[Senate Hearing 115-888]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 115-888
PIPELINE SAFETY IN THE MERRIMACK VALLEY: INCIDENT PREVENTION AND
RESPONSE
=======================================================================
FIELD HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 26, 2018
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
57-909 PDF WASHINGTON : 2025
SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota, Chairman
ROGER WICKER, Mississippi BILL NELSON, Florida, Ranking
ROY BLUNT, Missouri MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
TED CRUZ, Texas AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
JERRY MORAN, Kansas BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts
DEAN HELLER, Nevada TOM UDALL, New Mexico
JAMES INHOFE, Oklahoma GARY PETERS, Michigan
MIKE LEE, Utah TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire
CORY GARDNER, Colorado CATHERINE CORTEZ MASTO, Nevada
TODD YOUNG, Indiana JON TESTER, Montana
Nick Rossi, Staff Director
Adrian Arnakis, Deputy Staff Director
Jason Van Beek, General Counsel
Kim Lipsky, Democratic Staff Director
Chris Day, Democratic Deputy Staff Director
Renae Black, Senior Counsel
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on November 26, 2018................................ 1
Statement of Senator Markey...................................... 1
Joint statement of Andrew W. Maylor, North Andover Town
Manager and Andrew P. Flanagan, Andover Town Manager....... 73
Letter from Lawrence Fire Chief Brian Moriarty............... 87
Letter from North Andover Fire Chief William McCarthy........ 89
Prepared statements from community members................... 110
Statement of Senator Hassan...................................... 4
Witnesses
Hon. Elizabeth Warren, U.S. Senator from Massachusetts........... 3
Hon. Niki Tsongas, U.S. Representative from Massachusetts........ 5
Hon. Seth Moulton, U.S. Representative from Massachusetts........ 6
Hon. Lori Trahan, U.S. Representative-Elect from Massachusetts... 7
Lucyannie Rondon, Sister of Leonel Rondon........................ 8
Hon. Robert L. Sumwalt III, Chairman, National Transportation
Safety Board................................................... 9
Prepared statement........................................... 11
Hon. Matthew A. Beaton, Secretary, Massachusetts Executive Office
of Energy and Environmental Affairs............................ 12
Prepared statement........................................... 15
Steve Bryant, President, Columbia Gas of Massachusetts........... 19
Joe Hamrock, President and Chief Executive Officer, NiSource..... 21
Joint prepared statement..................................... 22
Richard B. Kuprewicz, President, Accufacts, Incorporated......... 27
Prepared statement........................................... 29
Paul Roberti, Chief Counsel, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration.......................................... 31
Prepared statement........................................... 32
Hon. Dan Rivera, Mayor, City of Lawrence......................... 78
Prepared statement........................................... 81
Tina Messina, Owner, Wine Connextion............................. 83
Prepared statement........................................... 85
Michael B. Mansfield, Fire Chief, Andover Fire Rescue............ 94
Prepared statement........................................... 96
Appendix
Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Edward Markey to:
Hon. Matthew A. Beaton....................................... 159
Paul Roberti................................................. 160
PIPELINE SAFETY
IN THE MERRIMACK VALLEY:
INCIDENT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE
----------
MONDAY, NOVEMBER 26, 2018
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Lawrence, MA.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:07 a.m. in
South Lawrence East Middle School Gymnasium, 165 Crawford
Street, Lawrence, Massachusetts 01843, Hon. Edward Markey,
Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Markey [presiding], Warren, and Hassan.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD MARKEY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
Senator Markey. Thank you for joining us for today's field
hearing of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation.
I would like to express my appreciation to Commerce
Committee Chairman John Thune and Ranking Member Bill Nelson
for their support in allowing me to chair this important
hearing.
And I'd like to welcome my U.S. Senate colleagues who have
joined me here today, my great partner from the state of
Massachusetts, Senator Elizabeth Warren, and from the state of
New Hampshire and a member of the Senate Commerce Committee,
Maggie Hassan.
We also welcome two members of the U.S. House of
Representatives, Congresswoman Niki Tsongas of the 3rd
Congressional District; Congressman Seth Moulton of the 6th
Congressional District; and a warm welcome to Congresswoman-
elect Lori Trahan. We look forward to continuing to working
with you and continuing to push for answers.
It has been 74 days since Lawrence, Andover, and North
Andover suffered a disaster that Andover Fire Chief Michael
Mansfield said, ``Looked like Armageddon.'' Explosions and
fires ripped through quiet neighborhoods, destroying homes and
businesses, a precious life was lost, dozens were injured.
For these communities, the explosions were only the
beginning of months of uncertainty and hardship. This was the
coldest Thanksgiving in 80 years in Massachusetts, with the
wind chill temperatures plunging into the single digits in the
Merrimack Valley, and despite its original promise, Columbia
Gas has missed its deadline for restoring gas service, meaning
that nearly 1,600 families spent the Thanksgiving holiday
enduring the brutal cold without heat.
The explosions happened on a single day but the crisis for
families as they try to stay warm and get back to work has gone
on for far too long. We have seen unprecedented disruption,
doubt, and despair for the Merrimack Valley. Columbia Gas
should be ashamed.
Our investigation into this disaster has resulted in one
crystal clear conclusion. What happened on September 13 was not
inevitable. It was preventable. Columbia Gas never contemplated
that a disaster of this magnitude could happen and therefore
did not have adequate procedures in place to prevent it or to
respond to it.
Not only did this company not prioritize safety, it appears
as if safety was simply an afterthought, but the responsibility
for safety failures doesn't stop with Columbia Gas and
NiSource.
Federal regulations set by the Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration or PHMSA are alarmingly
deficient. The safety gaps in Federal rules mean that families
all across the country cannot be assured that the natural gas
pipelines running under their streets and into their homes are
safe.
PHMSA's regulations essentially allow the natural gas
pipeline industry to regulate itself. When the fox is left to
guard the henhouse, we are assured to have a system-wide
failure and then an inevitable disaster.
We found failing after failing in Columbia Gas culture and
Federal regulatory oversight.
First, the company allowed an unqualified engineer to
approve the pipeline construction work plan that led to this
disaster.
Second, Columbia Gas officials who had an understanding of
the full pipeline system never saw or signed off on the
pipeline construction work plan that led to this disaster.
Third, Columbia Gas still has not adopted best practices
for safety 3 years after its own industry made these
recommendations.
And fourth, the woefully insufficient safety, operations,
and response plans that Columbia Gas did institute never
adequately contemplated a disaster of this magnitude. So when
it occurred, they were not prepared to stop it or to respond to
it.
The list of failings at this company is as long as the line
for the temporary showers at Pumps Pond and when it comes to
Federal regulations, there are clearly key gaps that allow a
company like Columbia Gas and NiSource to operate unsafely.
We owe it to the American people to put in place
requirements to ensure that no natural gas company is allowed
to shortchange safety ever again. Columbia----
[Applause.]
Senator Markey. Columbia Gas' deficiencies are more than a
litany of shortcomings. They are a roadmap to disaster and
that's exactly what we saw on September 13th.
On that day, following scheduled work in Lawrence, gas
pressure in the Merrimack Valley's distribution system rose to
dangerous levels. It forced harmful combustible gas out of
people's stoves, radiators, and hot water heaters. This over-
pressurization led to explosions, fires, and the destruction of
more than a hundred homes and businesses in this region.
Leo Rondon died. He had just gotten his driver's license
only to be killed while celebrating this achievement with his
friends. Our community mourns his loss and I'm grateful that
his family could be here today to share his story.
More than two dozen others were injured, including nine
firefighters as they ran toward the danger and worked to save
lives in that chaos.
The National Transportation Safety Board has recently
recommended that Columbia Gas and its parent company, NiSource,
make urgent changes to how they handle construction and
operations. That is the bare minimum of what this company needs
to do to improve safety.
But thus far, NiSource has refused to immediately implement
these changes and that is not acceptable, and I want to hear
directly from the company why our communities are yet again
having to wait.
Gas distribution companies need to put safety above speed
and the public above politics. If Columbia Gas and NiSource
refuse to do that, then they should not be operating in our
state or any other state.
This hearing----
[Applause.]
Senator Markey. This hearing is personal to me. My father
grew up in Lawrence. He graduated from the Vocational Program
at Lawrence High School. The day after the explosions, I went
up and visited the house he grew up in on Phillips Street, a
house where, as a little boy, I celebrated Christmases. I
talked to a family member there and they talked about their
loss of power and like tens of thousands of residents that day,
their power and everyone in their neighborhood's power was out.
They had no information, no comfort, no sense of when their
lives would return to normal. No family should have to
experience that kind of trauma and disruption.
It is time for Columbia Gas and NiSource to answer for this
disaster. The people of the Commonwealth have had to wait too
long.
So we thank you all for coming here today for this hearing.
It will set the table for changes nationally to make sure that
no one in Massachusetts or any other state ever has to suffer
from such an accident.
Now let me turn to recognize my partner, my great partner
in the U.S. Senate from the state of Massachusetts, Senator
Elizabeth Warren.
STATEMENT OF HON. ELIZABETH WARREN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
Senator Warren. Thank you. Thank you.
[Applause.]
Senator Warren. And thank you, Senator Markey, for holding
this hearing today.
The Merrimack Valley is still reeling from the horrific
series of explosions that occurred more than two months ago.
The Rondon family lost their son, many people were injured,
dozens of homes were destroyed, and businesses shuttered, and
thousands of people are still without heat and hot water,
living in temporary housing and unable to return to their
normal lives.
The communities of Lawrence, Andover, and North Andover
have suffered immensely. I saw firsthand the destruction that
these gas explosions caused across these communities, and I
want to start by thanking our local officials and our first
responders who acted quickly on September 13 and in the days
that followed.
In particular, I want to thank Mayor Dan Rivera who has
shown strong leadership throughout this very difficult time.
[Applause.]
Senator Warren. We're here to say to everyone in the
Merrimack Valley we will keep fighting for you. We will not let
up until every last home has heat and hot water and until every
last person has been compensated for their injuries and the
disruption to their lives.
Columbia Gas and NiSource are responsible not only for
fixing this mess but also for providing financial support to
every resident and every business affected by the explosion.
This disaster, which appears was wholly preventable, is on
them. The preliminary and interim NTSB report confirms that a
series of mistakes by, and I quote, ``a Columbia Gas-contracted
work crew, which included a Columbia Gas inspector, executing
one of the Columbia Gas-designed and approved pipe replacement
projects, caused these explosions.''
Our constituents deserve answers from Columbia Gas and
NiSource. Two of them, Francisco and Esther Brega, are here in
the audience today. The explosions cost them their home.
Esther, an early childhood educator, also lost her business.
They are still waiting for answers from Columbia Gas 2 months
after the explosions, and we expect honest and thorough answers
from the company. Our constituents deserve nothing less.
This hearing is only a first step toward accountability for
this disaster. The Massachusetts Congressional Delegation has
requested that the President issue an emergency declaration for
the gas explosions. We're going to make sure that every family
and every business is made whole. Then we're going to fight so
that this never happens in another community again.
This industry has proven that safety is not its top
priority. So if they won't do what is right, then we should
make sure that the laws and regulations compel them to do what
is right.
So thank you all for being here----
[Applause.]
Senator Warren.--today. I yield.
Senator Markey. Next, we're going to hear from Senator
Maggie Hassan from New Hampshire.
STATEMENT OF HON. MAGGIE HASSAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE
Senator Hassan. Well, good morning, everybody, and thank
you, Senator Markey, for convening this hearing. I also want to
thank our Chair and Ranking Member on the Commerce Committee.
I'll just start by also extending my deepest sympathies to
the Rondon family and to all of the families and individuals
who have been impacted by this tragedy. We lost one precious
life and we all know that several others were hospitalized or
injured, families were displaced over Thanksgiving, and while
we are grateful that they are safe, going through Thanksgiving
without heat or hot water or living somewhere else is not
acceptable.
Businesses were disrupted and continue to be disrupted. We
all know that we have to not only get to the bottom of what
happened but make sure that we take steps to ensure it never
happens again in any other community.
I also want to join my colleagues here in expressing our
deepest gratitude to the men and women who worked tirelessly to
respond to these explosions, to put out fires, to provide
medical care to those who needed it. A number of those first
responders were members of the New Hampshire first responder
family and we are so grateful for the mutual aid system that
allows all of us to come together as needed in this region and
do the work to keep our citizens safe. So again my deep thanks
to all of the first responders.
We know that 131 structures were damaged, including several
homes in Lawrence, and these explosions and this destruction
was unlike anything any of our first responders or any of us
had ever seen. Armageddon indeed, Senator Markey.
I look forward to the discussion today and hope that we can
be helpful in finding ways we can prevent this kind of disaster
in the future.
To put it briefly, in the year 2018, people should be able
to be confident that they can live in a home where their gas
lines don't explode. In the year 2018, people should be
confident that when there is a problem, that the response by
industry will be swift and efficient and effective, and they
can get their heat and their hot water back.
What we saw in Lawrence and what we are continuing to see
from the industry is unacceptable. I am grateful to all of the
members of the community who came forward and who are working
so hard to mitigate the damage and mitigate the disruption for
families and businesses, but this should never have happened in
the first place, and the slow response is unacceptable and
that's one of the reasons that I think all members of our
Commerce Committee will continue to work together to determine
how we can prevent this kind of disaster, this kind of
disruption, this kind of heartbreak in the future.
Thank you.
[Applause.]
Senator Markey. Thank you. Now we're going to hear from
Congresswoman Niki Tsongas.
STATEMENT OF HON. NIKI TSONGAS,
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM MASSACHUSETTS
Ms. Tsongas. Thank you, Senator Markey, and thank you also
for chairing this hearing today. It's so important to have it
in the communities that have been impacted so that you all can
hear firsthand both from those who are responsible for the
accident and the incidents in and of themselves but also for
those responsible for oversight. So I thank you so much for
that.
And I also want to thank the Senate Committee's leadership,
John Thune of South Dakota, Bill Nelson of Florida, for their
bipartisan support for holding this field hearing today.
Given the information that we have learned from the gas
explosions that devastated the Merrimack Valley in September,
it is now clear that this disaster was entirely preventable.
Columbia Gas had a dangerously misguided and tragically
incomplete process for pipeline replacement projects and
deficient decisionmaking by a field engineer was exacerbated by
the company's appallingly weak internal review procedures.
This series of incidents, which Senator Markey has
described and appropriately so as roadmap to disaster, resulted
in the death of an innocent teenager whose family today will
courageously give voice to their terrible loss, dozens of
injuries, significant property damage, widespread panic and
fear in the hours after the accident and still ongoing, and not
to mention the ongoing crisis for families still displaced by
these explosions.
We are so fortunate to have the extraordinary first
responders, many of you here in the room today, the great
leadership, political leadership of the communities impacted,
but, nevertheless, that is no substitute for the company's
failings.
I believe Columbia Gas has a responsibility to make this
community whole and to restore the public trust, to guarantee
the safety of their customers, and to prevent another tragic
accident like this from ever happening again, and beyond that,
we in Congress have a responsibility to look at, seriously
examine, and reform the ways in which we oversee this industry.
I look forward to the testimony of those appearing before
us today.
Thank you.
[Applause.]
Senator Markey. Next, Congressman Seth Moulton.
STATEMENT OF HON. SETH MOULTON,
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM MASSACHUSETTS
Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Senator Markey, for the time and
for putting this important hearing together.
To the witnesses sitting before us, thank you for being
here and to my colleagues, Senator Markey, Senator Warren, and
Representative Tsongas, I am grateful for your partnership in
all things but in particular through the last 3 months as our
offices continue to seek answers to this tragedy and help our
communities recover.
Representative-elect Trahan, welcome. You have big shoes to
fill. We are glad you're here.
Through all of the debates of appliance replacement and
Thanksgiving dinners in recent weeks, it can become easy to
forget how absurd, how fundamentally absurd this situation is
in the first place. No American family should go home in the
evening with the fear that their house might blow up.
Okay. Terrorists in some places like Afghanistan should go
home in the evening fearing that their house might blow up but
not Massachusetts families.
What this gas company allowed to happen through their
negligence is preposterous. Too many local families spent the
coldest Thanksgiving in 80 years unable to cook dinner and we
must never forget that one innocent promising young man lost
his life.
Columbia Gas and NiSource, we appreciate the work you've
done in the weeks since this tragedy, though we will question
you on the details, but let me be clear. This situation is
absurd. Your leadership must be held accountable and it must
never happen again.
Thank God for the heroes of this story, the first
responders, who responded when the company did not. We will
never know how many lives they, you, saved. We're proud to have
you here. We're lucky to have you in our community. Thank you.
[Applause.]
Senator Markey. And while we're losing the great
Congresswoman Tsongas, we have the great replacement for her,
who will start in one month.
So we welcome you to this hearing and so I recognize
Congresswoman-elect Lori Trahan.
STATEMENT OF HON. LORI TRAHAN,
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE-ELECT FROM MASSACHUSETTS
Ms. Trahan. Thank you. Thank you, Senator Markey.
I'd like to thank Senators Markey, Warren, and Hassan for
convening this hearing today in the heart of the disaster zone
to discuss the gas explosions that rocked Lawrence, North
Andover, and Andover on September 13.
I want to thank you for the opportunity to address this
panel as the next Congresswoman representing Lawrence and
Andover.
I also want to thank Representatives Tsongas and Moulton
for their tireless work on behalf of those affected by this
accident.
I, too, want to thank the valiant efforts of our first
responders and the ongoing leadership of Mayor Rivera and so
many others.
I also want to extend my deepest condolences to the family
of Leonel Rondon and I thank them for being here bravely to
share their story with us today.
It has been 74 days. Today, there are still over 5,000
people who cannot go home and while most of the 680+ businesses
affected have been brought back online, too many owners have
waited too long to be reimbursed for their lost income, lost
wages. These people cannot wait any longer. We need these
families, these businesses, these communities to be made whole,
but we also need the people across this state to feel safe and
secure.
We can replace heat and appliances, but we need to get to
the root cause of this disaster, to restore confidence and
faith that our pipelines are safe and that this will never
happen again.
We need answers from Columbia Gas so that we can bring out
every lesson from this disaster. I urge the representatives
from Columbia Gas and NiSource to fully cooperate with the
hearing, with the NTSB, and with all the investigations so that
we can co-produce safety protocols and prescriptions for the
future.
I urge Columbia Gas and NiSource at a minimum to adopt API-
recommended Practice 1173, the gold standard of safety
practices for pipelines. API-1173 was born out of another
pipeline disaster where 840,000 gallons of crude oil were
dumped into wetlands in the Kalamazoo River in Michigan in
2010.
These standards are strict but they are the equivalent to
the same safety standards governing our airlines, our chemical
plants, and our nuclear power. Adopting these standards will
ensure continuous improvement to increasing safety in the
pipeline industry.
I would like to thank the panel for this important work. I
look forward to working with you on this issue and helping the
people of the Merrimack Valley as we continue to cope with the
aftermath, ensure safety and comfort, and restore this
community's confidence.
Thank you.
[Applause.]
Senator Markey. Now I would like to begin the hearing by
inviting up the Rondon family, Lucy, Miguel, and Rosalie, to
join us to tell their story about September 13, and the
terrible loss which their family experienced when their brother
and son, Leonel, was killed.
I know that everyone in this room expresses their
condolences, shares their grief, and wants their family to know
that we are here for them and we want to, as well, thank them
for their strength, thank them for their willingness to speak
here today, because their story is a story which must be heard
in order to ensure that we do put the laws on the books that
ensure that it never happens again.
So let us then turn to the family and ask if you would
begin to tell the story of what happened on that day.
STATEMENT OF LUCYANNIE RONDON,
SISTER OF LEONEL RONDON
Ms. Rondon. So for all of you who don't know me, my name is
Lucyannie Rondon. I am the sister of Leonel Rondon.
Words cannot describe the pain my family and I feel at the
loss of my brother Leonel. Some days I can almost hear him call
me looking for my mother, filling up the room with his smile.
He had such a warm heart. This senseless tragedy was the
beginning of many things that my family and I will never do
with Leonel again.
My mother will never make him his favorite meal of shrimp
and totonacas again. My daughter Riannie will never dance to
her Uncle Leonel's music he created just for her. Our little
brother Yunite will never go to the movies with Leonel again.
We will never forget him. We will not let this loss be
without meaning. The grief we feel is unbearable but we know
Leonel want us to stay strong. We will stand with the community
on his behalf.
Even as a young boy, he was so kind to others. He shoveled
the snow for our neighbors. He carried groceries for the older
people in our neighborhood. We will not have the joy of seeing
the wonderful man we know he would have become.
I stand in front of you in his honor. I will never have my
brother back. We hope there will be justice for him and the
community. Nobody should ever go through what my family has
gone through ever again.
Thank you.
[Applause.]
Senator Markey. So our thanks to the Rondon family. Your
powerful statement is something that we'll always remember and
I think it is very important for us to hear your story because
that will now help everyone to understand the importance of the
hearing which we are about to have and why we must heed your
warning that this should never happen again to any other
family. So thank you so much for being here.
Now I would like to ask for the first panel to come up and
to be seated in front of your cards and that would be the
Honorable Robert Sumwalt, the Chairman of the National
Transportation Safety Board; the Honorable Matthew Beaton,
Secretary of the Massachusetts Executive Office of Energy and
Environmental Affairs; Mr. Steve Bryant, the President of
Columbia Gas of Massachusetts; Mr. Joe Hamrock, President and
Chief Executive Officer of NiSource from Columbus, Ohio; Mr.
Richard Kuprewicz, President of Accufacts, Incorporated; and
Mr. Paul Roberti, Chief Counsel of the Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration in Washington, D.C.
So if you could all please stand, thank you, please raise
your right hand.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Senator Markey. Let the record reflect that each answered
affirmatively.
Chairman Sumwalt, if you could begin your testimony and
outline what you have found about what happened here in
Lawrence.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT L. SUMWALT III, CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL
TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
Mr. Sumwalt. Thank you, Senator Markey. Good morning,
Senator Markey and Distinguished Members of Congress, Senator
Warren, Senator Hassan, Congresswoman Tsongas, Congressman
Moulton.
Thank you for inviting the NTSB to testify this morning
about the NTSB's investigation into the September fires and
explosion here in the Merrimack Valley.
I'd like to begin by offering our sincerest sympathies to
all of those who've been affected by this tragedy.
As you know, the NTSB is an independent Federal agency.
We're charged by Congress to investigate transportation
accidents, to determine the probable cause, and issue safety
recommendations to prevent the reoccurrence of those accidents.
We are not in the business of assigning blame or pointing
fingers.
Like with you, our goals are to determine what happened,
why it happened, and what can be done to keep it from happening
in the future?
So based on our investigation so far, we know that the
over-pressurization of a low pressure natural gas distribution
system is what initiated the accident sequence. Prior to the
over-pressurization, crews were replacing the older cast iron
distribution line with new plastic lines.
However, the sensing lines that are necessary for detecting
and controlling pressure were not relocated to the new pipe.
So, of course, once the old pipe was capped off, gas flow and
pressure became substantially reduced and because the sensing
lines were connected to the old pipes, which now had low flow
and low pressure, the pressure regulator commanded for a full
flow of high-pressure gas into the low-pressure distribution
system. This led to explosions and fires which were ignited by
gas-fueled appliances.
Why did it happen? We know that the tasks required for this
work were developed and approved by Columbia Gas and did not
account for the location of the sensing lines. Therefore, they
did not require their relocation to the new pipes.
We know that not all of Columbia Gas's internal departments
were required to review the plans nor were they required to be
approved by a professional engineer, also known as a PE.
Further, we know that a practice had been discontinued
several years ago by Columbia Gas that required personnel to be
in place to monitor work on the gas mains and be available to
immediately respond to any abnormalities.
Our investigation will further look into why the placement
of the regulator sensing line was not considered in the
planning phase and why it was not caught by inspectors.
As Chairman of the NTSB, I want you to know that I've
placed a high priority on properly completing this
investigation, but as you can imagine, an investigation such as
this is very complex and it will take time, but my commitment
is we will do a good job and we will come up with
recommendations to keep it from happening again.
And as Senator Markey mentioned, two weeks ago, we issued
five interim safety recommendations as a result of this
investigation, including four recommendations which we
classified as urgent recommendations.
Now we only issue urgent safety recommendations when we
determine that the course of action requires immediate
attention to avoid imminent loss due to a similar situation.
One recommendation was issued to the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts where we called for requiring the seal of a
professional engineer on all public utility engineering
drawings. We issued the four urgent safety recommendations to
NiSource, which, of course, is the pipeline owner operating as
Columbia Gas of Massachusetts.
First, to NiSource, they should revise the engineering and
constructability review process to include all internal
documents and require plans to be sealed by a PE prior to
construction.
Second, they should ensure that all natural gas system
records are complete and readily available.
Third, NiSource should incorporate risk assessment into
project development.
And last, while any modifications are being made to gas
mains, NiSource should actively monitor pressures and require
personnel to be in place to immediately respond to any abnormal
changes in the pipeline system.
In the interest of public safety, the NTSB urges
expeditious implementation of each of these five interim safety
recommendations.
We stand ready to work with you and the Committee to
continue improving the safety of our Nation's pipeline system.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify and I look forward
to your questions.
[The prepared testimony of Mr. Sumwalt follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Robert L. Sumwalt III, Chairman,
National Transportation Safety Board
Good morning Senator Markey. Thank you for inviting the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) to testify today.
The NTSB is an independent Federal agency charged by Congress with
investigating major transportation disasters--including pipelines. We
determine the probable cause of accidents and issue safety
recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. We do not assign
fault nor place blame.
On September 13, 2018, about 4:00 p.m. eastern daylight time, a
series of explosions and fires occurred after high-pressure natural gas
was released into a low-pressure gas distribution system in the
northeast region of the Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts. The
distribution system was owned and operated by Columbia Gas of
Massachusetts (Columbia Gas), a subsidiary of NiSource, Inc. The system
overpressure damaged 131 structures, including at least 5 homes that
were destroyed in the City of Lawrence and the towns of Andover and
North Andover. Most of the damage was a result of structure fires
ignited by gas-fueled appliances. Several structures were destroyed by
natural gas explosions. One person was killed and at least 21
individuals, including 2 firefighters, were transported to the
hospital. Seven other firefighters received minor injuries.
On behalf of the entire NTSB, I would like to begin by offering my
sincerest sympathies, to all of those in the Merrimack Valley who have
been impacted by this tragedy. Our investigation continues, and our
commitment is to keep the Commerce Committee informed of any updates,
along with all those affected by this tragic event.
Including this tragedy, we are currently investigating seven
natural gas pipeline explosions in which lives were lost, homes
destroyed, and communities severely affected. Further, we have
successfully completed over 120 pipeline investigations and issued more
than 1,300 pipeline safety recommendations, with over 80 percent closed
favorably, since 1967.
We launched this investigation to answer the very questions that
you have raised:
What happened?
Why did it happen?
What can be done to make sure that it never happens again?
What happened?
Based on our investigation so far, we know that over-pressurization
of a low-pressure natural gas distribution system initiated the
accident sequence.
The cast-iron, low-pressure distribution system was installed in
the early 1900s and had been partially improved with both steel and
plastic pipe upgrades since the 1950s. The low-pressure distribution
system in the affected area relied on 14 regulator stations to control
gas at the required pressure into structures serviced by the system,
unlike high-pressure gas distribution systems that place an individual
regulator to reduce pressure at each customer service. Each of the
regulator stations reduced the pressure from about 75-pounds per square
inch gauge (psig) natural gas main pipeline to 12 inches of water
column (about 0.5 psig) for delivery to customers.
Prior to the accident, Columbia Gas had an overarching plan
consisting of multiple projects to replace 7,595 feet of low-pressure,
existing cast-iron and plastic natural gas main with 4,845 feet of low-
pressure and high-pressure plastic gas main on South Union Street and
neighboring streets.
On September 13, prior to the overpressure event, a Columbia Gas-
contracted work crew, which included a Columbia Gas inspector, executed
one of the Columbia Gas-designed and--approved pipe-replacement
projects at the intersection of South Union Street and Salem Street in
South Lawrence. The project was to install a plastic distribution main
and abandon in place a cast-iron distribution main. The distribution
main that was abandoned still had the regulator-sensing lines that were
used to detect pressure in the distribution system and provide input to
the regulators to control the system pressure. Once the contractor
crews disconnected the distribution main that was being abandoned, the
section containing the regulator-sensing lines began losing pressure.
As the pressure in the abandoned distribution main dropped to about
0.01 psig, the regulators responded by opening further, increasing
pressure in the distribution system. The regulators opened completely
when they no longer sensed system pressure, allowing the full flow of
high-pressure gas to release into the distribution system supplying the
neighborhood. As a result, natural gas was delivered to customers at a
pressure well above the maximum-allowable operating pressure which led
to the ignition of fires and explosions in homes.
Minutes before the fires and explosions occurred, the Columbia Gas
monitoring center in Columbus, Ohio, received two high-pressure alarms
for the South Lawrence gas pressure system: one at 4:04 p.m. and the
other at 4:05 p.m. The monitoring center had no control capability to
close or open valves; its only capability was to monitor pressures on
the distribution system and advise field technicians accordingly.
Following company protocol, at 4:06 p.m., the Columbia Gas controller
reported the high-pressure event to the Meters and Regulations group in
Lawrence. A local resident made the first 9-1-1 call to Lawrence
Emergency Services at 4:11 p.m.
In response, three technicians were dispatched to perform field
checks on 14 regulators. Columbia Gas shut down the regulator at issue
by about 4:30 p.m. The critical valves of the natural gas distribution
system were closed by 7:24 p.m. Beginning about midnight, crews
consisting of two Columbia Gas technicians escorted by two emergency
response personnel began shutting off the meters at each house to
isolate the homes from the natural gas distribution system. All meters
were shut off by the following morning.
Why did this happen?
We know that the tasks required for this work were developed and
approved by the utility and did not account for the location of the
sensing lines. Therefore, they did not require their relocation so that
the actual system pressure was detected and controlled. We know that
not all of the utility's internal departments were required to review
the plans nor were they required to be approved by a professional
engineer, who then places his/her official seal on the documents (a
process known as ``sealing''). Further, we know that a practice had
been discontinued several years ago that required personnel to be in
place to monitor work on gas mains and be available to immediately
respond to any abnormalities.
Our investigation will further look into why the placement of the
regulator sensing lines were not considered in the planning phase and
why it was not caught by inspectors. We are also looking at the
response by Columbia Gas of Massachusetts once the event started to
determine if actions taken were timely and appropriate.
Urgent Safety Recommendations: What can be done to make sure that it
never happens again?
Our investigations are thorough, and it will take some time for us
to issue a final report regarding the probable cause and to make
recommendations to improve safety. However, as in all of our
investigations, if we identify safety issues requiring immediate
action, we have the capability to issue interim safety recommendations.
In fact, recently, we issued five interim safety recommendations as a
result of this investigation, including four which are classified as
``urgent.'' We only issue urgent recommendations when we determine that
the course of action requires immediate attention to avoid imminent
loss due to a similar accident.
One recommendation calls upon the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to
eliminate the existing professional licensure exemptions and require
the seal of a professional engineer (PE) on all public utility
engineering drawings. The NTSB believes that it is critical that an
engineer with appropriate qualifications and experience review
engineering plans for a gas company, if not develop them. The
Commonwealth of Massachusetts exemption for the requirement of PE
licensure to perform ``industrial'' and public utility work forecloses
an opportunity to detect this design oversight. The seal of a PE should
be required on all public utility engineering plans to reduce the
likelihood of accidents such as this occurring.
We issued the four urgent safety recommendations to NiSource, the
pipeline owner, operating as Columbia Gas of Massachusetts.
First, revise the engineering and constructability review process
to include all internal departments and require plans to be sealed by a
professional engineer prior to construction.
Second, ensure that all natural gas systems records are complete
and readily available. Third, incorporate risk assessments into project
development. Lastly, while any modifications are being made to gas
mains, actively monitor pressures and require personnel to be in place
to immediately respond to any abnormal changes in the pipeline system.
Conclusion
Over the last 51 years, our investigations have found that safe
operation of pipelines is a shared responsibility among operators,
government oversight agencies, and local communities.
Pipelines remain one of the safest and most efficient means of
transporting vital commodities used to power homes and supply
businesses. However, as many in this room know all too well, the
consequences are tragic when there is insufficient safety planning and
oversight. To that end, the NTSB urges expeditious implementation of
all five interim safety recommendations.
We recognize the progress that has been made; yet, there will
always be room for improvement. The NTSB stands ready to work with you
and this Committee to continue improving the safety of our Nation's
pipeline systems.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today. I am happy to
answer your questions.
Senator Markey. Secretary Beaton.
STATEMENT OF HON. MATTHEW A. BEATON, SECRETARY,
MASSACHUSETTS EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF ENERGY
AND ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS
Mr. Beaton. Thank you, Senator. Senator Markey, Senator
Warren, Senator Hassan, Congressman Moulton and Congresswoman
Tsongas, thank you for the opportunity to provide testimony on
behalf of the Baker-Polito Administration.
As Massachusetts Secretary of Energy and Environment, I
oversee the Commonwealth's six environmental natural resource
and energy regulatory agencies. One of those agencies, the
Department of Public Utilities, is the Commonwealth agency with
jurisdiction over natural gas infrastructure.
An annual certification provided by PHMSA grants the
Department of Public Utilities' Division of Pipeline Safety the
authority to oversee intrastate pipeline facilities and gives
the division the responsibility of pipeline inspections and the
enforcement of operator compliance with Federal and state rules
and regulations.
When the division conducts pipeline safety inspections, a
company's site work is checked against approved plans and
programs for consistency. PHMSA annually evaluates the
department's effectiveness and PHMSA's 2017 evaluation of the
DPU gave the Commonwealth's Pipeline Safety Program a perfect
score for incident investigations, program inspection
procedures, damage prevention, field inspections, and
compliance activities.
Massachusetts' PHMSA evaluations have trended upward from a
score of 89.3 in 2014 to a score of 97.4 percent in 2017.
Turning to the events of September 13, immediately
following the fires and explosions in Lawrence, Andover, and
North Andover, the Commonwealth mobilized emergency response
capabilities through MEMA and the State Police, establishing a
mobile incident command center in Lawrence to assist the
municipalities.
Within hours of the incident, the Governor, Lt. Governor,
myself, and a number of administration staff arrived onsite and
immediately began assessing the emergency response capabilities
of Columbia Gas, worked with National Grid to cut electric
power throughout the impact area, and dispatched the Director
of Pipeline Safety and three DPU inspectors.
Given the magnitude of the emergency and the insufficient
response from Columbia Gas within the first 24 hours, Governor
Baker issued a Declaration of Emergency by 3 p.m. on Friday,
September 14. This Declaration ultimately led to an
unprecedented DPU order directing EverSource Energy to take
management control over the effort to safely restore utility
services.
Subsequently, EverSource, with the oversight and support of
the Administration, led an effort with over 1,000 mutual aid
resources, to clear and make safe every structure within the
impact zone, restore gas service to thousands of unaffected
customers, and restore electric power to 18,000 customers.
Another DPU order on September 21 appointed Joe Albanese of
Commodore Recovery, LLC, as the Chief Recovery Officer to
manage and coordinate the restoration efforts, which included
building a command and control organization charged with
restoring service to over 8,400 gas meters impacting more than
10,000 dwellings and 680 businesses.
Since September 13, myself and EEA staff have maintained a
daily presence to coordinate and oversee the standup,
transition, and implementation of recovery operations. The
Baker-Polito Administration continues to maintain a daily
support function in these operations.
Simultaneous with the mobilization of recovery efforts, the
Baker-Polito Administration quickly turned to ensuring both the
continued safety and integrity of natural gas infrastructure in
the Commonwealth.
After a September 26 announcement to hire an independent
evaluator, the DPU selected Dynamic Risk Assessment Systems
earlier this month to examine the operation and maintenance
policies and practices of the Commonwealth's gas distribution
companies as well as the physical integrity of the
Commonwealth's gas distribution system.
On October 8 and 12, respectively, the DPU issued moratoria
on all work, except emergency and compliance work, in both
National Grid and Columbia Gas's service territories.
Last week, in coordination with the Northeast Gas
Association, the Baker-Polito Administration made a first in
the Nation announcement that all natural gas distribution
companies in Massachusetts will adopt a pipeline safety
management system, referred to as API-1173 that we already
heard about.
Additionally, the Baker-Polito Administration filed
legislation last week to ensure that all gas utility work that
could pose a material risk to public safety is reviewed and
approved by a certified professional engineer.
It is our hope that the actions taken in Massachusetts will
initiate a conversation on the national level regarding
appropriate industry standards and protocols to prevent such
disasters in the future.
In closing, this was undoubtedly a devastating and
unfortunate incident that resulted in a tremendous loss for
many residents of the Merrimack Valley.
While there were unacceptable oversights that led to the
incident and a challenging initial response, I do want to make
note of the genuine commitment to restoration that I have
observed from NiSource, particularly from their hundreds of
dedicated employees who have left their families and relocated
themselves in an effort to restore the quality of life as best
possible here in the Merrimack Valley.
I would also like to thank the Mayor of Lawrence, the Town
Managers of Andover and North Andover, and the countless local,
state, and Federal officials and first responders who have
partnered with us throughout this effort.
The leadership and service of these individuals to our
communities is commendable and has been an essential element to
this restoration effort.
Additionally, I would like to thank PHMSA and NTSB for
their support, the multiple companies and utilities, along with
the 4,500 plumbers, electricians, mutual aid workers,
contractors, linguists, and staff who united under the common
mission of restoration of the region.
And, finally, EverSource Energy is also deserving of our
gratitude for their willingness to rise to the challenge
associated with securing homes and businesses in the immediate
aftermath of events and restoring utility services to impacted
residents and businesses. Their leadership and ability to
quickly mobilize resources was invaluable to the Commonwealth.
Thank you again to the Committee for the opportunity to
provide testimony on this issue and I look forward to answering
any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Beaton follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Matthew A. Beaton, Secretary, Massachusetts
Executive Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs
Senator Markey, Senator Warren and members of the Senate Committee
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, thank you for the opportunity
to provide testimony on behalf of the Baker-Polito Administration
regarding pipeline safety in Massachusetts and the response to the
Merrimack Valley overpressurization event that occurred the afternoon
of September 13, 2018.
In the wake of this incident, which was caused by the release of
high-pressure natural gas into a low-pressure gas distribution system,
the Baker-Polito Administration immediately began coordinating relief
efforts for residents and businesses displaced by the disaster. In
addition to these relief efforts we took the following measures to
assess and restore the safety and integrity of our pipeline
infrastructure:
declared a State of Emergency;
directed Eversource to lead gas restoration efforts in
Columbia Gas' service territory;
directed Columbia Gas to hire an independent Chief Recovery
Officer;
issued moratoria on all natural gas work, excluding
emergency and compliance work in two natural gas service
territories;
issued an RFP and subsequently contracted with an
independent evaluator to conduct a comprehensive safety
evaluation of Massachusetts' natural gas infrastructure;
coordinated efforts to secure a commitment from all local
gas distribution companies in the Commonwealth to adhere to
industry best practices; and
filed legislation to implement the November 14, 2018
recommendation of the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) to help prevent over-pressurization events in the
future.
Before diving into further details regarding the Administration's
response in the immediate aftermath of the fires and explosions in
Lawrence, Andover, and North Andover, I'd like to first provide a brief
overview of the Secretariat of Energy and Environmental Affairs'
jurisdiction over intrastate natural gas pipeline safety in the
Commonwealth.
During the course of my testimony, I will be unable to discuss the
content of the ongoing investigations by both the NTSB and the
Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities (DPU) Division of Pipeline
Safety (Division), as I do not want to prejudice those investigations.
Overview of EEA Organization and DPU Jurisdiction
As the Massachusetts Secretary of Energy and Environment, I oversee
the Commonwealth's six environmental, natural resource and energy
regulatory agencies, which include the Departments of Environmental
Protection, Public Utilities, Energy Resources, Conservation &
Recreation, Agricultural Resources, and Fish and Game. The
Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities (DPU) is the Commonwealth
agency with jurisdiction over investor-owned electric power, natural
gas, and water companies, as well as bus companies, moving companies,
and transportation network companies.
Notably, the DPU is the state agency that has assumed the
responsibility for intrastate pipeline facilities, pursuant to Federal
delegation by the Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety Administration
(PHMSA) (49 USC 60105) and State law (MGL Chapter 164 Sec. 105A). Under
the annual certification provided by PHMSA to delegate its authority,
the Department of Public Utilities' Division of Pipeline Safety is
responsible for pipeline inspections, compliance and enforcement of
Federal and state rules, regulations, orders, safety programs, accident
investigations, record maintenance and reporting.
The Division's Public Utility Engineers (PUEs) are charged with
performing random and scheduled on-site audits and inspections of
intrastate natural gas pipeline distribution facilities and pipeline
crews, including reviews of crew qualifications, methods of work, and
drug and alcohol screening. These PUEs also perform pipeline corrosion
inspections and inspections of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) facilities,
as well as assist with the investigation of accidents involving public
utility organizations to determine the cause and origin of the
incident.
It should be noted that, except in instances involving the two
ongoing moratoria, the Division does not approve routine pipeline work
in the Commonwealth; however, companies are required (per 220 CMR
101.04) to notify the Division 48 hours in advance of the start of
construction of pipeline installations projects of 5,000 feet or more.
The Division is also responsible for reviewing, every 5 years per
PHMSA guidelines, programs and plans of the natural gas distribution
companies, to ensure consistency with Federal and state rules and
regulations, such as:
Operations & Maintenance Plan;
Operator Qualification Program;
Public Awareness Program;
Distribution Integrity Management Program (DIMP); and
Transmission Integrity Management Program (TIMP).
In addition to the Division's review of these plans and programs,
the Commission of the DPU annually reviews and approves Emergency
Response Plans of natural gas distribution companies in the
Commonwealth.
When the Division conducts onsite pipeline safety inspections, a
company's site work is checked against these plans and programs for
consistency. If the Division finds deficiencies in either these plans
and programs or the site work conducted by a company, they initiate an
investigation which may lead to the issuance of fines, penalties and
corrective actions. In response to violations of Federal and State
regulations, the Department of Public Utilities can issue a $200,000
fine for each violation and a maximum civil penalty of up to
$2,000,000(49 USC 60122; 220 CMR 59).
Since 2016, the DPU has undertaken a number of proactive actions to
increase pipeline safety in the Commonwealth, which notably includes
the Division annually developing a risk-based inspection plan to ensure
the targeted deployment of inspection resources on the activities,
plans, programs and infrastructure that pose the greatest safety risk.
In 2016, the Division also initiated an investigation of all district
pressure regulation stations to ensure compliance with Federal
regulations (49 CFR Part 192.619). When the Division discovered that
some district regulator stations were set at the Maximum Allowable
Operating Pressure (``MAOP''), they advised all companies of the risks
associated with this. Setting pressure at the MAOP is not a violation
of Federal regulations; however, Columbia voluntarily agreed to lower
the operating pressure.
Timeline of the Immediate Response to Events of September 13, 2018
On the afternoon of September 13, 2018, immediately following the
fires and explosions in the cities of Lawrence, Andover and North
Andover, the Commonwealth mobilized emergency response capabilities
through the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) and the
State Police, establishing a mobile State Police Incident Command
Center in Lawrence, MA.
Within hours of the incident, the Governor, Lieutenant Governor,
myself and a number of administration officials arrived on-site. Our
primary goal was to stabilize the situation and ensure local officials
had the resources and information necessary to extinguish fires, clear
and secure buildings and set-up shelters for displaced residents.
We simultaneously began assessing the emergency response
capabilities of Columbia Gas, worked with National Grid to cut electric
power throughout the impacted area and through the Department of Public
Utilities, dispatched the Director of Pipeline Safety and three DPU
inspectors to the Merrimack Valley region. Given the unprecedented
emergency circumstances coupled with the insufficient response from
Columbia Gas within the first 24 hours of emergency response, Governor
Baker issued a Declaration of Emergency by 3PM on Friday September 14,
2018.
This declaration authorized DPU Chairman Angela O'Connor, pursuant
to section 4B of MGL Chapter 25, to take any action ``necessary to
assure public safety and welfare through the priority restoration or
continuing availability of gas, electric, and water utility services.''
Under this authorization and in response to the need for experienced
management capable of advanced resource coordination and effective
communication, Chairman O'Connor promptly directed Eversource to take
management control over the effort to safely restore utility services.
Subsequently, Eversource, with the oversight and support of the
Administration, led an effort with over 1,000 mutual aid resources, to
shut off gas service, clear and make safe every structure within the
impact zone, restore gas service to over 10,000 customers outside the
impact zone and restore electric power to 18,000 customers.
Shortly thereafter, on September 21, 2018, DPU Chairman O'Connor
appointed, Joe Albanese, Commodore Recovery LLC, as the Chief Recovery
Officer, to manage and coordinate the restoration efforts. Joe is the
Founder, President and CEO of Commodore Builders.
Joe leveraged his 28 years of military service, including 20 years
with the Naval Construction Forces, to build a command and control
organization, consisting of over 14 divisions, supporting the mission
to safely restore services to over 8,400 gas meters impacting more than
10,000 dwellings and 680 businesses. In coordination with Baker-Polito
Administration and NiSource, the restoration effort has been effective
in:
mobilizing over 4,500 plumbers, electricians, mutual aid
workers, contractors, linguists and staff;
replacing 43.3 miles of main pipeline and 5,086 service
lines;
sourcing and distributing 14,000 hot plates and thousands of
space heaters;
arranging for alternative housing options (Hotels, RVs,
Apartments) to accommodate over 6,000 families;
maintain a shelter & warming center to accommodate an
additional 1,000 individuals;
installing over 25,000 smoke and carbon monoxide detectors;
and
launching 3 claims and business centers in Andover, Lawrence
and North Andover to provide in-person assistance.
Since September 13, 2018, I maintained a constant presence, 7-days
a week, with staff from my Secretariat and the Governor's office to
assist in the building and implementation of recovery operations. To
date, the Baker-Polito Administration continues to maintain a daily
support function in these operations.
Notably, the Administration has been committed to deploying energy
efficient products during all phases of the restoration. That effort
will not end when the natural gas service is restored to the Merrimack
Valley and we are pleased that Columbia Gas has announced the launch of
a targeted weatherization and energy efficiency campaign in the three
affected communities. We have been in discussions with the company
regarding the components of the program, but will certainly focus on
deployment of insulation, as well as air source heat pumps and
anticipate launching the program with the new 3-year energy efficiency
plan that will commence on January 1st.
Ongoing Reviews of Natural Gas Safety
Simultaneous with the mobilization of restoration and recovery
efforts, the Baker-Polito Administration quickly turned to ensuring
both the continued safety and integrity of natural gas infrastructure
in the Commonwealth.
On September 26, 2018, after considering other states' actions in
the aftermath of significant gas incidents and in consultation with
PHMSA, the DPU announced the intent to hire an independent evaluator to
assess, out of an abundance of caution, the safety of pipeline
infrastructure throughout the Commonwealth. The selection of Dynamic
Risk Assessment Systems, Inc., a Texas based firm with industry-leading
technical expertise in pipeline risk and asset integrity management,
was recently publicized on November 1, 2018.
Dynamic Risk will examine the operation and maintenance policies
and practices of the Commonwealth's gas distribution companies,
including municipal gas companies. The independent evaluator will also
examine the physical integrity of the Commonwealth's gas distribution
system. A preliminary report, which will complement the NTSB's ongoing
review, is expected within 120 days. We anticipate that the independent
evaluator's report will provide concrete recommendations regarding
improving the integrity and safe operation of the Commonwealth's aged
natural gas infrastructure.
Following another natural gas overpressurization event in Woburn,
on October 8, 2018, Chairman O'Connor issued a moratorium on all work,
except emergency and required compliance work, in National Grid's
service territory, citing a ``persistent disregard for Federal and
state pipeline safety regulations.'' This moratorium came on the heels
of a September 26, 2018 letter to National Grid, detailing 29 possible
violations of pipeline safety regulations by the company and a
September 28, 2018 request to the company for additional information
regarding pipeline activities in the company's territory. National Grid
has responded to these allegations and the Division has issued
additional discovery to the company and is continuing to investigate
these possible violations.
On October 12, 2018, following the issuance of the National
Transportation Safety Board's preliminary report, the DPU also issued a
moratorium on all non-emergency or compliance work in Columbia Gas'
service territory.
Last week, in coordination with the Northeast Gas Association
(NGA), the Baker-Polito Administration announced that all natural gas
distribution companies in Massachusetts committed to adopting industry
best practices--a Pipeline Safety Management System: American Petroleum
Institute's (API) Recommended Practice 1173. This marks the first time
an entire state has committed to Recommend Practices 1173, which was
developed in the aftermath of high-profile natural gas incidents like
the 2010 San Bruno disaster.
Finally, in response to the NTSB's November 14 recommendations, the
Baker-Polito Administration also filed legislation last week to ensure
that gas utility work that could pose a material risk to public safety
is reviewed and approved by a certified professional engineer.
Currently, Massachusetts is one of many states that exempt public
utility companies' work from needing the approval of certified
professional engineers.
Lessons Learned and Recommendations
While I've provided an overview of Massachusetts' response to the
events of September 13, 2018, both the NTSB report and the
recommendations of the Independent Evaluator hired by the DPU will
provide further insight into additional changes in protocols,
regulation, and statute to ensure gas pipeline safety in the
Commonwealth.
The Baker-Polito Administration looks forward to working with the
Massachusetts Legislature to pass the legislation we filed last week to
implement the first NTSB statutory recommendation and we are encouraged
by the Commonwealth's natural gas system operator's national leading
agreement to adhere to best practices. We hope both of these efforts
will initiate a conversation at the national level regarding
appropriate industry standards and protocols to prevent such disasters
in the future.
The issue of pipeline inspectors has also been an area of public
scrutiny in the wake of the Merrimack Valley overpressurization event;
however, based on the information made publicly available to date, we
believe that no additional number of inspectors could have prevented
this incident. PHMSA recommends a total of 10 Public Utility Engineers
(PUEs), which includes both the certified inspectors and those PUEs
undergoing federally mandated pipeline inspector certification.
Since 2014, the number of PUEs in the Division has annually
averaged at between 10-12 positions. The Pipeline Safety Division
currently employs 8 natural gas public utility engineers (PUEs)--which
includes 6 certified inspectors and 2 PUEs undergoing the Federal
certification process. In addition to these 8 PUEs, three (3) new PUEs
are expected to begin employment in mid-December, and the Division is
in the process of hiring two (2) additional PUEs and one (1) Assistant
Director of Pipeline Safety.
In 2017, the Division's pipeline inspectors conducted 1,177
inspections, up from 880 in 2016. Additionally, PHMSA annually
evaluates the Commonwealth's effectiveness and PHMSA's 2017 Evaluation
of the Department of Public Utilities gave the Commonwealth's Pipeline
Safety program a perfect score for incident investigations, program
inspection procedures, damage prevention, field inspections, and
compliance activities. Massachusetts PHMSA evaluations have trended
upwards from a score of 89.3 percent in 2014 to a score of 97.4 percent
in 2017.
The focus on pipeline inspector numbers has, however, highlighted
the issue of retaining qualified pipeline inspectors, which we
understand is a challenge not unique to Massachusetts and is a topic
worth further exploration.
Conclusion
The Baker-Polito Administration, the Executive Office of Energy and
Environmental Affairs and the Department of Public Utilities look
forward to a continued dialogue with the Committee regarding all of
these issues to ensure the safety of Massachusetts' natural gas
infrastructure.
We look forward to the results of the NTSBs full review of the
causes of the overpressurization event that occurred on September 13,
2018 and stand ready to implement both the recommendations of the NTSB
and the Commonwealth's independent evaluator.
In closing, I would like to note that this was a devastating and
unfortunate incident that resulted in tremendous loss for many
residents of the Merrimack Valley. While there were unacceptable
oversights that led to the incident and a slow initial response, I do
want to make note of the genuine commitment and dedication I have
observed from NiSource, particularly from their hundreds of dedicated
employees who have left their families and relocated themselves in an
effort to restore the quality of life, as best possible, for the
residents of Merrimack Valley. I would also like to thank the Mayor of
Lawrence, the town managers of Andover and North Andover and the
countless local, state, and Federal officials who have partnered with
us throughout this effort to break down barriers and collaborate on
solutions to a number of complex situations throughout the restoration.
The leadership and service of these individuals to our communities is
commendable and has been an essential element of this restoration.
Additionally, I would like to thank the multiple companies and
utilities, along with the 4,500 plumbers, electricians, mutual aid
workers, contractors, linguists and staff who united under the common
mission of restoration of the region.
Finally, Eversource is also deserving of our gratitude for their
willingness to rise to the immediate challenge associated with securing
homes and businesses in the immediate aftermath of events and restoring
utility services to impacted residents and businesses. Their leadership
and ability to quickly mobilize resources was invaluable to the
Commonwealth.
Thank you again to the Committee for the opportunity to provide
testimony on this important issue.
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Next, we're going to hear from Steve Bryant, the President
of Columbia Gas of Massachusetts.
STATEMENT OF STEVE BRYANT, PRESIDENT,
COLUMBIA GAS OF MASSACHUSETTS
Mr. Bryant. Good morning. Good morning, Senator Markey,
other Members of Congress, Merrimack Valley leaders and
residents.
Thank you for holding this hearing. We appreciate the
opportunity to answer your questions.
We know the tragedy of September 13 will have a lasting
impact on the communities of Lawrence, Andover, and North
Andover.
As we talk today about steps we are taking to respond, we
are deeply aware of the suffering, disruption, and unrest this
tragedy has caused. Our company's committed to addressing and
remediating the damage that has occurred and to helping the
community heal.
I want to take a moment to thank our partners in the effort
to help residents who have been impacted by this tragedy, the
first responders, Captain Joe Albanese and Rear Admiral Richard
C. Long, Governor Baker, Lt. Governor Polito, and Attorney
General Healey, Merrimack Valley community leaders, and other
public officials, EverSource, and more than 450 mutual aid
workers from utilities across the country. I say thank you.
What this group has done to protect, assist, and restore
the Merrimack Valley has been remarkable and we are grateful.
We have submitted a full statement for the record and I
will focus here on some of the immediate steps we are taking to
support our customers. I also want to speak about the claims
process for making our customers whole. I want to be clear up
front. We know we have more to do to improve the work that is
already underway.
We've worked since the tragedy to address residents'
immediate needs and to establish a process to reimburse losses.
Within 6 hours of the explosion, we established a dedicated
customer service line and within 48 hours, we opened the first
claims center in Lawrence. We have since opened two additional
claims centers in Andover and North Andover.
Families visiting the claims center can receive direct
financial aid to help address immediate needs for food,
supplies, and transportation while they begin the work with
claims personnel.
We bought temporary cooking equipment and worked with fire
officials to make sure residents who received equipment have
proper safety information. We inspected thousands of homes to
see if they could utilize space heaters and added smoke and
carbon monoxide detectors.
We have installed or provided reimbursement for alternate
fuel solutions so that residents could have heat and hot water
before gas service is restored. We secured temporary housing
for affected customers. We also brought in offshore housing for
workers leading the effort to restore gas service so our
customers could be placed closer to their homes and closer to
work.
As of November 24, we have had over 18,000 visits to our
claims center. We have added more resources to the center to
make sure we are processing claims quickly, accurately, and
efficiently. Nearly 400 adjustors support the claims process to
date and we have processed over 23,000 claims.
Affected customers who've not yet filed claims should call
1-800-590-5571 and we also have people in the room today, so if
we have customers that are impacted, we have claims adjustors.
I just ask you put your hands up and indicate where you are, so
please.
We've also added information to the Columbia Gas website
explaining how customers can escalate concerns with an adjustor
and we are listening to feedback from the community and from
you to improve our claims process and to make it as easy as
possible.
We recognize that the impacted communities will have needs
that go beyond this assistance. In the days following the
event, we donated $10 million to the Greater Lawrence Disaster
Relief Fund to support the short- and medium-term needs of
affected residents.
We recently doubled our commitment, donating another $10
million to support businesses in the Merrimack Valley.
