

**THE NOMINATIONS OF MS. KARI A. BINGEN  
TO BE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY  
OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE; MR. ROBERT  
S. KAREM TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF  
DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AF-  
FAIRS; MR. KENNETH P. RAPUANO TO BE  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR  
HOMELAND DEFENSE AND GLOBAL SECURITY**

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**HEARING**

BEFORE THE

**COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
UNITED STATES SENATE**

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

—————  
MAY 18, 2017  
—————

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FENSE AND GLOBAL SECURITY**

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**THURSDAY, MAY 18, 2017**

UNITED STATES SENATE,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
*Washington, DC.*

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:37 a.m. in room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Sasse, Reed, Nelson, McCaskill, Shaheen, Donnelly, King, Heinrich, Warren, and Peters.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, CHAIRMAN**

Chairman MCCAIN. Good morning. The Senate Armed Services Committee meets today to consider the nominations of Kari Bingen to be Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; Robert Karem to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; and Kenneth Rapuano to be the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security.

I note the presence of several of our colleagues here, including our distinguished Majority Leader, who is here, as well as Representative Barbara Comstock. If it's agreeable to my colleagues, we would like Senator McConnell to make an introduction. I know he has a very heavy, busy schedule.

Welcome, Senator McConnell.

**STATEMENT OF SENATOR MITCH McCONNELL**

Senator McCONNELL. Thank you, Chairman McCain, Senator Reed, Members of the Committee.

I'm exceedingly proud to be here today to introduce Robert Story Karem, a very experienced and well-qualified nominee to serve as

the next Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

Through his hearing, this Committee will find an individual who has worked to prepare himself to address some of the major challenges facing our country. Because of his razor-sharp intelligence and diligence, Robert, a native of Lexington, Kentucky, rapidly moved up in my office from Staff Assistant to Legislative Correspondent and eventually to be my Legislative Assistant for Foreign Affairs. He proved himself a quick study, and I learned not to doubt his advice or his judgment.

Robert also worked in my office when our Nation experienced one of the most harrowing days in its history. He was hard at work on Capitol Hill on September 11th, 2001, when our country was hit by the devastating al Qaeda terrorist attacks. Witnessing this heinous attack on our country, including on our Pentagon, from this close vantage point I know left a profound imprint on Robert and heightened his already keen appreciation of the seriousness of the threats confronting our Nation.

Robert was a stellar legislative staffer, and he advised me on a wide array of foreign policy issues. For instance, he played an important role in assisting me on matters related to Burma, something Chairman McCain and I have both been involved in over the years, the bipartisan sanctions effort, which led ultimately to the adoption of much needed reforms. Burma has been and remains a bipartisan issue on Capitol Hill, and Robert played a significant role in our efforts in this regard in the early 2000s.

He also provided vital assistance in staffing a congressional delegation I led to Afghanistan and Iraq back in 2003.

Eventually, Robert left my office to work in the Bush administration as a Special Advisor for National Security Affairs and Middle East Policy to Vice President Cheney, where Robert would work for a number of years. The Vice President evidently thought enough of Robert's skills that after he left office he asked him to assist him in researching and editing his memoirs.

Following his tenure with the Vice President, Robert's abilities drew the attention of House Majority Leaders Eric Cantor and Kevin McCarthy, both of whom Robert advised on national security matters. He later was the lead foreign policy staffer on the Jeb Bush campaign.

Today we face numerous security threats from around the globe. President Trump made an outstanding choice by nominating a man with both experience and ability to serve as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy.

I'm looking forward to this Committee's consideration of the nomination and to Robert's confirmation. The President simply could not have picked a better person for this office.

Thank you.

Chairman MCCAIN. I thank you, Senator McConnell, for taking the time from your busy schedule to be here on behalf of this nominee. I guess your message is that we need to confirm him or hire someone to start our car in the morning.

[Laughter.]

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you.

Representative Comstock, welcome.

**STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA COMSTOCK, U.S.  
REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA**

Representative COMSTOCK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman McCain, Senator Reed, and members of the Armed Services Committee, thank you for having me here this morning for the great honor of introducing my fellow Virginian and friend of over 30 years, Mr. Kenneth Rapuano, to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security.

He is surrounded here today by his family, his wife Dixie, as well as his son Scott, a recent West Point graduate, and also a recent newlywed here with his wife; also Ken's daughter Claire, who is joining the Peace Corps shortly, as well as another daughter Taylor, and son Will; his proud mother, Cathie Rapuano, is also here, along with his brothers Richard and Dave, as well as sister-in-law Sarah.

Mr. Chairman, this is truly a family of public service. Ken has my strong support based on my personal knowledge of his abilities, as well as his significant and stellar expertise in the areas covered by the Assistant Secretary of Defense position.

Ken, a marine, volunteered for two combat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan, his previous service at the Pentagon in key areas, and then he also had more recent service in positions of ever-increasing responsibility at the Department of Energy as a Deputy Under Secretary for Counter Terrorism, focused on unconventional nuclear threats. Then he also went on to serve at the White House as Deputy Homeland Security Advisor to President Bush, where he chaired the interagency process developing and overseeing Homeland security and counterterrorism policies.

Ken has also worked in industry in these primary fields, with recent service in two key federally-funded research and development centers, at Mitre and ANSER, supporting our Government in the core areas of the position he has been nominated to.

Mr. Chairman, Ken is fully prepared to be the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security by his lifetime of service and experience, his vast knowledge, and his hands-on experience in the field, as well as in government agencies and, of course, across the globe. He is a diligent public servant who goes beyond the call of duty with great skill to defend our Homeland, and I particularly appreciate his stepping up again. I know it's always a family sacrifice too, so we really appreciate him stepping up in this new role, and I look forward to seeing him and his success.

Again, thank you so much.

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you very much, Congresswoman, for coming over, and I appreciate your introduction. Thank you.

It's my understanding that Chairman Thornberry wanted to be here but he has another obligation, but he wanted to join us this morning to introduce Ms. Bingen in person, so I'll insert his statement of support into the record and simply note for the Members of the Committee that Chairman Thornberry writes that Ms. Bingen's commitment to public service will serve the Department of Defense and the Nation well.

[The information referred to follows:]

[Chairman Thornberry's statement has been retained in Committee files.]

Chairman MCCAIN. Welcome to the witnesses this morning. We thank you for joining us. We also welcome your families and friends who are with us here today. As is our tradition, at the beginning of your testimony, we invite you to introduce those who are joining you today.

It's the standard for this Committee to ask certain questions in order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities. It's important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress to be able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information, so if you'll answer the following questions.

Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest?

Ms. BINGEN. Yes.

Mr. RAPUANO. Yes.

Mr. KAREM. Yes.

Chairman MCCAIN. Will you ensure that your staff complies with deadlines established for requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings?

Ms. BINGEN. Yes.

Mr. RAPUANO. Yes.

Mr. KAREM. Yes.

Chairman MCCAIN. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests?

Ms. BINGEN. Yes.

Mr. RAPUANO. Yes.

Mr. KAREM. Yes.

Chairman MCCAIN. Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?

Ms. BINGEN. Yes.

Mr. RAPUANO. Yes.

Mr. KAREM. Yes.

Chairman MCCAIN. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this Committee?

Ms. BINGEN. Yes.

Mr. RAPUANO. Yes.

Mr. KAREM. Yes.

Chairman MCCAIN. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with a committee regarding the basis for any good-faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Ms. BINGEN. Yes.

Mr. RAPUANO. Yes.

Mr. KAREM. Yes.

Chairman MCCAIN. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?

Ms. BINGEN. No.

Mr. RAPUANO. No.

Mr. KAREM. No.

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you.

Ms. Bingen, the United States faces an increasingly complex global threat environment where terrorist organizations are metastasizing and exercising states' capabilities, and nation-state adversaries are increasingly asserting power, often through irregular and asymmetric means. Every component of our Defense Department must have timely intelligence to understand the very threats we face to prepare for potential conflict and to respond swiftly, accurately, and decisively, when necessary. With persistent budget constraints, accurate and timely intelligence becomes all the more vital. We look forward to hearing from you as to how you will address this important mission, if confirmed.

Mr. Karem, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs is charged with a wide breadth of responsibilities, from security cooperation and foreign military sales to United States defense policy in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. We will be interested to hear from you on a number of issues, United States strategy for countering Russian aggression, what United States force posture in Europe should look like over the long term, United States strategy for defeating ISIS [the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria], and what the United States should be doing to create space for political solutions in Iraq and Syria, and much more.

Mr. Rapuano, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security is responsible for a wide range of policy portfolios ranging from Homeland defense, defense support of civil authorities, counter-WMD [weapons of mass destruction], cyber policy, and space policy.

You have an extensive background in a variety of Homeland security issues both in government and in the private sector. I look forward to hearing you discuss how your previous experiences would inform your approach to these complex issues, especially the need for a U.S. policy and strategy in cyberspace.

Senator Reed?

#### **STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED**

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to join you in welcoming the nominees this morning.

Thank you for your willingness to serve our Nation, and I want to express my gratitude to your family members who are here today and whose support for you throughout your careers has been so important.

The nominees before the Committee today have extensive experience and are well qualified for the positions to which they have been nominated.

Ms. Kari Bingen, the nominee to be Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, is well known to this Committee for her work as a senior staffer at the House Armed Services Committee. The Principal Deputy supports the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, who serves as the principal intelligence advisor to the Secretary of Defense. The Under Secretary oversees all intelligence security organizations within the Department of Defense (DOD), including the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the intelligence components and combatant commands of the Military Services.

Throughout her work both on the Hill and in the private sector, Ms. Bingen has substantial expertise in the areas of defense policy, strategic forces, and space policy.

The nominee to be the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Mr. Karem, also brings significant experience on defense and foreign policy issues, including as a foreign policy advisor to the Majority Leader and a Middle East expert in the White House to the Vice President.

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs serves as the principal advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Secretary of Defense regarding defense policy and strategy for Europe, Russia, the Middle East, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere. The position involves managing critical defense and security relationships with some of our closest allies and partners.

Mr. Rapuano has had an impressive career in government service and private-sector work in the areas of national security, counter-proliferation, and policy analysis. He has previously served as a senior advisor on issues of Homeland security and counterterrorism in President George W. Bush's White House, the Department of Energy, and the Department of Defense. Mr. Rapuano has also served in the Marine Corps and, as a Marine Corps reservist, served on the Iraq Server Group. He has been nominated to serve as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security, a position for which he would be charged with developing policy and overseeing planning for countering weapons of mass destruction, cyberspace, missile defense, defense continuity and mission assurance, support of the civil authorities, and the Homeland defense activities at the Department of Defense.

If confirmed, all three of these nominees will be instrumental on a number of cross-cutting issues within the Department, including various aspects of a strategy to defeat the ISIS threat and countering the Russian malign influence threat to the integrity of our political institutions and those of our international partners.

The Committee looks forward to hearing your views on these and other complex issues.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman McCAIN. I thank you.

Mr. Karem, we'll begin with you. Welcome.

**STATEMENT OF ROBERT S. KAREM, TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS**

Mr. KAREM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed, Members of the Committee on Armed Services. It is an honor to appear before you this morning as a nominee to become Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ISA).

Leader McConnell, thank you for your generous introduction. I'm tremendously grateful for the confidence you showed in me 17 years ago. The experiences, opportunities, and lessons provided by my tenure in your office played an essential role in inspiring a career in public service that has led to my appearing before this Committee today.

I would like to thank the President of the United States and the Secretary of Defense for my nomination. If confirmed, it would be a tremendous and humbling honor to serve our country at the Department of Defense.

Let me also thank my friends, mentors, and former bosses, colleagues, and counterparts, without whose support I would likely not be here today.

I am particularly grateful that some of my family could join me this morning. My parents, Fred and Suzanne, of Lexington, Kentucky, and my brother Fred of Chapel Hill, North Carolina, are joined by my girlfriend, Alina Polyakova. My sister, Rebecca Hughes, of Birmingham, Alabama, could not be here today, but I am immensely proud of the amazing mother my little sister has become to her four children.

Chairman MCCAIN. We welcome your family members. Welcome. Mr. KAREM. Thank you.

The responsibilities of the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs cover the vast majority of the globe and stretch across five combatant commands. It is impossible these days to open a newspaper without confronting bold-face headlines about some conflict, crisis, or challenge with which the dedicated government servants and military personnel who work in ISA are already ably grappling. The national security policy challenges these quiet professionals confront every day are real, and they are sobering.

If confirmed, it would be a great privilege to serve alongside these American patriots to help rebuild America's military capabilities and readiness, bolster and modernize critical alliances such as NATO [the North Atlantic Treaty Organization] while rebalancing burden-sharing within these alliances, strengthen United States credibility and influence in regions of key strategic interest, defeat ISIS and other terrorist groups, confront Russian and Iranian aggression, combat new cyber threats, and create conditions favorable for safeguarding our national security and promoting America's economic prosperity.

If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with this Committee, and with the Congress as a whole, to address these and other national security challenges facing our Nation.

I am grateful for your consideration of my nomination, and I look forward to your questions. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Karem follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY ROBERT S. KAREM

Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed, Members of the Committee on Armed Services—it is an honor to appear before you this morning as a nominee to become Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

Leader McConnell, thank you for your very generous introduction. I am tremendously grateful for the confidence you showed in me 17 years ago—the experiences, opportunities, and lessons provided by my tenure in your office played an essential role in inspiring a career in public service that has led to my appearing before this Committee today.

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I am grateful for your consideration of my nomination, and I look forward to your questions.

Thank you.

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you.

Ms. Bingen?

**STATEMENT OF KARI A. BINGEN, TO BE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY  
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE**

Ms. BINGEN. Thank you. Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished senators of this Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today and for your consideration of my nomination to be the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.

First, I would not be here without the strong support of my family, my husband Sean, our two young sons, Henry and Harrison, and my parents, John and Rebecca.

My father enlisted in the Army at 18, and both my grandfathers served in the Army during World War II. My time on the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) and, if confirmed, my role in the Department is my opportunity to continue our family's tradition of service and to give back to our country.

Chairman MCCAIN. Welcome to your family members.

Ms. BINGEN. Thank you.

I wish to thank the President and Secretary Mattis for placing their trust and confidence in me. I am also grateful to several mentors who have helped shape my career, including Chairman Thornberry, Congressman Mike Turner, and retired Congressman Terry Everett, as well as to the HASC team and many of the staff behind you, who I have learned from and had the privilege to collaborate with in support of the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act].

Henry Kissinger's statement before this Committee in 2015 has stuck with me, that "The United States has not faced a more diverse and complex array of crises since the end of the Second World War." While threats increase, our military force structure

has decreased. Thus, as Secretary Mattis has stated, we have less of a military shock absorber than we once did. This makes intelligence and a highly effective defense intelligence enterprise all the more critical to buy our leaders the time and space necessary to develop policy, posture accordingly, and resource capabilities.

Keeping America safe and supporting our forces in harm's way is a humbling and solemn responsibility. If confirmed, my first priority will be to support the warfighter. We have troops today in harm's way in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere around the world. They deserve the best intelligence our Nation can provide to protect them and to support their missions.

Additionally, we must improve our defense intelligence posture and capabilities to better address the full spectrum of security challenges, particularly from near-peer challengers, that range from high-end nuclear and advanced conventional threats to grey-zone tactics in the cyber and information domain. The battlefield is more dynamic, and the defense intelligence enterprise must be more agile and adaptive, whether in its integration with operations, collection and analysis, or incorporation of new technologies and innovative concepts.

Furthermore, I am reminded of the reason why the USD(I) [Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence] was established in the first place: in the wake of 9/11, to improve the integration, management, and allocation of resources across a stove-piped enterprise. Integration and unity of effort across the defense intelligence enterprise is the value that this position brings to the Secretary, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), and Congress. I also recognize that collaborative relationships and motivated people focused on a clear mission are the foundation to implementing these priorities.

It has been an honor working for the House Armed Services Committee, starting with the strategic forces and intelligence portfolio and now as its policy director. I believe my time on Capitol Hill, coupled with my technical background and work in the private sector in support of several of the three-letter intelligence agencies, have uniquely prepared me for this position.

If confirmed, I am committed to working with this Committee and other committees of jurisdiction. I hope to earn your trust and confidence, and I am committed to providing you with the information you need to do your oversight. If confirmed, I also look forward to working closely with the new Under Secretary, once nominated and hopefully confirmed, and the great team in the USD(I) office and across the Department.

Thank you again for your time today and for your consideration of my nomination.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Bingen follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY KARI A. BINGEN

Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished senators of this Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today and for your consideration of my nomination to be the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.

I wish to start by thanking President Trump and Secretary Mattis for placing their trust and confidence in me. I am also grateful to several mentors who have helped shape my career, including Chairman Thornberry, Congressman Mike Turner, and retired Congressman Terry Everett, as well as to the House Armed Serv-

ices Committee (HASC) family and many of the staff behind you, who I have learned from and had the privilege to collaborate with in support of the National Defense Authorization Act.

Henry Kissinger's statement before this Committee in 2015 has stuck with me: that, "The United States has not faced a more diverse and complex array of crises since the end of the Second World War." While threats increase, our military force structure has decreased. Thus, as Secretary Mattis has stated, we have less of a military shock absorber than we once did. This makes intelligence—and a highly effective defense intelligence enterprise—all the more critical to buy our leaders the time and space necessary to develop policy, posture accordingly, and resource capabilities.

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Additionally, we must improve our defense intelligence posture and capabilities to better address the full spectrum of security challenges, particularly from near-peer challengers, that range from high-end nuclear and advanced conventional threats to grey zone tactics in the cyber and information domain. The battlefield of today and tomorrow is more dynamic, and the defense intelligence enterprise must be more agile and adaptive—whether in its integration with operations, collection and analysis, or incorporation of new technologies and innovative concepts.

Furthermore, I am reminded of the reason why the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) was established in the first place: in the wake of 9/11, to improve the integration, management, and allocation of resources across a stove-piped enterprise. Integration and unity of effort across defense intelligence is the value that this position brings to the Secretary, the Director of National Intelligence, and the Congress. I also recognize that collaborative relationships, and motivated people focused on a clear mission, are the foundation to implementing these priorities.

It has been an honor working for the House Armed Services Committee, starting with the strategic forces and intelligence portfolio and now as policy director. I believe my time on Capitol Hill, coupled with my technical background and work in the private sector in support of the National Reconnaissance Office, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Space Office, have uniquely prepared me for this position.

If confirmed, I am committed to working with this Committee and other committees of jurisdiction. I hope to earn your trust and confidence, and I am committed to providing you with the information you need to carry out your oversight. If confirmed, I also look forward to working closely with the new Under Secretary, once confirmed, and the great team in the USD(I) office and across the Department.

Finally, I would not be here without the strong support of my family: my husband, Sean Tytler, our two young sons, Henry and Harrison, and my parents, John and Rebecca Bingen. My father enlisted in the Army at 18, and both my grandfathers served in the Army during World War II. My time on HASC and, if confirmed, my role in the Department, is my opportunity to continue our family's tradition of service and to give back to our country.

Thank you again for your time today and for your consideration of my nomination.

Chairman McCAIN. Thank you.

Mr. Rapuano?

**STATEMENT OF KENNETH P. RAPUANO, TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND GLOBAL SECURITY**

Mr. RAPUANO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed, and Members of the Committee. Thank you very much for the privilege of appearing before you today.

I'd like to start by thanking my family. First of all, my wife, Dixie, who has been my best friend and partner for 28 years, and our four kids, who are all with us here today: Taylor, our oldest, who is currently studying at North Park University in Chicago to become a counselor; Scott, West Point class of 2015 and currently an infantry platoon commander with the 3rd Infantry Division, and

his wife Katie, our brand new daughter-in-law and a very welcome addition to our family; and Claire, who last month graduated Phi Beta Kappa from James Madison University and is leaving next month for 2 years of service in Africa as a Peace Corps volunteer; and finally Will, who will be a third year at University of Virginia this fall. He is on track to become a business major. He aspires to become a captain of industry someday.

Chairman MCCAIN. Welcome.

Mr. RAPUANO. Dixie and I are extremely proud of our kids. Raising them has been the most important and rewarding role of our lives.

I'd also like to thank my parents, Al and Cathie Rapuano. If it wasn't for their love, hard work, and perseverance, I am quite certain I would not be sitting before you today.

Mr. Chairman, I have been working national security issues my entire career, and I believe that the threats we face today are as complex, unpredictable, and dangerous as at any time in our history. The U.S. Homeland is no longer a sanctuary. The growing sophistication and proliferation of threats, such as cyber, space, ballistic and cruise missiles, CBRN [chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear] materials, endemic diseases, and unmanned technologies, combined with the growing number of nations and non-state actors with access to them, continue to increase risk to the Homeland and defense mission assurance.

I see no more important role in national security than serving in the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security, and focusing on ensuring the continuing ability to defend our Nation against dynamic and evolving threats.

If confirmed, I look forward to working with you and your staffs, and I appreciate the opportunity to answer your questions today.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rapuano follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY MR. KENNETH P. RAPUANO

Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed. Thank you very much for the privilege of appearing before you in the Committee today.

I'd like to start by thanking my family. First of all, my wife, Dixie—who has been my best friend and partner—and our four kids, all here today: Taylor—who is currently studying to be a social worker; Scott—an infantry platoon leader with the 3rd Infantry Division, with his wife Katie, our brand new daughter-in-law; Claire—who graduated Phi Beta Kappa from JMU last week, and is leaving soon for 2 years of service in Africa as a Peace Corps Volunteer; and Will, who will be a third year at UVA this fall—and aspires to be a captain of industry . . . some day. Dixie and I are extremely proud of our kids—raising them has been the most important and rewarding role of our lives.

I'd also like to thank my parents, Al and Cathie, If it wasn't for their love, hard work, and perseverance, I'm quite certain I would not be here today.

Mr. Chairman, I have been working national security issues my entire career, and I believe that the threats we face today are as complex and unpredictable as any time in our history. The U.S. Homeland is no longer a sanctuary. The growing sophistication and proliferation of threats, such as cyber, space, ballistic and cruise missiles, CBRN materials, endemic diseases, and unmanned technologies, combined with the growing number of nations and non-state actors with access to them, continue to increase risk to the Homeland & mission assurance. I see no more important role in national security than serving as Assistant Secretary of Defense for HD and Global Security, and focusing, in particular, on Homeland defense and ensuring the continuing ability to defend our country.

If confirmed, I look forward to working with you and your staffs, and I look forward to your questions today.

Thank you very much.

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. I thank the witnesses.

Mr. Rapuano, what do you think should be the key elements of our national cyber policy?

Mr. RAPUANO. Senator, there has been a lot of focus on our cyber policy of late, for very understandable reasons. The 2017 NDAA, as you well know, has very specific directives with regard to development of a deterrence framework and policy. There was the recent defense cyber deterrence study that really got at the importance of tailored deterrence campaigns and the whole approach to a declaratory policy.

I believe that we have to have both what is perceived to be and what is actually effective cyber capabilities that will introduce such an element of doubt in our adversaries that the cyber attacks that they would be interested in taking to achieve some goal would be outweighed by the high likelihood of our response.

Chairman MCCAIN. Ms. Bingen, as you know, we just had a very serious cyber attack worldwide. How well equipped are we intelligence-wise to anticipate or even adequately respond to this kind of really unprecedented activity?

Ms. BINGEN. Mr. Chairman, I believe this continues to be a challenge within the Intelligence Community writ large, but also particularly in the defense intelligence enterprise. We continue to need the capabilities to detect and attribute where these attacks are coming from, to understand the totality of them, but also to think more strategically about where is this headed. We look at each individual event as a more tactical event, but the challenge for the defense intelligence enterprise is putting it all together. As we look to stand up U.S. Cyber Command, our challenge is also from an intelligence perspective how do we support that command's responsibilities, military plans and operational capabilities. I believe that that's a very important area that we need to do a better job in, sir.

Chairman MCCAIN. Mr. Karem, what lesson do you think that Putin is learning, since there seems to be a significant lack of an international response to his actions in Ukraine, in Syria, obviously other cyber activities that emanate from Russia? What kind of lesson do you think he's learning from what seems to be rather successful activities from his standpoint?

Mr. KAREM. Senator, I believe that Russia's interference, invasion, and continued illegal occupation of Ukraine poses a significant threat to international security and our own, and his actions in Syria have also contributed to that problem. I do not believe that Vladimir Putin is sufficiently deterred from perpetuating similar and continuing malign activities.

Chairman MCCAIN. I believe that all three of our nominees are highly qualified and much needed, very frankly. I regret that Secretary Mattis does not have the team around him that he needs to do his job in the most efficient fashion, and we will expedite your nominations following a vote of the Committee to get you to work as quickly as possible. I view all three of you as highly qualified.

Senator Reed?

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Again, I've been impressed with the witnesses' not only experience but their discussions in the office. Thank you all very much.

Mr. Karem, we have seen since last year Russia's involvement in elections, particularly our own election. Do you agree with the assessment of the Russian activity in the 2016 presidential elections by our Intelligence Community?

Mr. KAREM. Sir, I have read the unclassified assessment from the Intelligence Community, and I agree with it.

Senator REED. Do you feel that this is an ongoing threat, not just an historical incident but an ongoing threat that you'll have to deal with?

Mr. KAREM. Senator, I believe the Russians, like the Soviets, have a long history of engaging in active measures against their adversaries, and I understand that the Director of National Intelligence has testified recently that these activities continue.

Senator REED. Mr. Rapuano, the same question about your sense of the Russian involvement in our election and other elections. Is it a credible and growing threat?

Mr. RAPUANO. Senator, yes, I believe it is. I believe they are going to continue doing it as long as they feel it's in their interest and the consequences are less than the benefits that are occurring.

Senator REED. How do you believe we're postured to counteract these operations that they're conducting in a larger sense too, participating in the kind of information campaigns and, in some cases, disinformation campaigns that we see from our adversaries? Are we in a similar position at least having the capability, if necessary, to do it?

Mr. RAPUANO. Senator, I think that our information operations capability has attrited since the Cold War, and I think that of late there has been growing recognition of how important it is. I think that recognition is understood in the Pentagon, and there are focused review groups looking at our cyber policy and that nexus with information operations.

Senator REED. Let me address this question again to Mr. Rapuano and Mr. Karem, and then I'll ask a question of Ms. Bingen.

