related to financial management certification, and implementation of initiatives that ensure effective use of resources.

OPERATIONAL ENERGY

Question. In his responses to the advance policy questions from this Committee, Secretary Mattis talked about his time in Iraq, and how he called upon the Department of Defense to “unleash us from the tether of fuel.” He stated that “units would be faced with unacceptable limitations because of their dependence on fuel” and resupply efforts “made us vulnerable in ways that were exploited by the enemy.”

Do you believe this issue remains a challenge for the Department?

Answer. Yes.

Question. If confirmed again, what specific steps will you take to unleash the Department from the tether of fuel?

Answer. If confirmed, as Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) I will ensure that new capabilities are assessed for energy supportability and will review energy key performance parameters as needed, before approving programs for production. In the annual Chairman's Risk Assessment, I will assess and manage energy-related risks to operations, training, and testing as they relate to supporting infrastructure, equipment, platforms, and personnel. I will also ensure that joint exercises and wargames incorporate and assess the Joint Force's energy demand and logistics supportability, as well as continue to use the acquisition process to explore not only ways to reduce energy consumption for our weapons systems, but to find alternate and renewable energy sources as well.

Question. If confirmed again, what priorities would you establish for defense investments in and deployment of operational energy technologies to increase the combat capabilities of warfighters, reduce logistical burdens, and enhance mission assurance on our installations?

Answer. We have a comprehensive operational energy program and I fully support its goals and objectives. We will continue to use the same standards for ranking energy technologies as for any other Departmental decision for basic research funding. We continue to assess alternative energy sources and evaluate improvements in the use of petroleum-based fuels, which ultimately will improve operational reach and lower vulnerabilities to the warfighter.

Question. If confirmed again, how will you consider operational forces' energy needs and vulnerabilities during training exercises, operational plans, and war games?

Answer. I share the concerns expressed by Secretary Mattis about this operational vulnerability. Through our global integration exercises, war gaming, and training programs we are taking opportunities to test mitigation solutions. This includes involvement with our multinational partners and allies around the globe and builds on Service and our combatant commanders insights on operational impacts. As they occur, we leverage public and private industry innovations into our future joint force planning. We are examining access, capacity, and risks across all horizons to address this challenge.

ENERGY AND ACQUISITION

Question. How can our acquisition systems better incorporate the use of energy in military platforms, and how, if at all, are assessments of future requirements taking into account energy needs as a key performance parameter?

Answer. The acquisition system considers the use of energy in military platforms as an important consideration in design, development, production and sustainment.

In the requirements process, energy will remain a key performance parameter that must be considered in the review and validation of future capability requirements.

ENERGY RESILIENCY IN THE FIGHT AGAINST THE ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND SYRIA
(ISIS)

Question. Back in July 2016 after a coup attempt, the Turkish Government cut off power to Incirlik Air Base, which is the primary platform for launching coalition airstrikes in the fight against ISIS. For roughly a week, deployed units had to operate relying on backup generators, which is expensive and is certainly not the preferred method of operation given the demanding tempo of sorties against ISIS. Recently, the Air Force described an incident in the past (via open source) in which a remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) mission based in the United States was flying a targeting mission overseas. Because of a power outage stateside, the RPA feed temporarily lost visual and the target was able to get “away and is able to continue plotting against the United States and our allies.”

If confirmed again, how will you specifically address and make energy resiliency and mission assurance a priority for the Department of Defense, to include acquiring and deploying sustainable and renewable energy assets to improve combat capability for deployed units on our military installations and forward operating bases?

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to support the Department’s efforts to increase the combat capability of deployed forces through improved energy resilience and mission assurance, in particular by emphasizing these attributes through the joint requirements process and encouraging innovation in both areas. We will continue to participate in DOD initiatives to improve energy resiliency and mission assurance on critical installations, and advocate for development and fielding of alternative energy sources.

Question. Do you support the J-4’s enforcement of the energy supportability key performance parameter in the requirements process?

Answer. Yes.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed again for this position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed again, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate committees in a timely manner?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with this Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to answer letters and requests for information from individual Senators who are members of this Committee?

Answer. Yes.

Question. If confirmed again, do you agree to provide to this Committee relevant information within the jurisdictional oversight of the Committee when requested by the Committee, even in the absence of the formality of a letter from the Chairman?

Answer. Yes.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CLAIRE McCASKILL

RUSSIAN INFORMATION WARFARE AND CYBER THREATS

1. Senator McCASKILL. General Selva, what is needed within the Department of Defense (DOD) to address disinformation campaigns?