Joe Hamrock and I have been in the communities for many
weeks and what I've seen reaffirmed my love for this region, a
place I've long called home.
Coming out of what was for many the scariest days of their
lives, so many residents are optimistic and selfless. The
responsibility for restoration is ours, we know, but we are
working with strong communities and people who are
extraordinary in their ability to do everything in their power
to keep moving forward.
I know our work has been far from perfect. I apologize for
the hardship and frustration that has certainly caused and give
you my commitment that we will continue to work to rebuild and
restore the Merrimack Valley.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify here today. I'm
ready to answer your questions about the tragic events and
about the work we must continue to recover from, and as a last
note, I wish to offer my condolences to the family of Leonel
Rondon. I will carry that in the heart for the rest of my life.
Thank you.
Senator Markey. Next, we're going to hear from Joe Hamrock,
the President and Chief Executive Officer of NiSource of
Columbus, Ohio.
STATEMENT OF JOE HAMROCK, PRESIDENT
AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, NiSOURCE
Mr. Hamrock. Thank you, Senator.
If I may, to the Rondon family, you have my deepest
sympathy. I'm deeply sorry for the loss of your beloved son and
brother. Lucy, thank you for your testimony here today.
Each day, you are in my prayers that our Lord might comfort
you and bring you His peace and those prayers will continue.
On behalf of Steve and all of the NiSource and Columbia Gas
family, we extend our condolences and sympathies and know that
we will be here to support you in any way that we can.
Good morning, Senators Markey, Hassan, and Warren,
Representatives Moulton and Tsongas, Representative-elect
Trahan, and Members of the Lawrence, Andover, and North Andover
communities.
Thank you for the opportunity to be here with you today. As
you noted, Senator, I am the CEO of NiSource, the company that
owns Columbia Gas of Massachusetts.
On the afternoon of September 13, 2018, a tragic event
occurred here in the Merrimack Valley. Columbia Gas was
conducting a planned gas pipeline modernization project when
things went horribly wrong, leading to multiple fires and
explosions, many injuries, and a tragic loss of life.
I am here on behalf of Columbia Gas and NiSource to
apologize. We are deeply sorry. I am deeply sorry.
I also want to reaffirm our responsibility to repair the
damage safely and as quickly as possible, and I want to express
our resolve to improve our gas delivery system and processes so
that a tragedy like this never happens again.
To those who were injured or who were carrying for injured
loved ones and to those whose homes and businesses were damaged
or destroyed because of the fires and explosions, we recognize
the distress and hardship this has caused in your lives.
To those whose daily routines have been disrupted as a
result of the restoration efforts, from elderly residents
living alone in Andover with unfamiliar appliances to young
families in Lawrence with longer commutes to work and school,
to the businesses in North Andover who were not open and fear
their customers may simply move on, I've heard you and we
recognize your challenges and struggles. We are working around
the clock to make things better.
I want to tell you all personally that I am sorry and that
I also know that an apology is simply not enough. We're going
to get everyone back in their homes and businesses. We know
it's too early to ask any of you to trust us, but we are
committed to restoring these communities.
We have completed the replacement of nearly 45 miles of gas
pipeline and over 5,000 service lines. That has allowed us as
of November 24 to restore service for over 6,000 residential
meters and over 600 business customers, and I'm pleased to
report that we are on track to restore heat and hot water to
remaining facilities in the early part of the December 2 to
December 16 date range.
The NTSB is investigating the cause of the September 13
tragedy and we are cooperating with that investigation. NTSB's
work continues, but I want to be clear with everyone here
today. We are not waiting for the NTSB final report to take
steps to make sure that something like this never happens
again.
On September 14, we suspended work on all low pressure
systems across NiSource, except where necessary for compliance
and safety, and as detailed in my written testimony, we have
already identified new safety measures for the operation of our
low pressure systems, including a $150 million program to
install continuous monitoring and protection against over-
pressure situations. We have also focused on additional
training across our entire company.
I am humbled by the spirit, optimism, and determination of
our customers not to allow this tragedy to disrupt their lives
any more than it has, but we know we have to do more and we
have to do it faster.
We are focused on that, and I appreciate the leadership of
the Massachusetts delegation, and before I close, I also want
to offer our deepest gratitude to the first responders who
answered the emergency calls on the evening of September 13 and
the gas workers who assisted them. What you did was heroic and
remarkable and we appreciate your work.
The Merrimack Valley has a long road to recovery ahead. Our
companies are committed to working with you and everyone here
today to advance that recovery. I know this work is and will be
the most important duty of my entire professional career.
We are going to make the Merrimack Valley gas system safer
than ever and we're going to be here working with you to meet
these commitments.
Thank you and I'm ready to answer your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Hamrock and Mr. Bryant
follow:]
Joint Prepared Statement of Joe Hamrock, President and Chief Executive
Officer, NiSource and Steve Bryant, President, Columbia Gas of
Massachusetts
I. Introduction
Good morning Senators Markey, Hassan, and Warren, Representatives
Moulton and Tsongas, Representative-Elect Trahan, and members of the
Lawrence, Andover, and North Andover communities. We appreciate the
opportunity to testify today on behalf of Columbia Gas of Massachusetts
(``Columbia Gas'') and NiSource. Because we were both called to testify
about the events surrounding the September 13th tragedy in the
Merrimack Valley, we are providing this joint written statement of
Columbia Gas and NiSource for the record.
We know that the tragic events of September 13th will have a
lasting impact on the people, businesses, and communities of Lawrence,
Andover, and North Andover. As we talk today about the steps we are
taking to respond, we are deeply aware of the suffering, disruption,
and unrest this tragedy has caused. We want to offer our deepest
sympathies and condolences to the family of Leonel Rondon, the young
man who died because of an explosion, and our deepest apologies to
those who were injured and to all the residents and business owners of
the Merrimack Valley who were impacted by the September 13th fires and
explosions. In addition, we want to offer our thanks to the first
responders who answered the emergency calls on the evening of September
13th and the gas workers who assisted them. We are grateful for your
service and your heroism in protecting the residents of the Merrimack
Valley. We also want to acknowledge the leadership of the Massachusetts
congressional delegation in the recovery efforts.
The entire Columbia Gas and NiSource team is dedicated to
addressing and remediating the damage that has occurred and to helping
the community heal.
II. September 13, 2018 And Its Aftermath: Taking Responsibility
On September 13, 2018, Columbia Gas of Massachusetts was conducting
a planned gas pipeline modernization project when things went horribly
wrong. At 4:04 and 4:05 pm, the Columbia Gas monitoring center received
two alarms indicating high pressure within the South Lawrence low-
pressure gas system. At 4:06 pm, a controller within the monitoring
center alerted the appropriate Columbia Gas personnel to dispatch them
to the field. At approximately 4:30 pm, the Columbia Gas team shut down
the regulator at issue.
Before services were cut off, gas traveled through the system,
leading to over-pressurization with terrible consequences--multiple
fires and explosions, many injuries, and, most tragically, a loss of
life.
We are here on behalf of Columbia Gas and NiSource to apologize for
this tragedy and to acknowledge our responsibility to make things
right. We are deeply sorry.
To those who were injured, those who cared or are caring for
injured loved ones, and those whose homes or businesses were damaged or
destroyed because of the fires and explosions, we recognize the
distress and hardship this has caused in your lives.
We know that the daily routines of many have been disrupted as a
result of the over-pressurization and subsequent restoration efforts--
from the elderly resident living alone in Andover with unfamiliar
appliances, to young families in Lawrence with longer commutes to work
and school, to business owners in North Andover who are not open and
fear their customers may simply move on. We have heard from you and
recognize your challenges and struggles. And we are working around the
clock to make things better.
We also know an apology is not enough. We know it is too early to
ask any of you to trust us, but we want to reaffirm our responsibility
and commitment to repair the damage safely and as quickly as possible.
In the days and months ahead, we hope to prove our commitment to you.
III. Broader Safety Measures
The National Transportation Safety Board (``NTSB'') is
investigating the cause of the September 13th tragedy, and we are
cooperating with that investigation. The NTSB's work continues, but we
want to be clear--we are not waiting for the NTSB to issue its final
report or for new regulations. We are proactively identifying actions
we can take now to make sure that something like this never happens
again.
After September 13, we suspended construction work on low-pressure
systems, only performing work necessary for compliance and safety.
Since then, we have identified additional ways to make our low-pressure
systems safer and reduce the risk of over-pressurization. We are also
taking steps to respond to and execute on the NTSB's safety
recommendations.
As part of this effort, we continue to evaluate opportunities to
engineer fail-safe measures in our gas delivery systems. We have
already committed to invest approximately $150 million to achieve the
following infrastructure improvements:
OVER-PRESSURE PROTECTION DEVICES: We will be installing
automatic pressure control equipment, referred to as ``slam-
shut'' devices, on low-pressure systems across our seven-state
operating area. These devices provide an additional level of
control and protection. They operate like circuit-breakers;
when they sense operating pressure that is too high or too low,
they shut down the flow of gas to the system, regardless of the
cause. These devices operate independently of other pressure
control devices, so they will automatically shut down the
system to prevent over-pressurization.
REMOTE MONITORING: As an additional layer of protection, we
will install remote monitoring devices on low-pressure systems
so that gas control centers have an ability to receive pressure
alarms on a real time basis. In the event a system is shut down
by the ``slam-shut'' devices described above, the remote
monitors will enable us to respond more quickly to restore
service to customers.
This commitment is in addition to the series of steps we took
across our seven-state footprint following the September 13th event in
the Merrimack Valley, including:
SUSPENDED WORK: We suspended work on low-pressure systems,
only performing work necessary for compliance and safety. We
are still operating under these strict work guidelines.
FIELD SURVEY: We initiated and completed a field survey of
our low-pressure regulator systems to identify available
options to enhance the safe, reliable operation of regulator
station equipment.
ENGINEERING DESIGN: We initiated an engineering design
review of regulator stations to determine how best to install
additional over-pressure protection systems.
MAPPING: We used the information from the field survey we
conducted to begin adding new details to our electronic mapping
system. Additionally, we are providing maps at the regulator
stations themselves.
DAMAGE PREVENTION: We have initiated a process so that when
we are notified of work near a regulator station by any company
performing excavation, NiSource personnel will be required to
be present to observe any excavation.
In addition, we will continue to modernize our system in
Massachusetts and elsewhere, replacing cast-iron and bare-steel pipes
with more modern materials.
IV. Customer Assistance and Claims
We have worked diligently since the tragedy to address residents'
immediate needs and to establish a process to reimburse them for their
losses. Within six hours of the explosions, we established a dedicated
customer service line. Within 48 hours, we opened our first claims
center in Lawrence, followed by two additional claims centers in
Andover and North Andover. As of November 21, we have had over 18,000
customer visits to these centers and have nearly 400 adjusters
supporting the claims process. These figures, and some of the other
figures throughout this statement of our companies, are best estimates
as we continue our work.
Families visiting the claims centers can receive direct financial
aid to help address immediate needs for food and supplies while they
begin to work with claims personnel. But, we also recognize that many
residents need more than monetary compensation. We bought temporary
cooking equipment and worked with fire officials to make sure residents
who received the equipment had proper safety information. We inspected
thousands of homes to see if they could utilize space heaters. We
installed space heaters in the homes that could support them and added
smoke and carbon monoxide detectors in the homes we inspected. We have
installed (or provided reimbursement for) alternative fuel solutions so
that residents could have heat and hot water before the restoration of
natural gas service in order to remain in their homes.
We have secured temporary housing for displaced residents,
including hotel rooms, apartments, travel trailers, a congregate
shelter, and even a pet shelter. We brought in offshore housing for
workers leading the effort to restore gas service, so that customers
could be placed in temporary housing that is closer to their homes and
places of work. We are providing transportation assistance, in the form
of either mileage reimbursement or access to our corporate accounts
with Uber or Lyft. We are also providing winterization assistance to
homes that have not yet had heat restored. We recognize there is no
substitute for living in your own home and in your own community, and
we continue to seek to identify additional avenues to minimize the
burden.
We recognize that the impacted communities will have needs that go
beyond this assistance. For that reason, we committed $10 million to
the Greater Lawrence Disaster Relief Fund in the days following the
event. This fund is managed by the leadership of Lawrence, Andover, and
North Andover. The Fund has helped serve the short and medium term
needs of impacted residents, including housing, sustenance and support
services. And, as we recently announced, we are providing an additional
$10 million to support business recovery efforts in the Merrimack
Valley. In coordination with state and local officials and community
organizations, this includes direct technical support, funds for
municipal discretion for business support, and longer-term regional
support for economic development.
We know that our customers have been frustrated by the flow of
information and by changes to our restoration and claims plans. We
recognize we need to do better and are working to improve our
communications. We now have a more robust customer communications
program to keep affected customers informed and we are sending regular
updates through several communication channels. The communications
program includes, among other things, direct mail, a weekly customer
newsletter, an interactive map of our work schedules on our website, a
24/7 helpline, paid ads, and social media posts. We also have
participated in six town hall/open-house sessions in the three affected
communities, where we heard directly from customers and provided
resources to help resolve their issues.
In addition to the channels mentioned above, we are making
personalized phone calls, leaving notices on doors, and have appointed
a dedicated spokesperson whose sole role is to communicate with the
public through the media. We are also making communications in both
English and Spanish.
We are also taking targeted steps, like reaching out proactively to
customers in communities that may not receive communications regularly
through the other channels discussed above.
We have hosted special events for the affected communities on
Halloween and Thanksgiving. On Halloween, we held Operation Trick or
Treat, which provided bags and candy to children in Andover and North
Andover, and made it possible for over 1,100 children to go trick or
treating in their temporary housing locations. For Thanksgiving, we are
planning to provide more than 16,000 holiday dinners to customers,
their families, and friends.
V. Restoration of Service
Following September 13th, our first priority has been to assist the
communities affected by this tragedy. These efforts were designed with
the primary purpose of helping get the Lawrence, Andover, and North
Andover communities back on their feet. We have not done this alone.
NiSource and Columbia Gas are grateful for the work of retired Navy
Captain Joe Albanese, who was appointed by Governor Baker to lead the
recovery effort in partnership with Columbia Gas and NiSource. We are
also grateful for the work of Rear Admiral Richard Cellon, who is
assisting Captain Albanese. We would also like to express our gratitude
to Governor Baker, Lieutenant Governor Polito, Attorney General Healey,
Adjutant General of the Massachusetts National Guard Keefe,
Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency Director Schwartz, Senators
Markey and Warren, Representatives Moulton and Tsongas, Representative-
Elect Trahan, Lawrence Mayor Rivera, Andover Town Manager Flanagan,
North Andover Town Manager Maylor, Eversource, the more than 450 mutual
aid workers from utilities across the country, and as noted earlier,
the first responders from the Merrimack Valley and surrounding areas.
The over-pressurization created a significant risk of damage to
Columbia Gas's facilities as well as customer-owned house-lines and
appliances that typically only receive gas at low pressure. As a
result, Columbia Gas could not safely just turn the gas back on at low
pressure. Potential damage to main lines, services lines, and in-home
natural gas systems and appliances all needed to be assessed and
addressed.
This restoration work is complex, and we are undertaking it at what
is an unprecedented scale. We recently announced the overall cost could
exceed $800 million. That amount includes pipeline and gas service
restoration, relief measures, and third-party damages.
Two initial observations about the restoration process. First, we
have prioritized restoring gas service to our most vulnerable
customers--the elderly, individuals with disabilities or health
concerns, and young children--even when that slowed the overall pace of
restoration. Our efforts to meet the needs of those vulnerable
populations have been valuable, but do not eclipse the fact that much
work remains to be done to completely restore the communities of
Lawrence, Andover, and North Andover. Second, due to the complexity and
scale of this work, we have committed to evaluating and adapting our
approach as the restoration program has progressed so that we implement
lessons we have learned along the way.
We refer to the first component of the restoration process as ``Gas
Ready'': The complete replacement of approximately 45 miles of low-
pressure bare steel and cast-iron pipeline with state-of-the-art
plastic mains and distribution lines. Customers will have noticed the
replacement of the gas mains, which run down their streets, as well as
the service lines, which connect the gas mains to their homes.
This portion of the project was completed on October 30, 2018,
ahead of schedule. Our thanks go out to the individuals who worked
tirelessly to install this state-of-the-art infrastructure safely and
efficiently and who saw this step of our restoration efforts to
completion.
The second component of the project, which we refer to as ``House
Ready,'' involves repairing and replacing appliances and other natural
gas infrastructure and equipment in customers' homes. This process
begins with an assessment of each home to determine the condition of
all gas appliances and infrastructure, along with issues such as lead
paint or non-code configurations that could affect work on the
structure. Once necessary repairs and replacements have been made, the
house will be inspected for safety.
As part of the ``House Ready'' process, Columbia Gas has committed
to replace essential natural gas appliances and equipment for impacted
residential customers. (Other gas appliances will be replaced through
the claims process.) Where possible, we are installing energy efficient
equipment and appliances. We initially planned to do these replacements
as part of the process of restoring gas service to a home. However, in
order to restore heat and hot water to customers as quickly as
possible, we have recently begun repairing equipment where we can
safely do so, and will return later, after winter, to replace it with
new, modern equipment.
Columbia Gas brought on a major contractor to complete the ``House
Ready'' process on the original timeline, which aimed to restore gas
service to all impacted customers by November 19, 2018. Unfortunately,
the ``House Ready'' process has taken longer than expected. The
contractor ran into significantly more issues within the homes than
anyone anticipated. Each home is unique and requires a tailored
solution, with different heat and hot water systems, hazards, code
issues, and layouts. We have also run into a significant number of
homes in the restoration area with environmental issues, such as mold
or asbestos, which required remediation before any work could be done.
To address the challenges we encountered in the ``House Ready''
process, we have brought on three additional contractors, one dedicated
solely to business customers, the other two to residential homes.
Additionally, as we described before, we shifted our focus to repair
any heating or hot water equipment where it could be safely repaired.
We have also been able to significantly increase the number of plumbers
working to restore service. Information about the revised schedule, as
well as the appliances we will provide, is available on our website.
Our business contractor leads an effort we refer to as ``Back to
Business,'' in which a project manager is assigned to each affected
company. The project manager leads a team, including a claims adjuster
who aims to expedite the claims approval process for businesses.
Residential and business customers also have the option to self-
mitigate and seek reimbursement through the claims process; advances to
fund repairs can also be obtained.
As of November 20, we have completed the replacement of
approximately 45 miles of gas pipeline and over 5,000 service lines.
That has allowed us to restore service for 5,592 residential meters and
602 business customers--76 percent and 87 percent of the total
residential meters and business meters. We deeply regret that we have
had to extend the anticipated timeline for gas restoration to between
December 2 and December 16. But we are pleased to report that we
continue to beat our daily goals of making homes ``House Ready,'' and
we are currently on track to restore heat and hot water in the early
part of that date range.
Our commitment to the Merrimack Valley will not end once gas
service is fully restored. We will continue to assist customers in
filing claims in the wake of this event to address the needs of homes
and businesses in the affected communities, including by coming back
after the winter season to replace appliances that were initially
repaired and completing paving and other work necessitated by the
restoration-related construction.
VI. Conclusion
We are humbled by the optimism and determination of our customers
not to allow this tragedy to disrupt their lives any more than it has,
but we know we have to do more, and we have to do it faster. The
Merrimack Valley has a long road to recovery ahead. Our entire company
is committed to working with you to advance that recovery. We know this
work is, and will be, the most important duty of our professional
careers. We are going to get you back in your homes and businesses. We
are going to make the Merrimack Valley gas system safer than ever. And
we are going to be here, working with you. Thank you.
VII. Witness and Columbia Gas of Massachusetts Background
Joe Hamrock. Since 2015, Joe Hamrock has served as President and
CEO of NiSource, Inc., which operates seven subsidiary natural gas and
electric utilities, including Columbia Gas of Massachusetts. He earned
a bachelor's degree in Electrical Engineering at Youngstown State
University and began his career as an electrical engineer. Hamrock
later attended business school here in Massachusetts, at MIT, and
transitioned into management, which led eventually to his role as
President and Chief Operating Officer of American Electric Power of
Ohio. From AEP, Hamrock joined NiSource in 2012 as an Executive Vice
President and Chief Executive Officer of the Gas Distribution Segment,
before being appointed CEO of NiSource in 2015.
Steve Bryant. Steve Bryant is the President of Columbia Gas of
Massachusetts. He is a native of Massachusetts, having grown up in
Somerville, and has worked in the utility field in the Northeast for
his entire adult life. After high school, Steve joined Commonwealth
Energy as a mail boy, and later attended UMass Boston, where he earned
a bachelor's degree in economics. After college, Steve held a variety
of positions at Commonwealth in the rates, customer operations, and
sales departments. During that time, he attended Boston University's
Graduate School of Management, where he earned a master's degree in
business administration. Eventually he became a vice president at
Connecticut Natural Gas, and from there, joined Columbia Gas in 2001
and was promoted to his current position in 2003.
Columbia Gas of Massachusetts and its predecessors have been
serving the energy needs of New Englanders for more than 160 years. In
1847, the Springfield Gas Light Company was founded to light the city's
streets, and it has been supplying gas heating to buildings since 1878,
later under the name Bay State Gas, and eventually as Columbia Gas of
Massachusetts. The company is proud of its long history serving the
people of Massachusetts.
Senator Markey. Thank you.
Our next witness is Richard Kuprewicz, who is the President
of Accufacts, Incorporated. Welcome.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD B. KUPREWICZ, PRESIDENT, ACCUFACTS,
INCORPORATED
Mr. Kuprewicz. Thank you. Thank you for the opportunity to
comment today on another pipeline event that could have been
prevented.
My name is Richard B. Kuprewicz, and I am President of
Accufacts, Incorporated, based in Redmond, Washington. I have
over 45 years of experience in the field.
After many years of effort, distribution integrity
management program or DIMP regulation became effective in
August 2011, though prudent gas distribution operators were
implementing these critical safety process approaches well
before this deadline.
Since promulgation of important transmission and
distribution integrity management performance-based regulatory
steps and minimum pipeline safety regulations, I have
investigated far too many pipeline disasters which speaks
volumes for the need for further pipeline safety regulatory
clarification and/or improvement.
Given the time limitations, I have focused on two important
recommendations for the minimum pipeline safety regulations.
Recommendation 1, add prescriptive requirements for
management of change in regulation. Prescriptive requirements
define shall and clearly define what an operator must do.
In the important area of management of change or MOC, the
gas industry mainly relies on the American Society of
Mechanical Engineers or ASME standard Management System
Integrity of Gas Pipelines, ASME B31.8S, and that supplements
ASME B31.8. Both are performance-based standards.
Parts of both of these industry practices are incorporated
by reference in current Federal pipeline safety regulations.
Given the importance of management of change in pipeline
safety, I recommend this process shall be prescribed by clear
wording in pipeline minimum safety regulation.
Industry practices development does not necessarily undergo
the more public review and scrutiny and possible challenge that
pipe safety regulation undergoes when reaching the higher
obligation of promulgation into law.
Incorporation of the exact wording of MOC protocols into
Federal pipeline safety regulation also makes such regulation
accessible to the public that could be impacted in the event of
a pipeline failure.
Congress made an attempt in the Pipeline Safety Regulatory
Certainty and Job Creation Act of 2011 to rectify this
difficulty for public access to important reference pipeline
safety documents, but this well-meaning effort was circumvented
by subsequent lobbying efforts to restrict such easier public
access.
Given the complexity of changes within many gas
distribution system operations, Congress should require that
pipeline safety regulation prescriptively incorporate critical
minimum steps required for all management to change procedures
that will cover both equipment and procedures.
My second recommendation, Recommendation 2, require the use
of computer leak mapping in DIMP. A creative pipeline operator
can tamper with the evaluation of important metrics required to
be reported annually to PHMSA, the Pipeline and Hazardous
Material and Safety Administration.
This is especially true in the area of DIMP regulation
calling for the operators to evaluate and rank risk. Risk
ranking can generate a wide range of outcomes developed from
the same data.
During the evolution of DIMP regulation, considerable
discussion occurred related to displaying hazardous leak data
by graphic mapping using computers and advanced mapping
software in the late 2000s. The mapping approach did not make
it into the final DIMP regulation because an argument was
presented at the time that many operators, especially the
smaller operators, did not have access to computers and
simpler-to-use developing mapping software was still evolving.
Many gas distribution operators now recognize the
importance, the efficiency, and safety benefits of computer
leak mapping by grade, by cause, and by pipe type, such as
mains or service lines, in quickly assisting in the evaluation
of leak risk on their gas distribution systems.
Such graphic color-coded computer mapping greatly aids the
rapid analysis of large volumes of data to assist in quickly
recognizing and identifying systemic geographic hot spots that
might warrant further attention and resources to prudently
control risk on their systems.
Such leak mapping also helps to identify areas of a gas
distribution system where One Call may not be effective.
Quite simply, in the important area of leak evaluation and
risk ranking, if a gas distribution operation cannot
incorporate such a technically advanced and relatively
inexpensive computer tool into helping to improve pipeline
safety, they should not be in the gas distribution business.
Congress----
[Applause.]
Mr. Kuprewicz. Congress should direct development of simple
regulations to require the use of computer leak mapping and
reporting technologies into gas distribution safety to assist
in evaluating and ranking risk.
And I thank you for your time and I'll take any questions
later.
[Applause.]
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kuprewicz follows:]
Prepared Statement of Richard B. Kuprewicz, President, Accufacts
Incorporated
Thank you for the opportunity to comment today on another pipeline
event that could have been prevented. My name is Richard B. Kuprewicz
and I am President of Accufacts Inc., a consulting firm based at 8151
164th Avenue, NE, Redmond, WA 98052. I specialize in all aspects of
hydrocarbon-based pipelines. I have over forty-five years of
investigative experience and trained as a chemical engineer with
additional knowledge in process safety management, developed from many
years of operational experience. I have consulted for various local,
state, and Federal agencies, NGOs, the public, and pipeline industry
members on pipeline regulation, operation, and design, with particular
emphasis on operation in unusually sensitive areas of high population
density or environmental sensitivity.
I serve as a representative of the public advising the Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, or PHMSA, on such areas as
liquid and gas transmission integrity management, or TIMP, regulation
development in the early 2000s following terrible pipeline tragedies.
As a representative of the public I was also involved in the many years
of natural gas distribution regulatory advancement wisely driven by the
Congressional Pipeline Inspection, Protection, Enforcement, And Safety
Act of 2006 (PIPES Act of 2006) that mandated the gas distribution
integrity management program, or DIMP, effort in Federal rulemaking.
After many years of effort, DIMP regulation became effective in August
2011, though prudent natural gas distribution operators were
implementing these critical safety process approaches well before this
deadline. At the end of 2017, reports to PHMSA indicated that there are
over 1,300 gas distribution operators in the U.S. encompassing a wide
range of complexity. I believe most, if not all, gas distribution
systems are intrastate pipeline systems operating within a state. The
U.S. gas distribution system utilizes over 2.2 million miles of
pipeline consisting of networks of mains and service lines, and
composed of a wide variety of pipe materials and connections. Much of
these materials and connections are sensitive to threats that are age
related, such as cast iron and older vintage plastics, and mechanical
connections. It is my observation that many gas distribution operators
understand the importance and intent of DIMP, while others, sadly,
still don't.
Since promulgation of these important TIMP and DIMP regulatory
steps in minimum pipeline safety regulation, I have investigated far
too many pipeline disasters, which speaks volumes for the need for
further pipeline safety regulatory ``clarification'' and/or
improvement. Concerning the failures (and I refer to multiple failures
based on my experience and recent observations) the situation affecting
the Merrimack Valley in Massachusetts (Lawrence event) on September 13,
2018, while rare for gas distribution operations, raises many questions
about the adequacy or clarity of minimum pipeline safety regulations
and safety process approaches. My comments are not intended to impede
or influence the NTSB investigation concerning the Merrimack Valley
failures. In my more than forty-five years of observation, I have
nothing but respect for the NTSB pipeline investigation process. To
finalize an NTSB report on a specific pipeline incident can take some
time, given the need to be thorough, but I have nothing but confidence
in this government body. It is a government organization that, well,
just works.
I will focus my brief comments and recommendations this morning
concerning natural gas distribution system regulations on two important
areas that I believe warrant regulatory advancement via prescriptive
and clear regulation. Prescriptive regulation can be more efficient and
effective than performance based regulations, such as TIMP, which has
experienced, at best, mixed success. Prescriptive based safety
regulations set basic obligations and tend to be clearer and less prone
to misinterpretation by using ``shall'' requirements, for example, that
should leave no doubt as to important minimum safety requirements.
I see the need for regulatory improvement in the area of gas
distribution: 1) Setting prescriptive minimum requirements in the area
of Management of Change, or MOC protocols in this critically important
area, and 2) Improving the way DIMP approaches the area of evaluating
and risk ranking, mandating the use of computer leak mapping, taking
advantage of recent computer/software mapping strides made in this
technical area.
Recommendation 1: Add prescriptive requirements for Management of
Change in regulation
In the important area of Management of Change, or MOC, the gas
industry mainly relies on the American Society of Mechanical Engineers
(``ASME'') standard, ASME B31.8S-2004, ``Managing System Integrity of
Gas Pipelines,'' revised in 2004 that supplements ASME B31.8. Parts of
both of these industry practices are incorporated by reference in
Federal pipeline safety regulation (49CFRSec. 195.7). Given the
importance of MOC in pipeline safety, I recommend this process should
be prescribed by clear wording in pipeline minimum safety regulation.
While I have great respect for many industry practices, their
development does not necessarily undergo the more public review and
scrutiny and possible challenge that pipe safety regulation undergoes
when reaching the higher obligation of promulgation into law.
Incorporation of the exact wording of MOC protocols into Federal
pipeline safety regulation also makes such regulation accessible to not
only the industry, but importantly, also to the public that could be
impacted in the event of a pipeline failure. Many referenced industry
documents in Federal pipeline safety regulations are still not readily
available to the public, or can only be obtained at great expense or
effort. Congress made an attempt in the Pipeline Safety, Regulatory
Certainty, and Job Creation Act of 2011 to rectify this difficulty for
the public in gaining access to important referenced pipeline safety
documents, but this well-meaning effort was circumvented by subsequent
lobbying efforts to restrict such easier public access. Given the
complexity of changes within many gas distribution system operations,
Congress should require that pipeline safety regulation prescriptively
incorporate critical minimum steps required for all Management of
Change procedures that will cover both equipment and procedure changes.
Recommendation 2: Require the Use of Leak Mapping in DIMP
While DIMP regulation is heavily and appropriately reliant on
metrics that can be measured, reported, and tracked, there nevertheless
can be weakness where a creative pipeline operator can tamper with the
evaluation of important metrics required to be reported annually to
PHMSA and to many state pipeline regulatory agencies. This is
especially true in the area in DIMP regulation calling for operators to
``Evaluate and rank risk.'' Risk ranking can generate a wide range of
outcomes developed from the same data. During the evolution of DIMP
regulation, considerable discussion occurred related to displaying
hazardous leak data by graphic mapping using computers and advancing
mapping software in the late 2000s. The mapping approach did not make
it into the final DIMP regulation because an argument was presented at
that time that many operators, especially the smaller operators, did
not have access to computers, and simpler to use developing mapping
software was still evolving.
I have seen many gas distribution operators who now recognize the
importance, efficiency, and safety benefits of computer leak mapping by
grade, by cause, and by pipe type (mains or service lines) in quickly
assisting in the evaluation of leak risks on their gas distribution
systems. Such graphic color coded computer mapping greatly aids the
rapid analysis of large volumes of data to assist in quickly
recognizing and identifying systemic geographic ``hot spots'' that
might warrant further attention and resources to prudently control risk
on their systems. On more than one occasion, I have recommended that
such simple computer mapping be utilized to aid pipeline operators and
state regulators in justifying additional funds for further pipe
replacement to efficiently improve gas distribution system safety. Such
leak mapping also helps to identify areas of a gas distribution system
where one-call may not be effective.
Such computer and software advances have, I believe, reached the
proficiency where a gas pipeline operator, even a small operator,
should be easily able to incorporate such leak mapping/tracking
advances into their operation. Quite simply, in the important area of
leak evaluation and risk ranking, if a gas distribution operation
cannot incorporate such a technically advanced and relatively
inexpensive computer tool into helping to improve pipeline safety, they
should not be in the gas distribution business. Congress should direct
development of simple regulations to require the use of computer leak
mapping and reporting technologies into gas distribution pipeline
safety to assist in evaluating and ranking risk.
Senator Markey. Thank you.
Now we're going to hear from Paul Roberti, Chief Counsel of
the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration.
STATEMENT OF PAUL ROBERTI, CHIEF COUNSEL, PIPELINE AND
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Roberti. Good morning. Senator Markey, Senator Warren,
Senator Hassan, Representative Tsongas, and Representative
Moulton,----
Senator Markey. Please move the microphone in a little
closer.
Mr. Roberti.--thank you for the opportunity to testify
today.
The Merrimack gas explosions on September 13 were indeed
tragic and unacceptable. On behalf of Secretary Elaine Chao and
Administrator Skip Elliott, I recognize and appreciate your
efforts to advance pipeline safety. For our leadership and
everyone working at the Department of Transportation, safety is
our Number 1 priority.
PHMSA's mission is to protect people and the environment by
advancing the safe transportation of energy and hazardous
materials that are so essential to our daily lives.
PHMSA oversees the inspection and enforcement of the
nation's interstate pipeline system. We advance education,
research and development projects, and we administer the State
Pipeline Safety Programs in 48 states, including Massachusetts.
The natural gas explosions and fires in the Merrimack
Valley were indeed tragic and avoidable. The United States
Department of Transportation deeply sympathizes with the Rondon
family and all those who suffered injuries or had their homes
and property damaged or destroyed.
PHMSA acknowledges and supports all initiatives to replace
aging cast iron pipelines to advance public safety.
In my prior role as a public utilities commissioner in
Rhode Island, just a few miles south of here, I worked
steadfastly to advance programs to accelerate the replacement
of aged cast iron and bare steel pipelines for many years,
particularly in the aftermath of tragedies like Allentown,
Pennsylvania.
Those types of tragedies galvanized the effort to modernize
pipeline systems across the nation, yet despite Columbia Gas's
effort to replace aging systems, we witnessed an extraordinary
failure in the planning, design, and execution of a replacement
project.
This accident once again illustrates how critical it is for
pipeline operators to thoroughly plan and safely execute all
facets related to construction, operation, and maintenance of
pipeline networks.
Now the written testimony I submitted discusses PHMSA's
Grant Assistance Program to our state partners, the training we
provide to Federal and state inspectors, the importance and
role of safety management systems, and, lastly, PHMSA's
evaluations of the State Pipeline Safety Programs.
On the afternoon of September 13, when the incident
occurred, PHMSA made an immediate decision to deploy multiple
inspectors to the scene to provide technical assistance to both
the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities and the
National Transportation Safety Board.
As some of you know, PHMSA's leadership also reached out in
the evening of the incident to keep members of the
Massachusetts congressional delegation apprised of PHMSA's
efforts and role.
Since the time the tragedy unfolded, PHMSA's team of
experts have provided hundreds of hours of technical assistance
and we will continue to do so until the Massachusetts and the
NTSB complete their investigations.
I also want to share some information about the State
Pipeline Safety Programs that PHMSA administers.
The Federal-state partnership with the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts spans over 35 years. Massachusetts is a certified
state partner with inspection and enforcement responsibilities
for intrastate natural gas distribution and transmission
pipelines.
As a matter of Federal law, the Commonwealth possesses
jurisdiction to investigate and make determinations regarding
an operator's compliance with Federal and state regulations.
We also recognize the NTSB's jurisdiction and expertise for
leading the investigation and determining the probable cause of
this tragic accident. While the NTSB's preliminary report
identified circumstances that likely contributed to the over-
pressurization during the pipeline replacement project, PHMSA
eagerly awaits the completion of both investigations so that we
will have all requisite information concerning the cause of the
incident and the operator's compliance with pertinent
regulations.
This terrible accident shows how critical it is for
pipeline operators to comprehensively understand their systems,
including the design, construction, and operation of all
facilities.
Operators and qualified contractors must exercise extreme
care and diligence in every aspect of their work. Above all,
they need to nurture and maintain a safety culture that
promotes the highest level of safety so that the tragic
pipeline accident that occurred in Merrimack Valley never
happens again.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify and I look
forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Roberti follows:]
Prepared Statement of Paul Roberti, Chief Counsel, Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
I. Introduction
Senator Markey and Senator Warren, thank you for inviting me to
testify today as part of the Senate Commerce, Science and
Transportation Committee's field hearing to discuss the September 13,
2018 natural gas accident involving Columbia Gas of Massachusetts and
the oversight and effectiveness of state pipeline safety programs.
Safety is the number one priority for U.S. Secretary of
Transportation Elaine L. Chao and PHMSA Administrator Howard ``Skip''
Elliott. The recent tragic events in your state can only intensify the
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration's (PHMSA)
commitment to its goal of zero pipeline incidents.
The mission of the PHMSA is to protect people and the environment
by advancing the safe transportation of energy and other hazardous
materials that are essential to our daily lives. The natural gas
explosions and fires in Lawrence, Andover, and North Andover,
Massachusetts, were tragic and all of us at PHMSA sympathize with the
family of Leonel Rondon, the young man who lost his life, and all those
who suffered injuries, or have property that was adversely impacted.
In response to the accident, PHMSA quickly dispatched multiple
inspectors to Massachusetts to provide technical assistance to the
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and to the Massachusetts
Department of Public Utilities (MA DPU). To date, PHMSA staff have
provided more than 600 work-hours of technical engineering expertise,
emergency response, and support. PHMSA will continue to assist the NTSB
and the MA DPU as long as needed.
In addition, PHMSA Administrator Elliott has made it a priority to
make himself available for discussions with the Congressional
Delegation and the Governor of Massachusetts. PHMSA will also continue
to prioritize answering your questions relating to this incident and
working with all Massachusetts officials.
II. Roles
Under PHMSA's oversight, pipelines have continued to remain one of
the safest ways to transport hazardous energy products in the U.S. This
safety record has been demonstrated with over 99.99 percent barrel
equivalent of liquid hydrocarbons reaching their onshore destinations
safely and through consistent declines in casualties and major injuries
attributed to pipeline incidents. In fact, pipeline incidents resulting
in death or major injury have declined 64 percent in the past 20 years,
despite increases in risk exposure measures like population, pipeline
mileage, aging infrastructure and volume of product delivered.
Pipeline safety is a shared responsibility for all public and
private sector stakeholders. Of the nearly 2.8 million miles of
pipeline infrastructure in the U.S., more than 80 percent of the lines
belong to local distribution companies that transport natural gas to
American homes and businesses. PHMSA's state certification program
expands the Federal government's capacity to oversee these lines.
A. Role of States
Since 1971, when a national, uniform standard of pipeline safety
regulations was implemented, states have had the authority, through
PHMSA, to regulate the safety of intrastate pipelines. Sections 60105
and 60106 of title 49 U.S. Code, continue to allow states to assume
safety authority through PHMSA for the inspection and enforcement of
intrastate pipelines. While states may act as interstate agents for
interstate gas transmission and hazardous liquid pipelines, the vast
majority of their responsibility is to oversee local distribution gas
systems, including the system we are here to discuss today.
PHMSA sets the minimum Federal standards for pipeline safety, which
the participating states then adopt into their state code and enforce.
States are allowed, under Section 60104(c) of title 49 U.S. Code, to
adopt more stringent safety standards than the minimum standards PHMSA
sets. This allows states to codify and enforce regulations that deal
with specific, regional (or local) risks that might not be feasible or
cost-beneficial to regulate on the National level. Many states have
established safety regulations that are more stringent than the Federal
regulations.
The MA DPU is PHMSA's certified state partner in the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts. Under this certification, the MA DPU is responsible
for the inspection and enforcement for all intrastate natural gas
distribution and transmission pipelines.
Across our country, PHMSA partners with pipeline safety programs in
48 states (in addition to the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico),
which employs approximately 380 full-time inspectors, through
certification and agreements for the inspection of the Nation's
intrastate gas and hazardous liquid pipelines. PHMSA also has
interstate agent agreements with nine states to perform interstate
pipeline inspections. State pipeline safety agencies are the first line
of defense in protecting much of the American public from pipeline
risks on lines that exist primarily where people live and work. State
pipeline safety agencies have authority over approximately 80 percent
of the total pipeline infrastructure under PHMSA's oversight and have
always been a critical component of a sound pipeline oversight program.
In addition to working with individual states, PHMSA works closely
with the National Association of Pipeline Safety Representatives
(NAPSR), an organization representing state government pipeline safety
programs, towards our joint safety mission. PHMSA supports annual and
regional NAPSR meetings and members of NAPSR frequently serve on
PHMSA's Advisory Committees.
PHMSA has worked with the MA DPU for over 35 years as they have
overseen pipeline safety in Massachusetts. PHMSA will continue to
provide technical support to the MA DPU through this investigation and
with any other technical assistance they may need in the future.
B. Role of PHMSA
There is an inherent risk associated with transporting energy.
PHMSA's job is to lessen the risk of energy transportation by pipelines
by setting and enforcing Federal minimum safety standards for pipeline
companies. The agency also promotes safety through education, research,
and our partnerships with 48 states, who inspect and enforce
regulations for pipelines and underground natural gas storage
facilities.
PHMSA is committed to making sure these organizations have the
resources and expertise they need to keep our Nation's pipelines safe.
Jointly with our partner states, PHMSA continuously strives to
strengthen oversight, inspection, and enforcement of pipeline
transportation through technical assistance programs, grants, training,
and outreach.
1. Grants
The financial support that we provide to our state partners
through grants is a vital part of our partnerships.
Based on the appropriation level set by Congress, our State
Base Grant program \1\ reimburses a portion of each of our
partner state's program expenses. The grants partially cover
the cost of any personnel, equipment, and activities reasonably
required for the conduct of the pipeline safety program. Most
importantly, PHMSA's grants provide state programs a consistent
source of funding to hire and maintain adequate pipeline safety
inspectors. PHMSA reviews state performance and conducts grant
monitoring to ensure that the funds are used efficiently and
effectively.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The State Base Grant is a formula grant that authorizes awards
to state pipeline safety programs under the authority of 49 U.S.C.
Sec. 60107--State Pipeline Safety Grants.
The statute allows PHMSA to reimburse states at a level set by
statute and Congressional appropriation--PHMSA can pay no more
than 80 percent of a state's total cost during a given calendar
year and we prorate the total appropriation when necessary. For
FY 2018, PHMSA awarded $56 million to participating state
programs,\2\ including over $1 million to Massachusetts, which
will cover almost 60 percent of their estimated program costs
this year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ All states except Alaska and Hawaii participate in PHMSA's
pipeline safety program.
As the number of miles of pipeline infrastructure continues to
grow and as the older pipes age, this grant program is critical
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
to our oversight of our Nation's pipeline systems.
2. Training
PHMSA also supports state programs by providing essential
technical training. Our state-of-the-art Training and
Qualifications (T&Q) program has full accreditation from the
International Association for Continuing Education and Training
(IACET).
The T&Q trains an average of 890 state and Federal inspectors
annually, ensuring that all are current on updated regulations,
technology, and best practices. PHMSA offers 58 online
computer-based training and on-site courses, including
classroom training and hands-on labs, that teach Federal and
state inspectors how to understand and apply Federal
regulations and incorporated industry standards. In addition,
the Training Center offers technical assistance and nationwide
seminars for companies to educate them on the consistent
application of the regulations, inspection techniques, and
compliance and enforcement procedures.
The core courses that inspectors must take cover topics
including PHMSA regulations, overpressure protection, corrosion
control, plastic pipe joining, and welding. Five of the seven
inspectors in Massachusetts have completed their core training.
The remaining two inspectors are new hires and will also take
these core classes. In FY 2018, inspectors in Massachusetts
completed 32 courses at the T&Q Center, and PHMSA looks forward
to continuing to work with the state.
Training is critical to state inspectors. A significant
increase in the total number of state and Federal inspection
personnel, along with the many new employees who replace
retirees, have led to increased training needs. Our Training
Center is working hard to increase capacity in order to handle
these needs. PHMSA has begun to hold ``boot camps'' to train
new inspectors with the basic skills that allow them to begin
their work quickly.
Looking ahead, PHMSA's T&Q Center is committed to developing
innovative ways to be more accessible and effective, including
the exploration of long-distance proctored classes, curriculum
improvements, and more efficient delivery to ensure relevancy.
3. Program Evaluations
Each year, PHMSA evaluates every partner's compliance with our
safety program requirements. Our representatives work with the
state officials to review their inspection procedures, records,
inspection activities, and enforcement actions.\3\ These
reviews provide an opportunity for dialogue between PHMSA and
the states during which we emphasize the imperative to
continually improve pipeline safety, public safety, and the
protection of the environment.
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\3\ Sections 60105(e) and 60106(d) of title 49 U.S. Code provide
for the monitoring of state pipeline safety programs by PHMSA.
This evaluation assesses whether the state is maintaining an
effective pipeline safety program in line with Federal
regulations and provides the basis for determining the state's
total point award for the PHMSA pipeline safety grant for the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
upcoming year.
The assessments consist of two parts. PHMSA first reviews each
state's Progress Report to validate that their pipeline safety
program is supported by the people, training and other
resources necessary to ensure pipeline safety. The progress
report also summarizes their annual inspection activities
conducted on the regulated companies within each state for the
previous year.
Second, PHMSA reviews the annual Progress Report documents
submitted by the state for accuracy, reviews the pipeline
program inspection procedures and records, and observes an on-
site inspection of a pipeline company conducted by state staff.
As part of this annual program evaluation process, PHMSA
discusses state metrics developed by PHMSA and the National
Association of Pipeline Safety Representatives. These metrics
track the state's damage prevention program, inspection
activity, inspector qualification, leak management,
enforcement, and incident investigation.
These evaluations and the review of metrics are an opportunity
for discussion between PHMSA and state pipeline safety program
managers about potential safety program improvements. PHMSA
also publishes each state's progress on these metrics online
\4\ so that the state programs can proactively review their
metrics and act to ensure positive performance trends.
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\4\ http://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/States.htm
The strength of state pipeline safety programs directly impacts
the integrity of our Nation's pipelines, especially the local
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distribution systems.
At the recent 2018 NAPSR National Meeting, PHMSA senior
leadership spoke to all state pipeline safety programs and
challenged the states to strive for excellence. Specifically,
PHMSA encouraged state leaders to be diligent in their
oversight, especially in light of the Massachusetts accident.
State pipeline safety authorities, just as we at PHMSA, must
vigorously inspect and enforce against the pipeline safety
regulations and take prompt action where needed.
C. Role of Gas Companies
While PHMSA and our state partners are dedicated to a goal of zero
incidents, a safe pipeline system requires the active participation of
all stakeholders. Thus, the onus of maintaining a safe pipeline system
is on the companies that own and operate the systems.
PHMSA expects companies to know their systems' risks and needs,
including the risks of the systems' design, environment, and
operations. Companies must address these risks promptly. Accidents like
what occurred here in Massachusetts are unacceptable.
I want to recognize and thank the NTSB for their outstanding
professionalism and dedication while leading the tragic Columbia Gas of
Massachusetts accident investigation. In its preliminary report, the
NTSB \5\ noted that the overpressurization that caused the explosions
and fires occurred during a pipeline replacement project. While we
applaud the company's intent to replace aged and vulnerable cast iron
lines, the project's work plan did not account for sensing lines of gas
regulators in that part of the system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ https://ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/
PLD18MR003-preliminary-report
.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This tragedy and its aftermath have demonstrated how critical it is
for companies to thoroughly plan and safely execute all their work
involving design, construction, operation and maintenance of any
replacement activity. Pipeline operators must understand that they have
a responsibility to demand excellence from the contractors and
subcontractors they hire to work on their systems.
We will support the MA DPU and the citizens of Massachusetts as
they work to recover from this tragedy. At this point, it also appears
that this accident was not caused by a gap in either Federal or state
pipeline safety regulations--this was an issue of company quality
control. While we might wish it otherwise, regulations alone will not
prevent pipeline incidents and accidents. To prevent future accidents
like this one, companies must focus on continuous improvement and
nurturing a good safety culture. Such aggressiveness is essential if
we--all of us, together--hope to create a pervasive culture of safety--
one that looks upon even near-misses as unacceptable failures, like air
traffic controllers have done for a very long time. And I choose that
occupation because they are one of few endeavors with a smaller
incident rate than pipeline operations.
III. Continuous Improvement/Safety Management and Culture
Pipeline operators must continue to use risk-informed approaches,
such as integrity management, to ensure they are adequately identifying
and addressing the greatest risks to their systems. This includes
efforts to conduct integrity assessments and apply lessons learned
across an entire system. But regulations are not the only resource
PHMSA can use to improve pipeline safety.
The common thread that runs throughout every aspect of PHMSA's
safety mission is a Safety Management Systems (or SMS) approach. SMS
looks to find gaps, address them promptly, and prevent pipeline
accidents and incidents from ever occurring as opposed to reacting. To
be effective, SMS requires PHMSA to move beyond the role of being just
a regulator--to encourage operators to identify and target their system
risks, address those risks, and encourage a company-wide culture that
makes safety the number one priority, always.
Pipeline operators are only as good as their worst contractor. For
SMS to permeate through all levels and areas of the pipeline industry,
we need ways to share and analyze data, allowing all of us to see
emerging trends and addressing problems before they result in
accidents. We all share the same goal of zero pipeline incidents, and I
believe that the more we collaborate, the safer our Nation's pipelines
will be.
PHMSA's expectation of companies, and the industries that support
them, is for them to know their systems' risks and needs. Periodic
inspections by PHMSA or its state partners will not yield the kind of
intimate knowledge required to anticipate all of a system's
vulnerabilities.
PHMSA challenges companies by encouraging them to not wait for
inspections, or for new regulations, to make safety improvements. It is
folly to think that further improvement will occur if companies are
either passive or complacent. Companies work with these systems every
day and they must be more aggressive than to wait for PHMSA or states
to identify potential problems.
Under a well-designed SMS, companies can address an issue or gap
before it becomes a problem, because some problems become accidents,
and some accidents become tragedies.
An aggressive approach is essential if we collectively advance to
create a pervasive culture of safety--one that looks upon even the
smallest issue or near-miss as unacceptable.
Our commitment to SMS goes beyond asking companies to make cultural
changes; we are implementing SMS throughout PHMSA as well. PHMSA is
incorporating a focus on safety into our everyday operations,
refocusing on our communications across the agency, and reexamining how
we can do business even better.
An element of the PHMSA SMS is our work with our state partners to
improve our training support. As I said before, PHMSA's T&Q Center is
working to provide an effective and efficient distance delivery system
that does not sacrifice the high quality of our training curricula.
PHMSA's goal is to make it easier for state inspectors to access the
courses they need quickly and at a lower cost.
PHMSA has an active mentoring program for state inspectors, and we
continue to encourage states to participate in the program to improve
inspector skillsets and benefit from feedback from experienced
inspectors. In addition, last year PHMSA employees spent well over
7,600 hours working directly with state pipeline safety programs
supporting pipeline safety.
IV. PHMSA Supports Modernization
Our Nation is growing rapidly. Increases in domestic energy
production are placing more demand on all of the Nation's
transportation modes and poising America to become the world's largest
energy producer. Technology advancements quickly change how the
industry uses the transportation system. In addition, it is projected
that another 70 million more people will live in America in 2050,
placing even more demand on the transportation network. All of these
changes present new safety challenges, as well as new opportunities to
improve the safety and efficiency of our Nation's hazmat transportation
system for today and the future.
PHMSA believes that many of the next steps in safety will come from
encouraging new technologies and prioritizing innovative solutions to
safety challenges. We support modernization in multiple ways, including
funding research and looking at new ways to conduct business.
If done correctly, upgrading our Nation's pipeline infrastructure
is one of the surest ways to foster even higher levels of pipeline
safety. That is why DOT and PHMSA issued a Call to Action in 2011 to
accelerate the repair, rehabilitation, and replacement of the aged and
outmoded pipeline that pose the highest risk across the country.
Thanks to increased state and Federal safety initiatives and
pipeline companies' replacement efforts, the miles of active cast or
wrought iron pipelines has declined significantly in recent years. To
date, 21 states and one territory have completely eliminated their
inventory of cast or wrought iron natural gas distribution lines.\6\ In
fact, cast or wrought iron gas distribution pipelines make up only 2
percent of distribution mains in our country today,\7\ and 41 states,
including the District of Columbia, have specific rate mechanisms that
foster accelerated replacement of pipelines no longer fit for service.
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\6\ Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Hawaii, Iowa, Idaho, Montana, New
Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Nevada, Oklahoma, Oregon, Puerto
Rico, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Washington,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming
\7\ https://opsweb.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline_replacement/
cast_iron_inventory.asp
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PHMSA considers it our responsibility to provide technical support
to state and Federal agencies that have siting or route designation
authority, to prioritize inspections related to the engineering and
construction of major new pipeline projects, and to the support of
projects that are designed to repair, rebuild, and expand
infrastructure.
We're also committed to undertake the research that will develop
new technologies and new solutions to pipeline safety challenges. Our
R&D program works to apply research, strengthen consensus standards,
and inform regulatory activities. Our research is focused on solving
discrete, current problems that have an immediate effect on overall
safety.
Since 2002, PHMSA has funded 270 projects designed to prevent
excavation damage to pipelines, identify and minimize leaks, and detect
defects in pipelines well before they fail. In September, PHMSA awarded
more than $3.8 million to 11 universities via our Competitive Academic
Agreement Program (CAAP). The 13 research projects funded by CAAP this
year address a number of consensus standards, rulemakings, mandates,
and recommendations.
The PIPES Act of 2016 \8\ required the Secretary to establish a
Voluntary Information-sharing System (VIS) Workgroup (WG) to study
information-sharing systems for the pipeline industry. This group will
provide recommendations to the Secretary regarding whether a sharing
system is needed, ways to encourage the exchange of inspection
information, and best practices for the protection of proprietary and
security-sensitive information. The VIS WG's membership includes
representatives from PHMSA, industry stakeholders, safety advocacy
groups, research institutions, state public utility commissions, state
pipeline safety inspectors, labor representatives, and other entities.
The Workgroup is on schedule to present their recommendations to
Secretary Chao before the end of the year.
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\8\ Protecting our Infrastructure of Pipelines and Enhancing Safety
Act of 2016, Public Law 114-183
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V. Conclusion
Safety is the highest priority for the U.S. Department of
Transportation and for PHMSA and we look forward to continuing to work
with Congress to prevent future natural gas distribution pipeline
accidents like what recently occurred in Massachusetts. Pipeline
companies must apply lessons learned from this accident to their own
programs and future operations. PHMSA holds companies accountable for
the safe operation of their pipelines, and will continue its efforts to
ensure that all stakeholders uphold the highest possible safety
standards.
As the number of miles of new pipe being buried across the country
continues to grow, the need for strong state pipeline safety programs
is ever more critical to promote transportation system safety in every
corner of our great nation. States' input and experience is critical in
this effort as PHMSA sets public policy, strategically allocates
resources, and moves forward with effective new regulations.
Thank you again for inviting me to today's field hearing. I look
forward to your questions.
Senator Markey. OK. Thank you.
Now we'll go to a round of questions from the members of
Congress.
Mr. Hamrock, will you commit under oath today that you will
guarantee that every family, every business is made 100 percent
financially whole for the disaster which occurred on the
property of Columbia Gas?
Mr. Hamrock. Senator, yes, we take responsibility for the
incident and the consequences of the incident and from the very
beginning, we're committed to working with each of the affected
individuals, families, and businesses to ensure that we fully
understand the impact on them and that we work with them
closely to fully compensate them for their losses.
Senator Markey. So you will make them 100 percent
financially whole?
Mr. Hamrock. We will work with them to fully understand not
just financially----
Senator Markey. Will you make them 100 percent financially
whole?
Mr. Hamrock. Yes, we will, and----
Senator Markey. OK.
Mr. Hamrock.--we'll work with them for all other effects
that they may have experienced.
Senator Markey. OK. The families and businesses need to
hear that.
Mr. Hamrock, the National Transportation Safety Board,
Chairman Sumwalt, he testified to this, issued an urgent set of
recommendations two weeks ago in an interim report which I have
here. It's an urgent report and it said that the company should
take all of these additional safety measures immediately.
