[Senate Hearing 115-795]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 115-795
STATUS OF U.S.- RUSSIA
ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 18, 2018
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web:
http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
40-370 PDF WASHINGTON : 2020
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
BOB CORKER, Tennessee, Chairman
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
MARCO RUBIO, Florida BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
CORY GARDNER, Colorado TOM UDALL, New Mexico
TODD YOUNG, Indiana CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming TIM KAINE, Virginia
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
RAND PAUL, Kentucky CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey
Todd Womack, Staff Director
Jessica Lewis, Democratic Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator From Tennessee.................... 1
Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator From New Jersey.............. 2
Thompson, Hon. Andrea L., Under Secretary for Arms Control and
International Security, U.S. Department of State, Washington,
DC............................................................. 5
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Trachtenberg, Hon. David J., Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
For Policy, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC......... 10
Prepared statement........................................... 12
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Hon. Andrea L. Thompson to Questions Submitted by
Senator Marco Rubio............................................ 41
Responses of Hon. Andrea L. Thompson to Questions Submitted by
Senator Robert Menendez........................................ 45
Responses of Hon. Andrea L. Thompson to Questions Submitted by
Senator Edward J. Markey....................................... 48
Responses of Hon. Andrea L. Thompson to Questions Submitted by
Senator Jeff Merkley........................................... 53
Responses of Hon. Andrea L. Thompson to Questions Submitted by
Senator Cory A. Booker......................................... 54
Responses of Hon. David J. Trachtenberg to Questions Submitted by
Senator Marco Rubio............................................ 55
Responses of Hon. David J. Trachtenberg to Questions Submitted by
Senator Robert Menendez........................................ 58
Responses of Hon. David J. Trachtenberg to Questions Submitted by
Senator Edward J. Markey....................................... 60
Responses of Hon. David J. Trachtenberg to Questions Submitted by
Senator Jeff Merkley........................................... 65
Responses of Hon. David J. Trachtenberg to Questions Submitted by
Senator Cory A. Booker......................................... 66
STATUS OF U.S.-RUSSIA
ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS
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TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 2018
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m. in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Bob Corker,
chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Corker [presiding], Risch, Rubio, Flake,
Gardner, Young, Barrasso, Isakson, Portman, Paul, Menendez,
Cardin, Shaheen, Coons, Udall, Murphy, Kaine, Merkley, and
Booker.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE
The Chairman. I want to thank everybody for being here. I
think because we need 11 people to vote, we are going to go
ahead and give the opening statements. As soon as we get to 11
folks, we will stop and vote on the noms. Again, I want to
thank everybody for their cooperation.
But first, I want to thank our witnesses for being here
with us today. We are fortunate to have such an experienced and
distinguished panel.
As our members know, this is the fourth in a series of
hearings on Russia since July, with today's hearing considering
the current status of and prospects for arms control efforts.
The current situation is not encouraging. Out of four
agreements, New START, the INF Treaty, the Open Skies Treaty,
and the Chemical Weapons Convention, we have significant
problems with Russian compliance of three of them.
It should come as no surprise to any of us that Russia has
been cheating on its treaties. Vladimir Putin's government has
annexed Crimea, occupied parts of Russia, interfered with
elections, including our own, used chemical weapons to poison
individuals on British soil, and even purportedly hacked U.S.
utilities.
Given that record, he is not likely to let treaty
commitments get in his way either.
The question we need to ask is what we are going to do.
Some argue that we should just walk away from the INF Treaty
since Russia has been in blatant violation for several years
now. Some think that is exactly what Putin hopes for. The last
time we deployed intermediate range missiles to West Germany in
1983, a million people protested. That is exactly the kind of
division that Russian information operations are designed to
exploit and to intensify.
As we discussed at our meeting on NATO, it is crucial that
we remain unified with our European partners on defense and
deterrence issues. On the Open Skies Treaty, we are at an
impasse with the Russians. We have not had a flight all year.
We can live without that data, but it hurts the 32 other
countries that do not have the same alternative resources that
we do.
Even with New START, which has succeeded in its objectives
so far, we should be realistic about our expectations of where
we will be with Russia in 2021 when the treaty expires, unless
extended.
Nevertheless, we need to be thinking carefully about the
effects of new weapons and technologies on strategic stability
between the U.S., Russia, and other nations. Putin has boasted
about the hypersonic glide vehicles, nuclear-powered ballistic
missiles, nuclear torpedoes, and Russian advances in cyber
warfare, space, and artificial intelligence. Each of these
developments introduces new uncertainties into the deterrence
calculations of adversaries and none of them is easy to address
from an arms control verification and compliance perspective.
But as we devote our own research and development into
these areas, we must consider their potential to encourage
risk-taking by any country with access to them.
I hope our witnesses today can not only provide an
assessment of the status of current agreements but also offer
us some assurance that the State and Defense Departments are
considering these emerging arms control challenges.
I also hope we can gain a better understanding of any arms
control discussions that took place at the Helsinki Summit and
what the prospects may be for future arms control agreements.
With that, I want to thank you again for being here.
I still do not think we have 11, so I will turn to our
distinguished ranking member, Senator Menendez.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for convening
today's hearing as part of a series of hearings on the U.S.
policy towards the Russian Federation.
Arms control efforts to reduce the risk of nuclear war and
limit Russia's nuclear forces are vital for maintaining and
strengthening U.S. national security.
Despite a number of inquiries to the Secretary and others,
more than 2 months after President Trump's Helsinki meetings
with President Putin, we remain largely in the dark as to what
the two leaders discussed or agreed to during their 2-hour
closed session. We do know that Russian Ambassador to the
United States Anatoli Antonov told reporters that, quote,
important verbal agreements were reached at the Helsinki Summit
on arms control issues, including preservation of the New START
and INF Treaty.
We continue to find ourselves in an incredible situation.
The American people, the elected officials in this body, and
members of the President's own administration hear more from
Russian officials about alleged agreements that the President
is making about critical national security issues.
What constitutes an important verbal agreement? Has the
President reached key decisions with Russia on key arms control
treaties? If so, why has Congress not been informed about this
decision?
Along with many others in this body, I have for many years
strongly supported policies to confront Russia for its multiple
and ongoing transgressions, including military aggression,
malign influence, and repressive policies. I believe that we
must develop comprehensive strategies to confront our
adversaries that ultimately prioritize the safety and security
of the United States and its citizens. This requires being
clear-eyed about the threats we face and all the tools our
adversaries can wield against us. Constraining the
proliferation of nuclear weapons must be a core component of
our strategy.
Given the reality of Russia's current nuclear capacity, we
must collectively use every diplomatic tool in our arsenal,
economic, political, and military, to achieve our goals. The
stakes could not be higher.
We have historically negotiated and entered into agreements
with our adversaries, recognizing that we are dealing with
hostile powers that cannot be trusted. We build in metrics that
account for a probability of efforts to deceive and dodge. In
high stakes agreements, provisions outlining U.S. intelligence
verification and compliance are essential. In the universe of
arms control agreements with Russia, we conduct onsite
inspections of military bases and facilities. We require data
exchanges in order to track the status and make-up of their
nuclear forces.
Today we know Russia is violating the Intermediate Range
Nuclear Force Treaty. If we have evidence that a country is
violating international commitments, we must be unequivocal in
working through the construction of the agreement to bring them
back into compliance. We must never lose sight of our
objectives with any arms control agreement: to reduce the risk
of catastrophic war and to constrain our adversary's ability to
threaten us and our allies.
In assessing the value of an arms control agreement, we
must consider whether our participation in the agreement
further advances our goals. Would withdrawing or walking away
from an agreement strengthen our hand or ultimately leave us
without a seat at the table without insight into our
adversary's stockpile? Safer or less secure?
Finally, I want to remind our members of some of the
history surrounding the Senate's ratification of the New START
treaty. When the Senate deliberated New START in 2010, some of
my colleagues on the other side of the aisle, including our
esteemed chairman, made it clear that they were willing to vote
for the treaty but only as part of a deal that modernized our
nuclear forces and infrastructure.
Neither an unconstrained nuclear arms race nor blind faith
in arms control agreements serve U.S. national security
interests. American security is best served with a strong,
credible deterrent that operates within the legally binding,
stable, and constrained arms control environment.
I hope the Trump administration fully appreciates this
vital linkage. Diminishing, for example, the value of arms
control and placing all faith in one-dimensional conceptions of
increasing nuclear strength to bring the Russians and the
Chinese to heel will result in a far more dangerous strategic
environment.
I also want to remind the administration that bipartisan
support for nuclear modernization is tied to maintaining an
arms control process that controls and seeks to reduce Russian
nuclear forces, which inevitably means promoting military and
fiscally responsible policies on ourselves. We are not
interested in writing blank checks for a nuclear arms race with
Russia, and we do not want to step off our current path of
stability to wander again down an uncertain road filled with
potentially dire consequences.
And the final note I would make, Mr. Chairman--I guess we
have enough people now to go ahead and vote--is that I hope
that as part of our oversight, which I applaud you for having
conducted with these hearings, that we will also get to an
opportunity to mark up DASKAA and similar related bills. I
think it is important for the Congress to speak about Russia's
violations of the international order, certainly the
undermining of our election.
And since we have very often in this committee taken up
sanctions as part of our overall foreign policy tools, which is
one of the critical tools of peaceful diplomacy, I would urge
you, Mr. Chairman, to make sure that we also keep
jurisdictional opportunities as it relates to that and that we
can have a markup that sends a, hopefully, united message to
the Russians that we will not tolerate their actions both at
home and abroad.
And with that, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the
witnesses.
The Chairman. Thank you. And thank you for that statement.
I think everyone here understands that depending on how you
write a bill and what key phrases you use, it determines which
committee it goes to. And we are not giving up jurisdiction on
anything, but every committee member has to understand if they
want it to come to Foreign Relations, they have to write it a
certain way. And I know everybody has mastered that art. I know
you did on your bill, and it is a bill that is in this
committee. So I thank you for referring to that.
With that, I thank everyone for their cooperation in being
here. What I would like to do is recess our hearing and move to
a very quick business meeting, if we could. And I thank all of
you.
I know that it does not mean much too many of us here in
some ways to confirm these nominees. It means a whole lot to
them, and it means a tremendous amount to the countries that
they are going to. And so I thank you.
[Recess.]
The Chairman. We will begin again the hearing. And I thank
all of those for being here.
You completed your opening statement, I think. So let me
move to another part.
Our first witness today is the Honorable Andrea Thompson,
Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International
Security. We had a chance to speak in the back, but thank you
so much for being here and sharing your expertise with us.
Our second witness is the Honorable David Trachtenberg,
Deputy under Secretary of Defense for Policy. I shared the same
with you.
Thank you both.
If you could summarize in about 5 minutes, any written
materials you have, without objection, it will be entered into
the record. We thank you again for being here. It is an
important hearing. And if you could just begin in the order
introduced, I would appreciate it.
STATEMENT OF HON. ANDREA L. THOMPSON, UNDER SECRETARY FOR ARMS
CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Thompson. Good morning, Chairman Corker, Ranking Member
Menendez, and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you
for hosting this hearing and welcoming me here today to discuss
arms control with Russia, a topic that is central to our
security and indeed the world's.
The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review states, quote, ``progress
in arms control is not an end in and of itself, and depends on
the security environment and the participation of willing
partners.'' End quote. The value of any arms control agreement
is derived from our treaty partners maintaining compliance with
their obligations and avoiding actions that result in mistrust
and the potential for miscalculation. Russia continues to
violate a series of arms control obligations that undermine the
trust the United States can place in treaties, including some
that have served U.S. and allied security interests for years.
As reflected in the administration's National Security
Strategy and echoed in our National Defense Strategy, great
power competition is reemerging. We can no longer be complacent
in the face of challenges by geostrategic competitors. We need
to be creative and flexible in how we approach and manage our
strategic competition with Russia, and that includes an
evaluation of where we stand with respect to our arms control
agreements and their interrelationship with our deterrence and
defense requirements.
I will begin with the New START treaty.
In February of this year, both countries confirmed
compliance with the treaty's central limits on ICBMs, SLBMs,
and heavy bombers and their associated warheads. We are
committed to implementing the treaty and ensuring Russia stays
in compliance. I know this committee has sought the
administration's view of extending the treaty. No decision has
been made at this time.
Meanwhile, Russia has persisted in its violation of the INF
Treaty through Russia's SSC-8 ground-launched cruise missile
program. This administration has utilized new diplomatic,
economic, and military measures to pressure Russia to return to
compliance. The lack of any meaningful steps by Russia to do so
diminishes our hope that it wants to preserve the INF Treaty.
As we have said many times, the status quo is unsustainable and
our patience is not unlimited.
On chemical weapons, Russia has blocked every effort to
compel the Assad regime to stop using chemical weapons. Russia
too is a perpetrator of chemical weapons-use with its brazen
assassination attempt against the Skripals in Salisbury, U.K.
in March using a Novichok chemical agent.
We recently imposed the first round of sanctions on Russia
required by the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and
Warfare Elimination Act. We have been clear with Moscow that we
will continue to execute our mandate under this law.
Meanwhile, the United States and our NATO allies, as
reinforced in the 2018 Brussels declaration, remain committed
to preserving, strengthening, and modernizing the existing
Euro-Atlantic conventional arms control regimes and confidence
and security building mechanisms.
The Department of State also continues to lead efforts to
push back against Russia's troubling behavior in space. Of
particular concern, Russia has launched experimental satellites
that conduct sophisticated on-orbit activities, at least some
of which are intended to advance counter-space capabilities.
And finally, I would also note that our sanctions policy is
an important tool in maintaining pressure on Moscow to abandon
its malign activities. We assess that our global campaign to
implement section 231 of the Countering America's Adversaries
Through Sanctions Act of 2017, or CAATSA, has denied Russia's
defense sector several billion dollars in lost sales as states
abandon pending arms deals with Moscow. The Department of State
remains committed to the ongoing full implementation of CAATSA
section 231.
In all, Russia's destabilizing actions include significant
transgressions in its adherence to international obligations,
namely, arms control treaties and agreements. This has created
a trust deficit that leads the United States to question
Russia's commitment to arms control as a way to manage and
stabilize our strategic relationship and promote greater
transparency and predictability. Russia must take its
commitments more seriously if we are to find the ways to shift
our relationship to a more stable path.
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss these critical
issues with you, and I look forward to your questions. Thank
you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Thompson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Andrea L. Thompson
Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Menendez, and distinguished members
of the Committee: thank you for hosting this hearing and welcoming me
here today. The subject of this hearing --the state of arms control
with Russia--is of critical importance to U.S. and allied national
security, and a timely issue to discuss with the Committee today.
The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review states, ``progress in arms control
is not an end in and of itself, and depends on the security environment
and the participation of willing partners.'' The value of any agreement
is derived from our treaty partners maintaining compliance with their
obligations, and avoiding actions that result in mistrust and the
potential for miscalculation. Russia continues to violate a series of
arms control obligations that undermine the trust the United States can
place in treaties, including some that have served U.S. and allied
security interests for years.
We seek to utilize a strong military deterrent in combination with
arms control to maintain strategic stability with Russia. Arms control
measures have benefited the United States by providing mutual
transparency and predictability, constraining certain weapons of
immense destructive potential in the Russian arsenal, and enhancing
strategic stability. The Department of Defense concluded in the
National Defense Strategy, and as reflected in the Trump
Administration's National Security Strategy, that great power
competition is reemerging. We need to be creative and flexible in how
we approach and manage our strategic competition with Russia, and that
includes an evaluation of where we stand with respect to our arms
control agreements, and their interrelationship with our deterrence and
defense requirements.
As you know, Russia has taken actions over the past few years that
have posed real challenges to our bilateral relationship and widened
the deficit of trust we have with Russia. Russia has used chemical
weapons in the United Kingdom and tacitly approved of the Assad
regime's abhorrent use of chemical weapons against its own people--even
while protecting that regime from accountability for these atrocities.
It has also violated its obligations under the INF Treaty and
undertaken aggressive actions in outer space while proposing agreements
to constrain others. Russia's response to each of these situations is
to employ its standard playbook of distraction, misinformation, and
counter-accusations. It has sought to blame the United Kingdom and
other European countries for the Salisbury incident and supported
Syrian claims alternatively blaming ``terrorists,'' Turkey, and the
United States for Assad's years of chemical weapons use. Similarly,
Russia has falsely accused the United States of not complying with the
INF Treaty in order to distract from its own INF violation. The Trump
Administration has challenged Russia's systematic misconduct a number
of ways. However, it remains in our interest to maintain strategic
stability with Russia, and continue arms control agreements that meet
U.S. and allied national interests.
I will briefly touch on a few key issues in our arms control
relationship with Russia, and will close with a few remarks regarding
the Department's implementation of Section 231 of the Countering
America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act of 2017.
strategic arms control: new start and inf treaty
I will start with the New START Treaty. The United States will
continue to implement the New START Treaty and verify Russian
compliance. We benefit from the Treaty's 18 annual on-site inspections
of strategic nuclear warheads and delivery systems, bases, and
infrastructure; the comprehensive biannual data exchanges which record
the disposition and numbers of intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy
bombers; and, the almost 16,000 notifications we have exchanged over
the life of the Treaty which give us a good idea of where these nuclear
weapons are at a given moment in time. The types of weapons that are
accountable and limited under New START make up the gross majority of
Russia's current and foreseeable strategic nuclear arsenal.
We are committed to implementing the Treaty and ensuring Russia
stays in compliance.
In February of this year, both countries confirmed compliance with
the Treaty's central limits on ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers and
their associated warheads. I know this Committee has sought the Trump
Administration's view of extending the Treaty. A decision has not been
made at this time. Among issues to consider will be Russia's decision
to manufacture compliance issues regarding U.S. weapons, and the
uncertainty of whether or not Russia's recently announced strategic
nuclear weapons will be held accountable under the Treaty. Any decision
on New START will take into context Russia's stance on these issues,
its behavior in other arms control agreements, and the security needs
of the United States and its allies. And it goes without saying:
Russia's continued compliance with New START is a requirement for any
potential extension of the Treaty.
Meanwhile, Russia has persisted in its violation of the INF Treaty
through Russia's SSC8 ground-launched cruise missile program. The Trump
Administration has utilized diplomatic, military, and economic measures
to pressure Russia to return to compliance. On the diplomatic front,
the Administration has sought dialogue with Russia, both at the expert
level in the Special Verification Commission, the implementation body
for the Treaty, and in bilateral formats, as well as raising the issue
at the political level. We have worked closely with our allies and
partners in Europe and in Asia to raise the profile of Russia's
violation and continued noncompliance. In the area of military
responses, the Department of Defense continues to pursue Treaty-
compliant research and development on a ground-based missile system
that, if completed, would be noncompliant with INF. This system is
designed to be a direct counter to Russia, and the United States has
made it clear that we will cease pursuing its development if Russia
returns to compliance with the Treaty. On the economic line of effort,
the Administration added two entities involved in the SSC-8's
development and production, Novator Design Bureau and Titan Central
Design Bureau, to the Department of Commerce Entity List in December
2017. This action imposes a license requirement for the export, re-
export, or transfer of any items subject to the Export Administration
Regulations (EAR) to these entities. Any such license applications will
be reviewed with a policy of presumption of denial. This prior review
will enhance the U.S. ability to prevent the use of items subject to
the EAR contrary to U.S. national security or foreign policy interests.
The lack of any meaningful steps by Russia to return to compliance
diminishes our hope that Russia has any interest in preserving the INF
Treaty, despite Moscow's public statements to the contrary. Russia has
not acknowledged its violation, although last year it acknowledged for
the first time that the missile system in question exists. Russia has
not attempted to negotiate in good faith and has done nothing to
satisfy our concerns or those of our allies. This complete lack of
willingness to engage in a meaningful manner leads us to conclude that
Russia has no interest in returning to compliance, which presents a new
threat to the security of our allies in Europe and Asia. The fact that
the United States complies with the treaty and Russia does not is
untenable.
chemical weapons convention: syria and russia
Regarding chemical weapons issues, Russia's destabilizing behavior
is also evident. Russia has stood in the way of every effort the United
States, our allies, and our partners have taken to compel the Assad
regime to stop using chemical weapons. Russia's actions are a betrayal
of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and UN Security Council
Resolution 2118, as well as its commitments to the United States as a
framework guarantor.
Russia continues these obstructionist actions with current efforts
to delegitimize the June 26, 2018 Decision of the Fourth Special
Conference of the States Parties. Eighty-two responsible States voted
to provide the OPCW Technical Secretariat with additional tools to
respond to chemical weapons use, including the means to identify the
perpetrators of chemical weapons attacks in Syria.
Russia, too, is a perpetrator of chemical weapons use with its
brazen assassination attempt against the Skripals in Salisbury, U.K.,
in March using a novichok chemical agent. Multiple British citizens
have been exposed to this same substance as a result of this deplorable
attack, one of whom ultimately died from exposure to the military-grade
nerve agent. Independent reports issued twice by the OPCW, most
recently on September 4, confirmed the U.K. assessment in identifying
the chemical nerve agent, novichok. Russia's use of a novichok has made
it extraordinarily clear that Russia only eliminated its declared
chemical weapons stockpile and further substantiates the U.S. finding
that Russia itself is in non-compliance with their obligations under
the CWC. Rather than accepting responsibility for its actions and
changing its harmful and destructive behavior, Russia offers only
denials and counteraccusations to deflect attention from its
culpability. No one, including Russia, should think they can murder
people with chemical weapons and get away with it. As you know, we
imposed the first round of sanctions on Russia required by the Chemical
and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991.
Following the fifteen day Congressional notification, these sanctions
took effect on August 22nd. We have been clear with Moscow that we will
continue to execute our mandate under this law and that it must take
action to disclose its chemical weapons activities. We are under no
illusion, however, that Russia will take the steps necessary to rescind
these sanctions.
conventional arms control
The United States and our NATO Allies, as reinforced in the 2018
Brussels Declaration, remain committed to preserving, strengthening,
and modernizing the existing Euro-Atlantic conventional arms control
regimes and confidence and security building mechanisms. We remain
concerned about specific compliance and implementation issues that
limit full territorial access over Russia--a fundamental Treaty
principle. While recently Russia has resolved one violation of its
obligations, and has made overtures that suggest it could resolve
another, Russia remains unwilling to lift its illegitimate limits on
the distance Open Skies Treaty parties can fly over the strategically
sensitive region of Kaliningrad. In September 2017, we made clear our
commitment to addressing Russia's continued noncompliance with the
Treaty when we established several reasonable, treaty-compliant
measures designed to encourage Russia to resolve its violations. These
measures are in effect and will impact any Russian flights over the
United States; they will be reversed if Russia returns to full
compliance.
Despite efforts by the United States and our Allies to effect a
reversal of Russia's 2007 decision to unilaterally ``suspend'' its
implementation of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty,
the status quo unfortunately persists. The United States does not
recognize Russia's ``suspension'' of the CFE. We continue to hold
Russia responsible for its obligations under the Treaty and, as a
countermeasure, together with our Allies and partners have ceased
implementing CFE vis-a-vis Russia. Russia's disregard for the Treaty's
provision on host-nation consent for the stationing of military forces
in places like Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine is a destabilizing element
that challenges the basic underpinnings of the existing Euro-Atlantic
security architecture. Nonetheless, we believe the Treaty still
provides valuable transparency about other military forces in Europe
that are of interest to the United States and our Allies and partners.
