[Senate Hearing 115-800]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 115-800
THE SITUATION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA
AND UNITED STATES STRATEGY IN THE
INDO PACIFIC REGION
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JANUARY 30, 2018
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
40-403 PDF WASHINGTON : 2020
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Chairman
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma, Chairman JACK REED, Rhode Island
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi BILL NELSON, Florida
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
TOM COTTON, Arkansas JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
JONI ERNST, Iowa RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina JOE DONNELLY, Indiana
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia TIM KAINE, Virginia
TED CRUZ, Texas ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
BEN SASSE, Nebraska ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
TIM SCOTT, South Carolina GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
Christian D. Brose, Staff Director
Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
_________________________________________________________________
January 30, 2018
Page
The Situation on the Korean Peninsula and United States Strategy 1
in the Indo-Pacific Region.
Blair, Admiral Dennis C., U.S. Navy (Ret.), Chairman and 3
Distinguished Fellow, Sasakawa Peace Foundation.
Green, Michael J., Ph.D., Senior Vice President for Asia and 8
Japan Chair, Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Magsamen, Kelly E., Vice President, National Security and 11
International Policy, Center for American Progress.
(iii)
THE SITUATION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA
AND UNITED STATES STRATEGY IN THE
INDO-PACIFIC REGION
----------
TUESDAY, JANUARY 30, 2018
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m. in
Room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator James Inhofe
presiding.
Members present: Senators Inhofe, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds,
Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Perdue, Cruz, Scott, Reed, Nelson,
McCaskill, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono,
Kaine, King, Heinrich, Warren, and Peters.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES INHOFE
Senator Inhofe. Our meeting will come to order.
We are discussing something up here informally, a problem.
It is not your fault. You have nothing to do with it, but you
are the victim of it. It happens that we have four committee
hearings at the same time this morning that happen to be very
significant ones, so we will have a lot of movement in and out,
and I apologize for that.
Our Armed Service Committee meets this morning to receive
testimony on the situation on the Korean Peninsula and the
United States strategy in the Indo-Pacific region.
I would like to welcome our distinguished panel of
witnesses this morning: Admiral Dennis Blair, former Commander
of the U.S. Pacific Command and Director of National
Intelligence; Dr. Michael Green, senior vice president for Asia
and Japan chair at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies; and Ms. Kelly Magsamen--does that sound good?--the
vice president of national security and international policy at
the Center for American Progress.
Last week, we had the honor of having Secretaries Kissinger
and Shultz here to discuss global challenges, and they both
agreed that North Korea is our most imminent--they always use
``imminent threat.'' Every witness that we have had so far has
talked about that. The others can be different threats, China
or problems with Russia. But when they talk about imminent
threat, that is what they talk about.
General John Hyten, U.S. Strategic Command Commander, said
last September that he views North Korea's ability to deliver a
nuclear weapon on an ICBM [Intercontinental Ballistic Missile]
as a matter of when, not if.
Of course, I think November 28th changed all that. We know
that range is something that is there. They can argue and say,
``Well, could they actually have carried a payload for that
kind of a range?'' That doesn't give me a lot of comfort. The
problem is still there, and it is potentially a very dangerous
position.
Unfortunately, the technology is in the hands of an erratic
despot with clear disregard for U.N. Security Council
resolutions. In view of this stark reality, this committee must
confront difficult questions about the United States policy and
strategy for achieving our stated objectives of defending our
homeland, protecting our allies, and denuclearizing the Korean
Peninsula.
We look forward to our witnesses' assessments of the
current state of play on the Peninsula and United States
offensive and defensive measures, including missile defense
programs.
In particular, we look forward to our witnesses'
recommendations for how the United States can pursue an
effective, long-term deterrence strategy for North Korea.
These are very difficult questions, and we have excellent
opinions that we will be hearing from you. We thank you very
much.
Senator Reed?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and let me
join you in welcoming the witnesses.
Thank you for your work and for your presence here today. I
believe everyone here today is very concerned about both the
rate of advancement of North Korea's nuclear and missile
programs and the lack of progress on the diplomatic front.
Last October, I visited South Korea and the DMZ
[Demilitarized Zone], and when I returned, I gave a speech
regarding my concerns about the national security challenges
posed by North Korea and the importance of diplomacy. I laid
out specific areas that I believe this administration needed to
work on to address this crisis. I am still quite concerned that
we have made little or no progress in these areas and that we
are not doing everything we need to set the right conditions
for diplomacy with North Korea.
Our State Department is lacking critical personnel, and we
still do not have an Ambassador to South Korea. The mixed
messaging coming from the administration is undermining what
should be one consistent message to North Korea, that the
United States will continue to exert maximum pressure
diplomatically and economically until North Korea comes to the
table and agrees to a negotiated solution, and that the United
States will only use military force as a last resort. Finally,
our coordination with our allies and partners lacks the
robustness and unity that I would have hoped for, given the
importance of this crisis.
I am also concerned that there is a lot of cavalier talk
about war and limited strikes with North Korea. There is
widespread agreement that a war with North Korea is not in our
long-term interests. A war with North Korea will result in a
tremendous loss of life, the likes of which we have not seen
since World War II, and subsequent stabilization efforts will
take years, possibly decades. It will cost the United States
taxpayers billions of dollars, much more than either Iraq or
Afghanistan. It will monopolize our military, diplomatic, and
financial resources, and leave us with limited options to
position ourselves globally and take on other adversaries,
including the long-term threats from Russia and China, or
address other crises. We will be in a worse position than we
are right now.
We have never been very successful at divining the long-
term strategic impacts of going to war. There are a multitude
of unintended consequences to every war, and this one would be
no different. I think we owe it to the citizens of this country
and our allies and partners to take a long, hard look at the
cost and risks associated with a war with North Korea.
I hope our witnesses today can provide us with their expert
views on the possible long-term strategic impacts of that
potential conflict.
Finally, I look forward to hearing how we should be
positioning ourselves, both diplomatically and militarily, to
engage in a long-term containment and deterrence campaign with
North Korea, if diplomacy fails.
Thank you, and I look forward to hearing your testimony on
these important issues.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Admiral Blair, we have introduced all three of you. It is
nice to be back with you. We look forward to your testimony.
Let's try to get it as close to 5 minutes as possible, but your
entire statement will be made a part of the record.
Admiral Blair?
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL DENNIS C. BLAIR, U.S. NAVY (RET.),
CHAIRMAN AND DISTINGUISHED FELLOW, SASAKAWA PEACE FOUNDATION
Admiral Blair. Yes, sir. Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member
Reed, members of the committee, thank you very much for
continuing this important discussion in open session. The
American people need to know: What are the stakes, what are the
risks, in dealing with the challenge of North Korea?
I would like to correct several widely held misconceptions
about North Korea.
Misconception one: Nuclear deterrence does not work for
North Korea. In fact, American nuclear deterrence has been
effective since North Korea became a nuclear power in 1991,
1992. None of the three generations of Kim dictators has used
nuclear weapons during those 26 years for fear of American
retaliation.
North Korea's ICBM delivery capability, which can never be
fully tested because of geographical limitations and a larger
number or weapons are still dwarfed by the American arsenal.
That situation will not change this fear and the effectiveness
of deterrence.
Misconception two: Sanctions have not worked against North
Korea. In fact, serious and strict sanctions have never been
tried against North Korea. The formal sanctions by the U.N.
have been less strict than those against either Syria or Iran,
and even those have been inadequately enforced. With a
sustained and comprehensive intelligence and diplomatic effort,
real pain can be inflicted on North Korea. In the past, when it
has suffered real economic pain, it has loosened its repressive
grip.
Misconception three: North Korea will never give up its
nuclear weapons. It is true that you only get what you inspect
with agreements with North Korea. However, that country has
been willing to slow and sell parts of its program over the
years in return for political and economic concessions.
The United States and the international community should
never accept North Korea as a nuclear state. We should retain
our ultimate goal of verifiable, irreversible, complete
disarmament. But we can learn something, we may gain something,
by patient, well-prepared, highly skeptical talks with the
North Koreans about their programs.
Misconception four: Time is on North Korea's side. Look at
that iconic satellite picture of the Korean Peninsula by night,
with a black void north of the DMZ, bright lights to the south.
Tell me, which country is a success? Which country is on the
ropes?
Misconception five: American policy toward North Korea has
failed. Look at that satellite picture again. Which of those
two countries is an ally of the United States? Yes, the dark
country to the north has nuclear weapons, but its quest to
develop them has played a role in impoverishing and isolating
it. The bright country to the south could have developed
nuclear weapons, but with our active encouragement, it has
chosen to rely on the American nuclear guarantee. That
guarantee, as I pointed out, has been effective for over a
quarter of a century.
Misconception six: The United States has no policy choices
but to attack North Korea. In fact, we have many means to deal
with North Korea. We can continue to deter the use of North
Korea's nuclear weapons in the future as we have in the past,
despite their development of an inadequately tested ICBM and a
growing but very limited stockpile of nuclear material. We can
bring stronger sanctions against North Korea than in the past,
especially against the members of the Kim dynasty and those
officials that support it through criminal activities around
the world. We can refine and exercise and resource the
contingency plans for a conflict in Korea, so that victory will
be as quick as possible and so that North Korea has no doubt of
the result. As it has in the past, a robust contingency plan
for major conflict puts an upper limit on North Korean
provocations, and they are very aware of it, and they try to
stay below it.
We can and we should respond to North Korean provocations,
however, from special forces attacks, to missile attacks, to
reckless nuclear tests, with powerful military strikes of our
own, in conjunction with the Republic of Korea. We can do so
with little risk of North Korean escalation.
Note that I said, ``respond.'' It matters how an exchange
like this begins. Preemption leads to unknown territory. The
results have been unpredictable, often adverse, and both
international and domestic support have been thin. Retaliation,
however, is much more certain in its effects. It runs far less
risk of escalation. It is widely supported at home and abroad.
Finally, we can pursue vigorous programs to open up North
Korea with information. The objective is for its people, and
especially those powerful organizations that now support the
Kim dynasty--the army, the police, the intelligence services,
the media, the propaganda organization--to open those
organizations up to realize that they can do much better
without the Kims.
I am mystified, frankly, by the gloom and doom that I hear
about American policy toward North Korea. We have successfully
handled this threat in the past, and we can do so in the
future.
Thank you. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Blair follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dennis C. Blair
There are at least five common misconceptions about North
Korea that are making it difficult for policy makers to come up
with an effective set of actions to deal with that country.
This statement discusses those misconceptions and then makes
recommendations for a sustained policy to support American
interests and those of our allies.
1. Misconception One: Nuclear deterrence does not work in
the case of North Korea.
In fact, American nuclear deterrence has been effective
against all three generations of the Kim dynasty.
North Korea first gained access to nuclear technology and
materials in 1962 when it established, with Soviet assistance,
the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center. In 1993, when
Kim il Sung was still dictator, the IAEA conducted a series of
inspections of Yongbyon, and announced that North Korea had
diverted plutonium from the reprocessing plant there for
nuclear weapons. In 2002, now with Kim Jong-il in charge, North
Korea admitted publicly that it had a clandestine nuclear
weapons program, and conducted two nuclear weapons tests. Now
the third Kim dictator, Kim Jong-un, has openly claimed that
his country has nuclear weapons, and tested them four times.
In other words, North Korea has had nuclear weapons for
about 25 years. Yet it has not used them. It is not because of
a lack of delivery systems. Crude large nuclear weapons that
are well within North Korea's technical capacity could have
been, and still can be, delivered against South Korea, Japan,
and even the United States, by submarine, disguised fishing
boat, or bomber aircraft.
North Korea has not used nuclear weapons for the same
reason no other country has used them against another nuclear
power or its allies--fear of retaliation. The Kim regime wants
above all to maintain its ruling position and survive. Using a
nuclear weapon against the United States or its allies means
certain destruction of North Korea, the end of the regime, and
death of the current Kim despot and his family.
Intercontinental ballistic missiles are simply another
delivery system for North Korean nuclear weapons. Because of
the limitations of North Korean testing, their nuclear missile
force will always be of unknown reliability. North Korean ICBMs
will be weapons for bargaining and blustering, not for
delivering against a country with thousands of highly reliable,
thoroughly tested nuclear systems.
2. Misconception Two: Sanctions have not worked against
North Korea
In fact, strict sanctions have never been attempted against
North Korea.
As Nicholas Eberstadt reminded us recently in an article in
Commentary Magazine, the international sanctions against North
Korea have been only moderately punitive, and have been weakly
enforced.
We know that reduction in outside support can destroy the
North Korean economy. This is what happened when Soviet support
collapsed in the early 90s, and overall foreign merchandise
coming into North Korea dropped by half. The Korean economy
seized up, and there was a mass famine. Even Kim Jong-il had to
make concessions and reforms to stay in power.
In the last five years, based on a combination of a limited
and controlled private market system within the country and a
restoration of inflows of food and merchandise from other
countries, North Korea has improved and stabilized its economy.
Yet it remains vulnerable to sanctions. International sanctions
against North Korea are less strict than those against either
Syria or Iran. Many countries are paying even these sanctions
lip service, while permitting North Korean slave labor to work
in their countries and turning a blind eye to criminal activity
run out of North Korean embassies.
Part of the work in putting a true economic squeeze on
North Korea is up to China. However, the United States can
influence that by secondary sanctions against Chinese companies
that are successfully violating the sanctions. The rest of the
work is divided among many countries. The United States is
beginning to monitor sanctions implementation by other
countries, almost all of which can be shamed into tightening
sanctions, as was Malaysia following the assassination of Kim
Jong-un's half-brother in the Kuala Lumpur airport. It will
take a sustained intelligence and diplomatic effort to build
international economic sanctions that will cause real pain to
North Korea's leaders, but it has not been done yet.
3. Misconception Three: Korea will never give up its
nuclear weapons.
In fact, North Korea has bartered some of its nuclear
weapons programs for political and economic concessions.
It is true that North Korea will comply only and barely
with provisions of agreements it signs that can be inspected,
and it will hide as much as it can of other parts of its
program. Under the 1994 Agreed Framework North Korea concealed
its uranium enrichment program, but it did agree to give up its
plutonium program. In 2008, the Six Party talks had produced an
agreement that controlled both the plutonium and uranium
nuclear weapons programs. North Korea balked at the end of the
negotiations and refused to agree to effective verification.
Although there are many advantages to North Korea from
having nuclear weapons, there are also heavy costs. The
negotiating record shows that North Korea cannot be trusted any
further than it can be inspected, but that it is also willing
to give up at least some of its nuclear weapons in return for
American economic and political concessions.
For the future, the international community should not
accept North Korea as a nuclear state, and the objective of
complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all
North Korea's nuclear weapons should remain the ultimate
objective of the United States and the entire international
community. However, while retaining that overall objective, the
United States may learn something and may gain something by
patient, well prepared and skeptical negotiations with the
North Koreans about their nuclear programs.
