    [Senate Hearing 115-674, Part 7]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                     S. Hrg. 115-674, Pt. 7

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2019 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                         ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                       ON

                                    S. 2987

         TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2019 FOR MILITARY
    ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION,
    TO PRESCRIBE MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR
                                 OTHER PURPOSES

                                   __________

                                     PART 7

                                STRATEGIC FORCES

                                   __________

                          MARCH 14, 22; APRIL 11, 2018

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

     [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
               2019 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM--Part 7

                                STRATEGIC FORCES

                                                     S. Hrg. 115-674, Pt. 7

                    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR
                    APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2019 AND
                        THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                         ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                       ON

                                    S. 2987

         TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2019 FOR MILITARY
    ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION,
    TO PRESCRIBE MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR
                                 OTHER PURPOSES

                                   __________

                                     PART 7

                                STRATEGIC FORCES

                                   __________

                          MARCH 14, 22; APRIL 11, 2018

                                   __________

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

            Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov

                                 ____

                 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
     41-249 PDF            WASHINGTON : 2020

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

      JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Chairman     JACK REED, Rhode Island
    JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma            BILL NELSON, Florida
    ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi         CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
    DEB FISCHER, Nebraska                JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
    TOM COTTON, Arkansas                 KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
    MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota            RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
    JONI ERNST, Iowa                     JOE DONNELLY, Indiana
    THOM TILLIS, North Carolina          MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
    DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska                 TIM KAINE, Virginia
    DAVID PERDUE, Georgia                ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine
    TED CRUZ, Texas                      MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
    LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina       ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
    BEN SASSE, Nebraska                  GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
    TIM SCOTT, South Carolina

                      Christian D. Brose, Staff Director
                      Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff
                                     Director

                        Subcommittee on Strategic Forces

      DEB FISCHER, Nebraska, Chairman     JOE DONNELLY, Indiana
    JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma             MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
    TOM COTTON, Arkansas                  ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
    DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska                  GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
    TED CRUZ, Texas
    LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina

                                      (ii)

                                 C O N T E N T S

                                 March 14, 2018

                                                                       Page

    Department of Energy Atomic Energy Defense Activities and             1
      Programs.

    Gordon-Hagerty, Honorable Lisa E., Under Secretary for Nuclear        2
      Security, Department of Energy.
    Owendoff, James M., Acting Assistant Secretary for Environmental     12
      Management, Department of Energy.
    Trimble, David C., Director, Natural Resources and Environment,      20
      Government Accountability Office.

    Questions for the Record.........................................    63

                                 March 22, 2018

                                                                       Page

    Ballistic Missile Defense Policies and Programs..................    73

    Rood, Honorable John C., Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,      75
      Department of Defense.
    Robinson, General Lori J., USAF, Commander, United States            79
      Northern Command and Commander, North American Aerospace
      Defense Command.
    Greaves, Lieutenant General Samuel A., USAF, Director, Missile       84
      Defense Agency, Department of Defense.
    Dickinson, Lieutenant General James H., USA, Commanding General,    101
      United States Army Space and Missile Defense Command/Army
      Forces Strategic Command and Joint Functional Component Command
      for Integrated Missile Defense.

    Questions for the Record.........................................   127

                                 April 11, 2018

                                                                       Page

    United States Nuclear Weapons Policy, Programs, and Strategy.....   131

    Roberts, Honorable Guy B., Assistant Secretary of Defense for       133
      Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs.
    Soofer, Robert M., Ph.D., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense     139
      for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy.
    Rand, General Robin, USAF, Commander, Air Force Global Strike       146
      Command.
    Benedict, Vice Admiral Terry J., USN, Director, Strategic Systems   156
      Programs.

    Questions for the Record.........................................   174

                                     (iii)

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2019 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                           WEDNESDAY, MARCH 14, 2018

                                   U.S. Senate,
                      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

       DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES AND PROGRAMS

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m. in
    Room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Deb
    Fischer (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Subcommittee members present: Senators Fischer, Cotton,
    Donnelly, Reed, Warren, and Peters.

                OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DEB FISCHER

        Senator Fischer. The hearing will come to order.
        The subcommittee meets today to receive testimony on the
    Department of Energy's atomic energy defense activities.
        Thank you to the witnesses for appearing before us today
    and for your service to this country. We appreciate it.
        We are very pleased today to be joined by the ranking
    member of the full committee, Senator Reed from Rhode Island,
    and I would ask Senator Reed if he has comments to make at this
    time.
        Senator Reed. I do not have an opening statement. Thank
    you, Madam Chairman.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you.
        Today's hearing marks the subcommittee's first meeting in
    open session since the release of the administration's 2018
    Nuclear Posture Review, which makes several key points that
    will be relevant to our discussion today. Where the NPR
    [Nuclear Posture Review] affirms the need for a modern and
    responsive nuclear infrastructure, it acknowledges that this
    has been a goal of all previous NPRs and that we have failed to
    make sufficient progress towards achieving this objective.
        As a result, it clearly states that there is no margin for
    further delay, a point you echoed in your prepared testimony,
    Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, and that, ``Significant and sustained
    investments will be required over the coming decade to ensure
    that NNSA [National Nuclear Security Administration] will be
    able to deliver the nuclear weapons at the needed rate to
    support nuclear deterrence in the 2030s and beyond.''
        Secretary, we look forward to hearing from you about the
    steps NNSA will be taking to confront this challenge and how
    the fiscal year 2019 budget request supports your needs with
    respect to sustaining the current stockpile and fulfilling
    NNSA's other missions.
        I also appreciated our discussion on Tuesday and your view
    that we must make a decision on the plutonium strategy and
    proceed aggressively so that we can meet the requirement to
    produce 80 pits per year by 2030. This committee looks forward
    to the conclusion of NNSA's engineering analysis and working
    with you to address this critical issue.
        Mr. Owendoff, we look forward to hearing an update from you
    on the Department of Energy's environmental management
    portfolio and Mr. Trimble's assessment of EM's [Office of
    Environmental Management] efforts.
        And, Admiral Caldwell, as always it is good to see you
    again and hear about Naval Reactors' contribution to our
    national security.
        With that, our ranking member has not arrived yet. I will
    ask for his opening statement when he does come, but I would
    like to begin with the Secretary, if you have an opening
    statement.

    STATEMENT OF HONORABLE LISA E. GORDON-HAGERTY, UNDER SECRETARY
               FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. Thank you very much, Chairman
    Fischer, Senator Reed, and the distinguished soon-to-join-us
    members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to
    present the President's fiscal year 2019 budget request for the
    Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security
    Administration.
        I would also like to thank you both for your support during
    my recent confirmation. It is a privilege to sit here before
    you today representing the extraordinary men and women of the
    DOE [Deparment of Energy] NNSA and the vital roles we play in
    executing our Nation's nuclear security mission.
        Chairman Fischer, a written statement has been provided to
    the subcommittee, and I respectfully request that it be
    submitted for the record.
        Senator Fischer. Without objection.
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. Thank you.
        Since being sworn in 3 weeks ago, I have had the
    opportunity to learn in depth about many of NNSA's programs and
    projects, and I still have a great deal more to learn. But what
    I have seen so far is impressive. From steady progress towards
    infrastructure modernization to flight qualification tests of
    the B-61-12, removals of highly enriched uranium from Ghana and
    the Republic of Kazakhstan to the commissioning to a new class
    of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, NNSA has lent its world-
    class expertise to keeping our Nation safe and secure with the
    support of this subcommittee and Congress. But there is much
    more to be done to meet the challenges posed by the current
    geopolitical environment.
        The President's fiscal year 2019 budget request for NNSA is
    $15.1 billion, providing the resources required to help ensure
    we are able to protect our Nation and keep our allies safe. And
    this request also moves us toward a deterrent that is modern,
    robust, flexible, resilient, ready, and appropriately tailored
    as outlined in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review.
        The fiscal year 2019 budget request clearly demonstrates
    the administration's strong support of the NNSA and its three
    enduring missions: maintaining the safety, security,
    reliability, and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear weapons
    stockpile; reducing the threat of nuclear proliferation and
    nuclear terrorism around the world; and providing nuclear
    propulsion for the U.S. Navy's fleet of aircraft carriers and
    submarines.
        NNSA's fiscal year 2019 budget request for weapons
    activities account is $11 billion, an increase of 7.6 percent
    over the fiscal year 2018 request to ensure we are able to
    achieve and maintain necessary capabilities. This funding
    supports the Nation's current and future defense posture,
    including infrastructure across the nuclear security
    enterprise. This budget request supports our three life
    extension programs and major alteration and advances
    recapitalization and modernization of our Cold War-era
    infrastructure.
        The fiscal year 2019 budget request also includes $1.9
    billion for defense nuclear nonproliferation account, a 3.9
    percent increase above the fiscal year 2018 request. This
    funding continues NNSA's far-reaching activities around the
    world to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons, counter the
    threat of nuclear terrorism, and respond to nuclear or
    radiological incidents.
        The budget request for naval reactors is $1.8 billion, a
    20.9 percent increase above the fiscal year 2018 request. In
    addition to supporting today's operational fleet, this request
    sustains Naval Reactors' ability to deliver tomorrow's fleet.
    It consists of three key projects: developing the Columbia-
    class reactor plant, refueling a research and training reactor
    in New York, and building a new spent fuel handling facility in
    Idaho.
        But paramount to all of our endeavors is our modernization
    effort. There is no longer margin for delay in modernizing
    NNSA's scientific, technical, and engineering capabilities and
    recapitalizing the infrastructure needed to produce strategic
    materials and components for U.S. nuclear weapons. NNSA's
    talented cadre of federal employees and partners at our
    laboratories, plants, and sites need these tools to overcome
    the complex challenges facing our nuclear security mission.
        The budget request for federal salaries and expenses is
    $422.5 million. This request provides funding for 1,715 full-
    time equivalents, for effective program management and
    appropriate oversight of the nuclear security enterprise. Of
    note, since 2010, NNSA's program funding has increased 50
    percent while our staffing has decreased by 10 percent.
        NNSA's fiscal year 2019 budget request is the result of a
    disciplined process to prioritize funding for validated
    requirements as designated by the administration and it sets
    the foundation to implement policies from the Nuclear Posture
    Review and the National Security Strategy.
        Thank you for your strong support of this subcommittee and
    the opportunity to testify before you today. I stand ready to
    answer any questions you may have. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary Gordon-Hagerty
    follows:]

             Prepared Statement by Secretary Lisa E. Gordon-Hagerty
        Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Donnelly, and Members of the
    Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to present the President's
    fiscal year (FY) 2019 budget request for the Department of Energy's
    (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). NNSA deeply
    appreciates the Committee's strong support for the nuclear security
    mission and for the extraordinary people and organizations that are
    responsible for its execution.
        The President's fiscal year 2019 budget request for NNSA is $15.1
    billion, an increase of $1.2 billion or 8.3 percent over the fiscal
    year 2018 request. The request represents approximately 50 percent of
    DOE's total budget. This budget request demonstrates the
    Administration's strong support for NNSA and reinforces the recently
    released Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and National Security Strategy
    (NSS). We will continue to work with the Department of Defense (DOD) to
    determine the resources, time, and funding required to address policies
    laid out in the NPR, including the potential low yield ballistic
    missile warhead, sea launched cruise missile, and B83-1 gravity bomb.
    We live in an evolving international security environment that is more
    complex and demanding than any since the end of the Cold War, which
    necessitates a national commitment to maintain modern and effective
    nuclear forces and infrastructure. To remain effective, however,
    recapitalizing our Cold War legacy nuclear forces is critical.
        NNSA's enduring missions remain vital to the national security of
    the United States: maintaining the safety, security, reliability, and
    effectiveness of the nuclear weapons stockpile; reducing the threat of
    nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism around the world; and
    providing nuclear propulsion for the U.S. Navy's fleet of aircraft
    carriers and submarines. The President's fiscal year 2019 budget
    request is reflective of this Administration's strong support for NNSA
    and ensures that U.S. nuclear forces are modern, robust, flexible,
    resilient, ready, and appropriately tailored to deter 21st-century
    threats and reassure America's allies.
        Attracting, training, and retaining a skilled and experienced
    workforce is critical to NNSA's ability to accomplish its diverse
    missions. NNSA's dedicated and highly talented cadre of Federal
    employees and Management and Operating (M&O) contract partners must be
    supported with the tools necessary to support the complex and
    challenging responsibilities found only within NNSA's nuclear security
    enterprise. NNSA's infrastructure is in a brittle state that requires
    significant and sustained investments over the coming decade to
    correct. There is no margin for further delay in modernizing NNSA's
    scientific, technical, and engineering capabilities, and recapitalizing
    our infrastructure needed to produce strategic materials and components
    for U.S. nuclear weapons.
        The fiscal year 2019 budget request also reflects the close
    partnerships between NNSA and other federal departments and agencies.
    NNSA collaborates with DOD to meet military requirements, support the
    Nation's nuclear deterrent, and modernize the nuclear security
    enterprise. NNSA also partners with a range of federal agencies, to
    prevent, counter, and respond to nuclear proliferation and nuclear
    terrorism.
        NNSA is mindful of its obligation to be responsible stewards of the
    resources entrusted by Congress and the American taxpayers. Our fiscal
    year 2019 budget request is the result of a disciplined process to
    prioritize funding for validated requirements as designated by the
    Administration and sets the foundation to implement policies from the
    NPR and NSS.
                        weapons activities appropriation
        The fiscal year 2019 budget request for the Weapons Activities
    account is $11.0 billion, an increase of $777.7 million or 7.6 percent
    over fiscal year 2018 request levels. Nuclear deterrence remains the
    bedrock of America's national security. Given the criticality of
    effective U.S. nuclear deterrence to the safety of the American people,
    allies, and partners, there is no doubt that NNSA's sustainment and
    replacement program should be regarded as both necessary and
    affordable. The programs funded in this account support the Nation's
    current and future defense posture and the associated nationwide
    infrastructure of science, technology, and engineering capabilities.
        The Weapons Activities account supports the maintenance and
    refurbishment of nuclear weapons to maintain safety, security, and
    reliability; investments in scientific, engineering, and manufacturing
    capabilities to certify the enduring nuclear weapons stockpile; and the
    fabrication of nuclear weapon components. This account also includes
    investments in enterprise-wide infrastructure sustainment activities,
    physical and cybersecurity activities, and the secure transportation of
    nuclear materials.
    Maintaining the Stockpile
        This year, the work of the science-based Stockpile Stewardship
    Program again supported the Secretaries of Energy and Defense in
    certifying to the President for the 22nd consecutive year, that the
    U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile remains safe, secure, and reliable
    without the need for nuclear explosive testing. This remarkable
    scientific achievement is made possible through the work accomplished
    by NNSA's world-class scientists, engineers, and technicians, and
    through investments in state-of-the-art diagnostic tools, high
    performance computing platforms, and modern facilities.
        For Directed Stockpile Work (DSW), the fiscal year 2019 budget
    request is $4.7 billion, an increase of $689.0 million or 17.3 percent
    over the fiscal year 2018 request. Included within this request is
    funding to support the life extension programs (LEPs) for the W76, B61,
    and W80, and a major alteration of the W88; and advance the ground
    based strategic deterrent, by one year to 2019, and investigate
    feasibility of interoperable aspects for other types of warheads. These
    LEPs are aligned with the needs outlined in the NPR and with the
    approved Nuclear Weapons Council strategic plan.
          W76-1 LEP: The $113.9 million requested for the W76-1 LEP
    directly supports the sea-based leg of the nuclear triad by extending
    the service life of the original W76-0 warhead. With continued funding,
    the W76-1 LEP will remain on schedule and on budget to complete
    production in fiscal year 2019.
          B61-12 LEP: NNSA continues to make progress on the B61-12
    LEP that will consolidate four variants of the B61 gravity bomb. This
    LEP will meet military requirements for reliability, service-life,
    field maintenance, safety, and use control while also addressing
    multiple components nearing end of life in this oldest nuclear weapon
    in the stockpile. With the $794.0 million requested, NNSA will remain
    on schedule to deliver the First Production Unit (FPU) of the B61-12 in
    fiscal year 2020. NNSA is responsible for refurbishing the nuclear
    explosives package and updating the electronics for this weapon. The
    Air Force will provide the tail kit assembly under a separate
    acquisition program. When fielded, the B61-12 gravity bomb will support
    both Air Force long-range nuclear-capable bombers and dual-capable
    fighter aircraft and bolster central deterrence for the United States
    while also providing extended deterrence to America's allies and
    partners.
          W88 Alteration 370 Program: Currently in the Production
    Engineering Phase (Phase 6.4), the W88 Alt 370 is on schedule, with FPU
    planned in December 2019. The budget request for this program, which
    also supports the sea-based leg of the nuclear triad, is $304.3 million
    in fiscal year 2019.
          W80-4 LEP: The current air-launched cruise missile
    delivers a W80 warhead first deployed in 1982. Both the missile and the
    warhead are well past planned end of life and are exhibiting aging
    issues. To maintain this vital deterrent capability, NNSA requests
    $654.8 million in fiscal year 2019, an increase of $255.7 million or
    64.1 percent over the fiscal year 2018 request to extend the W80
    warhead, through the W80-4 LEP, for use in the Air Force's Long Range
    Stand-Off (LRSO) cruise missile. This funding supports a significant
    increase in program activity through the Design Definition and Cost
    Study Phase on a timeline consistent with the DOD's LRSO missile
    platform modernization schedule.
          Interoperable Warhead 1 (IW1): The IW1 program will
    replace one of the oldest warheads in the stockpile, and provide
    improved warhead security, safety, and use control. To replace the Air
    Force employed W78 warhead, NNSA is requesting $53.0 million to support
    the scheduled restart of the feasibility study and design options work
    suspended in 2014. Technology development efforts are focused on
    supporting the W78 warhead replacement and investigate the feasibility
    of interoperable aspects for other types of warheads. To reduce risk,
    investments will initially be made against technologies that are less
    than technology readiness level 5.
        Within DSW, the fiscal year 2019 budget request includes $619.5
    million for Stockpile Systems. This program sustains the stockpile in
    accordance with the Nuclear Weapon Stockpile Plan by producing and
    replacing limited-life components such as neutron generators and gas
    transfer systems; conducting maintenance, surveillance, and evaluations
    to assess weapon reliability; detecting and anticipating potential
    weapon issues; and compiling and analyzing information during the
    Annual Assessment process.
        The DSW also requests $1.1 billion for Stockpile Services to
    support the modernization of capabilities to improve efficiency of
    manufacturing operations to meet future requirements. The Stockpile
    Services request supports all DSW operations by funding programmatic
    and infrastructure management, and maintaining the core competencies
    and technologies essential for reliable and operable stewardship
    capabilities.
        Strategic Materials are key for the safety, security, and
    effectiveness of the Nation's nuclear deterrent and are used for
    addressing national security concerns such as nuclear nonproliferation
    and counterterrorism missions. The requested funding is necessary to
    maintain NNSA's ability to produce the nuclear and other strategic
    materials associated with nuclear weapons as well as refurbish and
    manufacture components made from these materials. The program includes
    Uranium Sustainment, Plutonium Sustainment, Tritium Sustainment,
    Domestic Uranium Enrichment (DUE), and other strategic materials, such
    as lithium.
          Strategic Materials Sustainment: The $218.8 million for
    the Strategic Materials Sustainment program will develop and implement
    strategies to maintain the technical base for strategic materials in
    support of NNSA's nuclear weapons, non-proliferation, and naval
    reactors activities at NNSA's eight sites.
          Uranium Sustainment: Funding for Uranium Sustainment
    supports the program to maintain existing enriched uranium capabilities
    through enhanced equipment maintenance while preparing to phase out
    mission dependency on Building 9212, a Manhattan Project-era production
    facility at the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) in Oak Ridge,
    Tennessee. The funding request of $87.2 million will assist NNSA in
    sustaining uranium manufacturing capabilities while accelerating
    planning and execution of the Building 9212 Exit Strategy to reduce
    risks associated with transitioning enriched uranium capabilities to
    the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) that is under construction.
          Plutonium Sustainment: The $361.3 million requested for
    Plutonium Sustainment supports continued progress to meet pit
    production requirements. The requested funding increase would support
    efforts to begin the long term plan to develop a capability to produce
    no fewer than 80 W87-like war reserve pits per year by 2030, as
    directed in the NPR.
          Tritium Sustainment: The fiscal year 2019 budget request
    of $205.3 million will support the Nation's capacity to provide the
    tritium necessary for national security requirements. Tritium will be
    produced by irradiating Tritium Producing Burnable Absorber Rods in
    designated Tennessee Valley Authority nuclear power plants and by
    recovering and recycling tritium from gas transfer systems returned
    from the stockpile at the SRS Tritium Extraction Facility.
          Lithium Sustainment: The fiscal year 2019 budget request
    establishes a separate Lithium Sustainment Program of $29.1 million
    that supports a Lithium Bridging Strategy to maintain the production of
    the nation's enriched lithium supply in support of the nuclear security
    mission, DOE's Office of Science, and DHS.
          Domestic Uranium Enrichment: The DUE program, with a
    request of $100.7 million in fiscal year 2019, will continue efforts to
    make available when needed the necessary supplies of enriched uranium
    for a variety of national security needs.
        For Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E), the fiscal
    year 2019 budget request is $2.0 billion, a decrease of $33.0 million
    or 1.6 percent below the fiscal year 2018 request.
        Increases for the Science Program ($564.9 million) provide
    additional funding to support subcritical experiments for pit reuse and
    advanced diagnostics for subcritical hydrodynamic integrated weapons
    experiments that produce key data for stockpile certifications.
        The Engineering Program ($211.4 million) sustains NNSA's capability
    for creating and maturing advanced toolsets and technologies to improve
    weapon surety and support annual stockpile assessments.
        The Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield Program in
    fiscal year 2019 ($418.9 million) will continue to build upon prior
    accomplishments. These efforts continue to provide key data to reduce
    uncertainty in calculations of nuclear weapons performance and improve
    the predictive capability of science and engineering models in high-
    pressure, high-energy, high-density regimes.
        The RDT&E request for fiscal year 2019 includes $703.4 million for
    the Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC) Program, and continues
    NNSA's program of collaboration with DOE's Office of Science to
    implement DOE's Exascale Computing Initiative. NNSA's ASC Program will
    support stockpile stewardship by developing and deploying predictive
    simulation capabilities for nuclear weapons systems. NNSA is taking
    major steps in high-performance computing by deploying increasingly
    powerful computational capabilities at both Los Alamos National
    Laboratory (LANL) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.
        The Secure Transportation Asset (STA) program provides safe, secure
    movement of nuclear weapons, special nuclear material, and weapon
    components to meet projected DOE, DOD, and other customer requirements.
    The Office of Secure Transportation has an elite workforce performing
    sensitive and demanding work; agents are among the most highly trained
    and dedicated national security personnel operating within the United
    States. The fiscal year 2019 budget request of $278.6 million continues
    our efforts to modernize and replace the existing fleet of transporters
    and efforts to hire and train an additional 40 agents. The fiscal year
    2019 funding also supports the Safeguards Transporter (SGT) risk
    reduction initiatives to extend the life of the SGT to meet the STA
    mission capacity.
        NNSA's Office of Defense Programs also maintains the vitality of
    the broader nuclear security enterprise that supports other agencies'
    nuclear missions. An important aspect of this effort is investment in
    Laboratory, Site and Plant Directed Research and Development. As
    confirmed by independent reviews, this type of defense research and
    development investment provides basic research funding to foster
    innovation and to attract and retain scientific and technical talent
    and is critical to the long-term sustainment of our national
    laboratories.
    Improving Safety, Operations, and Infrastructure
        NNSA's diverse national security missions are dependent upon the
    safety and reliability of its infrastructure. More than half of NNSA's
    facilities are over 40 years old, and roughly 30 percent date back to
    the Manhattan Project era. If left unaddressed, the condition and age
    of NNSA's infrastructure will put NNSA's missions, the safety of its
    workforce, the public, and the environment at risk. As reaffirmed in
    the NPR, ``An effective, responsive, and resilient nuclear weapons
    infrastructure is essential to the U.S. capacity to adapt flexibly to
    shifting requirements. Such an infrastructure offers tangible evidence
    to both allies and potential adversaries of U.S. nuclear weapons
    capabilities and can help to deter, assure, hedge against adverse
    developments, and discourage adversary interest in arms competition.''
    The fiscal year 2019 budget request for Infrastructure and Operations
    is $3.0 billion, an increase of $199.6 million or 7.1 percent above the
    fiscal year 2018 request. The Fiscal Year 2018 National Defense
    Authorization Act provided NNSA and its M&O partners with additional
    flexibility to address the challenges of modernizing the enterprise by
    increasing the minor construction threshold to $20 million. This reform
    supports efforts to address deferred maintenance through
    recapitalization projects that improve the condition and extend the
    design life of structures, capabilities, and systems to meet NNSA's
    nuclear weapons and nonproliferation program needs.
        The fiscal year 2019 budget request for Infrastructure and
    Operations includes $1.1 billion for Line Item Construction projects.
    The requested amount provides the remaining funding of $48.0 million
    for the Albuquerque Facility, supports UPF at Y-12 ($703.0 million),
    and continues the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement project
    at LANL ($235.1 million). The fiscal year 2019 budget also includes
    $19.0 million in funding to begin the first steps toward the
    construction of a new lithium production facility and $6 million for
    the 138kV Power Transmission System Replacement project to replace and
    upgrade the current power transmission system for the Mission Corridor
    at NNSS. Delivering these projects on budget and schedule is contingent
    upon stable and predictable funding profiles, and the President's
    budget request being supported.
        Many of NNSA's excess process-contaminated facilities will
    ultimately be transferred to DOE's Office of Environmental Management
    for disposition. In the interim, NNSA is focusing on reducing risks
    where possible. For example, NNSA has made critical investments to
    stabilize high-risk process contaminated facilities until ultimate
    disposition, including at Y-12's Alpha 5 and Beta 4 facilities. NNSA
    also remains committed to reducing the risk of non-process contaminated
    facilities by dispositioning facilities where possible. In late 2017,
    NNSA, with the support of Congress, completed the transfer to a private
    developer of over 200 acres of the aging Bannister Federal Complex in
    Kansas City, Missouri, eliminating $300 million of repair needs.
        Later this spring, completion of the Pantex Drummond Office
    Building (formerly known as the Administrative Support Complex) at the
    Pantex Plant outside of Amarillo, Texas will allow NNSA to move nearly
    1,000 employees into a modern, energy efficient workspace. After
    completion of the Pantex Drummond Office building NNSA will also be
    able to dispose of dilapidated, 1950s-era buildings and eliminate
    approximately $20 million in deferred maintenance.
        Defense Nuclear Security's (DNS) fiscal year 2019 budget request is
    $690.6 million, an increase of $3.7 million or 0.5 percent over the
    fiscal year 2018 request. To execute its enterprise security program,
    DNS provides funding to the sites for: protective forces, physical
    security systems, information security and technical security,
    personnel security, nuclear material control and accountability, and
    security program operations and planning. The request manages risk
    among important, competing demands of the physical security
    infrastructure and includes planning and conceptual design funds for a
    series of future projects to sustain and recapitalize the Perimeter
    Intrusion Detection and Assessment Systems at the Pantex Plant and Y-
    12. Preliminary estimates are included within the recently completed
    10-year Physical Security Systems Refresh Plan. Future budget requests
    will reflect refined and detailed funding requirements.
        Information Technology and Cybersecurity enable every element of
    NNSA's missions. The fiscal year 2019 budget request is $221.2 million,
    an increase of $34.4 million, or 18.4 percent over the fiscal year 2018
    request. The cybersecurity program continuously monitors enterprise
    wireless and security technologies to meet a wide range of security
    challenges. The requested funding increase will be used to continue
    working toward a comprehensive information technology and cybersecurity
    program to deliver secure crucial information assets. The funding will
    continue to mature the cybersecurity infrastructure, comprising almost
    100 sensors and over 70 data acquisition servers located across the
    Nation.
                 defense nuclear nonproliferation appropriation
        The fiscal year 2019 budget request for the Defense Nuclear
    Nonproliferation account is $1.9 billion, an increase of $69.5 million
    or 3.9 percent above the fiscal year 2018 request. Defense Nuclear
    Nonproliferation account activities address the entire nuclear threat
    spectrum by helping to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons,
    counter the threat of nuclear terrorism, and respond to nuclear and
    radiological incidents around the world. The fiscal year 2019 budget
    request funds two program mission areas under the Defense Nuclear
    Nonproliferation account: the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN)
    Program and the Nuclear Counterterrorism and Incident Response (NCTIR)
    Program.
    Nonproliferation Efforts
        The Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation works with
    international partners to remove or eliminate vulnerable nuclear
    material; improve global nuclear security through multilateral and
    bilateral technical exchanges and training workshops; help prevent the
    illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials; secure
    domestic and international civilian buildings containing high-priority
    radioactive material; provide technical reviews of U.S. export license
    applications; conduct export control training sessions for U.S.
    enforcement agencies and international partners; strengthen the
    International Atomic Energy Agency's ability to detect and deter
    nuclear proliferation; advance U.S. capabilities to monitor arms
    control treaties and detect foreign nuclear programs; and maintain
    organizational readiness to respond to and mitigate radiological or
    nuclear incidents worldwide.
        The Material Management and Minimization (M3) program provides an
    integrated approach to addressing the risk posed by nuclear materials.
    The fiscal year 2019 budget request is $332.1 million. The request
    supports the conversion or shut-down of research reactors and isotope
    production facilities that use highly enriched uranium (HEU) and
    acceleration of new, non HEU-based molybdenum-99 production facilities
    in the United States, which recently contributed to the approval of the
    first Food and Drug Administration-approved U.S.-origin technology to
    produce the medical isotope. Additionally, the request for M3 supports
    the removal and disposal of weapons usable nuclear material and
    continues the transition to the dilute and dispose strategy for surplus
    plutonium disposition, including the completion of the independent
    validation of lifecycle cost estimate and schedule for the dilute and
    dispose strategy.
        The Global Material Security program works with partner nations to
    increase the security of vulnerable nuclear and radioactive materials
    and improve ability to deter, detect, and investigate illicit
    trafficking of these materials. The fiscal year 2019 budget request for
    this program is $337.1 million and includes efforts to secure the most
    at-risk radioactive material in U.S. high-threat urban areas by 2020.
        The Nonproliferation and Arms Control program develops and
    implements programs to strengthen international nuclear safeguards;
    control the spread of nuclear and dual-use material, equipment,
    technology and expertise; verify nuclear reductions and compliance with
    nonproliferation and arms control treaties and agreements; and address
    enduring and emerging proliferation challenges requiring the
    development of innovative policies and approached. The fiscal year 2019
    budget request for this program is $129.7 million. This increase serves
    to improve the deployment readiness of U.S. nuclear disablement and
    dismantlement verification teams and to enhance export control dual-use
    license and interdiction technical reviews.
        The Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development
    program supports innovative unilateral and multilateral technical
    capabilities to detect, identify, and characterize foreign nuclear
    weapons programs, illicit diversion of special nuclear material, and
    nuclear detonations worldwide. The fiscal year 2019 budget request for
    this program is $456.1 million.
        Nonproliferation Construction consolidates construction costs for
    DNN projects. The fiscal year 2019 budget request is $279.0 million. As
    in fiscal year 2018, the Administration proposes termination activities
    for the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility project and
    continuing to pursue the dilute and dispose option to fulfill the
    United States' commitment to dispose of 34 metric tons of plutonium.
    The $220.0 million for the MOX Facility will be used to continue
    terminating the project and to achieve an orderly and safe closure. The
    scope and costs will be refined in subsequent budget requests when the
    termination plan for the MOX project is approved. The request also
    includes $59.0 million for the Surplus Plutonium Disposition project to
    support the dilute and dispose strategy.
    Nuclear Counterterrorism and Incident Response (NCTIR)
        The fiscal year 2019 budget request for NCTIR is $319.2 million, an
    increase of $41.8 million or 15.1 percent over the fiscal year 2018
    request. NNSA's Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation (CTCP)
    program is part of broader U.S. Government efforts to assess the threat
    of nuclear terrorism and develop technical countermeasures. The
    scientific knowledge generated by this program underpins the technical
    expertise for disabling potential nuclear threat devices, including
    improvised nuclear devices, supports and informs U.S. nuclear security
    policy, and guides nuclear counterterrorism and counterproliferation
    efforts, including interagency nuclear forensics and contingency
    planning.
        The Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation program provides a
    flexible, efficient, and effective response capability for any nuclear/
    radiological incident in the United States or abroad by applying the
    unique technical expertise across NNSA's nuclear security enterprise.
    Appropriately trained personnel and specialized technical equipment are
    ready to deploy to provide an integrated response for radiological
    search, render safe, and consequence management for nuclear/
    radiological emergencies, national exercises, and security operations
    for large National Security Special Events.
        The CTCP program maintains an operational nuclear forensics
    capability for pre-detonation device disassembly and examination,
    provides operational support for post-detonation assessment, and
    coordinates the analysis of special nuclear materials. Readiness is
    maintained to deploy device disposition and device assessment teams,
    conduct laboratory operations in support of analysis of bulk actinide
    forensics, and to deploy subject matter expertise and operational
    capabilities in support of ground sample collections that contribute to
    conclusions in support of attribution.
        NNSA's Aerial Measuring System (AMS) provides airborne remote
    sensing in the event of a nuclear or radiological accident or incident
    within the continental United States, as well as in support of high-
    visibility national security events.
        The AMS fleet consists of three B200 fixed-wing aircraft with an
    average age of 33 years and two Bell 412 helicopters with an average
    age of 24 years. The age of the current aircraft leads to unscheduled
    downtime resulting in reduced mission availability. A recently
    concluded Analysis of Alternatives on the AMS aircraft determined that
    recapitalization of the aging aircraft fleet is necessary to continue
    to provide Federal, state, and local officials with rapid radiological
    information following an accident or incident. The fiscal year 2019
    budget requests $32.5 million as part of a two-year replacement process
    for the five aircraft.
        The equipment used by NNSA's emergency response teams is aging,
    resulting in increasing maintenance costs and increasing risks to the
    emergency response mission. This budget includes funding for
    incremental recapitalization of incident response equipment consistent
    with lifecycle planning to maintain operational readiness. This budget
    also includes funding for state-of-the-art, secure, deployable
    communications systems that are interoperable with the Federal Bureau
    of Investigation and DOD mission partners that will help provide
    decision makers with real-time technical recommendations to mitigate
    nuclear terrorist threats.
        The Emergency Operations program's fiscal year 2019 budget request
    includes $36 million under NCTIR to support NNSA's Office of Emergency
    Operations. This funding will support NNSA's all hazard emergency
    response capabilities, such as providing incident management training
    and exercise planning, and managing the Emergency Communications
    Network capability for the Department.
                          naval reactors appropriation
    Advancing Naval Nuclear Propulsion
        Nuclear propulsion for the U.S. Navy's nuclear-powered fleet is
    critical to the security of the United States and its allies as well as
    the security of global sea lanes. NNSA's Naval Reactors Program remains
    at the forefront of technological developments in naval nuclear
    propulsion by advancing new technologies and improvements in naval
    reactor performance. This preeminence provides the U.S. Navy with a
    commanding edge in naval war fighting capabilities.
        The Naval Reactors fiscal year 2019 budget request is $1.8 billion,
    an increase of $308.9 million or 20.9 percent above the fiscal year
    2018 request. In addition to supporting today's operational fleet, the
    requested funding is the foundation for Naval Reactors to deliver
    tomorrow's fleet and recruit and retain a highly-skilled workforce. One
    of Naval Reactors' three national priority projects, continuing design
    and development of the reactor plant for the Columbia-class submarine,
    featuring a life-of-ship core and electric drive, will replace the
    current Ohio-class fleet and provide required deterrence capabilities
    for decades. The project to refuel a Research and Training Reactor in
    New York will facilitate Columbia-class reactor development efforts to
    provide 20 more years of live reactor-based training for fleet
    operators. Funding will also be used to support construction of a new
    spent fuel handling facility in Idaho that will facilitate long term,
    reliable processing and packaging of spent nuclear fuel from aircraft
    carriers and submarines.
        Naval Reactors has requested funding in fiscal year 2019 to support
    these projects and fund necessary reactor technology development,
    equipment, construction, maintenance, and modernization of critical
    infrastructure and facilities. By employing a small but high-performing
    technical base, the teams at Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory in
    Pittsburgh, Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory and Kesselring Site in
    greater Albany, and the spent nuclear fuel facilities in Idaho can
    perform the research and development, analysis, engineering, and
    testing needed to support today's fleet at sea and develop future
    nuclear-powered warships. The laboratories also perform the technical
    evaluations that enable Naval Reactors to thoroughly assess emergent
    issues and deliver timely responses to provide nuclear safety and
    maximize operational flexibility.
                nnsa federal salaries and expenses appropriation
        The NNSA Federal Salaries and Expenses fiscal year 2019 budget
    request is $422.5 million, an increase of $3.9 million or 0.9 percent
    over the fiscal year 2018 request. The fiscal year 2019 budget request
    provides funding for 1,715 full-time equivalents for the effective
    program and project management and appropriate oversight of the nuclear
    security enterprise. Since 2010, NNSA's program funding has increased
    50 percent, while staffing has decreased 10 percent. NNSA has partnered
    with the Office of Personnel Management to develop a staffing analysis,
    now in its second phase, of a Human Capital Management Plan that
    assesses current personnel levels compared to mission needs. The
    results of the staffing analysis will be used to inform future
    recommendations on appropriate staff size and provide the type and
    number of scientists, engineers, project managers, foreign affairs
    specialists, and support staff needed to accomplish the mission. Part
    of the evaluation includes a review of current staff skill sets and
    areas where skills are needed for project and program management,
    applicable oversight, and day to day operations of the nuclear security
    enterprise.
        Thanks to the support of Congress, NNSA received a 10-year
    extension to continue to use the Demonstration Project personnel
    system. The pay for performance personnel system provides an important
    tool to retain and attract top talent for NNSA's national security
    missions. With the pay to perform personnel system, we are able to
    compete for personnel with other highly technical federal and private
    organizations, motivate and retain high-performing employees, and deal
    with poor performers. NNSA uses the Demonstration Project in
    conjunction with the Excepted Service hiring authorities to hire key
    personnel for the current and next generation workforce with critical
    nuclear security expertise.
                            management & performance
        Since 2011, NNSA has delivered approximately $1.4 billion in
    projects, a significant portion of NNSAs total project portfolio, 8
    percent under original budget. This past February, the High Explosive
    Pressing Facility at Pantex achieved CD-4 and was completed $25 million
    under the approved baseline. We are committed to encouraging
    competition and increasing the universe of qualified contractors by
    streamlining major acquisition processes. NNSA will continue to focus
    on delivering timely, best-value acquisition solutions for all programs
    and projects, by using a tailored approach to contract structures and
    incentives that is appropriate for the special missions and risks at
    each site. The Office of Acquisition and Project Management continues
    to lead improvements in contract and project management practices;
    provide clear lines of authority and accountability for program and
    project managers; improve cost and schedule performance; and ensure
    Federal Project Directors and Contracting Officers with the appropriate
    skill mix and professional certifications are managing NNSA's work.
                                   conclusion
        NNSA's diverse and enduring national security missions are crucial
    to the security of the United States, the defense of its allies and
    partners, and global stability. The U.S. nuclear deterrent has and will
    continue to remain the cornerstone of America's national security, and
    NNSA has unique responsibilities to maintain and certify the continued
    safety, security, reliability, and effectiveness of that nuclear
    deterrent.
        Nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear counterterrorism activities
    are essential to promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy and
    preventing malicious use of nuclear and radiological materials and
    technology around the world. Providing naval nuclear propulsion to the
    U.S. Navy is crucial to the United States to defend interests abroad
    and protect the world's commercial shipping lanes. Each of these
    critical missions depends upon NNSA's capabilities, facilities,
    infrastructure, and world-class workforce.

        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
        With that, I will recognize Senator Donnelly, the ranking
    member, for opening comments.

                   STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOE DONNELLY

        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        I want to start by thanking Senator Fischer for holding
    today's hearing. This subcommittee has a strong history of
    bipartisan support for modernization of our nuclear deterrent
    in which the National Nuclear Security Administration plays a
    central role.
        Let me also thank today's witnesses for joining us to
    testify on the fiscal year 2019 budget request for defense
    programs at Department of Energy. Today's hearing is wide-
    ranging from supporting the DOD [Department of Defense] and our
    nuclear deterrent to detecting smuggled nuclear materials
    around the world to cleaning up former defense production
    sites. In all of these, the key issue is effective use of the
    taxpayers' dollar.
        Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, congratulations on your
    confirmation and welcome to the subcommittee.
        The NNSA's stockpile program is experiencing the highest
    demand since the mid-1980s. They are now up to six major
    programs, all concurrent with each other. The credibility of
    the NNSA to meet the Department of Defense requirements is on
    the line, and you and your team have a big challenge to rise up
    to and we must meet that.
        Admiral Caldwell, it is good to see you again. I look
    forward to hearing from you about progress on the Columbia-
    class submarine and ongoing infrastructure modernization across
    the Naval Reactors complex.
        Mr. Owendoff, over the 20 years, your program has cleaned
    up 91 of the 107 sites. But now we have the most challenging,
    especially at Hanford with its 55 million gallons of liquid
    waste. Your total liability continues to grow, which the GAO
    [Government Accountability Office] estimates at $383 billion.
    Half of that liability is at Hanford and Savannah River. Time
    is your enemy for this liability, and we must try to get these
    sites done as quickly and safely as possible.
        Mr. Trimble, as always we are grateful for you and your
    staff on the excellent work your team undertakes for this
    subcommittee. You play a critical role in oversight of the work
    underway at the Department of Energy. I look forward to your
    testimony.
        I want to thank Ranking Member Reed for being here with us
    today as well. Thank you.
        Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Donnelly.
        Mr. Owendoff, if you would give us an update on
    Environmental Management in your opening comments please.

    STATEMENT OF JAMES M. OWENDOFF, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
             ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

        Mr. Owendoff. Good afternoon, Chairman Fischer, Ranking
    Member Donnelly, Senator Peters, Senator Reed, and members of
    the subcommittee. I am pleased to be here today to represent
    the Department of Energy's Office of Environmental Management
    and to discuss what we plan to accomplish under the President's
    fiscal year 2019 budget request.
        The total fiscal year 2019 budget request for the EM
    program is $6.6 billion. Of that, $5.6 billion is defense
    environmental cleanup activities. This request is the highest
    for the EM program in a decade and is an increase of $93
    million from the fiscal year 2018 request, which was also
    record request. The fiscal year 2019 request demonstrates the
    administration's continued commitment to the vital mission of
    EM to address the environmental legacy of nuclear weapons
    production and government-sponsored nuclear energy research.
        DOE and EM are committed to ensuring the safety of our
    workforce, the public, and the environment. Safety is the top
    priority for the Office of Environmental Management and its
    field sites. It is valued above production, budget, and
    schedule. We are also strongly committed to a workplace where
    all workers, federal and contractor, are free to speak out,
    voice concerns, or lodge complaints without fear of
    retaliation.
        To continue and further build upon our momentum of
    progress, we have focused on a greater sense of urgency to EM's
    decision-making process. This approach means more emphasis on
    engaging with regulators, stakeholders, and communities in
    making timely decisions which will enhance safety, shorten
    schedules, increase transparency, and reduce costs. This will
    enable us to achieve the best value for all taxpayers while at
    the same time protecting our workers, members of the public in
    the communities surrounding our sites and the environment.
        Going forward, our fiscal year 2019 request will enable us
    to continue making progress on those capabilities necessary to
    tackle some of our longer-term challenges while also enabling
    us to realize concrete accomplishments across the EM program.
        At Savannah River, the request will enable DOE to
    significantly increase processing of radioactive waste and
    closure of underground tanks. As a result, the site will be
    able to significantly build on its record to date of
    successfully emptying and closing those tanks.
        The WIPP [Waste Isolation Pilot Plant] request will have
    benefits across the EM program with the planned infrastructure
    improvements intended to enable increased true waste shipments
    from other EM sites.
        We will continue to enhance those portions of the Hanford
    Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant necessary to initiate
    tank waste treatment through the direct feed, low-activity
    waste approach and complete design and launch site preparations
    for the Oak Ridge Mercury Treatment Facility, which will help
    address the mercury contamination at the site and aid in the
    eventual D&D [Dilute and Dispose] of deteriorating facilities
    at the Y-12 National Security Complex.
        We will also complete targeted, buried waste exhumation at
    the Idaho site and continue implementation of an interim
    measure to address chromium groundwater contamination at the
    Los Alamos National Laboratory, among other projects.
        In closing, I am honored to be here today representing the
    more than 20,000 men and women that carry out the Office of
    Environmental Management mission. Ensuring a safe environment
    at all of our sites is our highest priority. We are committed
    to achieving our mission in a safe, effective, and cost
    efficient manner to serve as good stewards of taxpayer
    resources.
        Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you
    today, and I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Owendoff follows:]

                      Prepared Statement by James Owendoff
        Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to
    represent the Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Environmental
    Management (EM). I would like to provide you with an overview of the EM
    program, key accomplishments during the past year and what we plan to
    accomplish under the President's $6,601,366,000 fiscal year (FY) 2019
    budget request, which includes $5,630,217,000 in Defense Environmental
    Cleanup. This request demonstrates the Administration's continued
    commitment to the vital mission of EM to address the environmental
    legacy of nuclear weapons production and government-sponsored nuclear
    energy research.
                           overview of the em mission
        The Federal Government's nuclear weapons production programs have
    made significant contributions to our Nation's defense for decades--
    helping end World War II and the Cold War. In addition, government-
    sponsored nuclear energy research also made significant contributions
    to domestic energy growth and prosperity. The legacy of these programs
    is a massive amount of radioactive and chemical waste and contaminated
    facilities at sites across the country. It is the mission of DOE's
    Office of Environmental Management to clean up or remediate this legacy
    waste.
        This legacy includes 90 million of gallons of radioactive liquid
    waste stored in aging underground tanks. That's enough to completely
    fill the Capitol Rotunda nearly 10 times.
        This legacy also includes five thousand contaminated facilities,
    700,000 tons of depleted uranium, millions of cubic meters of
    contaminated soil, billions of gallons of contaminated water, used
    nuclear fuel and other nuclear materials.
        EM must execute its mission as safely, efficiently and cost-
    effectively as possible. This involves constructing new infrastructure
    like waste storage facilities and waste treatment plants. This mission
    also involves the management and retrieval of liquid tank waste as well
    as the decommissioning and demolition of deteriorating facilities that
    ultimately reduce maintenance and monitoring costs.
        The nature and length of the EM mission, coupled with the sheer
    technological complexity of cleanup means that we will always face
    challenges--some anticipated and others unexpected. These obstacles
    certainly warrant our careful attention, but EM also has a proven
    ability to achieve tangible results.
        When the program began in 1989, EM was responsible for a total of
    107 sites covering 3,100 square miles. That's an area larger than Rhode
    Island and Delaware combined. During early years, work focused on
    characterizing waste. Since then, EM's accomplishments have included 1)
    cleanup and closure of major sites in Colorado, Ohio, Missouri and
    Florida; 2) decommissioning of a gaseous diffusion enrichment plant in
    Tennessee; 3) vitrification of more than 4,000 canisters of high-level
    waste in South Carolina; and ) removal of all the plutonium metal and
    oxides from Washington state.
        Today, EM has 16 sites remaining, with an active cleanup footprint
    of less than 300 square miles. These 16 sites are home to some of our
    toughest and most complex challenges.
        The best value does not mean taking short cuts and it does not
    always mean choosing the cheapest option. It means getting the job done
    as safely, efficiently and cost-effectively as possible. It requires a
    sustainable, risk-informed approach centered on reducing the greatest
    amount of risk with the resources available, while maximizing
    opportunities to shorten schedules and lower lifecycle costs.
        That is why we have focused on a greater sense of urgency to EM's
    decision-making process. This approach means more emphasis on engaging
    with regulators, stakeholders, and communities in making timely
    decisions which will enhance safety, shorten schedules, increase
    transparency, and reduce costs--achieving the best value for all
    taxpayers, while at the same time, protecting our workers, members of
    the public in the communities surrounding our sites, and the
    environment.
        EM's first priority is worker safety, as well as protection of the
    public health and the environment. These are essential components of
    our cleanup objectives. EM will continue to discharge its
    responsibilities by conducting cleanup within a ``Safe Performance of
    Work'' culture that integrates protection of the environmental, safety,
    and protection of worker and public health into all work activities.
        The December spread of contamination that occurred during
    demolition activities at the Plutonium Finishing Plant at the Hanford
    site demonstrate the continued need to ensure a safe working
    environment at all of our sites. We will continue to engage with the
    workforce at Hanford and our other EM sites to solicit their input and
    ideas to further strengthen our safety performance.
                      em cleanup objectives and priorities
        Taking many variables into account, such as risk reduction and
    compliance agreements, EM has the following priorities:
          Radioactive tank waste stabilization, treatment, and
    disposal;
          Used nuclear fuel receipt, storage, and disposition;
          Special nuclear material consolidation, stabilization,
    and disposition;
          Transuranic and mixed/low-level waste treatment and
    disposal;
          Soil and groundwater remediation; and,
          Excess facilities deactivation and decommissioning.

        In particular, the fiscal year 2019 budget request will allow EM
    to:
          Ramp up efforts to address the largest environmental risk
    at the Savannah River Site---radioactive tank waste.
          Implement key infrastructure improvements at the Waste
    Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), integral to the cleanup activities at a
    number of EM sites.
          Complete design and begin site preparations for the Oak
    Ridge Mercury Treatment Facility, which will help address mercury
    contamination at the site and aid in the eventual deactivation and
    decommissioning (D&D) of aging facilities at the Y-12 National Security
    Complex.
                           key recent accomplishments
        While some cleanup projects will extend decades, stable steady
    progress is being made right now. In 2017, the EM workforce achieved
    the resumption of transuranic waste shipments to WIPP, enabling
    continued cleanup progress at several sites across the country.
        At Savannah River, workers successfully completed construction of
    the latest Saltstone Disposal Unit, which is integral to the tank waste
    cleanup mission, ahead of schedule and under budget. We also completed
    cleanup activities at Hanford's 618-10 burial ground; demolition of one
    of the last remaining buildings at the Separations Process Research
    Unit in New York state; and the safe treatment of remediated nitrate
    salt drums at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. At the Portsmouth
    site, we are continuing work to deactivate the former enrichment
    plant's massive process buildings to prepare them for eventual
    demolition. And at the Paducah site, we have optimized a system to
    control and mitigate the migration of groundwater contamination on the
    east side of the site ahead of schedule and under budget.
        Our successes have been recognized by the Project Management
    Institute (PMI). Our work to complete waste retrieval activities at the
    AY-102 double-shell tank at Hanford was awarded PMI's Project of the
    Year award. In addition, PMI also issued awards for efforts to upgrade
    a ventilation system at one of Hanford's tank farms and for work to
    close one of the underground waste tanks at the Savannah River Site. We
    are proud that the PMI chose to recognize the important work underway
    to address one of our largest environmental challenges--radioactive
    tank waste. These awards are a recognition of the dedicated and
    talented workforce we have at the Hanford and Savannah River sites, and
    across the entire EM program, and illustrate how the EM program is
    working to serve as a good steward of taxpayer resources. We are
    committed to building upon this cleanup momentum.
               highlights of the fiscal year 2019 budget request
        The fiscal year 2019 budget request for EM is $6,601,366,000, which
    includes $5,630,217,000 for defense environmental cleanup activities,
    $218,400,000 for non-defense environmental cleanup activities, and
    $752,749,000 for Uranium Enrichment Decontamination and Decommissioning
    Fund cleanup activities. This request is the highest for the EM program
    in a decade, and is an increase of $93,031,000 from the fiscal year
    2018 request, which was also a record request.
        EM's fiscal year 2019 request provides resources to make progress
    on cleanup activities across the complex, including tackling the
    largest environmental challenge at the Savannah River Site--radioactive
    tank waste; and executing key infrastructure improvements at WIPP,
    integral to the cleanup activities at a number of EM sites.
        At Savannah River, the request will enable DOE to significantly
    increase production of canisters of vitrified high-level waste at the
    Defense Waste Processing Facility, as well as support planned operation
    rates for the Salt Waste Processing Facility, and continued
    construction progress for Saltstone Disposal Units. As a result,
    Savannah River will be able to significantly build on its record of
    successfully emptying and closing underground waste tanks. The WIPP
    request will have wide-ranging benefits across the EM program, with the
    planned infrastructure improvements at WIPP intended to enable
    increased transuranic (TRU) waste shipments from other EM sites.
        We will continue to advance those portions of the Hanford Waste
    Treatment and Immobilization Plant necessary to initiate tank waste
    treatment through the Direct Feed Low Activity Waste (DFLAW) approach;
    and complete design and launch site preparations for the Oak Ridge
    Mercury Treatment Facility, which will help address mercury
    contamination at the site and aid in the eventual D&D of deteriorating
    facilities at the Y-12 National Security Complex. We also will complete
    targeted buried waste exhumation at the Idaho site and continue with
    preparations to transfer cesium and strontium capsules at Hanford from
    wet storage to a safer dry storage configuration; and implement of an
    interim measure to address chromium groundwater contamination at the
    Los Alamos National Laboratory.
              budget authority and planned accomplishments by site

                     Office of River Protection, Washington
                             (dollars in thousands)
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Fiscal Year 2018 Request             Fiscal Year 2019 Request
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                            $1,504,311                           $1,438,513
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Key Accomplishments Planned for Fiscal Year 2019
          Continue construction, startup and commissioning
    activities for the Low Activity Waste (LAW) Facility, Analytical
    Laboratory, Effluent Management Facility, and Balance of Facilities to
    complete hot commissioning of the LAW Facility by December 31, 2023,
    per the 2016 Amended Consent Decree;
          Continue design activities for the Low Activity Waste
    Pretreatment System (LAWPS);
          Pursue a complementary pretreatment capability using
    tank-side cesium removal equipment to provide initial feed by December
    2023 per the 2016 Amended Consent Decree; and
          Continue retrieval of single-shell tanks in A/AX Farm.

                     Richland Operations Office, Washington
                             (dollars in thousands)
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Fiscal Year 2018 Request             Fiscal Year 2019 Request
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                              $800,422                             $747,097
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Key Accomplishments Planned for Fiscal Year 2019
          Continue cesium and strontium capsules activities to move
    capsules currently stored at the Waste Storage Encapsulation Facility
    to dry storage;
          Continue waste site remediation and groundwater
    treatment; and
          Continue focus on canyon and waste site risk mitigation.

                       Savannah River Site, South Carolina
                             (dollars in thousands)
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Fiscal Year 2018 Request             Fiscal Year 2019 Request
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                            $1,447,591                           $1,656,180
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Key Accomplishments Planned for Fiscal Year 2019
          Package 135 to 175 canisters of vitrified high-level
    waste at the Defense Waste Processing Facility;
          Support start-up activities for the Salt Waste Processing
    Facility;
          Continue construction of Saltstone Disposal Unit #7, #8,
    #9;
          Operate Actinide Removal Process and Modular Caustic Side
    Solvent Extraction Unit and Tank Closure Cesium Removal system to
    process 200,000 gallons of salt solution;
          Complete D Area Ash Project including closure of the 488-
    1D Ash Basin and the Coal Pile Runoff Basin;
          Continue to receive foreign research reactor and domestic
    research reactor used nuclear fuel for safe storage and management; and
          Disposition used nuclear fuel in H-Canyon by processing.

                        Idaho National Laboratory, Idaho
                             (dollars in thousands)
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Fiscal Year 2018 Request             Fiscal Year 2019 Request
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                              $359,226                             $359,226
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Key Accomplishments Planned for Fiscal Year 2019
          Continue commissioning and startup of the Integrated
    Waste Treatment Unit;
          Characterize, repackage and certify contact-handled
    transuranic waste for shipment to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant;
          Complete exhumation of targeted buried waste at the ninth
    and final retrieval area; and
          Transfer Experimental Breeder Reactor-II and Advanced
    Test Reactor used (used) nuclear fuel from wet to dry storage.

                            Oak Ridge Site, Tennessee
                             (dollars in thousands)
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Fiscal Year 2018 Request             Fiscal Year 2019 Request
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                              $390,205                             $408,526
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Key Accomplishments Planned for Fiscal Year 2019
          Complete design and begins site preparation of the
    Outfall 200 Mercury Treatment Facility;
          Continue demolition of remaining facilities at East
    Tennessee Technology Park;
          Continue modifications to Building 2026 to support
    processing of U-233 material; and
          Initiate design for a new On-Site Waste Disposal
    Facility.

                        Carlsbad Field Office, New Mexico
                             (dollars in thousands)
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Fiscal Year 2018 Request             Fiscal Year 2019 Request
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                              $323,041                             $403,487
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Key Accomplishments Planned for Fiscal Year 2019
          Continue waste emplacement activities, increasing
    transuranic waste shipments to ten per week ;
          Address major repair or replacement of critical
    infrastructure; and
          Continue work on the Safety Significant Confinement
    Ventilation System.

                   Los Alamos National Laboratory, New Mexico
                             (dollars in thousands)
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Fiscal Year 2018 Request             Fiscal Year 2019 Request
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                              $191,629                             $191,629
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Key Accomplishments Planned for Fiscal Year 2019
          Continue execution of New Mexico Environment Department
    approved ground water remedies for the high explosives (RDx) plume in
    Canon de Valle; and
          Continue activities for chromium plume investigation
    through modeling, hydrology studies, installation of extraction and
    injection wells, and interim measure activities progressing towards an
    approved corrective measure evaluation.

                      Nevada National Security Site, Nevada
                             (dollars in thousands)
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Fiscal Year 2018 Request             Fiscal Year 2019 Request
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                               $60,136                              $60,136
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Key Accomplishments Planned for Fiscal Year 2019
          Continue soil and groundwater remediation activities; and
          Continue safe disposal operations for low-level and mixed
    low-level radioactive waste.
                                   conclusion
      I am honored to be here today representing the more than 20,000 men
    and women that carry out our Office of Environmental Management
    mission. Ensuring a safe work environment at all of our sites is our
    highest priority. We are committed to achieving our mission in a safe,
    effective and cost-efficient manner to serve as good stewards of
    taxpayer resources.
      At the end of the day, EM progress means safer, cleaner sites in the
    communities that hosted defense nuclear activities for decades. This
    kind of progress is not possible without our workforce, Members of
    Congress, regulators, cleanup community leaders and other partners.
    Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today and I
    look forward to your questions.

        [The prepared statement of Admiral Caldwell follows:]
                Prepared Statement by Admiral James F. Caldwell
        Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Donnelly, and Members of the
    Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to present the President's
    fiscal year (FY) 2019 budget request for Naval Reactors. In 1955, the
    United States experienced a step-change in naval dominance when USS
    Nautilus (SSN 571) reported ``Underway on nuclear power''. Since
    Nautilus, follow-on classes of ever more capable U.S. nuclear-powered
    submarines and aircraft carriers have ensured our warfighting edge over
    potential adversaries. Forward deployed fast attack submarines exert
    influence throughout the world, safeguarding vital commercial sea-
    lanes, protecting aircraft carrier and expeditionary strike groups, and
    operating virtually undetected in all the world's oceans, even under
    the Arctic ice. Our Navy's ballistic missile submarines provide
    strategic deterrence capability to our country and have done so for six
    decades. Virtually undetectable when submerged, these ballistic missile
    submarines form the most survivable component of the nuclear triad. Our
    nuclear aircraft carriers provide the nation highly mobile,
    sustainable, sovereign territory from which to project flexible, rapid,
    visible, and credible U.S. Military power to keep the peace, deter
    conflict, and protect American interests around the world. Nuclear
    propulsion enables these warships to conduct missions vital to national
    security by providing unique tactical mobility and flexibility,
    responsiveness, and sustainability--these key attributes ensure our
    nuclear fleet can meet the demands of forward presence and crisis
    response world-wide. Today, over 45 percent of the Navy's major
    combatants are nuclear powered (11 aircraft carriers, 14 ballistic
    missile submarines, 53 attack submarines, and 4 guided missile
    submarines) capitalizing on the mobility, flexibility, and endurance of
    nuclear power that enables the Navy to meet its global mission.
        Over the past year, with Naval Reactors support, the Navy deployed
    39 submarines and conducted 33 strategic deterrent patrols. At any
    given time, there were at least 49 of 71 submarines deployed or ready
    to deploy within days. Our carriers, USS Nimitz (CVN 68), USS Dwight D.
    Eisenhower (CVN 69), USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76), USS Theodore Roosevelt
    (CVN 71), USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70), and USS George H.W. Bush (CVN 77)
    successfully conducted deployments, and this past November, Reagan,
    Roosevelt, and Nimitz conducted the first tri-carrier operations in a
    decade off the Korean Peninsula.
        In nuclear shipbuilding, this past year also saw the keel laid for
    the attack submarines Pre Commissioning Unit (PCU) Oregon (SSN 793),
    the christening of PCU Indiana (SSN 789) and PCU South Dakota (SSN
    790), the delivery of PCU Colorado (SSN 788) and finally, the
    commissioning of USS Washington (SSN 787)--the fourteenth Virginia-
    class fast attack submarine to join the fleet. In addition,
    construction of the aircraft carrier John F. Kennedy is well underway
    and the third carrier of the Ford-class, Enterprise, starts
    construction activities this year.
        Another recent accomplishment was commissioning USS Gerald R. Ford
    (CVN 78) last July. I personally participated in the sea-trials of this
    incredible ship which has the first new design aircraft carrier
    propulsion plant in 40 years. Ford matches the high speed of our
    Nimitz-class ships while delivering 25 percent more energy and three
    times the electrical operating capacity, reduces maintenance by 30
    percent, and reduces propulsion plant manpower by 50 percent. This
    historic milestone represents the culmination of almost 20 years of
    dedicated and sustained effort by Naval Reactors and its field
    activities, our Department of Energy (DOE) laboratories, nuclear
    industrial base suppliers, the Navy design team, and the nuclear
    shipbuilders.
        In addition to supporting the operational nuclear fleet, we
    continue to safely maintain and operate two nuclear powered land-based
    prototypes--both over 40 years old--to conduct research, development,
    and training. We also continue to safely maintain and operate two
    Moored Training Ships to train our nuclear operators--these are both
    over 54 years old and are the oldest operating pressurized water
    reactors in the world. These four platforms allow us to train 2800
    students per year and provide highly qualified operators to the nuclear
    fleet.
        The strong support of this subcommittee enabled safe operation of
    the nuclear fleet, progress on our key projects, and our oversight and
    regulation on all areas across the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program.
    Naval Reactors' budget request for fiscal year 2019 is $1.79 billion,
    an increase of $309 million, or 21 percent, over the fiscal year 2018
    requested level and is consistent with the plan of record provided in
    previous budget requests for major projects we have underway. This
    year's request represents our peak budget year in the Future Years
    Nuclear Security Plan. The overall increase to the budget request is
    primarily driven by the planned funding ramp for two national priority
    projects--the refueling overhaul of a research and training reactor in
    New York, and the construction of the new Naval Spent Fuel Handling
    Facility in Idaho. The increase also allows research and development
    efforts for advanced reactor plant components and improved reactor
    cores for installation on future Virginia-class submarines. This
    reactor plant technology development will also underpin the demanding
    and critical design requirements of future classes of nuclear powered
    warships.
                                 major projects
        This past year marked the peak in our design efforts for the
    Columbia-class strategic ballistic missile submarine propulsion plant.
    Delivering the life-of-ship reactor core and electric drive propulsion
    system remains a top priority. The Columbia-class is the Navy's number
    one acquisition priority and we are on track to start reactor plant
    component procurement in fiscal year 2019 to support the start of ship
    construction in fiscal year 2021. Fiscal year 2019 funding of $138
    million will provide for propulsion plant component design,
    development, and testing to support fiscal year 2019 long-lead
    component contract placement in addition to supporting reactor plant
    testing and safety analysis.
        Fiscal year 2019 marks the start of the land-based prototype
    refueling overhaul. The $250 million request in this year's budget will
    support the refueling overhaul which is vital to the nuclear propulsion
    program, enabling 20 additional years of Naval Reactors' commitment to
    research, development, and training in New York. As part of this
    refueling activity, we will insert newly manufactured Columbia-class
    type fuel modules with the prototype refueling reactor core, enabling
    testing and demonstration of core manufacturability necessary for
    production and delivery of the Columbia-class reactor.
        Naval Reactors fiscal year 2019 budget request includes $287
    million in construction funding to continue the Spent Fuel Handling
    Recapitalization Project. The project broke ground last year, and we
    are conducting site preparation. Full support from Congress has enabled
    us to keep this project on track and on budget. The total estimated
    cost for this project remains unchanged. Continued Congressional
    support will ensure the facility is ready to receive spent nuclear fuel
    from aircraft carriers in fiscal year 2024 and be fully operational by
    2025.
                                  base funding
        In addition to our three priority projects, Naval Reactors
    maintains a high-performing technical base to: 1) execute nuclear
    reactor technology research and development that supports today's fleet
    and ensures our Navy remains technologically ahead of adversaries and,
    2) provide the necessary equipment, construction, maintenance, and
    modernization of critical infrastructure and facilities. The funding
    required for this base also supports the lean federal workforce that
    provides the regulatory oversight necessary to carry out this important
    technical work safely and efficiently. By employing an effective
    technical base, the teams of talented and dedicated people at our four
    Program sites--the Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory in Pittsburgh, the
    Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory and Kesselring Site in greater Albany,
    the Naval Reactors Facility in Idaho, and our Washington, DC
    headquarters--can perform the research and development, analysis,
    engineering, and testing needed to support today's fleet at sea and
    develop more capable nuclear-powered warships for tomorrow's fleet. Our
    labs perform the technical evaluations that enable Naval Reactors to
    thoroughly assess approximately 4,000 emergent issues annually and
    deliver timely responses that ensure nuclear safety and maximize
    operational flexibility.
        In the past, I have spoken to the importance of the technical base
    regarding its support of the nuclear fleet and our essential work on
    new technologies. This year's budget demonstrates this synergy by
    developing new technologies that will modify our current Virginia-class
    reactor plant design to advance reactor plant components and deliver
    improved capabilities for next generation submarines. Investing in
    these core technologies alone will result in an estimated $50 million
    per ship savings on future warships relative to current technology.
        Additionally, there are two other distinct areas of the base that
    are essential to the Program. First, we will be increasing our efforts
    in decontamination and decommissioning (D&D) older facilities that have
    been in existence since the start of the Program in the early 1950's.
    We have an estimated $7.4 billion in environmental liabilities
    requiring D&D efforts--about half of these facilities are no longer in
    use. The Program's positive track record on environmental safety is of
    the utmost importance to me, and is a core part of the Program's
    mission. This year's funding request will enable us to reduce these
    outstanding liabilities and ultimately reduce our caretaking burden.
    The second focus area is recapitalizing our Naval Nuclear Laboratory
    facilities and infrastructure systems, many of which have supported the
    Program since its inception over 60 years ago. Maintaining these
    laboratory facilities directly support nuclear fleet operations and
    advanced research and development efforts that make our nuclear navy
    the finest in the world.
        I want to assure the committee that the planning efforts we execute
    in budgeting for current and future projects are done with extreme
    rigor. Our budget profile never deviates far from projections in
    earlier Future Years Nuclear Security Plan submissions. Investments we
    make today in research and development efforts not only advance
    capabilities, but will result in cost savings far into the future. In
    developing our request, I worked closely with the leadership of the
    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the DOE, Office of
    Management and Budget, and the Department of Defense (DOD). This budget
    not only reflects my priorities for Naval Reactors but also integrates
    them with the other important work of my colleagues at NNSA and DOD.
    There is clear recognition of the valuable capabilities Naval Reactors
    provides and our history in effectively meeting our obligations. I
    understand the difficult budget environment in which Congress must
    craft legislation and I respectfully urge your support for aligning
    allocations with the fiscal year 2019 budget request.

