[Senate Hearing 115-770]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 115-770
THE ROAD AHEAD: U.S. INTERESTS, VALUES,
AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 30, 2017
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web:
http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
39-943 PDF WASHINGTON : 2020
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
BOB CORKER, Tennessee, Chairman
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
MARCO RUBIO, Florida ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
CORY GARDNER, Colorado TOM UDALL, New Mexico
TODD YOUNG, Indiana CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming TIM KAINE, Virginia
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
RAND PAUL, Kentucky CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey
Todd Womack, Staff Director
Jessica Lewis, Democratic Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator From Tennessee.................... 1
Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., U.S. Senator From Maryland............. 3
Albright, Hon. Madeleine K., Former U.S. Secretary of State,..... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Hadley, Hon. Stephen J., Former U.S. National Security Advisor,
Washington, DC................................................. 12
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
The Committee Received No Response From Hon. Madeleine K.
Albright for the Following Questions Submitted By Senator Todd
Young.......................................................... 39
The Committee Received No Response From Hon. Stephen J. Hadley
for the Following Questions Submitted by Senator Todd Young.... 39
The Committee Received No Response From Hon. Madeleine K.
Albright for the Following Questions Submitted By Senator Cory
A. Booker...................................................... 39
The Committee Received No Response From Hon. Stephen J. Hadley
for the Following Questions Submitted by Senator Cory A. Booker 40
Congress's Duty in the War with ISIS [New York Times, March 25,
2017].......................................................... 42
(iii)
THE ROAD AHEAD: U.S. INTERESTS, VALUES, AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE
----------
THURSDAY, MARCH 30, 2017
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m. in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Bob Corker,
chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Corker [presiding], Johnson, Flake,
Gardner, Young, Cardin, Menendez, Shaheen, Coons, Udall,
Murphy, Kaine, Markey, and Booker.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE
The Chairman. The Foreign Relations Committee will come to
order.
I thank everyone for being here. We have two outstanding
witnesses today.
And just as a housekeeping thing, I guess we have got
another vote. So what we might try to do is get through opening
comments now. We might run, go vote, and then come back. Again,
we apologize especially having such distinguished people with
us today.
We spent a lot of time in this committee looking at very
specific foreign policy issues, and whether it is the
challenges we face in the Mosul campaign in Iraq appears to
wind down or down-in-the-weeds details of Venezuelan politics,
we rightly focus much of our attention on the tactical and
operational. There is not much time left for the truly
strategic. I mean, let us face it. That is the way things have
been both at the White House and here. That is why as chairman
we have made it a priority to concentrate more of our time and
energy on exploring the bigger questions facing our country and
the world.
Members will remember that last year we were fortunate to
hear testimony along those more strategic lines from former
Secretary of State, James Baker, and former National Security
Advisor, Tom Donelan, both of whom I know are friends of yours.
I should also make clear that we stand in a moment of
exceptional opportunity to take the strategic thinking we are
exploring at hearings like this and work together with a new
administration and turn it into reality. We have a chance right
now to join forces in a bipartisan way with the executive
branch, which regardless of what side of the aisle you may be
on, there is no question they are more accessible and welcoming
of input than any administration I have dealt with since
joining the committee.
As a matter of fact, since I am getting a reaction from
Hadley, I will just say that we had lunch with Tillerson last
week. We are going to be breaking out in small groups to look
at each of their 12 strategic regions. We are going to be doing
the same thing with McMaster.
So as this administration moves ahead, they really are
looking on a bipartisan basis for input. So it is even more
important that you all are here today. And we thank you.
Members know we have already had, as I just mentioned, a
productive working meeting with Secretary of State Tillerson
yesterday. Ambassador Haley was in. I thought we had a great
meeting with her. What we will learn today will help inform
those future interactions with the executive branch, and if we
seize this moment, it will help us craft solid foreign policies
in a cooperative manner.
In my view, we face four critical areas of concern as we
and the new administration move ahead.
First of all, over the past several years, we have seen a
crisis of credibility emerge when it comes to the world's view
of the United States. Put simply, people no longer believe that
we can be counted on to do what we say we will do.
Second, we have a serious problem with prioritization.
Since the end of the Cold War, the number of things being
called national security priorities has expanded to an enormous
laundry list. We spend too much time frankly on pet issues of
specific interest groups, individual Members of Congress, and
administration bureaucrats. And as the old saying goes, if
everything is a priority, then nothing is a priority. And I
hope you will help us with that today.
Third, our foreign policy has clearly and obviously become
disconnected from the beliefs and desires of the American
people. I mean, let us face it. One of the outcomes of this
most recent election was about that. I mean, we have not done a
good job of making sure people here in our country are
connected with our foreign policy. We must have a national
conversation about what constitutes core U.S. interests and
policymakers who have to do a better job of squaring those
interests and the policies we pursue to achieve them with the
will of the folks that sent us here in the first place.
And then finally, we have to recognize that no matter what
we talk about in this committee day to day, no matter what we
discuss here this morning, the top threat, the top national
security threat is us. It is us. And that is our inability to
deal with our long-term fiscal situation. Everybody knows it.
Secretary Albright has mentioned this in times past. I know
Secretary Hadley has.
The other threats we face, North Korea, Russia, Iran, and
all the rest, are significant, but so is the fact that we are
staring down the barrel of the kind of fiscal situation that
has led to the end of kingdoms, empires, and republics
throughout history. And it is something that we have to grapple
with.
I want to extend my great gratitude to the witnesses. I do
not want to prolong my opening comments any longer. We look
forward to your testimony, vigorous questioning. It is an honor
to have you.
And with that, Senator Cardin.
STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND
Senator Cardin. Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for
convening this hearing and getting us two very, very
distinguished witnesses. Their service to our country is
legendary, and we thank you very much for everything you have
done to strengthen America in your public service throughout
your career and continuing your inspiration to foreign policy
development in our country. So thank you both. It is a pleasure
to have you here as we think about U.S. national security
strategies in the years ahead.
When the Cold War ended some 30 years ago, we were told
that we were at the end of history and that democracy, open
borders, free trade, liberal economics, and pluralistic
societies had emerged triumphant.
Yet, with the rise of populism, including here in the
United States, with the renewed ideological challenges that we
face from Russia, China, and the Middle East and with still
ongoing struggles with ISIS in Syria and Iraq, for the balance
of the 21st century we are very much in history once again.
Renewed and vigorous U.S. leadership of the sort that
helped us chart the 20th century, the sort of leadership that
the two of you have provided to multiple administrations have
never been more necessary. Yet, the new administration seems to
have a very different idea about how to exercise U.S. power in
the world, ideas that in my view risk undermining key tools and
mechanisms that enable U.S. leadership.
I am a firm believer in the enduring strength of the United
States. Yet, I am concerned that our position as the leader of
the free world is at risk. The ideas of democracy as a model
and of development and diplomacy as tools for engagement are
being significantly challenged. The European Project, which has
been the source of security and prosperity for the past 70
years, is now being undermined with U.S. support for and in
deference to far right wing efforts to undo European security
and democratic architecture. The new administration appears to
have elevated Russia and China to privileged positions ahead of
our allies in a new game of great power politics.