General SELVA. The Department needs to improve its ability to identify and attribute disinformation efforts. Effective response requires us to operate within a whole-of-government approach, and in concert with our allies and partners.

2. Senator McCASKILL. General Selva, are we seeing an increase in Russian attempts to influence United States servicemembers?

General SELVA. Yes, we have. Russia targets both the general United States populace, as well as specific segments of society, to include military servicemembers, as part of their information operations and influence and disinformation campaigns. The cyberspace domain, to include electronic communication and social media, are relatively permissive environments for Russian state and state-affiliated actors.

3. Senator McCASKILL. General Selva, what is DOD doing to help protect our servicemembers from this type of insidious undermining by the Russian Government and their proxies?

General SELVA. Our forces are generally resilient in the face of this kind of activity once it is exposed and discredited; the key is to inoculate our forces to disinformation before it occurs, and expose and attribute the activity once discovered. The Department conducts annual information assurance (IA) training for all personnel to enhance their awareness of tactics employed by threat actors. This training is continuously updated to incorporate the newest and most relevant threats.

4. Senator McCASKILL. General Selva, do you feel we have the capabilities within DOD to defend against this kind of attack?

General SELVA. Yes, we have the appropriate individual capabilities to defend against this kind of activity, and we are working to apply those capabilities to better understand and analyze the information environment, and to develop narratives, conduct planning, and coordinate Defense strategic messaging in concert with the whole-of-government.

The Department of Defense conducts planning, capability development, and exercises to counter adversary influence and disinformation campaign threats to U.S. interests. Responses to any incident must be determined on a case-by-case basis to ensure the response is appropriate to the threat.

5. Senator McCASKILL. General Selva, are we capable of doing to them what they're doing to us?

General SELVA. From a capabilities standpoint we could. However, we do not believe that adopting these tactics is in our interests. Rather, we need an integrated strategy for response and, more importantly, a strategy for proactive engagement. We don't want to respond to disinformation, we want to set the information environment so that our adversaries are responding to us. Second, we need to build a cross-government organization that not only harnesses and coordinates strategic messaging for DOD, but for the USG as well, complete with requisite authorities to task and execute. We—the USG—must organize so that we are capable of coordinating consistent messaging from all levels of the government, and persistent messaging which overshadows the adversarial message.

6. Senator McCASKILL. General Selva, what is the proper “whole-of-government” response to disinformation campaigns?

General SELVA. Interagency coordination is necessary to assessing the impact of adversary propaganda, providing attribution, and coordinating a consistent message across all levels of government.

7. Senator McCASKILL. General Selva, what is DOD doing in conjunction with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other agencies to ensure there are no cyber seams or gaps that are exploitable by the Russians or any other bad actors for that matter?

General SELVA. The Department of Homeland Security has the overall responsibility for protection of the Nation's critical infrastructure, and works with DOD and other interagency partners to identify civilian critical infrastructure, provide education to its partners through the sector specific agencies (SSAs), share information,

and collaborate on measures to address cyber seams or gaps. If requested by the Secretary of Homeland Security and approved by the Secretary of Defense, DOD will support national prevention, mitigation, and recovery efforts from cyber incidents.

8. Senator MCCASKILL. General Selva, what ideas do you have for a whole-of-government approach to protect our national critical infrastructure from attack given 90 percent of it is owned and operated by the private sector?

General SELVA. The Secretary of Defense has the authority to direct military operations, including certain cyber operations, to respond to an imminent or ongoing cyber attack or to authorize, at the request of a civil authority, support to state and local governments and to the private sector in responding to and recovering from such an attack. As cyber threats evolve, a more expansive DOD role may be required and should be explored. Any broadening of DOD's role would need to consider the breadth, depth, and speed of action required, and the resources necessary to meet those requirements. In all cases, any role for the Joint Force must be fully integrated into a whole-of-government approach.

9. Senator MCCASKILL. General Selva, what ideas do you have as far as a whole-of-government approach at countering information operations and state-sponsored disinformation campaigns?

General SELVA. We must leverage diplomatic and military-to-military engagements to increase transparency and to communicate the US narrative more actively and broadly. This would inoculate at-risk audiences to disinformation and therefore undermine adversary disinformation campaigns. We can also rapidly share counter-propaganda techniques and best practices across the USG, and with allies and partners.

10. Senator MCCASKILL. General Selva, during your hearing you mentioned how United States Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) was leveraging contractors to help close the gap between DOD's needs and the cybersecurity of the privately owned and operated critical infrastructure TRANSCOM relies on. Please provide additional information on the initiatives that TRANSCOM is utilizing here, and your thoughts on how that might be leveraged in a wider way across the whole-of-government?

