[Senate Hearing 115-783]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 115-783
ATTACKS ON U.S. DIPLOMATS IN CUBA:
RESPONSE AND OVERSIGHT
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN
HEMISPHERE, TRANSNATIONAL
CRIME, CIVILIAN SECURITY,
DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS,
AND GLOBAL WOMEN'S ISSUES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JANUARY 9, 2018
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web:
http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
40-253 PDF WASHINGTON : 2020
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
BOB CORKER, Tennessee, Chairman
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
MARCO RUBIO, Florida BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
CORY GARDNER, Colorado TOM UDALL, New Mexico
TODD YOUNG, Indiana CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming TIM KAINE, Virginia
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
RAND PAUL, Kentucky CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey
Todd Womack, Staff Director
Jessica Lewis, Democratic Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE,
TRANSNATIONAL CRIME, CIVILIAN SECURITY, DEMOCRACY,
HUMAN RIGHTS, AND GLOBAL WOMEN'S ISSUES
MARCO RUBIO, Florida, Chairman
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona TOM UDALL, New Mexico
CORY GARDNER, Colorado JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia TIM KAINE, Virginia
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Rubio, Hon. Marco, U.S. Senator from Florida..................... 1
Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator from New Jersey.............. 2
Palmieri, Hon. Francisco L., Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau
of Western Hemisphere Affairs, United States Department of
State, Washington, DC.......................................... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Brown, Todd J. Diplomatic Security Assistant Director,
International Programs, United States Department of State,
Washington, DC................................................. 7
Prepared statement........................................... 8
Rosenfarb, Charles, M.D., Medical Director, Bureau of Medical
Services, United States Department of State, Washington, DC.... 9
Prepared statement........................................... 10
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Hon. Francisco L. Palmieri to Questions Submitted by
Senator Marco Rubio............................................ 31
Responses of Hon. Francisco L. Palmieri to Questions Submitted by
Senator Robert Menendez........................................ 33
Responses of Mr. Todd J. Brown to Questions Submitted by Senator
Robert Menendez................................................ 34
Responses of Dr. Charles Rosenfarb to Questions Submitted by
Senator Robert Menendez........................................ 35
Responses of Hon. Francisco L. Palmieri to Questions Submitted by
Senator Jeff Flake............................................. 36
Responses of Mr. Todd J. Brown to Questions Submitted by Senator
Jeff Flake..................................................... 40
Responses of Dr. Charles Rosenfarb to Questions Submitted by
Senator Jeff Flake............................................. 41
(iii)
ATTACKS ON U.S. DIPLOMATS IN CUBA: RESPONSE AND OVERSIGHT
----------
TUESDAY, JANUARY 9, 2018
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere,
Transnational Crime, Civilian Security, Democracy,
Human Rights and Global Women's Issues,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Marco Rubio,
chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Rubio [Presiding], Johnson, Flake,
Gardner, Menendez, Udall, Shaheen, and Kaine.
Also present: Senators Barrasso and Markey.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARCO RUBIO,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator Rubio. This hearing of the Subcommittee on the
Western Hemisphere, Transnational Crimes, Civilian Security,
Democracy, Human Rights and Global Women's Issues is going to
come to order. And the title of this hearing is ``Attacks on
U.S. Diplomats in Cuba: Response and Oversight.''
We have one government panel testifying today with the
following three witnesses who are here, and we are grateful for
you joining us here today, on behalf of the executive branch:
Mr. Francisco L. Palmieri, who is the acting assistant
secretary of state for the Bureau of Western Hemisphere
Affairs, Mr. Todd J. Brown, diplomatic security assistant
director of International Programs at the Department of State,
and Dr. Charles Rosenfarb, who is the medical director of the
Bureau of Medical Services for the Department of State. Thank
you all again for being here on this important topic.
There are two goals to the hearing today. The first is to
establish the facts of what has occurred, and the second is to
conduct oversight over the conduct and the activities of the
United States State Department.
Here are the facts as will be testified to today by our
panel. In late 2016, staff at the United States embassy in
Havana began complaining of strange noises, and among the
descriptions that they complained of, high-pitched beam of
sound, incapacitating sound, baffling sensation akin to driving
with windows partially open in a car, or just intense pressure
in one ear. At the time of this report, the post's leadership
and the supporting office here in Washington, DC viewed this
activity as harassment from forces hostile to the United States
or to U.S. presence in Cuba.
Later, there was information gathered from additional
individuals, including some of these, which suggested that the
events that led to these complaints actually began as early as
November of 2016. The initial events that were reported
occurred at diplomatic residences, but later these events
occurred at hotels.
Individuals first visited the medical unit at the embassy
in December of 2016 and January of 2017. From February through
April of 2017, there was an evaluation conducted of 80 members
of the embassy community. Sixteen of these were identified with
symptoms and medically verifiable clinical findings of some
combination similar to what you would see in patients that
``have had a mild traumatic brain injury or concussion.''
In early July, the Bureau of Medical Services at the State
Department convened a panel of academic experts to review case
histories and the test results up to that point, and they
arrived at a consensus. And the consensus is, and I quote,
``The patterns of injuries were most likely related to trauma
from a non-natural source.'' Later in August of 2017, the Brain
Injury Center at the University of Pennsylvania reevaluated
embassy employees that were reporting symptoms, additional
individuals, and incidents prior to April 2014 were added to
the list of confirmed cases. Subsequently, two additional
individuals reported exposure in mid-August of last year, and
those cases were medically confirmed as well, bringing the
total number of cases to 24.
While the symptoms may vary, all of the medically-confirmed
cases, all 24 of them, have described some combination of the
following symptoms: sharp ear pain, dull headaches, ringing in
one ear, vertigo, visual focusing issues, disorientation,
nausea, and extreme fatigue. As we said earlier, the timeline
of the reported incidents are as follows. The initial wave that
were reported in December may have begun as early as November
of 2016, and they occurred through late March of 2017. From
March of 2017 through late April of 2017, there was a sporadic
period of reported incidents, then they stopped, and then two
additional reports happened in close proximity in August of
last year. They were medically confirmed in September.
These are the facts that will be testified to today by our
panel, and with that, I turn to the ranking member.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate
that we are starting the new year with a much-needed hearing on
the brazen attacks on our diplomats in Cuba, and I would ask
that my full statement be included in the record.
Senator Rubio. Without objection.
Senator Menendez. It is unfortunate that since the news of
these bizarre and vicious attacks broke late last summer, we
have not seen more public outcry against the Cuban government
for whatever scope of ownership it has over these attacks, or
more accountability for the health and wellbeing of our
diplomats, some of whom continue to suffer lingering health
conditions from these attacks. The Castro regime has proven
time and time again it is not a responsible actor in the
community of nations. The regime cannot be counted upon to
uphold its international commitments or responsibilities, and
most certainly the regime has no regard for individual human
rights, security, or dignity.
The Cuban government may or may not at the end of the day
be directly responsible for attacking our diplomats. But as
someone who has personally witnessed the modus operandi of the
Cuban government, it is unfathomable that the Castro regime,
and the intelligence services specifically, were not aware of
these attacks. If senior Cuban officials did not directly order
these attacks, they must have been aware or given tacit
approval to foreign agents to operate in Cuba. The scope of the
attacks is too specific. So, I hope to hear some more sound
explanations from our witnesses today.
Now, our own diplomats have borne the heavy burden of a
simple and changeable truth, and that is that being in a
foreign location in terms of your duty runs risk. And in this
particular case, no amount of placating, pandering, or
diplomatic overtures is going to change that. The Cuban
government has tried to undermine their dangerous and
irresponsible behavior by undermining the validity of the
claims of our diplomats. Why would a regime that has
demonstrated its ability to intimidate, oppress, and harm its
own citizens give credence to our concerns about the wellbeing
of Americans?
They accuse the United States of fabricating the attacks
because we have not released the names or diagnoses of the
affected people. Of course the Castro regime does not
fundamentally understand that in a democratic and free country,
citizens have a right to privacy, and to a government that
would prioritize their privacy and health over using them as
political tools.
And finally, turning to our witnesses, you cannot be
accountable for the behavior of the Cuban government or those
who were responsible for this. But you are responsible both for
the appropriate diplomatic response and the health and safety
of our diplomats. And from what I can see, the actions the
Department has taken on both counts are simply insufficient and
unacceptable.
Despite much-vaunted rhetoric from the President about
rolling back ill-conceived policy changes, the reality is that
the Cuban government continues to enjoy many of the benefits it
received. While the administration may champion its new
regulations prohibiting transactions that could benefit the
Cuban government, military, intelligence complex, it
grandfathered in all contracts that began during the last
administration. Furthermore, because the administration took so
long to actually announce these guidelines, major companies
were able to finalize deals in the months between the
administration's announcement of these policies and their
implementation.
At the enforcement level, the Office of Foreign Assets
Controls remains understaffed with no indication that personnel
will be hired. At the State Department, the President has not
even nominated an assistant secretary for the Western
Hemisphere Affairs. Failing to put critical senior staff in
place at the appropriate agencies severely undermines the
United States' ability to project our interests and to protect
our citizens abroad.
Accordingly, the administration and the Department's
reaction to the Cuban government, completely abrogating its
obligations under the Vienna Convention to protect our
diplomats, is laughable. The fact that somehow the Cuban
government has managed to paint a narrative that there were no
attacks at all is pretty outrageous. Expelling a handful of
diplomats to achieve parity with the number of diplomats who
had to be removed from Havana for safety is hardly a bold
diplomatic move. When new Treasury guidelines were finally
announced, the administration stressed they were not in
response to the attack on personnel.
And then turning to the impacted Foreign Service officers
themselves. I appreciate the overview that has been provided,
but the truth is from the accounts we have heard, the
Department's response was simply bureaucratic, inadequate, and
troubling. I will have a number of questions later, but let me
start by saying the stories we heard are shocking: the failure
of leadership at the Department and at post; the sluggish
reaction to the initial reports of afflicted personnel; the
aloof response of the medical team at the State Department.
Silence from diplomatic security to the rest of the Department
is simply staggering.
The members of the U.S. Foreign Service made a commitment
to serving their country overseas. They agreed to spend their
lives, often taking their families with them, in pursuit of
promoting American interests and helping Americans abroad. Some
serve in combat zones, large embassies and small, and sometimes
on communist islands.
According to accounts from those who suffered directly,
when diplomats first reported symptoms to the appropriate
people at post, they were rebuffed. It is also our
understanding that upon finally accepting that the employees
were suffering life-altering health consequences, the
Department took months to arrange for the appropriate care. It
was almost a year before the Department put the embassy on
ordered departure status, and only after reports surfaced in
the media.
Alarmingly, it is our understanding the Department did not
even warn diplomats going to Cuba for permanent or temporary
assignments about the risks to their health and the health of
their families. As their colleagues were evacuated from Cuba,
Department leadership failed to inform the rest of the
Department, including those being sent to serve in the place of
those being evacuated. Those who have been suffering physically
also have remaining questions about whether they will receive
appropriate care for the rest of their careers and their lives.
This lack of leadership and responsibility is shocking and
unacceptable. I sincerely hope this panel can provide us much-
needed answers to a myriad of pressing questions. The Cuban
government must be held accountable for its failure to uphold
international commitments and failure to protect American
diplomats. The Department must be held accountable for
executing the appropriate policies and response, and for
ensuring the safety, security, and health of the men and women
of the Foreign Service.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the hearing.
Senator Rubio. Thank you, and we will begin with our
witnesses. Mr. Palmieri, welcome to the committee.
STATEMENT OF HON. FRANCISCO L. PALMIERI, ACTING ASSISTANT
SECRETARY, BUREAU OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Palmieri. Chairman Rubio, Ranking Member Menendez, and
distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for the
opportunity to speak about the attacks against U.S. diplomats
in Cuba and the Department of State's efforts in response. At
the outset, I want to thank you for your concern for the safety
and security of our diplomatic personnel in Havana. As you
know, that is Secretary Tillerson's top priority. It is mine as
well.
I am pleased to be here today with my colleagues from the
Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the Bureau of Medical
Services, with whom the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs
has worked closely on this complex issue.
I would also like to emphasize up front that the
investigation into these health attacks is ongoing. We have the
best experts in the government and the private sector working
to help us understand it. At every step in our response to
these events, we have worked closely with our medical and
technical experts in evaluating health conditions and the
nature of the attacks.
I will walk you through a general timeline, which will
describe our diplomatic engagement with the Cubans on this
issue, and review many of the actions we have taken to date.
Then, I will defer to my colleagues to address the security and
medical issues.
In late 2016, some members of our diplomatic community
serving at U.S. Embassy Havana complained about hearing strange
noises and a variety of unexplained physical symptoms. As the
Department investigated, we began to see signs suggesting that
these events, initially in diplomatic residences and later at
hotels, may have begun as early as November 2016. As soon as we
identified a pattern connecting these unusual events with
certain health symptoms, U.S. officials approached the Cuban
government in mid-February to demand it meet its obligations
under the Vienna Convention to protect our personnel. The
Cubans denied involvement, offered their cooperation, and
opened their own investigation.
Since then, we have engaged the Cubans more than 20 times
from the working level to the highest level of the Cuban
government, both here in Washington and in Havana. In addition
to our diplomatic efforts, we prioritized the medical care of
our personnel. Dr. Rosenfarb will provide you with additional
details.
Separately, we launched a government-wide effort to find
the cause and culprits behind these attacks. Apart from the
investigation, we have met with U.S. interagency partners more
than a dozen times to discuss and refine our response to these
attacks.
The attacks initially appeared to occur in clusters, but
starting in late March, sporadic attacks continued until late
April and then seemed to stop. Beginning in mid-April, we
allowed anyone serving at Embassy Havana who did not feel safe
at post to return to the United States. We also expelled two
Cuban diplomats in May in order to underscore the Cuban
government's responsibility to protect our personnel. After a
period without any attacks, there were two additional attacks
reported in close proximity in late August, which were
medically confirmed in September. Based on the resumption of
these attacks, Secretary Tillerson ordered the departure of
non-emergency personnel from post on September 29th. The
Secretary assessed this was the only way to significantly
reduce the risk to our diplomats and their families.
