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THE ADMINISTRATION'S SOUTH ASIA STRATEGY ON AFGHANISTAN

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

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THE ADMINISTRATION'S SOUTH ASIA STRATEGY ON AFGHANISTAN

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 2018

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m., in room SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Bob Corker, chairman of the committee, presiding.

Present: Senators Corker [presiding], Johnson, Isakson, Gardner, Young, Barrasso, Flake, Paul, Cardin, Menendez, Shaheen, Coons, Udall, Murphy, Markey, Merkley, and Booker.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER, U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE

The CHAIRMAN. Senate Foreign Relations Committee will come to order. We thank all those in attendance.

In rolling out its new South Asia strategy last August, the administration underscored the United States' hard-fought security gains in Afghanistan and reiterated our commitment to helping establish a foundation for political resolution. With the recent reports of shrinking government control of territory, continued high attrition of Afghan forces, and deadly attacks in Kabul by Haqqani and ISIS Khorasan, it is clear that foundation is a long way off. But, we are encouraged by the troop strength authorized in the new strategy, at 12,300 military personnel, with an additional 1,000, on request, which is approaching the level our force commander requested in 2014. Our NATO and non-NATO allies have also reinforced their troop commitments and support to Afghan forces through 2020.

U.S. Commander General Nicholson says he now has what he needs to assist Afghans in achieving a sustainable outcome for Afghanistan and the region. The new conditions-based approach provides Afghans, our allies, as well as the Taliban a clear signal of American commitment as the National Unity Government pursues critical reform in self-reliance efforts.

This administration has also rightly drawn a clear line with Pakistan, suspending security assistance of over a billion as long as Islamabad continues to shelter Haqqani and other terror groups that target innocent civilians as well as U.S. and allied forces. This more pointed approach is designed to confront Pakistan's duplicity and its actions to provide safe harbor to the greatest threat to our efforts in Afghanistan.

The administration has also prioritized a broad diplomatic effort as key to stable, sustainable, and a self-governing Afghanistan that is at peace with its neighbors. I am pleased to hear that Deputy Secretary Sullivan and General Votel were recently in Kabul showing our resolve in the face of four deadly attacks, two attributed to the Haqqanis and two attributed to ISIS Khorasan. These attacks highlight the deadly threats that remain, and we must counteract them with a far more unified international community. While President Trump and President Ghani have stated that these attacks may preclude a peace process with the Taliban at the moment, it is incumbent upon us to be ready when that moment occurs.

I welcome our witnesses and hope to hear more specifics of this strategy, especially in the area of economic and personal diplomacy in order to make the most of military gains General Nicholson projects.

With that, I will turn to our distinguished ranking member, Ben Cardin.

STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I very much appreciate this hearing on Afghanistan so we can hear from the administration its strategies in regards to Afghanistan, moving forward.

We have two very distinguished witnesses. And I, Secretary Schriver, particularly appreciate the fact that the Department of Defense is present, represented here today. As you know, during the Syria hearings, we were unable to get a representative from the Department of Defense. And I think that was unfortunate. And we still have not had a classified briefing on the U.S. troop presence, moving forward, in Syria. And I hope that will take place.

Afghanistan, 16 years of U.S. combat in Afghanistan, significant U.S. investment of our—blood and treasure. And we are finding out that it is much harder to make peace than war, which is something that we always know is a challenge. All of us condemn the recent carnage that was caused by the insurgents and terrorists in the attack last month. And we very much are committed to ending the violence in Afghanistan.

But, the question is, What is the U.S. policy as it relates to resolving long-term peace in Afghanistan? And, Mr. Chairman, I note President Trump's comment to the United Nations Security Council. And here, I think we are finding conflicting messages as to what the U.S. policy is in Afghanistan. The President said, "We do not want to talk to the Taliban. We are going to finish what we have to finish. When nobody else has been able to finish, we are going to be able to do it." Well, that raises the question as to whether the President believes that this is a military-only operation, which I certainly disagree with.

I notice that, one day after the President's remarks, our witness, Secretary Sullivan, said that, "The strategy is to convince the Taliban or significant elements of the Taliban that there is not a military solution to the security situation here, that ultimately the peace and security of Afghanistan will be determined by peace talks."

Mr. Secretary, I agree with that comment. I think that is where our strategy should be. But, the question is, is it clear to our stakeholders, globally, what the U.S. policy is in Afghanistan? Does the administration really believe that a simple suspension—excuse me—do we have a clear message as to what the U.S. policy is in regards to our partners in that region? And I hope we will have a chance to talk about that today.

I want to hear, as I mentioned to you before coming into the chamber—I want to review here today our regional efforts in regards to Pakistan and how that impacts on our strategies in Afghanistan. Does the administration really believe that a simple suspension of security assistance is going to bring about a lasting commitment by Pakistan to drop support for the Afghan Taliban or the Haqqani Network? It has not before. We have tried it several times over the past 16 years. I have little confidence that such behavioral change is coming. So, are we prepared to do more to elicit the behavioral change we want, or is this just more about the same?

Assistant Secretary Schriver, I also hope you can give us a clear, detailed sense of the military conflict on the ground. I understand that much of the U.S. military strategy has focused on supporting Afghan Security Forces efforts to protect population centers. Judging from the devastating recent attacks in Kabul, something clearly is not working. We see that the Taliban contests or control an increasing swatch of the Afghan territory. It competes with ISIS for influence, leading to more and more brutal attacks. By any standard, the current security situation is grim.

The bottom line is, the administration consistently says that it has a condition-based strategy, contrasted with the approach taken by the Obama administration, but the administration has yet to articulate with any precision what those conditions are. What is the end state that the U.S. and NATO troops are fighting for? We have been there 16 years. Should the American people simply accept that this is, indeed, a forever war? To me, the answer is clear and resounding no. There is no military solution to the conflict in Afghanistan.

Last year, I introduced legislation that would boast U.S. diplomatic and programmatic engagement on a peace process as well on hard work of pursuing justice for wartime atrocities and accountability for human rights abuses and corruption by Afghan officials that continue to undermine the peace process. I stand ready, as I think members of this committee do, to work with the administration so that we have a clear policy for an end game in Afghanistan that can bring stability to the people of Afghanistan, allow our troops to come home, and really achieve, I hope, which is our objective.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you for those comments.

With that, I would like to recognize our distinguished witnesses today. Our first witness is The Honorable John Sullivan, the Deputy Secretary of State. Our second witness is The Honorable Randall Schriver, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs.

Thank you both for being here. We appreciate it. It is a timely hearing. If you could keep your comments to around 5 minutes,

that would be great. Any written testimony you have, without objection, will be entered into the record.

And, with that, Secretary Sullivan, if you would begin, we would appreciate it.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN J. SULLIVAN, DEPUTY SECRETARY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning. Good morning, Ranking Member Cardin, members of the committee. Thank you for inviting me here today to provide an update on the administration's South Asia policy, particularly as it applies to Afghanistan.

I want to begin by offering my thoughts on Afghanistan in light of my trip to Kabul last week, and talk about how we are engaging, together with our partners across the interagency, in a regional approach in South Asia to bolster stability in the region, and in Afghanistan in particular.

During my trip, I was, first and foremost, able to extend in person our condolences, thoughts, and prayers to the hundreds of victims and their families, all of those who were affected by the recent terrible acts of violent terrorism. The United States remains firmly committed to supporting the Afghan people and their government's efforts to achieve peace, security, and prosperity for their country.

While in Kabul, I met with President Ghani, Chief Executive Abdullah, and other Afghan partners. Every leader reiterated their support for our strategy and their commitment to creating the conditions that will bring the Taliban to the negotiating table, as Senator Cardin mentioned in his opening remarks, thereby establishing an environment for sustained peace. These leaders also reaffirmed their support for the Afghanistan Compact, a series of benchmarks established by the Afghans to implement reforms in security, governance, rule of law, economic development, and peace and reconciliation. President Ghani and I co-chaired an executive committee meeting of the Compact, where we reviewed and highlighted progress on those benchmarks.

I also discussed with the Afghan leadership the critical importance of timely, credible, and transparent elections. It is vital that parliamentary and presidential elections take place this year and next, respectively, and that they reflect the will of the Afghan people and create an inclusive government that continues to implement these fundamental reforms.

In addition to shifting to a conditions-based approach instead of one predicated on arbitrary timelines, the South Asia strategy marks a change from the status quo in U.S.-Pakistan relations. We intend to hold Pakistan accountable for its failure to deny sanctuary to militant proxies. We also encourage restraint in Pakistan's military, nuclear, and missiles programs, and seek continued closer alignment of Pakistan's nonproliferation policies with our own.

We continue to value our relationship with Pakistan, and recognize the benefit of cooperation. Pakistan has played an important role in pushing al Qaeda closer to defeat, combating ISIS, securing its nuclear weapons, hosting Afghan refugees, and, importantly, providing access for supplies and equipment used by U.S. and Af-

ghan forces. We also acknowledge the enormous sacrifices the Pakistani people and security forces have made to combat terrorism. We have shared with Pakistan our South Asia strategy in detail, and have made our expectations clear to Pakistan, emphasizing that they must take decisive action against all militant and terrorist groups based there.

In January, the President suspended security assistance to the Pakistani military, with limited exceptions for programs that directly support U.S. national security interests, which would be decided on a case-by-case basis. We may consider lifting the suspension when we see decisive and sustained actions to address our concerns, including targeting all terrorist groups operating within its territory without distinction.

The United States is committed to doing our part to reduce tensions in the region in ways that address Pakistan's legitimate concerns. To be clear, we oppose the use of terrorist proxies by any country against another country anywhere in the world. The use of terrorism has no place in a rules-based international system. We hope the Pakistanis will also help to convince the Taliban to enter into a peace process.

We continue to deepen our strategic partnership with India. Secretary Tillerson traveled to New Delhi for consultations in October of 2017, and we expect to launch our inaugural "two plus two" dialogue with India in Washington this spring, when Secretary Tillerson and Secretary Mattis will meet with their Indian counterparts to further deepen our security ties.

The United States and India share economic and humanitarian interests in Afghanistan. India has allocated more than $3 billion in assistance to Afghanistan since 2001. India further strengthened ties with Afghanistan with the signing of a Development Partnership Agreement last year. We appreciate these contributions, and we look forward for more ways to work with India to promote economic growth and security in Afghanistan.

The United States is also strengthening our partnerships with the Central Asian republics. We are committed to supporting their independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty, and fostering regional connectivity. Two weeks ago, I attended a C5+1—the "C" being the five Central Asian republics, plus the United States—in a discussion on Afghanistan at the United Nations Security Council, where we discussed our bilateral and multilateral efforts to support Afghanistan in enhanced Central Asian cooperation.

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan provide important logistical access for supplies and equipment used by U.S. and Afghan forces. These initiatives and others have helped the effort to build stability in Afghanistan and provide a better security and more economic opportunity for the people of Central Asia.

Despite recent setbacks stemming from the horrific and senseless acts of violence we witnessed recently, the President's South Asia strategy is showing some signs of progress. On the battlefield, we are seeing the Taliban's momentum begin to slow. No major population center has fallen to the Taliban since its temporary occupation of Kunduz City in 2015. Afghan forces are now on the offensive. Our allies and NATO partners, contributing more than 6,500

troops, are actively supporting our vision for a stable Afghanistan and a more prosperous South Asia.

And in the Afghan government, we have a partner that is tackling economic, political, security, and governance challenges, including corruption, that have greatly hindered progress to date.

Thank you. And I look forward to answering your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sullivan follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN J. SULLIVAN

Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cardin, and members of the Committee. Thank you for inviting me here today to provide an update on the Administration's South Asia strategy.

I want to begin by offering my thoughts on Afghanistan, in light of my trip to Kabul last week, and talk about how we are engaging, together with the interagency, in a regional approach in South Asia to bolster stability in the region.

During my trip, I was first and foremost able to extend in person our condolences, thoughts, and prayers to the hundreds of victims and their families, and all those affected by the recent terrible acts of violence. The United States remains firmly committed to supporting the Afghan people and their government's efforts to achieve peace, security, and prosperity for their country.

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We value the Central Asian governments' support for increased stability in Afghanistan. Under the leadership of President Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan has provided education and training to hundreds of Afghan students and civilian experts. In December, Uzbek President Mirziyoyev hosted President Ghani in Tashkent, where they signed a number of important agreements to foster increased trade and cross-border connectivity.

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan provide important logistical access for supplies and equipment used by U.S. and Afghan forces. These initiatives and others have helped the effort to build stability in Afghanistan and have provided better security and more economic opportunity for the people of Central Asia.

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And in the Afghan government, we have a strategic partner that is tackling economic, political, security, and governance challenges—including corruption—that have greatly hindered progress to date.

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Secretary Schriver, thank you, sir.

STATEMENT OF HON. RANDALL G. SCHRIVER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, ASIAN AND PACIFIC SECURITY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. SCHRIVER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cardin, and other distinguished members of the committee. I am thankful for the opportunity to give a DOD perspective on the implementation of our South Asia strategy.

In August, the President announced our new integrated regional strategy, and this strategy was developed to address the enduring interests we have in South Asia, and in Afghanistan in particular. South Asia is home to two nuclear-armed countries. It is also home to the highest concentration of U.S.-designated foreign terrorist groups. So, we have enduring interests there.

Our strategy emphasizes regional cooperation to reduce the threat of terrorism, reduce the threat and possibility of nuclear conflict, and to put pressure on the Taliban and other parties to seek reconciliation. We are in Afghanistan, and we remain engaged with Pakistan to protect Americans, to protect our homeland, and to ensure there are no safe havens from which terrorists can plan and operate and to support attacks. Our strategy focuses on the region as a whole, and shifts from a time-based approach to a conditions-on-the-ground approach, and promotes political settlement.

Regarding Afghanistan, we focus on four key pillars, known as the so-called "four Rs": regionalization, reinforcement, realignment, and reconciliation. Let me briefly update you on each.

Regionalization focuses on expanding burden-sharing, neutralizing potential spoilers, and creating the conditions for durable political solutions. As the Deputy Secretary noted, I would also note we are pleased with India's role in this regard, and their decision to increase economic and humanitarian aid to Afghanistan. As he also noted, we have shifted our approach on Pakistan. They are an important partner, and they are absolutely key to our strategy succeeding.

During Secretary Mattis's trip at the end of last year to Pakistan, he made clear that we appreciate the sacrifices they have made on the war on terror, our interest in continuing to partner with them, but he also made clear that we must see a change in Pakistan's behavior in particular areas where we have great concerns.

Reinforcement involves improving the Afghanistan National Defense and Security Force capabilities and their effectiveness. We do so by providing advisory support and tailored equipment and training, and assistance in expanding the size and reach of the more high-performing forces, the special forces, of Afghanistan. We also do this by assisting in areas where they lack key capabilities, such as in aviation and intelligence.

NATO and coalition partner uplifts are underway and will continue through 2018, and our own uplift is underway. U.S. and NATO will seek increased Afghanistan control of population centers, a reduction of violence, increased capabilities of Afghan special forces, and an increase to the independence of ANSDF operations.

Simultaneously, we are realigning U.S. military and civilian assistance to coincide with our overall objectives and our strategy. Major realignment initiatives include adjustments to our train-advise-and-assist authorities, seeking to improve the lethality and unity of effort within the Afghan Security Forces, and shift lethal and nonlethal resources outside of Afghanistan into theater. There is an ambitious roadmap for the Afghan Security Forces, as defined by leadership in Kabul. They seek to double the size of their special forces and modernize their air force, which we are contributing to and which we are helping them with.

Next steps will include the deployment of U.S. Security Assistance Brigades into the existing train-advise-and-assist structure, and we will continue to evaluate and determine how those efforts, particularly contributing at lower levels, more tactical levels, impact the effectiveness of Afghan Security Forces.

Reconciliation does remain our overarching objective. We seek to drive the Taliban to an understanding that they will not achieve their goals on the battlefield or through violence. To do so, we will continue to support the Afghan Security Forces on the battlefield to shape the choices of the Taliban and any other opponents of the government. We seek to drive all the parties to a political settlement that ends the conflict, reduces violence, and denies safe haven for terrorists.

Thank you, and look forward to any questions you may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Schriver follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. RANDALL SCHRIVER

Good morning Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cardin, and members of the committee. Thank you for this opportunity to update you on the work currently underway by the Department of Defense to implement the South Asia Strategy. While still new to this portfolio, it is clear to me that the Pentagon is working diligently and in close coordination with our interagency partners to implement this strategy, which is already yielding important results.

Before I detail the Department's efforts, allow me to recall the strategic aims of this strategy, and why we remain in Afghanistan. South Asia is home to two nuclear-armed powers and to the highest concentration of U.S.-designated foreign terrorist groups in the world. On August 21, President Trump announced a new, integrated regional strategy for South Asia. As you are aware, this new strategy focuses primarily on the challenges in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but recognizes that addressing these challenges effectively requires a broader regional approach. It seeks to discourage hedging behavior by regional states, puts pressure on the Taliban to join a peace process, and emphasizes the importance of regional cooperation to reduce the threat of terrorism and nuclear conflict. We are in Afghanistan to make America safer, to protect our citizens, and to ensure that Afghanistan and Pakistan do not serve as safe havens from which terrorists can support and launch attacks against our homeland, American citizens, and our allies. Now, more than ever, the United States ' vision and leadership must remain clear and steady.

The strategy seeks to deliver greater stability in the region by focusing on the region as a whole, and shifting from a time-based approach to one based on conditions on the ground in Afghanistan. It is important that we send a strong message to all actors that the United States remains committed to the continued development of the Afghan security forces, and that we are focused on promoting a political settlement that protects the interests of the United States, Afghanistan, and our international partners.

We are focusing the Afghanistan portion of the South Asia Strategy on four key pillars: 1) regionalization aimed at enlisting the support of regional actors and enhancing overall regional stability; 2) reinforcement of Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) capacity, capabilities and overall effectiveness; 3) realignment of U.S., coalition and Afghan resources; and 4) an Afghan-led peace process facilitating political settlement and reconciliation. All of these critical pillars of the strategy are complementary, mutually supportive, and designed to integrate through a political, fiscal, and military sustainable model.

Regionalizing our approach will expand burden sharing, neutralize potential spoilers to U.S. efforts, limit threats to the United States and its allies, and develop and support a durable political settlement in Afghanistan. We are working closely with the State Department to ensure that regional partners and allies support our South Asia Strategy, and we are equally focused on minimizing malign influence in Afghanistan, particularly from Russia and Iran.

We have asked regional partners to leverage their relationships with Afghanistan and Pakistan to reinforce our calls for broader cooperation between the two countries. We are also relying on regional partners, such as India, to increase their economic and humanitarian aid to Afghanistan. We have been very pleased with India's increase of non-lethal aid to Afghanistan, and continue to seek opportunities for burden sharing.

Our South Asia Strategy also reflects a shift in the U.S. approach to Pakistan. Pakistan is a long-standing and important partner, with deep historical ties to the U.S., and is key to the success of the President's South Asia strategy. America's interests are clear: we must stop the resurgence of safe havens that enable terrorists to threaten America, we must encourage restraint in Pakistan's nuclear weapons program and prevent nuclear weapons and materials from falling into the hands of terrorists. We must also encourage India and Pakistan to address tensions, in order to reduce the risk of nuclear war.

During Secretary of Defense Mattis's first trip to Pakistan in December, he engaged directly with Pakistani Chief of Army Staff Bajwa on the objectives of the South Asia Strategy.

Secretary Mattis underscored that the United States appreciates Pakistan's significant sacrifices in the war against terrorism, and that Pakistan can play a vital role in working with the United States and others to facilitate a peace process in Afghanistan. He also stressed that we must see a change in Pakistan's behavior in the areas of greatest concern to the United States.

Since the announcement of the South Asia Strategy in August, Pakistan has taken some positive steps. The steps to date, however, do not reflect the type of decisive action that is necessary to restore regional stability. We continue to call on Pakistan to take decisive, sustained action against terrorist safe havens on its soil. DoD will continue to press Pakistan to make positive changes in its approach, and will provide clear and consistent feedback in response to Pakistani action or inaction. DoD wants to ensure that Pakistan has a "bridge back" to enhanced cooperation if it takes decisive action on U.S. requests.

Reinforcement involves improving the ANDSF's capabilities and effectiveness. Our goal is to increase ANDSF operational capabilities and expand their operational reach by providing advisory support and tailored equipment and training. We are focusing our efforts on areas where they lack key capabilities, such as aviation and intelligence. We will also expand the size and reach of high-performing organizations such as the Afghan Special Operations Forces. While NATO and Coalition partner uplifts will occur throughout 2018, the U.S. uplift is already well underway.

We expect progress to accelerate over the coming year, as senior DoD leaders engage with regional partners, enablers transition from Operation Inherent Resolve to Afghanistan, Afghan special forces recruiting and training increase, and the Afghan Air Force modernizes. DoD is evaluating ANDSF progress consistent with the Afghanistan Compact. The U.S.-NATO Coalition seeks increased Afghan government control of population centers, lines of communication, and key terrain; marked reduction in violence; dramatic increase in defense capabilities with Afghan Special Forces growth; and an increase in effective independent ANDSF operations.

We are simultaneously realigning U.S. military and civilian assistance and political outreach to target key areas under Afghan government control to coincide with our overall objectives. The majority of measures to realign authorities, resources, and the ANDSF are progressing on schedule.

Our major realignment initiatives include adjustments to operational and Train, Advise, Assist (TAA) authorities; reorganization of portions of the ANDSF to improve lethality and unity of effort; and shifting lethal and non-lethal resources from outside of Afghanistan into theater. The ANDSF Roadmap is an ambitious plan to reform and improve the Afghan security forces; it includes doubling the size of Afghan Special Forces, a modernization of the Afghan Air Force and transitioning it from Russian-made to U.S.-made aircraft, transitioning control of border and civil order police forces to the Ministry of Defense, and improving leader development through mandatory retirements and merit-based promotions.

Our next steps will include the deployment of the U.S. Security Force Assistance Brigade into the existing TAA structure and determining how TAA efforts at lower levels impact ANDSF effectiveness. We will continue to monitor and evaluate the progress of the ANDSF Roadmap initiatives, and evaluate the effectiveness of an Afghan National Army- Territorial Force pilot program.

The objective of the South Asia Strategy is a political settlement and reconciliation in Afghanistan. We seek to drive all major parties, including the Taliban, towards a political settlement in Afghanistan that ends the conflict, reduces violence, and denies safe haven to terrorist organizations. We will do everything we can to support the ANDSF fight against the Taliban in order to drive them to the negotiating table. Fundamentally, our goal is to convince the Taliban's senior leadership that its goals are better pursued through political negotiation rather than violence. We remain committed to working with all parties, including regional partners, to forge a durable and inclusive settlement to the war in Afghanistan.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Cardin.

Senator CARDIN. Again, thank you both for your testimony.

Secretary Schriver, let me just start with you for a moment, if I might. And that is, a good part of the U.S. engagement in Afghanistan is to maintain the confidence of the people, that we are there in an interest at having a government that will protect the rights of all of its people. There have been some reported cases that involve the behavior—involving Afghan Security Forces and children—that would—that—it has been reported that U.S. soldiers witnessed, but said it would best to be leave it alone rather than reporting this misconduct. Do we have a very clear policy among our military that the United States has a responsibility to make sure that there is accountability, including the forces that we are

working with, to report any abuse of human rights, to make sure that the accountabilities for atrocities are ensured, whether they be the terrorist groups or the Afghan forces?

Mr. SCHRIVER. We do. We certainly reject any of that kind of behavior, and would seek to address that. We welcome any scrutiny that reveals that, including reporting by our forces. And, certainly, we have seen the same kind of reporting, and word has been delivered to our forces that they have a responsibility to report this kind of activity, should they see it.

Senator CARDIN. It is clearly important. And we have had this conversation with the—with Secretary Sullivan and the State Department—that part of the healing process in Afghanistan is accountability for those who have committed gross violations of human rights, whether they are, again, the insurgents, terrorists, or whether they are by local forces. I take it, Mr. Secretary, that that is still the policy of the United States on accountability as part of a settlement of what is going on in Afghanistan?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Emphatically so, Senator. And what—we bring it up repeatedly with our partners in the Afghan government. And I did, during my visits in Kabul last week with President Ghani and his cabinet.

Senator CARDIN. Would you just briefly review with us the status of the opportunities for regional diplomacy and whether the United States will be participating in the meetings in the Kabul process that are scheduled to take place, I think, later this month?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, Senator. There are a number of opportunities. There is the Kabul process. Following that, there will be a conference in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, sponsored by the Uzbek government, in coordination with the Afghan government.

Senator CARDIN. And who will represent the United States at those meetings?

Mr. SULLIVAN. The United States will be represented. I do not know whether that has been determined yet. I might be the representative, but it will be a senior-level U.S. Government representative participating.

Senator CARDIN. So, let us talk a little bit about Pakistan. What is the strategy, here? Have we seen any change in behavior, positive for the United States, as a result of the announced policies on international aid?

Mr. SULLIVAN. There certainly has not been any change that was—that we would consider final and irrevocable. We have had a number of discussions with our Pakistani partners on expectations for change and expelling terrorists from areas in which they have been allowed to operate. They understand what we expect. Our suspension of security assistance continues until we see more evidence that they are, in fact, taking action. So, they have engaged in discussions with us, but there has not been a sufficient amount of action yet, such that we would be lifting that suspension of security assistance.

Senator CARDIN. So, drill down just a little bit more. What is our objective in regards to the Taliban, as far as their participation in the peace process? The role the U.S. plays, the role Pakistan plays, the role Afghanistan plays. How does that come about? What is the

diplomacy that brings about a meaningful process that can lead to peace?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, we have engaged in discussions with the—with both the government—the governments in Kabul and Islamabad, on the need for a peace process to resolve the security situation in Afghanistan.

Senator CARDIN. Including the Taliban.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Including the Taliban. What we have not seen, however, is any inclination from at least significant elements of the Taliban that are still engaging in horrific acts of terrorist violence, as we saw last month in Kabul. So, everyone else seems willing to engage in a discussion at a peace conference, except those elements of the Taliban who are engaged in killing innocent men and women and children in Kabul.

Senator CARDIN. And just one last question. The common perception is that Pakistan is not doing enough to change that equation. Is that your assessment?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Certainly our assessment that Pakistan has not done enough to expel elements of the Taliban that have been operating in sanctuaries in Pakistan and able to cross the border.

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay.

Senator Young.

Senator YOUNG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And welcome, gentlemen.

Assistant Secretary Schriver, in your prepared statement, you discuss the effort to help the Afghan Security Forces to become more capable and effective. As part of that, you touch on the effort to transition Afghan forces from Russian-made to U.S.-made aircraft. And I support that effort. Helping the Afghans transfer to U.S.-made equipment will provide them superior capability, more effective lifecycle sustainment of equipment, and increased interoperability with our own forces.

Secretary Schriver, you agree that a transition to U.S. equipment will yield those benefits for our Afghan partners and for the United States?

Mr. SCHRIVER. We believe it will. And it is an important part of our approach.

Senator YOUNG. Well, I am glad to hear you say that. It is a happy coincidence that a transition to U.S. equipment will also provide benefits to U.S. workers. It is certainly true for my own constituents in the State of Indiana. In the northern part of my State, we are proudly building thousands of new Humvees for the Afghan Security Forces. My constituents, of course, take great pride in that work, knowing that a more capable and a better-protected Afghan Security Force means a safer America, as well. Our Afghan partners should not have to ride in combat against terrorists in thin-skinned pickup trucks, which is what some are having to do.

So, Secretary Schriver and Secretary Sullivan, please consider me an ally in the effort to facilitate a transition to U.S. equipment for the Afghan Security Forces, and let me know how I can help.

Secretary Sullivan, on a quick but important note, I want to thank you and your Department for your assistance related to some Ethiopian adoptions we have been trying to consummate.

This has been very important to a number of families in my own State, and I have received a specific and unequivocal commitment from the new Ethiopian Ambassador, you should know, related to certain cases that are still in the pipeline. So, I am hopeful and optimistic that the new Ambassador will honor his commitment to me regarding these specific cases. I wanted to publicly articulate my hopefulness in that regard, and my gratitude to your Department.

If, for some reason, this commitment is not honored, I may need to request your assistance once again. Can we have that conversation in the coming week or two, depending on the answer I get from the Ethiopian government, sir?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Of course, Senator. We have had this conversation about this issue, going back almost a year now. And we are aware of recent developments in Ethiopia with respect adoptions and the need for special treatment for those cases that are already pending. And I would be happy to discuss that with you further.

