[Senate Hearing 115-858]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 115-858
UNITED STATES NAVY AND MARINE CORPS READINESS
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER
AND
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS AND
MANAGEMENT SUPPORT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 12, 2018
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
42-873 PDF WASHINGTON : 2021
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma, Chairman JACK REED, Rhode Island
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi BILL NELSON, Florida
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
TOM COTTON, Arkansas JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
JONI ERNST, Iowa RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina JOE DONNELLY, Indiana
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia TIM KAINE, Virginia
TED CRUZ, Texas ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
BEN SASSE, Nebraska ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
TIM SCOTT, South Carolina GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
JON KYL, Arizona
John Bonsell, Staff Director
Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director
_________________________________________________________________
Subcommittee on Seapower
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi, MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
Chairman JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
TOM COTTON, Arkansas RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota TIM KAINE, Virginia
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine
TIM SCOTT, South Carolina
JON KYL, Arizona
_________________________________________________________________
Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support
Dan Sullivan, Alaska, Chairman TIM KAINE, Virginia
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
JONI ERNST, IOWA MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
_________________________________________________________________
December 12, 2018
Page
United States Navy and Marine Corps Readiness.................... 1
Spencer, The Honorable Richard V., Secretary of the Navy......... 5
Pendleton, John H., Director, Defense Capabilities and 10
Management, United States Government Accountability Office.
Questions for the Record......................................... 92
(iii)
UNITED STATES NAVY AND MARINE CORPS READINESS
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WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 12, 2018
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Seapower and
Subcommittee on Readiness
and Management Support,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in
Room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Roger F.
Wicker (chairman of the Subcommittee on Seapower) presiding.
Subcommittee Members present: Senators Wicker, Rounds,
Ernst, Sullivan, Shaheen, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, and King.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER
Senator Wicker. This joint meeting of the Senate Armed
Services Subcommittees on Seapower and Readiness and Management
Support convenes this morning to examine Navy and Marine Corps
readiness.
We welcome our four distinguished witnesses: the Honorable
Richard V. Spencer, Secretary of the Navy; General Robert B.
Neller, Commandant of the Marine Corps; Admiral William F.
Moran, Vice Chief of Naval Operations; and Mr. John H.
Pendleton, Director of Defense Capabilities and Management at
the Government Accountability Office (GAO).
Let me begin by expressing my deepest condolences to the
families and friends of the six marines who died after a mid-
air collision last Thursday near Japan. This tragedy serves as
a reminder of the constant dangers those in uniform face on a
daily basis.
I thank Chairman Sullivan and Ranking Members Hirono and
Kaine for agreeing to hold this hearing jointly--this
rescheduled hearing. We will discuss a range of important
issues today that cross subcommittee jurisdictions, such as
equipment modernization and funding for spare and repair parts.
Although there is plenty to discuss regarding Navy and Marine
Corps readiness, I will focus my opening remarks on the
readiness of the Navy surface ships.
This February, the late Senator John McCain and I
introduced legislation to help the Navy restore its surface
force readiness. The Surface Warfare Enhancement Act of 2018
sought to address some of the root causes of declining
readiness, which were outlined in the Secretary of the Navy's
Strategic Readiness Review (SRR) and the CNO's [Chief of Naval
Operations] Comprehensive Review.
In the aftermath of the tragic USS Fitzgerald and USS John
S. McCain collisions, in which 17 sailors lost their lives, our
commanders and sailors called for meaningful reform. Navy and
Government Accountability Office reviews cited over-extended
and undermanned ships, overworked crews, a decline in naval
mastery, and confusing chains of commands as contributing
factors to the Navy's readiness problems.
Our legislation, based on the Navy's own recommendations,
was specifically designed to address these and other
challenges. Although I have confidence in the Navy's
leadership, I believe Congress must continue to play an active
role in ensuring the right long-term corrective actions are
successfully implemented.
The John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) for fiscal year 2019, which President Trump signed into
law in August, includes 11 provisions derived from our original
legislation. These reforms required the Navy to review its
chains of command, ensure that the ships home-ported overseas
rotate back home, and keep formal watchstanding records, among
other several other provisions. We must learn the hard lessons
of the past 2 years and get meaningful reforms implemented.
I look forward to receiving an update on the progress of
implementing these reforms for our surface ships.
There will be several other topics which will be
highlighted in our witnesses' prepared testimony, but in the
interest of time, I will conclude my opening remarks.
By agreement, we are now to recognize Senator Kaine for
whatever opening remarks he might have. Senator Kaine?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR TIM KAINE
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to the
witnesses for being here today, to my colleague, Senator
Hirono, and all who are here.
This is an important hearing. I appreciated the opportunity
to meet in the office to talk a little bit about it. It is rare
to have a hearing of two of the Subcommittees jointly, but it
is very appropriate to talk in this joint Subcommittee hearing
about readiness in both the Marine Corps and the Navy.
I will also echo what Senator Wicker said. Our prayers go
out to the family members affected in the Marine family by the
mid-air collision. One of those killed was a marine, Kevin
Herman from Fredericksburg, Virginia. Thinking about Kevin and
his family.
I am going to keep my remarks brief as well because we want
to get into the Q&A.
First, on readiness recovery, I am encouraged by Secretary
Mattis' expressed goal of an 80 percent readiness figure. That
is a lofty goal, a stretch goal, a gasp goal, but it is the
kind of goal you need to do good work. While I support the
goal, I do have concerns about how we come up with and then
allocate the resources that we need to meet it.
The GAO found just last month the Navy spent about $1.5
billion since 2008 to support submarines that were not able to
be deployed. I am very interested to hear from the witnesses
how the Navy can best use both public and private shipyards to
ensure readiness goals are met and taxpayer dollars are used
wisely. I know you are prepared to testify about that.
Second, infrastructure challenges. I am encouraged by the
Navy's shipyard optimization plan. The plan has an estimated
cost of $21 billion over the next 20 years, which would be
nearly three times what the Navy has historically spent on
capital shipyard investment. If we are going to get to the 355-
ship Navy, we need to make those investments, but that will be
challenging. I am interested to hear from the witnesses today
on how exactly they plan to achieve this amount of investment.
Obviously, Congress has a huge role in that. So you will be
giving us a challenge as well as you describe it.
An additional concern I have about infrastructure,
especially just following the fall that we have been through,
is climate change. Hurricane Florence did significant damage to
North Carolina, and the costs at Lejeune to the Marine Corps
could be significant. This is not an Air Force hearing, but
Tindall in Florida also suffered significantly, and there will
be costs connected with it.
The GAO recently found, quote, DOD [Department of Defense]
acknowledges that the potential impacts of weather effects
associated with climate change pose operational and budgetary
risk to our military installations. We are seeing examples of
that.
Notably, the Fiscal Year 2018 NDAA required DOD to report
on vulnerabilities to installations from climate-related
events. It could be a hurricane. It could be flooding. It could
be drought, depending on the part of the country, wildfires--
including the top ten most vulnerable installations in each
military service. The report is due this month, and I will ask
both the Navy and Marine Corps for their top ten today, either
for verbal testimony or testimony for the record. I am not
expecting each of you to pound the table about debating about
climate change and the causes of it, but we do need to know,
coming up with the NDAA and prepping for it for next year, what
we need to build in to deal with those vulnerabilities.
With that, Mr. Chairman, thanks for calling this joint
hearing, and I appreciate the opportunity to dialogue with our
witnesses today.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
Before moving to the other two opening statements, you
mentioned your constituent. Let me just say that we now have
the names of four of the five marines who have been declared
dead after the crash of the two war planes. Family members of
the fallen marines identified their loved ones to Stars and
Stripes. In addition to Major Kevin Herman of Fredericksburg,
Virginia, who Senator Kaine has already mentioned, Staff
Sergeant Maximo Flores of Litchfield Park, Arizona; Corporal
Carter Ross from Hendersonville, Tennessee; and Corporal Daniel
Baker of Tremont, Illinois have been identified as deceased by
their loved ones. And the fighter pilot involved in the crash
who died was identified last week as Captain Jahmar Resilard of
Miramar, Florida. We mention all of those names with our
thoughts and prayers to their families and our appreciation for
their service and sacrifice to our country.
Senator Sullivan?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR DAN SULLIVAN
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank
all the members for being here for this important hearing that
really kind of emphasizes that modernization and readiness go
hand in hand. I know that our full Committee Chairman, Senator
Inhofe, is committed to ensuring that we continue down the path
to readiness and recovery while we still prioritize
modernization.
I want to thank the witnesses for being here today. It has
been over 6 months since we received testimony from the Navy
and Marine Corps on their current posture in support of the
fiscal year 2019 budget. Much has happened since then.
I am going to try to keep my opening remarks short, but
like Senator Kaine, I want to highlight a couple areas that I
hope our witnesses can address for us.
First, the readiness issues with regard to the Navy and the
Marine Corps, importantly within the context of the new
National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the recent National Defense
Commission report, which was mandated by this Committee and the
Congress--the leaders of that commission testified recently,
and I thought they did a very good job. All of this within the
context of the great power competition with China and Russia
that are the highlights and emphasis in the National Defense
Strategy.
As Senator Kaine mentioned, I also want to get a sense from
our witnesses on the laudable but, let us say, as he said,
stretch goal with regard to 80 percent mission-capable by the
year end with regard to Navy and Marine Corps aircraft. The
readiness issues in terms of naval aviation has been a big
challenge and continues to be.
I am also curious to get an assessment from, Mr. Secretary,
you and General Neller and Admiral Moran on how you plan to get
to the 80 percent capable mission for those airframes while
keeping training up, which has been a big problem, and not
degrading readiness capabilities.
On the topic of modernization, I am concerned about a
significant burden that we are seeing on sustainment. Last
month, Vice Admiral Moore stated that only 35 percent of the
ships that he had in maintenance availabilities would move on
time. This again is an area where maintenance and sustainment
of our fleet has typically been a strategic comparative
advantage of the United States Navy relative to other
countries, particularly China and Russia. I want to get a sense
from our witnesses on how we make progress on that. Those
numbers are concerning.
I also want to get a sense, in light of the NDS, as Senator
Kaine and I are going to be conducting a classified hearing
later today with regard to the Pacific laydown of our force
posture in light of the National Defense Strategy in the Asia-
Pacific, Indo-Pacific. That is going to be an important
hearing. My State plays an important role in that, being one of
the most strategically located places in the world. So I would
like to get an update on utilization of that platform, JPARC
[Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex], Adak, other future year
training and basing opportunities that fit well within the NDS.
Finally and I think most importantly--we have already
touched on it--the trend in the INDOPACOM [Indo-Pacific
Command] region with regard to accidents that we have had in
the Navy, in the Marine Corps. I do not want to go down the
whole list, but we know what they are: the USS McCain, others,
the collisions of our ships at sea resulting in the deaths of
17 sailors, several Marine Corps and Navy aviation crashes in
training, including the latest that we just talked about.
We, of course, send our heartfelt condolences to the
families of the marines who have lost loved ones during this
holiday season. I know all of you gentlemen take these issues
extremely seriously. These are the men under your charge, but
we have to do better. We must do better, all of us, including
the Congress. We have to do better.
What we need to do here on our side is make sure you get
the authorization and appropriations bills on time. CRs
[continuing resolutions] and omnibuses that you have been
forced to endure for over a decade do not help readiness and
contribute to the problem.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to very much
hearing from our witnesses.
Senator Wicker. The ranking member of the Seapower
Subcommittee, Senator Hirono.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR MAZIE HIRONO
Senator Hirono. Thank you very much. I will keep my remarks
very short.
And I do add my own condolences to the families of the
marines lost in the tragedy off the coast of Japan last week,
as well as their fellow marines at Marine Corps Air Station
Iwakuni and throughout the Pacific.
Gentlemen, it is nice to see three out of the four of you.
Thank you very much for coming to see me not too long ago.
These are the areas that I would like to focus on, and some
of them have already been, of course, mentioned.
One of the most important areas of concern for me is
shipyard modernization because Pearl Harbor Navy Shipyard is
very much a part of our industrial base in Hawaii, as well as,
of course, a major part of our national security. I too would
like to know how we are going to get to 80 percent availability
for aviation.
Something that I have been talking about quite a bit, not
necessarily mentioned by others, is how we are addressing the
corrosion problem because that can lead to deaths, as it has,
when a propeller falls off due to corrosion and lack of
adequate maintenance.
And then, of course, as mentioned by Senator Sullivan,
preventing collisions at sea.
So thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Wicker. Thank you.
I believe Secretary Spencer is first in line to make
opening remarks. Sir, we are delighted to have you.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE RICHARD V. SPENCER, SECRETARY OF THE
NAVY
Secretary Spencer. Great to be here, Chairman.
I would open up by saying thank you for keeping your
thoughts and prayers in mind for those marines affected, and I
would go one step further and please say keep your thoughts and
prayers in mind for all our Navy/Marine Corps team that are out
in harm's way.
Chairman Wicker, Chairman Sullivan, Ranking Member Hirono,
Ranking Member Kaine, distinguished members who are all here
today, first off, on behalf of the sailors, marines, civilians,
and all our teammates serving around the world, we want to
thank you for your bipartisan effort to restore funding
stability to the Department of the Navy. It is critical and it
is doing its work. I will tell you that the weather vanes are
all pointed in the right direction. Urgency is the message that
we have now. You are seeing improvement. You will hear it
today. But the rate of improvement must increase and we believe
we do have plans to address that.
The foundation for restoring readiness and increasing
lethality has been set, but we must build on this, as I said,
with a sense of urgency, and with a focus on people,
capabilities, and process. While we have much to do, we are
well underway. During this testimony, we will highlight and
answer questions for you that will delineate what is being
done.
The National Defense Strategy identifies three lines of
effort to counter the increasingly complex security environment
that we presently face. The first is to build a more lethal and
ready force. The second is to strengthen alliances. The third
is to reform the way that we do business.
I am going to highlight a couple of the major muscle
movements that we are making.
We are increasing lethality and readiness through targeted
investments in weapons platforms and munitions, while enhancing
our partnerships with the private sector. As an example,
alongside our private sector partners, we are gleaning
commercial best practices to increase efficiency and flow in
our maintenance facilities to turn those platforms back to the
fleet as quickly as possible.
The Navy/Marine Corps team is strengthening our network of
allies and attracting new partners through joint exercises such
as RIMPAC [Rim of the Pacific Exercise], Trident Juncture,
Malabar, and Bold Alligator, all the way increasing
opportunities for our personnel and their allied counterparts
to study together, serve together, and operate as a single
unit. Teaching, learning, and exercising together seals a long-
term bond with those that will be part of the fight, if called
on. Aligned and training allies and friends are our force
multiplier both in manpower, ideas, and capital assets.
We have made business process reform a top priority. At
every level we must become--and we are moving there--to be a
continual learning enterprise, identifying best practices from
outside the building, promoting a culture of problem solving,
and achieving efficiency at the speed of relevance. Recent
examples of this include the newly revised surface force
training and readiness manual, which places more focus on
training and changes the delivery strategy of basic phased
training to ensure ships are able to continuously train during
the optimized fleet replacement plan cycle. This, coupled with
the establishment of the Marine Skills Training Centers in both
Norfolk and San Diego, enable surface warfare offices to
develop their mariner skills throughout their career. They are
increasing the ability of the United States Navy and this shows
what we are investing in our people.
The American taxpayers provide us with a treasure, and in
return, we must protect them from the risks associated with an
ever-changing world. We owe it to them to ensure that every
single dollar we invest has a return on lethality. We must do
this to fulfill our oath to them.
We have more examples of our efforts put forth to increase
readiness and lethality. While we have been focused on
addressing root cause issues that we face, you should be aware
that we are making systemic changes that will take time to
meaningfully move the needle. In order to effect our goals, we
must, ladies and gentlemen--we must have consistent funding.
Any breaking in that consistency will have dire effects on the
process and progress that we have made to date.
We appreciate the support and the oversight of this
Committee, and on behalf of the world's finest marines and
sailors, we look forward to your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Spencer, General
Neller, and Admiral Moran follows:]
The joint prepared statement of The Honorable Richard V. Spencer,
General Robert B. Neller, and Admiral William F. Moran
Chairman Wicker, Chairman Sullivan, Ranking Member Hirono, Ranking
Member Kaine, distinguished Committee Members. On behalf of our
sailors, marines and civilians serving around the world, thank you for
your bipartisan efforts to restore funding stability to the Department
of the Navy. The foundation for restoring readiness and increasing
lethality has been set. Now we must build on that foundation with a
sense of urgency, with a focus on our people, capabilities, and
processes. While we have much to do, we are well underway, and I will
highlight some of our progress.
The National Defense Strategy identifies three lines of effort to
counter the increasingly complex security environment we face. The
first is to build a more lethal and ready force. The second is to
strengthen alliances. And the third is to reform the way we do
business.
building a more lethal and ready force
We're increasing lethality and readiness through targeted
investments in weapons platforms and munitions, while enhancing our
partnerships with the private sector. We are gleaning commercial best
practices to increase efficiency and flow in our maintenance facilities
to turn the platforms back to the fleet as quickly as possible.
Overall investment in naval readiness has increased through funding
for ship operations, ship depot maintenance, aviation depot
maintenance, aviation spares, and flying hours. The Navy has
accelerated acquisition for several key systems, including the Next
Generation Frigate, MQ-25 unmanned aerial refueling system, Surface
Navy Laser Weapons Systems and Standard Missile 6 Block 1B, while
investing further in advanced tactical munitions including tactical
tomahawks, long-range anti-ship missiles, rolling airframe missiles,
and heavy weight torpedoes. The Navy has also significantly accelerated
ship acquisition, procuring 22 Battle Force Ships over fiscal year 2017
and fiscal year 2018, while decommissioning nine ships.
The Marine Corps has increased modernization investments over the
last three fiscal years, including 82 F-35 aircraft and 16 CH-53K and
significant investments in the protected mobility of Marines at sea and
ashore through acquisition of 56 new Amphibious Combat Vehicles.
