[Senate Hearing 115-801]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 115-801
DEFENDING THE HOMELAND:
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE'S ROLE IN
COUNTERING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 7, 2018
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
40-404 PDF WASHINGTON : 2020
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Chairman
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma, Chairman JACK REED, Rhode Island
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi BILL NELSON, Florida
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
TOM COTTON, Arkansas JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
JONI ERNST, Iowa RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina JOE DONNELLY, Indiana
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia TIM KAINE, Virginia
TED CRUZ, Texas ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
BEN SASSE, Nebraska ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
TIM SCOTT, South Carolina GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
Christian D. Brose, Staff Director
Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director
_________________________________________________________________
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities
JONI ERNST, Iowa, Chairman MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi BILL NELSON, Florida
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
TED CRUZ, Texas
TIM SCOTT, South Carolina
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
_________________________________________________________________
February 7, 2018
Page
Defending the Homeland: Department of Defense's Role in 1
Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction.
Rapuano, Honorable Kenneth P., Assistant Secretary of Defense for 3
Homeland Defense and Global Security.
Osterman, Lieutenant General Joseph L., USMC, Deputy Commander, 10
United States Special Operations Command.
Questions for the Record......................................... 29
(iii)
DEFENDING THE HOMELAND:.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE'S ROLE IN
COUNTERING WEAPONS OF
MASS DESTRUCTION
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WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 2018
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Emerging
Threats and Capabilities,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m. in
Room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Joni
Ernst (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Members present: Senators Ernst, Fischer, Sullivan,
Heinrich, Shaheen, and Peters.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JONI ERNST
Senator Ernst. Good afternoon, everyone. I'd like to call
this Subcommittee meeting on Emerging Threats and Capabilities
to order.
I'll start with an opening statement. Senator Heinrich,
we'll have an opening statement from you. Then we'll move on to
our witnesses. So, thank you, gentlemen, for being here.
The Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities meets
today to receive testimony on the Department of Defense efforts
to counter weapons of mass destruction. We welcome Kenneth
Rapuano, Assistant Secretary for Defense of Homeland Defense
and Global Security--that's a very long title; you have long
business cards, I'm sure--and Lieutenant General Joseph
Osterman, Deputy Commander of United States Special Operations
Command, SOCOM, and thank them for appearing before us today.
This hearing comes at an important time. We are witnessing
a troubling increase in the proliferation of WMDs [Weapons of
Mass Destruction] by rogue states and terrorist organizations
that pose a direct and growing threat to our national security.
While we are familiar with, and concerned by, the growing size
the capabilities of North Korea's nuclear program, we should
also be mindful of its efforts to expand its chemical and
biological weapons capabilities.
The Washington Post reported in December that North Korea
is moving steadily to acquire the essential machinery that
could potentially be used for an advanced bioweapons programs,
from factories, by the ton, to laboratories specializing in
genetic modification. Similarly, ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq
and Syria] has demonstrated its ability to develop and use
chemical weapons like chlorine and mustard warfare agents in
Iraq and Syria. As fighters flee the region after the fall of
the physical caliphate, we must be aware of the potential for
their technical knowledge to spread. Additionally, there are
new reports of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad's continued use
of chemical agents, like sarin, and attacks against his own
people. All of these troubling developments vividly show the
global nature of the WMD [Weapons of Mass Destruction] threat
and, in turn, underscore the need for a global strategy to
combat the threat.
I note that the most recent DOD [Department of Defense]
counter-WMD strategy was released in June of 2014. As I have
just laid out, the scope and complexity of the problem has only
increased since that time. This requires the DOD to reassess
its strategy and ensure that we are postured appropriately, in
terms of organization, authorities, and capabilities, to most
effectively confront this threat, from preventing the
development of new WMD threats and mitigating existing ones to
responding in the event of a WMD incident. I look to our
witnesses to provide the subcommittee with their candid
assessment of how they view the WMD threat, as well as provide
recommendations on any changes to our current approach that may
be warranted.
Additionally, while our preference will always be to deal
with a threat before it reaches our shores, we must ensure that
we are prepared to respond quickly and effectively to a WMD
event in the Homeland. I note that, while DOD is not
necessarily the lead organization for the Homeland response
mission, it--in particular, the National Guard--plays a key
role in providing unique support to civil authorities, like the
Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Department of Homeland
Security, and local authorities. We would appreciate an update
on DOD planning and related efforts to fulfill its vital
support mission in the event of a WMD attack on the Homeland.
Lastly, it has been over one year since the unified
campaign plan was updated to assign SOCOM with responsibility
for synchronizing DOD's counter-WMD mission, which entails
drafting a new global campaign plan, establishing intelligence
priorities, and monitoring global counter-WMD operations.
General Osterman, we look to you to provide an update on
how SOCOM is managing its new responsibilities, the steps they
have been--taken to date, and a description of any issues that
could challenge the ability of SOCOM to successfully execute
this important mission.
Thank you for being here with us this afternoon. We look
forward to your testimony on this important topic.
I'll call on my Ranking Member to make his opening
statement.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR MARTIN HEINRICH
Senator Heinrich. Let me--when all else fails, improvise.
[Laughter.]
Senator Heinrich. How's that? Let me start over.
Let me begin by thanking Senator Ernst for holding this
hearing on the Department of Defense's role in countering
weapons of mass destruction. I certainly look forward to
working with you again this year to examine key emerging
threats and to craft the subcommittee's contribution to the
Fiscal Year 2019 National Defense Authorization Act.
The Department of Defense has a wide array of measures to
control the spread of WMD, ranging from nonproliferation
programs that help set international norms and export controls
to other efforts that are designed to stop the development of
WMDs by noncooperative nations.
Assistant Secretary Rapuano, your portfolio includes policy
oversight responsibilities for these efforts, and I look
forward to better understanding how they are achieving their
objectives and also what challenges they may be encountering.
U.S. Special Operations Command, or SOCOM, has played a key
role in supporting DOD's role in countering the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction for more than 25 years now. As a
force provider, SOCOM educates, trains, and equips special
operators tasked with interdicting and rendering safe WMDs,
should they fall into the wrong hands. As a combatant command,
SOCOM has also been tasked with synchronizing DOD's global
plans and operations for countering WMDs.
Today, I hope our witnesses will share their candid views
on how SOCOM is fulfilling these critical responsibilities
while also retaining its focus on countering violent extremist
groups. As we all know, Special Operations Forces are a finite
resource, and it is important that we maintain sufficient
readiness to address any contingencies in these no-fail
counter-WMD mission areas.
I look forward to hearing your testimony, both of you.
Senator Ernst. Okay. We'll go ahead and start with our
witness testimony.
Secretary Rapuano, why don't we start with you, sir.
STATEMENT OF HONORABLE KENNETH P. RAPUANO, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND GLOBAL SECURITY
Secretary Rapuano. Thank you, Chairman Ernst, Ranking
Member Heinrich, and members of the subcommittee. I'm pleased
to be here today to testify about the Department of Defense's
efforts to counter chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear [CBRN] threats both at home and abroad.
The United States faces a range of complex and
multidimensional CBRN challenges. Over the past year, the North
Korean regime has increased its dangerous and provocative
behavior and continued to test nuclear weapons and ballistic
missiles, in clear violation of multiple United Nations
Security Council resolutions. We've also seen the continued use
of chemical weapons by both the Syrian regime and the Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria, further eroding the international norm
against their use.
More broadly, rapid technological advancements and
increased access to dual-use technologies, expertise, and
materials that can be used for both peaceful and military
purposes heighten the risk that adversaries can more easily
seek or acquire WMD. It has never been more difficult to
prevent adversaries from acquiring the materials or expertise
necessary to develop WMD or use CBRN materials in intentional
attacks.
Additionally, the speed, volume, and coverage of
international travel means that naturally occurring pathogens
of security concern can spread worldwide in days, potentially
having the same catastrophic consequences of a deliberate
biological attack.
These diverse threats require multifaceted approaches that
keep up with and adapt to the current threats while looking
ahead to mitigate further risks. The intelligence community,
Department of State, DHS [Department of Homeland Security], DOE
[Department of Energy], and the Department of Justice all play
critical roles in detecting threats, preventing attacks on the
Homeland, and working with foreign partners to stop and respond
to incidents. DOD supports these efforts through both domestic
and overseas activities, and works closely with allies and
partners to counter the wide range of CBRN threats that exist
today.
Close cooperation with the other U.S. Departments and
agencies and allies and partners is crucial, since DOD must
prioritize capabilities and efforts that counter operationally
significant WMD risks and activities that are best executed by
the Department. We do this by ensuring we have a layered
approach to detecting and mitigating CBRN threats at the
source, preventing them from reaching the Homeland, and, when
necessary, responding militarily.
The Department's strategic approach to the CWMD mission
focuses on three lines of effort: preventing acquisition of
WMD, containing and reducing WMD threats, and, when necessary,
responding to and mitigating the consequences of their use.
For example, to prevent the transfer of CBRN or dual-use
materials to and from North Korea, the Department works closely
with interagency partners to encourage states to impede and
stop illicit shipments, including through efforts to build
partner capacity and spread an understanding of international
norms and obligations through the Proliferation Security
Initiative. We also engage with partners through the DOD
Cooperative Threat Reduction, or CTR, program to detect,
secure, or eliminate CBRN materials and pathogens of security
concern. Despite our best efforts at prevention, we must be
prepared to contain and reduce CBRN threats once they have
developed. DOD is postured to isolate, identify, neutralize,
and dispose of CBRN threats before they can reach our borders.
The Department also supports the government's efforts to
deter adversaries and ensure that those actors that already
possess WMD do not use them against the United States or our
allies and partners.
For example, DOD continues to support State Department-led
efforts to work with international allies and partners to hold
the Assad regime accountable for using chemical weapons. We
remain concerned about reports of ongoing use, and will
continue to ensure the President has all the options available
to respond, as necessary. In addition, to contain and reduce
the threat from ISIS, the U.S. and our coalition partners
continue to exploit opportunities on the ground to better
understand and disrupt their CW networks.
Ultimately, though, should deterrence or efforts to contain
and reduce threats fail and an adversary attacks the United
States or our allies, the Department of Defense's top military
priority is to respond and prevent future attacks. This may
require U.S. forces to operate in a contaminated environment,
which makes it critical that we safeguard the force and ensure
U.S. personnel can sustain effective operations in the event of
war or other contingencies. This is why DOD works closely with
allies and partners to ensure that we are prepared to respond
to CBRN incidents overseas.
