[Senate Hearing 115-806]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



                                                        S. Hrg. 115-806

                           ABUSIVE ROBOCALLS 
                        AND HOW WE CAN STOP THEM

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               before the

                         COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
                      SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                     ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________


                             APRIL 18, 2018

                               __________

    Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
                             Transportation






                 [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]








                Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov

                               ______
                                 

                 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

56-117 PDF                WASHINGTON : 2024












       SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

                     ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                   JOHN THUNE, South Dakota, Chairman

ROGER WICKER, Mississippi            BILL NELSON, Florida, Ranking
ROY BLUNT, Missouri                  MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
TED CRUZ, Texas                      AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska                RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
JERRY MORAN, Kansas                  BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska                 EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts
DEAN HELLER, Nevada                  TOM UDALL, New Mexico
JAMES INHOFE, Oklahoma               GARY PETERS, Michigan
MIKE LEE, Utah                       TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin               TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia  MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire
CORY GARDNER, Colorado               CATHERINE CORTEZ MASTO, Nevada
TODD YOUNG, Indiana                  JON TESTER, Montana

                       Nick Rossi, Staff Director
                 Adrian Arnakis, Deputy Staff Director
                    Jason Van Beek, General Counsel
                 Kim Lipsky, Democratic Staff Director
              Chris Day, Democratic Deputy Staff Director
                      Renae Black, Senior Counsel








                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
Hearing held on April 18, 2018...................................     1
Statement of Senator Thune.......................................     1
    Letter dated April 16, 2018 to Hon. John Thune and Hon. Bill 
      Nelson from Marc Rotenberg, EPIC President; Alan Rotenberg, 
      EPIC Senior Counsel; and Christine Bannan, EPIC 
      Administrative Law and Policy Fellow.......................    96
    Letter dated April 17, 2018 to Hon. John Thune and Hon. Bill 
      Nelson from Richard Hunt, President and CEO, Consumer 
      Bankers Association........................................    98
    Letter dated April 18, 2018 to Hon. John Thune and Hon. Bill 
      Nelson from Meredith Atwell Baker, President and CEO, CTIA.    99
Statement of Senator Blumenthal..................................     3
Statement of Senator Markey......................................    21
Statement of Senator Tester......................................    24
Statement of Senator Klobuchar...................................    24
Statement of Senator Cortez Masto................................    89
Statement of Senator Baldwin.....................................    93

                               Witnesses

Adrian Abramovich, Former President, Marketing Strategy Leaders 
  (Dissolved 1/29/2016)..........................................     4
    Prepared statement...........................................     6
Rosemary Harold, Chief, Enforcement Bureau, Federal 
  Communications Commission......................................    25
    Prepared statement...........................................    27
Lois Greisman, Associate Director, Marketingerg, Practices 
  Division, Bureau of Consumer Protection, Federal Trade 
  Commission.....................................................    28
    Prepared statement...........................................    30
Kevin Rupy, Vice President, Law and Policy, USTelecom............    54
    Prepared statement...........................................    56
Scott Delacourt, Partner, Wiley Rein LLP, On Behalf of the U.S. 
  Chamber Institute for Legal Reform.............................    58
    Prepared statement...........................................    59
Margot Freeman Saunders, Senior Counsel, National Consumer Law 
  Center.........................................................    65
    Prepared statement...........................................    67

                                Appendix

Letter dated April 17, 2018 to Hon. John Thune and Hon. Bill 
  Nelson from American Bankers Association, Consumer Bankers 
  Association, Credit Union National Association, Electronic 
  Transactions Association, Independent Community Bankers of 
  America, National Association of Federally-Insured Credit 
  Unions, National Council of Higher Education Resources, and 
  Student Loan Servicing Alliance................................   103
Letter dated April 28, 2017 to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, 
  Federal Communications Commission from Brian Scarpelli, Senior 
  Policy Council, ACT | The App Association; Thomas E. Goode, 
  General Counsel, ATS; Krista L. Witanowski, Assistant Vice 
  President, Regulatory Affairs, CTIA; Kevin G. Rupy, Vice 
  President, Law & Policy, USTelecom.............................   104
Response to written questions submitted to Adrian Abramovich by:
    Hon. Catherine Cortez Masto..................................   122
Response to written questions submitted to Rosemary Harold by:
    Hon. John Thune..............................................   123
    Hon. Maria Cantwell..........................................   123
    Hon. Catherine Cortez Masto..................................   124
Response to written questions submitted to Lois Greisman by:
    Hon. Maria Cantwell..........................................   126
    Hon. Tom Udall...............................................   127
    Hon. Catherine Cortez Masto..................................   127
Response to written questions submitted to Kevin Rupy by:
    Hon. Maria Cantwell..........................................   130
    Hon. Richard Blumenthal......................................   131
    Hon. Tom Udall...............................................   131
    Hon. Catherine Cortez Masto..................................   133
Response to written questions submitted to Scott Delacourt by:
    Hon. John Thune..............................................   135
    Hon. Maria Cantwell..........................................   136
    Hon. Catherine Cortez Masto..................................   137








 
                           ABUSIVE ROBOCALLS 
                        AND HOW WE CAN STOP THEM

                              ----------                              


                       WEDNESDAY, APRIL 18, 2018

                                       U.S. Senate,
        Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:09 a.m. in 
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. John Thune, 
Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
    Present: Senators Thune [presiding], Wicker, Blunt, Heller, 
Gardner, Blumenthal, Nelson, Cantwell, Klobuchar, Tester, 
Udall, Baldwin, Markey, Peters, Hassan, and Cortez Masto.

             OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN THUNE, 
                 U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA

    The Chairman. Good morning. In the United States Senate, we 
often have heated disagreements over important issues facing 
our country. Even in the Commerce Committee, which has a 
longstanding tradition of reaching bipartisan compromise when 
possible, we don't always see eye-to-eye when it comes to 
contentious issues. But today we are here to address an issue 
that I'm sure we can all agree on: unwanted, abusive, and 
illegal robocalls have got to stop.
    Unsolicited robocalls consistently rank among the top 
consumer complaints to the Federal Trade Commission and the 
Federal Communications Commission. Beyond just being annoying, 
many of those who send out unwanted robocalls do so with the 
intent to defraud consumers. As more phone systems move from 
copper wires to the Internet, it has become easier and cheaper 
for bad actors to make illegal robocalls from anywhere in the 
world.
    These new technologies have also made it easier for 
scammers to hide from law enforcement and to seek to gain their 
victims' trust by displaying fake caller ID information. Known 
as ``spoofing,'' this technique allows a fraudulent call to 
show up on recipients' caller ID as a number within their area 
code, or even with many of the same digits as their own phone 
number, making it appear like a trustworthy local number. I am 
sure that many of us, as well as many of our constituents, have 
experienced this phenomenon.
    The goal of scammers using spoofed robocalls is often to 
get money out of unsuspecting recipients, and some of their 
methods can be particularly malicious. For instance, given that 
yesterday was tax day, one common scam, especially at this time 
of year, is the ``IRS scam.'' This scam involves the caller 
pretending to represent the IRS in order to scare the victim 
into providing money or personal information to avoid phony tax 
penalties.
    Perhaps the biggest negative effect of the increasing 
prevalence of unwanted robocalls is that they frustrate 
recipients to the point that they are less likely to answer 
legitimate calls.
    It's important to remember that robocalls are not 
inherently negative. Many important services are carried out 
via robocall where companies and call recipients have pre-
established relationships and where the consumer has agreed to 
participate in these types of calls. Indeed, some entities, 
like hospitals and pharmacies, use robocalls to remind a 
patient of an upcoming appointment or that a prescription is 
ready for pickup. In addition, automakers often use robocalls 
to warn vehicle owners of urgent safety recalls. Missing calls 
like these can have life-or-death consequences for recipients.
    Today we have the opportunity to hear from enforcement 
officials responsible for combating illegal robocallers and 
from industry representatives who can speak to new methods for 
preventing consumers from receiving unwanted calls in the first 
place.
    We also have the opportunity to hear from Mr. Adrian 
Abramovich, who, according to the FCC, allegedly made almost 
100 million robocalls in a three-month period in 2016.
    On October 10, 2017, the Committee sent Mr. Abramovich a 
letter of inquiry regarding the FCC's notice of apparent 
liability, asking several questions about his conduct. On 
November 3, 2017, through his counsel, Mr. Abramovich informed 
the Committee that he would not be providing information in 
response to the Committee's inquiry.
    This past March, I invited Mr. Abramovich to appear 
voluntarily for today's hearing, but through his counsel, he 
declined. In light of Mr. Abramovich's decision to decline the 
Committee's invitation and refusal to provide information in 
response to the Committee's inquiry, a subpoena requiring Mr. 
Abramovich's appearance before the Committee was issued.
    Mr. Abramovich, your participation in today's hearing is 
important. According to the FCC, you allegedly made nearly 100 
million robocalls to American consumers purporting to be a 
well-known travel or hospitality company, such as TripAdvisor, 
Expedia, Marriott, or Hilton. If a robocall recipient answered 
and pressed ``1'' for more information, the consumer would be 
directed to a Mexican hotel and resort chain engaged in selling 
timeshares and vacation packages that had contracted with you, 
Mr. Abramovich, to receive calls generated by your network.
    Mr. Abramovich, I expect that today you will shed some 
light on your past conduct and provide the Committee with your 
unique perspective on the technologies and practices behind 
abusive robocalls. With this information, and that of the 
second panel, the Committee should better understand this 
problem and what steps might be necessary to end this abusive 
practice.
    Finally, before I turn to the Ranking Member, who today 
Senator Blumenthal is serving in that role, I would like to 
just note that the recent omnibus appropriations bill included 
Committee-approved legislation he sponsored and I say ``he 
sponsored,'' Senator Nelson, with Senators Fischer, Klobuchar, 
Blunt, and Duckworth to empower the FCC to combat spoofing 
originating from international locations. We'll be eager to 
hear how new law will be implemented and what more needs to be 
done.
    So with that, I'm going to turn to Senator Blumenthal for 
an opening statement.

             STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, 
                 U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT

    Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Senator Thune, and thank you 
for having this hearing today, which deals with a pernicious 
and prevalent problem. There is bipartisan loathing for 
robocalls, and today we will hear from some of the government 
officials who have responsibility for stopping them, but also 
from someone who has been responsible, Mr. Abramovich, for 
perpetrating them.
    They are rightly abhorred by consumers. They are not only 
oppressive and obnoxious, but they are extraordinarily 
prevalent, despite enforcement efforts by the Federal Trade 
Commission under existing law. The simple fact is that the Do 
Not Call list is totally ineffectual against them. The evidence 
is that consumers still are plagued with them.
    And that is why today I am introducing the ROBOCOP bill, 
Repeated Objectionable Bothering of Consumers on Phones Act. 
The ROBOCOP bill will require phone companies to offer 
effective tools to block robocalls to consumers at no extra 
cost to them. At the same time, it will enable emergency calls 
or others for legitimate purposes to continue as a robust 
mechanism.
    And I'm very proud to be joined by a number of my 
colleagues, including Senator Markey, of this Committee, who 
has been a leader, and Senator Baldwin, who is also on the 
Committee.
    I join Senator Thune in the hope that, Mr. Abramovich, you 
will answer fully and completely the questions that we have for 
you today. You have become the face of this problem. You may 
think it is unjust, and that your appearance here today, as 
you've said in your testimony, will impact your settlement with 
the FCC.
    But the fact of the matter is that you have a duty to 
answer these questions, and Senator Thune has recited a 
proposed fine of $120 million that the FCC has proposed. The 
fine is a result of more than 100 million illegal robocalls 
during a 3-month period in 2016. That is a phenomenal record of 
consumer abuse. The robocalls involved in this campaign 
displayed misleading or inaccurate caller ID information 
designed to make the calls appear to be originated locally to 
the recipient.
    So I hope that you will help us, in fact, shed some light 
on this problem and that you will explain any inability to 
answer our questions. If you answer them selectively, you will, 
of course, jeopardize your Fifth Amendment right if you wish to 
invoke it, but you have an obligation to be forthcoming here 
today and to help alleviate some of the harm that you have done 
already. And I hope that we will learn more in support of the 
legislation that I've introduced, the ROBOCOP bill, but also 
other legislation that can take action against this continuing 
and abusive consumer harm that literally hits everyone.
    No one is immune from robocalls. Whether you own a cell 
phone or a landline, there is no escaping them. Unwanted calls 
reach our most vulnerable and susceptible populations, 
particularly I know this as a member of the Special Committee 
on Aging because seniors and older Americans are often 
targeted, and they are often victims of the scams that are 
advanced through robocalls.
    In 2017, the FCC made it crystal clear that carriers can 
identify and block these calls from known scam numbers, and I 
hope that today's hearing will also result in more vigorous 
enforcement of existing laws along with support for new laws 
that will enable tougher penalties, stronger deterrents, and 
better consumer protection.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
    Mr. Abramovich, I understand you have an opening statement. 
And so we would ask you at this point to proceed with that. 
Welcome.

  STATEMENT OF ADRIAN ABRAMOVICH, FORMER PRESIDENT, MARKETING 
             STRATEGY LEADERS (DISSOLVED 1/29/2016)

    Mr. Abramovich. Yes, sir.
    Good morning to everyone. Chairman Thune, Ranking Member 
Nelson, and other members of the Committee, my name is Adrian 
Abramovich. I have been engaged in business with long distance 
telephone providers, wireless services providers, and 
conducting marketing activities for more than 15 years.
    On June 22, 2007, the FCC initiated a forfeiture action 
against me with a proposed penalty fine of $120 million and 
alleging that I perpetrated one of the largest spoof robocall 
campaign ever. These allegations obviously have generated 
immense publicity, to the point that I am here today before a 
Senate Committee of the United States of America.
    In no way did I seek more publicity or to engage in public 
discussion about the pending FCC action or my defenses. I filed 
a response to the FCC, I denied engaging in the fraudulent 
activities and the misrepresentation alleged by the FCC, and 
sought to reduce the amount of the proposed forfeiture. It was 
always my intent with the FCC to negotiate toward an 
appropriate fine within my ability to pay such amount.
    I did not come here today to testify because putting a 
further spotlight on my pending case can only hurt my chances 
to resolve this matter with the FCC. Having to come here today 
will no doubt portray me as the face of these unwanted 
robocalls, will prejudice my ongoing case with the FCC, and 
might also incriminate me with potential criminal charges.
    I am here now because the Committee served me with a 
subpoena. Instead of refusing to answer questions, I will make 
a good faith effort to answer questions within my industry-wide 
knowledge of telemarketing and the type of calls you are 
investigating. However, I will invoke my Fifth Amendment 
privilege not to answer questions seeking specific factual 
information regarding the allegations made by the FCC against 
me. With regard to the FCC allegations, I will refer to and 
incorporate my response to the FCC, which has been filed with 
this Committee.
    Because the FCC allegations will certainly be discussed 
today, I will briefly address the main points of my defense.
    I have denied and continue to deny any intent to defraud, 
cause harm, or wrongfully obtain anything of value. The resorts 
associated with telemarketing activities were indeed real 
resorts, offering real vacation packages. The packages were 
exclusively available to qualified persons, all the terms and 
conditions were clearly explained, including the timeshare 
presentation requirement. And the FCC does not cite a single 
complaint about the quality of vacation, accommodation, of 
amenities.
    The extent of my activities has been significantly 
overstated. I am not the king pin of robocalling that is 
alleged. While the allegations made in my case might be the 
biggest the FCC investigated, the FTC also regulates the 
telemarketing activities and conducts enforcement. In my 
response, I cite to several other cases involving as much or 
more call volume than my case and the same exact spoofing.
    One specific case is the Caribbean Cruise Line. This 
specific case alleges that the defendants made 15 more daily 
spoofed calls than the allegations against me, falsely claimed 
that they were associated with a political survey, and falsely 
claimed that the cruises were free, none of which is alleged in 
my case.
    In the Caribbean Cruise Line, the enforcement efforts 
targeted all the participants in the autodial campaign, 
including lead generation, travel provider, and the carrier. In 
my case, I'm the only target, and my proposed fine is 10 times 
all the fines imposed in the Caribbean Cruise case against all 
the participants.
    The effect on consumers has been also overstated in my 
case. The amount of actual calls getting through to consumers 
is much, much less than the number of calls dialed. Ninety 
percent of the calls detailed by the FCC were less than a 
minute. Less than 2 percent of any consumers have meaningful 
interaction with these calls.
    In an effort to help the Committee here today, I can 
generally speak about these phone calls. One of the main issues 
you have in addressing these calls is that the technology is 
easy to obtain and can be used by anyone. There is available 
open software that allows anyone to make thousands of automated 
phone calls with a click of a button. This software is totally 
customizable. But the biggest issue to stop robocall is the 
availability of carriers to accommodate these type of calls. 
There are companies that advertise on the web right now that 
offer long distance carrier services for ``Dialer/Short 
Duration Termination,'' also known as robocalls. To me, this is 
where the enforcement needs to focus on to stop this activity.
    In conclusion, as you have noticed today, English is not my 
first language. And I have, of course, prepared this statement 
with the assistance of my counsel. Throughout my questioning, I 
might need for you to repeat or rephrase a question, and I 
might also need to confer with my attorney prior to answering a 
question. I will do my best to answer all your questions here 
and to cooperate in this hearing.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Abramovich follows:]

 Prepared Statement of Adrian Abramovich, Former President, Marketing 
                 Strategy Leaders (Dissolved 1/29/2016)
    Chairman Thune, Ranking Member Nelson and the other members of the 
Committee:
Introduction
    My name is Adrian Abramovich, I have been engaged in business with 
long distance telephone providers, wireless service providers and 
conducting marketing activities for more than 15 years. On June 22, 
2017, the Federal Communications Commission initiated a forfeiture 
action against me with a proposed penalty of $120,000,000 and alleging 
that I perpetrated one of the largest spoofed robocall campaigns ever. 
These allegations obviously have generated immense publicity, to the 
point that I am here today before a Senate Committee of the United 
States of America.
    In no way did I seek more publicity or to engage in public 
discussion about the pending FCC action or my defenses. I filed a 
response to the FCC, I denied engaging in the fraudulent activities and 
the misrepresentation alleged by the FCC and sought to reduce the 
amount of the proposed forfeiture. It was always my intent with the FCC 
to negotiate towards an appropriate fine within my ability to pay such 
amount. (A copy of my June 27, 2017 ``Response'' is attached hereto as 
Exhibit A).
    I did not want to come here today to testify because putting a 
further spotlight on my pending case can only hurt my chances to 
resolve this matter with the FCC. Having to come here today will no 
doubt portray me as the face of these robocalls, will prejudice my 
ongoing case with the FCC and may also incriminate me with potential 
criminal charges.
    I am here now because the Committee served me with a subpoena. 
Instead of refusing to answer questions, I will make a good faith 
effort to answer questions within my industry wide knowledge of 
telemarketing and the type of calls you are investigating. However, I 
will invoke my 5th amendment privilege to not answer questions seeking 
specific factual information regarding the allegations made by the FCC 
against me. With regard to the FCC allegations I will refer to and 
incorporate my Response to the FCC which has been filed with this 
Committee.
Conduct Alleged by the FCC
    Because the FCC allegations will certainly be discussed today, I 
will briefly address the main points of my defense:

  (a)  I have denied and continue to deny any intent to defraud, cause 
        harm or wrongfully obtain anything of value. The resorts 
        associated with my telemarketing activities were indeed real 
        resorts, offering real vacation packages, the packages were 
        exclusively available only to qualified persons, all the terms 
        and conditions were clearly explained (including the timeshare 
        presentation requirement); and the FCC does not cite to a 
        single complaint about the quality of the vacation, 
        accommodations or amenities;

  (b)  The extent of my activities has been significantly overstated. I 
        am not the king pin of robocalling that is alleged. While the 
        allegations made in my case may be the biggest for the FCC, the 
        Federal Trade Commission also regulates telemarketing 
        activities and conducts enforcement. In my Response, I cite to 
        several other cases involving as much or more call volume than 
        my case and the exact same spoofing.

  (c)  One Specific case is the Caribbean Cruise Line case. This 
        specific case alleges that the defendants made 15 times more 
        daily spoofed robocalls than the allegations against me, 
        falsely claimed that they were associated with a political 
        survey, and falsely claimed that the cruises were free. None of 
        which is alleged in my case.

  (d)  In the Caribbean Cruise Line case, the enforcement efforts 
        targeted all the participants in the autodial campaign, 
        including lead generation, travel provider and the carrier. In 
        my case I am the only target and my proposed fine is ten times 
        all the fines imposed in the Caribbean Cruise case against all 
        the participants.

  (e)  The effect on consumers has also been overstated in my case. The 
        amount of actual calls getting through to consumers is much 
        less than the number of calls dialed. 96 percent of all calls 
        detailed by the FCC were less than 1 minute. The majority of 
        those do not bother anyone. Less than 2 percent of any 
        consumers have any meaningful interaction with these calls.
Information for the Committee
    In an effort to help the committee here today. I can generally 
speak about these phone calls and how to help limit them. One of the 
main issues you have in addressing these calls is that the technology 
is easy to obtain and can be used by anyone. Anyone can start a large 
autodial campaign from a home office.

        With regard to DIALING and SPOOFING

    There is available open source software that can be misused by 
someone to make thousands of automated phone calls with the click of a 
button. This software is totally customizable based on the needs of any 
particular campaign.
    There are also hosted auto-dialer services that are harder to be 
misused because of more control by the company, but they can still be 
improperly used and regulation of these companies may help.
    There are websites right now you can find on google that offer 
volume pricing for using their ``robocalling'' system that can handle 
``millions upon millions of calls''. I found these advertisements using 
google a few days ago.

        With regard to LONG DISTANCE PROVIDERS

    Once you have this software all you need is to then install your 
now customized auto-dialer platform to a cloud service and using the 
right long distance company to start placing calls.
    There are companies that advertise on the web right now that offer 
long distance carrier service for ``Dialer/Short Duration Termination'' 
calls. These are robocalls. Clearly regulation needs to address the 
carriers and providers and require the major carriers to detect 
robocalls activity.
Conclusion
    As you have notice today, English is not my first language, and I 
have of course prepared this statement with the assistance of counsel. 
Throughout my questioning I may need for you to repeat or rephrase a 
question and I may also need to confer with my attorney prior to 
answering a question. I will do my best to answer your questions here 
today and to cooperate in this legislative hearing.
                               Exhibit A

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    The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Abramovich.
    Mr. Abramovich. Thank you.
    The Chairman. In your prepared testimony, you say that you 
have been engaged in business with long distance telephone 
providers, wireless service providers, and conducting marketing 
activities for more than 15 years.
    Mr. Abramovich. Yes, sir.
    The Chairman. How many robocalls would you estimate to have 
made during that time?
    Mr. Abramovich. I'm not going to answer that specific 
question for my activities, and I invoke the privilege not to 
answer, no.
    The Chairman. In your prepared testimony, you state that 
the effect on consumers has been overstated in your case 
because fewer than 2 percent of consumers had a meaningful 
interaction with these calls, and 2 percent perhaps sounds 
small, but if the allegations against you are correct, that 
means you made nearly 100 million robocalls during one 3-month 
period.
    Mr. Abramovich. Mm-hmm.
    The Chairman. So 2 percent would be nearly 2 million 
people. Over a year, that would be nearly 8 million people.
    Mr. Abramovich. Mm-hmm.
    The Chairman. Does that sound like a small effect on 
consumers?
    Mr. Abramovich. Again, I'm not here to talk about my 
specific case. I invoke my privilege not to testify about 
things that might be used against me in the forfeiture case. 
But I can talk about general questions you might have about 
robocallings, telemarketing activities, and maybe can give you 
some insight on how those work.
    I'm not prepared to discuss my specific case because I am 
subject to a $120 million forfeiture against me right now. So I 
cannot talk about my specific case. But I'm here on a good 
faith effort to help the Committee to somehow come at these 
robocalls.
    The Chairman. Mr. Abramovich, based on the information that 
you provided in your opening statement, I believe you may have 
waived your Fifth Amendment privilege.
    Mr. Abramovich. Hmm?
    The Chairman. In fact, during your opening statement, you 
just spoke in detail about the core issues under consideration 
at this hearing. You cannot now claim privilege to avoid 
answering questions on the subject matter contained in that 
statement. You are also here under subpoena, and, therefore, 
must answer. So if you refuse to answer this question, the 
Committee may seek to hold you in contempt of Congress for 
failing to respond.
    Mr. Abramovich. Yes, but----
    [Mr. Abramovich speaking with his counsel.]
    Mr. Abramovich.--under advice of my Counsel, I'm not going 
to answer specific questions.
    The Chairman. All right. I'm going to try one more time, 
and then I'm going to flip it to Senator Blumenthal.
    Mr. Abramovich, the FCC alleges that your calls falsely 
claim to be affiliated with well-known travel and hospitality 
companies, including TripAdvisor, Expedia, Marriott, and 
Hilton.
    Mr. Abramovich. Mm-hmm.
    The Chairman. However, in your prepared testimony, you 
state that the resorts associated with your telemarketing 
activities were indeed real resorts.
    Mr. Abramovich. Mm-hmm.
    The Chairman. Which resorts did you work with? Did 
TripAdvisor, Expedia, Marriott, or Hilton ever authorize you to 
use their names during these calls?
    Mr. Abramovich. I never misrepresented any of those 
hospitality companies. All the resorts are legitimate. 
Everything was included in the vacations. There was no 
fraudulent activity. The customers knew what packages they were 
purchasing. It's not a good business practice call customers 
saying that this is a promotion from Marriott, and then one of 
the agents might come back and say, ``No, this is not Marriott, 
this is another resort in Mexico,'' and this type of business 
is not going to work. This is going to be flooded by 
chargebacks by misrepresentation. So it's not going to work.
    They are--on the web pages, everything is clearly stated. 
They know what they're purchasing. They're getting discount 
vacations because they're going to have a 90-minute timeshare 
presentation. I mean, there is not a single complaint of 
customers saying that they did not receive what they paid for.
    The Chairman. The FCC alleges that you received payment for 
your work, and your response to the FCC's charges, which you 
submitted as an appendix to your testimony, you state that 
lead-generating activities do not generate per-call revenue. So 
how are you compensated?
    Mr. Abramovich. This is a misunderstanding. Some companies 
might offer a per-call service, which is very different. Those 
companies usually use what they call the avatar service where 
it's a voice recognition system, there is no robocalling 
involved. And they, in fact, indeed get paid maybe a dollar or 
two dollar per minute because they are somehow profiling the 
client before they get transferred to a call center.
    In my case, I cannot answer the question because it's 
specific to my activities.
    The Chairman. Do you know how many of those consumers 
actually received the vacations that were pitched to them?
    Mr. Abramovich. How many?
    The Chairman. Yes.
    Mr. Abramovich. Excuse me?
    The Chairman. How many of the consumers that got calls 
where they had vacations pitched to them, how many of them 
actually received or took those vacations?
    Mr. Abramovich. They all received the vacation. Let me 
explain how it works. Once they are explained to about the 
vacations and the hotels where they're going to stay, it's all-
inclusive, and the customer must submit a copy of their credit 
cards. He has a voucher signed by the client accepting the 
terms and conditions. If that document is not faxed back to the 
resort or the company, they will eventually refund the money to 
the client.
    They must have a signature from the client accepting all 
the terms and conditions for these packages. We cannot control 
all the agents. In some cases, if the client is not happy with 
the vacation or the services, they might call their credit card 
company and get their money back. I mean, they are protected. 
There is no fraud in this case.
    The Chairman. Mr. Abramovich, can you explain what 
neighborhood spoofing is?
    Mr. Abramovich. Yes. Neighborhood spoofing is when you are 
making a phone call and make it look like it's coming from your 
local area.
    The Chairman. Do you engage in that practice?
    Mr. Abramovich. Again, I'm not going to answer questions 
specific to my activities. Remember, I have a pending FCC 
investigation forfeiture amount for $100 million. I might be 
facing criminal fines.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Abramovich. I can give you some explanation, like I 
said, general questions that you might have.
    The Chairman. Just one final question. In your written 
testimony, you state that regulation may help with respect to 
hosted autodialer services and companies that provide long 
distance carrier service. Can you comment on whether you think 
that----
    Mr. Abramovich. Yes. I was watching a lot of hearings on 
the C-SPAN channel lately, and I think that they come with this 
idea that they do not originate on the technological side. But 
I think that the most important factor on these robocalls are 
the voice over IP carriers that are advertising the short 
duration call. When they advertise short duration call, that 
means they're going to accept all the calls you can throw at 
them. It doesn't matter what caller ID you use, they never ask.
    It's going to be profitable for the long distance. For 
example, if you call AT&T directly, they're not going to accept 
that type of traffic because that type of company does not deal 
with those type of calls. But if you call a small voice over IP 
carrier, they're going to somehow blend the dialer traffic with 
the conversational calls and make it look like everything is 
normal. So that way they are fueling the robocalls.
    And I think a good idea would be to focus on those five or 
six companies that are actually offering services. And they 
actually clearly state on the page, We accept short duration 
call for robocalling. Start your company today. Prepayment 
accepted. You can use any caller ID you want. And you can 
customize the software too, spoofing is very easy. You can do 
that within a day. It's very simple. So if those carriers allow 
all those calls to go through, the major networks won't see 
that the calls are coming from a robocaller.
    The Chairman. Yes.
    Senator Blumenthal.
    Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Abramovich, you say in your statement, quote, I have 
denied and continue to deny any intent to defraud, cause harm, 
or wrongfully obtain anything of value, end quote. That 
statement relates to the activities involved in the FCC action, 
does it not?
    Mr. Abramovich. Yes. I have submitted my response to the 
FCC as well as the Committee. And I have nothing additional----
    Senator Blumenthal. Do you understand, Mr. Abramovich, that 
that statement, in effect, is a response that waives a Fifth 
Amendment privilege as to questions pertaining to those 
activities?
    Mr. Abramovich. May I consult with my lawyer for a second?
    [Mr. Abramovich speaking with his counsel.]
    Mr. Abramovich. I'm not a lawyer, and I cannot answer that 
question.
    Senator Blumenthal. You cannot selectively invoke a Fifth 
Amendment privilege. You can't decide to answer some questions 
and then decide you don't want to answer other questions about 
the same activities involving the same legal culpability. Do 
you understand that fact?
    [Mr. Abramovich speaking with his counsel.]
    Mr. Abramovich. Same answer. I'm not an attorney and----
    Senator Blumenthal. Let me try a couple of specific 
questions then, Mr. Abramovich. The robocalls involved in your 
activities involved misleading or inaccurate information, 
caller ID information, designed to make the calls seem like 
they appeared from one location when in fact they came from 
another, correct?
    Mr. Abramovich. Well, most robocallers use that technology 
because there's not a legal way to make a solicited phone call.
    Senator Blumenthal. Doesn't that mislead the recipient of 
the call as to location?
    [Mr. Abramovich speaking with his counsel.]
    Mr. Abramovich. I cannot speak to that and I'm not going to 
answer that question.
    Senator Blumenthal. You're invoking the Fifth Amendment?
    Mr. Abramovich. I'm invoking the Fifth Amendment, yes. I 
can't answer that----
    Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Abramovich, the FCC has also 
alleged that these calls were harmful to carriers.
    Mr. Abramovich. To carriers?
    Senator Blumenthal. Because they burdened or overwhelmed 
networks, and they alienated customers of those carriers. Do 
you deny it?
    Mr. Abramovich. In general terms, I can talk about that. 
They are actually small carriers?
    Senator Blumenthal. No. I'm asking about your specific 
activities.
    Mr. Abramovich. But I cannot talk about my specific 
activity.
    Senator Blumenthal. But you've denied that there is any 
harm to anyone from your activities, correct?
    Mr. Abramovich. Um, I'm not denying there is no harm. What 
I'm saying is that--Senator, you're asking about the carriers, 
right? The carriers and the flood of the calls? I don't think 
there is any harm to the carriers. They are actually offering 
short duration calls. They know they are going to receive a 
massive amount of calls, and then they're going to profit from 
those calls.
    Senator Blumenthal. So you're not invoking the Fifth 
Amendment privilege as to that question.
    Mr. Abramovich. Because it's in general terms.
    Senator Blumenthal. No, I'm asking about your activities. 
Did they cause harm to carriers?
    Mr. Abramovich. I cannot answer to that question.
    Senator Blumenthal. And I'm asking about your activities. 
Isn't it a fact they caused harm to consumers?
    Mr. Abramovich. I plead the Fifth Amendment. I cannot 
answer to that question. Like I said earlier, I have a pending 
investigation with the FCC, and all I say will probably hurt 
me.
    Senator Blumenthal. Let me ask you, What are the companies 
that you used to undertake your robocalling operations?
    Mr. Abramovich. Again, I invoke my Fifth Amendment.
    Senator Blumenthal. Would you agree with me, Mr. 
Abramovich, that some of the consumers who were called and 
solicited for resort activities were unqualified?
    Mr. Abramovich. In the timeshare industry, they are usually 
looking for young people between the years of 30, 45 years old, 
people that can actually buy a timeshare. There is no 
obligation whatsoever.
    Senator Blumenthal. In your activities, isn't it a fact 
that some of the consumers who were called were unqualified for 
those solicitations by their economic and income measures?
    Mr. Abramovich. But I cannot talk about my activities, 
Senator. I'm sorry.
    Senator Blumenthal. Let me just finally ask you a question 
about the impact of people who receive robocalls. I have heard 
from many of my constituents, like many members of this panel, 
about the intrusive and invasive effect of these calls. One was 
Catherine Larson of Sandy Hook, Connecticut. She was getting an 
average of 7 to 10 robocalls a day, and she had to take them 
because her son was deployed abroad in the military. In fact, 
he was in a war zone. She had to change her number, her phone 
rang so often. The effect of these calls was pernicious and 
intrusive. Can you say these robocalls harm no one?
    Mr. Abramovich. Um----
    Senator Blumenthal. That's what you say in your testimony.
    Mr. Abramovich. Yes. From a general point of view, not from 
my case, from a general point of view, I think bad guys like 
Rachel or the IRS or the alarm companies, they are defrauding 
customers. I think it might be harmful for consumers. But I 
think there should be somehow a law where the good guys 
offering solicitation over the phone should be able to make 
some calls offering legitimate services or products where, for 
example, the government might have some control over them, say, 
``OK,'' for example, and just an idea, and I'm talking off the 
top of my head. Okay, you're going to have this car or this, 
this is what you're going to offer, this is the message that 
you're going to play, right? And the government or the FTC can 
have control at least of the good guys.
    I mean, because this is the thing, when there's a robocall, 
automatically they are criminals. They don't leave a message, 
they're criminals, it's a scam. There are scams, but not all 
are scams, some are legitimate people trying to sell something.
    Senator Blumenthal. Well, it strikes me, Mr. Abramovich, 
that without prejudging the result in your case, that a high 
percentage of the calls were not only intrusive, but 
potentially scams, and that's why the FCC has levied a fine 
that is virtually unprecedented in its history, and that's why 
you're here today. And although you say you are not the king 
pin, certainly you're not the only one, but you are the face of 
this problem today, and I am going to ask the Chairman to 
consider a contempt proceeding because of your selective 
invocation of the Fifth Amendment. And I thank you for being 
here today.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
    Senator Markey evidently has a couple questions that he 
would like to ask as well.

               STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD MARKEY, 
                U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS

    Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
    Mr. Abramovich, you represent nearly 100 million reasons 
why we need robust protections from the epidemic of robocalls 
and robotexts afflicting the Nation. You and the companies you 
control are alleged to have made almost 100 million spoofed 
robocalls where you configured the calls in such a manner that 
the caller ID suggested that the calls were local calls.
    Mr. Abramovich. Mm-hmm.
    Senator Markey. And that's what the Telephone Consumer 
Protection Act of 1991 is designed to stop. I am the author of 
that law, which you are charged with violating. And I support 
the actions which the Federal Communications Commission has 
taken to enforce my law. The efficiency and the magnitude of 
your robocall campaign is truly historic. And you were able to 
become the king pin of robocalls because these technologies are 
so readily available and easily usable.
    In your testimony, you stated that many of the calls you 
orchestrated were only for a short duration, but that misses 
the point, Mr. Abramovich. The interruption to consumers comes 
the moment the phone starts to ring, whether it's during dinner 
or it's at a time when you're on the go. That's what the 
problem is. It might only last a minute, but it's a minute that 
is completely disturbing to the receiver of the call. Do you 
agree with that, Mr. Abramovich?
    Mr. Abramovich. In a general context, I agree to that. I'm 
not talking about specifics on my case, but I have been 
receiving four or five robocalls a day from my local number 
lately, and more after the FCC headlines, I'm receiving more 
spoofed calls than ever, myself.
    Senator Markey. And you don't like it when you get those 
calls.
    Mr. Abramovich. I just decline the call. I never answer the 
phone.
    Senator Markey. But do you understand why it irritates 
people? Do you understand why they don't want these unwanted 
calls, Mr. Abramovich?
    Mr. Abramovich. Yes, I understand.
    Senator Markey. Well, that's what this is all about. That's 
what the intent of the law is meant to achieve, it's to protect 
people at home, to protect people in their own privacy from 
having unwanted calls come in. And your understanding of that 
is obviously key, and your business model was obviously meant 
to circumvent that sense of protection which people want.
    So how easy would it be, Mr. Abramovich, for me to go back 
to my office, download automated phone call technologies and 
begin calling thousands of consumers with spoofed numbers? How 
hard would that be?
    Mr. Abramovich. How easy?
    Senator Markey. Or how easy?
    Mr. Abramovich. Right now, I understand that you, Senator, 
asked how easy it was. You can find several options on the 
Internet. For example, you have software that is open source, 
it's totally customizable to your needs. All you do is Google, 
and try for example, ``voice over IP provider, short duration 
calls,'' and it will pop up probably five, six, seven, and most 
of them are U.S.-based.
    Senator Markey. How many people would I have to employ if I 
wanted to make, say, 10,000 robocalls a day?
    Mr. Abramovich. Uh, on the systems side?
    Senator Markey. Yes.
    Mr. Abramovich. I would say from the general knowledge that 
I have, I would say one.
    Senator Markey. One person.
    Mr. Abramovich. One, and probably some technical support.
    Senator Markey. And how would consumers stop these calls 
absent an enforcement action by the Federal Communications 
Commission?
    Mr. Abramovich. Uh----
    Senator Markey. Can they say, ``Stop''?
    Mr. Abramovich. No. I heard some on the hearings that they 
said that they tried to stop the voice over IP providers, and 
they said it was tough because I guess there are so many. But 
at the end of the day, the people who made those calls need the 
voice over IP, which is not AT&T, Verizon, they are the 
smallest ones. They're actually looking for that type of 
business because it's lucrative. They can make easily $1 or $2 
million a year just by charging the robocaller for those calls. 
People say it's a penny of the dollar. Yes, but in such 
amounts, generally speaking, it's a lot of money for the 
carriers, and they just look the other way because it's 
profitable for them.
    Senator Markey. So you can make a lot of money compromising 
the privacy of families all across America. And, you know, that 
was the intent of the law that I authored, and that's what the 
Federal Communications Commission is now enforcing. But here's 
what I would say, because I led a letter with 14 of my Senate 
colleagues today calling on Chairman Pai at the FCC to adopt 
key protections: one, a comprehensive definition of 
``autodialer,'' ensuring all callers must receive permission 
before robocalling or robotexting a consumer, and preserving 
consumers' right to revoke consent should they no longer wish 
to receive calls or texts. I think that the Federal 
Communications Commission needs to take that action as soon as 
possible to stop the use of these technologies that harass 
consumers. Would those actions help to limit, Mr. Abramovich--
--
    Mr. Abramovich. This is----
    Senator Markey.--the ability of companies to be able to 
harass individuals?
    Mr. Abramovich. There was a problem because a few years ago 
before they came back with the express consent, it's the common 
knowledge that the robocalls has been increasing over the years 
right?
    A few years ago, I remember that there were lead providers 
that would provide you with leads that people actually wanted 
to receive, they were associated with the business partners, 
and somehow some people could call them, and there was no need 
for other people to make millions and millions of calls. You 
could make thousands of calls with those leads without making 
millions. I think that it is increasing now because the express 
consent law was passed. They basically killed the lead list 
provider, they went out of business, there were no more leads. 
Now they go and start dialing randomly.
    Senator Markey. Right.
    Mr. Abramovich. This is true, most of the numbers are bad, 
they don't even connect, it's voice-mails, most of them go to 
voice-mails, and others are busy, others just simply don't 
answer the phone. There's no way that the legal telemarketing 
can offer any product anymore.
    Senator Markey. Exactly. That's the point. People don't 
want to have the phone start ringing at 7 at night and go all 
night long. They have a right to not be called. They shouldn't 
have to hang up time after time night after night. It is not a 
business model that's consistent with how American families 
want to have their lives lived in the evening. And so that's 
why we need these laws, and that's why we need the FCC to 
tighten up these definitions even more.
    I think you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. All right. Thank you, Senator Markey.
    Actually, we have a second panel to get to. We have votes 
at noon, so we have a hard stop there. I, frankly, personally, 
and I think other members of the panel would say, too, that 
we're disappointed in the failure to provide answers to a lot 
of what I think are good faith questions. But as I stated 
previously, it's my opinion that you may have waived your Fifth 
Amendment rights based on the information you provided in your 
opening statement. The Committee may seek to hold you in 
contempt of Congress for failing to respond, but because I do 
want to get to the----

                 STATEMENT OF HON. JON TESTER, 
                   U.S. SENATOR FROM MONTANA

    Senator Tester. Mr. Chairman, can I just----
    The Chairman. Yes.
    Senator Tester. Just give me 20 seconds. No question.
    The Chairman. All right.
    Senator Tester. First of all, Mr. Abramovich, if you didn't 
want to draw attention to yourself, you should have sent back 
the request that the Chairman made and answered the questions. 
Then you potentially would not have been here today and you 
would not have the cameras focused on you.
    Second of all, if you don't think 2 percent is a lot, 
that's twice the population that lives in Montana, 2 million 
people--that you hit.
    Third of all, if I want to buy something, I'll call you, 
don't call me.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. All right. Senator Klobuchar.

               STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR, 
                  U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA

    Senator Klobuchar. Yes. Also I want to join in with what 
Senator Tester just said, Mr. Abramovich. This whole business 
model is put up to make you money and then to violate the 
privacy of 229 million numbers which are now registered on the 
Do Not Call list, that's 229 million people. And what's been 
happening is that we've gotten increased complaints because 
people like you have found ways to get around it, and it's 
violating their privacy and it's oftentimes selling them stuff 
that they shouldn't be buying and that they're not initiating 
their own calls. And with the world changing, with texts and 
autotexts, and with the world changing with the scams, we are 
reintroducing and updating some of the legislation we have, and 
that's one thing that we can do.
    But I am pleased that the Chairman had this hearing and 
that Senator Nelson did as well because I think that we also 
have to hold people accountable who have been skirting the law 
and getting around the law and potentially violating the law at 
others' expense.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Abramovich, we're going dismiss you and ask our second 
panel to come forward at this time.
    Mr. Abramovich. Can I say just one last thing?
    The Chairman. Mm-hmm.
    Mr. Abramovich. I think there's a lot of publicity around 
my case. Like I said before, the FCC enforced action to other 
people in the past that made 15, 20 million calls a day, and 
they are not here. I think the publicity is harming my case in 
some way. They made me the face of the robocalls and I think 
it's not the case. I mean, there are people that made 20, 30 
million calls a day, and they just receive a fine from the FTC 
for $7 million, and they settled for $5-, $400,000. And they 
are punishing me with a forfeiture fine of $120 million.
    The Chairman. We'll have a chance to ask them about that on 
the next panel. We have the FTC and the FCC both here.
    Mr. Abramovich. I would like to hear. OK.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    [Panel 2 coming forward.]
    The Chairman. Welcome. We have Ms. Rosemary Harold, who is 
Chief of Enforcement Bureau at the FCC; Ms. Lois Greisman, who 
is the Associate Director, Marketing Practices Division, Bureau 
of Consumer Protection, at the FTC; Mr. Kevin Rupy, who is Vice 
President of Law and Policy at the USTelecom Association; Mr. 
Scott Delacourt, who is a Partner with Wiley Rein representing 
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce; and Ms. Margot Saunders, who is 
the Senior Counsel of the National Consumer Law Center.
    So thank you all for being here. And in the interest of 
time, if you could move fairly quickly through your oral 
remarks and confine those, if possible, to 5 minutes, and then 
we'll make sure that your entire statements get included as a 
part of the written record.
    So we'll start on my left, and your right.
    Ms. Harold, thank you and welcome.

