[Senate Hearing 115-902]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 115-902
THE NOMINATIONS OF MS. KARI A. BINGEN
TO BE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE; MR. ROBERT
S. KAREM TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AF-
FAIRS; MR. KENNETH P. RAPUANO TO BE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
HOMELAND DEFENSE AND GLOBAL SECURITY
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 18, 2017
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
62-892 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Chairman
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma, Chairman JACK REED, Rhode Island
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi BILL NELSON, Florida
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
TOM COTTON, Arkansas JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
JONI ERNST, Iowa RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina JOE DONNELLY, Indiana
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia TIM KAINE, Virginia
TED CRUZ, Texas ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
BEN SASSE, Nebraska ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
TIM SCOTT, South Carolina GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
Christian D. Brose, Staff Director
Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
_________________________________________________________________
may 18, 2017
Page
The Nominations of Ms. Kari A. Bingen to be Principal Deputy 1
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; Mr. Robert S.
Karem to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs; Mr. Kenneth P. Rapuano to be Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security.
Members Statements
McCain, Senator John............................................. 1
McConnell. Senator Mitch......................................... 1
Comstock, Hon. Barbara........................................... 3
Reed, Senator Jack............................................... 5
Witness Statements
Karem, Robert S., to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for 6
International Security Affairs.
Advance Policy Questions....................................... 23
Questions for the Record....................................... 38
Nomination Reference and Report................................ 40
Biographical Sketch............................................ 40
Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire...................... 41
Signature Page................................................. 43
Bingen, Kari A., to be Principal Deputy Under Secretary of 8
Defense for Intelligence.
Advance Policy Questions....................................... 44
Questions for the Record....................................... 51
Nomination Reference and Report................................ 52
Biographical Sketch............................................ 53
Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire...................... 54
Signature Page................................................. 57
Rapuano, Kenneth P., to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for 10
Homeland Defense and Global Security.
Advance Policy Questions....................................... 57
Questions for the Record....................................... 72
Nomination Reference and Report................................ 76
Biographical Sketch............................................ 77
Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire...................... 78
Signature Page................................................. 81
(iii)
THE NOMINATIONS OF MS. KARI A. BINGEN TO BE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE; MR. ROBERT S. KAREM TO BE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS; MR.
KENNETH P. RAPUANO TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR HOMELAND
DEFENSE AND GLOBAL SECURITY
----------
THURSDAY, MAY 18, 2017
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:37 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe,
Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Sasse, Reed,
Nelson, McCaskill, Shaheen, Donnelly, King, Heinrich, Warren,
and Peters.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman McCain. Good morning. The Senate Armed Services
Committee meets today to consider the nominations of Kari
Bingen to be Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence; Robert Karem to be Assistant Secretary of Defense
for International Security Affairs; and Kenneth Rapuano to be
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and
Global Security.
I note the presence of several of our colleagues here,
including our distinguished Majority Leader, who is here, as
well as Representative Barbara Comstock. If it's agreeable to
my colleagues, we would like Senator McConnell to make an
introduction. I know he has a very heavy, busy schedule.
Welcome, Senator McConnell.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR MITCH McCONNELL
Senator McConnell. Thank you, Chairman McCain, Senator
Reed, Members of the Committee.
I'm exceedingly proud to be here today to introduce Robert
Story Karem, a very experienced and well-qualified nominee to
serve as the next Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs.
Through his hearing, this Committee will find an individual
who has worked to prepare himself to address some of the major
challenges facing our country. Because of his razor-sharp
intelligence and diligence, Robert, a native of Lexington,
Kentucky, rapidly moved up in my office from Staff Assistant to
Legislative Correspondent and eventually to be my Legislative
Assistant for Foreign Affairs. He proved himself a quick study,
and I learned not to doubt his advice or his judgment.
Robert also worked in my office when our Nation experienced
one of the most harrowing days in its history. He was hard at
work on Capitol Hill on September 11th, 2001, when our country
was hit by the devastating al Qaeda terrorist attacks.
Witnessing this heinous attack on our country, including on our
Pentagon, from this close vantage point I know left a profound
imprint on Robert and heightened his already keen appreciation
of the seriousness of the threats confronting our Nation.
Robert was a stellar legislative staffer, and he advised me
on a wide array of foreign policy issues. For instance, he
played an important role in assisting me on matters related to
Burma, something Chairman McCain and I have both been involved
in over the years, the bipartisan sanctions effort, which led
ultimately to the adoption of much needed reforms. Burma has
been and remains a bipartisan issue on Capitol Hill, and Robert
played a significant role in our efforts in this regard in the
early 2000s.
He also provided vital assistance in staffing a
congressional delegation I led to Afghanistan and Iraq back in
2003.
Eventually, Robert left my office to work in the Bush
administration as a Special Advisor for National Security
Affairs and Middle East Policy to Vice President Cheney, where
Robert would work for a number of years. The Vice President
evidently thought enough of Robert's skills that after he left
office he asked him to assist him in researching and editing
his memoirs.
Following his tenure with the Vice President, Robert's
abilities drew the attention of House Majority Leaders Eric
Cantor and Kevin McCarthy, both of whom Robert advised on
national security matters. He later was the lead foreign policy
staffer on the Jeb Bush campaign.
Today we face numerous security threats from around the
globe. President Trump made an outstanding choice by nominating
a man with both experience and ability to serve as Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy.
I'm looking forward to this Committee's consideration of
the nomination and to Robert's confirmation. The President
simply could not have picked a better person for this office.
Thank you.
Chairman McCain. I thank you, Senator McConnell, for taking
the time from your busy schedule to be here on behalf of this
nominee. I guess your message is that we need to confirm him or
hire someone to start our car in the morning.
[Laughter.]
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
Representative Comstock, welcome.
STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA COMSTOCK, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM
VIRGINIA
Representative Comstock. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman
McCain, Senator Reed, and members of the Armed Services
Committee, thank you for having me here this morning for the
great honor of introducing my fellow Virginian and friend of
over 30 years, Mr. Kenneth Rapuano, to be Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security.
He is surrounded here today by his family, his wife Dixie,
as well as his son Scott, a recent West Point graduate, and
also a recent newlywed here with his wife; also Ken's daughter
Claire, who is joining the Peace Corps shortly, as well as
another daughter Taylor, and son Will; his proud mother, Cathie
Rapuano, is also here, along with his brothers Richard and
Dave, as well as sister-in-law Sarah.
Mr. Chairman, this is truly a family of public service. Ken
has my strong support based on my personal knowledge of his
abilities, as well as his significant and stellar expertise in
the areas covered by the Assistant Secretary of Defense
position.
Ken, a marine, volunteered for two combat tours in Iraq and
Afghanistan, his previous service at the Pentagon in key areas,
and then he also had more recent service in positions of ever-
increasing responsibility at the Department of Energy as a
Deputy Under Secretary for Counter Terrorism, focused on
unconventional nuclear threats. Then he also went on to serve
at the White House as Deputy Homeland Security Advisor to
President Bush, where he chaired the interagency process
developing and overseeing Homeland security and
counterterrorism policies.
Ken has also worked in industry in these primary fields,
with recent service in two key federally-funded research and
development centers, at Mitre and ANSER, supporting our
Government in the core areas of the position he has been
nominated to.
Mr. Chairman, Ken is fully prepared to be the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security
by his lifetime of service and experience, his vast knowledge,
and his hands-on experience in the field, as well as in
government agencies and, of course, across the globe. He is a
diligent public servant who goes beyond the call of duty with
great skill to defend our Homeland, and I particularly
appreciate his stepping up again. I know it's always a family
sacrifice too, so we really appreciate him stepping up in this
new role, and I look forward to seeing him and his success.
Again, thank you so much.
Chairman McCain. Thank you very much, Congresswoman, for
coming over, and I appreciate your introduction. Thank you.
It's my understanding that Chairman Thornberry wanted to be
here but he has another obligation, but he wanted to join us
this morning to introduce Ms. Bingen in person, so I'll insert
his statement of support into the record and simply note for
the Members of the Committee that Chairman Thornberry writes
that Ms. Bingen's commitment to public service will serve the
Department of Defense and the Nation well.
[The information referred to follows:]
[Chairman Thornberry's statement has been retained in
Committee files.]
Chairman McCain. Welcome to the witnesses this morning. We
thank you for joining us. We also welcome your families and
friends who are with us here today. As is our tradition, at the
beginning of your testimony, we invite you to introduce those
who are joining you today.
It's the standard for this Committee to ask certain
questions in order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities. It's important that this Committee and other
appropriate committees of the Congress to able to receive
testimony, briefings, and other communications of information,
so if you'll answer the following questions.
Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
governing conflicts of interest?
Ms. Bingen. Yes.
Mr. Rapuano. Yes.
Mr. Karem. Yes.
Chairman McCain. Will you ensure that your staff complies
with deadlines established for requested communications,
including questions for the record in hearings?
Ms. Bingen. Yes.
Mr. Rapuano. Yes.
Mr. Karem. Yes.
Chairman McCain. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
Ms. Bingen. Yes.
Mr. Rapuano. Yes.
Mr. Karem. Yes.
Chairman McCain. Will those witnesses be protected from
reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
Ms. Bingen. Yes.
Mr. Rapuano. Yes.
Mr. Karem. Yes.
Chairman McCain. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and
testify upon request before this Committee?
Ms. Bingen. Yes.
Mr. Rapuano. Yes.
Mr. Karem. Yes.
Chairman McCain. Do you agree to provide documents,
including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a
timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee,
or to consult with a committee regarding the basis for any
good-faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
Ms. Bingen. Yes.
Mr. Rapuano. Yes.
Mr. Karem. Yes.
Chairman McCain. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
Ms. Bingen. No.
Mr. Rapuano. No.
Mr. Karem. No.
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
Ms. Bingen, the United States faces an increasingly complex
global threat environment where terrorist organizations are
metastasizing and exercising states' capabilities, and nation-
state adversaries are increasingly asserting power, often
through irregular and asymmetric means. Every component of our
Defense Department must have timely intelligence to understand
the very threats we face to prepare for potential conflict and
to respond swiftly, accurately, and decisively, when necessary.
With persistent budget constraints, accurate and timely
intelligence becomes all the more vital. We look forward to
hearing from you as to how you will address this important
mission, if confirmed.
Mr. Karem, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs is charged with a wide breadth
of responsibilities, from security cooperation and foreign
military sales to United States defense policy in Europe, the
Middle East, and Africa. We will be interested to hear from you
on a number of issues, United States strategy for countering
Russian aggression, what United States force posture in Europe
should look like over the long term, United States strategy for
defeating ISIS [the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria], and what
the United States should be doing to create space for political
solutions in Iraq and Syria, and much more.
Mr. Rapuano, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Homeland Defense and Global Security is responsible for a wide
range of policy portfolios ranging from Homeland defense,
defense support of civil authorities, counter-WMD [weapons of
mass destruction], cyber policy, and space policy.
You have an extensive background in a variety of Homeland
security issues both in government and in the private sector. I
look forward to hearing you discuss how your previous
experiences would inform your approach to these complex issues,
especially the need for a U.S. policy and strategy in
cyberspace.
Senator Reed?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
join you in welcoming the nominees this morning.
Thank you for your willingness to serve our Nation, and I
want to express my gratitude to your family members who are
here today and whose support for you throughout your careers
has been so important.
The nominees before the Committee today have extensive
experience and are well qualified for the positions to which
they have been nominated.
Ms. Kari Bingen, the nominee to be Principal Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, is well known to this
Committee for her work as a senior staffer at the House Armed
Services Committee. The Principal Deputy supports the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, who serves as the
principal intelligence advisor to the Secretary of Defense. The
Under Secretary oversees all intelligence security
organizations within the Department of Defense (DOD), including
the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency,
the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, the National
Reconnaissance Office, and the intelligence components and
combatant commands of the Military Services.
Throughout her work both on the Hill and in the private
sector, Ms. Bingen has substantial expertise in the areas of
defense policy, strategic forces, and space policy.
The nominee to be the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs, Mr. Karem, also brings
significant experience on defense and foreign policy issues,
including as a foreign policy advisor to the Majority Leader
and a Middle East expert in the White House to the Vice
President.
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs serves as the principal advisor to the Under Secretary
of Defense for Policy and the Secretary of Defense regarding
defense policy and strategy for Europe, Russia, the Middle
East, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere. The position involves
managing critical defense and security relationships with some
of our closest allies and partners.
Mr. Rapuano has had an impressive career in government
service and private-sector work in the areas of national
security, counter-proliferation, and policy analysis. He has
previously served as a senior advisor on issues of Homeland
security and counterterrorism in President George W. Bush's
White House, the Department of Energy, and the Department of
Defense. Mr. Rapuano has also served in the Marine Corps and,
as a Marine Corps reservist, served on the Iraq Server Group.
He has been nominated to serve as the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security, a position
for which he would be charged with developing policy and
overseeing planning for countering weapons of mass destruction,
cyberspace, missile defense, defense continuity and mission
assurance, support of the civil authorities, and the Homeland
defense activities at the Department of Defense.
If confirmed, all three of these nominees will be
instrumental on a number of cross-cutting issues within the
Department, including various aspects of a strategy to defeat
the ISIS threat and countering the Russian malign influence
threat to the integrity of our political institutions and those
of our international partners.
The Committee looks forward to hearing your views on these
and other complex issues.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. I thank you.
Mr. Karem, we'll begin with you. Welcome.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT S. KAREM, TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
Mr. Karem. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed, Members
of the Committee on Armed Services. It is an honor to appear
before you this morning as a nominee to become Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ISA).
Leader McConnell, thank you for your generous introduction.
I'm tremendously grateful for the confidence you showed in me
17 years ago. The experiences, opportunities, and lessons
provided by my tenure in your office played an essential role
in inspiring a career in public service that has led to my
appearing before this Committee today.
I would like to thank the President of the United States
and the Secretary of Defense for my nomination. If confirmed,
it would be a tremendous and humbling honor to serve our
country at the Department of Defense.
Let me also thank my friends, mentors, and former bosses,
colleagues, and counterparts, without whose support I would
likely not be here today.
I am particularly grateful that some of my family could
join me this morning. My parents, Fred and Suzanne, of
Lexington, Kentucky, and my brother Fred of Chapel Hill, North
Carolina, are joined by my girlfriend, Alina Polyakova. My
sister, Rebecca Hughes, of Birmingham, Alabama, could not be
here today, but I am immensely proud of the amazing mother my
little sister has become to her four children.
Chairman McCain. We welcome your family members. Welcome.
Mr. Karem. Thank you.
The responsibilities of the office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs cover
the vast majority of the globe and stretch across five
combatant commands. It is impossible these days to open a
newspaper without confronting bold-face headlines about some
conflict, crisis, or challenge with which the dedicated
government servants and military personnel who work in ISA are
already ably grappling. The national security policy challenges
these quiet professionals confront every day are real, and they
are sobering.
If confirmed, it would be a great privilege to serve
alongside these American patriots to help rebuild America's
military capabilities and readiness, bolster and modernize
critical alliances such as NATO [the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization] while rebalancing burden-sharing within these
alliances, strengthen United States credibility and influence
in regions of key strategic interest, defeat ISIS and other
terrorist groups, confront Russian and Iranian aggression,
combat new cyber threats, and create conditions favorable for
safeguarding our national security and promoting America's
economic prosperity.
If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with this
Committee, and with the Congress as a whole, to address these
and other national security challenges facing our Nation.
I am grateful for your consideration of my nomination, and
I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Karem follows:]
Prepared Statement by Robert S. Karem
Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed, Members of the Committee on Armed
Services--it is an honor to appear before you this morning as a nominee
to become Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs.
Leader McConnell, thank you for your very generous introduction. I
am tremendously grateful for the confidence you showed in me 17 years
ago--the experiences, opportunities, and lessons provided by my tenure
in your office played an essential role in inspiring a career in public
service that has led to my appearing before this Committee today.
I would like to thank the President of the United States and the
Secretary of Defense for my nomination. If confirmed, it would be a
tremendous and humbling honor to serve our country at the Department of
Defense. Let me also thank my friends, mentors, and former bosses,
colleagues, and counterparts, without whose support I would likely not
be here today.
I am particularly grateful some of my family could join me this
morning.
My parents, Fred and Suzanne, of Lexington, Kentucky and my
brother, Fred, of Chapel Hill, North Carolina, are joined by my
girlfriend, Alina Polyakova.
My sister, Rebecca Hughes, of Birmingham, Alabama could not be here
today, but I am immensely proud of the amazing mother my little sister
has become to her four children.
***
The responsibilities of the office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs cover the vast majority of
the globe, and stretch across five combatant commands. It is impossible
these days to open a newspaper without confronting bold face headlines
about some conflict, crisis, or challenge with which the dedicated
government servants and military personnel who work in ISA are already
ably grappling.
The national security policy challenges these quiet professionals
confront everyday are real, and they are sobering.
If confirmed, it would be a great privilege to serve alongside
these American patriots to help rebuild America's military capabilities
and readiness, bolster and modernize critical alliances such as NATO
while rebalancing burden-sharing within these alliances, strengthen
United States credibility and influence in regions of strategic
interest, defeat ISIS and other terrorist groups, confront Russian and
Iranian aggression, combat new cyber threats, and create conditions
favorable for safeguarding our national security and promoting
America's economic prosperity.
If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with this
Committee, and with the Congress as a whole, to address these and other
national security challenges facing our country.
I am grateful for your consideration of my nomination, and I look
forward to your questions.
Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
Ms. Bingen?
STATEMENT OF KARI A. BINGEN, TO BE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE
Ms. Bingen. Thank you. Chairman McCain, Ranking Member
Reed, and distinguished senators of this Committee, thank you
for the opportunity to appear before you today and for your
consideration of my nomination to be the Principal Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.
First, I would not be here without the strong support of my
family, my husband Sean, our two young sons, Henry and
Harrison, and my parents, John and Rebecca.
My father enlisted in the Army at 18, and both my
grandfathers served in the Army during World War II. My time on
the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) and, if confirmed, my
role in the Department is my opportunity to continue our
family's tradition of service and to give back to our country.
Chairman McCain. Welcome to your family members.
Ms. Bingen. Thank you.
I wish to thank the President and Secretary Mattis for
placing their trust and confidence in me. I am also grateful to
several mentors who have helped shape my career, including
Chairman Thornberry, Congressman Mike Turner, and retired
Congressman Terry Everett, as well as to the HASC team and many
of the staff behind you, who I have learned from and had the
privilege to collaborate with in support of the NDAA [National
Defense Authorization Act].
Henry Kissinger's statement before this Committee in 2015
has stuck with me, that ``The United States has not faced a
more diverse and complex array of crises since the end of the
Second World War.'' While threats increase, our military force
structure has decreased. Thus, as Secretary Mattis has stated,
we have less of a military shock absorber than we once did.
This makes intelligence and a highly effective defense
intelligence enterprise all the more critical to buy our
leaders the time and space necessary to develop policy, posture
accordingly, and resource capabilities.
Keeping America safe and supporting our forces in harm's
way is a humbling and solemn responsibility. If confirmed, my
first priority will be to support the warfighter. We have
troops today in harm's way in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere
around the world. They deserve the best intelligence our Nation
can provide to protect them and to support their missions.
Additionally, we must improve our defense intelligence
posture and capabilities to better address the full spectrum of
security challenges, particularly from near-peer challengers,
that range from high-end nuclear and advanced conventional
threats to grey-zone tactics in the cyber and information
domain. The battlefield is more dynamic, and the defense
intelligence enterprise must be more agile and adaptive,
whether in its integration with operations, collection and
analysis, or incorporation of new technologies and innovative
concepts.
Furthermore, I am reminded of the reason why the USD(I)
[Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence] was established
in the first place: in the wake of 9/11, to improve the
integration, management, and allocation of resources across a
stove-piped enterprise. Integration and unity of effort across
the defense intelligence enterprise is the value that this
position brings to the Secretary, the Director of National
Intelligence (DNI), and Congress. I also recognize that
collaborative relationships and motivated people focused on a
clear mission are the foundation to implementing these
priorities.
It has been an honor working for the House Armed Services
Committee, starting with the strategic forces and intelligence
portfolio and now as its policy director. I believe my time on
Capitol Hill, coupled with my technical background and work in
the private sector in support of several of the three-letter
intelligence agencies, have uniquely prepared me for this
position.
If confirmed, I am committed to working with this Committee
and other committees of jurisdiction. I hope to earn your trust
and confidence, and I am committed to providing you with the
information you need to do your oversight. If confirmed, I also
look forward to working closely with the new Under Secretary,
once nominated and hopefully confirmed, and the great team in
the USD(I) office and across the Department.
Thank you again for your time today and for your
consideration of my nomination.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Bingen follows:]
Prepared Statement by Kari A. Bingen
Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished senators of
this Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today and for your consideration of my nomination to be the Principal
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.
I wish to start by thanking President Trump and Secretary Mattis
for placing their trust and confidence in me. I am also grateful to
several mentors who have helped shape my career, including Chairman
Thornberry, Congressman Mike Turner, and retired Congressman Terry
Everett, as well as to the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) family
and many of the staff behind you, who I have learned from and had the
privilege to collaborate with in support of the National Defense
Authorization Act.
Henry Kissinger's statement before this Committee in 2015 has stuck
with me: that, ``The United States has not faced a more diverse and
complex array of crises since the end of the Second World War.'' While
threats increase, our military force structure has decreased. Thus, as
Secretary Mattis has stated, we have less of a military shock absorber
than we once did. This makes intelligence--and a highly effective
defense intelligence enterprise--all the more critical to buy our
leaders the time and space necessary to develop policy, posture
accordingly, and resource capabilities.
Keeping America safe and supporting our forces in harm's way is a
humbling and solemn responsibility. If confirmed, my first priority
will be to support the warfighter. We have troops today in harm's way
in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere around the world. They deserve the
best intelligence our Nation can provide to protect them and to support
their missions.
Additionally, we must improve our defense intelligence posture and
capabilities to better address the full spectrum of security
challenges, particularly from near-peer challengers, that range from
high-end nuclear and advanced conventional threats to grey zone tactics
in the cyber and information domain. The battlefield of today and
tomorrow is more dynamic, and the defense intelligence enterprise must
be more agile and adaptive--whether in its integration with operations,
collection and analysis, or incorporation of new technologies and
innovative concepts.
Furthermore, I am reminded of the reason why the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) was established in the first place:
in the wake of 9/11, to improve the integration, management, and
allocation of resources across a stove-piped enterprise. Integration
and unity of effort across defense intelligence is the value that this
position brings to the Secretary, the Director of National
Intelligence, and the Congress. I also recognize that collaborative
relationships, and motivated people focused on a clear mission, are the
foundation to implementing these priorities.
It has been an honor working for the House Armed Services
Committee, starting with the strategic forces and intelligence
portfolio and now as policy director. I believe my time on Capitol
Hill, coupled with my technical background and work in the private
sector in support of the National Reconnaissance Office, the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, and
the National Security Space Office, have uniquely prepared me for this
position.
If confirmed, I am committed to working with this Committee and
other committees of jurisdiction. I hope to earn your trust and
confidence, and I am committed to providing you with the information
you need to carry out your oversight. If confirmed, I also look forward
to working closely with the new Under Secretary, once confirmed, and
the great team in the USD(I) office and across the Department.
Finally, I would not be here without the strong support of my
family: my husband, Sean Tytler, our two young sons, Henry and
Harrison, and my parents, John and Rebecca Bingen. My father enlisted
in the Army at 18, and both my grandfathers served in the Army during
World War II. My time on HASC and, if confirmed, my role in the
Department, is my opportunity to continue our family's tradition of
service and to give back to our country.
Thank you again for your time today and for your consideration of
my nomination.
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
Mr. Rapuano?
STATEMENT OF KENNETH P. RAPUANO, TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND GLOBAL SECURITY
Mr. Rapuano. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed,
and Members of the Committee. Thank you very much for the
privilege of appearing before you today.
I'd like to start by thanking my family. First of all, my
wife, Dixie, who has been my best friend and partner for 28
years, and our four kids, who are all with us here today:
Taylor, our oldest, who is currently studying at North Park
University in Chicago to become a counselor; Scott, West Point
class of 2015 and currently an infantry platoon commander with
the 3rd Infantry Division, and his wife Katie, our brand new
daughter-in-law and a very welcome addition to our family; and
Claire, who last month graduated Phi Beta Kappa from James
Madison University and is leaving next month for 2 years of
service in Africa as a Peace Corps volunteer; and finally Will,
who will be a third year at University of Virginia this fall.
He is on track to become a business major. He aspires to become
a captain of industry someday.
Chairman McCain. Welcome.
Mr. Rapuano. Dixie and I are extremely proud of our kids.
Raising them has been the most important and rewarding role of
our lives.
I'd also like to thank my parents, Al and Cathie Rapuano.
If it wasn't for their love, hard work, and perseverance, I am
quite certain I would not be sitting before you today.
Mr. Chairman, I have been working national security issues
my entire career, and I believe that the threats we face today
are as complex, unpredictable, and dangerous as at any time in
our history. The U.S. Homeland is no longer a sanctuary. The
growing sophistication and proliferation of threats, such as
cyber, space, ballistic and cruise missiles, CBRN [chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear] materials, endemic
diseases, and unmanned technologies, combined with the growing
number of nations and non-state actors with access to them,
continue to increase risk to the Homeland and defense mission
assurance.
I see no more important role in national security than
serving in the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Homeland Defense and Global Security, and focusing on ensuring
the continuing ability to defend our Nation against dynamic and
evolving threats.
If confirmed, I look forward to working with you and your
staffs, and I appreciate the opportunity to answer your
questions today.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rapuano follows:]
Prepared Statement by Mr. Kenneth P. Rapuano
Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed. Thank you very
much for the privilege of appearing before you in the Committee today.
I'd like to start by thanking my family. First of all, my wife,
Dixie--who has been my best friend and partner--and our four kids, all
here today: Taylor--who is currently studying to be a social worker;
Scott--an infantry platoon leader with the 3rd Infantry Division, with
his wife Katie, our brand new daughter in-law; Claire--who graduated
Phi Beta Kappa from JMU last week, and is leaving soon for 2 years of
service in Africa as a Peace Corps Volunteer; and Will, who will be a
third year at UVA this fall--and aspires to be a captain of industry .
. . some day. Dixie and I are extremely proud of our kids--raising them
has been the most important and rewarding role of our lives.
I'd also like to thank my parents, Al and Cathie, If it wasn't for
their love, hard work, and perseverance, I'm quite certain I would not
be here today.
Mr. Chairman, I have been working national security issues my
entire career, and I believe that the threats we face today are as
complex and unpredictable as any time in our history. The U.S. Homeland
is no longer a sanctuary. The growing sophistication and proliferation
of threats, such as cyber, space, ballistic and cruise missiles, CBRN
materials, endemic diseases, and unmanned technologies, combined with
the growing number of nations and non-state actors with access to them,
continue to increase risk to the Homeland & mission assurance. I see no
more important role in national security than serving as Assistant
Secretary of Defense for HD and Global Security, and focusing, in
particular, on Homeland defense and ensuring the continuing ability to
defend our country.
If confirmed, I look forward to working with you and your staffs,
and I look forward to your questions today.
Thank you very much.
Chairman McCain. Thank you. I thank the witnesses.
Mr. Rapuano, what do you think should be the key elements
of our national cyber policy?
Mr. Rapuano. Senator, there has been a lot of focus on our
cyber policy of late, for very understandable reasons. The 2017
NDAA, as you well know, has very specific directives with
regard to development of a deterrence framework and policy.