As a follow-on to the ordered departure decision, we
expelled 15 more Cuban diplomats in October to ensure equity in
the impact on our respective operations and to underscore to
Cuba its obligation to stop the attacks. These decisions, both
to draw down our personnel at Embassy Havana and to expel Cuban
diplomats, did not signal a change from President Trump's new
policy.
Prior to the Secretary's decision to institute ordered
departure, our Embassy held 17 town hall meetings with American
staff. Since the return of U.S. diplomats to Washington, we
have held a number of meetings with them. Secretary Tillerson
personally met with these evacuees to explain his decision to
institute ordered departure, and we have organized a number of
meetings to address evacuees' concerns.
The wellbeing of the 24 confirmed victims, as well as the
wellbeing of all of our evacuees and those remaining in Havana,
continues to be our priority as does the ongoing investigation.
With that, I will turn it to my colleagues to discuss their
areas of expertise, and then I will be happy to answer your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Palmieri follows:]
Prepared Statement of Francisco L. Palmieri
Chairman Rubio, Ranking Member Menendez, and distinguished members
of the Committee: thank you for the opportunity to speak about the
attacks against U.S. diplomats in Cuba and the Department of State's
efforts in response. At the outset, I want to thank you for your
concern for the safety and security of our diplomatic personnel in
Havana. As you know, that is Secretary Tillerson's top priority. It is
mine as well.
I am pleased to be here today with my colleagues from the Bureau of
Diplomatic Security and the Bureau of Medical Services, with whom the
Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs has worked closely on this complex
issue.
I would also like to emphasize up front that the investigation into
these health attacks is ongoing. I understand that there are ongoing
discussions within the committee regarding this matter, and the fact
is, there is still much we do not know, including who or what is behind
the injuries to our personnel. We have the best experts in the
government and the private sector working to help us understand it. At
every step in our response to these events, we have worked closely with
our medical and technical experts in evaluating health conditions and
the nature of the attacks.
I will walk you through a general timeline, which will describe our
diplomatic engagement with the Cubans on this issue, and review many of
the actions we have taken to date. Then, I will defer to my colleagues
to address the security and medical issues.
In late 2016, some members of our diplomatic community serving at
U.S. Embassy Havana complained about hearing strange noises and a
variety of unexplained physical symptoms. As the Department
investigated, we began to see signs suggesting that these events--
initially in diplomatic residences, and later, at hotels--may have
begun as early as November 2016.
As soon as we identified a pattern connecting these unusual events
with certain health symptoms, U.S. officials approached the Cuban
government in mid-February to demand it meet its obligations under the
Vienna Convention to protect our personnel. The Cubans denied
involvement, offered their cooperation, and opened their own
investigation. Since then we have engaged the Cubans more than 20
times, from the working level to the highest level of the Cuban
government, both here in Washington and in Havana.
In addition to our diplomatic efforts, we prioritized the medical
care of our personnel. State Department and private medical experts
examined more than 80 post employees and their families, both in the
United States and in Havana. Dr. Rosenfarb will provide you with
additional details.
Separately, we launched a government-wide effort to find the cause
and culprits behind these attacks. Apart from the investigation, we
have met with U.S. interagency partners more than a dozen times to
discuss and refine our response to these attacks.
The attacks initially appeared to occur in clusters, but starting
in late March, sporadic attacks continued until late April and then
seemed to stop. Beginning in mid-April, we allowed anyone serving at
Embassy Havana who did not feel safe at post to return to the United
States. We also expelled two Cuban diplomats in May in order to
underscore the Cuban government's responsibility to protect our
personnel.
After a period without any attacks, there were two additional
attacks reported in close proximity in late August, which were
medically confirmed in September. Based on the resumption of these
attacks, Secretary Tillerson ordered the departure of non-emergency
personnel from post on September 29. The Secretary assessed this was
the only way to significantly reduce the risk to our diplomats and
their families.
As a follow-on to the Ordered Departure decision, we expelled 15
more Cuban diplomats in October to ensure equity in the impact on our
respective operations and to underscore to Cuba its obligation to stop
the attacks. These decisions--both to draw down our personnel at
Embassy Havana and to expel Cuban diplomats--did not signal a change in
policy.
Prior to the Secretary's decision to institute Ordered Departure,
our Embassy held 17 town hall meetings with American staff. Since the
return of U.S. diplomats to Washington, we have held a number of
meetings with them. Secretary Tillerson personally met with these
evacuees to explain his decision to institute Ordered Departure, and we
have organized a number of meetings to address evacuees' concerns. The
well-being of the 24 confirmed victims, as well as the well-being of
all of our evacuees and those remaining in Havana, continues to be our
priority, as does the ongoing investigation.
With that, I will turn it to my colleagues to discuss their areas
of expertise. Then I will be happy to answer your questions.
Senator Rubio. Thank you, Mr. Palmieri. Mr. Brown.
STATEMENT OF TODD J. BROWN, DIPLOMATIC SECURITY ASSISTANT
DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Brown. Good morning, Chairman Rubio and other
distinguished members of the Committee. Thank you for your
invitation to appear today to discuss the health attacks
involving U.S. diplomatic personnel and their families in
Havana. Along with my colleagues, I share your concerns
regarding the safety and security of our personnel in Cuba, and
welcome any discussion that may lead to a better understanding
of this issue and stronger safeguards for our employees.
From a security and investigative standpoint, we continue
to work with Embassy Havana to aggressively counter, mitigate,
and better understand who and what are causing injuries to our
diplomatic staff. Unfortunately, this remains a perplexing
case.
Our regional security officer at Embassy Havana first
became aware of potential health attacks involving embassy
personnel in late December 2016. In the early stages of trying
to understand what may be occurring, post leadership and
supporting offices in Washington believed it was likely a form
of harassment by forces hostile to the United States and our
presence in Cuba. As more incidents were reported in early
2017, and greater awareness of the seriousness of symptoms
became known, our level of concern and mitigation efforts rose
exponentially.
After senior-level meetings with Cuban officials in
February outlining Cuba's responsibility to protect diplomats
under the Vienna Convention, the regional security officer
received confirmation from Cuban counterparts that the Cuban
government was conducting its own investigation into the
matter. Senior U.S. officials on Embassy Havana's Emergency
Action Committee met frequently as part of our ongoing attempt
to better understand the nature of the apparent attack and
protect staff. Among other things, the embassy deployed
recording devices in staff residences in an effort to better
identify or capture the possible source behind the threat, as
many victims had associated the attacks with an acoustic event.
After further investigative attempts and expert analysis
failed to identify the cause or perpetrator, the Federal Bureau
of Investigation opened a case in early May. An FBI team has
since visited Havana several times and met with Cuban
officials. The FBI's investigation has interviewed victims and
conducted surveys of the residences and hotel rooms. However,
the investigation remains ongoing, and we would refer all
specific questions concerning the investigation to the FBI.
Thank you. I will be glad to answer any questions you may
have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Brown follows:]
Prepared Statement of Todd J. Brown
Good morning Chairman Rubio, Ranking Member Menendez, and other
distinguished members of the Committee.
Thank you for your invitation to appear today to discuss the health
attacks involving U.S. diplomatic personnel and their families in
Havana. Along with my colleagues, I share your concerns regarding the
safety and security of our personnel in Cuba, and welcome any
discussion that may lead to a better understanding of this issue and
stronger safeguards for our employees.
From a security and investigative standpoint, we continue to work
with Embassy Havana to aggressively counter, mitigate, and better
understand who and what are causing injuries to our diplomatic staff.
Unfortunately, this remains a perplexing case.
Our Regional Security Officer at Embassy Havana first became aware
of potential health attacks involving Embassy personnel in late
December 2016. In the early stages of trying to understand what may
have been occurring, Post leadership and supporting offices in
Washington believed it was likely a form of harassment by forces
hostile to the United States and our presence in Cuba.
As more incidents were reported in early 2017 and greater awareness
of the seriousness of symptoms became known, our level of concern and
mitigation efforts rose exponentially. After senior level meetings with
Cuban officials in February outlining Cuba's responsibility to protect
diplomats under the Vienna Convention, the Regional Security Officer
received confirmation from Cuban counterparts that the Cuban government
was conducting its own investigation into the matter.
Senior U.S. officials on Embassy Havana's Emergency Action
Committee met frequently as part of our ongoing attempt to better
understand the nature of the apparent attack and protect staff. Among
other things, the Embassy deployed recording devices in staff
residences in an effort to better identify or capture the possible
source behind the threat, as many victims had associated the attacks
with an acoustic event.
After further investigative attempts and expert analysis failed to
identify the cause or perpetrator, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
opened a case in early May. An FBI team has since visited Havana
several times and met with Cuban officials. The FBI's investigation has
interviewed victims and conducted surveys of the residences and hotel
rooms. However, the investigation remains ongoing and we would refer
all specific questions concerning the investigation to the FBI.
Thank you. I will be glad to answer any questions you may have.
Senator Rubio. Thank you. Dr. Rosenfarb.
STATEMENT OF CHARLES ROSENFARB, M.D., MEDICAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU
OF MEDICAL SERVICES, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Rosenfarb. Good morning. Chairman Rubio, Ranking Member
Menendez, and distinguished members of the Committee. Thank you
for the opportunity to testify on the Department's response to
the recent health attacks in Havana. I will be describing the
evolution of the medical response and what we currently know
about the health effects.
From the individual and public health perspective, managing
this evolving situation is challenging. Mission personnel
describe a multitude of symptoms, many of which are not easily
quantifiable and not easily attributable to a specific cause.
The sharing of information that occurs in a small, tight-knit
community has helped identify more affected personnel, but, as
typically is the case with any community outbreak, also can
complicate an epidemiological investigation. However, the most
challenging factor is the lack of certainty about the causative
agent and, therefore, the precise mechanism of the injuries
suffered.
Individuals first visited our medical unit in Embassy
Havana starting in late December 2016 and January 2017,
reporting various symptoms including headache, ear pain,
dizziness, and hearing problems. They associated the onset of
these symptoms to their exposures with unusual sounds or
auditory sensations. Various descriptions were given: a high-
pitched beam of sound, an incapacitating sound, a baffling
sensation akin to driving with the windows partially open in a
car, or just an intense pressure in one ear.
Since the symptoms first reported primarily affected
auditory functions, an otolaryngologist at the University of
Miami, highly experienced in evaluating acoustic injuries in
military personnel, was identified to perform additional
assessments. Between February and April of last year, this
specialist evaluated 80 members of the Embassy community. Of
the individuals evaluated in this initial tranche, 16 were
identified to have symptoms and medically verifiable clinical
findings of some combination similar to what might be seen in
patients following a mild traumatic brain injury or concussion.
In early July, my office convened a panel of academic
experts to review the case histories and the test results
gathered to date. Although the assembled group identified that
some of the symptoms and findings could be caused by other
things such as viral illnesses, previous head trauma, aging,
and even stress, the consensus was that the patterns of
injuries that had so far been noted were most likely related to
trauma from a non-natural source. In light of the emerging
clinical parallels to mild traumatic brain injury, the
nationally-recognized Brain Injury Center at the University of
Pennsylvania was identified to provide detailed reevaluations
of employees with prior exposures, and to evaluate embassy
community members who reported new exposures.
As a result of further evaluations begun in late August,
additional individuals with exposures that occurred prior to
April 24th were added to the list of confirmed cases. Two other
individuals who reported exposures that occurred in mid-August
2017 were also medically confirmed as cases, bringing the total
number of cases to 24.
I would like to now describe the health effects identified
so far. While descriptions of the reported auditory sensations
have varied, all medically confirmed cases have described some
combination of the following symptoms beginning within minutes
to hours of their exposure of the event: sharp, localized ear
pain, dull unilateral headache, tinnitus or ringing in one ear,
vertigo, visual focusing issues, disorientation, nausea, and
extreme fatigue. In many of the patients, the acute symptoms
seemed to resolve within days to weeks, but other health issues
emerged that were more persistent. These have included:
cognitive problems, including difficulty with concentration,
working memory and attention, recurrent headache, high-
frequency unilateral hearing loss, sleep disturbance, and
imbalance walking. As in the acute phases, the duration and
severity of these later symptoms have varied widely.
Defining the prognosis for the confirmed cases is extremely
difficult since no precise analogue for this possibly novel
syndrome exists. Some patients remain symptomatic months after
their exposure. The persistent symptoms have improved to
varying degrees in all individuals, some after extended
rehabilitative therapy, some over time without treatment. Ten
of the 24 patients have returned to either full- or part-time
work, while others continue to receive treatment with an
anticipation of return to duty. However, at this time we are
unable to state whether or not the injuries may result in
adverse long-term consequences to the individuals' future
health or functional abilities.
All government personnel who travel to Havana on official
duty now receive a detailed medical briefing and are encouraged
to undergo pre-deployment screening, including baseline
audiograms and neurocognitive testing. We have formally
requested assistance from the Centers for Disease Control for
performing a broader epidemiological analysis and providing
appropriate medical information to the American public.
Discussions have also been held with the National Institute of
Neurological Disorders and Stroke at the National Institutes of
Health regarding its participation in ongoing medical
investigations.
I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Rosenfarb follows:]
Prepared Statement of Charles Rosenfarb
Chairman Rubio, Ranking Member Menendez, and Distinguished Members
of the Committee:
Thank you for the opportunity to testify on the Department's
response to the recent health attacks in Havana. I will be describing
the evolution of the medical response and what we currently know about
the health effects.
From the individual and public health perspective, managing this
evolving situation is challenging. Mission personnel describe a
multitude of symptoms, many of which are not easily quantifiable and
not easily attributable to a specific cause. The sharing of information
that occurs in a small, tight-knit community has helped identify more
affected personnel, but, as typically is the case with any community
outbreak, also can complicate an epidemiological investigation.
However, the most challenging factor is the lack of certainty about
the causative agent and, therefore, the precise mechanism of the
injuries suffered.
Individuals first visited our medical unit in Embassy Havana in
late December 2016 and January 2017 reporting various symptoms
including headache, ear pain, dizziness, and hearing problems. They
associated the onset of these symptoms to their exposures with unusual
sounds or auditory sensations. Various descriptions were given: ``a
high pitched beam of sound''; an ``incapacitating sound''; a ``baffling
sensation'' akin to driving with the windows partially open in a car;
or just an intense pressure in one ear. Since the symptoms first
reported primarily affected auditory functions, an otolaryngologist at
the University of Miami, highly experienced in evaluating acoustic
injuries in military personnel, was identified to perform additional
assessments.