Some of this, I suspect, and I think you suspect too, is to stove-pipe organizations that seem to be rampant within the Department, then among departments—Homeland Security, Department of Energy, et cetera. As a result, I don't think we've come up with an integrated plan. We have pieces, but they're very discrete and fragmented. Is that fair? More importantly, how are you going to deal with that and make it coherent?

Mr. RAPUANO. Senator, I believe it is fair, and I believe that that has been recognized. There's a lot of work that needs to be done in terms of understanding all the players and stakeholders, the respective roles and responsibilities, authorities and resources, and then what are the threats, how we prioritize them, and how do we blend together to make for a very effective set of policies and capabilities and actions.

Senator REED. Where do you think that level of coordination has to be? Because again, it's not just DOD. It's the Department of Energy, the Department of Homeland Security.

Mr. RAPUANO. I think ultimately the White House has a very important marshaling role in the National Security Council staff.

Senator REED. They should be coordinating and leading an effort to come up with doctrine as well as organizational changes and personnel augmentations or movements? Is that fair?

Mr. RAPUANO. I believe they should be setting those expectations. I believe that the executive order issued by the President last week goes a long way to identifying the challenges and setting in motion the steps to start to identify the issues that need to be addressed.

Senator REED. Mr. Karem, quickly, any comments in this regard?

Mr. KAREM. Yes, Senator. I agree with Mr. Rapuano's assessment with respect to the U.S. Government. I would only add that the problem is magnified when you look at the threat that these activities pose to our allies. There would need to be coordination not just among the U.S. Government but with our allies. NATO's Cyber Center of Excellence is a step in the right direction, but clearly there's more work that needs to be done.

Senator REED. Ms. Bingen, we had a chance to talk on this topic in the office, and that is particularly after the OPM [Office of Personnel Management] database breach there was a huge shift back to DOD, but now we have a backlog of 600,000 people in terms of just getting cleared so we can have the people to do these jobs we've been talking about.

First, do you agree that this is a significant problem that DOD faces and that it's essential that we deal with this very quickly and very effectively?

Ms. BINGEN. Senator, I absolutely agree with that. Of that 600,000, most of those are DOD personnel awaiting a background investigation or update.

Senator REED. Now, we've mandated that DOD provide a plan to transfer completely the mission back from OPM, and I would assume that you are going to be one of the chief architects of this plan, and I also assume you're going to hit the ground running. Those are fair assumptions, correct?

Ms. BINGEN. Absolutely, Senator. The NDAA last year, as you fully know, sir, requires a plan by August 1st on that transfer. That is something that I absolutely, if confirmed, would have to hit the ground running and focus on meeting that deadline and providing you the information that you need, sir.

Senator REED. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Shaheen?

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

To all three of you, congratulations on your nominations, and thank you for your willingness to serve the country, continue to serve the country at this critical time.

Mr. Karem, I want to start with you because I very much appreciate that you have been a supporter of the Special Immigrant Visa Program that has helped those who helped us in Iraq and Afghanistan. As I'm sure you're aware, while the Iraq program is almost at completion, the program in Afghanistan continues. There are many people in the queue who helped us who would like to come to the United States. Can you talk about why you think this is important?

Mr. KAREM. Senator, thank you. I first want to recognize your leadership on this issue, and that of the Chairman and the Rank-

ing Member. When I served in House leadership, I was proud to get to work with your staffs on both the Iraq and Afghanistan Special Immigrant Programs to make sure they were extended, and I believe very strongly that with the United States should be no better friend and no worse enemy.

If confirmed, however, the portfolio for ISA would not include Afghanistan but for the NATO component. So this program would not fall under my jurisdiction. But as you know, I've been a long-time believer that we need to stand by those who have risked their lives alongside our soldiers.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, and I very much appreciate Secretary Mattis' support for the program as well.

Let me follow up on the questioning that Senator Reed started around NATO. You were answering that you think the Cyber Security Center of Excellence at NATO is important as we look at how we can better, with NATO, address the cyber threats to ourselves and the NATO allies. Can you expand a little more on what you would like to see NATO do with respect to cyber threats?

Mr. KAREM. Yes, Senator. I think there are a couple of pieces, and there are obviously things that the United States can do to increase its deterrence. But with respect to NATO, all of our allies have an obligation under Article 3 to increase their national resilience. Some nations in the cyber realm have done more than others. The Estonians are real leaders in this regard, and it's no surprise that the Cyber Center of Excellence is located in Tallinn.

Senator SHAHEEN. I've had a chance to visit there. It's very impressive.

Mr. KAREM. It is. There are investments in cyber security technologies. They are making budgetary decisions and really changing the culture so that we prioritize this. If confirmed, I really want to get a little more deeply into this subject and work with our NATO partners on it.

Senator SHAHEEN. Great.

Ms. BINGEN, you're going to be responsible for or have intelligence gathering as part of your portfolio, as I understand what you will be doing. How important is the intelligence sharing that we do to our allies in helping us to get the information that we need to take actions?

Ms. BINGEN. Senator, I believe it's incredibly important. Nearly every military operation that we undertake today is done in a coalition, and so it is incredibly important that we be able to provide our coalition partners intelligence information, but also that they be able to provide us information as well. At the end of the day, the mission is to protect our collective national security.

Senator SHAHEEN. How important to that effort is it that people believe that when they share that intelligence, it will continue to be confidential in the United States with those people who are going to act on it?

Ms. BINGEN. Senator, if confirmed as Principal Deputy, it is my responsibility to safeguard classified information and safeguard our sources and methods, including those from our allies and partners.

Senator SHAHEEN. It's important to our allies that that be the case; is that correct?

Ms. BINGEN. Yes, Senator.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you.

Mr. Rapuano, in thinking about cyber, what we've seen with some of the breaches within DOD have been with respect to the contractors that we work with. Do you have thoughts about what more we can do to ensure that our contractors are doing everything possible to make sure that they are not susceptible to cyber threats and that they maintain secure networks?

Mr. RAPUANO. Yes, Senator. The contractors are a very important component of the total force, and if they have vulnerabilities and the ability for adversaries to access their systems, it really weakens the entire system. Looking at their IT [information technology] at the level of modernity, how often/frequent, what are their policies for patches and other security measures is critical, and that's an area that, if confirmed, would be a higher focus for me.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator King?

Senator KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The discussion of cyber policy, I don't want to say I laughed, but I felt a sense of irony, because we probably spent more time on cyber policy and cyber issues in this Committee than any other single issue in the last year or so, but there is no cyber policy. I realize that you all are not at the level where you will be setting that policy, but I hope you will be the continued irritant within the Administration, and this spans the last Administration and the prior Administration.

We have got to get to the point where we have a doctrine and a policy and a clear deterrent strategy. We don't have that now, and I hope that this is something that, for example, in your list, Mr. Karem, you're looking at international security. The most likely attack is a cyber attack, and we have so many warnings that keep coming. It's the longest wind-up for a punch in world history, and we're still not ready.

I hope that each of you will take very seriously the necessity for a consistent overall government and non-government strategy and doctrine for dealing with this issue. I just hope you'll take that on.

Mr. Karem, a more specific question. What's your recommendation for our long-term military posture in Iraq after the defeat of ISIS?

Mr. KAREM. Senator, I believe there are ongoing discussions between the United States and Iraq about a longer-term United States presence after the defeat of ISIS. I think our objectives in Iraq should be to make sure that Iraq remains a long-term strategic partner in the fight against terrorism, and that Iraq remains free from Iranian malign interference. The precise mechanics of what that relationship looks like and the authorities under which it occurs I think are under negotiation, and if confirmed, I would want to work with counterparts throughout the interagency and with the Congress on what those mechanics should be.

Senator KING. But I take it, it would be your recommendation that some kind of total disengagement would not be good policy?

Mr. KAREM. Yes, sir. I believe history would caution against walking away from our partners.

Senator KING. Thank you.

Ms. Bingen, you're part of a much larger Intelligence Community in your position. Do you see areas of redundancy and opportunities for better coordination, cooperation, and perhaps even efficiency in terms of the 17 agencies that are involved in the United States Government in intelligence matters?

Ms. BINGEN. Yes, Senator. Right off the bat, I think that there is an opportunity for greater air space integration. I know we continue to have these discussions, but it's an area that we haven't made as much progress on as I would have expected. Air space integration, more integration on the ground in terms of the processing, exploitation, dissemination capabilities, and bringing in whether it's commercial technologies or other technologies out there. There is a lot of data right now out there, whether it's slow-motion video or others, that our analysts are frankly spending more time searching for that data than they are doing the analysis.

I think there are some opportunities to integrate not only better across the defense intelligence enterprise but also in support of that national Intelligence Community enterprise as well.

Senator KING. Will you participate in your position as a member of the Intelligence Community, or is that General Stewart? How does the structure work?

Ms. BINGEN. Yes, Senator. One of the jobs of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and as Principal Deputy, if confirmed, I would support that. It is dual hat. It is the Director of Defense Intelligence and Principal Advisor to the DNI for Military Intelligence matters.

Senator KING. You will be engaged in those discussions?

Ms. BINGEN. Absolutely, sir, if confirmed.

Senator KING. Mr. Rapuano, what do we need to do to ensure defense of the Homeland from the growing threat of missile attack from North Korea? How do you feel about the state of our missile defense? This is a key area, it seems to me, that is becoming more important every day, literally every day.

Mr. RAPUANO. Senator, missile attack is not directly in my portfolio, but clearly it's a growing threat specifically with regard to North Korea. There are a number of systems that we have in place, both in terms of our capability to detect and track these systems, as well as to engage and defeat them. I think it would be difficult without going into a closed hearing to get into some of those details, and I haven't been fully briefed on them, but I certainly recognize your concern, and that would be an area of focus should I be confirmed.

Senator KING. Thank you.

My time has expired, but another area I think it's important to pay attention to in a changing environment is the Arctic. In the absence of Senator Sullivan this morning, I'll carry the water for him. It's an incredibly important area. The opening up of the Arctic Ocean is the equivalent of the discovery of the Mediterranean Sea. It's a new body of water that's never been available for human activity in human history, and the implications in terms of national security are very serious. I hope that each of you in your respective areas will be thinking about that as an important part of the development of American doctrine and strategy. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Cotton?

Senator COTTON. I share Senator King's concern about the Arctic because I think we all do, but did we adopt a committee role that only Senator Sullivan gets to bring that up repeatedly in hearing after hearing?

[Laughter.]

Senator COTTON. You're his proxy today since he's absent for the time being.

Thank you all for being here. Thank you for your willingness to serve your country again. Thanks to all the family members I see behind you as well, for the support you've given them.

Mr. Karem, is it your sense that our NATO and United States posture in Europe is adequate today to meet the threat from Russia?

Mr. KAREM. Senator, I believe that Vladimir Putin remains undeterred from conducting activities that are harmful to the interests of the United States and its NATO allies. I would, if confirmed, want to look at what additional steps the United States and its partners could do to bolster our deterrence and ability to defend against such activities.

Senator COTTON. We're currently undertaking something called the Reassurance Initiative. It's regrettable that we've reached the point that we need to reassure our allies. But if Vladimir Putin remains undeterred, what are some of the broad steps—I understand you haven't been confirmed and you're not in office, you haven't seen the most recent intelligence—the broad steps necessary to reach a point where Vladimir Putin is deterred?

Mr. KAREM. Senator, I would look at it a couple of different ways. There are investments that the United States could make in technologies to offset the advantages the Russians have acquired after 15 or 20 years of military modernization. There are steps we could take to reinforce our position on the continent. But as importantly, there are steps that our NATO allies could take to meet the 2 percent pledge of Wales and to invest in technologies that allow them to play a larger role within the alliance in defending and deterring against Russian aggression.

Senator COTTON. Investing in technologies, not pensions and health care.

Mr. KAREM. Correct. And the Wales pledge speaks to this.

Senator COTTON. Yes, it does. I mean, the 2 percent goal is an important goal, but it's only a goal. Some countries might want to spend more than that. They might want to coordinate the technologies that they acquire given their positions within Europe and the threat that Europe poses to them, and they should all try to reach the 2 percent goal by increasing the numerator, not decreasing the denominator of the size of their economy, the way some European countries have done so.

Ms. Bingen, could you please speak to the importance of ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] in Europe, especially as it relates to the threat from Russia that we've been discussing?

Ms. BINGEN. Absolutely, Senator. I would start by saying that I think the defense Intelligence Community needs to go to school on what Russia is doing in Ukraine and Syria right now, particularly

in Ukraine. Based on what I've seen in my current position, when you look at how they've integrated drones, electronic warfare, cyber, their artillery capabilities, the little green men, they are presenting a sophisticated challenge. When I look at the whole of Europe and our national security interests, this is a very different operational challenge than what we've experienced the last 15 years in the counterterrorism fight. We cannot assume that we have air superiority in the future, and there are some tremendous, I think, foundational intelligence requirements that need to be undertaken that have atrophied over the last 15, 20 years, from better foundational targeting information, order of battle information, and a better ability to do indications and warning.

Senator COTTON. You speak about air superiority. My subcommittee, the Airland Subcommittee, we've heard from numerous generals over the last 4 years, to include H.R. McMaster in his previous role at CIC [Army Capabilities Integration Center], about the threat that we're being out-ranged and outgunned by our adversaries, in particular Russia and China. Could you speak a little bit about the threat that that poses to our forces in Europe?

Ms. BINGEN. Senator, I think it's an incredible threat. In my current position with the HASC, this is an area that we focused on quite significantly in terms of what our posture should be in that theater, but also the readiness challenges of our forces, everything from equipment to end strength to the training that's required in this contested environment that, frankly, we have not had to do, and we've had a whole generation of leaders coming up through the system that have not had to go through—well, that have largely been focused on the counterterrorism fight, rightly so, but they have not had to do that high-end training that would be required in that environment.

Senator COTTON. In layman's terms, our adversaries could hit our troops with bullets and bombs at a distance that we can't reach them; or, as you say, if we don't have air superiority, their aircraft could fly over our troops and attack our troops in a way that gives them the greater advantage that we have enjoyed for 15 years in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Ms. BINGEN. Yes, Senator.

Senator COTTON. Thank you all.

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Warren?

Senator WARREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you to all our witnesses for being here.

Mr. Karem, if confirmed, you'll be responsible for advising the Secretary of Defense on defense policy toward Iran, and there's no doubt that Iran remains a dangerous influence in the region. But I'd like to ask you specifically about the nuclear deal which imposed limits on Iran's nuclear program and placed it under rigorous monitoring and inspections.

At his nomination hearing before this Committee, Secretary Mattis referred to the Iran nuclear deal as, and I'll quote, "an imperfect arms control agreement," but stated "when America gives her word, we have to live up to it and work with our allies."

Do you agree with that statement by Secretary Mattis?

Mr. KAREM. I do, Senator.

Senator WARREN. Good. Donald Trump once threatened to rip up the Iran deal. Instead, last month, the Trump administration certified that Iran is complying with the nuclear deal, which was required for Iran to get sanctions relief and to keep the agreement intact.

Mr. Karem, again, setting aside your views on the Iran deal itself, do you agree with the Administration's decision to certify that Iran is complying with its commitments under the agreement?

Mr. KAREM. Senator, I agree with the determination.

Senator WARREN. Good.

Mr. KAREM. I believe it was based on the assessment of the Intelligence Community.

Senator WARREN. Good. Do you think the nuclear deal makes it harder or easier to counter Iran's other destabilizing actions in the region?

Mr. KAREM. Senator, I'm concerned that the nuclear deal has in some ways limited our ability to confront Iran's malign activities, that some of the sanctions relief has been lessened that pertains to missile proliferation, for example.

Senator WARREN. All right. But that's about sanctions in a different area, about Iran's behavior. The Iran nuclear deal isn't perfect, but I think it is easier to counter the ambitions of an Iran that has no nuclear weapons than it is to counter an Iran that can threaten the world with a nuclear bomb. If the United States tears up this deal, we isolate ourselves instead of Iran and potentially embolden the Iranians to revive their nuclear program and to escalate their dangerous activities in the region.

I want to also have a chance to ask you about Russia. Donald Trump has flip-flopped on many foreign policy issues, including the NATO alliance. Now, candidate Trump said that NATO was obsolete and suggested that the U.S. would meet its Article 5 commitments to defend our allies only if the country being attacked spent 2 percent of GDP [gross domestic product] on defense. But recently, after meeting with German Chancellor Merkel, the NATO Secretary and the NATO Secretary General, he announced that NATO was suddenly no longer obsolete.

Mr. Karem, what change caused NATO to go from obsolete to not obsolete in a matter of a few weeks?

Mr. KAREM. Senator, I can't speak to any internal deliberations inside the Administration that may have led to a change in the opinions of those in the White House.

Senator WARREN. Do you believe now that NATO is obsolete or not obsolete?

Mr. KAREM. Senator, I believe that NATO is an essential alliance—

Senator WARREN. I'm sorry. Does that mean you believe it's obsolete or not obsolete?

Mr. KAREM. I believe it is not obsolete.

Senator WARREN. You believe it is not obsolete. Do you believe it used to be obsolete?

Mr. KAREM. Senator, my own view is that NATO has been and remains an important institution for the United States.

Senator WARREN. Okay. I'll take that as not obsolete.

Should the United States refuse to defend our NATO allies if they don't spend as much as we want them to spend on defense?

Mr. KAREM. Senator, I think it's important that our NATO allies are full contributors to the alliance.

Senator WARREN. Okay, but that's not my question. I want them to be contributors to our alliance. The question I'm asking is should we refuse to defend them if they don't meet spending targets that we set that they should spend on their own defense?

Mr. KAREM. Senator, I believe that the United States' commitment to Article 5 of NATO is sacrosanct.

Senator WARREN. Which means that we commit no matter how much, right?

Mr. KAREM. Correct, but our allies should understand that they weaken the alliance by not meeting their commitment.

Senator WARREN. I understand that, but you're saying we're still committed.

We've also increased our own spending on the region through the European Resistance Initiative, ERI, deploying our own equipment and——

Chairman MCCAIN. It's "Reassurance."

Senator WARREN. Oh, I'm sorry, "Reassurance." You're right. Thank you. Sorry, Mr. Chairman.

Deploying equipment and rotating ground forces back into Europe. But this conventional display of force obviously by itself isn't sufficient to deter Russia. I'll stop here because I'm out of time and I want to be respectful, but I do want to submit a question for the record about working with our NATO allies to counter Russian aggression in the region.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MCCAIN. I thank you, Senator Warren.

Mr. Karem, would you judge Iranian behavior to have increased or decreased their aggressive behavior in the region since the agreement was made with the Iranians concerning nuclear?

Mr. KAREM. Senator, I believe the Iranian behavior has not decreased. It has probably increased, and it poses a significant threat to the United States and its allies.

Chairman MCCAIN. I could not allow the witnesses to leave without significant questions concerning the Arctic, Senator Sullivan.

[Laughter.]

Senator SULLIVAN. Mr. Chairman, I'm very glad that you're so interested in the Arctic.

[Laughter.]

Senator SULLIVAN. Mr. Karem, I'd actually like to follow up on Iran. You know, a number of us have been following that issue for quite some time, even well before we started negotiations with the Iranians, and there are some serious doubts, I think, both in classified and unclassified venues, on whether and to what degree the Iranians are actually complying with the nuclear agreement.

I know that the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] recently confirmed that they believe that they were in compliance, but a number of us who follow this very closely have a lot of skepticism with regard to that issue. I think it's an incredibly important issue.

If confirmed, will you commit to looking at that outside of what the IAEA has stated and give us, give this Committee your own view based on both classified and unclassified information on whether or not the Iranians or, for that matter, the Russians are in compliance with this agreement, which many of us thought was an ill-fated idea to begin with?

Mr. KAREM. Senator, I believe the Administration is very focused on making sure the Iranians are living up to their side of the agreement, and if confirmed I would certainly commit to coming back to you on this.

Senator SULLIVAN. But coming back to us not just parroting what the IAEA has stated but coming back to us with your own and the Department of Defense's own independent evaluation of whether or not you as an organization believe that they're in compliance.

Mr. KAREM. Yes, sir.

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you.

Mr. Rapuano—sorry, I know I'm probably butchering that. You know, in the last few days there's been—not few days, several weeks—a growing concern about the capability of the North Koreans with regard to their intercontinental ballistic nuclear capabilities. It's been stated in this Committee several times that it's not a matter of if anymore but when they're going to have that capability, not just a range to states like Alaska and Hawaii but the lower 48 states.

My view has certainly been that if we know that that day is coming that they're going to have that capability, whether in a year or 5 years, that we need to do much more with regard to our Nation's missile defense to array a missile defense system that tries to integrate THAAD [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense], Aegis, the missile defense base in the U.S.

What's your view on missile defense capabilities right now and what we should be doing with regard to our missile defense given that perhaps during your watch Kim Jong-un is going to be able to announce, and probably with good reason, that he has the capability to send a nuclear missile to hit Chicago or L.A. or New York?

Mr. RAPUANO. Senator, missile defense, ballistic missile defense does not fit within the portfolio for Homeland Defense and Global Security. Cruise missiles and air space defense does. But I will certainly acknowledge that there are growing concerns about ballistic missiles, particularly from countries like the DPRK. The capabilities associated with detecting, tracking, acquiring, and defeating these systems, as you know, we do have some of them deployed. We have areas that require improvement, and that is a growing focus of concern in the Department.

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you. I'd like to get a commitment that you work with other members within the Administration on that important issue, if confirmed.

Mr. RAPUANO. If confirmed, absolutely, Senator.

Senator SULLIVAN. Not to disappoint the Chairman with my 30 seconds left but, Mr. Karem, give me your sense. When Secretary Mattis, General Mattis testified, he did say that the Arctic is an increasingly important area of strategic interest for the United States because of, of course, natural resources, the environment, opening shipping lanes and sea routes. Vladimir Putin has called

it the new Suez Canal, which the Russians want to dominate. They're massively building up their military capabilities in the Arctic, four new brigade combat teams, a new Arctic military command, 40 icebreakers, building 13 more.

We've been slow to the game up there. The Department of Defense has just put out a revised Arctic strategy which was mandated by this Committee that the Secretary of Defense put forward. If confirmed, will you give that strategic area of the United States sufficient focus and interest the way that Secretary Mattis stated he would during his confirmation hearing?

Mr. KAREM. Senator, I will, and if confirmed I look forward also to working with our allies who share a significant stake in the Arctic.

Senator SULLIVAN. Great. We just had the Arctic ministerial led by Secretary Tillerson up in the great city of Fairbanks, Alaska last week where all eight Arctic ministers, including the foreign ministers of Russia, NATO, and Canada, convened and tried to talk about cooperation in that important area of the world. But the tensions underlying that ministerial were apparent, mostly because of the Russian aggressive actions, including five bomber runs at sovereign air space in the United States, in Alaska, where we've had to intercept those Russian bombers from coming into American air space. We want to work with you on that. It's an important area of the world and increasingly being militarized by the Russians.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MCCAIN. The Russians asserted their sovereignty over Alaska again?

Senator SULLIVAN. Putin is just upset that we got such a good deal 150 years ago when we bought Alaska.

Chairman MCCAIN. Some of us question that.

[Laughter.]

Chairman MCCAIN. I want to thank the witnesses for their willingness to serve, for their past service, and we will move forward as quickly as possible so that you can get to work. I thank you for your service to the country and your continued willingness to serve.

This hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 10:39 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

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[Prepared questions submitted to Mr. Robert S. Karem by Chairman McCain prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

#### QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

##### DEFENSE REFORMS

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 included the most sweeping reforms since the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.

*Question.* Do you support these reforms?

*Answer.* Yes, I do. With respect to reforms that impact the portfolio of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, the establishment of a central transfer account and consolidated authorities for security cooperation should help make our assistance more efficient, more flexible, and more tailored to our national interests and defense strategies. If confirmed, I look forward to better understanding the practical impact of the reforms that fall under the portfolio of the ASD (ISA) and how best to implement them.

*Question.* What other areas for defense reform do you believe might be appropriate for this Committee to address?

*Answer.* In the event I am confirmed, I would want to establish a baseline of experience working under the recent reforms before recommending additional areas of reform.

#### DUTIES

*Question.* The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs is the principal advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Secretary of Defense on international security strategy and policy on issues of Defense Department interest that relate to the nations and international organizations of Europe (including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Russia), the Middle East, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere, their governments and defense establishments; and for oversight of security cooperation programs, including Foreign Military Sales in these regions.

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs under current regulations and practices?

*Answer.* The responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, ASD (ISA), are outlined by DOD Directive 5111.07. My role, if confirmed, would be to serve as the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense and Undersecretary of Defense for Policy with respect to defense policy and strategy for the Middle East, Europe, Russia, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere. Practically, the ASD (ISA) has been responsible for coordinating policies with the Joint Staff, representing the Department in interagency deliberations, helping manage the Department's defense relationships with foreign partners from the above regions, and overseeing various security cooperation and assistance programs, among other responsibilities.

*Question.* If confirmed, what duties and functions do you expect that the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy would prescribe for you?

*Answer.* As yet, I am unaware of any specific additional guidance the Secretary of Defense or Under Secretary of Defense for Policy would prescribe for the ASD (ISA) position.

#### QUALIFICATIONS

*Question.* What background and experience do you possess that qualify you for this position?

*Answer.* For nearly two decades, I have been immersed in U.S. national security and defense policy. Both in government and at policy think tanks, I have worked on an array of issues relevant to the portfolio of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. I have served as a foreign policy advisor to the now Senate Majority Leader, as a Middle East policy advisor in the White House to the Vice President, and as the national security advisor to two U.S. House Majority Leaders. In these roles, I have worked closely with Defense Department officials, participated in high-level interagency deliberations, and helped to manage the national security oversight and legislative activities of the House of Representatives. These experiences have prepared me to execute the responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

#### MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

*Question.* If confirmed, what broad priorities will you establish?

*Answer.* If confirmed, the specific priorities I would establish will depend in large measure on the priorities of the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense. These priorities, among others, will in all likelihood include rebuilding American military strength and readiness, bolstering our critical alliances while ensuring our allies contribute meaningfully to our shared security objectives, strengthening U.S. credibility and influence in key regions, defeating ISIS, confronting Iranian aggression, and ensuring OSD(P) plays a meaningful and constructive role within the Department's overall military policy making, among others.

*Question.* In your view, what are the major challenges, if any, you would confront if confirmed as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I believe the major challenges will be defeating ISIS and other radical Islamic terrorist groups; countering Russian and Iranian aggression; rebuilding American military strength; strengthening America's credibility, alliances, and partnerships; and rebalancing burden-sharing within those alliances.

