[Senate Hearing 115-807]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 115-807
ASSESSING THE MAXIMUM PRESSURE AND
ENGAGEMENT POLICY TOWARD NORTH KOREA
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIA,
THE PACIFIC, AND INTERNATIONAL
CYBERSECURITY POLICY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 25, 2017
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web:
http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
40-415 PDF WASHINGTON : 2020
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
BOB CORKER, Tennessee, Chairman
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
MARCO RUBIO, Florida ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
CORY GARDNER, Colorado TOM UDALL, New Mexico
TODD YOUNG, Indiana CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming TIM KAINE, Virginia
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
RAND PAUL, Kentucky CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey
Todd Womack, Staff Director
Jessica Lewis, Democratic Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIA, THE PACIFIC,
AND INTERNATIONAL CYBERSECURITY POLICY
CORY GARDNER, Colorado, Chairman
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
MARCO RUBIO, Florida JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia TIM KAINE, Virginia
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Gardner, Hon. Cory, U.S. Senator From Colorado................... 1
Markey, Hon. Edward J., U.S. Senator From Massachusetts.......... 10
Portman, Hon. Rob, U.S. Senator From Ohio........................ 18
Thornton, Hon. Susan A., Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
East Asian and Pacific Affairs................................. 4
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Klingner, Bruce, Senior Research Fellow, Northeast Asia, The
Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC............................ 22
Prepared statement........................................... 23
Sigal, Leon V., Director, Northeast Asia Cooperative Security
Project, Social Science Research Council, New York, NY......... 30
Prepared statement........................................... 32
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Acting Assistant Secretary Susan Thornton to
Questions Submitted by Senator Edward J. Markey................ 39
Letter Submitted for the Record by Leon V. Sigal, Director,
Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project, Social Science
Research Council, New York, NY................................. 42
(iii)
ASSESSING THE MAXIMUM PRESSURE
AND ENGAGEMENT POLICY
TOWARD NORTH KOREA
----------
TUESDAY, JULY 25, 2017
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on East Asia, The Pacific, and
International Cybersecurity Policy,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:33 p.m. in room
SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Cory Gardner,
chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Gardner [presiding], Portman, Markey, and
Kaine.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CORY GARDNER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM COLORADO
Senator Gardner. This hearing will come to order. Let me
welcome you all to the fifth hearing for the Senate Foreign
Relations Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and
International Cybersecurity Policy in the 115th Congress. On
behalf of the committee, I apologize for the delay at the
beginning of this hearing. To the witnesses who have been here,
time away from work, as well as those attending the hearing
today, the action on the Floor, including the return of Senator
McCain, was a very poignant moment for the Senate.
I would like to welcome all to today's hearing.
North Korea has emerged as the most urgent national
security challenge for the U.S. and our allies in East Asia.
Secretary Mattis has said North Korea is the most urgent and
dangerous threat to peace and security. Admiral Gortney, the
former commander of U.S. Northern Command, stated that the
Korean Peninsula is at its most unstable point since 1953, when
the Armistice was signed.
Last year alone, North Korea conducted two nuclear tests
and a staggering 24 ballistic missile launches. This year,
Pyongyang has already launched 17 missiles, including the July
4th successful test of an intercontinental ballistic missile
that is reportedly capable of reaching Alaska and Hawaii.
Patience is not an option with the U.S. homeland in the
nuclear shadow of Kim Jong Un. Our North Korea policy of
decades of bipartisan failure must turn to one of bipartisan
success, with pressure and global cooperation resulting in the
peaceful denuclearization of the regime.
President Trump has said the United States will not allow
that to happen, and I am encouraged by the President's resolve.
As Vice-President Pence stated during his recent visit to
South Korea, ``Since 1992, the United States and our allies
have stood together for a denuclearized Korean Peninsula. We
hope to achieve this objective through peaceable means. But all
options are on the table.''
But time is not on our side.
I believe U.S. policy toward North Korea should be
straightforward: The United States will deploy every economic,
diplomatic and, if necessary, military tool at our disposal to
deter Pyongyang and to protect our allies.
However, the road to peacefully stopping Pyongyang
undoubtedly lies through Beijing. China is the only country
that holds the diplomatic and economic leverage necessary to
put the real squeeze on the North Korean regime.
According to the South Korean state trade agency, China
accounts for 90 percent of North Korea's trade, including
virtually all of North Korea's exports. From 2000 to 2015,
trade volume between the two nations has climbed more than
tenfold, rising from $488 million in 2000 to $5.4 billion in
2015.
Beijing is the reason the regime acts so boldly and with
relatively few consequences. China must now move beyond an
articulation of concern and lay out a transparent path of
focused pressure to denuclearize North Korea. A global power
that borders this regime cannot simply throw up its hands and
absolve themselves of responsibility.
The administration is right to pursue a policy of maximum
pressure toward North Korea, and we have a robust toolbox that
is already available to ramp up the sanctions track, a track
that has hardly been utilized to its fullest extent.
Last Congress, I led the North Korea Sanctions and Policy
Enhancement Act, which passed the Senate by a vote of 96 to
nothing. This legislation was the first standalone legislation
in Congress regarding North Korea to impose mandatory sanctions
on the regime's proliferation activities, human rights
violations, and malicious cyber behavior.
According to recent analysis from the Foundation for the
Defense of Democracies, ``North Korea sanctions have more than
doubled since that legislation came into effect on February
18th, 2016. Prior to that date, North Korea ranked eighth
behind Ukraine/Russia, Iran, Iraq, the Balkans, Syria, Sudan,
and Zimbabwe.''
Even with the 130 percent sanctions increase after the
legislation passed this Congress, North Korea is today still
only the fifth most-sanctioned country by the United States.
So while Congress has clearly moved the Obama
administration from inaction to some action, the Trump
administration has the opportunity to use these authorities to
build maximum leverage with not only Pyongyang, but also with
Beijing.
I am encouraged by the actions the administration took last
month to finally designate a Chinese financial institution. But
this should just be the beginning. The administration, with
Congressional support, should now make it clear to any entity
doing business with North Korea that they will not be able to
do business with the United States or have access to the U.S.
financial system.
A report released last month by an independent
organization, C4ADS, identified over 5,000 Chinese companies
that are doing business with North Korea. These Chinese
companies are responsible for $7 billion in trade with North
Korea. Moreover, the report found that only 10 of these
companies, 10 of these companies, controlled 30 percent of
Chinese exports to North Korea in 2016. One of these companies
alone was responsible for nearly 10 percent of total imports
from North Korea. Some of these companies were found to have
satellite offices in the United States.
According to recent disclosures, from 2009 to 2017, North
Korea used Chinese banks to process at least $2.2 billion in
transactions through the U.S. financial system.
This should all stop now, and it must stop now. The United
States should not be afraid of a diplomatic confrontation with
Beijing for simply enforcing existing U.S. law. In fact, it
should be more afraid of Congress if it does not.
As for any prospect of engagement, we should continue to
let Beijing know in no uncertain terms that the United States
will not negotiate with Pyongyang at the expense of U.S.
national security and that of our allies.
Instead of working with the United States and the
international community to disarm the madman in Pyongyang,
Beijing has called on the United States and South Korea to halt
our military exercises, in exchange for vague promises of North
Korea suspending its missile and nuclear activities. That was a
bad deal, and the Trump administration was right to reject it.
Moreover, before any talks in any format, the United States
and our partners must demand that Pyongyang first meet the
denuclearization commitments it had already agreed to in the
past and subsequently chose to brazenly violate.
President Trump should continue to impress with President
Xi that a denuclearized Korean Peninsula is in both nations'
fundamental long-term interests.
As Admiral Harry Harris rightly noted recently, ``We want
to bring Kim Jong Un to his senses, not to his knees.'' But to
achieve this goal, Beijing must be made to choose whether it
wants to work with the United States as a responsible global
leader to stop Pyongyang or bear the consequences of keeping
him in power. I will turn it over to Senator Markey as soon as
Senator Markey arrives. But in the meantime, he has agreed to
allow our witness, who has waited patiently for an hour, to
begin testimony, Susan Thornton on our first panel.
Our first panel is the Honorable Susan Thornton, who serves
as Acting Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and
Pacific Affairs.
Susan Thornton assumed responsibility as Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary in February of 2016 after serving for a
year-and-a-half as Deputy Assistant Secretary. Secretary
Thornton joined the State Department in 1991 and is a career
member of the Foreign Service.
Welcome, Secretary Thornton, and thank you for your
patience, and thank you for being here with us today. We will
begin your testimony.
STATEMENT OF HON. SUSAN A. THORNTON, ACTING
ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND
PACIFIC AFFAIRS
Ms. Thornton. Thank you very much, Chairman Gardner. It is
great to see you. And thank you very much for inviting me to
appear before you today on this really important, urgent issue
for both the United States, our allies and regional security,
and I would say global security.
North Korea's July 4th intercontinental ballistic missile
test is only the latest evidence of Kim Jong Un's desire to
threaten the United States with nuclear weapons. It constitutes
a serious escalation of the DPRK's nuclear and ballistic
missile program.
Our goal is to protect our country, our citizens, and our
allies by halting and eliminating North Korea's development of
nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them. The
administration's strategy to achieve this goal uses diplomatic,
economic, and other tools to build concerted global pressure on
Pyongyang to abandon its internationally proscribed nuclear and
missile programs.
North Korea needs to understand that the only path to
international legitimacy, regime security, and economic
prosperity is a denuclearized Korean Peninsula.
There are three components to our strategy. The first is
U.N. action. In concert with our Asian allies, we have called
on all U.N. member states to fully implement the strong
sanctions required in the U.N. Security Council Resolutions
2321, 2270, and 2356, and we will continue to work to increase
international sanctions.
The second component is diplomatic action by U.N. member
states. We have urged countries around the world to take their
own actions to express their condemnation, such as suspending
or downgrading diplomatic relations with North Korea. Cordial
ties with a country that threatens its neighbors and continues
to violate numerous U.N. resolutions is completely
inappropriate at this time. We have seen evidence that North
Korea violates international norms by using its diplomatic
missions to generate and transmit illicit resources for its
weapons programs.
The third component is economic pressure. We have asked all
countries to cut trade ties with Pyongyang as a way of
increasing North Korea's economic isolation and to prevent it
from using the international financial system to support its
illegal weapons programs. Secretary Tillerson has made clear in
meetings with his foreign counterparts that nations can no
longer operate in a business-as-usual approach. Our ambassadors
have reinforced this message in capitals around the globe.
Mr. Chairman, we are not seeking regime change, nor do we
seek military conflict, or to threaten North Korea. Our
pressure campaign is designed to make the cost of the regime's
programs too exorbitant. As has been said, we want to bring
North Korea to its senses and not to its knees. However, we
will respond accordingly to threats against us or our allies.
We remain open to talks with the DPRK, but it must first cease
its unlawful nuclear and missile programs and bring an end to
its pattern of dangerous, aggressive behavior in the region. We
are not going to negotiate our way back to the negotiating
table.
While our partners around the globe have begun to take
steps to increase pressure on North Korea, unfortunately we do
not see any signs that North Korea is willing to engage in
credible talks on denuclearization at this time. We will
continue to appeal to countries around the world to take
actions in opposition to North Korea's unlawful ballistic
missile and nuclear programs to make clear to the DPRK that
pursuing its unlawful programs will only increase its
isolation.
While addressing the threat to our homeland and our allies
is our most pressing concern, we will not abandon the three
U.S. citizens who have been unjustly detained by North Korea,
nor will we be silent in speaking out against the regime's
egregious human rights violations against its own people. The
State Department will soon impose a travel restriction
forbidding U.S. nationals to use an American passport to travel
in, through, or to North Korea. We seek to avoid another
tragedy like that which Otto Warmbier and his family endured.
In very specific limited circumstances, American citizens
can apply for a waiver to this travel restriction to allow them
to perform humanitarian work. We do not wish to punish the
North Korean people for the actions of their leadership and
therefore plan to allow for some exceptions to our travel
restriction.
We appreciate the strong interest in this issue from
Congress, and we look forward to continuing our cooperation and
protecting our country from this grave threat to international
stability.
Thank you again for inviting me to testify today, and I
look forward to any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Thornton follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Susan Thornton
Chairman Gardner, Ranking Member Markey and Members of the
Subcommittee: Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today
for this timely hearing on North Korea.
North Korea's July 4th Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)
test is only the latest evidence of Kim Jong Un's resolve to
successfully achieve a nuclear-tipped ballistic missile capable of
reaching the United States mainland. It constitutes a serious
escalation of the DPRK's nuclear and ballistic missile program.
Yet, the threat posed by North Korea is not new. This is a problem
set that has challenged five previous administrations. By examining
their approach to this problem, we have gathered several lessons from
painful experience. First--North Korea has no intention of abandoning
its nuclear program in the current environment. North Korea will not
give up its weapons in exchange for talks, even with economic
concessions that provide sorely needed assistance to the North Korean
people. Thus, while we continue to see a negotiated solution as the
best chance at resolving this problem, we remain firm that the
conditions at present are unconducive to dialogue. We will not
negotiate our way to talks. Second--there is a chance we can change Kim
Jong Un's calculus by increasing through economic and diplomatic
pressure the cost of maintaining his nuclear and ballistic missile
programs. North Korea has never faced a sustained period of intense
international pressure on the regime. We aim to change that. Third--
While we continue to seek international cooperation on North Korea, we
will not hesitate to take unilateral actions against entities and
individuals who enable Kim Jong Un's regime's pursuit of strategic
nuclear capabilities.
These lessons guided us in developing our current strategy. Through
this strategy, we are using all tools at our disposal to amass pressure
on Pyongyang to bring the regime to understand that the only path to
international legitimacy, regime security and economic prosperity is to
abandon its internationally condemned, destabilizing weapons program.
Three components serve as the pillars of this strategy: (1) We've
called on all U.N. member states to fully implement the commitments
they made regarding North Korea. These include the strong sanctions
required in UNSCRs 2321, 2270 and 2356, (2) Second, we've urged
countries to suspend or downgrade diplomatic relations with North
Korea, recognizing that cordial ties with Pyongyang imparts respect to
a country that shuns stability and international obligations. Simply
put, this is a country that proceeds without any regards for rules, (3)
Third, we asked all countries to cut trade ties with Pyongyang as a way
of increasing North Korea's financial isolation.
We have relentlessly implemented this policy. As Secretary
Tillerson said in remarks to this Committee on June 13, he has
highlighted North Korea in all his bilateral discussions with senior
officials from countries around the world. He has made this a top
priority for all State Department officials in their engagements with
foreign counterparts. Countries that never considered North Korea's
weapons programs as a priority issue in their bilateral relations with
the United States now know otherwise and have been asked to closely
examine their diplomatic and trade ties with North Korea. From Mali to
Malaysia, we have made clear that applying greater pressure on North
Korea is not only a talking point, it is an area where we expect
continuing cooperation as a basis for strong bilateral relations.
Trilateral cooperation with our South Korean and Japanese allies is
also critically important, and we've ensured that we maintain a steady
pace of high-level engagements to buttress the strength of our
alliances and to synch up DPRK policy in Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul.
On the margins of the recent G20 meeting in Hamburg, the President
convened a trilateral meeting to discuss DPRK with President Moon and
Prime Minister Abe. Through mechanisms like this, we have maintained
policy coordination with our strongest allies in East Asia on the North
Korean threat.
On China, we recognize the continued importance of Beijing doing
more to exert pressure on North Korea. We are also clear-eyed in
viewing the progress--growing but uneven--that China has made on this
front. We are conferring closely with our Chinese counterparts to
ensure strict implementation of China's commitment to curb imports of
North Korean coal, consistent with their declaration in February
banning coal imports for the duration of the calendar year. In the four
months since China's February 18 announcement to ban coal imports, our
estimates indicate that the value of North Korean coal imports into
China have been reduced to 26% and 31% of 2015 and 2016's levels,
respectively, during the same time period and have deprived the regime
of over $420 million in revenues at current market prices.
With this in mind, we recognize that Beijing can and should do more
to monitor financial activity within its own borders. Accordingly, we
worked closely with our Department of the Treasury colleagues to
designate two Chinese individuals and one Chinese entity on June 29, in
response to North Korea's ongoing WMD development and continued
violations of U.N. Security Council resolutions. The Treasury
Department also found the Bank of Dandong, a Chinese bank that has
acted as a conduit for illicit North Korean financial activity, to be a
foreign financial institution of primary money laundering concern,
pursuant to Section 311 of the USA Patriot Act. As a result, they
proposed a rule prohibiting U.S. financial institutions from
maintaining correspondent accounts for, or on behalf of, Bank of
Dandong.
Together, these actions all send a clear message to the
international community--if you attempt to evade sanctions and conduct
business with designated North Korean entities, you will pay a price.
We will continue to fully exercise all of our standing sanctions
authorities to choke off revenue streams to the DPRK.
signs of progress
While we are only in the first few months of our new policy, we are
encouraged by some signs of progress:
Days after the North Koreans tested an ICBM, the G20
countries meeting in Germany issued individual statements condemning
the ballistic missile launch.
We have seen countries expel sanctioned North Korean
officials and North Korean diplomats engaged in illicit commercial or
arms-related activities, and prevented certain North Korean individuals
from entering or transiting their jurisdictions.