Between February and April of last year, this specialist evaluated
eighty members of the Embassy community. Of the individuals evaluated
in this initial tranche, sixteen were identified to have symptoms and
medically verifiable clinical findings of some combination similar to
what might be seen in patients following mild traumatic brain injury or
concussion.
In early July, my office convened a panel of academic experts to
review the case histories and the test results gathered to date.
Although the assembled group identified that some of the symptoms and
findings could be caused by other things such as viral illnesses,
previous head trauma, aging, and even stress, the consensus was that
the patterns of injuries that had so far been noted were most likely
related to trauma from a non-natural source.
In light of the emerging clinical parallels to mild traumatic brain
injury, the nationally-recognized brain injury center at the University
of Pennsylvania was identified to provide detailed reevaluations of
employees with prior exposures and to evaluate Embassy community
members who reported new exposures. As a result of further evaluations
begun in late August, additional individuals with exposures that
occurred prior to April 24 were added to the list of confirmed cases.
Two other individuals who reported exposures that occurred in mid-
August 2017 were also medically confirmed as cases, bringing the total
number of cases to 24.
I would like to now describe the health effects identified so far.
While the descriptions of the reported auditory sensations have varied,
all medically-confirmed cases have described some combination of the
following symptoms beginning within minutes to hours of the event:
sharp, localized ear pain; dull unilateral headache; tinnitus in one
ear; vertigo; visual focusing issues; disorientation; nausea; and
extreme fatigue. In many of the patients, the acute symptoms resolved
within days to weeks, but other health issues emerged that were more
persistent. These have included: cognitive problems, including
difficulty with concentration, working memory, and attention; recurrent
headache; high-frequency unilateral hearing loss; sleep disturbance;
and imbalance walking. As in the acute phase, the duration and severity
of these later symptoms have varied widely.
Defining the prognosis for the confirmed cases is extremely
difficult since no precise analogue for this possibly novel syndrome
exists. Some patients remain symptomatic months after their exposures.
The persistent symptoms have improved to varying degrees in all
individuals, some after extended rehabilitative therapy, some over time
without treatment. Ten of the 24 patients have returned to either full
or part-time work, while others continue to receive treatment with an
anticipation of return to duty. However, at this time we are unable to
state whether or not the injuries may result in adverse long-term
consequences to the individuals' future health or functional abilities.
All government personnel who travel to Havana on official duty now
receive a detailed medical briefing and are encouraged to undergo pre-
deployment screening including baseline audiograms and neurocognitive
testing. We have formally requested assistance from the Centers for
Disease Control for performing a broader epidemiological analysis and
providing appropriate medical information to the American public.
Discussions have also been held with the National Institute of
Neurological Disorders and Stroke at the National Institutes of Health
regarding its participation in the ongoing medical investigation.
I look forward to your questions.
Senator Rubio. Thank you. Dr. Rosenfarb, I will start with
you. Is it fair to say that by May 1st--you said you saw the
confirmed cases, February through April of 2017. Is it fair to
say by May 1st or early May, we were aware that at least 16
U.S. government employees and/or dependents had suffered a
serious injury while working in Havana for the U.S. government?
Dr. Rosenfarb. Senator, it is fair to say that we were
aware that 16 people had suffered some type of injury. As I
said----
Senator Rubio. Were they--was it serious?
Dr. Rosenfarb. In some individuals, the symptoms were more
serious than others.
Senator Rubio. Well----
Dr. Rosenfarb. There was a whole spectrum of symptoms that
we saw and findings----
Senator Rubio. Let me ask you this. Was there a single--of
the 16, at least one U.S. government employee working in Havana
suffered serious injury? Is it fair to say at least one
suffered serious injury?
Dr. Rosenfarb. I would say many suffered serious injury.
Anything----
Senator Rubio. Let me tell you why I asked that, because,
Mr. Palmieri, according to the law, in any case of serious
injury related to a U.S. government mission abroad, the
Secretary of State shall convene an accountability review
board. The law allows--that has to happen within 60 days of the
occurrence of an incident, and it allows for a 60-day delay if
the Secretary determines that an additional period is necessary
for the convening of the board. So, by my calculation, by early
May, we knew that at least one, if not several, as Dr.
Rosenfarb has testified, suffered serious injury. By early
July, on the 60-day period, and certainly by early September,
the whole 120-day period, an accountability review board should
have been set up.
I got a letter on November 6th saying that there was still
not an accountability review board, that the Secretary had
decided to delay for 60 days in order to determine whether one
was even necessary. It says, ``Allow additional time for the
investigation to yield more information to better inform the
decision of whether to convene an ARB.'' Has an accountability
review board been set up as of this date, and why was it not
set up, as according to law, within the 120-day period?
Mr. Palmieri. Sir, thank you for that question. The
Secretary has made a decision to convene an accountability
review board. There will be a congressional notification sent
shortly.
Senator Rubio. Why was it not done within 120 days of May
1st when we knew that there was serious injury?
Mr. Palmieri. Throughout this process, there has been a lot
of information that we knew or at times was then later
contradicted. Throughout this process, we have not been able to
identify who the perpetrator of such attack was and what the
means of that attack was. It was only until late August when
there was another round of attacks that it became apparent to
us that we should begin the process of looking at an
accountability review board.
Senator Rubio. Well, that is not what the law reads. It
says, ``In any case of serious injury, loss of life,'' et
cetera, et cetera, ``related to a United States government
mission abroad.'' It does not say that you need to know who did
it. In fact, that is one of the reasons for an accountability
review board. The bottom line is the State Department did not
follow the law in setting one up within the 120-day period in
my opinion, and I believe in the opinion of others, given the
fact that by early May we knew serious injury had occurred to
U.S. personnel and their dependents related to their service in
a government mission abroad. It was not one person, it was
several people, as has been testified here.
Now, we first heard of the complaints in late 2016. And,
Mr. Brown, you testified the conclusion was that this was
forces hostile to the United States and/or hostile to our
presence in Cuba. Is that correct?
Mr. Brown. That is correct. Initially, we felt that it was
a form of harassment, and that was attributed to the
government.
Senator Rubio. Mr. Palmieri, do you know when Secretary
Kerry was made aware? This was a State Department conclusion
that there was harassment, correct?
Mr. Brown. Yes, sir, that was the early opinion of the
security professionals who looked at it, that it was likely a
form of harassment.
Senator Rubio. Okay. When was Secretary Kerry made aware?
Do you know?
Mr. Palmieri. I do not know. I will have to check the
record, Senator.
Senator Rubio. Do you know if President Obama was ever made
aware?
Mr. Palmieri. I know that as a regular matter, we would
have apprised the National Security Council at some point after
the late December information became apparent.
Senator Rubio. What about Secretary Tillerson? When was
he--when was he first made aware?
Mr. Palmieri. I would believe that would have been in late
February, sir.
Senator Rubio. Okay. Do you know if the Trump Transition
Team was made aware during the transition period?
Mr. Palmieri. I did not have contact with them on this
issue. I am not aware if anyone else did, sir.
Senator Rubio. Now, in December 2014, President Obama
changed policy towards Cuba. We set up the embassy. We had to
expand personnel, did we not, in Havana? We added personnel to
expand the mission.
Mr. Palmieri. I would have to go back to check the record,
but, yes, that probably makes sense.
Senator Rubio. And we also had to secure housing, and we
provided--so we had to secure housing for the additional
mission in Havana.
Mr. Palmieri. That would be normal practice, yes, Senator.
Senator Rubio. And in Cuba, we would have to provide the
Cuban government the list of all of the U.S. government
employees that were moving to Havana to work at the mission.
That is just a matter--a matter of course, correct?
Mr. Palmieri. We would have solicited visas for the
additional personnel, yes.
Senator Rubio. And the residences in Cuba, since there is
no real private property, all of these residents would have
been owned by the Cuban government.
Mr. Palmieri. That is my understanding, too, sir.
Senator Rubio. The hotels where these attacks happened were
owned by the Cuban government. That is for sure.
Mr. Palmieri. That is correct.
Senator Rubio. Okay. What security measures did we take,
Mr. Brown, in this expansion on these residences?
Mr. Brown. Senator, I mean, to talk a little bit about
residential security, I think historically from a crime
perspective, political violence perspective, there were--there
were not features sort of related to that. Our concern, and I
believe the Cuban government selected--was aware of which
housing our personnel would go into. Our housing profile is
fairly compact. There are not specific security measures in a--
in a high CI, counterintelligence type environment, so there
would not have been any other physical security in relation to
the residences that were in place other than the location. And
certainly based on a history in Cuba, we did not have--beyond
the harassment element, we did not have, you know, a high
crime--high crime statistics or anything related to political
violence.
So, there would not have been any residential measures
taken above and beyond what was already in place.
Senator Rubio. My final question is for you, Mr. Brown, and
you, Dr. Rosenfarb. Based on what we know and, more
importantly, what we do not know, can you today guarantee the
safety of any personnel in Havana currently stationed there or
about to be deployed to Havana? Do we know what they can do to
protect themselves from these sorts of injuries? Can we
guarantee that today if we send someone there, they are safe
from these injuries?
Mr. Brown. Senator, I do not think we can say categorically
that we can guarantee that they would be safe from this.
Certainly, we have--not knowing what is causing it, or who is
behind it, or how it is being done gives us very little in
terms of mitigation. What we have done is address sort of being
sure that our community in Havana is well aware of what has
happened, to provide advice on how to respond to that, to have
teams in place that then can respond, and how to report those
types of incidents.
So, we have done a lot of work in terms of elevating the
knowledge of the personnel that are----
Senator Rubio. I guess to cut to the chase, Mr. Brown, if I
were being deployed to Havana today to work in the embassy and
I asked you, what can I do to protect myself from the sort of
thing that has happened, you do not know what I can do to
protect myself since we do not know what it is they used to
attack them.
Mr. Brown. That is true, Senator. Our guidance would be in
the event of something to what has taken place, to react in a
certain manner. That is a reactive matter, not a mitigation
measure.
Senator Rubio. Dr. Rosenfarb, do you have any advice for
people that are being deployed to Havana, how they can protect
themselves from this?
Dr. Rosenfarb. Well, we try and educate those who have to
go down there for government business and make sure they are
aware of the risk, and make sure--make sure they are aware of
what we know about the symptoms that have occurred. As far as
we know right now, the only mitigation factor is to limit your
exposure. We inform people that should they hear or feel a
sensation, to move away as quickly as possible.
We know from our patients who already have been there that
the less exposure the better. We also do pre-deployment
screening now to ascertain hearing, baseline cognitive
function. So, should they report any concern, we are able to
measure what they are currently at compared to the previous
status and get them the health care they need.
Senator Rubio. The ranking member.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman,
unfortunately I am going to have to go the White House for an
immigration meeting, so I am going to have a series of
questions for the record. I do have some questions here now,
but I was looking forward to a second round, so I hope those
questions will be answered.
Senator Menendez. First, listening to this set of answers,
the times in which we used to have children put their head
underneath their desk during an air raid drill for a nuclear
attack comes to mind. Ridiculous. Move away from a sound that
you are hearing. It is pretty amazing to me.
Let me ask, the Democratic offices of this committee have
requested a classified briefing on this issue in early
December. To date that briefing has not taken place. Do you
commit to providing a classified briefing for this committee?
Mr. Palmieri. Absolutely, Senator.
Senator Menendez. And given the nature of the hearing and
the fact that so much is tied to classified information, do you
commit to accepting and responding to classified questions for
the record?
Mr. Palmieri. Yes, sir.
Senator Menendez. All right. Now, Mr. Palmieri, would it
not be fair to say that in Cuba, either it is the regime who
conducted these attacks, or they have full knowledge of who
conducted these attacks because the state security apparatus in
Cuba is one that has every element of Cuban society and life
fully monitored and engaged. Very difficult to believe that if
a third country ultimately engaged in these attacks within
Cuba, that the Cuban intelligence would not know. Is that a
fair statement?
Mr. Palmieri. Yes, sir.
Senator Menendez. All right. So, either it is the Cubans or
it is someone else. Now, under the possibility that it is
someone else, and I think the administration has recognized
that one possible explanation for these attacks on U.S.
personnel is a third country, possibly in collaboration with
the Cuban government or at least with its knowledge, or if it
was not with its knowledge, they know who it is, and they have
not come forth, as I understand. Is that a fair statement? Has
the Cuban government suggested who this might be if it is not
them?
Mr. Palmieri. No, not that I am aware of.
Senator Menendez. So, in the theory for a moment that it is
a third country, in December of 2016, around the same time
these attacks first started, the Cuban and Russian government
signed a new defense cooperation agreement, including
cooperation on a series of new technologies. And I would like
to introduce two press articles regarding this agreement for
the record, Mr. Chairman.
[The information referred to was not available at time of
print]
Senator Menendez. Has the State Department raised attacks
against U.S. personnel in Cuba with the Russian government, for
example?
Mr. Palmieri. Sir, I think I would--that is a very good
question. I think it would be better to address that issue in a
classified setting.
Senator Menendez. Okay. So, if I were to go to a list of
other countries, you are going to give me the same answer.
Mr. Palmieri. In general, yes, sir.
Senator Menendez. Yes, you are going to give me the same
answer.
Mr. Palmieri. Yes.
Senator Menendez. All right, so I will look forward to that
classified moment. Now, let me ask you--let me ask you this.
You have said that you will not return individuals if, in
fact--individuals to the post if--unless the Cubans can
guarantee that these attacks will not continue. Does that not
indicate that you believe that the government has at least some
knowledge of control over these attacks?
Mr. Palmieri. The President and the Secretary have stated
that they do believe the Cuban government has responsibility in
this situation.
Senator Menendez. Dr. Rosenfarb, when was the first time a
diplomat reported symptoms of an attack?
Dr. Rosenfarb. The first symptoms were seen--the first
patients were seen by our health provider in the medical unit
in Embassy Havana in mid-January.
Senator Menendez. Mid-January of?
Dr. Rosenfarb. 2017.
Senator Menendez. Of 2017. Do we know when the Charge was
first informed of these attacks?
Mr. Palmieri. I believe the Charge alerted these attacks at
the--at the very end of December of 2016.