Practically, I believe it is often a challenge amidst the daily demands and urgent crises to ensure we are regularly reevaluating our strategies and objectives, and

questioning the assumptions on which our strategies are based and the metrics by which our success is judged.

*Question.* If confirmed, what management actions and timelines would you establish to address these challenges?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I would want to first examine the existing management structure of the organization, as well as the assumptions and timelines associated with meeting these challenges, before providing an answer. Ultimately, prioritization and timelines of confronting these challenges will depend on guidance from the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, as well as by interagency or Presidential determinations.

#### RELATIONS WITH CONGRESS

*Question.* What are your views on the state of the relationship between the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and the Senate Armed Services Committee in particular, and with Congress in general?

*Answer.* I am unaware of the specific, current state of the relationship between the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and the Senate Armed Services Committee. I believe the new Secretary of Defense is committed to a harmonious relationship with Congress and I am optimistic the Department and the Committees of jurisdiction will establish a strong and collaborative relationship.

*Question.* If confirmed, what actions would you take to sustain a productive and mutually beneficial relationship between the Congress and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs?

*Answer.* It would be my intention, if confirmed, to take a proactive approach to working with the Committees of jurisdiction and the Congress in confronting the many significant threats facing our country. As a former Senate and House staffer, I am particularly mindful of the critical role the Congress can and should play in matters of national security. I believe the U.S. Government is stronger when the Executive and Legislative branches have a relationship of trust and when channels of communication run both ways.

#### TORTURE AND ENHANCED INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES

*Question.* Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2–22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated August 19, 2014, and required by section 1045 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114–92)?

*Answer.* I do, and I will uphold the law and the Department of Defense directives that govern detainee treatment.

#### UNITED STATES STRATEGIC VITAL INTERESTS

*Question.* It is important to delineate between the United States' strategic vital interests and other interests. Strategic vital interests must represent those for which the United States is willing to commit the nation's blood and treasure.

What and where are the United States' strategic vital interests?

*Answer.* I believe American strategic vital interests begin with protecting the physical security of the Homeland, safeguarding our sovereignty, preserving our democratic institutions, rule of law, freedoms, and values of our society (in short, our way of life), and promoting American economic prosperity. As a global superpower with global interests, these strategic vital national interests are closely tied to the international system of alliances, relationships, and order built and led by the United States World War II.

*Question.* How do these overlay with extant and emerging threats around the globe?

*Answer.* Given the global reach of the American economy, security challenges in nearly every region can touch upon various elements of our strategic vital national interests. For example, instability in regions of critical economic or security interest for the United States could jeopardize vital national interests; revisionist powers might threaten key shipping lanes or critical allies; or terrorist organizations might leverage new technologies or exploit gaps in our defenses to strike asymmetrically at core national interests.

#### NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY

*Question.* In your view, what should the envisioned end states entail for a new National Defense Strategy?

Answer. I would not want to prejudge the end states of a new National Defense Strategy, as required by the Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA. Such a strategy should clearly identify the vital national interests that such a strategy must safeguard and how all elements of national power can be utilized to do so. If confirmed, I would eagerly support my Assistant Secretary of Defense counterpart responsible for coordinating this important strategy document.

*Question.* What should be the objectives and key attributes of the National Defense Strategy?

Answer. I understand the National Defense Strategy is currently being updated. I believe the review will reassess our assumptions about the global environment, clearly identify our vital national interests, establish a strategic framework to identify threats and opportunities, identify elements of national power that can be utilized to protect and promote our vital national interests, and review force structure requirements for various aspects of the strategy.

*Question.* What are the key elements of strategic deterrence in the 21st Century?

Answer. The key elements of strategic deterrence in the 21st Century are the same as they have been for millennia. Deterrence requires having sufficient capabilities, credibility, and will to convince adversaries that challenging the United States, or allies to whom we are bound by treaty, would be prohibitively costly. Technological developments, changes in the distribution of global power, and the rise of violent non-state actors have complicated deterrence, but have not fundamentally altered how U.S. policymakers should think about deterrence strategies.

*Question.* What should be the core elements of a comprehensive global defense strategy to: defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Al Qaeda, and other purveyors of violent extremism; stabilize Afghanistan; limit Iran's malign influence and other activities; contain North Korea; and deter war with Russia and China?

Answer. In my view, such a strategy should begin with rebuilding America's military capabilities, strengthening our credibility, bolstering our alliances and partners, and mobilizing such partners to join the United States in confronting shared threats. Recognizing that some of these challenges fall outside of the portfolio of the ASD (ISA), if confirmed I would work with my colleagues across the government to address these discrete threats with specific strategies, consistent with a comprehensive global defense strategy and our national interests.

#### UNITED STATES MILITARY FORCE SUFFICIENCY

*Question.* The United States will likely never afford the resources to assign all the forces each combatant commander believes they need, which leads the Defense Department to apportion forces in operations planning. As U.S. military forces are already severely challenged in terms of capacity, in certain scenarios these forces may only exist on paper when it becomes necessary to allocate them for a given contingency.

How important are the U.S. military's global power projection capabilities in ensuring we remain a global power?

Answer. It is difficult to overstate the importance of maintaining America's global power projection capabilities. Our ability to deploy and sustain forces across the world is an essential element of our deterrence and defense strategies, and many non-military benefits accrue from our global force posture and power projection capabilities.

*Question.* Do you believe the United States must retain the capability to strike any global target (hold any target at risk), both in the nuclear and conventional sense?

Answer. Yes, although I am concerned that investments by sophisticated adversaries in certain technologies and systems are complicating our strike capabilities in some theatres. If confirmed, I would want to carefully review our current and projected ability to hold enemy targets at risk.

*Question.* In your opinion, does power projection include our ability to deploy and sustain forces anywhere on the planet, across the full range of military operations? Do you believe this is a unique characteristic of the American way of war?

Answer. Yes. Our ability to deploy and sustain forces across the globe is a unique characteristic of the U.S. military. Our ability to maintain such capabilities may be increasingly challenged both by advances in the capabilities of our adversaries and by our own budgetary decisions. We should not take for granted that this hugely important, asymmetric power of the United States will be maintained without risk or cost.

*Question.* Do you believe we must also have a sufficient strategic and operational reserve, national mobilization capability, and robust defense industrial base to pro-

vide a second echelon of follow-on forces if a contingency arises in a particular region, especially against a near peer state?

Answer. Yes. Such a capability is essential for deterring adversaries and, in the event the United States must go to war against a near peer adversary, for prevailing in such a conflict.

*Question.* In light of current and future threats to the United States' strategic vital interests, do you believe the U.S. military must have the capacity to fight two wars simultaneously?

Answer. I agree with the concerns expressed by the 2014 National Defense Panel with respect to the decision to edge away from having the capacity to conduct two major wars simultaneously. The deterioration of the global security environment in recent years has increased the likelihood that the U.S. and its partners could face such an eventuality.

*Question.* If you ascribe to these attributes as required of the U.S. military, in your opinion does the Fiscal Year 2017 Request for Additional Appropriations, and the fiscal year 2018 defense budget request previewed in the President's Budget Blueprint, sufficiently support the attainment of these attributes?

Answer. The Fiscal Year 2017 Request for Additional Appropriations and Fiscal Year 2018 defense budget request begin a process of digging the U.S. military out of the hole created in defense spending by the Budget Control Act. But, restoring America's military readiness, modernizing its capabilities, and fully meeting service requirements cannot be accomplished in a single budget cycle.

The defense budget is an expression of our national will, and it remains at historically low levels as a percentage of GDP.

#### STRATEGY TO DEFEAT ISIS

*Question.* On January 28, 2017, National Security Presidential Memorandum-3 was issued that states: "It is the policy of the United States that ISIS be defeated" and directs the Administration "to develop a comprehensive plan to defeat ISIS" with the Secretary of Defense as the lead of the interagency effort.

How would you define success in the defeat of ISIS?

Answer. I would define success as eliminating the ability of ISIS to control territory and promote a physical caliphate, significantly degrading its ability to conduct operations (especially against the Homeland), discrediting its radical ideology, and shaping the environment so that conditions do not easily allow for other radical Islamic terrorist groups to pick up the mantle of jihad.

*Question.* What goals, objectives, and indicators of success would you recommend for the strategy to defeat ISIS?

Answer. If confirmed, I would examine the definitions of success above in conjunction with the Department's existing goals, objectives, and metrics of success to determine whether any revisions are warranted.

*Question.* What types of options should be considered to accelerate the defeat of ISIS?

Answer. I understand some decisions have already been made with respect to changing the rules of engagement for United States forces and providing additional resources to local partners involved in the fight against ISIS. I further understand the Secretary has established a Defense Department task force aimed at integrating activities in the counter-ISIS campaign. If confirmed, I look forward to working with that task force and within the interagency process to identify additional steps the Department, other agencies, and United States partners can take to accelerate the defeat of ISIS.

*Question.* In your opinion, what are the major lessons learned from the fight against ISIS in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and elsewhere over the last 2½ years?

Answer. There are many lessons to be derived from our Nation's experiences in the fight against ISIS and other terrorist groups, particularly beyond the 2½ year window. An illustrative, partial list might include: being mindful that the risks of inaction can be as great as the risks of intervention; the fact that the need for local partners to take the lead can be complicated by the difficulties in rapidly training capable partner security forces; the importance of conducting military operations with a mind to shaping political conditions and outcomes consistent with US national interests; the impact that weakened credibility can have on America's influence over both its partners and its adversaries; the need to periodically challenge assumptions about the strategy and the metrics used to judge its success; and so forth.

*Question.* What non-military activities by the United States Government will be important for achieving a lasting defeat of ISIS?

Answer. A significant number of non-military factors will be essential for securing a lasting defeat of ISIS and preventing the rise of similar radical Islamic terrorist groups. Responsibility for these non-military measures will fall on other U.S. Government agencies, foreign partners, and local actors. An illustrative list would include governance issues in Iraq and Syria in the wake of the liberation of Mosul and Raqqa; political comity among sectarian and ethnic communities in these and other countries in the region; security sector reform and development; economic development; credible diplomatic pressure to facilitate political resolutions to ongoing civil conflicts; efforts to discredit radical ideologies; efforts to limit the malign activities of actors such as Iran; and efforts to better confront terrorist financing and arms transfers.

After Mosul and Raqqa are liberated from ISIS control, the next major military campaign will likely occur in the Euphrates river valley.

*Question.* What is your understanding of the strategy to accomplish United States objectives in Iraq and Syria after Mosul and Raqqa are liberated from ISIS?

Answer. I understand the current strategy is to enable and work with local partners, along with a regional and global coalition of partners, to defeat ISIS and prevent the rise of other radical Islamic terrorist groups. I have not yet been briefed on the specifics of the campaign plan for Iraq and Syria beyond the liberation of Mosul and Raqqa. If confirmed, I will work with colleagues throughout the Department and interagency to ensure the U.S. strategy shapes the outcome of the conflicts in Iraq and Syria consistent with our national interest.

*Question.* What steps should be taken to prepare for the next phase in the campaign after the liberation of Mosul and Raqqa?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of Defense and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to understand their priorities for the strategy beyond Mosul and Raqqa. While I support the view that the Department should preserve the element of strategic surprise by not telegraphing actions prior to taking them. I believe it is in America's interest that reliable and responsible local partners have control over these liberated territories, just as it will be important to constrain malign, destabilizing activities of Iranian-backed militia and other elements of destabilizing Iranian influence.

*Question.* Should we seek a political solution for the Sunni Arab peoples living between Damascus and Baghdad?

Answer. The political conditions under which Sunni Arabs will live in Syria and Iraq will have a significant impact on whether they, yet again, turn to radical Islamic terrorist groups to defend themselves against sectarian or oppressive leadership. The U.S. cannot impose a political solution, but it certainly has a stake in the political outcomes of the military campaigns in the region. If confirmed, I will work with counterparts at the Department of State to help the United States best shape an enduring and stabilizing political solution consistent with our national interests.

#### MIDDLE EAST

*Question.* What are the greatest threats to United States national security interests in the Middle East and what policy objectives should we pursue to protect them?

Answer. The most significant threats to United States national security interests in the Middle East are radical Islamic terrorist organizations, such as ISIS and al Qaeda; Iran's malign and destabilizing activities in the region, including the activities of Iranian proxies such as Hizballah; and a security and stability vacuum that has emboldened and enabled both radical Islamic terrorist organizations and aggressive, revisionist powers such as Iran.

To protect against these threats, the United States should maintain its ability to project power to deter and defeat such adversaries, successfully prosecute the war against ISIS, strengthen deterrent credibility, restore trust and confidence in our diplomatic and defense relationships with key regional partners such as Israel and the Gulf States, and encourage regional and extra-regional partners to contribute more to regional security efforts.

#### SYRIA

*Question.* What are the key United States national security interests in Syria and how would you describe the strategy to secure them?

Answer. Radical Islamic terrorist groups, such as ISIS and al Qaeda, pose the most immediate threat to United States interests in Syria. Aside from the ISIS threat, Iranian and Hizballah influence has made the Assad regime in Syria a strategic arm of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran and Hizballah are active participants in Assad's brutal war against the Syrian people—a war that helped create the condi-

tions for ISIS and other radical terrorist groups to thrive, and that has threatened the security of its neighbors Israel, Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon (all partners of the United States), fomented sectarian tensions, and destabilized the entire region. The confluence of the threats posed by ISIS, Iranian aggression, and the Syrian civil war have created a humanitarian catastrophe of historic proportions that has threatened the security and political order of Europe. The situation in Syria is truly a threat to international peace and security.

I believe the strategy to address these threats will entail working with partners to defeat ISIS and eliminate terrorist safe havens in Syria, counter the malign activities and influence of Iran and its terrorist proxies, support responsible local forces to defeat ISIS and establish control over territory, and foster conditions to allow for a cessation of hostilities and a negotiated solution to the Syrian civil war. Because the entire world is threatened by the tragic conflict in Syria, global pressure should be brought to bear on the principal combatants. Unfortunately, efforts to resolve the conflict have been complicated by Moscow, whose military intervention has done more to bolster Syria and Iran than to undermine ISIS or to stabilize the conflict.

*Question.* How does the strategy address the residual threat from Al Qaeda in Syria and their associates?

*Answer.* My understanding is the strategy prioritizes targeting of ISIS as well as residual Al Qaeda in Syria terrorists and other associated terrorist organizations that pose a threat to the United States. I have not yet been briefed on the specific mechanics of how such targets are prioritized. But, if I am confirmed, I would want to ensure the strategy effectively addresses the threat posed by a range of terrorist groups.

*Question.* How would the defeat of ISIS impact the civil war in Syria?

*Answer.* It would depend on a number of other variables, but the defeat of ISIS and other affiliated terrorist groups may serve to clarify the nature of the conflict in Syria, deny the Assad regime and its patrons the excuse of combating ISIS in its perpetration of war crimes against innocent civilians, and facilitate negotiations toward a political resolution to the conflict.

*Question.* Do you believe a political resolution to the civil war in Syria is necessary to address the underlying conditions that enable violent extremists like ISIS and Al Qaeda to take root?

*Answer.* Yes.

*Question.* What are the key strategic interests and objectives of the Russians in Syria and how successful have they been at accomplishing them?

*Answer.* I am unaware of the Kremlin's internal perceptions of its interests and objectives in intervening on behalf of the Assad regime in the Syrian civil war. Moscow's intervention appears to have shored up the Assad regime, increased Russia's regional influence, bolstered its likely long-term military presence in the Middle East, allowed its military to use Syria as a test-bed for a range of weapons systems and tactics, and complicated American and allied options for shaping the trajectory of the conflict. Whether these effects are ephemeral or enduring is, as yet, unclear. In my estimation, none of these effects have served America's national interest.

Discussing the removal of Bashar al-Assad from power with reporters in March 2017, the United States Ambassador to the UN said: "Are we going to sit there and focus on getting him out? No . . ."

*Question.* Has the previously stated goal of removing Bashar al-Assad from power in Syria changed, and if so, what is the new objective and what are the benefits to United States national security interests of changing it?

*Answer.* I have not been briefed on the specific objectives of United States policy in Syria, but multiple senior United States officials have publicly indicated the objective is a negotiated solution to the conflict. It is currently difficult to imagine a stable solution that leaves Assad, who has repeatedly used chemical weapons, barrel bombs, and other weapons to indiscriminately slaughter the Syrian people, in place.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been adamant that the People's Protection Units (YPG) of the Syrian Kurds should not receive United States and coalition support in their efforts to liberate Raqqa.

*Question.* If the United States chooses not to support the YPG in operations to liberate Raqqa, what alternative forces could be used and how would their use affect the timeline and logistical support of the operation?

*Answer.* Although I have not been specifically briefed on the decision, recent media reporting indicates the United States has decided to support Syrian Kurdish forces—which include YPG fighters—as part of the Syrian Democratic Force (SDF). These forces are believed to be the force most capable of liberating Raqqa from ISIS control in the near term. Media reporting also indicates the United States will con-

tinue to train and equip Syrian Arab Coalition fighters, who will likely play an essential role in holding and stabilizing the traditionally Sunni Arab city.

## IRAQ

*Question.* What are the key United States national security interests in Iraq and how would you describe the strategy to secure them?

*Answer.* It is in the United States national security interest in Iraq to defeat ISIS, help Iraqis stabilize their country and deny safe haven to terrorist groups, protect their sovereignty and territorial integrity, enhance our counterterrorism cooperation with the government of Iraq, and facilitate an enduring political relationship among Sunni, Shiite, and Kurdish communities that is free of Iranian and other malign interference. Through direct targeting of ISIS and supporting the government of Iraq and Iraqi Security Forces, the United States and its coalition partners are making progress in achieving these interests.

*Question.* Do you believe that an enduring United States military presence is needed in Iraq? If so, what should be the missions and size of the enduring U.S. military presence?

*Answer.* I do. Such an enduring presence need not entail combat forces. But, in retrospect, such a presence in Iraq would have been valuable not merely in identifying and confronting the advance of the ISIS threat at much lower cost to the United States, but also in limiting malign Iranian influence that has had a corrosive impact on Iraqi and regional security. The United States and Iraq should be long-term partners in combating terrorist organizations that will likely continue to threaten our interests even after the defeat of ISIS in Mosul.

I am not prepared to opine on the exact size or scope of a follow-on military presence. But, if confirmed, I would work closely with interagency counterparts and Iraqi government officials, while consulting closely with the Congress, to determine what size and type of presence would be in our mutual security interest.

*Question.* How would you characterize Iran's influence in Iraq today and what is your recommended strategy to limit that influence in the future?

*Answer.* For a number of years, and especially in the wake of the United States withdrawal from Iraq, Iran has sought to increase its influence in Iraq. In doing so, it fomented sectarian tensions, corrupted Iraqi government institutions, and fostered political conditions in Iraq that helped ISIS thrive.

The strategy to limit Iranian influence in Iraq in the near term will require sustained United States and international engagement to help the Iraqis strengthen cross-sectarian, national institutions, such as the Iraqi security forces.

Moreover, the United States and its partners will need a broader strategy to confront Iran's malign influence throughout the region.

## IRAN

*Question.* What is your assessment of United States national security interests associated with the growth of Iranian influence in the Middle East?

*Answer.* Iran, long the world's most active state sponsor of terrorism, poses a significant threat to U.S. national security interests and those of our closest allies and partners in the region. Tehran's bid for regional hegemony, destabilizing activities, efforts to undermine its neighbors, complicity in Assad's war against the Syrian people, support for terrorist proxies and insurgent movements, missile proliferation, and recurrent threats to destroy Israel threaten regional and even global peace and stability, and should be a matter of profound international concern.

*Question.* How would you describe our strategy to counter Iran's malign influence and other activities throughout the Middle East, and more specifically, Iran's proxy networks?

*Answer.* I am aware of some elements of this strategy, but I have not been briefed on all of the activities the United States is currently pursuing to counter Iran's malign influence. Given the expansion of Iranian malign influence in recent years and the boldness with which Tehran appears to operate, however, I am not convinced the strategy is succeeding. If confirmed, I would want to review the elements of the strategy with an eye towards coordinating a more effective regional and global approach to constrain, deter, and defeat Iran's malign activities.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to limit the nuclear program of Iran was agreed in July 2015 and implemented in January 2016.

*Question.* What is your assessment of the JCPOA?

*Answer.* I believe the JCPOA is a suboptimal agreement. The deal in the immediate term allows Iran to continue making progress on mastering the nuclear fuel cycle through continued uranium enrichment research and development activities. In the long-term, it opens an almost unfettered pathway to an industrial-scale ura-

mium enrichment program. Moreover, there are significant questions about the access the IAEA will have to suspected nuclear sites, especially military facilities, that may complicate monitoring and enforcement of the deal. I am also concerned about the phased removal of restrictions on Iran's missile and conventional military capabilities, and the degree to which the deal—including significant sanctions relief—has complicated multilateral efforts to constrain Iran's destabilizing activities throughout the region.

*Question.* In your opinion, how would Iran react to action by the United States to unilaterally withdraw from the JCPOA?

*Answer.* It is difficult to say without additional information regarding the context of a U.S. abrogation. It is possible Tehran would seek to remain in at least ostensible compliance with the deal in order to split the United States and its P5+1 partners and continue to benefit from certain terms of the deal. It is also possible Tehran would resume unfettered production of highly enriched uranium and weaponization activities, or take other provocative actions.

#### YEMEN

*Question.* What are the United States national security interests in Yemen?

*Answer.* The principal United States national security interests in Yemen are countering terrorists, primarily al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS, maintaining freedom of navigation of key international waterways, working with key economic and security partners on the Arabian peninsula like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to defend against missile threats and further destabilization, and supporting a political solution to the civil war that establishes enduring political stability while denying a safe haven for terror or increased Iranian influence.

*Question.* In your opinion, should we be doing more to help the Saudi coalition in its efforts to find a solution to the conflict in Yemen, and if so, what steps would you recommend?

*Answer.* I have not been briefed in detail on the current situation in Yemen or the extent of United States involvement. If confirmed, I would want to better understand the dynamics of the conflict and examine what additional steps, if any, the U.S. could take to improve the efficacy of our partners' operations while reducing civilian casualties and facilitating an end to the conflict consistent with our national interests.

*Question.* The Houthis are launching missiles deep into Saudi Arabia and conducting regular raids into Saudi Arabia's southern territory. In your estimation, do the Saudis have a choice of whether or not to continue fighting in Yemen?

*Answer.* Nations that have been attacked always have a choice whether or not to fight, though either decision can prove costly. Certainly, Houthi missile attacks and cross border raids pose a legitimate threat to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

*Question.* In your view, what conditions in Yemen need to be reached for the Houthis to be willing to negotiate? Is the Saudi-led coalition capable of creating those conditions and what is the appropriate role for the United States in support of the coalition?

*Answer.* Although United Nations Security Council Resolution 2216 establishes the conditions for all parties to broker a political solution to the conflict, I am not sufficiently well informed about the current dynamics of the conflict in Yemen to opine on what specific conditions must be attained for the Houthis to negotiate. I would imagine that internal Houthi leadership dynamics, battlefield conditions, and levels of external support for their continued rebellion, and the specific elements of any political settlement under consideration would affect the Houthi calculus in this regard. Without additional information, I cannot say whether the Saudi-led coalition is currently capable of achieving these conditions. If confirmed, I would want to closely examine the conditions that could facilitate a negotiated end to the conflict and the steps the U.S. could take to achieve such an outcome.

*Question.* In your view, is it possible for the United States to provide the Saudi-led coalition with assistance designed to reduce civilian casualties without becoming a "cobelligerent"? If so, what assistance do you believe should be provided?

*Answer.* I do not believe current levels of support to the Saudi-led coalition that allow our partners to defend themselves makes the United States a "cobelligerent" in the conflict, but I am not a lawyer. If I am confirmed, I would want to consult the Department of Defense's general counsel before offering a more precise answer. That said, I would also want to examine what additional steps the United States could take to limit the tragic humanitarian costs of the conflict.

*Question.* To what extent are the Houthis, supported by Iran, a threat to freedom of navigation in the Red Sea? What policy positions would you recommend for the United States to address this threat?

*Answer.* I have not been briefed on the Department's insights into the threat posed by the Houthis to freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, but media reporting suggests Iran has provided the Houthis with weapons, including anti-ship cruise missiles, which they have fired upon vessels operating in international waters. If true, it would be similar to Iran's provision of sophisticated weapons to terrorist proxies such as Hizballah, and indicate a growing need for an international effort to confront Iran's malign activities, such as its support for terrorism and illicit weapons shipments. Such cruise-missile attacks demonstrate an obvious threat to international freedom of navigation in such a narrow and important international waterway.

*Question.* In your opinion, what would be the implications of the United States cutting off the sale of precision-guided munitions to Saudi Arabia and its coalition partners?

*Answer.* The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia appears resolutely committed to prosecuting its operations against the Houthis in Yemen, regardless of whether or not Riyadh maintains access to precision-guided munitions that could increase the efficacy of their strikes and reduce the risk of inadvertent civilian casualties. Withholding U.S. technologies and support in this specific case may reduce the influence the United States has with respect to our Saudi partner's activities in this conflict.

#### RUSSIA

*Question.* Senior United States military officials have said Russia is the country that poses the greatest existential threat to the United States.

What are the challenges to United States national security interests from Russia and what are the key principles that must underpin a successful strategy to protect our interests?

*Answer.* Secretary Mattis has made clear that Russia is choosing to be a strategic competitor of the United States and seeks to enhance its global position and influence through destabilizing and aggressive means. While the United States has long sought cooperation with Russia—and while there may be areas where greater cooperation would seem to be in the interests of both parties—too often Russia has chosen to challenge and undermine America's strategic position and threaten our allies.

Significant challenges to United States national security interests from Russia include the invasion and occupation of the sovereign territory of Ukraine; the use of hybrid war tactics and active measures to destabilize American allies and partners; the aggressive use of asymmetric capabilities and technologies; diplomatic and military support to rogue state sponsors of terrorism such as Iran and Syria; and provocative military modernization efforts and deployments that pose offensive threats to the U.S. and its allies.

As described elsewhere, a strategy to deter and defend against such threats begins with rebuilding U.S. and NATO military capabilities and strengthening our credibility. We must be prepared to counter Russian aggression and impose meaningful costs on Russia when Moscow threatens American interests. Yet, while we must be resolute in responding to Russian provocations, we should also continue to seek cooperation with Russia in pursuit of shared interests.