Countries have reduced the size of the North Korean
mission in their countries, and canceled or downgraded diplomatic
engagements or exchanges with North Korea. Across the globe, countries
are beginning to view visiting North Korean official delegations with
caution, recognizing that welcoming these delegations come at a cost to
their bilateral relations with the United States.
Countries in the Middle East, Europe, and Southeast Asia
halted visa issuances to North Korean laborers and are phasing out the
use of these workers, whose wages are garnished to fund the regime and
its unlawful nuclear and missile programs. While a small number of
countries remain committed to this practice, we are working to ensure
they are the exception to an international consensus against hiring
DPRK laborers.
Like-minded countries including the Republic of Korea
(ROK), Japan, and Australia implemented their own unilateral sanctions.
EU partners are augmenting autonomous restrictive measures to implement
U.N. Security Council resolutions, and key European partners,
particularly the UK, France, and Germany, are collaborating with us on
maximizing pressure on the DPRK.
Countries with special leverage on North Korea are
committing to fully implement UNSCR obligations and are coordinating
with us on pressing North Korea to return to serious talks.
next steps
We will continue to appeal to countries around the world to take
actions in shared opposition to North Korea's unlawful ballistic
missile and nuclear weapon programs to make clear to the DPRK that it
stands alone in its pursuit of the advancement of its unlawful
programs. We will step up efforts to sanction individuals and entities
enabling the DPRK regime, including those in China. China must exert
its unique leverage over the DPRK. We will never recognize North Korea
as a nuclear state.
While addressing this imminent threat is our most pressing issue,
we have not and will not lose sight of the plight of the three
remaining American citizens who have been unjustly detained by North
Korea or of the regime's egregious human rights violations. Due to
mounting concerns over the serious risk of arrest and long-term
detention, the Department will soon impose a travel restriction on all
U.S. nationals' use of a passport to travel in, through, or to North
Korea. We seek to prevent the future detentions of U.S. citizens by the
North Korean regime to avoid another tragedy like that which Otto
Warmbier and his family endured.
We appreciate the strong interest in this issue from Congress and
we look forward to continuing our cooperation. Thank you for inviting
me to testify today. I am pleased to answer any questions you may have.
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Secretary Thornton.
As I mentioned, when Senator Markey arrives, we will turn
to him for his opening comments and questions as well.
I just want to start with a couple of questions to you,
Secretary Thornton, regarding the maximum pressure campaign. Do
you think the administration needs additional tools, additional
sanctions authorities from Congress to fully implement the
maximum pressure campaign or policy?
Ms. Thornton. I would say that there have been several
things that the administration has done in light of the review
that we conducted on North Korea policy and in implementing the
strategy that we have in place right now.
The first is to make North Korea the highest priority
national security issue that we are facing, and you have heard
Secretary Mattis and the President and the Secretary and others
speak to this.
The second thing that we are doing is we are making this a
real global campaign and putting the onus on other countries in
the international community to examine their relationships with
North Korea, both diplomatic, economic, financial, trading, and
asking them to make sure that not only are they implementing
the very sweeping U.N. sanctions regime that has already been
put in place but that they are going beyond that regime to
initiate their own actions to show the North Koreans that they
will not be able to seek solace or comfort in the international
community anywhere, and this is part of maintaining a global
network to show that we are unified in our efforts to thwart
their ambitions.
The third thing that we are doing is really working,
putting the onus on China. As you said, 90 percent of the North
Korean economy is flowing through China in one form or another,
and I think this is a real departure from previous approaches
on this issue, putting the onus on China to step up, as you
said, be a responsible global player and really use its tools
to up the pressure on the regime in North Korea and make clear
that China will only accept a denuclearized Korean Peninsula
and that they are prepared to impinge on the North Korean
economy in ways that are much more serious than they have done
in the past.
I think as far as the tools that we have at hand for
conducting this strategy, we do have very broad authorities
already existing. We are already undertaking a sweeping
assessment of all of the violations of sanctions that we can
detect that are going on in various countries around the world,
including in China. We have been working with some of those
countries to take action against entities that we find that are
violating these sanctions, and we have very broad authorities
to do so.
So I would say I do not think there is any lack of tools
that are keeping us from prosecuting a very active sanctions
campaign, both within the ambit of the U.N. Security Council
resolutions sanctions, but also within our own unilateral kind
of designations and secondary sanctions against entities that
we find to be violative.
Senator Gardner. And outside of this hearing, have you made
that position known, that you have the authorities that you
need, to both chambers of the Congress?
Ms. Thornton. Not aware specifically, but I believe that
that is our position, yes.
Senator Gardner. Thank you. And have you had a chance to
review some of the other pieces of legislation, either in the
House or regarding North Korea sanctions? And in the Senate I
have introduced, along with others on this committee,
legislation regarding North Korea and sanctions, particularly
relating to access to financial networks and systems. Could you
comment a little bit on those pieces of legislation?
Ms. Thornton. Sure, yes. There are quite a number of pieces
of legislation, and we definitely appreciate the interest of
Congress in this issue. I think what I would say is that the
authorities that we have, again, I think they are quite
sweeping. Authorities that were passed in the legislation from
2016, the North Korea Sanctions Enhancement Act that you
mentioned, and the executive orders that followed from that,
gave us very broad authorities to go after entities that we
find that are violating sanctions or U.S. laws or the U.N.
sanctions.
So I think the new pieces of legislation, there are various
targets. One was on the travel restriction or travel ban. One
is on North Korean human rights. So there are a number of
different aspects that they touch on, and I think in general we
have been consulting closely with staff on those and we
appreciate the interest.
Senator Gardner. The round of designations that you
mentioned, you talked about sanctioning Chinese financial
institutions, other measures, secondary sanctions. When can we
expect the next round of designations that include Chinese
entities and financial institutions?
Ms. Thornton. We have been working on coming up with a new
list of entities that we think are violating, and I think there
is no specific timetable, but there is no specific hesitation
to do that. We will be proceeding with those as soon as we can
get target packages ready to go and get the sort of evidentiary
standards and legal standards met that we need to meet.
Senator Gardner. Can we expect additional sanctions within
the next 30 days?
Ms. Thornton. I would hesitate to predict exact timetables,
but I think you will see something fairly soon, yes.
Senator Gardner. And will these sanctions, will they be
presented to China or others prior to the enactment of the
sanctions to give them a chance to correct, or will they just
be implemented immediately?
Ms. Thornton. Well, we have been in running conversations
with China and other countries about information that we have
on entities, and in some cases we tried to coordinate on
actions with them, with local law enforcement to our law
enforcement actions, and in some cases we are unable to do
that. So I cannot say specifically with regard to what we are
considering, but we have done both in the past, and we are not
bound by any particular arrangement.
Senator Gardner. When you see a report like the C480 report
that shows over 5,000 entities doing business with China, does
that provide evidence that you can use? Does that go into a
conversation with the Chinese government, and what is their
response?
Ms. Thornton. So, we have had a number of conversations, I
myself have had multiple conversations with my Chinese
counterparts, and whenever we have a report like this we bring
it to them and ask them to look into it, and they have done
that. Usually they come back to us with some kind of a
response, which we either follow up on or not. But, I mean,
usually we definitely share that kind of information.
Senator Gardner. In your testimony you talk--and you
mentioned it in the answer to your question--about three
components of service, pillars of the strategy: call on U.N.
member states to fully implement the commitments they have made
regarding North Korea; you have urged countries to suspend or
downgrade diplomatic relations with North Korea; and asked all
countries to cut trade ties with Pyongyang.
Could you give me an indication of the success of those
requests? How many member nations of the United Nations have
suspended or downgraded diplomatic relations with North Korea
that you have requested to do so? How many have cut trade ties
with Pyongyang that we have requested to do so?
Ms. Thornton. I cannot give you specific numbers, but we
have urged everybody to squeeze diplomatic representation or
downgrade if they can. There are a number of countries that
have expelled DPRK representatives from their capitals, who
have diminished their presence in Pyongyang of diplomatic
missions, have expelled representatives of commercial offices
or other entities that were transacting illicitly with the host
government and that we provided information on. So I cannot
give you the exact number, but there are quite a number that
have responded to our call for diminishing diplomatic presence.
We have also had a number of countries respond to the call
for diminishing commercial operations that are sponsored by
diplomatic establishments, and I think we have had--for
example, Germany has committed to take steps to close a hostel
there that was being run by the North Korean diplomatic mission
which provided revenue for the mission's operations. So we have
had a number of successes on that front, as well.
Senator Gardner. Could you talk a little bit about the
timing of the travel ban?
Ms. Thornton. Yes. So, we believe that in the coming week,
within the coming week, we will publish a notice in the Federal
Register outlining the period of consultation and what we are
proposing, which is a general travel restriction. That will be
in the Federal Register for a 30-day comment period, and the
proposal is to, I think as you know, make U.S. passports not
valid for travel into North Korea unless an application is made
for a one-time trip and you get a license or permission to make
that trip. So that will be in the Federal Register for 30
days----
Senator Gardner. Is that trip allowable under a
humanitarian exemption? Is that the purpose of that allowance?
Ms. Thornton. Right, right, for the subsequent--you would
have to make an in-person application for a trip.
Senator Gardner. And are we encouraging other nations to do
the same, and have others made the same decision?
Ms. Thornton. We have encouraged other people to make
decisions about restricting travel, because tourism is
obviously a resource for the regime that we would like to see
diminished. I do not think so far there are other people that
have pursued this, but this will be sort of the initial one,
and we will keep talking to others about that.
Senator Gardner. I thank you, Secretary Thornton.
As promised, I will turn to Senator Markey for any opening
comments you would make. Secretary Thornton has already given
her testimony, and so proceed into questions if you would like
to immediately.
STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD J. MARKEY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
Senator Markey. Okay. Beautiful. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We apologize to everyone. It is a very unusual day here in
the Congress, historic. So we apologize, but we think this is
as well an historic issue that has to be dealt with in the very
near term.
So I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for convening this hearing,
and to our three witnesses for being here.
Assistant Secretary Thornton, you are the first Trump
administration official to testify on North Korea in an open
hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Since
taking office, President Trump and his policymakers have made
inconsistent and sometimes conflicting public comments on this
sensitive matter. I hope your testimony will provide needed
clarity.
North Korea continues to develop its nuclear and missile
programs without constraint. Over the past 18 months it has
conducted its fourth and fifth nuclear tests, tested over 20
ballistic missiles, and launched a satellite into orbit.
On July 4th, North Korea tested an intercontinental
ballistic missile, or ICBM. This represents a startling advance
in Pyongyang's arsenal. And just hours ago, the Washington Post
reported that the Defense Intelligence Agency now assesses
North Korea could field a reliable nuclear-capable
intercontinental ballistic missile as early as next year, 2
years sooner than previously thought.
We and our allies must remain resolute and united to deter
this threat. Kim Jong Un's reckless brutality leaves no doubt
that he is homicidal, but at the same time his calculated
survival strategy shows that he is not suicidal. Like his
father and grandfather before him, Kim knows that an attack on
the United States or our allies will bring an immediate and
devastating military response. For that reason, so far
deterrence has worked. But as Kim builds nuclear weapons and
the situation continues to drift without diplomatic resolution,
he may eventually misread our deterrent military posture as
preparation for an imminent attack to topple his regime.
I believe that continued diplomatic drift only increases
the risk of unintended war, with potentially grave
consequences. Just 3 days ago, General Joe Dunford, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, said that war on the Korean
Peninsula would be, quote, ``horrific, a loss of life unlike
any we have experienced in our lifetimes, and I mean anyone who
has been alive since World War II.'' This echoed comments by
Secretary of Defense, Jim Mattis, earlier this year.
It is clear that there is no military solution to this
problem, and pressure without direct diplomatic engagement will
bring only continued drift. We need a bold new approach. I
believe that only direct diplomatic engagement backed by
unprecedented economic pressure will bring a peaceful solution
to the North Korea problem.
That is why I have joined with Chairman Gardner in leading
the North Korean Enablers Accountability Act. We believe that
the United States needs to make it crystal clear that our
country will impose unprecedented economic pressure on North
Korea and its enablers, and we need to give the administration
potent diplomatic tools with which to bring the North Korean
regime to the table for serious, direct negotiations.
But no matter how many sanctions tools we give the
President, pressure cannot bring North Korea to the table
unless we are willing to talk to them. Now is the time for the
administration to clearly state its diplomatic engagement
strategy, the circumstances under which it will agree to direct
engagement with North Korea, and how it intends to use
sanctions and other tools to bring Kim to the table for serious
talks. So this is, without question, Mr. Chairman, a very
important hearing, and I do have a question.
Senator Gardner. Please proceed to your questions.
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate it.
So, Secretary Thornton, part of the North Korea challenge
at present is that the administration has announced a policy of
maximum pressure and engagement but has not articulated as of
yet what that means or the strategy for implementing it,
specifically with respect to diplomatic engagement. President
Trump has spoken of the chances of ``a major, major conflict
with North Korea,'' quote unquote, but has also said he would
be honored to meet with Kim Jong Un and that he was ``a smart
cookie.''
Other administration officials, including Vice President
Pence and Secretary Tillerson, have given similarly
contradictory statements. And frankly, Secretary Thornton, your
opening statement still has not clarified exactly where the
administration has to be or is today.
You mentioned lessons that guided us in developing our
current strategy which has three components that serve as the
pillars but did not elaborate on what that strategy or the
pillars are. Calls for U.N. member states to fully enforce
sanctions and urging countries to isolate North Korea all sound
like things that previous administrations have also done.
So, can you explain to us what the administration's current
strategy is and how it is bringing us closer to the ultimate
goal of peacefully denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula?
Ms. Thornton. Thank you very much, Senator Markey, for your
statement and for these questions. I mean, this is obviously a
very difficult issue. Some of us have been working on this
issue for more years than we care to count, and I think in the
room here we probably have millennia of experience on this
issue. Unfortunately, we have not come up with a solution that
has allowed us to solve this issue in the way that we hope to
see it solved, which is the denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula.
The denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is the
administration's goal here. That is what we are going after. I
think the Secretary and others have made clear that it is our
preference to resolve this issue peacefully, to denuclearize
the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner. That said, it seems
that Kim Jong Un and the North Korean regime are quite
dedicated to developing these weapons and have not so far
demonstrated any inclination to join us for negotiations on the
dismantling and abandonment of the nuclear weapons.
Senator Markey. So what the administration is saying, then,
is that you believe in a negotiated settlement of this issue of
the development of nuclear weapons and intercontinental
ballistic missiles by North Korea, but thus far the
administration has been unwilling to actually negotiate with
North Korea.
Ms. Thornton. Well, thus far we have not had a partner--
sorry to interrupt, but thus far we have not had a partner with
whom we could negotiate, and we have had----
Senator Markey. Have you asked for negotiations with the
North Koreans?
Ms. Thornton. We have asked--the North Koreans know how to
get in touch with us when they are----
Senator Markey. I appreciate that, but do you know how to
get in touch with them?
Ms. Thornton. We do know how to get in touch with them.
Senator Markey. Have you asked for negotiations to commence
with the North Koreans, in conjunction with the Chinese or the
Japanese? Have you asked for that specific negotiation to occur
and for us to actually construct a framework by which we can
begin to resolve this issue?
Ms. Thornton. I mean, at this point, all of our allies,
partners, and others that are involved in trying to help and
cooperate to address this issue and solve this problem, none of
us have gotten a positive response from North Korea when the
topic of a serious conversation, a serious negotiation about
their nuclear program has come up. So in the face of that
intransigence, our strategy is to increase the pressure on the
North Korean regime to try to change its calculus, to change
the cost/benefit analysis in Pyongyang surrounding these
programs, and at the same time we are constantly evaluating and
probing to see if we are having that desired effect.
I think that it is certainly the case that ratcheting up
sanctions pressure is not like a cobra strike. It is definitely
a slow squeeze, a slow tightening of the screws, and I think we
are definitely in the process of trying to elevate that
pressure and change the calculus. We have not gotten there yet,
which I think is what I mentioned in my statement, but I think
we also think that sanctions over time and pressure over time,
unified global network over time can have the effect of
changing that calculation on the part of the DPRK regime, and
that is what we are seeking to do.
I mean, some people say this will not work, but I say we
have to test this hypothesis and test it at the point where we
bring the maximum amount of pressure.
Senator Markey. Well, Senator Gardner and I and other
members of this committee, we clearly want to intensify the
level of pressure on North Korea. They enjoyed a 37 percent
increase in trade with the Chinese from year to year, from 2016
to the beginning of 2017. When we began the deployment of the
THAAD, that has now led to a $10 billion-a-year economic
sanction that China is imposing on South Korea and its tourism
sector.
So from our perspective, the strategy which we have is not
working. We need legislation that will ensure that there is a
tightening of the sanctions, but it can only work if it is done
in conjunction with negotiations that begin but with the sure
and certain knowledge that these sanctions are arriving so that
you can extract the strongest possible result.
Mr. Chairman, I see that Senator Kaine has arrived, so I
will end my questions right now so that Senator Kaine can be
recognized.
Senator Gardner. Senator Kaine is recognized.
Senator Kaine. Thank you to my colleagues, and thank you
for your testimony, and forgive me if I ask questions that were
asked while I was coming from an Armed Services Committee
hearing.
It was, I think, on the 21st of June that the U.S. and
China held the first iteration of the Diplomatic and Security
Dialogue. What steps did the administration take during that
dialogue with China to urge them to increase pressure on North
Korea?