   STATEMENT OF ROSEMARY HAROLD, CHIEF, ENFORCEMENT BUREAU, 
               FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

    Ms. Harold. Good morning, Chairman Thune and other members 
of the panel. I am happy to speak with you and answer questions 
about our enforcement activities at the FCC regarding illegal 
robocalls and spoofed calls.
    As many people have already said, unwanted unlawful calls 
are not merely a serious irritation, they also can trick people 
out of significant amounts of money and often target vulnerable 
populations. Unwanted robocalls are our FCC's number one source 
of complaints.
    The recent omnibus legislation will assist our enforcement 
efforts. It allows us to act against spoofed calls that 
originate outside of the United States as well as against 
spoofed text messages. Thank you, Chairman Thune and other 
members of the Committee, for your leadership in the area.
    The FCC uses several statutory provisions to take action 
against unlawful calls. The Consumer Protection Act of 1991, or 
TCPA, and accompanying FCC rules generally prohibit autodialed 
calls or prerecorded or artificial voice messages to emergency 
telephone lines, hospitals, and cell phones. The law also 
generally prohibits unsolicited, prerecorded advertising 
messages to residential telephones.
    The Truth in Caller ID Act prohibits callers from 
falsifying or spoofing caller ID information with the intent to 
defraud, cause harm, or wrongfully obtain anything of value. 
Consumers depend on caller ID information to help them decide 
whether to answer a phone call and whether to trust the caller 
on the other end of the line. Most large-scale unlawful 
robocall schemes today also employ spoofing.
    We, at the FCC, have extensive ongoing enforcement efforts 
underway. Last year, we issued two notices of apparent 
liability and citations against two robocallers. In addition to 
Mr. Abramovich, Mr. Philip Roesel was a target of a different 
case. The evidence there showed that these individuals, along 
with their affiliated companies, made a total of more than 117 
million apparently illegal spoofed calls. Because those cases 
remain ongoing, I cannot discuss the status of the case or much 
about them.
    The FCC does work with the FTC on investigations and other 
actions. The agencies cooperate and share information pursuant 
to an MOU, a memorandum of understanding, and our roles are 
largely complementary, not duplicative. For example, the FCC 
has exclusive jurisdiction to enforce the anti-spoofing law.
    The two agencies also co-host events to raise awareness. On 
April 23rd, we are co-hosting an industry expo where private 
companies will showcase innovative products that consumers can 
use to combat illegal robocalls themselves. In addition, the 
FCC has established relationships with industry to help us with 
our enforcement.
    Telephone carriers have access to information and technical 
expertise that helps us to pinpoint the source of unlawful 
calls. Some of our most important efforts are ones you may 
never hear about. Together with the industry, we have been 
unable to shut down some unlawful robocall schemes early on.
    Major telephone carriers and industry associations have 
banded together to share critical information about fraudulent 
activity. We also appreciate the significant effort of consumer 
protection groups to educate consumers.
    With respect to rulemakings, the FCC, under Chairman Pai, 
is looking at ways to stop illegal robocalls before they even 
reach consumers. Last November, the FCC decided that voice 
service providers may block calls where spoofed caller IDs are 
invalid or unassigned or numbers that we know don't originate 
calls, such as in the recent IRS scams. Such calls are almost 
certainly illegal. In addition, the FCC right now is asking 
about other ways to identify and block illegal calls without 
also blocking legal ones.
    The FCC is working closely with industry also to adopt the 
adoption of call authentication, a technological means by which 
telephone calls can be securely ``signed'' by their senders to 
ensure that caller ID isn't being spoofed.
    The FCC has brought together experts and stakeholders in 
various ways to discuss the issues and try to solve at least 
parts of the problem, including the Robocall Strike Force, an 
ongoing inquiry proceeding, and most recently through a North 
American Numbering Council working group.
    Moreover, we've moved to help responsible lawful callers 
avoid calling numbers that have been reassigned to a new 
consumer.
    Last month, the FCC proposed a reassigned numbers data base 
that legit callers should check to avoid calling the wrong 
consumer.
    Finally, as you know, the D.C. Circuit recently issued a 
decision regarding the Commission's 2015 TCPA Omnibus Order. 
The Commission is actively reviewing that decision and 
determining what responsive actions would be appropriate. We 
are confident, however, that the court decision does not affect 
the enforcement actions that are ongoing against Mr. Abramovich 
or Philip Roesel because those actions were based on legal 
authority that the court did not address.
    Thank you for your time. And I'm happy to take any 
questions you may have for me.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Harold follows:]

   Prepared Statement of Rosemary Harold, Chief, Enforcement Bureau, 
                   Federal Communications Commission
    Good morning Chairman Thune, Ranking Member Nelson, and Members of 
the Committee. My name is Rosemary Harold, and I am Chief of the 
Enforcement Bureau of the Federal Communications Commission. I am happy 
to speak with you and answer questions about the Commission's 
enforcement actions and authority to combat illegal robocalls and 
spoofed calls.
    Unwanted, unlawful calls are not merely a serious aggravation; many 
robocall and spoofing schemes are designed to trick people out of 
significant amounts of money. These schemes often are most effective in 
harming vulnerable populations, such as senior citizens. Unwanted 
robocalls are the Commission's number one source of consumer 
complaints. The recent Omnibus legislation will provide significant 
assistance in our enforcement efforts. It allows us to take action 
against spoofed calls that originate outside the United States, and 
against spoofed text messages. Chairman Thune and Ranking Member 
Nelson, we are especially grateful for your leadership in this area.
    FCC Regulatory Authority. The FCC uses several statutory provisions 
to take action against unlawful calls. The Telephone Consumer 
Protection Act of 1991, or TCPA, and accompanying Commission rules 
generally prohibit autodialed calls or prerecorded or artificial voice 
messages to emergency telephone lines, hospitals, and cell phones. The 
law also prohibits unsolicited, prerecorded advertising messages to 
residential telephone lines, except under limited circumstances. The 
Commission's Do-Not-Call rules require telemarketers to honor 
consumers' desires not to receive telemarketing calls.
    The Truth in Caller ID Act prohibits callers from falsifying or 
``spoofing'' caller ID information with the intent to defraud, cause 
harm, or wrongfully obtain anything of value. Consumers depend on 
caller ID information to help them decide whether to answer a phone 
call and whether to trust the caller on the other end of the line. 
Unlawful spoofing can deceive recipients about the true identity of the 
caller and impede the ability of carriers and law enforcement to 
pinpoint the source of abusive calls. Most large-scale unlawful 
robocall schemes employ caller ID spoofing. In particular, many schemes 
utilize neighbor spoofing where the spoofed caller ID matches the area 
code and first three numbers of the phone number being called.
    FCC's Enforcement Work. The Commission has extensive ongoing 
enforcement efforts, although much of the work is conducted behind the 
scenes, long before a formal, public action. Last year, for example, 
the Commission issued notices of apparent liability (NALs) and 
citations against two massive robocallers and spoofers, Adrian 
Abramovich and Philip Roesel. The evidence in those investigations 
showed that these two individuals, along with their affiliated 
companies, made more than 96 million and 21 million apparently illegal, 
spoofed robocalls, respectively. And the Commission has proposed 
forfeitures of $120 million and $82.1 million, respectively, in these 
cases. Because the details of these ongoing investigations are not 
public, I cannot provide further information about these cases at this 
time.
    FCC/FTC Coordination: The FCC works with the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) throughout ongoing investigations and other actions. 
The agencies cooperate, share information, and render assistance 
pursuant to a Memorandum of Understanding. The FCC and FTC roles are 
largely complementary, and not duplicative. For example, the FCC has 
exclusive jurisdiction to enforce the Truth In Caller ID Act's 
provisions against spoofing. On March 23, we co-hosted with the FTC a 
Joint Policy Forum to learn what is being done to help consumers and 
the challenges that remain. On April 23, we are co-hosting with the FTC 
the ``Stop Illegal Robocalls Expo,'' where 17 tech companies will 
showcase their innovative technologies, devices, and applications for 
consumers to combat illegal robocalls. In addition to FTC coordination, 
the Enforcement Bureau regularly coordinates with the CFPB, Department 
of the Treasury, Department of Justice, and Department of Homeland 
Security.
    Industry Cooperation: We have also established relationships with 
industry to assist in enforcement. Telephone carriers have access to 
information and technical expertise that can help with early detection 
of potentially unlawful calls and pinpoint the source of the calls. 
Frankly, some of our most successful efforts are the ones you may never 
hear about: when we work with industry to identify and shut down 
unlawful robocall schemes early on. Major telephone carriers and their 
industry associations have banded together to share critical 
information about fraudulent call activity. We also appreciate the 
critical effort of consumer protection groups to inform and educate 
consumers.
    Rulemakings. Stopping illegal robocalls before they even reach 
consumers can put a big dent in the problem, and under Chairman Pai's 
leadership, the Commission is looking at different ways to make that 
happen.
    Last November, the Commission decided that voice service providers 
may block calls where spoofed Caller ID displays invalid or unassigned 
numbers, or numbers that we know don't originate calls, as in the 
recent IRS scam. Such calls are almost certainly illegal and can be 
blocked.
    The Commission is also asking about other ways to identify and 
block illegal calls, without blocking lawful calls. For example, can 
call analytics reliably identify calling patterns that result from 
illegal calls--such as large bursts of calls over a short time from 
numbers that don't usually make calls that way?
    The Commission is also working closely with industry to speed the 
adoption of call authentication--a means by which telephone calls can 
be securely ``signed'' by their senders, so that we know that the 
Caller ID isn't being spsoofed. The Commission has worked to bring the 
relevant experts and stakeholders together, through the Robocall Strike 
Force; a Notice of Inquiry; and most recently through a North American 
Numbering Council working group.
    We've also moved to help responsible, lawful callers avoid calling 
phone numbers that have been reassigned to a new consumer. Just last 
month, the Commission proposed a reassigned numbers database that 
callers could check to avoid calling the wrong consumer.
    ACA International Decision. The DC Circuit recently issued a 
decision regarding the Commission's 2015 TCPA Omnibus Order. The 
Commission is reviewing that decision and determining what responsive 
actions might be appropriate. We are confident, however, that the court 
decision does not affect the enforcement actions against Adrian 
Abramovich or Philip Roesel or other investigations we are pursuing 
because those actions were based on legal authority outside the scope 
of the recent D.C. Circuit decision.
    Thank you again for the opportunity to speak with you this morning. 
I welcome any questions you may have.

    The Chairman. Thank you, Ms. Harold.
    Ms. Greisman.

        STATEMENT OF LOIS GREISMAN, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR,

 MARKETING PRACTICES DIVISION, BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, 
                    FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

    Ms. Greisman. Good morning, Chairman Thune, Ranking Member 
Blumenthal, and members of the Committee. I'm honored to have 
the opportunity this morning to discuss the FTC's work to fight 
illegal robocalls. As each of you has made clear, there is no 
shortage of adjectives to describe the detested robocalls that 
batter our phones and mobile devices. At best, these calls 
cause intense annoyance; at worse, fraudulent calls cause 
wrenching economic harm.
    In 2017, the FTC received more than 7 million complaints 
about unwanted calls. Consistently, more than 60 percent of 
those complaints are about robocalls. In just the first 3 
months of 2018, we've received 1.4 million complaints, with 
robocalls driving the numbers. Some 900,000 of the 1.4 million 
complaints are about robocalls. The complaint numbers are 
compelling and demand action. That's precisely what the FTC has 
been doing, deploying a three-pronged approach to tackle 
illegal robocalls; namely, law enforcement, the promotion of 
technological solutions, and, of course, robust consumer and 
business education.
    First, law enforcement. I submit to you that the Commission 
has been relentless in its attacks against unwanted calls. 
Since 2014, when we started enforcing Do Not Call provisions, 
no less than 135 enforcement actions against 439 companies and 
356 individuals have been filed. 125 of those cases have been 
resolved, and the Commission has collected $121 million in 
monetary relief in civil penalties, and that amount does not 
include the historic $280 million civil penalty judgment 
against Dish.
    The recent cases alone have stopped literally billions of 
illegal robocalls, many of which use spoofed caller ID. We have 
targeted many pernicious king pins in the robocall ecosystem, 
many of whom are interconnected and providing dialing platform, 
lead generators, telemarketers, and sellers. Many of the people 
recently sued by the FTC have known and worked with one another 
for years. One was so bold as to use his own voice for the 
robocall recording. Another ensured that his dialer was 
programmed so as not to call anyone at the FTC.
    These connections are highlighted in a recently filed case 
against Alliance and its founder, Joe Gotra, who are alleged to 
have bombarded consumers with illegal calls for home alarm 
systems. These calls so outraged consumers that some of them 
went so far as to schedule an appointment for installation so 
that they could tell the person to their face to stop calling 
them.
    We will continue to coordinate our work with State 
enforcers, with Federal law enforcement, the FCC, the IRS, 
Postal Inspection Service, and Department of Justice.
    Still, we know sustained law enforcement alone will not 
solve the problem. The second prong focuses on technological 
solutions. Toward that end, the FTC has hosted four robocall 
contests. In fact, two of the winners brought call-blocking 
products to the market, Nomorobo and RoboKiller. Moreover, the 
FTC has supported industry initiatives, such as the industry-
led Robocall Strike Force, and has provided comment on the 
FCC's rulemaking efforts to expand voice service providers 
authorization to block unwanted calls. The recent joint FTC-FCC 
forum highlighted much of this work.
    No silver bullet is in sight, but real progress is being 
made. Indeed, when the FTC announced its first robocall 
challenge in 2012, few, if any, call-blocking tools were in the 
marketplace. Today, hundreds are available. The upcoming April 
23 expo that Ms. Harold mentioned that we're jointly hosting 
will highlight these tools to the public.
    The FTC has also implemented a strategy to facilitate 
technological solutions. Each business day, the agency releases 
about 22,000 phone numbers that consumers complain about. This 
data is used to improve the functionality of call-blocking 
solutions.
    The third prong of the FTC's work is consumer and business 
education. Often with assistance from your offices, the FTC 
continues to push out a large quality of--a large quantity of 
high quality educational messages to consumers and businesses. 
In connection with the recent forum, we released information on 
call-blocking tools, infographics on what's available for 
landlines and mobile devices, and how to choose the right one. 
We also work closely with sellers and telemarketers so they 
have clarity about what is legal and what is illegal.
    In short, I'm very proud of the work the FTC has done to 
curb illegal robocalls, halting billions and spurring 
innovation. But I am keenly aware that we must steadfastly 
tackle this vexing consumer protection problem, and I commit to 
you that we will do just that.
    Thank you very much.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Greisman follows:]

 Prepared Statement of Lois Greisman, Associate Director, Division of 
   Marketing Practices, Bureau of Consumer Protection, Federal Trade 
                               Commission
    Chairman Thune, Ranking Member Nelson, and members of the 
Committee, I am Lois Greisman, Associate Director of the Division of 
Marketing Practices, Bureau of Consumer Protection at the Federal Trade 
Commission (``Commission'' or ``FTC'').\1\ I appreciate the opportunity 
to appear before you today to discuss the Commission's initiatives to 
fight illegal robocalls.
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    \1\ The views expressed in this statement represent the views of 
the Commission. My oral presentation and responses to questions are my 
own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or any 
individual Commissioner.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In 2003, the FTC responded to enormous public frustration with 
unsolicited sales calls and amended the Telemarketing Sales Rule 
(``TSR'') to create a national Do Not Call Registry.\2\ The Registry, 
which includes more than 229 million active telephone numbers,\3\ has 
been tremendously successful in protecting consumers' privacy from 
unwanted calls by the thousands of legitimate telemarketers who 
subscribe to the Registry each year.\4\ Subsequently, changes in 
technology led to a new source of immense frustration--the blasting of 
prerecorded messages that primarily rely on Voice over Internet 
Protocol (``VoIP'') technology.\5\ In 2008, the Commission responded by 
amending the TSR to prohibit the vast majority of prerecorded sales 
calls.\6\
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    \2\ 68 Fed. Reg. 4580 (Jan. 29, 2003); 16 C.F.R. Part 310. The FTC 
issued the TSR pursuant to the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and 
Abuse Prevention Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 6101-6108. See generally The 
Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. Part 310.
    \3\ See Do Not Call Registry Data Book 2017: Who is using the Do 
Not Call Registry available at https://www.ftc.gov/policy/reports/
policy-reports/commission-staff-reports/national-do-not-call-registry-
data-book-fy-3.
    \4\ For example, in Fiscal Year 2017, more than 17,000 
telemarketers accessed the Do Not Call Registry. See id.
    \5\ See Section II(A), infra.
    \6\ 73 Fed. Reg. 51164 (Aug. 29, 2008); 16 C.F.R. 
Sec. 310.4(b)(1)(v).
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    Illegal robocalls remain a significant consumer protection problem 
because they repeatedly disturb consumers' privacy and frequently use 
fraud and deception to pitch goods and services, leading to significant 
economic harm. Illegal robocalls are also frequently used by criminal 
impostors posing as trusted officials or companies. Consumers are 
justifiably frustrated--in Fiscal Year 2017 the FTC received more than 
4.5 million robocall complaints.\7\ The FTC is using every tool at its 
disposal to fight these illegal calls.\8\ This testimony describes the 
Commission's efforts to stop telemarketer violations, including our 
aggressive law enforcement, initiatives to spur technological 
solutions, and robust consumer and business outreach.
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    \7\ The FTC's Fiscal Year 2017 began October 1, 2016 and ended 
September 30, 2017. Total unwanted-call complaints for FY 2017 
including both robocall complaints and complaints about live calls from 
consumers whose phone numbers are registered on the Do Not Call 
Registry, exceed 7million. Note, however, that the FTC identified a 
technical problem with complaint submissions that resulted in 
artificially high complaint counts in July and August. See Do Not Call 
Registry Data Book 2017: Complaint Figures for FY 2017 available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/policy/reports/policy-reports/commission-staff-
reports/national-do-not-call-registry-data-book-fy-1.
    \8\ See FTC Robocall Initiatives,https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/
features/feature-0025-robocalls.
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                           I. Law Enforcement
    Since establishing the Do Not Call Registry in 2003,\9\ the 
Commission has fought vigorously to protect consumers' privacy from 
unwanted calls. Indeed, since the Commission began enforcing the Do Not 
Call provisions of the TSR in 2004, the Commission has brought 135 
enforcement actions seeking civil penalties,\10\ restitution for 
victims of telemarketing scams, and disgorgement of ill-gotten gains 
against 439 corporations and 356 individuals. From the 125 cases that 
have been resolved thus far, the Commission has collected over $121 
million in equitable monetary relief and civil penalties.
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    \9\ In 2003, two different district courts issued rulings enjoining 
the Do Not Call Registry. See Press Release, FTC Files Motion to Stay 
Pending Appeal in Oklahoma DNC Ruling (Mar. 24, 2003), available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2003/09/ftc-files-
motion-stay-pending-appeal-oklahoma-dnc-ruling; Press Release, 
Statement of FTC Chairman Timothy J. Muris (Sept. 26, 2003), available 
at https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2003/09/statement-
ftc-chairman-timothy-j-muris. Congress addressed the first decision in 
summary fashion by enacting HR 3161 in one day. See ``HR 3161 (108th) 
Do-Not-Call-Registry bill,'' http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/108/
hr3161; Press Release, Statement of FTC Chairman Timothy J. Muris 
(Sept. 25, 2003), available at https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2003/09/statement-ftc-chairman-timothy-j-muris-0. The 10th 
Circuit reversed the second district court decision on February 17, 
2004. See Press Release, Appeals Court Upholds Constitutionality of 
National Do Not Call Registry (Feb. 17, 2004), available at https://
www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2004/02/appeals-court-upholds-
constitutionality-national-do-not-call.
    \10\ As is true of all TSR violations, telemarketers who violate 
the Do Not Call provisions are subject to civil penalties of up to 
$40,000 per violation. 15 U.S.C. Sec. 45(m)(1)(A); 16 C.F.R. 
Sec. 1.98(d).
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A. Robocall Law Enforcement
    On September 1, 2009, TSR provisions went into effect prohibiting 
the vast majority of robocalls selling a good or service.\11\ The 
robocall provisions cover prerecorded calls to all consumers, including 
those who have not registered their phone number on the Do Not Call 
Registry. The Commission has been aggressive in enforcing prohibitions 
against robocalls, filing 45 cases against 163 companies and 121 
individuals responsible for billions of illegal robocalls.\12\ From the 
42 cases that have concluded thus far, the Commission has collected 
more than $29 million in civil penalties, redress, or disgorgement. Set 
forth below are details regarding several of our recent robocall 
enforcement actions.
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    \11\ Like the other provisions of the TSR, the robocall provisions 
do not apply to non-sales calls, such as calls placed calls that are 
purely political, informational, or survey calls. Also, the provisions 
allow robocalls to members or prior donors of charities. See generally 
``Complying with the Telemarketing Sales Rule'' (June 2016), available 
at https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/complying-
telemarketing-sales-rule. Limited exceptions exist for calls that 
deliver a healthcare message made by an entity covered by the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 16 C.F.R. 
Sec. 310.4(b)(1)(v)(D), and for certain calls placed by telemarketers 
who solicit charitable contributions, 16 C.F.R. Sec. 310.4(b)(1)(v)(B).
    \12\ The FTC filed 12 of the 45 cases before the rule change went 
into effect on September 1, 2009.
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1. Recent Enforcement Activities
i. Alliance Security

    Just a few weeks ago, the FTC filed a complaint and motion for 
preliminary injunction in Federal district court alleging that Alliance 
Security Inc. (``Alliance'') and its founder, Jasjit ``Jay'' Gotra, 
directly and through its authorized telemarketers, called more than a 
million consumers whose numbers are on the Do Not Call Registry.\13\ 
Alliance installs home security systems, and makes outbound calls to 
solicit the sale of the systems and associated security monitoring 
services.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ Alliance and Gotra are recidivist violators of the 
Telemarketing Sales Rule that were under a 2014 FTC order for prior 
illegal calling practices. See U.S. v. Versatile Marketing Solutions, 
Inc., 1:14-cv-10612-PBS (D. Mass. Mar. 10, 2014) available at https://
www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/122-3162/versatile-marketing-
solutions-inc-also-dba-vms-alarms-et-al. Based on this pattern of 
behavior, the FTC's most recent enforcement action seeks a preliminary 
and permanent injunction that bans Alliance and Gotra from 
telemarketing. FTC v. Jasjit Gotra, 1:18-cv-10548 (D. Mass. Mar. 23, 
2018) available at https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/
x140022/jasjit-gotra-alliance-security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The FTC's complaint alleges that since 2014, Alliance and Gotra 
made or helped others make at least two million calls to consumers that 
violate the TSR, including more than a million calls to numbers on the 
DNC Registry.\14\ Many of these calls began as illegal robocalls using 
``spoofed'' Caller ID numbers and information.\15\ Defendants then 
transferred the calls to a live agent, but continued to hide the 
identity of the caller--even taking pains to prohibit agents from 
naming Alliance.\16\ In some cases, Alliance's agents deceptively held 
themselves out as a competitor, such as ADT, when calling 
consumers.\17\ Some consumers were so frustrated by the barrage of 
unwanted calls from Alliance that they scheduled an alarm installation 
just to plead in person for an end to the calls.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ FTC v. Jasjit Gotra, 1:18-cv-10548 (D. Mass. Mar. 23, 2018) 
available at https://www
.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/x140022/jasjit-gotra-alliance-
security.
    \15\ Id.
    \16\ Id.
    \17\ Id.
    \18\ Id.
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    The FTC's complaint alleges that Alliance's disregard for 
consumers' privacy went beyond the telephone and reached into their 
personal data.\19\ Alliance also performed undisclosed, unauthorized 
credit checks on consumers who received unsolicited telemarketing calls 
from Alliance or its telemarketers, in violation of the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act (``FCRA''), 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1681 et seq.\20\ Alliance 
typically ran a credit check on every consumer who ``pressed 1'' in 
response to a call placed by Alliance or one of its telemarketers and 
expressed interest in obtaining an alarm system--without informing the 
consumer.\21\
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    \19\ Id.
    \20\ To protect consumers' privacy and safeguard their financial 
information, the FCRA prohibits unauthorized access to credit reports 
and credit scores. Under the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1681b(f), it is 
unlawful for any ``person to use or obtain a consumer report for any 
purpose unless,'' that person has a specific permissible purpose 
enumerated in 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1681b(a).
    \21\ FTC v. Jasjit Gotra, 1:18-cv-10548 (D. Mass. Mar. 23, 2018) 
available at https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/x140022/
jasjit-gotra-alliance-security. Indeed, the complaint further alleges 
that defendants attempted to pull credit reports or scores on President 
Trump and former President Obama, and Vice President Pence and former 
Vice President Biden, among others.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Two of Alliance's authorized telemarketers and their principals 
agreed to settle charges that they made illegal calls on Alliance's 
behalf.\22\ One telemarketer and its principal will be permanently 
barred from telemarketing and is subject to a civil penalty of 
$2,296,500, that is suspended based on inability to pay.\23\ The second 
telemarketer and its principal will be permanently banned from selling 
home security and medical alert devices, making robocalls or helping 
anyone else make them, using spoofed caller ID numbers, and calling 
phone numbers on the Do Not Call Registry, unless a consumer directly 
contacts the principal to request a call.\24\ The second telemarketer 
is also subject to a civil penalty of $3,293,512, which will be 
partially suspended due to their inability to pay, upon payment of 
$300,000 to the Commission.\25\ The FTC is seeking strong injunctive 
relief and civil penalties against the remaining defendants, Alliance 
and Gotra, in Federal district court.\26\
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    \22\ Id.
    \23\ Id.
    \24\ Id.
    \25\ Id.
    \26\ Id.
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ii. Higher Goals Marketing

    In December 2017, the FTC filed an action in Federal district court 
against Higher Goals Marketing LLC to halt an alleged debt-relief scam 
that defrauded numerous consumers struggling with credit card debt.\27\ 
The complaint alleges that the Higher Goals Marketing defendants used 
illegal robocalls to contact consumers, pitching their fake debt-relief 
services and charging hefty up-front fees, causing millions of dollars 
in injury.\28\ Defendants guaranteed that consumers would substantially 
and permanently lower their credit card interest rates, and would save 
thousands of dollars in interest payments.\29\ In reality, the 
complaint alleges, the scheme was unable to deliver the promised 
results to most consumers.\30\ Since the FTC filed this action, all 
defendants stipulated to a Preliminary Injunction, which the Court 
entered on December 28, 2017.\31\ Thanks to the filing of the FTC's 
enforcement action, the defendants' operation is shut down, and the 
Court has appointed a receiver to oversee the two corporate 
defendants.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \27\ See FTC v. Higher Goals Marketing LLC, 6:17-cv-02048-GAP-KRS 
(M.D. Fla. Dec. 4, 2017) available at https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/
cases-proceedings/172-3045/higher-goals-marketing-llc.
    \28\ Id.
    \29\ Id.
    \30\ Id. The Commission also alleges that several defendants 
previously worked for a nearly identical telemarketing operation shut 
down in 2016 by court order at the request of the FTC. These defendants 
set up a new operation selling similar bogus credit-card interest-rate-
reduction services within weeks of the court order shuttering the 
earlier operation. Id.
    \31\ Id.
    \32\ See id.
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iii. Jones and Ramsey Cases

    Also in 2017, the Commission filed two lawsuits, FTC v. Justin 
Ramsey and FTC v. Aaron Michael Jones, that shut down operations 
responsible for billions of illegal robocalls. The Ramsey and Jones 
defendants bombarded consumers with robocalls pitching home security 
systems and extended auto warranties.\33\ The FTC obtained a settlement 
order in the Ramsey action that bans Ramsey and his company from 
placing robocalls to individuals to sell goods or services, initiating 
sales calls to numbers listed on the DNC Registry, and selling data 
lists containing phone numbers listed on the Registry.\34\ Ramsey and 
his company also agreed to a $2.2 million civil penalty, suspended upon 
payment of $65,000.\35\ In the Jones action, the court entered final 
orders permanently banning Jones and his companies from all 
telemarketing activities, including initiating robocalls, calling 
numbers on the DNC Registry, and selling data lists containing 
consumers' phone numbers and other information.\36\ The default 
judgment order against Jones also imposes a $2.7 million civil penalty 
against him, payable to the Commission.\37\
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    \33\ FTC v. Justin Ramsey, 9:17-cv-80032-KAM (S.D. Fla. Jan. 13, 
2017), available at https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/
132-3254/justin-ramsey; FTC v. Michael Aaron Jones, 8:17-cv-00058 (M.D. 
Fla. Jan. 13, 2017), available at https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/
cases-proceedings/152-3152/allorey-inc. Evidence reviewed by FTC staff 
in connection with the Ramsey case indicated that a portion of the 
unlawful telemarketing calls targeted ``distressed seniors.''
    \34\ FTC v. Justin Ramsey, 9:17-cv-80032-KAM (S.D. Fla. Apr. 11, 
2017), available at https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/
132-3254/justin-ramsey.
    \35\ Id.
    \36\ FTC v. Michael Aaron Jones, 8:17-cv-00058 (M.D. Fla. May 31, 
2017), available at https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/
152-3152/allorey-inc.
    \37\ Id.
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    Over the past three years the FTC, often in conjunction with its 
law enforcement partners, initiated eleven new actions targeting 
defendants we alleged are responsible for billions of illegal robocalls 
hawking home security systems, free vacations, medical alert devices, 
energy savings, and credit card interest rate reductions.\38\ Many of 
the defendants in these cases are now banned from robocalling or 
telemarketing.\39\
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    \38\ FTC v. Jasjit Gotra, 1:18-cv-10548 (D. Mass. Mar. 23, 2018) 
available at https://www
.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/x140022/jasjit-gotra-alliance-
security; FTC v. Higher Goals Marketing LLC, 6:17-cv-02048-GAP-KRS 
(M.D. Fla. Dec. 4, 2017) available at https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/
cases-proceedings/172-3045/higher-goals-marketing-llc; FTC v. Justin 
Ramsey, 9:17-cv-80032-KAM (S.D. Fla. Jan. 13, 2017), available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/132-3254/justin-
ramsey; FTC v. Michael Aaron Jones, 8:17-cv-00058 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 13, 
2017), available at https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/
152-3152/allorey-inc; U.S. v. Consumer Education.info, Inc., 1:16-cv-
02692 (D. Col. Nov. 1, 2016), available at https://www.ftc.gov/
enforcement/cases-proceedings/152-3081/consumer-education
info-inc; FTC et al., v. Life Management Services of Orange County, 
LLC, 6:16-CV-982-Orl (M.D. Fla. June 8, 2016), available at https://
www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/152-3216/life-management; 
U.S. v. Lilly Management and Marketing, LLC, 6:16-cv-485-Orl (M.D. Fla. 
Mar. 17, 2016), available at https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-
proceedings/152-3115/usa-vacation-station; U.S. v. KFJ Marketing Inc., 
2:16-cv-01643 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2016), available at https://
www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/152-3166/kfj-marketing-llc; 
FTC v. Lifewatch Inc., 1:15-cv-05781 (N.D. Ill. June 20, 2015), 
available at https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/142-
3123/lifewatch-inc; FTC v. All Us Marketing LLC, 6:15CV1016-0RL-28GJK 
(M.D. Fla. June 29, 2015), available at https://www.ftc.gov/
enforcement/cases-proceedings/142-3256/all-us-marketing-llc-formerly-
known-payless-solutions-llc; FTC et al., v. Caribbean Cruise Line, 
Inc., 0:15-cv-60423 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 4, 2015), available at https://
www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/122-3196-x150028/caribbean-
cruise-line-inc.
    \39\ See, e.g., U.S. v. KFJ Marketing Inc., 2:16-cv-01643 (C.D. 
Cal. Nov. 7, 2017), available at https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-
proceedings/152-3166/kfj-marketing-llc (final order permanently banning 
corporate defendants and individual ringleader from all telemarketing); 
FTC v. Michael Aaron Jones, 8:17-cv-00058 (M.D. Fla. May 31, 2017), 
available at https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/152-
3152/allorey-inc (final orders permanently banning Jones and related 
companies from all telemarketing activities, including initiating 
robocalls, calling numbers on the Do Not Call Registry, and selling 
data lists containing consumers' phone numbers and other information); 
FTC v. All Us Marketing LLC, 6:15CV1016-0RL-28GJK (M.D. Fla. May 22, 
2017, June 8, 2016 and Nov. 1, 2016), available at https://www.ftc.gov/
enforcement/cases-proceedings/142-3256/all-us-marketing-llc-formerly-
known-payless-solutions-llc (multiple final orders permanently banning 
most defendants from robocalling, telemarketing, and providing debt 
relief services); FTC v. Justin Ramsey, 9:17-cv-80032-KAM (S.D. Fla. 
Apr. 11, 2017), available at https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-
proceedings/132-3254/justin-ramsey (stipulated order banning Ramsey and 
his company from placing robocalls to individuals to sell goods or 
services, initiating sales calls to numbers listed on the Do Not Call 
Registry, and selling data lists containing phone numbers listed on the 
Registry); FTC v. Caribbean Cruise Line, Inc., 0:15-cv-60423 (S.D. Fla. 
Feb. 17, 2017), available at https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-
proceedings/122-3196-x150028/caribbean-cruise-line-inc (final 
stipulated order banning the Pacific Telecom defendants from 
robocalling and illegal telemarketing, as well as helping anyone else 
make such calls).
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iv. Historic Victory in Dish Network

    In addition to initiating new enforcement actions, the FTC and our 
law enforcement partners also achieved an historic win in a long-
running fight against unwanted calls and robocalls. On June 5, 2017, a 
Federal district court in Illinois issued an order imposing the largest 
penalty ever issued in a Do Not Call case: $280 million against Dish 
Network.\40\ The Dish litigation began in 2009 when the Department of 
Justice brought an action on behalf of the FTC with the states of 
California, Illinois, North Carolina, and Ohio alleging millions of 
violations of the Telemarketing Sales Rule, the Telephone Consumer 
Protection Act (``TCPA'') and various state Do Not Call laws.\41\ The 
litigation centered on allegations that Dish and its telemarketers made 
tens of millions of calls--often robocalls \42\--to telephone numbers 
on the Do Not Call Registry and called consumers who previously asked 
Dish and its telemarketers to stop calling.\43\ In January 2015, the 
Court found that Dish and its telemarketers had engaged in more than 66 
million violations of the TSR and that Dish was responsible for calls 
made by its retailers.\44\ The $280 million penalty against Dish 
includes $168 million to the United States for violations of the TSR 
and $112 million to the states for violations of the TCPA and various 
state laws. The order also imposed strong injunctive relief that, among 
other provisions, requires Dish to hire a monitor to ensure that Dish 
and its retailers comply with telemarketing laws.\45\ The tireless 
efforts of DOJ and our state co-plaintiffs were invaluable in securing 
an outcome that takes a strong stand against companies who invade a 
consumer's privacy through unwanted calls and robocalls.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \40\ See U.S. v. Dish Network, LLC, No. 3:09-cv-03073 (C.D. Ill. 
June 6, 2017) available at https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2017/06/ftc-doj-case-results-historic-decision-awarding-280-
million-civil.
    \41\ U.S. v. Dish Network, LLC, No. 3:09-cv-03073 (C.D. Ill. Mar. 
25, 2009), available at https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/
2009/03/ftc-charges-dish-network-formerly-known-echostar-multiple-do-
not.
    \42\ When the Dish case was filed in March of 2009, the robocall 
provision of the TSR was not yet in effect, thus the complaint reached 
Dish's unlawful use of robocalls through a count alleging violations of 
the TSR's abandoned call provisions. Since October 1, 2003, 
telemarketers have been prohibited from abandoning an outbound 
telephone call, and sellers are prohibited from causing a telemarketer 
to do so in violation of the TSR. 16 C.F.R. Sec. 310.4(b)(1)(iv). An 
outbound telephone call is abandoned if a person answers it and the 
telemarketer does not connect the call to a sales representative within 
two (2) seconds of the person's completed greeting. 16 C.F.R. 
Sec. 310.4(b)(1)(iv). The use of robocalls, where a sales pitch to a 
live consumer begins with or is made entirely by a pre-recorded 
message, violates the TSR's abandoned call prohibition because the 
telemarketer is not connecting the call to a sales representative 
within two (2) seconds of the person's completed greeting.
    \43\ U.S. v. Dish Network, LLC, No. 3:09-cv-03073 (C.D. Ill. Mar. 
25, 2009), available at https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-
proceedings/052-3167/dish-network-llc-united-states-america-federal-
trade.
    \44\ U.S. v. Dish Network, LLC, No. 3:09-cv-03073 (C.D. Ill. Jan. 
21, 2015), available at https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/
2015/01/court-grants-partial-summary-judgment-ftc-case-against-dish.
    \45\ See U.S. v. Dish Network, LLC, No. 3:09-cv-03073 (C.D. Ill. 
June 6, 2017) available at https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2017/06/ftc-doj-case-results-historic-decision-awarding-280-
million-civil.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Reaching Violators Attempting to Avoid Detection
    Increasingly, the perpetrators behind these abusive and often 
fraudulent calls take steps to avoid detection, either by operating 
through a web of related entities, ``spoofing'' their Caller ID 
information, or hiding overseas. The FTC uses every investigative and 
litigation tool at its disposal to cut through these deceptions. For 
example, the defendants in the Jones and Ramsey cases operated through 
a tangle of related individuals and entities to avoid detection by law 
enforcement. In addition, defendants in many of our robocall cases 
routinely hid their true name or phone number to deceive consumers and 
evade detection by law enforcement and the Commission included counts 
in its suits targeting this unlawful Caller ID spoofing.\46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \46\ See FTC v. Jasjit Gotra, 1:18-cv-10548 (D. Mass. Mar. 23, 
2018) available at https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/
x140022/jasjit-gotra-alliance-security; U.S. v. KFJ Marketing Inc., 
2:16-cv-01643 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2016), available at https://
www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/152-3166/kfj-marketing-llc; 
FTC v. Lifewatch Inc., 1:15-cv-05781 (N.D. Ill. June 20, 2015), 
available at https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/142-
3123/lifewatch-inc; FTC v. All Us Marketing LLC, 6:15CV1016-0RL-28GJK 
(M.D. Fla. June 29, 2015), available at https://www.ftc.gov/
enforcement/cases-proceedings/142-3256/all-us-marketing-llc-formerly-
known-payless-solutions-llc; FTC v. Caribbean Cruise Line, Inc., 0:15-
cv-60423 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 4, 2015), available at https://www.ftc.gov/
enforcement/cases-proceedings/122-3196-x150028/caribbean-cruise-line-
inc. In each case, the FTC alleged that defendants failed to transmit 
complete and accurate Caller ID information in violation of 16 C.F.R. 
Sec. 310.4(a)(8) or assisted others in doing the same.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The perpetrators behind many unlawful calls also seek to evade law 
enforcement by operating overseas. When consumers are victimized by 
fraudulent calls from international call centers, the Commission finds 
ways to stymie the scammers by cracking down on their U.S. enablers. In 
one recent case, the Commission filed suit against individuals and 
entities in the U.S. who were collecting money on behalf of 
telemarketers at India-based call centers operating government impostor 
scams that conned consumers into paying hundreds or thousands of 
dollars for taxes they did not owe, or fees for services they did not 
receive.\47\ In another recent case, the Commission brought suit 
against the U.S. operators of a scam that relied on Peruvian call 
centers and sophisticated Caller ID spoofing to pressure Spanish 
speaking U.S. consumers into purchasing English-language learning 
materials of little value--and then posing as government officials to 
threaten and harass uninterested consumers into ``purchasing'' their 
products.\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \47\ FTC v. PHLG Enterprises LLC, 8:17-cv-00220-RAL-AEP (M.D. Fla. 
Jan. 27, 2017), available at https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-
proceedings/152-3245-x170019/phlg-enterprises-llc.
    \48\ FTC v. ABC Hispana Inc., 5:17-cv-00252-JGB-DTB (C.D. Cal. Apr. 
19, 2017), available at https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-
proceedings/152-3108/abc-hispana-inc-et-al.
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B. Coordination with Law Enforcement Partners
    As the law enforcement challenges associated with illegal 
telemarketing have increased, the FTC's relationships with other 
agencies have become increasingly important. The Commission has robust, 
collaborative relationships with state law enforcers, including through 
the National Association of Attorneys General Do Not Call working 
group. The Commission coordinates with various partners to bring law 
enforcement actions. Many of the recent robocall enforcement actions 
the FTC has led involved collaboration with the Department of Justice 
or our state partners.\49\ The FTC also leads robocall law enforcement 
``sweeps''--coordinated, simultaneous law enforcement actions--in 
conjunction with state and Federal partners.\50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \49\ See supra n. 38.
    \50\ For example, the FTC led a multinational robocall sweep 
announced in June 2016 that took action against operations estimated to 
be responsible for billions of illegal robocalls.\50\ The June 2016 
sweep included thirty-nine actions taken by the FTC, the Canadian 
Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC), the United 
Kingdom's Information Commissioner's Office (ICO), as well as DOJ, the 
FCC and the attorney generals' offices of Colorado, Florida, Indiana, 
Kansas, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, and Washington 
State, and the Tennessee Regulatory Authority. See Press Release, FTC, 
Florida Attorney General Take Action Against Illegal Robocall Operation 
(June 14, 2016), available at https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2016/06/ftc-florida-attorney-general-take-action-against-
illegal-robocall and https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/
press-releases/ftc-florida-attorney-general-take-action-against-
illegal-robocall-operation/160614robocallenforcementactions.pdf 
(listing actions comprising the coordinated enforcement crackdown).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In addition, the FTC regularly works with the Federal 
Communications Commission (``FCC''), the Department of Justice, the 
Internal Revenue Service (``IRS''), the U.S. Treasury Inspector General 
for Tax Administration (``TIGTA''), the U.S. Postal Inspection Service, 
and U.S. Attorneys' Offices across the country. The Commission also 
coordinates with its counterparts in other countries on particular 
cases and broader strategic matters such as Caller ID spoofing. The 
FTC's collaboration with its partners takes many forms, including 
sharing information and targets, assisting with investigations, and 
working collaboratively on long-term policy initiatives. Also, on May 
17, for the third year in a row, the FTC is coordinating a meeting 
among stakeholders specifically to tackle Indian call-center fraud.
    Just last month, the FTC and FCC co-hosted a Joint Policy Forum on 
Illegal Robocalls on March 23, 2018.\51\ The purpose of the forum was 
to discuss the regulatory and enforcement challenges posed by illegal 
robocalls and what the FCC and FTC are doing to protect consumers and 
encourage the development of private-sector solutions.\52\ Discussion 
topics included the factors driving the volume of illegal robocalls; 
Caller ID spoofing; new threats to consumers, such as ``neighbor 
spoofing''; protections for callers placing legal calls; FCC 
rulemakings; enforcement challenges; third-party solutions and other 
resources available to empower consumers; and industry efforts to 
develop Caller ID authentication.\53\ The forum included policy and 
regulatory experts from both agencies, enforcement leaders from both 
agencies and the Florida Office of Attorney General, representatives 
from voice service providers, representatives from companies providing 
call-blocking solutions, as well as representatives from the call 
originators.\54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \51\ See Press Release, FTC and FCC to Host Joint Policy Forum on 
Illegal Robocalls (Mar. 22, 2018) available at https://www.ftc.gov/
news-events/press-releases/2018/03/ftc-fcc-host-joint-policy-forum-
illegal-robocalls.
    \52\ Id.
    \53\ See Press Release, Agenda Announced for the March 23, 2018 
FTC-FCC Joint Policy Forum on Fighting the Scourge of Illegal Robocalls 
(Mar. 19, 208) available at https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2018/03/ftc-fcc-host-joint-policy-forum-illegal-robocalls.
    \54\ Id. A video recording of the event is available on the FCC's 
website at https://www.fcc.gov/fcc-ftc-robocalls-forum.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
             II. Policy and Market Stimulation Initiatives
A. Understanding the Landscape of the Robocall Problem
    Despite the 2009 prohibition of unauthorized robocalls and the 
Commission's vigorous enforcement efforts, technological advances have 
permitted law-breakers to make more robocalls for less money with a 
greater ability to hide their identity. For example, at the end of 
2009, the FTC received approximately 63,000 complaints about illegal 
robocalls each month.\55\ That number has now more than quadrupled--in 
Fiscal Year 2017, the FTC received an average of nearly 400,000 
robocall complaints per month.\56\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \55\ National Do Not Call Registry Data Book FY 2010 at 5 (Nov. 
2010), available at https://www.ftc.gov/reports/national-do-not-call-
registry-data-book-fiscal-year-2010. Since that time, the FTC began 
separately tracking Do Not Call complaints and robocall complaints 
based on information provided by the consumer.
    \56\ See supra n. 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Recognizing that law enforcement, while critical, is not enough to 
solve the problem, FTC staff has aggressively sought new strategies in 
ongoing discussions with academic experts, telecommunications carriers, 
industry coordinating bodies, technology and security companies, 
consumers, and counterparts at federal, state, and foreign government 
agencies. The Commission ramped up these efforts in October 2012, when 
the FTC hosted a public summit on robocalls to explore these issues 
(the ``Robocall Summit'').\57\ Since then, as discussed below, the 
Commission has spurred the creation of specific groups of experts and 
industry members to work together and with international law enforcers 
to tackle this vexing consumer protection issue.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \57\ See generally FTC Workshop, Robocalls: All the Rage (Oct. 18, 
2012), available at https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/
2012/10/robocalls-all-rage-ftc-summit. A transcript of the workshop 
(hereinafter ``Tr.'') is available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/public_events/robocalls-all-rage-ftc-summit/
robocallsummittranscript.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Speakers at the Robocall Summit made clear that convergence between 
the legacy telephone system and the Internet has allowed robocallers to 
engage, at very little cost, in massive, unlawful robocall campaigns 
that cross international borders and hide behind spoofed Caller ID 
information. As a result, it is not only much cheaper to blast out 
robocalls; it is also easier to hide one's identity when doing so.
1. Technological Developments Have Made Robocalls Extremely Inexpensive
    Until relatively recently, telemarketing required significant 
capital investment in specialized hardware and labor.\58\ Now, 
robocallers benefit from automated dialing technology, inexpensive 
international and long distance calling rates, and the ability to move 
internationally and employ cheap labor.\59\ The only necessary 
equipment is a computer connected to the Internet.\60\ The result: law-
breaking telemarketers can place robocalls for a fraction of one cent 
per minute. In addition, the cheap, widely available technology has 
resulted in a proliferation of entities available to perform any 
portion of the telemarketing process, including generating leads, 
placing automated calls, gathering consumers' personal information, or 
selling products.\61\ Because of the dramatic decrease in upfront 
capital investment and marginal cost, robocallers--like e-mail 
spammers--can make a profit even if their contact rate is very low.\62\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \58\ Herrmann, Tr. at 58-59; Schulzrinne, Tr. at 24.
    \59\ Schulzrinne, Tr. at 24.
    \60\ Herrmann, Tr. at 59-61.
    \61\ Schulzrinne, Tr. at 20-21; Maxson, Tr. at 95-98.
    \62\ Schulzrinne, Tr. at 21; Bellovin, Tr. at 16-17.
    
    
2. Technological Developments Have Made It Easier for Robocallers to 
        Hide
    Technological changes have also affected the marketplace by 
enabling telemarketers to conceal their identities when they place 
calls. First, direct connections do not exist between every pair of 
carriers, so intermediate carriers are necessary to connect many calls. 
Thus, the typical call now takes a complex path, traversing the 
networks of multiple VoIP and legacy carriers before reaching the end 
user.\63\ These circuitous paths make it cumbersome to trace a call to 
its inception.\64\ All too often, this process to trace the call fails 
because one of the carriers in the chain has not retained the records 
necessary for a law enforcement investigation.\65\
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    \63\ Panagia, Tr. at 130-32; Bellovin, Tr. at 17.
    \64\ Schulzrinne, Tr. at 24-25; Maxson, Tr. at 100; Bash, Tr. at 
104. Recently, USTelecom's Industry Traceback Group has been able to 
assist law enforcement to traceback a call more quickly through the 
network.
    \65\ Panagia, Tr. at 160-61; see also id. at 132-133; Schulzrinne, 
Tr. at 21.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Second, callers can easily manipulate the Caller ID information 
that appears with an incoming phone call.\66\ While ``Caller ID 
spoofing'' has some beneficial uses,\67\ it also allows telemarketers 
to deceive consumers by pretending to be an entity with a local phone 
number or a trusted institution such as a bank or government 
agency.\68\ In addition, telemarketers can change their phone numbers 
frequently in an attempt to avoid detection.\69\ Today, many illegal 
callers rely on ``neighbor spoofing'', the practice of using a Caller 
ID number that appears to be from a number local to the call 
recipient.\70\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \66\ Schulzrinne, Tr. at 24-26.
    \67\ See, e.g., Panagia, Tr. at 129 (AT&T allows the third party 
that performs AT&T's customer service to ``spoof'' AT&T's customer 
service line).
    \68\ Schulzrinne, Tr. at 21-22.
    \69\ Id. at 24-26; Maxson, Tr. at 97; Bash, Tr. at 103. Under the 
Truth in Caller ID Act, it is generally illegal to transmit misleading 
or inaccurate Caller ID information with intent to defraud. See Truth 
in Caller ID Act, 47 U.S.C.Sec. 227(e); cf. 16 C.F.R. Sec. 310.4(a)(8) 
(the Telemarketing Sales Rule requires that sellers and telemarketers 
transmit or cause to be transmitted the telephone number and, when made 
available by the telemarketer's carrier, the name of the telemarketer, 
to any caller identification service in use by a recipient of a 
telemarketing call, or transmit the customer service number of the 
seller on whose behalf the call is made and, when made available by the 
telemarketer's seller, the name of the seller. Under this provision, it 
is not necessary to prove intent to defraud.).
    \70\ See FTC Consumer Information Blog, That's Not Your Neighbor 
Calling https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/2018/01/thats-not-your-
neighbor-calling.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Finally, new technologies allow robocallers to operate outside of 
jurisdictions where they are most likely to face prosecution.\71\ 
Indeed, the entities involved in the path of a robocall can be located 
in different countries, making investigations even more challenging.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \71\ Schulzrinne, Tr. at 21; Bellovin, Tr. at 16-17.
    