4. Misconception Four: Time is on North Korea's side.
In fact, important trends are running against North Korea.
Its primary supporter, China, is increasingly considering
it a liability, and is actively discussing with the United
States the possibility of North Korean collapse. Its economy
hangs by a thread, vulnerable to internal mismanagement,
rampant corruption, and external reductions of support. It
cannot feed itself. Pyongyang is a Potemkin village of faux
prosperity and modernity as the rest of the country struggles
to survive. The physical condition of its soldiers is
deteriorating and it cannot afford to modernize its military
equipment. The number and level of defectors is increasing.
Among its roughly 25 million people it has been able to
identify and educate the several thousand scientists and
engineers required to develop nuclear weapons, missiles and
cyber-attacks. It has supported them with first call on its
tiny industrial sector; using the hard currency it earns
through criminal activities, it purchases on the international
black and gray markets the remaining components these programs
need.
North Korea is no more than an extreme example of a pattern
we have seen many times in history, a pattern with an unbroken
record of regime failure. Dictators attempt to maintain their
grip on power through a combination of repression, nationalism
and materialism. They ultimately fail. The Kim dynasty so far
has been unflinching in its repression, but its nationalism is
artificial and it consistently fails to meet the material needs
of its people. The wheels will come off sooner or later. The
United States should pursue policies that make that date as
soon as possible, but recognize that the pressure from within
North Korea will be the primary cause of collapse.
5. Misconception Five: American policy towards North Korea
has failed.
By any objective measure, American policy on the Korean
Peninsula has been a signal success.
At the end of the Korean War in 1953, the Korean Peninsula
was divided into two countries, one an ally of the United
States and the other an ally of the Soviet Union. North Korea
had most of the industrial capacity and natural resources on
the Peninsula. With China's and the Soviet Union's approval it
had attempted to conquer South Korea by force of arms, and was
still determined to do so.
Sixty-five years later South Korea is still America's ally,
it is the 4th largest economy in Asia and the 11th largest in
the world, it has transitioned peacefully from a dictatorship
to a democracy, and North Korea has no chance of conquering it
successfully.
North of the DMZ is a country that has nuclear weapons, but
has no allies or friends, is among the poorest in the world and
is a brutal dictatorship.
To judge American policy on the Korean Peninsula by its
failure to achieve one of its many objectives, prevention of a
North Korean nuclear capability, is both narrow and dangerous.
Any country that is willing to sacrifice the well-being of its
people and endure international diplomatic and economic
isolation can develop nuclear weapons. The technology and the
component parts are widely available.
6. The United States has no policy choices but to attack
North Korea.
In fact, building on what it has learned in dealing with
North Korea over the years, the United States has many policy
choices.
American policy towards North Korea must evolve to meet
North Korea's advances in developing long-range missiles,
nuclear weapons and cyber weapons. There have also been changes
in the security environment in Northeast Asia that must be
taken into account. However, the successes as well as the
shortcomings of past American policy should be considered as
the United States formulates policies for the future to deal
with North Korea.
Yes, North Korea has been able to develop nuclear weapons.
They have had them for 25 years. However, the Kim dynasty, with
its finely-honed survival instincts and skills, is as subject
to deterrence from the actual use of those weapons as have been
all governments, totalitarian or democratic, that have
developed a nuclear capability since the atomic age began.
Although the development of nuclear weapons has been a high
priority for North Korea, over the years it has been willing to
trade parts of its program for political and economic gains.
While never recognizing it as a nuclear state, other countries
can shape North Korea's nuclear weapons program through
negotiations. Sanctions against North Korea can be much
stronger than they ever have been, cause greater economic pain,
especially to the members of Kim dynasty and its immediate
supporters. Many trends are running against North Korea that
the United States can nurture and reinforce.
Military preparedness, and the use of military force are
vital components of American policy towards North Korea. The
United States and the Republic of Korea have developed,
exercised and resourced a contingency plan to turn back a North
Korean attack, destroy the North Korean armed forces, and take
control of the entire peninsula. North Korea knows that it will
lose a major war if it starts one. Damage will be heavy on all
sides, but there is no question about the outcome. North Korea
keeps its provocative actions below the threshold that it
believes will trigger a major conflict it knows it will lose.
The United States and the Republic of Korea have been less
effective in responding to North Korean provocations below the
level of major attack--from the capture of the Pueblo to the
sinking of the South Korean frigate Cheonan to cyber-attacks.
Responses that have been effective are serious military
operations like the chopping down of the cherry tree in the DMZ
in 1976, backed by major force deployments to South Korea, and
the preparations to bomb the Yongbyon reactor in 1994. Every
time the US-ROK response has been relevant and strong,
supported by contingency plan preparations that make it clear
that if North Korea escalates the Alliance is ready for major
war, North Korea backs down. It will later in the future commit
further and different provocations, but it will retreat in the
near term.
The United States and the Republic of Korea should respond
promptly and disproportionately to North Korean provocations
such as missile tests that land on or near American, South
Korean or Japanese territory and nuclear tests in the Pacific
Ocean, as well as traditional limited military provocations by
special forces or regular military units. North Korea will
understand that the actions are retaliation for what North
Korea has done. At the same time, when these responses take
place, the Combined Forces Command of the United States and the
Republic of Korea must raise its readiness level so the North
Koreans know that if they escalate the confrontation, they risk
starting a war they know they will lose.
Finally, the kryptonite that can weaken North Korea is
information from beyond its borders. Subjected to an
unrelenting barrage of government propaganda, ordinary
citizens, soldiers, and even many in the favored elites do not
understand just how bad things are in their country compared to
the rest of the world. About one fifth of North Koreans have
access to cell phones that connect to cell towers on the
Chinese side of the Yalu River, allowing penetration of
information from the outside. Texts to these cell phones can
provide subversive truth. There are many other ways that
Koreans can be informed about the true state of their country,
countering the relentless propaganda and repression of the Kim
regime. Cell towers can be extended; CDs and thumb drives can
be smuggled in; radio and TV stations can be beamed there.
While it is very difficult for ordinary citizens to revolt
against the regime, the objective is to separate the Kim family
from its primary support--the secret police, the Army and the
propaganda ministry. In other equally brutal totalitarian
states, these elites have realized that life would be better
for their country if they replaced the dictator, and once that
process starts, it is hard to stop. Such will be North Korea's
fate.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Admiral.
Dr. Green?
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. GREEN, Ph.D., SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT FOR
ASIA AND JAPAN CHAIR, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL
STUDIES
Dr. Green. Thank you, Senator Inhofe, Senator Reed, and
members of the committee.
If I may, I would like to just briefly open my remarks by
acknowledging the enormous contributions Senator McCain has
made as chairman of this committee to American focus, resolve,
and credibility in the Asia-Pacific region, all things we are
going to need as we address the topic we are focusing on today.
The administration's ``Free and Open Indo-Pacific
Strategy,'' I believe, is a useful framework that recognizes
great power competition with China and the importance of
solidifying our alliances with democratic allies and partners
in the region. The strategy will only have credibility if it is
resourced and if we do something about the vacuum that we have
created by withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and,
of course, if we are wise, managing the growing threat posed by
North Korea's rapid development and deployment of nuclear
weapons and ballistic missiles.
The Hwasong-15 missile tested last year is a road-mobile,
solid-fueled intercontinental ballistic missile that ranges the
United States and would be extremely difficult to find and
destroy in a crisis scenario with Pyongyang, and the North is
probably months away from being able to develop and deploy a
warhead that could survive reentry into the atmosphere.
I believe, with this new capability, we are entering
dangerous territory with North Korea.
First, North Korea will likely use nuclear blackmail
against the United States as a shield for increased coercion
and intimidation comparable to the 2010 attacks on South Korea,
when North Korea sunk the corvette Cheonan in order to decouple
the United States from our allies and try to force Seoul to
make concessions and perhaps, one day, capitulate to the North.
Second, with nuclear weapons capability, North Korea will
be tempted to transfer this capability to other dangerous
actors in pursuit of cash or leverage against the United
States, as Pyongyang threatened to do in 2003 in talks I joined
with the North Koreans in Beijing and then subsequently did
when they helped Syria build a reactor complex in El Kibar in
2007 until the Israeli Air Force took it out.
Third, this new dynamic could create a situation where our
allies, Japan or South Korea, may question the viability of our
nuclear umbrella.
I do not think diplomacy is going to solve this problem for
us in any meaningful way in the foreseeable future. I do
believe, as Admiral Blair said, there is a role for dialogue
with North Korea in terms of clarifying positions, gathering
intelligence. But I could not tell you a realistic formula
under which North Korea abandons its nuclear weapons programs
in the foreseeable future, even with significantly increased
pressure.
The administration probably knows this, which is why we
hear talk of preventive war or now a bloody nose strategy
designed to force Pyongyang to back down. But I do not believe
that preventative military action is going to solve this
problem for us either.
It is possible that Pyongyang would capitulate after a
United States military strike, but we have not tested that
proposition since the Korean War, and most North Korea experts
in and out of the United States Government will tell you that
Kim Jong Un would have to strike back.
Escalation to nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons by
the North would mean a conflict that goes from tens of
thousands killed to millions. Put another way, the preventative
use of military force is likely to make the dangers associated
with North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs
worse, increasing tensions with our allies, the danger of North
Korean transfer to third parties, and the prospect that Japan
or Korea might consider their own nuclear weapons if they were
hit in retaliation after a United States strike.
I find it difficult to imagine a situation or a meeting in
which the principals decide that these risks are more tolerable
than the risks associated with a strategy of containing and
deterring North Korea.
I suspect that the administration has not fully weighed
these options because they are in the mode of maximizing
pressure on North Korea in the hope of obtaining a diplomatic
breakthrough. But I believe that, sooner or later, we are going
to be forced to look at a new strategy that focuses on
containment and deterrent.
Now, the elements of this strategy are worth debating now.
We need to enhance and expand the robust financial sanctions
introduced in September, the most sweeping we have ever imposed
on North Korea, including the application, where appropriate,
to third countries and firms and entities in China and Russia
that are enabling North Korea in violation of Security Council
sanctions. We need to engage in maritime interdiction
operations against ships we are already tracking to stop inward
and outward proliferation. We need to increase bilateral and
regional missile defense cooperation with our allies. We need
to reboot our relationship with Seoul. The United States-Korea
alliance, in my view, is the center of gravity in this entire
problem. We need an Ambassador in Seoul. We need to avoid
gratuitous trade friction with our allies at a time when our
enemies and our adversaries are trying to decouple us from
South Korea.
We have to address shortfalls in ammunition, readiness, and
joint exercises so that military options are credible, should
they become necessary. We need to update our counter-
provocation planning with South Korea to ensure, as Admiral
Blair said, that we are ready for prompt and decisive responses
to North Korean attempts at coercion, which they may be tempted
to expand with their new capability.
We do need to increase diplomatic, economic, and military
pressure not only on North Korea but on third states that might
be tempted to become potential customers of Pyongyang.
We need a diplomatic track. As Admiral Blair said, we need
to be deeply skeptical. We should not go in with the
expectation it will yield decisive results, and we should not
trade away sanctions, deterrence, or readiness just for the
privilege of talking with North Korea.
For all of this, we are going to have to increase
intelligence support.
This approach involves an increased level of risk for the
United States. It is not the approach we have had in the past,
but I think the level of risk we are talking about is more
tolerable and more appropriate than the risk associated with
either passive deterrence or moving toward preventive war or a
so-called bloody nose.
This strategy is also less likely to break American
alliances, damage American credibility, and, therefore, would
better position us to implement an effective, free, and open
Indo-Pacific strategy to deal with a larger challenge we face,
which is the rise of China and the shifting balance of power in
the region.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Green follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. Michael J. Green
I appreciate the opportunity to address the committee on the Trump
administration's broader ``Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy'' and
the rising danger posed by North Korean nuclear proliferation.
In my view the administration is to be commended for articulating a
strategic framework for the Asia-Pacific region that recognizes great
power competition with China and the importance of solidifying our
alliances and partnerships with maritime democracies. However, the Free
and Open Indo-Pacific framework still suffers from two major
shortcomings. The first is the administration's complete retreat on
trade, which puts American agriculture exporters at risk as our
partners negotiate new access agreements in the region without us--and
our strategic influence at risk as China fills the vacuum we have
created with their own initiatives like the ``Belt and Road.''
The second and more immediate challenge is North Korea's rapid
development and deployment of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.
The Hwasong-15 missile tested last year is a road-mobile, solid-fueled
intercontinental missile that ranges the United States and would be
extremely difficult to detect and pre-emptively destroy in a crisis
scenario. CIA Director Mike Pompeo has indicated that the North may be
months away from deploying nuclear warheads capable of surviving re-
entry into the atmosphere when launched on the Hwasong-15.
For 25 years Republican and Democratic administrations have tried
to contain the North Korean nuclear weapons program with a combination
of calibrated pressure and engagement. The quantity and quality of the
North Korean nuclear and missile capability will no longer allow
business as usual.
First, North Korea will likely use nuclear blackmail against the
United States as a shield for increased coercion and intimidation
comparable to the 2010 attacks on the South Korean corvette Cheonan in
order decouple us from our allies and force Seoul to make concessions
and perhaps one day capitulate.
Second, North Korea will be tempted to transfer their capability to
other dangerous actors in pursuit of cash or leverage against the
United States, as Pyongyang did in 2007 when it helped Syria build the
El Kibar reactor before the Israeli Air Force destroyed that facility.
Third, some argue that Japan or South Korea may question the
viability of our nuclear umbrella and be tempted to consider nuclear
proliferation.
Diplomacy is not going to solve this problem for us. Dialogue with
North Korea will probably become necessary in terms of clarifying
positions, managing crises and gathering intelligence, but I could not
tell you a realistic formula under which North Korea abandons its
programs even with significantly increased pressure.
The administration knows this, which is why we hear talk of
preventive war and now a ``bloody nose'' strategy designed to force
Pyongyang to back down. I do not think preventive military action is
going to solve this problem for us either, though. It is possible that
Pyongyang would retreat and capitulate after a United States military
strike, but we have not tested that proposition since the Korean War
and most North Korea analysts would tell you that Kim Jong-un would
have to strike back. Escalation to nuclear, biological or chemical
weapons by the North would mean a conflict that goes from tens of
thousands killed to millions.
Put another way, the preventive use of military force is likely to
make the dangers associated with the North's nuclear and ballistic
missile programs worse. Even the talk of preventive military action is
driving South Korea closer to China and having the perverse effect of
accelerating Pyongyang's goal of decoupling us from one of our key
allies. Military escalation would increase the likelihood that North
Korea transfers nuclear capabilities to a dangerous third state. Should
North Korea strike back at Japan or South Korea and survive, the
manifest failure of deterrence on our part would make those allies more
likely to consider their own nuclear weapons.