Senator YOUNG. Okay. Thank you so much.

Lastly, I would like to turn to the so-called Afghanistan Compact. I applaud the administration for shifting to a conditions-based, rather than a calendar-based, approach to the military campaign in Afghanistan. Our national security interests and objectives, the situation on the ground, and the advice of our diplomats and military leaders should guide our force posture in Afghanistan.

However, military progress is necessary, but not sufficient. If we do not see progress in governance, rule of law, and development, any military gains will not be sustainable, and those military gains will not lead to durable attainment of our objectives in Afghanistan. This is what our National Security Advisor often calls "the need to consolidate our gains around the world."

Secretary Sullivan, in your prepared testimony, you mentioned the Afghanistan Compact, a series of reform benchmarks established by the Afghans to implement reforms in the areas of security, governments, rule of law, economic development, and peace and reconciliation. According to a statement by our Embassy in Kabul last August, this Compact sets more than 200 benchmarks. Secretary Sullivan, you also write in your prepared testimony that, during your trip to Afghanistan last week, you reviewed and highlighted progress on those benchmarks. Ambassador Bass testified, last September, that the Afghan government has asked us to hold them accountable to these commitments.

Secretary Sullivan, where is the Afghan government falling short of these Afghanistan Compact benchmarks? And what is being done to address these shortcomings?

Mr. SULLIVAN. The principal focus of our meetings last week—Ambassador Bass and I met with President Ghani and with his cabinet—that it is a—the executive committee that forms the so-called Compact—our focus last week was on corruption and anticorruption efforts. The Afghans have adopted a legal structure, which we applaud and we have supported. Where we need to see more action is on follow-through on cases that are brought under the legal regime that has been adopted. They have adopted an office to prosecute corruption cases, but we need to see that office and those legal remedies actually employed. There have been some

cases brought, but I pointed out that there really had not been as many as we would have expected, given the scope of the problem.

Senator YOUNG. And, Mr. Secretary, you always strike me, every time you are before this committee, as so forthright and forthcoming. And I thank you for that. What I really think we need is more detail as a committee so we can fulfill our Article I oversight responsibility. So, do you commit to providing to this committee a list of the Afghanistan Compact benchmarks and a detailed, specific, and written assessment of where the Afghan government is falling short on these commitments, and how Kabul, with our help, presumably plans to address these shortcomings?

Mr. SULLIVAN. I do, Senator. I welcome it. Thank you.

[The information referred to above, "List of Afghanistan Compact Benchmarks," is located at the end of the hearing, beginning on page 49.]

Senator YOUNG. Okay, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Shaheen.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you both for being here.

Mr. Schriver, I am especially pleased to see you here, as someone from DOD. I think it is important for us to understand how State and DOD are working in conjunction on issues like Afghanistan.

Having said that, there are some measures that suggest that the Taliban are now in control of or contesting more territory today than at any point since 2001. And you all have both referred to the horrific terrorist attacks that killed so many Afghans in recent weeks. So, I am trying to better understand how this strategy is going to move Afghanistan forward.

President Trump declared, in August of last year, that America is not nation-building again. And so, I am not clear what exactly that means, because, like Senator Young, I share the concern that governance is as big, if not bigger, issue in Afghanistan than the military situation. So, if we are not nation-building, does this mean that we are less committed to human rights, to fighting corruption, to promoting good governance? What exactly does that mean? I guess this is for you, Mr. Sullivan.

Mr. SULLIVAN. The United States is committed to supporting an Afghan-led process that develops a government that is suitable for the Afghan people, and acceptable to them. We are not going to dictate the terms of either a peace settlement between the Afghan government and the Taliban, for example. What our—we have certain irreducible benchmarks for a basic stability in the country so that—for example, you mentioned Taliban-controlled areas—where the Taliban controls an area, there is massively increased drug cultivation and production, decrease in security, has a dramatic effect on the Afghan economy. So, we want to have a stable Afghanistan that is not a base for terrorism, as Secretary Schriver said, and then one that respects the Afghan constitution, which includes protections for women. Those are our basic—those are our irreducible basic thresholds for a resolution of our engagement in Afghanistan.

Senator SHAHEEN. And we are continuing to support the Afghan efforts, both with personnel and with resources?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, we are. I met with General Nicholson when I was there last week, and Secretary Schriver can go into greater detail. We are providing, both our—through our—with our NATO

partners and U.S. military, support for Afghan Security Forces—army, police—a particular focus now with security in Kabul, in developing a security force in Kabul to prevent the types of violent terrorist acts that we saw last month.

Senator SHAHEEN. Good.

On Pakistan, do we really believe that Pakistan has the ability to convince the Taliban to go to the negotiating table, as you suggested in your testimony?

Mr. SULLIVAN. They certainly have the ability to urge the Taliban to do so. What we believe they do have the ability to do also is to expel them from sanctuaries in their country. They may not be able to actually drive them to the negotiating table, but they can help, and they can eliminate sanctuaries in their country where they currently operate.

Senator SHAHEEN. They have—and I am not trying to make excuses for Pakistan, but they have, over a period of time, lost thousands of Pakistanis in the effort to throw the Taliban out—and other terrorist groups—out of their territory. With some success, but not entire success. And there has been a suggestion, over the years, that one of the challenges with the Haqqani Network is their ties to ISI and whether the government would be able to withstand an effort to remove the Haqqani Network because of the potential to create instability within the government. Do we believe that to be true? And, if so, how are—how is our Pakistan strategy accommodating that concern?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, we certainly understand the challenges that the—that Pakistan faces with these terrorist organizations within their borders, some of them directed at Pakistan itself, others directed at other countries in the region—Afghanistan, India, elsewhere. Pakistan has suffered grievously from terrorist attacks, as we all know and as I cited in my testimony. What we are looking for from Pakistan is more support from them against terrorist organizations that are outward-focused, in addition to their focus, the—Pakistan's government's efforts against terrorist organizations that threaten Pakistan. I understand it is a delicate balance for Pakistan. We want to do all we can to support them in that effort. And we have provided an enormous amount of assistance, monetary and otherwise, to the Pakistani government. What we are looking for is an indication from them, more support directed at those outward-focused terrorist organizations.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Isakson.

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Part of our new strategy calls for economic—calls for integration of diplomatic and economic assets into our military effort. That sounds a little bit like Provincial Reconstruction Teams that we did in Iraq for a while. Is that part of the goal in any way whatsoever? And I will further—I will just elaborate on that a little bit.

In Iraq, when we tried to bring over more of the Iraqi people to our side, versus the terrorist side or the Hussein side, we created Provincial Reconstruction Teams that used our military folks—in fact, in Gazaria, I was there with them personally when they did that—to make micro loans and things like to help them build the

local businesses and investment in them, as well as other participation like that with the State Department. Is anything like that being contemplated in Afghanistan?

Mr. SCHRIVER. I think the idea of integrating our approach is to try to achieve that same synergy of economic assistance and other support, along with the military campaign. So, although it is structured somewhat differently, in terms of the campaign, the best practices, lessons learned I think can still be applied when we ensure we are knitted up as two departments in our overall efforts.

Senator ISAKSON. Secretary Schriver, you made a very interesting comment in your verbal statement. I did not read your prepared statement, so it may be in there, as well. But, you said we are moving from measurement of accomplishment and not time. Is that correct? When we measure our success?

Mr. SCHRIVER. Yes, sir. Conditions-based.

Senator ISAKSON. Yeah. And that said to me a world of good, because when you use time, you say, "We are going to stay there til X time, and then we are gone." And we dealt with that, the last administration, for a long time, and we kind of protracted our investment in the country.

Now, by measuring accomplishment, we can actually see what we are doing to accomplish the ultimate goal, which is independence, regional cooperation, and hopefully a lessening dependence on terrorism and the Taliban and people like that.

Mr. Sullivan, is the Afghan Compact one of those benchmark measurements we are going to use to measure our accomplishments in Afghanistan?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, it is, Senator. In fact, as Senator Young mentioned, it has got a number of—within it, the Compact has a number of measurements—benchmark measurements for corruption, economic development, et cetera, that we will use to measure the progress of the Afghan government.

Senator ISAKSON. What do you see as the consequences for not reaching those benchmarks, for the players involved?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, ultimately, for the players involved, for the Afghan government, it is the success of their effort to govern their country, to govern effectively, to have a democracy in Afghanistan, to eliminate corruption, to promote the rule of law, to develop the economy. It is in the Afghans' self-interest to meet those benchmarks. And they, themselves, have adopted those benchmarks, and advocate for them.

Senator ISAKSON. This Thursday at Fort Benning, we are standing up a group—and I understand General Mattis is going to be there, or he just made that announcement today at the—before Armed Services Committee—a Security Forces Assistance Brigade at Fort Benning that will be going to Afghanistan, I think March the 1st. That is a significant commitment. My State of Georgia, with Fort Benning, with Robins, with so many—with Fort Stewart, with the investment we have in manpower and materiel going to Afghanistan, the—our success is a huge thing that is looked forward to by the people in my State. What are these—what is this group that is going to go from Georgia, come March 1st—what is it going to add to our effort in Afghanistan? And what are we going to look for them to achieve?

Mr. SCHRIVER. Our goal, Senator, is to integrate those brigades into the train-advise-and-assist structure and the mission, which is to ultimately create a more lethal and effective Afghan Security Force, as well as provide some key capabilities that are gaps for the Afghan forces currently. But, primarily, it is the train-advise-assist role that they will help with to improve the Afghan forces so, ultimately, they can operate more independently.

Senator ISAKSON. And I sense we are making a bigger effort for training of Afghan troops and Afghan resources to—in their own fighting for themselves. Is that correct?

Mr. SCHRIVER. That is a major focus, yes, sir.

Senator ISAKSON. Because in Moody Air Force Base in Valdosta, Georgia, we are trying to train the Afghan pilots now, under a three-year program of training, which is another investment we are making in training the Afghans to do for themselves what we, in the past, have been doing for them. That correct?

Mr. SCHRIVER. Yeah. The Air Force modernization is another key piece.

Senator ISAKSON. Yeah.

Mr. SCHRIVER. And it includes not only American equipment, but the training piece so that they can provide that key enabler to their operations.

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you both for what you are doing.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Menendez.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding the hearing. It has been nearly a year and a half since the committee has held a hearing on the United States' longest war, so I appreciate the opportunity, and, to both of you, for your testimony.

It is been nearly six months since the administration announced its new strategy for South Asia, which, as far as I can tell, is quite similar to the old strategy. I understand the administration is focused on conditions-based metrics for success and eventual withdrawal of U.S. forces, but I hope we can get a little more clarity to exactly what are our desired outcomes for our troops and for our foreign policy goals in Afghanistan.

And, Secretary Sullivan, you—in your testimony and as well as in responses, you have talked about a number of meetings and consultations you have had during your tenure, but I have not heard about the role of USAID or our plans to support good governance structures or economic development, critical components of successful countries. Can—are we talking about, for example, a civilian surge, here, to try to create the good governance? I think some of the reasons the Taliban has some successes is because the central government is not as responsive to its people and its needs as it should be. So, can you speak to that?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Sure. It—that is a very important component, Senator. I will give you some specific examples.

USAID is providing support to the Afghan government to run their elections coming up in this year—parliamentary elections; presidential elections next year. My message to President Ghani, which he was receptive to and embraced, was how important it was that the Afghans consider their record of commitment to democracy, their—they have had a number of elections, some more suc-

cessful than others, in the last 16 or 17 years, but it is important that these elections go forward. USAID is providing support to the government. I met with the opposition political leaders, while I was there at the embassy, to talk to them about the importance of free and fair elections and the support that the United States Government, through USAID, was going to be providing toward that end.

Senator MENENDEZ. Let me ask you. Since your testimony says that elections are vital, what specific diplomatic, developmental, and governance tools through USAID and State are you willing to—or utilizing to support those? And what is the realistic timeframe for you to be part of delivering it through those entities?

Mr. SULLIVAN. The timeframe is tight. We—the original schedule for parliamentary elections was this July. Based on my conversations in Kabul, that will likely slip to this fall, probably October. But, it cannot slip to next year. They have got to be done before the presidential elections.

Senator MENENDEZ. And what are we doing, in terms of——

Mr. SULLIVAN. Specific——

Senator MENENDEZ. —resources?

Mr. SULLIVAN. —support. For example, funding and providing advice on creating voter rolls and voter assistance, what we do here in the United States to support our elections, providing both advice and monetary assistance to the election commission both at the national level and at the provincial level so that the vote is fair and accurate.

Senator MENENDEZ. Let me ask you. Would you agree that the Taliban are able to build marginal support for some key constituents is largely due to their disillusionment and distrust of the central government in Kabul?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yeah, I think the Taliban is a broad term. There are elements of the Taliban that are more successful and more influential than others, and some have more of a political following than others. One of the strategies of President Ghani is in engaging the Taliban, to the extent that we can, in political discussions, is peeling off those elements of the Taliban that can be—where we can reconcile with, and then going after those elements of the Taliban that are, despite all of our efforts and entreaties, dedicated to violence and terrorism.

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, I say that, because, in 2014, I was pleased that the Senate passed the Afghanistan Accountability Act, which laid out a framework for the United States to work collaboratively with Afghan and international partners to implement meaningful reforms to promote accountability and transparency in the Afghan government. And I hope we can revisit the legislation and ensure the committee is effectively overseeing diplomatic and developmental efforts that the United States is making in Afghanistan, and ensure that we are supporting institutional reforms to safeguard governance structures. And I look forward to speaking to The Chairman about that opportunity.

Let me just take one last moment. At our hearing on the 2017 Trafficking-in-Persons Report, back in July, you offered to brief me on the Department's determinations regarding the Child Soldiers List. As I understand it, the Secretary decided to include a waiver for Afghanistan, despite the recommendation of his staff, knowing

full well that Afghanistan employs child soldiers. You also offered to brief me on a written plan submitted by the Cuban government to become eligible for a waiver from a downgrade to Tier 3, and clarification of Malaysia's upgrade, despite clear statutory language directing otherwise.

It has been nearly seven months since that hearing, and, despite repeated attempts from my office, and requests to follow on, we have received no information. So, can you commit yourself, after seven months, to give me the briefing you said you would give me and to provide the information you said you would provide?

Mr. SULLIVAN. I apologize for that failure, Senator. I commit to that now. I was not aware of the request. But, I cannot blame anyone else than myself. I made those commitments, and I will follow up immediately.

Senator MENENDEZ. I appreciate that.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Deputy Secretary Sullivan's briefing with Senator Menendez took place in the Senator's office on Wednesday, March 7, 2018.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Johnson.

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you both for your service.

Secretary Schriver, I want to kind of go back to Secretary—or Senator Isakson's question about measuring accomplishments. I am the accountant on the panel here. I do not need exact numbers, but I want, you know, basically, your assessment of troop levels of our enemies. Where is the—you know, what is the number of members of the Taliban right now?

Mr. SCHRIVER. I am not sure I can give you a number that I have great confidence in.

Senator JOHNSON. A ballpark. I mean, are we talking thousands, tens of thousands? Where are we at?

Mr. SCHRIVER. Yeah. I—in terms of actually dedicated fighters, with your permission, I would feel more comfortable taking the question, because there is—the Deputy Secretary said that there is different variations of Taliban, and they do have a tendency to melt away during nonfighting season. So, if—with your permission, I will take the question and——

Senator JOHNSON. So, I——

Mr. SCHRIVER. —will provide you——

Senator JOHNSON. I definitely want, you know, that kind of data.

Mr. SCHRIVER. Yes, sir.

[Mr. Schriver's response to Senator Johnson's question is located at the end of this hearing transcript in the Responses to Additional Questions for the Record section, beginning on page 45.]

Senator JOHNSON. What percent would you say are the terrorist element? You know, maybe this is for Secretary Sullivan. Is it ten percent? Is it a small percentage? I mean, is there a——

Mr. SULLIVAN. I am sorry, Senator. What——

Senator JOHNSON. What percentage of the Taliban would you consider the terrorist element versus those that we might be able to negotiate with?

Mr. SULLIVAN. I would have to defer to my colleagues both at DOD and the intelligence committee—community on that.

Senator JOHNSON. Okay. So, you can expect that, in terms of written questions for the record.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, Senator.

Senator JOHNSON. The same—I would like—same assessment of the Haqqani Network. And—both. Before I move on, is your assessment that the force through Taliban is growing? Is it declining? Is it stabilizing?

Mr. SCHRIVER. I think we will have a better assessment of that when the traditional fighting season starts and we can see the impact on the battlefield of our new strategy. Again, there is different sort of variations of dedicated fighters and those that are supportive politically, ideologically, but not dedicated necessarily to picking up arms. So——

Senator JOHNSON. Well, so what I am going to want is an assessment of what you thought the size—the troop level was, back 16 years ago, maybe 10 years ago. I mean, I kind of want a trend, here. I want to see what progress or lack of progress is being made against Taliban, Haqqani Network.

And then let me ask about ISIS. Is that a growing presence? Do you have any assessment of how many ISIS fighters are now located in Afghanistan?

Mr. SCHRIVER. Again, we will get assistance from the intelligence community to give us better figures. I know there is concern, particularly about returning foreign fighters, given developments in Syria, Iraq. So, it is something that we are watching very carefully, and will provide you an assessment.

[Senator Johnson's question was answered by Deputy Secretary Sullivan; the response is located at the end of this hearing transcript in the Responses to Additional Question for the Record section, beginning on page 45.]

Senator JOHNSON. So, you mentioned—and I was going to go the—here next. What is, then, the change of strategy? There used to—we used to have the winter pause, they would kind of melt back in, we would kind of leave them alone. Can you describe in greater detail exactly what we are doing, as well as any change of rules of engagement?

Mr. SCHRIVER. Sure. From a U.S. military perspective, there are several elements. One is the uplift, the reinforce part of it. And key to that is the role that any additional forces would play. So, that relates to the realignment of resources, as well. We are involved in trying to increase the lethality and capability of the Afghan Security Forces. Part of that is an equipment provision, part of that is training, part of them—part of that is actually being an enabler to some of their operations. I think what we can say, in terms of another change, is the Afghan approach to the conflict, in addition to trying to hold gains, there is more offensive action, taking the fight to the Taliban. We are helping with that, to fill in some key capabilities as enablers.

Ultimately, we want an Afghan force that can operate more independently and less reliant on the support of U.S. and NATO forces.

Senator JOHNSON. But, is it safe to say we are keeping up the pressure even during the winter months, versus the last administration, where we eased off? Is that——

Mr. SCHRIVER. Well, the overall tempo is down, but the pressure and the operations do continue, to some extent, yes.

Senator JOHNSON. Is that one of the reasons, Secretary Sullivan, that maybe we are seeing these terrorist attacks?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, I just wanted to add to that. When I met with General Nicholson last week, particularly with respect to operations against ISIS, that those have continued, and, in fact, there have been, in recent days, significant operations ongoing. So, there is a fighting season, traditionally, in Afghanistan, but our operations in Afghanistan are trying to break that mold a little bit.

Senator JOHNSON. Okay. Well, I have run out of time, but I will definitely be submitting those questions for the record.

Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Murphy.

Senator MURPHY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you both for being here. Appreciate your service.

As has been mentioned, things are not going well today in Afghanistan. The U.S.-backed coalition controls less territory than ever before. Insurgents control more than ever before. A series of very high-profile attacks. And, at the foundation, I think, lies some pretty significant confusion about what U.S. policy is. And I want to explore, as Senator Shaheen did, a few of those areas.

Maybe most significantly is this administration's position on the peace process, moving forward. I appreciated your answer, Secretary Sullivan, in response to Chairman Corker, that you believed—and I think you are representing the State Department's position—that there is a role for the Taliban in a peace process, going forward. Ambassador Haley mirrored that statement earlier this year.

But, here is what the President of the United States said a week ago. And he was definitive. He said, quote, "We do not want to talk with the Taliban. There may be a time, but it is going to be a long time." That seems to be in direct contradiction to the position that just articulated to this committee, that you believe, the State Department believes, there is room for the Taliban in those negotiations.

So, you can see that the world, and those involved in the peace process, may be pretty confused about what the U.S. position is. What is it? Is it the position that you articulated before the committee, or is it the position that the President articulated a week ago?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, I think the President's position—and I actually had the opportunity to speak with President Ghani shortly after the President—President Trump's statement. And I think President Ghani's view and President Trump's view are fairly well aligned. I think what President Trump was expressing was a reaction to the terrorist activities—the horrible terrorist activities last month in Kabul. Significant elements of the Taliban are not prepared to negotiate. And it may take a long time before they are willing to negotiate. That was the thrust, as I understand it, of the President's remarks. And that is certainly the view that President Ghani has. He is extremely upset about what happened, and he wants to take a very hard stance against those elements of the

Taliban that slaughtered innocent men, women, and children on the streets of Kabul.

Senator MURPHY. I—but, you just said, in your response to Senator Corker, that you believe there is a role for the Taliban. The President did not put conditions on this. He said, "We do not want to talk with the Taliban." So, do we believe that they have a place in the negotiating table, or do they not?

Mr. SULLIVAN. They do. I do not think that there is a place for the Taliban—for those elements of the Taliban that plotted those terrorist attacks last month, they are not showing an indication that they are willing to sit at the table. I think that is what the President was—the—that the—the sentiment that he was expressing.

Senator MURPHY. I understand you are in a very difficult position when the President adds no subtlety to these statements, but that is not what he said. He said, definitively, "We do not want to talk with the Taliban." And you can understand that, when the President makes statements, they hold much more water than the statements that the Secretary may make. I think there are still enormous amounts of—I know there are enormous amounts of confusion over here. We have directly contradictory statements.

Secretary Schriver, I want to talk to you a little bit about transparency. There were some disturbing reports recently that the Department of Defense limited a Special Inspector regarding information that they could make public. They were informed that they were not to release public data on the number of districts, the population living in them controlled or influenced by the Afghan government or by insurgents, or contested by both. This is following on instructions from the Department of Defense that the Special Inspector was not allowed to release numbers regarding losses by U.S.-backed Afghan forces. This is the first time that the Special Inspector has been told they cannot disclose information that was previously public and is not classified.

I am very concerned that the Department of Defense is trying to pull the cover over data that we all use, including our constituents use, to try to understand what is happening in Afghanistan, given some really disturbing trend lines. This does not suggest that this administration wants to make sure that my constituents have enough information to make decisions, going forward.

Can you speak to the limitations that have been placed on the Special Inspector's reports to Congress?

Mr. SCHRIVER. Well, we are going to work very closely with the Special Investigator to make sure that there is the transparency that you need, that I think we all benefit from. There are—there may be considerations in the future about operational security, the kinds of things that you do not want to telegraph to the enemy. But, I can tell you, our goal is to be transparent. We need the support of the people, we need the support of this committee and the Congress. And I think the way to do that is to be transparent and open. So, we will continue to work with the Special Investigator to achieve that.

Senator MURPHY. Why was SIGIR stopped from reporting losses for U.S.-backed Afghan government? They were unable to include the number of casualties among Afghan troops.

Mr. SCHRIVER. I think that there may be some misinformation. I think there was some information that SIGIR classified, themselves, and that may have been based on what information was provided by the Afghans and their own classification. But, I—as a general matter, Senator Murphy, let me tell you, we will work to resolve that, and we will work to be transparent. It is important to us.

Senator MURPHY. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Paul.

Senator PAUL. You know, after 16 years, thousands of lives, probably a trillion dollars spent, the Afghans do not seem to be able to defend themselves. They—you know, maybe people say, "If we left tomorrow, the Taliban would take over; therefore, we have to stay." When will the Taliban—when will the Afghans be ready to defend themselves, Mr. Schriver?

Mr. SCHRIVER. I would be hesitant to put a timeframe on it. I think the scrutiny is understandable. I would share every frustration that you mentioned about the time and investment. I do think the approach that we have adopted—we are six months into it; we are not into the new fighting season—traditional fighting season yet—I think gives us a better chance to achieve results on the battlefield, which will give us a better chance at the political settlement.

Senator PAUL. The original mandate from Congress was to go after those who attacked us on 9/11, or aided or abetted those who attacked us. Who is left over there that aided or abetted the attack on 9/11? Specific individuals that we are still looking for that aided or attacked it or were involved with the 9/11 attack?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Senator, I believe there are both elements of al Qaeda that are still—remnants of al Qaeda that are still in existence in Afghanistan, as well as the more lethal development of ISIS–K in Afghanistan.

Senator PAUL. Right.

Mr. SULLIVAN. So, those would be the terrorist elements that we would be most——

Senator PAUL. There is a real question, though, whether or not these people want to come attack us here or whether they want to control Afghanistan, you know, and whether this is a civil war in Afghanistan. And, by all appearances, it is a civil war in Afghanistan. And so, I think there is a real question whether this has anything left to do with 9/11. You can say the—you know, the Tories favored, you know, not letting us leave, and there are still Tories in England. I mean, are we going to be discussing this in 250 years from now?

I think there is an argument to be made that our national security is actually made more perilous the more we spend and the longer we stay there. And I am not saying we do not go after those who attack us, and plot to attack us, but everybody comes and says we are nation-building, when, in reality, we are nation-building. And then some want more nation-building. They do not think we are doing enough nation-building.

And, you know, if you look at the list of things we have spent money on—$45 million on a natural-gas gas station in the defense

budget because we are greening-up Afghanistan, we have got to put a green footprint on Afghanistan. Well, it turned out, nobody had a natural-gas car over there, so then we bought them natural-gas cars; then nobody had any money, so we got them credit cards so they could use it at the natural-gas gas station over there. That is absurd, and people are horrified by what we have done with that.

We spent $79 million on an Embassy in Mazar-e-Sharif. Never opened. It was all done, I think, at Clinton and Holbrook's request, and yet they looked at it, finally, and they found out there was a courtyard with tall buildings all around it, and said, "Hey, we cannot have an embassy where everybody can shoot down into the courtyard." And I think it was never occupied. We signed a ten-year lease on it.

Millions and millions, getting to the trillions, of dollars spent. There is no military solution. You know, we do not even know who to negotiate with. We do not know who the good guys in the Taliban are, if there are any, and who are not. We do not seem to be very forthright with how many people we are fighting. Are we fighting—if we cannot answer Senator Johnson's questions in round terms—10,000 Taliban, 100,000 Taliban, a million Taliban? Sure they slink away. We had 100,000 troops there. We could win. They all slink away when there are 100,000 troops facing them. Then they come back when there are not. How are we going to defeat them with 10,000 if we could not defeat them with 100,000?

Maybe it is time we have a frank discussion—Congress—whether or not there is a military solution in Afghanistan. We are spending $50 billion a year. That could be better spent. I would give the military all a pay raise and bring all the people home from Afghanistan. I would upgrade the nuclear arsenal. There are all kinds of things we could do with that $50 billion a year. But, it is just being thrown down, you know, a hatch in Afghanistan.

So, I think we really have to reassess this. I do not even know how we get to negotiating with the Taliban if we do not know who we are going to—you know, are we going to negotiate with the people who just exploded something? Obviously not. But, then, are there—there is a good-guy form of Taliban meeting somewhere? We do not know that. We are in an impossible situation.

And so, I see no hope for it, and I feel sorry for putting the military in this position. And we should not be nation-building. We are not very good at it. And I just hope that somebody will come here someday from an administration and say, "It is time that we reassess what we are doing in Afghanistan."

So, I do not see a bright future for Afghanistan. And I do not fault the military. I just do not think there is a military solution.

Thanks.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I actually—would you like to respond to that?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Sure.

Senator, I think our policy acknowledges that there is not a military solution or a complete solution. The military has to be part of the solution, and we have to train and equip the Afghans to fight this war against the Taliban. Everybody is against——

Senator PAUL. But, we have, for 16 years. I mean, when is enough enough?

Mr. SULLIVAN. I understand it is America's longest war. But, our security interests in Afghanistan and the region are significant enough, our commitment to the Afghan government, made over 16 years, we are doing, with the minimal amount of troops and money that we think can be committed to back the Afghan government in their struggle against the Taliban.

To get back to your original point about terrorists, everybody is—even the Taliban is against ISIS. It is a very complex battlefield. So, the Taliban is fighting ISIS. And it is a very complex political and military situation. And our strategy is trying to navigate those complex waters in a way that supports the Afghan government both militarily and politically so that we can get the Taliban to the negotiating table and at least negotiate with elements of the Taliban that are not going to—are not committed to blowing up men, women, and children on the streets of Kabul, that there is a more reasonable element, which we believe there is, that will negotiate a settlement to a more stable situation.

The CHAIRMAN. And just out of curiosity, what is our annual spend rate right now, all in?