    
B. Efforts to Stimulate Technological Solutions
1. Robocall Contests
    Recognizing the need to spur the marketplace into developing 
technical solutions that protect American consumers from illegal 
robocalls, the FTC lead four public challenges to help tackle the 
unlawful robocalls that plague consumers. In 2012-2013, the FTC 
conducted its first Robocall Challenge,\72\ and called upon the public 
to develop a consumer-facing solution that blocks illegal robocalls, 
applies to landlines and mobile phones, and operates on proprietary and 
non-proprietary platforms. In response, we received 798 submissions and 
partnered with experts in the field to judge the entries. One of the 
winners, ``NomoRobo,'' was on the market and available to consumers by 
October 2013--just 6 months after being named one of the winners. To 
date, ``NomoRobo,'' which reports blocking over 600 million calls, is 
being offered directly to consumers by a number of telecommunications 
providers and is now available as an app on iPhones.\73\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \72\ For more information on the first FTC Robocall Challenge, see 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/04/ftc-announces-
robocall-challenge-winners.
    \73\ See https://www.nomorobo.com/(last visited April 4, 2018) and 
Robocall Strike Force, Robocall Strike Force Report at 17-18 (April 28, 
2017), https://www.fcc.gov/file/12311/download (``Strike Force Report 
II'') at 17-18.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The following year, the FTC launched its second challenge--Zapping 
Rachel \74\--which called upon information security experts to help 
create a robust robocall honeypot. Sixty teams and individuals signed 
up for one or more phase, and FTC staff obtained new insights that 
improved current robocall honeypot designs and connected new partners 
and stakeholders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \74\ A robocall honeypot is an information system designed to 
attract robocallers and help investigators and academics understand and 
combat illegal calls. For more information on the Zapping Rachel 
challenge see https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/contests/zapping-rachel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In June 2015, the FTC sponsored its third challenge, 
DectectaRobo,\75\ in which it called 1upon the public to analyze call 
data to create algorithms that could predict which calls were likely 
robocalls. Nineteen teams from all over the U.S. participated. Later in 
2015, the FTC challenged information security experts to create tools 
people could use to block and forward robocalls automatically to a 
honeypot as part of the Robocalls: Humanity Strikes Back challenge.\76\ 
Contestants built and submitted robocall solutions to the judges and 
finalists, then competed to ``seed'' their solutions and collect the 
highest number of robocalls. One of the winners of the Humanity Strikes 
Back challenge developed Robokiller, a call-blocking app available for 
iOS phones.\77\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \75\ For more information on the Detectarobo challenge see https://
www.ftc.gov/news-events/contests/detectarobo.
    \76\ For more information on the Robocalls: Humanity Strikes Back 
challenge, see https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/contests/robocalls-
humanity-strikes-back.
    \77\ See https://www.robokiller.com/(last visited April 4, 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Each of the four challenges provided the Commission with an 
opportunity to promote industry dialogue and innovation in combatting 
illegal robocalls, develop industry partnerships, and refine its 
understanding of the robocall problem and potential solutions. More 
importantly, the challenges contributed to a shift in the development 
and availability of technological solutions in this area, particularly 
call-blocking and call-filtering products. A number of voice service 
providers now offer call-blocking or call-filtering products to some or 
all of their customers.\78\ In addition, there are a growing number of 
free or low-cost apps available for download on wireless devices that 
offer call-blocking and call-filtering solutions.\79\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \78\ For example, in late 2016 AT&T launched ``Call Protect'', 
which is a product available to many AT&T wireless customers that 
blocks fraud calls and flags others as potential ``spam.'' See http://
about.att.com/story/att_call_protect.html. T-Mobile offers its wireless 
customers two free products, ``Scam ID'' and ``Scam Block'', that flag 
and block unwanted calls. See http://explore.t-mobile.com/
callprotection (last visited April 4, 2018). Verizon offers a product 
called ``Caller Name ID'' to its wireless customers that also attempts 
to flag and block unwanted calls. See https://www.verizonwireless.com/
solutions-and-services/caller-name-id/(last visited April 4, 2018). In 
addition, a number of carriers make Nomorobo available to their VoIP or 
cable line customers. See, e.g., https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/
stop-unwanted-calls-texts-and-faxes (listing available call blocking 
resources from a number of wireline providers) (last visited April 4, 
2018).
    \79\ The Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association (CTIA) 
maintains a list of hundreds of available call blocking apps (including 
a list of the top 15 apps as determined by CTIA), both for iOS devices: 
https://www.ctia.org/consumer-tips/robocalls/ios-robocall-blocking and 
for Android devices: https://www.ctia.org/consumer-tips/robocalls/
android-robocall-blocking (last visited April 4, 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Coordinating with Technical Experts, Industry, and Other 
        Stakeholders
    The FTC provided input to support the industry-led Robocall Strike 
Force, which is also working to deliver comprehensive solutions to 
prevent, detect, and filter unwanted robocalls.\80\ In tandem with this 
effort, the FTC worked with a major carrier and Federal law enforcement 
partners to help block IRS scam calls that were spoofing well-known IRS 
telephone numbers. The Strike Force expanded this effort and it 
contributed to a drop in IRS scam calls at the end of 2016.\81\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \80\ The Robocall Strike Force developed in response to a call from 
the FCC to make better call blocking solutions available to consumers, 
quickly, and free of charge. See Robocall Strike Force, Robocall Strike 
Force Report at 1 (2016), https://transition.fcc.gov/cgb/Robocall-
Strike-Force-Final-Report.pdf. The FTC has long been a proponent of 
call blocking services as a critical tool to reduce unwanted calls and 
robocalls and strongly supports the Strike Force's efforts. See e.g., 
FTC Staff, Comments Before the Federal Communications Commission on 
Public Notice DA 14-1700 Regarding Call Blocking, CG Docket No. 02-278; 
WC Docket No. 07-135 (Jan. 23, 2015), available at https://www.ftc.gov/
policy/policy-actions/advocacy-filings/2015/01/ftc-staff-comment-
federal-communications-commission.
    \81\ See Robocall Strike Force, Robocall Strike Force Report at 32-
33 (2016), https://transition.fcc.gov/cgb/Robocall-Strike-Force-Final-
Report.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Strike Force also found that, while several providers and third 
parties offered call-blocking products, there was no widespread call-
blocking solution spanning the networks. In order to provide proactive 
call-blocking services to customers, the Strike Force sought 
clarification from the FCC that ``blocking presumptively illegal calls 
is one of the tools carriers are permitted to use to provide consumers 
additional relief.'' \82\ In response, in March 2017, the FCC issued a 
Notice of Proposed Rule Making and Notice of Inquiry that sought to 
expand the categories of calls that voice service providers are 
authorized to block and invited comment on what types of standards 
should govern providers engaged in call blocking.\83\ The FTC filed a 
comment in response, supporting the NPRM's efforts to expand the 
categories of calls that voice service providers are authorized to 
block and encouraging the FCC to allow for some provider flexibility 
when considering standards to govern provider-based blocking of 
presumptively-illegal calls.\84\ In November 2017, the FCC issued a 
Report and Order that enabled voice service providers to block certain 
categories of calls before they reach consumers' phones as proposed by 
the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.\85\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \82\ See id. at 40.
    \83\ Specifically, the FCC's NPRM sought input on rulemaking 
proposals that would authorize two categories of provider-based call 
blocking: 1) when the subscriber to a particular telephone number 
requests that telecommunications providers block calls originating from 
that number; and 2) when the originating number is invalid, 
unallocated, or unassigned. See Advanced Methods to Target and 
Eliminate Unlawful Robocalls, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice 
of Inquiry, CG Docket No. 17-59, FCC 17-23 (released Mar. 23, 2017), 
published in 82 Fed. Reg. 22625 (May 17, 2017).
    \84\ See Comment of the FTC to the Federal Communications 
Commission, Advanced Methods to Target and Eliminate Unlawful 
Robocalls, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry, CG 
Docket No. 17-59, FCC 17-23 (July 3, 2017), available at https://
www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-
comment-federal-communications-commission-supporting-fccs-proposed-
expansion-provider/
ftc_comment_to_fcc_re_nprm_noi_call_blocking_07032017.pdf. As call-
blocking technology gains momentum, the FTC is mindful about concerns 
that bad actors may place telemarketing calls while spoofing an 
innocent consumer's telephone number as the outbound caller ID number 
in an effort to evade detection or that the inadvertent blocking of 
legitimate calls may occur. These concerns were also raised by the FCC 
and addressed in the FTC's Comment.
    \85\ See Advanced Methods to Target and Eliminate Unlawful 
Robocalls, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 
CG Docket No. 17-59, FCC 17-151 (released Nov. 17, 2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Increased call-blocking and call-labeling tools for consumers has 
presented new challenges for call originators, some of which contend 
that their calls are being erroneously blocked or labeled. The FTC 
participates in several forums that seek to improve the communication 
between call originators and service providers. The FCC also recently 
sought input on how best to address the question of potential errors in 
call blocking and call labeling.\86\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \86\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In response, the FTC filed a comment encouraging providers of call-
blocking services to consider engaging in practices that could reduce 
the potential for inadvertently blocking wanted calls, such as 
communicating clearly to subscribers the types of calls that are being 
blocked, using plain and specific terms to label calls, and providing 
designated points of contact to handle questions about calls blocked in 
error.\87\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \87\ See Comment of the FTC to the Federal Communications 
Commission, Advanced Methods to Target and Eliminate Unlawful 
Robocalls, CG Docket No. 17-59, FCC 17-151 (Jan 23, 2018), available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/policy/advocacy/advocacy-filings/2018/01/ftc-staff-
comment-federal-communications-commission.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The FTC also has engaged with technical experts, academics, and 
others through industry groups, such as the Messaging, Malware and 
Mobile Anti-Abuse Working Group (``M\3\AAWG''). M\3\AAWG is a 
consortium of industry, regulators, and academics focused on developing 
solutions to mitigate various forms of messaging abuse such as e-mail 
spam.\88\ After discussions with the FTC and others, M\3\AAWG 
leadership formed the Voice and Telephony Abuse Special Interest Group 
(``VTA SIG'') in 2014, a subgroup formed to apply M\3\AAWG's expertise 
on messaging abuse to voice spam, such as robocalls.\89\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \88\ See M\3\AAWG, Activities, https://www.m3aawg.org/(last visited 
April 5, 2018).
    \89\ See M\3\AAWG, Voice and Telephony Abuse Special Interest 
Group, https://www.m3aawg.org/voice-and-telephony-abuse-sig (last 
visited April 5, 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Through the VTA SIG, the FTC coordinates with experts working on 
industry standards that will combat Caller ID spoofing by enabling the 
authentication of VoIP calls, such as the Internet Engineering Task 
Force's working group called ``STIR''--Secure Telephone Identity 
Revisited.\90\ The FTC further promotes technical advancements by 
collaborating with its counterparts in other countries, through its 
leadership in the Unsolicited Communications Enforcement Network 
(``UCENet'') an international syndicate of government agencies and 
private sector representatives focused on international spam 
enforcement cooperation.\91\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \90\ See Internet Eng'g Task Force, Secure Telephone Identity 
Revisited (STIR), https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/stir/charter/(last 
visited April 5, 2018).
    \91\ See https://www.ucenet.org/(last visited April 5, 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Data Initiatives
    The Commission also engages in information sharing to help 
facilitate technological solutions such as call blocking and has taken 
steps to increase the quality and quantity of shared information. To 
that end, on September 28, 2016, the FTC updated its Do Not Call 
complaint intake process to provide a drop-down list of possible call 
categories for consumers to choose from to make it easier for consumers 
to report the subject of the call and to help the Commission identify 
trends.
    Next, in Fiscal Year 2017, the FTC redesigned its annual National 
Do Not Call Registry Data Book.\92\ The Data Book now provides more 
information on robocall complaints, new information about the types of 
calls consumers reported to the FTC, and includes a complete state-by-
state analysis.\93\ In addition, this year the FTC has developed a 
``mini site'' on its website to make the information in the FY 2017 
Data Book more accessible for the public, such as providing a webpage 
for each state.\94\ For the first time, the data behind the report is 
also available in data files on the new website.\95\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \92\ Press Release, FTC Releases FY 2017 National Do Not Call 
Registry Data Book and DNC Mini Site (Dec. 18, 2017) available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2017/12/ftc-releases-fy-
2017-national-do-not-call-registry-data-book-dnc. Excerpts from the 
Data Book are attached at Exhibit A.
    \93\ Id.
    \94\ Id.
    \95\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    One of the features of the new Data Book is a breakdown of the 
topics of calls reported to the FTC that it gathered from the FTC's 
revised online complaint form:
                    FY 2017 COMPLAINTS BY TOPIC \96\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \96\ See Do Not Call Registry Data Book 2017: Complaint Figures for 
FY 2017 available at https://www.ftc.gov/reports/national-do-not-call-
registry-data-book-fiscal-year-2017. Not everyone who files a complaint 
reports a topic.


The state-by-state analysis also includes the top 10 topics of consumer 
complaints per state.\97\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \97\ See, e.g., Do Not Call Registry Data Book 2017: Alabama 
available at https://www.ftc.gov/reports/national-do-not-call-registry-
data-book-fiscal-year-2017/alabama.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In addition to refining our complaint intake process and upgrading 
our Data Book, the FTC recently began a new initiative to help improve 
industry call-blocking solutions by increasing the amount and frequency 
of consumer complaint data that we make publicly available.\98\ 
Beginning in August 2017, when consumers report Do Not Call or robocall 
violations to the FTC, the phone numbers consumers report are released 
each business day. The FTC is also releasing the following consumer-
reported data: the date and time the unwanted call was received, the 
general subject matter of the call (such as debt reduction, energy, 
warranties, home security, etc.), and whether the call was a 
robocall.\99\ By making our available data more up-to-date and more 
robust, the FTC seeks to improve the functionality of call-blocking 
solutions for consumers that choose to use a call-blocking service or 
feature.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \98\ See https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2017/08/
ftc-escalates-fight-against-illegal-robocalls-using-consumer. The 
complaint data is available at: https://www.ftc.gov/site-information/
open-government/data-sets/do-not-call-data.
    \99\ In the past, the Commission released a bi-weekly report that 
published only the telephone numbers that consumers complained about in 
their Do Not Call and robocall complaints.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Commission is committed to continuing to work with industry and 
government partners to improve information sharing to combat illegal 
calls.
                        III. Consumer Education
    Public education is also an essential tool in the FTC's consumer 
protection and fraud prevention work. The Commission's education and 
outreach program reaches tens of millions of people a year through our 
website, the media, and partner organizations that disseminate consumer 
information on the FTC's behalf.
    The FTC delivers practical, plain language information on numerous 
issues in English and in Spanish. The Commission also uses law 
enforcement announcements as opportunities to remind consumers how to 
recognize a similar situation and report it to the FTC. In the case of 
robocalls, the FTC's message to consumers is simple: if you answer a 
call and hear an unwanted recorded sales message--hang up. Period. 
Other key messages to consumers include how to place a phone number on 
the Do Not Call Registry, how and where to report illegal 
robocalls,\100\ available call blocking solutions,\101\ and how to 
identify common scams.\102\ The FTC disseminates these tips through 
articles,\103\ blog posts,\104\ social media,\105\ infographics,\106\ 
videos,\107\ audio,\108\ and campaigns such as ``Pass It On''--an 
innovative means of arming older consumers with information about scams 
that they can ``pass on'' to their friends and family members.\109\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \100\ See, e.g., National Do Not Call Registry, http://
www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0108-national-do-not-call-registry.
    \101\ See, e.g., FTC Consumer Information Blocking Unwanted Calls 
https://www.consumer
.ftc.gov/articles/0548-blocking-unwanted-calls.
    \102\ See, e.g., FTC Consumer Information Scam Alerts, https://
www.consumer.ftc.gov/scam-alerts.
    \103\ See, e.g., FTC Robocall Microsite, http://
www.consumer.ftc.gov/features/feature-0025-robo
calls.
    \104\ See, e.g., FTC Consumer Information Blog, Looking to Block 
Unwanted Calls? https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/looking-block-
unwanted-calls; FTC Consumer Information Blog, That's Not Your Neighbor 
Calling https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/2018/01/thats-not-your-
neighbor-calling; FTC Consumer Information Blog, Apps to Stop Robocalls 
https://www
.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/2017/10/apps-stop-robocalls.
    \105\ See, e.g., FTC Robocalls Facebook Q&A Transcript (Oct. 25, 
2012), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/ftc-
facebook-chats/1210robocallschallenge-fb.pdf.
    \106\ See, e.g., FTC Robocalls Infographic, https://www.ftc.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/public_events/robocalls-all-rage-ftc-
summit/pdf-0113-robocalls-infographic.pdf.
    \107\ See, e.g., FTC Video and Media, http://www.consumer.ftc.gov/
media.
    \108\ See, e.g., FTC Consumer Information Audio, ``Hang Up on 
Robocalls,'' http://www.con
sumer.ftc.gov/media/audio-0045-hang-robocalls.
    \109\ See Pass It On, http://www.consumer.ftc.gov/features/feature-
0030-pass-it-on#identity-theft.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The FTC is taking additional steps to communicate information to 
consumers about the available call-blocking solutions that might reduce 
the amount of unwanted calls they receive. On April 23, 2018, the FTC 
is co-hosting with the FCC a ``Stop Illegal Robocalls Expo.'' \110\ The 
Expo will feature innovative technologies, devices, and applications to 
minimize or eliminate the number of illegal robocalls consumers 
receive.\111\ The Expo is free and open to the public.\112\ In late 
March, the FTC also put out additional information on its websites 
regarding how to stop unwanted calls for different types of phone 
services: mobile, landline or VOIP.\113\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \110\ See Press Release, FTC and FCC Seek Exhibitors for an Expo 
Featuring Technologies to Block Illegal Robocalls (Mar. 7, 2018) 
available at https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2018/03/
ftc-fcc-seek-exhibitors-expo-featuring-technologies-block-illegal.
    \111\ Id.
    \112\ Id.
    \113\ See FTC Consumer Information How to Stop Unwanted Calls 
available at https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/features/how-stop-unwanted-
calls. A copy of this guidance is attached at Exhibit B.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                     IV. Next Steps and Conclusion
    The Do Not Call Registry continues to help protect consumers 
against unsolicited calls from legitimate telemarketers. However, as 
technology continues to develop and fraudsters exploit those 
developments, we must remain agile and creative. The Commission will 
continue its multifaceted efforts to fight illegal robocalls, including 
the following actions:

   Continue Aggressive Law Enforcement

     We will maintain our enforcement efforts, in 
            coordination with state, federal, and international 
            partners, to target high-volume offenders and pursue 
            robocall gatekeepers in order to stop the largest number of 
            illegal calls.

     We will work with the telecommunications industry, 
            encouraging carriers to be proactive in monitoring for 
            illegal robocalls, blocking illegal calls, and securing the 
            information necessary for prosecutions.

   Spur Innovation

     We will work with industry leaders and other experts 
            to further stimulate the development of technological 
            solutions to protect consumers from illegal robocalls.

     We will continue to encourage industry-wide 
            coordination to create and deploy VoIP standards that 
            incorporate robust authentication capabilities. Such 
            coordination is the only way to ensure a future phone 
            system with accurate and truthful calling information.

   Engage in Ongoing Consumer Education

     We will continue our broad outreach to consumers 
            regarding the Do Not Call Registry as well as illegal 
            robocalls and how best to fight them.

    Thank you for the opportunity to share some of the highlights 
regarding the FTC's battle against illegal robocalls. We look forward 
to working with you on this important issue.

                               EXHIBIT A

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


                                 ______
                                 

    The Chairman. Thank you, Ms. Greisman.
    Mr. Rupy.

           STATEMENT OF KEVIN RUPY, VICE PRESIDENT, 
                   LAW AND POLICY, USTelecom

    Mr. Rupy. Chairman Thune, members of the Committee, thank 
you for giving me the opportunity to appear before you today. 
My name is Kevin Rupy, and I serve as Vice President of Law and 
Policy at USTelecom. Over the last several years, USTelecom and 
our member companies have been tremendously focused on the 
robocall issue, and we share the Committee's concerns about the 
problems associated with phone-based imposter scams targeting 
consumers.
    In this ongoing battle against criminal robocallers, there 
have been four significant developments over the last year.
    First, the industry-led, ecosystem-wide Robocall Strike 
Force issued a series of reports to the FCC in October 2016 and 
April 2017. These reports hold a significant amount of good 
news for consumers. For example, the reports note that the 
SHAKEN/STIR standards development for the next generation of 
robocall mitigation tools were accelerated by 6 months. Some of 
the initial testing of the SHAKEN standard is expected to 
complete later this year with potential deployments anticipated 
later this year and in 2019.
    These reports also detail the efforts of USTelecom's 
Industry Traceback Group, which is comprised of a broad range 
of network providers from several industries who are working 
collaboratively to identify the origin of these calls at their 
source. Industry's strong commitment to this effort can be seen 
in its significant growth from just three carriers in July 2016 
to 22 providers as of today. The goal of this group is to 
identify the source of the worst of these illegal calls and 
further enable enforcement actions by Federal agencies.
    Second, the reports show that USTelecom member companies, 
independent application developers, and a growing number of 
diverse companies offer services today that can help consumers 
reduce unknown and potentially fraudulent calls. For example, 
AT&T has launched its Call Protect service that allows 
customers with iPhones and HD voice-enabled Android handsets to 
block suspected fraudulent calls. AT&T also offers AT&T Digital 
Call Protect for IP wireline phones.
    Verizon's new Spam Alerts service provides its wireline 
customers who have caller ID, whether they are on copper or 
fiber, with enhanced warnings about calls that meet Verizon's 
spam criteria by showing the term ``Spam?'' with a question 
mark, before a caller's name on the caller ID display.
    On the wireless side, Verizon has deployed and continues to 
expand robocall mitigation features as part of its Caller Name 
ID service, including a filter that automatically forwards to 
voice-mail any calls corresponding to the spam risk level 
selected by the customer.
    The significant growth in consumers' tools was highlighted 
just a few weeks ago at a joint FCC-FTC robocall workshop where 
it was noted that since 2016, there has been a 495 percent 
increase in smartphone applications for addressing robocalls.
    Third, the FCC recently adopted rules allowing voice 
providers to block certain types of calls. USTelecom supported 
adoption of these rules and participated fully in the 
proceeding. One issue the FCC raised is what protections 
legitimate callers should have if their calls are blocked, both 
for situations where voice providers block numbers directly, 
and for blocking services that consumers may opt into.
    This fall, USTelecom hosted a workshop aimed at helping 
develop best practices for the scoring and labeling of calls, 
and a follow up workshop is scheduled next month.
    Finally, we applaud our Federal Government partners at the 
FCC and FTC, who have engaged in a series of enforcement 
actions against illegal robocallers. Both agencies' civil 
enforcement actions send a strong and powerful message to 
illegal robocallers that they will be located and brought to 
justice. While these civil enforcement efforts are laudatory, 
we believe there is an acute need for coordinated, targeted, 
and aggressive criminal enforcement of illegal robocallers at 
the Federal level. Given the felonious nature of their 
activities, criminal syndicates engaged in illegal robocalling 
should be identified, targeted, and brought to justice through 
criminal enforcement efforts.
    While consumer-centric tools may stop a series of calls 
from reaching certain consumers, root-cause removal through 
criminal enforcement stops millions of calls from ever being 
originated.
    Let me again thank the Committee for holding this timely 
hearing. And I look forward to our continued work together to 
address this constantly evolving challenge.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Rupy follows:]

   Prepared Statement of Kevin Rupy, Vice President, Law and Policy, 
                               USTelecom
    Chairman Thune, Ranking Member Nelson, Members of the Committee, 
thank you for giving me the opportunity to appear before you today.
    My name is Kevin Rupy, and I serve as Vice President of Law and 
Policy at USTelecom. Over the last several years, USTelecom and our 
member companies have been tremendously focused on the robocall issue, 
and we share the Committee's concern about the problems associated with 
phone-based impostor scams targeting consumers. Scammers can use Caller 
ID spoofing to mask their identity and location, giving their target a 
false sense of confidence about who is calling.
    In this ongoing battle against criminal robocallers, there have 
been four important developments over the last year that are 
particularly significant.
    First, the industry-led, ecosystem-wide Robocall Strike Force 
issued its report to the Federal Communications Commission on October 
26, 2016. Comprehensive follow-up reports by the industry groups 
continuing the work started by the Strike Force were delivered to the 
FCC last year on April 28, 2017. These reports, taken together, 
catalogue industry's substantial efforts to advance the battle against 
illegal robocalls. These reports hold a significant amount of good news 
for consumers. For example, the reports note that the SHAKEN/STIR 
standards development for the next generation of robocall mitigation 
tools that the industry had initiated prior to the Robocall Strike 
Force, were accelerated by six months. These standards, which 
incorporate caller-ID authentication capabilities into the network and 
consumer devices, have entered the industry testing phase. In addition, 
the North American Numbering Council (NANC)--a Federal Advisory 
Committee that counsels the FCC on numbering issues--is nearing 
completion of its recommendation to the FCC on the SHAKEN governance 
framework. Some of the initial testing of the SHAKEN standard is 
expected to complete later this year, with potential deployments 
anticipated later this year and in 2019.
    The reports also highlight the increasing number of tools that are 
being developed and actively deployed to consumers, by a growing number 
of national voice and device providers. Finally, the reports detail the 
efforts of USTelecom's Industry Traceback Group, which is comprised of 
a broad range of network providers from the cable, wireline, wireless 
and wholesale industries, who are working collaboratively in order to 
identify the origin of these calls at their source. Industry's strong 
commitment to this effort can be seen its significant growth over the 
last year, from just 3 carriers in July, 2016, to 22 providers as of 
today.
    Second, the reports shows that USTelecom member companies, 
independent application developers and a growing number of diverse 
companies offer services today that can help older Americans reduce 
unknown and potentially fraudulent calls. For example, AT&T has 
launched its `Call Protect' service that allows customers with iPhones 
and HD Voice enabled Android handsets to automatically block suspected 
fraudulent calls. AT&T also offers AT&T Digital Call Protect for IP 
wireline phones. Verizon's new Spam Alerts service provides its 
wireline customers who have Caller ID--whether they are on copper or 
fiber--with enhanced warnings about calls that meet Verizon's spam 
criteria by showing the term ``SPAM?'' before a caller's name on the 
Caller ID display. And on the wireless side, Verizon has deployed and 
continues to expand robocall mitigation features as part of its Caller 
Name ID service, including a spam filter that automatically forwards to 
voice-mail any calls corresponding to the spam risk level selected by 
the customer.
    And various carriers have worked with Nomorobo to facilitate their 
customers' ability to use that third-party blocking service, such as 
Verizon's ``one click'' solution that simplifies customers' ability to 
sign up for the service. In fact, at a recent joint FCC and FTC 
robocall workshop, it was noted that since 2016, there has been a 495 
percent increase in smartphone applications alone for addressing 
robocalls.
    Third, the FCC recently adopted rules allowing voice providers to 
block certain types of calls. USTelecom supported adoption of the rules 
and participated fully in the proceeding. One issue the FCC raised is 
what protections legitimate callers should have if their calls are 
blocked due to the inappropriate scoring of their call. That is an 
important topic both for situations where voice providers block numbers 
directly, and for blocking services that consumers may opt into in 
order to block or filter potentially unwanted calls. It is an issue 
USTelecom and its members, and other parts of the robocall labeling/
scoring ecosystem, have been wrestling with for years, and this fall we 
hosted a workshop aimed at helping develop ``best practices'' for the 
scoring and labelling of calls. A follow-up workshop is scheduled next 
month.
    Finally, we applaud our Federal government partners in the robocall 
fight, who have engaged in a series of enforcement actions against bad 
actors that have reinvigorated efforts to curb this illegal activity. 
For example, the FCC last year initiated enforcement actions against 
three entities that have resulted in more than $200 million in proposed 
fines targeting perpetrators of illegal robocalling. The FTC also 
continues to engage in a series of complementary enforcement actions 
that target the worst of the worst bad actors in this space. These 
civil enforcement actions brought by both agencies send a strong and 
powerful message to illegal robocallers that they will be located and 
brought to justice. USTelecom and its industry partners stand ready to 
further assist in these efforts to bring this bad actors to justice. 
Indeed, the ultimate goal of USTelecom's Industry Traceback Group is to 
identify the source of the worst of these illegal calls, and further 
enable further enforcement actions by Federal agencies.
    While current Federal enforcement efforts are laudatory, they are 
mostly limited to civil enforcement. We believe there is an acute need 
for coordinated, targeted and aggressive criminal enforcement of 
illegal robocallers at the Federal level. As a result, bad actors 
currently engaged in criminal robocall activities are--at most--subject 
only to civil forfeitures. Given the felonious nature of their 
activities, criminal syndicates engaged in illegal robocalling activity 
should be identified, targeted and brought to justice through criminal 
enforcement efforts. We believe, in particular, that U.S. Attorneys' 
offices across the country should prioritize enforcement where Federal 
statutes, such as the Truth in Caller ID Act, are implicated, and 
should work closely with the FCC and FTC and international partners in 
enforcement cases, particularly when the calls originate outside of the 
United States. While a holistic approach is essential to broadly 
address the issue of robocalls, robust enforcement efforts targeting 
illegal robocallers are most effective since they address the activity 
at the source. For example, consumer-centric tools may stop a series of 
calls from reaching tens of thousands consumers, whereas root-cause 
removal stops millions of calls from ever being sent.
    All these recent developments further demonstrate the essential 
commitment from a broad range of stakeholders that will be necessary to 
effectively mitigate and defeat these scammers. Indispensable industry 
stakeholders from a wide range of companies--including cable, wireline, 
wireless, and wholesale providers, as well as standards organizations, 
equipment manufacturers and apps developers--have advanced a concerted, 
broad-based, effort focused on developing practices, technologies and 
methods for mitigating phone-based attacks and scams. This coalition 
has also expanded its cooperation with equally important stakeholders 
within the Federal government and with consumer groups. While our 
partners in government play a crucial enforcement role, our partners in 
consumer organizations are vital to raising awareness about the tools 
available to consumer to help mitigate illegal robocalls.
    Industry efforts to address the illegal robocall issue remain 
ongoing and extremely energized. Importantly, these efforts are being 
undertaken by the necessary broad range of industry stakeholders, 
including representatives from the wireline, wireless, wholesale, cable 
and app developer community, as well as critically important standards 
organizations. The results of these comprehensive industry efforts are 
detailed in the industry-led Strike Force report submitted to the 
Federal Communications Commission in April of last year. The 
collaborative efforts outlined in the report are highly detailed, 
extremely comprehensive and warrant more than a brief summary. In order 
for the Committee to gain a better and complete understanding of these 
efforts, USTelecom is submitting the April Strike Force Report as an 
addendum to this written testimony.
    In closing, let me again thank the Committee for holding this 
timely hearing. We share the Committee's concerns, and we look forward 
to our continued work together to address this constantly evolving 
challenge.

    The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Rupy.
    Mr. Delacourt.

   STATEMENT OF SCOTT DELACOURT, PARTNER, WILEY REIN LLP, ON 
     BEHALF OF THE U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM

    Mr. Delacourt. Chairman Thune, Ranking Member Nelson, and 
members of the Committee, my name is Scott Delacourt, and I am 
a partner in the telecommunications, media, and technology 
practice at Wiley Rein LLP. I am here today on behalf of the 
U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, or ILR.
    The U.S. Chamber is the world's largest business 
federation, representing the interests of more than 3 million 
businesses of all sizes and sectors. ILR is an affiliate of the 
U.S. Chamber that promotes civil justice reform. Thank you for 
the opportunity to testify today about abusive robocalls and 
why legitimate businesses trying to communicate with their 
customers who do not make these types of calls need Telephone 
Consumer Protection Act reform.
    I would like to make three points today.
    First, TCPA class-action litigation has harmed consumers 
and legitimate businesses while doing little to reduce illegal 
and abusive robocalling.
    Second, the D.C. Circuit's recent decision vacating 
portions of the FCC's 2015 Omnibus TCPA Order presents a 
sensible roadmap for interpreting the TCPA in a way that 
provides clear guidance to consumers and businesses.
    Third, the FCC should follow the court's guidance, clarify 
the TCPA's requirements, and focus on bad actors.
    Illegal and abusive robocalls continue to be a menace and a 
top complaint of consumers across the U.S. These calls 
originate with bad actors, and ILR does not condone the 
conduct. Customers are the lifeblood of commerce, and 
successful businesses avoid practices that customers revile. 
U.S. businesses have no interest in engaging in abusive 
practices. Indeed, businesses fear the brand and customer 
relationship damage of being cast as an illegal and abusive 
robocaller.
    On the other hand, ILR is concerned about businesses being 
able to communicate with their customers through the use of 
modern technology in an efficient and cost-effective manner. 
Consumers expect timely contemporary communications from the 
companies with whom they choose to do business. Unfortunately, 
the TCPA has become an obstacle, preventing legitimate and 
lawful communications between businesses and their customers. 
Businesses are in the crosshairs of potential litigation each 
time they pick up the phone or send a text message.
    The TCPA prohibits making calls to wireless telephone 
numbers using any automatic telephone dialing system, or ATDS, 
without the prior express consent of the called party. The act 
focused on technology, not bad conduct, such as harassment or 
fraud. Ambiguity over what constitutes an ATDS has become a 
source of unnecessary class-action litigation while doing 
little to stop truly abusive robocalls. Indeed, the number of 
TCPA case filings exploded to 4,860 in 2016, and TCPA 
litigation grew 31.8 percent between 2015 and 2016.
    Much of the litigation targets legitimate companies, many 
of which are well-known brands, that have committed marginal or 
unavoidable violations instead of the true bad actors, scam 
telemarketers, offshore operations, and fraudsters who operate 
through thinly capitalized and disappearing shell companies. 
These latter activities are of little interest to class-action 
lawyers.
    Abusive litigation targeting legitimate companies has 
devastating effects, as the TCPA's uncapped statutory damages 
can lead to multimillion-dollar judgments. Often consumers do 
not even collect from the judgment funds established to 
remediate harm, making class-action lawyers the only winners. 
Ironically, such litigation ultimately hurts the consumers it 
is intended to protect, as the costs are passed on in the form 
of increased costs of goods and services.
    The Federal Communications Commission's implementation of 
the TCPA to some degree has contributed to the problem. In its 
2015 omnibus order, the FCC expanded the types of devices that 
are considered ATDS to include equipment with computing 
capability or to which computing capability might be added, and 
expansive reading that potentially sweeps in everyday devices 
like smartphones and tablets, creating major uncertainty for 
businesses. Indeed, the FCC's order contributed to a 46 percent 
increase in TCPA litigation.
    The D.C. Circuit's decision last month in ACA International 
v. FCC, in which the U.S. Chamber was a petitioner, overturned 
key provisions of the FCC's order, including the agency's 
definition of an ATDS, which the court described as utterly 
unreasonable. The decision includes a sensible roadmap for how 
the FCC might interpret the TCPA in a manner that is clear and 
understandable, significantly reducing frivolous class-action 
litigation. This decision provides an opportunity for the FCC 
to revisit and clarify its approach to the TCPA. Following the 
D.C. Circuit's approach would provide guidance and clarity to 
businesses, and allow regulators, law enforcement, and courts 
to focus on the bad actors who are the source of the 
robocalling problem.
    Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. And I look 
forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Delacourt follows:]

    Prepared Statement of Scott Delacourt, Partner, Wiley Rein LLP, 
        On Behalf of the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform
I. Introduction
    Chairman Thune, Ranking Member Nelson, and members of the 
Committee. My name is Scott Delacourt. I am a Partner in the 
Telecommunications, Media, and Technology Practice at Wiley Rein LLP, 
and I am here on behalf of the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform 
(``ILR''). The U.S. Chamber is the world's largest business federation, 
representing the interests of more than three million businesses of all 
sizes and sectors, as well as state and local chambers and industry 
associations. ILR is an affiliate of the U.S. Chamber that promotes 
civil justice reform through regulatory, legislative, judicial, and 
educational activities at the global, national, state, and local 
levels. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today about abusive 
robocalls, and why legitimate businesses trying to communicate with 
their customers, who are not making these types of calls, desperately 
need the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (``TCPA'') reformed.
    I would like to make three points today:

   First, TCPA class-action litigation has harmed consumers and 
        legitimate businesses while doing little to reduce illegal and 
        abusive robocalling.

   Second, the D.C. Circuit's recent decision vacating portions 
        of the FCC's 2015 Omnibus TCPA Order presents a sensible 
        roadmap for interpreting the TCPA in a way that provides clear 
        guidance to consumers and businesses.

   Third, the FCC should follow the court's guidance, clarify 
        the TCPA's requirements, and focus on bad actors.

    Illegal and abusive robocalls continue to be a menace and a top 
complaint of consumers across the U.S. These calls originate with bad 
actors, and ILR does not condone the conduct. The ILR's members--a 
broad cross-section of American business--share consumers' concern. 
Customers are the life-blood of commerce, and successful businesses 
avoid practices that customers revile. U.S. businesses have no interest 
in engaging in abusive practices. Indeed, businesses fear the brand and 
customer relationship damage of being cast as an illegal and abusive 
robocaller.
    On the other hand, ILR is concerned about businesses being able to 
communicate with their customers through the use of modern technology, 
in an efficient and cost-effective manner, while consumers desire and 
expect timely, contemporary communications from the companies with whom 
they choose to do business. Unfortunately, the TCPA has become an 
obstacle, preventing legitimate and lawful communications between 
businesses--large and small--and their customers and has placed 
businesses in the crosshairs of potential litigation each time they 
pick up the phone or send a text message.
    The TCPA prohibits making phone calls to wireless telephone numbers 
``using any automatic telephone dialing system'' (``ATDS'') without the 
prior express consent of the called party. The Act focuses on 
technology, not bad conduct such as harassment or fraud. Ambiguity over 
the technology used or what constitutes an ATDS has become a source of 
unnecessary and sometimes abusive class-action litigation, burdening 
how businesses reach their customers, while doing little to stop truly 
abusive robocalls. Indeed, the number of TCPA case filings exploded to 
4,860 in 2016, and TCPA litigation grew 31.8 percent between 2015 and 
2016. Much of this litigation targets legitimate companies--many of 
which are well-known brands--that have committed marginal or 
unavoidable violations, instead of the true bad actors: scam 
telemarketers, offshore operations, and fraudsters who operate through 
thinly-capitalized and disappearing shell companies. These latter 
activities are of little interest to class-action lawyers.
    Abusive litigation targeting legitimate companies has devastating 
effects, as the TCPA's uncapped statutory damages can lead to multi-
million-dollar judgments. Often consumers do not even collect from the 
judgment funds established to remediate harm, making class-action 
lawyers the only winners.\1\ Ironically, such litigation ultimately 
hurts the consumers it is intended to protect as the costs are passed 
along in the form of increased prices for goods and services.
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    \1\ For example, one survey of Federal TCPA settlements found that 
in 2014, the average attorneys' fees awarded in TCPA class action 
settlements was $2.4 million, while the average class member's award in 
these same actions was $4.12. Wells Fargo Ex Parte Notice, filed 
January 16, 2015, in CG Docket No. 02-278, p. 19, available at http://
apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=60001016697. One of the most recent 
examples of the lucrative success that plaintiffs' attorneys continue 
to achieve in TCPA class actions includes an award of $15.26 million in 
fees. Plaintiffs;' counsel originally petition for an award in amount 
equal to one-third of the final common fund total. Aranda et al., v. 
Caribbean Cruise Line, Inc. et al., No. 12-04069, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
52645 (N.D. Ill., April 6, 2017),
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Federal Communications Commission's (``FCC'') implementation of 
the TCPA, to some degree, has contributed to this problem. In its 2015 
Omnibus Order, the FCC expanded the types of devices that are 
considered ATDS to include equipment with computing capability or to 
which computing capability might be added--an expansive reading that 
potentially sweeps in everyday devices like smart phones and tablets, 
creating major uncertainty for businesses. Indeed, the FCC's Omnibus 
Order contributed to a 46 percent increase in TCPA litigation.
    The D.C. Circuit's decision last month in ACA Int'l v. FCC, in 
which the U.S. Chamber was a petitioner, overturned certain key 
provisions of the FCC's Omnibus Order, including the agency's 
definition of an automated telephone dialing system (``ATDS''), which 
the court described as ``utterly unreasonable.'' \2\ The decision 
includes a sensible roadmap for how the FCC might interpret the TCPA in 
a manner that is clear and understandable, significantly reducing 
frivolous class-action litigation. This decision provides an 
opportunity for the FCC to revisit and clarify its approach to the 
TCPA. Following the D.C. Circuit's approach would provide guidance and 
clarity to businesses, and allow regulators, law enforcement, and 
courts to focus on the bad actors who are the source of the robocalling 
problem.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ ACA Int'l v. FCC, No. 15-1211, slip op. at 15 (D.C. Cir., Mar. 
16, 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
II. Uncertainty Regarding the Requirements of the TCPA Has Led to 
        Unnecessary Litigation that Does Little to Deter Robocalls
    Congress enacted the TCPA in 1991 to stop abusive cold-call 
telemarketing and fax-blast spamming.\3\ In promulgating its initial 
rules implementing the Act, the Commission acknowledged the TCPA's goal 
of ``restrict[ing] the most abusive telemarketing practices.'' \4\ The 
Supreme Court recognized that ``Congress determined that Federal 
legislation was needed because telemarketers, by operating interstate, 
were escaping state-law prohibitions on intrusive nuisance calls.'' \5\ 
Unfortunately, the Commission's implementation of the Act over many 
years has fostered a whirlwind of litigation. Interpretations by courts 
and the FCC have strayed far from the statute's text, Congressional 
intent, and common sense, turning the TCPA into a breeding ground for 
frivolous lawsuits brought by serial plaintiffs and their lawyers, who 
have made lucrative businesses out of targeting U.S. companies.\6\ The 
number of TCPA case filings exploded to 4,860 in 2016, and TCPA 
litigation grew 31.8 percent between 2015 and 2016.\7\ The focus of 
these lawsuits is often legitimate companies and well-known brands who 
have committed accidental or unavoidable violations. As then-
Commissioner Ajit Pai highlighted, the Los Angeles Lakers were hit with 
a class-action lawsuit from fans who received text messages confirming 
receipt of fan-originated texts.\8\ Similarly, a ride-sharing service 
was sued for texts confirming receipt of ride requests.\9\ And Mammoth 
Mountain Ski Area was sued for calling a group of litigants who had 
previously provided consent.\10\
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    \3\ See S. Rep. 102-178 at 1-2 (1991) (stating that the purpose of 
the TCPA is to ``plac[e] restrictions on unsolicited, automated 
telephone calls to the home'' and noting complaints regarding 
telemarketing calls); H.R. Rep. No. 102-317 at 6-7 (1991) (citing 
telemarketing abuse as the primary motivator for legislative action 
leading to the TCPA). See also Comments of the U.S. Chamber and ILR, 
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection 
Act of 1991, CG Docket No. 02-278, at 2-3 (filed Mar. 10, 2017).
    \4\ See Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer 
Protection Act of 1991, Report and Order, 7 FCC Rcd 8752, n.24 (Oct. 
16, 1992) (``1992 Report and Order'').
    \5\ Mims v. Arrow Financial Services, LLC, 565 U.S. 368, 370 (2012) 
(also citing the Preamble of the TCPA) (emphasis added); see also 
Emanuel v. Los Angeles Lakers, Inc., 2013 WL 1719035, at *3 (``Courts 
``broadly recognize that not every text message or call constitutes an 
actionable offense; rather, the TCPA targets and seeks to prevent the 
proliferation of intrusive, nuisance calls.'') (internal quotations 
omitted).
    \6\ See Letter from ACA International et al to the Members of the 
U.S. House of Representatives, (Mar. 8, 2017), http://
www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/TCPA_Coalition
_Letter_FICALA_to_House.pdf. For examples, Craig Cunningham of 
Nashville, according to news reports, has filed approximately 83 TCPA 
lawsuits since 2014--including 19 in 2017. He has three cell phones he 
uses to compile TCPA claims. John O'Brien, Phony Lawsuits: Man Has 
Filed 80 Lawsuits And Uses Sleuthing Skills To Track Down Defendants, 
Forbes, Nov. 1, 2017, https://www.forbes.com/sites/legalnewsline/2017/
11/01/phoney-lawsuits-man-has-filed-80-law
suits-and-uses-sleuthing-skills-to-track-down-defendants/#456cd2a76be7; 
A U.S. Magistrate judge found Jan Konopca, a serial plaintiff who has 
filed 31 lawsuits in New Jersey Federal court, was actively seeking the 
calls. Mr. Konopca earned approximately $800,000 for his endeavors and 
has even claimed that he is no longer eligible for Social Security 
Disability benefits because of his TCPA litigation. John O'Brien, Phony 
Lawsuits: Comcast Fighting For Access to `Professional' Plaintiff's 
Prior Testimony, Forbes, May 31, 2017, https://www.forbes.com/sites/
legalnewsline/2017/05/31/phoney-lawsuits-comcast-fighting-for-access-
to-professional-plaintiffs-prior-testimony/#18a02fba727c; see also John 
O'Brien, Phony Lawsuits: How a Polish immigrant apparently sued his way 
to $800K, Forbes, Mar. 15, 2017, https://legalnewsline.com/stories/
511092959-phoney-lawsuits-how-a-polish-immigrant-apparently-sued-his-
way-to-800k; Melody Stoops began her TCPA ``business'' by collecting at 
least 35 cellphones that she stored in a shoebox. Though she lived in a 
small town in Central Pennsylvania, she used Florida area codes when 
she registered for a new phone number for each. By admitting her 
scheme, Stoops lost her standing to sue, a Pennsylvania judge ruled in 
2015. If the calls were the goal, then she experienced no harm when she 
received them, it was determined. John O'Brien, Phony Lawsuits: A 
Federal Law is Giving Litigious People A New Income Stream, Forbes, 
Mar. 14, 2017, https://www.forbes.com/sites/legalnewsline/2017/03/14/
phoney-lawsuits-a-federal-law-is-giving-litigious-people-a-new-income-
stream/#6312998a68ee; see also John O'Brien, Phony Lawsuits: A `Most 
Profitable' Scheme Has TCPA Plaintiff On Track For One Last Payday, 
Forbes, Nov. 27, 2017, https://www.forbes.com/sites/legalnewsline/2017/
11/27/phoney-lawsuits-a-most-probable-scheme-has-tcpa-plaintiff-on-
track-for-one-last-payday/#7787c5823ba1.
    \7\ See 2016 Year in Review: FDCPA Down, FCRA & TCPA Up, WebRecon 
LLC (2018), https://webrecon.com/2016-year-in-reviewfdcpa-down-fcra-
tcpa-up/.
    \8\ Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer 
Protection Act of 1991 Declaratory Ruling and Order, 30 FCC Rcd 7961, 
8073 (2015) (``Omnibus Order'') (dissenting statement of Commissioner 
Ajit Pai).
    \9\ Id.
    \10\ Scaling the 'Mountain' of TCPA Lawsuit Abuse, U.S. Chamber 
Institute for Legal Reform (Apr. 8, 2015), http://
www.instituteforlegalreform.com/resource/scaling-the-mountain-of-tcpa-
lawsuit-abuse (explaining that the plaintiffs provided consent before a 
new FCC rule clarifying the prior express consent requirement took 
effect).
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    TCPA litigation has even gone so far as to subject nonprofit 
organizations to frivolous lawsuits. A blood bank, a state chapter of 
the Special Olympics, and the Breast Cancer Society have all faced TCPA 
suits.\11\ Recently, the American Heart Association was handed a 
``victory'' when a court in Louisiana found the plaintiff consented to 
the text messages she received and that the content of the messages was 
informational, not promotional.\12\ As a result, the TCPA is forcing 
such organizations to utilize and waste precious staff and monetary 
resources to handle needless litigation rather than devoting those 
resources to life-saving research.
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    \11\ See Murphy v. DCI Biologicals Orlando, LLC, et. al, 797 F.3d 
1302, 1308 (11th Cir. 2015); see also Wengel v. DialAmerica Marketing, 
Inc., 132 F.Supp.3d 910 (E.D. Mich. Sep. 22, 2015); see also Spiegel v. 
Reynolds et al., No. 17-3344 (7th Cir. Nov. 14, 2017).
    \12\ Reese v. Anthem Inc., et al., No. 2:17-cv-07940 (E.D. La Mar. 
12, 2018).
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    Because the TCPA provides for uncapped statutory damages, 
defendants in these lawsuits face multi-million-dollar judgments.\13\ 
Earlier this month, Outcome Health agreed to a $2.9 million settlement 
to end a class-action lawsuit over daily automated nutrition tips it 
texted to recipients who had signed up to receive such information. In 
another case, Lake City Industrial Products, Inc., a small, family-
owned company from Michigan, faced over $5 million in statutory damages 
for faxes it sent believing they were legal.\14\ Other well-known 
companies, like Capital One Bank, AT&T, MetLife, Papa John's Pizza and 
Walgreen's Pharmacy, have faced settlements of over ten million 
dollars, the largest of which was $75 million.\15\ TCPA lawsuits filed 
in the 17-month period after the 2015 FCC Omnibus Declaratory Ruling 
reached approximately 40 different industries.\16\
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    \13\ See The Juggernaut of TCPA Litigation: The Problems with 
Uncapped Statutory Damages, U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform at 
12 (October 2013), http://www.institutefor
legalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/TheJuggernautofTCPALit_WEB.PDF (``What 
is clear is that the TCPA's uncapped statutory damages pose a real 
threat to large and small well-intentioned American companies who have 
potentially millions of customers and who often need to communicate 
with those consumers.'').
    \14\ Id. at 10.
    \15\ TCPA Litigation Sprawl: A Study of the Sources and Targets of 
Recent TCPA Lawsuits, U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform at 10 
(Aug. 2017), http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/
TCPA_Paper_Final.pdf.
    \16\ Id. at 3. In total 3,121 cases were examined. Over 1,000 of 
those cases--more than one-third of the total lawsuits reviewed--were 
brought as nationwide class actions. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Compliance with the TCPA has been frustrated by uncertain and 
shifting standards as the FCC's interpretations have evolved over 
decades, leaving a tangled web of obligations. Businesses making good-
faith efforts to comply may nevertheless be subject to crippling 
litigation. Regulatory uncertainty and enormous settlements enriching 
class-action lawyers benefit neither consumers nor the economy. As FCC 
Commissioner Michael O'Rielly has observed, needless ``enforcement 
actions or lawsuits'' chill efforts by ``good actors and innovators'' 
to develop ``new consumer-friendly communications services.'' \17\
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    \17\ Commissioner O'Rielly, TCPA: It is Time to Provide Clarity, 
FCC Blog (Mar. 25, 2014, 2:10 PM), https://www.fcc.gov/news-events/
blog/2014/03/25/tcpa-it-time-provide-clarity
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The FCC's Omnibus Order added to the uncertainty. The TCPA 
prohibits making a call ``using any automatic telephone dialing 
system'' without the prior express consent of the called party.\18\ The 
Act defines ``automatic telephone dialing system'' as ``equipment which 
has the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, 
using a random or sequential number generator; and to dial such 
numbers.'' \19\ Uncertainty over the meaning of ``capacity'' led the 
FCC to adopt an order construing the term. Rather than providing 
clarity, however, the FCC adopted a sweeping interpretation including 
devices that have both the present and potential capacity to store or 
produce telephone numbers to be called, while also including devices 
that can generate random or sequential numbers and those that 
cannot.\20\ This baffling interpretation raised the prospect that 
everyday devices like smart phones and tablets could be ATDS subject to 
the TCPA's prohibitions because of their potential capacity to store or 
produce telephone numbers to be called. This construction conflicted 
with the text, history, and purpose of the TCPA, and contributed to a 
46 percent increase in TCPA litigation, with class actions comprising 
approximately one-third of those filings.\21\
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    \18\ 47 U.S.C. Sec. 227(b)(1)(A).
    \19\ Id. Sec. 227(a)(1)(A)-(B).
    \20\ Omnibus Order,  10-15.
    \21\ See TCPA Litigation Sprawl at 2, 4.
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III. The D.C. Circuit Vacated the FCC's Omnibus Order and Provided a 
        Sensible Roadmap for Moving Forward
    Numerous petitioners, including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 
sought judicial review of the Omnibus Order's unjustifiable expansion 
of the TCPA, arguing that the regime was unreasonable, impractical, and 
inconsistent with the statute's text. The D.C. Circuit largely agreed 
and vacated portions of the Omnibus Order in ACA Int'l v. FCC. 
Significantly, the court unanimously set aside the Commission's 
interpretation of ATDS, holding that the interpretation of capacity was 
``utterly unreasonable,'' \22\ ``incompatible with'' the statute's 
goals, and ``impermissibly'' expansive.\23\ The interpretation was so 
unreasonable, it was ``considerably beyond the agency's zone of 
delegated authority.'' \24\ The court also found unanimously that the 
Commission had offered an inconsistent and ``inadequa[te]'' explanation 
of what features constitute an [ATDS],\25\ ``fall[ing] short of 
reasoned decision making.'' \26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ Slip op. at 19.
    \23\ Slip op. at 23.
    \24\ Slip op. at 19.
    \25\ Slip op. at 29.
    \26\ Slip op. at 25.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The opinion also provided a roadmap for how the FCC should proceed. 
The court pointed to the interpretation of ``make any call . . . 
using'' offered by Commissioner Michael O'Rielly in his Omnibus Order 
dissent, which would require that dialing equipment ``be used as an 
[ATDS] to make the calls.'' \27\ In other words, the calling equipment 
must actually use ATDS capabilities to make the call. Although the 
court did not explicitly endorse this approach, as the issue was not 
raised in the appeal, it noted that this construction would 
``substantially diminish the practical significance of the Commission's 
expansive understanding of `capacity' in the [ATDS] definition.'' \28\ 
This is a significant signal to the FCC and the courts about the best 
reading of the TCPA.
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    \27\ Omnibus Order (statement of Commissioner O'Rielly) (emphasis 
in original).
    \28\ Slip op. at 30.
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IV. The FCC Should Adopt a New Approach to the TCPA that Protects 
        Legitimate Business Calls and Focuses on Bad Actors
    The D.C. Circuit's decision provides an opportunity for the FCC to 
rethink its approach to the TCPA. Confusing regulations and 
interpretations of the statutory text have contributed to a rise in 
TCPA litigation while doing little to reduce illegal and abusive 
robocalling. At the same time, increased liability exposure and 
compliance costs have deterred businesses from reaching out to their 
customers. A renewed focus on the TCPA's statutory text offers a path 
forward to better protect consumers and businesses that operate in good 
faith.
    Adopting the D.C. Circuit's suggested approach on what constitutes 
an ATDS would realign the interpretation of the TCPA to its text and 
purpose. This straightforward reading will ensure that liability 
attaches only when ATDS capabilities are used to make a call, rather 
than sweeping in calls made using smartphones, tablets, and other 
devices that conceivably could be modified to support autodialing at 
some point in the future. Significantly, it would provide businesses 
with clear guidance on the type of equipment they can use to contact 
their customers. A device's theoretical or potential capabilities would 
not be relevant to determining whether it is an ATDS. Instead, the 
inquiry should focus only on the functions used to make the call or 
calls in question. This clarification will help businesses avoid 
unnecessary litigation over whether they used an ATDS and help 
consumers differentiate whether they are targets of an illegal robocall 
campaign or receiving a routine business communication. Reducing the 
amount of TCPA litigation will also free up resources to focus on the 
actual bad actors who are the source of abusive robocalls. With fewer 
complaints, enforcement resources will not be wasted on investigating 
legitimate business communications and can be used to find and punish 
illegal robocallers.
    The TCPA was never intended to make all mass calling illegal. The 
legislative history reflects that the Act was intended to achieve a 
balance between the need for legitimate businesses to lawfully 
communicate with their customers and protecting consumers from certain 
abusive uses of the telephone system. There are bad actors who abuse 
the openness of our communications infrastructure, including through 
Caller ID spoofing and other illegal activities. The TCPA sought to 
prevent the use of specific equipment to engage in illegal and abusive 
conduct--random or sequential cold calling that tied up telephone 
networks, including emergency lines, and harassed consumers. The 
construction of ATDS suggested by the D.C. Circuit and supported by 
this testimony would categorically prohibit those abuses. At the same 
time, it would provide clear guidance to businesses on how they may 
lawfully communicate with their customers.
    The fact that the D.C. Circuit's preferred definition of ATDS does 
not cover as much equipment as the definition the court struck down in 
no way means that consumers are unprotected, or even less protected. 
The TCPA contains within itself the means of protection: the Do Not 
Call list. Any consumer lawfully contacted by a business using 
equipment that is not an ATDS and who does not desire to be called may 
ask the caller to be placed on the caller's company-specific Do Not 
Call list. Those consumers who proactively decide they do not want to 
receive calls--whether from an ATDS or not--may subscribe to the 
National Do Not Call List. Tens of millions of Americans already have.
V. Conclusion and Recommendations
    As Congress and the FCC look for ways to reduce abusive robocalls, 
reforming the TCPA is an important step. Reducing the amount of 
unnecessary litigation plaguing legitimate businesses will shift the 
focus of enforcement to the actual bad actors who are the root cause of 
illegal robocalls. In this regard, ILR commends the FCC for taking 
action to give telephone companies the authority to use innovative 
solutions to block illegal robocalls. The D.C. Circuit has provided 
both an opportunity and a roadmap to further the FCC's work of focusing 
resources at the root of the robocalling problem. Following that 
guidance will help businesses avoid burdensome litigation, restore the 
TCPA to its original purpose, and redirect resources and attention 
towards reducing abusive robocalls.
    As previously proposed by ILR, the following updates to the TCPA 
should be taken under consideration.

