[Senate Hearing 115-879]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 115-879
HAWAII FALSE MISSILE ALERT: WHAT HAPPENED AND WHAT SHOULD WE DO NEXT?
=======================================================================
FIELD HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 5, 2018
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
57-801 PDF WASHINGTON : 2025
SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota, Chairman
ROGER WICKER, Mississippi BILL NELSON, Florida, Ranking
ROY BLUNT, Missouri MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
TED CRUZ, Texas AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
JERRY MORAN, Kansas BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts
DEAN HELLER, Nevada TOM UDALL, New Mexico
JAMES INHOFE, Oklahoma GARY PETERS, Michigan
MIKE LEE, Utah TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire
CORY GARDNER, Colorado CATHERINE CORTEZ MASTO, Nevada
TODD YOUNG, Indiana JON TESTER, Montana
Nick Rossi, Staff Director
Adrian Arnakis, Deputy Staff Director
Jason Van Beek, General Counsel
Kim Lipsky, Democratic Staff Director
Chris Day, Democratic Deputy Staff Director
Renae Black, Senior Counsel
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on April 5, 2018.................................... 1
Statement of Senator Schatz...................................... 1
Witnesses
Hon. Mazie Hirono, U.S. Senator from Hawaii...................... 2
Hon. Colleen Hanabusa, U.S. Representative from Hawaii........... 3
Hon. Tulsi Gabbard, U.S. Representative from Hawaii.............. 5
Hon. Jessica Rosenworcel, Commissioner, Federal Communications
Commission..................................................... 6
Prepared statement........................................... 8
Rear Admiral Patrick A. Piercey, United States Pacific Command,
U.S. Department of Defense..................................... 17
Prepared statement of Admiral Harry B. Harris, Jr., U.S. Navy
Commander, U.S. Pacific Command............................ 18
Nicole McGinnis, Deputy Chief, Public Safety and Homeland
Security Bureau, Federal Communications Commission............. 21
Prepared statement........................................... 22
Antwane Johnson, Director, Continuity Communications Division,
Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security.............................................. 24
Prepared statement........................................... 26
Major General Arthur J. Logan, Adjutant General and Director,
Hawaii Emergency Management Agency, State of Hawaii, Department
of Defense..................................................... 40
Prepared statement........................................... 42
Chris Leonard, President and Legislative Chair, Hawaii
Association of Broadcasters, Inc............................... 43
Prepared statement........................................... 45
HAWAII FALSE MISSILE ALERT: WHAT HAPPENED AND WHAT SHOULD WE DO NEXT?
----------
THURSDAY, APRIL 5, 2018
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Honolulu, HI.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m. HST,
at 1601 East-West Road, East-West Center, Keoni Auditorium,
Hon. Brian Schatz, presiding.
Present: Senator Schatz [presiding], Senator Hirono.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BRIAN SCHATZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM HAWAII
Senator Schatz. Good morning. On behalf of the Senate
Commerce Committee, I would like to welcome everyone to today's
hearing on Hawaii's Emergency Alert System. I want to thank
Chairman Thune and Ranking Member Nelson for working with me to
convene this hearing, and to the FCC, especially Chairman Pai
and Commissioner Rosenworcel for their support, including the
resources that they've devoted to the FCC's investigation.
I also want to thank each of the witnesses who are here
today to testify, and the members of our delegation--Senator
Hirono, Congresswoman Hanabusa, and Congresswoman Gabbard--for
being here and for our partnership in the aftermath of the
false alarm; and, of course, finally, to the East-West Center
for hosting this hearing.
What happened in Hawaii on January 13 raised some basic
policy questions. Right now, any city, county, or state can
choose to participate in the Emergency Alert System, and when
they do, they get the technical capacity to get the word out,
but that does not make them experts to know when a missile is
coming. That ability rests with the Department of Defense. And
it is increasingly clear that if--that we are not going to get
all 50 states and 3,007 counties to voluntarily participate in
such a program. But even if we did, it is possible, even
likely, that we will have another mistaken missile alert as a
result of human error or a security breach.
Local officials have the lead on disaster response and
recovery, but if the Federal Government knows a missile is
coming, they should have the responsibility to inform the
public. In other words, a missile attack is not a local
question. The people who know first should be the people who
tell the rest of us.
Now, I understand that when it comes to natural disasters,
we take a different approach, but it's clear that a missile
threat is fundamentally different from tsunamis, hurricanes, or
other threats that we routinely face. Congress needs to decide
who should be responsible for notifying the public of a missile
attack. It is my judgment that there is nothing more Federal
than an incoming ICBM.
The false alarm in Hawaii also highlighted some of the
weaknesses in the State's Emergency Alert System, which had a
poorly designed user interface and did not have a verification
system to prevent mistakes. The incident made clear the need
for Federal standards in the system and raised basic questions
about who should be doing this kind of thing.
And that's why in January, I joined with Senators Harris,
Gardner, and Hirono, and others to introduce the ALERT Act.
This bill gives the Federal Government the primary
responsibility of notifying the public of a missile threat. The
bill would also strengthen the way states and counties use
IPAWS, the FEMA platform used by emergency management
professionals to issue warnings. The ALERT Act is now in the
DHS authorization bill, which has been passed by the Senate
Homeland Security Committee, and is pending a vote in the full
Senate.
The false missile alert also made clear the need for
improvements to the distribution side of our Emergency Alert
System. So I'm also preparing a companion bill to the ALERT Act
called the READI Act. The READI Act would take steps to update
the broadcast and mobile phone systems that actually deliver
the emergency warnings initiated by government entities. The
READI Act would close gaps in these systems so that they don't
fall behind as technology advances. It would also require the
FCC to set best practices and update the process for creating
and approving the State plans that organize these emergency
response systems and the networks that deliver the alerts. On
the State level, steps have been taken by HI-EMA and others to
address some of the issues that caused the false alarm, but
questions remain about what happened on that day.
We intend for this hearing to be constructive and clear-
eyed. We will not shy away from necessary accountability during
this oversight process, but we also need to clarify what to do
next in order to keep everyone safe, and most importantly, to
ensure that we can all have confidence when future alerts
occur.
I'll now turn it over to my colleague in the Senate,
Senator Hirono, for her opening remarks.
STATEMENT OF HON. MAZIE HIRONO,
U.S. SENATOR FROM HAWAII
Senator Hirono. Thank you. Thank you, Senator Schatz and
all of you, for convening this important field hearing to
assess how the Hawaii Emergency Alert System failed on January
13, 2018, and what specific remedies exist to fix the system so
that this never happens again. This hearing presents a good
opportunity to bring State and Federal officials together to
work to regain the public's trust after such a traumatizing
event.
It bears repeating that it took the Hawaii Emergency
Management Agency 38 minutes from the initial emergency alert
being sent for them to officially notify the public that there
was no inbound missile, that it was a false alarm, and that the
alert had been sent in error. While the relief was palpable, it
gave way to real visceral anger, anger that there was a false
alarm, anger that it took 38 minutes to alert the public, anger
that we faced a missile threat in the first place.
The fact that the people of Hawaii and the hundreds of
thousands of visitors in the State that day immediately
presumed the missile originated from North Korea speaks to the
broader concern about the potential for conflict and the threat
that North Korea poses to Hawaii and the Nation. And this
threat is real, and people across Hawaii and our country need
to have confidence in the government to provide accurate
information about potential threats. It's one of the reasons
why today's hearing and discussion is important.
Our congressional delegation is of one mind in getting to
the bottom of what happened and making sure that it never
happens again. With each of us sitting on different committees
of jurisdiction, we've been able to engage with a full range of
stakeholders on this important issue.
Over the past 3 months, I have focused on clarifying what
role the Federal Government can play in supporting State level
emergency preparedness and response and what it can do to
prevent the incident, this kind of incident, from occurring
again.
Through my work on the Armed Services Committee and in
conversations with senior officials, like Secretary of Defense
Mattis, then Secretary of State Tillerson, and Admiral Harris,
of PACOM, I've emphasized the critical role of diplomacy in
deescalating tensions with North Korea so that we can prevent a
missile strike from coming our way in the first place.
I've also engaged with the Secretary of Department of
Homeland Security Nielsen about how to strengthen Federal-State
cooperation on emergency alerts and secure the commitment from
the Department's Inspector General's Office to examine the
Federal Emergency Management Agency's oversight of the
Emergency Alert System, and our entire Nation will benefit if
key Federal agencies work with states to close gaps in training
and communication, institute best practices, and ensure that
our states and local governments have the appropriate resources
to prevent an incident like this from happening again.
Once again, mahalo to Senator Schatz for convening this
hearing today, and to all of our witnesses for coming together
to address this important issue. It will take all of us working
together to ensure that we've learned the right lessons from
this incident and that longstanding improvements have been made
to the Emergency Alert System.
Mahalo.
Senator Schatz. Thank you.
Congresswoman Hanabusa.
STATEMENT OF HON. COLLEEN HANABUSA,
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM HAWAII
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you, Senator Schatz. I do want to say
again the appreciation for you and the convening of this
hearing, and for the Senate for taking the lead on this. It is
very important for the people of Hawaii.
Let us understand why we are all here. It really is the
public confidence of the people. We have elected officials, but
as government itself, the most important thing we have to do is
to ensure that the public believes that we know what we're
doing, and it is a situation like this that causes them pause,
causes them to question, but more critically than all of that
is when they wonder whether we even know what we're doing or
what did we do.
This hearing is so important because we need to assuage all
those fears and those questions, the anger, as Senator Hirono
pointed out. There was a lot of anger, but imagine the anxiety
that many of them went through. That father, that image that
flashed across the whole Nation of him placing his child in a
storm drain. What--what do we do now to say, ``Look, we have
learned''? And that's what this is about. It is about what we
have learned. And it also is about, How do we begin to address
so that it will not happen again, not of this type of situation
where people are saying, ``Why did it take 38 minutes?'' or,
``Why is it that we couldn't have been told immediately?''
It is not the intent of all of us to point fingers or to
say this person was wrong or that person was wrong or this
government entity failed, but it is to say, How do we now come
back to all of you and say to the public that we are addressing
the major mishaps? Part of addressing the major mishaps is not
simply identifying what happened, it is giving people the sense
of security that we really do know what we're doing.
I share the sentiment that Senator Schatz initially stated,
which is that maybe when it comes to natural disasters, or
disasters period, or warning, or HI-EMA's jurisdiction, maybe
it is time for us to draw the distinction between that which is
a, quote, natural disaster--hurricanes, basically tsunamis,
floods--maybe that's one category, but when it comes to
ballistic missiles, maybe that should be a separate category.
And I still recall that day. What caused so many people
pause was when that banner went up on one of the television
stations that says, ``PACOM confirms.'' That I think set a
different tone for everything that was happening. And we have
subsequently learned that PACOM is part of this system. So the
sirens went off in Pearl Harbor. The Pearl Harbor workers also
ran off the base and drove off the base. So the question
becomes, Why? And who should address it?
Representative Gabbard and I have asked the House Armed
Services Committee to look into that because we do believe that
there is a role that the military has to play, and the role
that the military has to play is one of really assuring the
people across the United States, but especially in Hawaii, when
we look at PACOM, that in fact it is a true situation versus,
quote, a drill.
So this hearing, I hope, will help all of you understand
and get the people at least some sense of public confidence
again that government can do this right and government is
asking the right questions.
So again, Senator Schatz, thank you so very much, and
Senator Hirono as well, for the Senate's leadership in this
matter.
Mahalo.
Senator Schatz. Thank you.
Congresswoman Gabbard.
STATEMENT OF HON. TULSI GABBARD,
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM HAWAII
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you, Senator Schatz and your Committee,
for convening this very important hearing today. It's important
that these conversations not only happen in Washington, but
that they happen here in Hawaii.
Mahalo to our witnesses for coming and joining us today.
And thanks to the East-West Center for hosting us.
What happened on January 13 was a wake-up call for everyone
here in Hawaii and to leaders across the country, really
showing barely the stark reality of what the chaos of a nuclear
strike on Hawaii would be like. We saw many of those powerful
images, and I still hear from constituents across the state now
about what they did during those minutes following that false
missile alert, the tough choices that they were having to make
about how they would spend those last--what they thought were
those last remaining minutes of their lives.
They remain frustrated with a lack of clear answers and
really clear direction on, What do we do? What do people do in
this situation? I look forward to the conversations this
morning to be able to help provide those answers.
I've heard from many of my colleagues in Congress who have
watched closely what happened here in Hawaii, and causing them
now to ask questions within their own states, within their own
communities, about their level of preparedness, and their
actions that they can take now to make sure that something like
this does not happen there.
Along with Congresswoman Hanabusa, I have introduced two
bills in the House of Representatives to help deal with some of
these issues. The first is the Civil Defense Accountability
Act, which is really focused and centered around transparency
and accountability, requiring public reporting from the Federal
agencies involved, including FEMA, the Department of Defense,
and the FCC, to make sure that the lessons learned here in
Hawaii are shared in communities and states across the country,
and requiring the Department of Homeland Security to review the
current notification protocols for these ballistic missile
threats, studying the best practices regarding civil defense
emergencies, to prevent a similar catastrophic mistake from
happening again.
The second bill is the Civil Defense Preparedness Act,
which would expand existing Department of Homeland Security
terrorism and catastrophic event grant programs to include
improving nuclear, biological, and chemical attack
preparedness. Like I said, this event has really laid bare the
lack of preparedness and the lack of response plans in place
and the need for resources to our communities and our states to
be able to harden the infrastructure and to put these plans in
place. The grants could be used for things like training,
protective equipment, building reinforcements, and other
community preparedness measures to ensure that our local and
State governments have the support that they need.
One glaring problem that came to light was that many cell
phones and wireless phones did not receive the wireless
emergency alert. Different people in different parts of the
state, for one reason or another, did not even know that this
false missile alert had gone out. This is something that needs
to be resolved. It also again became very clear the lack of
response plans in place both at the leadership level as well as
within the community on what would happen if this were not a
false missile alert, if the alert were real, and we were facing
a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attack.
What Hawaii went through in January can never happen again.
We must take the corrective actions necessary to make sure that
a false alert never goes on, but we also have to make sure that
we are prepared in the event of a real attack. We have to
improve our emergency alert dissemination to fit with the
changing technological environment and ensure that everyone is
reached and fully informed. We will continue to work to
strengthen our missile defense systems, but most importantly,
we have to do all that we can to deal with this underlying
threat and the fact that we are facing this threat at all. We
need to exhaust all diplomatic efforts to continue to work
toward denuclearizing North Korea, bring about peace, and
prevent an all-out catastrophic war.
Thank you, Senator Schatz. Thank you to our witnesses. I
look forward to our conversation.
Senator Schatz. Thank you, Congresswoman Gabbard.
We will start with our first panel. We're going to have 5
minutes of testimony and 5-minute rounds of questions from each
of the members of the delegation. And we want to thank Jessica
Rosenworcel, FCC Commissioner, for being here.
Ms. Rosenworcel.
STATEMENT OF HON. JESSICA ROSENWORCEL, COMMISSIONER, FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Ms. Rosenworcel. Good morning to the members of the Senate
Commerce Committee in absentia, and in particular to Senator
Schatz, whose leadership has brought us all here today.
Years ago, I had the privilege of serving as Counsel to the
late Senator Inouye, who was then the Chairman of this
Committee, so it's a special treat to be back here in the Aloha
state.
I'm also so glad that Senator Hirono, Representative
Hanabusa, and Representative Gabbard are here to join this
important discussion.
Back in Washington, I serve as a Commissioner at the
Federal Communications Commission. Every day I see how
communications technology is changing every aspect of civic and
commercial life. And when it comes to the most critical aspect
of our communications, emergency alerts, I know that we bear a
special responsibility.
The FCC sets technical requirements for both the Emergency
Alert System and Wireless Emergency Alerts. And our work then
informs the work of others across government, including the
Federal Emergency Management Agency. But the bottom line for
every entity involved in emergency alerts is that the public
needs confidence in the systems that warn us when the
unthinkable occurs.
Now, as we all know, on January 13, the people of Hawaii
woke to ominous messages flashing on their mobile phones,
booming in from radio stations, and lighting up their
television screens. These messages commanded all who saw and
heard them to seek immediate shelter due to a ballistic missile
threat, and they included those haunting words, ``This is not a
drill.''
Now, from my experience working for Hawaii, I know that the
people of this state are resilient, I know that they are keenly
aware of old and new global threats to security, especially in
the Pacific. So when this incident occurred, I reached out to
some of my former colleagues, and they had only harrowing
stories to tell. I still can't quite imagine it, being told you
only have minutes left to live, and knowing that everything you
hold dear could be destroyed. When the threat was over, I am
sure that the people of Hawaii held their children a little bit
closer. I know I did the same that night.
After the false missile alert, the Chairman of the FCC
swiftly called for an investigation, and this was the right
thing to do. The agency's staff got to work, as did officials
in Hawaii, who conducted their own investigation. Those
investigations have revealed that this false alert could have
been avoided, and its effects could have been mitigated.
There were serious failures at the point of alert
origination, the Hawaii Emergency Management Agency. These
errors were both human and operational. There appears to have
been a miscommunication between personnel that fateful morning.
There was an apparent deviation from the script of the agency's
drill procedure. There was a human failure to recognize that a
drill was even being conducted. These problems were compounded
by a lack of secondary checks to prevent one person from
mistakenly sending an alert to the entire state. And there were
also no software checks to differentiate between a testing
environment and a live environment. And to make matters worse,
it took a full 38 minutes to issue an alert correction, and
there were no pre-existing systems to do so.
None of this is acceptable. We need to do better. This is
true here in this state and across the country because false
alerts have happened elsewhere, including in the last year in
Polk County, Iowa, and Riverside County, California. In short,
it can happen anywhere.
So what can we do about it? We need ideas to fix these
problems, so here are some of mine.
For starters, the FCC has conducted an investigation. It
now has a final report. It needs to make that report public as
soon as possible.
Next, State Emergency Alert System plans are filed with the
FCC, and they're subject to annual confirmation. It's time to
make that process a meaningful one by making sure every plan is
up to date. The Hawaii plan filed with the FCC was over a
decade old. The FCC should prevent this from happening by
serving as a convening force to develop a checklist of best
practices, including security protocols, at the local, State,
and Federal level, and then support their inclusion in up-to-
date annual EAS filings.
Second, the FCC does not now have a reporting system for
false alerts. I think we should have one. And I think if we
did, we'd be able to study what happens, learn from it, and
prevent it from happening again.
I also think the FCC needs to be mindful of future alert
capabilities from embedded multimedia to many-to-one
communications that allow for public feedback and to explore
how to make those viable in the marketplace.
Finally, and I'm stepping out of my jurisdiction here, I do
think we need to address failures at the alert origination
point. To this end, I know the recently introduced ALERT Act
proposes improvements, including clear lines of responsibility,
specifically when it comes to missile threats.
So let me close by thanking you for having me at this
hearing. I'm happy to answer any questions you might have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Rosenworcel follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Jessica Rosenworcel, Commissioner,
Federal Communications Commission
Good morning, Chairman Thune, Ranking Member Nelson, Members of the
Committee and in particular, Senator Schatz. Years ago I had the
privilege of serving as counsel to the late Senator Daniel Inouye, who
was then Chairman of this Committee. It is a special treat to be back
in the Aloha state. I am glad that Senator Schatz has convened this
hearing and that Senator Hirono, Representative Hanabusa, and
Representative Gabbard are here to join the discussion.