Russia has attacked our democracy, illegally annexed
Crimea, and invaded eastern Ukraine. Putin's Russia now
considers itself in an existential struggle with the West, and
all Russia's domestic problems, a weakening ruble, collapsing
energy prices, labor unrest, are framed by the Kremlin as
evidence of foreign hostility rather than the consequences of
their own corruption and expansionist ambitions. In my view,
Russia is a revisionist power that will cause further trouble
across Europe and in the international order more generally.
Russia sought to undermine and interfere in our elections, and
how we respond to Putin's broader strategic game is one of the
key challenges of our time. Therefore, your views and advice on
Russia is something that I look forward to our discussion at
this hearing.
Likewise, we welcome your perspectives on the rise of
China, which has created anxiety through the Asia-Pacific
region, raising with it questions as to how best maintain the
institutional order in East Asia that has so benefited the
region and the globe for the past seven decades.
After World War II, the United States led the world towards
peace, prosperity, and freedom. It did not come easy. We faced
down threats from the Soviets, Saddam Hussein, Milosevic, and
others, and we have done so effectively in the past. We need to
renew and revitalize American power and leadership to advance
U.S. leadership interests in the world, like continuing to take
back ISIS-claimed territory and fighting the warped ideology of
Al Qaeda. This challenge, this question about our commitment to
basic principles, values, and norms of democracy is fundamental
to our role in the world.
I am also interested in your views on the roles of good
governance, transparency, democracy, human rights, and the
development of a U.S. foreign policy toolkit. It is never more
important than it is today. For too long, U.S. foreign policy
has treated governance issues, anti-corruption, transparency,
democracy, and civil society capacity building, as well as
basic human rights and development, as secondary issues. Today
we need to make sure that is not the case.
Yet, this administration seems to take as a given that the
United States is not exceptional, rather than our form of
government is no different than that of Russia or China,
pursuing power narrowly, conducting foreign policy in a
transitional way that are not our values. That is not what we
are as Americans. The President and his inner circle may not
talk about American values, but I will and I know both of you
will. In the face of this assault of our values, we cannot be
silent. We know that America derives its strength from its
values, and we can never retreat from that core concept.
Lastly, I am interested in your perspective on how the
Trump administration's proposal to slash about 36 percent from
the State Department and USAID budgets will affect our ability
to safeguard our Nation's interests. The deep cuts, accompanied
by efforts to dismantle key U.S. foreign policy tools and
institutions, comes at a time when we face massive humanitarian
crises with 65 million people displaced or on the move and 20
million facing starvation in the coming weeks.
I recognize that Congress ultimately determines our
spending priorities. I recognize that. But I am deeply
concerned that the proposed cuts of the State Department and
foreign assistance budgets suggest that the Trump
administration could fatally undermine our ability to renew and
revive our leadership at just a time when the leadership is
increasingly essential.
So for all those reasons, I look forward to this discussion
today as we talk about the future of U.S. foreign policy.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Thank you again both for being here.
I have never seen a President's budget ever become law--
ever. So we know we are all going to shape that, and I know we
all have an opportunity to shape the direction of the Trump
foreign policy in ways that, candidly, we have not been able to
shape other administrations because of just where they are in
their thinking.
So your being here today is most helpful. We are glad to
have former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, known to all
of us, respected, and liked by all of us, and former National
Security Advisor Stephen Hadley, known by all of us, liked by
all of us, admired by all of us. Thank you for being here. If
you could summarize your comments in about 5 minutes, any
written documents you have will be entered into the record,
without objection. And with that, I think the way your protocol
is when you all do many joint assessments is Secretary Albright
goes first. So if you would, please begin.
STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT, FORMER U.S. SECRETARY
OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Secretary Albright. Thank you very much, Chairman Corker
and Senator Cardin and distinguished members of the committee.
And thank you for the opportunity to be here today. And in
listening to the opening statements, we certainly have plenty
to talk about and the fact that you see the role of this
committee in the broad way that you do I think is very
encouraging.
I am pleased to return to these familiar surroundings and
to see so many good friends here. And I am also delighted to be
able to appear alongside Steve Hadley who truly is one of the
smartest and most principled people that I know.
We have worked together on a number of foreign policy
initiatives in the years since we left office and most recently
in co-chairing the Atlantic Council's Middle East Strategy Task
Force. And we have done this not only because we happen to like
each other, but also because we both fervently believe in the
importance of bipartisanship in foreign policy. And this was a
lesson that I learned from one of my first bosses, Senator Ed
Muskie, when I worked as his chief legislative assistant.
I know that the members of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee share our belief in working across party lines
because this committee has always been bipartisan in its
approach. And proof of that can be found in the relationship
that I was able to build with Chairman Helms. He and I truly
were the odd couple. The ``New York Times'' called our
friendship, quote, perfectly natural and utterly astonishing.
But while our politics could not have been more different, we
did put those differences aside in order to build common ground
on issues such as NATO expansion, banning chemical weapons, and
reorganizing the State Department.
My experience with Chairman Helms gave me an even deeper
respect for the legislative branch of the government and the
responsibilities assigned to it under Article 1 of the
Constitution. This is Article 1 time. I know the members of
this committee take those responsibilities very seriously,
which is why Steve and I really are pleased to be able to be
here today and to join you in exploring the road ahead for U.S.
interests and U.S. values and the American people.
The hearing does come at a time of deep political divisions
at home and heightened instability abroad when basic questions
are being asked about how and why America engages in the world.
As members of different political parties, Steve and I disagree
on many things, but we are in vigorous agreement on how we see
America's role in the world. We both believe it is profoundly
in America's interest to be engaged globally because our
security and prosperity at home are linked to economic and
political health abroad. This mindset is what led our country
to construct the system of international institutions and
security alliances after World War II, and it is why Presidents
of both parties have worked to promote peace, democracy, and
economic opportunity around the world.
The system that America built has not been perfect, but it
has coincided with a period of security and prosperity
unmatched in human history. And while many nations have
benefited from the investments America has made in global
security and prosperity, none have benefited more than the
United States.
So we recognize that today the system is under stress in
different ways that you all have mentioned, China, Iran, North
Korea, resurgent Russia, and institutions of global governance
are showing their age and coming under tremendous stress as we
deal with unprecedented humanitarian challenges, including the
prospect of four famines in sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle
East. And meanwhile, the value of our global engagement is also
under question at home, and many Americans feel that their
lives have been threatened rather than enhanced by it.
So I do think this popular dissatisfaction with
international trade and technological change and the
facelessness of globalization needs to be understood and
acknowledged, but so do the consequences of disengagement. For
while it is comforting to believe that we can wall ourselves
off from the ailments of the world, history teaches us that
whenever problems abroad are allowed to fester and grow, sooner
or later they do come home to America.
Isolationism and retreat do not work. We know that because
we have tried it before.