The United States continues to be a leading voice in the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). We are
championing, along with many of our Allies, several proposals to
modernize the 2011 Vienna Document (VDoc), politically-binding
confidence and security building measures that contribute to openness
and transparency concerning military forces in Europe. However, since
2014, Russia has been increasingly exploiting gaps in the arrangement,
especially with regard to large-scale, short-notice exercises and
military activities near its borders. Furthermore, Russia has refused
in recent years to engage on these issues and professes to see no
current need for enhancing military transparency. The proposals for
which we and our Allies are advocating aim to address these activities
and increase military transparency. Our goal is to demonstrate the
value of the VDoc and the commitment of a majority of OSCE
participating States to fulfill existing VDoc measures and to improve
the effectiveness of the VDoc to rebuild trust.
space security
More recently, as the Director of National Intelligence noted in
February of this year, Russia is continuing to pursue antisatellite, or
ASAT, weapons as a means to reduce U.S. and allied military
effectiveness. Russia aims to have nondestructive and destructive
counterspace weapons available for use during a potential future
conflict. The U.S. intelligence community assesses that, if a future
conflict were to occur involving Russia, it would justify attacks
against U.S. and allied satellites as necessary to offset any perceived
U.S. military advantage derived from military, civil, or commercial
space systems. Military reforms in Russia in the past few years
indicate an increased focus on establishing operational forces designed
to integrate attacks against space systems and services with military
operations in other domains. In addition, Russian destructive ASAT
weapons probably will reach initial operational capability in the next
few years, and Russia probably has ground-launched ASAT missiles in
development and is advancing directed-energy weapons technologies for
the purpose of fielding ASAT weapons that could blind or damage
sensitive space-based optical sensors, such as those used for remote
sensing or missile defense.
Of particular concern, Russia has launched ``experimental''
satellites that conduct sophisticated on-orbit activities, at least
some of which are intended to advance counterspace capabilities. Some
technologies with peaceful applications--such as satellite inspection,
refueling, and repair--can also be used against non-cooperative
spacecraft in a hostile fashion.
These activities are occurring in spite of the fact that Russia is
continuing to publicly and diplomatically promote international
agreements on the nonweaponization of space and ``no first placement''
of weapons in space. However, the Russian proposals are crafted to
allow Russia to continue their pursuit of space warfare capabilities
while publicly maintaining that space must be a peaceful domain.
The Department of State continues to lead efforts to push back
against Russia's troubling behavior in space and its hypocritical
proposals. As Assistant Secretary Poblete noted at the Conference on
Disarmament in Geneva a little over a month ago, the Russian Ministry
of Defense is undertaking outer space activities that appear contrary
to the provisions of Russia's own draft treaty and its political
commitment not to be the first to place weapons in outer space. She
noted that, in October of last year, the Russian Ministry of Defense
deployed a space object they claimed was a ``space apparatus
inspector.'' But its behavior on-orbit was inconsistent with anything
seen before from on-orbit inspection or space situational awareness
capabilities, including other Russian inspection satellite activities.
Russian intentions with respect to this satellite are unclear and are
obviously a very troubling development--particularly, when considered
in concert with statements by Russia's Space Force Commander who
highlighted that ``assimilate[ing] new prototypes of weapons [into]
Space Forces' military units'' is a ``main task facing the Aerospace
Forces Space Troops.''
caatsa sanctions
I would also note that our sanctions policy is an important element
in maintaining pressure on Moscow to abandon its malign activities, and
that Section 231 of the Countering America's Adversaries Through
Sanctions Act of 2017, or CAATSA, is an important tool in our sanctions
toolkit and in our strategic competition with Russia. Arms sales are
not only an important source of revenue for Moscow, but also a means of
maintaining or growing its political and military influence around the
world. Ending those sales not only applies pressure to Russia to change
its behavior, but also helps to curb Russia's access in places where it
seeks to maintain or forge such ties. By mandating sanctions on those
who are engaging in significant transactions with Russia's defense and
intelligence sectors, CAATSA provides us with leverage in working with
our partners and allied states, so that they reduce their military ties
to Russia, a country that has become an increasingly unreliable and
risky security partner. Thus far, we assess that our global campaign to
implement CAATSA has denied Russia's defense sector several billion
dollars in lost sales as states abandon pending arms deals with Moscow.
The Department of State remains committed to the ongoing full
implementation of CAATSA Section 231, including through the imposition
of sanctions as appropriate.
conclusion
In all, the destabilizing actions Russia has taken are not isolated
to interference in the domestic affairs of the U.S. and allies, its
activities in Ukraine and Syria, or threatening our allies and partners
in Russia's near-abroad, but include significant transgressions in its
adherence to international obligations--namely, arms control treaties
and agreements. The value of any agreement to the United States is
derived from our treaty partners maintaining compliance with their
obligations, and avoiding actions that result in mistrust and the
potential for miscalculation. Russia, unfortunately, has created a
trust deficit that leads the United States to question its commitment
to arms control as a way to manage and stabilize our strategic
relationship and promote greater transparency and predictability in how
our countries address weapons of mass destruction issues and policies.
The more benign environment of much of the post-Cold War period allows
us to see that there was a better, more effective way to exist than
merely relying solely upon massive nuclear armaments, with huge risks
for miscalculation and accidental conflict. Russia's actions in recent
years raise the specter of a return to the ugly years of cutthroat arms
competition. I hope Russia can be reminded of these lessons in the near
future so we can find ways to shift our relationship to a more stable
path. I thank you for convening this important hearing, and look
forward to your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID J. TRACHTENBERG, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON,
DC
Mr. Trachtenberg. Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Menendez,
and distinguished members, thank you for the opportunity to
testify on the current state of arms control with Russia.
I will not repeat much of what Under Secretary Thompson has
already discussed. The bottom line is that arms control with
Russia is troubled because the Russian Federation apparently
believes it need only abide by the agreements that suit it. As
a result, the credibility of all international agreements with
Russia is at risk.
The United States is committed to its long-held arms
control, nonproliferation, and nuclear security objectives,
particularly our commitment to the goals of the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
Arms control can contribute to U.S. security by helping to
manage strategic competition among states, and we are committed
to meaningful arms control that decreases the chances of
misperception, miscalculation, and conflict.
The Nuclear Posture Review acknowledges that progress in
arms control is not an end in and of itself. The current
security environment makes arms control extremely challenging
in the near term. Any future arms control arrangement must be
pursued in the context of the broader security environment and
must include the participation of willing partners. It is
difficult to envision progress in a security environment that
is currently threatened by Russia's continuing noncompliance
with existing arms control obligations and commitments. In this
regard, Russia poses a series of challenges that do not lend
themselves to conditions suitable for the greater trust
necessary to engage in a prudent arms control agenda.
It would be irresponsible to ignore these infractions and
not hold Russia responsible for its violations. As a reliable
ally and partner, the United States must advocate for arms
control agreements that make the world more secure and include
the willing participation and compliance of all parties.
With respect to New START, the United States assesses that
Russia is in compliance with the New START treaty. Both sides
met the New START treaty's central limits in February of this
year, and I can assure you that the United States will
faithfully implement and verify Russian compliance with the
treaty.
Moving forward, the United States will consider whether to
extend the New START treaty beyond its February 2021
expiration. Any decision on extending the treaty will and
should be based on a realistic assessment of whether the New
START treaty remains in our national security interest in light
of overall Russian arms control behavior.
On INF, the Russian Federation remains in violation of its
obligations under the INF Treaty. We have been more than
patient and have provided Russia with ample opportunities to
come back into compliance, but to no avail.
This administration's determination of Russia's violation
is no different than the one first announced in July of 2014.
We reviewed the intelligence and came to the same conclusion as
our predecessors. The evidence is conclusive. The violation is
real, and it goes against the core purpose and restrictions of
the INF Treaty.
This administration has sought to preserve the viability of
the treaty by applying pressure on Russia to return to
compliance with its obligations. We believed it was in the
national security interest of the United States and in our
allies' and partners' interest to preserve the INF Treaty, but
we recognize that Russia ultimately would determine whether the
INF Treaty remains viable.
One thing is certain. We cannot allow our treaty partner to
continue to violate a core tenet of the INF Treaty
indefinitely. And we will not let our actions or inaction occur
at the expense of our security or that of our allies and
partners.
For the last year, the Department of Defense has reviewed
and evaluated systems it could develop if it were not
constrained by the INF Treaty. The identification of these
capabilities seeks to remind Russia of why it entered into the
INF Treaty in the first place. We appreciate the efforts of
Congress to help the Department of Defense implement these
research and development efforts.
Regardless of whether Russia returns to compliance with the
INF Treaty, there are broader implications for the future of
arms control due to the lack of trust that has been created by
Russia. It is difficult to envision a way forward for the
United States and Russia to rebuild that trust and achieve a
level of transparency that could lead to a brighter future for
arms control. The onus to create the conditions for this trust
falls on both the United States and Russia, but Moscow will
bear the burden should these efforts fail as Russia's actions
created the situation we currently find ourselves in.
Mr. Chairman, we appreciate the opportunity to testify, the
attention of this committee and the rest of Congress to these
issues, and we will keep you informed of developments.
Thank you again, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Trachtenberg follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. David J. Trachtenberg
Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Menendez, and distinguished
members, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the current state
of arms control with Russia.
russian compliance with arms control treaties and agreements
I will not repeat much of what Under Secretary Thompson has already
discussed: the bottom-line is that arms control with Russia is troubled
because the Russian Federation apparently believes it need only abide
by the agreements that suit it. As a result, the credibility of all
international agreements with Russia is at risk.
The United States is committed to its long-held arms control, non-
proliferation, and nuclear security objectives, particularly our
commitment to the goals of the Treaty on the NonProliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
Arms control can contribute to U.S. security by helping to manage
strategic competition among states, and we are committed to meaningful
arms control that decreases the chances of misperception and
miscalculation and avoids destabilizing arms competition. To advance
our national security objectives, the United States supports effective
arms control that is verifiable, enforceable, and consistent with U.S.,
allied, and partner security objectives. We are committed to complying
with our arms control obligations, and we remain open to considering
future arms control opportunities that advance U.S. security interests.
However, the Nuclear Posture Review also acknowledges that progress
in arms control is not an end in and of itself. The current security
environment makes arms control extremely challenging in the near term.
Any future arms control arrangement must be pursued in the context of
the broader security environment and must include the participation of
willing partners. It is difficult to envision progress in a security
environment that is currently threatened by Russia's continuing non-
compliance with existing arms control obligations and commitments. In
this regard, Russia poses a series of challenges that do not lend
themselves to conditions suitable for the greater trust necessary to
engage in a prudent arms control agenda.
The Russian Federation remains in violation of the Intermediate-
range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. It is also either rejecting or
avoiding its obligations under the Conventional Armed
Forces in Europe Treaty, the Budapest Memorandum, the Helsinki
Accords, and the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives. In addition, Russia
remains in violation of the Open Skies Treaty and is selectively
implementing the Vienna Document.
It would be irresponsible to ignore these infractions and not hold
Russia responsible for its violations. As a reliable ally and partner,
the United States must advocate for arms control agreements that make
the world more secure and include the willing participation and
compliance of all parties.
russian compliance with the new start treaty
The United States assesses that Russia is in compliance with the
New START Treaty because it values the predictability and transparency
it provides, and also because Russia finds the agreement to be in its
interest. Both sides met the New START Treaty's Central Limits in
February 2018, and I can assure you the United States will faithfully
implement and verify Russian compliance with the treaty.
Moving forward, the United States will consider whether to extend
the New START Treaty beyond its February 2021 expiration. Many factors
will affect this decision, and there are two I want to talk about
today.
The first is Russia's broader approach to arms control. This
Administration is concerned about Russia's violations of other
agreements and Moscow's lack of will to address these concerns. As the
Nuclear Posture Review made clear, the United States take seriously its
role in preserving the value of meaningful arms control, and will only
enter into and remain in arms control agreements when they further our
national security interests in an increasingly complex security
environment. Any decision on extending the Treaty will, and should be,
based on a realistic assessment of whether the New START Treaty remains
in our national security interest, in light of overall Russian arms
control behavior.
A second factor is Russia's nonstrategic nuclear weapons, which are
not captured under any treaty. Russia is modernizing its active
stockpile of up to 2,000 non-strategic nuclear weapons--this is many
times the number of U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons. The 2018
Nuclear Posture Review recommends countering this threat by advocating
pursuit of two supplemental capabilities: the low-yield ballistic
missile warhead and the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile. We have
opened the door to future arms control discussions with Russia by
stating that we would consider forgoing development of the nuclear sea-
launched cruise missile if Russia is willing to engage in meaningful
discussion on non-strategic nuclear arms control.
russian compliance with the inf treaty
The Russian Federation remains in violation of its obligations
under the INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-
launched cruise missile with a range capability of 500 to 5,500
kilometers, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles. This
is a conclusion reached by the previous administration more than four
years ago and remains the case today. We have been more than patient
and have provided Russia with ample opportunities to come back into
compliance, to no avail.
We have worked in diplomatic channels to urge Russia to preserve
the INF Treaty. We have sought answers to our questions at all levels,
but have received no meaningful response. Russia denies any wrongdoing
but offers no explanation in response to the evidence we have presented
to Russian officials. Instead, it levies false counter-accusations
against the United States in an effort to deflect the world's attention
from its violation.
This Administration's determination of Russia's violation is no
different than the one first announced in July 2014. We reviewed the
intelligence and came to the same conclusion as our predecessors. The
evidence is conclusive. Russia possesses a missile system, the SSC-8,
in direct violation of the INF Treaty. Russia has tested this ground-
based system well into the ranges covered by the INF Treaty, produced
it, and fielded it. The violation is real, and it goes against the core
purpose and restrictions of the INF Treaty.
In responding to this gross breach of the Treaty, this
Administration has sought to preserve the viability of the INF Treaty
by applying pressure on Russia to return to compliance with its
obligations. We believed it was in the national security interest of
the United States and in our allies and partners' interest to preserve
the INF Treaty, but we recognized that Russia ultimately would
determine whether the INF Treaty remains viable. Our response has also
focused on preparing the United States for a world without the INF
Treaty. We would prefer that Russia cease its noncompliant activity,
and eliminate all INF Treaty-prohibited missiles and launchers in a
verifiable manner. By doing so, it can preserve the INF Treaty. One
thing is certain. We cannot allow our Treaty partner to continue to
violate a core tenet of the INF Treaty indefinitely, and we will not
let our actions or inaction occur at the expense of our security or
that of our allies and partners.
department of defense response to russia's inf treaty violation
For the last year, the Department of Defense has reviewed and
evaluated systems it could develop if it were not constrained by the
INF Treaty. This is the Department of Defense's (DoD's) portion of the
U.S. Integrated Strategy implemented in the last half of 2017 to
respond directly to Russia's violation of the INF Treaty. DoD has
identified a number of conventional ground-launched capabilities that
it could develop if no longer bound by the INF Treaty--as a means to
pressure Russia to return to compliance with its obligations. The
identification of these capabilities seeks to remind Russia of why it
entered into the INF Treaty in the first place. Such systems could also
fill potential gaps in our military capabilities caused, in part, by
Russia's violation. The INF Treaty prevents us from possessing and
testing these types of missile systems, and we have no intention of
doing so while the United States is still bound by the INF Treaty, but
it does not prevent us from conducting general research and
development. We cannot sit idle while Russia makes a mockery of
international agreements at the expense of our security and that of our
allies and partners.
We appreciate the efforts of Congress to help the Department of
Defense implement these research and development efforts. Together, we
are sending a strong message to Russia and any other country violating
its obligations: Your actions will result in consequences that will
make you less secure, not more. Not complying with agreements
unilaterally may provide you some short-term gain, but it will result
in long-term costs.
Regardless of whether Russia returns to compliance with the INF
Treaty, there are broader implications for the future of arms control
due to the lack of trust that has been created by Russia. It is
difficult to envision a way forward for the United States and Russia to
rebuild that trust and achieve a level of transparency that could lead
to a brighter future for arms control. The onus to create the
conditions for this trust falls on both the United States and Russia,
but Russia will bear the burden should these efforts fail, as Russia's
actions created the situation we currently find ourselves in. We
support the State Department's ``Creating the Conditions for Nuclear
Disarmament'' approach, which aims to develop ``effective measures'' to
increase confidence and trust, thus beginning to create the conditions
for future arms control.
russian non-compliance with conventional arms control
Russia also continues to violate or avoid its obligations with
regard to conventional arms control agreements and confidence and
security building measures. Most fundamentally concerning is Russia's
continued occupation and illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, as well
as its arming, training, and fighting alongside anti-government forces
in eastern Ukraine. These actions undermine the most basic principles
of the Helsinki Final Act, which are reaffirmed in the Vienna Document.
Russia selectively implements the Vienna Document, and has both
failed to report required data about its military forces located in the
occupied territories of Georgia and Ukraine, and has improperly
reported and failed to report major land and air equipment. Since 2015,
Russia has also blocked reasonable updates to the Vienna Document that
would provide basic transparency on its exercises.
Russia also continues to be in violation of its obligations under
the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces (CFE) in Europe. There remains
no CFE Treaty basis for Russia's 2007 suspension of CFE Treaty
implementation.
Finally, Russia remains in violation of its Open Skies Treaty
obligations. The United States and other treaty parties have engaged in
years of diplomatic efforts with Russia to resolve concerns about its
non-compliance, but to no avail. In June 2017, the United States
declared Russia in violation of the Open Skies Treaty and in September
2017 imposed a number of Treaty-compliant, reversible response measures
to encourage Russia's return to full compliance with its Treaty
obligations. Those efforts continue today, with the support of our
allies and partners.
conclusion
We appreciate the attention of this Committee and the rest of the
Congress to these issues, and we will keep you informed of
developments. Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I look forward
to your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you both for your opening comments and
your service.
As is the norm, I am going to turn to our ranking member
and withhold my time for interjections. Thank you.
Senator Menendez. Thank you. And, Mr. Chairman, before I go
to questions, I just want to make a comment.
The question of how we wrote DASKAA as not for just
jurisdictional purposes. It was written in a way to be
comprehensive enough to deal with all of Russia's malign
activities. So I do not want you to think that it was just a
strategic purpose.
Let me just ask both of you. On the topic of arms control,
can you tell us what was discussed during the 2-hour closed
meeting with President Trump and President Putin?
Ms. Thompson. Thank you, Senator.
I cannot tell you the specifics of what was discussed in
Helsinki. I can tell you that arms control was a topic of
conversation.
We have since had dialogue with our Russian counterparts
last month, in August. NSA Bolton met with his counterpart.
Foreign Minister Lavrov and Secretary Pompeo have had multiple
discussions, and I have had discussions as well. So arms
control remains a dialogue----
Senator Menendez. As the Russian Ambassador said, verbal
agreements. Did verbal agreements get entered into, and if so,
what are they?
Ms. Thompson. I am not aware of any agreements other than
continuing to dialogue, Senator.
Senator Menendez. So it was discussed. And you know this by
virtue of what?
Ms. Thompson. I know it was discussed based on feedback
through senior representatives in the State Department.
Senator Menendez. Senior representatives. Can you define
that for me?
Ms. Thompson. Discussions of those that were in attendance
at the debrief with Ambassador Huntsman.
Senator Menendez. Let me ask, is there anything different
that you can add to that, Mr. Trachtenberg?
Mr. Trachtenberg. No, Senator. I am unaware of any
agreements that were reached.
Senator Menendez. Do you agree that Congress has given the
directive that links our nuclear modernization program with
maintaining a strategic arms control process?
Mr. Trachtenberg. I agree that both are indeed important.
Senator Menendez. But do you agree that Congress has
basically set that forth as a link?
Mr. Trachtenberg. I agree that that was part of the
discussion in the ratification debate over the New START
treaty----
Senator Menendez. If New START disappears and the
limitations on Russian forces lapse, what would the
implications be for U.S. national security and that of our
allies?
Mr. Trachtenberg. I am sorry, Senator.
Senator Menendez. If New START disappears and the
limitations on Russian forces lapse, what would be the
implications for U.S. national security and that of our allies?
Mr. Trachtenberg. From the Department of Defense
perspective, I can tell you that that is one of the issues that
we are currently considering both within the interagency and
with our allies and partners as well.
Senator Menendez. But you cannot give this committee at
this point in time any sense of the consequences of that?
Mr. Trachtenberg. I would say, Senator, that the issue of
New START, which runs until 2021, is an issue that we are very
much engaged in in terms of consultations and in terms of
implications. You are exactly correct----
Senator Menendez. So would we require a much larger and
more expensive force?
Mr. Trachtenberg. I cannot say that at this time.
Senator Menendez. Wait a minute. This worries me. The
Department of Defense is the one that always supposedly plans
ahead. They do not wait for a situation to happen and then
figure out what you are going to do. So you must be thinking as
a contingency that if New START lapses and there is no follow-
on, clearly to say--what do we do then? You do not believe that
it would require a larger and more expensive nuclear force?
Mr. Trachtenberg. Senator, the implications of whether New
START continues or whether it lapses are still under
discussion. The Department of Defense plans for all kinds of
contingencies and considers----
Senator Menendez. I find it incredible that you cannot tell
this committee at this point in time what the possibilities
would mean. I do not think it takes a rocket scientist to
figure that out.
Let me ask you, Ms. Thompson. Let me go through a series of
statements here.
In congressional testimony, senior military officials such
as Air Force General John Hyten, the Commander of the U.S.
Strategic Command responsible for all nuclear forces, and Vice
Chairman General Paul Silva, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, have voiced enthusiastic support for the New START
treaty.
So let me go through a series of questions. If you can just
give me a simple yes or no.
Can the United States meet all of our current deterrence
requirements with a force at or slightly below the levels of
the New START treaty? Yes or no?
Ms. Thompson. We are currently meeting obligations,
Senator.
Senator Menendez. I am sorry?
Ms. Thompson. We are currently meeting our obligations.
Senator Menendez. So the answer is yes, that we can meet
our requirements with a force at or slightly below the levels
of the New START treaty.
Ms. Thompson. Again, Senator, we have met our central
limits, and so we are meeting our obligations.
Senator Menendez. But, you know, the reason we have
witnesses here is to give us answers to the questions that we
pose. That is not the question I posed to you.
Let me try another one. These are relatively simple.
Does the New START treaty force the United States to cut
back any of our current nuclear modernization efforts? Yes or
no?
Ms. Thompson. I would say no.
Senator Menendez. Thank you.
Now, does this New START treaty limit in any way our
missile defenses? Yes or no?
Ms. Thompson. I would defer to the Department of Defense,
sir.
Mr. Trachtenberg. No, Senator. It does not.
Senator Menendez. Do you agree that the New START treaty
meets the standard put forward in the Nuclear Posture Review
for arms control treaties and that it fosters transparency,
understanding predictability in relations with Russia, thereby
reducing the risks of misunderstanding and miscalculation?
Mr. Trachtenberg. I would say the transparency and
verification requirements in the New START treaty are a
benefit.
Senator Menendez. Okay. Let me try one more time. My time
has expired.
Do you believe that it meets the standard--the New START
treaty meets the standard put forward in our Nuclear Posture
Review?
Mr. Trachtenberg. Senator, I believe it meets the
requirements we have today.
Senator Menendez. Well, thank you.
The Chairman. I am going to use the first minute of my time
to say that having written the two amendments myself with both
missile defense and modernization, that there was a connection.
In the resolution of ratification, we made sure that while we
were going to reduce the amount of warheads and our ability to
deliver them, we also wanted to modernize because there was a
huge savings in not keeping this massive inventory spread
throughout our country and not knowing whether they actually
operate or not, a huge savings in going ahead and modernizing.
So the two worked hand in hand.
We passed those amendments on the floor. I actually gave
other people's names on them trying to draw them onto the
treaty, in some cases successful; in some cases, not.