Enhanced investments also include close combat lethality equipment for
Marine infantry, High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, advanced air
defense systems, initial investments in a long range, ground-based,
anti-ship missile system, and improved command and control systems
aboard amphibious warships. All of the above enhance the Marine Corps'
ability to provide enabling lethality to the Naval Force in a naval
campaign at sea and from the sea.
We're also increasing the readiness of our existing fleet with $1.1
billion in additional funding executed for ship maintenance; an
increase from $8.7 billion in fiscal year 2017 to $9.8 billion in
fiscal year 2019. This additional funding enables ships to begin
deployment training on time with improved materiel condition and
modernized combat, communications, and engineering systems. We've
partnered with our shipyards, public and private, to improve
efficiency, reducing the maintenance backlog and increasing
productivity vital for future naval growth. In the past 3 years we've
reduced lost days to maintenance in the public shipyards by 11 percent
(40 percent if excluding USS Albany and USS Dwight D. Eisenhower). In
the past two years we have reduced workload carryover by 46 percent,
which reflects our efforts to balance workload to capacity in order to
improve productivity.
We've aggressively gone after readiness challenges in our
operational submarine fleet, and identified three key drivers: public
shipyard capacity, shipyard productivity, and parts availability.
Working with our industry partners, we've been able to allocate
multiple submarines to private shipyards in order to alleviate the
disparity between demand and capacity within our public shipyards. Our
first-ever Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Plan, delivered to
Congress earlier this year, establishes our roadmap to upgrade our
drydocks, facilities, and equipment to improve overall productivity.
Today's naval shipyard training and development is a combination of
class room, learning center development (hands-on in safe to learn
environments), and on-the-job experience. In previous years, training
could take up to 4 years, as the majority of the training and
development was shadowing an experienced mechanic while `on-the-job'.
Naval shipyards have now reduced the time it takes to train and develop
a worker by a least 50 percent. For example, it used to take over two
years to train the top two trade skills (Marine Machinist and
Pipefitter) at the four naval shipyards, but now, training and
development for these skills has been reduced to 6-12 months.
The Marine Corps made significant improvements and investments in
aviation readiness. Flight hours and aircrew proficiency are on-track
to meet service goals. On average, Marine squadrons last year achieved
readiness rates above service combat readiness standards for the first
time since sequestration. Average flight hours per aircrew increased
from 13.5 per month in fiscal year 2016 to 17.9 in fiscal year 2018, an
increase of 32.6 percent; and the Marines invested heavily in aviation
sustainment with the fiscal year 2017, fiscal year 2018 and fiscal year
2019 budgets. Over $1.6 billion in parts will be delivered in total
over that time to Marine aviation flight lines to improve the material
condition of the aircraft to the service standard ahead of forecast.
Marines continue to work aggressively to ensure the highest possible
ground equipment readiness. Over the last three years, average
readiness for mission essential ground equipment has increased to 92
percent in the active component operating forces and 95 percent in the
maritime prepositioned force.
All of these investments are increasing our readiness and lethality
capabilities. But our most important investments are in our greatest
resource--our people. The Department of the Navy has increased the
active duty force to 329,867 as of September 2018. We're also making
key hires in developing areas, such as the force the Marine Corps has
established for offensive and defensive cyber operations. We've also
accelerated efforts to hire and train new public shipyard workers,
bringing the total workforce at public shipyards from 34,918 in fiscal
year 2017 to 36,696 in fiscal year 2018, meeting our fiscal year 2020
goal of 36,100 full-time equivalent workers one year earlier than
originally planned.
To better assist and retain our personnel, while delivering on a
promise to provide Sailor-focused customer service and around-the-clock
assistance, we opened the MyNavy Career Center (MNCC) in September to
provide Sailors with 24/7 human resource services. In the first month,
MNCC resolved over 30,000 service requests, approximately 1,100 per
day. The Tier 1 contact center agents resolved 88 percent during the
initial contact and 96 percent were resolved in three days or less
without the need to transfer issues to our Tier 2 subject matter
experts. We also announced the military parental leave program to
consolidate the legacy adoption, paternity and maternity leave
policies, and to define primary and secondary caregiver leave
guidelines. Finally, we implemented the Targeted Reentry Program to
enable key former personnel a streamlined return into Active Duty,
should they choose to return. The program also empowers our commanding
officers to identify their high performers who do not intend to
affiliate with the Ready Reserve and offer them a path to return to the
Navy.
As we migrate to a continual learning organization, the Department
of the Navy continues to invest in key development opportunities for
our force, including developing the Naval Postgraduate School as a
premier, relevant research and education institution. And we've
increased readiness by adopting advanced technologies such as additive
manufacturing that will flatten the supply chain, and more importantly
promote a culture of problem solving to enable our sailors and marines
to ``fix it forward''.
In the wake of the tragic USS Fitzgerald and USS John S. McCain
collisions, the Department of the Navy conducted a Comprehensive Review
(CR) and Strategic Readiness Review (SRR), which identified readiness
reforms as a critical priority. In January of 2018, the Navy
established the Readiness Reform Oversight Council (RROC) to oversee
implementation of CR/SRR recommendations as well as related
recommendations from other sources including the Government
Accountability Office and the Navy Inspector General.
As of today, the RROC has considered 111 recommendations and fully
implemented 78, with the remaining recommendations on track for
adoption in accordance with programming schedules. We are now beginning
to witness the benefits provided by those recommendations, from
increased sea experience for our Surface Warfare Officers, to priority
manning for the Department's Forward Deployed Naval Forces, to
restoring deliberate scheduling and implementing a new force generation
model throughout U.S. Seventh Fleet, to Naval Surface Group Western
Pacific which ensures readiness concerns are voiced in the natural
tension between force supply and demand.
strengthening alliances and attracting new partners
The Navy Marine Corps Team is strengthening our alliances and
attracting new partners through joint exercises such as RIMPAC, Trident
Juncture, Malabar and Bold Alligator, and increasing opportunities for
our personnel and their allied counterparts to study together, serve
together and operate as a single unit. Teaching, learning and
exercising together seals a long term bond with those that will be part
of the fight. Aligned and trained allies and friends are our force
multiplier.
The foundation of our credibility as a reliable partner and
effective deterrent is our forward presence. From the vast expanses of
the Pacific, to the restricted waters of the Arabian Gulf, to the
Caribbean, the Mediterranean, the North Atlantic and the Arctic, we are
on watch alongside our allies and partners around the clock.
business process reform
The Department of the Navy has made business process reform a top
priority for our civilian and military leadership, promoting a
continual learning enterprise that can identify, pursue, and rapidly
achieve effectiveness and efficiency at the speed of relevance. For
example, we've embraced lessons from commercial airline heavy-
maintenance practices and their data-driven approach to improve Naval
Aviation's maintenance processes. This will be the foundation of the
Navy Sustainment System. Fleet Readiness Centers are a good example of
this kind of partnership, focused on reducing a significant backlog in
aviation component repair parts. This effort is just one example of how
the Naval Aviation Enterprise is working to improve readiness and
achieve Secretary Mattis' goal of 80 percent mission capable aircraft
in our Fleet Strike Fighter squadrons by the end of fiscal year 2019.
As part of ongoing business reform initiatives, the Department of
the Navy has reviewed duplicative programs and programs that are no
longer mission essential. This has resulted in the divestiture of the
Navy's legacy F/A-18 Hornets (which the Marines continue to fly), the
transition of the HH-60H reserve squadron from legacy aircraft to newer
MH-60S aircraft, and a review of Marine Corps training munitions.
Representative investments resulting from the reform initiative include
an additional DDG-51, one additional F/A-18 E/F, increased procurement
of Rolling Air Frame missiles and MK48 torpedoes, and funding afloat
readiness to maximum executable levels.
Moreover, the Department is focused on improving business processes
heightened through the audit of our financial statements. For example,
the audit work has revealed that the complexity of our distribution
network is too great for effective management, and this in turn leads
to challenges with knowing the location and condition of all the parts
and equipment we own. The audit has also revealed that we move money
internally too many times before it arrives in the hands of the people
who actually perform the work. The Department of the Navy is using this
information to streamline our operations and reimagine how our support
functions can be modernized in real time to increase readiness,
lethality and efficiency.
The American taxpayers provide us with their treasure, and trust us
to protect them from a dangerous world. And we owe it to them to ensure
that every single dollar is invested in the most effective manner
possible to fulfill our sacred oath. We appreciate the support and
oversight of the Senate Armed Services Committee on behalf of the
world's finest Marines and Sailors, and look forward to your questions.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Pendleton, I understand you also have an opening
statement. You are recognized.
STATEMENT OF JOHN H. PENDLETON, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CAPABILITIES
AND MANAGEMENT, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Pendleton. Chairman Wicker, Chairman Sullivan, Ranking
Member Hirono, Ranking Member Kaine, thank you for inviting me
to discuss our body of work on Navy and Marine Corps readiness
issues.
I will break my statement into two parts. First, I will
describe ship and submarine readiness, and then I will move to
aviation.
Just over a year ago, I had the grim duty to report to you
that Navy training was not up to its own standards. Training
requirements at that time were being waivered at an alarming
rate. The Navy, in a series of internal studies, concluded that
this lack of training had contributed to the deadly collisions.
When I learned that I would be testifying at this hearing,
I decided to go out to Japan to see for myself how things were
going. What I found was encouraging. The Navy has stepped up
training to make sure that ship crews are deployed before they
train, and they have committed to provide dedicated training
time going forward. Things had improved markedly.
However, this is keeping the sailors very busy. We talked
to 10 groups of sailors on two ships out in Japan, and they
told us the sense of morale was high, but that they are still
working very hard, sometimes 100 hours a week or more. I am
concerned that this reveals an underlying problem still facing
the Navy, that it simply is not yet putting enough sailors on
the ships to cover the workload.
We reported on this last year, and the Navy is working to
develop ship manning requirements, both at sea and in port, and
we eagerly await the results of those studies, as I suspect a
number of hardworking sailors do as well.
Completing maintenance on time has proven to be a wicked
problem. Since 2012, the Navy has lost more than 27,000 days of
ship and submarine availability due to delays getting in and
out of maintenance. 2018 was particularly challenging with the
equivalent of 17 ships and subs not available because they were
waiting to get into or out of maintenance.
Looking forward, I do see some cause for concern because
the dry docks are short about a third of the capacity that will
be needed to conduct the planned maintenance that the Navy
already has on the books, and that does not include the fleet
increase.
Moving to aviation, the issues center around sustaining
older aircraft while incorporating new aircraft into the fleet.
In a report earlier this year, we looked at seven different
Navy and Marine Corps aircraft, and none were meeting
availability goals, and those availability goals were less than
80 percent. Many had delays in depot due to personnel and parts
shortages and unexpected repairs due to their age. As you know,
the Hornet, the Harrier, and other aircraft are 20 or more
years old, and we are having to extend their service life to
bridge the gap until more F-35s come into the fleet.
Moving to the F-35, early indications incorporating the
fleet is we are seeing some challenges there as well. We found
in a report last year that depot capabilities were already 6
years behind. What that meant as a practical matter is it took
months, sometimes 6 months or more, to get the parts repaired
and back out to the fleet.
I understand the rush to field F-35, and I know the Navy
and the Marine Corps and DOD is working on this. But we feel
additional attention has to be paid to sustaining the F-35.
As mentioned, the Secretary of Defense has established a
goal to have 80 percent mission capability of several aircraft,
including the F-35, by next year. This will be difficult to
achieve in my assessment, and I offer a couple of cautions as
we move forward on this, Mr. Chairman.
Consistent and clear definitions will be critical. There
have been some efforts to define what we mean, both in the
numerator and the denominator of that 80 percent. I think that
is a step in the right direction. This is basically the 80
percent of what question.
Secondly, we need to be sure that everyone understands what
mission-capable is. It does not mean the aircraft can do all
the missions it might be assigned to it. That is typically
called fully mission-capable, and that is typically lower
because they need to perform all the missions, including the
high-end missions. When we looked at the F-35 last year, it had
a 15 percent fully mission-capable rate. This has significant
implications for a high-end fight because those difficult
missions are the ones that are often hard to find time to train
for.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, as my statement indicates, we
have 45 recommendations to the Navy and the Marine Corps and
DOD. I am happy to report to you there is progress being made
on those recommendations. We see actions being taken. We have
not closed that many of them, but we are working closely with
the Navy and monitoring progress and I am encouraged by what I
see. But make no mistake, it will take significant time to
rebuild the readiness of the ship, submarine, and aviation
fleets, and it will require sustained attention.
We stand ready to assist you in your oversight, and I am
happy to take any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Pendleton follows:]
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Senator Wicker. Thank you. A very plain and forthright
testimony that we need to heed.
Secretary Spencer, we are entering a time of divided
government in this Congress. We will soon have a Republican
Senate and a Democratically controlled house, and we are going
to have to join hands as Americans and give you the resources,
give all four of you gentlemen and the people you represent the
resources that you need.
Let me just remind folks listening that there is a
provision in a statute that has not yet been repealed, and if
it should be allowed to take effect, it would put us back in
sequestration, an unthinkable result, and an utterly
irresponsible act that I feel sure this Republican Senate and
this upcoming Democrat House will avoid.
I remember a previous Secretary of the Navy, Secretary
Mabus, telling me in a budget hearing that they had no
contingency plans for sequestration because it was so utterly
irresponsible and unthinkable that it could not happen. And lo
and behold, it happened. We received testimony before our full
Committee some 3 years ago from a previous CNO that the
sequestration cuts resulted in five canceled ship deployments,
$2 billion in deferred procurement, a 30 percent cut to
facilities sustainment, increased maintenance backlogs, and
approximately one-half of the Marine Corps home station units
at unacceptable levels of readiness. The CNO could have gone on
and on on that.
I do not think this is going to happen, but it is in the
statute and unless we take action, bipartisan action, to give
our citizens the security they need, it is there in the
statute, and we must be mindful of that.
Secretary Spencer, you first, then General Neller, and then
Admiral Moran. Please give us illustrations of what impacts
that would result in if the sequestration kicks back in as is
currently slated under current statute. Secretary Spencer, I
will let you go first.
Secretary Spencer. Mr. Chairman, devastating in many ways.
First, right off the bat, the money that you gave us in
2017, 2018, and 2019--you are going to hear what is being done.
We are doing some very unique and trailblazing efforts to
really get us back on our feet into the fight at fighting
weight. We are on the bicycle peddling. It took us a while to
get up.
This would just knock us down, flat down. If you look at
what sequester does, it is a $26 billion cut to the Department
of the Navy. If the President has MILPERS [military personnel]
as exempt or 19 percent non-exempt, 14 percent. It is
devastating.
I am more than happy to share with you all later a graphic
that I put together here, going around the country for
everyone's district, what this would mean that we would have to
do if sequestration hit, and no area of the country is really
unscathed by this.
Senator Wicker. Let us go ahead and put that in the record
right now, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Spencer. Will do.
Senator Wicker. Without objection.
[The information follows:]
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Secretary Spencer. Will do, sir.
That is the bottom line. I turn it over to my two
compatriots.
Senator Wicker. General Neller?
General Neller. As the Secretary said, we are making
progress, certainly not as fast as we would like or you would
like, but I can show you quantifiably how our readiness is
improving.
We have a unique problem. I mean, we are at an inflection
point for our Nation. We have to maintain current operations,
and those are being reviewed and looked at. We have to
modernize a force that has been at war for 17 years, and then
we have to prepare for something we have not had to prepare for
since the Cold War to fight a peer adversary. Those particular
nations have had to do nothing other than recapitalize their
force.
If we were forced back to a sequestration level, it would
be more than just the Blue Angels not doing air shows and
people not going to conferences. It would be units getting
ready to deploy later. It would cause us to look at our force
structure and have to make ourselves a smaller force, which we
lose capacity, which means we would have less presence around
the world. It would delay almost every single acquisition
program that we have underway, ground and air, to try to not
just modernize but to create future capabilities for the force
that we think we need to be to defend the interests of this
Nation.
I would never underestimate the impact it would have on the
force itself. It is important for--I know this Committee
understands that, but the American people understand. This is
not just an all volunteer force. This is an all recruited
force. They expect that when they are recruited and they sign
up, and we send them--we want all games to be away games. We do
not do home games--that they are going to have the best gear
and the best training that this Nation can provide. We would be
challenged to do that. Obviously, those that are going to be
forward deployed are going to get the best that we have got and
they are going to get the most ready capable equipment. But the
time for them to get ready would take longer, and the depth on
the bench, if there were an unexpected contingency, the
readiness of that force would go down. It would be devastating.
I agree with the Secretary.
Senator Wicker. Thank you.
Admiral?
Admiral Moran. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
When I think about the Budget Control Act, sequestration,
and even multiple continuing resolutions as opposed to a
stable, predictable budget, I go back 5 years ago or so when
the first time we went through this occurred. It has taken us 5
years to really get back on our bicycle, as the Secretary
referred to. So I think about this with a component of time,
time for our sailors to learn how to operate their gear, time
to fly airplanes to become proficient and beyond proficient,
but experts, masters at what they came in the Navy to do. I
think about time for families, notification for PCS [permanent
change of station] that gets driven down to 1 or 2 months
instead of 6 months as it should be. I also think of time in
terms of our ability to recover if we were to go back to those
levels again. Even though we would probably start to recover,
you are talking 5 years if you just use the recent last 5 years
as an example. The component of time is time you cannot get
back. So we lose proficiency. We lose expertise, and we have to
recover that by skipping generations of people who missed the
opportunity during the time when we did not have the resources
available.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, gentlemen.
Senator Hirono?
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I mentioned in my opening statement the concern I have
about our public shipyards, and I know that the Navy has a new
plan for modernizing the public shipyards called the Shipyard
Infrastructure Optimization Plan. I consider this to be a major
improvement after nears of neglect of this important
infrastructure. Certainly there have been military construction
projects and various upgrades over the years, but there is
nothing like a comprehensive plan that can be implemented to
really move us to the point where we need to be.
The Navy told us earlier this year that the Navy would
issue a master plan for modernizing the four public shipyards
in the fall of 2018. That master plan was intended to guide
Navy investments over the next 20 years.
Secretary Spencer, where does the Navy stand on
implementing that master plan?