I cannot imagine a Situation Room meeting in which the Principals
decide that these risks are more ``tolerable'' than the risks
associated with a strategy of containing and deterring North Korea. I
suspect the administration has not fully weighed those options because
they are in the mode of maximizing pressure on North Korea in the hope
of attaining a diplomatic breakthrough. They may be right that dropping
the option of a preventive military strike would weaken U.S. leverage
at this point. Eventually, however, they will confront the reality that
neither diplomacy nor war will solve this problem and they will have to
focus on a new strategy to reduce the dangers.
The elements of this new strategy are clear:
Enhance and expand the robust financial sanctions
introduced in September, to include the application of secondary
sanctions against Chinese or other firms assisting North Korea;
Engage in maritime interdiction operations (MIO) against
ships we are already tracking in order to contain inward and potential
outward proliferation by North Korea;
Increase bilateral and regional missile defense
cooperation with our allies;
Reboot our relationship with Seoul by sending an
ambassador and avoiding gratuitous trade friction;
Address shortfalls in ammunition, readiness and joint
exercises so that military options are credible should they become
necessary;
Update our counter-provocation strategies with South
Korea to ensure prompt and decisive responses to North Korean attempts
at coercion;
Increase diplomatic, economic and military pressure to
deter third states from becoming potential customers for North Korea;
Engage in diplomacy with North Korea as one line of
effort, but not with the expectation it will yield decisive results and
not at the cost of implementing these other elements of deterrence and
containment;
Increase intelligence support.
This approach involves an increased U.S. tolerance for risk
compared with the past, but that level of risk is more tolerable and
appropriate than either passive deterrence or preventive war. The
strategy is less likely to break American alliances or credibility and
would better position the United States to implement an effective Free
and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy to deal with the larger tectonic shift
we face as Chinese power and ambitions grow.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Ms. Magsamen, back to you.
STATEMENT OF KELLY E. MAGSAMEN, VICE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL
SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS
Ms. Magsamen. Good to see you. Senator Inhofe, Ranking
Member Reed, members of the committee, my fellow panelists, it
is an honor to testify today.
Given the strategic importance of the Indo-Pacific to
American interests as well as the potential for historic
conflict with North Korea, this hearing provides a much-needed
public discussion of the stakes involved. I am submitting a
fuller written statement for the record.
But first, I should be clear about one thing: North Korea
poses a serious threat to the United States and its allies.
North Korea is the country violating multiple U.N. Security
Council resolutions. Kim Jong-un is a ruthless tyrant building
nuclear weapons on the backs of his oppressed people. However,
with tensions high and increasing talk of preventive United
States military action, I am deeply concerned about the
prospect of war with North Korea, whether by miscalculation or
by design.
I believe that after a thorough analysis of a likely cost
of preventive war, as well as a careful examination of the
alternatives, it is nearly impossible to conclude that
preventive use of force is advisable or even the least bad
option, in terms of advancing our national security interests.
War with North Korea would have significant human,
economic, and strategic costs, some of which I will outline
briefly today.
Estimating the human costs of war is always an imperfect
exercise. Much depends on assumptions and scenarios. However,
even a limited military strike would likely escalate quickly
into a regional conflagration.
South Korea would face an artillery barrage on Seoul, if
not a nuclear or chemical attack from the North. According to
the Congressional Research Service, between 30,000 and 300,000
could die within days of the conflict, and that is just a
conventional conflict.
In addition to 28,500 United States military personnel and
thousands of their dependents, there are approximately 100,000
to 500,000 American citizens living in South Korea. There are
hundreds of thousands of American citizens and military
personnel living in Japan. Of course, Hawaii, Guam, and Alaska
are all within range of North Korean missiles.
In the aftermath of war, we would be immediately confronted
with a massive humanitarian crisis, not to mention issues of
reunification, transitional justice, and demobilization of the
North Korean army. Just to give you a sense of scale, the North
Korean army, including reservists, is around seven million
strong. That is 25 times the size of the Iraqi army in 2003.
There would be economic costs as well. South Korea and
Japan are the 12th and third largest economies, respectively.
Both are deeply integrated into global supply chains. If
nuclear conflict were to occur, RAND estimates that such an
attack would cost at least 10 percent of South Korea's GDP
[Gross Domestic Product] in the first year alone and that those
losses would likely be extended for at least a decade.
Further, direct costs to United States taxpayers of a war
with North Korea would be significant. According to another
2010 RAND report, estimates for long-term reconstruction of the
Korean Peninsula would top $1 trillion. I personally think that
estimate is low.
Then there are the strategic costs. First, a preventive war
without the full support of our Asian allies would do lasting
damage to trust in America, not just in Asia, but globally.
China and Russia will not sit on the sidelines. China will
almost certainly intervene to advance its own interests.
It is likely that China would seek to occupy North Korea at
a minimum to prevent state collapse, but also to secure the
nuclear sites to their advantage. A long-term Chinese presence
in North Korea, and it would almost certainly be long term,
would have serious implications for our alliances and our long-
term interests in Northeast Asia.
In a worst-case scenario, absent substantial strategic and
tactical deconfliction in advance, there is the potential that
a direct United States-China conflict could easily materialize.
Russia, which does share a small land border with North Korea,
could be counted on to play spoiler.
There would also be the global opportunity costs. A war
with North Korea would become the central preoccupation of the
President and his national security team for the duration of
his term, limiting strategic bandwidth for the United States to
deal with other key challenges, like Russia, China, and Iran.
These are just some of the factors the administration would
need to consider and address in expansive contingency planning,
if they do intend to use preventive use of force.
Finally, I would like to make four quick points on the case
for preventive use of force.
Arguments for preventive force are predicated on ultimately
unknowable determinations of Kim Jong-un's rationality. It
would be a tremendous gamble to bet on how Kim Jong-un would
perceive our intentions as well as on his own decision-making.
While the potential for nuclear coercion is real, I agree
with Dr. Green, we have a record of successful deterrence and
pushback. A preventive attack would undermine America's
deterrence strategy by showing we are willing to sacrifice our
allies, essentially decoupling them from ourselves.
Three, I have real questions about the purpose and
effectiveness of limited preventive use of force. What would we
be trying to achieve? How would we control escalation? Would we
have high confidence in our success?
Finally, there are basic military realities, which we
cannot ignore. In my view, there is no such thing as war over
there versus war over here. Millions of innocent civilians,
including Americans, are already at risk today.
In sum, national security decision-making often forces us
to choose the least-bad option. By far, in the case of North
Korea, the worst option is war.
As my fellow panelists have mentioned, there are other
options on North Korea that better advance our long-term
national security interests at much lower risk, and I look
forward to discussing them with the committee today.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Magsamen follows:]
Prepared Statement by Kelly E. Magsamen
Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, members of the Committee, my
distinguished fellow panelists--it's an honor to testify today on one
of our most vexing national security challenges--North Korea. Given the
potential for historic conflict with North Korea, this hearing provides
a much-needed public discussion of the stakes involved.
First, I should be clear about one thing: North Korea poses a
serious threat to the United States and our allies. North Korea is the
country violating multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions.
And Kim Jong-un is a ruthless tyrant building nuclear weapons on the
backs of his oppressed people.
I worked the North Korea challenge every day in my years at the
Department of Defense, so I am deeply familiar with the adage that
North Korea is the land of lousy options. They are no easy solutions or
silver bullets. But I do believe there are some basic ingredients to a
sound strategy:
Clear and consistent strategic messaging;
Sustained high levels of international pressure;
Diplomatic persistence, clarity and creativity;
Strong alliance management;
Credible deterrence with responsible risk management;
and,
Healthy skepticism about the intentions of China.
To its credit, the Trump Administration has had some important
achievements on increasing pressure on North Korea, including strong UN
Security Council sanctions resolutions and pushing China further along.
In some ways, these are extensions of the Obama Administration's
strategy and I believe more can be done to increase pressure. However,
the Trump Administration's strategy has also been plagued by
incoherence and neglect on many of these other fronts--and as a result,
the sum has not been greater than its parts.
With tensions high and increasing talk of preventive United States
military action, I am deeply concerned about the prospect of war with
North Korea--whether by miscalculation or by design. The question we
should be asking ourselves is whether initiating armed conflict with
North Korea is necessary or advisable to advance long-term United
States national security interests. I believe that after a thorough
analysis of the likely costs of preventive war, and a careful
examination of the alternatives, it is nearly impossible to conclude
that the preventive use of force is advisable or even the least bad
option in terms of advancing our interests and minimizing risk.
There is a role for the military instrument to play--it is
essential for deterrence credibility, the defense of our allies and to
back up diplomacy. But use of force should always be of last resort. If
there is an imminent threat to United States Forces in Korea or Japan
or elsewhere in the region, or against the United States Homeland, our
right to self-defense is clear and absolute. However, there are sound
reasons that multiple Administrations have refrained from using force
preventively--it would likely be catastrophic in human, economic and
strategic terms, not to mention illegal.
The Human Costs:
Estimating the human costs of war is always an imperfect exercise.
Much depends on assumptions and scenarios. However, even a limited
military strike would likely escalate quickly into a regional
conflagration. South Korea would likely face an artillery barrage on
Seoul, if not a nuclear or chemical attack from the North.
According to the Congressional Research Service, between 30,000 and
300,000 people could die within days of the conflict. In addition to
28,500 U.S. military personnel and thousands of their dependents, there
are approximately 100,000 to 500,000 American citizens living in South
Korea. North Korea's ballistic missiles can also range Tokyo, the
world's largest city, putting millions at risk. Hawaii and Guam- where
millions of American citizens reside--are at the top of the North
Korean target list.
Inside North Korea, a major humanitarian crisis would likely unfold
in the aftermath of use of force. Food supplies and basic health care
would be scarce, exacerbated by massive refugee flows numbering in the
millions. Hundreds of thousands of political prisoners and detainees
would also need critical attention.
Post-conflict security demands would be similarly daunting. North
Korea has the fourth largest military in the world: over a million
strong with more than seven million reservists. Including troops and
reservists, that is nearly 25 times the size of the Iraqi army in 2003.
Even as foreign forces worked to seize nuclear sites and materials,
stocks of chemical weapons would be scattered around the country, along
with caches of conventional weapons in underground tunnels and
facilities.
Surviving factions could ignite civil war and insurgency. As a
result, according to some estimates, stabilization and peacekeeping
tasks could require more than 400,000 troops.
This does not even begin to address the complex governance issues
that would instantly emerge. We have encountered questions on
unification, demobilization, and transitional justice in prior
conflicts and have not acquitted ourselves well in dealing with them.
Members of this Committee certainly remember these lessons from our
experiences in Iraq.
The Economic Costs:
On the potential economic costs of war, let's start with a few
simple facts:
The Republic of Korea (ROK) is the 12th largest economy
in the world and is deeply integrated into global supply chains.
Japan is the 3rd largest economy in the world by nominal
GDP, and deeply integrated into global supply chains.
The ROK and Japan account for approximately 7% (or $1.14
trillion) of global merchandise exports and 6% (or $1.01 trillion) of
global merchandise imports. Japan is the world's 4th largest exporter
and 5th largest importer of merchandise; South Korea is the world's 8th
largest exporter and 10th largest importer of merchandise.
If nuclear conflict were to occur, the RAND Corporation estimates
that such an attack would cost at least 10 percent of the ROK's GDP in
the first year alone and that those loses would likely be extended for
at least ten years. And these estimates don't even include a strike on
Hawaii or Japan.
Further, direct costs to United States taxpayers of a war with
North Korea would be significant. According to another 2010 RAND
report, estimates for long-term reconstruction of the Korean Peninsula
top $1 trillion.
The Strategic Costs
The strategic costs of preventive war with North Korea would be
quite consequential for long-term United States interests, even
assuming military success. Three questions factor most in my mind:
What will be the long-term impact on our alliances? If a
military strike is conducted without the concurrence of the Republic of
Korea and Japan, you can expect an end to the alliance relationships as
we know them in Asia and probably around the world. A preventive war
without the full support of our Asian allies would likely do lasting
damage to trust in America--not just in Asia but globally. Without our
alliances and partnerships, the United States role as a Pacific power
would be fundamentally diminished for the long term.
What will China and Russia do? China will almost
certainly intervene into a destabilized North Korea, creating both
military and political obstacles for the United States. It is likely
that China will seek to occupy North Korea, at a minimum to prevent a
complete state collapse and to secure nuclear sites. A long-term
Chinese presence in North Korea--and it would almost certainly be long-
term--has implications for our alliance with the Republic of Korea and
our interests in Northeast Asia. And in a worse-case scenario, absent
substantial strategic and tactical deconfliction in advance, a
potential United States-China conflict could easily materialize.
Russia, which shares a small land border with North Korea, will most
certainly oppose United States intervention and continue to play
spoiler alongside China.
What would be the opportunity costs for the U.S.? This
question never gets enough attention. War with North Korea would become
the central preoccupation of the President and his national security
team for the duration of his term--crowding out all other issues and
limiting strategic bandwidth for the United States to deal with
challenges like Russia, China and Iran. If great power competition with
China and Russia are indeed central to United States national security
strategy, then war with North Korea would almost certainly distract
United States resources and focus and increase China's opportunities in
the region. From a basic force management perspective, hard trade-offs
would need to be made with respect to forces and capabilities in other
theaters.
Examining the Argument for Preventive Use of Force
There are some who argue that preventive use of force is the least
bad option. They predicate this view in part on an assumption that Kim
Jong-un is not a rational actor and therefore deterrence is not a
reliable option for preventing a nuclear first strike against the
United States. They also suggest that once North Korea achieves a full
ICBM capability, Kim Jong-un will use that capability to hold the
United States Homeland at risk while forcibly unifying the Korean
Peninsula. While no one can credibly predict North Korean intentions
and the possibility of nuclear coercion is real, there are some
empirical weaknesses in this line of argument. Let me break it down:
First, history shows otherwise. While reunification
remains the stated objective of both North and South Korea, the
credible threat of American and ROK firepower has prevented North Korea
from pursuing that reunification by force since 1953. More than 28,000
United States troops remain on the Peninsula today, backed up by our
extended deterrence commitment that would bring to bear the full
spectrum of American power. Strengthening our deterrence credibility
starts not with an overt demonstration of U.S. power in defense of our
own citizens and interests, but with the credibility of our commitment
to defend the citizens and interests of our allies. A preventive attack
will undermine America's deterrence strategy by showing that we are
willing sacrifice our allies, essentially decoupling them ourselves.
Second, there are the basic military realities. There are
some that have suggested that ``war over there is better than war over
here.'' But let's be honest: North Korea already has the capability to
hold United States interests at risk in the Pacific--with nuclear-
tipped missiles ranging Hawaii and Guam where millions of American
citizens live, not to mention the hundreds of thousands of American
civilians living in both Korea and Japan. So, war over there would also
potentially costs millions of American lives.
Third, the arguments for preventive use of force are
predicated on ultimately unknowable determinations on Kim Jong-un's
rationality.