But there was no doubt a tie between the two, and it has
been very important. The essence of this is that the
modernization piece and the reduction in warheads piece go hand
in hand. So I mean, I think that is self-evident and has been
central to the entire agreement.
With that, Senator Paul.
Senator Paul. Thank you for your testimony.
Ms. Thompson, you mentioned that there are ongoing
discussions with the Russians both at your level and the level
of the National Security Council Director, as well as the
Secretary of State.
Do we also have some sort of permanent organization? Did
the treaty set up some kind of structure where there is ongoing
like--where each side can express their contention that the
other side is in violation of treaty? Is there an actual body
of people who meet regularly?
Ms. Thompson. There are, Senator. For example, with the INF
Treaty, we have had, during my time here, one experts meeting.
During the course of the administration, there have been two
experts meetings. We have the BCC, or the Bilateral
Consultative Commission, that gets together on the New START.
So each treaty has an organization of experts within our
respective governmental representatives that meet.
Senator Paul. So when we brought forward--and are these
separate sort of agencies or entities? Does the INF Treaty
organization have one for disputes and then New START has one?
Are they different? Is it all together, or how does it work?
Ms. Thompson. For the State Department, those
representatives all come under my purview in different bureaus,
but their experts reside within the State Department, also with
partners with DOE, Department of Defense as well.
Senator Paul. So you said you met once in the last year--
that group?
Ms. Thompson. For the INF experts meeting.
Senator Paul. And then there will be another meeting coming
up that is scheduled, or what?
Ms. Thompson. Yes, sir. They are fairly regular, regular in
the sense that some of the treaties are annually, some are
biannually, some are in conjunction with other conferences. But
we have an open line of communication for each of the treaties.
Senator Paul. So we believe them to be in violation of the
INF Treaty. They also complain and say some of our launchers
are in violation as well.
Ms. Thompson. That is correct.
Senator Paul. Do you think that this can be worked out
through discussion, that we are at a point where there could be
a resolution of these things, that both sides might have to
give a little bit on this? Or do we just acknowledge that there
is no way we are in violation of anything?
Ms. Thompson. We have not had progress thus far. I would
say that we have an interagency process that is looking through
that now on what are some of the options that we have
available.
Senator Paul. But it seems to me--and a lot of this is very
detailed whether or not something technically is in violation
or not--that it seems like an openness to having an ongoing
discussion is important.
Now, both of you acknowledged that the New START treaty we
are in compliance with. And yet, both of you--it seemed to be
the tenor is that you are very concerned could we even go
forward because they are in violation of so many other
treaties, the INF, etc.
And I guess my only concern is that with the Iran
agreement, everybody kept saying they are in compliance with
the Iran agreement. Iran is in compliance. But we were still
unhappy about other things Iran was doing. And I think there
are some similarities here. Many of us think the New START
treaty was an advantage and that it brought down the threat of
nuclear weapons--we have less nuclear weapons--and that there
were good things that came from New START. I guess my concern
is that we could be throwing all of that out and saying, well,
they are violating the INF or they are violating this, you
know, Conventional Forces Treaty and all these other treaties,
and we do not like all the stuff they are doing, which is true.
But I worry that we then just throw the New START treaty out.
And so I hope that people will think about--we try to get
the best that we can and we negotiate from a position of
strength. But I am concerned that we would just say, simply,
just start over. And it is not always that easy. I think the
Iran agreement will actually be very difficult to start again
from the very beginning. You know, instead of starting with
what are we complying on and going to our differences, let us
don't throw everything out. Let us start with what we are
complying on. If New START is working, maybe we then look at
the INF.
That is the only caution that I would have in looking at
this and also just to say that, at least our office, we are
very interested in what goes on with these and would like to
have you come in and talk to some more to us about how the
meetings are going, what the differences are, and what the
possibilities of resolving things are.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me thank our witnesses.
Ms. Thompson, I think the understatement in your written
statement about Russia has taken actions over the past few
years that have posed real challenges to our bilateral
relationship and widened the deficit of trust we have Russia. I
think all of us would say that that is a major concern.
And we look at our relationship with Russia on the nuclear
front, and we recognize that New START gives us the opportunity
to do the inspections not only on active sites but also those
sites that are not active. So we really do get to see with our
own people what is going on in Russia, which is extremely
valuable.
We also have the fact that Russia is in compliance, we are
in compliance with the New START treaty.
And then as Senator Paul has said, we know in INF that
Russia is in violation with what they have developed on land-
based missiles. And you are using the enforcement mechanisms
under the INF and diplomacy, which I strongly agree, and not
withdrawing from the INF, which I think would be a disaster
because it would only isolate us more from what Russia is
doing. And we have taken countermeasures through a submarine-
based defense system in regards to what Russia is doing on
land. So we are taking our steps in compliance with the INF in
order to make sure that we are secure.
My point is that in response to Senator Menendez's
question, I was surprised that I did not hear a stronger
statement as to the national security importance of both the
New START and INF. We know North Korea has a nuclear program.
What we do not know is the specifics because we do not have
inspections. We do not have eyes on the ground. We do not know
exactly what is going on in that country.
And, yes, we have international inspections now of Iran,
but not with the United States' participation. So we are
somewhat limited in understanding what is going on in Iran.
But at least with Russia, we have that capacity to
understand their program because of the New START treaty.
We know this administration has a way of surprising us at
times with statements made by the President. So that is one of
the reasons we had this hearing.
So I would like to get both of your views as to the
national security importance to the United States in these
tough times with Russia to be able to get our inspectors over
in Russia working with theirs, understanding their nuclear
program, the importance of that to the United States national
security.
Mr. Trachtenberg. Senator Cardin, if I could.
As I stated, I do believe that the verification and
monitoring and onsite inspection provisions provide a level of
openness and transparency that is useful and beneficial not
just to the United States but to our allies as well.
That said, what I find particularly troubling is the
overall nature of Russian arms control behavior and what the
Russians seem to be doing in terms of selectively complying
with various provisions of treaties and selectively non-
complying with others when they feel it is not in their
interest. It is that overall kind of behavior that I think from
a national security perspective we at least need to consider.
Senator Cardin. I do not disagree with that at all. I agree
with what you are saying.
My concern is that sometimes we do knee-jerk reactions in
this administration and that if we give up our ability to be
able to have our inspectors in Russia, because of a violation
of the INF, it leads to the end of New START. I think it is not
in our national security interest to do that. And I was hoping
to get a little bit broader of a response from you as to the
importance of our current relationship with Russia on nuclear
as it relates to the transparency that you referred to, which
is clearly in our interest.
We can counter their violations without pulling out of the
agreement. We have already done that in INF. Modernization
programs, as the chairman pointed out--we can still do that. We
can do our missile defense, and we are not in violation of New
START or INF. So we can stay in compliance with the treaties
without pulling out.
Yes, we are not satisfied where Russia is today. We have
mechanisms to try to counter that through direct enforcement
mechanisms within the agreements, as well as our own nuclear
program and our own defense programs, in order to counter what
Russia is doing. Is that not a fair statement?
Mr. Trachtenberg. I think you are exactly correct that we
do have mechanisms, indeed. Where I might differ somewhat,
Senator, is I believe we are taking a deliberate approach to
our assessment of all of these treaties, including the New
START treaty. I do not see this as a rush to judgment on the
part of the administration's perspective on this. And I think
it is perfectly legitimate and appropriate for us to weigh all
of the potential--look at all of the potential implications.
Senator Cardin. I agree with you, but we have a specific
responsibility as an independent branch of government and this
committee particularly on foreign policy. And I think the
American people need to understand how important these treaties
are to our national security.
And I respect that you are going through a deliberative
process. I really do. But we have seen this administration do
things that have not been under a deliberative process,
decisions made by our President. And it is important that we
have a publicly established record as to the importance of
these treaties as it relates to America's national security.
And I wish you would be a little bit bolder as to the
importance of us maintaining those types of relationships.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Isakson.
Senator Isakson. I want to follow up on what Senator Cardin
just said and Senator Menendez a minute ago because I think
this is an important point. It is for me.
When I came to the Senate and came to the Foreign Relations
Committee, the first legislation of any import at all was the
New START treaty, and I got very involved in it because of, I
think, the responsibility it put on me because of everything
else we dealt with, that was the most important thing we could
do: arms control, verification, limitations of arms with us and
Russia. And so I got really into the weeds, probably too deep
for a real estate salesman to be able to comprehend. But I did
anyway.
And I finally voted for it, and I did so because it was
clearly evident there was no other agreement that we were into
with any other adversary or potential adversary or ally in the
world that had better verification, better mandated access for
the United States of America, and better access for them than
us. Am I right on that?
Ms. Thompson. I would agree with that, Senator.
Senator Isakson. I want to carry that forward.
When we did this--the mess we did with Iran here that, as
Ben said, did not have any verification, or the verification
said we could not verify on military bases and things of that
nature. It had gaping holes in it, which is why I voted against
it or wanted to vote against it because it just did not add
anything to our country's security whatsoever. It diminished it
in comparison to what we agreed to with Russia on the START
treaty.
So my point is--and I understand, Secretary, you do not
want to give away negotiating positions with the Russians. When
you answer his question or my question about the START treaty,
you do not want to say anything that would cede a point you
might have to negotiate in negotiations.
But I too agree with what he said. We ought to be a little
bit more pro continuing the benefits the START treaty gives us
rather than getting the idea there might be some way we can get
out of it because I think knowledge and access is tremendous.
We have no-notice access. We have Russians in the United States
who have access to come inspect our sites, us in Russia. We
have a unique hologram system on the warheads so we can count
the warheads and what they can do and where they are. We can
catch them. They can catch us.
I mean, if we had insisted at the table with the Iranians,
we have a treaty on nuclear weapons with Russia, the two
largest nuclear powers in the world. We want to put those
verifications in our agreement with you, Iran. Iran, you will
be able to inspect ours and we want to be able to come in and
inspect yours, unfettered. There was a perfect predicate to do
that. Secretary Kerry decided not to do it in that way, but it
would have been a great way to get that foot in the door.
So all I am trying to say is when you get worried about
compromising your future by talking about what you might get
out of if you did not like it, you run the risk of letting them
think they could get out from under the responsibility it puts
on them, and they would be a lot more willing to take advantage
of it than we would. I just wanted to make that point.
Second point. I would like both of you to answer this
question. On the Space Force, when the Vice President announced
the Space Force and the President announced the Space Force--
and you acknowledged some of the experimentation the Russians
have done in space of a defensive nature, but potentially
offensive as well--would you equalize the Space Force
enthusiasm that you have seen so far in our government today to
be equal to what was the missile defense system of the Reagan
administration?
Mr. Trachtenberg. Senator Isakson, I do not think we are
currently considering a missile defense capability similar to
what was proposed during the Reagan administration.
But in terms of the Space Force, the Department of Defense
is certainly committed to going forward and implementing the
vision expressed by the President and the Vice President also
in terms of moving out expeditiously and appropriately to
develop those capabilities given the importance of space to our
national defense.
Senator Isakson. I was hoping that was going to be your
answer because when you had addressed it in your remarks--and I
have seen some of the other pieces and read some of the stuff
about it--the Space Force is the modern day answer to the
missile defense system that Reagan used. Reagan used missile
defense as an idea for the future. It scared the hell out of
the Russians and in fact led to their spending on defense,
which put them in the difficulty they fell into in the early
1990s when they did it.
So I think having the Space Force recognized as a future
addition to our defense or offense militarily and
diplomatically is as equally good a potential tool as missile
defense was in its infancy and has been since. And I applaud
the administration's boldness in doing that, and I hope it will
be something that is a meaningful tool and not a paper tiger.
With that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you both
for being here to testify this morning.
I want to go back to the INF Treaty because you both
pointed out Russia's violation. I agree with Senator Cardin's
point that it is not in our interest to withdraw from the INF
Treaty. I do not think that helps solve the Russia problem.
But what other options are being considered to try and push
the Russians to again comply with the INF Treaty? Are there
things that you can talk about that have been looked at that we
might not yet have tried?
Ms. Thompson. Thank you, Senator.
I can assure you that we have used diplomatic means. We
have used economic means. Through DOD, we have used military
means to try to wield them back into compliance, fulfill their
obligations that they set out when they signed the treaty.
Senator Shaheen. So can you discuss the specifics of what
those diplomatic and military means are?
Ms. Thompson. I would prefer to tell you that we are in an
interagency process now and looking at it holistically
throughout the Russia strategy. I would not want to get into
specifics as yet because we are still in the developmental
stages of that.
Senator Shaheen. And so do I take from that that we are
actually considering options that have not been tried yet?
Ms. Thompson. Yes, ma'am. That would be a fair assessment.
Senator Shaheen. The Nuclear Posture Review--I guess this
is for you, Ambassador Trachtenberg. It claims that the other
nuclear armed states have modernized their nuclear arsenals far
more extensively than the United States so that both China and
Russia have. Do you share that view, and what do we need to do
in order to be able to catch up to both of them if we are
behind?
Mr. Trachtenberg. I do, Senator. Certainly in the case of
Russia, which is the focus of our discussion today, the
Russians have for years been engaged in a very extensive
strategic modernization program not only of their strategic
nuclear forces and systems but of their non-strategic nuclear
weapons and systems as well that has, I would argue, far
outpaced what the United States has done to date.
I agree with the earlier comments that were made in terms
of the importance of the U.S. modernization program. Over the
years, we have reduced the levels of our nuclear stockpile by
some 85 percent since the height of the Cold War, but we do
need to pursue the modernization program that has been referred
to earlier. The United States has not built a new nuclear
weapon in many, many years. Russia we know has. China has.
Other nuclear weapon states have. So I do see a discrepancy
there, and I would completely agree with the conclusions
reached in the Nuclear Posture Review.
Senator Shaheen. So one of the things that Senator Corker
pointed out was that part of the agreement around New START was
the modernization piece, but the idea was that we would
continue to modernize. And I think there is some funding in the
current appropriations and authorization in the NDAA bill that
were passed that would allow us to look at some other
modernization capabilities. But they were also supposed to go
hand in hand with continued efforts to reduce the number of
nuclear weapons.
Can you talk about what has been done in the last 20 months
of this administration that would point to efforts to further
reduce nuclear weapons?
Mr. Trachtenberg. Well, I can tell you, Senator, that we
have reduced to the point where we are in compliance with all
of our arms control obligations, in particular the New START
totals which have put, of course, limitations on three systems,
the number of deployed strategic weapons, the number of
deployed strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, the ICBMs,
bombers, and submarines, as well as the total number of
deployed and non-deployed systems. So we have taken those
obligations seriously.
Senator Shaheen. And so can you talk about how much of that
has been done since the current administration took office?
Mr. Trachtenberg. I do not have the figures in front of me.
I would be happy to take that for the record and get back to
you.
Senator Shaheen. That would be great. Thank you. If you
would share it with the entire committee, that would be
helpful.
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Senator Shaheen. Last week, it was reported that the United
States refused to certify the new Russian Tu-214 aircraft for
flights under the treaty on Open Skies. We were the only one of
23 nations to vote no. I think this is probably for you, Ms.
Thompson. Can you talk about why we took that position?
Ms. Thompson. Yes, Senator. We had technical experts along
with over 20 other countries on the certification for the
Russian sensor. We did not fail to certify. We came back and
had to consult with some additional technical experts, and I
would anticipate we will have a decision on that within the
next 24 hours. We have not certified. We will have a decision
in the next 24 hours.
Senator Shaheen. I am out of time, but if we think we
should not certify this aircraft, will we not also argue with
some of our allies and those other 23 nations that they also
should not certify it?
Ms. Thompson. Yes, ma'am. There is a set process on those
deliberations, but again, within the next 24 hours, you will
have an answer for the certification.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, thank you, both of you, for what you do. I
think it has been said several times here today that what you
do is some of the most important work that our country does as
far as our national security and keeping us safe.
Having said that, trying to negotiate with people who are
not negotiating in good faith is a problem. And so you both
have a heavy lift ahead of you. I was one of the ones--indeed,
I led the effort--to not ratify the New START not because I do
not believe we should deal with the Russians. I think we have
to deal with the Russians. I just, as I think a lot of us
today, do not have any confidence whatsoever that they are
dealing in good faith. They are serial cheaters. They are
serial liars. And you have to look at the other things that
they are doing in the world to judge what kind of a mind these
people have as far as whether they are acting in good faith.
So having said that, the reason I opposed the original New
START was simply because I believed that it did not give us the
inspections, the confidence that we needed to get to where we
wanted to be. I thought there was more we could do. Obviously,
we cannot talk about it here, there are covert things that we
can do to verify in addition to the things that are included in
the treaty, and they do the same thing.
But having said that, as we look forward to renegotiating
the treaty when it expires, are there preparations being made
as to how we could ratchet up our game as far as being able to
verify the things that we suspect and probably know in some
instances that they are doing that we cannot even tell them
that we know because it would disclose methods and sources? Is
there a thought process going into this as to how we are going
to up our game, Ms. Thompson?
Ms. Thompson. Yes, Senator. There is a rigorous interagency
process ongoing. All options are on the table as we bring in
technical expertise on what we know, what we do not know, how
we can fill those gaps, again diplomatically from our end,
militarily from the Defense Department, economically from our
agencies as well. What are things that have not been tried
before? What are some options? And that process is ongoing.
Senator Risch. Mr. Trachtenberg, do you have anything to
add to that?
Mr. Trachtenberg. Well, I would agree with that, Senator. I
would also agree with your earlier comments as well in terms of
the New START treaty.
I would make this point. Of course, when the New START
treaty was negotiated in 2010, at the time we had hoped that it
would sort of represent a new relationship with the Russian
Federation and would lead to broader cooperation on a number of
fronts.
Since that time, what we have seen is a clear deterioration
of our relationship with Russia. Though we would like the
situation to be different, in fact, I believe to use Ranking
Member Menendez's words earlier, we must be clear-eyed about
the threats that we face. This administration is trying to be
just that in looking at arms control in the context of our
overall relationship with Russia.
Senator Risch. Well, thank you. I am glad to hear that that
is the view.
You are absolutely right about the deterioration, and that
deterioration should make us think about how we are going to
approach this as we go forward in trying to renegotiate.
In addition to the other things that they have done, the
poisonings and everything else that they have done, watching
them manufacture excuses as to why they are not complying,
manufacture accusations against us that we are not complying on
certain things really cries out to have us up our game in how
we are going to approach this on a New START treaty.
So, again, thank you for your work, and I hope we will
approach it differently this time than we did last time.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Udall.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you both
for being here.
Secretary Trachtenberg, part of the support for ratifying
the New START--I want to focus a little on that that others
have talked about--was that it allowed certain weapons to be
updated while also achieving overall reduction in the number of
arms both the United States and Russia possess. The national
labs located in my home state of New Mexico play a vital role
in fulfilling these updates or life extension programs.
President Trump has said he wants to strengthen and expand the
U.S. nuclear arsenal.
Now, while certain life extension programs are allowed
under New START, building new weapons and not drawing down the
overall number of weapons in our arsenal would go against the
treaty.
Can you clarify the President's position on what he means
by strengthen and expand?
Mr. Trachtenberg. Well, Senator, I believe the best
articulation of our policy with respect to our nuclear arsenal
going forward can be found in the Nuclear Posture Review that
was released in January. And I think what we are talking about,
as I mentioned previously, was----
Senator Udall. Could you focus on the strengthen and
expand? If it was in the Nuclear Posture Review, tell me what
we mean.
Mr. Trachtenberg. What the Nuclear Posture Review said
specifically was that what we are looking to do is to have a
modern, resilient, and capable nuclear force that is capable of
effectively deterring attack or aggression against the United
States or our interests. I want to be very clear about this.
What we are looking at in connection with our nuclear forces is
to preserve the efficacy of our deterrence capability. This is
all about deterrence, and the Nuclear Posture Review I believe
makes that clear. And so all of our efforts related to
modernization of our capabilities, while we, in fact, proceed
with the necessary reductions of older systems, are done with a
view toward maintaining the efficacy of our overall nuclear
deterrent. That is job number one.
Senator Udall. Now, we talked earlier about the meeting in
Helsinki between President Trump and Russian President Putin.
What specific arms control issues were discussed there?
Ms. Thompson. Senator, I know that the topic writ large was
raised. My belief is, as I have been briefed, the specifics
were not addressed. It was in general terms of the importance
of two nuclear capable countries that we need to remain open to
dialogue between our respective teams to ensure that the
obligations are met.
Senator Udall. Now, in August, a Russian document listing
arms control topics for discussion at the July summit between
President Trump and President Putin was leaked to the press.
According to the document, Putin spoke with President Trump
about extending New START for 5 years and about reaffirming
commitment to the INF Treaty.
Can you confirm whether or not Putin raised these topics
with President Trump?
Ms. Thompson. I cannot, Senator.
Senator Udall. Can you?
Mr. Trachtenberg. No, Senator, I cannot.
Senator Udall. When you talked about--the knowledge you had
was from the briefing that the ambassador had. You were not
given any instructions with regard to those.
Ms. Thompson. Correct, Senator.
Senator Udall. Were there any tasks that came out from the
meeting with the ambassador to say these are the things we have
to do flowing out of the summit?
Ms. Thompson. I did not receive any specific taskings. No,
sir.
Senator Udall. What is the status of DOD's research and
development on conventional ground-launched intermediate range
missile systems?
Mr. Trachtenberg. Senator, we are continuing to work on the
research and development based on the congressional guidance
that we received, which we very much appreciate. I believe
there has been about $48 million that has been set aside for
research and development of the conventional ground-launched
cruise missile. The research and development portion of that is
entirely compliant with the INF Treaty. If we were to go
forward and actually deploy such a system, then that would be
non-compliant with the INF Treaty. But no decision, of course,
has been made at this time.
Senator Udall. How much money has DOD spent on this effort
to date?
Mr. Trachtenberg. I would have to get you the exact
figures.
Senator Udall. Could you do that for the record, please?
Mr. Trachtenberg. Absolutely.
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Senator Udall. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Thank you very much.
Senator Rubio.
Senator Rubio. Thank you. Thank you both for being here.
In that March speech, Vladimir Putin unveiled these new
weapons. He referred to them over a dozen times as strategic,
at least in the Kremlin's English translation. And these new
kinds of nuclear arms include hypersonic nuclear cruise
missiles, nuclear-powered ballistic missiles, nuclear torpedoes
shot from drone submarines.
Under Secretary Thompson, I am glad that you acknowledged
in your prepared testimony that the U.S. has to reckon with--
and I quote--I think this is right out of your statement--
whether or not Russia's recently announced strategic nuclear
weapons will be held accountable under--end quote--the New
START treaty.
So let me ask just to clarify. Is it the position of the
United States that we consider the weapons that were previewed
in the speech that are under development that he announced in
March, the hypersonic nuclear cruise missiles, the nuclear-
powered ballistic missiles, the 100 megaton nuclear torpedo
shot from drone submarines, and the like--do we consider those
to be strategic nuclear weapons covered under the START treaty?
Ms. Thompson. Senator, I would defer to my technical
experts for the firm answer on that. My initial read is they
would count as strategic weapons.
Senator Rubio. Can I ask, have the Russians notified any of
these new kinds of strategic nuclear arms featured in that
speech to the Bilateral Consultative Commission?
Ms. Thompson. They have not been raised through the formal
process. No, sir.
Senator Rubio. Have we asked them to do so?
Ms. Thompson. Not to my knowledge, but I can check again on
what occurred. So I read the results from the INF technical
experts meeting. That was not raised, and we have not had
discussions on specifics of New START.
Senator Rubio. So as far as you know, no one yet has raised
with the Russians from our side we saw your speech, we saw what
you are talking about developing, we believe that needs to be
notified.