Because when we met with the administration at the White
House, that was in a classified setting, so I am not going to
go into it in any detail, but I think we all realized the
leverage that China has is not being deployed sufficiently to
change North Korean behavior. There is much more leverage that
can be deployed. And when we hear about China sanctioning South
Korea over efforts that South Korea is taking just to defend
itself, it seems like not only are we not using our leverage,
we may be going backwards.
So can you tell me about the dialogue between the U.S. and
China on June 21 about the North Korea issue?
Ms. Thornton. Yes, sure. Thank you very much, Senator, for
that question. First let me start off by saying that we deplore
and have spoken out publicly about how disappointed we are
about China's actions with respect to South Korea over the
THAAD deployment. Of course, the THAAD deployment is merely a
defensive system that is going to be used to protect South
Korea, protect our troops, and it is certainly within the
rights of South Korea to deploy a defensive system, and we
have, in the context of the diplomatic and security dialogue,
raised our disappointment again over that issue and insisted
with the Chinese that we continue to discuss it and that they
retract all of the negative ramifications that flowed from that
decision.
With regard to the sanctions on North Korea, and with
regard to the discussions on North Korea in general, I think
what we had hoped to do in the Diplomatic and Security Dialogue
in the period running up to that, when there was a lot of
active diplomacy, was convince the Chinese to take serious
action against their own entities that we found that were in
violation of some sanctions provisions. And once, after the
Diplomatic and Security Dialogue, we had a chance to talk
through with the Chinese how we saw it, then I think you saw
following from that discussion the decision to proceed with the
sanctioning of a number of Chinese entities.
We have had a number of conversations with China where we
said we would prefer to work through the U.N. sanctions,
because obviously if you have a U.N. Security Council
resolution, it is an international sanction that sweeps up the
entirety of the global network that we are trying to build, and
we would prefer to cooperate with China on going after entities
that we see in violation of those sanctions, but that we are
perfectly prepared to act on our own to target entities that we
find it necessary to target that are in violation of the
sanctions.
So I think the Chinese are now very clear that we are going
to go after Chinese entities if need be, if we find them to be
in violation; and if the Chinese feel they cannot cooperate in
going after those targets, that there is no block on us acting
on our own.
Senator Kaine. This committee acted in 2016 to do sanctions
that were followed on pretty quickly. I mean, not only through
the body to be signed by the President, but then they were
followed on pretty quickly by the U.N. Security Council, and
China did not choose to exercise its veto in those.
But I am curious, are there major differences in the way
they interpret the sanctions and we interpret them? Do we run
into interpretive disagreements where we think it should be
more maximal and they are claiming that it is not? Tell me a
little bit about the relationship with China, even over
understanding what these sanctions mean.
Ms. Thornton. So, we have had six U.N. Security Council
resolutions against North Korea since 2006, five of those with
sanctions, all of them adopted by consensus in the Security
Council, so no vetoes, which shows the degree to which North
Korea is a complete flagrant outlier in the international
system.
A Chinese vote for these U.N. Security Council resolutions.
They are opposed to all of North Korea's violative behavior.
But in the details of the sanctions--and there is a U.N. panel
of experts that monitors the sanctions and the implementation
and interprets--we work very closely with the panel of experts,
and the Chinese also work very closely with them. I mean, the
Chinese have a lot more trade going on with North Korea. They
have a very long border with North Korea. And so they have,
first of all, differences in interpretations of some of the
sanctions and more tangible differences in how they can
implement the sanctions. They have a lot more work to do to
implement the sanctions, obviously at the borders with
inspections of Customs, with tracking financial transactions,
et cetera.
So, they are both having a difference with regard also to
their domestic laws and how they enact domestic laws to
implement U.N. sanctions than what the system is that we have.
Senator Kaine. If I could ask one more question, Mr.
Chairman. I am just about up against my time.
These guys who have been on the subcommittee are far more
expert than me. I am a Middle East and Latin America guy just
added to this subcommittee, so I always ask questions that
others know about already, but help me understand Chinese
behavior on this.
They did not veto the sanctions, the sanctions as you
mentioned. They disagree on application issues, but that may
not be quite so unusual. They are on the border and they are
doing trade with them. It affects them more than it does us, so
we would have a different point of view. But then they would
sanction South Korea for taking steps that are clearly
defensive in nature. I mean, that seems so much more extreme
even than babbling about what does the U.N. Security Council
resolution mean.
When South Korea is taking steps that are clearly defensive
in nature to protect itself against what everybody agrees is
sanctionable behavior within the U.N. context that should cause
grave concern by a border neighbor, as well as other nations in
the region, I have a hard time understanding what this sanction
on South Korea is about. I cannot interpret it in any light
other than a really hostile and unhelpful one. So, help me
understand it.
Ms. Thornton. I think your interpretation is perfectly
legitimate. I mean, we have the same conversation, which is
this is a defensive system. The Chinese do not believe it is a
defensive system, but we have tried to explain that we can have
a technical conversation and explain to you exactly why you are
wrong, but they have not come to the same conclusion on that.
So I think we continue to point out to them that this is a
completely unjustified kind of behavior, and I think on the
reaction to the THAAD system I cannot explain exactly why they
are doing what they are doing, but I think seeing it as
unreasonable is perfectly legitimate.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
Secretary Thornton, just another round of questions. I will
be brief in my comments and questions here.
Just make it clear: There will be additional sanctions
issued on Chinese entities and others who are violating our
sanctions and U.N. sanctions. Is that correct?
Ms. Thornton. Yes.
Senator Gardner. And those will be issued shortly. Is that
correct? Shortly within the next----
Ms. Thornton. I mean, it is not the State Department that
issues them. So, yes, within----
Senator Gardner. Thank you.
Ms. Thornton. Yes.
Senator Gardner. I wanted to follow up on human rights.
Will any of these actions include violations of human rights by
the North Korean regime?
Ms. Thornton. I'm sorry?
Senator Gardner. Do any of these sanctions or any other
measures address the violations of human rights by North Korea?
Ms. Thornton. It is possible. I am not exactly sure which
ones are going to be included in the next tranche, but it is
possible. Certainly we still have the North Korea human rights
sanctions provided for in legislation, and we have the
authority to do that.
Senator Gardner. The other and final question before I turn
it over to Senator Markey, cyber capabilities. We, in the last
Congress, passed legislation requiring mandatory cyber
sanctions when we find a violation by North Korea under the
terms of the legislation. In the conversations over the past
several months we have talked about some of the ransomware
attacks that have gone viral around the globe. Does the United
States plan to utilize--the State Department, Treasury
Department, plan to utilize the cyber sanctions authority under
the previous legislation?
Ms. Thornton. Yes. I believe that, of course, we are well
aware of malicious cyber activity emanating from North Korea,
and we are very concerned about it. I think when we have the
opportunity to use the authority, we certainly would use it and
would not hesitate.
Senator Gardner. Thank you.
Senator Markey.
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, again.
And we thank you for being here, Secretary Thornton. This
is a very important discussion. And again, I continue my line
of questioning, again referencing back to the Washington Post
story of just two hours ago saying that our own Defense
Intelligence Agency now believes that they could deploy a
reliable nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile
next year. So, time is of the essence. This is the last best
chance we are going to have to deter them.
So the legislation pending before this committee and that
we intend on moving and is the subject of this hearing is to
impose broad sanctions on 10 Chinese companies identified
specifically as doing the largest amount of business with the
North Korean government, and we want to move on this rapidly so
that the Chinese know that we are serious and the North Koreans
know that we are serious. We now know that time is running out.
Once they have that intercontinental ballistic missile,
nuclear-capable ability, it will be very difficult to roll that
back.
So again, what is the administration's views on this
legislation that we have pending before the committee? Does the
Trump administration support it, oppose it, or are you neutral?
Ms. Thornton. Well, we certainly would support going after
entities that are violating the sanctions, and I cannot say
without knowing what the list of entities exactly is and having
a lot more information about what they have been doing, what
kinds of violations they are looking at. But we would certainly
not hesitate to go after companies that we have that kind of
information on.
So I think we are sort of in the same mode of wanting to
ratchet up the pressure on the North Korean regime quickly. As
far as signaling to North Korea about what it is we are trying
to do, since they do not seem willing to enter into a serious
negotiation, we are trying to let them know through other means
what it is that our goal is, what it is that we are trying to
do, and what it is that we are not trying to do.
I think the Secretary has been very clear that we are not
pursuing regime change in North Korea, we are not pursuing a
collapse or an accelerated reunification, that we are genuinely
focused on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. We
have done our part in South Korea. There are no nuclear
weapons, and it is now up to North Korea to come to the table,
hopefully encouraged by the sanctions and also encouraged by
other incentives.
Senator Markey. But my question goes to what is the
conversation between the Trump administration and the Chinese
government. What are you saying to the Chinese government about
the intention of the United States to tighten, in a vise-like
grip, sanctions on those companies that are cooperating with
the North Korean government, including the 10 companies that we
include in this legislation, towards the goal of moving to
direct negotiations with the North Koreans, having the Chinese
working with us? What is that conversation? That is what we are
trying to elicit. Because, obviously, when there is a 37
percent increase in trade with North Korea and China, and a $10
billion-a-year hit on the South Korean economy as they
cooperate with the United States in the deployment of the
THAAD, right now they are not feeling any pressure. It is just
business as usual, coasting towards that moment when they have
a nuclear weapons program that is successful in being able to
reach our country.
So what exactly are you saying to the Chinese leaders?
Ms. Thornton. We have had the conversation about our
intention to tighten the vise grip of sanctions with regard to
companies that are violating. We are also, of course, working
on new international sanctions through the U.N., and I think
U.S.-U.N. Ambassador Haley had a statement about that this
morning, that the Chinese have proposed some additional
measures and that things were positive in the conversations we
are having with China about instituting additional
international sanctions as a response to the ICBM launch on
July 4th.
But we are also telling them quite up front that we will
not hesitate to take additional actions against Chinese
companies that are violating the sanctions with North Korea. I
have not told them the list of 10 companies that are in your
bill, but we have been talking to them about a lot of other
entities and companies that we have information about that are
involved with North Korea and that we are proceeding to try to
move against.
Senator Markey. So what are you telling the Chinese are the
conditions under which we are willing to engage in direct talks
with the North Koreans? The Chinese have asked us to engage in
direct negotiations with the North Koreans. What have you said
to China about what those conditions would be that would bring
us to direct talks? What are the conditions you have given to
the Chinese?
Ms. Thornton. We have not given them a list of conditions,
but we have told them, as I think I mentioned in my statement,
that a start would be a moratorium on testing of missiles and
nuclear devices and a diminishing of provocative behavior. That
would be the first sort of step in moving toward a negotiation.
We would like to see some seriousness on the part of North
Korea about abandoning its weapons programs.
Senator Markey. So you are saying North Korea has to make
some concessions before we will begin negotiations. Is that the
position of the Trump administration?
Ms. Thornton. Well, North Korea does not have to make
concessions. It has to stop its U.N. Security Council
resolution violative illicit behavior, and we do not see that
as a concession.
Senator Markey. I appreciate that, but we have to look at
it from the perspective of the North Koreans as well, which is
why going to direct negotiations with a much tougher sanctions
program surrounding its economy, in cooperation with the
Chinese, is from my perspective the correct formula to get a
result before next year, when it becomes irreversible.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Senator Markey.
Senator Portman.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROB PORTMAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM OHIO
Senator Portman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As Senator Markey has described, we have big challenges
with North Korea, and over the period of the last couple of
decades, a few different administrations, we have tried
different things which have not worked.
I wanted to talk, if I could for a moment, about the
possibility of re-designating North Korea as a state sponsor of
terrorism. I raise this because you will recall that the
designation was actually removed as part of a negotiation. My
understanding is that the North Koreans did not keep their end
of the bargain on that negotiation.
I know that you are currently pursuing a strategy of
maximum pressure, as it is called, against the regime, and I
just wonder why this is not one of the things you are looking
at. The Perry Initiative during President Clinton's
administration was where this was removed. It was discussed
during the Clinton administration. The Bush administration's
removal of the regime from the list in 2008 was based upon an
agreement by North Korea to disable its plutonium factory and
for the complete and correct declaration of its nuclear
program. None of those things happened.
Today we understand that plutonium production continues at
Yongbyon, and it is an important part of the North Korean
nuclear program. If I am wrong about that, I would like to hear
from you, Ms. Thornton. We are nowhere near having a complete
and correct understanding of their nuclear program, of course.
So the removal from the list in 2008 was closely linked to
negotiating limitations on the program and changes in
international behavior by the regime, and it never happened.
Director Coates has now outlined in his worldwide threat
assessment that just came out a couple of months ago that North
Korea's record of sharing dangerous nuclear and missile
technology with state sponsors of terrorism, including Iran and
Syria, continues to pose a serious threat not just to the U.S.
but to the security environment in East Asia and elsewhere.
So sharing dangerous nuclear weapon technology with Iran, a
state sponsor of terrorism, should seem to be an important link
to terrorism. In addition, the regime has built a long record,
of course, of kidnapping and murder. Its treatment of Japanese
nationals was an important part of their designation
previously.
Unfortunately, they have made a habit now of detaining
Americans. As you know, one of my constituents, Otto Warmbier,
was one of those who was detained. That detention, in essence,
turned into a death sentence for him, improperly detained. So
my question to you would be whether you all are weighing the
re-designation of North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism
and what the status of that decision-making is; and if you are
not doing that, why are you not doing that?
Ms. Thornton. Thank you. Thank you, Senator, very much for
that question. Of course, let me just start by saying that our
hearts really do go out to the family of Otto Warmbier. It was
a reprehensible tragedy and something that no one should have
to go through. I certainly appreciate the sentiment behind your
question, and I think we all are very concerned about
humanitarian conditions inside North Korea and about actions by
the regime that are very much outside the bounds of any kind of
responsible state actor.
I think on the issue of the state sponsors of terrorism, we
are reviewing that issue right now. It is an issue that the
Secretary has taken an interest in. There are a lot of
technical and legal aspects to it, so I cannot tell you with
great specificity where we are in the review right now, but we
are looking at the issue of designation. I could give you more
information perhaps at a later date.
Senator Portman. Well, I appreciate that information, but I
would like to ask that you get back to me, and I assume the
Chairman and Ranking Member will be interested as well as to
what your thinking is and what the considerations are. You said
it is a highly technical decision. I know you have to meet
certain requirements. Again, providing missile technology to
countries that we consider some of the top state sponsors of
terrorism would seem to be a link, and then, of course, not
just how they treated other countries' citizens but ours.
By the way, with regard to Otto Warmbier, I want to thank
you again. I have done this before this committee a couple of
times, including when Deputy Secretary Sullivan was here. I
appreciate his personal involvement. As you know, Ambassador
Joe Younes was critical to us in being able to ultimately bring
Otto home. So we appreciate the State Department's increased
and highly personal efforts over the last couple of months.
Again, the process that we have gone through in the last 18
months with the DPRK with regard to Otto Warmbier indicates to
me the level of depravity that exists within that regime.
One final question, if I could, Mr. Chairman. This has to
do with economic sanctions. Many of us have talked about the
imposition of broader sanctions by checking more Chinese
companies brought into the sanctions regime, because there are
hundreds, if not thousands, of Chinese companies, as I
understand it, still doing business with North Korea, some of
whom are involved with dual technology that has had an effect
not just on their commercial activities but also their military
activities.
But let me ask you about the sanctions that are in place.
Are they working? Are they affecting the pace with which the
country of North Korea has been able to develop and test its
nuclear and ballistic missile programs? And to what sources of
funding has the regime resorted in order to get around some of
these sanctions?
Ms. Thornton. Thank you very much for that question. I
think that what we see is, as we build this kind of global
network to try to increase the pressure on the regime and
prevent proliferation, especially of illicit technology going
to North Korea, that there has been some effect. We are
affecting their ability to get things that they need. It has
not, unfortunately, slowed down their missile testing program,
but we do see them needing to resort to new avenues of access
to get imports and other things. I think that is one of the
desired goals of the sanctions regime, is to make things more
difficult for them, obviously, to proceed with their weapons
programs.
I think one aspect of this is as the pressure on the
regime, on sanctions, on their inability to transact financial
transactions and move things easily across borders without
being subject to inspection, et cetera, they will start to look
for new avenues of outlet, and that is one of the reasons why
we have been so insistent on traveling out to countries that
you would not normally think of as being partners of North
Korea to try to shore up the resolve of countries all over the
world to keep North Korea from accessing markets that they may
now be turning to when things get more difficult in the nearby
neighborhood.
But I think, unfortunately, we have not seen their missile
program slowed down. In fact, it seems that they are testing at
the same rapid rate that they have been testing at lately. So
we are continuing to talk to China about that. We are
continuing to try to impinge on sources of particularly hard
currency financing. But we do find that a lot of their
production has gone now indigenous, and it has become harder
and harder to stop this kind of activity in North Korea.
I think as we work with China--I mean, everybody in the
U.N. sanctions network is conscious, and it is one of the
things that the U.N. panel of experts is doing, keeping
particular track of items and dual-use items that may be of use
to North Korea and trying to make sure that we close down those
avenues. But we have also just started to work on this and we
have a lot of conversations and capacity building to do with
other countries. Some countries have more capacity to catch
these things at Customs than others, et cetera, and that is one
of the things in our conversations with our Chinese colleagues
that we have talked about, is providing customs assistance for
them on the border to catch a lot of this stuff that goes into
North Korea, and we are working with them on that, as are some
of our other like-minded allies in the region.