General SELVA. USTRANSCOM is leading, on behalf of the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise (JDDE), implementation and enhancement of existing policy in order to provide sufficient clarity to industry, via contract language, to raise the bar on our collective cybersecurity posture. Further, the Commander, USTRANSCOM, established a recurring series of Cyber Roundtables to advance the community of interest beyond cybersecurity situational awareness to pursue actions that will mitigate cyber-related risk. These sessions are composed of whole-of-government participants, academia, industry partners and technical experts. USTRANSCOM's collaboration with partners, contract language and Cyber Roundtables are exemplary efforts which could be a model for whole-of-government approaches albeit with adjustment for other organization's unique requirements.

UKRAINE AND LETHAL DEFENSIVE WEAPONS

11. Senator MCCASKILL. General Selva, what is the timeline for the decision of what lethal defensive weapons will be provided to Ukraine?

General SELVA. The decision has been the subject for interagency discussion at the Principals Level. Additional work is being done now to refine option packages. We would anticipate a decision on a specific option to be made soon, with the potential to begin execution as early as the fall 2017. Congress will be notified once the decision is made.

12. Senator MCCASKILL. General Selva, what defensive weapons are being considered and in what quantities, and which are not?

General SELVA. Several option packages are currently being considered by the interagency. The discussion includes the types and quantities of potential weapons.

13. Senator MCCASKILL. General Selva, what are the short and long term expected effects of providing Ukraine with lethal defensive weapon systems?

General SELVA. Ukrainian forces are facing a technologically superior force. If an option for defensive weapon systems is approved, I anticipate this action would help offset Ukraine's tactical disadvantages in defense of its territory, and build resiliency and survivability in its forces. It could also open the door for other allies, fol-

lowing our example, to increase their assistance in filling critical Ukrainian defensive shortfalls. In the long-term, we believe these systems will aid Ukraine in defending its sovereignty.

NORTH KOREA AND BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

14. Senator MCCASKILL. General Selva, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has spent \$40 billion since 2002 on the Ground-Based Interceptor system. Although it has had two successful tests in a row, the overall success rate is 40 percent since 2010. Are you satisfied with our current Ballistic Missile Defense framework?

General SELVA. I feel very confident the Ground Based Mid-Course Defense System is capable of defending the United States from the current North Korean threat. However, we must continue to develop, test, and employ improvements to the missile defense system to keep pace with the aggressive developmental cycles of our adversaries, to include North Korea.

15. Senator MCCASKILL. General Selva, what needs to be done to better the system?

General SELVA. The Department of Defense is currently undergoing a comprehensive review of the entire Ballistic Missile Defense enterprise. This effort will inform and guide future improvements to all elements of the Missile Defense systems.

INDIA PARTNERSHIP

16. Senator MCCASKILL. General Selva, what is your view of the current state of the United States-India security relationship?

General SELVA. The United States-India security relationship continues on an upward trajectory. In 2012, Secretary Carter launched the Defense Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI), which continues to be one of the primary areas of focus in United States-India bilateral defense discussions. The Trump administration and Secretary Mattis are committed to building a long-term security relationship with India to promote stability in the region.

17. Senator MCCASKILL. General Selva, can India be counted on to be a reliable partner in Asia-Pacific?

General SELVA. Yes, India is a reliable regional partner. As the world's largest democracy, India and the United States share many core interests such as commitment to the rule of law and promoting global security, stability, and economic prosperity. India's commitment to the Asia-Pacific region can be seen through its humanitarian support and outreach in the aftermath of natural disasters.

18. Senator MCCASKILL. General Selva, what would be your strategy for bolstering the overall defense relationship between our two countries?

General SELVA. The strategy for bolstering the overall India-United States defense relationship is three-fold. The first would be to continue to increase mil-mil exercises in number and complexity, particularly with the Indian Navy. The second would be to increase defense trade and defense technology cooperation under DTTI and its Joint Working Groups. The third would be to continue to increase the mil-mil interpersonal interactions by leveraging training and formal military education programs.

19. Senator MCCASKILL. General Selva, which areas would you focus on and what specific priorities would you establish?

General SELVA. The top priorities are expanding cooperation in maritime security in the Indian Ocean region and continuing to build India's defense capabilities. Increasing mil-mil exercises and expanding on the lessons we have learned in previous exercises such as MALABAR and RIMPAC will improve our ability to operate together.

20. Senator MCCASKILL. General Selva, does further cooperation with India threaten our relationship with Pakistan? If so, how do we balance the need for Pakistani cooperation in Afghanistan with the threat posed by China?