Ms. Thompson. Those were not notified. The only way we have
seen those is in the open press that you----
Senator Rubio. No. I know they have not been notified. Has
anyone from our government asked them, expressed to them our
belief that it is their obligation to notify based on what we
saw them describe?
Ms. Thompson. I have not done so, Senator.
Senator Rubio. Why not?
Ms. Thompson. We have not had the engagement on New START
with my counterpart. But I will take that back and----
Senator Rubio. Your counterpart on the Russian side.
Ms. Thompson. Correct.
Senator Rubio. But beyond that, there are other ways beyond
that. You are saying there has been no engagement at all
whatsoever. There are not other channels by which this could be
raised even through a public statement of some sort?
Ms. Thompson. We have had engagement, Senator, but because
it was in an unofficial press report and not through official
channels, we still have some intelligence to gather on that to
confirm/deny. As we have seen before----
Senator Rubio. Well, it was Putin's speech. That is pretty
official.
Ms. Thompson. Senator, as we have seen before from the
rhetoric from President Putin, what he says is not necessarily
ground truth.
Senator Rubio. Yes. I am not saying whether or not some of
this was built on hyperbole or not. My point is he gave a
speech, he described these weapons. You would think that
someone in the United States Government would say to them, hey,
we saw the speech by your Putin guy, and if that is true, you
need to notify that. That would violate START.
Ms. Thompson. Senator, we are taking action on it. We have
not done it through the formal New START process with our
counterparts.
Senator Rubio. Well, it does not sound like any action has
been taken yet in regards to that.
Ms. Thompson. We have taken action, Senator, within our own
community not through the formal process.
Senator Rubio. You mean you have talked to each other about
it.
Ms. Thompson. Senator, as a former intelligence officer of
28 years, we have a practice of information is not necessarily
intelligence until it is confirmed. So we are working with our
agencies and partners and allies to confirm if that
information----
Senator Rubio. I am not saying we should tell them, hey, we
know you have something. All I am saying is he gave a speech.
He described a series of weapons that, if they were developed
at any point in the future, would fall under the START treaty
as a strategic weapon. And you would think someone would say,
hey, we saw your speech. We are not saying we think it is real
or not real, but if that is real, you understand that needs to
be notified. And you are saying we have not yet done that.
Ms. Thompson. I am saying that we have looked at it
internally. I have not met with my counterpart on that
discussion, but I will take that back for consideration.
Senator Rubio. All right.
Let me ask about INF real quick. The treaty puts limits on
us in other theaters outside of Europe and with other
competitors in particular, especially China, that are not
covered by it. So I do not know who this question is
appropriately to, but does the INF Treaty, as currently
structured, begin to put us at a strategic disadvantage with
respect to China, particularly the Indo-Pacific region?
Mr. Trachtenberg. Senator, you raise a good point, and I
think that is indeed one of the questions that we are looking
at in terms of the overall implications of remaining in
compliance with the treaty which the Russians are in clear
violation of.
Senator Rubio. I guess my last question is as far as
violating the INF Treaty, it should not be surprising. It is
our official position that they are in violation of the INF
Treaty. That is correct. Okay.
And it should not be surprising--has it not been widely
reported now that the Russians have openly both displayed in
exercises and through statements made by military officials a
doctrine of escalate to deescalate, including the use in their
doctrine of tactical nuclear weapons in the battlefield in
essence in order to elevate or in order to exacerbate a crisis
in order to escalate it in order to then deescalate it. A
nuclear strike on the battlefield--everybody would stop and it
would allow them--so the violation of the INF Treaty and the
use of intermediate weapons would be fully consistent with that
new doctrine. Would it not?
Mr. Trachtenberg. I would believe it would be, Senator.
Absolutely correct. That is why I believe it is important that
we consider why the Russians are violating the INF Treaty in
the way they are because they must see some advantage to doing
it either militarily, politically, or otherwise.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Murphy.
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for being here today.
Following National Security Advisor John Bolton's meeting
with his Russian counterpart in Geneva at the end of August, he
stated that the administration was the very early stages of a
review regarding the pros and cons of extending the treaty. And
then he further commented that there were several options
available. One was, of course, extending the treaty. Another
was renegotiating it. But a third was jettisoning it and
pursuing a different kind of approach, and he made a specific
reference to the 2002 Moscow Treaty.
Of course, the Moscow Treaty only limits deployed warheads
and it does not include verification provisions. And so to some
of us there is a concern about the specific reference to the
Moscow Treaty given that it does not have verification.
So why did the administration suggest that the Moscow
Treaty may be an option for the path forward on renewing New
START?
Ms. Thompson. Senator, I can assure you as the Under
Secretary--and one of my bureaus is the Arms Control
Verification and Compliance Bureau--that whatever treaty that
we engage in with our counterparts has the verification within
it. That is an important part of the treaty.
I would never want to speak for Ambassador Bolton, but I
can assure you for my team that verification is integrated into
the treaties.
Mr. Trachtenberg. Senator, if I might just agree with those
comments and also share your view on the importance of
verification. I would say I was working in the Defense
Department at the time of the Moscow Treaty, and the reason why
that treaty did not contain verification measures like most
arms control treaties is because we were still operating under
the verification provisions in the original START treaty, which
did not expire until the end of 2009. So they were still fully
in effect.
Senator Murphy. Thank you both for those answers.
I will stay with you, Secretary Trachtenberg. I wanted to
come back to the issue of Open Skies. And I appreciate Senator
Shaheen's questions.
Separate and aside from this pending issue of this one
certification issue, Secretary Mattis wrote a letter to Senator
Fischer here indicating that Open Skies--compliance with it is
still in U.S. national security interests.
Do you agree with the statement despite the fact that we
have these ongoing Russian compliance issues? Even with the
Russian compliance issues, is this treaty still within national
security interests for the United States to remain an active
part of?
Mr. Trachtenberg. I think the Open Skies Treaty clearly has
been in the United States' interest and certainly because of
the transparency, it provides the openness, the level of
visibility of what other states are doing that it provides not
only to us but to our allies as well. We would much prefer to
see the Russians get back into compliance with its provisions.
Senator Murphy. I asked the question because this
administration has been in the business of pulling out of
several important multilateral security agreements, and I think
it is important to understand that even given these Russian
compliance problems, we can work through them. We hope to be
able to work through them within the construct of the existing
treaty.
Mr. Trachtenberg. I would agree that we would hope to be
able to work with Russia to work through these compliance
issues that we have. What I do find disturbing and troubling,
Senator, is the fact that, as I mentioned, there does seem to
be a sort of a pattern of behavior here on the part of the
Russian Federation that does not bode well, I think, in terms
of our desire to take arms control to the next level, so to
speak. And until Russian behavior changes or at least even if
it does not, we need to factor that into our overall
consideration of all of these treaties as we look at them to
determine what the United States should do going forward.
Senator Murphy. Thank you.
Finally, switching topics, again back to you, Secretary
Thompson. The Trump administration began talks earlier this
year on a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi
Arabia. Given that you are before the committee, I wondered if
you would give us an update on the progress with these
negotiations, including the last time that the two sides met,
and a confirmation that the administration continues to seek an
agreement that contains the gold standard. This committee
passed a resolution just a few weeks ago once again expressing
our interests that that standard be met to the extent that we
eventually reach an agreement with the Saudis.
Ms. Thompson. Yes. Thank you, Senator.
I can confirm that there are ongoing negotiations between
the United States and Saudi Arabia on the civil nuclear
agreement, the 123. I cannot address the specifics of the
negotiations since those are ongoing, but what I can assure you
as Under Secretary again that oversees that portfolio, that I
always seek the strongest standard in those agreements.
Senator Murphy. Secretary Pompeo said before this committee
that we have told Saudi Arabia we want a gold standard section
123 agreement from them. So can you just confirm that that
remains the bottom line for the administration?
Ms. Thompson. Yes, sir. The strongest standard possible.
Senator Murphy. We have a sense of what a gold standard is
here, and we passed a resolution making sure that there are no
enrichment or reprocessing abilities for the Saudis. Is the
gold standard still the bottom line?
Ms. Thompson. Yes, sir. Committed to ensure that the
enrichment reprocessing and those technologies do not get
proliferated.
Senator Murphy. Thank you.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Before turning to Senator Barrasso, I am going to take one
more of my minutes.
In this conversation with Senator Murphy, you were talking
about taking things to the next level in what all was happening
in the relationship. And I might not have heard you clearly,
but if the START treaty is being complied with and it is
yielding the benefits to us of not having to have so many
nuclear armaments, not knowing whether they work or not, but
focusing on the ones we have and making sure that they do so
that they are reliable, if it is working for us, we would not
consider undoing the START treaty because other treaties are
not being adhered to. Would we?
Mr. Trachtenberg. Senator, I think wherever something is of
benefit to U.S. interests, then the U.S. should continue to
adhere to it or seek to move forward in that respect.
The point that I was trying to make was that when looking
at the individual treaties, there does appear to be a pattern
of Russian behavior overall in terms of its arms control
compliance and Russia's willingness to abide by agreements that
have already been signed that I think speaks to sort of how the
Russians view their approach to arms control in general. And
all I meant to argue was that in our consideration of what is
or is not in our interest, we should try to at least take into
account how the Russians are viewing arms control and how they
are looking at our responses to their violations in terms of
determining the overall future for arms control going forward.
The Chairman. Senator Barrasso.
Senator Barrasso. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
For both of you, listening to Secretary Trachtenberg, you
talked about Russian behavior. And my concern as a member of
this committee and as an American citizen is more can they or
can they not rather than will they or will they not. And so I
like to make sure they have the capacity to do something,
whatever their intentions are.
Which brings us to the question that Senator Rubio had
talked about when he talked about this new strategic nuclear
weapon that is reported. I read about it in March. Vladimir
Putin said that the weapons include a nuclear-powered cruise
missile, a nuclear-powered underwater drone that could be armed
with a nuclear warhead, a hypersonic missile. The headline in
one of the papers said high-tech weaponry. Russia's new nuclear
weapons are technically plausible. You know, this is something
that they could potentially have. I mean, Putin did his
boasting and whether it was just an idle boast or real, I am
concerned. What is our government's assessment of the level of
maturity and accuracy of these weapons? For either of you.
Mr. Trachtenberg. Senator, I cannot speak specifically to
the individual systems that President Putin announced. There
are probably some of those that may be more mature than others.
I do think it is a worrisome development that he announced
these so publicly and made such a presentation of this, which
has led us to wonder why the Russians believe that they need to
do this given the fact that they have already extensively
modernized their strategic nuclear arsenal. So I would look at
this in the context of to some degree it may be aspirational.
To some degree, there may be a practical element to some of
these systems. But I do find it troubling not only from the
standpoint of arms control specifically but from the standpoint
of our overall relationship with Russia, which I think we would
all like to see improve.
Senator Barrasso. And then again along the same line of can
they or can they not, then the question is can we or can we not
defend against such things. So the question is, do we have a
current or prospective missile defense system to intercept the
possibility of these weapons?
Mr. Trachtenberg. We do not have a missile defense system
capable of defending against the Russian strategic nuclear
arsenal, nor has it been our policy to do that. The Russians
have a tremendous number of nuclear weapons systems, and for a
variety of reasons, we have not pursued an active defense
against the full range of Russian strategic weapons. We prefer
to rely on our deterrence capability when it comes to Russia.
Senator Barrasso. So at this point, we do not really have
any specific actions that we are taking in response to what
they are doing as opposed to a deterrence--the other deterrent
capacity.
Mr. Trachtenberg. Well, we do believe that proceeding with
the nuclear modernization program that we have, by modernizing
all three legs of our nuclear triad, the land-based, sea-based,
and air breathing components, is critical in order to continue
the deterrent effect that we rely on.
Senator Barrasso. Secretary Thompson, you know, as the
country continues to face threats from around the world, not
just Russia, I think we should not take any action that is
going to hinder our own missile defense systems. We need to
always remain in charge, I think, of our missile defense, not
Russia or any other country telling us where we can put up and
what we can put up in terms of defense.
So I have concerns about the efforts of Russia to limit our
missile defense and actions that a previous administration took
on this issue.
Can you commit to me that in any arms control discussions
with Russia for which you are responsible, that the United
States will not agree to limiting our own missile defense
programs?
Ms. Thompson. Yes, Senator. And I can assure you that I
will stand up for what is in the best interest of the United
States people and our partners and allies when appropriate.
Senator Barrasso. Thank you.
Anything, Secretary Trachtenberg, you would like to add to
this from the standpoint of the Department of Defense?
Mr. Trachtenberg. No. I would agree with that statement,
Senator. I was also present at the Department of Defense when
President Bush made the decision to withdraw from the--or to
exercise the withdrawal clause of the ABM Treaty because the
world had changed. We faced a variety of ballistic missile
threats and felt the need to move forward with at least an
initial deployment of missile defenses. So I very much believe
that missile defenses can not only defend but can be useful
from the deterrence perspective as well in devaluing the
currency that others place on ballistic missiles as a threat.
Senator Barrasso. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Thank you very much.
Senator Coons.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Chairman Corker, Ranking Member
Menendez.
Thank you to both our witnesses for your long service to
our country and for the chance to explore these important
issues with you.
Something we have not talked much about in today's hearing
is chemical weapons. So let me move to that if I can.
The Trump administration's recent National Security
Strategy claims we are in an era of renewed great power
competition, in particular with Russia. And I am wondering
whether this is an area in which you expect that to reemerge.
The State Department has long claimed that Russia has not
yet declared all its chemical weapons and production facilities
to the OPCW, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons, and Russia continues, I think, a despicable practice
of supporting or defending the murderous regime of Bashar al
Assad and their repeated use of chemical weapons.
Does the administration believe unilateral measures are the
best way to counter Russian chemical weapons production and
use, or should we, instead, work through international
institutions like the OPCW? That is for you, Ms. Thompson.
Ms. Thompson. Thank you, Senator.
I think both are appropriate. We have worked hand in glove
with the OPCW and our partners and allies of late. Assistant
Secretary Poblete was in a conference stating our views, and we
had a rigorous engagement with partners and allies to ensure it
is not only a U.S. voice but a voice of the global partnership.
And we have been very consistent on that and look forward to
continued emphasis both bilaterally and through the
multilateral engagements primarily with OPCW when it comes to
chem. And you can reference in my statement where we stand with
the Russians' actions in Syria with the Assad regime.
Thank you, Senator.
Senator Coons. And do you assess that Russia may seek to
reconstitute a large scale chemical weapon production
capability, or do you think its goal is the smaller scale
program that allows it to carry out attacks like the one that
recently happened in the United Kingdom? I would be interested
in both of your opinions on that.
Ms. Thompson. I would anticipate they will continue to
build on their existing program and, as we saw from the
Novichok attacks, continue to expand for new emerging
technologies in that as well.
Senator Coons. Would you agree that there is a distinction
between a large scale production in terms of capability to
improve and deploy chemical weapons as opposed to the ability
to carry out small scale attacks?
Ms. Thompson. I would agree with that assessment.
Mr. Trachtenberg. I would agree with that as well, Senator.
I would also think that anything that the Russians do in the
area of chemical weapons they will do with a clear intent to
try to hide what they are doing from detection. And I think the
results of the attack in Salisbury earlier this year was an
absolutely atrocious demonstration, regardless of whether they
have large or small arsenals. The willingness to actually
employ such weapons or to support regimes that employ such
weapons is really an atrocity.
Senator Coons. So I will just echo what Senator Isakson
said earlier about the importance of having robust verification
regimes and the ways in which his support for the New START
treaty ultimately was won over because of the breadth and
sophistication of the verification regimes involved. Or I will
simply speak for myself and say that also was a key part in my
supporting New START.
I want to revisit a question Senator Murphy asked earlier
about comments made by the National Security Advisor, John
Bolton, back in August after meeting with his Russian
counterpart where he was suggesting in the early stages of the
review that one option in consideration of New START was
pursuing a different type of approach such as the 2002 Moscow
Treaty, which only limits deployed warheads and does not, I
think, verification. You gave an answer about there being a
continuing verification regime that made that not necessary.
Let me just ask directly. Is the administration considering
in this interagency process a new arms control agreement that
does not include verification provisions?
Ms. Thompson. No, sir.
Mr. Trachtenberg. Not to my knowledge, Senator.
Senator Coons. And would you support or recommend arms
control agreements or reductions that did not include
verification procedures at least as robust as New START?
Ms. Thompson. I would not. I would want to ensure that
verification measures are integrated into any treaty that we
seek.
Senator Coons. It is my view, given public statements by
Putin and others, that Russia is seeking strategic weapons that
would allow them to restart a great power competition with us,
and it is just my hope that you will consider Congress a
partner and seek our input and assistance as we try to craft a
way to both push Russia back into compliance with the INF
Treaty and consider how, when, and whether to extend the New
START treaty, something that I think is of great concern to all
of us.
Thank you both for your testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Booker.
Senator Booker. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I know that some of this ground was already covered with
Senator Shaheen, but I would just like to go through it a
little bit again.
There is obviously a dispute over the compliance with the
Russians on the INF Treaty. A collapse of the INF Treaty would
open the doors, I would assume, towards further development of
arms in terms of the intermediate range missiles and the
negative repercussions.
Can you just help me maybe briefly restate the benefits of
the INF Treaty, not just to the United States but also to our
NATO allies?
Mr. Trachtenberg. Senator Booker, I think the INF Treaty,
when it was negotiated, was a major arms control accomplishment
in that it completely eliminated an entire class of nuclear
systems, systems that threatened our NATO Europe allies
specifically. So there was, indeed, great value to the treaty
at the time.
I would also note that the Russians were initially
reluctant, if I recall, to engage in any negotiations along
those lines until the United States had demonstrated a
willingness to at least counter what they were doing with the
deployment of their SS-20s in Europe. Now, we had no plans to
deploy missiles in Europe, INF missiles in Europe.
The reason I raise that point, however, is to make it clear
that Russian behavior occasionally is determined by how they
view the United States reacting to their behavior.
Senator Booker. And so they are in violation clearly right
now. In terms of our allies, what would it mean if we declared
them in material breach and pulled out? What would the
implications be?
Ms. Thompson. Senator, the implications of material
breach--those have been laid out in the treaty. There are
various options with the treaty, and those discussions would be
in collaboration with our technical experts here and partners
and allies. We are not there yet.
Senator Booker. No. And there is obviously an importance in
continuing that dialogue. This is just land-based. Obviously,
we have the other two prongs of the nuclear triad at our
disposal, air and submarine launch. Correct?
So then the bombasity, at least my description, not yours
obviously, of some of the statements on behalf of the
administration seem to me make me worry about the willingness
to go forward and continue sort of strategic stability talks.
Can you give me any understanding of what the
administration intends to do to continue what is important
dialogue to both us and our allies?
Ms. Thompson. Yes, Senator. I am committed to that. The
dialogue is incredibly important. And that was an example. With
the President and President Putin in Helsinki was one example
of dialogue. Again with Ambassador Bolton and his counterpart,
as I alluded to earlier, with Secretary Pompeo and Foreign
Minister Lavrov have had discussions. I have had discussions.
So as we have seen, despite their rhetoric, despite their
breach of their obligations, we continue to keep that door open
and remain committed to fulfill our end of the obligation.
Senator Booker. But is there going to be some kind of
formal follow-up to Helsinki? Are we going to have some efforts
to really have more formal discussions coming up?
Ms. Thompson. We have had formal discussions. There are
interagency dialogues on next steps. But it does not get much
press, but for example, when we had the INF technical experts
meetings, we engage in the chemical weapons piece and the OPCW,
among others. So it does not get as much press, but there are
lines of dialogue both from the Defense Department, State
Department. DOE Secretary Perry was in country, I believe it
was yesterday or the day before. So we continue to have those
discussions.
Senator Booker. Is there disagreement in the White House,
within the administration, about whether they will resume talks
on a specific date and time?
Ms. Thompson. Not to my knowledge, Senator, no.
Senator Booker. And lastly, what would the goals be for
those continued conversations?
Ms. Thompson. It depends on the treaty, quite candidly.
With INF, obviously, we have raised it that they are not in
compliance, and we showed them example upon example of that.
But as the President addressed in July the fact that we both
are nuclear-capable countries, we have an obligation to our
people and to our partners to maintain that open line of
dialogue.
Senator Booker. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Merkley.
Senator Merkley. Thank you very much, both, for continuing
to keep us briefed on developments in these very important
nuclear conversations.
Under New START, does the United States have access only to
declared facilities or to also undeclared facilities that we
suspect?
Ms. Thompson. To my knowledge, it is both, Senator, but
candidly, I will have to take that back to my experts and
confirm.
Senator Merkley. I do believe it is only declared
facilities.
Under the JCPOA, the IAEA has the power to request access
to suspect facilities and mandates, I believe, a 24-hour
response period. Is that correct?
Ms. Thompson. Yes.
Mr. Trachtenberg. I believe we could request it.
Ms. Thompson. Request access. We do not necessarily get the
access.
Senator Merkley. As of this time, we have heard report
after report that Iran is in compliance. Is that you all's
understanding from all of your examination of the issues?
Ms. Thompson. They are in compliance as the IAEA report,
not in compliance with all the additional malign activities,
but I am sure we will address that later, Senator.
Senator Merkley. But those are not JCPOA activities that
you are talking about. They are in compliance with the JCPOA in
your opinion?
Ms. Thompson. In the IAEA's opinion, they are in technical
compliance, yes.
Senator Merkley. But in your opinion.
Ms. Thompson. The technical portion, Senator--they are in
compliance.
Senator Merkley. They are in compliance. Okay. Thank you.
We have the challenge between a vision and the details of
an arms control agreement. This is the New START agreement, a
pretty hefty package. I could spend a career probably studying
it. And this is the JCPOA, which is also a pretty hefty
package. And this is the press release regarding the U.S. and
North Korea for denuclearization, and that is all we have. Am I
wrong? Is there any package like this, any set of detailed
plans yet between the U.S. and North Korea regarding North
Korea's program?
Ms. Thompson. I could bring in a stack of the intelligence,
but I do not think that would be appropriate for this hearing,
Senator.
Senator Merkley. Well, these are public agreements. These
are treaties. There is no such treaty worked out. Am I correct
that there is no detailed inventory of North Korean assets that
have been examined and developed with agreement on both sides?
Ms. Thompson. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Merkley. Am I correct that there is no schedule for
eliminating these nuclear assets that has been agreed to by
both sides?
Ms. Thompson. Not yet.
Senator Merkley. Am I correct that there is no verification
regime that has been developed and agreed to by both sides?
Ms. Thompson. It has been drafted from our side, not an
agreement yet, Senator.
Senator Merkley. Well, it is hard to have a complete
verification regime if you have not worked out what you are
actually eliminating.
Ms. Thompson. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Merkley. This particular statement says the United
States and DPRK, meaning North Korea, commit to work toward the
complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Now, that
working, ``to work toward,'' is a far cry from the standard
that Secretary Pompeo set out for, which was--I believe he used
the words ``complete, irreversible elimination of nuclear
weapons.'' Why would North Korea not agree to language? Or did
we insist and try to push language that would be a commitment
to complete, irreversible elimination rather than simply to
work toward denuclearization?
Ms. Thompson. Senator, the administration stands firm that
the final and fully verified denuclearization, and those
discussions are ongoing.
Senator Merkley. So at the time of this statement, North
Korea was unwilling to reach the language we wanted, the
complete, irreversible elimination.
Ms. Thompson. They have committed to denuclearize the
peninsula.
Senator Merkley. Well, I am just reading from the document.