Do you commit to adopting every one of these urgent safety
measures now?
Mr. Hamrock. Senator, the NTSB's recommendations are
aligned with our objectives. We are already implementing some
of those. We began----
Senator Markey. No. I asked you if you would implement all
of the recommendations----
Mr. Hamrock. We will work----
Senator Markey.--of the NTSB?
Mr. Hamrock.--with the NTSB to fully understand and
implement the recommendations they've made.
Senator Markey. It has been two weeks since they issued
these urgent recommendations. Why can you not commit to
implementing urgent recommendations from the NTSB right now,
all of them?
Mr. Hamrock. Senator, we are committing to implement those
recommendations.
Senator Markey. All of them?
Mr. Hamrock. Yes, all of them, and in fact we have already
implemented a number of them in the weeks subsequent to the
tragedy occurring, and in some cases, we've gone above and
beyond those recommendations already.
Senator Markey. It's critical that all of them be
implemented now. In the immediate aftermath, you said that you
would review them, but in reviewing, you said you will now
implement.
Next, the NTSB found that a single unqualified engineer was
allowed to approve the construction job that caused the
disaster with no oversight from experienced technicians that
would have understood the implications for the entire pipeline
system. It's unacceptable and shows a culture of complacency
that Columbia Gas would allow someone so unqualified to make
unilateral decisions about pipeline construction projects.
Mr. Hamrock, were you aware that this was a practice
occurring at Columbia Gas?
Mr. Hamrock. Senator, we are reviewing the NTSB's findings
in this regard, looking at all of the underlying factors that
would have contributed to that situation, committed to getting
to the bottom of it, and we'll not stop until we----
Senator Markey. Were you aware that there was an
unqualified engineer doing the review of the project? Were you
aware?
Mr. Hamrock. I was not personally aware.
Senator Markey. Mr. Bryant, were you aware?
Mr. Bryant. Senator, I am aware of the fact that engineers
who work on our system are not always professional engineers.
That's somewhat standard in the industry.
Senator Markey. It is a standard that is too low. To have a
safety decision made by an unqualified engineer is
unacceptable.
Will you commit right now to having all future pipeline
construction plans signed off on by a qualified engineer and
that Columbia Gas officials who know the entire pipeline system
as the NTSB has recommended? Will you commit to that?
Mr. Hamrock. Senator, yes, we have already begun to
implement that. Where we do not have professional engineers in
place, we will work with outside firms to ensure that we do in
fact bring professional engineers to oversee the work, and
we'll work with the NTSB to make sure that we fully understand
and clarify the intent of that recommendation.
Senator Markey. All right. Well, that was a catastrophic
mistake. The entire company failed. The buck does stop with
you. Your company gave too much power to a low-level engineer
with too little information.
Next, up until four years ago, Mr. Hamrock, it was company
policy to have a trained technician present in the pressure
monitoring station when construction work was being done. If a
technician had been onsite here in Lawrence on September 13,
they likely would have seen the pressure spike, immediately
turned off the gas, and potentially avoided this whole
disaster, but according again to the NTSB, your company
abandoned that requirement four years ago for that common sense
safety measure.
It took 26 minutes after the Columbia Gas Control Room
received the high pressure alarms for someone to shut down the
gas at the regulator. Four years ago, you would have had
someone there to shut down immediately during that critical 26-
minute gap. That did not happen because you abandoned that
policy and the result was disaster.
Saving money as a way of increasing profits but at the
expense of safety leads to disaster, Mr. Hamrock.
Do you commit to having someone there onsite from now on to
make sure it never happens again?
Mr. Hamrock. Senator, safety is a core value for us, the
core driver of everything that we do. We've reviewed that
recommendation and that finding. Further review is required to
fully understand it. We do commit to putting automatic shutoff
capabilities in all of our systems, not just with somebody
stationed at the regulator during construction work but on a
continuous basis----
Senator Markey. Again, will you commit to changing the
policy?
Mr. Hamrock. We do commit to putting automatic shutoff
capabilities across all of our low pressure regulator systems,
which goes above and beyond the NTSB recommendation, because it
will be continuous automatic shutoff, not just----
Senator Markey. Will that satisfy you, Chairman Sumwalt?
Mr. Sumwalt. I cannot commit on behalf of the entire Board,
I'm one of five members of the Board, but I like what I hear
there. The automatic shutoff valve, we've called for that in
other accidents.
Senator Markey. OK. And down to you, Mr. Kuprewicz. The
fine that can be levied is $2 million. This disaster could cost
upwards of a billion dollars. Is that fine too low, Mr.
Kuprewicz? What should the fine be? It seems to me for Columbia
Gas, it's like paying a parking ticket for something that
created a catastrophic accident. Where should these fines be
set?
Mr. Kuprewicz. Well, you ask a valid question. I've
investigated too many multibillion dollar disasters from
pipelines and that's multi-B, with a billion. The fines, you
could argue, and there has been a lot of debate on this over
the decades, what's the purpose of the penalty?
I can't give you a dollar answer, but what I can tell you
is it should be high enough to change the culture so that they
don't repeat the mistakes that are obviously going to be
investigated and reported on and so penalties aren't
necessarily to be punitive. They should be trying to modify the
culture. If they can't do that, then they're not high enough
and I'm sorry to be giving you a glib answer, but I'm giving
you an honest, truthful answer.
Senator Markey. Well, it's not a glib answer. You're saying
they're not high enough. They have to be much higher. It has to
discourage Columbia or any other company from ever turning a
blind eye to the safety problems in their company because they
know that the fine is the equivalent of a parking ticket.
Mr. Kuprewicz. It gets even worse because the actual
penalty that is assessed is very seldom actually collected.
It's a very small percentage, even less than that. So we're on
the same wavelength here, Senator.
Senator Markey. Well, again, boosterism leads to
complacency and complacency leads to disaster. When you assume
that there can be no accident and the fine is so low, if there
is one, then it creates the condition of complacency that does
result in disaster.
So these Federal fines have to be dramatically increased if
we're going to discourage this activity from ever occurring
again in the future, and I would say to you, Mr. Hamrock, that
my question to you is given what's happened, given this
catastrophic event, do you think that you should be any longer
allowed to run this company, given the catastrophe which has
occurred?
Mr. Hamrock. Senator, the consequences alone of this
tragedy motivate me to dedicate the remainder of my
professional career to ensuring that nothing like this ever
happens again. That becomes the sole driver.
I take responsibility on behalf of NiSource and on behalf
of Columbia Gas and as CEO, I'm accountable to be sure that
this never happens again and that we restore these communities
to where they were. We won't stop. We're here for the long run.
We won't stop until we're committed to that and that's what I
pledge.
Senator Markey. Well, Mr. Hamrock, I'm not sure that you
should be allowed to continue to be the CEO of this company
given what happened.
[Applause.]
Senator Markey. I think that it is absolutely imperative
that there be some price which is paid for what has happened.
Let me turn now and recognize my colleague, Senator from
Massachusetts, Elizabeth Warren.
Senator Warren. Thank you, Senator Markey.
So what happened in the Merrimack Valley is horrible, plain
and simple. It is even more infuriating that this is not the
first time that Columbia Gas and NiSource have failed to
provide safe gas service to its customers.
In 2012, a Columbia Gas worker punctured a mislabeled steel
service line in Springfield, Massachusetts, resulting in an
explosion that injured 17 people and caused an estimated $1.3
million in property damage.
Mr. Hamrock, following the Springfield explosions, was your
company pressed to improve your pipeline safety processes?
Mr. Hamrock. Senator, in that instance, as you noted, one
of our employees was investigating the call on a leak and in
the course of that investigation punctured the service line
during a process called bar holding, looking for the gas under
the pavement.
After that, as we always do in any sort of incident,
whether it occurs on our system or others, we take actions that
are designed to prevent something like that from ever happening
again, and we did in fact change procedures and change bar
holding procedures.
Senator Warren. So that's a yes?
Mr. Hamrock. It's a yes. Yes, we did.
Senator Warren. OK. Columbia Gas leaks also occurred across
the Commonwealth, in Walpole in 2004 and 2007, in Easton in
2007 and West Barnstable in 2009, and West Springfield in 2011,
and in Skaugen in 2012.
Following those leaks, did you take action to improve
safety?
Mr. Hamrock. In every case, when there's an incident,
whether it's caused by damage from an outside party, weather-
related, any sort of asset-related condition, we always look
for an opportunity to learn and make changes and take actions
as a result of what we learned from those, so yes.
Senator Warren. Well, here, we're here not because--and I
think this is what you're saying--not because one individual
engineer or one mislabeled engineering plan, but because of a
series of problems, and I'm concerned that these events
culminating in the deadly explosion three months ago expose a
corporate culture that isn't adequately focused on safety.
Mr. Bryant, Mr. Hamrock, corporate culture is on you.
Corporate priorities are on you and that's why I want to ask
about personal responsibility here.
On October 11, the National Transportation Safety Board,
the Federal body charged with determining what caused this
tragedy, released an interim report on the Merrimack Valley
explosions which clearly identified a series of failures by
Columbia Gas.
So, Mr. Bryant, you're the President of Columbia Gas. That
means the buck stops with you. The NTSB reports reveal
unambiguous failures by the company that you run that
contributed to this tragedy.
I just want to know. Do you take personal responsibility
for the breakdowns that led to these explosions?
Mr. Bryant. Senator, I take responsibility for the actions
in the company and I'm responsible at this point to make sure
that we thoroughly understand what happened and why.
Senator Warren. So you take personal responsibility here?
Can I ask you the same question, Mr. Hamrock? You're the
CEO of NiSource, the company that owns Columbia Gas. The NTSB
reports also clearly identify failures by NiSource that
contributed to this tragedy.
Do you take personal responsibility for this tragedy?
Mr. Hamrock. Senator, yes, I take responsibility for the
culture as well as you noted and safety is our core value. It
drives everything we do.
Senator Warren. So let me ask you what personal
responsibility means to you.
Mr. Hamrock, how much were you paid last year?
Mr. Hamrock. My compensation is a matter of public record
and it's in the range of $5 million.
Senator Warren. Five million. OK. And, Mr. Bryant, how much
were you paid last year?
Mr. Bryant. My compensation was approximately $550,000.
Senator Warren. OK. Little over half a million. Mr.
Hamrock, has your pay been reduced as a result of this
disaster?
Mr. Hamrock. Senator, again, I take full responsibility----
Senator Warren. That's a yes or no question. How your pay
been reduced as a result of this disaster?
Mr. Hamrock. I fully expect to be held accountable with
compensation being an important part of that and in fact have
recommended to our Board that my bonus be withheld.
Senator Warren. So your bonus may be withheld in the
future?
And, Mr. Bryant, was your pay reduced as a result of this
action?
Mr. Bryant. Senator, a significant portion of my
compensation above $230,000 is incentive compensation. I have
suggested to Mr. Hamrock that any payment of any incentive in
this year would be inappropriate.
Senator Warren. So you're going to reduce--so you will lose
your--people died in this explosion and you're going to lose
your incentive bonus this year, is that right?
Mr. Bryant. Senator, first conversation I had with Joe
Hamrock and that is the conversation that we had is that
something on the order of $300,000 would be inappropriate.
Senator Warren. OK. So you may lose your incentive bonus or
you may not?
Mr. Bryant. I'd like to clarify that. I think I was more
specific with Mr. Hamrock. I said that I did not think that it
should be paid and, if offered, I would not accept.
Senator Warren. OK. You hope you will lose your incentive
bonus. Is that what you just said?
Mr. Bryant. No. I'm sorry, Senator. I said that I told Mr.
Hamrock that I did not think that the payment of an incentive
this year would be appropriate.
Senator Warren. OK. Who's going to be responsible for
determining whether or not you get your incentive bonus? Is it
Mr. Hamrock?
Mr. Hamrock. Senator,----
Senator Warren. I just want to figure out what personal
responsibility means to you two?
Mr. Hamrock.--personal responsibility goes beyond
compensation. It's----
Senator Warren. Well, let's start with compensation. I'm
fine with beyond compensation, but I just want to know. You
kept your jobs and you're still getting paid what sounds like a
lot of money, and I want to know what personal responsibility
means here.
Let me ask you another question. You said, Mr. Bryant,
right after the explosion, ``I see no cause to fire anybody
with what I know so far.'' So who exactly at Columbia Gas has
been held responsible for the shortcomings that were identified
in the NTSB report? Have you fired anyone?
Mr. Hamrock. Senator, the review is underway. We will take
all appropriate actions, based on the final findings, the
ultimate understanding of what happened here, personal
accountability, including organizational responsibilities, and
compensation will all be a part of that.
The most important thing is that we get to the core set of
facts and understand what happened, who's accountable, make
sure we make a consistent----
Senator Warren. No.
Mr. Hamrock.--and complete set of recommendations.
Senator Warren. Let me stop you there. The most important
thing is not just that we find out what happens. The most
important thing is that we make changes so that it doesn't
happen again.
Mr. Hamrock. I agree.
Senator Warren. And I started my line of questions with how
many times you have stood up and said in effect publicly this
will not happen again. Yes, there has been an accident, there
has been a mistake, but we're going to improve safety and this
will not happen again, and we can go through the list a second
time or third time and that's just right here in Massachusetts
and yet now that we've had a huge tragedy, now that someone has
died, now that people have been injured, now that people have
lost their homes, you're saying exactly the same thing you said
every time in the past and you sit here and say I apologize and
I'm glad to hear that and I hope that it's sincere and you say
I take personal responsibility but I'm just not seeing any
impact from that.
I'm not seeing a company that takes safety seriously and
I'm not seeing people at the head of the company who take any
personal accountability for the kind of tragedy that a culture
that is not focused on safety causes to the public.
The people in this room have been injured. You have not.
You continue to keep your jobs, to collect your big paychecks,
and to go on about your business. Personal responsibility means
you step up in this, not simply that you back away and say
you'll figure out how other people can deal with this problem.
[Applause.]
Senator Markey. The Chair recognizes Senator Hassan.
Senator Hassan. Well, thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you to
the witnesses for being here.
Let me just start by saying you can count me in with my
colleagues, Senator Markey and Senator Warren, in questioning
why it is that the people of Lawrence and Andover and North
Andover or the people in New Hampshire or any American you all
serve should have to rely on your culture because I will add my
concern to that. You just heard from Senator Warren that there
have been safety incident after safety incident after safety
incident just here in Massachusetts and it does not seem to
have changed your culture and that is a grave concern because
this can't happen again and I'm sitting here saying that and,
of course, others have said that after other accidents with
your companies and others.
It's 2018 in the United States of America and nobody should
be worried when they come home at night that their house is
going to explode, nobody.
So let me now turn to you, Mr. Sumwalt, because I want to
figure out what we now do so that we're not just relying on the
culture of private enterprise and we are, in fact, doing what
we should do as Americans to require and implement standards
that will keep us safe.
I understand that one of the recommendations issued in the
NTSB's preliminary report is to require that a professional
engineer issue a seal of approval for public utility
engineering drawings.
Now I have to say when I read that, I was astounded that we
don't require that. It's my understanding that neither
Massachusetts nor New Hampshire nor many other states require
such a seal of approval, although I understand from the
Secretary that that is changing in Massachusetts.
It seems to me that if this change requiring such a seal of
approval could have prevented death and injury in the Merrimack
Valley explosions, it would be worth alerting state governments
so that they can respond accordingly, and I think you touched
on this in your testimony, but can you help me understand what
the NTSB is going to do to issue guidance to states that make
sure that they take the steps they need to require professional
engineer seal on these types of drawings?
Mr. Sumwalt. Thank you for your question, Senator Hassan,
and, of course, our immediate focus is on this particular----
Senator Hassan. Right.
Mr. Sumwalt.--tragedy here in the Merrimack Valley.
I would envision that part of our total package, our total
investigation, we would want to look and see what the
requirements are from various states. As you pointed out, about
29 states do not require this professional engineer signoff.
So I can envision that that would be something that we
would ultimately recommend.
Senator Hassan. Is there any reason you shouldn't be
recommending it right now? So that state legislatures will come
back next month to state houses across the country. Why
shouldn't the top of their agenda be, not to mention the top of
Congress's agenda be, to implement this requirement as a matter
of state regulation or state law? Why shouldn't the NTSB be out
front saying this is something you could do right now, this
legislative session, to make sure that gas pipelines are safer?
Mr. Sumwalt. Well, I certainly hear what you're saying and
I appreciate what you're saying. Again, our immediate focus is
on this particular event, so we've scoped the recommendations
to address this event, but, as I mentioned, I suspect this
investigation will have many, many recommendations that are
broad-reaching.
Senator Hassan. Well, I appreciate that. What I would urge
you all to do is when a recommendation, even if you haven't
finished the complete review, seems like there's an obvious
recommendation out there, that state legislators could act on
immediately, get that recommendation out there and there are
lots of us who want to work with you to do that.
Mr. Kuprewicz, I want to touch a little bit on your
testimony. You say in your testimony that using computer leak
mapping and reporting technologies could help guard against
incidents like the one in Merrimack Valley.
Can you please discuss the role of technology in providing
a backstop against human error and whether or not you think
state and Federal Governments have the resources to implement
that kind of technology?
Mr. Kuprewicz. Well, actually, there are a couple states,
and I won't name them because of nondisclosure agreements, who
have required as a matter in their PUCs, in their settlements
for pipe replacement that to have the company present annually
their leak detection results in computer maps and then they can
sort them and filter them and so when you see in some of these
areas the numerous leaks, even hazardous leaks, the Grade 1s,
and it fills up the page, well, that doesn't really do you a
lot of good.
So you've got to use the computer to filter it and so I
guess the example I'd use is I used Apple Maps to find Lawrence
today when I drove from Connecticut this morning visiting my
daughter and it works. It's not a real complicated system. You
can do the same thing with--not with the complications of leak
map--with Google mapping or Apple mapping, but there are very
easy tools out there. They've been around for, you know, 10
years. They're getting more sophisticated and so a simple
little portable computer can do exactly that.
Senator Hassan. OK. So what you're telling us is that there
are models out there that could be used that could help prevent
this kind of incident from occurring?
Mr. Kuprewicz. Well, it'll help indicate, you know, are you
doing pipe replacement where it really needs to be, first,----
Senator Hassan. Right.
Mr. Kuprewicz.--and then if you're doing pipe replacement
and it didn't really need to be the first one to be done and it
exposed you to a catastrophic over-pressure event for other
reasons,----
Senator Hassan. Right.
Mr. Kuprewicz.--that could have been avoided.
Senator Hassan. OK. Thank you.
Mr. Roberti, does PHMSA have the necessary cyber security
framework to rely on new technologies for safety like the ones
we just heard about?
Mr. Roberti. Senator, did you say cyber?
Senator Hassan. Yes. So we're talking about computer
programs. We're talking about new technology to help prevent
this kind of incident and, of course, the new technology has to
be protected by strong cybersecurity. So does PHMSA have that
kind of capacity?
Mr. Roberti. Certainly. We invest a lot in R&D research
with universities on that front. Cybersecurity on the pipeline
side is within the Department of Homeland Security, the
Transportation Safety Administration. We work with them very
closely. In fact, we're about to execute an Addendum to an
existing Memorandum of Understanding on how to bolster that
area.
In terms of this area about leak mapping, the distribution
integrity management protocols within the regulations envision
that pipeline operators will know their systems, prioritize
where the risks are, and then prioritize investments.
This type of technology should be employed if it's
available and can be employed and I think that's something
we'll continue to look at, as well, how we can harness
technology.
Senator Hassan. Thank you. And just in the interest of
time, I'll end my line of questioning, but I do want to follow
up with you because I think your agency has been slow in
responding to GAO recommendations about ways to improve and
obviously that needs to change.
Thank you.
Senator Markey. Congresswoman Tsongas.
Ms. Tsongas. Thank you, Senator Markey, and I think you can
hear from all our questions up here the deep concern obviously
about the impact on the residents of the Merrimack Valley, but
also the culture and processes and procedures in place within
the company that led to this.
So a lot of work to be done, and I think we're grateful for
the NTSB, who's bringing some clarity, some objective clarity
to just why this happened and what steps should be taken to
prevent it from happening again.
So I want to go to you, Chairman Sumwalt, and ask you, can
you talk about the additional steps that you will be taking to
conduct the investigation? You've issued a detailed preliminary
report, I think, which was very concerning to all of us up
here, showing, I think, in fact that this could have been
prevented.
But what will be the focus of your investigation moving
forward?
Mr. Sumwalt. Well, thank you. Of course, we did want to get
out these interim safety recommendations because we felt that
they were very important to get those out early.
So, in addition, I believe we've certainly identified the
proximate cause of the accident. Of course, that's an over-
pressurization. We understand why the system over-pressured and
so you could say, well, we figured the accident out.
Our investigations are very thorough. So, in addition to
identifying really the proximate cause, we want to look at the
organizational culture of NiSource and Columbia Gas. That's not
as easy as going out and finding a sensor that is attached to
the wrong line.
Ms. Tsongas. How do you do that? How do you look at the
organizational culture?
Mr. Sumwalt. Well, and that's very tricky and that's why it
takes time, but we do that by looking at prior practices. We've
heard about prior events that they've had. We will look at
their--by interviewing their senior management, by not only the
senior leadership but we want to interview the people that are
in the rank and file.
Oftentimes we find there's a difference between what the
people at the top of the organization are saying and what
people on the front line are actually perceiving. So we will
continue to look at that.
We will also look at the regulatory oversight not only from
the Federal oversight but from the state oversight, as well. So
that's what our entire investigation will look at.
Additionally, we will be looking at the emergency response.
So that's really the plan at this point.
Ms. Tsongas. Have you found everybody to be cooperative in
providing the documents, the people that you feel you've needed
to talk with at NiSource and Columbia Gas have been
cooperative?
Ms. Tsongas. Yes, ma'am, we've found them to be very
cooperative with the NTSB.
Ms. Tsongas. So you've had no incidents with them?
Mr. Sumwalt. I'm sorry?
Ms. Tsongas. So you've had no incidents having to insist on
being able to talk with someone, any people sort of trying to
avoid their conversations with you?
Mr. Sumwalt. The truth is I feel like we've had a very open
dialogue with NiSource and Columbia Gas.
Ms. Tsongas. And how long do you think it's going to take
to get to your final report? I know you said it's complicated.
Mr. Sumwalt. It is indeed a priority. Usually our
investigations, our pipeline investigations are running between
12 and 24 months. As I mentioned in my testimony, I've placed a
priority on this to make sure that it is done in a timely
fashion. Meanwhile, if we do see the need for urgent
recommendations or interim recommendations, we will certainly
come out with those.
Ms. Tsongas. So whatever recommendations you make will be
specific to the company or will it be--could they also include
recommendations around the regulatory framework, either a state
or Federal level?
Mr. Sumwalt. Yes, ma'am. I'm sorry. I couldn't clearly hear
that, but our recommendations, if they're interim
recommendations, could be broad-reaching. As you know in our
last recommendation package that came out 11 days ago, they
were not only to NiSource but they were to the State of
Massachusetts, as well.
Ms. Tsongas. And in terms of all the accidents you've
investigated, where does this fall along the trajectory of
seriousness?
Mr. Sumwalt. Well, all of the accidents the NTSB
investigates are very tragic in their own right. This one, of
course, is devastating to not only the families involved but to
the entire community.
Ms. Tsongas. And so you're hesitant to put it in somewhere
in the----
Mr. Sumwalt. Well, that's always tricky because even if one
person loses their life, that in itself is tragic. So I think
that they're all tragic and our thoughts and prayers are with
the people of this community.
Ms. Tsongas. Mr. Hamrock, do you dispute any of the NTSB's
findings to date?
Mr. Hamrock. No.
Ms. Tsongas. So you accept their findings?
Mr. Hamrock. We accept their findings and are working with
them.
Ms. Tsongas. Whatever it may say about the company?
Mr. Hamrock. Yes.
Ms. Tsongas. Mr. Hamrock, I wanted to ask a couple of other
questions.
There have been significant costs that your company's
incurred, rightfully so, and those will, I'm sure, be ongoing
and we won't know the final number, but can you make a
commitment that the costs that you have incurred will not be
passed along to the ratepayers?
Mr. Hamrock. We have approached this with no regard for
anything but taking care of our customers and understanding the
need, their needs, and have not focused on recovery or any
other----
Ms. Tsongas. Well, you may not be focused on it to date,
but in the future, when you come to grips with the total impact
on your bottom line, can you make the commitment that you will
not pass the costs along to the ratepayers?
Mr. Hamrock. I'm not in a position today to make such a
commitment. We've not spent any time focusing on that question.
Ms. Tsongas. Well, I think I take great exception to that
statement.
Thank you, and I yield back.
Senator Markey. Congressman Moulton.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Senator.
Mr. Bryant, my job description as a Marine infantry officer
is very simple. You're responsible for everything your platoon
does or fails to do. One sentence.
You said in your statement initially that you take
responsibility for recovery. Why did you not include in your
statement that you take responsibility for the disaster?
Mr. Bryant. Congressman, I apologize. That was not an
intentional omission. I take responsibility for the actions
that took place that led to that and that responsibility is now
to understand how that happened and my further responsibility
is to work with the rest of the NiSource team to make sure that
something like that never happens again and Columbia Gas or
NiSource or any other gas distribution company in the United
States.
Mr. Moulton. Mr. Bryant, Mr. Hamrock talked about his
responsibility for the safety culture of your company. Mr.
Hamrock said that safety is a core value. Now it's one thing to
have a value and quite another to actually live up to it.
Do you think that your company, Columbia Gas, lives up to
having safety as a core value?
Mr. Bryant. I absolutely believe that NiSource has safety
as a core value.
Mr. Moulton. And we know they have it as a core value.
They've stated that. I'm asking you if you live up to that
value?
Mr. Bryant. Yes, we do. I'll give you the best example that
I have is that any Columbia Gas employee can stop any activity
at any time if they believe that act is unsafe.
Mr. Moulton. So then let's go to the afternoon this tragedy
occurred. There were two alarms at 4:04 and 4:05 p.m. received
at your monitoring station, I believe in Ohio. What action did
your company employees take when those alarms went off?
Mr. Bryant. They notified resources in Massachusetts that
there was an over-pressurization and dispatched resources to
the regulated station.
Mr. Moulton. What resources, Mr. Bryant? What resources
were dispatched?
Mr. Bryant. Management regulation resources, the on-the-
ground resources.
Mr. Moulton. Mr. Bryant, are you aware that or were you
aware in the past that over-pressurization of a gas pipeline
can cause explosions that could lead to the loss of life?
Mr. Bryant. Yes, I'm aware of that.
Mr. Moulton. Were you aware of that before this tragedy
occurred?
Mr. Bryant. Yes.
Mr. Moulton. So it seems to me that if you're aware that
over-pressurization of a gas pipeline could cause loss of life
among your customers and if you receive two alarms at your
facilities that simply notifying some regulators that there's
an over-pressurization incident doesn't do much to help your
customers. That doesn't seem much like a culture of safety.
At what time did you notify customers of the problem so
that they could take action to secure their homes and save
their own lives?
Mr. Bryant. Congressman, public safety officials took those
actions immediately.
Mr. Moulton. I'm well aware of that. We're lucky they're
here because otherwise a lot more people would have died.
But if you're taking responsibility for this,----
[Applause.]
Mr. Moulton.--when did you notify your customers?
Mr. Bryant. Congressman, first and foremost, I have to
acknowledge and thank the public safety officials. They were on
the ground. This was a widespread event and they took the
actions necessary to keep the public safe and we will be
forever grateful to them for that.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you very much. Now you can answer my
question.
At what time did you notify customers that their homes
could start blowing up?
Mr. Bryant. Again, Congressman, we did not need to do that.
Public safety officials would do that.
Mr. Moulton. Well, let me help a little bit, Mr. Bryant,
because on your website, you posted a notice at about 9 o'clock
that evening, five hours, five hours after the two alarms were
received by your facility that there is ``an incident in the
area and that customers should make themselves safe.'' Five
hours. That does not strike me as a culture of safety among
your employees or at your organization.
Mr. Bryant. Congressman, I will readily admit that one of
the weakest areas we had in the earliest hours of this event
was communication and we intend to take that experience and
learn from that.
Mr. Moulton. And how are you going to learn from that, Mr.
Bryant?
Mr. Bryant. We will review the actions and the
circumstances that took place on that evening and determine
what we can do to make sure, God forbid, anything like this
ever happens again we have the----
Mr. Moulton. OK. But here's something that's very simple.
If your company culture cares about safety and if you and your
employees care about the lives of the customers you serve, then
you should let them know that their houses might explode and
not wait 5 hours to do so. Do you agree with that?
Mr. Bryant. I just might--I might suggest that I see this
in a different way. In those hours immediately after the
explosions and fires, all of our employees were focused on
making the systems safe, getting to all of the regulator
stations that fed into that distribution system, making sure
that all 14 points of gas flow were shut off, and that
customers were out of their--in that----
Mr. Moulton. So, Mr. Bryant, several reports and
constituents of mine have stated numerous instances where
Columbia Gas reps simply ran away from residents who were
bombarding them with questions they didn't know the answers to.
That's not a culture of safety.
We're going to hear later from Mayor Rivera of Lawrence and
in his testimony, he will say, ``It appeared to many of us that
Columbia Gas did not have an actual plan for dealing with the
disaster of this magnitude as if it never crossed their minds
that this could occur.'' To me, Mr. Bryant, that's not a
culture of safety.
Mr. Hamrock, what was the profit margin for NiSource last
fiscal year?
Mr. Hamrock. In 2017?
Mr. Moulton. 2017.
Mr. Hamrock. $1.20 per share, earnings per share.
Mr. Moulton. And do the math. What's the overall profit?
How many shares out there?
Mr. Hamrock. Well, on the order of 300 some million.
Mr. Moulton. 300 million? 300 million. What is the cost of
this tragedy, the latest estimate?
Mr. Hamrock. We've disclosed this tragedy, full cost, looks
like it'll cost about $800 million.
Mr. Moulton. $800 million? So what do you expect the profit
margin for NiSource to be in the next three years?
Mr. Hamrock. Well, without accounting for this tragedy,
it'll continue to----
Mr. Moulton. My question is whether you will account for it
and whether the cost of this tragedy, the estimated $800
million, which I suspect will rise even further, will actually
come out of your profit margin for the company.
Mr. Hamrock. We have approached this tragedy by bringing
every resource available in without regard for the profit
margin. Our first duty is to take care of our customers and
ensure----
Mr. Moulton. So what can we expect in your next quarterly
report?
Mr. Hamrock. I don't know. It's too early to know that.
Mr. Moulton. You're the CEO of the company, sir. You should
know what shareholders should expect in their next report.
Mr. Hamrock. In the fourth quarter,----
Mr. Moulton. Do you expect to report a profit?
Mr. Hamrock. We're still in the fourth quarter and I don't
have clarity on what that'll look like at this point.
Mr. Moulton. Well, if you took responsibility for this, you
would have clarity because you would say right now that you
will cover the $800 million and you will not see a profit at
your company because otherwise, as Representative Tsongas
suggested, it seems like you're going to take the money out of
your customers to make the company whole, to make your
shareholders whole. That's not responsibility.
Mr. Bryant, one last question for you. Do you plan to
resign?
Mr. Bryant. At this point, Congressman, I do not. My job,
my focus, my effort every day is the restoration of service to
our customers.
Mr. Moulton. So do you think you're the best-qualified
person to do that?
Mr. Bryant. I think I am the best-qualified person to do
that.
Mr. Moulton. Well, Mr. Bryant, I beg to differ. Based on
your response that evening, when it took five hours to notify
your customers that there was a problem, it's hard for me to
imagine that you're the best person to take responsibility of
this company, and I suggest you resign.
[Applause.]
Senator Markey. So now we're going to move to a second
round of questions. Any of the members who have questions will
be recognized for that purpose.
I'm going to move down to PHMSA, which is our Federal
pipeline safety agency, which has responsibility for issuing
regulations to ensure that communities in Merrimack Valley and
communities all across the United States are safe, but,
unfortunately, our pipeline safety agency has failed to do its
job when it comes to natural gas pipelines.
Federal rules contain critical safety gaps. This agency
often takes many years to issue required regulations, dragging
its feet while our communities remain in danger. The agency is
the poster child for an agency which has been captured by the
industry which it is supposed to regulate. Rather than being a
watch dog, PHMSA has become a lap dog for this industry in
discharging its responsibility to make sure that pipelines are
safe in Merrimack Valley but that pipelines are safe in every
community across the country.
Mr. Roberti, you say in your testimony, ``The onus of
maintaining a safe pipeline system is on the companies that own
and operate the system.'' That is a shocking statement, Mr.
Roberti. That is like saying it is the responsibility of the
fox to make sure that the hen house is safe.
The onus, Mr. Roberti, is on your agency to ensure that the
pipeline companies are operating safely, but your agency has
abdicated that responsibility to the industry which it
regulates. You leave it to the individual companies to
determine whether or not they are going to put safety measures
in place.
So here we have a situation where four years ago, Columbia
Gas just decided that they wouldn't have someone there on duty
in Lawrence to be able to respond immediately and that then
created a huge time gap which then allowed for this accident to
occur where it perhaps could have been stopped right at the
beginning.
So let me turn to you, Mr. Kuprewicz. Talk about PHMSA,
talk about their delegation of responsibility down to the
company level, and what needs to happen in order to make sure
that we in Congress take action, which is necessary, and that
there is a uniform set of guidelines which are put in place
that are mandatory to be abided by so it's not left in the
discretion of Columbia Gas or any other company to determine
whether or not safety standards, which will cost money, are put
in place. Mr. Kuprewicz.
Mr. Kuprewicz. I'd say, first of all, technically, PHMSA
has excellent technical people. I don't want to take that away
from them. I interact with them all the time.
The biggest problem I observed in the last 20 years is the
movement away from prescriptive regulation that has certain
things that they must do----
Senator Markey. Can you pull in the microphone, Mr.
Kuprewicz?
Mr. Kuprewicz. I'm sorry. I thought my voice would carry.
The biggest problem I see is the shift away from
prescriptive where there were certain things the operators must
do that PHMSA could get in and say you're doing this or you're
not doing this to what we call the more risk-based performance
movements and the performance gives a lot of wiggle room and
it's tough for a regulator to enforce. That's probably the
biggest frustration.
The second one I'd see, an example would be the integrity
management regulations for gas transmission interstate
pipelines as well as intrastate pipelines.
We started with a performance. We agreed to go with
performance-based. We'd rather have had a little more
prescriptive. We said it's the first time we're going to do
this. OK. You've talked us into performance-based and that has
not been very successful.
Senator Markey. So you say that the standard which is
applied right now is inadequate. There should be a more
prescriptive, a more detailed set of regulations put on the
books to make sure that no company, no natural gas company in
the United States is in any way questioning what the standard
should be, and that if they violate it, they're going to pay a
penalty, that the Federal agency's going to come down on them
for not abiding by what the national standard is for safety. Is
that what you're saying?
Mr. Kuprewicz. Yes, and especially if you want a rank in
terms of where you want to put your effort in getting back
toward the prescriptive regulations, OK, you can have a
discussion on it.
Senator Markey. So, in other words, we don't let nuclear
power plant operators, we don't let the Seabrook Nuclear Power
Plant or the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant determine what the
level of safety is at a nuclear power plant. There are Federal
regulations that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission puts on the
books and then implements, is that correct?
Mr. Kuprewicz. That's correct.
Senator Markey. And you're saying that the same thing
should be true for PHMSA and it is not today?
Mr. Kuprewicz. That's correct. Shift them back. They're
capable of doing that.
[Applause.]
Mr. Kuprewicz. But it's a major shift.
Senator Markey. Well, it's a common sense shift. The people
up here don't want to live questioning whether or not there are
safety standards for the Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant. They
don't want to wonder whether or not it's just left up to a
single unqualified engineer to determine what happens in a
particular situation. They want to make sure that their
families are safe. They want to make sure that there is a plan
in place that has been put together by the top people in the
United States to ensure that there is in fact protection which
is put on the books.
Chairman Sumwalt, do you agree with that?
Mr. Sumwalt. Well, generally, I do believe that the idea of
performance-based standards is acceptable. The trick is how do
you enforce the performance-based standards.
Senator Markey. And if I may, because we talked about the
$2 million fine on an $800 million accident, and I think that's
conservative because the $800 million is what the insurance
covers. There could be a much higher number ultimately, which
is in fact imposed upon the citizens of Merrimack Valley, and
this $2 million fine just seems absolutely pathetic as a
discouragement so that real safety standards are adopted.
Secretary Beaton, what is the state looking at in terms of
imposition of fines upon this company?
Mr. Beaton. Sorry, Senator, there was a noise. Did you say
relative to the fines?
Primarily up to this moment in time, our sole focus has
been on the restoration of and the stabilization of the
situation and the restoration as close, as best we can to back
to normal here in the Merrimack Valley.
We have an ongoing investigation at the Department of
Public Utilities that will ultimately take us to that answer. I
wouldn't want to put the cart before the horse and predetermine
the outcome of that. So I think that is yet to be determined
but I'm sure we will most certainly be looking into that. It's
too early to say what that would look like at this point in
time.
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Senator Warren.
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
So after the disaster in the Merrimack Valley, you
committed to replacing over 50 miles of pipeline, replacing all
in-home gas appliances, and providing temporary appliance
heating and housing sources for residents. You set the timeline
yourself for this, Mr. Bryant. What was the date that all that
was to be done by?
Mr. Bryant. The original date that we committed to was
November 19.
Senator Warren. November 19, and did you make that date?
Mr. Bryant. We did not, Senator.
Senator Warren. So now you have another date that you have
set. What's that date?
Mr. Bryant. No later than December 16.
Senator Warren. December 16, and can you guarantee that no
family will have to wait beyond December 16 in order to return
to their home, that they'll have full service by then?
Mr. Bryant. Everything that I see what we have accomplished
to date, up to and including yesterday, indicates to me that we
will beat that date.
Senator Warren. So is that a guarantee?
Mr. Bryant. Senator, for me to guarantee would suggest that
we're in control of everything in life. May I just----
Senator Warren. Well, let me stop you right there. You are
in control. You are the guys who have all of the information.
You're the ones who have the money. You're the ones who have
the resources. You're the ones who determine how many people
you hire and who you hire and how you go about this and you're
the ones who set the date.
Mayor Rivera didn't set the date. Senator Markey didn't set
the date. I didn't set the date. You set it. You said we can
meet this. Now you've already proven you're not very good at
this because you've already missed by a month.
All I want to know is can you really tell the folks here
who don't get to live in their houses, who don't have hot
water, who can't cook, who don't have heat, can you tell them
for sure that the date you've picked is a real date and on
December 16, they can all plan to move back home?
Mr. Bryant. I apologize for the comment about not being in
control. All I meant was that there are customers who are
making their own arrangements and their own arrangements to put
heat and hot water in their home may not be fulfilled perhaps
by their own desire.
Senator Warren. OK. So let's----
Mr. Bryant. For those----
Senator Warren. For anyone who's trying to do it on their
own, I get that, but for everyone that you're picking up, which
is everyone, if they want--if they trust you to do this, you'll
have everyone back in their homes on December 16?
Mr. Bryant. Yes, Senator, we will have everybody back in
their homes by December 16.
Senator Warren. By December 16, okay, and that's
guaranteed?
Mr. Bryant. Senator, that's my best statement. We will have
people back in their homes before December 16.
Senator Warren. That's guaranteed. OK. So look. Let me ask
you a question about how we got to this mess to begin with when
people thought they'd be back in on October 17--November 17.
People need heat and I understand this. We just had the
coldest Thanksgiving in 80 years and you said what you'd do is
you'd put space heaters in for everybody. That would get people
back into their homes quickly and be able to get heat. You
purchased 24,000 space heaters to provide to residents.
So Senator Markey and I asked for some more details about
the risk assessments you conducted before distributing these
appliances and whether you'd chosen the safest possible
options. So I just want to unpack a little how we got to where
we are now.
In your response, you acknowledge that about ``90 percent
of homes do not meet the recommended electrical configuration
for space heaters.'' When you announced the plan to provide
space heaters, did you know that almost none of the homes in
the region could handle them?
Mr. Bryant. No, we did not. One of the most difficult
things in this process was learning the assessment of what we
were facing and our intent was to give every customer
possible----
Senator Warren. So----
Mr. Bryant--a space heater.
Senator Warren.--did you not take any input from the local
fire chiefs on this when you put together your plan to buy
24,000 space heaters and distribute them? The fire chiefs
didn't talk to you about it or you didn't talk to the fire
chiefs about this?
Mr. Bryant. What we relied on with the fire chiefs is the
determination of what electrical requirements in the home would
be appropriate to put in a space heater.
Senator Warren. So when did you realize that you had a
problem doing this with space heaters and consider making
alternative housing and heating options available?
Mr. Bryant. As we began to intensively do house-by-house
assessments.
Senator Warren. So how deep were you into this before you
realized--I mean, I can do the math here, that 90 percent of
these homes you're not going to be able to fix this problem
with space heaters.
So how far did you get in this before you started making
alternative arrangements?
Mr. Bryant. Senator, we were working to make alternative
housing arrangements immediately, at the same time that we were
looking to put space heaters into homes. We came to the
conclusion that some customers may have wanted alternative
housing and some customers may have wanted to stay in their
homes. So we worked on two paths.
Senator Warren. So I'm just having trouble putting this
together. So your workers had trouble bringing housing up to
code. You said you'd give everyone space heaters. Then you
realized the houses can't handle them, so you're going to bring
in electricians and you're going to bring the houses up to
code.
So why did it take 13 days from the day that you announced
the November 19 deadline, you announced that on October 9 to
October 22 before you announced the delayed date for
restoration?
Mr. Bryant. Generally, we made the announcement about the
delayed date for restoration once we made the determination
that it would take us longer than we originally expected in
most houses to be able to mitigate to allow the house to become
ready for natural gas.
Senator Warren. And so you're saying that you didn't
realize that you were going to blow your deadline until October
22? That's when you made the announcement?
Mr. Bryant. Senator, when we made the announcement is when
we came to the firm conclusion that we were not going to make
that date.
Senator Warren. And you didn't make it before then? You
didn't make it back sometime around October 9th when you were
in the houses, going house-by-house, and finding out that 90
percent don't have the power structure to do this?
Mr. Bryant. I'm sorry, Senator. The electric space heater
issue really didn't play into the issue. It was really a case
of our making a determination of what it would take to be able
to turn natural gas service back on in a home.
Senator Warren. OK. And so now you've got the appliances
issue, though, whether or not you can get the appliances in,
right, new appliances because you've finished the main part of
the pipeline?
Mr. Bryant. Certainly, Senator, we completed the natural
gas distribution build-out earlier than expected but the--what
we call house-ready, the work necessary to be able to turn gas
back on turned out to be much more labor-intensive than we
originally estimated.
Senator Warren. OK. So here's the problem I've got and I'm
just trying to work through this. It starts with where
Congressman Moulton started and that is, why did it take 5
hours in order to tell customers that there was a problem? I
mean, you could see much more information on the news than you
could get from the company that was responsible both for the
explosion and for the safety of every single resident in the
region.
Now I'm going to the next part and so you announced a
deadline by which you'd have everyone back in their homes. You
gathered more information as you went along. You waited until
late in that process. Now you've announced a new deadline and
I'm asking the question in effect, how much confidence can you
have in the new deadline?
Part of the question is, are you taking the information in
as it comes, and I want to ask one more related to this. On my
way in, I met outside with the National Grid Workers, trained
workers who are ready to go, who are willing to help, who want
to help, and most of them idle for the last two and a half
months.
You know, you have a mutual aid pact with National Grid.
You could have put their workers to work if they had been back
at work at National Grid. So let me ask you. Have you urged
National Grid to reach an agreement with its workers so that
you could call on mutual aid and get those people to work here
in Lawrence and Andover and North Andover?
Mr. Bryant. I have not had such a conversation with
National Grid.
Senator Warren. Why not?
Mr. Bryant. Senator, because I believe that those employees
could have worked for our contractors and helped in the house
mitigation if they so choose.
Senator Warren. So you didn't think it was important to do
it through National Grid. You said you had another way to hire
all those employees, is that right? So you didn't ask National
Grid to do this? So did you--have you hired those National Grid
employees through contractors indirectly or directly?
Mr. Bryant. Senator, I don't know how many National Grid
workers worked for our contractors. I don't have any way of
knowing that specifically.
Senator Warren. So I guess here's the problem. We talked
about a culture of inattention to safety, putting profits ahead
of safety that led to the explosion.
Now the people here are trying to deal with the impact of
that, with the aftermath. Some families will never be made
whole. A family lost a son, people who've been injured, people
who've been moved out of their houses, little children who
can't go to their neighborhood schools, elderly people whose
lives have been disrupted.
But at a minimum, what we're asking for is some
accountability in the recovery efforts and that means the one
thing you ought to be able to do--you have all the information.
You are a very wealthy company. You could bring resources to
bear. You could put a timeline out and you could get these
people back in their homes and what we're hearing is that
there's more information. You don't know who's been hired. You
don't know if there are other people who would have been
available.
But somehow it all turned out to be a bigger project than
you had in mind back when you blew up a bunch of people's
houses and that you're still not on top of this and that people
can't count on getting back in their homes, and is there
anything you can say that's going to give people some
confidence that they really are going to be there before
Christmas?
Mr. Bryant. Senator, I will says that they will be there
before Christmas.
Senator Warren. All of them?
Mr. Bryant. Senator, all of them that we can complete.
Again, if a customer makes the determination that they don't--
--
Senator Warren. It's not all of them that we can complete.
What they want to hear is that they're all going to be
completed.
Mr. Bryant. Senator, we'll be effectively completed with
all customers in their homes before Christmas.
Senator Warren. All right. We're going to hold you to it.
Senator Markey. Senator Hassan.
Senator Hassan. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and----
Senator Markey. May I just?
Senator Hassan. Yes.
Senator Markey. Just to follow up, I ask unanimous consent
to submit into the record testimony from United Steelworker
Local 12003 President Joe Kirylo and testimony from United
Steelworker Local 12012 President John Buonopane describing
their concerns about Massachusetts pipeline safety.
Without objection, their testimony will be included in the
record.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Markey. I apologize. Senator Hassan.
Senator Hassan. It's all good. I want to go back to the
NTSB report and the timeline of this tragedy. Maybe, Mr.
Kuprewicz, I can start with you.
The monitoring center for Columbia Gas received an alert at
4:04 p.m. and 4:05 p.m. that there was over-pressurization
according to the NTSB report.
What technology exists, if any, that would have allowed the
control center to shut down the regulator remotely?
Mr. Kuprewicz. Well, they'd have to implement and go to the
screen. Most gas distribution systems do not have automated or
remote control shutoff valves across their gridded gas networks
and so when I hear that's kind of where they're heading, well,
that's a good thing, but it's kind of a different thing and so
that's good and that would have given them the ability to say
I'm monitoring the pressure at this point. I'm seeing over-
pressure. My control center now has the ability to close that.
Now there's risk in doing that, OK, but that would give the
control center the option of doing that because most
distribution systems do not have the ability--while they may
have remote monitoring, they don't have highly sophisticated
remote controlling of gas distribution systems. It's highly
unusual.
Senator Hassan. So it's unusual to have but the technology
exists to do it?
Mr. Kuprewicz. I'm sorry. I didn't hear you.
Senator Hassan. Sorry. It's unusual for a gas company to
have but the technology exists to do it?
Mr. Kuprewicz. That's correct. They could do it. It's just
money.
Senator Hassan. It took about, as I read the report, it
took about 26 minutes from the first alarm to the actual
closure of the critical regulator and that's a long time.
Mr. Kuprewicz. In the industry, yes, but it's pretty
typical for systems that have to be manually closed.
Senator Hassan. Well, and that's really what I'm trying to
get at here. If systems have to be manually closed and it takes
somebody calling people in the field and then them going out
and closing the regulators, during that 26 minutes, catastrophe
can occur.
Mr. Kuprewicz. That's right.
Senator Hassan. It did. It did. OK.
Mr. Roberti, I want to go back to what I referenced
earlier. Your agency, PHMSA, is responsible for developing and
enforcing regulations for the safe operation of our country's
2.6 million miles of pipelines.
Your agency, though, doesn't have a great track record. So
it is very clear that there are going to be recommendations of
new safety regulations that come out of this tragedy with the
hope that we will never see another tragedy like this one.
But it is hard, given your agency's track record, to
believe that you are really going to initiate the
implementation of these regulations. It seems that you'll have
no regard for timeliness when it comes to implementing
congressional mandates and recommendations from the NTSB, from
the GAO, or the Inspector General's Office.
According to a 2016 GAO report, PHMSA has not implemented
one-third of its mandates. It has missed numerous deadlines and
25 percent of its mandates remain completely unimplemented,
including eight pipeline recommendations relating to safety.
The numbers are from 2016. So the first question is, have
you made progress since 2016?
Mr. Roberti. Well, Senator, thank you for the question. We
work--the current PHMSA leadership is working tirelessly to get
these unfinished mandates out. We have made some success. The
Administrative Procedures Act is a law that we have to adhere
to. There are Executive Orders and OMB regulations and I can
tell you that the PHMSA leadership, we walk the hallways and
daily this is what we know we're tasked with this.
We have congressional mandates and we are doing everything
we can to get them done as soon as possible.
Senator Hassan. You are not the only Federal agency to have
to deal with the administrative rules and acts. I would urge
you, you know, we have a gymnasium full of people and a much
larger community full of people whose lives have been forever
changed by this tragedy and they are looking now to make sure
that we do more than rely on the private sector to regulate
itself.
They are looking to their state and Federal governments to
step up and make sure that we implement the rules that we have
and if we change some rules and implement some new ones to make
sure that this never happens again, that PHMSA will be right
out there and I would like your agency's guarantee that you
will be initiating and pushing in ways that you haven't in the
past, asking Congress, asking the Administration for more
resources, if you need them, but this should not be an agency
that is this woefully behind in implementing critical safety
mandates that protect the lives and the economy of this
country, is that fair?
[Applause.]
Mr. Roberti. That's a fair statement, and we commit to
meeting the congressional mandates and awaiting for the
conclusion of these investigations so that we have a full and
complete record on which to move, whether or not the minimum
standards need to be changed.
As you know, we set the minimum standards. States can go
above and beyond. It's actually not a pure delegation. Congress
granted or the authority over interstate systems has been
reserved to the states. So it's a little bit more complex.
Senator Hassan. I do understand that, and as a former
Governor, I am always appreciative of having that kind of
partnership, right, but what states are also looking to the
NTSB and to PHMSA for is leadership and coordination and,
frankly, it would be helpful to the point I made earlier to the
Chairman, given that state legislatures will be reconvening in
most states in this country next month. I would really highly
recommend that you take what you can share with state
governments now from this investigation and you get to work on
coordinating with them so that, to the degree there are state
laws and regulations that need to be changed, our states have
the opportunity to get on the ball and do that and they're
looking to you all for leadership and coordination to do that.
Will you commit to me and this panel and to the people here
that you will initiate that kind of coordination and
communication?
Mr. Roberti. Yes, Senator. It's underway and we commit to
doing that.
Senator Hassan. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Senator Markey. Congresswoman Tsongas.
Ms. Tsongas. Thank you.
It seems to me much of the discussion is focusing--it begs
the issue of the company's anticipation that such a terrible
disaster might happen. We are focused very much on what caused
it, how to put in place measures that prevent it from happening
ever again, but also being mindful that we have to plan in the
event that they do happen, and it seems to me much of our
experience here in the Merrimack Valley and much of the
questioning is eliciting answers that show you really did not
anticipate a disaster like this ever taking place.
So my question, Mr. Hamrock, is, how does your company plan
for worst case scenario disasters? Was there a plan in place
that you could immediately turn to and implement?
Mr. Hamrock. Thank you, Congresswoman. We do in fact have
extensive emergency response and crisis response plans in place
that we train on, drill on, run tabletops. We run through
scenarios on a very frequent basis.
When this happened, I was notified within 18 minutes of the
initial alarm, immediately knew something terrible had happened
and activated our Corporate Crisis Response protocols which
included and entailed bringing support to the Columbia Gas of
Massachusetts team, dispatched senior lieutenants who were on
the ground here within hours here that evening from other parts
of our system.
I was on the ground the very next day and have spent the
vast majority of the time here. The local operating company,
Columbia Gas of Massachusetts, also has emergency response
planning for such a scenario.
This clearly stretched--was an extreme scenario. A lot we
can learn from this, a lot we are learning from this. We're
committed to working with the NTSB.
One of the areas of their investigation looks at emergency
response. We're fully cooperating with that and will in fact
take back all lessons and actions that we can from this
terrible tragedy.
Ms. Tsongas. So as you're looking at your response and it's
clear that there were many shortcomings in it, what would you
identify at this point as some of the clear takeaways from it,
things you really have to deal with?
Mr. Hamrock. As Mr. Bryant said earlier, communications is
an area that we clearly have lessons that we learned and will
continue to learn. It's an area that requires additional focus
for us but we are focused on that.
And then I would commend the Administration, the Baker
Administration for implementing SMS on a statewide basis
because I believe that framework will help not only us here in
Massachusetts, but ultimately the entire industry have a more
effective overlay of risk analysis and the ability to do more
assessment of risk of these kinds of situations and be better
prepared in the event they could happen.
Ms. Tsongas. So is your disaster plan a written plan? Is it
something somebody could take a look at to be sure that it's
adequate? Where does it exist?
Mr. Hamrock. Our emergency plan is, in fact, a written
plan. It's drilled and it's shared with all of our
stakeholders. We actually we work with fire departments on
emergency response drills. We work with emergency responders.
We built a training center here in Massachusetts where we do
that kind of training and drilling. Very committed to that and
recognize there are things in this tragedy that we need to
learn from that didn't quite meet the standard.
Ms. Tsongas. So clearly need some work.
Mr. Roberti, I have a question for you. As part of your
regulatory oversight, do you require pipeline companies to have
a disaster response plan in place that you can review and
determine whether it's adequate or not?
Mr. Roberti. So under Federal regulations, for any
incident, including a pressure alarm going off, a leak, a fire,
or a call, an emergency call, companies have to respond
promptly and effectively. That's in the regulations.
Ms. Tsongas. And how do you describe promptly? How is that
determined?
Mr. Roberti. Well, I can tell you it's not three hours and
20 minutes to shut off the regulator stations. It has to be--as
Mr. Kuprewicz said, that each pipeline system is different. In
order to physically go out and shut off valves, it will require
different logistical actions.
There is no set timeframe, but typically 30 minutes is a
typical response time for an operator to respond to a call for
a leak or to respond to a situation like this.
Ms. Tsongas. And that's because there are people in place
who've been designated to take those actions?
Mr. Roberti. Personnel and resources have to be readily
deployable to respond to an incident like this.
Ms. Tsongas. So given the fact that this took so much
longer, what would you say about that?
Mr. Roberti. Well, I don't want to prejudge. This is--
again, I said that the jurisdiction to review compliance is
within--the compliance with Federal and state regulations is
with the State of Massachusetts. That investigation has to
complete.
We fully expect the Massachusetts Department of Public
Utilities, when it completes its investigation, to make
determinations about the company's compliance with existing
Federal regulations and state regulations, to the extent
Massachusetts has regulations that exceed the minimum.
Ms. Tsongas. All right. Well, thank you so much because I
know we've dealt in Washington with other disasters in which it
was clear there were no disaster response plans in place and we
watched these disasters unfold, as we did here, in a way that
caused much more damage than ever should have been the case and
so as lawmakers, we need to look at whether or not we need to
require by law something more particular that reassures the
public that the company is being held to the highest of
standards.
Thank you, and I yield back.
Senator Markey. Thank you.
Congressman Moulton.
Mr. Moulton. Yes, I'd like to talk to you, Secretary
Beaton.
How would you describe the current state of our gas
pipeline infrastructure in Massachusetts, Mr. Secretary?
Mr. Beaton. I think given the nature and the history of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the fact is we have one of the
oldest networks of natural gas distribution in the nation. I
think we see that in the Northeast in particular and our
industrialized, our early industrialized parts of the country,
but we do have a plan in place, called our GCEP Plan, that is a
plan submitted by the public utilities, of the replacement of
that older pipeline to be modernized by more modern
infrastructure.