        Senator Fischer. Thank you.
        Mr. Trimble will give a statement on behalf of GAO.
    Welcome.

    STATEMENT OF DAVID C. TRIMBLE, DIRECTOR, NATURAL RESOURCES AND
             ENVIRONMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

        Mr. Trimble. Thank you, Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member
    Donnelly, and members of the subcommittee.
        The critical missions of the Department of Energy depend on
    the extraordinary capabilities found at the Department and its
    networks of laboratories and production facilities across the
    country. These capabilities serve all of DOE missions,
    including weapons cleanup, nonproliferation, energy, and
    science.
        To successfully execute these missions, DOE must maintain,
    rebuild, and renew both its physical and human capital. DOE's
    efforts, however, are hindered by longstanding management
    challenges that have been well documented in reports by
    Augustine-Mies, Krenold, the Academies, the DOE IG [Department
    of Energy Inspector General], and GAO. Given the growing fiscal
    and budgetary pressures facing the government, DOE can no
    longer afford to poorly manage these billion dollar programs.
        My testimony today will highlight some of the challenges
    facing DOE, including the affordability of NNSA's nuclear
    modernization programs, the growing cost of DOE's environmental
    liabilities, management challenges in the nonproliferation
    program, and DOE's efforts to improve its management of
    programs, projects, and contracts.
        Regarding weapons, NNSA faces challenges with the
    affordability and execution of its nuclear modernization
    programs, which include ongoing and planned LEPs [Life
    Extension Programs], as well as major modernization projects.
    Our review of the fiscal year 2017 SSMP [Stockpile Stewardship
    and Management Plan] found misalignment between NNSA's plans
    and projected budgetary resources which could make it difficult
    for NNSA to afford its planned portfolio of modernization
    programs. We found that NNSA's estimates of program costs
    exceeded the projected budgetary resources included in the
    President's planned near- and long-term modernization budgets.
    As NNSA updates its requirements and plans to respond to the
    new Nuclear Posture Review, NNSA will need to ensure that its
    updated modernization plans are aligned with its potential
    future budgets.
        In addition, it is important to remember that the nuclear
    security enterprise is an interdependent system, and changes in
    one area can resonate throughout the enterprise. As you may
    recall, the 2014 Augustine-Mies report found that the lack of a
    stable, executable plan for modernization was a fundamental
    weakness for NNSA.
        Regarding environmental cleanup, DOE's growing
    environmental liabilities demonstrate the need for DOE to
    improve its oversight and management of its cleanup mission. In
    2017, we added the Federal Government's environmental
    liabilities to our high risk list. DOE is responsible for about
    $384 billion of the $465 billion, and DOE's total cleanup
    liability has been growing. Over a recent 6-year period, EM
    spent $35 billion on cleanup while its liabilities grew by $90
    billion. I should also note that these liability estimates do
    not include all of DOE's future cleanup responsibilities.
        Our recent work has identified opportunities where DOE may
    be able to save tens of billions of dollars such as by taking a
    risk-informed approach to treating a portion of the low-
    activity waste at the Hanford site.
        Regarding nonproliferation, DNN [Defense Nuclear Non-
    proliferation] has not consistently used program management
    leading practices. We found that DNN's policy did not require
    programs to establish life cycle estimates or measure
    performance against schedule and cost baselines. In addition,
    we have found that DNN's R&D [Research and Development] results
    were not being tracked consistently to help evaluate the
    success of that program.
        To successfully meet the challenges facing it, DOE needs to
    improve its management of programs, projects, and contracts,
    areas that have been on GAO's high risk list for almost 3
    decades. In recent years, DOE has taken some important steps,
    including requiring the development of cost estimates in
    accordance with industry best practices, creating new oversight
    structures, and ensuring that major projects, designs, and
    technologies are sufficiently mature before construction.
        However, significant challenges remain.
        First, DOE still lacks reliable enterprise-wide cost
    information. Without this information, meaningful cost analyses
    across programs, contractors, and sites are not possible.
    Reliable detailed data are also needed for DOE to manage its
    risk of fraud.
        Second, DOE has not always followed its own requirements.
    In 2018, we found that NNSA's analysis of alternatives to
    address its need for enriched uranium showed a bias for one
    option, building a new enrichment facility. We have found a
    similar problem with what the AOA [Analysis of Alternatives]
    has done in other projects such as the low-activity waste
    pretreatment system at Hanford.
        Third, regarding program management, we found in 2017 that
    the defense programs within NNSA had established program
    management requirements. However, for strategic commodities
    like uranium, plutonium, and tritium, these requirements are
    not always being met due to staff shortages. We also noted that
    DOE does not have a unified program management policy.
        In closing, let me note that we have several ongoing
    engagements for this committee examining these management
    challenges, and we strongly support the oversight efforts of
    this committee.
        Thank you. I would be happy to answer any questions you
    have.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Trimble follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Trimble.
        We are very pleased to have Senator Reed, the ranking
    member, with us today, and I would ask if you would like to
    begin our first round of questions, sir.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman. I
    thank you not only for your gracious hospitality but for your
    outstanding leadership along with Senator Donnelly. So thank
    you again.
        Madam Secretary, I would like to talk about pit production.
    This has been a saga going on for almost a decade now, and I
    have been involved with it in the committee. We started off
    with a big box concept at Los Alamos and Oak Ridge and
    discovered that was too expensive. We shifted to a modular
    approach. That modular approach was agreed to by DOD, NNSA, and
    Congress in the 2014 National Defense Authorization Act. And
    yet, it seems to have resurfaced again as not a settled issue
    but one that is subject to debate. Senator McCain and I wrote a
    letter to the Secretary, both Secretary Perry and Secretary
    Mattis, about this issue.
        I assume you are aware of all of this, the fact that we
    have assumed in the 2014 NDAA [National Defense Authorization
    Act] this was settled. You are aware of all of this I am sure.
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. Yes. I am generally aware of
    everything that you have cited.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        You have just, because of this reopening of the issue,
    performed an analysis of alternatives. Your office has. Now,
    that analysis is being reviewed by an engineering contractor.
    Are you going to have this new analysis independently reviewed
    outside of NNSA since we will get a definitive answer we hope?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. So the engineering analysis that
    is currently underway is in its final stages of preparation.
    And currently we have members from Los Alamos, Livermore,
    Savannah River, and also members of the former Rocky Flats
    Plant participating in this entire review. The assessment is
    the final draft data are available, and they are going to be
    reviewing the final draft data in the next week or so, at which
    point I have invited Under Secretary Lord from DOD over. When I
    receive the final draft briefing, we will take a look at it and
    then I will make my recommendation to the Deputy Secretary of
    Energy. We are trying to meet the NDAA guidelines direction of
    11 May.
        Senator Reed. Since this is shaping up to be a battle of
    analysis, I would urge you to get an outside review also. And
    if you could commit to that, I would appreciate it. Please
    consider that.
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. I will consider that. Thank you.
        Senator Reed. According to the fiscal year 2018 National
    Defense Authorization Act, it requires NNSA to forward its
    recommendation to DOE, and they in turn must certify it meets
    their need. And you are a member of the Nuclear Weapons
    Council. Can you tell us and update what you said previously
    about the status of this review?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. Yes. So in fact, I attended my
    first Nuclear Weapons Council meeting--I am a member of that
    august group--on my day 3 of my tenure. I found it to be very
    engaging and very enlightening.
        With regard to the plutonium analysis of alternatives and
    the engineering analysis that is currently ongoing, we are
    required, as I mentioned, to have the results to the committee
    through the NDAA requirement by 11 May. And that is why we are
    working so quickly on making sure that the engineering analysis
    that was done by an independent architecture and engineering
    firm is providing us with those data. And we are doing a
    rigorous analysis, again, with Livermore, Los Alamos, and
    Savannah River site personnel, as well as our federal
    employees.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Madam Secretary.
        And gentlemen, thank you for your service.
        Admiral Caldwell, good luck at Groton with the Colorado.
        Admiral Caldwell. Yes, sir. Thank you.
        Senator Reed. We are putting a new attack submarine in the
    water. He is, not me.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator.
        Madam Secretary, as I mentioned in my opening statement,
    the Nuclear Posture Review repeatedly makes the point that we
    have not made sufficient progress towards a responsive nuclear
    infrastructure. When discussing NNSA's production of strategic
    materials, particularly plutonium and tritium, the NPR states
    that programs are planned but not yet fully funded to ease
    these critical production shortfalls.
        I understand NNSA's fiscal year 2019 budget was written
    prior to the NPR's release. But does NNSA have a good
    understanding of the costs that are not reflected in the out-
    year projections submitted with this budget?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. With regard to the fiscal year
    2019 submission and related to the NPR, in near term we are
    leaning as far forward as we possibly can and to ensure,
    working closely with OMB [Office of Management and Budget] and
    DOD, that we have the priorities correct and that, again, with
    some congressional authorization that is needed for NNSA to
    move forward, we obtain that authorization so we can move as
    quickly as possible. In terms of out-years, we are going to be
    working on those budget requirements shortly.
        Senator Fischer. In terms of the out-years, can you give us
    some idea of the scale of investment that we are looking at
    here?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. This is going to be a sustained,
    prolonged, and significant investment in our nuclear security
    enterprise. Significant. And the numbers I have heard are up to
    6.5 percent of the DOD budget to support our initiatives long-
    term.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you.
        As you know, the NPR declares the administration's intent
    to rapidly pursue Stockpile Responsiveness Program established
    by Congress, and this is something that I am very supportive
    of. When can we expect to see that program implemented?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. We are already undertaking that
    program. We have some requests for that program in the fiscal
    year 2019 budget submission. And we will be taking that on. And
    I can provide you with a fuller explanation for the record.
        [The information follows:]

        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. The National Nuclear Security
    Administrations (NNSA) is already undertaking the Stockpile
    Responsiveness Program (SRP). The program is designed to provide a
    greater breadth of opportunities to exercise key capabilities and
    skills, the primary benefit of which is the preservation and transfer
    of knowledge across the workforce. It will take some time to develop
    the program and evaluate its proper size and scope in balance with our
    other programs.
        NNSA's Fiscal Year 2019 budget requests for SRP address gaps that
    have been identified in exercising design capabilities to maintain
    resilience in the face of evolving threats and requirements identified
    in the Nuclear Posture Review. The budget request reflects a balance
    between maintaining readiness for future threats and the tempo required
    to execute those life extension programs that are going forward to meet
    known present requirements.
        While we are looking at ways to improve NNSA's response time to
    meeting national needs, recommendations are made collaboratively with
    the Department of Defense through the Nuclear Weapons Council.

        Senator Fischer. And do you have in place a process so that
    you can evaluate the proposals that come from that?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. Absolutely.
        Senator Fischer. Can you let us know, are you working with
    labs in order to establish that program? Can you give us a
    little more detail on it?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. Sure. One of the things that I am
    committed to do, Madam Chairman, is absolutely working as a
    team. This is not a federal directive coming down to the labs'
    plants and sites. We are going to do whatever we can to
    communicate with, work with, and ensure that the laboratories
    and plants and sites that have to execute these missions are
    fully engaged with and have the opportunity to provide the
    input that is necessary for us to maintain a fulsome program.
    And it is impossible for us to do so from Washington.
        So I have already had my first tri-lab meeting with the lab
    directors. I have already spoken with all my field office
    managers, all of the plants and site directors, and they
    understand that my commitments to them will be open
    communications, and it must be two-way so we can ensure that
    all of the requirements necessary to effect or to execute our
    missions are made with an engagement strategy of everyone from
    headquarters to the field.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you. I hope you will continue to
    keep Congress informed on that to make sure we are meeting the
    objectives that were laid out by Congress.
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. I will. Thank you.
        Senator Fischer. And as you note in your opening statement,
    more than half of NNSA's infrastructure is over 40 years old,
    and roughly 30 percent dates back to the Manhattan Project.
    Last year, the Congress directed NNSA to establish the
    infrastructure modernization initiative in order to reduce the
    backlog of deferred maintenance at least by 30 percent by 2025,
    and that is a detailed road map.
        I understand that you are currently formulating a plan for
    how to execute this initiative. And when do you expect that
    plan to be completed so that you can brief Congress?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. I was just briefed on that plan
    yesterday. And they are putting together the plan right now. I
    believe that we can probably have that plan to you by the end
    of this year.
        Senator Fischer. And have you established any kind of
    guidance or criteria for project consideration on that?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. I understand that there is, but I
    am happy to get back to you with that response.
        [The information follows:]

        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. To prioritize projects within available
    resources, standardized processes have been implemented to rank annual
    recapitalization, disposition, and maintenance activities across the
    enterprise.
        For example, NNSA uses a prioritization methodology that ranks
    investments to optimize risk reduction per dollar by evaluating key
    criteria for Recapitalization projects. Criteria evaluated include
    program requirements and risk reduction, safety risk reduction,
    increases in operational efficiency and/or productivity, and deferred
    maintenance reduction. Similarly, NNSA ranks excess facility
    disposition projects by evaluating risk reduction, cost effectiveness,
    and cost savings.
        Currently, funding for Maintenance and Repair of Facilities is
    prioritized within an enterprise risk management framework based on
    mission needs, probability of failure of a system or a component, and
    risk determination with regard to safety, security, and environmental
    requirements. Investments focus on structures, systems, and components
    that are considered essential to NNSA's national security missions.
    NNSA is transitioning to the BUILDER Sustainment Management System
    (which was developed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers) to capture
    and predict the physical condition of infrastructure over time. When
    fully implemented, BUILDER's standards and policies prioritization
    capabilities will be used to inform maintenance decisions across the
    NNSA enterprise. These BUILDER capabilities will allow NNSA to take
    less risk maintaining critical building systems (e.g., fire protection)
    and facilities than other less critical systems and facilities.
    BUILDER's standards and policies will be used to assist NNSA in
    assigning maintenance and replacement priorities to specific facilities
    and specific systems in those facilities as very high, high, medium,
    low, or no repair.
        Additional information will be provided in NNSA's Infrastructure
    Modernization Initiative Implementation Plan, which will be available
    later this year.

        Senator Fischer. Thank you.
        Senator Donnelly?
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        And thank you to the witnesses for being here.
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, if we include the low-yield
    warhead, we have upward of six major programs, all occurring at
    the same time, and this does not include modernizing your
    infrastructure. My understanding is they all merge at the
    Kansas City plant and at Pantex in Amarillo, Texas. What are
    you doing to address this?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. Senator Donnelly, as I had
    mentioned, one of my priorities will be to ensure that we have
    active and open communications with not only the headquarters
    and federal field elements but, obviously, the teams that have
    to execute these missions. So in order to ensure that we have
    the capabilities, the infrastructure, the technical personnel,
    as well as the technicians and the support staff in order to be
    able to execute all of these missions on time, on budget, and
    within the parameters set forth by the Nuclear Weapons Council
    to ensure that our customer, the Department of Defense, has the
    needs and has the capabilities that they require for our
    nuclear deterrent, I am making sure that all of those teams
    will come together. I am certain that they have in the past,
    but there is a new administrator and she is going to ensure
    that that kind of robust organizational framework is put in
    place.
        Senator Donnelly. It is an awful lot of moving parts all at
    the same time --
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. I agree.
        Senator Donnelly.--all kind of coming to the same place at
    the same time as well. And so we just have to make sure we are
    on top of that.
        Mr. Owendoff, what are you doing to begin removing the
    Hanford low-activity waste from the tanks, and when will you
    begin, and when do you hope to finish?
        Mr. Owendoff. Thank you, Senator Donnelly.
        We have a contract goal, and the Secretary is very
    committed to be able to start making glass by the end of
    December 2021. We have a consent decree milestone that says we
    need to have started by December of 2023. So we have some time.
    But we are working on the December 2021 date for low-activity.
        We have felt, sir, that we need to start the first process
    building. There are three. We need to get the first one in
    place and running, and then work the next two, the high-level
    waste and the pretreatment facilities. Those other two
    facilities have a consent decree date of 2033 and 2035 to be
    operational.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
        Admiral Caldwell, how much do you expect it will cost to
    complete the fuel examination facility at Idaho, and does that
    include the hot cells to handle the fuel?
        Admiral Caldwell. Yes, sir. Thanks for the question. And I
    would like to say up front, Chairman Fischer and Ranking Member
    Senator Donnelly, thanks for the support of this subcommittee.
    It has been very important to my program and my ability to
    deliver safe, reliable, and effective nuclear propulsion to the
    Navy.
        Sir, regarding your question, there are multiple aspects
    and phases that I need to just walk you through quickly.
        The first is the facility that we have in Idaho does three
    things for us. It receives spent fuel, allows us to handle it
    safely, and package it. We are capitalizing that capability
    with the spent fuel handling facility, which this subcommittee
    has supported. That facility will come on line initially in
    2024 and then be fully operationally capable in 2025.
        The second component that occurs out at the expended core
    facility is the examination of naval spent fuel. That is
    important because it allows us to assess how that fuel
    performed over life and then to make modifications to our
    future fuel systems, and the process that that has enabled us
    to deliver the life of the ship or be prepared to deliver the
    life of the ship core for Columbia.
        That examination's recapitalization is one that I just
    defined the mission need for last year. And so we are coming
    our progression of alternatives and study to determine exactly
    what the requirements are and what the costs will be. And that
    will be reflected in future FYNSPs [Future Year Nuclear
    Security Plan]. Right now, I think the cost is going to be
    somewhere on the order of over $500 million to maybe slightly
    over $1 billion, but it is not defined yet, sir, and I have
    work to do to do that.
        The last piece is the capability to create specimens and
    transport those to the advanced test reactor that allows us to
    determine how fuel and how materials will react in future
    cores. That is important for future design. That is the third
    component that we still have to do more study with our partners
    in DOE who run the advanced test reactor. As they think about
    their future requirements and infrastructure that they are
    going to develop, we want to do that in partnership with them
    to make sure that our needs are met, as well as to understand
    what we need to invest in specifically for naval reactors.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Admiral.
        Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you.
        Senator Warren?
        Senator Warren. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you,
    Ranking Member, for having this hearing.
        And thank you to the witnesses for being here.
        The administration's Nuclear Posture Review calls for two
    new low-yield variants to our existing nuclear arsenal, a low-
    yield submarine-launched ballistic missile, or SLBM, in the
    near term, followed by a low-yield sea-launched cruise missile.
    And I would like to focus, if I can, on the SLBM for now.
        Ms. Gordon-Hagerty, I understand that NNSA plans to modify,
    quote, a small number, closed quote, of existing W76 warheads
    on our Trident missiles so that they are configured for a low-
    yield primary only explosion.
        Now, I know the W76 is already going through life extension
    programs. So I would like to ask you some questions just about
    how that is going to work in practice. I just want to try to
    understand this. Can you say how many W76 warheads NNSA intends
    to modify in this way?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. Senator, that number is
    classified. I am not able to provide that to you. But I would
    be happy to do that in closed session.
        Senator Warren. Okay.
        Let me ask another question then related to this. As I
    understand it, the current W76 life extension program is due to
    be completed by the end of fiscal year 2019. So how long will
    it take NNSA to modify the desired number, whatever that is, of
    warheads to detonate at a lower yield? Let me just ask related
    to that, do you anticipate that you can complete the low-yield
    modifications before the life extension production line closes
    at the end of this year?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. Senator, we are looking into that
    right now, and based on the program of record administered by
    the Nuclear Weapons Council and approved by Congress, we are in
    the process, as you rightly state, of nearing the completion of
    our life extension program for our 76-1. We are leaning as far
    forward as possible, putting schedules together, plans, and the
    things that we are authorized to do in anticipation of
    receiving congressional authorization to proceed with the low-
    yield ballistic missile warhead.
        Senator Warren. So you cannot give me an answer right now
    on how long it will take to do this?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. We are putting those plans
    together right now, as we speak, because as you rightly state,
    we have several life extension programs ongoing right now. This
    should not be a significant--this should not have a significant
    effect because we are, as you said, undertaking the LEP, life
    extension program, right now with the 76-1.
        Senator Warren. But you do anticipate that you will be able
    to complete before the life extension programs are completed.
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. It is dependent certainly on DOD
    requirements and when they will require to have the
    modifications.
        Senator Warren. So you are not certain on that yet. I just
    want to understand.
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. No. We are working with the NWC,
    Nuclear Weapons Council, de-action officer level to ensure we
    can support the scheduling.
        Senator Warren. So your budget request does not appear to
    specify any additional funding for the SLBM modifications
    called for by the Nuclear Posture Review. Are funds included
    for this purpose in the fiscal year 2019 request, and if so,
    how much?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. No, there are no funds related
    specifically to this activity. However, we are working closely
    with OMB and with DOD to ensure that any requirements necessary
    to be put forward for budget requirements for this process--we
    will be working with OMB on that.
        Senator Warren. But do you anticipate submitting a
    reprogramming or supplemental request, or do you expect to be
    using 2018 funds?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. At this time, I cannot tell you
    how that would be submitted if necessary, but we are getting a
    good idea about what the costs would be associated with this
    modification.
        Senator Warren. And one last question. What kind of testing
    will you need to conduct to ensure that whatever modifications
    are made will not impact the safety, security, and
    effectiveness of the warhead?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. Because this is a modification to
    an existing warhead, the science-based stockpile stewardship
    and all of the data that we have collected thus far should be
    adequate to meet the needs of the modification to the 76.
        Senator Warren. So you are not anticipating any additional
    testing?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. Additional testing?
        Senator Warren. To ensure that the modifications have not
    --
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. Well, because of the science-
    based stockpile stewardship, the high performance computing,
    all of the other science and engineering practices will be
    applied to this as well.
        Senator Warren. You know, I am just concerned here. Thank
    you.
        Your predecessor, retired Admiral Frank Klotz, recently
    gave an interview in which he said that NNSA is already, quote,
    working pretty much at full capacity. Given the number of life
    extension programs that NNSA is already overseeing and the
    demands of the stockpile stewardship program, I just have real
    concerns about your agency's capacity to take on additional
    work. And I think that maintaining our existing arsenal and our
    current program of record has to be our priority here.
        Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator.
        We are letting Senator Cotton collect his thoughts here
    before we call on him.
        But, Admiral, if I could ask you a question. In 2017, the
    Navy acknowledged the discovery of a manufacturing defect in
    the prototype electric-driven propulsion system for the
    Columbia-class reactor. And can you please update us on the
    progress that you are having in addressing this issue?
        Admiral Caldwell. Yes, ma'am, gladly. And you are speaking
    specifically about the electric drive or the integrated power
    system for the Columbia-class submarine. And again, I should
    note that this is funded on the Navy side not on the DOE side.
        We did have a manufacturing defect last year, and
    specifically what happened was that some of the components for
    a pre-production motor were not properly insulated. And what we
    discovered was that the sub-tier vendor did not properly flow
    down requirements to the manufacturer. And so as we were
    putting together this prototype motor, we learned of this
    deficiency, and it required us to go back and have another
    motor built, which the sub-tier vendor is executing. And that
    is going to delay our testing program.
        Our testing program comes together for full integration
    testing at a facility up in Philadelphia with life-sized, real-
    sized components, pre-production, and they will test the entire
    system end to end. And then we will take what we learned from
    that and roll that into the final design that will go into the
    first ship.
        So while we have lost some time on the pre-production
    motor, we still have been able, with shortening some test spans
    and doing some work in parallel, to preserve the required 9-
    months margin that I have specified to the required in-yard
    date for construction of the ship.
        The bottom line is we are still on track to support
    construction of the Columbia starting in 2021.
        Senator Fischer. So there really was not a negative impact
    to the larger schedule by this.
        Admiral Caldwell. It certainly put some pressure on it,
    ma'am, and it has required a significant amount of oversight to
    be able to execute it. And because we have had to overlap some
    portions of the test program, I think it inserts a little more
    risk than we would have originally preferred.
        But we are managing that extremely tightly, and I get
    frequent reports on it. And in fact, we are starting to test
    with the components that we have in hand already up at the
    facility in Philadelphia. So we are making progress and I will
    continue to keep you informed on that.
        Senator Fischer. Good.
        Have there been any other challenges in some of the new
    technology that is associated with the Columbia-class?
        Admiral Caldwell. The other big challenge that we have in
    Columbia-class is the manufacturing of the life of the ship
    core. It will be a pretty big step for us. It is going to be
    based on our experience with developing and building cores for
    many decades. And we knew this was going to be a challenge
    because to get to the over 40-year life of the core for
    Columbia was going to require the use of new materials.
        So in 2010, we decided that we needed to go prove out the
    design and the ability to manufacture using these materials by
    building a special core to go into a reactor prototype and
    training site in New York. We call that core the technology
    demonstration core. And that has allowed us to prove that we
    can manufacture on a large scale and that we can meet our
    design requirements.
        That core is nearly complete and it will be completed next
    year, and we will go to the Ballston Spa Kesselring site where
    it will refuel the S8G prototype, and that will help us prove
    out all the work that we have done to prepare for Columbia.
        So we are on track, and I expect to start building the core
    for Columbia next year, thanks to the money and the support
    that we have gotten from this subcommittee. So, again, it is
    not without challenge but we are overcoming those challenges as
    we encounter them, and we are on track to support the required
    in-yard date for the Columbia-class submarine.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir.
        Senator Cotton?
        Senator Cotton. Thank you. I apologize for my tardiness. I
    was presiding over the Senate. It was fascinating.
        I want to thank you all first for the jobs you do and very
    important work. And it is always not work that is in the
    headlines, and I think we should all be thankful for that given
    the nature of your work, that it is not frequently in the
    headlines.
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, let me just ask at a high level
    because I know you have addressed some of the specific programs
    in terms of the life extension and the modernization programs
    for our warheads. Is everything on track as of today?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. As of today, everything is on
    track and on budget.
        Senator Cotton. If that were to change in the future, what
    would be the main causes for that change? What are the risk
    factors that you see in the future to any of those programs?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. There are some scheduling issues
    certainly with the W80-4. We need to continue to be in
    alignment with the Department of Defense on that. And also
    continuing sustained funding, predictable funding, is what is
    really going to be the cause if any of those schedules slip.
        Senator Cotton. And that is it?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. At the present time.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you.
        Admiral Caldwell, let us turn to you. I know this is not
    exactly in your lane today, but I suspect you have worked on it
    some in the past. There is obviously a lot of debate in
    Congress about the National Defense Strategy and the Nuclear
    Posture Review and the return of some low-yield weapons to our
    arsenal. I know there is lots of sophisticated game theory type
    arguments you could make. Is the simplest argument to make is
    that Russia has them and we do not?
        Admiral Caldwell. I think the best argument to make, sir--
    first off, I support the Nuclear Posture Review. I support a
    strong nuclear deterrent. And I think the best argument to make
    is no matter who the potential adversary, that our nuclear
    deterrent must be strong, capable, and ready and must be ready
    to respond across a range of future scenarios.
        The important thing to note is deterrence--what really
    matters is what is in the mind of the adversary. If they do not
    think we have a capability to respond in a variety of scenarios
    or that we are not ready or that it is not credible, then
    deterrence fails. So I believe that the plans and the intent of
    the Nuclear Posture Review is exactly where we need to go for a
    strong United States.
        Senator Cotton. In terms of that flexible, ready response
    across a range of scenarios, so one of the threats there is
    that if the enemy possesses low-yield warheads, say, in the
    single digit kiloton range, yet it perceives us only to have
    high-yield, city-killing types in the dozens, hundreds of
    kiloton or even megaton range, they think they might be able to
    get away with detonating a low-yield weapon because we would
    not respond with a high-yield weapon.
        Admiral Caldwell. That is correct, sir. We do not want an
    adversary to think that we are self-deterred.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you.
        Let us get back a little bit more into your current lane.
    Do you anticipate any problems in supplying additional reactors
    if the decision is made to increase the number of ballistic
    missile submarines?
        Admiral Caldwell. Sir, as of now, I am not aware of any
    plans to increase the number of ballistic missile submarines.
        Senator Cotton. Maybe they will be coming one day.
        Admiral Caldwell. But certainly we will always welcome more
    submarines.
        What I would tell you is we are in close dialogue with our
    nuclear industrial base, frequent. And we know their business
    well. We are good partners with them. We have had dialogues on
    the range of future options in terms of additional ships,
    including carrier build rates. And as long as the nuclear
    industrial base has sufficient warning, they can make the
    proper investments in people, equipment, and facilities to
    deliver what the Nation needs.
        Senator Cotton. On that topic, we used to have surface
    ships besides aircraft carriers that were nuclear-powered. We
    no longer have those. Why is that?
        Admiral Caldwell. We had those cruisers, and then as they
    reached end of life, there was no intent to recapitalize them.
    And with every new ship class that comes into existence, we
    examine what the propulsion system should be and we assess the
    mission, the patrol cycles, the deployment cycles, the crew
    cycles. And we also assess the cost, and part of that is the
    cost of fuel and how the ship will be used. And in the analysis
    of alternatives, if it makes sense to use nuclear propulsion,
    we would. But to date, since the retiring of those nuclear-
    powered cruisers, the ships that have been manufactured and use
    nuclear propulsion are all carriers and all submarines, and I
    think that is a good thing. I know that in future scenarios, as
    we continue to decide what future classes we need, that we will
    continue to pursue these analyses of alternatives and make a
    decision based on cost and what the mission needs are.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Donnelly?
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Mr. Trimble, where do you see the greatest bottlenecks for
    the NNSA as we begin all of these designing production
    programs?
        Mr. Trimble. Thank you for the question.
        I think that is a difficult one to answer simply because as
    you lay out, the complex is working at levels not seen since
    the Cold War, and you are operating with a very tight schedule
    across all the LEPs, while simultaneously doing physical
    modernization for the core facilities for uranium, plutonium,
    et cetera. So it is a very complex system that needs to be
    tightly managed, tightly orchestrated. So the potential for
    things to go off the rails anywhere is there.
        By the way, if I had to pick one area, I think as you
    mentioned, Kansas City jumps to mind. I know we have some
    ongoing work looking at Kansas City for this committee. They, I
    believe, make roughly 80 percent of the non-nuclear components
    for the weapons. They are already planning to go to or already
    at two and three shifts. And over the next 5 years, we have
    been told they are looking to hire about 1,000 people. So that
    is quite a daunting undertaking and it is sort a fulcrum for
    all of our efforts.
        Throwing another challenge at Kansas City in terms of the
    hiring, there is another GAO high risk area dealing with
    security clearances. So the ability to hire those people who
    all need Q clearances is also going to run up into sort of the
    mess that is the clearance process currently in the Federal
    Government.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
        Admiral Caldwell, a life of core fuel is your current
    milestone for the Ohio-replacement program. If we go to life of
    core fuels for the fleet, what fuel forms of the future are you
    looking at?
        Admiral Caldwell. Sir, thanks for the question.
        We currently manufacture life of ship fuel for all of the
    submarines, and for the carriers, it is a once in their life
    refueling at roughly the 25-year point. With Columbia, again,
    life of the ship core enables us to avoid refuelings, taking
    the ship off line, saves money, saves force structure.
        What is next? Well, the Navy has a need for more power as
    we decide to put more capabilities on ships going forward. They
    need greater flexibility. Certainly the Navy would maybe like,
    in our submarine force, to have more speed. So these things
    require us to put more energy in the core if we can also make
    future cores more affordable because cost savings is something
    that we are focused on, as well as meeting the requirements for
    strong, stable, reliable nuclear propulsion.
        So what is next is that we plan to do, given the money
    requested in the presidential budget, is to take that Virginia
    core and see how we can make some modifications to it. And our
    plans right now are to make some of those modifications for
    installation on a late model Virginia and then be ready for a
    future SSN [Submersible Ship Nuclear-Powered]. And we believe
    we can put some more energy in there and make it more
    affordable, to the tune of perhaps maybe a $50 million
    reduction per ship. So that is substantial.
        What is after that would have to be pretty much a
    revolutionary change or a step change in core design using a
    completely different system. And we are working on that. We are
    making pace on that. But the next step is to take this
    Virginia-class core and take it to the next level using sort of
    the current model.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, my understanding is that in
    developing the fiscal year 2019 budget, we reduced the funds to
    the laser fusion efforts which underpin a lot of the science
    programs. In particular, we have proposed to phase out laser
    fusion at Rochester, which is the seed corn of future
    scientists for the weapons programs in many ways.
        Have you assessed what impacts this will cause in the short
    and long term?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. Senator Donnelly, I recently
    learned about this, and I have looked into it personally. We
    have near-term and long-term priorities in our science-based
    stockpile stewardship programs. And it so happens that part of
    the inertial confinement fusion program, of which NIF-Z
    [National Ignition Facility] at Sandia and NIF at--National
    Ignition Facility at Livermore, Z at Sandia, and the LLE
    [Laboratory for Laser Energetics] at University of Rochester,
    the Omega program, are part and parcel of those programs.
    However, because of near-term priorities in our science-based
    stockpile stewardship and our requirements, we have decided
    that it is best for us to ramp down the activities at
    University of Rochester. While I recognize that, yes, it is a
    source oftentimes of future scientists and engineers because
    they get some training there, we are looking at what it takes
    to ensure that we are supporting our science-based stockpile
    stewardship and management program. And therefore, we have
    determined that we are going to be putting it on a 3-year ramp-
    down.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Donnelly.
        I would like to thank the witnesses for being here today.
    If we do have some questions for the record and we get those
    submitted to you, I would hope that you could respond to us
    within a couple weeks with your answers.
        Senator Fischer. And with that, I thank Senator Donnelly,
    and the meeting is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 3:25 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

               Questions Submitted by Senator Kirsten Gillibrand
                   inertial confinement fusion (icf) program
        1. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, the ICF program
    supports critical experimental platforms that complement and validate
    computer modeling to maintain the Nation's nuclear stockpile without
    underground nuclear weapons testing. We have worked very hard to ensure
    a stable program that allows the Department, its national laboratories,
    and its university and industry partners to plan and execute the
    experimental work necessary to ensure the safety and reliability of our
    nuclear stockpile. However, the Administration's fiscal year 2019
    budget request would cut experiments at the National Ignition Facility,
    propose the shutdown of the OMEGA Laser Facility at the University of
    Rochester in New York, and terminate all university programs. The work
    of hundreds of scientists and researchers would end and efforts to
    achieve ignition, which would have tremendous benefits for the Nation's
    nuclear stockpile stewardship, would be considerably slowed if not
    abandoned. This fiscal year 2019 budget request will lead to the loss
    of U.S. leadership in these critical national security areas. Please
    provide an explanation for these proposed program cuts and explain how
    these proposals will not weaken the stockpile stewardship program.
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. The proposed budget for Fiscal Year (FY)
    2019 redirects resources to the most immediate stockpile stewardship
    needs, reflecting difficult choices that balance priorities between
    meeting near-term and long-term needs for the nuclear stockpile. The
    Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield (ICF) Program will
    continue to provide essential data and supporting expertise required
    for the ongoing assessment and certification of the nuclear weapon
    stockpile at the proposed $419 million funding level for fiscal year
    2019. This level of funding not only preserves the core of the most
    critical experimental capabilities supported through the ICF program,
    ensuring that there will be no impact to experiments supporting ongoing
    life extension programs, but also advances experimental platform
    development for weapon outputs and effects studies. In the long-term,
    achieving laboratory ignition remains a goal for the Stockpile
    Stewardship Program, as does the reconstitution of the academic
    alliances and university partnerships in a way that complements NNSA's
    Research & Development (Science) and Advanced Simulation & Computing
    Programs.

        2. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, I was pleased to
    hear during your Senate confirmation hearing that recruiting and
    maintaining the ``best and the brightest'' is a priority for you and
    NNSA. The OMEGA Laser Facility at the University of Rochester's (UR)
    Laboratory for Laser Energetics (LLE) is one of the three leading
    facilities for NNSA's Inertial Confinement Fusion program. As the DOE's
    and NNSA's largest university-based research center, the LLE is the
    only major facility that trains graduate students and also supports
    over 400 users from 55 universities and over 35 centers and national
    laboratories. More than 330 UR students alone have completed their
    Ph.D. degrees with LLE's support and 100 students are currently
    conducting research there. Given that LLE clearly serves as a vital
    pipeline to educate and train future talent, a priority you have
    identified for NNSA, I was disappointed to see the budget request would
    propose a 50 percent cut to the LLE in fiscal year 2019 and shut it
    down completely in three years. How do you reconcile your testimony and
    prioritization of talent with the President's request? How can we
    ensure that LLE continues to train the future workforce to help meet
    our national security needs?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. The role that LLE has played in educating
    and developing a trained workforce in the high energy density (HED)
    area is valued, and NNSA has recommended continued support for a
    University of Rochester-based research center focusing specifically on
    fundamental HED science and education, continuing their rich history of
    workforce development for the weapons program.
        The proposed budget for Fiscal Year 2019 reflects difficult choices
    that balanced priorities between meeting near-term and long-term needs
    for the nuclear stockpile including workforce development and training.
    The ability to recruit and retain the best and brightest is a priority
    for NNSA, and we will continue to strive to meet this challenge across
    all of the scientific, engineering, and manufacturing disciplines
    required to meet our mission.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Donnelly
                          waste isolation pilot plant
        3. Senator Donnelly. Mr. Owendoff, your budget includes major
    increases for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) to get it back up
    and running. The Department has proposed to terminate the MOX program
    and send the plutonium to WIPP. What will the impact be on WIPP with
    its re-start and back logged waste from other defense sites--and is
    there enough room for it?
        Mr. Owendoff. Independent of the plutonium disposition program, DOE
    is taking actions to ensure adequate capacity at the Waste Isolation
    Pilot Plant (WIPP) pursuant to its mission to accept transuranic waste
    streams resulting from atomic energy defense activities across the DOE
    complex.
        The Department is pursuing a change to the method of calculating
    the Volume of Record consistent with the WIPP Land Withdrawal Act (LWA)
    capacity limit for transuranic waste of 6.2 million cubic feet
    (approximately 176,000 cubic meters). DOE submitted a permit
    modification request in January 2018 to the New Mexico Environment
    Department; the request is under review.
        DOE is mining additional panels and pursuing the Volume of Record
    change whether or not additional surplus plutonium is designated for
    disposal at WIPP.
                                  hanford site
        4. Senator Donnelly. Mr. Trimble, you looked at grouting as an
    alternative to turning the other 60 percent of the low activity waste
    at Hanford into glass. How much will that save and where could it be
    disposed of?
        Mr. Trimble. DOE may be able to reduce certain risks and save tens
    of billions of dollars by adopting alternative approaches to treat a
    portion of Hanford's low-activity waste (LAW).
        In May 2017, we reported on DOE's efforts to treat the low-activity
    portion of the tank waste at the Hanford Site. DOE currently plans to
    treat up to one-half of the low-activity waste (LAW) at Hanford with a
    process called vitrification, which immobilizes the waste in glass.
    This is because the Waste Treatment Plant--DOE's current planned
    approach to treating Hanford's tank waste--is currently designed to
    treat only one-third to one-half of Hanford's LAW, meaning that DOE
    will have to modify the WTP or build another facility to treat the
    supplemental LAW, whether or not vitrification is chosen as the
    treatment method. DOE currently plans to dispose of Hanford's vitrified
    LAW in an on-site landfill called the Integrated Disposal Facility.
    However, at the Savannah River Site, DOE is grouting the site's LAW;
    grout is a process that immobilizes waste in a concrete-like mixture.
    We found that the best available information indicates that DOE's
    estimated costs to grout LAW at the Savannah River Site are
    substantially lower than its estimated costs to vitrify LAW at Hanford,
    and DOE may be able to save tens of billions of dollars by
    reconsidering its waste treatment approach for a portion of the LAW at
    Hanford.
        We also reported that, according a few of the 21 experts that
    attended GAO's meeting convened by the National Academies of Sciences,
    Engineering, and Medicine, Hanford's LAW could be treated and disposed
    of at an alternate location. DOE is currently conducting a
    demonstration project that would grout some of Hanford's LAW and
    transport it to the Waste Control Specialists' site in Texas for
    permanent disposal. According to DOE officials, disposal of grouted
    Hanford LAW at the Waste Control Specialists' site has the potential to
    save significant costs associated with the construction and operation
    of an additional vitrification facility. According to an estimate
    conducted by Waste Control Specialists, disposal of Hanford's LAW at
    the site in Texas could save DOE up to $16.5 billion when compared with
    the costs of constructing and operating a second vitrification facility
    for the treatment of supplemental LAW.

        5. Senator Donnelly. Mr. Owendoff, what is the status of the
    Hanford high level waste pretreatment project and are you keeping
    engineering capability alive while you concentrate of turning the low
    activity waste into glass?
        Mr. Owendoff. Work on the Hanford Waste Treatment and
    Immobilization Plant's Pretreatment (PT) Facility has been suspended
    since 2012 because of the need to address technical issues. We are
    making steady progress on addressing the remaining three identified
    technical issues at the PT Facility including: pulse jet mixer
    controls, erosion/corrosion in piping and vessels and black cell
    equipment structural integrity.
        DOE expects its contractors to effectively manage human capital to
    ensure the right expertise is brought to bear where and when needed.
                   naval reactors decommissioning and cleanup
        6. Senator Donnelly. ADM Caldwell, I understand you are working
    with DOE Environmental Management to have them perform some cleanup
    operations. To what extent will DOE Environmental Management perform
    this mission and on what facilities--will it extend to the current fuel
    pond at Idaho when the new one is built?
        ADM Caldwell. Naval Reactors (NR) has pursued a collaboration
    effort with DOE-EM to capitalize on their expertise and processes to
    increase our rate in reducing environmental liabilities. Naval Reactors
    and DOE-EM are currently developing the strategic framework necessary
    to lay out a prioritized plan across the Future Years Nuclear Security
    Plan, identify the project management processes to control funding
    transfers and project execution, and establish appropriate memorandums
    of agreement to define the nature of the partnership.
        The plan and budget profile for NR D&D activities over the next 5
    years is required to meet current mission needs and is based on using
    our current NR D&D processes and subcontractor (Babcock & Wilcox Shaw
    Remediation [BWSR]). Naval Reactors' contract with BWSR extends through
    fiscal year 2019 with an option year in fiscal year 2020. BWSR will
    continue to perform D&D activities under the scope of this contract.
        In fiscal year 2019, Naval Reactors and DOE-EM will accomplish the
    necessary planning and scoping activities to enable a transition to
    utilize DOE-EM to perform D&D work. Our goal is to be in a position to
    execute initial pilot projects in fiscal year 2020 and expand to other
    projects in future budget years. The specific pilot projects have not
    yet been determined.
        Under this new arrangement, DOE-EM would perform large-scale D&D
    projects, and Naval Reactors would continue to perform unique, smaller-
    scale efforts (such as high-curie work within an active building) using
    in-house personnel or via subcontract based on the nature of the work
    and the most efficient use of resources.
        Naval Reactors would oversee the work and establish program
    management checkpoints where DOE-EM must obtain approval to proceed, to
    be specified in a Memorandum of Agreement under development. Naval
    Reactors and DOE-EM would utilize the principles of DOE Order 413.3B to
    define and control this program of work. The work would be performed by
    DOE-EM contractors to DOE-EM requirements, under a DOE-EM managed
    contract. Naval Reactors would provide annual transfers to DOE-EM based
    on the approved scope.
        The earliest that D&D work could commence on the Expended Core
    Facility at the Naval Reactors Facility in Idaho is estimated to be in
    the 2040s. Therefore, determination of DOE-EM involvement in the D&D of
    this facility will be made at a later date.

        7. Senator Donnelly. ADM Caldwell, at one point I understand you
    were looking at commercial sites to dispose of the decommissioned
    reactor vessels. What is the status of that effort?
        ADM Caldwell. Naval Reactors is preparing to conduct an
    Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for CVN 65 (the first
    decommissioned nuclear aircraft carrier) to assess: 1) commercial
    recycling of the non-nuclear portions of the ship followed by reactor
    compartment packaging at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard (PSNS); and 2)
    commercial dismantlement and disposal of the reactor plants and
    recycling of the remainder of the ship. The EIS process will allow us
    to obtain input from stakeholders including the public on options for
    disposal. The EIS process is expected to start in the Fall of 2018 and
    span approximately three years.
        In 2012, the Navy issued an Environmental Assessment (EA) and
    Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) for disposal of the CVN 65
    reactor plants at PSNS, where submarine and cruiser reactor plant
    disposal has traditionally been done. The eight reactor compartments
    would be removed from the ship as it is dismantled and individually
    sealed in high-integrity packages for transport to the Department of
    Energy's Hanford site.
        However, as the technical details to actually perform the work
    outlined in the 2012 EA and FONSI developed, PSNS estimates for the
    overall cost as well as the time in drydock grew to where there was
    substantial doubt that the plan outlined in the EA and FONSI could be
    executed without additional cost and impact on active ship work. This
    cost and schedule growth, in part, led to a reexamination of additional
    alternatives. One such alternative is packaging the eight individual
    reactor compartments from CVN 65 as four pairs, which reduces the
    shipyard's efforts relative to the work outlined in the 2012 EA/FONSI.
    However, the larger and heavier reactor compartment disposal packages
    could require modification to the transportation route from Bremerton,
    Washington to the Hanford site.
        Separately, within the last decade, the cost to commercially
    recycle non-nuclear Navy ships declined to almost zero, and the idea of
    partial commercial dismantlement was developed. The number of large
    commercial nuclear power plants being dismantled in the commercial
    industry also increased. Given that both the commercial nuclear
    dismantlement industry as well as the commercial shipbreaking industry
    offered the potential for substantially reduced cost with proven
    results, without impacting Navy facilities, it seemed prudent for the
    Navy to evaluate this alternative.
        At this time, Naval Reactors does not have a preferred choice for
    CVN 65 disposal. The objective is to recommend an approach that is
    executable, environmentally responsible, and effective in the
    utilization of Navy resources.
                              savannah river site
        8. Senator Donnelly. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, you are looking at
    using the existing MOX building and its 400,000 square feet of un-
    finished space to machine plutonium, yet your own analysis says you
    need only about 100,000 square feet of that space. What are you going
    to do with the rest of it since this facility was custom built for
    making MOX fuel with 3 foot thick walls?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. While no mission other than pit
    production has been identified for the MOX facility, it is a viable
    asset that can be repurposed for other high hazard missions in addition
    to its use as a pit production facility.
                                 y-12 facility
        9. Senator Donnelly. Mr. Owendoff, my understanding is that you
    cannot tear down many Manhattan era buildings at the Y-12 plant in TN
    until you remediate the mercury in the ground water. How long will that
    take and how much will it cost?
        Mr. Owendoff. Several of the Manhattan Project-era buildings at Y-
    12 are contaminated with mercury. Before we can initiate large-scale
    demolition of these facilities, the Environmental Management (EM)
    program must construct a mercury treatment facility capable of
    controlling mercury releases that could occur once demolition of these
    deteriorating structures begins.
        Work is already underway on the mercury treatment facility, which
    will be operational in 2024, prior to our scheduled start of building
    demolition. Early estimates for the mercury treatment facility range
    from $120-$244 million, but those estimates will be refined as the
    project progresses.
        In addition, in order to cost-effectively demolish these excess
    shut-down facilities, the current perimeter intrusion, detection and
    assessment system (PIDAS) will need to be relocated prior to the start
    of demolition activities. The NNSA is funding a project to move the
    PIDAS, and their schedule for completing the relocation aligns with
    EM's schedule for demolition.
                              nnsa cost estimation
        10. Senator Donnelly. Mr. Trimble, what is you assessment of the
    cost estimation effort at the NNSA and why is it important?
        Mr. Trimble. Understanding the cost of programs and activities is
    essential to building credible budget and future spending plans. Our
    recent work shows that DOE and NNSA, with some exceptions, have made
    progress in improving the quality of its cost estimating for specific
    major projects and programs. For example, we found in September 2017
    that DOE's revised cost estimate for completing construction of the
    Mixed-Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility substantially met best
    practices and can be considered reliable as it substantially met all
    four characteristics of a high-quality cost estimate: comprehensive,
    well-documented, accurate, and credible. Likewise, in May 2018, we
    found that NNSA substantially incorporated most of the cost estimating
    best practices identified by our past work when it developed the
    program cost estimate for the B61-12 LEP. In addition, we believe that
    NNSA's cost estimating capability has been enhanced by the
    establishment of its Office of Cost Estimating and Program Evaluation
    which advises the NNSA administrator on policies and procedures for
    cost analysis and estimation and conducts independent cost estimates
    for projects and programs among other activities. We note that that
    this office was established under the National Defense Authorization
    Act for Fiscal Year 2014. (Pub. L.No. 113-66, Sec.  3112, 127 Stat.
    672, 1050 (2013) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. Sec. 2411(a)
    (2018)).
        Even with improved cost estimates for individual projects and
    programs, we have found problems with NNSA's overall long-term
    planning, programming, and budgeting for modernizing the nuclear
    weapons stockpile over the coming decades. For example, NNSA's fiscal
    year 2017 budget materials show that NNSA's modernization budget
    estimates for fiscal years 2022 through 2026 may require significant
    funding increases, raising affordability concerns. Moreover, in April
    2017, we concluded that NNSA had not addressed a projected ``bow wave''
    of future funding needs--that is, an impending and significant increase
    in requirements for additional funds--or the mismatch between potential
    funding needs and potential funding available. We recommended that NNSA
    include an assessment of the affordability of NNSA's portfolio of
    modernization programs in future versions of the Stockpile Stewardship
    and Management Plan--for example, by presenting options NNSA could
    consider to bring its estimates of modernization funding needs into
    alignment with potential future budgets. NNSA did not explicitly agree
    or disagree with our recommendation, but we are continuing to monitor
    any actions NNSA takes in response to the recommendation. We believe
    this recommendation may be particularly important as NNSA considers the
    additional program scope included in the January 2018 Nuclear Posture
    review is translated into program and budgetary requirements.
                          nnsa dnn program management
        11. Senator Donnelly. Mr. Trimble, what is your assessment of the
    program management at the NNSA Office Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation?
        Mr. Trimble. Program management involves aligning multiple
    components to achieve the program's goals and allows for optimized or
    integrated cost, schedule, and effort. The Project Management Institute
    (PMI) and GAO have established standards and guides that are generally
    recognized as leading practices for program management. When
    organizations apply leading program management practices they may be
    able to enhance their chances of achieving success across a range of
    programs. NNSA's Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) has
    issued its own program management policy, which it revised in 2017.
        However, in a September 2017 report, we found limitations DNN's
    revised policy--including that it does not address leading practices on
    establishing schedule estimates, estimating life-cycle costs, and
    measuring against such baselines--and that DNN management does not
    require the programs to establish schedules and cost estimates that
    cover their life cycles, or conduct baseline measurements. As a
    consequence, we found that none of the 4 selected DNN subprograms we
    reviewed had schedule and cost estimates covering their planned life
    cycles and none measured performance against schedule and cost
    baselines. We recommended that NNSA revise the DNN program management
    policy to include requirements for DNN programs on development of
    schedule and cost estimates, and use of schedule and cost baselines to
    measure performance. These changes could help ensure that NNSA managers
    and Congress have better information on how much DNN programs and
    subprograms may cost and subprograms may cost, the time they may need
    to achieve their goals, and how effectively they are being executed
    compared to plans.
        In its written comments, NNSA neither agreed nor disagreed with our
    recommendation. However, NNSA stated that it plans to take action in
    response to the recommendation. Specifically, NNSA stated that DNN will
    update its program management policy to formally document current
    practice and clarify expectations for addressing uncertainty. NNSA said
    it will update the policy to: (1) reflect that life-cycle cost and
    schedule management should be applied at the project or subprogram
    level where appropriate, considering the extent of uncertainty
    impacting scope, potential timelines, and executability; (2) define the
    methodologies to (a) account for uncertainties where applying these
    techniques would result in a reasonable range of estimates that would
    be useful for planning and scheduling purposes or (b) document risk and
    track actions to reduce uncertainty where applicable; (3) address
    expectations for assessing cost and schedule performance, commensurate
    with the level of certainty present at baselining; and (4) address
    requirements for documenting program management plans. In March 2018,
    NNSA indicated that DNN had developed a proposal to revise the DNN
    policy and it was under internal review with an estimated completion by
    December 31, 2018.
                             low-yield slbm warhead
        12. Senator Donnelly. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, is there a budget
    proposal yet for the low yield SLBM warhead and how much will it cost
    for fiscal year 2019?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. As submitted in the amended Fiscal Year
    (FY) 2019 budget request, $65 million is requested in fiscal year 2019
    for the low yield submarine-launched ballistic missile, which is now
    referred to as the W76-2 warhead.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
                  visit to new mexico's national laboratories
        13. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, congratulations on
    your confirmation as administrator; I look forward to working with you
    in support of the department's national security programs. I recognize
    you have taken on a very challenging job and already have a lot on your
    plate. However, I urge you to visit the NNSA's national laboratories
    soon to learn firsthand about their important work and the outstanding
    scientists and engineers that help maintain the Nation's nuclear
    stockpile. Will you make plans to come to New Mexico in the near future
    to visit both Los Alamos and Sandia National Laboratories?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. Thank you for your support, and I look
    forward to working with you during my tenure. Since being sworn in, I
    have made it a priority to visit all of the laboratories, plants, and
    sites that comprise the National Nuclear Security Administration's
    (NNSA) nuclear security enterprise. I visited the Los Alamos National
    Laboratory in April 2018 and Sandia National Laboratories in June 2018
    as well as the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore,
    California in May 2018. From ensuring the nuclear stockpile is safe,
    secure, and effective; to developing nuclear nonproliferation tools;
    and providing counter-proliferation expertise--the work done at these
    laboratories is central to NNSA's national security missions.
                               plutonium strategy
        14. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, at your
    confirmation hearing last month you indicated the plutonium strategy
    would be a top priority. Your testimony made reference to the pending
    deadline Congress set in section 3141(d) of this year's NDAA for a
    final decision. This process has taken far longer that it should have.
    An AOA was completed in October 2017, but failed to consider the
    modular approach at LANL or produce a practical recommendation. Then,
    an engineering analysis was undertaken in December to inform the
    selection of an alternative and to support conceptual design of a
    preferred alternative. The engineering analysis has not been completed.
        Did the engineering analysis fully evaluate the modular approach at
    Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL)?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. Yes. The engineering assessment includes
    an evaluation of the technical and functional feasibility of four
    different options for additional high-hazard, high-security footprint
    for the production of 50 war reserve pits per year. Three of these
    options are at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and one is at
    Savannah River Site. One of the three options evaluated at LANL is
    their proposed ``modular approach.'' NNSA also conducted a workforce
    and staffing analysis to assess the common staffing requirements and
    enable valid comparisons between the preferred alternatives. The
    analysis of alternatives, engineering assessment, and workforce
    analysis will be used to further refine budget requests and inform a
    conceptual design to support Critical Decision-1 in Fiscal Year 2020.

        15. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, can you assure me
    that key stakeholders, including the subject matter experts at LANL,
    will review the engineering analysis and that your decision will be
    based on the best data available and sound cost estimates?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. The engineering assessment (EA) and
    workforce analysis do not recommend an alternative, but are intended to
    provide additional information to senior NNSA decision-makers. Subject
    matter experts (SMEs) from Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL),
    Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), and the Savannah River
    Site (SRS) were an integral part of the EA, and an SME from each site
    provided their plutonium expertise and input to the EA throughout the
    document's development. In addition, NNSA provided a review period for
    additional subject matter experts from LANL, LLNL, and SRS to review
    the EA for factual accuracy. The EA provides additional analysis
    related to cost, schedule, risk, and feasibility for four options at
    the two alternative locations identified by the analysis of
    alternatives.

        16. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, will NNSA's Office
    of Cost Estimating and Program Evaluation (CEPE) fully review and
    report to you and the congressional defense committees on the
    engineering analysis?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. The National Nuclear Security
    Administration's (NNSA) Office of Cost Estimating and Program
    Evaluation was part of the review process of the engineering analysis
    and part of the NNSA team that briefed the congressional defense
    committees.

        17. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, are you aware that
    the Los Alamos County Council recently passed a resolution strongly
    supporting LANL's role as the Nation's center of excellence for
    plutonium R&D and expansion of the lab's pit production capabilities?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. Yes, I am aware of the Los Alamos County
    Council's resolution. The National Nuclear Security Administration
    (NNSA) greatly appreciates the vital role our partners in Los Alamos
    play in our national security missions. NNSA is committed to an
    enduring plutonium mission at Los Alamos. The Los Alamos National
    Laboratory is and will remain the center of excellence for plutonium
    R&D.

        18. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, working with the
    Nuclear Weapons Council, will you be able to propose a path forward by
    the 150-day deadline as directed in section 3141(d) of the fiscal year
    2018 NDAA?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. Per section 3141(d) of the National
    Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, I endorsed a path
    forward on May 10, 2018.