Mr. SULLIVAN. For Afghanistan, on assistance, it is roughly $780 million a year for security.

The CHAIRMAN. But I am talking about the troop support

Mr. SCHRIVER. Depending on how you calculate it—I mean, direct support, Afghan Security Fund, has been roughly—and this last—pardon me, the current year we are in—is about five billion. We support directly the U.S. forces that are in-country. And I believe that is roughly 13 billion. And then there are supporting elements to the overall military effort, which might bring the total number up closer to 45 billion.

The CHAIRMAN. So, we jump from the 18 billion you are talking about to 45 billion. How—tell me how we——

Mr. SCHRIVER. A big piece of that is efforts outside the immediate theater, for logistics support. So, it does depend on how you calculate that number. There is a big logistics chain, there is a big support chain.

The CHAIRMAN. And so, really, a lot of that would be contractors and others who are helping support the direct efforts that are underway by our own troops.

Mr. SCHRIVER. Correct. And other military elements that are supportive of the in-theater, in-country fight. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And again, this is just for edification. All in, what do you think our annual effort is there? So, including the State Department's efforts, the other departments that are underway doing other kinds of things—we have got multiple departments working together to help what is occurring in Afghanistan transpire in a positive way, plus the efforts we have with contractors, troops, and others—what would you put the overall number at on an annual basis?

Mr. SCHRIVER. Well, this is back-of-the-envelope. The assistance piece just mentioned would put it above 45 billion, close to 46. But, certainly we can break that out and give detailed numbers on how we arrive at that.

Senator CARDIN. I was going to ask if we could get that breakdown number, because it is a—that is a large number. And it looks

like about 2 percent of the total budget is in diplomacy and trying to find an end to the war, and 98 percent is pursuing the security war efforts. And I think some of us wonder if that is the right mix.

[The information referred to follows:]

RESPONSE TO CHAIRMAN RISCH AND SENATOR CARDIN'S QUESTION

For FY 2018, the discrete annual cost of implementing the South Asia Strategy in Afghanistan is approximately $15.7 billion. This includes $9 billion to cover the direct cost of U.S. military operations within Afghanistan, $4.9 billion for security assistance through the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), and $1.7 billion for Department of State and USAID operations.

In addition, the Afghanistan contingency operation requires a wide array of Department of Defense supportive infrastructure, maintenance, training and related costs in the Central Command area of operations (AOR) and in the United States. The estimated annual cost for this support is $33 billion for FY 2018. This is an inclusive figure that includes costs associated only with Afghanistan and some significant level of funding connected with regular U.S. military operations that will continue after the Afghanistan operation has ended. When these additional support costs are included, the estimated total FY 2018 cost of implementing the strategy in Afghanistan is $48.7 billion. (See attached table)

The President's FY 2018 amended Budget Request for Department of Defense Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding for Operation Freedom's Sentinel (OFS) (Afghanistan) is $47 billion, including the additional $1.1 billion in the November 2017 amendment request to support the President's South Asia Strategy.

The total OFS request includes the cost of operations and the sustainment of troops (including Coalition and Afghan Partners) in Afghanistan, within the CENTCOM AOR, and in CONUS.

The request supports the operations, sustainment, and force protection of approximately 14,000 U.S. troops and $4.9 billion of direct support to the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces through ASFF.

The request includes funding for CENTCOM command and control, communications, logistics, and basing infrastructure; air expeditionary forces flying from bases outside of Afghanistan; naval forces afloat providing support within the CENTCOM AOR; Coalition support; and other counterterrorism and related missions.

The DOD request provides funding for depot-level maintenance, for the reset of deployed equipment, and reachback capabilities for intelligence, logistics, and unmanned aerial systems support to Afghanistan.

The request for the Department of State and USAID includes $957 million in operational costs and $780 million in civilian assistance. Operational funding will support the operation and security of diplomatic and USAID facilities in Afghanistan and related costs. Civilian assistance funds will support programs to continue development progress and bolster the stability of the country with an emphasis on maintaining the effective provision of health and education services by the government, promoting private sector-led economic growth, improving the justice system, and empowering Afghan women and girls.

The figures discussed in this response are our best estimate of annual costs to support the U.S. South Asia Strategy in Afghanistan, and other related operations. The total figure excludes a few relatively insignificant funding streams that are either classified or difficult to disaggregate to isolate specific Afghanistan spending.

FY 2018 DOD, State, and USAID Costs to Support the U.S. South Asia Strategy in Afghanistan and Related Operations

Billions USD

	2018	
Total In-Country Costs - Afghanistan	**15.74**	
Total Department of Defense - In-Country Costs	*14.00*	
Afghanistan in-country operations	9.10	
Afghanistan Security Forces Fund	4.90	
Total Department of State and USAID - In-Country Costs	*1.74*	
Afghanistan in-country operations	0.96	
Assistance	0.78	
Total Costs Outside of Afghanistan*	**33.00**	
Department of Defense Operations and Infrastructure for Operation Freedom's Sentinel (OFS) and related missions	33.00	
Total Cost for Implementing U.S. South Asia Strategy in Afghanistan and related missions	**48.74**	
Total DoD Costs	**47.00**	96%
Total State and USAID Costs	**1.74**	4%

* includes operations and infrastructure across the U.S. Central Command area of operations and other related contingency operations described in more detail above.

The CHAIRMAN. So, I just—I am using part of my time now. I do not usually ask questions on the front end. I support a conditions-based effort. And I think that is the only way you are ever going to get to a place where people are going to negotiate with you. I understand there are elements pushing, and, you know, the Taliban is fighting ISIS. We had—it is an interesting group of characters, if you will, that we are dealing with in Afghanistan.

I think the point that has been made, and is true—I mean, the fact is that the Afghan—if you took their entire GDP, it could not support the security efforts that are underway. Just would not pay for it. And all of this discussion about eventually mining precious metals up in the mountains that have no railway to them—I mean, I have been hearing that forever. And I know it is likely not to occur during my lifetime.

So, I think the point is well made. I mean, we are, in fact, here for a long, long haul. And I think it is true that, without the support that we have—they have got a 30-percent—you know, 30 percent of the folks who are part of the Afghan military and security leave each year. So, we have had this—you know, we have watched training exercises there. They just do not stay. They go back home. Obviously, they have had significant fatalities.

If I could, on our own front, over the last 12 months of activity, how many fatalities have we had with U.S. or—and/or NATO forces?

Mr. SCHRIVER. Again, I would prefer not to give you an incorrect statistic. But it has been relatively light since our new strategy, but I will get you an actual number.

[The question above was also asked by Senator Johnson in his "Additional Questions Submitted for the Record"; Assistant Secretary Schriver's response to Senator Johnson is located on page 46.]

The CHAIRMAN. And, as we look at embedding some of our best and brightest a little bit more deeply into the Afghan operations, what is our sense there? I know we have had conversations where there have been concerns about some of the most talented folks that we have serving in our military being embedded in that way. And are we anticipating that casualty rate to increase, or do we feel like we can continue on this low-casualty-rate trend?

Mr. SCHRIVER. Well, our hope, and our expectation, is based on increasing the capabilities of the Afghan forces, themselves, they will be more successful on the battlefield. And even if we are providing a train-and-assist—advise-and-assist function or an enabling function, the effectiveness of the force, themselves, would result in less casualties.

We will certainly learn more about the effectiveness piece as—if and when the fighting picks up in the traditional fighting season.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Merkley.

Senator MERKLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, to both of you, for your testimony.

And, Secretary Sullivan, thank you for your personal assistance with the Oregon resident in Sudan who has been freed, in large part because of your efforts.

As we talk about these macro issues, I have an enormous amount of frustration, the feeling like I hear the same story. Every couple of years, we adopt a modestly different strategy, and we say, "Well,

we are turning the corner." We heard from President Ghani, in October of last year, "We are turning the corner." We heard from NATO Commander, General Nicholson, "We are turning the corner." But, what did we hear, back in 2011? We heard from President Barack Obama that we had turned the corner after the surge deployment. We heard from Defense Secretary Robert Gates that we had enjoyed a lot of success and were turning the corner. We heard from General Petraeus that the Afghan forces had turned a corner. And we have the same set of hopes and aspirations that somehow we will keep training, and somehow now the training will actually result in a fighting force that fiercely wants to fight for the Government of Afghanistan. And yet, we never get there.

We continually believe and hope that there is going to be a marvelous development to a functional government. But, we do not get there. Right now, we have the Vice President out of the country, not being allowed to return. We have a growth in ethnic divisions within the political establishment, from Uzbek to Tajik to Pashtun. We have, essentially, paralysis between the National Unity Government, in terms of the CEO, Abdul Abdullah, and the President. And then we have other aspirations, like, "But, now we are really turning the corner on corruption."

Well, we cherry-pick little pieces to say there is a little bit of improvement here or there, but, in general, no. Massive corruption that destabilizes all of the efforts of—whatever efforts the Afghanistan Government is making, but also our money has been helping to drive the corruption, because, essentially, the price on every position has become higher because of the sort of money that we have poured into the country.

And then there is this, the very fact that our presence remains a recruiting mechanism for the Taliban. This sense of—deep in the soul of the villagers of Afghanistan that they do not like foreigners goes back—they stopped—throughout history, they have stopped one foreign invasion after another after another. And I recall the words of poet Robert Kipling, who often wrote about wars around the world, but his poem about Afghanistan closed with something along the lines of, "If you are wounded and lying on the Afghanistan plain, roll over on your rifle and blow out your brains before the women of Afghanistan come out and carve up what remains."

And so, we have the set of, yes, we are—we—"We will get there on corruption." But, we do not. "Yes, we will get there on training." But, we do not. "Yes, we will get there on a politically effective government." But, we do not. Meanwhile, we just—we continue to paint a very rosy scenario. And we heard a very rosy scenario from you all today. And I feel like, if we are going to grip this as a nation, as a government, we have to have a really honest conversation about our perpetual aspirations that just are not realized, and why they are not realized, and why they may be impossible to realize.

So, one of those aspirations always is the political settlement. That is another piece of that. Why do the Taliban want a political settlement? They now control more territory than they controlled since 2001. They are gaining ground. They are creating chaos. They are getting through the perimeter of the capital and assaulting an international hotel, blowing up key locations, packing an ambu-

lance full of explosives, and somehow it gets through our perimeter and into the middle of the city and blows things up. Massive explosion.

This is my plea and hope, that we can have an honest discussion about these aspirations that we keep putting forward in slightly different versions, but we are really not gaining ground. And I would just—I will just throw that out there for your—your all's thoughts and comments.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, I do not know that there is a lot you said, Senator, that I would necessarily disagree with. I do not think that there is a rosy situation in Kabul. And I do not think President Ghani would agree there is. The attacks last month were a real shock to many people in the government and to a number of the Afghan people, NGOs, and political leaders, that I met with. There is no doubt that there is a serious challenge we face in dealing with Afghanistan. It took us months to come up with the policy that we developed, the regional policy that we developed, the South Asia strategy, because it is that challenging—the situation you posited is as challenging as it is.

One option is simply to withdraw. We decided we could not do that. We have come up with, and we are proposing, this policy. It is a regional policy. As I mentioned in my opening statement, I met with the foreign ministers in New York for the five Central Asian countries that border Afghanistan to the north. We are also working with India. India has made billions of investment in Afghanistan.

It cannot just be the United States that solves Afghanistan. It is a regional strategy. I do not want to come here and say, Henry Kissinger-like, that peace is at hand. I cannot say that to you. But, we have got a policy that we believe in. We want to stick to it. We want to persevere. And we think it is the outcome, and the significance to U.S. national security is such, that we cannot fold our tents just because there were terrorist attacks in Kabul last month. We need to persevere. But, I do not want to leave you with the impression that we have got a Pollyannaish view that this is—we are going to, you know, have peace break out this summer in Kabul.

Senator MERKLEY. My time is out, so I will just close with this comment, which is: My concern about no set timetables and no clear metrics for success just means that we are setting ourselves up to accept whatever level of failure occurs, and still just say, "We are staying, we are staying, we are staying." Because it is always hard, in any situation where we have inserted troops, to ever say, "The strategy is not working." You can do the eighth twist on the old strategy, call it a new strategy. It is going to fail. At some point, we have to recognize that there are fundamentals here that make the direction of our policy ineffective.

The CHAIRMAN. So, I—just one more interjection. Maybe another one later.

It does appear that, in Iraq, we left, we came back, we—it does appear there is a reasonable chance of the country holding together, if with proper governance, and becoming a more fully functioning country. But, they have resources. Afghan has no resources. Afghanistan. Never going to have any resources that compare to the Iraq situation.

I mean, is there a credible end—I mean, even in the event there is reconciliation with the Taliban? If you will, paint to us—paint the picture of what it would look like, in the event there was an actual—they are—they do control more territory. I know, with this new effort, we expect to gain another 20 percent and get things back to where they were a few years ago. But, they are still going to control a tremendous amount of territory. We are still going to have, you know, a tremendous amount of illicit behavior taking place. In the event they were to reconcile somehow with the current government, with Ghani and others, give us a picture of what that would look like, going forward, and what our role would be.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, I think the picture has to be, as I said to Senator Merkley, Afghanistan integrated into a region, as opposed to simply focused on Afghanistan, itself. Because, as you point out, Afghanistan does not sit on a trillion dollars' worth of oil wealth, the way Iraq does, a large amount of which is now funding government operations in Iraq. We have got to integrate Afghanistan into the region. There have been discussions with the Uzbek and Tajik governments on transmission of electricity into Afghanistan, for example. The discussions with India—India wants to do business—Indians want to do business in Afghanistan. And ultimately, as we have urged President Ghani, the bilateral relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan has to improve. If that does, then we think that there is a viable future, economically, for Afghanistan. The key, in my opinion, is the relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan. If we cannot solve that, this problem is not going to go away. And it is in Pakistan's interest to solve the situation in Afghanistan, as well.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gardner.

Senator GARDNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you both, Secretary Schriver, Secretary Sullivan, for your time today.

I, too, want to reflect what Senator Isakson talked about, the men and women in Fort Benning, and talk a little bit about my gratefulness for our men and women in uniform, our armed services.

In the spring, I believe, Fort Carson, Colorado, home to—Fort Carson, in Colorado, home to the 4th Infantry Division, will be deploying troops to Afghanistan later this spring. And so, I thank them for their service, and, obviously, the men and women in uniform around the globe who have continued to stand up for our country and our country's interests.

According to a BBC news report—and perhaps you have talked about this earlier today—on January 31st, the news report stated, "The Taliban fighters, whom U.S.-led forces spend billions of dollars trying to defeat, are now openly active in 70 percent of Afghanistan. The study conducted by BBC shows that the Taliban are now in full control of 14 districts and have an active and open physical presence in a further 263 districts, significantly higher than previous estimates of Taliban strength."

Could you address that a little bit? And when we were in Afghanistan two years ago, I believe it was, we met with General Campbell—then General Campbell—and talked about authorities that we were operating under in Afghanistan. And we have seen

those authorities change. And that has made a difference in Afghanistan. But, with this BBC report, do we need an additional change to those authorities? And what does that mean?

Mr. SCHRIVER. We have certainly seen these reports, and we are concerned about reports of Taliban gains in some of the rural, less populated areas. They do not control a major population center. They have been denied their strategic goal of overrunning a province. But, we are clearly not where we want to be. So, part of our train-advise-assist mission and our enabling function is to help the Afghan Security Forces win on the offense. And then they have—ultimately, have to be able to hold territory, as well. That will change, hopefully, the calculus of the Taliban and understand that they cannot prevail on the battlefield, and will ultimately lead to a political process.

Senator GARDNER. Would you like to address the issue of authorities? If current authorities for U.S. forces operating against insurgent elements, do they need to be expanded or refined, on top of what has already been done?

Mr. SCHRIVER. I think where we stand right now, our commander in the field is comfortable with, and our military officials are comfortable with. There will be a process of continuing to evaluate the effectiveness of our support to the Afghan forces. And, through continual evaluation, there may be a case in the future where we would want to revisit that. But, at this point, I think we are comfortable.

Senator GARDNER. Secretary Sullivan, you mentioned, in your last answer, that we need to integrate Afghanistan into the region. This is a region that also includes China, Iran, Russia. There have been reports, obviously, of Iran and—Iranian and Russian support of the Taliban. Can you talk a little bit about what you are seeing, in terms of Iranian and Russian involvement?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Certainly. We have seen, with respect to Russian involvement—and I was up at the U.N. Security Council a couple of weeks ago, and discussed this—we have seen Russian support for elements of the Taliban as a hedging strategy, and some accusations that the United States is supporting ISIS—you know, false information campaigns——

Senator GARDNER. This is the conspiracy theory, and they are trying to generate——

Mr. SULLIVAN. Trying to generate—very unhelpful and, of course, wildly inaccurate. So, the Russian influence has not been welcome.

There is a Shi'a minority population in Afghanistan. Afghanistan shares a long border with Iran. Just as Iraq and Iran have to coexist as neighbors, so does Afghanistan and Iran. What we are concerned about is pernicious influence by Iran that would undermine Afghan sovereignty, as we are with respect to Iran's influence in Iraq.

China has made investments in Afghanistan. And I think we are looking for all countries in the region to support a peaceful, prosperous Afghanistan. It is not just going to be the United States that is going to be able to achieve that ultimate goal.

Senator GARDNER. Yeah. Thank you.

When you say "Russian—Russia support for elements of the Taliban," what are you referring to?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, there are reports that Russian—Russia has provided support to groups in northern Afghanistan that are aligned with the Taliban. And it is sort of a hedging strategy. It is playing both sides, dealing with the Ghani government in Kabul, but also supporting the Taliban. And we are not willing to go to the peace table today with Taliban, because of their violent terrorist activities in Kabul. Elements of the Taliban, at least, we believe are dealing with some parts of the Russian government.

Senator GARDNER. And, Secretary Schriver, I was going to shift a little bit to Asia, but we are out of time, so I will yield back and thank you both for testifying.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Merkley—I mean, sorry—Markey. I do that often. Sorry about that.

Senator MARKEY. Oh, no problem. I do not mind. I do not know about Jeff, but I do not mind. The—you know, so I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think that we can agree that the United States needed to take swift action, and decisive action, after September 11th. It was important to reduce the likelihood that Afghanistan would continue to be a sanctuary for terrorists who would be seeking to harm Americans. The December 2017 statement of the National Security Strategy is that the United States will give priority to strengthening states like Afghanistan. Yet, the National Defense Strategy, released the following month, stated that the central challenge to U.S. prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term strategic competition, not fragile states like Afghanistan.

I think, Mr. Schriver, I heard you say that we are now spending $45 billion a year in Afghanistan. Is that the number that you used?

Mr. SCHRIVER. Again, it depends on how it is calculated. But, bringing in elements outside of theater that are in support——

Senator MARKEY. Yeah.

Mr. SCHRIVER. —you can—you could have that number. And we can provide the breakdown.

Senator MARKEY. Yeah. So, $45 billion a year is an amazing amount of money to be spent. Just by comparison, Andrew Kolodny, who works at Brandeis University—and he is the director of their opioid research facility—he said that, "If you just took two months of Afghanistan spending and dedicated it towards the opioid crisis, we could have an opioid center in every single county in the United States of America." And, just in Massachusetts alone, we had 2,000 people die from opioid overdoses last year. Seventy-five percent of them had fentanyl in their system. And we do not—we still do not have any more than 20 percent of Americans who are in treatment, who need it, who would qualify for it. So, we could be looking at an—we could be looking at a Vietnam War every single year in America, just from opioids. And the funding is completely inadequate.

So, I guess, from my perspective, as you look at priorities—in saving American lives, making sure that we are protecting people, including veterans who are back, who do not receive the treatment which they need—I would like to ask you just to reflect upon that, and the amount of money which we are spending there, knowing that it does come out of services like that, that could save lives,

could save tens of thousands of lives, if the resources were there to provide that kind of help. Would either of you like to speak to that issue, that resource allocation issue?

Mr. SCHRIVER. I think we need to be mindful of the costs. And I am—I—we certainly welcome the oversight and the scrutiny, and we should be held to task, if we are making gains and getting closer to reaching our objectives. Those are very fair and important questions to ask.

I think we look at the enduring interests we have. And that was the starting point when the new strategy was developed, looking at a region with two nuclear-armed countries, looking at a region that harbors all these foreign terrorist organizations. And we think we have developed a strategy that will give us a chance for success. There—but, as the Deputy Secretary said earlier, there is no attempt to paint a rosy scenario. These are significant challenges, to be sure.

Senator MARKEY. Mr. Sullivan.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes. As Secretary Schriver said, it is—it is an enormous cost, and you have drawn a stark contrast with what we could do with that money. The assessment we made in this administration was that the threat to U.S. national security from a withdrawal from Afghanistan was such that we needed to make that commitment.

And the problem that we face is—and I will just give you an example from the State Department—we make it a commitment to have our Embassy in Kabul. The number of U.S. direct hires—State Department employees—it is in the hundreds—500-and-some-odd employees. We need 6,000 security personnel, contractors, to protect that small group. Once we make a commitment to go in, and we make a commitment to the safety and security of our people, the costs multiply——

Senator MARKEY. And again, I——

Mr. SCHRIVER. —exponentially.

Senator MARKEY. —and I appreciate that. And, of course, we thank everyone for their service who takes on responsibility. But, it is only to make the point that——

Mr. SCHRIVER. Right.

Senator MARKEY. —for one-sixth of what you do in Afghanistan, 45 billion, we could take care of this crisis over a period of time. And we do not have the resources. So far—you are here testifying on behalf of the administration, for 45 billion more, essentially, and this administration has yet to put up one nickel for the opioid crisis. Not one nickel. We are still waiting to resolve this issue in the budget. It is—it had been 14–15 months without a single nickel on something that is killing Americans every single day, and many of them veterans. And there is no money. And they are saying this—you know, it is just so hard to find the money. And yet, here, if we just cut your budget down by 7 billion, there would be enough to put an opioid treatment center in every single county in the country. That would be comprehensive. So, it is a—I just keep—ask you to be mindful of that tradeoff, because every decision you make is draining from things that would, in fact, help people. They are—these very families of—that are over there serving us, here at home.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Udall.

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you both very much for your service.

And I will not repeat it, but I also share the frustration you have heard from both sides of the aisle here, in terms of where we are in Afghanistan. And I want to look back a little bit, because I remember, at the time, when I was in the House and we voted for the authorization of force, President Bush was very specific about us going after "terrorists of global reach." That was the term he used. And it—and, you know, when I look at President Trump's quote, here, on the new strategy last summer, he says, "We are not nation-building again. We are killing terrorists."

And so, what I am probing, from both of you, is, you know, are we focusing on terrorists that have global reach, that we believe are there in Afghanistan? And how many are there? Or are we focusing on—are we just focusing, like the President says, "We are just killing terrorists"? I mean, this is a—I have a longer statement here, but it basically says, "We are turning this over to Afghanistan, we are going to let them govern, we are going to let them do it, we are not going to tell them how to do it, we are—and we are not nation-building."

So, will you focus on the terrorists and a global reach? Because I think we have extended way beyond that, not only in Afghanistan, but around the world. And I thought the way President George W. Bush phrased that was very important.

Please.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Flip a coin.

You are absolutely right, Senator. The reason we are in Afghanistan is because of what happened on September 11th. It is still the reason we are in Afghanistan. There is still—there are still remnants of al Qaeda there. ISIS has metastasized into Afghanistan, with ISIS–K. If the Taliban were to regain control of the country, we would very likely see the same platform for that global reach of terrorists that struck New York and Washington and Pennsylvania on September 11th.

Having made that decision that we need to stop that platform from being recreated by the Taliban, it then causes, as I was discussing with Senator Markey, a decision for the United States to maintain a presence, an engagement in Afghanistan, automatically because of the security situation, generates enormous costs just for the State Department.

So, our strategy is an effort to reconcile the cost, to minimize the cost to the U.S. Government, but with—in treasure and, more valuably, lives of my colleagues at the State Department and those of my colleagues in uniform—but also do all we can to support the Afghan government so that we do not have a Taliban that resumes using Afghanistan as a platform for terrorists.

Senator UDALL. And could you add—he has mentioned ISIS again. And we have seen, with our allies and others, the defeat of ISIS in their capital in Raqqa. How many ISIS fighters have now come over into Afghanistan? That has been some discussion about

that. Assistant Secretary Schriver, when you answer the first question, there.

Mr. SCHRIVER. Yeah, it is certainly something that we are watching carefully, that, to defeat ISIS in one location, only to have them reinforce elements in another, would be certainly harmful to our interests.

So, our CT mission, our counterterrorism mission, sometimes in combination with the Afghan forces, sometimes unilateral, is exactly as the Deputy Secretary said, it is to prevent Afghanistan from being a place from which terrorists can launch, plan, support in any way, an attack against American citizens, our homeland, or our interests. Our assessment is, walking away would, in fact, create the potential for such a platform to reemerge.

Senator UDALL. So, do you have a number for me, a specific number, or can you get me one for the record, on how many ISIS fighters there in Syria and other—have made it in since the fall of Raqqa?

Mr. SCHRIVER. We will certainly work with the intelligence community to see what assessment can be made available, yes.

[The committee received no response to the question above from Assistant Secretary Schriver.]

Senator UDALL. Okay. The one thing that I think was kind of shocking to some on the committee in—was this $46 billion, when you added it all up. I think Senator Paul used the term "50 billion," but you are going to add it—add us up and give us the actual number. But, what I am wondering is, the folks we are fighting—the Taliban, ISIS—al Qaeda, you have mentioned them—what kind of resources do they have? What do—how—of countries outside and their own local resources—are they putting up $46 billion a year to get—as Senator Merkley said, they control more territory since 2001. So, how much are they putting up?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, what I would say, Senator Udall, is, as Secretary Schriver said, the Taliban control unpopulated areas. What they are doing in those unpopulated areas is actually cultivating and producing narcotics, which they are selling. To get to Senator Markey's point, the production of narcotics in Afghanistan from regions that are controlled by the Taliban is skyrocketing. And that is among the principal sources, more than 50 percent——

Senator UDALL. What cost do you put on that?

Mr. SULLIVAN. I do not have a dollar figure, but what I have is an estimate that whatever the—whatever—and we can get you that from the intelligence—the dollar figure for what the Taliban, we think, however defined—whatever our definition of the Taliban is, putting a dollar figure on that, 65 percent, rough estimate, of how they finance themselves is through the sale—production and sale of narcotics.

Senator UDALL. And so, you do not—you will try to get us an overall number. Because I am very interested in what our overall number is, and what theirs is. And, you know, one of the great diplomats, Richard Holbrook, when he was in there—and both of you may know him—he started the strategy, because of the growing of poppies and all of that—he said, "Well, we are going to allow them to grow them until they shift over to another product." And—a legitimate farming product or something like that. Are we trying

anything like that in the areas that we end up capturing? Are we—or are we just eradicating fields and putting a small farmer out of business?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, first, on the statistics that you asked for, Senator, several members of the committee, starting, I think, with Senator Johnson, have asked. So, Mr. Chairman we will commit to providing all of that information. Some of it may be classified, but we will produce those stats, the best numbers that we can get you on the facts and figures.

And then, with respect to narcotics, Senator, the State Department has got a limited budget for counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan. There is a larger effort—because of the Taliban's use of narcotics to fund operations against the U.S. military and the Afghan government, the U.S. military is also committed to the counternarcotics effort.

[The information referred to follows:]

DEPUTY SECRETARY SULLIVAN'S RESPONSE TO SENATOR UDALL

Mr. SULLIVAN. Terrorist groups around the world raise funds from a variety of sources, including theft, extortion, drug production and smuggling, extraction and trafficking of commodities like oil, kidnapping for ransom, fundraising from donors and charities, and other illicit activity.

According to the May 2017 "Opium Survey Report" published by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the Taliban generated approximately $160 million from "poppy taxes" in 2016. The report also adds that the estimated overall annual income of the Taliban (drugs and other sources of income) is around $400 million; half of which is likely to be derived from the illicit narcotics economy.

Al-Qa'ida largely depends on donations from supporters and from individuals who believe their money is supporting humanitarian causes. Other funds are diverted from Islamic so-called charitable organizations. Al-Qa'ida may have operated on a budget of up to $30 million a year prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks, but its annual income has decreased significantly in subsequent years due to counterterrorism pressure against the group and its networks.