Secretary Spencer. Underway, Senator. The key that we are
looking at right now when we fund and we are looking to build
up the POM [Program Objective Memorandum] is basically three
buckets, and that is our legacy systems, what I call our
installed base, modernization, and then Force 2.0, which are
our present investment for future weapons, think AI [artificial
intelligence], directed energy, et cetera.
We have stepped back and taken a close look because the
fact of the matter is until we get our shipyards, specifically
for our underwater fleet, our public shipyards primarily,
increased flow and increased efficiencies for throughput, we
are hurting ourselves. I am responsible with my Title 10 hat to
man, equip, train, and deliver those assets needed by the
combatant commanders. This is a key focus. We are allocating
dollars. Hawaii is one of the first projects that we are
looking at right now. We are sitting there taking an industrial
flow overview look on how we are going to rebuild these. The
fact of the matter is that the science of industrial flow has
progressed tremendously since we last touched these shipyards.
We are going to modernize them.
Senator Hirono. I am glad to hear that Pearl Harbor is one
of your first shipyard focuses. I would be very interested to
know what specifically is happening at Pearl Harbor that will
lead to its modernization.
Mr. Pendleton, has the GAO reviewed the Navy shipyard
modernization plans? If so, have you drawn any conclusions from
that review?
Mr. Pendleton. Ma'am, we have a review underway looking at
how that is going. We have work that indicates the age and
condition of the shipyards and have looked at the impact on
maintenance delays. The documentation itself--we are still
looking at that.
Senator Hirono. When you say looking at it, when can we
expect a report?
Mr. Pendleton. Let me check.
Summer, ma'am.
Senator Hirono. I am sorry?
Mr. Pendleton. Summer of next year, probably May, June. But
we would be happy to brief you earlier.
Senator Hirono. Meanwhile, the modernization plans are
proceeding. They are being implemented per our Secretary. So
thank you very much.
Mr. Moran has mentioned that it would be pretty challenging
to get to the 80 percent aircraft availability. Are we being
realistic in expecting, Mr. Secretary, an 80 percent readiness?
Secretary Spencer. It is a stretch goal, Senator, but it is
a stretch goal that we will take. If I could bring you out to
one of our depots out west to show you what we are doing as a
program for the F-18 Super Hornet--we have hired a fellow who
ran Southwest Airlines maintenance. In a matter of 8 weeks--and
I can turn it over to the Vice here because he sits on the
steering committee for this program. In 8 weeks, we have
increased throughput by 40 percent.
Senator Hirono. There is a concern about something called
innovative accounting techniques to indicate to us that these
80 percent goals are being met. Can you assure us that that is
not what you are going to provide us?
Secretary Spencer. It is not going to be done by pencil
whipping, I will tell you that.
Senator Hirono. Thank you.
I think it would be good for me to go and take you up on
that visit.
Now, I did want to get to the corrosion issue because we
recently had multiple deaths as a result. Just this week the
Marine Corps released their official results of the
investigation into the crash of a Marine Corps KC-130T aircraft
in Mississippi in 2017. The investigation found that aircraft
crashed because a corroded propeller blade came off during the
flight killing all 16 people aboard.
Secretary Spencer, can you give us your views on the
importance of pursuing corrosion prevention and mitigation
programs, as you seek to take good care of the people and
equipment under your control? Of course, part of what happened
in that tragic incident was that there was inadequate training
for the maintenance people. So can you tell us what you are
doing to address the corrosion issues?
Secretary Spencer. I can, Senator, in two ways. One is how
we go about doing our maintenance. The fact that corrosion was
the actual fault in that accident, the real problem was that we
were not doing the appropriate preventative maintenance in the
right way as outlined in the procedure. That has been corrected
on both fronts.
Now, when it comes to corrosion in general, we work in a
maritime environment, highly corrosive. This is something that
we are actually enhancing our efforts at because if you could
see, when we start peeling back the onion on our maintenance
issues, corrosion ends up being one of the biggest manpower
consumers. With the chemistry that is out there today, we have
the ability to really address this, along with process, to stay
ahead of it.
Senator Hirono. I think when I met with you, I was very
interested in making sure that when we purchase the ships, et
cetera, aircraft, that corrosion is one of the factors that we
would consider in putting out the contract to begin with, that
all these people should be looking at ways that they can
incorporate anti-corrosive products into the crafts.
Secretary Spencer. Most definitely, Senator. I mean, if you
were to see the efforts that are going on now with two of our
prime suppliers, they are partners in this problem. They are
not simply contractors. We are living it through them saying,
one, what can you bring to the table that is new since the last
time we let this contract, and two, what are best practices we
are seeing out there amongst other areas and what can we do to
improve the way that we battle this.
Senator Hirono. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Wicker. Senator Sullivan?
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate the witnesses joining this joint Committee
today.
General Neller, it has been nearly 3 months since Hurricane
Florence made landfall in North Carolina. Have you had the
opportunity to assess the order of magnitude to the impacts of
Camp Lejeune and the challenges we see there?
General Neller. Yes, sir, we have.
Senator Sullivan. What are the numbers? Do you have
numbers?
General Neller. Camp Lejeune is not as dramatic when you
look at it with your own eyes as to what happen on the
panhandle of Florida. The storm was very slow moving. There was
a lot of wind, but it sat on top of the base and it rained for
2 or 3 days. A lot of the buildings at Camp Lejeune are very
old. They suffered roof damage, exterior damage, and then when
that happened, the water got inside, and so you end up with
mold and other things.
And so there was an effect on housing, which we are working
with a private vendor for them to fix that, and they are making
some progress, not as fast as we would like, but they are
making progress.
On the facilities and structures for us, if you were to
repair it, it would be one number, but if you were to take the
buildings that we would consider to be not worth the cost of
just repair, that they needed to be rebuilt, the total bill
comes to about $3.6 billion.
Senator Sullivan. Let me ask another question for you,
General. You mentioned some of the bad consequences if we went
back into sequestration, and you put forward a list that was
pretty significant that I think should get everybody's
attention in terms of negative consequences.
One thing you did not mention, which is obviously an issue
that we have raised here, is, to be blunt, the increased
probability that some of the really bad things that we have
seen could increase in terms of their potential. I am talking
about deaths in training and deaths in the activities of our
military. Is that another risk if we go into sequestration?
That is the ultimate risk. Right? I love the Blue Angels, but
my biggest concern is that we see more of these deaths, and the
American people--none of us should tolerate it. Is that a risk?
General Neller. When you are not able to train as hard and
as long and fly as many hours as you require to maintain a
substantial training level that makes you qualified, based on
current standards, yes, Senator, that is a risk.
Senator Sullivan. Okay. That is really important to know.
Mr. Pendleton, you also mentioned--I think we all recognize
we have a readiness problem, readiness challenge. You just
mentioned in your opening testimony it is going to take
significant time to rebuild readiness. Let me ask just the
basic question. What in your view--you kind of have the outside
view, the independent view--put us in this hole in the first
place? Remember, it is not just readiness. This is a readiness
challenge that is killing our marines and sailors. What put us
in the hole? Was it the fact that from 2010 to 2016, the DOD
budget was slashed by 25 percent? A lot of people do not know
that. That is a fact. Is that it?
Mr. Pendleton. I do not think budgets helped.
Unpredictability of budgets certainly did not help.
But it was also a demand and supply problem. I mean, the
Army, if you go back a few years--they were able to bring more
folks home and retrain and get repetitions through the combat
training centers.
Senator Sullivan. So succinctly, what put us in the
readiness hole?
Mr. Pendleton. I think for the Navy and Air Force is what I
am getting to, is that demand did not really slow down, and so
they had to continue to find ways to meet the demand with a
shrinking fleet. With budgets like they were, they affected
sustainment accounts, which then had a ripple that we are
trying to work off now.
Senator Sullivan. Let me ask, Mr. Secretary. You know, one
of the things--and I touched on it briefly in my opening
statement. There has been a lot of interest from this Committee
on what is happening in the Arctic, and it is not just me as an
Alaska Senator. It is actually broad-based. We have had a
number of provisions in the NDAA, including the demand from the
Department of Defense for a new Arctic strategy. As you know,
the Russians are building up their capability massively, you
know, huge exercises, new airfields, new ports, 40 icebreakers,
building 13 more. Some are nuclear powered. Many are
weaponized.
Secretary Mattis, in his visit to Alaska this summer and in
a statement to this Committee, said it is a strategic area we
need to pay more attention to. You and I had the opportunity to
visit potential areas, Adak, Port Clarence, Nome, and you
recently said in a speech that we need a strategic Arctic port
in Alaska.
Can you focus on some of the issues that you see as
challenges from the national security perspective, National
Defense Strategy, and how the Arctic plays into that? Can I get
your commitment, as required in statute, to work with this
Committee on a revised analysis of a strategic Arctic port?
Secretary Spencer. One, you do have my commitment, Senator.
Last October when I was newly minted, one of my first trips
outside the country was to the Arctic, Kavivium and Reykjavik,
and that was my educational curve for really what was going on
in the Arctic. At that point, our Russian friends were warming
up five airstrips, 10,000 Spetsnaz troops up there for, quote/
unquote, search and rescue according to the ambassador from
Russia. The Chinese are up there. Everybody is up there.
Senator Sullivan. Everybody but us.
Secretary Spencer. Well, Senator, we are up there under the
sea and in the air.
Senator Sullivan. But you cannot do a FONOP [freedom of
navigation operation] under the water.
Secretary Spencer. I agree to an extent.
But I am getting to my point, which is we are looking at
how we can get up there. This is portfolio management. If I had
a blank check for everything, it would be terrific to ice-
harden ships, but with the demand that we have right now, it is
unaffordable. Do we have an avenue that could possibly work at
seasonal times to go up there? I believe we do. We are looking
at that right now. The Coast Guard is getting its heavy ice
cutter. We would have to have that in tail, if in fact there
was ice. We need to get up there. I can commit to the fact that
we are trying to figure out how we do service that.
You and I did go look on the coast up there for a potential
strategic port. I think the Coast Guard, in concert with the
Navy--we should definitely flesh out what could possibly be
done.
When it comes to using Alaska in the Arctic area for
training, the Commandant and I have talked about this, plans to
go look at doing something this summer, possibly on Adak for
training. The Vice and I have talked about possible P-8 debt up
to Adak. There is definite training uses and there is definite
ability to effect the National Defense Strategy with Arctic
activity.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much, Senator Sullivan.
Senator Kaine?
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Secretary Spencer, I will start with you. I have chatted
with you about the requirement in the NDAA from 2015 that is
now live about audited financial statements for all functions
within the DOD. We view that as a tool not just for
congressional oversight, not just for public oversight, but we
also view it as a tool for military leadership to manage, to
create--I think you described in your testimony kind of a
culture of continuous improvement. If we are going to be
reliable on ample budgetary requests and budget certainty going
forward, it really helps us if we believe that the DOD is using
tools like this to promote improvement, to let go of lesser
performing priorities or lower performing programs and invest
in other areas, as you describe, bringing in somebody from
Southwest to help you figure out new strategies on maintenance.
That sounds like a good one.
How are you using tools like the audited financial
statements and others to try to figure out how to better
prioritize and squeeze more value out of the dollars we give
you?
Secretary Spencer. Senator, the audit process at Navy from
the day I arrived, the conversation was this is not an invasion
into your area for a painful financial exam. This is a process
that will give you a tool--you, a manager, a tool--to see how
you are deploying resources and the effect of the employment of
those resources.
So we did change the conversation. I will tell you what. We
have gone through our first cycle, as you know, and I think as
we advertised day one when I was up here for my confirmation
hearings, I do not think we will probably get a clean opinion
for another 5 to 6 years. But that is not the issue. It is the
learning process along the way that is critical. This cycle
alone, we have vignettes that I can provide for you on the
record later of events, and I will just quote a few.
We found out that in the Navy alone, we had in excess of
700 distribution points for parts. You know, Amazon does this
globally with 25 centers. Do we have something to learn there?
We certainly do.
The ability to turn around and find out where inventory is.
A fine example. We were missing some assets that were held by a
contractor. In my heart of hearts, I said we will probably find
these. This is a paper issue. It was.
But when you work in the commercial sector, there was a
thing that I grew up with called SAS [Statement on Auditing
Standards] 70, which were the standards that you would provide
your services and goods to a client. That exists amongst all
our contractors, but it appears that we forgot to ask for that
or we were not aware that. From this evolution, we are going to
turn around and say when you hold assets for us, when you do
anything for us, will you do them at the same generally
accepted accounting standards as SAS 70? It is there, we are
taking advantage of it.
Senator Kaine. Well, expect to get asked questions like
this a lot at future hearings. We really want to see how those
are being used. To all of you.
General Neller, I was struck by your costs on the repair of
Lejeune. I think you put it at around 2.2. Is that right? $2.2
billion?
General Neller. Actually at the high end, if we costed out,
because we do not believe it is cost effective, Senator, to
repair buildings that are 35 to 50 years old.
Senator Kaine. Right.
General Neller. So if you replace these 31 buildings --
there are actually more, but these are the ones we put into
priority--the bill is around $3.6 billion, $3.7 billion.
Senator Kaine. It would also be the case that it would be
foolish to repair a building that would then be vulnerable to
the same kind of damage with the next hurricane that comes
along.
General Neller. I would agree with that.
Senator Kaine. Right. So we really ought to probably be
looking at the higher cost. The Tindall price tag is about $5
billion, as I understand it. That is not the purpose of this
hearing.
But talk to me about this top ten list. In the Navy/Marine
side, there is a report due, pursuant to the NDAA, this month
about sort of the top ten installations that you feel have
vulnerabilities because of climate. When are we likely to see
that report?
Secretary Spencer. Senator, that should be forthcoming
soon. I will get back to you on the exact date. I have seen the
list, and I do not know where the process is in actually
finalizing it and signing it out to you.
But not surprisingly, it is going to be what you might
expect. In the Navy, it is going to be oceanfront areas, water
rising issues. It is going to be areas exposed to what we have
seen now as 100-year storms that come every 2 or 3 years. We
are going to have to start addressing this so we do this
correctly and spend the money correctly.
Senator Kaine. We had a very well attended hearing in
Hampton Roads now nearly 2 years ago, a very bipartisan
congressional delegation talking about sea level rise and the
effect on Norfolk and other basis, Langley and others in the
area. And it was pretty sobering. And we started thinking about
if there is a future BRAC [Base Realignment and Closure] round
or any kind of physical base rationalization, that has got to
be a vulnerability that people would be concerned about. But
one of the DOD witnesses said you should worry about sea level
rise, but try running a base in an area where there is a
persistent drought. It is not just sea level rise. There are
all kinds of weather emergencies and challenges that all of the
services are dealing with on the climate side. And we look
forward to that report because it will help us do our job
better when we get to NDAA and appropriations.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Senator Kaine. And we certainly
ought to be able to deal with issues like that apart from any
BRAC round we might have.
Senator Rounds?
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you all for your service to our country.
Mr. Pendleton, some of the numbers right now with regard to
aircraft and their mission-capable, not fully mission-capable,
numbers are still pretty disturbing. The numbers, as I am
reading them--and I am looking at comparisons between the
different types of aircraft and the different branches of
government. Clearly there is a difference between the
requirements for each one of these aircraft in terms of the
missions that they are supposed to be capable of. But I would
like your thoughts on a couple of things.
Number one, the Navy's F/A-18 E&F, the Super Hornets, which
are the newest of the Hornets. They have a mission capable rate
of 49.1 percent right now, according to the most recent stats
that we have. Compare that with the Marine Corps who have a
mission capable on their older ones, their legacy Hornets, of
60 percent, clearly a higher percentage rate. I would like your
thoughts as to why Marines have a higher mission capability,
the same depot or different depot. If you compare that with the
Air Force, their F-16C aircraft, not their newest F-16's, they
have a 70 percent mission capable rate.
Why is it? What is the difference in discrepancy? Is it a
matter that the intensity of the operations for the Navy is
that much greater? Is it a matter of best practices? What in
your opinion is causing the differences between the mission-
capable differences?
Mr. Pendleton. You know, I am going to have to get back to
you with a better answer. But I mean, it has to do with the
experience level at the depots, the throughput at the depots.
We just have not done the comparison you are talking about, and
I do not feel comfortable opining about it. But we will look at
it because we visited all those places in recent years. Some of
the folks to my right might be able to talk to you about that,
but I do not feel comfortable making those comparisons.
Senator Rounds. Admiral Moran, would you care to comment on
it?
Admiral Moran. Senator, thank you for the question.
I think we got to make sure that we are comparing apples
and apples. Numerators and denominators matter here.
Our current statistics on the Super Hornet are the mission
capability rate for Super Hornets in operational squadrons that
would have to go to the fight, if called to, is at 66 percent
and rising.
Senator Rounds. So the numbers that I have got right now
with regard to 49 percent are older numbers?
Admiral Moran. They are much older numbers. And that 49
percent is much more reflective of the total active inventory,
to included airplanes that are in the depot today, which are
not in reporting. There is a lot of math here and I do not want
to confuse it. But we are on this path, this stretch goal to
the Secretary's point, of 80 percent. Last year, when I
testified, we were in the mid-40's.
Senator Rounds. Then let me ask this. I really do not mean
to cut you off, but I think you have answered my first
question.
What about the F-35's? Right now, the C model which you are
implementing at this point--the 35C indicates, according to the
data that we have got, about a 17 percent mission-capable rate.
Is that an accurate number today?
Admiral Moran. Well, sir, what I would share with you there
is it is the law of very small numbers. We only have one
operational F-35--well, we do not even have an operational F-
35C squadron yet. We have the FRS [Fleet Replacement Squadron],
which is our training squadron, and the law of small numbers
means that a couple go down on a given day. Depending on when
you report it, it could drive the percentages really low or
really high.
I think we need more run time on the F-35C, whereas the Air
Force and the Marine Corps have had more run time on the F-35's
and have a better indication I think of what you can expect.
Senator Rounds. Okay.
I want to move over to submarines for just a minute. Mr.
Pendleton, the attack submarines. A year ago, we used it as an
example of the reason why we need to improve the capabilities
of our dry docks. The USS Boise became an example. It had been
at dock not mission-capable, not even able to dive for a period
of up to 3 years. I presume that that attack submarine is now
in dry dock?