*Question.* Should the United States condition its military engagement with Russia on certain changes in Russian behavior, and if so what conditions, if any, would you recommend?

*Answer.* The United States is currently prohibited from engaging in military-to-military cooperation with the Russian Federation in response to its invasion and illegal occupation of Ukraine. Section 1232 of the 2017 NDAA requires that Russia must "cease its occupation of Ukrainian territory and its aggressive activities that threaten the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine and members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization" before such restrictions can be lifted. If confirmed, I would uphold this requirement.

*Question.* Do you agree with General Scaparrotti that our current force posture in Europe is "inadequate" to deter Russia? What changes to our force posture would you recommend?

*Answer.* Although the U.S. and NATO have taken some steps to improve the readiness and capabilities of our deterrent forces in Europe, I am personally skeptical that Russia is sufficiently deterred from engaging in a range of destabilizing and aggressive activities.

If confirmed, I will consult with the Joint Staff, United States European Command, NATO counterparts, and the Congress on what additional steps might be necessary to enhance United States and NATO readiness and capabilities in Europe.

*Question.* Should the Department of Defense revisit the European Infrastructure Consolidation (EIC) initiative announced in 2015? If so, how should any such revision to our force posture in Europe take into account United States objectives and plans under the European Deterrence Initiative to bolster the military capabilities of our European allies?

*Answer.* I am not sufficiently immersed in this issue to have an immediate answer. If confirmed, I would want to examine whether the European Infrastructure Consolidation (EIC), along with the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI), remain consistent with our national interest in maintaining a robust and capable deterrent force in Europe. I would want to consult with United States European Command to ascertain whether EIC remains an effective way to reduce cost and eliminate excess capacity without reducing our capabilities and flexibility.

*Question.* Do you support continued United States security assistance to Ukraine, and if so, how does the provision of such assistance contribute to a broader U.S. regional security strategy?

*Answer.* I have long supported United States security assistance to Ukraine in order to help the government in Kyiv defend its own sovereign territory and territorial integrity. If confirmed, I would want to examine the impact that the Department's existing train and equip efforts have had on the Ukrainian military's capacity to defend its territorial integrity, and whether additional security assistance efforts might be in our national interest.

*Question.* Do you support providing lethal defensive security assistance to Ukraine as in the interests of the United States?

*Answer.* I have been sympathetic regarding such assistance in the past, but have not been briefed in detail on the current dynamics of the conflict. If confirmed, I would want to more rigorously examine the capabilities of the Ukrainian military, the threat posed by separatists and Russian forces, and the expert views of relevant interagency and United States intelligence officials regarding the mechanics, risks, and benefits of such assistance.

*Question.* In your view, what are the key elements of a strategy to counter Russian hybrid tactics that employ both hard and soft power and present attribution challenges?

*Answer.* Rebuilding American and allied military strength remains at the center of any deterrence strategy, but specifically countering Russian hybrid tactics will require NATO allies to take more seriously their obligations under Article 3 to improve national resilience—especially with respect to cybersecurity—and to maintain the political will to defend the sovereignty of Member states and counter Russian influence and information operations. To counter a false Kremlin narrative, it is also important to demonstrate to the Russian people that the United States and its NATO allies have an alliance that is inherently defensive and does not pose a threat to Russia's sovereignty or legitimate national interests, and that Russia has more to gain in economic and security terms from partnership with the West than from confrontation.

*Question.* What is your assessment of the Russian malign influence threat, and what recommendations, if any, would you have for the role of the United States Government, and the Department of Defense in particular, in countering that threat?

*Answer.* Russian influence operations are not a new threat, and the United States and its allies effectively countered Soviet influence operations and active measures throughout the Cold War. Russia is effectively using new technologies and platforms to pursue old objectives, but as indicated above, these efforts can be thwarted by renewed investment by America and its allies in national resilience. Given the degree to which Russia's active measures and influence operations have used illicit cyber-activities, unique Department of Defense capabilities may be effective in countering some aspects of this threat. If confirmed, I would want to examine more closely the military dimensions of this threat—and our potential responses—before opining more specifically.

#### RUSSIAN VIOLATION OF THE 1987 INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF) TREATY

*Question.* Russia's deployment of a nuclear ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) in violation of the 1987 INF Treaty poses a risk to our NATO Allies and United States forces in Europe.

Given the unlikelihood that Russia will return to compliance with the INF Treaty, how should the United States address the military and political implications of this new nuclear ground-launched cruise missile?

Answer. As Secretary Mattis has said, Russia's violation of the INF Treaty increases the risk to United States forces in Europe and to our allies. Russia should not be allowed to violate arms control agreements with impunity, and the United States should consider whether to best respond to Russia's actions with diplomatic efforts, changes in our force posture, other forms of leverage and pressure, or some combination of the above. Clearly, the United States and its NATO allies must take Russia's military modernization in many areas seriously as they consider their Article 3 obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty.

*Question.* If Russia fails to return to compliance under the INF Treaty, should we extend the New START treaty for an additional 5 years, as stipulated by the treaty?

Answer. It depends on whether the New START Treaty remains itself in the United States interest irrespective of Russia's violations of the INF Treaty. If confirmed, I would want to confer with the Joint Staff and appropriate experts at the Department and within the interagency before coming to such a judgment. If maintaining New START levels irrespective of Russian INF violations is in the national interest, we should examine other means to induce Russia to return to compliance with the INF Treaty or to counteract the impact that Russian violations may have on United States and NATO security.

*Question.* What military advantage, if any, has Russia gained by acting in violation of its INF obligations?

Answer. Although I have not been briefed in any detail on Russia's violation of the INF Treaty, I do not believe Russia has gained an appreciable offensive military advantage that cannot be mitigated by countervailing defensive actions of the United States and its NATO allies. Responding to Russia's military modernization, treaty violations, and aggression will not be without cost, but maintaining our deterrent and defense capabilities in Europe remains essential to the United States national interest and that of our closest allies.

*Question.* Is there a gap in U.S. military capability that could be filled by a system comparable to the GLCM?

Answer. I understand the Administration is reviewing this issue. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Committee to address it.

*Question.* Should we increase NATO's defenses against these new cruise missiles as well as against Russia's air and sea-launched cruise missiles?

Answer. I understand the President has ordered a Ballistic Missile Defense Review to examine whether we should strengthen U.S. missile defense capabilities, including with respect to meeting this challenge. If confirmed, I would want to examine the findings of this study before opining on what new missile defenses might be necessary.

#### NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)

*Question.* In your opinion, does the NATO Alliance benefit the national security interests of the United States?

Answer. I agree with Secretary Mattis that "NATO is vital to our national interest and it is vital to the security of the United States."

*Question.* What are the major strategic objectives of the NATO Alliance in the coming years?

Answer. NATO must continue to deter Russian aggression; encourage and assist its Member States to become more resilient, particularly against asymmetric and "hybrid" threats; make demonstrable progress towards the Wales 2% pledge and alliance burden-sharing; and play a more active role in our common fight against terrorism and out-of-area threats.

*Question.* In your opinion, what are the greatest challenges for NATO and the most important capability improvements that the Alliance must make to deal with the accelerated and growing threats it faces?

Answer. Secretary Mattis has made clear a significant challenge for NATO will be to muster the political will to deter Russian aggression, resolve defense burden-sharing imbalances by meeting the 2% Wales pledge, and maintain alliance solidarity on key issues such as deterrence and countering terrorism. These challenges are exacerbated by growing political polarization within Europe, external crises and issues that will compete for the time and attention of national leaders, and NATO's somewhat cumbersome decision-making process.

That said, the magnitude of the growing threats posed to the Alliance should serve to help capitals overcome political resistance to increasing their contributions to the alliance and rallying behind joint efforts to defeat ISIS and deter further Rus-

sian aggression. In the event I am confirmed, I look forward to working with U.S. colleagues and NATO counterparts in identifying key capabilities in which the U.S. and our NATO partners must invest in order to effectively meet these challenges.

*Question.* What is your perspective on accusations that our NATO Allies do not carry their fair share of the security burden?

*Answer.* My perspective is that these accusations are accurate, long-standing, and bipartisan. They reflect a justifiable concern that some of our NATO allies do not take seriously their commitment to Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty which states that Members “separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.”

I agree with Secretary Mattis’ warning to NATO allies that “Americans cannot care more for your children’s security than you do. Disregard for military readiness demonstrates a lack of respect for ourselves, for the alliance, and for the freedoms we inherited, which are now clearly threatened.”

*Question.* In your view, is there a continuing requirement for U.S. nuclear weapons to be deployed in NATO countries?

*Answer.* Yes. NATO allies reaffirmed at the Wales Summit that the alliance nuclear force is an essential component of NATO’s deterrent strategy. I believe the U.S. and NATO must maintain the full range of capabilities necessary to maintain this successful deterrent.

*Question.* If confirmed, will you support fielding the dual capable F-35 modifications for the United States and its allies in the shortest feasible time?

*Answer.* I will.

#### BALKANS

*Question.* How would you describe today’s threats to the security and stability of the Balkans?

*Answer.* Although much has improved in many respects since the significant sectarian and ethnic conflict of the 1990s, the situation in some corners of the Balkans remains tenuous. Some states have made significant progress and have been welcomed into NATO. Others face significant governance and corruption challenges at home, which have been exploited by outside actors such as Russia. Other states continue to face ethnic and sectarian tensions that could escalate into armed conflict.

United States defense relationships with Balkan partners will continue to be an important element of a broader United States effort to bolster stability, economic development, and national resilience in this important corner of Europe.

*Question.* What do you see as the role of NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) and what conditions are required before that presence can be reduced or eliminated?

*Answer.* I concur with Secretary Mattis’ judgment that KFOR remains critical to ensuring stability in the region. While the UNSC authorized KFOR remains primarily a backstop, behind the Kosovo Police and the European Union Rule of Law Mission, unfortunately, due to the lack of progress in the European Union sponsored Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue and the absence of normalized ties between Serbia and Kosovo, conditions continue to justify the KFOR mission.

#### LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

*Question.* How do you define United States national security interests in Latin America and the Caribbean?

*Answer.* United States national security interests in Latin America and the Caribbean begin with protecting the security and promoting the economic prosperity of the Homeland and the American people. We also have a national interest in promoting the security and prosperity of our partners across the region and strengthening our joint efforts to address common security challenges. This includes narco-trafficking, terrorism, and transnational organized crime that have contributed to violence and corruption throughout the hemisphere and in the United States.

*Question.* Many of the internal security challenges in Latin America are associated with transnational criminal networks. How should the United States approach security assistance given the overlapping roles of host governments’ law enforcement organizations and militaries in combating these networks?

*Answer.* Countering transnational criminal networks is not primarily a Defense Department mission. It is primarily a law enforcement mission, both on the part of the U.S. Government and our partners, although military forces often play important supporting roles. The U.S. approach to security assistance should be tailored to the specific circumstances of each country, promote interagency and regional cooperation and interoperability, and reinforce the importance of promoting the rule of law, the integrity of state institutions, human rights and combating corruption.

*Question.* What types of United States assistance are appropriate for Latin American countries given that these challenges emanate from non-state actors?

*Answer.* U.S. foreign assistance, to be properly aligned with our national interests, should be coordinated among relevant U.S. departments and agencies in support of an interagency strategy that addresses the range of challenges related to non-state actors from terrorists to narcotraffickers to international criminal networks. Such strategies might include capacity-building for military and civilian security forces; efforts to improve governance, strengthen the rule of law, and fight corruption; and initiatives to facilitate regional cooperation and information-sharing.

*Question.* In some countries in Latin America, such as Mexico, the Department of Defense plays an important role in training, equipping, and rendering assistance to partner nation militaries. How should it coordinate efforts with security efforts in those countries led by other U.S. agencies, such as the Department of State?

*Answer.* The Department of Defense must coordinate closely with the Department of State and other relevant U.S. agencies, along with the partner nation, to ensure DOD assistance is part of an integrated approach. This coordination should happen both at the Country Team level, under the supervision of the U.S. Ambassador, and through the interagency process in Washington, D.C., and should include close partnership with Congress.

*Question.* There is a growing concern that the counter-narcotics campaign in Central America and security assistance from the United States is "militarizing" civilian police. In your view, how should the Defense Department condition its security assistance to countries such as Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador to ensure that it is training local police appropriately, and not exacerbating the violence in those countries?

*Answer.* The most basic condition on assistance to partner security forces is adherence to rigorous standards of respect for the rule of law and human rights. In addition, assistance must be planned in close coordination with the Department of State and Congress, and should be tailored to the specific situation in each country to ensure that Central American civilian police forces increasingly are able to handle their responsibilities for law enforcement effectively, appropriately, and free of corruption. It likely will take time for these countries to recruit, train and build effective police forces.

#### COLOMBIA

*Question.* United States assistance to Colombia over the past several years has facilitated the marginalization of the FARC and other violent revolutionary groups.

How do you define United States national security interests in Colombia? What means of support are appropriate for the Colombian government given the challenges it faces?

*Answer.* The United States has invested considerable time, effort, and resources into the relationship with Colombia and that country's long-standing campaign against the FARC. The United States has a vested interest in supporting Colombia's peace implementation process, which includes targeting coca cultivation and cocaine trafficking, demobilizing the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrillas, and expanding the presence and reach of the Colombian government throughout the country. A failure to adequately address growing coca cultivation and a burgeoning narcotrafficking industry would imperil the significant investments made by the United States in Colombia and endanger our national interests. We can protect our significant investment in Colombia's counternarcotics and counterinsurgency missions through defense institution-building efforts. These investments will continue to pay dividends as Colombia continues to emerge as a regional and global security exporter.

*Question.* What conditions need to be reached for the nature of the United States strategy in Colombia to change?

*Answer.* Even though Colombia has reached a peace deal with the FARC, the National Liberation Army (ELN) and other organized armed groups continue to present significant security challenges, thereby threatening implementation of the peace accord with the FARC. It would be premature to change our strategy until these gains are consolidated, narcotrafficking is curtailed, and the reach of the central government extended into previously hostile areas. It is my understanding that the Colombians are very capable and willing United States partners. If confirmed, I would want to sustain that close partnership while we assess how to meet our common objectives in Colombia and in the region.

*Question.* Provided that the Colombian government continues to make progress towards peace with the major rebel groups, what should be the United States' ap-

proach towards preventing the growth of illegally armed groups and drug trafficking organizations?

*Answer.* Implementing the peace accord will take a tremendous commitment of effort and resources. There are signs that the ELN and organized armed groups are taking over the FARC's narco trafficking and other illicit activities. We must work closely with the Government of Colombia to defeat these threats, as their persistence imperils both the peace with the FARC and the effectiveness of the Government's counternarcotics efforts.

*Question.* What are the challenges that the Colombian government and military will face in implementing the recent peace deal with the FARC and how can the United States contribute to the implementation process?

*Answer.* Successfully implementing the peace accord will require a major commitment of Colombian effort and resources over the coming decades. Colombia's security forces will be critical in extending security and the rule of law across the country, and in the eradication and interdiction components of the counternarcotics effort. The Government of Colombia also will have to leverage its civilian institutions to address the root causes of the conflict. It is my understanding that United States security assistance has been effective in building the capabilities of the Colombian security forces to defeat enemy forces on the battlefield.

*Question.* The Colombian military has become a security exporter throughout the region and the world due to its successes and expertise. What assistance should the United States provide to facilitate its growth as a source of stability?

*Answer.* Colombia has been a tremendous partner in the United States-Colombia Action Plan for Regional Security (USCAP), through which it trains Central American and Caribbean countries in counternarcotics and counterterrorism activities. Colombia has participated in NATO and European Union counter-piracy missions off the coast of the Horn of Africa, and has taken steps to prepare to participate in United Nations peacekeeping operations. We should maintain our support for Colombia's regional and global security activities, which contribute to our own national security.

#### CONTINUING USE OF GUANTANAMO AS A DETENTION CENTER

*Question.* Would you advise the President to transfer additional detainees to Guantanamo? What do you see as the costs and benefits of doing so?

*Answer.* While I do not believe detention policy or the disposition of the detention facility at Guantanamo falls under the purview of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, I do believe the United States needs an effective and sustainable policy consistent with the law of armed conflict that allows for the detention of enemy combatants captured on the battlefield. If confirmed and asked for my opinion on this controversial issue, I would want to better understand the costs, benefits, and risks of various options that have been considered across multiple Administrations.

*Question.* What should be the Department's long-term detention strategy?

*Answer.* I do not believe detention strategy falls under the purview of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, and I do not think that I am adequately qualified to opine on what a long-term detention strategy should be, without consulting first with the appropriate Department of Defense policy and legal experts.

*Question.* Do you think the U.S. Government should continue the Periodic Review Board Process and the process of transferring detainees to other countries, subject to the restrictions currently in law?

*Answer.* I would defer to the appropriate experts at the Department of Defense regarding the disposition of detainees currently held by the Department.

#### DEFENSE SECURITY COOPERATION

*Question.* What is the appropriate role of the Department of Defense in the conduct of security sector assistance?

*Answer.* Security sector assistance is an important element of the Department of Defense's relationship with partner militaries across the globe. Although other U.S. agencies have significant roles to play in assisting partners with security sector reform and building partner capacity, the Defense Department has unique capabilities to improve the capabilities of our partner militaries in line with our national interest. I understand the Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA included some reforms that have increased the integration and flexibility of some aspects of security assistance. If I am confirmed, I would want to conduct further research to determine if additional steps could be taken to improve coordination and efficacy of U.S. security assistance efforts.

*Question.* What should be the Defense Department's relationship with the Department of State in the conduct of these activities?

*Answer.* The Defense Department should work closely with the Department of State and other interagency partners—along with the Congress—in coordinating and overseeing security assistance to ensure such programs are effective, and efficient uses of taxpayer dollars, and remain consistent with our foreign policy goals and objectives.

*Question.* What should be the strategic objectives of the Defense Department's efforts to build the capabilities of a partner nation's security forces?

*Answer.* Defense Department security assistance programs should strive to enhance the ability of partner nations to provide for their own internal defense and contribute more meaningfully to regional and global security, consistent with our shared national interests. Having capable and responsible partners is a force-multiplier for the U.S. military, reducing the burden on U.S. forces for responding to security threats across the world.

*Question.* In your view, is the Defense Department appropriately organized and resourced to effectively conduct such activities? If not, what changes would you recommend?

*Answer.* I understand the FY 2017 NDAA included significant reforms of the Department's security cooperation programs. As I mentioned previously, I believe consolidating authorities and creating a central transfer account should make our assistance more efficient, flexible, and tailored to our national interests and defense strategies. If confirmed, I would want to examine more closely these reforms and related issues before advocating for additional reforms or resources.

#### CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

*Question.* In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

*Answer.* Yes.

*Question.* Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs?

*Answer.* Yes.

*Question.* Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate committees in a timely manner?

*Answer.* Yes.

*Question.* Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

*Answer.* Yes.

*Question.* Do you agree to answer letters and requests for information from individual Senators who are members of this Committee?

*Answer.* Yes.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER

##### HELSINKI COMMISSION

1. Senator WICKER. Mr. Karem, the United States Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE/Helsinki Commission) consists of 21 commissioners, 18 of whom come from the United States Congress. The remaining three commissioners are appointed by the President of the United States from the Departments of Defense (DOD), State, and Commerce, usually at the assistant secretary level. The commissioner appointed from DOD has typically been the official who serves as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, the position for which you have been nominated.

In addition to serving as a Member of this Committee, I also currently serve as the Chairman of the Helsinki Commission, whose mandate requires commissioners

to “monitor the acts of the signatories which reflect compliance with or violation of the articles of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe,” also known as the Helsinki Final Act. The Helsinki Final Act commitments have been under increasing strain in recent years. I strongly recommend that, if confirmed, you seek to engage with our bipartisan, bicameral commission, as we would welcome the opportunity to work with you.

Do you agree that collaborating with allies and partners through institutions such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to address the challenges facing Europe is helpful and in the national interest?

Mr. KAREM. I strongly agree that we must collaborate with allies and partners to address our shared security challenges, and, if confirmed, I hope to work with you and the other members of the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe to support and defend the principles and commitments enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe remains a key institution for international dialogue. If confirmed, I look forward to engaging with key allies and partners, as well those who may see us as an adversary, through the OSCE to address the recent strains to the European security environment.

2. Senator WICKER. Mr. Karem, what more can DOD do to support efforts to enhance accountability for signatory states that are in violation of their commitments under the Helsinki Final Act?

Mr. KAREM. I understand the U.S. has raised significant concerns regarding violations of the Helsinki Final Act, particularly by Russia, both bilaterally and in multilateral fora. These efforts are critical to maintaining consensus around key principles, such as sovereignty and host nation consent for the presence of military forces, that provide predictability and security within the international system. If confirmed, I will continue to work with allies and partners to press for accountability for the commitments made under the Helsinki Final Act, in close consultation with the Helsinki Commission.

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ELIZABETH WARREN

COUNTERING “GRAY ZONE” WARFARE IN EUROPE

3. Senator WARREN. Mr. Karem, the United States has deployed equipment and rotated ground forces back into Europe through the European Reassurance Initiative, but this conventional display of force alone obviously isn’t sufficient to deter Russia. Putin seems to rely increasingly on covert cyber activity, propaganda, and other indirect tactics—as he demonstrated just a few weeks ago by interfering with the French election. If confirmed, how will you work with our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies to counter Russia’s so-called “gray zone” warfare?

Mr. KAREM. As I wrote in response to a question about Russia’s hybrid war tactics in my Advance Policy Questionnaire:

Rebuilding American and allied military strength remains at the center of any deterrence strategy. But, specifically countering Russian hybrid tactics will require NATO allies to take more seriously their obligations under Article 3 to improve national resilience—especially with respect to cybersecurity—and to maintain the political will to defend the sovereignty of Member states and counter Russian influence and information operations. To counter a false Kremlin narrative, it is also important to demonstrate to the Russian people that the United States and its NATO allies have an alliance that is inherently defensive and does not pose a threat to Russia’s sovereignty or legitimate national interests; that Russia has more to gain in economic and security terms from partnership with the West than from confrontation.

If confirmed, I would seek to work with our NATO Allies to enhance our shared capacity to more quickly identify, expose, disrupt, and impose costs on Moscow’s use of “gray zone” measures that threaten our interests below the level of conventional conflict.

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[The nomination reference of Mr. Robert Story Karem follows:]

## NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,  
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,  
*April 25, 2017.*

*Ordered,* That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

Robert Story Karem, of the District of Columbia, to be an Assistant Secretary of Defense, vice Derek H. Chollet, resigned.

[The biographical sketch of Mr. Robert Story Karem, which was transmitted to the Committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

## BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF MR. ROBERT S. KAREM

*Education:*

- Columbia University
- 1996 to 2000
- B.A.; Honors in Political Science

*Employment record:*

List all jobs held since college including title or description of job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.

- Presidential Transition Team (Washington, DC)
  - Volunteer advisor to CIA Director Nominee Mike Pompeo
  - December 2016 to January 2017
- Sole Proprietor/Independent Consultant (Washington, DC)
  - October 2016 to November 2016
- Jeb 2016 Presidential Campaign (Miami, FL)
  - Foreign Policy Advisor
  - June 2015 to March 2016
- Right to Rise Policy Solutions (Miami, FL)
  - Independent Consultant
  - May 2015 to June 2015
- Office of U.S. House Majority Leader Kevin McCarthy (Washington, DC)
  - National Security Advisor
  - August 2014 to May 2015
- Office of U.S. House Majority Leader Eric Cantor (Washington, DC)
  - National Security Advisor
  - October 2011 to August 2014
- American Enterprise Institute (Washington, DC)
  - Research Fellow; Advisor to Richard B. Cheney
  - July 2009 to October 2011
- Transition Office of Vice President Richard B. Cheney (McLean, VA)
  - Advisor
  - January 2009 to July 2009
- Office of the Vice President (Washington, DC)
  - Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff; Special Advisor for National Security Affairs
  - February 2005 to January 2009
- Office of U.S. Senator Mitch McConnell (Washington, DC)
  - Personal Aide; Legislative Correspondent; Legislative Aide
  - January 2001 to September 2002
- Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington, DC)
  - Intern (Asia Program); Research Assistant (Nuclear Threat Initiative)
  - June 2000 to January 2001

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the

advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by Mr. Robert Story Kareem in connection with his nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

ROOM SR-228

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6050

(202) 224-3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF  
NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more space is needed, use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part of the form will be made available in Committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearing and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. **Name:** (Include any former names used.)  
Robert Story Kareem
2. **Position to which nominated:**  
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
3. **Date of nomination:**  
April 25, 2017
4. **Address:** (List city and state of personal residence and full office addresses.)  
[The nominee responded and the information is contained in the Committee's executive files.]
5. **Year and place of birth:**  
1977, Lexington, Kentucky
6. **Marital status:** (Include full name of current spouse including any other names used, including maiden name.)  
Single
7. **Names and ages of children (if over age 18)**  
N/A
8. **Education:** List names of secondary and higher education institutions attended, type of school (vocational, technical, trade school, college, university, military college, correspondence, distance, extension, and on-line) dates attended, degree received and date degree granted.
  - Henry Clay High School; 1993 to 1996; high school diploma; 1996
  - Columbia University; 1996 to 2000; B.A.; 2000
9. **Employment record:** List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment. If the employment activity was military duty, list separate employment activity periods to show each change of military duty station.
  - Presidential Transition Team, Washington, DC  
- Advisor to CIA Director Nominee Mike Pompeo (volunteer position)

- December 2016 to January 2017
- Independent Consultant, Washington, DC
  - October 2016 to November 2016
- Jeb 2016 Presidential Campaign, Miami, FL
  - Foreign Policy Advisor
  - June 2015 to March 2016
- Right to Rise Policy Solutions, Miami, FL
  - Policy Consultant
  - May 2015 to June 2015
- Office of House Majority Leader Kevin McCarthy, Washington, DC
  - National Security Advisor
  - August 2014 to May 2015
- Office of House Majority Leader Eric Cantor, Washington, DC;
  - National Security Advisor
  - October 2011 to August 2014
- American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC
  - Research Fellow and Advisor to Richard B. Cheney
  - July 2009 to October 2011
- Transition Office of Vice President Cheney, McLean, VA
  - Policy Advisor to Richard B. Cheney
  - January 2009 to July 2009
- Office of the Vice President, Washington, DC
  - Special Advisor for National Security Affairs
  - February 2005 to January 2009

10. **Government experience:** List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed above.