In Washington, I serve as a Commissioner at the Federal
Communications Commission. I have a front row seat at the digital
revolution. Every day I see how technology is changing every aspect of
civic and commercial life. Every day I am reminded that the future
belongs to the connected. And when it comes to the most critical aspect
of our communications--those involving emergency alerts--I know that we
bear a special responsibility. The agency sets technical requirements
for both the Emergency Alert System and Wireless Emergency Alerts. This
informs the work of others across government, including the Federal
Emergency Management Agency. But the bottom line for every entity
involved is that the public needs confidence in the systems that warn
us when the unthinkable occurs.
As we all know, on January 13 the people of Hawaii woke to ominous
messages flashing on their mobile phones, streaming in from social
media, booming from radio stations, and lighting up their television
screens. These messages commanded all who saw and heard them to seek
immediate shelter due to a ballistic missile threat. They included the
haunting words: ``This is not a drill.''
From my experience working for the people of this state, I know
that Hawaiians are resilient. I know that they are keenly aware of old
and new global threats to security, including in the Pacific. So when
this incident occurred, I reached out to friends and former colleagues
in Hawaii to understand what happened. They had only harrowing stories
to tell. I still can't quite imagine it--being told you have only
minutes left to live and knowing everything you hold dear could be
destroyed. When the threat was over I am sure that people in Hawaii
held their children a little bit closer. I know I did the same that
night.
After the false missile alert, the Chairman of the FCC swiftly
called for an investigation. It was the right thing to do. The agency
staff got to work, as did officials in Hawaii who conducted their own
investigation.
These investigations have revealed that this false alert could have
been avoided and its effects could have been mitigated.
There were serious failures at the point of alert origination--the
Hawaii Emergency Management Agency. These errors were human and
operational. There appears to have been a miscommunication between
personnel that fateful morning; there was an apparent deviation from
the script of the agency's drill procedure; there was a human failure
to recognize that a drill was being conducted. These problems were
compounded by a lack of safeguards to ensure that a false alert would
not be transmitted. There were no secondary checks to prevent one
person from mistakenly sending an alert to the entire state. There were
no software checks to differentiate between testing and live alert
environments. To make matters worse, it took a full 38 minutes to issue
an alert correction--and there were no preexisting systems to do so.
None of this is acceptable.
We need to do better. This is true in Hawaii and across the country
because false alerts have happened elsewhere--including in Polk County,
Iowa and Riverside County, California during the past year. In short,
it can happen anywhere.
So what can we do about it? We need ideas to fix these problems.
Here are mine.
First, state Emergency Alert System plans are filed with the FCC.
They are subject to annual confirmation. We should make this process a
meaningful one by making sure every plan is up to date. The Hawaii plan
was over a decade old. The FCC can help prevent this from happening by
serving as a convening force to report current best practices--
including security protocols--at the local, state, and Federal level
and then support their inclusion in annual filings.
Second, the FCC should know when false alerts occur. The FCC should
have a reporting system for false alerts--to learn when and where they
happen and to prevent them from happening again.
Third, the FCC should explore future alert capabilities, from
embedded multimedia to many-to-one communications enabling public
feedback. The agency also should also explore the viability of offering
alerts to audio and video streaming services.
Fourth--and I'm stepping out of my jurisdiction here--we need to
address failures at the alert origination point. To this end, the
Authenticating Local Emergencies and Real Threats (ALERT) Act of 2018
proposes important improvements, including clear lines of
responsibility when it comes to missile threats.
Let me close by thanking you for having me at this hearing. I look
forward to answering any questions you may have.
Senator Schatz. Thank you, Commissioner Rosenworcel.
I'll start with the first thing you talked about, the FCC
oversees this process in which states submit their plans. And
you said it's subject to annual confirmation. Is that just to
check to see that something is on file? In other words, it
sounds, from your language, that there's not a ton of analysis
that goes on, you're just checking to see that it has been
submitted and it is complete. Is that correct?
Ms. Rosenworcel. You're right.
Senator Schatz. OK. So it seems to me that the FCC has a
real opportunity to drive change here. And in the development
of the specifications for the EAS plan and the WEA plan, that
form can follow function--right?--that you can really develop
best practices by requiring something meaningful in the specs,
and I'm wondering if that's the direction that the Commission
is going right now.
Ms. Rosenworcel. I think that's a terrific idea, Senator.
It's certainly the direction I would like to see the agency go.
We're already requiring states to file these plans with us. We
should make that process a meaningful one. We can convene all
sorts of authorities, identify best practices, create a
checklist of those best practices, and induce states to follow
them through this filing process. I think that would help make
all of us safer going forward.
Senator Schatz. Do you have the capacity within the FCC to
provide this kind of technical expertise?
Ms. Rosenworcel. I believe we do. I've got to urge my
colleagues to agree with me.
Senator Schatz. OK. Thank you. I wanted to ask about the
problem that we found, as Members of Congress, as leaders in
the government, both State, Federal, and county, jammed phone
lines. Actually, members of the media as well, people trying to
call in to Hawaii News Now or KSSK, or I was trying to call
into PACOM, and phone lines were jammed. And it seems to me
that this is a absolutely solvable problem, and I'm wondering
if you can shed some light on that.
Ms. Rosenworcel. Sure. Most of our networks are built to
withstand capacity about 99 percent of the time. The problem is
when they are overloaded. Sometimes you can anticipate an
overload if there's a concert or a protest at a big event, and
networks can be adjusted with cellular service on wheels and
the like in order to take care of that excess capacity. But in
an emergency like this, you can't plan for it.
Federal, State, and local officials, though, are eligible
for the Government Emergency Telecommunications Service and
Wireless Priority Service programs. And I think as we review
what happened here in Hawaii, we should ask whether or not our
State authorities are taking advantage of those programs, which
help them get priority when networks are jammed.
Senator Schatz. I think this is a really important point,
and I would like this to be a takeaway probably for HI-EMA,
that the GETS card is available to government leaders. Many of
us didn't know that it existed. And so someone has got to
coordinate a process of determining who are the key leaders
that need--not everybody can get one of these cards. But
certainly the radio station of record, all four television
stations, your newspapers, Civil Beat, all of our media
partners, anybody at a high level of government and who has a
role in communicating to the public ought to be in possession
of a card that allows you to supersede anyone else's phone
call. That is no small thing because I think that 38 minutes
would have been a lot briefer had any of us had access to each
other.
Ms. Rosenworcel. Yes.
Senator Schatz. I want to talk a little bit about the
nature of these alerts. As we increasingly have cord cutters
and people who are watching--I'm sure they're watching
television in the sense that they're watching a show on a
screen, but they're not watching necessarily broadcast
television. So if you're on Hulu, Amazon, Netflix, you don't
get the alert over the screen. That's one question I have for
you. And then the second question has to do with whether or not
these things should be repeating and whether or not we want to
draw a distinction. In other words, if there's an incoming
ICBM, that thing--that alert should not run once, that should
be running constantly as a ticker, and, frankly, no one should
have any discretion to take it off the screen until we get an
``all clear,'' but if it's a flash flood on Kauai, you could
probably tell folks, you know, once every 5 minutes.
And so I wondering whether we can get to a more granular
place with all of that.
Ms. Rosenworcel. OK. Your first question. You know,
yesterday we were at Hawaii's Pacific University, and as I
looked at the students there, I thought, they're not watching
video the way I did when I was in school. They watch on
whatever screen is handy whenever they want. And I don't think
our Wireless Emergency Alert System or existing Emergency Alert
System for traditional media is really well calibrated to that
new watching reality. I don't think it's yet time to create new
obligations, but I think it is incumbent on the FCC to continue
to monitor those and continue to ask questions about them
because we need to make sure emergency information reaches
people where they are.
And then with respect to persistent alerts, this is a
really important point. In January of this year, with respect
to wireless emergency alerts, the FCC changed its policies to
make sure that any wireless emergency alert is available for 24
hours, and that's good because it speaks exactly to the problem
you described. But I see a gap with respect to traditional
media and broadcast and cable emergency alerts because those
can be on once, and if you didn't turn on the television when
they were on, you might have missed the most important
information that you need to receive.
Senator Schatz. Thank you very much.
Senator Hirono.
Senator Hirono. Thank you.
Can I--I have something to clarify, Commissioner. I think
you said that the FCC sets the technical requirements for WIAs
and some other communication networks?
Ms. Rosenworcel. For wireless emergency alerts, which are
associated with your mobile devices, the Emergency Alert
System, which is an outgrowth of the traditional Emergency
Broadcast System.
Senator Hirono. So when you were--when you were talking
just now about the new watching reality----
Ms. Rosenworcel. Yes.
Senator Hirono.--and people have all kinds of devices and
platforms and whatever else, as you reviewed what happened in
Hawaii and the complexities of how people get their information
and under what circumstances and what tools, have you also
begun to check on what is happening in terms of the
capabilities of other states to issue appropriate warnings?
Because I--the sense I have is that there is no state that is
prepared to respond to a ballistic missile threat. And Hawaii
did seek to institute such a system. But where are the other
states with regard to their ability to alert their people to a
missile strike?
Ms. Rosenworcel. I don't have specific information, but I
can tell you that my suspicion is the same as yours. I do not
believe other states are prepared. That's why I think the
legislation that's been introduced to make sure that ballistic
missile threats are alerted at the Federal level is so
important.
Senator Hirono. So if the responsibility for the alert goes
to the Federal Government, then do we need to institute a whole
new kind of a system of whatever the infrastructure is? Or how
do you see this happening?
Ms. Rosenworcel. I think that's an important conversation
to have with the Department of Homeland Security and the
Federal Emergency Management Agency, which oversees the IPAWS
system that generally gets those Federal alerts out, both
through traditional media and mobile devices.
Senator Hirono. So I think this is definitely a
conversation that involves a lot of different Federal
departments as well as the states because we would like to
have--I would like to see a system where you don't necessarily
have to create a whole new kind of infrastructure for alerts
because in Hawaii, yes, we do have a system for tsunami and
hurricane alerts and other natural disasters. So if we can
possibly make sure that the system would be in place or the
infrastructure would be in place, that makes sense to me.
In January, the FCC released a preliminary report from the
FCC's Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, which found
that a combination of human error and inadequate safeguards
contributed to the transmission of a false alert, and the
preliminary report recommended that the FCC partner with FEMA
to help implement best practices at the local, State, and
Federal level in an effort to improve our Emergency Alert
Systems across the board. Can you update us on how the
stakeholder engagement effort led by the FCC and FEMA is coming
along?
Ms. Rosenworcel. I have not been a part of those
conversations, though I believe it's absolutely paramount that
they occur. So I think that I would have to defer to the FCC
Chairman, who has probably been leading them at this point.
Senator Hirono. So is this something that you can pursue or
put to----
Ms. Rosenworcel. Absolutely. I would be----
Senator Hirono.--the FCC Chair? And then can this
Committee----
Ms. Rosenworcel. Yes. I would be happy to make sure that I
can get that information for you and follow up.
Senator Hirono.--receive a response? Now, there is also a
proposal, I think there's an--from the FCC to create a
reporting system for false alerts. Is that correct?
Ms. Rosenworcel. I believe that the FCC should have a
recording system for false alerts. We do not have one now. I
think if you don't study your errors, you will--you risk the
likelihood you will repeat them.
Senator Hirono. So I think it's important that you do get
the information about false alerts when they--after they've
occurred, I guess. Do you think it's also important for FCC to
know when false alerts occur in real time?
Ms. Rosenworcel. I think we're going to have to identify
what's the appropriate reporting practice because if there is a
false alert, I think the priority needs to be to make sure that
the individuals who received it get accurate information. I
don't want it to be a bureaucratic hassle associated with
reporting obligations to the FCC.
Senator Hirono. Yes.
Ms. Rosenworcel. But I do think we need to develop a record
when these happen because if we identify patterns of behavior
that are causing them to happen, we can take steps to make sure
they do not happen again.
Senator Hirono. So I recall that I was here when 9/11
occurred, and there were huge problems with interoperability of
the police department, the first responders, all of that. And I
don't even know if we have resolved those issues. I don't think
we've still gotten that down. And so here we are with this
potential missile attack, and you have all these different
first responders, you have different Federal agencies, and I
think that what Senator Schatz pointed out about our ability to
communicate with each other, I just--I think that is quite the
challenge to figure that out and to make sure that we are able
to communicate with each other. As I said, after 9/11, I'm not
sure that we've still resolved that issue.
Ms. Rosenworcel. I think you're absolutely right. I will
point out that there--since 2012 law passed by Congress, there
is now a process in place to make sure that all first
responders use the same 700 megahertz spectrum.
Senator Hirono. Yes.
Ms. Rosenworcel. And as a result, they will have common
interfaces and be able to talk to one another in ways they were
not able to on that fateful day.
Senator Hirono. And do you think we should have that kind
of capability with regard to missile attacks?
Ms. Rosenworcel. I just think we need a level of
coordination in order to ensure that people stay safe and they
get the information they need.
Senator Hirono. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Schatz. Congresswoman Hanabusa.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you, Senator Schatz.
Commissioner, welcome. I would like you to take a message
back to the Chair, Ajit Pai. He was very accommodating when
this happened and we put in a call, and he spent time on the
phone answering our questions. So please thank him.
I do have a follow up on something that you said about the
reporting of the false alerts. You mentioned the fact that it
has occurred in Polk County, Iowa, and Riverside, California.
Were there ICBM false alerts?
Ms. Rosenworcel. No.
Ms. Hanabusa. They weren't?
Ms. Rosenworcel. They were not.
Ms. Hanabusa. OK. So what kind of false alerts were they?
Ms. Rosenworcel. You know, I found them in news reports
because right after this occurred, I thought it would be
prudent to try to identify other places where this was
happening. One involved direction to shelter in place. Another
involved an emergency evacuation that was not necessary. I'm
confident there are other places. I think we have to develop a
way to study them comprehensively.
Ms. Hanabusa. So along those lines, do you know how long it
took to either retract or repeal those false alerts?
Ms. Rosenworcel. I don't have that information for you
right here right now. I could look for it for you, though.
Ms. Hanabusa. Because I--the Senator--I mean the
Representative from Riverside has never brought up that he had
one, so I was just curious.
Ms. Rosenworcel. No.
Ms. Hanabusa. I'll go back and ask him.
Ms. Rosenworcel. All right.
Ms. Hanabusa. The other thing that you said that I was
curious about was the fact that Hawaii's plan is over a decade
old. So if Hawaii's plan is over a decade old, as you know,
this whole issue of the ICBMs or ballistic missile alerts is
sort of recent. I don't think we're going back to the Cold War,
but basically that's what they did. So are we correct that
there has never been even a small update to say, ``And, by the
way, we're going to do a missile alert as part of our plan''?
Ms. Rosenworcel. Not to my knowledge.
Ms. Hanabusa. And what was the purpose of these plans?
Ms. Rosenworcel. Well, the purpose of these plans was
compliance with the FCC's Emergency Alert System obligations,
which apply to more traditional media, like broadcast and
radio. The act of filing them should be something more than
bureaucratic, though. The agency should be compelling State
actors in emergencies to come together, develop an up-to-date
modern plan, and then make those plans publicly available. We
can help states identify best practices and make those plans
much more effective in the event that something unthinkable
really does occur.
Ms. Hanabusa. So am I correct then in assuming that the FCC
or Department of Homeland Security, nobody has like a template
that says, ``Have you done this?'' or, ``Do you have any kind
of response in this case?'' There's nothing like that?
Ms. Rosenworcel. We have some categories, but it is not as
instructive, as you've just described. I think there would be a
lot of benefits in trying to develop that kind of checklist of
best practices.
Ms. Hanabusa. And as we spoke about this earlier, yes,
there are different kinds of disasters, and, of course
ballistic missile attack is, in my opinion, a separate
category. So would this type of alert system identify all these
different kinds of disasters and what is it that a particular
state or subcounty or whoever it is that's responding to this
is doing?
Ms. Rosenworcel. I think what we're starting to recognize
is that ballistic missile attacks are a completely different
category in the panic that ensues and also in the damage that
could occur, and we might need to treat those differently. So
for all of you who have introduced legislation or supported
legislation to do so, I think that's a really good idea.
Ms. Hanabusa. So back to this report, I'm just curious,
because I can't imagine that our report is a decade old, whose
responsibility is it to file that report?
Ms. Rosenworcel. You know, it's generally the State
Emergency Communications Committee, and that is done
differently in different states, but, again, the process of
filing it just shouldn't be bureaucratic. The agency shouldn't
just take them online and put them on a dusty shelf; we should
be making that process meaningful and we should be helping
states along the way by identifying current best practices that
make those plans effective.
Ms. Hanabusa. And in the time I have left, I would like for
you to address, Do you believe, for example, that if there was
a lead taken by DoD or Homeland Security on the issue of a
ballistic missile attack, that somehow that there would be
difficulties in interfacing that with the existing system on
all of the alerts that we have? Would it be possibly two
separate entities that would be triggering the actual alert?
Ms. Rosenworcel. It is essential for something like a
ballistic missile attack that we coordinate. Anything less is
unacceptable.
Ms. Hanabusa. So you don't see a problem with that.
Ms. Rosenworcel. We're going to have to find a way to do
it.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you. And the other, just quickly, you
did say that you want a process where no one can take off a
message----
Ms. Rosenworcel. Yes.
Ms. Hanabusa.--if it's put on? I guess the other time is--
you know what the problem in Hawaii was, they tried to contact
FEMA, which they didn't have to contact, and as a result,
that's one of the explanations for the 38-minute delay.
Ms. Rosenworcel. That's right. That's exactly right.
Ms. Hanabusa. So you anticipate, I assume, that if it's
false, that there will be a quick way to withdraw it.
Ms. Rosenworcel. Well, the idea of filing a plan is any
plan should include, What are your procedures if a false alert
goes out? Know immediately how fast you can correct that alert,
and what forms of social media you might use to make sure that
you bolster that information and it gets out there. So any
proper plan should include that. And if there's a takeaway from
the experience we just had, it's very clear that that is a
necessary element of any plan that's filed.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you, Commissioner.
Thank you, Senator Schatz.
Senator Schatz. Congresswoman Gabbard.
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you.
Thank you for your testimony. A follow-up again to the
decade-old EAS plan. You know, you talked about the annual
confirmation that's required. Was the situation here that
Hawaii just submitted the same decade-old plan every year, and
that was confirmed by the FCC's receipt, or was it that there
was no updated plan or plan submitted at all?
Ms. Rosenworcel. I think it was just an annual obligation
to just say, ``Yes, this is our plan, and it continues.'' I
would describe that as benign neglect.
Ms. Gabbard. And right now, that is all that's required by
the FCC's annual confirmation, is that a plan exists.
Ms. Rosenworcel. Exactly.
Ms. Gabbard. What kind of oversight would you recommend to
make sure that these plans are current and up to date?
Ms. Rosenworcel. Well, the FCC is a terrific convening
force. We could set up a blue ribbon panel. We could have
experts from multiple states, including states that have
experienced false alerts, come together and say these are the
key elements of an effective plan. We could assess them,
identify a checklist of best practices, and then encourage
every state that files with us to comply with them. And over
time, to the extent they don't, we should incentivize them to
do so. We can also work with our colleagues at FEMA, which
oversees the IPAWS process, which sends out alerts, to make
sure that they have comparable memoranda of understanding or
work with their State actors to make sure we are all growing in
the same direction and making those plans up to date and
effective.
Ms. Gabbard. And is there currently any form of recourse or
accountability measure that the FCC has if a state is not in
compliance?