There was the recent defense cyber deterrence study that really
got at the importance of tailored deterrence campaigns and the
whole approach to a declaratory policy.
I believe that we have to have both what is perceived to be
and what is actually effective cyber capabilities that will
introduce such an element of doubt in our adversaries that the
cyber attacks that they would be interested in taking to
achieve some goal would be outweighed by the high likelihood of
our response.
Chairman McCain. Ms. Bingen, as you know, we just had a
very serious cyber attack worldwide. How well equipped are we
intelligence-wise to anticipate or even adequately respond to
this kind of really unprecedented activity?
Ms. Bingen. Mr. Chairman, I believe this continues to be a
challenge within the Intelligence Community writ large, but
also particularly in the defense intelligence enterprise. We
continue to need the capabilities to detect and attribute where
these attacks are coming from, to understand the totality of
them, but also to think more strategically about where is this
headed. We look at each individual event as a more tactical
event, but the challenge for the defense intelligence
enterprise is putting it all together. As we look to stand up
U.S. Cyber Command, our challenge is also from an intelligence
perspective how do we support that command's responsibilities,
military plans and operational capabilities. I believe that
that's a very important area that we need to do a better job
in, sir.
Chairman McCain. Mr. Karem, what lesson do you think that
Putin is learning, since there seems to be a significant lack
of an international response to his actions in Ukraine, in
Syria, obviously other cyber activities that emanate from
Russia? What kind of lesson do you think he's learning from
what seems to be rather successful activities from his
standpoint?
Mr. Karem. Senator, I believe that Russia's interference,
invasion, and continued illegal occupation of Ukraine poses a
significant threat to international security and our own, and
his actions in Syria have also contributed to that problem. I
do not believe that Vladimir Putin is sufficiently deterred
from perpetuating similar and continuing malign activities.
Chairman McCain. I believe that all three of our nominees
are highly qualified and much needed, very frankly. I regret
that Secretary Mattis does not have the team around him that he
needs to do his job in the most efficient fashion, and we will
expedite your nominations following a vote of the Committee to
get you to work as quickly as possible. I view all three of you
as highly qualified.
Senator Reed?
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Again, I've been impressed with the witnesses' not only
experience but their discussions in the office. Thank you all
very much.
Mr. Karem, we have seen since last year Russia's
involvement in elections, particularly our own election. Do you
agree with the assessment of the Russian activity in the 2016
presidential elections by our Intelligence Community?
Mr. Karem. Sir, I have read the unclassified assessment
from the Intelligence Community, and I agree with it.
Senator Reed. Do you feel that this is an ongoing threat,
not just an historical incident but an ongoing threat that
you'll have to deal with?
Mr. Karem. Senator, I believe the Russians, like the
Soviets, have a long history of engaging in active measures
against their adversaries, and I understand that the Director
of National Intelligence has testified recently that these
activities continue.
Senator Reed. Mr. Rapuano, the same question about your
sense of the Russian involvement in our election and other
elections. Is it a credible and growing threat?
Mr. Rapuano. Senator, yes, I believe it is. I believe they
are going to continue doing it as long as they feel it's in
their interest and the consequences are less than the benefits
that are occurring.
Senator Reed. How do you believe we're postured to
counteract these operations that they're conducting in a larger
sense too, participating in the kind of information campaigns
and, in some cases, disinformation campaigns that we see from
our adversaries? Are we in a similar position at least having
the capability, if necessary, to do it?
Mr. Rapuano. Senator, I think that our information
operations capability has attrited since the Cold War, and I
think that of late there has been growing recognition of how
important it is. I think that recognition is understood in the
Pentagon, and there are focused review groups looking at our
cyber policy and that nexus with information operations.
Senator Reed. Let me address this question again to Mr.
Rapuano and Mr. Karem, and then I'll ask a question of Ms.
Bingen.
Some of this, I suspect, and I think you suspect too, is to
stovepipe organizations that seem to be rampant within the
Department, then among departments--Homeland Security,
Department of Energy, et cetera. As a result, I don't think
we've come up with an integrated plan. We have pieces, but
they're very discrete and fragmented. Is that fair? More
importantly, how are you going to deal with that and make it
coherent?
Mr. Rapuano. Senator, I believe it is fair, and I believe
that that has been recognized. There's a lot of work that needs
to be done in terms of understanding all the players and
stakeholders, the respective roles and responsibilities,
authorities and resources, and then what are the threats, how
we prioritize them, and how do we blend together to make for a
very effective set of policies and capabilities and actions.
Senator Reed. Where do you think that level of coordination
has to be? Because again, it's not just DOD. It's the
Department of Energy, the Department of Homeland Security.
Mr. Rapuano. I think ultimately the White House has a very
important marshaling role in the National Security Council
staff.
Senator Reed. They should be coordinating and leading an
effort to come up with doctrine as well as organizational
changes and personnel augmentations or movements? Is that fair?
Mr. Rapuano. I believe they should be setting those
expectations. I believe that the executive order issued by the
President last week goes a long way to identifying the
challenges and setting in motion the steps to start to identify
the issues that need to be addressed.
Senator Reed. Mr. Karem, quickly, any comments in this
regard?
Mr. Karem. Yes, Senator. I agree with Mr. Rapuano's
assessment with respect to the U.S. Government. I would only
add that the problem is magnified when you look at the threat
that these activities pose to our allies. There would need to
be coordination not just among the U.S. Government but with our
allies. NATO's Cyber Center of Excellence is a step in the
right direction, but clearly there's more work that needs to be
done.
Senator Reed. Ms. Bingen, we had a chance to talk on this
topic in the office, and that is particularly after the OPM
[Office of Personnel Management] database breach there was a
huge shift back to DOD, but now we have a backlog of 600,000
people in terms of just getting cleared so we can have the
people to do these jobs we've been talking about.
First, do you agree that this is a significant problem that
DOD faces and that it's essential that we deal with this very
quickly and very effectively?
Ms. Bingen. Senator, I absolutely agree with that. Of that
600,000, most of those are DOD personnel awaiting a background
investigation or update.
Senator Reed. Now, we've mandated that DOD provide a plan
to transfer completely the mission back from OPM, and I would
assume that you are going to be one of the chief architects of
this plan, and I also assume you're going to hit the ground
running. Those are fair assumptions, correct?
Ms. Bingen. Absolutely, Senator. The NDAA last year, as you
fully know, sir, requires a plan by August 1st on that
transfer. That is something that I absolutely, if confirmed,
would have to hit the ground running and focus on meeting that
deadline and providing you the information that you need, sir.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Shaheen?
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
To all three of you, congratulations on your nominations,
and thank you for your willingness to serve the country,
continue to serve the country at this critical time.
Mr. Karem, I want to start with you because I very much
appreciate that you have been a supporter of the Special
Immigrant Visa Program that has helped those who helped us in
Iraq and Afghanistan. As I'm sure you're aware, while the Iraq
program is almost at completion, the program in Afghanistan
continues. There are many people in the queue who helped us who
would like to come to the United States. Can you talk about why
you think this is important?
Mr. Karem. Senator, thank you. I first want to recognize
your leadership on this issue, and that of the Chairman and the
Ranking Member. When I served in House leadership, I was proud
to get to work with your staffs on both the Iraq and
Afghanistan Special Immigrant Programs to make sure they were
extended, and I believe very strongly that with the United
States should be no better friend and no worse enemy.
If confirmed, however, the portfolio for ISA would not
include Afghanistan but for the NATO component. So this program
would not fall under my jurisdiction. But as you know, I've
been a long-time believer that we need to stand by those who
have risked their lives alongside our soldiers.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, and I very much appreciate
Secretary Mattis' support for the program as well.
Let me follow up on the questioning that Senator Reed
started around NATO. You were answering that you think the
Cyber Security Center of Excellence at NATO is important as we
look at how we can better, with NATO, address the cyber threats
to ourselves and the NATO allies. Can you expand a little more
on what you would like to see NATO do with respect to cyber
threats?
Mr. Karem. Yes, Senator. I think there are a couple of
pieces, and there are obviously things that the United States
can do to increase its deterrence. But with respect to NATO,
all of our allies have an obligation under Article 3 to
increase their national resilience. Some nations in the cyber
realm have done more than others. The Estonians are real
leaders in this regard, and it's no surprise that the Cyber
Center of Excellence is located in Tallinn.
Senator Shaheen. I've had a chance to visit there. It's
very impressive.
Mr. Karem. It is. There are investments in cyber security
technologies. They are making budgetary decisions and really
changing the culture so that we prioritize this. If confirmed,
I really want to get a little more deeply into this subject and
work with our NATO partners on it.
Senator Shaheen. Great.
Ms. Bingen, you're going to be responsible for or have
intelligence gathering as part of your portfolio, as I
understand what you will be doing. How important is the
intelligence sharing that we do to our allies in helping us to
get the information that we need to take actions?
Ms. Bingen. Senator, I believe it's incredibly important.
Nearly every military operation that we undertake today is done
in a coalition, and so it is incredibly important that we be
able to provide our coalition partners intelligence
information, but also that they be able to provide us
information as well. At the end of the day, the mission is to
protect our collective national security.
Senator Shaheen. How important to that effort is it that
people believe that when they share that intelligence, it will
continue to be confidential in the United States with those
people who are going to act on it?
Ms. Bingen. Senator, if confirmed as Principal Deputy, it
is my responsibility to safeguard classified information and
safeguard our sources and methods, including those from our
allies and partners.
Senator Shaheen. It's important to our allies that that be
the case; is that correct?
Ms. Bingen. Yes, Senator.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Mr. Rapuano, in thinking about cyber, what we've seen with
some of the breaches within DOD have been with respect to the
contractors that we work with. Do you have thoughts about what
more we can do to ensure that our contractors are doing
everything possible to make sure that they are not susceptible
to cyber threats and that they maintain secure networks?
Mr. Rapuano. Yes, Senator. The contractors are a very
important component of the total force, and if they have
vulnerabilities and the ability for adversaries to access their
systems, it really weakens the entire system. Looking at their
IT [information technology] at the level of modernity, how
often/frequent, what are their policies for patches and other
security measures is critical, and that's an area that, if
confirmed, would be a higher focus for me.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator King?
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The discussion of cyber policy, I don't want to say I
laughed, but I felt a sense of irony, because we probably spent
more time on cyber policy and cyber issues in this Committee
than any other single issue in the last year or so, but there
is no cyber policy. I realize that you all are not at the level
where you will be setting that policy, but I hope you will be
the continued irritant within the Administration, and this
spans the last Administration and the prior Administration.
We have got to get to the point where we have a doctrine
and a policy and a clear deterrent strategy. We don't have that
now, and I hope that this is something that, for example, in
your list, Mr. Karem, you're looking at international security.
The most likely attack is a cyber attack, and we have so many
warnings that keep coming. It's the longest wind-up for a punch
in world history, and we're still not ready.
I hope that each of you will take very seriously the
necessity for a consistent overall government and non-
government strategy and doctrine for dealing with this issue. I
just hope you'll take that on.
Mr. Karem, a more specific question. What's your
recommendation for our long-term military posture in Iraq after
the defeat of ISIS?
Mr. Karem. Senator, I believe there are ongoing discussions
between the United States and Iraq about a longer-term United
States presence after the defeat of ISIS. I think our
objectives in Iraq should be to make sure that Iraq remains a
long-term strategic partner in the fight against terrorism, and
that Iraq remains free from Iranian malign interference. The
precise mechanics of what that relationship looks like and the
authorities under which it occurs I think are under
negotiation, and if confirmed, I would want to work with
counterparts throughout the interagency and with the Congress
on what those mechanics should be.
Senator King. But I take it, it would be your
recommendation that some kind of total disengagement would not
be good policy?
Mr. Karem. Yes, sir. I believe history would caution
against walking away from our partners.
Senator King. Thank you.
Ms. Bingen, you're part of a much larger Intelligence
Community in your position. Do you see areas of redundancy and
opportunities for better coordination, cooperation, and perhaps
even efficiency in terms of the 17 agencies that are involved
in the United States Government in intelligence matters?
Ms. Bingen. Yes, Senator. Right off the bat, I think that
there is an opportunity for greater air space integration. I
know we continue to have these discussions, but it's an area
that we haven't made as much progress on as I would have
expected. Air space integration, more integration on the ground
in terms of the processing, exploitation, dissemination
capabilities, and bringing in whether it's commercial
technologies or other technologies out there. There is a lot of
data right now out there, whether it's slow-motion video or
others, that our analysts are frankly spending more time
searching for that data than they are doing the analysis.
I think there are some opportunities to integrate not only
better across the defense intelligence enterprise but also in
support of that national Intelligence Community enterprise as
well.
Senator King. Will you participate in your position as a
member of the Intelligence Community, or is that General
Stewart? How does the structure work?
Ms. Bingen. Yes, Senator. One of the jobs of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and as Principal Deputy,
if confirmed, I would support that. It is dual hat. It is the
Director of Defense Intelligence and Principal Advisor to the
DNI for Military Intelligence matters.
Senator King. You will be engaged in those discussions?
Ms. Bingen. Absolutely, sir, if confirmed.
Senator King. Mr. Rapuano, what do we need to do to ensure
defense of the Homeland from the growing threat of missile
attack from North Korea? How do you feel about the state of our
missile defense? This is a key area, it seems to me, that is
becoming more important every day, literally every day.
Mr. Rapuano. Senator, missile attack is not directly in my
portfolio, but clearly it's a growing threat specifically with
regard to North Korea. There are a number of systems that we
have in place, both in terms of our capability to detect and
track these systems, as well as to engage and defeat them. I
think it would be difficult without going into a closed hearing
to get into some of those details, and I haven't been fully
briefed on them, but I certainly recognize your concern, and
that would be an area of focus should I be confirmed.
Senator King. Thank you.
My time has expired, but another area I think it's
important to pay attention to in a changing environment is the
Arctic. In the absence of Senator Sullivan this morning, I'll
carry the water for him. It's an incredibly important area. The
opening up of the Arctic Ocean is the equivalent of the
discovery of the Mediterranean Sea. It's a new body of water
that's never been available for human activity in human
history, and the implications in terms of national security are
very serious. I hope that each of you in your respective areas
will be thinking about that as an important part of the
development of American doctrine and strategy. Thank you very
much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Cotton?
Senator Cotton. I share Senator King's concern about the
Arctic because I think we all do, but did we adopt a committee
role that only Senator Sullivan gets to bring that up
repeatedly in hearing after hearing?
[Laughter.]
Senator Cotton. You're his proxy today since he's absent
for the time being.
Thank you all for being here. Thank you for your
willingness to serve your country again. Thanks to all the
family members I see behind you as well, for the support you've
given them.
Mr. Karem, is it your sense that our NATO and United States
posture in Europe is adequate today to meet the threat from
Russia?
Mr. Karem. Senator, I believe that Vladimir Putin remains
undeterred from conducting activities that are harmful to the
interests of the United States and its NATO allies. I would, if
confirmed, want to look at what additional steps the United
States and its partners could do to bolster our deterrence and
ability to defend against such activities.
Senator Cotton. We're currently undertaking something
called the Reassurance Initiative. It's regrettable that we've
reached the point that we need to reassure our allies. But if
Vladimir Putin remains undeterred, what are some of the broad
steps--I understand you haven't been confirmed and you're not
in office, you haven't seen the most recent intelligence--the
broad steps necessary to reach a point where Vladimir Putin is
deterred?
Mr. Karem. Senator, I would look at it a couple of
different ways. There are investments that the United States
could make in technologies to offset the advantages the
Russians have acquired after 15 or 20 years of military
modernization. There are steps we could take to reinforce our
position on the continent. But as importantly, there are steps
that our NATO allies could take to meet the 2 percent pledge of
Wales and to invest in technologies that allow them to play a
larger role within the alliance in defending and deterring
against Russian aggression.
Senator Cotton. Investing in technologies, not pensions and
health care.
Mr. Karem. Correct. And the Wales pledge speaks to this.
Senator Cotton. Yes, it does. I mean, the 2 percent goal is
an important goal, but it's only a goal. Some countries might
want to spend more than that. They might want to coordinate the
technologies that they acquire given their positions within
Europe and the threat that Europe poses to them, and they
should all try to reach the 2 percent goal by increasing the
numerator, not decreasing the denominator of the size of their
economy, the way some European countries have done so.
Ms. Bingen, could you please speak to the importance of ISR
[intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] in Europe,
especially as it relates to the threat from Russia that we've
been discussing?
Ms. Bingen. Absolutely, Senator. I would start by saying
that I think the defense Intelligence Community needs to go to
school on what Russia is doing in Ukraine and Syria right now,
particularly in Ukraine. Based on what I've seen in my current
position, when you look at how they've integrated drones,
electronic warfare, cyber, their artillery capabilities, the
little green men, they are presenting a sophisticated
challenge. When I look at the whole of Europe and our national
security interests, this is a very different operational
challenge than what we've experienced the last 15 years in the
counterterrorism fight. We cannot assume that we have air
superiority in the future, and there are some tremendous, I
think, foundational intelligence requirements that need to be
undertaken that have atrophied over the last 15, 20 years, from
better foundational targeting information, order of battle
information, and a better ability to do indications and
warning.
Senator Cotton. You speak about air superiority. My
subcommittee, the Airland Subcommittee, we've heard from
numerous generals over the last 4 years, to include H.R.
McMaster in his previous role at CIC [Army Capabilities
Integration Center], about the threat that we're being out-
ranged and outgunned by our adversaries, in particular Russia
and China. Could you speak a little bit about the threat that
that poses to our forces in Europe?
Ms. Bingen. Senator, I think it's an incredible threat. In
my current position with the HASC, this is an area that we
focused on quite significantly in terms of what our posture
should be in that theater, but also the readiness challenges of
our forces, everything from equipment to end strength to the
training that's required in this contested environment that,
frankly, we have not had to do, and we've had a whole
generation of leaders coming up through the system that have
not had to go through--well, that have largely been focused on
the counterterrorism fight, rightly so, but they have not had
to do that high-end training that would be required in that
environment.
Senator Cotton. In layman's terms, our adversaries could
hit our troops with bullets and bombs at a distance that we
can't reach them; or, as you say, if we don't have air
superiority, their aircraft could fly over our troops and
attack our troops in a way that gives them the greater
advantage that we have enjoyed for 15 years in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
Ms. Bingen. Yes, Senator.
Senator Cotton. Thank you all.
Chairman McCain. Senator Warren?
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to all our witnesses for being here.
Mr. Karem, if confirmed, you'll be responsible for advising
the Secretary of Defense on defense policy toward Iran, and
there's no doubt that Iran remains a dangerous influence in the
region. But I'd like to ask you specifically about the nuclear
deal which imposed limits on Iran's nuclear program and placed
it under rigorous monitoring and inspections.
At his nomination hearing before this Committee, Secretary
Mattis referred to the Iran nuclear deal as, and I'll quote,
``an imperfect arms control agreement,'' but stated ``when
America gives her word, we have to live up to it and work with
our allies.''
Do you agree with that statement by Secretary Mattis?
Mr. Karem. I do, Senator.
Senator Warren. Good. Donald Trump once threatened to rip
up the Iran deal. Instead, last month, the Trump administration
certified that Iran is complying with the nuclear deal, which
was required for Iran to get sanctions relief and to keep the
agreement intact.
Mr. Karem, again, setting aside your views on the Iran deal
itself, do you agree with the Administration's decision to
certify that Iran is complying with its commitments under the
agreement?
Mr. Karem. Senator, I agree with the determination.
Senator Warren. Good.
Mr. Karem. I believe it was based on the assessment of the
Intelligence Community.
Senator Warren. Good. Do you think the nuclear deal makes
it harder or easier to counter Iran's other destabilizing
actions in the region?
Mr. Karem. Senator, I'm concerned that the nuclear deal has
in some ways limited our ability to confront Iran's malign
activities, that some of the sanctions relief has been lessened
that pertains to missile proliferation, for example.
Senator Warren. All right. But that's about sanctions in a
different area, about Iran's behavior. The Iran nuclear deal
isn't perfect, but I think it is easier to counter the
ambitions of an Iran that has no nuclear weapons than it is to
counter an Iran that can threaten the world with a nuclear
bomb. If the United States tears up this deal, we isolate
ourselves instead of Iran and potentially embolden the Iranians
to revive their nuclear program and to escalate their dangerous
activities in the region.
I want to also have a chance to ask you about Russia.
Donald Trump has flip-flopped on many foreign policy issues,
including the NATO alliance. Now, candidate Trump said that
NATO was obsolete and suggested that the U.S. would meet its
Article 5 commitments to defend our allies only if the country
being attacked spent 2 percent of GDP [gross domestic product]
on defense. But recently, after meeting with German Chancellor
Merkel, the NATO Secretary and the NATO Secretary General, he
announced that NATO was suddenly no longer obsolete.
Mr. Karem, what change caused NATO to go from obsolete to
not obsolete in a matter of a few weeks?
Mr. Karem. Senator, I can't speak to any internal
deliberations inside the Administration that may have led to a
change in the opinions of those in the White House.
Senator Warren. Do you believe now that NATO is obsolete or
not obsolete?
Mr. Karem. Senator, I believe that NATO is an essential
alliance----
Senator Warren. I'm sorry. Does that mean you believe it's
obsolete or not obsolete?
Mr. Karem. I believe it is not obsolete.
Senator Warren. You believe it is not obsolete. Do you
believe it used to be obsolete?
Mr. Karem. Senator, my own view is that NATO has been and
remains an important institution for the United States.
Senator Warren. Okay. I'll take that as not obsolete.
Should the United States refuse to defend our NATO allies
if they don't spend as much as we want them to spend on
defense?
Mr. Karem. Senator, I think it's important that our NATO
allies are full contributors to the alliance.
Senator Warren. Okay, but that's not my question. I want
them to be contributors to our alliance. The question I'm
asking is should we refuse to defend them if they don't meet
spending targets that we set that they should spend on their
own defense?
Mr. Karem. Senator, I believe that the United States'
commitment to Article 5 of NATO is sacrosanct.
Senator Warren. Which means that we commit no matter how
much, right?
Mr. Karem. Correct, but our allies should understand that
they weaken the alliance by not meeting their commitment.
Senator Warren. I understand that, but you're saying we're
still committed.
We've also increased our own spending on the region through
the European Resistance Initiative, ERI, deploying our own
equipment and----
Chairman McCain. It's ``Reassurance.''
Senator Warren. Oh, I'm sorry, ``Reassurance.'' You're
right. Thank you. Sorry, Mr. Chairman.
Deploying equipment and rotating ground forces back into
Europe. But this conventional display of force obviously by
itself isn't sufficient to deter Russia. I'll stop here because
I'm out of time and I want to be respectful, but I do want to
submit a question for the record about working with our NATO
allies to counter Russian aggression in the region.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. I thank you, Senator Warren.
Mr. Karem, would you judge Iranian behavior to have
increased or decreased their aggressive behavior in the region
since the agreement was made with the Iranians concerning
nuclear?
Mr. Karem. Senator, I believe the Iranian behavior has not
decreased. It has probably increased, and it poses a
significant threat to the United States and its allies.
Chairman McCain. I could not allow the witnesses to leave
without significant questions concerning the Arctic, Senator
Sullivan.
[Laughter.]
Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chairman, I'm very glad that you're
so interested in the Arctic.
[Laughter.]
Senator Sullivan. Mr. Karem, I'd actually like to follow up
on Iran. You know, a number of us have been following that
issue for quite some time, even well before we started
negotiations with the Iranians, and there are some serious
doubts, I think, both in classified and unclassified venues, on
whether and to what degree the Iranians are actually complying
with the nuclear agreement.
I know that the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency]
recently confirmed that they believe that they were in
compliance, but a number of us who follow this very closely
have a lot of skepticism with regard to that issue. I think
it's an incredibly important issue.
If confirmed, will you commit to looking at that outside of
what the IAEA has stated and give us, give this Committee your
own view based on both classified and unclassified information
on whether or not the Iranians or, for that matter, the
Russians are in compliance with this agreement, which many of
us thought was an ill-fated idea to begin with?
Mr. Karem. Senator, I believe the Administration is very
focused on making sure the Iranians are living up to their side
of the agreement, and if confirmed I would certainly commit to
coming back to you on this.
Senator Sullivan. But coming back to us not just parroting
what the IAEA has stated but coming back to us with your own
and the Department of Defense's own independent evaluation of
whether or not you as an organization believe that they're in
compliance.
Mr. Karem. Yes, sir.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
Mr. Rapuano--sorry, I know I'm probably butchering that.
You know, in the last few days there's been--not few days,
several weeks--a growing concern about the capability of the
North Koreans with regard to their intercontinental ballistic
nuclear capabilities. It's been stated in this Committee
several times that it's not a matter of if anymore but when
they're going to have that capability, not just a range to
states like Alaska and Hawaii but the lower 48 states.
My view has certainly been that if we know that that day is
coming that they're going to have that capability, whether in a
year or 5 years, that we need to do much more with regard to
our Nation's missile defense to array a missile defense system
that tries to integrate THAAD [Terminal High Altitude Area
Defense], Aegis, the missile defense base in the U.S.
What's your view on missile defense capabilities right now
and what we should be doing with regard to our missile defense
given that perhaps during your watch Kim Jong-un is going to be
able to announce, and probably with good reason, that he has
the capability to send a nuclear missile to hit Chicago or L.A.
or New York?
Mr. Rapuano. Senator, missile defense, ballistic missile
defense does not fit within the portfolio for Homeland Defense
and Global Security. Cruise missiles and air space defense
does. But I will certainly acknowledge that there are growing
concerns about ballistic missiles, particularly from countries
like the DPRK. The capabilities associated with detecting,
tracking, acquiring, and defeating these systems, as you know,
we do have some of them deployed. We have areas that require
improvement, and that is a growing focus of concern in the
Department.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you. I'd like to get a commitment
that you work with other members within the Administration on
that important issue, if confirmed.
Mr. Rapuano. If confirmed, absolutely, Senator.
Senator Sullivan. Not to disappoint the Chairman with my 30
seconds left but, Mr. Karem, give me your sense. When Secretary
Mattis, General Mattis testified, he did say that the Arctic is
an increasingly important area of strategic interest for the
United States because of, of course, natural resources, the
environment, opening shipping lanes and sea routes. Vladimir
Putin has called it the new Suez Canal, which the Russians want
to dominate. They're massively building up their military
capabilities in the Arctic, four new brigade combat teams, a
new Arctic military command, 40 icebreakers, building 13 more.
We've been slow to the game up there. The Department of
Defense has just put out a revised Arctic strategy which was
mandated by this Committee that the Secretary of Defense put
forward. If confirmed, will you give that strategic area of the
United States sufficient focus and interest the way that
Secretary Mattis stated he would during his confirmation
hearing?
Mr. Karem. Senator, I will, and if confirmed I look forward
also to working with our allies who share a significant stake
in the Arctic.
Senator Sullivan. Great. We just had the Arctic ministerial
led by Secretary Tillerson up in the great city of Fairbanks,
Alaska last week where all eight Arctic ministers, including
the foreign ministers of Russia, NATO, and Canada, convened and
tried to talk about cooperation in that important area of the
world. But the tensions underlying that ministerial were
apparent, mostly because of the Russian aggressive actions,
including five bomber runs at sovereign air space in the United
States, in Alaska, where we've had to intercept those Russian
bombers from coming into American air space. We want to work
with you on that. It's an important area of the world and
increasingly being militarized by the Russians.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. The Russians asserted their sovereignty
over Alaska again?
Senator Sullivan. Putin is just upset that we got such a
good deal 150 years ago when we bought Alaska.