Mr. Moulton. And how long will that plan take to implement?
Mr. Beaton. Well, when they were originally filed, the
companies ranged between 20 and 25 years with one exception of
11, but for the most part, I think we're in year five. They
were 20-year plans.
Mr. Moulton. So 20-year plans. So in the interim, we need
to make sure that another tragedy like this doesn't occur, and
it seems to me that part of the way we do that is through
inspections and your office is responsible for inspections of
our gas pipeline system, is that correct, Mr. Secretary?
Mr. Beaton. Yes.
Mr. Moulton. And do you take responsibility for the safety
of our pipeline systems since you are in charge of inspections?
Mr. Beaton. Yes.
Mr. Moulton. Do you believe that the current inspection and
regulatory system in the state is adequate?
Mr. Beaton. I believe it serves the function. I believe it
serves its intended function is what I meant to say. Are there
improvements that we could make to it? Certainly, and I think
that is the reason for us calling on an independent evaluator.
Mr. Moulton. OK. So, Mr. Secretary, could you just--I'm not
sure what serves as function means exactly.
Do you think the system is adequate, the current system,
the current inspection system?
Mr. Beaton. To accomplish what it is intended to
accomplish, yes. Other opportunities----
Mr. Moulton. And what is it--Mr. Secretary, what is it
intended to accomplish?
Mr. Beaton. To oversee compliance and enforcement of
Federal and state standards.
Mr. Moulton. What about the safety of the citizens of the
Commonwealth, isn't that fundamentally what it's supposed to
accomplish?
Mr. Beaton. If that is the sole tool that is going to solve
all the answers to accomplish that, then yes, but I think by
inspection alone, we are not going to eliminate all risk
associated with natural gas.
Mr. Moulton. OK. I understand you can't eliminate all risk,
but you said you do take responsibility for the safety of the
citizens of the Commonwealth?
Mr. Beaton. I believe I was asked a different question, but
I think it is our role to put policies, procedures, and
enforcement and compliance in place that protects the
Commonwealth citizens, yes.
Mr. Moulton. OK. So there are 21,000 miles of pipeline
currently in Massachusetts. Can you say with confidence that we
are safe from another accident like this occurring in the
future, at least before the 20-year timeline for the
replacement of these pipelines?
Mr. Beaton. Is the definition of safe a guarantee that
something would never ever happen again?
Mr. Moulton. You can answer that as you like. I'm just
asking, do you have confidence that an explosion like this will
not occur again?
Mr. Beaton. I think we're going to do everything in our
power to make sure and I think we've taken great action. I
don't think anyone sitting at this table could guarantee
nothing could happen. There are too many scenarios that I think
makes that guarantee an impossibility.
Mr. Moulton. OK. Well, let's just talk about the inspectors
for a second. According to the Boston Globe just prior to the
explosions, Federal pipeline regulators audited the state's
utility commission and raised concerns about attrition among
the agency's inspectors. Data from the state comptroller show
eight DPU inspectors have retired in the past 3 years,
including four since March. Six engineers were certified to
conduct pipeline inspections at the time of the most recent
Federal audit but one was out on medical leave, another was
working on desk-bound duties due to medical issues, and two
were working as supervisors.
So at the time the state had just two engineers doing field
inspections of pipeline work. Do you think that is adequate?
Mr. Beaton. No.
Mr. Moulton. Just to put this in perspective for folks,
there are 21,000 miles of pipeline in Massachusetts. That means
that with two inspectors in the field, each is responsible for
10,500 miles of pipeline.
If you had a pipeline going from here to San Francisco and
from San Francisco to Houston and then from Houston back here,
that wouldn't be 10,500 miles. In fact, you could then go all
the way to San Francisco again and that wouldn't be 10,500
miles. That's the responsibility of one inspector. That doesn't
seem even close to adequate.
Mr. Beaton. Well, could I bring some clarification to that?
Mr. Moulton. Yes, Mr. Secretary, please.
Mr. Beaton. Yes, thank you. So those numbers aren't
entirely accurate. Currently, we have six certified inspectors,
two professional engineers on the pathway for inspection, three
new hires, two additional postings, and a divisional inspector.
You pointed out that there is high turnover. This is a
national challenge that every state faces, especially in a good
economy, when higher-paying private sector jobs, you can go in,
get the training with the state and through the Federal
Government and then be ripe for purchase in the private sector,
and it is a challenge all of our states face.
I will say in 2013, we had eight inspectors. It reached a
peak of 12.5. In 2017, we had 10. In 2013, 716 inspections were
completed. In 2017, 1,177 inspections were performed. There has
been a trajectory of trending in the right direction of both
the number of inspections. We did hit one of those cycles and
one of those dips where we had a large transition out of
inspectors at that moment in time when the incident occurred.
We have since taken the action to post new positions and
will be at an all-time high of 14 inspectors once all the hires
are made.
Mr. Moulton. OK. Well, I hope we get the 14 but just to put
it in perspective for folks again, through all the numbers you
went through, it seems to me that in the past years, the
highest you ever reached is 12. OK. Again, with 21,000 miles of
pipeline in Massachusetts, that's like saying that each one of
those inspectors is responsible for a pipeline that goes from
here to Dallas. That doesn't strike me as adequate, Mr.
Secretary.
I have one more question. I'm over my time. At a time when
the DPU had only two inspectors in the field, hundreds of
locked-out National Grid workers offered to assist in the
recovery effort. However, it wasn't until a month later that
these workers were actually deployed. Why did it take so long
for this to happen?
Mr. Beaton. There were a number of complexities there
associated with it. We don't have the unilateral jurisdiction
and authority to mandate that that happen. The Governor
convened multiple meetings between the parties to try to
negotiate and come to terms on this.
We also worked very closely with all parties to try to get
the workers to be able to work as quickly as possible. There
were many conversations and there was actually an effort by
NiSource to put out a notice that any of the employees would be
welcome. They would have to come through another contractor,
given the nature of the contract dispute between the Union and
National Grid.
There was an open door. We were trying to--there were some
workers that were able to work on the site but the expertise of
those workers was the work that was in the ground, not the
house-ready work that has been the challenge that we have
talked about and that work was way ahead of schedule, 43.3
miles and over 5,000, I think it was 5,086 service lines were
placed in 29 days.
So there was a short window of time where the expertise of
those workers would have been able to fit into the puzzle of
this extremely complicated restoration, but we did make every
effort and led by the Governor actually initiating
conversations and mediation talks to try to get the parties to
sit down and negotiate and try to accelerate the opportunity to
get those workers working as quickly as possible.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. But the bottom line
is it took a month for them to come online, and the bottom line
right now is that we have enough inspectors for each one to be
responsible for a pipeline from here to Dallas and your goal is
to add just two more. I think we need to significantly increase
that goal.
Thank you.
[Applause.]
Senator Markey. Thank you.
So this panel has made it very clear that there are huge
deficiencies in the regulatory system in our country, that
there is a huge regulatory black hole that has been created
where everyone can point a finger in another direction in order
to avoid the responsibility of actually having put the real
safety protections in place to guarantee that accidents like
this don't happen.
That's why we're having this hearing, to make sure it does
not happen again.
Mr. Hamrock, Mr. Bryant, at every step of the process,
there was a chance for NiSource and Columbia to avoid this
disaster. You could have had the correct maps of your system
but you did not. You could have made sure the Meters and
Regulations Group, the brains of the pipeline system, reviewed
all work plans but you did not. You could have had a
professional engineer sign off on plans but you did not. You
could have had automatic shutoff relief devices installed to
prevent over-pressurization but you did not. You could have had
someone onsite at the regulator station to monitor operations
but you did not.
Instead of choosing safety, you chose savings. Instead of
choosing action, you chose to cut corners, and instead of
choosing----
[Applause.]
Senator Markey. Instead of choosing to do things the right
way, you chose the easy way every time and the result was
disaster, but because of the decisions that you made to cut
corners, to never prioritize safety, you created a situation
where there were ticking time bombs underneath every street and
inside of every house and business.
The deeper we dig into your company, the more frightening
this has become. Your recklessness took a wrecking ball to the
lives of residents in these communities.
Columbia Gas has been making up its response to this
disaster as it goes along. Its deadlines----
[Applause.]
Senator Markey. Its deadlines in November are now deadlines
for December, but as Christmas is arriving, there are families
all over Merrimack Valley who still doubt that they will be
back in their homes. There are businesses who are still
doubting that they will be open and that's a legacy of your
negligent activities in the days and weeks and months and years
leading up to that disaster and now you're not even close to
making it up to the people in Merrimack Valley, not even close.
We're not going away. We're going to be here with the
people of Merrimack Valley to make sure that your company is
made accountable, to make sure that there is a reckoning which
NiSource and Columbia Gas has to suffer as a consequence of
your negligence, of your taking the lowest common denominator
as your standard for safety.
The people in this room, they paid the price for that
lowest common denominator. Their families paid the price, and
we're going to make sure that this system is overhauled so that
a real safety system is put in place, not just for Merrimack
Valley but for the whole country. We owe it to the people of
this country.
As the natural gas industry says it wants to dramatically
expand natural gas into every city, every town, every state in
the United States, that's their goal, but we're going to make
sure that safety is Issue Number 1, that this lesson is not
lost, that all of the answers which we have been receiving,
which basically have been saying they don't know all of the
details, that they're still learning, that they're still
responding to the NTSB, that's all we really need to know about
how little they had planned for this disaster.
So you might be making it up as you're going along, but for
the people of Merrimack Valley, their lives have been affected
by that lack of attention, lack of concern, lack of safety.
So this is the first hearing but it's not the last. This is
the beginning of accountability, the beginning of a process to
ensure that our promise to the American people and on behalf of
the people in Merrimack Valley that this never happens again.
So this completes the first panel and we will be submitting
questions in writing to you and we would also expect prompt
answers to those questions in detail to the Committee.
So this hearing is concluded and we now invite the second
panel up to begin their testimony.
[Applause.]
Senator Markey. Now I would like to welcome our next panel
made up of leaders from the communities who have been hurt by
this disaster.
First, we have Lawrence Mayor Dan Rivera. Mayor Rivera has
in many ways been the face of this issue, speaking for his
constituents. He's been doing an outstanding job in ensuring
that those voices are heard, and we thank him for his work.
[Applause.]
Senator Markey. Also, he's joined by North Andover Town
Manager Andrew Maylor and Andover Town Manager Andrew Flanagan,
who have been representing their communities to make sure that
their concerns are heard on a daily basis, and I am submitting
joint testimony on behalf of both of the Town Managers into the
record and I thank them for providing their stories to the
Committee.
[The information referred to follows:]
Joint Statement of Andrew W. Maylor, North Andover Town Manager
and Andrew P. Flanagan, Andover Town Manager
Chairman Thune, Ranking Member Nelson, and distinguished Members of
the Committee:
The Merrimack Valley Gas Disaster
On Thursday, September 13, 2018, at approximately 4:00 p.m. the
over-pressurization of the low pressure gas lines in a 5 square mile
radius in the Merrimack Valley area of northeastern Massachusetts
resulted in more than 130 fires, close to two dozen injuries and at
least one fatality. More than 10,000 households and 685 businesses lost
gas service and as a result did not have access to heat and hot water
and other gas appliances. For more than three hours after the over-
pressurization residents in the impacted area could smell gas outside
of their homes. It is estimated that this disaster impacted between
40,000 and 50,000 residents in the towns North Andover, Andover and the
City of Lawrence making it the largest disaster of its type in U.S.
history. By Friday, September 14, 2018, the Governor of Massachusetts
had declared a state of emergency.
Note: Columbia Gas of Massachusetts, a NiSource company, is the gas
utility that provides gas service to the impacted area.
The Four Phases of the Disaster
1. Response
Less than an hour after the first 911 call the executives in the
three impacted communities made their first major decision when they
recommended that all residents with gas service evacuate to emergency
shelters or to the homes of friends or relatives outside of the
impacted area. Within ninety minutes we needed to make a second major
decision-to authorize that electric service be shut off to a
significant portion of each community placing already scared and
confused residents into darkness. The public safety response, fire,
police and emergency medical services (EMS), was extraordinary and no
doubt saved lives, reduced injury and substantially mitigated the
impact that this disaster could have had on the region. As stated in
the NTSB Preliminary Report (PLD18MR003) their investigation is ongoing
and one of the factors that will require additional inquiry is ``the
coordination between the emergency responders and Columbia Gas''. Just
after 6:00 p.m. on the night of the disaster and only moments following
the Incident Command Center (ICC) going operational, there was
agreement that each of the impacted gas meters needed to be shut off to
reduce the risk of future explosions and fires. By 7:00 p.m. those
working in the (ICC) including the Governor, chief executives of the
impacted communities, fire chiefs, the fire marshal, and the director
of the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency (MEMA), requested from
Columbia Gas officials the maps of the impacted area and a definitive
list of the impacted households and businesses. Columbia Gas was unable
to produce such information for hours and when they did, the
information was not completely accurate. As a result, the process to
shut off all impacted meters began at approximately 2:00 a.m. Friday
morning. Ten hours after the first 9-1-1 call. This, combined with the
delay to fully depressurize the low pressure gas mains, hindered the
work of the public safety personnel to fully eliminate the risk to the
region. These were the first of many milestones that Columbia Gas would
not meet during the response phase. Columbia Gas struggled coordinating
their resources to complete the shutoff process and it became evident
by the early afternoon on Friday September 14. 2018, that they were not
up to the task. As a result Governor Baker declared a state of
emergency and handed the responsibility of shutting gas service off to
the remaining residents to Eversource. It should be noted that weeks
into the recovery phase of the disaster the communities still did not
have an accurate list of the properties impacted.
2. Recovery
A disaster of this magnitude is all consuming. Dozens of decisions
need to be made daily and the command structure nature of a disaster
response reduces the time available to develop consensus between
professional staff and elected officials and creates challenges in
finding ways to delegate the responsibilities and still meet deadlines.
An additional complication in the decision making process for a
regional disaster is representing the interests of your community while
trying to understand the specific issues facing the other communities
and trying to strike a balance that improves success for the entire
recovery effort. Recognizing these challenges and the shortcomings
during the gas shutoff effort, on September 21, 2018 Columbia Gas, with
the support and encouragement of Governor's office, hired retired Navy
Captain Joe Albanese as the Chief Recover Officer (CRO). Columbia Gas
has done an effective job of understanding the different needs of those
impacted and has worked well to avoid a one size fits all approach to
the recovery effort.
Gas Main and Gas Service Replacement
In order to restore service all 45 miles of gas main in the
impacted area had to be replaced as did the service mains and meters to
all homes. Columbia Gas under the direction of the CRO was well
positioned to complete this work. More than half a dozen large gas main
replacement contractors supplied the crews, at times more than 200 such
crews, and the gas main replacement was completed 3 weeks ahead of
schedule on October 30, 2018. Interestingly, there were more than 1,000
contractors from at least 7 states at the peak of the construction
phase. The impact on the roads, sidewalks and other infrastructure in
the impacted neighborhoods as a result of this massive utility project
will not fully be known for years. Miles of streets which have been
repaved in the past 5 years now have been damaged and there has been a
similar impact on hundreds of linear feet of sidewalks, countless
street trees and thousands of lawns and driveways. The communities have
requested that Columbia Gas replace, not just spot repair, all public
assets that were damaged. We have not yet received confirmation from
Columbia Gas if they will do so. As it relates to the private property
impact we would expect that Columbia Gas would return all impacted
properties to their pre-disaster condition.
Gas Device Replacement/Repair
In the early stages of the recovery phase all gas devices including
stoves, dryers, water heaters, boilers and generators were determined
to be unsafe and therefore needed to be replaced, not just repaired,
prior to service restoration. One of the most important decisions that
was made during the recovery phase was determining the time-frame for
completing the work to safely restore gas service and allow people to
return to their normal way of life. Based on all of the information
available the agreed upon ``re-light'' date was set at November 19,
2018. The restoration process turned out to be far more challenging
than expected. Arguably the most difficult decision of the entire
disaster was made on October 24, 2018, when, based on the information
available, the town managers and mayor agreed to change course and
allow, if possible, temporary repairs to heating systems previously
determined to be unsafe and extend the deadline for completion from
November 19th to December 16, 2018. As of November 19, 2018, sixty-
seven days after the event and the original date for having all
impacted residents and businesses ``re-lit'', 67 percent of residents
and 81 percent of businesses have been ``re-lit''. With the change in
strategy from ``repair when you can and replace later'' it is expected
that Columbia Gas will have to return in spring of 2019 and embark on a
5 month process to replace the equipment that has been temporarily
repaired.
With the average nighttime temperatures ranging from 20 to 45
degrees and dropping on a daily basis alternative housing and temporary
heat have been significant priorities. There are currently more than
1,700 families in hotels, travel trailers, shelters and apartments all
secured for the purpose of providing alternative housing. When the
restoration process began decisions needed to be made regarding
prioritizing certain properties to reduce the risk to health or safety.
These decisions had the burden of knowing those that wouldn't be
restored quickly may remain impacted for weeks or months. It is
difficult to get people to leave their homes even when faced with the
prospect of no heat, cold showers, and the inability to cook a hot
meal, and/or dry their clothes. The decision to add travel trailers
(RVs) was made in response to that concern. Locating the travel
trailers presented its own challenges and therefore, another set of
decisions was required. Where should the trailers be located given
there would be loud generators and bright lights? How many trailers on
each site? Should laundry facilities be included?
Decisions regarding the most effective way to communicate with
residents and determining who the audience is can present real
challenges. More than 1,500 contracted employees from around the
country are working in the three communities. There are cultural,
societal and language differences between the employees and residents.
Social media has taken on a more prominent role than what the
communities experienced pre-disaster. We had to decide early on to
focus increased resources in this space and push the gas company to do
the same to help manage the misinformation that was running rampart
early on. It took Columbia Gas weeks to engage in the appropriate
communication channels and this ultimately led to confusion and
mistrust which still exists through today.
A strength of the recovery process has been all three communities
working cooperatively. This has driven decisions which included holding
joint, rather than separate, press events, entering in joint contracts
for engineering services, developing inter-municipal agreements to help
fill hundreds of police and fire details on a daily basis, and having
similar agreements for hiring plumbing inspectors from other
communities.
During the past seven weeks we have had to make hundreds of
decisions each of which directly impact one or more residents or
business owners. Many of these decisions needed to be revisited or
revised. To say that the environment for making decisions in a disaster
such as this is dynamic would be an understatement. The primary lesson
learned has been that the residents, business owners, and other
stakeholders in the communities are looking for someone to trust, not
someone to always be right. This lesson has helped instill confidence
in our ability to make decisions even when insufficient information or
limited time have made the decision making process less than ideal.
We have no doubt that for many of the residents and businesses that
remain impacted the frustration must be mounting by the day. It is
frustrating for me as well. In many ways the ``Rapid Relight Plan''
which was instituted on October 24, 2018, raises new questions that
will need to be answered. When exactly will my heating unit be
replaced, will I have the option to move my gas service, who do I call
during the winter if my now repaired heating unit breaks, how does the
repair effect the warranty on my boiler, when will my driveway or lawn
be repaired?
Claims
The claims process has been challenging for most residents and
business owners. Claims centers were opened in each of the three
communities within a week of the disaster and those claims centers
remain open today. Impacted residents can also file claims via
telephone. Most claimants have had multiple claims representatives
throughout the reimbursement process as the third party company
managing the claims process ramped up the demand. To date more than
23,000 claims have been filed, 9,940 of those claims remain active and
more than $61 million in claims have been paid.
All three towns have been advocating on behalf of the residents and
businesses impacted since this disaster occurred and will continue to
do so. To expedite meeting the date established in the original plan we
made decisions based on verbal commitments from Columbia Gas. Given
what has transpired to date and the ongoing nature of the recovery
process, one which extends well into next year, verbal commitments will
no longer be acceptable. The Town of North Andover expects at a minimum
the following from Columbia Gas:
1. That a written agreement be drafted which very specifically
identifies what each resident/business can expect from Columbia
Gas and when. That agreement (contract) should be provided to
each customer impacted.
2. That Columbia Gas continue to provide the necessary resources to
respond to service questions and claims. These resources must
remain local.
3. That Columbia Gas commit to the curb-to-curb replacement of ALL
roads impacted by the gas main replacement work associated with
this disaster. Columbia should also commit to the repair or
replacement of all other impacted public assets such as
sidewalks and street trees.
3. Mitigation
As you know the NTSB issued its Preliminary Report on October 11,
2018 (PLD18MR003). In that report they were clear about the cause of
this disaster ``Columbia Gas developed and approved the work package
executed on the day of the accident. The work package did not account
for the location of the sensing lines or require their relocation to
ensure the regulators were sensing actual system pressure. The work was
performed in accordance with steps laid out in the work package. In
light of this accident, Columbia Gas implemented a safety stand-down
for all employees who perform work related to low-pressure natural gas
systems for NiSource subsidiaries.'' (Emphasis added)
In a conversation we had with one of the lead NTSB investigators
around the time the report was issued, it was confirmed to me that
Columbia Gas was responsible and the fact that the report was
``Preliminary'' would not change that but instead allow them to provide
more details about what took place before and after the incident. This
is supported by the last sentence in the report, ``The NTSB's
investigation into this accident is ongoing. Future investigative
issues include the coordination between the emergency responders and
Columbia Gas; an analysis of the engineering work package preparation
and execution, including the design documentation; and a review of
construction packages for constructability and safety.'' Since the time
the preliminary NTSB report was issued the State DPU issued a
moratorium to Columbia Gas for all non-emergency gas work. It should be
noted that a current Department of Public Utilities order includes a
penalty of up to $1,000,000 per impacted property if Columbia Gas fails
to meet their obligations to complete work required.
The NTSB has just recently (11/14/2018) issued a Safety
Recommendation Report (PSR1802) related to the disaster which provides
guidance to mitigate the likelihood of a similar disasters in the
future. That report recommends the following actions:
To the Commonwealth of Massachusetts:
Eliminate the professional engineer licensure exemption for
public utility work and require a professional engineer's seal
on public utility engineering drawings. (P-18-005)
To NiSource, Inc.:
Revise the engineering plan and constructability review process
across all of your subsidiaries to ensure that all applicable
departments review construction documents for accuracy,
completeness, and correctness, and that the documents or plans
be sealed by a professional engineer prior to commencing work.
(P-18-006) (Urgent)
Review and ensure that all records and documentation of your
natural gas systems are traceable, reliable, and complete. (P-
18-007) (Urgent)
Apply management of change process to all changes to adequately
identify system threats that could result in a common mode
failure. (P-18-008) (Urgent)
Develop and implement control procedures during modifications
to gas mains to mitigate the risks identified during management
of change operations. Gas main pressures should be continually
monitored during these modifications and assets should be
placed at critical locations to immediately shut down the
system if abnormal operations are detected. (P-18-009) (Urgent)
4. Preparedness
Per the NTSB Preliminary Report Preliminary Report issued on
October 11, 2018 (PLD18MR003) ``minutes before the fires and explosions
occurred, the Columbia Gas monitoring center in Columbus, Ohio,
received two high-pressure alarms for the South Lawrence gas pressure
system: one at 4:04 p.m. and the other at 4:05 p.m. The monitoring
center had no control capability to close or open valves; its only
capability was to monitor pressures on the distribution system and
advise field technicians accordingly. Following company protocol, at
4:06 p.m., the Columbia Gas controller reported the high-pressure event
to the Meters and Regulations group in Lawrence. The company protocol
does not appear to include contacting local or regional Public Safety
Answering Points (PSAPs or dispatch) when such an event occurs. The
first resident called 9-1-1 at 4:11 p.m. Fire, police and emergency
medical services (EMS) began to respond in all three communities within
five minutes of the over-pressurization as a result of an overwhelming
number of resident calls for service. However, there was no direct
communication to each community by the company regarding the nature of
the problem. Therefore, for the next one to two hours confusion and
fear spread throughout the region. ``Columbia Gas shut down the
regulator at issue by about 4:30 p.m. The critical valves of the
involved natural gas distribution system were closed by 7:24 p.m.''.
The municipal chief executives were told that the complete
depressurization of the impacted gas mains was not completed until
several hours after that. It is possible that more local control of the
system and a more robust protocol in response to an event could result
in less overall damage. Specific questions regarding the preparedness
issues are:
Would more local control of the system have allowed the
``regulator at issue'' to shut down this regulator sooner? If
yes, would this have reduced the extent of the damage?
Would more local control of the system have allowed ``the
critical valves of the involved natural gas distribution
system'' to be closed before 7:24 p.m.? If yes, would this have
reduced the extent of the damage?
Finally, the communication protocol must reflect the need to get
public safety agencies involved as quickly as possible and that gas
mains and therefore gas main failures do not recognize community
borders. PSAPs in all impacted jurisdictions must be contacted
immediately after an event occurs.
Conclusion
The actions of Columbia Gas which resulted in the gas explosions
and fires in the Greater Lawrence area have had a profound and
continuing impact on the region's residents and business owners. The
exact impact both personal and economic will not be known for months or
years to come. What is most concerning is the unforeseen costs such as
the long term impact on the economic viability of many of the small
businesses in the region, the emotional impact on vulnerable
populations from being without heat and hot water, and/or the effect
the disaster has had on families displaced and remaining in hotels
rooms or travel trailers.
In a disaster such as this identifying areas of deficiency is not
only acceptable, but quite frankly not difficult. That being said, the
senior leadership of Columbia Gas has partnered with the three
communities to find solutions to the most significant and impactful
problems. Also, the work of the Chief Recovery Officer Joe Albanese and
his team with the support of Governor Baker, the Lieutenant Governor
and several members of their senior staff, to continue to find creative
ways to solve problems and to challenge those on the project that have
underperformed is important to recognize. Without this leadership we
would not have made the progress we have made to date.
Finally, the residents and the business owners of the impacted area
woke up on September 13, 2018, never imagining how dramatically their
lives would change as a result of this disaster. They have endured loss
of life, property, income, and a degradation of their quality of life.
However, they have demonstrated great resilience, strength and courage
during this difficult time and they deserve our thanks and a commitment
that we will take steps to ensure their lives return to normal and that
a similar disaster does not occur anywhere in the United States again.
Regards,
Andrew W. Maylor
Town Manager
North Andover, Massachusetts
Andrew P. Flanagan
Town Manager
Andover, Massachusetts
Senator Markey. We thank you all for being here and we will
begin with you, Mr. Mayor, and then I will introduce the other
witnesses as their testimony is called for.
So, again, we welcome you, Mr. Mayor, and we thank you for
everything that you've done for your community and whenever you
are ready, please begin your testimony, and if you could move
that microphone in just a little bit.
Mayor Rivera. How's that?
Senator Markey. If you maybe lift it up a little bit.
STATEMENT OF HON. DAN RIVERA,
MAYOR, CITY OF LAWRENCE
Mayor Rivera. Good morning, Senators, invited guests, and
fellow affected citizens.
I want to begin by thanking Senator Markey for advocating
on behalf of our communities to bring this hearing to Lawrence,
an honorary Lawrence kid. It allows all those affected to be
present and included throughout the investigation process.
The gas fires and explosions of September 13 and the days
that followed were both a human tragedy and a human disaster.
That tragedy continues despite the best efforts of Columbia Gas
for the recovery effort.
I never thought that I would have to ask people in my
community and those in surrounding communities to evacuate the
city fearing for their lives, asking them to abandon their
homes, their businesses, and their neighborhoods because no one
knew if it was safe for them to be there.
Residents everywhere in the area evacuated out of sheer
panic. We had to cut the electrical power to every domicile and
business in South Lawrence, Andover, North Andover in the
middle of the night.
What followed the devastation of the fires and explosions
was loss of life, grave unbearable injury to people, priceless
loss of property and the regional economy, but worst of all, we
lost the underlying security that the very thing most of us
relied on to keep ourselves and our families warm in the
coldest of New England winters could destroy our homes, our
neighborhoods, our towns, and our very peace.
We expected that the gas services that we pay good money
for every month, that many families sacrifice to make those
monthly payments, and that business owners base the core of
their businesses on, would not put us in grave danger. However,
that is exactly what happened.
And during the heart of the disaster, I said this before,
Columbia Gas was the least informed and the last to act. It is
important to know that while we were trying to save lives and
make heads and tails of the tragedy and disaster of those days,
Columbia Gas was failing to manage the disaster in the same way
they had failed to maintain their gas lines.
I beat most of the upper echelon leadership to the scene
that night after driving in Thursday night traffic from Boston.
Those who have done that understand what I'm talking about.
It was clear that the Columbia Gas engineers and Columbia
Gas of Massachusetts top leadership were afraid and lacked a
clear path to deal with the disaster. They owned the gas in the
pipe, they owned the customer relationships, yet they failed to
own this disaster.
They failed so much so that Governor Baker had to call for
a state of emergency and put a different utility company in
charge and we lost critical hours that first weekend getting
people back in their homes because Columbia Gas refused to call
for mutual aid, motivated by what appeared to many of us to be
an unwillingness to bear the costs of that mutual aid.
One person was dead, many were injured, and the core of
three communities had been shaken, and it appeared to many of
us that Columbia Gas didn't have an actual plan for dealing
with the disaster of this magnitude, as if it had never crossed
their mind that this could occur.
And earlier today, they said they did have one. I would
love to see that. I'd love for them to put that up, the plan
that was in place prior to this event.
These plans should be mandated across utilities, not just
natural gas, for there to be a system failure and customer
evacuation plan created and refreshed every two years. Ordinary
people have plans to get out of their own homes in case of a
fire. It's the least the utility could do to have a basic plan
in place if they set your city on fire.
It's cold outside today and there's snow on the ground.
People in our communities are still without heat and hot water.
Some people are still in hotel rooms and RVs and some are still
cooking on hot plates and most of the people in the affected
areas, regardless if they were living before Thanksgiving or
not, let's just say they didn't have the Thanksgiving they
wanted to due to this disaster.
The recovery's a material effort, fixing things in the
system so that life can happen. I mean, in that sense, the
recovery's an awful experience only made better every day for
some who get their gas turned back on.
I want to say thanks to Governor Baker because, because of
him, we have Chief Recovery Officer Joe Albanese leading the
recovery effort, a 28-year veteran and former captain in the
United States Navy Civil Engineer Corps, the Seabees. We're
honored to have Joe leading our restoration efforts. He enjoys
our full support and appreciation for walking away from his own
business to work on this recovery.
Every day, he has done all he can to assist us to get
Columbia Gas to live up to the responsibilities and get the
work done.
As I have lived it, the recovery has really been about four
things: fixing the pipe in the street and to the house to get
gas to the house, fixing the pipe and appliances in the house
so they can turn the gas on, making people whole as customers
of Columbia Gas for their physical loss, for mental anguish,
and terrifying experiences that they had to endure and that
means financially, and, four, supporting those people
throughout this time as they waited for the first three things
to be completed.
Columbia Gas did accomplish the work of fixing the pipe in
the street ahead of schedule and without further disaster. For
this, we are thankful.
However, the rest of the work has been miserable. Any time
the recovery has had to deal with the plight and need of
people, Columbia Gas has initially failed, only getting it
right days and sometimes weeks after local and state officials
have raised the pressure on them so much so that they had to
relent.
The plight of people and their suffering has been prolonged
because of a broken claims process, a broken repair process,
and the total lack of understanding on how to communicate with
customers.
Long before we had 250 houses late in the day with gas, we
had weeks of only 40 homes a day lit. For this, not only does
Columbia Gas but Gilbane Recovery Services bear responsibility
and as such should be investigated. I want to repeat that.
Gilbane Recovery Services also bears responsibilities for
missing the initial date and should be investigated.
Before we had a hundred appliances delivered to homes on a
day, we had days with none, and for almost a week, securing
temporary housing was not only daunting but nearly impossible.
Customers were lied to about availability of hotels and RVs and
consistently left in the dark on their claims process. All the
while, all the while hotel rooms and RVs sat empty. Having to
endure not one, not two, but as many as five assessments of
their homes and appliances before one wrench was turned to fix
their boilers or furnaces was a common experience of the
affected communities.
Many times people languished without answers to important
questions about when they should stay home from work to
accommodate the Columbia Gas and the Gilbane contractors and
when they could expect answers regarding their claims. All the
while, people were sleeping in cold beds and cooking on hot
plates and taking cold showers. Other families huddled in RVs
and far-away hotel rooms waiting for their homes to be fixed.
I'm not sure what would have happened to our communities if
not for the firefighters of Lawrence, Andover, North Andover
Fire Departments, and the over a thousand firefighters that
came in support of them, including the State Fire Marshal's
Office.
The effect of this disaster was controlled only by the
professional posture and response of the Lawrence, Andover, and
North Andover Police Departments and the over 1,100 police
officers from across the Commonwealth and the State Police, all
the municipal employees that put down their city and town
bureaucracies and became an army of first responders, aid and
humanitarian workers.
[Applause.]
Mayor Rivera. From the city councils and selectmen to the
library directors, from the state representatives to the
teachers and staff of our public schools, many of them affected
themselves, the Governor and his staff and cabinet who
seamlessly rolled up their sleeves and became an active
informed part of these efforts, the state legislature and the
Federal delegation, both of you have made us feel that our
plight was the most important business before the Commonwealth.
Town Managers Maylor and Flanagan and I, as well as the
affected across communities, can never thank them all enough
for their actions.
I must say that I have never been more proud to be
associated with this group of people in my life. They all
showed the spirit of government and its power to do good.
I want to be sure to say the rank and file of Columbia Gas
workers and zone captains and the workers who fixed the pipe in
the street all were shining spots in this ordeal. Zone captains
became a symbol of the good Columbia Gas could do if it got its
stuff together.
The recovery and the personal and communal sense for every
person affected is going to take some time, not measured in
days or weeks. I'm not sure when we will remove from our
memories the darkness, the fire, the cold nights, the cold
showers, the evacuations, and the loss of such a young life.
So in the end, we will need help from state and Federal
officials and government to pave our roads, to fix our
infrastructure, to pay for economic development, basic help for
us to get off the mat after being knocked down by Columbia Gas,
but what we all expect from you, what we ask of you is to do
what is at the core of why we have governments and that is to
protect us and to ensure this can't and won't happen again.
In this one instance, in this one incident, Columbia Gas
has shown they could not provide safely the service they
promised everyone. This failure alone should cause that you
take that privilege of running a gas company away from them and
break that company apart.
[Applause.]
Mayor Rivera. I'm not sure how you do it, revoke their
licenses, make them sell their business to someone else. It
doesn't matter how you do it, but after they have met their
financial obligations not only to the individuals and the
businesses and to the municipalities, Columbia Gas should cease
to exist. No second chances.
Leonel Rondon's life was taken and multiple homes no longer
exist and our livelihood and our peace has forever been
altered, so should Columbia Gas no longer exist.
A disbanded Columbia Gas that no longer exists will send a
strong message and motivator to others to do better around
safety. That is what justice for everyone affected by this
disaster would look like.
Thank you.
[Applause.]
[The prepared statement of Mayor Rivera follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Daniel Rivera, Mayor, City of Lawrence
Good morning senators and invited guests and fellow affected
citizens. The gas fires and explosions of September 13, 2018 and the
days that followed was both a human tragedy and a human disaster. That
tragedy continues despite the best efforts of Columbia Gas and the
recovery effort. I never thought that I would have to ask people in my
community and those in surrounding communities to evacuate the city,
fearing for their lives. Asking them to abandon their homes, their
businesses and their neighborhoods because no one knew if it was safe
for them to be there; others evacuated out of sheer panic. We had to
cut the power to every domicile and business in South Lawrence, Andover
and North Andover in the middle of the night. What followed the
devastations of the fires and explosions was loss of life, grave,
unbearable injury to people, priceless loss to property and the
regional economy, loss of business and jobs. But worst of all we lost
the underlying security that the very thing most of us relied on to
keep ourselves and our families warm in the coldest of New England
winters could destroy our homes, our neighborhoods, our towns and city,
our very peace. We expected that the gas services that we pay good
money for every month, that many families sacrifice to make those
monthly payments and that business owners based the core of their
business and their livelihood on, would not put us in grave danger, but
that is exactly what happened.
During the heart of the disaster Columbia gas was the least
informed and last to act. It is Important to know that while we were
trying to save lives and make heads or tails of the tragedy and
disaster of those days Columbia gas was failing to manage the disaster,
in the same way that they had failed to maintain their gas lines. I
beat most of the upper echelon leadership to the scene after driving in
Thursday night traffic from Boston. It was clear that the Columbia Gas
engineers and Columbia Gas Massachusetts top leadership were afraid and
lacked a clear path to deal with the disaster. They owned the pipe,
owned the gas in the pipe, they owned the customer relationships, yet
they failed to own this disaster. So much so that Governor Baker had to
call for a state of emergency and put a different utility company in
charge. We lost critical hours that first weekend, getting people back
in their homes because they refused to call for mutual aid motivated by
what appeared to many to be an unwillingness to bear the cost of that
mutual aid. One person is dead, many injured the core of three
communities has been shaken. It appeared to many of us that Columbia
Gas did not have an actual plan for dealing with a disaster of this
magnitude; as if it never crossed their minds that this could occur. It
should be mandated across utilities (not just natural gas) for there to
be a system failure and customer evacuation plan created and refreshed
every 2 years. People have plans to get out of their homes in case of a
fire. Utilities to should have a basic plan if they set your city or
town on fire.
It is cold outside today and there is snow on the ground. People in
our communities are still without heat and hot water. Some people are
still in hotel rooms and RVs. Some are still cooking on hotplates. And
most of the people in the affected area, regardless if they were lit
before Thanksgiving or not, did not have the Thanksgiving they wanted
to due to this disaster. The recovery is a material effort; fixing
things and systems so that life can happen, in that sense the recovery
is an awful experience only made better every day for some who get
their gas turned back on.
Thanks to Governor Baker we have Chief Recovery Officer, Joe
Albanese, leading the recovery effort. A twenty-eight-year veteran and
former Captain in the United States Navy Civil Engineer Corps. We are
honored to have Joe leading our restoration efforts and he enjoys our
full support and appreciation for walking away from his business to
work on this recovery. Every day he has done all he could to get
Columbia Gas to live up to their responsibility and get the work done.
As I have lived it, the recovery has really been about 4 things: (1)
Fixing the pipe in the Street and to the House to get gas to the house,
(2) Fixing the pipe and appliances in the house to turn on the gas, (3)
making people whole as customers of Columbia Gas for the physical loss
but also for the mental anguish and terrifying experiences they had to
endure and (4) Supporting people as they waited for 1, 2, and 3 to be
complete.
Columbia Gas did accomplish the work of fixing the pipe in the
street ahead of schedule and without further disaster. For this we are
thankful. However, the rest of the work has been miserable. Anytime the
recovery has had to deal with the plight and need of people Columbia
Gas has initially failed only getting it right days and sometimes weeks
after local and state officials have raised the pressure so much that
they had to relent. The plight of people and their suffering has been
prolonged because of a broken claims process, a broken repair process
and a total lack of understanding of how to communicate with customers.
Long before we had 250 houses a day lit with gas, we had weeks of only
40 homes lit per day. For this not only does Columbia Gas but Gilbane
Recovery Services, bear responsibility and as such should be
investigated. Before we had days of 100 appliances delivered we had
days with none. For almost a week, securing temporary housing was not
only daunting, but nearly impossible. Customers were lied to about
availability of hotels and RVs and consistently left in the dark on
their claims processes. All the while hotel rooms and RVs sat empty.
Having to endure not 1, not 2 but as many as 5 assessments of their
homes and appliances before one wrench was turned to fix one boiler.
Many times people languished without answers to important questions
about when should they stay home from work to accommodate Columbia Gas
and GRS contractors, and when can they expect answer regarding their
claims. All the while, people were sleeping in cold beds and cooking on
hot plates and taking cold showers. Families huddled in RV's and far
away hotel rooms waiting for their homes to be fixed.
I am not sure what would have happened to our communities if not
for the firefighters of the Lawrence, Andover, North Andover fire
departments and the over 1,000 firefighters that came in support of
them including the State Fire Marshal's office. The effect of this
disaster was controlled only by the professional posture and response
of the Lawrence, Andover, North Andover police departments and the over
1,000 police officers from across the commonwealth and the State
Police. All the municipal employees that put down their city and town
bureaucracies and became an army of first responders, aid and
humanitarian workers, from the city councilors and selectmen to the
library director, from state representative to the teachers and staff
at our public schools (many affected themselves). The Governor and his
staff and cabinet, who seamlessly rolled up their sleeves and became an
active, important part of these efforts, the State legislature and the
Federal delegation both made us feel as if our plight was the most
important business before the commonwealth. I have never been more
proud to be associated with a group of people in my life. They all
showed the spirit of government and its power to do good. I must say
that the rank and file Columbia Gas workers and zone captains and the
workers who fixed the pipe in the street all were a shining spots in
this ordeal. Zone captains became a symbol of the good Columbia Gas
could do if it got it stuff together.
The recovery in the personal and communal sense for every person
affected is going to take some time not measured in days or weeks. I am
not sure when we will remove from our memories the darkness, the fire,
the cold nights, the cold showers or the evacuations. So, in the end we
will need help from state and Federal officials and government to pave
our roads, to fix our infrastructure, to pay for economic development,
basic help to get off the mat after being knock down by Columbia Gas.
But what we all except from you, what we ask of you, is to do what
is at the core of why we have governments, and that is to protect us
and to insure this can't and won't happen again. In this one incident,
Columbia Gas showed they could not provide the service they promised
everyone safely. This failure alone should cause that you should take
their privilege to run a gas company away. Break it apart revoke their
license make them sell their business to someone else, it doesn't
matter how, but like Leonel Rondon's life was taken, and multiple homes
no longer exist, and our lives and livelihood has forever been altered,
Columbia Gas as a company should no longer exist. That is what justice
for everyone affected would look like.
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Mayor. Thank you for your
great work.
And next, we're going to hear from Tina Messina. Tina is a
leader in the small business community in North Andover. We
thank you for coming here and representing all of those
businesses who want to have answers as to what happened and how
soon they can go back to work.
So we thank you and whenever you're ready, please begin.
STATEMENT OF TINA MESSINA, OWNER, WINE CONNEXTION
Ms. Messina. Sure. Thank you.
Good afternoon. My name is Tina Messina, and I'd like to
thank the Committee for this opportunity to discuss the impact
on September 13 gas explosion has had on the business
community.
Senator Markey. Could you move that microphone just over in
front of you just a little bit?
Ms. Messina. Closer?
Senator Markey. Yes.
Ms. Messina. After the initial shock of the event, the
community needed to understand the scope of the problem.
Information on the details came slowly as we learned what
happened and who was affected by this event.
By the following Sunday, I found myself hitting the
trifecta. I was impacted as a landlord with two retail
properties, a three-unit strip mall, a 23-unit shopping center,
a business owner of a retail wine store, and my home were all
in the affected area.
We learned that there could be over 40 miles of gas line
that needed to be replaced and our gas equipment had been
compromised. Upon learning this information, we didn't know if
we were looking at months or years to get back our gas service.
That Monday, I began receiving many phone calls from my
tenants. While some tenants could operate without gas, others,
such as the restaurants, were shut down. Our restaurant tenants
found themselves with no revenue stream and they were facing
loss of help.
Sharma Grill, a 164-seat restaurant, began to receive
cancellations of future events as he could not give these
clients any assurances that he would have a functional
facility.
During that first week after the explosion, finding
solution to our problems was difficult as we needed to wait on
state and local officials to give us direction. Information was
scarce and frustration set in.
As property owners, we began to explore our options to
provide alternatives to heat our buildings. It was September
and we figured that we had three months before the cold weather
was upon us and we knew that if we didn't have heat, we could
not provide a working sprinkler system and we would have to
shut down the buildings. It was an unthinkable scenario.
We immediately began to look into alternative fuel sources,
such as LP tanks, but quickly found we weren't the first to be
making those phone calls. It became clear they were many of us.
Businesses as well as homeowners fighting for the same limited
resources.
We were also encountering state regulations and large costs
for these solutions, making it very difficult to determine what
to do. We needed answers.
It wasn't until the following Friday that we learned that
the recovery process was going to take approximately two months
and businesses were going to be addressed first. While we were
all relieved to hear the short timeline, understanding the
execution of the recovery plan was unknown.
During this planning stage, many of us were experiencing
loss of revenue, whether you were able to open your business or
not. People stayed away from the area and many people didn't
know that businesses were open.
As the recovery plan unfolded, it became apparent we all
needed to individually manage the process of getting our gas
turned back on. This became a full-time job for some of us.
Understanding what needed to be fixed versus replaced was not a
simple yes or no answer.
Managing that process with Columbia was challenging as
parameters and information changed daily. You will be told what
to do 1 day and then the next day you would have a new crew
telling you something different. It was important to stay on
top of the situation to ensure that your business and/or
building would get relit.
Once the gas-ready plan was deployed, we were hit with
another wave of disruption. While we all understood replacing
48 miles of gas line was a monumental task, we did not
understand the impact it would have on the infrastructure
surrounding our businesses. Roads were shut down and dug up
while traffic was redirected making it time-consuming and
difficult for people to get to our businesses.
For more than 5 days, the only way to get in and out of our
23-unit shopping center was through the CVS Drive-Through.
As it became difficult to get to these affected areas, many
people were told not to go to these areas via social media.
People were posting ``What a mess, took me 40 minutes to go a
half mile, don't go there if you don't have to.'' Frustrations
amongst patrons began to set in and they stayed away.
I experienced this with the Wine Connection as our year-
over-year sales were down from the previous time last year and
I expect other businesses experienced the same.
Also during this time, it became evident that people were
living out of the area, whether by choice or the need to
relocate due to their living conditions. Our regular customers
were not around to shop for our goods and services. As someone
whose personal home was affected, I understood the difficulties
of living without heat, hot water, and cooking capabilities.
Now that we are entering our third month into the recovery,
concerns turn to the holiday season. This is a critical time
for retailers and hospitality businesses and we wonder how will
we fare through this season. Do customers know we're open? Will
they return to our businesses or have they adopted new
locations for shopping for goods and services? When will
residents be able to return to their homes and patronize our
business? In a booming economy, these are unsettling questions
we're about to face.
In conclusion, I'd just like to say to the Committee that
the people of Merrimack Valley are resilient and while we're
still dealing with these challenges to recover from this
disaster, we look forward to the days when we can get back to
normal.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Messina follows:]
Prepared Statement of Tina Messina, Owner, Wine Connextion
Good Afternoon, My name is Tina Messina and I'd like to thank the
committee for this opportunity to discuss the impact of the Sept 13th
gas explosion has had on the business community.
After the initial shock of the event the community needed to
understand the scope of the problem. Information on the details came
slowly as we learned what happened and who was affected by this event.
By the following Sunday, I found myself hitting the trifecta. I was
impacted as a landlord, with 2 retail properties; a 3 unit strip mall
and a 23 unit shopping center, a business owner of a retail wine store
and my home were all in the affected area.
We learned that there could be over 40 miles of gas lines that
needed to be replaced and our gas equipment had been compromised. Upon
learning this information we didn't know if we were looking at months,
several months or years to get back our gas service.
That Monday, I began receiving many phone calls from my tenants.
While some tenants could operate without heat, others such as the
restaurants were shut down. Our restaurant tenants found themselves
with no revenue stream and they were facing loss of help. Chama Grill,
a 164 seat restaurant, began to receive cancellations of future events
as he could not give these clients any assurance he would have a
functional facility.
During that first week after the explosion, finding solutions to
our problems was difficult as we needed to wait on state and local
officials to give us direction. Information was scarce and frustration
set in. As property owners, we began to explore our options to provide
alternatives to heat to our buildings. It was September and we figured
we had 3 months before the cold weather was upon us and we knew that if
we didn't have heat we could not provide a working sprinkler system and
we would have to shut the buildings down. It was an unthinkable
scenario.
We immediately began to look into alternative fuel sources such as
LP tanks but quickly found that we weren't the first to make those
calls. It became clear there were many of us, businesses as well as
home owners, fighting for the same limited resources. We were also
encountering state regulations and large costs for these solutions
making it very difficult to determine what to do. We needed answers.
It wasn't till the following Friday that we learned the recovery
process was going to take approximately 2 months and businesses were
going to be addressed first. While all were relieved to hear the short
time line, understanding the execution of the recovery plan was
unknown.
During this planning stage many of us were experiencing loss of
revenue whether you were able to open your business or not. People
stayed away from the area and many didn't know if businesses were open.
As the recovery plan unfolded it became apparent we all needed to
individually manage the process of getting our gas turned back on. This
became a fulltime job for some of us. Understanding what equipment
needed to be fixed vs replaced was not a simple yes or no answer.
Managing that process with Columbia was challenging as parameters and
information changed daily. You would be told what to do one day and
then the next day you would have a new crew telling you something
different. It was important to stay on top of the situation to ensure
your business and/or your buildings would get ``re-lit''.
Once the Gas-Ready plan was deployed we were hit with another wave
of disruption. While we all understood replacing 48 miles of gas lines
was a monumental task, we did not understand the impact it would have
on the infrastructure surrounding our businesses. Roads were shut down
and dug up while traffic was redirected making it time consuming and
difficult for people to get to our businesses. For more than 5 days,
the only way to get in and out of our 23 unit shopping center was
through the CVS drive thru.
As it became very difficult to get to the affected areas, many
people were being told not to go to these areas via social media.
People were posting ``what a mess'' took me 40 minutes to go a \1/2\
mile, don't go there if you don't have to.'' Frustration amongst
patrons began to set in . . . and they stayed away. I experienced this
with the Wine ConneXtion, as our year over year sal es were down from
the previous time last year and I expect other businesses experienced
the same.
Also during this time it became evident that many people were
living out of the area. Whether by choice or the need to relocate due
to their living conditions, our regular customers were not around to
shop for our goods and services. As someone whose personal home was
affected, I understood the difficulties of living without heat, hot
water and cooking capabilities.
Now that we are entering our 3rd month into the recovery, concerns
turn to the holiday season. This is a critical time for retailers and
hospitality businesses, and we wonder how will we fare through this
season? Do customers know we're open? Will they return to our
businesses or have they adopted new locations of shopping for goods and
services? When will residents be able to return to their homes and
patronize our businesses?
In a booming economy, these are very unsettling questions we are
about to face. In conclusion I'd like to let the committee know that
the people of the Merrimack Valley are resilient and while we are still
dealing with the challenges to recover from this disaster, we look
forward to the days where we can get back to normal.
Thank you.
Senator Markey. Thank you, and thank you so much for your
testimony.
[Applause.]
Senator Markey. And next, we are going to hear from Andover
Fire Chief Michael Mansfield and I am also going to submit to
the record testimony on behalf of Lawrence Fire Chief Brian
Moriarty and North Andover Fire Chief William McCarthy.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Markey. Also with us are Andover Police Chief
Patrick Keefe, Lawrence Police Chief Roy Vasque, and North
Andover Police Chief Charles Gray. We thank each and every one
of you and all of the people who work under you who responded
so valiantly on that first day and on all of the ensuing days.
We are in your debt. We are in your debt every day but that was
an especially trying time.
[Applause.]
Senator Markey. And we just want to--we are mindful that on
that day and on every day, you run toward the flames as
everyone else is running away from the flames and on a day like
today, I think it's appreciated more than ever. So thank you.
And now Chief Mansfield speaking on behalf of all of the
brave men and women who worked up in Merrimack Valley to
respond to that crisis, we welcome your testimony.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL MANSFIELD, FIRE CHIEF,
ANDOVER, MASSACHUSETTS
Mr. Mansfield. Senator Markey, thank you very much. Senator
Warren, Representative Tsongas, Representative Moulton.
I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today
representing those men and women of the Fire Service who
responded to the catastrophic natural gas incident that
occurred at approximately 4:18 on September 13, 2018. This
event has been identified by some as the worst natural gas
disaster to ever occur in the history of the United States, if
not the world.
I must state that the time afforded to me to speak today
will not even scratch the surface with regards to the specifics
of this event or the challenges we have been confronted with
and are still confronted with as we navigate through the
recovery phase of this operation.
Senator Markey. Chief, could I ask you just to move the
microphone in a little closer? OK. Beautiful.
Mr. Mansfield. Certainly.
Senator Markey. Thank you.
Mr. Mansfield. The events that led up to the disaster would
have never occurred if there were technological stopgap
measures on the pipeline in place by Columbia Gas. Those
measures would have prevented what has been reported to be up
to 74 pounds of pressure introduced into the gas line that took
well over, well over 1 hour by Columbia Gas employees and/or
subcontractors to shut down and purge.
To date, it remains incomprehensible that Columbia Gas,
which is a subsidiary of a multibillion dollar conglomerate
known as NiSource, is involved in an industry that is so
dangerous to our communities, but had no ability to stop the
flow of natural gas to its infrastructure that supplies the
three communities of Lawrence, North Andover, and Andover.
The Fire Service in all three communities usually rely
heavily upon one another to assist in the mitigation of any
type of emergency incident when they occur. In this incident,
all three fire departments found themselves competing for the
same resources to assist in the emergency response which
included a total of 141 fires, five building explosions,
unfortunately one death, and I want to express my sincere
condolences to the Rondon family for your loss, three civilians
seriously injured, and seven firefighter injuries.
9-1-1 calls for assistance at the initial point of the
incident were overwhelmed, all available fire-rescue resources
in the three affected communities within minutes, all off-duty
fire-rescue personnel were requested to report back in to work,
150 of those off-duty firefighters answered the call from the
three communities immediately.
The 9-1-1 telecommunications in the communities' Dispatch
Centers were overwhelmed immediately by the deluge of calls
from the affected residents. In the first eight hours after the
initial natural gas line over-pressurization occurred, the
Lawrence, North Andover, Andover and mutual aid assets
responded to over 375 calls for assistance.
Firefighter safety was drastically minimized during the
height of this incident as a result of the immediate lack of
available resources. There are many instances on record where
only one piece of apparatus with only three firefighters
onboard responded to a full-blown building fire.
A normal initial response to these types of incidents would
include up to three engines, an aerial ladder, command staff,
and rescues, totaling upwards between 15 to 17, quite possibly
20 firefighters.
There were many reports of fire personnel passing by
structure fires as they responded to a structure fire at an
address they had been originally dispatched to. There are also
many reports of firefighters exiting homes after extinguishing
a fire and being met by frantic neighbors telling them that
their home was also on fire.
Mutual aid was immediately requested response all affected
communities, as well. That system was overwhelmed to a point
that a request to the State of Massachusetts Emergency
Management Agency was made to activate the statewide Fire
Mobilization Plan which allowed for several task forces of
personnel, engine and ladder companies and ambulances to
respond to assist with the disaster.
The Fire Mobilization Plan brought in the following
additional personnel and equipment assets from as far away as
York, Maine, Nashua, New Hampshire, and communities as far away
as Weston, Massachusetts. We had a total of 18 additional
engine companies, six additional ladder companies, nine
additional chief officers, 56 additional ambulances, and 80
additional fire suppression personnel per 12-hour operational
period were involved.
These additional assets were rotated every 12 hours to
ensure firefighter safety was paramount and those asset numbers
were maintained until Monday, September 17, 2018.
Many Commonwealth of Massachusetts and Federal agencies
assisted with the initial responses, investigations,
mitigations, and are still operating as part of the recovery
phase of the operation, such as the Massachusetts Department of
Fire Services, the Fire Marshal's Office, Massachusetts
Emergency Management Agency, the National Transportation Safety
Board with their investigation, Federal Bureau of
Investigations, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, as
well.
There are many lessons to be learned by this event. We
within the Fire Service are willing to work with those at the
state and Federal level to assist in the writing of additional
legislation to further regulate the natural gas industry so
that we may prevent anything to this magnitude to ever occur
again in our country.
All the aforementioned agencies' assistance has been
immeasurable and we greatly appreciate the seamless methodology
of their approach and response to all of our requests to ensure
that the citizens we serve maintained a high level of safety.
Their compassion and caring in an effort to meet all of the
communities' needs and our citizens has been nothing short of
astounding.
In closing, on behalf of Lawrence Fire Chief Brian
Moriarty, North Andover Fire Chief William McCarthy, and
myself, I would like to thank all of those who have assisted us
throughout this ordeal to date and those who continue to assist
us with the recovery process.