Ms. Rosenworcel. No, I don't believe so.
Ms. Gabbard. With regard to the Wireless Emergency Alert
System, I think what came to light was that wireless providers
are not required or obligated to participate, so it's a
voluntary program where a wireless carrier can either
participate in whole or in part. Why is this not an obligation?
Why is this optional?
Ms. Rosenworcel. The Warning Alert and Response Network Act
makes it voluntary.
Ms. Gabbard. OK.
Ms. Rosenworcel. So to change that would require a change
in law.
Ms. Gabbard. And I wrote a letter to Chairman Pai about
tracking--right?--how do we know how many of these carriers
participate in whole versus in part? And he sent a reply
basically saying that it is tracked which carriers participate
and whether it's in whole or in part, but for those who
participate in part, there is no current mechanism to track
what geographic areas may or may not be covered.
So for us here in Hawaii, Chairman Pai confirmed that the
FCC is not aware of any eligible wireless provider that is--has
elected not to participate, but those who have chosen to
participate in part, there is no current collection of
information with regards to what geographic areas are covered
or not.
Can you comment on what I see is a big problem in that our
residents don't know if their carriers are covering them where
they live or work?
Ms. Rosenworcel. I agree with you, that's a problem. I
think we need to figure out where coverage exists and does not.
There are three ways I think you could do that.
Like I mentioned at the outset, you could change the
Warning Alert and Response Network Act, which makes this wholly
voluntary.
Second, you could follow up with the FCC and ask us, in
light of your earlier correspondence, to reach out to every
carrier that serves in Hawaii and ask, ``Please tell us, where
do you serve and not serve? Are there certain islands, for
instance, where residents are likely to be left behind?''
And then, third, you could also write the carriers directly
because I'm confident that they do have this information, and I
think it's important for emergency planning purposes that
Federal and State officials who represent the state have it.
Ms. Gabbard. Yes, absolutely. We talked a little bit
earlier about streaming services and the changing technology
and how people are getting access to media. While this is a big
shift in change that needs to be addressed, has--do you know if
the FCC has started kind of studying this and how this
technology could be used to get these emergency alerts out
there?
Ms. Rosenworcel. I think it's important for the FCC not
just to think about the present, but to think about the future
and how we interact with media and how we make sure everyone
gets the information they need. There's a lot more we could do
with multimedia alerts, so that the alert that comes to your
phone might, for instance, have a picture of an area that's
dangerous or a suspect for whom public safety officials want to
know some information. We can also do new activities with many-
to-one communications, which allows feedback from the public
that receives emergency alerts. And we should be exploring how
the ways that we're consuming media are different today and how
we make sure people get information over those new means.
Whether or not we have the authority, I think we have the
responsibility to explore what these alerts should look like in
the future so that we can inform all of you if we need changes
in the law to make that happen.
Ms. Gabbard. Great. Thank you so much.
Senator Schatz. I want to thank Ms. Rosenworcel for her
testimony and bring in the second panel. And I will introduce
them as they are walking up and our staff is putting the
information in front of their seats.
We have Rear Admiral Patrick Piercey of U.S. Pacific
Command, United States Department of Defense; we have Ms.
Nicole McGinnis, Deputy Chief, Public Safety and Homeland
Security Bureau of the FCC; and Mr. Antwane Johnson, Director,
Continuity Communications Division, Federal Emergency
Management Agency.
And we'll start on my left with Rear Admiral Piercey.
STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL PATRICK A. PIERCEY, UNITED STATES
PACIFIC COMMAND, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Admiral Piercey. Senator Schatz and distinguished members
of the Hawaii delegation, thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you today. As part of the Hawaii ohana, we at
PACOM share the concerns raised by the false ballistic missile
alert broadcast by the State of Hawaii on an otherwise quiet
Saturday morning in these tranquil islands.
PACOM works hand-in-hand with Federal and State agencies
both in times of calm and in times of crisis to defend our
homeland and our citizens. This is PACOM's enduring
responsibility and Admiral Harris' Number One priority.
While the false alert broadcast by the State of Hawaii was
unfortunate, the event also served to underscore the
complexities facing not only the State of Hawaii, but also all
50 states when it comes to alerting the public of a possible
North Korean missile attack and also provide--however, also
provided a valuable learning opportunity.
Other states can look to the proactive leadership and
engaged approach the State of Hawaii has demonstrated to
prepare for the new normal, specifically, living under the
threat of a North Korean missile attack. This event is likely
to strengthen its capability to notify the public in any future
emergency situation.
Perhaps as importantly, this event provides an opportunity
to collectively assess and refine our internal notification and
coordination processes in civil defense scenarios to ensure
command and component preparedness. To this end, PACOM will
continue to maintain a close relationship with the State of
Hawaii. PACOM will again participate in a triannual Defense
Support of Civil Authorities Executive Steering Board designed
to facilitate, coordinate, align, and prioritize support of
DSCA efforts.
With reference to the 13 January incident, USPACOM's review
of actions validated the fact that this alert was not generated
through DoD channels. It was, in fact, a false alarm generated
by the State of Hawaii. USPACOM assisted the State of Hawaii by
validating that this alert was false and communicating the same
to the military components in Hawaii.
As the State of Hawaii has no means to independently detect
a missile launch, the proper sequencing of ballistic missile
notification to the State of Hawaii authorities is from FEMA to
HI-EMA. Simultaneously, USPACOM validates the occurrence of a
launch to HI-EMA and notifies other DoD command centers in the
Pacific via classified conference call.
PACOM remains in close coordination with HI-EMA, FEMA
Region IX, U.S. Northern Command, and Department of Defense
stakeholders to gather lessons learned, identify areas
requiring improvement, and refine notification processes.
Of the things that went well, perhaps most importantly, the
event validated the importance of the existing missile
notification coordination between civil and military
authorities. Emergency management spanning the spectrum of
State and local governments and communities is a core mission
of the State of Hawaii, and PACOM will continue to work in
close coordination to ensure the effective synchronization,
integration, and coordination of disaster prevention,
protection, mitigation, response, and recovery efforts. This
coordination has taken place since 2009 and has been used
during every ballistic missile event.
PACOM learned from this experience as well. In response to
HI-EMA's false alert, missile alert, PACOM has taken action to
ensure senior leaders maintain the ability to contact the PACOM
Joint Operations Center, the JOC, regardless of call volume.
PACOM is also coordinating with HI-EMA and has added the JOC to
their AlertSense system distribution, which transmits emergency
alerts via unclassified e-mail. Additionally, to facilitate
expediency of information flow, HI-EMA was added as a
participant to the classified USPACOM conference call, allowing
for near simultaneous validation and redundant notification
from the initial report that HI-EMA receives from FEMA.
PACOM stands ready today to provide defense support to
civil authorities, emergency management drills, alerts,
exercises, and response operations within the Hawaiian Islands.
Moving forward, we will continue to exercise missile
notification procedures with HI-EMA and will continue to
support Nation State Threat planning for ballistic missile
notification and response, to include integration with FEMA's
National Warning System.
Thank you for your enduring support to PACOM's team and our
families who live and work in the Indo-Pacific.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Harris follows:]
Prepared Statement of Admiral Harry B. Harris Jr., U.S. Navy Commander,
U.S. Pacific Command
Chairman Thune, Ranking Member Nelson, and distinguished members of
the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to submit this written
statement and also allowing Rear Admiral Patrick Piercey, U.S. Pacific
Command's (USPACOM) Director of Operations (J3), to appear on my behalf
before you today as a subject matter expert. During my time at USPACOM,
I have had the tremendous honor of serving with the almost 400,000
Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, Airmen, Coast Guardsmen, and Department of
Defense (DoD) civilians standing watch for America's largest and most
diverse geographic combatant command. I am grateful for these men and
women, and to their families, for their hard work and devotion to duty.
I'm humbled to serve alongside them.
Since its inception in 1947, USPACOM and the joint military forces
assigned to it protect the U.S., its territories, its people, and its
interests throughout the Indo-Pacific region. To accomplish this,
USPACOM works hand-in-hand with the other U.S. government agencies in
this region to defend our homeland and our citizens. This is USPACOM's
enduring responsibility and my #1 priority. The path to security is
based on our commitments to mutual interests and partnerships,
continuous military presence, and global readiness.
While it is unfortunate that the State of Hawaii erred in
broadcasting a ballistic missile threat notification on Saturday, 13
January 2018, the event also provided a valuable learning opportunity.
Other states can look to the proactive leadership and engaged approach
the State of Hawaii has demonstrated to prepare for the new normal--
specifically, living under threat of a North Korean missile attack.
Perhaps more importantly, this event provides an opportunity to
collectively assess and refine our internal notification/coordination
processes in civil defense scenarios to ensure command and component
preparedness. To this end, USPACOM will continue to maintain a close
relationship with the State of Hawaii. USPACOM will again participate
in the triannual Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) Executive
Steering Board (ESB) designed to facilitate, coordinate, align and
prioritize support of DSCA efforts.
With reference to the 13 January 2018 incident, USPACOM's review of
actions validated the fact that this alert was not generated through
DoD channels. It was, in fact, a false alarm generated by the State of
Hawaii. USPACOM assisted the State of Hawaii by validating that this
alert was false and communicating the same to the military components
in Hawaii. A timeline of the incident is as follows:
0807: An employee of the Hawaii Emergency Management Agency
(HI-EMA) broadcasted the following emergency alert through the
Emergency Alert System (EAS) and Wireless Emergency Alert (WEA)
system across the state of Hawaii:
Emergency Alert
BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT INBOUND TO HAWAII.
SEEK IMMEDIATE SHELTER.
THIS IS NOT A DRILL.
0810: State Adjutant General, Major Gen. Joe Logan,
contacted USPACOM to confirm there was no missile launch.
0812: HI-EMA initiated cancellation messages.
0813: The state issued an internal cancellation of the
warning to prevent the false alert message from being broadcast
further.
0820: HI-EMA tweeted ``NO missile threat to Hawaii.''
0823: HI-EMA posted ``NO missile threat to Hawaii. False
alarm. We're currently investigating'' on Facebook.
0823: Following confirmation with USPACOM Joint Operations
Center (JOC) Director that there was no threat, USPACOM sent an
on-the-record statement via e-mail to Hawaii and national
media: ``USPACOM has detected no ballistic missile threat to
Hawaii. Earlier message was sent in error. State of Hawaii will
send out a correction message as soon as possible.'' A similar
message was posted to USPACOM social media within minutes.
0824: Hawaii Governor David Ige retweeted HI-EMA's 0820
tweet, noting: ``There is NO missile threat.''
0825: Commander Navy Region Hawaii issued a radio broadcast
to all ships in port stating the alert was a ``false alarm.''
0830: Hawaii Governor David Ige posted: ``NO missile threat
to Hawaii'' on Facebook.
0835: HI-EMA initiated cancellation messages to the public.
0835: Governor Ige shared HI-EMA's Facebook post: ``NO
missile threat to Hawaii. False alarm. We're currently
investigating.''
0845: HI-EMA broadcasted EAS and WEA messages confirming the
initial notification was a ``False Alarm'' and ``There is no
missile threat or danger to the State of Hawaii.''
Overall, 38 minutes transpired (0807 to 0845) before HI-EMA
retracted the false emergency alert of a ballistic missile inbound to
Hawaii by the same communication channels as the original alert (EAS
and WEA).
As the State of Hawaii has no means to independently detect a
missile launch, the proper sequencing of ballistic missile notification
to State of Hawaii authorities is from the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) to HI-EMA. Simultaneously, USPACOM validates the
occurrence of a launch to HI-EMA and notifies other DoD command centers
in the Pacific via a classified conference call.
USPACOM remains in close coordination with HI-EMA, FEMA Region IX,
U.S. Northern Command, and DoD stakeholders to gather lessons learned,
identify areas requiring improvement and refine notification processes.
Of the things that went well, perhaps most importantly, the event
validated the importance of coordination between civil and military
authorities. Emergency management spanning the spectrum of state and
local governments and communities is a core mission of the State of
Hawaii, and USPACOM will continue to work in close coordination to
ensure the effective synchronization, integration, and coordination of
disaster prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery
efforts. This coordination has taken place since 2009 and has been used
during every ballistic-missile event.
USPACOM learned from this experience as well. For example, we
discovered that the USPACOM JOC, as configured at the time of the
event, was unable to receive unclassified Short Message Service texts
and, as such, did not directly receive the erroneous missile warning or
the following cancellation messages on 13 January.
USPACOM also identified an inefficiency in the reporting process
which, in addition to the notification requirements maintained by the
USPACOM JOC, required a separate unclassified phone call to HI-EMA
designed to provide validation to the notification report HI-EMA
receives from FEMA.
Additionally, the event highlighted the importance of maintaining
an independent and dedicated unclassified line into the JOC for senior
USPACOM leaders to communicate in the event of an emergency, regardless
of call volume.
In response to the HI-EMA's false missile alert, the following
USPACOM actions have been implemented:
Two unclassified dedicated conference calls (Commander's
Conference Call and Director's Conference Call) have been
established to ensure USPACOM senior leaders maintain the
ability to contact the JOC regardless of call volume.
The first dedicated unclassified conference call is the
Commander's Conference Call which uses a USPACOM Bridge
(managed by the USPACOM Command, Control, Communications and
Cyber Director) and is limited to senior USPACOM personnel, to
include the Commander, Deputy Commander, their designated
principals, and the JOC Director (Conference Manager).
The second dedicated unclassified conference call is the
Director's Conference Call which allows for a greater number of
conference participants and is managed by the JOC Operations
Officer (Conference Manager).
To ensure the USPACOM JOC has the ability to receive HI-EMA
alerts, USPACOM has coordinated with HI-EMA to add the JOC to
their AlertSense system distribution which transmits emergency
alert via unclassified e-mail. The e-mail messages have the
same content as the cell phone alerts and display on the
unclassified consoles of the JOC watchstanders.
To facilitate expediency of information flow, HI-EMA was
added as a participant to the classified USPACOM conference
call, the Pacific Missile Defense Event Conference, allowing
for near-simultaneous validation and redundant notification
from the initial report that HI-EMA receives from FEMA.
While the false ballistic missile threat notification event was
unfortunate, it served to underscore the complexities facing not only
the State of Hawaii, but all 50 states, when it comes to alerting the
public of a possible ballistic missile attack. The State of Hawaii has
taken a proactive approach in this regard, and this event is likely to
strengthen its capability to notify the public in any future emergency
situation.
USPACOM stands ready today to provide DSCA for emergency management
drills, alerts, exercises and response operations within the Hawaiian
Islands. Moving forward, we will continue to exercise missile
notification procedures with HI-EMA and will continue to support Nation
State Threat planning for ballistic missile notification and response,
to include integration with FEMA's National Warning System.
Thank you for your enduring support to the USPACOM team and our
families who live and work in the Indo-Pacific.
Senator Schatz. Thank you.
Ms. McGinnis.
STATEMENT OF NICOLE McGINNIS, DEPUTY CHIEF,
PUBLIC SAFETY AND HOMELAND SECURITY BUREAU,
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Ms. McGinnis. Good morning, Senator Schatz and members of
the Hawaii congressional delegation, and thank you for the
opportunity to testify before you today.
The false alert warning of an imminent ballistic missile
attack issued on January 13 by the State of Hawaii was
unacceptable. But as unfortunate as this incident was, alert
messaging remains an essential tool for protecting the lives of
all Americans. The Commission is committed to doing everything
within our legal authority and in coordination with our
Federal, State, and local partners, to ensure that our Nation's
alert messaging tools are available and used properly when they
are needed most.
The Commission acted swiftly in the wake of this incident
to open an investigation into this matter. As part of its
investigation, the Bureau has coordinated with the Hawaii
Emergency Management Agency, or HI-EMA; with the Federal
Emergency Management Agency, FEMA; as well as with industry;
and has conducted several interviews with stakeholders.
The Bureau expects to release its final report in the near
future. The final report will provide an analysis of the facts
gathered from our independent investigation, and incorporates
facts developed in a separate report that's been prepared by
HI-EMA. We expect that the final report will confirm the
Bureau's preliminary findings. The false alert in Hawaii and
HI-EMA's delay in correcting it was due to a combination of
human error and their lack of effective operating procedures
and safeguards.
In my testimony today, I'd like to highlight a few of the
report's anticipated key findings and lessons learned.
First, human error occurred on many levels. For example,
one error was the use of an incorrect drill recording that
erroneously contained language from the EAS message for a live
ballistic missile alert. This contributed to the additional
error made by the employee responsible for issuing the alert,
who has stated that he mistakenly believed that the alert was
real.
Another error was the miscommunication between the outgoing
and incoming shift supervisors as to which shift would be
conducting the test. The day shift supervisor mistakenly
believed that the midnight shift would be conducting the test,
resulting in the drill being conducted by the day shift without
supervision.
Second, the procedures to prevent or correct the false
alert were not adequate. For example, HI-EMA lacked procedures
to present--prevent a single person from mistakenly issuing a
live ballistic missile alert. Given that the employee issuing
the alert was the only one under the mistaken impression that
the event was real, requiring signoff of a second warning
officer would have prevented this false alert.
The checklist used during the January 13 exercise also
lacked any protocol for correcting a false alert with an ``all
clear'' or similar message to the public. In addition, the
software failed to adequately distinguish between test
environments and live alerting environments. Clear protocols
for not just cancellation, but for prompt correction of a false
alert over the same systems used to issue the alert would have
reduced the public panic that ensued in the extensive time
following the false alert.
The report will also examine the performance of the
Emergency Alert System, or EAS, and Wireless Emergency Alert,
or WEA, system participants. As the report will explain in
greater detail, these technical systems generally broadcast the
alerts as designed. Where the alert was not transmitted by the
EAS, we understand that those protocols are being addressed to
ensure transmission in the future.
With respect to WEA, we have heard issues regarding whether
some consumer devices appropriately received and displayed the
alerts. While there are multiple reasons why this could have
been the case that are not system failures, for example, if the
consumer was on a 3G call or data session during the relatively
short active duration of the alert, we are continuing to study
this issue.
The most important outcome of this investigation, however,
is the identification of lessons learned and best practices to
prevent this type of mistake from occurring in the future. The
final report will offer recommendations to State, local,
Tribal, and Territorial emergency alert originators and
managers to minimize the risk of similar incidents occurring in
the future. HI-EMA has already implemented or has--or is in the
process of implementing many of these.
I would like to highlight a few of the key recommendations,
which will include conducting regular internal tests in a
controlled and closed environment, such as FEMA's Integrate
Public--Integrated Public Alert and Warning System, or IPAWS,
Test Lab; requiring more than one credentialed person to
validate message content prior to the transmission of high-
impact alerts; implementing specific upgrades to alerting
software to separate live from test alerting environments;
developing and memorializing standard operating procedures for
responding to false alerts, including issuing corrections using
the same system that was sent to issue the false alert; and
consulting with State Emergency Communications Committees on a
regular basis at least annually to ensure that EAS procedures
are mutually understood, agreed upon, and documented in the
State EAS plan.
The Bureau intends to follow up on these recommendations by
engaging in additional outreach in coordination with our
partners at FEMA to encourage the use of these best practices,
including a planned webinar and roundtable.
Again, I thank you for the opportunity to testify before
you today and look forward to any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. McGinnis follows:]
Prepared Statement of Nicole McGinnis, Deputy Chief, Public Safety and
Homeland Security Bureau, Federal Communications Commission
Good morning Senator Schatz and members of the Hawaii Congressional
delegation, and thank you for the opportunity to testify before you
today.