ISIS receives most of its funding from a variety of businesses and criminal activities within areas it controls in Iraq and Syria. Criminal activities include robbing banks, smuggling oil, looting and selling antiquities and other goods, as well as extortion, human trafficking, and kidnapping-for-ransom. The efforts of the Counter-ISIS Finance Group (CIFG) have been critical in coordinating the work of Coalition members designed to counter ISIS's means of financing. ISIS has lost over 98 percent of the territory it once controlled in Iraq and Syria, which has directly impacted ISIS's ability to generate revenue. In 2015, ISIS made about $500 million from the sale of oil and about $360 million from extortion. In 2017, ISIS lost control of the majority of its oil and gas fields and the population centers it previously exploited as a critical taxation base. By mid-2017, the group's oil sales were in the low millions of dollars per month.

Senator UDALL. Thank you both for your service.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. But, we are no longer—and we had a major spring operation, if you will, eradicating poppy fields. And then that stopped. And, to get specifically to his question, we—that is no longer a robust program. Is that correct?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Right.

The CHAIRMAN. And, just out of curiosity, it is not a robust program, because?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, I am—I believe that the U.S. military has focused on the narcotics production in areas that are controlled by the Taliban, both to limit the production in the country, but also to cut off the source of revenue to the Taliban. So, destruction of Taliban financing, so to speak.

Mr. SCHRIVER. That is correct. There is an effort—there is a more comprehensive effort at illegal illicit financing, but, in terms of the drug production and trade and money that they may make off that, there is certainly an effort to disrupt, particularly, storage facilities, distribution points, et cetera. It is something that the Afghan forces are focused on and we are assisting with.

The CHAIRMAN. And—but not the fields, themselves.

Mr. SCHRIVER. Not similar to the programs that we once had, that was mentioned earlier. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Coons.

Senator COONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you for your testimony, and thank you for your dedicated work in some extremely difficult areas of undertaking.

Let me just add, if I could, two questions that I think have not been addressed in detail, or maybe just in passing by one of my colleagues.

First, about other actors in the region. Mr. Schriver, you had mentioned that part of regionalizing our approach is an attempt at both expanding burden-sharing and neutralizing potential spoilers to U.S. efforts. And part of what I think has bedeviled our efforts in Afghanistan have been the lack of reliable cooperation, partnership, assistance, support from regional players. I think Senator Gardner asked about Russia and Iran.

Let us focus, if we could, on China and the reports that they are constructing, or planning to construct, a military base in eastern Afghanistan. Do you think there is a chance that China could be a viable constructive counterterrorism partner for the United States in Afghanistan? Do you think our pressure on Pakistan will only succeed in pushing them closer to China? And how do you see China playing either a constructive or destructive role in both diplomacy and development efforts, Mr. Sullivan, that are underway, and the military security efforts that are underway?

Mr. SCHRIVER. Thank you, Senator.

I think there is the possibility that China, on the counterterrorism front, could be a partner. They certainly have their own concerns about terrorism within China, and the potential for linkages between terrorist groups operating elsewhere, and for that to seep into China. Historically, we have run into some difficulties, what they define as a terrorist, particularly inside China, and the way we look at things. There is an important difference there. But, they do have an interest in stability in Afghanistan. They do have an interest in ultimate political resolution. And I do not see how we get there without fundamentally addressing the terrorist problem.

So, in our discussions with China, it is an agenda item, how we promote our cooperation and how we can for—ensure that they are a constructive participant in the process that is underway in Afghanistan.

Senator COONS. Mr. Sullivan?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yeah. And with respect to economic development, Senator Coons, certainly Afghanistan would be included as a small part of what you know as China's One belt, One road initiative. What we have found—and this goes to an observation that Senator Corker made—some significant investments by the Chinese—for example, billions of dollars invested in a copper mine that they

have yet to be able to develop production from, and now sits dormant. So, there are significant challenges to economic development in China that—excuse me—in Afghanistan, that the Chinese have discovered, that Senator Corker and I were discussing earlier.

Senator COONS. Accessing—building the infrastructure in Afghanistan to ever access its vast mineral potential is something that I think you said may not happen in your lifetime. I agree that it—I mean, visiting Afghanistan gives an insight into just how remote, how rugged, and how undeveloped it is as a nation. It may have vast mineral resources. They are still there because they are so incredibly hard to access.

Let me turn to humanitarian issues. The U.N. reports nearly half a million individuals, about 450,000, became internally displaced, became IDPs, within Afghanistan in the last year, and about 60,000 refugees returned from outside the country. Does the Trump administration plan to increase, Mr. Sullivan, its budget request to help refugees and IDPs within Afghanistan? And how does the administration's strategy account for the dramatic number of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, and then how that destabilizes the region, and how that humanitarian challenge continues to be a contributor to conflict?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, that last point you raised, Senator, is very significant, and was brought up with almost every interlocutor I had in my discussions in Kabul last week. The potential for Pakistan to send back the huge number of Afghan refugees that are now in Pakistan would be very destabilizing.

Senator COONS. Right.

Mr. SULLIVAN. And it is one area where we credit the Pakistani government for what they have done in supporting those refugees. And it is part of our complex relationship with Pakistan. We have got, on the one hand, our concerns with their lack of action to eliminate terrorists from these safe havens, but, on the other hand, they have provided this support to all of these refugees, which, if they did not, if they went back into Afghanistan, would be a huge burden for the Afghan government. And President Ghani is very concerned about that.

Senator COONS. Just to make sure I understand, there are more than two million Afghan refugees in Pakistan, many of them dating to the Soviet invasion of '79.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes. And they are identified by the Pakistanis, and they could be sent over the border.

Senator COONS. Let me ask a question that is not meant to be needlessly pointed, but, How does it affect our moral authority in having that conversation with the Pakistanis, when the administration has recently decided to begin deporting folks who have also been in the United States for decades, under temporary protected status, fleeing conflict or natural disasters in their countries of origin? How does that impact those conversations about—saying to the Pakistanis, "We would be appreciative, supportive if you would continue to host several million refugees in your country"? Do they simply turn around and say, "Then why are you deporting hundreds of thousands of people who initially came to your country as refugees from civil wars or from natural disasters?"

Mr. SULLIVAN. That issue has not been raised to me, in my discussions on this issue with the Pakistani government, but I take your point. It is, rhetorically, something that they could. I would draw distinctions between the legal status under which the TPS individuals were admitted here to the United States. But, I take your point.

Senator COONS. But, more broadly, I must say, thank you for your work. It is striking—The Chairman, earlier, was saying, "All in, what are we talking about?" And I—the number, 45 billion, is going to hang over my thoughts for a number of weeks—16–17 years in. I am not convinced that we have a strategy to win. But, a conditions-based strategy and looking harder at our partners in the region strike me as at least giving us the potential for progress. I listened to testimony from both of you in the question-and-answer from both Republican and Democratic members. I do not think there is a clear path out of Afghanistan. And I worry that the Taliban will simply wait us out, regardless of how long we are there, and that, as a result, we may be there the rest of my life.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

We are going to close. Are there any comments that were left hanging that you would like to respond to?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Not for me, Mr. Chairman, no.

Mr. SCHRIVER. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay.

Well, look, we know you came into office, and you have been in now for a year and a month. And this is something you inherited. I think most of us appreciate the conditions-based approach, the fact that you are really dealing with a region, the fact that we are pushing back against some of the duplicity that Pakistan has been putting forth for years. And I think we are all struggling, just like you are, to try to figure out a path forward, when it is pretty murky right now as to how we get to a place where Afghanistan is able to function without significant support from the West and other countries.

But, I do think that the strategy and—that you have laid out, is a better strategy towards that end. And I—you know, obviously, we may ask for a classified briefing, here in the near future, to get into some of the details we were not able to discuss here.

But, we thank you for your efforts. We thank you both for your transparency and your service to our country.

We are going to leave the record open until the close of business on Thursday. If you could fairly promptly answer any additional written questions that may come in, we would appreciate it.

And, with that, the meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:54 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF JOHN J. SULLIVAN TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BENJAMIN L. CARDIN

PEACE PROCESS AND RECONCILIATION

Question. We have long said that peace and reconciliation must be "Afghan-led" and "Afghan-owned," but the U.S. remains a party to this protracted conflict and our push for peace has been quiet and, so far, without meaningful results. There is skepticism among many countries in the region about how serious the U.S. is about a peace process, which disincentivizes them to back our strategy in Afghanistan. The President's recent comments rejecting outright any talks with the Taliban do not help.

Please provide specifics of the Administration's diplomatic strategy to pursue a negotiated political settlement, including which senior officials are personally engaged in this effort, the frequency and substance of conversations on this topic with the Afghan government, any prospects for the U.S. to engage in dialogue with the Taliban in the context of peace negotiations, and a summary of foreign assistance programs that aim at building support for peace negotiations and reconciliation at the community level.

Answer. The South Asia Strategy announced by President Trump is a conditions-based strategy designed to make clear to the Taliban that they cannot achieve their objectives on the battlefield and instead must pursue their objectives at the negotiating table with the Afghan Government as participants in a peace process designed to come to a durable peace agreement. Necessary outcomes of any peace agreement must include an absolute commitment from the Taliban that they will cut ties to terrorism, cease violence, and accept the Afghan constitution—a constitution that includes protections for the rights of women and minorities.

President Ghani has worked to build public and international support for peace talks, and to expand outreach to the Taliban and other insurgents. The onus of responsibility is now on the Taliban to demonstrate that they are ready to talk. The Afghan government can only negotiate if the Taliban are ready. Recent terrorist attacks in Kabul show that they are not.

The Administration is working closely with the Afghan government, including President Ashraf Ghani, his National Security Advisor, and National Directorate of Security chief, to initiate a peace process. The Afghan government attaches a high priority to the peace process, which is reflected in the frequency of conversations with Ambassador Bass in Kabul and with SCA Senior Bureau Official Ambassador Wells. The substance of these conversations has related to defining Afghanistan's vision for a peace process and gaining broad regional and international support for this vision. In recent weeks the focus has been on Afghan preparations for the February 28 Kabul Process Conference, where the Afghan Government is expected to lay out its vision for peace.

The State Department has assisted in building support for peace negotiations and reconciliation at the community level through an evolving set of Afghan initiatives under the management and oversight of the Afghan High Peace Council (HPC) and the UNDP. The current Afghan approach is the Peace and Reconciliation in Afghanistan (PRA) plan, which supersedes the earlier Afghanistan National Peace and Reconciliation initiative and Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program. In September 2017, the Department disbursed $3.9 million in FY 2016 funding to the UNDP to support the PRA project initiation plan, which supports HPC efforts to build consensus for peace at the community level through outreach activities with tribal leaders and local powerbrokers. The Department is considering allocating $6 million in FY 2017 ESF funding to support future HPC activities through UNDP, pending Congressional approval.

Question. Is the Administration willing to discuss substantive issues with the parties in the context of peace negotiations—including U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan and power-sharing options—that are key concerns for the Taliban to give up

its fight and will likely require intensive U.S. diplomacy with the parties to resolve? If not, what subjects is the U.S. willing to discuss and what do you think will these discussions achieve?

Answer. The Administration has no preconditions for peace talks and is willing to discuss all substantive issues—including the future disposition of U.S. forces in Afghanistan and power-sharing arrangements—within the context of negotiations that include representatives of the Afghan government. With respect to potential changes to Afghanistan's legal and governing structures, we want to ensure that any final agreement respects the Afghan constitution, including its critically important protections for women and minorities. We also have made clear that as end conditions of the peace process the Taliban must renounce violence and end any links to terrorist organizations.

Question. How are you encouraging the Afghan government to seriously pursue dialogue with the Taliban? Did you meet with the High Peace Council during your visit? What were your impressions? What is the Afghan government doing to build support among its citizens for an eventual peace deal with the Taliban, and how is it approaching questions of transitional justice and accountability for wartime abuses?

Answer. The Afghan government is serious in pursuing a dialogue with the Taliban and has made this clear publicly and through private channels. At the February 28 Kabul Process Conference the Afghan Government will clearly reiterate its interest in peace. Regrettably, this interest has not been reciprocated by the Taliban. Recent horrific terrorist attacks in Kabul demonstrate that the Taliban remains committed to violence and is not yet serious about peace.

Deputy Secretary of State Sullivan met with Afghan High Peace Council (HPC) Chairman Mohammad Karim Khalili and HPC Secretariat Chief Mohammad Akram Khpalwak during his January 29–30 visit to Afghanistan. The Deputy was impressed with the energy and vision of the HPC's leadership and by its commitment to building a public consensus for peace. Transitional justice and accountability can be expected to emerge as issues for the HPC at later stages of a peace process, when the parties have developed greater mutual confidence and trust.

REGIONAL DIPLOMACY

Question. What specific conversations are you having with Pakistan, China, India, and other regional actors to make progress toward peace, and what do they want from us?

Answer. Our South Asia strategy envisions Pakistan playing an important role in convincing the Taliban to negotiate with the Government of Afghanistan, in order to achieve a negotiated settlement that stabilizes Afghanistan and brings peace and prosperity to the region. While Pakistan has proposed that the United States begin direct talks with the Taliban immediately, we have insisted that the Afghan government be present at any talks about Afghanistan's future. The Taliban rejects the legitimacy of the Afghan government and has been unwilling to enter into direct talks.

In order to include China in discussions about reconciliation, we initiated a renewed Quadrilateral Coordination Group with China, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, through a meeting in Oman on October 16, 2017. China favors an approach focused on Afghan government reforms and clear signals that the Afghan and U.S. governments seek peace. During President Trump's November 2017 visit to Beijing, he and President Xi discussed measures to support a prosperous and stable Afghanistan. While we and China have disagreements about the need to put pressure on Pakistan to end its support for terrorist proxy forces, we believe that China will be a key actor in the peace process, and there is overlap in our positions and room for further discussions.

India remains a vital partner on Afghanistan, largely through the provision of substantial economic and development assistance. India has allocated more than $3 billion in assistance to Afghanistan.

We also have continued to discuss peace in Afghanistan with our partners in the Middle East, such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. These countries also seek peace and stability in Afghanistan and have offered to assist us in this process. We have encouraged them to strengthen their capabilities in combatting terrorists' financial networks—the more the Taliban are under pressure, the more likely they are to seek a negotiated settlement.

Question. Have you seen any positive changes in Pakistan's behavior since the President suspended security assistance last month?

Answer. Following the Administration's January decision to suspend the vast majority of our security assistance, we have conveyed that we are prepared to lift the suspension when we have seen decisive and sustained efforts to eliminate the capacity of externally-focused terrorist groups to carry out attacks against neighboring countries. Pakistan continues to cooperate with the United States on areas of mutual interest, and has taken some steps in response, particularly in the area of terrorist financing. We have not seen decisive action from Pakistan to deny sanctuary to externally-focused terrorist groups, such as the Taliban and Haqqani Network. We will continue to evaluate Pakistan's responsiveness to our requests in the coming months.

Question. Where do you go from here on Pakistan if the aid suspension does not motivate them to deny safe haven to the Taliban, given their fear of India gaining a strategic advantage from a stable Afghanistan?

Answer. Our South Asia strategy envisions Pakistan playing a key role in convincing the Taliban to enter a peace process leading to a negotiated settlement in Afghanistan. At the same time, we have been very clear that the Pakistani government must take decisive action against all militant groups based in Pakistan, including the Taliban and Haqqani Network. Our requests of Pakistan have been specific and consistent.

We also recognize that Pakistan has legitimate security concerns in Afghanistan, particularly relating to the ability of groups such as the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) to use Afghan soil to attack Pakistan. We continue to work to address these concerns by countering the TTP and related militants, and encouraging better coordination on border issues between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pakistan has been a good host for millions of Afghan refugees for nearly 40 years, and has an interest in their voluntary, orderly return to their homes in Afghanistan.

We continue to engage with Pakistan's leadership on our concerns in private, and will use the full range of tools at our disposal to encourage Pakistan to take action against all militant and terrorist groups operating on its soil. Discussions about which specific tools to use and when to use them are ongoing within our Department and the inter-agency. We will calibrate our relationship in accordance with the degree to which Pakistan addresses our concerns about its policies.

AFGHAN DOMESTIC SITUATION

Question. I am concerned by reports of increased divisions in Afghanistan's political and ethnic landscape that exist independently of the conflict with the Taliban. The hard work to ensure credible, inclusive elections and a broadly representative Afghan government can't be an afterthought to our military efforts—it is central to ensuring a democratic, prosperous future for the country where the rights of all Afghans are secure.

How are you pressing the Afghan government and various political factions to forge compromises and make progress on reforms, including on fighting corruption, in an equitable and inclusive way? What prospects do you see for progress in these areas?

Answer. We discuss regularly with President Ghani and senior Afghan officials the importance of reform, including anti-corruption. The Afghanistan Compact, an Afghan-led initiative launched in August 2017, tracks the implementation of reforms related to security, governance, economic development, and peace and reconciliation. We cooperate closely with the Afghan government on the Compact reforms, and we emphasize with political stakeholders both inside and outside the Afghan government the necessity of non-partisan implementation of reforms to ensure their durability beyond any given political cycle.

Enhancing anti-corruption efforts is necessary across all sectors. Despite a series of challenges, Afghanistan's Anti-Corruption Justice Center (ACJC) has successfully investigated and prosecuted several high ranking officials accused of corrupt activities. We continue to press top government leaders, including the Afghan Attorney General, to investigate and prosecute high level corruption cases, regardless of the political status or military rank of the accused.

Question. How are you engaging the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and the Attorney General's Office in particular to promote accountability for gross violations of human rights by police and other Afghan officials? In particular, how are you addressing credible reports of the use of boys as sex slaves by MoI forces?

Answer. The Department takes allegations of gross violations of human rights by Afghan security forces very seriously. The Department, through the Leahy Law, ensures that where there is credible information that a unit or individual has com-

mitted gross violations of human rights, such unit is ineligible to receive U.S. assistance, and we impress upon Afghan government leaders the importance of holding accountable those individuals who violate human rights laws, to include the exploitation of minors for sex by Afghan security force personnel.

The State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) continues to work with the Afghan government to strengthen provisions in Afghan laws and regulations against sexual abuse and exploitation. U.S. programs train Afghan law enforcement officials on human rights reporting and accountability. Additionally, we work with NGOs and Afghan civil society organizations to protect and provide community support for victims of child sex trafficking and to increase awareness of the laws that criminalize these acts, including a 2017 Law to Combat Trafficking in Persons and a new penal code, which took effect on February 15. The new anti-trafficking law and penal code strengthen definitions of trafficking crimes, including child sex trafficking, and increase punishments for traffickers.

RESPONSES OF RANDALL G. SCHRIVER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BENJAMIN L. CARDIN

HUMAN RIGHTS

Question. The recent SIGAR report pointed to credible allegations of child sexual assault perpetrated by Afghan military and police officials and noted the Secretary of Defense has nevertheless invoked "notwithstanding authority" to provide assistance to such units. Disturbingly, the report also quotes U.S. service - members who "witnessed inappropriate behavior involving Afghan security forces and children who thought it would be best to 'leave it alone' rather than report it."

What specific diplomatic or programmatic steps are you taking to boost accountability for serious human rights violations, including the practice perpetrated by some in the Afghan security services to keep children as sex slaves? How are you engaging the Ministry of Defense on these and other serious human rights abuses committed by the Afghan military? What is needed in this regard?

Answer. The Department of Defense (DoD) strongly condemns all acts of child sexual assault, and has not used the "notwithstanding authority" to provide assistance to units subject to credible allegations of child sexual assault. Any accusations otherwise are unfounded.

Furthermore, neither the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) nor the DoD Inspector General (DoDIG) in their recent reports on the implementation of the Leahy Law in Afghanistan allege the Secretary of Defense invoked the "notwithstanding authority" to provide assistance to units with credible allegations of child sexual assault. They also found no evidence that U.S. forces were told to ignore human rights abuses or child sexual assaults.

DoD has engaged and continues to engage at the highest levels of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) to reinforce the importance of respect for human rights by the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). This pressure has resulted in changes in Afghan law and policy and increased the Afghan government's prosecution of personnel alleged to have perpetrated gross violations of human rights, including instances of child sexual assault.

CONFLICT SITUATION

Question. I share your and others' concern and anger about the recent spate of devastating attacks in Kabul that have taken too many innocent lives. This is all the more frustrating given that, as indicated in the Department of Defense's 2017 report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, the Afghan security forces were assessed to have the capacity to maintain control of major population centers and, indeed, have been focused on a strategic effort to expand security to more of the population across the country.

Is the conflict dynamic shifting from battlefields in rural provinces to a more urban-focused war? How are you positioning U.S. troops to advise and assist at the field level, and how is the United States' military training, advising, and assistance addressing shifting dynamics in the insurgency?

Answer. The Afghan strategy to end the insurgency and defeat terrorists operating within its borders has always focused on protecting Afghan citizens, providing good governance, and improving the Afghan economy. The ANDSF remain committed to denying the Taliban its strategic objectives, including the Taliban's objec-

tive to control provincial capitals and population centers. To this end, the ANDSF, consisting of military forces of the Afghan Ministry of Defense and police forces of the Afghan Ministry of the Interior, have conducted combined combat operations in rural areas (where insurgents plan and train) with increased security operations (combat and law enforcement) in urban areas (where insurgents conduct attacks).

U.S. and NATO forces continue to train, advise, and assist (TAA) Afghans at the ministerial, institutional, and operational levels. The United States also provides some combat enablers to the ANDSF, including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), aerial fires, and artillery. Under the new South Asia Strategy, U.S. forces have the authority to TAA and accompany ANDSF at tactical levels if the situation warrants such support. The decision to conduct TAA at the tactical level is dictated by the situation and is made by the commander on the ground.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT AND CIVILIAN CASUALTIES:

President Trump has touted his loosening of the rules of military engagement to target and kill terrorists, but this also risks further exacerbating civilian casualties, which have reached record highs already in recent years. Our military has grappled in the past with the dangerous effects of civilian casualties in Afghanistan, as it undermines Afghans' trust in American forces and exposes us to political and legal risks.

Question. What steps are you taking to address and mitigate civilian casualties and ensure the precise and proportional use of force in the field? How are you addressing these issues in urban contexts, where attacks by insurgent groups have been a growing threat?

Answer. The United States attaches great importance to the preservation of innocent civilian lives. Our values and the law of armed conflict guide all of our military operations, which contain strong mechanisms for protecting innocent civilian personnel.

The Secretary of Defense has reinforced, both publicly and in Department of Defense (DoD) orders, that all U.S. operations must employ all feasible measures to protect civilian noncombatant life. This standard to protect civilian noncombatants applies not only to high population urban environments, but to all areas of combat operations.

CONDITIONS FOR WITHDRAWAL

Question. What specifically are the conditions in the Administration's "conditions-based" approach to determining U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan? Are you willing to discuss the specifics of an eventual U.S. troop withdrawal to spur progress toward a negotiated political settlement, given this is a core issue motivating the Taliban to keep fighting?

Answer. The key tenet of the South Asia Strategy is the adoption of a conditions-based approach. We no longer rely on a pre-set date for withdrawal, which only encouraged hedging by our adversaries and partners alike. We remain committed to the continued development of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and its security institutions, provided our Afghan partners continue their dedication to democratic ideals, the responsible and transparent spending of international aid, and improving their ability to function independently. Our resolve and conditions-based approach signal to the Taliban and other insurgent elements that they will not be able to wait out the United States and our coalition allies and partners.

RESPONSES OF JOHN J. SULLIVAN TO QUESTIONS
SUBMITTED BY SENATOR RON JOHNSON

Question. Please provide unclassified estimates of the size of the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, Al Qaeda and the Islamic State in Afghanistan for 2001, 2009 and 2017. For each of the estimates, what is the percentage of foreigners compared to Afghans?

Answer. We lack authoritative unclassified estimates on the size of the Taliban, including the Haqqanis, Al-Qaeda (AQ), and the Islamic State in Afghanistan (also commonly called ISIS–Khorasan (ISIS–K)) that date back to 2001 and 2009. ISIS–K did not coalesce until early 2015.

Afghan Taliban insurgents, including the Haqqanis, are drawn from ethnic-Pashtun tribes in Afghanistan with some tribal recruiting territory extending into Pakistan. Despite battlefield losses, neither the Taliban nor its constituent Haqqani

element has shown signs of experiencing manpower shortages. In 2017, we estimated the size of the Taliban, including the Haqqanis, to number in the tens of thousands, but we caution that this figure fluctuates with the annual onset of the fighting season and poppy harvest.

ISIS–K, like the Taliban, is a mainly homegrown movement. In 2017, the group's estimated size was several thousand fighters. Disillusioned or opportunistic elements of the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (also known as the TTP or "Pakistani Taliban"), Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and Afghan Taliban make up the bulk of ISIS–K's ranks in Afghanistan. ISIS–K is smaller than the Afghan Taliban yet capable of mounting high-profile attacks in Kabul and entrenching fighters in pockets of eastern and northern Afghanistan. Few ISIS–K fighters are from outside of Afghanistan-Pakistan.

Core AQ has been seriously degraded. The death or arrest of dozens of mid- and senior-level AQ operatives, including Usama bin Laden in May 2011, have disrupted communication, financial support, facilitation nodes, and a number of terrorist plots. Though the most recent estimate on the size of AQ in Afghanistan is classified, some unclassified estimates approximate that AQ is less than 100 members.

Question. What percentage of the Taliban is considered to be open to negotiations with the Afghan government?

Answer. The Taliban as an organization has long taken the position that it is prepared to negotiate with the United States, though not with the Afghan Government, even if recent terrorist attacks show they are not serious about negotiations. We have been clear that negotiations must include the Afghan government.

The South Asia Strategy announced by President Trump is a conditions-based strategy designed to make clear to the Taliban that they cannot achieve their objectives on the battlefield and instead must pursue their objectives at the negotiating table with the Afghan Government as participants in a peace process designed to come to a durable peace agreement.

It is impossible to know in advance what percentage of the Taliban will ultimately join a peace process. It may be that the leadership of the Taliban will agree to talk, but encounter resistance from hardened rank-and-file commanders. Alternatively, it could be that some subordinate elements within the Taliban will be the first to reconcile. The Afghan government is exploring all avenues. Ultimately, the trajectory of the peace process and the decisions of elements within the Taliban will depend on battlefield developments, the Taliban's willingness and seriousness about engaging, dynamics within the Taliban leadership, Taliban perceptions of U.S. and Afghan sincerity, and the effectiveness of the Afghan government in addressing grievances and offering incentives for reconciliation.

RESPONSES OF RANDALL G. SCHRIVER TO QUESTIONS
SUBMITTED BY SENATOR RON JOHNSON

Question. Please provide unclassified estimates of the size of the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, Al Qaeda and the Islamic State in Afghanistan for 2001, 2009 and 2017. For each of the estimates, what is the percentage of foreigners compared to Afghans?

Answer. Although elements of our intelligence community periodically provide estimates on the number of fighters affiliated with these terrorist groups, the figures are classified and tend to be made with lower levels of confidence. It is difficult to estimate group numbers because these groups, beyond senior leadership, are loosely affiliated, and prone to factionalizing at the local level. We will work with the intelligence community to provide a classified briefing on this subject.

Question. What percentage of the Taliban is considered to be open to negotiations with the Afghan government?

Answer. We do not have a specific number for what percentage of the Taliban is open to negotiations. There are complicating factors, even among Taliban pragmatists, to any negotiations: there are leaders who may perceive risk to the group's cohesion if they agree to participate in talks with GIRoA, at least in public, and those leaders who believe they may benefit more from the status quo than from participating in a more comprehensive political order.

Question. What are the U.S./NATO fatalities for the past 12 months?

Answer. U.S. Casualties in Calendar Year (CY) 2017: KIA: 12; WIA: 146; NATO Casualties in CY 2017: KIA: 2; WIA: 18.

RESPONSES OF JOHN J. SULLIVAN TO QUESTIONS
SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JEANNE SHAHEEN

Question. Secretary Sullivan and Secretary Schriver, according to the Department of Defense (DOD) final rule 80 FR 81467 issued in December 2015 and the Bilateral Security Agreement between the U.S. and Afghanistan signed in September 2014, U.S. contractors in Afghanistan are not liable to pay any tax assessed by the government of Afghanistan. I am concerned that despite this agreement the Afghan government has continued to levy unwarranted taxes on U.S. contractors. Are you aware of efforts by the Afghan government to enforce levies on U.S. contractors contrary to stated law?

Answer. The State Department is aware that the Afghan government continues to levy tax claims against U.S. DOD contractors and that a number of these tax claims have occurred subsequent to the 2015 Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA). We are engaging the Afghan government on this issue. We have also met several times with the International Stability Operations Association, which represents U.S. contractors, and discussed their members' concerns regarding this issue. We continue to work with U.S. contractors and the Afghan government to resolve these claims for illegitimate taxation and to make sure U.S. contractors are fully aware of legal requirements for conducting business in Afghanistan.