Now, most of you know that I was not born in the United
States. Instead, I entered the world in Czechoslovakia only a
year before the Munich agreement sacrificed my country's
sovereignty in order to appease Hitler. In my early years, I
saw what happened when America was absent, as it was in Munich,
and what happened when America was present, as it was during
World War II. The lesson I drew is that terrible things happen
when America is not engaged, and that is a lesson I have shared
with this committee on countless occasions whether testifying
as a professor of international relations, Ambassador to the
U.N., or Secretary of State.
America is not an ordinary country that can just put our
narrow interests first and forget about the rest of the world.
We are the indispensable nation, and it would be a terrible
mistake to pretend otherwise. But we should also remember that
there is nothing in the word ``indispensable'' that means
alone. We want and need other countries to have the desire and
capacity to work alongside us in tackling global problems.
The testimony Steve and I have submitted for the record
makes a bipartisan case for continuing American global
leadership in partnership with our allies while acknowledging
that the international order needs refurbishment, as do most
humans and institutions over 70 years. Drawing on the work of
the Middle East Strategy Task Force, we also outline a new
approach for dealing with the chaos and disorder of that
region. In a moment, Steve is going to provide a brief overview
of that strategy, but since we are both really looking forward
to questions, I would just make a couple of points before I
turn over to him.
First, decades of experience have taught us that in order
for America to engage effectively in the world, we need to be
able to use every tool in our national security toolbox, and
this includes diplomatic pressure, economic leverage, technical
assistance, and threat of force. Any one of these tools is
ineffective on its own, which is why Steve and I are opposed to
the steep and arbitrary cuts to the State Department
international affairs budget, which have been proposed by the
Trump administration. Our diplomats work every day at
considerable sacrifice to ensure that the United States has
superb representation and that our interests demand that our
military needs to achieve its mission. We cannot have that on
the cheap.
The truth is that foreign assistance, including programs
aimed at promoting democracy, is among the most efficient and
valuable tools that we have. And in the long run, nothing is
more expensive than poverty, suffering, and war. So we have to
invest the resources needed to make sure that our citizens are
protected and our diplomats succeed. And this is especially
true today when our personnel are often in danger in conflict
areas and when our diplomats face criticism from would-be
autocrats who do not like their advocacy for democracy,
American values, and American nongovernmental organizations.
As Senators and members of this committee, I know that you
take your responsibilities very seriously to ensure that all of
our instruments of national power are properly funded and that
you will join us in rejecting these unwise cuts.
As we consider America's role, another point worth
emphasizing is that we need to be clear not only about what our
Nation is against in the world, but what we are for. We cannot
and will not give in to those who threaten us or who conspire
to kill our citizens, but neither can we allow any enemy to
cause us to abandon our ideals that made America a symbol of
liberty and justice.
For more than 200 years, our country's strength has come
from our inclusiveness. You cannot tell an American by his or
her last name. You all know me as Madeleine Albright, but in
fact, my name is Marie Jana Korbelova. America has always been
able to lead the world because we spoke and listened to people
from vastly different cultures. Today I wear my pin of the
Statue of Liberty. In today's era of interdependence, these are
traits that we have to retain.
And so as I said earlier, this hearing comes at a time of
great consequence for our country and the world. So I thank you
very, very much for your attention and for your interest in
what we can do together. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Albright and Mr.
Hadley follows:]
Prepared Statement of Madeleine K. Albright and Stephen J. Hadley
Thank you Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, and other
distinguished members of the committee.
We are grateful for the opportunity to testify before you this
morning on the road ahead for U.S. interests, values, and the American
people. In our testimony, we would like to offer our perspective on the
current challenges to the international system, share some insights
relevant to this topic from our Middle East Strategy Task Force, and
suggest some ways in which Congress might be able to help forge a new
bipartisan consensus on American foreign policy.
america's role in the world
This hearing comes at a time of deep political divisions at home
and heightened instability abroad. At this pivotal moment, we believe
there needs to be a national debate about how and why America engages
in the world. We also believe that Congress has a vital role to play in
convening this debate, given its representative nature and the
responsibilities given to it by the Constitution.
Over the past 70 years, Democratic and Republican administrations
alike have understood that American security and prosperity at home are
linked to economic and political health abroad, and that America does
better when other countries have the incentive and the capacity to work
alongside us in tackling global challenges. This is why we constructed
a system of international institutions and security alliances after
World War II. They provided a framework for advancing economic openness
and political freedom in the years that followed.
The international order America built and led has not been perfect,
but it has coincided with a period of security and prosperity unmatched
in human history. And while many nations benefited from the investments
America made in global security and prosperity, none benefited more
than the United States.
Yet today, the value of America's global engagement is under
question. A substantial number of Americans feel that their lives and
livelihoods have been threatened rather than enhanced by it. They view
international trade as having shuttered the factories at which they
worked, immigrants as threatening their standard of living or safety,
and globalization as undermining American culture.
This popular dissatisfaction needs to be understood and
acknowledged. Washington needs to ensure that the benefits of America's
international engagement are shared by all of our citizens. But we also
need to be clear about the consequences of disengagement. For while it
is comforting to believe that we can wall ourselves off from the
ailments of the world, history teaches us that whenever problems abroad
are allowed to fester and grow, sooner or later, they come home to
America.
Isolationism and retreat do not work; we know because we have tried
them before.
We also know, from recent experience, that if America recedes from
the global stage, people in Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, and
the Middle East will increasingly look elsewhere for inspiration and
guidance--whether to authoritarianism or extremist ideology.
In our opinion, such a shift would be harmful to the interests of
those populations, but it would be harmful above all to the interests
of the United States, because our security and our prosperity depend on
having friends abroad that share our values--including our belief in
the rule of law, freedom of movement, and access to markets.
Neither Russia nor China proclaim the same loyalty to those
principles as we do. Were they to fill a vacuum left by the United
States, it could very well mark a return to a balance of power system,
where the world's major powers competed militarily for territory and
spheres of influence at great human and financial cost. This is a world
to which none of us should want to return.
America's continued global leadership cannot be taken for granted,
but a retreat into isolationism is not preordained. We have an
opportunity--and, in our view, an obligation--to defend those aspects
of the international system that work in the twenty-first century, and
to adapt those that do not.
In doing so, we should acknowledge that the existing order is in
need of revision and refurbishment. The international system was
designed for a different era, and it requires a renewal of purpose and
a reform of its structures. Its mission should more clearly extend
beyond preventing war in Europe to include stabilizing other strategic
regions that affect our well-being. Its approach should reflect the
fact that long-term stability depends on well-governed states whose
leaders are seen as legitimate by their people. And its structure must
be adapted to the realities of a world in which power is more diffuse,
so other countries can take on a greater role commensurate with the
contributions they make and the responsibilities they assume.
China, Russia, and other countries should understand that there is
a larger place for them at the decision-making table, provided they are
constructive and respect the interests of other nations. And they need
to understand that there will be costs if they do not.