What would be the objective and how would we effectuate the
desired outcome, especially if he is irrational? Much will depend on
Kim Jong Un's perceptions of our intentions. So if we assume Kim Jong
Un is indeed an irrational actor, why would we think that he would
exercise restraint when presented with a limited U.S. military strike?
This is the central flaw in argument for the ``bloody nose'' approach.
Escalation is extremely likely and deterrence cuts both ways.
Finally, there are real questions about the effectiveness
of preventive use of force. What would a limited strike ultimately seek
to achieve? If it is to show we are serious and force Kim Jong-un to
the negotiating table, it is unlikely that he will oblige. If the
objective of a strike is to take out his nuclear and ballistic missile
programs, then that is not a limited military option. In my judgment,
that would be a full-scale war and in that case, we would need to have
high confidence that we were able to hit everything and that the
nuclear, chemical and ballistic programs could not be reconstituted. In
fact, in a letter to Congress last year, the Pentagon itself estimates
that eliminating all of North Korea's nuclear capabilities would
require an actual ground invasion.
What are the other options?
National security decision-making often forces us to choose the
least bad option. Make no mistake that with North Korea there are no
good options and all carry risk, but by far the worst is war. In my
view, the least bad option is to contain, deter, pressure, and
vigorously try to open a genuine diplomatic process. So where does that
leave us?
First, there is the need to refresh our approach to
diplomacy and make clear to North Korea that the door is open. We all
know that diplomacy with North Korea has a checkered past, but it must
be the leading line of United States effort if for no other reason that
diplomacy is the necessary predicate to all other options. And while
North Korea has demonstrated little interest in meaningful diplomacy
over denuclearization, we need to be clear, persistent and creative
about how we approach any negotiations. There has been significant
confusion over U.S. intentions in this regard. We also need to consider
that at the heart of the North Korea problem is a security dilemma, not
just an arms control and proliferation problem. We need to think
creatively about how to address that dilemma in concert with our
allies--including what assurances we would be prepared to offer in
exchange for meaningful and verifiable limits on their nuclear program.
Diplomacy will also likely only have a chance if it begins without
preconditions and moves in stages of confidence-building. We should
also be positioning ourselves to shape any negotiations to our
advantage and not allow the North Koreans to seize the initiative. For
this to be possible, I would encourage the
Administration to appoint an experienced high-level envoy that has
the unambiguous backing of the White House to coordinate diplomacy and
messaging with our allies and who would be dedicated full time to the
pursuit of negotiations.
Second, we should consider a shift in our strategy vis-a-
vis China. While the Chinese do not share our long-term interests on
the Korean Peninsula, they do worry about two things: secondary
sanctions and American encirclement. On the sanction front, the
Administration has only just begun to get serious with China, and the
United States should pull every non-military pressure lever it has over
North Korea before putting American lives on the line. Critically,
China can cut off North Korea's oil supplies, but it has not yet done
so. The Administration should substantially ratchet up the costs
Beijing bears by continuing to supply fuel not only for the North
Korean economy but to its military as well.
Further, the Chinese need to look out around the region and see the
negative effect that a nuclear-armed North Korea will have on their
long-term objective to impose a sphere of influence in their near
periphery. We should consider what additional force posture is
necessary to contain and deter a nuclear-armed North Korea and we
should not hesitate to move forward with it, whether that is an
additional THAAD battery on the Peninsula, support for Japanese
acquisition of key capabilities, or additional United States air, naval
and ground forces around the region. As the United States bolsters
deterrence and containment against North Korea, United States policy
must send the unmistakable signal to China that, if the threat from
North Korea remains, the United States will strengthen its military
posture in Northeast Asia. We also need to work harder to improve
Japan-ROK relations and further operationalize trilateral cooperation--
not just to prevent North Korea from driving wedges, but also China.
Third, we are likely to find ourselves in a containment
and deterrence scenario and we should begin conceptualizing what would
be necessary in that scenario to limit risk. This is obviously no one's
preferred outcome and it certainly carries risks. But given the
challenges of diplomacy with North Korea and given the overwhelming
risks of war, I think we also need to be realistic. What would an
active containment and upgraded deterrence strategy look like that
would minimize risk, protect our long-term strategic interests and
could be executed in concert with our allies? We need to be thinking
hard about how to upgrade our extended deterrence commitments to our
allies, how to improve conventional deterrence, as well as a much more
integrated and enhanced counter-proliferation framework.
Conclusion
A war of choice with North Korea would be the option of highest
risk and unlikely to advance United States long-term strategic
interests, and in my view, would potentially mortally wound them. Given
the stakes involved with the use of force, the Administration owes our
military and the American public the planning and preparation that was
frankly absent with Iraq in 2003. Congress can help drive more public
debate on the choices before us. This hearing is an important step in
the right direction and I am grateful for the opportunity to present
this testimony. I look forward to your questions.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much.
We will have 5-minute questions, and we will have a lot
more turnout as they come back in from other committees.
For a number of years, we have viewed the development and
deployment of a layered ballistic-missile system as a defensive
shield that is vital to our national security and that of our
allies. We currently have 44 ground-based interceptors. That
dropped down for a while to 33, and back to 44 now, California
and Alaska, they have recently approved supplemental
appropriations for adding 20 more to the total inventory.
We have other missile-defense systems, such as Aegis and
THAAD [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense], to help track and
destroy missiles in the terminal phase.
Senator Sullivan and several of us have kind of looked at
the three phases and come to the conclusion that the boost
phase would be probably the area that, if we could get that
perfected, would cause them to be the most vulnerable. I think
that we are kind of behind in that, and I would like to kind of
explore that.
Admiral Blair, you are more closely associated with these
options that we have out there. What do you think about all
three phases, and then concentrating on improving the boost
phase?
Admiral Blair. I agree completely, Senator Inhofe, that
boost phase is the best point at which to shoot down missiles,
because they have not had a chance to deploy all sorts of
deceptive devices and different warheads and so on. As you
know, that is something that has been known for a while, and we
have been working on it.
North Korea is what is called a thin country, so it cannot
place it is missiles so far back that it can keep them out of
boost-phase interceptor range, so I think that is a very
important phase.
I agree with you completely. We should be pursuing it.
Senator Inhofe. I look at people like you, who have been
involved in this for a long period of time. What is the reason
that we have not jumped into the obvious phase that we could be
most effective in?
Admiral Blair. I think I would cite three things, Senator.
Number one, we put a lot of effort into the airborne laser,
which we thought would be exactly able to do that. It turns out
the science was fine. The engineering was a lot harder than we
thought, and eventually terminated the program.
The only other two ways to get close enough to do a boost-
phase interceptor is with a ship off the coast or on Republic
of Korea [ROK] territory. ROK has not until recently been
willing to do the sort of cooperation that would host that. To
keep a United States ship on station in North Korea 24/7/365
has been a heavier burden than the other commitments of those
ships have been willing to bear.
So I think those are all things that should be revisited,
and I agree with your emphasis.
Senator Inhofe. Any other comments on that from the other
two witnesses?
Dr. Green. If I may add to Admiral Blair's comments, I
agree with them. In addition to boost phase, we have one
battery of THAAD in Korea. It is somewhat politically
controversial. I suspect we will need more.
The Japanese are looking at Aegis Ashore. Remember, we have
bases there. We should support that and perhaps more
interceptors at Fort Greely, Alaska.
But the other thing I would add is that the architecture of
missile defense is going to be critically important. China's
opposition to the THAAD deployment, I believe, was more about
preventing a Korea, United States, Japan, potentially
Australia, architecture of missile defense. Frankly, that is
exactly what we need to have more effective defenses.
It also is a source of leverage for us, because if China
doesn't want to see our alliances become more integrated and
joint through missile defense, then China is going to have to
put more pressure on North Korea. In other words, the more
serious we are about missile defense with our allies, the more
effective we will be at defending ourselves, but also the more
effective we will be diplomatically at putting pressure on
Beijing to, in turn, put pressure on North Korea.
Ms. Magsamen, I would agree with Dr. Green's comments. I
would add one thing.
In addition to the importance of missile defense capability
is the importance of actually being able to practice it
alongside our allies. And so, really important is the
trilateral defense cooperation that is ongoing in this regard.
It certainly needs to be deepened.
Senator Inhofe. I think most of the things that have been
mentioned, and certainly by you, Dr. Green, we did address in
the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act], and we are aware
that we have fallen behind there.
I want to make one last comment, and this was 25 years ago,
during Senate confirmation, CIA [Central Intelligence Agency]
Director James Woolsey, who happens to be an Oklahoman and I
have known him for quite some period of time, he said, ``We
have slain a large dragon.'' He was referring to the Soviet
Union. ``But we live now in a jungle filled with a bewildering
variety of poisonous snakes.'' Of course, what he was talking
about at that time 25 years ago, that was not quite the snake
that we are talking about this morning. I think that is the
most vexing of those poisonous snakes.
Now, despite the fact that Russia and China represent the
greatest threats and military supremacy, we understand that the
word ``imminent,'' which I used in my opening statement, is a
word that is used describing North Korea by every witness that
we have had so far appearing before this committee.
And so I would just ask the three of you, do you agree, in
terms of the most imminent threat, that should be North Korea?
Or do you want to stand out as the only three who do not agree
with that?
Admiral Blair. No, I do not agree with that. I mean, it is
only an imminent threat if we make it an imminent threat. We
have been talking these guys up a lot more than they deserve.
As I said, this is a long-term movie, not a YouTube video
or not a snapshot. A steady, sustained, powerful American
policy can keep North Korea under control, where we have it and
where it belongs.
So I would not turn it into more of a crisis than it is.
Senator Inhofe. I noticed you said, at the conclusion of
your opening remarks--I asked them to find it so I could read
it in its whole context, and it was not in your written
statement--when you said you are mystified by the doom and
gloom surrounding our policy on North Korea. I guess that kind
of fits in with you deviating a little bit from others'
opinion.
Admiral Blair. Yes, sir. I think we can handle these guys,
and we only talk ourselves into being at a disadvantage by our
own rhetoric.
Every time the United States is firm and strong, North
Korea backs down and waits for another day. It happened in,
say, 1976 with the infamous tree-chopping incident. It happened
in 1994 with the agreed framework, when President Bush talked
about the axis of evil and then invaded Iraq. This guy's father
went to ground for several months.
What was it Grant said? My job is to make the other person
worry about what I am going to do, not to worry about what he
is going to do. We have the high cards.
Senator Inhofe. In spite of the fact that, at the time, the
previous examples they are using where, at that time, North
Korea did not have the degree of success they have had most
recently, particularly on November 28th.
Admiral Blair. In 1994, they did have nuclear weapons. They
could deliver them by many unconventional means, and the North
Koreans are specialists at unconventional means.
The ICBM, as I said, if you want to test an ICBM fully, you
have to be there where it lands as well as being there where it
takes off. You have to take measurements and understand if all
of the mechanisms for deploying the weapon work. North Korea
will never be able to do that, so they are always going to have
an uncertain----
Senator Inhofe. All right. Very good.
Before we continue on, we have a quorum right now, and I
ask the committee to consider the nomination of John H. Gibson
II to be chief management officer of the Department of
Department of Defense.
Senator Reed. So moved.
Senator Inhofe. Second?
Senator Rounds. Second.
Senator Inhofe. All in favor, say aye.
[Chorus of ayes.]
Senator Inhofe. Opposed, no.
Senator Gillibrand. No.
Senator Inhofe. Anyone who would like to be recorded as no,
other than Senator Gillibrand?
[No response.]
Senator Inhofe. Very good. Thank you.
Senator Reed?
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. This has
been an extraordinarily thoughtful presentation by the
witnesses. Thank you.
A theme seems to be appearing that there is not a binary
choice between war and diplomacy, that there are more
compelling alternatives--containment, deterrence. I wonder,
beginning, and I will go sort of reverse order in seating
order, with Ms. Magsamen, if you could just comment about this
notion of containment, deterrent, how we should posture
ourselves? Long term, what are the keys in this approach?
Ms. Magsamen, Thank you, Senator.
Yes, I agree that we are likely going to find ourselves in
a scenario of containment and deterrence, and that is not
necessarily the worst-case scenario in this context.
I do think, as Dr. Green mentioned, some of the ideas
around improving our ability to contain North Korea, whether it
is increasing intelligence-sharing, whether it is coming
through with policy decisions that help us address the North
Korean proliferation challenge, whether it is additional
posture issues in terms of deterrence, I personally think it is
important to improve conventional deterrence in the event that
they have an ICBM capability, because it is going to be very
valuable to our allies for us to improve conventional
deterrence.
So I do think that the Department of Defense, in
particular, but also others in the interagency should be
marking out what a long-term containment and deterrence
strategy looks like now, so that we can put ourselves in a
better position when we eventually get there.
I would say that, in terms of the other options, I do think
that while diplomacy is going to be challenging, and certainly
we need to approach it with a great deal of skepticism, I do
think it is important that the United States send a clear
message that diplomacy is on the table and that the door is
open, because, first of all, it is a necessary predicate for
sustaining the international pressure that the administration
has been good at pursuing in terms of North Korea.
So at a minimum, in terms of keeping other international
allies and partners onboard for a diplomatic approach, a
pressure approach, or a containment approach, diplomacy on the
table is going to be essential. I think it is really important
for the strategic messaging around diplomacy be clear.
It also needs to come without preconditions. I think we
need to be realistic that any kind of engagement with North
Korea is going to be hard, it is going to be slow, but we need
to be persistent and clear about it.
Then finally, I would just say, in terms of maximizing
pressure, I do think there is more room to do more. I think
that the administration's strategy of maximizing pressure needs
more time to play out. I think there is certainly more that we
can do in terms of pressuring the Chinese, and I can talk a
little bit about that.
But certainly, we need to have a comprehensive effort,
whether it is diplomacy, maximizing international sanctions
pressure, and also putting in place deterrence and containment
pieces.
Senator Reed. Dr. Green, could you give comments? Admiral
Blair?
Dr. Green. I appreciate the question, Senator. I do think
this committee, in particular, can play an important role
getting us into the discussion of a strategy of containment and
deterrence. I think the current binary debate we have is not
working.
Setting aside for the moment whether or not a bloody nose
or a preemptive war is a bluff or is a real plan, just in terms
of what it is doing to us right now, it is perversely helping
the North Koreans advance their strategy of decoupling us from
our allies.
If we move toward a discussion with our allies of a
strategy of containment and deterrence, we can get their
support for that. They are not focused on it now, because we
are not talking to them about it now. In part, that is, I
think, because the administration still is using the
possibility of preventive war for leverage. But it is
preventing us from getting into the kind of discussion we need
to have.
The strategy is not going to be easy, and I would like to
emphasize that. I agree with Admiral Blair, deterrence will
work with North Korea. They are not suicidal. No one thinks Kim
Jong-un is suicidal.