        Statute of Limitations: The TCPA contains no statute of 
        limitations, and so has fallen into the four-year default, 
        which makes no sense for calls/faxes that are supposedly 
        invasions of privacy that the consumer knows about at the 
        moment they are placed. Class actions reach staggering amounts 
        of damages because class plaintiffs seek four years' worth of 
        calling data and liability. The TCPA's time to bring suit 
        should be reasonably limited, as is the case with the other 
        Federal statutes providing private rights of action for 
        statutory damages.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \29\ See, e.g., Electronic Funds Transfer Act (15 U.S.C. 
Sec. 1693), Section 1693(m) (statute of limitations--1 year); Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act (15 U.S.C. Sec. 1692), Section 1692(k) 
(statute of limitations--1 year).

        Capping Statutory Damages and Adding Provisions for Reasonable 
        Attorneys' Fees: Similar to every other Federal statute 
        providing statutory damages and a private right of action to 
        consumers to seek those damages, the TCPA should have a cap on 
        the amount of individual and class action damages that can be 
        sought.\30\ There is no better way to curb litigation abuse, 
        bring the TCPA in line with its sister statutes, and avoid 
        unconstitutional and excessive fines for technical violations 
        causing no actual harm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \30\ See, e.g., Electronic Funds Transfer Act (15 U.S.C. 
Sec. 1693), Section 1693(m); Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (15 
U.S.C. Sec. 1692), Section 1692(k); Truth in Lending Act (15 U.S.C. 
Sec. 1631 et. al), Section 1640; Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 
Sec. 1681 et. al.), Section 1681(o). (Several of these statutes also 
permit defendants to recover costs/fees when actions are shown to have 
been brought in bad faith.)

        Affirmative Defenses: As businesses are targeted for calls 
        under Section 227(b), as well as for the 227(c) calls that 
        Congress knew could be made in error by a business acting in 
        good faith to follow the appropriate policies and procedures, 
        the affirmative defenses available in Section 227(c) should 
        also be imported into Section 227(b) to provide protection to 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        businesses working in good faith to comply with the TCPA.

        Capacity: The ``capacity'' of an ATDS should be interpreted for 
        past calls as written in the text of the statute, meaning only 
        those devices that have the actual ability to randomly/
        sequentially dial telephone calls would be actionable. And if 
        Congress wishes to limit some other sort of calling 
        technologies or text messages, new and more precise language 
        should be drafted, vetted, and implemented after a notice 
        period to companies so that they can comply with statutory 
        requirements.

        Reassigned or Wrongly-Provided Number: Businesses should not be 
        punished via TCPA lawsuits when they, in good faith, call a 
        customer-provided phone number that now belongs to a new party 
        unless and until the recipient informs the caller that the 
        number is wrong and the business has a reasonable time to 
        implement that change in its records. (If, after that notice 
        and reasonable time the company continues to call, then lack of 
        prior consent would be established for future calls.)

        Vicarious Liability: The FCC has interpreted the TCPA to allow 
        ``on behalf of'' liability for prerecorded/autodialed calls, 
        something not specifically provided for in the statute. Among 
        other things, the TCPA should be revised to define any such 
        vicarious liability so that it would exist only against the 
        appropriate entities--those persons who place the calls, or who 
        retain a telemarketer to place calls, or who authorize an agent 
        to place calls on their behalf.

        Bad Actors: The TCPA should be reformed to focus on the actual 
        bad actors (i.e., fraudulent calls from ``Rachel from 
        Cardmember Services,'' with spoofed numbers in Caller ID fields 
        to hide the identity of caller), instead of companies trying to 
        contact their consumers for a legitimate business purposes.

        Address New Technologies, Such As Text Messaging: A text 
        message is not the same as a call, and courts are wrong in 
        treating them equally. Should Congress wish to set rules on 
        text messaging within the TCPA, it should do so through the 
        regular channels of drafting, vetting, and implementing new 
        statutory language.

        Revocation: If a consumer that has provided a telephone number 
        to a company no longer wishes to receive communications at that 
        number, there should be a set process (as in the Fair Debt 
        Collection Practices Act) on how the business should be told of 
        the revocation, and a reasonable time for the company to 
        implement that change.

    The changes discussed above--which would help to protect American 
companies from expensive and damaging litigation abuse--would not risk 
any of these repercussions. Thus, we urge this Committee to revisit the 
TCPA to bring this 20th Century statute in line with 21st Century 
challenges. Twenty-five years have passed, and it is evident that the 
TCPA has had a negative impact on businesses that Congress never 
intended when first enacting this law in 1991. We appreciate the 
Committee's calling of today's hearing and stand ready to work with you 
on this important issue.
    Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to 
answering your questions.

    The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Delacourt.
    Ms. Saunders.

STATEMENT OF MARGOT FREEMAN SAUNDERS, SENIOR COUNSEL, NATIONAL 
                      CONSUMER LAW CENTER

    Ms. Saunders. Chairman Thune, Senator Blumenthal, and 
members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify 
today. I am here on behalf of the National Consumer Law 
Center's low-income clients as well as six other national 
consumer advocacy groups.
    My testimony, my written testimony, begins with a story of 
a woman in Florida who received over 1,800 calls from Conns 
Appliances. She was repeatedly--she repeatedly requested that 
these calls stop, and she was repeatedly bombarded with 
continued calls. At the end of the testimony, there's a 
calendar that shows that these 1,800 calls were made over a few 
months, including six or seven calls often daily on weekends. 
She--Conns--she was actually behind, but she was making her 
payments on the appliances.
    I start with that because one of the main points that I 
want to make today is that robocalls that are scams are 
significantly a problem, but they are not by any means the only 
problem that consumers are dealing with.
    On page 3 of my testimony, I show that the number of--one 
of the problems is simply that the number of robocalls is 
escalating tremendously. We start from less than a billion 
calls a month in September 2015 to now over 3 billion robocalls 
a month in March 2018. That's one of the primary callers--
primary reasons that we have this problem.
    But we also know, if you look at Table 2 on page 4 of my 
testimony, who the robocallers are. The top 20 robocallers 
include two scammers and 17 other callers, 15 of whom are debt 
collectors and are not covered by the Federal Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act, so that the only law that protects 
consumers from the onslaught of these callers is the Telephone 
Consumer Protection Act.
    But debt collection calls are not the only problem. In 
Table 3 of my testimony, I show what the types of calls are. 
About 28 percent are alerts and reminders, and as pointed out 
by other members of this panel, many of those calls are wanted 
by consumers, and the ability to consent and revoke is a very 
valuable tool for consumers because they want to be able to 
consent to reminders from their doctors and their pharmacies 
about health care matters.
    But the rest of the calls in that list, payment reminders, 
which is a euphemism for debt collectors, telemarketing, and 
scams, are generally unwanted calls and are rejected by 
consumers. And consumers very much need the ability to not only 
consent, but also to revoke consent, and much of the 
robocallers' position legally these days is that consumers, 
once they have consented, no longer have the ability to revoke 
that consent, and that is a critical piece of the Telephone 
Consumer Protection Act that was affirmed by the D.C. Circuit 
and needs to be maintained by the FCC.
    Later in my testimony I go through example after example of 
telemarketing calls that are--that were only addressed, not by 
public enforcement, but by private class actions. For example, 
Robertson v. Navient Solutions, Navient called Ms. Robertson 
667 times, over 500 of which were after she requested they--
she--they stop calling.
    Telemarketers remain a real problem, and these are not 
scammers, these are telemarketers selling real products. On 
page 8, there's an example of a case brought against Mortgage 
Investors Corporation for 64 million illegal telemarketing 
calls. This was a class action that stopped the caller and 
resulted in payment to all of the people who were harmed. The 
autodialer--the mechanism here was an autodialer with a human 
agent on the other end.
    Smith v. State Farm was another telemarketing litigation 
that was a class action that was only resolved by class 
actions. On Table 4 on page 10, I point out that while TCPA 
lawsuits have gone up, they've gone up in far less--a far lower 
proportion to the number of complaints and the number of 
robocalls that has escalated.
    We have suggestions at the end of the testimony for how the 
FCC should proceed. And I'm happy to answer any questions.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Saunders follows:]

    Prepared Statement of Margot Freeman Saunders, Senior Counsel, 
 National Consumer Law Center, On behalf of the low-income clients of 
   the National Consumer Law Center; Americans for Financial Reform, 
   Consumer Federation of American, National Association of Consumer 
       Advocates, Public Citizen, Public Knowledge and U.S. PIRG
    Chairman Thune, Senator Nelson, and Members of the Committee, I 
appreciate the opportunity to testify today on the importance of 
maintaining the integrity of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 
(TCPA) for consumers. I provide my testimony here today on behalf of 
the low-income clients of the National Consumer Law Center\1\ (NCLC), 
Americans for Financial Reform, Consumer Federation of American, 
National Association of Consumer Advocates, Public Citizen, Public 
Knowledge and U.S.PIRG.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The National Consumer Law Center (NCLC) is a non-profit 
corporation founded in 1969 to assist legal services, consumer law 
attorneys, consumer advocates and public policy makers in using the 
powerful and complex tools of consumer law for just and fair treatment 
for all in the economic marketplace. NCLC has expertise in protecting 
low-income customer access to telecommunications, energy and water 
services in proceedings at state utility commissions, the FCC and FERC. 
We publish and annually supplement nineteen practice treatises that 
describe the law currently applicable to all types of consumer 
transactions, including Access to Utility Service (5th ed. 2011), 
covering telecommunications generally, and Federal Deception Law (3d 
ed. 2017), which includes a chapter on the Telephone Consumer 
Protection Act. This testimony was prepared with the substantial 
assistance of Carolyn Carter and Stephen Rouzer.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I. The Scope of the Robocall Problem
    Unwanted robocalls are an invasion of privacy. As was forcefully 
stated by Senator Hollings, the TCPA's sponsor, ``[c]omputerized calls 
are the scourge of modern civilization. They wake us up in the morning; 
they interrupt our dinner at night; they force the sick and elderly out 
of bed; they hound us until we want to rip the telephone right out of 
the wall.'' \2\ I speak today for the 4.5 million Americans who 
complained last year about the barrage of unwanted robocalls we all 
receive.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ 137 Cong. Rec. 30,821-30,822 (1991) (also quoting Justice 
Brandeis, in Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 479, 48 S. Ct. 564, 72 L. 
Ed. 944 (1928), declaring ``the right to be let alone--the most 
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men''). 
See also S. Rep. 102-178, at 5 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1968, 1972-1973 (``The Committee believes that Federal legislation is 
necessary to protect the public from automated telephone calls. These 
calls can be an invasion of privacy, an impediment to interstate 
commerce, and a disruption to essential public safety services.''); 137 
Cong. Rec. S18781-02 (quoting Sen. Hollings as stating ``These calls 
are a nuisance and an invasion of our privacy.''); Mims v. Arrow Fin. 
Services, L.L.C., 565 U.S. 368, 370 132 S. Ct. 740, 181 L. Ed. 2d 881 
(2012) (noting that the TCPA ``bans certain practices invasive of 
privacy'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Let me tell you about just one case, which is typical of so many:

        Tonya Stevens of Tampa, Florida purchased some appliances from 
        Conns Appliances, Inc., a Texas company, in late 2014. Although 
        she was making her payments, they were not always on time. 
        Nevertheless, over the next fourteen months Conns called Ms. 
        Stevens on her cell phone 1,845 times, over one hundred times a 
        month, often as much as eight or nine times a day.\3\ These 
        calls were made despite Ms. Stevens' repeated requests that 
        Conns' agent stop calling. During one call, she said, ``I am at 
        my grandmother's death bed, quit calling.'' Conns' position is 
        that once Ms. Stevens provided consent to be called on her cell 
        phone she could never revoke that consent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ As this case is in arbitration, there is no formal complaint. 
However, Appendix 1 is a calendar showing the number of times these 
calls were made each day and each week.

    This case is emblematic of the problem Americans are facing with 
robocalls. The calls are unrelenting. The callers will not stop, 
despite consumers' pleas. The Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) 
``Biennial Report to Congress'' \4\ reveals a surge in consumer 
complaints about robocalls in 2017, with 4.5 million complaints filed 
in 2017 compared to 3.4 million in 2016. This rise in complaints is 
consistent with an increased use of intrusive and disruptive robocall 
technology. But the problem is far worse than the FTC's complaint 
numbers show. Industry data shows that over two billion robocalls are 
made every month, many of which are unwanted and illegal. Over 3 
billion robocalls were made just in February 2018. Robocalls increased 
from 831 million in September 2015 to 3.2 billion in March 2018--a 285 
percent increase in less than three years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/biennial-
report-congress-under-do-not-call-registry-fee-extension-act-2007-
operation-national-do-not/biennial_do_not_call_report_fy_
2016-2017_0.pdf


    Congress passed the Telephone Consumer Protection Act \5\ (TCPA) in 
1991 in direct response to ``[v]oluminous consumer complaints about 
abuses of telephone technology--for example, computerized calls 
dispatched to private homes.'' \6\ Yet 27 years later, the problem is 
only growing worse. The complaints are still pouring in. Private 
litigation and public enforcement have not kept pace with the problem--
both the number of calls and the number of complaints by consumers 
increase every month. Robocalls are very inexpensive to make. Callers 
can discharge tens of millions of robocalls over the course of a day at 
only a penny per call.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ 47 U.S.C. Sec. 227.
    \6\ Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., L.L.C., 565 U.S. 368, 370-371 132 S. 
Ct. 740, 181 L.Ed. 2d 881 (2012).
    \7\ See, e.g., Robodial.org, which costs 1 cent a call for calls up 
to 15 seconds, at https://www.robodial.org/instantpricequote/ (last 
accessed Apr. 12, 2018); Call-Em-All Pricing, which quotes pricing from 
a high of 6 cents per call to $7.50 per month ``for one inclusive 
monthly fee. Call and text as much as you need.'' https://www.call-em-
all.com/pricing (last accessed Apr. 12, 2018).
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A. Who Is Making These Calls?
    The problem of abusive, unwanted robocalls is not limited to scam 
calls. Scam calls--calls that are selling products or services they do 
not intend to provide, or that are pretexts for identity theft--are 
only one small part of the invasive robocall problem in the United 
States.
    We know who is making robocalls because call-blocking technologies 
track the identity of callers. The Robocall Index created by one call-
blocking app provider, YouMail, identifies the biggest robocallers 
every month.\8\ The biggest robocallers are not scammers; scammers 
actually account for only a small fraction of the robocalls to 
consumers in the United States. In March of 2018, only two scam callers 
(those marked in bold in Table 2, below) made the list of the top 20 
sources of robocalls. Banks, credit card companies, retailers, and debt 
collectors, all of whom were collecting debts according to the robocall 
blocker, took 17 of the top 20 spots.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ The existence of these third-party call-blocking technologies 
does not fully address the problem. Unfortunately, many consumers do 
not use them. Moreover, many consumers, particularly traditional 
landline users, lack access to effective robocall-blocking tools.

   Table 2--Top Twenty Robocallers in the United States March 2018 \9\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Capital One          8. Loan scam               14. Barclaycard
2. Portfolio Recovery   9. AT&T                    15. First Premier
 Associates             10. Enhanced Recovery       Bank
(debt collection)        Corporation               16. PayPal
3. Wells Fargo          (debt collection)          17. Chase Bank
4. Santander            11. Fingerhut              18. Chase Bank
5. A health insurance   12. Transworld Systems      (alternate number)
 scam                    (debt collection)         19. Kohl's
6. Comcast              13. Encore Receivables     20. Citibank
7. Job availability      Management
 call                   (debt collection)
(substitute teachers)
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    By no means do I intend to minimize the problem with scam calls. 
They are a real problem that must be dealt with. But they are also not, 
by any measure, the entire problem. In the first two months of 2018, 
scam calls accounted for only a quarter of all robocalls:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ See YouMail Robocall Index, available at https://
robocallindex.com/(last accessed Apr. 12, 1018). To come up with the 
names of the callers, we simply called the numbers listed on the 
website to see who answered.

           Table 3--Estimated National Robocalls By Type \10\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                      Category                        January   February
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alerts and Reminders                                      27%        28%
Payment Reminders                                         33%        32%
Telemarketing                                             15%        16%
Scams                                                     25%        24%
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This list of robocallers begs the question of which calls are 
objected to by consumers. We know the answer from the developers of one 
of the leading robocall-blocking apps: YouMail's Robocall Blocker.\11\ 
All of the calls in the bottom two categories--Telemarketing and 
Scams--are routinely blocked by users of the call-blocking program.\12\ 
Very few of the calls in the first category--Alerts and Reminders--are 
blocked. Most of the calls in the second category--Payment Reminders 
(which is a polite characterization for the debt collection callers)--
are blocked by their recipients.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ Press Release, YouMail, YouMail Releases Detailed Breakdown of 
U.S. Robocalls in February (Mar. 21, 2018), available at https://
www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/youmail-releases-detailed-breakdown-
of-us-robocalls-in-february-300616969.html (last accessed Apr. 12, 
2018).
    \11\ See https://www.youmail.com/home/feature/stop-robocalls (last 
accessed Apr. 12, 2018).
    \12\ This information was provided by Alex Quilici, CEO of YouMail, 
on March 28, 2018.
    \13\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Debt Collection Robocalls are a Huge Problem That Often Only the 
        TCPA Can Address
    As can be surmised from the huge number of debt collection 
robocalls made in the U.S., one third of all American consumers have 
accounts in collection.\14\ Indeed ACA International, ``a trade group 
located in the United States representing collection agencies, 
creditors, debt buyers, collection attorneys and debt collection 
industry service providers,'' \15\ has been a primary driver of efforts 
before the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to roll back the 
consumer protections in the TCPA \16\ both prior to and after the FCC's 
2015 Omnibus Order.\17\ This organization was also, of course, the lead 
petitioner in the appeal of the FCC's pro-consumer order issued in 
2015, which led to the recent decision of the D.C. Circuit Court in ACA 
International v. F.C.C.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ See Urban Institute, Debt in America: An Interactive Map (last 
updated Apr. 5, 2018), available at https://apps.urban.org/features/
debt-interactive-map/ (last accessed Apr. 12, 2018).
    \15\ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ACA_International.
    \16\ See e.g., ACA International, Petition for Rulemaking of ACA 
International (filed Feb. 11, 2014), available at https://
ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/7521072801.pdf.
    \17\ In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone 
Consumer Protection Act of 1991, CG Docket No. 02-278, Report and 
Order, 30 FCC Rcd. 7961 (F.C.C. July 2015) [hereinafter 2015 TCPA 
Omnibus Order].
    \18\ 885 F.3d 687 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It is a common misconception that the Federal Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act \19\ (FDCPA) provides sufficient protections for 
consumers against invasive and abusive debt collection calls. 
Unfortunately, that is the not case, for several reasons. The primary 
reason is that the FDCPA does not cover collection efforts made by 
creditors to collect their own debts; it covers only third-party debt 
collectors--those collecting debts originally owed to others.\20\ So of 
the 20 top robocallers listed in Table 2, only four (those whose names 
are in italics) were even covered by the FDCPA. Debt collection calls 
by all of the remaining robocallers were not covered by the FDCPA 
because they were collecting their own debts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1692.
    \20\ 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1692a(6).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This leaves the TCPA as the principal Federal law providing 
protections against harassing and unrelenting debt collection calls to 
consumers' cell phones. Below are just a few examples of the 
significance of the problem of debt collector robocallers. All of these 
cases are recent; all involve hundreds--if not thousands--of calls; and 
all involve multiple calls after repeated requests from the consumer to 
stop calling:

  1.  Robertson v. Navient Solutions.\21\ Shortly after Ms. Robertson 
        acquired a Certified Nursing Assistant certificate, which she 
        had funded with student loans, she experienced health problems 
        and, also, had to care for her dying father. She was unable to 
        work, and applied for disability. She received a forbearance on 
        her Federal student loans, but not for the private loans. Ms. 
        Robertson made payments when she was able. However, payments 
        did not stop the calls. In total, Navient called Ms. Robertson 
        a total of 667 times, and called 522 times after she told them 
        to stop calling. Navient would call back the same day even when 
        Ms. Robertson would tell the collection agent that she would 
        not have any money to pay until the following month.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ Robertson v. Navient Solutions, Inc., Case No.: 8:17-cv-01077-
RAL-MAP (M.D. Fla. filed May 8, 2017).

  2.  Gold v. Ocwen Loan Servicing.\22\ The plaintiff consented to 
        being contacted about his mortgage debt, and answered several 
        collection calls, but then asked for the calls to stop. 
        However, the servicer called his cell phone at least 1,281 
        times between April 2, 2011 and March 27, 2014, after the 
        repeated requests to stop.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ 2017 WL 6342575 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2017).

  3.  Montegna v. Ocwen Loan Servicing.\23\ The servicer called the 
        plaintiff on his cell phone at least 234 times, even after he 
        requested that the calls stop.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ 2017 WL 4680168 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2017).

  4.  Todd v. Citibank.\24\ Some time in January 2016, the bank began 
        calling the plaintiff's cell phone. The calls, often made twice 
        a day, totaled 350 calls, even after repeated requests to stop 
        calling. ``The purported injury here is Plaintiff's `privacy, 
        peace, and quiet' was disturbed by the numerous telephone 
        calls.'' \25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ 2017 WL 1502796 (D.N.J. Apr. 26, 2017).
    \25\ Id. at *8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
C. Real Telemarketers Are Making Many of the Unwanted Robocalls
    Telemarketing calls are also the source of millions of unwanted, 
and illegal, robocalls. Telemarketers with real products to sell (car 
insurance, home security networks, even marketing an independent film) 
bombard consumers' homes and cell phones with illegal robocalls. It is 
important to note that ``real'' telemarketing calls, often with a human 
caller at the other end of the phone, are not scammers. Their caller 
IDs are sometimes--although not always--truthfully displayed. So 
addressing scams and spoofing will not deal with these maddening and 
invasive--and illegal--calls.
    Often a single consumer is hounded by persistent telemarketing 
calls from the same company.\26\ With many telemarketing campaigns, 
however, the campaign will make millions of illegal calls, but only one 
or two to any given consumer. The only effective way to enforce the 
TCPA's protections against these illegal calls is through public 
enforcement or private class actions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ See, e.g., Jenkins v. MGage, L.L.C., 2016 WL 4263937 (N.D. Ga. 
Aug. 12, 2016) (individual action challenging 150 text messages 
promoting events at a nightclub despite 17 requests to stop).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    That is because the TCPA allows a consumer to recover only $500 to 
$1500 per call, and does not require the defendant to reimburse the 
consumer for the attorney fees incurred to prosecute the case. As a 
result, individual suits regarding just one or two calls are not 
economically feasible. (And a million individual suits for a million-
robocall campaign would overwhelm the court system in any event).
    One example of a particularly intrusive telemarketing campaign is 
the case of Golan v. Veritas Entertainment, decided by a Federal court 
in Missouri in 2017.\27\ In its efforts to market a political film, the 
company made so many calls in violation of the TCPA--over 3.2 million 
calls--that the judge ordered the statutory damages award reduced to 
just $10 per call. If he had stuck with $500 per call, the total would 
have been $1.6 billion, which he held to be so disproportionate as to 
violate due process. In reducing the award, the court noted:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \27\ 2017 WL 3923162 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 7, 2017).

        This reflects the severity of the offense, a six-day 
        telemarketing campaign which placed 3.2 million telephone 
        calls, as well as respecting the purposes of the TCPA to have a 
        deterrent effect and to account for unquantifiable losses 
        including the invasions of privacy, unwanted interruptions and 
        disruptions at home, and the wasted time spent answering 
        unwanted solicitation calls or unwanted voice messages.\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \28\ Id. at *4 (emphasis added).

    This sentiment was emphasized in another large class action case, 
Krakauer v. DISH Network,\29\ in which the court refused to unwind the 
jury's award of $400 per call, trebled by the court, for each of 51,000 
telemarketing calls. The court pointed out:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \29\ 2017 WL 4417957 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 3, 2017).

        It is not `grossly excessive' to require Dish to pay treble 
        damages for the more than 50,000 willful violations it 
        committed, given the nature of the privacy interests repeatedly 
        invaded and Dish's continuing disregard for those interests, 
        the extent of the violations, and the need to advance 
        reasonable governmental interests in deterring future 
        violations.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \30\ Id. at *11 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 3, 2017) (emphasis added). See also 
U.S. v. DISH Network, 256 F. Supp. 3d 810 (C.D. Ill. 2017) (similar 
case brought against Dish Network by the United States, as well as the 
states of California, Illinois, North Carolina and Ohio; the court 
ordered DISH to pay a civil penalty of $168,000,000 ``for Dish's 
violation of the TSR done with knowledge or knowledge fairly implied,'' 
plus statutory damages of $84,000,000).

    The court went on to treble the damages awarded by the jury, which 
the court found appropriate here in light of the seller's ``sustained 
and ingrained practice of violating the law,'' and the need for 
deterrence.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \31\ Krakauer v. DISH Network, L.L.C., 2017 WL 2242952, at *12-*13 
(M.D.N.C. May 22, 2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Below are just a few examples of pending or resolved class action 
lawsuits that used the TCPA to obtain redress for consumers for tens of 
millions of illegal robocalls:

  1.  Ott v. Mortgage Investors Corp.\32\ In this case, which settled 
        in 2016, there were over 64 million illegal telemarketing calls 
        made to millions of veterans to convince them to refinance 
        their VA loans. The consumers reported receiving dozens of 
        unwanted calls from the defendant, who repeatedly failed to 
        remove their telephone numbers from its call list upon demand. 
        The defendant's telemarketing efforts were so aggressive that 
        thousands of consumers filed complaints with the FTC and other 
        agencies regarding the unwanted and harassing telemarketing 
        calls. The technology used was an autodialer with a human 
        agent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \32\ Ott v. Mortg. Investors Corp. of Ohio, 65 F. Supp. 3d 1046 (D. 
Or. 2014).

  2.  Strache v. SCI Direct, Inc.\33\ This class action involved over 
        four million calls made by a company selling cremation 
        services. One of the consumers kept receiving these calls, even 
        after sending e-mails, calling back and requesting that the 
        calls stop, and filing an FTC complaint.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \33\ Case No. 1:17-cv-04692 (N.D. Ill.); original case was Allard 
v. SCI Direct, Inc., Case No. 3:16-cv-01033 (M.D. Tenn.).

  3.  Smith v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co.\34\ This class action was 
        filed after a marketing company made 350 million phone calls to 
        consumers from a list of numbers it found in the White Pages. 
        During each call, a recording instructed recipients to ``press 
        1 now'' for a better deal on auto insurance. Recipients who 
        pressed 1 were transferred to a live ``screener,'' who asked 
        questions and then transferred the call to insurance agents, 
        including agents for State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
        Company. The calls resulted in leads to State Farm agents for 
        at least 62,827 unique cell phone numbers. State Farm agents 
        continued to employ the marketers' services for over six months 
        after the lawsuit was brought.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \34\ Case No. 1:13-cv-02018 (N.D. Ill.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
  4.  Holtzman v. Turza.\35\ This case involved 8,430 junk faxes sent 
        by an attorney who was advertising his law practice to CPAs. 
        The defendant litigated the case for over ten years, until the 
        Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals put a stop to it.\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \35\ 728 F.3d 682 (7th Cir. 2013).
    \36\ ABA Journal, 7th Circuit rejects another appeal by lawyer 
ordered to pay up to $4.2M for sending junk faxes, Nov. 16, 2017, 
available at http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
7th_circuit_rejects_another_appeal_by_lawyer_ordered_to_pay_up_to_4.2m_f
or/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
II. Class Actions are Not the Problem
    Robocallers like to point to the numbers of class actions as fodder 
for their claim that TCPA rules are out of control. Class actions 
regarding TCPA violations have increased over the past several years, 
but they have not increased nearly as dramatically as the number of 
robocalls has increased. The annual number of robocalls increased from 
14 billion in 2015 to 30 billion in 2017, a 115 percent increase in 
just three years--see Table 4. (And the steep climb in the number of 
robocalls per month is even more alarming, as that number has increased 
285 percent from September 2015 to March 2018. Even if the monthly rate 
does not increase beyond March's total of 3.2 billion, we will see 38.4 
billion robocalls this year).
    The number of complaints to government agencies has also increased 
dramatically--a 100 percent increase during the same three-year period, 
from 3.5 million to 7.1 million.\37\ Yet the number of TCPA lawsuits of 
all types--both class actions and individual actions--increased only 19 
percent, from 3687 in 2015 to 4392 in 2017. The key point is that 
robocalls are rapidly increasing, which is clearly upsetting the 
Americans subjected to them.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \37\ Growth calculated through analysis of 2015 and 2017 figures. 
Federal Trade Commission, National Do Not Call Registry Data Book FY 
2017, at 6, (Dec. 2017), available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/
default/files/filefield_paths/dnc_data_book_fy2017.pdf (last accessed 
Apr. 14, 2018).

                          Table 4--Comparing Lawsuits to Complaints to Robocall Numbers
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                              TCPA Lawsuits   Complaints to FTC &  FCC       Total Number of
                                                Filed \38\              \39\              Robocalls in U.S.\40\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2015                                                   3687                 3,578,710            14,214,000,000
2016                                                   4860                 5,340,234            29,300,000,000
2017                                                   4392                 7,157,370            30,500,000,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Class actions serve a critical role in deterring robocallers from 
violating the law as well as protecting consumers from TCPA violations. 
Without class actions there would be little incentive for callers to 
comply with the TCPA. As is evident from the comparison of the number 
of complaints filed by consumers with the FTC and the FCC, and the 
number of cases actually filed, only a tiny proportion of complaints 
actually mature into real lawsuits. As there are no fee-shifting 
provisions in the TCPA, the economics of bringing litigation under the 
TCPA require that there be significant numbers of violations (multiples 
of the $500 statutory damages) before litigation regarding even the 
most blatant violations is feasible. These cases are time-consuming to 
litigate and they require expensive expert witnesses to prove the 
claims. The lawyers who bring these cases benefit from them--but only 
if they successfully prove the elements of the claims under the TCPA. 
That is why private enforcement is an effective mechanism of enforcing 
a consumer protection statute.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \38\ WebRecon, Web Recon Stats for Dec 2017 & Year in Review, 
available at https://webrecon.com/webrecon-stats-for-dec-2017-year-in-
review/ (last accessed Apr. 14, 2018).
    \39\ See Federal Trade Commission, National Do Not Call Registry, 
supra note 37.
    \40\ 2016 and 2017 numbers derived from the sum of monthly totals. 
YouMail Robocall Index, supra note 9. The 2015 number is derived from 
the average number of calls in the six months for which totals are 
provided. See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    When cases settle, the unnamed class members typically receive a 
portion of what they would have been entitled to had the case proceeded 
to final judgment. That is why the cases settle--so that the defendants 
do not have to pay as much as they might if the case was litigated 
through to judgment. The compensation for the attorneys who handled the 
case for the consumers must be approved by the court and depends on the 
benefit they achieved for the consumers, so they have the incentive to 
get the best settlement possible for the class.
    Consumers who are not members of the class also benefit from class 
actions, whether the actions are settled or resolved only after trial. 
Class actions provide a much-needed deterrent effect against violating 
the TCPA, which limits the number of unwanted calls and texts to cell 
phones for the rest of us.
    In dissenting from the FCC's 2015 Omnibus Order,\41\ Chairman (then 
Commissioner) Pai and Commissioner O'Rielly cited several TCPA cases 
that they felt were meritless. But this is not a reason to weaken the 
TCPA. With the exception of just one case (the Rubio case, discussed 
below), the courts dismissed those cases. In other words, our justice 
system, while not perfect, does a reliable job of weeding out meritless 
or abusive cases. For example:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \41\ 2015 TCPA Omnibus Order, supra note 17.

  1.  Emmanuel v. Los Angeles Lakers, Inc.,\42\ mentioned by 
        Commissioner Pai in his dissent.\43\ In this case, the 
        plaintiff attended a Lakers game during which attendees were 
        invited to send a text message to a specified telephone number 
        for the opportunity to have the message appear on the 
        scoreboard. After the plaintiff sent the Lakers a text message, 
        he received a confirmatory text back. He then sued, alleging 
        that this confirmatory text violated the TCPA's prohibition 
        against sending a consumer a text message without the 
        consumer's prior consent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \42\ Case no. 2:12-cv-09936-GW-SH (C.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2013).
    \43\ 2015 TCPA Omnibus Order, supra note 17, at 8072 (Pai, Comm'r, 
dissenting).

     The District Court granted the Lakers' motion to dismiss with 
        prejudice. Taking a ``common sense'' approach, the court held 
        that the challenged text message was not actionable under the 
        TCPA. By sending his original message, the plaintiff expressly 
        agreed to receive a return confirmatory text. This confirmatory 
        text was not the type of intrusive communication prohibited by 
        the TCPA because it responded directly to the plaintiff's 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        original text.

  2.  Gragg v. Orange Cab Co., Inc.,\44\ mentioned by Commissioner Pai 
        in his dissent.\45\ After the plaintiff requested a taxi, the 
        dispatcher manually inputted pertinent information, and pressed 
        ``enter'' to transmit the data to TaxiMagic to reach the 
        nearest available driver. A driver transmitted his acceptance 
        of the request by pressing ``accept'' on his Mobile Data 
        Terminal and then sent the plaintiff a message that read ``Taxi 
        # 850 dispatched @ 05:20.'' The plaintiff brought a class 
        action suit alleging that the text message violated the TCPA as 
        it was made with an autodialer without prior express consent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \44\ 995 F. Supp. 2d 1189 (W.D. Wash. 2014)
    \45\ 2015 TCPA Omnibus Order, supra note 17, at 8072 (Pai, Comm'r, 
dissenting).

     The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the modem 
        utilized by defendants to operate the TaxiMagic program was a 
        ``system'' as envisioned by TCPA precedent: ``The Court 
        declines to adopt an interpretation of `system' that would lead 
        to an absurd result.''\46\ The court entered summary judgment 
        against the consumer on the TCPA claim.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \46\ 995 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1192 (W.D. Wash. 2014) (emphasis added).

  3.  Kinder v. Allied Interstate, Inc.,\47\ mentioned by Commissioner 
        Pai in his dissent.\48\ Soon after acquiring a pager number 
        (619-999-9999), the plaintiff realized that it was receiving 
        thousands of unwanted pages that were not meant for him. He 
        then disconnected the pager, but recorded all the calls made to 
        it and filed many suits regarding them. The appellate court 
        affirmed the trial court's finding that the plaintiff 
        intentionally subjected himself to unwanted calls and that, as 
        a matter of policy, this conduct precluded any recovery under 
        the TCPA.\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \47\ 2010 WL 2993958 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2010).
    \48\ 2015 TCPA Omnibus Order, supra note 17, at 8072 (Pai, Comm'r, 
dissenting).
    \49\ 2010 WL 2993958, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010). See also Epps v. 
Earth Fare, Inc., 2017 WL 1424637 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2017) (dismissing 
case as ``manufactured'' lawsuit where plaintiff purported to revoke 
consent to receive commercial text messages by responding with long 
sentences rather than simply responding with the STOP command, as 
instructed in each message).

    Both Commissioners Pai and O'Rielly also cited the case of Rubio's 
Restaurant, which was sued for repeatedly calling a reassigned number, 
relying on the called party's statements that it had blocked the 
calls.\50\ Rubio's then filed a petition with the FCC requesting that a 
bad faith defense be allowed for TCPA claims. The FCC denied the 
request in the 2015 Omnibus Order, pointing out that once the caller 
affirmatively knew that the number was no longer assigned to the person 
from whom it had consent, it was incumbent on the caller to stop the 
calls.\51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \50\ Rubio's Restaurant, Inc., Petition for Expedited Declaratory 
Ruling, CG Docket No. 02-278 (filed Aug. 15, 2014), available at http:/
/apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7521768526.
    \51\ 2015 TCPA Omnibus Order, supra note 17, at 8012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Indeed, without ensuring that callers have the obligation to update 
records regarding reassigned numbers, there would be no meaningful 
enforcement of the TCPA's proscription against robodialing numbers 
without consent. Hopefully, the FCC's pending proposal to establish a 
reassigned number database \52\ will resolve most, if not all, of the 
challenges relating to reassigned numbers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \52\ In re Advanced Methods to Target and Eliminate Unlawful 
Robocalls, CG Docket No. 17-59, Second Further Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, 37 FCC Rcd. 56 (F.C.C. Mar. 2018), available at https://
transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2018/db0323/FCC-18-
31A1.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The potential of class action lawsuits benefits not only consumers, 
but also businesses that want to comply with the law. Without the 
threat of class action lawsuits, their competitors would violate the 
law with little fear of consequences, putting the law-abiding business 
at a competitive disadvantage. The deterrent effect of class actions 
protects millions of consumers from receiving unwanted--and unconsented 
to--calls and texts to their cell phones on a daily basis. Courts are 
quite capable of ferreting out meritless TCPA lawsuits.
III. The Impact of the D.C. Circuit Court's Decision in ACA 
        International v. FCC \53\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \53\ NCLC has produced a comprehensive analysis of the decision in 
a memorandum entitled The Effect of ACA International: What Does it 
Vacate, What Does it Undermine, What Rules Remain? (Apr. 2, 2018), 
available at www.nclc.org.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On March 16, 2018, the D.C. Circuit issued its long-awaited 
decision in ACA International v. FCC,\54\ an appeal filed by debt 
collectors and a number of other industry players from the 2015 Omnibus 
Order issued by the FCC.\55\ ACA International addresses three major 
issues:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \54\ 885 F.3d 687 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
    \55\ 2015 TCPA Omnibus Order, supra note 17.

   The definition of ``automatic telephone dialing system'' 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        (ATDS);

   Caller liability for calls to reassigned numbers; and

   The right of consumers to revoke consent to receive 
        robocalls.