In Asia, for example, DOD is working with key regional
allies, the Republic of Korea and Japan, to ensure that our
forces remain prepared to respond to CBRN contingencies on, or
emanating from, the Korean Peninsula.
Elsewhere, complementing those engagements, the CBRN
Preparedness Program trains and equips partner nations to
enhance their capabilities to respond to, and mitigate the
effects of, a CBRN incident.
In addition to being prepared to respond to events
overseas, DOD must ensure we are ready to support the Federal
response to a domestic CBRN incident at home. While most
incidents begin and end locally, significant events, such as a
WMD attack, will likely require additional support from
neighboring jurisdictions, State governments, and, as
necessary, the Federal Government. DOD's role to assist the
Federal Government's support of the State and local response,
when necessary, is an important one.
DOD has developed a wide range of domestic CBRN response
elements, and continuously trains and exercises to employ these
capabilities, which can be used to support civil authorities to
help save and sustain lives in the aftermath of a CBRN
incident. While a large-scale nuclear, chemical, or biological
attack is something we hope will never occur, we cannot be
complacent or wait until a threat is imminent to act.
As I said earlier, the complexity of this mission area
requires a whole-of-government approach and strong unity of
effort. I work closely with the Joint Staff and the combatant
commanders and other DOD components to ensure the Department
prioritizes its efforts and fully leverages DOD's unique
authorities, resources, and capabilities to protect the Nation.
U.S. Special Operations Command, in its new role as
coordinating authority for CWMD, has brought a renewed focus
and sense of enthusiasm to this mission, and is playing a
critical role in ensuring that combatant commands are taking a
transregional approach to countering these challenges and are
developing the tactical capability, capacity, and plans to
operationalize CWMD efforts.
In closing, we must anticipate that our adversaries will
continue to evolve and develop increasingly sophisticated
methods to pursue, develop, or deploy CBRN weapons. The
diversity of these challenges makes it imperative that DOD be
rigorous in prioritizing its efforts and work closely with
other U.S. departments and agencies and international partners
to continue and--to confront the threats posed by WMD at home
and abroad.
As CBRN-related challenges continue to emerge, your
continued support for the Department and the efforts described
today are critical to our ability to understand, anticipate,
and mitigate these threats.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today,
and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rapuano follows:]
Prepared Statement by Mr. Kenneth P. Rapuano
introduction
Chairman Ernst, Ranking Member Heinrich, and Members of the
Subcommittee, I am pleased to testify today about Department of Defense
(DOD) efforts to counter chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear (CBRN) threats both at home and abroad. The recently released
National Security Strategy (NSS) makes clear that this Administration
recognizes preventing nuclear, chemical, radiological, and biological
attacks as a key priority and an essential component of the U.S.
Government's efforts to protect the American people, the Homeland, and
the American way of life. Achieving success across the CBRN-threat
spectrum requires a whole-of-government approach, and the DOD has an
important role to play in support of this mission. That is why today I
would like to talk about both DOD's roles and responsibilities within
the countering-weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) mission, and where
DOD plays a supporting role to other departments and agencies,
including the U.S. Department of State, the Department of Energy (DOE),
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC), the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the U.S. Agency
for International Development (USAID).
threat environment
The use, or threatened use, of CBRN weapons poses a significant
threat to U.S. national security and peace and stability around the
world. In the past year, North Korea has accelerated its relentless
pursuit of nuclear and advanced missile delivery capabilities and
threatened to use nuclear weapons against the United States and our
allies in the region. Further, its conventional, chemical, biological,
and cyber capabilities continue to threaten the United States and our
allies. Russia has expanded and improved its strategic and non-
strategic nuclear forces. China's military modernization has resulted
in an expanded nuclear force. The Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism confirmed
that the Syrian regime and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)
usedchemical weapons in Syria. Additionally, we know ISIS has used
chemical weapons in Iraq. Iran has agreed to constraints on its nuclear
program in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
Nevertheless, Iran retains the technological capability and much of the
capacity necessary to develop enough fissile material for a nuclear
weapon within one year of a decision to do so.
More broadly, rapid technological advancements and increased access
to dual-use goods (i.e., items that can be used for both peaceful and
military purposes), expertise, and materials, heighten the risk that
adversaries will seek or acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It
has never been more difficult to prevent adversaries from acquiring the
materials or expertise necessary to develop WMD, or use CBRN materials
in intentional attacks. Emerging technologies are increasingly lowering
the threshold for a range of adversaries, including non-State actors,
to develop WMD. This trend is accelerating. Additionally, the speed and
volume of the international transportation system means that naturally
occurring pathogens of security concern can spread worldwide in days--
potentially having the same catastrophic consequences of a deliberate
biological attack.
These diverse threats require multifaceted approaches that keep up
with and adapt to the current threats while remaining postured to
mitigate future risks. The Department of State, the Department of
Homeland Security, the Department of Energy, the Department of Justice,
the Department of Commerce, the Department of the Treasury, and the
Intelligence Community, among others, all play critical roles in
detecting threats, preventing attacks on the Homeland, and working with
foreign partners to stop and respond to incidents. DOD supports these
efforts through both domestic and overseas activities and works closely
with allies and partners to counter the wide range of CBRN threats that
exist today.
dod roles and responsibilities
As the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and
Global Security ASD (HD&GS), I am responsible for the Department's CWMD
strategy and policies, as well as the Homeland Defense \1\ mission. My
office develops and oversees DOD's policies and guidance to protect the
U.S. Armed Forces, the Homeland, and other U.S. interests from a CBRN
attack or any type of destabilizing CBRN-related event, including the
natural or intentional spread of dangerous pathogens and toxins, and
represents DOD's interests on traditional counter-proliferation and
non-proliferation policy issues. I am also responsible for the
coordination of DOD assistance to Federal, State, and local officials
in responding to threats involving nuclear, radiological, biological,
chemical weapons, or high-yield explosives or related materials or
technologies, including assistance in identifying, neutralizing,
dismantling, and disposing of these weapons and materials.
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\1\ DOD defines ``Homeland Defense'' as ``[t]he protection of
United States sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical
infrastructure against external threats and aggression or other threats
as directed by the President.''
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I work closely with the joint staff and the combatant commanders,
including the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) in its new role
following the January 2017 Unified Command Plan (UCP) change, and U.S.
Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) with
their Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)
missions. USSOCOM has brought a renewed sense of enthusiasm to the CWMD
mission, and is playing a critical role in ensuring that the Combatant
Commands are fully integrated into the broader CWMD mission and taking
a transregional approach to countering these challenges. We also work
closely with our partners in Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
(``Acquisition and Sustainment'' as of February 1, 2018) to ensure that
DOD has the capabilities necessary to protect our forces and leverage
partners' capabilities in countering global threats.
DOD's efforts to prevent, counter, and respond to CBRN threats and
incidents are carried out by a number of dedicated and hardworking
airmen, sailors, marines, soldiers, coast guardsmen, and civilians.
DOD's cadre of CWMD experts supports a diverse range of activities,
including countering WMD-related planning, research and development,
programming, exercising, analysis, technical reach-back support, and
mission execution. Experts are positioned throughout the Services and
DOD, including at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA); the U.S.
Army 20th Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives
Command; the U.S. Army Edgewood Chemical and Biological Center (ECBC);
and the Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC). This mission
is a team effort, and it is an honor to work with such dedicated
professionals.
strategic approach for countering today's cbrn challenges
Given the scale and complexity of threats facing the United States
and its partners today, DOD pursues three lines of effort to counter
WMD threats: prevent acquisition, contain and reduce threats, and
respond to crises. Close cooperation with the other U.S. departments
and agencies, and our allies and partners, is crucial to all of these
activities since DOD must prioritize capabilities and efforts that
counter operationally significant WMD risks and activities that are
best executed by the Department. Ultimately, DOD seeks to ensure that
the United States and its allies and partners are neither attacked nor
coerced by actors with WMD. We do this by ensuring that we have a
layered approach to detecting and mitigating CBRN threats at the
source, preventing them from reaching the Homeland and, if attacked,
responding militarily to disrupt ongoing and preclude additional
attack, and providing support to domestic and international consequence
response efforts as requested.
preventing acquisition
A critical element of efforts to counter WMD threats is preventing
those that do not possess WMD from obtaining them. Although the
majority of activities in this space are led by other U.S. departments
and agencies, DOD works closely with our interagency partners to
leverage DOD authorities, resources, and capabilities where possible to
prevent adversaries from acquiring the technologies, materials, and
expertise needed to develop WMD. For example, DOD works closely with
the intelligence community and other agencies to ensure DOD understands
the threat environment and maintains situational awareness of the
location, quantity, and vulnerability of global materials and
stockpiles, and of the intentions and capabilities of actors of
concern. This is foundational to all DOD CWMD efforts, particularly
efforts to prevent State and non-State actors from acquiring WMD.
DOD has the authority to work with foreign partners to secure or
eliminate threats at the source and build partner capacity to prevent
proliferation. For example, the DOD Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)
Program is engaged in more than 30 countries, helping partners to
detect, secure, or eliminate CBRN and related materials and pathogens
of security concern.
Working with the Department of State, DOD also continues to raise
the barriers to acquiring WMD material through the Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI). Over the nearly 15 years since its
inception, PSI has brought together 105 nations to build political will
to stop the trafficking of WMD, delivery systems, and related
materials. By supporting and participating in numerous bilateral and
multilateral exercises, and through leadership in the PSI's Operational
Experts Group, DOD works alongside the Department of State and experts
from other U.S. departments and agencies to engage with partners to
address all aspects of the proliferation threat from enhancing
partners' CBRN defense capabilities, to preventing access to dual-use
materials, to interdicting shipments of proliferation concern.
In addition, DOD supports State and other U.S. departments and
agencies that lead efforts to implement and monitor international
treaties and agreements, including the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT), the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC). DOD also supports efforts to prevent the
misuse of sensitive dual-use technologies through its support to the
Nuclear Suppliers Group, Australia Group, and other key regimes. As
part of these efforts, DOD works with partners to monitor over-the-
horizon threats and consider the implications of emerging and
disruptive technologies, such as synthetic biology, for multilateral
treaties and regimes, as well as for ways to ensure that our forces
remain protected in the face of what may be emerging threats.
containing and reducing threats
For States that already possess WMD programs, DOD supports efforts
to deter use and contain and reduce threats. The use of chemical
weapons by ISIS in Iraq and Syria and by the Syrian regime in Syria
over recent years has reinforced the importance of containing and
reducing CBRN threats and the risks posed by extant WMD.