Question. Secretary Sullivan and Secretary Schriver, what means do DOD and the State Department have to enforce existing law to ensure that the Ministry of Finance in Afghanistan is not taking steps to effectively tax DOD contractors?

Answer. In November 2017, the Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan (CSTC–A) negotiated an agreement with the Afghan Finance Ministry to resolve all "legacy" tax claims against U.S. contractors which predate the BSA. Embassy Kabul has reported that to date the Finance Ministry has dismissed all legacy tax claims against eight U.S. contractors which have applied for tax relief under the terms of the November 2017 agreement. Bilateral discussions continue with the Afghan Ministry of Finance to resolve tax claims made toward U.S. contractors following the adoption of the BSA. We regularly raise this issue at the highest levels of the Afghan government.

RESPONSES OF RANDALL G. SCHRIVER TO QUESTIONS
SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JEANNE SHAHEEN

Question. Secretary Sullivan and Secretary Schriver, according to the Department of Defense (DOD) final rule 80 FR 81467 issued in December 2015 and the Bilateral Security Agreement between the U.S. and Afghanistan signed in September 2014, U.S. contractors in Afghanistan are not liable to pay any tax assessed by the government of Afghanistan. I am concerned that despite this agreement the Afghan government has continued to levy unwarranted taxes on U.S. contractors. Are you aware of efforts by the Afghan government to enforce levies on U.S. contractors contrary to stated law?

Answer. The Department of Defense (DoD), through U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR–A), is aware of instances when U.S. contractors operating in support of U.S. forces were levied taxes for work performed prior to the entry into force of the Security and Defense Cooperation Agreement Between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the United States (SDCA), also known as the Bilateral Security Agreement, on January 1, 2015. However, USFOR–A is unaware of any instance to-date were such U.S. contractors were not granted tax relief on these "legacy taxes" after a joint USFOR–A/Afghan Ministry of Finance (MoF) established process for addressing these issues. USFOR–A is also unaware of any instances where U.S. contractors were improperly taxed since the SDCA whether by the central government or provincial authorities, but has received unverified anecdotal accounts.

Question. Secretary Sullivan and Secretary Schriver, what means do DOD and the State Department have to enforce existing law to ensure that the Ministry of Finance in Afghanistan is not taking steps to effectively tax DOD contractors?

Answer. The Department of Defense (DoD) and Department of State (DOS) maintain a range of options for addressing issues of improper taxation assessed on DoD contractors by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA). Depending on the issue, these options include engaging (a) the dispute resolution body established under the Security and Defense Cooperation Agreement (SDCA), also known as the Joint Commission, (b) the Afghan Ministry of Finance (MoF), and/or (c) the Afghan Revenue Department (ARD). When presented with actionable infor-

mation from USFOR–A, these organizations have proven responsive to DoD and DOS raised issues.

RESPONSES OF JOHN J. SULLIVAN TO QUESTIONS
SUBMITTED BY SENATOR TODD YOUNG

Question. In his State of the Union address, President Trump said, "I am asking the Congress to pass legislation to help ensure American foreign-assistance dollars always serve American interests, and only go to America's friends." Can you provide more detail on what specific reforms the administration is seeking from Congress related to foreign assistance? Will the Department of State provide more details to my office regarding what reforms the administration might like to see related to foreign assistance?

Answer. The FY 2019 budget request provides the necessary resources to advance peace and security, expand American influence, and address global crises, while making efficient use of taxpayer resources. It modernizes State Department and USAID diplomacy and development to advance a more secure and prosperous world by helping to support more stable and resilient societies that will lead to their own development.

We believe it is important to assess our foreign assistance based on a number of factors, with the top reason being that our assistance should serve American interests. Countries' support for U.S. priorities in international fora is one indicator to consider, but there are other important factors to consider as well. We look forward to working with you and the rest of the Congress to ensure any legislation serves American interests.

Question. In your written statement you highlight the importance of our relationship with India—both generally and in Afghanistan. Not only do our two countries share interests in Afghanistan, but we also share democratic values and important strategic and economic interests. If there is anything I can do to help strengthen further the relationship between the U.S. and India, please let me know. Will you do that?

Answer. Secretary Tillerson and I look forward to collaborating with you and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as we work to strengthen the U.S.—India relationship. India is a close U.S. partner, and the Administration is committed to supporting its development as a leading security provider in the Indian Ocean region. The State Department seeks to expand and deepen the U.S. strategic partnership with India to advance our common objectives, including combatting terrorist threats, promoting stability and prosperity across the Indo-Pacific region, and increasing free and fair trade. We also are committed to increase U.S. exports to India and reduce the U.S. trade deficit, including through increased sales of civil and military aircraft as well as energy commodities, technology, and services. We welcome India's pledge to contribute $3 billion in bilateral development assistance to Afghanistan, and we are committed to continuing close consultation and cooperation with India in support of Afghanistan's democracy, development, and security.

RESPONSE OF RANDALL G. SCHRIVER TO QUESTION
SUBMITTED BY SENATOR TODD YOUNG

Question. Will you please provide an update on the development of a Security Force Assistance Brigade in the National Guard?

Answer. An Army National Guard SFAB will be developed with its Headquarters in Indiana and subordinate units in six other states. Under current projections, this Army National Guard SFAB will become initially operational in Fiscal Year 2019 and fully operational in Fiscal Year 2021, and will provide the same capabilities as an active duty SFAB.

LIST OF AFGHANISTAN COMPACT BENCHMARKS

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

MAR 13 2018

The Honorable
Bob Corker, Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 6, Deputy Secretary Sullivan committed to provide the committee with a list of Afghanistan Compact benchmarks and a written assessment of the Afghan government's reform efforts under the Compact. This letter fulfills that commitment, providing our written assessment below and the Compact benchmarks as enclosures.

As noted in the hearing, the Compact is a series of reform benchmarks established by the Afghan government in the areas of security, governance, peace and reconciliation, and economic growth. It is an Afghan-owned set of commitments – made by the Afghan government to the Afghan public – rather than a bilateral agreement between the United States and Afghanistan. The Afghans have asked us to hold them accountable to their reform agenda, and we do so in high-level engagements and by co-chairing monthly working group meetings in each of the four areas. But ultimately the Compact holds the Afghan government accountable to the Afghan people, who are the primary beneficiaries of its reforms.

It is also important to emphasize that the Compact is a living document. Since its official launch in August 2017, some of the Compact's benchmarks, action areas, and milestones have been adjusted, and some deadlines have been extended as the challenges of genuine reform become apparent. This makes it difficult to provide meaningful statistics about successes and failures, but the Compact was never intended to serve as a scorecard for the Afghan government. Rather, it provides a framework to promote accountability and reform, including through our diplomatic engagement. The enclosed set of benchmarks – current as of January – should therefore be viewed as a snapshot in time rather than a static set of commitments. We ask that these documents not be shared outside the U.S. government, since they are the Afghan government's to release publicly.

In our view, the institutionalization of a process to evaluate reform has been the Compact's most significant accomplishment to date. The Compact requires relevant ministries to report on their progress at monthly working group meetings, and to answer to President Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah every few months at executive committee meetings. In the Compact's first six months, this accountability has proven to be a powerful driver of reform. That said, we recognize that the four working groups established easier reform targets for the first few months to ensure early success. While that was needed to give the Compact critical momentum, the

reforms are becoming more challenging in all four working groups, and the deadlines are necessarily ambitious.

The **Security** working group has the most milestones, covering a wide range of action areas from elections security to healthcare for soldiers and police. Notable successes to date include removing 167 Afghan Commandos flagged with derogatory information pursuant to enhanced vetting; replacing over 60 corrupt or ineffective leaders in the Ministries of Defense (MOD) and Interior (MOI); planning for doubling of the size of the Afghan Special Security Forces; and developing the Afghan Air Force. However, some important initiatives have been adjusted to allow more time for completion, including the transfer of Afghan National Civil Order Police to the MOD and reviews by the Inspector General to counter corruption. Moving forward, we will emphasize the importance of reforms to improve transparency in the MOI and MOD, including continued efforts to eliminate "ghost" soldiers and police; rigorous and regular security reviews to reduce the likelihood of green-on-blue and green-on-green attacks; and improved security for the International Zone in Kabul.

The **Governance** working group's goals are arguably the most ambitious and difficult to implement due to their complexity and entrenched interests across Afghan ministries. They address elections, corruption, rule of law, government effectiveness, and the illicit narcotics trade. Substantive successes in the first six months include passage of the new penal code; establishment of a national anti-corruption strategy; announcement of parliamentary and district council elections; establishment of the National Election Forum to serve as a consultative body that includes government representatives, opposition parties, civil society leaders, and independent election officials; implementation of a competitive civil service recruitment process; and the more than doubling of the number of narcotic interdiction operations and total asset seizures over 2016 levels. The most important reforms relate to ensuring credible and transparent parliamentary elections in 2018. We, alongside the UN and other donor nations, continue to engage both the Palace and the Independent Election Commission (IEC) on the need for swift action on electoral reforms.

The **Peace and Reconciliation** working group has focused on the High Peace Council's (HPC) efforts to create a national consensus in support of reconciliation with the Taliban, bilateral efforts to normalize relations with Pakistan and eliminate terrorist sanctuaries, and international efforts to generate support for regional peace and stability. The HPC's efforts to reorganize itself and reach out to a wide range of groups – tribes, women, educational institutions, youth, religious Ulema, and local political bodies – have resulted in measurable successes, including the December 25-26 National Ulema Conference, which brought together over 700 non-government affiliated independent religious leaders to discuss recommendations for peace. The HPC and its 34 Provincial Peace Committees (PPCs) have also begun to work with families impacted by fighting. Internationally, Afghanistan participated in several multinational fora aimed at facilitating peace and regional stability, including the Quadrilateral Coordination Group, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's Afghanistan Contact Group, and the International Contact Group meeting in Oslo. These international and regional efforts will continue in 2018, starting at the end of February with the Kabul Process Conference, which aims to build international consensus for peace negotiations. The HPC and PPCs, meanwhile, will broaden their focus to facilitate training for many of the above-mentioned groups to develop reconciliation capacities.

The **Economic Growth** working group's benchmarks fall into four categories: 1) the business climate, 2) fiscal and macroeconomic policy, as well as economic legal and institutional frameworks; 3) key sectors, such as agriculture, manufacturing, and extractives, and 4) energy, transportation, and communications infrastructure. These benchmarks reflect the Afghan government's recent shift in focus from donor-funded state-building to enabling the private sector as the key to drive growth, reduce poverty, and ultimately achieve self-reliance. Notable successes include the approval of two privately invested independent power producer projects, which have the potential to increase domestic power generation by more than 40 percent; implementation of the "Open Access" communications policy, which will end state-owned AfTel's monopoly on broadband infrastructure; the Ministry of Mines and Petroleum's publication of all mining contracts online; and the establishment of a Customs one-stop-shop at the Kabul airport to facilitate exports and decrease corruption. In 2018, priority reforms will aim to continue improving the business climate; for example, by establishing an investment promotion board and resolving four pending mining contracts that were tendered with significant U.S. government support.

Over the next year, we will encourage our Afghan counterparts, through the working groups and in high-level engagements, to prioritize key reforms rather than focusing on overall rates of success or failure. Above all, we want our Afghan counterparts to focus on why substantive reforms matter to Afghanistan, not whether the United States will praise or criticize their reform efforts. To that end, we are also encouraging the Afghan government – to the extent that security considerations allow it – to make the Compact's successes, failures, and objectives available to the Afghan public, so that they, too, can monitor the results and hold senior Afghan leaders accountable.

We hope this information is helpful, and appreciate your interest in ensuring that our Afghan partners succeed in implementing as much of their ambitious reform agenda as possible. Please do not hesitate to contact us if we can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

Mary K. Waters

Mary K. Waters
Assistant Secretary
Legislative Affairs

Enclosures:
- Tab 1 – Afghanistan Compact Security Benchmarks
- Tab 2 – Afghanistan Compact Governance Benchmarks
- Tab 3 – Afghanistan Compact Peace and Reconciliation Benchmarks
- Tab 4 – Afghanistan Compact Economic Growth Benchmarks

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Action Area				Description	Milestone Date	Status	Remarks	Source Reference	
					Red - within 30 days Yellow - within 60 days Blue - within 90 days Grey - within 1 year	White - Pending Green - Completed Shaded Grey - Not Applicable			
1 Critical Area: Security	Actions and Effects	Performance Measures	Sub-Actions/Measures	**Aim:** Improve security for Coalition Forces, the international community, and GIROA. Endstate: The Insider threat to Coalition Forces that work with the Afghan Special Forces is eliminated and the Green Zone is more secure				N/A	N/A
		1		**Eliminate the insider threat (Green on Blue) to Coalition Forces**	immediately				
			a	Immediately remove the 167 Commandos for whom there is derogatory information	immediately				
			b	Review all screening and vetting records for the remainder of the Special Forces	immediately				
			c	Remove all personnel with derogatory information, focusing first on those in contact with Associate Support Advisors	immediately				
			e	Begin a review of screening and vetting procedures, and employ a check-and-balance system to ensure compliance, focusing first on new recruits and those returning from leave	immediately				
		2		**Develop procedures and infrastructure plans to enhance Green Zone security**	immediately				
2 Critical Area: Corruption and Rule of Law	Actions and Effects	Performance Measures	Sub-Actions/Measures	**Aim:** Achieve a tangible increase in GIROA counter corruption and transparency activities. Endstate: Decisive steps are taken to demonstrate GIROA commitment to countering corruption and bolstering the rule of law				N/A	N/A
		1		**Seek legal resolution of cases involving corruption among military leaders beginning with the 39 cases that were transferred from the the Major Crimes Task Force to the Attorney General's Office**	immediately				
		2		**Initiate investigations into the following three allegations of corruption**	immediately				
			a	The 6th Minister of Interior projects fraudulently requesting payment for work	immediately				
			b	The Police Zone 203 single source construction of fortifications in the vicinity of Turkham Gate	immediately				
			c	Evidence of corruption involving fuel at 209th Corps, Mol Materiel Management Center, and Kabul Central Logistic Depot	immediately				
		3		**Allow CSTC-A to audit funds transferred to the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Afghanistan**	immediately				
		4		**Fill vacant positions and remove corrupt, ineffective, and aged leaders within:**	immediately				
			a	The Ministry of Defense	immediately				
			b	The Ministry of Interior	immediately				
		5		**Use the High Board of Oversight to appoint senior officials to vacant positions within the defense and security sectors**	immediately				
3 Critical Area: Parliamentary Elections	Actions and Effects	Performance Measures	Sub-Actions/Measures	**Aim:** Gain the trust and confidence of the Afghan citizenry with respect to the planning and execution of democratic elections. Endstate: GIROA publicly announces a date for parliamentary elections	Jul 2017			N/A	N/A
		1		By the end of July 2017, GIROA publicly announces a date for parliamentary elections	July 2017				
4 Territorial Army Development and Employment	Actions and Effects	Performance Measures	Sub-Actions/Measures	**Aim:** Develop a Territorial Army model as a "field" force under the command and control of the Afghan National Army, starting in Southern Nangarhar and then expand to Khost, Paktika, and Paktiya. Endstate: A professional Territorial Army capable of conducting "field" force operations in locations defined in the Afghanistan Compact. Note: As explained in the accompanying letter, the Afghanistan Compact is a living document; this matrix is subject to change.				Roadmap	1A9
		1		Post signs courier for the establishment of a Territorial Army in Southern Nangarhar, Khost, Paktika, and Paktia	Aug 2017		**The timeline** for Commitment #4, **Territorial Army Development** and Employment will be reviewed at the September 2017 Joint Committee meeting and adjusted if necessary and as more detailed planning is conducted. A key issue will be tashkil determination for the Territorial Army.		
		2		ANA recruits, trains, and equips a 1500 Tashkil "Territorial Army for Southern Nangarhar					
			a	First 500 Tashkil	Sep 2017				
			b	Second 500 Tashkil	Oct 2017				
			c	Last 500 Tashkil	Nov 2017				
			d	Southern Nangarhar Territorial Army Achieves Initial Operational Capability	Dec 2017				
			e	Southern Nangarhar Territorial Army Achieves Full Operational Capability	Feb 2018				
		2		ANA recruits, trains, and equips a 1500 Tashkil Territorial Army for Khost, Paktika, and Paktiya region with initial focus on Khost					
			a	First 500 Tashkil	Nov 2017				
			b	Second 500 Tashkil	Dec 2017				
			c	Last 500 Tashkil	Jan 2018				
			d	Khost/Paktika/Paktiya Territorial Army Achieves Initial Operational Capability	Mar 2018				

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Note: As explained in the accompanying letter, the Afghanistan Compact is a living document; this matrix is subject to change.

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Action Area				Description	Milestone Date	Status	Remarks	Source Reference	
			e	Kheir/Pardis/Paktiya Territorial Army Achieve Full Operational Capability	April 2018				
		3		Upon transfer to MoD, ANCDF assumes command and control of Afghan Territorial Armies	Apr 2018				
		4		Peer decision to expand the Territorial Army model to other positions within Afghanistan	Sep 2018				
5	ASSF Growth NCO: ANASOC COOs and SWM NCIs: GCPSU	Indicator or Vignette	Action/Objective Summary	Aim: Increase ANDSF offensive fighting capability by expanding ANASOC capabilities and by growing the special police capacity within GCPSU. Indicator: A more sensitive, cohesive and coordinated ASSF able to support the ANDSF to defeat and disrupt threat groups and contribute to security reform efforts.	Dec 2020			Roadmap	1&8
		1		ANASOC					
		a		Expand the ANASOC Division to a fully-operational Corps	Sep 2017				
		b		Corps HQ fully operational	Dec 2017				
		c		Expanded from two to four Special Operations Brigades (SOBs)	Aug 2018				
			1	SOB North and SOB East at Full Operational Capability	Apr 2018				
		d		A fourth Commando Tolay added to all of the Special Operations Kandaks in each of the SOBs	Dec 2019				
			1	2 additional Tolay's added in 2017 - for a total of 32	Dec 2017				
			2	4 additional "Tolay's added in 2018 - for a total of 36	Dec 2018				
			3	3 additional Tolay's added in 2019 - for a total of 39	Dec 2019				
		e		Align National Mission Brigade (NMB) under ANASOC	Aug 2017				
		f		Integrated two existing Mobile Strike Force Vehicle Brigades (MSFVB) into the ANASOC	Aug 2018				
			1	First MSFVB transferred to ANASOC	Aug 2017				
			2	Second MSFVB transferred to ANASOC	Aug 2018				
		g		24 additional Special Mission Wing Crews trained	Dec 2020				
			1	2 additional trained crews in 2017 for a total of 40	Dec 2017				
			2	6 additional trained crews in 2018 for a total of 46	Dec 2018				
			3	8 additional trained crews in 2019 for a total of 54	Dec 2019				
			4	8 additional trained crews in 2020 for a total of 62	Dec 2020				
		h		Expanded the ANASOC School of Excellence to meet throughput and sustainment	Mar 2018				
		2		GCPSU					
		a		Consolidated the Special Police Training Center and Special Police Training Wing under a single command	Mar 2018				
		b		Established three new NMUs	Jun 2019				
			1	NMU 999 Initial Operational Capability	Dec 2018				
			2	NMU 555 Initial Operational Capability	Dec 2018				
			3	NMU 888 Initial Operational Capability	Dec 2018				
			4	NMU 999 Full Operational Capability	Jun 2019				
			5	NMU 555 Full Operational Capability	Jun 2019				
			6	NMU 888 Full Operational Capability	Jun 2019				
6	Afghan Air Force	Indicator or Vignette	Action/Objective Summary	Aim: Increase Afghan close air support and aircraft capabilities through reconstruction of the Afghan Air Force. Indicator: A professional, sensitive and sustainable AAF that is capable of supporting ANDSF joint operations, in particular with the Special Security Forces.	Jun 2019			Roadmap	2
		1		AAF Growth					
		a		Comprehensive plan developed in preparation for AAF growth, to include personnel, organization,	Oct 2017				
			1	Transfer 4 (US) UH-60s for Initial Training	Oct 2017				
			2	Receive and integrate 12x (Afghan) UH-60, 10x MD-530, 1 AC-208 (US training only), 2x A-29	Dec 2018				
			3	Receive and integrate 22x UH-60, 4x UH-60 FFF, 20x MD-530, 4x A-29, 5x AC-208	Dec 2019				
			4	Receive and integrate 32x UH-60, 28x UH-60 FFF, 0x AC-208	Dec 2020				
		b		An AAF Secondary Budgetary Unit (SBU) established within the MoD/ATN Ltd to manage AAF unique	Oct 2017				
		c		Existing ANDSF education systems re-orientated to the new aircraft capabilities and requirements	Jun 2018				
		d		Independent recruiting policy developed to mitigate competition with other elements of ANDSF to recruit educated, physically qualified English-speaking candidates	Sep 2017				
		e		National maintenance expertise developed IOT make future CLS contract costs more affordable	Jun 2023				
7	ANDSF Intelligence Capability	Indicator or Vignette	Action/Objective Summary	Aim: Increase ANDSF intelligence capabilities by creating a national intelligence system, and defining intelligence sharing procedures between MoD, MoI, and NDS. Indicator: Afghan Security Institutions (ASI) and Afghan National Security and Defense Forces (ANSDF) are able to plan and execute special, conventional, and police operations using Afghan-defined intelligence in order to counter current and future threats to Afghanistan	Dec 2020			Roadmap	3
		1		Develop, expand, and utilize MoI intelligence capability in support of strategic, operational, and tactical objectives.	Jan 2019				

NATO RS UNCLASS REL GIROA

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Action Area			Description	Milestone Date	Status	Remarks	Source Reference
	a		Expand the capability of DPI organic collection, counter intelligence, and analytical capabilities to meet national and ministerial objectives	Aug 2018			
	b		Establish effective analytical reach capability down to the district level	Dec 2018			
	c		Expand NAMS usage and affiliation; develop standardization of employement	Jan 2019			
	d		Expand and integrate biometric/forensic collection capabilities at all echelons	Dec 2018			
	e		DPI supports all MoI PCAIS requirements	Jan 2018			
	f		Improve and expand MoI technical collection capabilities	Aug 2018			
	g		Improve HUMINT tradecraft Standard Operating Procedures	Sep 2018			
	2		**Develop MoI organizations that analyze, fuse and disseminate intelligence through all echelons of the MoI, ANDSF and other governmental agencies**	Oct 2019			
	a		Improve inter/intra agency workin relationships within MoI and between MoI and other ASI/ANDSF entities	Jun 2019			
	b		Improve focused collection, analytical focus, and feedback mechanisms within the DPI and MoI	Oct 2019			
	c		Incorporate DPI and MoI pillar intelligence into operational planning and situational awareness in all echelons of the MoI	Jan 2019			
	d		Institutionalize the Criminal Techniques capabilities in support of evidence based operations across all and provinces	Sep 2019			
	e		Improve responsiveness of MoI Intelligence and targeting cycle	Sep 2018			
	3		**Develop and manage resources and processes for the acquisition, maintenance and fielding of new and existing intelligence capabilities**	Nov 2020			
	a		Establish the minimum financial requirements to sustain operational, systems and training requirements	Nov 2020			
	b		Develop and standardize source funding accountability program and improve tracking of ICF funds to the provinces	Nov 2020			
	c		Establish reliable connectivity, data base storage, and systems maintenance for all MoI biometric, forensics, and intelligence offices	Sep 2019			
	d		Create standardized NAMS apps to support all aspects of MoI Intelligence needs	Jul 2018			
	4		**Develop training organizations capable of meeting initial and recurring training requirements through static and mobile training organizations**	Apr 2019			
	a		Conduct a complete review/evaluation of DPI training courses in order to increase the number of course of instruction, update and standardize content to improve relevancy, and support 1st national objectives	Apr 2019			
	b		Add Mobile Training Team (MTT) capabilities to permanent Tashkil in support of DPI and ANP pillars	Mar 2018			
	c		Create and sustain DPI training programs in support of new ISR platforms and equipment	Mar 2018			
	5		**PoA/NSA establish the National Intelligence Directorate (NID) as part of the CNIC.**	Dec 2020			
	a		Establish a National Intelligence Community according to the Afghan Constitution and applicable laws.	Dec 2020			
	b		Coordinate national intelligence analysis and assessments for PoA, CEO and NSA.	Dec 2020			
	c		Produce a bi-annual National Threat Assessment (NTA).	Dec 2020			
	d		Provide strategic threat assessments – One to Five years – Regional, National and International levels.	Dec 2020			
	e		Develop national intelligence and threat data bases.	Dec 2020			
	f		Ensure seamless and mutually-supported operational coordination of national intelligence activities.	Dec 2020			
	g		Facilitate sharing between national intelligence organizations.	Dec 2020			
	h		Promulgate policies, standards and procedures for military and government civilian Security Clearances.	Dec 2020			
	i		Promulgate policies, standards and procedures for Protection of Classified Documents.	Dec 2020			
	j		Coordinate Indications and Warning data to protect National Peace and National Reconciliation efforts.	Dec 2020			
	6		**Develop and expand MoD collection management capability.**	Dec 2018			
	a		Develop and update PIR to drive collection, reporting and targeting effort.	Dec 2018			
	b		Development of collection management capability for MoD level HUMINT, COMINT and CGINT assets.	Dec 2018			
	c		Development of collection requirements for MoD level HUMINT, COMINT and CE assets.	Dec 2018			
	d		Dissemination of collection-emphasis guidance.	Dec 2018			
	e		Develop a sustainable process for managing RFIs.	Dec 2018			
	7		**MoD intelligence integrated into corps level planning and operations**	Dec 2018			
	a		MoD develops and maintains an intelligence architecture that enables intelligence support to plans and	Dec 2018			
	b		NMIC prepares estimates to support operations, challenges, and crisis action plans and current operations.	Dec 2018			
	c		Increase use of MoD Net and NAMS to facilitate info sharing and dissemination and improve productivity.	Dec 2018			
	d		Targeting section produces timely, accurate and useful Target Packets.	Dec 2018			
	e		Analysis section able to provide predictive analysis, forecasting or warning intelligence.	Dec 2018			
	f		Develop analytic processes that fuse and create estimates based on individual reports	Dec 2018			
	8		**Build MoD capability to train, field, employ, and sustain ISR enablers.**	Dec 2020			
	a		Field ScanEagle UASs to ANA Corps.	Dec 2020			
	b		Train Personnel in ScanEagle UAS detachments (including Training Unit).	Dec 2020			
	c		Develop a training sustainment plan for ScanEagle UAS.	Dec 2020			
	d		MoD ANA Corps are capable of collecting and disseminating ISR data ISO ANA Corps Operations.	Dec 2020			
	e		ISGCI (PPBE) must determine their zero based budget requirements.	Dec 2020			
	f		MoD develops and maintains equipment sustainment plan.	Dec 2020			