Chairman McCain. Some of us question that.
[Laughter.]
Chairman McCain. I want to thank the witnesses for their
willingness to serve, for their past service, and we will move
forward as quickly as possible so that you can get to work. I
thank you for your service to the country and your continued
willingness to serve.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 10:39 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
------
[Prepared questions submitted to Mr. Robert S. Karem by
Chairman McCain prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
defense reforms
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017
included the most sweeping reforms since the Goldwater-Nichols
Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.
Question. Do you support these reforms?
Answer. Yes, I do. With respect to reforms that impact the
portfolio of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs, the establishment of a central transfer account and
consolidated authorities for security cooperation should help make our
assistance more efficient, more flexible, and more tailored to our
national interests and defense strategies. If confirmed, I look forward
to better understanding the practical impact of the reforms that fall
under the portfolio of the ASD (ISA) and how best to implement them.
Question. What other areas for defense reform do you believe might
be appropriate for this Committee to address?
Answer. In the event I am confirmed, I would want to establish a
baseline of experience working under the recent reforms before
recommending additional areas of reform.
duties
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs is the principal advisor to the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy and the Secretary of Defense on international
security strategy and policy on issues of Defense Department interest
that relate to the nations and international organizations of Europe
(including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Russia), the
Middle East, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere, their governments and
defense establishments; and for oversight of security cooperation
programs, including Foreign Military Sales in these regions.
What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs under
current regulations and practices?
Answer. The responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for International Security Affairs, ASD (ISA), are outlined by DOD
Directive 5111.07. My role, if confirmed, would be to serve as the
principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense and Undersecretary of
Defense for Policy with respect to defense policy and strategy for the
Middle East, Europe, Russia, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere.
Practically, the ASD (ISA) has been responsible for coordinating
policies with the Joint Staff, representing the Department in
interagency deliberations, helping manage the Department's defense
relationships with foreign partners from the above regions, and
overseeing various security cooperation and assistance programs, among
other responsibilities.
Question. If confirmed, what duties and functions do you expect
that the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy would prescribe for you?
Answer. As yet, I am unaware of any specific additional guidance
the Secretary of Defense or Under Secretary of Defense for Policy would
prescribe for the ASD (ISA) position.
qualifications
Question. What background and experience do you possess that
qualify you for this position?
Answer. For nearly two decades, I have been immersed in U.S.
national security and defense policy. Both in government and at policy
think tanks, I have worked on an array of issues relevant to the
portfolio of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs. I have served as a foreign policy advisor to the now
Senate Majority Leader, as a Middle East policy advisor in the White
House to the Vice President, and as the national security advisor to
two U.S. House Majority Leaders. In these roles, I have worked closely
with Defense Department officials, participated in high-level
interagency deliberations, and helped to manage the national security
oversight and legislative activities of the House of Representatives.
These experiences have prepared me to execute the responsibilities of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.
major challenges and priorities
Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities will you establish?
Answer. If confirmed, the specific priorities I would establish
will depend in large measure on the priorities of the Secretary of
Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense. These priorities, among
others, will in all likelihood include rebuilding American military
strength and readiness, bolstering our critical alliances while
ensuring our allies contribute meaningfully to our shared security
objectives, strengthening U.S. credibility and influence in key
regions, defeating ISIS, confronting Iranian aggression, and ensuring
OSD(P) plays a meaningful and constructive role within the Department's
overall military policy making, among others.
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges, if any, you
would confront if confirmed as Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs?
Answer. If confirmed, I believe the major challenges will be
defeating ISIS and other radical Islamic terrorist groups; countering
Russian and Iranian aggression; rebuilding American military strength;
strengthening America's credibility, alliances, and partnerships; and
rebalancing burden-sharing within those alliances.
Practically, I believe it is often a challenge amidst the daily
demands and urgent crises to ensure we are regularly reevaluating our
strategies and objectives, and questioning the assumptions on which our
strategies are based and the metrics by which our success is judged.
Question. If confirmed, what management actions and timelines would
you establish to address these challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I would want to first examine the existing
management structure of the organization, as well as the assumptions
and timelines associated with meeting these challenges, before
providing an answer. Ultimately, prioritization and timelines of
confronting these challenges will depend on guidance from the Secretary
of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, as well as by
interagency or Presidential determinations.
relations with congress
Question. What are your views on the state of the relationship
between the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs and the Senate Armed Services Committee in particular, and with
Congress in general?
Answer. I am unaware of the specific, current state of the
relationship between the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs and the Senate Armed Services Committee.
I believe the new Secretary of Defense is committed to a harmonious
relationship with Congress and I am optimistic the Department and the
Committees of jurisdiction will establish a strong and collaborative
relationship.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to sustain a
productive and mutually beneficial relationship between the Congress
and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs?
Answer. It would be my intention, if confirmed, to take a proactive
approach to working with the Committees of jurisdiction and the
Congress in confronting the many significant threats facing our
country. As a former Senate and House staffer, I am particularly
mindful of the critical role the Congress can and should play in
matters of national security. I believe the U.S. Government is stronger
when the Executive and Legislative branches have a relationship of
trust and when channels of communication run both ways.
torture and enhanced interrogation techniques
Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the
Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated August 19, 2014, and
required by section 1045 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-92)?
Answer. I do, and I will uphold the law and the Department of
Defense directives that govern detainee treatment.
united states strategic vital interests
Question. It is important to delineate between the United States'
strategic vital interests and other interests. Strategic vital
interests must represent those for which the United States is willing
to commit the nation's blood and treasure.
What and where are the United States' strategic vital interests?
Answer. I believe American strategic vital interests begin with
protecting the physical security of the Homeland, safeguarding our
sovereignty, preserving our democratic institutions, rule of law,
freedoms, and values of our society (in short, our way of life), and
promoting American economic prosperity. As a global superpower with
global interests, these strategic vital national interests are closely
tied to the international system of alliances, relationships, and order
built and led by the United States World War II.
Question. How do these overlay with extant and emerging threats
around the globe?
Answer. Given the global reach of the American economy, security
challenges in nearly every region can touch upon various elements of
our strategic vital national interests. For example, instability in
regions of critical economic or security interest for the United States
could jeopardize vital national interests; revisionist powers might
threaten key shipping lanes or critical allies; or terrorist
organizations might leverage new technologies or exploit gaps in our
defenses to strike asymmetrically at core national interests.
national defense strategy
Question. In your view, what should the envisioned end states
entail for a new National Defense Strategy?
Answer. I would not want to prejudge the end states of a new
National Defense Strategy, as required by the Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA.
Such a strategy should clearly identify the vital national interests
that such a strategy must safeguard and how all elements of national
power can be utilized to do so. If confirmed, I would eagerly support
my Assistant Secretary of Defense counterpart responsible for
coordinating this important strategy document.
Question. What should be the objectives and key attributes of the
National Defense Strategy?
Answer. I understand the National Defense Strategy is currently
being updated. I believe the review will reassess our assumptions about
the global environment, clearly identify our vital national interests,
establish a strategic framework to identify threats and opportunities,
identify elements of national power that can be utilized to protect and
promote our vital national interests, and review force structure
requirements for various aspects of the strategy.
Question. What are the key elements of strategic deterrence in the
21st Century?
Answer. The key elements of strategic deterrence in the 21st
Century are the same as they have been for millennia. Deterrence
requires having sufficient capabilities, credibility, and will to
convince adversaries that challenging the United States, or allies to
whom we are bound by treaty, would be prohibitively costly.
Technological developments, changes in the distribution of global
power, and the rise of violent non-state actors have complicated
deterrence, but have not fundamentally altered how U.S. policymakers
should think about deterrence strategies.
Question. What should be the core elements of a comprehensive
global defense strategy to: defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
(ISIS), Al Qaeda, and other purveyors of violent extremism; stabilize
Afghanistan; limit Iran's malign influence and other activities;
contain North Korea; and deter war with Russia and China?
Answer. In my view, such a strategy should begin with rebuilding
America's military capabilities, strengthening our credibility,
bolstering our alliances and partners, and mobilizing such partners to
join the United States in confronting shared threats. Recognizing that
some of these challenges fall outside of the portfolio of the ASD
(ISA), if confirmed I would work with my colleagues across the
government to address these discrete threats with specific strategies,
consistent with a comprehensive global defense strategy and our
national interests.
united states military force sufficiency
Question. The United States will likely never afford the resources
to assign all the forces each combatant commander believes they need,
which leads the Defense Department to apportion forces in operations
planning. As U.S. military forces are already severely challenged in
terms of capacity, in certain scenarios these forces may only exist on
paper when it becomes necessary to allocate them for a given
contingency.
How important are the U.S. military's global power projection
capabilities in ensuring we remain a global power?
Answer. It is difficult to overstate the importance of maintaining
America's global power projection capabilities. Our ability to deploy
and sustain forces across the world is an essential element of our
deterrence and defense strategies, and many non-military benefits
accrue from our global force posture and power projection capabilities.
Question. Do you believe the United States must retain the
capability to strike any global target (hold any target at risk), both
in the nuclear and conventional sense?
Answer. Yes, although I am concerned that investments by
sophisticated adversaries in certain technologies and systems are
complicating our strike capabilities in some theatres. If confirmed, I
would want to carefully review our current and projected ability to
hold enemy targets at risk.
Question. In your opinion, does power projection include our
ability to deploy and sustain forces anywhere on the planet, across the
full range of military operations? Do you believe this is a unique
characteristic of the American way of war?
Answer. Yes. Our ability to deploy and sustain forces across the
globe is a unique characteristic of the U.S. military. Our ability to
maintain such capabilities may be increasingly challenged both by
advances in the capabilities of our adversaries and by our own
budgetary decisions. We should not take for granted that this hugely
important, asymmetric power of the United States will be maintained
without risk or cost.
Question. Do you believe we must also have a sufficient strategic
and operational reserve, national mobilization capability, and robust
defense industrial base to provide a second echelon of follow-on forces
if a contingency arises in a particular region, especially against a
near peer state?
Answer. Yes. Such a capability is essential for deterring
adversaries and, in the event the United States must go to war against
a near peer adversary, for prevailing in such a conflict.
Question. In light of current and future threats to the United
States' strategic vital interests, do you believe the U.S. military
must have the capacity to fight two wars simultaneously?
Answer. I agree with the concerns expressed by the 2014 National
Defense Panel with respect to the decision to edge away from having the
capacity to conduct two major wars simultaneously. The deterioration of
the global security environment in recent years has increased the
likelihood that the U.S. and its partners could face such an
eventuality.
Question. If you ascribe to these attributes as required of the
U.S. military, in your opinion does the Fiscal Year 2017 Request for
Additional Appropriations, and the fiscal year 2018 defense budget
request previewed in the President's Budget Blueprint, sufficiently
support the attainment of these attributes?
Answer. The Fiscal Year 2017 Request for Additional Appropriations
and Fiscal Year 2018 defense budget request begin a process of digging
the U.S. military out of the hole created in defense spending by the
Budget Control Act. But, restoring America's military readiness,
modernizing its capabilities, and fully meeting service requirements
cannot be accomplished in a single budget cycle.
The defense budget is an expression of our national will, and it
remains at historically low levels as a percentage of GDP.
strategy to defeat isis
Question. On January 28, 2017, National Security Presidential
Memorandum-3 was issued that states: ``It is the policy of the United
States that ISIS be defeated'' and directs the Administration ``to
develop a comprehensive plan to defeat ISIS'' with the Secretary of
Defense as the lead of the interagency effort.
How would you define success in the defeat of ISIS?
Answer. I would define success as eliminating the ability of ISIS
to control territory and promote a physical caliphate, significantly
degrading its ability to conduct operations (especially against the
Homeland), discrediting its radical ideology, and shaping the
environment so that conditions do not easily allow for other radical
Islamic terrorist groups to pick up the mantle of jihad.
Question. What goals, objectives, and indicators of success would
you recommend for the strategy to defeat ISIS?
Answer. If confirmed, I would examine the definitions of success
above in conjunction with the Department's existing goals, objectives,
and metrics of success to determine whether any revisions are
warranted.
Question. What types of options should be considered to accelerate
the defeat of ISIS?
Answer. I understand some decisions have already been made with
respect to changing the rules of engagement for United States forces
and providing additional resources to local partners involved in the
fight against ISIS. I further understand the Secretary has established
a Defense Department task force aimed at integrating activities in the
counter-ISIS campaign. If confirmed, I look forward to working with
that task force and within the interagency process to identify
additional steps the Department, other agencies, and United States
partners can take to accelerate the defeat of ISIS.
Question. In your opinion, what are the major lessons learned from
the fight against ISIS in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and elsewhere over the
last 2\1/2\ years?
Answer. There are many lessons to be derived from our Nation's
experiences in the fight against ISIS and other terrorist groups,
particularly beyond the 2\1/2\ year window. An illustrative, partial
list might include: being mindful that the risks of inaction can be as
great as the risks of intervention; the fact that the need for local
partners to take the lead can be complicated by the difficulties in
rapidly training capable partner security forces; the importance of
conducting military operations with a mind to shaping political
conditions and outcomes consistent with US national interests; the
impact that weakened credibility can have on America's influence over
both its partners and its adversaries; the need to periodically
challenge assumptions about the strategy and the metrics used to judge
its success; and so forth.
Question. What non-military activities by the United States
Government will be important for achieving a lasting defeat of ISIS?
Answer. A significant number of non-military factors will be
essential for securing a lasting defeat of ISIS and preventing the rise
of similar radical Islamic terrorist groups. Responsibility for these
non-military measures will fall on other U.S. Government agencies,
foreign partners, and local actors. An illustrative list would include
governance issues in Iraq and Syria in the wake of the liberation of
Mosul and Raqqa; political comity among sectarian and ethnic
communities in these and other countries in the region; security sector
reform and development; economic development; credible diplomatic
pressure to facilitate political resolutions to ongoing civil
conflicts; efforts to discredit radical ideologies; efforts to limit
the malign activities of actors such as Iran; and efforts to better
confront terrorist financing and arms transfers.
After Mosul and Raqqa are liberated from ISIS control, the next
major military campaign will likely occur in the Euphrates river
valley.
Question. What is your understanding of the strategy to accomplish
United States objectives in Iraq and Syria after Mosul and Raqqa are
liberated from ISIS?
Answer. I understand the current strategy is to enable and work
with local partners, along with a regional and global coalition of
partners, to defeat ISIS and prevent the rise of other radical Islamic
terrorist groups. I have not yet been briefed on the specifics of the
campaign plan for Iraq and Syria beyond the liberation of Mosul and
Raqqa. If confirmed, I will work with colleagues throughout the
Department and interagency to ensure the U.S. strategy shapes the
outcome of the conflicts in Iraq and Syria consistent with our national
interest.
Question. What steps should be taken to prepare for the next phase
in the campaign after the liberation of Mosul and Raqqa?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of
Defense and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to understand their
priorities for the strategy beyond Mosul and Raqqa. While I support the
view that the Department should preserve the element of strategic
surprise by not telegraphing actions prior to taking them. I believe it
is in America's interest that reliable and responsible local partners
have control over these liberated territories, just as it will be
important to constrain malign, destabilizing activities of Iranian-
backed militia and other elements of destabilizing Iranian influence.
Question. Should we seek a political solution for the Sunni Arab
peoples living between Damascus and Baghdad?
Answer. The political conditions under which Sunni Arabs will live
in Syria and Iraq will have a significant impact on whether they, yet
again, turn to radical Islamic terrorist groups to defend themselves
against sectarian or oppressive leadership. The U.S. cannot impose a
political solution, but it certainly has a stake in the political
outcomes of the military campaigns in the region. If confirmed, I will
work with counterparts at the Department of State to help the United
States best shape an enduring and stabilizing political solution
consistent with our national interests.
middle east
Question. What are the greatest threats to United States national
security interests in the Middle East and what policy objectives should
we pursue to protect them?
Answer. The most significant threats to United States national
security interests in the Middle East are radical Islamic terrorist
organizations, such as ISIS and al Qaeda; Iran's malign and
destabilizing activities in the region, including the activities of
Iranian proxies such as Hizballah; and a security and stability vacuum
that has emboldened and enabled both radical Islamic terrorist
organizations and aggressive, revisionist powers such as Iran.
To protect against these threats, the United States should maintain
its ability to project power to deter and defeat such adversaries,
successfully prosecute the war against ISIS, strengthen deterrent
credibility, restore trust and confidence in our diplomatic and defense
relationships with key regional partners such as Israel and the Gulf
States, and encourage regional and extra-regional partners to
contribute more to regional security efforts.
syria
Question. What are the key United States national security
interests in Syria and how would you describe the strategy to secure
them?
Answer. Radical Islamic terrorist groups, such as ISIS and al
Qaeda, pose the most immediate threat to United States interests in
Syria. Aside from the ISIS threat, Iranian and Hizballah influence has
made the Assad regime in Syria a strategic arm of the Islamic Republic
of Iran. Iran and Hizballah are active participants in Assad's brutal
war against the Syrian people--a war that helped create the conditions
for ISIS and other radical terrorist groups to thrive, and that has
threatened the security of its neighbors Israel, Jordan, Turkey, and
Lebanon (all partners of the United States), fomented sectarian
tensions, and destabilized the entire region. The confluence of the
threats posed by ISIS, Iranian aggression, and the Syrian civil war
have created a humanitarian catastrophe of historic proportions that
has threatened the security and political order of Europe. The
situation in Syria is truly a threat to international peace and
security.
I believe the strategy to address these threats will entail working
with partners to defeat ISIS and eliminate terrorist safe havens in
Syria, counter the malign activities and influence of Iran and its
terrorist proxies, support responsible local forces to defeat ISIS and
establish control over territory, and foster conditions to allow for a
cessation of hostilities and a negotiated solution to the Syrian civil
war. Because the entire world is threatened by the tragic conflict in
Syria, global pressure should be brought to bear on the principal
combatants. Unfortunately, efforts to resolve the conflict have been
complicated by Moscow, whose military intervention has done more to
bolster Syria and Iran than to undermine ISIS or to stabilize the
conflict.
Question. How does the strategy address the residual threat from Al
Qaeda in Syria and their associates?
Answer. My understanding is the strategy prioritizes targeting of
ISIS as well as residual Al Qaeda in Syria terrorists and other
associated terrorist organizations that pose a threat to the United
States. I have not yet been briefed on the specific mechanics of how
such targets are prioritized. But, if I am confirmed, I would want to
ensure the strategy effectively addresses the threat posed by a range
of terrorist groups.
Question. How would the defeat of ISIS impact the civil war in
Syria?
Answer. It would depend on a number of other variables, but the
defeat of ISIS and other affiliated terrorist groups may serve to
clarify the nature of the conflict in Syria, deny the Assad regime and
its patrons the excuse of combating ISIS in its perpetration of war
crimes against innocent civilians, and facilitate negotiations toward a
political resolution to the conflict.
Question. Do you believe a political resolution to the civil war in
Syria is necessary to address the underlying conditions that enable
violent extremists like ISIS and Al Qaeda to take root?
Answer. Yes.
Question. What are the key strategic interests and objectives of
the Russians in Syria and how successful have they been at
accomplishing them?
Answer. I am unaware of the Kremlin's internal perceptions of its
interests and objectives in intervening on behalf of the Assad regime
in the Syrian civil war. Moscow's intervention appears to have shored
up the Assad regime, increased Russia's regional influence, bolstered
its likely long-term military presence in the Middle East, allowed its
military to use Syria as a test-bed for a range of weapons systems and
tactics, and complicated American and allied options for shaping the
trajectory of the conflict. Whether these effects are ephemeral or
enduring is, as yet, unclear. In my estimation, none of these effects
have served America's national interest.
Discussing the removal of Bashar al-Assad from power with reporters
in March 2017, the United States Ambassador to the UN said: ``Are we
going to sit there and focus on getting him out? No . . . .''
Question. Has the previously stated goal of removing Bashar al-
Assad from power in Syria changed, and if so, what is the new objective
and what are the benefits to United States national security interests
of changing it?
Answer. I have not been briefed on the specific objectives of
United States policy in Syria, but multiple senior United States
officials have publicly indicated the objective is a negotiated
solution to the conflict. It is currently difficult to imagine a stable
solution that leaves Assad, who has repeatedly used chemical weapons,
barrel bombs, and other weapons to indiscriminately slaughter the
Syrian people, in place.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been adamant that the
People's Protection Units (YPG) of the Syrian Kurds should not receive
United States and coalition support in their efforts to liberate Raqqa.
Question. If the United States chooses not to support the YPG in
operations to liberate Raqqa, what alternative forces could be used and
how would their use affect the timeline and logistical support of the
operation?
Answer. Although I have not been specifically briefed on the
decision, recent media reporting indicates the United States has
decided to support Syrian Kurdish forces--which include YPG fighters--
as part of the Syrian Democratic Force (SDF). These forces are believed
to be the force most capable of liberating Raqqa from ISIS control in
the near term. Media reporting also indicates the United States will
continue to train and equip Syrian Arab Coalition fighters, who will
likely play an essential role in holding and stabilizing the
traditionally Sunni Arab city.
iraq
Question. What are the key United States national security
interests in Iraq and how would you describe the strategy to secure
them?
Answer. It is in the United States national security interest in
Iraq to defeat ISIS, help Iraqis stabilize their country and deny safe
haven to terrorist groups, protect their sovereignty and territorial
integrity, enhance our counterterrorism cooperation with the government
of Iraq, and facilitate an enduring political relationship among Sunni,
Shiite, and Kurdish communities that is free of Iranian and other
malign interference. Through direct targeting of ISIS and supporting
the government of Iraq and Iraqi Security Forces, the United States and
its coalition partners are making progress in achieving these
interests.
Question. Do you believe that an enduring United States military
presence is needed in Iraq? If so, what should be the missions and size
of the enduring U.S. military presence?
Answer. I do. Such an enduring presence need not entail combat
forces. But, in retrospect, such a presence in Iraq would have been
valuable not merely in identifying and confronting the advance of the
ISIS threat at much lower cost to the United States, but also in
limiting malign Iranian influence that has had a corrosive impact on
Iraqi and regional security. The United States and Iraq should be long-
term partners in combating terrorist organizations that will likely
continue to threaten our interests even after the defeat of ISIS in
Mosul.
I am not prepared to opine on the exact size or scope of a follow-
on military presence. But, if confirmed, I would work closely with
interagency counterparts and Iraqi government officials, while
consulting closely with the Congress, to determine what size and type
of presence would be in our mutual security interest.
Question. How would you characterize Iran's influence in Iraq today
and what is your recommended strategy to limit that influence in the
future?
Answer. For a number of years, and especially in the wake of the
United States withdrawal from Iraq, Iran has sought to increase its
influence in Iraq. In doing so, it fomented sectarian tensions,
corrupted Iraqi government institutions, and fostered political
conditions in Iraq that helped ISIS thrive.
The strategy to limit Iranian influence in Iraq in the near term
will require sustained United States and international engagement to
help the Iraqis strengthen cross-sectarian, national institutions, such
as the Iraqi security forces.
Moreover, the United States and its partners will need a broader
strategy to confront Iran's malign influence throughout the region.
iran
Question. What is your assessment of United States national
security interests associated with the growth of Iranian influence in
the Middle East?
Answer. Iran, long the world's most active state sponsor of
terrorism, poses a significant threat to U.S. national security
interests and those of our closest allies and partners in the region.
Tehran's bid for regional hegemony, destabilizing activities, efforts
to undermine its neighbors, complicity in Assad's war against the
Syrian people, support for terrorist proxies and insurgent movements,
missile proliferation, and recurrent threats to destroy Israel threaten
regional and even global peace and stability, and should be a matter of
profound international concern.
Question. How would you describe our strategy to counter Iran's
malign influence and other activities throughout the Middle East, and
more specifically, Iran's proxy networks?
Answer. I am aware of some elements of this strategy, but I have
not been briefed on all of the activities the United States is
currently pursuing to counter Iran's malign influence. Given the
expansion of Iranian malign influence in recent years and the boldness
with which Tehran appears to operate, however, I am not convinced the
strategy is succeeding. If confirmed, I would want to review the
elements of the strategy with an eye towards coordinating a more
effective regional and global approach to constrain, deter, and defeat
Iran's malign activities.
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to limit the nuclear
program of Iran was agreed in July 2015 and implemented in January
2016.
Question. What is your assessment of the JCPOA?
Answer. I believe the JCPOA is a suboptimal agreement. The deal in
the immediate term allows Iran to continue making progress on mastering
the nuclear fuel cycle through continued uranium enrichment research
and development activities. In the long-term, it opens an almost
unfettered pathway to an industrial-scale uranium enrichment program.
Moreover, there are significant questions about the access the IAEA
will have to suspected nuclear sites, especially military facilities,
that may complicate monitoring and enforcement of the deal. I am also
concerned about the phased removal of restrictions on Iran's missile
and conventional military capabilities, and the degree to which the
deal--including significant sanctions relief--has complicated
multilateral efforts to constrain Iran's destabilizing activities
throughout the region.
Question. In your opinion, how would Iran react to action by the
United States to unilaterally withdraw from the JCPOA?
Answer. It is difficult to say without additional information
regarding the context of a U.S. abrogation. It is possible Tehran would
seek to remain in at least ostensible compliance with the deal in order
to split the United States and its P5+1 partners and continue to
benefit from certain terms of the deal. It is also possible Tehran
would resume unfettered production of highly enriched uranium and
weaponization activities, or take other provocative actions.
yemen
Question. What are the United States national security interests in
Yemen?
Answer. The principal United States national security interests in
Yemen are countering terrorists, primarily al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS, maintaining freedom of navigation of key
international waterways, working with key economic and security
partners on the Arabian peninsula like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab
Emirates to defend against missile threats and further destabilization,
and supporting a political solution to the civil war that establishes
enduring political stability while denying a safe haven for terror or
increased Iranian influence.
Question. In your opinion, should we be doing more to help the
Saudi coalition in its efforts to find a solution to the conflict in
Yemen, and if so, what steps would you recommend?
Answer. I have not been briefed in detail on the current situation
in Yemen or the extent of United States involvement. If confirmed, I
would want to better understand the dynamics of the conflict and
examine what additional steps, if any, the U.S. could take to improve
the efficacy of our partners' operations while reducing civilian
casualties and facilitating an end to the conflict consistent with our
national interests.
Question. The Houthis are launching missiles deep into Saudi Arabia
and conducting regular raids into Saudi Arabia's southern territory. In
your estimation, do the Saudis have a choice of whether or not to
continue fighting in Yemen?
Answer. Nations that have been attacked always have a choice
whether or not to fight, though either decision can prove costly.
Certainly, Houthi missile attacks and cross border raids pose a
legitimate threat to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
Question. In your view, what conditions in Yemen need to be reached
for the Houthis to be willing to negotiate? Is the Saudi-led coalition
capable of creating those conditions and what is the appropriate role
for the United States in support of the coalition?
Answer. Although United Nations Security Council Resolution 2216
establishes the conditions for all parties to broker a political
solution to the conflict, I am not sufficiently well informed about the
current dynamics of the conflict in Yemen to opine on what specific
conditions must be attained for the Houthis to negotiate. I would
imagine that internal Houthi leadership dynamics, battlefield
conditions, and levels of external support for their continued
rebellion, and the specific elements of any political settlement under
consideration would affect the Houthi calculus in this regard. Without
additional information, I cannot say whether the Saudi-led coalition is
currently capable of achieving these conditions. If confirmed, I would
want to closely examine the conditions that could facilitate a
negotiated end to the conflict and the steps the U.S. could take to
achieve such an outcome.