For this and other reasons, U.S. military power will remain vital
in a renewed international order. We appreciate efforts to ensure that
our military remains the best-trained, best-equipped, and best-led
force on earth. Given the variety of threats facing our country, it
makes sense to continue upgrading and enhancing our country's military
capabilities and deterrent power. But we strongly believe that it would
be a mistake to increase defense spending at the expense of other
critical investments in national security--especially those in
diplomacy, development, democracy, and peacebuilding.
We know from experience that force, and the credible possibility of
its use, are essential to defend our vital interests and keep America
safe. But as one of us has said in the past, force alone can be a blunt
instrument, and there are many problems it cannot solve. Our military
leaders would be the first to tell you that they cannot succeed in
their missions without the vital capabilities that our civilian
agencies bring to the table. Gutting these capabilities will put an
unacceptable burden on our men and women in uniform, and would make
America less safe. We need to fund these other civilian elements of
American power as robustly as we do the military element.
We recognize that government can always be made more efficient and
effective, but the best way to accomplish that goal is to build a
budget based on a sound strategy. This administration first needs to
take the time to staff the Departments and agencies, and to develop a
national security strategy. As members of the legislative branch, it is
your responsibility to ensure that every dollar is spent wisely, but it
also your responsibility to protect our national security institutions
from arbitrary and senseless cuts.
the middle east strategy task force
No region has seen more death and suffering or presented more
challenges to the international order than the Middle East, with
outcomes that have frustrated both Democratic and Republican
administrations. The Middle East is likely to be an important test case
in the coming years--the region in which the international order gets
rejuvenated for a new era or ceases to function entirely.
From 2015 to 2016, we served as Co-Chairs of the Atlantic Council's
Middle East Strategy Task Force, which sought to understand better the
underlying challenges in the region and to articulate a long-term
strategy for meeting them. Our goal was not to develop a new U.S.
strategy, but to understand the role that the U.S. can play in
supporting a larger international effort led by the region itself.
One of our initial insights was that we face not just a crisis in
the Middle East, but from the Middle East having global impact. The
roots of this crisis lie in a long history of poor governance in many
states in the region. The Arab Spring was a consequence of the
dissatisfaction of increasingly connected and empowered citizens with a
number of political leaders who ruled ineptly and often corruptly.
Where leaders sought to quash these popular protests by force, the
result in most cases was Civil War.
The four civil wars raging in the Middle East--in Syria, Iraq,
Libya, and Yemen--have had destabilizing consequences for the region
and beyond. They have produced the ungoverned spaces and grievances
that have allowed terrorist groups to direct or inspire attacks in the
West. They have also created the greatest worldwide refugee crisis
since the Second World War, the devastating human cost of which has
been coupled with profound effects on our own domestic politics and
those of Europe.
The challenges we face in the Middle East bear some resemblance to
those of post-war Europe. Countries torn apart by war will need to
determine the new shape of their governments, and how those governments
interact with their people. The entire state system will need to be
shored up so that countries are less prone to subversion, supported by
effective regional institutions to mediate conflicts and prevent them
from spiraling into all-out war.
But there are also important differences between the modern Middle
East and post-war Europe. There is no magnanimous victor in the mold of
the Allies, with the will and capability to reshape the region from the
outside. New global and political realities mean that no Marshall Plan
is in the offing for the rebuilding of the Middle East. The American
people have no appetite for this, and the people of the region, too,
are tired of being beholden to outside powers. The Middle East must
chart its own vision for the future.
There is reason for hope. The fact is that now, more than any time
in the Middle East's modern history, the region has significant
capabilities and resources of its own to define and work toward this
vision and secure better opportunities for its people. And more than
ever, there are also indications that people and some governments in
the Middle East have the will to take on the region's hard challenges.
Although not always evident at first glance, there are promising
developments happening in the Middle East, even in the most unexpected
places. In Saudi Arabia, female entrepreneurs are founding startup
companies at a rate three times that of women in Silicon Valley, as
they begin to claim their rightful place in Saudi civic life. In Egypt,
the social enterprise Nafham is using technological solutions to
address the problem of overcrowding in Egyptian schools. And in Jordan,
Syrian refugees are using innovative 3D printing technology to help
develop more affordable prosthetic limb components for friends and
neighbors who bear the physical scars of Bashar Assad's war on his own
people. The region's vast population of educated youth, commonly
understood to be a liability, can in fact be a tremendous asset.
Some governments are beginning to understand that their future
depends on promoting these efforts and partnering with their people to
build a common future. Tunisia is showing that revolution need not
result in either chaos or authoritarianism, but can begin a transition
to an inclusive, democratic future. The UAE has led the way for
positive economic and social reforms and Saudi Arabia has now adopted
its own vision for the future. Jordan is making its own efforts. These
can be examples for other countries in the region.
Renewed and enhanced American leadership is needed in the Middle
East. But not to impose our will militarily or otherwise. Instead,
America has a clear interest in supporting and accelerating the
positive changes that are already happening. The goal of our strategy
in the region should be to help the Middle East move from the current
vicious cycle in which it finds itself to a more virtuous one--one in
which the Middle East no longer spawns violence and refugees, is not a
drain on international resources, and does not through its instability
and political vacuums aggravate great power competition.
With this goal in mind, U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East
should be informed by a set of guiding principles that represent the
new reality of the region since 2011.
First, the old order is gone and is not coming back. Stability will
not be achieved until a new regional order takes shape. The region
should assume the principal responsibility for defining this new order,
which should offer the people of the region the prospect of a stable
and prosperous future free from both terrorist violence and government
oppression.
Second, disengagement is not a practical solution for the West.
Disengagement will only allow the region's problems to spread and
deepen unchecked, creating further threats. Instead, it is in the
interest of the United States and others to help the Middle East
achieve a more peaceful vision. But their role must be different from
what it has been in the past. Rather than dictating from the outside
how countries should behave, they should support and facilitate the
positive efforts that some people and governments in the region are
beginning to take.
Third, a strategy for the region should focus on more than
counterterrorism. Pernicious as they are, groups like ISIS and Al Qaeda
are not the sole cause of the current crises. Even if these groups
disappeared tomorrow, others would arise in their place so long as the
underlying grievances that led to the Arab Spring remain unresolved.
Fourth, sectarian and ethnic rivalries are not as entrenched or
inevitable in the Middle East as many assume. Instead, they wax and
wane with broader tensions in the region. Achieving political solutions
to the civil wars would go far in stanching these communal tensions. To
this end, empowered local governance will be essential going forward,
so as to allow people the freedom to shape their own communities.
Finally, the Middle East cannot build a better future without the
active participation of the people of the region--including women,
youth, minorities, and those displaced by conflict. If enabled and
empowered, they can be the engines of job creation, help motivate the
broader population, and innovate solutions to the region's economic and
social problems. It is high time for all of us to bet on the people of
the region, not just on the states.
With these guiding principles in mind, we have, in our Middle East
Strategy Task Force report, proposed a two-pronged strategy that we
think will be able, over time, to change the trajectory of the region
in a more positive direction, to the benefit of people in the region
and the United States.