In an effort to leverage the capabilities of foreign allies and
partners, one of Secretary Mattis's top priorities, DOD engages
multilaterally through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
and bilaterally with other countries such as the United Kingdom on a
number of CWMD issues. We also work with partners to strengthen their
ability to detect, interdict, and mitigate threats at and within their
borders. For example, the DOD CTR Program works with partners in the
Middle East and North Africa, as well as along vulnerable borders in
Eastern Europe to prevent the proliferation of CBRN capabilities.
Other U.S. Government departments and agencies have key roles
preventing illicit trade and technology transfers relevant to WMD,
including the Department of State's role in negotiating and
implementing export control regimes, the Department of Treasury's
authorities to sanction proliferators, the Department of Homeland
Security's responsibilities to prevent and screen for dangerous
exports, and the Department of Commerce's efforts to ensure that U.S.
goods are not available to dangerous actors. DOD is prepared to support
interdiction options authorized by United Nations Security Council
Resolutions if there are no other options available. We also engage
with domestic interagency partners including the Department of Homeland
Security, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Department of
Health and
Human Services to leverage unique DOD capabilities in support of
U.S. Government efforts to prevent and, if necessary, interdict CBRN
weapons and materials from crossing our nation's borders into the
Homeland.
Where hostile actors persist in making significant progress toward
acquiring WMD, DOD will be prepared to undertake or support kinetic and
non-kinetic actions to prevent such capabilities from being fully
realized. DOD is postured to counter imminent WMD threats and maintains
specialized plans and capabilities to isolate, intercept, seize, and
secure lost or stolen items and manage CBRN threats from hostile or
fragile States. DOD maintains the ability to conduct specialized
pathway and WMD defeat missions. This involves developing and fielding
tailored kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities to neutralize or destroy
weapons and agents; delivery systems; and materials, facilities, and
processes, including the functional or structural defeat of hardened
targets. DOD also has the authority to work cooperatively with foreign
partners to dismantle and dispose of CBRN weapons and materials. This
includes deliberate technical processes that reduce or dismantle
production methods, materials, stockpiles, and technical
infrastructure; the redirection of an actor's capabilities and
expertise towards peaceful productive activities; and the establishment
of monitoring regimes to ensure a WMD program is not reconstituted.
Finally, a cornerstone of U.S. efforts to contain and reduce
threats is our ability to deter coercion or use. The United States
maintains a range of capabilities, both conventional and strategic, to
deter adversaries and ensure that those actors that already possess WMD
do not use them against the United States or its allies and interests.
Defenses in depth, including passive countermeasures, enhanced border
security, and missile defenses, also help to deter the transfer or use
of WMD. Although strategic deterrence and missile defense are not a
function of the ASD (HD&GS), building resilient capabilities both
overseas and in the Homeland supports deterrence, and my office helps
ensure that we are prepared to respond to an attack.
To decrease incentives for retention and employment of WMD
arsenals, DOD supports the creation and implementation of effective
arms-control initiatives, including measures to enhance security and
safety practices. As noted in the recently released Nuclear Posture
Review (NPR), the United States intends to work to create the
conditions for disarmament by pursuing transparency measures, engaging
in confidence and security-building measures with adversaries, and
pursuing new arms-control measures when conditions permit that would
improve the security of the United States and its allies and partners.
responding to wmd use
As the National Defense Strategy makes clear, should deterrence or
efforts to contain and reduce threats fail, the Joint Force must be
prepared to prevail. Our top Military CWMD priority is to attack the
source of the WMD attack to prevent ongoing or further attacks. To
guarantee DOD's warfighting capabilities, DOD must safeguard the force
and mitigate the hazards and effects of use to ensure U.S. military and
other mission-critical personnel can sustain effective operations in
the event of war or other contingencies. This includes recovering
casualties rapidly, decontaminating personnel and equipment, and
establishing a protective posture while continually monitoring the
force.
DOD works closely with allies and partners to ensure that we are
prepared to respond to international CBRN incidents. For example,
supported by other U.S. departments and agencies, the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, USPACOM, and U.S. Forces Korea work closely with
our Republic of Korea and Japanese counterparts to ensure that our
regional alliances are prepared to respond to WMD contingencies on, or
emanating from, the Korean Peninsula. This includes the conduct of
semi-annual CWMD-focused bilateral engagements, support to regional
exercises, and providing policy guidance to enable effective CWMD
operations. The U.S. Army's 20th Chemical, Biological, Radiological,
Nuclear, and Explosive (CBRNE) Command also continues to develop and
refine the extensive capabilities and technical expertise necessary to
deploy rapidly in support of U.S. forces around the world and conducts
regular training exercises to operate in highly challenging realistic
operational environments. In addition, DOD works with foreign military
and civilian first-responders through the CBRN Preparedness Program to
help strengthen our partners' ability to respond to and mitigate the
effects of a CBRN incident. Building partner nation response
capabilities promotes regional security cooperation and bilateral and
multilateral interoperability and reduces the potential for a large
U.S. Government requirement to provide assistance to international CBRN
incident-response operations.
From the Homeland perspective, I work closely with the commanders
of USNORTHCOM and USPACOM to ensure DOD forces remain ready to deter,
defend against, and, when required, defeat nation-State or terrorist
WMD or CBRN attacks on the Homeland in the air, maritime, and land
domains. As noted, DOD's primary responsibility is to employ our
warfighting capabilities to prevent, interdict, and respond militarily
to preclude further WMD attacks; however, DOD also plays an important
supporting role in the national response system.
As provided in the National Response Framework, the national
response system and its protocols provide tiered levels of support when
additional resources or capabilities are needed. Most incidents begin
and end locally and are managed at the local level. Some may require
additional support from neighboring jurisdictions, State governments,
and, as necessary, the Federal Government. The Federal Government's
role is to support State and local emergency assistance efforts to save
lives, protect property and public health and safety, and lessen or
avert the threat of a catastrophe. DOD's role is to assist the Federal
Government's support of the State and local response.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is responsible for
coordinating the Federal Government's response to major disasters,
including WMD attacks. DOD supports this response, providing DSCA--
using available capabilities developed for DOD's warfighting mission--
in support of FEMA or another lead Federal agency, when directed by the
President or when the Secretary of Defense has approved a request for
assistance pursuant to the Stafford Act \2\ or the Economy Act. \3\
This arrangement is absolutely critical to ensuring that DOD
capabilities are utilized as effectively and efficiently as possible to
save and sustain lives, particularly incidents involving multiple
States.
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\2\ The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance
Act (Public Law 93-288), as amended.
\3\ 31 U.S.C. Sec. 1535.
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DOD supports its Federal- and State-partner preparedness efforts to
respond to CBRN incidents in the Homeland, such as integrated regional
planning, training, and exercises in coordination with DHS, FEMA, the
Department of Health and Human Services, the FBI, and other Federal
partners. DOD is postured to assist civil authority efforts to detect,
identify, neutralize, dismantle, and dispose of CBRN threats before
they can reach our nation's borders and, if they succeed in penetrating
our borders, before they can be employed against our nation. DOD has
developed a wide range of CBRN-response capabilities and continuously
trains and exercises to employ these capabilities rapidly in support to
civil authorities to help save and sustain lives in the aftermath of a
CBRN incident.
The DOD CBRN Response Enterprise--almost 18,735 military personnel
strong--currently consists of:
National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support
Teams (one in each State and territory and two in California, Florida,
and New York);
17 National Guard CBRN Enhanced Response Force Packages
(stationed in Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, Oregon, Puerto
Rico, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin);
10 National Guard Homeland Response Forces (one stationed
in each of the 10 FEMA regions);
One Defense CBRN Response Force; and
Two Command and Control CBRN Response Elements.
The CBRN Response Enterprise provides such critical capabilities as
detection and assessment of CBRN hazards; casualty search and
extraction; casualty decontamination; emergency medical, patient
triage, trauma care, and surgical and intensive medical care; fatality
recovery; ground and rotary-wing air patient movement; security;
command and control; engineering; logistics; transportation; and
aviation lift.
conclusion
We must anticipate that our adversaries will continue to evolve and
develop increasingly sophisticated methods to pursue, develop, or
deploy CBRN weapons. The diversity of these threats makes it imperative
that DOD be rigorous in prioritizing its efforts and work closely with
other U.S. departments and agencies and international partners to
confront the threats posed by WMD at home and abroad. As WMD-related
crises continue to emerge, your continued support in the areas
described today are critical to our ability to understand, anticipate,
and mitigate these threats.
Chairman Ernst, Ranking Member Heinrich, Members of the
Subcommittee: We appreciate your leadership and your continued support
for the Department of Defense. Thank you for the opportunity to appear
before you today. I look forward to your questions.
Senator Ernst. Thank you very much, Secretary.
General Osterman?
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOSEPH L. OSTERMAN, USMC,
DEPUTY COMMANDER, UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
Lieutenant General Osterman. Chairwoman Ernst, Ranking
Member Heinrich, distinguished members of the subcommittee,
thanks for the opportunity to address you today.
It is an honor to testify with Assistant Secretary of
Defense Rapuano, whose office is critical in providing the
policy and strategic guidance for the Department of Defense's
support to countering weapons of mass destruction, or WMD.
During his posture testimony to the full Senate Armed
Services Committee last February, General Thomas outlined the
U.S. Special Operation Command, or USSOCOM's, initial goals for
our new role following the UCP change of January 2017. We're
proud to report significant strides in increasing
communication, information-sharing, and operational
coordination with other U.S. Government agencies, as well as
allies and partners who are working in this mission space.
USSOCOM has decades of experience preparing and providing
U.S. Special Operations Forces to execute counter-WMD tasks.
The role of coordinating authority, as directed by the Unified
Command Plan, broadens USSOCOM's scope of responsibility from
traditional Special Operations Forces' specific roles to the
planning of Department of Defense counter-WMD efforts in
support of other combatant commands, Department priorities,
and, as directed, other U.S. Government agencies. As in other
mission areas in which coordinating authority has been
established, this enables a more strategic approach and
enhanced integration of Department of Defense plans and
intelligence priorities.
Since the transfer of Defense lead responsibility for this
mission set for U.S. Strategic Command and the establishment of
USSOCOM's coordinating authority, we've focused on three major
areas of effort:
First, we're developing a functional campaign plan, in
coordination with the geographic combatant commands. The
campaign plan takes a transregional perspective and emphasizes
preventing new WMD development in existing programs and
precluding aspiring actors from obtaining a WMD.
Second, we've conducted a baseline assessment to determine
geographic combatant command counter-WMD capabilities and
capacities. The assessment has identified shortfalls and will
inform recommendations of future capability development and
resource allocation.