General SELVA. No. The United States relationships with India and Pakistan are not zero sum. We continue to maintain productive interaction with both nations to promote access and influence that can be used to facilitate our interests, to include stability in Afghanistan, and that can be leveraged to ease India-Pakistan tensions on a variety of issues.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JEANNE SHAHEEN

SYRIA

21. Senator SHAHEEN. General Selva, earlier this month, President Vladimir Putin and President Donald Trump brokered a ceasefire in southwest Syria at the G-20 summit in Germany. It has been reported that Israel does not support the agreement because it “perpetuates the Iranian presence.” Could you provide an update on the status of that ceasefire?

General SELVA. The de-escalation zone in southwest Syria, which includes a ceasefire component along with plans to facilitate delivery of humanitarian aid, went into effect on July 9, 2017. Since then the ceasefire has held, with minor reports of skirmishes between the conflicting parties.

The United States, Russia, and Jordan are conducting ongoing meetings to determine the way forward for the de-escalation zone. Those meetings include discussion of the presence of non-Syrian forces within specified areas of the de-escalation zone, including Iranian forces, Iranian proxies, and other foreign armed entities. The United States recognizes Israel’s legitimate apprehension about hostile forces along their border and is working to ensure any agreements made regarding southwest Syria address those concerns.

22. Senator SHAHEEN. General Selva, did the Administration consult with the military before announcing the ceasefire?

General SELVA. The Department of Defense has been a part of the interagency team conducting planning and negotiations for the de-escalation zone in southwest Syria since the beginning. We have worked closely with the State Department to ensure the de-escalation zone, and the associated ceasefire, can be executed concurrently with our operations to defeat ISIS and counter violent extremism across Syria.

23. Senator SHAHEEN. General Selva, can you discuss any guidance that was received from the Administration as to how the U.S. military was to enforce the ceasefire?

General SELVA. The details for the monitoring and enforcement of the ceasefire are still being discussed. At this time the plan does not call for the U.S. military to enforce the ceasefire, and I will defer on the specific roles of security forces on the ground until the agreement is complete.

The de-escalation zone in southwest Syria relies on the willingness of the conflicting parties, including Syrian government forces, pro-government forces, and armed opposition groups, to cease hostilities along pre-determined lines of contact in Dara’a, al-Qunaytirah, and al-Suwayda provinces. The United States, Russian Federation, and Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan intend to monitor and influence the conflicting parties into compliance with the ceasefire.

24. Senator SHAHEEN. General Selva, I am concerned that the Administration is touting a ceasefire that is nowhere near at-Tanf where United States troops have a presence, and it is also away from the Euphrates River Valley where coalition troops are focused on the Counter-ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] mission. Can you explain how this ceasefire is helping with protecting our troops in Syria who have come into contact with Syrian regime forces and Iranian Hezbollah on the other side of Syria, closer to the Iraqi border?

General SELVA. The recently enacted ceasefire agreement for southwest Syria was not intended to protect United States troops operating in other parts of the country. For our U.S. troops, and those of our Coalition and local partners, we have other arrangements with the Russians to de-conflict operations in order to enhance safety and retain freedom of maneuver. In addition to geographic de-confliction measures, the United States and Russia maintain an open communications channel to allow commanders in the region to de-conflict operations on the ground and in the air to avoid mishaps.

25. Senator SHAHEEN. General Selva, it seems that the Syrian regime is moving up the Euphrates River Valley, toward Deir-ez-Zor. How will their movements affect our counter-ISIS mission in the same region?

General SELVA. The Syrian regime is present in Deir-ez-Zor, and has been fighting ISIS for control of the city for the past several years. The regime has always intended, and clearly stated, that they will conduct military operations to liberate the city. The United States also intends to conduct operations in the Euphrates River Valley (ERV) beyond the liberation of Tabqa and Raqqa in order to complete

the destruction of ISIS. As in other parts of the country where our forces have come into close proximity, we must be aware of regime operations and ensure they are aware of our operations in order to de-conflict and avoid mishaps. Continuing operations in other parts of the ERV will require additional de-confliction measures.

IRAQ

26. Senator SHAHEEN. General Selva, recent news reports indicate that Iran is exerting tremendous influence in Iraq from flooding the market with consumer goods to television programming that is sympathetic to Iran. How concerned are you about Iran's influence in Iraq and what is the United States doing to counter this influence?

General SELVA. Iran seeks to influence Iraq to counter United States and allied influence, expand its operational reach, and gain influence throughout the Middle East. Iran provides support to Iraqi Shia militant groups and Shia political parties, primarily through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—Quods Force. Operations against ISIS have led many Shia Iraqis to view Iran and Iran-aligned militias positively. United States and Coalition advisors are working to bolster Iraqi security services to strengthen Iraq against Iranian influence.