Senator Portman. Well, Ms. Thornton, I hope we will
redouble our efforts to work on that, because the alternative
is frightening, not just for the region, and certainly Japan
and South Korea recognize that now, but also for the broader
region, including China, and what could happen on their border
with DPRK, and now with this new testing of intercontinental
ballistic missiles, really for the whole world.
So I would hope that we would not only put more pressure on
these countries but that we would apply that pressure in a way
that is clear that it is in their self-interest to avoid the
potential calamity that could occur if we do not more
effectively through sanctions and peaceful means curtail what
they are able to do in their nuclear program and in their
missile program.
So I know the Chairman is holding this hearing in part to
put attention on this issue, and I would certainly hope that is
a top priority of the administration and, again, in the self-
interest of these other countries to avoid a much more drastic
result.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Senator Portman.
Before we turn to the next panel, Secretary Thornton, I
would just like to add that if we could get a timeframe from
the State Department on the designation of state-sponsored
terror, I think it is important. It is clear, whether it is the
murderous actions the regime has taken against its own people,
others, the imprisonments that they continue to be responsible
for, whether it is the missile launches they continue, the
interaction with Iran, this decision needs to be made soon, and
it needs to be, I believe, a re-designation of that state
sponsor of terror.
So, thank you, Secretary Thornton, for your testimony
today, and again, apologies for the late start.
Ms. Thornton. Thank you.
Senator Gardner. I am going to bring up the second panel to
begin their testimony.
The first witness on our second panel today is Bruce
Klingner, who serves as a Senior Research Fellow at the
Heritage Foundation. Prior to joining Heritage in 2007, Mr.
Klingner spent 20 years serving at the Central Intelligence
Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency, focusing on the
Korean Peninsula, including as Chief of the CIA's Korea Branch
and as CIA's Deputy Division Chief for Korea.
Welcome, Mr. Klingner.
Our second witness and final witness of the second panel is
Mr. Leon Sigal, I believe, who currently serves as Director of
the Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project at the Social
Science Research Council in New York. He is an author of
numerous books on nuclear non-proliferation issues, has taught
at Columbia University and Princeton University, and has also
served as a member of the editorial board of the New York Times
from 1989 to 1995.
Welcome, Mr. Sigal, and thank you for being with us today.
Mr. Klingner, if you would begin. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF BRUCE KLINGNER, SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW, NORTHEAST
ASIA, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Klingner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Markey. It is truly an honor to be asked to appear before you
on such an important issue to our national security.
The imminence of Pyongyang's crossing of the ICBM threshold
has triggered greater advocacy by some for a U.S. preemptive
military attack to prevent North Korea from obtaining its
objective. But preemptive attacks on test flights that do not
clearly pose a security risk could trigger an all-out war with
catastrophic consequences. So while the U.S. should be
steadfast in its defenses of its territories and its allies, it
should save a preemptive military strike for indications of
imminent North Korean attack.
Conversely, others push for a return to negotiations, but
we have been down that path many times before and all were
unsuccessful. North Korea pledged in several international
agreements to never develop nuclear weapons, and, once caught
with its hand in the nuclear cookie jar, acceded to several
subsequent agreements to give up the weapons they promised
never to build in the first place. The U.S. and its allies have
offered economic benefits, developmental assistance,
humanitarian assistance, diplomatic recognition, declaration of
non-hostility, turning a blind eye to violations, and not
implementing U.S. laws. By word and deed, North Korea has
repeatedly and emphatically shown it has no intention of
abandoning its nuclear weapons under present circumstances.
It is also difficult to have a dialogue with a country that
shuns it. North Korea closed the New York channel in July 2016,
severing the last official link between our governments, until
allowing dialogue recently to facilitate the return of the
comatose and dying Otto Warmbier. North Korea literally refuses
to pick up the phone both in the joint security area in the DMZ
and the inter-Korean military hotline in the West Sea. And
North Korea has already rejected several attempts at engagement
by South Korean President Moon Jae-in. They have dismissed them
as nonsense. So South Korea has also tried engagement, having
240 inter-Korean agreements.
Proposals for returning to negotiations such as the freeze-
for-freeze option all share a common theme in calling for yet
more concessions by the U.S. in return for a commitment by the
North to undertake a portion of what it is already obligated to
do under numerous U.N. resolutions, and the best way to engage
in negotiations would be after a comprehensive, rigorous, and
sustained international strategy. Such a policy upholds U.S.
laws and U.N. resolutions, imposes a penalty on those that
violate them, puts in place measures both to make it harder for
North Korea to import items that they need for their new
prohibited programs, as well as constrain proliferation.
So North Korea must be held accountable for its actions,
and to refrain from doing so would be to condone illegal
activity and give de facto immunity from U.S. and international
law and undermine U.N. resolutions.
Successive U.S. administrations have talked tough about
pressuring North Korea but instead engaged in timid
incrementalism in imposing sanctions and defending U.S. law;
and U.S. officials responsible for sanctions, when you talk to
them privately, will say, yes, they have lists and evidence of
North Korean, Chinese, and other entities that are violating,
but they were prevented from implementing and enforcing those
laws.
Although President Trump has criticized President Obama's
strategic patience policy as weak and ineffectual, he has yet
to distinguish his North Korea policy from his predecessor's.
Trump's policy of maximum pressure to date has been anything
but, and he continues to pull American punches against North
Korean and Chinese violations of U.S. law. However, the Trump
administration recently expressed frustration with Beijing's
foot-dragging on pressuring North Korea and took actions
against the Bank of Dandong and a few other entities. We are
hearing, again, that there are indications that they will be
sanctioning additional Chinese violators, and I certainly hope
that is the case.
We also have to highlight and condemn Pyongyang's crimes
against humanity. Advocacy for human rights must be a component
of U.S. policy. Americans were rightly appalled by the death of
Otto Warmbier, but we must not lose sight of the brutal and
reprehensible human rights violations that the regime imposes
on its own citizens, which the U.N. Commission of Inquiry
assessed constituted crimes against humanity.
In July 2016, the Obama administration, for the first time,
imposed human rights sanctions on a handful of North Korean
entities, but since then the U.S. has not taken any further
action.
So, in conclusion, the most sensible policy is to increase
pressure in response to Pyongyang's repeated defiance of the
international community while ensuring the U.S. has sufficient
defenses for itself and its allies, and leaving the door open
to diplomatic efforts. But at present, any offer of economic
inducements to entice North Korea to abandon its nuclear
arsenal has little to no chance of success.
Thank you again for the privilege of appearing before you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Klingner follows:]
Prepared Statement of Bruce Klingner
My name is Bruce Klingner. I am the Senior Research Fellow for
Northeast Asia at The Heritage Foundation. It is an honor to appear
before this distinguished panel to discuss the North Korean threat to
our nation. The views I express in this testimony are my own, and
should not be construed as representing any official position of The
Heritage Foundation.
North Korea's test launch of an ICBM that could eventually threaten
the American homeland has energized debate over both how the U.S.
should respond to the launch as well as the parameters of President
Trump's long-term policy toward Pyongyang.
The imminence of Pyongyang's crossing of the ICBM threshold has
triggered greater advocacy for a U.S. preemptive military attack to
prevent North Korea from attaining its objective. But preemptive
attacks on test flights that do not clearly pose a security threat
could trigger an all-out war with catastrophic consequences. While the
U.S. should be steadfast in its defense of its territory and its
allies, it should save preemptive attack for indications of imminent
North Korean attack.\1\
Conversely, other experts continue to push for a return to the
failed approach of negotiations, insisting it is the only way to
constrain Pyongyang's growing nuclear arsenal. But there is little
utility to such negotiations as long as Pyongyang rejects their core
premise, which is the abandonment of its nuclear weapons and
programs.\2\
Dialogue requires a willing partner. But, by word and deed, North
Korea has repeatedly and emphatically shown it has no intention of
abandoning its nuclear weapons. Pyongyang has made clear in both public
statements and private meetings that denuclearization is off the table
and there is nothing that Washington or Seoul could offer to induce
Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear arsenal.\3\
The best way to engage in negotiations would be after a
comprehensive, rigorous, and sustained international pressure strategy.
Such a policy upholds U.S. laws and U.N. resolutions, imposes a penalty
on those that violate them, puts in place measures to make it more
difficult for North Korea to import components--including money from
illicit activities--for its prohibited nuclear and missile programs,
and further constrain proliferation.
Successive U.S. administrations have talked tough about imposing
pressure on the North Korean regime but instead engaged in timid
incrementalism in imposing sanctions and defending U.S. law.
There are, of course, no easy solutions to the long-standing North
Korean problem. But the most sensible is to increase pressure in
response to Pyongyang's repeated defiance of the international
community while ensuring the U.S. has sufficient defenses for itself
and its allies and leaving the door open for diplomatic efforts.
the growing north korean threat
The security situation on the Korean Peninsula is dire and
worsening. North Korea's growing nuclear and missile capabilities are
already an existential threat to South Korea and Japan and will soon be
a direct threat to the continental United States. Pyongyang's decades
long quest for an unambiguous ability to target the United States with
a nuclear-tipped inter-continental ballistic missile may be entering
endgame.
North Korea has likely already achieved warhead miniaturization,
the ability to place nuclear weapons on its medium-range missiles, and
a preliminary ability to reach the continental U.S. with a missile.\4\
ICBM. Pyongyang crossed the mobile ICBM threshold on July 4th by
launching a missile that could range the United States. North Korea's
first launch of the Hwasong 14 ICBM was flown on a high trajectory so
as not to overfly Japan and also potentially test a reentry vehicle
which would protect a nuclear warhead during its flight.
The missile flew 930 kilometers but could have traveled 7000 km or
further had it been flown on a normal trajectory. The regime brags of
its capability to directly threaten the United States with nuclear
weapons.
An ICBM is classified as any missile longer with than 5500 km
range--Anchorage is 5500 km from North Korea. It is not currently known
if the missile was tested its full potential. But expert analysis of
previous North Korean static rocket engine tests assessed the missile
may be able to reach New York or Washington when deployed.
The successful ICBM launch is the latest breakthrough in the
regime's robust nuclear and missile test program. Last year, Pyongyang
successfully conducted two nuclear tests, a long-range missile test,
breakthrough successes with its Musudan road-mobile intermediate-range
missile and submarine-launched ballistic missile, re-entry vehicle
technology, a new solid-fuel rocket engine, and an improved liquid-fuel
ICBM engine.
IRBM. This year, North Korea revealed several new missiles during a
military parade, some of which experts have still not yet been
identified. Pyongyang successfully tested a second IRBM, the Hwasong-
12, which flew even further than the Musudan. Both missiles can now
threaten U.S. bases in Guam, a critical node in the defense of the
Pacific, including the Korean Peninsula. During meetings in Europe last
month, North Korean officials told me that both the Hwasong-12 and
Musudan will be deployed to military units soon.
MRBM. Last year, North Korea conducted No Dong medium-range missile
flights and announced that they were practicing preemptive air-burst
nuclear attacks on South Korea and U.S. forces based there. A North
Korean media-released photo showed the missile range would encompass
all of South Korea, including the port of Busan where U.S.
reinforcement forces would land.
In 2017, North Korea fired a salvo of four extended-range Scud
missiles and then announced it had been practicing a nuclear attack on
U.S. bases in Japan. The regime also launched the new KN-15 medium-
range ballistic missile--its first successful solid-fueled missile
fired from a mobile launcher.
SLBM. In August 2016, North Korea conducted its most successful
test launch of a submarine-launched ballistic missile which traveled
500 kilometers (300 miles). South Korean military officials reported
that the missile was flown at an unusual 500-km high trajectory. If
launched on a regular 150-km high trajectory, the submarine-launched
missile might have traveled over 1,000 km.
South Korea does not currently have defenses against submarine-
launched ballistic missiles. The SM-2 missile currently deployed on
South Korean destroyers only provides protection against anti-ship
missiles. South Korea has recently expressed interest in the U.S.-
developed SM-3 or SM-6 ship-borne systems to provide anti-submarine
launched missile defense.
negotiations with north korea: abandon hope all ye who enter here
Advocates for engagement will insist that the only way to constrain
Pyongyang's growing nuclear arsenal is to rush back to nuclear talks
without insisting on preconditions. But there is little utility to such
negotiations as long as Pyongyang rejects their core premise, which is
abandonment of its nuclear weapons and programs.
Ninth time the charm? Promoting another attempt at a negotiated
settlement of the North Korean nuclear problem flies in the face of the
collapse of Pyongyang's previous pledges never to develop nuclear
weapons or, once caught with their hand in the nuclear cookie jar,
subsequent promises to abandon those weapons.
Pyongyang previously acceded to the 1992 North-South
Denuclearization Agreement, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, the Agreed
Framework, three agreements under the Six-Party Talks and the Leap Day
Agreement--all of which ultimately failed. A record of zero for eight
does not instill a compelling sense of confidence about any future
attempts.
For over 20 years, there have been official two-party talks, three-
party talks, four-party talks and six-party talks to resolve the North
Korean nuclear issue. The U.S. dispatched government envoys on numerous
occasions for bilateral discussions with North Korean counterparts. The
U.S. and its allies offered economic benefits, developmental
assistance, humanitarian assistance, diplomatic recognition,
declaration of non-hostility, turning a blind eye to violations and
non-implementation of U.S. laws.
Seoul signed 240 inter-Korean agreements on a wide range of issues
and participated in large joint economic ventures with North Korea at
Kaesong and Kumgangsan. Successive South Korean administrations offered
extensive economic and diplomatic inducements in return for Pyongyang
beginning to comply with its denuclearization pledges.
It is difficult to have a dialogue with a country that shuns it.
North Korea closed the ``New York channel'' in July 2016, severing the
last official communication link, until allowing dialogue recently to
facilitate the return of the comatose and dying U.S. citizen Otto
Warmbier.
Pyongyang walked away from senior-level meetings with South Korean
counterparts in December 2015, precipitating the collapse of inter-
Korean dialogue. In the Joint Security Area on the Demilitarized Zone
(DMZ), North Korea refuses to even answer the phone or check its
mailbox for messages from the U.S. and South Korea. North Korea has
already repeatedly rejected several attempts at engagement by newly-
elected South Korean President Moon Jae-in, dismissing them as
``nonsense.''
Hope springs eternal. Despite these failures, there has been a
renewed advocacy by some experts to negotiate a nuclear freeze. The
proposals all share a common theme in calling for yet more concessions
by the U.S. to encourage Pyongyang to come back to the negotiating
table in return for a commitment by the North to undertake a portion
what it is already obligated to do under numerous U.N. resolutions.
A nuclear freeze was already negotiated with the February 2012 Leap
Day Agreement in which the U.S. offered 240,000 tons of nutritional
assistance and a written declaration of no hostile intent. In return,
North Korea pledged to freeze nuclear reprocessing and enrichment
activity at the Yongbyon nuclear facility, not to conduct any nuclear
or missile tests and to allow the return of International Atomic Energy
Association inspectors to Yongbyon.
That agreement crashed and burned within weeks. Indeed, all eight
denuclearization agreements with North Korea were variants on a nuclear
freeze. Yet that does not seem to deter freeze proponents from
advocating another try. Hope is a poor reason to ignore a consistent
track record of failure.
Too High a Price. What would the U.S. and its allies have to offer
to achieve a freeze? Those things that were previously offered to no
effect? Or would Washington and others have to provide even greater
concessions and benefits? The regime has an insatiable list of demands,
which include:
Military demands--the end of U.S.-South Korean military
exercises, removal of U.S. troops from South Korea, abrogation of the
bilateral defense alliance between the U.S. and South Korea, cancelling
of the U.S. extended deterrence guarantee, postponement or cancellation
of the deployment of THAAD to South Korea and worldwide dismantlement
of all U.S. nuclear weapons;
Political demands--establishment of formal diplomatic
relations with the U.S. signing of a peace treaty to end the Korean
War, and no action on the U.N. Commission of Inquiry report on North
Korean human rights abuses;
Law enforcement demands--removal of all U.N. sanctions,
U.S. sanctions, EU sanctions and targeted financial measures; and
Social demands against South Korean constitutionally
protected freedom of speech (pamphlets, ``insulting'' articles by South
Korean media, and anti--North Korean public demonstrations on the
streets of Seoul).
Consequences of a bad agreement. A freeze would be a de facto
recognition and acceptance of North Korea as a nuclear weapons state.
Doing so would undermine the Non-Proliferation Treaty and send the
wrong signal to other nuclear aspirants that the path is open to
nuclear weapons. Doing so would sacrifice one arms control agreement on
the altar of expediency to get another.
A nuclear freeze agreement without verification would be worthless.
North Korea's grudging admission of its prohibited highly enriched
uranium program made verification even more important and difficult.
The more easily hidden components of a uranium program would require a
more intrusive verification regime than the one that North Korea balked
at in 2008.
A freeze would leave North Korea with its nuclear weapons, which
already threaten South Korea and Japan. Such an agreement would trigger
allied concerns about the U.S. extended deterrence guarantee, including
the nuclear umbrella, to South Korea and Japan. Allied anxiety over
U.S. reliability would increase advocacy within South Korea for an
independent indigenous nuclear weapons program and greater reliance on
preemption strategies.