        19. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, you testified that
    there is no margin for further delay in modernizing NNSA's production
    capabilities. In light of the delay in completing the AOA, do you
    expect NNSA will still meet the DOD and statutory capacity requirements
    for pit production in 2030 enacted over three years ago in 50 USC 2538a
    and reconfirmed in the NPR?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. Yes. NNSA remains committed to supporting
    an enduring 30 pit per year production capability in 2026, and an 80
    pit per year capability in 2030.
           trusted rad-hard strategic microelectronics at sandia labs
        20. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, the recent Nuclear
    Posture Review reaffirmed the need to maintain a robust capability for
    both research and a dedicated source of trusted radiation-hardened
    micro-electronics systems. The MESA facility at Sandia Labs is aging
    and needs to be upgraded to meet future national security requirements
    after 2025. What is the status and timeline to upgrade MESA to maintain
    the advanced R&D and production capacity of rad-hard micro-electronics
    to meet the needs of both NNSA as well as other strategic partners?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. The Silicon Fabrication (SiFab) foundry
    at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) produces radiation-hardened
    microelectronics for U.S. nuclear warheads. DOE/NNSA is working to
    extend this capability at SiFab beyond 2025. The SNL SiFab
    Recapitalization (SSiFR) project was initiated in 2012 to procure
    upgraded equipment over a 7-year period (ending in Fiscal Year 2019).
    As planned, this effort is nearing completion and the installation of
    the new, 8-inch equipment is scheduled. Real property upgrades to
    extend SiFab are in the planning process.
        As a strategic partner, SiFab is also accredited as a trusted
    supplier by the Defense Microelectronics Activity, which manages the
    Department of Defense's (DOD) Trusted Foundry Program. DOE/NNSA
    continues to collaborate with the DOD as the DOD develops a
    comprehensive national strategy for government access to
    microelectronics.
                  laboratory-directed research and development
        21. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, you testified that
    attracting and retaining a skilled workforce is critical to NNSA's
    mission. To that end, I continue to be a strong supporter of a modest
    set-aside of funding for Laboratory-Directed Research and Development
    (LDRD). The LDRD investment in high-risk, high-payoff activities
    supports the national security mission while allowing the labs'
    scientists to pursue innovative solutions to some of the Nation's most
    challenging energy and national security problems. I am pleased that
    you testified that LDRD funding fosters innovation and helps attract
    and retain the workforce critical to our national laboratories.
        Do you also support maintaining the NNSA lab directors' discretion
    to set aside up to 6 percent of funding for LDRD?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. The National Nuclear Security
    Administration is supportive of a robust Laboratory Directed Research
    and Development (LDRD) program. LDRD is a vital asset in recruitment of
    a world-class scientific workforce and is critical to the maintenance
    and development of scientific capabilities that serve energy and
    national security missions. The LDRD program provides a basis for
    continually engaging laboratory research staff in cutting-edge and
    challenging work, as well as providing education and training for the
    next generation of scientists.
                       nnsa's albuquerque office complex
        22. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, I had the
    opportunity to tour NNSA's Albuquerque Complex in 2017. There are about
    1200 federal workers housed in increasingly decrepit office buildings
    that date from the 1940s and 50s. The buildings do not meet even basic
    safety requirements. I strongly support plans to replace these
    inadequate facilities with a new LEED Gold building and am pleased the
    NNSA included funding in both the fiscal year 2018 and fiscal year 2019
    budgets to fully fund the project. A groundbreaking will likely be
    scheduled soon and I hope you will plan to attend.
        What is the status of the Albuquerque Complex project and when
    might construction begin?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. On Friday, April 20, the National Nuclear
    Security Administration's (NNSA) Project Management Executive approved
    the start of construction for the Albuquerque Complex Project. The
    United States Army Corps of Engineers awarded a construction contract
    to Caddell Construction Company on April 24, 2018. NNSA broke ground on
    this new state-of-the-art facility in July 2018 and expects to complete
    construction by the end of 2020.
                   increase in cap for general plant projects
        23. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, I worked last year
    with your office on legislation in the fiscal year 2018 NDAA to
    increase the statutory cap from $10 million to $20 million for general
    plant projects at NNSA labs and facilities. What is the status of
    NNSA's implementation of the increased cap for GPPs as authorized by
    section 3119 of NDAA18?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. The increase in NNSA's General Plant
    Project (GPP)/Minor Construction threshold from $10 million to $20
    million allows NNSA to address high-risk infrastructure deficiencies
    faster and more efficiently. As a result of additional funding provided
    in fiscal year 2018, some projects have been accelerated. The current
    plan is noted below. NNSA has moved to implement this new authority
    quickly, and per the notification provided in NNSA's fiscal year 2019
    budget request, NNSA is planning the following 11 projects between $10
    million and $20 million for execution beginning in fiscal year 2018 or
    fiscal year 2019:

          Three of the 11 projects are fully-funded in fiscal year
    2018:
            o  Pantex--New Gas Analysis Laboratory
            o  Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory--New AME Polymers and
    Engineering Facility
            o  Los Alamos National Laboratory--TA-16-0303 Crystal Lab
    Refurbishment Portfolio

          Two of the 11 projects fund design in fiscal year 2018
    and construction in fiscal year 2019:
            o  Pantex--Building 12-37 Secondary Electrical Feed
    Installation
            o  Sandia National Laboratories/CA--New Data Center Replacement
    Facility

          One of the 11 projects funds design in fiscal year 2018
    and construction in fiscal year 2020:
            o  Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory--Building 235 and
    Ancillary Synthesis Chemistry Laboratories Refurbishment with Fume Hood
    Upgrades

          Two of the 11 projects request full funding in fiscal
    year 2019:
            o  Los Alamos National Laboratory--Dual Axis Radiographic
    Hydrodynamic Test Facility Weather Enclosure Addition
            o  Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory--Building 341 AME
    Mechanical Test Capability Consolidation Refurbishment

          Three of the 11 projects request design funding in fiscal
    year 2019 and construction in fiscal year 2020:
            o  Nevada National Security Site--Mercury Modernization New
    Building 23-461
            o  Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory--Building 151 High
    Level Radiochemistry Laboratories Refurbishment
            o  Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory--New AME Joining
    Capabilities and Vapor Deposition Facility
                      domestic production of molybdenum-99
        24. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, NNSA currently
    provides funding to re-establish a domestic commercial supply of the
    radioactive isotope molybdenum-99 used for medical diagnostic
    procedures. What is your fiscal year 2019 budget request for support of
    this important program?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. Our fiscal year 2019 request includes $10
    million for laboratory support to develop domestic Mo-99 production
    technologies and implement cooperative agreements.

        25. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, do you have a
    forecast of what NNSA plans to spend over the following two years?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. The fiscal year (FY) 2019 request
    includes a forecast of $10 million for both fiscal year 2020 and fiscal
    year 2021 for continued laboratory support.
                           wipp budget and operations
        26. Senator Heinrich. Mr. Owendoff, you testified the fiscal year
    2019 request for WIPP is intended to enable increased transuranic waste
    shipments from other EM sites. However, I believe maintenance of WIPP
    must be a top priority. I continue to be concerned about the growing
    backlog in maintenance and repairs required to keep WIPP operating
    safely and efficiently. What is the current cost estimate of the
    accumulated maintenance backlog needed to properly maintain key
    infrastructure and facilities at WIPP?
        Mr. Owendoff. The 2019 Budget proposes $47 million for repair and
    replacement of critical facility structures, systems, and components.

        27. Senator Heinrich. Mr. Owendoff, how much of the $403.5 million
    in the fiscal year 2019 request for WIPP is set aside specifically to
    address the maintenance backlog of critical infrastructure?
        Mr. Owendoff. The 2019 Budget proposes $47 million for repair and
    replacement of critical facility structures, systems, and components.

        28. Senator Heinrich. Mr. Owendoff, it has been over a year since
    WIPP operations restarted. What are the remaining key milestones and
    the likely timeline to restore full operations at WIPP?
        Mr. Owendoff. While DOE completed the recovery effort with the
    resumption of waste emplacement, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant will
    operate at acceptance rate of approximately 8-10 shipments per week
    until critical facility structures, systems, and components are
    repaired or replaced and construction of the new safety significant
    confinement ventilation system is completed. These actions support
    operation at 17 shipments per week and are necessary to increase the
    Waste Isolation Pilot Plant emplacement capability, to ensure mining of
    new repository space is completed in time to ensure continuity of waste
    emplacement, and to sustain mining and waste emplacement operations.
    These key activities are expected to be completed in the 2021
    timeframe.

        29. Senator Heinrich. Mr. Owendoff, how many requests for permit
    modifications for WIPP are currently pending, what is the class of each
    of the pending modifications and what is the likely schedule and
    timeline to complete each of these requests?
        Mr. Owendoff. The following permit modification requests are now
    pending with the New Mexico Environment Department; associated class
    and target decision dates are shown:

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                          Action                            Class                       Target Date
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Volume of Record..................................            3                                     Summer 2018
    Panel Closure Plan................................            3                                     Summer 2018
    New Utility/Access Shaft..........................          2/3                                     Summer 2018
    Excluded Waste Provision..........................            3                                     Spring 2019
    Above Ground Storage..............................            3                                     Summer 2020
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

     new lanl legacy cleanup contract, section h, human resource management
        30. Senator Heinrich. Mr. Owendoff, in December, DOE/EM awarded a
    new contract to N3B to manage cleanup at Los Alamos National
    Laboratory; the transition to the new contractor is scheduled to be
    complete in late April. Maintaining good relations with the existing
    workforce and community are vital to assuring a smooth transition.
    There are several important requirements of the new contractor related
    to the incumbent employees, including plans for workforce and benefits
    transition and for employee hiring preferences.
        What is the status of the new contractor's required workforce
    transition plans?
        Mr. Owendoff. N3B submitted its workforce and benefits transition
    plans, met the contract requirements, and hired many of the workers
    formerly employed by Los Alamos National Security. Transition to the
    Los Alamos Legacy Cleanup Contract was completed successfully on April
    29, 2018.

        31. Senator Heinrich. Mr. Owendoff, will you hold the new
    contractor strictly accountable for complying with all human resource
    requirements of the contract for current employees, including the right
    of first refusal?
        Mr. Owendoff. N3B has been and will continue to be held accountable
    for complying with the human resource requirements of the Los Alamos
    Legacy Cleanup Contract. A total of 354 right-of-first-refusal letters
    were sent to Los Alamos National Security employees who worked on the
    Environmental Management Legacy Cleanup contract.

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2019 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, MARCH 22, 2018

                                   U.S. Senate,
                      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE POLICIES AND PROGRAMS

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:35 p.m. in
    Room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Deb
    Fischer
    presiding.
        Members present: Senators Fischer, Cotton, Sullivan, and
    Donnelly.

                OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DEB FISCHER

        Senator Fischer. The hearing will come to order.
        The Strategic Forces Subcommittee meets today to review the
    administration's fiscal year 2019 budget request for missile
    defense spending and to discuss related policies with our
    witnesses.
        This is an incredibly important and timely discussion given
    the increasing missile threats facing our Nation. Over the past
    year, we have witnessed dangerous advances in North Korea's
    ballistic missile capabilities. Kim Jong-un conducted a record
    number of ballistic missile tests, including tests of two new
    systems that appear to have a range sufficient to hold the
    United States at risk.
        The administration has responded to this growing threat. In
    September, the Department of Defense submitted a request to
    reprogram about $400 million in fiscal year 2017 funds towards
    urgent missile defense requirements. Additionally, in November,
    the Administration amended its fiscal year 2018 budget request
    to include almost $4 billion in additional funds for missile
    defense and defeat activities, including the expansion of our
    Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system by an additional 20
    interceptors by 2023. This robust support for missile defense
    continues in the fiscal year 2019 request, which includes
    almost a 25 percent increase in the Missile Defense Agency's
    budget.
        While I strongly support these increases, it is this
    subcommittee's responsibility to ensure they meet the war-
    fighter's needs today and invest in advanced technology to stay
    ahead of tomorrow's threats. Furthermore, while North Korea
    ballistic missiles remain the principal threat against which
    our Homeland missile defenses are arrayed, it represents only a
    portion of the broader missile threat. A report released last
    year by the National Air and Space Intelligence Center noted
    that Russia retains the largest force of strategic ballistic
    missiles, while China has the most active and diverse ballistic
    missile development program in the world, and both Nations
    continue to invest in hypersonic and cruise missiles designed
    to strike forward-deployed U.S. forces and in some cases the
    Homeland.
        Testifying on these issues before us today is a
    distinguished panel. We have John Rood, Undersecretary of
    Defense For Policy; and General Lori Robinson, Commander of
    U.S. Northern Command and NORAD [North Atlantic Aerospace
    Defense Command].
        General Robinson, as this is likely the last time, we will
    hear from you in anticipation of your retirement, I also want
    to thank you for your 36 years of distinguished service to this
    country. Thank you, ma'am. I think I speak for all of us when I
    say it has been a pleasure to work with you, and we wish you
    the best of luck.
        We are also joined by Lieutenant General Sam Greaves,
    Director of the Missile Defense Agency; and Lieutenant General
    James Dickinson, who holds the title of Commanding General,
    United States Army Space and Missile Defense Command, among
    many others.
        Thank you all for being with us today. We look forward to
    your comments.
        I would now like to recognize our Ranking Member, Senator
    Donnelly, for any opening remarks he would like to make.

                   STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOE DONNELLY

        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        I would like to thank all the witnesses; and, General
    Robinson, congratulations. Thank you for all your service to
    our country, for all the amazing things you have done for our
    Nation to make it stronger.
        I want to thank Senator Fischer for holding this hearing.
        Let me also thank today's witnesses for testifying. We very
    much appreciate your time and the work you do every day in the
    service of our Nation.
        Protecting our country, our forward-deployed troops, and
    our allies around the world is of the utmost importance, and
    the threats have not stood still since this subcommittee last
    met on this subject.
        For just one example, as General Greaves and I discussed
    yesterday, North Korea has made rapid progress on its
    intercontinental ballistic missile capability. As we await the
    release of the Missile Defense Review, it's important we take
    this opportunity to review the fiscal year 2019 budget request
    to ensure it provides sufficient resources to continue the work
    of getting our missile defense systems to perform reliably and
    effectively.
        We also need to continue improving our sensor and
    discrimination capabilities so we have a better picture of the
    threats, and we need to continue to conduct smart simulation
    and testing before we commit to buying new technologies.
        While we continue to improve the Homeland defense systems,
    we should not take our eyes off the ball when it comes to
    protecting our deployed troops and reassuring our allies and
    partners. The demand from our combatant commanders for Aegis,
    THAAD [Theatre High Altitude Area Defense], and Patriot
    batteries remains high. We need to consider how we can best
    allocate these systems and effectively train the war fighters
    who will operate them to provide the protection that is needed
    in today's demanding environment.
        Again, thank you for coming today. We look forward to the
    dialogue and to your testimony.
        Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Donnelly.
        Secretary Rood, I'd like to welcome you. If you would like
    to make comments to the committee?

    STATEMENT OF HONORABLE JOHN C. ROOD, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
                   FOR POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

        Secretary Rood. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member
    Donnelly, distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for
    the opportunity to testify today on behalf of the
    administration's fiscal year 2019 budget request.
        With regard to the security environment, today the United
    States faces an increasingly complex security environment in
    which the central challenge to our prosperity and security is
    the reemergence of long-term strategic competition driven by
    revisionist powers in China and Russia. Although they pose
    separate challenges with unique attributes, both China and
    Russia seek to reshape the world order and change territorial
    borders. Consequently, they pose increasing security threats to
    the United States and our allies and partners.
        Long-term competition with China and Russia requires
    increased United States and allied and partner military
    investment because of the magnitude of the threats they pose
    today and the potential that such threats will increase in the
    future. We also must simultaneously strengthen our efforts to
    deter and counter the clear and present danger posed by rogue
    regimes such as North Korea and Iran.
        The U.S. military remains the strongest in the world.
    However, our advantages are eroding as potential adversaries
    modernize and build up their conventional and nuclear forces.
    In particular, they are fielding a broad and expanding arsenal
    of new and more advanced missiles capable of threatening the
    U.S., our forces abroad, and our allies and partners.
        Although this picture is unsettling and not what we desire,
    as Secretary of Defense Mattis has pointed out, and I quote,
    ``We must look reality in the eye and see the world as it is,
    not as we wish it to be.''
        The Administration has heeded this admonition in recent
    strategic reviews, in the National Security Strategy, the
    National Defense Strategy, as well as the Nuclear Posture
    Review. They reflect a consistent and pragmatic assessment of
    the threats and uncertainties we face in the future security
    environment.
        Our task at DOD [Department of Defense] is to ensure that
    U.S. military advantages endure and, in combination with other
    elements of national power, that we are fully able to meet the
    increasing challenges to our national security.
        With this as the strategic context, let me turn to a
    discussion of the fiscal year 2019 budget request for missile
    defense and the policies, programs, and capabilities it
    supports. The Department's budget request supports the
    President's direction set out in the National Security Strategy
    to deploy a layered missile defense system to protect the
    American Homeland from North Korean and Iranian missile
    threats. The request also supports regional missile defenses to
    protect our deployed forces, allies, and partners. Our missile
    defense system not only protects the United States, it
    strengthens the deterrence of war and the assurance of allies
    and partners.
        Today the GMD, or Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system,
    provides protection for the Nation. General Greaves and others
    will discuss some of its attributes. But as noted by you,
    Senator Fischer, in September of last year, DOD requested the
    reprogramming of 2017 funding of more than $400 million to
    counter the North Korean missile threat. We appreciate the
    support that we received from Congress for this request.
        A portion of these funds supports the important Homeland
    defense activities, including initiating work on the
    procurement of 20 additional ground-based interceptors in
    Alaska as early as 2023, which will bring the total to 64
    fielded interceptors. This reprogramming also funded a service
    life extension to the COBRA DANE radar in Alaska, and software
    upgrades to the Sea-Based X-Band radar, which are both
    essential elements of our Homeland defense. Last November, the
    President submitted an amendment to the fiscal year 2018 budget
    request for $4 billion of additional funding for missile
    defense, which includes construction of a new missile field at
    Fort Greely, Alaska, and additional procurement funding
    necessary for the 20 GBIs [Ground-Based Interceptors].
        The fiscal year 2019 budget request includes $9.9 billion
    for the Missile Defense Agency and $3 billion for air and
    missile defense programs in the Services. This budget funds a
    more capable ground-based interceptor with the Redesigned Kill
    Vehicle; the deployment of new missile tracking and
    discrimination sensors in Alaska, Hawaii, and the Pacific
    region; and a new space-based kill assessment capability. These
    near-term investments will enable us to obtain substantially
    more performance and efficiency out of the GMD systems
    necessary to meet the evolving threat.
        We are also moving forward to bolster Homeland defenses
    against air and cruise missile threats. In 2018, we will
    complete the first part of a two-phase effort to provide
    effective surveillance against missile threats to the National
    Capital Region. Doing so will enhance our ability to detect,
    track, and investigate suspicious aircraft, as well as cruise
    missiles and, when necessary, cue our missile defense systems
    against the full spectrum of air threats. We are on track to
    begin the second phase of this effort in fiscal year 2019. We
    are also looking into technologies and concepts that could be
    used to provide scalable and deployable options for expanding
    this capability.
        The Department's fiscal year 2019 budget request also
    continues deployment of regional missile defenses tailored to
    meet missile threats to United States forces abroad and allies
    and partners in Europe, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific
    region. The budget enhances our regional missile defense
    capacity through additional Patriot missiles as well as THAAD,
    SM-3 Block IB, and SM-3 Block IIA interceptors. Our focus is on
    developing and fielding capabilities that are mobile and re-
    locatable, which allows us flexibility to respond to a crisis
    or conflict wherever it emerges.
        We are also encouraging our allies and partners in Europe,
    the Middle East, and in Asia to acquire MD [Missile Defense]
    capabilities and strengthen missile defense cooperation in
    order to move towards a more interoperable and integrated
    missile defense architecture.
        Looking forward, it's clear potential adversaries are
    modernizing and expanding their missile capabilities. We must
    ensure that our missile defense investment and strategy enable
    us to meet the most dangerous missile threats today, while
    enabling us to counter future missile threats as they expand.
    Areas for work on advanced technology include improved
    discrimination in our sensor architecture, lasers to intercept
    offensive missiles during their most vulnerable boost phase of
    flight, evaluating space-based sensor concepts, and the multi-
    object kill vehicle.
        Let me conclude by saying that in an increasingly complex
    and threatening security environment, DOD must sustain the
    capabilities needed to deter and defend against attacks on our
    Homeland, U.S. forces deployed abroad, allies and partners. We
    must make the investments needed to address the ongoing erosion
    of our operational advantages and remain the preeminent
    military power in the world.
        Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. I look
    forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary Rood follows:]

                   Prepared Statement by Secretary John Rood
        Chairwoman Fischer, Ranking Member Donnelly, and distinguished
    Members of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify on
    the President's Fiscal Year 2019 Budget Request in support of the
    Department's efforts to improve our missile defense capabilities so
    that we remain ahead of the evolving threat while providing effective,
    integrated and interoperable regional missile defenses in support of
    our global defense strategy.
                 security environment and strategic priorities
        Today, the United States faces an increasingly complex security
    environment, in which the central challenge to our prosperity and
    security is the reemergence of long-term strategic competition by
    revisionist powers in China and Russia.
        Although they pose separate challenges with unique attributes, both
    China and Russia seek to reshape the world order and change territorial
    borders. Consequently, they pose increasing security threats to the
    United States, and our allies and partners.
        Long-term competition with China and Russia requires increased U.S
    and allied and partner military investment because of the magnitude of
    the threats they pose today, and the potential that such threats will
    increase in the future. We also must simultaneously strengthen our
    efforts to deter and counter the clear and present dangers posed by
    rogue regimes such as North Korea and Iran.
        The U.S. military remains the strongest in the world. However, our
    advantages are eroding as potential adversaries modernize and build-up
    their conventional and nuclear forces. In particular, they are fielding
    a broad and expanding arsenal of new and more advanced missiles capable
    of threatening the United States, its forces abroad and its allies and
    partners.
        Although this picture is unsettling and clearly not what we desire,
    as Secretary of Defense Mattis has pointed out, ``We must look reality
    in the eye and see the world as it is, not as we wish it to be.''
        The Administration has heeded this admonition in recent strategic
    reviews--the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy,
    and the Nuclear Posture Review. They reflect a consistent and pragmatic
    assessment of the threats and uncertainties we face regarding the
    future security environment.
        Our task at the Defense Department is to ensure that U.S. military
    advantages endure and, in combination with other elements of national
    power, we are fully able to meet the increasing challenges to our
    national security.
        Strengthening our alliances and attracting new partners are a
    critical element of retaining our advantages. As the National Defense
    Strategy points out; ``Mutually beneficial alliances and partnerships
    are crucial to our strategy, providing a durable, asymmetric advantage
    that no competitor or rival can match. This approach has served the
    United States well, in peace and war.''
                       missile defense policy and posture
        With this as the strategic context, let me turn to a discussion of
    the fiscal year 2019 Budget Request for missile defense and the
    policies, programs and capabilities it supports. The Department's
    budget request supports the President's direction set out in the
    National Security Strategy to deploy a layered missile defense system
    to protect the American Homeland from North Korean and Iranian missile
    threats. The request also supports regional missile defenses to protect
    our deployed forces, allies, and partners. Our missile defense system
    not only protects the United States, it strengthens the deterrence of
    war and the assurance of allies and partners.
        Today, the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system provides
    protection for the Nation. It consists of 44 Ground-Based Interceptors
    (GBI) deployed in Alaska and California; land-, sea-, and space-based
    sensors; and a command and control system operated 24/7 by trained
    servicemembers. We are strengthening this system and investing in
    technologies to ensure that we can continue to counter rogue state
    missile threats to our Homeland.
        In September 2017, DOD requested the reprogramming of fiscal year
    2017 funding of more than $400 million to counter the North Korean
    missile threat. Congress approved this request. A portion of these
    funds supports important Homeland defense activities, including
    initiating work on the procurement of 20 additional GBIs in Alaska as
    early as 2023, which will bring the total to 64 fielded interceptors.
    The reprogramming also funded a service life extension to the Cobra
    Dane radar in Alaska and software upgrades to the Sea-Based X-Band
    (SBX) radar--both essential elements of our Homeland defense. In
    November 2017, the President submitted an amendment to his fiscal year
    2018 budget request for $4.0 billion for missile defense which includes
    construction of a new missile field at Fort Greely, Alaska, and
    additional procurement funding necessary for the 20 new GBIs.
        The fiscal year 2019 budget request includes $9.9 billion for the
    Missile Defense Agency and $3 billion for air and missile defense
    activities in the Military Departments. This budget funds: a more
    capable GBI with the Redesigned Kill Vehicle; the deployment of new
    missile tracking and discrimination sensors in Alaska, Hawaii, and the
    Pacific region; and a new Space-Based Kill Assessment capability. These
    near term investments will enable us to obtain substantially more
    performance and efficiency out of the GMD systems necessary to meet the
    evolving threat.
        We are also moving forward to bolster Homeland defenses against air
    and cruise missile threats. In 2018, we will complete the first part of
    a two-phase effort to provide effective surveillance against these
    missile threats to the National Capital Region (NCR). Doing so will
    enhance our ability to detect, track, and investigate suspicious
    aircraft, as well as cruise missiles, and when necessary, cue our
    missile defense systems against the full spectrum of air threats. We
    are on track to begin the second phase of this effort in fiscal year
    2019, which will expand our capability to detect, ID and take defensive
    action before air threats can strike potential targets within the NCR.
    We are also looking into technologies and concepts that could be used
    to provide scalable and deployable options for expanding this defensive
    capability.
        The Department's fiscal year 2019 budget request also continues
    deployment of regional missile defenses tailored to meet missile
    threats to U.S. forces abroad and allies and partners in Europe, the
    Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific region. The budget enhances our
    regional missile defense capacity through additional Patriot missiles
    as well as Terminal High Altitude Defense (THAAD), SM-3 Block IB, and
    SM-3 Block IIA interceptors. Our focus is on developing and fielding
    missile defense capabilities that are mobile and relocatable, which
    allows us flexibility to respond to a crisis or conflict wherever it
    emerges. Because systems such as Patriot, THAAD, and our Aegis BMD
    capable ships can be surged when and where required, they make it
    possible to deploy layered missile defense capabilities that are
    responsive to regional missile threats as they arise.
        We are also encouraging our allies and partners in Europe, the
    Middle East and Near East Asia to acquire missile defense capabilities,
    and to strengthen missile defense cooperation in order to move towards
    a more interoperable and integrated missile defense architecture
    against hostile ballistic and cruise missile threats.
        Looking forward, it's clear potential adversaries are modernizing
    and expanding their missile capabilities. We must ensure that our
    missile defense investment strategy and priorities enable us to meet
    the most dangerous missile threats today, while also enabling us to
    counter future missile threats as they expand. Areas for work on
    advanced technology include improved discrimination in our missile
    defense system sensor architecture, lasers to intercept offensive
    missiles during their most vulnerable boost phase of flight, evaluating
    new space-based sensor concepts, and the multi-object kill vehicle.
                                   conclusion
        Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by stating that in an increasingly
    complex and threatening security environment, DOD must sustain the
    capabilities needed to deter and defend against attacks on our
    Homeland, U.S. forces deployed abroad, allies and partners. We must
    make the investments needed to address the ongoing erosion of our
    operational advantages and remain the preeminent military power in the
    world.
        Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to
    your questions.

        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
        Your full statements will be included in the record.
        General Robinson?

    STATEMENT OF GENERAL LORI J. ROBINSON, USAF, COMMANDER, UNITED
                      STATES NORTHERN COMMAND AND
          COMMANDER, NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND

        General Robinson. Ma'am, first of all, thank you very much.
    I am certainly honored to be sitting here and testifying with
    this committee, especially along with my brothers. It's an
    honor for me.
        What has been mentioned is the strategic environment and
    threats facing our Nation continue to evolve, as you have both
    mentioned. Our adversaries are taking deliberate steps to
    extend their operational reach and are developing new
    capabilities to range targets in North America, in the United
    States and Canada.
        At U.S. Northern Command and NORAD, we understand the
    urgency of keeping pace with these evolving threats. We also
    recognize that North Korea represents the most immediate threat
    to our Homeland and therefore remains NORTHCOM's highest
    priority.
        I'm confident that the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense
    system can defeat the threat today, and I've testified in front
    of every committee and have said so, and I remain confident. I
    strongly support the continued improvements to the ballistic
    missile defense enterprise in order to maintain our advantage.
    We continue to work with the Missile Defense Agency, the
    intelligence community, and other combatant commands as part of
    our collaborative effort to out-pace the threat.
        I'm grateful, quite frankly, for the committee's approval
    of the fiscal year 2017 above-threshold reprogramming and
    support the budget amendment, and this will increase the
    systems capability and capacity.
        Under my NORAD responsibility, advanced cruise missiles
    with a low-rate arc cross-section represent a challenge to our
    air defense systems. Russia continues to modernize its delivery
    systems, long-range bombers, and strategic submarines capable
    of launching from distances not previously seen, reducing the
    indication and warnings we are likely to receive from a combat
    launch. To defend against these advanced cruise missiles, we
    must make prudent investments, as you both have talked about,
    and we appreciate in advance sensors and defensive weapon
    systems to protect our Nation's vital assets.
        The men, the women, the warriors of U.S. Northern Command
    and NORAD stand united in a common purpose, ready to face the
    threats to the United States and Canada today, and we are
    evolving to face the threats of tomorrow. Ladies and gentlemen,
    you need to know, we have the watch.
        Ma'am, sir, as you both have indicated, I'm getting to have
    the privilege to retire. I have to tell you both that after 36
    years of serving my Nation, and after these last two years of
    having this sacred responsibility of defending our Nation, I
    want you both to know, I want all of you to understand my
    gratitude and my heartfelt appreciation for what you do to
    support NORAD and U.S. Northern Command every day to our
    Nation's Armed Forces--soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines,
    civilians, and in my NORAD hat, the Canadians. What you do each
    and every day--you know, people say to me, hey, thank you for
    what you do, but I know I can't do what I do if you don't do
    what you and your back-benchers do each and every day.
        So, thank you very much. I welcome your questions.
        [Applause.]
        [The prepared statement of General Robinson follows:]

                 Prepared Statement by General Lori J. Robinson
                                  introduction
        Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Donnelly, and distinguished
    members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear
    before you today as the Commander of United States Northern Command
    (USNORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). As
    the Commander of two unique but complementary commands, I am honored to
    lead a truly remarkable team of professionals and patriots committed to
    defending our Nations against an ever-expanding array of threats. I am
    also deeply grateful for this Committee's support, especially in light
    of the wide range of threats and challenges addressed by USNORTHCOM and
    NORAD.
        As USNORTHCOM and NORAD look to the future, it is increasingly
    necessary to assess the potential for seemingly far-flung events to
    unfold in ways that have a direct effect on our Homeland defense
    missions. Adversaries such as North Korea continue to field advanced
    weapons systems, often at an unexpectedly rapid pace of development,
    while China and Russia have expanded their military presence into areas
    outside their traditional areas of operations. The long-term
    consequences of these developments remain to be seen, but in an
    environment in which the only constant is change, it is certain that
    defending our Homelands increasingly relies on a modern, ready, and
    well-trained force, along with innovative thinking and close
    collaboration across borders, agencies, and boundaries.
                             strategic environment
        The threats our Nations face continue to evolve. An increasing
    number of foreign states are developing new ways to hold our Homeland
    at risk in an effort to offset Western military advantages and limit
    our options in a crisis.
                                  north korea
        Over the last year, Kim Jong-un's pace of weapons testing, defiance
    of international norms, and deliberate efforts to reduce our
    indications and warning have established North Korea as the most
    immediate strategic threat to the United States. I testified last year
    I was concerned Kim Jong-un's willingness to fail in public would
    eventually enable him to develop a viable weapon system that could
    threaten the continental United States. That development has continued
    at an extraordinarily rapid pace, and in 2017, North Korea successfully
    flight tested such an intercontinental ballistic missile on three
    occasions, demonstrating for the first time a credible capability to
    hold the United States at risk.
        Kim Jong-un's possession of a viable intercontinental ballistic
    missile represents an obvious threat to the United States, and close
    collaboration with the intelligence community, the Missile Defense
    Agency, and fellow combatant commands remains essential to outpace
    North Korea's technological development and deception programs. I am
    grateful to the members of this Committee for your continued investment
    in the technology and capabilities necessary to defend the United
    States against a North Korean threat that is only increasing with time.
    Adding to the capabilities that provide advanced indications and
    warning of missile launches will continue to be a priority for
    USNORTHCOM as North Korea adds capability and capacity and improves its
    denial and deception programs.
                                     russia
        With a full suite of delivery platforms and weapons systems capable
    of ranging targets throughout the United States and Canada, Russia
    remains the only existential air domain threat our two nations face.
    Russian leaders regularly exercise conflict with the United States and
    are investing heavily to modernize their forces and develop novel
    weapons to ensure their ability to hold the United States and Canada at
    perpetual risk.
        Russian out-of-area flight activity has declined since the record
    levels we observed during the 2014 Ukraine crisis, but Russian heavy
    bombers continue to fly off our coastlines on a periodic basis,
    including the series of patrols that NORAD fighters intercepted near
    Alaska last April and May. Russia has also been cycling its aging
    bombers through a modernization program that enables them to carry a
    new generation of advanced cruise missiles that have been proven in
    combat against targets in Syria.
        Russia also launched next-generation cruise missiles against
    targets in Syria from ships and submarines in 2016 and 2017 and is
    fielding stealthy new naval platforms, including the Severodvinsk-class
    guided missile submarine and new Dolgorukiy-class ballistic missile
    subs. Together, these advancements represent a significant investment
    by the Russian Government in their strategic fleets that are likely to
    hold targets at risk in the United States and Canada for years to come.
                                     china
        China is pursuing a comprehensive military modernization program
    that includes a rapid expansion of its strategic forces intended to
    deter an attack from the United States by holding our Homeland at risk.
    Over the last decade, China has supplemented its modest silo-based
    ballistic missile force with dozens of road-mobile intercontinental
    ballistic missiles and operationalized its first class of ballistic
    missile submarines. As part of an effort to demonstrate global reach
    and influence, China's navy has developed a pattern of sending ships to
    ``distant oceans,'' and in July of this year, we saw the first Chinese
    intelligence collection ship operate near the United States. This
    followed the transit of a small group of Chinese ships through the
    Aleutian Islands in September 2015, the first-ever instance of Chinese
    naval vessels operating in the Bering Sea.
                                      iran
        Iran is not yet able to strike the United States with strategic
    weapons. Nonetheless, Tehran has expended significant resources on its
    ballistic missile, space launch, and civil nuclear capabilities and
    could develop an intercontinental ballistic missile relatively quickly
    if its leaders chose to do so. Currently, Iran retains the ability to
    conduct attacks in our Homeland via covert operations and terrorist
    proxies.
                              usnorthcom and norad
        USNORTHCOM and NORAD are separate commands with common purpose, as
    USNORTHCOM defends the United States against land- and sea-based
    threats and intercontinental ballistic missiles, while NORAD defends
    the United States and Canada against threats in the air domain.
        Established in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, USNORTHCOM is the
    U.S. geographic combatant command responsible for operations in North
    America, to include The Bahamas. For over 15 years, USNORTHCOM has
    defended the United States through the execution of no-fail missions
    such as intercontinental ballistic missile defense and defense support
    of civil authorities.
        NORAD is the bi-national United States and Canadian command
    responsible for aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime
    warning in the United States and Canada. In May of this year, we will
    celebrate the 60th anniversary of NORAD's establishment and honor the
    proud legacy of a unique organization that has drawn its strength from
    the unbreakable bond between our nations. United States and Canadian
    personnel work side-by-side in the combined USNORTHCOM and NORAD
    headquarters and in each of the NORAD regions in the United States and
    Canada.
        NORAD represents the gold standard for military collaboration, and
    its mission continues to be of vital importance to the defense of the
    United States and Canada as our adversaries continue to modernize their
    arsenals and develop advanced weapons systems, to include upgraded
    bombers and advance cruise missiles capable of holding the United
    States and Canada at risk.
                                homeland defense
    Ballistic Missile Defense
        In light of the strategic threat presented by North Korea,
    defending the United States against intercontinental ballistic missiles
    remains USNORTHCOM's highest priority mission. The rapid advancement of
    the North Korean intercontinental ballistic missile is my primary
    focus, although I also continually monitor Iranian technology programs
    that could present a threat in the future.
        I am confident the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System can
    currently defend the United States from the threats posed by North
    Korea, but we must take prudent steps to remain in a position of
    relative technological advantage. I support the Department of Defense's
    efforts to improve the ballistic missile defense enterprise, and I
    continue to prioritize improvements to the intercontinental ballistic
    missile defense sensor architecture to enhance system resiliency and
    target discrimination, followed by improvements to interceptor
    reliability and lethality, along with continued reassessment of our
    interceptor capacity.
        As our adversaries develop and field more sophisticated
    intercontinental ballistic missiles, improved target discrimination
    will improve the likelihood of a successful engagement. Upgrades to our
    ability to distinguish re-entry vehicles from non-lethal missile
    components will significantly improve engagement efficiency while
    maintaining required effectiveness.
        Improved discrimination capability will increase the likelihood of
    a successful intercept, and the Missile Defense Agency is developing
    additional radars such as the Long Range Discrimination Radar in Alaska
    and a persistent radar on Hawaii, both of which will provide improved
    target discrimination and a more survivable sensor network. In
    November, the Missile Defense Agency emplaced the last of the 44
    ground-based interceptors in our inventory, while continuing their
    important efforts to improve interceptor reliability in the fielded
    fleet while developing new variants for future deployment.
        In light of the mounting challenges of defending the United States
    against intercontinental ballistic missile attack, I am grateful to the
    defense committees for approving the Department's fiscal year 2017
    above-threshold reprogramming and supporting the budget amendment that
    will increase the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system's capacity and
    capability. That investment in improved target discrimination and more
    reliable kill vehicles will improve our ability to defend the Homeland.
    I will continue to work with my mission partners in the Missile Defense
    Agency, the intelligence community, and fellow combatant commands to
    identify and prioritize additional initiatives that will keep us on or
    ahead of the threat.
        As part of that effort, USNORTHCOM supported the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense in updating the Missile Defense Review. This
    foundational review will provide overarching policy direction for the
    missile defense enterprise, and I support its near- and long-term
    initiatives to ensure we remain ahead of our adversaries. As the
    warfighter responsible for the defense of the United States, USNORTHCOM
    will continue to work with our fellow combatant commands to integrate
    offensive and defensive capabilities as part of a coherent strategy to
    defeat the missile threats facing our Nation.
    Aerospace Warning and Aerospace Control
        Since its establishment in May of 1958, NORAD has defended Canadian
    and United States airspace against an ever-evolving range of threats.
    Originally focused on preventing Soviet bombers from reaching targets
    inside the United States and Canada with nuclear gravity bombs, this
    unique bi-national command has kept our airspace secure and monitored
    our maritime approaches while constantly looking to the future in order
    to adapt to new technologies and outpace emerging threats. From the
    Cold War, through the aftermath of 9/11, and into the modern era,
    Canadians and Americans have stood shoulder-to-shoulder in defense of
    our skies, our cities, and our citizens.
        NORAD's original mission remains as important as ever, as seen on
    20 April 2017, when United States F-22 Raptors and Canadian CF-18
    Hornets conducted a textbook intercept of two Russian TU-95 BEAR-H
    bombers that had penetrated the North American Air Defense
    Identification Zone and the Canadian Air Defense Identification Zone.
    That safe and professional intercept was the direct result of constant
    planning, coordination, and training between various NORAD commands
    over the course of many years.
        The ability to deter and defeat threats to our citizens, vital
    infrastructure, and national institutions starts with successfully
    detecting, tracking, and positively identifying targets of interest
    approaching and within U.S. and Canadian airspace. As part of an
    ongoing effort to defend the United States and Canada against a wide
    range of airborne threats--from modern strike aircraft and advanced
    air- and submarine-launched cruise missiles to small drones--NORAD
    planners continue to develop a modern three-phase Homeland Defense
    Design that links advanced sensors capable of detecting and tracking
    potential threats with weapons systems capable of neutralizing targets
    identified as hostile.
    Low Radar Cross Section Threats
        This Homeland Defense Design will play an ever-more important role
    in defending the Homelands against modern cruise missiles and other
    unmanned aerial systems. Small commercial drones, light aircraft, and
    advanced cruise missiles each present challenges to our air defense
    systems due to their low radar cross sections and corresponding ability
    to evade detection by legacy radars. Whether those technologies are
    purpose-built or are unintentionally exploitable by bad actors, the
    potential threat from airborne platforms with small radar signatures
    will become commonplace in the coming years as advanced missile
    technology proliferates and commercial unmanned systems become ever
    more readily available. From a threat-assessment perspective, low radar
    cross section systems are of particular concern as they have the
    potential to hold our vital institutions and infrastructure at risk due
    to their ability to evade detection, tracking, identification, and, if
    necessary, engage targets identified as hostile.
    Cruise Missile Defense
        Russia has prioritized the development of advanced cruise missiles
    capable of holding targets within North America at risk from distances
    not previously seen. These systems present an increasing threat to
    North America due to their long range, low radar cross section, and the
    limited indications and warnings likely to be seen prior to a combat
    launch. While the likelihood of a Russian kinetic strike against the
    United States and Canada is currently low, it is prudent to invest in
    advanced sensors and defensive weapons systems to protect our Nations'
    vital assets.
        I have confidence in the layered approach provided by overlapping
    air defense systems. However, I am concerned about the potential for
    those advanced cruise missiles, which can be launched from bombers or
    submarines at much greater ranges than legacy systems, to penetrate our
    air defense network due to their expanded range, low visibility, and
    limited radar cross section. The significantly improved range of these
    missiles has reduced the indications and warnings we are likely to
    receive prior to a combat launch, and their low radar cross section has
    required NORAD to adapt new tactics, techniques, and procedures to
    counter them.
        We must continue to invest and innovate to stay ahead of this
    emerging threat, and we have made significant advancements as part of
    those ongoing efforts. To that end, I would like to thank the defense
    committees for fully funding the Department's request for funding the
    procurement of Active Electronically Scanned Array radars to
    significantly improve the ability of our fighter aircraft to detect and
    engage advanced cruise missiles. Active Electronically Scanned Array
    radars and the network of ground-based sensors integrated under the
    Homeland Defense Design will provide important improvements to our
    ability to counter an expanding set of airborne threats.
    Canada
        The United States and Canada share the longest undefended
    international border in the world, and our collaborative relationship
    is one of the closest and most extensive in history. This relationship
    reflects a unique friendship, underpinned by common values, that has
    evolved over the course of the last century.
        In May 2018, NORAD celebrates its 60th birthday defending the
    United States and Canada in the air domain. We continue to evolve this
    venerable relationship to keep pace with evolving threats to ensure our
    bi-national defense can deter, and if necessary, defeat potential
    future attacks. NORAD prioritizes interoperability and command and
    control through regular operations, combined training and exercises,
    combined planning, information and intelligence sharing, and personnel
    exchanges to ensure we are capable of conducting operations together,
    across the spectrum of conflict.
        A critical component of our operational defense framework is the
    tri-command relationship between USNORTHCOM, NORAD, and the Canadian
    Joint Operations Command. Together, we are working to further integrate
    our operational framework into an adaptive continental defense
    arrangement that can function across multiple domains to defend the
    United States and Canada that preserves each nation's ability to
    conduct unilateral national missions such as disaster response.
                                   conclusion
        Above all, I am proud to serve alongside the remarkable men and
    women of USNORTHCOM and NORAD as they stand guard over our Homelands
    against a rapidly evolving and increasingly complex set of threats.
    Their proud histories and future successes are deeply rooted in a
    shared, unshakable commitment to protecting our citizens and defending
    our common values. Together with our allies and partners, I am
    confident we will continue to adapt, innovate, and fulfill the sacred
    responsibility of defending our great Nations.

        ``We have the watch''

        Senator Fischer. Thank you, General.
        General Greaves?

       STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL SAMUEL A. GREAVES, USAF,
        DIRECTOR, MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

        Lieutenant General Greaves. Chairman Fischer, Ranking
    Member Donnelly, distinguished members of the subcommittee,
    thank you for this opportunity to testify on the Missile
    Defense Agency's budget request for fiscal year 2019.
        I would first like to express our appreciation to this
    committee for its support of the Department's above-threshold
    reprogramming request in September 2017 and the fiscal year
    2018 budget amendment, which provided reprogramming approval
    and emergency funding to enhance the Nation's missile defeat
    and defense capabilities.
        I'm also pleased to report that we are executing those
    funds with the utmost urgency.
        I would also like to take a second to thank the thousands
    of men and women across government and industry who work
    tirelessly every single day across the globe in support of our
    Nation's ballistic missile defense system. They remain our
    asymmetric advantage.
        Over the past year we have been given a clear and
    unambiguous message from the President that we are committed to
    expanding and improving a state-of-the-art missile defense
    system. So in my mind, the time for delays and more studies and
    more objections is over. As I say it, the threat has voted and
    continues to visibly vote through a demonstration of
    capabilities.
        Last summer I laid out three Missile Defense Agency
    priorities to help guide our actions, our behavior, and program
    planning. First, we will continue to focus on increasing the
    system reliability to build more fighter confidence. Second, we
    will increase engagement capability and capacity. Third, we
    will address the advance threat.
        I can tell you that the current ballistic missile defense
    system meets today's threat. However, as the threat increases
    in both number and lethality, we need to ensure that our
    systems will remain reliable, remain secure from cyber security
    threats, and that the Nation's ballistic missile defense
    capability and capacity keep pace with that threat.
        We currently have 44 emplaced ground-based interceptors for
    Homeland defense. We plan to expand the fleet to 64 by 2023. In
    addition, improvements in sensor coverage to include the long-
    range discriminating radar in Alaska, the addition of a
    Homeland defense radar in Hawaii, if it is approved, and
    planning for a Homeland defense radar in the Pacific, as well
    as advanced discrimination improvements will enable the United
    States to improve protection of the Homeland.
        The agency will also continue its Redesign Kill Vehicle
    development efforts, enhance the stockpile reliability program,
    and expand the ground-based interceptor battle space.
        Integrated space and terrestrial sensors for cueing,
    tracking, discrimination, and targeting ballistic missile
    threats are critical to improving missile defense architecture
    robustness. This budget will continue to fund the space-based
    kill assessment demonstration program to deliver a capability
    to confirm intercepts for improved defense of the Homeland.
        We are also continuing concept definition studies for
    space-based missile defense tracking sensors. If pursued, space
    sensors will be able to detect and track traditional and
    emerging threats as part of the BMDS [Ballistic Missile Defense
    System] architecture.
        We will continue to install the Aegis ballistic missile
    defense weapon system on Aegis ships and deliver Standard
    Missile-3 Block IB interceptors. We're also supporting the
    European phase adaptive approach, providing coverage and
    protection of NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization]
    European territory populations and our deployed forces against
    the increasing ballistic missile threat from the Middle East.
        Our request will support continued integration of the SM-3
    Block IIA missile, a co-development effort with Japan into the
    Aegis ballistic missile defense weapon system, and the pre-
    production of all up-rounds to support the initial deployment
    for EPAA [European Phased Adaptive Approach] Phase 3.
        Currently, there is an operational Aegis to shore site
    located in Romania, and while we have experienced delays in the
    military construction portion of the Aegis to shore effort in
    Poland, we remain steadfastly committed to delivery of that
    capability in support of EPAA Phase 3.
        Finally, this budget request will continue the exploration
    of breakthrough technologies for integration into the BMDS,
    including discrimination improvements, multi-object kill
    vehicle technology, hypersonic defense technology, space-based
    interceptor technology, and exploring higher-power lasers and
    interceptors that have potential use against threat missiles in
    a boost phase of flight.
        As we evaluate the elements of the missile defense system,
    we will actively pursue developing elements that have multi-
    mission and Department-wide utility and leverage those systems
    once such activity with the F-35 that may have residual
    capability for missile defense.
        Madam Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I look
    forward to answering your questions. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of General Greaves follows:]
        [The information referred to follows:]