Question. In your view, is it possible for the United States to
provide the Saudi-led coalition with assistance designed to reduce
civilian casualties without becoming a ``cobelligerent''? If so, what
assistance do you believe should be provided?
Answer. I do not believe current levels of support to the Saudi-led
coalition that allow our partners to defend themselves makes the United
States a ``cobelligerent'' in the conflict, but I am not a lawyer. If I
am confirmed, I would want to consult the Department of Defense's
general counsel before offering a more precise answer. That said, I
would also want to examine what additional steps the United States
could take to limit the tragic humanitarian costs of the conflict.
Question. To what extent are the Houthis, supported by Iran, a
threat to freedom of navigation in the Red Sea? What policy positions
would you recommend for the United States to address this threat?
Answer. I have not been briefed on the Department's insights into
the threat posed by the Houthis to freedom of navigation in the Red
Sea, but media reporting suggests Iran has provided the Houthis with
weapons, including anti-ship cruise missiles, which they have fired
upon vessels operating in international waters. If true, it would be
similar to Iran's provision of sophisticated weapons to terrorist
proxies such as Hizballah, and indicate a growing need for an
international effort to confront Iran's malign activities, such as its
support for terrorism and illicit weapons shipments. Such cruise-
missile attacks demonstrate an obvious threat to international freedom
of navigation in such a narrow and important international waterway.
Question. In your opinion, what would be the implications of the
United States cutting off the sale of precision-guided munitions to
Saudi Arabia and its coalition partners?
Answer. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia appears resolutely committed to
prosecuting its operations against the Houthis in Yemen, regardless of
whether or not Riyadh maintains access to precision-guided munitions
that could increase the efficacy of their strikes and reduce the risk
of inadvertent civilian casualties. Withholding U.S. technologies and
support in this specific case may reduce the influence the United
States has with respect to our Saudi partner's activities in this
conflict.
russia
Question. Senior United States military officials have said Russia
is the country that poses the greatest existential threat to the United
States.
What are the challenges to United States national security
interests from Russia and what are the key principles that must
underpin a successful strategy to protect our interests?
Answer. Secretary Mattis has made clear that Russia is choosing to
be a strategic competitor of the United States and seeks to enhance its
global position and influence through destabilizing and aggressive
means. While the United States has long sought cooperation with
Russia--and while there may be areas where greater cooperation would
seem to be in the interests of both parties--too often Russia has
chosen to challenge and undermine America's strategic position and
threaten our allies.
Significant challenges to United States national security interests
from Russia include the invasion and occupation of the sovereign
territory of Ukraine; the use of hybrid war tactics and active measures
to destabilize American allies and partners; the aggressive use of
asymmetric capabilities and technologies; diplomatic and military
support to rogue state sponsors of terrorism such as Iran and Syria;
and provocative military modernization efforts and deployments that
pose offensive threats to the U.S. and its allies.
As described elsewhere, a strategy to deter and defend against such
threats begins with rebuilding U.S. and NATO military capabilities and
strengthening our credibility. We must be prepared to counter Russian
aggression and impose meaningful costs on Russia when Moscow threatens
American interests. Yet, while we must be resolute in responding to
Russian provocations, we should also continue to seek cooperation with
Russia in pursuit of shared interests.
Question. Should the United States condition its military
engagement with Russia on certain changes in Russian behavior, and if
so what conditions, if any, would you recommend?
Answer. The United States is currently prohibited from engaging in
military-to-military cooperation with the Russian Federation in
response to its invasion and illegal occupation of Ukraine. Section
1232 of the 2017 NDAA requires that Russia must ``cease its occupation
of Ukrainian territory and its aggressive activities that threaten the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine and members of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization'' before such restrictions can be
lifted. If confirmed, I would uphold this requirement.
Question. Do you agree with General Scaparrotti that our current
force posture in Europe is ``inadequate'' to deter Russia? What changes
to our force posture would you recommend?
Answer. Although the U.S. and NATO have taken some steps to improve
the readiness and capabilities of our deterrent forces in Europe, I am
personally skeptical that Russia is sufficiently deterred from engaging
in a range of destabilizing and aggressive activities.
If confirmed, I will consult with the Joint Staff, United States
European Command, NATO counterparts, and the Congress on what
additional steps might be necessary to enhance United States and NATO
readiness and capabilities in Europe.
Question. Should the Department of Defense revisit the European
Infrastructure Consolidation (EIC) initiative announced in 2015? If so,
how should any such revision to our force posture in Europe take into
account United States objectives and plans under the European
Deterrence Initiative to bolster the military capabilities of our
European allies?
Answer. I am not sufficiently immersed in this issue to have an
immediate answer. If confirmed, I would want to examine whether the
European Infrastructure Consolidation (EIC), along with the European
Reassurance Initiative (ERI), remain consistent with our national
interest in maintaining a robust and capable deterrent force in Europe.
I would want to consult with United States European Command to
ascertain whether EIC remains an effective way to reduce cost and
eliminate excess capacity without reducing our capabilities and
flexibility.
Question. Do you support continued United States security
assistance to Ukraine, and if so, how does the provision of such
assistance contribute to a broader U.S. regional security strategy?
Answer. I have long supported United States security assistance to
Ukraine in order to help the government in Kyiv defend its own
sovereign territory and territorial integrity. If confirmed, I would
want to examine the impact that the Department's existing train and
equip efforts have had on the Ukrainian military's capacity to defend
its territorial integrity, and whether additional security assistance
efforts might be in our national interest.
Question. Do you support providing lethal defensive security
assistance to Ukraine as in the interests of the United States?
Answer. I have been sympathetic regarding such assistance in the
past, but have not been briefed in detail on the current dynamics of
the conflict. If confirmed, I would want to more rigorously examine the
capabilities of the Ukrainian military, the threat posed by separatists
and Russian forces, and the expert views of relevant interagency and
United States intelligence officials regarding the mechanics, risks,
and benefits of such assistance.
Question. In your view, what are the key elements of a strategy to
counter Russian hybrid tactics that employ both hard and soft power and
present attribution challenges?
Answer. Rebuilding American and allied military strength remains at
the center of any deterrence strategy, but specifically countering
Russian hybrid tactics will require NATO allies to take more seriously
their obligations under Article 3 to improve national resilience--
especially with respect to cybersecurity--and to maintain the political
will to defend the sovereignty of Member states and counter Russian
influence and information operations. To counter a false Kremlin
narrative, it is also important to demonstrate to the Russian people
that the United States and its NATO allies have an alliance that is
inherently defensive and does not pose a threat to Russia's sovereignty
or legitimate national interests, and that Russia has more to gain in
economic and security terms from partnership with the West than from
confrontation.
Question. What is your assessment of the Russian malign influence
threat, and what recommendations, if any, would you have for the role
of the United States Government, and the Department of Defense in
particular, in countering that threat?
Answer. Russian influence operations are not a new threat, and the
United States and its allies effectively countered Soviet influence
operations and active measures throughout the Cold War. Russia is
effectively using new technologies and platforms to pursue old
objectives, but as indicated above, these efforts can be thwarted by
renewed investment by America and its allies in national resilience.
Given the degree to which Russia's active measures and influence
operations have used illicit cyber-activities, unique Department of
Defense capabilities may be effective in countering some aspects of
this threat. If confirmed, I would want to examine more closely the
military dimensions of this threat--and our potential responses--before
opining more specifically.
russian violation of the 1987 intermediate-range nuclear forces (inf)
treaty
Question. Russia's deployment of a nuclear ground-launched cruise
missile (GLCM) in violation of the 1987 INF Treaty poses a risk to our
NATO Allies and United States forces in Europe.
Given the unlikelihood that Russia will return to compliance with
the INF Treaty, how should the United States address the military and
political implications of this new nuclear ground-launched cruise
missile?
Answer. As Secretary Mattis has said, Russia's violation of the INF
Treaty increases the risk to United States forces in Europe and to our
allies. Russia should not be allowed to violate arms control agreements
with impunity, and the United States should consider whether to best
respond to Russia's actions with diplomatic efforts, changes in our
force posture, other forms of leverage and pressure, or some
combination of the above. Clearly, the United States and its NATO
allies must take Russia's military modernization in many areas
seriously as they consider their Article 3 obligations under the North
Atlantic Treaty.
Question. If Russia fails to return to compliance under the INF
Treaty, should we extend the New START treaty for an additional 5
years, as stipulated by the treaty?
Answer. It depends on whether the New START Treaty remains itself
in the United States interest irrespective of Russia's violations of
the INF Treaty. If confirmed, I would want to confer with the Joint
Staff and appropriate experts at the Department and within the
interagency before coming to such a judgment. If maintaining New START
levels irrespective of Russian INF violations is in the national
interest, we should examine other means to induce Russia to return to
compliance with the INF Treaty or to counteract the impact that Russian
violations may have on United States and NATO security.
Question. What military advantage, if any, has Russia gained by
acting in violation of its INF obligations?
Answer. Although I have not been briefed in any detail on Russia's
violation of the INF Treaty, I do not believe Russia has gained an
appreciable offensive military advantage that cannot be mitigated by
countervailing defensive actions of the United States and its NATO
allies. Responding to Russia's military modernization, treaty
violations, and aggression will not be without cost, but maintaining
our deterrent and defense capabilities in Europe remains essential to
the United States national interest and that of our closest allies.
Question. Is there a gap in U.S. military capability that could be
filled by a system comparable to the GLCM?
Answer. I understand the Administration is reviewing this issue. If
confirmed, I look forward to working with the Committee to address it.
Question. Should we increase NATO's defenses against these new
cruise missiles as well as against Russia's air and sea-launched cruise
missiles?
Answer. I understand the President has ordered a Ballistic Missile
Defense Review to examine whether we should strengthen U.S. missile
defense capabilities, including with respect to meeting this challenge.
If confirmed, I would want to examine the findings of this study before
opining on what new missile defenses might be necessary.
north atlantic treaty organization (nato)
Question. In your opinion, does the NATO Alliance benefit the
national security interests of the United States?
Answer. I agree with Secretary Mattis that ``NATO is vital to our
national interest and it is vital to the security of the United
States.''
Question. What are the major strategic objectives of the NATO
Alliance in the coming years?
Answer. NATO must continue to deter Russian aggression; encourage
and assist its Member States to become more resilient, particularly
against asymmetric and ``hybrid'' threats; make demonstrable progress
towards the Wales 2% pledge and alliance burden-sharing; and play a
more active role in our common fight against terrorism and out-of-area
threats.
Question. In your opinion, what are the greatest challenges for
NATO and the most important capability improvements that the Alliance
must make to deal with the accelerated and growing threats it faces?
Answer. Secretary Mattis has made clear a significant challenge for
NATO will be to muster the political will to deter Russian aggression,
resolve defense burden-sharing imbalances by meeting the 2% Wales
pledge, and maintain alliance solidarity on key issues such as
deterrence and countering terrorism. These challenges are exacerbated
by growing political polarization within Europe, external crises and
issues that will compete for the time and attention of national
leaders, and NATO's somewhat cumbersome decision-making process.
That said, the magnitude of the growing threats posed to the
Alliance should serve to help capitals overcome political resistance to
increasing their contributions to the alliance and rallying behind
joint efforts to defeat ISIS and deter further Russian aggression. In
the event I am confirmed, I look forward to working with U.S.
colleagues and NATO counterparts in identifying key capabilities in
which the U.S. and our NATO partners must invest in order to
effectively meet these challenges.
Question. What is your perspective on accusations that our NATO
Allies do not carry their fair share of the security burden?
Answer. My perspective is that these accusations are accurate,
long-standing, and bipartisan. They reflect a justifiable concern that
some of our NATO allies do not take seriously their commitment to
Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty which states that Members
``separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-
help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and
collective capacity to resist armed attack.''
I agree with Secretary Mattis' warning to NATO allies that
``Americans cannot care more for your children's security than you do.
Disregard for military readiness demonstrates a lack of respect for
ourselves, for the alliance, and for the freedoms we inherited, which
are now clearly threatened.''
Question. In your view, is there a continuing requirement for U.S.
nuclear weapons to be deployed in NATO countries?
Answer. Yes. NATO allies reaffirmed at the Wales Summit that the
alliance nuclear force is an essential component of NATO's deterrent
strategy. I believe the U.S. and NATO must maintain the full range of
capabilities necessary to maintain this successful deterrent.
Question. If confirmed, will you support fielding the dual capable
F-35 modifications for the United States and its allies in the shortest
feasible time?
Answer. I will.
balkans
Question. How would you describe today's threats to the security
and stability of the Balkans?
Answer. Although much has improved in many respects since the
significant sectarian and ethnic conflict of the 1990s, the situation
in some corners of the Balkans remains tenuous. Some states have made
significant progress and have been welcomed into NATO. Others face
significant governance and corruption challenges at home, which have
been exploited by outside actors such as Russia. Other states continue
to face ethnic and sectarian tensions that could escalate into armed
conflict.
United States defense relationships with Balkan partners will
continue to be an important element of a broader United States effort
to bolster stability, economic development, and national resilience in
this important corner of Europe.
Question. What do you see as the role of NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR)
and what conditions are required before that presence can be reduced or
eliminated?
Answer. I concur with Secretary Mattis' judgment that KFOR remains
critical to ensuring stability in the region. While the UNSC authorized
KFOR remains primarily a backstop, behind the Kosovo Police and the
European Union Rule of Law Mission, unfortunately, due to the lack of
progress in the European Union sponsored Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue and
the absence of normalized ties between Serbia and Kosovo, conditions
continue to justify the KFOR mission.
latin america and the caribbean
Question. How do you define United States national security
interests in Latin America and the Caribbean?
Answer. United States national security interests in Latin America
and the Caribbean begin with protecting the security and promoting the
economic prosperity of the Homeland and the American people. We also
have a national interest in promoting the security and prosperity of
our partners across the region and strengthening our joint efforts to
address common security challenges. This includes narcotrafficking,
terrorism, and transnational organized crime that have contributed to
violence and corruption throughout the hemisphere and in the United
States.
Question. Many of the internal security challenges in Latin America
are associated with transnational criminal networks. How should the
United States approach security assistance given the overlapping roles
of host governments' law enforcement organizations and militaries in
combating these networks?
Answer. Countering transnational criminal networks is not primarily
a Defense Department mission. It is primarily a law enforcement
mission, both on the part of the U.S. Government and our partners,
although military forces often play important supporting roles. The
U.S. approach to security assistance should be tailored to the specific
circumstances of each country, promote interagency and regional
cooperation and interoperability, and reinforce the importance of
promoting the rule of law, the integrity of state institutions, human
rights and combating corruption.
Question. What types of United States assistance are appropriate
for Latin American countries given that these challenges emanate from
non-state actors?
Answer. U.S. foreign assistance, to be properly aligned with our
national interests, should be coordinated among relevant U.S.
departments and agencies in support of an interagency strategy that
addresses the range of challenges related to non-state actors from
terrorists to narcotraffickers to international criminal networks. Such
strategies might include capacity-building for military and civilian
security forces; efforts to improve governance, strengthen the rule of
law, and fight corruption; and initiatives to facilitate regional
cooperation and information-sharing.
Question. In some countries in Latin America, such as Mexico, the
Department of Defense plays an important role in training, equipping,
and rendering assistance to partner nation militaries. How should it
coordinate efforts with security efforts in those countries led by
other U.S. agencies, such as the Department of State?
Answer. The Department of Defense must coordinate closely with the
Department of State and other relevant U.S. agencies, along with the
partner nation, to ensure DOD assistance is part of an integrated
approach. This coordination should happen both at the Country Team
level, under the supervision of the U.S. Ambassador, and through the
interagency process in Washington, D.C., and should include close
partnership with Congress.
Question. There is a growing concern that the counter-narcotics
campaign in Central America and security assistance from the United
States is ``militarizing'' civilian police. In your view, how should
the Defense Department condition its security assistance to countries
such as Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador to ensure that it is
training local police appropriately, and not exacerbating the violence
in those countries?
Answer. The most basic condition on assistance to partner security
forces is adherence to rigorous standards of respect for the rule of
law and human rights. In addition, assistance must be planned in close
coordination with the Department of State and Congress, and should be
tailored to the specific situation in each country to ensure that
Central American civilian police forces increasingly are able to handle
their responsibilities for law enforcement effectively, appropriately,
and free of corruption. It likely will take time for these countries to
recruit, train and build effective police forces.
colombia
Question. United States assistance to Colombia over the past
several years has facilitated the marginalization of the FARC and other
violent revolutionary groups.
How do you define United States national security interests in
Colombia? What means of support are appropriate for the Colombian
government given the challenges it faces?
Answer. The United States has invested considerable time, effort,
and resources into the relationship with Colombia and that country's
long-standing campaign against the FARC. The United States has a vested
interest in supporting Colombia's peace implementation process, which
includes targeting coca cultivation and cocaine trafficking,
demobilizing the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
guerrillas, and expanding the presence and reach of the Colombian
government throughout the country. A failure to adequately address
growing coca cultivation and a burgeoning narcotrafficking industry
would imperil the significant investments made by the United States in
Colombia and endanger our national interests. We can protect our
significant investment in Colombia's counternarcotics and
counterinsurgency missions through defense institution-building
efforts. These investments will continue to pay dividends as Colombia
continues to emerge as a regional and global security exporter.
Question. What conditions need to be reached for the nature of the
United States strategy in Colombia to change?
Answer. Even though Colombia has reached a peace deal with the
FARC, the National Liberation Army (ELN) and other organized armed
groups continue to present significant security challenges, thereby
threatening implementation of the peace accord with the FARC. It would
be premature to change our strategy until these gains are consolidated,
narcotrafficking is curtailed, and the reach of the central government
extended into previously hostile areas. It is my understanding that the
Colombians are very capable and willing United States partners. If
confirmed, I would want to sustain that close partnership while we
assess how to meet our common objectives in Colombia and in the region.
Question. Provided that the Colombian government continues to make
progress towards peace with the major rebel groups, what should be the
United States' approach towards preventing the growth of illegally
armed groups and drug trafficking organizations?
Answer. Implementing the peace accord will take a tremendous
commitment of effort and resources. There are signs that the ELN and
organized armed groups are taking over the FARC's narcotrafficking and
other illicit activities. We must work closely with the Government of
Colombia to defeat these threats, as their persistence imperils both
the peace with the FARC and the effectiveness of the Government's
counternarcotics efforts.
Question. What are the challenges that the Colombian government and
military will face in implementing the recent peace deal with the FARC
and how can the United States contribute to the implementation process?
Answer. Successfully implementing the peace accord will require a
major commitment of Colombian effort and resources over the coming
decades. Colombia's security forces will be critical in extending
security and the rule of law across the country, and in the eradication
and interdiction components of the counternarcotics effort. The
Government of Colombia also will have to leverage its civilian
institutions to address the root causes of the conflict. It is my
understanding that United States security assistance has been effective
in building the capabilities of the Colombian security forces to defeat
enemy forces on the battlefield.
Question. The Colombian military has become a security exporter
throughout the region and the world due to its successes and expertise.
What assistance should the United States provide to facilitate its
growth as a source of stability?
Answer. Colombia has been a tremendous partner in the United
States-Colombia Action Plan for Regional Security (USCAP), through
which it trains Central American and Caribbean countries in
counternarcotics and counterterrorism activities. Colombia has
participated in NATO and European Union counter-piracy missions off the
coast of the Horn of Africa, and has taken steps to prepare to
participate in United Nations peacekeeping operations. We should
maintain our support for Colombia's regional and global security
activities, which contribute to our own national security.
continuing use of guantanamo as a detention center
Question. Would you advise the President to transfer additional
detainees to Guantanamo? What do you see as the costs and benefits of
doing so?
Answer. While I do not believe detention policy or the disposition
of the detention facility at Guantanamo falls under the purview of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, I do
believe the United States needs an effective and sustainable policy
consistent with the law of armed conflict that allows for the detention
of enemy combatants captured on the battlefield. If confirmed and asked
for my opinion on this controversial issue, I would want to better
understand the costs, benefits, and risks of various options that have
been considered across multiple Administrations.
Question. What should be the Department's long-term detention
strategy?
Answer. I do not believe detention strategy falls under the purview
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs, and I do not think that I am adequately qualified to opine on
what a long-term detention strategy should be, without consulting first
with the appropriate Department of Defense policy and legal experts.
Question. Do you think the U.S. Government should continue the
Periodic Review Board Process and the process of transferring detainees
to other countries, subject to the restrictions currently in law?
Answer. I would defer to the appropriate experts at the Department
of Defense regarding the disposition of detainees currently held by the
Department.
defense security cooperation
Question. What is the appropriate role of the Department of Defense
in the conduct of security sector assistance?
Answer. Security sector assistance is an important element of the
Department of Defense's relationship with partner militaries across the
globe. Although other U.S. agencies have significant roles to play in
assisting partners with security sector reform and building partner
capacity, the Defense Department has unique capabilities to improve the
capabilities of our partner militaries in line with our national
interest. I understand the Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA included some reforms
that have increased the integration and flexibility of some aspects of
security assistance. If I am confirmed, I would want to conduct further
research to determine if additional steps could be taken to improve
coordination and efficacy of U.S. security assistance efforts.
Question. What should be the Defense Department's relationship with
the Department of State in the conduct of these activities?
Answer. The Defense Department should work closely with the
Department of State and other interagency partners--along with the
Congress--in coordinating and overseeing security assistance to ensure
such programs are effective, and efficient uses of taxpayer dollars,
and remain consistent with our foreign policy goals and objectives.
Question. What should be the strategic objectives of the Defense
Department's efforts to build the capabilities of a partner nation's
security forces?
Answer. Defense Department security assistance programs should
strive to enhance the ability of partner nations to provide for their
own internal defense and contribute more meaningfully to regional and
global security, consistent with our shared national interests. Having
capable and responsible partners is a force-multiplier for the U.S.
military, reducing the burden on U.S. forces for responding to security
threats across the world.
Question. In your view, is the Defense Department appropriately
organized and resourced to effectively conduct such activities? If not,
what changes would you recommend?
Answer. I understand the FY 2017 NDAA included significant reforms
of the Department's security cooperation programs. As I mentioned
previously, I believe consolidating authorities and creating a central
transfer account should make our assistance more efficient, flexible,
and tailored to our national interests and defense strategies. If
confirmed, I would want to examine more closely these reforms and
related issues before advocating for additional reforms or resources.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other
appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this position, to appear before this
Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this Committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees in a timely manner?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the Committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to answer letters and requests for
information from individual Senators who are members of this Committee?
Answer. Yes.
------
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
helsinki commission
1. Senator Wicker. Mr. Karem, the United States Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE/Helsinki Commission) consists
of 21 commissioners, 18 of whom come from the United States Congress.
The remaining three commissioners are appointed by the President of the
United States from the Departments of Defense (DOD), State, and
Commerce, usually at the assistant secretary level. The commissioner
appointed from DOD has typically been the official who serves as
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, the
position for which you have been nominated.
In addition to serving as a Member of this Committee, I also
currently serve as the Chairman of the Helsinki Commission, whose
mandate requires commissioners to ``monitor the acts of the signatories
which reflect compliance with or violation of the articles of the Final
Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe,'' also
known as the Helsinki Final Act. The Helsinki Final Act commitments
have been under increasing strain in recent years. I strongly recommend
that, if confirmed, you seek to engage with our bipartisan, bicameral
commission, as we would welcome the opportunity to work with you.
Do you agree that collaborating with allies and partners through
institutions such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE) to address the challenges facing Europe is helpful and in
the national interest?
Mr. Karem. I strongly agree that we must collaborate with allies
and partners to address our shared security challenges, and, if
confirmed, I hope to work with you and the other members of the U.S.
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe to support and defend
the principles and commitments enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act. The
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe remains a key
institution for international dialogue. If confirmed, I look forward to
engaging with key allies and partners, as well those who may see us as
an adversary, through the OSCE to address the recent strains to the
European security environment.
2. Senator Wicker. Mr. Karem, what more can DOD do to support
efforts to enhance accountability for signatory states that are in
violation of their commitments under the Helsinki Final Act?
Mr. Karem. I understand the U.S. has raised significant concerns
regarding violations of the Helsinki Final Act, particularly by Russia,
both bilaterally and in multilateral fora. These efforts are critical
to maintaining consensus around key principles, such as sovereignty and
host nation consent for the presence of military forces, that provide
predictability and security within the international system. If
confirmed, I will continue to work with allies and partners to press
for accountability for the commitments made under the Helsinki Final
Act, in close consultation with the Helsinki Commission.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
countering ``gray zone'' warfare in europe
3. Senator Warren. Mr. Karem, the United States has deployed
equipment and rotated ground forces back into Europe through the
European Reassurance Initiative, but this conventional display of force
alone obviously isn't sufficient to deter Russia. Putin seems to rely
increasingly on covert cyber activity, propaganda, and other indirect
tactics--as he demonstrated just a few weeks ago by interfering with
the French election. If confirmed, how will you work with our North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies to counter Russia's so-
called ``gray zone'' warfare?
Mr. Karem. As I wrote in response to a question about Russia's
hybrid war tactics in my Advance Policy Questionnaire:
Rebuilding American and allied military strength remains at the
center of any deterrence strategy. But, specifically countering Russian
hybrid tactics will require NATO allies to take more seriously their
obligations under Article 3 to improve national resilience--especially
with respect to cybersecurity--and to maintain the political will to
defend the sovereignty of Member states and counter Russian influence
and information operations. To counter a false Kremlin narrative, it is
also important to demonstrate to the Russian people that the United
States and its NATO allies have an alliance that is inherently
defensive and does not pose a threat to Russia's sovereignty or
legitimate national interests; that Russia has more to gain in economic
and security terms from partnership with the West than from
confrontation.
If confirmed, I would seek to work with our NATO Allies to enhance
our shared capacity to more quickly identify, expose, disrupt, and
impose costs on Moscow's use of ``gray zone'' measures that threaten
our interests below the level of conventional conflict.
------
[The nomination reference of Mr. Robert Story Karem
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
April 25, 2017.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
Robert Story Karem, of the District of Columbia, to be an Assistant
Secretary of Defense, vice Derek H. Chollet, resigned.
------
[The biographical sketch of Mr. Robert Story Karem, which
was transmitted to the Committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
Biographical Sketch of Mr. Robert S. Karem
Education:
Columbia University
- 1996 to 2000
- B.A.; Honors in Political Science
Employment record:
List all jobs held since college including title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
Presidential Transition Team (Washington, DC)
- Volunteer advisor to CIA Director Nominee Mike Pompeo
- December 2016 to January 2017
Sole Proprietor/Independent Consultant (Washington, DC)
- October 2016 to November 2016
Jeb 2016 Presidential Campaign (Miami, FL)
- Foreign Policy Advisor
- June 2015 to March 2016
Right to Rise Policy Solutions (Miami, FL)
- Independent Consultant
- May 2015 to June 2015
Office of U.S. House Majority Leader Kevin McCarthy
(Washington, DC)
- National Security Advisor
- August 2014 to May 2015
Office of U.S. House Majority Leader Eric Cantor
(Washington, DC)
- National Security Advisor
- October 2011 to August 2014
American Enterprise Institute (Washington, DC)
- Research Fellow; Advisor to Richard B. Cheney
- July 2009 to October 2011
Transition Office of Vice President Richard B. Cheney
(McLean, VA)
- Advisor
- January 2009 to July 2009
Office of the Vice President (Washington, DC)
- Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff; Special Advisor for
National Security Affairs
- February 2005 to January 2009
Office of U.S. Senator Mitch McConnell (Washington, DC)
- Personal Aide; Legislative Correspondent; Legislative Aide
- January 2001 to September 2002
Center for Strategic and International Studies
(Washington, DC)
- Intern (Asia Program); Research Assistant (Nuclear Threat
Initiative)
- June 2000 to January 2001
------
[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Mr. Robert
Story Karem in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed, use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
part a--biographical information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in Committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearing and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.