The first prong involves outside actors helping partner countries
in the region to wind down the violence, starting with the four civil
wars. This means containing the spread of the current conflicts and
accelerating diplomatic efforts to resolve them, while addressing the
staggering humanitarian crises that they have generated.
The most immediate priorities must be 1) mitigating the current
human suffering in Syria and 2) recapturing the territory that ISIS now
controls. A third, longer-term priority is to contain Iran's aggressive
foreign policy behavior while still exploring opportunities to engage
with it.
Achieving these priorities will require a limited but greater
degree of American and allied engagement in the region, diplomatic as
well as military. This greater engagement and the kind of concrete
steps we recommend in our report, taken together, will rally and
reassure America's friends and allies in the region, send a message of
strength to its adversaries, and provide additional leverage for the
United States to work with all internal and external players to end
these destabilizing wars.
The second prong of the strategy, which must be pursued
simultaneously with the first prong, seeks to support now those bottom-
up efforts that will create the social basis for stability and
prosperity. This means supporting the citizen-based entrepreneurial and
civic activity occurring throughout the region. It also means
encouraging regional governments to facilitate these efforts, to invest
in the education and empowerment of their people, and to address the
societal, economic, and governance issues that are key to future peace
and success.
Ultimately, this prong seeks to unlock the significant human
potential in the Middle East.
Governments in the region need to create the enabling environment
for individuals to deploy fully their talents, whether as innovators,
entrepreneurs, or just engaged citizens. This means better and fairer
legal and regulatory frameworks, but also more inclusive, effective,
transparent, and accountable governance more generally.
The United States should support those governments that are trying
to create such an enabling environment. The idea is to create a ``more-
for-more'' relationship with countries in the region that are trying to
do right by their people. The more ambitious the efforts for change in
the region, the more support countries should expect from the United
States--not as charity or aid, but because it is a good investment of
resources likely to yield solid returns on our security. By the same
token, where countries are not taking steps for change, they should not
expect support--not because we wish to punish them, but because it
would be a waste of our own limited resources.
Most importantly, the American approach toward the Middle East
needs to be colored with a good deal of humility. This is the most
difficult problem that either of us has seen in our careers, and it
won't be solved overnight. We all should be steeled for the long term,
and prepared to weather setbacks when they come--and they will. But the
good news is that our country has succeeded at long-term foreign policy
challenges such as this before, not least the rebuilding of Europe
after World War II and ending the Cold War. America's efforts were
strengthened by a bipartisan national consensus regarding the
importance of these missions and the soundness of the principles upon
which they were based. It is time to forge a similar national consensus
on our approach to the Middle East and, more broadly, the world.
conclusion: the role of congress
Congress, especially the U.S. Senate, has an incredibly important
role to play in forging such a consensus. It is our belief that
Congress should:
1) Help start a national debate regarding America's role in the
world;
2) On the basis of that debate, forge a bipartisan strategy for
American leadership to build a revised and revitalized international
order for the 21st century;
3) Insist that American efforts to defeat ISIS and al Qaeda are
embedded within a larger strategy to make the Middle East over time
more stable and prosperous;
4) Ensure that U.S. efforts at diplomacy, peacebuilding, advancing
democracy and development do not get shortchanged as we increase our
expenditures on defense; and
5) Through its legislative actions, provide reassurances to our
friends and allies regarding America's continued commitment to their
defense and to a rules-based international system.
We thank you again for this opportunity to testify before you and
look forward to your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you so much. I know this committee is
thankful you changed your name----
[Laughter.]
The Chairman.--in that I have great difficulty with those
kinds of things.
So the Honorable Mr. Hadley.
STATEMENT OF HON. STEPHEN J. HADLEY, FORMER U.S. NATIONAL
SECURITY ADVISOR, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Hadley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
Cardin, distinguished members of this committee. I appreciate
the opportunity to be with you here this morning.
One of the great privileges I have enjoyed since leaving
government is being able to work with Secretary Albright on
bipartisan efforts to try and solve some of these foreign
policy challenges we face. And I am honored to be with her
again this morning.
She has set out and summarized our views in our written
testimony. I would like to just elaborate on three points, if I
could.
First, the state of the U.S.-led rules-based international
order. As Madeleine has so eloquently pointed out, for 70 years
since the end of World War II, the centerpiece of American
grand strategy has been to build and lead an international
order that has advanced the causes of freedom, prosperity, and
peace at home and abroad.
But this international order is under enormous strain for
the reasons that you are all aware of. Madeleine and I would
argue that the reason for the current chaos and conflict and
disorder in the world today is precisely because that U.S.-led
international order is breaking down in the face of these
challenges. At the same time, this global order needs to be
adapted to the changes in the international environment that
have occurred and to take account of the real grievances and
concerns expressed by American voters in the last presidential
election.
This presents an opportunity, an opportunity for the
Congress to work with the Trump administration, for Republicans
and Democrats to work together on this common project, how to
adapt and revitalize a U.S.-led international order.
Congress can begin by conducting a national debate on what
a revised and revitalized order would look like through a
series of structured hearings. And these need to be held not
just in Washington but throughout the country to ensure that
congressional deliberations reflect the views of all Americans.
A good place to start in this debate, I would argue, is a
recently issued Brookings Institution report written by a
bipartisan group of foreign policy experts, of which I was one,
entitled Building Situations of Strengths.
Second, let me say a word about the Middle East. This new
international order and American leadership will be sorely
tested in the Middle East, and as described in our Atlantic
Council Middle East Strategy Task Force report, the goal of any
strategy for the region should be to help the people in
countries of the Middle East change the trajectory of events
towards a more positive future. And any effort to do that is
going to have to reflect the new reality in the region since
2011 and the following guiding principles.
First, the old order is gone and it is not coming back. The
region itself needs to assume the principal responsibility for
defining and building a stable and prosperous Middle East free
from both terrorist violence and government oppression.
Disengagement is not a practical solution for the United
States. Disengagement will only allow the region's problems to
spread and deepen unchecked, creating further threats. That is
what we have seen for the last 5 or 6 years.
But the role of the West must be different than what it has
been in the past. Rather than trying to impose its will on the
region, outsiders like the United States must support and
facilitate the positive efforts of the people and governments
in the region. And there are some and we talk about them in our
report.
A strategy for the region needs to focus more than on just
counterterrorism. Pernicious as they are, even if groups like
ISIS and Al Qaeda were to disappear tomorrow, others would
arise in their place so long as the underlying grievances that
led to the Arab Spring remain unresolved.
Sectarian and ethnic rivalries are not as entrenched or
inevitable in the Middle East as many assume. They wax and wane
with the broader tensions in the region. Achieving political
solutions in the civil wars, along with empowered local
governance, letting local communities take more responsibility
for their own future, can go a long way towards reducing these
communal tensions.
The Middle East cannot build a better future, however,
without the active participation of the people of the region,
including women, youth, and minorities. If enabled and
empowered, they can be the engines of job creation and
innovative solutions to the region's problems. It is high time
for us to start betting on the people of the region and not
just on the states in the region.