Senator Menendez. So, we say that some of these attacks
took place in May of 2016, right?
Mr. Palmieri. There was a cluster of attacks that occurred
between March and mid-April. I do not believe there was an
attack in May. I would have to go back to the timeline.
Senator Menendez. Okay. So, if it is March or mid-April of
2016, and you----
Mr. Palmieri. I am sorry. Excuse me, Senator. I meant 2017.
Senator Menendez. 2017, okay. So, let me ask you this. Was
the Charge informed of the severity of the attacks? Was he
advised that the effects of the attack could be permanent?
Mr. Palmieri. He was informed of the attacks in late--in
late December, sir, of 2016. At that point, I do not believe we
knew or we had information about the severity or the depth of
the attacks.
Senator Menendez. When diplomats reported symptoms to the
regional security officer and medical team, why did it take so
long to respond?
Mr. Brown. Senator, I believe--to try to clarify how--sort
of how this sort of timeline from an investigative standpoint
took place, it was December 30th in 2016 when it was first
brought to the attention of the regional security officer and
the front office of the embassy. At that time, it was not
clear, you know, what was taking place, nor were there related
severe medical symptoms. They just simply did not know.
And at that point, that is when they thought it might be
some form of harassment, and the regional security officer did
note it in a report back to Washington along with other reports
it was in. So, that is when they first sort of had this notice
of what was--what was happening. Then there was this long gap
that nothing new happened.
So, this--you know, this case is sort of amplified by how
perplexing and knowledge gaps, but they did seize on this early
indicator that something odd had happened. And then I believe
it was late--you know, this was considered a form of harassment
early on, and then it was not until early February when new
incidents were reported, there was sort of this moment of we
have got something bigger happening here.
Senator Menendez. Why were diplomats who were affected told
not to share their symptoms or concerns with family members?
Mr. Brown. I am not aware that that was ever done, sir.
Senator Menendez. Would you review it because I think if
you talk to these individuals, they will tell you that they
were told not to share their symptoms or concerns with family
members. Let me ask you this. When did you first learn that
employees were suffering symptoms associated with traumatic
brain injury?
Dr. Rosenfarb. We medically evacuated the first patient, I
think it was February 6th, 2017. And like I testified, over the
next 2 months, we evacuated 40 more people, but we also had the
specialist from Miami go to Havana and assess more people. As
we saw more and more patients and the specialist was able to do
the evaluations and do the objective assessments, it became--
the pattern of injuries became consistent with what I testified
as being most likely a version of traumatic brain injury or
concussion. It was an accumulation of information and findings
over that 2 months.
Senator Menendez. Mr. Palmieri, for these employees who
were or are currently being treated, will the Department
continue to cover all their medical care?
Mr. Palmieri. I would refer that question to the Office of
Medical Services, Senator.
Senator Menendez. Okay, Dr. Rosenfarb can answer it.
Dr. Rosenfarb. We are committed to do everything we can
under existing authorities to provide the care and the--and
support that our employees need.
Senator Menendez. Do those existing authorities suggest
that there are some limitations to the treatment you will give
these employees?
Dr. Rosenfarb. We are--there may be some limitations that
family members over the course--because what happened--people
who are injured--employees injured in the course of duty would
be covered by the worker's compensation law. Family members
would not be.
Senator Menendez. Well, I would ask you in response to my
questions to give the committee a full sense of what
limitations there are. I do not think that when we send a
diplomat abroad who is attacked by whomever, at the end of the
day, that their health and wellbeing should be limited in terms
of our response to them. I think you want to send a global
message to all of our men and women abroad that if they are
attacked, they will be taken care of just as we would to any of
our veterans. And I consider them in this respect a veteran of
our diplomatic efforts, which are equally as important. So, I
would like to see what limitations there are, if any, and then
work with the chairman and others to see if we can respond to
that.
I have plenty of other questions, but I will look forward
to your answers in writing.
Senator Rubio. Thank you. Senator Johnson.
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am not sure who
to direct this to, but let me first say I do agree with Mr.
Brown there. This is a pretty perplexing case. Does anybody
know how many different locations this has been perpetrated at?
Mr. Brown. Senator, I do not have the exact number of
locations, but it was--it was several residences. It was no
official facilities, and there were two hotels, I believe.
Senator Johnson. Okay. Are you aware of these types of
symptoms with any other Cuban nationals or people that were not
associated with the United States diplomatic corps? Any reports
of something similar to others?
Mr. Palmieri. Subsequent to the issuance of our travel
warning on or about October 1st of 2017, there have been 18
American citizen reports to the Department's Bureau of Consular
Affairs. That information has been shared with the
investigators.
Senator Johnson. Of those--of all the reports, what
percentage approximately is there an audible type of attack as
opposed to just starting to feel ill, or dizzy, or experiencing
vertigo? I mean, is there always associated with it some kind
of high-pitched sound or something?
Mr. Palmieri. Senator, you are referring to the attacks
against the diplomats. We do not have information about the
attacks on individuals.
Senator Johnson. Okay, with the diplomats, I mean, how
many--how often is that? Is it a hundred percent of the time
there is--they hear something or?
Dr. Rosenfarb. The vast majority of the 24 cases reported
hearing or feeling some auditory sensation.
Senator Johnson. When you say, ``feel auditory sensation,''
something you just--feeling a fluttering in your ear or
something? Like, say, the capitation you hear or capitation
with the window lowered in your car, that type of thing?
Dr. Rosenfarb. Right, the descriptions of the sensations
vary quite a bit. Some feel more like a vibration. Some report
a loud sound. The descriptions have varied, though.
Senator Johnson. Have we ever set up any kind of monitoring
device in any of those residences?
Mr. Brown. Yes, sir, we have provided off-the-shelf
recording devices that are geared to record high-frequency
sounds. We have successfully recorded some sounds and turned
those over to investigators.
Senator Johnson. Okay, that is interesting. When you
recorded those sounds, did people exhibit the symptoms?
Mr. Brown. I believe that some of those at least were
associated with individuals who later showed symptoms, but I
would defer to the doctor also to comment on that.
Senator Johnson. Dr. Rosenfarb, are you aware of any type
of technology that would cause this?
Dr. Rosenfarb. No, I am not.
Senator Johnson. Again, not do you know exactly what caused
this, but are you aware of some kind of auditory type of weapon
that could cause this type of damage?
Dr. Rosenfarb. No, I am not, sir.
Senator Johnson. Mr. Palmieri, do you know if the United
States government is aware of any?
Mr. Palmieri. No, I do not, sir.
Senator Johnson. Dr. Rosenfarb, I take Senator Rubio's
description of the ARB and what is required by law, but as a
medical doctor, it seems like you hopped on this pretty quick,
and we had experts come in February 2017, literally within a
month, month and a half of when embassy personnel were even
made aware of this. Short of a full-scale ARB, from a medical
standpoint, is there anything else--any regrets you have in
terms of things you did not do?
Dr. Rosenfarb. No, no regrets, sir. I think it is important
to remember that when I said, ``serious injuries,'' at the time
the injuries were as serious as any acute injury would be. One
thing that has not become clear and still not certain is what,
if any, their long-term consequences would be. Someone can
suffer serious injury, but may improve completely. At that
point, you know, they are able to go on and do not have any
health consequences.
Each step of the way, we identified where we had
information gaps. We sought to fill those gaps. We got the best
care we could find for our personnel, and we made decisions
based on the information we had at each point of the
investigation.
Senator Johnson. So, you can suffer an injury from an
illness, but at what point do you believe an injury was caused
by some type of attack, or are you still not certain of that?
Dr. Rosenfarb. After our discussion with the panel of
academic experts in July when the panel reviewed other possible
explanations, each explanation seemed to have holes in it. And
the panel felt that the one explanation that could probably
best explain--was most likely to explain it was that there was
some non-natural incident that had caused the injuries.
Senator Johnson. Yeah, that was in July 2017.
Dr. Rosenfarb. Yes.
Senator Johnson. But my final question, how many embassy
personnel have requested relocation, or was that just a
decision made by the State Department to move people or the
medical corps?
Mr. Palmieri. There were eight individuals who requested
departure from Havana before the Secretary's decision that
moved the post to an ordered departure status where we removed
all but emergency personnel.
Senator Johnson. So, were those requests granted?
Mr. Palmieri. Yeah, anyone who wanted to depart post was
allowed to depart post.
Senator Johnson. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Rubio. Senator Shaheen?
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all
for testifying today. I think this committee had a classified
briefing on this issue in October. Mr. Palmieri, you suggested
that there was information that you could only share in a
classified briefing. Is there new information that has come to
light since that classified briefing about what has occurred in
these instances?
Mr. Palmieri. I think it would benefit the committee for us
to come up and do an additional classified briefing. There have
been developments since the October briefing. I know we have
tried to keep the committee informed to the best of our
ability, and there has been--it would be worthwhile, yes,
Senator.
Senator Shaheen. There is an AP headline, a story from
yesterday, which you all may have seen, which says that the FBI
doubts a sonic attack. And I would just read briefly: ``The FBI
report,'' which has not been release publicly, ``is the
clearest sign to date of the U.S. ruling out the sonic weapon
theory.'' The report says, ``The FBI tested the hypothesis that
air pressure waves via audible sound, infrasound, or ultrasound
could be used to clandestinely hurt Americans in Cuba and found
no evidence.'' Do you believe that this report is accurate that
was in the AP story?
Mr. Brown. Senator, perhaps I could comment. It is an FBI
report, and I would hesitate on the FBI findings at this point.
Senator Shaheen. Mr. Chairman, did we ask the FBI if they
would come and testify before this committee about this issue?
Senator Rubio. We did not. The FBI generally will not
testify because of jurisdictional issues with Judiciary.
Senator Shaheen. Is there a way for us to get the
information from this FBI report in a classified briefing?
Senator Rubio. There is, and I think that is one of the
things Senator Menendez was asking about.
Senator Shaheen. I think that would be very helpful. Mr.
Brown, how has the Cuban government responded to these attacks,
and have they been cooperative in the investigations?
Mr. Brown. Senator, I am not--I am not aware that they have
been uncooperative. I know that we have had our own
investigative team that went down in May, and they had no
difficulties in at least entering the country, and certainly
working the case in terms of just the U.S. mission. I am also
unaware that the FBI has encountered any difficulties in terms
of coming in and out of the country for investigative purposes.
Beyond that, I do know that the Cuban government said they
would also conduct a parallel investigation, so to speak. I
understand that the embassy has noted increased security, Cuban
security presence in our--in our residential areas purportedly
in response to this issue, but I honestly do not know if that
has--is any legitimate attempt on their part to uncover. But it
has been noted that there is increased security by the Cubans
in those residential areas.
Senator Shaheen. Mr. Palmieri, knowing what you know about
the way the Cuban government operates, do you believe that
there could have been deliberate attacks on our personnel
without the Cuban government knowing about it?
Mr. Palmieri. I find it very difficult to believe that.
Cuba is a security state. The Cuban government in general has a
very tight lid on anything and everything that happens in that
country.
Senator Shaheen. And have they been more responsive because
we asked them to remove their embassy personnel? Has that
produced any change in their behavior?
Mr. Palmieri. The Cuban government, since we expelled their
personnel in October, has engaged in a pattern of trying to
discredit the theories related to these attacks. I do not think
that is a helpful posture for it to take.
Senator Shaheen. Have they actually investigated the
attacks themselves, Mr. Brown?
Mr. Brown. According to the Cuban authorities, they said
that they were opening a parallel investigation, but beyond
that, I am unaware of what they have done or what they have
uncovered. Perhaps that could be a question posed to FBI
investigators.
Senator Shaheen. So, we have not--the State Department has
not seen the results of any report that they have done.
Mr. Brown. Not that I am aware of, no.
Senator Shaheen. Given----
Mr. Palmieri. Senator, if I could clarify that last point.
Senator Shaheen. Yeah.
Mr. Palmieri. We did have a law enforcement dialogue in
September where they did share with the Department a document
that they purported to be the results of their preliminary
investigation into this matter.
Senator Shaheen. And did it shed any light on or provide
any information that we did not already have?
Mr. Brown. I have not seen the report, Senator, but I am
not aware that any new information surfaced due to a Cuban
investigation.
Senator Shaheen. My time is up, but if I could just ask one
more question, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Palmieri, as someone who has
watched Cuba for some time, given the change in American policy
during the Obama administration to resume a diplomatic
relationship with Cuba, and to begin to resume other commercial
and other ties with the country, is there any reason to think
it would be in Cuba's interest to make deliberate attacks
against our embassy personnel at a time when there was an
effort to resume ties with the country?
Mr. Palmieri. I am loath to speculate on Cuban government
intentions. However, there is a long history and pattern of
Cuban harassment of U.S. diplomats stationed in Havana. It is
entirely possible that they could have escalated that pattern
of harassment and caused these incidents. In whatever case,
they are responsible for the safety and security of U.S.
diplomats stationed in Havana under the Vienna Convention.
Senator Shaheen. Right.
Mr. Palmieri. And they have failed to live up to that
responsibility.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Rubio. Thank you. Senator Udall.
Senator Udall. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
obviously care, like you do, very much, and I think all of us
here, about our personnel overseas, and if they get harmed, and
making sure that they get adequate medical personnel. And,
Doctor, you seem to suggest that they get the care, and that
some of the care they--you were drawing lines. Some may be
workmen's comp. Others may be that they were not serving in the
line of duty, something along that line. Of the 24 cases, which
of those would you say are workmen's comp? Were they off duty?
Were all of them off duty, or some of them on duty situations
in the hotel, the two hotels and at the residence?
Dr. Rosenfarb. All 24 are getting the best care available.
Senator Udall. And you plan to keep that care, the best
care available like you are talking about.
Dr. Rosenfarb. Right. As individuals, they have the option
to seek any care they want. In terms of a worker's comp issue,
that--in terms of--that determines how that care is paid for.
Any U.S. employee working at an embassy, we consider this an
occupational exposure. Therefore, we are encouraging our
personnel and employees to make a claim with the Department of
Labor for worker's compensation. The issue on the compensation
is it may be won for any eligible family member who might be
affected because they are not the employee.
Senator Udall. Yeah, but are you aware of any of these 24
individuals or additional individuals who are now paying for
their medical care because the government will no longer
provide it?