27. Senator SHAHEEN. General Selva, we were all pleased to hear that the Iraqi Security Forces liberated Mosul after a brutal 9 month campaign. However, more work remains. What is the Iraqi Government doing to rebuild Mosul and restore stability?

General SELVA. The Iraqi government understands the importance of rebuilding Mosul to demonstrate to the Iraqi people that their government is capable and responsive. Restoring stability starts with establishing security in order to set conditions for the return of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and restoration of essential services. This has largely occurred in parts of Eastern Mosul with markets and schools reopening and returning to some semblance of normalcy. The Government of Iraq will need to address even greater stability challenges in Western Mosul due to extensive damage to infrastructure and wide use of IEDs and booby traps. To date, only 42 percent of Iraq's humanitarian response plan has been funded for what has been estimated at over \$1 billion dollar stabilization project.

28. Senator SHAHEEN. General Selva, how is the Iraqi Government incorporating other ethnicities in the effort to rebuild and what is the United States military doing to support those efforts?

General SELVA. The Iraqi Government understands that national stability directly correlates to inclusivity and that rebuilding efforts provide opportunities for inclusivity. One example is the GOI's "pay-for-work" stabilization programs in Mosul that enable citizens the opportunity to assist in rebuilding their community while earning wages to provide for their families. There are opportunities across the country for initiatives like this.

From the United States military perspective, we have seen positive trends of Iraqi nationalism and acceptance of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), specifically the Counter-Terrorism Service and, to some extent, the Iraqi Army. The U.S. military is committed to investing in the training and advising of the ISF, with a focus on professionalizing the force while promoting nationalism and inclusivity.

RUSSIAN INFLUENCE

29. Senator SHAHEEN. General Selva, we have seen an emboldened Russia willing to use hybrid tactics to discredit western democracy and values in Europe. How is our military combining its tools with tools of other agencies to address hybrid threats?

General SELVA. As hybrid tactics often combine military, economic, cultural, and political aspects, so too does our approach to countering these tactics. We leverage routine coordination in training and operations between DOD and our military allies and partners, Department of State, the Intelligence Community, law enforcement, and others to reduce the vulnerability of friendly forces and populations to these tactics, advance shared values and themes, and expose and attribute malign activity.

30. Senator SHAHEEN. General Selva, how closely is DOD working with the State Department, the Treasury Department, and the Intelligence Community to look at the broad spectrum of hybrid threats emanating from Russia?

General SELVA. We are working closely with our interagency partners to strengthen our ability to detect, deter, and defeat hybrid threats emanating from Russia. For

example, defense intelligence organizations coordinate routinely with the Intelligence Community on assessments that address a broad spectrum of threats, including hybrid threats emanating from Russia. This includes supporting efforts, such as the Russia Strategic Initiative, a Department of Defense decision-aid framework that supports the integration of multiple Combatant Command Russia-related efforts and requirements. National intelligence organizations also routinely support this initiative.

31. Senator SHAHEEN. General Selva, given the abundance of hybrid tools to include disinformation, cyber-attacks, and illicit financing, how best can the United States Government approach these issues in the future?

General SELVA. By enhancing resilience of our systems and building capacity in our allied and partner nations in order to identify and mitigate threats/attacks as early as possible. Domestic resilience and better partner capacity will increase the amount of time that our government will have to identify, isolate, and defeat these emerging hybrid threats.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MAZIE K. HIRONO

RUSSIA-CHINA RELATIONSHIP

32. Senator HIRONO. General Selva, Russia-China relations appear to have reached a new high, including multiple joint statements vowing to deepen their partnership and a signed roadmap on military cooperation for 2017–2020. How does a closer relationship between Russia and China impact our interests and strategy in the region?

General SELVA. The Russia-China relationship is complex and we continue to monitor their cooperative activities with great attention. Our primary focus remains supporting our Allies and strengthening our well-established, transparent security partnerships both in Europe and in the Asia-Pacific region. Russia-China cooperation does not change the imperative of supporting enduring United States interests in the European and Asia-Pacific regions. In particular, our commitment to act by, with, and through our allies and partners in these regions remains crucial for Joint Force support toward addressing security challenges and achieving U.S. strategic objectives.

MISSILE DEFENSE

33. Senator HIRONO. General Selva, some experts claim that North Korea has an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) that could have the ability to reach Alaska. How well are Alaska, Hawaii and the continental United States protected from North Korean missile launches?

General SELVA. The nation's Ground Based Mid-Course Defense system is very capable of defeating North Korean missile threats to the homeland.

