[Senate Hearing 115-878]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 115-878
KEEPING OUR SKIES SECURE:
OVERSIGHT OF THE TRANSPORTATION
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 5, 2018
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
57-581 PDF WASHINGTON : 2024
SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota, Chairman
ROGER WICKER, Mississippi BILL NELSON, Florida, Ranking
ROY BLUNT, Missouri MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
TED CRUZ, Texas AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
JERRY MORAN, Kansas BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts
DEAN HELLER, Nevada TOM UDALL, New Mexico
JAMES INHOFE, Oklahoma GARY PETERS, Michigan
MIKE LEE, Utah TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire
CORY GARDNER, Colorado CATHERINE CORTEZ MASTO, Nevada
TODD YOUNG, Indiana JON TESTER, Montana
Nick Rossi, Staff Director
Adrian Arnakis, Deputy Staff Director
Jason Van Beek, General Counsel
Kim Lipsky, Democratic Staff Director
Chris Day, Democratic Deputy Staff Director
Renae Black, Senior Counsel
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on September 5, 2018................................ 1
Statement of Senator Thune....................................... 1
Statement of Senator Nelson...................................... 3
Statement of Senator Wicker...................................... 13
Statement of Senator Cantwell.................................... 15
Statement of Senator Udall....................................... 18
Article dated February 20, 2018 from Government Executive
entitled ``TSA's Facial Recognition Pilot Program May Make
Travel Worse for Ethnic Minorities'' by Rosie Spinks....... 18
Statement of Senator Peters...................................... 20
Statement of Senator Hassan...................................... 23
Statement of Senator Sullivan.................................... 25
Statement of Senator Markey...................................... 28
Statement of Senator Inhofe...................................... 31
Statement of Senator Lee......................................... 32
Statement of Senator Gardner..................................... 35
Witnesses
Hon. David Pekoske, Administrator, Transportation Security
Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation.............. 3
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Appendix
Response to written questions submitted to Hon. David Pekoske by:
Hon. Deb Fischer............................................. 41
Hon. Bill Nelson............................................. 42
Hon. Amy Klobuchar........................................... 42
Hon. Brian Schatz............................................ 43
Hon. Edward Markey........................................... 44
Hon. Tom Udall............................................... 49
Hon. Tammy Baldwin........................................... 50
Hon. Catherine Cortez Masto.................................. 53
Hon. Jon Tester.............................................. 61
KEEPING OUR SKIES SECURE:
OVERSIGHT OF THE TRANSPORTATION
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
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WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 5, 2018
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:22 a.m. in
room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John Thune,
Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Thune [presiding], Nelson, Wicker,
Cantwell, Udall, Peters, Hassan, Sullivan, Markey, Inhofe, Lee,
and Gardner.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN THUNE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA
The Chairman. Well, good morning and welcome back, Admiral
Pekoske.
I want to begin by thanking you and the men and women of
the TSA for the vital job that you do. That's probably
something we don't say often enough. At the same time, I want
to encourage you to continue improving, and that's the spirit
that underpins our oversight hearing today.
Over two years ago, the FAA Extension, Safety, and Security
Act of 2016, or FESSA, was enacted into law. It included
multiple provisions from my Airport Security Enhancement and
Oversight Act designed to reform and refocus TSA's efforts.
Two years after enactment, however, some important mandates
contained in FESSA remain outstanding, including updated
regulations to enhance airport and airline employee access
controls.
I look forward to hearing an update on implementation of
these measures. As threats to aviation continually evolve, we
must ensure that TSA is able to test, procure, and deploy new
technologies to counter those threats.
Recent advancements in computed tomography, biometrics, and
credential authentication technologies empower TSA to enhance
its layers of security and better respond to potential
vulnerabilities.
Nevertheless, TSA has had difficulty testing and deploying
these technologies to airports in a timely manner as well as
adequately communicating and adhering to its long-term
technology investment plan, which makes it challenging for
security technology manufacturers to do their part in
supporting the agency's needs.
TSA must provide certainty in its equipment procurement
plans to enable the consistent rapid deployment of advanced
security technologies.
This past Labor Day weekend, an estimated 16 and a half
million passengers were predicted to travel through our
nation's airports, which is a new record for that particular
holiday travel period.
With so many passengers requiring screening at airport
checkpoints, we're reminded of the importance of the PreCheck
Program to pre-vet and expedite screening for low-risk
travelers so that public airport areas are less vulnerable and
TSA can focus on screening passengers who are higher-risk.
Unfortunately, TSA has not significantly increased its pre-
check enrollment numbers in recent years and has not yet
offered expanded services and options for travelers to make
enrollment easier as required under FESSA.
On the whole, however, TSA continues to lead the world in
creating a secure global aviation environment. In the last
year, TSA has issued security directives for airports with
commercial flights to the United States aimed at countering
threats related to personal electronic devices, powders, and
air cargo.
Since these security directives were announced, many
countries have successfully implemented enhanced security
screening protocols and some countries, including the United
Kingdom, have followed the TSA's lead with similar directives,
raising the global standard for aviation security, ensuring
safer international travel.
We want to ensure that TSA remains a global security leader
and sets the standards for the rest of the world. The TSA
Modernization Act, which I authored along with Senators Nelson,
Blunt, and Cantwell, would help the agency do so by addressing
the issues I've mentioned here today.
I'm hopeful that we can enact this reauthorization bill in
the coming weeks as part of our FAA reauthorization effort.
Before concluding my remarks, I want to note the words of a
man who led this Committee for many years. In April of 2000,
months before the attacks of 9/11, he said the following in
prepared remarks for an Aviation Security hearing, and I quote:
``I am certainly aware that aviation security is a complex and
difficult undertaking and any system involving humans is going
to have flaws. Every effort must be made to increase awareness
and performance. You can be sure that Osama bin Laden and
others like him will continue to target Americans and American
interests.''
Those words were by then Chairman John McCain and they not
only demonstrated a remarkable foresight but still hold true in
many ways even though the names of those who want to do us harm
have changed.
It is also a reminder of the legacy and impact of our
friend and colleague who as Chairman helped craft legislation
establishing the TSA and stabilizing the airline industry in
the wake of the horrific events of 9/11.
As we near the 17th Anniversary of these attacks, we are
soberly reminded once again of how important the TSA's work is
and of all your agency does to keep the traveling public
secure.
With that, I reiterate my thanks to the Administrator for
being here and will turn to Ranking Member Nelson for his
opening remarks.
Senator Nelson.
STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator Nelson. And those comments sound just like John
McCain, who had an extraordinary insight into matters of
national security.
As the Chairman said, we want to get TSA attached to the
FAA bill and the TSA Modernization Act this Committee passed
last October focused on improving security at airports by
authorizing an increase in the Law Enforcement Officer
Reimbursement Program.
Expanding the use of explosive detection K-9 teams, which
every TSA officer that I talk to says that's the most
effective, and expediting the deployment of security screening
equipment.
We hope that this bill will help the TSA grow its pre-check
program, which has been successful but continues to struggle
with enrollment. I look forward to your updates.
I also hope that we can shine some light on TSA's Quiet
Skies Program, which has been in the news recently. Along with
Senator McCaskill, we sent you a letter last week asking for
clarification about this program. It's important for us to know
the program's details, and I believe it's imperative that we
have a discussion on the ways that TSA is responding to the
emerging threat, as you and I, Admiral, discussed, of 3-D
printed guns.
As we have had that discussion, there's a great concern
about the danger that these weapons pose to getting through the
screening equipment.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Admiral Pekoske, as always, great to have you here, and
thank you again to you and the many folks who work with you and
for you at the TSA to keep our traveling public safe.
But welcome, and we look forward to your remarks.
STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID PEKOSKE, ADMINISTRATOR,
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Mr. Pekoske. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
Nelson and distinguished Members of this Committee. Thank you
for the opportunity to appear before you today.
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your and Ranking Member Nelson's
opening comments, particularly with regards to Senator McCain.
I also appreciate both of your leadership in support of TSA.
First and foremost, let me acknowledge the outstanding men
and women of TSA. It has been my privilege to serve as the
Administrator to the over 63,000 dedicated professionals that
provide security for millions and millions of travelers every
day.
On behalf of this team, I thank you for your support
enabling TSA to accomplish a mission so critical to the safety,
security, and economic well-being of the American people.
I appreciate the Committee's work on the TSA Modernization
Act that may be included with the FAA Reauthorization Act. They
will, these Acts--the TSA Modernization Act, will certainly
strengthen our ability to execute our mission.
And I also appreciate, sir, you and your staff's input to
the new TSA Strategy and Administrator's Intent.
As you noted, we will mark the 17th Anniversary of 9/11
next Tuesday. The threat today is no less concerning than it
was immediately following 9/11. It is somewhat different. It's
more diffuse. It has evolved and to meet the mission of
protecting the Nation's transportation systems, we must evolve
with the threat, and you have seen us do that over the past
year.
Let me highlight just a few of our many accomplishments.
First, we've significantly improved security here at home,
both in aviation and surface transportation security. You
mentioned the development of the CT, CAT scan technology at our
checkpoints. We have made significant progress in bringing the
CT capability to our checkpoints.
We are in the final phases of operational testing and
evaluation as I speak. That program remains on track and I am
very pleased so far with the results.
With respect to K-9 teams, we have very much valued the
additional layer that canines provide to our security. They
provide an excellent deterrence and detection and I'm happy to
report that between this time last year and today, we have
increased the number of deployed K-9 teams at our security
checkpoints by 41 percent. That's a very significant
improvement and, in fact, our throughput results over the busy
summer travel season reflects the addition of those K-9 teams,
and I'll talk about that in just a second.
We have also recently published the Pipeline Security
Guidelines. I'm very focused, as you know, on surface
transportation security. These guidelines were put together in
great collaboration with the industry and have raised the
security profile on the pipeline industry.
As you mentioned, sir, we have also raised the global
baseline for aviation security. We implemented our measures,
thanks to the authority that you've provided in the Aviation
and Transportation Security Act, and this was done in full
cooperation with our industry and international partners.
And all the while, passenger growth continues to increase
by about 4 percent per year. We just had our busiest summer
travel season on record and just to think about a number, if
you would, please, we screened over a quarter billion people
through our security checkpoints here domestically between
Memorial Day and Labor day this past Monday, and our passenger
throughput was well within the norms for both pre-check and
standard lay-in passengers.
We also have recently received some very positive FEVs or
Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey Results that were contributed
to by the TSA workforce.
I'm happy to report that TSA was up in every single FEVs
category. The greatest improvement in our FEV scores was with
the Federal Air Marshal Service and this represents, in my
view, continued steady progress in both workplace morale and
job satisfaction. That will continue to have my focus, I know
it has your focus, and we owe it to respond to the input that
our workforce has provided to us.
Two current issues that I'd like to address upfront with
the Committee, the first is the incident at Seattle-Tacoma
International Airport on August 10, which involved the theft of
an aircraft.
There are multiple investigations underway, including one
by TSA. None of those investigations are yet complete, but once
they are complete, we will review the results and then
determine whether or not changes are needed.
On the Quiet Skies Program, this program is not a new
program but it is an intelligence-driven risk-based rules
program that has been in place since 2011. Privacy impact
statements have been filed and updated and there is, I assure
you, strong oversight of this program from the department.
I am confident that it has reduced risk for nearly seven
years, and I would note that we're fortunate to have the Air
Marshal capability supporting this program and I am proud of
the professionalism of the Federal Air Marshal Service, and I
would state unequivocally that we have the best Air Marshal
Service in the world. Our Air Marshals are a critical element
of aviation security.
Much of the Quiet Skies Program, as you can appreciate, is
security-sensitive information and the intel that supports it
is classified. I am always available to answer your questions
on SSI or classified matters in closed session.
As I look to the future, I see several things immediately
on the horizon: continued technology infusion throughout TSA, a
refreshment of our Insider Threat Programs, continued K-9
Program growth, enhanced air cargo security, the integration of
the TSA PreCheck Program and Customs and Border Protections
Global Entry Program, and the publishing of regulations and
guidelines for surface transportation security.
Chairman Thune, Ranking Member Nelson, Members of the
Committee, I appreciate your oversight and support. My
overarching goal is very simple, three simple words, better
security faster, and I need your help to achieve this.
And, finally, were it not for your support of my
confirmation, I would not have had this opportunity to serve
and I thank you all for your confidence in me.
Sir, before I conclude my opening statement, I would like
to introduce two members that are new to TSA over my left
shoulder. Both are supervisory transportation security
officers.
I have brought uniformed officers into TSA Headquarters
because when I arrived, I saw none, and uniformed officers
represent the vast majority of the TSA workforce.
The first is Supervisory Transportation Security Officer
Charles Meador from Anchorage Airport and the second
Supervisory Transportation Security Officer Cavel Malcolm from
LaGuardia Airport. So we've gone from coast to coast but
Charles sits in my front office, Cavel will in about 6 months,
and they're there for our direct input and they participate in
all of our policy discussions.
I will bring and am soliciting at this point in time, one
of our Federal Air Marshals also into the front office, because
I want the frontline workforce to be right by my side and to
have a view and to have input into how we develop policy and
procedures inside TSA.
So this concludes my opening statement, and I look forward
to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Pekoske follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. David P. Pekoske, Administrator,
Transportation Security Administration,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Good morning Chairman Thune, Ranking Member Nelson, and
distinguished Members of the Committee. Thank you for inviting me here
today to testify about the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
and the work we are doing to keep our transportation system secure
despite persistent threats. TSA appreciates the support of this
Committee as we carry out our vital security mission. We are grateful
for the constructive relationship TSA enjoys with each Member and are
confident, that if enacted, the TSA-related provisions potentially to
be included within H.R. 4, the FAA Reauthorization Act, will further
strengthen the Agency's ability to execute its mission.
Next week, the entire nation will reflect upon the 9/11 attacks.
While aviation security operations have advanced significantly in 17
years, we still face determined adversaries. The threat to aviation
remains high and terrorists remain intent on attacking civil aviation.
We also cannot ignore the real threat to the surface transportation
system, as evidenced by the 2017 attacks in New York City, London,
Paris, and Barcelona. Last month's vehicular attack outside of London's
House of Parliament and the intentional crashing of an airplane in the
vicinity of the Seattle-Tacoma airport are recent reminders of the
types of dangers we face every day.
We must remain vigilant in continually assessing vulnerabilities,
identifying threats, and mitigating risks while ensuring massive
volumes of passengers and commodities can move securely and efficiently
through the transportation ``system of systems.'' That system is the
lifeblood of our economy and way of life and one that requires all
stakeholders to help protect it.
Since being confirmed as Administrator a little over a year ago, I
have spent a significant amount of my time at the front lines of TSA,
engaging with employees at all levels of the organization, and meeting
with our partners. I have visited many airports; numerous transit
infrastructure venues, to include train stations and operation control
centers; met with rail, pipeline, and motor carrier operators and
owners; and traveled abroad to gain greater perspective regarding the
security challenges we face and to advance discussions on how we
continue to raise the global baseline for transportation security.
Securing the Nation's transportation system requires the collective
efforts of all segments of our society; it is not something that the
government can accomplish alone. As such, I recognize the critical
importance of partnering with and actively including as many of our
stakeholders in the process of developing transportation security
solutions. This is why I value the opportunity to engage with
stakeholders directly as well as through the Aviation Security Advisory
Committee (ASAC), the DHS Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory
Committee's Transportation Systems Sector Coordinating Council, and
other forums. In fact, later this month I will participate in a
roundtable discussion with pipeline operators and government partners
in Alaska to discuss the important topic of pipeline security.
In all of my encounters, I have observed a deep commitment to our
shared mission to protect the Nation's transportation system to ensure
freedom of movement for people and commerce. This dedication is
critically important because we face both multiple determined
adversaries and a threat environment that remains complex, diverse, and
persistent.
I am honored to be leading the 63,000 dedicated professionals who
make up TSA's workforce, share our core values of integrity, respect,
and commitment, and provide security for millions of Americans using
our transportation systems each and every day. I am also focused on
ensuring we are prepared to address today's risks and tomorrow's
threats. This challenge is compounded by increased user demand on the
transportation system and passenger expectations for customized and
seamless travel experiences. As it relates to air travel, my first year
at TSA was the busiest in TSA history--with extremely busy spring and
summer travel periods.
Compared to the 771 million passengers screened in 2017, we are
projected to screen more than 800 million passengers and crew this
year. Of note, TSA has managed the nearly four percent annual passenger
growth experienced over the last few years while only increasing the
size of its Transportation Security Officer workforce at roughly half
that rate each year as a result of funding limitations, which has
impacted both training and morale. We have worked as efficiently as
possible, are introducing more capable equipment (e.g., computed
tomography (CT) screening systems), and are updating approaches for
recruiting, retaining, and developing our personnel.
TSA's continued success is contingent on our ability to rise to the
challenge of outmatching a dynamic threat to our aviation and surface
transportation systems. To be effective and efficient in a changing
environment, TSA must continuously re-evaluate how it uses its
resources and performs its mission.
First, quintessential to using our resources as effectively as
possible is understanding where they can best be directed to address
the greatest level of risk. TSA uses several risk-based programs,
including QUIET SKIES, to inform a series of operational actions--such
as whether to conduct enhanced screening at the checkpoint and when to
assign Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) coverage. These risk-based
programs are critically important for our security. They are
intelligence-based and designed to identify individuals who may pose a
higher risk, so that TSA can take action to mitigate these security
risks. We aggressively employ procedural and privacy safeguards and
have robust review procedures within TSA and with the DHS Privacy
Office,
Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties and Office of the
General Counsel. TSA's intelligence-driven risk-based programs rely on
passenger provided data and do not use race, color, religion,
disability, sexual orientation, or parental status as a basis for
operational decisions.
Second, every year as part of the Federal budget process, TSA is
charged with considering ways to create operational efficiencies. For
example, as part of that deliberative process for the Fiscal Year 2020
budget request, TSA was required to respond to various budget scenarios
and explain how limited resources would be allocated based on proposed
funding levels. The possibility of eliminating security screening at
low volume airports was one of many options discussed as part of the
budget development process. Internal consideration of that option,
however, did not constitute a decision. In fact, TSA decided not to
propose that strategy for further consideration by the Department or
Administration.
In short, we must not only continue to work hard, but we must also
work smarter and more strategically. This is why it was a priority for
me to issue guidance within my first year to explain to our work force,
Congress, and our stakeholders how TSA would continue to improve the
execution of our mission into the future. I did so via the publication
of my ``Administrator's Intent''--a document that lays out my
priorities for the Agency and is intended to be updated periodically--
and the 2018-2026 TSA Strategy. Together, these structured documents
ensure strategic alignment and a greater level of transparency.
The TSA Strategy ensures our focus on capability innovation and
threat-informed, information-driven operations. My Administrator's
Intent explains how we will execute the strategy between now and 2020.
The TSA Strategy and my Administrator's Intent detail the three main
strategic priorities for the organization and how we will accomplish
them. Both are posted on our website for public review and
transparency. The first priority is to improve security and safeguard
the transportation system. Our second is to accelerate action. And the
final priority is to commit to our people. These priorities reflect my
focus on preserving frontline operations, quickly transitioning to new
technologies, and creating efficiencies to optimize limited resources.
Improve Security and Safeguard the Transportation System
TSA's operational environment requires robust partnerships and
effective security operations across all modes of transportation. We
strive to strengthen our operational approach through a proficient and
professional workforce, more effective detection capabilities, enhanced
intelligence and vetting, and better communication and coordination
with stakeholders.
Simultaneously, we also strive to improve the passenger experience.
For more than a year and in response to the evolving international
aviation threat, TSA has mandated enhanced security requirements for
all commercial flights to the United States. Those measures include
enhanced screening of passengers and electronic devices and heightened
security standards for aircraft and airports. These new security
measures have been implemented at 280 last points of departure airports
in over 105 countries. These airports service approximately 180 U.S.
and foreign airlines transporting an average of 375,000 passengers on
2,100 flights daily.
In addition to raising the baseline for passenger aviation
security, TSA has worked closely with U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) to ``raise the bar'' for cargo operations by requiring
the use of the Air Cargo Advance Screening program for cargo on all
flights destined for the United States. This allows CBP and TSA to
target potential U.S. bound cargo before it is loaded aboard an
aircraft, based on threat reporting, for a higher level of screening.
As threats continue to evolve, TSA, in cooperation with partners world-
wide, will work to improve intelligence sharing and standardize best
practices, while also pursuing technological security advancements.
Domestically, TSA is also strengthening and expanding our security
screening procedures and capabilities to address the dangers we face.
We are working to expand participation in our TSA Pre3 program through
improved marketing and partnership. For instance, since January 2018,
TSA announced that TSA Pre3 expedited screening program would include
eligible customers of certain airlines in addition to those already
participating. The number of airlines participating in TSA Pre3 stands
at 54 domestic and international carriers representing more than 90
percent of passengers traveling to or within the U.S. TSA is also
working with CBP to identify ways that we can better leverage and align
the two DHS Trusted Traveler programs, Global Entry and TSA Pre3.
To manage risk and resources more effectively, TSA is exploring
ways to further segment the passenger screening process through
innovative applications of its screening capabilities, including
passenger screening canines. As a result of increased appropriations,
TSA has been able to procure additional canines from domestic and
international sources to build the capacity needed to implement this
option more broadly. Efforts like this will be designed to make the
screening process more efficient, match procedures with level of risk,
and improve the passenger screening experience. In short, TSA is
striving to provide better security, faster.
Just as it is the case for passengers, knowing more about aviation
workers and the air carrier population is a critical component of
understanding the security risk associated with potential insider
threats. TSA's implementation of FBI's RAP Back services, which
provides recurrent vetting for those populations and automatic
notification to airports and air carriers of new criminal activity,
began in May 2016 at two airports and with one carrier. Today, RAP Back
services have expanded to 132 airports and two airlines.
In addition to our aviation passenger screening mission, we
continue to oversee the security of the surface transportation system.
The interconnected, varied, and expansive scope of the surface
transportation system creates unique security challenges that are best
addressed by system owners and operators. TSA's approach to surface
transportation security reflects this reality and focuses on providing
system owners and operators Federal support through communication,
coordination, and collaboration. On a daily basis, TSA assists surface
stakeholders through conducting vulnerability assessments, analyzing
security programs across the surface sector, from pipelines, to mass
transit, to freight rail, to over-the-road bus entities, providing
training and exercise support, executing collaborative law enforcement
and security operations, and sharing intelligence information.
Additionally, TSA strives to keep pace with the fast-moving
advancement of security technologies to address current and evolving
threats by looking at emerging technologies, including from outside the
transportation environment, to assess their potential applicability to
the surface transportation environment. We work closely with surface
transportation owners and operators to develop and deploy technology
solutions to advance transit security through collaborative operational
test beds for different modes of transportation (mass transit, highway
motor carrier, pipeline, and freight rail). While TSA does not procure
the technology for surface transportation operators and owners, our
efforts are designed to assist with development of their technology
requirements, to represent them in government technology forums, and to
help inform their acquisition decision making process.
A good example of the results of this process received national
attention recently. On August 14, 2018, Los Angeles County Metro
announced that it had become the first transit system in the country to
purchase passenger screening technology capable of detecting weapons
and explosive devices on passengers. TSA and L.A. Metro had been
testing the equipment since last year. The same detection system has
also been tested by Amtrak at Penn Station in New York City and New
Jersey Transit at Newark Penn Station in New Jersey. This technology
would have been able to detect the improvised explosive device on the
individual that attempted a suicide attack while walking from the Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey bus terminal to the New York
Metropolitan Transportation Authority train last year.