Dr. Rosenfarb. Right. So, no one is actually paying for
their medical care right now directly. We have authorities to
medically evacuate personnel, and to be--we seek reimbursement
from the medical insurer, the primary medical insurer first.
But we have committed to providing what we call secondary payer
benefits to personnel who are affected overseas. We have
authority to do that for up to a year, potentially longer,
again, primarily for employees, but we also have benefit--able
to do that for a period of time for family members as well.
Senator Udall. Yeah.
Dr. Rosenfarb. So, there are no out-of-pocket expenses that
are incurred by any of the employees or family members right
now.
Senator Udall. Okay. Now, Senator Shaheen read the recent
AP story where the FBI concluded that this was not a sonic
attack and basically ruled that out. As you know, the FBI took
a number of trips to Cuba. They interviewed down there. They
were very, very thorough in terms of what they did. And so,
them coming out with this report, which you cannot comment on,
would you tell us what your theories are of what happened? They
have ruled that out. What are your theories of what you think
happened?
Mr. Brown. There has been--you know, when this thing has
been looked at an investigative standpoint, I do not think that
solely the acoustic element has been looked at, you know. From
the very beginning, even going back into late February when we
sort of had that moment of a medical element associated with
this, that it was shared with the interagency community of what
possibly could be, you know, happening in Havana. And though
these events were associated with an acoustic element, they
were still looking at other possibilities.
And so, I am not familiar with the FBI. I know this report
was not put out publicly. If----
Senator Udall. But what are your--they have ruled that out.
Have you ruled it out, or do you still have----
Mr. Brown. Well, I do not know that I would rule it out
entirely. The acoustic element could be used as a masking, you
know, piece of it.
Senator Udall. So, on what basis then are you claiming that
it is acoustic?
Mr. Brown. I am not claiming that it is acoustic. I just
know that there has been an acoustic element associated with
the sensations and the feelings. If the FBI has determined that
that is not the case, which I have not seen this report and I
do not think it has been released publicly, that does not mean
that an acoustic element could not be part of another type of,
you know, style of attack here. And I do know that other types
of attacks are being considered in connection with this.
Senator Udall. And what are those?
Mr. Brown. I think there is viral. There is ultrasound. You
know, there is a range of things that the technical experts are
looking at as could this be a possibility.
Senator Udall. So, when you say ``viral,'' you are talking
about somebody intentionally implanting a virus.
Mr. Brown. That would not be ruled out. That could be a
possibility.
Senator Udall. And then other--ultrasound you are saying?
Dr. Rosenfarb. Yeah, I have seen sort of the range of what
possibly could be taking place beyond sort of the acoustic
element, and those are some of the things that have been
mentioned to be looked at. And in some cases, they have been
ruled out from experts. They do not know how that could be done
in that fashion, so.
Senator Udall. I see my time is up, Mr. Chairman. I would
like a second round, but----
Senator Rubio. Go ahead now.
Senator Udall. Okay, no, that is----
Senator Rubio. We are all alone here.
Senator Udall. Okay, we are all alone.
Senator Rubio. Well, just us and whoever is watching.
Senator Udall. We may be rejoined----
Senator Rubio. It is 11:10.
Senator Udall. We may be rejoined. But let me also say
that, you know, I supported President Obama's efforts to
reengage with Cuba. I believe that President Trump's decision
to walk back some of those efforts is a major mistake that only
harms the Cuban people and isolates the United States in the
region. Cuba has been looking to reopen and grow ties with the
U.S. and U.S. businesses, including those in New Mexico,
Arizona, Florida, Mississippi, and with many U.S. citizens who
want to travel.
In my trips to Cuba, I have taken a number of trips. The
last one was with several members--Senator Leahy, Senator
Cochran. This was in February 2017, so it was after this was
already unfolding down there. I was there with Senator Leahy,
Senator Cochran, Senator Bennet, Representative McGovern. We
had a very good visit and visited with a number of officials,
and stayed in hotels down there. And we--as far as we can tell
for many of the members that went along, nothing of this sort
happened to us.
But I wonder why, you know, with Cuba, and there seems to
be a huge interest on them wanting to open up and wanting to
have the engagement with our business community, and all of
these things. What would be their motive when the Cuban
government was looking to increase ties with the U.S., Mr.
Palmieri or Mr. Brown?
Mr. Palmieri. Again, I cannot speculate on what motive the
Cubans would have. It is just--it has happened in Havana in
their country, a country which they generally exercise total
security control over. It is incomprehensible to us that they
are not aware of how and who is responsible, and that they
cannot take steps to prevent these kinds of attacks from ever
happening again.
Senator Udall. Well, they have said on a number of
occasions, on our trip down there, and the foreign minister has
traveled here, that they did not condone the attacks in any
way. They were not a part of them. They have no knowledge of
them. They have been very forthright, I think, in that respect.
The safety of our diplomats is paramount, and I found it
interesting that many U.S. diplomats disagreed with the
departure orders, as did their employee association, the
American Foreign Service Association, or the AFSA, whose
president, Barbara Stephenson, said at the time, ``AFSA's
view,'' and this is a quote from her, ``is that America's
diplomats need to remain on the field and in the game. We have
a mission to do, and it is an important mission.''
And what happened here, what the United States did was very
different than what was done by the Canadians. Canadian
diplomats in Havana also reported mysterious ailments, yet
Canada has not reduced its diplomatic presence in Havana or
expelled Cuban diplomats from Ottawa. Why has the U.S. response
been so different than from the Canadian response?
Mr. Palmieri. Secretary Tillerson, from his first day at
the Department, has said that the safety, wellbeing, and
health, and security of U.S. diplomats overseas are his top
priority. It is mine as well. This decision to go to ordered
departure reflects his belief and his concern and our concern
that we had to take this step to protect our people, and that
the Cuban government had to do more to assure us that these
attacks would stop.
Senator Udall. Has any other country in the world done what
we have done and withdrawn all of their diplomats, except a
small emergency force?
Mr. Palmieri. In Havana?
Senator Udall. Yes. Yes, in Havana.
Mr. Palmieri. Not that I am aware. Not that I am aware of,
sir.
Senator Udall. And are you aware that any Canadian
diplomats, since all of this has unfolded, have they had
additional ailments or additional problems?
Mr. Palmieri. Sir, the Canadians have withdrawn some of
their personnel, but I think we could go into greater detail in
the classified briefing on that element.
Senator Udall. Thank you. We look forward to that. The
Trump administration has reversed a variety of steps to improve
ties made by the previous administration. What benefits have we
achieved from these actions? How has this impacted American
businesses as well as cuentapropistas in Cuba?
Mr. Palmieri. I am sorry. I missed the first part of that
question.
Senator Udall. I said the Trump administration has reversed
a variety of steps to improve ties made by the previous
administration, referring to the Obama administration trying to
improve ties, trying to open up and engage, trying to help the
Cuban people, and we have seen a big growth in the small
business community there in Cuba. And I am just wondering now
that this administration has reversed all of that, what
benefits have we achieved from these actions. Are you aware
that the Cuban people are doing better, or how has this
impacted American businesses as well as the cuentapropistas in
New Mexico--in, excuse me, in Cuba?
Mr. Palmieri. President Trump's new National Security
Presidential Memorandum on Cuba lays out a new policy--you are
correct, Senator--that is designed to not just help the private
sector in Cuba, but to ensure that the Cuban government lives
up to its international commitments on human rights, to allow
us to promote greater freedom on behalf of the Cuban people,
and to ensure that we are enforcing U.S. law with respect to
the embargo and a statutory ban on tourism to Cuba. The
measures we have taken are designed to ensure that any
engagement and assistance, private sector assistance in Cuba
benefits the Cuban people and not the regime.
Senator Udall. Thank you very much, and I hope that what
will occur here is that you will continue to share with us how
this progresses. I mean, this is a very perplexing situation,
and I think we should continue our investigations here in the
Congress both in private security briefings and those kinds of
situations. But I think we should be careful not to jump to
conclusions until we really know what happened.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I really appreciate you calling
this hearing.
Senator Rubio. Thank you, and if any other members appear,
I will just kind of try to wrap up the loose ends. And I will
take off with--right what Senator Udall said there at the end,
and that is jumping to conclusions. That is why I thought the
important part of this hearing is to kind of lay out the facts,
okay? I read this headline a couple days ago. It said, FBI
rules out sonic attacks, and saw some other things out there
about it.
And so, you read that and you could conclude that nothing
happened in essence, you know. I saw at one point the Cuban
government said that it could be crickets or some insect noise,
cicadas? Is that what they--yeah. I did not even know there
were cicadas. I do not know. We do not have that problem in
Miami.
Senator Udall. We have them in New Mexico.
Senator Rubio. You have them?
Senator Udall. Yep.
Senator Rubio. A lot of concussive effects after? No?
Senator Udall. They drive you crazy.
Senator Rubio. All right, well, yeah.
[Laughter.]
Senator Rubio. But my point is that you could read that
headline and conclude that that means that nothing happened.
That is the method by which the attack--there has not been a
definitive--we cannot definitively sit here today and say this
is the machine, or this is the thing they used to cause these
injuries, okay? And no one here has claimed that we know that.
What I think is not in dispute is that there are 24
Americans who either work for the U.S. government or were there
as a dependent of a U.S. government employee, who during their
time in Havana have experienced symptoms that are consistent
with what you would see in mild traumatic brain injury and/or
concussion. That is an established fact that we have talked
about today. We may not know how they came to that point, but
we know it happened to them, and we know it happened to 24
people while they were working in Havana.
Dr. Rosenfarb, let me ask you. Is there any thought given
to the fact that this is a case of mass hysteria, that a bunch
of people are just being hypochondriacs and making it up?
Dr. Rosenfarb. Well, as you said, Senator, 24 people have
had symptoms and findings consistent with what looks like a
mild traumatic brain injury. The objective tests that were done
were not ones that could be basically easily faked. There are
exact findings that our experts have determined. That being
said, you know, no etiology, no cause has been fully rolled
out, and we are--there are doctors who are looking at
everything. But the findings suggest that this is not an
episode of mass hysteria.
Senator Rubio. And so, what we know for a fact is that 24
Americans that were in Havana on--either related to or on
government business for a significant period of time--for a
period of time have come back with these symptoms. That is a
fact. So when people are there reporting about sonic attack
ruled out, perhaps the sonic part of it has been ruled out. But
the fact that people, if that is even true, by the way. I am
not saying--that is just what the headline said.
But the fact that this has happened, that people have been
hurt, that is established fact. Does anyone on the panel
dispute that, that people have been hurt while working in
Havana on behalf of the U.S. government?
[Nonverbal response.]
Senator Rubio. Okay. So, then the second question becomes
what is our role here in oversight. And I know we are starting
to play some word games here, but I think this is really
important because this is an oversight committee, okay, and our
job is to conduct oversight over the Department of State.
Here is what we know. I know what the law says. The law
says in the case of any serious injury related to a U.S.
government mission abroad, the Secretary of State shall convene
an accountability board. It does not say in case of any
permanent injury. It says in the case of any serious injury.
And I know given all the attention being paid to concussions,
as an example, because of football and other things, that
concussions are considered serious injury. And I would say to
anyone in the world, if I told you I am going to cause you to
have mild traumatic brain injury, you would think that is
serious whether it is permanent or not. That is what the law
says.
We know that these complaints came in by late 2016, that
there were visits to the medical unit in late December of 2016
and throughout 2017. We know that they were serious enough that
by mid-February we approached the Cuban government about it. We
know that in the early stages after this occurred, it was the
opinion of both the leadership at the post in Havana and in the
supporting office in Washington that this was likely some form
of harassment by forces hostile to the United States or our
presence in Cuba. That was the assessment made at that time.
We know that in late April or certainly by early May, we
had 16 people that we could identify with symptoms, and
medically verifiable clinical findings similar to, as I said
earlier, mild traumatic brain injury or concussion. We know
that by September 29th, we ordered the departure of non-
emergency personnel. All these things happened, and yet we know
that by October, certainly by November 6th of this year, an ARB
was still not up and running.
So, if you just do the math on the calendar, these facts
that I just laid out extrapolated backwards should have led to
the appointment--and I understand it was a transition, and I
understand there was a change in the administration. But we
should have had an accountability review board in place, or
some notification given as to why it is no longer necessary. Of
course, since then the decision has been made.
And where are we, by the way, Mr. Palmieri, in the
accountability review period? Are we now in the active--has it
now--when was it stood up? When was the accountability review
board activated?
Mr. Palmieri. The Secretary took a decision to form an
accountability review board on December 11th. I believe a
congressional notification will arrive shortly, and that is
required before the Board is actually constituted, Senator.
Senator Rubio. So, on December 11th. So, okay. Well, I can
tell you that is more than 120 days from all these facts, which
I think leads to the argument that we should have had.
Now, because we do not know how these attacks were
conducted, suffice it to say--let me ask this, Dr. Rosenfarb
and Mr. Brown, and this would never happen. But if someone in
the U.S. government says we want to cause these symptoms in
people, that technology does not exist. We do not know of that
technology. Is that accurate? We are not aware of a technology
that does this. We have never seen a technology anywhere in the
world that does this to people.
Mr. Brown. That is my understanding, Senator. When going to
the subject matter experts both in government and outside
government, we have not seen this.
Senator Rubio. Dr. Rosenfarb, have you ever seen cases of
this outside of an actual blow to the head or something
similar?
Dr. Rosenfarb. I have not.
Senator Rubio. Okay. And that is consistent with everything
we have been told is that--and the reason why I raise that is
because obviously this is a pretty sophisticated thing, okay.
This was not something conducted by, you know, a fly by night
operation. Whatever happened to these people as a result of
some sophisticated technology that, quite frankly, is so
sophisticated, we do not understand it. So, it leads you then--
so you have a sophisticated attack of some sort causing these
injuries. We do not know who possesses that sophisticated
material, but we know that it is pretty sophisticated, leading
you to believe it is a nation-state, someone who can afford
this kind of thing.
And then it leads you down the road of motivation. And I
think it is fair to say, and I think most members of this
committee would argue as well, and I think many of you would
probably share this view, that whoever did this did this
because they wanted there to be friction between the United
States and the Cuban government. That would be the motivation
behind this, someone who wanted to cause friction between the
U.S. and the Cuban government, particularly if you look at the
timing of these attacks, November, December of 2016, after the
election.