34. Senator HIRONO. General Selva, as their capabilities continue to improve, how are we expanding our missile defense capabilities to defend against this threat?

General SELVA. In the near term we are focused on improvements to both the capability and the capacity of our sensor networks and interceptors. For the longer term, the Department of Defense is undergoing a comprehensive review of the entire Ballistic Missile Defense enterprise. This effort will inform and guide future improvements to all elements of the Missile Defense systems.

SOUTH CHINA SEA FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION OPERATIONS

35. Senator HIRONO. General Selva, at the Shangri-la Dialogue Summit, a number of defense ministers from allied countries called for the continuation of U.S. Navy freedom of navigation patrols in the South China Sea. These types of patrols demonstrate the U.S.' resolve to defend our allies and to maintain the sanctity of the international rule of law and the Law of the Sea. What are your thoughts on conducting freedom of navigation exercises?

General SELVA. Since its inception in 1979 the Freedom of Navigation Program has helped preserve the vital national interest of global mobility. Continuing to challenge coastal states' excessive maritime claims is important as we will continue to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows in order to protect U.S. national security interests, and demonstrate our commitment to uphold a rules-based security order.

36. Senator HIRONO. General Selva, currently, who has the authority to make the decision to conduct the exercise?

General SELVA. Subject to interagency review, and synchronization with other U.S. Government activities in their areas of responsibility, Combatant Commanders can conduct regular FONOPs in a routine manner throughout the globe to protect freedom of navigation and overflight.

ADVANCEMENTS OF OUR ADVERSARIES

37. Senator HIRONO. General Selva, a common theme that we hear from the Services and experts in national defense is that one of the biggest challenges in the future will be staying ahead of the rate of modernization we see in our adversaries, particularly our near peer adversaries. How does the advancements of our adversaries impact the advice you provide the President and future operational plans for the most critical threats?

General SELVA. The advancements of adversaries informs the Joint Force's future operational plans for the most critical threats, particularly as they relate to our competitive advantage and as such forms the basis of my best military advice to the President.

MARITIME SECURITY PROGRAM

38. Senator HIRONO. General Selva, you and I have discussed the importance of the Maritime Security Program (MSP) to our national security efforts. While it might be allowed due to a loophole in the current law, do you think it is inherently fair for an MSP designated ship which receives payments from the Maritime Administration (MARAD) to compete against a non-MSP U.S. flagged ship in a domestic trade route? Please explain.

General SELVA. Yes. Commercial carriers participating in the Maritime Security Program adhere to the law. According to 46 United States Code, Chapter 531, as a condition of receiving full payment for a fiscal year by the Secretary of Transportation, the vessel must be operated exclusively in the foreign commerce or in mixed foreign commerce and domestic trade allowed under a registry endorsement for a period of at least 320 days in the fiscal year.

The MSP financial payments are paid to a limited number of U.S. flagged ocean-going ship operators in return for making their ships, crews, and intermodal transportation and communication networks available to the DOD for sealift operations during times of contingency or national emergency. The Department of Defense relies on the ships MSP participants provide, and leverages their vast intermodal capabilities and global reach to move the Nation's combat power from the Continental United States to all points across the globe. During times of contingency, the Department must preserve all transportation options, be it the number of commercial participants, operating locations and maritime lanes.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ELIZABETH WARREN

FIGHTER AIRCRAFT INVENTORY AND HI-LOW MIX

39. Senator WARREN. General Selva, the caps established by the Budget Control Act have forced the Department to consider a number of unwanted tradeoffs, delaying some modernization programs to the out years and divesting older weapon systems earlier than planned. For example, the Air Force has had to slow its F-35A buy and, according to previous testimony, is considering divesting the F-15C fleet without replacements. What would be the impact of divesting the F-15C fleet without an adequate number of fifth generation fighters to replace it?

General SELVA. There are no plans to divest any F-15C aircraft in the FYDP, as this would significantly degrade our air-to-air capability against potential adversaries. As F-35 aircraft come online, a subset of aircraft and pilots will be equipped and trained to focus on the air-to-air mission set covered by the F-15C to ensure there are no gaps in capability. With the current force size, we must carefully replace aging F-15Cs with F-35As to ensure success across the range of missions we support.

40. Senator WARREN. General Selva, are there benefits to having a high-low mix in the U.S. military's fighter inventory?

General SELVA. Yes. Having a high-low mix in the U.S. military's fighter inventory allows us to equip the combatant commands with the appropriate capability for a given threat.