- Office of U.S. Senator Mitch McConnell (2001 to 2005)

11. **Business relationships:** List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational or other institution.

N/A

12. **Memberships:** List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and other organizations.

N/A

13. **Political affiliations and activities:**

(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office for which you have been a candidate.

N/A

(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political parties or election committees during the last 5 years.

N/A

(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity of \$100 or more for the past 5 years.

- Jeb 2016 - \$1,000 (6/2015)
- Jeb 2016 - \$500 (9/2015)
- Mitch McConnell Senate Committee - \$750 (6/2013)
- Mitch McConnell Senate Committee - \$500 (8/2014)
- Romney for President - \$500 (10/2012)

14. **Honors and Awards:** List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary degrees, civilian service citations, military awards and decorations, honorary society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.

N/A

15. **Published writings:** List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have written.

N/A

16. **Speeches:** Provide the Committee with two copies of any formal speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years of which you have copies and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have been nominated.

N/A

17. **Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service:**

(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest?

I will.

(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?

I have not.

(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established for requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings?

I will.

(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests?

I will.

(e) Will you promise to enforce or ensure whistleblower protections for all those witnesses?

I will.

(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this Committee?

I do.

(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

I do.

\_\_\_\_\_  
[The nominee responded to Parts B–F of the Committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–F are contained in the Committee’s executive files.]

\_\_\_\_\_  
SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

ROBERT STORY KAREM

This 4th day of May, 2017

\_\_\_\_\_  
[The nomination of Mr. Robert Story Karem was reported to the Senate by Chairman McCain on May 23, 2017, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on May 25, 2017.]

\_\_\_\_\_  
[Prepared questions submitted to Ms. Kari A. Bingen by Chairman McCain prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

## QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

## DEFENSE REFORMS

*Question.* The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 included the most sweeping reforms since the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.

Do you support these reforms?

*Answer.* As a professional staff member on the House Armed Services Committee (HASC), I had the privilege of supporting the Committee in its efforts to reform the organization and management of the Department of Defense, and I support the reforms that were recently enacted into law. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Armed Services Committees on their implementation, as they relate to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) and the defense intelligence enterprise.

*Question.* What other areas for defense reform do you believe might be appropriate for this Committee to address?

*Answer.* I believe there is opportunity for continued reform within the Department of Defense and, if confirmed, I would support the USD(I) in looking carefully across the organization, management, and activities of the defense intelligence enterprise to determine any areas where improvements could be made.

*Question.* Section 911 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 required the Secretary of Defense to establish cross-functional teams to address critical objectives of the Department.

Do you agree that the Department must be able to integrate its diverse, functional capabilities well in order to successfully defend the Nation from increasingly complex and dynamic security threats? Will you meet this requirement to the best of your abilities?

*Answer.* Yes, I agree with the need to integrated these capabilities, and if confirmed, I would endeavor to meet this requirement to the best of my abilities. The national security threats facing the Nation today are not only complex and dynamic, but diverse. Today's threats cross all domains and require not only a DOD, but a whole-of-government approach to developing responses. Using cross-functional teams would tap the expertise across the DOD to include the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, the combatant commands, the Military Departments/Services and the combat support agencies. Bringing together talent from across the Department, soliciting innovative thought, and providing an open thinking environment is crucial to improving DOD's ability to address current and emerging threats to national security.

As an example, I understand that the USD(I) has been tasked by the Deputy Secretary to oversee a cross-functional team focused on algorithmic warfare and leveraging technology to improve the processing, exploitation, and dissemination of full motion video collected from airborne platforms, which is a key intelligence capability in the defeat-ISIS campaign.

*Question.* What is your understanding of the attributes and characteristics of effective cross-functional teams?

*Answer.* My understanding is that DOD's cross-functional teams include subject matter experts from across the Department with the appropriate knowledge of policy, strategy, technical expertise, and operations to tackle our most daunting national security challenges. If confirmed, I would support the USD(I) in encouraging the best possible environment for these cross-functional teams to succeed in addressing our national security challenges.

## DUTIES

*Question.* What is your understanding of the role, duties, and functions of the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (PDUSD(I))?

*Answer.* My understanding is that the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (PDUSD(I)) is responsible for assisting the USD(I) in supporting the Secretary of Defense in discharging his intelligence-related responsibilities and authorities under Title 10 and Title 50 of the United States Code.

I understand the responsibilities of the USD(I) to include: serving as the principal intelligence advisor to the Secretary of Defense; exercising authority, direction, and control on behalf of the Secretary of Defense over the Defense Intelligence Components of the Department of Defense; ensuring that intelligence organizations in the Department of Defense are manned, organized, trained, and equipped to support the missions of the Department; ensuring that the DOD Intelligence Components that are also elements of the Intelligence Community are responsive to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) in the execution of the DNI's authorities; ensuring that

the combatant commanders, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the civilian leadership of the Department are provided with appropriate intelligence support; ensuring that counterintelligence activities in the Department are conducted and managed efficiently and effectively; ensuring that other sensitive activities which the Department conducts or supports are conducted and managed efficiently and effectively; overseeing the implementation of all DOD security policies and programs except for nuclear, chemical, and biological security to ensure efficiency and effectiveness; serving as the Program Executive for the Military Intelligence Program, and ensuring that the DOD Intelligence Components that are also elements of the Intelligence Community are robust, balanced, and in compliance with the guidance and direction from the DNI; and ensuring that the Department provides the U.S. Congress with intelligence-related information sufficient to execute its oversight responsibilities.

*Question.* What recommendations, if any, do you have for changes in the duties and functions of the PDUSD(I)?

Answer. At this time, I do not have specific recommendations for changes in the duties and functions of the PDUSD(I), but if confirmed, I would keep the Committee informed of any changes in view that I may have.

*Question.* How do you view the relationship and division of responsibilities between the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD(I)) and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy?

Answer. Secretary Mattis has emphasized collaboration. If confirmed, I would work closely and collaboratively with each of the Under Secretaries, their Principal Deputies, and senior teams, recognizing the complementary perspectives each brings to our shared Department mission. I believe that a close and continuing partnership between the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the USD(I), their Principal Deputies, and their staffs helps to ensure that policy and intelligence are effectively integrated in executing the Department's mission.

#### QUALIFICATIONS

*Question.* Section 137a of title 10, United States Code, requires that the PDUSD(I) be "appointed from among persons who have extensive expertise in intelligence matters."

What background and experience, particularly in the area of intelligence matters, do you possess that qualify you to perform the duties of the PDUSD(I)?

Answer. If confirmed, I believe I have the proper background and experience to effectively perform the duties of the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.

I have been honored to serve as a professional staff member on the HASC, from 2006 to 2011, and again from 2013 to the present. In my capacity as policy director, I have led a small team that oversees national defense policy and strategy; regional strategies, posture, and military campaign plans, including in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan; building partnership capacity efforts; and Department of Defense organization and management. I have largely been an intelligence consumer, Intelligence Community assessments to inform my policy recommendations to Committee Members and to inform legislation. I have also seen, through my oversight role, how critical intelligence support is to the operations, military planners, and the acquisitions community.

I have also served as the staff lead for the HASC Strategic Forces Subcommittee with direct responsibility for overseeing military space, missile defense, nuclear weapons, and military intelligence programs and resources. During this time, I supported the Committee's efforts to raise awareness of space threats and the need for greater space situational awareness and space protection capabilities; to enhance our Nation's missile defense capabilities in response to increasing foreign ballistic missile threats; and to invest in the modernization and enhanced safety and security of our nuclear deterrent capabilities.

Prior to working on Capitol Hill, I served as a senior space policy analyst at The Aerospace Corporation's Center for Space Policy and Strategy, providing subject matter expertise on space protection, vulnerabilities, and commercial remote sensing for the National Security Space Office (NSSO) and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA).

Prior to Aerospace, I was employed with SRA International's Adroit C4ISR Center as a space systems analyst, where I supported various defense and intelligence organizations. I provided analytical support to the NSSO in areas such as space protection, hyperspectral imaging, and satellite constellation performance; analyzed threats to U.S. space systems for customers in the Intelligence Community; examined the integration of airborne intelligence, surveillance (ISR), and reconnaissance assets into ground systems for the Air Force; and served as SRA's Deputy Program

Manager providing strategic planning support to the CIA Office of Transnational Issues' Geospatial Analysis Center. In 2002, I was selected as a National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Technology Fellow and assigned to the CIA's Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation & Arms Control Center to examine threats to U.S. space systems.

From my legislative, executive, and private sector background, I have experience working with the defense intelligence enterprise in a variety of different roles. I understand the important role of congressional oversight; I understand the technical, operational, and programmatic complexities involved in the acquisition and fielding of ISR capabilities; and I appreciate the analytical challenges of assessing foreign capabilities and intent. I believe this cumulative experience and perspective, coupled with my technical engineering background, have uniquely prepared me for this position.

#### RELATIONS WITH CONGRESS

*Question.* What are your views on the state of the relationship between the OUSD(I) and the Senate Armed Services Committee in particular, and with the Congress in general?

*Answer.* My current responsibilities have not afforded me sufficient visibility to assess the relationship between OUSD(I) and the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC). In my capacity as the policy director for the HASC, I found the OUSD(I) and the defense intelligence enterprise to be generally responsive to the Committee. However, if confirmed, I would seek to engage the SASC and other committees of jurisdiction to better understand the state of the relationships and how they could be enhanced.

*Question.* If confirmed, what actions would you take to sustain a productive and mutually beneficial relationship between the Congress and the OUSD(I)?

*Answer.* If confirmed as PDUSD(I), I would support the USD(I) in pursuing an open, continuing, and forthright dialogue with Congress concerning issues vital to defense intelligence and national defense. Furthermore, I believe it is important to engage with Congress on a regular basis; to be forthcoming in explaining intelligence activities, programs, and budgets; to provide the Committees of jurisdiction the information they need to carry out their Article I constitutional responsibilities; and to be accountable to the Congress.

#### MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

*Question.* In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and the Defense Intelligence Enterprise?

*Answer.* From my view as a professional staff member of the HASC, I believe the major challenges confronting OUSD(I) and defense intelligence are the diverse and complex array of security challenges and continued scope and pace of global operations conducted against a backdrop of a smaller force and a constrained fiscal environment. Additionally, the demand is increasing for intelligence to support policy, operations, and acquisitions, as is the need to improve our defense intelligence posture and capabilities to better address the full spectrum of security challenges to prevent strategic and military surprise, while fully supporting ongoing operations. Furthermore, the OUSD(I) must address these challenges in a threat environment that requires better protection of our intelligence sources and methods from espionage by state and non-traditional actors and unauthorized disclosures of information.

*Question.* If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

*Answer.* If confirmed, given the importance of intelligence to ongoing operations, I would assist the USD(I) in ensuring that sufficient resources are devoted to the defense intelligence enterprise, and that intelligence is disseminated broadly while still properly protected. I would reinforce and seek to effectively implement the USD(I)'s priorities across the defense intelligence enterprise, and ensure effective policies are developed to support the execution of these priorities. Lastly, the success of the defense intelligence enterprise depends on a workforce—a team—of highly talented and experienced professionals with a wide range of skills. If confirmed, I would support the USD(I) in recruiting, retaining, and developing this talent.

*Question.* How would you anticipate developing priorities for allocating your time and resources as the PDUSD(I)?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I would align my priorities with those of the USD(I) and the Secretary of Defense. I would anticipate dividing my time generally between oversight of intelligence operations, the development of intelligence capabilities, internal management of OUSD(I), and other duties as the Secretary and the USD(I)

may assign. In what will likely continue to be a resource-constrained environment, I would assist the USD(I) in seeking to ensure that resources are strategically allocated to, and across, the defense intelligence enterprise.

*Question.* If confirmed, how would you balance the need to provide intelligence support to the warfighter with the need to provide intelligence support to policy makers?

*Answer.* My understanding is that one of OUSD(I)'s primary responsibilities is to ensure the appropriate balance between intelligence support to the warfighter and to policy makers. If confirmed, I would support the USD(I) in working to ensure the defense intelligence enterprise continues to satisfy intelligence requirements—foremost in support of current military operations and planning, while working collaboratively with interagency partners to inform political-military decision-making by our national leaders. If confirmed, I would seek to identify and communicate the critical intelligence needs of the warfighter. If confirmed, I would also assess the current level of support to policy-makers and warfighters across the national Intelligence Community and defense intelligence enterprise, and seek ways to improve coordination and integration.

*Question.* If confirmed, how will you ensure that the geographic combatant commands are adequately assessing and prioritizing their intelligence needs?

*Answer.* If confirmed, and in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I would support the USD(I) in seeking to strengthen integration and collaboration between the geographic and functional combatant commands, and the components of the national Intelligence Community and the defense intelligence enterprise. I understand that OUSD(I) has a central responsibility, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to ensure a continuous dialogue with the combatant commands regarding their priority intelligence requirements. Combatant command intelligence requirements are continually assessed and prioritized, taking into account U.S. national security interests, Secretary of Defense priorities, combatant command priorities, and resource constraints. From my experience serving as a professional staff member with the HASC as well as my work within the Intelligence Community, I have seen how important it is for the national Intelligence Community and defense intelligence enterprise to recognize and respond to warfighter needs dynamically and with maximum agility. If confirmed, I would work diligently to ensure effective communication across the defense intelligence enterprise, the national Intelligence Community, and all combatant commands.

#### BUDGET

*Question.* What is your assessment of the impact of the budget caps required by the Budget Control Act on the capacity and capabilities of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise to meet requirements?

*Answer.* I understand that the impact on the readiness, capacity, and capabilities of the defense intelligence enterprise has been significant. This enterprise has been squeezed by five consecutive years of budget reductions to meet budget caps. At the same time it has been stressed to meet warfighting requirements while also addressing strategic and full spectrum challenges. From my position on the HASC, I have seen delays in system upgrades, reduced facility maintenance, and a slower than desired pace to address the emerging challenges presented by China's rapidly growing military and a resurgent Russia. If confirmed, I would support the USD(I) in addressing these challenges.

#### TORTURE AND ENHANCED INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES

*Question.* Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2–22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated August 19, 2014, and required by section 1045 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114–92)?

*Answer.* Yes, I support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the current Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2–22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated August 19, 2014, and required by section 1045 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016. Individuals in the custody or control of the United States Government may not be subjected to any interrogation technique or approach, or any treatment related to interrogation, that is not authorized by and listed in the Army Field Manual.

## MANAGEMENT OF THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ENTERPRISE

*Question.* What is your understanding of the role of the OUSD(I) in overseeing and coordinating the efforts of the elements of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise?

*Answer.* My understanding is that the PDUSD(I) is responsible for assisting the USD(I) in supporting the Secretary of Defense in discharging his intelligence-related responsibilities and authorities under Title 10 and Title 50 of the United States Code. This includes exercising authority, direction, and control on behalf of the Secretary of Defense over the Defense Intelligence Components of the Department of Defense.

*Question.* Are additional authorities, policy guidance, or resources necessary for effective oversight of the enterprise?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I would carefully assess the adequacy of the existing authorities, policies, and resources and evaluate potential options to recommend to the USD(I) to increase the effectiveness of the defense intelligence enterprise.

*Question.* Are there opportunities to improve coordination with the National Intelligence Community to improve intelligence support to the warfighter and, if so, where are the opportunities?

*Answer.* Yes, I believe there are opportunities to improve collaboration across the national Intelligence Community and defense intelligence enterprise on behalf of the warfighter. If confirmed, I would support the USD(I) in engaging early and often with the combatant command commanders to understand their needs and to elicit their feedback on how OUSD(I) can better support them. I would also support the USD(I) in engaging on a frequent basis with leaders in the national Intelligence Community to communicate warfighter needs and identify opportunities to improve warfighter support. I am particularly interested in improving the integration of national and defense ISR capabilities, and applying greater attention to faster, more agile and adaptive processing, exploitation, and dissemination of intelligence data to better support the warfighter. Improvements can also be made to increase warfighter awareness of compartmented Intelligence Community capabilities, so they are able to take advantage of them.

## ALLOCATION OF INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE (ISR) ASSETS THROUGH THE GLOBAL FORCE MANAGEMENT PROCESS

*Question.* The Committee has expressed concerns about the process and underlying analysis supporting the allocation of ISR assets to the combatant commands under the Global Force Management Process (GFMAP). While these GFMAP problems are numerous, the Committee has noted in particular that, since the events of September 11th, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) has received the overwhelming share of ISR assets, to the point where the Committee expressed doubt that "a rigorous analysis would consistently rank the lowest priorities of one or more combatant commands higher than the highest priorities of other combatant commands."

What is your understanding and assessment of the adequacy of the process for allocating ISR capabilities under the GFMAP process?

*Answer.* I understand that the GFMAP process was designed to allocate forces and capabilities across the combatant commands to best meet their requirements, including ISR requirements. If confirmed, I would work with the USD(I), in close coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to ensure the appropriate balance in ISR allocation, informed by rigorous analysis of tradeoffs and risks to ongoing combat operations and support to all other combatant commands.

*Question.* In your view, are modifications to the process warranted?

*Answer.* My present duties have not yet afforded me an opportunity to systematically review and assess the GFMAP process in connection with the allocation of ISR assets. However, if confirmed, I would study this matter and not hesitate in providing recommended modifications if warranted.

I recognize there are immense challenges posed by the need to fulfill U.S. Central Command ISR requirements while still ensuring other combatant commands receive adequate support to achieve their assigned missions. If confirmed, I would support the USD(I) in working closely with the key stakeholders in the GFMAP process across the Department, Joint Staff, combatant commands, Military Departments/Services, and combat support agencies to ensure the tradeoffs and risks to missions and forces associated with global ISR allocation are thoroughly analyzed and understood.

## CYBER

*Question.* How do you perceive the challenges we face in cyberspace?

*Answer.* I believe the challenges we face in a constantly changing and dynamic cyberspace environment are significant. In recent years, malicious cyberspace activities conducted by our adversaries have become increasingly complex, technologically advanced, disruptive, and persistent. Correspondingly, DOD continues to face challenges in protecting and securing its networks, systems, infrastructure, and in developing its overall cyber capabilities.

*Question.* Briefly describe what policy objectives the Defense Department should be seeking to achieve in the cyber realm and the strategy you think is necessary to address these challenges.

*Answer.* The Secretary has discussed the need for a whole-of-government effort and policy regarding U.S. responses to cyber aggression, and the need for hardening our information networks and critical infrastructure, which I fully support. If confirmed, cyber will be a key focus area of mine, as the OUSD(I) continues to support efforts to better assess the threat and technological advancements, to rapidly develop the capabilities to deter our adversaries and protect our networks, to support cyber operations, to develop the Cyber Mission Forces, and to support the implementation of section 923 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 on the establishment of U.S. Cyber Command.

*Question.* What role should the OUSD(I) play in addressing challenges in cyberspace?

*Answer.* I believe that OUSD(I)'s role is to provide a holistic and integrated perspective on cyberspace, as it relates to intelligence. This includes a holistic look at the capabilities, operations, personnel, and resources across the defense intelligence enterprise necessary to provide more effective and efficient intelligence support to cyberspace operations, to DOD decision-making, to protection of the Defense Industrial Base, and to DOD plans for cyber deterrence and defense.

*Question.* What is your understanding of the support that the OUSD(I) should provide to the Principal Cyber Advisor's cross-functional team under section 932 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014?

*Answer.* I understand that OUSD(I) supports the Principal Cyber Advisor (PCA) cross-functional team through direct liaison with the OUSD(I) SIGINT and Cyber Directorate under the Director for Defense Intelligence responsible for technical collection and special programs.

#### SPACE

*Question.* What do you perceive as the threats to our national security space satellites?

*Answer.* We face a number of threats to our national security space systems which, given our high dependency on space, can have severe consequences on the battlefield. Our adversaries recognize this dependency and have invested in a range of anti-satellite capabilities, from kinetic kill weapons to be employed against our satellites to non-kinetic cyber weapons that can disable our satellite ground stations and jam command, control, and communications links. Also, space has become increasingly congested, with the number of objects in orbit steadily growing.

*Question.* Briefly describe what policy objectives the Defense Department should be seeking to achieve and the strategy you think is necessary to address these threats.

*Answer.* I would defer to the Secretary and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to articulate the Department's space policy objectives. However, I believe that our defense intelligence enterprise must have the capabilities, personnel, and resources to adequately assess space threats and technology, to better support the acquisition of new space capabilities. Furthermore, I believe that OUSD(I) can work to better integrate intelligence with operations to better protect our space capabilities, and to better integrate space and air to provide greater continuity of ISR support to users.

*Question.* Given that the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) would be required to respond operationally to active threats to reconnaissance satellites by adversaries in a conflict, should the Department consider designating the NRO as a combat support agency?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I would support the USD(I) in assessing whether that relationship should change based on the current and predicted threat environment.

#### RELATIONSHIP WITH RESPECT TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT (ASD SOLIC)

*Question.* How are responsibilities for the oversight of the activities and programs of special operations forces delineated between the OUSD(I) and ASD SOLIC?

Answer. It is my understanding that OUSD(I) and ASD(SO/LIC) have some concurrent responsibilities for the oversight of the activities and programs of special operations forces (SOF). The Secretary of Defense assigned to the USD(I), in DOD Directive 5143.01, "Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)),” the responsibility to oversee all DOD intelligence, counterintelligence, security, sensitive activities, and other intelligence-related activities. I understand that the Secretary of Defense assigned to the ASD(SO/LIC), in DOD Directive 5111.10, "Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)),” the responsibility to oversee all DOD special operations and low intensity conflict activities. To the extent that SOF engage in intelligence, counterintelligence, security, sensitive activities, or other intelligence-related activities, the USD(I) and the ASD(SO/LIC) share responsibility for overseeing those activities.

If confirmed, I would foster continued collaboration between USD(I) and ASD SO/LIC to ensure any overlap of responsibilities strengthens rather than weakens the Department's oversight of SOF activities and programs.

*Question.* Are there any programs that are currently overseen by the OUSD(I) that would be more appropriately overseen by ASD SOLIC?

Answer. I have no program recommendations at this time. If confirmed, I would assist the USD(I), in collaboration with ASD SO/LIC and in consultation with Congress, to make any adjustments in oversight, as necessary, and also work to ensure no gaps in oversight coverage of activities and programs.

#### PERSONNEL SECURITY AND INSIDER THREATS

*Question.* The Committee has enacted significant legislation in recent National Defense Authorization Acts mandating and guiding urgent reforms in personnel security processes and insider threat detection and prevention. Breaches in personnel security records held by the Office of Personnel Management has now also driven a reevaluation of which element or elements of the government should conduct background investigations (BIs) and be responsible for protecting the information that such investigations produce.

What is your assessment of the current process for conducting BIs and what changes, if any, would you recommend to improve the process?

Answer. I am aware of the significant challenges in the current process for conducting background investigations and of the growing backlog of investigations, which are affecting not only DOD personnel and contractors, but also many employees on the Hill. I am also familiar with the Committee's actions in this area in recent National Defense Authorization Acts. If confirmed, I would be in a better position to examine the process in detail, assess the problem, consider options, and make any recommendations for improvements to the process.

*Question.* What is your understanding of the technical and systems integration challenges involved in improving personnel security processes and insider threat detection and prevention within the Department of Defense?

Answer. At this time, I do not have a detailed assessment of the technical and systems integration challenges, but I would surmise that they are significant. I do believe that technology, coupled with process and education, can improve personnel security and insider threat detection. I am interested in the technical efforts within OUSD(I) to conduct automated record checks and to leverage continuously available data sources, to include social media. If confirmed, I would support the USD(I) in working with our interagency partners to accelerate the development of our IT solutions and other automation initiatives to deliver timely, cost-effective and quality background investigations.

*Question.* What are your views about whether the Department of Defense should be responsible for conducting BIs and protecting that sensitive data?

Answer. I am aware of the significant backlogs and delays in background investigations and the impact this has on getting talented personnel to work, including on the Hill. However, in my current capacity, I have not studied this issue in depth. In support of the USD(I), I would assess the process, analyze options, and consider costs and benefits before providing an informed view and any recommendations for the Secretary.

#### U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

*Question.* In your view, how are intelligence operations carried out by special operations personnel different from those carried out by others in the Intelligence Community?

Answer. It is my understanding that SOF's unique set of missions all require very precise and detailed intelligence to ensure their operations are effective. The range of missions unique to SOF also requires agility and flexibility provided by defense

intelligence capabilities in order to meet operational timeline requirements. If confirmed, I look forward to developing a deeper understanding of how SOF conducts its intelligence activities.

*Question.* If confirmed, how would you ensure intelligence activities carried out by special operations forces are adequately coordinated with other activities carried out by those in the Intelligence Community?

*Answer.* It is my understanding that SOF intelligence activities are coordinated fully with the Intelligence Community to ensure necessary de-confliction and avoid redundancy. If confirmed, I would assist the USD(I) in advancing efforts to improve coordination and integration of SOF activities with those of the Intelligence Community.

#### NEED FOR INDEPENDENT INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

*Question.* If confirmed, how would you ensure that intelligence analysts within the Defense Department, including those who may be seconded to offices that are not part of the defense intelligence structure, are independent and free of pressure from influence from their chain of command to reach a certain conclusion, including a conclusion that fits a particular policy preference?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I would fully support policies and programs that ensure defense intelligence analysis is objective and free from the personal or political biases of individual analysts or managers. I am aware of and fully support actions taken by OUSD(I) in light of recent recommendations made by the DOD Inspector General to ensure analytic integrity, such as establishment of an analytic ombudsman at each defense component, a Defense Analytic Tradecraft Council, and other important initiatives.

#### CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

*Question.* In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

*Answer.* Yes.

*Question.* Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence?

*Answer.* Yes.

*Question.* Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate committees in a timely manner?

*Answer.* Yes.

*Question.* Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

*Answer.* Yes.

*Question.* Do you agree to answer letters and requests for information from individual Senators who are members of this Committee?

*Answer.* Yes.

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[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARTIN HEINRICH

##### SATELLITE INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

1. Senator HEINRICH. Ms. Bingen, given the resource-constrained environment that we are in, it will become increasingly important to look for creative solutions to meet intelligence collection requirements. In the past few years there has been a growth in U.S.-based commercial remote sensing satellite providers. These companies offer new capabilities for breadth of coverage and revisit rates for overhead satellite imagery, with new companies projected to significantly increase the total number of satellites operating in orbit providing persistent coverage. What are your thoughts on using these new commercial satellite imagery providers to meet increasing intelligence requirements?