The false alert warning of an imminent ballistic missile attack
issued on January 13 by the State of Hawaii was unacceptable. It
resulted in widespread panic, which was exacerbated by a delay of
nearly 40 minutes before a correction was issued through proper
alerting channels. False alerts like this one can shake the public's
trust in alert messaging, and ultimately jeopardize the public's safety
in times of real emergency.
But as unfortunate as this incident was, alert messaging remains an
essential tool for protecting the lives of all Americans. The
Commission is committed to doing everything within its legal authority,
and in coordination with our federal, state, and local partners, to
ensure that our Nation's alert messaging tools are available and used
properly when they are needed most.
The Commission acted swiftly in the wake of this incident in Hawaii
to open an investigation into the matter. Since this Committee's
hearing on January 25, the Bureau presented its preliminary findings to
the Commission on January 30 and submitted that presentation to this
Committee for the record. As part of its investigation, the Bureau has
coordinated with the Hawaii Emergency Management Agency (HI-EMA), the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and industry and has
conducted many interviews with stakeholders.
The Bureau is finalizing its final report and expects to release it
in the near future. We would be pleased to submit that report in its
entirety to the Committee upon its release. The final report will
provide an analysis of the facts gathered from our independent
investigation and will incorporate facts developed in a separate report
prepared by HI-EMA. We expect that the final report will confirm the
Bureau's preliminary findings: The false alert in Hawaii and HI-EMA's
delay in correcting it was due to a combination of human error and the
lack of effective operating procedures and safeguards.
In my testimony today, I'd like to highlight some of the final
report's anticipated key findings and lessons learned.
First, human error occurred on many levels. For example, one error
was the use of a recording to initiate the drill that contained the
text of an EAS message for a live ballistic missile alert, including
the language, ``THIS IS NOT A DRILL.'' While the recorded message also
contained the language ``EXERCISE EXERCISE EXERCISE,'' the employee
tasked with issuing the alert submitted a written statement to HI-EMA
stating that he mistakenly believed the exercise was, in fact, a real
event. This failure to hear and/or properly understand the instructions
indicating the exercise was a test was clear human error. Another error
was the result of miscommunication between the outgoing and incoming
shift supervisors as to which shift would perform the test during the
shift change. The midnight shift supervisor did not provide the day
supervisor with written notice of the test, and only mentioned it to
the day supervisor minutes before the drill was conducted. The day
shift supervisor assumed that the drill would be run by the midnight
shift, and did not understand that the drill would involve the day
shift. Because of this miscommunication, the day shift supervisor was
not in the watch center at the time of the drill, and it was conducted
without supervision.
Second, the procedures to prevent or correct the false alarm were
not adequate. For example, HI-EMA lacked procedures to prevent a single
person from mistakenly issuing a live missile alert. Given that the
employee issuing the alert was the only one under the mistaken
impression that the event was real, requiring sign off of a second
warning officer would have prevented the false alert. Equally
significant, the checklist used during the January 13 exercise lacked
any protocol for correcting a false alert with an ``all clear'' or
similar message to the public. Clear protocols for not just
cancellation, but also for prompt correction of a false alert over the
same systems used to issue the alert would have reduced the public
panic that ensued in the extensive time following the false alert.
The final report will also detail the Bureau's findings with
respect to the how the emergency alert system (EAS) participants and
participating wireless emergency alert (WEA) providers transmitted the
message. The majority of EAS participants received the alert within
seconds and retransmitted it. From a technical perspective, this was
exactly as the system is designed to work. Those that did not relay the
alert did not have their equipment set to ``auto-forward'' the message,
which we understand is being addressed and that such messages will now
be auto-forwarded going forward. The four nationwide wireless carriers
offering service in Hawaii also received and transmitted the WEA alert
within seconds. Neither EAS nor WEA is designed such that a carrier or
participant would have the discretion to question whether an alert was
erroneous. Although reports suggest that some consumers did not receive
the alert, there are several reasons why this might have been the case,
including lack of access to a wireless signal or having the device
powered off during the time the alert was sent and cancelled, which
would have impacted the receipt of the message. In addition, some
handsets are not WEA capable, and consumers may also opt out of non-
Presidential alerts. None of these are flaws in the operation of the
system.
The most important outcome of this investigation, however, is the
identification of lessons learned and best practices to prevent this
type of a mistake from occurring in the future.
In this respect, the final report will offer recommendations to
state, local, Tribal, and territorial emergency alert originators and
managers to minimize the risk of similar incidents occurring in the
future. HI-EMA is already implementing or has implemented many of these
anticipated recommendations. Among others, these recommendations will
include:
Conducting regular internal tests in a controlled and closed
environment, such as the FEMA's Integrated Public Alert and
Warning System (IPAWS) Test Lab. This will enable staff to
maintain proficiency with alerting tools and to exercise plans
and procedures in a manner that does not affect the public;
Requiring more than one credentialed person to validate
message content prior to transmission of high-impact alerts
that affect a significant percentage of the population;
Implementing specific upgrades to alerting software to
separate live environments from test environments, including
clearer prompting language distinguishing live and test
messages;
Developing and memorializing standard operating procedures
for responding to false alerts within their jurisdictions,
including specifying that corrections to false alerts must be
issued over the same systems used to issue the false alert,
including the EAS and WEA, as well as other available means;
and
Consulting with state emergency communications committees
(SECCs) on a regular basis--at least annually--to ensure that
EAS procedures, including initiation and cancellation of actual
alerts and tests, are mutually understood, agreed upon, and
documented in the State EAS Plan.
The final report will also make recommendations addressing the
incorporation of social media within standard operating procedures,
notifying the media of false alerts, establishing redundant lines of
communications, and use of priority communications tools.
The Bureau intends to follow up on these recommendations by
engaging in additional outreach, in coordination with our partners at
FEMA, to encourage the use of these best practices, including a planned
webinar and roundtable.
Finally, the Commission continues to work to improve EAS and WEA.
For example, the Commission recently adopted new rules that require
State EAS Plans be updated annually and be filed in a streamlined
electronic database, the Alert Reporting System. By replacing paper-
based filing requirements and coordinating State EAS Plan information
in this manner, administering the EAS at the state level will be more
clear and consistent. We hope to release that item soon.
Again, I thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today
and look forward to any questions you may have.
Senator Schatz. Thank you very much.
Mr. Johnson, with FEMA.
STATEMENT OF ANTWANE JOHNSON, DIRECTOR, CONTINUITY
COMMUNICATIONS, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Johnson. Thank you. Senator Schatz and distinguished
members of the Hawaii congressional delegation, good morning.
My name is Antwane Johnson, and I am the Director of Continuity
Communications at FEMA.
On behalf of Secretary Nielsen and Administrator Long,
thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to
discuss the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System, also
known as IPAWS, and how it is used to save lives across the
country.
An effective and timely public alert and warning system is
critical to communicating threats to public safety and
providing people with guidance during times of crisis. At FEMA,
we manage IPAWS--IPAWS and its two main components: warnings
and communications from the President in the event of a
catastrophic national emergency through the National Public
Warning System, and geotargeted alerts sent from Federal,
State, local, Tribal, and Territorial officials during
emergencies, such as those issued last year during the
hurricanes and wildfires.
IPAWS allows these alerting authorities to send emergency
messages to people in their geographic jurisdiction by
Emergency Alert System broadcasts through radio and TV,
Wireless Emergency Alerts to cell phones, and other Internet-
connected services. Today, IPAWS supports more than 1,000
Federal, State, local, Tribal, and Territorial users;
connections to more than 26,000 radio, TV, and cable
connections; 63 cellular carrier gateways reaching millions of
cell phones; as well as 73 Internet vendors that tap into the
alert feed. And we established a connection with--between IPAWS
and Canada's multiagency situational awareness system for the
exchange and sharing of disaster information.
Since inception of the system in 2012, there have been
nearly 3 million messages disseminated through IPAWS. These
messages, which cover everything from a natural disaster to
active shooter to missing children and planned power outages,
help communicate critical lifesaving information to the public.
For example, in September 2016, New York City sent a Wireless
Emergency Alert with an electronic ``Wanted'' poster to
identify a suspect in connection with bombings in Manhattan and
New Jersey. The suspect was captured within hours.
Last year, Wireless Emergency Alerts were used by officials
to issue warnings and evacuation orders across Texas, Florida,
and California, in response to hurricanes and wildfires.
Significantly, since 2012, 53 kidnapped children have been
reunited with their loved ones after AMBER Alerts were issued
through the system and members of the community helped law
enforcement locate perpetrators.
In addition to managing the IPAWS program, FEMA helps train
users and create guidance for alerting authorities and software
tool vendors. It is important to note that while FEMA manages
the IPAWS system, we rely on our State and local partners to
originate communications to their jurisdictions, as they are
the boots on the ground that are best able to communicate the
threats they face and provide specific protective action
information related to their area.
Following direction from Congress and the IPAWS
Modernization Act of 2015, FEMA has established a subcommittee
to the National Advisory Council. The subcommittee includes
members from State, local, and Tribal governments and
communications service providers; organizations representing
individuals with disabilities or limited English proficiency;
and others.
This committee is consulting with IPAWS users and experts
to consider new and developing technologies that may be
beneficial to IPAWS and the Nation. The subcommittee will
develop recommendations on matters related to common alert and
warning protocols, standards, terminology, and operating
procedures. Through this subcommittee, we are looking at recent
uses of the system, including use during the 2017 natural
disasters, as well as the false alert in Hawaii. To identify
lessons learned and best practices to fold into these
recommendations, the IPAWS subcommittee report will be
available by spring 2019.
FEMA continues to assist State and local agencies with
their specific training requirements. In the last year, FEMA
assisted multiple State and local agencies with IPAWS-specific
training, testing, and exercise requirements during 115
separate engagements. Two of those trainings were with Hawaii
Emergency Management Agency prior to the false missile alert.
Additionally, FEMA IPAWS is also working with the Emergency
Management Institute, National Exercise Division, and Director
of the FEMA National Incident Management System program to
incorporate public alert and warning training, tests, and
exercises, into the NIMS program.
This month, FEMA will launch an online collaborative forum
to enable alerting authorities and software developers to share
best practices, operating procedures, and safeguards, and
alerting concepts for their communities.
FEMA is assisting states with guidance on the type of
alerts a state may wish to include in their State warning
plans, and alert and warning template tailoring according to
each state's specific needs.
This month, FEMA will issue recommendations to vendors to
address functionality issues to clearly illustrate when
alerting originators are in the test or lab environment.
I look forward to continuing to work with Congress and
provide updates as we move forward with recommendations to
continue to modernize the system and our processes. I am
grateful for the opportunity to appear before you today. And I
am happy to respond to any questions the Subcommittee may have
at this time.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Johnson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Antwane Johnson, Director,
Continuity Communications, Federal Emergency Management Agency,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Introduction
Good morning Chairman Thune, Ranking Member Nelson, and Members of
the Committee. My name is Antwane Johnson, and I am the Director of
Continuity Communications within the National Continuity Programs
Directorate (NCP) at the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). On
behalf of FEMA Administrator Brock Long and John Veatch, the Assistant
Administrator for NCP, I appreciate the opportunity to speak today on
the importance of the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System
(IPAWS), how the system was used during the events of January 13, 2018,
and the steps we are taking to improve the system.
What is IPAWS?
An effective, timely, and far-reaching public alert and warning
system is critical to communicating threats to public safety and
providing people with guidance during times of crisis.
Executive Order 13407 and The IPAWS Modernization Act of 2015
define FEMA's responsibility to provide a public alert and warning
system. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance
Act directs FEMA to provide technical assistance to state, local,
tribal, and territorial (SLTT) governments to ensure that timely and
effective disaster warning is provided. In accordance with these
statutes, IPAWS was created to enhance and extend a national
infrastructure and capability to SLTT officials for public alert and
warning.
IPAWS is a national warning infrastructure that provides a single
interface for public safety officials to alert and warn the public
about emergencies. There are two main system components:
(1) IPAWS supports warnings and communications from the
President in the event of a catastrophic national emergency.
The President can reach the American people through the
National Public Warning System, where the message is
transmitted through FEMA Primary Entry Point (PEP) radio
stations and Emergency Alert System (EAS) radio television, and
cable stations.
(2) IPAWS also supports geo-targeted alerts sent from federal,
local, state, tribal, and territorial officials during
emergencies, such as those issued last year by Florida and
Texas, in anticipation of hurricanes Harvey, and Irma.
These federal, local, state, tribal, or territorial alerting
authorities can, via the ``IPAWS OPEN'' gateway, send emergency
messages to people in their geographic jurisdiction by radio and TV
Emergency Alert System (EAS) broadcasts, Wireless Emergency Alerts
(WEA) to cell phones, broadcasts from National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) Weather Radios, and other IPAWS internet-
connected services. The DHS Science and Technology Directorate (S&T)
conducted research to improve geo-targeting capabilities and public
response to alerts and warnings, through funding provided by the
Department of Commerce's National Telecommunications and Information
Administration. Today, IPAWS supports more than 26,000 radio, TV, and
cable EAS connections, 63 cellular carrier gateways reaching millions
of cell phones, connections to NOAA dissemination systems, and 73
Internet application vendors that tap into the IPAWS alert feed.
States determine who their state alerting authorities are, and
validate requests from potential local alerting authorities to gain
access to the IPAWS. A profile is created in the system for each
validated authority describing the geographic jurisdiction, types of
alerts, and which alert dissemination systems will be used by the
authority. Following completion of required FEMA-developed training by
the authority, access to send alerts directly through IPAWS to people
is turned on. This training provides skills to draft effective and
accessible warning messages, and best practices in effective use of the
Common Alerting Protocol. In addition to the initial training, in June
2014 FEMA released an advanced course to further develop these skills
among alerting authorities. Messages that match the authorities profile
pass automatically through the system to EAS, WEA, and the other alert
dissemination systems to population's TV, radio, and cell phones.
IPAWS supports ``broadcast'' type alert and warning services.
Unlike subscription based-alert services, warnings are sent to all
people located in a specified area, both residents and visitors.
FEMA is responsible for development, operation, integration, and
maintenance of IPAWS infrastructure, which includes the EAS, WEA, NOAA,
and IPAWS Alerts Feed components plus any future connections. IPAWS was
designed so it can easily adapt to technological advances.
As of March 2018, there are 1,075 total IPAWS public alerting
authorities. Since its inception in 2011, more than 2.7 million alert
messages have been processed by IPAWS.
Authorities have used IPAWS connections to successfully alert
people of a wide variety of threats to public safety. This includes,
but is not limited to: natural disasters, gas plant explosions and
evacuations, armed robbers, active shooters, dangerous water
advisories, 911 service outages, and electrical power outages.
AMBER Alerts
In 2003, President George W. Bush signed the Prosecutorial Remedies
and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today (PROTECT) Act
of 2003 (Public Law 108-21). This act established the national
coordination of state and local programs, including the development of
guidance for issuance and dissemination of AMBER alerts.
The National Center for Missing & Exploited Children (NCMEC) is
responsible for America's Missing: Broadcast Emergency Response (AMBER)
plan, which allows broadcasters and transportation authorities to
immediately distribute information about recent child abductions to the
public and enables the entire community to assist in the search for and
safe recovery of the child.
The AMBER Alert program is a voluntary partnership among law
enforcement agencies, broadcasters, transportation agencies, and the
wireless industry to activate an urgent Wireless Emergency Alert in the
most serious cases of child abduction.
Since the AMBER alert program's inception, 53 children across the
country have been safely returned to their families as a direct result
of these WEAs.
IPAWS Use during Recent Hurricanes, Wildfires, and Mudslides
For the three major hurricanes in 2017--Harvey, Irma, and Maria--
nearly 700 emergency messages were sent via IPAWS by both the National
Weather Service and state and local alerting authorities.
Prior to Hurricane Irma, state and local alerting authorities
issued a series of timely WEA and EAS alerts to advise the public to
take appropriate protective measures. The Florida Division of Emergency
Management (FDEM) issued several evacuation alerts that facilitated the
safe and timely evacuation of nearly 6.5 million residents and
visitors. FDEM issued IPAWS alerts on behalf of counties that were
unable to issue an alert because they were not an authorized alerting
authority, demonstrating state-local coordination.
For Hurricane Maria, FEMA IPAWS developed an innovative arrangement
with SirusXM to deploy satellite radios to Puerto Rico. Extensive
efforts by the IPAWS project management office successfully kept PEP
stations broadcasting in Puerto Rico to provide critical response and
recovery information to the island's residents. These efforts included
coordination of fueling where power was unavailable, and providing
technical assistance to ensure the PEP stations remained up and
running. In the U.S. Virgin Islands, FEMA IPAWS had primed the backup
generator for the PEP station two years ago and had replaced the fuel
tank generator and fuel distribution systems in June 2017. This
continued maintenance allowed for radio broadcasts and alerts to be
sent to residents in the U.S. Virgin Islands through this station while
the power was out following Hurricane Irma.
In October 2017, WEAs were issued to warn California residents
about the wildfire danger. This event highlighted a few strengths as
well as areas for improvement. Strengths include some local authorities
using a variety of warning and communications methods to reach as many
people as possible, including WEAs, police sirens, opt in reverse 911
and text alerts, door-to-door notifications and social media. Areas for
improvement include the regular testing of IPAWS to ensure the system,
and user access, is operational and working correctly. One alerting
authority's user access was recently updated and was not tested prior
to attempted use during the wildfires, at which time it was discovered
to have not worked. It has since been fixed.
During the January 2018 flooding and mudslides in Southern
California, 10 WEAs were sent: five by the National Weather Service,
three by Santa Barbara County, and two by the City of Los Angeles.
Implementation of IPAWS Modernization Act
The IPAWS Modernization Act of 2015 (PL 114-143) directs FEMA to
implement and modernize the IPAWS and to establish an IPAWS
subcommittee under the National Advisory Council (NAC). This council
advises the Administrator on all aspects of emergency management to
ensure input from and coordination with state, local, tribal, and
territorial governments, non-profit organizations, and the private
sector communities on the development and revision of plans and
strategies.
Additionally, the law directs the IPAWS subcommittee to consult
with users and experts to consider new and developing technologies that
may be beneficial to the public alert and warning system; develop
recommendations for IPAWS and submit a recommendation report to the NAC
for approval. The recommendations will be on matters related to common
alerting and warning protocols, standards, terminology, and operating
procedures. The subcommittee will also make recommendations to the NAC
on having the capability to adapt the distribution and content of
communications based on locality, risks, or user preferences. As
outlined in the law, the subcommittee will terminate no later than
April 2019.
FEMA announced the IPAWS subcommittee membership in July 2017.
Membership includes participants from: state, local, and tribal
governments and emergency management agencies; communications service
providers; third-party service bureaus; commercial mobile radio service
industry; satellite industry; organizations representing individuals
with access and functional needs and limited English proficiency;
privacy advocates; and senior Federal leaders. The subcommittee members
are divided into four working groups, focused on: alert writers and
alerting authorities; public needs; stakeholder engagement and
coordination; and future technologies.
As of January 2018, the working groups have held 45 webinars, with
48 guest speakers presenting to subcommittee members. These guest
speakers include educators and researchers, state and local alerting
authorities, and private sector partners to help inform the
recommendations.
The subcommittee will continue developing and refining
recommendations in the coming months, in order to present draft
recommendations to the NAC in fall 2018. The subcommittee will also
take into consideration recent uses, including best practices and
lessons learned, when developing the recommendations. Once a draft is
complete, the subcommittee will work with NAC to develop the final
approved recommendations to present to the FEMA Administrator, the head
of each agency represented on the subcommittee, this committee, the
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the
House committees on Homeland Security and on Transportation and
Infrastructure.