But deterrence with the Soviet Union was based on a fairly
simple formula. They had 127 divisions. NATO [North Atlantic
Treaty Organization] had about two dozen. We needed nuclear
weapons to offset that conventional advantage, and then they
needed nuclear weapons to offset our advantage. There was a
certain level of stability there.
In the North Korean case, their goal will be anything but
stability. They will mess with us. They will threaten to
transfer. They will use nuclear weapons as cover to do
cyberattacks. They will use nuclear weapons as cover to do
attacks like they did in 2010 against South Korean ships in the
west sea. That is going to require a higher level of resources,
intelligence, operations, sanctions.
And so I do agree with Admiral Blair. Deterrence will work.
But I think it is important for the committee and for the
American people to know, this is not going to be easy. It is
going to require a higher level of risk than we have been used
to. But as I said in my testimony, it is a more acceptable and
prudent level of risk than resorting, for all the reasons Kelly
said, to an attack.
Senator Reed. Admiral Blair, if you could, just a few
minutes, a minute if you could, or less.
Admiral Blair. Senator, to containment and deterrence, I
would simply add strong economic pressure; punishment to
provocations, if they commit them; and prying that regime open
with information.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much. Spoken like an admiral.
Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. Very good.
Senator Rounds?
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Green, last October, you argued in a piece that the
United States should be preparing for a sustained period of
deterrence, coercive diplomacy, and rollback. You believed that
neither immediate conflict nor diplomatic resolution is
imminent. I think you have kind of followed up on that today.
My question is, can you describe for the committee what a
strategy of sustained deterrence should look like, and what
military tools should be considered to implement such a
strategy, if a military tool is appropriate?
Dr. Green. The broad contours of that strategy are in the
article you referenced in ``War on the Rocks'' and in my
testimony, and you have heard from the other witnesses
important elements of the strategy as well.
I think to add more granularity to what we are describing,
we need, in my view, to be engaging in maritime interdiction
operations. We know, for example, that the North Koreans are
trying to get around sanctions by transferring oil from ship to
ship, and we generally know where they are. We know that, in
the past, North Korea has transferred capability to Syria to
build a Yongbyon-type plutonium-based reactor. So we need to be
stepping up pressure on Syria and Iran, by the way.
We know that North Korea is engaged in illicit activities--
counterfeiting drugs, $100 supernotes, the Chinese renminbi and
the Japanese yen and the euro. We need to be stepping up law
enforcement and intelligence efforts to constrain their cash
there.
We, in my view, need to sustain our exercise schedule with
Korea and Japan, so that we are, as United States Forces Korea
put it, ready to fight tonight, and so that we demonstrate our
readiness, both our willpower but also our capacity to
introduce strategic assets like B-2 bombers and so forth.
That all will elicit Chinese reactions and North Korean
reactions, and we need to be ready for that. We need a
consensus that we can take the heat and that we are going to
resource our military and our intelligence services to get the
job done.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
I want to lead right into that with Admiral Blair. Admiral,
first of all, thank you for your service.
In your prepared remarks, you noted that the United States
and the Republic of Korea have been less effective in
responding to North Korean provocations below the level of a
major attack, citing the sinking of the South Korean frigate
the Cheonan and the DPRK [Democratic People's Republic of
Korea] cyberattacks as examples of this shortcoming. Recent
reporting in the Wall Street Journal noted that United States
officials might be considering so-called bloody nose or limited
strike options in response to North Korean nuclear ICBM tests.
I am just curious, when we talk about limited nuclear
responses and so forth, or limited responses on a military
basis, do you believe that these limited strikes should be
considered in response to North Korean provocations that fall
below the level of a major attack? I think that is one of the
items that Dr. Green has alluded to. How would you assess the
risk of conducting such strikes?
Admiral Blair. Senator, absolutely, we should not only
consider retaliatory strikes for lower level provocations by
North Korea, we should carry them out.
When the Cheonan was sunk, we should have bombed the
submarine base from which the submarine came that conducted
that attack.
The record, when we have responded to North Korean
provocations, has been entirely positive. North Korea has
backed down. They have done another provocation a few years
later, but it has not escalated, and it has chill shocked the
situation for a matter of months and sometimes a few years.
So yes, I believe we should. I believe that the North
Koreans understand that when we retaliate for an outrageous
provocation that they conducted against us, that is connected
to that provocation. This is not leading into a major war,
which they know they will lose. Preemptive attacks mess up that
barrier to escalation.
Now, it is still a question, if we did conduct a preemptive
limited attack, would North Korea escalate? I do not go with
the general consensus of North Korean analysts that they
necessarily would start an all-out war if we did a preemptive
attack. I think it is an open question. But I think the risks
are much smaller if we respond to a provocation.
Let me just add a last thing. It is quite interesting, the
provocations by Kim Jong-un's father and grandfather were
things like special forces attacks on the Blue House,
assassinations of South Korean cabinet officers, shootings of
missiles, sinkings of destroyers. Kim Jong-un's provocations
have been these missile tests within North Korea and nuclear
tests within North Korea. Interesting. Not things that kill or
hazard South Korean civilians, which are what really inflame
the passions.
So it is interesting that he has chosen these methods of
provocation, which are, in fact, within his own country. It
makes it more difficult to come up with an exactly
proportionate response.
But he will step over the line. We should shwack him. He
will understand it. It will be good.
Senator Rounds. Succinctly put. Thank you. Shwack him.
Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Shaheen?
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Thank you all for being here today.
So, Admiral Blair, why haven't we responded more robustly?
Fear of the risk?
Admiral Blair. It is interesting. I have been involved in
fairly high-level discussions of this, and the discussions
generally take the form of, ``Gosh, if we respond in a firm
way, he will get angry and retaliate, and this thing will
escalate.''
What you have to understand is that when we are strong,
North Korea backs down. It is counterintuitive, I know, because
it is not the way you and I think. But we are talking about a
gangster, survival regime, which is not interested in
reputations and escalation theory. It is interested in
surviving.
It will poke the United States as long as it won't see a
response. When it sees that response, it will back down and
recalibrate.
So I think it is just a lack of understanding of how North
Korean despots think.
Senator Shaheen. It is sort of the way bullies respond.
Admiral Blair. Bingo.
Senator Shaheen. Ms. Magsamen, you authored an article in
November that talked about China and Russia, and what their
response might be to any escalation of conflict on the Korean
Peninsula. Can you describe what you think might happen?
Ms. Magsamen, Certainly. I will start with China.
I think the Chinese certainly have their own interests when
it comes to long-term orientation of the peninsula, and those
interests do not include a reunified Korea under a democratic
South Korea. So I think we need to understand that, and they
are very forthright about that in all of their public
statements.
I think the Chinese are most fearful of instability on
their periphery, the potential for millions of refugees flowing
across. But I also think that they are very suspicious of
whether or not the United States would try to take advantage of
any potential collapse scenario or any additional military
strikes.
So I think the Chinese would intervene, certainly. I think
they would absolutely rush for the nuclear sites. I think that
has serious implications for our interests.
Now, it may be that we think that is an acceptable outcome,
that, okay, China, you take North Korea, and we take South
Korea. But that would have huge implications for our alliances
with South Korea and Japan, and I think would be contrary to
our interests.
So I think the United States and China have, at multiple
moments, tried to have conversations about what a long-term
orientation on the peninsula looks like in the event of a state
collapse in North Korea or a military action. The Chinese have
been pretty resistant to have that conversation with us in the
past. I think that may be changing, given the circumstances.
But certainly, the Chinese are going to intervene. They are
going to have their plan in place. There are reports that they
have forces already on the border. So I think we should
anticipate their engagement.
Senator Shaheen. Russia?
Ms. Magsamen, I think the Russians will continue to be the
spoiler actor that they are in the Pacific. I do think that we
have seen an increased tempo of Russian engagement in the Asia-
Pacific in recent years, separate and distinct from the issue
on North Korea. So I would anticipate the Russians could easily
try to potentially also engage in some way, especially along
their border region.
So it could be a military engagement. But certainly, at a
political level, the Russians will make hay in the U.N. They
will make hay for us, potentially, on other fronts around the
world.
Senator Shaheen. Apropos Admiral Blair's comments about
understanding power, does that speak to our moving more swiftly
to put in place the sanctions that we passed last year on
Russia and North Korea, to show that we are serious about any
potential action?
Ms. Magsamen, Absolutely. I think the bipartisan sanctions
legislation on Russia should be implemented by the
administration, absolutely, separate and distinct from the
issue on North Korea.
Certainly, in China's regard, I think we have been holding
the threat of secondary sanctions over them. I think we
actually have to demonstrate our seriousness in that space.
Senator Shaheen. We had people testifying before this
committee, I think a little over a year ago, who said that the
only way they saw China taking a more active role to deter
North Korea was if we did increase those secondary sanctions,
particularly on their financial industry; and second, if they
thought a war on the Korean Peninsula was imminent. Do you
agree with that?
Ms. Magsamen, I would agree with that. The two things that
China fears most are secondary sanctions and encirclement by
the United States.
So to Dr. Green's comments, some of the additional posture
moves would also be useful.
Senator Shaheen. Can I ask Dr. Green and Admiral Blair if
you agree with both of those statements, that we should move
forward more expeditiously on implementing the Russian
sanctions, and that that is the only way to get China to act?
Dr. Green?
Dr. Green. I personally support the Russia sanctions, quite
apart from the North Korea problem, because of the threat to
our democratic institutions. I do not think they undermine us
in our North Korean strategy. We need Moscow to take us
seriously.
I can give you concrete evidence that this is right, that
financial sanctions, threats against China, get them to move. I
was the senior Asia official in the NSC [National Security
Council] 12, 13 years ago when we sanctioned a very small bank
called Banco Delta Asia in Macao. Governor Zhou of the People's
Bank of China was told ahead of time by our authorities, and
the Chinese very quickly shut down North Korean bank accounts
throughout their system, because of the risks to their banks,
reputationally and in terms of even the prospect then of
secondary sanctions.
So already, the September 21st sanctions the administration
introduced have, from what we know from public figures, caused
year-to-year trade between China and North Korea to drop 80
percent from January this year to January a year ago. There are
estimates from the South Korean Government that about 60
percent of North Korea's currency reserves are going to go away
this year.
The sanctions work, and they are most effective when they
get the Chinese to police their own banks, their own companies.
The Hwasong-15 missile, as you may know, is on a nine-axle
TEL, a giant chassis that the Chinese built for logging, that
showed up in a military parade for the world to see in North
Korea.
So, yes, the sanctions will be effective.
Our alliances are critical, if I can quickly emphasize that
point again. The Chinese assumption long term, I believe, and
you can hear it clearly in speeches by Xi Jinping and other
leaders, is that United States alliances in Asia will wither as
Chinese economic power grows. If Beijing thinks that, there is
little incentive for them to pressure North Korea now. Why not
wait until they have a situation 10, 20, 30 years down the
road, where they have maximum leverage on both Koreas?
If we want them to act, we have to show our alliances are
strong, which means we have to do a lot of things: get an
Ambassador in Seoul, get serious about a joint strategy with
our allies, and so forth.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I am out of time, but just
quickly, Admiral Blair, do you agree with that?
Admiral Blair. I have talked with many Chinese leaders
about North Korea. After a few Moutais, they say, ``Admiral,
tell you what, we will make a deal. You give us Taiwan, we will
give you North Korea.''
There is no love lost within China for North Korea. There
is also an agreement of interest. The United States and China
could easily agree on a unified Korean Peninsula which was
under South Korean rule, had no nuclear weapons, and which
American forces stayed to the south, Camp Humphreys in the
South, the way they now are.
That is a good deal for China. It is a good deal the United
States. It is a good deal for the Republic of Korea. It is a
good deal for the North Korean people.
However, China doesn't see a clear path to get there. They
think that pushing the North Korean regime too hard would
result in chaos, which would be bad for them for all sorts of
reasons. They think the Unites States might take advantage of
it and not stick to our side of the deal.
But recently, I have heard from Chinese officials a little
more willingness to think about these things, a little more
willingness to think about the end of North Korea. I think we
should continue to press that kind of discussion with them.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Senator Rounds is presiding, and we recognize Senator
Perdue.
Senator Perdue. Admiral Blair, Admiral Harris before this
committee on a number of occasions has said that he is getting
a very small percentage of intelligence requests that he
continues to make. One of the concerns that he has voiced is
the potential for miscalculation on the Korean Peninsula.
Do you agree with that assessment? What should we be doing
right now to make sure we have all the intel we need, ISR
[Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance] and so forth, to
make good, solid planning decisions for North Korea?
Admiral Blair. Senator, I am not going to second-guess
somebody who has the job that I used to have, so you will have
to press Admiral Harris on that, probably in closed session.
Senator Perdue. I will be happy to do that. Thank you.
Dr. Green, we have talked about Russia a number of times,
but Secretary Tillerson just earlier this month, actually, in a
speech said that it is apparent to us that Russia is not
implementing all the sanctions and there is some evidence that
they may be frustrating some of the sanctions.
Reuters just last week, actually, revealed that there is
transshipping. Shipping of coal going to Russia is being
transshipped to places like Japan and South Korea, of all
places.
What can we do to ensure that Russia is not frustrating our
efforts? Then secondarily, what can we do to help bring Russia
into a constructive conversation around this sanction
implementation?
Dr. Green. It is an excellent question, Senator. For all
the difficulties we are having with Moscow, I would not paint
them as 100 percent against our strategy on North Korea.
For example, in my own experience working this problem in
government a decade ago, the Russians take the nuclear piece of
this very seriously. If we were to have instability and
collapse or, somewhere down the road, a diplomatic agreement
for nuclear disarmament, Russia's role would be critical. We
would want to get fissile material out. Russia has experience
immobilizing nuclear weapons, and so on and so forth. There is
a potential role for Russia.
I also have the impression that, in the Security Council,
the Russians are less obstructionist than they were. It is a
slight improvement. However, as you point out, in the actual
implementations of sanctions, the Russians are backfilling. The
Chinese will complain officially, if you ask, that the Russians
are moving in and providing cash through a variety of means to
backfill for China, and they are doing it to have influence.
They want strategic influence with us and our allies. I think
their view--this was my experience in negotiating with the
Russians in government--their view is, if they have the best
relationship with Pyongyang of any of us, they will hold all
the cards diplomatically. We need to disabuse them of that, and
there have to be some consequences to them for the way they are
helping North Korea get around sanctions, even in cases where
China is implementing them and Russia is backfilling.
Senator Perdue. Thank you.
Admiral Blair, you made a comment earlier I happen to
strongly agree with, and that is that we have not seriously
implemented sanctions on North Korea. They are actually the
fourth most sanctioned country in the world right now, behind
Russia, Syria, and Iran.
What should we do to up that ante? All three of you are
talking about that as a possible deterrent, but be specific,
particularly with regard to China, in terms of how we can up
the pressure on North Korea relative to the sanction regime.