Mr. Pendleton. I believe so. I better check to be sure if
it still is. It is out?
Senator Rounds. Secretary Spencer?
Secretary Spencer. It is not there yet, no.
Senator Rounds. It is not there yet?
Secretary Spencer. It is January, sir.
Mr. Pendleton. I knew it was around that. Contracted.
Senator Rounds. So it has been 4 years then out of service
for an attack submarine.
Secretary Spencer. That is correct.
Senator Rounds. Do we have any other attack submarines that
are currently at dock, not able to dive, that are awaiting
drydock services?
Admiral Moran. Yes, sir, we do. We have two more that are
not certified to dive today. Both of those go into dry docks
after the new year, one in February and I think the next one in
May or June. This is all part of spreading this across the
public and private sector and addressing the submarine
shortages.
Senator Rounds. My time is up.
Senator Wicker. Well, no. Why did that happen, Admiral?
Admiral Moran. Why did what happen, sir?
Senator Wicker. The 4-year period, the lengthy time.
Admiral Moran. It is the age-old problem of what we talked
about the last 2 years in this hearing where we had aging SSBNs
which take priority in the public yards to fix because of the
national priority on strategic deterrence.
The next in the order of priority are our carriers, which
as we have all testified here the last couple years, have been
ridden very hard, high OPTEMPO [Operational Tempo], extended
periods because of discovery work and additional maintenance
that we were not anticipating.
The last and standing in line to get into those
availabilities in the public yards were our SSNs.
And so we have begun to put them in private yards to help
unload or level load and get submarines that need to be in dry
dock in dry dock sooner. Boise was--you know, we talked about
this last year, Senator. We want no more Boises. The numbers
are coming down significantly. The standing in line has come
down significantly. We still have a ways to go. We are not out
of the woods yet, but I think as capacity opens up in the
private yards and we do a better job in the public yards of
getting our carriers out on time, we will be there.
Senator Rounds. Mr. Chairman, if I may, just one thought.
Senator Wicker. Please.
Senator Rounds. A year ago, did we have three submarines
that were waiting to get into drydock or did we have less than
that?
Admiral Moran. I will have to get back to you.
Senator Rounds. Okay. It appears to me that even with the
resources that we have allocated so far, we are going the wrong
direction with regard to the fleet that we have got. My only
point is that if it is a matter of resources and if you are not
here in public testimony to tell us what the impacts of not
having the additional resources necessary to keep these
critical pieces in the defense of our country operational, how
in the world can we ever go to what we know we need in a 355-
ship Navy and support them if we are not going to be able to
share with the American public how critical it is to maintain
the defense posture that we have currently got. What I would
expect, as a member of the committee, is to at least be able to
allow you the opportunity to share what happens if we ever do
get back into a reduced defense budget or to, heaven forbid,
another sequestration and what the impact is to these young men
and women that are expecting that they are at least going to
get the tools to do their job. Then to find out that we have
three attack submarines that have not even been able to get
into dry dock seems to me to be something that ought to be
shared with the American public, and they ought to understand
how serious this problem really is.
Secretary Spencer. I could not agree with you more,
Senator. But as a fine example, so everyone truly does
understand the ups and downs of this, the monies that you gave
us to optimize the shipyards--that is a 2-year project at the
least to get that up and running to the new flow rate.
There was a study that was done up at Portsmouth. You all
know maintenance is all about hands touching and turning and
fixing things. It is hands-on time. They tracked one of the
maintenance people for his hands-on time. He drove a golf cart
around the area for 4 miles one day just in an average search
of parts. We have to bring the parts down to the ship. This is
what I am talking about, the science of industrial flow that
needs to be put into these old shipyards. We are doing it. The
monies that you have given us will get after that. It is 2
years to effect that, but to kill it now with any sort of
sequestration would be a crime.
Admiral Moran. Senator, if I could. If I could go back to
the earlier comment about what the element of time does to this
problem, we just got back the shipyard workers in the public
yards to the level we wanted after sequestration 5 years ago.
This is a unique, highly skilled workforce in our nuclear
yards. If they do not feel like they are supported, if we are
not giving them adequate resources to do their job and have the
manning levels where they need to be, they walk. They can go
other places because they are highly skilled. And then it takes
a long time to recover that.
So to your point, if we go backwards on this, it is going
to take us 3, 4, 5 years to recover just the workforce and
skill sets we need to do nuclear maintenance.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Wicker. I do not think we are going to go back to
sequestration, but we are going to have to take affirmative
votes not to.
I think Senator Rounds' question, though, is even with the
adequate budgets that we have provided the last 2 years, and
going forward, if we are able to do the same thing--now it
seems that the administration is all in favor of generous
funding for the military. Even with that, I think the question
is what else is necessary. I do not think you are being
critical, Senator Rounds. I think we are asking a question of
how we can improve the situation.
Senator Rounds. Mr. Chairman, thank you. If I came across
as being critical, I do not intend to be. What I am trying to
get at is that we have got to be able to share with an American
public that sees an increasing defense budget, and they have
got to understand how far behind we were and about what our
adversaries are doing with their own and where we are falling
behind. It is not just a matter of readiness. It is a matter of
modernization because, as you say, directed weapons is not
something in the future. Others are working on it now. And we
start talking about what is going on in space and our ability
to control the information coming through, and in hypersonic
weapons which are there now and how far we will be if we do not
maintain this. And it puts our security at risk. We have a
difficult time trying to get that information out to the public
because most of the information we receive is in a classified
section. So this opportunity for you to share how serious this
is has got to be shared with the American public. That, I
guess, is where my frustration comes from.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Senator Rounds.
Senator King, it appears that we have taken all of your
time and I just regret that.
[Laughter.]
Senator Wicker. Why do we not go ahead and recognize
Senator King?
Senator King. I would be glad to yield my time to Senator
Rounds anytime.
Secretary Spencer, I think you have touched upon this, but
it strikes me that both in aircraft and ship maintenance, we do
have a lot to learn from the private sector, and I hope that
that is a really active effort. I know you mentioned when I was
absent--I apologize. I had another hearing--Southwest Airlines.
Obviously, there are differences. It is not apples to apples.
But I think there is a lot to learn in terms of work flow,
systems, just in time, parts availability. I hope that is a
major part of your effort to upgrade because we cannot afford
to buy ships that we are not using.
Secretary Spencer. Senator, I could not underscore your
statement stronger. One thing that I do want you all to know is
that as we reach out, whether it is Southwest, whether it is
Delta, whether it is Carnival Lines, to similar models that we
are facing, corporate America is bending over backwards to help
us. The hours that they spend with us, the resources that they
provide us with people, it really is stunning. And we are
learning a tremendous amount. I could give you vignettes down
the line on simple parts that used to take 55 days for us to
process where someone looked and said, hey, here is how we are
doing it in the civilian world, and cut it down to 2 days. And
that one part would be a downing part for an aircraft. That is
the kind of impact that we are seeing with what we are
learning.
Senator King. Well, there is an interesting chart in the
GAO analysis of the naval data that talks about parts
obsolescence or diminishing manufacturing source of parts.
There is a checkmark next to every Navy aircraft in those
areas, as well as delays in depot maintenance. So I think this
is a really big deal, and it is very important in terms of
budgetary priorities. Again, it makes it so much more efficient
if the planes and ships that we have are fully ready to be
utilized.
One of the concerns I have--and you mentioned Portsmouth--
is personnel and workforce. At Portsmouth now, a tremendous
yard doing great work, 30 percent of their workforce has been
there less than 5 years. That is a change in recent years. I
hope the Navy is thinking about workforce development because
that is not going to happen on its own.
Secretary Spencer. It is a definite upfront of mine,
Senator. And you and I have talked about this. But when I talk
about collaboration and partnership with our commercial
counterparts, also with our States to help whatever they can do
to promote any sort of educational assistance or early
education venues to feed the yards, which are amazing careers--
you know, a lot of people do not realize the contribution that
one makes to a great product, but also the compensation
received.
Senator King. I can attest to that at Portsmouth because
they let me use a virtual welding machine where I could
actually think I was wielding, but I was not screwing up a ship
hull. It was a very positive experience.
Secretary Spencer. Next time, we will use you.
Senator King. That is right.
Talking about industrial base and acquisition, the frigate,
which we are talking about--there are five yards competing.
There are going to be 20 ships. As I understand it, the
intention now is to award all 20 ships to the winner. It is a
winner take all among five. In terms of industrial base and
also just spreading the work, getting the work done faster,
talk to me about the possibility of splitting that award
between at least two yards, if not three.
Secretary Spencer. You bring up an interesting concept.
There are two things going on here that need to be weighed out.
One, yes, we do have to be attentive to our industrial base and
the ability to keep hands busy and trained. Two, one thing we
also have to look at, though, is the balancing of the flow of
new ships into the fleet because what we want to avoid is a
spike because that spike will come down and bite us again when
they all go through regular maintenance cycles and everyone
comes due within 2 or 3 years or 4 years. It gets very crowded.
It is not off the table because we have not awarded
anything yet. We will look at how best we can balance with how
we get resourced, and if we have the resources to bring
expedition, granted, we will do that.
Senator King. I appreciate that.
Final question. The Navy and the Marine Corps recently went
through their first audit, and no one expected it to be a clean
audit first time through. Two questions. What have you learned
from this audit, and secondly, when can we expect a clean
audit?
Secretary Spencer. I will go first question first. We are
still learning. It was a tremendous cycle. As I told Senator
Kaine, we changed the conversation in the Department of the
Navy, the Navy and Marine Corps team, that this iteration of a
thing called an audit is not an invasion for financial reasons.
This is a tool that you will use as a manager so you know how
your organization is operating, so you know how the resources
you are applying are providing you a return. That message has
been received.
If you look at our list of deficiencies, there are many,
but this was the first time in the barrel for the Navy. It was
eye-opening, 700 distribution centers. Well, you know what? We
can probably get after that. Real estate that was missing,
quote/unquote. A lot of it was procedure. I mean, the building
was there, but was it in the right book in the right business
system? No. This is all the learning that we are doing so we
have tools to manage.
Senator King. Do you feel that we are headed toward a time
when there can be a clean audit?
Secretary Spencer. Yes. I would love to say in the future.
I do not see a clean----
Senator King. In our lifetimes?
Secretary Spencer. I would say 5 to 6 years, to be very
frank with you.
Senator King. General Neller, I just want to greet you.
Senator Wicker. What is your life expectancy?
[Laughter.]
Secretary Spencer. That might be my life expectancy,
Senator.
Senator King. General Neller, I just want to compliment you
on your service. You drew the long straw this morning and the
Secretary seems to be getting the brunt of the questions. But
thank you.
General Neller. We are very appreciative that you are
giving him all the questions.
[Laughter.]
General Neller. Senator, just one thing on the audit just
for the record. The Marine Corps has been under audit for
several years, and as the Secretary said, I have taken the
brief from the audit team myself the last 3 years. It has been
enlightening. A lot of it is procedural. A lot of it is
accounting things and procedures. A lot of it is that there are
a number of systems across not just within the Department of
the Navy, other services. A big issue is we have a lot of
ammunition that we share with the Army and the systems that we
have that account for that--they do not talk to each other.
The auditor gives you a list of findings or conclusions or
things, and then your job is to go back and try to close them
out. I assure you that the Secretary of the Navy and the
Secretary of Defense keep score on that sheet. And so we have a
team of people, and then the audit for this next year has
already started. Again, it is a continuous process.
We will get there in our lifetimes, I am confident, but
there are going to be some things that are going to have to
take place probably systemically and with data. But there is no
shortage of effort and understanding and appreciation that we
are going to get there eventually.
Senator King. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Wicker. Senator Ernst is next, and Senator Shaheen,
regardless of who else walks into the room, you will be
recognized after Senator Ernst. Senator Ernst?
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Secretary Spencer, we are going to continue on with your
questioning. So thank you for being available today. And it was
a great game on Saturday. So thank you.
[Laughter.]
Secretary Spencer. Kind of.
Senator Ernst. Yeah, sorry. No, I am not.
[Laughter.]
Senator Ernst. As the chairman of the Emerging Threats and
Capabilities Subcommittee, I do especially enjoy working with
our special operations community and really want to make sure
that our SOF [Special Operations Forces] have the support and
capabilities necessary to perform their many no-fail missions.
One issue that I have learned about is the importance of
assuring that SOF have necessary access to float-ahead staging
bases. Especially with our renewed focus on great power
competition, naval resources will be extremely strained while
we continue to build up the fleet. The demands in the Pacific
and in Europe especially will mean that the Navy and SOCOM
[Special Operations Command] will be required to find intuitive
ways to supply capabilities to our SOF warriors.
How do you believe that we can ensure that SOF warfighters
have adequate, dedicated, persistent support in order to
fulfill their missions?
Secretary Spencer. Senator, leave it to the SOF world, and
I use them as a poster child. They have already done some, as
you know, innovative ways to find platforms to work on on a
maritime basis.
That being said, you address a topic, though, that is a gap
that we know we have and that we are working on. And we will
come to you with some requests here going forward, and that is
our pre-positioned forward ships and our reserve ships. You
know--you have read the reports--the shape that they are in.
This is a simple case, in many cases, of portfolio management
and resources available. If in a perfect world, I had the
ability to go out and buy used ships on the market with very
little constraint, we could close this gap quite rapidly.
Senator Ernst. Well, and we talk about the policy
limitations that are out there. You had just addressed one of
those.
With those limitations on the use of leased vehicles, how
do you balance sea-basing support for SOF between our
counterterrorism and our VEO [violent extremist organizations]
missions and potential state-on-state conflict where we cannot
use those leased vehicles?
Secretary Spencer. Yes. My easiest answer is if I could get
some more restraint lifted, I would have the ability to manage
that risk-gapping.
Senator Ernst. Is that an area that we can address within
this committee?
Secretary Spencer. I believe it is.
Senator Ernst. Okay. Thank you for that.
Are there platforms within the current industrial base that
you do believe would be optimal for our SOF mission?
Secretary Spencer. Yes, there are.
Senator Ernst. In an open format, can you discuss any of
those?
Secretary Spencer. We have the ability right now with some
of the things that we are looking at within the Navy that would
be applicable to missions. But more importantly, we do have an
industrial base out there that has the ability to produce
specifically what might be needed for that mission set.
Senator Ernst. Okay. Thank you.
Recently--just a slightly different topic. One that is very
important, though. Recently I did have the honor of speaking at
the commissioning of the USS Sioux City over at Annapolis. I
appreciated that. Among many other aspects, I was impressed by
the crew of the ship and their ability to explain to me the
importance of that naval platform. And I believe--and as I was
a commander, of course, in the Iowa Army National Guard--that
it is our sailors, it is our people that make up the backbone
of our services. And as in the Navy, they will be manning those
stations and making critical life or death decisions in times
of conflict, and that absolutely is something that we cannot
have built in a shipyard.
General Neller, it is the same with you. What I would like
for you gentlemen to do, just in the very brief remaining time
that I have left, is to address the challenges that we have in
recruiting and retention in the Navy--and Admiral Moran, if you
could address that--in the Navy and in the Marine Corps. How do
we do better?
General Neller. Well, Senator, first on your previous
question, there are a lot of things going on with the use of
SOF or the SOF operating off of naval platforms throughout the
world. In fact, we train it. We do it as a matter of course. It
happens all the time. It just is something you do not read or
see in the newspapers or the media. I can talk to you offline
and there are actually things we do to accommodate each other.
I think the Navy, the naval force, and SOF--they do a lot of
things.
On recruiting, we made our numbers. We made our quality
spread. We work really hard. We invest a lot in our recruiters.
We have a command screen board for our officers that lead our
recruiting stations. If you are a Marine major and you are at
the top of the heap, your reward is you get to command a
recruiting station. And then if you are successful, then you
will probably be acknowledged later on in the promotion process
for command of another organization from your MOS [military
operational specialty]. So it takes work.
We are recruiting the seniors for next year. We came into
the year with over 50 percent of the recruits that we wanted to
ship this year already contracted. The most difficult time
comes after the first of the year, kind of January through May,
because you have shipped all the seniors. They graduate last
May, June, and then they ship this summer. So you are more in a
direct shipping market.
We are confident that we can make it. It is getting harder.
We used to make it before the third week of the month was out.
Now some places, you are making it the last day of the month.
So it just takes really, really hard work.
I think this committee and the Nation should be aware or
concerned about the fact, not just the propensity of the young
men and women to want to serve in the military, but the
percentage that are qualified to be able for us to even talk to
them. That number is right around or slightly below 30 percent.
But we are making it. On the officer side, we have got more
people that want to be a Marine officer than we have spots.
Senator Ernst. Admiral?
Admiral Moran. Senator, thank you.
I would just build off of what General Neller just
commented on. The Navy is in a very similar place. We were able
to make mission this year in a much more demanding market. Our
goals were at 40,000-plus, and a typical year for us about
33,000. We made goal by May. So our recruiters are doing a
great job. We have shifted our approach in how we do
recruiting, to go where the market is, which is more in the
social media lane than it is on the more traditional
advertising campaigns we have done in the past. Our recruiting
force is doing a fabulous job.
We are starting to see some stressors, though, similar to
what the Commandant just talked about in terms of when we are
meeting those goals, at the end of the month as opposed to the
second, third week in the month. So the stressors are clear.
Anytime you have an unemployment rate below 4.1 percent,
historically trouble looms on the horizon for both recruiting
and retention. It is at about 3.8 percent I think now. So we
are all expecting this market to get more difficult than
easier.
That said, we had the best retention year in zone A, B, and
C this past year than we have had in a decade.
So there are some good things going on. Hard to put our
fingers on exactly what is generating those kinds of results in
an economy that is really challenging us and competing for that
talent. But hopefully, we can continue to do this because our
recruiting goal for this year is also high.
Thanks for the question.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, gentlemen.
Secretary Spencer. Senator, if I could add something on
there.
Senator Ernst. I suppose, Secretary.
[Laughter.]
Secretary Spencer. Not a huge item, but it is worth
bringing up for conversation.