So our report outlines a two-prong strategy.
The first prong involves outside actors helping countries
in the region to wind down the violence starting with the civil
wars. This means containing the spread of the current conflicts
and accelerating diplomatic efforts to resolve them while
addressing the staggering humanitarian crisis they have
generated. This will require increased diplomatic and military
engagement from the United States and its friends and allies,
something that is already beginning to see under the Trump
administration building on what was done by the administration
before it.
The second prong of our strategy, which must be pursued
simultaneously and in parallel with the first, seeks to support
now those efforts in the region that will create the social
basis for longer-term stability, prosperity, and peace. This
means supporting the bottom-up citizen-based entrepreneurial
and civic activity that is already occurring throughout the
region. And it means supporting those governments in the region
that are facilitating these efforts, that are investing in the
education and empowerment of their people, and that are
providing them with uncorrupt and effective governance. And
there are some. You see it in UAE. You see it in Tunisia. You
are beginning to see progress in Saudi Arabia. We need to build
on these efforts.
Finally, let me say a word about the significance of this
last point, this prong two, for the budgetary guidance recently
issued by the administration.
Madeleine and I agree that we must continue to upgrade and
enhance our Nation's military capabilities and deterrent power.
There is no question about that. But accomplishing the second
prong of the Middle East strategy we outlined requires the non-
military civilian instruments of our national security toolkit,
diplomacy, trade and investment, development assistance,
reconciliation, peace-building skills, and sound political
advice. And these, of course, are exactly the things that have
been targeted in the administration's recent preliminary
guidance.
Military forces can push ISIS out of Iraq, Syria, and the
territory it controls, but they will return if those liberated
lands do not enjoy some measure of political stability,
societal reconciliation, and economic progress. And such
progress requires the very non-military elements of national
power targeted by the recent budget guidance.
Failing to win the peace after so many have fought so
bravely would be an insult to the memory of those who laid down
their lives in service to our Nation.
Thank you again for the chance to testify this morning.
The Chairman. Thank you, both.
Again, we apologize for the order of what is happening in
the Senate today. I think what we will do, if it is okay with
our ranking member--it is 10:37 now--is let us reconvene at
10:50. So you guys do not have to sit there. You can come back
here and make calls. As matter of fact, let us reconvene at
10:55 to give us a chance to get over and get back and get
settled. And then we will come back for questioning at that
time, if that is okay. I think it is better for everybody here,
everyone's questions, and for us to have a session that linear,
if you will. So we will be back at 10:55. Thank you so much.
[Recess.]
The Chairman. The Foreign Relations Committee will
reconvene.
I just will ask a question. I usually defer, but I am going
to ask just one.
We had a great meeting with Tillerson last week just to go
through I think every member of the Democratic side and there
were three members on the Republican side missing, but a large
group. I think most of us up here support the efforts that our
Nation, Hadley, while you were in office, put forth relative
the PEPFAR. Unbelievable what we have done.
I think we all understand we put forth one-third of the
food aid in the world, and we are thankful especially at this
time of tremendous famine around the world, manmade conflicts
creating famine. We are thankful for that. I plan to be in the
region in the next couple weeks to highlight that.
But we also know the State Department is really bloated. We
have realized through some hearings recently there are 54
special envoys. I mean, it is ridiculous. I mean, you look at
the names of these. It is just absolutely--it will make your
blood boil that there is this much.
Tillerson has gotten over there, and I think he wants to
reform it and transform it. I know Condi Rice is going to be up
here today talking to Republicans about the foreign operations
budget. And again, I am saying I support those things that are
transformative. I really do.
Slavery. I mean, I hope we are going to be able to use the
same principles that we have used with PEPFAR on modern slavery
today with 27 million people.
At the same time, much of what we have done for years is
just doubling down on the Cold War model of buying influence
towards no end.
So is it not somewhat healthy to have a discussion about
the State Department, about the fact that for years we have
been working around ineffective Assistant Secretaries by
creating envoys, about the fact that we have programs that
basically need to be--so that we can do things that make a
difference like Electrify Africa, like the food aid reforms
that have been put in place? So is this not a healthy
discussion for Congress to be having at this moment knowing
that, again--I could not agree more with Secretary Albright. We
have to lead the world, and with that comes resources. And to
the extent we are not successful diplomatically, our young men
and women in uniform, who we treasure, are going to be in
harm's way in more instances than they otherwise would be.
Mr. Hadley. I would agree with you completely. I think,
though, you have to start from the premise that these non-
military elements are important and that our young men and
women who served in Iraq and Afghanistan will tell you and have
told you they cannot achieve their military mission if they do
not have a robust non-military civilian partner in all these
areas to work with them. So if we start with that premise, then
the question is we ought to try to have these non-military
elements to be as efficient and effective as they can be. And
the question is how you get there.
And my recommendation would be Secretary Tillerson,
nominated by the President, confirmed by the Senate, to head
the State Department--why not give him some time to learn his
organization, figure out how he wants to reorganize it and
strengthen, and then on the basis of his plan for the
Department, come to the Congress of the United States and say I
can cut these things, I can eliminate these things, but some of
these things actually maybe I need to plus up.
I think the concern we have is it seems across-the-board
meat axe rather than pursuant to a plan, and it seems to be
premised on the notion that we do not need these non-military
elements as part of our national security toolkit. If we can
agree that we need them and the goal is then to make them more
effective and to shrink them and make them more efficient where
that is appropriate, then the question is how do you do that.
And I think that is what you as a committee should be looking
to Secretary Tillerson to do and give him the time to do it.
That would be my view.
The Chairman. I think that is kind of what is happening. Is
it not? I mean, the President's budget--I mean, it goes in the
waste basket as soon as it gets here. So is that not what is
happening? Secretary Albright?
Mr. Hadley. Maybe you can make it happen.
Secretary Albright. Thank you very much. And I agree with
the way Steve has framed this, but I have somewhat mixed
feelings in terms of the State Department.
I think that there are a lot of people there that are
dedicated American servants and need to be respected for what
they do. And so I have not liked some of the kind of
descriptions of them as kind of useless and not doing the
things that they are supposed to do.
I do think that, as Steve said, we need to have the
functions that the State Department does. It is a complicated
place, and it is a place where most of the people actually are
serving abroad. That is part of the issue. And the question
then is what is the size of our missions, how do they operate,
whether they sit behind walls because they are afraid of
security or whether they go out and do, as Condi actually
talked about, expeditionary and really go out there and be a
part of it. So I think that there needs to be a discussion
about it.
What I am troubled by, I have to tell you, is that I think
that it is important to give the new Secretary of State time.
And people say it is early, but soon it will be too late. And I
think, therefore, there really has to be a better sense of what
is going on at the State Department and to have them have a
feeling that they are part of America's representation and that
they are respected, and that this will not be just
reorganization for the same of reorganization. It is
complicated. It takes time and it takes away in some way from
the mission of what our diplomats do, which is to be engaged
abroad and to represent our country, which then leads I think
to the larger question that both of you raised, what is our
national security policy. When are we going to be clear about
the direction in which this administration is going in terms of
the whole-of-government approach to it and what is the role of
the State Department?