           Prepared Statement by Lieutenant General Samuel A. Greaves
        Good afternoon, Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Donnelly,
    distinguished Members of the subcommittee. I appreciate this
    opportunity to testify before you today on one of the President's
    highest defense priorities for fiscal year (FY) 2019.
        As I say it, the ballistic missile threat has voted and continues
    to vote today. Given this reality, the Administration has stated that
    we must take steps to respond quickly to counter the ballistic missile
    and nuclear weapons developed by our adversaries that are intended to
    kill Americans, and our allies and friends. To meet this pressing
    requirement, the President signed into law emergency appropriations
    requested in the Fiscal Year 2018 Budget Amendment that provided
    emergency funding to enhance the Nation's missile defense and defeat
    capabilities. I want to express my appreciation to the Congress for its
    support in this process. I am pleased to report that the Missile
    Defense Agency (MDA) is executing these funds with the utmost urgency.
    The President and the Department of Defense leadership have been very
    clear in outlining their priorities.
        President Donald J. Trump stated on August 23, 2017: ``We are
    committed to expanding and improving a state of the art missile defense
    system to shoot down missiles in flight. And we are getting better and
    better at it. It's actually incredible what's taking place. We will
    develop better surveillance and long-strike capabilities to prevent our
    enemies from launching them in the first place.''
        Secretary of Defense James Mattis, on September 20, 2017, warned
    the Department that '' . . . if we fail to adapt at the speed of
    relevance, ourforces will lose . . .
        The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Joseph Dunford,
    Jr., USMC, on October 3, 2017 elaborated on the proximity and extent of
    the threat facing the United States when he stated: ``Based on the
    current capacity of the North Korean threat, both the type and the
    amount of missiles that they possess, we can protect Hawaii today
    against an ICBM. We can protect the continental United States against
    an ICBM . . . As the capacity of the threat increases--that is the
    size, not just the lethality, of missiles that they may possess--we
    need to be concerned about ensuring that our ballistic missile defense
    capability keeps pace with that threat. We do think an increase is
    warranted.''
        And Ms. Ellen Lord, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition
    and Sustainment, emphasized the importance of moving quickly through
    our processes to get the best and most advanced capabilities out into
    the field in a timely manner when she stated:  ``It's all about
    velocity.  We are trying to get stuff downrange quickly.''
        The MDA mission is ``to develop and deploy a layered Ballistic
    Missile Defense System to defend the United States, its deployed
    forces, allies, and friends from ballistic missile attacks of all
    ranges and in all phases of flight.'' The MDA budget request of $9.9
    billion for fiscal year 2019 will continue the development, rigorous
    testing and fielding of reliable, increasingly capable, and state-of-
    the-art defenses for the United States, our deployed forces, and the
    forces and territories of our allies and partners against current and
    projected missile threats. This request will maintain current Homeland
    and regional missile defense assets and increase capability and
    capacity to keep pace with advancing threats. We will continue to
    collaborate closely with the warfighter and support the current and
    future needs of the combatant commanders with the development, testing,
    deployment, and integration of interceptors, sensors, and the command,
    control, battle management and communications (C2BMC) system into a
    multi-domain battle management and command and control system for the
    Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS).
        MDA's fiscal year 2019 program plan aligns with the December 2017
    National Security Strategy \1\ and the 2018 National Defense Strategy
    \2\ as well as the fiscal year 2017, fiscal year 2018 and fiscal year
    2019 President's Budgets that lay out the path forward we are taking
    for missile defense. Last summer, I laid out three Agency priorities,
    support the Department's defense strategy, and guide the execution of
    missile defense program activities.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ ``The United States is deploying a layered missile defense
    system focused on North Korea and Iran to defend our Homeland against
    missile attacks.'' National Security Strategy of the United States of
    America, December 2017, p. 8.
        \2\ ``Investments will focus on layered missile defenses and
    disruptive capabilities for both theater missile threats and North
    Korean ballistic missile threats.'' Summary of the 2018 National
    Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the
    American Military's Competitive Edge, p. 6.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          First, we will continue to focus on increasing system
    reliability to build warfighter confidence by upgrading, improving, and
    sustaining deployed systems and executing a rigorous and continuous
    test and evaluation approach with strong modeling and simulations to
    mature technologies and validate deployed capabilities.
          Second, we will increase engagement capability and
    capacity by increasing the number of fielded interceptors, building out
    the sensor architecture with the aim of capturing ``birth-to-death''
    tracking, improving system discrimination and integration, leveraging
    international partnerships for affordability and interoperability, and
    working closely with the Combatant Commands to provide integration
    support and capabilities to meet emergent operational needs.
          Third, we will address the advanced threat by working
    with Combatant Commands and Services to address emerging threats, to
    include the growing and highly challenging hypersonic glide vehicle and
    cruise missile threats and by pursuing advanced technologies, such as
    directed energy, and making prudent and affordable investments in
    potentially game-changing capabilities.
        I can tell you today that the current BMDS meets today's threat,
    but we require additional capacity and advanced capability to stay
    ahead of the evolving threat, as is requested in the Fiscal Year 2019
    President's Budget.
                                 missile threat
        Nearly all of our adversaries are concerned with U.S. missile
    defenses and have devised various means to complicate missile defense
    operations. Missile defense countermeasures continue to be developed
    and fielded. Future supersonic/hypersonic powered cruise missiles may
    be launched by large rocket boosters that have traditionally been
    associated with ballistic missiles. Hypersonic glide vehicles are being
    developed as a new type of ballistic missile payload. The combination
    of high speed, maneuverability, and relatively low altitude makes them
    challenging targets for missile defense systems.
        North Korea is committed to developing a long-range, nuclear-armed
    missile that is capable of posing a direct threat to the United States.
    In 2016 and 2017, North Korea conducted over 40 launches of short,
    medium, intermediate, submarine-launched, and intercontinental-range
    systems. This past February, North Korea paraded five ballistic missile
    systems: four of these received their first test launch in 2017. North
    Korea flight-tested two Hwasong-14 intercontinental ballistic missiles
    (ICBMs) in July. In their tested configuration, these missiles are
    capable of reaching North America. In late November 2017, North Korea
    launched what it described as a new ICBM-the Hwasong-15-which also
    demonstrated a capability to reach the United States. Pyongyang flew
    two Hwasong-12 intermediate-range missiles over Japan last year,
    placing our allies at potential risk from missile debris. The second of
    these tests demonstrated a capability to reach over 3,700 kilometers,
    which can range beyond Guam. The North twice flight-tested a solid-
    propellant medium-range missile capable of reaching Japan. Based on
    North Korea's developmental submarine-launched ballistic missile, this
    system-the Pukguksong-2 is the North's longest-range solid-propellant
    missile. This advancement is significant because solid-propellant
    missiles can be prepared for launch more rapidly than liquid-propellant
    systems. Additional missile launches out of North Korea--from short-
    range to intercontinental-range--are a near certainty. In addition to
    further strategic-weapon testing, North Korea has announced that it
    will focus on producing and deploying nuclear weapons and ballistic
    missiles in 2018.
        Iran has ambitious ballistic missile and space launch development
    programs and continues to attempt to increase the lethality of its
    ballistic missile force. Iran is fielding increased numbers of theater
    ballistic missiles and improving its existing inventory. Its progress
    on space launch vehicles could shorten a pathway to an ICBM. Iran's
    ballistic missiles are capable of striking targets throughout the
    region, ranging as far as southeastern Europe. It has used these
    missiles in the region, conducting retaliatory strikes on ISIS targets
    in Syria. Iran has steadily increased its ballistic missile force,
    deploying next-generation short- and medium-range ballistic missiles
    (SRBMs and MRBMs) with increasing accuracy and new submunition
    payloads. Iran is developing, and has publicized the testing of, SRBMs
    with anti-ship payloads. Iran also continues to proliferate ballistic
    missiles to states and non-state groups.
           increasing system reliability through testing, warfighter
                        collaboration, and cybersecurity
        We continue to enhance the reliability and functionality of current
    missile defense systems, especially the Ground Based Interceptors and
    Aegis BMD Weapon System/Standard Missile (SM)-3 performance, build the
    confidence of warfighters in the BMDS, and work to reduce the number of
    interceptors needed to defeat in-flight ballistic missile threats. To
    increase system reliability and improve warfighter confidence in the
    system, MDA executes a fully integrated test program that synchronizes
    the system with the warfighters trained to operate the system under
    varying wartime conditions against current and emerging threats. This
    ensures BMDS capabilities are credibly demonstrated and validated prior
    to delivery to the warfighter.
        MDA executes a continuous program to improve system reliability and
    manage service life of our BMDS components. An example is the Ground-
    Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) weapon system. A cornerstone of this
    effort is our stockpile reliability program (SRP) for Ground Based
    Interceptors (GBIs). Two GBIs have been removed from the fleet this
    past year, inspected, and tested to gain understanding of how the GBIs
    age in the silos. Another GBI will be removed this year for the SRP.
    From testing to date, we have been able to extend the service life of
    the Cl and C2 boosters. Another key effort is our Service Life
    Extension program. This program performs lifetime testing on key
    components in the kill chain enabling MDA to extend the service life
    beyond the manufacturer's estimate. This testing allows us to avoid
    unnecessary maintenance actions and control operations and support
    costs. MDA also pursues reliability improvements through our
    development activities. We measure availability and reliability data in
    the field and target improvements in the GBIs and GMD ground system
    development programs. A key delivery this year was Ground System 7A,
    which removed obsolete equipment from the kill chain, eliminated cyber
    defense vulnerabilities, and improved redundancy for the warfighter.
    Key future reliability improvements include delivering the Redesigned
    Kill Vehicle and upgrading the GMD Communications Network, launch
    support equipment, and the IFICS Data Terminal High Power Amplifier.
        We continue to work closely with independent testers within the
    Department--the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E);
    Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Developmental Test & Evaluation;
    Service Operational Test Agencies; Combatant Commands, and the Joint
    Forces Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense--to develop an
    Integrated Master Test Plan (IMTP) and execute a robust, cost-effective
    test program. The IMTP provides a flight- and ground-test program, to
    include rigorous modeling and simulation, systems engineering and
    validation, verification and analysis necessary to demonstrate and
    deliver proven integrated capabilities against the evolving threat.
        MDA focuses on BMDS flight and ground testing that rigorously
    verifies, validates, and accredits models and simulations (M&S) to
    ensure confidence in the data used to make performance assessments. We
    use M&S in a robust integrated and distributed ground-test program. In
    2018 MDA began the development of a high-fidelity, all-digital,
    integrated, BMDS-level simulation. This effort will combine the best
    performance assessment models from across all BMDS elements into an
    integrated simulation. The all-digital simulation will be able to model
    full BMDS architectures and excursions that cannot be easily explored
    in ground tests or flight tests for a more thorough exploration of the
    BMDS performance space. In fiscal year 2017, MDA successfully
    demonstrated a prototype of this digital simulation capability.
        Our system ground-tests are the primary source for system
    performance data, and they test our capability across a wide range of
    threats and environments that cannot be replicated affordably in flight
    tests. The BMDS Operational Test Agency, which provides an independent
    operational assessment of the BMDS, relies heavily on the MDA ground-
    test program to assess independently MDA's operational capability. The
    ground-tests allow analysts to characterize BMDS performance under
    varying conditions, with unconstrained red and blue force limitations,
    and without the safety, fiscal, and hardware availability limitations
    of flight-testing. Additionally, with warfighters on console, they are
    able to use ground-tests to refine Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures.
    All of the data from ground tests are used to inform DOT&E assessments
    of BMDS capability.
        In addition to 14 element-level ground-tests, we conducted eight
    developmental and operational system-level ground-tests from October
    2016 to present. There are two more system-level ground-tests scheduled
    for this fiscal year and five more planned for fiscal year 2019. Last
    year, we also conducted or participated in more than 20 multi-event
    exercises and wargames, which are critical to the Combatant Commands
    and the intensive engineering efforts across the Agency.
        Flight-testing uses operational realism to provide data for M&S and
    demonstrates the performance functions of the system that ground-
    testing cannot address. One of the key attributes of each flight-test
    is combining the system under test with the soldiers, sailors, airmen,
    and marines that plan to operate the system in wartime under
    operationally realistic conditions. We also work closely with our
    allies to prove BMD capabilities are integrated and interoperable
    before they are fielded. From October 2016 to present, we have executed
    22 flight-tests. For the remainder of fiscal year 2018, we will conduct
    seven more flight-tests, and in fiscal year 2019, 12 flight-tests,
    including the operational test of European Phased Adaptive Approach
    (EPAA) Phase 3 capabilities and the first salvo test using the Ground-
    Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system. The Agency also is conducting
    detailed planning to conduct an Aegis BMD test against a long-range
    ballistic missile target and adding an IRBM target to GM CTV-03+ as
    risk reduction for the Homeland defense Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV)
    program. Both tests are planned for fiscal year 2020.
        The warfighter is integrated into our requirements, engineering
    design/review and test efforts and processes. The Unified Command Plan
    assigns responsibility to the U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM)
    Commander to synchronize planning for global missile defense in
    coordination with other Combatant Commands, the Services, and
    appropriate U.S. Government agencies. USSTRATCOM, the central
    integrator for our requirements, defines the Integrated Air and Missile
    Defense (IAMD) Warfighter Involvement Process (WIP), which outlines the
    roles and responsibilities for all participants and establishes the
    structure for collaboration and advocacy for desired missile defense
    capabilities and characteristics on behalf of the warfighter.
    USSTRATCOM leads the WIP, advocates for the Combatant Commanders'
    desired IAMD characteristics and capabilities, and provides a
    Prioritized Capabilities List (PCL) of joint military capability needs
    to MDA and other appropriate acquisition authorities. The PCL informs
    MDA's President's Budget Request.
        The Capabilities Document for Homeland Ballistic Missile Defense,
    accepted by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) in 2014,
    baselined the current concept and prioritized future capabilities
    within the Homeland defense BMD system based on previously approved
    warfighter requirements, acquisition decisions, and current long-term
    investment strategy. This review included rigorous warfighter
    coordination and provided the opportunity to the warfighter to shape
    the document, which resulted in the JROC accepting the framework and
    Required Operational Attributes in the document. The Agency now uses
    those Required Operational Attributes as the requirements that guide
    capability development and future program capabilities necessary to
    make the system effective against threats in the future.
        The objective of any development program is to provide effective
    warfighting capability to the hands of the warfighter as soon as it is
    technically and operationally feasible. Ultimately, the Services and
    Combatant Commands will operate and employ these capabilities as
    required. Upgraded Early Warning Radars, COBRA DANE, and Patriot are
    examples of systems or components that have successfully transitioned.
    Transitioning operations and sustainment to Services allows development
    agencies to re-focus RDT&E activities to address evolving threats.
    Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and AN/TPY-2 radar
    transition is in work with the Army and we are developing an agreement
    on the conditions and terms of transfer. Additionally, we are
    developing a plan for transition of Standard Missiles to the Navy, as
    is requested in the Fiscal Year 2019 President's Budget. MDA will
    continue to work within the Department on decisions to transfer
    capability to the Services. As transition is the end goal, each element
    and component will be evaluated against criteria such as its multi-
    mission potential; technical maturity; requirements and technical
    volatility; and interoperability with the overall system to determine
    the pace at which we will pursue transition.
        MDA will also continue to provide the warfighter operational
    support by performing the routine mission essential functions of BMDS
    configuration control, asset management, and operational readiness
    reporting, providing an operational-level interface to United States
    Strategic Command, Northern Command, European Command, Central Command,
    and Pacific Command, and facilitating increased warfighter
    participation in development of future missile defense capabilities.
    MDA will continue to provide support for systems like the globally
    deployed Aegis BMD/Standard Missile (SM)-3 system, AN/TPY-2 radar
    (Terminal and Forward-Based Modes), THAAD, and Command and Control,
    Battle Management and Communications (C2BMC). MDA also will continue to
    lead the integration of evolving MDA, Service, and COCOM command and
    control capabilities through systems engineering analysis and
    development of technical integration requirements and interface control
    documents to address the fielding of air, missile, and rocket
    capabilities by U.S. adversaries.
        Getting work on contract and delivering capability as quickly as
    possible using the unique and broad set of authorities,
    responsibilities and accountability assigned to the Agency with
    balanced oversight from the Under Secretary (Research and Engineering)
    and Under Secretary (Acquisition & Sustainment) are critical to our
    ability to support the warfighter and accelerate program decisions and
    contract actions necessary to counter the rapidly evolving threat. As
    an example, MDA program offices are expediting activity to put new
    content on contract to deliver new capability to the warfighter after
    receiving $250 million in fiscal year 2017 reprogrammed funds and over
    $2.0 billion in emergency appropriations requested in the Fiscal Year
    2018 Budget Amendment to support the Missile Defeat and Defense
    Enhancements (MDDE) initiative. Additionally, our centralized decision
    authority for program development and contract updates enabled more
    rapid incorporation of mandatory cybersecurity contract actions. New
    contract and program strategies, to include the proposed strategy for
    the Homeland Defense Radar--Hawaii (HDR-H), also are quickly approved
    and implemented.
        Finally, the Missile Defense Agency is cognizant of the growing
    cyber threat and we continue to work aggressively to ensure the
    Nation's missile defenses are resilient and able to operate in a highly
    contested cyber threat environment. We are progressively improving the
    cyber hygiene of our missile defense capabilities by ensuring the
    cybersecurity infrastructure has the latest security upgrades. MDA
    remains focused on supporting the DOD Cybersecurity Campaign through
    implementation of the DOD Cybersecurity Discipline Implementation
    Plan--Four Lines of Effort for: Strong Authentication, Hardening of
    Systems, Reducing the DOD Attack Surface, and Alignment to
    Cybersecurity / Computer Network Defense Service Providers across all
    networks. These four lines of effort are critical to the defense of the
    MDA networks.
        In addition to the four lines of effort, MDA has determined that
    protection of the Nation's BMDS unclassified data requires additional
    safeguards and enhanced vigilance. As part of these safeguards, MDA has
    engaged with our defense industrial base corporate partners to ensure
    cybersecurity is prioritized, addressed and enforced at all levels of
    the supply chain. The National Institute of Standards and Technology
    (NIST) has developed a Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure
    Cybersecurity. This is a set of industry standards and best practices
    to help organizations manage cybersecurity risks. Measures include NIST
    control compliance, industry cybersecurity best practices as well as
    techniques for providing only the need-to-know unclassified BMD system
    data to each level of the supply chain. We continue to address industry
    compliance with applicable DFARs clauses associated with the protection
    of critical MDA controlled unclassified information and critical data.
        Not only are we focused on external threats to our enterprise, but
    MDA acknowledges the reality of the insider threat as one of the more
    pervasive threats to be addressed, and we have established and
    implemented an aggressive Agency Insider Threat Program. This allows us
    to monitor both internal and external data movement to ensure all
    unclassified and classified data is handled in accordance with
    applicable guidance and is also afforded the highest level of
    protection. We are constantly evaluating our attack data and updating
    the MDA Emergency Response Team procedures. Abnormalities or violations
    are quickly identified and thoroughly investigated by both MDA and DOD
    Insider Threat and Counter Intelligence.
        Finally, MDA is actively integrating cybersecurity requirements
    early into the acquisition life cycle to increase security and reduce
    overall cost. For example, we are upgrading C2BMC and the GMD ground
    systems software and hardware to enable enhanced cybersecurity
    protection capabilities. To better support our Combatant Commanders,
    this year we successfully executed the first DOT&E Cybersecurity
    Vulnerability & Penetration Assessment on BMDS platform systems
    culminating in a system-level assessment during Ground Test
    Distributed-07a. This is a significant step in understanding the
    cybersecurity posture of the BMDS and the ability to defend against
    emerging threats. We continue to develop a culture of cybersecurity
    knowledge and accountability across the Agency, which fosters awareness
    down to the user level to anticipate, detect, and respond to cyber
    issues before they can have an impact.
        The MDA office of the Chief Information Officer, which conducts
    cybersecurity testing involving all the systems to include BMD
    elements, development labs, test systems to ensure the entire MDA
    Enterprise is secure, executes several testing efforts across MDA
    systems on an annual basis: 46 cybersecurity controls validation tests,
    50 vulnerability assessments, and 110 software assurance code reviews,
    for a total of 1,030 test across the Future Years Defense Program
    (FYDP). MDA also executes BMDS element and system level tests that
    support fielding of new capability to be included in the Operations
    Capacity Baseline. Per section 1647 of the fiscal year 2016 NDAA, MDA
    is also responsible for MDA weapon system cyber testing and risk
    mitigation for the congressional report scheduled to be delivered first
    quarter fiscal year 2020. Over the FYDP there are over 211 cyber tests
    planned, including developmental and operational Cooperative
    Vulnerability and Penetration Assessments (CVPA) and Adversarial
    Assessments.
        We have had a comprehensive ongoing effort since 2010 that I
    believe will go a long way in providing insight and proof of MDA's
    commitment to cyber protection and testing as a way of being responsive
    to DOT&E and working with them on the way-ahead. For example, as the
    cybersecurity threat has matured, the Terminal High Altitude Area
    Defense (THAAD) program identified the need to take a proactive
    approach to cybersecurity. The likelihood and consequence of the cyber-
    threat was increasing at a pace that necessitated programmatic change.
    After careful consideration, we created a comprehensive cyber program
    structure called the THAAD Security and Networking Division. This
    organizational structure is the foundation of THAAD's cyber security
    model and acts as the enabler for THAAD execution in all areas of
    cybersecurity. Cybersecurity includes compliance, security engineering,
    design, development, test, physical security and program security. The
    key to executing these roles is the understanding of the linkage that
    cybersecurity has with system engineering and the acquisition
    processes. By locating cybersecurity into THAAD's system engineering
    directorate, this aligns cybersecurity functions to the following other
    functions: software, modeling and simulation, future concepts,
    requirements, and system integration. This alignment not only ensures
    cybersecurity is inherit in the system engineering and development life
    cycles, it is the catalyst to increase THAAD's chances of survival in a
    cyber-contested environment. We believe this is a proven model that
    should be considered a best practice.
                 increasing engagement capability and capacity
        This budget request maintains operational missile defense
    capabilities for existing operational Homeland and regional defense
    forces and will continue to increase interceptor inventory capacity and
    use existing technologies to improve sensors, battle management, fire
    control, and kill vehicle capabilities to address evolving threats.
    Homeland Defense
        MDA remains committed to operating, sustaining, and expanding our
    Nation's Homeland missile defenses and requests $2.2 billion in fiscal
    year 2019 for the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) program. We
    currently have emplaced 44 operational GBIs and, in accordance with the
    Fiscal Year 2017 Above Threshold Reprogramming and Fiscal Year 2018
    Budget Amendment, plan to expand the fielded GBI fleet to 64 as early
    as 2023. This increase to GBI capacity is a response by the National
    Command Authority to the rapidly advancing North Korean threat and has
    been designated as an ``emergency requirement'' by the President in the
    Fiscal Year 2018 President's Budget Amendment.
        The Agency will continue to demonstrate improved performance
    through flight- and system-ground testing of Homeland defenses,
    integrate additional capabilities provided by the Long Range
    Discrimination Radar (LRDR), BMDS system track, and Homeland Defense
    RadarHawaii (HDR-H), plan for a Homeland Defense Radar--Pacific (HDR-
    P), continue Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV) development, enhance the
    Stockpile Reliability Program, and expand the GBI battle space. We will
    continue improving our sensors, C2BMC, GMD ground systems hardware/
    software upgrades, GMD Fire Control (GFC), and kill vehicle software to
    improve discrimination capabilities and overall system performance. We
    also will continue to improve confidence in our reliability through
    increased testing and analysis.
        At the same time, MDA is evaluating the technical feasibility of
    the capability of the SM3 Block IIA missile, currently under
    development, against an ICBM-class target in accordance with
    Congressional legislation. If proven to be effective against an ICBM,
    this missile could add a layer of protection, augmenting the currently
    deployed GMD system. As directed by the fiscal year 2018 NDAA language,
    we will conduct this demonstration no later than December 31, 2020.
      Increasing GBI Capacity
        In 2013, the Secretary of Defense directed MDA to expand the GBI
    fleet from 30 to 44 by the end of 2017, in response to provocations
    from North Korea. The GBI is the Nation's primary defense against long-
    range and intercontinental ballistic missiles. In November 2017, MDA
    emplaced the 44th GBI at Fort Greely, Alaska (FGA). Achieving this
    objective required MDA to purchase and field 14 additional GBIs. It
    also required refurbishment of Missile Field-1 to remediate obsolete
    hardware, update silo interface equipment, install a hardened
    mechanical electrical building, and upgrade related mission support
    systems infrastructure. To support the 44 GBIs within the existing
    system, MDA also upgraded GFC and ground systems.
        Leading up to the fielding of 44 GBIs, MDA conducted three
    successful flight tests. Flight Test Ground-Based Midcourse Defense
    (FTG)-06b, conducted in June 2014, demonstrated long interceptor time-
    of-flight and Capability Enhancement (CE)-II Exo-atmospheric Kill
    Vehicle (EKV) capability to discriminate targets and intercept lethal
    objects from a representative target scene with countermeasures. A
    controlled test vehicle flight test, GM CTV-02+, conducted in January
    2016, evaluated CE-II EKV performance with the newly designed Alternate
    Divert Thrusters in a non-intercept flight environment while allowing
    data collection to evaluate system enhancements, advanced
    discrimination algorithms, and salvo intercept time spacing.
        FTG-15, conducted in May 2017, demonstrated viability of the new 3-
    Stage Configuration 2 (C2) booster and CE-II Block I EKV GBI. This was
    the first ever intercept of an ICBM-class target. The FTG-15 flight
    test successfully demonstrated our Homeland defenses GMD's systems
    functioned as predicted against a realistic threat ICBM-range target.
    The upgraded CE-II Block 1 EKV launched on a C2 booster successfully
    intercepted and destroyed a target designed to emulate a projected
    North Korean threat. FTG-15 proved effective engineering and
    manufacturing of the new GBI as well as improved discrimination
    algorithms, missile defense architecture and warfighter command and
    control.
        MDA is developing the capability to provide the warfighter the
    option of either flying GBIs using all three booster stages or not
    igniting the third stage, providing performance similar to a 2-stage
    boost vehicle. This approach will provide additional Homeland defense
    battle-space capability through shorter engagement times without the
    expense of a separate 2-stage boost vehicle development program. This
    capability is planned to be tested in calendar year (CY) 2019, after
    which it will be fielded on all boost vehicle configurations.
      Redesigned Kill Vehicle
        The Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV) will improve reliability and make
    Homeland defenses more robust. The RKV will help address the evolving
    threat, enhance kill vehicle reliability, improve in-flight
    communications to better utilize off-board sensor data, and heighten
    Combatant Commanders' situational awareness via hit/kill assessment
    messages. The program leverages the SM-3 Block IIA kinetic warhead
    electronic and seeker to provide commonality among Agency interceptors,
    which is expected to lower costs, reduce risks and increase the speed
    of technology development and fielding of the RKV. The program schedule
    will conduct its first controlled test vehicle flight test of the RKV
    in fiscal year 2020 (GM CTV-03+). The first intercept flight test (FTG-
    17) is planned for fiscal year 2021 with a second intercept flight test
    (FTG-18) in fiscal year 2022. We anticipate deploying the RKV beginning
    in the fiscal year 2022 timeframe.
        In 2018 MDA is initiating the GMD portion of MDDE, which will field
    an additional 20 RKV-equipped GBIs at FGA. MDA will accelerate the RKV
    production deliveries, construct a new missile field (Missile Field 4)
    at Fort Greely, install 20 silos, and deliver an additional 20 GBIs
    tipped with RKVs. We will complete the GMD portion of the MDDE as early
    as 2023. In addition, MDA will initiate a plan to ensure that no less
    than 64 GBIs are available to the warfighter at all times. To
    accomplish this, MDA will add two silos to MF-1 at FGA and purchase six
    additional GBI boosters. The additional silos and boosters will enable
    MDA to deliver an RKV-equipped GBI prior to removing a GBI as we
    replace the CE-I Kill Vehicles currently in the fleet.
      Ground System Upgrades
        MDA is continuing with capability upgrades and technology
    modernization of key ground support and fire control systems components
    such as the GFC equipment, the GMD Launch Support System,
    Communications Network, and the In-Flight Interceptor Communication
    System Data Terminal. The capability upgrades include: GFC-Warfighter
    interface and logic improvements, 2-/3-stage selectable GBI battle
    management, discrimination improvements, enhancements to the kill
    vehicle Target Object Map, and On-Demand Communications for the RKV.
    Ground system modernization will continue to mitigate obsolescence
    issues, improve cybersecurity resilience, increase GFC capacity for
    emerging threat complexity and raid size, reduce life-cycle cost,
    increase system reliability and operational availability, and simplify
    the insertion of future technologies.
      Defense Sensors
        We are investing in radars and developing advanced electro-optical
    sensors to achieve a diverse sensor architecture that will provide
    highly accurate midcourse tracking, discrimination and battle damage
    assessment. We are also leveraging Services' sensors to support the BMD
    architecture, for example, the Navy's new solid state SPY-6 radar on
    their Flight III destroyers, the Air Force F-35 Distributed Aperture
    System, and future Department of Defense and Intelligence Community
    space sensors. In this year's budget submission we highlight the
    continued development of the Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) and
    Spacebased Kill Assessment (SKA) programs, which will improve system
    target discrimination and assessment capabilities. Improved sensor
    coverage and interceptor capabilities will help the warfighter expand
    the battle space to reengage threats as needed.
        We request $176.1 million to sustain Cobra Dane, the Upgraded Early
    Warning Radars (UEWR), and the Army Navy/Transportable Radar
    Surveillance and Control Model-2 (AN/TPY-2) radars. The Services and
    Combatant Commands, with logistical support from the MDA, operate a
    fleet of five AN/TPY-2 (Forward Based Mode) radars in Japan, Israel,
    Turkey, and United States Central Command in support of Homeland and
    regional defense.
        We request $220.9 million to continue the development of advanced
    discrimination algorithms for the AN/TPY-2, Sea-Based X-Band (SBX)
    radar, and the UEWRs to counter evolving threats. The discrimination
    improvements will develop and field integrated capabilities to improve
    the BMDS ability to identify lethal and non-lethal objects. Beginning
    in fiscal year 2018, MDA will complete transition to production design
    activities for next generation Gallium Nitride Transmit/Receive
    Integrated Multichannel Modules to support the AN/TPY-2 obsolescence
    and sparing strategy and set the condition for enhanced performance in
    the future. MDA requests $81.0 million for Ballistic Missile Defense
    (BMD) Sensors testing activities for planning, analysis, and execution
    of BMDS flight test events, including pre- and post-test efforts, such
    as Digital and Hardware-in-the-Loop Pre-Mission Tests, and Post-Flight
    Reconstruction.
        MDA requests $149.7 million for the SBX radar. The SBX is an
    advanced mobile radar that provides precision midcourse tracking and
    discrimination capabilities. The SBX participates in flight tests to
    demonstrate discrimination and debris mitigation improvements. To
    address the continued missile test activity of North Korea, our budget
    request includes funds to extend time at sea and conduct contingency
    operations for defense of the Homeland in the United States Pacific
    Command and United States Northern Command areas of responsibility.
        We request $164.6 million to continue development of the LRDR. The
    LRDR is a midcourse sensor that will provide persistent long-range
    midcourse discrimination, precision tracking, and hit assessment and
    improve BMDS target discrimination capability while supporting a more
    efficient utilization of the GMD interceptor inventory. LRDR also will
    support additional mission areas, including Space Situational
    Awareness. The LRDR site will be constructed as two separate military
    construction projects. For fiscal year 2017, Congress fully funded
    Phase 1 of the LRDR project by providing $155 million for a Shielded
    Mission Control Facility and Radar Foundation. MDA began military
    construction of Phase 1 in fiscal year 2017. Phase 2 in fiscal year
    2019 will address the shielded Power Plant that includes fuel storage,
    a maintenance facility, and associated site support. Initial fielding
    of the LRDR is on schedule for first quarter calendar year 2020. We are
    on-schedule for the Technical Capability Declaration in late third
    quarter or early fourth quarter fiscal year 2021, leading to Warfighter
    Operational Readiness Acceptance in fiscal year 2022.
        The Sensors Analysis of Alternatives (AOA), conducted by the
    Department to assess the most cost-effective options for enhanced
    sensor capability to increase Ground Based Interceptor effectiveness
    against future, complex threats, highlighted the operational value of
    placing additional discrimination radars in the Pacific. Based on the
    Sensor AOA finding, MDA completed site surveys for the Homeland Defense
    Radar-Hawaii (HDR-H) in fiscal year 2017. We requested $21 million in
    fiscal year 2018 for the HDR-H to conduct source selection activities
    and award this radar as the first delivery order on a fixed-price
    indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contract. MDA is
    requesting $62.2 million in fiscal year 2019 for the HDR-H. In
    addition, MDA plans to complete site surveys in fiscal year 2018 and
    competitively award the Homeland Defense Radar-Pacific (HDR-P) by the
    end of fiscal year 2019 as the second delivery order on the IDIQ
    contract. MDA is requesting $33.5 million in fiscal year 2019 for the
    HDR-P. Both radars will close coverage gaps in the Pacific architecture
    and provide persistent long-range acquisition and midcourse
    discrimination, precision tracking, and hit assessment to support the
    defense of the Homeland against long-range missile threats.
        Space provides the critical vantage point necessary to address
    rapidly advancing threats across multiple regions of interest and the
    only vantage point for global persistence to address warfighter
    requirements. A space-based sensor layer would enable the United States
    to use interceptor inventory more efficiently and effectively to
    counter a broad array of threats. Integrated space and terrestrial
    sensors for tracking, discriminating, cueing and targeting ballistic
    missile threats can improve missile defense architecture robustness.
        We are requesting $16.5 million for the Spacebased Kill Assessment
    (SKA) program. Using fast frame, infrared sensors, SKA will deliver a
    kill assessment capability for GMD defense of the Homeland as part of
    an integrated post intercept assessment solution requested in the
    Fiscal Year 2014 NDAA. SKA is MDA's pathfinder program to deliver a
    resilient sensor network in a rapid and affordable manner. Ground
    segment participation in BMDS flight tests occurred last year; on-orbit
    deployment of the sensors occurs this year; and we are looking at steps
    to add SKA to the operational BMDS when SKA proves itself during flight
    testing next year.
        Also, we request $37.0 million for continued operation of the Space
    Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) and the Missile Defense Space
    Center (MDSC) in fiscal year 2019. STSS satellites, which were launched
    in 2007, have exceeded their life expectancy and have proven to be a
    good investment. These satellites operate in low earth orbit and
    continue to collect valuable test data. The STSS program and the MDSC
    support concept development activities for future space sensor
    architecture studies and analyses to address advanced threats.
        MDA is currently conducting trade studies and prototype concept
    design for a potential space-based missile tracking sensor/system. MDA
    envisions a space-based sensor architecture designed to detect and
    track traditional and emerging threats using persistent infrared
    sensing. If pursued, space sensors could be a key element of an
    integrated and layered BMDS Sensor Architecture. MDA could partner with
    the U.S. Air Force on requirements definition. MDA also envisions
    partnering opportunities with the Air Force on ground services,
    integration, launch, and operations. MDA will leverage the Enterprise
    Capabilities developed collaboratively between other DOD and federal
    agencies.
    Regional Defenses
        There are hundreds of ballistic missiles within range of U.S.
    forces and allies worldwide. Our fiscal year 2019 budget request
    continues to resource and build integrated regional missile defenses
    that are interoperable with systems deployed by international partners
    to protect deployed forces, allies and international partners against
    SRBMs, MRBMs, and IRBMs.
      Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
        Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) is a transportable,
    ground-based missile defense system that defends against short- ,
    medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in the terminal
    phase of flight. THAAD provides Combatant Commanders a rapidly
    deployable capability to deepen, extend, and complement BMDS Homeland
    and regional defenses. THAAD is now 15 for 15 in flight testing. MDA is
    conducting New Equipment Training for the 7th Battery, which will be
    ready for operational support to the Army later this calendar year. MDA
    also continues to deliver interceptors for the U.S. inventory. We have
    successfully fielded two THAAD batteries for a Foreign Military Sales
    case with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and continue to deliver
    interceptors for the UAE inventory and provide maintenance and
    sustainment support.
        Continued provocations demonstrate the serious threat North Korea
    poses to the Republic of Korea (ROK), the Asia-Pacific region, and
    United States forward-deployed forces. MDA continues to provide
    maintenance and supply support of the THAAD battery (including the
    Terminal Mode AN/TPY-2 radar) stationed in Guam. MDA is strengthening
    the capability of this regional BMDS presence in response to a United
    States Forces Korea Joint Emergent Operational Need (JEON) to increase
    integrated missile defense system interoperability and expand the
    defended area. This requirement is supported by USSTRATCOM and approved
    by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).
        U.S. Pacific Command initiated the deployment of the THAAD system
    to the ROK on March 6, 2017, implementing the United States-ROK
    Alliance's July 2016 decision to bring the defense capability to the
    peninsula. In coordination with the Army's Lower Tier Program Office,
    MDA began a concerted effort in May 2017 to develop an integrated,
    phased approach to incrementally field capability, delivering improved
    BMDS capability to the Korean Peninsula, including integration of
    existing BMD assets to improve engagement options and coverage. The
    deployment of THAAD contributes to a layered missile defense system and
    enhances the United States-ROK Alliance's defense against North Korean
    missile threats.
        At OSD direction, the Army and MDA developed a draft Memorandum of
    Agreement (MoA) for the transfer of the THAAD and AN/TPY-2 programs
    from MDA to the Army. The draft MoA stipulates that when THAAD
    transfers to the Army, production operations and sustainment program
    and funding for THAAD and AN/TPY-2 systems would transfer to the Army,
    and Research and Development program funding of THAAD and AN/TPY-2
    radars would remain in MDA. The MDA was approved by MDA and is
    currently being reviewed by the Army.
        MDA requested $214.2 million in fiscal year 2019 for THAAD
    development efforts. We will continue development of THAAD software
    upgrades to address threat packages and defense planning as well as
    improved capability to engage SRBM, MRBM, and limited IRBM threats.
    THAAD development and integration will provide enhanced debris
    mitigation capability, improved interoperability with other BMDS
    elements, and expanded defended area footprints via remote operation of
    THAAD Launchers, as well as complete developmental efforts to upgrade
    and ensure the integrity and availability of positioning, navigation,
    and timing data for the THAAD weapon system. Finally, we will continue
    development efforts associated with USFK JEON that provide enhanced
    THAAD capability against specific USFK threats, improved radar energy
    allocation, improved THAAD performance against debris and in complex
    environments, and an accelerated initial capability to remote launchers
    and increase defended area.
        Flight Test THAAD-18 (FTT-18) was conducted in Kodiak, Alaska on
    July 11, 2017. This test demonstrated THAAD's intercept of an IRBM-
    class target and THAAD's ability to fire from two launchers. Flight
    Experiment THAAD-01 (FET-01) was conducted in Kodiak, Alaska on July
    30, 2017, which collected critical performance data related to
    countermeasures. Additionally, THAAD successfully achieved an intercept
    against the target in that countermeasure environment.
        MDA requests $874.1 million to continue procurement of THAAD
    equipment, including 82 THAAD Interceptors in fiscal year 2019. By the
    end of fiscal year 2019, MDA will deliver 60 additional THAAD
    Interceptors to the U.S. Army, for a total of 276 interceptors
    delivered. MDA requests $61.0 million for Terminal Defense Testing in
    fiscal year 2019. We also request $92.6 million of Operations and
    Maintenance funding to support the maintenance and upkeep of all BMDS-
    unique items of the fielded THAAD batteries and for all THAAD training
    devices. In fiscal year 2018 MDA will provide support to seven THAAD
    batteries, including the two forward batteries stationed in the U.S.
    Pacific Command's area of responsibility and is prepared to support the
    U.S. Army in any future deployment around the world.
      Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense
        Aegis BMD continues to be a key component of the Nation's regional
    defense for our deployed forces, allies, partners and friends, and
    directly supports and expands our Homeland defenses with long range
    surveillance and track capability. The fiscal year 2019 budget request
    of $767.5 million supports continued advancement of the system to
    counter the growing threats.
        In fiscal year 2017 we completed one Aegis BMD Weapon System
    installation on an Aegis ship: Aegis BMD 3.6 to Aegis Baseline (BL)
    9.C1 (BMD 5.0CU) upgrade. We also initiated two Aegis BMD Weapon System
    installations on Aegis ships: one Aegis BMD 3.6 to Aegis BL 9.C1 (BMD
    5.OCU) upgrade and one non-BMD capable ship to Aegis BL 9.C1 (BMD
    5.0CU) upgrade. In fiscal year 2018 we began an additional eight Aegis
    BMD Weapons Systems installations on Aegis ships: six Aegis BMD 3.6 to
    4.X, and two non-BMD capable ships to Aegis BL 9C.2 (BMD 5.1). We also
    retired the BMD 4.0.2 baseline in fiscal year 2017. We will retire BMD
    4.0.3 through upgrades to BMD 4.1 in fiscal year 2019. In fiscal year
    2017, we delivered 55 Standard Missile -3 (SM-3) Block IB missiles.
    Additionally, in fiscal year 2018, we plan to deliver 35 SM-3 Block IB
    production rounds to the Fleet.
        In fiscal year 2019, as part of our overall Aegis BMD request we
    are requesting $232.92 million for the SM-3 Block IIA Program. This
    includes the continued integration of the SM-3 Block IIA into the BMD
    Weapon Systems, as well as pre-production All-Up-Rounds to support the
    initial deployment for EPAA Phase 3. In February 2017, we completed
    SFTM-0I, a successful developmental flight test, to demonstrate an
    organic intercept of a MRBM-class target with an SM-3 Block IIA missile
    from an Aegis Baseline 9.C1 Ship. This was the first intercept flight
    test of the SM-3 Block IIA missile, which is a cooperative development
    program with Japan, and supports the initial production decision for
    the SM-3 Block IIA and the Aegis BL 9.C2 (BMD 5.1) certification
    effort, which will certify in 2018. In June 2017, with the execution of
    SM-3 Block IIA Cooperative Development (SCD) Flight Test Mission
    (SFTM)-02, we conducted a second SM-3 Block IIA missile flight test
    using an Aegis Baseline 9.C2 ship. Although this second test did not
    result in an intercept of the MRBM target, significant accomplishments
    were still achieved. A Failure Review Board (FRB) determined that an
    operator's actions at a console resulted in early termination of the
    SM-3 Block IIA missile in flight.
        In January 2018, FTM-29 was conducted with a primary objective to
    intercept an air-launched IRBM-class target with an SM-3 Block IIA
    missile. While an intercept was not achieved, FTM-29 successfully
    demonstrated the ability of the Aegis Weapon System to receive and
    process remote link track via Command, Control Battle Management, and
    Communications (C2BMC) from the AN-TPY 2 radar, confirming Engage on
    Remote functionality. It also resulted in the first launch of a SM-3
    Block IIA missile from the Aegis Ashore Missile Defense Test Complex
    (AAMDTC) at PMRF in Hawaii, which is important for EPAA Phase 3 Aegis
    Ashore sites in Romania and Poland as well as the potential procurement
    of Aegis Ashore by the Government of Japan. An FRB is investigating the
    cause of the failure and unmet objectives will be addressed in future
    flight testing.
        In October 2017, Formidable Shield (FS)-17 was conducted with our
    NATO allies. This exercise included a successful intercept test of an
    SM-3 Block IB Threat Upgrade (TU) missile against an MRBM-class target,
    fired from an Aegis BMD destroyer at the United Kingdom Ministry of
    Defence Hebrides Range in Scotland, which resulted in the successful
    transition to full rate production for the SM-3 Block IB TU. This test
    was a mandatory prerequisite to the full production decision for the
    SM-3 Block IB Program, which was approved in December 2017. As a result
    of the full production decision, MDA is requesting 5-year Multi-Year
    Procurement (MYP) authority for the SM-3 Block IB interceptor for
    fiscal year 2019 to fiscal year 2023.
        In fiscal year 2019, we will conduct Flight Test Operation-03 Event
    1 (FTO-03 E1), where two SM-3 Block IIA missiles will simultaneously
    engage two IRBM-class targets, with one fired from Aegis Ashore Missile
    Defense Test Center (AAMDTC) at PMRF and the other from a U.S. Navy
    destroyer. This will demonstrate operational realism in an Engage on
    Remote (EoR) test scenario for ship launched missiles as well as those
    launched from operational Aegis Ashore sites in Romania and Poland.
        We are strongly committed to further enhancing capability of the
    Aegis BMD system and continuing to improve the Aegis Weapon System in
    alignment with Navy requirements. In August 2017, we certified the
    Aegis BMD 4.1 computer program, delivering BMD 5.0CU capability with
    Sea Based Terminal defense with the SM-6 missile. We conducted CTV-03
    following FS-17 on the Hebrides range, firing a SM-6 Dual I using Aegis
    BMD 4.1, providing the proper Objective Quality Evidence to certify
    firing this missile with this computer program. In fiscal year 2018, we
    will certify Aegis BL 9.C2 (BMD 5.1), that incorporates the SM-3 Block
    IIA missile and an EoR capability to meet European Phased Adaptive
    Approach (EPAA) Phase 3 requirements. In fiscal year 2018 we also plan
    to procure 34 SM-3 Block IBS and 20 SM-3 Block IIAs (16 SM-3 Block IIAs
    were requested in the fiscal year 2018 Missile Defeat and Defense
    Enhancement Budget Amendment and four SM-3 Block IIAs from the fiscal
    year 2018 President's Budget (PB) submission), and continue efforts on
    the installation of the Aegis Ashore Deckhouse and equipment in Poland.
        In fiscal year 2019, we will continue our commitment to develop,
    test, and deliver global naval capability to the warfighter and support
    defense of our deployed forces and European NATO allies through
    delivery of EPAA Phase 3 missile defenses. MDA requests a total of
    $805.8 million in procurement for Aegis BMD, which plays a critical
    role in both Homeland and regional defense. As part of the overall
    Aegis BMD procurement request, MDA is requesting $411.68 million to
    procure 37 Aegis SM-3 Block IB missiles and $181.81 million to procure
    6 SM-3 Block IIAs, along with associated hardware and support costs. By
    the end of fiscal year 2019, we plan to have 203 SM-3 Block IBS and 12
    SM-3 Block IIAs in inventory. As the part of the procurement budget
    also requests $97.1 million for Aegis BMD Weapon Systems equipment.
    Also part of the request, we are asking for $115.21 million for advance
    procurement for economic order quantities and request permission to
    enter into a 5-year SM-3 Block IB Multi-Year Procurement (MYP) contract
    for fiscal year 2019 to fiscal year 2023. MDA will continue to deliver
    to the Navy SM-3 Block IBS and SM-3 Block IIAs once production has
    begun, for deployment on land at the Aegis Ashore site in Romania and
    at sea on multi-mission Aegis ships with BMD capability. In
    coordination with the U.S. Navy, we continue to expand the Fleet, and
    by the end of fiscal year 2018 we anticipate having 38 ships (41 by the
    end of fiscal year 2019) equipped with the Aegis BMD weapon system.
        The Navy is working with MDA to integrate the multi-mission Aegis
    BL 5.3 with Aegis BMD 4.1 into a single computer program. We are
    actively working with Navy to certify this capability in fiscal year
    2020. MDA also continues collaboration efforts with the U.S. Navy on
    AN/SPY-1 radar antenna improvements that, when coupled with Aegis BL
    5.4, increase radar detection sensitivity. We will continue to align
    ourselves with the Navy to develop and deliver a comprehensive
    Integrated Air and Missile Defense capability for the Arleigh Burke
    Flight III Destroyers, working towards a 2024 Initial Operational
    Capability. This Computer Upgrade will integrate BMD capability with
    the advanced Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR), also known as the
    AN/SPY-6, for remote engagements and increased raid capacity with
    simultaneous multi-mission capabilities.
        Adding an additional layer to the Aegis BMD weapon system, we are
    using an incremental development approach integrated within the Navy's
    Baseline 9 architecture to develop and deliver a Sea Based Terminal
    (SBT) capability. By expanding the capability of the SM-6 missile and
    BMD 5 series weapon systems, we are delivering capability to maritime
    forces to protect against anti-ship ballistic missiles and provide
    layered defense for forces ashore.
        We executed a non-intercept flight test, Flight Test Experimental
    (FTX)-21 in May 2016 involving the Aegis Sea Based Terminal defense of
    the fleet capability against an advanced threat representative target.
    The target, launched from PMRF in Hawaii, was the first flight of the
    MRBM-class Type 3 Phase 2 target. A U.S. Navy destroyer, an Aegis
    Baseline 9.Cl (BMD 5.0 CU) configured Arleigh Burke Destroyer, detected
    and tracked the target. This was a very important step in ensuring the
    safety of the fleet and demonstrating the Sea Based Terminal
    capability.
        In December 2016, we conducted a detection, tracking, and intercept
    test (FTM-27) to further assess the capability of Sea Based Terminal
    Increment 1 in the Aegis Baseline 9.C1 (BMD 5.0CU) Weapon System.
    During this test we fired a salvo of two SM-6 Dual I missiles against
    the MRBM-class target launched out of PMRF. In this no-notice test, the
    sailors on the consoles aboard a U.S. Navy destroyer demonstrated the
    ability to conduct a critical terminal defense engagement in a ship-
    defense role. This was the first intercept test of this kind and it
    gave us greater confidence in the reliability and performance of our
    Sea Based Terminal defense capabilities. We conducted an additional
    test of the Sea Based Terminal Increment 1 capability in April 2017
    (FTM-27 Event 2). During this test we fired a salvo of two SM-6 Dual I
    missiles against the MRBM target launched out of PMRF. In this no-
    notice test, the sailors on the consoles aboard a U.S. Navy destroyer
    again demonstrated the ability to conduct a critical terminal defense
    engagement in a ship-defense role. This test demonstrated improved SM-6
    Dual I performance and further increased fleet confidence in the
    deployed SBT capability.
        Sea Based Terminal Increment 2, which further improves our endo-
    atmospheric defensive capabilities, is on schedule to be certified and
    operational in the 2018-2019 timeframe. We conducted a successful
    Critical Design Review for ship defense in April 2017 for the SM-6 Dual
    II Sea-Based Terminal defense interceptor and conducted missile and
    weapon system integration testing in 2017. The first intercept flight
    test supporting Sea-Based Terminal Increment 2 is planned for first
    quarter of fiscal year 2019.
        We continue to support the European Phased Adaptive Approach as a
    United States contribution to NATO BMD, providing coverage and
    protection of NATO European territory, populations, and forces against
    the increasing threat of ballistic missile proliferation in the Middle
    East. Currently, there is an operational Aegis Ashore site located in
    Romania. NATO's BMD architecture also includes the United States
    contributions of a forward-based AN/TPY-2 in Turkey, four BMD-capable
    Aegis destroyers homeported in Rota, Spain, SM-3 interceptors, and a
    command-and-control node at Ramstein Air Base, Germany.
        In fiscal year 2018, we will continue our commitment to develop,
    test, and deliver global Naval capability to the warfighter and support
    defense of our deployed forces and European NATO allies through
    supporting the operational readiness of EPAA Phase 2 and efforts to
    deliver Phase 3 to improve defensive coverage against medium- and
    intermediate-range threats, which includes delivery of the Aegis Ashore
    site in Poland. Aegis Ashore site construction in Poland began in
    fiscal year 2016. That site will be equipped with the upgraded Aegis
    Baseline 9 weapon system with BMD 5.1 and a capability to launch SM-3
    Block IIAs. This new SM-3 variant will support the EPAA Phase 3
    technical capability declaration. The Aegis Weapon System upgrades are
    further enhanced by spiral upgrades to C2BMC and AN/TPY-2 sensors,
    enabling Engage on Remote capability and extended defensive coverage
    for NATO Europe.
        Military construction (MILCON) delays due to an unsatisfactory rate
    of construction progress at the Aegis Ashore site in Poland will push
    the EPAA Phase 3 Technical Capability Declaration from December 2018 to
    CY 2020. Efforts by the Missile Defense Agency and the Army Corps of
    Engineers to mitigate the MILCON delays included creation of an onsite
    Poland Integrated Project Office to administer the MILCON contract and
    facilitate continuous and real-time assessment of the construction
    contractor's performance. Efforts also included the U.S. Government
    continuing to provide supplemental program leadership, subject matter
    experts and additional quality assurance personnel to Poland; proactive
    use of contractual incentives, establishment of joint weekly program
    updates with the MDA Director and Army Corps' North Atlantic Commanding
    General; and quarterly Flag and General Officer reviews onsite. Despite
    these efforts, by December 6, 2017, it became evident that it was no
    longer possible to mitigate MILCON delays through compression of, and
    concurrency between, the non-MILCON elements of the project. At that
    time, the government decided to rebaseline the project schedule given
    the likelihood of continued schedule erosion and the consumption of all
    margin. The rebaseline effort is on-going.
        MDA fiscal year 2019 budget request includes $15.0 million in
    Defense Wide Procurement and $27.7 million in Research, Development,
    Test & Evaluation (RDT&E) funds to address the multiple actions
    required to field Aegis Ashore in Poland and continued operations of
    other Aegis Ashore sites. Given the MILCON delays and the requirement
    to be on-site for at least another year, MDA's fiscal year 2019 budget
    request includes funding to complete combat system adaptation,
    integration, installation, and testing to ensure delivery of EPAA Phase
    3 capability to the warfighter. This capability ensures our ability to
    defend United States assets in Europe and meet EPAA Phase 3 commitment
    to our NATO allies. Given the successful efforts of controlling
    military construction costs, MDA does not anticipate a need to increase
    our MILCON budget in support of Aegis Ashore Poland.
      Command and Control, Battle Management, and Communications and
            Regional Sensors
        We request $475.2 million in fiscal year 2019 for the C2BMC. C2BMC
    provides persistent acquisition, tracking, cueing, discrimination, and
    fire-control quality data to Aegis BMD, GMD, THAAD, Patriot, and
    coalition partners to support Homeland and regional defense. We
    continue to support warfighter command, control and battle management
    needs across the globe by providing the Combatant Commander with the
    BMD planner, situational awareness tools, and battle management
    capability to support global BMD situational awareness, coalition
    operations, weapons release authority for Homeland defense, and control
    and tasking of forward-based AN/TPY-2 radars and the LRDR radar. C2BMC
    operators and maintainers deploy forward in some of the world's hottest
    threat spots and continue to provide around-the-clock support to the
    local commanders.
        In fiscal year 2019, we will complete testing and deployment of
    C2BMC Spiral 8.2-3 and BMDS Overhead Persistent Infra-Red Architecture
    (BOA) 6.1, in support of EPAA Phase 3 / Aegis BMD Engage-on-Remote
    functionality. Initial deployments will be to U.S. Central Command and
    U.S. European Command followed by U.S. Northern Command and U.S.
    Pacific Command providing enhanced tracking capabilities to the
    warfighter. C2BMC also will initiate integration of a sea-based mobile
    sensor in the S8.2-3 timeframe that will provide enhanced tracking for
    emerging threats. We will continue development of C2BMC Spiral 8.2-5,
    which provides system level discrimination data, BOA 7.0 to provide
    advance threat warning capability, and threat characterization
    solutions and support command and control integration of the LRDR into
    the BMDS by 2021 to support a Robust Homeland Defense capability. C2BMC
    will initiate Increment 7 development tasks for command and control of
    the HDR-H radar and Robust Post Intercept Assessment supporting our
    Homeland defense focus.
        We continue supporting incremental improvements to the BMDS to keep
    pace with emerging threats worldwide by investing in the development,
    integration and testing of advanced algorithms to improve track and
    discrimination capabilities and enhance the use of space-based sensor
    data from sources such as the Space Based Infra-Red System (SBIRS),
    using the BMDS OPIR architecture. C2BMC will update hardware/software
    to increase cybersecurity through implementation of the DOD
    Cybersecurity Discipline Implementation Plan--Four Lines of Effort. We
    are conducting over 63 cyber-focused C2BMC tests and assessments
    involving multiple agencies over the FYDP to ensure the system is
    cyber-secure.
        Finally, MDA continues to support the AN/TPY-2 (Terminal Mode)
    radars as part of a forward-deployed Terminal High Altitude Area
    Defense (THAAD) batteries in Guam and the Republic of Korea.
    International Cooperation
        The fiscal year 2019 budget request includes funding for regional
    missile defense capabilities to protect deployed U.S. forces, reassure
    allies and partners, and build cooperative regional security
    architectures. MDA has engagements with over twenty countries and
    international organizations and is committed to expanding work with our
    international partners through joint analyses, partner missile defense
    acquisition decisions, cooperative research and development projects,
    deployment of BMD assets, Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and co-
    production efforts.
        MDA continues to emphasize allied and partner investments in their
    own missile defense capabilities, which create more effective regional
    security architectures that complement U.S. regional missile defense
    capabilities. We continue to execute an FMS case with the United Arab
    Emirates for two THAAD batteries, including launchers, radars, and
    interceptors. Both batteries have been delivered to the UAE and have
    achieved Initial Operational Capability (IOC). MDA is actively engaged
    with several nations, particularly those in the Arabian Gulf region, to
    provide program information and cost data that may inform future
    decisions to procure THAAD and other missile defense systems. In 2016,
    MDA completed a regional Ballistic Missile Early Warning System
    architecture study for the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), analyzing
    sensor and C41 options for defense of the region. We are continuing to
    discuss the study's findings with the GCC nations. Additionally, MDA
    received a Letter of Request from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for seven
    THAAD batteries in April 2017. MDA is working with the Saudis to
    finalize the Letter of Offer and Acceptance.
        MDA has a strong cooperative missile defense partnership with
    Israel through our continued work with the Israeli Missile Defense
    Organization. MDA's fiscal year 2019 request is consistent with the
    funding Memorandum of Understanding that the United States and Israel
    signed in 2016. This budget continues MDA's longstanding support of
    United States-Israeli Cooperative BMD Programs, to include the co-
    development and co-production of the David's Sling Weapon System and
    Upper Tier Interceptor, and improvements to the Arrow Weapon System.
    The Department continues to support co-production efforts for the Iron
    Dome program to provide critical defense against short-range rockets
    and artillery.
        We continue to make progress with our Japanese counterparts on the
    Standard Missile-3 Block IIA (SM-3 Block IIA), our largest co-
    development effort, which supports extended deterrence and establishes
    an important vehicle for closer defense cooperation ties. The
    development work remain on track for first delivery of the missile in
    the 2018 timeframe. The United States will deploy the SM-3 Block IIA to
    the fleet and at Aegis Ashore sites to improve and expand defenses
    against MRBM and IRBM threats. We are committed to delivering the SM-3
    Block IIA to meet global threat requirements and support EPAA Phase 3.
        Our fiscal year 2019 budget request also supports Allied
    participation in tests, exercises, and wargames.
                         addressing the advanced threat
        We must make investments in advanced technology today to prepare
    for tomorrow's threats by improving system performance and
    effectiveness. This budget request will continue the development of
    breakthrough technologies for integration into the BMDS, including
    discrimination improvements, Multi-Object Kill Vehicle technology,
    hypersonic defense technology, and high-powered lasers that have
    potential use against threat missiles in the boost phase of flight. We
    need to investigate solutions that reduce reliance on expensive kinetic
    interceptors. Scalable, efficient, and compact high-energy lasers could
    change future, missile defense architectures. By improving reliability,
    enhancing discrimination, and expanding battle space, I believe we can
    reduce the cost per kill. MDA is developing technology to address gaps
    in the BMDS and dramatically drive down the cost of defending the
    Homeland.
        MDA requested $148.8 million for Technology Maturation Initiatives
    to conduct ground and airborne demonstrations of advanced sensor
    systems and refine directed energy technologies for missile defense.
    MDA is committed to developing and demonstrating directed energy and
    laser technologies that could be integrated into the BMDS, and we are
    actively testing a broad range of potential concepts, including both
    tracking and defensive lasers that could be deployed on a variety of
    platforms. Once we mature the required power, one potential concept the
    Agency is exploring is an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle-mounted laser that
    could destroy ICBMs in the boost phase at long standoff ranges. This
    concept requires precision tracking and a highly stable, lightweight,
    accurately pointed laser beam. We are currently testing a number of
    technologies to determine if this is a viable concept.
        We are operating MQ-9 aircraft outfitted with passive sensors to
    help us understand boost-phase intercept tracking and how an airborne
    layer could augment our existing sensor network. In 2019, we will add
    tracking lasers to these aircraft to increase precision and range and
    determine how these compact lasers could further influence sensor
    design. In addition, we are developing advanced sensors and testing
    them from ground sites to improve discrimination accuracy and validate
    performance against targets of opportunity. What we learn from these
    ground and airborne tests could influence future space-based sensor
    systems.
        We will complete three industry preliminary designs in 2018 of a
    multi-kilowatt class electric laser on a high-altitude airborne
    platform to demonstrate beam stabilization technology. In 2019 we will
    finish the design and begin fabrication of this first-of-a-kind system.
        We continue to advance the state of the art for scaling electric
    laser power in efficient packaging. Both Diode Pumped Alkali Laser and
    Fiber Combing Laser technology have the potential to meet missile
    defense requirements. In 2019, we will concentrate on compact component
    development at the national laboratories and work with Industry and the
    Services to investigate other promising laser technologies. Based on
    the results of these and other tests, we will work closely with the
    Department to determine the best way to integrate directed energy and
    laser sensing into the missile defense system.
        MDA requests $189.8 million for the Multi-Object Kill Vehicle
    (MOKV) effort to establish the technology foundation for killing
    multiple lethal objects from a single interceptor. The more kill
    vehicles we can put on an interceptor, the greater the raid capacity of
    our Ground-based Midcourse Defense system. MOKV has the potential to
    significantly enhance Homeland defense capabilities at a lower cost per
    engagement against the threat. MDA competitively awarded contracts to
    three major prime contractors in 2017 to reduce the technical risk for
    MOKV product development. The MOKV Technology Risk Reduction effort
    will culminate with demonstrations of hardware-in-the-loop prototypes.
    Our current plan is for an MOKV demonstrated capability in the 2027
    timeframe.
        We request $120.4 million in fiscal year 2019 for the Hypersonic
    Defense effort to execute the systems engineering process, identify and
    mature full kill chain technology, provide analysis and assessment of
    target of opportunity events, and execute near term space sensor
    technology and multi-domain command and control capability upgrades to
    address defense from hypersonic threats. This effort will execute the
    Defense Science Board's recommendations to develop and deliver a set of
    material solutions to address and defeat hypersonic threats informed by
    a set of near-term technology demonstrations. An integrated set of
    enhancements will provide incremental capability measured by progress
    and knowledge points in the following areas: establishment of systems
    engineering needs and requirements to identify alternative material
    solutions; execution of a series of sensor technology demonstrations;
    modification of existing BMDS sensors and the C2BMC element for
    hypersonic threats; and definition of weapon concepts and investments
    in key technologies to enable a broad set of solutions, including
    kinetic and non-kinetic means.
        MDA requests $20.4 million for the Advanced Research Program to
    continue capitalizing on the creativity and innovation of the Nation's
    small business community and academia to enhance the Ballistic Missile
    Defense System. Advanced Research conducted research and material
    solution analysis to identify initiatives and technology to include
    missiles, sensors, and command and control components in the defense
    against current and future threats. We are fostering cutting edge
    research between U.S. and foreign universities of allied nations
    through international cooperative technology development projects.
        We request $13.0 million for the Advanced Concepts & Performance
    Assessment effort, which centralizes advanced technology concept
    modeling, simulation, and performance analysis and delivers independent
    assessments of government, university, and industry technology concepts
    that, along with systems engineering requirements, support acquisition
    strategy decisions and define our technology focus areas.
        We also will continue to support trade studies, systems
    engineering, modeling and simulation, and prototype design for a
    potential space-based missile defense-architecture.
                                   conclusion
        Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, in closing, our
    fiscal year 2019 budget funds comprehensive missile defense development
    efforts, including several critical capabilities required by the
    warfighter. We will continue to increase the reliability as well as the
    capability and capacity of fielded Homeland and regional missile
    defense systems and make measured investments in advanced technology to
    counter the adversary missile threat.
        Based on the current capacity of the North Korean threat, both the
    type and the amount of missiles that they possess, we can protect the
    continental United States and Hawaii today against an ICBM. However, as
    the threat increases in size and lethality, we need to ensure that our
    systems are reliable and our ballistic missile defense capability and
    capacity keep pace with that threat. With its fiscal year 2019
    President's Budget request, MDA will support the National Defense
    Strategy with the continued development and deployment of an
    integrated, layered missile defense system to defeat current and
    projected missile threats, allowing the Nation to compete, deter, and
    win.
        We must evolve our missile defense capabilities to outpace growing
    and increasingly complex threats. The addition of another Fort Greely
    Missile Field and twenty GBIs to the operational inventory will address
    the increasing numbers of threat missiles we may have to counter
    against the Homeland. Sixty-four GBIs and urgent improvements in sensor
    coverage, to include the addition of a Medium Range Discrimination
    Radar and advanced discrimination improvements, will enable the United
    States to improve protection of the country. This budget request also
    will help grow the number of THAAD and SM-3 Block IB interceptors
    available to the warfighter to improve regional missile defenses.
        Continuing the approach employed by my predecessors, I am
    completely committed to MDA's audit process to demonstrate our careful
    stewardship of the resources provided us. I am equally committed to
    MDA's full transparency in our engagements with the congressional
    defense committees, the Government Accountability Office, and
    Department's Inspector General.
        I also would like to recognize the brave men and women who serve in
    our Armed Forces at home and abroad and who operate the BMDS. Our
    Nation is fortunate to have such a capable fighting force.
        I appreciate your continued support for MDA and this critical
    mission, and I look forward to answering the committee's questions.
    Thank you.

        Senator Fischer. Thank you, General.
        General Dickinson?

       STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JAMES H. DICKINSON, USA,
       COMMANDING GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY SPACE AND MISSILE
        DEFENSE COMMAND/ARMY FORCES STRATEGIC COMMAND AND JOINT
      FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT COMMAND FOR INTEGRATED MISSILE DEFENSE

        Lieutenant General Dickinson. Chairman Fischer, Ranking
    Member Donnelly, and other distinguished members of the
    subcommittee, thank you for your continued support of our
    soldiers, civilians, and their families. I'm honored today to
    testify before you to emphasize the importance of air and
    missile defense to our Nation, deployed forces, allies and
    partners.
        Air and missile defense threats continue to increase both
    in quantity and offensive capability. With this in mind, I
    appreciate your continued support for the Nation's air and
    missile defense forces as we fulfill our role in securing the
    Nation today and developing future forces and capabilities to
    counter tomorrow's threats.
        I'd like to briefly summarize the missions of the
    organizations I command.
        First, United States Army Space and Missile Defense
    Command, Army Forces Strategic Command, SMDC/ARSTRAT, serves as
    a force provider in support of our combatant commanders. Our
    six priorities are to protect our Homeland; provide combat-
    ready forces and capabilities; plan and conduct synchronized
    global operations; prepare or adapt leap-ahead concepts and
    technologies; preserve and account for the Nation's critical
    resources; and promote and foster a positive command climate.
        We provide not only air and missile defense forces but also
    Army space forces. The Army has more than 4,000 military and
    civilian space cadre providing continuous space-based
    capabilities and support to the warfighter around the world,
    from satellite communications to missile warning. SMDC/
    ARSTRAT's future warfare center and technical center develop
    space and missile defense concepts, requirements, and doctrine.
    We provide training to the Army space cadre and missile defense
    operators, and execute space and missile defense research and
    development.
        Within SMDC/ARSTRAT, we are collaborating closely with the
    Army's air and missile defense cross-functional team. This
    effort is key to rapidly developing requirements and ensuring
    these future capabilities transition quickly from concept to
    prototyping to fielding. We are focusing on capabilities that
    include mobile short-range air defense and directed energy.
        I also have the honor and the privilege to command the
    Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile
    Defense, or JFCCIMD, which supports United States Strategic
    Command by integrating and synchronizing global missile defense
    operations.
        In support of USSTRATCOM, JFCCIMD executes these five
    essential mission defense tasks: synchronizing operational-
    level planning; supporting ongoing operations; integrating
    training exercises and test activities globally; providing
    recommendations on the allocation of low-density, high-demand
    missile defense resources; and also advocating for future
    capabilities.
        To accomplish this, we maintain close collaborative
    relationships with the geographic combatant commands, the
    Missile Defense Agency, the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
    the Joint Staff, and our allies and partners.
        Lastly, it's important to highlight that the challenges
    that we face cannot be overcome without the dedication of our
    most precious asset, our people. The servicemembers, civilians
    and contractors, along with their families, stationed at home
    and globally deployed, provide support to the Army and joint
    warfighter each and every day. We are committed to providing
    trained and ready soldiers and civilians and developing
    effective space and missile defense capabilities to counter the
    threats of today and tomorrow.
        I appreciate the committee's continued support of missile
    defense operations, and especially your support of the men and
    women who deploy, develop, and operate these complicated
    systems. I have addressed in detail the full range of these
    missions and how we are executing them today in my written
    statement which, as you said, will be submitted for the record.
    I look forward to addressing your questions. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Lieutenant General Dickinson
    follows:]
          Prepared Statement by Lieutenant General James H. Dickinson
                                  introduction
        Madam Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Donnelly, and distinguished
    Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for your continued support of
    our servicemembers, civilians, and families. Let me express my
    appreciation to this Subcommittee for its continued support of the
    Army, the U.S. Strategic Command, the Department of Defense, and the
    missile defense community. I am honored to testify before this
    Subcommittee along with these distinguished witnesses who provide and
    utilize missile defense capabilities in defense of our Nation, forward
    deployed forces, partners, and allies.
        I appear before you today bringing both a joint and Army
    perspective on effective missile defense capabilities. Within the Army
    and joint community, my responsibilities encompass several mission
    areas.
        As the commander of the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command
    and Army Forces Strategic Command (USASMDC/ARSTRAT) I have title 10
    responsibilities to organize, train, and equip Army space and global
    ballistic missile defense forces. I serve as the Army's force
    modernization proponent for space, global ballistic missile defense,
    and high altitude forces and capabilities. Further, I am the Army
    Service Component Commander (ASCC) to U.S. Strategic Command
    (USSTRATCOM). I am responsible for planning, integrating, coordinating,
    and providing Army space and missile defense forces and capabilities in
    support of USSTRATCOM missions.
        I also serve as the Army's Air and Missile Defense (AMD) Enterprise
    Integrator. My responsibility in this role is to synchronize the
    balanced execution of the Army's AMD strategy across the functions of
    force planning and sourcing requirements, combat and materiel
    development, AMD acquisition, and life cycle management. I coordinate
    with the AMD community of interest to balance priorities, inform
    resourcing decisions, and pursue innovative approaches in order to
    enhance our strategic flexibility.
        Finally, as the Commander of USSTRATCOM's Joint Functional
    Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC IMD), I am
    responsible for coordinating global missile defense planning,
    conducting missile defense operations support, recommending allocation
    of missile defense assets, and advocating for missile defense
    capabilities on behalf of the Combatant Commanders.
        My first, second, and third major tasks within these roles can be
    summarized as providing forces and capabilities for current operations;
    preparing forces and capabilities for the future fight; and, research
    and development of Army technologies that will provide future
    advancements in air and missile defense capabilities. To achieve this,
    the organizations I command align their activities to these priorities:
          Protect our Homeland
          Provide combat-ready forces and capabilities
          Plan and conduct synchronized global operations
          Prepare or adopt leap-ahead concepts and technologies
          Preserve and account for the Nation's critical resources
          Promote and foster a positive command climate
        My intent today is to highlight the dedicated people who serve in
    the diverse and geographically dispersed organizations under my
    command; to briefly outline the strategic environment; to emphasize
    USASMDC/ARSTRAT's missile defense force provider responsibilities with
    respect to the Army and the geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs); to
    outline JFCC IMD's role as a warfighter advocate and supporting
    USSTRATCOM's coordinating authority for global missile defense
    planning; and finally, to summarize a few key Army AMD developments in
    the context of a comprehensive approach to addressing the evolving air
    and missile threat.
    The Workforce-Our Foundation
        USASMDC/ARSTRAT and JFCC IMD cannot carry out our wide-ranging
    national security missions without the dedication of our greatest
    asset--our people. One of my most important messages to you today is
    that your continued support is critical to our ability to develop and
    retain a highly qualified and mission ready workforce. The recent long-
    term budget uncertainty impacted our warfighters executing today's
    missions, as well as our ability to posture for the future. The
    servicemembers, civilians, and contractors who make up these commands
    support the Army and joint warfighter each and every day, in the
    Homeland and deployed across the globe. The budget agreement and the
    associated increase to the Department's top line budget is very helpful
    and will ensure we continue to provide trained and ready servicemembers
    and civilians to operate and pursue advancements in space and missile
    defense capabilities for our Nation. The extra resources will provide
    additional interceptor inventory capacity, modernize essential
    infrastructure, and enhance discrimination and assessment capabilities.

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Soldiers, Civilians, and Contractors Working
     Together Across 11 Time Zones in 23 Locations to
     Protect Our Nation, Allies, and Deployed Forces
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Increasingly Complex Threat Environment
        Current global trends indicate ballistic and cruise missiles are
    becoming more capable, due in part to the proliferation of advanced
    technologies, resulting in systems with global reach, increasing speed,
    and greater accuracy. Additionally, many foreign ballistic and cruise
    missile systems are progressively incorporating advanced
    countermeasures including maneuverable reentry vehicles, multiple
    independent reentry vehicles, and electromagnetic jamming, all intended
    to defeat our missile defense capabilities. Moreover, numbers of
    ballistic and cruise missile platforms are increasing. Many of these
    systems are mobile, which increases the difficulty in detecting,
    tracking, and engaging these weapons prior to launch.
        Numerous countries are developing ground-, sea-, and air-launched
    land-attack cruise missiles (LACM) using a variety of unconventional
    and inexpensive launch platforms. Today, nearly 30 countries possess
    ballistic missile capability and some are actively pursuing hypersonic
    weapons. There are over 35 different variants of ballistic missiles in
    service across the globe today and a number of new intermediate-range
    and intercontinental ballistic missiles (IRBM and ICBM) are under
    development. North Korea has demonstrated rapid advances in range and
    overall missile performance. Since 2016, it has tested a submarine-
    launched ballistic missile, a new solid-fueled MRBM from a mobile
    launcher, a new IRBM, and its first ICBMs.
        In the future, our missile defense systems will encounter more
    complex electronic and cyber-attacks, as well as directed energy
    threats that could significantly degrade U.S. missile defense
    operations. We expect cyber and electronic attacks will be increasingly
    relied upon in potential adversaries' anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD)
    strategies. Our ability to successfully counter these continuously
    advancing threats will rely heavily on our increased use of space and
    space-enabled capabilities. Space sensors could expand our capacity to
    track, discriminate, and successfully engage ballistic, cruise, and
    hypersonic threats.
        In summary, adversary air and missile threats are proliferating in
    number and advancing in complexity. Our evolution of capability
    advancements requires a holistic approach that effectively integrates
    alternative capabilities to defeat air and missile threats. The
    strategic missile defense environment is becoming more challenging.
    Implementing technological advances in a time of fiscal constraints
    requires more cost effective methods to integrate our current and
    future capabilities. We continue to prioritize integrated AMD resources
    to optimize our support of the warfighter and to partner with the
    Missile Defense Agency (MDA), Combatant Commands, and the Services in
    pursuit of fiscally responsible methods to address evolving threats.
    Strategic Positioning to Counter the Threat
        To counter the threat and meet the objectives of the 2018 National
    Defense Strategy, USSTRATCOM and the U.S. Army continue to provide and
    enhance Homeland and regional missile defenses. We continue to work
    with our allies and partners in Europe, the Asia Pacific region, and
    the Middle East to increase integration and interoperability of missile
    defense systems and operations.
        Integrated missile defense planning, force management, and
    operations emphasize global coordination with regional execution so
    that for any threat, we match the best interceptor with the best
    sensors. A holistic approach that integrates offense and defense will
    move the U.S. toward a more robust and flexible crisis response
    capability.
        Over the last year, basing a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
    (THAAD) battery in the Republic of Korea bolstered our regional defense
    capabilities to improve protection of U.S., allied forces, and critical
    infrastructure on the Peninsula. Additionally, during 2017, MDA
    completed the emplacement of 14 additional Ground-Based Interceptors
    (GBIs) at Fort Greely, Alaska to provide improved capacity to defend
    the Nation against an ICBM attack from North Korea, and potentially
    Iran in the future. The Nation now has a total of 44 GBIs and planning
    is underway to emplace an additional 20 GBIs in a new missile field at
    Fort Greely, Alaska as is reflected in the Fiscal Year 2019 President's
    Budget Request.

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      ``I am confident the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system can currently
     defend the United States from the threats posted by North Korea, but we must
     take prudent steps to remain in a position of relative technological
     advantage.''

      --USNORTHCOM SASC Posture Statement
                                  February 2018
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The 2018 National Defense Strategy prioritizes a strong commitment
    to security and stability in the lndo Pacific region, Europe, and the
    Middle East. In conjunction with our allies and partners, the
    Department of Defense maintains forward-committed Patriot, THAAD, and
    counter rocket, artillery and mortar (C-RAM) forces to enhance our AMD
    posture, sending a deterrence message to potential adversaries and
    assurance to our friends. We continue to work with regional partners
    and allies to increase information and data sharing and we are
    developing a more robust global AMD force posture that leverages
    partner nations' growing capabilities. This will result in reducing the
    strain on our forces while enabling more timely modernization of our
    AMD assets.
        The Army AMD Enterprise is developing a new AMD strategy based on
    the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, the pending
    Missile Defense Review, Army Operating Concept, the changing
    operational and threat environments, and the rapid pace of
    technological advancement. This new strategy, to be published later
    this year will focus on the 2018-2028 timeframe and align with current
    Department and Army doctrine. The updated strategy will address our
    ability to balance today's operational requirements while shaping the
    force and modernization efforts to counter future challenges. In
    addition, the Army's Modernization Strategy will enable us to deliver
    advanced air and missile defense capabilities to our warfighters on a
    substantially decreased timeline. The Air and Missile Defense Cross
    Functional Team is key to rapidly developing requirements and ensuring
    these future capabilities transition quickly from concept, to
    prototyping, to fielding. We are focusing on capabilities that include
    Mobile Short-Range Air Defense, directed energy, and advanced
    energetics.
    Providing and Enhancing Missile Defense Capabilities
        USASMDC/ARSTRAT's first major task is carrying out its title 10
    responsibilities as a force provider of missile defense capabilities.
    This command is manned by multi component soldiers, civilians, and
    contractors, who contribute to operations, planning, integration,
    control, and coordination of Army forces and capabilities in support of
    USSTRATCOM's missile defense mission. Other commands around the world,
    including all GCCs, also leverage the capabilities we provide.
        Our operational function in today's fight is to provide trained and
    ready missile defense forces and capabilities to the GCCs and the
    warfighter. For example, USASMDC/ARSTRAT soldiers serving in the
    Homeland and in remote and austere forward-deployed locations operate
    the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system and the Army-Navy/
    Transportable Radar Surveillance Forward-Based Mode (AN/TPY-2 FBM)
    radars. Highlights of the capabilities provided to current operations
    and readiness by our missile defense professionals include:
        Support to Global Ballistic Missile Defense: Soldiers from the
    100th Missile Defense Brigade, headquartered in Colorado Springs,
    Colorado, and the 49th Missile Defense Battalion, headquartered at Fort
    Greely, Alaska, are ready to defend our Nation and its territories from
    an ICBM attack. In support of U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), Army
    National Guard and Active component soldiers operate the Ground-Based
    Midcourse Defense Fire Control Systems located at the Fire Direction
    Center in Alaska, the Missile Defense Element in Colorado, and the GMD
    Detachment at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. These soldiers, in
    conjunction with USNORTHCOM, also oversee maintenance of GMD
    interceptors and ground system components. At the Missile Defense
    Complex at Fort Greely, a remote site with limited community support
    amenities, 49th Missile Defense Battalion military police secure the
    interceptors and command and control facilities from physical threats.
    Given their strategic mission in this remote location, the harsh
    environment and 20-hours per day of winter darkness, we must
    continuously review and enhance the Fort Greely Garrison services and
    support to these soldiers, civilians, contractors, and their families.
    With the continued support of Congress, we have already realized
    substantial quality of life improvements for these remotely-stationed
    personnel and their families.

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      `` . . . develop a state-of-the-art missile defense system to protect
     against missile-based attacks . . .''

                            --POTUS Statement
               Making Our Military Strong Again
                                   January 2017
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Support to GMD System Test and Development: Soldiers from the 100th
    Missile Defense Brigade participate in GMD test activities and work
    with MDA developers on future improvements to the GMD system. MDA's
    testing regime, conducted through a series of ground-based and
    operational flight tests, and rigorously verified, validated, and
    accredited models and simulations, emphasizes operational realism
    during test design and execution. This realism enables soldiers of the
    100th Missile Defense Brigade to gain tremendous training value and
    validate operational employment of the system. This contributes to
    readiness, by executing their actual operational tasks while providing
    warfighters with confidence the system will perform as designed.
        Support to Regional Capabilities: The 100th Missile Defense Brigade
    also provides GCCs with trained and certified AN/TPY-2 Forward Based
    Mode (FBM) missile defense batteries (MDBs). These operational
    capabilities exist today at five strategic locations around the globe
    where they contribute to the early warning, cueing, tracking, and
    discrimination of threats to our allies and partners. These forward-
    based radars also represent a tangible contribution to both Homeland
    and regional defense. Soldiers manning these radars, deployed to remote
    and austere locations across the globe, persistently demonstrate our
    Nation's commitment to defend deployed forces, allies, and partners
    from ballistic missile attacks. MDA is the materiel developer for the
    AN/TPY-2 radars and, in accordance with the 2018 National Defense
    Authorization Act, is developing plans to transfer the program of
    record to the Army for continued operational sustainment.
        Space Support to Ballistic Missile Early Warning: Space-enabled
    capabilities are essential for missile defense operations, providing
    and enabling communications, positioning, navigation, timing,
    intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and early warning. We
    routinely coordinate and collaborate with USSTRATCOM's National Space
    Defense Center to ensure that the space assets are poised to support
    missile defense capabilities.
        In support of the joint force commander, USASMDC/ARSTRAT continues
    to provide ballistic missile early warning within the U.S. European
    Command (USEUCOM), U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), and U.S. Pacific
    Command (USPACOM) theaters of operations. The 1st Space Brigade's Joint
    Tactical Ground Station (JTAGS) Detachments, which support the Joint
    Force Space Component Command (JFSCC), are operated by USASMDC/ARSTRAT
    space-professional soldiers who monitor launch activity and other
    infrared events. They provide essential information to members of the
    air, missile defense, and operational communities. Our JTAGS
    Detachments are forward deployed around the globe, providing
    continuous, dedicated, assured missile warning to USSTRATCOM and GCCs
    in support of deployed and forward-based forces. We continue to
    optimize this capability, and this year we gained support from the
    Government of Italy to relocate the JTAGS in Europe to Sigonella Naval
    Air Station. This will increase operational missile warning capability.