There is in excess of 1,100 schools and school districts
that deny access to the uniformed members to recruit on their
campuses. They are all throughout the country, the
preponderance up in the northeast and northwest. Whatever help
anyone could do in helping us get the message out would be
greatly appreciated.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Secretary. You are absolutely
welcome in Iowa.
Senator Wicker. Are you speaking of colleges and
universities?
Secretary Spencer. High schools.
Senator Ernst. High schools for recruiting. Thank you for
pointing that out.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Senator Ernst, for that line of
questioning. Let me just thank the General and the Admiral for
good answers and for a really good work product in challenging
times. I am impressed, and I think the country is impressed.
Senator Shaheen?
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you all for being here.
Senator Hirono, I believe that Secretary Spencer may have
misspoke when he said that Pearl Harbor was the number one
priority. Senator King and I understood that it was Portsmouth
that was the number one priority.
Secretary Spencer. One of our first priorities.
[Laughter.]
Senator Wicker. I think he was talking about his priority
for a field hearing.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I just wanted to make sure
everybody was awake this morning.
Mr. Pendleton, you talked about the delays in maintenance.
Secretary Spencer, you talked about the plan to address depot
maintenance. We all recognize the challenges with getting the
McCain back into operation.
Are there lessons that we have learned from what has
happened, aside from the challenges around depot maintenance
and a plan? Are there other lessons that we have learned about
how to better get the fleet back out when there are damages? I
think about the Portsmouth Shipyard where during World War II,
they produced 70 ships. They launched four subs in one day. So
there are other things that are going on other than just the
facilities that address how quickly we are responding to the
challenge. Can you talk about some of those lessons that have
been learned?
Mr. Pendleton. Around the damage, we did not really look at
the McCain maintenance.
I think one of the things, going forward, that is going to
be very important is not to let deferred maintenance mount up.
What is happening is that as they bring the ships and subs in
and they begin to look at the tanks and other things, they find
damage or corrosion or other things that require additional
work. I think getting caught up on the deferred maintenance is
one of the key lessons learned and it will be one of the keys
to success going forward.
Senator Shaheen. Anything else?
Secretary Spencer. Yes. Senator, one of the things--you
asked--it is a far-reaching question that deserves a moment
here because one of the things that we are trying to do--and I
will back up to the F-18 scenario that we are working on right
now. We are calling that the Naval Sustainment System that we
are building because it does not just apply to aviation. It
applies to surface, underwater, weapons platforms. Maintenance
is all about flow, getting parts, people all in line in time
for procedures.
One of the things that we want to start doing is we have
the data to start doing predictive analytics. So before a ship
even comes in, we know where there is great probability that
there is going to be work done, have it pre-staged, have the
work orders ready. It is going to take some time. But you asked
for the lessons learned. This is exactly it. Allowing those
teams that are actually working on the ships alone to start
thinking how can I do this better, how as a team can we
actually make more movements shorter, quicker, more effective.
So it is a collection of a bunch of activities that we are
doing. A lot of them we are picking up from the commercial
world outside the wire, but a lot are organic ideas coming from
within the organization.
Senator Shaheen. Great.
Back at the end of November, we had the National Defense
Strategy Commission come and appear before the committee. They
identified six trends in national security that we needed to be
aware of. One of those was conflict in the gray zone. One was
cyber as well. But one of the things that the commission
recommended was that DOD develop--and I am quoting here--
analytic tools that measure readiness across the range of
challenges from low intensity gray zone conflicts to protracted
high intensity fights with major power rivals.
It seems to me that we have been able to better measure
some of the ways to address the high intensity fights with
major power rivals because we can look at how many ships we
have and how many people we have ready. But when we are talking
about gray zone conflicts and the potential for that kind of
conflict, how do we measure how ready we are and what are we
doing to address that?
We had a briefing yesterday, which I will not go into
because it was classified. It presented the problem, but it did
not really talk about how we are addressing the problem. And it
seems to me that it is not clear to me how we are addressing
that problem.
Secretary Spencer. The Commandant has some more granular
information, but to frame the context of this from my point of
view wearing the Title 10 hat is this is exactly one more
portfolio that we actually have to manage. Whenever one talks
about us competing with China and we continually hear they are
investing this amount of money and they are building this
amount of ships, one, they do not have the installed base that
we have. Two, they do not have the mission requirements set for
global security. These are what we--I will not say struggle
with. This is what we perform to. To get an appreciation, it is
one more of the portfolios.
But, Commandant?
General Neller. Senator, I will speak for the Marine Corps,
but I can say with some confidence that all the services have
developed capabilities that allow them to function within this
area, whether it be cyber, electronic warfare, whether it be
information operations, whether it be military information, or
things like that.
For our example, organizationally we have changed a group
which used to be a headquarters support group into what we call
the MEF [Marine Expeditionary Force] Information Group. We have
grown hundreds and hundreds of people that now have MOSs in
cyber that support CYBERCOM [Cyber Command] as part of their
componency. Each of the services has a component there. So that
readiness is measured. In preparation for this hearing, I
looked over the readiness of those teams. You have cyber
protection teams that do defense, and you have cyber teams that
do offensive things. Obviously, I am not going to talk about
what that is. And some of them work for other organizations.
But to your point, I think it is a clear recognition with
all the services and with the joint world and with OSD [Office
of the Secretary of Defense] that we are growing and continue
to develop this capability. And it is not going to get smaller.
We are going to need this capability because this is the fight
that goes on every day. This is the fight that is taking place
as we sit here in this hearing. This is the fight that is
probably going to be the precursor to a fight which could
potentially--God forbid--lead us to a kinetic fight further on
down the road.
If you ask me what my biggest readiness concern is or my
operational concern is, it is the ability for us to have
resilient, reliable command and control to move our forces
around the world and protect the network that allows us to do
that. At the same time, I want to be able to take that away
from whoever might be our adversary. Whoever can protect theirs
and keep it up or bring it back faster and whoever can deny the
adversary their ability to do command and control or pass
information or share information or do analytics, you have a
decided advantage. And that is where I think we are all headed.
Senator Shaheen. I really appreciate that.
Mr. Chairman, it would certainly be helpful to me--I do not
know how others feel--to have a better understanding of more
about what is being done in that area.
Can I ask just one more question to follow up on Senator
King's question about audit?
Senator Wicker. Absolutely.
Senator Shaheen. There have been some reports about fraud
within the Department around the audit. Has there been any
evidence of fraud that occurred or that was shown to be the
case as the result of the audit?
Secretary Spencer. As far as Department of the Navy goes,
Senator, I have not heard the word ``fraud'' used during the
audit. Unaware in that regard. That would have come front and
center.
Senator Shaheen. Good. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
Senator Blumenthal?
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Commandant, this hearing marks the last official appearance
here and work by my military fellow, Alex Monte, who happens to
be a Marine Corps officer. He has done extraordinary work over
the last year. I was tempted to ask you to issue an order that
he continue in my office, but that work has been such a
hardship, I am sure, given his boss, that I think he deserves
relief from this duty, sir. But I just wanted to say on the
record how grateful and pleased I have been with his
performance. I would say he is the best of our military
fellows, except a few others have been marines. So I do not
want to single him out, but he certainly is one of the best and
we will miss him. I am grateful to you personally for
permitting your marines to serve us in that capacity. I will
not ask you for a response to that.
I do have a question about submarine maintenance, and I
know you have been asked about submarines by Senators Hirono
and Kaine and about the maintenance issue by Senator Rounds. It
is not the most glamorous of the topics that we discuss today,
but in my view, it is one of the most essential because our
submarine fleet, our undersea warfare capability, is in my view
one of the linchpins of our national defense and part of
building a more powerful Navy and ensuring readiness is not
just building more ships--we like to do that in Groton Electric
boat--but also making the ones that we have now work properly
and keeping them at sea.
As you are aware, the GAO released a report last month,
actions needed to address costly maintenance delays facing the
attack submarine fleet. The Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA)
agreed with the majority of the report's findings and has
already taken some specific actions. I am very much aware to
address the GAO findings. Specifically, the Navy contracted
four submarine availabilities to the private yards, one to
Electric Boat, three to Newport News, and plans to contract an
additional two attack submarines in the spring of 2019. I am
also aware the Navy is working with private shipyards to
provide a longer-term plan for modernization.
I want to stress Electric Boat has approximately 5 million
hours of available labor to provide submarine maintenance from
fiscal year 2019 to fiscal year 2024. I wrote the Navy a letter
last week asking for a detailed submarine workload allocation
plan to consider awarding submarine maintenance contracts to
Electric Boat. Based on maintenance requirements, the Navy
should consider transferring more than the two additional
attack submarines to address readiness, in my view, challenges
that are simply growing, and we need to address them to make
sure that we have that workforce available ahead of the
Columbia-class production.
Mr. Pendleton, let me ask you, based on the GAO report and
your assessment, how is the current submarine maintenance
backlog affecting readiness? What is your plan for providing
more work to the private yards? What is the timeline?
Mr. Pendleton. So we did the study, and we updated some of
the numbers. Maintenance delays have been trending upward since
we even finished the study last month. So that is headed in the
wrong direction. We are hoping that it is reaching as bad as it
is going to get.
What we recommended was the Navy take a look to see if
there were opportunities in the private yards, and they are
doing that. We will be following up with them to see how that
goes over time and following submarine readiness in general,
sir.
Senator Blumenthal. Would you recommend that additional
work be sent to the private yards?
Mr. Pendleton. That is really not my place. I mean, what we
wanted the Navy to do was to look to see if you could make a
business case for it because the public yards, as Admiral Moran
mentioned, it is a lower priority and there were backups. And
we understood that there was potentially capability there
available, and we wanted the Navy to take a look at the cost
and the benefits of doing that. That is what we understand that
they are doing.
Senator Blumenthal. If I may ask another question, Mr.
Chairman. Thank you.
Admiral Moran and Secretary Spencer, I wonder if you would
respond as well please.
Secretary Spencer. Senator, we are, obviously, exercising
the public yard option. I have learned in my life that managing
expectations is probably the best way to go. I will tell you--
and it will be self-admitted by the shipyard builders--that
there is not a 100 percent correlation between building skills
and maintenance skills. They do not overlap 100 percent. We are
learning that right now. They are farther up the curve than
starting from zero, for sure. But repair is a different
exercise than build. So we are on a learning curve, and all we
are hoping for--not that hope is a strategy--is that as
partners working together we can get a price point that is
agreeable.
Senator Blumenthal. Well, hope is not a strategy. You are
absolutely right. And repair is not the same as building a new
boat. But the skills are very, very transferable and
comparable. And I want to urge that, with all due respect,
perhaps you could respond to my letter. I look forward to
hearing in more detail either in person or by letter about what
the plans are because I think it is very important that we
address these maintenance needs. And it goes beyond Electric
Boat. It is the capability of our private yards to do this
work, to maintain the defense industrial base to give our
workers continued challenges and work that they need and
deserve.
Secretary Spencer. Totally agree. And when I talk about the
learning curve, we have Virginia payload and we have Columbia,
and I have to balance that also when we talk about using those
man-hours. We will do whatever we can. We need everyone to lean
towards the stone to make sure we can get the right value and
efficiency proposition.
But you will hear from us. We have a 5-year plan for
submarines that has been finished. I think we are going sign it
out to you on the 28th of December. But more than happy. Your
letter will be addressed. It is on my desk right now to be
addressed. Loud and clear, we hear you. We need to fix the
maintenance flow for these vessels.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Senator Wicker. Senator Blumenthal, I think you are going
to get a response to your letter.
Now I will now take a second round. Secretary Spencer, I am
going to direct these questions to you. If someone wants to
jump in as a member of the team, please do so.
I spoke in my opening statement about requirements that we
placed in the NDAA on surface warfare and readiness. So let us
go down the list.
Section 911 directs the Secretary of the Navy to conduct a
comprehensive review of operational and administrative chains
of command and functions at the Department of the Navy. This is
due month after next, February of 2019. Will this deadline be
met?
Secretary Spencer. Yes, it will.
Senator Wicker. Are there any changes or insights that you
would like to share with the committee today?
Secretary Spencer. I think I would like to have the report
presented to you in full.
Senator Wicker. All right. You have answered the question.
Section 915 expands the principal duties of the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and
Acquisition, to include sustainment, including maintenance. The
intent was to put a single Senate-confirmed official in charge
of sustainment, including maintenance of weapons systems. This
took effect in August. How is this change being implemented?
Secretary Spencer. It has been implemented, Senator.
Senator Wicker. And how is it going?
Secretary Spencer. It is actually going very well. It is
something that we probably should have done a while ago, to be
very frank with you, because we spend an inordinate amount of
time focusing on how we buy things, and the sustainment
equation did not get the appropriate amount of attention. Now
it is.
Senator Wicker. Well, got advice from folks out there
around the globe that know what they are doing. So that is good
to hear.
Section 322 requires the Bureau of Inspection and Survey
Inspections beginning January 1, 2020, to be conducted with
minimal notice and results reported in an annual unclassified
report. I assume that this deadline will be met since it is a
year away.
Secretary Spencer. This we will meet March of 2019.
Senator Wicker. There you go.
Section 323 limits the duration of vessels home-ported in
locations other than the United States or Guam to no more than
10 consecutive years. With some few exceptions, this provision
took effect in August. What actions are being taken to comply?
Secretary Spencer. This will be completely implemented by
fiscal year 2021 due to the cycle nature of it. We are
underway.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, sir.
Section 526 requires certain watchstanders on Navy surface
ships to maintain a career record of watchstanding hours in
specific operational evolutions for key watch stations. This
takes effect in February. Will that deadline be met?
Secretary Spencer. January of 2019, Senator.
Senator Wicker. All right. It is hard to keep up with you
guys.
Section 524 requires a comprehensive assessment of the
Navy's standard workweek and update of Navy policies and
procedures to identify the manpower necessary to execute in-
port workload. This is due in February. Will the deadline be
met, and are there any early insights that can be shared today?
Secretary Spencer. The deadline will be met. I have not
read the final report yet, so I would like to wait until it is
fully vetted.
Senator Wicker. We look forward to those insights.
Secretary Spencer--and Admiral Moran may want to chime in
here--section 527 requires a review of the adequacy of
individual training for certain watch stations. This is due in
February. Will that deadline be met, and are there early
insights?
Secretary Spencer. That deadline will be met, and we will
share with you what we learned. No insights right now, sir.
Senator Wicker. Okay.
Section 525 requires congressional notification if manning
levels drop below certain percentages for ships. This took
effect in August. We have not received any notifications being
submitted pursuant to this section. So is the Navy compliant
there?
Secretary Spencer. The first report is in staffing now.
Senator Wicker. Okay. And what is it going to show? Give us
a sneak preview. Admiral?
Admiral Moran. It is going to show we have a relatively
small percent of those ships that are outside their maintenance
and basic phase of the OFRP [Optimized Fleet Response Plan]
that are below those thresholds, very marginally below, but it
is a small percentage. I think you will be pleased with the
report that is on its way to the Secretary.
Senator Wicker. All right. Only two more.
Section 334 requires a review of options to increase
civilian watchstanding qualifications for surface warfare
personnel. This is due in March. Will that deadline be met?
Secretary Spencer. That deadline will be met.
Senator Wicker. Section 335 requires a review of Navy
surface ship inspections and visits to identify unnecessary
requirements. This is due in August. Will that deadline be met?
Secretary Spencer. That will be met in January of 2019. The
initial reviews are complete.
Senator Wicker. Actually, Mr. Pendleton, I hope you are
expecting two questions in this regard. Are you prepared to
talk about section 514?
Mr. Pendleton. Is that the one about surface warfare
audits, sir?
Senator Wicker. It requires a GAO study of surface warfare
career paths. This is due in March.
Mr. Pendleton. Yes. We have it underway. We will see you in
March.
Senator Wicker. Okay.
Can you give us observations or comments on the updates
provided by the Secretary, as well as your understanding of the
implement of GAO's related recommendations?
Mr. Pendleton. I am not sure I quite understand what you
are looking for there. We have not done a lot of work on the
surface warfare officer mandate yet. We are getting started.
And in the back of my prepared statement, we detail the 45
related recommendations we made over the last 3 years and the
status of them. And so we keep track of that very closely.
One thing I would like to mention, Mr. Chairman, is the
question came up earlier about gray zone conflict and domain
readiness, and I feel like I should remind everyone----
Senator Wicker. With regard to Senator Shaheen's----
Mr. Pendleton. Yes, Senator Shaheen's question.
We were required in last year's NDAA to look at readiness
through a domain lens, air, ground, sea, space and cyber. We
have also done that work. So in the spring, we hope to have
some assessment of how the Department is doing in assessing
readiness across all those domains as well.
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much. I tell you what we are
going to do, Mr. Pendleton. I am going to look over your
prepared statement and see if I need to follow up on any
questions for the record.
Does anyone else wish to ask questions? Senator Hirono?
Senator Hirono. Very briefly.
Mr. Secretary, you have been impressively prepared to
respond to the chairman's questions. Thank you very much.
With regard to our shipyards, could you provide to this
committee a list of what specifically is being done at the four
public shipyards to implement the shipyard infrastructure
optimization plan?
Secretary Spencer. I will follow up with you on that, yes.
Senator Hirono. Thank you.
One more thing. I had mentioned in my opening remarks that
I was interested in preventing collisions at sea, the sort of
disasters that occurred. One of the changes that the Navy has
discussed was ensuring that ship or squadron commanders can
highlight their concerns when higher headquarters may try to
deploy ships that are not trained and ready.
My question to either you, Mr. Secretary or Admiral Moran,
in particular, can you point to any example of a ship not
deploying after being assigned to deploy when training or
readiness were not up to standards per the ship or squadron
commander's concerns?
Admiral Moran. Senator, we have--and I can send you a
written follow-up with the list of those examples. They come
both ways, both from senior officers in the chain of command
who observe a ship not being ready to either go to an exercise,
deploy, get underway and where ships themselves have come
forward through their chain of command saying they need
additional time to train and be certified for the----
Senator Hirono. I think that was an important change, and I
hope that Admiral Moran agrees with that, because we cannot
continue to have all these waivers for the readiness of these
ships before they deploy.