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Action Area			Description	Milestone Date	Status	Remarks	Source Reference
		g	G5G1 plans for and ensures tashkil represents sufficient ISR equipment and trained personnel to sustain ISR ops for future years.	Dec 2020			
		h	MOD develops and maintains collection plans for gathering information from all available sources to meet intelligence requirements.	Dec 2020			
	9		**MoD-I conducts strategic analysis and develops strategic estimates for the strategic planning process**	Aug 2018			
		a	Production of a strategic, regional, and country assessment at least semi-annually for each in support of	Aug 2018			
		b	MoD-Intel Plans and Policy cooperation with MoD Strategic Plans for integration of plans and analysis into	Aug 2018			
		c	Institute effective cooperation and information sharing to increase MoD / ANA Intelligence capabilities and operations through the progressive refinement of operational / tactical Intelligence/Information from all elements of the Afghan Intelligence Enterprise – CNOC, GS, MoI.	Aug 2018			
		d	Develop sustained relationship and intelligence sharing with NSI.	Aug 2018			
		e	Develop sustained relationship and intelligence sharing with NDS.	Aug 2018			
		f	Develop sustained relationship and intelligence sharing with MoI.	Aug 2018			
	10		**MoD-I provides Planning, Programming and Budgeting management for MoD/ANA Intelligence capacity building**	Dec 2020			
		a	Determine military intelligence capabilities to support operational needs	Dec 2019			
		b	Provide an effective Intelligence oversight program for MoD/ANA	Nov 2019			
		c	Increase counter/self-corruption capability through visibility of investigations and effective security processes of national security crimes	Sep 2019			
		d	Establish an Intelligence career program for the MoD and ANA	May 2019			
		e	Develop strategic military intelligence policy and planning for required military intelligence capabilities	May 2018			
	11		**Develop MoD's Intelligence sustainment capability, both personnel and Intel enablers.**	Dec 2020			
		a	All G5G1 property is properly maintained and operational to support intelligence operations	May 2019			
		b	All G5G1 property is on the property book and properly inventoried/accounted for through hand receipts	Mar 2019			
		c	G5G1 identifies new capabilities and reviews current authorized tashkil items	Oct 2019			
		d	G5G1 proactively orders all classes of supply based on applicable budget and in accordance with decrees and policies in order to support all intelligence operations	Mar 2019			
		e	G5G1 plans and executes all budget activities within established timelines	Sep 2018			
	12		**MoD conducts national security and Counterintelligence activities against internal and external threats, through and supported by special operations, analysis, personnel security, and foreign disclosure duties.**	Jul 2018			
		a	Collect on and conduct operations to protect against spying, collection, infiltration, corruption, sabotage, or assassination	May 2018			
		b	Supervise and conduct the C strategic threat assessment for Afghanistan	Feb 2018			
		c	Oversee and conduct counter-espionage operations against hostile intelligence services and extremist activity against MoD	Jul 2018			
		d	Evaluate enemy intelligence capabilities against operations, operational security, and related activities	Jul 2018			
		e	Conduct investigations of national security crimes and corruption constituting a threat to ANA operations and MoD	Apr 2018			
		f	Conduct security operations which involve physical security vulnerabilities of ANA operations and coordination with AMCD-I for security checks of MoD and GS personnel	Jul 2018			
		g	Conduct Counter Intelligence liaison with allied services for security and force protection	Jul 2018			
	13		**Conduct sustainable GEOINT and Topography support to MoD and other national level intel community organizations.**	Jul 2020			
		a	Develop, maintain and disseminate GEOINT and topographic product line in support of Afghanistan-wide intelligence requirements via NIMS or other approved dissemination methods	Jul 2020			
		b	Develop and maintain a sustainable GEOINT and topographic training program for Intelligence officers assigned to the GEOINT/TOPO mission at all levels (national to corps and below)	Feb 2018			
		c	Ensure training and sustainability of mapping and imagery programs (ie Falconview and PixToday) across Afghanistan	Jun 2018			
		d	Develop, monitor, and modify relevant GEOINT and mapping databases in NIMS to ensure sustainability of GEOINt mission and widespread dissemination of GEOINT related products	Jul 2019			
		e	Receive, process, and track GEOINT/TOPO requests for information received from the Collections Directorate or CCIRM within NIMS	Jul 2020			
	14		**Conduct sustainable TECHINT Collection Operations and analysis to support overall MoD intelligence info/files.**	Jul 2018			
		a	Train the Wolfhound Operators on low level voice intercept (LLVI) proficiency	Feb 2018			
		b	Sustain LLVI proficiency at military intelligence kandaks with refresher training and reporting techniques	Feb 2018			
		c	Conduct 24 hour sustainable TECHINT operations (collection, analysis, production and assessments) to contribute to Intel collection effort and fused intelligence at the National Military Intelligence Center NMIC	Jul 2018			
	15		**MoD conducts sustainable HUMINT Collection Operations and analysis to support intelligence priorities.**	Jul 2019			
		a	Develop and maintain a HUMINT collection plan to meet the needs of G2 and MoD-I	Jul 2019			

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Action Area					Description	Milestone Date	Status	Remarks	Source Reference	
			b		Respond to information requirements from G2 Director, MoD-I	Jul 2018				
			c		Manage and communicate HUMINT source operations, Afghan intelligence information reports and source directed requirements through the National Information Management System (NIMS) network	Jul 2018				
			d		Ensure HUMINT personnel are trained to perform HUMINT functions and duties	Jul 2018				
		10			Develop MoD's ANA ITC training capability.	Feb 2018				
			a		MoD maintains an institutional training capability and every course in the ANA ITC course catalog is taught by ITC instructor cadre or Afghan-contracted instructor support	Jan 2018				
			b		Training programs in place to meet Corps needs	Nov 2017				
			c		MoD maintains an institutional training capability.	Jan 2018				
			d		Institute Afghan-led strategic intelligence and security training into the Intelligence training programs	Dec 2017				
			e		Develop training requirements by identifying current skill shortfalls and needs; track placement of trained soldiers	Jan 2018				
8	Establish National and Regional Joint Commands	Mission Partners	Afghan Partners		Aim: Develop an ANDSF National Joint Command (NJC) and complementary Regional Joint Commands (RJCs) to increase unity of command and unity of effort and achieve better coordinated security operations with clear lines of responsibility and authority. Implement a structure that frees ministerial-level leaders to focus on development of institution by reducing MoD Deputy Minister and Chief of General Staff span of control, while expanding strategic, operational and tactical, levels and responsibilities. Endstate: An effective and efficient ANDSF Command and Control structure capable of directing security	Apr 2018			Roadmap	4
		1			Establish MoD structure					
			a		Functional review of MoD staff structure completed	Aug 2017				
				1	Define distinguishing functions, roles and responsibilities for PDM and CoS3 and subordinate staff	Aug 2017				
				2	Identify unnecessary redundancies across the MoD staff	Aug 2017				
			b		Optimized MoD Organization Defined	Aug 2017				
				1	Develop future MoD Organization with Staff sections, sub-sections and subordinate functional components	Aug 2017				
				2	Eliminate redundant functions and associated Tashkil positions from the organization based on milestone 1.b.	Sep 2017				
				3	PDM and CoS3 span of control is reduced through alignment of staff sections under functional Director and DCOS positions, as well as staff sector eliminations and mergers	Sep 2017				
				4	Reduce MoD NC Tashkil Positions to offset projected SY 1397 ASOF / AAF growth.	Sep 2017				
		2			Establishment NJCs					
			a		NJC Tashkil Completed	Oct 2017				
			b		NJC Established	Apr 2018				
				1	NJC at Initial Operational Capability	Nov 2017				
				2	NJC at Full Operational Capability	Apr 2018				
		3			Establishment RJCs					
			a		RJC Organization Defined	Feb 2018				
			b		RJC Tashkil Completed	Mar 2018				
			c		RJCs are Established	Apr 2019				
				1	All RJCs at Initial Operational Capability	Nov 2018				
				2	All RJCs at Full Operational Capability	Apr 2019				
9	Training and Education	Mission Partners	Afghan Partners		Aim: Establish and implement a Unified Training System (UTS) and a Unified Training Command (UTC) in order to support leadership and MoD development. Endstate: The UTS supports the leadership development and MoD capability development through a well-coordinated and efficiently structured professional training & education in combination with a human resources management from recruitment until retirement.	Dec 2018			Roadmap	5
		1			Review and compare Training & Education Capacity and Capability requirements			Commitment #9, Training and Education, is currently focused on the MoD as a Phase 1 endeavor. The Joint Security Compact Committee will periodically review progress and available resources to determine if and when Mid related milestones can be included in this commitment to initiate a Phase-2 effort.		
			a		Structure of institutional Training & Education elements is reviewed. Conduct thorough review of current	Jun 2017				
				1	Review KMTC	Jun 2017				
				2	Review CTC	Jun 2017				
				3	Review Branch Schools. All schools will be integrated into 4 schools based on the 4-Year Developmental Plan	Jun 2017				
				4	Review MPRDU. MPRDU will be migrated into the Framework of the UTS	Jun 2017				
			b		ANA Institutional Training & Education Capacity and Capability Requirements are reviewed. Assess required capacities and capabilities (school, Military, Competitive Specialties, NCOS and education level). Assess	Jun 2017				
				1	Determine average annual required MOS flip rate of Soldiers, NCOs, Officers, Staff Officers and General Officers	Jun 2017				
				2	Calculate average attrition rate by MOS since start of Resolute Support mission	Jun 2017				

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Action Area					Description	Milestone Date	Status	Remarks	Source Reference	
				3	Determine required skills and capabilities of MoA soldiers by MCS and people to be achieved with recruiting	Jun 2017				
				4	Determine required skills and capabilities of MoA soldiers by MCS and people to be achieved with education	Jun 2017				
			c		Compare current institutional Trng & Edu production capabilities (based on infrastructure & manpower) to	Aug 2017				
				1	Identify KMTC infrastructure & manpower requirements	Aug 2017				
				2	Identify CDC infrastructure & manpower requirements	Jun 2017				
				3	Identify branch School infrastructure & manpower requirements	Jun 2017				
				4	Identify MPHOU infrastructure & manpower requirements	Jun 2017				
		2			UTS establishment					
			a		Concept for UTS developed based on assessment results	Dec 2016				
				1	Short, mid and long term plans developed for establishment of UTS.	Apr 2017				
				2	Proposal for structure Unified Training Command (UTC) developed	Apr 2017				
				3	Developed recommendation for organizational structure of UTS elements for MINADP approval	Aug 2017				
				4	Detailed organizational structure of UTS elements drafted for submission to CDD	Sep 2017				
			b		UTS established	Dec 2016				
				1	Tashkil developed for UTS elements for MINADP approval	Nov 2017				
				2	Curriculum developed for training and education at existing UTS elements	Nov 2017				
				3	Curriculum implemented for training and education at existing UTS elements	Nov 2017				
				4	Joint Strategic course curriculum established. Attendees selected based on merit. IOC and FOC achieved.	Nov 2017				
				5	Joint Operational course curriculum established. Attendees selected based on merit. IOC and FOC achieved. Lessons learned and integrated.	Sep 2018				
				6	Move of UTC HQ and IOC UTS achieved	Dec 2018				
10	ABP Transfer	Action Initiation	Action Completion		Aim: Increase the fighting capability of ANBP through transfer of the Afghan Border Police (ABP) from MoI to MoD. The transfer will improve unity of command by combining Army and former police combat forces under one command structure. The transfer also aims to reduce corruption and ministerial complexity within MoI, enabling the MoI to focus on the promotion and rule of law. Outcome: A sustainable and effective force successfully transferred and operating under the MoD. A [illegible]	Jan 2018			Roadmap	4a
		1			ABP Transfer					
			a		POA transfer theme issued	Jul 2017				
			b		Tashkil & Coordination established	Aug 2017				
				1	Start of ABP/ANP STRATEGIC campaign	Jul 2017				
				2	Tashkil submitted	Sep 2017				
				3	ABP C2 and staff at MoI determined	Sep 2017				
				4	ABP C2 structures at MoD determined	Sep 2017				
				5	Plan for ABP integration into MoD developed	Sep 2017				
			c		Training & Doctrine established	Sep 2017				
				1	Training requirements defined	Sep 2017				
				2	Training plans and organization developed	Sep 2017				
				3	MOI Small Sharing Policy established	Sep 2017				
			d		Technical & Logistical established	Sep 2017				
				1	ABP/ANP Logistics/supply plan developed	Sep 2017				
				2	Interiors logistics and infrastructure completed	Sep 2017				
			e		Personnel & Leadership established	Sep 2017				
				1	Plan for legal and terms of service amendments developed	Jul 2017				
				2	Initial plan developed	Sep 2017				
			h		Legal changes, terms of service amendments completed	Oct 2017				
			f		Facilities established	Aug 2017				
				1	MS plan for infrastructure distribution and responsibilities developed	Aug 2017				
				2	Assessment on infrastructure completed	Sep 2017				
			g		Finance established	Sep 2017				
				1	MS plan to redirect fund streams developed and achieved	Oct 2017				
					MS fund streams redirected	Oct 2017				
			j		Start transfer ABP	Nov 2017				
			k		ABP transfer completed	Jan 2018				
11	ANCOP Transfer	Action Initiation	Action Completion		Aim: Increase the fighting capability of ANBP through transfer of the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) from MoI to MoD. The transfer will improve unity of command by combining Army and former police combat forces under one command structure. The transfer also aims to reduce corruption and ministerial complexity within MoI, enabling the MoI to focus on the promotion and rule of law. Outcome: A sustainable and effective force, able to significantly project the rule of law into contested areas and contribute to the wider ANDSF mission. A force that is successfully transferred and operating under the MoD.	Apr 2018			Roadmap	4b
		1			ANCOP Transfer					
			a		POA transfer cipher issued	Aug 2017				
			b		Tashkil & Coordination established	Jan 2017				
				1	ANCOP STRATEGIC campaign starts	Aug 2017				
				2	Confirm and submit Tashkil	Oct 2017				
				3	ANCOP C2 structures at MoD determined	Oct 2017				

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Action Area					Description	Milestone Date	Status	Remarks	Source Reference	
				4	Plan for ANCSF integration into MoD developed	Oct 2017				
				5	Twinid transfer fully made	Jan 2018				
			c		Training & Doctrine established	Dec 2017				
				1	Training requirements defined	Oct 2017				
				2	Training plans and organization developed	Nov 2017				
				3	AG Inter Shaping Policy established	Dec 2017				
			d		Technical & logistical established	Dec 2017				
				1	ANCSF Logistics/supply plan developed	Nov 2017				
				2	Inventory logistics and infrastructure completed	Jan 2018				
			e		Personnel & Leadership established	Jan 2018				
				1	Plan for legal and terms of service amendments developed	Sep 2017				
				2	HRM plan developed	Aug 2017				
			f		Legal changes, terms of service amendments completed	Jan 2018				
			g		Facilities established	Oct 2017				
				1	RS plan for infrastructure distribution and responsibilities developed	Nov 2017				
				2	Finance established	Jan 2018				
				1	RS plan to redirect fund streams developed	Sep 2017				
				2	RS plan to redirect fund streams approved	Sep 2017				
			h		MOF/MOD funding in place	Jan 2018				
			i		Start transfer ANCSF	Jan 2018				
			j		ANCSF transfer completed	April 2018				
12	Leadership Development	Mission Critical	Sustainment	5	Aim: Establish and implement a Unified Training Trainer (UTT). ANCSF cannot retain the ability to complete periodic performance evaluations for all members; HQ cannot demonstrate the ability to execute centrally managed, merit-based +8 promotions Explicit: On a regular and repeatable basis, ANCSF employs centrally-managed, merit-based processes for leader selection, promotion, assignments, and for selecting individuals to attend professional training and educational programs	Dec 2020			Roadmap	7
		1			**Leadership Development**					
			a		New policies developed with overarching guidelines for leadership development.	Dec 2020				
				1	Complete and approve LDHRS Concept Plan, including a 3-year implementation strategy for the primary	Mar 2018				
			b		Annual performance evaluation system implemented for all ANCSF members at all ranks with forms uploaded in APPS.	Dec 2020				
				1	Complete and document Leader assessments for all ANA commanders, deputies and chiefs of staff down to CAPT level; results are provided to RS advisors & Zalmay	May 2018				
				2	Complete and document Leader assessments for all ANP commanders, deputies and chiefs of staff down to CAPT level; results are provided to RS advisors & Zalmay	May 2018				
				3	Complete Annual evaluation forms and be passed for a 50% of ANCSF officers	May 2019				
			c		Centrally-managed promotion boards incorporated for all ANCSF personnel that are executed no more than semi-annually, with selection based solely on objective data sources	Dec 2020				
				1	MoI GO selection & promotions: MoI executes High Oversight Board (HOB) and GO Promotion Board in accord with timelines and procedures delineated in Apr 2016 PoA decree	Dec 2017				
				2	MoD GO selection & promotions: MoD initiates & executes procedures consistent with High Oversight	Jul 2018				
				3	≥ 75% of ANCSF promotions to Sr & Jr officer ranks are issued by proper approval authority, executed in compliance with current MoD and MoI promotion policies/criteria, with a summary report of all promotions reported to RS advisors on a monthly basis	Jul 2019				
			d		MoD career paths developed. Ensure ANCSF maintain awareness of regular/repeated opportunities for assignments and traditional national courses.	Dec 2020				
				1	MoD and MoI personnel mgt HQs develop prescribed career path diagrams for each specialty including recommended assignment types and professional training/education courses with appropriate phasing/timelines for each; every ANCSF member is provided a copy of the diagram associated with his/her specialty	Sep 2018				
13	STRATCOM	Mission Critical	Sustainment		Aim: The Communications Strategy workstream aims to ensure both internal and external audiences remain informed of ongoing efforts to increase the capability of ANCSF to provide security for the Afghan people. Explicit: A strong, sustainable Global strategic communications structure capable of building and sustaining confidence in the Afghan government and its security forces.	Dec 2018			Roadmap	8
		1			**Public Affairs (PA) Development**			At the September 2017 Joint Security Compact Committee meeting, the committee will review the possibility of integrating a plan for employing clergy at the tactical and operational level of the ANDSF as a means of increasing cross morale.		
			a		PA Coordination: Develop and sustain policies and procedures designed to facilitate cross-ministerial coordination and delivery of strategic communication guidance, priorities and direction.	Aug 2019				
				1	PA Coordination: Participate in PoA/CCD/NSC recurring strategic communication working groups with ministerial spokesmen, to synchronize National Level Messaging and deliver recurring cross-ministry	Aug 2019				

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				2	PA Coordination: Facilitate public affairs coordination between GiRoA, Ministries and Provincial Public Affairs elements to achieve national communication objectives.	Aug 2019				
			9		PA Planning: Develop public affairs policy, communication plans and public affairs guidance in support of strategic and operational plans, goals and objectives.	Dec 2018				
				1	PA Planning: Develop public affairs strategies, messaging grids, communication plans and public affairs guidance. (For example: police roles).	Dec 2018				
				2	Develop a strategy and implementation plan for increasing ANDSF morale	Dec 2017				
			1		PA Operations: Execute planned and directed public affairs operations and tasks in support of public information, community relations, and command information.	Dec 2018				
				1	PA Operations: Communicate with external and internal audiences via the use of Digital Media, Broadcast Media, Print Media and Radio.	Dec 2018				
				2	PA Operations: Deliver School of Public Affairs (SoPA) training for all assigned public affairs personnel from the Ministerial-level to the Corps and Zones.	Dec 2019				
				3	MoD signs STMTCCMS MoUs with Ministry of Border and Tribal Affairs and IDLG	Dec 2017				
		3			P4 Resource Management: Effectively manage resources for the Public Affairs Directorate.	Dec 2017				
			8		P4 Resource Management: Develop and manage an annual spend plan.	Jun 2017				
				1	P4 Resource Management: Develop, Implement and manage a system to properly account for and maintain all equipment to Corps and Zone levels.	Dec 2019				
				2	P4 Resource Management: Develop, Implement and manage a system to properly oversee all service contracts.	Dec 2018				
		3			G9G3 Psychological Information Development					
			8		G9G3 Psy Info Plans and Assessments: Deliver plans/annexes to subordinate units and conduct assessments of the information environment.	Dec 2018				
				1	G9G3 Psy Info Plans and Assessments: Develop and publish clear and detailed plans/annexes/orders that coordinate and synchronize information activities in order to create desired effects in the information environment in support of security and crisis response operations.	May 2018				
				2	G9G3 Psy Info Plans and Assessments: Conduct assessments of friendly and enemy information activities and environment in order to inform future information activities.	Dec 2018				
				3	G9G3 Psy Info Plans and Assessments: Integrate with targeting kwd (G9G3) in order to synchronize lethal and non-lethal effects.	Mar 2018				
			9		G9G3 Psy Info Operations/Training: Conduct Psychological Information Operations in support of National and Corps level security and crisis response operations, and provide psychological information operations trainer as required.	Dec 2018				
				1	G9G3 Psy Info Operations/Training: Provide a full time representative to the GS JOC, GS JOC (forward), or NMCC to support current National and Corps level operations and provide battle tracking as well as monitoring psychological information activities.	Mar 2018				
				2	G9G3 Psy Info Operations/Training: Coordinate, provide guidance, and assist in development of National level products (print, radio, TV, etc.).	Dec 2018				
				3	G9G3 Psy Info Operations/Training: Participate in GS battle rhythm meetings, to include meetings with the GS, G3, G35, NCA, PA.	Mar 2018				
				4	G9G3 Psy Info Operations/Training: Deliver psychological information operations training to MoD senior leaders in order to increase the effectiveness of their communications and achieve desired effects in the information environment.	Dec 2018				
			6		G9G3 Psy Info Resource Management: Effectively manage G9G3 Psy Info resources.	Dec 2018				
				1	G9G3 Psy Info Resource Management: Ensure that TashKil supports the desired capabilities for Psychological Information Operations. Personnel are fully trained/equipped and are utilized for psychological information operations positions. Systems are in place to review requirements and make changes if necessary.	Dec 2018				
				2	G9G3 Psy Info Resource Management: Develop, Implement and manage a system to properly account for	Dec 2018				
				3	G9G3 Psy Info Resource Management: Develop, implement and manage a system to properly oversee all service contracts.	Dec 2018				
				4	G9G3 Psy Info Resource Management: Demonstrate an understanding of the process to develop and submit annual budget requests as well as develop and manage an annual spend plan.	Dec 2018				
14	Police Reorganization	Mission certificate	Mission Statement		Site: Reorganize and re-orient the Afghan National Police on traditional, community-centric, evidence-based law enforcement. Coordinate planning and activities with the stand-up of the National Joint Command and Regional Joint Commands with ABP/ANCDP transition to MoD, and with expansion of the DCPSU. Endgame: A sustainable and effective Afghan National Police force focused on rule of law	Sep 2021			Roadmap	12
		1			MRTL, Force Laydown and TashKil			The Joint Security Committee agreed that the subject of Counternarcotics must be included in the Good Governance element of the U.S.-Afghanistan Compact rather than the Security element. The Committee also agreed to hold an ONSC concept for the nationalization of Afghan police at such time as a [illegible]		
			8		Mission Essential Tasks List approved	Sep 2017				
				1	Defined ANDSF roles	Sep 2017				
			9		Force Laydown reviewed	May 2017				
				1	Approved Operational Framework(ABP/ANCDP MD)	Sep 2017				
				2	Reviewed ALP	Oct 2017				
				3	Revised MD courses	Oct 2017				

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	Action Area					Description	Milestone Date	Status	Remarks	Source Reference	
					d	MOI retraining has started	Nov 2017				
				c		GCPSU growth tashkil identified	Oct 2017				
					3	EBRT Tashkil published	Jan 2018				
				d		Counter Narcotics structures and procedures approved	Aug 2018				
			2			ANP restructure					
				a		Mol headquarters and Police Zones restructured in preparation for stand-up of MC and NCs	Jul 2018				
					1	Complete MoI headquarters and Police Zone restructuring plan and obtain GIROA approval	Dec 2017				
					2	Implemented MoI headquarters restructure	Jan 2018				
					3	Implemented Police Zone structure (Mol Zone SCP	Jan 2018				
					4	Implemented Police Zone restruct AUP CPR	TBC 2018				
					5	PRDs enhanced and professionalized	Jul 2018				
				b		ABP restructured	Sep 2018				
					1	EBRT Tashkil published	Jan 2018				
					2	Confederation (Tranche 1) completed	Nov 2017				
					3	Confederation (Tranche 2) completed	Sep 2018				
			3			New Police Code of Conduct	Mar 2018				
				a		New Police Code of Conduct approved	Jan 2018				
				b		New Police Code of Conduct embedded in the ANP	Mar 2018				
15	Civil Outreach	Mission activities	Activities/Outcomes			Aim: To improve trust in the Police through effective and co-ordinated public engagement. Indicator: An informed, respectful and positive relationship between the Afghan people and the MoI and ANP.	June 2019			Roadmap	11
			1			Coordination					
				a		MoI Community Outreach Commissioner Established	Aug 2017				
				b		MoI Community Outreach Commissioner Communicating with Zones and PCoPS	Aug 2017				
			2			Plans					
				a		CNAPT Community Outreach Plan written	Aug 2017				
				b		CNAPT Police-e-Mansoori Plan Ready for Approval	Aug 2017				
				c		Zone Community Outreach Plans written	Nov 2017				
				d		PCOP Community Outreach Plans written	Nov 2017				
				e		DCOP Community Outreach Engagement Plans written	Nov 2017				
			3			Working Groups					
				a		TAAC Community Outreach Working Group established	Sep 2017				
				b		Zone Community Outreach Working Group established	Oct 2017				
			4			Training					
				c		Police Training amended to include Police-e-Mansoori	Aug 2017				
16	Counter Corruption / Transparency	Mission activities	Activities/Outcomes			Aim: To build ANDSF capabilities to fight corruption by advising ANDSF agencies responsible for combatting corruption; helping to create policies and procedures to prevent corruption, and assisting ANCSF with conducting proper corruption investigations free of undue political influence while reinforcing the Rule of Law. End state: ANDSF corruption and percentage networks are significantly reduced and an improved [illegible]	Jan 2020			Roadmap	12
			1			Counter Corruption / Transparency development					
				a		MoD & MoI properly refer non-NCAC corruption cases to the Attorney General's Office (AGO) for prosecution and track non-NCAC corruption cases referred to the AGO to ensure corruption cases are appropriately acted upon.	Dec 2017				
				b		Build up a MCTF independent, self-sustaining, and resistant to influence.	Jan 2020				
				c		Build up a MOI IG independent, self-sustaining, and resistant to influence.	Jan 2018				
				d		ANP Academy to implement anti & counter corruption training	Mar 2018				
				e		Register assets of all high level officials at MoD	Feb 2018				
				f		Develop a plan to execute Internal Control Seminars at MoD	Dec 2017				
				g		Train counter corruption evaluators at MoD	Dec 2017				
17	Budget Formulation Process	Mission activities	Activities/Outcomes			Aim: To improve security sector budget formulation process. Indicator: MoI/MoD is able to formulate an accurate annual budget to meet internal and external requirements	Jan 2020		The Joint Security Compact Committee assesses this task to be aspirational. The Committee will therefore continue to discuss and review this commitment as a joint conditionality within the government of Afghanistan develop and resource availability becomes clearer.	19	1.1b

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Action Area			Description	Milestone Date	Status	Remarks	Source Reference	
18	Procurement Processes		Aim: improve ANP procurement processes. Evidence: Ministries in a position to solicit, evaluate, award, and award contracts and manage contractor performance to ensure timely acquisition and budget execution as planned.	Dec 2018		The Joint Security Compact Committee reviewed this task to be aspirational. The Committee will therefore continue to discuss and refine this commitment as larger conditions within the government of Afghanistan develop and resource availability becomes clearer.	EF	1.4e
19	Payroll Execution		Aim: improve ANP payroll execution. Evidence: Ministries can fully pay all employee accurately, in a timely manner, and in a secure fashion	Jan 2019		The Joint Security Compact Committee reviewed this task to be aspirational. The Committee will therefore continue to discuss and refine this commitment as larger conditions within the government of Afghanistan develop and resource availability becomes clearer.	EF	1.2f
20	Automated Personnel Management		Aim: ANDSF utilizes the automated personnel management system of record (APPS) down to the kandak level for visibility personnel and maintaining sufficiently accurate and complete personnel records. Evidence: Automated Personnel Management – Implement the automated personnel management system. APPS. In both MoD and MoI, ensure personnel records match personnel files; individuals are aligned to appropriate UIC positions on the 1396 tashkil	Oct 2018			EF	4.1.a
		1	Personnel Asset Inventory (PAI) operation completed across entire MoI + all Kabul units & 2 Corps under MoD. This accomplishment provides higher fidelity personnel data for APPS (reduces risk to successful implementation 1st July 17 and May 18) and sets stage for more accurate pay calculations/distribution (see Force structure/composition task)	Complete				
		2	95% of ANDSF personnel mgt units down to the kandak and police district level have transitioned from AHRMIS to APPS to execute all personnel accountability operations	Mar 2018				
		3	All ANDSF salary payments are calculated and distributed via APPS	Sep 2016				
		4	≥ 90% of ANDSF personnel claimed in PERSTAT total are validated in APPS (validated = all mandatory Form 30 fields accurately filled)	Dec 2017				
		5	≥ 95% of ANA & ANP personnel (vs PERSTAT end strength) are slotted into UICs on 1396 tashkil	Sep 2017				
		6	APPS training program is approved by RS advisors and completed annually by ≥ 90% of ANDSF APPS office personnel down to kandak and police district level	Oct 2016				
		7	APPS used to generate slotting, reports & PERSTAT data, provided to EFA/HRM ≥ 1x/mo	Aug 2018				
21	Force Management		Aim: FORCE MANAGEMENT, PROFF develop and execute repeatable human resource management processes to reduce attrition, increase the integrator of services, maintain core populations in alignment with tashkil authorizations or achieve ≥ 90% of authorized overall end strength. Evidence: Implement a workforce strategy, supported by policies and internal laws, to ensure that the ANDSF can meet both current and future force structure requirements; manage recruitment, training and education, career management, promotion, assignment, retention and attrition to establish and maintain a balanced force structure.	May 2018			EF	4.1.d
		1	Overall end strength claimed by MoI for ANP exceeded 95% by end of SY 1395. Overall end strength claimed by MoD for ANA reached 90% consistent with equal set tours in CY4 for SY 1395	Complete				
		2	MoD & MoI document 1-year recruiting plans deemed appropriate & achievable by RS advisors and approved by ANDSD/MoIAT	Dec 2017				
		3	≥ of ANA & ANP personnel slotted in 1396 tashkil is ≥ 92% of authorized end strength	Apr 2018				
		4	MoD gains 5,000 more members (via recruiting/re-contracting) than it loses to attrition overall for SY 1396	Apr 2018				
		5	MoI gains 3,000 more members (via recruiting/re-contracting) than it loses to attrition overall for SY 1396	Apr 2018				
		6	≥ 1 "DSG1 Roadshow" is conducted at each ANA Corps & ANP Zone per year, effectively informing Corps/Zone G1 personnel of current M&D policies, recruitment/re-contracting bonuses & incentives, exit/ease best at end of month	Jun 2018				
		7	MoD Active Reserve is reduced to ≤ 1,000 personnel	Mar 2018				
		8	No male ANDSF members are slotted in P3 positions & all female ANDSF members are assigned to P2 or P3 tashkil UIC	Dec 2017				
		9	≤ 10% difference between # of tashkil officer authorizations and # of slotted officers at each rank (both MoD and MoI)	May 2018				
		10	≥ 75% of MoD and MoI personnel who meet eligibility criteria for re-assignment (rotation) in 1396 accordance with institutional policy are moved to new assignments	May 2018				
		11	Rolling 12-month DFR rate in ANA and ANP reduced to ≤ 15% of PERSTAT end strength (measure is % of	Apr 2018				
		12	GIRoA achieves 50% female participation in uniformed ANP	Dec 2020				
		13	MoI improves working practices, employment opportunities and career paths for female police personnel and children	Jan 2018				
		14	MoD strengthens the policy for dealing with sexual harassment and bullying of female personnel, to include penalties for violations	Oct 2017				