The Chairman. Let me just move to--I usually do not take
any time on the front end--a couple things.
Number one, we had witnesses in last week, Republican and
Democrat, who had worked in the State Department, who basically
talked about these special envoys as being workarounds, that in
essence, when they had somebody that was not effective, we
would create a special envoy. So I am really referring to
testimony from folks within the State Department.
Secondly, the President, as I understand it--and we are
working closely. They are developing a strategic vision. It is
going to be due in September, and we are going to be very
involved in that. So they have come into office--let us face
it--in many cases had no institutional support. We are,
hopefully, going to help with some of that, and you are helping
with that today. So that is happening over the next 6 months.
And I think that Tillerson feels, just for what it is
worth, that he has got professionals there that he is working
with. We would like to have some nominations. When we thought
we were going to be in the personnel business, we are not. We
have no nominations. But he told us the other day he is working
with people who have been there for years. They are very
professional. They are helping him immensely. He will take his
time to do what he is doing.
So, again, I look at the budgetary piece. I do not know
when we take it up, but it seems like to me it is going to be a
long time from now--is it not--where we actually deal with next
year's appropriations. So, again, as I look at this, I think
there is a lot of ``hair on fire'' discussions.
Mr. Hadley, you know, you were kind of Tillerson's agent I
think in coming in. You engaged and Condoleezza Rice. So I
assume that you being his agent and wafting him into this
position, you can have some influence over this.
But, again, I do not see this as being quite the way people
are laying it out. I think it is much healthier. And I do agree
that lopping everything off to support defense is the wrong
place.
Senator Cardin?
Senator Cardin. Well, Mr. Chairman, just because we have
not done fiscal year 2017, you think we are not going to get to
fiscal year 2018 for a while. I understand that.
I wish it was true that the President's budget was thrown
in the waste basket, but it is very much referred to by
stakeholders and it is a message to stakeholders, whether they
are American or whether they are international. And it is
troublesome. What really worries me is at times used as a
yardstick. And if the President's budget is used as a yardstick
with the programs under the Secretary of State, we have serious
challenges in this Congress. So I am with you. Throw it in the
waste basket.
Just one quick question, if I might, on the State
Department and trying to figure out where it is going. We have
had some really good discussions with the Ambassador to the
United Nations, and she is going through significant change
there in a very open, transparent way, and I think is giving
confidence to our mission at the United Nations, as well as the
international community, that America is going to be a player.
I do not see that from the Secretary of State. He has a
different way of operating. He does not hold press conferences.
He does not do things in an open way. And, Secretary Albright,
you got to fight within any administration as a cabinet officer
for what you believe in, but if you do not have a more open way
of how you are doing your business, does he cede power by not
getting a better way to broadcast what he is doing?
Secretary Albright. Well, I do think that having a public
voice makes a big difference. And the Secretary of State is the
person that publicly describes what our policies are and the
direction that we are going in.
As I said, I do think that Secretary Tillerson is somebody
that has not been a part of a governmental system. So I think
that he is entitled to have some time to figure out what is
going on.
But I do think that one of the issues--and you have spoken
about this. We all have a number of times--the Russians are
actually very good at propaganda. That is their specialty. I
think we need to be better at public diplomacy which explains
what our position is, and the Secretary of State is the main
person to do that. Therefore, silence is not a good idea.
I think that Ambassador Haley has really done a terrific
job. There is no question. And I think I may be one of the few
people that truly understands the relationship between
Secretary of State and U.N. Ambassador, having been both. It is
a peculiar relationship, if I may say so, because what happens
is the U.N. Ambassador is an instructed Ambassador, but at the
same time, a member of the Principals Committee that is
required to have an independent voice. And so the question is
how they actually do relate, how they work together. And I
think that Ambassador Haley has really done a great job in
explaining our position internationally. She is appreciated in
New York and internationally.
I wish that the Secretary felt more comfortable taking the
press with him when he goes abroad because they provide an echo
chamber of what is going on in terms of how others understand
what our policies are.
Senator Cardin. That is very helpful.
I want to get both of your responses to a real concern I
have about human rights. We have seen more and more atrocities
around the world, what is going on in Syria, what is going on
in South Sudan. We can mention many, many other countries where
atrocities are going on. It just points out the importance of
dealing with the seeds of discontent and U.S. presence in the
global community through what we do at the Department of State.
I am concerned how high of an elevation these issues will
be in critical meetings that are going to be taking place
shortly. President Trump will be with President Xi. How
important is it that human rights be on that agenda, that there
be mention of our concern about what China is doing in
repressing its own people so that America's values and ideals
are at the table?
We know that the Secretary of State will be traveling to
Russia. How important is it for him to meet with opposition
people or NGOs in order to show Mr. Putin that America stands
by its values?
President Sisi will be here from Egypt. How important is it
on the agenda that the reform issues that are so critically
important to the Egyptians are on the agenda between the
President at that meeting? And if they are not, what signal
does that send?
I will take both of your answers.
Secretary Albright. Let me just say that I do believe that
it is essential for the United States to make our value system
clear. I believe in a moral foreign policy.
I think the question always is how do you combine idealism
and realism. I had real problems with this because I did not
know whether I was an idealistic realist or a realistic
idealist. And in many ways it is a false dichotomy because you
need both. And I have often compared policy to a hot air
balloon. You need the idealism in order to get the balloon up,
and then the ballast of realism to give it a direction. So you
need both.
But in terms of when the Secretary of State or the
President of the United States or anybody goes out in order to
represent us, I think the human rights issues have to be on the
talking points because if they are not, then people do not
understand that it is a basic aspect of our foreign policy. And
whenever I went out, we went through various talking points and
business, but always I raised the human rights issues wherever
I was. And I did have kind of a trick which I would say I have
come a long way, so I must be frank. And it really is one of
the basic aspects of American foreign policy.
I am deeply troubled by the fact that the Secretary was not
there to present the Human Rights Report, that this
administration has not really spoken on the values aspect of
our foreign policy because it is a basic aspect of it. I also
do think it is important to meet with opposition people. But I
think this balance always, to be completely fair about it, is a
balance between the realism and the idealism, and you figure
out what you can do where. But it is a mistake if it is not
brought up.
Senator Cardin. Let me take the chairman's prerogative and
ask Mr. Hadley as the advisor to Secretary Tillerson, what
advice will you give him on these issues?
Mr. Hadley. I am not an advisor to Secretary Tillerson. I
think he is a terrific candidate for Secretary of State.
Look, Ambassador Haley is a practicing politician. She has
been dealing with media. She knows the role they play.
Tillerson is a former Fortune 100 chief executive officer. As
he said, he is an engineer. Give him some time to make the
transition. It is a difficult transition he is trying to make.
He is an engineer. He learns the facts and then follows the
facts. And I think we need to give him some time to do that.
And I am encouraged at what the chairman said that from the
standpoint of this committee, he will be given the time to
figure out how to strengthen and make more effective our State
Department. That is where it ought to happen.