Most importantly, we would like to thank those who reside
in our communities for their patience throughout this event and
the outpouring of support we have received.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mansfield follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael B. Mansfield, Fire Chief,
Andover Fire Rescue
I appreciate this opportunity to testify before you today
representing those men and women of the fire service who responded to
the catastrophic natural gas incident that occurred at approximately
4:18 pm on September 13, 2018. This event has been identified as the
worst natural gas disaster to ever occur in the history of the United
States.
I must state that the time afforded for me to speak today will not
even scratch the surface with regards to the specifics of this event or
the challenges we have been confronted with and are still confronted
with as we navigate through the recovery phase of the operation.
The events that led up to the disaster would have never occurred if
there were technological stop gap measures on the pipeline in place by
Columbia Gas. Those measurers would have prevented what has been
reported to be up to seventy four (74) pounds of pressure introduced
into the gas line that took well over one (1) hour by Columbia Gas
employees and/or subcontractors to shut down.
To date, it remains incomprehensible that Columbia Gas which is a
subsidiary of the multibillion dollar conglomerate known as NiSource is
involved in an industry that is so dangerous to our communities, but
had no ability to stop the flow of natural gas to its infrastructure
that supplies the three communities of Lawrence, North Andover, and
Andover.
The fire service in all three communities rely heavily upon usually
assist one another in the mitigation of any type of emergency incident
when they occur. With this incident all three fire departments found
themselves competing for the same resources to assist in the emergency
responses which included:
141 Fires
5 Building Explosions
1 Death
3 Civilians Seriously Injured
7 Firefighter injuries
911 calls for assistance at the initial point of the incident
overwhelmed all available fire/rescue resources in the three affected
communities within minutes. All off duty fire/rescue personnel were
requested to report back into work. One hundred and fifty (150) off-
duty firefighters from the three communities immediately answered the
call.
The 911 Telecommunicators in the communities dispatch centers were
also overwhelmed immediately by the deluge of calls from the affected
residents. In the first eight hours after the initial natural gas line
over pressurization occurred, the Lawrence, North Andover, Andover and
mutual aid assets responded to over three hundred and seventy five
(375) calls for assistance.
Firefighter safety was drastically minimized during the height of
this incident as a result of the immediate lack of available resources.
There are many instances on record where only one piece of apparatus
with only three firefighters on board responded to a building fire. A
normal initial response to these types of incidents would include three
(3) engines, an aerial ladder and Command Staff totaling fifteen (15)
to seventeen (17) firefighters. There were many reports of fire
personnel passing by structure fires as they responded to a structure
fire at an address they had been originally dispatched to.
There are also many reports of firefighters exiting homes after
extinguishing a fire and being met by frantic neighbors that their home
is on fire also.
Mutual aid was immediately requested to respond to all affected
communities as well. That system was overwhelmed to a point that a
request to the State of Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency was
made to activate the statewide fire mobilization plan, which allowed
for several task forces of personnel, engine and ladder companies and
ambulances to respond to assist with the disaster. The fire
mobilization plan brought in the following additional personnel and
equipment assets from as far away as York, ME., Nashua, NH and
communities as far away as Western Massachusetts:
18 Additional Engine Companies
6 Additional Ladder Companies
9 Additional Chief Officers
56 Additional Ambulances
80 Additional Fire Suppression Personnel per 12 hour
Operational Period
These additional assets were rotated every twelve hours to ensure
firefighter safety was paramount and those asset numbers were
maintained until Monday September 16, 2018.
Many Commonwealth of Massachusetts and Federal agencies assisted
with the initial responses, investigations, mitigation and still are
operating as part of the recovery phase of the operation such as the
Massachusetts Department of Fire Services, Fire Marshal's Office,
Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency, National Transportation
Safety Board, Federal Bureau of Investigations and the Federal
Emergency Management Agency.
There are many lessons to be learned by this event. We within the
fire service, are willing to work with those at the state and Federal
level to assist in the writing of additional legislation to regulate
the natural gas industry so that we may prevent anything to this
magnitude to ever occur again within our country.
All of the aforementioned agencies assistance has been immeasurable
and we greatly appreciate the seamless methodology of their approach
and response to all of our requests to ensure that the citizens we
serve maintained a high level of safety. Their compassion and caring in
an effort to meet all of the community's needs and our citizens has
been nothing short of astounding.
In closing, on behalf of Fire Chief Brian Moriarty, Fire Chief
William McCarthy and myself, I would like to thank all of those who
have assisted us throughout this ordeal to date and those who continue
to assist us with the recovery process. Most importantly we would like
to thank those who reside in our communities for their patience
throughout this event and the outpouring of support we have received.
Senator Markey. Thank you, Chief, and----
[Applause.]
Senator Markey.--again we're in your debt today but every
day for what you do. So we thank you so much.
So let's begin with an overarching question and I would ask
each of the witnesses to answer it.
Mayor Rivera, Ms. Messina, Chief Mansfield, what grade A
through F would you give to Columbia Gas in their response on
the night of the incident and why would you give them that
grade?
Mayor Rivera. On the night of the incident, I think that
those who were close to this would give them an F. You know,
having been in the military, there's a term people talk about
this, like somebody's in the weeds, even just not really
present in the magnitude of the situation. We were pretty
present but then looking for guidance and action from Columbia
Gas, we just saw that they were in the weeds. They had no sense
of this magnitude.
Senator Markey. Ms. Messina.
Ms. Messina. That night, the first thing that happened with
us was that we had an alarm in our big 23-unit plaza and went
down and thought nothing of it. It was in one of the
restaurants and didn't think much of it until the fire truck
passed us and was like what's going on here.
So I think, you know, it was a very difficult night. As far
as the response from Columbia, I mean, it wasn't there. I
didn't hear anything till the Governor came on late at night,
but, you know, it was just a lot of panic. For me, it was a
little bit reminiscent of I was in Boston on 9/11 and it felt a
little bit like that where it was just what's going on, what do
you mean? It didn't feel--like depending on where you were, it
didn't feel like you were either in dire straits or what's
going on? It was not a big deal until I walked into my house
and smelled gas. That's when I started getting very unnerved.
Senator Markey. And what grade would you give them on the
first day?
Ms. Messina. It wasn't there. So for me, it would be, you
know, in the D range because we didn't hear anything. We didn't
know what was going on, period.
Senator Markey. OK. Chief Mansfield, where were you when
you were made aware that there was a gas-related emergency on
September 13? When did they notify you on that day, and what
grade would you give to Columbia Gas for their response?
Mr. Mansfield. I wasn't in contact with anybody from
Columbia Gas for several hours after the event occurred. Due to
the lack of communications, due to the lack of organization,
due to the lack of their emergency planning, I would give them
an F.
Senator Markey. Mayor Rivera, you said in your testimony
that Columbia Gas engineers and top leadership were afraid
themselves and lacked a clear path to deal with the disaster.
Can you elaborate on that?
Mayor Rivera. Yes, I mean, I guess I think we all were
afraid. I think the problem is that when you're tasked, you
make five times the amount of money a year I make or 50 times
the amount of I make a year, you're going to be called to
action, and I just felt like we couldn't even get maps from
them and then every time somebody in the room would have a
suggestion on how to mitigate or deal with the problem, every
idea went on the map and went on the list, and I think in a
situation like that, even though I'm the Mayor of the city, I'm
not really sure that I'm fully equipped to understand the
complexities of a gas line and how to mitigate that problem.
So I really do think that they were at a loss and they did
send one person. They sent national support but they only sent
one person on the ground that night.
Senator Markey. And when did they respond to you on that
night, Columbia Gas?
Mayor Rivera. I called them first. I got a call from my
Chief and then I got a call and then we all got together and
then we ended up at the site, but on my drive in, I had called
the Columbia Gas Government Affairs person. I called their head
engineer. I was breaking the news to them and so I was kind of
surprised that I was doing that, considering that I already had
made it all the way down the building that I was in in Boston
and I had already been in traffic for a good time when I called
them after getting a sense of what was going on and they still
had not known that something was going on.
Senator Markey. And that's unbelievable that you're calling
them to notify them of what's going on.
Mayor Rivera. Yes.
Senator Markey. It's absolutely incredible and
unacceptable.
Mayor Rivera. I don't know how that happens and, frankly,
the first time I talked to--that I saw somebody live was when
they came up to me and said you have to shut the electricity
off.
Senator Markey. OK. So I've already referenced this----
Mayor Rivera. I'm sorry. Can I say, when they said you have
to evacuate the city?
Senator Markey. Yes. So, again, we should talk about
evacuation because the Columbia Gas Emergency Response Plan was
woefully inadequate. They failed to imagine that there was a
disaster of this scale that could occur and by doing so, they
guaranteed that they would fail to execute a swift and
effective response when a system-wide catastrophe did occur.
Mayor Rivera, in your testimony, you requested that there
be a Customer Evacuation Plan created and revisited every year.
What are some of the components that you would like to see in a
Company Evacuation Plan?
Mayor Rivera. Well, first of all, they have to have a
notification system to make sure that every customer who they
get a bill from every month gets notified in a way that's
appropriate and in their language immediately that something's
happening.
I think that their conversations with the 9-1-1 folks, with
first responders has to be immediate, and I think that it has
to delineate what you would do with those people once you get
them out of their homes, how you plan to put them in a place
that's safe, how you plan to support them in the long term and
the short term, and then immediately figure out how to get them
whole.
They stood up a claims process two or three days right
after and I think everyone saw pictures of what that looked
like in Lawrence. They just did it in Lawrence. They didn't
even think about doing it that weekend in North Andover and
Andover. It was a huge shortcoming. But that it really looked
like a refugee center. There was no control. If it wasn't for
the staff of the city, the towns, and the State Police to get
people in an orderly fashion, to give them a sense of how to
get their claims started, I'm pretty sure we would have had a
riot down there.
Senator Markey. Yes. And I understand how utilities think.
They don't like to anticipate an accident which can occur. So
it's actually my law which requires the distribution of
potassium iodide that could protect against thyroid cancer to
everyone within a 10-mile radius around the Seabrook Nuclear
Power Plant. You have to anticipate that something wrong can go
wrong and thyroid cancer is the single-most likely consequence
if you're exposed.
So here, there was no plan and they just assumed nothing
could go wrong.
So, Chief Mansfield, Columbia Gas is required to notify
fire departments in the event of a Grade 1 gas leak which are
severe and potentially dangerous. How quickly are you notified
of these leaks by Columbia Gas and do you feel like the
response from the company is sufficient to keep this area safe?
Mr. Mansfield. The short answer is no, we don't like their
response to how they inform us of Grade 1 natural gas leaks.
Several of us in the Merrimack Valley have been trying to get
the ears of legislators in Columbia Gas. We've had open
discussions with Columbia Gas leadership with regards to how we
get notified when Grade 1 natural gas leaks occur and typically
the response is they find that a Grade 1 leak occurs, they go
ahead, they mitigate it after they find it, and then they
notify the fire department and the law enforcement official as
required by Massachusetts state law.
Senator Markey. So what you're saying is that the company
identifies a serious potentially dangerous gas leak, they don't
call the fire department, they don't call the police
department, they fix it as best they can, then they call you
the next day or 2 days later and say, oh, we had a big problem,
but we didn't feel we had to call you, the fire department, the
police department of the city, is that correct?
Mr. Mansfield. That is correct. The Grade 1 leak is the
worst case scenario of a natural gas leak you can possibly have
and it's in their infrastructure and what they do is they go
out, they locate a leak through their surveying process.
They'll mitigate the leak, repair it, and then the following
day, we don't get a phone call, we get an e-mail from somebody
in their Operations Center that states that they had a Grade 1
leak at a particular address and there's no need for emergency
response.
Senator Markey. So the question of long-term relief is also
important because these businesses, these families that are
going to be impacted, and we've been pushing the Trump
Administration, Small Business Administration, trying to make
sure that there is emergency home heating assistance for
everyone who needs it because we're never going to forget that
these communities need help and we're going to be there every
step of the way.
Mr. Mayor, Ms. Messina, Chief Mansfield, what grade A
through F would you give Columbia Gas' work over the longer-
term restoration process and why?
Ms. Messina. This is a double-edged sword. You know, when
we first started in that first week, it was pretty bad because
we just didn't have any information. As the plan started to get
deployed, there were a lot of resources. I mean, as someone
who's lived through this, I don't think any of us can really
complain about the amount of people that have been put on the
ground.
The biggest complaint I think that we would have is again,
and I think this is an underlying issue, has been
communication. You know, they were there when I called. I would
be able to speak to them. They always had people that were
available to talk to but trying to find the right person was
difficult and being able to get some straight answers,
especially for the higher-end equipment, like HVAC units and
things like that, that, you know, what do we do, you know. Do
we have to replace them? Do we have to fix them because it's
not like these HVAC units are sitting in a warehouse somewhere.
They take months to have to order and take a lot longer to have
put up.
So, I mean, I'd give them--clearly, I'd go from a D that I
rated them in the beginning to a B+ because I really felt that
I could get to somebody and get answers done and things were
getting done faster, so that's the double-edged sword.
Senator Markey. Does anyone else want to give a grade to
the long-term restoration?
Mayor Rivera. I guess I'd say the idea of the different
points in time, I think you've got to give them an A for fixing
the pipe in the street. Everyone thought there was going to be
mass disaster and there was going to be--you couldn't do it. I
seen many people talking on TV about how it was undoable. So
you've got to give them an A for that.
I think for the fixing the pipes and the appliances in the
house, you know, I think that that's got to be a D to a C. We
knew we needed an army of plumbers on September 14 and 15 and
we were having discussions about plumbers in the first week of
November. I'm not sure why Columbia Gas and Gilbane let that
most important resource go unattended for so long, and I think
they're still at a D with the customer support and making
people whole. They still are failing to cut checks to people.
They put big numbers on the checks that they're cutting to
people. There are still people with fundamental issues
unresolved, mainly because they just refuse to cut the check,
and I'm telling them they should just cut this check now and
not spend money on attorneys because it will turn into
litigation, but I think all that type of grading goes to
underscore, I think, something that I forgot to say in my
comments and that's to mention the people that have been
affected.
These people have been the most patient and understanding
people. Literally the pipe froze on an RV and they asked this
lady who clearly couldn't speak that much English anyway how
you feel? She said, oh, it's Mother Nature, like this too shall
pass.
It is a miracle that we don't have a riot. People have been
so thankful for the crap they've had to put up with this
company every day. It's a blessing on them. It's another reason
why they should double their forces on the claims, pay these
folks. You've put them through too much.
Senator Markey. So thank you. We're going to give them an
A+ to the people from Merrimack Valley----
Mayor Rivera. Amen.
Senator Markey.--for their response and to all of those----
[Applause.]
Senator Markey.--who helped them in their response. We
thank you.
Let me recognize Senator Warren.
Senator Warren. So thank you very much.
I just want to ask, did Mr. Bryant stay? Is he in here? How
about Mr. Hamrock? Did anybody stay from Columbia Gas? Good.
OK. You represent the employees. How about representing the
company? For what?
Voice. Claims questions.
Senator Warren. Good. Well, I'm glad you're here. I'll ask
about claims.
So I wonder who is here to at least hear this and take this
information back to Mr. Bryant and Mr. Hamrock. I want to ask
actually about the process, about what's happened to the small
businesses.
We've heard from the Mayor. We've heard from the Fire
Chief. But I want to drill down just a little bit on small
businesses.
Ms. Messina, I appreciate your being here today. Prior to
the explosion, you had several businesses, as you testified,
several properties in Andover. You were one of the many people
whose businesses as well as your home was affected by this
disaster.
Can I just start by asking you about some of the financial
costs here? How much money did you lose for the weeks that you
could not operate your businesses?
Ms. Messina. We're still in the process of trying to put
that together. It didn't happen just for the month of October.
This is something ongoing. As I said in my testimony, one of
the things that we didn't recognize as we were looking at, hey,
how come so and so hasn't been in? Well, we find out that so
and so's been living in their home in Maine because it's too
uncomfortable to be living here and dealing with this issue.
So, you know, we had planned a great month of October and I
just barely broke last year's numbers, if that. We put
everything on to it and, you know, in booming economy where we
were seeing increases, it just kind of like came to a stop. I
mean, those first 2 weeks, we lost about 30 percent of our
business.
Senator Warren. So what you're saying is one of the ways
small businesses lost out obviously is if they were closed all
together, but the second way is small businesses lost out
because there were just a lot fewer people who came in to shop,
even if your business was otherwise operational, is that right?
Ms. Messina. Correct. I mean, and to add to that was the
difficulty of getting to the actual stores once the gas-ready
plan was put into place. I mean, I think we all understood,
like I said in my testimony, that 48 miles was a lot. I don't
think we understood that there'd be areas that were just
completely cutoff and you would have to be redirected and there
were times you'd go around in circles and you'd just say that's
it, I'm done, I'm going home.
Senator Warren. OK. And this obviously was affecting your
customers. So has Columbia Gas explained to you whether or not
they're going to pay for your diminished business during this
period of time?
Ms. Messina. Going through the claims process, we were
given--we were asked to give information but most of this
information was skewed toward mainly a restaurant or anybody
that had a hospitality business because they're asking me about
my food loss and stuff like that and it's like no, no, I'm hot
goods.
So in fairness to them right now, we're in the process of
still trying to make those parameters for that claim. So my
claim is still open and I have yet to really even talk to
somebody because once I found out that I could self-mitigate my
home, I dropped my business claim so I could get my house
online.
Senator Warren. So they haven't told you yet then if
they're going to--they've not committed to reimburse you for
the time that your business was less than it otherwise would
have been if this disaster hadn't occurred?
Ms. Messina. Correct. But at the same time, I haven't given
them the complete information that they've asked for.
Senator Warren. OK. So let me ask you just a little bit
about the information because I had some people come up during
the break who have a small business that they have just
launched and they said that they were asked for 3 years worth
of financial information which they don't have because they're
a beginning business.
So what happens to a business like that in the claims
process?
Ms. Messina. Well, I mean, I would tell the claims process
that they're going to have to, you know, sit down and talk to
them on an individual case basis because you're right, there's
plenty of--I mean, I have three years but what does that mean?
The other side of that equation is you can't compare the
last three years to this year which is a very good economy
year, you know. You've got consumers buying more. So it's going
to have to be done on a case-by-case basis.
Senator Warren. OK. And what I'm hearing you say is there's
no commitment on the part of Columbia Gas. They have described
it. This was the question. This is why I wanted to know whether
or not we still had Mr. Bryant here and Mr. Hamrock. They both
said that everyone who'd been injured would receive full
compensation, and I'm just trying to----
Ms. Messina. Well, I have not.
Senator Warren .--ask what that means?
Ms. Messina. I have not.
Senator Warren. And are you confident that you will?
Ms. Messina. I'm pretty confident.
Senator Warren. You're pretty confident.
Ms. Messina. And only because of the way things have been
handled on the home end.
Senator Warren. OK.
Ms. Messina. So I feel like I have some kind of idea as to
how it will be.
Senator Warren. And are you confident for small businesses
that have just started, say businesses that don't have a long
history? Are you confident they're going to be fully
compensated for their losses?
Ms. Messina. I can't speak for that. I mean, like I said, I
don't know how they're going to be able to structure what is
fair for a new business that just started, you know. That would
be difficult to try to monetize but that's going to be a task
that they're going to need to do.
Senator Warren. Mayor Rivera, did you want to weigh in on
that?
Mayor Rivera. I mean, I think at least the sense is that
they're--because they're having the insurance company deal with
these claims and not themselves and the money they have in the
bank, they're making decisions based on what their attorney's
allowing them to make and it is incredibly difficult if you're
an immigrant entrepreneur serving at least our city where it's
a lot of folks who don't have the same resources that folks in
Columbia Gas have to have 3 years of information.
All those things are true even more so and then the idea
that they're going to have--the bodega owner's going to have
the wherewithal to stay on top of these people for two years so
they can get reimbursed for lost income but that's what they're
going to have to do in order to be made whole.
So I think that they're better that they're going to get
out of here, you know, with maybe 50 cents on the dollar what
they really owe because the bureaucracy itself does not allow
it.
We have a lady who has a laundry mat and she has dryers
that are gas and she doesn't believe that they could fix her
gas dryers but they fixed other laundry mats' dryers and
they're all working. She doesn't feel that that's going to be
effective for her. They're refusing to pay her the cost of new
dryers. They think that that mitigation should be the case for
everybody and, you know, the sense I get back from them is that
they're trying to get over on Columbia Gas and I just keep
telling them you're going to have to pay somebody. They're not.
You're just making this lady's life more miserable. Just buy
her the new dryers because, frankly, she doesn't believe that
you're going to make it safe for her in her business.
So I think that that's happening a lot. So I have less
sense of a hundred percent of what was loss will get put in
place and like Town Manager said, and even if they do get back,
some places have lost employees and clientele and that's a
double whammy. In 6 months, I'm not sure they can recover and
we may lose that business forever.
Senator Warren. It's hard enough to run a small business
but these folks are now being asked to take on two jobs, run a
small business and run a claims prosecution against an
insurance company that doesn't want to pay.
Mayor Rivera. And they stop talking to the business owner
if they mention an attorney. Then they'll only go through the
attorney.
Senator Warren. So, in other words, reaching out and
getting help may not help under these circumstances.
Mayor Rivera. Correct.
Senator Warren. Can I ask you a couple more about this, and
that is, cash flow for these small businesses? Has money been
forthcoming? You know, it's one thing to say some day there
will be a check coming, 3 months from now or 6 months from now
or 10 months from now, but people have to meet payroll, people
have to buy supplies, people have to buy food, thinking of the
restaurant business. They need cash flow right now.
If the customers don't come in for the past month and a
half because either the business was entirely shuttered or
because they couldn't get there because the streets were torn
up because everything's chaotic and no one comes, they're going
to have depleted cash-flow which really puts the business at
risk of collapsing.
Has money been made available for people under those
circumstances?
Ms. Messina. My understanding is, is that, with some of the
restaurant tenants, they have done things for.
Senator Warren. Some, mm-hmm.
Ms. Messina. I have three restaurant tenants that were
affected by this. One was able to get online within a week. The
other two was anywhere between four and five to six weeks
before they could get on and that's what--in my testimony, when
I talked about you had to manage it on your own, it really came
down to that because their needs were different than somebody
like myself, the Wine Connection, which I could operate. I was
just feeling loss of sales.
So they did receive some financial. As a landlord, there
were some tenants that, you know, did not pay because they just
didn't have revenue coming in and, you know, we're floating
that and waiting to see what happens there. So, again, we're
looking for that to be made whole.
Senator Warren. Mayor Rivera, did you want to add to that?
Mayor Rivera. Yes. Just there's a bit of a chicken-and-egg
thing with that process, too. If they tell you that your claim
check is imminent and that it's going to cover all the things,
including cash flow, it's hard to go and find cash flow or
maybe even apply to the Emergency Loan Program that we had.
So there was always this dueling thing of what check is
going to hit for them first and then will Columbia Gas pay the
subsequent issue after. So I think it has been confusing for
small businesses on which way to go, mitigating on which heat
source to use, do you stay on natural gas, do you go to
electric, do you go to propane, because you're not sure which
is going to hit first, the claim check or a loan check, and
money that you got for lost, spoiled food and those things,
that came pretty fast, but like you said, if you don't have
food, as well.
Senator Warren. Well, when you think about small
businesses, I'll wrap this up, when you think about small
businesses that live so close to the margin, I worry that
something like this just wipes them out or puts them on such a
downward path that they can't recover and it doesn't sound like
the claims process is oriented toward how to get them
stabilized and climbing again and then I worry about what the
long-term implications are for Lawrence, for Andover, and for
North Andover if they lose some number of their small
businesses that try to keep an economic activity in the city
and real economic engine for those areas.
So I thank you.
Senator Markey. Thank you, Senator Warren.
Congresswoman Tsongas.
Ms. Tsongas. Thank you all, and thank you all for being
here, and for your leadership and resolve through these very--
these times that are certainly sorely testing you, and I am so
sorry. I regret that the leadership from Columbia Gas and
NiSource is not here to hear from you all just the dramatic
shortcomings of their processes, at least in the near term.
I'm sure, Mayor Rivera, as you heard Mr. Hamrock say that
the company had a well-oiled response plan in place in the
event of a disaster that you heartily disagreed. Am I correct?
Mayor Rivera. I would just like to see it. I'm not sure
that anybody could put their hands on it. I was talking to
Manager Maylor and he looked for it. So if they can make it
public, it'd be great to see the pre-thirteenth plan----
Ms. Tsongas. Yes.
Mayor Rivera.--because we haven't seen it. It sure felt
like there wasn't one.
Ms. Tsongas. This is just an off-the-top of my head, but
when you finally talked to somebody at Columbia Gas or
NiSource, who was it? At what level was it?
Mayor Rivera. Well, I spoke to--I'm going to get the lady's
last name wrong--Dana Argo. I first spoke to Mike Kane, who was
the Government Relations guy, and then I called Dana Argo,
who's the head engineer, but he didn't know what was going on.
Ms. Tsongas. So when did Mr. Hamrock finally manage to get
in touch with you?
Mayor Rivera. Oh, he wasn't on the ground till like maybe
after we had gotten people home and safe, right, week plus.
Pablo Vegas who came, he was there the night of, came in from
Ohio.
Ms. Tsongas. Well, you're right when you say that the way
in which the community responded is really quite a testament to
the character of the City of Lawrence as well as Andover and
North Andover.
I know when we all visited and made our way to the senior
center to see the way in which people were coming forward to be
sure people had a place to stay, food to eat in the near term
while we started to sort of sort things out, I think was just
again yet another remarkable testament to the character of the
city. So I commend you for your leadership and for the
remarkable people who live in this city as well as the Town of
Andover and North Andover.
Obviously communication was one of the extraordinary
shortcomings of their response plan and you really had to step
in. The City of Lawrence had to step in and do that in ways
just to be reassuring in such a frightening time.
Can you talk about how you did that and how you coordinated
that with your response plan, let them know what was happening,
when it was happening, at least especially in the near term?
Mayor Rivera. You know, I think what became evident very
fast was that people were looking for information. I know the
town managers and I, we spent a lot of time communicating with
people as it is through, you know, whether it be for a town
meeting or for a city council event or for whatever we're
doing. So we started to use those processes. We set up websites
to put every single piece of information we could get on to
that and then we just started to get to people and also
monitoring social media.
I know a lot of people don't think that people live on
social media but there are a lot of really important
conversations happening on social media, a tactic that Columbia
Gas came to late in this process, and I think that once we got
all those things squared away, we started to just use that
information, as much as we could get, to get to people.
It got to a point where we were getting more information on
a daily basis than they were giving out, and I think MEMA, Kurt
Schwartz from MEMA started to do a MEMA daily update. So I
would just post that daily update. There's a lot of information
it was hard to make heads or tails of, but we were getting this
pretty daily PowerPoint presentation and almost simultaneously
all three of us started to ask them to allow us to publish this
and we went days--I think we went a week and a half, maybe 10
days before we just said we're going to publish it regardless
of whether they let us and so that started to go out and it has
the key indicators about who's getting lit, where's the
information going, and if you go to the websites now, all of
our websites has every single daily update on there.
And then, you know, I think the Governor's staff pushed
them through Joe Albanese to again be more transparent. They
had not done one direct mail piece to their customers in the
whole time that we were there. We were pushing them to do that
and they finally did the newsletter. I think they're into their
fourth newsletter of this event, which has become a very
important tool.
Ms. Tsongas. Have they done a direct mail piece yet?
Mayor Rivera. That was it. They're doing a newsletter. I
think we got four newsletters in the can. They're supposed to
do weekly ones going forward but that was a battle, too. They
didn't want--again, I think in this process of trying to cover,
trying to mitigate their damages, they created a situation
where everything gets, you know, attorney'd to death and
meanwhile people, you know, who need real answers about claims,
people who need real answers about their housing stagnate,
takes 2 days to do something and that means 2 days more in an
RV or two days more without your business being open, and they
scrub anything of any real meaning so that they're not really
providing any information.
Ms. Tsongas. At this point, what are the costs that the
City has absorbed in order to respond to this?
Mayor Rivera. Well, we have very smart public safety folks
and they started charging the Columbia Gas directly for every
dollar we spend on public safety. So we've been made whole on
that front, but I think that that number's still yet to be
understood. We each have areas where we put RVs on that need to
be made whole again. We each have staff that have taken time
away from their normal processes, focused solely on this, and
also people who are affected who've been only focused on doing
this, and so the roads, you know, have to spend much time in
the affected area to see the immense disaster and mess they
have made of our roads. Thank God they did it because they got
the gas to us fast but there are some roads that literally were
paved three months ago with just a fresh coat of paving on it
and people have been waiting 30 years for that road to get
paved and so I think that the paving of the roads are going to
be the first real example of their hundred percent making the
municipalities whole but along with the staff time and effort
and energy and again I think that the amount of confusion
they've created in our world is another reason why they just
can't be allowed to keep doing business.
They've just not earned that privilege and that to keep
doing business in our country after the death of a young boy
and after the immense chaos they created in this community.
There are other people that can do that work.
Ms. Tsongas. Well, I encourage you, all of you, all the
communities to keep close tabs on what your costs have been so
that we can make sure Columbia Gas and NiSource assume
responsibility for those, as well.
I yield back.
Senator Markey. Thank you.
Mayor Rivera. I will say Manager Maylor's keeping the
spreadsheet and I scream loud. He's the good-looking one. He's
the smart one. That's a compliment.
Senator Markey. Congressman Moulton.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Senator.
Mayor Rivera, a major complaint we have heard during our
office hours in the District is that Columbia Gas failed to
provide native language speakers in dealing with customers'
concerns and issues.
As one of our first community leaders to address our
Spanish-speaking constituents, can you elaborate on that and
explain to everybody some of the challenges that many of your
residents have faced?
Mayor Rivera. I mean, I think it's when you think about the
impact to everyone that's involved, the impact to folks who are
new to our country, who are already facing tons of challenges,
and even some people who are not new to our country who are
facing challenges around poverty, I think this has shown the
weaknesses around our infrastructure and the weaknesses and our
inability for communities like ours to defend ourselves against
such a big disaster.
It goes without saying that if we weren't talking in
Spanish, they weren't listening because they don't speak
English and so it was important for us to translate things.
They stood up a process to hire a ton of translators. I think
immediately, you know, the solution is can we hire enough full-
time translators, and they were having a hard time doing that
because people who could translate have full-time jobs and so
they initially didn't want to do part-time translators and they
got themselves into a situation where they didn't have enough
translators.
I think later on, they backed off of that and, you know,
you could work nights and weekends with the translation
process, but again in the sense of trying to make it easy for
themselves, not really thinking about the impact to the
customer.
And I think that right away, they took our suggestions
about making things bilingual, but I think they fell down on
that with the robocalls and I think it wasn't till a couple
weeks ago that they put a Spanish TV commercial that talks to
those issues.
You know, they said they had 30 business-focused claims
agents but only had really two people who speak Spanish but
they would put a translator with them, even though half of the
businesses affected were in the city of Lawrence and I would
say a good half of those needed English and Spanish
translation.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mayor.
Ms. Messina, I just want to ask about your experience and
your colleagues in the small business industry's experience
with the Small Business Administration.
Did you seek a disaster relief loan from the SBA?
Ms. Messina. I'm sorry. I didn't hear the question again.
With the SBA?
Mr. Moulton. Did you seek a disaster relief loan from the
Small Business Administration?
Ms. Messina. I did not.
Mr. Moulton. Are you familiar with people who have sought
that resource?
Ms. Messina. I'm not familiar. The only one that I'm
familiar with is that one of the tenants did. I think they're
still in the process of trying to get something. It's my
understanding there was some kind of--I don't know if it was
through the SBA, that there was some way to get some interest-
free, up to $50,000 was available for funding like cash flow
and things like that.
So, again, the hard part for me was trying to deal with all
these different types of tenants with all different issues.
Some had more needs than others and we were trying to find out
how to best keep them operating while they were either down or
just even like earlier said that their businesses were just
off.
Mr. Moulton. So is it fair to say that you're basically
unaware of what the SBA offers here?
Ms. Messina. Yes, that would be a fair statement.
Mr. Moulton. OK. Clearly, we need to do a better job of
making those resources available.
Chief Mansfield, thank you again for your response to the
effort.
What are some lessons that you would like to just briefly
share with us that you've learned that will affect your
response and your advice to others going forward?
Mr. Mansfield. I think the lack of communications that was
not there between Columbia Gas and the emergency response
personnel. I think they need to do a better job at getting the
word out and getting communications to the first responders so
that they know exactly what it is they're dealing with.
We shouldn't have to wait four-five-six hours to talk to
somebody from Columbia Gas to find out exactly what's going on
with their pipeline infrastructure. We had people going out
immediately responding to these natural gas calls, fires,
explosions, and had really no idea, hard factual data that was
indicating to us exactly what was going on with that
infrastructure.
I think there just needs to be--there could certainly be
some tightening up of legislation, as I stated earlier, at the
local level. I think we could probably tighten up within the
Commonwealth itself. Bill 4164, which basically outlines how
fire departments and law enforcement officials are notified,
when they're notified about Grade 1 leaks, and I think there
could be certainly from what we've all experienced here, could
certainly be some legislation tightened up at the Federal
level, too, to make these people accountable for what they're
doing so that we don't have the tragedies that we experienced
in the Merrimack Valley.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you.
Senator Markey. Thank you.
For the information of the members and the witnesses, I'm
going to ask unanimous consent that the hearing record remain
open two weeks. Without objection, so ordered.
And I would also ask unanimous consent to submit into the
record testimony that was shared with the Committee by
community members hurt by this disaster. I think it's important
for their voices to be in the congressional record.
[The information referred to follows:]
Statements from Community Members
Rosario Germinudy from Lawrence: I felt desperate, hopeless and
depressed when couldn't go back home coming back from work. Finding a
place to stay with 5 kids and a dog was a challenge for me and my
husband. Thanks to really good friends we kept the family together. But
can't take the scenario I saw and experienced when had to go back home
for some clothes the next day, seeing that my town turned into a ghost
town was terrible; once I made it back to the north side all I wanted
to do was cry and had that feeling of deception and for some reason
kept on asking God why and why us. I know this will be in our lives for
ever and will be remembered as a disaster, feel sorry for the lost of
the boy that died and for others injured. What most of us lost can be
replaced but a life can never be. Then the struggles that we are still
going through is never heard off, happening in the USA, but we will
stand because what does not kill us just makes us STRONGERS and that is
what we are and will always be, strong people rising back a strong city
. . . Lawrence strong. Together we are more and together we can
overcome anything. I want to thanks Columbia Gas for trying their best
even when it was after something that big happened once it did nothing
else but to rescue and respond was to be done and that they have, the
support my family have received from them and the city and mayor Dan
Rivera have been priceless for me and my family. Hope everyone gets
their services back and continue with their lives. Happy holidays for
everyone.
______
Monica Morell from Andover: We need to deep talk. I am still
displaced. Limited network access. Please contact me via e-mail to set
up a time to talk, or call me directly.
Monica Morell Andover
______
Nathan Ray from North Andover: I was not directly affected by this
event. Friends stayed at my house for a few nights as they were looking
for assistance. I have volunteered and promoted effected businesses and
Families as much as possible. Unfortunately, I have witnessed a high
level of fraud, mismanagement, and lack of accountability. I will not
use names in this brief note. There is a massive amount of
mismanagement and fraud. I know of one group that invoices $80k per
week, just to install a dozen ovens. That is not the cost of the ovens,
just the installation and service. 12 OVENS!! There is no organization
in any part of this effort. The winners are the divorced or single guys
out of state that earn 10x what they would normally earn. Meanwhile
elderly family's still do not have a place to sleep and are suffering
badly. The rest of the community is stuck sitting in traffic all day
watching all of these people doing nothing. Contractors and family's
have confirmed all of this information. Please feel free to contact me
to discuss in more details.
Best regards,
Nathan Ray
617-863-0062
[email protected]
______
Leo Lafond from North Andover: While we are being compensated for
money spent to replace alliances etc I have not heard anyone talk about
compensation for all the time we have spent on working through the
recovery process. The number o hours spent on the phone with Columbia
Gas, the claims adjusters, the assessment teams, added travel time etc
is enormous. I self mitigated and going out shopping for appliances and
contacting and working with contractors was a part time job This is
time take away from family and friends that we won't get back. My rough
estimate is that it is somewhere between 40 and 59 hours at this pint
and I am still not done. Once heat is on for everyone I really hope
that we will all be compensated for this. This does not take into
account the emotional stress that has been placed on all of us. I was
home when my house filled with gas. Thank god I wad luckier than many
of my neighbors. They did to do more for us than just pay for
appliances. etc.
______
Max Lopez from Lawrence: I live in 8 Halsey st Lawrence. I
originally had a 99.9 energy efficient boiler which meant CG had to
replace this boiler with something comparable. They did so but did not
provide me a receipt or information on who installed the boiler. It has
been a pain for me to register the unity under warranty and it has also
been a pain to received a rebate associated by this new unit.
Ultimately I did not ask to have my boiler replaced, instead this
happened because of the negligence of CG.
______
Javier Caban from Andover: We purchased the house in April 15,
2017. We went thru the whole year thru reconstruction replacing Gas
appliances. Right when the project finalize in early May 2018, where
the kitchen and new gas Range, gas dryer and gas fire places were
completely done to start enjoying the new house, the '' catastrophe''
happens . . . right now I am living with nor gas dryer, and no gas
stove, eating out most of the time . . . Impossible to find a plumber
to fix the gas line Columbia Gas remove to provide gas to the stove, so
we can stop eating out. I understand that this is nothing compared to
what other people are going thru . . . but it is my story and it has an
impact on us after spending 12 months going thru construction and
living surrounded by the stress that reconstructions creates and the
cost involved.
______
Christopher McCarthy from Andover: On September 13th, around 4:50pm
our CO2 detector and fire detectors started going off. My
two children (age 2 and 8), my girlfriend and I were all home. We
discovered smoke coming from our basement and quickly got our children
and animals out of the house. We called 911 once we were safely
outside--it took over 4 minutes to get someone on the phone, continuely
got a busy signal. Once the fire department showed up they quickly put
out the fire in our basement and told our surrounding neighbors to not
go into their homes. They left shortly after without further
instruction on what we should do (at this point it was around 5pm and
you could hear sirens going off everywhere).
Luckily we had family in Boston we could spend the night with so we
decided to head there. We didn't realize how bad this situation was or
how lucky we were to escape our house without getting hurt till we
heard on the radio what was going on. It was a very traumatizing
experience for my 8 year old son who is still scared of loud noises.
Since September 13th, my family and I have not been able to return
to our home to live there. We have been bounced around from 9 different
hotels which in itself has been very difficult with two small children,
two dogs, and a cat. The hotels that they have put us up in are covered
by them except for a deposit. This deposit has ranged from $30-$500. .
. Now tell me how we can continue to afford this when we are constantly
being moved from place to place? These deposits sometimes take up till
10 days to get back. It has definitely been a struggle.
My son has had a hard time adjusting to school life again because
of us constantly moving. Luckily our school has an amazing support
system and he is getting the help he needs.
Columbia Gas has done little to help us with every day expenses we
had to deal with because of being displaced. They had made promises of
a debit card to help with food but never followed through. We have
gotten very little answers on what is next for us. Every time we talk
with someone or go into one of the centers they had set up we are met
with different answers. They seem to put on a good front to the public
but those going through this ordeal know all too well it's all a
facade. We have spent so much money being displaced from this disaster
with no relief in sight. We just want them to be held accountable for
everything they have caused.
______
Eric Simili from North Andover: This is a letter I previously sent
to my Reps:
Dear Representative,
I am a North Andover resident. As you know, our town went through a
major disaster recently, along with Lawrence and Andover. Due to an
unexplained incident having to do with natural gas pressure running
through our streets and homes, at least 7 homes that I know of in my
town either exploded or caught fire. I witnessed three of the fires,
two on Pleasant St. and one on Phillips Ct.
I was at work at the local pizza shop down the street from my home,
as a delivery driver, when suddenly the ovens stopped working. We
realized there was no gas. As I was on hold with Columbia gas, trying
to figure out what was going on, I realized there were firetrucks going
back and forth everywhere. The owner of the store next to us told me he
heard there was an accident downtown. I turned on my scanner app to see
if I could hear anything and heard them talking about two fires across
the street from each other about two blocks from me. I looked over and
saw the smoke. It didn't make sense, how was it possible that two
houses across the street from each other were on fire? Then I heard
them calling in a fire from Phillips Ct, down the street. I had already
hung up with Columbia by now, realizing this was something big. I knew
this had something to do with gas and houses on fire. I decided to take
a drive down the road to Phillips Ct, where a neighbor of the house on
fire was asking others if they smelled gas. I asked her if she knew
what was happening. She said the firemen were telling people to shut
off their gas. I headed back to the restaurant.
At this point, firetrucks and sirens were being heard all over. I
saw three helicopters flying over town. I started to imagine the worst.
Maybe this was an act of terrorism.
Maybe somebody had sabotaged the gas lines? Or a foreign government
hacked into the gas company's computers? Who knows? I was pretty
unnerved at this point. When I saw on tv that a house had blown up, I
thought, wow, what if that was the restaurant? I felt my heart beating
faster as I thought about it. I thought about my house, but we don't
have a gas hookup, so I wasn't too concerned.
We had to close the restaurant at this point. After cleaning up, I
stayed around a while talking with a co-worker and watching the news on
my phone. There was traffic backing up as far as I could see.
Thankfully I only live about a mile from work, so I went home. I joined
neighbors who were out talking about what's going on for a while. The
feeling I got reminded me a little of the days after 9/11. It was
nowhere near that bad, but we still had the same uneasy feeling you get
when something like this happens.
The reason I am telling you all this is because I am not happy with
the way this is being handled. Columbia Gas has not shown up to press
briefings. They don't seem like they are taking it seriously. A person
has died and others are seriously injured. There were many people
without electricity for days. Half of Lawrence was forced out of their
homes. Highway exits are closed. And we still don't know when the gas
is going to be turned back on. I heard maybe 3-4 weeks.
I have missed work and am losing money because of this. I don't
know how much longer I'll be able to pay bills. I doubt my boss will
pay me anything for missed work. Most of my income is from tips anyway.
I want this to be investigated thoroughly to make sure it doesn't
happen again. If the pipes are old and rusty, we need to replace them.
If we need more inspectors and enforcement, we need to make these
utility companies pay for it. Massachusetts DPU needs to take this
seriously. Joseph Hamrock, the CEO of NiSource, the parent company of
Columbia Gas, earned $5.4 million last year, or 51 times as much as the
$105,206 median salary of NiSource employees, according to the AFL-CIO.
I'm lucky if I earn $35,000 a year!
Respectfully,
Eric Simili
10 Walker Rd Unit 8
North Andover, MA 01845
______
Kerin Miller from Andover: Our family of four was home on September
13th when my husband received an alert on his cell phone that we needed
to evacuate the house immediately. I was five months pregnant and about
to head to the grocery store; my husband happened to be home sick that
day with a cold. I told him it was a hoax; if there was an emergency
why would we need to leave? Wouldn't they tell us to stay inside? We
called 911 to confirm. ``Get out immediately,'' she said. ``What about
pets?'' I asked. ``Take them if you can.''
We put our seven year old daughter and five year old son into the
car, and we put our cat in the back in a carrier. We had nothing else
with us but our phones and our wallets. As we exited our neighborhood
in the Shawsheen area of Andover, people were standing on their lawns,
dumbfounded expressions on their faces. To me, this was the most
terrifying and traumatizing part of the Merrimack Valley Gas
Explosions: the fifteen minutes or so when we had no idea what was
happening. This all happened two days after the anniversary of Sept
11th. Fresh on my mind were stories about 9/11, so when I was told to
evacuate, and that it had something to do with gas, my first thought
was that there was some kind of terror attack involving utilities.
There we were, our entire family in the car, sirens sounding all
around, with no idea what was happening or which direction was safe.
Emergency vehicles seemed to be headed north, and my husband was
getting some preliminary news on his phone, so when I asked him what
direction to drive in he said ``away from Lawrence.'' We started
driving on route 133 with no plan other than getting out of the area,
the cat meowing in the back our SVU, all the while keeping our voices
unnaturally cheerful for our children. ``What's going to happen to our
house?'' my daughter asked. We explained that everything in our home
could be replaced, but people and pets could not be, so the important
thing was that we were all together and safe.
I am grateful for a few lucky breaks we got on that day: my husband
should have been at work, and as surreal and alarming as it was to get
two kids and a pet into a car and drive off not knowing what was
happening to our town and our home, it would have been much more
difficult if I was alone. I am also grateful that I was feeling ill
from morning sickness and put off running errands--I would have been
closer to the fires, and away from our children. I am also grateful
that our daughter had just arrived home from school, so we did not have
the added worry of being apart from her.
We drove to Tewksbury and pulled into a Holiday Inn. We were lucky
that it was a pet-friendly hotel and that a suite was available--later
that night, I sat in the lobby and watched family after family get
turned away.
That afternoon and evening we watched the footage on the news and
learned about the death of the 18 year old man in Lawrence and about
the Lawrence police officer whose home sat burning because there were
so many homes on fire at once. We saw aerial views of our town
completely in the dark, as electricity had been cut to the entire area
to avoid more fires starting. I used the word ``surreal'' again and
again. That morning I had thought about the families in North Carolina
evacuating for the hurricane, never imagining I we would be evacuating
that afternoon, or that the Merrimack Valley would be all over the
news, locally, nationally, and even internationally.
Our two days at the hotel were spent trying to entertain our
children and checking when we could return back to our home. My husband
was allowed to return briefly and gather a few of our belongings, and
he went back again to let a crew of gas workers and police in to check
the house at night by flashlights. As we waited for word that we could
return for good, we got some unrelated news that we had been anxiously
waiting for: we were finally ``clear to close'' on the home in Andover
we had been working for months to purchase. We had been living in town
for almost five years, renting the bottom floor of a duplex, and we had
been thrilled to find a 4 bedroom fixer upper we could afford in the
same school district our daughter had been attending since
Kindergarten. We had spent months completing paperwork and weeks
waiting, and now, finally, we got the news we thought we would never
hear: we were going to be first-time homeowners, in the town we had
grown to love but weren't sure we could ever hope to afford.
Instead of feeling joyful, however, we looked at the map of
explosions. Our new home was even closer to many of the fires than our
rental. Both were in the ``affected zone'' that would have no gas for
weeks.
Within minutes of hearing that we were going to be homeowners, we
also heard that we could return to our rental home. We took the last
hot showers we would have for awhile and headed back to the affected
area.
It was much, much worse for others: a life was lost. Homes burnt
down. Pets disappeared. We had been inconvenienced, but we were okay.
I also thought that it was basically over; however, after the
immediate impact of the gas explosions, we entered a much longer phase.
It's one thing to not have hot water for a few days--but not having it
for weeks presents some very real challenges. In our rental, we had an
electric stove, so in that way we're lucky--we could cook as usual.
Bathing was another story. We boiled water on the stove and mixed it
with cold water in the bathtub to wash our children. We tried to take
cold showers--but ``cold'' isn't really the right word: the water was
freezing. My husband could have taken hot showers at his gym, but his
gym was also affected, so we took the advice of other families on
facebook and invested in a ``camping shower'' from Amazon, a popular
choice for those of us without hot water. (If you have never
experienced a camping shower: A battery operated pump with a shower
head on the other end, stuck into the bucket of hot water, gives you
about 3 minutes of showering time; I soon learned to dread the sound of
the pump running out of water at the bottom of the bucket.) I have long
hair that was never going to get clean in the time or water pressure a
camping shower provided, but I could also shower at Merrimack College,
where I teach. A couple evenings a week, I left my house at 11 pm,
drove to Merrimack, and obviously pregnant, surrounded by young people,
went to the college gym to shower. It was a huge pain--something that
took 20 minutes and relaxed me before bed now took an hour round-trip
and involved flip flops, strange looks, walks back to my car with wet
hair, and flashing my work ID (one night I forgot my wallet and the
Merrimack students working the front desk, perhaps not realizing the
state I was living in--a divide those of us who were ``affected'' began
to find ourselves looking at the ``non affected'' across from more and
more--sent me back home to get it rather than break the rules of gym
admittance). I was lucky, though: the showers were clean and private
and the locker rooms were empty. My friends and neighbors were
showering at the much more crowded YMCA or at the temporary showers set
up at Pomps Pond. My husband made due with a camp shower for weeks.
All during this time we were supposed to be packing, as we were
closing on our new home, two miles away. Finally, everything I had
wanted was falling into place: but now, I found myself not wanting to
move. Our new house had far more gas appliances than our rental: on top
of no hot water, we would have no way to dry clothes and no stove to
cook or even boil water. Also, there was the question of whether the
sale would even go through. Can you buy a house with no gas? Was the
house still going to be assessed at the same value? What about the
appliances? What if we still had no gas by winter? How would we pay to
stay somewhere else?
Thankfully our real estate lawyer was also my cousin's husband, and
he was extremely concerned for us; much to the annoyance of our seller,
he made sure there were provisions before we closed so that funds would
be available should Columbia Gas not pay for repairs to the home, or if
the home became unlivable during the winter months. We could not
immediately move as planned, however, because we had done so little
packing while we were dealing with being evacuated and dealing with
life post-evacuation. We also had to spend hours of our time at the
empty new house waiting for teams of gas workers to arrive. My husband
left his number on the doors, and they would call him at work, and if I
was home, I would come by immediately, usually with our four year old
in tow. In addition to the stresses of moving and new homeownership
(getting floors redone, finding out the dishwasher didn't work), we
were dealing with our appliances at the new house being assessed and
condemned. We had to buy new electric appliances--dryer and water
heater--so we could at least wash ourselves and our clothes post-move,
and then we had to get Columbia Gas to reimburse us for the cost of the
appliances and installation. It would have been wonderful to get that
reimbursement in the form of a check, but it came instead on a debit
card, making it difficult to get money into our checking account to pay
bills, and requiring my husband and I to pass a card with thousands of
dollars back and forth for every errand (``Do you have the card?''
``No. Do you have the card?''). We learned the hard way that there were
some essentials we couldn't buy with the debit card at all, including
gas. And, again, we were the lucky ones, since we happened to have
money on hand to pay up front--an unusual situation for us, and one
that only happened because we were in the process of buying a home.
We did a lot of leg work to get a functioning dryer and hot water
heater for our new home, but we decided to go through Columbia Gas to
replace the gas stove in our new house, and, eventually, the boiler,
too (it took a few weeks to get word that all boilers had to replaced).
In the meantime, a local charity gave us a hotplate to cook on.
Our new home sits on the Andover/Lawrence town line. Both of these
communities turned into a maze of road construction at all hours of the
day and night. It took at least 20 minutes to drive a couple of miles
in any direction. Crews from all over the country descended on the
area; day after day, groups of 9 or 10 workers, mostly men but some
women, came in and out of our home, and we met people from all over the
country. My husband is from the South, and we lived together in Atlanta
for many years, so we enjoyed connecting with Southerners and hearing
the stories of others, too, from as far away as Seattle.
We were optimistic at this time. The ball seemed to be rolling. The
neighborhood was a mess of trenches and trucks; our own yard was dug
up, the meter moved outside--but we were assured, almost daily, that
our stove and boiler would be replaced soon, and our gas would be
turned on after that. One Sunday afternoon, a crew from Chicago came by
and said we were on the list for that week. Then, the next day,
everything stopped. The roads were quiet. No crews showed up. A press
conference was held later that week, and we learned that a new plan was
being put in place, putting the priority on getting boilers fixed or
replaced, and moving back the November 17th deadline to have all work
completed.
We started to hear the term ``self mitigate,'' and a few neighbors
got their gas turned on after having bipassed Columbia Gas and getting
appliances through a contractor. My husband ran this option by our
adjuster who said that Columbia would now pay for self mitigation up-
front, and that it would likely be faster than waiting. We contacted a
contractor and began the process of waiting for assessments and funds
(always on the debit card, complicating every transaction).
This past Saturday, as I left the house to bring my daughter to
ballet class, a gas worker approached me in my driveway. ``Are you
leaving?'' she asked. ``We're ready to get your boiler hooked up. We
have a team on the way.'' Thrilled, I explained my husband was home and
left. He texted me a half hour later. We couldn't get a boiler
installed because we had started using an outside contractor--even
though no work had been done yet.
Within days, the temperature at night dropped into the teens. All
four of us slept in one bed to stay warm. My husband was up and down
most of the night, nervous about the pipes freezing and checking on the
space heaters we didn't want to run while we slept but didn't want to
turn off, either. Over and over he kept saying ``I shouldn't have let
them leave. I should have made them put the boiler in. We could have
had heat.''
It snowed last night. As of today, November 16th, we are still
without gas and still without heat. The contractor we were working with
told us it would be after Thanksgiving before they could get to us,
even after my husband explained that we have small children and I am
now seven months pregnant. We canceled our contract with them, are now
waiting for a refund of our deposit, and have hired a plumber to
install a boiler and gas stove on Saturday. Even if this does work out,
I do not know when Columbia Gas will actually turn our gas on. Our
facebook page of affected Andover residents has more and more people
posting pictures of blue stove flames accompanied by those amazing
three words: WE'VE BEEN LIT! Temperatures are dropping again after this
weekend, and we hope by next week we are able to say the same. We have
been contacted about finding alternate housing, but where would that
housing be? My husband commutes to Boston; our kids have to be at
school; I work at Merrimack College and teach nights at Bunker Hill--
all easily accessible from here. We would have to pack, figure out a
plan for our cat if we couldn't take her with us, and winterize our
home. Then we would have to share one room with two small children, who
would have to adjust to sleeping in a new environment. The
inconvenience of staying in a hotel seems about equal to the
inconvenience of being cold and cooking on a hot plate.
What we want is normalcy. A friend who lives in Methuen said to me
``I'm just so tired of hearing people who don't have gas complain about
it. There are so many worse things that can happen.'' Yes--that's true,
and I can see why she feels that way. I'm tired of complaining, too.
I'm tired of talking about all of this. I'm tired of people coming in
and out of my home without warning. What no one seems to understand is
that all the stresses of life have continued, and every stress is
compounded by the additional stress of dealing with Columbia Gas--a
process that easily feels like a part time job. My husband used up all
his time off in the initial stages--the evacuation, and our move--so
most of this stress has fallen on me in the late stages of my
pregnancy. Imagine those families going through even more than we are:
caring for the elderly or disabled, trying to find a job, going through
chemotherapy, having a newborn to care for--all the myriad ways that
life can be difficult and trying--never feeling like their home the
safe haven it's supposed to be.
______
Maureen Elliot from Andover: My husband and myself have owned a
home in Shawsheen, Andover, for over 30 years. We never had water
issues in our basement other than damp corners in our fieldstone
foundation during this time. After Columbia Gas dug up our front yard
we have had major flooding issues in our basement. Columbia Gas claims
it is ground water. Serve Pro came and said it was obvious that we
never had water issues before this. Columbia Gas does not respond. It
is going to cost us approximately $10,000 to get this resolved. My
husband has heart disease and is up every several hours turning on a
sump pump we purchased at Home Depot. We own an another home in North
Andover and this is also in the affected area. Columbia Gas needs to
step up and do the right thing. Please call me at 508 846 3301
______
Susan Haltmaier from North Andover: I received my first assessment
visit on 9/29/18 because I spoke to a team I saw in the street behind
my house on Friday, 9/28/18. I had been scheduled for that Friday but
no one called or came. The daily briefings initially suggested that
Columbia Gas would repair any leaks that had been found during the
assessments. One was found in my house on 9/29/18 but no one from
Columbia Gas ever came to repair it, as promised. My yard was dug up
for a new line from the street and my bushes were dug up to connect the
new line to the house. The bushes were put back in a crooked manner,
with roots showing, and using sand rather than soil. I had to track
down a crew working down the street to come back and correct the
plantings. In mid-October, I arranged for third party deliveries and
installation of a stove, dryer, water heater, and furnace. But Columbia
Gas was still insisting on making repairs to any leaks, regardless of
who was installing the new appliances. The rules changed several times
between 10/10, when I arranged for my new appliances and received
prompt reimbursement from Columbia Gas, and 11/1, when Columbia Gas
changed the rules and stated that third parties installers would be
responsible for repairing leaks. I had not received an estimate for
repairing the leak from the third party installer of my furnace. A
stand-off ensued where Columbia Gas refused to repair the leak and my
installer said it was not in their estimate. One Columbia Gas
representative threatened me with ``You made a claim, you took our
money, repairing the leak is no longer our problem. It is your
problem.'' After a series of phone calls that escalated up the ladder,
a very competent man came on 11/5/18 to repair the leak. Several other
connections were deemed to require replacement and a crew came in and
completed them. Another man came on 11/8 to relight my existing furnace
under the latest directive from Columbia Gas and he said I needed a
``fan in a can'' to provide more combustion air in my basement to meet
the current code. He said that the installer would know to include a
``fan in a can'' when he came with the new furnace on 11/12. But my
third party installer did not install such a fan. Now I am in the
situation of trying to get the installer to come back or Columbia Gas
to come and put in the fan. It is exhausting to be caught in the
middle, to receive a variety of advice, suggestions, directives, and
recriminations. It is not that the work did not get done eventually,
but that each affected homeowner has to be vigilant, alert, and aware.