DEFENSE INNOVATION UNIT, EXPERIMENTAL (DIUX)

41. Senator WARREN. General Selva, the House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee marked up a bill that would cut funding for DIUX by approximately 50 percent. What impact would that reduction have on DIUX operations if enacted?

General SELVA. A reduction of DIUX budget by 50 percent would halt the Department's momentum gained over the last two years with nontraditional defense firms. DIUX credibility with emerging technology sector companies would be adversely impacted, and access to nontraditional defense firms and innovative, emerging capability would decrease.

42. Senator WARREN. General Selva, you testified that the Department puts "tremendous demands on the defense experimental unit" and that it was currently working on a reprogramming request. In your view, has DIUX been worth the investment?

General SELVA. Yes. DIUX provides the department access to innovative commercial solutions that may solve DOD problems at a pace and agility level that uniquely leverages the rapid rate of progress in industry. The DIUX process can result in capability solutions in a competitive environment measured in weeks and months rather than years. Their continued work with nontraditional defense firms also gives them a visibility into innovative technology and emerging companies that inform multiple efforts across the Department, areas the Department has been challenged to access previous to the work of DIUX.

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY

43. Senator WARREN. General Selva, the Department submitted a report to Congress in July 2016 entitled "The Department of Defense Plan for Military Response Options to Russian Federation Violations of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty". The unclassified report laid out a number of options for responses to Russia's violation, but notably it did not recommend the research and development of a new land-based cruise missile. What are the range of military options, from least aggressive to most aggressive, at our disposal?

General SELVA. The INF Treaty prohibits the possession, production, and testing of ground launched intermediate-range cruise and ballistic missiles. Research and development (R&D) of these systems is, however, not prohibited by the treaty. R&D of these systems could pressure Russia to return to full and verifiable compliance with the treaty, and if Russia continues to violate the treaty, R&D on these capabilities would help posture us for a post-INF Treaty world. There are three categories of systems we could consider as part of this R&D process: modification of current air- and sea-based strike systems into a ground launched mode; development of new systems; and the purchase of intermediate-range ground launched systems from countries not constrained by the INF Treaty.

44. Senator WARREN. General Selva, what other military options exist aside from developing a new land-based cruise missile?

General SELVA. In addition to possible compliant research and development of non-compliant systems, we will continue development of compliant offensive systems as well as defensive systems that negate Russia's advantage.

45. Senator WARREN. General Selva, to your knowledge, are there any NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies that would allow the United States to base a new dual-capable ground-launched cruise missile on their territory?

General SELVA. No, not to my knowledge.

FUNDING INTER-AGENCY PARTNERS

46. Senator WARREN. General Selva, the Trump administration's Fiscal Year 2018 budget proposal would make significant cuts to the State Department and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). If enacted, would these cuts to our diplomacy and development resources be helpful or harmful to our military's ability to meet what you refer to as the five challenges: Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and violent extremism?

General SELVA. The State Department and USAID are extremely important to a whole-of-government approach to national security and cuts in these organizations will have an impact on the military dimension.

The Chairman has spoken a great deal about competition short of traditional armed conflict. In fact, it is a central tenet of the National Military Strategy. To effectively compete against our potential adversaries, State and USAID are essential

partners. Investment in preventive diplomacy and development complement military action in a manner that is greater than the sum of their parts.

[The nomination reference of General Paul Selva, USAF follows:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

PN465

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,
May 16, 2017.

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

The following named officer for appointment as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and appointment in the United States Air Force to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., sections 601 and 154:

To Be General

Gen. Paul J. Selva

_____, 2017.
(Date)

Reported by Mr. McCain _____
(Signature)

with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed.

☐ The nominee has agreed to respond to requests to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Senate.

[The biographical sketch of General Paul J. Selva, USAF, which was transmitted to the Committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]



GENERAL PAUL J. SELVA

Gen. Paul J. Selva serves as the 10th Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In this capacity, he is a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the nation's second highest-ranking military officer.

General Selva graduated from the U.S. Air Force Academy in 1980, and completed undergraduate pilot training at Reese AFB, Texas. He has held numerous staff positions and has commanded at the squadron, group, wing and headquarter levels. Prior to his current assignment General Selva was the commander of U.S. Transportation Command, Scott AFB, Illinois.

General Selva is a command pilot with more than 3,300 hours in the C-5, C-17A, C-141B, C-37, KC-10, KC-135A and T-37.

EDUCATION

1980 Bachelor of Science in Aeronautical Engineering, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colo.
1983 Squadron Officer School, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
1984 Master of Science in Management and Human Relations, Abilene Christian University, Abilene, Texas
1992 Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala., distinguished graduate
1992 Master of Science in Political Science, Auburn University, Montgomery, Ala.
1996 National Defense Fellow, Secretary of Defense Strategic Studies Group, Rosslyn, Va.