Pyongyang may be willing to talk--but not about the topic of
paramount U.S. concern: the denuclearization required by U.N.
resolutions to which Pyongyang previously committed several times, but
failed to fulfill.
sanctions: an important and variable component of foreign policy
Critics of coercive financial pressure question its effectiveness
because they have not yet forced Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear and
missile programs, but neither did repeated bilateral and multilateral
negotiations or unconditional engagement. Adopting such a narrow
viewpoint overlooks the multifaceted utility of sanctions, which:
1. Show resolve to enforce international agreements and send a
resolute signal to other nuclear aspirants. If laws are not enforced
and defended, they cease to have value;
2. Impose a heavy penalty on violators to demonstrate that there
are consequences for defying international agreements and transgressing
the law and sent a signal to other potential violators that prohibited
nuclear programs comes with high economic and diplomatic costs;
3. Constrain North Korea's ability to acquire the components,
technology, and finances to augment and expand its arsenal by raising
the costs and slow the development of North Korea's development of
nuclear and missile arsenals;
4. Impede North Korean nuclear, missile, and conventional arms
proliferation. Targeted financial and regulatory measures increase both
the risk and the operating costs of North Korea's continued violations
of Security Council resolutions and international law;
5. Disrupt North Korean illicit activities, including illegal drug
manufacturing and trafficking, currency counterfeiting, money-
laundering, and support to terrorist group;
6. Raise the risks for entities doing business with Pyongyang by
eliminating their ability to access the U.S. financial network;
7. In conjunction with other policy tools, seek to modify North
Korean behavior and persuade the regime to comply with U.N. resolutions
and its previous denuclearization commitments.
tightening the economic noose--targeting north korea's cash flow
North Korea must be held accountable for its actions. To refrain
from doing so is to condone illegal activity and give de facto immunity
from U.S. and international law and to undermine U.N. resolutions. The
U.S. must employ a comprehensive, integrated strategy that goes even
beyond sanctions and diplomacy to include a full-court press against
North Korean regime's actions and indeed its stability.
Washington should lead a world-wide effort to inspect and interdict
North Korean shipping, aggressively target all illicit activity,
sanction entities including Chinese banks and businesses that are
facilitating Pyongyang's prohibited nuclear and missile programs,
expand information operations against the regime, highlight and condemn
Pyongyang's crimes against humanity, and wean away even North Korea's
legitimate business partners.
Successive U.S. presidents have declared North Korea is a grave
threat to the United States and its allies. The U.S. Treasury
Department has called North Korea a ``threat to the integrity of the
U.S. financial system.'' \5\ Yet, the U.S. has not backed up its
steadfast words with commensurate actions.
Increased financial sanctions, combined with the increasing pariah
status of the regime from its human rights violations, are leading
nations to reduce the flow of hard currency to North Korea. While
sanctions only apply to prohibited activities, even legitimate North
Korean enterprises are becoming less profitable.
Each individual action to constrict North Korea's trade may not be
decisive, but cumulatively these efforts reduce North Korea's foreign
revenue sources, increase strains on the regime, and generate internal
pressure. Collectively, the sanctions and measures to target North
Korea's financial resources are forcing the regime to switch to less
effective means to acquire and transfer currency as well as increasing
stress on elites and the regime.
Only such a long-term principled and pragmatic policy provides the
potential for curtailing and reversing North Korea's deadly programs.
Returning to over-eager attempts at diplomacy without any North Korean
commitment to eventual denuclearization is but a fool's errand.
Everything that is being advocated by engagement proponents has been
repeatedly tried and failed.
The U.N., the U.S. and the European Union have not yet imposed as
stringent economic restrictions on North Korea as it did on Iran. There
is much more that can be done to more vigorously implement U.N.
sanctions as well as what the U.S. can do unilaterally to uphold and
defend its own laws.
North Korea is more vulnerable than Iran to a concerted sanctions
program since it has a smaller, less functioning economy that is
dependent on fewer nodes of access to the international financial
network.
U.S. officials responsible for sanctions will tell you privately
that they have lists and evidence of North Korea, Chinese, and other
violators but were prevented from implementing them during the Obama
administration.
trump not yet distinguished his policy from that of obama
As many U.S. presidents had done, President Trump initially placed
his hopes on Chinese promises to more fully implement U.N. sanctions.
As a candidate, Trump had strongly criticized China for not pressuring
North Korea to denuclearize.
Yet, after the U.S.-China summit meeting, Trump heaped praise on
Chinese President Xi Jinping for his perceived assistance. He adopted a
softer tone on Xi's help with North Korea: ``I believe he is trying
very hard. . . . He is a very good man, and I got to know him very
well. . . . I know he would like to be able to do something; perhaps
it's possible that he can't.'' Trump even claimed that ``nobody has
ever seen such a positive response on our behalf from China.''
As a result of his changed perception of China, Trump backed off
pledged actions against China. He walked back a campaign promise,
declaring, ``Why would I call China a currency manipulator when they
are working with us on the North Korean problem?'' Trump also postponed
enforcing U.S. law against Chinese violators, including secondary
sanctions, and signaled reduced trade pressure on China while
concurrently threatening greater trade pressure against our ally South
Korea.
Although Trump has criticized President Barack Obama's ``strategic
patience'' policy as weak and ineffectual, he has yet to distinguish
his North Korea policy from his predecessor's. Trump's policy of
``maximum pressure'' to date has been anything but, and he continues to
pull his punches against North Korean and Chinese violators of U.S.
law.
But the Trump administration subsequently expressed frustration
with Beijing's foot dragging on pressuring its troublesome ally North
Korea and took action against the Bank of Dandong--the first U.S.
action against a Chinese bank in 12 years--and three other Chinese
entities.
Recently the State Department introduced a ban on U.S. travel to
North Korea but refused to return North Korea to the state sponsors of
terrorism list. There are indications that the administration will
sanction more Chinese violators of U.S. law. I certainly hope that is
the case.
The Trump administration has also sent conflicting signals about
whether it would negotiate with North Korea or potentially conduct a
military attack to prevent the regime from mastering an
intercontinental ballistic missile.
chinese policy toward north korea: mix of sanctions and support
Faced with a stronger international consensus for greater pressure
on North Korea, the Chinese government, as well as Chinese banks and
businesses, undertook a number of promising actions early in 2016.
Beijing accepted more comprehensive sanctions in U.N. Resolution 2270
that went beyond previous U.N. resolutions. Chinese banks and
businesses reduced their economic interaction with North Korea, though
it is unclear whether it was due to government direction or anxieties
over their own exposure to sanctions.
However, Beijing took similar action after each previous North
Korean nuclear test. Each time, China temporarily tightened trade and
bank transactions with Pyongyang and reluctantly acquiesced to
incrementally stronger U.N. resolutions, only to subsequently reduce
enforcement and resume normal economic trade with North Korea within
months.
China as Enabler of North Korean Misbehavior. In the U.N., China
has acted as North Korea's defense lawyer by:
Repeatedly resisting tougher sanctions;
Watering down proposed resolution text;
Insisting on expansive loopholes;
Denying evidence of North Korea violations;
Blocking North Korean entities from being put onto the
sanctions list; and
Minimally enforcing resolutions.
Even when the U.N. passed stronger resolutions last year by
imposing bans on the export of key North Korean resources, China
insisted on an exemption for ``livelihood purposes.'' In implementing
the U.N. resolution, Beijing simply requires any Chinese company
importing North Korean resources to simply sign a letter pledging that
it ``does not involve the nuclear program or the ballistic missile
program'' of North Korea.'' The reality is that the loophole is larger
than the ban, making the sanction largely ineffective.
Even after the latest U.N. resolution sanctions, China remains a
reluctant partner, fearful that a resolute international response could
trigger North Korean escalatory behavior or regime collapse. Beijing
resists imposing conditionality in trade because it believes it could
lead to instability and unforeseen, perhaps catastrophic,
circumstances.
China's reluctance to pressure its ally provides Pyongyang a
feeling of impunity which encourages it toward further belligerence.
North Korea is willing to directly challenge China's calls for peace,
stability, and denuclearization by repeatedly upping the ante to
achieve its objectives including buying time to further augment its
nuclear and missile capabilities.
China's timidity, and the international community's willingness to
accommodate it, only ensures continual repetition of the cycle with
ever-increasing risk of escalation and potential catastrophe. The
effectiveness of international sanctions is hindered by China's weak
implementation.
The North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act mandates
secondary sanctions on third-country (including Chinese) banks and
companies that violate U.N. sanctions and U.S. law. It forces them to
choose between access to the U.S. economy and the North Korean economy.
The U.S. should penalize entities, particularly Chinese financial
institutions and businesses, that trade with those on the sanctions
list or export prohibited items. The U.S. should also ban financial
institutions that conduct business with North Korean violators from
access to the U.S. financial network.
While sanctions opponents assert that Beijing will not go along
with U.S. sanctions, Washington can influence the behavior of Chinese
banks and businesses that engage with North Korea through the use of
targeted financial measures. When Washington took action against Macau-
based Banco Delta Asia in 2005, labeling it a money-laundering concern,
U.S. officials traveled throughout Asia, inducing 24 entities--
including the Bank of China--to cease economic engagement with North
Korea.
U.S. officials indicate that the Bank of China defied the
government of China in severing its ties with North Korea lest the bank
face U.S. sanctions itself. The action showed that U.S. government
actions can persuade Chinese financial entities to act in their self-
interest even against the wishes of the Chinese government.
advocacy for human rights must be a component of u.s. policy
The death of Otto Warmbier dramatically underscored to Americans
the heinous nature of North Korea's legal system and the risk that
foreigners face by traveling there. But we must not lose sight of the
brutal and reprehensible human rights atrocities that the regime
imposes on its citizens. The U.N. Commission of Inquiry concluded in
2014 that Pyongyang's human rights violations were so widespread and
systemic that they constituted ``crimes against humanity.''
In July 2016, the Obama administration imposed sanctions on North
Korean leader Kim Jong Un and 15 other individuals entities ``for their
ties to North Korea's notorious abuses of human rights.'' It was the
first time that the U.S. had designated North Korean entities for human
rights abuses.
Sanctioning Kim Jong Un and others will not only have a direct
financial impact on the North Korean regime, but could also have
powerful secondary reverberations for the pariah regime. Concern over
potential secondary liability, or of keeping company with perpetrators
of crimes against humanity, has begun to galvanize other nations and
business partners to reduce or sever their economic interaction with
Pyongyang.
But since that action, the U.S. has yet to expand the list of human
rights violating entities subject to sanctions. While North Korea's
nuclear and missile threats have garnered world attention, the Trump
administration must include advocacy for human rights, including
expansion of information operations into North Korea, in its overall
North Korea policy.
conclusion
At present, any offer of economic inducements to entice North Korea
to abandon its nuclear arsenal is an ill-conceived plan with little
chance of success. Instead, the international consensus is that tougher
sanctions must be imposed on North Korea for its serial violations of
international agreements, U.N. resolutions, and U.S. law.
Washington must sharpen the choice for North Korea by raising the
risk and cost for its actions as well as for those, particularly
Beijing, who have been willing to facilitate the regime's prohibited
programs and illicit activities and condone its human rights
violations. Little change will occur until North Korea is effectively
sanctioned, and China becomes concerned over the consequences of
Pyongyang's actions and its own obstructionism.
Sanctions require time and the political will to maintain them in
order to work. In the near-term, however, such measures enforce U.S.
and international law, impose a penalty on violators, and constrain the
inflow and export of prohibited items for the nuclear and missile
programs.
While there are additional measures that can and should be applied,
more important is to vigorously and assiduously implement existing U.N.
measures and U.S. laws. We must approach sanctions, pressure, and
isolation in a sustained and comprehensive way. It is a policy of a
slow python constriction rather than a rapid cobra strike.
The difficulty will be maintaining international resolve to stay
the course. Already, some have expressed impatience with the recent
sanctions and advocated a return to the decades-long attempts at
diplomacy which failed to achieve denuclearization.
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------------------
Notes
\1\ Bruce Klingner, ``Save Preemption for Imminent North Korean
Attack, The Heritage Foundation, March 1, 2017.
\2\ Bruce Klingner, ``The Trump Administration Must Recognize the
Dangers of Premature Negotiations with North Korea,'' The Heritage
Foundation, May 11, 2017.
\3\ Bruce Klingner and Sue Mi Terry, ``We participated in talks
with North Korean representatives. This is what we learned,'' The
Washington Post, June 22, 2017.
\4\ Bruce Klingner, ``Allies Should Confront Imminent North Korean
Nuclear Threat,'' Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2913, June 3,
2014.
\5\ U.S. Department of Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network, ``Finding that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is a
Jurisdiction of Primary Money Laundering Concern,'' 81 Federal Register
35441, June 2, 2016.
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Klingner.
Mr. Sigal, we will begin with your testimony.
I forgot to mention to you how sorry we are for the late
start, as well. So thank you both for being here.
Mr. Sigal.
STATEMENT OF LEON V. SIGAL, DIRECTOR, NORTHEAST ASIA
COOPERATIVE SECURITY PROJECT, SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL,
NEW YORK, NY
Mr. Sigal. Thank you, Chairman Gardner, Ranking Member
Markey. Thanks for inviting me to appear before you today.
The current unbounded North Korea weapons program poses a
clear and present danger to the U.S. and allied security. That
makes it a matter of great urgency to negotiate a suspension of
its nuclear missile testing and fissile material production,
even if the North is unwilling to recommit to complete
denuclearization up front.
Have no doubt about it: complete denuclearization remains
the goal. But demanding that Pyongyang pledge that now will
only delay a possible agreement, enabling it to add to its
military wherewithal and bargaining leverage in the meantime.
Now, soon after taking office, President Trump wisely
resumed diplomatic engagement with Pyongyang. Those talks are
now in abeyance. Restarting them is imperative. The experience
is that pressure without negotiations has never worked in the
past with Pyongyang, and there is no reason to think it will
work now. The question to ask about people who prefer the
sanctions-only approach is: How long will it take for the
sanctions to work to get North Korea to accept our negotiating
position and to stop their ICBM testing, their nuclear testing,
and their fissile material production? How long? With that in
mind, it seems to me that legislation now under consideration
should not immediately trigger sanctions but provide for at
least a three-month implementation period to allow time for
talks. Three months is not going to make a difference in terms
of the impact of the sanctions, but it may open the opportunity
for talks if we are willing to talk.
Now, Washington is preoccupied with getting Beijing to put
more pressure on Pyongyang. But it is worth recalling that on
three occasions when China and the United States worked
together in the U.N. Security Council to impose tougher
sanctions--in 2006, 2009, and 2013--North Korea responded by
conducting nuclear tests in an effort to drive them apart.
That, interestingly enough, did not happen after Washington
and Beijing agreed on the much tougher Security Council
sanctions last November. Instead, Kim Jong Un defied widespread
expectations that he would soon conduct a sixth nuclear test as
a signal of restraint in the expectation that President Trump
would open talks. If we delay talks, we may get that test.
The recent test-launch of an ICBM underscores how the
prospect of tougher sanctions without talks prompts Pyongyang
to step up arming. A policy of maximum pressure and engagement
can only succeed if nuclear diplomacy is soon resumed and the
North's security concerns are addressed.
We must not lose sight of the fact that it is North Korea
that we need to persuade, not China. And that means taking
account of North Korea's strategy. During the Cold War, Kim Il
Sung played China off against the Soviet Union to maintain his
freedom of maneuver. In 1988, anticipating the collapse of the
Soviet Union, he reached out to improve relations with the
United States, South Korea and Japan in order to avoid
overdependence on China. That has been the Kims' objective ever
since.
From Pyongyang's vantage point, that aim was the basis of
the 1994 Agreed Framework and the September 2005 Six-Party
Joint Statement. For Washington, obviously, suspension of
Pyongyang's nuclear and missile programs was the point of those
agreements, which succeeded for a time in shuttering the
North's production of fissile material and stopping the test
launches of medium- and longer-range missiles. Both agreements
collapsed, however, when Washington did little to implement its
commitment to improve relations and, of course, Pyongyang
reneged on denuclearization.
That past is prologue. Now there are indications that a
suspension of North Korean missile and nuclear testing and
fissile material production may again prove negotiable. In
return for suspension of its production of plutonium and
enriched uranium, the Trading with the Enemy Act sanctions
imposed before the nuclear issue arose could be relaxed for yet
a third time, and energy assistance unilaterally halted by
South Korea in 2008 could be resumed.
An agreement will require addressing Pyongyang's security
needs, including adjusting our joint exercises with South
Korea, for instance, by suspending flights of nuclear-capable
B-52 bombers into Korean airspace. Those flights were only
resumed, I want to remind you, to reassure allies in the
aftermath of the North's nuclear tests. If those tests are
suspended, the B-52 flights can be too, without any sacrifice
of deterrence. North Korea is well aware of the reach of U.S.
ICBMs and SLBMs, which, by the way, were recently test-launched
to remind them.
The U.S. can also continue to bolster, rotate, and exercise
forces in the region so conventional deterrence will remain
robust. The chances of persuading North Korea to go beyond
another temporary suspension to dismantle its nuclear and
missile programs, however, are slim without firm commitments
from Washington and Seoul to move toward political and economic
normalization, engage in a peace process to end the Korean War,
and negotiate security arrangements, among them a nuclear-
weapons-free zone that would provide a multilateral legal
framework for denuclearization. In that context, President
Trump's willingness to hold out the prospect of a summit with
Kim Jong Un would also be a significant inducement.