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Space_The Ultimate High Ground
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        USASMDC/ARSTRAT's second major task is to build and mature future
    missile defense forces and capabilities. A major component of this
    function is providing relevant and updated training for our global
    missile defense systems. During the past fiscal year, USASMDC/ARSTRAT
    trained approximately 200 soldiers who execute the missile defense
    mission of the Homeland and our missile defense training courses earned
    USASMDC/ARSTRAT recertification as an Army Learning Institution of
    Excellence.
        USASMDC/ARSTRAT, as a recognized Army Center for Analysis, also
    conducts studies to determine how to best meet the Army's assigned
    missile defense responsibilities. Our analyses support the established
    and emerging processes the Army uses to document its missile defense
    needs and pursue joint and Army validation of its requirements. With
    insights from these studies, we develop and operationalize the
    Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education,
    Personnel, Facilities, and Policy (DOTMLPF-P) requirements to address
    evolving threats and potential vulnerabilities to the GMD and AN/TPY-2
    FBM missile defense systems. This disciplined approach ensures limited
    resources are applied to achieve maximum operational utility.

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Provide Combat Ready Forces and Capabilities
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        USASMDC/ARSTRAT's third major task is to provide critical
    technologies to address future needs that will enhance warfighter
    effectiveness. Our technology development function is primarily focused
    on the space and high altitude domains. Additionally, although MDA is
    the principal materiel developer for missile defense capabilities,
    USASMDC/ARSTRAT carries out supporting missile defense-related materiel
    development efforts, to include supporting research, development, and
    testing of an Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) sponsored
    conventional prompt strike capability. In addition to offensive
    capability development, we are also supporting MDA's concept
    development for defense against hypersonic threats. These technical
    capabilities are at the forefront of developing holistic, cost-
    effective approaches to address the broadening missile defense
    challenge. The following are brief summaries of two of our research and
    development efforts, as well as an overview of the capabilities of an
    essential Army testing range.
        High Energy Laser Technology Development and Demonstration: The
    Army's high energy laser science and technology effort aims to develop
    ruggedized laser system components and subsystems, integrate them onto
    an Army vehicle, conduct demonstrations to characterize performance,
    and transition the technology to a Program Executive Office. A solid-
    state laser weapon system has the potential to be a low-cost and
    effective complement to kinetic capabilities in countering rockets,
    artillery, and mortars (RAM), unmanned aerial systems (UAS), and other
    threats. The effort builds upon earlier pathfinder demonstrations of a
    10-kilowatt (kW) laser system by continuing to develop, integrate, and
    mature the technology at higher laser power outputs. The Robust
    Electric Laser Initiative (RELI) fiber laser was delivered to the Army
    in early 2017 and is being integrated into the High Energy Laser Mobile
    Test Truck (HELMTT) for a 50-kW laser demonstration against RAM and UAS
    threats later this year. This demonstration will be a key knowledge
    point for the next major phase of high energy laser technology
    development, the High Energy Laser Tactical Vehicle Demonstrator (HEL
    TVD). The HEL TVD supports the Army's Indirect Fire Protection
    Capability Increment 2-lntercept (IFPC Inc 2-I) program, discussed
    later in this document. It is on schedule to conduct a C-RAM 100-kW
    demonstration in late 2022 to validate system performance against IFPC
    Inc 2-I requirements.
        USASMDC/ARSTRAT is also starting work this fiscal year on the
    Multi-Mission High Energy Laser (MMHEL) as an Army Technology
    Maturation Initiative (TMI). The TMI will integrate a 50-kW laser
    system on a Stryker platform and culminate in an operational
    demonstration that informs Maneuver-Short Range Air Defense (M-SHORAD)
    requirements. Supporting this effort is the Mobile Experimental High
    Energy Laser (MEHEL), a 5-kW laser on a Stryker. Over the past few
    years, MEHEL has participated in Maneuver Fires Integration Experiments
    and recently participated in a Joint Warfighting Assessment in Germany.
    MEHEL is helping warfighters develop tactics, techniques, and
    procedures, as well as concepts of operations for future high energy
    laser weapons.

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Adapt Leap
      Ahead Concepts
      and Technologies
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Low-Cost Target Development: The Army is engaged in a technology
    effort to develop a suite of threat-representative targets for lower
    tier missile defense testing at a substantially reduced cost. Over the
    past year, we completed three detailed target designs and successfully
    demonstrated two of the configurations, which leverage excess solid
    rocket motors. The first Sabre target was successfully launched and
    intercepted in June 2017, meeting all performance objectives. The
    second Sabre target was launched and successfully intercepted in
    November 2017. These missions were critical operational tests of the
    new Patriot interceptor. Development of a two-stage ballistic missile
    target, known as Black Dagger, continues with a risk reduction launch
    scheduled for mid-2018. The Black Dagger target is meant to mimic a
    broader range of short-range ballistic missile threats by achieving
    longer range, higher altitude, and increased velocity. The Zombie suite
    of targets has missions planned for Patriot and Integrated Air and
    Missile Defense (IAMD) over the next few years. The goal remains to
    reduce DOD's overall test execution costs.
        Missile Defense Testing Range: USASMDC/ARSTRAT operates the Ronald
    Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test Site (RTS). RTS, located on the
    U.S. Army Garrison--Kwajalein Atoll in the Republic of the Marshall
    Islands provides critical testing support to both offensive and
    defensive missile testing requirements for programs such as GMD and
    U.S. Air Force strategic ballistic missile systems. RTS retains
    preeminent ballistic missile testing capabilities used in validating
    the Nation's ability to sustain a strong, credible ballistic missile
    deterrent as a key element of national security and the security of
    U.S. allies and partners.
        RTS supported 10 missile defense developmental flight tests in
    2017. The Army conducted three of those tests with the Patriot system.
    MDA and the Army conducted two THAAD flight tests; MDA and the Navy
    conducted four test flights of the Standard Missile (SM-3 and SM-6);
    and MDA conducted one test of the Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI).
    Homeland and regional defense tests have grown ever more challenging
    and complex, providing a means to replicate missile defense
    architectures superimposed over this Pacific test site.
        RTS also supports offensive ballistic missile testing for Air Force
    Global Strike Command. During fiscal year 2017, RTS supported four
    Minuteman III test launches to successfully validate and verify the
    effectiveness, readiness, and accuracy of the weapon system.
        In concert with its testing mission, RTS conducts continuous deep
    space surveillance and space object identification operations to
    increase national capabilities and reduce expenditures for both mission
    sets. During the past year, the U.S. Air Force began construction of
    their most advanced surveillance system--Space Fence. In a few years,
    this improved surveillance capability will enable proactive space
    situational awareness while complementing existing systems at the RTS.
        army contributions to the nation's missile defense capabilities
        AMD is an enduring Army core function. AMD units serve as a key
    strategic enabler-an essential component of the Army mission to provide
    wide area security and support to joint campaigns. In addition to
    defense against ballistic missiles, the Army's current AMD strategy
    seeks to develop a more comprehensive portfolio of Integrated Air and
    Missile Defense (IAMD) capabilities. AMD is one of six Army
    modernization priorities and, as such, recent Army investments in
    missile defense have significantly increased. The Program Executive
    Office for Missiles and Space (PEO MS) is the Army's materiel developer
    for these capabilities and works closely with the other Services, the
    Joint Staff, and MDA toward joint IAMD capabilities. To ensure the
    mission of providing trained and ready Army AMD forces, we are engaged
    in developing an updated Army AMD strategy. A summary of the Army's AMD
    strategic direction and major programs follows:
        Air and Missile Defense Readiness: Readiness is the Army's top
    priority, and the challenge to sustain the readiness of the total Army
    AMD force requires constant vigilance and senior leader focus. The
    operational demand to meet the requirements of joint warfighters
    continues to stress the Army AMD force, impacting both current and
    future readiness, as well as modernization initiatives. With over 50
    percent of the AMD force either forward stationed or deployed, the Army
    continues to take action to mitigate this stress to the force and
    restore strategic flexibility. An Army Campaign Plan strategic effort
    to implement a Sustainable Readiness Model supports characterization of
    the challenge. A recent study on striking a balance between operational
    demand and modernization led to the activation of an AMD test
    detachment in fiscal year 2018. This study also supports normalization
    of AMD rotations to a 9-month cycle rather than the current 12-month
    cycle; we expect to achieve the shorter rotation cycle in the near
    future.
        Mission Command: Closely linked to the challenge of sustaining AMD
    readiness is the ability to provide low density/high demand AMD mission
    command elements. The mission command elements are especially critical
    to support the integration of Army AMD forces into joint command and
    control architectures. Operationally, the Army recently activated a
    third National Guard air defense brigade headquarters assigned to the
    South Carolina Army National Guard to support mission command rotations
    for the National Capital Region integrated air defense mission. The
    Army completed the development and procurement of five Dismounted
    Patriot Information Coordination Centrals (DPICC) for the Army Air and
    Missile Defense Commands (AAMDC), which mitigates the requirement to
    deploy a Patriot Battalion Headquarters element with each one- or two-
    battery deployment.
        Army Integrated Air and Missile Defense (A/AMD): In addition to
    providing defense against ballistic missiles, the current AMD strategy
    continues to develop a more comprehensive portfolio of AIAMD
    capabilities to provide protection against other adversary threat
    systems and capabilities. The Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD)
    Battle Command System (IBCS) integrates current and future AMD
    components into an Integrated Fire Control (IFC) system, provides a
    single integrated air picture, increases defended area, and provides
    flexibility in deployment. IBCS, the foundation for Army AMD
    modernization, is an Army priority. The program will field a common IFC
    system for Army AMD forces to defend against cruise missiles, manned
    and unmanned aircraft, air-to-ground missiles, tactical ballistic
    missiles, and RAM attacks. The IBCS network will operate with air
    surveillance and fire control capabilities across Services, and with
    coalition partners that provide joint warfighters with more decision
    space and lethality. When fielded, IBCS will enhance the lethality of
    the AMD force, breaking the current system-centric control paradigm,
    which will dramatically increase capability and also facilitate open
    industry competition in support of the AMD community. Additional
    efforts are currently underway to integrate the Army's IBCS and MDA's
    BMD System Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications
    (C2BMC) to fully support IAMD interoperability with the ballistic
    missile defense system (BMDS).
        As noted, the IBCS and indirect fire protection efforts will
    provide the future force with a capability to defend against a wide
    range of threats. Recent conflicts highlight the growing threat of UAS
    in support of tactical operations. They pose an increasing risk to the
    Army's combined arms team who are operating where the strategic and
    operational advantage of highly technical stand-off weapons have
    limited utility. Efforts are underway to close the risk gap to protect
    our maneuver forces with short range defense capability.
        Patriot/Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) Missile Segment
    Enhancement (MSE): The Army Patriot force remains the cornerstone of
    AMD protection for our deployed forces, friends, and allies. GCCs'
    increasing AMD requirements drive the operational tempo and stress on
    the Patriot force. To meet requirements, reduce stress, and avoid
    adversary overmatch, the Army is improving Patriot capability against
    the near-term evolving threat while we move toward the IBCS
    architecture including the IFPC Inc 2-1 and a new Lower Tier Air and
    Missile Defense Sensor (LTAMDS).
        Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor (LTAMDS): The LTAMDS
    program will provide sensing capabilities in the lower tier portion of
    the ballistic missile defense battlespace. LTAMDS will expand MSE
    battlespace, serve as a sensor node on the IAMD battle command system
    network, address capability gaps, modernize technology, reduce
    operations and sustainment cost, mitigate obsolescence, and increase
    reliability and maintainability. To enable the development of LTAMDS,
    the Army is leveraging the competitive nature of the Other Transaction
    Authority (OTA) to mature and integrate technologies, reduce risk, and
    to manufacture the LTAMDS.
        Patriot must continually modernize through software and hardware
    upgrades to avoid obsolescence and to take advantage of the expanded
    battlespace afforded by the PAC-3 MSE interceptor. To counter the near-
    term threat, the Army is in the process of delivering the next Patriot
    software build, Post Deployment Build--8 (PDB-8). PDB-8 software
    provides combat identification enhancements, addresses upper tier
    debris mitigation, improves performance of the PAC-3 Missile Segment
    Enhancement (MSE) interceptor, and enhances Patriot and THAAD
    interoperability. To accelerate the modernization upgrades of the 35th
    Air Defense Artillery Brigade, the PBD-8 Urgent Materiel Release (UMR)
    was approved in July 2016. Initial Operational Test & Evaluation
    (IOT&E) was completed in September 2017, and the PDB-8 Full Materiel
    Release is planned for later this year.
        Terminal High Altitude Area Defense System (THAAD): THAAD, a key
    component of the BMDS architecture, is designed for area defense of
    deployed and allied forces, population centers, and critical
    infrastructure against short-, medium-, and intermediate-range
    ballistic missiles. THAAD is a mobile and globally transportable, low
    density/high demand asset. A fully operational THAAD battery consists
    of 95 soldiers, an AN/TPY-2 radar, six launchers, a fire control and
    communications element, a battery support center, and a support
    element. THAAD has a unique endo- and exo-atmospheric intercept
    capability using proven hit-to-kill technology. There are now six
    available THAAD batteries, and a seventh will be operational by the end
    of 2018. As noted earlier, THAAD batteries are deployed to Guam and the
    Republic of Korea in response to the North Korean nuclear and missile
    threat.
        Indirect Fire Protection Capability Increment 2--Intercept Block 1
    (IFPC Inc 2-I): As the end of the operational lifecycle approaches for
    short-range AMD capabilities such as Avenger, the Army is developing
    new capabilities to defeat air threats. The IFPC Inc 2-I, currently
    under development, is a mobile, ground-based AMD weapon system designed
    to provide 360-degree protection against cruise missiles and UAS
    threats for fixed and semi-fixed sites, with the capability to launch
    multiple missile types. A block acquisition approach is being used to
    provide this essential capability. The Block 1 baseline system,
    consists of a new Multi-Mission Launcher (MML), an existing Sentinel A3
    radar, and multiple missile types, integrated with IBCS. An engineering
    demonstration of the IFPC system was successfully completed in March
    2016, which effectively used four different interceptors. The Block 1
    baseline system, providing counter-UAS/cruise missile capability, is
    slated to begin fielding in fiscal year 2021. A second missile will be
    added to provide an initial C-RAM capability beginning in fiscal year
    2023. The Block 2 System will provide a full C-RAM capability. This
    capability could be achieved by fiscal year 2028 for a kinetic energy
    solution and by fiscal year 2032 for a directed energy weapon.
        Army Low-Cost Portable Surveillance (ALPS): The ALPS passive sensor
    will integrate into the IBCS network and provide continuous, 360-
    degree, long-range surveillance against fixed and rotary wing aircraft,
    UAS, and cruise missile threats.
        Maneuver-Short Range Air Defense (M-SHORAD): The Army is increasing
    capabilities to address increasing short-range air threats to our
    deployed forces and allies. Plans are in execution to expand M-SHORAD
    capabilities, not only with additional forces but also with new
    equipment, especially in the European theater. Per Army Chief of Staff
    direction, we have fielded Stinger teams to protect maneuver forces and
    are on schedule to deliver two Avenger battalion equipment sets to
    USEUCOM this year in support of the European Deterrence Initiative. The
    equipment will be followed by personnel and infrastructure resulting in
    an Active component Avenger Battalion next year. We are also exploring
    the feasibility of procuring an interim M-SHORAD capability. Fielding
    of four M-SHORAD battalions is slated to occur over fiscal years 2021
    and 2022. While the current M-SHORAD systems, Avenger and Stinger
    missiles, provide capabilities today, we must develop and field more
    advanced systems to outpace the threat. In addition to IFPC, continued
    R&D investments in lasers, high power microwaves, and electronic
    warfare are essential to increase M-SHORAD capabilities in support of
    the maneuver force.
    joint functional component command for integrated missile defense (jfcc
              imd)--lntegrating and synchronizing missile defense
        JFCC IMD is one of the geographically dispersed elements for which
    I serve as commander. It is USSTRATCOM's missile defense integrating
    element, formed to execute Strategic Command's Unified Command Plan
    (UCP) assigned missile defense mission and enable the headquarters to
    focus on integration and advocacy. Headquartered at Schriever Air Force
    Base in Colorado Springs, Colorado, JFCC IMD is manned by a cohesive
    team of Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, government civilians, and
    contractor personnel.

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
      ``This request supports
      additional efforts to detect,
      defeat, and defend against
      any North Korean use of
      ballistic missiles . . . ''

         --POTUS Fiscal Year 2018
           DOD Budget Amendment
                    November 2017
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        As the Secretary of Defense and various Combatant Commanders have
    previously testified, warfighters remain confident in our ability to
    protect the Nation against missile attacks. However, as the global
    missile threat continues to evolve, we must invest in holistic
    approaches to defeat adversary missiles before launch or while in
    flight, as well as implement mitigations should an attack succeed in
    penetrating our defenses. JFCC IMD's principal mission is to coordinate
    with and operationally support the joint warfighters at the GCCs, and
    advocate for their requirements with the materiel developers at MDA and
    the Services. On behalf of the GCCs and USSTRATCOM, JFCC IMD champions
    warfighter priorities and capability needs, including continued
    development of a robust sensor network, integrated discrimination
    capabilities, resilient command and control networks with enhanced
    cybersecurity defenses, and improved interceptors for both Homeland and
    regional missile defenses.
        Through JFCC IMD, we work across DOD and alongside key allies and
    partners to improve integration of existing capabilities, maximizing
    efficiency and effectiveness in global missile defense missions. The
    essential force multiplier is integration-a critically important
    mission enabler that JFCC IMD directly supports. As a functional
    component command of USSTRATCOM, JFCC IMD executes support to
    designated UCP responsibilities along four lines of effort:
          Synchronizing global missile defense planning, global
    force management and missile defense security cooperation activities.
          Conducting global missile defense operations support, to
    include: asset management, alternate execution authority, federated
    intelligence support, and network monitoring and protection.
          Executing above element joint and combined global missile
    defense training, exercises, and experimentation.
          Advocating for and recommending acceptance of global
    missile defense capabilities, conducting analysis and assessments of
    current and future capabilities, and supporting ground & flight tests.
        To accomplish these efforts, we maintain close collaborative
    relationships with the GCCs, MDA, the Services, OSD, the Joint Staff,
    and our allies and partners. We continually seek to enhance our
    deployed forces' capabilities while gaining operational experience and
    confidence in our collective ability to defend the Nation, deployed
    forces, partners, and allies. Some of our key efforts to enhance
    missile defense planning and capabilities for both the Homeland and
    regional architectures follow:
        Expansion and Integration of the Missile Defense Architecture: In
    response to the evolving strategic environment, we continue to bolster
    Homeland and regional missile defense capabilities. In development of
    the global missile defense mission, we are supporting the advancement
    of the new capabilities such as Aegis Ashore in Poland; the Standard
    Missile 3 Block IIA under co-development with Japan; Long Range
    Discrimination Radar at Clear Air Force Station, Alaska; 20 additional
    GBIs in a new missile field at Fort Greely, Alaska; Homeland Defense
    Radar-Hawaii; Homeland Defense Radar-Pacific; Space-based Kill
    Assessment, and various other capabilities. Given the many challenges
    associated with implementation of these architectures, JFCC IMD, in
    support of USSTRATCOM's coordinating role for global missile defense,
    collaborates with the GCCs to assess and address cross-regional gaps in
    the areas of planning, policy, capabilities, and operations.
        Multi-Regional Missile Defense Asset Management: JFCC IMD, in
    coordination with USSTRATCOM and the GCCs, manages the availability of
    missile defense assets to balance operational readiness posture,
    coordinates the scheduling of missile defense system maintenance
    activities, and supports MDA and Service test requirements. The asset
    management process allows us to continually assess our readiness to
    defend against missile attacks and to recommend adjustments to optimize
    the overall MD architecture.
        Cybersecurity of the Ballistic Missile Defense System: JFCC IMD, in
    coordination with USSTRATCOM and MDA, conducts the Cybersecurity
    Service Provider (CSSP) mission for the BMDS to ensure cyber defenses
    and operations are planned and executed across the globe. JFCC IMD
    works with key stakeholders to enhance the cyber defense posture of our
    missile defense operational architecture against malicious activity. We
    are collaborating with our mission partners to incorporate realistic
    cybersecurity testing in support of the warfighter capability
    acceptance process. JFCC IMD also works closely with the Joint Staff,
    Combatant Commanders, and MDA to educate, train, and exercise
    cybersecurity protocols to ensure the highest levels of readiness.
        Global Planning and Assessment: As regional and global missile
    threats continue to increase in number and complexity, JFCC IMD works
    with the missile defense community to refine processes designed to
    synchronize trans-regional, global missile defense planning and
    operations. Codified in periodic revisions to the Global Missile
    Defense Concept of Operations, these processes ensure unity of effort
    and mitigate potential seams and gaps across geographic areas of
    responsibility. Consistent with the Department's transition to planning
    based on adversary problem sets, we have continued to refine our
    process for adversary-centric plans assessment, and completed further
    objective analysis of missile defense risks across multiple GCC plans.
    This assessment methodology identifies systemic risk, informs
    recommendations for shortfall mitigation, and increases effectiveness
    in future missile defense planning efforts. The output of this analysis
    will inform our biennial Global Integrated Air and Missile Defense
    Assessment (GIAMDA) which shapes recommendations for global force
    management and future capability advocacy efforts. Looking forward, we
    will focus our efforts with the warfighter community to establish
    approaches and processes necessary to enable increased integration and
    a more holistic approach to missile defense.

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Plan and Conduct
      Synchronized
      Global Operations
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Global Force Management: USSTRATCOM, as the designated Joint
    Functional Manager for missile defense, relies upon JFCC IMD to
    evaluate and recommend to the Joint Staff sourcing of missile defense
    requirements based on assessed risk. Due to the low density/high demand
    nature of missile defense assets, all sourcing decisions have a direct
    and significant impact on other Combatant Commanders' campaign and
    contingency plans. We continue to refine our approach to prioritize
    steady-state global missile defense requirements. This Global
    Prioritized Defended Asset List (Global PDAL) categorizes the GCCs'
    critical assets based on global risk. It informs our recommendations in
    the Global Force Management process, enabling senior leaders to make
    informed decisions on allocation of low density missile defense forces.
        Allied and Partner Missile Defense Integration: Given that we will
    never have enough active defense capacity, integrating allies into a
    common and mutually supportive architecture is a critical warfighter
    priority. In support of those efforts, our Global Missile Defense
    CONOPS includes an International Engagement Framework which provides a
    common approach to identify potential partners, a model to identify a
    level of maturation, and an assessment mechanism. This approach formed
    the analytical basis for the Department's 2017 Report to Congress on
    Allied Integration. Another venue aimed at promoting increased
    cooperation is the Nimble Titan campaign, a biennial series of
    multinational missile defense experiments. Nimble Titan brings together
    policy and military subject matter experts from allies and partner
    nations to explore collaborative missile defense, synchronize policy
    and military initiatives, and identify potential future concepts.
    Today, ministries of foreign affairs and defense representatives from
    24 nations, NATO, three additional multinational organizations, as well
    as DOD, OSD, Joint Staff, Combatant Commands, and MDA convene quarterly
    to exchange views and insights, experimenting collectively with policy
    and operational concepts. The Nimble Titan campaign provides a unique
    forum to advance U.S. missile defense policies and Combatant
    Commanders' regional security objectives. As the free world's premier
    strategic military and policy focused missile defense event, this
    campaign provides participating nations with critical opportunities for
    multinational and cross-regional discussions. The 28 member nations and
    international organizations work collectively to produce practical
    missile defense concepts and solutions to policy-military challenges;
    many of which influence and inform real-world missile defense policies
    and multinational planning.

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
      ``We must strengthen our
      collaboration with our allies
      and explore further integration
      of our collective capabilities
      toward an effective mutual
      defense.''

                      --USSTRATCOM
               HASC Posture Statement
                            March 2018
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Nimble Titan 2018 campaign culminated in the Capstone Conflict
    Event this March. In September, NATO will host a subsequent senior
    leader forum. This campaign addressed IAMD, deterrence and de-
    escalation, left-of-launch actions, passive defense, advanced
    technologies, interoperability, regional defense planning, alliance and
    coalition cohesion, and harmonized strategic messaging--challenges of
    concern to all participants. Nimble Titan has been a gateway for the
    U.S. to establish crucial relationships with allies and partners. It
    also informs the missile defense policies of the participating nations
    and international organizations. Events like Nimble Titan foster
    greater confidence in combined missile defenses and provide a means to
    advance U.S. efforts in collaboration, integration, interoperability,
    and burden sharing with our allies and partners.
        Additionally, we have successfully integrated allies directly into
    the JFCC IMD staff through the Foreign Liaison Officer (FLO) program.
    Our first FLO, a German Air Force officer, has been an integral player
    in Nimble Titan, NATO BMD Training, and allied and partner modeling and
    simulation efforts. We are seeking to add additional Foreign Liaison
    Officers to increase our understanding of allied missile defense
    policies, capabilities, and planning in order to optimize missile
    defense planning and force allocation.
        Joint Missile Defense Training: In coordination with USSTRATCOM,
    the Joint Staff, Combatant Commands, and the Services, we continue to
    develop comprehensive and innovative training programs to close gaps
    between Service, joint, and regional missile defense training and
    education. JFCC IMD's Joint Ballistic Missile Defense Training and
    Education Center, or JBTEC, expanded its curriculum to meet warfighter
    demands. It now offers 15 mission-oriented resident and Mobile Training
    Team (MTT) courses, and online courses to include orientation, staff
    basic, and asset management training. Over the past year, JFCC IMD
    instructors executed 233 courses, training over 4,200 students
    worldwide. Additionally, in keeping with Joint Vision 2020, JFCC IMD
    provided training courses to our allies and partners through military-
    to-military and Foreign Military Sales training venues.
        Warfighter Capability Acceptance and Integrated Master Test Plan:
    As missile defense architectures mature, warfighters require a
    credible, comprehensive assessment of new capabilities to inform
    operational acceptance into the global BMDS. The warfighter relies on a
    robust and operationally relevant test campaign to confidently field
    and integrate new capabilities into their existing IAMD architectures.
    As noted previously, warfighters supported the May 2017 FTG-15 GBI test
    which demonstrated the first ever Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV)
    intercept of an ICBM-class target. Also in 2017, JFCC IMD supported a
    successful intercept flight test of the United States and Japanese co-
    developed SM-3 Block IIA interceptor for Phase III of the European
    Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) architecture. In fiscal year 2019, the
    Department has an Aegis BMD and Aegis Ashore intercept test planned
    that will demonstrate the multiple simultaneous engagement of two IRBMs
    using the same EPAA Phase III architecture. The Navy and MDA will
    demonstrate fleet defense using a salvo of two SM-6 missiles.
    Additionally this year, we plan to demonstrate coordinated THAAD and
    Patriot interceptors in a simulated engagement using a live target.
        In summary, JFCC IMD continues to expand our Nation's global
    missile defense architecture and explores future capabilities to
    maintain operational advantage against current and future threats.
    Competitive edge is maintained through integrated planning and
    operational support, deliberate investments in our capability
    developments by MDA and the Services, investments in our warfighters
    through education and training, and expansion of collaboration with our
    allies and partners.
                                   conclusion
        Madam Chairman Fischer and Ranking Member Donnelly, as a member of
    the joint missile defense community, the Army continues to pursue
    enhancements to the Nation's IAMD systems, from the tactical to the
    strategic levels of warfare. As outlined here, USASMDC/ARSTRAT and JFCC
    IMD perform a broad set of critical national security missions. These
    missions include providing professional warfighters and capabilities to
    support current operations, ensuring they are prepared for tomorrow's
    fight, and developing new technologies required to maintain a
    technological advantage against the adversary threat. Our trained and
    ready soldiers, operating GMD elements in Colorado, Alaska, New York,
    California, and from remote, globally deployed locations, remain on
    point to defend the Homeland against an ICBM attack. As a force
    provider to the GCCs, our soldiers provide essential regional sensor
    capabilities, ballistic missile early warning, and satellite
    communications. Our regional forces continue to leverage allied
    collaboration and planning efforts in developing integrated and
    interoperable defenses against the various threat sets. USSTRATCOM,
    through the JFCC IMD, continues to integrate BMDS capabilities to
    counter global missile threats and to protect our Nation, deployed
    forces, allies, and partners.
        While operational, doctrinal, and materiel developments are
    essential, our most important assets are the thousands of soldiers,
    sailors, airmen, marines, civilians, and contractors who deploy and
    operate our IAMD systems. As recognized by Department leadership, the
    strength behind our outstanding workforce is their families. Their
    contributions and sacrifices are foundational to the dedication and
    performance of our workforce--the role and support of our families
    empowers mission accomplishment.
        I appreciate having the opportunity to address missile defense
    matters and look forward to addressing your questions.

        Senator Fischer. Thank you all very much.
        We'll begin our first round of questions.
        General Robinson and General Greaves, you both have talked
    about the defense capabilities that we have currently with the
    most pressing threat that we have, and that's North Korea. But
    in your opinion, does this budget keep us on a path to stay
    ahead of the threat that's posed by North Korea?
        General Robinson. So, ma'am, I'll talk first, and then I'll
    let General Greaves, since he is the smart one.
        Here's what I worry about. As I paid attention, we
    appreciate the ATR [Automatic Target Recognition] that was
    given to us last fall. It allows us to build capacity.
        You and I chatted a couple of times. The fact is when we
    looked at what KJU [Kim Jong-un] was doing last May versus what
    happened through the summertime, this capacity and this
    Redesigned Kill Vehicle will be very good for us in Alaska. But
    at the same time, we're not taking our eye off of having a
    better discriminating radar.
        I would tell you that where we are and what we're doing
    right now keeps us ahead of what's happening. We just can't
    take our eye off the ball.
        And I'll turn it over to General Greaves.
        Lieutenant General Greaves. Chairman Fischer, the answer is
    yes. As I mentioned, the current ballistic missile defense
    system can meet today's threat, and both the fiscal year 2017
    ATR, the fiscal year 2018 budget amendment, and this budget,
    what it does is increase our capability or our capacity, more
    rounds in the ground, whether it's ground-based interceptors or
    THAADs or Aegis 3 IBs, or ultimately the IIAs. So I believe we
    are perfectly positioned to defend against today's threat.
        The other thing the budget does, it helps us keep our eye
    on the advancing threat as North Korea in particular and Iran,
    as they both increase their capability, both in numbers and
    lethality. We must ensure that we look ahead at what capability
    will be required to stay apace of that threat.
        In the area of space sensors or deploying the terrestrial
    architecture to space to supplement and augment what is on the
    ground, keeping track of that capability is quite essential.
        Thank you.
        Senator Fischer. And United States Force Korea, you've
    submitted that request. Can you talk a little bit about the
    request and the importance of receiving funding this year? You
    outlined it a little bit, but what is the priority for it this
    year?
        Lieutenant General Greaves. It's a very high priority. In
    fact, it was sensitized to me during my last visit to Korea
    with General Brooks. We spent over an hour about two to three
    feet away, and he impressed upon me the importance of what's in
    that GEON. What it does, a couple of things. One, it allows us
    to disconnect the fiber tie between the THAAD control center
    and its launchers to increase the battle space by moving the
    launchers out. It allows the Patriot capability to essentially
    use the power of the THAAD radar to expand its battle space.
    And then it does what I believe is extremely important,
    integrates THAAD and Patriot to essentially optimize use of the
    interceptor so you minimize or eliminate wastage. So for
    General Brooks being right there on the front line, that was
    extremely important to him to ensure that we expand the battle
    space and optimize use of those precious assets.
        Senator Fischer. Usually items on the UFR [Unfunded
    Requirements] list are there because they were judged to be of
    lower priority than the items that are included in the basic
    budget request. As I understand it, however, this funding
    appears on the UFR list as a result of timing. Is that correct?
        Lieutenant General Greaves. That's correct. The items you
    see on the----
        Senator Fischer. It's not a reflection of the priority,
    then, in this case?
        Lieutenant General Greaves. Not in my mind.
        Senator Fischer. It was all due to timing.
        Lieutenant General Greaves. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Fischer. Okay. And, Secretary Rood, when do you
    expect to complete the MDR [Missile Defense Review]?
        Secretary Rood. We're in the process of doing that work now
    as we speak, Senator, and we're looking in the near term here,
    in the spring, to finish that review. There are a number that
    you highlighted in your statement, some of the challenges in
    the threat environment that we face, so we're eager to stay
    ahead of that threat, and we're looking at some competing
    approaches to do that. But I expect we'll have that shortly to
    you.
        Senator Fischer. General Hyten noted some difficult policy
    questions in there, and we heard that boost phase term on an
    opening statement, that that's a big challenge. Is the
    Department formulating policies to fill that gap so that you
    can address those challenges that are associated with the boost
    phase intercept as part of the MDR?
        Secretary Rood. Yes. We're looking at boost phase defense.
    As mentioned, this is a period during the missile's flight when
    it is vulnerable to attack. It's a challenging period to be
    able to execute an effective missile defense during that period
    due to the geographic constraints and other things, but we are
    looking at a variety of ways to try to accomplish that goal.
        Senator Fischer. Including lasers?
        Secretary Rood. Yes.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you.
        Senator Donnelly?
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        I want to thank all of the witnesses again for being here.
        Undersecretary Rood, can you tell me how and why the review
    changed from the ballistic missile defense review to the
    missile defense review?
        Secretary Rood. In terms of the rationale, Senator, the
    ballistic missile defense review was looking, of course, at
    ballistic missile defense, defense of missiles that fly over a
    ballistic trajectory. The thought process was that there are
    other forms of missile attack, cruise missile attack,
    hypersonic glide vehicles and the like that were of a similar
    nature, and their challenge in the integrated air and missile
    defense systems that the Services are pursuing to provide
    defense for our troops in the field, our allies and things of
    that nature, that it was important to see a connection there,
    and that was the rationale. Of course, it predated my arrival
    at the Department to do that, but I support that decision
    because of the integrated security challenge that we face with
    those threats.
        Senator Donnelly. General Greaves, can you tell us how you
    contributed input into the missile defense review?
        Lieutenant General Greaves. Yes, sir. We have key members
    of our staff from the engineering directorate, from our command
    and control battle management directorate, from other parts of
    the organization that have met frequently with other members
    within the Department to help construct the MDR. So we've been
    actively involved.
        Senator Donnelly. General Robinson, can you please tell us
    how you helped contribute input into the missile defense review
    process?
        General Robinson. Absolutely. I think what's important as
    the warfighter and the one defending the United States, I've
    been able to contribute saying that I need to be able to
    detect, identify, track, and when necessary engage to defend
    the United States. So whether it's ballistic missiles, whether
    it's cruise missiles, I've been able to give as the battle
    space owner my opinion and support my brothers here at the
    table.
        Senator Donnelly. General Dickinson, same question.
        Lieutenant General Dickinson. Yes. We've contributed in a
    large part to the effort in terms of JFCCIMD or the role that I
    play as the integrated missile defense element for U.S.
    Strategic Command. So we've been participating throughout the
    process, and what we bring to the process is we bring the
    representation of all the combatant commands along with
    NORTHCOM in terms of providing that expertise and that
    perspective as we help to develop and shape the document.
        Senator Donnelly. General Greaves, I understand you're
    trying to accelerate the development and fielding of the
    Redesigned Kill Vehicle to address the growing threat, and what
    I would like to know is can you describe for us the ways you're
    mitigating the risk in the program and ensuring we have a
    capability that is fully tested before it is deployed?
        Lieutenant General Greaves. Yes, sir. This development will
    be a gated, milestone-driven acquisition in specific decision
    points along the way where the Department, not only the Missile
    Defense Agency, will assess readiness to proceed to the next
    phase. As an example, we completed the preliminary design
    review last May and used that as a decision point to convince
    anyone from the CAPE [Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation],
    the then AT&L [Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
    Technology, and Logistics], Ms. Lord, and others within the
    building that we were ready to proceed with obligating, I think
    it was, $56 million worth of advanced procurement.
        So what we have done is we have taken great care and we
    have heeded the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act]
    language that addresses fly before you buy, with the specific
    wording that talks about assessing our readiness to make these
    decisions through either adequately assessing through tests or
    some other method before we make these production and
    deployment decisions. So we will make decisions after, as I
    mentioned, the preliminary design review. We have the critical
    design review coming up in December where another subset of
    that funding will be assessed, and we've got a decision to make
    after the first control test vehicle test, which will now
    include not only a fly-out of the interceptor but a target
    where we will maneuver to the target but then maneuver away
    after convincing ourselves that we would have engaged the
    target, and we will use that extra capability to assess how
    well the interceptor does in the combined or expanded battle
    space.
        So the bottom line story, sir, is a gated, milestone-
    driven, thoroughly reviewed assessment along the way.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
        Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Cotton?
        Senator Cotton. Thank you all for appearing today for your
    testimony.
        General Greaves, let's talk a little bit more about boost
    phase intercept. I will reveal that I am a major proponent of
    this technology at the outset. The boost phase missiles are big
    and they're hot, so easy to detect, and most importantly
    they're over the bad guys' territory, not over ours. But they
    don't come from just anywhere on earth. There's a limited
    number of countries on earth that have this capability, and
    they intend to challenge us, and that boost phase intercept is
    at risk. Two obvious candidates are Russia and China. But is it
    fair to say that boost phase defenses are not really suitable
    against that threat because those countries are so large and
    they can position their missiles so far inland?
        Lieutenant General Greaves. I would say so, yes. There is a
    geographical component of it. Boost phase intercept is, if not
    ideally, well-suited to, say, the Korean Peninsula where, as
    you say, they can't go far back.
        Senator Cotton. Those are the magic words. So since Russia
    and China are not really susceptible to effective boost phase
    missile defense, where is it? North Korea. Maybe Iran as well,
    but North Korea is where it's really suitable.
        We talked about the lasers earlier. I want to come back to
    those in a bit.
        What is the agency doing to explore the feasibility of
    airborne hit to kill defenses, specifically on UAVs [Unmanned
    Aerial Vehicles]? What kind of technology gap do we have today,
    given what we're already capable of doing with a UAV, in air-
    to-ground attack that might help neutralize or at least
    mitigate the North Korea threat?
        Lieutenant General Greaves. We are doing technology
    development. That is a phase of acquisition that we're in,
    looking at both directed energy components as well as most
    likely taking advantage of air assets which will already be in
    the theaters in support of other mission sets, executing by the
    COCOM [Combatant Command] to look at those assets, either
    sensors that could be fed into the command and control battle
    management system within our ballistic missile defense system,
    or at shooters. They could be platforms for a new breed of fast
    interceptor weapons that if placed appropriately or closely or
    in the right position would be effective boost phase intercept
    capability.
        Senator Cotton. I'm a big fan of manned aircraft as well,
    but manned aircraft have men and women in them, so they have
    limitations, right? They have to land, they have to eat, they
    have to sleep, so on and so forth. UAVs do not. How high a
    priority is it for the agency to explore the possibility that
    we could put an effective airborne net over the Korean
    Peninsula with UAVs, both sensor platforms and armed platforms
    in international waters, that could potentially prevent North
    Korean missiles from ever getting off of the launching pad?
        Lieutenant General Greaves. It is a high priority within
    the Missile Defense Agency, and the phase that we're in now is
    the technology piece of it. For instance, directed energy. Can
    we get----
        Senator Cotton. Can we get to directed energy for a moment?
    So given what we can do with a UAV and air-to-ground attack
    right now, what is the gap of taking that kind of demonstrated
    and deployed technology and deploying it in that kind of system
    against North Korea? And rather than aiming it at a terrorist's
    home or car, aiming it at a North Korea missile on the launch
    pad?
        Lieutenant General Greaves. The full answer will have to be
    coordinated with the combatant commander. But the gap or
    limitation is numbers and altitude and duration for the
    platforms of interest, and we have been doing some preliminary
    work on that over the past few years. And again, we're not
    talking directed energy, but doing things such as beam
    pointing, stability, duration, and pseudo con ops development
    on it. But the actual placement above, around, in the vicinity
    of the targets, that's a COCOM decision.
        Senator Cotton. Okay. I just think it's an extremely high
    priority, and most people probably underestimate how close we
    are to that kind of solution. I know that's not the long-term
    solution. That's why I want to put directed energy or lasers to
    the end of the conversation. I know that's a little bit longer,
    but that's ultimately the right solution, I think. Once lasers
    get shrunken down so the power source can actually fit on an
    aircraft like that, then I strongly support that as well. But I
    think that we have a real opportunity in the very short term,
    not a matter of months but not a matter of decades either, to
    if not neutralize the North Korean threat with airborne boost
    phase systems, at least severely mitigate it.
        Thank you.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Sullivan?
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Just to follow up on Senator Cotton's questioning, General
    Greaves, is the technology available right now to do that?
        Lieutenant General Greaves. Sir, I'd say portions of the
    technology are available. For instance, the current suite of
    kinetic weapons that we have that could potentially fulfill
    that role, they may not have the distance, the legs as we call
    it, to execute even if we had the UAV technology flying and
    ready to go. The concept of operations is extremely important
    with respect to how many caps are flying, where those caps are
    located, the resources tail that goes behind it. But those are
    not my areas of responsibility. That's the COCOM. But the
    technology is getting closer.
        Senator Sullivan. Okay. Good. That's good to know.
        General Robinson, thank you. I missed your opening
    statement, but I understand you had an announcement, which
    we're kind of shocked and, wow, you've been an historic figure.
    I want to thank you for your service, the first female
    combatant commander in the history of the United States. Thanks
    for coming up to Alaska so much, we appreciate that. Recently
    at the event that we both were at, it was a great evening, so
    thank you. Thank you for your wonderful service.
        I wanted to talk a little bit, I mentioned to a number of
    you, General Greaves as well--so we made good progress in the
    last year, I think, with regard to a missile defense bill from
    this committee, passes in the NDAA, fully funded in December. I
    was out on a CODE [Congressional Delegation] led by the current
    chairman, acting chairman of the Armed Services, Senator
    Inhofe. We were in Alaska. We went out to Fort Greeley. Part of
    the funding and the new authorization is for a new field out
    there, a lot of excitement. We're on the ground looking at it.
    And then we hear 5 to 6 years, 5 to 6 years, before we get this
    field operational.
        Now, we won World War II in a shorter amount of time. I can
    go through a whole list, and the Chair is very focused on these
    issues, not just in the military but building roads, whatever.
        Why on earth should this take 5 to 6 years? What do you
    need--I've already talked to a number of you--legislatively,
    because I'm sure it would be bipartisan, to say, hey, the
    threat is here, the threat is here right now, we need more
    capacity. A new field at Fort Greeley is more capacity.
        What can we do to help you make this so it's not 5 to 6
    years, a half a decade, to get a new field operational? We
    should try to get that done in a year and a half, in a year.
        So, General Greaves, I know I just pitched this to you the
    other day, but we want to get this in the NDAA to help you, to
    help America defend itself when there's enormous bipartisan
    support to do it. Five to six years, to me, is lunacy. What can
    we do?
        I'll throw this out to any of the witnesses.
        Lieutenant General Greaves. Sir, if I can start, one update
    to our conversation yesterday, the environmental impact
    statement for Fort Greeley was done for the 100 interceptor
    base when the field was first developed.
        Senator Sullivan. Right, right.
        Lieutenant General Greaves. So what we have to do for the
    additional 20 is an environmental assessment, and that work is
    just about done.
        Senator Sullivan. Okay. Good.
        Lieutenant General Greaves. So that's off the table.
        The construction of the missile field itself is an
    approximately 36-month effort, and the limitations involved
    in----
        Senator Sullivan. They built the Alcan Highway in 11
    months.
        Lieutenant General Greaves. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sullivan. I mean, there's a long list of things in
    America we used to build quickly. Even 3 years is pretty darn
    long, right?
        Lieutenant General Greaves. Yes, sir. Those 3 years are
    paced by the standard building timeframe up in Alaska, April
    through October. Now, there are things that could be done----
        Senator Sullivan. We build year-round in Alaska on
    occasion.
        Lieutenant General Greaves. Yes, sir. I was about to say
    there are things that can be done to essentially reduce that
    time, but the pacing item for the additional 20 GBIs in the
    ground are the GBIs themselves and the fact that they were
    being procured as all-up rounds with the Redesigned Kill
    Vehicle on top. And the approach, unlike what was done for the
    initial deployment of the initial interceptors, where we
    essentially have done exactly what you're asking, we are taking
    a series of steps to ensure that what we are designing,
    building, testing, and delivering are more reliable, more
    maintainable, and for the long term more sustainable. And the
    acquisition of that under the current set of guidelines--we
    talked about that a little earlier--is a gated and milestone-
    driven decision process.
        There are a number of folks, other entities within the
    Department that are involved, all the way from the operational
    testers to the folks in CAPE to the folks in now A&S,
    acquisition and sustainment, that have to be involved to ensure
    that we are minimizing risk for this deployment. Now, if it was
    stated that there is some national security waiver to get them
    into the ground now and to provide the Missile Defense Agency
    and others with complete authority to do things, then we could,
    of course, move out faster at a higher level of risk.
        But we learned some significant lessons from the deployment
    of the initial set of GBIs where we had to go back and complete
    the systems engineering for those rounds, and it's taken us
    quite a bit of time to do it, and we have now completed that.
        The intent here is, keeping the threat in mind, we already
    accelerated the planned deployment of those GBIs by at least a
    year, to 2023, beginning in 2021, going out to 2023. But to
    accelerate it further brings increased risk. We feel very
    confident we can deliver it per the timeline that we got.
        Senator Sullivan. Well, we want to work with you, all of
    you, on accelerating that.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
        Secretary Rood, if I could continue with another issue on
    the missile defense enterprise, we know it struggled with the
    increasing portion of the MDA's [Missile Defense Agency's]
    budget that's going to procurement and taking money away from
    what really is the MDA's chief purpose, and that's research and
    development, and while we all support the significant increase
    in MDA's top line that's included in this year's budget, I
    think it actually exacerbates this issue. MDA's budget grew by
    almost $2 billion compared to the projections in last year's
    budget, and about 45 percent of that increase went to
    procurement.
        Do you expect the MDR to look into this issue?
        Secretary Rood. One of the things that is a challenge
    facing us in the Department is the Missile Defense Agency's
    role, as you said, as a research, development, testing, and
    evaluation organization. They've also played a substantial role
    in operations and sustainment of systems once we have them in
    the field. And one of the organizational issues that we need to
    work through is the transition, at what point and how do we
    transition those capabilities to the services to manage. That's
    been something the Department has struggled with for quite some
    time. For the past decade and a half, that's been a discussion
    item.
        So that is one of the things in the missile defense review
    that we are looking at because we want to make sure that we get
    the balance correct, where MDA's work on near-term production--
    that is to say, current systems--and the balance about new
    system development, advanced capabilities. There's always a
    balance about how much do you invest today and how much in
    future technology, and getting that balance correct is one of
    the things we're looking at.
        Senator Fischer. I hope you are able to do that.
        Secretary, for all of Russia's talk about how the United
    States missile defenses jeopardize strategic stability and
    justifies their violation of arms control treaties or pursuit
    of new nuclear weapons--President Putin's speech was the latest
    example of that--isn't it true that Moscow deploys a highly
    capable ballistic missile defense system?
        Secretary Rood. They do. The Russians have maintained and
    indeed, at times when their budgets were most stressed, they
    continued to modernize the Moscow anti-ballistic missile
    defense system. I can say from the time when I previously
    served in government, in the 2001 to 2008 period, having
    routine discussions with the Russians about that, and they're
    very blunt about the fact that that's a high priority for them,
    to defend their capital and their people, where the majority of
    their population lives, against ballistic missile attack. Their
    basic argument is that they don't wish the United States to do
    that.
        I don't accept that argument, and I would note that it's a
    new argument from President Putin. In 2001, when the United
    States announced its withdrawal from the ABM [Anti-Ballistic
    Missile] Treaty, President Putin gave a national address in
    which he stated this posed no threat to Russia's national
    security, and shortly thereafter he agreed to the conclusion of
    the Moscow Treaty, which at that time and to date is the
    largest reduction in strategic nuclear forces that our two
    countries have done.
        So I read very carefully his recent statement, and we
    weren't surprised by what was announced, certainly disappointed
    by the tone in that statement, but it's a new discussion item,
    it's a new characterization I think of what has led to those
    capabilities that we're seeing from President Putin.
        Senator Fischer. Do you have any thoughts that you can
    share with us on why you think President Putin is making this
    new case?
        Secretary Rood. I think it is twofold. One, the context of
    that speech. The vast majority of it dealt with domestic
    issues. It was a bit of a--State of the Union speech wouldn't
    be exactly the right description of it, but it covered a whole
    range of topics, mostly focused on domestic issues. The tail
    end did focus on defense capabilities and those particular
    capabilities.
        Senator Fischer. Was it a political speech do you believe,
    then?
        Secretary Rood. Yes, but it was more than that. It
    certainly was messaging to the rest of the world and the United
    States. So we should see it for both. And it was noteworthy
    that President Putin showed an animation of a missile strike on
    the United States. There is only one other country that has
    done that, North Korea. It was also noteworthy that it was not
    the only time or effort where the Russians have signaled things
    to us in the United States.
        So I think while it was a political speech, it was also a
    message to the United States and the rest of the world about
    how they see us and that security environment and the
    capabilities that Russia is pursuing.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
        Senator Donnelly?
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        General Dickinson, DOTE [Director of Operational Test and
    Evaluation] continues to find the Army's training of its
    soldiers to conduct testing of THAAD and Patriot is
    insufficient. In the fiscal year 2017 report, DOTE found that
    flight testing in fiscal year 2017 demonstrated that THAAD
    training and documentation deficiencies worsened in fiscal year
    2017, and Patriot training remained inadequate to prepare
    operators for complex Patriot engagements.
        In your role as Commander of Army Space and Missile Defense
    Command, you have the responsibility to organize, train, and
    equip Army space and global ballistic missile defense forces.
    Do these insufficiencies concern you, and what are we doing to
    improve the training?
        Lieutenant General Dickinson. So, the air and missile
    defenders in the Army in particular that I can speak for go
    through a very rigorous training program from the time that
    they come in to their initial assignments into their units.
    They go through a very detailed and comprehensive training
    strategy that's codified and developed into what we call table
    training, very similar to what you may see in an armor unit
    that has tables 1 through 12 that are very prescriptive and
    descriptive in highlighting the tasks that need to be completed
    as they move along from an individual type of qualification as
    an individual solider operator into a team or into a crew.
        That spans from a Patriot unit to a THAAD unit, even to a
    GM [Ground-Based Missile] unit, and I'm responsible for
    providing trained and ready forces to General Robinson in the
    GMD world in terms of the 100th and the 49th missile defense
    units. But I can assure you that that training development and
    that training proficiency is measured on a very frequent basis
    and is tested frequently on the actual equipment, and we also
    use a host of simulations in order to develop that.
        Senator Donnelly. So, then, is the fiscal year 2017 DOT&E
    report wrong in its conclusions?
        Lieutenant General Dickinson. I wouldn't say it was wrong.
    I would have to look closely at the scenarios in which they
    were evaluating those. I will tell you from my experience as a
    commander on the ground and through the evaluations that I run
    that the training proficiencies, particularly with the GM
    system, are at a very high state, and I don't believe DOT&E was
    evaluating the GM soldiers. I know they were on the THAAD and
    Patriot.
        General Robinson. Senator, if you don't mind, I had the
    privilege to go to Fort Greeley and watch the soldiers, so I
    know from the time that I have to give some authorities that I
    have to the execution that happens on the ground at Fort
    Greeley for me to be able to sit down and talk to the soldiers
    that do this each and every day from a training perspective, I
    was very proud to watch them, and I know that this training
    goes on more than once a day, every crew, both from my command
    center in Colorado Springs down to the soldiers at Fort
    Greeley. So I just wanted to add that as a warfighter.
        Senator Donnelly. General, I have great respect for them,
    too, and appreciate everything they do for our country. So how
    does the report come up with that conclusion?
        General Robinson. I'd have to go back and do like General
    Dickinson said and go see what was the scenario that they
    looked at, to give it a little more context, because of what I
    watched and observed myself. So I owe you my best military
    advice if I go back and re-read what was given.
        Secretary Rood. If I might add also, I'd have to go back,
    as I mentioned earlier, take a look at the report and see what
    the scenario is. If it was a test scenario, for example,
    sometimes they will look at that during one of MDA's tests,
    operational tests, or whether or not they were in the field
    with the soldiers at that time. So the circumstances are very
    important here.
        But I can attest to the fact that at every level within
    their training program, they are trained and certified. It's a
    series of written evaluations, a series of hands-on
    evaluations, and then performance-oriented evaluations
    conducted by, many times, outside agencies. What I mean by that
    is outside their immediate chain of command. And there are
    passes, and there are failures, and we do that routinely both
    in the United States as well as to our deployed forces
    overseas.
        Senator Donnelly. Okay. Well, I am about out of time.
    General Robinson, thank you again. As you head toward
    retirement and travel around, when you go to the Air Force
    Academy Notre Dame football game, I am curious as to who you'll
    be rooting for.
        General Robinson. Well, when your husband is an Academy
    graduate and your brothers are Academy graduates, there's
    really not much that I can say. So, go Air Force.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you.
        Senator Sullivan?
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Mr. Secretary, good to see you again, and I'm glad you're
    in this position. You have a background with a lot of expertise
    in these areas.
        Let me ask on the missile defense review, when are you
    anticipating that being done? And the reason I ask is one of
    the things that we'll be looking at with regard to the NDAA
    this year is building on what we did last year with regard to
    missile defense. We had kind of a breakthrough, I think,
    politically. We had a bill that was included as part of the
    NDAA which was a pretty significant advancement in missile
    defense that was very bipartisan. If you look at the history,
    missile defense has not always been bipartisan. As a matter of
    fact, it's kind of been a partisan issue. But in this case, I
    think we made a breakthrough.
        I'm asking this because we will be looking at kind of a
    missile defense 2.0 component of the NDAA, but we want it to be
    significantly informed by the work that the Pentagon is doing.
    So when do you anticipate that being done, and is there a
    timeline we can hold you to that would be in front of the work
    that we're doing on the NDAA, which you know is kind of already
    starting?
        Secretary Rood. We're at work now on the missile defense
    review. There are a number of real challenges that we're still
    working through how specifically we will address in that
    report. But I am pleased that we've come a long way. So I think
    this spring we firmly plan to complete the report. Right now we
    still have some internal discussions in the Department to work
    through, different opinions, as you'd expect, on certain
    questions. But I think we'll have something soon, and I
    understand your point about wanting to take that into account,
    and the legislation that you sponsored last year was very
    noteworthy in advancing the ball down the field on missile
    defense, and the NDAA markup schedule is certainly something
    that we would want to take into account.
        Senator Sullivan. Great. Do you think sometime in April? I
    mean, I'm going to try to hold you to something here, Mr.
    Secretary.
        Secretary Rood. I wouldn't want to commit to----
        Senator Sullivan. I'm putting your feet to the fire.
        Secretary Rood. I feel the heat already rising around me.
        Senator Sullivan. Good, good.
        [Laughter.]
        Secretary Rood. I wouldn't want to commit to April to get
    it to the committee, but certainly we'll be deeper into our
    discussions by that time. But I think in the next couple of
    months here, that is our intention to finish it.
        Senator Sullivan. Okay, because we don't want to miss--I
    know there's a lot of work, a lot of expertise going into this,
    but we want to keep in mind the vehicle that will move
    legislatively to enact some of these ideas and reforms you have
    in the review is going to be the NDAA. We're going to be
    marking it up late April, early June, so I think it's important
    to keep that in mind.
        One element that we started on in last year's legislation
    but as I talk to the experts, essentially everybody at the
    table and General Hyten, there seems to be, I would say, broad-
    based consensus on what we need to do more with regard to the
    next steps is space-based sensors that are integrating both
    kind of theater and Homeland missile defense. Would that be
    something that all of you are in agreement on, the need to
    accelerate and really focus on that unblinking eye being able
    to track? Can I get an answer from each of you, if that's
    something you think is worthy of us to be working with you on
    to pursue as a program on our missile defense systems?
        Lieutenant General Greaves. Senator Sullivan, absolutely.
    That is where we need to start.
        Senator Sullivan. General Robinson, would you agree with
    that?
        General Robinson. I do, but let's not forget what we need
    to make sure is that we can do what we need to do today as we
    look to the future.
        Senator Sullivan. I agree. Great point.
        General Robinson. Okay. That's the only thing that I would
    add to the conversation.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
        Mr. Secretary?
        Secretary Rood. Support in this year's budget, we're going
    to talk about doing some demonstrations on space-based sensor
    capability, as you know, and I think continuing to build on
    that is one of the things that we would like to do. We've got
    to look at that in the context of the other budget challenges
    as we put together the next 5-year budget submission through
    the remainder of the year. But I certainly am supportive of
    continuing to explore that.
        Senator Sullivan. Okay.
        General Dickinson?
        Lieutenant General Dickinson. Absolutely. I think the
    better you see the potential threat, the better we'll be in the
    redundancy and resiliency of having terrestrial-based sensors
    as well as space-based sensors that provide us that capability,
    especially as we look to an increasing, evolving threat. So the
    better information we have, the better opportunity and the
    better ability we'll have to defeat it.
        Senator Sullivan. Madam Chair, do I have time for one more
    question?
        Senator Fischer. Okay.
        Lieutenant General Greaves. If I could add, just really
    quickly, the integration of sensors in space with the
    terrestrial sensors are absolutely critical for the real threat
    that we see in front of us, the hypersonic threat, earth to
    burst tracking, and that's why I said absolutely.
        Senator Sullivan. Okay, great. Thank you.
        Let me ask one final question that goes to the issue of
    testing. Again, what we tried to do in the legislation last
    year was really kind of give cover to all of you, not in terms
    of ``failures'' but to start to make the point not only to
    Congress but the American people that when you are testing,
    even if you're not hitting a target or a successful flight,
    you're learning, you're learning. Our space program, you only
    have to look at that in the 1950s and 1960s. We were
    ``failing'' all the time. But we weren't failing. We were
    learning.
        Kim Jong-un, I would never want to use him as an example,
    so I'm not, but the guy is obviously testing, failing, and
    learning. So we are trying to provide you with a sense from the
    Congress that, hey, the next time you do a big test, if it
    doesn't hit the target, it certainly would be my intention not
    to drag all of you up in front of this committee and pound the
    table and look for the TV [television] cameras and try to
    berate the people with stars on their shoulders that you're
    failing, because you're not failing, you're learning.
        So, we started that in last year's NDAA. We're trying to
    accelerate and put you on a schedule to do tests at least
    yearly. But what more can we do to help you in terms of your
    testing, even if you're not always hitting the target? My
    understanding in talking to some of the experts, there will be
    certain tests that we're stretching the envelope, from physics,
    from the activities that we're doing, so much that you almost
    think that you're going to miss the target anyway, and you're
    still going to learn a ton.
        What more can we be doing to help you in the Congress so
    your culture of testing is not so worried about some of us
    calling you up here the next time there's a missed target when
    we're still learning tons?
        Lieutenant General Greaves. Senator, I'd say what you've
    just stated is sufficient, in my mind, in that we're not only
    learning when we don't achieve an intercept, we're also
    delivering capability.
        One example I'll use is the recent SM-3 IIA mission that we
    just executed. We did not achieve an intercept. We believe we
    understand why we did not. But taking a look at what we did
    achieve, we achieved the demonstration of launching the SM-3
    IIA from Aegis ashore, which is absolutely critical for the
    sites in Romania, in Poland, and if the Japanese continue with
    their acquisition of the two Aegis source sites. It's a clear
    demonstration of that capability.
        We also increased the battle space for that weapon system.
    We flew outside the organic radar's capability and demonstrated
    feeding off-site sensor information, engagement-quality
    information to that interceptor as it was in flight.
        We also certified the Aegis weapon system baseline that
    accompanied all that capability.
        So we did not achieve that intercept, but we learned and we
    delivered capability. What you have stated, sir, is sufficient
    in my mind because it lends a level of understanding that we do
    a lot more than just intercepts.
        Senator Sullivan. Yes. Anyone else want to comment on that?
    One thing I've thought is you guys could do a background
    briefing to our wonderful friends in the media who love to look
    for ``failures.'' They don't really understand the issues. And
    if you can background the media on this, that it's not a
    failure, it's a learning opportunity.
        But anything else, Mr. Secretary? General?
        Secretary Rood. I certainly concur with the approach.
    Throughout our history, the things where we've had some
    issues--first of all, we generally have issues at some level in
    virtually every new cutting-edge endeavor. So I wholly concur
    with the thought process that you're taking. And it's not just
    us. I think in some ways when we look at our allies like Israel
    and their test regimen, they're much more willing to go back
    out to the test range, begin a flight test regimen, work
    through their issues, understanding there are going to be bumps
    in the road.
        So I certainly second the approach that you're trying to
    encourage us to take.
        Senator Sullivan. As you probably know, Mr. Secretary, the
    Israelis are actually testing right now in the great state of
    Alaska, in Kodiak, Alaska, so they're learning a lot there as
    well.
        Lieutenant General Dickinson. Senator, if I could, just one
    final comment on that.
        Senator Sullivan. Yes, sir.
        Lieutenant General Dickinson. As General Greaves described
    in terms of learning a lot, first of all I think your approach
    is right on. I think that's what we need.
        But the other piece that goes in, not only on the learning
    piece to the technology under development, but there is a big
    learning piece between the warfighter as well as the material
    developer, in this case MDA. So that's actually a relationship
    that we enjoy on a daily basis between the 100th and the 49th
    and the Missile Defense Agency. That ability to have the
    warfighter working side by side with the material developer in
    a test scenario, for example--and I'll use the FTG-15 a year
    ago, where we actually had a crew out of the 100th that
    actually executed the warfighting piece of that test, launching
    the interceptor for that engagement--is the fact that we learn
    a lot from the warfighter's perspective.
        Then we also are able to inform the material developer on
    the road ahead, are they developing the things that the
    soldiers can use. So I would just offer that.
        Senator Fischer. My thanks to the panel today for your
    testimony and your willingness to give us some pretty blunt
    answers. We appreciate that, and I thank you all for your
    service.
        And thank you again, General Robinson, for your service to
    this Nation, and we wish you all the best.
        General Robinson. Thank you, ma'am.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you.
        The hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 3:43 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Deb Fischer
                           radar acquisition strategy
        1. Senator Fischer. Lieutenant General Greaves, do you intend to
    hold separate full and open competitive procurements for the Homeland
    Defense Radar--Hawaii (HDR-H) and Homeland Defense Radar--Pacific (HDR-
    P) to ensure the most competitive price and latest technology in each?
        Lieutenant General Greaves. Missile Defense Agency (MDA)
    acquisition strategy includes the use of a full and open competitive
    multi-award indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity (MA IDIQ) fixed
    price incentive firm (FPIF) contract to support the competitive
    procurements for both the HDR-H and HDR-P. MDA plans to award the MA
    IDIQ contract to multiple contractors in October 2018. The HDR-H
    contract will be awarded in December 2018 as delivery order Number 1 on
    the MA IDIQ contract. The HDR-P will be competitively awarded as a
    follow on delivery order in 4QFY2019 timeframe. The MA IDIQ contract
    will include the option for a potential third Homeland Defense Radar
    delivery order. This approach enables MDA to maintain competition to
    ensure the best price, while also ensuring access to cutting-edge
    technology for each of the three potential future radar delivery
    orders.
                                 juniper cobra
        2. Senator Fischer. Lieutenant General Dickinson, the United States
    and Israel recently concluded ballistic missile defense drills as part
    of the Juniper Cobra exercise. How do you asses the results of the
    Juniper Cobra exercise and what were some of the highlights related to
    missile defense activities?
        Lieutenant General Dickinson. Juniper Cobra 18 provided an
    unmatched opportunity to exercise our bi-lateral relationship with
    Israeli Defense Forces in a realistic and challenging exercise
    construct while conducting missile defense operations at the
    operational and tactical levels. Working collaterally, United States
    and Israeli soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines practiced and
    refined tactics, techniques, and procedures critical to the successful
    execution of designated operation plans. Tactical U.S. missile defense
    units validated eleven battle positions and related command and control
    links, executed Joint and Combined United States and Israeli battle
    staff operations, and fought complex and layered simulated air battles
    with multiple missile defense systems. Key outcomes included validated
    confidence in the ability of United States and Israeli missile defense
    forces to successfully conduct Joint and Combined operations, a
    strengthened relationship among United States and Israeli forces, and a
    successful exercise demonstration that included both Patriot and Iron
    Dome.
                                      ifpc
        3. Senator Fischer. Lieutenant General Dickinson, considering the
    Army's current plans for Indirect Fire Protection Capability (IFPC)
    envision reaching initial operational capability (IOC) until the end of
    2023, is the Army evaluating any alternative systems, such as the Iron
    Dome system or NASAMS, that could provide near-term capabilities
    against cruise missile threats, or rocket, artillery, and mortar (RAM)
    threats?
        Lieutenant General Dickinson. The Army's current plan for IFPC is a
    2021 IOC. In the interim, the Army has existing, fielded Cruise Missile
    Defense (CMD) and Counter-RAM (C-RAM) capabilities provided by the
    Patriot Weapon System and the Land-Based Phalanx Weapon System (LPWS).
    The Army has previously considered numerous alternatives including Iron
    Dome and NASAMS but none of the systems meet all current requirements.
    The Army continues to evaluate options to accelerate C-RAM capability
    into IFPC via the competitive Enhanced Mission Area Missile (EMAM)
    effort for the second IFPC missile.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
                        missile defense--left of launch
        4. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Rood, General Robinson, Lieutenant
    General Greaves, and Lieutenant General Dickinson, I believe there is a
    growing recognition that we are on the wrong side of the cost curve
    when it comes to missile defense. What sort of priority will the
    Missile Defense Review give to left-of-launch capabilities?
        Secretary Rood. The Missile Defense Review takes a comprehensive
    look at U.S. missile defense capabilities. This includes capabilities
    for deterrence, active and passive missile defense, and attack
    operations to destroy offensive missiles and their infrastructure prior
    to launch. Capabilities for attack operations, in particular, increase
    overall missile defense effectiveness, and lighten the burden on active
    and passive missile defense by reducing the number of offensive
    missiles that the adversary can launch. To strengthen U.S. capabilities
    for attack operations the United States will invest in: all-weather
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms, information
    systems for rapid targeting, and prompt strike capabilities.
        General Robinson. Lieutenant General Greaves and Lieutenant General
    Dickinson, as the Commander of U.S. Northern Command, my focus is on
    right-of-launch capabilities since my ballistic missile mission is
    defensive in nature. We are on the right path to increase the
    capabilities and capacity of the Ballistic Missile Defense System and
    improve engagement efficiency without sacrificing effectiveness. I
    defer assessments of left-of-launch capabilities to those Commanders
    whose mission includes offense.
        Lieutenant General Greaves. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) defers
    to the Secretary of Defense to set the priority for left-of-launch
    capabilities in the Missile Defense Review.
        Lieutenant General Dickinson. As highlighted in my written
    statement, with the continued advancement of global missile threats, I
    believe it prudent to pursue holistic missile defense approaches, to
    include left-of-launch capabilities. The Missile Defense Review is in
    senior level staffing. I respectfully defer any questions regarding
    priorities to OSD Policy.