ASSIGNMENTS

1. June 1980 - July 1981, student, undergraduate pilot training, Reese AFB, Texas
2. July 1981 - December 1984, co-pilot and aircraft commander, 917th Air Refueling Squadron, Dyess AFB, Texas
3. January 1984 - December 1988, co-pilot, aircraft commander, instructor pilot, and flight commander, 32nd Air Refueling Squadron, Barksdale AFB, La.
4. January 1989 - July 1991, company grade adviser to Commander, Strategic Air Command, later, manager of offensive aircraft systems and executive officer, Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Resources, Headquarters Strategic Air Command, Offutt AFB, Neb.
5. August 1991 - July 1992, student, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
6. July 1992 - June 1994, instructor pilot and flight commander, 9th Air Refueling Squadron, later, Commander, 722nd Operations Support Squadron, March AFB, Calif.
7. June 1994 - June 1995, Commander, 9th Air Refueling Squadron, later, Deputy Commander, 60th Operations Group, Travis AFB, Calif.
8. July 1995 - June 1996, National Defense Fellow, Secretary of Defense Strategic Studies Group, Rosslyn, Va.
9. July 1996 - August 1998, assistant to the Director, Office of the Secretary of Defense for Net Assessment, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
10. August 1998 - July 2000, Commander, 60th Operations Group, Travis AFB, Calif.
11. July 2000 - June 2002, Commander, 62nd Airlift Wing, McChord AFB, Wash.
12. June 2002 - June 2003, Vice Commander, Tanker Airlift Control Center, Scott AFB, Ill.
13. June 2003 - November 2004, Commander, Tanker Airlift Control Center, Scott AFB, Ill.
14. December 2004 - August 2006, Director of Operations, U.S. Transportation Command, Scott AFB, Ill.
15. August 2006 - June 2007, Director, Air Force Strategic Planning, Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Programs, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
16. June 2007 - October 2008, Director, Air Force Strategic Planning, Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Programs, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, and Director, Air Force QDR, Office of the Vice Chief of Staff, Washington, D.C.
17. October 2008 - October 2011, Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C.
18. October 2011 - November 2012, Vice Commander, Pacific Air Forces, Joint-Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii
19. November 2012 - May 2014, Commander, Air Mobility Command, Scott AFB, Ill.
20. May 2014 - July 2015, Commander U.S. Transportation Command, Scott AFB, Ill.
21. July 2015 - present, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C.

SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS

1. September 1996 - August 1998, Assistant to the Director, Office of the Secretary of Defense for Net Assessment, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., as a lieutenant colonel
2. November 2004 - July 2006, Director of Operations and Logistics, U.S. Transportation Command, Scott AFB, Ill., as a brigadier



general
 3. October 2008 - October 2011, Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C., as a lieutenant general
 4. May 2014 - July 2015, Commander U.S. Transportation Command, Scott AFB, Ill.
 5. July 2015 - present, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C.

FLIGHT INFORMATION

Rating: command pilot
 Hours flown: more than 3,300
 Aircraft flown: C-5, C-17A, C-141B, C-37, KC-10, KC-135A and T-37

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

Defense Distinguished Service Medal
 Distinguished Service Medal
 Defense Superior Service Medal
 Legion of Merit with two oak leaf clusters
 Defense Meritorious Service Medal
 Meritorious Service Medal with three oak leaf clusters
 Air Force Commendation Medal
 Air Force Achievement Medal
 Joint Meritorious Unit Award
 Combat Readiness Medal with two oak leaf clusters
 National Defense Service Medal with bronze star
 Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal with two bronze stars
 Southwest Asia Service Medal with bronze star
 Global War on Terrorism Service Medal
 Armed Forces Service Medal

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION

Second Lieutenant May 28, 1980
 First Lieutenant May 28, 1982
 Captain May 28, 1984
 Major Jan. 1, 1990
 Lieutenant Colonel March 1, 1994
 Colonel Sept. 1, 1998
 Brigadier General Jan. 1, 2004
 Major General June 2, 2007
 Lieutenant General Oct. 8, 2008
 General Nov. 29, 2012



[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by General Paul J. Selva, USAF in connection with his nomination follows:]

The nominee responded and the information is contained in the Committee's executive files.

[The nominee responded to Parts B–E of the Committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B–E are contained in the Committee's executive files.]

[The nomination of General Paul J. Selva, USAF was reported to the Senate by Chairman McCain on July 20, 2017, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on July 31, 2017.]