Let me say in closing, we know what North Korea is like,
with its one-man rule, cult of personality, internal
regimentation, and dogmatic devotion to juche ideology. It is a
decidedly bad state. That is what we Americans know about North
Korea.
The wisest analyst I know once wrote, ``Finding the truth
about the North's nuclear program is an example of how what we
know sometimes leads us away from what we need to learn.'' The
best way to learn is to enter into talks about talks and probe
whether Pyongyang is willing to change course.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sigal follows:]
Prepared Statement of Leon V. Sigal
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Markey, Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for inviting me to appear before you today. I have been
involved in the North Korean nuclear and missile issue for well over
two decades and have participated in Track II meetings with senior
North Korean officials, as well as with senior officials of the other
six parties.
As you know, North Korea is on the verge of developing boosted
energy nuclear weapons with higher yield-to-weight ratios. It has begun
test-launching ICBMs and new mobile intermediate-range missiles to
deliver them. It is churning out plutonium and highly enriched uranium
at a rate of six or more bombs' worth a year.
Such an unbounded North Korean weapons program poses a clear and
present danger to U.S. and allied security. That makes it a matter of
great urgency to negotiate a suspension of its nuclear and missile
testing and fissile material production even if the North is unwilling
to recommit to complete denuclearization up front. Have no doubt about
it: complete denuclearization remains the ultimate goal. But demanding
that Pyongyang pledge that now will only delay a possible agreement,
enabling it to add to its military wherewithal and bargaining leverage
in the meantime.
Soon after taking office President Trump wisely resumed diplomatic
engagement with Pyongyang. Those talks are now in abeyance. Restarting
them is imperative. Pressure without negotiations has never worked in
the past with Pyongyang and there is no reason to think it will work
now. With that in mind, legislation now under consideration should not
immediately trigger sanctions, but provide for at least a three-month
implementation period to allow time for talks to resume.
Washington is preoccupied with getting Beijing to put more pressure
on Pyongyang. Yet it is worth recalling that on three occasions when
China and the United States worked together in the U.N. Security to
impose tougher sanctions--in 2006, 2009, and 2013, North Korea
responded by conducting nuclear tests in an effort to drive them apart.
That did not happen after Washington and Beijing agreed on the much
tougher Security Council sanctions last November. Instead, Kim Jong Un
defied widespread expectations that he would soon conduct a sixth
nuclear test-a signal of restraint in the expectation that President
Trump would open talks.
The recent test-launch of an ICBM underscores how the prospect of
tougher sanctions without talks prompts Pyongyang to step up arming. A
policy of ``maximum pressure and engagement'' can only succeed if
nuclear diplomacy is soon resumed and the North's security concerns are
addressed.
We must not lose sight of the fact that it is North Korea that we
need to persuade, not China. Insisting that China do more ignores North
Korean strategy. During the Cold War, Kim Il Sung played China off
against the Soviet Union to maintain his freedom of maneuver. In 1988,
anticipating the collapse of the Soviet Union, he reached out to
improve relations with the United States, South Korea and Japan in
order to avoid overdependence on China. That has been the Kims' aim
ever since.
From Pyongyang's vantage point, that aim was the basis of the 1994
Agreed Framework, which committed Washington to ``move toward full
normalization of political and economic relations,'' or, in plain
English, end enmity. That was also the essence of the September 2005
Six-Party Joint Statement in which Washington and Pyongyang pledged to
``respect each other's sovereignty, exist peacefully together, and take
steps to normalize their relations subject to their respective
bilateral policies'' as well as to ``negotiate a permanent peace regime
on the Korean Peninsula.''
For Washington, suspension of Pyongyang's nuclear and missile
programs was the point of these agreements, which succeeded for a time
in shuttering the North's production of fissile material and stopping
the test-launches of medium and longer-range missiles. Both agreements
collapsed, however, when Washington did little to implement its
commitment to improve relations and Pyongyang reneged on
denuclearization.
In the case of the 1994 Agreed Framework, when Washington was slow
to live up to its obligations, the North Koreans began acquiring the
means to enrich uranium. In the ill-fated October 2002 meeting with
Assistant Secretary James Kelly, the North Koreans addressed uranium
enrichment, but in Condoleezza Rice's words, ``Because his instructions
were so constraining, Jim couldn't fully explore what might have been
an opening to put the program on the table.''
Similarly, in the case of the September 2005 six-party joint
statement, believing that North Korea's declaration of its nuclear
program in 2007 was incomplete, the United States decided, in the words
of Secretary of State Rice, to ``move up issues that were to be taken
up in phase three, like verification, like access to the reactor, in
phase two.'' The North eventually agreed orally to key steps. When they
refused to put them in writing, South Korea, in response, reneged on
providing promised energy aid in 2008 and the North Koreans conducted a
failed satellite launch.
That past is prologue. Now there are indications that a suspension
of North Korean missile and nuclear testing and fissile material
production may again prove negotiable. In return for suspension of its
production of plutonium and enriched uranium, the Trading with the
Enemy Act sanctions imposed before the nuclear issue arose could be
relaxed for a third time and energy assistance unilaterally halted by
South Korea in 2008 could be resumed. An agreement will require
addressing Pyongyang's security needs, including adjusting our joint
exercises with South Korea, for instance by suspending flights of
nuclear-capable B-52 bombers into Korean airspace. Those flights were
only resumed to reassure allies in the aftermath of the North's nuclear
tests. If those tests are suspended, the B-52 flights can be, too,
without any sacrifice of deterrence. North Korea is well aware of the
reach of U.S. ICBMs and SLBMs, which were recently test-launched.
The United States can also continue to bolster, rotate, and
exercise forces in the region so conventional deterrence will remain
robust. At the same time it would be prudent to tone down the saber-
rattling rhetoric lest we stumble into a deadly clash we do not want.
As Defense Secretary Jim Mattis has recently underscored, a war in
Korea would be ``more serious in terms of human suffering than anything
we have seen since 1953.''
The chances of persuading North Korea to go beyond another
temporary suspension to dismantle its nuclear and missile programs are
slim without firm commitments from Washington and Seoul to move toward
political and economic normalization, engage in a peace process to end
the Korean War, and negotiate regional security arrangements, among
them a nuclear-weapon-free zone that would provide a multilateral legal
framework for denuclearization. In that context, President Trump's
willingness to hold out the prospect of a summit with Kim Jong Un would
also be a significant inducement.
Although the September 2005 joint statement of Six Party Talks
explicitly called for the parties ``to negotiate a peace regime for
Korea'' and ``to explore ways and means for promoting security
cooperation in Northeast Asia,'' little planning has been undertaken in
allied capitals to implement those commitments. Seoul could take the
lead in mapping out ways to do so and coordinate them with Washington.
I would ask the chair's permission to enter into the record my prepared
statement along with a proposal for such a comprehensive security
settlement that I recently co-authored with Morton Halperin, Thomas
Pickering, Moon Chung-in, and Peter Hayes.
[The information referred to is located at the end of the hearing]
In closing, much about North Korea rightly repels us. Goose-
stepping troops and gulags, a regime motivated by paranoia and
insecurity to menace its neighbors, leaders who mistreat their people
and assassinate or execute officials for not toeing the party line, a
state that committed horrific acts like its 1950 aggression and the
2010 sinking of the Cheonan. It is one of our core beliefs that bad
states cause most trouble in the world. North Korea, with its one-man
rule, cult of personality, internal regimentation, and dogmatic
devotion to juche ideology is a decidedly bad state. That's what
Americans know about North Korea.
The wisest analyst I know once wrote, ``Finding the truth about the
North's nuclear program is an example of how what we `know' sometimes
leads us away from what we need to learn.'' The best way to learn is to
enter into talks about talks and probe whether Pyongyang is willing to
change course.
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Sigal, for your testimony
today, to both of you.
Senator Markey, if you have any questions.
I just would start with the brief question that you heard
Secretary Thornton talk about some of the pillars that they
laid out. Mr. Klingner, you said how is the policy of the
administration any different than strategic patience. If the
actions that they have laid out do not result in additional
pressure, it is strategic patience. Is that correct?
Mr. Klingner. I think the real test is what actions are
implemented. We have heard from successive administrations
tough talk. When President Obama said North Korea is the most
heavily sanctioned, the most cut off nation on earth, he was
flat-out wrong, as you pointed out in your opening comments.
So it is really the actions that carry through on these
pledges of pressure. I am waiting to see the length of the list
of sanctions or entities that will be sanctioned, not only
North Korean but, as you have pointed out, the Chinese
violators of U.S. law.
Senator Gardner. And would a more global approach to denial
of access to financial networks be something that you think
could actually work?
Mr. Klingner. I think so, sir. I think we need to have
really a full spectrum and a comprehensive, integrated
strategy. Too often the debate in Washington is sanctions
versus engagement. They are two sides of the same coin. You
need both of them. They are working in conjunction with each
other, along with other measures of information operations,
human rights advocacy, deterrence, et cetera. But I think we do
need to augment the sanctions that we have.
As you have said, there is proposed legislation which will
plug holes, which will augment measures. In many ways, though,
they are trying to induce this administration, as previous
administrations, to use the authorities they have long had to
fully enforce U.N. resolutions and U.S. laws.
Senator Gardner. Mr. Sigal, why will China not, responsible
for 90 percent of North Korea's economy, why will China not
simply go to Kim Jong Un and say step down your nuclear program
and begin the conversations that you talk about?
Mr. Sigal. I think, Mr. Chairman, they have. The problem is
that the Chinese, I think, understand the situation somewhat
similarly to what I have tried to suggest, which is that the
North Koreans want to change their relationship with us as a
hedge against China. They do not want to be dependent on China.
They also understand that when they joined with the U.S. at the
U.N. and voted for tougher sanctions resolutions, and in most
cases implemented them, at least most of them, the North Korean
response on three occasions was to test a nuclear weapon in
order to drive the two of us apart.
So I think part of this is there seems to be in the Chinese
mind a different logic working because they seem to grasp what
the North Koreans seem to want, and I think we have to,
unfortunately, grasp what the North Koreans want, which is an
improved relationship with us because they do not want to be
dependent on China.
Senator Gardner. Senator Markey.
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for excellent testimony.
Mr. Sigal, it is often implied that the only way the United
States can engage in dialogue with North Korea is by giving it
economic or other concessions, or by conceding the ultimate
goal of any talks, the complete denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula.
But I believe there are many circumstances under which we
could engage in talks with North Korea that would not require
concessions, that would not impact our ability to ensure the
safety and security of our allies, and would not remove any
options for the United States to deal with the North Korean
challenge. Mr. Sigal, your testimony indicates that you may
feel the same.
Can you share your opinion on some of the different ways
the United States can engage with North Korea without having to
provide economic concessions or without having our allies
question our commitment to their safety or security?
Mr. Sigal. Yes, sir. First of all, from the North Korean
vantage point vis-a-vis the United States, not necessarily vis-
a-vis others, this has never been about economics. It has been
about the relationship. The only interest they have in
sanctions easing is not because they expect Fortune 500
companies to rush into North Korea and invest. It is because it
is a sign to them of enmity. The Trading with the Enemy Act--I
mean, how clear could it be?
Secondly, with respect to a thing that obviously a lot of
people worry about, that the first thing they will want in a
peace process is U.S. troops to go out, if that is what they
want, we are not going to give it to them, are we? We will only
take our troops out of South Korea if South Koreans ask us to
do that, and the North Koreans know that. Indeed, the North
Koreans for many years, until at least a couple of years ago,
kept talking about essentially this: If the United States is
our enemy, U.S. troops in South Korea are a threat to us and
they have to go. But if the United States is no longer an
enemy, those troops are no longer a threat to us, and they can
stay.
And indeed, the North Koreans on numerous occasions, the
last of them a couple of years ago, talked about the U.S.--it
is a bridge too far--and North Korea being allies. You can have
two allies. You can be allied to South Korea, and you can be
allied to us. They were looking for a formulation to change the
relationship. That is what this is about.
In a world in which the relationship is changed, it is
possible to imagine--I am not saying it is likely, but it is
possible to imagine that the North Koreans, down a long road,
will become convinced we are no longer their enemy and they do
not need nuclear weapons to protect themselves. I do not think
there is a sign we can get there now because of our politics
and because of their politics. But we have got to stop the
programs now to give ourselves the chance to do that, and I
know of no other way to get them to get rid of their nuclear
weapons.
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Sigal.
Mr. Klingner, we ``convinced'' Gaddafi to give up his
nuclear weapons program. We ``convinced'' Saddam Hussein to
give up his nuclear weapons program. And then subsequently we
participated in the process that led to their deaths. So if you
are Kim and you are looking at the United States and the goal
ultimately to denuclearize, what does he need as a guarantee
for his own personal safety in order to convince him that it is
worth his while to engage in talks that could head towards
denuclearization? And ultimately, what are the concessions or
the commitments that the United States would have to make in
order to get him to accept that premise?
Mr. Klingner. North Koreans have used those same examples
in explaining why they will never, ever negotiate away their
nuclear weapons.
Senator Markey. Exactly.
Mr. Klingner. They have said denuclearization is off the
table, there is nothing you can offer us, we are prepared to
talk about a peace treaty or a fight. So unless we change their
calculus, then they will not negotiate away those nuclear
weapons. In the meantime, the pressure, the sanctions, the
targeted financial measures are fulfilling a number of other
objectives as we hope we can get to a negotiated position. In
the meantime we are enforcing our law, we are no longer turning
a blind eye to violations and, as I mentioned, we are putting
in place measures to constrict both the in-flow and out-flow of
prohibited nuclear missile components.
Senator Markey. So when you look at this recent dramatic
increase in trade between North Korea and China, what is your
message to the Trump administration in terms of what they have
to do, in terms of telescoping the timeframe to ensure that the
North Korean economy is not benefitting from this Chinese trade
given the rapid movement that they have made towards the
integration of an ICBM with a nuclear warhead?
Mr. Klingner. I would say we need to distinguish between
diplomacy and law enforcement, and then give that message to
China. So, U.S. law is not negotiable. Those entities that come
into the U.S. financial system and misuse it, in violation of
U.S. law, will be treated accordingly. And then with diplomacy
we continue to try to convince Beijing to more fully implement
required U.N. sanctions. We work with them to try to reduce
their support for the regime.
But those things that are against U.S. law, against U.N.
resolutions, those are not negotiable.
Senator Markey. Can we change the calculus in the North
Korean regime's mentality that they do not want to have a
repetition of what happened in Libya and Iraq affect them
without our legislation passing and without the already-
existing sanctions being tightened in order to force a
negotiation in a timeframe that actually avoids, perhaps, the
irreversible moment in our relationship?
Mr. Klingner. I think the first step is you need to change
the calculus of the Chinese banks and businesses that are
engaging with North Korea, and you can do that through U.S.
law. So you can wean them away from engaging with North Korea,
and we have seen that in the past when the U.S. took action and
then had private meetings throughout Asia to induce 24
entities, including entire countries and the Bank of China, to
defy the Chinese government by cutting off its interaction with
North Korea. If we go after those Chinese organizations, as
Senator Gardner pointed out, you can have a few small number of
very influential actions you can take that have repercussions
across a much broader scale. You use the laws to take out the
criminal organizations, and you also change the calculus for
legitimate businesses who see it as no longer in their business
interest to engage with North Korea. So you can tighten the
regime by enforcing U.S. law.
Senator Markey. So compared to the sanctions that are
already on the books, and thus far their lack of efficacy, and
the proposal that Senator Gardner and I have introduced, what
is your view about our legislation in terms of serving as an
additional weapon in the arsenal, the diplomatic arsenal which
the Trump administration can use, and how would such
legislation, our legislation, complement existing laws already
on the books?
Mr. Klingner. I think it very well complements existing
legislation and existing executive orders and regulations. But
again, the problem or the question will always be ``Will the
executive branch of any administration actually use the powers
that they have been given? It is like the mayor of a city
saying I am tough on crime, but then not having his police
department enforce those that they have evidence against.
Senator Markey. And my view is that if they do not, then it
is going to lead inexorably, inevitably, to a North Korean ICBM
weapons program that is completed. So I do not think, as a
nation, there is an option. I think the President has to become
tougher on the Chinese. They are the safety valve. They are the
release valve the North Koreans are using, and they are
punishing the South Koreans rather than the North Koreans. I
think ultimately, unless we get more real about what is
happening, then we are just on a collision course with a North
Korean nuclear weapons-armed, ICBM-capable posture for the rest
of our lives.
Do you agree with that, Mr. Sigal?
Mr. Sigal. I agree with that, but I think what you said
earlier is just as important, which is you have to open the way
to negotiation.
Senator Markey. Exactly.
Mr. Sigal. That is the key.
Senator Markey. Exactly.
Mr. Sigal. And not on our terms but actually talks about
talks to get them to stop. In a circumstance in which they have
suspended their testing and their fissile material production,
that period is much more secure. We want to prolong that
suspension as much as possible and go beyond it to get them to
dismantle the facilities they have for producing more missiles,
and then ultimately get the weapons. The weapons are going to
come last. They are going to come down a very long road because
they need to be assured the relationship has changed. That is
the structure of a deal that at least is remotely possible.