It says they have committed to work toward. That is quite
different. It reminds me actually of the NPT language, the Non-
Proliferation Treaty language, where the large nuclear states
pledged to--and they used very similar language--undertake to
pursue negotiations on complete disarmament. In other words, it
is those inserted words that say, no, we do not really have a
commitment yet. North Korea is just saying it will work toward
that effort.
I stress this because quite a bit of time has passed, and
we do not even have the first leg of the journey. The first
base is getting to a complete inventory of their program. And
North Korea has not even agreed to that. And there was not
actually any language in this one-page document that committed
them to it. So it is of real concern.
The other thing is that one thing we said in this document,
which was a little unusual, is we specifically called out that
we were committed to hold follow-up negotiations led by the
U.S. Secretary of State Pompeo and a relevant high-level North
Korean official to implement the outcomes. But the outcome is
only to work towards something because there is no verification
regime to implement. There is no inventory of their nuclear
program, and there is no schedule or plan for how that will be
eliminated. So what is there exactly to implement?
Ms. Thompson. Senator, when we talk final and fully
verified, I would say that is the last step of--I know you are
aware based on your arms control background that once we get
the agreement, we get the access to the country. And then there
is a series of steps. We have done this in multiple areas. We
have got the technical expertise within the ranks of the State
Department, DOD, Department of Energy, and partners and allies.
So I am confident, when Secretary Pompeo reaches the agreement
with the President, that we have the steps that are necessary
to final and fully verify----
Senator Merkley. I was just trying to understand what there
was to implement because this was not to implement what we may
someday negotiate. It was to implement the outcome of the
summit it says. And I am just a little puzzled by exactly what
that meant.
So given that it says that we were fully committed to
having Secretary Pompeo do these follow-up negotiations, why
was his second trip to hold those negotiations cancelled by the
United States?
Ms. Thompson. The North Koreans had not taken the
appropriate action to justify a visit. That said, the
discussions are ongoing with Secretary Pompeo, with our envoy,
and through senior leadership.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Merkley. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just a couple of
follow-up questions, returning to the START treaty.
Has the United States been able to verify Russia's meeting
the limitations of the treaty?
Ms. Thompson. We did. Both countries met the limits in
February, Senator.
Senator Menendez. And assuming that the United States
continues to verify Russia is in compliance, can the United
States meet all of our deterrence requirements for the next 5
years if New START is extended?
Ms. Thompson. I would defer to the Department of Defense.
Mr. Trachtenberg. Senator, for the next 5 years, it is a
bit speculative. I know we can meet those requirements today,
but conditions occasionally change quite rapidly. So I would be
reluctant to say whether we could or could not 5 years hence.
Senator Menendez. Well, the question is, if Russia
continues to meet its obligation and is in compliance, you
cannot tell me whether we can meet our deterrence requirements
under the New START treaty?
Mr. Trachtenberg. Our deterrence requirements may be
variable, Senator, and not only directly related to the Russian
Federation. There are other countries out there with nuclear
weapons. So again, that would be speculative on my part.
Senator Menendez. Let me just say that the more I hear the
answers to the questions, I do not understand if we can meet
all of our current deterrence requirements with a force at or
slightly below the levels of the New START treaty. If we are
not forced to cut back any of our current nuclear modernization
efforts, if we are not in any way limited in terms of our
missile defenses, if this meets the standard put forward in the
Nuclear Posture Review for arms control, if we have been able
to verify Russia is meeting the limitations of the treaty, it
seems to me that all of the foundational building blocks of
aspiring to a follow-on on this treaty would be in place. But
as I listened to your answers, I get a sense that maybe the
administration is headed a different way.
Mr. Trachtenberg. I am not intending to imply, Senator,
that the administration takes a different view of that. You may
be absolutely correct in what you say. All I am suggesting is
that much can happen in 5 years.
Senator Menendez. Let me turn to the chemical weapons
question. Obviously, Salisbury--that attack directly
contravenes the Chemical Weapons Convention which is a
fundamental pillar of international attempts to limit the use
of weapons of mass destruction. Now that you have imposed a
first round of sanctions, has the Russian Federation taken
steps to avoid additional sanctions required under the Chemical
and Biological Act?
Ms. Thompson. Not that we have seen as yet.
Senator Menendez. So assuming that that goes unabated, then
there should be more consequences. Is that a fair statement?
Ms. Thompson. That is a fair statement, Senator.
Senator Menendez. Now, let me finally turn to the INF
Treaty. It appears that the Russians have consistently said
that they value the INF Treaty and would like to preserve it.
We will see. In addition, it appears that Russia and the United
States have at least agreed on the missile, the 9M-729, which
we have identified as violating the treaty. On the other hand,
in March in congressional testimony, General Hyten, the
Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, testified Russia had
increased the production and deployment of the 9M-729,
compounding Russia's violations and further threatening
European security.
So let me ask you a few questions about the next steps and
our attempts to bring Russia back into compliance.
Has the United States asked Russia to halt production of
the 9M-729 so that the military situation does not further
deteriorate during our discussions?
Ms. Thompson. We have had discussions with our Russian
counterparts in the INF technical experts meeting on what is
their obligations in the compliance and how they are violating
the treaty.
Senator Menendez. Have we specifically asked them to halt
production of that missile?
Ms. Thompson. We have told them to get back into compliance
and showed them examples of what that looks like.
Senator Menendez. Okay. Would halting production not begin
the process of getting them back into compliance?
Ms. Thompson. In discussions, Senator, I prefer not to talk
about open dialogue of our negotiations in the open setting,
but we can----
Senator Menendez. Well, look, you know, hiding behind
things that are not classified and calling them classified are
beyond the pale.
Let me ask you this. Has the United States asked Russia to
provide an exhibition of the missile so U.S. experts can review
its technical characteristics and determine whether it can fly
more than 500 kilometers, which would violate the treaty?
Ms. Thompson. I have not. I do not know if other agencies
have, Senator.
Senator Menendez. Do you know of any?
Mr. Trachtenberg. Not to my knowledge, Senator.
Senator Menendez. What steps does Russia need to take to
bring itself back into compliance with the treaty?
Ms. Thompson. Fulfill the obligations set forth in the INF
Treaty.
Senator Menendez. Which are what? You are the Under
Secretary. Why do you not tell me what some of those are?
Ms. Thompson. Well, for one, Senator, is they would have to
get rid of the SSC-8. That blows the compliance. They have
battalions of them. They would have to stop production, among
other things, Senator.
Senator Menendez. Let me just close on this.
Secretary Thompson, you mentioned section 231 of CAATSA in
your opening statement. The fiscal year 2019 National Defense
Authorization signed into law on August 13th included a
provision which requires the administration to submit a report
on whether the President has made a determination that
significant transactions have taken place with the Russian
defense and intelligence sectors. That report is due on
November 13th.
Can we have your commitment that this report will be
submitted to the committee on or before that date?
Ms. Thompson. You have my commitment that that will be
submitted. Yes, Senator.
Senator Menendez. Thank you.
The Chairman. I want to thank you both for being here and
just ask a closing question.
I know that Secretary Thompson referred to some of the
rhetoric that has come out of the Russian leader's mouth.
Sometimes that is information and not reality.
And then, Secretary Trachtenberg, you have left yourself a
lot of room as it relates to some of these treaties.
Are there things out there right now that cause either one
of you concerns about strategic stability?
Mr. Trachtenberg. Senator, I am concerned about the overall
state of the U.S.-Russia relationship. To the extent that
affects stability, absolutely. And I am concerned not just from
an arms control perspective, but my concern goes beyond the
arms control realm looking into some of the other things that
the Russian Federation is doing, some of its actions that sort
of span a range of activities that I would find
counterproductive to American interests across the board.
The Chairman. So those are all things that we can visibly
see and are aware of. Are there other things, though, that you
are aware of that they are developing that cause you to feel
concern about the strategic stability? Either one of you.
Ms. Thompson. Senator, if I may. Particularly to Russia but
to other countries as well, as one that oversees the arms
control and the treaties writ large, is the emerging
technologies. I have talked with some of the staff of late.
Artificial intelligence, the hypersonics, cyber, although here,
but the further development. And those are the type of
technologies that we need to get our arms around with
responsible nation states activities and what that looks like.
So I see that as being the future of arms control as some of
these emerging technologies and how they are integrated into
the arms control treaties.
The Chairman. Are you sensing that we are losing an edge in
those future technologies or that someone is gaining advantage?
Ms. Thompson. Sir, I am confident in our technologies. We
have some work in international forums as well on what that
means to adherence in arms control as these technologies
develop.
The Chairman. Do you want to make any comment?
Mr. Trachtenberg. Yes, Senator. I would agree with that,
and I would say with the support of the Congress that the
Department of Defense has had, for which we thank you very
much, we believe going forward and investing in these types of
technologies that Under Secretary Thompson has talked about are
essential to maintaining the United States' military advantages
going forward. Otherwise, we do run the risk of falling behind
and having that negatively impact our overall national security
objectives.
The Chairman. Well, we thank you both.
The record will remain open for written questions through
the close of business Thursday. If you could respond to those
fairly quickly, we would appreciate it.
We thank you both for being here, for sharing your
knowledge and insights.
And with that, the committee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Hon. Andrea L. Thompson to Questions Submitted by
Senator Marco Rubio
compliance issues with inf treaty and new start treaty
In a March speech, Russian President Vladimir Putin unveiled
details of new weapons supposedly under development that he described
nearly a dozen times as ``strategic'' in the Kremlin's English
translation. These new kinds of strategic nuclear arms include
hypersonic nuclear cruise missiles and nuclear-powered ballistic
missiles, and a nuclear torpedoes shot from drone submarines. I
appreciated hearing your view that some, if not all, of these new kinds
of Russian strategic nuclear arms, which are said by Putin to be under
development, could fall under the New START Treaty's limits on
strategic weapons.
Question. For the written record, I wanted to confirm whether or
not the United States has ever asked the Russians to notify these new
kinds of strategic nuclear arms, or ever otherwise discussed or raised
these systems with Russian officials, in the context of the under the
U.S.-Russian bilateral consultative commission (BCC) or via any other
channel?
Answer. The United States has raised questions related to the
systems unveiled during President Putin's March 1 address with Russian
officials in the appropriate fora. The Administration is happy to
provide additional detail in a classified setting.
As you acknowledged in your testimony, Russia is violating the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty). Rather than own-
up to its noncompliance and resolve these issues in good faith,
however, the Kremlin has repeatedly tried to change the narrative by
accusing the U.S. government of violating the INF Treaty.
Question. What allegations are the Russians making about U.S.
violations of the INF Treaty? Is there any truth to these allegations?
Answer. The United States is in full compliance with its INF Treaty
obligations. The Russian Federation has raised three main areas of
concern regarding U.S. compliance with its obligations: the Aegis
Ashore Ballistic Missile Defense system; ballistic target missiles; and
armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The United States has repeatedly
engaged Russian officials in multiple venues, including the Treaty's
Special Verification Commission (SVC), to explain why U.S. actions in
these areas are compliant with the Treaty.
The United States has consistently addressed Russia's questions in
a transparent, substantive, and constructive manner, while Russian
officials have refused to engage in any serious discussion of the U.S.
concerns or take steps to return to compliance. Instead, Russia has
sought to deflect U.S. concerns by accusing the United States of being
the party in violation of the INF Treaty.
Question. Does the Russian government expressly acknowledge that
the United States is in full compliance with New START?
Answer. While Russia has raised concerns about U.S. implementation
of the New START Treaty, Russia has not accused the United States of
violating the Treaty. In its official response to the U.S. Report on
Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and
Disarmament Agreements and Commitments covering 2017, the Russian
Federation claims that the United States achieved some of its
reductions under the New START Treaty ``by manipulations that are
incorrect from the point of view of contractual practice.''
Specifically, Russia claims that the United States incorrectly removed
some items from New START accountability using conversion procedures
that Russian inspectors cannot verify.
The United States is in full compliance with its obligations under
the New START Treaty. Russia's assertions are baseless. The United
States converted and removed these items from the Treaty's
accountability in accordance with the Treaty's provisions. The United
States has exhaustively addressed Russia's concerns in the Treaty's
Bilateral Consultative Commission, and will continue to answer
questions related to these issues in the confidential Treaty
implementation body designed for such discussions.
Question. Is the Russian government currently in full compliance
with the INF Treaty? And with the New START Treaty?
Answer. Russia remains in violation of its obligations under the
INF Treaty not to produce, possess, or flight-test a ground-launched
ballistic or cruise missile with a range capability between 500 and
5,500 kilometers. The United States announced this finding in 2014, and
has repeated the finding every year since. Russia has taken steps to
develop, test, and field a ground-launched cruise missile, the SSC-8
(9M729), that can fly to ranges prohibited by the Treaty. The
Administration is happy to provide additional detail in a classified
briefing.
Russia is in compliance with the New START Treaty. Every six
months, the Parties exchange declared data on their strategic offensive
arms, which is confirmed via the Treaty's verification regime,
including on-site inspections and monitoring through national technical
means. The aggregate data from these exchanges is made available on the
State Department website. Per the most recent data exchange, Russia had
met the Treaty's central limits as of February 5, 2018.
Question. If Russia refuses to do what's required to get in full
compliance with the INF Treaty, what should the United States do in
terms of the future of the INF Treaty?
Answer. Since 2014, the United States has sought to return Russia
to full, verifiable compliance with the Treaty. In 2017, the United
States announced its Integrated Strategy to pressure Russia to return
to compliance, while ensuring through coordinated action with allies
and partners that Russia does not gain a military advantage from its
violation. Russian officials have so far refused to take substantive
steps to return to compliance, or persuasively refute the information
provided by the United States.
The status quo, whereby the United States remains bound by its INF
obligations while Russia continues its violation, is untenable. Since,
2017, the Administration has pursued diplomatic, economic, and military
means to increase pressure on Russia to return to compliance, and
ensure that the United States is able to defend itself and allies
should Russia not return to compliance.
Question. Given Russia's ongoing noncompliance with the INF Treaty,
does it make sense to start negotiations for an extension or follow-on
to the New START Treaty before Russia comes into full compliance with
the INF Treaty?
Answer. Russia's ongoing violation of the INF Treaty creates a
deficit of trust in the arms control relationship. The United States is
committed to arms control efforts that advance U.S., allied, and
partner security. This commitment necessitates that the United States
have a partner which is willing to comply responsibly with its
obligations. That said, Russia is in compliance with its obligations
under the New START Treaty, which continues to serve as an example of
what both sides can accomplish when Russia lives up to its obligations.
The Administration's analysis of whether to support extending the New
START Treaty--or negotiate a follow-on agreement--will take into
context Russia's behavior in other arms control agreements, and the
security needs of the United States and its allies.
Question. What strategy does the United States have for addressing,
diplomatically and militarily, the growth of Russian tactical nuclear
weapons and other nuclear weapons systems, which the Kremlin is
fielding for potential use in military contingencies in Europe, but
which are not covered by the New START Treaty or the INF Treaty?
Answer. Diplomatically, the United States remains committed to
pursuing future negotiations with Russia to increase transparency of
and reduce the threat posed by Russia's nonstrategic nuclear weapons if
conditions permit, provided that the outcome would improve the security
of the United States and its allies and partners. The United States
remains committed to consulting closely with NATO Allies and will take
into account NATO requirements in the context of any discussions with
Russia on nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Arms control requires a willing
partner and a conducive strategic environment. Russia has repeatedly
refused to engage in discussions related to its nonstrategic nuclear
forces. When this issue has been raised with Russia in the past, it has
routinely imposed preconditions on any such discussion. These
conditions are unacceptable to the United States and its allies.
Militarily, the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review calls for the
development of two U.S. supplemental capabilities, a low-yield
submarine launched ballistic missile and a sea-launched cruise missile,
to counter mistaken Russian perceptions of an exploitable gap in U.S.
regional deterrence capabilities. Furthermore, the U.S. pursuit of a
sea-launched cruise missile may provide incentive for Russia to
negotiate seriously a reduction of its tactical nuclear weapons.
Question. Was the future of the New START treaty discussed during
the drafting of the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review?
Answer. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) states that the
United States is committed to implementing the New START Treaty and
continuing to verify Russian compliance. It also notes that the Treaty
may be extended, by mutual agreement, until 2026. The NPR does not take
a position on whether to support an extension, as the interagency is
currently conducting a review regarding whether extending the Treaty is
in the U.S. national security interest. The NPR does seek to ensure
that the United States is postured to field nuclear capabilities to
deter adversaries in any threat environment, including contributing to
the capacity to hedge against an uncertain future.
Question. Are there any ongoing discussions, or plans to hold
discussions, in the interagency to determine potential impacts on
nuclear modernization and whether the treaty should be extended?
Answer. Any decision whether to support extending the New START
Treaty will include an analysis of ongoing U.S. modernization efforts,
and a projection of U.S. deterrence requirements over the period of a
potential extension. It is critical that we maintain the ability to
meet our deterrence and assurance objectives. Constraining adversaries'
arsenals through arms control agreements remains a potential tool to
help achieve this goal.
Question. If the treaty were not to be extended, would the 2018 NPR
require a revision?
Answer. No. The 2018 NPR focused on ensuring U.S. nuclear
capabilities are flexible, adaptable, and resilient. It is strategy
driven and provides guidance for the nuclear force structure and policy
requirements needed now and in the future to maintain peace and
stability in a rapidly shifting environment with significant future
uncertainty.
ctbt
Some experts have suggested that the Russians, and perhaps also the
Chinese, have conducted low-yield events, skirting the definition of a
test in the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).
Question. Has Russia or China ever conducted any nuclear weapons-
related events or testing that circumvents the spirit or the letter of
the CTBT?
Answer. Neither Russia nor China has publicly defined the scope of
its unilateral nuclear testing moratoria. Thus, it is difficult to
assess the compliance of any testing activities with either country's
moratorium.
Question. Does the State Department view Russia's or China's
nuclear weapons-related events or testing activities as violating
either the spirit or the letter of the CTBT?
Answer. Neither Russia nor China has publicly defined the scope of
its unilateral nuclear testing moratoria. Thus, it is difficult to
assess the compliance of any testing activities with either country's
moratorium. Any activities conducted in accordance with the U.S.
definition of its nuclear weapons explosive test moratorium would be
viewed as consistent with spirit and letter of the CTBT.
russian chemical weapon attacks
The United Kingdom has formally accused the Russian Federation of
being behind the chemical weapons attack with the Novichok nerve agent
that targeted Sergey Skripal and his daughter in Salisbury, England,
severely injuring both of them and resulting in the death of two other
U.K. citizens.
Question. Does the United States agree with Britain's assessment
that the Russian Federation is behind the Novichok nerve agent attack
in Salisbury?
Answer. The United States agrees with the U.K.'s assessment that
Russia is responsible for the use of chemical weapons on U.K. soil.
Only Russia has the motive, means, and record to conduct such an
attack. Russia developed the class of military-grade nerve agents of
the type used in Salisbury and has a record of conducting state-
sponsored assassinations. We also have full confidence in the
evidentiary basis for the U.K.'s indictment against the two suspects
identified by U.K.'s authorities as officers from the Russian military
intelligence service, also known as the GRU, and that this operation
was almost certainly approved at a senior government level. We have
already taken action together to disrupt the activities of the GRU
through the largest collective expulsion of undeclared intelligence
officers.
Question. Does the United States assess the Russian Federation, a
signatory to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), to be in compliance
with or violation of the CWC?
Answer. The United States has certified to Congress that Russia is
in non-compliance with its obligations under the Chemical Weapons
Convention for declaration of its: (1) chemical weapon production
facilities; (2) CW development facilities; and (3) CW stockpiles. The
Russian-perpetrated attack with a military-grade nerve agent in
Salisbury further reinforces our long-standing view that Russia is not
in compliance with its obligations under the CWC. In light of the
extraordinary, urgent and grave nature of the attack in the U.K., this
event was addressed in the State Department's 2018 Report on Adherence
to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament
Agreements and Commitments.
Question. Is it accurate that the Kim regime's assassination of Kim
Jong-un's half-brother, Kim Jong-nam, using chemical weapons influenced
or was a factor in the United States's decision to relist North Korea
as a state sponsor of terrorism?
Answer. On November 20, 2017, the Secretary of State designated the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) as a State Sponsor of
Terrorism. The Secretary determined that the Government of the DPRK has
repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism, as the
DPRK has been implicated in assassinations on foreign soil. These
terrorist acts are in keeping with the DPRK's wider range of dangerous
and malicious behavior, including continued nuclear and ballistic
missile testing and development as well as Kim Jong Un's threats
against American cities and territories and those of our allies.
Question. Given that the Russian Federation, like North Korea, has
used chemical weapons against political opponents, and give Putin's
support for Syria's Assad regime--itself designated as a state sponsor
of terrorism--is the Administration considering adding Russia to the
list of state sponsors of terrorism?
Answer. As a matter of law, in order for any country to be
designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, the Secretary of State must
determine after a careful review of all available evidence that the
government of that country has repeatedly provided support for acts of
international terrorism. The State Department consistently reviews all
of the available information and intelligence, from a variety of
sources; it is an ongoing process and all information is evaluated in
its entirety and must be credible, verified, and corroborated. The U.S.
government has already taken a number of significant and effective
steps to indicate our concern about and respond to Russian aggression
and destabilizing behavior. We will continue applying pressure until
Russia chooses to become a responsible member of the international
community.
__________
Responses of Hon. Andrea L. Thompson to Questions Submitted by
Senator Robert Menendez
open skies treaty
From September 2-10, 2018, experts from the United States and 22
other States Parties met in Russia for the Certification of Russia's
Tu-214 Open Skies aircraft and its associated sensor. This was the same
sensor the United States previously determined in 2016 met the treaty
requirements. At the meeting, all other treaty parties approved the
sensor expect the United States, which declined to do so. The United
States then apparently back tracked on its decision and certified the
Russian aircraft.
Question. Did the United States consult our allies before the
September meeting about our decision not to certify the plane at that
time?
Answer. The United States closely collaborated with our Allies and
partners in the Open Skies Treaty throughout the 120-plus day
certification process, to include on the ground in Russia during the
final Certification Event from September 2-10, 2018.
Question. How did the State Department specifically come to the
decision not to certify the plane? And why did it reverse this
decision?
Answer. At the conclusion of the Certification Event on September
10, the United States declined to sign the final certification report,
citing ongoing discussions in Washington. We made clear that this did
not preclude the United States from certifying the Russian aircraft
following the completion of those discussions. Subsequently, the United
States informed all States Parties on September 18, via formal Open
Skies Treaty mechanisms, that we would approve the certification of the
Russian aircraft.
Question. What legal and technical issues were identified for not
certifying the plane?
Answer. The United States did not sign the Certification Report for
Russia's aircraft on September 10, stating that further discussions in
Washington were required. On September 18, we informed all States
Parties that we would certify the Russian aircraft and on September 24,
the United States signed the Certification Report on the margins of the
Open Skies Consultative Commission plenary meeting in Vienna. All 23
states participating in the certification event concluded that the
Russian aircraft and its associate sensor met the Treaty's requirements
for certification.
Question. Is the United States seeking to use certification
decisions as a political tool to put pressure on Russia for its Open
Skies violations? Would the United States be in violation of our legal
obligation under the Open Skies treaty if we held up certification of
aircraft and associated sensors without a technical justification for
our decision?
Answer. Under the Open Skies Treaty certifications follow a
technical process intended to ensure, through extensive and intrusive
inspections, that the aircraft and sensor combination being presented
for certification meets the relevant requirements of the Treaty. The
United States has not linked its position on such certifications to the
resolution of Russia's violations of the Treaty.
Question. In your testimony in front of the committee U/S Thompson,
you stated that the United States has not brought up Russia's newly
unveiled systems with the Russian Federation in the Bilateral
Consultative Commission. Would you like to correct the record on that
issue?