    The TCPA prohibits the use of an autodialer (the statute uses the 
term ``automated telephone dialing system'' or ATDS) to call a cell 
phone without the called party's consent.\56\ This prohibition is 
critically important to consumers, as it is the primary bulwark against 
the tsunami of unwanted calls that would otherwise flood their phones.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \56\ 47 U.S.C. Sec. 227(b)(1)(A)(iii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The TCPA defines autodialer as equipment that has the capacity to 
store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or 
sequential number generator, and to dial such numbers.\57\ The FCC has 
interpreted this definition on several occasions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \57\ 47 U.S.C. Sec. 227(a)(1). See also 47 C.F.R. 
Sec. 64.1200(f)(2) (similar definition).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In 2003, the FCC held that a device cannot be excluded from the 
definition because it dials from a given set of numbers rather than 
from randomly or sequentially generated numbers.\58\ That ruling also 
holds that a predictive dialer is an autodialer, reasoning that, like 
earlier autodialers, the basic function of a predictive dialer is the 
capacity to dial numbers without human intervention. In 2008, the FCC 
issued another declaratory ruling reiterating that a predictive dialer 
is an autodialer.\59\ Many decisions have held that these rulings are 
binding on courts.\60\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \58\ In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone 
Consumer Protection Act of 1991, CG Docket No. 02-278, Report and 
Order, 18 FCC Rcd. 14,014 (F.C.C. July 2003).
    \59\ In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone 
Consumer Protection Act of 1991, CG Docket No. 02-278, Declaratory 
Ruling, 23 FCC Rcd. 559 (F.C.C. Jan. 2008).
    \60\ Zeidel v. A&M (2015) L.L.C., 2017 WL 1178150 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 
30, 2017) (relying on FCC's 2003 order to hold that device that sends 
text messages en masse is ATDS regardless of whether it has capacity to 
generate numbers sequentially or randomly; device is ATDS if it stores 
pre-programmed numbers or receives numbers from a computer database, 
can dial those numbers at random in sequential order or from a database 
of numbers, and its basic function is the capacity to dial numbers 
without human intervention); Espejo v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., 
2016 WL 6037625 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 14, 2016) (relying on 2003 order to 
hold that predictive dialer is an ATDS); Brown v. Credit Mgmt., L.P., 
131 F. Supp. 3d 1332 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (relying on 2003 and 2008 orders 
to hold predictive dialer an ATDS); Swaney v. Regions Bank, 2015 WL 
12751706 (N.D. Ala. July 13, 2015) (text message sending system is ATDS 
because it has ability to dial numbers without human intervention); 
Brown v. Account Control Tech., Inc., 2015 WL 11181947 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 
16, 2015) (relying on 2003 and 2008 orders to hold that a predictive 
dialer is an ATDS; dismissing defendant's argument that predictive 
dialer is ATDS only if it has capacity to use random or sequential 
number generation); Morse v. Allied Interstate, L.L.C., 65 F. Supp. 3d 
407 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (2003 and 2008 orders are binding; predictive 
dialer that calls numbers without human intervention is ATDS); Moore v. 
DISH Network L.L.C., 57 F. Supp. 3d 639 (N.D. W. Va. 2014) (predictive 
dialer is ATDS even if it lacks capacity to generate random or 
sequential phone numbers and even though humans create the lists of 
numbers to be called); Sterk v. Path, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 3d 813 (N.D. 
Ill. 2014) (relying on 2003 and 2008 orders; a predictive dialer is an 
ATDS; here, device that sends text messages to call list is ATDS even 
if it lacks capacity to generate numbers randomly or sequentially); 
Davis v. Diversified Consultants, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 3d 217 (D. Mass. 
2014) (relying on 2003 and 2008 orders to hold that predictive dialer 
is ATDS even if it does not have capacity for random or sequential 
number generation); Lardner v. Diversified Consultants, Inc., 17 F. 
Supp. 3d 1215 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (relying on 2003 order and finding it 
reasonable; device is ATDS if it automatically dials numbers from a 
preprogrammed list); Cabrera v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 2014 WL 
11881002 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 26, 2014) (relying on 2003 and 2008 orders to 
hold that any device that is able to dial numbers without human 
intervention, for example by calling numbers stored in a database, is 
an ATDS; LiveVox system is ATDS).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Robocallers have not been happy with these rulings. They have 
sought to create equipment that automatically calls millions of numbers 
a day but that does not quite meet the statutory definition, and they 
have also repeatedly petitioned the FCC to issue a narrow definition of 
``autodialer.'' In 2015, in response to the latest batch of petitions, 
the FCC issued another declaratory order that reiterated the 
conclusions of the 2003 and 2008 orders and added further 
interpretations.\61\ The 2015 order held that, whether or not a 
particular call was placed through random or sequential generation of 
telephone numbers, a system is an autodialer if it has the present or 
potential capacity to generate numbers in this way.\62\ The order also 
made it clear that ``the TCPA's use of `capacity' does not exempt 
equipment that lacks the `present ability' to dial randomly or 
sequentially.'' \63\ Thus hardware that can store or produce telephone 
numbers to be called using a random or sequential number generator is 
an autodialer even if software necessary to accomplish that 
functionality has not yet been installed.\64\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \61\ In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone 
Consumer Protection Act of 1991, CG Docket No. 02-278, Report and 
Order, 30 FCC Rcd. 7961  10, 23, 24 (F.C.C. July 10, 2015), appeal 
resolved, ACA International v. FCC, 885 F.3d 687 (D.C. Cir. 2018) 
(setting aside portions of FCC's 2015 order dealing with ATDS 
definition and treatment of reassigned cell phone numbers).
    \62\ Id. at  15.
    \63\ Id.
    \64\ Id. at  16, 18-20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The industry appealed the 2015 order,\65\ and in 2018, in ACA 
International v. Federal Communications Commission,\66\ the D.C. 
Circuit set aside the portions of the 2015 order that dealt with the 
definition of autodialer. The court's main concern was that the FCC's 
broad interpretation of the term ``capacity'' in the autodialer 
definition could sweep in smartphones that consumers were using for 
ordinary purposes. It sent this part of the order back to the FCC to 
redo.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \65\ See National Consumer Law Center, Federal Deception Law 
Sec. 6.2.4.3A (3d ed. 2017), updated at www.nclc.org/library.
    \66\ 885 F.3d 687 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    While ACA International sets aside the portions of the FCC's 2015 
order that dealt with the definition of ATDS, it leaves in place the 
FCC's 2003 and 2008 orders, which remain binding on the courts.\67\ The 
D.C. Circuit's decision thus rolls the clock back to 2014, before the 
FCC had issued the portions of its 2015 order that relate to the 
definition of an ATDS. Accordingly, the role of courts after ACA 
International should be to interpret the statute in light of the 2003 
and 2008 FCC orders, the decisions of the Court of Appeals for their 
Circuit, and any decisions of other courts that have persuasive value, 
but without the benefit of the 2015 order on this point. In our view, 
discussed in length in our published analysis of the effect of ACA 
International,\68\ most dialers used by robocallers still fall within 
the definition of autodialer.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \67\ The D.C. Circuit's brief references to the 2003 and 2008 FCC 
orders in ACA International do nothing to undermine the conclusion that 
the opinion decides only the validity of the 2015 order. Except for a 
brief mention of the 2003 order in an introductory section describing 
the FCC's history of rulemaking and declaratory rulings, ACA 
International mentions the FCC's 2003 and 2008 orders only in section 
II(A)(2). 885 F.3d at 701. That section first addresses the question 
whether the existence of the 2003 and 2008 orders deprives the D.C. 
Circuit of jurisdiction to entertain the challenge to the 2015 order. 
This was a necessary prerequisite for the court to address the 2015 
order. For more discussion of this point, see NCLC's memorandum on the 
impact of the decision, supra note 54, at Sec. I.A.3.
    \68\ See NCLC's memorandum on the impact of the decision, supra 
note 54, at Sec. I.A.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In ACA International, the D.C. Circuit also addressed the question 
of reassigned cell phone numbers. Often callers have claimed that a 
barrage of calls is legal because the called party's cell phone number 
was previously assigned to a consumer who had consented to the calls. 
Consumers have found these calls extremely difficult to stop. The FCC's 
2015 order made it clear that a caller has to have the consent of the 
person it actually calls, and that, when a telephone number is 
reassigned from one consumer to another, the caller must have the new 
consumer's consent. In addition, however, the FCC created a safe harbor 
for the first call to a reassigned number while imposing liability for 
calls after that first call. The D.C. Circuit held that, while the 
rationale for requiring the caller to have the consent of the person it 
actually called was ``persuasive,'' the FCC had not articulated a good 
enough rationale for the one-call safe harbor, so it set aside the 
entire portion of the order dealing with liability for calls to 
reassigned numbers and sent it back to the FCC to redo.
    The D.C. Circuit rejected the other challenges to the FCC's 2015 
order. It agreed that the FCC's ruling that consumers have the right to 
revoke consent by any reasonable means was reasonable, and it rejected 
a pharmacy chain's argument that a narrow, carefully crafted exception 
from the consent requirement for time-sensitive health care messages 
should have been broader. It left all the other portions of the 2015 
order undisturbed.
IV. A Plan for Dealing with Robocalls
    American consumers want robocalls to stop. Callers want to continue 
calling, and they do not want to be sued. But most responsible callers 
agree that consumers should have some control over the calls they 
receive. The way to thread our way through this conundrum is for the 
FCC to develop clear rules to guide callers, to cover all truly 
automated calls (otherwise consumers will have no control), to ensure 
that consumers can clearly and easily revoke consent, and to give 
consumers the means to block calls they do not want.
    The FCC, under Chairman Pai, has already launched some important 
initiatives to deal with unwanted robocalls. These include permitting 
phone companies to allow call blocking,\69\ consideration of a 
comprehensive reassigned number database that will enable callers to 
check that they have consent from the current subscriber of the phone 
before calling,\70\ encouraging phone companies to develop technologies 
that allow for reliable call authentication,\71\ and beginning the 
process of tightening regulations around caller ID spoofing.\72\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \69\ In re Advanced Methods to Target and Eliminate Unlawful 
Robocalls, CG Docket No. 17-59, Report and Order and Further Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 17-51 (F.C.C. Nov. 2017).
    \70\ In re Advanced Methods to Target and Eliminate Unlawful 
Robocalls, CG Docket No. 17-59, Second Further Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, supra note 53.
    \71\ In re Call Authentication Trust Anchor, CG Docket No. 17-97, 
Notice of Inquiry, 32 FCC Rcd. 5988 (F.C.C. July 2017).
    \72\ See Press Release, Federal Communications Commission, FCC 
Proposes $82 Million Fine for Spoofed Robocalls (Aug. 3, 2017); Press 
Release, Federal Communications Commission, Robocall Scammer Faces $120 
Million Proposed Fine for Massive Caller ID Spoofing Operation (June 
22, 2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    But the first step must be to make sure that all of the invasive 
and unwanted calls are covered by the TCPA's consumer protections. This 
step involves ensuring that the TCPA's definition of an ATDS covers the 
automated calls being made. As explained in the previous section, we 
believe that if the FCC does nothing to change the existing law on the 
definition, then there is ample room for the courts to find that most 
autodialers currently being used are covered. But doing nothing to 
resolve the outstanding issues does not provide the clarity craved by 
responsible callers. And it would invite callers to continue trying to 
design equipment that barrages consumers with unwanted calls yet does 
not quite meet the definition of autodialer.
    The TCPA requires consent for calls to cell phones that include 
either a prerecorded or artificial voice, or that are made with an 
autodialer (whether or not a human operator speaks to the consumer once 
the call is answered). As described in previous sections of this 
testimony, many of the worst calls about which consumers are now 
complaining are made with human operators and autodialers. Consumers 
would be substantially harmed if the FCC moved forward with a 
constricted definition of autodialer that excluded these calls. The 
definition of autodialer is central to coverage of the calls under the 
TCPA, not only for private enforcement, but for FCC enforcement as 
well.
    Consider, for example, what happened in the case of Dominguez v. 
Yahoo, Inc.\73\ In this case, Yahoo sent 27,809 wrong number text 
messages to Mr. Dominguez over 17 months. It refused to stop even after 
the consumer's many pleas, and even after he called a representative 
from the FCC, who then participated in a call (with Mr. Dominguez on 
the line) to Yahoo's customer service. Yahoo told Mr. Dominguez that 
the company could not stop the messages and that, as far as Yahoo was 
concerned, the number would always belong to the previous owner. Yahoo 
defended--and is still defending \74\--its actions by saying that that 
the equipment sending the messages did not fit the statutory definition 
for an ATDS. Without a broad definition of autodialer, companies will 
be able to continue to thumb their noses like this at both consumers 
and the FCC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \73\ 629 Fed. Appx. 369 (3d Cir. 2015).
    \74\ Dominguez v. Yahoo!, Inc., 2017 WL 390267 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 
2017) (appeal filed 3d Cir. Feb. 2, 2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    If the FCC were to adopt a limited definition, the following calls, 
even if made by automated equipment from a call center, would be 
outside the scope of the TCPA's protections for cell phones, and 
neither the U.S. Government nor consumers would have control over these 
calls.

   All texts to cell phones, since these do not use artificial 
        voices. Consumers could try to put their cell phones on the 
        FCC's Do Not Call list, but it applies only to residential 
        phones, and only to telemarketing calls. The FCC has created 
        something of a presumption that a cell phone is a residential 
        phone, but this is not a universal rule.

   Telemarketing calls that avoid artificial or prerecorded 
        voices, including scam telemarketing calls that use humans, 
        such as the IRS scam calls (``Your computer has a virus,'' 
        etc.). Consumers could register their cell phones on the FCC's 
        Do Not Call list, but, as noted in the preceding bullet, all 
        cell phones may not be protected by the Do Not Call list.

   Debt collection calls, as long as they avoid prerecorded or 
        artificial voices.

   Unwanted autodialed calls to emergency rooms, hospitals, 
        etc., if they do not use prerecorded or artificial voices.

    Below is our proposal for the next steps that we believe the FCC 
should take to deal with illegal and invasive robocalls.

  1)  Cover all the calls to cell phones that are made with automated 
        equipment.

     This ensures that the FCC has authority over all 
            problem calls;

     Clarity of coverage will assist the calling industry; 
            and

     The statutory definition of ATDS provides ample room 
            to do so (using either the language ``store'' numbers and 
            ``dial those numbers'' or a broad definition of 
            ``capacity'').

  2)  To prevent application of a broad definition to ordinary personal 
        use of a smart phone, use the FCC's general authority to adopt 
        rules implementing the TCPA to exclude equipment that does not 
        routinely make en masse calls, possibly by:

     More closely defining the call abandonment rate; and

     Excluding equipment that does not have more than X 
            abandoned calls.

  3)  Provide a safe harbor for one or more methods for consumers to 
        revoke their consent to receive calls and text messages. This 
        would:

     Encourage uniform methods of stopping calls;

     Mimic methods used by the text trade association 
            (including in every call a simple way to stop future 
            messages);

     Provide clarity for callers, which would reduce 
            litigation; and

     Ensure protection for consumers who want to stop 
            calls.

  4)  Require phone companies to implement call authentication, in 
        which the caller is determined to be the person whose name 
        appears on the caller ID, as soon as possible.

     This will drastically reduce scams;

     It will empower consumers to use personal blocking 
            tools;

     It will make caller ID much more reliable, thereby 
            empowering consumer choice of which calls to accept; and

     It will enable anti-spoofing rules to be more 
            meaningful.

  5)  Promulgate more rigorous regulation of spoofing in order to:

     Prohibit all spoofing of numbers that callers do not 
            have a right to use; and

     Allow caller IDs to be legitimately altered by 
            callers, but only for legitimate purposes (i.e., caller 
            from call center in Iowa calling on behalf of Bank in 
            Delaware can use Bank's Delaware caller ID, but not a fake 
            number, etc.).

  6)  Institute the proposed reassigned number database that features:

     A centralized system which is reliable, easy and 
            inexpensive for callers to use; and

     A safe harbor only for calls made as the result of 
            database mistakes, and for which callers otherwise complied 
            with the TCPA.

  7)  Require telecommunication providers to make a free robust call 
        blocking system available to consumers. This would:

     Provide consumers with control over their incoming 
            calls; and

     Create a centralized appeals/whitelist system to 
            address caller needs, yet always permit consumers to block 
            specific numbers.

  8)  Implement congressionally-required rules limiting calls made to 
        collect debt owed to the Federal government by limiting the 
        number of calls that can be made.
    Thank you for the opportunity to bring our concerns and ideas to 
your attention. I would be happy to answer any questions.

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


    The Chairman. Thank you, Ms. Saunders. Let me just direct 
this, if I can, principally at least to the FTC and the FCC. 
But consumer complaints about illegal robocalls seem to be on 
the rise despite the efforts that you've all noted. The FTC, 
FCC, and the industry have tried to prevent them. What do you 
think accounts for this?
    Ms. Harold. This is a difficult and complex problem, as 
everyone understands, and there is no silver bullet. A big part 
of the problem obviously is that technology has made it easy 
and relatively cheap to engage in this kind of behavior. No 
single entity has 100 percent of the answers, so we'll have to 
work together. The kind of activities that we're undertaking, 
targeted enforcement against some of the biggest robocallers to 
get attention and send a message to others, is part of it, of 
course. Technological developments to put into consumer hands 
so that they can block calls they don't want is a big part of 
that as well, as is consumer education, and continued 
cooperation among law enforcement authorities, both between the 
FTC and us, but also between State and Federal law enforcement 
authorities. I'm happy to say that that kind of exchange 
happens regularly.
    The Chairman. Yes, that's good.
    Ms. Greisman. Chairman? Chairman? Complaints are on the 
rise. We've seen that steadily over the years. On average now, 
we're receiving some 475,000 complaints each month. And we know 
they're the tip of the iceberg because we know from our law 
enforcement cases, we have sued individuals and companies that 
have placed billions of calls. So complaints are the tip of the 
iceberg.
    This may sound odd, but complaints are actually very 
helpful. They're very useful for us. We mine them. We use them 
to identify law enforcement targets. And as I mentioned 
earlier, each day we're putting some 22,000 numbers that 
consumers complained about, we're putting them out into the 
public where they can be used by others engaged in call-
blocking technologies.
    So complaints will continue to rise.
    The Chairman. Do you all think you have the authorities 
that you need to meet the challenge, the legal authorities you 
need?
    Ms. Harold. With respect to the FCC's enforcement actions, 
what we're concentrating now are on major robocallers. And 
fortunately, we have two good grounds to do that. Almost all 
such robocallers use prerecorded messages, which is part of the 
TCPA and was not affected by the recent court decision. They 
also spoof, and that's a completely different statute. Should 
Congress decide to give us additional authority, of course, we 
will pay close attention to that.
    Ms. Greisman. Mr. Chairman, the Commission has been on 
record for well over a decade now calling for the repeal of the 
Common Carrier Exemption. It is a real impediment to our 
ability to provide robust law enforcement in this space. In 
fact, Mr. Abramovich, I believe what he was commenting on are 
certain carriers whose primary, if not significant, business 
that generates significant revenues is precisely to carry 
robocalls. Currently, under the law, we do not have 
jurisdiction over those entities to the extent they are 
actually engaged in the business of common carriage.
    Ms. Harold. I would like to add one thing, Mr. Chairman. If 
Congress would like to enact legislation, there are two 
procedural things that would help us at the FCC. One would be 
to eliminate the citation requirement that applies to actions 
taken under the Consumer--the TCPA. That does not apply to the 
anti-spoofing law, but it does apply to the robocall law 
essentially. We have to give somebody a citation, which is 
basically a warning, that gives them maybe a free ``Get Out of 
Jail'' card free because they get a warning before we can take 
any serious action against them. They can change the way they 
do business, and we have to go hunting them down again. If we 
could get rid of the citation requirement for the TCPA, that 
would be very helpful.
    The other thing that would be helpful would be to harmonize 
the statute of limitations for both statutes. Right now, under 
the anti-robocalling law, we have 2 years to get to the point 
where we charge someone. Under the TCPA, we only have one. It 
makes it a little difficult back in the office when we're 
actually working on the investigations to figure out which 
deadline applies to which part of an investigation that often 
covers both types of problems.
    The Chairman. We're coming up on the 15th anniversary of 
the creation of the National Do Not Call Registry. And so I 
want to ask you a yes-or-no question, and then if anyone wants 
to elaborate on it, you can. But is the Do Not Call list 
broken?
    Ms. Greisman. No. Do Not Call set out to prevent live calls 
from legitimate telemarketers. That's what the system was 
designed to do. It was not designed to prevent or halt 
fraudulent calls. The bad guys never were going to subscribe to 
the list and abide by the law. So the goal of and the purpose 
of the Do Not Call Registry was to prevent legitimate live 
calls, and I do believe it has been and remains successful in 
that regard.
    The Chairman. All right. Yes? No?
    Ms. Harold. I agree with what Ms. Greisman said. For the 
limited purpose it was designed to serve, it seems to be 
serving that purpose, but the bad guys don't pay attention to 
it.
    The Chairman. Right.
    Mr. Rupy. Mr. Chairman, I would agree with both Ms. Harold 
and Ms. Greisman on that point.
    The Chairman. OK.
    Mr. Delacourt. I agree as well. The Do Not Call list is 
well understood by consumers who have subscribed in large 
numbers. It's oriented to people who are going to comply with 
the law, companies that are going to comply with the law. It's 
not going to address those scofflaws who aren't going to comply 
regardless of what the law requires.
    Ms. Saunders. I agree.
    The Chairman. OK. Senator Blumenthal.
    Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
    Let me ask the same question, but in a different way. If 
the Do Not Call Registry is working, why do I receive hundreds, 
maybe thousands of calls, from my constituents saying, ``I'm on 
the Do Not Call list, but I'm continuing to receive calls''? 
And when I ask them, it's not fraudulent calls, it's not calls 
from charitable organizations or politicians who are perhaps 
within an exemption, they are regular calls that should be 
covered by the Do Not Call list. Is it that the law is working, 
but the companies are ignoring it?
    Ms. Greisman. It's a little bit of both. We distinguish 
between abusive calls and fraudulent calls. To focus on abusive 
calls, yes, there are companies that--one was named, one 
recognized, Dish, for example, that, as challenged in the 
lawsuit and as reflected in a $280 million judgment, civil 
penalty judgment, violated Do Not Call provisions of the 
Telemarketing Sales Rule and the TCPA. So there are entities 
out there that take a view that the way their product is 
marketed by others, it does not result in liability for them.
    Senator Blumenthal. Let me ask every one of the members of 
the panel, would you all agree that consumers need and deserve 
more effective means to block robocalls, better tools?
    Ms. Harold. Yes. And I think that technology is probably 
the leading pipeline for us to be able to help people. The FCC 
certainly will encourage that and has been working with 
industry to develop things like Call Authentication, a system 
that will allow for a technological block, and educating 
consumers about the availability of these tools is an important 
part of the picture.
    Ms. Greisman. Absolutely. That's why back in 2012 in the 
first robocall contest, the FTC put forth a stimulation to the 
public, to industry, to develop call-blocking tools.
    Mr. Rupy. Senator, I would agree with Ms. Greisman's point 
in her testimony, and I think it is certainly crucial that we 
deploy and get tools into the hands of consumers. And think, 
you know, one of the points that was raised, it was raised in 
my testimony, you are seeing more and more tools that are out 
there today----
    Senator Blumenthal. I take it the three of you would 
support the ROBOCOP bill that I've introduced that would 
require phone companies to provide more effective tools.
    Mr. Rupy. Senator, I think a couple things on that and on 
the tool issue. Number one, I think when you look at just the 
last couple years alone, the marketplace is responding in 
terms----
    Senator Blumenthal. Well, why would you not support the 
ROBOCOP?
    Mr. Rupy. Because I think a couple things, Senator. First, 
the marketplace is deploying tools. In smartphone apps alone--
--
    Senator Blumenthal. They're not moving fast enough.
    Mr. Rupy. There are a growing number of tools in terms of 
the apps. And you're also seeing voice providers partnering 
with a lot of these services.
    The other--the other issue that I would state on that, 
Senator, is that it's important that we take a holistic 
approach to this. When you look at blocking in and of itself, 
AT&T has blocked 3.3 billion calls. And my sense is that we are 
not going to block our way out of this problem. I think we need 
to take a very holistic approach in terms of getting tools out 
there, which is happening, educating consumers, and civil and 
criminal enforcement.
    Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Delacourt?
    Mr. Delacourt. Yes. I agree that technology is going to be 
a big part of the solution for robocalls, particularly with 
respect to scofflaws and people who won't be bound by law.
    Senator Blumenthal. But would you support the ROBOCOP bill?
    Mr. Delacourt. I'm not familiar with the particular ins and 
outs of that piece of----
    Senator Blumenthal. We'll get you a copy of it.
    Mr. Delacourt. I appreciate that. And I'll review it.
    Senator Blumenthal. I'm pressed for time, so I'm 
interrupting you. I apologize.
    But let me ask Ms. Saunders.
    Ms. Saunders. Senator, I worked with your staff on your 
good bill, and I certainly--we certainly support it.
    Senator Blumenthal. I'm not going to ask the FCC and the 
FTC representatives because I know you will have to go back to 
your agencies and go through the, for lack of a better term, 
bureaucratic process, but I hope that you will review it 
carefully and support it. Thank you.
    Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
    Senator Tester.
    Senator Tester. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I just want you to know, Senator Blumenthal, they were both 
nodding their heads. I don't know if that's in support of the 
bill or not, but, you know.
    [Laughter.]
    Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Senator Tester.
    Senator Tester. That's good.
    So, Mr. Delacourt, you talked about business, and I think 
it is affecting business. And I think many parts of the country 
get work done by e-mails or texts or video chat. In Montana, I 
speak for myself, but also for my neighbors, we pick up the 
phone, and so the phone is really critical for jobs and for 
health care and many of the essential services we have. If I 
want to buy something, as I pointed out to the previous guy, I 
pick up the phone and call, I don't expect them to call me.
    But nonetheless, when I start getting a bunch of robocalls, 
I start losing faith. And I'll just be honest with you, because 
of robocalls, if I don't recognize the number, even if it's in 
my area code, even if it's in my three digit, I don't pick up 
the phone because I don't want to waste my time. And so from 
that standpoint, it's bad for business, wouldn't you say?
    Mr. Delacourt. Oh, yes.
    Senator Tester. Yes.
    Mr. Delacourt. In the sense that businesses want to 
lawfully communicate with their customers, they want to be 
credible, they want consumers to have the faith to answer the 
phone. Absolutely.
    Senator Tester. Yes. So it's cutting those folks out of the 
business because I screen my calls now, and I never used to do 
it. I think it's an important priority. And I don't want to put 
you on the spot in this question, it isn't meant to put you on 
the spot, but has the Chamber thought about ways we could solve 
this problem? Because it truly is a problem and it's a problem 
for business.
    Mr. Delacourt. Sure. The Chamber has thought about it, and 
our thinking is that the approach, not unlike what others have 
said here today, is to really focus on two things, law 
enforcement and technology. I would distinguish between and I 
think this hearing today has drawn a useful distinction between 
abusive robocalls, sort of what was discussed on the first 
panel, and legitimate businesses.
    Senator Tester. Right.
    Mr. Delacourt. The first--the activity of the first panel 
is not something that could really be addressed through law, it 
has to be addressed through--through changes in the law, 
requiring regulation. It can be addressed through law 
enforcement and it can be addressed through technology.
    Senator Tester. Yes. So let me move over on that question 
to either the FTC or the FCC, whichever is most appropriate to 
answer this question. As far as the Do Not Call list goes, are 
there any penalties if people don't follow the rules?
    Ms. Greisman. Absolutely. Civil penalties are upwards of I 
think it said $44,000.
    Senator Tester. Upwards of $4,000?
    Ms. Greisman. $44,000 per violation.
    Senator Tester. 44,000? Does the person who receives the 
calls have any recourse within the courts?
    Ms. Greisman. Under the Telemarketing Sales Rule, there is 
a private cause of action, but it is more--far more 
circumscribed than that which exists under the TCPA.
    Senator Tester. OK. And so do you think that would be 
helpful? I mean, I've got to tell you, when I do happen to pick 
up the phone because I don't have my glasses on, and I think 
it's somebody that it isn't, you know, I always tell them, 
``I'm going to go get recourse in the courts, and when I get 
done, you're not going to be able to breathe.'' I don't know 
that I can do that. But you think I can.
    Ms. Greisman. Under the TCPA, as we've heard on this panel, 
there is quite robust and extensive litigation, plaintiffs 
exercising the private cause of right that exists under it.
    Senator Tester. OK, good. When was the last time the Do Not 
Call rule was updated? Do you know? Or has it been in the last 
15----
    Ms. Greisman. The amendments in the Commission, approved 
amendments in 2008, which became effective in 2009. Those are 
the robocall prohibitions.
    Senator Tester. OK. Ms. Harold, I understand that a lot of 
the bad actors are from other countries. Does the FCC have an 
idea who these countries are?
    Ms. Harold. Senator, we have some notion that a good number 
of the calls come from the west--west of our western border or 
south of our southern border, but beyond being able--I can't 
pinpoint for you a particular country----
    Senator Tester. For specific countries, you don't know.
    Ms. Harold. I don't have that information at the tip of my 
fingers, but if you would like me to get it for you, I'll 
deliver it to you after the hearing.
    Senator Tester. But you have it. You have it.
    Ms. Harold. We have some information.
    Senator Tester. OK. So are you able to talk to your 
counterparts in those countries to hold those folks----
    Ms. Harold. We do. And I think that the----
    Senator Tester. And how successful has that been?
    Ms. Harold. I think that the omnibus legislation that 
Congress just enacted that gives us clear authority to go after 
callers in other countries will be a helpful starting point.
    Senator Tester. Yes. OK. Good enough.
    Just one other question, and I know I'm past time, but it's 
really quick. You guys talked about technology that's out 
there, blocking tools that are available. Are they available to 
me? And are they expensive? And do they work?
    Mr. Rupy. So there are a variety of tools that are out 
there, Senator. Many of these tools are free. Some of these may 
have a charge. There are native apps that are out there, so 
these are independent----
    Senator Tester. I would love to have it work like my spam 
box does.
    Mr. Rupy. Absolutely, Senator.
    Senator Tester. If I get a robocall, I just hit the spam 
button and it just goes to a different file.
    Mr. Rupy. And that's something that you're seeing in the 
marketplace.
    Senator Tester. OK.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the flexibility.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Tester.
    Senator Cortez Masto.

           STATEMENT OF HON. CATHERINE CORTEZ MASTO, 
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM NEVADA

    Senator Cortez Masto. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    So this is for the panel. Let me just start with maybe Ms. 
Harold, Ms. Greisman, and Mr. Rupy.
    So there was an article in the Washington Post in January 
about an FTC action against a robocaller from California who 
had made billions of illegal robocalls, and he was living in a 
wealthy neighborhood, paying $25,000 a month for his house, had 
a personal chef, and drove two Mercedes. The FTC brought him in 
for questioning and he basically admitted he did it without 
remorse, and he was fined $2.7 million and banned from 
telemarketing.
    Now, while it's clear that in the digital age your agencies 
need more resources to police this behavior, and we've talked a 
little bit about the technology, but it's also evident from the 
article that even when cases are brought, there is this thought 
that robocallers believe they have clearly concluded that the 
financial benefits outweigh any cost of their behavior, it's a 
cost of doing business. Any fine that is assessed against them 
is a cost of doing business, and so they'll continue and engage 
in that.
    For this reason, I'm looking at--excuse me--to introduce 
legislation to include criminal penalties or criminal 
enforcement.
    And so, Mr. Rupy, you've talked about this, the need for 
criminal enforcement.
    I also noted, both Ms. Greisman and Ms. Harold, certain 
things. One of them was the elimination of citations laws for 
the TCPA and to harmonize the statute of limitations. But if 
we're looking at enforcement and new criminal enforcement 
tools, do you have an idea what that should look like?
    Mr. Rupy. That's a great question, Senator. And I think a 
couple things. And the first point I want to emphasize is that 
the civil enforcement authority that the FCC and FTC have is 
effective and it's important. And when they initiate those 
actions and take those actions, those actions send a very 
strong message to bad actors. So we applaud those types of 
actions targeted at these illegal robocallers. With that being 
said, you know, we certainly believe that given the financial 
harm that these activities cause, the emotional harm that these 
activities cause, both of which are significant, criminal law 
enforcement is warranted.
    Now, I am not an expert, if you will, on criminal law 
enforcement, but my sense is that there are sufficient or 
existing statutes on the books, whether it's bank fraud, wire 
fraud, RICO statutes, whereby a criminal--a Federal criminal 
enforcement agency can target these actors. And if I'm not 
mistaken, I think the FCC's citation against Mr. Abramovich 
cites the Wire Fraud Act, which is a Federal criminal statute.
    So, you know, my sense is we have tools in the toolbox to 
go after these bad actors from a criminal perspective.
    Senator Cortez Masto. And so, Ms. Greisman and Ms. Harold, 
do you think--would you agree there's maybe tools out there 
that we could look to, to mirror?
    Ms. Greisman. I'm very familiar with the case that you 
referred to and with the set of facts you described. There are 
limitations to civil law enforcement; we're well aware of that. 
We work closely with our counterparts at the Department of 
Justice. There have been a significant number of criminal cases 
brought against telemarketers engaged in hard-core fraud, wire 
fraud, mail fraud, as well as some that were involved in Do Not 
Call violations and robocall violations. And we're committed to 
working with our criminal colleagues to get greater deterrent 
effect.
    Senator Cortez Masto. OK. Thank you.
    Ms. Harold. The same.
    Senator Cortez Masto. Thank you.
    Let me ask you, Mr. Delacourt. In May of last year, the 
Chamber submitted a comment to the FCC on a petition from a 
group called All About the Message, which hoped to remove 
automated voice-mail from the authority of the TCPA. The 
comment in support of All About the Message argued that a 
central problem with the unchecked expansion of the TCPA's 
prohibition is that it is not the unscrupulous scam 
telemarketers that are targeted by the TCPA litigation, but, 
rather, legitimate domestic businesses. And you also mentioned 
this in your testimony today.
    While the TCPA certainly was designed to target scammers, 
my understanding is it was also designed to prevent robocalls 
in general even from legitimate businesses. Consumers don't 
want to be bothered, that's the intent, why Congress acted.
    So what I would like to know, is it the position of the 
U.S. Chamber that robocalls should be entirely legal if not 
done for a fraudulent purpose?
    Mr. Delacourt. No, that's not the position of the Chamber. 
The distinction I was trying to draw was between actors in the 
economy who are constrained by law and regulation and who will 
comply with things like the Do Not Call list, and others who 
are scofflaws who are only susceptible to solutions through 
technology like blocking or apps or things that so you can 
blacklist those numbers. You generally won't need those against 
legitimate companies who are concerned with law enforcement, 
the idea that not only that they will be sued, but that they 
will suffer brand damage and customer relationship damage as a 
result of being branded as an abusive robocaller.
    Senator Cortez Masto. But there are legitimate businesses 
that engage in abusive calls is my understanding. Isn't that 
correct?
    Mr. Delacourt. It is certainly the case that there have 
been legitimate grievances against businesses and misconduct, 
but I would say that the mass of the activity that is the 
source of the consumer complaints is not on that side of the 
house for the reasons I've discussed today, that what 
businesses want to do is lawfully communicate with their 
customers, they want to build a relationship, not destroy a 
relationship. And so, you know, while there may be instances in 
which companies have done that either through vendors or other 
issues, it's not the massive--the complaints from consumers, 
the activity that's giving rise to consumer complaints is the 
abusive robocallers.
    Senator Cortez Masto. And I know my time is running out, 
but I see, Ms. Saunders, you're looking to ask a question.
    Mr. Chair, is it all right if she responds?
    The Chairman. Quickly.
    Senator Cortez Masto. Thank you.
    Ms. Saunders. I would beg to differ with my colleague to my 
right. If you look at the numbers of the top robocallers as 
compiled by the telecommunications blockers, they are not 
scammers, they are what we call legitimate businesses. In fact, 
in the chart in my testimony, we've named them, and those are--
many of them are members of the Chamber of Commerce. I'm not 
saying they've engaged in scams, I'm saying they have engaged 
in extensive robocalls which are complained about by consumers. 
Whether or not those calls are illegal goes to the question of 
whether consent was originally obtained and whether the calls 
continue to be made after the consumers have revoked consent. 
Those are very important questions that consumers need 
protection on.
    Senator Cortez Masto. Thank you.
    And thank you, Mr. Chair, for your indulgence.
    The Chairman. Senator Markey.
    Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chair, very much.
    I think Mr. Abramovich is just one bad actor in a universe 
of bad actors of people who try to exploit the vulnerability of 
people at home with these phone calls that just keep coming in 
and disturbing their family peace and quiet. And it's an 
industry solely predicated on contacting consumers by any means 
possible, debt collectors, telemarketers, insurance providers, 
and that's just a short list of the many different industries 
that seek to exploit this.
    And the only thing that protects them is the Telephone 
Consumer Protection Act of 1991. And I am the author of that 
law, and I will just tell you that the key word that I wanted 
to have built in is the word ``consent.'' Consent is the 
bedrock of the TCPA, and while technology may change, that key 
principle does not.
    Therefore, it is the FCC's obligation to use its authority 
to adapt to changing technologies and ensure consumers have 
robust enforceable protections against the onslaught of 
unwanted and abusive calls and texts. And their work is more 
important now than ever because the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals recently struck down portions of the FCC's 2015 rules, 
which updated protections for the smartphone era.
    While the court case was a setback, the spirit and the 
intent of the TCPA is as clear today as it was in 1991. One, 
callers must have affirmative permission from the consumer 
before using autodialers, which are technologies that can call 
and text countless consumers at one time, and, two, consumers 
should always have reasonable means to revoke consent, to say 
no from receiving any more calls or texts.
    So, Ms. Saunders, if you would, is there any reason why the 
FCC cannot use its authority under the TCPA to ensure consumers 
have an easy way to revoke consent and require callers using 
autodialers to receive permission before calling or texting a 
consumer? And what harms could arise if weak protections are 
adopted?
    Ms. Saunders. Senator Markey, thank you for the question. 
One of the most critical issues that was sent back to the FCC 
as a result of the D.C. Circuit order was the definition of 
``autodialer.'' And if the FCC bows to the calling industry and 
defines that equipment very narrowly, consumers will be 
significantly harmed because they won't have the option to 
consent or revoke consent from calls that are made by equipment 
that is now covered or considered to be covered by an 
autodialer.
    So one big issue is that if autodialer is not 
sufficiently--defined sufficiently broadly, it won't cover 
texts. There's no independent language in the TCPA that will 
cover texts unless the ``autodialer'' definition is covered.
    The other issue that is bound to come up again at the FCC 
is how to revoke and whether consumers even have the right to 
revoke. A recent Second Circuit opinion held that consumers, 
once they've consented, by contract, do not have the right to 
revoke. That's the position of the caller in the first example 
in my testimony. They said once she gave consent, she can never 
say no.
    So the harm to consumers is, A, that they may not have the 
option to consent and then revoke; or, B, they may not be able 
to revoke at all.
    Senator Markey. Yes. Right. So it sounds like the ``Me 
Too'' movement here. Consent once is consent forever, huh?
    Ms. Saunders. Exactly.
    Senator Markey. And people have a right to say no at any 
point, that's the way it should be. Now, we made a mistake, and 
we just don't want that kind of conduct to continue.
    So, as I said earlier, I drafted a letter to the Chairman 
today asking for a comprehensive definition of ``autodialer,'' 
ensuring all callers must receive permission before robocalling 
or robotexting a consumer, and preserving consumers' rights to 
revoke consent should they no longer wish to receive calls or 
texts.
    So, Ms. Harold, will the FCC heed our call and establish 
robust protections?
    Ms. Harold. Mr. Chairman--Mr. Markey, sorry--as the 
Enforcement Bureau Chief, I'm not in a position to tell you 
exactly what the Commission will do and how soon it will do it, 
but people of the Commission I can tell you are well aware of 
the letter that you provided to the Chairman today, as well as 
the D.C. Circuit opinion in ACA International.
    Senator Markey. So you're working on this issue? You are 
going to proceed toward trying to put protections on the books?
    Ms. Harold. I can't speak for the Commission. I enforce the 
rules that are already before us as opposed to thinking about 
how to improve them. But I can take your message back to my 
colleagues who are working on that.
    Senator Markey. In light of the court decisions, it's time 
to go back, redo the rules, and get back out into the 
marketplace to protect consumers. And I would urge you to do 
that as quickly as possible.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Markey.
    Senator Baldwin.

               STATEMENT OF HON. TAMMY BALDWIN, 
                  U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN

    Senator Baldwin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking 
Member.
    Thank you to our witnesses.
    I have listened to my colleagues and their questioning. 
Senator Tester talked about the fact that Montanans perhaps 
might be more prone to using the telephone. I certainly would 
have that reflection among some of my rural constituencies, 
depending on access to other alternative communication tools. I 
would also perhaps have that observation about my elderly 
constituents. I regularly receive calls from older constituents 
who I suspect are more greatly affected by robocalls because 
they rely more on the telephone for staying in touch with 
friends and family and accessing services and government 
benefits and conducting business.
    So in today's testimony, we've heard that one approach to 
addressing unwanted robocalls is giving consumers more options 
to control which calls they receive, including through new 
technologies. And I wonder how well these proposals will work 
for some of our constituencies, as have been described, 
including older Americans.
    Ms. Saunders, can you speak to how robocalls may uniquely 
affect older or rural-living Americans and how solutions should 
take into account the needs of these populations?
    Ms. Saunders. Yes, I can. Thank you for the question. We do 
have many blocking solutions that are available in the 
marketplace, but my understanding is that very few of these 
blocking solutions are available for landlines, and seniors 
most often rely on landlines more than younger folks, who rely 
exclusively on their cell phones. So the blocking technologies 
are not really helpful for them, which leaves seniors much more 
vulnerable to both the abusive repeated phone calls and the 
inability of finding blocking.
    I will say that I'm 64, and now I am getting an onslaught 
of calls from the Medicare Health Center, all who know my name 
and mispronounce it every time. They call me three or four 
times a day offering me Medicare health supplement. So that's 
coming on my home phone and now my cell phone. I don't know 
where they're getting that information, and they are not 
stopping calling. So they--that's presumably a legitimate 
business, but that is--that's not paying any attention to the 
TCPA requirements.
    Senator Baldwin. Thank you.
    Mr. Rupy, how are your member companies working to ensure 
that the proactive steps that they are taking to address 
robocalls will work for constituencies that are more reliant on 
landlines?
    Mr. Rupy. Thank you for that question, Senator. It's a 
great question. And I think from our industry's perspective, as 
you've heard repeatedly during this panel, there is no silver 
bullet to this--addressing this problem, and we have to take a 
holistic solution and we have to take a holistic approach to 
addressing it.
    So, you know, number one, our industry, we have our 
Industry Traceback Group, which USTelecom leads. That includes 
cable, wireline, wireless, wholesale providers, a broad range 
of companies. And we want to identify the source of these calls 
because our collective view is that by identifying the source, 
it's like a bad weed, if we pull it out by the root, we're 
going to stop millions of calls. So that's number one.
    Number two, there is importance for tools, so we want to 
make sure that tools do get out there. And I think, as you've 
heard, there are more and more tools across a variety of 
platforms. So you're seeing tools across IP wireline, wireless, 
and copper. They're going to vary. We always encourage 
consumers to call their provider, but those tools are out 
there. And even on the copper point, you know, I would note 
Verizon's recent deployment of this caller ID service, the spam 
service, that, you know, provides context for that call, and I 
think that's important.
    So, you know, those are all the areas that our members are 
focused on this.
    Senator Baldwin. OK. If I could just do a quick follow-up. 
Just can you just tell me how the industry traceback works?
    Mr. Rupy. So the way that effort works, Senator, is that we 
basically have a collective. We have our 22 member companies. 
These are some of the largest companies out there: AT&T, 
Verizon, Frontier, Comcast, Charter, Sprint. And----
    Senator Baldwin. So are they tracing back based on traffic 
that they notice independently, or do they have to be tipped 
off by, say, a landline consumer or customer that they're 
getting these calls in order to enable a traceback?
    Mr. Rupy. Generally speaking, Senator, the companies are 
sourcing these tracebacks internally. So in other words, these 
companies all have network operations centers where they are 
actively monitoring for suspicious traffic 24/7/365. When they 
find an instance where they have identified traffic that they 
believe is illegal or it verified as illegal, the group will 
initiate traceback, and what makes traceback difficult today, I 
equate it to peeling back the layers of an onion. Any call can 
go through perhaps 10 providers, but each provider, in the 
course of that call, they can only see to whom they handed it 
to and from whom they got it from. They don't know the 
subsequent carriers or the preceding carriers. So we work 
collectively to accelerate that process so that, you know, we 
can get the ball down the field closer to the origin of the 
call.
    Senator Baldwin. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Baldwin.
    Anything for the good of the--to close it out?
    Senator Blumenthal.
    Senator Blumenthal. Just an observation. Mr. Rupy, I 
appreciate your citing a holistic approach and the services 
that are now available. I would just point out that they're 
available at a cost, and sometimes significant cost, correct?
    Mr. Rupy. Senator, there is both--there are free--free 
services out there, and some are at a cost. But there is a 
diversity of services that are available out there both from 
providers, from third-party providers, carriers. Some are free, 
some may have a charge.
    Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
    Mr. Rupy. But the examples I cited in my oral testimony 
both are free.
    Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
    I thank the panel. This has been very helpful, and we 
appreciate your insights.
    I'm going to ask unanimous consent to include in the 
letter--or I should say in the record--several letters, one 
from Epic, one from CTIA, and one from CBA.
    [The information referred to follows:]

                      Electronic Privacy Information Center
                                     Washington, DC, April 16, 2018

Hon. John Thune, Chairman,
Hon. Bill Nelson, Ranking Member,
U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.

RE: ``Abusive Robocalls and How We Can Stop Them''

Dear Chairman Thune and Ranking Member Nelson:

    We write to you regarding tomorrow's hearing on ``Abusive Robocalls 
and How We Can Stop Them.'' \1\ We appreciate your interest in this 
important issue.
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    \1\ Abusive Robocalls and How We Can Stop Them, S. Comm. on 
Commerce, Science, & Transportation, 115th Cong. (April 17, 2018), 
https://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/hearings?ID=E0EB17D2-
A895-40B4-B385-F94EA2716957.
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    The Electronic Privacy Information Center (``EPIC'') is a public 
interest research center in Washington, D.C.\2\ EPIC played a leading 
role in the creation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 
(``TCPA'') and continues to defend the Act,\3\ one of the most 
important and popular privacy laws in the history of the United States. 
EPIC supported establishment of the original Do Not Call registry.\4\ 
EPIC provided numerous comments to the Federal Communications 
Commission (``FCC'') and the Federal Trade Commission (``FTC'') on the 
implementation of the TCPA, and maintains online resources for 
consumers who seek to protect their rights under the TCPA.\5\ EPIC has 
testified twice in congressional hearings on robocalling.\6\ Last year 
EPIC submitted comments to the FCC, expressing support for a new rule 
that would allow phone companies to block calls from numbers they know 
are invalid, such as numbers that have not been assigned to a 
subscriber.\7\ EPIC also submitted an amicus brief in ACA International 
v. FCC, 885 F.3d 687 (D.C. Cir. 2018).\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ EPIC, About EPIC (2016), https://epic.org/epic/about.html.
    \3\ See, e.g., Telephone Advertising and Consumer Rights Act, H.R. 
1304, Before the Subcomm. on Telecomms. And Fin. of the H. Comm. on 
Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (April 24, 1991) 
(testimony of CPSR Washington Office director Marc Rotenberg), https://
www.c-span.org/video/?18726-1/telephone-solicitation; Brief of Amici 
Curiae Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) and Six Consumer 
Privacy Organizations in Support of Respondents, ACA Int'l v. FCC, No. 
15-1211 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 22, 2016), https://epic.org/amicus/acaintl/
EPIC-Amicus.pdf; National Consumer Law Center et al., Petition for 
Reconsideration of Declaratory Ruling and Request for Stay Pending 
Reconsideration In the Matter of Broadnet Teleservices LLC Petition for 
Declaratory Ruling, CG Docket No. 02-278 (2016).
    \4\ Comments of EPIC, In the Matter of Rules and Regulations 
Implementing the Consumer Protection Act of 1991, FCC. Docket No. 02-
278 (Dec. 9, 2002), https://epic.org/privacy/telemarketing/
tcpacomments.html.
    \5\ See, e.g, EPIC, EPIC Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 
Comments, https://epic.org/apa/comments/; EPIC, Telemarketing and the 
Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), https://epic.org/privacy/
telemarketing/.
    \6\ Marc Rotenberg, EPIC President, Testimony and Statement for the 
Record, H.R. 5126, the Truth in Caller ID Act of 2006, H.R. Comm. on 
Energy and Commerce, Subcomm. on Telecommunications and the Internet, 
109th Cong. (2006), https://epic.org/privacy/iei/hr5126test.pdf; 
Allison Knight, EPIC Counsel, Testimony and Statement for the Record, 
The Truth in Caller ID Act of 2007, S. 704, S. Comm. on Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation, 110th Cong. (2007), https://epic.org/
privacy/iei/s704test.pdf.
    \7\ Comments of EPIC, Advanced Methods to Target and Eliminate 
Unlawful Robocalls, FCC 17-24 (June 30, 2017), https://epic.org/apa/
comments/EPIC-FCC-Robocall-Comments.pdf.
    \8\ Brief of Amici Curiae EPIC et al., ACA International v. FCC, 
No. 15-1211 (D.C. Cir.), https://epic.org/amicus/acaintl/EPIC-
Amicus.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Robocalls are a consistent source of annoyance for American 
consumers who confront bad actors that engage in identity theft, 
financial fraud, and debt collection scams. Robocalls are consistently 
one of the top complaints made to both the FCC and the FTC.\9\ The 
transition from land lines to mobile phones\10\ has only made the 
problem worse. Unsolicited calls and texts facilitate fraud, drain 
battery life, eat into data plans and phone memory space, and demand 
attention when the user would rather not be interrupted. Because we 
carry our phones with us everywhere,\11\ unwanted calls and texts 
interrupt sleep, disturb meetings and meals, and disrupt concentration 
wherever we go. For low-income consumers who often rely on pay-as-you-
go, limited-minute prepaid wireless plans,\12\ these unwanted calls and 
texts are particularly harmful.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ Consumer Complaint Center, FCC, https://
consumercomplaints.fcc.gov/hc/en-us/articles/115002234203-Unwanted-
Calls; FTC Releases Annual Summary of Consumer Complaints, FTC, Mar. 3 
2017, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2017/03/ftc-
releases-annual-summary-consumer-complaints.
    \10\ 95 percent of American adults own at least one cell phone and 
77 percent own smartphones. Mobile Fact Sheet, Pew Research Ctr. (Jan. 
12, 2017) http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/mobile/; Over half of 
American households do not have a land line. Stephen J. Blumberg & 
Julian V. Luke, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Wireless 
Substitution: Early Release of Estimates from the National Health 
Interview Survey, July-December 2016, at 2 (May 2017), https://
www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhis/earlyrelease/wireless201705.pdf.
    \11\ More than 70 percent of smartphone users keep their phones 
within five feet a majority of the time. Harris Interactive, 2013 
Mobile Consumer Habits Study (June 2013), http://pages.jumio.com/rs/
jumio/images/Jumio%20-%20Mobile%20Consumer%20Habits%20Study-2.pdf.
    \12\ Federal Communications Commission, Annual Report and Analysis 
of Competitive Market Conditions With Respect to Mobile Wireless, 
Eighteenth Report, WT Docket No. 15-125,  44, 73, 95-96 (Dec. 23, 
2015).
    \13\ Bill Moack, Feds, Fla. Shut Down Robocall Ring That Targeted 
Seniors, Clarion Ledger (Jun. 9, 2017), http://www.clarionledger.com/
story/business/2017/06/09/feds-fla-authorities-shut-down-robocall-ring-
targeted-seniors/371452001/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Current laws and penalties for illegal robocalls have not been 
enough to stop these calls. Even with the private right of action 
contained within the TCPA, illegal, predatory behavior continues. This 
is despite the fact that in general TCPA cases are among the most 
effective privacy class actions because they typically require 
companies to change their business practices to comply with the law. 
However, more must be done. While consumers now have more options to 
block calls from their home and cell phones, they can only do so after 
they have received these illegal and bothersome phone calls.
D.C. Circuit Decision
    The recent decision in ACA International v. FCC\14\ was a generally 
positive outcome for consumers, but created some ambiguity surrounding 
the definition of ``automated telephone dialing system'' (``ATDS''). 
The court upheld the FCC's interpretation of the consent rule, which 
allows consumers to revoke consent using ``any reasonable means clearly 
expressing a desire to receive no further messages from the caller.'' 
\15\ The court also affirmed the FCC's conclusion that callers cannot 
``unilaterally prescribe the exclusive means for consumers to revoke 
consent.'' \16\ But the court also held that the FCC's definition of 
ATDS under the TCPA was an unreasonably expansive because it could 
include ordinary smartphones. This creates some uncertainty regarding 
the scope of ATDS devices.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ No. 15-1211, 2018 WL 1352922 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 16, 2018), 
https://epic.org/amicus/acaintl/15-1211-1722606.pdf.
    \15\ Id. at 5.
    \16\ Id. at 17.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A broad definition of ATDS should be preserved. The court only 
struck down the FCC's 2015 order, leaving the 2003 and 2008 orders in 
place. The ATDS definition under those orders would cover most 
autodialers responsible for unwanted calls. But companies and scammers 
may continue to seek to circumvent the TCPA by developing technology 
that falls outside of the definition of ATDS. Any further narrowing of 
the ATDS definition would harm consumers.
EPIC's Recommendations
    EPIC is in favor of rules that would (1) allow phone providers to 
proactively block numbers that are unassigned, unallocated, or invalid; 
(2) block invalid numbers without requiring consumer consent; (3) 
provide strong security measures for any database of blocked numbers 
that may be created; and (4) prohibit spoofing with the intent to 
defraud or cause harm.
    First, proactive blocking of these numbers is the most effective 
way to protect consumers. If providers wait until complaints pile up, 
consumers will be exposed to calls that are predatory and fraudulent. 
Some consumers choose not to answer calls from numbers that they 
suspect are invalid based on caller ID information. But some consumers 
use landlines that may not have or use caller ID, and upon answering 
the phone they would have no way to be alerted to the fact that the 
call they are receiving is likely an illegal robocall.
    Second, phone providers should not require consent from consumers 
before blocking calls from invalid numbers. No reasonable consumer 
wants to receive robocalls. This is evident from the fact that these 
calls are consistently the number one complaint at both the FTC \17\ 
and the FCC. A consent for blocking requirement would leave individuals 
and, particularly, seniors at risk of identity theft, fraud, and 
harassment by phone scammers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ FTC Releases Annual Summary of Consumer Complaints, FTC, Mar. 
3 2017, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2017/03/ftc-
releases-annual-summary-consumer-complaints.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Third, databases and ``white lists'' of blocked numbers require 
strong security measures. EPIC has long advocated for strong security 
measures to protect personal data stored in databases.\18\ EPIC 
recommends data minimization, but in this case it is necessary to 
maintain a list of all numbers that have been blocked by providers. 
Such a database will be an attractive target for hackers.\19\ If 
compromised, it would not only allow scammers to continue with their 
illegal behavior, but also would severely hamper any further efforts to 
implement widespread blocking of invalid numbers. EPIC has suggested 
the implementation of certain procedures that would help enhance the 
security of a database of blocked numbers.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\ See e.g., Comments of EPIC, Privacy Act of 1974; Department of 
Homeland Security/ALL--038 Insider Threat Program System of Records, 
Mar. 28, 2016, https://epic.org/apa/comments/EPIC-DHS-Inisder-Threat-
Comments.pdf; Comments of EPIC, Department of Defense (DoD) Insider 
Threat Management and Analysis Center (DITMAC) and DoD Component 
Insider Threat Records System, Jun. 2, 2016, https://epic.org/apa/
comments/index.php?y=2016; Comments of EPIC, Privacy Act of 1974: 
Implementation of Exemptions; Department of Homeland Security/U.S. 
Customs Enforcement-016 FALCON Search and Analysis System of Records, 
Jun. 5, 2017, https://epic.org/apa/comments/EPIC-DHS-FALCON-Database-
Comments.pdf.
    \19\ Bruce Schneier, Data Is a Toxic Asset, Schneier on Security, 
Mar. 4, 2016, https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2016/03/
data_is_a_toxic.html (``saving [data] is dangerous because failing to 
secure it is damaging. It will reduce a company's profits, reduce its 
market share, hurt its stock price, cause it public embarrassment, 
and--in some cases--result in expensive lawsuits and occasionally, 
criminal charges. All this makes data a toxic asset, and it continues 
to be toxic as long as it sits in a company's computers and 
networks.'')
    \20\ See, e.g., Reply Comments of EPIC, Advanced Methods to Target 
and Eliminate Unlawful Robocalls, 82 Fed. Reg. 22,625 (July 31, 2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Fourth, any regulation of spoofing should contain an intent 
requirement--``intent to defraud or cause harm.'' This language would 
cover the problem of pretexting, where bad actors use the number of a 
trusted entity, such as a bank or government agency, to fool people 
into giving the caller personal information. But it would also preserve 
legitimate uses of spoofing where callers wish to withhold their phone 
number, including drug treatment services, suicide prevention, domestic 
abuse, and crime tip line. The default for disclosure of identity 
should be in control of the non-commercial callers. A spoofing 
regulation without this intent requirement could hurt the privacy 
interests of callers.
    We ask that this Statement from EPIC be entered in the hearing 
record. EPIC looks forward to working with the Committee on these 
issues of vital importance to the American public.
            Sincerely,

/s/ Marc Rotenberg
Marc Rotenberg
EPIC President

/s/ Alan Butler
Marc Rotenberg
EPIC Senior Counsel

/s/ Christine Bannan
Christine Bannan
EPIC Administrative Law and Policy Fellow
  
      
                                 ______
                                 
                               Consumer Bankers Association
                                     Washington, DC, April 17, 2018

Hon. John Thune,
Chairman,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.