1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Robert Story Karem
2. Position to which nominated:
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs
3. Date of nomination:
April 25, 2017
4. Address: (List city and state of personal residence and full
office addresses.)
[The nominee responded and the information is contained in the
Committee's executive files.]
5. Year and place of birth:
1977, Lexington, Kentucky
6. Marital status: (Include full name of current spouse including
any other names used, including maiden name.)
Single
7. Names and ages of children (if over age 18)
N/A
8. Education: List names of secondary and higher education
institutions attended, type of school (vocational, technical, trade
school, college, university, military college, correspondence,
distance, extension, and on-line) dates attended, degree received and
date degree granted.
Henry Clay High School; 1993 to 1996; high school
diploma; 1996
Columbia University; 1996 to 2000; B.A.; 2000
9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment. If
the employment activity was military duty, list separate employment
activity periods to show each change of military duty station.
Presidential Transition Team, Washington, DC
- Advisor to CIA Director Nominee Mike Pompeo (volunteer
position)
- December 2016 to January 2017
Independent Consultant, Washington, DC
- October 2016 to November 2016
Jeb 2016 Presidential Campaign, Miami, FL
- Foreign Policy Advisor
- June 2015 to March 2016
Right to Rise Policy Solutions, Miami, FL
- Policy Consultant
- May 2015 to June 2015
Office of House Majority Leader Kevin McCarthy,
Washington, DC
- National Security Advisor
- August 2014 to May 2015
Office of House Majority Leader Eric Cantor,
Washington, DC;
- National Security Advisor
- October 2011 to August 2014
American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC
- Research Fellow and Advisor to Richard B. Cheney
- July 2009 to October 2011
Transition Office of Vice President Cheney, McLean, VA
- Policy Advisor to Richard B. Cheney
- January 2009 to July 2009
Office of the Vice President, Washington, DC
- Special Advisor for National Security Affairs
- February 2005 to January 2009
10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.
Office of U.S. Senator Mitch McConnell (2001 to 2005)
11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
business enterprise, educational or other institution.
N/A
12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and
other organizations.
N/A
-13. Political affiliations and activities:
(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
any public office for which you have been a candidate.
N/A
(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
years.
N/A
(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
Jeb 2016 - $1,000 (6/2015)
Jeb 2016 - $500 (9/2015)
Mitch McConnell Senate Committee - $750 (6/2013)
Mitch McConnell Senate Committee - $500 (8/2014)
Romney for President - $500 (10/2012)
14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
degrees, civilian service citations, military awards and decorations,
honorary society memberships, and any other special recognitions for
outstanding service or achievements.
N/A
15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
N/A
16. Speeches: Provide the Committee with two copies of any formal
speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years of which you have
copies and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have
been nominated.
N/A
17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service:
(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing
conflicts of interest?
I will.
(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which
would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?
I have not.
(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including questions
for the record in hearings?
I will.
(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in
response to congressional requests?
I will.
(e) Will you promise to enforce or ensure whistleblower protections
for all those witnesses?
I will.
(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request
before this Committee?
I do.
(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the Committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
I do.
------
[The nominee responded to Parts B-F of the Committee
questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-F
are contained in the Committee's executive files.]
------
Signature and Date
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
Robert Story Karem
This 4th day of May, 2017
------
[The nomination of Mr. Robert Story Karem was reported to
the Senate by Chairman McCain on May 23, 2017, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on May 25, 2017.]
------
[Prepared questions submitted to Ms. Kari A. Bingen by
Chairman McCain prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
defense reforms
Question. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2017 included the most sweeping reforms since the Goldwater-Nichols
Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.
Do you support these reforms?
Answer. As a professional staff member on the House Armed Services
Committee (HASC), I had the privilege of supporting the Committee in
its efforts to reform the organization and management of the Department
of Defense, and I support the reforms that were recently enacted into
law. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Armed Services
Committees on their implementation, as they relate to the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) and the defense
intelligence enterprise.
Question. What other areas for defense reform do you believe might
be appropriate for this Committee to address?
Answer. I believe there is opportunity for continued reform within
the Department of Defense and, if confirmed, I would support the USD(I)
in looking carefully across the organization, management, and
activities of the defense intelligence enterprise to determine any
areas where improvements could be made.
Question. Section 911 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2017 required the Secretary of Defense to establish cross-
functional teams to address critical objectives of the Department.
Do you agree that the Department must be able to integrate its
diverse, functional capabilities well in order to successfully defend
the Nation from increasingly complex and dynamic security threats? Will
you meet this requirement to the best of your abilities?
Answer. Yes, I agree with the need to integrated these
capabilities, and if confirmed, I would endeavor to meet this
requirement to the best of my abilities. The national security threats
facing the Nation today are not only complex and dynamic, but diverse.
Today's threats cross all domains and require not only a DOD, but a
whole-of-government approach to developing responses. Using cross-
functional teams would tap the expertise across the DOD to include the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, the
combatant commands, the Military Departments/Services and the combat
support agencies. Bringing together talent from across the Department,
soliciting innovative thought, and providing an open thinking
environment is crucial to improving DOD's ability to address current
and emerging threats to national security.
As an example, I understand that the USD(I) has been tasked by the
Deputy Secretary to oversee a cross-functional team focused on
algorithmic warfare and leveraging technology to improve the
processing, exploitation, and dissemination of full motion video
collected from airborne platforms, which is a key intelligence
capability in the defeat-ISIS campaign.
Question. What is your understanding of the attributes and
characteristics of effective cross-functional teams?
Answer. My understanding is that DOD's cross-functional teams
include subject matter experts from across the Department with the
appropriate knowledge of policy, strategy, technical expertise, and
operations to tackle our most daunting national security challenges. If
confirmed, I would support the USD(I) in encouraging the best possible
environment for these cross-functional teams to succeed in addressing
our national security challenges.
duties
Question. What is your understanding of the role, duties, and
functions of the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence (PDUSD(I))?
Answer. My understanding is that the Principal Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (PDUSD(I)) is responsible for
assisting the USD(I) in supporting the Secretary of Defense in
discharging his intelligence-related responsibilities and authorities
under Title 10 and Title 50 of the United States Code.
I understand the responsibilities of the USD(I) to include: serving
as the principal intelligence advisor to the Secretary of Defense;
exercising authority, direction, and control on behalf of the Secretary
of Defense over the Defense Intelligence Components of the Department
of Defense; ensuring that intelligence organizations in the Department
of Defense are manned, organized, trained, and equipped to support the
missions of the Department; ensuring that the DOD Intelligence
Components that are also elements of the Intelligence Community are
responsive to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) in the
execution of the DNI's authorities; ensuring that the combatant
commanders, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the civilian leadership of
the Department are provided with appropriate intelligence support;
ensuring that counterintelligence activities in the Department are
conducted and managed efficiently and effectively; ensuring that other
sensitive activities which the Department conducts or supports are
conducted and managed efficiently and effectively; overseeing the
implementation of all DOD security policies and programs except for
nuclear, chemical, and biological security to ensure efficiency and
effectiveness; serving as the Program Executive for the Military
Intelligence Program, and ensuring that the DOD Intelligence Components
that are also elements of the Intelligence Community are robust,
balanced, and in compliance with the guidance and direction from the
DNI; and ensuring that the Department provides the U.S. Congress with
intelligence-related information sufficient to execute its oversight
responsibilities.
Question. What recommendations, if any, do you have for changes in
the duties and functions of the PDUSD(I)?
Answer. At this time, I do not have specific recommendations for
changes in the duties and functions of the PDUSD(I), but if confirmed,
I would keep the Committee informed of any changes in view that I may
have.
Question. How do you view the relationship and division of
responsibilities between the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Intelligence (OUSD(I)) and the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy?
Answer. Secretary Mattis has emphasized collaboration. If
confirmed, I would work closely and collaboratively with each of the
Under Secretaries, their Principal Deputies, and senior teams,
recognizing the complementary perspectives each brings to our shared
Department mission. I believe that a close and continuing partnership
between the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the USD(I), their
Principal Deputies, and their staffs helps to ensure that policy and
intelligence are effectively integrated in executing the Department's
mission.
qualifications
Question. Section 137a of title 10, United States Code, requires
that the PDUSD(I) be ``appointed from among persons who have extensive
expertise in intelligence matters.''
What background and experience, particularly in the area of
intelligence matters, do you possess that qualify you to perform the
duties of the PDUSD(I)?
Answer. If confirmed, I believe I have the proper background and
experience to effectively perform the duties of the Principal Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.
I have been honored to serve as a professional staff member on the
HASC, from 2006 to 2011, and again from 2013 to the present. In my
capacity as policy director, I have led a small team that oversees
national defense policy and strategy; regional strategies, posture, and
military campaign plans, including in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan;
building partnership capacity efforts; and Department of Defense
organization and management. I have largely been an intelligence
consumer, Intelligence Community assessments to inform my policy
recommendations to Committee Members and to inform legislation. I have
also seen, through my oversight role, how critical intelligence support
is to the operations, military planners, and the acquisitions
community.
I have also served as the staff lead for the HASC Strategic Forces
Subcommittee with direct responsibility for overseeing military space,
missile defense, nuclear weapons, and military intelligence programs
and resources. During this time, I supported the Committee's efforts to
raise awareness of space threats and the need for greater space
situational awareness and space protection capabilities; to enhance our
Nation's missile defense capabilities in response to increasing foreign
ballistic missile threats; and to invest in the modernization and
enhanced safety and security of our nuclear deterrent capabilities.
Prior to working on Capitol Hill, I served as a senior space policy
analyst at The Aerospace Corporation's Center for Space Policy and
Strategy, providing subject matter expertise on space protection,
vulnerabilities, and commercial remote sensing for the National
Security Space Office (NSSO) and the National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency (NGA).
Prior to Aerospace, I was employed with SRA International's Adroit
C4ISR Center as a space systems analyst, where I supported various
defense and intelligence organizations. I provided analytical support
to the NSSO in areas such as space protection, hyperspectral imaging,
and satellite constellation performance; analyzed threats to U.S. space
systems for customers in the Intelligence Community; examined the
integration of airborne intelligence, surveillance (ISR), and
reconnaissance assets into ground systems for the Air Force; and served
as SRA's Deputy Program Manager providing strategic planning support to
the CIA Office of Transnational Issues' Geospatial Analysis Center. In
2002, I was selected as a National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)
Technology Fellow and assigned to the CIA's Weapons Intelligence,
Nonproliferation & Arms Control Center to examine threats to U.S. space
systems.
From my legislative, executive, and private sector background, I
have experience working with the defense intelligence enterprise in a
variety of different roles. I understand the important role of
congressional oversight; I understand the technical, operational, and
programmatic complexities involved in the acquisition and fielding of
ISR capabilities; and I appreciate the analytical challenges of
assessing foreign capabilities and intent. I believe this cumulative
experience and perspective, coupled with my technical engineering
background, have uniquely prepared me for this position.
relations with congress
Question. What are your views on the state of the relationship
between the OUSD(I) and the Senate Armed Services Committee in
particular, and with the Congress in general?
Answer. My current responsibilities have not afforded me sufficient
visibility to assess the relationship between OUSD(I) and the Senate
Armed Services Committee (SASC). In my capacity as the policy director
for the HASC, I found the OUSD(I) and the defense intelligence
enterprise to be generally responsive to the Committee. However, if
confirmed, I would seek to engage the SASC and other committees of
jurisdiction to better understand the state of the relationships and
how they could be enhanced.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to sustain a
productive and mutually beneficial relationship between the Congress
and the OUSD(I)?
Answer. If confirmed as PDUSD(I), I would support the USD(I) in
pursuing an open, continuing, and forthright dialogue with Congress
concerning issues vital to defense intelligence and national defense.
Furthermore, I believe it is important to engage with Congress on a
regular basis; to be forthcoming in explaining intelligence activities,
programs, and budgets; to provide the Committees of jurisdiction the
information they need to carry out their Article I constitutional
responsibilities; and to be accountable to the Congress.
major challenges and priorities
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and the
Defense Intelligence Enterprise?
Answer. From my view as a professional staff member of the HASC, I
believe the major challenges confronting OUSD(I) and defense
intelligence are the diverse and complex array of security challenges
and continued scope and pace of global operations conducted against a
backdrop of a smaller force and a constrained fiscal environment.
Additionally, the demand is increasing for intelligence to support
policy, operations, and acquisitions, as is the need to improve our
defense intelligence posture and capabilities to better address the
full spectrum of security challenges to prevent strategic and military
surprise, while fully supporting ongoing operations., Furthermore, the
OUSD(I) must address these challenges in a threat environment that
requires better protection of our intelligence sources and methods from
espionage by state and non-traditional actors and unauthorized
disclosures of information.
Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these
challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, given the importance of intelligence to
ongoing operations, I would assist the USD(I) in ensuring that
sufficient resources are devoted to the defense intelligence
enterprise, and that intelligence is disseminated broadly while still
properly protected. I would reinforce and seek to effectively implement
the USD(I)'s priorities across the defense intelligence enterprise, and
ensure effective policies are developed to support the execution of
these priorities. Lastly, the success of the defense intelligence
enterprise depends on a workforce--a team--of highly talented and
experienced professionals with a wide range of skills. If confirmed, I
would support the USD(I) in recruiting, retaining, and developing this
talent.
Question. How would you anticipate developing priorities for
allocating your time and resources as the PDUSD(I)?
Answer. If confirmed, I would align my priorities with those of the
USD(I) and the Secretary of Defense. I would anticipate dividing my
time generally between oversight of intelligence operations, the
development of intelligence capabilities, internal management of
OUSD(I), and other duties as the Secretary and the USD(I) may assign.
In what will likely continue to be a resource-constrained environment,
I would assist the USD(I) in seeking to ensure that resources are
strategically allocated to, and across, the defense intelligence
enterprise.
Question. If confirmed, how would you balance the need to provide
intelligence support to the warfighter with the need to provide
intelligence support to policy makers?
Answer. My understanding is that one of OUSD(I)'s primary
responsibilities is to ensure the appropriate balance between
intelligence support to the warfighter and to policy makers. If
confirmed, I would support the USD(I) in working to ensure the defense
intelligence enterprise continues to satisfy intelligence
requirements--foremost in support of current military operations and
planning, while working collaboratively with interagency partners to
inform political-military decision-making by our national leaders. If
confirmed, I would seek to identify and communicate the critical
intelligence needs of the warfighter. If confirmed, I would also assess
the current level of support to policy-makers and warfighters across
the national Intelligence Community and defense intelligence
enterprise, and seek ways to improve coordination and integration.
Question. If confirmed, how will you ensure that the geographic
combatant commands are adequately assessing and prioritizing their
intelligence needs?
Answer. If confirmed, and in coordination with the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, I would support the USD(I) in seeking to
strengthen integration and collaboration between the geographic and
functional combatant commands, and the components of the national
Intelligence Community and the defense intelligence enterprise. I
understand that OUSD(I) has a central responsibility, in coordination
with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to ensure a continuous
dialogue with the combatant commands regarding their priority
intelligence requirements. Combatant command intelligence requirements
are continually assessed and prioritized, taking into account U.S.
national security interests, Secretary of Defense priorities, combatant
command priorities, and resource constraints. From my experience
serving as a professional staff member with the HASC as well as my work
within the Intelligence Community, I have seen how important it is for
the national Intelligence Community and defense intelligence enterprise
to recognize and respond to warfighter needs dynamically and with
maximum agility. If confirmed, I would work diligently to ensure
effective communication across the defense intelligence enterprise, the
national Intelligence Community, and all combatant commands.
budget
Question. What is your assessment of the impact of the budget caps
required by the Budget Control Act on the capacity and capabilities of
the Defense Intelligence Enterprise to meet requirements?
Answer. I understand that the impact on the readiness, capacity,
and capabilities of the defense intelligence enterprise has been
significant. This enterprise has been squeezed by five consecutive
years of budget reductions to meet budget caps. At the same time it has
been stressed to meet warfighting requirements while also addressing
strategic and full spectrum challenges. From my position on the HASC, I
have seen delays in system upgrades, reduced facility maintenance, and
a slower than desired pace to address the emerging challenges presented
by China's rapidly growing military and a resurgent Russia. If
confirmed, I would support the USD(I) in addressing these challenges.
torture and enhanced interrogation techniques
Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the
Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated August 19, 2014, and
required by section 1045 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-92)?
Answer. Yes, I support the standards for detainee treatment
specified in the current Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the
Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated August 19, 2014, and
required by section 1045 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2016. Individuals in the custody or control of the United
States Government may not be subjected to any interrogation technique
or approach, or any treatment related to interrogation, that is not
authorized by and listed in the Army Field Manual.
management of the defense intelligence enterprise
Question. What is your understanding of the role of the OUSD(I) in
overseeing and coordinating the efforts of the elements of the Defense
Intelligence Enterprise?
Answer. My understanding is that the PDUSD(I) is responsible for
assisting the USD(I) in supporting the Secretary of Defense in
discharging his intelligence-related responsibilities and authorities
under Title 10 and Title 50 of the United States Code. This includes
exercising authority, direction, and control on behalf of the Secretary
of Defense over the Defense Intelligence Components of the Department
of Defense.
Question. Are additional authorities, policy guidance, or resources
necessary for effective oversight of the enterprise?
Answer. If confirmed, I would carefully assess the adequacy of the
existing authorities, policies, and resources and evaluate potential
options to recommend to the USD(I) to increase the effectiveness of the
defense intelligence enterprise.
Question. Are there opportunities to improve coordination with the
National Intelligence Community to improve intelligence support to the
warfighter and, if so, where are the opportunities?
Answer. Yes, I believe there are opportunities to improve
collaboration across the national Intelligence Community and defense
intelligence enterprise on behalf of the warfighter. If confirmed, I
would support the USD(I) in engaging early and often with the combatant
command commanders to understand their needs and to elicit their
feedback on how OUSD(I) can better support them. I would also support
the USD(I) in engaging on a frequent basis with leaders in the national
Intelligence Community to communicate warfighter needs and identify
opportunities to improve warfighter support. I am particularly
interested in improving the integration of national and defense ISR
capabilities, and applying greater attention to faster, more agile and
adaptive processing, exploitation, and dissemination of intelligence
data to better support the warfighter. Improvements can also be made to
increase warfighter awareness of compartmented Intelligence Community
capabilities, so they are able to take advantage of them.
allocation of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (isr)
assets through the global force management process
Question. The Committee has expressed concerns about the process
and underlying analysis supporting the allocation of ISR assets to the
combatant commands under the Global Force Management Process (GFMAP).
While these GFMAP problems are numerous, the Committee has noted in
particular that, since the events of September 11th, U.S. Central
Command (CENTCOM) has received the overwhelming share of ISR assets, to
the point where the Committee expressed doubt that ``a rigorous
analysis would consistently rank the lowest priorities of one or more
combatant commands higher than the highest priorities of other
combatant commands.''
What is your understanding and assessment of the adequacy of the
process for allocating ISR capabilities under the GFMAP process?
Answer. I understand that the GFMAP process was designed to
allocate forces and capabilities across the combatant commands to best
meet their requirements, including ISR requirements. If confirmed, I
would work with the USD(I), in close coordination with the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to ensure the appropriate balance in ISR
allocation, informed by rigorous analysis of tradeoffs and risks to
ongoing combat operations and support to all other combatant commands.
Question. In your view, are modifications to the process warranted?
Answer. My present duties have not yet afforded me an opportunity
to systematically review and assess the GFMAP process in connection
with the allocation of ISR assets. However, if confirmed, I would study
this matter and not hesitate in providing recommended modifications if
warranted.
I recognize there are immense challenges posed by the need to
fulfill U.S. Central Command ISR requirements while still ensuring
other combatant commands receive adequate support to achieve their
assigned missions. If confirmed, I would support the USD(I) in working
closely with the key stakeholders in the GFMAP process across the
Department, Joint Staff, combatant commands, Military Departments/
Services, and combat support agencies to ensure the tradeoffs and risks
to missions and forces associated with global ISR allocation are
thoroughly analyzed and understood.
cyber
Question. How do you perceive the challenges we face in cyberspace?
Answer. I believe the challenges we face in a constantly changing
and dynamic cyberspace environment are significant. In recent years,
malicious cyberspace activities conducted by our adversaries have
become increasingly complex, technologically advanced, disruptive, and
persistent. Correspondingly, DOD continues to face challenges in
protecting and securing its networks, systems, infrastructure, and in
developing its overall cyber capabilities.
Question. Briefly describe what policy objectives the Defense
Department should be seeking to achieve in the cyber realm and the
strategy you think is necessary to address these challenges.
Answer. The Secretary has discussed the need for a whole-of-
government effort and policy regarding U.S. responses to cyber
aggression, and the need for hardening our information networks and
critical infrastructure, which I fully support. If confirmed, cyber
will be a key focus area of mine, as the OUSD(I) continues to support
efforts to better assess the threat and technological advancements, to
rapidly develop the capabilities to deter our adversaries and protect
our networks, to support cyber operations, to develop the Cyber Mission
Forces, and to support the implementation of section 923 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 on the
establishment of U.S. Cyber Command.
Question. What role should the OUSD(I) play in addressing
challenges in cyberspace?
Answer. I believe that OUSD(I)'s role is to provide a holistic and
integrated perspective on cyberspace, as it relates to intelligence.
This includes a holistic look at the capabilities, operations,
personnel, and resources across the defense intelligence enterprise
necessary to provide more effective and efficient intelligence support
to cyberspace operations, to DOD decision-making, to protection of the
Defense Industrial Base, and to DOD plans for cyber deterrence and
defense.
Question. What is your understanding of the support that the
OUSD(I) should provide to the Principal Cyber Advisor's cross-
functional team under section 932 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2014?
Answer. I understand that OUSD(I) supports the Principal Cyber
Advisor (PCA) cross-functional team through direct liaison with the
OUSD(I) SIGINT and Cyber Directorate under the Director for Defense
Intelligence responsible for technical collection and special programs.
space
Question. What do you perceive as the threats to our national
security space satellites?
Answer. We face a number of threats to our national security space
systems which, given our high dependency on space, can have severe
consequences on the battlefield. Our adversaries recognize this
dependency and have invested in a range of anti-satellite capabilities,
from kinetic kill weapons to be employed against our satellites to non-
kinetic cyber weapons that can disable our satellite ground stations
and jam command, control, and communications links. Also, space has
become increasingly congested, with the number of objects in orbit
steadily growing.
Question. Briefly describe what policy objectives the Defense
Department should be seeking to achieve and the strategy you think is
necessary to address these threats.
Answer. I would defer to the Secretary and the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy to articulate the Department's space policy
objectives. However, I believe that our defense intelligence enterprise
must have the capabilities, personnel, and resources to adequately
assess space threats and technology, to better support the acquisition
of new space capabilities, Furthermore, I believe that OUSD(I) can work
to better integrate intelligence with operations to better protect our
space capabilities, and to better integrate space and air to provide
greater continuity of ISR support to users.
Question. Given that the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) would
be required to respond operationally to active threats to
reconnaissance satellites by adversaries in a conflict, should the
Department consider designating the NRO as a combat support agency?
Answer. If confirmed, I would support the USD(I) in assessing
whether that relationship should change based on the current and
predicted threat environment.
relationship with respect to the assistant secretary of defense for
special operations and low intensity conflict (asd solic)
Question. How are responsibilities for the oversight of the
activities and programs of special operations forces delineated between
the OUSD(I) and ASD SOLIC?
Answer. It is my understanding that OUSD(I) and ASD(SO/LIC) have
some concurrent responsibilities for the oversight of the activities
and programs of special operations forces (SOF). The Secretary of
Defense assigned to the USD(I), in DOD Directive 5143.01, ``Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)),'' the responsibility to
oversee all DOD intelligence, counterintelligence, security, sensitive
activities, and other intelligence-related activities. I understand
that the Secretary of Defense assigned to the ASD(SO/LIC), in DOD
Directive 5111.10, ``Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)),'' the
responsibility to oversee all DOD special operations and low intensity
conflict activities. To the extent that SOF engage in intelligence,
counterintelligence, security, sensitive activities, or other
intelligence-related activities, the USD(I) and the ASD(SO/LIC) share
responsibility for overseeing those activities.
If confirmed, I would foster continued collaboration between USD(I)
and ASD SO/LIC to ensure any overlap of responsibilities strengthens
rather than weakens the Department's oversight of SOF activities and
programs.
Question. Are there any programs that are currently overseen by the
OUSD(I) that would be more appropriately overseen by ASD SOLIC?
Answer. I have no program recommendations at this time. If
confirmed, I would assist the USD(I), in collaboration with ASD SO/LIC
and in consultation with Congress, to make any adjustments in
oversight, as necessary, and also work to ensure no gaps in oversight
coverage of activities and programs.
personnel security and insider threats
Question. The Committee has enacted significant legislation in
recent National Defense Authorization Acts mandating and guiding urgent
reforms in personnel security processes and insider threat detection
and prevention. Breaches in personnel security records held by the
Office of Personnel Management has now also driven a reevaluation of
which element or elements of the government should conduct background
investigations (BIs) and be responsible for protecting the information
that such investigations produce.
What is your assessment of the current process for conducting BIs
and what changes, if any, would you recommend to improve the process?
Answer. I am aware of the significant challenges in the current
process for conducting background investigations and of the growing
backlog of investigations, which are affecting not only DOD personnel
and contractors, but also many employees on the Hill. I am also
familiar with the Committee's actions in this area in recent National
Defense Authorization Acts. If confirmed, I would be in a better
position to examine the process in detail, assess the problem, consider
options, and make any recommendations for improvements to the process.
Question. What is your understanding of the technical and systems
integration challenges involved in improving personnel security
processes and insider threat detection and prevention within the
Department of Defense?
Answer. At this time, I do not have a detailed assessment of the
technical and systems integration challenges, but I would surmise that
they are significant. I do believe that technology, coupled with
process and education, can improve personnel security and insider
threat detection. I am interested in the technical efforts within
OUSD(I) to conduct automated record checks and to leverage continuously
available data sources, to include social media. If confirmed, I would
support the USD(I) in working with our interagency partners to
accelerate the development of our IT solutions and other automation
initiatives to deliver timely, cost-effective and quality background
investigations.
Question. What are your views about whether the Department of
Defense should be responsible for conducting BIs and protecting that
sensitive data?
Answer. I am aware of the significant backlogs and delays in
background investigations and the impact this has on getting talented
personnel to work, including on the Hill. However, in my current
capacity, I have not studied this issue in depth. In support of the
USD(I), I would assess the process, analyze options, and consider costs
and benefits before providing an informed view and any recommendations
for the Secretary.
u.s. special operations command intelligence operations
Question. In your view, how are intelligence operations carried out
by special operations personnel different from those carried out by
others in the Intelligence Community?
Answer. It is my understanding that SOF's unique set of missions
all require very precise and detailed intelligence to ensure their
operations are effective. The range of missions unique to SOF also
requires agility and flexibility provided by defense intelligence
capabilities in order to meet operational timeline requirements. If
confirmed, I look forward to developing a deeper understanding of how
SOF conducts its intelligence activities.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure intelligence
activities carried out by special operations forces are adequately
coordinated with other activities carried out by those in the
Intelligence Community?