Hawaii False Missile Alert and Next Steps
On January 13, 2018, at 8:07 am local time, the Hawaii Emergency
Management Agency (HI-EMA) mistakenly issued an alert through FEMA's
Integrated Public Alert and Warning System-Open Platform for Emergency
Networks (IPAWS-OPEN) to residents of Hawaii notifying them of an
inbound ballistic missile threat. The alert was issued as an IPAWS WEA
displayed on cell phones and via EAS on television and radio. The live
EAS and WEA messages used the event code Civil Defense Warning (CDW).
The WEA message read:
``BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT INBOUND TO HAWAII. SEEK IMMEDIATE SHELTER.
THIS IS NOT A DRILL''
HI-EMA canceled the WEA cell broadcast at 8:13 am local time,
thereby preventing additional cell phones from receiving the alert.
FEMA was contacted by HI-EMA at 8:30 am local time to seek confirmation
to use the Civil Emergency Message (CEM) event code to issue a follow-
up message. At 8:45 am local time (approximately 38 minutes after the
erroneous alert was sent), HI-EMA issued a second IPAWS message to
inform the public there was no missile threat. The second WEA message
stated:
``There is no missile threat or danger to the State of Hawaii. Repeat.
False Alarm''
The alert issued on January 13 brought to light gaps in existing
alerting plans, protocols, and procedures, including those for
responding to an erroneous public alert. These gaps exist at multiple
levels. Standard operating procedures for the release of alerts need to
include additional review steps to ensure the accuracy of a public
alert. Additionally, all plans, protocols, and procedures need to
include clear guidance and steps for rectifying an erroneous alert if
one is sent.
FEMA continues to assist state and local agencies with their
specific training requirements and has assisted multiple state and
local agencies with IPAWS-specific training, testing, and exercise
requirements during 115 separate engagements. Two of those trainings
were with HI-EMA.
FEMA is taking steps to review and improve public alert and warning
guidance, planning, training, practice, and exercises, and incorporate
them across FEMA programs and into the National Incident Management
System.
To help share the lessons learned from the Hawaii missile alert and
other recent events (including the use of IPAWS during the 2017
hurricane season and recent California wildfires), FEMA is highlighting
best practices to help guide alerting authorities as they review and
update their policies and procedures. To facilitate dissemination
within the emergency management community, FEMA will launch an online
collaborative forum in the spring of 2018 to enable alerting
authorities and software developers to share best practices,
experiences, operating procedures, and lessons learned.
FEMA has also issued recommendations to Alert Origination Software
Providers (AOSP) that go beyond recommendations provided to AOSPs in
2015. In particular, FEMA recommends that vendors providing alert
origination software ensure critical capabilities be included in their
products to make alert and warning more effective and include steps to
mitigate alerting errors.
The success of IPAWS depends on public confidence in the
reliability of the system to issue timely, accurate, and actionable
information. While alerting authorities have their own public outreach
strategies, FEMA conducts a series of awareness programs to ensure the
American people understand the functions of IPAWS and how to respond to
alerts and warnings from public safety officials. Project Management
Office (PMO) efforts have included releasing Public Service
Announcements (PSAs) on radio and television, providing a 15-minute
online course ``IPAWS and the American People,'' and incorporating
IPAWS and WEA information on Ready.gov.
The PSAs educate the public on what a WEA is and how to recognize a
message when received, advise the public to heed the warning and take
the prescribed protective action in the message, and direct viewers to
learn more about life-saving alerts on www.fema.gov/ipaws and
www.ready.gov/alerts. Public safety officials are encouraged to work
with local broadcasters to make the WEA PSAs a part of local public
education campaigns.
IPAWS will also continue to make State, local, tribal, and
territorial emergency managers aware of the ``IPAWS Lab.'' This lab,
located at the Naval Surface Warfare Center in Indian Head, Maryland,
provides alerting authorities with test and evaluation, operational
assessments, IPAWS demonstrations, and expert technical support. The
lab provides an interactive and closed IPAWS testing environment, and
allows users the opportunity to practice and train to increase
familiarity and confidence using IPAWS.
In accordance with new WEA rules established by the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) in 2016, IPAWS is working with wireless
carriers and alerting software vendors to enhance WEA capabilities
based on research conducted by S&T. This includes creating room for
more detailed information in messages, allowing links to instructions
and images, Spanish language support, and dedicated test message type
for use by SLTT alerting authorities.
The IPAWS PMO continues to collaborate with our alerting authority
partners to look for opportunities to incorporate best practices and
lessons learned into program guidance and training.
Conclusion
Every day I am grateful for the opportunity to work with a program
dedicated to helping alert and provide guidance to people during times
of crisis. Thank you for your interest in the program and we look
forward to collaborating with this subcommittee on ways the program can
improve. I am happy to take any questions you have at this time.
Senator Schatz. Well, thank all the testifiers.
My first question is for Ms. McGinnis.
When can we expect the report?
Ms. McGinnis. In the near future.
[Laughter.]
Senator Schatz. Are we talking about days or weeks?
Ms. McGinnis. Well, we wanted to take some time to
benefit----
Voice. Turn it on.
Ms. McGinnis. Thank you. I apologize.
Just to repeat, we wanted to take some time to benefit from
this hearing today to have that opportunity to fold that into
the report. So----
Senator Schatz. But you're almost done.
Ms. McGinnis. Correct.
Senator Schatz. OK.
Ms. McGinnis. We are almost done, but we want to make sure
that it's thorough, and we're listening very closely to the
testimony and information shared today.
Senator Schatz. Thank you.
The next question is for Admiral Piercey.
The sirens went off at the Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam.
Is that correct?
Admiral Piercey. Yes, sir.
Senator Schatz. And did they go off on any other bases or
installations?
Admiral Piercey. They--they also went off the--in the
Wahiawa complex.
Senator Schatz. Now, does HI-EMA have the ability to set
off a siren on a base or an installation, or was that a--was
that in response to the HI-EMA errant missile notification, and
then someone, a Department of Defense personnel, pressed the
button to set off the sirens?
Admiral Piercey. Well, the latter is correct, sir. So in
response to the false alert, the command duty officer, a
command duty officer, activated the sirens for both the Wahiawa
complex and also the Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam area.
Senator Schatz. So if we're able to enact our legislation,
all of our legislation, this would be moot, but in the
meantime, I'm assuming you're doing after-action analysis to
make sure that your people are not responding to any errant
information coming from the HI-EMA side.
Admiral Piercey. So, yes, sir, that's correct. We conducted
an informal after-action analysis review, and we determined
that we do have procedures in place to ensure there's
appropriate backup. In this particular case, the Command Duty
Officer did not go through the normal process to--to validate
with another Command Duty Officer that this was an actual
alert.
Senator Schatz. OK. Could you follow up for the members and
for the Committee, and especially for the other members of the
delegation and members of the Armed Services Committee, to
understand exactly how you're changing your procedures and your
training to make sure that something like that doesn't happen
again?
Admiral Piercey. Sure.
Senator Schatz. Thank you.
Mr. Johnson, you know, I want to talk a little bit about
the way FEMA highlights best practices. And I think when it
comes to natural disasters, you have so many reps, if you will,
you have so many iterations and so many years of experience
that if you're doing, you know, flood notification, wildfire
notification, tsunami, hurricane, that merely highlighting a
best practice is a useful way to do this because it's highly
localized stuff.
But we have a voluntary program for missile alert
notification. We have one state, zero territory, zero counties
participating. You've got 3,017 counties. I doubt any other
state is going to be rushing in to voluntarily participate in
this program.
And so you have a couple of problems. First, no one wants
to voluntarily participate in this program at this point.
Second of all, to the extent that FEMA provides a service under
normal circumstances in highlighting what states and counties
are doing right, there are no examples of what states and
counties are doing right. There are no best practices at this
point. The FCC is leaning into this, FEMA is considering this,
but, frankly, the way you're configured is to simply look at
what other places are doing and saying this works, this maybe
is not so good, but you have literally no examples for other
states or counties to consider best practices.
So I'm wondering how you view missile alert notifications
as possibly different from any other category, not merely as it
relates to the ALERT Act and who should be primarily
responsible, that's another public policy question, but how do
we get best practices if what your job is under normal
circumstances to see what other states and counties are doing,
and then say ``Attaboy'' or ``Attagirl''? But there are
literally no examples. So how is any state going to be able to
follow any example if there are zero examples to be followed?
Mr. Johnson. Great. Thank you for that question. Today, in
terms of voluntary participation in the IPAWS program, all 50
states are voluntarily participating with IPAWS----
Senator Schatz. I know that. I'm saying there are zero
participants in a missile alert notification program. And I get
that you can--you can sort of, in a broad sense, show what
states and counties are doing using IPAWS.
Mr. Johnson. Mm-hmm.
Senator Schatz. But I'm talking about a missile
notification, which clearly we've learned from experience that
there are different procedures, there are different protocols,
there's more coordination, and it's, frankly, higher stakes.
So I get that 50 states are participating in IPAWS. I love
IPAWS. It works great for what it works for. It doesn't appear
to be working for something which is essentially notifying the
public of a war.
Mr. Johnson. Correct. And thank you so much for your
question, Senator. I think that when we look at the history of
alerting in the country and what's been done for the last 60-
plus years, both on the technology side as well as what's been
done in the social sciences arena with studies by the National
Academies of Science and others, there's a great deal of room
for improvement in terms of how we do things. But I would say
that there are a number of best practices that have evolved
over the last few years in terms of how states plan and
organize similar to--and organize their activities as it
relates to alert and warning.
Now, it is true that with the accidental warning, ballistic
missile warning, that took place here in Hawaii, it did prompt
a number of other states to contact our office because, you're
right, they were not preparing or planning for a ballistic
missile warning having to be issued by the state or anyone
else.
Senator Schatz. Well, to put a fine point on it, they call
FEMA and say, ``I didn't know that was on us.''
Mr. Johnson. Right. So there is some level of coordination
and there is some degree of misunderstanding as to how the
process works. We at FEMA are going back and revisiting that
and working with the State and local governments so that they
clearly understand what those responsibilities, those roles,
are when it comes to a ballistic missile warning or any other
type threat to public safety.
Senator Schatz. Thank you.
Senator Hirono.
Senator Hirono. Thank you. What I'm getting from our
witnesses is that this is--it's a lot more complicated than
meets the eye because there are a number of Federal agencies,
State agencies, and local authorities that are involved. And so
to me, this really underscores how important it is that we not
create an environment where a missile strike comes our way to
Hawaii, or anyplace else for that matter, because it is rather
astounding to contemplate what might happen if there was an
actual missile strike.
Yes, we want to have the warning systems. At least the
warning systems should be accurate, at least. But what happens
after a missile strike would be, I would say, devastation and
chaos. And so, you know, I want to underscore some of the
things that I said as well as Congresswoman Gabbard, that we
really need to shore up our capability, diplomatic
capabilities.
Now, for the Admiral then, it was sort of alarming that the
alarms went off at Joint Base Pearl Harbor and that you had a
person there that did not follow the appropriate protocols to
verify. So I take it that this has led to all of you reviewing
what it is that you folks do and how you interface with the
local governments and our local alert systems.
Admiral Piercey. Yes, ma'am. As I mentioned before, we took
the opportunity as we went through this process, one, to
validate that we did not initiate the false alert. And then,
second, we took a look at our own internal process to see where
we could make some improvements because clearly we share with
you the concern that we have to have the public's trust and
confidence----
Senator Hirono. Yes.
Admiral Piercey.--to do our number one mission.
Senator Hirono. So that alarm should never have gone off at
Joint Base Pearl Harbor.
Admiral Piercey. Oh, I would like to say we would always
want to go with never, but I would offer this, that based upon
where many acted upon a false alert, and it said this was not a
drill, we enable our commanders, in this particular case, the
command duty officer, to make a decision given the indications
that he received, and based upon that, he took action,
initiative, in this case, to activate the alerts. The process
was then corrected. It took some time to reverse that process
to turn the alarms off and say this was a false alert.
But what I have to face from a readiness side is, as a
military officer, is I have to create conditions that enable my
leaders to make decisions. In this case, I will say that the
particular individual did not make the right decision. However,
and the process had backup, and we did not follow that process.
But at the same time, I can't squash initiative because I need
that in cases where things aren't exactly always by the book.
So I would like--I want this--there to be no accidents or
incidents or mistakes, but part of the readiness part here is I
have to recognize that we have to create the conditions so
that----
Senator Hirono. Excuse me, I'm running out of time, but I
thought that Admiral Harris had determined quite early on that
Northern Command had never issued such a missile alert, and
that was a verification that should have occurred. But I'm
assuming that you've corrected that situation.
Admiral Piercey. Senator, the alert was based upon the text
alert that the command duty officer had received, the
individual.
Senator Hirono. Yes, but they--it was supposed to have come
out of Northern Command to begin with, and that never emanated
from Northern Command.
Turning to Mr. Johnson, as we talk about how all of the
states can update their plans, their Emergency Alert System
plans, and that we have not done so, and I would probably not
be wrong to assume that a lot of other states have not done so,
so we're all sitting here talking about, How can we enable them
to understand what the best practices are? And the
Commissioner, FCC Commissioner, said that they could convene
different groups to come.
But, you know, I notice in your testimony that as a result
of what happened in Hawaii, that FEMA is highlighting best
practices to help guide alerting authorities. So what are the
best practices that you have already identified? Or are you
still working on identifying best practices that could be sent
out to the states to enable them to, for example, update their
plans?
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Senator Hirono. There--there are a
number of initiatives that were taken within FEMA, one of which
that I'll mention is a number of Nation State Threat meetings
that are taking place to sort through internal procedures and
protocols and how we will respond to that type of threat as a
nation.
But, second, we are looking at things like testing and
training. We want to make sure that there is adequate training,
not only that's provided by the Federal Government, meaning
FEMA, throughout--through the Emergency Management Institute,
but we're also looking at the type of training that the
software vendors who are providing these tools to State and
locals that they provide, and assuring that it's consistent and
that they're providing adequate support 24/7 and respond to
questions that the state may have on the use of their tool.
For example, there was somewhat of a delay in contacting
FEMA during the course of that errant message that went out on
the thirteenth. Had the vendor that they were using at the time
had a 24/7 more robust training help desk capability, that
question could have been answered very quickly without
additional guidance or seeking FEMA guidance on that matter. So
we're looking at testing and training.
We're standing up this collaborative environment on Monday.
I just got the word back from my office that Monday we will
launch an environment that will allow State and local
government as well as the private sector, you know, technology
providers, to collaborate on best practices, and as a whole of
community, come up with appropriate practices that can be
applied by each of the states that have a responsibility or
role in this area. So that's one of the others.
We are working with the FCC in the review of State plans,
ensuring that they not only address the Emergency Alert System
and how that whole daisy chain plays out, but we're also
looking at all of the emerging technologies, like the inclusion
of Wireless Emergency Alerts or the inclusion of ATSC 3.0
nanotechnology, which is the next generation of over-the-air
broadcasts, to be able to disseminate information, not only
through the scroll or the audio message that appears on your
screen, but other rich media as well, and to be able to provide
that information in multiple languages, so to speak.
Senator Hirono. So I appreciate that you are taking
concrete steps in conjunction with the FCC. So at some point,
is there a report that comes--that is made available to
everyone of the various steps and the best practices that you
all have identified?
Mr. Johnson. Yes.
Senator Hirono. Is there a report that's coming at some
point?
Mr. Johnson. Yes. And so--and later in the spring, FEMA
will release its after-action report that will contain a number
of best practices as well as specific actions that FEMA has
taken in response to the January 13th event. We will make that
report available to the Committee and others within the
community. And so it will be fairly comprehensive, but will
include things that are not necessarily knee-jerk reactions to
an event like the one of January 13th, but will be more
systematic in addressing some of the issues that surfaced as a
result of that false missile alert----
Senator Hirono. Thank you.
Mr. Johnson.--training, education, and all of the other
things that we've talked about in short form this morning.
Senator Hirono. Well, keep doing what you're doing. I look
forward to the report.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you.
Senator Schatz. Congresswoman Hanabusa.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, I heard you say two different things, so let me
try to clarify it. First you said that part of readiness, you
have empowered whoever--whatever level that commander was. And
given the fact that he, I guess, believed--he got the alert
that it was a proper alert, he then triggered whatever he
triggers, the sirens in both Pearl as well as in Wahiawa, which
are you talking about Schofield or someplace else in Wahiawa?
Admiral Piercey. The NCTAMS PAC facility at Wahiawa, ma'am.
Ms. Hanabusa. OK. So then you said that he didn't follow
proper protocol. So first you're saying he's empowered to take
action, which he apparently did. So let me ask you a follow up
on that. Is HI-EMA's, I guess, notification, is that considered
proper notification as far as PACOM is concerned?
Admiral Piercey. Proper notification would go through our--
through military channels.
Ms. Hanabusa. So are you--so are you now saying that the
whoever it was, the Commander, who triggered the, quote/
unquote, the alert at Pearl Harbor did not have and did not
follow protocol because he triggered it and it should not--or
the notification did not come through proper military channels,
or are you saying HI-EMA's notification is considered part of
proper military channels?
Admiral Piercey. So, ma'am, let me sort of step back to
this and go through the process again. So through the normal
alert process, you know, so we at--at PACOM, we have the
ability to validate an event, and then we, through----
Ms. Hanabusa. I understand that, Admiral.
Admiral Piercey. Right. So I--ma'am, I have to sort of----
Ms. Hanabusa. I want to know, is HI-EMA's notification
considered proper or not?
Admiral Piercey. I would consider under normal
circumstances, HI-EMA's alerting notification to be an
indicator of a ballistic missile attack in this particular
case. Under normal circumstances, where it was not sent as a
false alert, I would expect people to take that as notification
that they then need to take certain actions because of the
alert.
Our processes are written in a way that normally through
the process, since he did not receive this notification through
his normal chain of command, he is required to validate that by
going back to the next level up, the Command Duty Officer at
Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, and then based upon that, then
activate the alarm. He took it on his own initiative, based
upon what he saw in the alert, to then activate the alarm.
So from that mistake, then we had to go back through and
then go through the process to have the alarms or the sirens
turned off as we went back to the process of----
Ms. Hanabusa. Admiral, I guess my concern is, Why would
PACOM, a branch of DoD, which, of course, has the entity
NORTHCOM, who would really be the one who would get the
notification properly, why would you rely on or consider the
HI-EMA as a valid source versus looking whether or not you've
got something from DoD versus HI-EMA?
Admiral Piercey. Because the notification to HI-EMA through
the normal reporting process would be they're part of our
secure conference call, and also through another reporting
procedure, it goes in through FEMA, and then FEMA notifies HI-
EMA. So there are two paths in terms of coming into HI-EMA for
notification.
Ms. Hanabusa. And I guess the problem that I see with what
you just said is that's a lot of steps. And as you know, when
they tried to validate with FEMA as to whether or not this is
true or not, we had another delay, and you have a situation
where if anybody should know that this is a valid ballistic
missile coming into Hawaii, it should be you, it should be your
process.
So I would, I hope--and I want to ask you as part of what
you're doing, Have you taken HI-EMA out of this process as
opposed--as when it comes to your notification internally?