Hon. Bill Nelson,
Ranking Member,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.

Dear Chairman Thune and Ranking Member Nelson:

    On behalf of the Consumer Bankers Association (CBA), I would like 
to commend the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation's for 
holding the hearing on ``Abusive Robocalls and How We Can Stop Them.'' 
CBA is the voice of the retail banking industry whose products and 
services provide access to credit to millions of consumers and small 
businesses. Our members operate in all 50 states, serve more than 150 
million Americans, and collectively hold two-thirds of the country's 
total depository assets.
    The influx of fraudulent and illegal robocalls by bad actors has 
become an ever-growing problem for consumers. As Congress examines how 
to prevent these burdensome calls and address those with ill-
intentions, it is imperative to distinguish these robocalls from the 
beneficial communications between legitimate businesses and their 
customers.
    Consumers utilize many useful communications through calls and 
texts ranging from low balance notifications to repayment counseling, 
among other important notices and alerts. While the Telephone Consumer 
Protection Act (TCPA) was enacted nearly 27 years ago and aimed to 
protect consumers from intrusive and unwanted telemarketing calls, it 
has also forced financial institutions to limit many pro-consumer, non-
telemarketing communications. Failing to reflect both changes in 
technology and the contact preference of consumers, the TCPA is barring 
businesses from providing important information that consumers want and 
need to receive. CBA members are committed to the spirit of the TCPA 
and go to great lengths to comply, but the recent interpretations of 
the law have stifled legitimate businesses' ability to better serve and 
communicate with their customers.
    Since enacted, TCPA litigation has become a thriving industry for 
class action lawyers. Mobile applications have been created for the 
sole purpose of collecting and reporting calls to waiting attorneys, 
helping to drive a 1,272 percent increase in TCPA litigation from 2010 
to 2016.\1\ Attorneys are benefiting from the outdated law with 
settlement fees averaging $2.4 million, dwarfing the average plaintiff 
award of $4.12.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ https://webrecon.com/2016-year-in-review-fdcpa-down-fcra-tcpa-
up/
    \2\ https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/60001016697.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The FCC has an opportunity to re-examine the TCPA, and prescribe 
new guidelines for the industry. On March 16, 2018, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit issued a unanimous decision in ACA 
International v. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) vacating the 
FCC's overbroad reading of what qualifies as an automatic dialer, most 
notably addressing the FCC's 2015 interpretation of ``capacity'' of an 
automatic dialer, and the FCC's order on reassigned numbers, finding 
that a one-call safe harbor for companies who inadvertently contacted a 
number that had been reassigned to be ``arbitrary and capricious.''
    The FCC should re-evaluate the definition of an automatic dialer to 
include those technologies that use random and sequential numbers--
typically for marketing or fraudulent purposes--and not those that 
employ existing customer contact lists stored by legitimate businesses.
    Additionally, the FCC should continue its pursuit of a reassigned 
numbers database to create an all-encompassing source for businesses to 
scrub their contact lists, and permit a safe-harbor from any violations 
of the law for those businesses that voluntarily use the database to 
determine if a phone number has been reassigned or improperly entered 
to their lists. Establishing a solution that permits, but does not 
require the industry to scrub numbers against such a list is crucial. 
We urge the Committee to encourage the FCC to take prompt action in 
these matters.
    CBA members greatly appreciate this thoughtful approach to 
examining the issues surrounding illegal and burdensome robocalls. We 
remain committed to working with the Committee to protect consumers 
from abusive robocalls while providing legitimate businesses with much 
needed clarification and reasonable standards on how to reach their 
customers.
            Sincerely,
                                              Richard Hunt,
                                                 President and CEO,
                                          Consumer Bankers Association.
                                 ______
                                 
                                                       CTIA
                                                     April 18, 2018

Hon. John Thune, Chairman,
Hon. Bill Nelson, Ranking Member,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
United States Senate,
Washington, DC.

Dear Chairman Thune and Ranking Member Nelson:

    CTIA commends the Committee for holding today's hearing to examine 
the problem of abusive robocalls. CTIA understands consumer annoyance 
over these calls and we have continued to work actively and in close 
coordination with Congress, the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC), and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to address this serious 
issue on many fronts. Unfortunately, the tactics used by today's 
malicious spoofers, scammers and other bad actors that generate abusive 
robocalls have evolved dramatically from when Congress passed the 
Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) over twenty-five years ago. 
Aggressive enforcement of bad actors is key to combatting the scourge 
of illegal robocalls and we applaud this Committee for its focus on 
enforcement of illegal robocallers. Tracking down and prosecuting bad 
actors should be the centerpiece of robocall mitigation efforts. In 
addition to robust FCC and FTC enforcement efforts, CTIA and its 
members have implemented a multifaceted approach to robocalls--one that 
includes a variety of technical solutions and industry initiatives to 
protect consumers, including development of new applications, new 
network-based tools, and industry work to deploy call authentication to 
mitigate caller id spoofing.
    Industry Technical Solutions. Industry has been at the forefront of 
the fight against malicious spoofing and robocalls, having collectively 
blocked billions of robocalls. CTIA and its members continue to 
innovate new solutions to stop illegal and unwanted robocalls, 
including by adopting new call blocking and spam call prediction tools 
for customer use. The application ecosystem around robocall blocking 
technology has exploded in recent years. In 2016 there were over 85 
call-blocking applications available across all platforms, including 
several offered by carriers to their customers at no charge. CTIA has 
launched a website devoted to providing consumers instructions on how 
to stop robocalls, and our website has links to these call blocking 
applications. Since launch of our website, there are now over 550 
applications available, a 495 percent increase in call blocking, 
labeling, and identifying applications to fight malicious robocalls.
    Wireless Industry Cooperation with Government and Other Stakeholder 
Initiatives. In addition to technology development, the wireless 
industry has worked with other stakeholders, including government 
entities, to reduce abusive robocalls. For example, the industry has 
implemented recommendations from the October 2016 FCC Strike Force 
Report, including partnering with standards bodies and accelerating 
STIR/SHAKEN call authentication development by six months. This 
technology will give service providers the tools to consistently 
authenticate, digitally sign, and verify calling party numbers--acting 
like a digital fingerprint to determine callers are who they say they 
are. CTIA members also participate in U.S. Telecom's Traceback efforts, 
and that Working Group is sharing its information with the FCC and FTC 
to identify the source of illegal robocall traffic. A component of 
these efforts is preventing false positives to protect communications 
from legitimate callers. CTIA and its members also assist the FCC and 
FTC with enforcement actions against robocallers and maintain 
relationships with call fraud bureaus that may initiate investigations 
after a suspected mass calling event. CTIA has also created its own 
Robocall Working Group and provides consumer-facing resources on how to 
limit and report illegal robocalls.
    CTIA Member Actions. CTIA's members have also taken strides to 
combat malicious robocalls. Many providers, including all of the 
national wireless carriers, offer robocall abatement options for their 
customers that are not dependent on the customer first downloading a 
third-party application. Just some of the efforts of several CTIA 
members are described below:

   AT&T launched AT&T Call Protect in December 2016 as a free 
        network service. It can flag suspected spam calls, allowing the 
        customer to choose whether to answer or not, and allowing 
        customers to manually block an unlimited number of specific 
        telephone numbers for thirty-day intervals. In November 2017, 
        AT&T made Call Protect available to its IP Wireline Home Phone 
        Users Network. In addition, AT&T has blocked 3.5 billion 
        unwanted robocalls in cases where its business contracts allow 
        it to block impermissible traffic using a new program that 
        detects violators through network data analysis. Call data 
        analysis and heuristics are powered by Hiya.

   Sprint offers Premium Caller ID service, which allows users 
        to identify nuisance calls and provides an option to block 
        them. This solution directly leverages data and network 
        intelligence powered by a partnership with Cequint, a wholly 
        owned subsidiary of Transaction Network Services.

   T-Mobile launched Scam ID in March 2017 as an automatic 
        network-based free service for all postpaid T-Mobile customers 
        and MetroPCS customers. Scam ID identifies calls from known 
        phone scammers and displays ``Scam Likely'' on the device, 
        giving customers the option to answer or block the number. 
        Customers may also choose to use Scam Block, another free 
        service to have calls from known scammers blocked. These 
        solutions are powered by network call data analysis and 
        heuristics provided by PrivacyStar, and have resulted in more 
        than 3 billion scam calls tagged since launch.

   Verizon offers all wireless customers who subscribe to its 
        Caller Name ID service a free feature that identifies potential 
        spam calls and displays the level of risk with a ``risk 
        meter.'' The service is also powered by Cequint. They also 
        offer a free robocall labeling solution called Spam Alerts for 
        all wireline customers with Caller ID. The feature warns 
        customers about robocalls identified by Verizon's analytics 
        engine and its robocall mitigation team.

    These strategies and technologies highlight the wireless industry's 
hard work to stay ahead of malicious robocallers, and that work 
continues. We appreciate this Committee's efforts to explore ways to 
further reduce the transmission of illegal robocalls and continue to 
encourage aggressive enforcement of bad actors. We look forward to 
continuing to work with you and your colleagues on this important 
issue.
            Regards,
                                    Meredith Attwell Baker,
                                                 President and CEO.

    The Chairman. And I would also note that we'll keep the 
hearing record open for a couple of weeks, and if the members 
of the Committee have questions that they can submit for the 
record, that you could get those back to us as quickly as 
possible, that would be most appreciated.
    But thank you all again for your willingness to participate 
today and for your honest answers about what's happening out 
there in the world of robocalls. It's something that affects 
literally pretty much every American who has a phone.
    So thank you. This hearing is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 12:03 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

                            A P P E N D I X

                                                     April 17, 2018

Hon. John Thune,
Chairman,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.

Hon. Bill Nelson,
Ranking Member,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.

Dear Chairman Thune and Ranking Member Nelson,

    The undersigned trade associations and industry groups, who 
represent thousands of financial institutions and other businesses 
across the country, appreciate the opportunity to comment on the Senate 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee's hearing entitled 
``Abusive Robocalls and How We Can Stop Them.''
    Illegal and fraudulent robocalls can be a time-consuming and 
annoying burden on consumers. Congress should rightfully evaluate how 
it can prevent these invasive and burdensome calls and remove bad 
actors from the marketplace. However in doing so, it is important to 
distinguish between fraudulent and illegal robocalls and calls from 
legitimate businesses seeking to communicate with their members and 
customers.
    Today, many businesses call or text their members and customers in 
an effort to communicate time-sensitive, critical information, such as 
low balance notifications, due date reminders, and fee avoidance 
alerts. Consumers want and expect these types of communications in the 
most convenient way possible, including via cell phone. Unfortunately, 
the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), while enacted in 1991 to 
reduce consumers' costs at a time when cell phone users were charged by 
the minute, has had the unintended consequence of stifling pro-
consumer, non-telemarketing communications. The TCPA has become rife 
with litigation, with a 1,272 percent increase in TCPA lawsuits from 
2010 to 2016. This litigation risk has led businesses to limit--and, in 
certain instances, to eliminate--communications consumers want and 
expect to receive.
    On March 16, 2018, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 
issued a decision in ACA International v. Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC), vacating portions of a 2015 FCC Order interpreting 
various sections of the TCPA. This ruling gives the FCC an opportunity 
to re-examine the TCPA, and prescribe new guidelines for the industry.
    It is critical the FCC seize this opportunity to clarify the 
definition of an Automatic Telephone Dialing System (ATDS) so that it 
is consistent with the statute and take other action to ensure that 
consumers whose mobile phone numbers have been reassigned continue to 
receive important communications. Doing so will permit businesses to 
provide beneficial communications to their members and customers 
without the threat of costly litigation driven by serial plaintiffs and 
attorneys who have taken advantage of the ATDS definition recently 
vacated by the D.C. Circuit. We urge the Committee to encourage the FCC 
to take prompt action in these matters, and to continue its efforts to 
establish a free or low-cost reassigned numbers database and provide a 
safe-harbor for businesses that use the database.
    Legitimate businesses need clarification and standards for how to 
best serve their members and customers, and are equally concerned about 
the level of fraudulent and illegal actors in this space. We support 
the FCC's efforts to deter bad actors while facilitating the ability of 
legitimate businesses to contact consumers promptly and efficiently. We 
look forward to working with the Committee as it pursues this issue.
            Sincerely,

American Bankers Association
Consumer Bankers Association
Credit Union National Association
Electronic Transactions Association
Independent Community Bankers of America
National Association of Federally-Insured Credit Unions
National Council of Higher Education Resources
Student Loan Servicing Alliance
                                 ______
                                 
                                                     April 28, 2017
Ms. Marlene H. Dortch
Secretary
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, DC.

Ex Parte Submission

RE: Advanced Methods to Target and Eliminate Unlawful Robocalls, Notice 
            of Proposed Rulemaking, CG Docket No. 17-59

Dear Ms. Dortch:

    On behalf of ACT | The App Association, Alliance for 
Telecommunications Industry Solutions (ATIS), CTIA and USTelecom, we 
are filing the attached Industry Robocall Strike Force report. Linda 
Vandeloop (AT&T) provided a copy of this report to Mark Stone and Micah 
Caldwell on April 26, 2017. In accordance with section 1.1206(b)(2) of 
the rules of the Federal Communications Commission, this letter is 
being filed electronically with your office. Please feel free to 
contact us if you have any questions.
            Sincerely,

/s/ Brian Scarpelli                  /s/ Thomas E. Goode
Brian Scarpelli                      Thomas E. Goode
Senior Policy Counsel                General Counsel
ACT | The App Association            ATIS
 
/s/ Krista L. Witanowski             /s/ Kevin G. Rupy
Krista L. Witanowski                 Kevin G. Rupy
Assistant Vice President,            Vice President, Law & Policy
 Regulatory Affairs                  USTelecom
CTIA
 

Attachment

cc: Micah Caldwell
Mark Stone
                                 ______
                                 
                 Industry Robocall Strike Force Report
1. Introduction (AT&T)
1.1. Overview
    On October 26, 2016, the Industry Robocall Strike Force issued a 
report describing progress made during the first sixty days and 
outlining a process for continuing the work necessary to develop an 
industry solution to the robocall problem. The industry committed to 
continue to work together and to issue another status report in six 
months. ACT, ATIS, CTIA and USTelecom, who count among their members 
many Strike Force members, agreed to facilitate that process and work 
together toward long term goals.
    Many industry leaders in robocall mitigation have concluded that 
there is no ``silver bullet'' to solve the problem. However, to 
mitigate the problem of illegal robocalls, the industry is implementing 
a diverse multitude of evolving mitigation tools and efforts so that it 
becomes too costly for illegal robocalling campaigns to overcome the 
industry's dynamic mitigation techniques.
    The organizations focused on continuing work in the same areas 
identified by the Industry Strike Force during the first sixty days:

   Authentication

   Empowering Consumer Choice

   Detection, Assessment, Traceback and Mitigation

   Regulatory Support

    Each organization met with their members on a regular basis and the 
organizations held planning meetings at least twice a month. 
Additionally, monthly meetings were held with all strike force members.
    Over the past six months much additional progress has been made and 
is outlined in this report. Additionally, this report will summarize 
how the industry will continue its efforts.
1.2. Description of Organizations and Membership
  1.2.1.  ACT | The App association (``ACT'') represents more than 
        5,000 app makers and connected device companies in the mobile 
        economy. Organization members leverage the connectivity of 
        smart devices to create innovative solutions that make our 
        lives better. ACT is the leading industry resource on market 
        strategy, regulated industries, privacy and security.

  1.2.2.  ATIS is a technology and solutions development organization 
        that brings together global ICT companies to advance the 
        industry's pressing business priorities. In addition to the 
        extensive work being done by ATIS and its members to address 
        caller ID spoofing and robocalling, ATIS' nearly 200 member 
        companies are also working to address 5G, Cybersecurity, Smart 
        Cities, the evolution to content optimized networks (eCON), the 
        Connected Car, NFV, unmanned aerial vehicles, emergency 
        services, M2M, quality of service, billing and operations, and 
        more. These priorities follow a fast-track lifecycle of 
        development--from design and innovation through standards, 
        specifications, requirements, business use cases, software tool 
        kits, open source solutions, and interoperability testing.

         ATIS also is a founding partner and the North American 
        Organizational Partner for the 3rd Generation Partnership 
        Project (3GPP), the global collaborative which has developed 
        the Long Term Evolution (LTE) and LTE-Advanced wireless 
        specifications. It is also a founding Partner of the oneM2M 
        global initiative, a member of the International 
        Telecommunication Union (ITU), as well as a member of the 
        Inter-American Telecommunication Commission (CITEL).

         ATIS' membership is diverse and includes participants from key 
        service providers and vendors, including the following 21 of 
        the 33 Strike Force members: AT&T, Bandwidth.com, Blackberry, 
        CenturyLink, Charter, Comcast, Cox, Ericsson, FairPoint, 
        GENBAND, Google, Inteliquent, LG, Nokia, Qualcomm, Samsung, 
        Sprint, T-Mobile, U.S. Cellular, Verizon, and West.

  1.2.3.  CTIA represents the U.S. wireless communications industry. 
        With members from wireless carriers and their suppliers to 
        providers and manufacturers of wireless data services and 
        products, the association brings together a dynamic group of 
        companies that enable consumers to lead a 21st century 
        connected life. CTIA members benefit from its vigorous advocacy 
        at all levels of government for policies that foster the 
        continued innovation, investment and economic impact of 
        America's competitive and world-leading mobile ecosystem. The 
        association also coordinates the industry's voluntary best 
        practices, hosts educational events that promote the wireless 
        industry, and co-produces the industry's leading wireless 
        tradeshow. CTIA was founded in 1984 and is based in Washington, 
        D.C.

         CTIA created a Robocall Working Group (RWG) in early November 
        2016, shortly after the October 26th release of the Initial 
        Strike Force Report. Since November of last year, CTIA has 
        engaged in weekly meetings of the RWG, and has facilitated 
        members' substantial progress on making robocall control 
        mechanisms and techniques available to consumers.

         Of the 33 Strike Force participants, 15 are CTIA members who 
        participate actively in CTIA's RWG. Participating members are: 
        Apple, AT&T, Bandwidth, Ericsson, Inteliquent, LG, Nokia, 
        Qualcomm, Samsung, Sprint, Syniverse, T-Mobile, US Cellular, 
        Verizon, West. These members span the wireless ecosystem and 
        include carriers, VoIP providers, handset and equipment 
        vendors, infrastructure suppliers and system aggregators.

  1.2.4.  USTelecom is the premier trade association representing 
        service providers and suppliers for the telecommunications 
        industry. USTelecom members provide a full array of services, 
        including broadband, voice, data and video over wireline and 
        wireless networks. USTelecom's members are comprised of 
        companies of all sizes--urban and rural, publicly traded, 
        privately held, and cooperatives. Collectively, these companies 
        have a distinguished history of serving America's 
        communications' needs.

         USTelecom members have long demonstrated their commitment to 
        finding solutions to mitigate robocalls. USTelecom's member 
        companies understand and appreciate the annoyance and potential 
        monetary harms inflicted on consumers and businesses resulting 
        from illegal robocalls. USTelecom has a long track record of 
        working with consumer, industry and regulatory stakeholders on 
        ways to mitigate such harms, and has developed strong 
        relationships with law enforcement agencies at the local, state 
        and Federal level. The association has also established an 
        industry working group of more than 20 companies that are 
        committed to working together to fight the robocall problem.
2. Authentication and Other Technical and Operational Work (ATIS)
    The October 26, 2016, Robocall Strike Force Report (Initial Strike 
Force Report) noted the significant work that ATIS and its members have 
done to address issues associated with robocalling and caller ID 
spoofing. In addition to recognizing the significant progress made as 
of October 2016, the report also acknowledged the work that ATIS had 
underway to further resolve technical and operational impacts. This 
report provides a progress update on these efforts, including a summary 
of the significant work completed since October and the on-going 
efforts to craft technically feasible and broadly implementable 
mitigation tools. As ATIS has noted in its monthly updates to the 
Strike Force, work to address robocalling and caller ID spoofing began 
long before the Strike Force was assembled; this work will not stop 
when the Strike Force ends. However, because of the focus of the strike 
force and the commitment from the strike force members, ATIS has been 
able to accelerate its timeline.
2.1. Introduction and Background
    ATIS is examining issues associated with robocalling and caller ID 
spoofing from a number of different perspectives:

   Technical work. On the technical front, one of the main 
        focuses of ATIS' work has been the development of the SHAKEN 
        framework and associated governance structure by the ATIS and 
        SIP Forum Joint Network-to-Network Interoperability Task Force 
        (Joint IP-NNI Task Force). However, ATIS' technical work also 
        includes projects undertaken by ATIS' Packet Technologies and 
        Systems Committee (PTSC) and the Joint IP-NNI Task Force to 
        examine SHAKEN-related Best Practices, Attestation and 
        Origination Identifiers and to develop a framework for the 
        display of verified caller ID; as well as PTSC efforts to: (1) 
        examine the feasibility of using Vertical Service Codes to 
        identify unwanted robocalls; and (2) further analyze its 
        initial recommendations for Integrated Services User Part 
        (ISUP) screening indicator interworking.

   Testing. The ATIS Testbed Focus Group has also worked on 
        technical issues associated with the testing of SHAKEN, 
        including the development of SHAKEN test plans. ATIS has also 
        partnered with Neustar Trust Labs to offer the ATIS Robocalling 
        Testbed, a virtualized testbed to advance industry efforts to 
        mitigate unwanted robocalls and caller ID spoofing.

   Operational Work. ATIS' Next Generation Interconnection 
        Interoperability Forum (NGIIF) is examining SHAKEN and the 
        proposed governance authority framework to provide operational 
        guidance to facilitate implementation by the industry.

   Numbering-related impacts. ATIS' Industry Numbering 
        Committee (INC) is examining potential impacts from the 
        implementation of SHAKEN, the SHAKEN governance framework, and 
        the potential use of vertical service codes to report unwanted 
        robocalls.

    Finally, ATIS notes that it has continued to collaborate with other 
key stakeholder organizations, including CTIA, USTelecom and ACT to 
share progress and foster cooperation.
2.2. SHAKEN Framework
    ATIS continues to make progress on technical issues and operational 
issues associated with the Signature-based Handling of Asserted 
information using toKENs (SHAKEN). This work includes publication of 
the SHAKEN framework, as well work to facilitate industry 
implementation of this framework.
2.2.1. SHAKEN Framework Publication

    As noted in the in the Initial Strike Force Report, ATIS and the 
SIP Forum accelerated their development of the SHAKEN framework.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Strike Force Initial Report, Section 1.10.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ATIS and the SIP Forum successfully completed the efforts on this 
framework, concluding with its availability in December 2016 and formal 
publication in January 2017.\2\ The SHAKEN framework provides a 
mechanism for managing the deployment of Secure Telephone Identity 
(STI) technologies with the purpose of providing cryptographic 
authentication and verification of telephone numbers associated with 
calls traversing Internet Protocol (IP)-voice networks. This 
specification defines the framework for telephone service providers to 
create signatures in Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and validate 
those signatures at the call termination. It defines the various 
classes of signers and how the verification of a signature can be used 
toward the identification of illegitimate uses of telephone numbers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ A pre-publication draft was made available in December 2016; 
final industry approval and publication occurred on January 6, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The document has broad industry support, having been approved by 
both ATIS and SIP Forum under their respective transparent, consensus-
based approval processes. Initial feedback has been positive. This 
document is available to the industry electronically at no charge.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ This document is available electronically at no charge from the 
ATIS Document Center at https://www.atis.org/docstore/
product.aspx?id=28297 and from the SIP Forum at https://www.fcc.gov/
news-events/events/2016/10/second-meeting-industry-led-robocall-strike-
force.
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2.2.2. SHAKEN Operational Guidance

    A related ATIS work program not referenced in the Initial Strike 
Force Report was the development and publication of a document 
providing operational guidance for interoperability when implementing 
the SHAKEN framework.
    ATIS NGIIF developed Interoperability Standards between Next 
Generation Networks (NGN) for Signature-Based Handling of Asserted 
Information Using Tokens (SHAKEN) as a companion to the SHAKEN 
framework. It provides Next Generation Network (NGN) telephone service 
providers with a framework and guidance for interoperability as calls 
process through their networks implementing SHAKEN technologies 
ensuring the mitigation of illegitimate spoofing of telephone numbers. 
This document was published in January 2017. This document is available 
to the industry electronically at no charge.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ This document is available electronically at no charge from the 
ATIS Document Center at: https://www.atis.org/docstore/
product.aspx?id=28298.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2.3. SHAKEN Authentication/Verification/Attestation Best Practices and 
        Additional STIR Use Cases
    In the Initial Strike Force Report, it was noted that ATIS was 
working on the creation of SHAKEN-related Best Practices that carriers 
would maintain.\5\ Work is progressing on these two initiatives within 
the Joint IP-NNI Task Force.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Initial Strike Force Report, Section 10.1.7
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The first is focused directly on SHAKEN Best Practices. It 
describes how SHAKEN should be deployed along with guidance on 
implementing the authentication and verification functions. It shows 
how SHAKEN components would map onto the network under representative 
deployment scenarios.
    The second initiative is focused on the SHAKEN Attestation and 
Origination Identifiers, which were discussed in Section 1.5 of the 
Initial Strike Force Report.\6\ This work focuses on how the service 
provider decides what level of attestation is appropriate, as well as 
provides guidance on how the Orig ID can be used to help with 
traceback. This document describes problems associated with originating 
party spoofing in IP communication networks, identifies potential 
options and/or Best Practices related to attestation and the use of the 
origination identifiers, and analyzes the pros and cons of mitigation 
options.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ Section 1.5 of the Initial Strike Force Report addresses this 
issue but does not identify a specific long-term objective associated 
with this action. Nonetheless, the industry has been working on a 
related deliverable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    While work has progressed, there remains a good deal of work to be 
completed. ATIS and the industry remain committed to completing this 
work and hope to complete this by end of 2017.
2.4. Joint Lab Prototype Testing
    As noted in the Initial Strike Force Report, ATIS had agreed to 
further progress its work to facilitate prototype testing of SHAKEN.\7\ 
Since the publication of the initial report, ATIS launched a 
virtualized testbed to advance industry efforts to mitigate illegal 
robocalls and caller ID spoofing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ Initial Strike Force Report, Section 1.0.4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The ATIS Robocalling Testbed, hosted by the Neustar Trust Lab, 
allows the testing of SHAKEN by generating end-to-end calls that 
include all network functions. The testbed allows service providers and 
vendors to test their implementations of SHAKEN in a test environment 
to ensure full interoperability. The testbed can provide various 
configurations to test individual SHAKEN components or complete network 
implementations.
    The test plans were developed by the ATIS Testbed Focus Group in 
parallel with the development of the SHAKEN framework. This work 
started well before the Strike Force, and will continue as the best 
practices documents identify additional areas for testing. Updates to 
the test plans to cover extensions to SHAKEN are being considered by 
the ATIS Testbed Focus Group.
    Testing of SHAKEN via the ATIS Robocalling Testbed will be provided 
at no cost to the industry through the end of 2017. Membership in ATIS 
is not required--any service provider with an assigned Operating 
Company Number (OCN) is eligible to participate. Other parties, such as 
equipment manufacturers, may participate if they have solutions 
relevant to the SHAKEN framework available to test.
    There has been active outreach to organizations that have 
previously expressed interest in SHAKEN testing. ATIS notes that active 
testing is underway. To date, approximately 10 companies have executed 
or are in the process of executing the relevant agreements to test, and 
a total of 16 companies have executed the testing NDA that would allow 
possible future participation in testing.
    Strike Force members and others interested in learning more about 
the ATIS Robocalling Testbed may visit https://www.neustar.biz/atis-
testbed/index.php.
2.5. Governance Model and Certificate Management Policy Framework
    In addition to the development of the underlying technical 
framework (i.e., SHAKEN), there is work underway to advance the 
governance model associated with this framework. The three initiatives 
below would define the ecosystem in which end-to-end cryptographic 
authentication and verification of the telephone identity would occur.
2.5.1. Governance Model/Framework

    One of the long term goals identified in the Initial Strike Force 
Report was to further progress the SHAKEN governance model.\8\ 
Significant progress has been made on this deliverable by the Joint IP-
NNI Task Force.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ Initial Strike Force Report, Section 1.10.7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The SHAKEN governance model identifies the key roles/functions 
involved in distributing and managing SHAKEN certificates. The model 
envisions a governance authority that would oversee a policy 
administrator, which would determine who is entitled to get SHAKEN 
certificates, which would be issued by certificate authorities.\9\ The 
chart below provides a high-level view of the various roles, including 
what is currently addressed by the governance model (``in scope'') and 
what is being defined through other work (``out of scope'' for the 
framework but addressed in section E.3 below).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ The Initial Strike Force Report identified the role of the TA 
Administrator, which would do the manual process of working with 
service providers to validate they are who they say they are and manage 
credentials of Telephone Authorities to have a secret key and the 
Service Providers to do Certificate Signing Requests (CSR) transactions 
with the Telephone Authorities. This role is now defined under the 
draft framework as the STI Policy Administrator.


    The model would specify the protocols that will be used to obtain 
certificates and the ``key'' that service providers will obtain from 
the STI Policy Administrator to prove that they are entitled to get 
SHAKEN certificates. ATIS notes that, while this model identifies at a 
high-level the functions associated with the STI Governance Authority 
and policy administrator, it does not specify the structure of, or 
detailed functions associated with, the STI Governance Authority or STI 
Policy Administrator.
    The work to ensure that the proposed model results in an 
implementable solution that is both technically and operationally 
feasible has been complex. Proposals to align with existing service 
provider certificate management processes are expected to facilitate 
and expedite implementation. This work is expected to be completed in 
2Q2017.
2.5.2. Framework Operational Guidance

    ATIS NGIIF is developing a document examining the operational 
implications of the SHAKEN governance model and certificate management. 
This document will complement the governance framework currently under 
development by the Joint IP-NNI Task Force (see section E.1 above). The 
target is to align the publication date with Joint IP-NNI Task Force 
governance document.
2.5.3. Governance Ecosystem

    ATIS is also working with its members to identify the detailed 
functions associated with the governance framework. This work will 
complement the governance framework document by examining the ecosystem 
that will be necessary to implement that framework by defining in a 
more granular fashion the roles of the STI Governance Authority and STI 
Policy Administrator. This work, which is expected to result in 
consensus-based proposal for the structure of the ecosystem that would 
be necessary to support the implementation of SHAKEN by the industry, 
is expected to be completed in 2Q2017.
2.6. Display Framework
    The Initial Strike Force Report noted the work that ATIS had 
underway to further progress its Signaling Verification and Analytics 
Information, and Display Framework.\10\ The industry continues to make 
progress on the draft Framework for the Display of Verified Caller ID. 
Additionally, ATIS notes that there are other initiatives within the 
Joint IP-NNI Task Force to: (1) assess mechanisms to signal 
verification to legacy call display; and (2) provide input to 3GPP and 
track progress on ``verstat'' TEL URI parameter to signal verification 
to SIP client. All three deliverables are anticipated to be completed 
by the end of 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ Initial Strike Force Report, Section 1.8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2.7. Feasibility of Using Vertical Service Codes to Report Unwanted 
        Robocalls
    The Initial Strike Force Report recommended that ATIS investigate 
the feasibility of using vertical service codes (i.e., *XX codes) to 
report unwanted robocalls.\11\ Two initiatives are under development on 
this topic.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ Initial Strike Force Report, Section 2.5.2. Although VSCs are 
originally defined for TDM networks, concepts could be extended to SIP 
networks for SHAKEN
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The first initiative is being undertaken by ATIS PTSC. Its 
objective is to examine the feasibility of using these codes to report 
unwanted robocalls, including whether codes in use for other services 
(such as *57-Call Trace) could be used, the benefits and challenges of 
sharing codes and/or selecting a new code and effective alternatives to 
the use of vertical service codes. The PTSC (and subsequently Joint IP-
NNI Task Force) reviewed contributions on the use of VSC and agreed 
with the preference to use alternative methods to report robocalls, 
such as using web portals and smartphone apps, rather than using VSC.
    ATIS INC has also examined this issue and will address any 
numbering related impacts, including the development of and/or revision 
of industry guidelines should the use of an existing or new vertical 
service code be recommended. INC's initial review of the existing 
framework draft identified no unusual numbering-related impacts from 
the use of these codes.
2.8. Technical Review on SS7 Feasibility
    As noted in the Initial Strike Force Report, ATIS' Technical Report 
on Use of the ISUP Screening Indicator for Conveying Caller ID 
Authentication Information was completed in October 2016.\12\ This 
Technical Report assessed three potential industry solutions for using 
the ISUP Screening Indicator to convey Caller ID Authentication 
information. The industry Strike Force evaluated these potential 
solutions and identified one of the proposed solutions \13\ as the most 
viable, in that it would provide the greatest integrity of the Calling 
Party Number (CgPN), while being the least impactful to existing 
customer expectations with respect to delivery of CgPN.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ Initial Strike Force Report, Section 1.10.3. This ATIS 
technical report is available from the ATIS Document Center: at: 
https://www.atis.org/docstore/product.aspx?id=28295.
    \13\ This solution involves the successfully verified signed PAI or 
FROM headers, attesting that the device can use the TN, being 
interworked into the CgPN with a SI value of ``user provided, verified 
and passed,'' but differs from other solutions in that, if the PAI or 
FROM headers are not signed, a ``network provided'' number (e.g., 
pseudo number that is unique to each carrier) is populated into the 
outgoing ISUP CgPN parameter with an indication of ``network provided'' 
in the SI field.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Based upon the completed work and the input from the Strike Force, 
ATIS PTSC has initiated a project to further analyze one of its 
recommendations for ISUP screening indicator interworking. This work 
has been targeted for completion by the end of 2017.
2.9. Other ATIS Strike Force Work
    In addition to the work projects described above, ATIS has also 
worked cooperatively with the other stakeholder organizations on Strike 
Force matters. ATIS has provided feedback, for example, to the 
USTelecom Industry Traceback Group (ITB Group) on Canadian service 
provider interest in the group, resulting in a new service provider 
participant.
    ATIS has provided feedback from ATIS INC to this group noting that 
555 numbers may be good candidates for Do Not Originate trials. These 
numbers should not be used for any natively legitimate purpose to 
originate calls, and thus any originating use would identify the call 
as spoofed.
2.10. Conclusion
    ATIS notes that the efforts to mitigate robocalling and caller ID 
spoofing are complex, with a significant number of interdependencies. 
However, ATIS and its members are committed to addressing these issues 
with the requisite urgency, including relevant work outside of those 
projects identified in the Initial Strike Force Report. ATIS' work is a 
careful balance of the need for quick action with the need to develop 
implementable, technically-and operationally-effective and sound 
mitigation techniques that reflect the consensus of the industry.
3. Empowering Consumer Choice
    Consumer choice is critical to effectively managing illegal 
robocalls. Many marketing, charitable and other communications are 
wanted and lawful, while unscrupulous telemarketers abuse technology 
and flout the law. Consumers should be empowered to better control 
their communications. Fortunately, mitigation tools are available in 
the form of applications that are providing increased options to 
consumers. And industry associations are acting as force multipliers 
for company efforts and consumer education.
3.1. App Development (ACT)
    As the world has quickly embraced mobile technology, the hyper-
competitive app ecosystem continues to produce more innovative and more 
efficient solutions that leverage mobile technologies to drive the 
global digital economy across modalities and segments, augmenting 
consumer interactions and experiences throughout their personal and 
work lives.
    Service providers, manufacturers, app developers, government, and 
consumers all have a role in reducing unwanted robocalls. ACT agrees 
that third-party apps can play a critical role in empowering consumers 
to control robocalls. As a part of our commitment to stop unwanted 
robocalls, ACT, representing the developer community, has worked within 
the Strike Force to support the development of more effective apps to 
increase consumer control over robocalls. ACT has completed three key 
deliverables following the completion of the Strike Force. They are:

   A public-facing website that provides technical information 
        and recommendations for current and potential robocall control 
        app developers, including technical updates related to changes 
        to information provided by networks and vendors on call 
        spoofing or signaling systems that applications can harness. 
        The website provides app developers information on privacy and 
        privacy policy best practices. ACT designed this information to 
        make it easy for app developers to capitalize on the approaches 
        developed by the Strike Force and to create innovative new 
        solutions.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ http://actonline.org/2017/03/28/robocalls-app-developers/

   Targeted outreach to the ACT's members, including more than 
        5,000 app companies and IT firms from across the mobile economy 
        to educate members about opportunities to develop robocall 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        control apps.

   An online workshop for developers offering both real-time 
        participation and access to ACT's archives. The workshop will 
        work to catalyze the creation of new apps by helping developers 
        quickly get up to speed on the technical and policy 
        considerations behind robocall control apps.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ Id.

    ACT is pleased to satisfy its obligations as part of the Strike 
Force, and we are proud of the incredible work every member has 
contributed in taking meaningful steps to contribute to the mitigation 
of unwanted robocalls.
    While further innovative apps are in development, apps today are 
already playing a major role in mitigating unwanted robocalls (examples 
include AT&T Call Protect, Nomorobo, Hiya, PrivacyStar, and many 
others), and will continue to do so. We encourage developers, 
consumers, and other stakeholders to explore the apps available today; 
and to collaborate and develop innovative apps to mitigate unwanted 
robocalls.
    As discussed in this report, the Robocall Strike Force is examining 
the development of a standardized framework for delivering information 
from networks to devices with the aim of better empowering consumers to 
make informed call handling decisions. Moving forward, ACT will 
continue to encourage its members to rely on these important consensus 
documents as they find new and innovative ways to provide for consumers 
to take control over robocalls.
3.2. Consumer Education Efforts by Strike Force Members
3.2.1. Wireless

    The wireless sector has been actively working to address abatement 
of illegal robocalling, and promoting consumer awareness of existing 
tools.
    With release of the Industry Strike Force Report, CTIA convened the 
RWG and immediately began work on wireless stakeholder engagement, 
working with other trade associations, and committing to and providing 
regular updates to the Industry Strike Force. Specifically, since CTIA 
convened its RWG:

   CTIA has highlighted and facilitated members' efforts to 
        keep their consumer-facing robocall prevention content current 
        in collaboration with Industry Strike Force initiatives.

   CTIA conducted a survey of its members to learn about spam-
        scoring services available in the marketplace today.

   CTIA convened six third party vendor presentations to 
        educate members on innovative robocall mitigation techniques.

   CTIA has integrated a robocall mitigation use case into its 
        ongoing Automated Cyber-Threat Information Sharing (AIS) Pilot 
        being sponsored by CTIA's Cybersecurity Working Group.

   CTIA is working with members on the best ways to display 
        verified caller ID information graphically on a user's handset.

    CTIA' s consumer education efforts have been robust and effective. 
CTIA's webpage on Robocall Mitigation provides a comprehensive list of 
well over 80 mitigation apps and step-by-step video instructions for 
Android, BlackBerry, iOS and Windows devices. Many, if not most, of 
these apps are free. Carriers often refer their customers to the CTIA 
website to guide consumers to the rich variety of available third-party 
apps. Likewise, CTIA and other associations have supported ACT in its 
efforts. CTIA has updated its website to contain references to numerous 
tools, including apps, as well as important consumer tips. Go to: 
http://www.ctia.org/your-wireless-life/consumer-tips/blocking-
robocalls.