Third, we're increasing our understanding of the operating
environment by enhancing integration of intelligence, planning,
and assessments. To this end, we've established a Counter-WMD
Fusion Center dedicated to coordinating information flow and
planning, fusing intelligence and operations, and providing the
WMD community of action a single point of contact for DOD
operational capability.
While much progress has been made in the past year, a
tremendous amount of work remains to finalize and fully
implement these efforts. We look forward to continuing to
collaborate closely with the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, the Joint Staff, Defense Threat Reduction Agency,
other combatant commands, and the rest of the counter-WMD
community.
Thank you for the subcommittee's continued support to the
counter-WMD mission, to our servicemen, and to our families.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Lieutenant General Osterman
follows:]
Prepared Statement by Lieutenant General Joseph L. Osterman, U.S.
Marine Corps
Chairwoman Ernst, Ranking Member Heinrich and Members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to address you today. It
has been just under a year since General Thomas' testimony to the full
Senate Armed Services Committee. During that address, he unveiled the
U.S. Special Operations Command's (USSOCOM) goals in our new role as
DOD's Coordinating Authority (CA) for Countering Weapons of Mass
Destruction (CWMD), on which this testimony is focused. I am proud to
say that we have made tremendous strides in enhancing the dedicated
CWMD community of action, including: heightened operational
coordination within and among entities; the development of a center
dedicated to coordinating information flow and executing planning
efforts; and further refinement, and thus improvement, of our initial
goals. A tremendous amount of work remains. We must finalize and
continue to refine an active campaign plan. To that end, we must expand
and refresh efforts to assess and understand the environment in which
we operate, and regularly measure how our capabilities map to these
assessments. The reality is that the CWMD mission is highly dynamic and
constantly evolving, requiring unity of effort and constant vigilance.
The WMD threat has evolved beyond state-sponsored programs, and its
transregional nature challenges regionally focused planning efforts and
operations. The danger from state and non-state actors attempting to
acquire, proliferate, or use WMD is increasing and the technology,
materials, and expertise to develop WMD are more readily available than
ever before. There is a need for robust monitoring of potential sources
of supply and expertise, whether witting or unwitting, while also
focusing on emerging threats and capabilities. Advances in, as well as
the dual use nature of, science and technology further exacerbate this
problem. Differentiating between peaceful scientific research and
nefarious intent requires exquisite access into adversary leadership
decision-making. The United States and our partners face a persistent
threat against our citizens and interests.
One year ago, USSOCOM assumed responsibilities as DOD's CA for
CWMD. This role broadens USSOCOM's scope of responsibility from its
traditional Special Operations Forces (SOF)-specific CWMD roles to
encompass CWMD planning efforts for the Department. As such, we aim to
bridge the gap between policy guidance and tactical capability and
capacity by actively supporting Combatant Command (CCMD) planning
efforts, Departmental priorities, and, as directed, other U.S.
Government agencies. We are doing this, as directed in the Unified
Command Plan (UCP) by integrating DOD plans and intelligence priorities
to support operations against state and non-state networks that possess
or seek WMD and executing global operations against the same, in
coordination with other Combatant Commands.
USSOCOM's traditional role in the tactical aspects of CWMD likely
contributed to the Department's decision to transfer many of the U.S.
Strategic Command's (USSTRATCOM) responsibilities to USSOCOM, though
not all missions were included. USSTRATCOM remains the lead for
strategic deterrence, nuclear operations, Global Strike, and missile
defense. Similarly, U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and U.S. Pacific
Command (PACOM) maintain responsibility for Defense Support to Civil
Authorities (DSCA) and Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
(CBRN) response. Other ancillary missions associated with WMD are
assigned to appropriate staff agencies, such as the capabilities
development portfolio, assigned to the Joint Staff. The shift in
responsibility exposed gaps that the community continues to resolve,
underscoring the need to continue to build and foster a strong and
efficient CWMD team. In coordination with the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency (DTRA), we are gaining greater fidelity on shortfalls with
respect to CWMD capabilities within the Geographic Combatant Commands
(GCC).
Given both the complexity of this mission and our role as the CA,
USSOCOM established the CWMD Fusion Center (FC) located at both
HQUSSOCOM at MacDill Air Force Base and at Ft. Belvoir, collocated with
DTRA. The FC is a nexus of CWMD awareness, active planning, and
operational advocacy across functional and geographic missions. The FC
accomplishes its mission by coordinating planning, integrating
intelligence, assessing campaign progress, advocating for CWMD
operations with the Services and CCMDs, and--when directed--supporting
execution. Operating within broader national and Department policy
guidance, as conveyed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense for
Policy (OSD-P) and the Joint Staff, the FC combines the strengths and
perspectives of CWMD stakeholders in order to achieve a comprehensive
understanding of the threat environment as well as partner
capabilities. In turn, the FC identifies opportunities for action
against adversary vulnerabilities and advocates for intelligence
priorities. In doing so, we facilitate an operational construct that is
active and responsive to the dynamic CWMD environment, while
maintaining a persistent strategic focus.
The CWMD mission space is broad and varied. In pre-crisis
scenarios, other Departments and agencies have traditionally maintained
primacy with DOD playing a supporting role. These efforts span from
export license reviews to interdiction of specialized WMD components.
The CWMD FC is working with OSD and the Joint Staff to enhance DOD's
operational relationships across the interagency and Intelligence
Community, in order to optimize DOD support. Within DOD, we are
engaging with OSD, the Joint Staff, the GCCs, Theater Special
Operations Commands (TSOCs), and other DOD elements to ensure we share
a collective understanding of the threat and are making best use of
existing resources. The CWMD FC has also improved our ability to assess
DOD's CWMD requirements and drive unity of effort.
During our first year, we conducted a baseline assessment of the
draft Functional Campaign Plan Strategic Objectives with significant
input from the GCCs. The primary finding is that the GCCs lack
sufficient capacity and, therefore, assume risk in CWMD. This finding
is based on a number of factors which include: resource competition
with other priority mission areas; gaps in understanding the threat--a
global and evolving threat; unconnected data sources--absence of a
complete picture; traditional prevalence of Interagency/Intelligence
Community (IA/IC) in preventing proliferation--prevention not viewed as
a primary military task; and lack of clear tasks in support of a
strategy--perhaps the primary cause for the CWMD-related risks we have
assumed. In addition, the baseline assessment identified the
difficulties with anticipating the emergence of new WMD programs, and
that analysis remains important to understanding the networks
supporting WMD pathways. As we conduct future baseline assessments, we
will expand our analysis to include the Services, the rest of the
Interagency, and Partner Nations. Finally, we will highlight any gaps
in policy, authorities, or other strategic issues that may be
illuminated through our assessments with our teammates in the Joint
Staff and OSD.
In addition to the baseline assessment, we have focused efforts on
writing a Joint Staff-directed Functional Campaign Plan for CWMD as an
engine for change. The Functional Campaign Plan for Countering WMD (DOD
FCP-CWMD), which is being developed in coordination with the Combatant
Commands, translates policy into strategic guidance that can be further
refined into GCC-specific operational planning. Close coordination with
GCCs--who conduct the majority of campaign activities--enables us to
assess and, when appropriate, adjust guidance in light of operational
effectiveness and changing intelligence. We have established
collaborative forums among CCMDs, combat support agencies, Military
Services, other U.S. Government agencies with CWMD equities, allies,
and partner nations. The plan opens the operational aperture of how DOD
sees the WMD problem with a transregional perspective, emphasizing
active prevention of new WMD development, and precluding aspiring
actors from attaining WMD.
The FCP is crosscutting with the Department's threat-specific
Global Campaign Plans (GCPs) and has three Lines of Effort (LOE):
Prevent, Protect, Respond. It nests with, supports, and complements the
National Defense Strategy, DOD Strategy to Counter WMD and other
strategic guidance documents. The FCP focuses heavily on the Prevent
LOE, given the strategic imperative to operate as early in the WMD
threat spectrum as possible. Actors of concern, in accordance with
priorities set by the National Security Strategy and National Defense
Strategy, are addressed individually in the campaign plan's supporting
annexes, which in turn, provide operational constructs that guide the
GCCs operational planning.
The central idea driving the FCP's strategic approach to preventing
proliferation is disrupting or defeating WMD pathways. Pathways
represent the way actors of concern move from the notion of WMD to
development, delivery, or use. Examining pathways through the lens of
people, places, and things--coupled with monitoring movement of WMD-
related technology, materials and equipment--illuminates emerging WMD
actors and identifies opportunities to disrupt. Disrupting pathways at
the far left of the continuum includes affecting the decision making of
aspirants as well as the means to acquire infrastructure and expertise.
Disrupting progress as early as possible ensures that those undeterred
lack the means to produce WMD. The FCP prioritizes intelligence
collection, analysis, and production to outline adversaries' objectives
concerning research and development and highlights potential
vulnerabilities along the continuum. We are applying this model in
close coordination with the CWMD community of action and, as a result,
are already seeing progress in implementing a more active campaign. In
support of this model, the FCP provides a guidepost for GCCs to prepare
supporting plans or to integrate campaign activities into existing
plans to meet objectives and accomplish tasks outlined in the base plan
and annexes.
Through recurring battle rhythm events, we aim to coordinate DOD
operational activities across the spectrum of the strategic and
operational space. The cornerstone of this battle rhythm is the semi-
annual CWMD Global Synchronization Conference (GSC). The GSC serves as
a venue for the CWMD community to address and advance activities to
prepare, deny, defeat, and respond to the threats posed by WMD. These
conferences emphasize the interoperability between USG assets and
international partners to succeed in the global environment. While
previous GSCs focused on broad sets of topics applicable across the
entire spectrum of the mission, we have focused the next one--scheduled
for this February--on identifying detailed requirements and describing
how the FCP is implemented for a specified WMD actor of concern.
In closing, I would like to emphasize our priorities going forward.
First, we will finalize the Department's Functional Campaign Plan for
Countering WMD in an inclusive manner that builds and strengthens
established partnerships. Second, we will improve our assessment
process in order to measure more holistically how we can best operate
and achieve our objectives in this complex environment. In addition, we
will continually update our approach as our understanding of the myriad
adversaries, threats, and capabilities evolves. Thank you for your
interest in our role as Coordinating Authority and your continued
support of USSOCOM and our people.
Senator Ernst. Outstanding.
Thank you, gentlemen, very much.
We will open with questions, and we will do those in 5-
minute iterations. Should we be joined by other members of the
subcommittee, we'll allow their questions, as well.
I would like to start with you, Mr. Rapuano. Which WMD
threat concerns you most at this stage, based on your work
within the Department and your insights across our
interagencies?
Secretary Rapuano. Thank you, Senator.