Is it likely? I would not bet on that. Negotiations are not
guaranteed. But sanctions seem to me a very long road to
nowhere at this point, if done alone, if done alone.
Senator Markey. Right.
Mr. Sigal. You are saying both.
Senator Markey. Our view is sanctions--my view is sanctions
with direct negotiations.
Mr. Sigal. Absolutely, and that is my view too.
Senator Markey. So can you just both--and I apologize, Mr.
Chairman. Can you each give me your one-minute summary, just
your one minute that you want the Chairman and I to remember
from your testimony as we move forward during this very
perilous time in our relationship with North Korea?
Mr. Klingner. I would say realize that all the hype that
sanctions have been implemented and failed is incorrect. They
have not been tried to the full extent. The legislation last
year induced the Obama administration to do its three actions
against North Korea, which was because of the legislation. We
need to increase the pressure. Yes, we want to get to
negotiations, but I would distinguish between diplomatic
discussion between diplomats as opposed to resuming formal
negotiations where you lose control of the momentum and it
often requires U.S. concessions so the negotiations do not
fail. Have diplomatic discussions amongst the State Department
and their MOFA counterparts, but realize that has been tried
many times before and they are the ones that have been refusing
to talk.
Senator Markey. Mr. Sigal?
Mr. Sigal. I think sanctions are important, but they have
to be married with negotiations. The only way in the time that
we need to stop an ICBM and stop a boosted energy or
thermonuclear device by North Korea is to get negotiations
going and see whether they will stop testing and stop fissile
material production. That takes both sanctions and negotiation.
Senator Markey. I thank both of you, and I thank you, Mr.
Chairman, for this excellent hearing.
Senator Gardner. No, thank you.
Thanks to all of you. Thanks again for being here. I
apologize for the late start. Thank you all for being a part of
this hearing.
The record will remain open until the close of business on
Friday, including for members to submit questions for the
record. I kindly ask the witnesses to respond as quickly as
possible, and your responses will be made a part of the record.
Thanks to the committee.
This hearing is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:05 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Acting Assistant Secretary Susan Thornton to Questions
Submitted by Senator Edward J. Markey
Question. In your testimony, you mentioned that the administration
undertook a policy review and gathered ``lessons'' that guided the
development of the administration's current strategy. You also noted
that ``a negotiated solution'' remains ``the best chance at resolving
this problem,'' and yet the administration maintains its unwillingness
to engage in dialogue with North Koreans.
What engagement options were considered during the administration's
North Korea policy review?
If the administration continues to see a ``negotiated solution as
the best chance at resolving this problem'' then how is the
administration working to achieve this end if it is unwilling to
negotiate at this time?
What is the most effective way to use sanctions to get North Korea
back to the table?
Answer. The United States seeks to find a peaceful resolution to
the nuclear problem on the Korean Peninsula, and we are willing to
engage in negotiations under the right conditions. During our policy
review, the administration entertained an array of engagement options
with the DPRK but ultimately assessed that conditions were not
appropriate for direct strategic engagement at this time. This decision
was reinforced by North Korea's continued provocations and flagrant
violations of international law, signaling its unwillingness to engage
in credible dialogue.
Despite our willingness to engage with North Korea, we have seen no
sign that the North Koreans are ready, or willing, to engage in any
serious talks on denuclearization, nor do we see any chance that
negotiations would succeed until underlying conditions change.
Therefore, until North Korea indicates a credible willingness to
discuss denuclearization, we will focus on increasing international
pressure on the regime.
Our maximum pressure campaign aims to restrict the regime's access
to funds, and thereby to curtail its proliferation activities. To date,
we've seen promising results for our maximum pressure strategy; many
countries are expelling North Korean laborers and downsizing or ceasing
diplomatic relations with the Kim regime. Furthermore, we have been
aggressively engaging with China to use its unique economic leverage
against North Korea to force the regime into returning to dialogue. It
is the goal of this administration that through continued international
pressure, Kim Jong Un will change his strategic calculus, discontinue
developments of his nuclear and ballistic programs, and return to
credible talks with the United States.
Question. Reuters recently reported that North Korea's economic
growth in 2017 was at a 17 year high despite sanctions and that China
was responsible for 92.5% of all North Korean trade that same year. The
New York Times recently reported that North Koreans in Russia work
``basically in the situation of slaves,'' there have been news reports
of North Korean laborers killed in Qatar while building soccer
stadiums, and there are reports that despite the progress being made in
Myanmar, its military still maintains close relations with North Korea.
In your testimony, you talked a lot about working with countries that
have ``special leverage'' over North Korea.
What strategies will be most effective in exerting pressure on
these partners and enablers of the North Korean regime?
In addition to China, which countries have ``special leverage''
over North Korea and how you are working with them to pressure North
Korea?
Has the United States made clear that any engagement in
sanctionable activity could lead to us imposing sanctions on these
countries?
Answer. The Trump administration is taking a global approach for
this global issue; only by working with partners around the world will
we be able to convince the DPRK that they stand alone as they pursue
nuclear and ballistic weapons. Our strategy relies on messaging to our
partners the urgent priority the administration places on the North
Korean threat and establishing each country's cooperation on this
matter as a significant benchmark reflecting the strength of our
overall bilateral relationship. In addition, we will impose significant
costs upon those who continue to do business with the North Korean
regime. This tactic has evinced success in encouraging our
international partners to curtail diplomatic and trade ties with the
DPRK.
Multiple countries with distinct leverage over North Korea, China
first among them, have committed to fully implement UNSCR obligations.
They are coordinating with us on pressing North Korea to return to
serious talks. However, as we continue our peaceful pressure campaign,
we are also focusing our efforts on a decreasing number of countries
that continue to maintain relations with the DPRK. In addition to our
ongoing diplomatic work on specific cases of illicit DPRK activities,
engagements range from maximizing all bilateral opportunities to stress
our request, to sending interagency teams from Washington to foreign
capitals to discuss specific concerns, to assisting countries in fully
adhering to U.N. Security Council resolutions. Special Representative
for North Korean Policy Ambassador Joseph Yun's recent trip to Burma is
a notable example of one such trip.
We have made it clear to countries around the globe that the United
States is committed to using targeted financial sanctions to impede
North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs and to counter the
grave threat those programs pose to international peace and security.
We have also stressed this administration will go wherever the evidence
leads to impose legally available sanctions on entities or individuals
that support North Korea's proscribed programs.
Question. A recent study by Recorded Future, a cyber-security and
intelligence firm based in Somerville, Massachusetts, found that ``the
limited number of North Korean leaders and ruling elite with access to
the internet are actively engaged in Western and popular social media,
regularly read international news, use many of the same services such
as video streaming and online gaming, and above all, are not
disconnected from the world at large.''
What do these reports say about the likely success of our efforts
to isolate North Korea in order to make the Kim regime and its allies
reconsider their nuclear and missile programs?
Do we have any indications that North Korean elite internet
activity, including ecommerce, violates any existing U.S. or U.N.
sanctions?
Answer. We support greater access to the internet in North Korea,
not just for the commercial and economic reasons, but also for North
Korean people to have access to voices of freedom and democracy, and
greater visibility into the world outside of this isolated nation.
While internet use has exploded globally, North Korea heavily restricts
access, allowing only the most loyal government officials the ability
to access the internet. The regime allows a larger pool of North
Koreans access to a DPRK government-managed intranet. We oppose the
repressive censorship environment in the DPRK and encourage the free
flow of information to the North Korean people. The availability of
accurate information about world events challenges the government's
monopoly on information and builds curiosity among North Koreans for
facts independent of state propaganda.
At the same time, I can assure you that we take seriously and
examine very closely all relevant information regarding possible DPRK
illicit activities that might violate sanctions. We take into account
both open source and intelligence reporting in considering necessary
courses of action. This administration will go wherever the evidence
leads to enforce sanctions on entities or individuals that support
North Korea's proscribed programs.
Question. Of the 1.7 million Korean Americans in the United States,
some 100,000 are estimated to have families in the North. Almost none
have been formally permitted to visit their family members or
participate in inter-Korean family reunions. While North Korea and
South Korea have a formal mechanism for face-to-face reunions with
family members divided since the Korean War, no such formal mechanism
exists for Korean Americans, many of whom use informal networks to
reunite with family members in the DPRK.
After the travel restriction goes into effect, how will the
administration ensure the safety of Korean Americans who wish to
reunite with their family members living in North Korea?
Answer. The safety and security of U.S. citizens overseas is one of
our highest priorities. Due to mounting concerns over the serious risk
of arrest and long-term detention in North Korea, the Secretary has
authorized a Geographic Travel Restriction on the use of a U.S.
passport to travel in, through, or to North Korea. This restriction
applies to all U.S. citizens and non-citizen nationals, including
Korean Americans who wish to reunite with their family members.
Korean Americans wishing to travel to North Korea to reunite with
family members may be eligible for consideration for a special
validation in a U.S. passport permitting travel to North Korea. Their
eligibility to apply for an exception, however, does not guarantee a
favorable answer to their request.
Question. Recent reports by two private organizations, C4ADS and NK
News, have revealed evidence of alleged North Korean sanctions evasions
through networks of shell and front companies in China, Singapore, and
elsewhere. We regularly hear from administration officials about the
resources the United States is devoting to strengthening our military
posture in Northeast Asia to deter North Korea. We hear very little
about the resources that the United States is devoting to enforcing
sanctions. Sanctions enforcement should be a coordinated whole of
government approach involving the Department of State, Department of
the Treasury, the intelligence community, and law enforcement agencies.
Please describe in as much detail as possible the resources across
the executive branch that the administration has committed to enforcing
sanctions on North Korea.
Answer. North Korea is a top national security priority, and the
administration is working actively on a range of diplomatic, security,
and economic measures to address this threat. We will utilize available
sanctions authorities to ratchet up the pressure on the regime and cut
off revenue that supports its illicit programs.
We work in close coordination with other U.S. agencies that have a
role in U.S., U.N., and other sanctions enforcement, including the
Department of the Treasury, the Intelligence Community, and U.S. law
enforcement. Within the Department of State, a number of bureaus and
offices devote budgetary and workforce resources to enforcing
sanctions, including the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, the
Office of the Special Representative for North Korea Policy, the Bureau
of Economic and Business Affairs, the Bureau of Energy Resources, the
Office of the Coordinator for Sanctions Policy, the Office of the
Coordinator for Cyber Issues, the Bureau of International
Organizations, the Bureau of International Security and Non-
Proliferation, the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, the
U.S. Mission to the United Nations, the Bureau of Intelligence and
Research, and the Office of the Legal Adviser. Within the Department of
the Treasury, a number of agencies and offices also devote budgetary
and work resources to countering North Korea's proscribed nuclear and
missile programs, including the Office of Foreign Assets Control, the
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, the Office of Terrorist Financing
and Financial Crimes, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, and the
Office of the General Counsel. Our departments have a record of close,
continuing, and successful coordination on the implementation of U.S.
and U.N. sanctions against North Korea.
We take seriously our obligations under the North Korea Sanctions
and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (NKSPEA) and other statutory and
Executive authorities. The Treasury and State Departments, through
close consultation, take actions consistent with the NKSPEA. Since the
February 2016 enactment of NKSPEA, Treasury has made nine designations
targeting a total of 113 individuals and entities for North Korea-
related activities and identified dozens of aircraft and vessels as
blocked. Those designations included North Korean ruler Kim Jong Un,
marking the first time Treasury designated a head of state for human
rights abuses.
On September 26, 2016, the Department of Justice unsealed a
criminal complaint against a Chinese company, Dandong Hongxiang
Industrial Development Co., and four Chinese nationals for: conspiracy
to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and
defraud the United States; conspiracy to launder monetary instruments;
and violation of IEEPA. The Department of Treasury designated these
same entities under E.O. 13382 which targets weapons of mass
destruction proliferators and their supporters.
On June 15, 2017, the Department of Justice filed a complaint to
forfeit over $1.9 million from China-based Mingzheng International
Trading Limited for laundering U.S. dollars on behalf of sanctioned
North Korean entities.
On June 29, 2017, Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets control
designated and froze the assets of three Chinese entities. Treasury's
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network announced a finding that the Bank
of Dandong acted as a conduit for illicit North Korean financial
activity, is a foreign bank of primary money laundering concern, and
has proposed to sever the bank from the U.S. financial system.
The State Department has also designated eight entities and
individuals associated with North Korea's prohibited weapons programs.
In executing President Trump's North Korea policy, Secretary
Tillerson has publicly stated that the time for strategic patience is
over and all options are on the table with respect to countering the
North Korea threat. Sanctions will play a prominent role in this
administration's North Korea policy, as will continued, urgent
engagement with the international community to better ensure
enforcement of sanctions already in place. All members of the
international community are duty-bound to ensure that United Nations
Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) are fully implemented to limit
North Korea's access to weapons technologies and to block revenue
sources for its associated unlawful and dangerous programs. Our
respective departments, along with U.S. Ambassador to the United
Nations Nikki Haley, are devoting substantial resources to accelerate a
vigorous international campaign to apply significant pressure on North
Korea through diplomatic, security, and economic measures.
Question. Since 2006, a series of U.N. Security Council resolutions
have prohibited trade with North Korea in luxury goods. These sanctions
are particularly important because they target regime elites not than
ordinary North Koreans. Recently NK News has published evidence
suggesting that a Singapore company called OCN Ltd is involved
importing a vast range of luxury goods into North Korea.
Prior to the publication of the NK News report, was the
administration aware of the allegations of OCN's involvement in
sanctions violations?
If no: What additional tools does the administration need to be
able to investigate potential sanctions violations?
Answer. The administration will go wherever the evidence leads to
impose legally available sanctions on entities or individuals that
support North Korea's proscribed programs. We cannot comment on any
ongoing investigations of sanction violations.
__________
Letter Submitted for the Record by Leon V. Sigal, Director, Northeast
Asia Cooperative Security Project, Social Science Research Council, New
York, NY
ENDING THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR THREAT BY A COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY
SETTLEMENT IN NORTHEAST ASIA
morton halperin, peter hayes, chung-in moon, thomas pickering, leon
sigal
June 28, 2017
introduction
Many Americans and South Koreans are convinced that it is
impossible to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula, code for disarming
North Korea's nuclear weapons program, and for ensuring that the South
does not follow suit. We argue that the opposite is the case.
However, as the old saying goes, if you don't know where you're
going, any road will take you there. This logic applies as much to the
North as it does to the United States, its allies, and international
partners.
As President Donald Trump prepares to meet with President Moon Jae-
in on June 29th, it is critical that they have a meeting of minds on
the endgame. Unless this occurs, it will be impossible to align the
front line state with American policy. Likewise, unless the two allies
define a joint goal that makes sense to Kim Jong Un, he will have no
reason to cooperate as against continue to confront the international
community. The administration has made statements that denuclearization
is their goal. We agree, but with the careful caveats embedded in this
article.
Now that North Korea unambiguously has demonstrated the ability to
explode nuclear warheads--a condition that was not anticipated in the
September 2005 principles--a new approach is required to match the
scale and complexity of the North Korean nuclear threat. Sometimes such
wicked problems require that the problem be enlarged, in order to
change the mix of stakeholders, sequence of outcomes, and ultimate
result. North Korea's nuclear weapons program is a case in point.
The key is to shift from managing North Korea's bad behavior
incrementally and reactively to a proactive, constructive policy by
emphasizing a comprehensive approach that utilizes a set of
interrelated elements agreed up front, and then implemented flexibly in
whatever sequence best matches the asymmetrical capacities and
interests of the six key parties to the Korean nuclear conflict. In
particular, it requires addressing North Korea's security concerns, not
just the allies'.
In the six years since the comprehensive security concept to the
North Korean problem was articulated in Tokyo by Morton Halperin,\1\
Kim Jong Un has grown accustomed to ruling while concurrently
reconstructing North Korean identity and security strategy around its
nuclear weapons. Consequently, it will be much harder and slower to
freeze, dismantle, and eliminate North Korea's nuclear weapons today
than it was in 2011, let alone in 2005.
This essay argues that a U.S.-ROK coordinated approach can be built
on the foundation of a plausible, concrete concept of a comprehensive
regional security strategy that is actually capable of reversing and
disarming the North Korean nuclear weapons program. Pressure may be
useful, but thinking ahead to calculate and synchronize the pressure
and critically to design a negotiable outcome is also essential. Unless
the two allies propose to bring about a final state of affairs that is
desirable to North Korea as well as the international community,
nuclear brinksmanship in Korea is likely to continue for the
foreseeable future; and North Korea will continue to acquire more
nuclear weapons and to add delivery systems to its arsenal. This essay
explains how the United States might actually achieve its most
important policy goal in Korea, stopping and reversing North Korea's
nuclear breakout.
background
The original 2011 comprehensive security settlement proposal and
subsequent articulations argued that the United States take the
initiative in resolving the North Korea nuclear problem and that a
clear pathway to doing so successfully could be envisioned.\2\ The
strategy has six, inter-locking essential elements:
1. Set up a Six Party Northeast Asia Security Council.
2. End sanctions over time.
3. Declare non-hostility.
4. End the Korean Armistice; sign a peace treaty in some form.
5. Provide economic, energy aid to DPRK, especially that which
benefits the whole region (that is, complete many types of energy,
telecom, logistics, transport, mobility, trading, financial networks
via the North Korean land-bridge from Eurasia to ROK and Japan).