Admiral Blair. Senator, I think the other countries of the
world dealing with North Korea fall under two categories, those
which are shameable and, if we simply bring it to their
attention that their currencies are being counterfeited, North
Korean workers in their countries are sending money back home
and forming potential assassin squads within their countries,
they will do something about it, they just haven't done it
because it is a high priority----
Senator Perdue. You are talking about the exported labor
from North Korea?
Admiral Blair. I am talking about Malaysia and the thousand
workers who were there. I am talking about countries in the
Middle East that use imported North Korean laborers for their
own purposes. Those countries, I think, if we go to the
intelligence effort to identify all of that, then our
Ambassador walks in, tells them, ``Listen, take of care of
this.'' ``Oh, okay, we will do it.'' Then we just follow up. So
that is one category.
Then there is the other category, like China and Russia,
who try to calibrate their support to North Korea to keep the
survival systems alive but not enough to be accused of
violating sanctions. Those are the ones that Dr. Green was
talking about that we have to go in with very specific
information with sanctions on those Chinese or Russian
companies which are conducting this, which will prevent them
from using our banking and financial system, which has been
very effective in the past, or for snapping their garters in
other ways that we can do quietly, and that is more effective.
Public shaming for them has some effect, but, generally, it
is a badge of courage there in China and Russia to be
criticized by the United States, so we have to play that pretty
carefully. But that is done by smiling and then jabbing them
with the stiletto.
So it is a complicated diplomatic effort. It is a very
complicated intelligence effort. We just have to get organized
as we have for other important things and do it and sustain it.
That will have the desired effect.
As I said in my written testimony, in the mid-1990s, when
the Soviet Union fell apart and their explicit subsidies to
North Korea ended, the overall inputs, the external trade
coming into North Korea, dropped by 50 percent, roughly. The
result was mass starvation, complete collapse of the economy,
and North Korea had to completely recalibrate its policies.
So they are affected by outside pressure. They stabilized
their economy recently. They have managed, by both illegal
means and by countries that are willing to keep them on life
support, to get a fairly decent flow of what they need from the
outside. We need to end that, and they will react.
Senator Perdue. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Rounds. [Presiding.] On behalf of the chairman,
Senator Gillibrand?
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
While our President is cutting our State Department and
USAID [United States Agency for International Development]
budgets, and, unfortunately, too often alienating or sending
mixed signals to our allies, China is actively forming
relationships and seeking influence around the world at an
unprecedented level.
My first question is, how has the standing, credibility,
and perception of the United States changed since President
Trump took office? Have these changes affected our ability to
address the threat of North Korea?
Starting with Ms. Magsamen.
Ms. Magsamen, I would say, essentially, in terms of the
question of standing, I think the most important thing for our
alliance relationships is steadiness and clarity. I think that
is where, unfortunately, the administration has suffered from
some strategic incoherence, in terms of what our relationships
with our alliances should be. And so, in that sense, it is a
messaging issue.
Again, we have already talked about the fact that we do not
have an Ambassador in South Korea. That significantly hobbles
our ability to engage with our allies, and it is really
important that we get one immediately.
I would say, if the United States is serious about
diplomacy with North Korea, as Secretary Mattis has called it,
the first line of effort, if we are serious in that regard, I
do think that we need some sort of senior envoy from the White
House with the credibility and backing of the President who is
able to engage on a full-time basis on this problem set,
because, unfortunately, I think there are a lot of doubts, both
on the North Korean side but also on amongst our allies about
what our long-term play is and where we are actually trying to
land this.
Allies like Japan may not be able to publicly say some of
these things, because they are very intensely interested in
staying as closely aligned with the United States as possible,
but I do think that there is a significant amount of
questioning going on about our ability to follow through on
diplomacy and the potential for war.
So I think, first and foremost, is steadiness, strategic
messaging, not taking own goals, especially giving North Korea
and China options to split us from our allies. I think we have
done that a couple of times over the last year, and I think
that deeply wounds us and wounds our strategy.
So that would be how I would respond.
Senator Gillibrand. Dr. Green?
Dr. Green. So the administration's free and open Indo-
Pacific strategy was literally taken word for word from the
Japanese Foreign Ministry and elevates the importance of India
and Australia. In concrete form, you can see it, because those
four countries--the United States, Japan, India, and
Australia--have convened a so-called Quad officials meeting to
coordinate, essentially, on China. For a long time, they
weren't willing to do it, because they were worried about
China's reaction.
So you can see in different ways that the larger, more
confident democratic maritime allies--Japan, Australia, and
India--at least at the government level are moving closer to us
right now.
On the other hand, in Southeast Asia, I think almost any
expert you ask, and I have traveled to the region, to Southeast
Asia, several times this last year, will tell you we have lost
ground. We have lost ground because of our withdrawal from TPP
[Trans-Pacific Partnership]. We have lost ground because our
diplomats are not empowered.
The President spent 12 days in Asia, and Secretary Mattis
has made more trips to Southeast Asia in his first year than
any of his predecessors. But the maintenance of our
relationship with the 10 members of ASEAN [Association of
Southeast Asian Nations], Thailand, Malaysia, and so forth,
that is done by the State Department. It is not done by the
White House. I can say that as a former White House guy. If you
do not have a confirmed Assistant Secretary, if you do not have
a clear strategy for your diplomats, if you do not have a trade
strategy, they have nothing to work with.
You can just feel it in the region, that we have lost in
that critical part of Asia. We can recover. The bigger maritime
powers are with us. But we have lost ground.
Korea is the one that worries me the most, because it is
the center of gravity. If China has a long-term strategy to
weaken our alliances, if they can get Korea separated from us,
I do not think they can, but if they think they can, it is
going to weaken our leverage on North Korea. It is going to
weaken our leverage on a whole range of issues.
It is about getting an Ambassador in Seoul. It is about
stopping the gratuitous attacks on the Korea Free Trade
Agreement. We can renegotiate it, but let's keep it steady.
Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Blair?
Admiral Blair. Basically, Senator Gillibrand, I would agree
with Dr. Green.
Asians are not obsessed with tweets. They look in a very
clear-eyed way at what the United States does. The actions that
we have generally taken in terms of overall policy, military
actions, and so on are favored by our allies and are noticed by
our adversaries and others.
I would say the two areas of stepping back from
multilateral trade agreements and not having this substantive
working-level diplomatic presence are our two biggest
weaknesses in terms of the actions, and those are noted by the
Asian countries.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Rounds. On behalf of the chairman, Senator
Sullivan?
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to the witnesses for your testimony. I
particularly want to thank Dr. Green and congratulate him on
his recent book, ``By More Than Providence.'' Anyone interested
in a great treatise on American strategy in the Asia-Pacific
should read it. I am still reading it. It is pretty long, but
it is a great book.
I want to dig into this binary debate topic that we have
been discussing. I think it has been incredibly useful. The
administration is essentially--I am not sure they have called
it a red line. We have had Senators here in committee hearings
on this committee call it a red line. They have essentially
said we are going to prevent North Korea to have the capability
to have an intercontinental nuclear ballistic missile that can
range the lower 48, the continental United States. As we have
all heard and seen, and intel reports have been made public, a
lot of people think that red line is maybe even here already or
very close, within the year.
So this binary debate has started about, to make sure we do
not let them cross that red line, we either need to undertake a
preemptive or preventative military action, which, by the way,
I believe the Congress of the United States would have to
authorize. It is not the President's call to do that under our
Constitution. Or there has to be, as we have been discussing
here, some kind of sustained serious containment and
deterrence.
Dr. Henry Kissinger weighed in on this kind of binary
choice, a fork in the road, as some senior officials have
called it. He said there were rational arguments on the
preemptive war part, but he had concerns about going it alone.
Then Secretary Tillerson has weighed in on the other
element, particularly a sustained containment and deterrence
strategy, because of the risk of proliferation, where he said
that is not going to work.
So what I would like, Dr. Green, first, you have thought
about this a lot, a containment and deterrence strategy would
obviously have to have some continuum of the use of force to be
effective. So let me give you just a couple examples and see
where you would fall in a containment and deterrence strategy.
I think all the panelists agree a much more robust sanctions
effort should be part of that.
How about a naval blockade that was authorized by the U.N.?
Assume you could get that authorization. Would that be part of
something?
Dr. Green. Thanks, Senator. There will be a quiz on the
book in the next open hearing. But first, on this binary
choice, it is an important point because, for 25 years,
Republican and Democratic administrations have faced repeated
crises with North Korea. The North Koreans have been able to
hit our bases and allies in Japan and Korea for over a decade.
In other words, this is not a----
Senator Sullivan. With a nuclear weapon?
Dr. Green. Probably, probably. In other words, I think we
are all saying the same thing. This is not a sort of black and
white shift in the threat. This is a more significant and more
dangerous level, but the threat has been mounting for some
time.
The way both Democratic and Republican administrations have
generally dealt with this, since George Herbert Walker Bush, is
to increase pressure, not want war, and then toggle over to
diplomacy and release the pressure. Every administration has
done that, because war is so unthinkable.
We have to have the discipline now to not continue this
cycle of toggling from war to diplomacy, but to sustain a
deterrence strategy that constrains their program, that, as
Admiral Blair has said, deters them from thinking they can get
away with small attacks in cyberspace or on South Korean ships.
So as part of that strategy, whether you call it a naval
blockade or not, I do think we need to engage in maritime
interdiction operations against North Korean ships that are,
for example, refueling at sea in violation of Security Council
sanctions.
Senator Sullivan. Okay, let me ask you a couple other
elements of what that deterrence and containment strategy might
look like.
How about using all means to disrupt their proliferation
networks, including overtly or covertly killing those involved
in the networks? If there was clear and convincing evidence of
a facility that helped proliferate weapons, nuclear weapons,
that we would bomb that?
Again, this is not a preemptive or preventative war, but if
we have a serious containment and deterrence strategy, it would
have to have some elements of force to be credible, and
particularly to be able to be credible on the issue that
Secretary Tillerson says is his reason for not wanting a
containment and deterrence strategy, and that is proliferation.
How do you deal with containment and deterrence with a real
threat of nuclear proliferation, which this country clearly has
done in the past and will try to do so in the future? Shouldn't
we have force as an element of that part of the strategy? For
both of you.
Dr. Green. The answer is yes. I think we need a more
aggressive interdiction strategy.
Senator Sullivan. Would our allies and Russia and China
agree with that, if we said this is the strategy?
Dr. Green. If we create the conditions where there are
consequences for them not to cooperate, for example, secondary
sanctions, then I think they will be more cooperative. We have
seen that in the past.
In terms of striking facilities, as Admiral Blair pointed
out earlier--if I have this correctly, Admiral--it is going to
be difficult for North Korea to distinguish between a
preventive attack on a facility and the opening of a campaign
to destroy the regime. So the risk, to me, would be too high.
But interdicting outside of North Korea against North
Koreans proliferating but also those who are cooperating, I
think it needs to be much more aggressive. It needs to be
resourced with intelligence of all means and should be part of
the strategy.
Senator Sullivan. Admiral Blair, do you have any comments?
Sorry, I have gone over my time.
Admiral Blair. I would generally agree with the thrust of
your questions, that an aggressive set of responses to
proliferation activities by North Korea, including the use of
deadly force and military strikes on relevant North Korean
facilities, should be a part of that response.
It is hard to go through this a la carte menu in a
theoretical dinner in a few years and just pick off individual
items. It really depends on what is going on at the time.
But in response to a clear proliferation provocation by
North Korea, strikes against relevant facilities or units in
North Korea should be a part of that.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Rounds. On behalf of the chairman, Senator Hirono?
Senator Hirono. Thank you.
Admiral Blair, aloha. It is good to see you. I certainly
remember working with you closely when you were at Pacific
Command.
You have said, Admiral Blair, that North Korea is not an
imminent threat. If we define ``imminent threat'' as sending a
missile against us or any of our allies, is that a pretty good
definition of ``imminent threat,'' in a very simplified way,
and that North Korea, therefore, is not an imminent threat?
Admiral Blair. I did notice, Senator, that this red line
about the lower 48 provided cold comfort to those American
citizens living in places like Hawaii and Guam and so on. So we
feel these things stronger, those of us who have lived in
Hawaii or who do now.
We get into fine debating points with adjectives and so on.
North Korea has been a threat to American interests ever since
the end of the Korean--unexpected things happen. North Korea
has been a threat ever since the Korean War. They are very
adept and have the penchant for using unconventional forms of
aggression against this country. In that sense, they are sort
of a running threat.
But to say that there is some sort of a cliff that we are
approaching I think mischaracterizes it. I would agree with Dr.
Green that we are seeing an increasing threat, but not
something that is defined and imminent in time.
Senator Hirono. Would you agree with that, Ms. Magsamen?
Ms. Magsamen, Yes, I would agree with Admiral Blair's
comments. Also, I think the word ``imminent'' sort of implies a
sense of intent on behalf of the adversary. Again, I think if
you are thinking about whether or not Kim Jong-un intends to
actively first strike the United States, I think there are open
questions about that. So I would agree with Admiral Blair's
comments.
Senator Hirono. That doesn't mean, just because North Korea
is not an imminent threat, that we should not be doing the
variety of responses and actions that all three of you have
laid out in your testimony. I think this binary discussion we
are having, which means do we use either military force or do
we use diplomacy, I agree with all of you, I think, if this is
what you are saying, that we should not confine ourselves to an
either/or situation because it is all very complicated
diplomatically, as well as from an intelligence standpoint, as
Admiral Blair has pointed out.
At the least, shouldn't we have an Ambassador to South
Korea with the necessary experience, at this point?
Ms. Magsamen, Yes.
Admiral Blair. Yes, Senator. The line of American
Ambassadors of all administrations to that country have been
very distinguished, fine public servants, and they have played
absolutely crucial roles at key times during crises. We need to
have that strong voice there.
Senator Hirono. It is very mystifying as to why this
administration has not named someone as an Ambassador to South
Korea, because North Korea remains so much on everyone's minds.
Admiral Blair, in your testimony, you recommend that the
United States should respond promptly and disproportionately to
North Korean provocations. So can you explain what you mean by
disproportionate response to their missile tests and nuclear
tests?
Admiral Blair. Right. In order to make a retaliation to
provocation effective and terminal, you should not be in a tit
for tat of they poke you and you poke them a little bit. When
they poke you, you should poke them a lot more than they were
poking you. So if they sink one ship, you should sink three. If
they fire ten artillery shells, you should fire 50.
That is what I mean by disproportionate. We need to respond
in kind with relevant military strikes, but they should be
stronger than the ones that were directed against our allies.
Senator Hirono. You made a note that Kim Jong-un's
grandfather and father both did very specific things, such as
sinking ships and assassinating people. What Kim Jong-un is
doing, as you noted, is a little bit more difficult to define
as being the kind of provocation that should lead us toward any
kind of a military disproportionate, as you would say,
response.