Answer. It is my understanding that SOF intelligence activities are
coordinated fully with the Intelligence Community to ensure necessary
de-confliction and avoid redundancy. If confirmed, I would assist the
USD(I) in advancing efforts to improve coordination and integration of
SOF activities with those of the Intelligence Community.
need for independent intelligence analysis
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that intelligence
analysts within the Defense Department, including those who may be
seconded to offices that are not part of the defense intelligence
structure, are independent and free of pressure from influence from
their chain of command to reach a certain conclusion, including a
conclusion that fits a particular policy preference?
Answer. If confirmed, I would fully support policies and programs
that ensure defense intelligence analysis is objective and free from
the personal or political biases of individual analysts or managers. I
am aware of and fully support actions taken by OUSD(I) in light of
recent recommendations made by the DOD Inspector General to ensure
analytic integrity, such as establishment of an analytic ombudsman at
each defense component, a Defense Analytic Tradecraft Council, and
other important initiatives.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other
appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this position, to appear before this
Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the Principal Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this Committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees in a timely manner?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the Committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to answer letters and requests for
information from individual Senators who are members of this Committee?
Answer. Yes.
------
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
satellite intelligence collection
1. Senator Heinrich. Ms. Bingen, given the resource-constrained
environment that we are in, it will become increasingly important to
look for creative solutions to meet intelligence collection
requirements. In the past few years there has been a growth in U.S.-
based commercial remote sensing satellite providers. These companies
offer new capabilities for breadth of coverage and revisit rates for
overhead satellite imagery, with new companies projected to
significantly increase the total number of satellites operating in
orbit providing persistent coverage. What are your thoughts on using
these new commercial satellite imagery providers to meet increasing
intelligence requirements?
Ms. Bingen. The capabilities provided by the commercial remote
sensing (CRS) industry make a valuable contribution to helping meet the
Nation's intelligence needs, including military intelligence needs. I
understand that the Department of Defense (DOD) and Intelligence
Community have made significant investments in CRS to augment our
Government-owned and operated intelligence capabilities, and both have
continued to make progress in CRS data integration. If confirmed, I
will continue to support these capabilities and the Department's CRS
integration efforts.
2. Senator Heinrich. Ms. Bingen, how can DOD benefit from access to
this new imagery, and do you have any plans to leverage more commercial
solutions to meet intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
requirements?
Ms. Bingen. One of the primary benefits of commercial remote
sensing (CRS) is its unclassified nature. This enables DOD to
disseminate products more freely with allies, partners, and tactical
users in support of coalition operations and to address our shared
security challenges. With limited resources, and an ISR demand greater
than the assets available, we must use the intelligence data we
currently collect more effectively. We must also improve the
integration of CRS and commercial solutions more broadly. If confirmed,
I will fully support DOD's efforts to do this.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
countering ``gray zone'' warfare in europe
3. Senator Warren. Ms. Bingen, the United States has deployed
equipment and rotated ground forces back into Europe through the
European Reassurance Initiative, but this conventional display of force
alone obviously isn't sufficient to deter Russia. Putin seems to rely
increasingly on covert cyber activity, propaganda, and other indirect
tactics--as he demonstrated just a few weeks ago by interfering with
the French election. If confirmed, how will you work with our North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies to counter Russia's so-
called ``gray zone'' warfare?
Ms. Bingen. It is my understanding that there are several
intelligence-related forums that allow us to work closely with our NATO
allies, including the NATO Military Intelligence Committee (MIC), NATO
Intelligence Fusion Center (NIFC), and Centers of Excellence such as
the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence located in
Tallinn, Estonia. Also, collaboration and intelligence sharing is
enabled through shared communications infrastructure such as the
Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System (BICES).
Defense intelligence capabilities are critical to detecting,
attributing, and analyzing ``gray zone'' activities, and support both
our warfighters and policymakers in their development of deterrence and
response options. If confirmed, I will work closely with our policy,
operational, and acquisition communities, and with our NATO allies and
other European partners to support efforts to counter and deter Russian
aggression. I also intend to sustain the Department of Defense's
leading role on the NATO MIC, work to ensure the NIFC is focusing on
the Russia problem set, and support NATO's efforts to enhance its
intelligence enterprise.
------
[The nomination reference of Ms. Kari A. Bingen follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
April 25, 2017.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
Kari A. Bingen, of Virginia, to be Principal Deputy Under Secretary
of Defense, vice Marcel J. Lettre II, resigned.
------
[The biographical sketch of Ms. Kari A. Bingen, which was
transmitted to the Committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
Biographical Sketch of Ms. Kari A. Bingen
Education:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
- 1995 to 1999
- B.S. Aeronautics and Astronautics
Employment Record:
U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed
Services, Washington, DC
- Policy Director / Professional Staff Member
- September 2013 to Present
K.A. Bingen, LLC, Falls Church, VA*
- Consultant; provided analysis of space industrial base and
technology issues for a private sector company.
- February 2012 to September 2013
* From September 2011 to September 2013, lived overseas with
DOD civilian spouse on Permanent Change of Station orders. During that
period, provided consulting services as K.A. Bingen, LLC.
U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed
Services, Washington DC
- Strategic Forces Staff Lead / Professional Staff Member
- April 2006 to September 2011
The Aerospace Corporation, Arlington, VA
- Senior Space Policy Analyst, Center for Space Policy and
Strategy
- April 2005 to April 2006
- Supported the National Security Space Office (NSSO) on space
protection and commercial remote sensing issues, and supported the
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) in a review of the
commercial remote sensing industry
SRA International, Inc., Adroit C4ISR Center,
Alexandria, VA
- Space Systems Analyst, Intelligence and Policy Division
- July 1999 to April 2005:
- Office of Transnational Issues, Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), January 2005 to April 2005. Served as SRA's Deputy
Program Manager providing strategic planning support to the CIA Office
of Transnational issues' Geospatial Analysis Center.
- National Security Space Office (NSSO), October 2003 to
January 2005 and April 2000 to October 2002. Provided analytic support
to the Protection for Space Mission Assurance study, Fiscal Year 2004
National Security Space Program and Budget Assessment, and several
national security space architecture studies.
- National Reconnaissance Office Technology Fellowship
Program, October 2002 to October 2003. Assigned to the Central
Intelligence Agency, Weapons Intelligence, Non-Proliferation, and Arms
Control (WINPAC) branch to examine threats to U.S. space systems.
- Adroit C4ISR Center, July 1999 to April 2000. Provided
analytical support to several airborne intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance projects for the Air Force and Office of the Secretary
of Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.
Honors and Awards:
National Reconnaissance Office Gold Medal, 2011.
National Reconnaissance Office Technology Fellow, 2002.
Office of the National Security Space Architect Star of
the year Award, 2001.
Federation of Galaxy Explorers Volunteer of the Year
Award, 2005
- FOGE is a 501(c)3 non-profit volunteer organization that
educates and inspires youth in space-related science and engineering.
------
[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Ms. Kari A.
Bingen in connection with her nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed, use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies. Unless otherwise required, an answer of yes or
no, or not applicable is appropriate.
part a--biographical information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in Committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearing and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.
1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Kari Anne Bingen
Also, Kari Anne Bingen Tytler (full legal name, added ``Tytler''
upon marriage in October 2002)
2. Position to which nominated:
Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
3. Date of nomination:
April 25, 2017
4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[The nominee responded and the information is contained in the
Committee's executive files.]
5. Date and place of birth:
1976, Pusan, South Korea
6. Marital status: (Include full name of current spouse including
any other names used, including maiden name.)
Married to Sean Christopher Tytler
7. Names of children (if over age 18):
N/A
8. Education: List names of secondary and higher education
institutions attended, type of school (vocational, technical, trade
school, college, university, military college, correspondence,
distance, extension, and on-line) dates attended, degree received and
date degree granted.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1995 to 1999,
B.S. Aeronautics and Astronautics, June 1999
9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed
Services, Washington, DC
- Policy Director / Professional Staff Member
- September 2013 to Present
K.A. Bingen, LLC, Falls Church, VA*
- Consultant; provided analysis of space industrial base and
technology issues for a private sector company.
- February 2012 to September 2013
* From September 2011 to September 2013, lived overseas with
DOD civilian spouse on Permanent Change of Station orders. During that
period, provided consulting services as K.A. Bingen, LLC.
U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed
Services, Washington DC
- Strategic Forces Staff Lead / Professional Staff Member
- April 2006 to September 2011
The Aerospace Corporation, Arlington, VA
- Senior Space Policy Analyst, Center for Space Policy and
Strategy
- April 2005 to April 2006
- Supported the National Security Space Office (NSSO) on space
protection and commercial remote sensing issues, and supported the
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) in a review of the
commercial remote sensing industry
SRA International, Inc., Adroit C4ISR Center,
Alexandria, VA
- Space Systems Analyst, Intelligence and Policy Division
- July 1999 to April 2005:
- Office of Transnational issues, Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA), January 2005 to April 2005. Served as SRA's Deputy Program
Manager providing strategic planning support to the CIA Office of
Transnational issues' Geospatial Analysis Center.
- National Security Space Office (NSSO), October 2003 to
January 2005 and April 2000 to October 2002. Provided analytic support
to the Protection for Space Mission Assurance study, Fiscal Year 2004
National Security Space Program and Budget Assessment, and several
national security space architecture studies.
- National Reconnaissance Office Technology Fellowship
Program, October 2002 to October 2003. Assigned to the Central
Intelligence Agency, Weapons Intelligence, Non-Proliferation, and Arms
Control (WINPAC) branch to examine threats to U.S. space systems.
- Adroit C4ISR Center, July 1999 to April 2000. Provided
analytical support to several airborne intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance projects for the Air Force and Office of the Secretary
of Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.
10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.
N/A
11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
business enterprise, educational or other institution.
N/A
12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and
other organizations.
Current member, American Institute of Aeronautics and
Astronautics (AIAA)
Current member, Women in Aerospace (WIA)
Current member, MIT Club of Washington, DC
13. Political affiliations and activities:
(a) If you have ever been a candidate for or have been elected or
appointed to a political office, list the name of the office(s),
whether you were elected/appointed/candidate, the year(s) the election
was held or the appointment was made, and the term of office (if
applicable).
N/A
(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
to all political parties or election Committees during the last 5
years.
N/A
(c) Itemize all individual political contributions of $100 or more
to any , campaign organization, political party, political action
committee, or similar entity for the past 5 years. List each individual
contribution and not the total amount contributed to the person or
entity during the year.
Romney for President, Inc., October 2012
14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
degrees, civilian service citations, military awards and decorations,
honorary society memberships, and any other special recognitions for
outstanding service or achievements.
National Reconnaissance Office Gold Medal, 2011
National Reconnaissance Office Technology Fellow, 2002
Office of the National Security Space Architect Star of
the Year Award, 2001
Federal of Galaxy Explorers Volunteer of the Year
Award, 2005
- FOGE is a 501(c)3 non-profit volunteer organization that
educate and inspires youth in space-related science and engineering.
15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written including articles published on the Internet.
N/A
16. Speeches: Provide the Committee with two copies of any formal
speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years of which you have
copies and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have
been nominated.
N/A
17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service:
(a) If confirmed, will you adhere to applicable laws and
regulations governing conflicts of interest?
Yes.
(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which
would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?
No.
(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including questions
for the record in hearings?
Yes.
(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in
response to Congressional requests?
Yes.
(e) Will you promise to enforce or ensure whistleblower protections
for all those witnesses?
Yes.
(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request
before this Committee?
Yes.
(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Yes.
------
[The nominee responded to Parts B-F of the Committee
questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-F
are contained in the Committee's executive files.]
------
Signature and Date
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
Kari A. Bingen
This 7th day of May, 2017
------
[The nomination of Ms. Kari A. Bingen was reported to the
Senate by Chairman McCain on May 23, 2017, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on May 25, 2017.]
------
[Prepared questions submitted to Mr. Kenneth P. Rapuano by
Chairman McCain prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
defense reforms
Question. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2017 included the most sweeping reforms since the Goldwater-Nichols
Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.
Do you support these reforms?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will comply with the law, and work
with colleagues in the Department and with the defense committees to
understand their impact and determine how best to implement these
changes for the future betterment of the Department.
Question. What other areas for defense reform do you believe might
be appropriate for this Committee to address?
Answer. Currently, I do not believe that further reforms are
required.
duties and qualifications
Question. Section 138 of title 10, United States Code, provides
that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global
Security is responsible for the overall supervision of the Homeland
defense activities of the Department of Defense.
What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global
Security?
Answer. My understanding of the duties and functions of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense & Global Security
is consistent with those described in DOD Directive 5111.13, as well as
other applicable DOD directives, with the exception of the duties and
functions for Western Hemisphere security policy, which has been
transferred within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs (ASD(ISA)). In addition, the duties and functions for
cyberspace, space, and countering weapons of mass destruction policies
are also the responsibility of this Assistant Secretary.
Question. What background and experience do you possess that
qualify you to perform these duties?
Answer. My professional background includes over 30 years of
experience working on national and Homeland security issues in the
military, Federal Government, private sector, and academia. I believe I
have substantive expertise and leadership experience providing me with
the background and skills necessary to serve successfully, if
confirmed, as Assistant Secretary of Defense for HD & GS.
My career-long focus on and direct involvement in the development
and implementation of U.S. national security, counterterrorism, and
Homeland security initiatives has provided me with a deep understanding
of the missions, authorities, resources, and constraints of federal
departments and agencies with Homeland security and Homeland defense
responsibilities. As Deputy Homeland Security Advisor to the President
in the Bush administration I chaired the Deputies Committee process for
coordinating the development and implementation of Homeland security
and Homeland defense policies across the federal government, with state
and local governments, and the private sector.
I believe I also have the leadership and management skills to
perform effectively as Assistant Secretary of Defense for HD &GS. I
have managed large staffs in previous positions in the federal
government, military, and private sector, and have considerable
experience achieving goals in cross-cutting mission areas requiring
buy-in and collaboration from multiple stakeholders.
major challenges and priorities
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
confront the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and
Global Security?
Answer. I would characterize the threat as evolving and changing,
and believe that adapting our security posture to emerging threats will
be a continuing challenge. The Homeland is no longer a sanctuary. The
growing sophistication and proliferation of threats, such as cyber and
space, ballistic and cruise missiles, CBRN materials, diseases of
security concern, and unmanned technologies, combined with the growing
number of nations and non-state actors with access to them, continue to
increase risk to the Homeland and mission assurance. DOD must
continuously adapt and improve Homeland Defense risk management
decision-making to account for these multi-domain, multi-functional
capabilities of a growing number of strategically significant actors
who present real and present threats to the Homeland. Russia, China,
Iran, North Korea, and transnational violent extremism (4+1 challenges)
are capable of varied attacks against North America and in the Pacific
across multiple domains, from multiple approaches, and at increasingly
greater ranges. Such threats may not only impact the U. S. populace,
but may also impact the ability of the Department to deploy forces in
support of overseas operations.
Question. If confirmed, what priorities and plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I would maintain support for the key issues I
outlined above by actively addressing them in key Department of Defense
and interagency processes, including the Planning, Programming,
Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) processes, strategic reviews inside the
Department, and the interagency Policy Coordination Committee (P CC)
process.
If confirmed, I would continue to build upon and improve the
outstanding efforts the Department of Defense has devoted to protecting
the Homeland from a major terrorist attack or an attack using a weapon
of mass destruction, to include planning and preparing for the response
to catastrophic incidents in the United States. I would also focus
attention on the Department's efforts ensuring that its approach to
force protection is keeping pace with the current terrorist threat in
the Homeland and abroad.
An important priority will be to develop and improve comprehensive,
cross-cutting, risk-mitigated capabilities and plans that ensure
successful execution of the Department's essential functions. We must
outthink our adversaries and anticipate uncertainty in our planning and
capability development.
If confirmed, I would also devote special attention to the
challenge of building the cyberspace workforce, expanding DOD's
operational capabilities, and continuing to rationalize the complex
funding streams that support cyberspace initiatives.
relations with congress
Question. What are your views on the state of the relationship
between the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and
Global Security and the Senate Armed Services Committee in particular,
and with the Congress in general?
Answer. My sense is that the relationship is very good. I would
strive to continue a strong working relationship and look for ways to
enhance it.
If confirmed, what actions would you take to sustain a productive
and mutually beneficial relationship between the Congress and the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and
Global Security?
If confirmed, I would actively engage with the Congress to build a
productive relationship.
torture and enhanced interrogation techniques
Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the
Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated August 19, 2014, and
required by section 1045 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-92)?
Answer. Yes.
combating terrorism roles and responsibilities
Question. Please specify what combating terrorism activities will
be under the jurisdiction of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Homeland Defense and Global Security, particularly domestic
antiterrorism activities.
Answer. As I understand it, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Homeland Defense and Global Security advises the Secretary of Defense
on all domestic counterterrorism and consequence management matters. I
understand that the specific counterterrorism activities that reside
under the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and
Global Security include providing critical staff support to the
Secretary of Defense regarding support requested by the Attorney
General, or as directed by the President of the United States, to
combat terrorism within the United States, and on matters involving
terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction worldwide. I understand
that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global
Security, also advises the Secretary of Defense on global antiterrorism
and force protection policies, in close coordination with the
Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the geographic combatant commanders, and other key
stakeholders in the Department.
Question. What Defense Department official or officials will be
responsible for the Department's activities combating terrorism that
are not under the jurisdiction of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Homeland Defense and Global Security?
Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy has the overall
lead for DOD combating terrorism policy oversight. If confirmed, I
would work closely with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)) and with the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) to achieve the Secretary
of Defense's objectives and proper alignment of DOD combating terrorism
activities.
Additionally, the geographic combatant commanders have tactical
control for force protection of all DOD personnel within their areas of
responsibility, with the exception of DOD personnel for whom the chiefs
of U.S. diplomatic missions have security responsibility. If confirmed,
I would work closely with both the combatant commanders and the
Department of State to ensure that all DOD personnel serving overseas,
including those at U.S. missions and embassies, have appropriate
antiterrorism protection.
Question. What steps will you take to ensure that the Department's
efforts are focused and well-coordinated in this critical area of
Homeland defense?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict
and with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to achieve the
Secretary of Defense's objectives in this critical area of Homeland
defense.
I would also use DOD's Mission Assurance Coordination Board, which
the ASD for Homeland Defense and Global Security leads, to ensure that
the Department's efforts are focused and coordinated on antiterrorism
and force protection issues. DOD's Mission Assurance Senior Steering
Group integrates mission-related security issues of mutual interest
with other executive committees and efforts within the Department.
Question. In your view, what is the extent of the current threat to
the U.S. Homeland of terrorist extremists both from outside the United
States and from within the United States and how would you characterize
the threat--low, medium, or high?
Answer. I would characterize the threat as significant, enduring,
and less predictable than in years past, with individual threat streams
varying in their frequency and severity.
Based on my understanding of the current threat to the U.S.
Homeland, homegrown violent extremists remain the most frequent and
unpredictable terrorist threat to DOD personnel and facilities across
the country. While the United States has made progress against external
threats from core al Qaeda (AQ), the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria,
and AQ in the Arabian Peninsula, these foreign terrorist organizations
maintain the intent and capability to target the Homeland and will
continue to attempt to inspire, enable, and direct attacks against U.S.
interests.
If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the
Intelligence Community to prevent an attack against the United States.
difference between homeland defense and homeland security
Question. Please describe your understanding of the differences
between the role of the Department of Homeland Security and the
Department of Defense's Homeland defense mission.
Answer. My understanding is that the Department of Defense and
Department of Homeland Security have complementary and mutually
supporting roles, missions, and responsibilities. Homeland security is
a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks in the United
States, reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the
damage and recover from attacks that do occur. Homeland defense is the
protection of U.S. sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and
critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression
or other threats as directed by the President.
Question. Do you agree that the Department of Defense should not be
responsible for Homeland security, but may serve in a supporting role
to assist civilian federal agencies, as directed by the President or
Secretary of Defense?
Answer. Congress, in the Homeland Security Act of 2002, specified
that the primary mission of the Department of Homeland Security is to:
prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; reduce the
vulnerability of the United States to terrorism; and minimize the
damage, and assist in the recovery, from terrorist attacks that occur
within the United States. As necessary, and consistent with the law,
the Department of Defense provides support to the Department of
Homeland Security in the execution of its Homeland security missions.
relationship with the department of homeland security
Question. The establishment of the Department of Homeland Security
was one of the U. S. Government's largest cabinet-level reorganizations
in the last 50 years. Despite this reorganization, the Department of
Defense will continue to play an important role in providing Defense
Support of Civil Authorities for federal responses to certain domestic
incidents, as directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense.
Please describe your understanding of the relationship between the
Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security,
particularly with respect to Defense Support of Civil Authorities and
cyber security.
Answer. It is my understanding that the Department of Defense and
the Department of Homeland Security have a close working relationship
due to their complementary Homeland defense and Homeland security
responsibilities, and the need for a close and well-exercised
relationship for the rapid execution of Secretary of Defense-approved
Defense Support of Civil Authorities missions as requested by the
Department of Homeland Security, including in response to domestic
disasters, emergencies, and cyber incidents.
Question. If confirmed, what role would you play in the direction
and coordination of Defense Department activities with the Department
of Homeland Security?
Answer. If confirmed, I would be responsible for the overall
supervision of the Homeland defense activities of the Department, as
well as coordinating the planning and execution of Defense Support of
Civil Authorities missions in support of the Department of Homeland
Security. If confirmed, my goal would be to continue this strong
relationship between the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security.
defense support of civil authorities
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense
and Global Security has primary responsibility for Defense Support of
Civil Authorities (DSCA), particularly support to the Department of
Homeland Security and its components, for responses to natural and man-
made disasters in the United States.
Please describe your general understanding of the roles and
responsibilities of the Department of Defense in providing DSCA, and
the roles and responsibilities of other federal agencies in responding
to domestic disasters.
Answer. The Department of Defense plays an important role. It
supports civil authorities in response to domestic disasters. Normally,
the Department of Defense provides disaster support to the Federal
Emergency Management Agency or another lead Federal agency, when
directed by the President, or when the Secretary of Defense has
approved a request for assistance pursuant to the Stafford Act or the
Economy Act.
Under the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended by the Post-
Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006, the Administrator of
the Federal Emergency Management Agency is the principal advisor to the
President, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Homeland
Security for all matters relating to emergency management in the United
States. The Administrator is responsible for providing the Federal
Government's response to terrorist attacks and major disasters,
including managing such response.
Consistent with the National Response Framework, the Federal
Government and many State governments organize their response resources
and capabilities under the Emergency Support Function (ESF) construct.
The 14 Federal ESFs bring together the capabilities of Federal
departments and agencies and other national-level assets to perform
such functions as transportation, public works and engineering, mass
care and temporary housing, logistics, public health and medical
services, and search and rescue.
Question. Under current law, when the Department of Defense
provides DSCA, what are the responsibilities of other federal agencies
for paying for or reimbursing the Department for such support?
Answer. During an emergency or disaster, when the Department
supports FEMA under the terms of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief
and Emergency Assistance Act, the Department is reimbursed by FEMA for
civilian overtime, temporary duty expenses, and the operational and
maintenance costs of providing the support. DOD is not reimbursed for
the pay and allowances of personnel providing the support.
When DOD supports other Federal departments and agencies under the
Economy Act (Title 31, U.S. Code, Section 1535), DOD is reimbursed for
all support costs, including the pay and allowances of the personnel
providing the support.
Under the Presidential Protection Assistance Act of 1976, when the
Department provides temporary support to the Secret Service that is
directly related to the protection of the President or Vice President,
the support is provided on a non-reimbursable basis. When support is
provided to the Secret Service for other protected persons, DOD is
reimbursed for its expenses.
defense critical infrastructure program
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense
and Global Security is responsible for overseeing Defense Department
efforts and programs to protect defense critical infrastructure in the
United States.
If confirmed, what plans, approaches, and priorities would you have
for ensuring that the Defense Critical Infrastructure Program is
functioning properly?
Answer. If confirmed, ensuring the resilience of DOD's critical
infrastructure, both within and outside DOD's control, would be a
priority for my organization. I understand that DOD's mission assurance
framework continues to align the Department's security, protection, and
risk management programs and activities to improve the resilience of
DOD's critical infrastructure overall. As part of this mission
assurance effort, if confirmed, I would also co-chair the cross-
Department Mission Assurance Executive Steering Group (MA-ESG) where I
would review plans, approaches and priorities and make recommendations
to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to ensure adequate
measures are taken for the protection of defense critical
infrastructure in an all-hazards environment to ensure mission
execution.
If confirmed, ensuring the resilience of DOD's critical
infrastructure, both within and outside DOD's control, would be a
priority for my organization. I understand that DOD's mission assurance
framework provides for alignment, synchronization, and integration with
the Department's security, protection, and risk management programs and
activities to improve the resilience of DOD's critical infrastructure
overall. As part of this mission assurance effort, if confirmed, I
would also co-chair the cross-Department Mission Assurance Executive
Steering Group (MA-ESG) where I would review plans, approaches and
priorities and make recommendations to the USD(P), who is responsible
for the defense security enterprise, regarding adequate measures to be
taken to protect defense critical infrastructure in an all-hazards
environment to ensure mission execution.
installation security
Question. The security of U.S. military installations--both at home
and abroad--has been a longstanding priority for the Senate Armed
Services Committee.
If confirmed, what would be your priorities for ensuring an
adequate level of security for military installations in the United
States?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work to ensure the effectiveness of
Department of Defense antiterrorism and protection policies in
detecting, deterring, preventing, and responding to threats directed at
DOD installations, facilities, and personnel, including their families.
I would also work to ensure that adequate authorities and resources are
provided to execute these policies. In addition, I would work to ensure
that the Department of Defense is working closely with its Federal,
State, local, and tribal partners in establishing a mutually supportive
protective posture inside and outside DOD installations and facilities.
Although the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence is the
principal staff assistant for physical security, if confirmed, I would
leverage the Mission Assurance Coordination Board to ensure
antiterrorism and physical security policies work together to focus on
risk mitigation. I would ensure Department efforts are coordinated to
provide defense-in-depth using tailored procedures, select technologies
and well-trained personnel to reduce risk and mitigate potential
threats. In addition, I would encourage DOD Components to share access
control information and continuously vet individuals against U.S.
criminal and terrorist databases. Finally, I would work to ensure
antiterrorism policy is consistent with DOD physical security and
installation emergency management policy, as part of the overall DOD
Mission Assurance effort.
defense continuity and mission assurance
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense
and Global Security has primary responsibility for the Defense
Continuity Program and for Department of Defense Mission Assurance in
the United States.
What is your understanding of the roles and responsibilities of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security
with respect to the Defense Continuity Program and Mission Assurance?
Answer. Under the authority, direction, and control of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security has two major
responsibilities for the Defense Continuity Program. The first is to
develop, coordinate, and oversee implementation of Defense continuity
policy (which includes activities supporting continuity of operations,
continuity of government, and enduring constitutional government). The
second is to develop and oversee a comprehensive continuity program
including continuity plans to support the Secretary, the Deputy
Secretary, their senior and supporting staffs, and the DOD Components
in collaboration with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Question. If confirmed, what would be your priorities for
accomplishing these important missions?
Answer. It is imperative that the Department to maintain the
ability to provide senior leaders a clear understanding of options and
risks to mission accomplishment. It is also essential that we provide
the Department's senior leaders with tools and resources that allow for
enhanced flexibility, mobility, resilience, and survivability during
times of crisis in order to support the Secretary of Defense. Defense
Continuity and Mission Assurance provide this important capability to
ensure resiliency and readiness.