        5. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Rood, General Robinson, Lieutenant
    General Greaves, and Lieutenant General Dickinson, given that the
    fiscal year 2019 budget was submitted prior to the MDR release, should
    Congress expect a supplemental budget request to account for any
    increased investment in left-of-launch capabilities?
        Secretary Rood. The Missile Defense Review is nearing completion
    and will be released in a few weeks. As a result, it is premature to
    comment on the need for an fiscal year (FY) 2019 supplement budget
    request at this time. The Department fully supports the fiscal year
    2019 President's Budget request.
        General Robinson. I defer to Secretary Rood and Lt. Gen. Greaves on
    budget sufficiency for left-of-launch capabilities.
        Lieutenant General Greaves. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) defers
    to the Secretary of Defense with regard to the submission of any fiscal
    year 2019 supplemental budget requests.
        Lieutenant General Dickinson. The Missile Defense Review is in
    senior level staffing. I respectfully defer any questions regarding its
    contents to OSD Policy.
                             boost phase intercept
        6. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General Greaves, I am glad to see
    you are looking at directed energy technology to address emerging
    threats like hypersonic vehicles and cruise missiles. I continue to
    believe that directed energy is a potential option to achieve a viable
    boost phase intercept capability. I am particularly interested in the
    Request for Information (RFI) that the Missile Defense Agency put out
    last summer for a high altitude long endurance (HALE) unmanned aircraft
    to carry a high-energy laser system. What were the results of that
    request, what is the status of the RFI, and what is MDA's plan moving
    forward?
        Lieutenant General Greaves. The High Altitude Long Endurance (HALE)
    unmanned aircraft is an essential component for the Missile Defense
    Agency (MDA) to achieve a viable Boost Phase Intercept (BPI)
    capability. Ten contractors responded to the HALE Request for
    Information (RFI) with 26 different concepts varying from near-term
    concepts providing modest performance improvements to far-term
    platforms meeting MDA's objective BPI performance requirements for
    altitude, payload and endurance. The RFI responses provided MDA several
    potential paths forward with varying degrees of cost, schedule and
    technical risk. MDA is using the results to inform both BPI planning
    and laser scaling size, weight and power requirements for mid and far-
    term potential capabilities. The next step is for MDA to solicit HALE
    concept designs from industry through a Broad Agency Announcement
    (BAA). The schedule for this effort is under development.
                                 laser scaling
        7. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General Greaves, the MDA's unfunded
    priorities this year include Laser Scaling in order to continue
    research and development of three separate laser scaling efforts with
    the goal of demonstrating a 500 kilowatt (kW) laser by 2022 and a best
    of breed 1 Megawatt (MW) laser capability by 2024. Can you update the
    committee on the competing laser scaling efforts underway today?
        Lieutenant General Greaves. MDA continues to fund Diode Pumped
    Alkali Laser (DPAL) and Fiber Combining Laser (FCL) technologies at
    Lawrence Livermore National laboratory and MIT Lincoln Laboratory
    respectively. Both technologies have the potential to meet missile
    defense laser power, efficiency, beam quality and weight requirements.
    Both are demonstrating 30 kilowatt-class compact systems with excellent
    beam quality this year. The Agency is also interested in a third
    technology, Distributed Gain Laser (DGL). Initially this DARPA funded,
    General Atomics developed approach is currently operating at higher
    power levels with MDA funding the beam quality improvements.

        8. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General Greaves, is there value in
    having three separate laser scaling efforts, or should we be
    concentrating our resources on two competing lines of effort?
        Lieutenant General Greaves. Yes, there is value to funding three
    separate laser scaling efforts. Each laser uses a distinct technology
    approach and each approach has unique benefits and different technical
    risks. The DPAL shorter wavelength benefits missile defense, fiber
    lasers have high intrinsic beam quality and DGL's are ahead on power
    scaling but have beam quality risks. MDA's combination of requirements
    is stressing. Parallel demonstrations, which incrementally increase
    power while demonstrating high efficiency and excellent beam quality,
    increase confidence in reaching the missile defense laser requirements
    because the risks along the three paths are different. Each laser
    scaling demonstration activity could also spin off significant
    technology advances for multiple DOD missions.
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
                    transparency in missile defense testing
        9. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Greaves, according to an
    article that was published last month, you discussed plans to change
    how you report Missile Defense Agency testing plans to the public.
    According to this article, you previously provided the name of the
    planned test event, the objective of the test, and a three-month window
    during which the test would take place. But last month you told Inside
    Defense that you would no longer release that information because of
    ``the need to safeguard critical defense information.''
        What has changed in the threat picture that makes it necessary to
    withhold this information?
        Lieutenant General Greaves. [Deleted.]

        10. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Greaves, what is the
    military benefit of withholding basic test information--like the high-
    level objectives or the season in which a test will take place--from
    independent observers?
        Lieutenant General Greaves. [Deleted.]

        11. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Greaves, understanding we
    cannot hide these tests because they can be seen from space, isn't
    there some deterrence value in letting our adversaries know that we are
    actively working to improve our missile defense systems? Please explain
    your view.
        Lieutenant General Greaves. [Deleted.]
                         homeland defense radar--hawaii
        12. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Greaves, in May 2017, the
    Government Accountability Office put out a report on the Missile
    Defense Agency's progress in achieving its acquisition goals and
    objectives. The report praises MDA for using ``best practices'' and ``a
    sound business case'' in developing its next generation of
    capabilities. The report also found that MDA's process ``lacks . . .
    sufficient input from Department of Defense components.'' Specifically,
    GAO said that by not consulting more with the Army, Navy, Air Force and
    Marines, MDA risks investing in ``solutions that are unnecessary,
    insufficient, or not a priority.'' GAO said that multiple DOD officials
    warned that MDA was making ``trade-offs [that] compromise performance
    and reliability, potentially resulting in the warfighter receiving
    capabilities that are insufficient to defeat the threat.''
        How is MDA working with the military services to ensure that we get
    systems that meet their needs, and that we don't end up with multiple
    systems with similar requirements and mission sets?
        Lieutenant General Greaves. MDA works collaboratively with the
    military services to meet their requirements and prevent duplication of
    effort. MDA receives feedback and priorities through the United States
    Strategic Command-Approved Warfighter Involvement Process. In addition,
    MDA leadership coordinates and communicates with the Services through
    the Missile Defense Executive Board and Board of Directors meetings,
    which are held quarterly with the Army, Navy, and Air Force to review
    development activities for new Ballistic Missile Defense System
    systems, including the HDR-H and HDR-P. Both radars were requested by
    United States Pacific Command and United States Northern Command
    leadership to fill capability gaps identified in the Global Sensors
    Analysis of Alternatives, which was completed in 2016. MDA has engaged
    with the Air Force in the early planning stages for both radars, to
    include the ability to support other mission sets such as space
    situational awareness, and is working with the Department to have a
    lead Service designated.

        13. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Greaves, the MDA is
    currently in the process of acquiring a new discrimination radar for
    Hawaii and Japan, called the Homeland Defense Radar. I recently sent
    you a letter about MDA's acquisition strategy for this radar and others
    in the Pacific. Are you willing to come brief me on your acquisition
    strategy for additional radars in the region?
        Lieutenant General Greaves. Yes. We would welcome the opportunity
    to brief you on the Homeland Defense Radar acquisition strategy.

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2019 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                           WEDNESDAY, APRIL 11, 2018

                                   U.S. Senate,
                      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

              U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY, PROGRAMS, AND STRATEGY

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:32 p.m. in
    Room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Deb
    Fischer
    presiding.
        Members present: Senators Fischer, Cotton, Sullivan,
    Donnelly, Warren, and Peters.

                OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DEB FISCHER

        Senator Fischer. The hearing will come to order.
        The subcommittee meets today to receive testimony on United
    States nuclear weapons policy, programs, and strategy in review
    of the Administration's fiscal year 2019 budget request.
        I thank the witnesses for being with us today.
        General Rand and Admiral Benedict, this will likely be the
    final time you appear before this subcommittee. Congratulations
    to you both on your upcoming retirements. We've enjoyed working
    with you and benefitted from your testimony these past years.
    This Nation owes you both a deep debt of gratitude for your
    four decades of military service. Gentlemen, I thank you.
        [Applause.]
        Senator Fischer. Secretary Roberts and Dr. Soofer, thank
    you for joining us today. We look forward to hearing from both
    of you on how the budget supports the policies described in the
    Administration's Nuclear Posture Review, as well as the broader
    actions being taken to implement the NPR [Nuclear Posture
    Review].
        I also want to compliment both of you for your work on the
    NPR. Since its release, critics have made a number of claims
    about its contents ranging from allegations that it lowers the
    threshold for nuclear use by proposing the employment of
    nuclear weapons in response to cyber attacks, to assertions
    that it initiates a new global arms race. Over the hearings and
    classified briefings we have held this year, we have explored
    many of these criticisms and often found that the truth is far
    less dramatic.
        Instead, the 2018 NPR continues many of the policies
    established in previous NPRs and plans put in place by the
    Obama Administration, such as the modernization of our nuclear
    forces. In the areas where it calls for change, such as the
    introduction of two supplemental systems, the NPR makes a clear
    case that the threats to our Nation have changed over the last
    10 years and our Nation's deterrence posture must adapt
    accordingly.
        Dr. Soofer, we look forward to hearing more on this topic
    from you, sir.
        Again, I thank the panel for being with us today. We look
    forward to your comments and to your full statements, and those
    full statements will be made part of the record.
        With that, I would like to recognize the Ranking Member,
    Senator Donnelly, for any opening remarks that he would like to
    make.
        Senator?

                   STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOE DONNELLY

        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thanks for
    holding today's hearing, and to our witnesses for being here.
        Let me start out, as our Chair did, by noting that this
    will be the last time we have testimony from two friends of the
    subcommittee: General Robin Rand, the Commander of Air Force
    Global Strike Command, having served in the Air Force for 44
    years--amazing, thank you so much--and Vice Admiral Terry
    Benedict, the Director of the Navy Strategic Systems Program,
    having served 41 years in the United States Navy. The Admiral
    said 41 years in the Navy is equivalent to 44 years in the Air
    Force.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Donnelly. That's a joke, for the record.
        Both of you came to your leadership positions when our DOD
    [Department of Defense] nuclear program was undergoing great
    change and attention, and both of you, in my opinion, have been
    an amazing credit to the airmen and seamen who perform our
    nuclear deterrence mission 24/7, 365 days a year. I want to
    thank you for your service and wish you the best.
        Today's hearing is focused on DOD's nuclear weapons policy
    for fiscal year 2019. If we include the full cost of the B-21
    bomber, the Department will be requesting about $22.1 billion
    for nuclear modernization and operations, or, as Dr. Soofer
    likes to say, about 3 percent of the fiscal year 2019 DOD
    budget. We are told in peak years it will rise to about 6 to 7
    percent.
        That 6 to 7 percent deters a threat that is existential to
    our homeland, and our job in Congress is to ensure those
    dollars are well spent. It's in that regard that I'll ask
    questions on programs and operations for fiscal year 2019.
        Also of interest is the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. It has
    many features similar to the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review and
    retains the same negative use assurance in that we will not use
    nuclear weapons against nations in good standing with the
    Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty but reserve the right to do so
    under extreme circumstances. It keeps our commitment to the
    Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and to nonproliferation in
    general but recognizes the changed threat environment as
    compared to 2010.
        Of interest will be the proposal for two supplemental
    systems, one a low-yield submarine-launched ballistic missile,
    and the other the bringing back of a sea-launched cruise
    missile which was dropped in the 2010 NPR as it was not
    maintained in storage stateside. My understanding is this
    action upset Japan and South Korea, so that additional aspect
    needs to be taken into account when we consider this proposal,
    along with the programmatic and policy, force structure, and
    budget impacts.
        With that, let me thank everyone for coming today, and
    thank you, Madam Chair, for holding this hearing.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Donnelly.
        With that, I would ask for opening comments by members of
    the panel. My apologies.
        Secretary Roberts?

     STATEMENT OF HONORABLE GUY B. ROBERTS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
     DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS

        Secretary Roberts. Thank you, Chairman Fischer, Ranking
    Member Donnelly. Thank you for this opportunity again to
    testify before you today on the fiscal year 2019 budget request
    for nuclear forces. I'm pleased to join Vice Admiral Terry
    Benedict, General Robin Rand, and Dr. Soofer to discuss one of
    the Department of Defense's highest priorities.
        As the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear,
    Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs and the Staff
    Director for the Nuclear Weapons Council, I oversee the
    Department's efforts to ensure the U.S. nuclear deterrent is
    safe, secure, ready, and effective, developing and sustaining
    capabilities to counter weapons of mass destruction threats,
    effects, and proliferation, and ensure DOD compliance with
    nuclear, chemical, and biological treaties and agreements.
        Since the Cold War, the U.S. has reduced its nuclear
    stockpile by over 85 percent and deployed no new nuclear
    capabilities. Meanwhile, our adversaries have modernized their
    weapons systems and developed new capabilities while reducing
    transparency. With the return of Great Power competition and
    emerging nuclear threats, it is important to ensure our
    Nation's nuclear stockpile and infrastructure are prepared to
    provide a credible, flexible, ready, and technologically
    advanced deterrent that is resilient to technical and
    geopolitical change. The ability to effectively deter threats
    to our Nation's security relies on a diverse nuclear force with
    the flexibility to deliver tailored effects quickly and
    credibly. We now face a challenging task to counter and deter a
    wide range of current and emerging threats in an environment of
    increased uncertainty and risk. We must prepare to deploy a
    tailored and flexible nuclear deterrent as we face modern
    challenges and hedge against an uncertain future.
        Over the past several decades, our nuclear weapons
    infrastructure has suffered the ravages of time and a lack of a
    comprehensive investment. Many of the specialized capabilities
    required for stockpile work have atrophied or become obsolete.
        Our effort to reestablish our production capabilities at
    sufficient rates must be a national priority. As an integrated
    enterprise, we are focused on developing and executing a plan
    to meet stockpile needs and establish a path forward to
    manufacturing critical materials and components to meet future
    deterrent requirements.
        While our nuclear triad forms the core of our deterrent, it
    is further strengthened by denying any potential adversary the
    perceived benefits of nuclear use. By ensuring that United
    States Forces and infrastructure are able to survive and
    operate through nuclear attack, we remove the incentive an
    adversary may have to launch such an attack in the first place.
    They demonstrate that aggression of any kind is not a rational
    option.
        Our efforts to counter nuclear threats and respond to post-
    detonation scenarios, as well as supporting nuclear
    nonproliferation efforts, allow for improved responsiveness in-
    theater and flexibility for U.S. Forces to safeguard our
    weapons systems, delivery platforms, and personnel overseas.
        Our fiscal year 2019 budget request is critically important
    for sustaining and revitalizing the Nation's nuclear deterrent
    in all its forms. It includes funding for sustaining and
    modernizing our nuclear forces and addressing military
    requirements in a complex and changing security environment.
        We ask that you support both the Department of Defense and
    Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration's
    budget request as we continue to work closely to deter
    potential adversaries, meet emerging threats, assure our
    allies, and hedge against an uncertain future. I thank you very
    much for the committee's time, support, and leadership. Thank
    you.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary Roberts follows:]

                 Prepared Statement by Secretary Guy B. Roberts
        Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Donnelly, and distinguished
    members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify
    before you today on the fiscal year (FY) 2019 budget request for
    nuclear forces. I am pleased to join Gen Robin Rand, VADM Terry
    Benedict, and Dr. Robert Soofer to discuss one of the Department of
    Defense's (DOD) highest priorities: ensuring that the Nation has a
    flexible, adaptable, and resilient nuclear deterrent in an increasingly
    complex and demanding security environment.
        As the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and
    Biological Defense Programs and the Staff Director of the Nuclear
    Weapons Council (NWC), I work directly for the Under Secretary of
    Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (A&S), and advise the
    Department's senior leadership on nuclear matters. The Under Secretary
    leads the Department's efforts to acquire nuclear weapons delivery, and
    command and control systems required to meet the operational needs of
    our Armed Forces. The Under Secretary also chairs the NWC, a DOD and
    Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration
    (NNSA) governance body established to facilitate cooperation and
    coordination, reach consensus, and establish agreed-upon priorities as
    the Departments fulfill their shared responsibilities for United States
    nuclear weapons stockpile management. The NWC is deeply involved in
    balancing the need to maintain our existing nuclear weapons stockpile
    while modernizing that stockpile to ensure the long-term credibility
    and effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent, updating aging
    infrastructure, and preserving the human capital that underpins our
    capability to be a nuclear weapons state.
        Global threat conditions have worsened markedly since the 2010
    Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), and the United States and our allies now
    face an unprecedented range of threats, requiring a diverse set of
    nuclear capabilities to maintain a credible deterrent. The 2018 NPR
    tasks DOD and DOE/NNSA with ensuring the Nation is prepared to support
    a tailored and flexible nuclear deterrent to face modern challenges and
    to hedge against an uncertain future.
        Our budget request demonstrates the Department's commitment to
    strengthening and modernizing the nuclear Triad and revitalizing the
    aging infrastructure that supports the nuclear security enterprise.
    Today, I will summarize the DOD perspectives on, and priorities for,
    warhead life extension, nuclear weapon delivery systems modernization
    and replacement, nuclear enterprise infrastructure modernization,
    stockpile sustainment, nuclear command and control, and communications
    (NC3), allied engagements specifically with NATO and in the Asia-
    Pacific region, as well as the challenges we face today and tomorrow to
    address emerging threats and ensuring a credible nuclear deterrent.
    While estimates of the cost to sustain and replace United States
    nuclear capabilities vary, according to our analysis, nuclear spending
    will reach a peak of approximately 6.4 percent of the overall DOD
    budget by the late 2020s, which compares favorably to the 10.6 percent
    of the DOD budget required during the 1980s and 17.1 percent in the
    1960s. To ensure the continued credibility and reliability of our
    nuclear deterrent in an increasingly complicated and challenging world,
    it is essential that Congress support the President's fiscal year 2019
    budget request for nuclear deterrence activities.
                         nuclear enterprise challenges
        Since the height of the Cold War, the United States has reduced the
    nuclear stockpile by over 85 percent and deployed no new nuclear
    capabilities. Meanwhile, Russia has modernized its non-strategic and
    strategic systems and developed new capabilities to bolster its nuclear
    Triad while instituting a military doctrine predicated on an ``escalate
    to de-escalate'' strategy. China has pursued new capabilities by
    modernizing and expanding its nuclear forces, developing and deploying
    new ground-based and sea-based nuclear delivery vehicles, all while
    displaying a lack of transparency in its nuclear force posture.
    Finally, North Korea's rapid progress with its nuclear weapons and
    missile programs also poses a significant security challenge.
        With the return of Great Power competition and emerging nuclear
    threats, it is important, now more than ever, to ensure our Nation's
    nuclear stockpile, and infrastructure are prepared to provide a
    credible, flexible, ready, and technologically advanced deterrent for
    United States, allies, and partner security. To this end, the NWC
    regularly convenes to ensure synchronization between the Departments of
    Defense and Energy on the vision, strategy, and execution of nuclear
    programs. Specifically, the Council focuses its attention on nuclear
    enterprise challenges in four vital areas. First, the DOD must address
    the challenges of sustaining and modernizing all parts of our nuclear
    force structure, ensuring that the Nation's nuclear weapons sustainment
    and delivery system modernization programs are funded and aligned.
    Second, we must remain steadfast in our commitment to sustain and
    modernize our aging infrastructure, which provides materials,
    components, and testing facilities essential to our nuclear deterrent.
    Third, we must maintain and strengthen our ability to extend the lives
    of aging warheads, as the majority of today's nuclear weapons and
    delivery systems have surpassed their initial design life. This is
    accomplished through a robust program of science-based stockpile
    stewardship, as well as comprehensive component reuse, refurbishment,
    and replacement, while we ensure alignment with existing and future
    delivery systems. Fourth, we must continuously improve the rigorous
    science and engineering tools required to assess the safety and
    effectiveness of our aging nuclear weapons stockpile.
        One of our significant internal challenges has been our lack of
    development of new capabilities to address the changing threat. We must
    be capable of developing and deploying new capabilities, when
    necessary, to deter adversaries, assure allies, achieve United States
    objectives if deterrence fails, and to hedge against uncertainty. Our
    future stockpile must be flexible, adaptable, and resilient to
    technological and geopolitical change.
                           dod stockpile requirements
        ``The United States will sustain a nuclear force structure that
    meets our current needs and addresses unanticipated risks. The United
    States does not need to match the nuclear arsenals of other powers, but
    we must sustain a stockpile that can deter adversaries, assure allies
    and partners, and achieve U.S. objectives if deterrence fails.''
    - (National Security Strategy, page 30)

        Our nuclear deterrent is based on the capability to maintain and
    modernize our nuclear stockpile. To support this and remain consistent
    with past efforts, reflective of the priorities identified in the 2018
    NPR, the NWC aligns warhead plans and infrastructure needs with
    delivery system modernization and replacement efforts.
        We must sustain our current stockpile in order to avoid gaps in
    fulfilling military requirements, while developing the expanded
    capabilities identified in the 2018 NPR. NNSA's science-based Stockpile
    Stewardship Program has ensured confidence in the reliability of the
    current nuclear stockpile without nuclear explosive testing. The
    Stockpile Stewardship Program, composed of research, development, test,
    and evaluation (RDT&E) facilities and personnel, enables the
    surveillance and assessment of the stockpile's condition by identifying
    anomalies, evaluating impacts of anomalies on warhead performance, and
    implementing solutions.
        To address supplemental capabilities, the NWC will coordinate the
    near-term plans to modify a small number of existing submarine-launched
    ballistic missile (SLBM) warheads to provide a prompt low-yield option,
    and in the longer term, to pursue a modern nuclear-armed sea-launched
    cruise missile (SLCM). The low-yield SLBM warhead and SLCM will provide
    additional diversity in platforms, range, and survivability, as well as
    a valuable hedge against future nuclear ``break out'' scenarios,
    without impacting our obligations under bilateral nuclear arms control
    agreements, such as the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) and New
    START treaties.
                    revitalizing the nuclear infrastructure
        ``Our nuclear deterrent is nearing a crossroads. To date, we have
    preserved this
    deterrent by extending the lifespan of legacy nuclear forces and
    infrastructure-in many cases for decades beyond what was originally
    intended. But these systems will not remain viable indefinitely. In
    fact, we are now at a point where we must concurrently modernize the
    entire nuclear triad and the infrastructure that enables its
    effectiveness.''
    - Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Paul Selva, 2017

        The current global threat environment and an uncertain future now
    necessitate a national commitment to maintain modern and effective
    nuclear forces, as well as the infrastructure needed to support them.
    Over the past several decades, our nuclear weapons infrastructure has
    suffered the ravages of time and a lack of comprehensive investment.
    Our nuclear enterprise infrastructure challenges are two-fold: 1)
    working to achieve an infrastructure more responsive to nuclear
    deterrent requirements, and 2) addressing aged, end-of-life facilities
    maintenance, recapitalization, and replacement. Many of the specialized
    capabilities required for stockpile work have atrophied or become
    obsolete. As a result, the dedicated personnel at our national security
    laboratories and production facilities have not been able to process or
    manufacture many of the required strategic materials and critical
    components in quantities necessary to sustain our stockpile.
        Our effort to re-establish our production capabilities at
    sufficient rates must be a national priority. The NWC is focused
    specifically on plutonium, uranium, lithium, and tritium capabilities,
    as well as radiation-hardened microelectronics manufacturing
    capabilities needed to support the current and future nuclear weapons
    stockpile. The Department of Defense reinforces NNSA's commitment to
    develop a responsive and productive strategic materials plan to meet
    stockpile needs and establish a path forward to manufacturing critical
    materials to meet future deterrent requirements.
        Through the Stockpile Responsiveness Program (SRP), established by
    Congress with bipartisan support, NNSA sustains the nuclear weapons
    design and development skills needed by its workforce to address
    evolving threats and the potential for technological surprise. The SRP
    expands opportunities for scientists and engineers to advance such
    skills, which have not been fully developed or exercised in the current
    programs of warhead assessment, maintenance, and life extension.
    Maintaining these skills is an important element of the U.S. hedging
    strategy in order to provide timely availability of capabilities, if
    needed to meet changes in the security environment.
        A key element in establishing a robust production capability is
    attracting top talent. Talent is being lost to non-defense industries
    due to unacceptable, extended delays in the security clearance process.
    Personnel shortages are contributing to national security risks as
    positions go unfilled and mission performance is comprised. Unfilled
    positions in the nuclear enterprise due to security clearance process
    delays will have an impact on our ability to meet our goals. This is a
    serious national security issue with strategic implications. .
        An assured, reliable, and resilient NC3 system that operates across
    the full spectrum of conflict is essential in today's complex security
    environment. As we modernize our nuclear forces, we must also modernize
    our NC3 systems to enhance deterrence. An effective NC3 architecture
    must support a tailored deterrence strategy for each potential
    adversary, allowing for flexible response options to various
    provocations, and enabling adjustments to our deterrent posture over
    time to face emerging threats. Robust NC3 ensures the United States
    receives indications and warning in a timely manner, and provides
    decision-makers with the necessary time to make informed decisions and
    employ our forces in extreme circumstances.
                        dod delivery system requirements
        The ability to effectively deter threats to our Nation's security
    relies on maintaining a nuclear force with a diverse, flexible range of
    yield and delivery modes that are ready, capable, and credible. While
    the delivery systems underlying our nuclear triad remain effective
    today, the Department is entering a period when all legs of the triad,
    to include delivery platforms, will require significant modernization
    or replacement to sustain these capabilities. Since most of the
    Nation's nuclear deterrence delivery systems were built in the 1980s or
    earlier, they will begin to age out or face decreasing effectiveness by
    the mid-2020s. As the 2018 NPR reaffirms, we must recapitalize our
    legacy nuclear deterrence forces now and continue the modernization
    program initiated during the previous Administration.
        To this end, the fiscal year 2019 budget request funds all critical
    DOD nuclear modernization requirements, ensuring that modern
    replacements will be available before the our legacy systems reach the
    end of their sustainability. DOD continues to pursue a robust plan for
    recapitalizing ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), submarine-launched
    ballistic missiles (SLBMs), intercontinental ballistic missiles
    (ICBMs), air-launched cruise missiles, and nuclear-capable heavy
    bombers and their associated gravity bombs that comprise our strategic
    nuclear deterrent. Our budget request is consistent with our plans to
    ensure that current nuclear delivery systems will be sustained, and the
    weapons and delivery platforms modernization and replacement programs
    are integrated, executable and on-schedule to avoid capability gaps.
        Modernization and replacement programs will require increased
    investment over current levels for next 15 years or more. We are taking
    steps to control the costs of these efforts, such as ensuring weapon
    system component commonality to a practical extent and close alignment
    between DOD delivery systems and NNSA warhead programs. We will
    continue to monitor the progress of both the weapons and platform
    programs to ensure the long-term viability of the nuclear deterrent.
                    ally engagements and extended deterrence
        Effective deterrence is the foundation for effective assurance. Our
    ability to continue assuring allies depends on the credibility of our
    nuclear capability and extended deterrence. As such, we must develop
    the necessary infrastructure, capabilities, and political agreements,
    to address nuclear threats or nuclear use now and in the future.
        In addition to our deterrence and assurance posture in Europe, our
    nuclear forces provide a worldwide deterrent posture. The United States
    will maintain a spectrum of capabilities to ensure that no adversary
    perceives an advantage in nuclear escalation. These capabilities run
    the full spectrum of options to assure our allies in both Europe and
    the Pacific.
        The United States must and will continue to maintain a credible
    forward deployed nuclear deterrent capability. Together with our allies
    in Europe and the Pacific, maintaining a strong, cohesive alliance is
    the most effective way of deterring aggression from potential
    adversaries and promoting peace throughout the world. This posture
    demonstrated that aggression of any kind is not a rational option.
    Essential to these objectives is ensuring that upgrades and
    replacements for our legacy forward-deployed dual capable aircraft
    (DCA) and associated B61 gravity bombs remain capable of convincing our
    adversaries that prospective benefits of aggression are outweighed by
    the consequences.
        As we prepare for the modernization of nuclear weapons that will
    later be deployed within the European theater, we have partnered with
    our allies and with United States European Command to conduct an
    exercise that will ensure both the United States and the host nation
    can respond to high consequence/low probability scenarios. This
    exercise, to be conducted later this year, will guarantee our readiness
    as a joint and interagency emergency response force and will set the
    stage for future ``whole-of-government'' events.
        From a modernization perspective, with the B61-12 life extension
    program on schedule, we are working with our allies in planning the
    upcoming deployment of this enhanced capability. We continue to monitor
    the Air Force's progress on nuclear certification of the F-35 and look
    forward to what this 5th generation fighter will do to solidify our DCA
    capabilities for the United States and NATO.
        At the NATO High Level Group, for which I serve as the Vice
    Chairman for Safety, Security, and Survivability, we've had the
    opportunity to interact with our European counterparts and have
    informed them of the various advancements being made within the nuclear
    security arena. We continue to move with alacrity on our planned
    Weapons Storage and Security System life extension program, which
    furthers our ability to secure our nuclear assets well into the future.
    Although moving cautiously to ensure proper technology maturation, we
    continue to make progress on fielding additional security technologies
    and capabilities with the assistance of NATO, which will allow both
    United States and host nation security forces to keep pace with
    emerging and asymmetric threats. Since 2000, NATO has invested over
    $271 million dollars in security upgrades and another security
    capability package was approved in December 2017.
                          nuclear security and safety
        In additional to modernizing our nuclear deterrence and providing
    assurance to our allies and partners, we continue efforts to create a
    more cooperative and collaborative physical security environment for
    our nuclear facilities at home and overseas. We continuously review our
    policies ensuring our nuclear deterrent remains safe, secure, and
    effective in a changing security environment, while allowing for
    flexibility in the implementation by the Services and DOD components.
    Part of our responsibility is to oversee the Mighty Guardian series of
    physical security exercises designed to test DOD policy against
    evolving threats. These threats can be both foreign and domestic and
    include evaluating new and emerging technologies, such as unmanned
    systems. We recently concluded an exercise overseas and are in the
    final planning phases of executing another exercise here within the
    United States. To date, we have executed 18 exercises, all of which
    have resulted in enhancing our security posture through the years.
        Further, we invest approximately $40 million per year in both
    nuclear and conventional physical security efforts through the Physical
    Security Enterprise and Analysis Group. Our office works with the
    Military Departments and the interagency to identify and eliminate gaps
    in our ability to detect, delay, deny, defeat, and ultimately deter
    threats to our vital assets.
                             nuclear survivability
        While our nuclear triad forms the core of our deterrent, it is
    further strengthened by denying any potential adversary the perceived
    benefits of nuclear use. By ensuring that United States Forces and
    infrastructure are able to survive and operate through nuclear attack,
    we remove the incentive an adversary may have to launch such an attack
    in the first place. To that end, we are working to improve the
    survivability of United States nuclear and conventional systems to
    nuclear effects, including high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (EMP).
    In particular, we are working with Joint Staff to improve how we
    address nuclear survivability beginning early in the acquisition
    process, for example the hardening of the Marine Corps' new
    Presidential helicopter. We are beginning to recapitalize our test and
    evaluation capabilities as hardened systems are developed and fielded.
    In addition, we will support the efforts of the EMP Commission
    established by Congress last year to assess the threat of EMP attacks
    on the United States, and I look forward to its findings and
    recommendations.
                           countering nuclear threats
        While maintaining a credible national and extended deterrent is our
    top priority, we should be mindful not to ignore the importance of
    countering potential threats from non-state actors. Combatting weapons
    of mass destruction (WMD) requires a strategy that leverages a wide
    range of activities and capabilities integrated through a multilayered
    approach. The United States strives to prevent malicious actors from
    obtaining nuclear weapons or weapons-usable materials, technology, and
    expertise; counter non-state actor's efforts to acquire, transfer, or
    employ these assets; and respond to nuclear incidents, by locating and
    disabling a nuclear device or managing the consequences of a nuclear
    detonation both on the battlefield and in a civil setting.
        The fiscal year 2019 budget request for Countering Nuclear Threats
    (CNT) continues to focus on interoperability and survivability, with
    programs to provide the Services with radiation-hardened, common
    equipment, including capabilities for rapid post-detonation deployment.
    These systems support a variety of missions, including recovery of
    material after a nuclear weapons accident, contamination avoidance on
    the nuclear battlefield, decontamination verification both on the
    nuclear battlefield and in support of consequence management missions,
    as well as verification that platforms and materiel meet radiological
    release criteria.
        In addition, the Department of Defense is working with its
    interagency partners (NNSA, FBI, and DHS) and the national security
    laboratories on technical nuclear forensics (TNF) to rapidly collect
    and analyze samples for attribution in a nuclear event. This
    contributes to our deterrent strategy and has application beyond
    responding to a nuclear detonation, as it is invaluable to efforts such
    as treaty monitoring and understanding baseline environmental
    conditions.
        As part of our efforts to deter future nuclear use, the United
    States remains deeply committed to nuclear nonproliferation efforts.
    Early warning of nuclear proliferation is a critical first step in our
    overall strategy. To facilitate this, we support partner nation
    capability building to improve responsiveness in theater and return
    flexibility to United States Forces in order to safeguard our weapons
    systems, delivery platforms, and personnel overseas.
                                   conclusion
        As articulated in the 2018 NPR and National Defense Strategy, the
    United States now faces a more diverse and complex nuclear threat
    environment than ever before. In order to build a more lethal,
    resilient, ready, and rapidly innovating force in response to these
    emergent threats, we must continue to field a strong nuclear deterrent
    supported by an agile and responsive infrastructure, including a well-
    trained and sufficiently exercised nuclear enterprise workforce,
    undiminished by security clearance delays.
        The President's Fiscal Year 2019 Budget Request supports our
    nuclear force strategy as our program of record evolves. It includes
    funding for sustaining and modernizing our nuclear forces, and
    addressing military requirements in a complex and changing security
    environment to deter potential adversaries and threats, assure allies,
    and hedges against an uncertain future. The Department of Defense
    remains committed to maintaining its close and vital partnerships with
    DOE/NNSA and Congress in meeting the Nation's fundamental security
    needs. In closing, we respectfully ask that you support the President's
    fiscal year 2019 nuclear forces' budget request.

        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
        Dr. Soofer?

        STATEMENT OF ROBERT M. SOOFER, Ph.D., DEPUTY ASSISTANT
      SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR AND MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY

        Dr. Soofer. Thank you. Madam Chair, Ranking Member
    Donnelly, I thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
    With your permission, I'd like to submit a longer statement for
    the record and make a few opening remarks. Thank you.
        Secretary Mattis, Under Secretary Rood, and General Selva
    have previously briefed the full committee on the 2018 Nuclear
    Posture Review, so I won't go into any great detail today.
    However, I would like to take a moment to summarize a few key
    points based on feedback we received from members of Congress,
    as well as our allies.
        First, the findings and recommendations of the 2018 Nuclear
    Posture Review are well grounded in what has been a traditional
    bipartisan approach to nuclear policy, summarized by Secretary
    Mattis in his public remarks following the February meeting of
    NATO's [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] Nuclear Planning
    Group.
        ``The U.S. approach to nuclear deterrence,'' he said,
    ``embraces two co-equal principles: first, ensuring a safe,
    secure, and effective nuclear deterrent; and second, working
    wherever possible for nuclear nonproliferation and arms control
    whenever it advances stability and security for us and our
    allies. Nuclear deterrence and efforts to foreclose
    proliferation and reduce the number of nuclear weapons are not
    mutually exclusive.''
        Second, reflecting the priority afforded nuclear
    deterrence, the fiscal year 2019 budget request includes full
    funding for Department of Defense nuclear programs and is meant
    to maintain the nuclear modernization plans approved by
    Congress over the past years.
        Third, despite what you may have seen in the press, our
    nuclear posture does not increase the circumstances under which
    our Nation would contemplate the use of nuclear weapons, nor do
    we increase reliance on nuclear weapons. Rather, we maintain
    the longstanding policy that ``the United States would employ
    nuclear weapons only in extreme circumstances to defend the
    vital interests of the United States, allies, and partners.''
    This recognizes the enduring role for nuclear weapons in
    deterring nuclear and conventional aggression and assuring
    allies, while hedging against an unpredictable security
    environment.
        Fourth, the recommendation to pursue two supplemental
    capabilities to the existing nuclear force program of record
    will not increase the likelihood of nuclear war or stimulate an
    arms race. These recommendations include in the near term
    modifying a small number of existing submarine-launched
    ballistic missile warheads to lower their explosive yield, and
    in the mid-to-longer term pursuing a nuclear sea-launched
    cruise missile, a capability that existed in our arsenal until
    it was retired early in the prior administration when the
    security environment seemed more benign. Both these
    capabilities are in response to Russian nuclear doctrine and
    new nuclear capabilities that must be viewed in the broader
    context of the long-term competition between the United States
    and Russia identified in the 2018 National Defense Strategy.
        These capabilities are also applicable to what appears to
    be China's growing nuclear forces that can threaten the United
    States and its allies in the Indo-Pacific region.
        The supplemental capabilities are needed to ensure that
    Russian and Chinese leadership do not mistakenly conclude they
    could achieve some advantage by initiating a limited first use
    of nuclear weapons, potentially including low-yield weapons.
    It's not a radical departure from previous policy. It does not
    signify a shift to nuclear warfighting. Rather, it reinforces
    the imperative expressed by the previous administration to
    retain a range of nuclear capabilities in explosive power and
    methods of delivery to strengthen deterrence in a wide range of
    scenarios, including an adversary's calibrated nuclear
    escalation.
        These two additional capabilities strengthen the
    credibility of our declaratory policy to counter any nuclear
    attack under any circumstance, which in turn raises the nuclear
    threshold and strengthens deterrence by signaling to
    adversaries that they have nothing to gain through limited
    strikes and everything to lose.
        Because these capabilities are consistent with existing
    arms control treaties and do not threaten Russian nuclear
    retaliatory forces, they should not stimulate an arms race.
    Rather, they could provide the means for addressing the growing
    disparity between Russia and the United States in nuclear
    forces not limited by existing nuclear treaties, a disparity
    that has been well recognized by Congress and that will
    continue to grow in the future unless we create some point of
    leverage.
        Fifth, throughout the Nuclear Posture Review we consulted
    extensively with allies and partners, and their reaction to the
    NPR has been positive. Asian and European allies recognize that
    the security environment has changed for the worse and requires
    an emphasis on nuclear deterrence even while we continue to
    pursue, where feasible, a balanced policy that combines
    effective deterrence with a broad-based effort to reduce
    nuclear risks through global nonproliferation initiatives and a
    responsible program of arms control.
        Finally, I would add that, as noted by Secretary Mattis,
    the United States' commitment to arms control and nuclear
    nonproliferation remains strong, but arms control is not an end
    in itself and depends on the security environment and the
    participation of willing partners. Russia's significant non-
    compliance with the INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces]
    Treaty and buildup of nuclear weapons not limited under the New
    START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] Treaty calls into
    question its willingness to be a serious partner in arms
    control. The United States remains committed to strategic
    dialogue when conditions permit.
        I thank the committee for its strong bipartisan support of
    U.S. nuclear policies and modernization programs over the years
    and look forward to answering your questions. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Soofer follows:]

                    Prepared Statement by Dr. Robert Soofer
        Chairwoman Fischer, Ranking Member Donnelly, and distinguished
    Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on
    the President's Fiscal Year (FY) 2019 Budget Request for Nuclear Forces
    and Atomic Energy Defense Activities.
                       the changing strategic environment
        Today, the United States faces an increasingly complex global
    security environment, in which the central challenge to our prosperity
    and security is the reemergence of long-term strategic competition by
    revisionist powers in China and Russia. The 2017 National Security
    Strategy observes that Russia and China are asserting their global and
    regional influence and are fielding military capabilities designed to
    deny the United States' ability to project power and defend our allies
    and partners in Europe and Asia respectively.
        Long-term competition with China and Russia requires increased U.S
    and allied military investment because of the magnitude of the threats
    they pose today, and the potential that these threats will increase in
    the future. This is underscored in the 2018 National Defense Strategy,
    which asserts that we must also simultaneously strengthen our efforts
    to deter and counter the clear and present dangers posed by rogue
    regimes such as North Korea and Iran.
        The United States for years worked to reduce the role and number of
    nuclear weapons worldwide, but potential adversaries have done the
    opposite. Over the past decade, they have vigorously pursued the
    modernization of their existing nuclear forces and the development and
    fielding of new nuclear capabilities. In some cases, they deliberately
    elevated and expanded the prominence of nuclear weapons in their
    military strategies. Nuclear weapons are seen as a useful means of
    political coercion and a potential source of military advantage,
    especially when facing an opposing force with far greater potential at
    the conventional level of war. It is no surprise, therefore, that
    Russia, China and North Korea, in particular are modernizing and
    expanding their nuclear arsenals.
                               the nuclear threat
        The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) reflects DOD's strategic
    priority to maintain a safe, secure, survivable and effective nuclear
    deterrent. The NPR used a threat-based approach by examining the
    challenges posed by Russia, China, and other states' strategic
    policies, programs, and capabilities, particularly nuclear.
    Russia
        Russia is improving and expanding its nuclear capabilities with a
    large, diverse, and modern arsenal of strategic and non-strategic
    weapons. With non-strategic nuclear weapons numbering in the thousands,
    in addition to its strategic nuclear stockpile, Russia is widening the
    quantitative and qualitative gap between its nuclear arsenal and our
    own.
        Russia's nonstrategic nuclear weapons provide a flexible, usable
    adjunct to its conventional forces to prevent battlefield defeat.
    Russia is modernizing an active stockpile of up to 2,000 such weapons
    that can be deployed on ships, bombers and tactical aircraft, and with
    ground forces. This includes short-range ballistic missiles, air-to-
    surface missiles, gravity bombs, torpedoes, and depth charges. Russia
    is also deploying a nuclear ground-launched cruise missile in violation
    of the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. By contrast,
    NATO's nonstrategic nuclear posture relies upon a modest number of
    gravity bombs and dual-capable tactical aircraft, capabilities that are
    being modernized but not expanded in size.
        The asymmetry in nonstrategic nuclear weapons has always been a
    source of concern precisely because of the fear that it could
    contribute to regional deterrence instability. This is why we have
    consistently called for extending the bilateral arms control framework
    to include these forces. With equal consistency Russia has refused to
    consider these offers. Now, with its ongoing violation of the INF
    Treaty, Russia is poised to extend this asymmetry with the development,
    production, and fielding of a mobile ground-launched system that can
    quickly and reliably strike deep into NATO territory.
        In support of these capabilities, Russia's military doctrine
    emphasizes the coercive nature and military value of nuclear weapons.
    During its invasion and illegal annexation of Crimea, Russia raised the
    alert of its nuclear forces and issued veiled nuclear threats to warn
    against Western intervention. Russia has repeatedly in recent years
    brandished its nuclear sword against our NATO allies, while Russian
    President Putin issued this past July an edict that ``in conditions of
    a military conflict, demonstration of readiness and determination to
    use force by employment of a non-strategic nuclear weapon is an
    efficient deterrence factor.''
        This past month, NATO's Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg
    expressed, ``Our concern [is] that Moscow has clearly stated in their
    doctrine that they are prepared to use nuclear weapons in regional
    conflicts . . . We see the danger that Russia could gradually move from
    using conventional weapons to nuclear weapons.'' Russian military
    doctrine allows for use of nuclear weapons on a limited scale with the
    goal of protecting Russian strategic and operational gains in a local
    aggression and deterring an effective NATO response. Russian leaders
    might execute such a strategy if they believed that it was their best
    chance to terminate or freeze a conflict on favorable terms--and that
    NATO and the United States would hesitate to respond in kind because
    most available nuclear options carry a high risk of further, unintended
    escalation or could be defeated by Russia's growing anti-access/area
    denial capabilities (e.g., advanced integrated air defenses). This
    approach, of course, is as risky as it is reckless--but Russian leaders
    could conclude the risk is acceptable if the stakes for Russia were
    sufficiently high and that they enjoyed ``escalation advantage'' at the
    nonstrategic nuclear level.
        Our aim is to disabuse Russia of the notion that nuclear warfare is
    a viable option and to reinforce deterrence at all levels. We
    understand that the exact elements of Russia's nuclear doctrine are
    subject to public interpretation and debate--and that we cannot know
    with certainty what would trigger limited nuclear use against NATO. But
    given the stakes, it would not be responsible to base our policy on a
    benign reading of Moscow's intentions and how Russian leaders think
    about the nuclear threshold and the risks of escalation.
    China
        China is rapidly modernizing its strategic and non-strategic
    nuclear weapons as part of its efforts to prevent the United States
    from defending its allies and partners in the region. And, China
    continues to expand its nuclear capabilities in both quantity and
    quality. Since 2010, it has announced the development of or fielded new
    road-mobile and MIRV-capable ICBMs, theater-range ballistic missiles, a
    new SLBM, a new ballistic missile submarine, and the H-6K strategic
    bomber.
        China's ICBMs and SLBMs are capable of reaching the United States,
    and nuclear-armed, theater-range ballistic missiles are capable of
    reaching U.S. territory, allies, partners, forces and regional bases.
    China's rapid military modernization, growing and diversifying nuclear
    arsenal, and assertive approach to expanding its geopolitical power at
    the expense of the sovereignty of its neighbors undermine the stability
    of the Indo-Pacific region. Moreover, China's lack of transparency
    regarding the scope and scale of its nuclear modernization leaves the
    international community with concerns about its future intent.
    North Korea
        North Korea's continued pursuit of nuclear weapons, combined with
    frequent threats against the United States and our South Korean and
    Japanese allies, are a major challenge to peace and security in
    Northeast Asia and around the world. North Korea has dramatically
    increased its missile flight testing, including recent ICBM tests, and
    has conducted six nuclear tests since 2006. Just as concerning is North
    Korea's history of proliferating nuclear and missile technology.
    Iran
        Finally, Iran's continued efforts to destabilize its neighbors and
    support violent extremists undermine stability in the region. Iran's
    destabilizing regional actions, aggressive strategy, and development of
    increasingly longer-range missile capabilities calls into question its
    long-term commitment to foregoing nuclear weapons. Although Iran has
    agreed to constraints on its nuclear program in the Joint Comprehensive
    Plan of Action (JCPOA), it retains the technological capability and
    much of the capacity necessary to develop a nuclear weapon within one
    year of a decision to do so.
                          united states nuclear policy
        The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review reflects the Department of
    Defense's strategic priority to maintain a safe, secure, survivable and
    effective nuclear deterrent. The highest U.S. nuclear policy and
    strategy priority is to deter potential adversaries from nuclear attack
    of any scale against the United States or its allies. However,
    deterring nuclear attack is not the sole purpose of nuclear weapons.
    Given the diverse threats and profound uncertainties of the current and
    future threat environment, U.S. nuclear forces play the following
    critical roles in U.S. national security strategy. They contribute to
    the:
          Deterrence of nuclear and non-nuclear attack
          Assurance of allies and partners
          Achievement of U.S. objectives if deterrence fails
          Capacity to hedge against an uncertain future
        Effective U.S. deterrence of nuclear attack and non-nuclear
    strategic attack requires ensuring that potential adversaries do not
    miscalculate regarding the consequences of nuclear first use, either
    regionally or against the United States itself. They must understand
    that the costs far outweigh any perceived benefits from non-nuclear
    aggression or limited nuclear escalation.
        The requirements for effective deterrence vary given the need to
    address the unique perceptions, goals, interests, strengths,
    strategies, and vulnerabilities of different potential adversaries. The
    deterrence strategy effective against one potential adversary may not
    deter another. Consequently, the United States will apply a tailored
    approach to effectively deter across a spectrum of adversaries,
    threats, and contexts.
        Tailoring our deterrence strategy requires a diverse set of nuclear
    capabilities to provide the President the flexibility needed to address
    a spectrum of adversaries and threats and enable adjustments over time.
    Flexibility means having the appropriate range and mix of nuclear and
    other capabilities required to tailor deterrence strategies now and
    into the future.
        The United States has understood the value of flexibility for
    nuclear deterrence for six decades, but its importance is now magnified
    by the emerging diversity of nuclear and non-nuclear strategic threats
    and the dynamism and uncertainties of the security environment. This
    need for flexibility to tailor U.S. capabilities and strategies to meet
    future requirements and unanticipated developments runs contrary to a
    rigid, continuing policy of ``no new nuclear capabilities.''
        Potential adversaries do not stand still. On the contrary, they
    seek to identify and exploit weaknesses in U.S. capabilities and
    strategy. Thus, U.S. future force requirements for deterrence cannot
    prudently be considered fixed. The United States must be capable of
    developing and deploying new capabilities, if necessary, to deter,
    assure, or achieve U.S. objectives if deterrence fails, and hedge
    against uncertainty.
    Declaratory Policy
        U.S. nuclear declaratory policy is consistent with the 2010 NPR and
    states that ``the United States would employ nuclear weapons only in
    extreme circumstance to defend the vital interests of the United
    States, allies and partners.'' The 2018 NPR clarifies that the
    ``extreme circumstances'' that may lead the United States to consider
    nuclear use, include, but are not limited to: significant non-nuclear
    strategic attacks on U.S., allied, or partner civilian population or
    infrastructure; and significant non-nuclear strategic attacks on U.S.
    or allied nuclear forces, their command and control, or warning and
    attack assessment capabilities. This is not--as sometimes portrayed--an
    expansion of the circumstances under which the U.S. might consider the
    use of nuclear weapons, but rather a clarification intended to reduce
    the probability of adversary miscalculation.
        The 2018 NPR further states that ``The United States will not use
    or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states
    that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-
    proliferation obligations.''
                         united states nuclear posture
        The 2018 NPR confirms the findings of all previous NPRs that the
    diverse capabilities of the nuclear triad provide the flexibility and
    resilience needed for deterrence in the most cost-effective manner.
    Unfortunately, each leg of the triad is now operating far beyond its
    originally-planned service life. Consequently, we must not delay the
    recapitalization of the triad initiated by the previous Administration.
        The fiscal year 2019 budget request funds all critical Department
    of Defense (DOD) modernization requirements, helping to ensure that
    modern replacements will be available before the Nation's legacy
    systems reach the end of their extended service lives. The fiscal year
    2019 budget request for nuclear forces is $24 billion, which includes
    $11 billion for nuclear force sustainment and operations, $7 billion
    for recapitalization programs (including LRSO, B-21, GBSD, and the
    Columbia-class SSBN), and $6 billion for Nuclear Command, Control and
    Communications (including MILSATCOM).
        The DOD request to recapitalize the nuclear enterprise in fiscal
    year 2019 is about 1.4 percent of the total DOD base budget. Overall,
    nuclear force modernization will cost approximately $320 billion over
    23 years. At its highest level of funding in 2029, recent estimates,
    such as those from the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, project that the
    total cost to sustain and modernize U.S. nuclear forces will account
    for about 6.4 percent of the Defense budget, returning to about 3
    percent upon completion of modernization.
    Supplemental Capabilities
        The President's budget request includes two supplemental
    capabilities designed to enhance deterrence against emerging challenges
    in the near- and mid-term. The first of these is to modify a small
    number of existing submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) warheads
    to provide a low-yield ballistic missile option in the near term. The
    Department requests $22.6 million in fiscal year 2019 to support
    integration of these warheads into the missile system. We also request
    funds of $1 million in fiscal year 2019 to initiate an analysis of the
    performance requirements and costs to pursue a modern nuclear-armed
    sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) that could be available in the mid-
    term. This capability was previously fielded but retired in 2011 given
    the hope of a more benign security environment.
        The modified SLBM warhead and a modern SLCM will provide additional
    low-yield employment capabilities that an adversary will have to
    consider if contemplating a limited use of nuclear weapons. They will
    also provide additional diversity in platforms, range, and
    survivability, and a valuable hedge against future nuclear ``break
    out'' scenarios. The SLCM also improves overall survivability of the
    deterrence force and provides additional assurance to allies. The
    availability of such systems will give an adversary pause, especially
    if paired with other demonstrations of U.S. and allied resolve, and
    thus lessen the risk of a catastrophic miscalculation. United States
    leadership will want options that are operationally effective and that
    signal unmistakably the will to defend vital interests and impose
    significant costs on an adversary--but that can be executed in a way
    that is perceptibly restrained and has some prospect of managing the
    risk of further escalation.
        This is not a warfighting approach, but rather reinforces
    deterrence of conflict at the outset. The possession of potent,
    flexible nuclear capabilities can bolster deterrence by convincing
    adversaries not to initiate a conventional war in the first place, or
    by compelling them to accept conventional defeat rather than reaching
    for nuclear weapons.
        These capabilities are consistent--and fully comply--with the New
    START Treaty and the INF Treaty. They will not add to the number of
    nuclear weapons in the U.S. nuclear stockpile or create pressures for
    an ``arms race,'' and when fielded will not pose a threat to Russia's
    nuclear retaliatory capabilities. Deployed at sea, these systems will
    not place added burdens on allies for basing and support.
        Some have suggested that low-yield nuclear weapons undermine
    deterrence by lowering the nuclear threshold and making nuclear war
    more likely. There is no empirical basis to this claim. The United
    States has long maintained a high threshold for nuclear use together
    with a diverse range of nuclear explosive yields and response options.
    These proposed supplements to our current strategic forces would
    contribute to deterrence by raising a potential adversaries' threshold
    for nuclear use. They would make nuclear war less, not more, likely by
    demonstrating to adversaries that the United States is fully prepared
    to deter nuclear threats at every stage of an escalating crisis or
    conflict.
        This would help ensure that potential adversaries do not perceive
    an exploitable advantage in using low-yield nuclear weapons and thereby
    deny them confidence that their coercive threats of either limited
    nuclear first use or actual first use can provide a useful advantage
    over us and our allies. These supplements are not intended to mimic or
    match adversary nuclear capabilities. They can, nevertheless, counter
    Russian limited nuclear war doctrine, help address the imbalance in
    U.S. and Russian non-strategic nuclear forces, and may create
    incentives for Russia to return to compliance with its nuclear arms
    control commitments and reduce numbers of non-strategic nuclear
    weapons.
                       arms control and nonproliferation
        The U.S. commitment to nonproliferation and arms control remains
    strong. We value an integrated approach that combines effective
    deterrence with a broad-based effort to reduce nuclear risks through
    global nonproliferation initiatives and a responsible program of arms
    control. The United States remains committed to all of its obligations
    under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, including Article VI. By
    providing a credible nuclear umbrella extended to over thirty allies
    and partners, the U.S. is meeting their need for nuclear deterrence and
    at the same time enabling them to forgo independent nuclear weapons
    capabilities.
        Arms control can contribute to U.S., allied and partner security by
    helping to manage strategic competition among states. By codifying
    mutually agreed-upon nuclear postures in a verifiable and enforceable
    manner, arms control can help foster transparency, understanding, and
    predictability in adversary relations, thereby reducing the risk of
    misunderstanding and miscalculation.
        Arms control, however, is not an end in itself, and depends on the
    security environment and the participation of willing partners. Russia
    continues to violate a series of arms control treaties and commitments,
    most significantly, its non-compliance with existing obligations under
    the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and its failure to
    abide by its obligations under numerous agreements such as the Helsinki
    Accords, which established the inviolability of borders. Russia also
    refuses to address the disparity in the number of non-strategic nuclear
    weapons in its stockpiles as compared to the United States.
        The United States does not wish to regard Russia as an adversary
    and seeks stable and productive relations. We remain committed to
    strategic dialogue when conditions permit and there is a meaningful
    prospect for positive outcomes. Given its actions in recent years,
    realistically the onus is on Russia to restore the basis for
    constructive engagement; if it does so, it will find a willing partner
    in NATO and the United States.
        We understand the importance of a balanced policy that combines
    effective deterrence with a broad-based effort to reduce nuclear risks
    through global nonproliferation initiatives and a responsible program
    of arms control. This past February, Washington and Moscow announced
    that they had achieved the negotiated limits of the New START Treaty,
    codifying the lowest levels of strategic nuclear weapons since the era
    of bilateral nuclear arms control began. The Treaty remains in effect
    until 2021 unless a decision is made to extend it.
        Today, however, it is difficult to envision further progress given
    Russia's significant non-compliance with its INF Treaty obligations and
    its refusal to discuss limits to nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Make no
    mistake, Russia's decision to violate the INF Treaty, regardless of the
    military implications, is a significant political act that calls into
    question its willingness to be a serious security partner. Still, the
    United States remains committed to finding a diplomatic solution that
    brings Russia back into full and verifiable compliance. The Alliance is
    united in this goal and this approach, as reflected in the 15 December
    2017 statement by the North Atlantic Council on the INF Treaty. While
    the United States will continue to pursue a diplomatic solution, we are
    also implementing economic and military measures intended to induce the
    Russian Federation to return to compliance. This includes a review of
    military concepts and options, including options for conventionally-
    armed, ground-launched, intermediate-range missile systems.
        It is useful to view the NPR initiatives in this light. U.S.
    resolve to maintain modern nuclear forces and prevent destabilizing
    force imbalances from emerging or persisting provides the necessary
    foundation for effective arms control. This is a lesson borne out in
    the history of U.S.-Russia arms control, including the INF Treaty. The
    decision to pursue a modern sea-launched cruise missile capability is a
    Treaty-compliant response to Russia's violation of this Treaty and--it
    is hoped--will provide an incentive to Moscow to return to compliance
    or agree to negotiate limits on nonstrategic nuclear weapons that could
    enhance allied security.
        Likewise, minimizing the number of nuclear weapon states and
    limiting the spread of expertise and technology that enable nuclear
    proliferation remain foundations of American policy. We understand our
    unique leadership role in nonproliferation and nuclear security, and
    our commitment to these goals--and to exercising active leadership in
    pursuing them--is undiminished. We remain focused on a pragmatic
    approach to strengthening the NPT and the and other elements of the
    global nonproliferation regime and creating conditions within the NPT
    framework for further progress in disarmament, consistent with our
    obligations under Article VI of the Treaty.
        At the same time, despite the importance of these goals, we no
    longer believe they can be effectively advanced by unilaterally
    reducing or limiting the capabilities available to ensure deterrence.
    Today that path carries unacceptable risk. Nonproliferation faces acute
    challenges, to be sure, but can and will be pursued even as we take the
    steps necessary to strengthen nuclear deterrence.
                                   conclusion
        According to Secretary Mattis, ``nuclear weapons have and will
    continue to play a critical role in deterring nuclear attack and in
    preventing large-scale conventional warfare between nuclear-armed
    states for the foreseeable future.''
        In an increasingly complex and threatening security environment,
    DOD must sustain the capabilities needed to deter and defend against
    attacks on our homeland, as well as those aimed at U.S. Forces deployed
    abroad, our allies and partners. This requires making the investments
    needed to address the on-going erosion of our nuclear capabilities.
    Along with our allies and partners, we must ensure that we have the
    capabilities needed, now and in the future, to protect our people and
    the freedoms we cherish, and are able to engage potential adversaries
    diplomatically from a position of strength. This is a top priority of
    the Department of Defense.
        While nuclear deterrence remains a bedrock of our security,
    Secretary Mattis has also observed that ``the U.S. approach to nuclear
    deterrence embraces two co-equal principles: First, ensuring a safe,
    secure and effective nuclear deterrent; and second, working wherever
    possible for nuclear nonproliferation and arms control, whenever it
    advances stability and security for us and our allies. Nuclear
    deterrence and efforts to foreclose proliferation and reduce the number
    of nuclear weapons are not mutually exclusive.''
        To achieve these goals, I urge you to support the important
    capabilities contained in the President's fiscal year 2019 budget
    request.
        Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to
    your questions.