Answer. The United States has raised questions related to the
systems unveiled during President Putin's March 1 address with Russian
officials in the appropriate fora. The Administration is happy to
provide additional detail in a classified setting.
Question. Has the United States assessed which of the systems
President Putin unveiled in March 2018 would be constrained by New
START?
Answer. The following categories of strategic offensive arms are
subject to the New START Treaty's central limits and verification
provisions: ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. Regarding new kinds of
strategic offensive arms, the New START Treaty states in Article V
that, ``When a Party believes that a new kind of strategic offensive
arm is emerging, that Party shall have the right to raise the question
of such a strategic offensive arm for consideration in the Bilateral
Consultative Commission.'' As provided in Section I of Part Six of the
Protocol to the Treaty, it is within the authority of the Bilateral
Consultative Commission to ``[r]esolve questions related to the
applicability of provisions of the Treaty to a new kind of strategic
offensive arm.'' The United States is in the process of engaging the
Russian Federation on whether the new systems announced by President
Putin qualify as ``new kinds'' of strategic offensive arms, and if so,
whether and how New START Treaty provisions would apply to these
systems.
Question. Has the United States assessed whether the new Russian
systems unveiled in March 2018 will be deployed during the lifetime of
New START?
Answer. I defer to the Intelligence Community's assessment on this
topic.
Question. Has the United States assessed when Russia's newly
unveiled systems are likely to be fielded and deployed by the Russian
military?
Answer. I defer to the Intelligence Community's assessment on this
topic.
Question. As part of our pressure campaign to push the Russian
Federation back into compliance, has the United States called upon
Russia to halt production of the 9M729?
Answer. Yes. The Administration is happy to provide additional
detail in a classified briefing.
Question. Has the Russian Federation halted production of the
9M729?
Answer. No, to our knowledge the Russian Federation has taken no
steps to return to compliance. The Administration is happy to provide
additional detail in a classified briefing.
Question. Has the United States asked Russia to provide an
exhibition of the 9M729 so U.S. experts can review its technical
characteristics and determine whether it can fly more than 500km, which
would violate the treaty?
Answer. Yes. The Administration is happy to provide additional
detail in a classified briefing.
Question. Has the Russian government put forward any proposals to
address the United States concerns about the 9M729?
Answer. No.
Question. Has the United States scheduled another meeting of the
Special Verification Commission (SVC) or a bilateral meeting with
Russia to discuss a diplomatic solution to Russia's INF violation?
Answer. There are no meetings specifically on INF scheduled at this
time. The Administration regularly raises Russia's INF Treaty violation
and other noncompliance issues in appropriate meetings with Russian
officials.
Question. The United States and Russia held a first round of
strategic stability talks last September in Helsinki. These talks in
the past have been critical for reducing the risk of nuclear conflict.
Does the administration support a resumption of strategic stability
talks?
Answer. At their meeting in Helsinki earlier this year, President
Trump and President Putin directed their respective national security
advisors to continue discussions on issues relevant to easing tensions
in the U.S.-Russia relationship and to explore cooperation in areas of
mutual interest. As Ambassador Bolton stated after meeting his Russian
counterpart, Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev, in August,
the two sides discussed a number of issues, including some related to
strategic stability. This was just one example of the various fora
where the United States and Russia discuss matters relating to
strategic stability. We will continue these discussions as appropriate
in the interest of U.S. national security.
Question. Has Russia indicated whether they support resumption of
the talks?
Answer. At their meeting in Helsinki earlier this year, President
Trump and President Putin directed their respective national security
advisors to continue discussions on issues relevant to easing tensions
in the U.S.-Russia relationship and to explore cooperation in areas of
mutual interest. As Ambassador Bolton stated after meeting his Russian
counterpart, Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev, in August,
the two sides discussed a number of issues, including some related to
strategic stability. This was just one example of the various fora
where the United States and Russia discuss matters relating to
strategic stability. We will continue these discussions as appropriate
in the interest of U.S. national security.
Question. In future strategic stability talks will the United
States raise hypersonic delivery systems and cyberattacks as potential
dangers to strategic stability?
Answer. The Administration acknowledges the danger of hypersonic
delivery vehicles and cyber-attacks to U.S. security. The United States
and Russia will discuss appropriate security topics at the appropriate
time.
missile defense review
Question. The Missile Defense Review mandated by Congress was
originally scheduled for release alongside the Nuclear Posture Review
in February. However, Congress has still not received a copy of this
report. When will the Administration publish its Missile Defense
Review?
Answer. The MDR is nearing completion, but we refer you to the
Department of Defense for the precise timing of its release.
Question. What has delayed the process?
Answer. The Administration's efforts to prepare the MDR have been
very thorough and comprehensive in order to produce a document in line
with the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and
the Nuclear Posture Review. These efforts have taken longer than
planned.
Question. Do you agree there is an interrelationship between
strategic offensive arms and defensive strategic arms?
Answer. The Preamble of the New START Treaty contains a statement
acknowledging the interrelationship of strategic offensive and
strategic defensive arms.
Question. Have U.S. strategic missile defense deployments
influenced the size, capabilities, and posture of Russian and Chinese
nuclear forces since the United States withdrew from the ABM treaty?
Answer. Russia and China are completing long-term modernization
programs for their strategic nuclear forces and developing a range of
technologies to ensure the viability of their strategic deterrents. The
overall objectives and initiation of these modernization programs are
not premised on U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.
U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) is defensive in nature. The
United States has been open and transparent and stressed that our
missile defenses are not directed against Russia or China and will not
undermine Russia's or China's strategic deterrence capabilities.
The threat to the populations, territory, and forces of the United
States and its friends and allies, posed by the proliferation of
ballistic missiles continues to increase, and missile defense forms
part of a broader response to counter it. U.S. BMD, along with the BMD
of friends and allies, enhances regional stability by countering the
coercive power of ballistic missiles.
__________
Responses of Hon. Andrea L. Thompson to Questions Submitted by
Senator Edward J. Markey
new start treaty
In comments just a few weeks ago, National Security Advisor Bolton
said the Trump administration is ``very, very early in the process of
considering'' what it wants to do about the New START Treaty:
Question. Is this the first time since the Trump administration
came into office in January 2017 that the State Department is reviewing
its position with regard to the New START Treaty? If so, why is the
Trump administration just starting its review now? If not, why is the
Trump administration re-reviewing its position with regard to New
START?
Answer. The Administration is committed to implementing the New
START Treaty, as stated in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review--a DoD-led
interagency process in which the Department of State participated. The
Administration is currently reviewing whether to extend the New START
Treaty beyond its scheduled expiration on February 5, 2021. The
Administration began reviewing the status of all arms control treaties
and agreement in January 2017, including the New START Treaty. The
Administration initially focused on assessing Russia's current
compliance with the New START Treaty, assessing Russian progress toward
meeting the central limits by the February 2018 deadline, and Russia's
compliance with other treaties and agreements. Now that we assess that
Russia met the central limits by the February 2018 deadline, the
Administration is focused on monitoring Russia's on-going
implementation of the New START Treaty and other treaties.
Question. What specifically is being reviewed in the ``process'' to
which Ambassador Bolton referred? What is the timeline for completion
of this review?
Answer. The Administration is assessing the value, risks, and
consequences to U.S. national security of either extending the New
START Treaty beyond February 5, 2021, or not extending it. The Treaty
expires on that date unless it is extended for up to five years by
mutual agreement between the United States and Russia. There is no
timeline for the completion of this review.
Question. Recognizing that the State Department is one of many
parties that participates in interagency national security decision-
making, what specifically is the State Department's position with
regard to the New START Treaty? Does the State Department believe the
New START Treaty is in the national security interest of the United
States? If so, will the State Department recommend to the National
Security Council that the United States seek extension of the New START
Treaty?
Answer. The United States and Russia are in compliance with their
New START Treaty obligations. In February of this year, both countries
met the Treaty's central limits. The United States benefits from the
Treaty's 18 annual on-site inspections, notifications, and biannual
data exchanges, which give us insight into the number of Russia's
strategic offensive arms subject to the Treaty and where they are at
any given time. We are committed to implementing the Treaty and
verifying Russian compliance.
Question. Does the State Department believe the New START Treaty is
in the national security interest of the United States? If so, will the
State Department recommend to the National Security Council that the
United States seek extension of the New START Treaty?
Answer. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review affirmed the United States
will continue to implement the New START Treaty and verify Russian
compliance. Any decision on supporting an extension of New START beyond
2021 will take into context Russia's behavior in other arms control
agreements, as well as the security needs of the United States and its
allies. Russia's continued compliance with New START is an absolute
requirement for any potential extension of the Treaty, and we continue
to assess the value, risks, and consequences to U.S. national security
of either extending the New START Treaty or not extending it.
Question. What are the diplomatic consequences of not extending the
New START Treaty? If New START were to expire, how does the State
Department anticipate America's partners and allies in Europe and
elsewhere around the world would react?
Answer. As observed in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, the United
States is committed to arms control efforts that advance U.S, allied,
and partner security; are verifiable and enforceable; and include
partners that comply responsibly with their obligations. All U.S.
allies support implementation of the New START Treaty. Any decision
regarding a potential extension of the New START Treaty will take into
account allied and partner views.
intermediate range nuclear forces (inf) treaty
Last December the Trump administration announced ``new diplomatic,
military, and economic measures intended to induce'' Russia ``to return
to compliance'' with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty
and ``to deny it any military advantage should it persist in its
violation.'' This included beginning research on ``concepts and options
for conventional, ground-launched, intermediate-range missile
systems:''
Question. What is the status of the diplomatic efforts referred to?
What specific efforts has the State Department undertaken to mobilize
European partners and allies to put multilateral pressure on Russia to
return to compliance with its INF obligations?
Answer. Since 2013, the United States has sought to induce Russia
to return to full, verifiable compliance with the Treaty. In December
2017, the United States announced its Integrated Strategy to pressure
Russia to return to compliance while ensuring through coordinated
action with allies and partners that Russia does not gain a military
advantage from its violation.
The United States has sought a diplomatic resolution through all
viable channels, including the INF Treaty's Special Verification
Commission (SVC) established to ``resolve questions relating to
compliance with the obligations assumed.'' The SVC most recently met
December 12-14, 2017, and previously November 16-18, 2016. The SVC
includes Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, United States, and Ukraine--the
Treaty parties who agreed to continue participation in this
implementation body after the fall of the Soviet Union. The diplomatic
effort has also included bilateral meetings, including a technical
experts meeting on June 20-21, 2018. In addition, the United States
strives to keep allies informed of our efforts to pressure Russia to
return to compliance with the Treaty. This is evidenced by a December
2017 North Atlantic Council statement concerning Russia's INF
compliance, and a statement on the INF Treaty in the Brussels Summit
Declaration this summer with the strongest Alliance language to date on
NATO's concerns with Russia's compliance with the Treaty.
A more detailed accounting of specific engagements on the INF
Treaty with allies and Russia is contained in the relevant portions of
the classified version of the Report on Noncompliance by the Russian
Federation with its Obligations under the INF Treaty delivered
quarterly to Congress.
Question. Is the INF Treaty in the U.S. national security interest?
Answer. The Administration believes the INF Treaty is in the U.S.
national security interest if all parties are in compliance with their
obligations.
Question. When will State Department representatives next meet with
Russian counterparts to discuss how to resolve Russia's current
noncompliance with the INF Treaty?
Answer. There are no meetings specifically on INF scheduled at this
time. The Administration regularly raises Russia's INF Treaty violation
and other noncompliance issues in appropriate meetings with Russian
officials.
Question. Has the State Department been instructed to ask European
allies and partners to consider hosting a potential U.S. ground-
launched, intermediate-range missile system? Have any European allies
or partners volunteered to do so?
Answer. No.
open skies treaty
On September 10, 2018 the United States refused to certify the new
Russian Tu-214 aircraft for flights under the Treaty on Open Skies. At
the time, the United States was the only country to vote against
certification. You represented that the reason for this vote was that
U.S. experts wanted more time to review additional data before making a
final decision:
Question. Who made the decision that additional data was needed
before the United States could certify Russia's new aircraft? What
specific data was reviewed and why wasn't this information available to
the United States before the September 10 meeting?
Answer. Technical experts from the United States and 22 other
States Parties participated in the Certification Event for Russia's Tu-
214 aircraft from September 2-10, 2018. At its conclusion, the United
States declined to consent to the certification due to ongoing
discussions in Washington. No additional data was required from the
Russian Federation at that time. On September 18, the United States
informed all States Parties that it would certify Russia's aircraft.
Question. What instructions did you provide to the State Department
delegation before departing Washington, DC to attend the September 10,
2018 meeting regarding certification of Russia's new Open Skies
aircraft? Was the delegation specifically instructed to refuse to
certify the aircraft and collect additional data, or was that decision
made later?
Answer. Prior to the certification team's departure to Russia to
participate in the Certification Event, the Senior U.S. Representative
received technical guidance for U.S. participation in the inspection of
Russia's aircraft and sensor. Prior to the signing ceremony on
September 10, the U.S. team was instructed not to sign the
Certification Report, pending further discussions in Washington.
Question. Before the vote, did the United States give our European
partners or allies like France or Canada or the U.K. and warning of our
planned objection? If so, how far in advance?
Answer. The United States closely collaborated with our Allies and
partners in the Open Skies Treaty throughout the 120-plus day
certification process, to include on the ground in Russia during the
final Certification Event from September 2-10, 2018.
Question. In the State Department's view, is the Open Skies Treaty
in the U.S. national security interest?
Answer. Yes, the Department continues to believe the Open Skies
Treaty is in the national security interest of the United States. The
Treaty contributes to stability through the transparency and confidence
building it provides among its 34 States Parties. This is particularly
important during this time of increased tensions in Europe.
emerging technologies
Question. Emerging technologies--such as hypersonic weapons and
artificial intelligence--may potentially impact strategic stability.
The science and technology behind these weapons is advancing rapidly,
while the policy and diplomatic conversation is not. What discussions
is the State Department having within the U.S. government to develop a
diplomatic strategy for engaging with Russia, China, and others on how
these weapons intersect with America's national security and foreign
policy? Have you raised the possibility of discussing these issues with
Russia, China, or others? Could our strategic stability talks with
Russia provide a good platform for having these discussions?
Answer. You are correct. Emerging technologies such as hypersonic
weapons, artificial intelligence, and others, could have the potential
to impact strategic stability. This was a driver behind Secretary
Pompeo's June 30, 2018, decision to create a new Cyberspace Security
and Emerging Technology Bureau that would report to the Under Secretary
for Arms Control and International Security. This Bureau will oversee
the Department's efforts to pursue international engagements, in
bilateral and multilateral venues, to advance U.S. national security
interests in these areas. The Department will be raising these issues
with our foreign counterparts as opportunities become available, to
include potentially at strategic stability talks.
Question. Both the State and Defense Departments appear to support
resuming our strategic stability talks with Russia. John Rood,
undersecretary of defense for policy, said July 20 at the Aspen
Security Forum said that, ``we would also like to talk more about
strategic stability, making sure there are clear understandings between
the United States and Russia about these terribly lethal weapons that
we both control and talk about the future of nonproliferation.''
Despite a Presidential summit and meeting between our national security
advisors, no new talks have been scheduled. Why?
Answer. At their meeting in Helsinki earlier this year, President
Trump and President Putin directed their respective national security
advisors to continue discussions on issues relevant to easing tensions
in the U.S.-Russia relationship and to explore cooperation in areas of
mutual interest. As Ambassador Bolton stated after meeting his Russian
counterpart, Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev, in August,
the two sides discussed a number of issues, including some related to
strategic stability. This was just one example of the various fora
where the United States and Russia discuss matters relating to
strategic stability. We will continue these discussions as appropriate
in the interest of U.S. national security.
Question. When does the State Department estimate the next round of
strategic stability talks will occur? Who does the State Department
anticipate will lead the U.S. and Russian delegations to these talks?
Answer. At their meeting in Helsinki earlier this year, President
Trump and President Putin directed their respective national security
advisors to continue discussions on issues relevant to easing tensions
in the U.S.-Russia relationship and to explore cooperation in areas of
mutual interest. As Ambassador Bolton stated after meeting his Russian
counterpart, Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev, in August,
the two sides discussed a number of issues, including some related to
strategic stability. This was just one example of the various fora
where the United States and Russia discuss matters relating to
strategic stability. We will continue these discussions as appropriate
in the interest of U.S. national security.
Question. The Trump administration has repeatedly asserted that
Russia has adopted a policy of escalate to de-escalate--a doctrine in
which they would use a nuclear weapon to end a conventional conflict
they were losing. Has the State Department explicitly asked its
counterparts in either the Russian Ministry of Defense, the Russian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or the Russian military about this
supposed doctrine? If not, why not?
Answer. As explained in the Administration's 2018 Nuclear Posture
Review, Russian strategy and doctrine emphasize the potential coercive
and military uses of nuclear weapons. Russia mistakenly assesses that
the threat of nuclear escalation or actual first use of nuclear weapons
would serve to ``de-escalate'' a conflict on terms favorable to Russia.
These mistaken perceptions increase the prospect for dangerous
miscalculation and escalation.
The United States has discussed the Nuclear Posture Review with
Russia, and has regularly expressed concerns regarding Russia's nuclear
strategy and doctrine to Russian officials. As the two countries hold
the preponderance of the world's nuclear weapons, we have to manage our
relations by adopting responsible nuclear doctrines to avoid
unnecessary conflict and maintain strategic stability.
Question. The Trump administration began talks earlier this year on
a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia. In May,
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo told this committee that ``we have told
them [Saudi Arabia] we want a gold-standard Section 123 Agreement from
them.'' What is the status of the administration's negotiations with
Saudi Arabia on a possible 123 agreement?
Answer. The United States and Saudi Arabia have been in
negotiations for a 123 agreement since 2012, and the negotiations
remain ongoing.
Question. The Atomic Energy Act, which is a U.S. law, requires the
President to keep the Senate Foreign Relations Committee ``fully and
currently informed of any initiative or negotiations relating to a new
or amended agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation.'' Does the State
Department feel it is meeting this standard?
Answer. The Department of State is committed to keeping the
relevant committees informed of the status of all 123 Agreement
negotiations, consistent with the Department's statutory obligations
under the Atomic Energy Act, as amended. Department officials would be
available to brief interested Committee Members in a classified setting
at an appropriate time.
Question. In the wake of President Trump's decision to unilaterally
withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal, Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister
Adel al-Jubeir told CNN that ``if Iran acquires a nuclear capability,
we will do everything we can to do the same.'' These remarks echo
similar comments by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in March.
When asked about al-Jubier's comment, the White House press secretary
said, ``Right now, I don't know that we have a specific policy
announcement on that front, but I can tell you that we are very
committed to making sure that Iran does not have nuclear weapons.''
Does the administration support the longstanding, bipartisan U.S.
policy to actively work against the spread of nuclear weapons to any
country, friend or foe, or does the administration's silence on these
threats indicate a change to this policy? If no, then why haven't we
spoken out against Saudi Arabia's comments? Are we somehow okay with
Saudi Arabia potentially pursuing nuclear weapons?
Answer. Saudi Arabia is a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) and a strong security partner of the United States. As an
NPT Party, Saudi Arabia has a legal obligation never to acquire nuclear
weapons and to apply full scope IAEA safeguards to all peaceful nuclear
activities. The United States remains firmly committed to the global
nuclear nonproliferation regime and to preventing the further spread of
nuclear weapons, and attaches great importance to Saudi Arabia's
continued fulfillment of all of its nonproliferation obligations,
including those under the NPT. In addition, the United States is
committed to working cooperatively with Saudi Arabia to address the
full range of Iranian malign activities, which pose a serious threat to
security and stability in the region.
nuclear non-proliferation (npt) treaty
Question. In the spring of 2020, the parties of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty will meet for the Treaty's Review Conference. What
will the United States present as a demonstration of its commitment to
its obligations under Article V of the Treaty?
Answer. Article V of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT) deals with the peaceful applications of nuclear
explosions. This provision has never been invoked. In light of efforts
to maintain a worldwide moratorium on all nuclear test explosions,
Article V has little practical relevance.
Question. Why hasn't the Administration pursued the ratification of
the three Protocols to various Nuclear Weapons Free Zones that are
currently available for consideration here in the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee?
Answer. The United States has historically supported Nuclear
Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) treaties as a way for regional states to
advance regional security and to reinforce the global nuclear
nonproliferation regime and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons. NWFZ treaties and their accompanying protocols provide
a vehicle for extending to NWFZ treaty parties a legally binding
negative security assurance. The United States has signed the protocols
to the NWFZ treaties covering Africa, Central Asia, and the South
Pacific, and the previous Administration submitted them to the U.S.
Senate for advice and consent to ratification. The Trump Administration
has not completed its policy review with respect to these protocols.
missile defense review
Question. Do U.S. missile defense policies have an effect on
strategic stability matters and can those policies have a deleterious
effect on arms control?
Answer. Missile defense systems are not destabilizing. Russia
develops, deploys, and is modernizing its own strategic and regional
missile defense capabilities. Missile defenses provide a capability to
protect the U.S. homeland, our deployed forces, and our allies and
partners. The current limited numbers of interceptors deployed world-
wide do not compare to the thousands of missiles employed by our
adversaries. For example, our homeland missile defense system
consisting of 44 deployed Ground-Based Interceptors, is no match for
Russia's deterrent force of 700 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy
bombers, and 1550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads. Our homeland
missile defense system is not designed to counter Russia's
sophisticated ballistic missiles; it is designed to defeat ballistic
missile threats posed by countries like North Korea and potentially
Iran. For these reasons, our limited homeland missile defenses pose no
threat to Russia's nuclear deterrent and do not have a deleterious
effect on arms control.
Question. To what extent has the Department of State been involved
in the formation of the Missile Defense Review? Are there State
representatives present at all meetings related to the formation of the
Missile Defense Review? Have you personally been involved in the
formation of the Missile Defense Review?
Answer. State representatives up to the level of the Deputy
Secretary have participated in the Missile Defense Review process,
including interagency meetings overseeing and approving the drafting of
the Review. Since my confirmation as Under Secretary for Arms Control
and International Security earlier this year, I have been personally
involved in the Missile Defense Review and have had oversight of the
Department of State's participation in the Review process.
missile defense review
Question. Have our allies been informed about current deliberations
surrounding the Missile Defense Review? Will they be briefed in advance
of the release?
Answer. The Departments of State and Defense consulted with allies
and partners during the MDR process. We are also collaborating on a
plan for rolling out the MDR, which includes briefings to Congress as
well as to allies and partners.
__________
Responses of Hon. Andrea L. Thompson to Questions Submitted by
Senator Jeff Merkley
Question. Do you agree that it is vital that the United States and
Russia continue to cooperate on issues related to nuclear weapons, even
as bilateral relations have deteriorated due to a range of Russian bad
behaviors?
Answer. Yes. In Helsinki, the leaders of the United States and
Russia affirmed the importance of continuing discussion on nuclear
issues, given that our two countries hold the preponderance of the
world's nuclear weapons and have a duty to manage our relations
responsibly.
Question. In March, President Putin publicly announced the
development of three new types of nuclear weapons that are either
purported under development or in a testing phase--a hypersonic nuclear
armed cruise missile, a new heavy ICBM, and an underwater drone. Would
these systems be accountable under the New START Treaty if they are
tested to a range of greater than 5,500 kilometers? Would extending New
START provide the United States greater transparency into these
concerning, new strategic systems?
Answer. The United States has raised questions related to the
systems unveiled during President Putin's March 1 address with Russian
officials in the appropriate fora. The Administration is happy to
provide additional detail in a classified setting.