I think it depends on the filter that you look through.
But, if we're looking at the near term, clearly North Korea is
a primary concern and focus of the Department. A combination of
destabilizing behaviors and very aggressive testing program for
their ICBMs [Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles], aggressive
statements about their nuclear weapons program and
capabilities, give cause for great concern. And we've got a lot
of efforts focused on that.
I think that we also put a lot of concern, in terms of that
evolving capability, beyond the primary Russia-China focus,
which you're well familiar with from the NPR [Nuclear Posture
Review] and National Defense Strategy, is Iran, that they are
developing missile and weapons capabilities, in contravention
of U.N. security resolutions, and are a threat that we are
monitoring closely and looking to address in a variety of ways.
Then, finally, in terms of developments that create growing
concern over time, is biotechnology, just the rapid advances
and ubiquitous availability of biotechnology today. Things that
you can buy on the Web now, and essentially do a paint-by-
numbers instruction, were the province of Nobel prize-winning
scientists, only decades ago. That really levels the playing
field for any actor looking to develop biotechnology,
biological agents, and novelty engineer agents that could
present a real threat.
Senator Ernst. Certainly. Thank you. You mentioned North
Korea, of course, the nuclear tests. We've all followed that
with great interest. But, something that we just don't talk
about a lot, but was pointed out in a Washington Post--and I
mentioned it in my remarks--is North Korea acquiring different
mechanical pieces that potentially could allow them to develop
chemical or biological weapons. Is--has that been a focus, as
well, of the agency?
Secretary Rapuano. Yes. We and the rest of the interagency
community have significant concerns about North Korean chemical
and biological programs that we believed are focused on
developing weapons. So, we are tracking that very closely.
There are a variety of export control, Australia Group and
other organizations, for which we look to limit the export, the
further proliferation of agents of particular concern. But, we
do have concerns about biotechnology and the ability to
innovate agents and develop them without that kind of seed
stock over the longer term.
Senator Ernst. Okay. Then, in regards to the biological and
chemical weapons, as well, Secretary or General, when we talk
about nation-states, we know that they have the capabilities
out there. What are the assessments, when it comes to various
terrorist organizations and/or including ISIS? Do they have the
ability to deliver those types of weapons?
Secretary Rapuano. So, we understand that both al Qaeda and
ISIS are interested in chemical, biological--nuclear, they
certainly would be if they have opportunity to acquire the
materials and know-how. More details, in terms of understanding
of those capacities, we'd need to go to closed session,
Senator.
Senator Ernst. Yes, I'm sorry.
Do you have anything----
Secretary Rapuano. I'm sorry.
General Osterman?
Senator Ernst.--to add?
Lieutenant General Osterman. The only thing I'd like to
add, Senator, is the fact that part of our functional campaign
planning that we associate with this is to allow us, not only
the state, but nonstate actors, to look at the threats, if you
will, in vertical columns, and then as the functional campaign
plan crosscuts those, so we can observe where the technology
transfer may occur between state/nonstate actors, also where
one nonstate actor perhaps is working with another nonstate
actor in a different geographic location or in a functional
capacity. So, we try to weave that in with the translation of
our strategy and policy to actual tactical application of
interdiction in order to, basically, reinforce the larger
protocol efforts that are in place.
Senator Ernst. Okay. Thank you very much.
Senator Heinrich.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Secretary Rapuano, I want to go back to the issue you were
talking about, in terms of rapid innovation with respect to
biological resources, and with technologies like CRSPR and
others, just changing that landscape at a rate that we could
just--has never occurred within the field before. Are there
things that we should be thinking about now that can create
some level of obstruction or raise barriers to entry to make
sure that we're doing an adequate job of what we apply with
respect to export controls and other tools in other fields? How
can we make sure that, you know, we're not just missing some
very big developments that could be happening under our nose
with off-the-shelf Internet-purchased items, for example?
Secretary Rapuano. Senator, that is something that we're
very focused on with our interagency partners, in term--there
are a number of norms, in terms of internationally, nationally,
with regard to research being done in the bio area, where you
look to not do certain things. But, well-established norms that
get at----
Senator Heinrich. That works great for the folks who follow
the norms. It's the----
Secretary Rapuano. That's exactly----
Senator Heinrich. I'm wondering if we shouldn't have some
sort of track-and-trace technology that makes sure that people
are following the standards in the research community.
Secretary Rapuano. There are efforts in that area. I didn't
come prepared to speak in detail about them today. It's very
difficult, though, because it's very widespread. The research
is going on all over the world. It's not like more select
research that's only being done in highly developed nations.
It's proliferated to where it's being done, places that would
have been unimaginable decades ago.
Senator Heinrich. Well, that wasn't the answer I was hoping
for.
Secretary Rapuano. Me either.
Senator Heinrich. I think we really need to put some
thought into this, because this is a situation that feels like
it could get ahead of all of us very quickly.
I want to shift gears for a minute and ask you, General
Osterman. With respect to Special Forces and how they have led
the effort, in places like Syria and Iraq, in reining in
development of chemical or biological weapons from groups like
ISIS, you know, these are specialized missions. They're
uniquely tailored for SOF [Special Operations Forces]
capabilities. But, I wanted to ask, how would Special Forces
perform this sort of a mission in a more conventional forces
environment? Take a force environment like North Korea, where
you have a very different battlespace than you would in Iraq or
Syria, a lot of very heavily secured WMD sites. I'm just trying
to get--without a specific locational answer, I want to
understand how you apply that same mission set in a more
traditional battlespace environment.
Lieutenant General Osterman. Okay. Senator, I think I would
probably answer that one from a standpoint of a reactive or
proactive approach to it. Really, when you look at the
proactive ways of being able to interdict things like that, it
really is associated with a pathway approach. I think you
alluded to that in one of your opening statements about, you
know, components of different types of WMD that are required as
precursors, or even technology requirements associated with,
you know, missile or other type activity. And so, understanding
pathways is important.
I guess, when I would look at that from a--what we've done
in Iraq and Syria, versus what we've actually--you know, would
be looking at with a state actor, really the process is very
similar. You look at that--for example, we could easily
translate the human capital that is associated with the
knowledge for these things, and that becomes a--an opportunity
for targeting, whether it be kinetically or nonkinetically. So,
I think there's a lot of similar things that way that can be
done.
When it comes to secure facilities, all those, I'd probably
have to get with you offline on that one. But, the--as far as
the details--but, I would say that the approach is very, very
similar, in the sense that there's always human capital,
resourcing, and technology that's associated with these type
things. And just really depends on what scope it's actually
being applied. But, the fundamentals still apply from--example,
as I mentioned with our Fusion Center--the opts-intel fusion,
to understand what is that indication of warning that things
may be coming along, and, you know, how do you matrix that with
the different threats that are out there, versus viability of
the threat?
If that answers the question.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you, General.
Lieutenant General Osterman. Sure.
Senator Ernst. Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Thank you both for your testimony. I'm sorry I wasn't here
to hear it.
But, can you--perhaps this is for you, Secretary Rapuano--
how do we describe ``weapons of mass destruction''?
Secretary Rapuano. Senator, that's a great question. In
different quarters, it's described in very different ways. If
you look at domestic law, the Department of Justice defines
``weapon of mass destruction'' essentially from a firecracker
to a thermonuclear bomb.
When we look at it in an international perspective, we have
a much higher threshold. So, it is a weapon that causes
significant effects. But, you still see a very wide range.
Chlorine, for example, which is an industrial chemical, can be
used, and has been used, as we know, by the Syrians and ISIS as
a chemical weapon. It doesn't have near the level of effect of
nerve gas and other agents.
It's a pretty wide spectrum, but it's essentially a
chemical, biological agent, or nuclear device that creates
significant consequence.
Senator Shaheen. Do we consider cyberattacks as potential
weapons of mass destruction?
Secretary Rapuano. We have not defined, to date, in terms
of how we, in the U.S. Government, use the term ``WMD''--we
have not defined that to include cyber.
Senator Shaheen. Should we? I notice that the Nuclear
Posture Review contemplated that there might be situations in
which the massive use of cyberattacks could result in,
potentially, a nuclear response. So, should we be thinking
about them in those terms? Cyberattacks?
Secretary Rapuano. So, Senator, my reading of the NPR, it
doesn't define ``cyber use,'' it defines----
Senator Shaheen. Boy, it leaves a pretty big hole----
Secretary Rapuano. It----
Senator Shaheen.--there, though.
Mr. Rapuano.--defines the effects----
Senator Shaheen. Right.
Mr. Rapuano.--of any use of any technique that would be
extreme and disastrous for the Nation, that could result in our
response with nuclear weapons. So, it's not the means, it's the
end.
Senator Shaheen. Right. But, anything that might produce
that sort of end has to be pretty disruptive. And so, the
question I'm raising is, Should we be thinking about cyber in
the same way that we're thinking about these other weapons of
mass destruction? Because certainly they have the potential to
create the same amount of chaos and potentially the same amount
of fatalities, depending on how they're used.
Secretary Rapuano. Senator, I think the challenge with that
is, cyber is a domain from which there is zero negative effect
all the way to ``could be very high'' potential effect. With
the WMD classification, one of the distinctions has been the
threshold of even lower use is significant enough to
characterize it as a class of weapon.
Senator Shaheen. Isn't part of the issue with cyber is that
we don't really have a well-defined body of law and response,
proactively--``response'' is the wrong term--that we don't have
a proactive way to address the potential of cyberattacks, and
that that's part of what makes it very difficult for us to
figure out how to categorize those?
Secretary Rapuano. I believe the challenge with any means,
whether it's cyber or other avenues of attack, is, What is a
threshold that will warrant what level of response? It's a
threshold of the consequence that I believe is a deciding
factor to determine what level and what significant the
response would be.
Senator Shaheen. I appreciate what you're saying. I don't
think that really responds to the question that I'm raising,
however.
I want to go to another issue around cyber, though, because
I appreciated the Department's response to my inquiry regarding
the work that the Department does with IT companies and the
issue around sharing sensitive source-code data with Russia and
other hostile governments. I wonder if you can tell me why DOD
doesn't require companies to disclose information about whether
they have released their source-code information to hostile
governments, and whether we should be doing that.
Secretary Rapuano. Senator, I don't come here to today's
hearing with details on that, but I can get those answers for
you.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Department of Defense does not currently monitor
whether commercial information technology vendors share source
code or other (non-controlled) commercial intellectual
property. There are cost and efficiency advantages for the
Department in procuring commercial off-the-shelf software. The
Department is currently exploring the feasibility of such a
disclosure requirement and how we might implement the process
without undermining the advantages of relying on commercial
software.