Accelerate Action
TSA is building a culture of innovation that can anticipate and
rapidly counter the changing threats across the transportation system.
Rapid development and deployment of technical or non-material solutions
will enable TSA to continuously improve operations.
TSA's Innovation Task Force, in partnership with stakeholders, has
accelerated efforts to advance security technology. This year we
expanded the use and testing of CT screening systems in numerous
airports. We are grateful for the support of Congress, as well as CT
equipment donated by American Airlines, that has enabled us to announce
plans to expand testing of CT systems this year. Computed tomography
technology allows TSA officers to more easily identify potential
threats and in the future may eliminate the need for passengers to
remove liquids, electronics and food items from carry-on passenger
bags. This technology will significantly enhance the effectiveness of
TSA's security screening process while also improving the passenger
experience. As such, the President's Budget for Fiscal Year 2019 calls
for deployment of CT systems nationwide beginning in 2019. I appreciate
your support of this important technology enhancement.
TSA has also continued to work with airport and airline partners to
deploy Automated Screening Lanes (ASL) to more airports. The ASLs are
designed to improve the checkpoint screening process for travelers,
including the ability for multiple passengers to divest their
belongings at the same time. To date, thanks to Congressional support
as well as donations from our airline and airport partners, there are
over 140 lanes at more than a dozen airports, with additional
deployments scheduled this year.
Additionally, TSA has made significant advancements with the
deployment of biometric and identity technology to improve security and
strengthen the identification process. We continue to test and expand
the use of Credential Authentication Technology (CAT), which allows us
to validate the security features of a passenger's photo ID and match
the information from the ID against our Secure Flight vetting system.
Credential Authentication Technology is a cornerstone technology for
TSA. Testing of CAT, which started with 17 systems at seven airports,
has expanded to 42 active systems at 13 airports and we expect to award
a contract in January 2019 for an additional 294 systems.
Finally, TSA has conducted tests of facial recognition technology
at John F. Kennedy International Airport. Last month, TSA conducted
further testing, in collaboration with U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP), at the Tom Bradley International Terminal at LAX.
During the most recent testing, TSA used CBP's traveler vetting systems
to match facial images of international outbound passengers to photos
in U.S. Government systems, such as photos obtained from passports or
visa applications or taken at time of entry to the U.S., to verify a
passenger's identity. This technology could help TSA improve identity
validation and verification, an essential component of intelligence-
and risk-based screening. Such was the case last month, where the CBP
facial recognition technology we are currently testing was used to
identify an individual at Dulles airport trying to enter the U.S. using
a passport other than his own.
Through embracing emerging technologies, leveraging agile
processes, and continued collaboration efforts, TSA is positioning
itself to keep pace with industry partners while advancing security
across all modes of transportation. To that end, TSA has taken steps to
formalize a strategic management process that aligns strategy and
policy to operations by leveraging risk assessment capabilities to
inform budgeting and investment decisions.
Commit to Our People
The most critical element impacting our ability to keep the
transportation system secure is our workforce. TSA is wholly committed
to its people and recognizes that our strategic success depends upon
how well we attract, hire, train, develop, promote, and equip our
workforce at all levels of the organization. Over the past two years,
TSA has seen the Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey (FEVS) Employee
Engagement Index increase by seven points. In fact, TSA's 2018 FEVS
results that we just received several weeks ago reflect improvement on
every index. We are encouraged by this progress and hopeful that the
actions we are currently taking will continue these very positive
trends.
Our workforce is comprised of professionals from many disciplines
within TSA, to include Transportation Security Officers, FAMS,
inspectors, vetting experts, international representatives, and mission
support personnel. Earlier this summer, TSA announced a new
comprehensive career progression plan for frontline employees. This
plan is designed to foster career growth and reflect an expanded
investment in our Transportation Security Officers.
Through defined career paths and standardized processes, TSA will
provide greater transparency and opportunity to recognize, reward, and
promote those who consistently excel in their role.
Complementing this effort, TSA is implementing a new Annual
Proficiency Review process that focuses on improving and sustaining
Transportation Security Officers' ability to correctly perform security
screening procedures through receiving real time feedback based on
observations in a live screening environment. This approach represents
a shift from performance remediation to a coaching model.
Concurrent with its Career Progression Plan, TSA is also working to
institutionalize TSA training and a development roadmap for our
workforce. Through these efforts, TSA is focused on making its
outstanding cadre of Transportation Security Officers and Inspectors
even more effective and proficient in carrying out their mission.
As a further reflection of TSA's commitment to facilitate
leadership development at all levels of the workforce and effective
communication throughout our ranks, I recently created two Advisor
positions on my direct staff that are being filled by a Supervisory
Transportation Security Officer and a FAM. The role of these two
leaders is to provide frontline input directly to me on policies,
procedures, and initiatives. Whenever there is a major decision within
TSA that impacts the frontline screening workforce, these TSO and FAMS
advisors will be part of the discussion.
Conclusion
The future to which TSA aspires is ambitious. It requires
accountable leadership. It requires the unique contributions of all
members of our dedicated TSA workforce. It requires close collaboration
with our partners to transform transportation security together on
behalf of the American people. Noting such, I am confident that with
the continued support of Congress and all of our stakeholders, TSA is
well positioned to achieve the goals outlined in its Strategy.
Since TSA's inception, it has functioned with the motto ``Not on My
Watch.'' This has served as a powerful call to action for TSA but one
that, not by intent, was limited. As security of our Nation's
transportation system is a common objective for all segments of our
society, it is one that is best achieved through a shared and
complementary effort between government, industry, and the public. In
short, to secure all modes of our transportation system requires an
``All Hands On Deck'', collaborative approach. Consequently, TSA has
adopted a new creed reflective of this fact. TSA hopes that its new
motto, ``Not on Our Watch'', will serve as a reminder of the collective
effort, commitment and vigilance we must all share to protect our
Homeland.
Chairman Thune, Ranking Member Nelson, and Members of the
Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I
am honored to serve in this capacity along with the dedicated men and
women of TSA. I look forward to your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you, Admiral, and we thank the members
of your team for the great work that they do and encourage you
to keep it up.
There are constantly-evolving threats and we have to stay
ahead of the bad guys. So thank you for all your efforts in
that regard.
Admiral, as I noted in my opening remarks, two years ago we
had required TSA to update its rules on access controls and on
vetting requirements for airport employees with access to
secure areas of an airport.
As you know, TSA has yet to issue even a Proposed
Rulemaking for the vetting rulemaking and decided to take other
action and not issue a rulemaking to update access control
requirements.
These requirements were centerpieces of FESSA designed to
improve security by requiring TSA to consider adding more
disqualifying criminal offenses and a longer look-back period
for individuals seeking access to secure airport areas.
What is the current status of TSA's efforts to implement
each of these directives and why have they been so delayed?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir, thank you for your question, and
implementing the regulations is amongst our highest priorities
and with respect to the vetting requirements for employees with
site requirements, we do plan to issue a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking coming up in the first part of Calendar Year 2019.
With respect to the access control issues, as we looked at
the requirements in law, it's our view that those access
control issues don't require new regulation, that we can do it
within our existing regulatory regime.
We have put out for comment a change to the Airport
Security Plans and got a lot of comments back on the first
round. We're about to issue the second round for comment in the
next couple of days, but given the issues that we've seen with
inside or across the board, Seattle-Tacoma one very recent
example, this is a very high priority of mine.
With respect to the TSA PreCheck Program, pre-check
actually is growing quite a bit. We added 1.8 million pre-check
registrants over the past year, so that's about a 30-percent
growth. That's pretty healthy. I'm not satisfied yet, though,
where we're at. We have about seven million registrants in TSA
pre-check.
Part of what we're looking at, as I mentioned in my opening
statement, is this integration of CBP's global entry in TSA
pre-check, particularly from an enrollment standpoint and also
from an ease of marketing, ease of communication with the
traveling public and so we're going to put a lot of effort
because I would like to see many more passengers in our Trusted
Travel Programs, either Global Entry or TSA PreCheck.
The Chairman. TSA is currently preparing to undertake
significant new technology acquisitions, including computed
tomography or CT units, for more effective 3-D screening of
carry-on bags and long-delayed credential authentication
technology units for more accurate verification of travel
identities.
Given past delays associated with the testing and
evaluation of some of these technologies, could you please
update the Committee with the current timeline for the roll-out
and full deployment of CT and CAT as well as TSA's next steps?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. CT is on track. In fact, you know, a
year ago, we really didn't have much of a CT program in place
whatsoever and so in the course of a year, we have gotten to
the point where we have five vendors actively participating in
the process, going through operational test and evaluation,
four of the five going through OT&E.
I've been out to airports. We have 13 airports around the
country right now that have those CT systems in place. I've
watched them in operation. They are a significant enhancement
in security effectiveness and I've also watched passengers
actually self-align behind the CT machines because it's a
better passenger experience. Passengers are not required to
take as many things out of their carry-on bags.
We expect to be in the position to have awarded the initial
contract for CT in the first quarter of 2019, sir, which is on
the original schedule that we had established. So that project
is on schedule. I expect to see roughly 200 CT machines
procured over the course of the next year.
With respect to CAT or the Credentialed Authentication
Technology, we do have CAT deployed in a number of airports
around the country and that has been very, very successful.
CAT essentially does an automatic validation of a
credential that a passenger provides to the first officer in
the checkpoint and then automatically queries our Secure Flight
database as that passenger is standing there, and for a
passenger with the current credential authentication
technology, that passenger will not need to have a boarding
pass. So there's a passenger benefit to this and also a
security benefit to us.
We have in our Fiscal Year 2019 budget funds requested for
300 more CAT machines and we intend to deploy those as rapidly
as we can. The CAT machines individually are relatively
inexpensive. They're about $15,000 apiece, but for me that's a
really good investment for what it provides for better security
and for passenger convenience.
The Chairman. We also understand TSA is developing a
biometrics roadmap, and my question is have industry
stakeholders or U.S. Customs and Border Protection been
consulted in the design of the roadmap?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. The roadmap is in final draft form.
I expect that we will sign that out very, very shortly and
certainly all of our interagency partners, including the Office
of Biometric Identity Management in DHS, have been involved in
this. We reached out to partners external to TSA and got their
input, as well.
The roadmap is in my view a very good one. It sets a path
ahead for us with biometric technology and recognizes the fact
that as TSA, we don't need to repeat the lessons that CPB has
already learned with biometrics. We should benefit from what
they have already demonstrated.
As we speak, there is a demonstration project going on at
the Tom Bradley International Terminal at LAX Airport that
combines the CBP Biometric Exit Program with entrance into the
TSA Security Line. So this is all an effort to integrate
programs the best we can and to save taxpayer money in the
process.
The Chairman. Do you see CAT intersecting with biometric
solutions?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir, I do. There is a corollary to CAT
called BAT, everything's an acronym, and that's Biometric
Authentication Technology, and we will continue to move forward
on that, as well.
As you know, sir, we have a registered traveler partner
CLEAR that works with us that provides biometric identification
for their customers and then we have CBP that has biometric
capability, plus our own in TSA with this Biometric
Authentication Technology. So part of the reason for the
roadmap is to put a path ahead for those three programs.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. If you don't present a boarding pass, what
do you present?
Mr. Pekoske. You present your driver's license, sir, or
your passport, and then when it queries--what the system does
is it validates the credential of the--the authenticity of the
credential, rather, and then it pulls the information from the
credential off automatically. So it will pull your name, your
date of birth, and your gender, and then while you're standing
there, it queries the Secure Flight database.
Secure Flight database will come back and tell us which
flight, at what time, and which terminal, and also give us a
risk assessment for that passenger. It's a huge step forward.
Senator Nelson. You are testing that in Miami and I have
seen that. Very good.
Well,----
Senator Wicker. Amen.
Senator Nelson.--the big question is so much of TSA is
trying to protect us on an airplane and now with 3-D guns and
despite the court injunction about a thousand of those plans
have been uploaded and downloaded. What are you going to do?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. We've looked at this issue very
carefully and I appreciate the conversation you and I had a
couple of weeks ago.
Our officers at the checkpoints are skilled in identifying
3-D weapons. We can see them on the existing X-ray technology
we have. The CT technology makes it even better because with
the CT technology, you get that 3-dimensional view. It's much
easier to discern what an object is and so what we've done is
we've certainly trained our officers to use the existing
technology to the best of our advantage to detect these 3-D
printed weapons, but also work forward with the technology
solution that enhances our capability.
Senator Nelson. And the CT technology is the replacement
for the metal detector?
Mr. Pekoske. No, sir. The CT technology is the replacement
for the existing X-ray machines. The AIT, and the acronyms, I
know, can be confusing, the AIT is the replacement eventually
for the walk-through metal detector.
Senator Nelson. Right. But the conveyor belt, that's an X-
ray?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir.
Senator Nelson. And so it's the CT that would detect then a
bulge of plastic which could be a 3-D gun?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir.
Senator Nelson. And what's your time table for replacing
the older technology with the new?
Mr. Pekoske. So with the X-ray technology, sir, so that's
what your carry-on bag goes through, that X-ray technology,
we're in operational test and evaluation for that new CT or
computed tomography technology or typically called CAT scan. We
should begin a large-scale purchase of those systems beginning
in the first quarter of Calendar Year 2019.
With the AIT technology, which is the walk-through, the
machine you put your hands over your heads, we are working very
hard to upgrade the software with that technology to provide
additional visibility into what a person might have on their
person.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Wicker.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROGER F. WICKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSISSIPPI
Senator Wicker. Mr. Administrator, thank you for being with
us.
I appreciate the fact that Senator Nelson would ask about
the Miami Airport and we are all interested in our large major
airports. I think also, I think, across the board on both sides
of the dais, we're interested in our medium-size airports and I
have a question about a couple of them.
Let's start with Jackson-Medgar Wiley Evers Airport in
Jackson, Mississippi. They've got particular design problems.
They have two concourses, but right now they have only one
screening line for each concourse. This prohibits them from
having TSA PreCheck which is quite an inconvenience.
Now the airport is being proactive. They have expansion
plans, $1.5 million, to add one processing lane at each
concourse. Here's our problem. We don't have an assurance from
your agency that they will staff and provide the necessary
resources for these additional lanes which are going to be done
based on a local $1.5 million expansion plan.
So can you work with us on that, and can you commit your
agency's support to provide the necessary resources after we've
done this new project?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir, I can absolutely commit to working
with you on that, and I'm sure the Federal Security Director at
that airport is already very much involved in the process.
As you may know, sir, every year we look at where our
resources are allocated and adjust those resource allocations
based on what we see as throughput and so our primary metric is
passenger throughput going through that particular airport, but
we also have a desire to continue to enhance the TSA PreCheck
brand and part of that process is to make sure that we have
more predictable hours for PreCheck lanes to be open and
closed, and where we do have the capability to expand the
PreCheck footprint, we'd very much like to do that.
I would also add that thanks to the work we've done with a
lot of the airlines, we have more and more airlines signing up
all the time for TSA PreCheck. So it's more available to
passengers in Jackson if they're using a certain carrier. It's
more likely than not they can use PreCheck with that carrier.
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much. Let's talk about then
passenger throughput, which is important, but I hope you can
see also that there are other factors that are available and
pertinent in determining the amount of, say, baggage scanners
that an airport gets and particularly if you're a medium-size
airport and you try to expand and getting more airlines in and
successfully doing so, if you've got to use last year's
throughput numbers, it's a handicap in attracting the
additional business.
So do you have any ideas about how TSA can adjust its
formula to take into account other factors, such as stakeholder
input, facility design, past costs incurred by the airport
itself, as well as customer convenience?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir, and we consider all those factors,
and actually when we look at throughput projections----
Senator Wicker. So it's not totally bound by this one----
Mr. Pekoske. That's correct.
Senator Wicker.--statistic?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. No, we look at the whole picture. We
also look at, you know, does an airport have steady stream load
throughout a day or is it just focused on certain parts of the
day. That changes how we staff because we might go to more
part-time employees, for example, in that regard, and so I can
assure you that we collaborate very closely with the airports
and if there is any issue, I'll take a look at Jackson myself,
to make sure that we're taking a very close look at that to
ensure that the airport investment is going--you know, that
we're partnered with them very closely on that.
Senator Wicker. OK. Now one other thing, when there's a
security incident that TSA can't completely handle at an
airport, local law enforcement has to come in, and we have a
program called Law Enforcement Officer, LEO, Reimbursement
Program, and there's a proposal coming out of the Budget Office
to substantially cut funding for this reimbursement program.
What can TSA do to mitigate the burden on small airports
that are going to have to use these local law enforcement
people but don't have the revenue streams to reimburse the
local law enforcement personnel?
Mr. Pekoske. Senator, we rely on law enforcement across the
board, large airports, small airports, to provide a security
presence at our checkpoints, and I will tell you that they are
invaluable in providing that service to my officers at the
checkpoint.
Senator Wicker. You'll concede that this LEO Reimbursement
Program is part and parcel to that?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir, I would. The Airport Security Plan
requires the airports to provide security at the checkpoint.
The Law Enforcement Reimbursement Program was designed to
support work above and beyond what the Airport Security Plan
requires.
With the Airport Security Plan proposal to reduce the funds
going to law enforcement agencies around the country, it's a
tough choice. You know, we don't have the top-line budget
that--you know, a budget is always a constrained document, by
and large, and you have to make some tough choices in that and
that was one of the very difficult choices that we made.
But, you know, that budget is still up for congressional
review and I know it's ready to go to a conference committee.
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much and thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
Senator Cantwell.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks for
holding this important hearing, and thank you for mentioning
the secure briefings and having several of them. I think this
is something that's very important to our Committee and I hope
we continue to do them.
Some of this is the larger Homeland Security but I think
our efforts to move our borders overseas that Senator Collins
and I worked with Homeland on has been a great solution in
stopping some people from coming to the United States and so
there are many aspects to this aviation security and so we
appreciate the fact that we can have secure briefings to talk
about many of these elements.
Administrator Pekoske, thank you so much for being here and
I very much appreciate your prioritizing your challenges at the
agency and what you're working on. I appreciate that very much,
appreciate the 41-percent increase in the K-9 activity.
For us at Sea-Tac, being one of the fastest-growing
airports in the country, the amount of demand this K-9
flexibility both in more canines, particularly at high season
time, and more canines through the flexibility you're giving to
airports, I just can't speak enough about. This is not just the
speed of moving people through TSA lines, this is a layer of
security that cannot be underestimated and so appreciate it and
so appreciate that they are also in the outer terminal of the
airport and doing good work, too, because that is a line of
defense and very much appreciated.
You mentioned the incident at Sea-Tac where an air-ground
service agent was involved with the theft of a plane and I
definitely want to recognize the air traffic controllers and
the military and the first responders who handled this
situation so well. We appreciate it.
The incident, though, raises questions about our layers of
security. My understanding is your--obviously there are lots of
people involved here. There are airlines, there are airports,
there's TSA, and your main responsibility as it relates to
airports are the security plans and reviewing the security
plans of airports, is that correct? Is that a good
characterization of your role here and responsibility?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, ma'am, but we're also responsible for
overall security and that's really why--and we have a number of
investigations underway. I want to see what those
investigations say from a fact set.
I would also reassure you that we've done a lot already on
this issue. As soon as the incident happened--and we do this
all the time, if something happens in a particular airport, we
telegraph to all of our Federal Security Directors throughout
the entire system so that they can work with their airline and
airport partners in their locations to make sure we don't have
a copycat issue, that we close up or put additional eyes on
whatever vulnerability might have existed.
The other thing that we have done is, you know, I have a
great Aviation Security Advisory Committee and I appreciate the
authorities that you have given me with respect to the ASAC.
They have helped me immeasurably in my year in this
position. I have asked the ASAC several times in several
different ways to look at the insider issues. So I expect to
get another report back from the ASAC sometime toward the end
of the year.
The final thing that I would just like to recognize is the
industry initiative here. The airlines and the airports have
gotten together and formed a work group so that they can share
across their peers in the system best practices with respect to
aircraft and airport security and they've agreed to feed their
best practice input into our ASAC deliberations.
So there's an awful lot of work being done on this insider
issue.
Senator Cantwell. So currently, right now, TSA has already
implemented interim measures to help prevent copycat events
from happening?
Mr. Pekoske. Senator, we haven't changed any measures. What
we've done is we've highlighted the incident and provided some
additional detail to our Federal security directors so that
they're particularly alert for this particular incident and
then, as we get the investigative information in and look at
the facts, we'll determine whether or not some changes are
needed to procedures.
Senator Cantwell. And I get that that's both interim and
long-term and appreciate the----
Mr. Pekoske. Right.
Senator Cantwell.--fact that you're going through that
investigative process or that there are several organizations
going through that investigative process and will continue to
get information.
So, OK, on that point, one of the things that I'm always
amazed about obviously coming from both an aviation and a
technology state is that, you know, things like flight radar or
flight aware, even, you know, you can stand on the shores of
Puget Sound and get information about various----
Mr. Pekoske. Right.
Senator Cantwell.--vessels going through our waterways.
As we look at Next Gen, why not have better situational
awareness on all ground planes or all airport assets? Why is
that not going to be part of the array in the future so that
you actually know where every asset is on the airport and
whether it should be or should not be being moved, given that
you could have some data and information about that?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, Senator, that is part of the review
that's being done. As you mentioned, there are several
investigations underway. There's one with TSA, one with the
Federal Bureau of Investigations, certainly one with the Port
Authority of Seattle, and also one with the National
Transportation Safety Board, and, you know, we collaborate very
closely with each other on those investigations so that we can
look at things, the technologies that might be available to
help us at low or no-cost to provide that situational awareness
for something that may be occurring that you don't necessarily
have visual eyes on but you may have technology eyes on.
Senator Cantwell. Well, I definitely encourage us to look
at those. I'm pretty sure this is where we're going with Next
Gen anyway because Next Gen is about moving all the assets cost
effectively through the system as expeditiously.
As you were saying, that it's not just security but also
the efficiency of how we move things through the system and
having that level of efficiency of knowing where everything on
the ground is and where it's going and whether it should be
moved or not be moved or is part of a repair plant, whatever
the information is.
I know that in past discussions here in the Committee, a
lot of people think that's going to actually help us moving
aircraft through the system on the ground because of the level
of congestion that exists. So why not capitalize on that data
and information and use it to our advantage on the security
side, as well? So you're look at those details?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, ma'am, along with our partners.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cantwell.
Senator Udall.
STATEMENT OF HON. TOM UDALL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW MEXICO
Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and appreciate you
holding this hearing and, Administrator Pekoske, thank you for
your efforts to keep us safe in our travels.
And this hearing is very important in terms of oversight,
as you recognized, the oversight Congress does and today, I'd
like to focus on TSA's use of facial recognition technology.
TSA claims this technology will streamline the security
process but it is unclear how these technologies will impact
efficiency and whether this software treats all travelers and
all Americans equally in practice.
A recent Massachusetts Institute of Technology study showed
that facial recognition software can have an error rate as high
as 35 percent for dark-skinned women. If a TSA agent was wrong
a third of the time, they'd be considered ineffective at their
job.
So why would we want to implement technology that can be
inaccurate for a large segment of the population?