So, it makes you start to think who would do this. Someone
who does not like our presence there, and someone who wants
there to be this sort of friction between the U.S. So, who
would be motivated to create friction, or who would not be in
favor of an increased U.S. presence in Cuba? Well, the first
obviously is opponents of the U.S.-Cuba opening under the Obama
administration. I do not think any credible person on the
planet believes that some group of anti-Castro Cubans conducted
these attacks in an elaborate scheme to somehow disrupt the
Obama opening, so I do not even want to spend any time on that
unless anyone here thinks that that is a viable option. I
assure you it is not.
The second is a rogue element within the Cuban government
itself. And it is interesting, I was reading this Associated
Press report, and it talks about the initial reaction. Now,
maybe this is not accurate, but on September 15th, the
Associated Press reported that, ``In a rare face-to-face
conversation, Castro told U.S. diplomat, Jerry DeLaurentis,
that he was baffled and he was concerned, and he denied any
responsibility. But U.S. officials were caught off guard by the
way he addressed the matter, devoid of the indignant ``how dare
you accuse us'' attitude the U.S. had come to expect from
Cuba's leaders.'' It went on to say, ``His government did not
dispute that something troubling may have gone down on Cuban
soil.'' Now subsequently, that is not the position they have
taken, but this is what the article reports.
This suggests to me that potentially Castro is aware of
rogue elements within his own government that may have been
behind this because, whether you want to call them hard liners
or people that feel--they just do not--they feel like they
would be in a stronger position if this opening had not
occurred or this increased U.S. presence, perhaps people
concerned about an increased U.S. presence in light of the
planned transition that theoretically is supposed to take place
at some point this year.
So, I am not asking you for anything classified because I
do not think such a thing would be classified. But, Mr.
Palmieri, at any point in time, have we ever seen reports from
any of our diplomats in Cuba that suggest that Raul Castro or
anyone around him has ever said to us it was not us, but it
could have been someone within us who did this?
Mr. Palmieri. If I----
Senator Rubio. Has Raul Castro ever said to any U.S.
diplomat, I did not do it, but it is possible that some of my
guys did it without me knowing about it?
Mr. Palmieri. I do not believe that communication has ever
occurred.
Senator Rubio. Is that your answer because it is--you do
not want to discuss something that is not in the proper
setting, or is that just your--you just have never heard it?
Mr. Palmieri. That is my recollection, that I have never
heard that, but we can check the diplomatic record and see if
there was any exchange like that. I do not believe so.
Senator Rubio. Okay. And then, the last one that was--then
you say, well, if it was not a rogue element that was in the
Castro government, maybe it was a third country. Which third
country would want to disrupt the U.S. presence there, and the
logical conclusion is Russia and Vladimir Putin. During the
Cold War, do we have any documented cases of similar attacks
against individuals anywhere in the world?
Mr. Brown. I am not aware, Senator, of anything similar to
this, no, sir.
Dr. Rosenfarb. I believe in the late 50s and 60s, there
were some evidence that microwave beams or radiation was
directed against the U.S. embassy in Moscow, and I think it
stopped in 1975, 1976.
Senator Rubio. So, there were some microwave attacks
against the U.S. diplomatic presence in Moscow between some
point in the 1950s through the mid-1970s.
Dr. Rosenfarb. Senator, I am not knowledgeable enough to
say whether ``attacks'' or not, but I know they were
investigating excess levels of microwave radiation that people
may have been subjected to back in that timeframe.
Senator Rubio. Mr. Palmieri, you were asked by, I believe,
Senator Menendez if this had ever been raised with the Russian
government, and your answer was you could not answer that in
that setting. Why would a communication to a foreign
government, unless it contained, you know, sensitive
information, be classified? In essence, is it typical that any
sort of communication with a foreign government, because we are
aware that, for example, that we have addressed this with the
Cuban government. Why would the fact or lack of existence of a
communication to the Russian government be something that we
cannot discuss in public?
Mr. Palmieri. Because of the nature of an interagency
discussion to give the context, to give you the full reply
would be required. And I believe that would be more appropriate
in the classified setting.
Senator Rubio. And then I think the last point that I think
is pretty clear here is that it is important for us not to
ascribe to Havana attributes of New York or Washington, DC.
Cuba, by all accounts, is by far the most heavily monitored and
surveilled country in the Western Hemisphere. Does anyone
disagree with that assessment?
[No response.]
Senator Rubio. It is a police state. Does anyone disagree
with the assessment that the City of Havana is the most
monitored and surveilled city within the island of Cuba?
[No response.]
Senator Rubio. Then let me ask you, U.S. government
personnel. If you are an employee of the United States
government and you are going to Havana, what level of
monitoring or surveillance should you expect when you are
positioned there? What do we tell our people when they go just
outside of this context? Do they have free rein to do anything
they want, or should they expect that they are constantly being
watched, monitored, and closely kept tabs on? Mr. Brown, I
think that is--probably----
Mr. Brown. Senator, I do want to go into too much detail in
an unclassified----
Senator Rubio. Yeah, do not tell me the methods. I just
want to know----
Mr. Brown. Certainly we prepare our personnel for levels of
surveillance and levels of harassment, and movements are
certainly restricted. And movements are anticipated that there
will be a Cuban element monitoring those movements.
Senator Rubio. What other post in the world would you say
is comparable to the level of surveillance, history of
harassment that a U.S. government employee would find in
Havana? What other places in the world have similar attributes?
Mr. Brown. Senator, I think we are getting close to some
classified areas, and I would hesitate to compare.
Senator Rubio. I am not asking you, again, for the type of
harassment or even the type of surveillance. But I think it
is--so it is classified to say----
Mr. Brown. The ranking of the level of counterintelligence
is a classified area.
Senator Rubio. I am not asking for the ranking. I am just
saying who it compares to. Is it like it is in Montreal or
Quebec?
Mr. Brown. It is not.
Senator Rubio. Okay. So then, the reason why I am asking
this is because if a U.S.--I think it is safe to conclude that
if I am a U.S. government employee working in the embassy in
Havana, the Cuban government knows where I live and is probably
watching me every single day. The idea that somehow someone
could conduct an attack so sophisticated that we do not even
know what it is without the Cuban government at least knowing
about it to one U.S. government employee, not to mention 24
over a 12-month period, is outside the realm of reasonable--it
is ridiculous.
I could understand if somebody was mugged on a street
corner, but these are sophisticated attacks, so sophisticated,
as I said, that we cannot even describe how it happened yet to
24 U.S. government employees and their dependents in the most
heavily monitored city in the most heavily monitored country in
the Western Hemisphere, and among the most heavily monitored in
the world, where U.S. government personnel in particular are
watched very carefully for all of their movements and
activities. And the idea that someone could put together some
sort of action against them, 24 of them, and the Cuban
government not see it or know about it, it is just not
possible. And so, it leads you to conclude that the Cuban
government either did this or they know who did it, and they
cannot say because whoever did it is either a third-party
country that they cannot take on, or elements within their own
regime that they do not want to reveal for purposes of not
making it appear to be unstable internally.
And so, I think these are all good conclusions from this
hearing that conclude by saying my admonition at the beginning.
I think it is really unfair for any suggestion that people
working on behalf of the U.S. government were not injured in
Havana. Imagine if you were one of these people who are out
there working on our behalf who are now suffering from these
injuries, and reading in a newspaper somewhere that what
happened to you did not happen.
Not only is it demoralizing, I think it is incredibly
unfair to them. We can say that we do not know how it happened.
We can even say we cannot know for sure who did it, but two
things we know for sure: people were hurt, and the Cuban
government knows who did it. They just will not say for some
reason. And I think that is the biggest takeaway from this
hearing, other than I remain concerned about the State
Department's unwillingness to stand up the ARB, the
accountability review board, in a timely fashion and in
accordance with the law. And I imagine that will be a topic of
further discussion down the road.
I think that will conclude my questioning. I do not--seeing
no other members. Did you have anything else, Senator Udall?
Senator Udall. No, thank you.
Senator Rubio. Well, I want to thank all of you for being
here. I know this is a unique and perplexing subject matter,
something we have not really seen. Senator Menendez has already
indicated, and I think some other members, Senator Flake had to
leave. This is a topic he cares about a lot, but he had to be
at the White House as well as Senator Menendez on an
immigration meeting, so they had to leave. But both of them
have indicated they are going to have extensive questions for
the record.
And so, we are going to keep the record open for 48 hours,
and I would ask that their questions be answered in a timely
fashion so that we can close out this hearing and have all that
information. I also ask that my questions that remain
unanswered--when was Secretary Kerry notified, when was
President Obama notified, and whether the Trump Transition was
briefed on this topic--also be taken back for the record. I
think these are important questions to have answers for.
Senator Rubio. And seeing no other members here and nothing
further, the meeting is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:35 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Hon. Francisco L. Palmieri to Questions
Submitted by Senator Marco Rubio
Question. Was there an Accountability Review Board during the Obama
administration? If not, why?
Answer. By law, the Secretary of State must convene an
Accountability Review Board (ARB) to review incidents involving
``serious injury, loss of life, or significant destruction of property
at, or related to, a United States government mission abroad'' unless
``the Secretary determines that a case clearly involves only causes
unrelated to security.'' (22 U.S.C. 4831). Our prior experiences with
security incidents resulting in an ARB have been events in which the
impacts were immediately clear, such as the Embassy bombings in Kenya
and Tanzania in the late 1990s, or the explosion of a vehicle-borne
improvised explosive device in Kabul on May 31, 2017 that killed ten
local guard contractors.
While the Department became of aware of an increase in some unusual
harassment and health complaints in late December 2016, it was not
until after the presidential transition in January 2017 that medical
officials confirmed the onset of possibly serious related medical
symptoms. This confirmation suggested these incidents went beyond
routine harassment previously experienced by U.S. diplomats in Havana.
As the number of attacks increased and we learned more about the
medical effects, the need to consider convening an ARB became clear. By
then, the Trump administration had taken office.
Question. When President Obama announced the changes to Cuba policy
on December 17, 2014, steps were taken to increase staffing levels at
the Embassy--a structure that had been essentially closed since the
1960s. Housing needs had to be addressed in very short order for the
new personnel. Names were provided to the Cuban government about U.S.
government personnel who would be stationed at Embassy Havana: What
steps were taken when increasing personnel to ensure the safety of U.S.
personnel? Did the Cuban government choose housing for U.S. personnel?
Answer. As is standard practice around the world, the Regional
Security Office (RSO) conducts briefings for all personnel (permanent,
TDY, and dependents) regarding threats at post, physical security at
residences, and emergency notification/response. All personnel and
dependents are also provided security notices (when relevant), and
security directives outlining safe practices and procedures in country.
Under standard diplomatic practice, names of personnel are provided to
the host nation, as it is the host nation's responsibility to ensure
the safety of all diplomatic personnel in their country.
The Embassy's RSO and Management Officer, in collaboration with the
Bureaus of Diplomatic Security (DS) and Overseas Buildings Operations
(OBO), are responsible for outlining and ensuring the implementation of
residential security requirements are in place before staff are allowed
to move in to any property. These entities work together to locate
housing, assess its suitability, and acquire residences. Part of that
process is assessing what upgrades or additional features may be
required in order to meet Overseas Security Policy Board residential
standards. Those upgrades are coordinated between offices at the
Embassy, DS, and OBO. The upgrades or exceptions are in place prior to
occupancy. This ensures that the Chief of Mission acknowledges and
accepts any known remaining risk, and that the risk is mitigated to the
greatest extent possible.
Question. When were the health complaints first raised with
Secretary Kerry?
Answer. It was not until after the presidential transition in
January 2017 that medical officials confirmed the onset of possibly
serious medical symptoms stemming from the incidents in late December
2016, which suggested these incidents went beyond routine harassment
previously experienced by U.S. diplomats in Havana. Secretary Kerry was
therefore not informed of the complaints.
Question. Were the complaints shared with President Obama? If yes,
when?
Answer. Embassy Havana first notified staff at the National
Security Council of increased harassment in early January 2017. We
would refer you to the White House and NSC for more information on
whether President Obama was made aware of these reports.
Question. Who decided it was safe to continue to keep the Embassy
open?
Answer. The Department of State is constantly reviewing the safety
and security of our embassies abroad. After considering the totality of
the situation, on September 29, 2017, Secretary Tillerson determined
that the circumstances necessitated the departure of non-emergency
personnel from Embassy Havana and assessed that the reduction of staff
and other mitigation mechanisms put into place allowed for the embassy
to remain open to support American citizens and U.S. diplomatic
initiatives while investigations were underway.
Question. During the transition, were Trump administration
officials read-in to the situation? If not, why?
Answer. It was not until after the transition that we received
medical confirmation of adverse medical effects on our personnel. Once
we understood these incidents were more than harassment and were
ongoing, we formally notified Secretary Tillerson.
Question. As Cuba fails to meet the norms of the OAS Charter, do
you believe that Cuba should participate in the Summit of the Americas?
Answer. No. The Cuban regime violates the basic human rights of its
people, and we will continue to call attention to its lack of
democracy, repression of civil society, and other abuses, including at
the Summit of Americas. Cuba's failures in these areas should be
addressed, and we should hold Cuba accountable.
As host, the Peruvian government has the prerogative to decide
which countries to invite and it invited Cuba. We are working with Peru
to ensure members from independent Cuban civil society have the
opportunity to engage leaders and other civil society representatives
from the region at the Summit, and to ensure the people of Cuba, not
just its regime, are represented.
__________
Responses of Hon. Francisco L. Palmieri to Questions
Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez
Question. You mentioned that Secretary Tillerson decided to form an
accountability review board on December 11, but the board has not yet
been constituted and Congress will be notified as soon as it is. Nearly
a month later, why hasn't the board been formed yet? What is causing
the delay? When can Congress expect the notification?
Answer. Following the Secretary's decision to form an
Accountability Review Board (ARB), the Department canvassed a broad
list of individuals with the experience and skills necessary to serve
on this ARB. Assembling the ARB took several weeks due to the Christmas
and New Year holidays, and because the majority of individuals
initially considered for this ARB could not serve due to scheduling
conflicts. However, the Department has since been able to assemble an
ARB with the right combination of skills to investigate this situation.