        Senator Fischer. Thank you.
        General Rand?

      STATEMENT OF GENERAL ROBIN RAND, USAF, COMMANDER, AIR FORCE
                         GLOBAL STRIKE COMMAND

        General Rand. Good afternoon, Chairman Fischer and Ranking
    Member Donnelly. Thank you for allowing me to appear before you
    today, and thank you very much for your kind remarks.
        As I conclude my third year in command of Air Force Global
    Strike Command, I have four fundamental focus areas.
        First, the fight tonight, the fight in 2030, the
    professional development of our airmen, and the care and
    feeding of our families. Today I will highlight two of these
    areas in my opening comments.
        In the fight tonight, let me say the strength of Global Air
    Force Strike Command is in our 34,000 airmen and their
    remarkable families. Representing them today is Command Chief
    Master Sergeant Tommy Mazzone, a highly distinguished combat
    veteran and the senior ranking non-commissioned officer in our
    command. He is also my best wingman. He and these airmen are
    nothing short of spectacular and deserve our Nation's gratitude
    for their service of providing global strike and strategic
    nuclear deterrence.
        Right now, we have airmen deployed to the Intercontinental
    Ballistic Missile fields of Colorado, Nebraska, Wyoming,
    Montana, and North Dakota, where they provide a 24/7, 365-day
    umbrella of strategic nuclear deterrence and assurance for our
    Nation and our allies.
        At the same time, we have striker airmen deployed in the
    Middle East in support of Central Command and Africa Command
    fighting violent extremists. We have airmen deterring our
    adversaries and assuring our partners in European Command and
    Pacific Command, and we have airmen supporting counter-narcotic
    operations in United States Southern Command, all of this while
    our bomber airmen remain postured to support the United States
    Strategic Command's nuclear operational plan.
        At the direction of the commander of the United States
    Strategic Command, in September 2017, we reorganized to
    establish one line of authority for USSTRATCOM's air component
    under a single four-star commander. The reorganization
    established clear lines of authority, simplifying an outdated
    command structure for bomber and our missile forces. My
    position is now dual hatted as the Commander of Air Force's
    Strategic-Air Joint Force Air Component Commander and the
    Commander of Air Force Global Strike Command.
        A major part of this reorganization was to activate the
    Joint Global Strike Operations Center, or J-GSOC, headquartered
    at Barksdale Air Force Base. The J-GSOC enables us to focus on
    the operational nuclear deterrence and global strike missions,
    while the headquarters of Air Force Global Strike Command
    focuses on the organize, train, and equip aspects of our
    mission.
        Equally important as our ability to fight tonight is our
    ability to fight in 2030. Simply stated, modernization of our
    nuclear forces is at a critical juncture. The key to Air Force
    Global Strike Command's continued success will remain our
    ability to modernize, sustain, and recapitalize. To accomplish
    this we must have predictable, adequate, and flexible budgets
    in order to continue our readiness recovery while building a
    more capable and lethal force. The future, as great power
    competition reemerges as a major focus area, requires that Air
    Force Global Strike Command lead the way.
        I am happy to report today that we're on a good path moving
    forward, and I look forward to answering any of your questions
    about our modernization and sustainment plans related to our
    mission.
        Again, Madam Chairwoman and subcommittee members, Ranking
    Member Donnelly, I want to thank you for your dedication to our
    great Nation and the opportunity to appear before the committee
    today to highlight the missions and successes of the striker
    airmen and Global Air Strike. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of General Rand follows:]

                    Prepared Statement by General Robin Rand
                                  introduction
        Chairwoman Fischer, Ranking Member Donnelly and distinguished
    members of the committee, thank you for allowing me to come before you
    and represent over 34,000 Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) Total
    Force Airmen. It is an honor to be here today, and I look forward to
    updating you on what the command has accomplished and where we are
    going.
                    air force global strike command mission
        Air Force Global Strike Command is a warfighting command
    responsible for two legs of our Nation's nuclear triad and the Nation's
    nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) capabilities while
    simultaneously accomplishing the conventional global strike mission. As
    long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States must deter attacks and
    maintain strategic stability, assure our allies, and hedge against an
    uncertain future. At AFGSC, we're especially focused on today's
    evolving world and tomorrow's emerging threats.
        The command's top priority is to ensure our nuclear arsenal is
    lethal, safe, and secure. This priority underlies every nuclear-related
    activity in AFGSC, and we must never fail in the special trust and
    confidence the American people have bestowed on our nuclear warriors.
    To that end, our Nation's leaders must continue to support and advocate
    for the sustainment and modernization of these weapon systems.
    Sustaining and progressing these efforts require predictable,
    sufficient, and flexible budgets. Reinforced in the 2018 Nuclear
    Posture Review, the nuclear deterrent is at a crossroads, and there is
    no higher priority for national defense. We must concurrently modernize
    the nuclear triad and the infrastructure that enables its
    effectiveness, and we require budget stability to accomplish these
    efforts.
        In 2017, AFGSC significantly reorganized at the direction of the
    Commander, United States Strategic Command (CDRUSSTRATCOM), the first
    step in a larger USSTRATCOM restructuring. Under the previous
    construct, responsibilities for the air, space, and naval strategic
    missions were spread amongst several lines of authority. The
    reorganization solved two issues.
        First, it cleaned up an outdated and confusing command structure
    for bomber and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) forces under
    USSTRATCOM. Second, it allowed AFGSC to reshape the command and stand
    up a full time air component to USSTRATCOM. Our Nation relies on the
    strategic deterrence AFGSC provides every day. In order to perform this
    high priority mission, AFGSC needed an organizational structure that
    allows a portion of the command to focus on supporting day-to-day
    deterrence, while the rest of the command focuses on OT&E commitments.
    On 29 September 2017, AFGSC stood up Air Forces Strategic-Air (AFSTRAT-
    Air) as the full time air component to USSTRATCOM. This gives
    CDRUSSTRATCOM a single four-star general responsible for USSTRATCOM's
    air missions.
        The Joint-Global Strike Operations Center (J-GSOC) was created to
    handle the day-to-day responsibilities of the strategic deterrence
    mission for USSTRATCOM's air component. The J-GSOC consists of the
    Joint Air Operations Center (JAOC) Joint Nuclear Operations Center
    (JNOC). The JAOC, already in existence, handles the conventional
    portion of the command's mission. The two nuclear task forces were
    combined into the JNOC, and focuses on the nuclear portion of the
    command's mission. Several additional mission teams were also aligned
    under the J-GSOC. The National Airborne Operations Center (NAOC),
    combined with AFGSC's existing responsibility for the E-4B, allows
    AFSTRAT, through USSTRATCOM, to better organize, train, equip, and
    present the NAOC mission to support the President and Secretary of
    Defense. The Standoff Munitions Application Center (SMAC) was stood up
    to provide expertise in planning and targeting of Air Force standoff
    weapons. The Cruise Missile Support Activity Atlantic (CMSALANT) and
    Pacific (CMSAPAC) were also aligned under the J-GSOC, and combined with
    SMAC, give the J-GSOC the ability to plan and target any standoff
    weapon in support of any combatant commander.
        In addition to standing up the J-GSOC, CDRUSSTRATCOM also
    designated the AFGSC Commander as the Joint Force Air Component
    Commander (JFACC). The dual-hatted Commander, AFSTRAT-Air/JFACC has the
    ability to monitor, control, and direct all the air assets assigned or
    attached to USSTRATCOM anywhere in the world. These include the Air
    Force bomber, tanker, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance,
    and ICBM forces as well as the USSTRATCOM Airborne Command Post (ABNCP)
    and Take Charge and Move Out (TACAMO) missions. The JFACC also supplies
    a common operating picture to CDRUSSTRATCOM that provides status and
    locations of all air assets.
        These warfighting authorities were immediately tested during
    USSTRATCOM's Global Thunder exercise, and performed well beyond
    expectations. We have already achieved initial operating capability and
    are on track to achieve full operational capability by July 1, 2018. As
    emphasized in the 2017 National Defense Strategy (NDS), the global
    security environment is now more complex and volatile than experienced
    in recent memory, and inter-state strategic competition is now the
    primary concern in U.S. national security. The Air Force fiscal year
    2019 budget prioritizes a more lethal and ready force, strengthening
    alliances and partnerships, and delivering greater performance. AFGSC's
    bomber, ICBM forces, and NC3 systems support both the NDS strategy and
    Air Force priorities by deterring potential adversaries, assuring our
    allies and partners, and guaranteeing the security of our national
    interests through cost-effective modernization. If deterrence should
    fail, AFGSC stands ready to defeat our adversaries through the
    persistent employment of lethal combat power.
                     air force global strike command forces
    Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Forces
        Twentieth Air Force (20 AF), one of two Numbered Air Forces in
    AFGSC, is responsible for the Minuteman III (MMIII) ICBM, UH-1N
    helicopter forces, the Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance and
    Storage Complex at Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico, and a ground
    combat training squadron at Camp Guernsey, Wyoming. The 450 dispersed
    and hardened Launch Facilities (LFs), are controlled, maintained,
    defended, and supported by AFGSC airmen every single day, providing the
    bulk of our day-to-day nuclear alert force, and doing so with precision
    and professionalism. Our ICBM experts, the silent warriors, are
    deployed in place, and preserve strategic stability by providing the
    nation a credible and responsive deterrent in a contested environment
    and presenting adversaries a nearly insurmountable obstacle of numbers
    should they consider a disarming attack on the United States.
                Minuteman III
        We continue to sustain and modernize the MMIII ICBM and its
    command, control, and communications systems and support equipment. To
    modernize our existing fleet of large missile maintenance vehicles, we
    continue moving forward on the $123 million Transporter Erector Program
    (TERP) and the $201 million Payload Transporter Replacement (PTR). We
    currently expect PTR to begin production in fiscal year 2019.
        The ICBM Launch Control Centers (LCC) will be equipped with
    modernized communications systems to improve and replace aging and
    obsolete systems. The LCC Block Upgrade, expected to begin full
    deployment in 2019, is a $96 million modification effort that replaces
    multiple LCC components to include modern data storage and higher
    fidelity voice communications capabilities. A significant security
    upgrade to the remote visual assessment capability at our LFs will
    increase situational awareness and security. This $51.6 million program
    is expected to begin deployment in fiscal year 2019.
        In fiscal year 2018 we are scheduled to conduct three operational
    MMIII flight tests and two simulated electronic launch tests that will
    demonstrate the operational credibility of the nuclear deterrent force
    and the AF's commitment to sustaining that capability. We conducted
    four MMIII flight tests and two simulated electronic launch tests in
    fiscal year 2017.
        In an effort to vastly improve the nuclear capability of our ICBM
    force, the ICBM Programmed Depot Maintenance program began in fiscal
    year 2016. The program places operational LFs and LCCs on an 8-year
    depot-level maintenance cycle. It greatly increases the effectiveness
    and lethality of our ICBMs by ensuring their sustainment is done in an
    engineering-based, systematic way. Successful prototyping of the
    program was accomplished in fiscal year 2016, with 26 LFs and LCCs
    undergoing the maintenance. Thirty nine LFs and LCCs were completed in
    fiscal year 2017, and 50 are planned in fiscal year 2018. This program
    is key to ensure MMIII viability through the transition to Ground Based
    Strategic Deterrent (GBSD).
        Our effort to remove 50 ICBM boosters from their LFs as part of our
    effort to meet New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) limits is
    complete. The selected LFs are spread across all three ICBM wings and
    will remain fully operational and capable of receiving boosters, if
    needed. The final booster was removed in early June 2017, a full nine
    months ahead of the treaty-mandated suspense of February 2018.
                Ground Based Strategic Deterrent
        The Minuteman weapon system was fielded nearly 60 years ago, yet
    has remained a cornerstone deterrence platform. ICBMs are the sole
    weapon system capable of rapid global response and impose a time-proven
    and unpalatable cost to attack by peer, near-peer, and aspiring nuclear
    nations. The current system, the MMIII, suffers from age-out, asset
    depletion, and numerous performance shortfalls. Simply put, it will not
    meet critical mission performance or force requirements by 2030.
        To meet these requirements, we're successfully moving forward on
    developing the GBSD. OSD/AT&L approved the GBSD Acquisition Strategy in
    July 2016, Milestone A was achieved on 23 August 2016; on 21 August
    2017, technology maturation and risk reduction contracts were awarded,
    initiating a three year acquisition risk reduction activity. When
    complete, a second cost-reducing, competitive source selection will
    identify a single provider and initiate material development efforts
    beginning in the 2020 timeframe. GBSD is fully funded at $8.5 billion
    for fiscal year 2019 to 2023.
        We remain engaged with our Navy partners and have identified
    promising areas for intelligent commonality between GBSD systems and
    future Navy weapons. Additionally, we are collaborating with the
    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to develop a W78
    warhead replacement program starting in 2019. The replacement warhead
    will use a Mk21 aeroshell and will deploy on GBSD after fiscal year
    2030; the Navy will study the feasibility of using the same nuclear
    explosive package with their flight vehicle. Due to MMIII system age-
    out, attrition, and commitment requirements, the first priority is to
    modernize the necessary facilities, replace the missile, and modernize
    command and control (C2) systems.
                UH-1N
        AFGSC is the lead command for the Air Force's Vietnam-era fleet of
    63 UH-1N helicopters. The majority of these aircraft support several
    critical missions: security of our ICBM fields, transport missions in
    the National Capitol Region and U.S. Pacific Command areas of
    responsibility, and critical Continuity of Operations. Additionally,
    they support Air Force survival training with rescue operations.
    Further, they participate in the Defense Support of Civil Authorities
    program and are frequently called upon to conduct search and rescue
    activities for missing or injured civilians. As an example, Malmstrom
    AFB's UH-1N Airmen have been credited with over 400 saves in their
    history.
                UH-1N Replacement
        In order to continue supporting these critical national missions
    and fully comply with Department of Defense (DOD) and United States
    Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) requirements, the Air Force has
    committed $2.3 billion in fiscal year 2019 to 2023 toward replacing the
    UH-1N fleet, as the platform falls short of missile field operational
    needs--notably speed, range, endurance, payload, and survivability. The
    Air Force is pursuing a full-and-open competition to procure 84
    replacement helicopters. Vendor proposals were received in September
    2017, and contract award is anticipated summer of 2018.
                Airborne Launch Control System
        The Airborne Launch Control System (ALCS) is USSTRATCOM's only
    alternate and survivable launch control system for the MMIII. The ALCS
    consists of an airborne component onboard 16 Navy E-6Bs and a ground
    component housed at all 450 MMIII launch facilities.
        The current ALCS was fielded in 1987 and requires 100 percent
    recapitalization of existing architecture and infrastructure as well as
    full replacement of specific portions of the system. The ALCS
    Replacement program will replace and modernize the current system
    through 2035 and will replace both airborne and ground components
    enabling integration of GBSD command and control requirements through
    smart, modular design. ALCS-R is funded to $657.3 million in the Fiscal
    Year 2019 Presidential Budget.
    Bomber Forces
        Eighth Air Force (8 AF) is responsible for the B-52H Stratofortress
    (B-52) bomber, the B-2A Spirit (B-2) bomber, and the B-1B Lancer (B-1)
    bomber. Bombers provide decision makers the ability to demonstrate
    resolve through generation, dispersal, and deployment.
        Since 1991, the Air Force has conducted continuous combat
    operations resulting in a growing toll on airmen, their readiness, and
    equipment. Bombers have supported operations through continuous
    rotations in United States Central Command (CENTCOM), United States
    Pacific Command (PACOM), United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), United
    States European Command (EUCOM), and United States Southern Command
    (SOUTHCOM) areas of responsibility (AORs). Bomber contributions to our
    national security in the Cold War, Vietnam, and operations Desert
    Storm, Allied Force, Iraqi Freedom, Enduring Freedom, and today's
    Inherent Resolve and Freedom Sentinel are well documented.
        At the end of Desert Storm in 1991, the Air Force had 290 total
    force bombers, 17 bomb wings, and 22 bomb squadrons. Today the number
    has dropped to 157 bombers, 5 bomb wings, and 9 bomb squadrons. That is
    a 46 percent decrease in our bomber force, a 70 percent decrease in
    bomb wings, and a 60 percent decrease in bomb squadrons. The demand
    signal for bombers has continued to increase in the last two decades,
    while long range airpower assets have decreased by 46 percent during
    the same timeframe. To assure our allies and partners, and to increase
    regional stability, AFGSC provides bomber forces arrayed across the
    globe, providing flexible, responsive options to combatant commanders.
    The deployments in support of the CENTCOM AOR and the Continuous Bomber
    Presence in the PACOM AOR send a strong signal to our allies of our
    commitment to our treaty obligations and their regional concerns.
    Additionally, AFGSC provides bomber forces to support SOUTHCOM's Joint-
    Interagency Task Force-South, EUCOM, and AFRICOM through the Joint
    Staff's Global Force Management process and Bomber Assurance and
    Deterrence-ordered deployments and missions. These opportunities
    enhance our support to our allies and display our resolve to potential
    adversaries. The core of AFGSC assurance and deterrence is our
    unwavering commitment to USSTRATCOM and our nuclear mission. AFGSC must
    balance global force posturing with our nuclear mission, while not
    jeopardizing readiness and fleet health. Arraying bomber forces
    globally, to increase strategic flexibility and response to a changing
    global security environment, while doing no harm to our nuclear
    mission, will further enhance our assurance to allies and partners and
    posture our forces in such a manner where our adversaries take notice.
                B-1
        The B-1 is a highly versatile, conventional-only multi-mission
    weapon system that carries a large payload of both guided and unguided
    weapons, which it can rapidly deliver in support of combatant
    commanders around the globe. Multiple wartime employments, high
    operations tempo, and harsh environment exposure have proven the
    aircraft's combat effectiveness, but have impacted aircraft
    availability.
        The B-1 will continue to be in service for two more decades and
    avionics and weapon upgrades are critical for it to remain a viable
    combatant commander tool. The Integrated Battle Station/Sustainment
    Block-16 ($152 million fiscal 2019-23) includes an upgraded Central
    Integrated Test System, Fully Integrated Data Link, Vertical Situation
    Display, and flight simulator upgrades. These are essential
    capabilities and the will provide the aircrew with a much more
    flexible, integrated cockpit.
        The stand-off weapons currently employed by the B-1 include the
    Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM), the Joint Air-to-Surface
    Standoff Missile-Extended Range (JASSM-ER), and very soon the Long
    Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM). This unmatched precision strike
    capability has guaranteed a critical role for the B-1 in assuring our
    allies and deterring potential adversaries now and into the future.
                B-52
        The B-52 may be the most universally recognized symbol of American
    airpower, it is able to deliver the widest variety of nuclear and
    conventional weapons, and boasts the best aircraft availability and
    mission capable rates of all three bomber platforms.
        The B-52 will remain a key element of our bomber force until the
    2050s and it is paramount that we continue to invest resources into
    this aircraft. B-52s are still using 1960s radar technology with the
    last major radar upgrade done in the early 1980s. The current radar on
    the B-52 will be even less effective in the future threat environment,
    and without an improved radar system, there will be increased
    degradation in mission effectiveness. In order to remedy this, the $733
    million fiscal year 2019 to 2023 B-52 Radar Modernization Program now
    has an approved acquisition strategy, a Joint Staff-validated
    Capability Development Document, and has entered execution in the pre-
    Milestone B phase. Furthermore, B-52 training simulators are lagging
    behind operational aircraft capabilities. They require integration of
    various programs such as Combat Network Communications Technology
    (CONECT), internal weapons bay upgrade, data link capabilities, air
    refueling, and information technology refresh. Supporting the
    revitalization of these critical training tools will create high
    fidelity training environments and increase the readiness of B-52 crews
    in support of nuclear and conventional missions.
        Additionally, the 1960-era TF-33 engines currently on the B-52 are
    operating on parts salvaged from aircraft no longer in the inventory.
    The supply of these parts, no longer made by industry, will be
    exhausted and leave the engines unsustainable by 2030. The Air Force is
    now funding efforts ($1.6 billion fiscal years 2019 to 2023) to
    integrate and deploy replacement B-52 engines, which will save fuel,
    extend the aircraft's range, and improve reliability and sustainment.
        Today, we have 37 B-52s converted to the CONECT configuration. This
    modification moves the B-52 into the digital age for the first time,
    providing an on-board local area network, allowing the aircrew to share
    a common battlespace picture. This modification is installed on every
    aircraft going through regular program depot maintenance cycle. The
    Internal Weapons Bay Upgrade increases B-52 smart weapons capacity by
    67 percent. This capability reached its initial operational capability
    milestone in May 2016 and added Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile
    (JASSM) and Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile-Extended Range
    (JASSM-ER) capability in October 2017. Communications remain the
    cornerstone of our long-range strike capability. The ability to launch
    bombers and retask and retarget them while enroute to the battlespace
    is a powerful force multiplier. We will add a critical communications
    node to enhance the operational picture with Link-16, integrating the
    aircraft into the warfighter's efforts. Currently, the B-52 is the only
    Combat Air Forces platform without line-of-site Link-16.
        Finally, we have converted 29 operational and 12 stored B-52
    aircraft to conventional-only configurations. These conversions were
    undertaken as a part of New START obligations, and were completed in
    January 2017, a full year ahead of the treaty-mandated suspense of
    February 2018.
                B-2
        For nearly 25 years, B-2s have provided the Nation with an assured
    penetrating bomber capability. The B-2's ability to penetrate enemy
    defenses, holding targets at risk anywhere on the globe, with a variety
    of nuclear and conventional weapons, has provided deterrence against
    our enemies and stability for our allies. The B-2's conventional
    accomplishments are numerous and incontrovertible; the bomber provided
    precision attacks during the Kosovo and Iraq Wars, strikes on the
    Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan, and on forces in Libya.
        B-2 modernization efforts are addressing a nuclear command and
    control need by bringing a survivable very low frequency communication
    capability to the aircraft. Additionally, with the proliferation of
    anti-access/area denial threats, we are ensuring the B-2's ability to
    penetrate enemy defenses is maintained with the Defensive Management
    System Modernization program. Finally, the B-2 is upgrading to carry
    the B61-12 nuclear gravity weapon. This upgrade is currently programmed
    for $144 million in RTD&E and is critical to ensuring the bomber leg of
    the nuclear Triad remains a visible deterrent to those who wish us
    harm.
        Small fleet dynamics continue to challenge our sustainment efforts
    primarily due to vanishing vendors and diminishing sources of supply.
    We are striving to maintain the proper balance of fleet modernization
    and sustainment while maintaining combat readiness. Lessons learned
    from the difficulty of sustaining and modernizing the B-2's small
    fleet, and an ever-decreasing technological advantage, are some of the
    drivers for the planned minimum B-21 requirements.
                B-21
        Technology gaps between the U.S. and potential adversaries are
    closing. The B-21 Raider will support the nuclear triad by providing an
    advanced and flexible deterrent capability and the ability to penetrate
    modern and future air defenses. Further, the B-21 will provide
    flexibility across a wide range of joint military operations using long
    range capabilities, large and mixed payloads, and survivability. From
    the outset, the B-21 has been designed to have an open architecture,
    which enables it to integrate new technology and respond to future
    threats. The B-21 program is a national security imperative that will
    extend American air dominance and lethality against next generation
    capabilities and advanced air defense environments.
        The B-21 is fully funded in the fiscal year 2019 budget submission,
    and initial capability is projected for the mid-2020s. Extensive
    campaign and mission level analysis will determine the minimum number
    of B-21s required to meet combatant commander needs in the face of
    closing technology gaps and increasing threat capabilities.
        As the B-21 development progresses, the Air Force is conducting the
    strategic basing process. While B-21 fielding will include new
    construction and facility renovation, current bomber bases have
    infrastructure for operations, maintenance, munitions storage,
    security, and training. Additionally, base operating support and off-
    base community support are well-established at current bomber bases.
    While conducting B-21 bed down, our primary focus will be providing
    safe, secure, and lethal bomber operations in a cost-efficient manner.
                Air Launched Cruise Missile
        The AGM-86B Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) is an air-to-ground,
    winged, subsonic nuclear missile delivered by the B-52. Fielded in the
    1980s, the ALCM is over 30 years old, well beyond its life expectancy,
    and is involved in its third life extension program (LEP). While the
    ALCM remains effective today, we must replace it due to its aging
    subsystems, the shrinking stockpile of operational missiles (546), and
    advances in enemy defenses. We plan to invest $380 million in fiscal
    year 2019 to 2023 to continue SLEPs and testing efforts that include
    critical telemetry, encryption, and flight termination components until
    the Long Range Stand-Off (LRSO) missile reaches operational capability
    in 2030.
                Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missile
        The AGM-86C, Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missile (CALCM) is a
    conventional variant to the ALCM. Its only employment platform is the
    B-52 and unlike the ALCM, CALCM has not received any LEPs to maintain
    reliability or viability against enemy defenses. NDAA language prevents
    the service from removing this aging and obsolete weapon system from
    operational use pending the development, testing, and initial fielding
    of a LRSO conventional variant. The conventional long range stand-off
    capability currently resides in JASSM-ER and is a more survivable
    weapon system with low observable characteristics. JASSM-ER is capable
    of employment from the B-52 and B-1, with B-2 capability projected for
    fiscal year 2019. It is prudent that when our bomber force continues to
    make advancements in capability, that we divest ourselves of CALCM and
    focus our training and maintenance resources towards the use of more
    capable weapons.
                Long Range Stand-Off Missile
        The Air Force dedicated $2.6 billion in fiscal year 2019 to 2023
    for the LRSO to replace the aging ALCM. The ALCM has significant
    capability gaps that will only worsen through the next decade. The LRSO
    will be a reliable, long-range, and survivable weapon system and is
    absolutely an essential element of the nuclear triad. It will be
    flexible and compatible with B-52 and B-21 platforms.
        The LRSO missile will ensure the bomber force continues to hold
    high value targets at risk in an evolving threat environment, including
    targets deep within an area-denied environment. I cannot overemphasize
    this point: B-21 and B-52 without LRSO greatly reduces our ability to
    hold adversaries at risk, increases risk to our aircraft and aircrew
    members, and negatively impacts our ability to execute the mission.
    Additionally, AFGSC is synchronizing efforts with NNSA to fully
    integrate the W80-4 nuclear warhead with LRSO. This weapon will retain
    nuclear penetrating cruise missile capabilities through 2060. To meet
    operational, testing, and logistics requirements, the Air Force plans
    to acquire approximately 1,000 LRSO cruise missile bodies. This
    quantity will provide spares and supply sufficient non-nuclear missile
    bodies throughout ongoing flight and ground testing. The number of
    nuclear-armed LRSO cruise missiles (i.e., mated to a nuclear warhead)
    is expected to be equivalent to the current ALCM nuclear force.
    Milestone A for LRSO was declared in July 2016. The Air Force awarded
    contracts for technology maturation and risk reduction in August 2017.
                B61
        The B61 family of gravity nuclear weapons supports the airborne leg
    of the triad and is the primary weapon supporting our NATO allies under
    extended deterrence. The B61 is currently undergoing a LEP that results
    in a smaller stockpile, reduced special nuclear material in the
    inventory, modernized safety and security features, and reduced
    lifecycle costs by consolidating four weapon versions into one version,
    the B61-12. The B61-12 includes the addition of a digital weapons
    interface and a guided tail kit assembly. AFGSC is the lead command for
    the $419 million fiscal year 2019-23 B61-12 Tail Kit Assembly program,
    a DOD-developed system providing reduced maintenance, reduced cost and
    increased sustainability. The B61-12 Tail Kit Assembly program is in
    Engineering and Manufacturing Development Phase 2 and is synchronized
    with NNSA efforts. The Tail Kit Assembly design and production
    processes are on schedule and within budget to meet the planned fiscal
    year 2020 First Production Unit date, and support the lead time
    required for the inclusion of the Department of Energy (DOE) warhead
    service-life extension completion date of March 2020. This joint DOD
    and DOE endeavor allows for continued attainment of our strategic
    requirements and regional commitments.
                GBU-57
        AFGSC assumed responsibility as the lead MAJCOM for the GBU-57
    Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) in the summer of 2015. The MOP is a
    30,000-pound guided conventional bomb designed to defeat hardened and
    deeply buried targets and is exclusively employed from the B-2. It has
    received several upgrades and enhancements based on warfighter
    requirements.
        AFGSC, PACOM, and the Air Force Life Cycle Management Center
    Program Office are currently validating a requirement to expand the
    weapon's operational capabilities.
                           security & infrastructure
        Nuclear security is a key function of the command's mission, and a
    major AFGSC security initiative continues to be new weapon storage
    facilities. These new facilities will consolidate nuclear maintenance,
    inspection, and storage into a single, modern and secure facility,
    replacing deficient 1960s-era weapon storage areas. Additionally, this
    initiative mitigates security, design, and safety deficiencies and
    improves our operational lethality.
        One of our growing concerns is the impact that degraded and
    unpredictable infrastructure funding is having on our missions, our
    airmen, and their families. Our bases are power projection platforms,
    and should be viewed as 3-D weapon systems. This is particularly true
    for our ICBM and B-2 bomber bases, which stand in continuous readiness
    to initiate global strike missions directly from these locations. For
    years, the Air Force has been forced to make deliberate decisions to
    take risk in infrastructure funding, in order to apply scarce dollars
    toward higher readiness and modernization priorities. The cumulative
    effect has been a steady erosion of our facilities and core
    infrastructure, and a huge growth in costs to address our exponentially
    growing repair and replacement backlogs. As we bring new systems online
    such as Weapon Storage Facilities, the B-21 Raider, and GBSD, some of
    our installation infrastructure will receive much needed
    recapitalization. However, it will be several years before those
    systems are in place, and will not address much of the infrastructure
    where our airmen work and live. We are seeing a growing risk in
    facilities and infrastructure reliability, higher overall costs due to
    accelerated deterioration, and increasing potential for unexpected
    catastrophic, mission-impacting failure. Our innovative airmen have,
    and will continue to, focus limited resources on ``mission critical,
    worst first'' facilities and infrastructure while accepting risk in the
    recapitalization of facilities with less-direct mission impact such as
    community and base support. There is without question a link between
    facility condition and quality of life, as well as quality of service.
    Without your support of the fiscal year 2019 President's request for
    MILCON and facility sustainment, restoration and modernization funding,
    we will not only continue to increase our risk of mission interruption
    or degradation, but will also be unable to adequately address the
    quality of life of our airmen and their families. Providing a
    predictable, stable budget will not only enhance our lethality, but
    will go far in providing our airmen with working and living
    environments that directly enhance their readiness.
                  nuclear command, control, and communications
        Air Force nuclear command, control and communications (NC3) systems
    connect the President to senior advisors and the nuclear forces.
    Receiving presidential orders and converting them into actionable
    directives are critical to having a strong strategic deterrent. AFGSC
    is the Air Force's lead command for National Leadership Command
    Capabilities (NLCC)/NC3 which establishes a single focal point for the
    NC3 weapon system.
        AFGSC is aggressively working to maintain and sustain the NC3
    weapon system. Through the Nuclear Enterprise Review process and a
    cross-MAJCOM internal Air Force study, we identified multiple areas
    that have atrophied through decades of low prioritization. In a major
    organizational effort, AFGSC stood up the USAF NC3 Center in April
    2017. The NC3 Center oversees interoperability, standardization, and
    configuration control of the Air Force's NC3 weapon system, and will
    plan and program for NC3 investment, sustainment, and operations.
        In its first year, the NC3 Center has taken great strides in cross-
    MAJCOM governance to ensure strong advocacy as NC3 programs compete for
    resources within the Air Force Corporate process. An outstanding
    example of the Air Force's increased emphasis on NC3 includes the $275
    million allocated for E-4B modernization programs, which is in the
    fiscal year 2019 Presidential budget for the fiscal year 2019 to 2023
    FYDP. Additionally, the E-4B replacement program, the Survivable
    Airborne Operations Center is programmed to receive $182 million to
    begin the effort to replace the aircraft itself. For nuclear planning
    and execution analysis, $72.6 million is allocated to complete the
    Mission Planning Application System Increment 5 program at USSTRATCOM.
    The Global Aircrew Strategic Network Terminal Increment 1 program for
    Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) capability at nuclear-tasked
    command posts receives $246 million to complete terminal procurement.
    To ensure connectivity with our B-52 fleet, $132.6 million is programed
    to integrate the Family of Advanced Beyond Line of Sight Terminals onto
    the aircraft. The B-52 will also integrate a new very low frequency
    receiver ($175.6 million), and we have allocated $73.9 million to
    upgrade our oldest system, the Strategic Automated Command Control
    System. To ensure connectivity with our ICBMs via USSTRATCOM's only
    alternate and survivable launch control system for the MMIII, the
    Airborne Launch Control System-Replacement has been funded $83 million
    in fiscal year 2019. Collectively, these NC3 efforts add $1.20 billion
    over the fiscal year 2019-23 FYDP to assure the President connectivity
    to the Nation's nuclear forces.
        In addition to modernization efforts, the NC3 Center is
    standardizing the training of airmen who operate and maintain NC3
    equipment. The Center built new courseware and developed ``hands-on''
    simulators for airmen coming out of technical school to gain experience
    before arriving at operational bases. For more experienced personnel,
    the Center also secured distance learning systems to grant engineering
    graduate degrees through universities such as Harvard, Stanford, and
    Portland State University. Additionally, the Center has streamlined the
    reporting of communication system outages so combatant commanders
    receive real-time status and impact updates of temporary NC3 capability
    degradations and worked with Defense Logistics Agency to improve
    processes to provide a reliable, secure supply chain.
                              ongoing initiatives
        Since 2014, the Air Force has applied deliberate and sustained
    focus to address shortfalls. AFGSC's ongoing efforts--spanning the
    full-range of personnel, management, oversight, mission performance,
    training, testing, and investment--continue to produce tangible and
    lasting improvements. As this committee is well aware, the Air Force
    and AFGSC have undertaken monumental shifts to build a more lethal
    force.
        AFGSC initiated an effort to invigorate Security Forces (SF),
    specifically in the critical function of nuclear security. This
    initiative focuses on increasing SF lethality and readiness by
    enhancing leadership, proficiency, and effectiveness of personnel
    guarding our strategic deterrence capabilities. Changes have included
    increasing manning, especially in supervisory positions, increasing
    training cadre, investing in SF leadership through focused professional
    development, and implementing a Missile Security Operating Concept.
    This squadron deployment model, implemented across all three ICBM
    wings, optimizes core skill presentation in the field, keeps leadership
    with their airmen, and provides stable, work-rest-train cycles. While
    the command has achieved early success with this program, we still have
    improvements to make in modernizing equipment and infrastructure, and
    decreasing position vacancies. Finally, Secretary Wilson directed a
    follow-on review, led by AFGSC, which is expected to result in external
    recommendations for cross-cutting improvements to Air Force Security
    Forces that will enhance the nuclear mission by providing world-class
    security forces with world-class equipment.
        In 2017, we stood up an Independent Strategic Assessment Group
    (ISAG), comprised of former DOD leaders. The ISAG conducted a deep dive
    into numerous key areas, including current management structure and
    practices of the Nuclear Enterprise, and how AFGSC can field a more
    lethal force. The assessments produced nearly 50 action items the
    command is tackling so we can more effectively accomplish our
    deterrence and global strike missions. Going forward into this year,
    I've asked the group to look into additional key areas and provide
    recommendations. We will continue using this independent look to help
    shape innovation, change, and improvement throughout the command.
                                   priorities
        My priorities remain the same and are relatively simple. They guide
    every decision I make. They are Mission, airmen, and families . . .
    rooted in our Air Force Core Values and reinforced by our rich
    heritage. We exist to serve the Nation by providing strategic
    deterrence and global strike; we are ready to fight tonight, and are
    planning for the fight in 2030. The airmen in this command make this
    possible and I have charged my staff to emphasize professional
    development and provide more opportunities for every rank. I truly
    believe that while we recruit airmen, we retain families, which is why
    one of my initiatives is a renewed focus on quality of life. I declared
    2017 the Year of the Family in AFGSC. We stood up the Family and Airmen
    Support Team to identify ways we can improve where our airmen live,
    learn, and receive medical care. We will continue to build upon this
    and other initiatives throughout 2018.
                                   conclusion
        Although we account for less than one percent of the overall
    Federal budget, AFGSC forces represent two-thirds of the Nation's
    nuclear triad and oversee approximately 75 percent of the Nation's NC3
    systems. This is especially profound when considering these forces
    deliver U.S. national security 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, while
    also providing joint commanders rapid global combat airpower. AFGSC
    will continue to seek innovative, cost-saving measures to ensure our
    weapon systems are operating as efficiently and effectively as
    possible; however, as stated in the NDS, we cannot expect success
    fighting tomorrow's conflicts with yesterday's weapons.
        Modernization is critical. Great power competition has reemerged.
    AFGSC is operating a bomber force averaging over 40 years of age;
    operating ICBMs with 1960s infrastructure; and utilizing 1960s-era
    weapon storage areas. We cannot afford to delay modernization
    initiatives. The best way to avoid unthinkable conflict is to deter our
    adversaries and be prepared to fight with modern and reliable forces.
    Any American weakness emboldens competitors to subvert the rules-based
    international order and challenge the alliance and partnership network
    that underpins it. To continue to do what the Nation requires of us, we
    require a stable budget and we are on a good path moving forward; the
    American people and our allies are counting on continued congressional
    action to fund our nuclear enterprise modernization efforts.

        Senator Fischer. Thank you, General.
        Admiral Benedict?

      STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL TERRY J. BENEDICT, USN, DIRECTOR,
                       STRATEGIC SYSTEMS PROGRAMS

        Admiral Benedict. Yes, ma'am. Madam Chairman, Ranking
    Member Donnelly, thank you for the opportunity to be here
    today, and thank you for your support of the Navy's deterrence
    mission and for your very kind words to open.
        It's been my greatest privilege as the Director to
    represent the men and women of SSP [Strategic Systems Programs]
    for the last eight years. My goal as the Director has been to
    ensure that they are properly positioned to execute the mission
    with the same level of success today and tomorrow as they have
    done since our program's inception in 1955.
        SSP is currently extending the Trident II D-5 strategic
    weapon system to match the Ohio-class service life and to serve
    as the initial weapon system on the Columbia-class. I'll
    summarize our efforts by saying that all of our life extension
    programs remain on track and on budget. Our life extension
    efforts will ensure an effective and credible sea-based
    strategic deterrent on both the Ohio and the Columbia-class
    until the 2040s.
        The Navy is also taking steps to ensure a credible weapons
    system is available beyond 2040. In fact, the last Nuclear
    Posture Review directs the Navy to ``begin studies in 2020 to
    define a cost-effective, credible, and effective sea-launched
    ballistic missile that we can deploy through the life of the
    Columbia SSBN [Subsurface Ballistic Missile Nuclear] through
    the 2080s.'' We will execute that direction.
        I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Benedict follows:]

               Prepared Statement by Vice Admiral Terry Benedict
                                  introduction
        Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Donnelly, distinguished Members of
    the subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to discuss the sea-
    based leg of the triad. It is an honor to testify before you this
    morning representing the Navy's Strategic Systems Programs (SSP).
        The Nation's nuclear triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles,
    strategic bombers, and submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) is
    essential to our ability to deter major warfare with adversaries and
    assure our allies. Each leg provides unique attributes and provides an
    effective hedge. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review reaffirms that the
    nuclear triad is the bedrock of our ability to deter aggression, assure
    our allies, and hedge against an uncertain future. It also reaffirms
    the need to recapitalize each component of the triad.
        The Navy provides the most survivable leg of the triad with our
    Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and the Trident II (D5)
    strategic weapon system (SWS) they carry. SLBMs are responsible for a
    significant majority of the Nation's operationally deployed nuclear
    warheads. The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) has made clear the
    priority the Navy places on the maintenance and modernization of the
    undersea leg of the triad, saying it ``is foundational to our survival
    as a Nation.''
        SSP's mission is to design, develop, produce, support, and ensure
    the safety and security of the Trident II (D5) SWS. The men and women
    of SSP and our industry partners remain dedicated to supporting the
    mission of our sailors on strategic deterrent patrol and our marines,
    sailors, and coast guardsmen who stand watch, ensuring the security of
    the weapons we are entrusted with by this Nation.
        Our fiscal year (FY) 2019 budget request provides the required
    funding to support the program of record for the Trident II (D5) SWS.
    To sustain this capability, I am focusing on my top priorities: Safety
    and Security; the Trident II (D5) SWS Life Extension Program; Trident
    II (D5) SWS Long-Term Sustainment; the Columbia-class Program; the
    Solid Rocket Motor Industrial Base; and my Navy Nuclear Deterrence
    Mission Oversight responsibility.
        The men and women of SSP and their predecessors have provided
    unwavering and single mission-focused support to the sea-based leg of
    the triad for over six decades. As an organization, SSP is facing a bow
    wave of critical work, as most recently evidenced by the 2018 Nuclear
    Posture Review. The organization must be prepared to sustain and
    modernize a credible and effective strategic weapon system to support
    our ballistic missile submarines and our strategic deterrent mission
    until the 2080s. It has been my highest honor to represent the men and
    women of SSP for the past eight years, and my goal, as the Director, is
    to ensure they are properly positioned to execute the mission with the
    same level of success today and tomorrow as they have done since our
    program's inception in 1955.
                              safety and security
        The first priority, and the most important, is the safety and
    security of the Navy's nuclear weapons. Accordingly, Navy leadership
    delegated and defined SSP's role as the program manager and technical
    authority for the Navy's nuclear weapons.
        At its most basic level, this priority is the physical security of
    one of our Nation's most valuable assets. Our Marines and Navy Master
    at Arms Sailors provide an effective and integrated elite security
    force at our two Strategic Weapons Facilities within their area of
    operations to include the Limited Area, Convoy Route, and the
    Waterfront Restricted Areas in Kings Bay, Georgia, and Bangor,
    Washington. U.S. Coast Guard Maritime Force Protection Units have been
    commissioned at both facilities to protect our ballistic missile
    submarines. Together, the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard team form
    the foundation of our security program, while headquarters' staff
    ensures that nuclear weapons-capable activities comply with safety and
    security standards.
        We thank the Congress for the authorities provided in the Fiscal
    Year 2017 National Defense Authorization Act allowing the Services to
    use technological means to counter unmanned aerial systems (UAS) at our
    installations. This authority has enabled us to deploy systems that
    give our security forces a greater ability to identify, track, and
    defeat unauthorized small UAS.
        The Navy and SSP maintain a culture of self-assessment in order to
    ensure safety and security. This is accomplished through formal
    biennial self-assessments, periodic technical evaluations, formal
    inspections, and continuous on-site monitoring and reporting at the
    Strategic Weapons Facilities and on submarines. We also strive to
    maintain a culture of excellence to achieve the highest standards of
    performance and integrity for personnel supporting the strategic
    deterrent mission and continue to focus on the custody and
    accountability of the assets entrusted to the Navy. SSP's number one
    priority is to maintain a safe and secure strategic deterrent.
                           d5 life extension program
        The Trident II (D5) SWS has been deployed on the Ohio-class
    ballistic missile submarines for nearly three decades and is planned to
    be deployed more than 50 years. This is well beyond its original design
    life of 25 years and more than double the historical service life of
    any previous sea-based strategic deterrent system. As a result, SSP is
    extending the life of the Trident II (D5) SWS to match the Ohio-class
    submarine service life and to serve as the initial SWS for the
    Columbia-class SSBN. This is being accomplished through an update to
    all the Trident II (D5) SWS subsystems: launcher, navigation, fire
    control, guidance, missile, and reentry. Our life extension of missile
    and guidance flight hardware components is designed to meet the same
    form, fit, and function of the original system, maintain the deployed
    system as one homogeneous population, control costs, and sustain the
    demonstrated performance of the system.
        The Navy's D5 life extension program remains on track. In 2017, the
    Navy deployed 24 life-extended missiles to the Fleet and remains on
    track to complete deployment by fiscal year 2024. Later this year, we
    will begin the Commander Evaluation Test (CET) program on life-extended
    missiles to measure the performance and capability of the system
    against the demonstrated performance.
        Another major initiative to ensure the continued sustainment of our
    SWS is the SSP Shipboard Systems Integration (SSI) Program, which
    manages obsolescence and modernizes SWS shipboard systems through the
    use of open architecture design and commercial off-the-shelf hardware
    and software. The SSI Program refreshes shipboard electronics hardware
    and upgrades software, which will extend service life, enable more
    efficient and affordable future maintenance of the SWS, and ensure we
    continue to provide the highest level of nuclear weapons safety and
    security for our deployed SSBNs while meeting U.S. Strategic Command
    (STRATCOM) requirements. Twelve installations were completed in 2017;
    and two have been completed so far this year with an additional twelve
    planned.
        The Navy also works in partnership with the Department of Energy's
    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to sustain our reentry
    systems. The Trident II (D5) is capable of carrying two types of
    warheads, the W76 and the W88. Both warheads are being refurbished.
    Deliveries of life-extended W76 warheads to the Navy are over 85
    percent complete and on track to finish by the end of fiscal year 2019.
    The W88 major alteration program remains on track to support a first
    production unit in calendar year 2019 with production scheduled to
    complete in fiscal year 2024.
        In accordance with the Nuclear Posture Review, the Navy's fiscal
    year 2019 budget request supports two near-term additional efforts. The
    budget request supports investigating the feasibility of fielding the
    nuclear explosive package from the Air Force's W78 warhead replacement
    in a Navy reentry body. It also includes funding to begin efforts to
    modify a small number of SLBM warheads to provide a low-yield option.
    The Nuclear Posture Review directed that the modification to the
    existing warheads will not increase the overall number of deployed
    ballistic missile warheads. This near-term capability will bolster our
    deterrence posture by helping ensure that no adversary perceives an
    advantage through the use of limited nuclear escalation.
                   trident ii (d5) sws long-term sustainment
        The Trident II (D5) SWS continues to demonstrate itself as a
    credible deterrent and exceeds operational requirements established
    more than 30 years ago. Our life extension efforts will ensure an
    effective and credible SWS on both the Ohio-class and Columbia-class
    SSBNs until the 2040s. The Navy is also beginning an approach to
    maintain a credible and effective SWS beyond 2040, leveraging the work
    that is being done today to extend the life of the Trident II (D5) SWS
    as well as investigating opportunities to innovate, such as through the
    application of model-based engineering. In fact, the Nuclear Posture
    Review directs that the Navy ``begin studies in 2020 to define a cost-
    effective, credible, and effective SLBM that we can deploy throughout
    the service life of the Columbia SSBN.''
        SSP has a history of more than 60 years of developing, producing,
    and supporting SWSs to support the undersea leg of the triad. We have
    optimized our SWS by applying lessons learned from six generations of
    missiles and will continue to do so until the 2080s.
                             columbia-class program
        The Navy's highest priority acquisition program is the Columbia-
    class Program, which replaces the existing Ohio-class submarines. The
    continued assurance of our sea-based strategic deterrent requires a
    credible SWS, as well as the development of the next class of ballistic
    missile submarines. The Navy is taking the necessary steps to ensure
    the Columbia SSBN is designed, built, delivered, and tested on time
    with the right capabilities at an affordable cost.
        To lower development costs and leverage the proven reliability of
    the Trident II (D5) SWS, the Columbia SSBN will enter service with the
    life-extended Trident II (D5) SWS. Life-extended missiles will be
    shared with the Ohio-class submarines until their retirement.
    Maintaining a common SWS during the transition to the Columbia-class is
    beneficial from a cost, performance, and risk reduction standpoint.
        A critical component of the Columbia-class program is the
    development of a Common Missile Compartment (CMC) with the United
    Kingdom. The U.S. and the UK, one of our closest allies, have
    maintained a shared commitment to nuclear deterrence through the
    Polaris Sales Agreement since 1963. Today, the Trident II (D5) SWS is
    shared with the UK. Like the U.S. Navy, the UK is recapitalizing her
    four Vanguard-class submarines with the Dreadnought-class. The CMC will
    allow the life extended Trident II (D5) SWS to be deployed on the
    Columbia and the UK Dreadnought-class SSBNs. It will also support
    production of two new classes of SSBNs in both the U.S. and UK build
    yards. We have begun construction of missile tubes to support building
    the U.S. prototype Quad-pack module, the SWS--Ashore (SWS Ashore)
    integration test site, and the UK's first Dreadnought SSBN.
        To manage and mitigate technical risk to both the U.S. and UK
    programs, SSP is leading the development of the SWS Ashore integration
    test site at Cape Canaveral, Florida. This is a joint effort with the
    Navy and the state of Florida investing in the redevelopment of a
    Polaris site to conduct integration testing and verification for
    Columbia and UK Dreadnought programs. We reached a programmatic
    milestone last year when test bay one, which will be used to test the
    Missile Service Unit first article, achieved initial operational
    capability. In 2019, test bay two will achieve initial operational
    capability for verifying and validating the SWS support systems for the
    Columbia and UK Dreadnought programs.
        To mitigate the risk in the restart of launcher system production,
    SSP developed a surface launch test facility at the Naval Air Warfare
    Center Weapons Division, China Lake, California. This facility will
    prove that the launcher industrial base can replicate the performance
    of the Ohio-class Trident II (D5) launcher system. Last year, we
    started launching refurbished Trident II (D5) test shapes originally
    used in the 1980s. Ten evaluation launches were conducted in 2017 and
    we have conducted four of sixteen planned this year.
        The Ohio-class SSBNs will begin decommissioning in the late 2020s
    and the Columbia-class must be ready to start patrols in fiscal year
    2031 to maintain a minimum operational force of 10 SSBNs. The Navy has
    already extended the Ohio-class service life from 30 years to 42 years
    and there is no engineering margin left. Recapitalizing our SSBNs is a
    significant investment and something that happens every other
    generation, making it critically important that we do it right. Any
    delay has the potential to impact not only our ability to meet
    operational requirements, but also the UK's ability to maintain a
    continuous at sea deterrent.
                       solid rocket motor industrial base
        The defense and aerospace industrial base--in particular the solid
    rocket motor industry and its sub-tier supplier base--remains an
    important priority. While the Navy is maintaining a continuous
    production capability of rocket motors, the demand from both National
    Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Air Force has
    precipitously declined. This decline has resulted in higher costs for
    the Navy and has put an entire specialized industry at risk. Though
    future Air Force modernization will provide some much needed relief
    beginning in the mid-2020s, our Nation cannot afford to lose this
    capability.
        While the efforts of our industry partners and others have created
    short-term cost relief, the long-term support of the solid rocket motor
    industry, including its sub-tier supplier base, and maintenance of
    critical skills remains an issue that must be addressed. For example,
    we are concerned with ensured access to and affordability of certain
    critical solid rocket motor constituents, such as ammonium perchlorate.
    At SSP, we will continue to work with our industry partners, the
    Department of Defense, senior NASA leadership, Air Force, and Congress
    to do everything we can to ensure this vital national security industry
    asset is preserved.
                navy nuclear deterrence oversight responsibility
        In 2014, the CNO directed establishment of a centralized Navy
    oversight authority for nuclear force readiness. As the Director of
    SSP, I have been assigned accountability, responsibility, and authority
    to serve as the single Flag Officer to monitor performance and conduct
    end-to-end assessments of the Navy Nuclear Deterrence Mission (NNDM)
    elements and report issues to the NNDM Oversight Council and the CNO.
    As the NNDM regulatory lead, I am tasked with developing, coordinating,
    and implementing policies approved by the CNO, and conducting end-to-
    end assessments of the Navy's nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons
    systems and personnel, including Nuclear Command, Control, and
    Communications (NC3), for safe, reliable, and effective execution of
    the NNDM. In October of 2017, I submitted the second annual end-to-end
    assessment report to the CNO, and I assessed that the NNDM execution
    was effective and sustainable with some areas for improvement.
                                   conclusion
        SSP ensures a safe, secure, and effective strategic deterrent and
    focuses on the custody and accountability of the nuclear assets
    entrusted to the Navy. Sustaining the sea-based strategic deterrent
    capability is a vital national security requirement. Our Nation's sea-
    based deterrent has been a critical component of our national security
    since the 1950s and must continue to assure our allies and deter
    potential adversaries well into the future. I am privileged to
    represent this unique organization as we work to serve the best
    interests of our great Nation. I thank the committee for the
    opportunity to speak with you about the sea-based leg of the triad and
    the vital role it plays in our national security.