An ACLU test of one major facial recognition technology
found that it falsely identified 28 members of Congress to
arrest photos of people accused of crimes. Those 28 members
were disproportionately people of color, including Civil Rights
Hero John Lewis, and even included a member of this Committee,
our law-abiding colleague, Senator Markey, who sits right here
on my right.
Additionally, we don't know whether the impact of this
technology on the privacy of American travelers. Overseas,
we're seeing authoritarian nations, like China, roll out facial
recognition technology in public on a massive scale to surveil
its population.
As TSA considers scaling up this technology, I would urge
you to halt full implementation until there is clear
transparency into its effects this technology is having on our
travelers.
In February of this year, the Government Executive
published an article titled ``TSA's Facial Recognition Pilot
Program May Make Travel Worse for Ethnic Minorities,'' and, Mr.
Chairman, I'd like to enter this into the record.
The Chairman. Without objection.
[The Government Executive article follows:]
Government Executive--February 20, 2018
TSA's Facial Recognition Pilot Program May Make Travel Worse
for Ethnic Minorities
By Rosie Spinks
You'd be hard pressed to find a traveler who would describe getting
through security at Los Angeles International Airport as an orderly or
peaceful experience. Even when the threat level is deemed moderate,
long lines, stringent security, and barking security agents are more or
less the norm.
But as of this week, the Transportation Security Administration is
trying to streamline the experience, with an opt-in pilot program using
biometric facial recognition technology, which is aimed at verifying
and matching a passenger's identity to their travel documents. It's
intended to automate the often repetitive and human error-prone process
of verifying a passenger's boarding pass and passport several times
over before boarding. The pilot project is being run at the boarding
gate--documents will also be manually checked during the test program
to ensure no security lapses--in a partnership with British Airways,
U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and LAX's Tom Bradley International
terminal.
According to industry intelligence agency CAPA Centre for Aviation,
the plan is in keeping with President Donald Trump's wider aims to
tighten border security measures. Though the technology existed before
he took office--similar programs have been tested or are in use in the
United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and at Washington Dulles airport in
2015 and New York's JFK in 2016--Trump has expedited implementation,
despite the technology's so-called ``teething problems.''
Whether you are a fan of Trump's policies to tighten border
security or not, there is certainly a case to be made that biometric
boarding could eventually be a boon for all travelers who dislike what
CAPA colorfully calls the ``slow, mundane, intrusive, unfashionable and
irritating'' process of airport security. If implemented at its highest
capability, passengers theoretically wouldn't have to hold onto and
flash their travel documents at multiple points throughout an airport
visit.
That could one day mean no more panicking that you've forgotten
your passport or boarding pass--because your face would be all you
need.
In addition, costly snafus like All Nippon airway's ``flight to
nowhere'' in December--when the plane had to make a U-turn because it
had inadvertently allowed a non-ticketed passenger to board--would be
less likely. Indeed, data from air travel IT and communications firm
SITA shows that passengers are generally a fan of technology-enabled
travel, with 57 percent reporting they would use biometrics for their
next trip. Thus, passenger satisfaction is often positioned as the
reason for the technology.
But there's a huge caveat. Where the technology currently stands,
face recognition doesn't work the same for everyone. As CAPA noted,
``face recognition software is not so good at identifying ethnic
minorities when most of the subjects used in training the technology
were from the majority group.'' In addition, commonplace accessories or
personal effects like hats, scarves, facial hair, long hair, heavy
make-up or even low resolution images and poor lighting mean the
current technology may perform inaccurately.
Given those limitations, it's not hard to imagine a whole host of
ways that biometric security could make travel more seamless for one
set of travelers, and an even larger headache for others. Whether it's
being asked to remove cultural dress such as head or face coverings,
someone who's undergone corrective or plastic surgery, or having an ID
photo that's not in CBP's database, there are number of scenarios in
which ethnic minority, non-American, or heavily ornamented travelers
could find biometric boarding the opposite of seamless.
The CBP reports that the technology is 97.5 percent accurate, and
has aspirations to roll it out at all U.S. airports within four years.
While the technology still has a way to go, the desired end point for
some in the industry is for airport security to be able to focus on
``finding bad people, not bad objects.''
Senator Udall. Thank you. And this seems to suggest that
facial recognition does not work the same for everyone, and the
article quotes the Center for Aviation saying, ``Face
recognition software is not so good at identifying ethnic
minorities when most of the subjects used in training the
technology were from the majority group.'' That's the end of
the quote there.
Other factors that seem to affect the accuracy are facial
hair or makeup, scars. Given these limitations, it's hard not
to imagine a whole host of ways that biometric security could
make travel more seamless for one set of travelers and an even
larger headache for others.
Can you guarantee that no population of U.S. travelers will
be disproportionately inconvenienced, harassed, or
discriminated against by this new TSA technology?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, Senator. Thank you for your comments and
I promise to you and to the entire Committee that I will
carefully look at all those studies as we proceed forward with
facial recognition biometrics in general, and the goal here is
not to disproportionately affect any aspect of our population.
So we will be very, very careful and completely transparent
with all of you as we move forward.
I would also mention----
Senator Udall. Have you looked at these specific studies
that I've talked about and mentioned?
Mr. Pekoske. I haven't read them--sir, I haven't read them
in detail, but I'm aware that they're out there.
But, sir, the other thing I just wanted to mention to you
is, you know, as we're registering new PreCheck passengers, so
if somebody comes in and says, hey, I'm not currently a
PreCheck passenger, they're going to register, let's say, in
two or three months from now, we are capturing their facial
biometric with their permission but we also capture a print, so
we have two biometrics, and so, you know, there is a potential
that the multiple biometrics that would be in a database,
voluntarily given by a passenger, could begin to--you know, if
that issue persists as the technology is developed, could
provide a remedy for it.
Senator Udall. Yes. Do you know if the technology that the
TSA is using was tested on enough people of different genders
and ethnicities so that it does not have the inherent bias that
many of these technologies have?
Mr. Pekoske. So we're using the technology that U.S.
Customs and Border Protection has developed. I have not looked
specifically at those test results but will, based on your
comments.
Senator Udall. OK. Thank you very much. I have a number of
other questions but based on all the Members that are here, I'd
like to put them in the record and work with you to make sure
you get timely answers to them.
Thank you, Admiral.
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir, and I'd be most happy, sir, you
know, your schedule permitting, to come up and chat with you
about some of this.
Senator Udall. Happy for you to do that. Thank you.
Mr. Pekoske. Thanks.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Udall.
Senator Peters.
STATEMENT OF HON. GARY PETERS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MICHIGAN
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Pekoske, it's good to have you here and thank you for
your service every day in this very important job that you
have.
I want to take a moment and follow up on some questions
that Senator Wicker asked you regarding expanding airports and
how TSA resources are allocated to meet those growing needs.
In Michigan, we have the Gerald R. Ford International
Airport in Grand Rapids and they just completed the first phase
of really a major transformation project which included an
update to the checkpoint footprint that can accommodate seven
active TSA screening lanes but, unfortunately, the local TSA
only has equipment and staffing to operate six of those lanes.
The Gerald R. Ford Airport, as you may know, is actually
the second fastest-growing commercial airport in the United
States right now and so it's absolutely critical that they have
TSA staffing necessary for West Michigan and have already made
substantial investment to make that happen.
So I know you answered the question in terms of your
process, the staffing and looking at throughputs and making
that analysis, but my question is how often do you look at
that?
You mentioned annual, but it seems to me if an airport has
just completed an expansion, has just brought in additional
aircraft as a result of that, there needs to be some sort of
expedited process. If you could walk me through that, I'd
appreciate it.
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. Thanks for the question and really,
you know, working with airports very closely, as we do, we
review the designs for any checkpoint modifications that an
airport is going to make before those designs are even approved
and moved forward.
So I'm pretty certain that our Federal Security Director
was involved in that from the beginning and, you know, as we
look at our algorithms for how we staff our checkpoints
throughout the system, we would have that information in
advance.
So I'll go back and look specifically at the Gerald Ford
staffing issues, but, you know, we don't really wait for a
project to be complete and then decide how we're going to deal
with the staffing. We usually do that as soon as the plans are
put in place and plan our way through because, as you know, the
budget process generally takes two years to provide new
resources for new capability.
Senator Peters. Well, good, and I appreciate you looking at
that and we'd love to follow up with your office as to the
status of that and what we might expect in the future,
depending on what you find.
You also mentioned your desire to expand PreCheck and
that's, of course, important, increased throughputs, so we can
get more people through these lines.
One process is having offsite and onsite periodic
enrollment events but those events, as you know, are usually
completely booked and the airports that I've heard from say
that permanent in-airport enrollment centers would be
enormously helpful in order to increase it.
So my question is how does the TSA currently pick where to
set up enrollment sites?
Mr. Pekoske. So the way we do it is we target in our
PreCheck enrollment frequent flyers because those are the ones
that will benefit most by the investment in PreCheck and for
us, candidly, from a managing the throughput issue, we benefit
most if frequent travelers are in PreCheck, as well.
We've looked at many, many ways to make the enrollment
process as easy as we possibly can. We have mobile enrollment
vehicles that travel around the country, based on demand, and
enroll people as, you know, just basically driving up to the
front of an airport and enrolling people right there if there
is no enrollment center at the airport.
The other thing that I mentioned that's really important to
this whole process is in our work with Customs and Border
Protection to try to integrate the Global Entry and PreCheck
Programs.
Right now, we each have our own set of infrastructures that
manage--you know, I have mine that manages TSA. CBP has theirs
that manages Global Entry.
We will have more capacity when we bring these programs
closer together and one of the first things you'll see, sir, is
a universal portal. So passengers just go to one place and it
kind of steps you through the different criteria you have for
your own travel and will recommend a solution that might be
best for that passenger, but the whole idea is to make a better
investment of the dual systems we have right now by integrating
them together.
Senator Peters. You mentioned your desire to expand the
program. There is currently not a cap on the program, is that
correct?
Mr. Pekoske. No, sir.
Senator Peters. Do you think there will ever be an eventual
need for a cap or do you believe that the program will be able
to continue for the foreseeable future?
Mr. Pekoske. No, sir. I think the program will be able to
continue for the foreseeable future. If you think about, you
know, we have seven million people right now in the TSA
PreCheck Program, probably another six or seven million in
CBP's Global Entry, so let's say a total of 14 or 15 million
passengers.
On any given day, on a busy day in the summer, for example,
we had 2.5 million people go through our security checkpoints.
So I just see continued growth in the PreCheck Program which is
good for security and it's good for passenger experience.
Senator Peters. Yes. In response to some earlier questions,
principally from Senator Nelson, you talked about 3-D printed
firearms and your efforts to make sure you're protecting us
from those firearms.
My question to you is, what about international
coordination? Are there other countries preparing for this
threat, and are they taking measures to ensure that they are
not trafficked in it on flights or used onboard to harm
passengers, particularly those that may be heading towards the
United States, and what are some of the lessons we can learn
from what you're seeing around the world?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. We coordinate very closely with our
partners around the world, particularly our FVEY partners, with
respect to threat information and exchange, and then also some
of our other key partners in Europe, in the Middle East, and in
Asia.
I've traveled extensively to have personal relationships
with my key partners around the globe. We do a very good job, I
think, of sharing best practices and, in fact, we're trying to
get to the point where we can more integrate our standards of
performance so that, for example, as we're--you know, the CT
technology that I mentioned earlier that we're deploying in our
checkpoints is also being deployed at other airports around the
world.
We're sharing to the maximum extent we possibly can and
vice versa with our test results, so that we don't relearn, but
we're also trying to see where we can merge standards of
technology development so that there's more of a seamless,
there's more of a similarity in security around the globe to be
part of the process.
We're also very active participants in ICAO and ICAO has a
Global Aviation Security Plan that's quite good and we are very
strongly advocating, as are our key partners, to continue to
advance the criteria in the Global Aviation Security Plan so
that globally we get better all the time.
Senator Peters. Great. Thank you.
Mr. Pekoske. Thanks.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Peters.
Senator Hassan.
STATEMENT OF HON. MAGGIE HASSAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE
Senator Hassan. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and good morning,
Administrator Pekoske, it is so good to see you. Thank you
again for your service to TSA and as a member of the Coast
Guard. We are very lucky to have you.
I wanted to follow up a little bit on a related line to
what Senator Peters was just talking about. It was just about a
year ago that you testified before this Committee as a nominee
to be the TSA Administrator, and I asked you to look into the
adequacy of our foreign partners in addressing insider threats.
In particular, I asked you to provide your assessment of
whether countries with airports that served as last points of
departure into the United States were sufficiently screening
their airport workers for terrorist threats.
So kind of three questions here. At the time you committed
to looking into the matter, so, first, have you since
investigated it, and, two, in your view, are our allies and
aviation partners in foreign countries doing enough to screen
their workers, and, finally, are any of these allies
specifically allowing TSA and the Federal Government to screen
their workers against United States counterterrorism databases?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, ma'am, and I remember our conversation,
and I have looked very closely into the insider threat issue.
In fact, if I look across the entire spectrum of what TSA
does with respect to security, there are two that are going to
be a key focus over the coming years, not that they're not a
focus already. One is insider, the other is cargo security.
On the insider piece, I have discussed this extensively
with my international partners and, as you know, we do have
standards of performance for insider that are established by
ICAO. The countries agree to abide by and we audit their
compliance with those standards for all last point of departure
airports. So there is an active look, an active auditing
process in place in doing that.
I would submit that, given what we've seen around the
world, I don't think any of us are really doing enough here and
that's why I've asked the ASAC, the Aviation Security Advisory
Committee, to take another look at this and that's why it's
always an active topic of discussion amongst our key
international partners because I think we can all do better
with it.
Some countries do have very, very good programs and I've
stated publicly several times in international fora that the
United States can learn from other countries' experience. You
know, we never stand for the proposition that ours is always
the best in every single aspect. There are other examples out
there that we should learn from and we are doing that.
Senator Hassan. OK. That is good to hear. Are they allowing
TSA and the Federal Government to screen their workers against
our counterterrorism databases?
Mr. Pekoske. I'm sorry. That last question.
Senator Hassan. Yes.
Mr. Pekoske. Not that I am aware of, Senator, and that goes
to specific country law and practices. So I'm not aware of them
using our vetting systems for their airport workers at this
point.
Senator Hassan. Well, I think what I would suggest, and we
can further discuss this, is that they allow us to vet their
workers against our database, so giving us the information
about their workers would seem to me to be a way that we don't
have to get into necessarily their systems but we want enough
from them to get into our systems, right?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, and thank you for that clarification, and
we actually have engaged in some conversations with a key
partner on doing that with respect to cargo, as well.
Senator Hassan. OK. Well, thank you. I would look forward
to following up with you on that.
I also wanted to ask you about another conversation we had
during your nomination hearing. Congress was considering the
President's Fiscal Year 2018 Budget Request at that time and
there had been a cut in funding for the Viper Teams and the Law
Enforcement Reimbursement Program.
Many members, including myself, asked you at that hearing
about whether you supported cutting these programs that help
secure the public areas of airports, and at the time you
pledged to thoroughly review the cost-benefit analysis of those
proposed cuts.
Now fast forward several months to the release of the
President's Fiscal Year 2019 Budget Request, and TSA, now under
your leadership, again proposed the elimination of the Viper
Teams and the Law Enforcement Office Reimbursement Program,
which you spoke about a little bit ago, but the request in the
budget, in the 2019 budget, certainly signals your support for
cutting the only Federal programs that would help to secure the
public areas of airports, the same public areas that have
previously been targeted by ISIS and Al Qaeda.
So now you are beginning your second year as TSA
Administrator. There are reports that have also surfaced about
TSA pondering proposals to eliminate screening all together for
150 smaller airports.
These proposals suggest that TSA is trying to pull back its
resources from a large number of airports all across the
country. If true, that's really an alarming trend. While terror
groups, like ISIS and Al Qaeda, have suffered some defeats on
the battlefield, they still pose an extraordinary threat to our
homeland and to our aviation system, making these cuts all the
more concerning.
So can you please share with us your unclassified analysis
of the terror threat to the homeland that TSA is using to
justify these cutbacks?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, ma'am, and a couple comments. First on
VIPR, as I testified in my confirmation hearing, I've testified
since then in other committee settings that I'm a strong
supporter of the VIPR Program. It has value. I like the
program. The men and women who staff our VIPR Operations are
largely Federal Air Marshals and they do an outstanding job.
VIPR were particularly critical for us in hurricane
response because in some locations they were the security in
airports for a period of time. So it's a very, very valuable
program.
Senator Hassan. Right.
Mr. Pekoske. I also, as I stated earlier, I very much
strongly support Law Enforcement Reimbursement Program. I value
what our law enforcement partners bring to the security
checkpoint and we're better for their presence there.
This all rolls up into what can you afford and if you have
to make some reductions, where would you make them, because the
budget is not unlimited, and so these are very difficult
choices that we had to make but it does not in any way, shape,
or form signal anything but strong support for those programs.
The other part of this, if I could just for a second,----
Senator Hassan. Yes.
Mr. Pekoske.--is that these programs recognize the fact
that there is some existing capability at the state and local
level. So if you reduce VIPR, for example, it's not like the
capability that's provided by the overall community is
completely gone.
Senator Hassan. So I appreciate that answer and I know I'm
going over here, so I will wrap up, but please understand that
what we expect from you is to stand up for the security needs--
--
Mr. Pekoske. Right.
Senator Hassan.--for our airports, for our homeland, and
the notion that we would cut back after other priorities, like
big tax cuts have been provided, is really astonishing to me.
I will also tell you that state and local governments are
already, most of them, very extended themselves and this is a
Federal function to keep our airports safe. You said that a lot
of the help you get from the reimbursement program really goes
hand-in-hand with TSA and is critical to its mission, which is
a Federal mission.
So I would look forward to having further discussions with
you. I think you need to be standing up for these programs and
refusing to cut them, unless you have security information or
intelligence information that tells us we don't need them
anymore.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, ma'am. If I can just add one piece of
this because I didn't answer your question on low-volume
airports, we are not reducing our presence at low-volume
airports. In fact, quite the contrary, I think we need to
improve our security profile at smaller airports and so the
reports that we were going to pull away from 150 airports
around the country, that's not what we're doing.
Senator Hassan. Good. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Hassan.
Senator Sullivan.
STATEMENT OF HON. DAN SULLIVAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, Admiral,
welcome, and I want to reiterate the Chairman's opening
statements.
I think you and your team are doing a really good job. You
don't always get that enough and it's, you know, obviously not
perfect, but when you think about how far we've come from 9/11
and standing up a brand-new Federal agency, I'm glad to see you
got your frontline workers--particularly someone from Alaska--
but, you know, all of us, we travel a lot. I try to get home
every weekend, and I always take the time to compliment your
team in Alaska because I think they do outstanding work and
it's not easy work. It's not perfect, but I just want to thank
you and please pass that on to all of the members of TSA
because I agree with what the Chairman said at the outset here.
Let me ask an issue that I know it's not completely in your
lane, but it's a really important one to so many of us, and
that's TSA working with local law enforcement on drug
interdiction issues.
Like most states, Alaska's experiencing a lot of problems
with addiction and the related crime. Fentanyl obviously is a
big one. We're hopefully going to pass the STOP Act here, which
is going to put more resources into stopping fentanyl coming in
from China.
That is actually remarkable that the Chinese could stop
that, if they wanted to right now. It's a Communist state. I
was in China several months ago and I asked them to stop
sending fentanyl that's killing our citizens.
But what are you doing or what can you do with local law
enforcement to help? You know, we have small communities in
Alaska, many of which are only served by airports, not even
roads. So we know when drugs--a lot of times when drugs are
coming in.
Are there things that you can do more or you have ideas for
maybe agencies that aren't in your--it's not your jurisdiction
but the Post Office and others. I'm sure you get this question
a lot. It's actually a very important one.
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. Thanks for the question and really
thanks for your comments, as well.
I agree wholeheartedly with your comments on the workforce,
as I mentioned in my opening statement, and I'm really proud to
lead these 63,000 professionals that do amazing work every
single day, not just in the United States but around the globe.
With respect to drug interdiction, sir, you're right, that
is not a TSA mission per se. We do discover drugs in our
screening process at security checkpoints, but our procedure is
to turn that contraband over to local authorities and local
authorities typically handle that very well for us.
Your question really relates to when there is no local
authority, how can we help? The only thing I could think of off
the top of my head with respect to TSA, sir, is with our VIPR
Teams, they do supplant some local requirements. So, in other
words, if we have a VIPR Team operating in Anchorage, for
example, that might free up some Alaska State Police to go
somewhere else for a period of time and that's the way we could
indirectly assist with this.
Our requirement for VIPR is that they perform their mission
around transportation centers, of course, because it is TSA.
Senator Sullivan. Let me ask you another question that
relates to my state, but it also relates nationally, in that
TSA at one time had a Cargo Division. I know it's complex with
regard to how cargo operates, how you screen it, but it's also
a big security issue. Cargo hubs in my state are very big.
What are you doing on that, and what are you looking at in
the future with regard to cargo screening as a security
measure?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. I spent a significant amount of time
with the major cargo carriers in this country. I've learned an
awful lot in my visits with them, spent an entire day with
most, and we recently established a Cargo Division in TSA
Headquarters.
I mentioned earlier that that's a key area of focus for me
and I need to have an organizational structure that focuses on
that, as well, and I want to provide an easy point of contact
for the cargo industry inside TSA Headquarters.
Senator Sullivan. Let me ask a final question. It's not
necessarily related as much to my state but certainly out here,
you know, every time I've gotten on a train, like a passenger
train on the East Coast, I always kind of, you know, sense that
this is a pretty soft target.
What are you doing? I mean, there doesn't seem to be a lot
of kind of visible presence from somebody who wanted to do
damage to our commuter train system, particularly, you know,
Amtrak and those high-volume areas on the East Coast. What are
you doing on that, and do you need help from Congress on an
area that to me seems, like I said, pretty vulnerable?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. We have very good relationships with
the operators of major rail systems around the country, and
I've spent significant amount of my time, my personal time in
understanding these issues.
We regularly provide intelligence updates to our rail
partners, as we do across the entire surface transportation
spectrum.
Senator Sullivan. And is that relationship good?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, I think that relationship is outstanding,
and for a number of the major systems, we also support their
Explosive Detection K-9 Program. So those canines, a portion of
them at least, are provided for and trained by TSA, and we also
certify them every year. So there's a very good relationship
back and forth between the major rail carriers in the country,
in my view.
Senator Sullivan. So you are not concerned about that as a
vulnerability?
Mr. Pekoske. I'm concerned about it as a vulnerability. I'm
concerned about, you know, any vulnerability to a
transportation system and certainly, as we've seen instances
occur around the world, that that is very much a target, and I
know the owners and operators of those systems very much feel
that way, as well, and Amtrak in particular has a very robust,
in my view, police presence and, you know, as I've seen before
I came into this position, as I traveled up the Northeast
Corridor, I would typically see Amtrak Police Officers on
trains that I was on, not every single one but on a fairly
regular basis, and the whole idea is to provide--you can't
cover every transit, which you can't, is to provide that
unpredictability of when you're going to be there.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
Senator Markey.
STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD MARKEY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Pekoske, recent reports have revealed concerning
details about your agency's previously undisclosed Quiet Skies
Program.
Under the program, Air Marshals monitor American travelers
who aren't suspected of any crime and aren't on any watch list.