Question. Would the predictability and value to our defense
intelligence community relating to U.S. insight into the number,
movement and disposition of Russian strategic forces be lost if the New
START Treaty was allowed to expire in 2021? Would conclusion of a
treaty or agreement that has no verification regime--along the lines of
the 2002 Moscow Treaty--provide the same level of insight that is
presently offered by New START?
Answer. We refer you to the Intelligence Community for its views on
the predictability and value of the current treaty.
Should the Treaty expire, U.S. inspectors would lose their current
access to Russian strategic nuclear warheads and delivery systems,
bases, and infrastructure, as well as the Treaty's biannual exchange of
data and associated updates on the location and status of Russia's
strategic offensive arms subject to the Treaty. Should New START expire
and the United States and Russia enter into an agreement that has a
less robust verification regime, it would not provide the same level of
insight into Russian systems as the New START Treaty's verification
regime.
Question. Is the administration undertaking a review of the risks
to national security if New START expires? If so, when we can we
anticipate its completion?
Answer. The Administration is undertaking a review of whether
extending the New START Treaty is in the U.S. national security
interest. This review includes analyzing how the Treaty's expiration
would impact U.S. national security. The Treaty does not expire until
February 5, 2021, and there is no timeline for the review's completion.
Question. The 2013 U.S. Nuclear Employment Strategy states that the
United States could seek up to a 1/3 reduction in its deployed
strategic forces below New START and still ``ensure the security of the
United States and our allies and our partners.'' Is that still the U.S.
position?
Answer. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) describes how the
global security environment has deteriorated in recent years and
highlights the return of Great Power competition. In his preface to the
2018 NPR, Secretary Mattis stated ``we must recognize that the current
environment makes further progress toward nuclear arms reductions in
the near term extremely challenging.'' While affirming arms control as
a tool that can contribute to maintaining strategic stability, the NPR
states ``progress is difficult to envision, however, in an environment
that is characterized by nuclear-armed states seeking to change borders
and overturn existing norms, and by significant, continuing non-
compliance with existing arms control obligations and commitments.''
Question. Has the administration presented Russia with a roadmap
detailing the steps Russia must take to return to compliance with the
INF treaty?
Answer. Yes. The Administration is happy to provide additional
detail in a classified briefing.
Question. Do the other Parties to the Treaty--Kazakhstan, Ukraine,
Belarus--as well as NATO allies support efforts to fix and strengthen
the INF Treaty?
Answer. Yes. Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus, the other INF
Parties who still participate in the Treaty's Special Verification
Commission, have recently reaffirmed their commitment to the Treaty.
NATO allies have spoken on the need to preserve the INF Treaty as
well, including by noting in this summer's Brussels Summit Declaration
that the Treaty ``has been crucial to Euro-Atlantic security'' and that
the Alliance remains ``fully committed to the preservation of this
landmark arms control treaty.''
Additionally, NATO maintains ``full compliance with the Treaty is
essential,'' and that the United States is in compliance with its
obligations under the INF Treaty. NATO notes in this Declaration ``in
the absence of any credible answer from Russia on this new missile, the
most plausible assessment would be that Russia is in violation of the
Treaty,'' and urges greater transparency by Russia in addressing U.S.
concerns.
Question. Is it still the U.S. Government's assessment that Iran
has complied with its obligations under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action (JCPOA) as is stated in the 2017 State Department Annual
Compliance Report, submitted to Congress in April 2018?
Answer. As reported by the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), Iran continues to implement its commitments under the JCPOA. As
President Trump has made clear, however, we view the JCPOA as a flawed
deal. Following U.S. withdrawal from the arrangement on May 8, we are
therefore seeking to impose maximum pressure on Iran to bring it back
to the negotiating table in order to conclude a comprehensive agreement
that resolves, not just the nuclear proliferation threats left
unaddressed by the JCPOA but indeed the totality of Iran's malign
conduct.
__________
Responses of Hon. Andrea L. Thompson to Questions Submitted by
Senator Cory A. Booker
strategic stability talks
The United States and Russia held a first round of strategic
stability talks last September in Helsinki. The specific agenda was not
disclosed. A second round of talks was slated to take place on March 7-
8 in Vienna, but Russia announced that it would not participate in the
talks, citing the U.S. cancellation of bilateral consultations on
cybersecurity that had been scheduled to take place in late February in
Geneva.
A follow-up meeting on Helsinki between National Security Adviser
John Bolton and his Russian counterpart, Nikolai Patrushev, in Geneva
on August 23 had been expected to lead to an agreement to resume
bilateral strategic stability talks, but no announcement occurred.
Question. Why has the administration been unable to schedule the
resumption of strategic stability talks?
Answer. At their meeting in Helsinki earlier this year, President
Trump and President Putin directed their respective national security
advisors to continue discussions on issues relevant to easing tensions
in the U.S.-Russia relationship and to explore cooperation in areas of
mutual interest. As Ambassador Bolton stated after meeting his Russian
counterpart, Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev, in August,
the two sides discussed a number of issues, including some related to
strategic stability. This was just one example of the various fora
where the United States and Russia discuss matters relating to
strategic stability. We will continue these discussions as appropriate
in the interest of U.S. national security.
Question. What is the administration's plan for restarting
strategic stability talks?
Answer. At their meeting in Helsinki earlier this year, President
Trump and President Putin directed their respective national security
advisors to continue discussions on issues relevant to easing tensions
in the U.S.-Russia relationship and to explore cooperation in areas of
mutual interest. As Ambassador Bolton stated after meeting his Russian
counterpart, Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev, in August,
the two sides discussed a number of issues, including some related to
strategic stability. This was just one example of the various fora
where the United States and Russia discuss matters relating to
strategic stability. We will continue these discussions as appropriate
in the interest of U.S. national security.
Question. What does the administration consider to be the benefits
of strategic stability talks?
Answer. At their meeting in Helsinki earlier this year, President
Trump and President Putin directed their respective national security
advisors to continue discussions on issues relevant to easing tensions
in the U.S.-Russia relationship and to explore cooperation in areas of
mutual interest. As Ambassador Bolton stated after meeting his Russian
counterpart, Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev, in August,
the two sides discussed a number of issues, including some related to
strategic stability. This was just one example of the various fora
where the United States and Russia discuss matters relating to
strategic stability. We will continue these discussions as appropriate
in the interest of U.S. national security.
Question. What are the administration's goals for future strategic
stability talks with Russia?
Answer. At their meeting in Helsinki earlier this year, President
Trump and President Putin directed their respective national security
advisors to continue discussions on issues relevant to easing tensions
in the U.S.-Russia relationship and to explore cooperation in areas of
mutual interest. As Ambassador Bolton stated after meeting his Russian
counterpart, Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev, in August,
the two sides discussed a number of issues, including some related to
strategic stability. This was just one example of the various fora
where the United States and Russia discuss matters relating to
strategic stability. We will continue these discussions as appropriate
in the interest of U.S. national security.
Question. If New START is not extended, do you acknowledge that
modernization plans risk losing the support of many in Congress?
Answer. The Administration is reviewing whether it will extend New
START beyond 2021. Regardless of the outcome of this review, fully
funding the modernization of our nuclear forces is essential to
ensuring that the U.S. deterrent remains credible. Congress must
continue its bipartisan support for modernizing U.S. nuclear forces to
ensure that the United States can continue to meet its deterrence and
assurance objectives. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review stated there is
no higher priority for national defense. The 2017 National Defense
Authorization Act states that the United States must ``afford the
highest priority to the modernization of the nuclear triad, dual-
capable aircraft, and related command and control elements.''
Additionally, the Administration has continued to support arms
control and disarmament efforts that enhance U.S. national security and
the security of our allies and partners. We continue efforts to
minimize the number of nuclear weapons states, deny terrorist
organizations access to nuclear weapons and materials; strictly control
weapons-usable material, related technology, and expertise; and seek
arms control agreements that enhance security, are verifiable and
enforceable. Specifically, the Administration has supported the goals
of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, completed
the reductions of strategic offensive arms under the New START Treaty,
and has continued full implementation of New START.
Question. Has the Department considered this potential outcome in
its review of the New START treaty?
Answer. Any decision regarding whether to support extending the New
START Treaty will include an analysis of ongoing U.S. modernization
efforts and a projection of U.S. deterrence requirements over the
period of a potential extension. It is critical that we maintain the
ability to meet our deterrence and assurance requirements. As affirmed
by the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, constraining potential adversaries'
arsenals through arms control agreements remains a tool to help achieve
this goal.
__________
Responses of Hon. David J. Trachtenberg to Questions Submitted by
Senator Marco Rubio
compliance issues with inf treaty and new start treaty
In a March speech, Russian President Vladimir Putin unveiled
details of new weapons supposedly under development that he described
nearly a dozen times as ``strategic'' in the Kremlin's English
translation. These new kinds of strategic nuclear arms include
hypersonic nuclear cruise missiles and nuclear-powered ballistic
missiles, and a nuclear torpedoes shot from drone submarines. I
appreciated hearing your view that some, if not all, of these new kinds
of Russian strategic nuclear arms, which are said by Putin to be under
development, could fall under the New START Treaty's limits on
strategic weapons.
Question. For the written record, I wanted to confirm whether or
not the United States has ever asked the Russians to notify these new
kinds of strategic nuclear arms, or ever otherwise discussed or raised
these systems with Russian officials, in the context of the under the
U.S.-Russian bilateral consultative commission (BCC) or via any other
channel?
Answer. The United States began raising questions related to these
new Russian systems earlier this year prior to and during the most
recent session of the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC).
Question. As you acknowledged in your testimony, Russia is
violating the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty).
Rather than own-up to its noncompliance and resolve these issues in
good faith, however, the Kremlin has repeatedly tried to change the
narrative by accusing the U.S. government of violating the INF Treaty.
What allegations are the Russians making about U.S. violations of the
INF Treaty? Is there any truth to these allegations?
Answer. The United States has attempted to address Russia's
violations with Russian officials since 2013. Thus far, Russia has
refused to engage in a substantive manner. Instead, the Russian
Federation raised allegations that falsely assert that the United
States is in violation of the INF Treaty, allegations that in two cases
were initially raised and addressed years before the United States
found Russia in violation of the INF Treaty.
Russia has accused the United States of violating the INF Treaty in
three areas: using ballistic target missiles to test missile defense
systems; armed, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs); and Aegis Ashore
missile defense system capabilities. These accusations are baseless.
The United States has always been and remains in full compliance with
all of its INF Treaty obligations. The United States has directly and
substantively refuted these allegations on multiple occasions in
meetings with Russian officials.
Question. Does the Russian government expressly acknowledge that
the United States is in full compliance with New START?
Answer. No. In its response to the U.S. Arms Control Compliance
Report for 2017, the Russian Federation expresses its view of on-going
implementation of the New START Treaty and alleges ``problems with its
implementation by the American side.'' Russia claims that the United
States achieved some of its reductions under the New START Treaty ``by
manipulations that are incorrect from the point of view of contractual
practice.'' Specifically, Russia claims that the United States
``incorrectly removed some items from New START accountability using
conversions that Russian inspectors cannot verify.''
The United States is in full compliance with its obligations under
the New START Treaty. Russia's assertions are baseless. The United
States converted and removed these items from the New START Treaty's
accountability in accordance with the Treaty's provisions. The United
States has exhaustively addressed Russia's concerns in the New START
Treaty's Bilateral Consultative Commission.
Question. Is the Russian government currently in full compliance
with the INF Treaty? And with the New START Treaty?
Answer. The Russian Federation remains in violation of its
obligations under the INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-
test a ground-launched cruise missile with a range capability of 500 to
5,500 kilometers, or to possess or produce launchers of such a missile.
The United States assesses that the Russian Federation is in
compliance with the New START Treaty.
Question. If Russia refuses to do what's required to get in full
compliance with the INF Treaty, what should the United States do in
terms of the future of the INF Treaty?
Answer. Although the Administration's current strategy for
responding to Russia's INF Treaty violation is aimed at convincing
Russia to return to compliance, the strategy also acknowledges that the
United States must be prepared for the eventuality of a world without
the INF Treaty should Russia cause the INF Treaty to fail.
As part of the U.S. Integrated Strategy for responding to the
violation, the Department of Defense has commenced INF Treaty-compliant
research and development of conventional, ground-launched,
intermediate-range missile systems that could be pursued if the INF
Treaty limits no longer exist. Should the Russian Federation's actions
result in the collapse of the INF Treaty, these efforts will prepare
the United States to better defend itself and its allies.
Question. Given Russia's ongoing noncompliance with the INF Treaty,
does it make sense to start negotiations for an extension or follow-on
to the New START Treaty before Russia comes into full compliance with
the INF Treaty?
Answer. The United States remains willing to engage in a prudent
arms control agenda. We are prepared to consider arms control
opportunities that return Parties to predictability and transparency,
and we remain receptive to future arms control negotiations if
conditions permit and the potential outcome improves the security of
the United States and its allies and partners. The United States will
continue to implement the New START Treaty fully, which complements
U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy by contributing to a transparent and
predictable strategic balance between the United States and Russia. We
will consider next steps related to the New START Treaty at the
appropriate time, taking into account Russia's compliance with its
obligations under the New START Treaty and other arms control
agreements.
Question. What strategy does the United States have for addressing,
diplomatically and militarily, the growth of Russian tactical nuclear
weapons and other nuclear weapons systems, which the Kremlin is
fielding for potential use in military contingencies in Europe, but
which are not covered by the New START Treaty or the INF Treaty?
Answer. Russia has expanded and is modernizing its strategic and
non-strategic nuclear forces. DIA estimates that Russia possesses
approximately two thousand non-strategic nuclear warheads. The
Administration has taken note of the new strategic nuclear weapons
announced by President Vladimir Putin on March 1, 2018. In addition,
Russia has rejected U.S. efforts to seek negotiated reductions in
tactical or non-strategic nuclear weapons. Russia's nuclear
modernization efforts and lack of interest in further negotiated arms
reductions highlight a dramatic deterioration of the strategic
environment that predates this Administration. The 2018 Nuclear Posture
Review recommends two supplemental nuclear capabilities to enhance the
flexibility and responsiveness of U.S. nuclear forces to respond to
this challenge: the low-yield ballistic missile and the nuclear sea-
launched cruise missile. These modest supplements to the U.S. nuclear
force will enhance deterrence by denying Russia any mistaken confidence
that limited nuclear employment could provide an advantage over the
United States or its allies and partners.
Question. Was the future of the New START treaty discussed during
the drafting of the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review?
Answer. The New START Treaty was discussed during the analysis and
drafting of the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. Both the United States and
Russia met the central limits of the New START Treaty by the February
5, 2018 deadline--three days after the Nuclear Posture Review was
released. The Administration has made no decision regarding potential
extension of the New START Treaty beyond its expiration in February
2021.
Question. Are there any ongoing discussions, or plans to hold
discussions, in the interagency to determine potential impacts on
nuclear modernization and whether the treaty should be extended?
Answer. Yes, the Administration has assessed and continues to
assess the value, risks, and consequences to U.S. national security of
either extending the New START Treaty or not extending it.
Question. If the treaty were not to be extended, would the 2018 NPR
require a revision?
Answer. Regardless of a decision whether or not to extend the New
START Treaty, the guidance laid out in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review
(NPR) would not require a revision. The NPR clearly states that the
United States is prepared to consider arms control opportunities that
return parties to compliance, predictability, and transparency, and the
United States is receptive to future arms control negotiations if
conditions permit and the potential outcome improves the security of
the United States, its allies, and partners. This guidance will be used
to guide the Administration's decision whether to extend the New START
Treaty, and will continue to be implemented after any decision is made
in order to continue to advance the security of the United States, and
its allies and partners.
ctbt
Some experts have suggested that the Russians, and perhaps also the
Chinese, have conducted low-yield events, skirting the definition of a
test in the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).
Question. Has Russia or China ever conducted any nuclear weapons-
related events or testing that circumvents the spirit or the letter of
the CTBT?
Answer. Classified response.
Question. Does the United States view Russia's or China's nuclear
weapons-related events or testing activities as violating either the
spirit or the letter of the CTBT?
Answer. Classified response.
__________
Responses of Hon. David J. Trachtenberg to Questions Submitted by
Senator Robert Menendez
open skies treaty
From September 2-10, 2018, experts from the United States and 22
other States Parties met in Russia for the Certification of Russia's
Tu-214 Open Skies aircraft and its associated sensor. This was the same
sensor the United States previously determined in 2016 met the treaty
requirements. At the meeting, all other treaty parties approved the
sensor expect the United States, which declined to do so. The United
States then apparently back tracked on its decision and certified the
Russian aircraft.
Question. Did the United States consult our allies before the
September meeting about our decision not to certify the plane at that
time?
Answer. All States participating in the certification event were
given limited advance notice that the Senior Representative of the
United States was not authorized to sign the Certification Report; that
the United States would issue an Open Skies Format 35 message within 14
days, as required by the Treaty; and that this action did not preclude
the United States from certifying the Russian aircraft and sensor
following further consultations in Washington.
Question. How did the State Department specifically come to the
decision not to certify the plane? And why did it reverse this
decision?
Answer. On September 10, 2018, the United States did not sign the
certification report due to ongoing discussions in Washington. The
United States announced its intent to certify the aircraft and sensor
on September 18, 2018, and signed the certification report on September
24, 2018. I would respectfully refer you to the Department of State for
further questions regarding their internal discussions.
Question. What legal and technical issues were identified for not
certifying the plane?
Answer. On September 10, 2018, the United States did not sign the
certification report due to ongoing discussions in Washington. Those
discussions concluded and on September 18, 2018, the United States
informed all States Parties via formal Treaty mechanisms that it would
sign the certification report for Russia's aircraft and sensor. The
United States signed the report on September 24, 2018.
Question. Is the United States seeking to use certification
decisions as a political tool to put pressure on Russia for its Open
Skies violations? Would the United States be in violation of our legal
obligation under the Open Skies treaty if we held up certification of
aircraft and associated sensors without a technical justification for
our decision?
Answer. Open Skies Treaty certifications follow a technical process
intended to ensure, through extensive and intrusive inspections, that
the aircraft and sensor combination being presented for certification
meet the relevant requirements of the Treaty. The United States has not
linked its position on such certifications to the resolution of
Russia's violations of the Treaty.
Question. Has the United States assessed which of the systems
President Putin unveiled in March 2018 would be constrained by New
START? Has the United States assessed whether the new Russian systems
unveiled in March 2018 will be deployed during the lifetime of New
START? Has the United States assessed when Russia's newly unveiled
systems are likely to be fielded and deployed by the Russian military?
Please include a classified answer to this set of questions if
necessary.
Answer. The United States has reviewed the systems President Putin
unveiled in March 2018. The Defense Intelligence Agency conducted a
highly classified assessment and the Office of the Secretary of Defense
is prepared to brief the findings and implications.
Question. As part of our pressure campaign to push the Russian
Federation back into compliance, has the United States called upon
Russia to halt production of the 9M729? Has the United States asked
Russia to provide an exhibition of the 9M729 so U.S. experts can review
its technical characteristics and determine whether it can fly more
than 500km, which would violate the treaty? Has the Russian government
put forward any proposals to address the United States concerns about
the 9M729? Has the United States scheduled another meeting of the
Special Vertification Commission (SVC) or a bilateral meeting with
Russia to discuss a diplomatic solution to Russia's INF violation?
Answer. Russia has violated core tenets of the Intermediate-range
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a
ground-launched intermediate-range cruise missile and not to possess
and produce launchers of such missiles. Russia knows what it must do to
return to compliance, but Russia has not substantively addressed U.S.
concerns in any way. We conducted three bilateral experts meetings and
two SVC meetings. No further meetings are currently scheduled.
Question. Has the United States asked Russia to provide an
exhibition of the 9M729 so U.S. experts can review its technical
characteristics and determine whether it can fly more than 500km, which
would violate the treaty?
Answer. Russia has violated core tenets of the Intermediate-range
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a
ground-launched intermediate-range cruise missile and not to possess
and produce launchers of such missiles. Russia knows what it must do to
return to compliance, but Russia has not substantively addressed U.S.
concerns in any way. We conducted three bilateral experts meetings and
two SVC meetings. No further meetings are currently scheduled.
Question. The United States and Russia held a first round of
strategic stability talks last September in Helsinki. These talks in
the past have been critical for reducing the risk of nuclear conflict.
Does the administration support a resumption of strategic stability
talks? Has Russia indicated whether they support resumption of the
talks? In future strategic stability talks will the United States raise
hypersonic delivery systems and cyberattacks as potential dangers to
strategic stability?
Answer. No further strategic stability talks are currently
scheduled, although the United States is not opposed to further
discussions. Without speculating on the agenda, hypersonic weapons and
cyberattacks are among the issues that could be discussed, were talks
to resume.
Question. The Missile Defense Review mandated by Congress was
originally scheduled for release alongside the Nuclear Posture Review
in February. However, Congress has still not received a copy of this
report. When will the Administration publish its Missile Defense
Review?
Answer. The Secretary assigns a high priority to the Missile
Defense Review (MDR) and has directed the Department to proceed with
the Review's completion and release. The report is in the final stages
of completion, and the MDR will be released in the near future. The MDR
is an important strategic document and should be released to the
Congress and the public. Thank you for support of our missile defense
programs and the warfighters who operate them.
Question. What has delayed the process?
Answer. The Department's efforts to prepare the MDR have been very
thorough and comprehensive in order to produce a document in line with
the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the
Nuclear Posture Review. The Department has also carefully taken into
account recent missile threat and technological developments.
Question. Do you agree there is an interrelationship between
strategic offensive arms and defensive strategic arms?
Answer. Both strategic offensive arms and defensive capabilities,
properly configured, sized, and postured, can promote stability by
enhancing deterrence of both conventional and nuclear war.
Question. Have U.S. strategic missile defense deployments
influenced the size, capabilities, and posture of Russian and Chinese
nuclear forces since the United States withdrew from the ABM treaty?
Please include a classified answer to this set of questions if
necessary.
Answer. There can be a number of national and strategic goals and
objectives that influence the size, capabilities, and posture of
Russian and Chinese nuclear forces as well as their missile defenses.
The composition of strategic capabilities is likely based on a
combination of these goals and objectives, rather than on a single one.
For example, Russian leaders decided that building a missile defense
system to protect Russian territory is in its strategic interests. They
deploy defenses against both long-range and shorter-range ballistic
missiles. In addition, history has shown that Russia engaged in its
most substantial buildup of strategic nuclear weapons after the ABM
Treaty was signed in 1972. That said, we have been clear about the role
and purpose of our missile defense policy. U.S. homeland missile
defenses are focused on staying ahead of rogue state ICBM threats.
These defenses are not capable of negating Russian and Chinese
strategic forces, which greatly exceed in number and capability our
homeland missile defenses. The United States relies on nuclear
deterrence to deter a potential Russian or Chinese nuclear attack.
__________
Responses of Hon. David J. Trachtenberg to Questions Submitted by
Senator Edward J. Markey
new start treaty
In comments just a few weeks ago, National Security Advisor Bolton
said the Trump administration is ``very, very early in the process of
considering'' what it wants to do about the New START Treaty.
Question. Is this the first time since the Trump administration
came into office in January 2017 that the Defense Department is
reviewing its position with regard to the New START Treaty? If so, why
is the Trump administration just starting its review now? If not, why
is the Trump administration re-reviewing its position with regard to
New START?
Answer. The Administration began reviewing the status of all arms
control treaties and agreements in January 2017, including the New
START Treaty. The Administration initially focused on assessing
Russia's current compliance with the New START Treaty, assessing
Russian progress toward achieving its reductions by the February 2018
deadline, and Russia's compliance with other treaties and agreements.