If confirmed, one of my Defense Continuity Program priorities would
be to continue modernization of selected DOD continuity capabilities to
improve readiness and resilience while incorporating operational
efficiencies. I believe that our approach must consider innovative
policies and plans, as well as shared resources and enhanced mobility.
cbrn consequence management enterprise
Question. Among the specialized capabilities that the Defense
Department can provide to civil authorities are the Chemical,
Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) consequence management
response forces. These comprise a mix of National Guard and Active
Component forces and units, both large and small.
Please describe your understanding of the composition and role of
the Defense Department's CBRN consequence management enterprise, the
circumstances under which they could be used, and the role of National
Guard capabilities in responding to both state and federal CBRN
incidents.
Answer. As I understand, the Department of Defense uses the Total
Force approach to meet the requirement--some 18,700 personnel, CBRN
response-capable units from the Active Component, Reserve Component,
and National Guard to provide a wide range of capabilities to save
lives and protect property. The CBRN Response Enterprise is composed of
57 National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-
CSTs) (one in every State and territory, and two in the States of
California, Florida, and New York), 17 National Guard CBRN Enhanced
Response Force Packages (CERFPs) (based in Alabama, Colorado, Florida,
Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota,
Nebraska, Nevada, Oregon, Puerto Rico, Virginia, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin), 10 National Guard Homeland Response Forces (HRFs) (one in
each Federal Emergency Management Agency Region), one Federal Defense
CBRN Response Force (DCRF), and two Command and Control CBRN Response
Elements (C2CREs).
CBRN Response Enterprise units support civil authorities in
response to domestic CBRN incidents. Given the potential for surprise
attacks within the United States, the Department of Defense organized
the CBRN Response Enterprise to have enhanced lifesaving capabilities,
increased flexibility, and reduced response times. This is why a
substantial part of the CBRN Response Enterprise is composed of
National Guard units, which can, under State command and control, be
directed by their Governors to respond to a CBRN incident within a
State or region more rapidly. In exigent circumstances, and consistent
with the law, these National Guard units may be ordered to Active Duty
to augment the Federal CBRN response. As necessary, Federal CBRN
Response Enterprise units, at the direction of the President or as
requested by the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management
Agency and approved by the Secretary of Defense, will augment the
Federal Government's assistance to the States.
Question. If confirmed, what would be your role with regard to the
oversight, training, certification, coordination, and employment of the
Defense Department's CBRN consequence management response forces?
Answer. If confirmed, I would be responsible for developing,
coordinating, and overseeing Defense policy for DSCA plans and
activities, including force readiness, commitment, and employment to
conduct DSCA activities, including CBRN response. I would also work
with USNORTHCOM and the National Guard Bureau to ensure that the
Department's CBRN Response Enterprise maintains its readiness.
In accordance with section 2313 of title 50, U.S. Code, the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security
is responsible for coordinating Department of Defense assistance to
Federal, State, and local officials when responding to threats
involving chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield
explosives weapons or related materials or technologies. This includes
assistance in their identification, neutralization, dismantlement, and
disposition. Therefore, if confirmed, I would have this responsibility
as well.
relationship with united states northern command
Question. United States Northern Command was established in October
2002 with the mission of conducting operations to deter, prevent, and
defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its
territories, and interests within the Command's assigned area of
responsibility, and, as directed by the President or Secretary of
Defense, to provide military assistance to civil authorities, including
consequence management operations.
If confirmed, how do you anticipate you would coordinate roles and
responsibilities with the Commander of United States Northern Command?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Commander of
the North American Aerospace Defense Command and United States Northern
Command. I would also work with the Commander of United States Pacific
Command to support the efforts of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy, Secretary, and Deputy Secretary, particularly in the areas of
Homeland defense and DSCA strategy and policy, contingency planning,
and policy oversight of operations.
Question. How do you anticipate that the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security and the Commander of
United States Northern Command will coordinate with other Federal and
State entities in planning for responses to catastrophic events that
might require Defense Department support?
Answer. If confirmed, I expect to work closely with the Commander
of United States Northern Command and the Commander of United States
Pacific Command to ensure that Department of Defense support to Federal
and State entities in response to catastrophic events, if required, is
provided in a timely and coordinated fashion. It is my understanding
that this begins with supporting the Federal Emergency Management
Agency's integrated regional planning efforts with the States. I would
also work with the Commander and the Department's civilian partners to
ensure that the Department is prepared to provide support quickly,
effectively, and in a coordinated fashion that facilitates unity of
effort to save and sustain lives and relieve human suffering.
partnership with the national guard and the states
Question. The Department of Defense has an important partnership
with the National Guard because it has both federal and state
responsibilities. The Department has worked with the Council of
Governors to establish procedures to ensure unity of effort between
military forces operating in federal and state status, including the
creation of ``dual-status commanders.''
Please summarize your understanding of how this unity of effort is
maintained through the dual status commander arrangement, so that the
authorities of the President and Secretary of Defense are preserved for
federal military forces, and the authorities of Governors are preserved
for National Guard forces acting in a state capacity.
Answer. As I understand, a ``dual-status commander'' is a commander
who may, by law, serve in two statuses, Federal and State, while
performing the duties of those statuses separately and distinctly for
the purpose of facilitating unity of effort. In his or her State
status, a dual-status commander is a member of the State chain of
command, subject to the orders of the Governor and Adjutant General of
their State, and, on their behalf, exercises command of State National
Guard forces. In his or her other Federal status, a dual status
commander is a member of the Federal chain of command, subject to the
orders of the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the supported
combatant commander, and, on their behalf, exercises command of
assigned Federal military forces.
In accordance with section 515 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, when the Armed Forces and the
National Guard are employed simultaneously in support of civil
authorities in the United States, appointment of a dual-status
commander as commander of Federal forces by Federal authorities and as
commander of State National Guard forces by State authorities, should
be the usual and customary command and control arrangement.
national guard and reserve role in homeland defense
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense
and Global Security has policy responsibility for the participation of
National Guard units or personnel in Homeland defense activities, when
the Secretary of Defense determines that such participation is
necessary and appropriate.
What role do you believe the National Guard and Reserves should
have in Homeland defense, and how does their role relate to the role of
the Active Component?
Answer. I believe that Homeland defense is a Total Force mission.
The role of the National Guard and the Reserves is to integrate
seamlessly with Active Component forces to defend the United States
Homeland. If confirmed, I will work with the Service Secretaries, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Reserve Chiefs, and the
responsible combatant commanders, to ensure that all forces--Active,
Guard, and Reserve--are prepared to execute assigned Homeland defense
missions.
Question. What role do you believe the National Guard and Reserves
should have in providing civil support assistance to other federal
agencies, and how does their role relate to the role of the Active
Component?
Answer. I believe that DSCA is a Total Force mission. The role of
the National Guard and the Reserves, as well as that of the Active
Component and other Department of Defense Components, is, when directed
by the President or the Secretary of Defense, to be an integrated part
of the Department of Defense's support of other Federal departments and
agencies. If confirmed, I will work with the Service Secretaries, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Reserve Chiefs, and the
responsible combatant commanders to ensure that all Defense resources--
military and civilian (Active, Guard, and Reserve)--are prepared to
execute assigned DSCA missions.
use of active duty and reserve personnel for homeland defense/posse
comitatus
Question. What is your understanding of the legal issues and
authority associated with using National Guard and Reserve personnel in
security roles within the United States?
Answer. I understand that the National Guard, as a State militia,
under the command and control of their Governors and Adjutants
Generals, may be used for any State response activities under State
law, consistent with the United States Constitution and applicable
Federal laws. The National Guard is not subject to the restrictions
imposed by the Posse Comitatus Act and, therefore, may be used for
security roles authorized under State law, consistent with the United
States Constitution and applicable Federal laws.
Question. When authorized to support missions requested by the
President or the Secretary of Defense in a duty status under title 32,
U.S. Code, National Guard personnel, under the command and control of
their Governors and Adjutants General, are also not subject to the
restrictions imposed by the Posse Comitatus Act.
When the Reserve Components (including the National Guard) are
ordered to Active Duty under title 10, and placed under Federal command
and control, they are subject to the same restrictions imposed by the
Posse Comitatus Act. They are also subject to the same restrictions
imposed by other laws and policies concerning DOD support to law
enforcement agencies. The same exceptions specifically authorized by
Congress and applied to other Federal military forces also apply to the
National Guard when they are placed under Federal command and control.
Question. In your opinion, does the Posse Comitatus Act (18 U.S.C.
Sec. 1385) or chapter 18 of title 10, United States Code (which
regulates the use of the armed forces in support of civilian law
enforcement and related activities), require amendment to deal with the
present Homeland security situation?
Answer. In my opinion, current laws regarding the use of the Armed
Forces in support of civilian law enforcement and related activities
appear to be sufficient. If confirmed, I would carefully review these
laws and their affects and, if necessary, make appropriate
recommendations to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the
Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Defense.
Question. Under what circumstances do you believe it is appropriate
for the Department of Defense to provide assistance to law enforcement
authorities in response to a domestic terrorist event? What about a
non-terrorist event?
Answer. Congress has authorized the Department of Defense to
provide assistance to civilian law enforcement authorities in a number
of terrorist and non-terrorist circumstances. For example, under
section 282 of title 10, U.S. Code, the Secretary of Defense may, when
requested by the Attorney General, provide assistance, during an
emergency situation involving a weapon of mass destruction if: (i) the
Secretary and the Attorney General jointly determine that an emergency
situation exists; (ii) the emergency situation poses a serious threat
to the interests of the United States; (iii) civilian expertise and
capabilities are not readily available to provide the required
assistance to counter the threat immediately posed by the weapon
involved; (iv) special capabilities and expertise of the Department of
Defense are necessary and critical to counter the threat posed by the
weapon involved; and (v) the Secretary determines that the provision of
such assistance will not adversely affect the military preparedness of
the United States. Section 282 does not require a terrorist event for
DOD assistance to be provided.
Question. If confirmed, what role do you expect to play in making
such determinations and making such assistance available?
Answer. If confirmed, I would be the principal civilian advisor to
the Secretary of Defense under the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy on all matters related to Defense Support of Civilian
Authorities, including support of civilian law enforcement authorities.
In this capacity, I would work with other principal staff assistants in
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, in particular the Office of The
General Counsel, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the
heads of other Department of Defense Components and activities to
facilitate informed decision-making by the Secretary of Defense.
policy to counter weapons of mass destruction
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense
and Global Security has primary policy and oversight responsibility for
countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), i.e., nuclear,
biological, and chemical weapons.
What do you believe are the principal challenges in countering WMD
and, if confirmed, what would be your priorities for Department of
Defense policy for countering WMD?
Answer. I believe that preventing the proliferation and use of
weapons of mass destruction by State and non-state actors is the
principal challenge. A proactive approach to prevent such attacks is
critical, however the Department also needs to retain the ability to
respond to and mitigate WMD attacks. I believe the approach provided by
the current DOD strategy (reducing incentives to proliferation,
increasing the barriers to acquisition and use, and denying the effects
of current and emerging WMD threats) is appropriate. If confirmed, I
would prioritize DOD's efforts in these areas.
Question. If confirmed, what role do you expect to play in the
creation of policy for, and oversight of, Defense Department programs
to counter WMD?
Answer. If confirmed, my office would lead the development of
policies to prevent and respond to WMD threats at home and OCONUS. This
would include prioritizing DOD efforts to protect our forces and
allies, and ensuring appropriate support to civilian authorities, as
needed. Such efforts require active partnership with other U.S.
Departments and Agencies, and, if confirmed, I expect to partner with
DOD, interagency, and international partners to ensure that appropriate
policy and oversight are in place to reduce these threats and protect
our interests.
Question. The Unified Command Plan (UCP) was revised in August 2016
by transferring the mission for synchronizing global Department of
Defense operations for countering WMD from U.S. Strategic Command
(STRATCOM) to U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM).
What is your understanding of SOCOM's assigned responsibilities for
synchronizing global Department of Defense operations for countering
WMD?
Answer. As I understand, as of January 9, 2017, SOCOM became the
designated lead combatant command for synchronizing DOD planning
efforts to Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction. In this capacity, SOCOM
is responsible for maintaining the DOD CWMD Global Campaign Plan (GCP),
establishing intelligence priorities, monitoring global operations and
conducting assessments.
Question. What is your understanding of the oversight
responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Defense and Global Security with regard to this mission change and how
do those responsibilities contrast with those of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict?
Answer. As I understand it, the change in UCP responsibilities did
not impact the oversight responsibilities within OSD/P. The ASD for
HD&GS continues to be responsible for providing oversight, to include
developing, coordinating, and implementing plans and policy for the DOD
Global CWMD mission. This includes those plans and operations involving
SOF, Homeland Defense, and Defense Support to Civil Authorities. If
confirmed, I would coordinate matters with the ASD(SOLIC) as required
and appropriate.
cooperative threat reduction program
Question. If confirmed, what will be your role in implementing and
overseeing the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program?
Answer. The ASD/HD&GS role is to provide policy guidance to the
Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency for the DOD CTR
Program, coordinating with the Undersecretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, who maintains authority,
direction and control of DTRA. If confirmed, I will ensure that the CTR
program focuses in areas where DOD's authorities, capabilities, and
relationships make a unique contribution to USG non-proliferation
objectives, and are well coordinated with interagency and international
partners.
Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend
to the CTR Program, including changes in legislative authorities,
programs, or funding?
Answer. My understanding is that the DOD CTR Program has had, for
the most part, the authorities, programs, and funding needed to address
emerging WMD threats appropriately. Consolidating and updating
authorities in the 2015 NDAA has provided the CTR Program with the
legal stability needed to be successful. As the WMD threat evolves and
the need for cooperative threat reduction programs in advance of U.S.
national security objectives expands, if confirmed, I will engage with
my colleagues at DTRA and AT&L to determine whether any additional
legislative changes or funding requirements are warranted.
Question. How do you envision the continued evolution of the
program as it transitions away from Russia to countries outside the
former Soviet Union?
Answer. WMD threats have rapidly evolved and become more complex in
nature, and I envision that the CTR Program will continue to evolve to
meet those critical and emerging threats. I understand that the CTR
Program is focused on countering all WMD threats--whether posed by
state or non-state actors, and these are no longer limited to the
former Soviet Union. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that CTR is
well-positioned to continue to address the most significant threats,
while also responding to unique challenges such as those posed by
emerging technologies and continued pressures on international
nonproliferation regimes.
Question. Do you believe the CTR Program should be closely
coordinated with related efforts of the Defense Department's Chemical
and Biological Defense Program focused on reducing biological threats?
Answer. Yes, keeping our country safe from chemical and biological
threats requires a multi-faceted approach. While the CBDP focuses on
developing and acquiring capabilities that allow the Joint Force to
deter, prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from CBRN
threats, the CTR program builds partner nation capability to execute
some of these same actions. DOD is supporting development of a National
Biodefense Strategy, per Section 1086 of the Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA. If
confirmed, I will work to coordinate the various programs that seek to
protect the Homeland, our forces, and allies from biological threats.
chemical and biological defense
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense
and Global Security is responsible for the Chemical and Biological
Defense Program of the Defense Department.
What do you believe are the principal challenges in chemical and
biological defense, and what would be your priorities for the Defense
Department's Chemical and Biological Defense Program?
Answer. The ASD for Homeland Defense and Global Security Affairs is
responsible for developing policies to guide the Chemical and
Biological Defense Program (CBDP), which is overseen and managed by
ASD/NCB. If confirmed, I would work to ensure close coordination
between our respective offices to support the Department's overall
efforts to counter weapons of mass destruction. Such coordination would
posture us to effectively equip the force, maintain our CBDP
infrastructure, while staying current with advances in science and
technology research.
Question. Do you believe the Chemical and Biological Defense
Program should be closely coordinated with related efforts of the
Defense Department's CTR Program focused on reducing biological
threats?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I would work to ensure close
coordination between the two Programs.
chemical demilitarization
Question. DOD Directive 5160.05E states the Defense Department
policy that ``the Department of Defense shall be in full compliance''
with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons
Convention (BWC). In 2006, the Department announced that the United
States would not meet even the extended deadline of April 2012 for
destruction of its chemical weapons stockpile, as required under the
CWC. It has still not met this deadline.
Do you agree that the Department of Defense and the U.S. Government
should be in full compliance with the terms and obligations of the CWC
and the BWC, including the deadline for destruction of the U.S.
chemical weapons stockpile under the CWC?
Answer. In 2006 the United States informed the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) that it did not expect to
complete destruction of the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile by 2012.
Since then, it is my understanding that the United States has remained
open and transparent with the OPCW about the U.S. chemical weapons
destruction program, emphasizing U.S. efforts to destroy the stockpile
as safely and expeditiously as practicable. If confirmed, I would
continue this approach.
Question. If confirmed, will you work to ensure that the Department
takes steps needed to minimize the time to complete destruction of the
U.S. chemical weapons stockpile, without sacrificing safety or
security, and that the Department requests the resources necessary for
complete destruction as close as practicable to the long-passed April
2012 extended deadline?
Answer. It is my understanding that the ASD for Nuclear, Chemical,
and Biological Defense Programs (NCB) and the Department of the Army
continue to oversee the programs to meet U.S. commitments under the
CWC, including the elimination of the remaining U.S. chemical weapons
stockpile. If confirmed, I would work closely with these offices to
ensure continued focus on these efforts and on completing the
destruction of the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile as safely and
quickly as practicable.
proliferation security initiative
Question. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is an
international effort to identify and interdict WMD and related
materials.
If confirmed, would you recommend that the PSI program continue
and, if so, do you believe that it should be modified in any way?
Answer. I support the Proliferation Security Initiative. If
confirmed, I will ensure that the Department of Defense continues to be
engaged in promoting the PSI and its Critical Capabilities and
Practices (CCP) initiative to ensure that our partner nations continue
to have the knowledge, skills, and political will to interdict WMD,
their delivery systems, and related materials.
With regard to modifications to the initiative, although the PSI
remains strong--one of my goals will be to ensure that the PSI's
Operational Experts Group (OEG) of 21 countries is re-invigorated to
become a more action-oriented and results-driven body. The PSI must
look towards the future to keep pace with evolving trends and threats,
especially as actors such as North Korea, Iran and Syria continue to
defy the international community with their proliferation activities.
ballistic missile defense
Question. The United States Homeland and its deployed forces enjoy
a measure of protection against ballistic missile threats from rogue
nations such as North Korea and Iran, yet the threat continues to grow.
During the past year, North Korea conducted several missile tests and
continued development of mobile long-range missiles. Likewise, Iran
continues to test ballistic missiles of increasing range. Russia and
China also continue to deploy ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic
missiles that threaten United States forces, allies, and the United
States Homeland.
What policies would you recommend for U.S. missile defense
capabilities in the following areas: (1) Homeland missile defense; (2)
regional missile defense; (3) improved discrimination and sensors; (4)
next generation missile defense; and (5) defense against cruise and
hypersonic missiles?
Answer. Defending the Nation and U.S. interests abroad from
ballistic missiles is one of the Department's highest priorities.
Secretary Mattis directed the commencement of the Ballistic Missile
Defense Review (BMDR) to identify ways to strengthen missile-defense
capabilities, rebalance Homeland and theater defense priorities, and
provide the necessary policy and strategy framework for our nation's
missile defense systems.
The review, running concurrent to the Nuclear Posture Review, will
be led by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Vice Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and include interagency partners. The process
will culminate in a final report and will be delivered to the President
by the end of the year.
The policy areas referenced above will be examined during the
course of the BMDR. If confirmed, I will review the results of the BMDR
and make recommendations as appropriate.
Question. Do you support the ``fly before you buy'' approach to
ensure that realistic and successful intercept flight testing is
conducted before additional interceptors are deployed?
Answer. Although ``fly before you buy'' responsibility will not be
directly in my portfolio, yes, as a policy matter, I support
operationally realistic testing prior to making final acquisition
determinations.
Question. Do you believe the United States should encourage our
regional allies and partners to increase their missile defense
capabilities to contribute to regional security and help reduce the
burden on U.S. forces and requirements?
Answer. The rebalance of Homeland and regional defense priorities
will be one of the focus areas of the BMDR. The review, running
concurrent to the Nuclear Posture Review, will be led by the Deputy
Secretary of Defense and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and include interagency partners. The process will culminate in
a final report and will be delivered to the President by the end of the
year. If confirmed, I will work closely with my counterparts on
contributing to the review and make recommendations as appropriate.
cyber security
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense
and Global Security serves as the Principal Cyber Advisor to the
Secretary of Defense and has primary responsibility for Department of
Defense cyber policy.
What is your understanding of the roles and responsibilities of the
Department of Defense for cyber security, and how do they compare to
the roles and responsibilities of the Department of Homeland Security?
Answer. My understanding is that similar to the roles and
responsibilities of the Department of Defense in other domains, DOD is
responsible for defending the Nation against attacks of serious
consequence in cyberspace. The Department is also responsible for
cybersecurity of its own networks, systems, and infrastructure.
The Department also works closely with the Department of Homeland
Security, which plays the lead role in protecting, mitigating, and
recovering from domestic cyber incidents and the Department of Justice,
which plays the lead role in investigating, attributing, disrupting,
and prosecuting cybercrimes. When directed, the Department of Defense,
including the National Guard, can provide support to domestic civilian
agencies, as well as State and local governments.
Question. Given that cyber threats can be inherently global in
nature, and that cyber security is not a mission limited to the U.S.
Homeland, how do view the relationship of cyber security to Homeland
defense?
Answer. Homeland defense includes the protection of U.S.
sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and defense of critical
infrastructure against external threats and aggression, or against
other threats as directed by the President. I believe in this threat
environment, cyberspace is a key part of our Homeland defense because
our advanced adversaries are pursuing cyber capabilities to threaten
all of these things. Of course, the Department must continue to work
with other federal departments and agencies, the private sector, and
international partners to ensure it can carry out its assigned missions
in all domains.
supervision and management of the cyber mission
Question. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2014 requires the Secretary of Defense to appoint a Senate-confirmed
official from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
to act as the Principal Cyber Advisor to the Secretary. The Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security plays
that role, and as such is responsible for overall supervision of cyber
activities, including policy and operational considerations, resources,
personnel, and acquisition and technology. The legislation also directs
the Principal Cyber Advisor to assemble a small cross-functional team
to integrate cyber expertise across the Department to enable sound
decisions while leaving execution of decisions to existing
organizations and officials.
If confirmed, how would you approach your role as the Principal
Cyber Advisor to the Secretary of Defense?
Answer. Based on my initial review, I believe the PCA authorities
to oversee the broad, cross-cutting activities in the Department
related to cyber is an effective approach. I believe the cross-
functional nature of the PCA is essential, as it allows a focused team
to work across the Department with the appropriate Principal Staff
Assistants to tackle tough problems, whether they involve policy,
operations, personnel, training, acquisition, or intelligence. It is
clear the role of PCA will be broadened and, if confirmed, I welcome
those additional responsibilities to enhance the PCA's oversight and
advocacy role for US Cyber Command.
Question. How do you intend to empower the cross-functional team
led by the Principal Cyber Advisor to produce policy, strategy, and
resourcing options for the Secretary?
Answer. As highlighted previously, I believe the PCA's cross-
functional team construct provides tremendous value and has served the
Department well since its inception. With the potential elevation of
USCYBERCOM, it will be important to review the current staffing
strategy and expertise to ensure the PCA is well equipped to perform
the duties as outlined in the 2017 NDAA. I understand the Department is
evaluating courses of action to better posture PCA to conduct oversight
of USCYBERCOM as directed by Congress. If confirmed, I will work with
key stakeholders to ensure PCA is able to effectively perform the
additional responsibilities as directed.
relationship between cyber and information operations
Question. Russia, other nations, and adversaries such as ISIS
conduct information operations through cyberspace where the ultimate
goal of the operations is to affect perceptions, beliefs, and decision-
making in the cognitive sphere--not simply to steal information, or
disable a network. Modern information technologies and platforms, such
as social media and ``big data analytics,'' have been proven to be able
to amplify the speed, scale, agility, and precision targeting of
traditional information operations. In the Defense Department, however,
U.S. Cyber Command is focused on technical cyber missions and skills,
while different organizations are responsible for information
operations, psychological and deception operations, and electronic
warfare. In addition, there are concerns that the Defense Department's
focus on tactical and operational support to deployed forces has
resulted in serious neglect of strategic-level information operations.
What changes do you think are necessary to improve the Defense
Department's ability to detect and counter information operations, both
defensively and offensively?
Answer. It is my view that cyber-enabled information operations,
online propaganda, and adversary information activities are an
increasingly significant security challenge. If confirmed, I will serve
as an advocate for cyber mission forces contributions to the fight
against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and its propaganda,
and how cyber operations can be better synchronized and coordinated
with DOD online information operations. I will work with my colleagues
across the Department to integrate best practices and lessons learned
to ensure cyber capabilities are best postured to support strategic-
level information operations.
Question. What are your views on the recommendations of the Defense
Science Task Force on Cyber Deterrence?
Answer. I believe the report offers some interesting and thoughtful
suggestions on improving our deterrence posture in cyberspace.
Question. Do you believe that we need a more integrated whole-of-
government approach to combating hostile information operations
directed against the United States, its allies, and interests?
Answer. Given the complexity and scope of the cyber-enabled
information operations and online propaganda efforts being undertaken
by our adversaries around the world, it is my view a whole-of-
government approach that leverages all elements of national power is
necessary. Each department and agency provides a unique set of
capabilities and authorities that can contribute to stronger and more
effective capabilities for combating hostile information operations. If
confirmed, I will work with my counterparts to develop an effective
approach to address these challenges.
information assurance
Question. There are some concerns about the commitment of the
National Security Agency (NSA) to the cyber security mission and the
Office of the Secretary of Defense's ability to conduct proper
oversight of NSA's cyber security mission since NSA merged the
Information Assurance Directorate within its Signals Intelligence
Directorate.
Given that the position to which you have been nominated is the
Principal Cyber Advisor to the Secretary of Defense, what is your view
of this change?
Answer. NSA is the nation's leader of cryptographic solutions,
security engineering and architecture, and advanced cybersecurity
operations. It is tasked with protecting and defending National
Security Systems by providing solutions to the nation's hardest
Information Assurance and Cybersecurity challenges. Based on my
initial, unclassified review, the NSA organizational changes were made
after extensive research and engagement by NSA to position itself to
remain at the forefront of foreign signals intelligence, information
assurance, and cyber into the next decade. I understand this change was
less a merger of IA, and more an integration of NSA's key mission
functions to streamline capabilities development and accelerate
innovation efforts. The organizational changes did include the stand-up
of the Deputy National Manager of Information Assurance office, whose
role is to provide the proper internal oversight to NSA's IA mission.
If confirmed, I will work with my counterparts to ensure continued
prioritized focus on the IA mission.
Question. If confirmed, how will you approach oversight in your
role?
Answer. The DOD CIO has oversight of DIRNSA's performance of duties
as the National Manager for National Security Systems and on DOD
cybersecurity policy and guidance. As is standard practice for the
Principal Cyber Advisor, if confirmed, I would work closely with DOD
CIO to address any issues/concerns that may arise related to NSA's
support to the vital security missions of the U.S.
dual hatting and elevation of u.s. cyber command
Question. What are your views about elevating U.S. Cyber Command to
a unified command and about maintaining or ending the ``dual hat''
relationship where the Commander of U.S. Cyber Command serves also as
the Director of NSA?