Mr. Pekoske, I want to learn more about what exactly the
TSA is monitoring. Does the TSA monitor whether Americans go to
the bathroom during flights?
Mr. Pekoske. Sir, the Quiet Skies Program is not a new
program. It has been in existence since about 2011.
Senator Markey. Right. Does the TSA monitor whether
Americans go to the bathroom during flights?
Mr. Pekoske. Sir, we place Federal Air Marshals on flights
where some Quiet Sky selectees may be passengers----
Senator Markey. So yes or no? Do you monitor?
Mr. Pekoske.--and part of their presence to mitigate the
risk of a Quiet Skies passenger----
Senator Markey. Yes or no?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, yes.
Senator Markey. Does the TSA monitor what Americans eat or
drink on a flight?
Mr. Pekoske. We don't monitor--I would not use the term
``monitor.'' We observe. This is a law enforcement mission.
Senator Markey. So the answer is yes?
Mr. Pekoske. They observe. Yes, sir.
Senator Markey. Does the TSA follow Americans after they've
deplaned and are walking to their car or taxi?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir.
Senator Markey. Yes. So, again, the American public does
deserve to know the extent to which they are being surveilled.
Again, we are talking about Americans who aren't on any watch
list and aren't suspected of any crimes.
Who at TSA determines what passengers land on the Quiet
Skies list?
Mr. Pekoske. Quiet Skies is an intelligence-based risk
assessment program, sir, that's operated by rules and so the
rules set are reviewed continuously and changes to those rules
can only be approved by myself or my deputy.
Senator Markey. OK. Once you gather information about
flying Americans, where is the data stored and who has access
to that information?
Mr. Pekoske. The data is stored in our intelligence office
and our intelligence professionals have access to the
information.
Senator Markey. It's limited to them?
Mr. Pekoske. Right.
Senator Markey. What do you do with the information about
innocent Americans? Do you delete it immediately?
Mr. Pekoske. With respect to an individual who would be a
Quiet Skies selectee, based on rules, based on intelligence,
if, after a certain period of time,----
Senator Markey. What is the period of time?
Mr. Pekoske. I can't reveal that in open session, sir, but
there is a period of time. It is short.
Senator Markey. Well, if they haven't done anything wrong,
why is it not immediately?
Mr. Pekoske. We, by our rules, want to see a certain number
of encounters before they're removed from that program.
Senator Markey. Even if you've already determined that
they're innocent?
Mr. Pekoske. We would not have made that determination----
Senator Markey. Once you've determined that they're
innocent, do you----
Mr. Pekoske. We would----
Senator Markey.--then delete it immediately?
Mr. Pekoske. Sir, once we determine--I wouldn't use the
term ``innocent'' either. Once we determine that they don't
present a risk, an additional risk to security, then they are
removed from the Quiet Skies Program. Those records are
retained for 2 years.
Senator Markey. Two years?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir.
Senator Markey. Even though they're innocent Americans.
They haven't--you don't have any reason to have----
Mr. Pekoske. Sir, I wouldn't say that. I would say that
it's a rules-based program that assesses risk. People that are
selected for Quiet Skies, based on patterns of travel, in our
view, informed by intelligence, represent more risk than other
passengers do.
Senator Markey. Right. But having surveilled them and not
able--and not having any evidence which has been developed, it
just seems to me that they do have a right to the presumption
of innocence.
I'm also concerned that the Quiet Skies Program may not
pass constitutional muster. Mr. Pekoske, does TSA take into
account characteristics, like a traveler's name, when
determining who to monitor?
Mr. Pekoske. We take into consideration a traveler's
record. We do not take into consideration a traveler's race or
religion.
Senator Markey. So identifiers, like race or religion or
their name, can clearly be used as proxies for race and
religion. Monitoring travelers based on these criteria raises
pressing concerns about the constitutionality of the Quiet
Skies Program.
So you are saying that you do not use race, religion, or
the traveler's name in determining who to monitor?
Mr. Pekoske. We don't use race or religion, sir. We do, of
course, use the traveler's name because that's part of the
reservation data.
Senator Markey. Right. But is a traveler's name used to
create a suspect category just because of the traveler's name
and with no other information gathered about him or her, with
the exception of the name?
Mr. Pekoske. No, sir, it wouldn't be the name all by
itself. It would be the name and other criteria.
Senator Markey. All right. The American public also
deserves to know whether other agencies, besides TSA, are
involved here.
Does the White House or Department of Justice have any
involvement with this program?
Mr. Pekoske. This program is part of a privacy impact
assessment that has been published on the DHS website for years
and we do use the travel vetting system that Customs and Border
Protection employs.
Senator Markey. So does the White House or Department of
Justice have any involvement in this program?
Mr. Pekoske. Involvement meaning what, sir?
Senator Markey. Are they participating----
Mr. Pekoske. Awareness?
Senator Markey. Yes. Are they participating in this
program?
Mr. Pekoske. The White House, to my view, is not
participating in the program.
Senator Markey. OK. The Department of Justice, do they have
any involvement with the program, the Department of Justice?
Mr. Pekoske. This is a law enforcement program. Department
of Justice may, in certain circumstances, but it wouldn't be
based just on Quiet Skies.
Senator Markey. Air Marshals have recently come forward and
voiced doubts about the Quiet Skies Program, which they say
saps their ability to do more vital law enforcement work.
Approximately how many people has TSA monitored so far
under the program?
Mr. Pekoske. Sir, I don't have those numbers right in front
of me. I'd be happy to provide them to you for the record
because we do record those numbers.
Senator Markey. Could you give me a range?
Mr. Pekoske. I would say, you know, in Quiet Skies, with
the Air Marshal involvement, it's in the thousands of
passengers.
Senator Markey. OK. Of those, how many were American
citizens?
Mr. Pekoske. I don't have that information off the top of
my head.
Senator Markey. How many individuals surveilled under the
Quiet Skies Program have been arrested or prosecuted?
Mr. Pekoske. I don't believe anybody has been arrested or
prosecuted. However, people that are in the Quiet Skies Program
have eventually been determined to be part of a larger selectee
pool, based on what the Quiet Skies Program----
Senator Markey. I appreciate that, but no one has been
arrested or prosecuted yet,----
Mr. Pekoske. No, sir.
Senator Markey.--and how many threats has the program
foiled thus far?
Mr. Pekoske. The program is a prevention program designed
to mitigate risks onboard aircraft and so, you know, like many
of our prevention programs, there's no particular plot that has
been foiled as a result.
Senator Markey. So it hasn't foiled any threats yet?
Mr. Pekoske. Not to my knowledge.
Senator Markey. OK. And without knowing more, the program
appears like a huge waste of taxpayer dollars and infringement
on our privacy. This is a vast program that actually takes
Americans and puts them into a suspect category and thus far
there's no evidence that it has produced anything that would,
in fact, enhance the safety of the American flying public.
So from my perspective, it is something that you should
seriously reconsider because to me it just does look like a
huge waste of taxpayer dollars.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Markey.
Senator Inhofe.
STATEMENT OF HON. JIM INHOFE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM OKLAHOMA
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I've got a couple of things that come from personal
experience, and we had a discussion before this Committee about
the K-9 Program and how effective it has been and some of the
problems with it.
Well, it has been very effective in Oklahoma. In fact, the
Oklahoma City's Will Rogers World Airport, we had a canine that
was working and was reassigned to DFW. Now immediately after it
was reassigned and we have all the documentation on this, all
of a sudden we had waiting times for passengers increase
immediately after that.
Now I know that the Homeland Security has in their
appropriation bill, which we're working through right now, has
an additional $10 million to fund more dogs and I think in your
written testimony, you talked about some enhancements to that
program.
Tell me what is going on right now with that program. It
has been very successful in Oklahoma.
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. Thanks for your comments, and I
agree it has been very successful. In fact, it has been so
successful we want to continue to increase the number of K-9
teams that are available throughout the system and so we've
seen about a 41-percent increase in the number of K-9 teams
available at airports between today and this time a year ago,
so a very significant increase there.
We have also increased the capacity at our K-9 Training
Center down in San Antonio, Texas, so we can train 50 more
teams per year. So that's quite a significant increase in
capacity----
Senator Inhofe. Yes.
Mr. Pekoske.--at that training center.
The final thing I'd mention to you, Senator, is that, as
you may know, we have our Passenger Screening K-9s, which were
operated by TSA handlers, and then we have our Law Enforcement
K-9 Program, which are TSA canines trained at the TSA K-9
Training Center but with local law enforcement officers being
the handlers.
We've offered to local law enforcement authorities the
opportunity for them to up-train their canines in that program
to the passenger screening standard that involves about four or
five weeks of additional training at our K-9 Training Center
and today we've had five law enforcement agencies agree to do
that. So that again increases our capacity at the screening
checkpoints.
Senator Inhofe. Yes. Well, as we rebuild that program, keep
Oklahoma in mind. Will you do that?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir, will do.
Senator Inhofe. All right. The other problem that I had is
the search problem. I know you guys have the capacity to help
with that and just as an example, if I take the early flight
coming from Tulsa, Oklahoma, to Washington, you don't have a
direct flight, if you could help us get a direct flight, I'd
appreciate that, too, but if you get there for the early
flight, which is about 6 o'clock in the morning, I mean, it's
about a block long you're waiting in there. If you come back an
hour later, there's nobody there.
Now what is your capability of handling the surges, and do
you have a program that might help with that type of thing?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir, and that's one of the big challenges
in the checkpoint screening because you do run into surges
early in the day and early in the evening, large volumes of
passengers trying to get through, and sometimes we're
constrained by the infrastructure at the airport. We just can't
put any more screening lanes in the existing footprint of the
airport.
We do use canines to help alleviate that,----
Senator Inhofe. Yes, yes.
Mr. Pekoske.--but one of the things, sir, with the canines
is that canines are terrific at detection and deterrence both,
and I want to make sure that as we deploy canines, we just
don't deploy them during surge periods because an adversary can
gain that system on us and just look and observe when we deploy
canines and then if they're concerned about the canine
capability, which they should be, then they would try to go
through it at an off time and so we want to make sure that we
kind of roll out that canine capability, but----
Senator Inhofe. Yes.
Mr. Pekoske.--we do pay very close attention to the surge
issues and try to bring as much--as many officers as we can in
for the checkpoint to speed the passengers through.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, yes. Well, that makes sense. Well,
you're doing a great job. Keep it up. All right.
Mr. Pekoske. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Lee.
STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE LEE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM UTAH
Senator Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Admiral,
for being here with us today.
Currently, there are 22 airports in the United States that
participate in the TSA's Screening Partnership Program, or SPP,
which, of course, allows the TSA to have oversight over
screening services conducted not by Federal employees but by
private screening personnel through a private screening service
security company of some sort.
Now in 2015, when the General Accountability Office
produced a report, it reported that contract award prices for
private screeners within the SPP Program carried an average of
11 percent in savings compared to the TSA's own cost estimate
for Federal screening.
So as TSA considers better operational changes to more
effectively allocate taxpayer dollars and ultimately make TSA
more effective at fulfilling its mission, which is making the
American people safer, is the SPP a viable option? Is that an
attractive option? If so, why?
Mr. Pekoske. Sir, the SPP remains an option for any airport
that wants to, what we call, opt-in to the SPP Program.
What they do is they just indicate a desire to participate
in that program and then we within a very short period of time,
30 to 60 days, engage with them and help them work through the
process of becoming an SPP airport.
SPP is a contract that TSA manages with a set of about 10
or 12 vendors and then we basically do a task order bid for
that particular airport because every location has different
costs and different structure to it and then once we get those
bids in, we award it to the best value bidder. So it's a fairly
quick process for airports.
Senator Lee. And ultimately that's your judgment call, not
theirs? In other words, you review the bids, including the TSA
being one of the bidders?
Mr. Pekoske. The TSA is--if they opt to SPP, we are not one
of the bidders, but the cost, sir, can't be more than what
we're currently----
Senator Lee. Right, right.
Mr. Pekoske.--using for Federal service, and I do want the
airport authorities to have visibility into that process.
Senator Lee. Got it. Now the 2015 GAO report, as I
understand it, also acknowledged that in that cost assessment
that you run through, it's not necessarily an apples-to-apples
comparison because it doesn't take into account some of the
costs that are borne not by the TSA specifically, but are
nonetheless borne by the Federal Government.
Shouldn't be that be an apples-to-apples comparison?
Mr. Pekoske. That's a very hard apples-to-apples
comparison, as you can imagine,----
Senator Lee. Sure.
Mr. Pekoske.--to be able to make and it really----
Senator Lee. But the GAO was able to acknowledge that, you
know, there was this lag that should enable you to at least get
closer, shouldn't it?
Mr. Pekoske. It's easy to acknowledge a gap and very hard
to figure out the metrics to close that gap.
The other thing, sir, is, from a TSA perspective, for those
non-TSA expenditures, that does not come out of my budget and
so, you know, what TSA looks at is what is the TSA budget
requirement for SPP and not letting the SPP cost exceed the
Federal cost for TSA.
Senator Lee. Sure.
Mr. Pekoske. But you're right. There is a larger Federal
cost that is very hard to quantify.
Senator Lee. You can understand why, as a member of the
U.S. Senate, I'd be concerned about costs that extend farther
than your agency. I mean, as long as this is a cost comparison,
you can understand why I would want it to incorporate costs to
the Federal Government generally?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir, I understand the concept. Yes, sir.
Senator Lee. So things like retirement, other things that
might be backfilled by the Federal Government, sure, it's
complex, but those can be estimated, can't they?
Mr. Pekoske. They can be estimated. Yes, sir.
Senator Lee. And so are you willing to look at that and
take steps to work toward more of an apples-to-apples
comparison?
Mr. Pekoske. That is certainly something that, you know,
I'm sure when we got the GAO report, which I believe was issued
before I got into this position, so I haven't read it in
detail, I'm sure TSA did a review, but I need to be careful
personally because I'm recused from SPP issues for another
year. So I can't directly get involved in that.
Senator Lee. OK. I understand that, but would you agree as
a general matter that within the SPP, private screeners ought
to be evaluated on an equal even playing field within an
apples-to-apples comparison with TSA services?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir, I would always agree with apples to
apples. My concern, though, as an agency would be would the
costs to the agency be higher in that regard.
Senator Lee. Would the costs to the agency be higher----
Mr. Pekoske. Right.
Senator Lee.--if they went with a private screener?
Mr. Pekoske. That's correct. In other words, because I'm
trying to manage a budget.
Senator Lee. Sure, sure. OK. Mr. Chairman, if I could ask
one more question, I see my time's expiring.
In both 2015 and 2017, the Department of Homeland
Security's Inspector General revealed some very alarming fail
rates that documented how auditors from the IG's Office were
able to consistently evade airport security screeners while
they were carrying in banned items.
Can you tell me what changes you've incorporated in order
to stop this dangerous trajectory and to reverse it?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. I think the trajectory has been
reversed and I've paid very close attention, as you would
expect me to, to those IG audits, and I said in my response to
the IG audit that I agreed with their results and that we would
take steps to close the vulnerabilities that they identified.
I would also add that we do our own red team or covert
testing out of TSA Headquarters and we continue to do tests on
the system to see what changes we've made and what kind of
improvements have resulted from that.
But to get to some of the changes, first and foremost, the
CT technology, I mean, you know, as I look at this problem,
there are kind of three ways you can address it. You can put
better technology out there which we sorely need. You can
change your procedures, and you can provide better training for
your officers.
One of the things that I have consistently stated is that
those test results are not a reflection on officer performance.
They're a reflection on technology procedures and training that
systematically needs to be provided by the agency.
So with technology, we've got the CT technology. As I
mentioned, operational test and evaluation right now, very,
very promising results from that that will be a game changer
for us from a security perspective in the checkpoints.
We are also looking at other technologies for on-body
anomaly detection, for example, in the checkpoint. For
procedures, we changed our procedures at the very end of last
summer and so you may have seen this as you travel, sir, where
the officers ask you to take more things out of your carry-on
bag. That was a very deliberate change on our part that
significantly enhanced security from the end of last summer all
the way through the present day, and while we did have a
temporary slow-down in throughput at our checkpoints, once
passengers got used to it and once our officers got used to it,
we've seen no change year over year, and then we've placed a
significant emphasis on training for our officers, so that it's
more face-to-face, less computer-based. So I think we're making
progress there, sir.
Senator Lee. I'm pleased to hear that. You can understand
why I'd be concerned about that, not only for the safety itself
but also as we hear from constituents. I've lost track of how
many constituents have come to me themselves in tears talking
about seeing their daughters, their sons subjected to invasive
groping searches. Then when they read about reports like this
one indicating lapses in security, they become even more upset
about seeing their daughter groped.
So I hope we can increase the security and do so in a way
that respects the dignity of each American as he or she
travels.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, Senator, and as you can appreciate that's
an equally uncomfortable operation for our officers, and I
don't think any of our officers groped any passengers. They're
following the procedures that we put in place.
Senator Lee. With all due respect, I've seen it happen.
I've seen that happen to my own family members. They've been
groped.
Mr. Pekoske. Well, if the officers are following the
standard operating procedure, that should not happen, but I
would make a key point for you, Senator, and it goes right back
to technology.
The reason why those pat-downs occur is because a machine
detected an anomaly. What I look at a lot is the false alarm
rate on those machines and that's something that we need to
address and we need to put more effort towards and we are doing
that.
Senator Lee. I appreciate that. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Lee.
Senator Gardner.
STATEMENT OF HON. CORY GARDNER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM COLORADO
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr.
Pekoske, for your time and testimony today and your service to
our country, and I know we've had many conversations about
Denver International Airport.
I think they're in the process of about a $3 billion
renovation effort, expanding their gates, redoing the Great
Hall, and making some other improvements to their security
system, of course, which you are partnering with them and
working with them very closely on, and I'm grateful for that.
So thank you for that.
I also want to commend the folks over at Denver
International Airport for the excellent trolling they're doing
on Twitter right now. Part of the construction signs that they
have, of course, if you live in Denver, if you've watched some
late night comedy, they talk about the work camps underneath
DIA, the horse outside of DIA that they've nicknamed
``Blucifer'' and some other conspiracies at DIA.
If you go through the airport now, you see the construction
signs. You'll see signs like ``Construction or Cover-up? What
are we doing? Planning for the end of the world.'' So this is a
pretty great troll effort by DIA right now on social media.
Mr. Pekoske, following up on the testimony, you talked a
little bit about efforts to analyze and develop emerging
security technology.
In 2016, Congress, this Committee, authorized and passed
legislation called the SCREEN FAST Act, which I introduced and
sponsored. This bill established pilot programs at airports for
the purpose of implementing innovative screening checkpoints to
bolster security, passenger throughput and other things.
Thank you very much to TSA for utilizing the pilot program
to test and implement new technologies, like the automated
screening lanes and now 3-D bag scanners, at the checkpoint.
We've seen airlines, like DIA, stepping up, taking the
initiative, prioritizing screening equipment, to the purchasing
of equipment, and it's my understanding that TSA and DHS are
working on a program that would allow their partner
organizations to purchase security equipment and then gift it
to TSA.
Could you provide an update on that process?
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. First, thanks for your comments and
I would just like to commend DIA. I think they're doing a
terrific job in moving the checkpoint up to the mezzanine
level, addressing a security issue in and of itself with having
a mezzanine, and their great partnership with us along the way,
and we do have the authority in law to accept gifts of
equipment and that's what DIA is doing.
They've agreed to purchase equipment and then they will
gift it over to TSA and that's really a great solution because
the airport is able to get technology that they're willing to
purchase in place much faster than if we had to go through a
Federal procurement process.
I would also note, too, that the automated screening lanes
in particular has allowed us to--you know, the fact that
airlines and airports have been able to gift those to TSA will
allow us to skip some steps or very much shorten some steps in
our Federal acquisition process.
So when we get into a large-scale acquisition for the rest
of the system, we will benefit from all of the testing and
evaluation, the manning studies, and everything else that has
been done on that gifted equipment.
What I would ask is that what we can't do right now is we
cannot accept as a gift payment for services that TSA provides
and a number of airports, for example, have hotels that are
right in the airport and they would like to put a screening
lane right at the hotel entrance.
We would like to see that, too, because that actually helps
us manage throughput to some degree. They can gift us the
equipment, but they cannot reimburse us for the services to
provide a separate screening lane, and we've asked for that to
be considered as part of the TSA Mod Act.
It would very much parallel but would not apply to the
central checkpoint but would very much parallel authorities
that Customs and Border Protection has and so, you know, I
would just, you know, recognize the work of the airports, the
airlines, our Innovation Task Force, to really kind of push the
envelope and say, hey, how can we really embed technology, use
the private sector capability to buy things quicker and put it
in place so the passengers can see the immediate benefit of all
that.
I would tell you, sir, that with the CT, huge improvement
in security, huge improvement in convenience. ASL, same
comments, and so it has really been a really good program.
Senator Gardner. So thank you and so the TSA Mod Act is
where you've requested that language and working with----
Mr. Pekoske. For reimbursement, yes, sir, and we've worked
with our industry partners on that to make sure that they--you
know, that was language they could live with, as well, and I
think we're in a good place there.
Senator Gardner. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Gardner.
Back to Senator Markey.
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
I want to turn to facial recognition. TSA recently began
taking pictures of American faces at a Los Angeles
International Airport security checkpoint in collaboration with
Customs and Border Protection, yet dating back to 2017, Senator
Mike Lee and I had already called on the Department of Homeland
Security, which includes both TSA and CBP, to implement formal
rules to address important concerns with biometric technology
at U.S. airports.
Number One: Americans need to be able to opt out of facial
recognition. Number Two: We need to ensure the security of
traveler data. Number Three: We need to prevent any racial bias
in the technology. Those are the concerns that Senator Lee and
I have.
In response to our letter, DHS promised to not expand the
program until it completed a formal rulemaking to put privacy
rules on the books. Yet, DHS continues to expand the program.
I know how problematic facial recognition can be. The ACLU
recently used Amazon's facial recognition software to see who
of the 535 Members of Congress who matched with a criminal
database. Well, 28 of us did, including me, Congressman John
Lewis, and 26 others. So there are problems here.
So, Mr. Pekoske, can you commit here to completing a formal
rulemaking to address these issues before expanding TSA's use
of biometric technology?
Mr. Pekoske. Well, Senator, we are simply prototyping the
biometrics in partnership with CBP and we are using CBP's
technology. We're using CBP's testing and we have an updated
privacy impact assessment for that prototype.
We don't have any plans at this point for a formal program
expansion. We just want to see how it works and passengers----
Senator Markey. Will you commit to completing a formal
rulemaking to address these issues before expanding TSA's use
of biometric technology?
Mr. Pekoske. Sir, I will defer to the Department of
Homeland Security, which is overseeing the overall biometric
effort of the components.
Senator Markey. Well, I am very disappointed, you know,
that you and your agency will not commit to ensuring that these
fundamental protections aren't in place through a formal
rulemaking before you move forward.
The American people deserve to have a set of guidelines
which are put in place in order to protect their privacy. I
already personally have had a mistake made with regard to
facial recognition, a United States Senator.
Now it's one thing for a United States Senator or
Congressman. We can protect ourselves. But for an ordinary
person of color in our country, that can cause real problems
for them, and I just think that a formal rulemaking is the
absolute prerequisite that your agency should engage in and I
would like you again to make a commitment that you would do it.