Senator Shaheen. I would appreciate that. Thank you.
Senator Ernst. Okay. We'll start our second round of
questioning.
Secretary, in the Department's strategy for countering
weapons of mass destruction, DOD states that it will dissuade
pursuit and possession of WMD by demonstrating layered defenses
based on active and passive capabilities. You had made those
comments, as well, in your opening statement. Can you--in this
opening setting, can you describe what those capabilities are?
What are those layered defenses?
Secretary Rapuano. So, Senator, that--there's a range of
defenses, depending on the type of weapon used and the
consequences of the effect, starting with the passive--that's
inclusive of resilience, to deny the adversary the intended
benefit of the use; so the better defended or the more
resilient the targets of their attacks, the less inclination on
our--their part to employ it; active military operations, or a
range of other activities that are not necessarily kinetic
military operations, from a whole-of-government perspective--
it's a well-known list, as you know: sanctions, there are
diplomatic actions, there are financial penalties; and then,
getting into the military space, there's a full range of what
the total force brings, in terms of capabilities for response.
Senator Ernst. Okay. As Secretary of Homeland Defense and
Global Security, you coordinate the CWMD policy and oversee
defense support to civilian authorities. How is DOD postured to
respond to a CBRN incident in the Homeland? Can you give us an
example and walk us through that?
Secretary Rapuano. Senator, we have what we call the CBRN
Response Enterprise. It's almost 19,000--a combination of
National Guard and title 10 military who are formed into a
variety of teams. We have the WMD CSTs, the Civil Support
Teams. We have the Enhanced Response Teams. We have a range of
teams with a different mix of capabilities that go from
decontamination, detection, medical effects, medical treatment.
There is air transportation, ground transportation--the whole
package that can be integrated, that can either be commanded by
the State National Guards--and there's at least one team in
every State--or they can be authorized under title 10 and under
DOD command.
Senator Ernst. I appreciate it. Thank you for the shout-out
for our CSTs. I'm intimately familiar with the CST existing in
our Iowa National Guard; Air Guard, as well. We have both--both
Air Guard and National--Army National Guard that combine their
forces as a joint force. They work very proactively.
Just for the public's information, can you describe their
proactive stance and where they might be stationed during large
events--perhaps they were around the Super Bowl this past
weekend--just so people understand how we utilize those teams?
Secretary Rapuano. Yes. As you imply, Senator, we use them
on a routine basis, starting with national special security
events--the Super Bowl, other large events, 4th of July. These
assets will be predeployed in the vicinity of activities for
which there may be some concern that they would be the target
of an attack that might include WMD. And they are prepared to
respond, in concert with all the other assets that are
typically deployed for those events, law enforcement and
others.
Senator Ernst. I appreciate that. Just to make it clear for
our public that we are not just reactive in certain situations,
but we're also very proactive in making sure that our public is
safe here on the Homeland.
Secretary Rapuano. Absolutely.
Senator Ernst. Thank you very much for that.
We'll go on to Senator Sullivan, if you would like to take
an opportunity to ask some questions.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Gentlemen, good to see you. General, Semper Fi.
I don't know if the Chair already asked it, so, if she did,
I apologize for the repetition. But, how is the transition
going from STRATCOM [United States Strategic Command]? Are
there assets that--or authorities that you need right now from
us that can help with this mission? I actually think, from a
broader national-security mission, the counter-WMD mission is
kind of the evergreen mission. We might be going after ISIS for
a couple more years, or al Qaeda, but, as long as we're a
republic, the counter-WMD mission is the evergreen mission--in
my view, the most important mission in the U.S. military. We
want to make sure it's resourced. I actually think it made
sense to transfer it over to SOCOM, but I'm sure the transition
hasn't been flawless. And it's not like, General, you guys
don't have other missions that you're currently focused on. I'm
wondering how it's going.
Lieutenant General Osterman. Senator, thanks for the
question. Actually, the transition and assumption of the duties
went exceptionally well, very close and good relationship with
U.S. STRATCOM [United States Strategic Command]. It was well
coordinated, well defined. Frankly, we--everyone came to the
table with an understanding--a basic understanding of what the
resource requirements were. And so, before--actually before
assumption of the mission, we actually worked through all that.
We're actually at a point right now where I'd--the way the
plan was set up and General Thomas approved the--essentially,
our transition plan--was that at the 1-year mark, where we are
right now, we would reevaluate, kind of, how things went over
the last year: Do we have the right people in the right places
and the right resources aligned to the mission set? I think
we're real close to what we need. We probably need to tweak it
internally to optimize it. But, everyone was very, very
supportive that way. So, right now, any additional resources
we've put into the normal budgeting cycle, and I'm very
confident they'll be represented in there.
The--as far as the authorities, right now everything is
moving along well, no problems with the geographic combatant
commands and helping to work with them, nor with the
interagency.
Senator Sullivan. Great.
Secretary Rapuano. Senator, if I could add that SOCOM
really--having been someone who's tilled in this field most of
my career, that--SOCOM brings a unique blend of experience,
skills, capabilities, and relationships that make them uniquely
well-equipped, particularly in terms of the relationship with
the COCOM [combatant command], the operational equipage of the
capabilities necessary. They have a visceral appreciation of
that from their experience. And then working the entire threat
or kill chain associated with CB [chemical biological] WMD, all
the way from ideation to consequence management, and focusing
the Department and the COCOMs in those areas that we have the
most impact on getting at WMD.
Senator Sullivan. Great. Thanks.
Both in my capacity here and in--General, as you know, in
my Reserve duties--spent a lot of time focused on this issue.
Just recently, within the last six months, there's both been,
kind of, exercises, kind of, at the very large scale, you know,
the counter-WMD SINC conference, and then, more tactical in
nature, the Bronze RAM exercise, are there--do you have after-
actions and, kind of, lessons learned from those operations,
that are either classified or unclassified, that you could
share with the committee, that, kind of--again, so we're having
good visibility on how things are developing, what you see as
strengths and weaknesses?
Lieutenant General Osterman. Yes, Senator. We definitely
have the after-actions. We use those to feed, you know,
successive iterations. In the case of the field exercises
there, we obviously adjust those in stride, based on, you know,
emerging threats that are out there. So, probably not best that
I say those here. And I--you know, in a closed session or----
Senator Sullivan. Yeah;.
Lieutenant General Osterman.--afterwards, we could get the
classified information to you.
Senator Sullivan. Great.
And then, I'll just--and, Madam Chair, on the North Korean
threat and the network that they've developed, you know,
there's a lot of us who are, you know, very curious on how
much--and I've asked a lot of the intel community on this
issue--but, how much the North Korean proliferation network has
helped with regard to not only what they're looking at, in
terms of proliferation, but how--the advances they've made,
particularly with regard to intercontinental ballistic missile
testing. You know, it's hard for some of us to believe that
that's all organic advancements. Because they've clearly made a
lot of advancements, not only on the nuclear side, but on the
missile side. Do we have a sense--and, again, maybe it's better
for a classified session--are they getting help on the outside
with regard to how quickly they're advancing? And are we
confident that our networks are able to battle their networks
on a country that almost certainly--certainly has a record of
proliferation, but I think we should--we would be fools if we
weren't assuming that they're going to try to continue to
proliferate, even with this very strong, kind of, sanctions net
around them.
Secretary Rapuano. Senator, I would simply say, in open
session, that this is something that we and the rest of the
intelligence community are intensely focused upon. That's
probably all I can say here.
Senator Sullivan. Okay. Well, I'm glad you're intensely
focused on it.
Thank you.
Madam Chair.
Senator Ernst. Thank you.
Senator Heinrich.
Senator Heinrich. General Osterman, I wanted to ask you:
Obviously, ISIS has lost, geographically been defeated, but
would you still consider them a WMD threat, even in that
scenario? Because, obviously, this is about talent as much as
anything, and intellectual capacity. What's your analysis of
that at this point?
Lieutenant General Osterman. Senator, I--my analysis is,
yes, they are still as threat, to put it simply. Really, when
we look at pathways, we're looking at intent, infrastructure,
and expertise, to your point, production, weaponization,
delivery systems, and use. They've demonstrated not only that
capability over time, but, even though the--as they lose the
geographic caliphate, that those individuals that have the
technical knowledge and, frankly, the level at which they were
working, and have been working, is not one that, you know,
would--by loss of that geographic caliphate, that it would
undermine their ability to continue to pursue weapons-of-mass-
destruction----
Senator Heinrich. Yeah.
Lieutenant General Osterman.--capability.
Senator Heinrich. Secretary Rapuano, one of our greatest
challenges in countering, particularly, biological WMD is being
able to, at scale, develop vaccines and other potential
specialized medicines and pharmaceuticals for our troops or for
populations that are impacted by those. And, you know, a good
example is, when Ebola began to emerge, there was a DOD vaccine
that hadn't gone through the FDA [Federal Drug Administration]
full process, but there's not an obvious way to scale those up
in a for-profit pharmaceutical company, in many cases, and we
haven't found partners to do that. Have you thought about how
to address this so that we don't get caught behind the eight
ball, the way that we did with the Ebola crisis?
Secretary Rapuano. Yes, Senator. We work very closely with
HHS [Health and Human Services]--BARDA [Biomedical Advanced
Research and Development Authority], over at HHS--DHS, to look
at biothreats, in general, including naturally occurring, to
sync our research with them to ensure that we're covering the
full landscape of what's naturally occurring and what perhaps
could be intensified or developed for malevolent use. So, we're
looking at ways that we can get quick production, just in time.
But, that's very difficult, because you need that base, in
terms of that manufacturing base.
Senator Heinrich. Right.
Secretary Rapuano. We've done that in certain areas. In
other areas, it's been more challenging. But, that's a
priority. That's a priority that's also reflected in the still
draft, but almost complete, National Biodefense Strategy.
Senator Heinrich. I look forward to seeing that, because it
seems to me that, you know, setting bioweapons aside for a
moment, even with just zoonotic outbreaks, that we typically
have not had the capacity to be able to manufacture things. We
may know, through research, what would or might work, but
getting that to scale in any sort of meaningful way, we just--
we don't have a mechanism to do that right now.
Secretary Rapuano. Absolutely.
Senator Heinrich. I've got a few seconds left, and then
I'll turn it over to my colleagues. The--can you talk just a
little bit, from either of you, on--talking about how
communities collaborate and leverage relative strengths across
the counter-WMD mission, in terms of: How do you bring all the
different talents that different agencies and labs and et
cetera have together? You mentioned the Fusion Center. Like,
what has worked, when it comes to effectively leveraging the
intellectual talent that is in different places?