So I think that is what makes things so complicated,
because what we could unleash with even a bloody nose kind of
response would need to be very much analyzed as to what the
possibilities might be, but still retaining the capability to
respond militarily.
I am out of time. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. [Presiding.] Senator Cotton?
Senator Cotton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Green, I want to return to the exchange you had with
Senator Sullivan, speaking about the escalation ladder and
where there might be a way to step off the escalation ladder,
if North Korea engaged in a provocation that warranted a
military strike against North Korea by the United States.
My understanding of your position is that, in part due the
size of their unconventional weapons systems on the DMZ and the
number of those systems that can range Seoul, that there are
not a lot of easy off-ramps on the escalation ladder. Is that
right?
Dr. Green. Thank you, Senator. I am glad you did return to
the question raised by Senator Sullivan, because I think I need
to add more clarity.
In a scenario where there is actionable intelligence that
North Korea is going to proliferate, I think there is a legal
and a strategic case for preemption against a facility, even
North Korea. Or in retaliation for known proliferation, I think
there is arguably a case, a harder case, but arguably a case,
under international law and strategically for using military
force.
I think the legal case is flimsier, and the strategic case
is weaker, if you are talking about using military force to
stop their program.
So the reason it is worth taking the risk to retaliate, as
Admiral Blair was describing it, in my view, is because if we
do not, the North Koreans will continue increasing the level of
the threat. Then our options are getting worse and worse.
That is why I said earlier in my testimony, this new
containment strategy will involve a higher level of risk for
us, but it is to prevent us having to take even riskier choices
down the road, but not for preventive war. I think that is a
much harder case.
Senator Cotton. If you had to take that step, given their
nuclear weapons program, given their indirect fire systems on
the DMZ, it is unclear how Kim Jong-un would assess those
strikes versus, say, what Ronald Reagan did in Libya in 1986,
what Bill Clinton did in Iraq in 1998 that had very clear and
limited objectives that Muammar Qaddafi or Saddam Hussein did
not see as regime-decapitating strikes. Is that right?
Dr. Green. That is right. So my understanding is that,
after the 2010 attacks by North Korea against South Korea, the
ROK and the United States agreed on new guidelines, on new
planning parameters, for counter-provocation that would involve
moving up one echelon. They hit us with a battery; we hit the
headquarters in the brigade.
The North Koreans backed off, because they knew it was a
limited context, and it was not a preamble to invasion or
regime change. That is easier--not easy, but easier--to manage,
in term of escalation.
Senator Cotton. What might be intended as a limited or
retaliatory strike might be perceived as an effort to go for
the jugular.
Dr. Green. The North Koreans know these rules of
engagement, and they backed off. I think if our rules of
engagement are understood, then we face less of a risk of
escalation.
There are scenarios where the U.S. and our allies would
have no choice but to go to that complete regime change
scenario, depending on what we are managing with at the time.
Right now, I do not see that warranted, in terms of the
enormous risk we have described.
Senator Cotton. Okay. Admiral Blair, given that context
that has prevailed in the Korean Peninsula for some time, and
the motto of United States Forces Korea, ``Ready to fight
tonight,'' we have about 250,000 American citizens on the
Korean Peninsula. A lot of those are private citizens. Many of
them are military personnel, but many of them are dependents,
husbands and wives, and kids of those military personnel, plus
our diplomatic personnel.
Would it be prudent, given the heightened tensions, to
begin to consider stopping the deployment of dependents of
United States Government officials and military personnel on
the Korean Peninsula?
Admiral Blair. Stopping that right now, in view of the
current level of tensions, are you asking, Senator?
Senator Cotton. Yes. So obviously, it would be a huge
evacuation effort to get all of the dependents out of Korea,
even if you wanted to do that today. But would it be prudent to
say to servicemembers, starting in 30 days, Korea will once
again be an unaccompanied tour and not an accompanied tour, so
we do not continue adding to the risk that we are posing to our
families and also the leverage that we might be giving to the
Kim regime?
Admiral Blair. I would not favor that under current
circumstances right now, Senator. It sort of ties in with this
discussion of imminent threat that we have been having earlier
in this hearing.
We have had both military members and their families there
for a long time. We have a war plan, which we have confidence
in. We have nuclear deterrents, which we have confidence in. We
think we can handle it.
If the circumstances changed radically, then, as you know,
evacuating all of our citizens is a part of our preparations to
do that. But I do not think we have crossed that trigger yet.
Senator Cotton. Okay, thank you. My time has expired.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Heinrich?
Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
There has been a relatively high amount of unanimity from
all of you in terms of what sort of approach we should be
taking. Is it fair to say for each of you that there is an
enormous difference in relative risk, regarding escalation,
between something that would be retaliation for bad North
Korean behavior versus something that would be preemptive? Do
you all agree on that point?
Admiral Blair. I strongly do. Yes, sir.
Dr. Green. I agree as well.
Ms. Magsamen, I do as well.
Senator Heinrich. Do you also agree that our first priority
here in getting this right, especially for the long term,
should be having a unified strategy with our allies in the
region?
Admiral Blair. The worst mistake we could make is to come
out of this dance without the girl who brung us. The basis of
our long-term influence and strong policy in the region are our
two alliances with Japan and North Korea, and we should
evaluate all our actions.
Senator Heinrich. South Korea.
Admiral Blair. Excuse me. Yes, sir. Brain cells, senior
moments.
We should evaluate all of our actions in that light. That
doesn't mean we do everything they want to do. This is a give-
and-take alliance. But over the long term, we want to come out
of this with stronger alliances than we went in.
Senator Heinrich. Dr. Green?
Dr. Green. I agree the current South Korean Government has
elements within it that are a little too hopeful about the
prospects for diplomacy with North Korea. So as Admiral Blair
said, we do not have to do exactly what our allies say, but we
have to get it right, not only because we want to come out of
this with strong alliances, but our leverage vis-a-vis North
Korea or other actors like China depends, to a very large
degree, on how solid they see our alliance relationships.
Ms. Magsamen, I would agree that alliances are essential to
a successful American strategy in the Pacific, so absolutely.
Senator Heinrich. Would we be in a better position to
create that sort of unified strategy with our allies if we had
a sitting Ambassador to South Korea right now?
Dr. Green. We would, not only because of the necessity of
clarifying signals from Washington to Seoul, but because an
Ambassador in Seoul could play a critical role with our
Ambassador, our very excellent Ambassador in Japan, and, of
course, also China, in knitting up our allies and other
players. A lot of the diplomacy happens out there, and we have
a missing piece in the puzzle.
Senator Heinrich. Obviously, one of the things we want to
do is send that message of steadiness and clarity to our
allies, but also to North Korea. When you see things like the
recent tweet from the President about a much bigger and more
powerful nuclear button, obviously, that was designed to be
heard by the North Korean regime, but what does it send in
regard to a message to our allies in the region? What do they
think when they see that kind of action coming out of the White
House?
Admiral Blair. Senator, I do not think things like have
that big an effect on our allies. They look at what we do, at
sustained, official, long-term policies. I would say they are
less obsessed with tweets than others are.
Dr. Green. I think our allies are discounting the tweets.
In one sense, that is good. In another sense, it is not good,
because you want the bully pulpit to have some weight.
But in general, I do not think it is the problem. I think
the problem with our alliances right now is that the talk of a
bloody nose or preventive war is focusing allies that should be
working with us on pressuring North Korea on finding ways to
slow us down. We want to redirect them on the real problem.
Ms. Magsamen, I guess I disagree somewhat. I think that our
allies are looking at the disconnect between what the White
House says and what our Cabinet officials say. And so I do
think that when they see a delta there, that they do have a lot
of confusion about what our long-term sort of intentions are.
So I guess I would disagree.
I agree that our alliances are durable, and certainly
tweets are not going to make the ultimate difference. But I do
think that they are having an impact in terms of how our allies
perceive our policy.
Senator Heinrich. To finish up, I want to return to the
Russian issue that Senator Perdue brought up. There has been a
lot of reporting about North Korea, effectively Russia's ports
becoming a transshipping hub for North Korean coal. There has
been a lot of reporting about oil moving into North Korea from
Russia and dropping the price of fuel oil. They seem to be an
enormous economic release valve.
That all comes at the same time that the Congress voted
517-to-5 to give more sanctions tools to the administration to
deal with Russia, and yet we do not see a willingness to impose
those sanctions.
What do you think the Russian administration thinks when
they see us choose not to impose those sanctions?
Ms. Magsamen, I think it sends a signal, and also, I think
the Russians will exploit any possible opening for themselves.
So I think as the Chinese crack down, the Russians certainly
want to move in for business with North Korea, so that is
something we have to watch.
But separate and distinct from the North Korea piece,
absolutely, if the Russians do not see us following through on
our sanctions, I think that just induces further bad Russian
behavior.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Ernst?
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you to our witnesses for being here today and
discussing a very important topic to all of us.
Admiral Blair, I would like to start with you, sir. Many
years ago, I was very fortunate to have the opportunity to
attend an agricultural exchange in Ukraine while it was still
part of the Soviet Union. During that time, the other Iowa
students and I lived on a collective farm for a number of
weeks.
In the evening, we would come together as a community, and
we thought we would be talking about agriculture, Ukrainian
agriculture versus what I grew up with in Iowa. We did not talk
about agriculture at all. What we talked about and the
questions that were being posed to us from the Ukrainians was,
what is it like to be free? What is it like to be an American?
Tell us about democracy. Talk to us about your form of republic
and government. Those were the things that we discussed.
In your opening statement, you note the need to strengthen
the information campaign in North Korea as the government
maintains control over its people and restricts their access to
the outside world. So how can the United States and our
regional partners work to expand access to freedoms like news
and television and technology inside of North Korea?
Admiral Blair. I think that is a very important point,
Senator, and I think your observations are exactly correct,
that the greatest long-term threat to despotic regimes is
information and dissatisfaction by their citizens.
The one that we all laugh a little bit about, we all have
plaques on our walls with a little balloon that North Korea
uses to send propaganda over to the South, and the South, when
the wind blows from the south, has, over the years, sent
balloons with little transistor radios and other publications
to try to spread news in North Korea and undermine the
Democratic Republic of North Korea, just the way you say.
But we are in the information age in 2018 now, and I think
we can do a lot more. As I mentioned, Chinese cell towers
splatter into North Korea. We can use satellite broadcasts to
be able to send texts that provide more information.
There is a huge counterfeit or smuggling trade that goes
back and forth over North Korean borders. We can put thumb
drives and disks into that. We can physically get other items
in there. I think we should do that, we, the Koreans, all of
our friends, and just begin to let North Koreans know what the
situation is in the rest of the world and let them draw their
own conclusions.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Admiral. I do truly believe that,
if we want to see dissatisfaction in North Korea, we have to
push our ideals and values into that country through whatever
means. We have seen other countries--we talk about Russia and
its propaganda--campaign in other countries. Why isn't it that
we can engage in that same type of activity with North Korea?
You are right about the illicit trade that goes on. I have
heard they love American soap operas and so forth.
So anyway, if there is a way that we can engage in that, I
think we should engage in that. If it saves bullets and lives,
certainly, let's do it.
Another issue, Dr. Green, just in my remaining time, we
have talked about this before, but the importance of trade in
that region, and if you could just explain, from your point of
view, do you believe that the U.S. needs to reengage with those
Pacific nations, especially at a time now that we are not
involved in TPP [Trans-Pacific Partnership]? What should we be
doing? How can that help the overall situation?
Dr. Green. As you know well, Senator, the consequences of
our leaving TPP are that our trading partners are signing
agreements with each other, with Europe, that are freezing out
our exporters, especially our exporters from agricultural
States. It is costing us, and it is going to cost us more as
these new trade agreements we are not in take effect.
On a geopolitical basis, the impression in the region is
that the United States is abdicating leadership on what kind of
rules will govern trade and investment. I was, in the Bush
administration, part of the small group that contemplated
whether or not we should do a free trade agreement with the
Republic of Korea, which, of course, we did. One of the main
reasons we decided we needed to do it was to demonstrate
clearly that our fate and our ally South Korea's fate were
going to be tied together for generations by greater economic
interdependence and cooperation.
The fact that we are now putting that on the chopping
block, aside from the damaging effect on our agricultural
exports, is that it is going to raise questions about whether
we are truly committed in the long run to the Republic of
Korea, and the same could be said for TPP with those states.
China is filling that vacuum with Belt and Road and other
things. You can debate how much is really there, but the sense
of momentum right now is clearly with Beijing.
This all effects how we manage the North Korean problem,
because if the Chinese think, in the long run, they will have
the dominant position over the entire region, they are not
going to take risks now to help us.
So it does affect the North Korea problem indirectly, but
importantly.
Senator Ernst. Very good. Thank you. We need to engage.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Warren?
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for being here today. I want to talk more
about our alliances in the region.
Our allies in Asia rely on the United States nuclear
umbrella for their security. We promise to treat an attack on
Seoul or Tokyo as an attack on our homeland, and their belief
in our extended deterrence is one reason that countries like
South Korea and Japan do not seek nuclear weapons of their own
and one reason there is not an arms race in the region.
By developing a long-range nuclear capability, North Korea
is trying to convince our allies that the United States will
not protect them, leaving them open to Kim Jong-un's bullying
and intimidation.
So let me ask this, Ms. Magsamen, what actions should the
administration be taking to keep North Korea from driving a
wedge between the United States and its allies?
Ms. Magsamen, Thank you, Senator. I think that is a very
important question.
The relationship between Japan and Korea has actually been
deteriorating recently, and I think one the most important
things that----
Senator Warren. It has never been easy.
Ms. Magsamen, It has never been easy, a long history, but
it really requires American leadership and effort with both of
our allies to bring them closer together. So I think one the
most important things the U.S. can do is try to improve that
political relationship between the two countries. Frankly, that
is going to require presidential-level leadership, in addition
to agencies and departments engaging those two powers.
So I think that is sort of one piece of it. The other piece
you alluded to was the extended deterrence commitment. I think
there we can certainly do some more strengthening. We have an
extended deterrence dialogue with those countries, and I think,
certainly, we should look at deepening those and potentially
having them more regularly and throughout the year.
Finally is trilateral cooperation. I think demonstrating to
North Korea and, by extension, to the Chinese, frankly, that
the North Korea problem is driving us closer to each other
operationally in the Pacific I think is essential in that
space.
Senator Warren. Actually, let me drill down just a little
bit more on that. As you rightly say, it is no secret that
South Korea and Japan have a very complicated history, dating
back for many years, and that the United States has
traditionally played a role in trying to keep the three of us
together in the region. Can you just say a word more about what
you think the United States should be doing in order to
preserve that three-part relationship, particularly focusing on
the part between South Korea and Japan, if you could?
Ms. Magsamen, Sure, I think it is going to require actual
just getting them in a room together on a consistent basis at a
high level, and that is going to require some sort of
presidential engagement.