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	Action Area					Description	Milestone Date	Status	Remarks	Source Reference	
22	Martyrs and Disabled Services	Rule of Law	Rule of Law	Institutionalization		Aim: Ensure ALANDSF personnel are able to receive their martyred and disabled rights and benefits as set in Afghan National Law. Endstate: Compensation is being paid accurately and timely to all eligible individuals and families in accordance with Policies and Internal Laws	May 2018			EF	4.1.c
			1			Reports documenting payment all information (timing & amount) made to eligible MoD/MoI MBO	May 2018				
			2			≥ 50% of MBO compensation payments are delivered to recipients on or before due date and in amounts	Feb 2018				
			3			Full funding is secured and design is complete for Kabul disabled veterans relief center	May 2018				
			4			Develop a communication plan for recognition of martyrs and distribution of benefits to families	Nov 2017				
23	ANA Training and Doctrine Development Systems	Rule of Law	Rule of Law	Institutionalization		Aim: ANDSF achieve an effective ANA training and doctrine development system. Endstate: The ANA's training and education system (including infrastructure and resources) provides a sufficient number and quality of trained individuals and units, in time, to meet the ANA's capability requirements. The ANA enterprise (full training and education by receiving a Doctrine system that provides the guidance the ANA requires to operate effectively, including the incorporation of lessons learned from their current tactical operations. All this is sustained without TAA or other support.	Dec 2020			EF	4.1.c
			1			ANA Systems Approach to Training (SAT) implemented across the Training and Education landscape (TEL)	Dec 2020				
			2			Effective Command and Control (C2) of ANA TEL.	Dec 2017				
			3			Doctrine Development system implemented.	Jun 2019				
			4			Effective Lessons Learned (LL) and Lessons Identified (LI) system implemented.	Jun 2019				
			5			Effective leadership training is delivered to all officers and NCOs.	Jun 2019				
			6			Training institutions and schools are effectively manned with the right quantity and quality of staff/instructors.	Dec 2018				
			7			Training institutions are properly resourced with the required expendable materials (fuel, ammunition etc).	Dec 2019				
			8			Training institutions are properly resourced with infrastructure.	Dec 2018				
			9			Training institutions are properly financially resourced (CT be able to conduct proper education.	Dec 2020				
			10			Branch Schools are operating effectively.	Dec 2020				
24	Air to Ground Integration	Rule of Law	Rule of Law	Institutionalization		Aim: Effective System for Training ANA in Air to Ground Integration. Endstate: The ANA sustains, without TAA (or other) support, the sufficient number and quality of ANA Tactical Air Co-ordinator (ATAC) personnel to meet the ANA's operational requirements.	Dec 2020			EF	4.1.c
			1			ANA AGI training requirement is defined, and the ANA proponent for it confirmed.	Dec 2020				
			2			Issues with current AGI training are confirmed.	Dec 2020				
			3			ANA agree plan for development and resourcing of AGI training.	Dec 2020				
			4			Plan is implemented so that the AGI training requirement is met by the ANA.	Dec 2020				
25	Supply Chain Management within the Security Sector	Rule of Law	Rule of Law	Institutionalization		Aim: Improve Supply Chain Management. Endstate: MoD/I conducts consumption based, demand driven supply chain management. There is a fully network (non-paper) automated warehouse operations including logistic information system (LIS) down to the Brigade level. A pillar of the supply chain is a responsive distribution system that is able to transfer materiel to meet operational need.	Dec 2020		The joint Security Compact Committee assesses this task to be aspirational. The Committee will therefore continue to discuss and refine this commitment as larger conditions within the government of Afghanistan develop and resource availability becomes clearer.	EF	5.1.a
26	Trauma Care Systems	Rule of Law	Rule of Law	Institutionalization		Aim: Improve MoD/I response to others. Endstate: MoD/I develop and exercise other action plans to respond to contingencies such as natural or man-made emergencies	Jan 2019		The joint Security Compact Committee assesses this task to be aspirational. The Committee will therefore continue to discuss and refine this commitment as larger conditions within the government of Afghanistan develop and resource availability becomes clearer.	EF	5.1.a

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	Action Area				Description	Milestone Date	Status	Remarks	Source Reference	
27	Force Health Protection (FHP) Initiative	Action: ANDSF	Action: MoD	Action: MoI	Aim: Improve ANDSF force health protection (FHP). Endstate: ANDSF institutes a sustainable preventive health program.	Jan 2018		The Joint Security Compact Committee assesses this task to be aspirational. The Committee will therefore continue to discuss and refine this commitment as larger conditions within the government of Afghanistan develop and resource availability becomes clearer.	EF	5.2.f
28	Medical Standards	Action: ANDSF	Action: MoD	Action: MoI	Aim: Improve ANDSF healthcare standards. Endstate: ANDSF develops programs to meet national healthcare standards and demonstrated compliance with those standards	Jan 2021		The Joint Security Compact Committee assesses this task to be aspirational. The Committee will therefore continue to discuss and refine this commitment as larger conditions within the government of Afghanistan develop and resource availability becomes clearer.	EF	5.2.g
29	Healthcare Operations	Action: ANDSF	Action: MoD	Action: MoI	Aim: Improve ANDSF medical logistics and infrastructure systems. Endstate: ANDSF develops sustainable medical logistics and infrastructure systems to support healthcare operations.	Jan 2018		The Joint Security Compact Committee assesses this task to be aspirational. The Committee will therefore continue to discuss and refine this commitment as larger conditions within the government of Afghanistan develop and resource availability becomes clearer.	EF	5.2.h
30	Sustainable Information and Communications Network	Action: ANDSF	Action: MoD	Action: MoI	Aim: Develop a secure ANDSF Information and Communication Systems Enterprise Network. Endstate: Build ANDSF Cyber Security Capabilities and a Program to Endow Cyber Security across and within all ANDSF Information Systems and Networks	Dec 2100		The Joint Security Compact Committee assesses this task to be aspirational. The Committee will therefore continue to discuss and refine this commitment as larger conditions within the government of Afghanistan develop and resource availability becomes clearer.	EF	5.2.i
31	ANDSF Radio System	Action: ANDSF	Action: MoD	Action: MoI	Aim: Improve ANDSF spectrum management. Endstate: Establish an ANDSF Spectrum Management Capability and Organization	Dec 2100		The Joint Security Compact Committee assesses this task to be aspirational. The Committee will therefore continue to discuss and refine this commitment as larger conditions within the government of Afghanistan develop and resource availability becomes clearer.	EF	5.2.j
32	MoD Strategic Document Implementation	Action: ANDSF	Action: MoD	Action: MoI	Aim: MoD delivers strategic interior documents and develops and implements them through a robust process. Endstate: MoI capable of delivering the Strategic Planning Directive, a 4-year strategy, and Annual Plans on time and better with a focused, threat informed resource away, and pilot in a closed process. MoI is also capable of implementing these documents, monitoring its implementation, and guiding the MoI Force Management process. MoI can conduct all of these processes without US advising effort.	Feb 2018		The Joint Security Compact Committee understands the MoI intends to develop a Strategic Plan - to include a "plan-to-plan" and therefore much of the work and progress will be captured and tracked outside of the Compact - though progress on the key elements captured here in the commitment milestones will still be reported.	EF	6.c
				1	DM STRATPOL produces a Strategic Planning Directive to initiate and drive the development of strategic MoI documents in time and quality.	Sep 2017				
				2	DM STRATPOL develops, publishes and promulgates a MoI strategic document, derived from National Security Strategy, NSD goals and directives, the MIRWIP 10 Year Vision, and incorporating the flowlines that clearly articulate MoI objectives to allow subordinate planning.	Oct 2017				
				3	DM STRATPOL develops, publishes and promulgates a detailed annual plan, based on the strategic plan, to allow subordinate planning.	Dec 2017				
				4	Implementation: DM STRATPOL establishes and executes an effective capability to monitor, assess and report on strategic and policy implementations.	Oct 2017				
				5	DM STRATPOL develops and promulgates guidance necessary to inform effectively the MoI Force Management process.	Oct 2017				
				6	MoI develops long and medium term planning derived from the strategy, assigning missions to subordinate commanders and DM Chiefs, and articulating strategic, institutional and operational priorities and with appropriate consultation across MoI and other stakeholders, achieving timely output	Feb 2018				
				7	MoI develops a robust governance mechanism of strategic leadership meetings that can monitor and direct progress towards the Ministry's strategic endstate	Oct 2017				

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	Action Area			Description	Milestone Date	Status	Remarks	Source Reference	
33	Plan and Issue Orders (Operational to Tactical)	Mission Command	Sub-Mission Command	Aim: MoD/GS plan and issue orders from the Operational to Tactical level. Evaluate ANDSF as the Operational and Tactical level are capable of planning in a timely manner utilizing a military decision making process that follows their commander's guidance and synchronizes warfighting functions independent of the RS advising effort.	Oct 2010			19	64
			1	MoD/GS plan joint operations.	Nov 2010				
			2	GDGS develops, publishes and promulgates the pertinent annual operational planning guidance derived from NMS and in accordance with ANA Long Term Plans as required.	Nov 2010				
			3	GS develops, tied by DSBB, Long and Medium Term Planning derived from SPG/NMS assigning missions to subordinate commanders and GS Chiefs, and articulating strategic, institutional and operational priorities and with appropriate consultation across MoD and other stakeholders, achieving timely output.	Nov 2010				
			4	ANA conducts effective planning.	Oct 2010				
			5	ANP conducts effective planning. ANP staff at all echelons are able to execute a planning process, which follows the commander's guidance.	Oct 2010				
			6	ANP conducts plans operations for community policing environments throughout the Police Zone HQs.	Oct 2010				
34	ANDSF Sustainment at the Corps Level	Mobility Activities	Sustainment	Aim: ANDSF can sustain. Evaluate: The ANDSF is capable of effectively refitting fielded forces to provide for a long-term and sustainable operational security force. Sub-categories are: - Personnel ("P" Rating) - Equipment ("E" Rating) - Training ("T" Rating)	DEC 2010		Corps Readiness Reporting*: Overall Readiness Rating ("C" Rating) C1 - "Fully Ready" (>95%) C2 - "Ready with Limitations" (80%<C2<95%) C3 - "Ready with Problems" (70%<C3<80%) C4 - "Not Capable" (<70%) --- The "C" Rating is equal to the lowest of the P/E/T rating levels below* (* P,E,T, Ratings are self reporting per the Afghan National Army Readiness Reporting System Regulation dated 15 September 2011). The process is managed by the Afghan General Staff	ANDSF	1
			1	Brigades sustain a "C1" rating or better (No Brigade will remain at "C4 for more than 90 days).	DEC 2017				
			2	Brigades sustain a "C1" rating or better (No Brigade will remain a "C4" for more than 30 days).	DEC 2018				
			3	Brigades sustain a "C2" rating or better. (No Brigade will remain a "C3" for more than 30 days).	DEC 2019				
			4	Brigades sustain a "C2" rating or better. (No Brigade will remain a "C3" for more than 30 days).	DEC 2020				
35	Personnel Sustainment at the Corps Level	Mobility Activities	Sustainment	Aim: ANDSF can generate and sustain qualified personnel in the right positions. Evaluate: The ANDSF is capable of effectively refitting fielded forces to provide for a long-term and sustainable operational security force. Sub-categories for "Personnel sustainment" are: - On Hand Strength/ Manning Shortages - Key Leadership Shortages - Attrition	DEC 2010		Corps Readiness Reporting: Personnel Rating ("P" Rating) P1 - (Strength (100% - 95%) P2 - (Strength (95% - 80%) P3 - (Strength (79% - 70%) P4 - (Strength <70%) --- "Strength" is the lowest of the following: PA - % Personnel Assigned PS - % Personnel Deployable PE - % Assigned Senior Grade	ANDSF	1
			1	No Brigade remains at a "P4" rating for over 60 days.	DEC 2017				
			2	Brigades sustain a "P3" rating or better (No Brigade will remain a "P4" for more than 30 days).	DEC 2018				
			3	Brigades sustain a "P2" rating or better. (No Brigade will remain a "P3" for more than 30 days).	DEC 2019				
			4	Brigades sustain a "P2" rating or better. (No Brigade will remain a "P3 for more than 30 days).	DEC 2020				
36	Equipment Sustainment at the Corps Level	Mobility Activities	Sustainment	Aim: The ANDSF's ability to maintain and sustain equipment to maintain the unit's ability to move, move, and communicate. Evaluate: The ANDSF is capable of effectively instituting maintenance operations in order to provide for a long-term and sustainable operational security force. Sub-categories for "Equipment sustainment" are: - Shoot (Weapons) - Move (Vehicles) - Communicate (Communications, Electronics/Optics and Night Vision Devices)	DEC 2010		Corps Readiness Reporting: Equipment ("E" Rating) E1 - Operational (100% - 95%) E2 - Operational (95% - 80%) E3 - Operational (79% - 70%) E4 - Operational (<70%) --- "Operational" is the lowest of the following: EOH - % Total Assigned Equipment On Hand ES - % Total Operational Equipment ROH - % Total Assigned Vehicle Items On	ANDSF	1
			1	No Brigade remains at a "E4" rating for more than 60 days.	DEC 2017				
			2	Brigades sustain a "E3" rating or better (No Brigade will remain a "E4" for more than 60 days).	DEC 2018				
			3	Brigades sustain a "E2" rating or better (No Brigade will remain a "E3" for more than 30 days).	DEC 2019				
			4	Brigades sustain a "E1" rating or better (No Brigade will remain a "E2" for more than 60 days).	DEC 2020				

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	Action Area				Description	Milestone Date	Status	Remarks	Source	Reference
37	Training at the Corps level		Mentor the Corps	2	Aim: ANCDF can generate and sustain qualified personnel in their right positions, and pair and maintain individual and unit proficiency in key mentor, advisors and enablers tasks. Outcome: The ANCDF is capable of effective mentoring fielded forces and provides a bridge training to provide for a long term and sustainable expeditionary security force. Sub-discipline for "Training proficiency" aim: - Individual Training - Specialization Training	DEC 2012		Corps Readiness Reporting Training ("T" Rating) Rating is based on an estimate range of training days to achieve mission standards. "1" - 0-14 days to achieve standard "2" - 15-28 days to achieve standard "3" - 30 - >42 days to achieve standards	ANCDF	4
				3	No Brigade remains at a "T3" rating for more than 90 days.	DEC 2017				
				3	Brigades sustain a "T3" rating or better	DEC 2018				
				3	Brigades sustain a "T2" rating or better (the 8 brigade will remain a "T3" for more than 42 days).	DEC 2019				
				4	Brigades sustain a "T1" rating or better (the 8 brigade will remain a "T2" for more than 28 days).	DEC 2020				

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AFGHANISTAN COMPACT
GOVERNANCE BENCHMARKS

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DEMOCRACY			
LONG TERM GOAL 1: Afghanistan holds timely, credible, and inclusive elections.			
#	Benchmark	Responsible Entity	Deadline
1.01	Hold a monthly National Elections Forum (NEF) to chart progress toward credible elections. - Transparent: open to the public, open to the media, or minutes of NEF released, and - Inclusive: include representatives of the Elections Support Group, the Independent Election Commission, the Election Complaints Commission, political parties and coalitions, civil society organizations, and the media.	IEC	November 2017 Review Monthly
1.02	Establish the Operational Plan for registering voters, voting and vote counting. - If biometric voter registration (BVR) kits are not in place by October 31, then the Independent Elections Commission will immediately begin to implement traditional voter registration to ensure the Parliamentary elections are held on time. [November 2017] - Establish the operational plan for voter registration, voting, and vote counting. [December 2017] - Establish a budget to support the voting process from registration through vote counting; [December 2017]	IEC with oversight by the ONSC, and the President's Office	December 2017 Review Monthly Originally Due October 2017
1.03	Promote voter information and registration. - Draft and release a nation-wide outreach plan. [December 2017] - Establish budget to support voter information and registration drives, [December 2017] - Advertise voter registration campaigns through all available, useful media, including television, radio, Internet, and print (encourage all eligible voters to participate, including through targeted ads aimed at increasing women and minority voters), and [January 2018 (Review Monthly)] - Establish a centralized voter registration information resource. [March 2018]	IEC	March 2018 Review Monthly Originally Due October 2017
1.04	Prepare polling station staff for Parliamentary elections. - Establish budget to support polling station staff, [December 2017] - Hire polling station staff and polling station security (IEC shall confirm hired staff members were not involved in fraud in last election), and [March 2018] - Train polling station staff to: check voter registration records against voters on elections day; teach registered voters how to cast their ballots; prevent repeat voting; safeguard ballots; counting ballots; reporting votes, and securing ballot boxes in the event of a recount. . [May 2018]	IEC	May 2018 Review Monthly Originally Due October 2017

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1.05	Make a decision on whether to hold District Council elections.	President's Office	December 2017
1.06	Provide sufficient funds to the Independent Election Commission and Independent Election Complaints Commission to function as independent bodies throughout the electoral cycle.	MOF, IEC, President's Office, OCE, Donors	November 2017
1.07	Decide on constituency reform.	President's Office	November 2017
1.08	Ensure that the Executive Staff of the Secretariat and the Commission in the Kabul office of the Independent Election Commission and the Independent Electoral Complaint Commission are fully staffed.	President's Office, IEC	December 2017
1.09	Review, update, and publish the rules governing allowable campaigning and code of conduct, including eligibility requirements and when campaigning can begin. The media commission will develop a comprehensive monitoring plan to ensure compliance with the code of conduct. Establish and enforce penalties for violating campaign regulations, including ineligibility for most significant violations.	IEC	January 2018
1.10	Register qualified voters. - Announce voter registration qualifications, rules, and requirements, including mandating all voters to vote at the polling station where they are registered; [January 2018] - Produce voter registration sheets; [March 2018] - Conduct registration process; [March – June 2018, Review Monthly] - Ship ballots to polling stations (the number of ballots sent to a polling station must equal the number of registered voters at that particular polling station).	IEC	June 2018
1.11	Provide overwhelming security at all election polling stations during registration and on election day to ensure public safety and voting integrity, including security of all ballot boxes.	MOI, MOD	July 7, 2018
1.12	Hold Parliamentary elections on July 7, 2018.	IEC	July 7, 2018
1.13	Announce presidential elections in 2019.	IEC	July 2018

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CONTROL OF CORRUPTION			
LONG TERM GOAL 2: Senior government officials face well-defined and credible punishment for acts of corruption, and public trust in government institutions increases substantially.			
#	Benchmark	Responsible Entity	Deadline
2.00	Anti-Corruption Prevention: Strategies, Systems and Legislation to Enhance Transparency and Reduce Corruption		
2.01	- Organize High Council for Rule of Law & Anti-Corruption quarterly meetings and publish the minutes publicly.	President's Office	November 2017 Originally Due October 2017
2.02	- Finalize and adopt the Anti-Corruption Strategy; establish timelines for each of the Strategy's recommendations.	President's Office; ONSC	November 2017 Originally Due October 2017
2.03	- Establish, and advertise in public media, an anti-corruption tip hotline and provide financial rewards for tips that lead to corruption charges.	AGO, ACJC	November 2017
2.04	- Publish and begin implementing MEC's Vulnerability to Corruption Assessment (VCA) of the Ministry of Mines and Petroleum (MOMP) and MEC's recommendations to address and eliminate causes of corruption at the Attorney General's Office (AGO).	OCE, MOMP, MEC	December 2017
2.05	- Enact a comprehensive anti-corruption law, based on the anti-corruption strategy, and consistent with Afghan Law and UNCAC commitments.	President's Office	June 2018
2.06	- Execute existing anti-corruption plans for the five revenue-generating ministries, the ACJC, the AGO, and the MCTF, and make quarterly public reports on progress.	MCIT, MOMP, MOT, MOF, MOCI, AGO, ACJC, MCTF	August 2018
2.10	Anti-Corruption Prosecution: Anti-Corruption Justice Center (ACJC), Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF), and Attorney General's Office (AGO)		
2.12	- Develop, implement, and publish rules for when cases are to be submitted to the ACJC.	AGO, ACJC	November 2017 Originally Due October 2017
2.13	- Prosecute high-profile corruption cases to demonstrate to the Afghan public that all citizens shall be accountable for their crimes. - Kabul Bank Case - Embassy requested a list of all suspects who entered into a repayment agreement in lieu of prosecution. [November 2017] - Former Minister of Telecommunications and Information technology Abdul Razaq Wahidi	AGO, ACJC, MCTF	March 2018 Review Monthly Originally Due October 2017 Review Monthly

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	Case [January 2018] - Herat Provincial Council Kamran Alizai Case [February 2018] - Individuals named in the Farooqi Report [March 2018]		
2.14	- Increase the Anti-Corruption Justice Center (ACJC) funds to provide armored vehicle shuttle service and body guard detail to protect ACJC officials and their families	MOF, ACJC, AGO	November 2017 Review Monthly Originally Due October 2017 Review Monthly
2.15	- Provide security protection to ACJC officials and their families.	MOI, MOD, ACJC	November 2017
2.16	- Prosecute all officials removed from government office due to corruption.	AGO, ACJC , MCTF	December 2017
2.17	- Polygraph all ACJC, AGO, and MCTF officials and judges every three years.	ACJC, AGO, MCTF	January 2018 Review Annually
2.18	- Establish and implement a system for receiving and handling corruption complaints that includes an independent and transparent mechanism to refer corruption cases involving influential political, business, and/or public figures to the ACJC for prosecution.	AGO, ACJC	June 2018

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RULE OF LAW			
LONG TERM GOAL 3: The public has confidence in the Government of Afghanistan's ability to fairly enforce the law.			
#	Benchmark	Responsible Entity	Deadline
3.00	Enact and implement rules and legislation to improve transparency:		
3.01	- Add an enforcement mechanism to strengthen the Audit Law	MOJ, OP, National Assembly, SAO, AGO	November 2017
3.02	- Pass and implement Land Management Law and Land Acquisition Law.	ARAZI, Cabinet, President's Office, MOJ, National Assembly	December 2017
3.03	- Require all courts to publish the date of court proceedings at least one week before the proceeding, except in emergency circumstances.	Office of the President; AGO	January 1, 2018
3.04	- Publish statistics on number of cases in each court, conviction rates, length of time from start to resolution, number of civil settlements, number of civil trials, etc.	Supreme Court	January 2018 Review Annually.
3.05	- Require all corruption legal proceedings to be broadcast or recorded through radio and television	AGO, ACJC	June 2018
3.06	- Amend and enact the Access to Information Law to meet international best practices.	President's Office, MOJ, Parliament, MoIC, OCE, LMs	July 2018
3.07	- Strengthen case management system to improve coordination within the judiciary and among law enforcement agencies.	Supreme Court, MOJ, AGO, MoF	August 2018
3.08	- Amend the Special Courts law to allow the ACJC to prosecute ministers.		December 2018
3.10	Enact and implement legislation to enhance equal protection under the law:		
3.11	- Enforce the January 2016 Presidential Decree to investigate past cases of violence against journalists.	MOIC, AGO, MOI, NDS	December 2017
3.12	- Draft and enact a Whistle-blower Protection Law. The law must protect employees and contractors, in the public and private sector, from retribution of any kind resulting from the employee or contractor reporting wrongdoing.	MOJ, OP, National Assembly	September 2018
3.13	- Strengthen legal protections for women, to include drafting, passing, implementing, and enforcing legislation to enable women to inherit and own property.	President's Office, MOWA, MOJ, ARAZI	August 2018
3.20	Enact and implement legislation to standardize and modernize criminal law provisions:		
3.21	- Publish the new Penal Code.	MOJ, National Assembly, Justice Ministries	December 2017
3.22	- Train police, investigator, prosecutors, and judges on the new provisions.	MOJ, Justice Ministries	September 2018

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GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS AND PROVISION OF SERVICES			
LONG TERM GOAL 4: Afghan citizens have increasing confidence they will benefit from effective and impartial local, provincial, and national services delivery.			
#	Benchmark	Responsible Entity	Deadline
4.00	Local and Provincial Government		
4.02	- Submit the Subnational Governance Policy for Cabinet approval.	IDLG, MOF, and LMs	December 2017
4.04	- Develop and approve public grievance procedure in municipalities and provinces, and establish a procedure to hold local and provincial officials accountable if they fail to address grievances.	IDLG	December 2017
4.05	- Settle and publish the geographical boundaries of 20 provincial municipalities.	IDLG, MOF, LMs, CSO, ARAZI	December 2017
4.07	- Pass and implement the Local Administration Law, and Municipal Law.	IDLG, Cabinet & National Assembly	June 2018
4.10	Civil Service Commission		
4.11	- Audit and reform the Independent Administrative Reform Civil Service Commission.	IARCSC	December 2017
4.12	- Establish a competitive recruitment process in the civil service including the units that are civilianized in AGO, MOD, MOI, and Supreme Court.	IARCSC	December 2017
4.13	- Pass and implement civil service legislation, including Organic Law, Civil Service Law, Civil Servants Law, and Administrative Procedure Law.	MOJ, President's Office, National Assembly, IARCSC	March 2018
4.14	- Set key performance indicators for civil service ministries and agencies in line with "Capacity Building for Results" program.	IARCSC	March 2018
4.15	Complete evaluation of digitalized "Human Resource Management Information System" options.	IARCSC	December 2017
4.20	National Government		
4.21	Establish a customer service department to provide timely information and guidance to beneficiaries on legal matters.	Supreme Court	December 2017
4.22	Provide resources to basic health and education in higher ratio to Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) funding for these sectors.	MOF, MoED, MoPH,	March 2018