Secretary Rapuano. I'll take a start at that, Senator, and
then hand it over to General Osterman.
When you look at that spectrum of activities, all the way
from intent and desire for WMD through use and response to, it
is a very wide spectrum. When we look at any one agency,
including the Department of Defense--roles responsibilities,
authorities, capacity, scope--there's no one that can do it
all. In fact, if you start to specialize and say, ``What tools,
techniques, weapons can be applied to getting most return on
investment, in terms of preventing, denying, responding''--so,
if you start all the way to the left on the pathways, that's
primarily export-control-driven, intel community, understanding
what those pathways are. So, that's very heavy Department of
Commerce, Department of State. But, there are still
opportunities. For example, COCOMs are operating with partner
nations. The militaries of other nations do things very
differently than they do here. Some of them manage export
controls. Developing an understanding of the individuals,
characters, leaders, and what their level of interest is, it
all forms a composite, in terms of our understanding.
So, what SOCOM, for example, is doing with the Fusion
Center is just improving that add mixture, that integration of
intelligence, both from a national and a military intelligence
perspective. As you go further right to a point of use or
threatened use to response, our activities get much more
kinetic, both in terms of military operational kinetic as well
as the dynamics of a response, which really needs then to be an
integrated whole-of-government response.
We're very focused, in the past several years, on national-
scale events, intentional events, nuclear events. So, that
obviously is a major challenge, in terms of: How do we achieve
the unity of effort in crisis from--in real time? But, we are
making progress in that area, as well.
Senator Ernst. Very good.
Senator Sullivan.
Senator Ernst. I think we're doing Democrat, Republican,
Democrat.
Senator Sullivan. Okay.
Senator Ernst. Yeah.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I wanted to get back to--and, again, if we've touched on
this, I apologize--but, in terms of countries--so governments--
that you see as the biggest threats, from the perspective of
counter-WMD threats, which ones would you put in the top
category?
Secretary Rapuano. From a strategic perspective, we----
Senator Sullivan. Just a country that has capability and
has a history of proliferation.
Secretary Rapuano. Obviously, we need to start with the two
countries who have existential WMD capability with regard to
potential impact on the United States. That's Russia and China.
Senator Sullivan. But, I mean, is there a history of China,
with regard to proliferation, to bad actors; or Russia, the
same? Like, for example, North Korea clearly, you know, helped
Syria build a nuclear reactor, which the Israelis ended up
bombing. Have we seen that kind of activity from----
Secretary Rapuano. When we're looking at those countries
that are of greatest proliferation concern, you know, again,
depending--if you're talking the dual-use commodity size--side
of the equation, it is more mixed, but then it's not entirely
always clear where those dual-use items are going, whether
they're going into an--WMD program, potentially, or a
conventional program. But, Iran and Syria are two very
significant nonproliferation actors, in terms of proliferating
technologies. Iran has done it. There are a number of other
countries that we have concerns and issues with that we would
probably be better handling in closed----
Senator Sullivan. And North Korea, of course?
Secretary Rapuano. And North Korea, of course.
Senator Sullivan. Let me ask another question related to
that.
Secretary Rapuano. Although, just on the point of North
Korea, I wouldn't say in the context of proliferating WMD, per
se. The dual-use piece is a lot more gray.
Senator Sullivan. Well, they've built the reactor in Syria.
That's about as dramatic as it gets, isn't it?
Secretary Rapuano. It is a concern, but, really, depending
on how you want to draw the threshold of, ``Are they knowingly
and deliberately looking to provide WMD capability to another
actor?''--again, that's better left to a closed session.
Senator Sullivan. I had once heard a--I'll just describe it
as a senior national security official--say that the JCPOA
[Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action]--the Iran nuclear deal
with the United States--was--had enabled us to kind of take our
eye off that proliferation threat, because of the fact of the
agreement. That's not the current view of the U.S. military or
others, is it, General?
Secretary Rapuano. That is not.
Senator Sullivan. Mr. Secretary?
Lieutenant General Osterman. I guess I'm from----
Senator Sullivan. It was a shocking statement that I heard.
I actually couldn't believe it, where somebody had mentioned,
``Well, because we have the agreement now,'' which I was very
opposed to, ``we don't have to look at them so much with regard
to a proliferation nuclear-development problem.'' I think
that's--I think that's just incorrect, and I just wanted to get
that out there.
Secretary Rapuano. You're correct, that----
Senator Sullivan. So, both of you, that----
Mr. Rapuano.--that is not the view of this administration.
Senator Sullivan. Okay. Or the U.S. military as part of the
administration.
Secretary Rapuano. Or the U.S. military.
Senator Sullivan. Let me ask one final question. With
regard--we had Secretary Mattis testify in front of the full
committee yesterday on the National Defense Strategy, which I
think he got a lot of bipartisan compliments on for the
thoughtfulness of the document, for what its focus is. But, in
particular, one of the areas of focus in the document is the
emphasis on our allies with regard to our National Security
Strategy. In this effort, the ally participation with regard to
counter-WMD would seem to me really important. Do you--are we
getting cooperation? Do we have regular deep consultations with
our NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies or other
bilateral allies who have similar capabilities that we have, in
terms of counter-WMD? Or is there more that we can do to help
encourage some of these important countries to coordinate more
with our counter-WMD efforts?
Secretary Rapuano. We have a variety of programs--I
mentioned the CTR--but a number of proliferation programs,
where we're developing capacity, on the part of allies, to
operate in CBRN environments. We're assisting them, in terms of
understanding dual-use commodities and the potential risks.
We're working with them, for example, in the maximum pressure
campaign, with regard to illicit shipments to North Korea,
ship-to-ship transfers. So, we are very active. The Secretary
is very serious about partnerships being a critical element.
It's--from the Secretary, you've heard it from him--lethality,
partnerships, and reform. That partnership component of our WMD
approach is a mainstay.
Senator Sullivan. Right. Thank you.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Ernst. Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Madam Chair.
So, I wanted to follow up on that a little bit, because I
understand that we're a participant under the Proliferation
Security Initiative, and that that works with our international
partners to interdict shipments of WMD-related items. Can you
talk about that a little more than you just did with Senator
Sullivan? And also, talk about its importance in addressing
situations like North Korea, in terms of the potential to
interdict shipments of nuclear-related materials.
Secretary Rapuano. Yes, Senator. The Proliferation Security
Initiative is not an operational coordination process. It's
really about developing a common understanding and
prioritization of proliferation consequences and impacts, and
working together. What flows from that oftentimes are
operational coordination. For example, the hail and queries of
ships at sea. But that's not done with NPSI, per se. It's more
about having that worldwide cooperation, discussing, agreeing
conceptually; but actual operational coordination happens
bilaterally in small groups. Another topic that would be best
addressed in a closed hearing.
Senator Shaheen. With respect to its importance in
addressing the situation in North Korea, can you speak to that
in this open session?
Secretary Rapuano. Simply to say that we have a growing
number of partners and allies who are looking to cooperate with
us on addressing illicit shipments, including ship-to-ship.
Senator Shaheen. Does that include states like Russia and
China?
Secretary Rapuano. Well, I just wouldn't go into detail, in
this session, talking about individual relationships and
agreements that--at this point.
Senator Shaheen. General Osterman, as you have both pointed
out, we have a multitude of threats of WMD around the world.
Can you talk about how our military assesses the severity of
each threat and the potential resources that it would require
to respond?
Lieutenant General Osterman. Yes, Senator. There's--I kind
of described that pathway framework earlier. Most of the
assessments are addressed in our functional campaign planning.
So, in other words, we look at it from a wide variety of
criteria, from their--you know, what is their intent, what is
their ability, all the way through that. Then, really, from a
transregional perspective, some of that threat is, you know,
how are they looking to work this in a transregional fashion?
Are they exporting? Is it, you know, a singular small node? Is
it--what are the viability of chemicals that they may be
capable of producing, for example? Or, as was mentioned
earlier, the biological-agent aspect of things, et cetera.
That's basically how we get into the assessments of that risk.
Really, what we do is, we define that prioritization, if
you will, of threats, and then, as I mentioned, matrix that
with the actors that are out there to kind of come up with
recommendations, up through the Department, about: How do we
prioritize, and how do we set policy, you know, for those?
That's really about it. Most of that's based on our
intelligence and our technical means of looking at things. We
translate that internally, just to make sure that we have the
response and protective-force capability within the military to
operate in that environment and/or, you know, counter the
particular WMD we may be working with.
Senator Shaheen. You were talking--Senator Heinrich,
earlier, raised the question of ISIS and whether they continue
to have the capacity to inflict major damage through WMD. You
talked about the--and we've all read about the reduction of
their caliphate, and that they're on the run. There have been
several news reports recently that have talked about the fact
that they--there are significant numbers of ISIS fighters who
have gone underground and are reappearing in other places, and
have the potential to reorganize. Since we saw that in Syria,
and that's how ISIS reconstituted itself from al Qaeda, what
are we doing about that? How much of a concern is that?
Lieutenant General Osterman. Senator, what we're doing with
that is that, even though the writ-large ISIS has a number of
people that are basically moving to counterinsurgency--or to an
insurgency type of mode, or whatever, the actual number of
individuals that are associated with WMD production--and a--
this goes back to your definitional question about ``What is
WMD?'' You know, the ability to put, you know, low toxicity
into something, is that really WMD? It's a very, very finite
technical capability and human-capital issue. It's--and they
are generally not front-line fighters. They're--these are--they
are folks that were not necessarily easy to track, but they're
ones that we've been working on for a number of years, here,
and have ideas where they are, if we haven't already, you know,
basically, taken them off the battlespace.
That's where my concern is and where we watch very closely,
again, through the transregional approaches, to make sure that
they're not leaving that area of operations and perhaps then
becoming an export or, as we term it, an ex-ops threat to the
United States, proper.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Ernst. I believe we have time for one more brief
round of questions. If we can just maybe ask one final question
in this last round, and then we'll wrap our subcommittee
hearing.
I appreciate, Mr. Secretary, the discussion about the
different agencies that you interact with, whether it's
Department of Energy, Homeland Security, other entities. Being
the junior Senator from the great State of Iowa, one agency
that I did not hear was the USDA [United States Department of
Agriculture]. One thing that we don't often discuss is the fact
that, yes, we want to protect our human capital, but part of
that is also protecting our feedstocks here in the United
States. We have had an active discussion, in the Agriculture
Committee, about offshore vaccine banks for things like foot-
and-mouth disease that would impact agriculture at large with
livestock, other diseases that could be introduced into plant
varieties of agriculture. What are the discussions, when it
comes to working on--with the USDA and protecting agriculture?