The members of the Cuba ARB possess extensive leadership and
management experience at overseas posts, medical and security
expertise, and experience with the intelligence community. The
Secretary has approved the ARB members, and we expect the congressional
notification to be released soon.
Question. During the hearing you agreed that Cuba being the police
state that it is clearly has some knowledge of who is performing these
attacks and that the Cuban government's public attempts to discredit
the attacks are extremely unhelpful, yet we have not taken any
measurable steps to demonstrate our outrage since we expelled 15
diplomats in October. Are we planning any other retaliatory measures?
What will our policy response be to Cuba's flagrant violation,
abrogation, and mockery of their international obligations?
Answer. Our response to these attacks has been robust and constant.
We have protested these attacks against our diplomats since February
2017 with the Cuban government and demanded the Cuban government
fulfill its obligations under the Vienna Conventions to take
appropriate steps to protect our diplomats in Havana. We have done so
on more than 20 subsequent occasions. In May 2017, we expelled two
diplomats to reflect the number of officials who, at the time, had
departed post because of these attacks. On October 3, 2017, we expelled
an additional 15 Cuban diplomats to underscore the gravity of these
attacks and ensure operational equity in our embassies. We most
recently raised these issues with Cuban government officials on the
margins of law enforcement-related technical exchanges in mid-January
2018.
Question. You testified during the hearing that we engaged with the
Cuban government over 20 times on the health attacks, but have we
discussed the attacks with any other governments, in particular Russia?
Please provide a classified briefing and update if you are not able to
answer this question.
Answer. We would be happy to address this question in a classified
setting.
Question. Embassy Havana went into Ordered Departure on September
29 and it is my understanding that the Department can keep an embassy
in that status for up to 180 days. What happens after that? If we are
still nowhere closer to understanding how or why our diplomats are
being attacked will we close down the embassy?
Answer. The total length of departure status may not exceed 180
days. Taking into account the Authorized Departure status for Hurricane
Irma, which preceded Ordered Departure, the 180-day period ends on
March 4, 2018. The Secretary will continue to review all available
security information and will decide on appropriate staffing levels,
after considering factors such as post's ability to maintain the
safety, security, and free movement of personnel posted to Havana. At
that point, the Department will consider appropriate actions, including
any adjustments to the staffing posture of Embassy Havana. The
embassy's Emergency Action Committee continues to meet regularly to
assess the security situation under Ordered Departure status.
Question. How many American businesses currently have licenses to
operate in Cuba? How many American businesses were granted licenses to
operate in Cuba after the previous administration announced new
regulations in 2014? How many OFAC licenses were finalized or granted
between February 2017 and November 2017?
Answer. While we work closely with the Department of the Treasury's
Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) on licensing cases in which
there is a U.S. foreign policy interest, we refer you to OFAC for
details on its licenses.
Question. As noted in the hearing, it does not appear the United
States has taken any action to respond to the Cuban government's
abrogation of duty? Expelling two diplomats and 15 more to achieve
parity in Embassy operations is not a countermeasure. What steps are we
taking?
Answer. The safety and security of our diplomats is our top
priority. Our response to these attacks has been robust and constant.
We have protested these attacks against our diplomats since February
2017 with the Cuban government and demanded the Cuban government
fulfill its obligations under the Vienna Conventions to take all
appropriate steps to protect our diplomats in Havana. We have done so
on more than 20 subsequent occasions. In May 2017, we expelled two
diplomats to reflect the number of officials who, at the time, had
departed post because of these attacks. On October 3, 2017, we expelled
an additional 15 Cuban diplomats to underscore the gravity of these
attacks and ensure operational equity in our embassies. We most
recently raised these issues with Cuban government officials on the
margins of law enforcement-related technical exchanges in mid-January
2018.
We would be happy to discuss steps we are taking with regard to
countermeasures in a classified setting.
__________
Responses of Mr. Todd J. Brown to Questions
Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez
Question. It is my understanding that even after employees were
medically evacuated from Cuba in February, the Department did not
include the attacks or the risk of attacks in security briefings
provided to employees who were either being posted to Havana or serving
in temporary capacities. When exactly did the Department start
including the potential of attacks as part of the standard security
briefing for incoming officers? Why did it take the Department so long
to include that information in their standard security briefing?
Answer. All U.S. direct hire personnel traveling to Havana are
required to receive a security brief prior to and when they arrive to
post. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) and Embassy Havana's
Regional Security Office (RSO) actively brief staff of security
concerns, personal security practices, and the embassy's security
response to threats personnel might face while in Cuba. The Embassy
began briefing personnel about potentially new aspects of harassment
impacting our staff as early as January 2017. As we developed more
information on the medical impacts to our staff, our briefing
incorporated any and all relevant threat information that could protect
our people.
Question. I understand that diplomats who were affected were told
not to share their symptoms or concerns with family members. Why?
Answer. We would be happy to address this question in a classified
setting.
Question. Did you activate a trip wire in Embassy Havana? Did
Embassy Havana convene an emergency action committee in response to the
attacks? When? How many times? If so, how did post safety policy change
due to the tripwire and EAC meeting? If not, why not?
Answer. Embassy Havana has convened over a dozen Emergency Action
Committee (EAC) meetings related to these attacks, the first of which
was held in April 2017. Post continuously assessed the available facts
and refined its response in an effort to better understand the
situation and protect personnel. The Embassy leadership shared
information with the community through several town hall meetings, the
first of which was held in March 2017. Beginning in February 2017,
Embassy Havana's Regional Security Office regularly engaged Department
of State security officials as well as experts within the interagency
community to share information and seek to better understand the
threat. Although the cause has not been identified to date, the Embassy
continues to provide a robust briefing to personnel electing to serve
in Havana, providing instruction on mitigation efforts and how to react
to an event, and immediately deploying emergency security and medical
personnel to attack scenes.
__________
Responses of Dr. Charles Rosenfarb to Questions
Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez
Question. You testified that the first time the medical unit
evaluated one of the victims was in January 2017, but the first
reported attack was in November 2016 and the Regional Security Officer
and Charge were made aware of the symptoms in December 2016 according
to other testimony. Why did it take so long to provide medical
attention to the victim? What steps exactly did the medical unit take
to ensure that that patient was receiving the best medical care
available? How did the medical unit decide to which medical facility to
refer the victims and did those facilities have the capacity to treat
brain injuries? When did you make the decision to utilize other medical
facilities?
Answer. I misspoke. The medical unit first evaluated one of the
patients who noted an unusual acoustic exposure on December 30, 2016.
The symptoms the patient experienced at the time of exposure had
resolved by the time the individual presented to the medical unit.
Those initial symptoms described by the patient were vague and could be
attributed to numerous causes. When at least one additional patient
reporting a similar history to the first patient presented to the
medical unit in January, it was determined that further evaluations
were needed. The medical unit in Havana then authorized the affected
individuals to undergo government-funded evaluations by a highly
qualified specialist in injuries to the acoustic system at the
University of Miami.
Both Embassy leadership and the medical provider at Embassy Havana
continually encouraged mission personnel to report anything unusual to
the medical unit and to the Regional Security Officer, whether it was
an unusual sound or sensation or unexplained symptoms. All individuals
in the Embassy community who reported symptoms at any time received
medical attention as soon as they reported to the Embassy medical unit,
all individuals who desired specialist evaluation, whether or not they
had reported symptoms, were medevaced to Miami for assessment, and a
screening of the general Embassy community was conducted by medical
experts including from the University of Miami.
After the initial cohort of patients was identified by our
University of Miami medical experts, we selected a nationally-known
center of excellence in brain injury and repair, convenient to the
Washington metropolitan area, that could fully accommodate all future
patient referrals, provide the required full spectrum of rehabilitative
services to those affected, and serve as a resource on ancillary
occupational health matters that would enable the patients' ability to
return to work.
Question. You testified that none of the victims were paying for
any medical bills, but conceded that there were some limitations to the
medical treatment that would be covered by workers compensation. In
particular, you noted that family members (some of whom are victims)
would not be eligible for workers compensation, what other coverage
limitations exist? Is the State Department also covering other
associated expenses like travel to and from the medical facilities?
Answer. I would defer to my colleagues in the Department of Labor
to address coverage limitations of workers compensation. While existing
authorities permit the Department of State (Department) to pay for the
treatment cost for illnesses, injuries, or medical conditions incurred
while assigned to a post abroad for eligible government employees and
their families, current policies may limit coverage of expenses for
long-term follow-up evaluations and later treatment. The Department is
covering the cost of travel to and from medical facilities for its
employees and affected family members who are on medical evacuation,
including some travel that had not traditionally been covered under the
Department's medical program.
Question. Given the life-altering implications of these attacks,
will the Department provide life-time coverage for related health
concerns? Even if employees leave the Department?
Answer. At this time we do not know the long-term implications of
these patients' symptoms and clinical findings given the unknown
mechanism of cause. We do know that people with head injuries sometimes
experience long term sequelae. The Department has not typically funded
long term care or medical follow-up for current or former personnel for
work-related illnesses or injuries when workers compensation benefits
are an available remedy. However, this is an unusual circumstance, and
we are working to ensure that our people receive the care they need for
as long as is necessary. Caring for our personnel remains our highest
priority.
__________
Responses of Hon. Francisco L. Palmieri to Questions
Submitted by Senator Jeff Flake
Question. There seems to be some confusion as to what, exactly,
caused the incidents that have impacted U.S. diplomats as well as
reportedly diplomats associated with the Canada. Those affected have
spoken about hearing some kind of sound. Do U.S. investigators know
whether this reported sound was natural or mechanical?
Answer. The exact mechanism responsible for the reported injuries
caused to U.S. and Canadian diplomatic personnel remains unknown.
Question. What has been the nature of U.S. contacts with Cuban
officials regarding this matter?
Answer. The Department has raised this issue on more than 20
occasions with Cuban officials from the highest level to the working
level. Department officials most recently reminded the Cubans of their
obligation under the Vienna Convention to take adequate steps to
protect our diplomats on the margins of law enforcement-related
technical exchanges in mid-January 2018.
Question. How have Cuba and the U.S. worked together to further the
investigation into what impacted American personnel?
Answer. The United States is conducting a thorough, ongoing
investigation into the specifics of these attacks. The Cubans have
facilitated the travel of U.S. investigators to the island on four
occasions and provided access to the hotels where attacks occurred. The
Cubans also provided U.S. investigators with the results of an ongoing
Cuban investigation into the attacks. However, the Cubans have failed
to resolve the case or to provide a guarantee regarding the safety of
our personnel.
Question. Cuba has proposed a greater exchange of medical
information with the U.S. and a direct meeting of Cuban and U.S.
medical experts. What is the status of this proposal? What are the
benefits of such a potential meeting? What are the risks?
Answer. We are still trying to understand this complicated medical
issue. Our patients have received comprehensive medical evaluations and
treatment by leading American medical experts in the field. In late
April 2017, a medical summary that described the early health effects,
including symptoms and findings, was provided to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs by the U.S. Embassy. Similar information was shared
with Ministry of the Interior officials during a May 2017 meeting with
the Embassy medical practitioner and the RSO. In early June 2017, the
Embassy provided a formal response to a Cuban Diplomatic Note that had
requested additional information regarding the medical examination of
victims of the attacks.
While a potential meeting with Cuban public health officials could
yield information regarding similar health issues noted outside the
diplomatic community, greater sharing of medical findings with the
Cuban government would carry significant risks. The medical privacy of
our personnel could be compromised, and information might
unintentionally emerge that could potentially benefit the still-
unidentified perpetrators of these attacks.
Question. Press reports indicate that the FBI has found no evidence
to support the conjecture of impacts to American personnel being caused
by ``an attack.'' Is the use of the term ``attacks,'' even without
proof or conjecture to substantiate the use of this term, an attempt to
draw attention to Cuba's responsibilities under Article 29 of the
Vienna Convention?
Answer. We would refer any questions regarding the status of the
investigation to the FBI. In light of the harm to affected individuals,
the State Department considers these incidents to be attacks against
our personnel. Accordingly, we have continued to press the Cuban
government to fulfill its obligations under Article 29 of the Vienna
Conventions to take all appropriate steps to protect accredited foreign
diplomats in its territory. It is the Cuban government's responsibility
to ensure these attacks come to an end.
Question. The Cuban government claims that it was informed of a
March 30 incident on April 25; a one month delay. On April 6, Cuban
authorities indicate they were informed of an incident that occurred
the night before but were allegedly denied access to the premise. How
are the State Department and other related investigative agencies
coordinating to ensure these kinds of mishaps do not take place?
Answer. Post and the Department pass all relevant information
immediately to the Cuban government as soon as it is reported or
confirmed through medical diagnosis. Any delays in notifications were
based on timeliness of reporting by employees and medical confirmation,
which often came well after the initial incident took place. Embassy
Havana's Regional Security Officer (RSO) and Front Office reinforced
with employees the need to report incidents immediately. In cases when
this happened, Cubans authorities promptly responded with the RSO to
the location of the incident.
In regards to the April 6 event, the Embassy RSO and Front Office
contacted the Cuban authorities immediately after being notified of a
possible event at one of our properties. Cuban authorities responded to
the location in question with 30 people to the attack site, all were
allowed access to the property. The Cubans then conducted a search of
the property, to include a video recording of their inspection.
Question. Cuba is on the verge of what could arguably be the most
influential leadership transition in a generation. Given our
restriction on personnel related to the ordered departure, what are the
embassy's current capabilities to monitor and assess political
conditions on the island?
Answer. On September 29, 2017, the Secretary determined the risks
associated with the health attacks required a change in U.S. Embassy
Havana's operating status to Ordered Departure (OD). Among the
emergency personnel who remain in Havana is a political-economic
officer whose duties include monitoring and assessing Cuba's political
conditions. While we recognize the change in status to OD necessarily
limits our capacity to monitor political conditions, the safety and
security of our people is the overriding priority of the Secretary. It
is mine, as well.
Question. What are the embassy's current capabilities to monitor
and assess economic conditions on the island?
Answer. On September 29, 2017, the Secretary determined the risks
associated with the health attacks required a change in U.S. Embassy
Havana's operating status to Ordered Departure (OD). Among the
emergency personnel who remain in Havana is a political-economic
officer whose duties include monitoring and assessing Cuba's economic
conditions. While we recognize the change in status to OD necessarily
limits our capacity to monitor economic conditions, the safety and
security of our people is the overriding priority of the Secretary. It
is mine, as well.