In the Obama administration, we had a series of trilateral
summits. Of course, that was a different South Korean
Government at the time, but I think that kind of almost retail
politics engagement at a senior level is going to be essential
in terms of improving the relationship, finding ways to put out
ideas for confidence-building measures, active diplomacy.
Again, it would be great to have an Ambassador in South
Korea in place to work with his counterpart in Tokyo, as Dr.
Green alluded to. So even just day-to-day engagement in both
capitals by our Ambassadors would be essential.
Senator Warren. Thank you. I think that is very important.
I want to loop back to the point I had started with, though,
here.
During the Cold War, we succeeded in convincing the Soviet
Union that our extended nuclear deterrence was credible, that
we, the United States, would defend NATO, if attacked. It is
the same principle that applies here. Our network of partners
in the region is one of our unique strengths, but it is only
our strength if it is credible and if they believe it.
So I think everything we do to reinforce that is critically
important, and I think Kim Jong-un knows that. I think the
Chinese know that, and everything they can do to try to
undermine that helps their interests and hurts ours.
So I appreciate your thoughts on this, and I just want to
underline how important I think it is going forward. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Peters?
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to our witnesses today. It is a fascinating
discussion.
I want to get back to the bloody nose strategy. We have had
quite an extensive conversation about that already with the
panel.
But, Ms. Magsamen, I would like to just ask you about Kim
Jong-un's response. You mentioned in your testimony that it is
a big gamble to count on his rationality. But I also want to
think a little bit about what is the political situation that
he faces.
We think what might be a limited strike, however that is
defined, if he does not react, what is his political situation?
Are there hardliners within that government, that if he does
not act could very well be decapitating, even though we may not
think so?
Could you talk a little bit about what is going on behind
the scenes, as much as we know, as difficult as that is?
Ms. Magsamen, I would say one thing on the bloody nose
approach, the preventive use of force, to sort of take a
limited strike with the objective of compelling Kim Jong-un to
the negotiating table, I think there are significant
weaknesses.
On the one hand, the rationality behind it, the
administration has been talking about how Kim Jong-un is
irrational, but then sort of expecting him to have a rational
response to that kind of limited strike. I think that is the
essential flaw in the argument for a bloody nose.
I do think that deterrence cuts both ways, so I do think
Kim Jong-un will look to move quickly to reestablish his own
deterrence vis-a-vis the United States.
I also think, to your question, that Kim Jong-un's core
interest is his own personal survival and the survival of his
family. So I think he is going to act according to that
interest, regardless of the scenario.
So I think the potential for escalation is significant in
the case of a bloody nose, a limited strike.
I personally do not believe that there is a limited strike.
I do not believe that would be effective in the objective of
getting him to the table. It certainly would not be effective
in taking apart the nuclear, ballistic, and chemical weapons
programs.
Senator Peters. Part of it, to be effective, if it is
effective, is you have to have the belief that this is not a
full-on attack from the United States that would jeopardize his
position, as you mentioned.
But, Admiral Blair, I would like to have you address this a
little bit, think it through. It is clear, the United States, I
would think, if we are thinking of a bloody nose attack, that
we have to be prepared for the horrible repercussions that
could potentially happen. Therefore, you have to be prepared
militarily. You have to have the force that, if they do come
across the line after that bloody nose attack, we can win
swiftly, as you mentioned in your testimony, and crush them.
But that would mean the deployment of additional troops before
the bloody nose.
As a former logistics officer in the U.S. Navy Reserve, I
know that you have to move to pre-position supplies there.
There are a lot of things that could be viewed pretty
provocatively before you actually get to the bloody nose, as
you are preparing for what would be a much larger conflict,
should it occur. It may be difficult to communicate that to the
North Korean military, that we are not going to go in really
big, because we have been preparing for that.
If you could talk a little bit about how we would need to
have some logistics preparation before this, and that could be
provocative? Or are there ways that it would not be, if you
could discuss that, please?
Admiral Blair. Yes, sir, Senator. That is why I am a strong
advocate of strong retaliation against their provocations,
accompanied by all those initial logistics, communications,
preparatory measures that you mentioned, which you have to do
in order to get ready for serious conflict on the peninsula.
In the context of conducting a limited retaliatory strike,
those sorts of preparations are interpreted and have been in
the past by North Korea as meaning that the United States is
serious about responding to general conflict, if they had to,
and they have generally backed down at that point.
If you take those same measures in the context of a
preemptive strike tied not to a particular outrage by Korea or
without a specific goal that is tied to those goals, then I
think you run a much higher risk of North Korea calculating
that this is going to be a big war, so we better get in the
first shot, and all of the actions that they would take. All
the advantages they are given by geography, of having Seoul so
close to the line, come in to play.
So that is why I really strongly believe that the risks of
retaliation for North Korean provocation are a great deal less
than some sort of a preemptive attack that is not tied to a
specific objective.
If we could disarm North Korea with a military strike--that
is, destroy all of their nuclear capability and all of their
missile capability--I would be a strong advocate of it. But
with the geography of that country, with the great number of
tunnels they have been able to get, with the record that the
United States has had so far of knowing exactly where all of
the components of these programs are, I think that is a very,
very high-risk situation. It would require an enormous strike,
which would be on the order of what you would do in a general
war. I think there would be quite a high risk that it would not
get all the components, and you would get the worst of both
worlds.
Senator Peters. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Blumenthal?
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
I want to focus on an area that has not yet been covered, I
think. By the way, I think this panel has been absolutely
magnificent, very insightful, and, in a way, reassuring,
because you are more optimistic than I think generally I have
heard experts be about the potential effectiveness of sanctions
and diplomacy, which it tends to be downgraded, and is
especially important in this forum, the Armed Services
Committee.
But one of the areas that I think deserves attention is
cyber. You know better than I that North Korea's cyberattacks
are a major source of revenue. In fact, the most reliable
estimate I have heard is about $1 billion per year, which is a
staggering figure, equivalent to about a third of the country's
total exports. North Korea's attacks around the world produce
this stream of revenue.
One example that has come to light publicly is the Lazarus
Group, a North Korean-linked cyber ring, stole $81 million from
a Bangladesh central bank account at the New York Federal
Reserve, which would have been $1 billion except for a spelling
error.
This is totally unclassified. It has been reported
publicly. But it is just the tip of the iceberg.
The North Koreans also have been tied to the WannaCry
attack earlier this year that impacted over 200,000 victims in
150 countries, as well as the Sony attack in 2014. They were
linked last month to a $60 million theft from a Taiwanese bank.
So the world community ought to be unified in responding
and retaliating, or deterring and punishing, this kind of
state-sponsored cyberattack on the United States and countries
and banks around the world.
So my question to you is, what should be done? There is a
bipartisan letter that has been joined by many of us, that I
helped to lead, to U.N. Ambassador Nikki Haley, urging her to
work with members of the U.N. Security Council to pass a
resolution more aggressively deterring and punishing these
kinds of attacks. We sent it on November 1 of last year, and,
of course, that is just an overture with no real immediate
practical impact.
What do you think ought to be done by the State Department
or by the United States Government, in general?
That is for all of you. Perhaps, Admiral, you can begin,
and then we will go down the line. Thank you.
Admiral Blair. All right, Senator, I will just start
quickly.
Yes, I think we should take active cyber measures to
destroy as much of the capability of the North Korean hacking
operation that you just described as we can.
When you get below that general statement into specifics of
American capability to do so, we would have to go into closed
session to talk about that, and my knowledge, frankly, is
somewhat out of date. But I believe that should be a part of
the punishment of North Korea for the actions that they have
taken, in addition to the other things that we have talked
about that can be done with more traditional financial
sanctions and punishments and corresponding sanctions. So I
believe that should be a part of it.
Dr. Green. I would agree. I think it is important for two
additional reasons.
First, we need to punish, deter North Korea, for escalating
the cyber domain, so that they do not escalate in other
domains, for example, atmospheric tests of nuclear weapons and
so forth.
So for our broader deterrence of a North Korea that might
think it can put us on our back foot in various domains, in
this domain, we have to be ferocious.
Secondly, North Korea's cyber activities are one piece of
the larger network of criminal associations they have with the
triad, the Green Gang, the Real IRA [Irish Republican Army], a
whole host of the worst actors in international crime.
That is not just a law-enforcement issue. That is a problem
because that is also how they are getting technology for the
weapons and, in the worst-case scenario, how they might try to
transfer out of North Korea fissile material or weapons to
retaliate against us.
Ms. Magsamen, Senator, I would agree. I would also say that
the Department of Defense does have cyber dialogues with Korea
and Japan, and I think it would be useful for DOD to
potentially consider trilateral options in that space, because
I do agree with the other panelists that cyber would be an area
that the North Koreans would look to try to find some sort of
asymmetric advantage, especially in the middle of conflict. So
I think that certainly should be added to the trilateral
cooperation space.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you all.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Senator King?
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for the
drama associated with my exit. I wish I could blame Kim Jong-un
for that, but I think it was Elizabeth Warren actually that
tripped me.
[Laughter.]
Senator King. No, it was me.
I was in this region about a year ago and talked to a lot
of our national security people both in Japan and in Korea. I
asked them three questions.
Number one, is Kim Jong-un rational? The uniform response
was yes, that he is not crazy and he is capable of rational
analysis. Therefore, that leads to a possibility of a
deterrence strategy being successful.
The second thing I asked was, what does he want? Why is he
doing this? The answer was regime survival, I think you have
all testified to that, and his personal survival.
Where does nuclear capacity fit in? The answer was, this is
his insurance policy. This is what he is developing as an
insurance policy.
So if I am trying to put myself in his shoes, which I think
is what we all ought to try to do, you look around the world
and you say, okay, who has denuclearized? Saddam, dead.
Qaddafi, dead. Ukraine, invaded. What about nuclear agreements
with the U.S.? Well, there was one in 2015, but now, three
years later, it appears to be on the verge of being abrogated.
Ms. Magsamen, if you were in his shoes, wouldn't those be
part of what you would be considering, in terms of bringing him
to the table to denuclearize?
Ms. Magsamen, Certainly, Senator. I think in terms of
whether or not he is irrational or rational, I think,
ultimately, nobody really knows for sure. But at the same time,
he has demonstrated a level of rationality over the years.
I do think that he is aggressively pursuing the capability
as a deterrent to the United States attacking him. I think he
does look around and sees the Qaddafi scenario and Saddam, and
thinks, ``This is my best insurance policy and deterrent
against a potential preventive attack by the United States.'' I
think that is true.
In terms of how he is looking at us, at the end of the day,
in addition to North Korea being an arms-control problem, it is
also a security dilemma, in terms of how he is approaching the
issue.
So I think if we are thinking about diplomatic options, for
example, I do think we have to take into account the fact that
at the core of this is also a security dilemma for Kim Jong-un.
Senator King. You go back to the Cuban Missile Crisis,
which there is no exact analogy, but there are some
similarities, and one of the pieces of the solution was a
commitment not to invade Cuba. I do not know about you, but I
do not have much interest in invading North Korea. Of course,
we do not have Jupiter missiles to give away, but there may be
something else.
But, Admiral Blair, is there an outline of a deal here? Or
do you think that, under any circumstances, he is not going to
give up these weapons?
Admiral Blair. I think that he has, right now, worked out a
strategy, an approach, it is not a strategy, of this nuclear
missile development within his own country, which, as I said
earlier, is not as provocative in terms of public outrage in
the Republic of Korea and the United States as the old sorts of
provocations of sinking ships, special forces assassinations,
and so on. It builds a nuclear capability, which he can use for
two purposes. One, he can, as predecessors have done, use
pieces of it to get concessions in other areas, political and
economic. Two, ultimately, as you pointed out, it can be his
ace in the hole.
I am not sure whether he is a Herman Kahn-trained
economist. I think he is more of a bully, who thinks, ``This is
the biggest goddamn knife I can have, a nuclear weapon. I am
going to have one. That is good for me, because I am
surrounded.''
So I think we can sort of overthink it in that way. But
yes, he wants to have a nuclear weapon because he feels that
will help him deal with his enemies.
Senator King. Let me turn the discussion a bit, because
this has been a very important hearing, because until today,
the only discussion has been, in effect, bomb or don't bomb. I
mean, it has been very straightforward about military force.
Yes, we are going to talk about diplomacy. Now we are talking
about containment and deterrence.
The flaw in deterrence, it seems to me, in this particular
situation, is the proliferation danger, and can we develop
deterrence 2.0 in this situation that would deal with
proliferation? Because if these weapons fell into the hands of
ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] or someone who you
couldn't deter because they are not a state actor, that would
raise the level of threat exponentially.
Dr. Green. I think that is exactly right, Senator. The
deterrence 2.0, or whatever we call it, is more than the
deterrence we saw with the Soviet Union, because the regime
does not want these weapons to be left alone. That is part of
it. They want these weapons to coerce us, the South Koreans,
the Japanese, to get concessions and to----
Senator King. Part of the coercion could be threatening
proliferation.
Dr. Green. I am convinced part of it will be. I was in
negotiations with the North Koreans in Beijing in 2003 when, on
instructions from Pyongyang, their delegate said to us, ``If
you do not end your hostile policy''--and by that, they meant
sanctions, our nuclear umbrella over Japan and Korea, our
forward bases. ``If you do not end it, we will transfer our
'deterrent' to a third country.'' That was 2003. In 2007, we
caught them, the Israelis caught them, helping to build a
nuclear power plant in Syria and bombed it.
I am absolutely convinced that North Korea will seek to
gain coercive leverage through cyber, through the threat of
transfer. They will stay below the red line. They know
transferring fissile material could be the death of the regime.
They will push it.
That is why we have to have a very active deterrence 2.0,
as you put it, where we are interdicting, where we are putting
pressure on potential recipients of technology, where we are
interdicting at sea, and where we are retaliating quickly and
promptly whether it is in cyberspace or other domains to impose
a cost and to make it much more difficult for them to
proliferate in or out.
That is where we are heading. It is not easy. It is going
to take resources. It is where, in my view, the administration
should be focusing our discussion with allies.
I hope we get to that point and beyond, as you said, this
sort of binary debate, diplomacy or war, which is not really
getting us traction on the problem.
Senator King. I am out of time, but you have mentioned one
of the problems we have, and we have talked about this numerous
times in this committee, we do not have a deterrence strategy
with regard to cyber. We do not even have a definition of what
a cyberattack is, what an act of war is, what should be
responded to in what proportion.
For that reason, we are a cheap date in cyber. There are no
results from coming after us, as we have learned in the last
several weeks. This is sort of a big parenthetical, but that is
another area of U.S. foreign policy strategic strategy that we
really have to get after.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator King.
First of all, when we have hearings like this, we always
have experts, and experts, quite frankly, know more than we do.
It is healthy now and then to disagree, which we had some
disagreement.
I appreciate your straightforward responses and the time
that you have given to this committee. Because of our competing
committees this morning, we are not going to have a second
round.
We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:03 p.m., the committee adjourned.]
[all]