Now that we assess that Russia achieved its reductions by the February
2018 deadline, the Administration is focused on monitoring Russia's on-
going implementation of the New START Treaty and other treaties.
Question. What specifically is being reviewed at the Defense
Department in the ``process'' to which Ambassador Bolton referred? What
is the timeline for completion of this review?
Answer. The Department of Defense is focused on assessing Russia's
implementation of the New START Treaty and Russia's modernization of
its strategic forces. For example, several of the new strategic systems
announced by Russian President Putin in his speech on March 1, 2018,
meet the criteria for what the Department of Defense believes the New
START Treaty calls ``new kinds of strategic offensive arms.''
Question. The Defense Department often emphasizes how important
``stability'' and ``predictability'' are for national security. Is the
same not also true for policy? Does the military use information gained
from New START data exchanges and inspections to inform our own force
posture decisions? If so, please explain how.
Answer. The military uses a variety of information regarding
Russian nuclear forces, including New START Treaty data, to inform our
own force posture decisions. The verification procedures in New START
provide insights into Russian behavior that inform U.S. nuclear force
posture decisions. Because the security environment remains dynamic,
U.S. policy must be adaptable to changing circumstances; policies that
are not aligned with strategic realities do not protect our national
security.
Question. If New START isn't extended, what specific adjustments
will the Defense Department have to consider making to U.S. force
posture vis-a-vis Russia? How specifically would America's nuclear
forces have to be adjusted?
Answer. Recommendations regarding adjustments to the U.S. force
posture, if any are needed, would be made based on an assessment of how
changes to the Russian Federation's force posture affects our ability
to fulfill the roles nuclear weapons play in our national security
strategy. Without knowing what changes the Russians might make in the
absence of New START, it is not possible to say what adjustments would
be required.
Question. If New START expires, is there anything to stop the
Russians from moving rapidly to expand their strategic forces? Is the
U.S. military comfortable with no limits on Russia's strategic nuclear
forces? Really want to have to go nuclear weapon for nuclear weapon
with Russia?
Answer. The United States is not interested in matching Russian
nuclear forces weapon for weapon. However, regardless of the future of
the New START Treaty, the United States will do what is necessary to
maintain a credible and effective nuclear deterrent.
intermediate-range nuclear forces (inf) agreement
Last December the Trump administration announced ``new diplomatic,
military, and economic measures intended to induce'' Russia ``to return
to compliance'' with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty
and ``to deny it any military advantage should it persist in its
violation.'' This included beginning research on ``concepts and options
for conventional, ground-launched, intermediate-range missile
systems.''
Question. What is the status of these efforts and how much has DoD
spent on them to date?
Answer. For the last year, the Department of Defense has reviewed
and evaluated options for systems it could develop if it were not
constrained by the INF Treaty. The effort up to now has been largely
pre-decisional, staff-level analysis to evaluate and narrow the range
of options for candidate systems. The Department is now prepared to
begin formal research and development activities, pending appropriation
of the $48M DoD requested in Fiscal Year 2019. The Department is also
working through the budget process to ensure it has the necessary
funding to continue these efforts beyond Fiscal Year 2019. At present,
all research and development efforts remain compliant with U.S.
obligations under the INF Treaty and would only proceed to testing and
production if the INF Treaty obligations no longer exist.
Question. Is the INF Treaty in the U.S. national security interest?
Answer. The value of the INF Treaty, or any arms control treaty,
depends on all Parties remaining in compliance. Russia's violation of
the INF Treaty is a concrete threat to U.S. forces and to allies and
partners in Europe and Asia. Russia's blatant violation of the Treaty
has resulted in U.S. unilateral compliance, and calls into question the
continued viability of the Treaty. It is Russia's actions that will
ultimately determine the future of the INF Treaty.
Question. What evidence do you have to suggest that conducting
research and development on a ground-launched, intermediate-range
missile system will change Russia's behavior with regard to the its
noncompliance with the INF Treaty? If the premise of this strategy is
wrong and R&D on this possible system is completed, what will the
United States do next?
Answer. U.S. diplomatic efforts since 2013 have not resulted in any
change to Russia's behavior with regard to its violation of the INF
Treaty. Therefore, this Administration included a specific military
measure commencing INF Treaty compliant research and development aimed
at reminding Russia why it entered into the INF Treaty in the first
place. Only Russia can answer the question of whether it will choose to
alter its course as a result of this action. The United States is
seeking to preserve the INF Treaty but Russia's actions will decide its
fate. Either way, the United States will ensure its own national
security and the security of our allies and partners.
Question. Has the Defense Department been instructed to ask
European allies and partners to consider hosting a potential U.S.
ground-launched, intermediate-range missile system? Have any European
allies or partners volunteered to do so?
Answer. No, it remains too early to consider discussions on both
matters.
open skies treaty
Question. On September 10, the United States refused to certify the
new Russian Tu-214 aircraft for flights under the Treaty on Open Skies.
Did the Defense Department provide a recommendation to the State
Department and other interagency partners on whether to certify
Russia's new aircraft in advance of the September 10 meeting?
Answer. The Department of Defense was involved in the interagency
discussions regarding certification of Russia's new Open Skies
aircraft.
Question. The State Department has represented that the United
States did not certify the aircraft because U.S. experts needed more
time to review additional data before making a final decision. Was the
Defense Department consulted on that decision?
Answer. I would respectfully refer you to the Department of State
for any clarification of its representation.
Question. What additional data--if any--did the Defense Department
review subsequent to the September 10, 2018 meeting to determine
whether the United States should certify Russia's aircraft? Why wasn't
this information available to the Untied Stated before the September 10
meeting?
Answer. At the conclusion of the certification event on September
10, the United States declined to consent to the certification due to
ongoing discussions in Washington. On September 18, the United States
informed all States Parties via formal treaty mechanisms that we would
approve the certification of the Russian aircraft.
Question. Before the vote, did the United States give our European
partners or allies like France or Canada or the U.K. and warning of our
planned objection? If so, how far in advance?
Answer. All states participating in the certification event were
given limited advance notice that the Senior Representative of the
United States was not authorized to sign the Certification Report; that
the United States would issue an Open Skies Format 35 message within 14
days, as required by the Treaty; and that this action did not preclude
the United States from certifying the Russian aircraft following
further consultations in Washington.
Question. In the Defense Department's view, is the Open Skies
Treaty in the U.S. national security interest?
Answer. As Secretary Mattis stated in a letter to Senator Fischer
in May 2018, it is the Department's view that it is in our best
interest to remain a party to the Open Skies Treaty because it
contributes to greater transparency and openness. However, Russia's
actions in violation of certain provisions of the Treaty have the
opposite effect and must be challenged.
Question. What is the progress on updating our own Open Skies
aircraft to digital sensors? Was there anything, besides funding, that
prevented the United States from moving to digital sensors faster?
Answer. The Department of Defense is working within the budget and
acquisition process to update the sensors on our Open Skies aircraft.
To date, the first of two aircraft has been modified with the new
digital sensor. Testing is ongoing in preparation for Treaty
certification of the new sensor.
2018 trump administration nuclear posture review
The Trump administration has repeatedly asserted that Russia has
adopted a policy of escalate to de-escalate--a doctrine in which they
would use a nuclear weapon to end a conventional conflict they were
losing.
Question. Has the Defense Department explicitly asked its
counterparts in either the Russian Ministry of Defense, the Russian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or the Russian military about this
supposed doctrine? If not, why not?
Answer. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) has written about
Russian military doctrine and emphasized that Russia has discussed
using nuclear weapons to de-escalate a conflict. In addition, DoD
officials have directly raised this doctrinal issue with Russian
counterparts and expressed our concern about their doctrine and the
risks it presents for miscalculation.
Question. The Trump administration is pressing forward with plans
to develop the W76-2 ``low-yield'' nuclear warhead to be launched atop
the Trident D5 submarine-launched ballistic missile. Is a Trident D5
launched with a W76-2 warhead distinguishable from one with a high-
yield W76 or W88 nuclear warhead? If not, does the Defense Department
this poses any increased risk for miscalculation?
Answer. The W76-2 reduces the risk of miscalculation because it is
meant to reinforce the credibility of our response. A credible response
strengthens deterrence by denying potential adversaries the advantages
they appear to believe they could realize from nuclear first use. It
sends a signal to Russia and other potential adversaries that the
United States is serious about maintaining an unambiguously strong
nuclear deterrent.
The type of warhead is not distinguishable by observing a Trident
D5 missile launch alone. The W76-2 is intended to provide a credible
response option to a limited nuclear attack in order to strengthen
deterrence of such an attack. We are confident that a nuclear-armed
adversary that decides to use a nuclear weapon in a limited way would
anticipate that we would launch a response and that they would
correctly calculate that the launch of a single Trident D5 missile
would not be a large-scale attack.
Question. The United States already has ``low-yield'' nuclear
weapons and delivery platforms in place to deter Russian aggression.
Why are these options insufficient?
Answer. Although the United States has low-yield capable nuclear
weapons, these weapons must be delivered by aircraft, which are
vulnerable to formidable existing Russian air defenses. Russia may
conclude that it could blunt the current U.S. low-yield response and
that the United States would be self-deterred from using strategic
nuclear weapons; the W76-2 low-yield warhead is intended to dispel this
notion--however mistaken it might be.
emerging technologies
Question. Emerging technologies--such as hypersonic weapons and
artificial intelligence--may potentially impact strategic stability.
The science and technology behind these weapons is advancing rapidly,
while the policy and diplomatic conversation is not. What discussions
is the State Department having within the U.S. government to develop a
diplomatic strategy for engaging with Russia, China, and others on how
these weapons intersect with America's national security and foreign
policy?
Answer. In general, it should be noted that ``emerging
technologies'' is an extremely broad term that covers many different
technologies including artificial intelligence (AI) and hypersonic
weapons. However, I would defer to my State Department colleagues
regarding diplomatic discussions on this topic.
Question. Have you raised the possibility of discussing these
issues with Russia, China, or others? Could our strategic stability
talks with Russia provide a good platform for having these discussions?
Answer. The issues of artificial intelligence and hypersonic
weapons could be items for discussion with Russia or China, but I defer
to the State Department regarding any plans to raise these issues in
diplomatic forums.
Question. With respect to artificial intelligence, the State
Department leads the U.S. participation in multilateral discussions on
lethal autonomous weapon systems held under the auspices of the
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, which includes China and
Russia. Does the Defense Department view hypersonic weapons or
artificial intelligence as threats to strategic stability?
Answer. Generally the Department views hypersonic weapons as posing
a low risk to stability. The technical characteristics of these weapons
are such that the risks of misinterpretation are low.
DoD does not view AI as an inherent threat to stability; artificial
intelligence holds the promise of improved efficiency and
effectiveness, to include improved compliance with the Law of War and
improved humanitarian outcomes, as well as improved efficiencies in
maintenance, personnel management and payroll, and other so-called
``back-office'' functions.
modernization and nuclear reductions
Question. The Administration likes to point to a broad, bipartisan
consensus in support of upgrades to the U.S nuclear infrastructure.
That consensus is based on the idea that modernization would be paired
with clear, committed, and continuous work on arms control and
disarmament efforts. What has the Administration done over the last
twenty months to support and enhance arms control and disarmament
efforts?
Answer. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review notes that arms control can
contribute to U.S., allied, and partner security by helping to manage
strategic competition among states. The Administration has continued to
support arms control and disarmament efforts that enhance U.S. national
security and the security of our allies and partners. We continue
efforts to establish the political and security conditions that would
enable further nuclear reductions; deny terrorist organizations access
to nuclear weapons and materials; strictly control weapons-usable
material, related technology, and expertise; and seek arms control
agreements that enhance security and are verifiable and enforceable.
Specifically, the Administration has supported the goals of the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and completed the
reductions of strategic offensive arms under the New START Treaty The
Administration is working to convince States in violation of their arms
control obligations to return to compliance. We seek to reestablish the
conditions necessary for greater trust with the Russian Federation and
improved transparency with China.
Question. Since we knew that the Russians and Chinese were
modernizing their forces back in 2013, what are the new specific
nuclear-related events that have happened in the last five years that
would justify not only maintaining our current numbers, but potentially
expanding them?
Answer. Russia has repeatedly announced new programs and made
specific nuclear threats directed at the United States and NATO Allies.
For instance, in his March 1, 2018 Presidential Address to the Federal
Assembly, Putin announced the creation of several new types of nuclear
weapons, including: 1) a new heavy ICBM ``equipped with powerful
nuclear warheads, including hypersonic;'' 2) an ``unlimited-range
nuclear-powered cruise missile;'' and 3) intercontinental-range
nuclear-powered unmanned underwater vehicles. Russia has also
repeatedly brandished its nuclear sword in recent years against our
NATO allies. During its invasion and illegal annexation of Crimea for
instance, Russia raised the alert of its nuclear forces and issued
veiled nuclear threats to warn against Western intervention. China has
continued its practice of non-transparency and has steadily increased
its reliance on nuclear weapons. In response, the United States studied
these changes in the security environment and determined that the
United States can address capability gaps by modernizing the nuclear
enterprise and providing modest supplements to ensure that our
adversaries do not miscalculate U.S. resolve. These supplemental
capabilities would not expand the size of our nuclear arsenal.
missile defense review
Question. The FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act required
the Missile Defense Review (MDR) to be completed by January 2018. On
May 2, when the report was already four months late, you said you
expected the MDR ``to be out very soon.'' Yet two months later on July
10 you stated ``It's coming out soon.'' The Missile Defense Review is
now eight months overdue--when will it be published?
Answer. The report is in the final stages of completion and will
serve as the policy foundation and guide the Missile Defense Program
Objective Memorandum for the Fiscal Year 2020 submission.
Question. What specifically has delayed release of the Missile
Defense Review?
Answer. The Department's efforts to prepare the MDR have been very
thorough and comprehensive in order to produce a document in line with
the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the
Nuclear Posture Review. These efforts have taken longer than planned
but we expect the review to be out shortly.
Question. Will the Defense Department brief Congress in advance of
the MDR's release? Will the Defense Department brief foreign allies and
partners about the MDR?
Answer. Yes, the Department will brief Congress as well as allies
and partners on the MDR.
Question. Could increasing the amount of U.S. missile defense
systems worldwide affect strategic stability?
Answer. Missile defense systems are not destabilizing. U.S. missile
defenses have strengthened stability by diminishing the ability of
countries like North Korea and Iran to coerce the U.S., its allies and
partners. For example, our homeland missile defenses are oriented
towards the strategic arsenals possessed by North Korea and,
potentially, Iran. By undermining coercive strategies posed by these
potential adversaries, missile defenses are a stabilizing factor that
strengthen both deterrence and assurance. Despite claims to the
contrary, U.S. missile defenses do not undermine Russia or China's
strategic nuclear deterrent.
Regional missile defenses similarly are stabilizing. These defenses
cannot provide perfect protection, but can provide sufficient
protection to our forces and infrastructure to strengthen conventional
deterrence by undermining adversary confidence in their offensive
missile capabilities.
The value of missile defenses is demonstrated, in part, by Russian
and Chinese investments in missile defense systems.
Question. Is there an interrelationship between strategic offensive
arms and strategic defensive arms? If so, please detail what this
interrelationship is.
Answer. Both strategic offensive arms and defensive capabilities,
properly configured, sized and postured, can promote stability by
enhancing deterrence of both conventional and nuclear war.
Question. In an article published in July 2016, you praised
provisions in the fiscal year 2017 national defense authorization act
calling for developing and integrating space-based missile defenses
into the U.S. missile defense architecture and a policy of broadening
U.S. territorial defense against more than just ``limited'' ballistic
missile strikes. You added that these actions ``would help make it
clear that continued American vulnerability to Russian nuclear missiles
is unacceptable.'' Do you continue to believe that American
vulnerability to Russian nuclear missiles is unacceptable? Will the
forthcoming missile defense review reflect that view?
Answer. It is U.S. policy to defend our homeland from a potential
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) attack from regimes like
North Korea and Iran. We rely on our nuclear forces to deter a
strategic nuclear attack from Russia and China. However, even though
our homeland missile defenses are designed to protect against regional
powers, in the event of conflict, we will use our missile defense
systems to the extent feasible to defend against an ICBM attack from
any source. We will deploy and employ regional missile defenses to
protect against any regional missile threat. This policy will be
reflected in the Missile Defense Review.
__________
Responses of Hon. David J. Trachtenberg to Questions Submitted by
Senator Jeff Merkley
Question. One of the justifications given for the development of a
low-yield submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) is that the
United States is ``self-deterred'' from responding to a limited use of
Russian nuclear weapons. However, in addition to several conventional
options, the United States already possess hundreds of newly life
extended B-61 gravity bombs and hundreds more of low yield air launched
cruise missiles (ALCM), launched as stand-off weapons to minimize risk
to U.S. Air Force pilots. Given the current diverse options available
to the President, is a new low-yield SLBM necessary?
Answer. The low-yield submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM)
will be highly survivable when deployed in ballistic missile submarines
at sea, while U.S. gravity bombs are more vulnerable in fixed storage
and operating locations. SLBMs are highly accurate and, given their
speed and trajectory, are better able to penetrate modern defenses that
could challenge air-delivered weapons. The low-yield SLBM will provide
an additional, assured option to bolster nuclear deterrence by ensuring
adversaries do not miscalculate U.S. resolve and capabilities. The low-
yield SLBM does not reduce the need for air-delivered gravity bombs and
dual-capable aircraft, which can be forward deployed; contribute to
allied burden sharing; provide visible assurance to both allies and
partners; and serve as a tangible demonstration of U.S. extended
deterrence guarantees.
Question. Given Russia would have mere minutes to react to the U.S.
launch of a SLBM, what assurance do we have that Russia would not
mistake a single low-yield warhead for a SLBM carrying multiple
warheads with an explosive yield measuring hundreds of kilotons?
Answer. We are confident Russia could distinguish a single
submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launch from a large-scale
attack. Knowledge that we actually have a low-yield option should
actually encourage restraint.
Question. If low-yield capable nuclear weapons have greater
deterrence value, what is the possible reason for the administration to
retain the B-83 megaton bomb, which is a nuclear weapon that boasts an
explosive power of up to 80-times that which was used against Hiroshima
in August 1945?
Answer. A low-yield submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM)
warhead enhances deterrence by providing an additional, survivable
response capability that an adversary must consider if contemplating a
limited use scenario. The B83-1 enhances deterrence by maintaining a
known capability that can effectively strike hard and deeply buried
targets. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review reiterates the prior
Administration's commitment to retain the B83-1 in the stockpile until
there is sufficient confidence in the B61-12 gravity bomb. Given the
changed threat environment, deterrence requirements to hold a variety
of protected targets at risk, and the unique capabilities of the B83-1
bomb to fulfill those requirements, the Administration decided to
postpone B83-1 retirement until a suitable replacement is validated.
Question. The Department of Defense justified the need for the B-61
(12) Life-Extension Program (LEP), in part, on the basis that it would
provide the United States an earth-penetrating capability to hold at
risk underground targets. Is it no longer assessed that the B-61(12),
which the Government Accountability Office (GAO) estimates could cost
up to $10 billion, can hold underground targets at risk?
Answer. We assess that the B-61(12) will be effective against a
variety of targets, including some underground targets.
__________
Responses of Hon. David J. Trachtenberg to Questions Submitted by
Senator Cory A. Booker
new start renewal considerations
During the hearing you outlined the importance of New START and its
benefits to the United States. In your testimony you said, ``Any
decision on extending the Treaty will, and should be, based on a
realistic assessment of whether the New START Treaty remains in our
national security interest, in light of overall Russian arms control
behavior''.
Question. If the assessment is that the United States and Russia
are both fully complying with New START, would the administration
consider not extending it because of other difficulties with the
Russia-U.S. relationship?
Answer. The Administration has not yet made a decision on whether
or not to extend the New START Treaty. Future progress with the New
START Treaty should occur in the context of actions taken by Russia
with regard to all of its arms control obligations. Russia's appalling
behavior of continued violations and non-compliance with other treaties
and agreements remains an impediment to bilateral cooperation.
Question. What would be the consequences if there are no data
exchanges, reciprocal inspections or verifiable limits on U.S. and
Russian strategic nuclear forces, which would be the case if New START
is allowed to expire with nothing to replace it?
Answer. Arms control treaties, such as the New START Treaty, can
contribute to U.S. security by fostering transparency, establishing
openness, and building confidence. However, these potential benefits
must be weighed against Russia's overall arms control behavior, which
suggests a policy of selective compliance that impedes transparency and
diminishes confidence. The verification regime is important, but it is
one of several factors in determining whether the New START Treaty
continues to contribute to U.S. security.
Question. Recognizing that New START expires in February 2021, what
is a realistic deadline for the U.S. to decide if it will seek to
extend the treaty?
Answer. Deciding to extend the New START Treaty is a decision made
between the Treaty's Parties and is not subject to any deadline other
than the expiration of the Treaty itself in February 2021. The
Administration has not yet made a decision on whether it will extend
the New START Treaty.
resolving the inf treaty dispute
Because of a compliance dispute, the INF Treaty is under threat. A
collapse of the INF Treaty would open the door to a U.S.-Russian arms
race in intermediate-range missiles and have negative repercussions for
the entire arms control agenda and pose a new threat to our NATO and
European allies.
Some independent U.S. and Russian experts who are familiar with the
nature of the Russian INF violation argue that Washington and Moscow
should agree to reciprocal site visits by experts to examine Russia's
disputed 9M729 missile and U.S. missile defense launchers in Romania
and Poland. If the 9M729 missile is determined to have a range that
exceeds 500 km, Russia could modify the missile to ensure it no longer
violates the treaty or halt production and eliminate any such missiles
in its possession. For its part, the United States could modify its
missile defense launchers to clearly distinguish them from the
launchers used to fire offensive missiles from U.S. warships or agree
to transparency measures that give Russia confidence the launchers do
not contain offensive missiles.
Question. Do you agree that in order to break the impasse, both
sides need to address the concerns of the other side?
Answer. There is no equivalence between the two. The impasse is the
result of the Russian Federation's continued unwillingness to address
its serious breach of the INF Treaty. Russia has violated core tenets
of the INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-
launched intermediate-range cruise missile and not to possess and
produce launchers of such missiles.
Question. The United States has not violated the INF Treaty and
remains in compliance with its obligations. The United States has
addressed Russian allegations in a transparent and comprehensive manner
during multiple engagements with the Russian Federation. Have you
considered this or other reciprocal arrangements?
Answer. A site visit will not resolve Russia's violation. In order
for the Russian Federation to return to compliance with its
obligations, it must eliminate all 9M729 cruise missiles and associated
launchers in a verifiable manner.
Question. What other approaches should we be exploring to get the
Russians back into compliance?
Answer. The Administration continues to work through diplomatic
channels to urge Russia to preserve the INF Treaty. We have engaged
Russia bilaterally as well as in multilateral venues such as the INF
Treaty's Special Verification Commission.
Question. The Administration continues to apply pressure on Russia
by conducting INF Treaty-compliant research and development of
potential new ground-based strike capabilities. We urge Russia to begin
recognizing that its violation will not make Russia more secure. When
was the last time the administration met with representatives of Russia
to discuss the INF issue? Who represented the United States and Russia
at those talks?
Answer. The last dedicated meeting between the United States and
the Russian Federation related to the INF Treaty occurred in June 2018
when technical experts of both countries met to discuss INF Treaty
issues. Ambassador John Ordway and Mr. Vasiliy Boryak represented the
United States and the Russian Federation, respectively.
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