Simply because one of the banners was, ``PACOM confirms,''
because your sirens went off. I believe that the people would
feel a lot safer and have more public confidence if HI-EMA was
out, and if you, PACOM, or someone within DoD is the one who
sets it off, that's something else. So have you taken HI-EMA
out as a proper notification step so that we can at least get
to the people who know, which is DoD?
Admiral Piercey. The answer to that is no, we have not
taken HI-EMA out of the process. We've paused pending the
implementation of the corrective actions from the various
studies, as HI-EMA has implemented their changes to their
processes, and at the request of the state, we have paused
conducting exercises. I would offer that PACOM has a very close
relationship with--with--with many organizations, clearly the
State of Hawaii, and that we believe that continued close--
working closely together, coordinating closely together,
building that trust, continues to be critical. And so--so,
therefore, Admiral Harris has not taken action nor has been
direction that we should eliminate our relationship with the
State of Hawaii through the HI-EMA.
Ms. Hanabusa. But you have put it on pause, right? You've
put it on pause is what you testified.
Admiral Piercey. We've paused--what we've paused is the
conduct of--the conduct of exercises. However, our current
procedures exist that if in the event of an actual launch, we
would, through two conference calls, one conference call
through FEMA, and the other conference through HI-EMA, they
would give--we would notify them once we validated the fact of
an actual launch. From our perspective, it's a parallel
reporting method that also----
Ms. Hanabusa. I understand, Admiral. Let me just tell you
this: a ballistic missile into Hawaii is an act of war, and I
don't think you should be delaying notification by doing a
parallel path or whatever else. If you know it is, you should
act accordingly.
And with that, thank you very much.
And thank you, Senator Schatz.
Senator Schatz. Representative Gabbard.
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you.
You know, I think you're getting the point here of the
delineation between any of a number of the natural disasters
that our EAS system is set up to notify our residents about,
the difference between that and what is an act of war and
attack on the homeland. And the reason, you know, Senator
Schatz's legislation I think gets to the heart of this issue in
treating this differently, understanding that time is of the
essence, when we have mere minutes from the point that a
missile is launched to point of impact, and that every second
in that period counts.
Mr. Johnson, you know, the President has sole
responsibility to determine when EAS will be activated at a
national level, and that responsibility has been delegated to
the Director of FEMA. When was the last time this occurred?
Mr. Johnson. The activation of the Emergency Alert System
in response to a national type of event has never been
activated and has never been carried out. We have, however,
tested our national capabilities both in 2011 as well as 2016
and 2017. And you are correct, at the direction of the
President, if we were under attack or there was a national
emergency, we would, at the direction of the President,
activate these capabilities. But until that direction is
provided by the President, we would not activate those systems
under any conditions.
Ms. Gabbard. So this delegation of authority to the FEMA
Director really isn't a whole delegation because the FEMA
Director would still wait for the President to take action, is
that correct?
Mr. Johnson. Right. So there are two things at play here.
One is, of course, the Executive Order that was issued by
President Bush in 2006, as well as the 1995 statement of
requirements that were issued by President then Clinton. It
establishes protocols, one, to allow what--it establishes
protocols that would cause FEMA to respond at the request of
the President to activate the system, but it also goes on
further to state that once the system has been activated or
directed to be activated by the President, then the Director of
FEMA can use the system for follow-on information, and that
would typically be during the response-and-recovery phase of an
event.
Ms. Gabbard. OK. Thanks. Sorry. I don't have much time. I
guess the point here is that when our country has been attacked
by a foreign nation state, all of this seems like far too many
layers for our residents to be notified that we are under
attack, especially those, in the instance of Hawaii, who are in
the impact zone.
So I guess the question for Admiral Piercey is, Why
shouldn't the DoD, being that first point of verification that
North Korea has launched a missile, as you go through your
process every time to see what the direction and where the
potential impact zone is, as that first point of verification,
why shouldn't the DoD be responsible for sending out the
notification, especially given with the existing notification
system, State and local governments already have the authority
to send out these messages? It doesn't seem like it would be
too much to authorize DoD and PACOM directly to be able to do
so.
Admiral Piercey. Yes, ma'am. I would offer that we are the
first point of verification.
Ms. Gabbard. Correct.
Admiral Piercey. And through that process, it then goes
through the established--the existing channels that exist
through both FEMA and HI-EMA. I would offer that if you're
proposing that we are actually the ones that drop down the menu
and do the notification, if that's what the proposal, the
legislation, is, I would offer that the existing process in
terms of that covers--a notification process that covers the
entire range both from the very high end, as we have discussed
today, through--you know, through the other ones that--that
allow both states, localities, and municipalities to exercise
some level of management and oversight to see to,
responsibility for, those systems that--that that--the existing
process supports that. Ultimately, we recognize, we accept, the
fact that we need to verify. We have that process in place.
Ms. Gabbard. Right.
Admiral Piercey. And through--but if we go through our
process, we have verified this, and then through the existing--
through FEMA, through the Federal process, and through the
State process, those at the Federal level and the State level,
they take the action for notification.
Ms. Gabbard. So I guess that's--that's the question here,
Admiral Piercey, is, Why do we need these extra layers? Because
we recognize obviously that PACOM and NORTHCOM have the direct
verification and the first line of verification. Why not cut
out the extra layers and empower you to click the dropdown
option and send out that alert so that people are getting it
directly from the verification source rather than questioning,
whether it be at FEMA or the local level or the county level or
the State level, that someone may have made a mistake along the
way and wondering if this is, in fact, real or not?
Admiral Piercey. I would offer again that there are
existing agencies that have that authority and responsibility.
Ms. Gabbard. I think this is the reason why we're gathered
here, though, is there's a problem with the existing process.
So, you know, this is an important follow-up response that I
think we need from PACOM, is, Why not? You say there's an
existing process, but why not improve that process by creating
that direct line of communication between your command and the
people of Hawaii?
Admiral Piercey. And I would offer that the existing lines
of communication with the existing system supports that.
Ms. Gabbard. OK. Thank you. We'll look forward to follow up
on this.
Senator Schatz. I'm just going to follow up with a comment,
and if the other Members have any follow-up questions, they're
welcome to ask them.
You know, I don't think this is quite as complicated as it
sounds. We just want the origination of a notification of a
missile alert to start with the people who know and then drop
down to the Department of Homeland Security, FEMA. It's not
that HI-EMA shouldn't have a role, just like it's not that HPD
shouldn't have a role, it's not that the Sheriff's Department
shouldn't have a role, it's not that the Red Cross shouldn't
have a role, it's just that the information should flow from
the people who know for sure and then down and out to the
community.
And the concerning thing, Admiral, that you said is that I
understand, actually like, that you said we want to authorize
our people in terms of organizational culture to exercise
initiative and err on the side of readiness, right? That
totally makes sense to me. And that can be in conflict with a
procedure. And so somebody made a mistake, and yet you're sort
of--you're accounting for the fact that people may make
mistakes because you're asking them to exercise their
initiative. Frankly, in contrast to what happened in the HI-EMA
headquarters, where everyone was frozen in time, worried about
making a mistake and worried about noncompliance with Federal
procedures when they should be worrying about notifying their
neighbors that they're not going to perish.
So I don't mind that someone was authorized to exercise
discretion, but I do think it's important what all of my
colleagues have said, is that we now have a convoluted process,
and we have a convoluted process that, based on results, is a
failure. And we don't have to reconfigure something very fancy,
we just want to say people who know whether there's a missile
in the air tell people who can operate IPAWS on a nationwide
level.
Because the other part of this--right?--is that the FEMA
model is there's a flood in San Mateo County, San Mateo County
should be informed; there's a hurricane in the Western Pacific,
you know, people should be informed. If we are at war, there is
no reason not to inform every American citizen.
The idea that there should be a regional alert about an
incoming ICBM is preposterous. Imagine that there's an ICBM and
it's tracking to--I don't even want to name a state--a state on
the mainland, do you think it's appropriate for only those
states that have enlisted in a missile notification program to
have the capacity to get the word out? Do you think it's--what
about an adjacent county that didn't sign up? What about an
adjacent state? And we don't know, by the way, if we're at war,
how many additional warheads are on the way.
This is Federal by its very definition. We have robust
conversations with our Republican colleagues about the role of
the Federal Government versus local government, but, gosh, I
can't find even my most Libertarian colleague who thinks that
this is something that the local government should handle. So
it's not that the local government shouldn't have a role, it's
just that they're downstream from the decisionmaking process.
And I think that's what we're all looking to accomplish.
Do the other Members have any follow-up questions?
Ms. Hanabusa. I have a comment.
Senator Schatz. Representative Hanabusa.
Ms. Hanabusa. Admiral, what we're here to do, all of us, is
to try to build back public confidence. So I understand what
you're saying, I understand readiness, and I understand the
ability to empower. However, what we're saying is if you are--
put yourself in the shoes of someone out there. Who do they
want to believe? That's the issue. And actually, you can go
back, and I'm sure--Admiral Harris and I have had this
conversation, you can go back and tell the admiral--you should
be proud of the fact that we are saying people would believe
the military because it is, in their minds, an act of war.
FEMA has to wait for the President, everyone else. The FCC
doesn't have the authority to trigger anything. This is a
situation where we want our people to know that if it comes
over, and it should be throughout the United States, I agree
with Senator Schatz, that, in fact, it comes from the best
source that we have, not--and every time you have another
person in there, you have a potential error. I'm not going to
say that you will be absolutely perfect, but I'll tell you
what, January 13 should not have happened if it's you, I would
like to think, because you wouldn't be out there triggering an
alert because there is no alert to trigger. So that is, I
think, the basis of what we are saying.
And I think that the military should view it as a
compliment, that we're saying, hey, people believe in you.
People want to see that whoever makes that decision doesn't
have all these other things that they've got to think about.
You have the defense of this country and Hawaii, of course,
very important to us. That's the priority.
Thank you.
Senator Schatz. Well, thank the----
Senator Hirono. Can I just add?
Senator Schatz. Sure. Senator Hirono.
Senator Hirono. As we sit here and have this really robust
discussion, is there some kind of a technical problem with the
military, the DoD and PACOM, pressing the button that sends the
alert to everybody in our state? Is there some technical
problem with you folks having that initial responsibility?
Because, yes, as we're sitting here, we recognize that a
missile alert, an attack, is an act of war and that this is not
a localized weather condition or anything. So is there some
way--is there a problem with you folks being able to press the
alert button from your end?
Admiral Piercey. There's not--right now it's not
technically supported, but I could imagine that could be
technically supported.
Senator Hirono. We can figure out, can't we?
Admiral Piercey. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Hirono. OK. Thank you.
Senator Schatz. Well, thank the testifiers and bring in the
new panel. Our third and final panel has Major General Joe
Logan, Adjutant General, Hawaii--for the State of Hawaii and
Hawaii Emergency Management Agency; and Mr. Chris Leonard,
President and Legislative Chair for the Hawaii Association of
Broadcasters.
General Logan, please proceed.
STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL ARTHUR J. LOGAN,
ADJUTANT GENERAL, AND DIRECTOR,
HAWAII EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY,
STATE OF HAWAII, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
General Logan. Good morning, aloha, Senator Schatz--Senator
Hirono had to step out--but Representative Hanabusa,
Representative Gabbard. Thank you for the opportunity this
morning. I am Major General Joe Logan, the Adjutant General of
the State of Hawaii. I am also the Homeland Security Advisor to
the Governor and the Director of Hawaii Emergency Management
Agency.
I provided my testimony this morning regarding Hawaii's
State warning systems and the steps that we are taking to
ensure accurate and timely emergency notification to the
public. You have my written testimony, and I will take just a
few minutes for this opening statement.
On January 13, 2018, the people of Hawaii and our visitors,
including loved ones far away, suffered an unnecessary fear of
a missile strike resulting from human error and a series of HI-
EMA leadership failures. We've apologized for this incident,
especially for the 30-minute delay in correcting the message
error and providing accurate information to the majority of the
public.
Most important, we have been taking--we have taken
immediate steps to guard against a false alert being sent and
to ensure that such a delay will not happen again. While
inexcusable, the false alert revealed systemic issues and
provides opportunities to undertake corrective actions, thereby
generating enduring solutions and rebuilding trust in Hawaii's
Emergency Management Agency.
As you may already know, shortly after the incident,
Governor Ige suspended all activities surrounding the ballistic
missile alert campaign plan, including the additional wailing
siren tone testing and the ballistic missile checklist
rehearsal at the State Warning Point. Furthermore, Governor Ige
directed us to develop a comprehensive Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, Nuclear, and High Explosive Annex to our 2014
Hawaii Catastrophic Plan prior to any further training on the
ballistic missile alert.
Under new management, HI-EMA has already implemented many
recommendations from Brigadier General Retired Oliveira's
investigative report and Brigadier General Hara's 30-day action
plan report ordered under the Governor as Executive Order 18-
01.
We appreciate the support we have received from our
military and Federal partners, and we look forward to continued
collaboration as we implement the action steps identified in
both reports.
HI-EMA continues to provide timely and accurate alert and
warnings and executes its role and responsibilities to ensure
that the State of Hawaii is able to prepare for, respond to,
and recover from all hazards, manmade or natural. This is
evident by the January 23, 2018, tsunami warning, which, due to
a 7.9 magnitude earthquake off Alaska threatened Hawaii and the
West Coast of the United States. The tsunami warning came in at
23:40, or 11:40 p.m., Monday, and the State Warning Point
immediately went into action. And just after midnight, the
Governor, the HI-EMA administrator, other staff members, and I
were at the State Emergency Operations Center connected to the
counties and the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center awaiting
further information and preparing to activate warning systems
if necessary. The alert was canceled shortly after 1 a.m. I'll
reiterate that the system does work.
Again, mahalo for the opportunity to be here this morning,
and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Logan follows:]
Prepared Statement of Major General Arthur J. Logan, Adjutant General,
and Director, Hawaii Emergency Management Agency, State of Hawaii,
Department of Defense
Aloha Chairman John Thune, Ranking Member Nelson, and members of
the Committee:
I am Major General Arthur J. Logan, State Adjutant General, the
Director of the Hawaii Emergency Management Agency (HIEMA), and the
Homeland Security Advisor to Governor David Y. Ige.
Mahalo for the opportunity to provide testimony to the U.S. Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation regarding Hawaii's
False Missile Alert on January 13, 2018 and what we do next.
I am here today to provide testimony, not to focus on the events of
January 13, 2018, as that has been covered extensively via an internal
investigation, media coverage, media releases, and testimony at a State
Joint Legislative Committee hearing on January 19, 2018. I would like
to focus my testimony on the topics of what we have done, what are we
doing in the short term and long term to improve our emergency
management systems, and how we are regaining the trust of the people of
Hawaii.
Let me first state that the people of Hawaii and our visiting
tourists, including loved ones far away, suffered unnecessary fear
resulting from human error, exacerbated by a series of HIEMA leadership
failures. These failures were in the domains of decision-making and
communications evident by the time it took to correct the false alert
message error and provide that information to the majority of the
public. While inexcusable, the false alert revealed systemic issues and
provides opportunities to undertake corrective actions thereby
generating enduring solutions.
Let me lay the ground work that set in motion the State of Hawaii
being the first state in the Nation to identify the threat and, barring
any Federal guidance, began a campaign plan to educate the population
and further prepare for, and respond to, a ballistic missile threat.
From January through November 2016, North Korea tested a nuclear
device and fired some 20 ballistic missiles, each time improving its
ballistic missile and nuclear capabilities. In January 2017, the
Administrator of HIEMA and I discussed our concerns about this with the
Governor and recommended that we plan and prepare for this threat and
to inform the public about it.
According to open source news reports, in 2017 North Korea launched
15 ballistic missiles and conducted another nuclear test. This nuclear
test of a hydrogen bomb increased the earlier assessments from 15
kilotons to 150 kilotons.
The experts tell us that the flight time of an ICBM from North
Korea to the State of Hawaii is approximately 20 minutes.
Further, we are told that it takes approximately 5 minutes after
launch to determine the direction and likely target of the ICBM. This
leaves Hawaii with approximately 15 minutes when we are notified that
we are under a ballistic missile threat.
Because time is of the essence with ballistic missile preparedness
we began the campaign plan with development of a ballistic missile
checklist for the State Warning Point (SWP) and a public outreach
program, well before we completed a tangible Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, Nuclear, and High Explosive (CBRNE) response Annex to
Hawaii's 2014 Catastrophic Plan.
By law, the HIEMA is responsible for monitoring and issuing alerts
and warnings. The SWP, a section of HIEMA, is tasked with the timely
warning and notification to government, county warning points,
emergency operations centers, and when directed, the public.
Further, the State Department of Defense Public Affairs Office and
the HIEMA Public Information Office are responsible to notify the
public through the use of live, taped, print, and social media modes.
These entities were trying everything humanly possible to get the word
out to the public. The lack of adequate telecommunications capabilities
in the Diamond Head Crater severely impacted HIEMAs ability to provide
timely live news media feeds to the public.
Immediate actions occurring as of January 13, 2018:
While it took HIEMA 38 minutes to issue the ``false missile alert''
message via the Wireless Emergency Alert (WEA) system, this capability
continues to reside on the vendor HIEMA subscribes to that access
Integrated Public Awareness Warning System (IPAWS).
Governor Ige suspended all activities related to the Ballistic
Missile Preparedness Campaign, including ballistic missile tone siren
testing and SWP ballistic missile checklist rehearsals until a
comprehensive CBRNE Annex is prepared.
The State Emergency Communications Committee met the day after this
incident with appropriate broadcasting media agency heads and engineers
to discuss the communications issues and to develop a way ahead.
HIEMA has updated its Ballistic Missile Alert Checklist, which now
provides greater clarity and standardization for the members of the
SWP.
Short-and long-range recommendations and actions:
Governor David Ige issued Executive Order 18-01, directing BG
Kenneth Hara, Deputy Adjutant General (DAG), to review current
emergency response systems, including notifications and warnings, and
make recommendations for improvement. His Initial Action Plan--30 day
Report was released to the public on February 14, 2018 and is available
online via the Hawaii State Department of Defense website. (http://
dod.hawaii.gov/blog/news-release/fma-final-report/)
We, at the State Department of Defense and HIEMA, are implementing
those recommendations and have tasked the new HIEMA Administrator,
Thomas Travis, with the responsibility to track and report to myself
and the DAG as to the status of each recommendation.
HIEMA continues to work with the vendor that provides access to the
IPAWS system and they have greatly enhanced the software so that there
are color differences between test and real world alert icons to click
on. We are also working on two-factor authentication with the vendor,
however, this adds a complexity layer that would only be used for very
specific alerts, such as a missile alert.
The HIEMA Administrator has developed an action plan based on his
initial assessment of the organization. He has briefed me and the DAG,
and we concur with his assessment and action plan. His priorities are
preparing a HIEMA Strategic Plan, realigning the organizational chart
to cross-walk strategic goals and objectives with agency branches, and
filling vacancies to help with accountability, roles and
responsibilities.
HIEMA is establishing internal processes and procedures to ensure
supervisors are monitoring the performance of its subordinates,
tracking training, and identifying training requirements for the
established positions.
The State Emergency Communication Committee is working to establish
a comprehensive mass notification system between HIEMA and the
broadcasting companies.
HIEMA is working with the Department of Land and Natural Resources
on a permit to locate a Cell on Wheels (COW) device to enhance wireless
telecommunications within the crater.
Hawai'i continues to have an outstanding relationship with FEMA.
During the initial campaign plan FEMA provided a wealth of knowledge to
HIEMA to prepare its outreach to the public. In fact, the Administrator
or FEMA scheduled a visit to Hawaii prior to the January 13, 2018
event.