Question. Without divulging sources, methods, or current asset,
what is the U.S. government's current capacity to monitor and assess
intelligence-related issues on the island?
Answer. We would be happy to discuss this in a classified setting.
Question. In your oral testimony, you indicated that after the
incidents that have impacted U.S. diplomats came to light embassy
personnel were given the opportunity to leave Embassy Havana
voluntarily. Were there embassy personnel that opted to stay in Havana?
Answer. Yes, most employees opted to continue working to promote
U.S. interests in Havana after learning about these attacks. Six
embassy officers affected by the incidents left post prior to ordered
departure. Regardless of whether they chose to remain or depart,
Department employees are dedicated to serving the country and promoting
U.S. foreign policy abroad, even in difficult circumstances.
In your written testimony, you indicated ``[t]hese decisions--both
to draw down our personnel at Embassy Havana and to expel Cuba
diplomats did not signal a change in policy.'' While purportedly not a
policy change, the reduction in staff is having an impact on basic
embassy functions that are fundamental to a bilateral relationship.
Along those lines:
Question. How many non-immigrant and immigrant visa interviews were
conducted each month since the drawdown and monthly in the year prior
to the drawdown?
Answer. Beginning September 29, 2017, the U.S. Embassy in Havana
suspended most routine visa services due to the ordered departure of
non-emergency personnel. Immigrant visas for Cubans are processed at
the U.S. Embassy in Bogota, Colombia. The only nonimmigrant visa
applications the U.S. embassy in Havana is able to process are those
for diplomatic or official (category A or G) visas or extremely rare
emergency cases when the applicant has a life-threatening condition
requiring treatment in the United States.
Since the drawdown in staff, Embassy Havana has processed the
following number of nonimmigrant (NIV) and immigrant visa (IV)
applications by month. The second chart contains statistics for the
previous 12 months.
Question. What is the current average wait time for non-immigrant
and immigrant visa interviews? What is the average wait time each month
in the year prior to the drawdown?
Answer. Due to the unique circumstances of each immigrant visa (IV)
case, the Department does not track average wait times for these visas.
The Department is no longer tracking non-immigrant visa (NIV) wait
times at Embassy Havana because of the change in operating status. In
the year preceding the drawdown, the last reported wait times for NIVs
in Havana for each month were as follows: October 2016-117 days,
November 2016-124 days, December 2016-98 days, January 2017-97 days,
February 2017-98 days, March 2017-99 days, April 2017-113 days, May
2017-123 days, June 2017-76 days, July 2017-70 days, August 2017-61
days, September 2017-83 days.
Question. How many cases are currently pending in 221(g) status?
How many were pending in 221(g) status each month in the year prior to
the drawdown?
Answer. Embassy Bogota has issued 669 immigrant visas to
individuals whose cases were originally refused under INA 221(g) in
Embassy Havana at the time of the drawdown in services. Embassy Havana
is in the process of transferring the remaining cases originally
refused under INA 221(g) to Embassy Bogota for processing. There are
currently 89 NIV cases at U.S. Embassy Havana that are refused under
INA 221(g). Embassy Havana will continue processing those NIV cases as
appropriate.
Question. How many non-immigrant and immigrant visas have been
issued on a monthly basis since the drawdown and were issued each month
in the year prior to the drawdown?
Answer. Since the drawdown in staff, Embassy Havana has issued the
following number of nonimmigrant and immigrant visa applications by
month.
Question. In what instances have immigrant and non-immigrant visa
application processing been referred to a third country?
Answer. Cuban applicants for nonimmigrant visas may apply at any
U.S. embassy or consulate overseas, but must be physically present in
the country at the time of the application. We have begun transferring
immigrant visa applications and scheduling immigrant visa interviews
for Cuban nationals at the U.S. Embassy in Bogota, Colombia.
Question. It is my understanding that the current status of ordered
withdrawal for Embassy Havana will come to an end in early March. What
factors will be considered when deciding the subsequent condition and
staffing levels of the embassy in post-order withdrawal status?
Answer. The total length of departure status may not exceed 180
days. Taking into account the Authorized Departure status for Hurricane
Irma, which preceded Ordered Departure, the 180-day period ends on
March 4, 2018. The Secretary will continue to review all available
security information and will make that determination at the
appropriate time, after considering factors such as post's ability to
maintain the safety, security, and free movement of personnel posted to
Havana. At that point, the Department will consider appropriate
actions, including any adjustments to the staffing posture of Embassy
Havana. The embassy's Emergency Action Committee continues to meet
regularly to assess the security situation under Ordered Departure
status.
Question. It is my understanding that the expulsion of Cuban
diplomats in order to match staff reductions at Embassy Havana involved
the expulsion of specifically selected and named staff members at the
Cuban embassy. Is it the usual practice in matching staffing levels to
delineate specific members of the foreign embassy staff for removal
versus selecting a target staffing level?
Answer. On May 23, 2017, the Secretary of State made the decision
to expel two diplomats assigned to the Cuban Embassy in Washington, DC.
On October 3, 2017, the Secretary of State expelled an additional 15
Cuban diplomats. This was done to underscore Cuba's responsibility to
protect our diplomats in Havana and the gravity of the situation, as
well as to ensure equity in the impact on operations of our respective
missions. The specific circumstances of this situation led the
Secretary to determine this approach as the most appropriate course of
action. We would be happy to provide further information in a
classified setting.
__________
Responses of Mr. Todd J. Brown to Questions
Submitted by Senator Jeff Flake
Question. There seems to be some confusion as to what, exactly,
caused the incidents that have impacted U.S. diplomats as well as
reportedly diplomats associated with the Canada. Those affected have
spoken about hearing some kind of sound. Do U.S. investigators know
whether this reported sound was natural or mechanical?
Answer. The exact mechanism responsible for the reported injuries
caused to U.S. and Canadian diplomatic personnel remains unknown.
Question. What has been the nature of U.S. contacts with Cuban
officials regarding this matter?
Answer. The Department has raised this issue on more than 20
occasions with Cuban officials from the highest level to the working
level. Department officials most recently reminded the Cubans of their
obligation under the Vienna Convention to take adequate steps to
protect our diplomats on the margins of law enforcement-related
technical exchanges in mid-January 2018.
Question. How have Cuba and the U.S. worked together to further the
investigation into what impacted American personnel?
Answer. The United States is conducting a thorough, ongoing
investigation into the specifics of these attacks. The Cubans have
facilitated the travel of U.S. investigators to the island on four
occasions and provided access to the hotels where attacks occurred. The
Cubans also provided U.S. investigators with the results of an ongoing
Cuban investigation into the attacks. However, the Cubans have failed
to resolve the case or to provide a guarantee regarding the safety of
our personnel.
Question. Cuba has proposed a greater exchange of medical
information with the U.S. and a direct meeting of Cuban and U.S.
medical experts. What is the status of this proposal? What are the
benefits of such a potential meeting? What are the risks?
Answer. We are still trying to understand this complicated medical
issue. Our patients have received comprehensive medical evaluations and
treatment by leading American medical experts in the field. In late
April 2017, a medical summary that described the early health effects,
including symptoms and findings, was provided to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs by the U.S. Embassy. Similar information was shared
with Ministry of the Interior officials during a May 2017 meeting with
the Embassy medical practitioner and the RSO. In early June 2017, the
Embassy provided a formal response to a Cuban Diplomatic Note that had
requested additional information regarding the medical examination of
victims of the attacks.
While a potential meeting with Cuban public health officials could
yield information regarding similar health issues noted outside the
diplomatic community, greater sharing of medical findings with the
Cuban government would carry significant risks. The medical privacy of
our personnel could be compromised, and information might
unintentionally emerge that could potentially benefit the still-
unidentified perpetrators of these attacks.
Question. Press reports indicate that the FBI has found no evidence
to support the conjecture of impacts to American personnel being caused
by ``an attack.'' Is the use of the term ``attacks,'' even without
proof or conjecture to substantiate the use of this term, an attempt to
draw attention to Cuba's responsibilities under Article 29 of the
Vienna Convention?
Answer. We would refer any questions regarding the status of the
investigation to the FBI. In light of the harm to affected individuals,
the State Department considers these incidents to be attacks against
our personnel. Accordingly, we have continued to press the Cuban
government to fulfill its obligations under Article 29 of the Vienna
Conventions to take all appropriate steps to protect accredited foreign
diplomats in its territory. It is the Cuban government's responsibility
to ensure these attacks come to an end.
Question. The Cuban government claims that it was informed of a
March 30 incident on April 25; a one month delay. On April 6, Cuban
authorities indicate they were informed of an incident that occurred
the night before but were allegedly denied access to the premise. How
are the State Department and other related investigative agencies
coordinating to ensure these kinds of mishaps do not take place?
Answer. Post and the Department pass all relevant information
immediately to the Cuban government as soon as it is reported or
confirmed through medical diagnosis. Any delays in notifications were
based on timeliness of reporting by employees and medical confirmation,
which often came well after the initial incident took place. Embassy
Havana's Regional Security Officer (RSO) and Front Office reinforced
with employees the need to report incidents immediately. In cases when
this happened, Cubans authorities promptly responded with the RSO to
the location of the incident.
In regards to the April 6 event, the Embassy RSO and Front Office
contacted the Cuban authorities immediately after being notified of a
possible event at one of our properties. Cuban authorities responded to
the location in question with 30 people to the attack site, all were
allowed access to the property. The Cubans then conducted a search of
the property, to include a video recording of their inspection.
Question. In response to questions, you said you were not aware of
Cuba's investigative efforts. Why would the Diplomatic Security Bureau
be uninformed about information developed by Cuba?
Answer. The Department of State engaged the Cubans on several
occasions during the course of these events, stressing the importance
of honoring their commitments to protect all diplomats living and
working in their country. To date, the FBI, with DS' cooperation, has
had significant access to sites and locations within Cuba, and has been
leading the U.S. investigation. The Cuban government has been
conducting their own investigation of the events and DS defers to the
FBI for updates on their relationship with Cuba's investigation. As of
now, the Cuban government has relayed their continued inability to
identify a responsible actor/s or mechanism of injury.
__________
Responses of Dr. Charles Rosenfarb to Questions
Submitted by Senator Jeff Flake
Question. There seems to be some confusion as to what, exactly,
caused the incidents that have impacted U.S. diplomats as well as
reportedly diplomats associated with the Canada. Those affected have
spoken about hearing some kind of sound. Do U.S. investigators know
whether this reported sound was natural or mechanical?
Answer. The exact mechanism responsible for the reported injuries
caused to U.S. and Canadian diplomatic personnel remains unknown.
Question. What has been the nature of U.S. contacts with Cuban
officials regarding this matter?
Answer. The Department has raised this issue on more than 20
occasions with Cuban officials from the highest level to the working
level. Department officials most recently reminded the Cubans of their
obligation under the Vienna Convention to take adequate steps to
protect our diplomats on the margins of law enforcement-related
technical exchanges in mid-January 2018.
Question. How have Cuba and the U.S. worked together to further the
investigation into what impacted American personnel?
Answer. The United States is conducting a thorough, ongoing
investigation into the specifics of these attacks. The Cubans have
facilitated the travel of U.S. investigators to the island on four
occasions and provided access to the hotels where attacks occurred. The
Cubans also provided U.S. investigators with the results of an ongoing
Cuban investigation into the attacks. However, the Cubans have failed
to resolve the case or to provide a guarantee regarding the safety of
our personnel.
Question. Cuba has proposed a greater exchange of medical
information with the U.S. and a direct meeting of Cuban and U.S.
medical experts. What is the status of this proposal? What are the
benefits of such a potential meeting? What are the risks?
Answer. We are still trying to understand this complicated medical
issue. Our patients have received comprehensive medical evaluations and
treatment by leading American medical experts in the field. In late
April 2017, a medical summary that described the early health effects,
including symptoms and findings, was provided to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs by the U.S. Embassy. Similar information was shared
with Ministry of the Interior officials during a May 2017 meeting with
the Embassy medical practitioner and the RSO. In early June 2017, the
Embassy provided a formal response to a Cuban Diplomatic Note that had
requested additional information regarding the medical examination of
victims of the attacks.
While a potential meeting with Cuban public health officials could
yield information regarding similar health issues noted outside the
diplomatic community, greater sharing of medical findings with the
Cuban government would carry significant risks. The medical privacy of
our personnel could be compromised, and information might
unintentionally emerge that could potentially benefit the still-
unidentified perpetrators of these attacks.
Question. Press reports indicate that the FBI has found no evidence
to support the conjecture of impacts to American personnel being caused
by ``an attack.'' Is the use of the term ``attacks,'' even without
proof or conjecture to substantiate the use of this term, an attempt to
draw attention to Cuba's responsibilities under Article 29 of the
Vienna Convention?
Answer. We would refer any questions regarding the status of the
investigation to the FBI. In light of the harm to affected individuals,
the State Department considers these incidents to be attacks against
our personnel. Accordingly, we have continued to press the Cuban
government to fulfill its obligations under Article 29 of the Vienna
Conventions to take all appropriate steps to protect accredited foreign
diplomats in its territory. It is the Cuban government's responsibility
to ensure these attacks come to an end.
Question. The Cuban government claims that it was informed of a
March 30 incident on April 25; a one month delay. On April 6, Cuban
authorities indicate they were informed of an incident that occurred
the night before but were allegedly denied access to the premise. How
are the State Department and other related investigative agencies
coordinating to ensure these kinds of mishaps do not take place?
Answer. Post and the Department pass all relevant information
immediately to the Cuban government as soon as it is reported or
confirmed through medical diagnosis. Any delays in notifications were
based on timeliness of reporting by employees and medical confirmation,
which often came well after the initial incident took place. Embassy
Havana's Regional Security Officer (RSO) and Front Office reinforced
with employees the need to report incidents immediately. In cases when
this happened, Cubans authorities promptly responded with the RSO to
the location of the incident.
In regards to the April 6 event, the Embassy RSO and Front Office
contacted the Cuban authorities immediately after being notified of a
possible event at one of our properties. Cuban authorities responded to
the location in question with 30 people to the attack site, all were
allowed access to the property. The Cubans then conducted a search of
the property, to include a video recording of their inspection.
[all]