Mr. Pekoske. Sir, what I will commit to, without
hesitation, is that whatever systems we put in place will
provide equitable treatment for all.
Senator Markey. No. We need a formal rulemaking. We need a
formal rulemaking. This just can't be informal and a set of----
Mr. Pekoske. Well, I think the larger thing, though, sir,
is, are we concerned about privacy rights for passengers?
Absolutely. Are we concerned with equity across all passengers?
Absolutely. But where I might disagree is the method to get
there.
Senator Markey. OK.
Mr. Pekoske. But the concept----
Senator Markey. But we need a formal rulemaking. This is
too important not to.
And, finally, there's a proposal to cut screening at 150
smaller airports in response to budgetary constraints. I find
that very unfortunate in the aftermath of the September 11
attacks. Two of the planes were hijacked from my congressional
district. We lost 150 people on those two planes from
Massachusetts.
Congress established the September 11 Security Fee to help
finance the cost of securing the Nation's aviation
transportation system.
Regrettably, the 2013 Congress began diverting
approximately one-third of the revenue generated by these
security fees for deficit reduction.
Administrator Pekoske, would dedicating all of the revenue
generated by the security fee help TSA provide basic aviation
security and modernize their systems to address emerging
threats?
Mr. Pekoske. Well, sir, just a factual correction, if I
could. We have no plans to reduce screening at any airport in
the United States whatsoever. In fact, we have plans to enhance
security at low-volume airports.
Senator Markey. So you're saying this report that 150 small
airports, there is going to be a cut in screening is erroneous?
Mr. Pekoske. It's wrong.
Senator Markey. It is wrong?
Mr. Pekoske. It's wrong.
Senator Markey. It's not going to happen?
Mr. Pekoske. No, sir.
Senator Markey. OK. Well, I am glad to hear that and just
to make sure that that's the case, I'm introducing with Senator
Blumenthal today The FASTER Act, which would ensure that none
of these fees are diverted and that we'll just make that policy
once and for all. The FASTER Act, Funding for Aviation
Screeners and Threat Elimination and Restoration Act. In fact,
it's my legislation in 2007 that passed in the 9/11 bill that
requires for the screening of all cargo that goes on all
passenger planes in America. That was a six-year battle by me
to get that law on the books to screen.
So any retreat on this is absolutely unnecessary if one-
third of the security funding is being diverted just to deficit
reduction and not to the security of the passengers who are
flying in our country.
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. None whatsoever. In fact, further
investment in both low-volume airports and cargo screening,
and, sir, just a request from me for you to consider at your
convenience. I would like to come and talk with you about Quiet
Skies because I think some of the issues that you've raised, I
could help provide more information to give you more context to
that program because it is a very, very valuable program in my
view, and I can't go through the details in this setting but I
would very much like to have that conversation with you, if
you're available.
Senator Markey. OK. And, again, I would love to have that
conversation in my office. I'm relying now on Air Marshals who
are telling us that they just don't think it's worth the money.
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. But in a large organization, you're
going to have some people that have a different point of view.
I would take a look at the intelligence information first.
Senator Markey. I do appreciate that but thus far there has
been no evidence that it has thwarted any attacks whatsoever,
and I think that's----
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir.
Senator Markey.--the relevant----
Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir, but there is evidence that it has
transitioned some passengers identified in Quiet Skies to the
known or suspected terrorist list, significant numbers. It is
successful, and I would love to have that conversation with
you.
Senator Markey. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Markey.
Senator Markey. Thank you for your generosity.
The Chairman. It sounds like you guys need to have that
conversation, and I, too, raised with Admiral Pekoske when
there was reporting about reductions at low-volume airports and
he assured me that that wasn't the case. That was like many
other things that sometimes make it into the press, something
that had not been agreed upon or implemented or anything like
that. So we appreciate that.
And when it comes to the biometric stuff, Senator Markey's
often confused with Brad Pitt. So it's really important that we
make sure that we get this right.
We'll keep the hearing record open and ask members to
submit questions and if you could, Admiral, respond to those as
quickly as possible, keep the hearing record open for two
weeks.
But we appreciate you being here and your responsiveness
and we'll look forward to working with you and your team to
again ensure that Americans who travel here at home or abroad
have the absolute top-level safety precautions put in place.
So thank you again, and with that, this hearing is
adjourned.
Mr. Pekoske. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[Whereupon, at 11:57 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Deb Fischer to
Hon. David Pekoske
Question 1. I have heard from airports across Nebraska that their
passenger traffic has been increasing. To support that increase in
traffic, airports from Eppley Airfield in Omaha to the Western Nebraska
Regional Airport in Scottsbluff need additional TSA staff to maintain
security and address longer wait times. How is TSA working with
airports in Nebraska to ensure they have a sufficient number of TSA
security officers to meet their needs?
Answer. Strong passenger traffic growth is a challenge being faced
by the majority of our airports nationwide. Each year, the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) evaluates the staffing
requirements at each airport, with a heavy focus on individual airport
growth rates. These passenger traffic increases are applied to our
staffing model, which was validated as part of a Government
Accountability Office review, and airport staffing allocations are
adjusted appropriately. The President's budget request for Fiscal Year
FY 2019 includes 717 Full Time Equivalents (FTE) for volume growth
within TSA over current levels, and the Nebraska airports were
allocated an additional 8 percent in staffing for the upcoming year. In
particular, Eppley Airfield (OMA) received a 23 FTE (12 percent)
increase in allocated staffing for FY 2019.
Additionally, many of the airports in Nebraska, similar to other
airports across the country, have seen an increase in Transportation
Security Officer (TSO) attrition as the U.S. economy improves with
additional job opportunities and competitive wages. This has been the
case in OMA, where employment competition from both private sector
employers and positions within the Federal Government that offer more
traditional work schedules have resulted in attrition. To offset this
impact, TSA recently put in place a retention incentive for OMA to help
retain existing employees and attract new TSO applicants. TSA has also
expanded our statewide recruitment efforts beyond traditional
advertising venues by concentrating on digital and social media
advertising to ensure we reach the broadest applicant pool. This, along
with attending in person and virtual job fairs and working with local
workforce offices to create our own employment events, is helping
promote TSA's employment opportunities in the smaller communities.
TSA's Recruitment and Hiring staff stays in close contact with the
local TSA airport staff members to identify other opportunities to
promote TSO position openings.
Question 2. General aviation is particularly important in a rural
state like Nebraska. TSA has received 19 recommendations in the past
several years from the Aviation Security Advisory Committee to reform
security programs related to general aviation. These recommendations
cover a variety of issues, such as vetting for flight training
candidates and compliance requirements. Can you provide an update on
TSA's work to respond to the Aviation Security Advisory Committee's
recommendations on general aviation security?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) concurred
with 13 of the 19 recommendations put forth by the Aviation Security
Advisory Committee's General Aviation Sub-Committee and non-concurred
with the others after careful consideration and for reasons specific to
each recommendation. Of the recommendations with which TSA concurred,
six have been closed and the appropriate action taken. Of the seven
recommendations which remain open, five are related to flight training
candidates that are in the process of rulemaking.
The remaining two open recommendations relate to ``Twelve Five''
operators.
Unlike General Aviation, which is largely unregulated by TSA, each
operator of an aircraft with a certificated takeoff weight of more than
12,500 lbs. (i.e., ``Twelve Five''); in scheduled or charter service;
carrying passengers or cargo or both; and not regulated by TSA under a
full security program, partial security program, or full call-cargo
security program is regulated by TSA under the Twelve Five Standard
Security Program. See 49 CFR 1544.101(d). Many General Aviation
stakeholders who serve on the ASAC General Aviation Subcommittee are
also Twelve Five stakeholders and have advanced their recommendations
through the General Aviation Subcommittee and will be addressed at the
next meeting on December 12, 2018.
As required by section 1952(d) of the FAA Reauthorization Act of
2018, Pub. L. 115-254, TSA will provide a Report to Congress by
February 3, 2019 regarding the implementation of certain
recommendations that were submitted by the ASAC and with which the
Administrator has concurred.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Bill Nelson to
Hon. David Pekoske
Question. Mr. Administrator--There has been reporting in the media
on allegations from several years ago that Federal Air Marshals at
Orlando International Airport were encouraged to racially profile
African-American travelers. I received TSA's statement disputing these
allegations.
Can you ensure this committee that you have thoroughly reviewed
these allegations and that TSA is not racially profiling today?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) takes all
allegations of profiling seriously and is committed to treating all
travelers with dignity, courtesy, and respect. TSA thoroughly reviewed
the allegations that were reported in the media regarding the profiling
of African American travelers at Orlando International Airport and can
assure the Committee that TSA is not racially profiling passengers.
TSA is dedicated to operating our programs in compliance with
Federal laws, executive orders, and directives. TSA follows a 2013
policy statement, titled ``The Department of Homeland Security's
Commitment to Nondiscriminatory Law Enforcement and Screening
Activities'' and, as applicable, the 2014 Department of Justice
``Guidance for Federal Law Enforcement Agencies Regarding the Use of
Race, Ethnicity, Gender, National Origin, Religion, Sexual Orientation,
or Gender Identity.''
All TSA employees, including Federal Air Marshals, must complete
mandatory ``multicultural awareness'' training on an annual basis. This
training provides guidance to help employees better understand
different religions and cultures. Additionally, all Federal Air
Marshals must annually complete a training module called, ``Guidance
Regarding the Use of Race for Law Enforcement Officers.''
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Amy Klobuchar to
Hon. David Pekoske
Question 1. Passenger wait times are on the rise at airports across
the country. Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport (MSP) has made
significant investments to modernize and streamline its security
checkpoints to address this trend, but a significant portion of the
efficiency gains resulting from these investments are being lost due to
the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) staffing reductions.
While the number of MSP passengers increased by 12 percent last year,
TSA reduced its screeners by 9 percent. Administrator Pekoske, on
September 4, 2018 I sent you a letter on the need to address recent
increases in checkpoint wait times. What is TSA doing to ensure
airports have the staffing they need to capitalize on new investments
to improve security?
Answer. As the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) deploys
new technology, such as Automated Screening Lanes (ASL) and Computed
Tomography (CT), staffing models are updated and airport staffing
allocations are adjusted appropriately. TSA's staffing allocation
process uses a proven methodology that was reviewed by the U.S.
Government Accountability Office (GAO) in Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 without
any resulting recommendations. This process ensures that each airport's
staffing levels are based on their unique operating characteristics.
TSA works closely with the airports and airline industry to ensure
staffing models are updated to reflect changes to airport
configurations, equipment, and flight trends. As changes occur that
affect national staffing requirements, TSA works closely with other DHS
elements such as the DHS Chief Financial Officer, as well as the Office
of Management and Budget to ensure those requirements are represented
in our budget requests. For example, the FY 2019 budget request
supports an additional 717 Full-Time Equivalents (FTE) to support
increased passenger loads.
Question 2. The last time we faced extended wait times at MSP, I
invited former TSA Administrator Neffenger to see the lines first-hand
and worked with him to bring in more K-9 teams. These K-9 teams have
proven very effective in expediting passenger screening and reducing
wait times. The Senate FAA reauthorization bill that passed the Senate
Commerce Committee in June 2017 includes provisions that would promote
and expand the use of explosive detection K-9 teams. What operational
benefits do these teams provide and does TSA currently have the
capacity to meet demand for these K-9 units?
Answer. Passenger Screening Canine (PSC) teams are an effective and
versatile tool within the Transportation Security Administration's
(TSA) multi-layered security process. They also serve as a highly
visible deterrent against criminal and terrorist threats. TSA is able
to deploy PSC teams at passenger security checkpoints in a manner that
not only helps mitigate the explosives threat to aviation, but also
helps mitigate the threat to the security checkpoints themselves.
TSA has significantly increased the capacity for training canine
teams at our Canine Training Center (CTC) in San Antonio, Texas. In
Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 TSA trained 250 canines, while in FY 2017 and FY
2018 TSA trained 300 canines each year. We are on track to meet all FY
2019 projected canine requirements provided by the operators by
training 350 canines, as well as continuing to increase capacity for
anticipated future growth.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Brian Schatz to
Hon. David Pekoske
Question 1. TSA is conducting pilots to use biometrics data
collection for identifying and screening passengers.
How is TSA informing travelers about what information is being
collected in these pilots? Can travelers opt out of facial recognition?
If so, how does the traveler's experience differ from those who do not
opt out? How does TSA independently test the accuracy and potential
bias of algorithms that are used for any face recognition?
Answer. As part of the Transportation Security Administration's
(TSA) collaboration with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) on
biometric technology pilots, CBP has provided general notification of
the biometric pilots to travelers through airport signage, through
Privacy Impact Assessments (PIAs), published on www.dhs.gov/privacy and
through program information readily available on www.cbp.gov. TSA has
coordinated with CBP on providing these notices. For joint pilots
conducted with CBP, travelers can opt out of facial recognition
technology used in the pilot programs. Persons who choose not to
participate undergo regular manual identity verification procedures
using their travel documents.
TSA currently does not have its own facial matching system. We are
evaluating CBP's facial matching system--Traveler Verification Service
(TVS)--for potential use at TSA checkpoints. CBP and other DHS partners
are working to ensure the accuracy of any biometric services provided
to TSA.
CBP is working with DHS Science and Technology Directorate to
continue to develop and refine methods to analyze differences in
matching performance (e.g., age, gender, and citizenship) based on the
available data garnered through biometric entry-exit operations. CBP is
also moving towards formalizing a partnership with the National
Institute of Standards and Technology. Although CBP's currently
available data does not at present demonstrate any significant
difference in match rate between age, gender, or citizenship, CBP will
continue to work with its partners to develop methods to address any
performance variations within the system.
Question 2. The number of guns brought into our airports is
growing. Last year, TSA confiscated nearly 4,000 guns from security
checkpoints--an increase of 17 percent from 2016. Based on information
provided by your staff that number will go even higher this year. Do
you believe that the presence of these weapons is a threat to the
safety of the traveling public and to our aviation industry? What
actions is TSA taking to prevent loaded guns from entering our airports
in the first place? What more can be done?
Answer. Yes, the presence of weapons of any kind, including
firearms, continues to remain a threat to the safety of the traveling
public and to the aviation industry. As such, the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) remains vigilant in its mission to
protect the Nation's transportation systems and is committed to
ensuring items on our Prohibited Items list do not enter the sterile
area of an airport or cabin of any aircraft.
TSA new hire and recurrent training curriculum addresses firearms
via classroom lecture, x-ray image training, and checkpoint labs and
simulations. Image training uses both threat and non-threat items to
assist officers in detecting guns (both standard construction and 3D
printed, as well as assembled and disassembled) and gun parts
(including magazines, loose ammo, firing pins, etc.). In addition, TSA
collaborates with external Government partners, including USSS, ICE,
CBP, and ATF, to share intelligence information with regards to guns
and guns parts to further enhance training and awareness for Officers
and Supervisors.
Further, TSA's Public Affairs Office has taken several steps to
inform travelers that firearms are not permitted past airport
checkpoints.
TSA partners with airports to post signs in the airport
terminal that alert travelers that firearms are not permitted
past airport checkpoints. Additionally, TSA posts signs at
checkpoints with the same message.
TSA maintains a detailed webpage dedicated to inform
travelers of the proper way to travel with firearms and
ammunition. https://www.tsa.gov/travel/transporting-firearms-
and-ammunition
TSA produced a video that demonstrates the proper way to
travel with firearms. The video is posted on TSA's website and
YouTube: https://www.tsa.gov/videos/travel-tips-traveling-
firearms#
TSA has a free downloadable app called ``My TSA'' that has a
useful feature called ``Can I bring?'' A traveler can enter the
name of the item (i.e., gun, rifle, pistol) and find out right
away if it cannot go into a carry-on bag or if there are
special instructions for proper transport.
TSA's homepage has the same feature, entitled ``What can I
bring?'', in the upper right-hand corner of its home page. A
traveler can enter the name of the item (i.e., gun, rifle,
pistol) and find out right away if it cannot go into a carry-on
bag and if there are special instructions for proper transport.
https://www.tsa.gov/travel/security-screening/whatcanibring/all
TSA operates its own social care program, which enables a
traveler to send a question to @AskTSA on Twitter and Facebook
Messenger about security policies and procedures. Travelers may
also send a photo of an item to find out if the item is
permitted in carry-on or checked baggage. @AskTSA operates 365
days a year.
TSA has a customer call center with representatives
available every day of the year to answer questions from
travelers at 1-866-289-9673. The TSA Contact Center
representatives are available 8 a.m. to 11 p.m. ET weekdays;
and 9 a.m. to 8 p.m. on weekends and holidays.
TSA issues a weekly blog post that features a rundown of
firearm discoveries and other interesting finds to bring public
attention to the fact that guns are not to be brought to
checkpoints and that TSA officers will detect firearms if they
are brought to checkpoints (visit https://www.tsa.gov/blog).
TSA Public Affairs leverages its social media following to
educate travelers on what not to bring to the checkpoint,
including firearms and other weapons. Photos, videos, and
information about firearms are available on TSA's Instagram,
Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube.
TSA issues a year-end summary of gun catches on its blog and
it gets national media attention every year.
TSA spokespeople across the country conduct media events at
airports regularly, during which they discuss and demonstrate
the proper way to travel with firearms stressing that
passengers should not bring guns to checkpoints. These events
typically garner significant local coverage in the cities and
towns where they/are conducted.
The TSA Public Affairs Office also issues local news
releases on a daily basis about firearm catches to bring
awareness about the criminal and civil penalties to which
travelers are subject if they bring a firearm to the
checkpoint.
Lastly, the TSA Public Affairs Office established a group this past
spring to explore additional ways to message the public about the
firearm regulations. The group is working to develop an awareness
campaign on firearm travel.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Edward Markey to
Hon. David Pekoske
Question 1. How many individuals have been monitored under the
Quiet Skies program? Of that total number, how many are American
citizens?
Answer. The response to the question includes Sensitive Security
Information and can be briefed upon request.
Question 2. How many individuals have been subject to Special
Mission Coverage (SMC) under Quiet Skies since SMCs were initiated
under this program in March 2018? Of that total, how many are American
citizens?
Answer. The response to the question includes Sensitive Security
Information and can be briefed upon request.
Question 3. At the hearing, Administrator Pekoske stated that the
Quiet Skies program has ``transitioned some passengers identified in
Quiet Skies to the known or suspected terrorist list.'' Please detail
how many individuals monitored under the Quiet Skies program have been
added to this list, and what precisely the list is. What percentage of
all individuals monitored under the Quiet Skies program have been added
to this list? Were these individuals added to this list specifically
because of information gathered about them under the Quiet Skies
program? Administrator Pekoske and Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) spokespersons have stated that the Quiet Skies
program surveillance missions have identified no threats or activity
meriting follow-up action. How are these statements consistent with the
fact that Quiet Skies selectees have been added to a terrorist watch
list? Please explain why someone who does not merit follow up action
can also exhibit behavior that places them on a terrorist watch list.
Answer. Quiet Skies is a risk-based, intelligence driven program to
mitigate the threat from higher risk travel, not a surveillance
program. Quiet Skies relies on an analysis of current intelligence
reporting to develop rules that identify a small portion of the
traveling population as higher risk to determine whether those
passengers should receive enhanced screening. The Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) does not nominate individuals to the
Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) on account of matching a Quiet
Skies rule, and would not share Quiet Skies matches with other agencies
such as the Terrorist Screening Center unless suspicious activity is
noted during the passenger's travel. Individuals must meet specific
criteria in order to be nominated to the TSDB. The nomination of a
subject to the TSDB is separate from and independent of Quiet Skies.
TSA analyzed data on passengers who matched Quiet Skies rules over
a period of time and preliminarily found that passengers over that time
period who matched a Quiet Skies rule were subsequently added to the
TSDB--for reasons independent of their match to a Quiet Skies rule--at
a higher rate than all other passengers. This data shows that Quiet
Skies, which is based on timely intelligence, is identifying travelers
who are higher risk and who are unknown to the Federal Government or
only partially identified at the time of the travel resulting in a
Quiet Skies match. TSA can provide specific information regarding
passengers identified by Quiet Skies who were later added to the TSDB
in a classified briefing.
Question 4. According to a TSA document published in the Boston
Globe, ``Effective Tuesday, March 13, 2018, OLE/FAMS will initiate SMC
on flights carrying Quiet Skies Selectees.'' What prompted this
decision? Why was the program initiated on this date? Was there an
incident or specific issue that promoted the decision? If so, what?
What are the Quiet Skies rules and criteria for selection for SMC? On
what intelligence is Quiet Skies mission coverage based? How does TSA
choose who from the Quiet Skies selectee list to assign teams of
Federal Air Marshals (FAMs) for SMC? Are all Quiet Skies selectees
monitored in flight under SMC?
Answer. Quiet Skies is an intelligence-driven, risk-based program
designed to identify higher-risk patterns of travel. Quiet Skies rules
are based upon current intelligence regarding threats to aviation
security within the homeland. Explaining specific Quiet Skies rules and
criteria for selection for Special Mission Coverage (SMC) requires
conveyance of Sensitive Security Information (SSI) and classified
information, which we can provide in a briefing in a secure setting. As
part of its review of scheduling priorities, the Federal Air Marshal
Service sought to improve the degree to which Federal Air Marshal
deployments are based upon intelligence-informed risk analysis, and to
add the unique law enforcement capabilities of the Federal Air Marshal
Service to ensure aviation security where intelligence indicated higher
risk associated with a particular flight.
For additional detail regarding the Federal Air Marshal Service
Concept of Operations, including priorities and rationales for SMC
assignments, we recommend a private briefing in a secure setting.
Question 5. Is there a minimum age for individuals monitored under
the Quiet Skies program? Could a four-year-old child be the target of a
Quiet Skies SMC assignment?
Answer. The response to the question includes Sensitive Security
Information and can be briefed upon request.
Question 6. Please describe the selection process and intelligence
collection and retention policies for the Silent Partner program. Who
does this program target and what rules are used to select targets?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) bases
Silent Partner rules on current intelligence indicating a current
credible threat to aviation security or the Homeland, as assessed by
TSA Intelligence and Analysis. TSA relies upon intelligence provided by
the Intelligence Community (IC) to identify potential threats of
concern to TSA. TSA uses its authorities, experience, and expertise in
evaluating threats to transportation security to create the Silent
Partner or Quiet Skies rules that are used to identify higher risk
passenger itineraries based on terrorist travel, trends. The specific
rules are sensitive and would need to be provided in a closed briefing.
TSA retains specific information pertaining to the passenger's
travel for a limited period of time, in accordance with established
record retention schedules (two years for TSA Intelligence and Analysis
Silent Partner/Quiet Skies program, seven years for Secure Flight
records reflecting that an individual was selected for enhanced
screening as a Silent Partner or Quiet Skies match and five years for
Federal Air Marshal Service after action reports). TSA maintains these
records for appropriate follow-up when there is suspicious activity
during travel and for the purposes of evaluating program performance
and effectiveness, redress, and litigation. TSA's operation of Silent
Partner and Quiet Skies are reviewed on a routine basis by the DHS
Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, the DHS Privacy Office,
and the DHS Office of General Counsel.
Question 7. At the hearing, Administrator Pekoske stated that
intelligence collected during Quiet Skies SMC assignments is kept for
two years after determining the passenger in question is cleared as a
threat. According to investigations published in the Boston Globe, FAMs
submit two types of reports to TSA after they complete Quiet Skies
missions. Are there different conditions or guidelines governing the
collection, retention, sharing or accessing of information in these two
types of reports?