Ms. BINGEN. The capabilities provided by the commercial remote sensing (CRS) industry make a valuable contribution to helping meet the Nation's intelligence needs, including military intelligence needs. I understand that the Department of Defense (DOD) and Intelligence Community have made significant investments in CRS to augment our Government-owned and operated intelligence capabilities, and both have continued to make progress in CRS data integration. If confirmed, I will continue to support these capabilities and the Department's CRS integration efforts.

2. Senator HEINRICH. Ms. Bingen, how can DOD benefit from access to this new imagery, and do you have any plans to leverage more commercial solutions to meet intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) requirements?

Ms. BINGEN. One of the primary benefits of commercial remote sensing (CRS) is its unclassified nature. This enables DOD to disseminate products more freely with allies, partners, and tactical users in support of coalition operations and to address our shared security challenges. With limited resources, and an ISR demand greater than the assets available, we must use the intelligence data we currently collect more effectively. We must also improve the integration of CRS and commercial solutions more broadly. If confirmed, I will fully support DOD's efforts to do this.

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ELIZABETH WARREN

COUNTERING "GRAY ZONE" WARFARE IN EUROPE

3. Senator WARREN. Ms. Bingen, the United States has deployed equipment and rotated ground forces back into Europe through the European Reassurance Initiative, but this conventional display of force alone obviously isn't sufficient to deter Russia. Putin seems to rely increasingly on covert cyber activity, propaganda, and other indirect tactics—as he demonstrated just a few weeks ago by interfering with the French election. If confirmed, how will you work with our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies to counter Russia's so-called "gray zone" warfare?

Ms. BINGEN. It is my understanding that there are several intelligence-related forums that allow us to work closely with our NATO allies, including the NATO Military Intelligence Committee (MIC), NATO Intelligence Fusion Center (NIFC), and Centers of Excellence such as the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence located in Tallinn, Estonia. Also, collaboration and intelligence sharing is enabled through shared communications infrastructure such as the Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System (BICES).

Defense intelligence capabilities are critical to detecting, attributing, and analyzing "gray zone" activities, and support both our warfighters and policymakers in their development of deterrence and response options. If confirmed, I will work closely with our policy, operational, and acquisition communities, and with our NATO allies and other European partners to support efforts to counter and deter Russian aggression. I also intend to sustain the Department of Defense's leading role on the NATO MIC, work to ensure the NIFC is focusing on the Russia problem set, and support NATO's efforts to enhance its intelligence enterprise.

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[The nomination reference of Ms. Kari A. Bingen follows:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,  
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,  
*April 25, 2017.*

*Ordered,* That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

Kari A. Bingen, of Virginia, to be Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, vice Marcel J. Lettre II, resigned.

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[The biographical sketch of Ms. Kari A. Bingen, which was transmitted to the Committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

## BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF MS. KARI A. BINGEN

*Education:*

- Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  - 1995 to 1999
  - B.S. Aeronautics and Astronautics

*Employment Record:*

- U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Washington, DC
  - Policy Director / Professional Staff Member
  - September 2013 to Present
- K.A. Bingen, LLC, Falls Church, VA\*
  - Consultant; provided analysis of space industrial base and technology issues for a private sector company.
  - February 2012 to September 2013
  - \*From September 2011 to September 2013, lived overseas with DOD civilian spouse on Permanent Change of Station orders. During that period, provided consulting services as K.A. Bingen, LLC.*
- U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Washington DC
  - Strategic Forces Staff Lead / Professional Staff Member
  - April 2006 to September 2011
- The Aerospace Corporation, Arlington, VA
  - Senior Space Policy Analyst, Center for Space Policy and Strategy
  - April 2005 to April 2006
  - Supported the National Security Space Office (NSSO) on space protection and commercial remote sensing issues, and supported the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) in a review of the commercial remote sensing industry
- SRA International, Inc., Adroit C4ISR Center, Alexandria, VA
  - Space Systems Analyst, Intelligence and Policy Division
  - July 1999 to April 2005:
    - *Office of Transnational Issues, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), January 2005 to April 2005.* Served as SRA's Deputy Program Manager providing strategic planning support to the CIA Office of Transnational Issues' Geospatial Analysis Center.
    - *National Security Space Office (NSSO), October 2003 to January 2005 and April 2000 to October 2002.* Provided analytic support to the Protection for Space Mission Assurance study, Fiscal Year 2004 National Security Space Program and Budget Assessment, and several national security space architecture studies.
    - *National Reconnaissance Office Technology Fellowship Program, October 2002 to October 2003.* Assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency, Weapons Intelligence, Non-Proliferation, and Arms Control (WINPAC) branch to examine threats to U.S. space systems.
    - *Adroit C4ISR Center, July 1999 to April 2000.* Provided analytical support to several airborne intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance projects for the Air Force and Office of the Secretary of Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.

*Honors and Awards:*

- National Reconnaissance Office Gold Medal, 2011.
- National Reconnaissance Office Technology Fellow, 2002.
- Office of the National Security Space Architect Star of the year Award, 2001.
- Federation of Galaxy Explorers Volunteer of the Year Award, 2005
  - *FOGE is a 501(c)3 non-profit volunteer organization that educates and inspires youth in space-related science and engineering.*

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[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details

the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by Ms. Kari A. Bingen in connection with her nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

ROOM SR-228

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6050

(202) 224-3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF  
NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more space is needed, use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. Unless otherwise required, an answer of yes or no, or not applicable is appropriate.

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part of the form will be made available in Committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearing and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. **Name:** (Include any former names used.)

Kari Anne Bingen

Also, Kari Anne Bingen Tytler (full legal name, added "Tytler" upon marriage in October 2002)

2. **Position to which nominated:**

Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

3. **Date of nomination:**

April 25, 2017

4. **Address:** (List current place of residence and office addresses.)

[The nominee responded and the information is contained in the Committee's executive files.]

5. **Date and place of birth:**

1976, Pusan, South Korea

6. **Marital status:** (Include full name of current spouse including any other names used, including maiden name.)

Married to Sean Christopher Tytler

7. **Names of children (if over age 18):**

N/A

8. **Education:** List names of secondary and higher education institutions attended, type of school (vocational, technical, trade school, college, university, military college, correspondence, distance, extension, and on-line) dates attended, degree received and date degree granted.

- Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1995 to 1999, B.S. Aeronautics and Astronautics, June 1999

9. **Employment record:** List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.

- U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Washington, DC

- Policy Director / Professional Staff Member
- September 2013 to Present
- K.A. Bingen, LLC, Falls Church, VA\*
  - Consultant; provided analysis of space industrial base and technology issues for a private sector company.
  - February 2012 to September 2013
  - \* From September 2011 to September 2013, lived overseas with DOD civilian spouse on Permanent Change of Station orders. During that period, provided consulting services as K.A. Bingen, LLC.
- U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Washington DC
  - Strategic Forces Staff Lead / Professional Staff Member
  - April 2006 to September 2011
- The Aerospace Corporation, Arlington, VA
  - Senior Space Policy Analyst, Center for Space Policy and Strategy
  - April 2005 to April 2006
  - Supported the National Security Space Office (NSSO) on space protection and commercial remote sensing issues, and supported the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) in a review of the commercial remote sensing industry
- SRA International, Inc., Adroit C4ISR Center, Alexandria, VA
  - Space Systems Analyst, Intelligence and Policy Division
  - July 1999 to April 2005:
    - *Office of Transnational issues, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), January 2005 to April 2005.* Served as SRA's Deputy Program Manager providing strategic planning support to the CIA Office of Transnational issues' Geospatial Analysis Center.
    - *National Security Space Office (NSSO), October 2003 to January 2005 and April 2000 to October 2002.* Provided analytic support to the Protection for Space Mission Assurance study, Fiscal Year 2004 National Security Space Program and Budget Assessment, and several national security space architecture studies.
    - *National Reconnaissance Office Technology Fellowship Program, October 2002 to October 2003.* Assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency, Weapons Intelligence, Non-Proliferation, and Arms Control (WINPAC) branch to examine threats to U.S. space systems.
    - *Adroit C4ISR Center, July 1999 to April 2000.* Provided analytical support to several airborne intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance projects for the Air Force and Office of the Secretary of Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.

10. **Government experience:** List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed above.

N/A

11. **Business relationships:** List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational or other institution.

N/A

12. **Memberships:** List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and other organizations.

- Current member, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA)
- Current member, Women in Aerospace (WIA)
- Current member, MIT Club of Washington, DC

13. **Political affiliations and activities:**

(a) If you have ever been a candidate for or have been elected or appointed to a political office, list the name of the office(s), whether you were elected/appointed/candidate, the year(s) the election was held or the appointment was made, and the term of office (if applicable).

N/A

(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political parties or election Committees during the last 5 years.

N/A

(c) Itemize all individual political contributions of \$100 or more to any , campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity for the past 5 years. List each individual contribution and not the total amount contributed to the person or entity during the year.

- Romney for President, Inc., October 2012

14. **Honors and Awards:** List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary degrees, civilian service citations, military awards and decorations, honorary society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.

- National Reconnaissance Office Gold Medal, 2011
- National Reconnaissance Office Technology Fellow, 2002
- Office of the National Security Space Architect Star of the Year Award, 2001
- Federal of Galaxy Explorers Volunteer of the Year Award, 2005
- FOGE is a 501(c)3 non-profit volunteer organization that educate and inspire youth in space-related science and engineering.

15. **Published writings:** List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have written including articles published on the Internet.

N/A

16. **Speeches:** Provide the Committee with two copies of any formal speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years of which you have copies and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have been nominated.

N/A

**17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service:**

(a) If confirmed, will you adhere to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest?

Yes.

(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?

No.

(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established for requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings?

Yes.

(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to Congressional requests?

Yes.

(e) Will you promise to enforce or ensure whistleblower protections for all those witnesses?

Yes.

(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this Committee?

Yes.

(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Yes.

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[The nominee responded to Parts B–F of the Committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–F are contained in the Committee’s executive files.]

## SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

KARI A. BINGEN

This 7th day of May, 2017

[The nomination of Ms. Kari A. Bingen was reported to the Senate by Chairman McCain on May 23, 2017, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on May 25, 2017.]

[Prepared questions submitted to Mr. Kenneth P. Rapuano by Chairman McCain prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

## QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

## DEFENSE REFORMS

*Question.* The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 included the most sweeping reforms since the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.

Do you support these reforms?

*Answer.* Yes, if confirmed, I will comply with the law, and work with colleagues in the Department and with the defense committees to understand their impact and determine how best to implement these changes for the future betterment of the Department.

*Question.* What other areas for defense reform do you believe might be appropriate for this Committee to address?

*Answer.* Currently, I do not believe that further reforms are required.

## DUTIES AND QUALIFICATIONS

*Question.* Section 138 of title 10, United States Code, provides that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security is responsible for the overall supervision of the Homeland defense activities of the Department of Defense.

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security?

*Answer.* My understanding of the duties and functions of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense & Global Security is consistent with those described in DOD Directive 5111.13, as well as other applicable DOD directives, with the exception of the duties and functions for Western Hemisphere security policy, which has been transferred within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ASD(ISA)). In addition, the duties and functions for cyberspace, space, and countering weapons of mass destruction policies are also the responsibility of this Assistant Secretary.

*Question.* What background and experience do you possess that qualify you to perform these duties?

*Answer.* My professional background includes over 30 years of experience working on national and Homeland security issues in the military, Federal Government, private sector, and academia. I believe I have substantive expertise and leadership experience providing me with the background and skills necessary to serve successfully, if confirmed, as Assistant Secretary of Defense for HD & GS.

My career-long focus on and direct involvement in the development and implementation of U.S. national security, counterterrorism, and Homeland security initiatives has provided me with a deep understanding of the missions, authorities, resources, and constraints of federal departments and agencies with Homeland security and Homeland defense responsibilities. As Deputy Homeland Security Advisor to the President in the Bush administration I chaired the Deputies Committee process for coordinating the development and implementation of Homeland security and

Homeland defense policies across the federal government, with state and local governments, and the private sector.

I believe I also have the leadership and management skills to perform effectively as Assistant Secretary of Defense for HD &GS. I have managed large staffs in previous positions in the federal government, military, and private sector, and have considerable experience achieving goals in cross-cutting mission areas requiring buy-in and collaboration from multiple stakeholders.

#### MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

*Question.* In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security?

*Answer.* I would characterize the threat as evolving and changing, and believe that adapting our security posture to emerging threats will be a continuing challenge. The Homeland is no longer a sanctuary. The growing sophistication and proliferation of threats, such as cyber and space, ballistic and cruise missiles, CBRN materials, diseases of security concern, and unmanned technologies, combined with the growing number of nations and non-state actors with access to them, continue to increase risk to the Homeland and mission assurance. DOD must continuously adapt and improve Homeland Defense risk management decision-making to account for these multi-domain, multi-functional capabilities of a growing number of strategically significant actors who present real and present threats to the Homeland. Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and transnational violent extremism (4+1 challenges) are capable of varied attacks against North America and in the Pacific across multiple domains, from multiple approaches, and at increasingly greater ranges. Such threats may not only impact the U. S. populace, but may also impact the ability of the Department to deploy forces in support of overseas operations.

*Question.* If confirmed, what priorities and plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I would maintain support for the key issues I outlined above by actively addressing them in key Department of Defense and interagency processes, including the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) processes, strategic reviews inside the Department, and the interagency Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) process.

If confirmed, I would continue to build upon and improve the outstanding efforts the Department of Defense has devoted to protecting the Homeland from a major terrorist attack or an attack using a weapon of mass destruction, to include planning and preparing for the response to catastrophic incidents in the United States. I would also focus attention on the Department's efforts ensuring that its approach to force protection is keeping pace with the current terrorist threat in the Homeland and abroad.

An important priority will be to develop and improve comprehensive, cross-cutting, risk-mitigated capabilities and plans that ensure successful execution of the Department's essential functions. We must outthink our adversaries and anticipate uncertainty in our planning and capability development.

If confirmed, I would also devote special attention to the challenge of building the cyberspace workforce, expanding DOD's operational capabilities, and continuing to rationalize the complex funding streams that support cyberspace initiatives.

#### RELATIONS WITH CONGRESS

*Question.* What are your views on the state of the relationship between the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security and the Senate Armed Services Committee in particular, and with the Congress in general?

*Answer.* My sense is that the relationship is very good. I would strive to continue a strong working relationship and look for ways to enhance it.

If confirmed, what actions would you take to sustain a productive and mutually beneficial relationship between the Congress and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security?

If confirmed, I would actively engage with the Congress to build a productive relationship.

#### TORTURE AND ENHANCED INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES

*Question.* Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated August 19, 2014, and required by section 1045 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-92)?

*Answer.* Yes.

## COMBATING TERRORISM ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

*Question.* Please specify what combating terrorism activities will be under the jurisdiction of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security, particularly domestic antiterrorism activities.

*Answer.* As I understand it, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security advises the Secretary of Defense on all domestic counterterrorism and consequence management matters. I understand that the specific counterterrorism activities that reside under the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security include providing critical staff support to the Secretary of Defense regarding support requested by the Attorney General, or as directed by the President of the United States, to combat terrorism within the United States, and on matters involving terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction worldwide. I understand that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security, also advises the Secretary of Defense on global antiterrorism and force protection policies, in close coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the geographic combatant commanders, and other key stakeholders in the Department.

*Question.* What Defense Department official or officials will be responsible for the Department's activities combating terrorism that are not under the jurisdiction of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security?

*Answer.* The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy has the overall lead for DOD combating terrorism policy oversight. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)) and with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) to achieve the Secretary of Defense's objectives and proper alignment of DOD combating terrorism activities.

Additionally, the geographic combatant commanders have tactical control for force protection of all DOD personnel within their areas of responsibility, with the exception of DOD personnel for whom the chiefs of U.S. diplomatic missions have security responsibility. If confirmed, I would work closely with both the combatant commanders and the Department of State to ensure that all DOD personnel serving overseas, including those at U.S. missions and embassies, have appropriate antiterrorism protection.

*Question.* What steps will you take to ensure that the Department's efforts are focused and well-coordinated in this critical area of Homeland defense?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I would work closely with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to achieve the Secretary of Defense's objectives in this critical area of Homeland defense.

I would also use DOD's Mission Assurance Coordination Board, which the ASD for Homeland Defense and Global Security leads, to ensure that the Department's efforts are focused and coordinated on antiterrorism and force protection issues. DOD's Mission Assurance Senior Steering Group integrates mission-related security issues of mutual interest with other executive committees and efforts within the Department.

*Question.* In your view, what is the extent of the current threat to the U.S. Homeland of terrorist extremists both from outside the United States and from within the United States and how would you characterize the threat—low, medium, or high?

*Answer.* I would characterize the threat as significant, enduring, and less predictable than in years past, with individual threat streams varying in their frequency and severity.

Based on my understanding of the current threat to the U.S. Homeland, home-grown violent extremists remain the most frequent and unpredictable terrorist threat to DOD personnel and facilities across the country. While the United States has made progress against external threats from core al Qaeda (AQ), the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, and AQ in the Arabian Peninsula, these foreign terrorist organizations maintain the intent and capability to target the Homeland and will continue to attempt to inspire, enable, and direct attacks against U.S. interests.

If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the Intelligence Community to prevent an attack against the United States.

## DIFFERENCE BETWEEN HOMELAND DEFENSE AND HOMELAND SECURITY

*Question.* Please describe your understanding of the differences between the role of the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense's Homeland defense mission.

*Answer.* My understanding is that the Department of Defense and Department of Homeland Security have complementary and mutually supporting roles, missions,

and responsibilities. Homeland security is a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks in the United States, reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur. Homeland defense is the protection of U.S. sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression or other threats as directed by the President.

*Question.* Do you agree that the Department of Defense should not be responsible for Homeland security, but may serve in a supporting role to assist civilian federal agencies, as directed by the President or Secretary of Defense?

*Answer.* Congress, in the Homeland Security Act of 2002, specified that the primary mission of the Department of Homeland Security is to: prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism; and minimize the damage, and assist in the recovery, from terrorist attacks that occur within the United States. As necessary, and consistent with the law, the Department of Defense provides support to the Department of Homeland Security in the execution of its Homeland security missions.

#### RELATIONSHIP WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

*Question.* The establishment of the Department of Homeland Security was one of the U. S. Government's largest cabinet-level reorganizations in the last 50 years. Despite this reorganization, the Department of Defense will continue to play an important role in providing Defense Support of Civil Authorities for federal responses to certain domestic incidents, as directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense.

Please describe your understanding of the relationship between the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security, particularly with respect to Defense Support of Civil Authorities and cyber security.

*Answer.* It is my understanding that the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security have a close working relationship due to their complementary Homeland defense and Homeland security responsibilities, and the need for a close and well-exercised relationship for the rapid execution of Secretary of Defense-approved Defense Support of Civil Authorities missions as requested by the Department of Homeland Security, including in response to domestic disasters, emergencies, and cyber incidents.

*Question.* If confirmed, what role would you play in the direction and coordination of Defense Department activities with the Department of Homeland Security?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I would be responsible for the overall supervision of the Homeland defense activities of the Department, as well as coordinating the planning and execution of Defense Support of Civil Authorities missions in support of the Department of Homeland Security. If confirmed, my goal would be to continue this strong relationship between the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security.

#### DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES

*Question.* The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security has primary responsibility for Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA), particularly support to the Department of Homeland Security and its components, for responses to natural and man-made disasters in the United States.

Please describe your general understanding of the roles and responsibilities of the Department of Defense in providing DSCA, and the roles and responsibilities of other federal agencies in responding to domestic disasters.

*Answer.* The Department of Defense plays an important role. It supports civil authorities in response to domestic disasters. Normally, the Department of Defense provides disaster support to the Federal Emergency Management Agency or another lead Federal agency, when directed by the President, or when the Secretary of Defense has approved a request for assistance pursuant to the Stafford Act or the Economy Act.

Under the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended by the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006, the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency is the principal advisor to the President, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Homeland Security for all matters relating to emergency management in the United States. The Administrator is responsible for providing the Federal Government's response to terrorist attacks and major disasters, including managing such response.

Consistent with the National Response Framework, the Federal Government and many State governments organize their response resources and capabilities under the Emergency Support Function (ESF) construct. The 14 Federal ESFs bring together the capabilities of Federal departments and agencies and other national-level

assets to perform such functions as transportation, public works and engineering, mass care and temporary housing, logistics, public health and medical services, and search and rescue.

*Question.* Under current law, when the Department of Defense provides DSCA, what are the responsibilities of other federal agencies for paying for or reimbursing the Department for such support?

*Answer.* During an emergency or disaster, when the Department supports FEMA under the terms of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, the Department is reimbursed by FEMA for civilian overtime, temporary duty expenses, and the operational and maintenance costs of providing the support. DOD is not reimbursed for the pay and allowances of personnel providing the support.

When DOD supports other Federal departments and agencies under the Economy Act (Title 31, U.S. Code, Section 1535), DOD is reimbursed for all support costs, including the pay and allowances of the personnel providing the support.

Under the Presidential Protection Assistance Act of 1976, when the Department provides temporary support to the Secret Service that is directly related to the protection of the President or Vice President, the support is provided on a non-reimbursable basis. When support is provided to the Secret Service for other protected persons, DOD is reimbursed for its expenses.

#### DEFENSE CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAM

*Question.* The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security is responsible for overseeing Defense Department efforts and programs to protect defense critical infrastructure in the United States.

If confirmed, what plans, approaches, and priorities would you have for ensuring that the Defense Critical Infrastructure Program is functioning properly?

*Answer.* If confirmed, ensuring the resilience of DOD's critical infrastructure, both within and outside DOD's control, would be a priority for my organization. I understand that DOD's mission assurance framework continues to align the Department's security, protection, and risk management programs and activities to improve the resilience of DOD's critical infrastructure overall. As part of this mission assurance effort, if confirmed, I would also co-chair the cross-Department Mission Assurance Executive Steering Group (MA-ESG) where I would review plans, approaches and priorities and make recommendations to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to ensure adequate measures are taken for the protection of defense critical infrastructure in an all-hazards environment to ensure mission execution.

If confirmed, ensuring the resilience of DOD's critical infrastructure, both within and outside DOD's control, would be a priority for my organization. I understand that DOD's mission assurance framework provides for alignment, synchronization, and integration with the Department's security, protection, and risk management programs and activities to improve the resilience of DOD's critical infrastructure overall. As part of this mission assurance effort, if confirmed, I would also co-chair the cross-Department Mission Assurance Executive Steering Group (MA-ESG) where I would review plans, approaches and priorities and make recommendations to the USD(P), who is responsible for the defense security enterprise, regarding adequate measures to be taken to protect defense critical infrastructure in an all-hazards environment to ensure mission execution.

#### INSTALLATION SECURITY

*Question.* The security of U.S. military installations—both at home and abroad—has been a longstanding priority for the Senate Armed Services Committee.

If confirmed, what would be your priorities for ensuring an adequate level of security for military installations in the United States?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I would work to ensure the effectiveness of Department of Defense antiterrorism and protection policies in detecting, deterring, preventing, and responding to threats directed at DOD installations, facilities, and personnel, including their families. I would also work to ensure that adequate authorities and resources are provided to execute these policies. In addition, I would work to ensure that the Department of Defense is working closely with its Federal, State, local, and tribal partners in establishing a mutually supportive protective posture inside and outside DOD installations and facilities.

Although the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence is the principal staff assistant for physical security, if confirmed, I would leverage the Mission Assurance Coordination Board to ensure antiterrorism and physical security policies work together to focus on risk mitigation. I would ensure Department efforts are coordinated to provide defense-in-depth using tailored procedures, select technologies and well-trained personnel to reduce risk and mitigate potential threats. In addition, I

would encourage DOD Components to share access control information and continuously vet individuals against U.S. criminal and terrorist databases. Finally, I would work to ensure antiterrorism policy is consistent with DOD physical security and installation emergency management policy, as part of the overall DOD Mission Assurance effort.

#### DEFENSE CONTINUITY AND MISSION ASSURANCE

*Question.* The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security has primary responsibility for the Defense Continuity Program and for Department of Defense Mission Assurance in the United States.

What is your understanding of the roles and responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security with respect to the Defense Continuity Program and Mission Assurance?

*Answer.* Under the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security has two major responsibilities for the Defense Continuity Program. The first is to develop, coordinate, and oversee implementation of Defense continuity policy (which includes activities supporting continuity of operations, continuity of government, and enduring constitutional government). The second is to develop and oversee a comprehensive continuity program including continuity plans to support the Secretary, the Deputy Secretary, their senior and supporting staffs, and the DOD Components in collaboration with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

*Question.* If confirmed, what would be your priorities for accomplishing these important missions?

*Answer.* It is imperative that the Department to maintain the ability to provide senior leaders a clear understanding of options and risks to mission accomplishment. It is also essential that we provide the Department's senior leaders with tools and resources that allow for enhanced flexibility, mobility, resilience, and survivability during times of crisis in order to support the Secretary of Defense. Defense Continuity and Mission Assurance provide this important capability to ensure resiliency and readiness.

If confirmed, one of my Defense Continuity Program priorities would be to continue modernization of selected DOD continuity capabilities to improve readiness and resilience while incorporating operational efficiencies. I believe that our approach must consider innovative policies and plans, as well as shared resources and enhanced mobility.

#### CBRN CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT ENTERPRISE

*Question.* Among the specialized capabilities that the Defense Department can provide to civil authorities are the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) consequence management response forces. These comprise a mix of National Guard and Active Component forces and units, both large and small.

Please describe your understanding of the composition and role of the Defense Department's CBRN consequence management enterprise, the circumstances under which they could be used, and the role of National Guard capabilities in responding to both state and federal CBRN incidents.

*Answer.* As I understand, the Department of Defense uses the Total Force approach to meet the requirement—some 18,700 personnel, CBRN response-capable units from the Active Component, Reserve Component, and National Guard to provide a wide range of capabilities to save lives and protect property. The CBRN Response Enterprise is composed of 57 National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-CSTs) (one in every State and territory, and two in the States of California, Florida, and New York), 17 National Guard CBRN Enhanced Response Force Packages (CERFPs) (based in Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, Oregon, Puerto Rico, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin), 10 National Guard Homeland Response Forces (HRFs) (one in each Federal Emergency Management Agency Region), one Federal Defense CBRN Response Force (DCRF), and two Command and Control CBRN Response Elements (C2CREs).