Mr. Pendleton. I went out to Japan, as I mentioned in my
opening statement, and what we saw was a much different looking
certification chart. For the ships that were underway, less
than 3 percent of the certifications were expired, and they
were managing those very, very closely.
The Navy has done this by pouring resources into what is
called the Afloat Training Group, and that means that folks are
going out and working with the ship crews to make sure that
they are trained and certified before they deploy. So that has
been a significant change, at least in Japan.
Senator Hirono. Thank you very much. I commend the Navy for
doing those kinds of changes.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Wicker. Senator Kaine?
Senator Kaine. Thank you.
Secretary Spencer, one of the things I think we are all
aware of is that the backlog of installation and infrastructure
maintenance is a sizeable one, and it is probably going to be
unrealistic to think that the Marines and the Navy can MILCON
[military construction] their way out of this. So we will have
to tackle it.
But one particular I was interested in is this. Within the
Navy, there has been, for a number of years, a Resilient Energy
Program Office, REPO. REPO's goal--I guess mission--has been to
leverage third party investment to improve installation
readiness. My understanding is third parties will make
investments on naval bases to either improve the resiliency of
the energy infrastructure or, on occasions, investments to do
conservation and efficiency investments, and then the third
party shares if there is a reduction in energy cost. The third
party shares in that. These are common arrangements. I did some
when I was Mayor of Richmond 20 years ago.
My understanding is that REPO projects have slowed to
almost a halt, and I wonder, is that the case? Why is it the
case? Do you commit to finding paths forward to make these
kinds of investments that can save the Navy money that could be
used to address some of the other installation issues?
Secretary Spencer. Most definitely, Senator. I will follow
up with you because the whole battle cry from my office is if
we can leverage private-public relationships in any way,
whether it be real estate development, whether it be energy
resiliency, we are to explore them.
Senator Kaine. Excellent. I will submit that as a written
question for the record and look forward to your response.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Senator Wicker. Any other questions?
[No response.]
Senator Wicker. I want to thank our witnesses for their
testimony today. It occurs to me that we are extraordinarily
well represented by the members of the panel today, and I want
to thank you.
The record will remain open for 1 week for other questions
members may have.
If there is nothing else, this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:26 a.m., the Subcommittees adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
navy pilot production
1. Senator Wicker. Secretary Spencer, given that helicopter pilots
make up 55 percent of the Naval Aviators produced each year, please
describe how the Navy plans on replacing the aging TH-57 helicopter and
ensure naval aviation warfighting readiness can be improved by training
aviators in aircraft that more closely resemble what they fly in the
fleet?
Secretary Spencer. The Navy initiated an effort to replace its
legacy TH-57 training helicopters with the Advanced Helicopter Training
System (AHTS). The goal is to rapidly and efficiently replace the TH-57
with a better, more modern training helicopter by leveraging the
capabilities and capacity of industry. AHTS will consist of a
commercial helicopter accompanied with a Ground Based Training System
and Contractor Logistics Support. The commercial acquisition will allow
the Navy to obtain a suitable replacement trainer, free of development
costs. Naval Air Systems Command released the AHTS Request for Proposal
in January 2019 with industry responses due April 2019. Following the
source selection process, the contract award for the TH-57 replacement
will be in the 1st quarter fiscal year 2020, with aircraft delivery
approximately one year after contract award.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joni Ernst
naval support to sof
2. Senator Ernst. Secretary Spencer, I greatly appreciated
discussing with you the need to provide dedicated persistent support to
our Special Operations Forces (SOF) through sufficient access to afloat
sea basing. During your testimony, you stated that if certain policy
restraints were removed, you could rapidly close gaps in our current
afloat sea basing posture. Secretary Spencer, could you detail in
writing the current posture for afloat sea basing to SOF?
Secretary Spencer. Current SOF requirements for Afloat Forward
Staging Bases (AFSBs) are best met by a combination of dedicated leased
commercial Maritime Support Vessels (MSVs), Navy AFSB support provided
by Expeditionary Support Bases (ESBs), and contingency support from
other SOF-modified Navy platforms. Two ESBs are currently available for
tasking with three more under construction, and two MSVs are available.
A number of other Navy vessels are suitable and have been used for SOF
seabasing in support of contingency operations; LHD/LHA, LPD and SSGN
are prime examples.
3. Senator Ernst. Secretary Spencer, how do policy restrictions
prevent you from closing current gaps in afloat sea basing?
Secretary Spencer. There are legal restrictions and limitations on
using leased commercial vessels for a potential state on state
conflict; these do not prevent these vessels from being used for
counterterrorism operations. With DOD and Navy vessels suitable for use
as AFSBs increasingly focused on state on state conflict there is a gap
in suppling seabasing capabilities for counterterrorism. If there was
the ability to purchase and modify for SOF used vessels and possibly
foreign-flagged vessels as a cheaper alternative to U.S.-flagged ones
this would help alleviate the gap.
4. Senator Ernst. Secretary Spencer, could you provide in writing
the specific policy changes that need to be made in order to allow you
to close these gaps?
Secretary Spencer. The ability to purchase and modify for SOF, used
vessels and possible foreign-flagged vessels as a cheaper alternative
to U.S. flagged ones would help alleviate the gap.
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
aviation mission capability
5. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Spencer, a couple months ago the
Secretary of the Defense established a mission capability goal of 80
percent for key aircraft, such as the F/A-18 Super Hornet, that is to
be achieved by the end of fiscal year 2019, while also reducing
sustainment costs. In October 2018, the Navy reported publicly that F/
A-18 Super Hornet availability was about 50 percent, how realistic is
it for the Navy to add about 30 percent availability for the F/A-18
Super Hornet in less than year in order to meet the Secretary of
Defense's goal? What's the risk in trying to meet that goal?
Secretary Spencer. The Navy believes that actions taken over the
past year, combined with the increased support to sustainment budgets
over the past several years, has put us on a path to reach the required
Mission Capable (MC) readiness level for Fleet F/A-18 Super Hornet
Squadrons by the end of fiscal year (FY) 2019. The MC rates for the
Navy F/A-18 is 71 percent as of April 22, 2019. We have implemented a
comprehensive approach to address F/A-18 and other platform readiness
shortfalls called the Naval Sustainment System (NSS). The NSS will
address the systemic issues that have led to reduced availability, with
emphasis on reforming activities across the key pillars of governance,
operational-level maintenance, intermediate and depot-level support,
supply support, and engineering support. The NSS will take advantage of
best practices from the commercial aviation industry, balancing those
with the unique missions and operational environments of Naval
Aviation. For F/A-18s, examples of specific reforms include the
implementation of an ``Aircraft On the Ground'' cell, focused on the
near-term prioritization of supply and maintenance actions to get more
flight line aircraft into an MC status sooner; a reduction of the time
to conduct an aircraft's depot-level Planned Maintenance Interval
inspections from 120 to 60 days; a reduction of 4 days in the time to
conduct operational-level 84-day aircraft inspections; and an increase
in the output of repaired engines to the flight line to support the
increasing numbers of MC aircraft. All of those activities are underway
with demonstrated results, as the monthly average of MC F/A-18 Super
Hornet aircraft has shown improvement each of the last four months. The
risk in trying to meet the fiscal year 2019 MC aircraft goal is that
actions taken in the near term must not come at the expense of the
longer term requirement to sustain the fleet at the higher 80 percent
MC level. The Navy is acutely aware of, and is managing, that risk. The
actions being taken, such as those described in the examples above,
appropriately consider long term sustainment. That risk is one reason
why the inclusion of commercial industry best practices into the Naval
Aviation model is so important. Those best practices support both near
and long term commercial aviation readiness goals, and without success
in both areas those companies suffer. Naval Aviation is taking that
same mindset with the NSS and our actions to increase readiness across
the force.
implications of 2018 national defense strategy
6. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Spencer, in January 2018, the
administration announced a new defense strategy that identifies long-
term strategic competition with China and Russia as DOD's principal
priorities. Secretary Spencer, how will you balance the need to rebuild
readiness with the need to modernize? Should one take priority?
Secretary Spencer. The National Defense Strategy identifies great
power competition with China and Russia as DOD's priority and pursues
three distinct lines of efforts to expand our competitive space,
including rebuilding military readiness, as we build a more lethal
Joint Force. A fundamental tenet of every budget request we build is
that naval power is about maintaining balance across all dimensions of
naval power. Naval power is not a choice between increased capacity or
better capability--it is a combination of both. Naval power is not a
choice between readiness and modernization--it requires a balance of
both. Naval power is not a choice between more complex stand-alone
technologies or networked systems--it is achieved through both. The
talent to operate and sustain a larger and more lethal force is not a
choice between more people or better training--it must draw on
components from both. Our Program Objective Memorandum process is
designed to optimize this balance to ensure the fleet can maneuver as
desired, respond when directed, and win in a short or prolonged fight.
readiness improvements at navair (san diego)
7. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Spencer, can you talk about some of
the improvements you are making to the Navy Sustainment System (NSS),
specifically the work being done at NAVAIR's Fleet Readiness Center--
Southwest (FRC-SW) in San Diego?
Secretary Spencer. The Naval Air Systems Command's (NAVAIR) Fleet
Readiness Center Southwest (FRCSW) reform is one of the six pillars
that has been employed to establish the Navy Sustainment System (NSS).
The six pillars are: Surge/Aircraft on the Ground; FRC reform;
Operational-Level reform; supply chain reform; engineering and
maintenance programming reform; and governance, accountability, and
organization. These pillars are the foundational business processes
being addressed to improve the Navy's F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet readiness
shortfalls. FRCSW's activities associated with NSS are initially
focused on aircraft component repair work centers. These work centers
were strategically selected based on their impact to F/A-18 E/F
material shortfalls known as Issue Priority Group One (IPG-1). IPG-1s
are backordered repairable component supply inventory requirements
associated with a missing part on aircraft, and have the highest repair
priority to restore aircraft to mission readiness status. The
foundation to the improvement process within the FRCSW work centers is
accuracy, accountability, and transparency. Work centers were
transformed into production control centers that physically integrate
the daily activities of external partners in the supply chain
responsible for supporting component repairs such as Naval Supply
Systems Command (NAVSUP), Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), and
engineers. Production and supporting stakeholders aligned their
activities that have the greatest effect on decreasing flight line IPG-
1s and increasing throughput. The goal of these work centers are to
drive IPG-1 backorders to zero and improve aircraft component
availability at the flight line. The improvements at FRCSW have been
focused on flow, visual management, material kitting, supply chain
synchronization, machine maintenance availability, and artisan
training. The fundamental focus of NSS improvements at FRCSW is to
treat the maintenance artisan as a surgeon where all production and
support activities come to them to efficiently produce components.
Flow-Production Control Centers are transformed to
provide minimal travel time and maximum visibility.
Visual Management- Each production process is visible in
the work center where operations that become barriers can be visible
and elevated.
Supply Chain Synchronization--Improving the demand
signal, logistics response time, and overall material availability to
support rapid repair.
Material Kitting--Partnering with DLA and NAVSUP in
strategies to improve material processing within the FRC to ensure all
material to complete repair is available at time of need.
Machine Maintenance Availability--establishing strategies
and preventative maintenance to decrease support equipment down time.
Artisan Training--developing training strategies and
programs aligned to meet customer demand. The NSS initiatives have had
immediate gains:
FRCSW Hydraulic Shop reduction in aircraft component IPG-
1s by 78 percent in 120 days (Pre-NSS IPG-1 count of 107, current IPG-1
count of 24)
FRCSW Canopy Shop has increased production from 2.4
canopies/month to 8 canopies/month in the past 30 days, IPG-1 reduction
of 24 percent (Pre-NSS IPG-1 count of 37, current IPG-1 count of 28)
FRCSW Landing Gear Shop reduction in IPG-1s by 13 percent
(Pre-NSS IPG-1 count of 112, current IPG-1 count of 97) NSS improvement
plans are scalable. FRCSW is beginning efforts to scale the NSS effort
across the plant to include all type-model-series components and
aircraft maintenance, repair, and overhaul production lines. Commander
FRC has initiated the NSS improvement strategy across all FRCs.
arctic strategy/freedom of navigation operations
8. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Spencer, during the hearing you
stated, ``If I had a blank check for everything, it would be terrific
to ice-harden ships, but with the demand that we have right now, it is
unaffordable.'' Can you elaborate on specifically why it is
unaffordable to ice-harden ships?
Secretary Spencer. As agreed to by the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) in their recent November 2018 Report to Congress, there
are currently no validated capability gaps that require the Navy to
ice-harden existing vessels or construct new ice-capable vessels. From
a funding perspective, ice hardening an existing program of ship might
take ten years if the Navy can leverage an ongoing program, such as the
DDG-51 Class program. Modifications to the current surface fleet that
would enable sustained operations in extreme cold environments could
compromise performance in other areas such as speed, range, and ship
motion. Navy-contracted construction yards currently lack expertise in
the design and construction of winterized, ice-hardened surface
combatant and amphibious warfare ships. Accordingly, ice-hardening and
winterization design practices could introduce cost and schedule risk,
challenging the execution of a new construction ship-building program
for an ice-hardened ship.
9. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Spencer, given the requirement in
the current Arctic strategy, how will the Navy address the need for
conducting visible surface FONOPs, in all weather conditions during all
times of the year?
Secretary Spencer. The current Department of Defense (DOD) Arctic
Strategy states that the DOD will preserve freedom of the seas in the
Arctic. In support of the U.S. national security interest in preserving
all of the rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea and airspace
recognized under international law, DOD will preserve the global
mobility of U.S. military and civilian vessels and aircraft throughout
the Arctic, as in other regions. This includes conducting Freedom of
Navigation operations (FONOPS) to challenge excessive maritime claims
when and where necessary. The U.S. FON Program, as executed by DOD,
employs every branch of military service including the U.S. Coast
Guard. In the Arctic, Navy submarines can conduct FONOPS year round,
either undersea or by surfacing, and Navy surface combatants could
conduct FONOPS in open water conditions during the summer melt season.
10. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Spencer, can the Navy conduct such
FONOPs without ice-hardened ships? If so, would the Navy use a U.S.
Coast Guard icebreaker? How would that ice-breaker be protected?
Secretary Spencer. The Navy cannot conduct visible surface FONOPs,
in all weather conditions during all times of the year without ice-
hardened and winterized ships; neither can any other nation or
military. The U.S. FON Program, as executed by DOD, employs every
branch of military service including the U.S. Coast Guard. U.S. Coast
Guard ice-breakers may be employed in accordance with the FON program.
Current U.S. Coast Guard ice-breakers lack defensive capabilities and
would need escort during a high-risk transit. Other options are: fully
funding and building of the National Polar Security Cutter which will
have power, weight, and space for defensive systems of their own;
conducting FONOPS in areas where protection is not needed; or conduct
FONOPS with friends, allies, and partners.
11. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Spencer, are subsurface FONOPs
using submarines effective? When such FONOPs are not readily visible,
how do they show forward U.S. presence to deter adversaries and assure
allies?
Secretary Spencer. The U.S. FON Program consists of a two-pronged,
complementary strategy for preserving the rights, freedoms, and uses of
the sea and airspace recognized by international law. The Department of
State leads the first prong by diplomatically protesting excessive
maritime claims, and the DOD complements those efforts in the second
prong, by conducting operational assertions of freedom of navigation
(i.e., ``FONOPs"), regularly and routinely around the world. The Navy
believes that sub-surface FONOPs are an effective method of
accomplishing the goals of the FON Program. Submerged transits in
straits used for international navigation, for example, challenge
excessive maritime claims that purport to require submarines to transit
on the surface. The DOD publishes an annual FON report that summarizes
these operations, and other FONOPs, identifying the specific coastal
states and excessive maritime claims challenged in that year. U.S. Navy
submarines can show forward U.S. presence in the Arctic by surfacing
through the ice. Last year, during the Navy's biannual Arctic Ice
Exercise (ICEX), two U.S. submarines rendezvoused with a British
submarine at the North Pole and simultaneously surfaced through the
ice, demonstrating to our adversaries that the U.S. and our partners
continue to retain assured access to the entire Arctic region.
12. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Spencer and Admiral Moran, does it
make operational or tactical sense for a U.S. submarines to conduct a
surface FONOP in the Arctic, as has been suggested in previous Senate
Armed Services hearings? If so, how?
Secretary Spencer. and Admiral Moran. There is no inherent
operational or tactical benefit to operating a submarine on the
surface. However, if the DOD determines that the best asset for a FONOP
is a submarine and a visible transit is desired, that submarine will
likely not drive on the surface for the entire transit. The submarine
could drive certain portions of a transit on the surface and other
portions underwater. Another option would be to navigate the majority
of a transit underwater and then surface to make its presence known,
then submerge to continue the transit.
strategic arctic port
13. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Spencer, the DOD's most recent
``Strategic Arctic Port'' report (sent to the SASC in January 2018)
concludes that in light of the current threat environment, the Port of
Anchorage, while not technically an Arctic port, is sufficient to meet
the DOD's near to midterm requirements for Navy operations in the
Arctic region. However, you recently stated in an event at CSIS that we
need a strategic arctic port in Alaska.
In your personal opinion, is the DOD's assessment and conclusion in
this report reflective of your current view? Please elaborate.
Secretary Spencer. The National Defense Strategy affirms the
Department of Defense (DOD) will be prepared to defend the U.S.
Homeland. The Arctic is strategic terrain in the defense of the
Homeland and protecting U.S. northern approaches is critical to our
national security. We are considering all options in terms of how to
best ensure our security interests in the region, but have nothing to
announce at this time. The Navy supports and agrees with the DOD's
``Strategic Arctic Port'' report.
14. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Spencer, do I have your commitment
to work with the SASC on a revised analysis for a strategic arctic
port?
Secretary Spencer. While existing DOD infrastructure in the region
is adequate to meet today's needs, we regularly assess the evolving
security environment and associated changing requirements for the
Arctic region. We remain committed to addressing SASC concerns as well.
15. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Spencer, in your personal opinion,
is it in the strategic interest of the U.S. to have a Strategic Arctic
Port or Ports?