Secretary Rapuano. Thank you very much, Senator. That was a
major omission on my part. Agriculture is the lead Federal
agency----
Senator Ernst. Okay, thank you.
Mr. Rapuano.--for threats to agriculture, livestock. They
play a very important role, because that is a critical
commodity, in terms of our economy and our population's needs.
So, they are part of that team, and a core member of that team,
helping evaluate potential threats to agriculture, and
developing approaches either to forestall or respond to events
that threaten U.S. agriculture.
Senator Ernst. Okay. I appreciate that. Thank you very
much.
Senator Heinrich?
Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Secretary Rapuano, you mentioned the draft National
Biodefense Strategy that was actually required back in the
Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act]. A
number of members of this committee, including the Chair and
the Ranking Member of the full committee, have been sort of
waiting with bated breath for that. What is the holdup? When
will we see that document, do you think?
Secretary Rapuano. So, that is at the White House. We've
been participating in the NSC [National Security Council] and
DHS-led review of the biostrategy. I met with the Director and
the NSC staff, two weeks ago, on that topic. To my
understanding, it is just about there, but----
Senator Heinrich. Okay.
Mr. Rapuano.--I don't have the latest----
Senator Heinrich. Because we're----
Mr. Rapuano.--and I'm not----
Senator Heinrich. And the reason being, we're hoping to use
that for the Fiscal Year 2019 NDAA. So----
Secretary Rapuano. Absolutely.
Senator Heinrich.--the sooner, the better.
Secretary Rapuano. Understood.
Senator Ernst. Senator Sullivan.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Gentlemen, I just want to ask one final question on
interagency cooperation, which I'm sure--I think we all would
agree is really essential to defeating the networks that
you're--the proliferation networks that you're focused on.
Do you see that there is, in terms of this mission,
sufficient cooperation between, say, the intel community, DOD,
SOCOM, Department of Energy, Department of Agriculture, and
others? Or are there statutory improvements that we could help
you with that could help make sure that the mission and the
interagency coordination is not stovepiped, and it brings
together all the agencies?
Secretary Rapuano. Senator, I don't see any statutory
obstacles. In my experience, the interagency community working
CWMD is very collaborative, works very well together. We are
constantly looking for ways we can improve the process and
focus and prioritize those threats that are most extant to us.
Also, looking ahead at evolving technology and actors to better
understand where the most significant threats will come from.
That's part of the great work that SOCOM is doing in their new
coordinating authority role for the COCOMs. So, we're--I would
just, speaking for myself, from my perspective, say that we're
on the right road, but we definitely have room to improve, and
we're moving out.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
Lieutenant General Osterman. Senator, if I could onto that.
I--with all the different functional areas and different
units and everything else I've worked with in the military, to
be honest with you, entering the counter-WMD realm here, I've
never found a community that works more closely together. It's
literally an open door everywhere you go, from not only a--an
interagency, but also an IC perspective, and then also from an
allied perspective.
Some of those tangible examples are routinely meeting with
the various intel agencies affiliated with this. And there are
some organizations collaboratively working on tools and intel
assessments, as well as getting tangible technical means on
certain things.
From an allied perspective, that question earlier, we
actually bring in allied partners to our twice-a-year Global
SINC [Strategic Information Networking Conferences] Conference
that come in there to participate and sit in as participating
members.
It really is a--in my view, a tremendous community.
Frankly, just having forums to bring them together, which is a
big responsibility on SOCOM as a coordinating authority, to be
able to convene those meetings, bring everyone together, and
then get concerted effort in a particular direction, based on
departmental guidance, has actually--that hasn't been the
problem. You know, it's--everybody's willing to help. It's just
trying to--getting everything moving in the same direction. And
very, very positive responses, so far.
Senator Sullivan. Great.
Thank you.
Senator Ernst. Well, thank you.
I'd like to thank my colleagues and Senator Heinrich for
coordinating this meeting for us today.
As well, Secretary and General, thank you for your
wonderful expertise and your commitment to the men and women of
our uniformed services, as well as our civilian population
citizens of the great United States, for all that you do. We
look forward to seeing how SOCOM progresses during this
transition, and we look forward to working with you on any
initiatives that you deem necessary. Thank you very much for
joining us today.
We will conclude this subcommittee meeting.
[Whereupon, at 3:40 p.m., the committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
wmd threats
1. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Rapuano, how does DOD plan to
address WMD threats posed by convergence of emerging technologies such
as artificial intelligence and advanced health research capabilities
such as CRISPR gene manipulating technology?
Secretary Rapuano. Artificial intelligence, synthetic biology, and
other technologies that lower the barriers to entry for potential
adversaries are the very technologies that may help ensure we win the
wars of the future. For this reason, the Department takes a balanced
approach to addressing these technologies. DOD seeks to maximize
opportunities provided by these technologies to advance our
capabilities, while seeking to minimize the risks they could pose to
our national security. As a matter of course, we actively monitor the
emergence and convergence of new technologies to inform our risk
assessments and capability requirements. For example, DOD recently
funded the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine to
review the changing nature of the biodefense threats in the age of
synthetic biology and to develop a strategic framework to guide an
assessment of associated potential security vulnerabilities.
Additionally, DOD continues to leverage these types of technologies in
the development of capabilities to address current and emerging WMD
threats.
2. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Rapuano, how does DOD's counter-WMD
efforts collaborate with the civilian Counter WMD efforts at DHS? Does
the recent formation of a CWMD office at DHS present greater
opportunities for collaboration or challenges?
Secretary Rapuano. DOD coordinates and collaborates with the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) on a number of issues related to
our counter-WMD missions, including the BioWatch Program, the National
Biodefense Strategy, and the National Technical Nuclear Forensics
Center. DOD also collaborates with the Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office's efforts to enhance the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture
(GNDA), which serves as a framework for detecting, analyzing, and
reporting on nuclear and other radioactive materials outside of
regulatory control. DOD looks forward to continuing this coordination
and collaboration with the new DHS Countering Weapons of Mass
Destruction (CWMD) Office. We also welcome any improvements in
efficiency and effectiveness that may result from the establishment of
this new office.
radiation exposure
3. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Rapuano, over the past year, we've
heard news reports highlighting problems facing servicemembers and
veterans seeking treatment at the Department of Veterans Affairs whose
radiation exposure was not recorded or tracked. Unfortunately, this
spans across exposure at Pacific island nuclear test sites in the
1950s, in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, around the Fukushima nuclear
disaster, and via depleted Uranium use in current operations. These
examples demonstrate the urgent need and application for modern
personal dosimeters that provide a legal record of radiation exposure
for each servicemember.
I commend the Army Reserve and Army National Guard for ensuring
that 100 percent of their soldiers have the most modern and capable
personal dosimeters. I understand, however, that the Active Army
currently has a significant readiness shortfall in this area, having
supplied only 50% of their soldiers with personal dosimeters that
provide a legal record of any radiation exposure.
What is DOD's plan to ensure each of the military serves can field
similar personal dosimeters?
Secretary Rapuano. The U.S. Army is closely collaborating with the
U.S. Navy on the acquisition of the Joint Personal Dosimeter--
Individual (JPD-I), which will eventually replace the legacy dosimetry
systems for Active Duty, Reserve, and National Guard personnel. The
U.S. Army plans to test the U.S. Navy's newly acquired Battlefield
Dosimeter based on the lessons learned from DOD's response to the 2011
Fukishima Reactor disaster (Operation Tomodachi).
The U.S. Marine Corps plans to maintain a squad-level dosimeter.
The U.S. Air Force intends to maintain the commercially available
Thermofisher Electronic Personal Dosimeters (EPD), which were procured
prior to Operation Tom odachi. The U.S. Air Force expects to start
replacing those in the middle of the next decade and is observing the
U.S. Army and U.S. Navy test results for the JPD-I as well as costs in
its evaluation of the Thermofisher EPD.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
dod cybersecurity
4. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Rapuano, could you explain why DOD
does not require companies that it contracts with to disclose instances
where they have shared source code with foreign countries?
Secretary Rapuano. DOD does not currently require DOD contractors
to disclose when they share source code or other (non-controlled)
commercial intellectual property. DOD accepts that among the risks
associated with acquiring commercial, non-controlled technology is the
possibility that such disclosures may occur or that an adversary may
acquire the technology for test and evaluation.
In efforts to mitigate risks associated with the use of commercial
products, the Department's current risk management approach considers
all source intelligence information, hardware and software evaluation
results, known vulnerability information, and the criticality of
product in the system. If a risk is discovered, the Department has
established practices and a variety of system analysis tools it can
employ to determine the existence of vulnerabilities. If a
vulnerability is discovered, the Department will take the appropriate
action to remediate and reduce negative impacts on critical systems.
5. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Rapuano, if DOD does not ask
companies directly about their interactions with foreign governments
overseas how can we be sure that hostile governments do not obtain
source codes and other data that may give them access to U.S.
Government systems?
Secretary Rapuano. The Department employs a comprehensive approach
to product acquisition. In general, the Department is aware of
countries that require organizations to submit source code for review
for certain types of security products. DOD, however, assumes that a
capable adversaries have the capability to discover latent
vulnerabilities in commercial applications without access to source
code. To mitigate this risk, DOD participates in Government-wide
strategic efforts to protect commercial technology through a controlled
risk management process, has an established approach to supply chain
risk management that uses clearly defined process and functions to
acquire products. These risk management processes may consider all
source intelligence information, vulnerability information, results of
hardware and software test and evaluation, and criticality of product
in the system.
6. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Rapuano, the FY18 NDAA contains a
provision that directs the President to establish a national policy
with respect to matters pertaining to cyberspace, cybersecurity and
cyber warfare. Do you believe it is important that the administration
articulates such a policy and have you been consulted in its drafting?
Secretary Rapuano. It is essential for the United States Government
to have a holistic strategy to address the range of challenges and
threats confronting the Nation in cyberspace. My staff and I work in
close collaboration with the National Security Council (NSC) and our
interagency partners at the State Department, Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and other
departments and agencies, to ensure the Federal Government has the
necessary policies and is taking appropriate actions to address the
critical issues and potential threats in cyberspace.
Over the past year, the Department has participated in the
Administration's efforts to articulate clear policies and priorities
for cyberspace. These policies include Executive Order 13800
Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical
Infrastructure, which directed concrete actions to address cyber risks
across the Federal Government; The National Security Strategy (NSS),
which furthers the Federal Government's cyber posture by prioritizing
and directing action to ensure the security of the domain; and the
National Defense Strategy (NDS), which refines, clarifies, and
prioritizes missions for DOD in and through cyberspace.
[all]