Answer. I am supportive of the elevation of U.S. Cyber Command to a
unified combatant command consistent with the requirement in the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017. I understand
that certification of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs is required before the ``dual hat'' arrangement can be
changed. If confirmed, I will seek to gain better understanding about
the appropriateness and timing for such a decision.
development of cyber capabilities
Question. U.S. Cyber Command has depended heavily to date on NSA
for technology, equipment, capabilities, concepts of operations, and
tactics, techniques, and procedures.
Are you satisfied that the Department of Defense is organized and
resourced to provide a broad base of innovation and capability
development in the cyber domain that includes the military service's
research and development organizations, defense agencies such as the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, and the private sector?
Answer. The Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA stipulates that separation of the
dual-hat construct can only occur once the Secretary of Defense and the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs jointly determine and certify that
separation will not pose unacceptable risks to the military
effectiveness of Cyber Command. If confirmed, I would work to ensure
that Cyber Command is supported by a broad base of innovation and
capability development in the cyber domain.
defense space policy
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense
and Global Security has primary responsibility for Department of
Defense space policy.
Please describe your understanding of the space policy
responsibilities intended for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Homeland Defense and Global Security, and how those responsibilities
would relate to cyber security policy responsibilities.
Answer. As I understand it, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Homeland Defense and Global Security is responsible for both Space and
Cyber policy. If confirmed, I would ensure the close collaboration
between these two critical areas by actively leading the development
and oversight of space and cyber policy and strategy for the
Department. I would also be an active participant in the DOD space- and
cyber-related decision-making processes, and in the DOD Planning,
Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) processes to ensure space
and cyber system architectures support our national security objectives
effectively.
Question. If confirmed, what would be your priorities for
Department of Defense policy for space, and how would you ensure
effective execution of the Department's space policy?
Answer. If confirmed, I would place priority on strengthening
deterrence by assuring U.S. national security space capabilities
against growing counter-space threats. In particular, through
partnerships with commercial suppliers, collaboration with
international partners, and changes in our own architectures and
operational tactics, we can improve the resiliency, defense, and the
ability to reconstitute our space systems and strengthen strategic
stability in space.
Question. What do you perceive as the threats to our national
security space satellites?
Answer. In addition to the space environment, which includes man-
made debris and space weather, the threat to our satellite capabilities
is real and growing. Both China and Russia have developed and tested a
variety of anti-satellite weapons that can destroy or disable
satellites. Iran, North Korea, and other countries have capabilities to
jam satellite communications and GPS. If confirmed, I would work to
ensure that mission assurance of space capabilities against these
growing threats is commensurate with the requirements of the operations
and activities our space systems perform and support.
Question. Briefly describe what policy objectives the United States
should be seeking to achieve and the strategy you think is necessary to
address these threats.
Answer. The sustainability, stability, and free access to, and use
of, space is and will remain vital to U.S. national interests. The
United States should seek to deter conflict that extends to or begins
in space. Achieving that requires that we ensure the availability,
security, and resiliency of our space assets at all times and through
all phases of conflict, and thereby deny aggressors the desired
benefits of attacks in space. If confirmed, I would focus on such steps
to increase our ability to deter such attacks.
Question. Do you support the development of offensive space control
capabilities to counter those threats?
Answer. It is in the interest of all nations to avoid hostilities
in space. However, just as on Earth, the U.S. retains the inherent
right of self-defense in space. As Secretary Mattis stated in his
confirmation testimony, ``Offensive space control capabilities should
be considered to ensure survivable and resilient space operations
necessary for the execution of war plans.'' I share that view.
Question. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2017 prohibits the use of Russian rocket engines after December 31,
2022.
Are you committed to ending our dependence on the use of Russian
rocket engines as soon as possible, perhaps even before December 31,
2022?
Answer. Yes. Secretary Mattis stated in his confirmation that he
will abide by the law and work with Congress to meet or exceed any
deadline requirements. I will do likewise.
national security budget reductions and sequestration
Question. The original discretionary caps imposed by the Budget
Control Act (BCA) will be in effect for fiscal year 2018 through fiscal
year 2021, unless there is agreement to change budget levels. Both the
Secretary of Defense and the President have stated the need to repeal
the ``defense sequester.''
What are your views on how the BCA impacts the military? Should the
BCA be amended or repealed?
Answer. The Budget Control Act has presented significant challenges
to many Departments and Agencies across the government. I understand
that senior officials have testified that it has weakened our
military's readiness. I believe that, moving forward, changes will need
to be made if the Department is to achieve its readiness,
modernization, and force structure required to address emerging
threats.
Question. Many of your responsibilities involve providing support
to other federal government agencies. Do you believe that any future
budget agreements should maintain a dollar-for-dollar principle to
provide relief from the caps to non-Defense Department agencies?
Answer. I agree with Secretary Mattis who said that budgets should
match resources to national priorities. Each Department and Agency
should define and justify its requirements.
Question. If confirmed, by what standards would you measure the
adequacy of funding for the missions under your supervision?
Answer. If confirmed, I would measure the adequacy of the funding
for the missions under my supervision by the ability to achieve our
objectives and execute our missions related to space, cyberspace,
countering weapons of mass destruction, and Homeland defense. This will
require close collaboration and cooperation with colleagues throughout
the Department including members of the joint staff, combatant
commands, and other OSD Components.
financial management and audit readiness
Question. The Department of Defense is the only federal agency
unable to complete a financial audit in accordance with the law,
despite having invested billions over the past 16 years to do so. The
persistent lack of accountability by Department leadership for results
leads to concerns within the Congress and in the public over the
stewardship of Department funds and the qualifications of the people
entrusted to lead the Department in its audit efforts. It is not simply
an abstract statutory requirement that the Department produce auditable
financial statements showing where and how it spends its annual
budget--the accuracy of the financial information underlying the
financial statements is critical to the Department's ability to develop
an adequate defense budget and make important financial decisions in an
environment where every defense dollar counts.
What actions will you take or direct that will achieve a better
outcome than past actions and initiatives for financial auditability of
the Defense Department?
Answer. I understand the Government Accountability Office has made
assessments and recommendations regarding audit readiness. If
confirmed, I will work closely with appropriate Department personnel to
ensure that I understand the recommendations, and as appropriate to my
mission areas, work to ensure that functions and missions under my
responsibility will meet audit readiness goals.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other
appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this position, to appear before this
Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Homeland Defense and Global Security?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this Committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees in a timely manner?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the Committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to answer letters and requests for
information from individual Senators who are members of this Committee?
Answer. Yes.
------
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
missile defense
1. Senator Reed. Mr. Rapuano, please describe the responsibilities
you would have as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense
and Global Security for our Nation's ballistic missile, cruise missile,
and air defense policy and programs, and how those responsibilities
coordinate with other offices within the Office of the Under Secretary
of Defense for Policy.
Mr. Rapuano. It is my understanding that the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security (ASD(HD&GS)) is
responsible for policy matters related to the aerospace defense of the
United States, including the cruise missile threat and response. It is
also my understanding that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Strategy, Plans & Capability (ASD(SP&C)) is responsible for ballistic
missile defense, including the emerging threat posed by North Korean
ballistic missiles. These two assistant secretaries must work together
closely on the development of policy to address missile threats to the
United States including the development and coordination of DOD policy
and guidance on U.S. ballistic missile defenses., This includes
providing policy and guidance to the Missile Defense Agency.
If confirmed, I would work closely with the ASD(SPC), the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other DOD organizations to ensure our
Nation is defended against all missile threats.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Kirsten Gillibrand
cyber
2. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Rapuano, in your advance policy
questions submitted to the Committee, you pledge to, ``Devote special
attention to the challenge of building the cyberspace workforce,
expanding DOD's [Department of Defense] operational capabilities, and
continuing to rationalize the complex funding streams that support
cyberspace initiatives.'' As Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on
Personnel, I have been working to push DOD to recruit and retain the
best possible cyber warriors. With a focus on Homeland defense against
cyber adversaries, how can DOD improve upon its efforts to recruit and
retain the best possible cyber warriors?
Mr. Rapuano. I appreciate your commitment to this important issue,
and, if confirmed, I will make building the Department of Defense's
cyberspace workforce one of my top priorities. The uniformed and
civilian members of the Department of Defense's cyberspace workforce
are the foundation of our Nation's strength in this domain. Without
these dedicated and extremely capable men and women we would not have
the ability to fight and win in cyberspace.
I believe there are many possible avenues to enhance current
cyberspace workforce recruiting and retention programs within the
Department. The implementation of Title 10, Cyber Excepted Service
(CES), for example, will assist in recruiting and retaining quality
cyber professionals.
The CES will streamline civilian hiring procedures, provide
additional flexibility in the hiring process, and allow the Department
to employ market-based pay initiatives targeting specialized skills.
This will help the Department compete better with the private sector
for talent.
The standup of National Guard and Reserve component cyber forces is
another avenue to enhance the Department's cyber recruitment and
retention. As you know, some National Guard and Reserve component
Airmen and Soldiers have unique technical skillsets and leadership
abilities that they have honed through many years of working in the
commercial sector. National Guard and Reserve cyber teams will provide
the Nation with a way to tap commercial sector talent and provide those
who exit the Active component a way to continue their service.
3. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Rapuano, can you expand your concern
regarding the ``complex funding streams'' involved in the Department's
cyber activities?
Mr. Rapuano. Given the extent to which activities in cyberspace
provide a foundation for almost all of the Department's missions, it is
understandably challenging to get a complete picture of all the
investments involved. Resources are spread across the Department and
the Services, consistent with their core roles and responsibilities.
However, in order to accomplish our strategic objectives for
cyberspace, I believe it is necessary to have a better understanding
and where possible, to simplify funding streams to allow for informed
investment decisions and strong oversight for this critical mission.
4. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Rapuano, the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security plays a key role in
the Department's responsibility for critical infrastructure
protection--first as a Federal department and second as a sector-
specific agency for the Defense Industrial Base. Do you believe that
there is a coherent plan in place to allow the Federal Government, in
coordination with State and local governments to respond to major
cyber-attacks on the country and escalate the response as appropriate?
Mr. Rapuano. The National Cyber Incident Response Plan (NCIRP)
provides a strong foundation for a whole-of-government plan to respond
to a significant cyber incident against the United States. However,
much work still is required to improve this process. Through exercises
like Cyber Guard, the Department of Defense has worked extensively with
the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, and other interagency
partners to identify and address gap and seam issues in the interagency
response plan. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that our Nation will
be effectively defended against significant cyberattacks.
5. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Rapuano, do you believe that there is a
coherent plan in place for the transition between private companies and
government response?
Mr. Rapuano. Current policy specifies roles and responsibilities
for federal Departments and Agencies and identifies priority industries
and companies. However, I believe there is more work to be done to
understand and plan for how the government and private sector would
work together in practice during an incident. To this end, I welcome
the recent Executive Order's focus on protecting critical
infrastructure, including the commitment to increasing public-private
partnerships. If confirmed, I would work with my DOD and interagency
counterparts to use this new opportunity to build relationships and to
regularly practice incident response.
6. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Rapuano, what are the challenges in
developing a plan that incorporates Federal, State and local
governments as well as the private sector in a whole-of-country cyber
response plan?
Mr. Rapuano. One of the challenges of developing a whole-of-nation
cyber response plan is the sheer number and diversity of state, local,
tribal, and territorial systems and processes in responding to cyber
incidents. The recently-released National Cyber Incident Response Plan
(NCIRP), that DOD fully participated in developing in conjunction with
the Department of Homeland Security, takes steps to address this
challenge by codifying how we respond as a nation to cyberspace
incidents and provides a way for each entity to be full partners in
incident response activates.
7. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Rapuano, I have long fought for the
inclusion of the National Guard in the Defense Department's cyber
mission because I believe that the Guard provides unique capabilities
for attracting people with outside expertise and retaining those we've
already trained--and also serves both Federal and State needs in
defending the Homeland. Do you think we are using the National Guard as
effectively as we could be?
Mr. Rapuano. I share your views about the importance of effective
employment of National Guard and Reserve cyber forces, and will make
this a priority, if confirmed. The National Guard and Reserve are
currently building capability and capacity to conduct cyberspace
operations, and a number of programs and initiatives are still in the
pilot phase. Given this, it is likely too early to make a comprehensive
assessment of the Department of Defense's efforts to integrate the
National Guard and Reserve into cyberspace operations.
The Department must employ a Total Force solution when it comes to
cyberspace operations. The National Guard and Reserve bring with them
private sector experience, understanding of the unique critical
infrastructure and information technology industries in their states,
and a fresh perspective to how we conduct operations. To ensure mission
success, the Total Force must be trained and equipped to the same level
and held to the same operational standards as the Active Duty
cyberspace operations force.
The National Guard and the Reserve Component are also a key element
in developing and preserving the Department's cyberspace talent. As you
know, it is difficult for the military to compete with private sector
cyberspace salaries, so the Reserve Component provides a way to
encourage military members who are leaving Active service to join a
reserve component. In this way, we can continue to reap the benefits of
the training and experience that has already been invested in these
members while providing an option for them to continue to serve.
8. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Rapuano, could the Guard serve as a
conduit for cyber response between State, local and Federal Government
as well as the private sector because of its unique authorities?
Mr. Rapuano. Yes, I believe the National Guard is uniquely
positioned to serve as a conduit between State and private sector
entities and the Federal Government because its force posture and legal
status provides many advantages in supporting state and local
authorities.
9. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Rapuano, some Guard cyber units are
already working to red team the private sectors' networks, which means
that down the line, they will be familiar with and potentially able to
assist these companies. Do you think we should expand these types of
efforts?
Mr. Rapuano. It is difficult at this time to provide a thoughtful
comment about expanding these activities without full knowledge and
consideration of the Department's other operations. If confirmed, I am
committed to advancing the integration of National Guard cyber
capabilities into the Total Force and strongly support initiatives that
help to strengthen our defenses and resiliency in case of cyberattack.
In this way, these types of efforts that advance partnering with the
private sector make sense, as it helps to foster mutual trust and
organizational familiarity before a time of crisis. Cyber response
teams operating under Guard authorities can also perform a variety of
missions in support of state, local, and private entities (which
operate independently under their own authorities).
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
cyber acquisitions
10. Senator Heinrich. Mr. Rapuano, as Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security, you would serve as
the Principal Cyber Advisor to the Secretary of Defense with primary
responsibility for DOD cyber policy. As cyber continues to evolve as a
domain, DOD must remain resilient and agile in order to counter current
and future threats from both state and non-state actors. One recurring
theme I hear from cyber professionals is their concern with the ability
of DOD acquisition process to keep pace with emerging cyber threats. Do
existing acquisition authorities allow the DOD's cyber teams to keep
pace with commercial off the shelf capabilities?
Mr. Rapuano. I share the Committees view, and the view of many in
the national security community, that keeping pace, or better, out-
pacing adversaries is a strategic issue. The ability to provide
resilience, secure trusted networks and weapon systems, and
capabilities to defend the Nation will be a point of focus if I am
confirmed. I understand that changes have been made in the current
acquisition process to facilitate rapid acquisition, leverage
commercial technology, and advance DOD capabilities to deal with many
commercially available technologies available to both nation state and
non-state actors alike. New policies enable rapid acquisition of cyber
capabilities and new authorities give Cyber Command greater flexibility
and provide the Department even more expedient action in the case of an
imminent or an on-going cyberattack. If confirmed, I will look closely
at the capabilities needed for our missions in cyberspace and work with
my colleagues in the Department, the Secretary, and you to ensure we
are keeping pace with innovation, while making efficient use of
taxpayer dollars.
11. Senator Heinrich. Mr. Rapuano, how will you work to speed up
the timeline to procure information technology (IT) items for DOD's
cyber professionals?
Mr. Rapuano. I will work with my colleagues in the OSD staff and
the Services to streamline the inherent processes in the requirements
and acquisition phases to instill timeliness and a sense of urgency.
Enterprise services are one of the keys to this pathway and are
identified in the President's new Executive Order as an area of
emphasis.
cyber vulnerabilities
12. Senator Heinrich. Mr. Rapuano, in order to combat threats from
state and non-state actors, DOD must recognize weaknesses in cyber
defense and infrastructure. Do you support creative ideas like the
Department's Bug Bounty Program or ``Hack the Pentagon'' program?
Mr. Rapuano. I fully agree that it is paramount for the Department
to identify weaknesses and vulnerabilities in its cyber defenses and
infrastructure. The Bug Bounty and ``Hack the Pentagon'' programs are
two innovative and highly successful approaches to addressing this
problem. If confirmed, I would support these efforts and seek
additional creative initiatives to help mitigate vulnerabilities in a
cost-effective manner.
13. Senator Heinrich. Mr. Rapuano, how will you support these
programs to identify cyber vulnerabilities?
Mr. Rapuano. The Bug Bounty and Vulnerability Disclosure Programs
have proven to be very successful ways of finding vulnerabilities as
well as engaging with the security community. Therefore, if confirmed,
I will fight to maintain funding for these programs, support their
expansion, where possible, and engage with the private sector and
outside experts to identify potential improvements in their
implementation.
private sector
14. Senator Heinrich. Mr. Rapuano, programs such as the Defense
Digital Service, the Defense Innovation Unit Experiment, and the
Defense Innovation Advisory Board represent a DOD initiative to
collaborate with the private sector. How will you utilize these
programs to introduce and exchange ideas, integrate private sector
innovations into the DOD infrastructure, and shape cyber policy in DOD?
Mr. Rapuano. The cyber domain is so thoroughly integrated into the
everyday lives and economy of Americans that DOD must look to the
private sector to fully understand trends, to leverage technology,
expertise, and best practices, and to develop the best workforce. From
Silicon Valley, to San Antonio, Seattle, Boston, St Louis, and beyond,
technology and practices are constantly emerging and it is critical
that DOD is connected to these developments to ensure the ability to
defend and operate in cyberspace.
If confirmed, I will establish strong relationships with leading
organizations in cyber, including tech companies, academic and other
training institutions, and leaders in cybersecurity. To this end, I see
the DDS, DIUx, and the DIAB as key mechanisms for institutionalizing
such relationships and ensuring the exchange of ideas and technology to
allow DOD to be successful at its missions. By establishing open and
transparent mechanisms for collaboration, and in some cases even
putting DOD in proximity to these centers of influence, these
initiatives will lay the critical groundwork for building enduring
connections to help DOD solve challenging problems, to include
priorities such as recruiting and retaining the best workforce and
staying ahead of threats.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
countering ``gray zone'' warfare in europe
15. Senator Warren. Mr. Rapuano, the United States has deployed
equipment and rotated ground forces back into Europe through the
European Reassurance Initiative, but this conventional display of force
alone obviously isn't sufficient to deter Russia. Putin seems to rely
increasingly on covert cyber activity, propaganda, and other indirect
tactics--as he demonstrated just a few weeks ago by interfering with
the French election. If confirmed, how will you work with our North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies to counter Russia's so-
called ``gray zone'' warfare?
Mr. Rapuano. Russian destabilizing ``gray zone'' or hybrid activity
in Europe is a serious concern. While not all of the cyber-enabled
influence operations we have seen in Europe have been definitively
attributed to Russia, the apparent objectives of these operations
clearly match with Moscow's goals.
If confirmed, I will work with our European allies--including
through threat information sharing, efforts to fulfill the NATO Cyber
Defense Pledge, and capability development--to help build their cyber
defenses so that they are less vulnerable to Russia's malicious cyber
activity.
------
[The nomination reference of Mr. Kenneth P. Rapuano
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
April 25, 2017
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
Kenneth P. Rapuano, of Virginia, to be an Assistant Secretary of
Defense vice Eric Rosenbach, resigned.
------
[The biographical sketch of Mr. Kenneth P. Rapuano, which
was transmitted to the Committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
Biographical Sketch of Kenneth P. Rapuano
Education:
Georgetown University, Washington, DC
- 1989 to 1992
- MA--National Security Studies
Middlebury College, Middlebury, VT
- 1980 to 1984
- BA--Political Science, Minor--Education
Employment Record:
List all jobs held since college including title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
The Anser Corporation, Falls Church, VA
- Senior Vice President, and Executive Director of the Studies
and Analysis Group
- October 2015 to Present
The Mitre Corporation, McClean, VA
- Director of Advanced Systems and Policy Analysis
- December 2008 to October 2015
Independent Consultant, Falls Church, VA
- Director of Advanced Systems and Policy Analysis
- October to December 2008
ICx Technologies
- President, Homeland Security
- July 2007 to September 2008
Independent Consultant, Falls Church, VA
- Director of Advanced Systems and Policy Analysis
- May to July 2007
The White House
- Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy Homeland
Security Advisor
- July 2004 to November 2006
Department of Energy
- Deputy Under Secretary of Energy for Counterterrorism
- October 2003 to July 2004
United States Marine Corps Reserve, Iraq
- Chief, Joint Interrogations and Debriefing Center, Iraq
Survey Group (ISG)
- May to November 2003
Department of Energy, Washington, DC
- National Security Advisor to the Secretary of Energy
- April 2001 to May 2003
Southern Research Institute, Falls Church, VA
- Director, International Affairs & Nonproliferation Department
- October 1998 to April 2001
Dyncorp, Alexandria, VA
- Program Manager, National Security Programs Counter
Proliferation Mission
- April 1993 to September 1998
Department of Defense, Washington, DC
- Special Assistant to Assistant Secretary of Defense,
International Security Policy (1992 to April 1993)
- Foreign Affairs Specialist, Office of Multilateral
Negotiations (February 1989 to 1992)
Presidential Transition Team, Washington, DC
- Special Assistant to the General Counsel to the President-
Elect
- November 1988 to February 1989
Republican National Committee, Washington, DC
- Campaign Research
- June to November 1988
United States Marine Corps, Camp Lejeune, NC
- Infantry Officer
- October 1984 to March 1988
Ridgewood, NJ Public School System, Ridgewood, NJ
- Assistant Football Coach, Substitute Teacher
- July to November 1984
Honors and Awards:
Military Awards
- Bronze Star Medal
- Defense Meritorious Service Medal
- Afghanistan Campaign Medal
- Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal
- Marine Corps Expeditionary Medal
- Armed Forces Reserve Medal (3 awards)
- National Defense Service Medal
- Joint Meritorious Unit Award (2 awards)
- Selected Marine Corps Reserve Medal (2 awards)
- Navy MeritoriousUnit Commendation
- Navy Unit Commendation
- Sea Service Deployment Ribbon (4 awards)
Federal Civilian Awards
- DHS Under Secretary for Science and Technology Awards for
Building Partnerships on Non-Traditional Aviation Technologies Whole-
of-Community Initiative
- NNSA Excellence Medal
- Secretary of Defense Medal for Outstanding Public Service
------
[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Mr. Kenneth P.
Rapuano in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed, use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies. Unless otherwise required, an answer of yes,
no, or not applicable is appropriate.
part a--biographical information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in Committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearing and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.
1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Kenneth P. Rapuano
2. Position to which nominated:
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global
Security
3. Date of nomination:
April 25, 2017
4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[The nominee responded and the information is contained in the
Committee's executive files.]
5. Year and place of birth:
1962, Passaic, NJ
6. Marital status: (Include full name of current spouse including
any other names used, including maiden name.)
Married. Dixie Houseal Rapuano (Maiden Name: Dixie Houseal)
7. Names of children (if over age 18):
Taylor (daughter)
Scott (son)
Claire (daughter)
William (son)
8. Education: List names of secondary and higher education
institutions attended, type of school (vocational, technical, trade
school, college, university, military college, correspondence,
distance, extension, and on-line) dates attended, degree received and
date degree granted.
Georgetown University--1989 to 1992 MA National
Security Affairs; August 14, 1992
Middlebury College--1980 to 1984 BA Political Science;
May 1984
Ridgewood High School--1977 to 1980 HS Degree; June
1980
9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment. If
the employment activity was military duty, list separate employment
activity periods to show each change of military duty station.
The Anser Corporation (aka Analytic Services Inc.),
Falls Church, VA
- Senior Vice President, and Executive Director of the Studies
and Analysis Group
- October 2015 to Present
The Mitre Corporation, McClean, VA
- Director of Advanced Systems and Policy Analysis
- December 2008 to October 2015
Independent Consultant; Falls Church, VA
- October to December 2008
ICx Technologies
- President for Homeland Security
- July 2007 to September 2008
Consultant; Self-employment; Falls Church, VA
- May to July 2007
U.S. Marine Crops (Reserve Active Duty Deployment),
Jalalabad, Afghanistan
- Director of Targeting Fusion Cell
- November 2006 to May 2007
The White House
- Deputy Homeland Security Advisor to the President
- July 2004 to November 2006
10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.
National Defense University, Department of Defense,
Washington, DC
- Distinguished Research Fellow and Adjunct Faculty;
- February 2009 to Present
Defense Science Board Task Force; Arlington, VA
- Member
- October 2015 to Present
Federal Bureau of Investigation; Washington, DC
- Member, FBI Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate Advisory
Group
- 2013 to Present
, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory National
Security Advisory Committee, Richland, Washington
- Member
- 2014 to Present
Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory
Committee; Department of Homeland Security; Washington, DC
- Member
- 2008 to 2012
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review; Department of
Homeland Security; Washington, DC
- Member
- 2009 to 2010
11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
business enterprise, educational or other institution.
None (other than current employer)
12. Memberships: List all current memberships and offices that you
hold in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable
and other organizations.
None
13. Political affiliations and activities:
(a) If you have ever been a candidate for or have been elected or
appointed to a political office, list the name of the office(s),
whether you were elected/appointed/candidate, the year(s) the election
was held or the appointment was made, and the term of office (if
applicable).
N/A
(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
years.
None
(c) Itemize all individual political contributions of $100 or more
to any , campaign organization, political party, political action
committee, or similar entity for the past 5 years. List each individual
contribution and not the total amount contributed to the person or
entity during the year.
Barbara Comstock for Congress; $500/June 2016
14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
degrees, civilian service citations, military awards and decorations,
honorary society memberships, and any other special recognitions for
outstanding service or achievements.
DHS Under Secretary for Science and Technology Award
for Building Partnerships on Non-Traditional Aviation Technologies
Whole-of-Community Initiative
NNSA Excellence Medal--Naitonal Nuclear Security
Administration
Bronze Star Medal
Defense Meritorious Service Medal
Afghanistan Campaign Medal
Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal
Expeditionary Medal--Marine Corps
Armed Forces Reserve Medal (3 awards)
National Defense Service Medal
Joint Meritorious Unit Award (2 awards)
Selected Marine Corps Reserve Medal (2 awards)
Navy Meritorious Unit Commendation
Navy Unit Commendation
Sea Service Deployment Ribbon (4 awards)
15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written including articles published on the Internet.
Homeland Security Resilience; Navigating the Path from
Theory to Practical Application; Signal Magazine, November 1, 2013
http://www.afcea.org/content/?q=node/11854
Peace-Enforcement Operations; Marine Corps Gazette,
October 1993
16. Speeches: Provide the Committee with two copies of any formal
speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years of which you have
copies and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have
been nominated.
None
17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service:
(a) If confirmed, will you adhere to applicable laws and
regulations governing conflicts of interest?
Yes.
(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which
would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?
No.
(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including questions
for the record in hearings?
Yes.
(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in
response to Congressional requests?
Yes.
(e) Will you promise to enforce or ensure whistleblower protections
for all those witnesses?
Yes.
(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request
before this Committee?
Yes.
(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Yes.
------
[The nominee responded to Parts B-F of the Committee
questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-F
are contained in the Committee's executive files.]
------
Signature and Date
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
Kenneth P. Rapuano
This 24th day of April, 2017
------
[The nomination of Mr. Kenneth P. Rapuano was reported to
the Senate by Chairman McCain on May 23, 2017, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on June 12, 2017.]
[all]