   In March 2017 alone, CTIA's robocall consumer tip pages 
        received over 15,000 views

   Since November 2016, CTIA's robocall consumer tip pages has 
        received an average of nearly 10,000 views each month

    Several carrier and vendor members of CTIA's RWG have their web 
resources on robocall mitigation mirrored on the dedicated FCC Resource 
webpage: http://fcc.gov/unwanted-calls. In turn, CTIA uses social media 
to heighten public awareness on robocall mitigation. CTIA also 
facilitated members' efforts to keep their consumer-facing content 
current in collaboration with Industry Strike Force initiatives.
    CTIA looks forward to continuing to support the efforts of the 
Industry Strike Force and other industry efforts. Attention will be 
directed to authentication, empowering consumer choice, and efforts to 
automate what are today the largely manual and iterative Traceback and/
or Do Not Originate processes, which are described in detail below.
    CTIA considers illegal robocalling to be a potential cyber threat. 
So, looking ahead to automation, CTIA has integrated a robocall 
mitigation use case into the ongoing Automated Cyber-Threat Information 
Sharing (AIS) Pilot sponsored by CTIA's Cybersecurity Working Group. 
This pilot seeks to build toward automated examination and sharing of 
call detail records associated with suspected robocalls to inform 
Traceback and Do Not Originate capabilities.
3.2.2. Wireline

    After the initial meeting of the Industry Strike Force at the FCC 
on August 19, 2016,\16\ USTelecom worked with its association members 
and Strike Force participants to increase consumer awareness on 
robocall issues. After the conclusion of the first Strike Force 
meeting, USTelecom and CTIA, in coordination with the FCC, published 
consumer-centric websites providing them with information on robocall 
issues, including consumer tools available to them.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ See, Public Notice, FCC to Host First Meeting of Industry-Led 
Robocall Strike Force, DA 16-917 (August 12, 2016); see also, FCC 
website, First Meeting of Industry-Led Robocall Strike Force (available 
at: https://www.fcc.gov/news-events/events/2016/08/first-meeting-
industry-led-robocall-strike-force) (visited March 30, 2017).
    \17\ See, USTelecom website, Robocalls (available at: http://
www.ustelecom.org/issues/robocalls) (visited April 22, 2017); see also, 
CTIA website, How to Stop Robocalls (available at: http://www.ctia.org/
consumer-tips/robocalls) (visited April 22, 2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    USTelecom's webpage includes a broad variety of consumer-centric 
information regarding robocalls, including consumer safety tips and 
robocall mitigation tools. The website also includes a link to several 
tools available to consumers to block and/or mitigate robocalls on a 
range of consumer voice platforms, including traditional TDM networks, 
IP networks and wireless services.\18\ A link to USTelecom's website is 
also available through the FCC's robocall portal. Several consumer 
groups and other organizations also maintain resources on their 
respective websites educating consumers about robocall issues.\19\ In 
addition, several companies participating in the Industry Strike Force 
have also taken steps to educate customers about robocalls, as well as 
make mitigation tools available to consumers on their company 
websites.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\ See, USTelecom website, Robocalls (available at: http://
www.ustelecom.org/issues/robocalls) (visited April 25, 2017).
    \19\ See e.g., Consumer Reports, Robocall Blocker Review, August 14 
(2015) (available at: http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/magazine/2015/
07/robocall-blocker-review/index.htm) (visited April 25, 2017); see 
also, AARP website, Robocalls (available at: http://blog.aarp.org/tag/
robocalls/); AARP website, Scam Alert (available at: http://
blog.aarp.org/2014/08/01/how-to-avoid-robocall-scams/) (visited April 
25, 2017); FTC website, Consumer Information, Robocalls (available at: 
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/features/feature-0025-robocalls) (visited 
April 25, 2017).
    \20\ See e.g., AT&T website, Call Blocking options: Nomorobo 
(available at: https://www.att.com/esupport/article.html#!/u-verse-
voice/KM1074689) (visited April 25, 2017); CenturyLink website, Ways to 
block unwanted calls from your home phone (available at: http://
www.centurylink.com/home/help/products/calling-features/ways-to-block-
unwanted-calls-from-your-home-phone.html) (visited April 25, 2017); 
Verizon website, What are robocalls (available at: https://
www.verizon.com/support/consumer/consumer-education/robocalls) (visited 
April 25, 2017); Frontier website, Call Block & Priority (available at: 
https://frontier.com/helpcenter/categories/phone/calling-features/call-
block-priority-residential) (visited April 25, 2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    There is strong industry support for increased consumer education 
about robocalls, to include increasing awareness of the threat, as well 
as tools available to consumers. Such an approach can have a tangible 
and positive impact on robocall issues, and educational outreach has 
been previously identified by the FCC and the Federal Trade Commission 
as an essential component to raising awareness of this issue.\21\ 
Public outreach measures have been successfully implemented by the 
Federal government in the past and are ideally suited in the current 
context. Whether implemented on a broad public relations scale, or 
through targeted multi-industry efforts, such outreach measures ensure 
that valuable information is disseminated and shared amongst target 
audiences.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ See e.g., Public Notice, FCC to Host Consumer Webinar on 
Dealing with Robocalls (released February 2, 2017); See e.g., Comments 
of FTC Chairman Jon Leibowitz, FTC Robocall Workshop, October 18, 2012 
(noting that the FTC ``pride ourselves on the fact that we take a 
multi-faceted approach to consumer protection issues that includes 
enforcement, education, policy, and advocacy.'' (available at: https://
www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/robocalls-all-
rage-ftc-summit/robocallsummittranscript.pdf) (visited April 25, 2017). 
See also, FTC website, Phone Scams (available at: https://
www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0076-phone-scams) (visited April 25, 
2017); FCC website, Unwanted Calls (available at: https://www.fcc.gov/
unwanted-calls) (visited April 25, 2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3.3. Industry Input from Non-Strike force members
3.3.1. Wireless

    CTIA has worked to bring non-members into the discussion and 
activity on illegal robocall abatement. CTIA convened numerous meetings 
to share technology and solutions. As discussed in the October Strike 
Force report, CTIA undertook the task of working with members to 
provide robocall mitigation information to customers.
    CTIA surveyed its RWG members and learned about spam-scoring 
services in the market today. As noted, CTIA then reached out to the 
third party vendor community, and facilitated presentations from six 
companies to the RWG regarding robocall mitigation opportunities. The 
companies below presented:

   Cequint: Provides spam scoring, based on real-time network 
        data analytics to ensure that legitimate enterprise calls to 
        customers are not placed incorrectly on a blacklist. https://
        www.cequint.com/personal/

   Hiya: Provides network-based caller ID and spam detection 
        and protection natively integrated for all clients, and O/S 
        platform independent. https://hiya
        .com/#page-top

   iconectiv: Certified Caller ID: Demonstrated the process of 
        certificate assignment (and revocation) pursuant to STIR/SHAKEN 
        protocol. http://iconectiv.com/thought-leadership/existing-
        robocalling-and-spoofing-mitigation-techniques

   Neustar: Smart ID product, which integrates APIs on: CNAM 
        (to include business logos); subscriber insights; and certified 
        caller ID. Includes Neustar's Trust Lab, selected by ATIS as 
        its Robocalling Test Bed. https://www.neustar.biz/
        communications/caller-id

   Nomorobo: A wireless, network-agnostic application based on 
        new API capabilities available with the release of iOS 10 and 
        higher. A nominal subscription-based service, it allows the 
        download of updated number blacklists to the iPhone. http://
        www.nomorobo.com/

   PrivacyStar, a First Orion company: Originally app-based, 
        expanded their in-network deployments which leverage data 
        analytics and call heuristics to aid in call labeling and 
        categorization and offer consumers more information to reduce 
        blocking of ``wanted'' robocalls (pharmacy, school, 
        enterprise). https://www.privacystar.com/

    CTIA and its members are encouraged by the level of communication 
about these issues, and look forward to pressing forward on new 
solutions and approaches, including those developed by third parties. 
In fact, some CTIA members already make services from these third party 
vendors available to their customers.
3.3.2. Wireline

    Since the start of the industry-led Strike Force efforts, USTelecom 
has also made significant outreach and inroads to non-Strike Force 
members. For example, in January, 2017, USTelecom met with 
representatives from Duke Energy, which is leading a coalition of 
approximately 90 electric utility organizations called ``Utilities 
United Against Scams'' (Utilities Coalition). The Utilities Coalition 
was formed last year by Duke Energy to address and combat ongoing fraud 
targeted towards electric utility customers through illegal robocalls. 
The calls would fraudulently advise consumers that their electricity 
services would be cut off, unless payment was immediately submitted.
    In January, 2017, USTelecom delivered a presentation to the 
coalition regarding the ITB Group \22\ efforts, and USTelecom will also 
be attending its first face to face meeting in Fort Worth, Texas in 
May. In addition, USTelecom was able to facilitate discussions between 
the Utilities Coalition and other industry partners in order to shut 
down several toll free numbers that were hosting fraudulent interactive 
voice response (IVR) systems that were spoofing legitimate electric 
utility companies. Fraudsters were using the spoofed IVR systems to 
facilitate communications between targeted consumers and the scammers 
(i.e., consumers were led to believe they were contacting legitimate 
electric utility companies).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ See sections below, ``USTelecom Efforts on Detection, 
Assessment, Traceback and Mitigation'' and ``USTelecom Status of 
Traceback Initiatives'' for further details on the ITB Working Group.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As a result of this coordination, the Utilities Coalition was able 
to identify toll free numbers being used in the IVR scams and have them 
removed from service. This industry-wide coordination is ongoing, and 
the group is working to establish a more streamlined and effective 
system for electric utilities to remove these fraudulent IVR numbers 
from service on an expedited basis.
    In addition to this effort, USTelecom continues its outreach and 
coordination with various Federal agencies regarding areas of potential 
cooperation. For example, USTelecom staff met with IRS investigators in 
September, 2016, to discuss the IRS scam, and additional cooperation 
between industry and the agency. As a result of these efforts, 
USTelecom staff conducted in-person training for Treasury Department 
staff, including Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration 
(TIGTA) personnel on November 9, 2016. The class, ``Telephony 101 and 
Robocall Fundamentals'' provided Treasury Department personnel with an 
overview of how telecom networks function, the nature of robocalling, 
the wide variety of robocall schemes and industry traceback efforts.
    These efforts are ongoing, and in addition to the IRS, USTelecom 
has coordinated with Health and Human Services and Immigrations and 
Customs Enforcement on industry-led efforts to combat robocalls. 
Finally, USTelecom has also conducted outreach to various industry 
stakeholders engaged on the robocall issue. For example, USTelecom has 
met on several occasions with various stakeholders deploying robocall 
mitigation tools, including several vendors of telecommunications 
services. USTelecom intends to continue this outreach and coordination 
in the coming year.
3.4. Network to Device Display
3.4.1. Wireless and other IP-based Networks

    The telecommunications industry has been working on the 
complexities surrounding on-device displays about illegal robocalling. 
To date, industry efforts on Robocall Mitigation have focused on the 
transmission of ``verified Caller ID'' using the ``STIR/SHAKEN'' 
framework where a SIP-based network is available, e.g., a VoLTE network 
supporting wireless subscribers. Using this protocol can enable a 
carrier to determine if an originating service provider has 
authenticated a particular telephone number. Industry has been 
considering how verified Caller ID information can and should be 
displayed on a user's wireless handset to enable real time decision 
making by consumers about incoming calls. Questions include whether 
there should be standardization with respect to a minimum set of 
display requirements or whether that is best left to the network, OEM 
and app communities.
    Industry participants are investigating how an OEM or carrier can 
graphically display verified caller ID information on the user's 
handset. Work on network-to-device display is in early stages and 
ongoing. CTIA is working with its carrier, handset and system vendor 
members, and standards organizations, on how to best display 
information to the consumer about an incoming call. Considerations 
include whether minimum set of requirements for network-to-device 
display is preferred, versus giving carriers greater flexibility to 
pursue innovation in graphical design from the handset, system vendor, 
and carrier communities.
3.4.2. Wireline

    On the wireline side, substantial innovation is ongoing to address 
the display challenges associated with existing customer premises 
equipment. For example, for several months Verizon has been trialing, 
to millions of its wireline customers, a new service that warns about 
potential spam by inserting a warning indication in the Caller Name 
field of the home user' phone display that the incoming call may be 
spam related. One advantage of this approach is that because it rides 
on the CNAM database that carriers use to associate a calling party 
name with a particular telephone number, it uses the customer's 
existing 15-character display, and it does not require either a VoIP 
connection or the transmission of a new SS7 field. This trial is an 
implementation of the patented prototype technology that Verizon 
presented to strike force members last fall, which Verizon has offered 
to share with interested carriers.
3.5. Industry Member Activity
    Industry participants and Strike Force members continue to improve 
and expand mitigation tools to combat illegal robocalling. Much of this 
work cannot be made public because it would provide too much 
information to the robocallers but here are some examples of what is 
being done. The market is working.

   AT&T: Launched AT&T Call Protect in December 2016 as a free 
        network service. It allows customers with iPhones and HD Voice-
        enabled Android handsets to automatically block suspected 
        fraudulent calls. It can flag suspected spam calls so the 
        customer can choose whether to answer or not. And, using the 
        interface provided by the AT&T Call Protect app, customers can 
        manually block an unlimited number of specific telephone 
        numbers for 30-day intervals. The customer can download the app 
        via the AT&T website or on their device through the App Store. 
        Network call data analysis and heuristics that power this 
        solution are provided by Hiya. In addition, AT&T blocked its 
        billionth unwanted robocall in cases where its business 
        contracts allow it to block impermissible traffic using a new 
        program that detects violators through network data analysis.

   Comcast: Comcast offers Nomorobo, a free cloud-based service 
        that hangs up on or blocks illegal robocaller or telemarketing 
        calls from calling the intended home telephone number, to its 
        wireline customers

   Sprint: Sprint offers Premium Caller ID service on a 
        subscription basis. It now includes, for select Android 
        smartphones, the ability to not only the ability to identify a 
        higher percentage of nuisance calls, but also an option to 
        block them. This solution directly leverages data and network 
        intelligence powered by a partnership with Cequint, a wholly 
        owned subsidiary of Transaction Network Services (TNS).

   T-Mobile: T-Mobile launched Scam ID in March 2017 as a free, 
        network-based automatic service that identifies calls from 
        known phone scammers, across all handset platforms, on 
        smartphones and feature phones. If a scam call is detected, the 
        Caller ID will display ``Scam Likely'' on the device, giving 
        customers the option to answer, or permanently block the 
        number. Customers that choose to invoke Scam Block, another 
        free service, will have all calls from known scammers blocked. 
        These solutions are powered by network call data analysis and 
        heuristics provided by PrivacyStar, a First Orion company.

   Verizon: Verizon has used the CNAM-based solution described 
        above to warn more than four million wireline Fios Digital 
        Voice customers about calls identified by Verizon's analytics 
        engine and its robocall mitigation team, including calls 
        relating to the well-known IRS impersonation scam. Verizon's 
        network team also worked with Nomorobo to develop a ``one 
        click'' solution that simplifies Fios Digital Voice customers' 
        ability to sign up for that third-party blocking service. And 
        since November 2016, Verizon Wireless has been trialing a 
        service that scores all incoming calls to its Caller Name ID 
        customers, identifying potential spam and calling-out the level 
        of risk with a ``risk meter.'' The service is powered by 
        Cequint, a wholly owned subsidiary of Transaction Network 
        Services (TNS), and is currently available on ten Android 
        devices. Verizon expects a broader product launch later in 
        2017.

   Apple: Apple introduced CallKit for iOS 10 and higher. API 
        developers can create a call directory app extension to 
        identify and block incoming callers by their phone number. This 
        opens the iPhone ecosystem to an important call control 
        capability, for devices running iOS 10 and higher, across all 
        service provider networks. https://developer.apple.com/
        reference/callkit

   West: In response to the rise of spam calls, West is working 
        with the various call blocking solution providers to promote 
        decision support tools for the entities whose numbers have been 
        compromised.

   Google: In late 2016, Google introduced spam protection 
        functionality on the Google Phone application for Pixel, Nexus, 
        and Android One devices, which warns users about potential spam 
        callers and provides users with the choice to block and report 
        these numbers. (See, e.g., https://support.google.com/
        pixelphone/answer/3459196) The user interface and reporting 
        aspects of Google Phone spam protection have also been made 
        openly available at no cost to third parties via the Android 
        Open Source Project (https://source.android.com/). In addition, 
        there are plans to provide platform APIs in upcoming builds of 
        Android that would offer new forms of spam solution support for 
        carriers and manufacturers.

   Strike Force members worked with the CFCA in developing 
        customer education messaging about how consumer can protect 
        themselves from fraud, including the attached the attached 
        fraud-related message: https://www.youtube.com/
        watch?v=rE53QDNP8Is.
4. Detection, Assessment, Traceback and Mitigation (USTelecom)
    In June of 2015, USTelecom formed a Robocall Engineering Working 
group. USTelecom invited its carrier members to participate in this 
working group with the goal of easing and simplifying the process of 
tracing the origins of robocalls, otherwise known as traceback. During 
the course of these Robocall Engineering Working Group efforts, the 
group noted that the sharing of certain network intelligence and 
traceback information among its participants could and did lead to the 
successful thwarting and mitigation of unwanted and illegal phone 
traffic. A key lesson learned from USTelecom's extensive experience and 
leadership in traceback efforts is that with investments in personnel 
and IT systems, along with providers' contact information for traceback 
and subpoena requests being readily available, voice providers can 
establish the systems and processes needed to efficiently process 
requests (whether government subpoenas or requests from other carriers) 
to identify the source of suspicious traffic traversing their networks. 
Unfortunately, while numerous providers have formally joined our 
traceback efforts, and many others cooperate in good faith in 
tracebacks, there are still upstream carriers who refuse to cooperate, 
which prevents carriers from tracing these malicious calling events 
back to the origin of the call.
    In May of 2016, the Robocall Engineering Working group felt it 
would be beneficial for wide-scale industry participation, and to 
include service providers from outside of USTelecom's membership in 
these robocall mitigation efforts. USTelecom therefore developed a 
framework for participation and governance and began to invite numerous 
service providers to participate in traceback efforts.
    Many service providers accepted the invitation and the terms of the 
framework. On June 28, 2016, USTelecom conducted the first Industry 
Traceback Working Group (ITB Group) conference call. There are 
currently twenty-one members of the ITB Group, which includes 
traditional wireline phone companies, wholesale carriers, wireless 
providers, and cable companies. The membership also includes foreign 
carriers (e.g., Bell Canada), and non-traditional voice providers 
(e.g., Google). USTelecom will continue to reach out to industry 
stakeholders in an effort to continue expanding membership in the ITB 
Group.
    The ITB Group conducts biweekly conference calls to discuss 
malicious calling events that were observed on the members' respective 
networks. Various network actions and mitigation practices are 
discussed and shared with the group. Between conference calls, when a 
malicious calling event occurs on one or more networks, the ITB Group 
is alerted via e-mails that are sent out by the detecting service 
provider. The remaining group members conduct network scans, research 
and analysis to determine if these events are occurring on their 
respective networks. Each ITB Group member explains their observations, 
their respective notification actions, network actions, and shares any 
traceback information with the rest of the working group.
    Subsequent to the October meeting of the Industry Strike Force, 
USTelecom and the ITB Group focused its efforts on completing a Do Not 
Originate (DNO) \23\ trial in order to assess the feasibility of DNO as 
a robocall mitigation tool. During November and December of 2016, 
USTelecom staff and individual ITB Group members reached out to 
relevant stakeholders to identify potential DNO candidates. This 
included outreach to industry trade associations, individual companies, 
and government stakeholders. Once suitable candidates for DNO were 
identified, a series of trials were conducted during January and 
February of 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ See section below, ``USTelecom Status of Do Not Originate 
Initiatives'' for further details on the DNO.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Finally, the ability of carriers to institute a DNO varies by ITB 
Group members. Each ITB Group member oversees a diverse range of 
network facilities, some of which are more capable of instituting DNOs 
in a more seamless manner. In addition, the resources and capabilities 
available to each of the ITB Group members also varies, with some 
members having fully staffed fraud and network engineering departments 
operating on a round-the-clock basis. In addition, implementation of 
DNOs by individual ITB Group members was wholly voluntary throughout 
this process.
4.1. USTelecom Status of Traceback Initiatives
    With the establishment of the ITB Group, efforts were primarily 
focused on the mechanics and processes for initiating industry 
traceback efforts. Initial efforts of the group were focused on 
identifying possible illegal robocall incidents, and threat 
intelligence was shared between ITB Group members. This initial 
information sharing effort enabled ITB Group members to scale the scope 
of suspected robocall incidents, and enabled individual ITB Group 
member efforts to institute mitigation measures on their own networks 
to address these call incidents.
    As the ITB Group grew in membership size, these information sharing 
efforts significantly accelerated awareness of such incidents across a 
broad range of industry stakeholders. In addition, these initial 
efforts facilitated coordination between individual ITB Group members, 
who could more easily cooperate on analyzing suspected robocalling 
events. Also, efforts have been implemented for faster responses to 
traceback requests, by working in conjunction with ATIS to update ATIS' 
Service Provider Contact Directory (SPCD).\24\ The SPCD, available upon 
request across the industry ecosystem (e.g., service providers, 
regulators and enforcement bureaus) to provide contact information for 
reporting or passing along trouble reports to interconnecting 
companies, has been expanded to include contacts related to traceback 
and for subpoena requests. As more providers submit their contact 
information for the SPCD, traceback efforts can be investigated in a 
more expeditious manner.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ See section below, ``Work with enforcement to shorten the 
cycle time between identification and action to stop illegal activity'' 
for further details on the SPCD.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In late 2016 (between November and December), USTelecom staff began 
exploring enhancements to its initial efforts. These reforms were 
instituted to make the ITB Group's traceback process more focused and 
more effective in tracing back specific call paths closer to their 
point of origin in the network. These reforms included: (1) more 
targeted traceback requests; (2) expanded outreach to upstream 
carriers; and (3) detailed cataloguing of information collected during 
individual tracebacks.
    Regarding the first reform, ITB Group members focused on exercising 
their ability under Section 222(d) of the Communications Act, which 
allows carriers to share CPNI in order to ``protect the rights or 
property of the carrier, or to protect users of those services and 
other carriers from fraudulent, abusive, or unlawful use of, or 
subscription to, such services.'' \25\ The sharing of such information 
by telecommunications providers can benefit consumers by enabling 
providers to quickly, efficiently and cooperatively identify the true 
source of fraudulent, abusive or unlawful calls, including robocalls. 
In instances where calls are traced to their point of origin, this 
often enables investigating providers to work with the originating 
carrier to cease such calls initiated by its customer. Such efforts are 
also extremely valuable to law enforcement, since carriers' ability to 
trace calls through several networks can substantially assist law 
enforcement personnel in subsequent investigations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\ 47 USC 222(d)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Regarding expanded outreach to upstream carriers, USTelecom 
initiated an effort whereby non-ITB Group upstream carriers were 
contacted by USTelecom staff. Because any particular call flow can 
include both ITB Group members, and non-ITB Group members, it was 
essential to reach out to carriers in the latter category to encourage 
them to participate in the industry-led effort to identify the source 
of illegal robocalls.
    Finally, USTelecom instituted a process whereby the association 
catalogues certain information relating to traceback efforts by the ITB 
Group. The information is retained in a password-protected Microsoft 
Access database by USTelecom. Once a traceback effort is initiated by 
an ITB Group member, a reference number is assigned for that particular 
call incident. This information includes the requesting ITB Group 
member, the date of the calling incident, the date the traceback effort 
was initiated within the ITB Group, the volume of calls associated with 
the calling incident, and the phone number associated with the calling 
incident (Traceback Number).
    Once this data is entered, ITB Group members are asked to scan 
their respective networks for the Traceback Number to see whether it 
has transited their respective networks. If this is the case, ITB Group 
members report back to USTelecom with a listing of the top 5 or 10 
upstream carriers (that may include both ITB Group members, and non-ITB 
Group members), as well as associated call volumes (Incident Reports). 
The Incident Reports from responding ITB Group members are entered into 
a separate table that tracks upstream carriers and call volumes for the 
Traceback Number. The general process for this effort is highlighted in 
the below diagram.


    USTelecom will then select an Incident Report from an ITB Group 
member for an active traceback effort. USTelecom staff coordinates 
separately with each ITB Group member identified as a source of 
upstream traffic to obtain the source of their upstream traffic. In 
addition, USTelecom also reaches out to non-ITB Group members, 
requesting that the source of their upstream traffic be provided to 
USTelecom for further traceback efforts. This process is reflected in 
the below diagram.


    This process is repeated through each network hop: USTelecom 
coordinates with ITB Group members to push back deeper into the network 
path; while also reaching out to non-ITB Group members requesting 
additional traceback information. The process continues, until such 
point that USTelecom can no longer continue to traceback the Incident 
Report further into the network path due to the absence of 
participating ITB Group members and/or non-responsive non-ITB Group 
members. A sample call path scenario is illustrated below.


    In January, 2017, the ITB Group initiated its first traceback 
effort under the enhanced traceback process. The number at issue 
involved an IRS-related scam using a non-toll free number. Between 
January 13, 2017, and January 27, 2017, USTelecom staff identified 
approximately 70 upstream carriers, and sent approximately forty 
separate communications to upstream carriers requesting assistance on 
the ITB Group Traceback efforts (several of these upstream carriers 
lacked readily available contact information). None of the non-ITB 
Group members provided actionable information. However, working with 
just the members of the ITB Group, USTelecom was able to trace the call 
back through four distinct network hops by the end of the traceback 
effort.
    Finally, USTelecom recently met with staff from the FCC's 
Enforcement Bureau to discuss the traceback efforts of the ITB Group, 
and potential handoffs of information collected by the ITB Group during 
the traceback process. During this initial meeting, USTelecom staff 
provided FCC personnel with an overview of the enhanced traceback 
process, discussed areas of potential cooperation, as well as certain 
challenges faced by industry in these efforts. USTelecom will continue 
to work with its partners in government and law enforcement, in order 
to maximize the effectiveness of industry-led efforts.
4.2 USTelecom Status of Do Not Originate Initiatives
    On October 26, 2016, USTelecom was directed to complete a report on 
one component of robocall mitigation efforts known as Do Not Originate 
(DNO).\26\ That report was delivered to Strike Force members on March 
31, 2017 (DNO Report). The DNO Report provided an overview of the DNO 
process, including spoofing challenges associated with this approach, 
as well as DNO's application as a highly specialized tool. It also 
included a summary of industry efforts on this issue, including the 
development of USTelecom's ITB Group, and provided an analysis of three 
completed DNO trials, and the findings from those efforts. It finally 
discussed lessons learned over the last two months from these DNO 
efforts, and provides an analysis on the effectiveness and feasibility 
of DNO.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ Id., Section 3.2.3, p. 34.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This is a process whereby certain telephone numbers are identified 
at VoIP gateways or interconnection points, and prevented from 
terminating to the end user based upon the originating telephone 
number. A measured and tightly controlled process is implemented, and 
can be instituted by some or many carriers. Calls from numbers that 
have been placed on a DNO list are rejected by the first service 
provider in the call path that has implemented DNO based on the 
originating telephone number and thus blocked from entering the phone 
system. This is no substitute for authentication, but USTelecom's 
testing efforts demonstrated that the process can prevent a certain 
subset of narrowly defined harmful calls from reaching consumers.
    The USTelecom DNO trials demonstrates that applied in a narrow and 
tightly controlled manner, this can be an effective deterrent in 
mitigating certain types of large and medium scale attacks. It is 
important to note that the calls themselves will still route across 
networks up until the point that the traffic is handed off to a carrier 
that is instituting a block. Because there are potentially multiple 
paths for any call to take, the effectiveness of any given effort will 
rely on the participation rate of carriers. In other words, the more 
carriers that are instituting a block on a given number, the more 
effective that particular undertaking will be.
    The DNO Report discussed a series of three DNO trials using certain 
criteria.\27\ The three completed trials involved efforts involving the 
Internal Revenue Service, a toll free directory assistance number, and 
the Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency. A complete analysis of 
these efforts was provided to the industry-led Strike Force on March 
31, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \27\ See e.g., USTelecom Comments, CG Docket No. 02-278, WC Docket 
No. 02-278, p. 17 (submitted January 23, 2015) (available at: https://
ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/60001015988.pdf) (visited April 22, 2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4.3 The Effectiveness and Feasibility of DNO
    Blocking DNO numbers can be an effective tool for addressing 
certain types of robocalls (specifically, ones where bad actors spoof 
known ``vanity'' numbers to impersonate legitimate callers), when it is 
applied in a narrow and targeted manner. As USTelecom has previously 
noted, there is no single `silver bullet' to the robocall problem,\28\ 
and the process of blocking DNO numbers should be viewed as one of a 
growing number of tools available to address the robocall problem. In 
general, robocalls are best addressed in a holistic manner through 
deployment of a wide variety of tools by a broad range of stakeholders. 
These stakeholders include consumer groups (e.g., education/awareness, 
adoption of consumer-based blocking tools), government entities (e.g., 
enforcement, education, coordination, regulatory protection), standards 
organizations (e.g., development of industry standards such as SHAKEN/
STIR), and industry (e.g., Blocking DNO numbers, traceback, robocall 
mitigation tools, etc.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \28\ See e.g., USTelecom Comments, CG Docket No. 02-278, WC Docket 
No. 02-278, p. 17 (submitted January 23, 2015) (available at: https://
ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/60001015988.pdf) (visited April 22, 2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In particular, this process should be paired with robust traceback 
efforts in order to ensure that the bad actors whose illegal spoofing 
is being partially mitigated by these policies can be investigated 
fully and prosecuted if appropriate. As discussed below, the calls that 
are candidates for the DNO blocking are often among the most egregious 
legal violations of all categories of robocalls.
    USTelecom concludes that the DNO trials outlined in this report 
were effective due to the efforts being narrowly targeted towards the 
specific set of telephone numbers identified and confirmed as inbound-
only. That is no guarantee that they will be similarly effective in the 
future, or that they could be successfully scaled without creating 
harmful unintended consequences. If DNO blocking procedures were more 
widely deployed beyond a narrow set of numbers (i.e., inbound-only 
telephone numbers), bad actors could easily and rapidly transition to 
randomized and/or legitimate telephone numbers in order to circumvent 
DNO blocks. In fact, the widespread deployment of a broader range of 
DNO numbers (e.g., unassigned telephone numbers) could have the 
perverse effect of quickly nullifying any protections, while also 
making robocallers more difficult to identify. This could also increase 
instances of both ``false positives'' (i.e., blocking numbers that 
should not have been blocked) and ``false negatives'' (i.e., fail to 
block numbers that should have been blocked).
    Accordingly, due to the nature of the DNO blocking process (i.e., 
outright blocking in the network), its use should currently be limited 
to those instances where the number in question (i) is used by bad 
actors as part of an impersonation scam, (ii) is confirmed as an 
`inbound-only' number using strong vetting procedures that go beyond 
merely asking the subscriber or its carrier about the number's use, and 
(iii) appropriate authorizations are obtained from the entity to whom 
the number is assigned. In addition, the process should also be 
deployed in a highly controlled environment. Carriers must carefully 
and continually coordinate with the telephone number owner before and 
during the entire process, in order to ensure that issues arising from 
inadvertent blocking of legitimate calls do not arise. As happened 
during one of the trials, legitimate calls will be blocked if any 
carrier attempts to implement blocks of purported inbound-only numbers 
without fully vetting the subscriber's understanding that the number is 
inbound-only.\29\ Such false positives should of course be avoided in 
the first instances, and if they do occur they need to be remedied 
promptly.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \29\ Customers who attest that they never initiate calls with a 
particular number often find other parts of their business, or third 
parties contracted services, that do. And a carrier that has assigned a 
number to a customer cannot conclusively and uniquely tell that 
customer that no other carrier originates traffic using that number to 
initiate legitimate calls. Outbound services using the telephone number 
could be hosted in the cloud or third party providers and carried over 
multiple wholesale provider networks. Given the highly dynamic and 
competitive call processing and handling ecosystem, which involves a 
diversity of business arrangements and call center structures, 
simplistic assumptions about a number's appropriateness for DNO are 
likely to result in unintended consequences.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In the near term, any widely deployed efforts would likely face 
significant technical scalability issues, in addition to the policy 
risks (e.g., incentivizing more spoofing of legitimate numbers in order 
to get around DNO blocks) discussed above. For example, the network 
capabilities for all providers operating in today's voice ecosystem 
varies widely. In some instances, an individual carrier may even have 
disparate network capabilities within their respective networks (e.g., 
portions of the network may be TDM, while other portions may be IP-
based). As a result, as any centralized list of DNO numbers grows, it 
may very well exceed the capacity of certain network systems.
    In addition, there is currently no centralized method for obtaining 
blocking authorizations across the universe of network providers. As a 
result, letters of authority (LOAs) from each number's owner must 
ideally be sent to each organization seeking to institute a DNO 
blocking process, since there is currently no form of `transitive' 
authorization. In order to implement DNO blocking process on a broader 
scale, some form of universal LOA would need to be developed. In 
addition, some form of centralized distribution method for such LOAs 
would need to be developed, along with a list management framework. 
Regarding this latter point, any such list would need to be continually 
monitored and updated as telephone numbers are added to, or removed 
from, the list of authorized DNOs, while keeping such information out 
of nefarious hands.
    Because of the risks of unintended consequences if the blocking 
were implemented in an unmeasured way, USTelecom supports the 
permissive approach outlined by the Commission in its recent Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking.\30\ This is an appropriate starting point for 
considering its applicability to other categories of phone numbers. 
Specifically, the Commission's proposal is to permit voice service 
providers to block telephone calls in certain, narrow circumstances to 
protect subscribers from fraudulent and illegal robocalls. Under the 
proposal, the Commission would codify the Consumer and Governmental 
Affairs Bureau guidance public notice that providers may block calls 
when the subscriber to a particular telephone number requests that 
calls originating from that number be blocked.\31\ USTelecom intends to 
participate in the Commission's rulemaking proceeding, and it is 
anticipated that this current report to the Industry Strike Force will 
help to further inform industry's analysis of this proposal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \30\ See e.g., Blocking NPRM, p. 10 (stating that ``it is also 
important for the Commission to protect the reliability of the nation's 
communications network and to protect consumers from provider-initiated 
blocking that harms, rather than helps, consumers. The Commission 
therefore must balance competing policy considerations--some favoring 
blocking and others disfavoring blocking--to arrive at an effective 
solution that maximizes consumer protection and network 
reliability.'').
    \31\ The Commission also seeks comment on authorizing providers to 
block calls from three categories of numbers: invalid numbers, valid 
numbers that are not allocated to a voice service provider, and valid 
numbers that are allocated but not assigned to a subscriber.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4.4. Work with enforcement to shorten the cycle time between 
        identification and action to stop illegal activity
    In October 2016, ATIS completed its work on a process to maintain a 
contact list for robocall related subpoenas as noted by the Initial 
Strike Force Report. The list is included as part of ATIS' larger 
service provider contact directory that allows the industry to identify 
contacts for other key issues, including call termination issues. ATIS 
maintains this list and has been working to promote the completion of 
contact information and its use by the industry. ATIS efforts since the 
Initial Strike Force report include efforts to streamline and automate 
input processes. This streamlining/automation is expected to be 
finalized in April 2017.
    The ATIS Service Provider Contact Directory is available 
electronically at no charge. However, because this document is intended 
only for use only by service provider and enforcement agencies, it is 
password protected. More information about this document, including how 
to request the password, is available from: http://www.atis.org/
01_committ_forums/NGIIF/contact_directories.asp.
    USTelecom also realizes the importance of participation in the ATIS 
carrier directory. It will continue to coordinate with all of the ITB 
Group members and the association's individual members to ensure that 
their updated contact information is added to the list maintained by 
ATIS. In addition to direct communication and coordination with its 
individual members and members of the ITB Group, USTelecom has also 
utilized additional tools to expand awareness of this ATIS effort. 
These efforts include articles in the association's weekly newsletter, 
as well as blog entries regarding the importance of the ATIS 
initiative.
    Further, CTIA has ensured that all national carriers have added 
their contact information to the ATIS service provider contact 
directory to help expedite investigations into the sources of illegal 
robocalls.
5. Regulatory Support
    During the first sixty days, the Strike Force identified several 
regulatory road blocks and asked the Commission for rule clarifications 
and, if necessary, rule changes. The Commission addressed those 
requests in its NPRM and NOI released on March 23, 2017. Industry 
members expect to comment on the proposed rules and the technical and 
definitional questions raised by the FCC. Abating illegal robocalls is 
a complex undertaking, with potential unintended consequences, so 
carriers must have clear guidelines and protections for actions they 
may take to facilitate illegal robocall abatement. As new regulatory 
issues arise, the industry will continue to work with the Commission to 
remove any additional regulatory road blocks.
6. Conclusion
    Significant progress has been made over the past six months. But 
this is not the end of the industry effort to develop ways to stop 
unwanted and illegal calls. The industry is committed to continuing to 
develop mitigation tools and techniques until these illegal harassing 
calls are stopped.
                                 ______
                                 
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Catherine Cortez Masto 
                          to Adrian Abramovich
    Question 1. Deterrence--In your statement you said that a major 
reason that robocallers do what they do is because the software is 
easily accessible and inexpensive. One person can now make millions and 
millions of calls with just a computer. You mentioned the need to 
regulate the companies that sell autodialers and other software that 
makes this practice easy for telemarketers.
    Other than looking at these companies, what actions can we take 
that would deter people from engaging in illegal robocalls?
    Answer. No response to received.

    Question 2. Do believe criminal penalties, with possible jail time, 
would deter some callers from making robocalls?
    Answer. No response received.

    Question 3. Size of the Industry--You said in your testimony you 
would make a good faith effort to work with the committee with your 
knowledge of the telemarketing industry. With regards to that industry, 
I am curious about its size. Obviously we see billions of these calls 
made but with modern technology one person can initiate an endless 
amount of calls.
    From your experience, do you have any sense of the quantity of 
actors out there?
    Answer. No response received.

    Question 4. Are there bigger players that are responsible for a 
majority of the calls? Or is the industry much larger and diversified?
    Answer. No response received.

    Question 5. Are people in the industry worried about government 
action? Or is there a general sense that the chances of being caught 
are very small?
    Answer. No response received.
                                 ______
                                 
     Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. John Thune to 
                            Rosemary Harold
    Question. Would a longer statute of limitations improve the 
Commission's ability to focus its enforcement efforts against knowing 
and willful violators of the TCPA?
    Answer. Yes, even a one-year longer statute of limitations for 
enforcement of the TCPA would improve the Commission's enforcement 
efforts against knowing and willful violators.
                                 ______
                                 
   Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to 
                            Rosemary Harold
    Question 1. What is the interplay between privacy and robocalls? 
How do robocallers get access to our private information in order to 
target consumers for robocalls?
    Is there any evidence that robocallers share call lists with each 
other or on the dark web which has the potential of creating repeat 
victims?
    Answer. Taking each question in turn:

   Interplay between privacy and robocalls: Consumers widely 
        consider unauthorized robocalls to be intrusive and an invasion 
        of privacy. When Congress passed the Telephone Consumer 
        Protection Act (TCPA) in 1991, one of the stated bases for 
        placing additional restrictions on robocalls was that

    ``. . . automated telephone calls that deliver an artificial or 
        prerecorded voice message are more of a nuisance and a greater 
        invasion of privacy than calls placed by `live' persons. These 
        automated calls cannot interact with the customer except in 
        preprogrammed ways, do not allow the caller to feel the 
        frustration of the called party, fill an answering machine tape 
        or a voice recording service, and do not disconnect the line 
        even after the customer hangs up the telephone. For all these 
        reasons, it is legitimate and consistent with the Constitution 
        to impose greater restrictions on automated calls than on calls 
        placed by `live' persons.''

    (See S.Rep. No. 102-178, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) at 4-5.)

   How robocallers get access/target consumers: Different 
        robocallers use different techniques, depending on the goal of 
        the communication. For example, during his testimony before the 
        Committee, Adrian Abramovich generally described his intention 
        to reach certain demographics (married, over the age of 30, 
        etc.), and explained that he targeted certain area codes in an 
        attempt to reach consumers fitting the profile. While we make 
        no assessment about the truthfulness of those statements, we 
        note that the process Abramovich describes is fairly typical 
        for target demographic-based telemarketing. Some robocall 
        telemarketers purchase lists of phone contacts from data 
        brokers or lead generators. Some robocallers use a scattershot 
        or broadcast approach, hitting as many phone lines as possible 
        in as short a time as possible. This type of robocaller tends 
        to dial phone numbers randomly.

   Robocallers sharing lists/dark web: Over the course of our 
        investigations, we have found indications that similar (or even 
        identical) robocall scams have been perpetrated by apparently 
        unrelated persons or entities. These indications suggest that 
        scammers are trading information in some way.

    Question 2. Last year the FCC initiated a proceeding seeking public 
comment on ways to authenticate caller ID information to further secure 
our telephone networks against illegal robocallers. What is the status 
of that proceeding?
    Answer. A robust call authentication framework is part of the 
Commission's multi-pronged effort to combat the scourge of spoofed 
robocalls that American consumers know all too well. In July 2017, the 
Commission sought public input on the best way to establish a reliable 
system to verify caller ID information and tasked the North American 
Numbering Council (NANC) with recommending a governance framework. In 
May 2018, Chairman Pai accepted the recommendations of the NANC 
regarding the call authentication ecosystem, namely the adoption and 
deployment of ``SHAKEN/STIR,'' the set of procedures and protocols 
intended to eliminate the use of illegitimate spoofed numbers from the 
telephone system. Industry stakeholders have now completed the first 
step of this process--formation of the governance authority for 
implementing SHAKEN/STIR. The governance authority is a stakeholder 
group established to determine the policies by which a carrier and its 
calls are considered trusted enough to ``sign'' calls originating on 
their networks. Next, a policy administrator will be established to 
certify carriers that are authorized to approve a call as legitimate. 
Finally, certification authorities will be chosen to provide the 
``keys'' that digitally stamp a call as legitimate. Although some 
carriers are expected to start signing calls even before this process 
is complete, operationalizing this system will help all carriers sign 
calls, attesting to their validity from start to finish--and 
conversely, making clear which calls are not valid.
    The Commission expects this effort to move forward as quickly as 
possible to protect consumers. Industry has been making progress, but 
success requires sustained investment in this next-generation call 
authentication standard. To address this, on November 5, 2018 Chairman 
Pai sent letters to the phone industry demanding that voice providers 
adopt a robust call authentication system to combat illegal caller ID 
spoofing and launch that system no later than next year. In particular, 
the Chairman sent letters asking those that have not yet established 
concrete plans to protect their customers using the SHAKEN/STIR 
framework to do so. Chairman Pai also thanked those companies that have 
committed to implement a robust call authentication framework in the 
near term.

    Question 3. Would it decrease enforcement matters if the FCC adopts 
a call authentication system to combat illegal robocalls?
    Answer. Caller ID authentication appears to be an important tool to 
combat illegal, malicious spoofing. And illegal spoofing makes it 
difficult for law enforcement to locate the violators and protect 
consumers from unwanted communications. Accordingly, we are hopeful 
that, to the extent that caller ID authentication removes the ability 
of malicious callers to hide behind falsified information, the 
increased risk of detection will cause many fraudsters to cease using 
robocalling as a vehicle for their scams.
                                 ______
                                 
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Catherine Cortez Masto 
                           to Rosemary Harold
    Question 1. Impact on Immigrants--Robocalls, and particularly those 
done by illegitimate businesses are obviously a nuisance and can pose a 
danger to anyone who receives them. But some populations are 
particularly vulnerable, we had a hearing in the Aging committee last 
fall on the impact of these calls on seniors. Another population that 
can be impacted is immigrants, especially those who have recently 
arrived or may be still developing English skills. There is some 
reporting suggesting that scammers actively target immigrants.
    Can any of you talk about cases where this has happened? A 
deliberate targeting of immigrants and non-English speakers?
    Answer. Yes. For example, in recent months, the FCC has received 
numerous consumer complaints about Chinese-language robocalls from 
scammers trying to steal money or personal information by posing as 
Chinese consulate employees. According to multiple news reports, random 
consumers in areas with large Chinese communities have been targeted. 
The FCC issued a public notice warning consumers of the scam (available 
in English and Chinese), here: https://www.fcc.gov/chinese-americans-
targeted-consulate-phone-scam.

    Question 2. Are there any steps your agency is taking to reach 
these populations with educational campaigns?
    Answer. Yes, the Commission extends information to immigrant 
populations and non-English speakers through the Commission website and 
via distribution of tip cards in Spanish, Korean, Tagalog, Vietnamese, 
and Chinese. The Commission has provided information on particular 
scams targeting immigrants, such as calls from scammers posing as 
representatives from:

   Charitable organizations collecting donations in the wake of 
        Hurricanes Harvey, Irma and Maria and most recently Hurricanes 
        Florence and Michael.

   Insurance companies offering additional flood insurance.

   The IRS, seeking to collect supposedly overdue taxes.

   Chinese embassy representatives asking for personal 
        information.

    Question 3. Deterrence--There was an article in the Washington Post 
in January about an FTC action against a robocaller from California who 
had made billions of illegal robocalls. He was living in a wealthy 
neighborhood and paying $25,000 a month for his house, had a personal 
chef, and drove two Mercedes. The FTC brought him in for questioning 
and he basically admitted he did it without remorse, he was fined $2.7 
million and banned from telemarketing. While it's clear that in the 
digital age your agencies need more resources to police this behavior, 
it's evident from the article that even when cases are brought fines 
are often negotiated down by the perpetrators of these calls and 
robocallers have clearly concluded that the financial benefits outweigh 
and costs of this behavior.
    How does the FCC find individuals to pursue?
    Answer. The Commission identifies enforcement targets principally 
via consumer complaints filed with the FCC's Consumer & Governmental 
Affairs Bureau. The FCC also accepts and may act on referrals from 
other governmental agencies, members of the U.S. Congress, state or 
local officials, and industry stakeholders. For example, USTelecom 
leads the efforts of an Industry Traceback Group, which attempts to 
identify the source of illegal robocalls and shares the results of its 
efforts with the Commission. To encourage further participation in the 
Industry Traceback Group, on November 6, 2018, the Commission's Chief 
Technology Officer and I sent letters to voice providers, calling on 
them to assist in industry efforts to trace scam robocalls that 
originate on or pass through their networks. In addition to complaints 
or referrals from third parties, Enforcement Bureau staff may identify 
potential violators through independent research (such as media reports 
or consumer complaints filed online, among others).

    Question 4. If the person is found to engage other criminal 
behavior, such as fraud, while making robocalls how does the FCC work 
with other law enforcement organizations to bring charges related to 
those crimes?
    Answer. The FCC coordinates with other law enforcement agencies at 
the local, state, federal, and international level. The Commission has 
executed Memoranda of Understanding with multiple entities to allow 
each entity to share relevant evidence with the other in pursuit of 
respective law enforcement goals. We continue to look for ways to 
strengthen these relationships and build processes to better and more 
quickly communicate with outside agencies that may have an interest in 
pursuing criminal charges against identified targets.

    Question 5. How does the FCC ascertain what the content of the 
calls was and how difficult is it to prove that a person engaged in 
fraudulent behavior beyond just making illegal robocalls?
    Answer. FCC investigators use multiple techniques to determine the 
content of the robocalls, including interviewing robocall victims, 
reviewing consumer complaints, and obtaining evidence via the agency's 
investigatory subpoena powers (e.g., actual recordings of the call). 
Proving fraud in the context of robocalling, as in any other context, 
presents challenges.

    Question 6. Does the FCC have a sense of the size of the illegal 
robocalling industry? How many people or organizations are engaging in 
these illegal calls?
    Answer. We do not have a precise calculation of the number of 
people/organizations who deliberately make unlawful robocalls. Our data 
indicate that a relatively small number of entities account for a very 
large portion of the total number of unlawful robocalls.

    Question 7. On average, how many fines does the agency levy in 
recent years?
    Answer. From January 1, 2017, through September 30, 2018, the 
agency has issued or proposed fines of $242,536,000.00 pursuant to the 
Truth in Caller ID Act (TICIDA) and the Telephone Consumer Protection 
Act (TCPA). From January 1, 2010 through December 31, 2016, the agency 
issued or proposed fines of $3,387,500 under the TICIDA and TCPA.

    Question 8. Do you believe that the current fines are a significant 
enough deterrent, or do you think that increased levels of fines would 
also increase the level of deterrence?
    Answer. The current fines under the TCPA and TICIDA are assessed on 
a per-call basis, so any robocaller making millions of illegal 
robocalls may find itself facing penalties in the hundreds of millions 
of dollars. This is a significant deterrent against abuse. A more 
limiting factor to enforcement is likely to be the applicable statute 
of limitations periods. The statute of limitations is one year for TCPA 
violations and two years for TICIDA violations, which may not be enough 
time to complete investigations involving complex robocalling cases. 
Accordingly, the FCC's enforcement tools might be enhanced if Congress 
considered expanding the current statute of limitations for violations 
under TCPA and TICIDA.

    Question 9. Banking--In 2014 a couple won a lawsuit against Bank of 
America for more than $1 million after they were flooded with robotic 
collection calls over the course of several years. It is understandable 
that banks and other companies want to contact their customers about 
issues, but we cannot have financial institutions blatantly ignoring 
the law and instituting a policy of annoying their customers with 
illegal phone calls.
    Can you provide data on how many illegal calls originate from the 
financial industry?
    Answer. The Commission does not have that data.

    Questions 10. Is there evidence of organizations in the financial 
industry systematically ignoring existing law?
    Answer. We cannot comment on matters that may be under 
investigation by the FCC's Enforcement Bureau. We encourage all 
aggrieved persons to file complaints on fcc.gov to alert us to illegal 
robocalls they have received from any industry segment. We note that in 
2016, the Commission's Broadnet Declaratory Ruling held that the TCPA 
does not apply to Federal government contractors, including those in 
the financial industry. See Rules and Regulations Implementing the 
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Broadnet Teleservices LLC 
Petition for Declaratory Ruling, CG Docket No. 02-278, Declaratory 
Ruling, 31 FCC Rcd 7394 (2016). There are two pending petitions for 
reconsideration of that decision.

    Question 11. A one million dollar cost, as shown in this case, is 
not a significant sum for a large bank, are the financial risks great 
enough to discourage this behavior?
    Answer. As noted above, the fines for large robocalling schemes can 
provide a substantial financial deterrent.

    Question 12. Educating Seniors--I appreciate the efforts people are 
making in the government and private sector to hold competitions and 
develop apps. Ultimately, as we well know, seniors are the most 
vulnerable to scam calls. We have a lot of seniors moving to Nevada and 
a lot of retirement communities in places like Las Vegas, which 
received an estimated 26.7 million robocalls in March of this year.
    Seniors are harder to reach with some of this new technology that 
can be of real assistance in blocking these calls.
    Can you provide examples of how your agency is trying to educate 
seniors about new technology?
    Answer. We have undertaken a major outreach campaign to reach older 
Americans and alert them to robocalls scams. In September, the FCC 
teamed up with AARP on two tele-townhalls to inform older Americans 
about phone scams and what they can do to avoid being victims. We also 
work with the American Library Association to furnish libraries 
throughout the Nation with FCC Consumer Guides and Tip Cards for all 
patrons, many of whom are 65 and over. We use information gathered from 
consumer complaints about robocalls to post consumer alerts concerning 
current scams such as ``grandparent scams,'' ``Social Security scams,'' 
``IRS scams,'' and others that target older Americans. We also share 
this information with national and local community groups.

    Question 13. Is there data available on how educated our seniors on 
our robocalls? If so, can you please provide it?
    Answer. While we do our best to educate seniors and will continue 
our efforts to help them avoid unwanted robocalls, we do not have data 
on how well-informed seniors are about robocalls.
                                 ______
                                 
   Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to 
                             Lois Greisman
    Question 1. What is the interplay between privacy and robocalls? 
How do robocallers get access to our private information in order to 
target consumers for robocalls?
    Is there any evidence that robo callers share call lists with each 
other or on the dark web which has the potential of creating repeat 
victims?
    Answer. Robocalls are not only a mechanism for perpetrating fraud, 
they are also an intrusion on consumer privacy. Some robocallers 
purchase lists containing consumer information from data brokers to 
target specific communities, but in the FTC's experience these data 
brokers operate in plain sight on public websites. For example, 
telemarketers selling home security systems, solar panels, replacement 
windows, and other goods for residential use can legally purchase lists 
of new home-buyers. Most of these data brokers, which range from small 
businesses to large, publicly traded firms, usually provide this 
information to legitimate businesses that responsibly use it for legal 
marketing and other purposes.
    At the same time, in our experience, some robocallers obtain 
information on potential targets through online lead generation, while 
others are simply random-dialing numbers throughout the country.

    Question 2. What is your budget for robocalls enforcement? Is it 
enough?
    Answer. The FTC does not have a discrete robocall enforcement 
budget. Rather, divisions within the FTC's Bureau of Consumer 
Protection, along with our regional offices, bring robocall cases and 
engage in outreach and educational initiatives as part of their efforts 
to protect consumers from fraud and abusive telemarketing. The costs of 
running the FTC's robocall enforcement program are included within the 
total request for funding the FTC submits to Congress on an annual 
basis. Like any law enforcement challenge, additional resources and 
enforcement tools could yield even greater results.
                                 ______
                                 
     Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Tom Udall to 
                             Lois Greisman
    Question 1. Most people recognize the fines leveled by the FTC are 
a drop in the bucket compared to the injury and harm consumers 
experience from bad actors. Does the FTC have the resources to increase 
its enforcement activity?
    Answer. The FTC has expended significant time and effort to combat 
illegal robocalls. The FTC uses every tool at its disposal to tackle 
this pernicious consumer protection problem. Like any law enforcement 
challenge, additional resources and enforcement tools could yield even 
greater results. In order to advance its robocall enforcement program, 
the FTC seeks to repeal the common carrier exemption from its 
jurisdiction. The exemption impedes investigations, complicates 
litigation, and prevents the FTC from challenging common carriers of 
telecommunications that violate the TSR.