CBRN Response Enterprise units support civil authorities in response to domestic CBRN incidents. Given the potential for surprise attacks within the United States, the Department of Defense organized the CBRN Response Enterprise to have enhanced lifesaving capabilities, increased flexibility, and reduced response times. This is why a substantial part of the CBRN Response Enterprise is composed of National Guard units, which can, under State command and control, be directed by their Governors to respond to a CBRN incident within a State or region more rap-

idly. In exigent circumstances, and consistent with the law, these National Guard units may be ordered to Active Duty to augment the Federal CBRN response. As necessary, Federal CBRN Response Enterprise units, at the direction of the President or as requested by the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency and approved by the Secretary of Defense, will augment the Federal Government's assistance to the States.

*Question.* If confirmed, what would be your role with regard to the oversight, training, certification, coordination, and employment of the Defense Department's CBRN consequence management response forces?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I would be responsible for developing, coordinating, and overseeing Defense policy for DSCA plans and activities, including force readiness, commitment, and employment to conduct DSCA activities, including CBRN response. I would also work with USNORTHCOM and the National Guard Bureau to ensure that the Department's CBRN Response Enterprise maintains its readiness.

In accordance with section 2313 of title 50, U.S. Code, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security is responsible for coordinating Department of Defense assistance to Federal, State, and local officials when responding to threats involving chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives weapons or related materials or technologies. This includes assistance in their identification, neutralization, dismantlement, and disposition. Therefore, if confirmed, I would have this responsibility as well.

#### RELATIONSHIP WITH UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND

*Question.* United States Northern Command was established in October 2002 with the mission of conducting operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its territories, and interests within the Command's assigned area of responsibility, and, as directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, to provide military assistance to civil authorities, including consequence management operations.

If confirmed, how do you anticipate you would coordinate roles and responsibilities with the Commander of United States Northern Command?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I would work closely with the Commander of the North American Aerospace Defense Command and United States Northern Command. I would also work with the Commander of United States Pacific Command to support the efforts of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Secretary, and Deputy Secretary, particularly in the areas of Homeland defense and DSCA strategy and policy, contingency planning, and policy oversight of operations.

*Question.* How do you anticipate that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security and the Commander of United States Northern Command will coordinate with other Federal and State entities in planning for responses to catastrophic events that might require Defense Department support?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I expect to work closely with the Commander of United States Northern Command and the Commander of United States Pacific Command to ensure that Department of Defense support to Federal and State entities in response to catastrophic events, if required, is provided in a timely and coordinated fashion. It is my understanding that this begins with supporting the Federal Emergency Management Agency's integrated regional planning efforts with the States. I would also work with the Commander and the Department's civilian partners to ensure that the Department is prepared to provide support quickly, effectively, and in a coordinated fashion that facilitates unity of effort to save and sustain lives and relieve human suffering.

#### PARTNERSHIP WITH THE NATIONAL GUARD AND THE STATES

*Question.* The Department of Defense has an important partnership with the National Guard because it has both federal and state responsibilities. The Department has worked with the Council of Governors to establish procedures to ensure unity of effort between military forces operating in federal and state status, including the creation of "dual-status commanders."

Please summarize your understanding of how this unity of effort is maintained through the dual status commander arrangement, so that the authorities of the President and Secretary of Defense are preserved for federal military forces, and the authorities of Governors are preserved for National Guard forces acting in a state capacity.

*Answer.* As I understand, a "dual-status commander" is a commander who may, by law, serve in two statuses, Federal and State, while performing the duties of those statuses separately and distinctly for the purpose of facilitating unity of effort. In his or her State status, a dual-status commander is a member of the State chain

of command, subject to the orders of the Governor and Adjutant General of their State, and, on their behalf, exercises command of State National Guard forces. In his or her other Federal status, a dual status commander is a member of the Federal chain of command, subject to the orders of the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the supported combatant commander, and, on their behalf, exercises command of assigned Federal military forces.

In accordance with section 515 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, when the Armed Forces and the National Guard are employed simultaneously in support of civil authorities in the United States, appointment of a dual-status commander as commander of Federal forces by Federal authorities and as commander of State National Guard forces by State authorities, should be the usual and customary command and control arrangement.

#### NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE ROLE IN HOMELAND DEFENSE

*Question.* The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security has policy responsibility for the participation of National Guard units or personnel in Homeland defense activities, when the Secretary of Defense determines that such participation is necessary and appropriate.

What role do you believe the National Guard and Reserves should have in Homeland defense, and how does their role relate to the role of the Active Component?

*Answer.* I believe that Homeland defense is a Total Force mission. The role of the National Guard and the Reserves is to integrate seamlessly with Active Component forces to defend the United States Homeland. If confirmed, I will work with the Service Secretaries, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Reserve Chiefs, and the responsible combatant commanders, to ensure that all forces—Active, Guard, and Reserve—are prepared to execute assigned Homeland defense missions.

*Question.* What role do you believe the National Guard and Reserves should have in providing civil support assistance to other federal agencies, and how does their role relate to the role of the Active Component?

*Answer.* I believe that DSCA is a Total Force mission. The role of the National Guard and the Reserves, as well as that of the Active Component and other Department of Defense Components, is, when directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, to be an integrated part of the Department of Defense's support of other Federal departments and agencies. If confirmed, I will work with the Service Secretaries, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Reserve Chiefs, and the responsible combatant commanders to ensure that all Defense resources—military and civilian (Active, Guard, and Reserve)—are prepared to execute assigned DSCA missions.

#### USE OF ACTIVE DUTY AND RESERVE PERSONNEL FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE/POSSE COMITATUS

*Question.* What is your understanding of the legal issues and authority associated with using National Guard and Reserve personnel in security roles within the United States?

*Answer.* I understand that the National Guard, as a State militia, under the command and control of their Governors and Adjutants General, may be used for any State response activities under State law, consistent with the United States Constitution and applicable Federal laws. The National Guard is not subject to the restrictions imposed by the Posse Comitatus Act and, therefore, may be used for security roles authorized under State law, consistent with the United States Constitution and applicable Federal laws.

*Question.* When authorized to support missions requested by the President or the Secretary of Defense in a duty status under title 32, U.S. Code, National Guard personnel, under the command and control of their Governors and Adjutants General, are also not subject to the restrictions imposed by the Posse Comitatus Act.

When the Reserve Components (including the National Guard) are ordered to Active Duty under title 10, and placed under Federal command and control, they are subject to the same restrictions imposed by the Posse Comitatus Act. They are also subject to the same restrictions imposed by other laws and policies concerning DOD support to law enforcement agencies. The same exceptions specifically authorized by Congress and applied to other Federal military forces also apply to the National Guard when they are placed under Federal command and control.

*Question.* In your opinion, does the Posse Comitatus Act (18 U.S.C. § 1385) or chapter 18 of title 10, United States Code (which regulates the use of the armed forces in support of civilian law enforcement and related activities), require amendment to deal with the present Homeland security situation?

Answer. In my opinion, current laws regarding the use of the Armed Forces in support of civilian law enforcement and related activities appear to be sufficient. If confirmed, I would carefully review these laws and their affects and, if necessary, make appropriate recommendations to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Defense.

*Question.* Under what circumstances do you believe it is appropriate for the Department of Defense to provide assistance to law enforcement authorities in response to a domestic terrorist event? What about a non-terrorist event?

Answer. Congress has authorized the Department of Defense to provide assistance to civilian law enforcement authorities in a number of terrorist and non-terrorist circumstances. For example, under section 282 of title 10, U.S. Code, the Secretary of Defense may, when requested by the Attorney General, provide assistance, during an emergency situation involving a weapon of mass destruction if: (i) the Secretary and the Attorney General jointly determine that an emergency situation exists; (ii) the emergency situation poses a serious threat to the interests of the United States; (iii) civilian expertise and capabilities are not readily available to provide the required assistance to counter the threat immediately posed by the weapon involved; (iv) special capabilities and expertise of the Department of Defense are necessary and critical to counter the threat posed by the weapon involved; and (v) the Secretary determines that the provision of such assistance will not adversely affect the military preparedness of the United States. Section 282 does not require a terrorist event for DOD assistance to be provided.

*Question.* If confirmed, what role do you expect to play in making such determinations and making such assistance available?

Answer. If confirmed, I would be the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense under the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on all matters related to Defense Support of Civilian Authorities, including support of civilian law enforcement authorities. In this capacity, I would work with other principal staff assistants in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, in particular the Office of The General Counsel, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the heads of other Department of Defense Components and activities to facilitate informed decision-making by the Secretary of Defense.

#### POLICY TO COUNTER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

*Question.* The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security has primary policy and oversight responsibility for countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), i.e., nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.

What do you believe are the principal challenges in countering WMD and, if confirmed, what would be your priorities for Department of Defense policy for countering WMD?

Answer. I believe that preventing the proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction by State and non-state actors is the principal challenge. A proactive approach to prevent such attacks is critical, however the Department also needs to retain the ability to respond to and mitigate WMD attacks. I believe the approach provided by the current DOD strategy (reducing incentives to proliferation, increasing the barriers to acquisition and use, and denying the effects of current and emerging WMD threats) is appropriate. If confirmed, I would prioritize DOD's efforts in these areas.

*Question.* If confirmed, what role do you expect to play in the creation of policy for, and oversight of, Defense Department programs to counter WMD?

Answer. If confirmed, my office would lead the development of policies to prevent and respond to WMD threats at home and OCONUS. This would include prioritizing DOD efforts to protect our forces and allies, and ensuring appropriate support to civilian authorities, as needed. Such efforts require active partnership with other U.S. Departments and Agencies, and, if confirmed, I expect to partner with DOD, interagency, and international partners to ensure that appropriate policy and oversight are in place to reduce these threats and protect our interests.

*Question.* The Unified Command Plan (UCP) was revised in August 2016 by transferring the mission for synchronizing global Department of Defense operations for countering WMD from U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) to U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM).

What is your understanding of SOCOM's assigned responsibilities for synchronizing global Department of Defense operations for countering WMD?

Answer. As I understand, as of January 9, 2017, SOCOM became the designated lead combatant command for synchronizing DOD planning efforts to Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction. In this capacity, SOCOM is responsible for maintaining the

DOD CWMD Global Campaign Plan (GCP), establishing intelligence priorities, monitoring global operations and conducting assessments.

*Question.* What is your understanding of the oversight responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security with regard to this mission change and how do those responsibilities contrast with those of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict?

*Answer.* As I understand it, the change in UCP responsibilities did not impact the oversight responsibilities within OSD/P. The ASD for HD&GS continues to be responsible for providing oversight, to include developing, coordinating, and implementing plans and policy for the DOD Global CWMD mission. This includes those plans and operations involving SOF, Homeland Defense, and Defense Support to Civil Authorities. If confirmed, I would coordinate matters with the ASD(SOLIC) as required and appropriate.

#### COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM

*Question.* If confirmed, what will be your role in implementing and overseeing the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program?

*Answer.* The ASD/HD&GS role is to provide policy guidance to the Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency for the DOD CTR Program, coordinating with the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, who maintains authority, direction and control of DTRA. If confirmed, I will ensure that the CTR program focuses in areas where DOD's authorities, capabilities, and relationships make a unique contribution to USG non-proliferation objectives, and are well coordinated with interagency and international partners.

*Question.* If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend to the CTR Program, including changes in legislative authorities, programs, or funding?

*Answer.* My understanding is that the DOD CTR Program has had, for the most part, the authorities, programs, and funding needed to address emerging WMD threats appropriately. Consolidating and updating authorities in the 2015 NDAA has provided the CTR Program with the legal stability needed to be successful. As the WMD threat evolves and the need for cooperative threat reduction programs in advance of U.S. national security objectives expands, if confirmed, I will engage with my colleagues at DTRA and AT&L to determine whether any additional legislative changes or funding requirements are warranted.

*Question.* How do you envision the continued evolution of the program as it transitions away from Russia to countries outside the former Soviet Union?

*Answer.* WMD threats have rapidly evolved and become more complex in nature, and I envision that the CTR Program will continue to evolve to meet those critical and emerging threats. I understand that the CTR Program is focused on countering all WMD threats—whether posed by state or non-state actors, and these are no longer limited to the former Soviet Union. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that CTR is well-positioned to continue to address the most significant threats, while also responding to unique challenges such as those posed by emerging technologies and continued pressures on international nonproliferation regimes.

*Question.* Do you believe the CTR Program should be closely coordinated with related efforts of the Defense Department's Chemical and Biological Defense Program focused on reducing biological threats?

*Answer.* Yes, keeping our country safe from chemical and biological threats requires a multi-faceted approach. While the CBDP focuses on developing and acquiring capabilities that allow the Joint Force to deter, prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from CBRN threats, the CTR program builds partner nation capability to execute some of these same actions. DOD is supporting development of a National Biodefense Strategy, per Section 1086 of the Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA. If confirmed, I will work to coordinate the various programs that seek to protect the Homeland, our forces, and allies from biological threats.

#### CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE

*Question.* The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security is responsible for the Chemical and Biological Defense Program of the Defense Department.

What do you believe are the principal challenges in chemical and biological defense, and what would be your priorities for the Defense Department's Chemical and Biological Defense Program?

*Answer.* The ASD for Homeland Defense and Global Security Affairs is responsible for developing policies to guide the Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP), which is overseen and managed by ASD/NCB. If confirmed, I would work to ensure close coordination between our respective offices to support the Depart-

ment's overall efforts to counter weapons of mass destruction. Such coordination would posture us to effectively equip the force, maintain our CBDP infrastructure, while staying current with advances in science and technology research.

*Question.* Do you believe the Chemical and Biological Defense Program should be closely coordinated with related efforts of the Defense Department's CTR Program focused on reducing biological threats?

*Answer.* Yes. If confirmed, I would work to ensure close coordination between the two Programs.

#### CHEMICAL DEMILITARIZATION

*Question.* DOD Directive 5160.05E states the Defense Department policy that "the Department of Defense shall be in full compliance" with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). In 2006, the Department announced that the United States would not meet even the extended deadline of April 2012 for destruction of its chemical weapons stockpile, as required under the CWC. It has still not met this deadline.

Do you agree that the Department of Defense and the U.S. Government should be in full compliance with the terms and obligations of the CWC and the BWC, including the deadline for destruction of the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile under the CWC?

*Answer.* In 2006 the United States informed the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) that it did not expect to complete destruction of the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile by 2012. Since then, it is my understanding that the United States has remained open and transparent with the OPCW about the U.S. chemical weapons destruction program, emphasizing U.S. efforts to destroy the stockpile as safely and expeditiously as practicable. If confirmed, I would continue this approach.

*Question.* If confirmed, will you work to ensure that the Department takes steps needed to minimize the time to complete destruction of the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile, without sacrificing safety or security, and that the Department requests the resources necessary for complete destruction as close as practicable to the long-passed April 2012 extended deadline?

*Answer.* It is my understanding that the ASD for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs (NCB) and the Department of the Army continue to oversee the programs to meet U.S. commitments under the CWC, including the elimination of the remaining U.S. chemical weapons stockpile. If confirmed, I would work closely with these offices to ensure continued focus on these efforts and on completing the destruction of the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile as safely and quickly as practicable.

#### PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE

*Question.* The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is an international effort to identify and interdict WMD and related materials.

If confirmed, would you recommend that the PSI program continue and, if so, do you believe that it should be modified in any way?

*Answer.* I support the Proliferation Security Initiative. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Department of Defense continues to be engaged in promoting the PSI and its Critical Capabilities and Practices (CCP) initiative to ensure that our partner nations continue to have the knowledge, skills, and political will to interdict WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials.

With regard to modifications to the initiative, although the PSI remains strong—one of my goals will be to ensure that the PSI's Operational Experts Group (OEG) of 21 countries is re-invigorated to become a more action-oriented and results-driven body. The PSI must look towards the future to keep pace with evolving trends and threats, especially as actors such as North Korea, Iran and Syria continue to defy the international community with their proliferation activities.

#### BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

*Question.* The United States Homeland and its deployed forces enjoy a measure of protection against ballistic missile threats from rogue nations such as North Korea and Iran, yet the threat continues to grow. During the past year, North Korea conducted several missile tests and continued development of mobile long-range missiles. Likewise, Iran continues to test ballistic missiles of increasing range. Russia and China also continue to deploy ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missiles that threaten United States forces, allies, and the United States Homeland.

What policies would you recommend for U.S. missile defense capabilities in the following areas: (1) Homeland missile defense; (2) regional missile defense; (3) im-

proved discrimination and sensors; (4) next generation missile defense; and (5) defense against cruise and hypersonic missiles?

Answer. Defending the Nation and U.S. interests abroad from ballistic missiles is one of the Department's highest priorities. Secretary Mattis directed the commencement of the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) to identify ways to strengthen missile-defense capabilities, rebalance Homeland and theater defense priorities, and provide the necessary policy and strategy framework for our nation's missile defense systems.

The review, running concurrent to the Nuclear Posture Review, will be led by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and include interagency partners. The process will culminate in a final report and will be delivered to the President by the end of the year.

The policy areas referenced above will be examined during the course of the BMDR. If confirmed, I will review the results of the BMDR and make recommendations as appropriate.

*Question.* Do you support the "fly before you buy" approach to ensure that realistic and successful intercept flight testing is conducted before additional interceptors are deployed?

Answer. Although "fly before you buy" responsibility will not be directly in my portfolio, yes, as a policy matter, I support operationally realistic testing prior to making final acquisition determinations.

*Question.* Do you believe the United States should encourage our regional allies and partners to increase their missile defense capabilities to contribute to regional security and help reduce the burden on U.S. forces and requirements?

Answer. The rebalance of Homeland and regional defense priorities will be one of the focus areas of the BMDR. The review, running concurrent to the Nuclear Posture Review, will be led by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and include interagency partners. The process will culminate in a final report and will be delivered to the President by the end of the year. If confirmed, I will work closely with my counterparts on contributing to the review and make recommendations as appropriate.

#### CYBER SECURITY

*Question.* The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security serves as the Principal Cyber Advisor to the Secretary of Defense and has primary responsibility for Department of Defense cyber policy.

What is your understanding of the roles and responsibilities of the Department of Defense for cyber security, and how do they compare to the roles and responsibilities of the Department of Homeland Security?

Answer. My understanding is that similar to the roles and responsibilities of the Department of Defense in other domains, DOD is responsible for defending the Nation against attacks of serious consequence in cyberspace. The Department is also responsible for cybersecurity of its own networks, systems, and infrastructure.

The Department also works closely with the Department of Homeland Security, which plays the lead role in protecting, mitigating, and recovering from domestic cyber incidents and the Department of Justice, which plays the lead role in investigating, attributing, disrupting, and prosecuting cybercrimes. When directed, the Department of Defense, including the National Guard, can provide support to domestic civilian agencies, as well as State and local governments.

*Question.* Given that cyber threats can be inherently global in nature, and that cyber security is not a mission limited to the U.S. Homeland, how do view the relationship of cyber security to Homeland defense?

Answer. Homeland defense includes the protection of U.S. sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and defense of critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression, or against other threats as directed by the President. I believe in this threat environment, cyberspace is a key part of our Homeland defense because our advanced adversaries are pursuing cyber capabilities to threaten all of these things. Of course, the Department must continue to work with other federal departments and agencies, the private sector, and international partners to ensure it can carry out its assigned missions in all domains.

#### SUPERVISION AND MANAGEMENT OF THE CYBER MISSION

*Question.* The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 requires the Secretary of Defense to appoint a Senate-confirmed official from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to act as the Principal Cyber Advisor to the Secretary. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security plays that role, and as such is responsible for overall supervision of cyber

activities, including policy and operational considerations, resources, personnel, and acquisition and technology. The legislation also directs the Principal Cyber Advisor to assemble a small cross-functional team to integrate cyber expertise across the Department to enable sound decisions while leaving execution of decisions to existing organizations and officials.

If confirmed, how would you approach your role as the Principal Cyber Advisor to the Secretary of Defense?

Answer. Based on my initial review, I believe the PCA authorities to oversee the broad, cross-cutting activities in the Department related to cyber is an effective approach. I believe the cross-functional nature of the PCA is essential, as it allows a focused team to work across the Department with the appropriate Principal Staff Assistants to tackle tough problems, whether they involve policy, operations, personnel, training, acquisition, or intelligence. It is clear the role of PCA will be broadened and, if confirmed, I welcome those additional responsibilities to enhance the PCA's oversight and advocacy role for US Cyber Command.

*Question.* How do you intend to empower the cross-functional team led by the Principal Cyber Advisor to produce policy, strategy, and resourcing options for the Secretary?

Answer. As highlighted previously, I believe the PCA's cross-functional team construct provides tremendous value and has served the Department well since its inception. With the potential elevation of USCYBERCOM, it will be important to review the current staffing strategy and expertise to ensure the PCA is well equipped to perform the duties as outlined in the 2017 NDAA. I understand the Department is evaluating courses of action to better posture PCA to conduct oversight of USCYBERCOM as directed by Congress. If confirmed, I will work with key stakeholders to ensure PCA is able to effectively perform the additional responsibilities as directed.

#### RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CYBER AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS

*Question.* Russia, other nations, and adversaries such as ISIS conduct information operations through cyberspace where the ultimate goal of the operations is to affect perceptions, beliefs, and decision-making in the cognitive sphere—not simply to steal information, or disable a network. Modern information technologies and platforms, such as social media and “big data analytics,” have been proven to be able to amplify the speed, scale, agility, and precision targeting of traditional information operations. In the Defense Department, however, U.S. Cyber Command is focused on technical cyber missions and skills, while different organizations are responsible for information operations, psychological and deception operations, and electronic warfare. In addition, there are concerns that the Defense Department's focus on tactical and operational support to deployed forces has resulted in serious neglect of strategic-level information operations.

What changes do you think are necessary to improve the Defense Department's ability to detect and counter information operations, both defensively and offensively?

Answer. It is my view that cyber-enabled information operations, online propaganda, and adversary information activities are an increasingly significant security challenge. If confirmed, I will serve as an advocate for cyber mission forces contributions to the fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and its propaganda, and how cyber operations can be better synchronized and coordinated with DOD online information operations. I will work with my colleagues across the Department to integrate best practices and lessons learned to ensure cyber capabilities are best postured to support strategic-level information operations.

*Question.* What are your views on the recommendations of the Defense Science Task Force on Cyber Deterrence?

Answer. I believe the report offers some interesting and thoughtful suggestions on improving our deterrence posture in cyberspace.

*Question.* Do you believe that we need a more integrated whole-of-government approach to combating hostile information operations directed against the United States, its allies, and interests?

Answer. Given the complexity and scope of the cyber-enabled information operations and online propaganda efforts being undertaken by our adversaries around the world, it is my view a whole-of-government approach that leverages all elements of national power is necessary. Each department and agency provides a unique set of capabilities and authorities that can contribute to stronger and more effective capabilities for combating hostile information operations. If confirmed, I will work with my counterparts to develop an effective approach to address these challenges.

## INFORMATION ASSURANCE

*Question.* There are some concerns about the commitment of the National Security Agency (NSA) to the cyber security mission and the Office of the Secretary of Defense's ability to conduct proper oversight of NSA's cyber security mission since NSA merged the Information Assurance Directorate within its Signals Intelligence Directorate.

Given that the position to which you have been nominated is the Principal Cyber Advisor to the Secretary of Defense, what is your view of this change?

*Answer.* NSA is the nation's leader of cryptographic solutions, security engineering and architecture, and advanced cybersecurity operations. It is tasked with protecting and defending National Security Systems by providing solutions to the nation's hardest Information Assurance and Cybersecurity challenges. Based on my initial, unclassified review, the NSA organizational changes were made after extensive research and engagement by NSA to position itself to remain at the forefront of foreign signals intelligence, information assurance, and cyber into the next decade. I understand this change was less a merger of IA, and more an integration of NSA's key mission functions to streamline capabilities development and accelerate innovation efforts. The organizational changes did include the stand-up of the Deputy National Manager of Information Assurance office, whose role is to provide the proper internal oversight to NSA's IA mission. If confirmed, I will work with my counterparts to ensure continued prioritized focus on the IA mission.

*Question.* If confirmed, how will you approach oversight in your role?

*Answer.* The DOD CIO has oversight of DIRNSA's performance of duties as the National Manager for National Security Systems and on DOD cybersecurity policy and guidance. As is standard practice for the Principal Cyber Advisor, if confirmed, I would work closely with DOD CIO to address any issues/concerns that may arise related to NSA's support to the vital security missions of the U.S.

## DUAL HATTING AND ELEVATION OF U.S. CYBER COMMAND

*Question.* What are your views about elevating U.S. Cyber Command to a unified command and about maintaining or ending the "dual hat" relationship where the Commander of U.S. Cyber Command serves also as the Director of NSA?

*Answer.* I am supportive of the elevation of U.S. Cyber Command to a unified combatant command consistent with the requirement in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017. I understand that certification of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is required before the "dual hat" arrangement can be changed. If confirmed, I will seek to gain better understanding about the appropriateness and timing for such a decision.

## DEVELOPMENT OF CYBER CAPABILITIES

*Question.* U.S. Cyber Command has depended heavily to date on NSA for technology, equipment, capabilities, concepts of operations, and tactics, techniques, and procedures.

Are you satisfied that the Department of Defense is organized and resourced to provide a broad base of innovation and capability development in the cyber domain that includes the military service's research and development organizations, defense agencies such as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, and the private sector?

*Answer.* The Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA stipulates that separation of the dual-hat construct can only occur once the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs jointly determine and certify that separation will not pose unacceptable risks to the military effectiveness of Cyber Command. If confirmed, I would work to ensure that Cyber Command is supported by a broad base of innovation and capability development in the cyber domain.

## DEFENSE SPACE POLICY

*Question.* The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security has primary responsibility for Department of Defense space policy.

Please describe your understanding of the space policy responsibilities intended for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security, and how those responsibilities would relate to cyber security policy responsibilities.

*Answer.* As I understand it, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security is responsible for both Space and Cyber policy. If confirmed, I would ensure the close collaboration between these two critical areas by actively leading the development and oversight of space and cyber policy and strategy for the Department. I would also be an active participant in the DOD space-

and cyber-related decision-making processes, and in the DOD Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) processes to ensure space and cyber system architectures support our national security objectives effectively.