Answer. Federal Air Marshals (FAMs) do not engage in intelligence
collection and do not submit two reports. As a law enforcement officer,
a FAM will look for suspicious behavior by engaging in observation of a
Quiet Skies passenger and other passengers to ensure the security of
the aircraft. These observations are not part of any larger
investigation into a passenger. A FAM will either report that no
suspicious activity was observed, or will document suspicious activity
observed in an after-action report. In either case, the rules governing
the retention of FAM reports are the same, which require a retention
period of five years. TSA has begun the process of reducing the
retention period of reports following Quiet Skies missions for which no
suspicious activity was observed.
TSA retains specific information pertaining to the passenger's
travel for a limited period of time in accordance with established
record retention schedules. This includes retention by TSA's Office of
Intelligence & Analysis (I&A) Silent Partner/Quiet Skies program for
two years, seven years for Secure Flight records reflecting that an
individual was selected for enhanced screening as a Silent Partner or
Quiet Skies match and five years for Federal Air Marshal Service after
action reports). TSA maintains these records for appropriate follow-up
when there is suspicious activity during travel and for the purposes of
evaluating program performance and effectiveness, redress, and
litigation. This data is accessible to TSA personnel solely for one or
more of these particular purposes. TSA, including both TSA I&A and the
Federal Air Marshal Service, does not share this information unless it
is necessary to accomplish one of these purposes (e.g., sharing Quiet
Skies information with the Department of Homeland Security Traveler
Redress Inquiry Program when necessary to resolve a redress
application).
Question 8. Why does TSA retain data about individuals cleared as a
threat for two years? What is this data used for and what happens to it
for those two years? What individuals and what agencies can access,
copy or modify this data and under what circumstances?
Answer. Following the attempted detonation of an explosive device
onboard flight 253 from Amsterdam to Detroit by Umar Farouk
Abdulmutallab in 2009, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
conducted a review of the existing threats to aviation security and
determined that it needed to mitigate the risk to commercial aviation
posed by unknown or partially known potential terrorists. Quiet Skies
does not identify passengers as known threats. Quiet Skies relies on an
analysis of current intelligence reporting to identify a small portion
of the traveling population as higher risk to determine whether those
passengers should receive enhanced screening for a defined number of
flights or period of time. In accordance with established records
retention schedules, TSA's Intelligence and Analysis Silent Partner/
Quiet Skies program retains data about Quiet Skies passengers for two
years for the purposes of evaluating program performance and
effectiveness, redress, and litigation, Secure Flight records
reflecting that an individual was selected for enhanced screening as a
Silent Partner or Quiet Skies match are retained for seven years and
Federal Air Marshal Service after action reports are retained for five
years. This data is only accessible to TSA personnel for carrying out
one of those specific purposes. TSA does not share this information
unless suspicious activity is noted during travel or is necessary to
accomplish a specific purpose (e.g., sharing Quiet Skies information
with the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry
Program when necessary to resolve a redress application). To date, TSA
does not share information it retains about Quiet Skies passengers
except as consistent with the purposes described above. TSA's operation
of Silent Partner and Quiet Skies are reviewed on a routine basis by
the DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, the DHS Privacy
Office, and the DHS Office of General Counsel.
Question 9. TSA documents indicate that individuals selected for
Quiet Skies SMC remain on this list for up to 90 days or 3 encounters,
whichever comes first. After they are monitored on flights for this
amount of time, they are then removed from the list and their
information is removed from the database, TSA has stated. Please
explain how this time-frame is consistent with the two-year time-frame
Administrator Pekoske referenced at the hearing.
Answer. The Quiet Skies program identifies higher risk passengers
for enhanced screening, and automatically precludes an individual from
receiving additional scrutiny based on the same Quiet Skies rule after
the passenger has been encountered for a defined number of times or
period of time, whichever comes first. The specific number of
encounters and the period of time under which an individual may receive
additional scrutiny on account of matching a Quiet Skies rule is
Sensitive Security Information. This automated preclusion is built into
the program in order to limit impact on passengers. At the end of the
defined period of time, TSA's Intelligence and Analysis office retains
specific information pertaining to the passenger's travel for two years
in accordance with established record retention schedules for the
purposes of evaluating program performance and effectiveness, redress
and litigation and, in accordance with established records retention
schedules, Secure Flight records reflecting that an individual was
selected for enhanced screening as a Silent Partner or Quiet Skies
match are retained for seven years and Federal Air Marshal Service
after action reports are retained for five years.
Question 10. Is information about Quiet Skies targets who have been
cleared as threats ever accessed by anyone at any agency or
organization inside or outside government after the two-year period?
Answer. Quiet Skies passengers are not identified as known threats.
Quiet Skies relies on an analysis of current intelligence reporting to
identify a small portion of the traveling population as higher risk to
determine whether those passengers should receive enhanced screening
for defined number of flights or period of time. The Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) retains Quiet Skies passenger data in
accordance with established record retention schedules. TSA uses the
information for appropriate follow-up when there is suspicious activity
during travel and for the purposes of evaluating program performance
and effectiveness, redress, and litigation. TSA does not share this
information unless it is necessary to accomplish a specific purpose
(e.g., sharing Quiet Skies information with the Department of Homeland
Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program when necessary to resolve a
redress application).
Question 11. Administrator Pekoske has stated that ``intelligence
professionals'' have access to data collected during Quiet Skies SMC
missions. Who exactly is considered for this purpose an ``intelligence
professional,'' and are these individuals all TSA employees? Do
employees of any other agencies have access to information about Quiet
Skies targets?
Answer. ``Intelligence professionals'' refers to Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) personnel within TSA's Intelligence and
Analysis office who fall within the intelligence series job
classification. These individuals are responsible for reviewing all
current and relevant information to ensure that Quiet Skies rules
remain valid, based upon current intelligence, and participate in the
redress process for individuals affected by Quiet Skies. Since TSA's
Federal Air Marshal Service began mission coverage using Quiet Skies
information to inform its mission deployments in March 2018, all
information provided back to TSA intelligence analysts by the Federal
Air Marshal Service has been for the purposes of evaluating whether the
passenger is of low risk and should be removed from Quiet Skies. TSA
does not share information about passengers identified for additional
scrutiny by Quiet Skies outside of the agency unless suspicious
activity is noted during travel, or as necessary for the purposes of
evaluating program performance and effectiveness, redress, and
litigation.
Question 12. Is there any way in which Quiet Skies SMC is carried
out differently than non-Quiet Skies missions such as SMC targeting
subjects of active FBI terrorism investigations? Is information
collected about targets of these different types of missions stored
differently?
Answer. There are differences between how Federal Air Marshals
carry out Quiet Skies Special Mission Coverage (SMC) and non-Quiet
Skies SMCs. Those differences are considered Sensitive Security
Information. However, the information obtained is stored in the same
manner, regardless of the type of SMC. For more information, we
recommend a private briefing in a secure setting.
Question 13. What agencies and individuals were involved in
initiating SMC of Quiet Skies selectees? What agencies and individuals
were made aware of this decision? Was anyone at the White House or
Department of Justice involved in the initiation of Quiet Skies SMCs or
notified about this initiation?
Answer. The Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) new Concept of
Operations (CONOPS) that expands FAMS SMC deployments to include Quiet
Skies missions was approved for implementation by the TSA Administrator
on February 20, 2018 to improve the deployment CONOPS based on risk.
The CONOPS was briefed to DHS leadership and relevant offices, the
Office of Management and Budget, and Congressional Committees,
including the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee.
The new FAMS CONOPS took into account recommendations from Inspector
General reports, congressional oversight, and internal assessments. The
implementation of the new CONOPS further mitigates the risk presented
by passengers onboard the aircraft.
Question 13a. What agencies or officials at the Federal or state
level are currently involved in the Quiet Skies program? More
specifically, what agencies or officials can recommend someone for
monitoring under Quiet Skies or Silent Partner programs, or any other
kind of SMC? What agencies or officials can request or otherwise gain
access to information gathered during the missions?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) bases
Quiet Skies rules on current intelligence indicating a current credible
threat to aviation security in the Homeland, as assessed by TSA
Intelligence and Analysis. TSA relies upon intelligence provided by the
Intelligence Community (IC) to identify potential threats of concern to
TSA. Although the IC provides intelligence to TSA regarding threats to
aviation security and the homeland, the IC does not provide
recommendations to TSA about the creation of Silent Partner or Quiet
Skies rules or the identification of passengers for additional scrutiny
through Silent Partner or Quiet Skies. Indeed, no agency recommends any
person for inclusion within Silent Partner or Quiet Skies. TSA uses its
authorities, experience, and expertise in evaluating threats to
transportation security to create the Silent Partner or Quiet Skies
rules that are used to identify higher risk passenger itineraries. TSA
may coordinate with U.S. Customs and Border Protection, which assists
in the operation of Quiet Skies through TSA's use of ATS-P, regarding
TSA's rules to ensure the effective operation of Quiet Skies. CBP does
not recommend that any person or group of persons be identified for
additional scrutiny by TSA through Silent Partner or Quiet Skies.
Information about Quiet Skies may be shared within the Department of
Homeland Security for redress, litigation, and oversight purposes, and
with the Department of Justice for litigation purposes.
TSA does not collect intelligence through Silent Partner or Quiet
Skies. TSA does not provide activity reports completed by the Federal
Air Marshal Service to other external Federal agencies or internal DHS
components unless suspicious activity is noted during travel.
Question 14. At the hearing, Administrator Pekoske stated that ``in
certain circumstances'' the Department of Justice may be involved in
the Quiet Skies program. Please elaborate and detail any involvement of
Department of Justice personnel in the Quiet Skies program.
Answer. The Department of Justice does not have regular involvement
in the Quiet Skies program. If a Federal Air Marshal notes suspicious
activity or other conduct that appears to violate Federal law, the
Federal Air Marshal Service may refer the activity or conduct to the
Department of Justice's Federal Bureau of Investigation, regardless of
whether the person has been identified by Quiet Skies or not. To date,
the Federal Air Marshal Service has not referred any Quiet Skies
information to the Department of Justice. The Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) may share Quiet Skies information with the
Department of Justice for litigation purposes as appropriate.
Question 15. Administrator Pekoske publicly responded, ``To my
view, no,'' when asked if the White House is involved with the Quiet
Skies Program. Please elaborate. Does the White House have any
involvement in the Quiet Skies program?
Answer. In a January 7, 2010 memorandum responding to the December
25, 2009 attempted bombing of Northwest Flight 253, President Obama
concluded that immediate actions must be taken to enhance the security
of the American people. Following this direction, and in coordination
with interagency partners, TSA designed and implemented the Silent
Partner program, leveraging capabilities already in use by U.S. Customs
and Border Protection, and subsequently, the related Quiet Skies
program. The White House does not direct any person be included within
Silent Partner or Quiet Skies or otherwise have any involvement in the
operation of Quiet Skies. TSA's allocation of funding for Silent
Partner and Quiet Skies has been a consistent element of TSA's budget,
which is submitted through interagency budgeting processes.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Tom Udall to
Hon. David Pekoske
Question 1. Customs and Border Protection reports that the facial
recognition technology is 97.5 percent accurate. This percentage seems
to be dramatically higher than what is expected given the reported
faults of the technology for ethnic populations and women and children.
Does TSA keep its own statistics on accuracy of this technology in real
world practice? What documentation about the accuracy of the technology
will TSA share with this committee to be transparent about how this
technology is performing?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) currently
does not own a facial matching system. We are evaluating U.S. Customs
and Border Protection's (CBP) facial matching system--Traveler
Verification Service (TVS)--for potential use at TSA checkpoints. CBP
and other Department of Homeland Security partners are working to
ensure the accuracy of any biometric services provided to TSA.
As of September 1, 2018, CBP has processed 600,000 travelers
departing the United States from 15 airports and 1.7 million passengers
arriving into the United States at 14 airports. The biometric match
rate for departing travelers is 97 percent and for arriving travelers
is 95 percent.
CBP is working with DHS Science and Technology Directorate to
continue to develop and refine methods to analyze differences in
matching performance (e.g., age, gender, and citizenship) based on the
available data garnered through biometric entry-exit operations. CBP is
also moving towards formalizing a partnership with the National
Institute of Standards and Technology. Although CBP's currently
available data does not currently demonstrate any significant
difference in match rate between age, gender, or citizenship, CBP will
continue to work with its partners to develop methods to address any
performance variations within the system.
Question 2. Customs and Border Protection has aspirations to roll
out the technology at all U.S. airports within four years. That kind of
expedited time frame is concerning, especially considering all of the
questions about the accuracy of the technology and who might get caught
up in the program's inadequacies. How quickly does the TSA plan to
expand the program from the current pilot? Is TSA hoping for the same
expedited time frame?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has not
yet defined a timeline for the development and deployment of its
biometrics capability. TSA's collaboration with CBP on a series of
operational technology pilots is one of a series of efforts that TSA is
engaged in to inform future requirements and acquisitions strategy for
any biometrics capability. The results of the TSA-CBP pilot program
testing will inform but not necessarily determine TSA's timeline.
Question 3. Will there be increased reporting to this committee and
the public as the pilot program expands?
Answer. Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is committed
to informing Congress and the public of its development and exploration
of biometric technologies. We will continue to engage on a regular
basis with Congress to inform them of our progress with biometrics,
including TSA and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
collaboration on biometric technology pilots. TSA is working to
schedule a Biometrics Roadmap briefing with the Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation in mid-November.
Question 4. It is important for the data collected through the
facial recognition program not to be abused. There seems to be a lack
of transparency about how TSA will store this data and how widely the
information stored will be shared. Travelers have a right to know what
our government is doing with their sensitive biometric data. What
protections exist to ensure that U.S. citizens biometric data and this
technology is not abused?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) does not
have its own facial matching system. TSA is collaborating with CBP on
pilot programs testing the use of CBP's Traveler Verification System
(TVS), a cloud-based matching service, at TSA security screening
checkpoints to compare photographs voluntarily provided by
international travelers at the checkpoint against a gallery of
previously captured photographs (e.g., visa or passport photographs
etc.). TSA does not collect or store photographs in TSA systems.
Matching and storage of biometric data by the TVS system is conducted
by CBP, in accordance with applicable privacy and information
management requirements. For example, CBP has developed and posted for
public availability, updates to the Privacy Impact Assessment for TVS,
to address each phase of the pilot program with TSA, including the
handling and protections for personally identifiable information
collected using facial recognition technology at the checkpoint.
Question 5. How will the TSA plan to address the privacy concerns
associated with deploying biometrics?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is
committed to protecting the privacy rights of individuals' subject to
TSA security procedures and safeguarding personally identifiable
information (PII) collected by TSA in accordance with Federal laws,
regulations and DHS policies. TSA follows the eight DHS Fair
Information Practice Principles (FIPP) of transparency, individual
participation, purpose specification, data minimization, use
limitation, data quality and integrity, security, and accountability
and auditing, to analyze the collection of PII necessary to fulfill
TSA's transportation security mission and to determine how TSA can best
provide privacy protections to information collected under these
principles.
Before TSA implements any biometric-enabled technology as part of
its standard security procedures, TSA will develop and make publicly
available applicable Privacy Impact Assessments. Following from FIPPs,
as described above, the PIA will address the privacy risks of deploying
biometrics and how TSA plans to mitigate these risks. TSA will share
the PIA with the traveling public to ensure awareness of any privacy
risks inherent in the use of biometrics.
Question 6. At full implementation, what is the projected cost for
a full implementation of the facial recognition program? If the cost
will be split with CBP, please explain this breakdown.
Answer. TSA is also working with other DHS elements, including the
Office of Biometric Identity Management (OBIM),to conduct an
independent business case analysis for different population segments
that TSA services. This analysis is expected to begin in Q1 FY19.
Currently, TSA screens up to 2.5M passengers a day, with volume
increasing year over year. With such volume, TSA will not likely have a
``one-size-fits-all'' biometrics solution to include all the various
populations that we screen. Therefore, a business case analysis that
articulates the cost-benefits of deploying biometrics capability to
different populations would be critical to design the appropriate
solution architecture and governance framework. TSA is also leveraging
and strengthening existing security partnerships within the Department
(such as CBP, OBIM, etc.) and aviation security stakeholders on
biometrics, working to clearly articulate public and private sector
roles and responsibilities in the context of applicable laws and
regulation.
Because TSA has not established what a complete facial recognition
solution would look like at this time, full costs for TSA`s
implementation of biometric final operating capability (FOC) are
unknown. While the costs are unknown, the benefits are clear. On the
basis of pilots conducted to date, TSA anticipates that biometric
solutions will enhance security effectiveness, capture operational
efficiencies, and improve the passenger experience, but additional
study is needed.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Tammy Baldwin to
Hon. David Pekoske
Question 1. I remain concerned by the potential dangers posed by
the lack of adequate in-flight security measures whenever pilots unlock
flight deck doors, including to get food, sleep, or use the lavatory.
It is my understanding that a veteran Air Marshal has raised concerns
internally with DHS, TSA and Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS)
officials regarding the threats to aviation security posed by the
potential use of weaponized synthetic opioids, such as fentanyl or
carfentanyl, and so-called rush attacks. What steps are TSA and FAMS
taking to combat the potential use of weaponized synthetic opioids to
attack pilots when flight deck doors are unlocked?
Answer. The tactical mission statement of the Federal Air Marshal
Service is to ensure the security of the flight deck, protect the
integrity of the aircraft, and the safety of the crew and passengers.
To increase awareness and a Federal Air Marshal's (FAMs) ability to
combat opioid and chemical attacks, training courses and materials were
made available to FAMs. TSA most recently provided training to Federal
Air Marshals (FAMs) in early 2018 to increase awareness and ability to
combat opioid and chemical attacks. In February 2018, TSA provided a
Fentanyl Awareness presentation, a Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) Fentanyl Awareness video, and a DEA Fentanyl Briefing Guide for
First Responders. All armed LE/FAMS personnel received this training by
July 31, 2018. As threats evolve, TSA updates training materials to
address the current threats.
Additionally, TSA published advisories in August and September
2017: Emergency Response to Chemical or Biological Threats Against
Aircraft, Acid Attack First Aid, Small Scale Poisons and Toxins, and a
presentation on the Chemical and Biological Threats to Aircraft. In
June 2016, the TSA issued a Training Advisory to the LE/FAMS workforce
to ensure review of a DEA produced training video regarding the safety
issues related to Fentanyl exposure. The TSA continues to work with the
DEA and other agencies to update training materials commensurate with
the current threat.
Question 2. What steps are being taken to combat potential rush
attacks when flight deck doors are unlocked? Do you believe that
current safety protocols related to rush attacks are effective?
Answer. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has the primary
regulatory authority over flight deck doors. Under the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act, TSA works with the FAA on actions or
activities that may affect aviation security or air carrier operations.
49 U.S.C. 114 (f) (13).
The FAA issued a final rule on August 15, 2007 (Flightdeck Door
Monitoring and Crew Discreet Alerting Systems), requiring a means for
flight crews to visually monitor the door area outside the flightdeck
and requiring that flight attendants have a means to discretely notify
the flight crew of suspicious activity or security breaches in the
cabin. See 72 FR 45629; 14 Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) part 121.
The current safety protocol in 14 CFR Section 121.584(a)(1) states that
prior to the flight deck door opening the flight crew must ensure ``the
area outside the flight deck door is secure.''
Question 3. Do you believe that physical secondary barriers should
be installed on all aircraft to prevent successful rush attacks?
Answer. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has the primary
regulatory authority over flight deck doors, and in 2015, published an
Advisory Circular addressing the issue of secondary cockpit barriers on
all commercial aircraft by developing guidance on onboard procedures to
safeguard the flight deck when the flight deck door is unsecured during
flight. The Advisory Circular listed three acceptable methods of
secondary flight deck security: (1) installation of physical secondary
barriers; (2) use of improvised non-installed secondary barriers; and
(3) human secondary barriers (flightcrew members). At the present time,
FAA subject matter experts have informed TSA that FAA does not require
commercial aircraft to install secondary barriers, but they report that
all aircraft carriers are in voluntary compliance with the Advisory
Circular. Additionally, the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 requires
TSA, in consultation with the FAA to complete a threat assessment to
identify any safety or security risks associated with unauthorized
access to the flight decks on commercial aircraft and any appropriate
measures that should be taken based on the risks.
In order to assess the landscape of existing information on the
issue of secondary barriers on commercial aircraft, on July 15, 2018,
TSA tasked the Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC) with
conducting an assessment of secondary barriers. TSA has asked that the
ASAC:
Consult with the FAA with respect to activities or actions
taken concerning air carrier operations that may affect the
ASAC's assessment;
Review documents and literature on secondary barriers such
as circulars, white papers, and reports;
Evaluate the types of secondary barriers that are currently
installed and in use onboard commercial passenger aircraft and/
or are available to install onboard aircraft;
Evaluate the security risk of not having a secondary barrier
and provide a cost benefit analysis should such barriers be
required; and
Include the number of passenger airlines currently using a
secondary barrier or are considering the use of secondary
barrier onboard their aircraft.
TSA anticipates receiving the report shortly, and will carefully
review the ASAC's findings to determine appropriate next steps, if any.
Question 4. I remain concerned by the lesser Federal civil service
rights and protections afforded to Transportation Security Officers
(TSOs) compared to the rest of the TSA workforce. This unequal
treatment of TSOs is the result of TSA deviating from the statutory
framework-set out in Title 5 U.S. Code-governing Federal civil service,
including labor-management relations.
The following is a list of labor rights and standards that apply to
the Federal workforce:
Neutral Merit Systems Protection Board review of personnel
decisions, including adverse actions.
A negotiated grievance/arbitration procedure with Federal Labor
Relations Authority and U.S. Court oversight.
Statutory civil rights (protections under the Rehabilitation
Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Equal
Pay Act).
The Fair Labor Standards Act, including enforcement by the Wage
and Hour division of the U.S. Department of Labor.
The Back Pay Act (5th Amendment right to Due Process against
wrongful taking, including back pay awarded due to an agency's
unjustified personnel action).
For each of the following categories of TSA employees, please tell
me whether the aforementioned labor rights and standards apply and, if
they do not, please tell me why not and whether in your judgment, the
effectiveness of the category of employees in question would be
improved by applying such labor rights and standards.
Federal Air Marshals
Cargo Inspectors
Criminal Investigators
Executive Assistant
Truck Driver
Telecommunications Specialist
Budget Analyst
Accounting and Civilian Pay Technician
Contract Specialist
Administrative Assistant
Screening Manager
Transportation Security Officer
Why does TSA extend the aforementioned labor rights to a minority
of its employees and limit or deny rights to the majority that work as
TSOs?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has unique
requirements because of its mission to protect the Nation's
transportation systems and ensure the freedom of movement of people and
commerce. TSA was established by Congress as an excepted service agency
under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) in 2001. ATSA
gives TSA the flexibility required to complete its security-based
mission and be responsive and agile in managing a workforce while
responding to an emerging threat or national emergency. Under ATSA,
there are two categories of TSA employees for purposes of personnel
management. For non-screener employees, ATSA provides that the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) personnel management system applies,
subject to modifications by the TSA Administrator. Like FAA, TSA non-
screener employees are not covered by Title 5, with the exception of a
few specific provisions such as veterans' preference, whistleblower
protections, labor management relations, anti-discrimination,
suitability, compensation for work injury, retirement benefits,
unemployment compensation, and insurance coverage and MSPB appeal
rights. For the screening workforce, the Transportation Security
Officers (TSOs), ATSA vests authority and responsibility for all final
employment actions with the TSA Administrator.