    Question 2. Yesterday, my staff googled ``autodialer.'' One of the 
top hits was a video on YouTube from a user showing how to use Excel 
and Skype to make hundreds of calls. This is just one of many videos 
showing how to buy equipment and call lists from the Internet and spam 
people. How can the FTC stop this problem if it is so simple to make 
fraudulent calls?
    Answer. The FTC is keenly aware of the low barriers to entry and 
ease of placing illegal robocalls. This is one reason the FTC believes 
that civil law enforcement alone will not completely solve the problem. 
The FTC partners with industry to help spur innovative technological 
solutions such as call blocking applications, which enable consumers to 
limit the calls they wish to receive. The FTC will continue to work 
with the FCC and the telecommunications industry to advance call 
verification and call labeling protocols that will offer consumers even 
more tools to avoid unwanted, fraudulent, or abusive calls.
                                 ______
                                 
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Catherine Cortez Masto 
                            to Lois Greisman
    Question 1. Impact on Immigrants--Robocalls, and particularly those 
done by illegitimate businesses are obviously a nuisance and can pose a 
danger to anyone who receives them. But some populations are 
particularly vulnerable, we had a hearing in the Aging committee last 
fall on the impact of these calls on seniors. Another population that 
can be impacted is immigrants, especially those who have recently 
arrived or may be still developing English skills. There is some 
reporting suggesting that scammers actively target immigrants.
    Can any of you talk about cases where this has happened? A 
deliberate targeting of immigrants and non-English speakers?
    Are there any steps your agency is taking to reach these 
populations with educational campaigns?
    Answer. The FTC periodically encounters robocall scams that target 
foreign language speakers or non-native English speakers. In 2017, the 
FTC sued a telemarketing operation that impersonated the government and 
used spoofed caller ID numbers to sell English-learning products to 
Spanish-speaking consumers. In that case, FTC v. ABC Hispana Inc., et 
al., the FTC obtained a court order banning the defendants from all 
telemarketing and imposing a $6.3 million judgment.\1\ Most recently, 
we learned of Chinese language robocalls purporting to be from the 
Chinese Consulate. Some of the robocall messages falsely stated that 
consumers needed to pick up a package at the Consulate, while others 
falsely stated that consumers needed to pay fees to avoid trouble with 
the Chinese government. In response, in April the FTC coordinated with 
the Chinese Embassy to publish a consumer notice about these scams in 
English and Simplified Chinese.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The FTC's pleadings and press releases are available here: 
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/152-3108/abc-hispana-
inc-et-al.
    \2\ A copy of the FTC consumer warning is available here: https://
www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/2018/04/scammers-impersonate-chinese-
consulate. The publication of this alert, both on the FTC and Chinese 
Consulate websites, was followed by a series of media interviews by FTC 
staff.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In addition, as part of its longstanding Every Community 
initiative, the FTC engages in frequent consumer education to 
immigrants and non-native English speakers. For example, to date the 
FTC has held a series of 22 Ethnic Media Roundtables around the 
country, bringing together the FTC, state attorneys general offices, 
local agencies and law enforcement, community-based organizations, and 
ethnic media to discuss how scams affect diverse local communities. 
Also, as part of this initiative, the FTC does targeted outreach to 
legal services providers, teachers of English as a second language, 
librarians, and other local community members who can help us amplify 
our consumer protection messages.
    The FTC also educates consumers about avoiding scams targeting 
immigrants in English, Spanish, Arabic, Chinese, Creole, Korean, 
Russian, and Vietnamese at FTC.gov/immigration. We created a plain 
language fraud handbook in English, Spanish, Amharic, Arabic, Dari, 
French, and Somali for refugees and recent immigrants at FTC.gov/
refugee. And we offer the top ten things to do to avoid fraud in 
English, Spanish, Arabic, Chinese, Korean, Russian, Tagalog, and 
Vietnamese. Our community partners can order large quantities of these 
resources for free at FTC.gov/bulkorder.

    Question 2. Deterrence--There was an article in the Washington Post 
in January about an FTC action against a robocaller from California who 
had made billions of illegal robocalls. He was living in a wealthy 
neighborhood and paying $25,000 a month for his house, had a personal 
chef, and drove two Mercedes. The FTC brought him in for questioning 
and he basically admitted he did it without remorse, he was fined $2.7 
million and banned from telemarketing. While it's clear that in the 
digital age your agencies need more resources to police this behavior, 
it's evident from the article that even when cases are brought fines 
are often negotiated down by the perpetrators of these calls and 
robocallers have clearly concluded that the financial benefits outweigh 
and costs of this behavior. How does the FTC find individuals to 
pursue?
    Answer. The FTC analyzes consumer complaints, reviews evidence 
compiled in prior investigations and litigation, and pursues tips from 
informants and third parties to identify targets in robocall cases. As 
is true of any law enforcement agency, the details of the FTC's process 
for initiating specific investigations are generally non-public.

    Question 3. If the person is found to engage other criminal 
behavior, such as fraud, while making robocalls how does the FTC work 
with other law enforcement organizations to bring charges related to 
those crimes?
    Answer. The FTC has a Criminal Liaison Unit (CLU), which, when 
appropriate, coordinates law enforcement initiatives with state and 
Federal criminal prosecutors. Through CLU, the FTC has referred 
numerous cases to criminal prosecutors. In the first three quarters of 
Fiscal Year 2018, criminal prosecutors relied on FTC information and 
support to charge twenty-two new defendants and obtain forty-four new 
pleas or convictions.

    Question 4. How does the FTC ascertain what the content of the 
calls was and how difficult is it to prove that a person engaged in 
fraudulent behavior beyond just making illegal robocalls?
    Answer. In challenging certain types of illegal robocalls, the FTC 
has numerous means through which to ascertain the content of the calls 
and, accordingly, to challenge that content as deceptive. Such means 
include obtaining declarations from consumers who received the 
telemarketing pitches, obtaining telemarketing scripts, and 
transcribing FTC investigators' undercover recordings of calls by 
telemarketers.

    Question 5. Does the FTC have a sense of the size of the illegal 
robocalling industry? How many people or organizations are engaging in 
these illegal calls?
    Answer. We have no precise way to measure the size of the illegal 
robocalling industry. In its robocall and Do Not Call enforcement 
cases, the FTC has sued 454 companies and 367 individuals to date. The 
FTC knows these illegal robocalls are supported by several different 
types of businesses and service providers:

   software companies that provide autodialing software;

   VoIP providers that provide the telephone lines to connect 
        the calls;

   data brokers and lead generators that sell lists of 
        consumers to call;

   call centers that field robocalls after consumers press 1 to 
        speak with a live operator;

   caller ID resellers that license ``local area code'' 
        telephone numbers that telemarketers use to entice consumers to 
        answer the phone;

   sellers of goods and services who reap the financial 
        benefits of blasting out low-cost robocalls to reach a wide 
        audience; and

   fraudsters who rely on robocalls as a low cost way to reach 
        potential victims

    To the extent the Commission has jurisdiction, it targets parties 
in these industries that assist and facilitate illegal robocalling. In 
this regard, we observe that the common carrier exemption to the 
Commission's jurisdiction impedes investigations, complicates 
litigation, and prevents the FTC from challenging common carriers of 
telecommunications that violate the TSR.

    Question 6. On average, how many fines does the agency levy in 
recent years?
    Answer. The FTC does not have authority to levy fines. Rather, to 
enforce the robocall and Do Not Call provisions of the Telemarketing 
Sales Rule (TSR), the FTC litigates in Federal court to obtain 
disgorgement of ill-gotten profits, consumer redress, and injunctive 
relief. The FTC can also refer enforcement of TSR violations to the 
Department of Justice (``DOJ'') to obtain civil penalties; the DOJ can 
refer the matter back to the FTC to litigate. To date, the FTC has 
brought 138 Do Not Call and robocall cases against 454 corporate 
entities and 367 individuals, resulting in actual collections of more 
than $121 million. The $121 million in collections includes $71 million 
in equitable monetary relief (disgorgement/redress) and $50 million in 
civil penalties. This does not include the $280 million civil penalty 
trial verdict against Dish Network (litigated by DOJ on the FTC's 
behalf), which is now on appeal to the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals.\3\ Since January 2017, the FTC has brought ten cases alleging 
violations of the TSR's robocall or Do Not Call rules, seeking civil 
penalties and/or equitable monetary relief.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ See USA et al., v. Dish Network L.L.C., No. 3:09-cv-03073 (C.D. 
Ill.). Pleadings and press releases from the case are available here: 
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/052-3167/dish-
network-llc-united-states-america-federal-trade.

    Question 7. Do you believe that the current fines are a significant 
enough deterrent, or do you think that increased levels of fines would 
also increase the level of deterrence?
    Answer. The FTC is authorized to obtain judgments, including a 
civil penalty of up to $41,484 per violation of the TSR. As a practical 
matter, in our law enforcement experience, defendants very rarely have 
sufficient assets to pay a significant civil penalty. As such, we think 
it unlikely that increasing the maximum civil penalty would have any 
deterrent effect.

    Question 8. Banking--In 2014 a couple won a lawsuit against Bank of 
America for more than $1 million after they were flooded with robotic 
collection calls over the course of several years. It is understandable 
that banks and other companies want to contact their customers about 
issues, but we cannot have financial institutions blatantly ignoring 
the law and instituting a policy of annoying their customers with 
illegal phone calls. Can you provide data on how many illegal calls 
originate from the financial industry?
    Is there evidence of organizations in the financial industry 
systematically ignoring existing law?
    A one million dollar cost, as shown in this case, is not a 
significant sum for a large bank, are the financial risks great enough 
to discourage this behavior?
    Answer. The FTC does not have data on the volume of illegal calls 
from financial institutions or information on the possible scope of 
non-compliance with telemarketing rules by such entities. As a general 
matter, the FTC does not have jurisdiction over banks and other 
financial institutions.\4\ We further observe that while the FTC 
enforces the Fair Debt Collection Act, debt collection robocalls are 
outside the scope of the FTC's Telemarketing Sales Rule, as such calls 
do not seek to sell any good or service. Debt collection robocalls, 
however, may be covered under other Federal statutes, such as the 
Telephone Consumer Protection Act and the Truth in Caller ID Act, both 
enforced by the Federal Communications Commission.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ The exemption is explicit in the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. 
Sec. 45(a)(2).

    Question 9. Educating Seniors--I appreciate the efforts people are 
making in the government and private sector to hold competitions and 
develop apps. Ultimately, as we well know, seniors are the most 
vulnerable to scam calls. We have a lot of seniors moving to Nevada and 
a lot of retirement communities in places like Las Vegas, which 
received an estimated 26.7 million robocalls in March of this year.
    Seniors are harder to reach with some of this new technology that 
can be of real assistance in blocking these calls.
    Can you provide examples of how your agency is trying to educate 
seniors about new technology?
    Is there data available on how educated our seniors on our 
robocalls? If so, can you please provide it?
    Answer. The FTC has a robust program to educate older adults. 
Through Pass It On, the FTC's signature consumer education campaign 
directed at active older adults, the agency enlists older adults to 
share their experiences with scams and fraud with their peers. This 
includes, at FTC.gov/PassItOnImposters, strategies for handling calls 
from imposters pretending to be online technical support, the IRS, a 
romantic interest, or a family member with an emergency. These efforts 
at reaching older adults are complemented by ongoing advice via 
consumer alerts (consumer.ftc.gov/blog) on a range of issues, including 
robocalls \5\ and online technical support scams,\6\ which affect many 
older adults.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Untangling a Robocaller Web (June 5, 2018), at https://
www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/2018/06/untangling-robocaller-web; That's Not 
Your Neighbor Calling (Jan. 31, 2018), at https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/
blog/2018/01/thats-not-your-neighbor-calling.
    \6\ Warn Your Friends about Tech Support Scams (July 27, 2018), at 
https://www.con
sumer.ftc.gov/blog/2018/07/warn-your-friends-about-tech-support-scams; 
No Gift Cards for Tech Support Scams (June 6, 2018), at https://
www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/2018/06/no-gift-cards-tech-support-scammers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    While we are not aware of particular research about older 
consumers' level of education regarding robocalls, we know that 
robocalls involve a complex set of technological issues that are 
challenging for many consumers. We try to address these challenges by 
creating an array of educational messages that take many forms, 
including handouts, videos, and blog posts. This spring, we also 
created FTC.gov/calls, which features three new shareable graphics 
telling people how to block unwanted calls on their mobile and home 
phones. These graphics provide key information on the various call-
blocking options that are available for different types of phones, 
including a landline that uses the Internet (VoIP) or traditional 
copper line.

    Question 10. Common Carrier Exemption--At a recent panel you called 
for getting rid of the common carrier exemption as a way for the FTC to 
crack down on robocalls. Can you explain the mechanism by which 
repealing this exemption would help the FTC increase enforcement 
efforts?
    Answer. Robocallers use VoIP lines to make a significant number of 
commercial robocalls. Telecommunications carriers typically provide 
VoIP lines to telemarketers, and we have observed that many small VoIP 
carriers appear to market their services specifically to robocallers. 
The common carrier exemption to the FTC jurisdiction likely precludes 
the FTC from bringing any law enforcement actions against VoIP 
providers, even if they knowingly sell or lease telephone lines to 
telemarketers making illegal robocalls.
    As such, the common carrier jurisdictional exemption creates a 
significant gap in the FTC's robocall enforcement work and impedes the 
agency's ability to more effectively protect consumers. For instance, 
in FTC v. Christiano, a case the FTC filed on May 31, 2018, the FTC 
sued James Christiano and two of his companies for assisting and 
facilitating illegal robocalls.\7\ The FTC alleged that the defendants 
provided robocallers with autodialing software and servers to host that 
software--even while knowing the robocallers were using that software 
to place illegal calls. Mr. Christiano owned a third company that 
provided the robocallers with VoIP lines. The FTC did not pursue the 
VoIP company for its knowing participation in the illegal robocalls due 
to the common carrier exemption.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ See FTC v. Christiano et al., No. 8:18-cv-00936 (C.D. Cal.). 
The complaint and press release from the case are available here: 
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/162-3124/james-
christiano-et-al-netdotsolutions-inc.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                 ______
                                 
   Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to 
                               Kevin Rupy
    Question. What is the interplay between privacy and robocalls? How 
do robocallers get access to our private information in order to target 
consumers for robocalls?
    Is there any evidence that robocallers share call lists with each 
other or on the dark web which has the potential of creating repeat 
victims?
    Answer. Unwanted, unconsented to robocalls can be considered a 
nuisance or affront to privacy as they cause unnecessary and 
unwarranted interruption and distraction. In the past year, however, 
there are a growing number of tools and services that are helping 
consumers better manage these calls, thereby providing them with 
increased control over their privacy.
    Robocallers can gain access to consumers' telephone numbers from a 
variety of sources. These include publicly available sources, and so-
called ``lead-lists.'' In addition, illegal robocallers can also 
generate telephone numbers randomly or sequentially without regard to 
the actual identity of the subscriber.
                                 ______
                                 
 Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Richard Blumenthal to 
                               Kevin Rupy
    Question. I recently introduced S. 2705, the Repeated Objectionable 
Bothering of Consumers on Phones (ROBOCOP) Act to require phone 
companies to offer effective tools to block robocalls to consumers at 
no extra cost to them. Do you support this legislation?
    Answer. USTelecom supports the goal of the ROBOCOP Act. Its member 
companies are actively pursuing the development of the technologies 
described in the bill under the auspices of the Federal Communications 
Commission and an industry-created governance board. In addition, 
USTelecom member companies already offer a number of free, effective 
tools to block robocalls at no extra cost to their customers.
    Given the development of marketplace solutions in this area, a 
legislative approach that mandates robocall tools is unnecessary. 
Today, a broad range of voice providers, independent application 
developers and a growing number of diverse companies are offering 
services that can help Americans reduce unknown and potentially 
fraudulent calls. While these tools are not a panacea to the robocall 
problem, they are an important component that empowers consumers with 
the increased ability to better identify and/or block illegal or 
unwanted robocalls.
    An increasing number of robocall mitigation tools are being 
deployed by facilities-based providers themselves. For example, AT&T 
has deployed its ``Call Protect'' service, and has partnered with 
robocall blocking service ``Hiya.'' Similarly, Verizon's new Spam 
Alerts service utilizes TNS's Call Guardian and Neustar's Robocall 
Mitigation solution to proactively identify illegal robocalls and other 
fraudulent caller activity with more accuracy. Various carriers have 
also worked with Nomorobo to facilitate their customers' ability to use 
that third-party blocking service, such as Verizon's ``one click'' 
solution that simplifies customers' ability to sign up for the service.
    In addition, in the last year alone the number of scoring and 
labelling analytics tools for consumers has exploded. In 2016 there 
were over 85 call-blocking applications available across all platforms, 
including several offered by carriers to their customers at no charge. 
As of today, there are now over 550 applications available, a 495 
percent increase in call blocking, labeling, and identifying 
applications to fight malicious robocalls. The diversity in tools 
across multiple platforms demonstrates industry's commitment to empower 
consumers, regardless of the type of network utilized by their chosen 
voice service provider. The significant availability in services and 
offerings throughout the marketplace is an important component of the 
battle against illegal robocalls. Specifically, the diversity in 
robocall analytics and tools means that illegal robocallers face a wide 
variety of mitigation techniques that makes their countermeasure 
efforts less effective--in other words, they must overcome multiple 
mitigation techniques, as opposed to a single standard.
                                 ______
                                 
     Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Tom Udall to 
                               Kevin Rupy
    Question 1. Your testimony identified products that are available 
to telephone customers, even those with ``plain old telephone 
service.'' Are there costs associated with these services? Do any of 
your member companies offer discounts for certain populations, such as 
those who receive basic telephone service through the Lifeline program?
    Answer. There are a growing number of tools available to consumers 
today that mitigate illegal and/or unwanted robocalls. These tools work 
across various platforms and services, including cable, wireless, IP, 
and ``plain old telephone service.'' Given the diversity in robocall 
scoring and analytics services, as well as the variety of voice 
platforms, some of these consumer services are free, while others 
include a charge.
    For example, Verizon's new Spam Alerts service provides its 
wireline customers who have Caller ID--whether they are on copper or 
fiber--with enhanced warnings about calls that meet Verizon's spam 
criteria by showing the term ``SPAM?'' before a caller's name on the 
Caller ID display. By using existing Caller-ID technology, the service 
empowers consumers to better decide if they should answer a particular 
call. Various carriers have also worked with Nomorobo to facilitate 
their customers' ability to use that free, third-party blocking service 
by establishing a ``one click'' solution that simplifies customers' 
ability to sign up for the service.
    Programs such as Lifeline are not directly tailored to provision 
robocall mitigation services to consumers. Rather, the program provides 
consumers with a pre-determined subsidy that can be utilized for voice 
or broadband services. Of course, it is possible that the consumer's 
choice for subsidized Lifeline service may include a free robocall 
mitigation service. In the alternative, a consumer could choose to 
utilize the savings from the Lifeline subsidy to acquire a 
subscription-based robocall service.

    Question 2. AARP partners with organizations to warn seniors, 
especially home-bound men and women, about fraudulent calls--like the 
``grandparent'' or IRS scam. Do any of your members work with outside 
organizations to help provide information about these scams?
    Answer. Education is an important tool in the fight against illegal 
robocalls, and several of our members--and other industry 
stakeholders--have implemented education efforts to provide information 
to consumers on robocall tools and scams. Verizon, for example, has 
developed a package of consumer education materials to help consumer-
facing personnel, such as staffers at consumer protection agencies or 
in constituent-services offices, effectively counsel consumers about 
robocalls. AT&T has developed a website that provides customers with 
easy access to consumer information and tips about identifying and 
avoiding unwanted calls, as well as alerts on recently identified 
scams. AT&T's website also provides links to other important consumer 
resources, as well as instructions for reporting various types of fraud 
(including telephone call fraud).
    In addition to the efforts of individual companies, other 
stakeholders are also engaged in consumer education. For example, the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) have correctly focused on raising customer awareness 
of their options, including with the successful Stop Illegal Robocalls 
Expo in April 2018. The Expo featured technologies, devices and 
applications to minimize or eliminate the number of illegal robocalls 
consumers receive. It also provided a platform for showcasing 
innovative technologies, devices and applications that are available to 
consumers to assist in combatting illegal robocalls.
    Similarly, several industry and governmental organizations are also 
focused on consumer education. For example, CTIA--the Wireless 
Association, has published a webpage devoted to increasing awareness of 
robocall prevention tools and provides consumers with instructions on 
how to stop robocalls. In addition, the Communications Fraud Control 
Association (CFCA), maintains a consumer education channel on YouTube 
that includes various educational videos, including on robocalls. The 
Better Business Bureau Institute has also started publishing an annual 
``Scam Tracker'' report that collects reports of scams and fraud and 
displays the information in real time on an interactive map that warns 
consumers.
    Similar educational outreach has been conducted by the FCC and FTC 
for some time. For example, the FTC maintains a wide range of 
educational materials on its website that provides timely and 
informative information to consumers regarding robocall related scams 
and information. USTelecom, CTIA and several other industry and 
consumer organizations are also members of the FCC's Consumer Advisory 
Committee (CAC). One of the first recommendations adopted by the 
members of the CAC, focused on ways for the FCC to improve consumer 
education efforts, particularly with respect to robocalls.

    Question 3. Have your members considered ways to help notify or 
enable consumers' complaints about the abusive or fraudulent robocalls?
    Answer. Empowering consumers through streamlining the complaint 
process is an important component to addressing the robocall issue. 
Both the FCC and the FTC provide portals where consumers can file 
robocall complaints. In addition, both agencies publish portions of the 
complaint data (excluding any personal information), which is then used 
by industry stakeholders to assist in their robocall efforts. For 
example, analytic companies use the public data to improve their 
scoring of illegal robocalls, and USTelecom has used the same data to 
match consumer complaints with active traceback investigations.
    In order to simplify the FCC's complaint process for consumers, the 
FCC's CAC--of which USTelecom is a member--adopted a series of 
proposals for the agency's consideration. Among other things, the CAC 
encouraged the FCC to simplify the consumer complaint filing process 
for unwanted calls by developing a form that allows for information to 
be entered about multiple unwanted calls at once, and creating a 
separate intake portal for unwanted-call complaints. The FCC 
subsequently created the proposed intake portal, and was in the process 
of exploring alterations to its portal to allow for multiple calls to 
be entered at once.

    Question 4. Are your members Customer Service Representatives able 
to assist callers that complain about the robocalls?
    Answer. Consumer education is a critical component to increasing 
consumer protection from illegal robocalls. Many of USTelecom's member 
companies are taking active steps to educate consumers. For example, 
recognizing that consumer education may be particularly beneficial if 
provided at the moment consumers are complaining about robocalls, 
Verizon has developed a package of consumer education materials to help 
consumer-facing personnel, such as staffers at consumer protection 
agencies or in constituent-services offices, so they may effectively 
counsel consumers about robocalls. Counselors are encouraged to first 
ask questions to elicit the nature of the consumer's service and 
facility (e.g., smartphone, wireline VoIP, wireline copper), and then 
the talking points have a ``decision tree'' that counselors can follow 
to tailor their advice to each customer's particular technology 
platform and his or her needs. The package includes different 
educational brochures to be mailed or e-mailed to consumers based on 
what makes sense for each one.
    In addition, AT&T's website provides customers with easy access to 
consumer information and tips about identifying and avoiding unwanted 
calls. More specifically, AT&T's Cyber Aware Resources page includes 
alerts on recently identified scams and provides links to other 
important consumer resources, as well as instructions for reporting 
various types of fraud (including telephone call fraud). AT&T also 
issues consumer alerts when fraud events are identified.
    USTelecom and its member companies actively work with other 
stakeholders to increase consumer education. For example, in April, 
2018, several USTelecom members worked with the FCC and the Federal 
Trade Commission to put on a public expo to raise customer awareness of 
their options. In addition, as member of the FCC's Consumer Advisory 
Committee, USTelecom worked with FCC staff, industry stakeholders and 
consumer groups to propose a variety of consumer education initiatives 
that the agency has since adopted. For example, in response to a CAC 
recommendation asking that the FCC incorporate educational information 
into replies to consumer complaints, the agency began linking resources 
(including consumer guides) in their response to complaints.
                                 ______
                                 
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Catherine Cortez Masto 
                             to Kevin Rupy
    Question 1. There was an article in the Washington Post in January 
about an FTC action against a robocaller from California who had made 
billions of illegal robocalls. He was living in a wealthy neighborhood 
and paying $25,000 a month for his house, had a personal chef, and 
drove two Mercedes. The FTC brought him in for questioning and he 
basically admitted he did it without remorse, he was fined $2.7 million 
and banned from telemarketing. While it's clear that in the digital age 
your agencies need more resources to police this behavior, it's evident 
from the article that even when cases are brought fines are often 
negotiated down by the perpetrators of these calls and robocallers have 
clearly concluded that the financial benefits outweigh and costs of 
this behavior. In your testimony, you emphasized the need for criminal 
enforcement to crack down on illegal robocalls, and in questioning, you 
said that tools exist to criminally target those who engage in 
``hardcore fraud.''
    Would U.S. Telecom and its members support an expansion of criminal 
penalties for robocalls already illegal under the TCPA, including those 
that may not otherwise prosecuted for other criminal statutes like 
fraud?
    Answer. USTelecom is supportive of criminal enforcement actions 
against illegal robocallers, however, we believe that criminalizing 
violations under the TCPA is not the correct approach. TCPA violators 
are already subject to substantial no-fault, class action litigation 
exposure for alleged violations of the statute and the Federal 
Communications Commission's (FCC) rules implementing the statute. 
Although USTelecom believes that S.3149 (the Do Not Call Act) is 
motivated by a sincere desire to address the behaviors of firms and 
individuals such as the witness featured at the April 18 Senate 
hearing, there is no indication that there is a lack of any Federal 
authority to address those behaviors adequately, either by the FCC or 
the U.S. Attorney.
    For example, last month, the Department of Justice announced that 
twenty-one members of a ``massive India-based fraud and money 
laundering conspiracy that defrauded thousands of U.S. residents of 
hundreds of millions of dollars'' were sentenced to terms of 
imprisonment up to 20 years. These individuals were all prosecuted 
under various existing criminal statutes. Given that sufficient legal 
authorities exist for Federal prosecutors to prosecute egregious 
robocallers under the Communications Act, the FTC Act and the Federal 
criminal statutes, USTelecom recommends that the U.S. Attorney General 
should issue guidance to Federal prosecutors outlining these 
authorities and prioritizing Federal law enforcement activities in this 
area.
    USTelecom stands prepared to work with and assist Federal agencies 
in putting these predatory criminals behind bars. Indeed, this criminal 
prosecutorial effort--which was given ``significant support'' by both 
the FCC and TIGTA--proves that through appropriate collaboration, these 
criminal elements can be located, identified, and aggressively 
prosecuted. If criminal enforcement agencies join the FCC and the FTC 
to conduct robocall fraud investigations, such joint enforcement--
especially if coupled with stronger private sector traceback activity--
could reduce the number of illegal robocalls American consumers 
receive.

    Question 2. What steps are your members taking to help Federal law 
enforcement identify the source of these calls?
    Answer. USTelecom, along with several of its member companies, 
works closely with Federal law enforcement to identify the source of 
illegal robocalls. For the last several years, USTelecom has led the 
efforts of the Industry Traceback Group (ITB Group), whose primary 
mission is to vigorously protect participating carriers' networks, and 
users of their services, from fraudulent, abusive, and/or unlawful 
robocalls. With 24 voice provider members from a broad range of 
industry (i.e., cable, wireline, wireless, wholesale, etc.), the ITB 
Group identifies illegal and fraudulent traffic, and through its 
cooperative framework of sharing call detail information, traces these 
calls to their origins.
    Once the ITB Group has traced a call back through the network as 
far as possible, it will share this information with the appropriate 
Federal enforcement agencies. In particular, USTelecom will provide 
referrals to the enforcement departments of the FCC and/or FTC. In 
fact, just this week, the FCC's Enforcement Bureau sent a letter to 
USTelecom expressing its ``gratitude for the work of USTelecom and the 
USTelecom Industry Traceback Group.'' It also noted that due to the 
information obtained from the USTelecom Industry Traceback Group, the 
amount of time necessary for the Enforcement Bureau to conduct a 
traceback investigation from start to finish has ``shrunk from months 
to weeks.''
    While current Federal enforcement efforts are laudatory, they are 
mostly limited to civil enforcement. As a result, bad actors currently 
engaged in criminal robocall activities are--at most--subject only to 
civil forfeitures. USTelecom believes there is an acute need for 
coordinated, targeted and aggressive criminal enforcement of illegal 
robocallers at the Federal level through the use of existing Federal 
statutes. Given the felonious nature of their activities, criminal 
syndicates engaged in illegal robocalling activity should be 
identified, targeted and brought to justice through criminal 
enforcement efforts.
    USTelecom and its industry partners stand ready to further assist 
in these efforts to bring these bad actors to justice. Indeed, the 
ultimate goal of USTelecom's Industry Traceback Group is to identify 
the source of the worst of these illegal calls, and further enable 
aggressive enforcement actions by Federal agencies.

    Question 3. Common Carrier Exemption--At a recent panel the FTC has 
called for getting rid of the common carrier exemption as a way for the 
FTC to crack down on robocalls.
    What is the position of USTelecom on the common carrier exemption 
as it relates to illegal robocalls?
    Answer. USTelecom maintains that the FTC has sufficient authority 
to pursue illegal robocallers, and that there is no need to remove the 
common carrier exemption. Moreover, in a memorandum of understanding 
(MOU) between the FCC and the FTC, both agencies expressly address the 
common carrier exemption, and commit to coordinate their respective 
jurisdictions. For example, the agencies ``express their belief that 
the scope of the common carrier exemption in the FTC Act does not 
preclude the FTC from addressing non-common carrier activities engaged 
in by common carriers.''
    They also agree that enforcement authority exercised by the FTC 
should not be viewed as a limitation of the FCC's authority, including 
``FCC authority over activities engaged in by common carriers and by 
non-common carriers for and in connection with common carrier 
services.'' The MOU further notes that no exercise of enforcement 
authority by the FCC ``should be taken to be a limitation on authority 
otherwise available to the FTC.'' In other words, the common carrier 
exemption only preempts the FTC's authority over common carriers in 
instances where they engage in common carrier activities. The MOU 
underscores that both the FTC and FCC have sufficient authority to 
pursue common and non-common carriers in appropriate instances.

    Question 4 Why does USTelecom think that this would, or would not 
be, an effective means of policing robocalls?
    Answer. Because the FCC already has full authority to pursue 
appropriate remedies against carriers, USTelecom is concerned that 
elimination of the common carrier exception could lead to regulation of 
the communications industry by two separate agencies. This in turn has 
the potential to create duplicative or conflicting regulatory 
requirements, resulting in additional consumer confusion and 
frustration. Moreover, USTelecom believes that existing statutory tools 
are sufficient for addressing the robocall issue both in terms of civil 
and criminal enforcement.
                                 ______
                                 
     Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. John Thune to 
                            Scott Delacourt
    Question. During the hearing, Ms. Saunders testified that ``one big 
issue is that if auto dialer is not sufficiently defined broadly, it 
won't cover texts. There is no independent language in the TCPA that'll 
cover texts unless the auto dialer definition is covered.'' Do you 
agree with Ms. Saunder's assessment? Please explain.
    Answer. No, I do not agree the above assessment, as it is incorrect 
and shows a fundamental misunderstanding of the Telephone Consumer 
Protection Act (``TCPA'') and its implementation. Additionally, Ms. 
Saunders's assessment does not account for the robust protections that 
consumers have to prevent unwanted text messages, nor does the 
assessment consider the common and best practices of legitimate U.S. 
companies seeking to build positive relationships with consumers.
    First, the statement that ``[t]here is no independent language in 
the TCPA that'll cover texts unless the auto dialer definition is 
covered'' is simply incorrect. The independent language in the statute 
that allows the TCPA to cover text messages is ``any call.'' \1\ 
Specifically, the statute prohibits any person from ``mak[ing] any call 
(other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior 
express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone 
dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice'' to certain 
telephone lines and numbers, including wireless numbers.\2\ ``Call'' is 
not defined in the statute, and has therefore been interpreted by both 
the Federal Communications Commission (``FCC'') and various courts. It 
is now well-settled law that the term ``any call'' encompasses text 
messages. In 2003, the FCC affirmed that ``any call . . . encompasses 
both voice calls and text calls to wireless numbers including, for 
example, short message service (SMS) calls.'' \3\ Courts agree that 
texts are calls for TCPA purposes, and have held that the FCC's 
interpretation of the word ``call'' is entitled to Chevron 
deference.\4\ In sum, text messages are covered under the TCPA based on 
the statute's ``any call'' language, not its ``ATDS'' language.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ 47 U.S.C. Sec. 227(b)(1)(A); see also 47 C.F.R. 
Sec. 64.1200(a)(1) (prohibiting ``any telephone call'' initiated using 
an ATDS or an artificial or prerecorded voice without consent or an 
emergency purpose).
    \2\ See 47 U.S.C. Sec. 227(b)(1)(A).
    \3\ In the Matter of Rule and Regulations Implementing the 
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, CG Docket No. 02-278, Report 
and Order, 18 FCC Rcd. 14014 ( 165) (July 3, 2003) (``2003 TCPA 
Order''); see also In the Matter of Rule and Regulations Implementing 
the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, CG Docket No. 02-278, 
Report and Order, 27 FCC Rcd. 1830 ( 4) (Feb. 15, 2012) (``2012 TCPA 
Order'') (``The Commission has concluded that the prohibition 
encompasses both voice and text calls, including short message service 
(SMS) calls, if the prerecorded call is made to a telephone number 
assigned to such service.'').
    \4\ See Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946 (9th 
Cir. 2009).
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    Second, there is no direct relationship between the definition of 
``automatic telephone dialing system'' or ``ATDS'' and the TCPA's 
application to text messages. The ATDS definition is key to determining 
whether the TCPA's consent restrictions apply to calls to wireless 
numbers, among other things. It has nothing to do with whether text 
messages--as a broad category of calls--are covered under the TCPA. As 
described above, that issue rests on the definition of another term in 
the statute: ``any call.'' If the Commission narrows the definition of 
ATDS in line with the plain meaning of the statute, text messages will 
still be covered.
    Third, in addition to being incorrect and reflecting a 
misunderstanding of the implementation of the TCPA, Ms. Saunders's 
statement ignores a key and robust protection that consumers have 
against unwanted telemarketing text messages--the Do Not Call rules. 
The TCPA gives consumers the ability to register numbers on the 
National Do Not Call Registry to prevent unwanted telemarketing calls. 
This protection extends to wireless telephone numbers as well as 
wireline numbers.\5\ In addition, consumers may take advantage of the 
TCPA's company-specific do-not-call lists to prevent unwanted 
telemarketing messages.\6\ The Do Not Call rules are not triggered by 
whether a caller uses an ATDS--even manual telemarketing calls must 
comply with Do Not Call.\7\ Accordingly, narrowing the definition of 
ATDS in line with the plain language of the statute would not affect a 
consumer's ability to prevent unwanted telemarketing texts using the Do 
Not Call rules.
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    \5\ 2003 TCPA Order at  33 (``We conclude that the national 
database should allow for the registration of wireless telephone 
numbers, and that such action will better further the objectives of the 
TCPA and the Do-Not-Call Act.'').
    \6\ See 47 C.F.R. Sec. 64.1200(e).
    \7\ See id. Sec. 64.1200(c) (restricting ``any telephone 
solicitation[s]''); id. Sec. 64.1200(d) (restricting ``any call[s] for 
telemarketing purposes'').
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    Fourth, consumers are also protected against unwanted text messages 
by the common and best practices of legitimate U.S. companies. 
Independent of the TCPA framework, it is a best practice to include an 
option for consumers to opt-out of text messages and to honor such opt-
outs. Not only is this good business--as I testified, U.S. businesses 
have no interest in engaging in abusive practices and fear the brand 
and customer relationship damage of being cast as an illegal and 
abusive robocaller--but it is also enforced by industry itself. For 
example, CTIA--The Wireless Association administers the Short Code 
Registry program, a common way of sending marketing text messages. As 
part of the program, CTIA publishes the Short Code Monitoring Handbook, 
which describes best practices for short code programs and ``requires 
all short code programs to comply with a basic code of conduct that 
promotes the best possible user experience.'' \8\ One key best practice 
is that, ``[f]unctioning opt-out mechanisms are crucial for all short 
code programs to comply with the CTIA Short Code Compliance Handbook. 
Programs must always acknowledge and respect customers' requests to opt 
out of short code programs. Short code programs must respond to, at a 
minimum, the universal keywords STOP, END, CANCEL, UNSUBSCRIBE, and 
QUIT by sending an opt-out message and, if the user is subscribed, by 
opting the user out of the program.'' \9\ CTIA audits against this and 
other best practices, and failure to comply with the Handbook may 
result in suspension from the short code registry.\10\ Accordingly, 
even if a non-marketing text message is not covered under the TCPA 
because it is not made using an ATDS, industry common and best 
practices still value and protect consumer choice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ Short Code Monitoring Handbook, CTIA Short Code Monitoring 
Program, Version 1.7, at 3 (March 27, 2017).
    \9\ Id. at 4.
    \10\ Id. at 14-16.
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                                 ______
                                 
   Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to 
                            Scott Delacourt
    Question 1. What is the interplay between privacy and robocalls?
    Answer. The TCPA reflects a balance between consumer protection and 
the benefits of communications between businesses and consumers. In 
enacting the TCPA in 1991, Congress made clear that regulation of 
calling must balance consumers' rights to privacy with legitimate 
business interests: ``[i]ndividuals' privacy rights, public safety 
interests, and commercial freedoms of speech and trade must be balanced 
in a way that protects the privacy of individuals and permits 
legitimate telemarketing practices.'' \1\ The TCPA does not prohibit 
all technologically assisted calling, and does not regulate all calls 
by businesses.
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    \1\ Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer 
Protection Act of 1991, CG Docket No. 02-278, Report and Order, 27 FCC 
Rcd. 1830,  24 (Feb. 15, 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The FCC has acknowledged this. For example, in formulating TCPA 
rules, the Commission has stated that, ``the rules the Commission 
adopts'' aim to ``strike an appropriate balance between maximizing 
consumer privacy protections and avoiding imposing undue burdens on 
telemarketers.'' \2\ Time and again, the FCC has ``affirm[ed] the vital 
consumer protections of the TCPA while at the same time encouraging 
pro-consumer uses of modern calling technology.'' \3\ Recently 
Commissioner O'Rielly recognized the importance of balancing these 
interests, noting that the Commission's actions should ``protect 
consumers from unwanted communications while enabling legitimate 
businesses to reach individuals that wish to be contacted. That is the 
balance that Congress struck when it enacted the [TCPA] in 1991.'' \4\
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    \2\ Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer 
Protection Act of 1991, CG Docket No. 02-278, Report and Order, 18 FCC 
Rcd. 14014,  1 (July 3, 2003).
    \3\ Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer 
Protection Act of 1991, CG Docket No. 02-278; Declaratory Ruling and 
Order, 30 FCC Rcd. 7961,  2 (July 10, 2015) (``2015 Declaratory Ruling 
and Order'').
    \4\ Id. at 8084 (Statement of Commissioner Michael O'Rielly 
Dissenting in Part and Approving in Part).
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    With the TCPA's passage in 1991, Congress's primary aim was to 
alleviate intrusive telemarketing calls--like nuisance calls during 
dinner--and junk faxes. As Chairman Pai has said, ``Congress passed the 
[TCPA] to crack down on intrusive telemarketers and over-the-phone scam 
artists.'' \5\ In the Preamble to the TCPA, Congress cited the 
``proliferation of intrusive, nuisance calls to [consumers'] homes from 
telemarketers'' as a reason for acting.\6\ According to the Supreme 
Court, ``Congress determined that Federal legislation was needed 
because telemarketers, by operating interstate, were escaping state-law 
prohibitions on intrusive nuisance calls.'' \7\
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    \5\ Id. at 8072 (Dissenting Statement of then-Commissioner Ajit 
Pai).
    \6\ Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, PL 102-243, 105 
Stat. 2394, Sec. 2 (Dec. 20, 1991).
    \7\ Mims v. Arrow Financial Services, LLC, 565 U.S. 368, 370 (2012) 
(also citing the Preamble of the TCPA) (emphasis added); see also 
Emanuel v. Los Angeles Lakers, Inc., 2013 WL 1719035, at *3 (``Courts 
``broadly recognize that not every text message or call constitutes an 
actionable offense; rather, the TCPA targets and seeks to prevent the 
proliferation of intrusive, nuisance calls.'' (internal quotations 
omitted)).

    Question 2. How do robocallers get access to our private 
information in order to target consumers for robocalls?
    Answer. As I discussed during my oral testimony, the term 
robocallers often encompasses two very different types of callers--the 
first being bad actor telemarketers, the second being companies trying 
to lawfully contact their consumers for a legitimate business purpose. 
The Chamber's knowledge only extends to those in the second category of 
callers. There are varied methods for compiling and building customer 
and target lists for legitimate communications. The Chamber represents 
companies who place calls based on valid consent (either written or 
non-written, depending on the context), which can be obtained in 
several ways, including through business transactions, customer 
inquiries, or written consent.

    Question 3. Is there any evidence that robo callers share call 
lists with each other or on the dark web which has the potential of 
creating repeat victims?
    Answer. Chamber members engage in legal calling campaigns. I am not 
familiar with how bad actors obtain phone numbers, whether on the Dark 
Web or otherwise.
                                 ______
                                 
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Catherine Cortez Masto 
                           to Scott Delacourt
    Question 1. Calls from Legitimate Businesses--In your testimony, 
you said ``The TCPA prohibits making phone calls to wireless telephone 
numbers ``using any automatic telephone dialing system'' (``ATDS'') 
without the prior express consent of the called party. The Act focuses 
on technology, not bad conduct such as harassment or fraud.'' How does 
the Chamber think the law could be changed to ensure that robocall 
enforcement targets harassment?
    Answer. This question rightly inquires how to focus enforcement on 
bad actors, not on well-intentioned U.S. businesses that use a new 
technology or make a technical error.
    Currently, the TCPA is abused by class action plaintiffs' lawyers 
to seek from U.S. businesses enormous statutory damages that bear no 
relationship to harm. These lawsuits, while profitable for lawyers, do 
not benefit class members and do nothing to deter truly bad actors.\8\
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    \8\ Unstable Foundation: Our Broken Class Action System and How to 
Fix It, U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, at 15 (October 2017), 
https://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/
UnstableFoundation_Web_10242017.pdf (`Critics of the current class 
action system point to the absence of any substantial compensation for 
class members, the control by plaintiffs' lawyers of the class action 
process, and the unchecked conflict of interest between class members 
and class counsel. Defenders of the current system argue that these 
points should all be disregarded, because class actions supposedly 
deter unlawful conduct and provide potential defendants with a powerful 
incentive to act lawfully. This deterrence argument may sound good, but 
there is a big difference between theory and practice. The reality of 
class actions shows that there is no credible basis for a deterrence 
justification.'').
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    It would be preferable for the law to focus on calls that are 
placed with the intent to defraud or otherwise do harm. Rather than 
focus on technology (i.e., whether an automated telephone dialing 
system (``ATDS'') was used to place the call), Congress could look to 
the Truth in Caller ID Act of 2009,\9\ which outlaws ``intentionally 
harmful or fraudulent spoofing of caller ID information.'' \10\ 
Specifically, the Truth in Caller ID Act makes it ``unlawful for any 
person within the United States, in connection with any 
telecommunications service or IP-enabled voice service, to cause any 
caller identification service to knowingly transmit misleading or 
inaccurate caller identification information with the intent to 
defraud, cause harm, or wrongfully obtain anything of value.'' \11\ 
Amending the TCPA to include a similar focus on intentionally harmful 
or fraudulent actions would more effectively target the behavior that 
is likely to harm consumers while protecting the modern communications 
that consumers desire.
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    \9\ Truth in Caller ID Act of 2009, PL 111-331, 124 Stat. 3571 
(Dec. 22, 2010) (codified at 47 U.S.C. Sec. 227(e)).
    \10\ Rules and Regulations Implementing the Truth in Caller ID Act 
of 2009, WC Docket No. 11-39, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 26 FCC 
Rcd. 4128  1 (March 9, 2011).
    \11\ 47 U.S.C. Sec. 227(e)(1).
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    There are several other steps that could move the TCPA in the right 
direction to benefit consumers without unduly harming U.S. businesses. 
For example, Congress could create robust safe harbors for legitimate 
businesses that take reasonable steps to avoid violating the TCPA. 
Congress also should remove the private right of action and leave 
enforcement to the agencies that have the tools and expertise to attack 
the problem in a concerted and consistent fashion.

    Question 2. If the perpetrator of calls makes millions of billions 
of calls that are non-fraudulent but nonconsensual, how does the 
Chamber believe the law should impact those robocallers?
    Answer. Your question raises two main concerns: consumer consent to 
receive calls and call volumes. Regarding consent, the Chamber believes 
that the TCPA is in need of reform. The TCPA--as interpreted by the 
FCC--dictates consent requirements based on (1) the technology used to 
place the call, (2) the type of number to which a call is delivered, 
and (3) the content of a call.\12\ The consent requirement is subject 
to change if any one of these three elements changes. For example, if 
the caller uses an ATDS or an artificial or prerecorded voice to place 
a telemarketing call to wireless number, then the caller must first 
obtain written consent from the consumer; if the caller uses an ATDS or 
an artificial or prerecorded voice to place a non-telemarketing call to 
wireless number, then the consent from the consumer does not need to be 
in writing, but still must be obtained expressly from the consumer and 
prior to the call being placed. These consent requirements are overly 
complicated, and they detract from what should be the real focus of 
policymakers: stopping bad actors that purposefully evade the consent 
requirement and that call with the intent to defraud. The TCPA should 
not--as it does today--expose to ruinous liability well-intentioned 
companies that take advantage of modern technology to communicate 
quickly and efficiently with consumers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ See 47 C.F.R. Sec. 64.1200(a)(1) (imposing one consent 
requirement on any call to a wireless number utilizing an ATDS or an 
artificial or prerecorded voice); id. Sec. 64.1200(a)(2) (imposing a 
different consent requirement on a telemarketing or advertising call to 
a wireless number utilizing an ATDS or an artificial or prerecorded 
voice); id. Sec. 64.1200(a)(3) (imposing consent requirements on calls 
place to residential landlines utilizing an artificial or prerecorded 
voice).
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    Regarding call volume, I respectfully suggest that this is a red 
herring. The mere fact that a caller places a high volume of calls is 
not inherently bad, as there are calls that consumers want to receive. 
So long as a caller in good faith attempts to comply with the consent 
requirements and does not have the intention of defrauding or otherwise 
doing harm to consumers, the caller should be able to place as many 
calls as it sees fit to communicate lawfully with customers. 
Fundamentally, call volume--on its own--is not a relevant metric on 
which policymakers should focus. Whether a legitimate company places 
one hundred or one million calls with consumer consent, no consumer 
harm occurs.

    Question 3. Banking--In 2014 a couple won a lawsuit against Bank of 
America for more than $1 million after they were flooded with robotic 
collection calls over the course of several years. It is understandable 
that banks and other companies want to contact their customers about 
issues, but we cannot have financial institutions blatantly ignoring 
the law and instituting a policy of annoying their customers with 
illegal phone calls. Does the Chamber believe that banks, because they 
are legitimate businesses, should be able to make collection calls 
without user consent?
    Answer. Businesses have every incentive to cultivate positive 
customer relationships while using modern technology to efficiently 
communicate with customers, including about debt collection.
    As it happens, debt collection calls are ordinarily made with 
consent. As the FCC has recognized, the provision of a phone number in 
the context of incurring a debt constitutes consent for the purposes of 
the TCPA.\13\ We support the FCC's practices of permitting legitimate 
businesses to communicate with their customers regarding repayment of 
debts. Importantly, the TCPA is not the only, or even the primary, law 
that governs the debt collection process.\14\ Debt collection 
activities are heavily regulated at the Federal and state levels. The 
Chamber supports its members' compliance with these regulations.
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    \13\ Request of ACA International for Clarification and Declaratory 
Ruling, CG Docket No. 02-278, Declaratory Ruling, 23 FCC Rcd. 559,  9 
(Jan. 4, 2008) (``2008 Declaratory Ruling'') (``We conclude that the 
provision of a cell phone number to a creditor, e.g., as part of a 
credit application, reasonably evidences prior express consent by the 
cell phone subscriber to be contacted at that number regarding the 
debt.'').
    \14\ See, e.g., Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 
Sec. 1692 et seq.

    Question 4. A one million dollar cost, as shown in this case, is 
not a significant sum for a large bank, does the Chamber believe this 
is significant enough to deter ``harassment?''
    Answer. The fundamental problem with the TCPA is its statutory 
damages, coupled with its private right of action. TCPA class action 
lawsuits have skyrocketed in recent years. As the Chamber recently 
explained ``Settlement is where almost all TCPA cases end up if a class 
is certified, or if certification seems at all likely, because of the 
in terrorem value of classwide claims. In TCPA litigation, every 2,000 
calls can equate to $1 million in potential statutory damages, even 
before potential `willfulness' damages are considered.'' \15\
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    \15\ Id. at 9.
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