Secretary Spencer. The existing DOD infrastructure in the region is
adequate to meet today's needs. We regularly assess the evolving
security environment and associated changing requirements for the
Arctic region. The Port of Anchorage was designated as a Strategic
Seaport in 2004 and is sufficient to meet the current requirements for
a deep water port in the Arctic at this time. Additionally, Thule Air
Base is the United States Air Force's northernmost base, located about
750 miles north of the Arctic Circle and adjacent to the world's
northernmost deep-water seaport. This seaport supports logistics
resupply operations for Thule and smaller military sites in Greenland
and in northern Canada.
16. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Spencer, as required by the Fiscal
Year 2017 NDAA, would you support the designation of a site (or sites)
for a strategic Arctic Port? If so, what sites?
Secretary Spencer. The existing DOD infrastructure in the region is
adequate to meet today's needs. We regularly assess the evolving
security environment and associated changing requirements for the
Arctic region. Thus, in accordance with the Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA, and
since the ``Strategic Arctic Port'' report concluded that no Strategic
Arctic ports were required, there are no recommendations for the
designation of one or more ports as Department of Defense Strategic
Arctic Ports.
marine corps training
17. Senator Sullivan. General Neller, can you please describe--in
detail--the Marine Corps current plan to begin training in Alaska? What
specific sites will be used, what type of training will be done, and
how many Marines will be involved in each training exercise?
General Neller. To fully utilize and exploit opportunities for
amphibious cold-weather training in Alaska, I would work with our
Training and Education Command, associated commands in Alaska, and our
unit commanders to seek affordable and sustainable venues that would
increase our combat readiness in cold-weather operations.
18. Senator Sullivan. General Neller, can you elaborate on the
Marine Corps mid-term and long-term plans to train in Alaska,
specifically focusing on combined arms live fire exercises and the use
of Alaska's Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex (JPARC)? From what
installation(s) would the Marine Corps operate? What facilities--if
any--would you expect them to use and/or need?
General Neller. I would continue efforts to take advantage of
Alaska's terrain, climate, and world-class training in the Joint
Pacific Alaska Range Complex (JPARC) for Marine deployment for
training, ensuring that those opportunities are affordable and
sustainable from a global force management perspective. The size of the
JPARC airspace--vertical (altitude) and horizontal (square miles)--
offers unique opportunities for aviation to exercise a broader range of
aviation capabilities. Other benefits include less congestion and
competition for ranges and periodic opportunities to train alongside
joint and partner nation forces.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator David Perdue
sustainment of new acquisitions
19. Senator Perdue. Secretary Spencer, the Navy is pursuing the
development and procurement of various advanced technologies. One such
technology is the MQ-25 tanker drone that is in a six year development
effort moving toward a 2024 declaration of initial operational
capability. The sustainment of new and technologically advanced weapons
systems like the F-35, however, is proving to be a major challenge for
all of the Services. Among other supply chain deficiencies, military
depots were found to be 6 years behind schedule in their capabilities
to repair F-35 parts. Has the Navy projected its sustainment costs for
the MQ-25?
Secretary Spencer. Yes, the current Acquisition Program Baseline
has an estimated operating and support cost of $13.78 billion, covering
a 30-year program life cycle of 74 aircraft flying 8773,000 flight
hours. Military Construction ($778 million) is currently in place to
stand up all depots and hangers by fiscal year 2028.
20. Senator Perdue. Secretary Spencer, to what extent has the Navy
considered organic solutions for short and long-term maintenance of the
MQ-25?
Secretary Spencer. The MQ-25 will be maintained organically at the
organizational level by Navy Sailors assigned to a squadron once the
MQ-25 reaches Initial Operational Capability. Intermediate level
maintenance will be performed organically by Navy Sailors at Fleet
Readiness Centers. The Navy's strategy for establishing depot level
repair includes performing a Core Logistics Analysis to determine core
sustainment requirements and performing a Source of Repair Analysis
(SORA) to identify organic depot repair sites and compliant commercial
support arrangements. The SORA considers organic depot facilities
across all services to help the program manager implement performance
based logistics strategies that optimize total system availability
while minimizing cost and logistics footprint. The MQ-25 SORA
recommended organic depot facilities across the Department of Defense
for system and sub-system sustainment. As the MQ-25 design is refined,
a Level of Repair Analyses (LORA) and follow on economic LORA will
determine the level of repair for each component of the MQ-25 and the
most cost effective level of repair or replacement. This analysis will
feed a Depot Source of Repair (DSOR) decision. The DSOR will ensure
compliance with title 10 U.S.C. sections 2464/2466 and include
industrial based optimization, capacity and surge requirements,
criticality of the system, leverage existing Performance Based
Logistics arrangements, limited inventory of the system, and location
of the MQ-25 basing sites to support operational needs. Funding for
depot facilities and capabilities stand up has been included in the
Military Construction and Operating and Support cost estimates.
21. Senator Perdue. Secretary Spencer, how does the Navy plan to
capitalize on lessons learned from RQ-4 sustainment, which is now
organically maintained by the Robins Air Force Base Air Logistics
Complex?
Secretary Spencer. Over the past few years the MQ-4C Triton and RQ-
4 Global Hawk programs have exchanged sustainment concepts and planning
in efforts to exploit lessons learned and to coordinate future
sustainment activities. The Global Hawk program is transitioning from
Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) sustainment strategy to an
organically supported weapon system. The timing of transition has
presented numerous opportunities for cooperation and shared investments
for establishment of depot-level repair capability. The Triton Joint
Depot Source of Repair determinations are complete and include
capabilities at all three Air Logistics Complexes (ALC) for common
subsystems. The two programs have coordinated capability standup
priorities, activities, and recommended investment sharing. Major sub-
systems include landing gear, flight controls, and engine. Common
engine overhaul and major repair capability is in-place in a joint
arrangement with Oklahoma City ALC. The Triton incorporated lessons
learned provided through site visits to Global Hawk facilities and
subject matter experts during the MILCON and airfield support
requirements definition. Additional opportunities for greater
collaboration and data exchange to enhance the supportability of the
two platforms continue to be actively explored through regular Program
Office engagements and the Q-4 User's Group. Future areas of discussion
include, but are not limited to, the following: 1. Engineering
methodologies to be used in defining scheduled maintenance requirements
2. Aircraft Age Exploration and Aircraft Conditional Inspection 3.
Interactive Electronic Technical Manuals 4. Advance Material
(Composite) Repair Development 5. Aircraft Non-Destructive Inspection
standards 6. Strip, Paint, and Fill and Fair Process 7. Paint and
Corrosion Control Manual 8. Support Equipment 9. Maintenance Planning
Database
inter-service depot maintenance
22. Senator Perdue. Secretary Spencer, what are the benefits of
inter-service depot maintenance?
Secretary Spencer. The benefits of inter-service depot maintenance
for the Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of the Navy is the
ability to leverage existing capability, capacity, expertise, and
lessons learned across the DOD maintenance, repair, and overhaul
enterprise to focus on readiness requirements in the most effective and
efficient manner.
23. Senator Perdue. Secretary Spencer, what have been the benefits
of moving Navy C-130 and C-17 work to the Warner Robins Air Logistics
Complex?
Secretary Spencer. One of the primary benefits of the directed move
from Ogden (OO-ALC) to WR-ALC, has been a revitalized relationship
between the United States Air Force (USAF) and the United States Navy
engineering and logistics departments at WR-ALC. This move has resulted
in more unified and streamlined depot overhaul procedures to include
both quality assurance and turnaround time. Additionally, manpower and
support equipment constraints for both the USAF and Navy for concurrent
workload at OO-ALC will be mitigated by the migration of this workload
to WR-ALC.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Rick Scott
marine corps aav-su program
24. Senator Scott. Secretary Spencer, on August 17, the Department
of the Navy made an abrupt decision to cancel the Amphibious Assault
Vehicle Survivability Upgrade program. Given the immediate need for
safe, reliable, and survivable ship-to-shore transportation for our US
Marines, I do not understand the decision. Cancelling this program
keeps our Marines at risk for the next ten years, or until the next
generation vehicle is fielded. This is simply unacceptable. Further
defying explanation, is that the Navy is cancelling a firm fixed price
contract. Such types of contracts are a victory for taxpayers. The
Marine Corps asked for my help to preserve this program in the Fiscal
Year 2019 NDAA, yet you decided to cancel the program shortly after the
NDAA was signed into law. Congress also appropriated about $97 million
for it this year. To be honest, I would like to see this program re-
instated. I fear the Navy's treatment of the contractor will result in
less competition for this work in the future. We need more companies
competing for these programs, not less.
Secretary Spencer, I understand you and Secretary Geurts have been
in discussions with the contractor regarding certain costs that they
incurred to keep program costs down and to maintain the contemplated
schedule. Could you tell me where the Navy stands in resolving this
issue?
Secretary Spencer. The Amphibious Assault Vehicle Survivability
Upgrade (AAV SU) program was initiated to enhance the legacy AAV's
survivability, a limited effort deliberately intended to upgrade only a
portion of the AAV fleet, and to serve as a bridge until the Marine
Corps fielded Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) 1.2. This plan was based
on the estimated arrival of its replacement, the ACV and based on the
capabilities of each variant of the ACV. Originally, the ACV 1.1
variant was to provide land and limited ship-to-shore amphibious
capability only. ACV 1.2 would provide the missing ship-to-shore
capability, while both ACV variants would provide enhanced
survivability to the AAV. The expected time lapse between the 1.1 and
1.2 variants led the Marine Corps to pursue the AAV SU in order to
maintain enough operationally relevant vehicles to support the
requirements of our forward deployed forces. There were several
developments which contributed to the decision to divest of AAV SU.
First was the release of the National Defense Strategy in December 2017
and the following guidance issued from the Secretary of Defense
(SECDEF) and Congress. The SECDEF's guidance for divestment decisions
prioritizes investment in modernization for the capabilities needed in
the future operating environment and pacing competitors over modest
improvements to ``legacy programs.'' Congressional guidance also
consistently directed the services to re-consider investment in legacy
programs such as AAV. Subsequently, the Commandant of the Marine Corps
directed senior leaders to begin addressing possible divestment
opportunities. In July 2018, the Marine Requirements Oversight Council
(MROC) convened to officially review acquisitions programs for
potential divestiture. The MROC determined that the need for the AAV SU
program had been significantly reduced and recommended divesting of the
program, while maintaining investment in certain sub-systems such as
the Remote Weapon Station and Tactical Communications Modernization.
Significant to this decision was the fact that the ACV 1.1 program had
progressed faster than expected. The ACV 1.1 variant demonstrated its
ability to be a robust swimmer with ship-to-shore capabilities and
increased mobility and survivability during testing in 2018. This
eliminated the requirement for the bridge capability provided by AAV
SU. Accordingly, the Commandant approved the divestiture decision in
August of 2018. The Termination for Convenience process dictates that
all aspects of liability and termination costs will be negotiated by
the assigned Defense Contract Management Agency termination contracting
officer in good faith and in due time. The Government has requested a
termination proposal from the vendor and until such time as we have
that proposal, it is difficult to make any assessment as to what will
or will not be acceptable as covered termination costs. In reference to
investments made by the vendor, the Marine Corps recently received a
Request for Equitable Adjustment from the Science Applications
International Corporation (SAIC) regarding long lead material purchased
for a portion of the contract which was not executed. This request is
under careful consideration by our contracting and legal teams and will
be adjudicated in a fair and reasonable manner. The Marine Corps has
repeatedly demonstrated an understanding of the value of additional
players in the combat and tactical vehicle market. The competitive
selection of SAIC both as an early competitor for the ACV and the AAV
SU program supports this assertion.
25. Senator Scott. General Neller, are you comfortable with the
risk you are placing Marines at by keeping legacy AAVs in the fleet for
at least another ten years?
General Neller. Yes. The Marine Corps will maintain 10 infantry
battalions of lift to include 10 Amphibious Assault companies. Risks
are moderately mitigated by the re-prioritization of ACV fielding to
OPFOR from 125 to 150 vehicles per year. In addition, the AAV
modification line will mitigate some risks by upgrading to Amphibious
Remote Weapon Station and improving communications. The follow-on ACV,
currently being tested, has demonstrated several critical objective
level requirements and will be significantly more lethal and survivable
than the AAV. The Marine Corps legacy AAV fleet is in sundown, the
total number of vehicles is being decreased annually. All AAVs are
planned to be replaced through the ACV program.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
ch-53k
26. Senator Blumenthal. General Neller, I understand that
modernization is the primary method to improve aviation readiness in
the Marine Corps. Replacing the legacy CH-53E remains crucial as low
numbers of flyable aircraft is affecting Marine Corps aviation
readiness. What does heavy lift capability bring to the Marine Corps?
How will it be improved with the CH-53K? Can any other helicopter meet
heavy lift requirements?
General Neller. Just as the heavy lift mission remains relevant
today, it will also be key for future operating concepts. The legacy
CH-53E continues to do the heavy lifting for the Marine Corps but has
approximately 40 percent of its service life remaining with growing
sustainment and obsolescence issues. There are 142 CH-53E's in the
current inventory, covering down on a 200 aircraft requirement. Years
of war and worldwide operations have impacted sustainability,
availability, and exacerbated an inventory shortfall. To mitigate these
issues, significant investments in readiness initiatives like RESET and
the Engine Reliability Improvement Program (ERIP) have been made to
ensure that CH-53E remains ready and relevant until the arrival of the
CH-53K to the Fleet Marine Force. Vertical heavy lift provides the
Marine Corps with the speed, agility and the flexibility required to
defeat a near-peer adversaries. As the Marine Corps has modernized, its
equipment has not only gained decisive capability, but weight as well
(e.g. missionized JLTV is 22.5K, 7K heavier than an up armored HMMWV).
The ability to maneuver Marines and their equipment from anywhere
facilitates our forward power projection and the successful
manipulation of engagements with our adversaries. The blitzkrieg of
this maneuver hinges on the MAGTF's ability to conduct heavy lift
operations. This capability relieves pressure on surface connectors
(land and sea) and exponentially bolsters the speeds associated with
them. The ability of a commander to maintain the speed and tempo of an
engagement is also empowered by vertical heavy lift's ability to
forward refuel and rearm other ground and air platforms during
operational maneuver. Vertical heavy lift has also recovered countless
downed Joint and Coalition aircraft on the battlefield, as well as the
training environment. This enables us to preserve assets and
warfighting capability. Probably the least publicized but most
significant capability of vertical heavy lift is in the support of
humanitarian aid operations. The agility and forward presence of the
Marine Expeditionary Unit allows this asset to respond within days if
not hours to humanitarian plight. Vertical heavy lift can transport
countless aid requirements from water and medical supplies to
generators and heavy equipment. These supplies can be delivered to the
most devastated and remote areas. Unlike fixed wing platforms, the
vertical heavy lift capability is not reliant on a functioning airport
or usable runways. Finally, when state and local aerial firefighting
assets are overwhelmed, Marine Corps vertical heavy lift is routinely
called upon to supplement. Its speed, agility and excessive payload are
much sought after traits when battling wildfires. The responsibility of
the Marine Corps to provide vertical heavy lift to the MAGTF and Joint
Force is essential in the execution of our National Defense Strategy
and the diplomacy of our Nation. The CH-53K will bring quantum
improvements to the current vertical heavy lift capability of the
Marine Corps. First, it is the only fully marinized heavy lift
rotorcraft that will support current and future warfighting concepts by
lifting 100 percent of the equipment to the ranges that the Marine
Corps will require. The CH-53K is a state of the art aircraft that
brings our fighting force into the next century. Lifting almost three
times more than its predecessor in a hot heavy environment out to 110
NM, the safety and reliability of this aircraft are unprecedented for a
rotorcraft of this size. Enhancements in information management,
mission integration and flight stability greatly reduce the pilot
workload in the most challenging and historically demanding
environments. The CH-53K has also been designed with the maintainer in
mind. Everything from work platforms, ergonomic workspaces and
component orientation have been influenced by current seasoned Marine
maintainers. All of these initiatives reduce the maintainer workload
and cost of ownership while increasing availability and reliability.
Finally, as I mentioned previously there are currently 142 CH-53Es to
do the current Heavy lift mission. While the CH-53E is doing a great
job, we are operating at a reduced inventory. The CH-53K program of
record is 200 aircraft. 200 aircraft allows the Marine Corps to operate
at a full Table of Organization for the life of the aircraft and ensure
that we can provide the Heavy lift capability to the Nation. The answer
to your final question is no. There is currently nothing else that will
meet the heavy lift requirement other than the CH-53K.
27. Senator Blumenthal. General Neller, in terms of the overall
program, I understand the CH-53K is performing well and meeting its
marks; however, the Marine Corps has initiated an above threshold
reprogramming request for $158 million to cover unanticipated
shortfalls and keep the CH-53K program on track. While there are
numerous reasons for the research and development shortfalls, can you
tell me exactly why the Marine Corps missed the budget mark for funding
in fiscal year 2019? If this above threshold reprogramming request is
not approved by Congress, what overall impact would it have on the CH-
53K program?
General Neller. The Marine Corps did not identify the fiscal year
2019 shortfall until after the budget controls had already left our
hands. A couple of items influenced this. First, the rate of closure on
technical deficiencies and testing were not being conducted at the rate
that we had planned on. There were also some new discoveries and
technical issues that slowed the test progress and shifted some of the
scope of effort on higher priority challenges early in fiscal year
2019. We as a team also had to ensure that with the new technical
challenges and demonstrated test efficiency, funding request were
commensurate with funding requirements. This detailed validation was
time intensive requiring the integrated effort of both NAVAIR and the
original equipment manufacturer (OEM) to ensure its accuracy. If the
ATR is not approved it will require the test program to slow down even
more than it already has. The program office will direct Sikorsky to
reduce spending and scope to what is currently in the budget. This will
ultimately delay Initial Operational Capability and the first
deployment that is scheduled for 2023-2024. I have also been told that
Sikorsky will have to move or reduce the workforce on the CH-53K team
and that knowledge base will not be easily replaced.
28. Senator Blumenthal. General Neller, despite the need for
additional funds in fiscal year 2019 and in the out years, where does
the CH-53K program stand with regard to a Nunn-McCurdy violation?