Administrator Long, along with FEMA Regional IX Administrator
Robert Fenton and others visited with U.S. Pacific Command, HIEMA, and
Governor Ige, and discussed the lessons learned from Puerto Rico's
disaster recovery. They also discussed how FEMA can better assist State
and Local governments to prepare for, respond to, and recover from
major disasters.
Mahalo.
Senator Schatz. Mr. Leonard
STATEMENT OF CHRIS LEONARD, PRESIDENT,
HAWAII ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS
Mr. Leonard. Good morning, Senator Schatz, Senator Hirono,
who is not with us right now, Congresswomen Hanabusa and
Gabbard. My name is Chris Leonard and I am the President of the
Hawaii Association of Broadcasters. On behalf of over 100 local
television and radio broadcasters across the state, thank you
for inviting me to testify today.
I also bring the perspective today as the President and
General Manager of New West Broadcasting Corp., a locally owned
business that operates five radio stations on Hawaii Island,
and as a member of the Committee tasked with updating Hawaii's
Emergency Alert System plan.
Broadcasters in Hawaii and across our great Nation play a
vital role as the country's first informer sometimes of
emergency and disaster. Local stations have proven time and
again that they will not hesitate to put themselves in harm's
way to deliver critical emergency information to their
communities, whether it's the recent false missile alert,
Tropical Storm Iselle from a few years ago on my island, or
Category 4 Hurricane Iniki on Kauai in 1992, local broadcasters
are there providing lifeline information to the public before,
during, and after a crisis.
Often local broadcasters are the only available and
reliable communications medium available during disasters. Our
transmission systems are not subject to outages due to network
congestion. The robust one-to-many nature of our technology and
the redundancy provided by multiple broadcasters who have
invested heavily in equipment and generators ensure that we are
uniquely situated to remain on the air. FEMA has noted in the
past that there is no more reliable source of information
during emergencies than local broadcasters.
On January 13, at 8:07, the Hawaii Emergency Management
Agency issued a civil danger warning alert that automatically
triggered wireless phones and EAS messages on radio and
television stations across the state. I immediately raced out
of my house and drove to my studios, and as I was driving, I
heard the EAS message broadcast on my stations that said the
U.S. Pacific Command has detected a missile threat to Hawaii, a
missile may impact on land or sea within minutes, this is not a
drill.
I literally watched cars pull off the road as the message
played instructing people to seek shelter immediately if you're
in a vehicle. I made it to my studios in about 7 minutes and
immediately started fielding phone calls from panicked and
confused listeners. And I, like many people, wanted to think
that the warning couldn't be true, but the message was clear
that this is not a drill, and as a result, it wasn't subject to
my interpretation, nor was it subject to the interpretation of
any other broadcasters.
The EAS system was built to allow emergency managers
immediate access to broadcast airwaves in times of national
emergencies precisely because of the resiliency and reach of
broadcasting. Broadcasters are required by Federal law to
participate in the EAS program and to carry Presidential level
alerts, but participation in State and local messages is
voluntary. However, almost every broadcast station in Hawaii
and the Nation see it as their duty to participate with their
State plans. Thus, although the alert on January 13 was issued
by the state, it was still carried by a majority of the
stations across Hawaii.
As a community member, I was troubled by the false missile
alert and the level of responsiveness to correct it. As a
broadcaster, I was and remain concerned about the procedural
failings of that day. Broadcasters need to know that emergency
messages have been thoroughly vetted and authenticated before
they are sent to us, and emergency managers need to have
confidence that broadcasters will disseminate those messages in
accordance with the State plan.
The same technology and systems that allowed emergency
managers to immediately push out the false warning on air would
have also allowed them to immediately push out another message
saying it was a mistake. According to the after-action reports,
emergency managers knew the alert was a mistake almost
immediately after sending it, yet it took 13 minutes to
acknowledge that mistake on Twitter and another 25 minutes
before a corrected EAS message went sent out under a different
header code to broadcasters and, as a result, the public. In
many cases, broadcasters informed audiences of the error in
much less time than the 38 minutes it took for the second EAS
alert to be issued.
But make no mistake about it, the EAS system and the
technology worked as it was intended. The underlying technology
worked on that day. It was human procedure and implementation
that failed to ensure its accuracy.
Currently, and it has been discussed a bit here already
today, our State's EAS plan is significantly out of date. As
the State Emergency Communications Committee revises its plan,
the plan needs to thoroughly address the errors that occurred
due to the shortfalls of the existing plan. Any new plan needs
to, one, clearly define the roles and responsibilities of all
EAS participants, both public and private; two, provide
redundant communication paths to EAS participants and the
public, both for EAS alerts and ideally for longer form
emergency information; three, address rapid response issues and
the ability to replay the message as needed, as the situation
warranted on that particular day.
On January 13, the EAS message played immediately after
officials issued the alert. However, for residents and visitors
that didn't hear the initial broadcast, they had no way of
knowing of the alert. As far as they were concerned, if they
didn't hear it, it didn't exist, and that's something that
needs to be addressed.
Emergency managers need the ability to repeat messages on
an automated basis as the situation dictates, either by updated
procedures in the State EAS plan or upgrades to the technology.
In conclusion, the American public relies heavily on local
radio and television broadcasting during times of emergency. On
January 13, broadcasters fulfilled their duty and successfully
transmitted the EAS message as intended to keep our communities
informed. Unfortunately, we didn't receive official corrective
information in a timely manner, and, as a result, many of our
State's 1.4 million people and nearly 200,000 visitors were
scared and confused for a terrifying 38 minutes, and clearly
the public deserves better. We must update and improve our
State EAS plan, and broadcasters stand ready and committed to
work with all stakeholders to do so.
And with that, I thank you for your time and look forward
to answering any questions that you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Leonard follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chris Leonard, President,
Hawaii Association of Broadcasters
Introduction
Good morning, Senator Schatz, Senator Hirono, Congresswomen
Hanabusa and Gabbard and members of the committee. My name is Chris
Leonard and I am the President of the Hawaii Association of
Broadcasters (HAB). On behalf of over 100 local television and radio
broadcasters across the state of Hawaii, thank you for inviting me to
testify on ``Hawaii's False Missile Alert: What Happened and What
Should We Do Next.'' In addition to my role at HAB, I am also the
President and General Manager of New West Broadcasting Corp., a
locally-owned business that operates five radio stations on Hawaii
Island. I also serve as a member of the State Emergency Communications
Committee (SECC) a group that is tasked with updating the State's
Emergency Alert System (EAS) plan.
Hawaii's radio and television broadcasters and broadcasters across
our great nation play a vital role in emergency alerting. We are the
country's first informers and first choice for news and emergency
updates. Local stations are an integral part of the communities that
they serve and have proven time and again that they will not hesitate
to put themselves in harm's way to deliver critical emergency
information to the public. Often times, local radio and television
stations are the only available and reliable communications medium
during disasters. Our transmission systems are not subject to outages
due to network congestion. The robust ``one-to-many'' nature of our
technology and the redundancy provided by multiple broadcasters who
have invested heavily in equipment and generators ensure that we are
uniquely situated to remain on-air and deliver critical information
before, during and after natural disasters and other emergencies. The
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has noted that there is no
more reliable source of information during natural disasters than local
broadcasters. Whether it's a hurricane in the Gulf of Mexico, the
recent catastrophic hurricanes in Puerto Rico, Tropical Storm Iselle
from a few years ago on my Island, or Category 4 Hurricane Iniki on
Kauai in 1992, broadcasters are there providing crucial information to
the public. We provide information to help people prepare prior to
disasters, to keep safe during disasters and we help our communities
recover and rebuild in the aftermath. Local broadcasters are committed
to help the public and were committed to help on January 13, 2018.
What happened on January 13
On January 13 at approximately 8:07am, the Hawaii Emergency
Management Agency issued an EAS and Wireless Emergency Alert (WEA)
alert using a Civil Danger Warning header. That alert automatically
triggered wireless phone alerts and EAS broadcast alerts on radio and
television stations across the state of Hawaii. The EAS messages were
broadcast on New West Broadcasting's five stations immediately after
they were received, as they were on most radio and television stations
across the state.
I raced out of my house immediately. As I was heading to my
studios, I heard the EAS message broadcast on my stations in Hilo that
said:
``The U.S. Pacific Command has detected a missile threat to
Hawaii. A missile may impact on land or sea within minutes . .
. THIS IS NOT A DRILL. If you are indoors, stay indoors, if you
are outdoors, seek immediate shelter in a building . . . If you
are driving, pull safely to the side of the road and seek
shelter in a building or lay on the floor. We will announce
when the threat has ended. . . .''
Cars were literally pulling off the road ahead of me as the message
played. I made it to my studio in 7 minutes and immediately started
fielding phone calls from panicked and confused listeners.
I, like many people, wanted to think that the warning couldn't be
true, but the message was clear that ``THIS IS NOT A DRILL.'' It was
not subject to my interpretation. Our stations received this message on
a dedicated phone circuit that was installed by Hawaii's Civil Defense
Agency. We also received copies of the message via FEMA's Integrated
Public Alert & Warning System (IPAWS) Common Alerting Protocol server.
The EAS system was built to allow emergency managers immediate access
to radio and television stations in times of national emergencies,
precisely because of the resiliency and reach of broadcasting.
Broadcasters are required by Federal law to participate in the EAS
program and are required to auto-forward an Emergency Action
Notification to all stations. Broadcaster participation in EAS for
state and local messages is voluntary; however, almost every radio and
television station in the state of Hawaii and around the country see it
as their duty to participate in state and local emergency alerting in
accordance with their state plans. The alert on January 13 was issued
by the state and as such is considered a ``state level'' alert that was
not required to be rebroadcast but was carried by the majority of radio
and television stations across the state.
As a community member I was troubled by the January 13 issuance of
the false missile alert and the level of responsiveness to correct it
post-issuance. As a broadcaster, I was and remain concerned about the
procedural aspects of the issues that we faced on that day. The
federal, state and local government along with various stakeholders
(radio and television stations, wireless providers) have procedures in
place that need to be followed. Broadcasters provide voluntary access
to our airwaves to state and local emergency managers in times of
emergency. We run monthly emergency management tests in compliance with
Federal law and on a voluntary basis with the state. These tests
instruct the public to ``tune in to this station for more
information.'' Broadcasters take this responsibility and obligation
seriously.
For a threat of this level, we voluntarily provide direct access to
our air chain. Emergency management officials can click a mouse and
immediately be on-air on all of our stations. At the most basic level,
broadcasters need to know that emergency messages have been thoroughly
vetted and authenticated before they are sent to us and emergency
managers need to have confidence that broadcasters will disseminate
those messages in accordance with the state EAS plan. The same
technology and systems that allowed emergency managers to push out a
false warning immediately on-air through our stations would have also
allowed them to push out another message saying it was a mistake.
According to the after-action reports, emergency managers knew that the
alert was a mistake almost immediately after sending it. It took 13
minutes to acknowledge the mistake on Twitter and--what I found
extraordinarily upsetting--it took approximately another 25 minutes
before that message was sent to broadcasters to share with the nearly
1.43 million residents of the state of Hawaii via broadcast radio and
television. We have been telling the public for decades to tune-in to
radio and television in times of emergencies and they have been
conditioned to rely on that system.
Where do we go from here?
Make no mistake about it, the EAS system and its underlying
technology worked as intended on January 13 in alerting the public;
however, it was human procedure and implementation that failed.
Broadcasters distributed the missile alert messages and, in many cases,
informed audiences of the error in much less time than the 38 minutes
that it took for a second EAS alert to be issued by emergency
management officials. I have referenced several times in this testimony
the state EAS plan. According to 47 CFR 11.21, ``EAS plans contain
guidelines which must be followed by EAS participants personnel,
emergency officials, and National Weather Service [NWS] personnel to
activate the EAS. . . .'' The state plans also ``contain procedures for
State emergency management and other State officials, the NWS, and EAS
participants personnel to transmit emergency information to the public
during a state emergency using the EAS. . . . The State plans must
include specific information describing how such messages will be
aggregated and distributed to EAS Participants within the state. . .
.'' The plans must be reviewed and approved by the Chief, Public Safety
and Homeland Security Bureau prior to implementation to ensure that
they are consistent with national plans, Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) regulations and EAS operation.
Currently our state's EAS plan is out of date and is need of a
significant rewrite to address the changes in technology and
distribution methods that have happened since the plan's last update in
2006. The SECC is tasked with the responsibility to rewrite this plan.
The committee has met twice since January 13 and a rewrite of the plan
is being worked on. The new state plan needs to thoroughly address the
procedural errors that occurred on January 13 and address the
shortfalls of the existing plan. It needs to clearly define the roles
and responsibilities of all EAS participants. It needs to provide
redundant communication paths to EAS participants and the public, both
for EAS alerts and ideally for longer form emergency information as
available. It must also address rapid-response issues and the ability
to replay a message as needed. On January 13 the message played on
radio and television stations across the state immediately after
emergency management officials issued the alert. However for members of
the public that didn't hear the initial broadcasts, they had no way of
knowing of the existence of the alerts. Emergency managers need to be
able to have messages repeated on an automated basis as the situation
dictates, either by updated procedures in the state EAS plan or
upgrades to the technology. It is also imperative that local
jurisdictions have the ability to activate EAS through the ``daisy-
chain system'' from each local warning point whether they have
connectivity to FEMA's IPAWS servers or not. It is not a question of
if, but when local jurisdictions will be cut off from network
connectivity. Our state needs to have a plan to address this critical
scenario for public safety.
Conclusion
We have spent many years training the public about where to tune-in
during times of emergency. On January 13, broadcasters fulfilled their
duty and successfully transmitted the EAS message as intended.
Unfortunately, broadcasters did not receive official corrective
information from emergency managers in a timely manner. As a result,
many of the state's 1.4 million people were scared and confused for
approximately 38 minutes with little information available to them.
Broadcasters were left scrambling to try to figure out what was
happening and to inform the public. The EAS technology worked to issue
the first warning, however additional procedures were not in place to
properly authenticate the warning nor to address the issuance of a
false alert. The public deserves better. Although mistakes happen,
proper procedures and implementation help prevent them and there should
be plans on how to address them when they happen. We must update and
improve our state EAS plan to fix many of the issues that we faced here
in Hawaii on January 13. While the false missile warning happened in
Hawaii, it presents an issue with national implications. We may face
different disasters in different parts of the country, however the
common thread is that emergency managers and broadcasters have a duty
to inform the public in times of emergencies. Broadcasters are
committed to work with all stakeholders to evaluate and greatly improve
our public safety communications here in Hawaii and across the Nation.
Thank you very much for your time. I am prepared to answer any
questions that you may have.
Senator Schatz. Thank you very much.
General Logan, I want to ask you three questions. The first
is about the chain of command. It's HI-EMA Administrator to TAG
to Governor, is that correct?
General Logan. Yes.
Senator Schatz. And is that in all cases? In other words,
including in a case of emergency, the Governor does not--the
HI-EMA Administrator is not a direct report to the Governor, is
that correct?
General Logan. No, but he could be. If I am out of state,
he could be, yes.
Senator Schatz. If you're out of state, it doesn't go to
the Deputy Adjutant General, it goes to the HI-EMA
Administrator.
General Logan. Yes, sir.
Senator Schatz. OK. Does that make sense? Is that the best
way to do this?
General Logan. I think so.
Senator Schatz. So, you know, I met with General Hara. You
and I have had several conversations. There's a lot of work
going on at HI-EMA, the legislature is doing their oversight,
and in my view, there has been an appropriate focus on policies
and procedures, but if you kind of get into that room in those
moments, you know, it wasn't a question of the right policy,
you know, not being in a binder to be, you know, pulled off the
shelf, referred to, and executed. To me, the more you hear
about exactly what went on in that room and the confusion and
the--like I said, the being frozen in space, the arguing among
staffers, the shifting of blame, the lack of clarity about
whether you needed to get clearance from FEMA, and I'll just
add that we all know now that they didn't need clearance from
FEMA. But I will tell you, if they did need clearance from
FEMA, even if a statute or a rule said they needed clearance
from FEMA, somebody ought to have violated that statute or rule
to make sure all of us knew we weren't going to die, and that's
the kind of initiative that you want in an emergency management
agency.
And so I guess the question I have for you is, How much of
this is policy and procedure and statute, and how much of it is
organizational culture? And what do you think is the path
forward for HI-EMA in terms of fixing what I think is clearly a
broken organizational culture?
General Logan. Well, I think had, you know, myself or the
Deputy Adjutant General been in or the Administrator been in
HI-EMA at the time of the false alert, you would have seen that
initiative being taken. We have--I'm allowing Mr. Travis to
assess his organization now and see where he can--where he
needs to be changed. And he has already come forward to me with
his initial assessment. He has identified some key areas that
need some--some change and some updates, some training. And so
he is working towards that, and I'm giving that latitude to----
Senator Schatz. I will just convey to you and to him that I
think all of that is great, but I don't want to focus just on
resources, which may be an issue, the physical plan, which may
be an issue, training, staff salary, policies and procedures.
All of that sounds like an appropriate set of priorities to
work on, but organizational culture is tougher to talk about
and tougher to fix, but it seems to me foundational to what
happened on that day.
General Logan. Yes, sir, and I agree. And one of the issues
and concerns that we've identified quickly is the lack of a
strategic plan in HI-EMA that would set the culture, set a
vision and mission for what they need to do.
Shortly after the incident, I sat down with most of the HI-
EMA members and I talked about Simon Sinek's book ``Start With
Why,'' and why do they do what they do and why--the State
Warning Point is so important to 1.4 million people, and they
are the tip of the spear to keep safety and security throughout
the State of Hawaii and to inform them timely and accurately.
There seemed to have been a culture where that was lacking.
In the operations piece, not in the Preparedness Branch, not in
other branches, but in that specific Operations Branch, that
seemed to be lacking.
Senator Schatz. Is it true that the person who clicked on
the erroneous missile alert button on the screen is paid around
$40,000 a year?
General Logan. I'm not sure what their salary is, but I
know it's fairly low. We are looking at the position
descriptions for the State Warning Point and trying to figure
out what is the right and adequate pay for that. Are they
similar to Honolulu Police Department dispatchers? Are they
similar to other Warning Point? They have a--because they have
a reason and expectation, as you mentioned earlier, for
initiative and take action, we believe that should be higher,
so we're working through that now.
Senator Schatz. Mr. Leonard, just a quick question. When--I
know you've been deeply engaged, thank you, as a volunteer in
the SECC, and I'm wondering when you think a new plan will be
ready and submitted to the FCC. And are you already working
with FEMA and the FCC in terms of getting the expertise
necessary to have a functional plan?
Mr. Leonard. I can't speak to the exact date. It is in the
works. We will have another meeting later this month. It is my
expectation that we should have some draft language for that
plan by that time. I've had numerous conversations with FEMA
and with the FCC, both as a broadcaster and as a member of that
committee, and it's much needed. It will provide quite a bit of
guidance and hopefully will address a number of the issues that
we faced on January 13.
Senator Schatz. Thank you.
Representative Hanabusa.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you, Senator Schatz.
General Logan, I want to understand some of the things you
said. But first I want it to be clear to everyone, that as
the--we call you the TAG, The Adjutant General--you are not
simply in charge of the--basically the Guard Army or the Guard
Air. You actually have other divisions, if we were to do an
organizational chart on you. Isn't that true?
General Logan. Yes, I have six divisions.
Ms. Hanabusa. You have six divisions. So taking away the
Guard Air and the Guard Army, can you name the other six
divisions?