The uncertainty is enervating. It affects trying to do one's paid job
and take care of the people around you. Fortunately, I had many friends
and family members who could take me in and spend the day at my house
waiting for assessments, deliveries, repairs, etc. But not everyone was
so fortunate.
______
Nora Pelt from Andover: Our story is no different than most
affected by the Columbia Gas fires of September 13th, 2018. It is the
story of a scary, chaotic night on September 13th followed by 60 days
of being scared to leave the house because you have no word of when
crews might show up at your door, of waking up early to turn on space
heaters to try and warm the house before the rest of the family awakes,
of watching Columbia Gas daily put a positive spin on their work while
pulling my hair out because not once did their updates reflect the
nightmare that everyone I knew was going through. It is the story of
all my husband's and my free time spent combing the Columbia Gas
updates to see how they daily changes the rules, of (unsuccessfully)
trying to find reputable plumbers and electricians that were available
before mid-December, of boiling water in an electric kettle literally
for hours to get everyone showered at the end of the day, of
researching boiler types/like-for-like appliances/venting systems
because it was impossible to trust Columbia Gas was making decisions in
our best interest. It is the story of Columbia Gas playing ``yes, you
can'' and ``no, you can't'' for over two months. We have our home and
our lives but every single aspect of our days was changed. I was able
to recognize people in the affected area by the sound of their voices.
Their shaky, quiet voices unable to make simple decisions betrayed
their smiles. I recognize it because mine is the same.
I was about to pick up my son from soccer practice when I told my
husband I smelled gas in the house. He took note and we went on with
our day. Five minutes later, as I was pulling out of the driveway, I
received the call to turn off the gas and evacuate. I spent the next
three hours trying to get my three boys home from various after school
activities--that were normally 10 minutes away--while my husband ran
from house to house turning off neighbor's gas and holding babies while
moms ran inside for diapers. We were overwhelmed watching a staging
area at the end of our street, the firetrucks from Chelsea, Burlington,
Lynn, Methuen, Revere, Dracut and on and on flew off in every direction
at screaming pace. Usually, they all go in the same direction. It was
so strange to see them scatter. It was wonderful to know so many had
come to help and horrifying to realize that while I may have been
trying to convince myself otherwise, what ever this was, was indeed a
very big deal.
Once cleared to reoccupy our house, my husband and I began learning
to navigate the claims process. We picked up our hot plate and began
discussing temporary hot water solutions. The hot plate was the first
of many disappointments. It couldn't boil water in less than an hour
and truly wasn't an option for a working mom of three boys to get
dinner on the table each night. As for showers, my husband and I agreed
an electric water heater was an indulgence we could live without. For
$100, my husband hooked a propane camp shower to the propane from our
grill with a garden hose through our bathroom window providing hot
water and good water pressure. We settled in and waited for crews to
arrive.
Eleven days after the evacuation, we were told to call to make a
space heater appointment. I waited on hold for 56 minutes and scheduled
the appointment. A crew came four days later (on time and pleasant).
They made it clear upon arrival that these appointments were no longer
for space heaters but for ``data collection so more effective decisions
can be made'' BUT I didn't call for data collection! I called for a
space heater. They also had never seen a heating/hot water system like
ours. They were standing right next to it when they asked me where it
was. They said they had looked around my basement for 15 minutes for
it. After sticking red ``condemned stickers'' on a few things, they
left. My nerves began to unravel.
Fifteen days in and we finally saw crews on our street! Hopes
soared but they came and went leaving some spray painted lines. This
week friends began dropping off warm bread, coffee cakes, cookies . . .
things we couldn't make for ourselves. Trying any way to help but
realizing that most of this recovery laid in Columbia Gas's hands.
People dropped off space heaters, heating blankets, and InstaPots.
Heating blankets and space heaters allowed two of our children to stay
in their bedrooms with some sense of normalcy while one of our boys
began sleeping in our bedroom on the floor. The InstaPot allowed me to
run the boys to their activities and still cook a healthy meal for
dinner.
For three weeks, my husband and I have switched off working from
home, afraid to leave the house unattended but the kids were getting
squirrely so with great anxiety, we crossed our fingers, put our cell
number on the door, and left the house unattended to head to Topsfield
Fair. The kids had a blast and our joy was that we didn't miss a crew
at our door.
The month of October was one disappointment after another. At this
point it was obvious to all affected, that the best source of accurate
information was a Facebook page that those affected created. With 8,000
people affected, we found that we were having 8,000 different
experiences. My adjuster told me to Columbia Gas decided not to haul
away condemned appliances, so we needed to make arrangements for that.
A friend was told she was not allowed to remove condemned appliances
because Columbia Gas was taking inventory of them. Every aspect of the
recovery had multiple variations of this. Our nerves frayed a little
bit more. We would get calls that crews needed come to look at our
appliances for the third, fourth, fifth time only to get notification
later that Columbia Gas changed their minds. Our relight date was
pushed to 11/19. The cruise ship for the workers arrived with word that
it will stay for ``several months'' and our nerves frayed a little
more. We had a constant debate over the forecast and what we will do
about hot water and heat. Columbia Gas won't give us a space heater and
won't approve a mini-split system. We ask our adjuster for alternative
heat sources and he suggested a pellet stove. We debate the
installation of a pellet stove with a hole cut into our dining room
wall and wonder if our wood floors will be damaged. Then comes word
that Columbia Gas will be taking back the pellet stoves after all this
is over! An invasive installation and then a removal??? We decide to
pass and try to make due with our own space heaters and donated heating
blankets. Our relight date is pushed to 11/22. My office was also
affected and I would sit in my winter coat next to a space heater. The
Columbia Gas website listed had our office as ``relit'' but I can
assure you it was not.
Almost five weeks in and crews arrive on our street to start
digging. It took crews a little over a week on our short dead-end
street to get the main and service gas lines tested and fixed.
I had my annual check up with my primary care physician. She was
surprised to see my usually normal blood pressure was high. We chatted
about the situation and she said she would leave it be as it was likely
situational. I explained I had nightmares about fires and explosions, I
jumped when I heard sirens. Then she said I could stay in their warm
lobby for the day and use their vending machine as much as I liked. I
held back the tears because there was no way to explain the biggest
problem was not heat or hot water or cooking but the mental game
Columbia Gas was playing with us. We were forced to put our trust in a
company that proved over and over they weren't trustworthy. We had no
other choice and it felt devastating.
It was too cold for our propane shower system, so we borrowed an
indoor camp shower from a friend. After boiling water in an electric
kettle literally for hours each night for two weeks, we were done. I
had too many tears, the boys didn't want to get out of bed for school,
they fought all the time and we decided to finally install an electric
water heater. We still felt it was wasteful for the environment, we
didn't want it taking up space in our basement but hot water would be
one less thing for us to have to manage on a daily basis.
We had a long planned family party to attend out of state for just
two days. At this point it had been weeks with no one in our house and
we weren't on the 72 hour list. We again took a deep breath, left our
number on the door, and headed to the airport. Within two hours of
landing, my cell phone rang with a crew at our door. We felt terrible
about not being at the house but we had no notice of any kind and our
relit date was still weeks away. We scrambled from out of state to get
a neighbor to let them in and try to understand over the phone about
what was happening and what decisions were being made. As we landed
back at Logan airport, I checked the Columbia Gas website to see our
relit date was pushed out three more weeks to 12/9.
As November began, 50 days in, we started the search for a
reputable plumber that could beat our 12/9 relit date. Our plumber was
booked until mid-December. Another plumber was going door to door
giving estimates, so we let him in but online reviews showed they
jacked up prices and work done wasn't great. Eventually, a friend
pulled some strings and got their plumber to commit to a date to come
and take a look. A day later Columbia Gas showed up saying they are
ready to work. We don't trust them and we start to gamble. Do we trust
that Columbia Gas will show up tomorrow? Do we trust that they will
stay until we have heat? What do we do if we aren't happy with the
work? Who do we call in three months if we have a problem with the new
boiler? Will our friend's plumber be able to beat the 12/9 date (we
know this is unlikely)? We are sick about it, and Columbia Gas can
provide no information, but decide to call our friend's plumber and let
him go knowing that we won't be able to get him back if Columbia Gas
decides not to show up. We see Columbia Gas is under criminal
investigation. This is no surprise to any one affected but our nerves
fray a little more.
The crew come and stay. We are told we will get a like-for-like
replacement for our boiler and the next day they deliver something
completely different. Something that can't vent out our chimney so they
will have to drill holes out our walls and we may need asbestos
abatement. No one can explain to us why this happened. They all say,
``don't worry . . . you are going to love it!'' That is fine, but we
want to understand the decisions that are being made on our behalf! Is
it because Navien gave Columbia Gas a great deal on these boilers? Is
it because Columbia Gas will get Mass Save rebates for installing them?
Is it because Columbia Gas has a warehouse of them and needs to get rid
of them? Why the hell is it? A week into working 10.5 hours days, one
of the plumber explains our chimney was likely not up to code and
Columbia Gas would have had to pay for our chimney to be rebuilt in
order to vent a like-for-like system. Okay, this makes sense . . . I
just wish someone would communicate these things . . . or anything. It
takes the plumbers (kind, amazing, and lovely) nine days to install one
boiler. They just didn't have enough parts. They would go scavenging
for parts each day. They can't find any within a two hour radius of the
area. One day they drove up into New Hampshire in hopes of finding
parts. How can they not have enough parts when 6,000 people are still
waiting?
On day 59, 99 percent of our heat/hot water was restored. We are
happy crews moved on to those that have no heat, but hope they circle
back someday and fix the small section of baseboard heat that is not
working. This is a long process. There are still 5,000 waiting on heat
and hot water. Even with using Columbia Gas crews instead of our own,
we spent thousands out of pocket. We have been reimbursed for much of
it but have been waiting weeks for a large check. On day 65, our stove
was relit.
We are grateful for the progress and my eyes have been opened to
what a recovery process can look and feel like. We were not physically
injured. Our home is standing. My thoughts are on the California fires
and hurricane hit areas and the nightmare recovery process. I hope FEMA
does a better job than Columbia Gas and I hope Columbia Gas is held
responsible for the complete lack of a disaster/recovery plan. The
affects at our house will linger for a long time.
______
Janina Majeran from Andover: I didn't lose my house to an explosion
or fire, but my home without heat and hot water for so long did not
feel like my home. My home was always my sanctuary, but once it's 50
degrees in your apartment and no amount of space heaters can warm it
up, it ceases to be a safe haven.
The thing that boggles my mind was how some representatives of
Columbia Gas could be so callous when dealing with us. When I asked
about temporary housing because my apartment was too cold to stay in, I
was told to get a space heater. A friend of mine was told to get an
electric blanket. Neither of those things are in any way sufficient
when it's dropping below 50. And it's not like you can run a space
heater all night long because they are a fire hazard--and these people
know this.
It took me over 3 weeks to get housing. I kept being put off, kept
being told someone would be in touch with me and no one ever was. This
was a lesson in how the squeaky wheel gets the oil.
I spent a month relying on friends and family to let me stay with
them when it was too cold to stay at my apartment. I had to shuttle my
cat here and there and everywhere. I was stressed out every day
wondering how cold my apartment was going to get and checking weather
apps all day every day.
I'm home now and it was hard for me to come back. I was worried it
would be taken away and I wouldn't be able to get housing again. My
home still does not feel like my home. I feel like I just moved in all
over again only this time I'm worried I'll wake up one night or come
home after work and find it all gone again.
The past 2 months have been hell and I've gotten little sympathy
from people staying in warm places at the end of the day. And I worry
about the people who have been trying to stick it out as the
temperature drops and drops.
This never should have happened. And none of us should be made to
feel like criminals for wanting compensation for the things we've had
to buy extra just to survive. If I want an electric skillet or toaster
oven over your crappy little hot plates, then don't argue with me over
it. You did this. You did this to all of us. It's not our fault you
screwed up.
______
Yeison Pinales from Lawrence: This has hurt me so much that I'm
missing out on my kids development I had to arrange for then to b more
without me cuz of I can't b at my house.. Because my house is not a
home at the moment I can't do my routine like I always did in the past.
thanks giving is a no at my home this year
______
Nicole Pelletier from North Andover: My two children, ages 5 and 3,
were home with me on the afternoon of September 13. Without warning,
one of our neighbors began practically banging the door down telling us
that homes were exploding and that we needed to get out. Completely
caught off guard and terrified, my children and I fled our home and
tried to get out of North Andover.
During this trip, we had to drive through a ``ground zero'' of
sorts . . . many of the homes that had exploded were in our
neighborhood. We witnessed homes smoking and on fire. The sound of
sirens was constant. We were unsure about the status of our own home
left behind. My 5 year old son was so terrified he cried for an hour
straight and was physically sick, before he finally passed out from
exhaustion.
We were thankfully not one of the worst affected--although we were
without gas for more than six weeks, our home is still standing and
none of us were physically injured.
My son's mental and emotional health, on the other hand, has been a
different story. He had just started kindergarten the week prior to the
gas fires, so he already had so much going on when this struck. He is
now petrified of any kind of siren, no matter how far away it may be,
and the possibility of any type of fire drill at school had him so
anxious that he doesn't want to go to school on most days. We have had
to be in constant touch with his school counselor and we have also
found him his own therapist for when he is not at school. This event
has scarred him, and we are still dealing with this aftermath months
later.
Having said all that I don't think Columbia has done nearly enough
to remediate this disaster. My son will never forget this and although
I am encouraged by the progress he is making with his therapist, the
memory of his first ``big kid'' school experience will forever be
colored by the events of September 13.
______
Joseph Beninato from North Andover: I was at work my wife called
said pilot in the gas wood stove hissing torch like flame shooting out.
I told her go outside I would call gas company. When I called the
operator was very calm asked address wanted to know the cross street
told me to have my wife go outside and a man from Columbia gas would
come by and take care of it. She said the was a problem in the area and
they would take care of it. When I called my wife back she was
hysterical all the neighborhood were in the streets. so much for the
man coming by. so many people and teams coming repeating the same thing
and no record of what the other team had done no database. our town is
behind in the gas ready timeline. no one here was injured but the
anxiety and fear will be with us for a long time. hopefully lessons can
be learned because there will be another event if not looked into. we
never found out the real cause. any word on that?
______
Michael Silverman from Andover: The gas explosion occurred on Sept.
13, 2018. Late that afternoon, we evacuated our home as ordered. We are
a family of 4 including an 81 year old mother/grandmother who is a
dialysis patient, a husband and wife with a 5-year old girl. Gas and
electricity were shut off by 4:30 p.m. or so on that date . . . By
Sunday morning, Sept. 16 electricity was restored. Gas was not . . .
and still till this date, November 19, 2018 there is no gas service.
This means that we have no gas for hot water, drying or heating in the
home. While at first this was workable, as the cold weather has
arrived, conditions are worse. We paid for and installed an electric
water heater in early October so that we could take ``hot'' showers. We
have an electric toaster oven, hotplate and microwave to heat foods. We
also purchased several electric heaters. We have to be careful with
which small heaters or cooking appliances are own. When the microwave
is on with any one of the portable heaters, the circuit breakers switch
off and have to be reset. This can be dangerous . . . especially at
night for the 81-year old and the 5 year old.
Approximately, November 4th, the Gas Company set up some diesel
powered generator outside with additional sub-generators inside. The
main goal of these generators is to heat the water pipes to prevent
them from freezing.
We have become to accommodate to the situation. Being able to
``cook'' food is a regular challenge due to not having a range to use.
This has increased our normal food budget to approximately double it's
normal amount each week. With all the electric heaters in addition to
the hot water heater, electricity costs are averaging $460/month
compared to $65/month prior to the gas disruptions.
______
Lauren Keating from Andover: When I tell people my house almost
blew up, they laugh, until I add, ``no, but really,'' before explaining
the Columbia Gas fiasco that has dominated the last two plus months of
my life. I was coaching in Chelmsford, MA when my phone figuratively
blew up as the Merrimack Valley literally blew up. Friends asking if I
was safe, telling me not to go home, and a former colleague desperately
warning me to NOT, UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES head to Andover. It got to
the point that I had to have my team copy and paste messages to friends
and family that I was towns away and really had no idea what was going
on. As a neighbor called me, I could hear the alarms in the background
from our whole neighborhood, in the heart of what would come to be the
affected area. Throughout the night, the news became more and more
unbelievable, explosions, evacuations and exits being closed down.
Essentially the Valley was shut down.
On Sunday, when I returned from evacuation and was greeted with a
bill from Columbia Gas. Newsflash--that was never going to get paid as
this was around the time they referred to the devastation as an
``inconvenience'' or an ``unfortunate incident.'' As the weeks went on,
it appeared that efficiency was a trait only possessed by their billing
department as the weeks stretched into October and we still had no
utilities, although we did have a LOT of people making a lot of doing
construction at all hours. I think for people living outside of this,
this is the hardest part--the small things that were the biggest
disruption. For 10 days, there were police escorts as our street was
shut down with no notice. Workers were jackhammering though the night
and after a long day at work, the only options for dinner were a
reheated crockpot and a cold shower. I took to going to the gym before
4 am to work out and shower and by mid-October was a zombie. As much as
the reimbursement process was a pain, the worst part were the things
you can't quantify--the extra time to do daily tasks of living.
By November, I had been in three hotels, fought for reimbursement
and spent multiple weeks in my own apartment with temperatures under
40+ inside as the list to receive housing was so long. When we returned
home, we had out electricity cut multiple days for multiple hours with
30 minute notice, which is super convenient when you need to use a
crockpot or microwave to eat. We had to leave our doors unlocked for
two weeks because the workers ``might'' be by to replace our
appliances. Because we wanted the work done, we did it, risking that
anyone could have walked in. It is now November 19, the original date
of restoration and the ``ongoing disruption'' is still in full swing.
Our ``new'' stoves were defective and the replacements are backordered
and we weren't given a date for their arrival. The new furnace upon
installation is leaky and not functioning at full capacity so while we
have heat, it is not efficient.
Through it all though, the strength of this community has shown
through. The five people in our house have worked together to make sure
we are as close to functional as possible. In the initial days of the
evacuation, watching the communities come together to make sure
everyone had what they needed even when Columbia was so distant was
inspiring as everyone was in a state of uncertainty. I may still be
rolling my eyes from all the euphemisms used by Columbia Gas for how
miserable of a situation this is, but there is truly a soft spot in my
heart for the resilience of the Merrimack Valley in circumstances for
which they have had zero control and very little progress.
______
Constance Glore from West Boxford: It is past time to face the
truth that the burning of fossil fuels is making the earth
uninhabitable for life as we know it. The rise in global temperature,
sea level and forest fires is directly caused by the use of these
fuels. The warming of the Gulf of Maine has brought shrimp populations
to the brink of extinction. Pollution caused by the burning of fossil
fuels was dubbed ``the new tobacco'' last week by the head of the World
Health Organization who also reported that ``the simple act of
breathing is killing 7 million people a year and harming billions
more.'' (The Guardian)
I am one of those. I have COPD.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change reported in Fall
2018, ``Governments should stop licensing new fossil fuel projects; and
stopping new projects alone will not be enough-governments must also
phase out a significant number of existing projects ahead of schedule,
while investing in a just transition for workers and communities.''
A UN panel of scientists said every bit of warming matters, and
we're almost out of time to keep it in check. We have the next 12 years
to begin to drastically reduce CO2.
The tragedy and ensuing future environmental damage caused by
Columbia Gas/NiSource and other gas utilities must never be repeated.
We need renewable, green, clean energy infrastructure to be built now.
______
Martin Boroian from North Andover: I live with my sister Mary. I am
a former Ma. State Metropolitan District Comm. Police Officer. We have
been with heat from Sept. 13, 2018 till Nov. 2018. I am a disabled
person. I have had 5 operations in the last five years. It was very
hard waking up in a house with no heat. It was also very hard not
knowing if and when we would have our heat restored. I also suffer from
PTSD. I feel that there should have been more Ma. State utility
inspectors to make sure that the Gas lines were in better condition. It
was also not reassuring when none of our local politicians, except. Our
U.S. Senator Edward Markey seemed to care about what happened to the
citizens in Lawrence, North Andover, and Andover. Thanking you for
letting us tell what happened to us. Ma. State and U.S. Citizens.--
Respectfully Submitted by Martin Boroian-Tel.No. (78-655-7656--home
address 58 Union Street, Apt.# 2. North Andover, Ma. 01845.--e-mail
[email protected].
______
Vladimir Saldana from Lawrence: September 13th
I was sitting with a friend on the front porch of Lawrence
CommunityWorks office building going over the treasurer report for a
Rwanda Youth Development Project we are both involved with. Not long
after the explosions broke out, a colleague from Lawrence
CommunityWorks walks ups the stairs and says ``Omg Vladi, Lawrence is
on Fire'' My immediate reaction was ``of course Lawrence is on fire,
lots of good things are happening in this city'' Her face expression
change significantly as she was walking closer to me with her cell
phone out in her hands she turns the screen around to show me a video
of the news coverage. We watched the news clip for about 3-5 minutes to
get a sense for what was happening. After learning that the affected
area in the city was South Lawrence and that folks were being asked to
evacuate I got my phone and called a friend that lives in South
Lawrence. As we were on the phone my friend was packing up her stuff to
leave her home. I asked her where she was going and she said to a
friend that lives in the North of the City. My thoughts and heart we're
raising 100 miles per hours trying to wrap my head around what I should
be doing and what was most necessary at the time. Organizing my
thoughts quickly, I concluded to a three-phase strategy: a) my
organizations have affordable housing units in the south of the city so
I felt it was our responsibility to ensure the safety and evacuation of
those units safety b) ensure that all my friends that live in South
we're evacuated, safe and had a place to go c) assist the greater
community with the emergency response.
It had been announced that the Parthum School was one of the
emergency shelters that was set up for evacuees. After completing the
first two part of my personal efforts to assist with the gas explosion
I left the office and drove to the emergency shelter. When I arrived at
the Parthum School there was a ton of activities and many faces I
recognized, from community leaders to politicians. After hanging out in
the front lobby for 10-15 minutes with nothing to do I decided it was
time to depart. When I was walking towards my car, a longtime friend/
brother Emmanuel asked me where I was going. The question struck my
cord because it felt as if I was abandoning the city during a tough
time--I went on to explain to Emmanuel that I was leaving because they
had enough volunteers and assistance. Emmanuel felt we needed to do
more so he suggested we check out the other shelter at the Arlington
School. We arrived at the Arlington School around 7:00 or so. When we
arrived at the Arlington we didn't find the same situation as the
Parthum School. It was a bit more chaotic it the sense that no one
really knew what was happening and folks that were evacuated and
looking for a place to sleep didn't know who to talk to or what to do.
There was way too many activities happening and just not enough
coordination. We approached the Red Cross respondent and asked how can
we help? They said that at the moment there was nothing to do because
they are getting organized. But, what we saw was a lot of emotional and
personal disconnect from the vulnerable residents sitting in the school
cafeteria with the people that were ``in charge''. I want to avoid
critiquing the Red Cross because they were doing the best they can do
with the resources they had at the moment. But in addition to having a
low number of ``official'' volunteers, their low number of volunteers
did not speak Spanish. This is where we saw an opportunity to assist.
So we decided to serve as translators for the Red Cross. As time went
on we made observations and noticed other gaps in their process, such
as very little emotional support to the victims arriving at the
shelter.
Emmanuel and I recognized other community leaders and friends such
as Pavel Payano and many others who were also feeling the disconnection
between the process and the people arriving at the shelter. From this
point on, the atmospheres took a turn, it was a kinematic connection
between the community leaders that were present at the time. We all
started to assume leadership roles. By the end of the first night on
Thursday, it was clear that local leaders we're going to manage the
relief efforts with the Red Cross assistance. That night, I and other
leaders that took an active role. From registering victims, feeding
them dinner, getting answers for what was happening, setting up
sleeping cods to even calling out of work for one the victim who did
not speak English. That night, most of the community volunteers left
the school at 2:30 A.M. on Friday. A few hours later, we all returned
energized to assists our community. The situation at the Arlington
School improved tremendously all due to the help of many local
community leaders and neighbors helping neighbors. Like others, I've
spent a tremendous amount of time in the shelter From Friday to Sunday.
I slept at the emergency shelter Friday night and Saturday night. One
of the reasons why I decided to stay was because none of the Red Cross
official volunteers spoke Spanish. The vast majority of residents
sleeping at the shelter did not speak English. I've felt responsible
for their wellbeing and being a traumatic situation without
interpretation can add more anxiety to a difficult situation.
During those 3 and half days, my heart grew every moment I witness
people from all over the place come to the shelter asking, ``what can I
do to help'' or bringing food, toiletries, necessities and all sort of
donations for the folks at the emergency shelter. We had an abundance
amount of food, clothes, and basic needs at the shelter from just
regular people dropping stuff off. We also had educators set up
activities for families with kids, therapist offering free services to
families that needed to speak to someone. I've felt the love,
compassion, and services from the wider community for the victim and
the City of Lawrence.
Despite all the commotion that was happening outside of the walls
of the Arlington emergency shelter, inside felt like a community center
addressing individual needs. Responding to the larger crisis at hand.
Volunteers stepping up and dedicating countless hours to help out in
any way they can. The spirit of the community was incredible and eye-
opening. To give you a sense on the sort of activities that were common
during the emergency period read the following two scenarios. One
night, a truck branded with a logo from a paving company from Peabody
pulled up with about 50 cases of 24 pack of waters, inside the shelter,
we probably had triple that amount of waters, and space was limited so
we asked them to take it to the other shelter or the Senior Center. The
stranger's faces looked disappointed. Ultimately, we ended up squeezing
the waters inside the school. The second scenario happened on Sunday
afternoon after the Mayor decided to lift the band and allow people to
go back home. Firefighters from Lowell pulled up to the school with two
full vans of donation items. Half of the shelter population had already
gone home. The ones that didn't did have a home to go to.
Today marks two after the gas explosions and the relief efforts
continue to be a challenge for various reasons. Many families are still
in a dire situation and the City continues to do everything possible to
restore a sense of normality. As we are approaching a holiday dedicated
for to give Thanks, I want to give Thanks to the community of Lawrence
for showing me resiliency, to the wider community for having a blessed
heart and giving their support during these hard few weeks. I am
confident that we will come out stronger out of this situation.
______
Heather Wilson from North Andover: On September 13 2018 at
approximately 4:30 PM I had just got home form work and my son stopped
by and said he smelled something, and immediately the smoke detectors
went off he ran down the cellar to find my boiler engulfed in flames.
My brother who has plumbing experience grabbed a tool and immediately
shut the gas off to my boiler and went outside to turn it off at the
house and while all this was happening I called fire department they
where there immediately and the fire was out by the time they got
there, They stayed for about 5 minutes when they realized it was a
community wide gas leak and left to deal with more serious issues they
realized there were higher triages to deal with., The next two weeks
met me with many claims workers form all over the country who will all
giving me different answers there was no consistency to their answers.
Also they never called me I had to call them a week later only to find
out that they had the wrong number, and they did not believe there was
a fire in my house until i sent the report to them. I spent the next 5
weeks in 4 different hotels, very inconvenient as I am a handicapped
women away form my home.
______
Todd Sacco from Withrop: I don't live in the affected area,
however, a co-worker of mine does. His brother in law has been shipped
in from other areas to assist with changing out meters. LOOK TO THE
IMPORTED WORKERS FOR THE TRUTH. The local union workers are NOT
carrying their weight and the imports are protecting them by not
calling them out.
This is not only making it unsafe and extremely inconvenient for
residents, it's making YOU, the elected official, who receives campaign
funds from unions, look very very bad.
This is unconscionable and needs to stop. I nave no dog in the hunt
other than my sincerest concern for the innocent victims of the
explosions and the ongoing war between the gas company workers and
their management.
______
Astrid Nielsen from Andover: Story from a resident in a NON
impacted area
Thursday Sep. 13th I was on the road when my kids called from home
to tell me, that their friends were texting if we had gotten a prank
call too about leaving the house. On my way back home through town
sirens were blasting left and right and just as a firetruck would pass
one way, another would come in the other direction. Usually when there
is a fire an army of firetrucks will be present as well as police and
the street will be closed of. That day I passed several single
firetrucks without backup running in and out of buildings.
We left the house and got a chance to talk it through and check
social medias and found, that since we are on a street, where gas was
never put in, we could go home safely. Instead we invited friends to
come and stay with us.
A friends in Andover was driving around with her child and another
3 children. They had been at the library and had been evacuated and
when the mom came to pick up her daughter, she took the other 3 as
their parents were not close by. Two of the children's parents were
stuck in Lawrence, where they have a restaurant, and was not able to
get out of town until late that evening. We made beds for 10 but
eventually only 3 stayed. The next evening they were able to go home.
That was suppose to be it for us, but
--My daughter had to go to emergency counseling. She is better,
but it has been so hard to witness. All the uncertainty and not
feeling safe is hard to deal with as an adult and much more for
an adolescent with anxiety.
--I was in Andover a few days later and when a firetruck came
blasting by and everyone absolutely froze including me. It took
a minute or two before anyone were able to talk again. We all
remembered
--For the next two month I would have to add a minimum of 15
minutes to any trip trough town because of all the construction
and detours. With two kids and their schedule it was very
stressful to have to be places at specific times when you never
knew what to expect.
--I have lunch in town several times a week and for two month
my favorite places were closed. (Bueno Malo, Yella, Casa
Blanca). There are people I used to pass by every week I
haven't seen for month now. The dynamic in town has been so off
since 9/13
The most popular costume this year for Halloween was a yellow vest
and a hard hat!!!
On paper my family will not be a part of history. But we were
impacted.
PS I don't think you will ever know the whole scope. I talked to a
home owner who told me, that there had been 6 fires on their street,
but when I checked the map, only 1 had been recorded.
______
Stacie Murphy from Lawrence: I am submitting this story on behalf
of CLASS, Inc. Located at One Parker Street, Lawrence, MA.
On Thursday, September 13, 2018 at approximately 4:20pm, several
gas lines in the Merrimack Valley started to explode as staff was
leaving for the day. A called was placed to the CEO Al Frugoli who was
still inside the building in a meeting. He was told to evacuate the
building and ask that the evening cleaning crew leave as well. Nancy
Price, Facilities Manager was on her way home when she received the
news of the emergency in Lawrence. She headed back to CLASS at One
Parker St. but at that time, no one was allowed on or near the
property. CLASS Management spent hours on the phones communicating with
key staff regarding opening of the building on Friday, as we were not
aware of the severity of the disaster.
On the evening of September 13th all power was cut to 1 Parker
Street and the surrounding areas. No power means we lost all
connections to our phone system and servers. At approximately 11pm a
decision was made to closed CLASS at One Parker Street for programs on
Friday. Staff would have to use a snow day in order to be paid. Meeting
had to be canceled and rescheduled.
CLASS serves 265 individuals at One Parker Street on a daily basis,
many of our clients live in group homes, many were also affected by the
gas disaster in the Merrimack Valley. A majority of CLASS Staff lives
in the affected areas and some could not even get to their homes.
CLASS lost approximately $6,800.00 in Transportation, $15,786 in
Employment Services and $10,591.00 in Medicaid. Total revenue lost on
Friday, September 13 was $33,177.00.
On Saturday September 15, at around 8pm, all power was restored to
CLASS at One Parker Street.
On Sunday, September 16, Lawrence Fire Department along with
Columbia Gas inspected One Parker Street and gave CLASS the green light
to open. CLASS opened without heat operating in the building and re-
opened programs at One Parker Street on Monday, September 17
On Monday September 17, programs re-opened. Many issues were
discovered due to the power being cut. We discovered both garage doors
were not operating and had to be manually opened. Service was called to
repair the garage doors that resulted in charges as parts needed to be
replaced. The security system dropped from the server and had to be re-
programmed by technicians.
At approximately 10:25AM, an odor of gas was reported and our
building was evacuated. After Friday's incidents staff were nervous and
it was unsettling to many individuals we serve as well. The Fire
Department arrived on scene, did a walk through and cleared the
building, followed by the gas company who checked the building and gave
the final ok.
On October 13, a temporary heating system was installed into the
building. Due to the nature of our business, CLASS had to hire
temporary staff for some individuals we serve. Gas was restored on
Monday, November 12. During this disaster, CLASS paid overtime hours to
our facilities manager who worked almost 24/7 to make sure things were
done correctly and our building was handled with care.
______
Shawn Logan from Andover: Although not directly impacted by the Gas
explosions (with the exception of my brother staying at my home as his
house was impacted), I am impacted peripherally--as were countless
others in two ways:
1. The Columbia Gas workers and their efforts have closed streets,
re-routed traffic and resulted in extreme congestion throughout the
towns of Andover, North Andover, and Lawrence. This has been time
consuming and frustrating. Further it appears they have taken advantage
of the explosions to unnecessarily upgrade all their gas lines and
forced homeowners to have their gas appliances and homes re-inspected
and brought up to existing code.
2. The street work to dig up, replace, and repair gas lines has
reduced the quality of the roads and paved surfaces in Andover, North
Andover, and Lawrence. In my view, Columbia Gas should pay to have the
impacted roads re-paved. The patchwork of repairs results in excessive
wear and tear on the suspensions of all our vehicles and makes for some
very uncomfortable travel.
______
Dean and Mona Thornhill from North Andover: Our home was set on
fire. We lost 85 percent of all our possessions. We are estimated to be
out of our home for a year to repair it.
______
Alexander Katsev from North Andover: I own a property in North
Andover that was affected by the disaster. I would like to get the
property inspection results, but Columbia gas was unable to produce it.
I called--10 times--no one knows anything. No written report, no
certification that gas operated appliances are not damaged. Nothing.
very poorly managed. . . .
______
Jon Paul from Andover: I am the pastor of the Free Christian Church
in Andover, a local church that is still not fully restored as of today
(11/21/2018). We hope to have heat restored by next week but our
kitchen could take weeks or months longer due to a number of
complications. In the meantime, ministries that use the kitchen to
provide meals for seniors and others in need are on hold.
Even our normal worship services have been challenging as the
building is very cold. A number of our parishioners have chosen to stay
home due to the cold.
I plan to do a wedding on Saturday morning 11/24. We have some
temporary heat, but it is inadequate for our large church building. I
feel bad (especially for the bride) that it will probably be cold
indoors at her wedding.
We are doing our best to provide spiritual and practical support
residents and businesses impacted by this crisis while dealing with our
own issues. We recently received an e-mail from one of our seniors, a
widow. I think is a good example of the struggles many are facing. She
writes: ``I am not feeling well today and will stay home [from the
church's senior group] tomorrow. Exhausted trying to deal with
everything. The gas situation is disorganized. I wake up and find
people digging up my lawn and they have machinery blocking my driveway.
Electricians came to hook up my furnace, but I don't have a furnace
yet. Had a small flood in my basement when they took out the hot water
heater, and the pipe is still leaking into a large bucket. I am really
exhausted. They told me that my appliances would be coming on a certain
day, but they didn't. Afraid to leave the house in case they do come,
or people want to get into the house. I am just beat right now. . .''
______
Lacey McManus from Andover: On September 13th after smelling gas in
my home I went outside, thinking I was losing my mind. How could there
be a gas odor in my home, no gas appliance was on! I found a neighbor,
who myself and my children consider family, in the middle of the street
frantic! My heart broke for her when she said she had a fire in her
basement and was told the fire department would get to her as soon as
they could. We proceeded to tell our neighbors to get out of their
homes and ensuring all were safe. Since that horrific day, we have all
spent countless hours trying to find ways to feed our families, keep
our children and pets warm, all while making life continue as normal.
Because outside of the affected areas nobody understood the struggle of
feeding a family without a stove or ensuring the house was warm enough
when your kids got home or where and when their next warm shower would
be. As a mother it has been very hard to look my children in the eyes
and tell them everything would be ok and there was nothing for them to
worry about. A hotel was out of the question, because how would I get
the kids to school, how would I get to work, and the kids to their
afterschool sports practices. We live here because our entire lives are
within a 5 mile radius of where we live. I had already been
inconvenienced enough with driving 30 minutes for them to take warm
showers, spending hours on end planning and making meals for us to eat
and stressing over the winter months just around the corner. Then we
got into a routine and we made it work. Then the contractors came a
month early to get us relit . . . what a nightmare!!! People in and out
of my home, with no respect for my belongings or my family. The water
tank blew water everywhere and the entire crew left without cleaning it
up, they forgot about my house for days, and when they finally did come
back it was days before everything was properly installed. The
inspector spent 2 minutes in basement to say we were good to go, and
when we were relit I still had no hot water. A task that took self
mitigated people 2 days tops took us 2 and a half weeks! Once we were
relit, I was happy but then fear set in. How am I supposed to feel safe
in a home with gas again? Every noise, while probably normal, scares me
to my core. Using a stove again, having the furnace on, and using my
dryer, while normal and an everyday necessity that many don't bat an
eye to, makes me so nervous! This is going to take a LONG time to
recover from. What makes matters worse, is how do we feel safe knowing
we have the same gas provider that caused this epic disaster? Monetary
reimbursements for minimal expenses only get us so far, the
responsibility of making us all feel safe and comfortable in our homes
sits in the hands of our representatives, senators, our governor,
mayors, town managers and everyone else who should have the residents
well-being at the top of their agenda.
______
Susan Roussilhes from Andover: The horror of September 13, 2018 has
been recounted and retold many times so I'll start with the days
following the explosions. We are doubly affected--our home and our new
business are both in the affected area. We received an alert that our
home had been broken into. We called the police and after some
confusion and vague explanations, we were informed that Columbia Gas,
along with the police and a locksmith, broke into our home to shut off
the gas. We were allowed to enter both places 4 days after the
explosions-both with no heat. In addition to having no heat in our
home, we had no hot water, no dryer for clothes, cold showers, and no
cooking. There was also the constant anxiety that what would happen
before might happen again. There were ``gas purges'' that caused worry
and confusion. In the days following the incident there were workmen,
police, officials from the state and town. I think everyone was still
in shock.
We attended meeting after meeting to receive whatever information
we could--which was sparse and confusing. We filed our first claims at
the new claim center in town. We waited in line with everyone else. We
were given a hot plate and were told we would have to have our home
inspected if we were to receive space heaters. No one came to inspect
so we were then told to go out and buy space heaters and we would be
reimbursed. We submitted receipts to an assigned adjuster who then
issued a few checks to reimburse us. We continued to submit expense
receipts with no response after 2 weeks. We called the claim number and
spoke to our adjuster who told us she was no longer our adjuster and we
were reassigned to another adjuster but she had no idea who that
adjuster was. This changing of adjusters would occur 3 more times. She
said that she submitted all of our documents to her supervisor who
assigned our claim to another adjuster. We were finally told who are
new adjuster was and it was a disaster from the beginning. We had to
resubmit all of our receipts again and then we were accused of
duplicating receipts. We spent hours in the claim center and on the
phone with the claim center in Louisiana. We care for our grandson 3
days a week and it had started to get very cold. We talked to an
adjuster for families who needed to be relocated and our only options
would have been to go into an RV which would not have been acceptable
with a young child and a dog and 3 adults or to be placed in a hotel 27
miles south. We explained to the adjuster in Louisiana that traffic in
Boston is horrendous and that commute would be over an hour or more
both ways (our business is located 3 blocks from our home). We were
then lectured by this person located thousands of miles away that it
would only be 35 minutes. We decided to stay in our home and remain
cold.
This was our day: on the phone with adjusters in Louisiana, in the
claim center in town--for hours on end--gather documents, receipts,
etc. We called newspapers, news channels, and congress people and
senators and even the governor-but since it was in the middle of
elections, we had little response.
We became inundated with workmen and police. Our street was blocked
off for several weeks. Work went on through the night with many
sleepless nights.
Our home has 2 sections-one is 160 years old and there was an
addition added 10 years ago so therefore we have 2 boilers and 2 hot
water heaters. We were able to replace 1 hot water heat and convert it
to electric so we had limited hot water and we were finally able to
take a hot shower. after several weeks of. Old showers. We were also
able to get reimbursed for that expense fairly quickly. We ordered
replacements for all appliances but had to front the bill for a new
oven, gas dryer, 1 boiler, and a combination boiler and gas hot water
heater all costing around $30,000. Getting reimbursed was agonizing-
calling Louisiana and spending hours in the claim center. We got our
gas back on November 9. We still have no stove in spite of the purchase
of a brand new one. The town inspector would not approve the use of our
stove because our cabinets above our stove are too low. These same
cabinets were approved prior to these explosions. So now we have 2
options in order for us to use the stove-raise the cabinets 3 inches
throughout our kitchen and extend the tile backsplash and paint the
kitchen which would cost a few thousand dollars or have metal plates
put under the cabinets which might be unsightly-we don't know because
we've never heard of this before.
Now for our business-September was to have been the beginning of
our busiest season. It has turned out to be disastrous. My daughter and
I opened our store on November 9, 2017. We worked very hard to
establish a women's boutique and we put everything we have into our
store. We previously had a successful store on Newbury street in Boston
but decided to open a new location in our community. We wanted to leave
behind the high rent, the hectic commute, and the higher cost of doing
business in Boston and concentrate on our community. We opened in
November of last year to a very successful few months. The business
previously occupying the space was a very successful and lucrative
women's boutique selling very similar styles to what we have so we
anticipated doing a similar business. We started out that way and then
September 13 happened. Our business came to a standstill. Because we
don't have numbers for our Andover location from last year, we used an
average of what we did in our Boston store and the store previously in
this space and took an average. Our sales for the month of September
declined by 83 percent. For October we used a similar formula and again
sales declined 77 percent. We can now use last year's November numbers
and as of this date-our November sales are down 57 percent. In the days
since the explosions parking has been a nightmare because many of the
available parking has been taken up by work trucks and such. Traffic
has been snarled because of workers and construction trucks. The
restaurants surrounding us have been closed. We get many customers from
these restaurants and it is very much a co-dependent relationship.
Business has decreased to such a point that we have been unable to pay
rent. We don't want to lose the 3 employees we have so we have been
scheduling them for half of the hours to which they are accustom. We
have orders that we can't take in so that those customers who do come
in we can sell them merchandise that is current and not previous season
inventory. Our business is suffering. Claim money that we have received
has gone to paying rent and orders. We are paying pay roll out of
personal funds which would not be so serious but we have had to put out
$30,000 up front for our appliances and work for our home.
We have received claim money and reimbursements for expenses but we
are not sure if we will ever recover our customer base when there are
other businesses in nearby towns that customers can frequent as well as
online shopping.
In short we are very aware that we may never recover and the
business that my daughter and I started may have to be declared
bankrupt. We don't have the money from our savings to keep putting into
our business.
We wanted you to hear our story. Thank you.
______
Janice Valverde from Lawrence: TESTIMONY of YWCA Northeastern
Massachusetts to the Field Hearing of the U.S. Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science and Transportation--November 26, 2018--Lawrence, MA
YWCA Northeastern Massachusetts is a multi-site, multi-service
agency that has served vulnerable women, children and families in the
Merrimack Valley for over 125 years. One of its major program areas is
Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault services.
Four of the agency's seven sites are located in Lawrence. One of
those is the YWCA Domestic Violence Emergency Shelter, located at an
undisclosed residential address in South Lawrence. It was directly
affected by the gas explosions on September 13, 2018.
At any given time, the Shelter is home to five women and their
minor children who have fled domestic violence. It is always full to
capacity. On September 13, there were five women and six children
living at the Shelter.
While the gas pipeline incident was extremely disruptive to all
affected, and especially devastating to those who lost their homes, the
YWCA Shelter residents were thrust into a situation that affected them
in a way somewhat different from the way it affected others.
For them to have to evacuate the Shelter and very quickly adapt to
a different environment and different routines, even for three days,
was far beyond an inconvenience; it as extremely stressful, disruptive
and fear-inducing, especially to a few with fragile mental health.
The YWCA wants to enter the unique story of these domestic violence
survivors and their children into the record. We appreciate this
opportunity to do so.
The YWCA Emergency Shelter was evacuated on the evening of
September 13 after the gas explosions occurred. The Shelter's gas
furnace and hot water heater were no longer usable. It would be three
days (and nights) until the Shelter's five women and six children would
be able to return to the Shelter. Columbia Gas offered accommodations
in trailers or reimbursement to the YWCA for hotel stays. Neither of
these was a viable or practical solution for the 11 Shelter Residents,
however.
For domestic violence victims whose lives had already been
profoundly disrupted, each of whom was at a point on their own path of
healing from trauma while living in the Emergency Shelter, this new
disruption was quite traumatic. Some of the residents were experiencing
PTSD or other mental health issues. Typically, over a period of time,
usually months, survivors slowly heal from trauma as some stability and
certainty comes into their lives. But a major stressor can cause a
setback in their recovery.
Having to leave the Shelter in the midst of the gas explosion
disaster was indeed a setback for all of the YWCA Emergency Shelter
residents to some degree, but particularly for two women and one young
teenage boy who are suffering with mental health issues.
Along with the rest of the Shelter ``family,'' they were frightened
to leave the Shelter itself and did not want to be separated from each
other or the YWCA Shelter staff. YWCA staff, who are highly trained and
experienced in dealing with trauma, were able to manage the situation,
but that did not erase the trauma added to all these residents' lives.
Trailers offered by Columbia Gas as temporary quarters were at
least a temporary solution for some people, but not a viable solution
for the YWCA Shelter residents. Moving into a trailer in the city among
others affected by the gas explosions, was not only an added stressor,
but was potentially a threat to individual safety. The trailers
provided no guarantee of privacy and physical safety and security,
which are obviously paramount to someone whose abuser may be in the
same community. Shelter residents typically bond into a family-like
community within the house--bonding with each other and with YWCA
Shelter staff who are present 24/7. This would not have been
sustainable if every family was in its own trailer, and support of the
staff is key to maintaining stability and encouraging healing for the
residents.
Likewise, the option of a hotel stay was not a good one. There were
not enough rooms in any one area hotel for all 11 residents. Again,
this option brought up the issue of how to maintain the daily support
system provided by YWCA Shelter staff and the common fear of being
``out in the community.''
The bottom line was that Shelter residents were re-traumatized to
varying degrees, and all of them were frightened to leave the Shelter,
but forced to do so by circumstances.
After considering the options, the YWCA decided there was no choice
but to use its own resources. For three days, Shelter residents were
able to stay at the YWCA Fina House, a residential building that houses
the YWCA Transitional Housing program for domestic violence survivors
and the residential Teen Parenting Program, was available, too. It is a
secure building, staffed 24/, as is the Shelter. Conditions over those
three days were somewhat chaotic, overcrowded and far from ideal, but
at least the residents were persuaded to go there since their safety
and security could be guaranteed and YWCA staff could remain with
them..
Once the Shelter was cleared by authorities after three days, the
residents returned to a house, albeit without central heat or hot
water. It was decided that the best course of action was to have the
residents remain in the Shelter while YWCA senior staff ``scrambled''
as much as necessary to restore heat and hot water. For almost six
weeks, residents were shuttled to other YWCA facilities in Lawrence to
take showers--the Fina House and the YWCA Lawrence site which has a
locker room with showers.
The YWCA discovered that the electrical panel in the house
(Emergency Shelter) could not even accommodate space heaters in every
room, so the YWCA purchased electric blankets for residents.
Fortunately the weather was not too cold for the next six weeks--the
last two weeks of September and all of October.
Over several weeks, with cold weather on the horizon, the challenge
of restoring some normalcy to the Shelter residents' lives was a big
one. The YWCA made various requests for assistance, reaching out to the
state and to private foundations, while negotiating with Columbia Gas
regarding the YWCA's claim for damages, and its need for a replacement
water heater.
Ultimately, the YWCA was able to find emergency funding to cover
the costs of replacing the failed gas heating system with electric
baseboard heat, and had a new electrical panel was installed to
accommodate the baseboard heating and a new stove. Columbia Gas finally
provided a new gas hot water heater after about five weeks, but not
without repeated calls from YWCA directors.
None of this happened without incurring many unexpected costs and a
diversion from the regular work of the agency's directors, and domestic
violence program staff, but the emotional costs to the Shelter
residents was perhaps the greatest cost.
Thank you for considering this story of how the Columbia Gas
pipeline explosions affected a unique population in Lawrence.
______
Jaime Sloan-McCarthy from North Andover: My name is Jaime Sloan-
McCarthy and I am the owner of Dani Kaye Store LLC located at 85 Main
Street in North Andover, MA. My husband and I own two businesses in
North Andover and thankfully his company Muse Intermedia LLC was
minimally affected by the Columbia Gas explosions that happened on
September 13, 2018. I opened Dani Kaye on August 24th, 2017 and we had
just completed our first year of business when the incident occurred.
Opening and cultivating a new business in a new market is a significant
undertaking by itself, and the challenge of the gas explosions has been
crippling. As a new business, I only have one year of records and every
piece of product is purchased outright. My vendors do not extend credit
terms to new businesses and one year of records is not enough to
present to a bank for business financing options. There isn't enough
documentation to show viability to any financial institution to receive
a loan. My husband and I were in the process of building a home at the
time of the incident and were weeks away from our closing date. We were
displaced for a few days from the apartment we were staying in while
waiting for the home to be completed as we were staying in North
Andover. We are both self employed and did not have the luxury of using
our personal credit or assets to ease the financial strain in my
business, nor could we seek financing even to help our business with a
pending mortgage. We knew our financials were being monitored up until
we closed and we could not afford to jeopardize the home we had worked
so hard to purchase. We applied for an emergency loan from MCCI after
closing on our home to help us and we just received it yesterday
morning; it took two weeks to receive because of the back and forth
between the lender and Columbia Gas regarding my claim. Two weeks is
significantly longer than the 24-48 hour approval we were promised. Two
weeks is a long time after losing two months of my most lucrative
season right before the Holidays which is supposed to be the icing on
the cake for a retail business like mine and the necessary financial
cushion we need to get us to the Spring season. Additionally, we still
do not have gas in my shop and my HVAC unit has not been replaced for
me to have a permanent heating solution. I currently have a Rheem
heating unit that was supplied by my landlord who chose to self
mitigate and until this unit was installed we had two weeks where it
was too cold for me to operate my business out of the shop. I am
grateful for the Columbia Gas workers who have tried to help get us
hooked back up, but having them continually coming through my store is
disruptive to my business and makes it an uncomfortable environment for
my clientele to shop.
I am proud of what I have been able to achieve in my first year of
business in this market as the first upscale women's boutique in North
Andover. Growing a new business takes time and planning and this is
something Columbia Gas is not willing to consider as we have been
dealing with them for our business claim. After the gas explosions, I
did not see many customers for four weeks due to traffic disruptions
and the fact many of them were impacted and displaced as well. I did
not expect to see them under the circumstances. After the four weeks it
became too cold for me to operate in my store and we lost another two
weeks of business over this. I was still trying to do business at this
time because I had to sell product to pay for product that I ordered
six months prior that was cut to order for our store. Some of my
vendors cancelled a few orders for us but I could not cancel everything
without jeopardizing my relationships and the exclusivity of some of
our brands. I also needed the product for my regular customers who
expect new items when they come to see me, and I didn't want to risk
having my pieces re-allocated by the vendors to other businesses. I
struggled to sell inventory that was intended for early Fall and that
would inevitable go on sale online and in department stores within a
few months. I am still sitting on many pieces that have effectively
``expired'' and I have lost my window to sell them due to the shift in
weather. My money is still tied up in this product which should have
moved through my business by now. Columbia Gas has ignored this part of
my claim which has made doing business incredibly difficult. They do
not want to take responsibility for my product needs and obligations
and the numbers they have presented to us have netted out and
discounted all costs associated with product. Since we don't have
enough history as a business, the gas company is using our numbers from
last year as a base line and we had barely been open. I don't know how
they can compare a business that only had under 50 customers to a
business that currently has 600 and counting as people are still
discovering us everyday. I have fought to build our business and
reputation over the last year and I am only asking that I be treated
fairly so I can continue to operate and get back on track to grow as I
had planned.
Despite the challenges and losses we have endured with our
business, I have still made it a priority to give back to our
community. I have hosted Sip and Shop events where we raised money for
the Lawrence Emergency Fund and for the Soto family. I have also
donated clothing to people who have needed it. I know I am fortunate to
be operational and that others have it worse than I do and I have felt
obligated to help. I hope that we will be given that same support from
our community as the situation is rectified. It is imperative that the
Town of North Andover will push to bring business downtown now for the
Holidays to help the businesses like mine that are up and running and
are fighting to get back to business as usual. The road to recovery
will be a long one; small businesses are necessary to the fabric of
this community and we cannot be forgotten. I opened my store in North
Andover a year ago because I believed in the future and potential of
the area. I intend to not only survive this incident, but continue to
thrive and service the community.
______
Lisa Cascio from Lawrence: https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/
read/ma-natural-gas-explosions-highlight-tension-between-recovery-and-
efficiency#gs.dSkRLuc
______
Elizabeth Rocco from Arlington: I'm a family physician at the GLFHC
clinic at Plaza 114 in South Lawrence. I was in the clinic during the
explosions, and I heard of the impact on my staff and patients' lives
for the last 2 months. 3 of my patients residences burned down and lost
everything. One patient moved out of state. The other two moved from
hotel to hotel for 2 months looking for housing and only found housing
last week. One had to drop out of graduate school because the cost of
losing all her possessions and living in a hotel wiped out her savings.
She also experienced trouble sleeping, panic attacks and depression
which interfered with her ability to study and work. Most of my
patients had anxiety and sleep disturbances related to the fires and
explosions depending on how closely they were impacted. Many of my
patients and staff have complained of exhaustion from the extra time
needed to heat water on electric hot plates for bathing, the
inconvenience and extra cost of not being able cook at home and the
discomfort of not being able to heat their home during the cold fall
nights. Patients also missed their appointments at the health center
because they were displaced from their home.
______
Erika Ody from North Andover: While I am one of the lucky ones that
was able to safely retrieve my four year old son and dog the day of the
explosions, our lives haven't been the same since Sept 13th. I didn't
get the opportunity to retrieve any belongings that weekend and had to
drive hundreds of miles picking up and dropping off my pet and child
that weekend to find emergency care and housing. We stayed in the house
from Sept 15th through Oct 8th without heat, hot water, a dryer or
stove. Then, we were forced into emergency housing as my son has an
eating disorder and doesn't have enough body fat for sustained cold
temperatures. We are attempting to self mediate and hope to be home
soon but I cannot emphasize enough how little contact we had from
Columbia Gas prior to this last week when they finally started to check
on me. It's too little and too late.
______
Rafael Juliao from Lawrence: My name is Rafael Juliao; I live at
26-28 Farley St. in Lawrence, MA, and own a business two blocks from my
home, First Class Car Shop, Inc. On the afternoon of September 13,
2018, I was at the shop when I got a call from my family at home-they
were scared; all of the alarms were going off and they were saying
there was fire and smoke in the house. I rushed home and saw all of the
tenants-I have a multi-family home and rent apartments to two tenants-
outside looking at the house. When I got to the driveway, I called 911
over and over again, but there was either no answer or the line was
busy. Eventually, fearing that my house would burn down-and despite my
wife's objections-I went into our basement, where I found the furnace
on fire and flames creeping up the wall. I also heard the sound of
blowing air. What I now know is that it was a gas leak. I used wet
laundry and buckets of water and clothing to put the fire out. I
grabbed pliers and turned off the gas meter and opened the windows.