TSA has implemented many policies and procedures for the entire
workforce, both screening and non-screening employees, that are similar
to Title 5 through TSA's Management Directives and other human capital
policies. For example, TSA employees, including TSOs, are covered by
TSA policies on Premium Pay (overtime, night pay differential, split
shift differential, etc.) and Back Pay. In addition, Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act, the Equal Pay Act, the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, and the Rehabilitation Act have been applied to the TSA
workforce since TSA's inception. Further, TSA complies with Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission regulations and guidance. Please note
that TSO applicants and TSOs must still meet the statutory requirements
of the position, including physical and medical requirements, as set
forth in ATSA.
As stated above, the TSA Administrator has the authority and
responsibility for all final employment actions for the screening
workforce. TSA's labor framework for the non-supervisory screening
workforce is designed to be implemented in the context of how to best
achieve TSA's critical security mission and not adversely impact the
resources and agility necessary to protect the security of the
traveling public.
The non-screening workforce (all positions listed above except TSO
positions) may appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), as
MSPB appeal rights are covered under the specific, limited Title 5
provisions noted above. However, the screening workforce (TSO
positions) may appeal adverse actions to an impartial internal board,
the TSA Office of Professional Responsibility Appellate Board (AB). The
AB is independent from Security Operations, the office in which the
screening workforce resides. On average, the AB process is quicker than
the MSPB process. In addition, the AB overturns and mitigates a higher
percentage of cases than the MSPB.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The data available for the MSPB does not separate adverse
actions from other types of appeals (e.g., reduction in force,
performance, retirement) when reporting percentage of cases overturned,
mitigated, and upheld. However, adverse actions make up approximately
40 percent of the appeals cases reported. Source: Table 2, Disposition
of Appeals Decided in the Regional and Field Offices, by Type of Case,
p. 14, MSPB Annual Report for FY2017.
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There are two areas for which Congress acted to grant two
exceptions permitting screening workforce appeals to MSPB: 1)
application of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment
Rights Act (USERRA) to the screening workforce, and 2) enactment of the
Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act to afford all TSA employees
coverage for discrimination, whistleblower retaliation, and certain
other forms of retaliation.
Question 5. What percentage of the TSA workforce is employed in the
TSO classification?
Answer. 77.2 percent of the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) workforce is employed in the Transportation Security Officer
(TSO) classification.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Catherine Cortez Masto
to Hon. David Pekoske
Question 1. As you know, McCarran International in Las Vegas is
among the busiest airports in the world. So obviously safety is a huge
priority for them, and to ensure that passengers can travel in and out
of our great state they convey that canine teams are a huge success in
assisting them with screenings. However, they have expressed some
concerns about delays in getting their canine teams because of the
training is not completed on time. This is a very important program for
McCarran, so we need to ensure that it continues to operate is a way
that is useful and efficient. Given the challenges the TSA has in
training canines, have you been able to identify any improvements to
the overall status and future of the program?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has
significantly increased the capacity for training canine teams at our
Canine Training Center in San Antonio, Texas. Since 2015, the Canine
Training Center has increased production by 57 percent (from 200 to
350) to meet operational requirements and is continuing to increase
capacity for future growth. In the past months, four additional Las
Vegas Passenger Screening Canine (PSC) handler teams have graduated
from training and are now operationally deployed. This brings LAS's
total number of PSC teams available for duty to 11. In FY19, LAS is
scheduled to receive two additional teams to their authorized
allocation, bringing the total number of PSC teams working at LAS to
13.
Question 2. Both of the major airports in Nevada, McCarran and
Reno-Tahoe, have emphasized the importance of the TSA staffing exit
lanes as well as ensuring that there is proper reimbursement for our
the service of our law enforcement officers. You may remember I asked
about you about this issue during your nomination hearing before the
committee, when proposed budget cuts would have cut this staffing, and
you replied that you weren't involved in the decision but would review
them. Now fully entrenched in your position, do you think it would be a
wise decision to cut the ability of the TSA to staff these lanes?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) currently
staffs exit lanes by utilizing its existing checkpoint resources as
mandated by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013. TSA will continue to
staff exit lanes as required by law, to include Las Vegas, McCarran,
and Reno-Tahoe.
Staffing exit lanes does not require the specialized skills of
TSA's Transportation Security Officers. We believe moving those TSOs
from exit lanes to screening positions is better for both safety and
efficiency. TSA also plans to work with airports on implementing exit
lane technology solutions, such as double doors with monitoring
systems, which are also more effective and efficient than monitoring by
staff.
Question 3. In your testimony you note that ``every year as part of
the Federal budget process, TSA is charged with considering ways to
create operational efficiencies.'' It's vital that the Federal
Government operate efficiently and we work to reduce the deficit, but
often times in this administration this language has meant proposing to
gut agencies without any thought as to how they will continue to
perform their important missions, like keeping our skies safe. For
example, in the President's FY 2017 budget proposal he eliminated the
Law Enforcement Officer Reimbursement Program, which pays our law
enforcement professionals for keeping our airports secure. Can you
please describe how you've been advocating internally for the resources
you need to maintain effectively addressing the agency's mission?
Answer. TSA is committed to being a responsible steward of taxpayer
dollars as we pursue our mission to protect the Nation's transportation
systems. As part of the annual budget process, program reviews are
performed as well as a select number of internal studies. Each are
designed to provide TSA leadership with information to identify areas
in need of funding or potential savings. TSA crafts its budget and
advocates for resources in accordance with the Administration's
priorities and program requirements to best fulfill its mission through
negotiations with DHS and OMB.
Question 4. In Nevada we have a great group called Gender Justice
Nevada which has talked with me about some of the security screening
issues they're having at airports. In June of this year,
Representatives Jayapal and Kennedy wrote a letter to you about this,
which they cite a survey in which 43 percent of transgender individuals
reported having had negative experiences passing through TSA. This
includes false alarms, intimate pat-downs, and intrusive personal
questions. My understanding is that TSA has looked at both potential
software and hardware improvements to its advanced imaging technology
to make traveling more comfortable for these individuals. Can you
describe what is being done in the screening process to make it more
inclusive, both from a technical and training perspective? Is there a
timeline for when travelers will be able to notice some of these
changes?
Answer. From a technical perspective, you are correct that we would
like to update Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) software to improve
the screening experience for transgender individuals. The
Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) Acquisition Program
Management office is analyzing the AIT market, encouraging development
of gender-neutral algorithms that also improve threat detection and
decrease false alarms.
TSA is committed to ensuring all travelers are treated with respect
and courtesy and that screening is conducted without regard to a
person's race, color, sex, gender identity, national origin, religion
or disability. TSA recognizes the concerns that some members of the
transgender community may have with certain security screening
procedures at the Nation's security checkpoints.
To ensure all our employees understand how to screen transgender
passengers, TSA has added a module in its Transportation Security
Officer (TSO) Basic Training Program focused on transgender awareness.
This course places a heavy emphasis on respecting privacy when
interacting with a traveler who self-identifies as transgender.
In addition, TSA offers a series of webinars, which are available
on-demand through our Online Learning Center. These webinars focus on
transgender etiquette and sensitivity in security screening, and
feature guest speakers from TSA's Multicultural Coalition, such as
Gender Justice Nevada, the National Center for Transgender Equality,
Kristin Beck, Lady Valor, Equality Florida, and former Federal Air
Marshal Veronica Pickell. Also, when feasible, our Civil Rights &
Liberties Ombudsman and Traveler Engagement (CRL/OTE) office delivers
in-person civil rights and liberties training to officers at airports
across the country, which includes a discussion of communicating with,
and screening, transgender passengers. During 2018, CRL/OTE conducted
onsite training at Denver International Airport, Newark International
Airport, Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport, Phoenix Sky Harbor
International Airport, Tucson International Airport, San Francisco
International Airport, and Philadelphia International Airport.
Question 5. What is the best way for this population to report some
of these concerns when they are the victim of some of this, frankly,
rude and discriminatory behavior?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has
multiple avenues for individuals to report concerns about their
screening experience. The TSA Contact Center (TCC) is the main portal
for individuals to communicate concerns with the Agency. The TCC can be
reached by phone at (866) 289-9673 (Federal Relay 711). Information is
available in multiple languages and agents are available from 8 a.m. to
11 p.m. ET on weekdays, and 9 a.m. to 8 p.m. on weekends and holidays.
The TCC can also be e-mailed at [email protected]. In
addition, we encourage individuals to ask to speak with the Supervisory
Transportation Security Officer at the screening checkpoint to discuss
their concerns.
Question 6. When you were nominated for this position, you
highlighted workforce engagement as a specific challenge and priority
of yours. I appreciate that you specifically highlighted some of these
issues in your testimony, but how is this process going? What specific
metrics are you using to measure any improvement?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is showing
a promising upward trend in morale over the past two years. This data
is based on the Employee Engagement Index (EEI) of the Office of
Personnel Management's Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey. TSA
experienced a seven-point increase in this index in the two year
period. We are making improvements in all the indices comprising the
EEI--including satisfaction levels regarding topics, such as Leader's
Lead, Supervisors, and Intrinsic Work Experience.
Airports are a particular sub-element within TSA driving the
overall improvement in EEI. Our 2018 results indicate that 70 airports
improved their EEI by at least 10 points while 58 airports had an EEI
of 65 percent or higher. Additionally, LE/FAMS improved their EEI by 6
points this year.
To help further the progress we have made on the EEI, we recently
conducted a study to analyze the drivers of airports and offices with
the highest employee engagement survey scores. We are using the lessons
learned from this study to replicate them enterprise-wide and help
worksites with lower morale improve in key areas that drive employee
satisfaction and morale, such as creating a supportive environment,
empowering employees, and open communication.
In addition, I have spent a lot of time on the road visiting our
frontline workforce, traveling to almost all of our Category X \1\
airports within my first year. We've also created a new Uniformed
Advisors position in our Front Office to allow our Transportation
Security Officers (TSOs) to engage with senior leadership.
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\1\ Category X is an airport where screening is performed and the
number of annual enplanements is 5 million or more and international
enplanements of 1 million or more.
Question 7. There are various improvements that are needed to
improve the morale and retention of these workers we pay to train and
need to be our first level of defense. What was the attrition rate
prior to your arrival? What is it now?
Answer.
Attrition Rates for Transportation Security Officers Prior to
Administrator Pekoske's Arrival
(Year to date attrition as of Pay Period 15 of 2017: July 23-August 5,
2017)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Full Time Attrition Rate 12.42%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Part Time Attrition Rate 29.53%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Attrition Rate 15.92%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Attrition Rates for Transportation Security Officers as of
(Year to date attrition as of Pay Period 17 of 2018: August 19-September
1, 2018)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Full Time Attrition Rate 13.92%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Part Time Attrition Rate 28.60%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Attrition Rate 16.74%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
We are continually analyzing our attrition rates, why individuals
separate, and ways to increase satisfaction in the Agency in order to
retain our employees and continue to meet our critical mission. We are
also further developing initiatives, including improved employee
recognition and career development opportunities as well as exploring
incentives to improve satisfaction in the workforce.
In August 2018, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
implemented Transportation Security Officer (TSO) Career Progression,
which allows TSOs, depending on operational need, to remain at their
home airport for approximately 2 to 6 months before attending
Transportation Security Officer--Basic Training Program (TSO-BTP) at
the TSA Academy to potentially address attrition among new TSOs. The
program is designed to show new hires the specific steps and timelines
for advancing their career at TSA.
On an encouraging note, TSA saw a reduction in the attrition rate
during the first 180 days of being hired for those attending TSO Basic
Training at the Academy in 2016 versus those who received their initial
training at field airports through the New Hire Training Program.
Question 8. In your nomination hearing last June, we discussed the
TSA workforce, and my hope you'd be an advocate on behalf of the staff.
You noted that that was a ``key aspect of my job'' and that you planned
``to invest an awful lot of time in developing relationships within
TSA, understanding what they deal with day in and day out. . .and how
TSA can best support them.'' So how has that process been going, and
what have they expressed to you?
Answer. Since becoming Administrator I have made it a goal to get
out and interact with the workforce as much as possible. By the end of
my first year as Administrator, I was able to visit all Category X
airports in the United States with the exception of one, and that visit
is scheduled for early 2019. I have managed to visit numerous other
airports and Transportation Security Administration (TSA) facilities in
that time as well. Those travels have helped me better understand the
operational aspects of TSA and they have afforded me the opportunity to
engage with our employees across the country. I make it a point to have
engagements with the workforce at every location visited, which
includes the opportunity for the employees to share feedback directly
with me. This practice will continue as long as I am privileged to hold
this position. I have also held Town Halls at our Headquarters
location-simultaneously broadcast to the field-and encourage all
employees to submit questions in person or electronically. It is also a
priority to be as responsive as possible to those employees who e-mail
me personally. I have found that our employees are not shy in letting
me know about their thoughts and concerns, and I listen, no matter what
way they choose to communicate with me.
In the coming months we will utilize our crowdsourcing
functionality known as Idea Factory to pulse the entire TSA community
on various topics. The Idea Factory is a way of hearing what is most
important to the workforce. It is a mechanism for our workforce to be
heard, to submit ideas, based upon their frontline experiences, that
they feel will improve and strengthen TSA.
In August, we brought on two Supervisory Transportation Security
Officers (STSOs) from the field, one from Anchorage, AK, and one from
New York City, to act as Uniformed Advisors to the Administrator.
Additionally, I plan to bring on a Federal Air Marshal Advisor in the
coming months. The Uniformed Advisor role is a one-year detail
position, and we intend to continue this role, rotating in new
Uniformed Advisors each year so we get a diverse field of candidates
with varied background and experience. We have tasked the current
Uniformed Advisors to come up with a process for a feedback loop for
the front office that we believe will pay extensive dividends in making
policy and procedures that are heavily informed by the field. The
intent will be communications out to the field on items that would be
of interest to our front line employees, but also an opportunity for
our workforce to reach into the front office of TSA. I believe by
building on the relationships between Headquarters and field employees,
and increasing two-way communication, this will lead to higher job
satisfaction and lower attrition rates.
Further, being exposed to frontline employee's thoughts and
concerns is the only way to ensure that we make informed policy
decisions for the workforce and for the traveling public, and this is a
top priority for my time here. These efforts, among others, will
advance TSA's strategic priority to commit to our people.
Question 9. During July TSA rolled out the TSO Career Progression
Program, in part to address career advancement, training, and hopefully
morale among the Transportation Security Officer workforce. Career
advancement, access to training and a boost in morale are very welcome,
especially by the TSO workforce. Under the career progression program,
new hires receive a pay raise after the completion of initial training.
This is not available to incumbent TSOs. In addition, incumbent TSOs
were not included in a 5 percent 2014 pay raise for new TSOs. In a
sense, TSOs with experience on the job and commitment to aviation
security have missed out on two 5 percent pay increases. Are TSOs who
complete trainings under the career progression program ensured a
promotion or raise? How will the TSO workforce be eligible for
promotions under your framework?
Answer. In 2014, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
increased the entry-level pay for newly hired D Band Transportation
Security Officers (TSOs) by five percent, and also increased the
minimum rate for TSOs who are promoted to the E Band. At that time, we
provided an increase to all current D Band and E Band TSOs in order to
keep their pay comparable to TSOs who would be hired after
implementation of those new minimum salary rates.
The TSO Career Progression program, which went into effect on
August 5, 2018, is a strategic and comprehensive approach which
establishes a clearly defined and transparent career path with pay
increases tied to enhanced skills and training for the TSA frontline
workforce. TSOs hired after the implementation of the Career
Progression program and incumbent TSOs hired before the program's
implementation will be paid the same amount once they reach the E Band,
which is five percent over the minimum rate of our E Band. The
difference is that pay adjustments and the promotion to E Band for
these two groups of employees are staged at different points in their
career. While TSOs hired after August 5, 2018 will receive a five
percent pay adjustment after successfully completing required training
and being employed for six months, TSOs hired before August 5, 2018
will be eligible for promotion to the E band one year after being on
board, which is likely sooner than their Career Progression
counterparts depending on timing of Career Progression training
completion. Additionally, TSA implemented an On-the-Job Training (OJT)
Coach program for which certified OJT Coaches, selected from among
high-performing E Band TSOs (regardless of hire date), are eligible to
receive an incentive of $300 per quarter.
The Career Progression program will be further developed to address
progression beyond the TSO position and into the Lead TSO, Supervisory
TSO, and Transportation Security Manager positions. We also exploring a
similar Career Progression pay adjustment opportunity for E Band TSOs
who acquire specific skills or complete training courses. In order to
maintain pay comparability with TSOs hired prior to the implementation
of Career Progression, we will provide this same opportunity to all E
Band TSOs.
Question 10. You also stated in your testimony before the House
Homeland Security Committee that the issue of TSO pay is not one of
your authority, but ``the ability with respect to funding to pay
workers.'' Did the FY 2019 TSA budget request include a request for
additional funding to cover a TSO pay raise, and if not, why?
Answer. The Fiscal Year (FY) 2019 Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) budget includes annualization for the FY18 pay
raise, but does not include a request for additional funding to cover a
pay raise for any TSA employee, including Transportation Security
Officers (TSOs).
Question 11. Mr. Administrator--in questions for the record after
your last appearance, you described challenges in attracting and
retaining the workforce within TSA. One area you focused on was the
compensation available to your employees. Can you explain where you are
as far as a competitive wage and what you're doing to work within your
position to advocate for improvements or increases to the compensation
package you need to maintain the best of your labor force?
Answer. We have initiated and are evaluating various options to
address compensation issues, particularly for the Transportation
Security Officer (TSO) workforce.
In August 2018, we rolled out the TSO Career Progression
initiative, a strategic and comprehensive approach that established a
clearly defined and transparent career path for the TSO workforce with
pay increases and promotions tied to enhanced skills and training.
Additionally, we implemented an On-the-Job Training (OJT) Coach program
for which certified OJT Coaches, selected from among high-performing E
Band TSOs, are eligible to receive an incentive of $300 per quarter.
Peer-to-peer coaching is a fundamental component of mission success and
this new model recognizes and rewards TSOs who seek additional training
and acquire additional security and leadership skills.
We have also identified approximately 70 geographic areas for the
use of targeted retention incentives for TSOs. Some of these are carry-
overs from incentives that were in effect during the previous Fiscal
Year, while others are additions. The incentive rates for Fiscal Year
2019 became effective on October 1, 2018. We will evaluate the labor
market conditions throughout the year and may add localities to the
list of retention incentive locations, or may adjust the amount of the
incentives, as needed.
We are also taking an in-depth look at vacancy and attrition rates
for both our screener and non-screener workforce to determine whether
pay rate adjustments may be necessary, and what is possible within
current budget constraints. We plan to make a determination on a way
forward during FY19.
Question 12. Because you highlighted the competition you have with
staff leaving for other posts within the Federal Government, so we need
to analyze what can be done to increase their professional
satisfaction, in those cases, for individuals we've paid to train and
develop. You noted some of this in your testimony, but do you feel
that's sufficient to adequately staff this priority agency?
Answer. We are continually analyzing our attrition rates, why
individuals separate, and ways to increase satisfaction in the Agency
in order to retain our employees and continue to meet our critical
mission. We are also continually developing initiatives, including
improved employee recognition and career development opportunities such
as our recent launch of Career Progression for our Transportation
Security Officers, as well as exploring incentives to improve
satisfaction in the workforce. In addition, I've recently asked our
senior leaders to review their local Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey
(FEVS) results and create action plans that lead to tangible
improvements in employee satisfaction across TSA.
Question 13. You raise the Employee Viewpoint Survey Employee
Engagement Index in your testimony. Specifically you note an increase
in the TSA by seven points. Where does that leave in you the overall
ranking with in the Federal Government? And as you note the increase,
looking at the 2018 results, as well as previous years, what do you
read from these results as the top three challenges to your agency's
workforce satisfaction viewpoint, because as you know, the TSA has also
ranks very poorly in the nonpartisan rankings for the ``Best Places to
Work in the Federal Government?''
Answer. Although the 2018 government-wide report has not been
released yet by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), we do know
that our scores are below the government average. However, it is
interesting to note that within TSA, headquarters employee scores match
the government average at 68 percent positive responses on the Employee
Engagement Index, a key metric on the OPM Federal Employee Viewpoint
Survey (FEVS). Airports and Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshals scores
are still below the government average, but they have made notable
progress this year.
The Best Places to Work in the Federal Government rankings for 2018
have not been released yet, but our preliminary FEVS scores from OPM
improved on the three items the Partnership for Public Service uses to
calculate their annual rankings:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2016 2017 2018
------------------------------------------------------------------------
I recommend my organization as a good place to 37% 43% 47%
work.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Considering everything, how satisfied are you with 46% 53% 54%
your job?
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Considering everything, how satisfied are you with 32% 40% 43%
your organization?
------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to our survey scores for 2018, our most challenging areas
are consistent with those of previous years:
Leaders Lead: Employee perceptions of the integrity of
leadership, as well as leadership behaviors such as
communication and workforce motivation;
Collaborative Management: Management styles that promote and
support collaborative communication and teamwork in completing
projects and accomplishing goals/objectives; and
Performance Recognition and Reward: Providing incentives to,
and recognition of, employees for their performance, and
acknowledging employee contributions to the agency's mission.
Leaders Lead, at 44 percent positive, has shown notable improvement
in the past two years, improving by four points since 2017 and by 10
points since 2016. We continue to focus on these areas and monitor our
progress.
Question 14. You've noted that in an attempt to ``facilitate
leadership development at all levels of the workforce'' you have
created two Advisor positions on your direct staff. I couldn't agree
more with you about the need to get create input from staff at all
levels and the need to create an atmosphere for mentorship and
leadership development. Now, are these standing positions within your
office, or will you be rotating those individuals to sit in these
positions to help generate an on-going development process and
generating an ever changing dialogue with more of your subordinates?
Answer. Establishing a position for a Uniformed Advisor to the
Administrator was one of my initial goals as the TSA Administrator.
This past summer, we posted an announcement to the field, looking for a
Supervisory Transportation Security Officer (STSO) to serve as a
Uniformed Advisor to my office. In fact, in recognition of the positive
effects this role could have within TSA, we also sought a Uniformed
Advisor for our Security Operations office, as well. In August, we
brought on two STSOs from the field, one from Anchorage, and one from
New York City, to fill these two details.
The Uniformed Advisor role is a one-year detail position, rotating
in new Uniformed Advisors each year, so we get a diverse field of
Advisors with varied backgrounds and experience. These Advisors have
jumped right in and began participating and advising on policy from Day
One of their details.
The current Uniformed Advisors are creating a feedback loop process
that we believe will pay extensive dividends in making policy and
procedures that are heavily informed by the field. The intent of the
process is ensuring that we get communications widely disseminated to
the field on items of interest to our front-line employees, but also
ensuring there is an opportunity for our front-line employees to
communicate back to the TSA Front Office.
Additionally, I plan to add a Federal Air Marshal Advisor to my
office in the coming months. The Federal Air Marshal Advisor selection
and detail term will mirror the process used for the Uniformed Advisor
positions.