General Logan. Yes. I have the Office of Homeland Security,
I have the Youth Challenge program, I have the Office of
Veterans Services, and HI-EMA.
Ms. Hanabusa. So HI-EMA actually is a division under you,
so you are responsible for HI-EMA, correct?
General Logan. That's correct.
Ms. Hanabusa. OK. Now, given that, given that, can you tell
us how your time is spent? Like how much time would you say, a
percentage of a pie, for example, is Guard duty, taking care of
the two Guard units, Veterans, Homeland Security, Teen
Challenge, HI-EMA?
General Logan. Ma'am, I don't--I don't divvy up my time. I
go based on what sometimes first come, first served, and where
I can fit it in my schedule. Being that I have so many things,
it's an interesting question that you ask. A fairly new TAG of
Alaska who came on shortly after I did, she has similar hats
that I wear, and she asked that very question, ``How do you
divide up that time?'' and you can't. I devote as much time as
I can to each of those divisions. But I will say I have
leadership in each of those divisions. I have an administrator
of HI-EMA. I have an administrator of Homeland Security. I have
a director that runs the Youth Challenge program. I have two
general officers who run the Army and the Air National Guard.
And I have a deputy. So I have layers of ability to help me
manage all of that.
Ms. Hanabusa. OK. Then let me ask you this. You said, in
response to Senator Schatz, that had you been there, and I
think you were talking about basically what we call Diamond
Head, I mean, had you been there, this would not have happened.
Isn't that what you said?
General Logan. No, I wouldn't say the false alert wouldn't
have happened, I said the reaction and the initiative to get it
quickly fixed probably would have been shorter.
Ms. Hanabusa. OK. So tell me this: When you found out about
the false missile alert, it was within a couple of minutes, as
I recall.
General Logan. Yes.
Ms. Hanabusa. Correct? Then I assume you were in Hawaii,
weren't you?
General Logan. Yes.
Ms. Hanabusa. Then I assume you probably went immediately
to Diamond Head. Is that correct?
General Logan. I did not go immediately. I was on Joint
Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam. We were at a family readiness group
with the senior leadership of the National Guard and our
spouses talking about what we can do next for our soldiers and
airmen.
Ms. Hanabusa. But the alert went off, right?
General Logan. Yes.
Ms. Hanabusa. So you knew the alert went off?
General Logan. Yes.
Ms. Hanabusa. So why would you have physically been
required to respond at Diamond Head? Why couldn't you have
taken care of it immediately from where you were?
General Logan. Because of the congestion of the phone. I
got an initial call out within a minute or two talking to the
State Warning Point, understood that it was a false--a false
alert. I then tried to get a hold of Vern Miyagi, the
Administrator. I couldn't get in touch with him. He might have
been trying to call. I couldn't get back into the State Warning
Point. And from that point, I fielded numerous, some 37, phone
calls, texts, and e-mails over that period.
Ms. Hanabusa. When did you get into your car and go to
Diamond Head?
General Logan. Maybe about 10 or 12 minutes later.
Ms. Hanabusa. 10 or 12 minutes later.
General Logan. Yes. Because I couldn't drive and talk on
the phone at the same time. I had two phones going, and I
needed to----
Ms. Hanabusa. But you could not--even in the 10 to 12
minutes, you still couldn't clarify what was going on from
where you were at Pearl Harbor.
General Logan. I knew what was--I mean, I knew what was
occurring, but I didn't know what was going on outside the
base.
Ms. Hanabusa. You said on January 18, as an indicator of
how the system works----
General Logan. Yes.
Ms. Hanabusa.--you said that there was a tsunami, you went
over there, you took care of it, and it shows how the system
works. Do you remember that testimony?
General Logan. Yes.
Ms. Hanabusa. So tell me, how long did it take you to get
to Diamond Head? I assume that's where you were for that system
to work. And what was the time from the time it went out to the
time that you decided that, you know, it's an ``all clear''?
General Logan. The ``all clear'' message--well----
Ms. Hanabusa. We're talking about January 18. You said the
system works. I want to know, how can you say that? What is it
that happened that you can sit here today and tell us the
system works? Why did the system work on January 18 and didn't
work on January 13?
General Logan. Well, we didn't put out any warnings. We
didn't put out any--we didn't sound any sirens, we didn't
sound--we didn't put out any wireless or emergency alert system
notifications because we didn't have to. And so the news was
on--the media was on the stations reporting the tsunami, and as
soon as Pacific Tsunami Warning Center gave the ``all clear,''
that was immediately broadcast into the television. So it
wasn't--the public wasn't--addressed to the public yet because
we didn't--we didn't know what the threat was to Hawaii. We
were still waiting for the Tsunami Warning Center to let us
know, yes, there is in fact a tsunami coming. There are buoys
out there that have to be measured, have to be watched, and
they make the decision.
Ms. Hanabusa. I'm very familiar with the buoy system. I
understand that. So that's the reason why it worked, because
you never sounded an alarm. That's basically what you're
saying.
General Logan. Yes.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you, Senator Schatz.
Senator Schatz. Representative Gabbard.
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you. Thank you both for being here.
Mr. Leonard, how much of the current outdated EAS plan is
dedicated to addressing broadcast communications, given our
residents in Hawaii really will learn about a natural disaster
or a threat incoming through two main sources, the EAS system
and our local broadcasters?
Mr. Leonard. I think part of the issue with the current
plan is it does not thoroughly address IPAWS, which has been in
play for a number of years now. Some of the daisy-chain
participants are not properly identified in there, and that
needs to be updated. And then I think the big factor, and this
plays into the situation on January 13th, the event codes--
there's a table that has event codes for everything, and we all
understand what a tsunami watch is or a tsunami warning is. We
issued a CDW and CEM, a Civil Danger Warning and a Civil
Emergency Message, and nobody really had a relationship between
that and a ballistic missile attack. While those both were
codes that were in the 2003 plan, which was last updated in
2006, there was really no clarification as to what those were
for, and at the State and local level, the participation is
voluntary.
It's my belief that most of our broadcasters, when we
update the plan and we provide an updated list of codes and
say, ``These are the things that we want you to auto-forward,''
most of them will do that, I would be willing to bet that
almost all of them will do that. But we need to provide some
guidance on that, and we need to be able to provide some
clarity, and CDW or CEM, Civil Danger Warning, Civil Emergency
Message, were things that weren't really fully understood.
Thankfully, we didn't have to worry about that a whole lot
until recently, and now this has obviously brought about a new
discussion that we have to find some answers to and make sure
that all of the partners, both private and public, are all on
the same page, and that's really what the plan will help do,
and it will solidify that.
Ms. Gabbard. And are you fairly confident through the SECC
and the work that you guys have been doing and are doing that
the updated plan will include that information?
Mr. Leonard. Yes, absolutely.
Ms. Gabbard. Good.
General Logan, you know, in the report that General Hara
issued, there were obviously a number of things that were
noted, but one of them was talking about the robust public
outreach campaign that was conducted, I think you, HI-EMA,
called it Ballistic Missile Preparedness Phase 1----
General Logan. Yes.
Ms. Gabbard.--that went through I think the majority of the
second half of last year. And while, you know, I've seen the
numbers, you know, 41 town halls, meeting engagements, radio
ads, and public service announcements, and so on, you know, the
reality was that beyond the mantra of, ``Get inside, stay
inside, stay tuned,'' that really people didn't have any idea
what to do beyond that, and that included individuals as well
as some of the business owners that we saw who were just
telling people, ``Get out of here.''
What kind of information and what is the outreach plan to
actually make sure that people are armed with accurate and
factual information and know what to do?
General Logan. That's correct. And we are working towards
that, and that's why we are looking at one is a strategic plan
for HI-EMA, but number two is the CBRNE annex to our
catastrophic plan, and that would help us outline.
I think part of the issue, what we had, is we developed the
ballistic alert campaign plan in three phases, so you just
mentioned. Phase 1 was a public outreach and to understand and
speed up the notifications between PACOM/FEMA to the State
Warning Point, and we could put out the alert to the public. So
that was Phase 1.
So what we did is we really started flying the plane before
we built the whole plan. And so Phase 2 was to sit down with
stakeholders and identify what's--what we need to do to react
and respond--how do we respond to and recover from a ballistic
missile or nuclear, biological, chemical attack? And then Phase
3 is to actually write the plan out with our stakeholders. So
we never got--we didn't get that far this--unfortunately
because we--of certain protocols we did not have in place on
the 13th allowed for the ballistic--the false alert to go out,
and that took us time to--because we didn't put on the back end
a way to correct the false alert, we couldn't turn it off
right----
Ms. Gabbard. And are the plans in place currently? Admiral
Piercey mentioned, you know, DoD is ready to stand in support
and provide DSCA support. Are the plans in place with HI-EMA,
DoD, FEMA, DHS, to respond to a WMD attack?
General Logan. We have the capability today to take the
call and to send out the alert warning as intended, as it
worked on January 13. We also have--we also have a way to turn
it off if we sent out an accidental. We also have a way to
get----
Ms. Gabbard. Right. But I'm talking about in the event of
an attack, what are the--are the response plans in place
working----
General Logan. Don't know yet.
Ms. Gabbard. There are no response plans in place.
General Logan. No, we--we're trying to gather and
understand completely what that means. HI-EMA is working
through its Preparedness Branch, but we are working on letting
a contract to allow an outside agency with a little more
expertise to come in and help us because we just don't have the
manpower to write the annex and continue with day-to-day
operations. So----
Ms. Gabbard. Are you aware of DoD or FEMA, who obviously
are much larger agencies, working through these plans in an
interagency capacity?
General Logan. Yes. So our outreach plan is with them also,
to bring in all of the stakeholders from outside to help us
draft this plan and understand what--what the impact is--
probably a bad term--but what the result would be of an actual
missile impact and what is the response requirements for all of
that.
Ms. Gabbard. And you already have modeling, though, that
you are using to identify what are the likely scenarios of
attack, what the likely points of impact would be, and how far-
reaching they would go specific to Hawaii.
General Logan. Yes. We have modeling that can place over
what we may think likely targets that would understand what the
impact is.
Ms. Gabbard. And has that modeling been made public?
General Logan. I don't believe so.
Ms. Gabbard. Why not?
General Logan. I'm not sure. I think there is modeling
available on the FEMA website. So you can take a look at that.
And we're using their data also. So, yes, it is out there to
the public.
Ms. Gabbard. OK. I'm over my time, but I think it's really
important as you're looking at communication and preparedness
and response that, A, the public knows and understands the
reality of the seriousness of the threat, what the reality of
the impact would be in event of an attack, and to better equip
the response plans.
One of the other things that was mentioned in General
Hara's report was the fact that we don't have fallout shelters.
So what is being done to change that, to fix that, given the
reality of the threat that we're facing today? There are a
number of things obviously that we've got to follow up on
really. A lot of this focus has been on what led up to this
false missile alert attack, but obviously this is a major wake-
up call to see what response plans are in place. How are
individuals as well as the Federal Government and State
government reacting to and responding to such an attack?
General Logan. Absolutely. And we've corrected the error
that created the situation of the false missile alert. That I
won't say will never happen again, but we've put in all the
protocols and worked with the software vendor, updated the page
that you see and the operator would see. It's color-coded, and
so it's much better than it was on January 13.
The outreach program that we started identified, you know,
a number of casualties and impact areas, the widespread. So we
tried to get out as much information as we could to the public
as we were briefing them on our public outreach plan if they
were there present while we were giving it. It's also on the
HI-EMA website, so you can look at the prepared----
Ms. Gabbard. I think, if I recall, the projections that
were put out, the information that was put out, you know, I
think it had something like, you know, only 10 percent of the
state population would die in this scenario, which, you know,
when you look at it's 130-, 140,000----
General Logan. Right.
Ms. Gabbard.--people, given that projection, but it failed
to include the fact that, as an island state, water--you know,
the response plan, the support plan. So you can talk about the
numbers of people who would perish in the event of the attack
itself, but in the aftermath of that and the weeks coming,
especially if you're dealing with a nuclear or biological
attack, what are the realistic scenarios and the responses
that--the plans that need to be in place to deal with that?
General Logan. Exactly. And that's why the Governor
postponed the continuation of our public outreach plan and the
continuation of the checklist rehearsals inside the State
Warning Point, even though they've updated the rehearsal
checklist, and he has tasked us to put the plan together so we
know how to respond to and how to recover from and what
entities from the United States Federal, military, and other
agencies that would descend upon the state to help us respond
to and recover from this type of disaster.
Ms. Gabbard. Yes.
General Logan. And so we are leaning way forward than any
other State and Territory, other than Guam, they are trying to
stay up with us, because they were physically threatened by a
North Korean leader that he was going to shoot missiles at
Guam.
And so in our ability to lean way ahead, we didn't do
everything we should have done on the checklist to put in the
proper ways to basically alert the public quicker and faster
that it was a false alert.
Ms. Gabbard. And I think this is the issue that our
legislation is trying to address because this is a much bigger
issue than just Hawaii, and it's something that the entire
country has to deal with and the Federal Government needs to
take the lead on. Thank you.
General Logan. Thank you.
Senator Schatz. Second round for Representative Hanabusa.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you, Senator Schatz.
Mr. Leonard, how long have you been on the SECC?
Mr. Leonard. The SECC had not met for a number of years. I
was part of the group that signed off on the original plan on
behalf of the Hawaii Association of Broadcasters back in 2003.
And the Committee had not convened since--I can't give you an
exact date, but it hadn't convened in a number of years.
Ms. Hanabusa. So who convenes the Committee? Who says,
``OK, you guys meet''?
Mr. Leonard. It is chaired by Courtney Harrington.
Ms. Hanabusa. So in the interim from 2003 or 2006,
whichever one is the report, Hawaii instituted this whole issue
with the missile alert and so forth. There is no incorporation
in any plan of this new warning system that they've put in?
Mr. Leonard. So IPAWS has been up and operational for a
number of years. It is not addressed in our existing State
plan, but it has been the operational mechanism for most of the
EAS alerts. One of the things that we've talked about quite a
bit as we become reliant upon new technology, IPAWS is
wonderful, it provides greater detail, greater access, but one
of the things that we've been concerned about as well is that
networks go down. We saw that in the Gulf. We saw that in
Puerto Rico. And broadcasters have been looking at fortifying
their facilities and looking at it, providing redundant power,
redundant equipment, redundant transmission sites in some
cases, so that we can stay on through those situations. But the
plan has not kept pace with the operational practice.
Ms. Hanabusa. So you don't even have IPAWS included in the
plan, so you don't have----
Mr. Leonard. It's not--it's not currently included.
Ms. Hanabusa.--you definitely haven't addressed anything
like a false missile alert or anything like that.
Mr. Leonard. Well, and I think what's even more important
and beyond just a false missile alert is a rapidly changing
situation. In this particular case, the fast-changing situation
was that we made a mistake and issued a wrong alert. But if you
were to look at a train derailment in the Midwest in a chemical
car, and we say, ``OK, everybody shelter in place,'' and the
winds shift, and now that changing situation is we need to
evacuate everybody; or wildfires in California, it jumps a
firebreak, I think our ability to rapidly respond or change the
messaging for whatever reason, whether it's erroneous or
changing scenarios, needs to very clearly be addressed in our
plans.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you.
General Logan, you know, something that you've been saying
that bothers me is that you talk about now we're developing the
plan. So it seems like, was getting--trying to be the first
state to even have a ballistic missile kind of warning system,
was that premature? Because now you're suspended it. Because
you don't have the critical answers to what Congresswoman
Gabbard asked you.
OK, so what do you do? So, yes, warning is one thing, but
what do you do? Because, you know, it makes no sense to have
people trying to protect their children by putting them into
storm drains or telling them to get off the road, or people
trying to get home because they want to be with their family.
This is the end, they want to be with their family. So you've
got all these other things.
So why did--why did we do what we did? You're the head of
HI-EMA. I mean, why did--why did you do what you did without
everything else in place?
General Logan. If you look at my testimony and you look at
what was happening in 2014, 2015, and 2016, North Korea was
firing off multiple ballistic missiles. They were firing--they
were doing underground nuclear testing. They were threatening
the United States, Guam, and Hawaii. We, myself and the
emergency management organization, went to the Governor and
said, ``Sir, we believe we are--,'' we've already been
threatened, we believe this is escalating, there are more and
more missile tests. He fired more missiles than his
predecessors had fired. So we felt----
Ms. Hanabusa. But he has fired four at Japan, General. And
we all know that the Earth is round, and we all know that
Seattle is 500 miles closer than we are. So the question is,
Why, when you didn't have all the necessary components in
place, did you decide that we needed to do this? Because it
seems like all that we had was possibly the Cold War plans that
you kind of dusted off and said, ``OK, this is what we're going
to do.''
General Logan. Right. So as I explained to Representative
Gabbard, we--we developed a campaign plan with three phases. We
started with Phase 1--right?--based on the threat and based off
that we needed to inform the public that we at least--we only
have 15 minutes from the time of launch to the time that it
would impact.
Ms. Hanabusa. That's right.
General Logan. That doesn't leave Hawaii residents a lot of
time to do anything. So the shorter--the reduced amount of time
for notification and the more time I give the citizens of the
State of Hawaii, the residents and visitors, more time to get
inside and stay inside, the more people will survive. So that's
the point we did based on the----
Ms. Hanabusa. So you made the decision, as the head of HI-
EMA, that we are--we should do this, that we should have this
missile alert plan, even if we can't tell people what it means
to shelter in place, or if it comes, what do you do? You
decided that what we're going to do is we're going to have this
alert, that that was going to be what HI-EMA was proposing to
the Governor. So is that--is that your testimony here today?
General Logan. That's exactly what we did. Based on the
threat, we needed to do something, and we were going to do a
three-phase operation, building the second part, which is, How
do you respond to and recover from?
Ms. Hanabusa. Did the PACOM tell you or somebody tell you
that we are the target, Hawaii is the target? Is that why you
decided that we needed to have this in place, even if we don't
have really anything in place? Your testimony here today
confirms it, we don't have anything in place.
General Logan. I didn't mean----
Ms. Hanabusa. We don't even have this testing anymore,
because everything is suspended. We don't have it.
General Logan. Because my duties and responsibilities in
state law require that the safety of the people of the State of
Hawaii, it is part of my responsibility as Director of
emergency management, I felt that it was imperative that we do
something rather than just wait for a launch and then try to
react.
Ms. Hanabusa. And, of course, you realize that that would
be an act of war and that it would be something within the
defense of Title 10 as opposed to your Title 32 status----
General Logan. I fully understand that, but the consequence
management relies on the State emergency management office.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you very much, Senator Schatz.
Senator Schatz. I want to thank the testifiers. I want to
thank all three of our panels. I want to thank the good
Commerce Committee staff, the congressional delegation and
their staff, our community partners.
There are several lines of inquiry and effort to be talked
about. Obviously, we need best practices. There are lots of
Federal public policy questions to be addressed. There are
funding questions. There are organizational culture questions.
But in the end, all of this comes down to restoring public
confidence in the system.
We have been blessed over the many years in Hawaii to be
able to rely upon our Emergency Management Agency to inform us
when there's a hurricane, when there is any other kind of
weather event, and that partnership has been absolutely
productive and certainly kept us safe.
And so as we move forward, again, we're going to be clear-
eyed about what mistakes were made, we're going to be tough on
these issues, but we have to focus on one thing, and one thing
only, which is restoring the public's confidence in this alert
system.
So I thank everybody. This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:21 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
[all]