        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Admiral.
        As I noted in my opening statement, one of the basic
    premises of the NPR is that our nuclear forces must adapt to
    the changing threat landscape that we face. Some critics,
    including the Russian Government, have attacked us by denying
    that the security environment has changed, while others argue
    that the sheer power of the United States nuclear arsenal is
    somehow going to insulate us from any changes in a security
    environment.
        Dr. Soofer, you touched on this in your opening statement
    when you note that ``potential adversaries do not stand
    still,'' and consequently U.S. deterrence requirements cannot
    remain, as you put it, fixed.
        We've heard plenty of testimony about the changing threat
    environment on this committee and on the full committee. I
    don't think that's in question. But I'd like to explore the
    notion that U.S. nuclear forces have no need to adapt to a
    different security environment.
        So, Dr. Soofer, U.S. nuclear policy and planning has long
    emphasized the need for flexible adverse nuclear forces
    specifically to adjust to a changing threat landscape. Is that
    correct?
        Dr. Soofer. Yes, it is.
        Senator Fischer. I'm sure that you've seen these vague
    criticisms that the current U.S. nuclear posture is more than
    sufficient to deter any new threats. What is your reaction to
    statements like this? In your opinion, what would be the impact
    to strategic stability of overlooking the expansion of
    adversaries' arsenals, the increasing ability of adversaries to
    deny U.S. nuclear employment, and the violation of treaties,
    and concluding this warrants no change in U.S. nuclear posture?
        Dr. Soofer. Thank you, Madam Chair. As senior DOD
    leadership has testified, including General Hyten, today we
    have a strong nuclear deterrent, and there should be no
    question that we have the ability to deter current threats.
        In the course of the Nuclear Posture Review, we concluded
    that, as I indicated, the threat doesn't stand still, and
    there's some disturbing trends out there that require a
    response.
        One of the biggest problems that we faced was the growing
    disparity between Russia and the United States in a category of
    weapons called non-strategic nuclear weapons, sometimes
    referred to as tactical nuclear weapons. This has been a
    concern not only of ours but of previous administrations as
    well, and even during the New START ratification proceedings in
    2010 there was a provision in the resolution ratification that
    directed the administration within one year to address this
    disparity, bring the Russians back to the negotiating table.
        So we've been concerned about this for a long time, and we
    came to the conclusion that it wasn't just the numbers but it
    was the types of capabilities that they were deploying--depth
    charges, torpedoes, short-range ballistic missiles; air, land,
    and sea-launched cruise missiles. Why would you build so many
    different types of nuclear weapons? Both the United States and
    Russia reduced their tactical nuclear weapons at the end of the
    Cold War. We have a modest number that we are modernizing but
    certainly not expanding, but the Russians are expanding their
    capabilities.
        So they have the capabilities, plus you've heard about
    their nuclear doctrine, their limited nuclear war doctrine.
    Some people would argue that maybe the Russians wouldn't do
    this in an actual scenario, but we have to assume that they
    would because they have the capability and they exercise the
    capability.
        So you have the doctrine, you have the capabilities, you
    have what everybody agrees is a more belligerent Russia. So we
    add all that up, and we came to the conclusion that just maybe
    the Russians perceived an advantage with this new capability.
    After all, if they didn't think they needed them, they probably
    wouldn't build them given our strategic triad.
        So we felt we had to do something in the near term and in
    the long term to address this problem. In the near term it's
    the modification of a modest number of submarine-launched
    ballistic missile warheads, just so the Russians understand
    that at that low level of low-yield capability, we have a
    response option, the president has a response option. It's for
    deterrence purposes, not for warfighting.
        In the longer term, how do you address this growing
    disparity in non-strategic weapons? We've been trying to get
    the Russians to come back to the table to negotiate reductions,
    but they haven't been willing to come back. So by going forward
    with a sea-launched cruise missile capability, a capability
    that, by the way, is consistent with the INF Treaty, consistent
    with the New START Treaty, maybe this will give us some
    leverage to bring them back to the negotiating table.
        If we don't do this, the problem may be that we get to a
    point where the Russians may perceive they have not only a
    military advantage over us, because the numbers are so
    disparate, but now your allies start to worry. They say, well,
    the Russians have two times or three times, ten times as many
    weapons as the United States does. Maybe in a crisis situation,
    they'd question our leadership. So there's a real military and
    strategic problem associated, I think, with not addressing the
    growing threat.
        I hope that answers the question.
        Senator Fischer. Yes. As we look at Russia and their
    doctrine of escalate to deescalate, and I think we've had
    numerous discussions on that in this subcommittee and in the
    full committee as a whole, there seems to be acceptance of that
    now and kind of almost a downplaying of it, and instead the
    focus I think is on--and I think it comes from the Russians in
    many areas. The focus is on we are so superior in our nuclear
    capabilities, the power that the United States has, then why
    would the United States need to change? They view it as a
    change in the posture that we're taking.
        You mentioned so many points to that, but specifically how
    would you address the Russians saying that the United States
    has such superiority when it comes to our power that we have
    with our nuclear capabilities that there's no way they're going
    to do the escalate to deescalate?
        Dr. Soofer. First, the Russian claim in Putin's March 1st,
    speech, where he's claiming that he's doing this in reaction to
    what the United States is doing, of course that's nonsense
    because these capabilities, the Russian capabilities have been
    in development for decades. So it's clearly not a response to
    what the United States is doing. We are playing catch-up at
    this point. So I think that criticism on its face is just
    false.
        So I'm not quite sure how to address it other than that. I
    would just go back to say that even Ash Carter, former
    Secretary of Defense, he noted that there has been no arms
    race. The only country that's been running this race has been
    the Russians over the last 10, 20 years.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you.
        Senator Donnelly?
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Assistant Secretary Roberts, what is your assessment of the
    NNSA [National Nuclear Security Administration] efforts on
    modernization in general and the ability to produce up to 80
    plutonium pits by 2030, as required by statute?
        Secretary Roberts. Thank you, Senator, for the question.
    Given the future stockpile requirements, number one, I
    certainly support, as stated in the NPR, to produce 80 pits by
    2030. Based on the work that we've done now, I think that we're
    in a good position to actually achieve that. We've recently
    completed a review. It was basically an engineering analysis,
    as well as a workforce analysis on the path that we've looked
    at, the various alternatives that have come out of those, both
    an analysis of alternatives review and this engineering
    analysis that was just recently completed.
        The modernization aspects we've looked at that are in place
    at a production facility at Los Alamos, this is the one place
    where we still have existing and enduring production
    capabilities. In fact, Los Alamos has been the plutonium Center
    of Excellence for operations. They will have the capability to
    produce up to 30 pits per year. Now we have to look at how we
    get from 31 to 80.
        So this engineering analysis was looking at the processes
    that are necessary to select the best location for future pit
    production requirements of 50-plus pits per year, and we're
    undergoing right now a final assessment to make a
    recommendation to the Deputy Secretary of Energy. Hopefully
    that will be done very soon. We've looked at the various
    alternatives, and we've come up with a recommendation that will
    hopefully meet that requirement, and we'll do that before the
    11th of May, which we're required to do by law, as you know.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
        Admiral Benedict, can you give us the status for fiscal
    year 2019 on the Navy role in the conventional prompt strike
    system?
        Admiral Benedict. Yes, sir. To date, we have been operating
    under the Defense-wide account. We flew a very successful
    experiment late last year in the fall. As I have briefed, the
    results of that were classified, but it was a very successful
    experiment, met all our objectives. We have now been directed
    to do the second experiment along the lines of conventional
    prompt strike, as well as at the direction of OSD [Office of
    the Security of Defense] we are running a motor competition.
    The inputs from industry are in SSP. We are evaluating those,
    and I would suspect that we will make an award here very
    shortly.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
        Dr. Soofer, we haven't seen all the budget data for the
    low-yield submarine-launched ballistic missile. How much will
    it cost in fiscal year 2019 for the NNSA and for the DOD?
        Dr. Soofer. Thank you, Senator. I believe the request for
    Department of Defense is $23 million, and I think it will be
    $50 million to complete the project. Unfortunately, Senator, I
    don't have the numbers for NNSA. I'm going to say that they're
    going to be in a similar range, and those numbers will be
    provided to Congress by OMB [Office of Management and Budget]
    in a whole-of-government errata by the end of this month.
        Senator Donnelly. Okay. Thank you.
        General Rand, my understanding is we dropped from the B-2
    the ability to send and receive information with the new
    satellite system that can operate in a nuclear stress
    environment. Does that concern you?
        General Rand. No, sir. I made that decision largely, and
    then coordinated it with my boss, General Hyten, at STRATCOM.
    The rationale, sir, is that the AEHF [Advanced Extremely High
    Frequency] that you referred to will not be fielded until 2026.
    It's our intention to sunset the B-2 in the early 2030s. The
    six years of utility to have us receive and transmit isn't
    worth the squeeze when that $1.3 billion that we save can be
    used for other more critical MC-3 capabilities across the
    enterprise.
        I will tell you that what we did do is we have sped up the
    acquisition of what's called the common very low frequency
    receiver that we will start putting on the B-2 in fiscal year
    2019.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
        Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Donnelly.
        Senator Sullivan?
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Gentlemen, thanks for being here.
        Dr. Soofer, I wanted to thank you for your help previously
    on the Advancing America's Missile Defense Act. A number of us
    worked on that last year and it became a full part of the NDAA
    [National Defense Authorization Act]; very strong bipartisan
    support, by the way. It started really significantly revamping
    our missile defense for our country when the threats are very
    significant.
        As you know, in the previous NDAA there had been a demand
    for the completion of the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, and
    I'm sure all of you are hard at work. I had the opportunity to
    question Undersecretary Rood on that recently, and I was
    pressing him. Didn't get it, but I'd like to press you now to
    try to get the review sooner rather than later because, again,
    one of the things that I think was very positive in this last
    go-around was that it was very bipartisan. I'm working with a
    number of folks on the committee and some of the folks in the
    Pentagon. I'm looking at ways to make progress again on some of
    the missile defense issues.
        It would be really important, as we're marking up the NDAA
    this year, to be informed by the review. Otherwise we
    essentially miss an entire year.
        So you probably were ready for this question, but can we
    get a commitment from you to have that done, say, by within the
    next month? You know how this schedule works.
        Dr. Soofer. Yes.
        Senator Sullivan. How about before we start marking up the
    NDAA in earnest?
        Dr. Soofer. Senator, we are now weeks away from getting
    this done. I think the draft is done. It's a coordination
    problem, and you know how difficult it is to get coordination.
        Senator Sullivan. Correct, but you know how difficult it is
    to miss the window.
        Dr. Soofer. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sullivan. Given your background, you know a lot
    about how the markup of that bill works. Do you think we'll
    have it in time to be informed as we mark up the next National
    Defense Authorization Act? It would be a missed opportunity is
    all I'm saying.
        Dr. Soofer. It would be, sir, and we will do our best to
    have it done and to you by the end of this month or early next
    month.
        Senator Sullivan. Okay. Good. Well, we want to keep working
    with you and keep pressing you on that.
        Let me ask, as we are looking at one of the things--we did
    a CODEL [Congressional Delegation], a number of us, up to Fort
    Greeley in Alaska where we're going to have a new missile
    defense field built. One of the challenges that we want to work
    with all of you on, Senator Inhofe and I, and I know the Chair
    and Ranking, I'm sure are very supportive of this as well, but
    when we were up there talking about how long it would take to
    actually fully operationalize a new field at Fort Greeley,
    which everybody agrees we need, the estimates were four, maybe
    five years--four, maybe five years. We won World War II in four
    to five years.
        So we want to work with all of you to accelerate the
    deployment of these missiles that are supposed to protect the
    entire United States, and I think four to five years is
    unacceptable. I think everybody says it's unacceptable, but we
    need to look at ways to make sure that--the threat is here. The
    threat is here right now, today. The whole point of the bill
    was to advance our missile defense. Four to five years doesn't
    help anyone.
        Do you care to comment on that, any of the members of the
    panel here? We need to do more, faster, and we can. We won a
    war in that amount of time. I think we can build a new missile
    field.
        Dr. Soofer. Senator, I agree. I've always wondered why it
    takes so long. The answer that usually comes back is the
    weather in Alaska, the construction----
        Senator Sullivan. Well, trust me, we built the Alcan
    Highway in World War II, which was 1,100 miles, in eight
    months. We can do this stuff. We can do it. We're Americans, we
    can do it. So the weather is not a big deal in Alaska, trust
    me.
        Dr. Soofer. I think the other limiting factor may be
    development of the redesigned kill vehicle.
        Senator Sullivan. We can get the silos built, and I'm not
    saying we have to get that done. How about just a commitment
    from all of you at all levels of the government to just
    accelerate this? Nobody wants this to be four to five years.
    Can I get that from everybody here in positions of authority?
        Dr. Soofer. Yes, sir.
        Admiral Benedict. Yes, sir. Absolutely.
        Senator Sullivan. One final question. As we are looking at
    the missile defense provisions in the NDAA, one issue that
    keeps coming up is the idea of space-based sensors uniformly to
    integrate our theater, Aegis, THAAD [Terminal High Altitude
    Area Defense], homeland. Would you all agree with that as a
    priority?
        Dr. Soofer. Absolutely.
        Senator Sullivan. Okay. Thank you.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
        Senator Warren?
        Senator Warren. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Thank you to our witnesses for being here today.
        So, the Administration's Nuclear Posture Review calls for a
    new low-yield submarine-launched ballistic missile. DOD has
    previously suggested that this could be accomplished quickly by
    modifying the W-76 warhead that goes into our existing
    submarine-launched Trident missile. The NNSA administrator
    recently came before our committee, and she testified that she
    didn't know how long it would take NNSA to modify the W-76
    warhead, and she didn't know whether it could be done before
    the life extension production line closes at the end of the
    year.
        So let me ask you this, Dr. Soofer. Does DOD know how long
    it will take to modify the W-76 warhead?
        Dr. Soofer. When we considered this during the Nuclear
    Posture Review, and, since then, we came to the conclusion
    based on talking to people at NNSA that this could take 2 to 3
    years at the most.
        Senator Warren. So you think 2 to 3. Does that mean it
    can't be done by the end of the life extension program?
        Dr. Soofer. I think it's important that it be done by the
    end of the life extension program.
        Senator Warren. So you think it will be within the end of
    the life extension program.
        Dr. Soofer. It should be.
        Senator Warren. Okay. All right. So, the NNSA administrator
    also testified that NNSA had not requested any funding to
    modify the W-76 warhead, she didn't know if they would request
    a reprogramming or a supplemental request, so let me ask you
    about that one, Dr. Soofer. I understand that the DOD budget
    does include $22.6 million for the SLBM [submarine-launched
    ballistic missile]. Is the OMB request next month a
    reprogramming or a supplemental?
        Dr. Soofer. They call it, as a formal term, errata. It's a
    whole-of-government errata.
        Senator Warren. An errata?
        Dr. Soofer. An errata.
        Senator Warren. Okay.
        Dr. Soofer. It's a new term to me, as well. But it
    essentially will be a reallocation of funds, because I think
    they're thinking of trying to do that with existing funds, but
    I'm not sure. It's called an errata, a whole-of-government
    errata.
        Senator Warren. Okay, but it's a reallocation is what
    you're telling me, it's not new money. You're shaking your
    head, right? It's a reallocation. So what is the money going to
    be reallocated from?
        Dr. Soofer. That's a decision for NNSA and the Department
    of Energy to make, and I'm not privy to that.
        Senator Warren. So we don't know where it comes from.
        Dr. Soofer. You'll know when you see the budget request.
        Senator Warren. Okay. But right now, it's that somebody is
    actually willing to give up $23 million, right? Okay.
        What is DOD using the $23 million for?
        Admiral Benedict. So, ma'am, the $23 million in the
    Department of Defense is actually in my budget, and my budget
    will be to do the integration of the NNSA effort to ensure that
    all my documentation is complete and consistent with this type
    of weapon, and to do the work at my strategic weapons
    facilities, to do the loud-out change between the current
    configuration on the submarines and this new configuration.
        Senator Warren. Okay. So the NNSA is going to do the actual
    modification.
        Admiral Benedict. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Warren. The $22.6 million is so that you can--say
    that one more time?
        Admiral Benedict. I need to do the integration of their
    effort with----
        Senator Warren. So it's to integrate.
        Admiral Benedict. Yes, sir. Yes, ma'am, integrate with the
    system. I need to change all my documentation to ensure that
    I'm complete and consistent with nuclear weapons, and then I
    need to do the actual work at my strategic weapons facilities
    to change the warhead on the missiles. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Warren. Okay. Thank you.
        You know, I appreciate and I think you all understand why
    we're concerned about this. We're all familiar with NNSA's
    program management challenges in recent years, and given that
    track record, I find the number of unknowns that we heard
    before from the administrator and that still seem to be there
    worrisome. We're already asking them to conduct an
    unprecedented number of life cycle extension programs, along
    with other demands of the stockpile stewardship programs, and I
    just have real concerns about their capacity to take on
    additional work. I think maintaining our current arsenal and
    our current programs should be our number-one priority and that
    we should manage that first.
        Thank you very much. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Warren.
        Senator Cotton?
        Senator Cotton. Dr. Soofer, I want to speak to you first
    about Russia's pattern of behavior regarding their
    international commitments. Is Russia violating the INF Treaty?
        Dr. Soofer. Yes, it is, Senator.
        Senator Cotton. Is Russia still violating the Open Skies
    Treaty?
        Dr. Soofer. I believe so, Senator.
        Senator Cotton. We also know what happened in the United
    Kingdom a few weeks ago with the poisoning of two Russians. I
    know you aren't the lead for chemical weapons issues, but given
    what's been reported by our Government and the actions we've
    taken, is it fair to say that Russia has violated the Chemical
    Weapons Convention?
        Dr. Soofer. I don't know, Senator. I assume so.
        Senator Cotton. I'll answer yes.
        What about some other international agreements to which
    Russia is a party? The Budapest Memorandum, the Presidential
    Nuclear Initiatives, the Conventional Forces in Europe
    Agreement, the BNN document. Is Russia out of compliance with
    all of these in one way or another?
        Dr. Soofer. Yes, Senator.
        Senator Cotton. What do you think this pattern of behavior
    tells us about how much Russia respects its international
    commitments?
        Dr. Soofer. I think they scorn their international
    commitments, and they're bent on upsetting the status quo.
        Senator Cotton. So what about the New START Treaty? Is
    Russia complying with its obligations under New START?
        Dr. Soofer. We believe that they have met the limits. Yes,
    Senator.
        Senator Cotton. After all the scorn they show for these
    other commitments, they are upholding their commitments under
    the New START Treaty. Why would that be?
        Dr. Soofer. I think it's a strategic approach. I think that
    they are limiting their strategic nuclear weapons while they
    circumvent this by building up their non-strategic nuclear
    weapons that are not limited by the treaty. I think it's a very
    clever approach.
        Senator Cotton. So they are complying with their
    obligations under the treaty that tends to benefit them while
    they get the benefits of violating all of their other treaties.
        Dr. Soofer. Yes, sir.
        Senator Cotton. Well, New START expires in about 3 years,
    but we'll have the option to extend it for another 5 years. Do
    you think it makes sense in this set of circumstances to extend
    the New START Treaty if Russia remains in violation of almost
    every other international agreement that they have made?
        Dr. Soofer. Senator, we're going to begin a whole-of-
    government review of the pros and cons of extending that
    treaty.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you.
        Finally, I want to address what President Putin said in his
    televised remarks last month about all kinds of new Russian
    capabilities. I don't think any of these capabilities were
    terribly surprising for people who have followed the matters.
    But would something like an intercontinental-range nuclear-
    powered cruise missile be covered under the New START Treaty?
    Or what about his so-called intercontinental underwater
    vehicle?
        Dr. Soofer. Senator, these are not covered by the New START
    Treaty.
        Senator Cotton. So, all of the new systems he's announced
    are not covered by the treaty that benefits him, and he
    violates all the obligations under the other treaties that
    don't benefit him. Given that set of circumstances, I think we
    should take a serious second look at extending the New START
    Treaty.
        Admiral Benedict, if I can turn to you, I noted in the
    Nuclear Posture Review that it said we would now field a fleet
    of at least--that's the quote, ``at least''--12 Columbia-class
    SSBNs. I think the previous statement had been we would field
    12 Columbia-class SSBNs. Does that mean that there is some
    thinking inside the Navy or the broader Department of Defense
    that we might need more than 12 Columbia-class submarines?
        Admiral Benedict. Sure. I think that's a decision that will
    be made and a recommendation made by leadership as we approach
    the end of production. But I think, given the current changing
    world dynamic, we want to reserve the right to revisit that at
    some point.
        Senator Cotton. So that's the import of those words ``at
    least?''
        Admiral Benedict. Yes, sir.
        Senator Cotton. I think that's something we should
    entertain as well. I was glad to see that in the review, and
    thank you for that, Admiral.
        Gentlemen, thank you again for your testimony today.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator.
        We'll begin a second round of questions.
        Dr. Soofer, the Nuclear Posture Review repeatedly makes the
    point that we have not made sufficient progress towards a
    responsive nuclear infrastructure despite the fact that it's
    been a longstanding goal that's been confirmed in previous
    NPRs. So with that in mind, can you describe how the Department
    is translating the NPR into specific guidance, and what
    processes will be put in place so we can assure a successful
    implementation?
        Dr. Soofer. Thank you, Senator. Just today, as a matter of
    fact, we put together a package or a memo to the Secretary of
    Defense that lists about 40 different actions following from
    the Nuclear Posture Review. Those actions are assigned to
    specific entities within the Department of Defense--Joint
    Staff, Army, Navy, OSD policy, STRATCOM. It's our
    recommendation that the Office of the Secretary of Defense
    review the progress twice a year and report to the Deputy and
    the Secretary on how well we're implementing these specific
    recommendations.
        Again, there are about 40 different recommendations. Some
    of those recommendations speak directly to our hedging criteria
    and the need to have a more responsive nuclear infrastructure.
    I will note, however, that these implementation recommendations
    are only for the Department of Defense and do not pertain to
    the Department of Energy. They would have their own procedures.
        Senator Fischer. Will the Department provide that
    implementation guidance to this committee?
        Dr. Soofer. I think as soon as the Secretary of Defense
    signs that, we should come up and brief you on the
    implementation plan.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you.
        You mentioned hedging, and with the NPR we see that it
    emphasizes the importance of being able to hedge against the
    geopolitical and technical uncertainties that we're seeing out
    there.
        To what extent is the Department reviewing its hedging
    strategies to ensure that they're keeping pace with this new
    threat environment?
        Dr. Soofer. Maybe I can start, but Secretary Roberts, given
    his affiliation with the Nuclear Weapons Council, may be better
    suited. But this idea of hedging is nothing new. Previous
    administrations have done it, and they've hedged against
    geopolitical changes, what happens if the relationship with
    Russia gets even worse and they break out of the New START
    Treaty and they start deploying more weapons? How do you hedge
    against that? Do you hedge against technical problems in your
    force?
        Because our force is so old and we're in the process of
    recapitalizing every leg, we also have a new level of risk
    called programmatic risk or schedule risk. So what happens if
    the new systems don't come online in time before the old
    systems are retired? So we have to figure out a way to hedge
    against that possibility given the fact that sometimes programs
    are late.
        So again, this is part of the NPR implementation tasking,
    but I think the Nuclear Weapons Council is looking seriously at
    this as well.
        Senator Fischer. Mr. Secretary, that also is an issue when
    we look at the NNSA's protection capacity, correct?
        Secretary Roberts. Yes, yes.
        Senator Fischer. Would you like to continue from Dr.
    Soofer's comments on that?
        Secretary Roberts. Well, first of all, I endorse everything
    he said. But also, the Nuclear Weapons Council and the
    subordinate bodies, because we have now created three other
    subordinate bodies, one on standing and safety, one on
    transformation coordination, and then one on compartmental
    issues and an advisory committee for that regard, what we're
    doing is we are taking on that accountability and enforcement,
    looking at the priorities.
        Senator Fischer. When you say we're taking it on, is that
    the Weapons Council?
        Secretary Roberts. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Fischer. Okay.
        Secretary Roberts. Taking on those roles and
    responsibilities, in effect an enforcing function because of
    the criticality of the dates we've set out very explicitly in
    the Nuclear Posture Review. There is no margin for many of
    these programs. If we don't, we're going to have a gap, and
    that gap is going to adversely affect our deterrence to the
    point where it may not be credible. So that's very important.
    It will be difficult, but it's something that we absolutely
    have to do.
        Senator Fischer. Do you have any insight into the future in
    looking at how that road map is going to differ, perhaps, from
    any existing plans or requirements that we have out there now?
        Secretary Roberts. I've been very----
        Senator Fischer. Or are you just right on schedule, right
    on point?
        Secretary Roberts. I've never been very good at predicting
    the future.
        Senator Fischer. But you do have the flexibility to
    confront any changes that may be happening on the world stage?
        Secretary Roberts. Yes, and that's part of my office's
    responsibilities, is that we'll be watching that very closely
    and identifying, in fact, and bringing to this committee any
    issues and problems that we see are important and that need to
    be addressed.
        Senator Fischer. Okay. Thank you very much.
        Senator Donnelly?
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Secretary Roberts, will the low-yield submarine ballistic
    missile warhead undergo the traditional 6.x review process the
    Nuclear Weapons Council has established for acquisition
    programs?
        Secretary Roberts. Yes, it will.
        Senator Donnelly. This would be for General Rand. My
    understanding is that your organization has ownership of the
    National Emergency Airborne Command Post, or NEACP, a modified
    747, which is aging out by the 2030s. How is its replacement
    coming along?
        General Rand. Sir, there has been no money yet laid into
    the palm or the fight app for this, but I think we are going to
    begin some very serious discussions in the next weeks and
    months to follow, but not only about the NEACP but, if I could,
    about the family of systems that includes the Take Charge and
    Move Out, as well as the Airborne Command Post. So I will pitch
    my opinions and ideas to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force
    and to General Hyten, and there is no doubt a need to get very
    serious about this.
        Senator Donnelly. Because the follow-up question I had is
    are some of its missions going to be split amongst other
    aircrafts and other commands?
        General Rand. No, sir, not at this time. We intend to keep
    the NEACP for what it's intended for the ability for the
    nuclear command and control communications, as well as to
    support Secretary of Defense. But we will keep those three, the
    Take Charge and Move Out that supports the Navy, and the
    Airborne Command Post, as well as how we use the NEACP.
        Senator Donnelly. Okay.
        General Rand. I personally am in favor of looking at some
    commonality in that platform, though, for those three missions.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
        Admiral Benedict, what are we doing, or what do we need to
    be doing, to solve the radiation hardened microelectronic
    problem that seems to be looming?
        Admiral Benedict. Yes, sir. That is not a Navy problem,
    that is not an Air Force problem. I believe that is a national
    problem, and I will tell you that the Department of Defense is
    extremely serious about taking that on at the Department level.
    OSD Industrial Base, that group that manages industry, has
    formed a task force which has not just the Navy and the Air
    Force on it but also DTRA [Defense Threat Reduction Agency] and
    all the other interagency groups which will deal with radiation
    levels to an event of a nuclear capability. That is chaired by
    OSD Industrial Base, and the executive agent for that is
    actually Crane.
        Crane has done all our nuclear rad hard piece part work for
    the D-5 life extension effort. We have procured enough parts to
    ensure that we can sustain the Trident II D-5 life extension
    effort through the 2040s. Our next need will be in the follow-
    on, which is directed in the NPR, and we are working closely
    with the United States Air Force. We passed the entire rad hard
    database that we developed for the life extension effort to the
    Air Force as part of commonality, and they will be the first
    ones to deal with the actual issue of reduced capacity for the
    rad hard industry in the U.S.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
        Admiral Benedict, what's the status for the rocket
    propellant industrial base?
        Admiral Benedict. Sir, that remains, in my opinion, my
    professional opinion, fragile. We are down to, essentially, two
    major suppliers. If you were to segregate those between large
    capability and small to medium capability, we have one in each.
    Not only are we fragile in the major developers for solid
    rocket motors, we are seeing fragility within the suppliers of
    constituents, some of the necessary chemicals that make up a
    large percentage of a solid rocket motor. That is, again, being
    addressed in OSD at the Industrial Base Group through policy.
    We are working closely with the Industrial Base.
        I'll just remind this committee, we are the only strategic
    asset that is in production today. We have maintained a minimum
    state of production for the Trident II D-5 rocket motors in
    order to ensure that there is capacity. That skill set does
    remain alive, and we are producing at the minimum sustaining
    safe rate for the Trident rocket motors. The next, again, large
    rocket motor production requirement will be the Air Force GBSD
    [Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent] effort.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
        Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Peters?
        Senator Peters. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Thank you for all four of your testimonies here today and
    for your service to the country. We appreciate it.
        Dr. Soofer, I'd like to start with you and ask you a little
    bit about missile defense. I understand the NDAA is reviewing
    three potential locations for a continental U.S. interceptor
    site to join the current sites that are out there. One of the
    locations under consideration is Fort Custer Training Center,
    as you know, in Michigan, and my understanding is that that
    site is shovel ready. It provides the lowest cost, the least
    environmental impact options out there, which we're very proud
    of.
        In last year's STRATCOM posture hearing, General Hyten
    testified that it would likely take 5 to 10 years to construct
    a third site once the decision is made. This is not something,
    obviously, that you can just turn on. As a result of that, I
    would agree with Senator Sullivan, who suggested that we need
    this report as soon as possible so we can inform the NDAA and
    be thinking through some of these strategic implications going
    forward.
        So my question for you is, what are the criteria and
    priorities that the NDAA will consider when selecting a
    preferred site for the continental interceptor site, as
    required?
        Dr. Soofer. Senator, I think the Missile Defense Review
    will try to address some of that. If I could just talk
    generally about the types of criteria----
        Senator Peters. That would be great.
        Dr. Soofer. You have to ask yourself, what is the threat
    you're protecting against? If it's mostly coming from the east,
    say from the Middle East, there's one location. If you want to
    get the Middle East and provide additional protection from
    North Korea, you might choose a different site. Are you trying
    to maximize your battle space, get as many shots off as
    possible, have what's called a shoot opportunity? That will
    dictate which site.
        So all three of those in terms of getting input from the
    warfighter, balancing it against the threat, and the ease of
    construction, I think those are all being weighed.
        Senator Peters. In the full committee recently, actually in
    February, I asked General Robinson about the missile threat
    from Iran, and she indicated--I'll quote her statement in the
    committee. She said she ``watches North Korea with an eyeball
    and a half, and then a half an eyeball on Iran.''
        So from a battle space perspective, what are the current
    consequences--or I should say what would be the consequences
    for the current GMD [Ground-Based Midcourse Defense] system if
    Iran were to develop a ballistic missile capability that would
    threaten the United States?
        Dr. Soofer. Based on our analysis during the missile
    defense review--and I think this is supported by the previous
    administration's findings--you can actually protect most of the
    United States against an Iranian threat from the interceptors
    at Fort Greeley, as long as you have the proper sensor support
    on the east side. You may recall that we had plans to build a
    long-range discriminating radar in Alaska to help discriminate
    the threat from North Korea. You have to do the same from Iran.
        So there is some inherent capability today to defend
    against Iran, but it depends on the complexity of the Iranian
    threat. If they have more warheads, more counter-measures, then
    the system in Fort Greeley would not suffice and it would make
    sense to have an additional site, a third site somewhere else
    to deal with that threat.
        Senator Peters. Areas such as Michigan, New York, and Ohio
    that are being considered, something towards the Midwest or
    East would be the place to have it, would be the natural site
    for it?
        Dr. Soofer. Yes, sir.
        Senator Peters. So the question, though, as you mentioned,
    we may have that capability, unless the system is more
    sophisticated. However, given the fact that we have to look 5
    to 10 years out and that's not an easy task to do, but it's
    probably safe to assume that if they should get that
    capability, they will constantly be improving it over that
    time, that we need to be making these plans now. So that
    process, there's a balancing act of what we can do now and what
    we must do in the future. How do you weigh those?
        Dr. Soofer. Exactly right, sir. I'll be honest with you
    that one of the greatest areas of uncertainty is the nature of
    the threat. We can share with you the information we have in
    the intelligence world and have a more fulsome discussion about
    that, but then there's also the issue of cost.
        Senator Peters. Of course.
        Dr. Soofer. To go to an additional site, I'm thinking about
    $5 billion. Others say the priority should be sensors in space,
    or a multiple kill vehicle, so we have to weigh those.
        This committee had some very significant debates over an
    East Coast missile defense site, and I think where they came
    down was it's a hedge against the Iranian threat to go forward
    with a sensor. So there is a requirement for an Atlantic radar.
        All these considerations are important. What happens to the
    future of the agreement with Iran? This could all impact the
    nature of the threat, and I think that's going to be weighed in
    the final Missile Defense Review, sir.
        Senator Peters. Right. Thank you for your response,
    appreciate it.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator.
        I have one last question for the Admiral and the General. I
    would be interested in knowing your views on the NPR, if you
    support it, if you see it as enhancing our ability to deter our
    adversaries.
        General Rand. Madam Chair, as I told you this morning, I
    believe it's a good, sound document, and in my mind it's what
    the 11 previous administrations supported. It states the fact
    that there's a requirement for the triad to continue, that it
    needs to be lethal, and it should be used only in extreme
    circumstances. I like the fact that that is our declaratory
    policy, and I think it is a good guideline for setting the tone
    for deterrence and assurance.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir.
        Admiral?
        Admiral Benedict. Yes, ma'am. I would echo what General
    Rand said. We were supportive during the development of the
    NPR. We stand fully in a supporting role of being able to
    deploy a low-yield weapon on the Trident weapon system as
    quickly as possible, and I believe it actually enhances
    deterrence. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir.
        Senator Donnelly, did you have other questions?
        Senator Donnelly. No, Madam Chair.
        Senator Fischer. Okay. With that, I would like to thank our
    panel of witnesses for coming before this committee today. Your
    information is always very helpful to us.
        We extend our best wishes to General Rand and Admiral
    Benedict for your many years of service to this country. Thank
    you very much.
        We are adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 3:39 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Deb Fischer
                        stockpile responsiveness program
        1. Senator Fischer. Secretary Roberts, Dr. Soofer, the nuclear
    posture review emphasizes the importance of the NNSA's Stockpile
    Responsiveness Program (SRP). Please describe the Department's views of
    this program and the unique contribution it makes to the long-term
    future of our nuclear enterprise.
        Secretary Roberts. The Stockpile Responsiveness Program established
    by Congress directs National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to
    continually exercise all capabilities required to conceptualize, study,
    design, develop, engineer, certify, produce, and deploy nuclear
    weapons. The SRP makes a unique and critical contribution to ensure the
    nation has a resilient and responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure.
    This program is critical to achieve the objectives of the Nuclear
    Posture Review (NPR) and could include: i. Development of rapid
    prototyping capabilities; ii. Development of options for modifying
    warheads to increase flexibility and responsiveness; iii. Surveying
    past and extant warhead designs to understand what can be certified
    without resuming full-scale nuclear testing; and iv. Reducing the time
    required to design, develop, and initially produce a warhead.
        Dr. Soofer. The Stockpile Responsiveness Program (SRP) established
    by Congress directs National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to
    continually exercise all capabilities required to conceptualize, study,
    design, develop, engineer, certify, produce, and deploy nuclear
    weapons. The SRP makes a unique and critical contribution to ensure the
    nation has a resilient and responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure.
    This Program is critical to achieve the objectives of the 2018 Nuclear
    Posture Review (NPR) and include: 1) development of rapid prototyping
    capabilities; 2) development of options for modifying warheads to
    increase flexibility and responsiveness; 3) surveying past and extant
    warhead designs to understand what can be certified without resuming
    full-scale nuclear testing; and 4) reducing the time required to
    design, develop, and initially produce a warhead.

        2. Senator Fischer. Secretary Roberts, Dr. Soofer, will the
    Department playing a role in setting the goals or selecting the
    projects this program will pursue?
        Secretary Roberts. DOD will work with DOE/NNSA to identify DOD's
    roles and responsibilities; and identify a mechanism to establish
    governance to coordinate SRP activities.
        Dr. Soofer. DOD will work with the Department of Energy (DOE)/NNSA
    to identify DOD's roles and responsibilities; and identify a mechanism
    to establish governance to coordinate Stockpile Responsiveness Program
    activities.
                       sea-launched cruise missile (slcm)
        3. Senator Fischer. Dr. Soofer, please provide an anticipated
    timeline and associated milestones for the Department's Analysis of
    Alternatives (AOA) for the sea-launched cruise missile?
        Dr. Soofer. The U.S. Navy is working closely with the Joint Staff
    and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to evaluate
    options for a nuclear sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) based on the
    policy guidance reflected in the 2018 NPR. This evaluation process,
    which is ongoing, will include an Analysis of Alternatives (AOA), as
    well as timelines and milestones.

        4. Senator Fischer. Dr. Soofer, what organization will lead the
    AOA?
        Dr. Soofer. The U.S. Navy, working closely with the Joint Staff and
    the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

        5. Senator Fischer. Secretary Roberts, Dr. Soofer, the AOA will
    presumably analyze alternatives related to the missile body and the
    platform, but the SLCM will also require a warhead. Will the AOA
    analyze alternatives related to which warhead will be mated with the
    missile, and if not, how and when will the Department synchronize the
    SLCM program with an NNSA warhead program?
        Secretary Roberts. In concurrence with the Analysis of Alternatives
    AOA, the nuclear weapons joint lifecycle process will provide the
    Nuclear Weapons Council with options for evaluation regarding the most
    appropriate sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) warhead. The selected
    warhead will undergo a deliberate and detailed analysis in order to
    validate its suitability in meeting military requirements.
        Dr. Soofer. In concurrence with the Analysis of Alternatives AOA,
    the nuclear weapons joint lifecycle process will provide the Nuclear
    Weapons Council with options for evaluation regarding the most
    appropriate sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) warhead. The selected
    warhead will undergo a deliberate and detailed analysis in order to
    validate its suitability in meeting military requirements.
                           nuclear enterprise reviews
        6. Senator Fischer. General Rand, in 2014, the Department made a
    series of recommendations that were intended to improve morale and
    operations at the missile wings. Some of these recommendations were
    implemented and closed out--like, for example, the elevation of the
    Commander of Global Strike Command to a four-star billet. Others are
    ongoing. Initially, the DOD Office of Cost Assessment and Program
    Evaluation was tasked with monitoring the implementation of the
    recommendations, but in December of 2016 that responsibility was
    transferred to the Navy and the Air Force.
        How is the Air Force monitoring the implementation of the
    recommendations?
        General Rand. AFGSC developed a regular mechanism to reinforce the
    progress we've made since the Nuclear Enterprise Review (NER) and ICBM
    and Bomber Force Improvement Programs (FIP) in order to ensure
    continued improvement. The Global Strike Health and Operations Board
    and Council (GSHOB/C) is one venue where commanders from across AFGSC
    gather monthly to review airmen, commander, and stakeholder inputs for
    improvement and tracking progress. This avenue provides every Striker a
    direct line of communication to the AFGSC Commander on how to improve
    our capability, capacity, and human capital. The meticulous tracking of
    every input guarantees all ideas are explored, identifies root causes,
    and implements long-term, sustainable solutions. This forum identifies
    and shares Best Practices across all organizations within the command
    and allows the AFGSC Commander to adapt and modify the venue to
    proactively respond to areas identified for command-wide focus,
    ensuring future generations do not repeat previous findings/
    shortcomings. Additionally, this forum validates items that have been
    worked and subsequently closed. Specifically, validation looks at items
    closed 6 to 12 months prior to the meeting and aims to ensure actions
    taken corrected the identified shortcoming, have been built into a
    repeatable process and are enduring. In addition to the monthly GSHOB/C
    review of NER and FIP actions, AFGSC/A9 conducts Airmen Driven
    Innovation (ADI) analyses. The ADI is a preventative, functionally-
    focused initiative designed to provide airmen at all levels with a
    voice to our senior leadership to communicate potential areas that need
    attention. It is comprised of a cross-functional team to rapidly
    implement solutions or engage other staff processes, and serves as a
    feedback mechanism to keep Striker Airmen, leadership and AFGSC Staff
    informed of our findings, progress, and organizational changes. ADI
    findings are tracked separately from FIP items through the GSHOB/C
    forum, but findings are cross-referenced to FIP and additional reports
    or studies as a trending analysis tool. In 2017, AFGSC hired a panel of
    independent consultants to provide an external assessment of the health
    of the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise. The Independent Strategic
    Assessment Group (ISAG) is comprised of former DOD leaders. The ISAG
    conducted a deep dive into numerous key areas, including current
    management structure and practices of the Nuclear Enterprise, and how
    AFGSC can field a more lethal force. The assessments informed AFGSC
    staff and resulted in the development of action items the command is
    tackling so we can more effectively accomplish our deterrence and
    global strike missions. Going forward, we will continue using this
    independent look to help promote innovation, change, and ultimately
    improvement throughout the command. Finally, we stood up the Family and
    Airmen Support Team (FAST) to identify ways we can improve where our
    airmen learn, live, play, receive medical and child care, and overall
    well-being. AFGSC hosts an annual conference to build initiatives in
    four major working groups: Airmen and family maintenance, physical
    environment, sustaining the family, and training and educating airmen.

        7. Senator Fischer. General Rand, does the Air Force plan on
    conducting an enterprise-wide assessment of the health of the missile
    force?
        General Rand. The health of the ICBM community is routinely
    analyzed and assessed several venues. The National Mission Assessment
    (NMA) is a comprehensive assessment of the nuclear mission that is
    congressionally directed, led by HAF/A10, and provided to the SECAF and
    CSAF. The assessment is organized by component (e.g. B-52, MMIII)
    across five performance areas. Performance measures focus on human
    capital, readiness, sustainment, modernization and effectiveness. This
    program helps break down information stovepipes across organizations
    and helps determine interdependencies between components and
    performance areas. In addition to the NMA, AFGSC has the tools to
    regularly assess the missile force. Such tools include Airmen Driven
    Innovation (ADI) events, a functionally-focused initiative to provide
    airmen at all levels with a voice to our senior leadership.
    Furthermore, AFGSC has implemented the No-Notice On-Site Visit (NNOSV)
    program which provides another touchpoint to assess the health of the
    force. NNOSVs are observations focused on Operations, Security Forces,
    Maintenance, People/Profession of Arms, and Support, providing an
    independent assessment of unit health, operational readiness, and
    lethality.

        8. Senator Fischer. General Rand, the Force Improvement Program
    (FIP) received credit for generating significant positive change within
    the culture and climate of the missile wings. That program officially
    ended last year. How will you ensure that those gains are not lost now
    that FIP is no longer official Air Force policy?
        General Rand. The initiatives undertaken by the SECAF and CSAF to
    support commanders down to the squadron level have provided commanders
    the most freedom of maneuver and authority to operate in recent years.
    AFGSC has expanded this effort through our own delegation of
    authorities initiative. Additionally, AFGSC hosts multiple events such
    as the Squadron Commander Course and monthly VTCs with wing leadership
    so leaders at multiple levels have several routine touch points to
    discuss past, present, and on-going initiatives. This approach ensures
    ``the way it has always been'' is not the reason for execution; rather,
    commanders are charged with effective and efficient mission
    accomplishment and continual unit improvement on a regular basis. In
    addition to these regular touch points with new and sitting commanders,
    AFGSC's ``Striker Culture'' has been developed, defined and inculcated
    throughout the command. Our AFGSC culture slide was written by the
    airmen of AFGSC and approved by AFGSC senior leaders. The building
    blocks to guarantee positive change are well established with current
    and future leaders in AFGSC. AFGSC developed a regular mechanism to
    reinforce the progress we've made since the Nuclear Enterprise Review
    (NER) and ICBM and Bomber Force Improvement Programs (FIP) in order to
    ensure continued improvement. The Global Strike Health and Operations
    Board and Council (GSHOB/C) is one venue where commanders from across
    AFGSC gather monthly to review Airmen, commander, and stakeholder
    inputs for improvement and tracking progress. This avenue provides
    every Striker a direct line of communication to the AFGSC Commander on
    how to improve our capability, capacity, and human capital. The
    meticulous tracking of every input guarantees all ideas are explored,
    identifies root causes, and implements long-term, sustainable
    solutions. This forum identifies and shares Best Practices across all
    organizations within the command and allows the AFGSC Commander to
    adapt and modify the venue to proactively respond to areas identified
    for command-wide focus, ensuring future generations do not repeat
    previous findings/shortcomings. Additionally, this forum validates
    items that have been worked and subsequently closed. Specifically,
    validation looks at items closed 6 to 12 months prior to the meeting
    and aims to ensure actions taken corrected the identified shortcoming,
    have been built into a repeatable process and are enduring. In addition
    to the monthly GSHOB/C review of NER and FIP actions, AFGSC/A9 conducts
    Airmen Driven Innovation (ADI) analyses. The ADI is a preventative,
    functionally-focused initiative designed to provide Airmen at all
    levels with a voice to our senior leadership to communicate potential
    areas that need attention. It is comprised of a cross-functional team
    to rapidly implement solutions or engage other staff processes, and
    serves as a feedback mechanism to keep Striker Airmen, leadership and
    AFGSC Staff informed of our findings, progress, and organizational
    changes. ADI findings are tracked separately from FIP through the
    GSHOB/C forum, but findings are cross-referenced to FIP and additional
    reports or studies as a trending analysis tool. In 2017, AFGSC hired a
    panel of independent consultants to provide an external assessment of
    the health of the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise. The Independent
    Strategic Assessment Group (ISAG) is comprised of former DOD leaders.
    The ISAG conducted a deep dive into numerous key areas, including
    current management structure and practices of the Nuclear Enterprise,
    and how AFGSC can field a more lethal force. The assessments informed
    AFGSC staff and resulted in the development of action items the command
    is tackling so we can more effectively accomplish our deterrence and
    global strike missions. Going forward, we will continue using this
    independent look to help promote innovation, change, and ultimately
    improvement throughout the command. Finally, we stood up the Family and
    Airmen Support Team (FAST) to identify ways we can improve where our
    Airmen learn, live, play, receive medical and child care, and overall
    well-being. AFGSC hosts an annual conference to build initiatives in
    four major working groups: Airmen and family maintenance, physical
    environment, sustaining the family, and training and educating Airmen.
               nuclear command, control and communications (nc3)
        9. Senator Fischer. General Rand, please describe the current
    approach to developing Air Force officers qualified to be effective
    leaders in NC3 acquisition, architecture, and operations.
        General Rand. Developing leaders in Nuclear Command, Control, and
    Communications (NC3) is an ongoing process. Initially, officers train
    and certify in their core nuclear mission according to their Air Force
    Specialty Code (AFSC). Examples include ICBM operators, pilots, and
    combat systems officers. Mid-level education opportunities include the
    USAF Weapons School, organized by weapon system, and Intermediate
    Developmental Education programs with a nuclear concentration. Although
    there is no NC3 AFSC, all officers who fill these billets are
    designated with a special duty identifier. The NC3 officers are
    selected by interview from a pool of prior nuclear certified officers
    and receive training on Joint Nuclear Command and Control procedures
    and NC3 equipment. Additionally, they complete a locally graded
    certification before they are considered certified in NC3 operations.
    There are no specific NC3 acquisition and architecture officers. NC3
    uses general acquisition officers and civilian architects and trains
    them in NC3 background, history, and policies. They will receive on-
    the-job training on the NC3 systems they are assigned. Acquisition
    leadership positions fall into two categories. Material Leaders (MLs)
    are typically responsible for a moderately sized program or several
    small programs. To be minimally qualified for an ML position, an
    officer must be a Lieutenant Colonel or Colonel and have achieved a
    Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) Level II
    Certification in Program Management. Generally speaking, this requires
    at least one tour in a Program Office with duties that involve cost,
    schedule, and performance on an acquisition program in addition to
    educational and formal acquisition training requirements. Senior
    Material Leaders (SMLs) are typically responsible for a large program
    of national significance or a portfolio of multiple programs. To be
    qualified for an SML position, an acquisition Colonel must have DAWIA
    Level III Certification in Program Management. Similar to a Level II
    Certification, a Level III Certification requires several years of
    experience with cost, schedule, and performance on an acquisition
    program. In this case, the minimum tenure is four years with additional
    formal acquisition training. Once determined qualified for ML or SML
    positions, officers are matched to specific positions commensurate with
    their background and experience. For NC3 acquisition leadership
    positions, some combination of prior experience in the acquisition,
    sustainment or operation of nuclear, command and control, or
    communications systems is desired.

        10. Senator Fischer. General Rand, please describe the process by
    which officers are selected and assigned into program management roles
    for NC3-related acquisition programs?
        General Rand. For Material Leader (ML) selection, interested and
    qualified officers are first vetted through a boarding process, chaired
    by senior acquisition leaders within the Air Force, to include at least
    one General Officer and Senior Civilian (SES). For Senior Material
    Leader (SML) selection, the CSAF has directed that all qualified
    Colonels compete for SMLs and other leadership opportunities on the
    CSAF's Command Screening Board. This board is comprised of Senior Air
    Force Leaders. In either case, the vetted MLs and SMLs are then bid
    into Program Manager Positions by Senior Air Force Acquisition Leaders
    based on background and level of experience. For example, the largest
    acquisition programs (ACAT I) require at least eight years of
    experience handling cost, schedule, and performance work on an
    acquisition program.

        11. Senator Fischer. General Rand, please describe the training or
    education they receive relating to the NC3 enterprise.
        General Rand. Beginning in 2017, the Air Force Nuclear Command,
    Control, and Communications Center (AFNC3C), in conjunction with the
    Air Education and Training Command (AETC) has been conducting NC3 150,
    a training course available to the NC3 community. The purpose of this
    course is to provide initial Nuclear Command, Control, and
    Communications training. There are four main topic areas that cover
    nuclear deterrence (history and strategy), organizational and command
    relationships essential to the NC3 mission, operational dimensions of
    NC3, and finally the future challenges the NC3 community faces. This
    course is available to officers, enlisted and civilian personnel
    recently assigned to NC3 billets. Additional courses (NC3 200, 300, and
    400) are in development and will provide further development
    opportunities for NC3 leaders. AFNC3C and AETC are also offering
    Distance Learning courses in NC3 Systems Engineering and Deterrence to
    selected individuals awarding certificates, Bachelors, Masters,
    Doctorates degrees or providing specific education as needed.

        12. Senator Fischer. General Rand, are you satisfied with the
    selection process and level of training, or are there areas you believe
    could be improved upon?
        General Rand. AFGSC is aggressively pursuing ways to improve the
    selection process and level of training in Nuclear Command, Control,
    and Communication (NC3). Accessions to the Air Force NC3 Center have
    expertise in their functional specialty and we are working to expand
    their NC3 expertise. We are on a good path moving forward. The Air
    Force NC3 Center is developing an integrated training plan to increase
    NC3 knowledge for both junior and senior officers, as well as enlisted
    and civilian Airmen. We have engaged the Air Force's Air Education and
    Training Command (AETC) and the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center
    (AFNWC) to develop and deliver a multi-level NC3-focused curriculum.
    The first of these courses, NC3 150, was delivered in December 2017.
    While these efforts are still in their infancy, AFGSC is optimistic
    this training will provide the requisite breadth of knowledge for all
    personnel, and will guarantee the Air Force's continual focus on the
    NC3 Enterprise.
                                    hedging
        13. Senator Fischer. General Rand, the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review
    (NPR) emphasizes the need to hedge against future uncertainty and
    states: ``This requires maintaining the U.S. capacity to upload hedge
    weapons onto existing delivery platforms to augment the deployed force
    as necessary if, for example, an unexpected operational or technical
    problem were to arise in U.S. forces.''
        General Rand. I concur with this statement. I have provided a
    classified annex to further expand on this topic.

        14. Senator Fischer. General Rand, Admiral Benedict, please
    describe the upload process, including the expected timeline for
    completion if the Department were asked to begin immediately and
    readiness of forces to execute such orders.
        General Rand. The upload process for hedge purposes applies to the
    Minuteman III (MMIII) ICBM. The MMIII is capable of being uploaded with
    two or three MK12A reentry vehicles each. The MK21 reentry vehicle can
    only be configured as a single reentry vehicle. Upon order from
    USSTRATCOM, AFGSC would partner with HAF/A4, the AF Nuclear Weapons
    Center, and NNSA, to flow build-up materials to each of the three
    missile wings. Each wing is designated for a rough equivalency share of
    uploading requirements, balancing the workload across the fleet. The
    specific number of ICBMs designated for upload and the required
    timeline is provided in a classified annex.
        Admiral Benedict. U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) is
    responsible for the strategic war plan, to include strategic hedge
    requirements. The Navy remains confident in its ability to meet
    USSTRATCOM requirements and can brief you in a classified forum on the
    requirements, associated timelines, and the implications of potential
    changes to these requirements.

        15. Senator Fischer. General Rand, Admiral Benedict, what steps
    could the Department take in order to reduce that timeline or increase
    readiness of the forces?
        General Rand. In order to ensure timely response to hedge, AFGSC A4
    has received approval from HAF A4LR to build High Priority Mission
    Support Kits (HPMSK) at each missile wing allowing for immediate access
    to build-up materials. Use of HPMSKs will institutionalize hedge
    mission requirements; affording AFGSC a formal channel for programming
    and reporting hedge related assets through the Air Force's corporate
    process. Additionally, a Unit Type Code (UTC) is currently under
    development for hedge requirements with the intent to include HPMSKs
    within that UTC. Both measures will keep Air Force and Combatant
    Commanders apprised of hedge readiness. Please see classified annex on
    SIPRNet for additional information.
        Admiral Benedict. U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) is
    responsible for the strategic war plan, to include strategic hedge
    requirements. The Navy remains confident in its ability to meet
    USSTRATCOM requirements and can brief you in a classified forum on the
    requirements, associated timelines, and the implications of potential
    changes to these requirements.
                             adversary developments
        16. Senator Fischer. General Rand, we have low-yield nuclear
    weapons in our triad's airborne leg; how is the development of advanced
    air defenses impacting our ability to hold targets at risk with these
    weapons?
        General Rand. Fielded in the 1980s, the Air Launched Cruise Missile
    (ALCM) is over 30 years old, well beyond its life expectancy, and is
    involved in its third life extension program (LEP). While the ALCM
    remains effective today, we must replace it due to its aging
    subsystems, the shrinking stockpile of operational missiles, and
    advances in enemy defenses. Advanced air defense systems increase the
    risk to aircrew and the weapons. Russia and China are quickly advancing
    their air defense technologies; advances in computer processing,
    digital networking technology, and targeting systems enable air
    defenses to better detect U.S. assets. Future systems, specifically the
    Long Range Stand-Off missile and the B-21 Raider will provide enhanced
    capabilities against these defenses.
                        warhead stockpile strategic plan
        17. Senator Fischer. Secretary Roberts, the Nuclear Posture Review
    (NPR) states: ``To provide the required strategic vision needed to
    inform critical warhead modernization investments, the DOD and DOE
    Nuclear Weapons Council approved a strategic plan. This plan describes
    a current and future path for the nuclear warhead stockpile to meet
    deterrence, assurance, and technical hedging requirements.''
        Please describe the new strategic plan, its key differences from
    pre-existing plans, and whether the new strategic plan still envisions
    a final composition of 3 interoperable ballistic missile warheads
    deployed on both the SLBM and ICBM legs of the Triad and 2
    interoperable air-delivered warheads or bombs.
        Secretary Roberts. As the NPR notes, we are now in the early stages
    of a comprehensive warhead sustainment program. The Nuclear Weapons
    Council approved the most recent Fiscal Year17-42 Strategic Plan in
    2016 and is currently revising that plan to account for the findings of
    the NPR. The Council expects the revised plan to be completed by the
    end of the year.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Donnelly
                            plutonium pit production
        18. Senator Donnelly. Dr. Soofer, are you concerned about the DOE
    NNSA's ability to produce 80 plutonium pits per year by 2030 as
    mandated in the statute?
        Dr. Soofer. Based on NNSA's engineering assessment, the schedule to
    reach 80 war reserve pits per year is extremely challenging. Any
    approach to achieve this objective will require leadership and intense
    focus by DOD and NNSA to meet the 2030 timeline. The NWC will exercise
    regular oversight and monitoring of this effort.
                          sea-launched cruise missile
        19. Senator Donnelly. Dr. Soofer, the Nuclear Posture Review
    proposes a sea launched cruise missile to replace the one dropped in
    the 2010 NPR. I don't want to pre-judge your analysis but many people
    for a long time, going back as far as the Regulus program in 1955,
    thought about which sea platform to put such a system on. Each time
    they came back to a submarine. What's different this time?
        Dr. Soofer. The U.S. Navy is working closely with the Joint Staff
    and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to evaluate
    options for a nuclear sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) based on the
    policy guidance reflected in the 2018 NPR. The platform for the SLCM
    will be determined as part of the Analysis of Alternatives (AOA)
    evaluation.
                              oasd (ncb) staffing
        20. Senator Donnelly. Secretary Roberts, the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense has been undergoing a lot of organization and
    staffing changes with the split up of the Undersecretary for
    Acquisition and Logistics into two--one for Acquisition and Sustainment
    and one for Research. Do you have adequate staffing to do your job?
        Secretary Roberts. We are sufficiently staffed for our current
    portfolio of responsibilities. As our portfolio continues to evolve,
    however, our staffing levels will require constant reevaluation in
    order to ensure our responsibilities are fulfilled to the highest
    possible standard.
                              oasd (ncb) and dtra
        21. Senator Donnelly. Secretary Roberts, my understanding is that
    the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, like other field support agencies,
    will report directly to the Undersecretary for Acquisition and
    Sustainment. Before, it reported to you, given the extensive amount of
    work in nuclear weapons and non- and counter-proliferation it
    performed. What oversight do you now have of this field support agency?
        Secretary Roberts. A final decision on the organizational reporting
    structures within Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
    Acquisition and Sustainment (OUSD(A&S)) and OUSD(R&E) is expected to be
    announced by the Deputy Secretary soon after June 1. I am not aware of,
    nor do I anticipate, any disruptive changes to the reporting
    relationship between NCB and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency
    (DTRA). Under the current reporting relationship, in accordance with
    DOD Directive 5134.08 and on behalf of the USD(A&S), the ASD(NCB)
    exercises authority, direction, and control over the Director of DTRA.
                     cocoms and nuclear operations planning
        22. Senator Donnelly. Dr. Soofer, U.S. Strategic Command
    traditionally performs all nuclear operations planning. Do you believe
    the Combatant Commands should also have such a capability and are you
    concerned whether they do or don't have one?
        Dr. Soofer. It is not necessary to replicate U.S. Strategic
    Command's (USSTRATCOM) capabilities across multiple Combatant Commands.
    The Department of Defense has been working with the Combatant Commands
    and Military Departments and Services to identify capabilities
    necessary to enable the United States to respond in a regional conflict
    should deterrence fail. This approach is reinforced in the 2018 NPR,
    which states that the United States will strengthen the integration of
    nuclear and non-nuclear military planning. Specifically, the Combatant
    Commands and their Service components will be organized and resourced
    for this mission, and they will plan, train, and exercise to integrate
    U.S. nuclear and non-nuclear forces to operate in the face of adversary
    nuclear threats. This includes developing a cadre of personnel within
    the Combatant Commands with knowledge of nuclear operations,
    identifying and sourcing any necessary augmentation that might be
    needed in a conflict, strengthening command and control relationships,
    and deploying equipment necessary to enable the Combatant Commanders to
    conduct secure communications.
                       role of 20th and 8th air force(s)
        23. Senator Donnelly. General Rand, U.S. Strategic Command has
    placed you in charge of ICBM and bomber operations. In prior years, the
    20th and 8th Air Force(s) were the direct report to STRATCOM for bomber
    and ICBM operations. What is their role under this new construct?
        General Rand. Previously, 8 AF and 20 AF were dual-designated Task
    Force 204 and Task Force 214 respectively. Operational control flowed
    from USSTRATCOM through these task forces to their subordinate wings.
    Operational control now flows from USSTRATCOM through the Commander,
    Air Forces Strategic-Air (AFSTRAT-Air), dual-hatted as the Commander,
    Air Force Global Strike Command. This presents a single Air Force
    commander to USSTRATCOM for assigned forces. Both 8 AF and 20 AF have
    retained their service administrative control (ADCON) responsibilities,
    and their supporting organize, train, and equip (OT&E)
    responsibilities. Day-to-day operational direction flows from
    USSTRATCOM to AFSTRAT-Air to the 8 AF and 20 AF commanders. These
    commanders continue to be responsible for their wings' compliance with
    and execution of orders either from USSTRATCOM or AFSTRAT-Air. Plus,
    they are responsible for ensuring their wings comply with service
    policy and guidance, are resourced for mission requirements, and that
    they are trained and capable of executing assigned missions. There is a
    direct supervisor-subordinate relationship between the wing commanders
    and their assigned number air force commander.
                          afgsc weapons storage areas
        24. Senator Donnelly. General Rand, I understand you are having
    cost growth issues with replacing the weapons storage areas for the
    missile and bomber wings. What is going on and what are you doing to
    contain the cost growth?
        General Rand. When the bids for the FE Warren Weapon Storage
    Facility (WSF) came in higher than expected, AFGSC took the following
    actions with all WSF stakeholders: We analyzed the bids to identify
    high cost drivers Conducted a two week High Performance Team (HPT)
    event to scrub operational/institutional requirements and WSF designs
    to ensure we had the right balance between combat lethality, risk, and
    cost Implemented a series of Program Control events to baseline source
    documents, improve the control process, and improve the WSF program
    oversight/approval process As a result of this initiative, we
    eliminated a $439 million plus material handling development
    requirement and lowered expected costs for the first three WSFs by over
    $200 million. Going forward, the Program Control process will enable us
    to maintain tight control of WSF scope, cost, and schedule.
              next generation submarine-launched ballistic missile
        25. Senator Donnelly. Admiral Benedict, I understand you are now
    looking to a new strategic missile system to be introduced into the
    Columbia-class. What are the major issues you will concentrate on for
    this new missile system?
        Admiral Benedict. The Navy is extending the life of the Trident II
    (D5) strategic weapon system (SWS) until the 2040s to match the hull
    life of the Ohio-class SSBN and serve as the initial delivery and
    payload system on the Columbia-class SSBN. The Navy is also beginning
    to study how to maintain a credible and effective SWS beyond 2040 by
    leveraging the work that is being done today to extend the Trident II
    (D5) SWS, as well as investigating opportunities to innovate through
    the application of model-based engineering. In fact, the Nuclear
    Posture Review directs that the Navy ``begin studies in 2020 to define
    a cost-effective, credible, and effective SLBM that we can deploy
    throughout the service life of the Columbia SSBN.'' These studies will
    determine the most appropriate and cost-effective combination of pull-
    through technologies and modernized components to meet U.S. Strategic
    Command requirements, address technology obsolescence, and allow for
    sufficient future flexibility in an evolving security environment. The
    Navy will focus these studies on ensuring industrial base capacity,
    payload flexibility, survivability, system performance, operational
    availability, and planning efficiency.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
                               plutonium strategy
        26. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Roberts, the Nuclear Posture Review
    reaffirms the military requirements for plutonium pit production of 30
    per year by 2026, ramping up to 80 by 2030. The initial capability of
    30 per year will be at Los Alamos. The source of the additional
    capacity is still under review by the Nuclear Weapons Council. I
    believe this process has taken far longer than necessary. What is the
    status of the council's review and agreement on a path forward for pit
    production?
        Secretary Roberts. USD (A&S) Lord and NNSA Administrator Gordon-
    Hagerty have agreed on a path forward that repurposes the Mixed-Oxide
    Fuel Fabrication Facility at the Savannah River Site to produce at
    least 50 pits per year, and to continue to invest in Los Alamos
    National Laboratory to produce at least 30 pits per year. This path
    forward is acceptable to the Secretary of Defense and the Nuclear
    Weapons Council (NWC) as a resilient and responsive option to meet DOD
    requirements. The NWC recognizes that there are major construction and
    certification schedule risks with this or any path forward on plutonium
    pit production. The NWC will be exercising regular coordination and
    monitoring of progress, and seeking opportunities to reduce risk.

        27. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Roberts, has the Department's Cost
    Assessment and Program Evaluation Office, or ``CAPE,'' been charged to
    do an independent review?
        Secretary Roberts. Section 3141 of the National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 requires CAPE to conduct a
    reconciliation of its 2013 CAPE plutonium production capability review
    with the Department of Energy (DOE)/NNSA's recommended alternative.
    CAPE's subsequent review of the 2018 NNSA Plutonium Engineering
    Assessment (EA) indicates the acquisition cost estimates included in
    the EA appear consistent and were reconciled with the 2013 review
    outcomes.

        28. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Roberts, in your view, will the
    goal of 80 pits per year by 2030 be met and will the council meet the
    deadline of May 11th to make a recommendation?
        Secretary Roberts. The NWC met the deadline of May 11, 2018, to
    provide its certification of DOE/NNSA's recommended alternative. NNSA
    delivered its recommended alternative, supporting materials, and the
    NWC Chairwoman's certification letter to the congressional defense
    committees on May 10. We will continue to work closely with NNSA to
    achieve the goal of 80 pits per year by 2030.
                            fy19 nnsa authorization
        29. Senator Heinrich. Dr. Soofer, NNSA's FY18 appropriation and
    FY19 budget request fully support the program of record for stockpile
    and modernization programs, but any specific new military requirements
    of the NPR have not been defined by the Nuclear Weapons Council. Will
    the DOD and NNSA be submitting modifications soon for the FY19 budget
    request so that the committee can properly consider any new
    authorizations required?
        Dr. Soofer. The Department of Defense (DOD) is in the process of
    implementing the outcomes of the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR),
    including defining military requirements for supplemental capabilities
    such as the W76-2 warhead and the sea-launched cruise missile. These
    requirements will be integrated into DOD and Department of Energy/
    National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) guidance, including
    among other things a revised Nuclear Weapons Council Strategic Plan.
        The fiscal year 2019 budget request for the DOD included funding
    for NPR priorities including sustainment of existing systems and
    continued investment in recapitalization programs. The fiscal year 2019
    budget request for NNSA is being amended to fund the W76-2 warhead. For
    details on NNSA's fiscal year 2019 budget request, I refer you to my
    colleagues at the DOE. As requirements and costs for supplemental
    capabilities identified in the NPR are determined, future budget
    requests may incorporate funds for such programs.
                schedule for deployment of new low-yield warhead
        30. Senator Heinrich. Dr. Soofer, the W76 life-extension program is
    on schedule to be completed in FY2019, about 18 months from now;
    however, you stated the process to develop a new low-yield warhead must
    be part of the ongoing LEP and would take two to three years. Of
    course, work on a proposed new low-yield warhead has not been
    authorized and could well take longer than expected. What are the
    specific plans and time-line for the near-term modification required to
    provide a low-yield warhead before the W76 LEP has been completed as
    scheduled in FY2019?
        Dr. Soofer. Weapons development is managed through the Nuclear
    Weapons Council Joint Nuclear Weapons Lifecycle Process. Using this
    process, the NNSA believes it can achieve W76-2 first production unit
    (FPU) within 3-6 months after congressional authorization. Production
    for the W76-1 is ongoing. With congressional authorization, development
    engineering work can begin on the W76-2. NNSA will seek timely
    authorization. The W76-2 is not expected to adversely impact the
    current W76-1 production schedule, which is scheduled to be complete by
    mid-2019. Further details can be provided in a classified briefing.
                        schedule impacts on ongoing leps
        31. Senator Heinrich. Dr. Soofer the national labs and sites have
    said they are as busy as they have ever been when considering the Life
    Extension Projects that are already underway and the ones planned in
    the future. What are the additional work and funding requirements for
    the proposed new low-yield warhead for a sub-launched ballistic
    missile?
        Dr. Soofer. DOE has sought congressional authorization to
    reallocate $65 million in funding within the DOE Weapons Activities
    account to support the low-yield ballistic missile recommended by the
    2018 NPR. Because the W76-2 is a minor modification to the existing
    W76-1, there will be minimal workforce impact. At the time the FY 2019
    Budget was transmitted to the Congress, the details of the 2018 NPR
    were still being developed, and were not ready for inclusion in the FY
    2019 Budget.
        DOD has requested $22.6m in FY 2019 and $48.5m across the Future
    Years Defense Program (FYDP) for Trident modifications that will
    qualify the missile to deliver low-yield nuclear weapons.

        32. Senator Heinrich. Dr. Soofer, have you considered the possible
    impacts on the existing schedule for the ongoing and planned life-
    extension programs and the additional costs and effort on top of all
    the other outstanding requirements across the complex?
        Dr. Soofer. Yes, I have. The Nuclear Weapons Council is focused on
    ensuring that NNSA's nuclear weapons activities are aligned and
    synchronized with DOD's modernization programs, and that it has the
    resources to execute these activities. We do not expect the low-yield
    ballistic missile to impact planned life-extension program schedules
    because it is a modification to the W76-1 currently in production.
                  uncertainties in future security environment
        33. Senator Heinrich. Dr. Soofer, the NPR includes a discussion of
    uncertainties regarding the future security environment and the threats
    it may pose, including technological threats to the U.S. deterrent.
    Sandia National Labs, on behalf of NNSA, has specific capabilities to
    ensure the stockpile can withstand technological breakthroughs or the
    development of wholly new technologies. However, Sandia's and the other
    labs' threat experimentation capabilities are decades old. What is your
    perspective regarding whether the NNSA labs should be contemplating
    increasing their science and engineering capabilities to outflank
    unanticipated technological breakthroughs?
        Dr. Soofer. DOD and NNSA work together to conduct ongoing
    evaluations of the current and future security environments to ensure
    the United States remains at the forefront of science and technology
    and to reduce the likelihood of technological surprise. NNSA's national
    laboratories possess science and engineering capabilities that enhance
    deterrence and national security writ large. The NNSA laboratories have
    the capability to respond effectively to emerging threats,
    unanticipated events, and technological innovation. Continued support
    for and investment in these capabilities, including threat environment
    experimentation capabilities, at the NNSA National Laboratories is
    essential. The NNSA laboratories are also currently in the process of
    implementing the statutrory Stockpile Responsiveness Program to
    exercise these capabilities further with DOD coordination.
                             hypersonic technology
        34. Senator Heinrich. Dr. Soofer, I understand the Department is
    still in the process of building its Missile Defense Review, but I
    would like your assessment of where the NPR and the Missile Defense
    Review will converge around hypersonic capabilities of Russia. Noting
    that we are in an open session today, can you discuss with the
    Subcommittee what the Department's specific priorities are for
    hypersonic technology?
        Dr. Soofer. DOD takes the threat posed by offensive hypersonic
    weapons seriously. Hypersonic threats and technology development will
    be addressed in the Missile Defense Review (MDR). Recently, Under
    Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering Mike Griffin made
    hypersonic technology/capability development his top technical
    priority. If a potential adversary gains an advantage in hypersonic
    technology, it could invite the mistaken impression that the United
    States could be coerced into not upholding its security commitments to
    allies and partners. We are concerned about our ability to characterize
    and defend against hypersonic systems. The Department is conducting a
    formal Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) that will characterize hypersonic
    weapon threats and identify alternatives for defending against them.
    This AOA is well underway and on-track to provide its final report by
    the end of this calendar year 2018.
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
                          sea-launched cruise missile
        35. Senator Warren. Admiral Benedict, I understand that no decision
    has been made at this point about where a low-yield nuclear SLCM would
    be deployed, but that the entire fleet is being considered. Can you
    describe what would be required to put nuclear weapons back on surface
    ships or attack submarines --in terms of manpower, training, security,
    and operations?
        Admiral Benedict. The Navy, working closely with the Joint Staff
    and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, is evaluating requirements
    associated with the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile. Manpower,
    training, security, and operations are factors that will be part of the
    evaluation. Specialized training and certification will be required to
    ensure the safety and security of the weapons. The Navy successfully
    performed the mission associated with the nuclear sea-launched cruise
    missiles on surface ships and attack submarines for decades.

        36. Senator Warren. Admiral Benedict, both Secretary Spencer and
    Admiral Richardson have listed the Navy's readiness as one of their top
    concerns. Will the impact on readiness be part of the Department's
    analysis of alternatives?
        Admiral Benedict. Yes. The Navy, working closely with the Joint
    Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, is evaluating
    requirements associated with the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile.
    Specialized training and certification will ensure surface ships and
    submarines are adequately prepared for deployment.

        37. Senator Warren. Admiral Benedict, will putting nuclear weapons
    on attack submarines or surface ships require making new arrangements
    for port visits with U.S. allies and partners, some of whom have
    legislated specific requirements for the transit of nuclear weapons on
    or through their territory?
        Admiral Benedict. We do not discuss the presence or absence of
    nuclear weapons on our vessels. The current policy of the U.S.
    Government is not to deploy nuclear weapons aboard U.S. Navy surface
    ships and attack or guided missile submarines. Our entry into another
    state's ports is subject to whatever conditions the foreign state may
    require. If there are new or existing restrictions that would apply to
    our port visits, we may need to request exemptions or negotiate new
    arrangements. However, the outcome of any negotiations with a
    particular state would be speculative at this point.
                                b83-1 retirement
        38. Senator Warren. Dr. Soofer, the NPR proposes to keep the B83-1
    warhead until a suitable replacement is found. For how much longer can
    NNSA retain the B83-1 without performing an ALT or LEP?
        Dr. Soofer. As part of DOD's implementation of the 2018 NPR, we
    will review whether it is necessary to retain the B83-1 and for how
    long. NNSA can provide classified technical details pertaining to how
    much longer NNSA can retain the B83-1without performing an ALT or life-
    extension program (LEP).

        39. Senator Warren. Dr. Soofer, how would a refurbishment or life
    extension for the B83-1 impact NNSA's already aggressively ambitious
    program of work?
        Dr. Soofer. There is no current plan to seek a B83-1 refurbishment
    or LEP. If a decision were made to refurbish or life extend the B83-1,
    DOD and DOE would carefully coordinate to balance the competing demands
    on NNSA's infrastructure. A request for further specificity about what
    this would entail should be directed to NNSA.

        40. Senator Warren. Dr. Soofer, according to your previous public
    comments, the B83 is required to hold certain targets in North Korea at
    risk. What has changed about the North Korean threat that requires DOD
    to retain the B83; are there targets that cannot be held at risk by
    other weapons in the U.S. arsenal?
        Dr. Soofer. As a result of the significant and rapid worsening of
    the international security environment since the 2010 NPR, the
    Administration decided to postpone B83-1 retirement until completion of
    a 2018 NPR-directed study assessing the requirements necessary to meet
    policy and operational objectives, and if required, a suitable
    replacement capability is identified.