*Question.* If confirmed, what would be your priorities for Department of Defense policy for space, and how would you ensure effective execution of the Department's space policy?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I would place priority on strengthening deterrence by assuring U.S. national security space capabilities against growing counter-space threats. In particular, through partnerships with commercial suppliers, collaboration with international partners, and changes in our own architectures and operational tactics, we can improve the resiliency, defense, and the ability to reconstitute our space systems and strengthen strategic stability in space.

*Question.* What do you perceive as the threats to our national security space satellites?

*Answer.* In addition to the space environment, which includes man-made debris and space weather, the threat to our satellite capabilities is real and growing. Both China and Russia have developed and tested a variety of anti-satellite weapons that can destroy or disable satellites. Iran, North Korea, and other countries have capabilities to jam satellite communications and GPS. If confirmed, I would work to ensure that mission assurance of space capabilities against these growing threats is commensurate with the requirements of the operations and activities our space systems perform and support.

*Question.* Briefly describe what policy objectives the United States should be seeking to achieve and the strategy you think is necessary to address these threats.

*Answer.* The sustainability, stability, and free access to, and use of, space is and will remain vital to U.S. national interests. The United States should seek to deter conflict that extends to or begins in space. Achieving that requires that we ensure the availability, security, and resiliency of our space assets at all times and through all phases of conflict, and thereby deny aggressors the desired benefits of attacks in space. If confirmed, I would focus on such steps to increase our ability to deter such attacks.

*Question.* Do you support the development of offensive space control capabilities to counter those threats?

*Answer.* It is in the interest of all nations to avoid hostilities in space. However, just as on Earth, the U.S. retains the inherent right of self-defense in space. As Secretary Mattis stated in his confirmation testimony, "Offensive space control capabilities should be considered to ensure survivable and resilient space operations necessary for the execution of war plans." I share that view.

*Question.* The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 prohibits the use of Russian rocket engines after December 31, 2022.

Are you committed to ending our dependence on the use of Russian rocket engines as soon as possible, perhaps even before December 31, 2022?

*Answer.* Yes. Secretary Mattis stated in his confirmation that he will abide by the law and work with Congress to meet or exceed any deadline requirements. I will do likewise.

#### NATIONAL SECURITY BUDGET REDUCTIONS AND SEQUESTRATION

*Question.* The original discretionary caps imposed by the Budget Control Act (BCA) will be in effect for fiscal year 2018 through fiscal year 2021, unless there is agreement to change budget levels. Both the Secretary of Defense and the President have stated the need to repeal the "defense sequester."

What are your views on how the BCA impacts the military? Should the BCA be amended or repealed?

*Answer.* The Budget Control Act has presented significant challenges to many Departments and Agencies across the government. I understand that senior officials have testified that it has weakened our military's readiness. I believe that, moving forward, changes will need to be made if the Department is to achieve its readiness, modernization, and force structure required to address emerging threats.

*Question.* Many of your responsibilities involve providing support to other federal government agencies. Do you believe that any future budget agreements should maintain a dollar-for-dollar principle to provide relief from the caps to non-Defense Department agencies?

*Answer.* I agree with Secretary Mattis who said that budgets should match resources to national priorities. Each Department and Agency should define and justify its requirements.

*Question.* If confirmed, by what standards would you measure the adequacy of funding for the missions under your supervision?

Answer. If confirmed, I would measure the adequacy of the funding for the missions under my supervision by the ability to achieve our objectives and execute our missions related to space, cyberspace, countering weapons of mass destruction, and Homeland defense. This will require close collaboration and cooperation with colleagues throughout the Department including members of the joint staff, combatant commands, and other OSD Components.

## FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND AUDIT READINESS

*Question.* The Department of Defense is the only federal agency unable to complete a financial audit in accordance with the law, despite having invested billions over the past 16 years to do so. The persistent lack of accountability by Department leadership for results leads to concerns within the Congress and in the public over the stewardship of Department funds and the qualifications of the people entrusted to lead the Department in its audit efforts. It is not simply an abstract statutory requirement that the Department produce auditable financial statements showing where and how it spends its annual budget—the accuracy of the financial information underlying the financial statements is critical to the Department’s ability to develop an adequate defense budget and make important financial decisions in an environment where every defense dollar counts.

What actions will you take or direct that will achieve a better outcome than past actions and initiatives for financial auditability of the Defense Department?

Answer. I understand the Government Accountability Office has made assessments and recommendations regarding audit readiness. If confirmed, I will work closely with appropriate Department personnel to ensure that I understand the recommendations, and as appropriate to my mission areas, work to ensure that functions and missions under my responsibility will meet audit readiness goals.

## CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

*Question.* In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

Answer. Yes.

*Question.* Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security?

Answer. Yes.

*Question.* Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate committees in a timely manner?

Answer. Yes.

*Question.* Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Answer. Yes.

*Question.* Do you agree to answer letters and requests for information from individual Senators who are members of this Committee?

Answer. Yes.

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[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

## QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JACK REED

## MISSILE DEFENSE

1. Senator REED. Mr. Rapuano, please describe the responsibilities you would have as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security for our Nation’s ballistic missile, cruise missile, and air defense policy and programs, and how those responsibilities coordinate with other offices within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

Mr. RAPUANO. It is my understanding that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security (ASD(HD&GS)) is responsible for policy matters related to the aerospace defense of the United States, including the cruise

missile threat and response. It is also my understanding that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans & Capability (ASD(SP&C)) is responsible for ballistic missile defense, including the emerging threat posed by North Korean ballistic missiles. These two assistant secretaries must work together closely on the development of policy to address missile threats to the United States including the development and coordination of DOD policy and guidance on U.S. ballistic missile defenses. This includes providing policy and guidance to the Missile Defense Agency.

If confirmed, I would work closely with the ASD(SPC), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other DOD organizations to ensure our Nation is defended against all missile threats.

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND

CYBER

2. Senator GILLIBRAND. Mr. Rapuano, in your advance policy questions submitted to the Committee, you pledge to, “Devote special attention to the challenge of building the cyberspace workforce, expanding DOD’s [Department of Defense] operational capabilities, and continuing to rationalize the complex funding streams that support cyberspace initiatives.” As Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Personnel, I have been working to push DOD to recruit and retain the best possible cyber warriors. With a focus on Homeland defense against cyber adversaries, how can DOD improve upon its efforts to recruit and retain the best possible cyber warriors?

Mr. RAPUANO. I appreciate your commitment to this important issue, and, if confirmed, I will make building the Department of Defense’s cyberspace workforce one of my top priorities. The uniformed and civilian members of the Department of Defense’s cyberspace workforce are the foundation of our Nation’s strength in this domain. Without these dedicated and extremely capable men and women we would not have the ability to fight and win in cyberspace.

I believe there are many possible avenues to enhance current cyberspace workforce recruiting and retention programs within the Department. The implementation of Title 10, Cyber Excepted Service (CES), for example, will assist in recruiting and retaining quality cyber professionals.

The CES will streamline civilian hiring procedures, provide additional flexibility in the hiring process, and allow the Department to employ market-based pay initiatives targeting specialized skills. This will help the Department compete better with the private sector for talent.

The standup of National Guard and Reserve component cyber forces is another avenue to enhance the Department’s cyber recruitment and retention. As you know, some National Guard and Reserve component Airmen and Soldiers have unique technical skillsets and leadership abilities that they have honed through many years of working in the commercial sector. National Guard and Reserve cyber teams will provide the Nation with a way to tap commercial sector talent and provide those who exit the Active component a way to continue their service.

3. Senator GILLIBRAND. Mr. Rapuano, can you expand your concern regarding the “complex funding streams” involved in the Department’s cyber activities?

Mr. RAPUANO. Given the extent to which activities in cyberspace provide a foundation for almost all of the Department’s missions, it is understandably challenging to get a complete picture of all the investments involved. Resources are spread across the Department and the Services, consistent with their core roles and responsibilities. However, in order to accomplish our strategic objectives for cyberspace, I believe it is necessary to have a better understanding and where possible, to simplify funding streams to allow for informed investment decisions and strong oversight for this critical mission.

4. Senator GILLIBRAND. Mr. Rapuano, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security plays a key role in the Department’s responsibility for critical infrastructure protection—first as a Federal department and second as a sector-specific agency for the Defense Industrial Base. Do you believe that there is a coherent plan in place to allow the Federal Government, in coordination with State and local governments to respond to major cyber-attacks on the country and escalate the response as appropriate?

Mr. RAPUANO. The National Cyber Incident Response Plan (NCIRP) provides a strong foundation for a whole-of-government plan to respond to a significant cyber incident against the United States. However, much work still is required to improve this process. Through exercises like Cyber Guard, the Department of Defense has

worked extensively with the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, and other interagency partners to identify and address gap and seam issues in the interagency response plan. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that our Nation will be effectively defended against significant cyberattacks.

5. Senator GILLIBRAND. Mr. Rapuano, do you believe that there is a coherent plan in place for the transition between private companies and government response?

Mr. RAPUANO. Current policy specifies roles and responsibilities for federal Departments and Agencies and identifies priority industries and companies. However, I believe there is more work to be done to understand and plan for how the government and private sector would work together in practice during an incident. To this end, I welcome the recent Executive Order's focus on protecting critical infrastructure, including the commitment to increasing public-private partnerships. If confirmed, I would work with my DOD and interagency counterparts to use this new opportunity to build relationships and to regularly practice incident response.

6. Senator GILLIBRAND. Mr. Rapuano, what are the challenges in developing a plan that incorporates Federal, State and local governments as well as the private sector in a whole-of-country cyber response plan?

Mr. RAPUANO. One of the challenges of developing a whole-of-nation cyber response plan is the sheer number and diversity of state, local, tribal, and territorial systems and processes in responding to cyber incidents. The recently-released National Cyber Incident Response Plan (NCIRP), that DOD fully participated in developing in conjunction with the Department of Homeland Security, takes steps to address this challenge by codifying how we respond as a nation to cyberspace incidents and provides a way for each entity to be full partners in incident response activities.

7. Senator GILLIBRAND. Mr. Rapuano, I have long fought for the inclusion of the National Guard in the Defense Department's cyber mission because I believe that the Guard provides unique capabilities for attracting people with outside expertise and retaining those we've already trained—and also serves both Federal and State needs in defending the Homeland. Do you think we are using the National Guard as effectively as we could be?

Mr. RAPUANO. I share your views about the importance of effective employment of National Guard and Reserve cyber forces, and will make this a priority, if confirmed. The National Guard and Reserve are currently building capability and capacity to conduct cyberspace operations, and a number of programs and initiatives are still in the pilot phase. Given this, it is likely too early to make a comprehensive assessment of the Department of Defense's efforts to integrate the National Guard and Reserve into cyberspace operations.

The Department must employ a Total Force solution when it comes to cyberspace operations. The National Guard and Reserve bring with them private sector experience, understanding of the unique critical infrastructure and information technology industries in their states, and a fresh perspective to how we conduct operations. To ensure mission success, the Total Force must be trained and equipped to the same level and held to the same operational standards as the Active Duty cyberspace operations force.

The National Guard and the Reserve Component are also a key element in developing and preserving the Department's cyberspace talent. As you know, it is difficult for the military to compete with private sector cyberspace salaries, so the Reserve Component provides a way to encourage military members who are leaving Active service to join a reserve component. In this way, we can continue to reap the benefits of the training and experience that has already been invested in these members while providing an option for them to continue to serve.

8. Senator GILLIBRAND. Mr. Rapuano, could the Guard serve as a conduit for cyber response between State, local and Federal Government as well as the private sector because of its unique authorities?

Mr. RAPUANO. Yes, I believe the National Guard is uniquely positioned to serve as a conduit between State and private sector entities and the Federal Government because its force posture and legal status provides many advantages in supporting state and local authorities.

9. Senator GILLIBRAND. Mr. Rapuano, some Guard cyber units are already working to red team the private sectors' networks, which means that down the line, they will be familiar with and potentially able to assist these companies. Do you think we should expand these types of efforts?

Mr. RAPUANO. It is difficult at this time to provide a thoughtful comment about expanding these activities without full knowledge and consideration of the Department's other operations. If confirmed, I am committed to advancing the integration of National Guard cyber capabilities into the Total Force and strongly support initiatives that help to strengthen our defenses and resiliency in case of cyberattack. In this way, these types of efforts that advance partnering with the private sector make sense, as it helps to foster mutual trust and organizational familiarity before a time of crisis. Cyber response teams operating under Guard authorities can also perform a variety of missions in support of state, local, and private entities (which operate independently under their own authorities).

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARTIN HEINRICH

CYBER ACQUISITIONS

10. Senator HEINRICH. Mr. Rapuano, as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security, you would serve as the Principal Cyber Advisor to the Secretary of Defense with primary responsibility for DOD cyber policy. As cyber continues to evolve as a domain, DOD must remain resilient and agile in order to counter current and future threats from both state and non-state actors. One recurring theme I hear from cyber professionals is their concern with the ability of DOD acquisition process to keep pace with emerging cyber threats. Do existing acquisition authorities allow the DOD's cyber teams to keep pace with commercial off the shelf capabilities?

Mr. RAPUANO. I share the Committee's view, and the view of many in the national security community, that keeping pace, or better, out-pacing adversaries is a strategic issue. The ability to provide resilience, secure trusted networks and weapon systems, and capabilities to defend the Nation will be a point of focus if I am confirmed. I understand that changes have been made in the current acquisition process to facilitate rapid acquisition, leverage commercial technology, and advance DOD capabilities to deal with many commercially available technologies available to both nation state and non-state actors alike. New policies enable rapid acquisition of cyber capabilities and new authorities give Cyber Command greater flexibility and provide the Department even more expedient action in the case of an imminent or an on-going cyberattack. If confirmed, I will look closely at the capabilities needed for our missions in cyberspace and work with my colleagues in the Department, the Secretary, and you to ensure we are keeping pace with innovation, while making efficient use of taxpayer dollars.

11. Senator HEINRICH. Mr. Rapuano, how will you work to speed up the timeline to procure information technology (IT) items for DOD's cyber professionals?

Mr. RAPUANO. I will work with my colleagues in the OSD staff and the Services to streamline the inherent processes in the requirements and acquisition phases to instill timeliness and a sense of urgency. Enterprise services are one of the keys to this pathway and are identified in the President's new Executive Order as an area of emphasis.

CYBER VULNERABILITIES

12. Senator HEINRICH. Mr. Rapuano, in order to combat threats from state and non-state actors, DOD must recognize weaknesses in cyber defense and infrastructure. Do you support creative ideas like the Department's Bug Bounty Program or "Hack the Pentagon" program?

Mr. RAPUANO. I fully agree that it is paramount for the Department to identify weaknesses and vulnerabilities in its cyber defenses and infrastructure. The Bug Bounty and "Hack the Pentagon" programs are two innovative and highly successful approaches to addressing this problem. If confirmed, I would support these efforts and seek additional creative initiatives to help mitigate vulnerabilities in a cost-effective manner.

13. Senator HEINRICH. Mr. Rapuano, how will you support these programs to identify cyber vulnerabilities?

Mr. RAPUANO. The Bug Bounty and Vulnerability Disclosure Programs have proven to be very successful ways of finding vulnerabilities as well as engaging with the security community. Therefore, if confirmed, I will fight to maintain funding for these programs, support their expansion, where possible, and engage with the pri-

ivate sector and outside experts to identify potential improvements in their implementation.

PRIVATE SECTOR

14. Senator HEINRICH. Mr. Rapuano, programs such as the Defense Digital Service, the Defense Innovation Unit Experiment, and the Defense Innovation Advisory Board represent a DOD initiative to collaborate with the private sector. How will you utilize these programs to introduce and exchange ideas, integrate private sector innovations into the DOD infrastructure, and shape cyber policy in DOD?

Mr. RAPUANO. The cyber domain is so thoroughly integrated into the everyday lives and economy of Americans that DOD must look to the private sector to fully understand trends, to leverage technology, expertise, and best practices, and to develop the best workforce. From Silicon Valley, to San Antonio, Seattle, Boston, St Louis, and beyond, technology and practices are constantly emerging and it is critical that DOD is connected to these developments to ensure the ability to defend and operate in cyberspace.

If confirmed, I will establish strong relationships with leading organizations in cyber, including tech companies, academic and other training institutions, and leaders in cybersecurity. To this end, I see the DDS, DIUx, and the DIAB as key mechanisms for institutionalizing such relationships and ensuring the exchange of ideas and technology to allow DOD to be successful at its missions. By establishing open and transparent mechanisms for collaboration, and in some cases even putting DOD in proximity to these centers of influence, these initiatives will lay the critical groundwork for building enduring connections to help DOD solve challenging problems, to include priorities such as recruiting and retaining the best workforce and staying ahead of threats.

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ELIZABETH WARREN

COUNTERING “GRAY ZONE” WARFARE IN EUROPE

15. Senator WARREN. Mr. Rapuano, the United States has deployed equipment and rotated ground forces back into Europe through the European Reassurance Initiative, but this conventional display of force alone obviously isn’t sufficient to deter Russia. Putin seems to rely increasingly on covert cyber activity, propaganda, and other indirect tactics—as he demonstrated just a few weeks ago by interfering with the French election. If confirmed, how will you work with our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies to counter Russia’s so-called “gray zone” warfare?

Mr. RAPUANO. Russian destabilizing “gray zone” or hybrid activity in Europe is a serious concern. While not all of the cyber-enabled influence operations we have seen in Europe have been definitively attributed to Russia, the apparent objectives of these operations clearly match with Moscow’s goals.

If confirmed, I will work with our European allies—including through threat information sharing, efforts to fulfill the NATO Cyber Defense Pledge, and capability development—to help build their cyber defenses so that they are less vulnerable to Russia’s malicious cyber activity.

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[The nomination reference of Mr. Kenneth P. Rapuano follows:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,  
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,  
*April 25, 2017*

*Ordered,* That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

Kenneth P. Rapuano, of Virginia, to be an Assistant Secretary of Defense vice Eric Rosenbach, resigned.

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[The biographical sketch of Mr. Kenneth P. Rapuano, which was transmitted to the Committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

## BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF KENNETH P. RAPUANO

*Education:*

- Georgetown University, Washington, DC
  - 1989 to 1992
  - MA—National Security Studies
- Middlebury College, Middlebury, VT
  - 1980 to 1984
  - BA—Political Science, Minor—Education

*Employment Record:*

List all jobs held since college including title or description of job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.

- The Anser Corporation, Falls Church, VA
  - Senior Vice President, and Executive Director of the Studies and Analysis Group
  - October 2015 to Present
- The Mitre Corporation, McClean, VA
  - Director of Advanced Systems and Policy Analysis
  - December 2008 to October 2015
- Independent Consultant, Falls Church, VA
  - Director of Advanced Systems and Policy Analysis
  - October to December 2008
- ICx Technologies
  - President, Homeland Security
  - July 2007 to September 2008
- Independent Consultant, Falls Church, VA
  - Director of Advanced Systems and Policy Analysis
  - May to July 2007
- The White House
  - Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy Homeland Security Advisor
  - July 2004 to November 2006
- Department of Energy
  - Deputy Under Secretary of Energy for Counterterrorism
  - October 2003 to July 2004
- United States Marine Corps Reserve, Iraq
  - Chief, Joint Interrogations and Debriefing Center, Iraq Survey Group (ISG)
  - May to November 2003
- Department of Energy, Washington, DC
  - National Security Advisor to the Secretary of Energy
  - April 2001 to May 2003
- Southern Research Institute, Falls Church, VA
  - Director, International Affairs & Nonproliferation Department
  - October 1998 to April 2001
- Dyncorp, Alexandria, VA
  - Program Manager, National Security Programs Counter Proliferation Mission
  - April 1993 to September 1998
- Department of Defense, Washington, DC
  - Special Assistant to Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Policy (1992 to April 1993)
  - Foreign Affairs Specialist, Office of Multilateral Negotiations (February 1989 to 1992)
- Presidential Transition Team, Washington, DC
  - Special Assistant to the General Counsel to the President-Elect
  - November 1988 to February 1989
- Republican National Committee, Washington, DC
  - Campaign Research
  - June to November 1988
- United States Marine Corps, Camp Lejeune, NC
  - Infantry Officer
  - October 1984 to March 1988
- Ridgewood, NJ Public School System, Ridgewood, NJ

- Assistant Football Coach, Substitute Teacher
- July to November 1984

*Honors and Awards:*

- Military Awards
  - Bronze Star Medal
  - Defense Meritorious Service Medal
  - Afghanistan Campaign Medal
  - Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal
  - Marine Corps Expeditionary Medal
  - Armed Forces Reserve Medal (3 awards)
  - National Defense Service Medal
  - Joint Meritorious Unit Award (2 awards)
  - Selected Marine Corps Reserve Medal (2 awards)
  - Navy Meritorious Unit Commendation
  - Navy Unit Commendation
  - Sea Service Deployment Ribbon (4 awards)
- Federal Civilian Awards
  - DHS Under Secretary for Science and Technology Awards for Building Partnerships on Non-Traditional Aviation Technologies Whole-of-Community Initiative
  - NNSA Excellence Medal
  - Secretary of Defense Medal for Outstanding Public Service

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by Mr. Kenneth P. Rapuano in connection with his nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE  
 COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
 ROOM SR-228  
 WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6050  
 (202) 224-3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM  
 BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF  
 NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more space is needed, use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. Unless otherwise required, an answer of yes, no, or not applicable is appropriate.

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part of the form will be made available in Committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearing and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. **Name:** (Include any former names used.)  
 Kenneth P. Rapuano
2. **Position to which nominated:**  
 Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security

**3. Date of nomination:**

April 25, 2017

**4. Address:** (List current place of residence and office addresses.)

[The nominee responded and the information is contained in the Committee's executive files.]

**5. Year and place of birth:**

1962, Passaic, NJ

**6. Marital status:** (Include full name of current spouse including any other names used, including maiden name.)

Married. Dixie Houseal Rapuano (Maiden Name: Dixie Houseal)

**7. Names of children (if over age 18):**

Taylor (daughter)

Scott (son)

Claire (daughter)

William (son)

**8. Education:** List names of secondary and higher education institutions attended, type of school (vocational, technical, trade school, college, university, military college, correspondence, distance, extension, and on-line) dates attended, degree received and date degree granted.

- Georgetown University—1989 to 1992 MA National Security Affairs; August 14, 1992
- Middlebury College—1980 to 1984 BA Political Science; May 1984
- Ridgewood High School—1977 to 1980 HS Degree; June 1980

**9. Employment record:** List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment. If the employment activity was military duty, list separate employment activity periods to show each change of military duty station.

- The Anser Corporation (aka Analytic Services Inc.), Falls Church, VA
  - Senior Vice President, and Executive Director of the Studies and Analysis Group
  - October 2015 to Present
- The Mitre Corporation, McClean, VA
  - Director of Advanced Systems and Policy Analysis
  - December 2008 to October 2015
- Independent Consultant; Falls Church, VA
  - October to December 2008
- ICx Technologies
  - President for Homeland Security
  - July 2007 to September 2008
- Consultant; Self-employment; Falls Church, VA
  - May to July 2007
- U.S. Marine Corps (Reserve Active Duty Deployment), Jalalabad, Afghanistan
  - Director of Targeting Fusion Cell
  - November 2006 to May 2007
- The White House
  - Deputy Homeland Security Advisor to the President
  - July 2004 to November 2006

**10. Government experience:** List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed above.

- National Defense University, Department of Defense, Washington, DC
  - Distinguished Research Fellow and Adjunct Faculty;
  - February 2009 to Present
- Defense Science Board Task Force; Arlington, VA

- Member
- October 2015 to Present
- Federal Bureau of Investigation; Washington, DC
  - Member, FBI Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate Advisory Group
  - 2013 to Present
- , Pacific Northwest National Laboratory National Security Advisory Committee, Richland, Washington
  - Member
  - 2014 to Present
- Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee; Department of Homeland Security; Washington, DC
  - Member
  - 2008 to 2012
- Quadrennial Homeland Security Review; Department of Homeland Security; Washington, DC
  - Member
  - 2009 to 2010

11. **Business relationships:** List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational or other institution.

None (other than current employer)

12. **Memberships:** List all current memberships and offices that you hold in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and other organizations.

None

13. **Political affiliations and activities:**

(a) If you have ever been a candidate for or have been elected or appointed to a political office, list the name of the office(s), whether you were elected/appointed/candidate, the year(s) the election was held or the appointment was made, and the term of office (if applicable).

N/A

(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political parties or election committees during the last 5 years.

None

(c) Itemize all individual political contributions of \$100 or more to any , campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity for the past 5 years. List each individual contribution and not the total amount contributed to the person or entity during the year.

- Barbara Comstock for Congress; \$500/June 2016

14. **Honors and Awards:** List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary degrees, civilian service citations, military awards and decorations, honorary society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.

- DHS Under Secretary for Science and Technology Award for Building Partnerships on Non-Traditional Aviation Technologies Whole-of-Community Initiative
- NNSA Excellence Medal—Naitonal Nuclear Security Administration
- Bronze Star Medal
- Defense Meritorious Service Medal
- Afghanistan Campaign Medal
- Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal
- Expeditionary Medal—Marine Corps
- Armed Forces Reserve Medal (3 awards)
- National Defense Service Medal
- Joint Meritorious Unit Award (2 awards)
- Selected Marine Corps Reserve Medal (2 awards)
- Navy Meritorious Unit Commendation
- Navy Unit Commendation
- Sea Service Deployment Ribbon (4 awards)

15. **Published writings:** List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have written including articles published on the Internet.

- Homeland Security Resilience; Navigating the Path from Theory to Practical Application; Signal Magazine, November 1, 2013 <http://www.afcea.org/content/?q=node/11854>
- Peace-Enforcement Operations; Marine Corps Gazette, October 1993

16. **Speeches:** Provide the Committee with two copies of any formal speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years of which you have copies and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have been nominated.

None

17. **Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service:**

(a) If confirmed, will you adhere to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest?

Yes.

(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?

No.

(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established for requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings?

Yes.

(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to Congressional requests?

Yes.

(e) Will you promise to enforce or ensure whistleblower protections for all those witnesses?

Yes.

(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this Committee?

Yes.

(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Yes.

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[The nominee responded to Parts B–F of the Committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–F are contained in the Committee’s executive files.]

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SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

KENNETH P. RAPUANO

This 24th day of April, 2017

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[The nomination of Mr. Kenneth P. Rapuano was reported to the Senate by Chairman McCain on May 23, 2017, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on June 12, 2017.]