6. Establish a regional nuclear weapons free-zone (NWFZ) in which
to re-establish DPRK's non-nuclear commitment in a legally binding
manner \3\ and to provide a framework for its dismantlement; and to
manage nuclear threat in the region in a manner that treats all
parties, including North Korea, on an equal basis.
This approach was based on the following premises:
The United States is a reliable and responsible provider
of global and regional security.
The United States is a sole supplier of the leadership
needed to solve the North Korea issue.\4\
North Korea's fundamental strategy--to change U.S. hostile
policy to one that allows it to lessen dependence on China, improve its
security, and survive as an independent state--remains the same under
Kim Jong Un as his predecessors.
The Six Party Talks is the only negotiation framework
wherein all six parties could come together today given their
respective frictions.
To some, the first premise may no longer be a given because of
President Trump's sometimes shocking statements and some U.S. actions,
especially those surrounding the March-April 2017 U.S.-ROK military
exercises which included ``decapitation'' dry runs and the botched
deployment of an ``armada.'' The optics of latter was particularly
unsettling to U.S. allies and other parties.
Yet President Trump's willingness to drop U.S. insistence on an
immediate DPRK commitment to denuclearization, his tantalizing
references to meeting with Kim under the ``right circumstances,'' the
near issuance of visas for a track 2 meeting in New York, and the quiet
early approval of his administration of provision of food aid to North
Korea, suggest he may be open to striking a deal with the DPRK. No one
knows what this deal might be, although most American analysts suggest
that a suspension of North Korean nuclear and missile testing and
perhaps fissile material production is the most that can be achieved
for now.
Given the priority appropriately accorded to overcoming North
Korea's nuclear threat by President Trump, we believe that striking an
in-principle deal is at least on the cards. By ``deal'' here, we mean
an agreement to start ``talks about talks'' on a deal, not the precise
content of an acceptable deal which may take years and several stages
to hammer out. But after President Trump mentioned meeting Kim Jong Un
``under the right circumstances,'' one presumes that some officials in
the administration, if not President Trump himself, have some clarity
as to what might constitute such a deal, even if they are not sure yet
how to get there.
The death of American Otto Warmbier on June 19, 2017 after his
eighteen-month-long detention in North Korea reminds us that timing is
everything in politics, and that now is hardly a propitious time to be
rushing to strike a deal with the North. Yet the strategic import of
the North Korean threat is so great that the United States' ability to
turn around this deteriorating situation has become a key test of its
global leadership. It can no more walk away from dealing with North
Korea than it can retreat to its own borders.
Two parties have already positioned themselves to exploit the
possible Trump opening to Pyongyang. China has made its own military
deployments including bomber alerts, an aircraft carrier exercise, and
border troop deployments. These deployments signal to Kim Jong Un and
remind the United States and its allies that China could conceivably
re-enter a new Korean War to preserve North Korea. Xi's private talks
with Trump have clearly impressed upon the U.S. president that American
policy is the main driver as to whether there will be more or fewer
nuclear weapons in North Korea. China stands to gain from a Trump deal
that would stabilize the Korean Peninsula to its benefit, avoid the
unpleasant aspects for both of them of U.S. secondary sanctions
affecting Chinese firms' dealings with North Korea, and allow the two
great powers to move onto even more consequential issues that they must
solve together.
North Korea has become a pivot point for U.S.-China relations.
These two great powers must choose between increasingly competitive
versus cooperative world orders. Unless the United States is careful,
by default China will become the locally strongest military power, the
United States increasingly will be offshore and disengaged, and North
Korea will continue to act as a spoiler state projecting nuclear
threats. For North Korea that includes the ability to attack the United
States itself with nuclear weapons. The alternative is a more fluid
cooperative-competitive and multipolar world with a strong element of
U.S.-Chinese concert that uses North Korea's dependency on China to
block and then reverse its nuclear breakout.\5\ If they are jointly to
resolve the North Korean threat, the North Korean issue demands that
the United States and China make choices about the nature of their
relationship that have implications well beyond the Korean Peninsula.
For its part, in spite of its shrill and outrageous propaganda
campaigns, North Korea has been profoundly silent in the way that
matters most: it has neither tested a nuclear weapon nor a long-range
missile since Trump's election. It seems likely that Kim Jong Un is
waiting to see if Trump is capable of adjusting U.S. policy to the
point where it is in North Korea's interest to re-enter talks, and to
take the concrete steps needed to do so. In short, Kim Jong Un will not
put his head in a noose unless it is made clear how he can slip through
it.
Which brings us to South Korea. The incoming president, Moon Jae-
In, confronts urgent domestic political and economic issues that he
must attend to as his first order of business in the aftermath of
former President Park Geun Hye's impeachment and the scandals demanding
radical chaebol reform. To do so, he also needs to be perceived as
playing a critical role in overcoming North Korea's nuclear threat
precisely so he can focus on these domestic issues without being
ambushed by inter-Korean issues or a U.S.-North Korea confrontation.
Finally, President Moon must repair relations with China, and quickly,
or lose one of the South's most potent policy tools with regard to the
North, its indirect influence on China's North Korea policy.
With regard to the Trump administration, President Moon faces a
two-pronged dilemma. The first prong is that South Korea, not the
United States, is at immediate risk from North Korean nuclear and
conventional attack, but only the United States can reduce the nuclear
and conventional threat posed to North Korea. In large part, this is so
because North Korea will only deal with the United States on the
nuclear issue. Thus, in spite of fears of abandonment or entanglement
by the United States in its dealing with the North, and being perceived
as inferior in some respect to the North in inter-Korean competition,
when it comes to the nuclear issue, South Korea has no choice but to
line up with, but behind the United States.
The second prong is that to mollify President Trump and to secure a
distinct role of its own in easing tensions with North Korea, President
Moon may have to modify the KORUS trade deal in ways that are hugely
politically unpopular with his key political constituencies. However,
South Korea appears to be willing to review and reform its trade with
the United States and may avoid making this a hot issue between the
allies.
President Moon must therefore decide which of these two priorities
is most important--leading on North Korea issues and nuclear threat
reduction; or realizing domestic social, economic, and political
reforms. There is little doubt which he will choose.
Likewise, President Trump will have to choose carefully how hard to
push President Moon on trade issues in order to head off North Korea's
threat to move the front line from the DMZ to the continental United
States. He must also accept that if President Moon is to deliver on
trade issues in ways that matter to the United States, he must first
commence the truly arduous tasks of economic revival, reforming the
chaebols, overcoming political corruption, and reducing inequality in
Korean society.\6\ And he must embrace South Korea's constructive and
leading role in resolving the North Korea issue, a point that Moon Jae-
in is sure to make during the Summit. Although South Korea cannot be
the conductor of the DPRK denuclearization orchestra, it surely must be
lead violin and recognized as such for its contribution.
How both parties deal with the deployment and operation of the
THAAD anti-ballistic missile system is a lightning rod for all these
issues. At this stage, the prudent approach is for the United States
and South Korea to forestall any precipitous decisions that may affect
negatively an overall strategic approach to reducing North Korea's
nuclear threat.
three phase korean peninsula denuclearization process
After the Summit, the two allies need to develop jointly an
operational concept for a phased dialogue and set of nested, reciprocal
actions and commitments that would incorporate the six elements of a
comprehensive settlement listed at the outset of this note. To this
end, we suggest that three distinct phases, albeit partly overlapping
in implementation, will be required. These are:
Phase 1: Initial agreement is reached that:
1. North Korea will freeze quickly all nuclear and missile tests
and fissile material production, including enrichment, either
simultaneously or in a defined sequence and timeline, allowing the IAEA
and possibly U.S. inspectors to monitor and verify these steps;
2. In return for suspension of testing, the United States and South
Korea will scale back joint exercises, especially deployment of
strategic bombers, and lift the U.S. Trading with the Enemy Act for a
third time. In return for freeze on all fissile material production,
the allies will commence rapid, sensible energy assistance to the DPRK
for small-scale cooperation on power generation, provide some
humanitarian food and agricultural technical aid, and medical
assistance, and commit to begin a peace process during phase 2.
The Six Party Talks will resume on the on basis that (1) there are
no preconditions; (2) all issues can be considered; and (3) each phase
can be implemented as talks proceed with nothing agreed in each phase
until everything in the phase is agreed.
Phase 1 can be done in a series of reciprocal steps over a
relatively short time frame (roughly three to six months).
Phase 2: Six Party Talks resume, and North Korea undertakes initial
dismantlement of all nuclear materials production facilities, including
enrichment declaration and disablement, verified by IAEA and possibly
U.S. inspectors.
In return, the United States, China, and the two Koreas commence a
``peace process'' to bring about a Northeast Asia ``peace regime.'' The
Korea focus of this regime would be a non-hostility declaration and
military confidence-building measures culminating in the replacement of
the Korean Armistice with a peace treaty acceptable to all parties.\7\
At the same time, the six parties would establish a regional security
structure including a regional Security Council, and would take initial
steps to create a Northeast Asian security and economic community and
cooperative security measures on a range of shared security concerns.
The United States and South Korea would adjust in an incremental
and calibrated manner their unilateral sanctions to allow for a phased
resumption of trade and investment with North Korea, among them,
revival of the Kaesong industrial zone by South Korea.
The United States and the other four parties may commence
confidence-building steps to cooperate with the DPRK on nuclear and
energy security. Such steps might include implementation after
preparation of the DPRK's 1540 nuclear security obligations,
examination of nuclear safety requirements for fuel cycle operations in
the DPRK, and/or initial joint work with DPRK on grid rehabilitation in
the context of regional grid integration and tie lines with the ROK,
Russia, and China.
One issue to be resolved early in talks would be whether missile
production facilities will also be designated for dismantlement and
controlled by the agreement in defined ways.
South Korea will also initiate discussions with the other five on a
Northeast Asia Peace Regime.
Defining what Phase 2 would cover can be done in a few months, but
implementation of measures required of the DPRK side will take several
years to complete in verified manner. Initial nuclear safety and
security measures, and early energy cooperation steps, may be
undertaken in six to eighteen months.
Likewise, a peace and regional security process can begin in Phase
2, but completion of key elements of each of these interrelated
elements will take years. North Korea will want to see the result
tested over multiple administrations representing both parties in the
United States and South Korea to see if a peace regime is durable
before they give up their weapons and weapons-usable fissile materials.
This leads into Phase 3.
Phase 3: Declaration and implementation of a legally binding
Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NEANWFZ) by the other five
parties for eventual acceptance and entry by the DPRK in lockstep with
agreed timelines and specific actions to eliminate nuclear weapons by
the DPRK; and commitment to come into full non-nuclear compliance over
an agreed timeline, in return for lifting of multilateral and
unilateral sanctions, large-scale energy-economic assistance package as
part of a regional development strategy, successful experience with no
U.S. hostile intent and conclusion of a peace treaty, and a calibrated
nuclear negative security assurance to the North from the Nuclear
Weapons States.
Such a treaty is a standard U.N. multilateral convention that both
Koreas have had no problem signing in the past and would not confront
the constitutional issue that otherwise makes the two Koreas loathe to
sign treaties with each other that might affect their respective claims
to exercise sovereignty over the entire Korean peninsula. Moreover, the
other four parties may be skeptical as to the durability of a Korea-
only denuclearization agreement and prefer the multilateral rather than
unilateral guarantees provided by the Nuclear Weapons States to an NPT-
compatible nuclear weapons-free zone treaty.
Phase 3 may take ten years to complete, maybe longer, during which
incremental nuclear weapons disarmament may be undertaken by the North
and verified by the other parties to the NWFZ as part of a regional
inspectorate, accompanied by effective implementation of peaceful
relations by the five parties. Phase 3 would enable a presidential
summit to take place ``under the right conditions'' within two to three
years from now.
conclusion
North Korea's acquisition of nuclear weapons demands a
comprehensive approach that is commensurate with the problem. Even if
phases 1 and 2, the freezing and dismantlement of its nuclear fuel
cycle and delivery systems were achievable, it is not clear why Kim
Jong Un would enter into such commitments except for short-term
tactical reasons. Although achieving such an outcome would be highly
beneficial relative to where we are headed now with North Korean
nuclear armament, limiting U.S. and South Korean strategy to realizing
only a freeze and dismantlement would fail to bring about the actual
elimination of North Korea's weapons. And we are skeptical that such a
deal would endure long precisely because the North would not have a
long-run interest in the ultimate outcome and would be left with a
small, relatively vulnerable nuclear weapons stockpile and ever
increasing isolation.
To succeed, it is evident that a new element to the U.S. approach
is needed that was not anticipated in 2005 because of its subsequent
rapid nuclear arming. Simply insisting that the North disarm and rejoin
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is unrealistic as North Korea
would have little confidence that putative benefits--in particular the
ending of nuclear threat against the North by the United States--would
be delivered. Moreover, it will take time to actually disarm--and North
Korea cannot actually rejoin the NPT until it is fully disarmed.
Meanwhile, a framework is needed to manage nuclear threat in the
region, and most urgently, North Korea's nuclear threats. The elements
that we have included in phase 3 are designed to address the need for
such a management framework in a way that is legally binding, flexible
enough to include all the parties to the Korean conflict and its
resolution, and admits North Korea's anomalous status until it is fully
disarmed.
That said, we emphasize that in some sequence, all six elements of
a comprehensive security settlement must be included in phase 3, not
just a nuclear weapons-free zone. These provide interlocking support to
the realization of a comprehensive security settlement that can change
the strategic calculus of a state, even one as ``hard'' as North Korea.
Anything less than such a comprehensive approach is liable to fail,
with all the predictable consequences for American security, American
global leadership, U.S.-Chinese relations, U.S. alliances in the
region, and for the Korean peninsula.
------------------
Notes
\1\ Morton H. Halperin, ``A Proposal for a Nuclear Weapons-Free
Zone in Northeast Asia'', NAPSNet Special Reports, January 03, 2012.
Updated here: Morton H. Halperin, ``A comprehensive agreement for
security in Northeast Asia'', NAPSNet Policy Forum, March 16, 2015.
\2\ Supplementary analysis includes: Peter Hayes, ``Overcoming
U.S.-DRPK Hostility: The Missing Link Between a Northeast Asian
Comprehensive Security Settlement and Ending the Korean War,'' North
Korean Review,11:2, Fall 2015, pp. 79-102.
Binoy Kampmark, Peter Hayes, and Richard Tanter, ``Summary Report:
A New Approach to Security in Northeast Asia-Breaking the Gridlock
Workshop'', NAPSNet Special Reports, November 20, 2012.
Peter Hayes and Richard Tanter, ``Key Elements of Northeast Asia
Nuclear-Weapons Free Zone (NEA-NWFZ)'', NAPSNet Policy Forum, November
13, 2012.
Leon V. Sigal, ``Sanctions easing as a sign of non-hostility'',
NAPSNet Policy Forum, February 23, 2015.
Thomas Pickering, ``Iran and a Comprehensive Settlement'', NAPSNet
Policy Forum, February 10, 2015.
\3\ Such a NWFZ would recognize that the DPRK would come into
compliance with full dismantlement only over time and after full
restoration of its NPT non-nuclear status. A NWFZ also deepens ROK and
Japanese non-nuclear commitments (of value to China); and may
facilitate management of nuclear threat by the three Nuclear Weapons
States against each other in this region. In return, calibrated to its
dismantlement and full compliance, the DPRK would get legally binding
guarantees of no nuclear attack by Nuclear Weapons States; and the ROK
and Japan immediately get the same legally binding guarantees from
China, Russia and U.S. U.S. nuclear extended deterrence to allies
continues because if the NWFZ treaty is violated, the United States and
allies can revert to reliance on nuclear threat.
\4\ After consultation with Chinese colleagues, the authors
recognized that China was not capable of assuming a regional leadership
role to create such an institutional security framework, but would
willingly partner in a regional concert to establish a regional
comprehensive security framework with the United States including the
elements outlined in this essay. South Korea would follow the U.S.
lead. Japan would follow the U.S. and ROK lead. Russia would be a bit
player but can provide important reassurance and buttressing of the
concept in Pyongyang.
\5\ These are two of seven regional orders conceptualized by the
U.S. National Intelligence Council; see D. Twining, ``Global Trends
2030: Pathways for Asia's Strategic Future,'' December 10, 2012 and
``Global Trends 2030: Scenarios for Asia's Strategic Future,'' December
11, 2012.
\6\ In this ``transaction,'' South Korea will gain from U.S.
leadership on the nuclear issue provided it delivers sufficient
progress to enable President Moon to implement his domestic policies as
his first priority; and the United States will gain from South Korean
support in its strategy to avoid North Korea being able to inflict
nuclear attacks on the United States itself as well as on Japan. Thus,
each party holds sway over the other's ability to realize its highest
policy priority.
\7\ Since the constitutions of both North and South Korea do not
recognize the other as a sovereign entity, the ``peace treaty'' would
involve a DPRK-U.S. normalization treaty and inter-Korean agreement. A
four-party peace treaty is possible, but in that case, there must be a
new interpretation of constitution in each Korea.
Morton Halperin is senior advisor, Open Society Foundations; Peter
Hayes is Director, Nautilus Institute and Honorary Professor, Center
for International Security Studies, Sydney University; Chung-in Moon is
distinguished professor, Yonsei University; Thomas Pickering is retired
U.S. ambassador; Leon Sigal is Director, Northeast Asia Cooperative
Security Project, Social Science Research Council.
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