When I went back outside, more people who live on the street were
coming outside, and within minutes, all of my neighbors were outside,
screaming and afraid their houses were going to burn down. I worked
with a few of my neighbors to go into three other houses and put the
fires out and turn off the gas meters.
After that, we started hearing there had been pipeline explosions
all over town. Because we have emergency supplies in our house, we
decided to stay put instead of going to a hotel that Columbia Gas was
offering. Even with no electricity, no gas, and no heat, with two kids,
ages 11 and 18, we felt we would be better off staying at home. But it
was frightening every day. It felt like a war zone in the days after
the explosions. We saw people robbing the house across the street. My
son was stopped when he was riding his bike because police thought he
was a looter. The emotional and psychological toll this has taken on
our kids and our family has been immense. My kids both missed school;
they've been cold; they've been frightened.
I thought Columbia Gas would be sympathetic and helpful to those
impacted by the disaster they caused, but interacting with them has
been a nightmare. Because I am a business owner, a homeowner and have
tenants, I have had to deal with them on multiple fronts. I have had to
call them dozens of times. I have been passed around from one claim
adjuster to another (at this point, I think the number is up to six),
each one requiring me to submit a different set of documents and
evidence and requiring me to start the process anew each time I am
passed to someone new.
One of the adjustors assigned to me for my home told me to get an
estimate from an electrician and plumber for the repairs that needed to
be made in the house to have temporary heat put in. The estimate was
upwards of $13,000, and when I reported back to Columbia, the adjustor
simply said there was no way Columbia would agree to pay that amount.
Eventually, I spoke to the foreman overseeing a crew working on repairs
to the pipelines in the street, and he felt bad for us and sent men in
to put in a new furnace, new water heaters, and a new stove, but we
still don't have cooking gas. According to one of Columbia's claim
adjusters, I shouldn't be making a fuss about not having cooking gas
because we ``can find other things to eat.''
On top of all of this, my business is suffering. The shop was shut
down for five days after the explosions; we had no electricity. Once we
opened back up, there was construction in front of the shop to fix
pipelines, and it was blocking the entrance for customers to come into
the shop. Beyond that, there is no one left in town. How is my business
supposed to survive when there are no customers?
Columbia Gas was offering me a fraction of the profits I was
losing-the income I need to feed my family-and when I tried to outline
not only the lost profits, but also the costs of repair that were
piling up, I was met with hostility and skepticism. I've had to use
money from my pension to pay our bills. When I explain to the adjusters
that my business will never be the same, they don't care. When I call
them to ask them when something is going to be done, their response is
that we have to wait or it's not happening. I have been stunned by how
poorly they treat us.
The callousness of these adjustors has been like a punch to gut.
They caused this disaster. They put my family and our whole community
through this nightmare. They missed their deadlines for restoring heat
and making the necessary repairs. And yet, when we talk to them, they
act as if we've done something wrong, like we're inconveniencing THEM.
There has been so little communication and transparency during the
process, and my family and I are at our wit's end. We don't know when
things will return to normal, if ever.
______
Elsa Berroa from Lawrence: My husband and I are senior citizens
with disabilities, and we suffer from multiple ailments. With no gas,
heat or hot water in our home, we had no choice but to go to one of the
temporary trailers after the explosions. But even the trailers were
cold, and because I have poor circulation, the cold affects me
tremendously. The trailers were such poor quality that they would move
in the wind; it felt like we were on a boat. And the park where we were
kept was so badly maintained that mud gathered in huge amounts and made
it impossible to get around. I felt trapped in our tiny trailer.
When our gas was finally reconnected, Columbia Gas gave us 24 hours
to move out of the trailer. It felt like an eviction. We don't move so
well, and we don't drive, so this was incredibly difficult for us. I
needed assistance to pack and couldn't get it. It was terrible.
Further, when I tried to sign up for their Thanksgiving meal about two
weeks before the holiday, I was told it was too late.
I have been traumatized because now I fear my home. I blame
Columbia Gas wholeheartedly for what they have put us through. Every
representative I have spoken to has been unkind. It makes me feel like
I'm begging for assistance and that Columbia Gas wants to seem like a
hero, like they're helping us, when really, they caused this disaster
with their negligence.
______
Cynthia Rwabuhinga from Lawrence: I'm Cynthia Rwabuhinga; I live in
Lawrence, MA, and since the explosions on September 13, 2018, my life
has been turned upside down. I'm a teacher's assistant at a local
public school, where I work with kindergartners. I'm an active member
of my church and community. I rent space in a house in Lawrence, but
after the explosions, it was not safe to return home. I was only just
able to return home last week, but I still don't have cooking gas.
On the day of the explosions, I was assisting with an afterschool
activity at my school. We were outside when the chaos started. A child
was crying and said she had heard there were fires--soon afterward, the
school was evacuated. It felt like a terrorist attack. I thank God the
kids were at school because it could have been worse, but it really
felt like Armageddon. It felt like God was coming, and I wasn't going
with him. Everywhere I turned, it was chaos.
A friend told me that explosions were happening everywhere, and
police were saying don't go into your houses. As I drove from the
school, I saw a house on fire, smoke everywhere, everyone outside of
their houses in panic. I was calling 911 but couldn't get through. I
started calling everyone I knew telling them not to go into their
houses. I drove a town over to Methuen and stayed with a friend's
parents for almost two weeks before being able to get a hotel through
Columbia Gas. We were all in a state of shock.
When I reached out to Columbia Gas for a hotel, they told me there
was nothing close and that the only thing they could give me is a place
in Waltham; otherwise, I'd have to wait. And please understand, I had
already waited. I didn't get into a hotel until October 3. I took it,
but my work and my church, where I go almost five days a week for
various community programs I participate in, are back in Lawrence.
Columbia Gas said they would pay for my gas because of all of the
driving back and forth I was doing, but meanwhile, my car battery also
ran out, my mileage went up, and one of my tires popped. In addition to
the financial and physical toll driving back and forth had on me, it
was stressful, and I was spending more than an hour and a half in the
car every day. Columbia Gas didn't care. I live paycheck to paycheck,
and they refused to give me the gas money up front, which also made it
near impossible for me to afford all of my living expenses. The gas
card also didn't arrive when they said it would, and they were
dismissive when I tried to explain that I needed it.
**The hotel that they put me up in was dilapidated. The stove and
entire ``kitchen'' in the hotel room was run down; the stove was
crusted with rust and unusable. When I tried to raise this with
Colombia Gas, they were rude and dismissive. They also had someone from
the hotel knocking on my door regularly to see if anyone was staying
with me. No one was, but they invaded my privacy nonetheless.
Eventually, they did move me to a better hotel because I'd found a
threatening note on my windshield at the first place, but why did it
take so long? Why did I have to suffer and feel unsafe for them to put
me in a decent place when I couldn't return home?
I suffer from chronic arthritis, and this ordeal has exacerbated my
pain. I'm under such stress that my hair has started to fall out; my
blood pressure is dangerously high; I've started having panic attacks.
I'm drowning in bills. I haven't been able to cook and so have racked
up so many expenses paying for food; I've gained weight from eating
poorly. I had a good life. I loved my job; I loved my church and my
community. And it's crumbled because Columbia Gas created a disaster
and then resented the residents of Lawrence for needing relief and
support. They've destroyed our community, and they couldn't care less.
______
Brigdetann Tavares from Lawrence: I have MS and am a single mother
of a toddler. I decided to weather it out and stayed in my home after
the explosions. When the temperature started to drop, we went to a
hotel that was very far from my child's daycare and from Boston, where
I need to go regularly for medical treatment. I am having trouble
sleeping. I am under so much stress, and one of the worst triggers of
MS is stress, so I have been greatly physically impacted, too. I feel
powerless and don't feel like Columbia Gas is listening to us to try to
lessen the burden they created for me and everyone in Lawrence.
______
Karen Martin from Boxford: The collapse of the gas system in the
Merrimack Valley, the largest disruption in the history of the
industry, has significantly impacted the residents of this area,
devastating many. To be evacuated, to live in a trailer not fit for New
England winter or in a hotel 20 miles from work and kids' school and
activities, or to remain in unheated homes for months is the largest
disruption of most victims' lives.
This was a preventable tragedy. Twenty years ago when I worked for
a telecommunications company, a much more inherently safe industry than
gas distribution, there was a process of review by a team of experts
before any product was delivered. It's unimaginable that Columbia Gas
did not have such a process in place. Even with the new rules for the
gas companies that will be required by this and other hearings, who
will monitor and enforce the implementation of these rules? How long
will it be before some belt-tightening measure buries these rules? The
aging gas infrastructure, with its many known gas leaks, suggests
another disaster is possible.
In addition to the obvious safety issues with the gas system that
were experienced in the Merrimack Valley, there is the larger issue of
climate change. Burning ``natural'' gas for heat and power produces 36
percent of the carbon dioxide emissions in Massachusetts. Methane, the
main component of natural gas, is a greenhouse gas that is 80 times
more powerful than carbon dioxide. Unburned methane escapes into the
atmosphere from the many gas leaks in the area as well as when pipes
are vented (as they were in the repair process).
Our Global Warming Solutions Act of 2008 requires us to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions 25 percent from 1990 levels by 2020. We are a
far cry from that. The recent IPCC report declares we have until 2030,
just 12 years from now, to reduce emissions by 45 percent and develop
into a net-zero planet by 2050. This would allow for the possibility of
keeping global warming to 1.5 degrees Centigrade to avoid the most
catastrophic impacts of climate change.
With this in mind, why is Columbia Gas allowed to rebuild the
Merrimack Valley with more dirty fossil fuel burning, greenhouse gas
emitting equipment? Why are they allowed to install gas equipment that
is not the most energy efficient equipment available? Shouldn't they be
required to rebuild with equipment that runs on clean energy, reducing
our GHG emissions? Why is there not a state or Federal plan that would
require a rebuild after any tragedy such as this to be one that would
move us to a net zero state by 2050 or earlier? Why can't we make the
Merrimack Valley rebuild a model for reconstruction in the eventuality
of future catastrophes?
Lawrence is one of the poorest cities in Massachusetts. In our
state, people whose income is below 50 percent of the Federal poverty
level, spend 40 percent of their income on energy bills. With climate
change making New England summers hotter, coupled with the ``heat
effect'' in cities like Lawrence, this expense will only rise. High
efficiency electric heat pumps provide both heating and cooling,
satisfying heating needs for New England winters and fulfilling an
approaching need for air conditioning. Heat pumps, coupled with
weatherization of homes and a plan to ``solarize'' Lawrence would
reduce energy bills for its residents while reducing greenhouse gas
emissions.
A just solution to the gas system collapse requires a forward
thinking solution that would move the Merrimack Valley toward a
renewables energy future. It would enhance the safety of residents and
put us on a path to meeting our climate goals, sustaining a livable
planet for our children and grandchildren.
______
Laura Roffer from North Andover: My story cannot even remotely
compare to the family who lost a son, or those who lost homes, but I
feel it is important for my story to be heard.
I got a call from my daughter on the afternoon of the explosions. I
was at North Station about to board the commuter rail home. I was under
such stress, and so anxious, that I boarded the wrong train as I tried
to understand what was happening. I made my way to the correct train
while trying to juggle calls coming from my son, 300 miles away at
school, but had heard from friends what was happening at home, and my
daughter telling me she was trying to get out of the house with our
dog, and other friends and family members calling and texting making
sure we were OK. The early calls from my son were full of emotion as I
tried to tell him that we were OK.
I had to exit the train at North Wilmington because the train
wasn't going further north. It was mass confusion. My daughter & dog
managed to get in the car to come get me in Wilmington. We drove back
to North Andover to gather some belongings, and the scene was like
nothing I had ever seen before. I entered the house with a flashlight
so as not to spark anything. We all headed to Manchester NH to my
fiancee. I had to use my son's car and not mine because we were turned
away from Merrimack Street where the commuter rail garage is and where
my car was. The house was without power from Thursday at 6 until
sometime on Saturday morning. I wasn't able to get my car until Sunday
when the street and the garage were opened.
From that weekend and continuing to current day I, and would assume
most, have experienced a total lack of coordinated statuses,
communications and solutions. I remember going back to my house to put
a note on the door with my cell # so that I could be contacted for a
relight, clearly not knowing it would take 66 days for me to get to
that point.
I believe it was a full week after the explosions, that residents
then knew the extent of the issue and had hopes of being made whole by
November 19 as shared by the recovery team. I showered for 3 weeks at
the Y on the Andover/North Andover line before my commute to Boston. I
bought substitute cooking appliances. I went to my fiancee's every
weekend with my laundry. I bought space heaters to warm the house a
bit, which in the early days was OK, because it wasn't that cold yet.
I received 2 confirmations that an assessment team would be coming
on October 3. I stayed to work from home, put my dog in doggy daycare,
and no one showed up. I went to work the following day to get a text
from my neighbor that the crew was there. Thankfully my daughter was
about 15 minutes away and they could get in and condemn all of my
appliances: furnace, tankless hot water heater, dryer and stove.
As the recovery options changed, I opted to have an electric hot
water heater installed with my own contractor. I spent hours making
calls to plumbers and electricians to come give estimates, and made
arrangements to work from home so I could explain the situation and
show them the space. About a week later, it started to get cold.
Options were made available for alternative housing. I called my claims
adjuster, he told me I didn't qualify because Columbia Gas had made the
investment in the hot water heater, so the assumption was that I could
stay. I spent hours getting estimates for alternate heat options like
mini-splits and pellet stoves, again, making arrangements to work from
home to allow the workers in but couldn't find a reasonable solution.
Days later, I made the request again based on the upcoming colder
forecast. It took 3 days for someone to get back to me with options. We
were eventually provided with a trailer in Andover. We never stayed in
it though, because of the inconvenience of the location.
Then came the news conference with the announcement that they would
not hit their deadline. My relight date went from November 9, to
November 9-19, to December 7. I read the daily updates, I checked the
72-hour schedule and the interactive map almost daily. We made the
decision to stay in the house as long as the temps at night were 40 or
above. If the temps were going to be below that, I took the dog with me
to my fiancee's house, my daughter went to her boyfriend's house in
Bolton. I never really knew where I was going to be on any given day.
Based on the December 7 date, I made the decision to self-mitigate.
Again, took time to be home to have an HVAC contractor come, took the
time to write e-mails, ask questions, submit estimates and eventually
get something approved for a December 3 install which was the earliest
my contractor could get there. I had hoped to have heat in my house for
Thanksgiving so my son could come home & actually stay in his own bed.
On November 10, my street was full of various crews. I was home
because I was scheduled for an assessment. But there were other crews,
installing emergency heat systems. I asked one of the workers if I was
getting one and he told me I wasn't on the list. I never received a
call or door hanger offering that option.
That day, the assessors determined that I was eligible for the
rapid re-light. I assumed that was still my December 7 date, but a
couple of days later, when I called to inquire about the emergency
heat, Columbia Gas said my address was on the 72 hour schedule. That
was November 12. No one was home that day, nor did I get a call from a
contractor, but Columbia Gas told me it was likely they'd be at my
house. So I stayed home on November 13, worked in a cold house, no one
came. I called to get additional information, and demanded to speak
with a supervisor. He told me that I would receive a call from a
contractor the night before someone would come. My address remained on
the 72 hour schedule through November 14, and that was the date I
finally received a call from a contractor. I let my neighbor know (as I
live in a duplex), and made arrangements to work from home on November
15. It was 47 degrees in my house. I'm not sure why given that it's a
duplex, my neighbor's address was not on the 72-hour schedule or why he
did not receive a contractor call.
They did indeed come & work. The inspector arrived at 5. Again
confusion. He was only provided with my neighbors address and not mine,
but did the inspection. The Columbia contractor thought they could get
the relight done that night, but that was not the case. So I drove back
to Manchester.
The relight happened on November 16, 66 days after the explosions.
Had I known Columbia Gas was coming earlier, I'd have had my new
appliances ready for installation. I'm thankful to have heat, but
wasn't able to do any special cooking for my son's arrival home for
Thanksgiving and am still doing laundry in Manchester.
A few of my neighbors still have emergency heat. I have a generator
outside of my front door the size of a dumpster with hoses running
across the sidewalk and my lawn into my neighbor's windows. It's
frightening to me to know that some people don't have heat and the
temperature in the teens, the coldest Thanksgiving on record.
My time is important. I spent far too much time and energy on this
incident. Too much time e-mailing, calling, waiting at home. Too much
time packing and unpacking my belongings and trying to plan my days.
There was tremendous stress, anxiety and uncertainty.
While I'm thankful to those on the street performing the work who
work through the rain, snow and cold temps, I am not thankful for the
miscommunications and disjointed efforts across subcontractors hired to
answer questions. After my relight, I received 5 calls from various
Columbia Gas centers asking if I had heat. I also had a knock at the
door at 9:30 at night asking if I had heat. I appreciate the concern,
but I think they just can't keep up with the information as it changes,
so they needed to be sure. I'm also thankful that my claims adjuster
turned things around quickly, which from reading stories in the paper
and hearing from neighbors at one of the open houses, this was not the
case for many.
I'm hopeful that this will be but a blip on the radar when I put my
house in the market in the spring and that there are no long term
impacts to the housing market due to fear of natural gas in the
neighborhood.
I appreciate your efforts on our behalf as well as the efforts from
the offices of Senator Warren, Congressman Moulton, AG Maura Healey and
Governor Baker, all of whom I've written.
Please hold those responsible accountable for this.
Kind regards,
Laura Roffer
978-302-0834
______
John Matera from Andover: I live in Andover, MA, where the
consequences of the Columbia Gas disaster continue to be felt.
Fortunately, our home does not have natural gas service and was not
directly damaged. Our community has been damaged greatly.
Loss of life and destruction of dozens homes and commercial
buildings is horrific. Friends are still without heat in their own
residences. Traffic continues to severely restricted, making ordinary
trips arduous while circumnavigating the destruction/construction.
Commerce is not back to normal--many retail and services business are
still not operating normally. The loss of productivity is huge. Even if
the tangible costs are remediated, the intangibles and difficult-to-
quantify damages--that are nevertheless real--are unlikely to be
addressed.
NiSource and its subsidiary, Columbia Gas, have not evidenced any
degree of competence in either preventing the disaster in the first
place, but in making repairs or even estimating when they will be
complete. No one has explained how this was allowed to be possible. Why
weren't redundant safeguards in place? What assurance do we have that
the same level of negligence will not continue?
My friends and neighbors live in fear or what is next. Will there
be an audit of cybersecurity at all of the gas utilities in the
country? If not, haven't we just trained terrorists how to blow up
cities? The likelihood of companies that allow such unsafe gas networks
to be in place will have good computer network security is low. Are we
one hacking incident away from another catastrophe?
Mostly, we fear that nothing will happen at all. The utility
executives and regulators will keep their jobs and get promotions and
bonuses instead of being held accountable. We will continue to live
with sub-standard utilities and infrastructure that should be an
embarrassment to a nation that is supposed to lead.
Sincerely,
John Matera
______
Isabelle Ceron from Lawrence: The worst part of the gas disaster
for our family was that my son was alone at home in South Lawrence when
the explosions happened. He is a teen, and he was terrified. He called
me at work, telling me about the terrible gas smell, the sirens and
helicopters, and I told him to get out. We met on the road between
Lawrence and North Andover.
Because of all the commotion we went to my sister's house in North
Andover. However, there too there were fires and everyone was
evacuating. At first, we were just out in the front yard trying to
understand what to do. Then we understood we had to evacuate--and in
all the commotion we made a hotel reservation and drove what took about
2 hours to Manchester. Once we got there, we realized that this wasn't
the place where we made the reservation. We'd been so upset we didn't
write down the name correctly. The place we went to didn't have space.
So, we turned around and went back to North Andover and stayed the
night at home. We knew we weren't supposed to, but the gas and the
electricity were out, and we had nowhere else to go, so we stayed home.
The next morning, we went to Lowell to eat, since there was nothing
open around us, and we didn't feel comfortable staying home.
We were lucky that our gas was turned on after the first weekend,
since we were on a high-pressure line. My sister stayed with us for 65
days until her gas was returned.
______
Elsa Berroa from Lawrence: First, it's important that the senate
committee understand that we were all subjected to a terrifying event.
I was certain that I was not going to survive on the evening of Sept.
13th. I heard sirens and helicopters and heard something rushing out of
the basement of our triple decker. There was a terrible odor of gas,
and I realized the rushing sound was the gas coming out. I ran for my
life onto the street--and then I saw that a house down the block was
already on fire, and the street was filling with smoke. We hopped in
the car and evacuated with everyone else as quickly as possible. We
went to stay at one of our children's homes.
A painful headache started that evening and has plagued me on and
off frequently since then. When evening comes, I feel jumpy and
afraid--as if again this awful fear and dread will overtake me. I feel
so relieved that the over pressurization of gas didn't happen at
night--we all would have been asphyxiated in our beds. There are two
kids upstairs, my granddaughter on my floor, and a child downstairs. I
think of how we all could have been gone.
We remained evacuated for 4 days, and when we returned at last our
apartment had no gas appliances.
We were told a space heater couldn't be installed even though we
requested it. It was a hardship for us to purchase our own space
heaters, but we had to. Even though we could get reimbursed from
Columbia Gas, it wasn't an easy process. I don't have Internet or a
scanner at home, and I'm retired, so it was a lot of trouble to get
reimbursed. Perhaps if this ever happens again the gas company should
accept pictures of receipts to make reimbursement easier or provide
cash before a purchase is made.
To cook, we were supplied a hot plate. I cooked on the hot plate,
an electric fry pan, and the microwave. No hot water, which was very
uncomfortable.
Then it began to get quite cold out, and it was very uncomfortable
to be in the house. We requested a trailer close to our home for
temporary shelter. We're on a limited income, and it was too much for
us to go far to a hotel, have meal and gas expenses, and be uncertain
if we'd be reimbursed, since Columbia Gas said they'd provide me a
refillable debit card--but the funds were never put on it. Therefore, I
couldn't trust leaving my cold apartment to go far away. SO I requested
a trailer, and was told by the claims agent they would call me back. I
called again, waited, was transferred, and was told again that they'd
call back. There was so much negligence in setting up the temporary
housing. After about literally a month, and after getting very cold, I
finally had a friend of mine who works for the city call Columbia Gas.
They did give us a trailer that night--but far from home. I went to the
site and saw the mayor there, and he finally got us set up for a
trailer close to our home. We moved there the next day.
However, the thing about the trailers is that they turned off the
heat when we left the site, and we had to request that they turn it
back on, and then had to wait for the space to heat up. It was
certainly a nuisance. I didn't cook in the trailer because I don't want
to use gas.
So, 63 days after the explosions I still get headaches in the
afternoon. I still have trouble sleeping--I stay up watching boring TV
with the hopes of sleeping, but really have a hard time getting to
sleep at night. And I am still afraid of gas--and am so happy that my
landlord got us an electric stove. All of this has made me wonder why I
don't just leave all this trouble and retire to my native Dominican
Republic.
______
Alice Fulton from Lawrence: While checking on my 92 year old mother
in Haverhill on September 13, 2018, as I do every day, life as we know
it changed for the foreseeable future. My wife, Lora, had received word
from a friend that houses were exploding in Lawrence and surrounding
towns, and nobody knew why. i agreed to go home, get the cats, and
she'd meet me there so we could decide what to do. I was battling a
heart condition at the time, so was moving very slowly. As I walked
past one apartment at my mother's residence, I heard a television news
report stating that people just didn't know if their houses would be
next to explode, since nobody knew why the first seventy homes were on
fire. One of those homes is 1/4 mile from ours, and was completely lost
because there were no more crews to fight new fires at the early point
when it broke out.
Approaching Lawrence on Route 495 it looked like a war zone, with
smoke billowing from several house fires across the horizon of
Lawrence, Andover, and North Andover. The confusion, lack of
communication, and lack of disaster planning were on the horizon as
well, though we were unaware of its effects at that point. The
automatic response from other cities and towns was amazing. I saw
emergency vehicles that were like no others I had ever seen before, and
as the days ticked by thereafter, they were joined by fire apparatus,
police, and gas company workers from far-reaching cities and towns like
Boston, Brookline, Holbrook, Randolph, and Atkinson, NH.
Once home, it took me nearly an hour to gather the cats, place some
low-sodium foods in a bag to eat wherever we were to land, and load all
this with a few bags of clothing and personal items (including my new
medications) into my car. As I made one more pass around our home to
assure that I had not forgotten anything essential, a neighbor pounded
on the front door, asking to be let into the area where our gas meter
was located. He had an off-duty fireman with him, who was voluntarily
shutting off the gas in any homes he could. After the gas was shut off,
I sat to gather my thoughts and catch my breath on the bench outside
our garage. Lora arrived shortly from work in Boston, reporting that
traffic was already at a standstill on roads leading out of Lawrence.
As we began to process what we knew of the situation, which was only
the beginning of the uncertainty that became ``the new normal'' of the
next few months, some neighbors joined us, one of whom had a scanner.
We all sat in our yard, hearing that it was taking hours for traffic to
leave the area, that there was already one break-in at a house on a
street nearby, and discussing that our only options for the night were
to go hours away where we would have no hope of monitoring the
situation directly. We, and our other two closest neighbors, decided to
stay put, as we were unwilling to leave our cats, nor to be stuck in
traffic for hours to go . . . where. . .? Nothing seemed like a better
alternative, since our gas had been shut off already.
At approximately 8pm, electricity was shut off to the area. For the
next three days until it was restored, we quickly opened the
refrigerator to get what we could, heated things on the gas grill
(including making packaged ramen noodles on the grill), and used
rechargeable light bars to see at night (that I had thankfully kept
charged for emergencies). We periodically sat in our vehicles, engines
running, for hours to recharge devices so that we could get any news at
all. Devices seem to charge faster if the vehicle is moving, but we
didn't dare drive farther than around the immediate block, because
people were not being allowed into the area during the rumored
evacuation. The rest of the world knew more about what had happened
than we did, it seemed, since we had no access to television.
The first night had been eerie, at best, with helicopters flying
about all night, no light, and a plan we had devised in case someone
came to the door in the darkness. At 2:30 a.m. we were awakened by
pounding on our front door; a Boston Police Officer, and a gas company
employee from Fall River came to check that our gas was, indeed, shut
off. He determined that it was, and they moved on. At 2:00 p.m. the
following day, another crew came to check the same thing. It's great
that three different people/crews came to assure that the gas was off,
but as the months marched on, it would have been better if crews knew
what other crews had already done. We were visited by no less than four
different crews to do the same thing at most every step of the
restoration process. We liken it to always expecting company, never
sure when they will arrive, and never arriving when they have said they
would, so we could never leave or stop looking out the windows. The
interactive maps and 72-hour lists were never accurate; more on that to
follow.
Three days after the electricity was shut off to the area it was
restored, and that made things easier, but there was still a lot of
uncertainty and lack of information. We had no idea when or how gas
service could be restored, so the wait began. We made sure there would
always be someone home, as we knew nothing about when someone might
stop by to do something toward that goal. After a week or two, we
stopped waiting, as the information just was not coming (and what
little that came was inaccurate), so we went about our business,
returning to work and keeping appointments. Sure enough, when Lora was
at work in Boston and I was at a medical appointment in Brookline, a
neighbor called her to say that someone was there to begin some phase
of work at our house. She rushed home in the middle of her work day,
determining that she'd get there quicker than I would, and met them
within an hour. The neighbor had detained them for us, otherwise, who
knows how long it would have been before anyone came back (we received
zero notes on the door to say that someone had missed us, no calls in
advance of workers coming until the very last stage of the work/
relight, and people coming by unannounced in almost every case).
Columbia Gas made the effort to publish information that they felt
was accurate, but it never was. For some reason, our street was never
on the lists stating what streets were to be worked on over certain
days, so we were unsure if we were in the queue at all. The interactive
map was a great idea, but was never accurate, changing our expected
work dates four times over, sometimes stating that work was done that
was not done (so we would not be on their radar to come do it), and
taking four days to be updated. Every call we made or contact in person
was with people who were referring to the same information, so they
were telling us that phases of the work were completed at our house
that were not. Adjustor #3 refused to approve an alternate heating
source because their data stated that our gas would be restored within
four days of that conversation, which was not close to what actually
occurred. We attended forums, sought resources, and had to fight for
everything we've been reimbursed for so far. It has taken three hours
per day to do this job, including monitoring websites for information,
speaking with workers in the streets and neighbors/reading local
message boards for real time information, standing in lines,
deciphering published information that isn't necessarily accurate,
learning new terminology, and fighting for what we were promised. We
are on our fourth adjustor; I never even dealt with #3, #4 has changed
the rules for things I was told by #2 regarding reimbursement of lost
wages, and #2 tried to refuse our claim for a replacement five-burner
stove with convection oven by trying to talk me into whatever they
would provide (no convection oven, four burners, ordinary stove). Is
Columbia Gas prepared to reimburse us somehow for that time? **(UPDATE:
I JUST missed a call while writing this from Adjustor #4 checking to
see if I received his e-mail (I haven't), leaving me a telephone number
to call back that states that the voice mail box is not set up, so I
can't reach him to tell him any of this.)**
We are fortunate that we were able to afford to install a temporary
electric water heater for $1,900, and purchase a suitable stove,
awaiting reimbursement for both. Not everyone is well enough to
withstand indoor temperatures below fifty degrees, as worries began
about the need to drain pipes and evacuate our home. We are fortunate
to have had gas restoration completed immediately prior to the fifteen
degree night before Thanksgiving. We are fortunate that we are able to
self-advocate and persist to get our needs met. Others are not, and
their stories are heartbreaking. I hope that our story helps in some
way to tirelessly continue the fight to get the needs met for every
last person affected by this incident. This is not over yet, even for
those of us whose service has been restored. Pipeline work should have
taken place 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, not taking whole days off
for rain, Sundays off, and many not working on Saturdays. The remaining
work should not have run into freezing weather, with people displaced
from their homes, now indefinitely, while four crews come to do the
same work. We were fortunate that Lora could work from home for this
time period, but there were days when she had meetings that she could
not miss, so I had to lose a day's pay to also be home for work to be
done. I anticipate another fight to recover lost wages due to that
uncertainty. Our furnace is installed and operational, but not adjusted
properly, so we need to spend more time pursuing adjustments once
triage is completed for people who have no heat.
Thank you for pursuing resolution of these issues, for speaking for
those who can't or can't as effectively, and for caring about what
we've been through as well as what is still to come.
______
Lynne Rudnicki from North Andover: I have a couple of questions. 1.
Our street lines and meter equipment have been converted to allow high
pressure gas. Is the pressure on street lines now or in the near future
being increased to high pressure. 2. Will residents receive prior
notice of increasing the pressure of the gas on the street lines? Note:
many residents have experienced gas leaks after installation of new
service lines and equipment change. Prior notice should be required so
we can know to be aware. 3. Only the lines which experienced over
pressurization in our three communities have been replaced. How many
miles of gas lines and meters are needed to bring the rest to current
standards. 4. Since the impacted areas have very irregular boundaries,
will there be prioritization to finish replacing aged leaky pipes and
updating the gas meter equipment in our communities. Residents of the
impacted areas will certainly be concerned for a long time about nearby
lines which have not been repaired.
______
Thomas Schaefer from North Andover: Here is a quick summary of our
two month nightmare . . .
When Columbia Gas relocated our gas meter from indoor to
outdoor, they installed the pipe to connect the gas main to our
existing gas line within the home. When our plumbers did a
pressure test on this line, they noticed there was a leak
We witnessed endless amounts of misinformation. A Columbia
Gas rep I called on the phone rudely informed me that if I were
to have my stove and dryer installed by someone other than
Columbia Gas that I would be liable for all damages.
We stayed in our house the entire time (some days the
temperature was 47 degrees inside) and Columbia Gas was only
willing to reimburse me $7 of my $160 electric bill for
October.
The three hour window for a Columbia Gas rep to come and
install the gas meter and relight our home turned into 7 hours
of waiting
My wife and I began our journey through the Merrimack Valley
Explosions by returning home from vacation exactly 24 hours after the
initial event occurred. We had no direct experience with the way
emergency services handled the evacuation but were told by our
neighbors of the chaos and diligent efforts by both the police and
firefighters in immediate response to a growing catastrophe.
From the beginning of the experience we were not informed of the
scale of damages done throughout our neighboring towns. We were reliant
on the news for information almost immediately. As the first week
progressed we didn't receive a call until, at earliest, September 21st,
8 days after the event.
I was forced to gain any real information from social media
accounts held by Columbia Gas and neighbors. Columbia Gas did nothing
to communicate the extensive amount of damage that occurred during the
emergency.
We attempted our first claim at a claims center set up by Columbia
Gas located at First and Main in North Andover. After speaking with a
representative who did not work directly for Columbia Gas he informed
us that they would be offering us $100 gift card to help with initial
expenses, we didn't end up accepting it as the representative claimed
that if we accepted it sometimes Homeowners insurance could be denied
as we accepted benefits from a separate entity.
Approximately one week after our first interaction we were informed
that we would be receiving a call from Columbia Gas to set up and
delivered space heaters. We never received that call. We were forced to
find alternative ways to heat our home and deliver hot water. I made a
purchase of a propane burner that would allow us to heat up large
quantities of water for bathing and washing up.
Desperate for information we continuously called the Merrimack
Valley affected customer line provided by Columbia gas for answers to
our mounting questions. No information was provided other than requests
for our patience as they continued their work. After continually
reaching out for information and not receiving it we began to get
frustrated. Columbia gas then announced that they wouldn't be making
their deadline and if you wanted to have the problems solved it would
be quicker to self-mediate their issues. I would rather have gone this
route because I didn't not trust Columbia Gas to attempt to repair my
appliances. We contacted a company to quote us for the work they said
was required for us to receive gas again. By then we had a claims
adjuster that worked for Columbia Gas to work on our claim. After a lot
of back and forth I received a commitment to pay for the work. I paid
$6,000.00 out of pocket to reserve a time for the work to be completed
on November 19th and waited for Columbia Gas to pay for the new
equipment. And still, there was little to no information being shared
with people in the affected area.
After purchasing a new dryer and stove we contacted a separate
company to install our new equipment I called Columbia Gas to make sure
that it was OK to do so. The women on the phone rudely informed me that
if I were to have my stove and dryer installed by someone other than
Columbia Gas that I would be liable for all damages. I asked her how
she figured that as we had in no way affected the safety of our home to
which she replied if anything happens we are liable. This was the final
straw for me in contacting Columbia Gas as I knew that the people they
put in charge of communications were severely unqualified and frankly
disrespectful.
At this point we noticed our deadline for restorations had been
updated on Columbia Gas's restoration map. The dates on the map changed
each week and never really provided us any valid information. We were
now on the 72 hour list for restoration with a relight date the day
after the work I had requested from our plumber would be completed.
We were on the 72 hour list for 10 days without a single call or
visit. I took time of work to make sure we wouldn't miss our
opportunity to have gas restored. They never showed. The last week
however I received several calls. Sometimes 4 times a day to make sure
I had been contacted. I repeated the same information several times to
not bother me as I was self-mitigating the damages and had received
money from claims to pay for the work. Three times we had Columbia Gas
representatives showing up at my home asking to do the same inspection
of my home. I informed them each time that they had already done this
work. They told me that the organization of Columbia gas was abysmal
and unorganized. On Sunday, November 18th Columbia Gas relocated our
gas meter from indoor to outdoor, they installed the pipe to connect
the gas main to our existing gas line within the home. When our
plumbers did a pressure test on this line, they noticed there was a
leak
On November 21st the work in my home had been completed and I
needed to call the relight team to turn on my gas. Everything had been
inspected and approved. I was told the earliest the Columbia Gas
employee could make it was three hours. I needed the meter installed
and gas to be turned on by an official employee. The three-hour window
I was given ran up and I called again. I was told an employee had me
scheduled. After another hour I called again asking when I could expect
the employee. I was told 9 pm, seven hours after I was initially told
three hours. I sent the plumbers (who has been waiting in my basement
for the past five hours) home as I can expect them to put in 14 hours
in a day. When 9pm rolled around I called for the last time saying that
I didn't believe they were coming. And employee showed up at 9:45pm and
the first thing he said to me was ``please don't tell me you have steam
heat'' of course we do! They called in a plumber who got my boiler lit
and ready for heat. On November 22nd at 1:45am I had my appliances
restored to previous condition and our nightmare was over. I have never
seen a company more unorganized . . . you would think after two months
of this they would have had established a better system instead of the
complete chaos we witnessed.
One of the worst parts for me, was how cheap Columbia Gas was being
with the claims reimbursements. They refused to pay our October
electric bill. We had to send them July-November 2017 electric bills
and compared it July-October 2018 and the currently bill. They only
willing to reimburse us $7. Not sure why they would compare it to
summer months when we run our ACs non-stop. That was comparing apples
to oranges. The whole time we stayed at home, while only being able to
run one space heater at a time. We obviously used more electricity than
we normally would have.
With each passing week it got harder and harder to live the way we
were living. Some days our house averaged 49 degrees.
After all the stress and anxiety we went through these past two
months I don't feel comfortable having Columbia Gas as our gas company
in Massachusetts. We saw how they reacted in a disaster. I feel
disgusted thinking back on how this whole process unfolded and the lack
of Columbia Gas's response. They made us feel like we were the burden
when we had to alter our lives for the past 65 days.
______
Maureen Elliot from Andover: We have owned our house in Andover fog
over 30-years with virtually no water our basement flooded and Columbia
Gas refused to pay for a French drain and other repairs. What people
have gone through, is beyond disgusting.
______
Carolyn Bonier from Lawrence: I was one of the lucky ones. I had my
gas back on in 4 days. However, the night the disaster happened was the
most upsetting night I have ever experienced. I am 79 years old and
live alone with my dog. I was watching TV when the explosions started
happening. In a few minutes I lost power. When I went out on my deck, I
could smell smoke, hear sirens and three helicopters were circling over
head. I later learned that the closest explosion was about 10 houses
away from mine. A neighbor came by with a wrench and turned off my gas.
I decided to go to visit my husband who is in a nursing home, thinking
he would be worried about me. When I got to the nursing home I learned
that everyone in the disaster area had been told to evacuate and that
there would be police barricades blocking off entry to South Lawrence.
I began to get very upset because I had left my dog at home. I knew I
had to get her but I was afraid I wouldn't be allowed into the
neighborhood. I decided to wait until about 9:30 to go to get her
thinking there might be less police presence. I had decided I would
walk in if I was blocked from driving in. Also I had nowhere to spend
the night because my friends with cats would not allow me to come with
my dog. I got to the barricade on the edge of my neighborhood around 10
PM and, after sitting in a line of cars for about 20 minutes, I was
told by the officer that I could get my dog but to ``hurry back''. I
went to my house and fed the dog and went to bed. I felt that I
couldn't use a flashlight or even my cell phone because the light might
alert the police and they might think I was an intruder. I had real
difficulty getting any sleep. I felt strange hiding from the police.
They drove by with their blue lights on frequently. The next morning, a
friend with a dog offered me a place to stay and my nightmare was over.
However for the next few weeks, I cried whenever I thought about that
night. I jumped whenever I heard a siren and felt depressed in general.
If I reacted so strongly from one night of trauma, I can only imagine
how bad it must be for the thousands who have suffered for months
because of this disaster.
______
Alice Fulton from Lawrence: Still writing, please check back
tonight, when I will submit. Need to go do parent care now, but will
get it in tonight. Thank you!
______
Dr. Angela and John Barnes from Andover: We have been displaced
from our home, due to the Columbia Gas explosions since September 13th
2018. We were able to stay in our affected home until then solely
because the weather cooperated and was above 55 degrees.
As of today, November 25th 2018 we STILL do not have heat or hot
water in our home and we are ALSO without electricity. Yes, there are
NO working utilities in our home.
We reside as tenants in our historic Shawsheen home which did not
pass the electrical capacity test in order to run even temporary
heating solutions in the current voltage setting. The homeowners
(residence is in trust) are making decisions from other locations and
are removed from the situation. You can understand the trickle effect
this is having on us all.
I am sure our story is similar to that of other families displaced
and impacted. We are working professionals and also owners of
businesses, missed time at work is not ``simply'' forgiven by ``missed
wages'' paid by Columbia Gas. We have careers and cannot ``just'' miss
work. There are other implications longstanding due to missed days due
to this Columbia Gas disaster.
Contractors, who don't show up on time or show up out of the blue
due to poorly coordinated efforts are upsetting, when we have changed
our work schedule according to the online information link per Columbia
Gas and this ridiculous contradictory information on the Columbia Gas
website regarding relight dates. The IT efforts at the back end change
our home address relight dates DAILY. We have learned that we cannot
rely on any information listed. Why is this public information listed
incorrectly and updated incorrectly daily? Who needs this incorrect
information? It's not provided for the residents. Is it to satisfy
safety or government guidelines?
We have also had the unfortunate circumstance of daily
communication with adjusters who won't work with us on approval for
everyday and necessary expenses, even though, keep in mind, Columbia
Gas is the one who created this mess.
We don't have all day to run back and forth to a laundry room at a
hotel or laundry mat?? We have a system in our home to make laundry,
food and work all happen, which we can no longer use. Our basic rights
disrupted and at the mercy of adjusters to decide.
In the immediacy after the disaster we scrambled from a hotel in
Danvers to maintain our careers and commute while driving back and
forth to take children safely to school in Andover, waking children up
at 5am to feed them breakfast and paying additional childcare costs to
drop them off early at school so we could have enough time to drive
around in newly created traffic.
When we were able to safely return to our home we had 25 days of
residence WITHOUT the use of hot water where we microwave water to fill
our bathtub and or take sponge baths. Do you know how long it takes to
fill a bathtub of water on the second floor of a home to properly clean
3 children (never mind we parents)? I can tell you. It took 2.5 hours
of continuously going up and down the stairs. Cooking on a hot plate
and microwaving food for children and all the while trying to keep our
own health. How can one spend that many hours a day bathing and cooking
while trying to keep up with professional work obligations and also
keep some semblance of a healthy home for children??? Pretending like
all is well to mitigate any further stress on the children?
We relocated permanently to a hotel on October 8th 2018, only with
the assistance of Jim Lyons as on my own I was unable to find a
Columbia Gas, Worley or Adjuster who would APPROVE a direct bill on our
hotel room.
We were told countless times by Columbia Gas, Worley and Adjusters
that they only would only approve one queen bedroom with a shower for
five people before for 4 weeks of time, despite the fact that I had a
private reservation for a two bdrm hotel in Tewksbury at a corporate
rate!
Since the move to our hotel room, we are grateful to have a roof
over our heads however one needs to understand it doesn't all end
there. It's no vacation, no fun, no break from it all. Now we must rise
at 4:30am daily, pay for additional school drop/childcare to drop for
7am so we are able to continue our careers and operate our businesses
just to make it on time. These are additional expenses above and beyond
what is reimbursed by Columbia Gas, Worley or adjusters. I was told
these expenses would be denied.
Maybe this experience seems trivial to the executives and
management of Columbia Gas. Multiply these types of situations--
increased traffic, missed work, etc due this situation becomes
stressful beyond comprehension, from an event that really should not
have happened at all.
Our story tends to diverge from others because we have 3 children
under age 8 yrs, one of whom has special needs. Try speaking to
children about this situation. When our children ask when will we be
back in our home, our answer is, truthfully, ``we don't know''. Who
knows, truthfully, if we will be back to our home by Christmas.
Columbia Gas is such a joke. Try answering questions about, ``how Santa
will find us mommy and daddy?''
How are parents supposed to put on Christmas from a hotel room???
From the looks of our nonoperational home, we will be spending
Christmas like Thanksgiving. Thanksgiving was not one we'd like to
relive as we were not only not able to host our family, we were not
able to experience our traditions, we weren't able to teach our
children about our family traditions or serve OUR abundant bountiful
traditional meal--from our family.
Sure, the dinner provided by Columbia Gas was a nice half-measure.
Really, that is all it was. We waited in a car line for an hour to wait
for food, thinking ``this should have never happened to us''. I would
rather have spent that precious hour of time with my family.
This is what Columbia Gas needs to hear. Our lives have BEEN TURNED
UPSIDE DOWN, whether it is waiting in line, waiting on the phone to
speak to someone, waiting for a contractor has been extremely disrupted
by the negligence of Columbia Gas. Compound these situations by months
and months of NO answers, no wonder why our community is unsettled and
uneasy.
John and Angela Barnes
______
Denise Velez from Lawrence: This nightmare began for us Sept 13th
at around 4:30. We were lucky to not have started cooking our dinners
yet. My parents own the home I live in. Its technically a 2 family but
it is 1. I live upstairs with my 2 girls and my elderly parents live
downstairs.
On the day this started their was nothing on the news on TV or
radio, phones nothing. We evacuated across our street lawn and garden
store in front of our homes. Only through word of mouth, facebook, and
neighbors listening to scanners were we even slightly aware of what was
happening. We sat at a loading dock surrounded by burning and exploding
homes. Smoke in every direction. Watched smoke surround my home and
worried that my home was not hit with fire. I was one of the ``lucky''
ones on my street. Out of 8 others the blasting furnaces stopped only 2
doors down. The three homes before that had charred, melted furnaces,
and burnt basements. Luckily a neighbor was a firefighters son. His
knowledge helped us. That night we slept with our eyes open, listening
to the news on the radio. My kids anxiety was greater then I've ever
seen before and they've been through some awful trauma. They begged and
pleaded for us to leave but we had nowhere to go till the morning. The
only person saying there was any threat to our safety was Mayor Rivera.
Columbia gas was a ghost!!! They did not communicate to first
responders nor residents.
Eversource was put into play and things started moving. I had to be
placed in a hotel because I am handicapped. Need the hot water. I am in
a wheelchair and I use a cpap and nebulizer. They got us back into our
homes 4 days after the explosions. Then we realized Columbia had
finally stepped up and was trying to cover their tracts. Since CG took
over there has been a constant barrage of people in and out of our home
doing the same thing the other has done.
No one at CG would give me an answer to a simple problem. I had an
old
______
William Sahlas from North Andover: My family's daily routines were
altered and disrupted by, and because of, the Columbia Gas disaster. My
wife works for the City of Somerville as a teacher in 3rd grade.
Someone in her situation would NOT have had the necessary free-time
bandwidth nor cooperation from her employer to recover from the
disaster without the help of a significant other. I was able to be the
primary person in the family to be the contact and liaison to Columbia
Gas restoration efforts because of my employers cooperation. If it were
not for a very understanding employer, Brightcove Inc. HQ at 290
Congress St. Boston MA, I would not have been able to successfully
undergo the steps needed to navigate the recovery efforts.
These steps and efforts are still going on today. There's
bookkeeping and accounting to deal with keeping track of the costs for
repairs and appliance replacements. There was significant time involved
to be with those who were doing the appliance replacements and home
repairs. The hours that I put into the recovery efforts were very
significant.
I cannot imagine how some others are dealing with this ordeal who
have not the same understanding employers or the financial means to
fund the repairs needed while waiting to be reimbursed. Not to mention
the temporary heating sources that had to be put in place.
Having lived through the ordeal I feel that we are owed more than
just an apology from the NiSource/Columbia Gas. The cold showers and
cold rooms and disrupted holiday season as a result of the disaster
will not be soon forgotten. Thanks for the memories Columbia Gas.
Regards,
William G. Sahlas
43 Woodbridge Rd
North Andover MA 01845
______
Rachel McEnroe from Andover: This fall, we have been part of the
affected area of the Merrimack gas explosion. We were evacuated for 2-3
days, went two months without hot water, just got a portion of our heat
back last week (November 20th) and still have not had our stove and
oven inspected and turned on. While dealing with this for a short
period was OK, over the fall it had a significant impact on our daily
routine (who wants to exercise when it requires you to heat up water on
a hot plate in your bathroom in order to shower) and has taken a lot of
energy and time to 'self-mitigate' by arranging for new equipment,
plumbers, and inspectors to come by--and we are very lucky that we
could handle the upfront costs ahead of reimbursement. While we have
hot plates to cook at home and have been OK, the local restaurants have
all been closed for two months and we typically rely on take-out or
dining out 1-2x/week because of busy schedules and that too has been
both an added drain on us and a tough thing for our local economy. I
cannot imagine what this would have been like had we not had some heat
or had a gas dryer or had to relocate because of those things. There
needs to be better safety procedures put in place for this kind of work
and better state or Federal oversight.
______
Carolyne Popescu-Pretor from Andover: THIS IS A CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE PROBLEM! USA missed the wake-up call many years ago.
On September 13th we had gas fumes in our condominium. Our family
needed to leave immediately. We also had dirty water. Our water was so
dirty, it clogged the furnace valves. While we have numerous workers
troubleshooting the situation, we currently have no hot water. On a
record cold Thanksgiving Day, we had no heat. I'm genuinely concerned
there was error in determining the correct replacement gas-fired boiler
for our unit.
The initial install date for our boiler was October 8th. Today is
Sunday, November 25th, I have heat--but no hot water. We have not had
consistent heat and hot water since the initial incident. Naturally,
the current potential for cyber incidents affecting pipeline business
systems is a national concern. Leaving this tremendous responsibility
of public safety to private industry is reckless. The blame game,
please lets not be niave.
https://energypost.eu/vulnerability-electric-utility-system-cyber-
attacks/
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-04/cyberattack-
bleeds-into-utility-space-as-duke-sees-billing-delay
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2018/03/28/how-on-earth-
did-russia-hack-our-energy-systems/#73d7a21a6104
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cyber-russia/russian-
hackers-penetrated-networks-of-u-s-electric-utilities-wsj-idUSKBN1KE03F
https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/
russian-hacking-attacks-us-power-grid-sewage-explosions-a8462691.html
https://www.wired.com/story/hackers-gain-switch-flipping-access-to-
us-power-systems/
Carolyne Popescu-Pretor
______
Jorma McSwiggan Hong from Lawrence: Dear Senator Markey,
First, I'd like to thank you and the other representatives for
coming to our community today, it is encouraging to find that many of
my own concerns were those voiced by you and your colleagues. I left a
handwritten testimony today, not realizing that there was an online
platform available, and didn't include any of my personal information.
For ease of documentation, I thought it might be a good idea to submit
my testimony electronically as well. My household was affected as well,
but I focus here on the effects of the community as I witnessed while
working in Lawrence.
I'm currently a graduate student studying public health, but until
very recently and including the months following the disaster, I was
working as a nutrition educator in the Lawrence Women, Infants, and
Children (WIC) program. The office serves low income pregnant and
breastfeeding mothers and their children. This is a community that
cooks daily, typically from scratch. It took one mother three hours to
cook the afternoon meal for her family on a hotplate. Another mother,
pregnant, experienced increased nausea and vomiting while relying on
convenience take-out foods that she would not typically have chosen to
eat. Pregnancy and infancy are short windows in which to begin healthy
development, and to an extent this was disrupted by the explosions and
subsequent displacement of our communities. Mothers who had frozen
breastmilk in anticipation of returning to work lost their supply as it
thawed during the power outage in the days immediately following the
explosions. Some mothers were unable to continue breastfeeding their
infants, so great was the disruption of the evacuation and multiple
relocations. This interruption potentially has life-long health risks
to the infants affected. Breastfeeding in the first 6 months of life,
per WHO recommendations, is attributed to helping establish the immune
system, reducing allergies, and protecting against type II diabetes and
certain types of cancer. In the event of a disaster such as this, it is
important to recognize that in addition to the immediate damages
endured, the health of a future generation has been affected as well.
Thank you again, Senator, for your time and representation of the
Merrimack Valley community.
Sincerely,
Jorma McSwiggan-Hong
______
Elizabeth Cunningham from Andover: Lack of clear plan and protocols
to restore power. Teams of 8-10 would arrive together at homes numerous
times, often dirty and disruptive. I am a 73 year old retiree who ended
up flagging down a Columbia Gas VA truck driving down my street. He was
kind enough to give me his phone number, which I called often to
receive step-by-step directions. He sent the right person my way each
step of the way. Without his assistance and my financial resources, I
still would not have heat. I had numerous visits after I had heat, as
CG was clueless as to the status of individual homes.
It was clear that Columbia needed to assign a project leader to
each street, and provide residents with their phone number. Recovery
required leaders, as you can't just throw people onto a disaster
without a clear plan.
______
Maureen Omara from Andover: On September 13th I went home to find
an in tact house and there hadn't been a fire, thankfully, but not
being able to get into my house and not knowing whether it was safe to
even be standing in my front yard was a very unsettling feeling, one
that took a few days to resolve. Trying to get to where I was staying
and then back to work the next day, wearing the same clothes as the day
before, and then trying to figure out how to get the logistics for my
weekend guest and myself to get someplace else was a task in it's own
right. Knowing the gas was turned off when I was able to go back home
was better, however I still had to deal with the unknown. The days that
followed were spent trying to figure out where to shower if I didn't
want to take an ice cold one in my home and/or what and where to eat--
that was a bigger battle as I have an autoimmune disease and try to eat
a specialized diet. People who were not affected were great in reaching
out offering up a place to shower, do laundry and have a home cooked
meal. The YMCA was great in providing a space to shower but it was just
one more thing to try to find time to do in an already tight schedule.
There were mornings I just sucked it up and took a freezing cold
shower--not a great way to start your day.
Then there was coordinating when I had to be home for someone to
come to assess my home--could we get a space heater? I live in a very
old home so I knew that wouldn't happen. I had to take off time from
work to do so during one of the busiest times for me. The next day
Columbia Gas announced there wouldn't be any more appointments as they
were going to use the approach that everyone would need new systems and
appliances; that was incredibly aggravating. After that it was like
radio silence--when would someone come back? Would I have to be home?
How much notice would I really get so I could be sure I could miss
work. Every day in limbo.
When the opportunity arose to relocate to a hotel as I live in the
affected area, I took the steps to do so; that was a process in its own
right and was just one more thing that you didn't know when you were
going to be contacted. When I finally was a message was left saying
there was a reservation for me at the Embassy Suites at Logan Airport
however there was no information left as to when the reservation would
start, what might I have to pay for. etc. It took five different phone
calls to get the information and it turned out the reservation had
started the day before. Yet one more thing to be aggravated about. I
appreciated having a place to go but the fact that I work in Wilmington
meant for an even longer day every day. I was at the hotel for almost
five weeks.
Trying to keep up with the tasks associated with this mess became
and continues to be exhausting and almost as if I have an additional
part-time job. Not knowing what to expect--more importantly what
information to trust has truly been the greatest source of my
frustrations around this event. When will someone be at my house to
inspect it? Will someone actually show up when they are supposed to be
on my street? What if someone comes and I am not home--will then come
back and when? What could you get reimbursed for as far as expenses? Is
the map posted online the actual work plan or will that change? What
could you actually get reimbursed for? I heard different things from
different claims adjusters, neighbors and others affected. That kept
changing and continues to this day to change. Information about what
you can still be reimbursed for changes too depending on what you read
and hear from others. Having to keep pestering my claims adjuster about
the weekly per diem and getting continued clarification about what was
and wasn't reimbursable--that became a regular task; he was just as
frustrated at times as the information kept changing. Different people
calling--about claims, the status of the work being done at my home,
etc.--trying to return phone calls and having to play phone tag--more
time sucked up and more frustrations. The daily updates--great that
Columbia Gas tried to keep us informed--but most of it was information
none of us really needed. We wanted to know if our street was listed as
a work site to be gas ready/house ready was that really the case?
Having an actual window of time someone needed to be home would have
helped so we could try to plan to continue to go to work and take care
of things we needed to/wanted to. There are things that are still
unknown--when will my stove come off of backorder and then,
realistically, how long will it take to get installed (and the old one
removed from my house)? I understand this situation is one that hasn't
been experienced before and there are many moving parts and many people
with a say in what happens or doesn't happen however I still feel
things could have been a little more streamlined; even there had been
one phone number to call to have your questions answered about
everything instead having to reach out to different people and/or
physically go places--that would have been an improvement.