We are very excited about these roles and the opportunities they
offer for making more informed decisions for all employees, as well as
the traveling public.
Question 15. What else are you doing to create a sense of potential
upward mobility in your workforce, and giving them a platform to
provide you more direct input from all levels within the agency?
Answer. In addition to Transportation Security Officer (TSO) Career
Progression, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)'s Human
Capital office is developing an agency-wide career mapping system that
will enable employees to map a progressive career ladder of job
opportunities within TSA, as well as view skills, abilities,
competencies, recommended training, and developmental activities
necessary to advance from one position to another. The first iteration
of the system, which is anticipated to be available in 2019, will
include maps for TSOs, Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshals (LE/FAMs),
and certain support positions (e.g., Human Resources Specialist,
Financial Specialist, Program Specialist).
The Administrator also holds periodic employee town halls at
headquarters--in addition to the employee engagements he conducts
during his field site visits. During his headquarters events, he
dedicates more than half of the time to Q&A, which includes a polling
feature that any employee can access, whether they physically attend
the town hall or not. The poll allows employees to not only answer
questions the Administrator's staff publishes, but it also allows
people to ask their own questions of the Administrator. Many dozens of
questions were submitted during the latest town hall (September 25). As
many questions were answered as time allowed. As in the past, all
questions will be grouped and answered; and the answers will be
published on a dedicated SharePoint page for all employees to access.
Question 16. During our conversation at your last appearance in
this committee on surface transportation security, you noted that you
believed TSA needed ``to look at our risk quotient overall within the
transportation system and then allocate the resources where we the see
the greatest risk.'' That was in January. Have you made progress on
this priority that you flagged, and where do we stand on it? And how
are you incorporating this analysis into your budget formations?
Answer. As part of our upcoming budget planning process, the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) analyzed each proposed
initiative and evaluated them within a risk-metric system. The analysis
showed TSA has an appropriate alignment with the level of risk
identified by the Agency; meaning, we are successfully investing more
funding (75 percent) to those areas we have determined to be of the
most significant risk; less funding (10 percent) in those areas we have
assessed to be of lower risk; and some funding (15 percent) in those
areas we are willing to accept additional risk in order to be
successful.
Question 17. In your testimony you noted that ``TSA is also working
with CBP to identify ways that we can better leverage and align the two
DHS Trusted Traveler programs, Global Entry and TSA PreCheck.'' Please
describe what that coordination looks like for the Nevadans I know who
travel, as well as the millions we bring into our state every year.
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) are working towards finding
efficiencies between the various Trusted Traveler Programs, including
TSA Pre3 and CBP Global Entry.
TSA Pre3 and CBP Global Entry leadership are focusing on ways to
increase security effectiveness, leverage resources to create cost
savings, and enhance the traveler experience. Currently, TSA and CBP
are examining integration of public-facing messaging and enrollment
activities, such as a joint landing page for all trusted traveler
programs. We anticipate a six month's level of effort for completion of
the Landing Page once the task has been prioritized by both Components.
We are still assessing the other efforts.
Question 18. As we've discussed multiple times, I'm a big proponent
of innovation when it can be done safely and effectively. Now, you
noted in your testimony that TSA is conducting ``tests of facial
recognition technology at JFK Airport.'' Can you walk me through how
that testing has been going, whether you've seen any specific concerns
related to the implementation of this technology related to traveler's
race?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) have launched a series of
operational technology pilots to evaluate the use of facial recognition
technology that CBP developed called the Traveler Verification Service
(TVS).
Phase I, which was voluntary for passengers, was completed in
November 2017 at John F. Kennedy International Airport. It explored the
feasibility of using TVS at the TSA checkpoint; no TSA Standard
Operating Procedure was altered. The technology was used in parallel to
the standard TSA identification verification process in order to see
whether CBP's facial matching system could be scaled up to handle the
volume of passengers through a TSA checkpoint. The scalability and
responsiveness of CBP's system when stressed with TSA passenger volume
justified TSA-CBP moving to the next phase of the pilot program.
Phase II, initiated in August 2018 at Tom Bradley International
Terminal at Los Angeles International Airport, which is also voluntary,
uses TVS to verify the identity of passengers when there is a positive
match, in lieu of the manual processes currently performed by the
Transportation Security Officer (TSO) at the Travel Document Checker
(TDC) stations. Phase III, which is still under development, may allow
data sharing between CBP and TSA systems to test potential automation
of certain TDC manual functions to reduce the need for travelers to
present a boarding pass and/or physical identification to TDC. These
pilots aim to test whether this technology is a viable way to improve
TSA operations, achieve efficiencies, and streamline the passenger
experience by bringing biometric capabilities to the TSA checkpoint.
TSA currently does not own a facial matching system. We are
evaluating CBP's facial matching system--TVS--for potential use at TSA
checkpoints. According to CBP, its presently available data does not
currently demonstrate any significant difference in match rate through
TVS between age, gender, or citizenship. CBP and other DHS partners are
working to ensure the accuracy of any biometric services provided to
TSA.
CBP should be consulted for additional information regarding the
capabilities of its biometric systems.
During the hearing, several of your colleagues raised concerns
about this issue and cited studies that had been done on the topic of
biometrics and race. In an effort to fully understand the concerns I
have asked my team to research the mentioned studies to make sure we
are mindful of their findings as we move forward in our pilots with
CBP.
CBP is seeking to enter into an interagency agreement with NIST to
provide verification and validation for CBP's face recognition system.
NIST will examine the technology, methodology, and data from the
biometrics pilot programs that have been based on the Traveler
Verification Service (TVS) that CBP has built. In parallel, CBP and TSA
have regular joint-technical team meetings to discuss the solution
architecture and governance related to the further expansion and
integration of biometrics technology between CBP and TSA, including
analysis of matching data in testing and operational environments.
As we have specifically stated in the recently published TSA
Biometrics Roadmap, we will be deliberate, intentional, and transparent
as it tests and deploys biometrics-based identification verification
capability. TSA will adopt a ``privacy by design'' mindset that
incorporates privacy considerations into each phase of biometric
solution development (design, build, implement).
To address the Privacy considerations embedded in TSA pilots with
CBP, DHS/CBP have issued Privacy Impact Assessments (PIA), available at
www.dhs.gov/privacy; TSA contributed in the PIA for CBP-TSA Technical
Demonstration Phase II, issued in August 2018. Additionally, CBP has
issued program information, such as Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
on www.CBP.gov; there are Public signage is available at pilot sites;
and U.S. Citizens can request not to participate in biometric pilots
and seek an alternative means of verifying their identity and
documents.
Question 19. If you can, what are the current tangible logistical
benefits of the use of this technology, and what are the ongoing
challenges?
Answer. Facial recognition technology will increase security by
allowing the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to verify the
identity of passengers more reliably and will improve the travel
experience by enabling more passengers to get through the checkpoint
more quickly.
Aviation travel volume is increasing rapidly year after year. The
summer of 2018 was TSA's busiest summer to date. Between the Wednesday
before Memorial Day from until the Tuesday after Labor Day, we screened
253 million-more than a quarter of a billion--travelers and nearly 165
million pieces of checked baggage.
A challenge to throughput is the need to ensure identity
verification, a crucial security layer at this key entry point to the
screening process, and deployment of TSA resources to address potential
security threats. Today, Transportation Security Officers and airline
employees manually compare the passenger in front of them to their
photo identification to verify their identities for bag drop and
checkpoint screening. Technological solutions for biometric
verification can provide automation to improve the accuracy and speed
of identity verification, making the passenger experience faster and
more seamless without any negative impact on security.
Facial recognition technology has several potential benefits for
TSA's processes: it can be self-service, facilitative, and incorporate
anti-tampering countermeasures. These features can reduce reliance on
physical travel documents.
We recognize the potential benefits of these new technologies and
are monitoring their development with the goal of using biometrics to
reduce the need for passengers to physically present identification
documents to verify their identity.
Question 20. Have you begun to make any kind of determinations on
the cost benefit of implementing more of this technology?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is working
with the Office of Biometric Identity Management, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection, the Science and Technology Directorate, and
appropriate industry stakeholders to conduct an independent business
case analysis for different population segments that TSA services. This
analysis is expected to begin in the first quarter of Fiscal Year 2019.
As TSA will not likely have a ``one-size-fits-all'' biometrics solution
for all the various populations that it screens, a business case
analysis that articulates the costs and benefits of deploying different
available types of biometrics capabilities to different populations is
critical to design the appropriate solution architectures and
governance frameworks.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Jon Tester to
Hon. David Pekoske
Question 1. How is TSA working with small and rural commercial
service airports to identify specific challenges pertaining to airport
access control measures and surveillance technologies and implement
best practices?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is working
with small rural airports to overcome challenges with access control,
surveillance technologies, and best practices in several ways. The
following highlights a few initiatives specifically focused on rural
airports:
In July 2015, TSA issued the Airport Security Design
Guidelines, which offers several recommendations on the use of
Closed Circuit Television (CCTV). This document is intended to
bring to the attention of the airport planning, design, and
engineering community the serious security concerns that must
be considered for incorporation into an airport design at the
earliest possible planning stage, in order to bring the most
efficient and cost-effective security solutions to bear. The
Guidelines are available for small airports to use when
considering new or upgrading existing surveillance systems.
In October 2017, TSA shared with industry a List of
Effective Measures from Airport Vulnerability Assessments
developed after completing airport assessments of perimeter and
access controls to support voluntary initiatives to mitigate
vulnerabilities. Approximately 145 small and rural airports
were included in the assessments.
TSA continues to provide National Safe Skies Alliance
evaluations and reports on varying topics regarding access
control and surveillance testing for airports to provide
insights into technologies being tested without the individual
investment from a small airport. National Safe Skies Alliance,
Inc. (Safe Skies) is a non-profit organization that works with
airports, government, and industry to maintain a safe and
effective aviation security system. Safe Skies' core services
focus on helping airport operators make informed decisions
about their perimeter and access control security. Safe Skies
evaluations and reports are available for small and rural
airports to use when considering new or upgrading existing
access control and surveillance systems. National Safe Skies
Alliance posted guidelines regarding airport security design in
April, 2017 on their public website.
In addition, TSA looks at the environmental and demographic needs
of small airports when considering demonstration activity through work
within its Innovation Task Force (ITF). Through ITF's work, TSA is
better positioned to refine a long-term investment strategy, inform
future requirements and refine potential solutions with a ``system of
systems'' approach. ITF approaches technology demonstrations with the
understanding that no two airport environments are alike, and has the
ability to complete demonstrations at specialty sites such as small
airports. The TSA Innovation Task Force supports TSA's mission to
foster innovation by working with key stakeholders to identify and
demonstrate emerging solutions that increase security effectiveness and
efficiency, improve passenger experience and the flow of commerce, and
deliver solutions that secure the freedom of movement throughout the
Nation's transportation systems.
In addition to these initiatives, TSA initiated several changes to
its security program requirements and recommendations related to access
media, watch list vetting, and security of identification documents.
Rural and small airports are being directly consulted on the impact of
these requirements. TSA can provide a secure briefing on these issues
upon request.
Question 2. The Horizon Air incident displayed in full view an
issue that is normally out-of-sight to the general public--threats to
aviation security by insider employees. Presently, TSA conducts
background checks and airports rely upon TSA's findings from those
background checks when determining whether or not to issue a Security
Identification Area (SIDA) badge. Does TSA know when an airport revokes
a SIDA badge? If yes, what is the process for TSA being notified? If
no, how does TSA prevent the situation where an employee whose SIDA
badge has been revoked at one airport, lands a job at a different
airport and is issued a new SIDA badge?
Answer. Yes, airports are required to notify the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) when they revoke a Security
Identification Area (SIDA) badge for cause, electronically through
TSA's Vetting System. TSA is in the process of establishing a national
database of revoked badges that should be operational in Fiscal Year
2019. This aligns with Congress' intent, as reflected in Section 1934
of H.R. 302, the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018.
Question 3. Regarding revoked SIDA badges, does TSA have a
nationwide database of employees whose SIDA badges have been revoked?
If not, is TSA planning to establish such a database?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is in the
process of establishing a database of individuals whose SIDA badges
have been revoked for cause, which may be operational in Fiscal Year
(FY) 2019, depending on whether notice and comment is necessary. TSA
intends to complete its analysis and determination regarding notice and
comment requirements by the end of Q2 FY19. This database would be for
use by airports and would align with Congress' intent, as reflected in
Section 1934 of H.R. 302, the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018.
Question 3a. What issues would need to be addressed in any
guidelines for managing the database's content (e.g., duration of data
retention, deletion, mistaken identity)?
Answer. We must work with the airports to establish the parameters
that govern when it is appropriate to list an individual in the
database, what information should be included, privacy protections to
prevent unauthorized disclosures, procedures to prevent errant
listings, and appropriate redress procedures to remove listings that
are determined to be incorrect. Some considerations involve:
The need to create new data inputs to distinguish revocation
based on voluntary separation,
Disqualifying offenses,
Suitability determinations by airports unrelated to
transportation security, and
The length of time for which an individual's information
should be retained in such a database and other privacy
considerations.
Question 3b. Would TSA issue draft rules for public comment?
Answer. TSA continues to analyze this issue to determine what, if
any, notice and comment opportunity must be afforded. Whether database
input is mandatory or voluntary, as well as the database content, will
inform this analysis. TSA intends to complete its analysis and
determination regarding notice and comment requirements by end of Q2
FY19.
Question 4. How would TSA ensure the database's validity while
safeguarding individuals' privacy? What role would the Department of
Homeland Security play in the establishment of this database or in its
data validation?
Answer. As with all Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
systems, we implement U.S. Department of Homeland Security directives
and guidance on information technology standards to ensure the
protection and accuracy of an individual's information. This includes
establishing parameters that govern when it is appropriate to list an
individual in the database, what information should be included,
privacy protections to prevent unauthorized disclosures, procedures to
prevent errant listings, and appropriate redress procedures to remove
listings that are determined to be incorrect.
Question 5. With regard to passenger screening technologies, TSA
has prioritized deployments of various checkpoint security systems,
such as Advanced Imaging Technology whole-body scanners and now
Computed Tomography scanners for carry-on bags, to the Nation's largest
airports. Are there any innovative strategies that TSA is exploring or
implementing to address the various challenges of applying cost-
effective passenger and baggage screening at smaller airports?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) looks at a
diverse range of solutions across a variety of metrics and measures
that apply to smaller airports. TSA engages and collaborates with
transportation security equipment (TSE) stakeholders (such as, original
equipment manufacturers, U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Science
and Technology Directorate, national laboratories, academia, and
industry) in part to address the overall physical footprint of TSE in
order to accommodate smaller-sized airports.
As part of its efforts to develop and mature TSE technology for
future procurements, TSA is committed to defining cost-effective system
requirements with multiple hardware configurations. These efforts seek
to accommodate the types of space and staffing constraints, such as
those common in small airport environments, within the broader context
of maintaining operational efficiencies and security effectiveness.
TSA is also exploring innovative screening capabilities (e.g.,
remote screening), which will reduce overall costs, including TSE and
staffing, for checkpoint screening. Remote screening offers the
opportunity to build and operate a centralized image interpretation
room that allows a single security officer to oversee multiple carry-on
screening lanes, thus reducing the number of operators required to
fully staff a lane. In addition to screening equipment, TSA also
understands the crucial needs of staffing and scheduling in the small
airport environment and is identifying solutions that will alleviate
local staffing and scheduling burdens for a more integrated and
comprehensive system.
Question 6. Has TSA investigated new software products that utilize
deep learning and computer vision technology to enhance current and
future screening machines?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) actively
engages industry, national laboratories, and academic partners to
develop and test advanced algorithms based on deep learning for
automated threat detection. To date, these efforts have provided us
with a path forward for automated prohibited items detection in carry-
on baggage for both current Advanced Technology and future Computed
Tomography systems, as well as shown enhancements for explosives
detection and false alarm reduction in both carry-on and checked
baggage screening. Future plans include further applications of machine
learning to passenger and baggage screening systems, as well as
security system optimization.
Question 7. Earlier this year, TSA withdrew its long-delayed
rulemaking proposal on security for large general aviation aircraft
(known as the Large Aircraft Security Program or LASP). What is TSA
doing to work with the general aviation community (including general
aviation airports, fixed-base operators, and aircraft owners and
pilots) to strengthen security measures and access controls to general
aviation facilities and aircraft, particularly large business and
private jets?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) continues
to work with the general aviation (GA) community and industry partners
to strengthen security measures and awareness surrounding general
aviation operations. The GA subcommittee of the Aviation Security
Advisory Committee collaborates regularly to offer suggestions to
enhance GA security.
TSA partnered with the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association to
develop the Airport Watch program. Similar to the If You See Something,
Say Something campaign, it encourages pilots, airport employees, and
associated personnel to take an active role in securing GA facilities
and aircraft. The program promotes a hotline (866 GA SECURE) to report
security concerns in the GA environment. This hotline is answered by
TSA personnel on a 24/7 basis.
TSA also published Security Guidelines for General Aviation Airport
Operators and Users which was developed jointly with the GA community.
The document provides suggested security enhancements for GA airports
including lighting, fencing, access control, closed circuit television,
etc. It also covers associated areas such as fixed base operators and
fuel storage facilities. The full document can be found at: https://
www.tsa.gov/sites/default/files/2017_ga_security_guidelines.pdf
Question 8. What are some of the unique characteristics of general
aviation that have made it so challenging to move forward with these
security regulations?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is not
moving forward with this rulemaking for three primary reasons: (1) an
assessment of the relative risk associated with general aviation
operations; (2) feedback from the industry; and (3) alignment with the
Executive Orders related to regulatory costs and regulatory reform.
First, TSA regularly assesses the risk of the aviation sector and
has determined that the risk from GA aircraft is relatively low. Unlike
commercial aviation, most GA aircraft are operated by recreational
pilots or serve as corporate aircraft. The low risk is attributed to
the fact that passengers and crew are typically family, friends, and/or
business colleagues. Thus, the familiarity of the passengers would
generally result in identifying bad actors and preventing them from
boarding. The low risk evaluation also considers that GA operations
often involve small aircraft with minimal fuel and passenger loads,
which are less likely to do the kind of harm that commercial operations
can cause. Finally, GA operators do not fly with the same frequency as
commercial flights, which further reduces the opportunities for these
operators to do harm.
Second, in a rulemaking proceeding TSA initiated several years ago,
more than 7,000 pilots, aircraft operators, airports, aviation workers,
individuals, Members of Congress, aviation associations, and civic
organizations provided comments objecting to the proposed regulations.
The overwhelming majority of commenters asserted that the rulemaking
would increase costs and other burdens unnecessarily, and would lead
small airport and aircraft operators to go out of business, causing
loss of employment. Also, the commenters noted that they did not
support TSA issuance of regulations absent a statutory mandate.
Third, in January 2017, the President issued two Executive Orders
(EOs) related to regulatory reform. EO 13771 directs all Federal
agencies to eliminate two regulations for every one regulation the
agency implements and ensure that any new regulatory action has a $0
net cost.
In consideration of all of these factors, TSA decided not to pursue
a rulemaking and issued a notice in March 2018 to withdraw the notice
of proposed rulemaking. Should TSA determine the threat to or from
general aviation has increased, the agency has authority to take
appropriate action. This action can be taken quickly, as it was in 2001
when general aviation operations were prohibited at Ronald Reagan
National Airport (DCA), or through notice and comment rulemaking.
Question 9. What alternative approaches can strengthen general
aviation security in the future?
Answer. TSA continues to work with the general aviation (GA)
community and industry partners to strengthen security measures and
awareness surrounding general aviation operations. The GA subcommittee
of the Aviation Security Advisory Committee collaborates regularly to
offer suggestions to enhance GA security.
TSA partnered with the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association to
develop the Airport Watch program. Similar to the If You See Something,
Say Something campaign, it encourages pilots, airport employees, and
associated personnel to take an active role in securing GA facilities
and aircraft. The program promotes a hotline (866 GA SECURE) to report
security concerns in the GA environment. This hotline is answered by
TSA personnel on a 24/7 basis.
TSA also published Security Guidelines for General Aviation Airport
Operators and Users which was developed jointly with the GA community.
The document provides suggested security enhancements for GA airports
including lighting, fencing, access control, closed circuit television,
etc. It also covers associated areas such as fixed base operators and
fuel storage facilities. The full document can be found at: https://
www.tsa.gov/sites/default/files/2017_ga_security_guidelines.pdf
Question 10. In January 2016, TSA centralized the training of its
security officers under the TSO Basic Training program by sending staff
to Glynco, Georgia for two weeks of training that includes standard
operating procedures, threat detection, and the use of screening
equipment. Has there been a measurable difference of performance by
TSOs since the Basic Training program was instituted? What metrics is
TSA using to measure performance?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) uses the
industry standard Kirkpatrick Evaluation Model to determine the
effectiveness of its training, which includes the Transportation
Security Officer Basic Training Program (TSO-BTP) at the TSA Academy in
Glynco, Georgia. We have complete data for Fiscal Year (FY) 2017. A
Level 1 Kirkpatrick evaluation refers to the immediate feedback from
students participating in the course, and the Level 1 data has been
overwhelmingly positive. In addition, Human Capital's 2017 Employee
Engagement Survey revealed that overall morale was 11 percent higher
for TSO-BTP graduates when compared to their peers trained at local
airports. Organizational commitment, which is a measure of an
individual's attachment to the organization, was also 12 percent higher
for TSO-BTP graduates, and overall satisfaction was 13 percent higher.
A Level 2 Kirkpatrick evaluation refers to transferred knowledge,
which is measured at the end of training or a segment of training. For
TSO-BTP, that means a Job Knowledge Test and an Image Interpretation
Test (IIT). To meet operational needs, some local new-hire training was
conducted at airports during FY 2017. We were therefore able to look at
Level 2 data, comparing the results of traditional new-hire training at
the airports with TSO-BTP at the TSA Academy. Initial IIT results show
that TSO-BTP students trained at the TSA Academy achieved passing rates
that were higher than those of TSOs trained locally.
Question 10a. In your estimation, when will TSA have enough data to
show whether attrition at TSA slowed as a result of this Basic Training
program?
Answer. Attrition is a complex problem and factors outside of
training become more important the longer an employee is with the
organization. Two factors outside of training which can affect
attrition are pay and the economy.
Noting the importance of these factors and the difficulty linking
attrition to a single training event, TSA did see positive results in
the population of new hires attending TSO-BTP at the TSA Academy.
According to data collected in 2016, graduates from TSO-BTP showed
lower attrition rates within their first 180 days of employment, when
compared to new hires trained at field airports. Within this 180-day
period, the attrition rate for new hires attending TSO-BTP at the TSA
Academy in 2016 was 12.76 percent, while the attrition rate for field
trainees was 15.66 percent. This approximately three-percent difference
indicates a positive trend in the first six months for students
receiving a standardized, Academy-delivered basic training program.
TSA has also implemented TSO Career Progression, which allows TSOs,
depending on operational need, to remain at their home airport for
approximately two to six months before attending TSO-BTP at the TSA
Academy. The timing shift is intended to increase operational capacity
at the airports, help ensure career fit prior to further training
investment, and potentially address attrition among new TSOs.
TSA also has implemented TSO Career Progression, which allows TSOs,
depending on operational need, to remain at their home airport for
approximately two-to six-months before attending TSO-BTP at the TSA
Academy to potentially address attrition among new TSOs.
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