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COUNTERNARCOTICS			
LONG TERM GOAL 5: Afghan illicit drug production and trafficking no longer destabilize local economies and law enforcement.			
#	Benchmark	Responsible Entity	Deadline
5.01	Counter Narcotics High Commission led by H. E. President, CEO or Vice President conducted quarterly.	President's Office, OCE, MCN	November 2017
5.02	Eradication: - Improve eradication efforts to reduce poppy cultivation in select districts and provinces working with supportive local governments and communities. - Review existing eradication methodologies/practices to identify and implement the most effective methods. - Maximize joint Afghan interagency coordination, especially the provision of security, to increase poppy eradication.	MCN, MOI, MOD	January 2018 Review Monthly
5.03	Alternative Development: - Broaden and diversify licit alternatives to poppy cultivation using community-based approaches to address illicit crop production and its associated value chain in select districts and provinces, to demonstrate proof of concept for a larger strategy to promote sustainable development.	MCN, MAIL	January 2018 Review Monthly
5.04	Interdiction: - Increase the number of successful interdiction operations over the 2016 total. [Completed] - Increase the National Interdiction Unit's ability to independently plan and execute interdiction operations. [December 2017] - Pay rewards for tips that lead to successful interdiction operations. [December 2017]	MCN, MOI	December 2017 Review Monthly
5.05	Anti-Money Laundering: - Successfully investigate and prosecute money laundering cases against drug kingpins and narcotrafficking organizations. - Remove from office senior officials who refuse to prosecute kingpins and drug traffickers. - Reward police, investigators, and prosecutors who successfully convict drug kingpins and traffickers.	AGO, MOI	January 2018 Review Monthly
5.06	Counter Narcotics Community Engagement: - Broaden drug demand reduction campaigns throughout Afghanistan across a range of institutions, including schools, mosques, community events, and the workplace. - Focus messaging campaigns on linking the Taliban to narcotrafficking and the illicit drug trade. - Conduct annual surveys to measure the public's level of understanding and awareness of the ill effects of drug production and use.	MCN, MOE, President's Office	January 2018 Review Quarterly
5.07	Drug Demand Reduction: - Successfully transition the administrative and financial control of all U.S. government-funded drug treatment centers to the Ministry of Public Health.	MCN, MOPH	December 2019 Review Monthly

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COMPLETED BENCHMARKS		
BM#	Benchmark	Responsible Entity
2	Announce Parliamentary and district council elections in 2018.	IEC
3	Decide on biometric voter registration for both 2018 Parliamentary and district council elections in 2018.	IEC
5	Establish National Elections Forum to serve as consultative mechanism on parliamentary and presidential elections, including representatives from the Afghan Unity Government, independent Election Commission and Election Complaints Commission (Electoral Management Bodies), political groups outside of government, and civil society.	President's Office
7	Provide initial funding for specific electoral events, e.g., voter registration drives, polling station security, etc.	MOF, IEC
13	Carry out polling center assessments.	IEC
22	Appropriate and release funding that fully pays for the Arti-Corruption Justice Center staff, operations, and maintenance via a dedicated budget line.	ACJC, AGO, MCTF, MOF
23	Establish Bilateral U.S.-Afghan Coordination Body.	President's Office, OCE
29	Start the process of recruitment of the qualified professionals below the deputy minister level.	President's Office, IARCSC
30	Pass and implement the Provincial Budgeting Policy	IDLG, MoF
45	Launch the Provincial Councils (PCs) Oversight Regulation and subsequently begin building oversight capacity of PC members.	IDLG and CSOs
63	Add an enforcement mechanism to strengthen the Audit Law.	MOJ, OP, National Assembly, SAO
64	Establish Executive Committee of Prevention of Corruption and Systems Development.	President's Office, OCE
65	Draft and implement comprehensive Anti-Corruption Strategy that streamlines anti-corruption institutions and is in line with UNCAC commitments.	High Council for Rule of Law & Anti-Corruption
71	Remove from government all officials who are required by law but have failed to declare their assets.	President's Office
79	Publish MEC's Vulnerability to Corruption Assessment (VCA) of Attorney General's Office.	OCE, AGO, MEC
1.01	Hold a monthly National Elections Forum (NEF) to chart progress toward credible elections. - Transparent: open to the public, open to the media, or minutes of NEF released, and - Inclusive: include representatives of the Elections Support Group, the Independent Election Commission, the Election Complaints Commission, political parties and coalitions, civil society organizations, and the media.	IEC
3.01	- Add an enforcement mechanism to strengthen the Audit Law - ACJC monitoring of Audit office, and - amending of Article 20 to allow the AGO to review documents.	MOJ, OP, National Assembly, SAO, AGO
5.01	Counter Narcotics High Commission led by H. E. President, CEO or Vice President conducted quarterly.	President's Office, OCE, MCN
5.04	Interdiction: Increase the number of successful interdiction operations over the 2016 total.	MCN, MOI

AFGHANISTAN-UNITED STATES COMPACT

PEACE AND RECONCILIATION BENCHMARKS

NO	BENCHMARKS	RESPONSIBLE ENTITY	DEADLINE
	Action Steps by the High Peace Council		
1	Formally launch the implementation of the new National Peace and Reconciliation Strategy as a fundamental step to advance an effective national peace process and build national consensus on peace (subject to availability of funds);	HPC	August 2017
2	PPCs demonstrate that they meet the objectives laid out in the National Peace Strategy and in accordance with specific needs of their communities;	HPC; PPCs; IDLG	August through December 2017
3	Ensure proper fiscal oversight and project management for the strategy in collaboration with UNDP including regular financial reports;	HPC; Ministry of Finance; ONSC; UN	August 2017
4	Review and reform HPC structures at center and provincial level to mobilize countrywide peace efforts;	HPC	September 2017
5	Provide regular reports detailing concrete nationwide efforts by the HPC and government in support of the peace strategy;	HPC and ONSC	October through December 2017
6	Provide quarterly plans for peace-related outreach and public engagement;	HPC and IDLG	Ongoing through 2017
7	Clearly define specific roles and responsibilities of all relevant government agencies in supporting the HPC and a whole-of-government approach to the peace process;	HPC and ONSC in collaboration with all relevant gov't agencies	September 2017
8	Strengthen national consensus in support of the peace process through a wide range of focused consultations at the center and provincial levels;	HPC	September 2017 through August 2018
9	Launch a nationwide strategic communications program on peace, and develop unified and coordinated messages of peace and integrate them across the political spectrum;	HPC; ONSC; MoFA; GMIC; MoWA; MoHRA; MoIC	September 2017 and ongoing
10	Establish an effective coordination mechanism of communication to regularly report on progress made in supporting the peace process;	HPC	September 2017
11	Implement coordinated peace initiatives with HPC, Ulema, women, youth, and CSOs in accordance with the national peace strategy;	HPC	November 2017 through

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			January 2018
12	Reach out to Ulema of Afghanistan and the region including engaging with OIC in support of peace in Afghanistan and de-legitimization of violence that is taking place in the name of Jihad in Afghanistan;	MoFA; Ulema Council; HPC; Ministry of Hajj and Religious Affairs	October 2017 through July 2018
13	Enhance peace-related programs in universities, higher institutes of education, and high schools across the country including establishing student-run peace associations;	HPC; Ministry of Education; Ministry of Higher Education	October 2017 and ongoing
14	Promote bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral mechanisms of regional cooperation in support of peace in Afghanistan including convening the next rounds of QCG and 6+1	MoFA; ONSC; HPC	September 2017 and ongoing
15	Ensure the continuation of the Kabul Process as an umbrella platform that takes stock of all the regional peace initiatives;	MoFA; ONSC; HPC	October 2017 and ongoing
16	In accordance with the National Peace Strategy, engage in outreach and peace talks with Afghan armed opposition groups;	NDS; NSC; HPC	January 2018
17	Continue to support Track 1.5 and Track 2 engagements including reaching out to civil society, media, and tribal elders in the region in an attempt to forge closer relations on the grassroots level and reduce tensions with regional countries.	HPC; MoFA; GMIC; Ministry of Border and Tribal Affairs; Parliament; CSOs	August 2017 and ongoing

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U.S.-AFGHAN COMPACT ECONOMIC WORKING GROUP (WG): IMPLEMENTATION MATRIX

Recommendations	Organization	Deadline
Business Climate Reforms		
(1) Business Process Simplification		
Issue decree mandating all regulations of each citizen-facing office are placed on walls	AOP	Sept 2017
Implement the existing signed regulations for visa-on-arrival for business travelers	MoFA	Oct 2017
Issue decree to shorten the authentication process for foreign investors	MoCI/MoFA	Nov 2017
Move their initial licensing representatives to MOCI CBR	MoCI	Dec 2017
(2) Legal Reforms		
Pass revisions to the Corporations & Limited Liability Law	MoJ/MoCI	Dec 2017
Pass Bankruptcy Law	MoJ/MoCI	June 2018
Pass revisions to Municipal Law	MoJ/KM	Dec 2018
(3) Lowering Cost of Business Reforms		
Improve ease of doing construction		
▪ *Pass regulation to reduce number of checks during construction process*	KM	Sept 2017
▪ *Publish regulations online that specifies frequency of checks during construction*	KM	Oct 2017
Improve availability of electricity		
▪ *Target 120th rank by 2021*		
▪ *Publish effective tariff rates and connection fees online*	DABS	Sept 2017
▪ *Publish SAIDI and SAIFI indices*	DABS	Dec 2017
▪ *Establishment of power sector regulator*	MoEW	Dec 2017
▪ *DABS to reduce costs of installation for business consumers*	DABS	June 2019
Trading across borders		
▪ *Target 120th rank by 2021*		
▪ *Reduce border compliance costs by 25% per year (target export costs of $500 and import costs of $900)*	MoF	2018 & 2019
▪ *Reduce border compliance hours by 25% per year (target export hours of 150 hours and import hours of 200 hours)*	MoF	2018 & 2019
Paying taxes		
▪ *Target 100th rank by 2021*		

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▪ *Decrease tax burden to South Asia average (i.e. 40%)*	MoF	Dec 2018
▪ *Decrease time to prepare tax returns (by 25% per year, target 200 hours)*	MoF	2017 & 18
▪ *Decrease time to complete corporate income tax audit (by 25% per year)*	MoF	2017 & 18
▪ *Decrease time to comply with corporate income tax audit (by 25% per year)*	MoF	2017 & 18
(4) Supporting Business Reforms		
Enforcing contracts		
▪ *Target 120th ranking by 2021*		
▪ *Map out existing commercial legal system to identify ways to decrease time to settle a commercial dispute*	MoJ	Dec 2017
▪ *Pass law setting overall time standards for key events in a civil case*	MoJ	Dec 2018
▪ *Establish court automation system*	MoJ	Dec 2018
▪ *Reduce time to obtain judgment from court system (by 50%)*	MoJ	Dec 2019
Getting credit		
▪ *Target 60th ranking by 2021*		
▪ *Improve the depth and breadth of credit registry coverage to South Asia average*	DAB	Dec 2019
Registering property		
▪ *Target 120th ranking by 2021*		
▪ *Improve reliability of land administration infrastructure (from zero to three)*	ARAZI	Dec 2018
▪ *Improve transparency of land ownership (from zero to three)*	ARAZI	Dec 2018
▪ *Increase the geographic coverage of the land ownership database (from zero to four)*	ARAZI	Dec 2018
▪ *Improve land dispute resolution index (from three to five)*	ARAZI	Dec 2018
▪ *Reduce time for title transfer (to less than six months)*	KM	Dec 2018

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Economic Sector Reforms		
(1) Finance		
Macro: Complete reviews under the IMF ECF to preserve macroeconomic and fiscal stability	MoF	Dec 2017 & 2018
Budget Execution		
▪ *Implement "Use it or Lose it" policy will be adopted to make the budget process more realistic, where actual spending of the previous year will be considered as base for the next year's budget*	MoF	Dec 2017
▪ *Increase budget execution rates at top-5 expenditure ministries by 10% per year*	MoF	2017 & '18
▪ *PFM to be introduced to top-5 expenditure ministries*	MoF	Dec 2018
Taxes		
▪ *Establish a call center with modern call distribution and automated answering capabilities for taxpayers*	MoF	Dec 2017
▪ *Pilot e-filing within LTO (contingent upon approval of e-governance law by MoCIT)*	MoF	June 2018
▪ *Roll out e-filing to other offices in MTO and STO*	MoF	Dec 2018
Banking		
▪ *Develop strategy for three state-owned banks*	AOP	Dec 2017
▪ *Develop policies to increase access to finance for the business community*	AOP	Dec 2018
Mobile Money		
▪ *Roll Issue RFP for mobile money at MoEd*	MoF	Dec 2017
▪ *Issue RFP for mobile money at additional 5 ministries*	MoF	Dec 2018
Accounting		
▪ *Pass accounting law that creates an independent accounting authority*	MoF	Dec 2017
▪ *Pass a new SAO law that leads to SAO reform*	MoF	June 2018
State-Owned Companies / Corporations		
▪ *Issue decree mandating professional board requirements for all state corporations*	MoF	Dec 2017
▪ *Complete annual external audit of largest state corporations Ariana and DABS*	MoF	Dec 2017
(2) Commerce		
Explore negotiations with the United States on a Bilateral Investment Treaty	MoCI	Dec 2017
Classify and certify private companies in order to be qualified to attend the bidding	MoEc	June 2018

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process in certain level of development projects		
Expand Air Corridor Project to an average one flight per month during high season	Ariana	June 2018
Establish a corruption-free, one-stop air cargo zone at Kabul Airport	ACAA	Dec 2018
Implement WTO Agreements	MoCI/ANSA	
TBT (Technical Barriers to Trade) Agreements		
▪ *Obtaining membership in the International Accreditation Cooperation (ILAC) for mandatory testing,*		June 2018
▪ *Negotiating an concluding agreements for the mutual acceptance of conformity assessment results,*		Dec 2018
▪ *Developing a database of standards and technical regulation,*		June 2019
▪ *Developing a certification system*		Dec 2019
WTO Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary agreements	MAIL	Dec 2019
(3) Transport		
Legal: Revise and update transportation law to incorporate clauses necessary to regulate TIR, road pass, and to establish transportation companies	MoT	March 2018
Financial: Computerization of revenue collection system linked to the banking system so as to replace cash transactions and ensure transparency and efficiency	MoT/MoF	Dec 2018
Rail: Establishment of the legal basis and other actions to strengthen railway management in Afghanistan		
▪ *Membership of ARA in COTIF approved by Cabinet of Afghanistan and it need approval of Afghanistan Parliament*	ARA	Dec 2017
▪ *Afghanistan Railway Act*	ARA	June 2018
▪ *Afghanistan Railway Business Act*	ARA	Dec 2018
▪ *Separation of Afghanistan Railway Authority from Ministry of Public Works to enable Railway Authority undertake strategic planning and management by its own*	ARA	Dec 2018
Road: Pass restructuring plan of MoPW	MoPW	Dec 2018
Regional Agreements		
▪ *Signing of Lapus Lazuli agreement*	MoFA	Dec 2017
▪ *Establish RECCA Chamber of Commerce*	MoFA	Dec 2017
▪ *Obtain membership to TRICICA*	MoFA	June 2018

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Air: Applying regulatory and institutional reform sufficient to improve safety standards to the degree necessary to permit the removal of Afghanistan's airlines from the EU blacklist	ACAA	July 2018
Establishing Transportation Institute	MoT	June 2019
Primary Sector Reforms		
(1) Agricultural		
Rehabilitate four grain silos	MAIL	Dec 2018
Create strategic grain reserves	MAIL	Dec 2018
(2) Manufacturing		
Auction plots for new Barikab Industrial Zone	CRIDA	Dec 2017
MoF Amlak department to advertise all government leases online	MoF	Dec 2017
DABS to develop new regulations regarding electricity provision to businesses	DABS	Dec 2017
Construct five new industrial parks	MoCI	Dec 2018
(3) Mining & Hydrocarbons		
Ensure all mining contracts are recorded on online MoMP database	MoMP	Sept 2017
Publish all mining contracts online	MoMP	Dec 2017
Develop a roadmap for the extractive industries to provide a clear vision and stable development of the sector	MoMP	Dec 2017
Establish Institutional and legal framework for Beneficial Ownership:	MoCI/NPA	
▪ *Prepare conceptual note on BO registration and get HEC approval*		Dec 2017
▪ *Establish inter-ministerial Committee on BO*		Mar 2018
▪ *Establish BO disclosure legal base through formulating and adapt BO regulation*		Dec 2018
Starting new round of mining concessions by Jan 2018	MoMP	Jan 2018
Approve, reject and retender each of the four stalled mineral exploration contracts	MoMP	June 2018
Publish royalty payments summary to international community	MoMP	June 2018
Establishment of independent hydrocarbons regulatory authority	MoMP	Dec 2018
Passage of revised hydrocarbons legislation	MoMP	Dec 2018
Enact amendments to the mining law	MoMP	Dec 2018

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Infrastructure Commitments		
(1) Power		
PPP Committee approval for Mazar IPP	MoEW	Dec 2017
PPP Committee approval for Kajaki Dam IPP	MoEW	Dec 2017
PPP Committee approval for Bayat IPP	MoEW	Dec 2017
Operationalize power sector regulator	MoEW	June 2018
Complete Turkmen 500kV line	MoEW	March 2019
(2) Transport		
National Ring Road: Start construction of remaining portion of Afghanistan Ring Road providing national and regional connectivity (Armalik to Laman and Qaisar-Bala Marghab-Laman)	MoPW	Dec 2017
Kabul Ring Road: Finalize procurement of Kabul Ring Road	MoPW	Dec 2017
East-West Corridor: Construction of three parts of East-West Corridor (Gardandiwal-Chekhcharan, Herat- Chesht)	MoPW	Dec 2018
North-South Corridor: Construction of one part of North-South Corridor (Yakawlang Dara e Soof)		Dec 2018
Rail: Complete connecting rail links to Tajikistan and Pakistan	ARA	Dec 2020
(3) Telecoms		
Issue RFP for audit of ATRA and TDF	ATRA	Sept 2017
Issue RFP for fiber licenses	ATRA	Sept 2017
Sign at least one fiber license	ATRA	Jan 2018
Complete audit of ATRA and TDF	ATRA	March 2018

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RESPONSE OF DEPUTY SECRETARY SULLIVAN TO A FOLLOW-UP QUESTION TO HIS MARCH 7, 2018 BRIEFING TO SENATOR MENENDEZ REGARDING EFFORTS TO COUNTER RUSSIAN DISINFORMATION

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

MAR 16 2018

The Honorable
Robert Menendez
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Menendez:

Thank you for the opportunity for Deputy Secretary John Sullivan to brief you on several matters March 7 following up his appearance at the hearing on the Administration's South Asia Strategy before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 6.

Attached please find the additional information you had requested on the Department of State's efforts to counter Russian disinformation. We hope this information is helpful. Please do not hesitate to contact us if we can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

Mary K. Waters
Assistant Secretary
Legislative Affairs

Enclosures:
State Department Efforts to Counter Russian Disinformation

State Department Efforts to Counter Russian Disinformation

(SBU) Countering foreign state disinformation requires a whole-of government effort that includes considerable work at virtually all of our overseas missions, as well as efforts funded by various bureaus at the Department of State, USAID, the Department of Defense, and other agencies. The Department of State works closely with allies, other governments, civil society, and media organizations to support efforts to deter and defend against these foreign state disinformation. Examples of our efforts include:

(SBU) Capacity Building of Civil Society and Media Organizations
(SBU) The Department of State supports the capacity and professionalism of credible, independent, indigenous, foreign media outlets and journalists, and fosters the development and expansion of nascent regional media platforms in Europe and Eurasia and innovative tools to provide information to the public. One example is building public understanding of and demand for independent, reliable, and high quality news through targeted complementary media literacy activities in libraries, schools, and other community platforms in Moldova. Another example includes IIP support for TechCamps around the world on disinformation and media literacy, which connect private-sector technology experts with journalists and civic groups to improve the use of digital tools to counter malign foreign influence and/or discredit false narratives. Additionally, the Digital Communications Network supports journalists, new media specialists, and government digital communicators in Europe and Central Asia by leveraging new technology and digital media skills to create a dynamic network of like-minded credible voices demanding accuracy, transparency, and independence in news media.

(SBU) The Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs (ECA) supported four International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP) projects in FY 2017 focused specifically on detecting and countering disinformation for Moldova, Lithuania, Poland, and regions covered by the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs (EUR). Sixty additional media IVLP projects last year and this year emphasize fact-checking and providing valid and verifiable content as key elements in responsible journalism. The Bureau of Public Affairs' (PA) Foreign Press Centers hosted several groups of Russian journalists and bloggers for a media reporting tour introducing them to media advocacy and civil society institutions in the U.S. that protect the rights of journalists, and foster professionalism and ethics in the media. (USAID, EUR, PA, IIP, ECA, DRL, Embassies, GEC)

(SBU) Promoting Media Literacy
(SBU) The Department of State develops and funds youth outreach and media literacy programs that help foreign audiences recognize false narratives and stave off attempts at foreign disinformation. For example, Embassy Kyiv has provided $450,000 to support a $700,000 initiative with the British Embassy to equip Ukrainian secondary school students with critical thinking and media literacy skills to help them recognize foreign disinformation for what it is. (USAID, EUR, DRL, ECA, IIP, Embassies)

(SBU) USAID has incorporated media literacy components into its media development programs in the region since the 1990s, and will continue such efforts in the formal and informal space. Current USAID media literacy programming is occurring in Armenia, Georgia, Macedonia, Moldova, and Ukraine. Additionally, USAID supports media watchdog groups, such as Detector

Media in Ukraine, and Metamorphosis in Macedonia, to help journalists adhere to professional and ethical standards. These platforms encourage participating journalists to conduct peer reviews and critique each other's reporting.

(SBU) Providing Access to Accurate Information
(SBU) The Department of State works with its partners and Allies to share information on patterns of foreign influence operations and exchange best practices. For example, at NATO we have ongoing, regular exchanges with Allies on foreign disinformation, some of which is directed at NATO's forward forces. The Department of State shares information about "front" NGOs and other actors working at the behest of the Kremlin. EUR works with partners who are on the frontlines of the battle against disinformation, and arms our partners with the core competencies necessary to counter disinformation, and advance policy-rich engaging credible messaging. EUR launched the European Digital Diplomacy Exchange, an intergovernmental network of digital diplomacy practitioners from strategic partner governments, to build regional strategic digital communication capacities. (EUR, USNATO, Embassies; GEC)

(SBU) U.S. international media produced by the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) provides audiences overseas with access to alternative and objective information they may not otherwise be able to obtain. The BBG's goal is to provide accurate, credible, and comprehensive news and information to audiences that lack access to objective information, including audiences that may be more susceptible to Russian disinformation. In many countries in Russia's periphery where Russian media dominates, Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty are often some of the only alternatives to Russian-owned or supported outlets available.

(SBU) Exposing Foreign Disinformation and Delivering U.S. And Partner-Developed Content
(SBU) Charged with leading U.S. government efforts to counter foreign disinformation and propaganda that undermines U.S. national security interests, the Global Engagement Center (GEC) coordinates relevant activities by the Department of State, our overseas missions, USAID, the Department of Defense (including COCOMs), the Intelligence Community, and other agencies. The GEC focuses on state-sponsored disinformation and propaganda from Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran, as well as from non-state terrorist groups.

(SBU) The GEC coordinates efforts to leverages best practices from the private sector, our partners, and allies regarding efforts to counter foreign disinformation; analyzes the evolving nature of the foreign disinformation threat, including those audiences most susceptible to it; and supports ongoing efforts to counter foreign disinformation by offering expertise and analytical support.

(SBU) The Department of State works to publically expose Russian malign behavior both from Washington and through PA sections in posts abroad, including the Spokesperson from the podium, our Ambassadors and press attachés, PA's overseas regional media hubs, and on our many electronic and social media platforms. (EUR, PA, IIP, Embassies; GEC)

(SBU) Exchange Programs
(SBU) The Department of State promotes positive, truthful narratives about the United States and its Allies to foreign audiences and reinforces the importance of Western institutions to

targets of Russian influence, including through people-to-people diplomacy and exchange programs, and by sending American experts abroad to speak on policy topics. One example is the U.S. Speaker Program which sends American speakers around the world to share their expertise to improve professional standards of journalism and media ethics and promote media literacy. Additionally, the 49 missions in EUR leverage 350 digital platforms to message on U.S. policy and push back against foreign disinformation, as do our missions in Central Asia.

(SBU) Other exchange programs include FLEX, which brings high school students from countries in Russia's periphery to the United States, and the Fulbright program, a worldwide exchange which sends Europeans to study and research in the United States, and sends American students/researchers to Europe. Some 600 U.S. Fulbright English Teaching Assistants, who teach in high schools and universities across Europe, are being prepared to teach media literacy and critical thinking skills as part of a $500,000 Congressional mandate to address disinformation in Eastern and Central Europe. (EUR, ECA, PA, IIP, SCA Embassies; GEC)

CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHRIVER'S TESTIMONY
[*see pages 22-23 above.*]

SIGAR | Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

John F. Sopko
Special Inspector General

February 8, 2018

The Honorable Randall G. Schriver
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs
Department of Defense
1400 Defense Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301-1400

Dear Assistant Secretary Schriver,

I am writing in regard to your testimony of February 6, 2018, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during a hearing titled "The Administration's South Asia Strategy on Afghanistan." Your testimony contained inaccuracies regarding information recently classified by the NATO Resolute Support (RS) mission in Afghanistan and provided to SIGAR for its Quarterly Report to Congress on the progress of U.S. reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan.

In an exchange with Senator Christopher Murphy of Connecticut, in which he asked why SIGAR was unable to publicly report on Afghan security forces' casualties in its Quarterly Report to Congress, you replied, "I think there may be some misinformation. I think there was some information that SIGAR classified themselves and that may have been based on what information was provided by the Afghans and their own classification . . ."[1]

This is incorrect. SIGAR does not have classification authority and therefore cannot classify information. SIGAR receives Afghan casualty figures from RS, not the Afghan government. In October 2017, RS notified SIGAR it had classified Afghan casualty figures at the request of the Afghan government. SIGAR had previously included these figures in its publicly available Quarterly Report to Congress. SIGAR scrupulously follows the classification and restriction markings on all information it receives from RS, DOD, and other U.S. agencies. Therefore, since October 2017, SIGAR has been providing Afghan casualty figures to Congress in a separate classified annex.

In addition, your testimony this week seems inconsistent with a statement you recently made in a response letter[2] to Representative Walter B. Jones of North Carolina, a senior member of the House Armed Services Committee, who recently wrote to DOD about this classification issue. In your letter to Representative Jones, you explained Afghan casualty figures had been classified at the request of the Afghan government, which is consistent with what RS told SIGAR in October 2017. Specifically, your letter said:

> The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) has requested that information pertaining to casualties, command and control, operational readiness, personnel

[1] Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs Randall G. Schriver, testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, hearing titled, "The Administration's South Asia Strategy on Afghanistan" (February 6, 2018).
[2] DOD, Letter from Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs Randall G. Schriver to Representative Walter B. Jones of North Carolina, January 17, 2018.

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Arlington, Virginia 22202-3940 | Tel: 703 545 6000 | www.sigar.mil

> staffing, training, equipping, and resourcing and sustainability, provided to U.S. and NATO Resolute Support Mission personnel and their respective governments, remain classified.[3]

In light of the above, and in the best interest of providing accurate information to Congress, I am requesting that you promptly send a written clarification to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to correct the hearing record. In addition, I ask that you continue to work closely with SIGAR toward the mutually shared goal of transparency regarding these issues for Congress and the American people.

Thank you for your consideration and prompt attention to this request. Should you have questions, please feel free to contact me directly, or your staff may contact Jaryd Bern, SIGAR's Director of Congressional Relations and Government Affairs, at jaryd.m.bern.civ@mail.mil or (703) 545-5985.

Sincerely,

John F. Sopko
Special Inspector General
for Afghanistan Reconstruction

cc:

The Honorable Bob Corker
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee

The Honorable Robert Menendez
Ranking Member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee

The Honorable Christopher Murphy
United States Senate

encl:

DOD Response letter to Rep. Walter B. Jones

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[3] DOD, Letter from Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs Randall G. Schriver to Representative Walter B. Jones of North Carolina, January 17, 2018.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHRIVER'S RESPONSE TO A REQUEST FOR INFORMATION FROM SENATOR CORKER

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2700 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2700

ASIAN & PACIFIC
SECURITY AFFAIRS

MAR 12 2018

The Honorable Bob Corker
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Corker:

Thank you for the opportunity to update the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 6, 2018, regarding the Department of Defense's (DoD) current efforts to implement the South Asia Strategy. I am writing to provide additional clarity to my remarks before the Committee. Specifically, in response to Senator Murphy's question regarding the classification of Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) casualty data provided to the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), I did not intend to imply that the SIGAR was the original classification authority for this data. As I stated at the hearing, the Afghan government chose to classify this information. My comment was intended to acknowledge that the SIGAR reports ANDSF casualty information in the classified annex to its Quarterly Report to Congress based on the Afghan government's classification decision.

As I conveyed to the Committee at the hearing, DoD recognizes that the transparent and open reporting of information commonly used to measure the progress and performance of the ANDSF is essential to maintaining accountability and effective oversight of U.S. taxpayer funds. Also, as I mentioned in my testimony, DoD works closely with the SIGAR to ensure unclassified, publicly releasable information is made available to Congress and the U.S. taxpayers.

Thank you for your continued support to the U.S. mission in Afghanistan.

Sincerely,

Randall G. Schriver

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