General Neller. We are currently at 22.02 percent above the
original December 2005 baseline. Our program office constantly updates
this as we change the scope and time in the program. Right now we are
not at risk of a Significant Nunn-McCurdy violation, but as with any
program, delays to production or issues discovery will increase this
risk. As the program continues to progress, we will closely monitor the
potential for violation and make all efforts to avoid it.
c-130t modernization
29. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Moran, earlier this month, the
Marine Corps released its findings regarding last year's fatal C-130T
mishap that killed 15 Marines and one sailor. The investigation
determined the primary casual factor of the mishap was an unnoticed
fatigue crack on a propeller blade, resulting from corrosion not
removed during its depot overhaul, which caused a series of cascading
failures that led to the aircraft breaking up in mid-air. Although the
Marine Corps intends to replace its legacy C-130T fleet with new C-130J
aircraft, Navy modernization efforts for its 43 C-130T aircraft will
replace the legacy four bladed propellers with an improved eight bladed
propeller system known as the NP2000 Propeller System--manufactured by
UTC's Collins Aerospace in Windsor Locks, CT. The NP2000 Propeller
System offers a significant operational capability enhancement to
current U.S. Navy C-130T aircraft that have significant airframe life
remaining, but at a fraction of the cost of replacing the aircraft with
C-130J. After more than a year following the fatal Marine Corps C-130T
mishap, I understand a majority of the Navy's C-130T fleet remains
grounded? Are C-130T propellers the Navy's number one aircraft
readiness degrader?
Admiral Moran. There are currently 31 Navy C-130T aircraft and 12
USMC aircraft. The Navy's fleet consists of 24 Fleet Logistics Support
Wing (FLSW) aircraft, six Navy Test Wings Atlantic / Pacific aircraft,
and Fat Albert. Currently five of the 24 Navy FLSW C/KC-130T aircraft
have NP2000 propellers, with the remaining 19 scheduled to complete the
transition by fourth quarter, fiscal year 2020. Navy Test Wings will
remain with 54H60 for the time being. Until the transition is complete,
propellers will continue to be a readiness degrader and therefore, a
closely monitored item.
30. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Moran, for the Navy's fiscal year
2020 budget submission, will there be more emphasis on modernizing Navy
C-130T propellers or should we expect to see another unfunded
requirement like we did this past year for fiscal year 2019?
Admiral Moran. The funding supplied in fiscal year 2018 for the
NP2000 propeller fully funded equipping the existing fleet of 24 Navy
Fleet Logistics Support Wing (FLSW) K/C-130T aircraft. To date, 5 FLSW
aircraft have been modified and the remaining 19 are scheduled to
complete transition by fourth quarter, fiscal year 2020. Future budget
submissions may include funding for the Navy's six C-130 test aircraft;
however, the decision to transition has not yet been made.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie Hirono
surface ship maintenance strategy
31. Senator Hirono. Admiral Moran, how well is the current surface
ship maintenance strategy performing in terms of providing sufficient
throughput and timely delivery of ships back to the Fleet in terms of
meeting the requirements of the Optimized Fleet Response Plan?
Admiral Moran. The Navy is continuing to work for greater
improvements to on-time delivery and availability performance through
Private Sector Optimization (PSO) and Private Sector Improvements
(PSI). Initiatives include Small Dollar Value Growth (SDVG) that sets a
fixed price for growth valued over $25,000, standard item reductions /
modifications, checkpoint reductions, awarding ships earlier, and the
vertical and horizontal grouping of ships. The Navy continues to engage
regularly with industry, hosting two Industry Days thus far in FY 2019
with a third planned in September, as we work in collaboration to
implement contracting strategies and administrative improvements that
provide for increased predictability and stability in the industrial
base. These improvements will allow industry to better plan and execute
the required work allowing ships to meet OFRP commitments.
32. Senator Hirono. Admiral Moran, if performance is not meeting
the Navy's needs, what is the Navy implementing or considering to
improve throughput and timeliness?
Admiral Moran. Navy initiatives to improve throughput and
performance include using solicitation approaches such as Vertical and
Horizontal Grouping to increase stability and predictability in the
industrial base. With Vertical Grouping, the Navy groups availabilities
with similar start dates into a single solicitation. Horizontal
Grouping combines multiple ship availabilities that have a similar work
scope over a longer time period into a single solicitation. Vertically
grouped ships in Norfolk were awarded in February, and the first two
horizontal groupings (one group in Norfolk and one group in San Diego)
are in solicitation now and awaiting industry bids. In order to reduce
the amount of time needed for change approvals that occur while a ship
is in execution, the Navy has implemented methods to streamline the
process for executing contract changes such as the Level of Effort
(LOE) to Completion and Small Dollar Value Growth initiatives. These
changes will serve to provide private-sector contractors with improved
workload and workforce predictability and stability, which are expected
to improve planning and execution of future work.
ship maintenance planning
33. Senator Hirono. Secretary Spencer, I understand that the Navy
uses the principle of ``executor in the loop'' to better coordinate
planning for aircraft carrier and submarine maintenance availabilities.
Is this principle something that could help in surface ship
maintenance?
Secretary Spencer. Yes, the surface ship maintenance community
recognizes the benefit from having the executor involved in
availability planning as early as possible in the process. One
significant difference between surface ship and both aircraft carrier
and submarine maintenance is the contracting timeline. Usually,
aircraft carrier and submarine availabilities are planned by the
executing shipyard and given as much as 18-months lead time between
contract award and the start of the maintenance as opposed to three to
six months for surface ships. In order to leverage benefits from
``executor in the loop'' principles while maintaining fair and open
competition, the Navy is developing a strategy that will afford surface
ship maintenance contractors the opportunity for earlier engagement in
the planning process by publically issuing preliminary work items or
draft specifications for review.
contracting strategy
34. Senator Hirono. Secretary Spencer, how is the current surface
ship maintenance contracting strategy performing in terms of creating
the business conditions needed for industry to attract the skilled
labor and capital necessary to perform at optimal levels and meet the
Navy's expectations and needs both today and in the future?
Secretary Spencer. The Navy recognizes that the current contracting
strategy requires changes to provide a more predictable and stable
longer term workload so industry can better forecast capacity needs.
Therefore, we are implementing contracting changes and initiatives to
update the acquisition strategy to improve longer term workload
stability and predictability. Capacity growth is assessed by regions
monthly. We have recently observed signs of improvements in capacity
and capability such as the Virginia Ship Repair Association (Feb 2019)
reporting that they have increased member companies from 250 in 2016 to
more than 280 at the close of 2018.
preventing surface ship mishaps
35. Senator Hirono. Mr. Pendleton, following the tragic mishaps
involving the destroyers Fitzgerald and McCain last year, the Navy
undertook a lengthy investigation and produced two reviews full of
recommendations, many of which were incorporated into law in the Fiscal
Year 2019 NDAA. Do you believe that these investigations,
recommendations and changes required in the NDAA fully address the root
causes of the surface mishaps in 2017?
Mr. Pendleton. In sum, the Navy has taken many actions to address
the root causes of the 2017 surface ship mishaps, but sustained
attention will be required to ensure those actions result in meaningful
and lasting change. Looking forward, we believe additional attention by
the Navy is needed to address manning shortfalls and maintenance
challenges.
Status of Navy Reforms
The Navy chartered its Readiness Reform Oversight Committee (RROC)
in January 2018 to implement more than 100 recommendations derived from
the Comprehensive Review and the Strategic Readiness Review it
conducted in 2017, as well as related recommendations from GAO and
other audit organizations. The Navy recently reported that 82 percent
of those recommendations have been implemented. \1\ However, the Navy
defines a recommendation as implemented when it initiates action and
sets policy instead of when its actions have been evaluated to
determine whether they have achieved their intended outcomes. As we
testified in December 2018, and as senior Navy officials have
recognized, reform efforts are ongoing and it will take years to
determine the efficacy of the Navy's actions.
GAO has made recommendations in addition to the ones being tracked
by the Oversight Committee. In total, GAO has made 25 readiness-related
recommendations to the Navy and Marine Corps, 19 of which relate to
surface ship readiness. \2\ The Navy concurred with the majority of
them, and has many actions underway that partially address them, but
has not completed implementation of any. Attention to these
recommendations can assist the Navy as it continues to address the
causes of the surface ship mishaps in 2017 and seeks to rebuild the
readiness of the surface fleet. We will monitor this going forward.
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\1\ U.S. Navy, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, RROC: One Year Later
(Feb. 25, 2019).
\2\ GAO, Navy and Marine Corps: Rebuilding Ship, Submarine, and
Aviation Readiness Will Require Time and Sustained Management
Attention, GAO-19-225T (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 12, 2018).
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Ship Manninq Shortfalls
While both of the Navy's reviews are in part focused on addressing
ship manpower requirements and manning, the issue of undermanned crews
could benefit from increased attention by the Navy to systemic or
underlying causes. Specifically,
Manpower requirements: Pursuant to GAO's recommendations,
the Navy has conducted studies across its surface ship classes to
reevaluate the proper size and composition of its crews, and has
drafted changes to guidance intended to prevent the perpetuation of
outdated or unrealistic manpower requirements. However, the Navy has
yet to update its manpower requirements for ships based on these
studies. Once a stable baseline for the number and type of required
personnel is established by updated manpower requirements, the Navy
could better understand the scale of its service-wide personnel issues.
For example, the Navy has cited it has a shortage of sailors with the
proper experience and skills to fully man the fleet and is expecting
manning shortfalls to persist through at least fiscal year 2021.
However, these shortfalls are likely to be worse given that the Navy
has not yet updated manpower requirements per our recommendation.
Manning: The Navy established a minimum threshold of
filling at least 95 percent of billets in its ship crews (referred to
as fill), with a minimum goal of 92 percent of those sailors having the
right qualification for the billet (known as fit). These fit-fill goals
are taken from the billets authorized (i.e. funded) every year, not
from the number or type of sailors required by updated ship manpower
requirements. Ninety-two percent fit and 95 percent filled results in
crews with unfilled billets, and that workload is redistributed among
other crew members. Also, as we learned during discussions with
officials and ship crews in November 2018, the Navy's methods for
tracking shipboard manning do not account for sailor experience, and
may overstate the number and skill level of sailors aboard and
available to work at any given time. For our December 2018 testimony,
we conducted group discussions with ship crews, during which sailors
consistently told us that ship workload had not decreased, workweeks
over 100 hours remained common, and that it was still extremely
challenging to complete all required workload while getting enough
sleep. It will be important for the Navy to man its ship crews
according to updated manpower requirements to ensure that sailors are
not overworked.
Maintenance Challenges
As we testified in December 2018 and have previously reported, the
Navy is increasingly unable to complete surface ship depot maintenance
on time and on cost. \3\ As noted in both the Navy's Comprehensive
Review and Strategic Readiness Review, this additional time and cost
needed to complete depot maintenance is pulling resources from other
areas and contributing to systemic problems. Additionally, in May 2016
we reported that the Navy's adherence to revised deployment, training,
and maintenance schedules-the Optimized Fleet Response Plan--
contributes to wide swings in workload. \4\ These swings in workload
erode the industrial base and exacerbate maintenance challenges. While
the Navy's Strategic Readiness Review recommended that the Navy should
increase the duration of surface ship availabilities by creating more
comprehensive work packages and reinstituting ship-check validation,
the effectiveness of these actions has not been determined.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ GAO-19-225T.
\4\ GAO, Military Readiness: Progress and Challenges in
Implementing the Navy's Optimized Fleet Response Plan, GAO-16466R
(Washington, D.C.: May 2, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In July 2017, we also reported that ships are being delivered to
the surface fleet in incomplete condition, leading to an increased
maintenance burden before they can operate. \5\ Additionally, the Navy
changed its contracting strategy for private shipyard maintenance in
2015 with the intention of reducing cost growth, but reductions in cost
growth are not yet evident. We recommended that the Navy systematically
assess the new strategy's implementation. The Navy concurred with our
recommendation and responded that it would submit biennial reports
covering its assessment, but it has not yet released its first biennial
report. \6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ GAO, Navy Shipbuilding: Policy Changes Needed to Improve the
Post-Delivery Process and Ship Quality, GAO-17418 (Washington, D.C.:
July 13, 2017).
\6\ GAO, Navy Ship Maintenance: Action Needed to Maximize New
Contracting Strategy's Potential Benefits, GAO-1754 (Washington, D.C.:
November 21, 2016). We did not include this report's recommendation in
our total above since it is not directly related to ship readiness.
However, the recommendation relates to maintenance cost growth, which
the Navy cited in the Strategic Readiness Review as being a depot
maintenance challenge.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ongoing GAO work
GAO has ongoing work examining key Navy training, manning, and
maintenance issues that we expect to report on over the next year that
will provide additional insight. Specifically, we will be reporting on:
Navy surface warfare officer training and career paths,
the Navy shipyard improvement plan,
Navy overseas ship maintenance and repair capacity,
implications of acquisition decisions on the sustainment
of Navy ships, and
Navy's implementation of the Multiple Award Contract,
Multi Order (MAC-MO) contracting strategy.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tim Kaine
shipyard optimization plan
36. Senator Kaine. Secretary Spencer, issued almost a year ago, the
Shipyard Optimization Plan is an attempt to optimally size, configure,
and locate the Navy's public shipyard infrastructure in order to meet
operational needs. The total estimated cost for this plan is $21
billion over 20 years, which is nearly three times what has
historically been spent on shipyard capital investment. What will be
the operational effects on the fleet if the Navy does not receive the
estimated funding identified in the Shipyard Optimization Plan and what
is your mitigation plan if you do not receive all the planned funding?
Secretary Spencer. If the Navy does not receive the estimated
funding identified in the Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Plan
(SIOP) Report delivered to Congress in February 2018, an estimated 67
major drydock availabilities will have to be moved, deferred and/or
rescheduled due to the lack of adequate dry dock capacity. The
shipyards' current outdated industrial layout will continue to impact
throughput, productivity, and morale. Naval shipyard capital equipment
infrastructure is well beyond its effective service life. Continuing to
rely on aged equipment for maintenance availabilities and places their
schedules at risk. Fully funding SIOP is crucial to the Navy's ability
to improve productive capacity at our shipyards to support increased
maintenance throughput and on time delivery of a growing fleet. If the
funding is not received for the optimization effort, the Navy will
attempt to mitigate existing depot level maintenance challenges by
continuing to follow the current facility sustainment model and work
towards recapitalizing the shipyards within that constrained funding
profile. Full benefits of the recapitalization with a focus on
optimization will be delayed or may not be realized at all to the
detriment of the Navy's readiness.
navy and marine corps installations funding shortages
37. Senator Kaine. Secretary Spencer, as you know, the current
backlog of installation infrastructure maintenance is significant. It
is highly unlikely the Navy and Marine Corps will be able to request
and receive enough military construction to find their way out of this
backlog, which will continue to degrade installation readiness. In
recent years, the Resilient Energy Program Office (REPO) has leveraged
third-party investment to improve installation readiness. However, REPO
projects have slowed to almost a halt in the last year. Why has the
REPO effort slowed, given the large infrastructure backlog, and do you
commit to placing an emphasis on REPO going forward?
Secretary Spencer. The Department of the Navy's energy strategy is
built on the Energy Security Framework and its three pillars of making
installations reliable, resilient, and efficient. Leveraging third-
party investments helps us achieve this goal and continues to be a top
priority for the Navy. The Navy and the Resilient Energy Program Office
(REPO) remain committed to this priority and utilizing third-party
investment projects whenever practicable. To better align energy
investments to mission assurance and critical operational capabilities,
the Navy created the Energy Mission Integration Group (EMIG) in 2018,
which leverages REPO expertise to identify the highest priority energy
gaps, determine the most effective solutions, and execute these
solutions through authority best suited for the requirement, to include
third-party investments. The Navy and REPO have executed $800 million
through 50 projects between fiscal year 2016 and 2018 and intend to
continue to develop and execute projects through the EMIG process at a
similar pace in the years to come.
climate change
38. Senator Kaine. Secretary Spencer, can you talk about some of
the climate-related impacts you've already observed and which
installations might make the top 10 most vulnerable to climate-related
events required by the Fiscal Year 2018 NDAA?
Secretary Spencer. We are seeing extreme weather events, droughts,
and sea level rise. Superstorm Sandy caused $50 million in damage at
Naval Weapons Station Earle. More recently, Hurricane Irma severely
impacted Naval Air Station Key West in 2017 and Hurricane Florence
caused $3.6 billion in damage at Camp Lejeune in 2018. Wildfires in
2018 forced the evacuation of Naval Air Station Point Mugu and burned
approximately 1,200 acres at Camp Pendleton. Droughts can have broad
implications for base infrastructure, impair testing activities,
increase the number of black flag day prohibitions for testing and
training, and contribute to heat-related illnesses. Naval Station
Norfolk is experiencing sea level rise averaging 4.6mm per year, with a
5.1mm increase in 2017. Sea level rise, land subsidence, and changing
ocean currents have resulted in more frequent nuisance flooding and
increased vulnerability to coastal storms. The ten most vulnerable
Marine Corps installations (in no particular order) are:
Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, CA
Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, NC
Marine Corps Base Camp Butler, Okinawa, Japan
Marine Corps Base Hawaii, HI
Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island, SC
Marine Corps Support Facility Blount Island, FL
Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort, SC
Marine Corps Base Quantico, VA
Marine Corps Reserve Forces, New Orleans, LA
Marine Corps Recruit Depot San Diego, CA The sixteen*
most vulnerable Navy installations (in no particular order) are:
Naval Air Station Key West, FL
Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay, GA
Naval Base Guam, Guam
Joint Base Pearl Harbor Hickam, HI
Wahiawa Annex, HI
Naval Magazine Indian Island, WA
Naval Base Coronado, CA
Naval Base San Diego, CA
Joint Base Anacostia Bolling, DC
Washington Navy Yard, DC
Andersen Air Force Base, Guam
Naval Support Facility Indian Head, MD
Naval Air Station Oceana, VA
Naval Air Station Norfolk, VA
Naval Support Activity Hampton Roads, VA
Naval Support Activity Hampton Roads--Northwest Annex,
VA/NC
Sixteen installations are listed to include installations
similarly impacted by current and potential future climate events.
[all]