I am fortunate that I am a renter with a proactive landlord as if
that wasn't the case, I more than likely would still be living at the
Embassy Suites at Logan Airport. I am fortunate that I'm not afraid to
be proactive, have stayed on top of things and have a responsive claims
adjuster who continues to reach out and make sure I have what I need.
Each day though I come home to take care of another 'Columbia Gas'
task. I'm tired and just want things to go back to normal.
______
Richard Oneil from Andover: About 10 years ago we had a non ignited
explosion in the front of our house in the middle of our street which
was caused by a leaky gas main it did not catch fire but we were
evacuated none the less there was never a cause or response or any such
information given to us and this just solidified our feeling of
unsafeness. It's obvious that the infrastructure is failing all over
the area, what are they going to do? Perhaps replace all lines?
______
Howard Garshman from Auburn: Senator Markey--I applaud you efforts
re: Columbia Gas, unfortunately you are not seeing the larger picture.
The DAILY dangers and risks the gas companies are exposing an unknowing
public too, make what happened in Merrimack look like a firecracker.
______
Frank Dushame from North Andover: Good Morning Mr. Markey:
It was a very chaotic day and time for all affected, and the day
and stories and memorable for many. Mine was not as tragic as some but
very clear in my mind like many. I was home that late afternoon and
could smell gas in my house. I had new appliances but an old gas line
system. I first checked the stove and could smell the strong order from
there so I proceeded to shut the gas valve off behind the stove and was
going to address it later. I was headed out to dinner that night so I
proceed to leave my house. While driving to the top of my street I
remember seeing a lot of first responder activity and was wondering
what was going on. As i headed up RT125 towards Haverhill I saw many
fire engines headed toward North Andover from other communities. I
called my cousin to see what the hell was going on because one is a
firefighter and another a police officer. He told me the news and after
picking up my girlfriend I told her we were returning to my house to
get my dogs out of there. It took us over 55 minutes to get back and
upon arrival I opened the door and a tremendous gas smell came from my
house. The dogs came running out and jumped into my car and we left
right away. It has been a long and sometimes difficult 2 months and I
know for me and many that those thoughts, experiences and images will
always remain in ones mind. Thank you to all the first responders and
people who have been assisting with this difficult time and situation
Frank Dushame
______
Suzanne Vazquez from Andover: Good Morning,
I have been impacted by the Columbia Gas Explosion. I live with my
husband four children and my brother with special needs. One of my
children has a medical condition that needs to be closely monitored. In
the beginning we could stay in our home and learned to take 5 minute
showers. The showers were cold but manageable. As the weeks went by and
the temperature dropped, I began the search for housing. The process
was tedious with many phone calls and me explaining my situation to
numerous people. My family started by hotel jumping, finding what ever
hotel was available relatively close. Then, the hotel became fewer and
far between. My children's after school activities make it difficult to
live further away because I would not get home until 7/7:30 on a good
night. The hotels were paid for by me and then reimbursed by my
adjuster. My adjuster has been a life saver. He understood my situation
and worked tirelessly on finding me permanent housing. After a few
weeks, we were placed in the Rec Park trailer site in Andover. I was
not originally placed there but my adjuster and the site manager had
room for my family and accepted us there. This made my stress and
anxiety levels subside for a while. My children and brother had a safe
permanent place to call home. There was weak wifi at the site so my
cell phone bill has been overcharged for three months due to my older
children needing Internet access to do homework. Sometimes they would
brave the cold and stay at the house to do homework and come to the
trailer around 11pm to sleep. This would make waking up in the morning
a challenge for all of us. The site managers are awesome! They are so
friendly and accommodating to all our needs. The school where my
younger children attend rerouted a bus to pick up my children. I can
not say enough good things about the staff at the site.
The second week in November Columbia Gas came to my house to begin
the restoration process. The fore told me they would be in and out in
two days. The crews were at my house for eight days. I had to
continuously call out of work because I could not get a straight answer
as to when they were going to be done. When there crews had finished,
my new unit did not work. I took a week and countless phone calls to
have someone come back to my house. Finally, a CG worker came to my
house, I took another day off from work, and he looked at the system
and explained that ``they'' have not been trained on the new systems
and he didn't know how to fix the problem. He reset the unit again and
told me call the emergency line again to have another crew come back to
me house. While I was waiting at the bus stop with my younger children,
there was a crew beginning their day down the street. I ran over to
them and asked if they could get in touch with someone who could come
back to my house. A young man told me that he would be at my house when
he finished assessing the house that he was at. An hour later, he came
to my house and reset the system again. He gave me his number and told
me to text or call if the unit went off again. I text him two more
times that day. The following day a whole new crew was at my house
trying to solve the problem. The problem turned out to be the pipping.
The pipes were too small for my house. The standard pipes that were
installed were too small and now I have 4 1/2 inch pipes. The pipes are
on the side of my house leading to the driveway. Now anytime that the
weather gets cold, my driveway freezes. I have missed a ten days of
work, so far, and may have to miss more when they come back to take my
appliances. I am aware that a person 18 years or older needs to be home
but I am an instructional assistant and taking this many days off of
work has affected my ability to teach my students. I am responsible for
their learning and help improve their way of learning. This does not
happen if I have missed out on a weeks worth of classroom material. I
am currently back in my home with heat and hot water but no appliances.
I understand that there is a lot of work to be done, I do wish that the
communication was better between CG and residents. It would be a little
easier if I could let my administration know when I will be out of
work. I have a lot of out of pocket food expenses and cooking for a
family of seven, now eight, on a hot plate is quite time consuming and
difficult. Not to mention, there is only so much take out one can
really have. I have exhausted all the local take out places and fronted
a restaurant bill and waiting to be reimbursed is expensive. This is
only just the physical toll that this explosion has taken on me and my
family.
There is an emotional side effect as well. My children's school
work has suffered greatly due to this incident. They have missed
assignments and sometimes emotionally fragile during the school day.
The unpredictability has taken it's toll on the younger children and
they have become sleep deprived and emotional. My older children have
become sleep deprived and irritable, more so than teen angst. There is
constant tension between my husband and I as to who will take off work.
I have more sick time to do so but I am also missing important class
time with my students. I too have become emotional at work due to the
stress.
I have no time line of when my appliances will be removed or
replaced. There have two assessor at my house in regard to the
appliances but no action.
The lack of internal communication is infuriating.
Thank You,
Zana Vazquez
______
Lee Bluemel from North Andover: As a clergy person in North Andover
and a resident impacted by the gas disaster, I see the impact of this
disaster from many angles:
1. As a clergy person, my initial response was to ascertain the
needs of my congregation members, to coordinate congregational
support with food, appliances, living spaces and emotional
support. We were incredibly lucky in that none of the members
of my congregation had fires or explosions in their homes;
other clergy did have members impacted, and I believe six
churches were without heat for weeks. Immediate response also
included networking with the churches in the state to direct
them regarding where they could send special relief collections
that Sunday to the ECCF.
2. As a clergy person, next phase response included attending three
community meetings in Lawrence to hear from residents who were
impacted regarding their experiences and needs. These were
coordinated by Merrimack Valley Project and interfaith clergy.
We learned from these meetings the need for temporary heat in
homes, the need for additional translators on the streets, and
the need for greater funding for therapeutic support. We also
learned of a desire to reduce gas usage and to switch as
possible to electric appliances. These concerns were all shared
with the presidents of Columbia Gas and NiSource, and with Gov.
Baker in a letter signed by 17 clergy and other supporting
organizations. They were then shared with Mr. Steve Bryant,
President of Columbia Gas, in a meeting with 23 clergy from the
area. He took notes at that meeting about our requests;
however, we did not hear back if, when or how these concerns
were addressed.
3. Our interfaith team continued then to listen to residents, attend
community meetings, contact the State Attorney General's
Office, the Office of Energy and others to try to continue to
raise concerns, especially regarding an overlooked issue: the
lack of energy efficient equipment being brought in by Columbia
Gas to people's homes, resulting in more gas usage and higher
bills. We also led a community educational session on what to
look for in equipment, since Columbia Gas was not offering that
education and much of the equipment there were offering was
standard efficiency or poorly sized (and thus inefficient) for
homes.
4. As a resident, I looked into Air Source Heat Pumps when Columbia
Gas initially said these would be covered and received a quote;
CG then reversed its earlier stated policy. I then looked into
solar hot water heater or heat pump water heater, since I have
solar on my roof, and then requested the most energy efficient
option for my home from the CG list, but was told again and
again by my adjuster that I was only eligible for ``like for
like'' replacement of old equipment. I was also told that I
could not get a fireplace insert because I was too close to my
re-light date, even though I knew from the meeting with Mr.
Bryant that those relight dates were in question.
The gas disaster has consumed my ministry for the past two months,
and it is clear to me that Columbia Gas and NiSource must be required
by law to shift to a safety culture and an energy efficient culture.
They have not done these things on their own. They should also set
aside funds for the non-profits in Lawrence who have been saddled with
so much extra work, as well as for solarizing the valley and bringing
in energy efficiency programs, which they have not done when they had
the opportunity.
______
Leslie Diaz from North Andover: Good morning,
How do you even start to express the magnitude my life has changed
since September 13, 2018 to sum up how emotionally stressed and without
a voice I feel every single day is an equality to been rape and robbed.
Every day is a new struggle and challenge and I'm going to quote a
phrase I was told by one of Columbia Gas employee ``I'm just a one man
show'' while I was trying to explained that my basement has been
flooded ever since they worked outside. I was livid so I used his own
phrase and told him how would you feel been a one woman show single
mother dealing with all of these with no moral or physical support from
no one?? He couldn't say anything. Precisely I said. To put in a little
box all the frustration, headache, hopeless, helpless I feel throughout
all of these it wouldn't fit here and I would have to spend days
writing. My only hope is to get back to my home take back my regular
life and put all these behind me.
______
Janice Phillips from North Andover: Comparatively, my family
doesn't have a horrific story to share. We are safe and sound and
returned to our home 62 days after Columbia Gas's negligent error
caused explosions in North Andover, Andover, and Lawrence. Those 62
days were full of worry, chaos, panic, and exhaustion. But, I am
grateful. I am grateful we are safe and sound. I am grateful we have
had a reasonable and responsive claims adjuster who does want us to
feel whole again. The boots on the ground in our home were kind,
patient, and respectful as they tried to understand our fear and
frustration while working to fix our home. It's simply that no one who
isn't part of ``the affected'' can truly understand the impact.
From a purely logistical level, dealing with this disaster caused
by Columbia Gas completely overtook our lives. Early on, it took hours
of watching news outlets, digging around on Columbia's website,
stalking their twitter feed to looking for any shred of accurate
helpful information. The problem? There was none. Personally, it took 2
weeks before I could finally track someone down, who wasn't just placed
on a street corner in a truck to hand out a phone number to call, who
could actually physically come to my house to tell me whether I had low
pressure lines and was in this for the long haul or we'd be back up and
running soon because we had high pressure lines. Unfortunately for my
family, we had low pressure lines and we realized we were in this for
the long haul.
I can't even convey the number of hours of all of our lives this
has eaten away at. Hours upon hours trying to get answers on the phone.
Hours upon hours waiting and waiting some more because Columbia gas
*should* show up at my house sometime in the next 3 days. The toll on
my entire family, living in two places, never having what we needed in
either place is not something I can put into numbers. Our base of
operations had to continue to be our home in North Andover as it was
early in the school year, peak sports season for my kids, and we were
trying to continue with some semblance of normalcy. Each day the temp
would drop in my house and eventually, it stopped rebounding. I'd drive
in from Danvers, to drop my high schooler off, spend an hour at home
with my 5th grader before his drop off where we would snuggle under
blankets keeping warm because our home was not approved to use space
heaters, then I would begin my ``normal day''.
I was working about 10-12 hour days at my actual job, and spending
any spare moment I had trying to get answers about what was happening
in our home. My kids would head home to wait in a cold house for sports
practice and we'd regroup around 8-9 pm each night to get packed for
the next day and trek to Danvers. This didn't seem so bad at first, day
2, day 5, day 7, I mean, there was a warm breakfast after all, a
novelty for my kids. Then it sunk in. This wasn't ending anytime soon.
This logistical nightmare was actually my new normal. Sitting in my
freezing cold house while we tried to live our ``normal'' life day in
and day out, with no end in sight. The logistics were completely
overwhelming and depressing.
The emotional toll is also not to be forgotten. The terror each and
every time you hear sirens, to this day. The true mental suffering of
each and every member of my family as our lives were completely torn
upside down. The tears of exhaustion from myself and my kids as we
trekked back and forth to a warm bed. The missed parties and social
events because you can't just ``pop over'' from Danvers.
Most significant is the loss of trust and security in our own home.
The loss of ability to feel safe in the one place that should never be
taken away. Our fearful tears, because we are afraid that this will
happen again, sad tears because we know that many of our community
members had their lives far more uprooted than we did, these are the
things that each of you who caused this disaster CANNOT understand.
I DO consider my family fortunate but this is way more than an
``inconvenience''. This is a life changing, man made disaster that
could have been prevented. At the upper levels, this project has been
woefully mismanaged only increasing the levels of stress on the
affected residents. Don't worry though, we have come together and
formed an unstoppable bond only understood by ``the affected''. We will
fight for each other and support each other until each and every home
is back up and running. However, the toll on our mental health will
take much longer to heal.
What's done is done, we are forever changed. We NEED Columbia Gas
to step up to the plate. You can't take your mistake back, but you need
to make it as right as it can be made. Again, we are not an
extraordinary story. Just a story of a working class family, fighting
hard each day to get through having our world turned upside down.
______
Mark Ross from Peabody: I'd like to suggest that every home in the
area has a high pressure gas senor installed that senses over pressure
and prevents what recently happened in the Merrimack Valley. There no
other way to make people feel safe regarding gas coming into their
home. Personally I'm willing to pay privately for the installation but
feel that gas companies should be more likely to pickup the expense.
Mark Ross from Peabody
______
Clara Ruiz Vargas from Lawrence: My family and I are one to be
grateful on being blessed as one of the luck ones. My heart goes out to
each everyone one individual that was affected by this senseless,
selfish, irresponsible disaster that not only greed was a great factor
but lack of humanity from CG.
In this whole process I've endured sickness, depression,
humiliation, fear and so much anger!
Not only did CG is fully responsible for what we are going thru
they have made me fell like if I'm the one responsible for their
negligence with their lack of communication and heartless ways in
handling this disaster.
To be where I am in this horror movie I had to beg every single day
for over five weeks!
No call/e-mails from my adjuster when I requested a budget for more
heating source, for housing, for my stove, for my HW & Furnace, reimb.
for heaters, until I threaten her with all of our politicians in charge
including TRUMP! Now tell me was that necessary! My family and bundled
up in one BR to keep each other warm when temperature dripped just
because they were trying to save every penny for CG. and not realizing
CG was the cause of all this!
Once again we are very lucky to be here today and have a place to
call home but it doesn't change the fact that we are all victims of
CG's negligence!
______
James Allick from Andover: Dear Senator Markey,
Under normal situations I would not take the time to comment, but
in this case I feel the need to say something.
I have been a long time resident of Andover but this mistake by
Colombia Gas really proves they are among the worst business group I
have ever seen.
As of last week I finally got gas back at my house, this is after
of miscommunicated facts by Colombia Gas And to note I had been living
in my car as it had been hovering around 40 Degrees in my home, I have
a pet which precluded me from any hotels, and Colombia Gas did NOTHING
to help me. I was told to find housing on my own, I did the charge for
the month of November was $1400.00 I turned in a receipt as instructed
by Colombia Gas. they are not doing ANYTHING to cover that expense. Now
upon replacement of the stove they by accident unplugged my
refrigerator and causing ALL the food in the fridge and freezer to
SPOIL AGAIN. their reply was did I take pictures???????? No another
$300.00 out the window.
In closing I would not wish this on anyone, And Colombia Gas has
done NOTHING TO HELP ME much less the people of Lawrence, Andover and
North Andover but they did offer a Thanksgiving dinner. . . . Thanks
ALOT!!!!!!!!!
Jim Allick
Andover, Ma 01810
______
Linda Battalagine from North Andover: On the day of the disaster my
daughter was home. My landlord had come home and smelled gas, he called
Columbia Gas and a tech came to the house and said we were fine. He
told my landlord that the levels of gas in the house were in acceptable
range. My landlord MADE him shut off the main. By the time they got out
side my neighbors house was on fire then the house across the street,
there were six fires within a block radius of my house. After they
assessed the damage to our house, not only were the appliances
condemned but also the gas lines in the house were damaged do to the
high pressure and we had several leaks that had to be repaired. So much
for being ``safe''.
Also my daughter was traumatized she called me hysterical looking
for the pets and trying to evacuate everyone by herself in what I can
only describe what looked like a war zone.
In the days, weeks and months following--dealing with the claims
reps was frustrating and difficult to get reimbursed. First when I
asked about housing (moving cost or hotel) I was told ``we offered a
replacement water heater, don't pay your rent''. Which I refused to do
as my landlord was a victim. Three weeks in I caught pneumonia from the
stress, and taking cold showers and sitting in a cold house. At least
six men where in my kitchen tearing out the appliances that were built
into the cabinets. I put in a claim for take out that week and it was
denied. They stated ``we gave you a hot plate''. . . . I was so upset
they it was expected of me to work around all these men doing stuff in
the house while in bed with pneumonia to whip up a healthy dinner for
my family on a two burner hot plate! I should have been in a hotel!!!!
That saved them thousands of dollars.
The only reason I got into housing was because of the local
officials that required CG to do so. It took them four or five days to
put me in housing after that. When they did they put me in Manchester
NH!!!! I was commuting to my job in Boston and commuting took 5-6 hours
a day!!! They put me in a hotel room with one bed and a pull out couch!
I had to share a bed with my teenage son. I ended up calling around
myself and I found a local hotel that CG reserved that was empty!!!!
And the trailers were empty as well, I suspect they put us in
Manchester so we would refuse the housing and they would not have to
pay that bill. I did get into the local hotel after about 9 days.
They promised to give me a food syphon after that and never did. I
am out 14K of which I have only been reimbursed for about 8K. I did
finally hire my own attorney who will work with CG to get me reimbursed
for all my expenses.
I think the worst part is the attitude that we should somehow be
``grateful'' for everything CG has done. They hired a company that
deals with natural disasters to handle the claims process. The
difference is that this was not a ``natural disaster'' it was
negligence and my experience with CG through this process has been for
them to blame everyone else and NOT take responsibility. From making my
landlord responsible for housing, to thinking that a hotplate and space
heater should be sufficient in dealing with the aftermath.
The worst part is in the end all of our bills will probably be
increased to cover the expense of what their oversight and greed has
caused.
Their executives make millions annually in a salary while I am on
single mom who gets by living pay check to pay check. I have everything
back now . . . but this disaster will have long term implications for
me. . . . I am still out 8K and we will not have many gifts this Xmas
as a result. My car had to go into the shop as during this I had put
over 3000 miles add'l onto my car. My kitchen is still damaged as the
appliances where custom fitted and the new ones don't fit so we will
need a carpenter to fix. Workers broke things in my house while they
were tromping in and out without knocking (one time my daughter was
alone and changing in her room).
I lost time out of work, and when I was at work I couldn't
concentrate as I had to deal with the lack of communication and
fighting to get reimbursed for certain items.
CG did not care about what their negligence caused . . . they cared
about the perception of the public. They rushed through to complete the
pipeline and gloated to the press about how they completed what was
said couldn't be done. They forgot that 8000 people were still without
heat or hot water the day of that press release, they did not care if
people were getting ill, or making a crazy commute. They neglected the
human element of the disaster they do not deserve to be in business and
it is my hope that they are forbidden to work in Massachusetts after
this. I would rather see that than get my 8K back.
______
Lawrence Teachers' Union Local 1019: December 4, 2018
Dear Members of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation,
The Lawrence Teacher's Union, Local 1019, AFT MA, AFL-CIO, would
like to offer some brief written testimony regarding the Lawrence Gas
Explosion of September 13, 1018 and its aftermath. We are attaching
some news clippings, press releases, and internal memos to support our
concern for our students, families, community, and our members. We are
attaching a survey taken by members who lived in the affected area.
The explosions directly affected the homes of approximately 270
unionized AFT MA members and their families. Most of the 140 teachers,
90 paraprofessionals, and 20 clerks were without heat, hot water, and
stoves for over two months. They were relocated to hotels and trailers
and suffered the inconveniences of not being able to cook, take a
shower, or sleep in a warm bed in their own homes.
The gas crisis also exposed the weakened gas infrastructure in all
school buildings throughout the city. Differed maintenance of school
boilers and HVAC systems reached a crisis in the weeks following the
explosions, as the school department struggled to turn on the heat in
the schools before the cold temperatures could set in.
Students and teachers were inconvenienced by multiple evacuations,
fire drills, and delays. Young children were exposed to cold and rain
as they were moved to other schools.
The Parthum School, although deemed safely situated in another part
of the city, was constantly being evacuated for nearly two weeks due to
gas fumes of an unspecified origin. The quick thinking of a school
custodian found a leaking roof top unit at the school. The gas fumes
were circulated back into the building through the exhaust system. The
problem was rectified but the parents and public were on edge. Mayor
Rivera stationed off duty firemen in all the city schools to insure
safety and peace of mind.
The crisis also brought out the best in the Lawrence Public
Schools. Union members and administrators worked with the Red Cross by
assisting in the shelters and comforting families. Staff read and
played with children as their parents made arrangements for alternate
housing and assistance. I am proud of their efforts, particularly the
staff of the Bruce and Rollins Schools who suffered from school fires
in 2016 and 2017. We are lucky to have such dedicated and caring
unionists.
On November 1, AFT President Randi Weingarten came to Lawrence and
toured the neighborhoods and the schools before visiting one of the
trailer parks. At the Breen School she distributed hats and gloves to
the 4 and 5 year olds to help ward off the winter's chill. These
littlest victims of the natural gas fires and explosions took to
President Weingarten as she read and talked with them. President
Weingarten knows the Breen staff has a big job ahead of them but knows
well that they are up to the challenge.
We thank Mayor Daniel Rivera for his exceptional leadership,
transparency, and courage during this crisis. He is doing an
exceptional job.
We are deeply grateful to the Lawrence Fire and Police Departments
as well as all state and regional public safety and public works
departments. They keep us safe.
We are grateful to the American Federation of Teachers and the AFL-
CIO for their support. As a gesture of good will at Thanksgiving, the
union distributed $300 worth of Market Basket gift certificates to
every affected member. This was a modest gesture of support to our
brothers and sisters who were affected by the explosions and struggled
through the recovery effort.
We hope for a safe and swift resolution of this prolonged crisis.
May we all stay Lawrence strong!
Respectfully,
Francis J. McLaughlin Jr.
President
Lawrence Teachers' Union
Local 1019
______
Chief Patrick E. Keefe, Chief Roy P. Vasque, Chief Charles P. Gray:
On September 13th, 2018 the City of Lawrence Massachusetts, along with
the neighboring communities of Andover and North Andover, experienced a
natural gas disaster, which is being described as the largest disaster
of its kind in our Nation's history. This incident was the result of
the over pressurization of a low pressure gas main, resulting in
explosions and structure fires in these three communities. The Dispatch
Centers of Lawrence, North Andover, and Andover were immediately
inundated with hundreds of frantic 911 calls from terrified residents,
as the smell of gas and clouds of smoke filled the air. The City of
Lawrence alone received five hundred and fifty-six (556) calls between
4:10 PM and 8:00 PM. The Town of North Andover received roughly 198 911
calls in the initial moments of the incident. The Town of Andover
received over 300 calls for service during the initial hours of the
event. The men and women of these three police departments immediately
responded without hesitation to this unprecedented disaster, doing what
was asked of them without concern for their own safety. As Chiefs, we
were tasked with coordinating the immediate evacuation of all residents
as the fires began and continued to spread with no end in sight. Entire
neighborhoods were filled with terrified residents, leaving their homes
with just the clothes on their backs, as the magnitude and danger of
this disaster remained unknown for a period of time. The three Chiefs
immediately called and spoke to each other to determine the scope and
magnitude of the event. The Chiefs, after determining the proximate
caused was gas related, had officers on the roads and in cruisers begin
to use their public address systems to tell people to get out of their
houses. Cruisers drove through the affected area warning residents to
rally at local evacuation sites. During the initial hour of the event,
local fire apparatus was tied up at fire after fire. Police officers
were tasked with locating other structure fires and alerting central
dispatch. It was at this time that a call was made to Rockingham County
New Hampshire for assistance. This is something that has never happened
before.
As the situation was unfolding, an incident command location was
established immediately adjacent to Interstate 495 and Route 114 at the
borders of the three neighboring communities. As Chiefs, we immediately
realized that an emergency of this size would require a significant
amount of law enforcement personnel, far greater than that which was
available in all three communities combined. As a result, we
collectively established a safety plan utilizing the Massachusetts
State Police and the Northeastern Massachusetts Law Enforcement Council
(NEMLEC). The Council is made up of sixty (65) communities and
Sheriff's Departments from Northeastern Massachusetts. NEMLEC provided
personnel as well as additional communications and command capabilities
to aide in the implementation of a constantly evolving safety plan. The
Massachusetts State Police provided similar assets as well as providing
helicopters to oversee the entire operation.
At the command post, the three Chiefs sat in a meeting with the
Governor, Lieutenant Governor, the State Fire Marshall, Fire Chiefs and
the two town managers and the Mayor of the City of Lawrence. Also
present were members of MEMA, the Columbia Gas. The meeting focused on
turning off residential and business gas meters, as well as shutting
down the power.
As it was deemed necessary for safety reasons to shut down the
power grid, a mass evacuation of the disaster zone was implemented.
This required closing all exits from the highways and blocking all
secondary entrances to the zone, while still allowing people to safely
evacuate the area. Following the evacuation, the next essential task
was to provide safety and security in the disaster zone which, with the
exception of strategically placed temporary lighting, was in total
darkness. Officers also were teamed with firefighters and Columbia Gas
personnel to begin the arduous task of shutting down every gas meter in
the affected area, approximately 8500 meters in total. This was done in
all three communities well into the night and early morning. Massive
amounts of police, fire, EMS, and gas company personnel were used to
complete this task. As daylight broke, the plan required an avenue for
law enforcement to assist residents in temporarily returning home to
gather medication and other essential items. This effort was carried
out with assistance of buses provided by the Merrimack Valley Regional
Transit Authority and the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority.
Throughout the first two nights where power was turned off,
cruisers from all over Massachusetts arrived to patrol the affected
areas. Cruisers maintained a visible presence to all those still in the
area, both residents and potential criminal elements saw a cruiser on
every block all through the nights.
These efforts continued for two (2) days until the power was
restored on day three (3) of the event. As the evacuation order was
lifted, law enforcement personnel assisted residents with the safe
return to their homes, and continue to maintain the visible presence
giving people a sense of safety and peace of mind..
As each of the affected communities attempted to return to a sense
normalcy, it became clear that there would be an unprecedented amount
of road construction underway simultaneously in all three communities.
Once again, this required another adaption of the safety plan that
would allow for the utilization of law enforcement personnel from
Massachusetts and southern New Hampshire, as needed on a day-to-day
basis. The three Chiefs quickly contacted NiSource and established a
work agreement for the use of police officers in the work zones related
to this incident. This was required to ensure the safety of motorists
and pedestrians as they tried to navigate through neighborhoods in
which virtually every street was affected. As alternative housing
locations were established throughout the three communities, a law
enforcement presence was maintained. Both of these facets of the plan
are continuing to this very day.
The overwhelming cooperation, collaboration, and professionalism of
all law enforcement personnel involved from the outset of this incident
until this very day has been simply amazing. While no amount of
training or preparation could have adequately prepared our three
communities for this disaster, this is without question one of the
finest hours for the Massachusetts law enforcement community. In
closing, it is important to note that none of these highlighted law
enforcement successes would have obtainable without the support and
understanding of the residents who we are sworn to serve.
______
Jennifer Vallone from Lawrence: Her is my story . . . On that day I
got home from work approximately 3:45. I was on the phone with my
husband, i heard a loud bang. I figured it was a car accident so I
looked outside and saw nothing. I walked back to the kitchen and
smelled gas, thought maybe the cat had turned the knob on the stove,
looked and saw nothing. Then I heard the smoke alarm going off in the
basement, I opened the door and the smoke just started filling up the
entire house. I was still on the phone with my husband and said
something is really wrong here. I walked down a couple stairs to the
basement and all I saw was flames. I screamed into the phone the house
is on fire and immediately hung up on him and called the fire
department. They told me leave the premises and evacuate the area
there's been multiple gas explosions in the area. I grabbed me keys and
two dogs and ran out of the house. The smell of gas was so strong and
when i saw the flames I knew it was bad. As I pulled away from the
house my husband pulled up like a bat out of hell and I saw him run
into the house from my rear view mirror. I immediately knew he was
going in to save the house. I parked my car and ran back to the house
to make sure he was ok, the house was filled with smoke, he was running
around looking for a wrench screaming he had to shut the gas off. He
yelled at me to get far away as he was running down to the basement
after he found a wrench. He shut the gas off and the flames went out.
He saved our house from burning down. After he knew we were ok, he
grabbed two wrenches, he gave one to our neighbor and they both ran
around the neighborhood shutting gas meters off to save other peoples
homes. There were no firefighters, police or any help for almost 2
hours. It was like a movie, helicopters flying above, people running
around, kids crying. It was horrible.
We ended up being without gas for 57 days. That time was the most
stressful time of my life. Carting kids around to hotel rooms to
shower. Trying to figure out different ways to cook for our family. The
worst thing is the worry. I am worried everyday that something like
this will happen again. I lay in bed every night before I fall asleep
wondering if the smoke alarms are all working, I have a suitcase packed
in case we have an emergency again and we have to leave our home
suddenly. My husband has nightmares at night to this day, talking in
his sleep. My 9 year old can't even take a shower without calling me to
make sure I'm still here or asking me if I'm ok. This incident changed
our lives forever.
______
Margaret Stone from Londonderry: I am writing on behalf of my Mom,
Rita Kimball. We were in the process of selling her home and signed a
purchase & sales agreement on 9/14/18 the day after the disaster. Her
house is on 53 Dana St. Lawrence & it was considered to be in the high
impact area. At the time my mom was living in a nursing home (age 87)
so I was the contact to get any information of what we needed to do
regarding the disaster. I repeatedly called the Columbia Gas phone # to
get info with no answers, their usual response was since we are in the
high impact area we can't tell you any information at this time. I
actually gave them my cell phone # and still no call backs. We
originally had a closing date of 10/19/18 but due to the disaster & no
Gas or appliances we had to extend it to 11/19/18 and now it all set to
close on 11/30/18. I'm just puzzled as to why no one called me not one
time except on 11/17/18 to ask if we were all set & if our gas was on.
We didn't even have a stove at that time, they delivered the wrong
furnace which had to be replaced which took an extra week, when someone
came in with the water heater & noticed they delivered the wrong
furnace. Finally everything fell into place the following week. The
total lack of information that was given out during this trying time
was exhausting. No one not even the workers could tell you anything
when you saw them in the neighborhood. If they did tell you something
it was usually the wrong information. It's stressful enough trying to
sell your family home but to have this on top of everything else was
truly trying. I must say that every worker that we encountered during
this process was very polite and caring. My family appreciated all
their hard work they have endured. Our situation was not as bad as
other people including my sister who was also impacted during this
time. She actually purchased all her appliances and she got her gas
quicker than expected. Fortunately no one was living in the house at 53
Dana Street or this would be an entirely different response. Just the
total lack of communication.
left me speechless. Thank you for listening and thank you for your
hard work during this time. I no longer live in Lawrence but work in
the area and still have family in this city.
I hope that Columbia Gas realizes the major impact of this terrible
disaster.
______
Juliann Porter from Lawrence: On Sept 13th I received a call from
my neighbor, a little before 5p, telling me that houses were exploding
and I needed to get home to get my animals. I was at work in the
Lexington area and begun the very long ride home, panicking the entire
time that I would be to late to save my 2 dogs and 2 cats. By the time
I made it into N Andover the emergency was full on and it felt like a
war zone as I inched closer to my house. Just about 2 blocks from my
house, someone tried to stop me and he made a rude remark when I told
him that I had to get my animals. I immediately lost my composure and
drove up on the sidewalk to get around him, in a complete panic. I ran
in my house and threw all my animals into my car. Right after this, a
house, approximately 5 houses down, basement exploded and I jumped in
my car. My husband was unable to get into the area and we agreed to
meet in a parking lot in Methuen. It then took me another hour and a
half to make it those few miles to get to him. We were lucky to have
family that were able to take us in for the evacuation, but that
weekend was supposed to be filled with joy, as my brother was getting
married. We were now in shock and without anything except the clothes
on our back and our animals and had to figure out a way to still
celebrate. The ensuing months just brought more frustration as the
communication between Columbia Gas and those of us affected was horrid,
at best. I lost those first 2 weeks of work due to robo calls telling
me to be home for the next 48 hrs only to have nobody show up. After
that it was just luck of the draw if you were home when they came. They
repeatedly, did the exact same inspections with no progress at all. At
the end of October, they finally were installing our combi unit, but
this took 5 days because nobody was familiar with them. The removal and
installation process was a joke as nobody was even aware that our
appliances either hadn't been removed yet or that we hadn't even picked
out new appliances. The workers on the ground were all very nice and
3working hard, but appeared to be just as confused as we were, as they
were not getting direction from Columbia Gas either. I am grateful to
be up and running, but feel as if we will never quite be able to return
to our normal, prior to that day of Sept 13th.
______
Doug Porter from Lawrence: This whole experience was a lesson and a
scary one at that about how bad the flow of information was kept and
shared. None of the workers knew where to go or what to do. I had
workers in and out of my house four times to assess appliances and
heating system. They took pictures of them every time they were here.
The removal of the condemned appliances was a nightmare, they skipped
around. When it came time to install heat and hot water, only a few
workers seemed to know about how to install and wire controls for the
systems they installed. It took four to five days at each person's
house. I know plumbers that could have everything done in half the
time. Then with the stoves and dryers, you'd call and they said one
thing but we're doing another. They told people they weren't installing
them, yet they were. The miscommunication in all this was horrendous,
surely in this day and age of computers, there should of been an app
from Google or Microsoft that could of kept all information and shared
among the workers as to what each address needed. Many people had to
use vacation or sick days to be home for the reconstruction process
only for them not to show up. FRUSTRATING! Many people ended up getting
sick too. Some with pneumonia or bad colds or flues. I myself got
bronchitis because of a cold damp house. This could of gone quicker and
easier if they actually had proper communication and worked in an
efficient manner.
______
Vicente De La Rosa from Lawrence: Vicente de la Rosa Consejo
Terapeutico Familiar. Es imposible entender como ocurrio este desastre
que a creado confusion, ansiedad, temor entre los Residentes que
vivimos en esta ciudad, ami que como consejero terapeutico familiar y
Miembro del Comite intergrado por Sacerdotes, pastores, Capellanes y
consejeros, me a tocado escuchar a muchos personas miembros de nuestras
congregaciones donde han expresado su agustia y temor haun cuando se
escucha el sonido de Emergencia muchas personas estan aun en panico y
asta han expresado el deceo de mudarse de esta Ciudad por el temor que
esto pueda vover a ocurrir, ami en particular que me toco junto a mi
esposa Rosina estar por mas de un mes viniendo en un Trailer a sido muy
dificil, su conducciones de salud se empeoran y aun esta en
recuperacion, mi nieta Marlin enferma pir mas de dos semanas y aun no
se recupera del todo apor que teniamos que pasar por esto? Por la
negligencia de Columbia Gass, y no nos sentimos seguro de que vuelva a
ocurrir y tengamos que atravesar por situaciones peores en el futoro,
aun no se puede estar seguro en toda la la Nacion porque estamos viendo
en tiempo donde nadie esta seguro, con sistemas de distribucion muy
obsoleto y vulnerable a cualquir persona mal intencionada en sus manos
queda impulsar leyes que nos permitan vivir con mas confianza.
______
Kate McHugh from Andover: November 26, 2018
Initial Shock
On September 13 I returned home from the hospital after having a
total hip replacement. A casual friend drove me home. She had been to
my home only once before. It was 10 minutes before the evacuation alert
was sent.
I truly believed that I had minutes to leave my house. I believed
my life was endanger and that I would lose everything. But what could I
do? What options did I have? How could I get the cats out? I could
barely walk on crutches, I couldn't go down stairs easily, nor could I
drive. Neighbors went door to door to turning off gas valves as others
huddled in the street in disbelief. My friend ran to CVS to get my
crucial blood thinner and pain med prescriptions. When she got there,
employees were fleeing. They said they could not help and told her go
to any other CVS. By that point, my street was closed and there was
gridlock on Elm Street and Rt. 28. I needed those meds as blood clots
are the most serious risk of death post hip surgery. My friend, not
knowing the area, admitted she wanted to get home. What was I to do?
This 30 minute period brought back another awful trauma . . . 3
years ago my husband died suddenly as we were commuting to Boston. I
was as helpless then, as I was on Sept. 13.
I was scared and frightened throughout that long initial 4 day
period; every night a different crew came to check the house for gas.
But my gas was turned off. What are they looking for? What is the
danger? Feeling afraid in your own home is something you never forget.
Turning Challenge into Opportunity
A community of ``affected'' folks shared info about getting
resources and alternative heat. This is how I learned of a safer, more
energy efficient way of heating my home. It appeared that the safest
and alternative was a ductless system. In fact, it would be more energy
efficient as my steam heat has only one zone. A mini split system would
allow me to heat only the rooms that I am occupying.
So, I was proactive and asked Worley if I could get approval to
research other heat sources, namely a mini-split system. My adjuster
replied that that shouldn't be a problem. After doing copious research,
I obtained 3 estimates for mini-split from MassSave approved
contractors. The estimate included $1,700 rebates from MassSave. I
called them immediately and sent the best estimate to my claim
adjuster.
To qualify, an energy audit/assessment must be scheduled, but not
necessarily completed, before work is begun. Eager to use these
rebates, I called MassSave to schedule an assessment. Initially they
said they were booking into January in Andover but when I provided my
address I was told they could not book a date because I am in the
``affected'' area! When I explained that that was precisely why I
needed to install an alternative heat source, I was told that Columbia
Gas was forbidding the scheduling of energy assessments and then she
gave me the phone number of folks who could help me. . . . The Columbia
Gas Claims adjuster. My adjuster knows absolutely nothing about energy
assessments! The worst part of this? Even if folks in the ``affected ''
had the means to pay for a mini split, they would not qualify for
$1,700 in rebates!
That same day, my adjuster responded that his supervisor advised
him not able to approve any mini split systems. It was suggested that I
have a contractor come to my home to see if a pellet stove is possible
to be installed.
I asked if Columbia Gas would offer even a partial reimbursement as
the mini-split system is an energy efficient alternative to heating my
entire house with gas. He told me he had been forbidden to authorize
any payment toward a mini-split because the system is not solely used
for heat.
The idea that a pellet stove is a reasonable substitution is
absolutely unfounded. The idea that I haul 40 lbs of wood pellets is
simply not possible; I am physically unable to maintain a pellet stove.
What You See is Not What You Get
I stayed updated via Columbia Gas website and Andover.gov. Again, I
was searching for energy efficiency so I was happy to read that CG was
offering such as for replacement. When the Gilbane crew (my 4th
assessment) took over on my street I spoke to them about this and
pointed to the pdfs online. They were totally unaware these options
existed . . . because they didn't in their world.
Communication within Columbia Gas was sorely lacking. Their
subcontractors were not kept up-to-date nor did they have access to the
models shown on the website! The crew chief said, I have access to 3
boilers today, Kate, that's it.
How do you measure the fear, anguish, and exhaustion that countless
people have and are still going through? Not only did this affect the
residents but also the subcontractors. Boots on the ground. They were
under a tremendous amount of pressure (meetings every night after they
had worked 12 hrs) to check off the houses. And all these folks were
away from their homes and family. There was empathy on both sides.
Columbia Gas kept track of houses that were ``relit'' but those
numbers don't show the truth behind them. My home was relit on October
23, only because my 83-year-old neighbor was elevated to ``priority''
status. My neighbor told all the workers they needed to put me on the
priority list as well due to my recent surgery. However, as of December
9, 2018, I have no stove nor oven nor heat in my bedroom. I got
approval to replace my gas fireplace for my bedroom last week. It took
5 weeks to get the approval.
The CEO of NiSource said in the hearing that he couldn't commit to
NOT raising rates for those who lived through this disaster.
Essentially, their victims would foot the bill for their complacency
and utter neglect. Please tell the residents of the Merrimack Valley
that this unconscionable action will not be allowed in the United
States of America.
Thank you.
Kate McHugh
Andover, MA
Senator Warren. Mr. Chairman, does that mean people can
still submit stories?
Senator Markey. For two weeks, yes, for two weeks, that
will be included in the record, and we----
Senator Warren. Small business owners, as well.
Senator Markey. Everyone up in this community who was
affected, we want to hear your stories and it will be included
in the record and we welcome that, urge you to do so.
And, again, I want to thank Andrew Flanagan of Andover and
Andrew Maylor of North Andover, the Town Managers of those two
communities. Thank you so much for being here. Thank you for
your incredible response to this disaster. It's ongoing but I
can see--I think we can all see the teamwork that exists
amongst your three communities.
And I know that you're a unit because that's why we're
here. You're saying how often does it happen that a Senate
committee goes to a local community. Not often. This is a
special day----
[Applause.]
Senator Markey.--and the reason that I wanted to bring the
Senate Commerce Committee, which has jurisdiction over the
pipeline safety agency and has jurisdiction over the National
Transportation Safety Board, so they would be here today, is
that they should experience what the impact is of regulations
that do not work. They should see the harm which is done.
Again, my father grew up in 88 Phillips Street in South
Lawrence. He went to the John Breen School and I would like to
take this moment to thank the South Lawrence East Middle School
for hosting us here today. We thank you for----
[Applause.]
Senator Markey --allowing us to use your beautiful
facility. My father came from this community and many members
of my family now live in Andover and North Andover. It's one
community united.
After hearing today from Columbia Gas and NiSource, Federal
and state regulators, safety experts, and our communities on
the devastation and hardship they have had to endure, I am not
satisfied. We are not satisfied. The company and regulators
refuse to take responsibility and I will not rest until there
is accountability.
1,300 Merrimack Valley families are still waiting for their
homes to be house-ready because Columbia Gas was not even close
to being safety-ready. Temperatures in Massachusetts are
dropping and so is my faith, our faith that Columbia Gas,
NiSource, and Federal regulators can prevent another disaster
like this from happening again.
That is unacceptable. That must change and I will fight
every day, along with Senator Warren, as I know that Seth
Moulton and Lori Trahan will, in partnership with Congresswoman
Tsongas, to ensure that things change and that there is justice
for our communities.
We are going to take the lessons of this disaster and then
turn them into laws so that we can ensure that no community, no
family anywhere in Massachusetts or the United States has to
experience a tragedy like this ever again.
We thank all of you for being here. We will not forget.
[Applause.]
Senator Markey. This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:08 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Edward Markey to
Hon. Matthew A. Beaton
Question 1. The Columbia Gas pipeline integrity management plan did
not contemplate the risk of this sort of event--a very low-probability,
high-consequence disaster. This integrity management plan was audited
and approved by the Department of Public Utilities.
Did the Department of Public Utilities offer any comments or
technical assistance for improving the distribution integrity
management plan?
Answer. In accordance with Federal law, 42 CFR 192 Subparts M and
O, gas distribution companies are required to develop, and the
Department is required to review, integrity management programs. The
programs must meet the requirements set forth in the Federal
regulations. The purpose of the Department`s review of the programs is
to ensure compliance with the Federal standards.
The Department reviews these programs for compliance with Federal
and state laws and regulations and, beyond ensuring compliance, does
not offer comments related to the programs.
Question 1a. Does DPU plan to require any modifications of this
plan following the September 13 disaster?
Answer. The Department has hired an independent evaluator, Dynamic
Risk, who will examine the operation and maintenance policies and
practices of the Commonwealth's gas distribution companies and will
also examine the physical integrity of the Commonwealth's gas
distribution system. A preliminary report, which will complement the
NTSB's ongoing review, is expected within the coming weeks. The purpose
of the independent evaluator's report will be to provide concrete
recommendations for improving the integrity and safe operation of the
Commonwealth's aged natural gas infrastructure.
Question 2. The Columbia Gas emergency response plan was approved
by the Department of Public Utilities. However, this plan simply does
not seem to have contemplated responding to system-wide disaster of the
magnitude that we saw on September 13. The most severe level of
emergency your response plan contemplated was for an incident that
would last ``72 hours or longer.''
Did the Department of Public Utilities offer any comments or
technical assistance for improving the emergency response plan?
Answer. Under the Department's regulations, Emergency Response
Plans (``ERP'') of the natural gas distribution companies are annually
filed with the Department and developed in accordance with the
requirements set out in G.L. c. 164, Sec. 85B and 220 C.M.R. 19.00.
Each gas company is required to ensure that it is adequately and
sufficiently prepared to restore service to its customers in a safe and
reasonably prompt manner during an Emergency Event. This includes, at a
minimum, preparing and following written procedures consistent with
those required by 49 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 60101 through 60125; 49 C.F.R.
Part 192; G.L. c. 164, Sec. Sec. 85B and 105A; 220 CMR 69.00 and 220
CMR 100.00 through 113.00. Each gas company shall include these written
procedures in their respective manuals for conducting operations and
maintenance activities and for emergency response, and, where
appropriate, in their manuals of written procedures to minimize hazards
resulting from gas pipeline emergencies, as required by 49 C.F.R. Part
192; 220 CMR 69.00 and 220 CMR 100.00 through 113.00.
The Department reviews these plans for compliance with Federal and
state laws and regulations.
Question 2a. Does DPU plan to require any modifications of this
plan following the September 13 disaster?
Answer. The Department has hired an independent evaluator, Dynamic
Risk, who will examine the operation and maintenance policies and
practices of the Commonwealth's gas distribution companies and will
also examine the physical integrity of the Commonwealth's gas
distribution system. A preliminary report, which will complement the
NTSB's ongoing review, is expected within the coming weeks. We
anticipate that the independent evaluator's report will provide
concrete recommendations for improving the integrity and safe operation
of the Commonwealth's aged natural gas infrastructure.
Question 3. After reading the National Transportation Safety Board
report about what happened with this disaster, is it your opinion that
a state inspector would have been able to catch this error, if one were
to have been looking at the September 13 job at Salem St. and South
Union St.? If not, is DPU planning additional requirements to ensure
that state inspectors have the information or tools necessary to detect
these sorts of faulty plans?
Answer. The Department is one of many parties working with the NTSB
on its investigation. As such, the Department cannot comment on, nor
offer opinions about, the NTSB report. Additionally, the Department is
conducting its own investigation into the cause and origin of the
events of September 13, 2018 and it would be improper to comment,
speculate, or make any conclusions about the possible outcome of that
investigation.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Edward Markey to
Paul Roberti
Question 1. Columbia Gas used to have a policy in place that
required a trained technician be on site at the pressure-regulating
station when work was being done that could affect the pressure of the
pipeline system. This policy was abandoned four years ago, but
according to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), on-site
personnel could have ``immediately addressed the issue and mitigated
the consequences.''
Would a nationwide requirement that technicians are present at key
pressure-regulating stations improve safety during construction?
Answer. Pipeline regulations already require that all individuals
who perform tasks that affect the operation and maintenance of a
pipeline, including tie-in of a new pipeline to a previously existing
(operating) pipeline, are qualified. Such qualified personnel are
expected to perform or oversee activities that may represent a high
risk to the safe operation of the gas system.
Further, it is PHMSA's expectation that the pipeline industry adopt
the American Petroleum Institute's (API) Recommended Practice (RP)
1173, which clearly indicates that risk management must be an integral
part of the design, construction, operation, and maintenance of a
pipeline system. PHMSA participated as part of the RP 1173 standards
development committee. This standard defines operational controls that
are essential to the safe design and construction of pipelines. For
example, Section 5.6: Risk Reduction requires that processes are
reviewed to continuously reduce risk in all activities, including
construction practices. Section 8.2: System Integrity requires pipeline
operators to maintain quality control procedures so that construction
is performed in accordance with an approved design. Pursuant to these
practices, a pipeline operator should assess risk associated with all
aspects of its pipeline system to define operational controls, address
those risks, and review progress.
Question 1a. If so, is PHMSA working on any regulation or guidance
that would require on-site technicians during construction? If not, why
not?
Answer. Pipeline regulations already require that all individuals
who perform tasks that affect the operation and maintenance of a
pipeline, including tie-in of a new pipeline to a previously existing
(operating) pipeline, are qualified. Such qualified personnel are
expected to perform or oversee activities that may represent a high
risk to the safe operation of the gas system. Pipeline regulations also
require that companies have adequate written procedures for pipeline
design, construction, operation, maintenance, and emergencies; have the
capability to shut down systems in a timely manner in the event of an
incident; and establish and adhere to written emergency plans to
minimize hazards to life and property.
PHMSA awaits the official conclusion of the NTSB's investigation of
the incidents in Merrimack Valley Massachusetts and will fully evaluate
and consider all of the NTSB's conclusions and recommendations,
including whether or not further regulatory clarifications are needed.
Question 2. The NTSB found that a single field engineer was allowed
to almost unilaterally approve the work order that led to the
explosions on September 13, 2018. The NTSB noted there was no oversight
from experienced technicians who would have understood the implications
for the entire pipeline system. According to the NTSB, the engineer in
question had only ``limited knowledge'' about the ``consequences of
losing the capability to sense the main pressure.''
Mr. Roberti, would safety improve if Federal regulations required
that the departments responsible for knowing the locations of pressure-
control equipment have to sign off on work plans?
Answer. PHMSA takes all NTSB recommendations seriously. PHMSA
awaits the official conclusion of the NTSB's investigation of the
incidents in Merrimack Valley Massachusetts and will fully evaluate and
consider all of the NTSB's conclusions and recommendations.
Preliminary NTSB findings indicate that this accident stemmed from
a deficiency in the company's quality control and a breakdown of
internal procedures. Pipeline regulations already require that all
individuals who perform tasks that affect the operation and maintenance
of a pipeline, including tie-in of a new pipeline to a previously
existing (operating) pipeline, are qualified. Such qualified personnel
are expected to perform or oversee activities that may represent a high
risk to the safe operation of the gas system.
Companies must comply with existing safety regulations, including
instituting quality control procedures, and should continuously improve
and nurture a comprehensive safety culture. Implementing the elements
of RP 1173 can help companies achieve a strong safety culture.
Question 2a. If so, is PHMSA working on any regulation or guidance
that would require the approval of the officials within companies that
have a system-wide view of the gas system? If not, why not?
Answer. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts has passed laws to
require this for pipelines in Massachusetts. PHMSA's primary role is to
establish minimum safety standards and to provide oversight to these
standards. PHMSA also partners with most U.S. states to provide
pipeline safety oversight of about 80 percent of the 2.8 million miles
of pipelines in the U.S. The states may establish safety standards that
go above and beyond the Federal minimum standards. PHMSA expects the
pipeline industry to understand and manage the risks or their
respective pipeline systems and to ensure the safe operation regardless
of compliance with the Federal minimum standards.
Question 3. One of the NTSB recommendations was for Columbia Gas to
have a professional engineer review and certify any construction plans
before starting work, in order to provide another layer of defense
against the odds that one engineer could make a decision that would
bring down the pipeline system.
Mr. Roberti, would safety improve if gas distribution companies
everywhere had a professional engineer review and approve all
construction plans for gas distribution companies?
Answer. PHMSA takes all NTSB recommendations seriously. PHMSA
awaits the official conclusion of the NTSB's investigation of the
incidents in Merrimack Valley Massachusetts and will fully evaluate and
consider all of the NTSB's conclusions and recommendations.
Question 3a. If so, is PHMSA working on any regulation or guidance
that would require that professional engineers review and approve all
work plans? If not, why not?
Answer. As noted above, PHMSA awaits the official conclusion of the
NTSB's investigation of the incidents in Merrimack Valley Massachusetts
and will fully evaluate and consider all of the NTSB's conclusions and
recommendations.
Question 4. Right now, Federal regulations do not require pipeline
companies to have a Pipeline Safety Management System (SMS) in place,
which would require the adoption of a safety culture throughout a
company's operations and decisions.
Do you agree that it would improve safety if Federal regulations
required that all pipeline companies adopt a safety culture through a
Safety Management System?
Answer. At this time, PHMSA's focus is on emphasizing the
continuous assessment and improvement of pipeline safety by strongly
encouraging pipeline operators to implement SMS.
The common thread that runs throughout every aspect of PHMSA's
safety mission is an SMS approach. SMS looks to prevent accidents and
incidents from ever occurring. PHMSA is moving beyond the role of being
just a regulator--to push operators to identify and target their own
risks, and to encourage a company-wide culture that makes safety the
number one priority, always. Further, PHMSA understands that there is
no one-size-fits-all method for creating an SMS program; implementation
varies from operator to operator. To be effective, SMS programs must be
developed by operators to address their specific operator needs and
risks.
Further, for an SMS culture to permeate through all levels and
areas of the pipeline industry, we need ways to share and analyze data,
allowing all of us to see emerging trends to inform best practices. In
December 2016, PHMSA established a Voluntary Information-Sharing System
Working Group (VIS WG). The VIS WG was charged with studying
information-sharing systems for the pipeline industry and providing
recommendations to the Secretary of Transportation on the necessity of
a sharing system, ways to encourage the exchange of information, and
best practices for the protection of proprietary and security-sensitive
information. The VIS WG plans to submit its recommendation report to
the Secretary in Spring 2019.
Question 5. On September 13, the pressure-controlling equipment in
Lawrence experienced what is known as a ``common mode of failure.'' One
action, in this case the abandonment of a pipeline running under South
Union Street, caused both the main pressure regulator and the backup
regulator to fail at the same time and in the same fashion. PHMSA
regulations require that equipment meant to protect from over-
pressurization are ``designed and installed to prevent any single
incident [. . .] from affecting the operation of both the overpressure
protective device and the district regulator.'' Shut-off devices or
relief valves both provide a separate layer of protection beyond just
having two working regulators in series. Previously, PHMSA staff have
said that the regulator setup employed by Columbia Gas at issue in the
September 13 disaster satisfied Federal requirements and is in common
usage throughout distribution systems--conceivably putting other
communities at a similar risk.
Would safety improve if Federal regulations required that pressure-
control devices could not have a common mode of failure, as we saw in
this disaster?
Answer. Preliminary NTSB findings indicate that this accident
stemmed from a deficiency in the company's quality control and a
breakdown of internal procedures. Several methods and devices could
potentially provide additional protection. PHMSA awaits the conclusion
of the NTSB's investigation and will thoroughly consider whether to
require additional measures to prevent over-pressurization of low-
pressure systems.
Question 6. The maximum fine that PHMSA can levy for an incident is
only $2.09 million.
Do you think it would act as a greater deterrent if PHMSA were able
to fine companies above $2 million for disasters like this, yes or no?
Answer. Civil penalties for violations of the pipeline safety
regulations, statutorily set by Congress under 49 U.S.C. Sec. 60122 and
49 CFR Sec. 190.223, may be assessed up to $213,268 for each violation
for each day the violation continues, with a maximum administrative
civil penalty not to exceed $2,132,679 for any related series of
violations. This maximum represents an inflationary increase by DOT
final rule effective November 27, 2018.
Civil penalties are just one of the critical tools, such as
corrective action orders, that PHMSA uses to hold operators
accountable. When appropriate, our agency does not hesitate to issue
fines to operators. PHMSA also uses Compliance Orders and Corrective
Action Orders to mandate company action, sometimes beyond regulatory
standards, in order to assure safety. PHMSA has found the cost of
complying with these orders can dwarf the civil penalties that PHMSA
can impose, serving as a significant additional deterrent to pipeline
failures.
Question 7. When setting the recommended level of inspectors per
state, does PHMSA take into account how much of a state's pipeline
system is made up of old, leaky cast iron pipes, some of which are well
over 100 years old?
Answer. Yes, PHMSA's state inspection formula considers a state's
pipeline system composition, as well as several other performance
factors, to determine the minimum inspections required in accordance
with state certification. The number of inspections is then used to
determine the number of inspectors needed.
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