Basically on your question of human rights, I think the
pursuit of our ideals in our foreign policy is one of the most
realistic things we can do because a world that is more based
on our ideals is going to be a more congenial place for America
and the United States. So this notion that there is a war
between realism and idealism I have never embraced.
Second, you indicated you are having a good dialogue with
the administration. I would put this issue of the role of human
rights in our foreign policy on that dialogue and have a candid
discussion about how to do it. It is I think a fairly subtle
mix of some things you do publicly, some things you say
privately, and some tradeoffs and compromise you make because
human rights is not the only thing that is in our interest to
pursue. It is a delicate matter.
And Egypt is a good case. And we say in this report that we
have done we need to embrace Egypt. We need to show we are
going to be a strong ally. We need to maintain our military
assistance. I think if you put your arm around a country and
show that you are a strong friend and ally and stand with them,
it is easier to have a candid conversation where you say to
President Sisi, you cannot crack down your country into
stability. In the end of the day, there will be no long-term
stability until you open up your politics in a way that is
consistent with the pressure you face from the terrorism. But
that is the only way to get true stability. I think you have
got to reassure someone before you deliver that message.
Senator Cardin. Thank you.
The Chairman. So I want to apologize to everybody for both
of us having gone over.
And I just want to say, look, I had strong disagreement
with the foreign policy positions coming in on January the
20th. I have seen a significant evolution--significant--on
NATO, on Israel, on China, on numbers of issues. And I really
believe that once we can all get past what happened on November
the 8th, this committee has more opportunity to shape this
administration than at any time I have seen since I have been
here in 10 years. And I think that is a positive thing.
Senator Young?
Senator Young. Thank you, Chairman.
Thank you so much, Madam Secretary, Mr. Hadley, for
appearing before this committee.
The first thing I would like to ask you about relates to
our organization over at the State Department. State and USAID
seem to operate in stovepipes of sorts as we carry out our
diplomacy efforts, our aid efforts, and the stovepiping
continues not just within our State Department and USAID but
across agencies as we look to try and improve our diplomatic
efforts. Our interagency coordination seems to be fertile for
improvement, at least from this vantage point.
So, Mr. Hadley first, if you please, and then perhaps
Secretary Albright. Do you believe it would make sense to
establish a statutory requirement for State and USAID to
periodically produce and submit to this committee a national
diplomacy and development strategy in direct support of our
national security strategy? It would establish real diplomatic
and development priorities, objectives, metrics, balance ends
and means. At least that would be the idea. I will be quiet for
now and get your thoughts on this.
Mr. Hadley. I think it is a terrific idea. What I would
hope to see is that we get a national security strategy out of
the White House and the administration that reflects the
priorities of the President hopefully this fall. And then that
document would be taken to develop a national defense strategy,
if you will, with the Defense Department in the lead and the
kind of national diplomacy development and democracy strategy
out of the State Department. And I would hope those two
organizations would develop their products on an interagency
basis and in coordination with each other because in theaters
like Iraq and Afghanistan, they have to be mutually supportive.
The hardest thing in the government is integration. It is
all organized with vertical cones, with people operating in
their narrow spaces. And the hardest thing is to integrate
across those in service of a national strategy. And we need the
kind of process you described to give that strategy and to
integrate and give people basically the plans for going forward
to achieve that strategy.
Senator Young. Secretary Albright?
Secretary Albright. I do believe that we need to have more
of a whole-of-government approach to all of this. In addition
to the Defense Department, there are other parts of the
government that also need to be a part of it. We were talking
earlier today with some people about the Agriculture Department
needs to be a part with Public Law 480 and how it affects our
farmers, et cetera.
So one of the things, frankly, Secretary Clinton tried
under this thing called the QDDR of trying to bring more
rationality to the State Department budget and the USAID
budget. I have to tell you I tried because part of the thing
that you want to do is to have there be some relationship
between the projects that USAID does and American policy.
But I do think the stovepiping hurts. I cannot tell you how
many various reorganizations I have looked at ever since even
the Carter administration on how to bring all this together.
Senator Young. So do you think codifying the QDDR----
Secretary Albright. I think would make a difference.
Senator Young.--would help?
Secretary Albright. Yes. But it also is in terms of the
preparation of it, that kind of action together is good.
Senator Young. Let me briefly pivot to the AUMF, I know
something you have spoken to in a previous hearing here on the
Hill. On March 22nd, we had Secretary of Defense Mattis testify
before the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee,
indicating that he thought that a new AUMF focused on ISIS
would be a statement of the American people's resolve. It would
hearten our allies, something of importance to this committee
certainly, and give our troops a sense of purpose.
You echoed your support for that, Mr. Hadley. You said you
thought it would be a good thing in response to Representative
Banks in your testimony at the HASC recently. Secretary
Albright, you indicated that you thought you believed that
there needs to be an AUMF.
Why do you believe there needs to be an AUMF? I will start
with you, Secretary Albright.
Secretary Albright. I think, first of all, because the old
ones are not really representative of what is going on now and,
second, because I think that we need a public debate about what
America's role is in the world. And in many ways, an AUMF is a
very good vehicle for it. I know Senator Kaine has been talking
about this for some time. I do believe in the executive/
legislative relationship on this.
But most of all, I think the American people need to
understand why we send our troops somewhere, what is the
purpose of it, how does it add, and it is a great mechanism for
actually forcing a national debate that Steve and I have been
talking about generally is necessary and especially given what
has already been said by some of you, which is we are in a
different kind of a world. And the American public needs to
witness their representatives having this serious discussion.
Senator Young. Well, I agree with you. That is why I have
introduced an AUMF, Senate Joint Res. 31, on March 2nd.
Mr. Hadley, anything to add to the Secretary's commentary?
Mr. Hadley. I agree with Madeleine. I have not read the
resolution you introduced. But we need a new AUMF to clarify
the mission and the authorities in light of the fact that we
have a new administration in the White House.
Second, we need the kind of national debate Madeleine
talked about.
And third, the Congress needs to be on record in support of
this effort against ISIS. You are the vehicle for the
expression of the popular will, and you need to be on record.
Senator Young. Thank you.
The Chairman. I know that Mattis has developed a strategy.
He gave it to the President 30 days ago. That was not accepted,
as I understand it. They are reworking it. But we do wish for
them to come up and lay out their new strategy, and I think
that would be the appropriate time for us to take up an AUMF
when we have a new administration and really tease out where we
are going. So I think that is very healthy.
Senator Menendez?
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for your extraordinary service to our
country and for consistently coming back to the committee to
give us insights. We appreciate it.
I want to focus on one part of your testimony where you
talk about the international order. And you mentioned--and I am
going to quote directly from your written testimony--China,
Russia, and other countries should understand that there is a
larger place for them at the decision-making table provided
that they are constructive and respect the interests of other
nations. And they need to understand that there will be costs
if they do not.
My question is understanding your views that the
international order needs to be updated in terms of its
institution, its magnitude to deal with the realities of the
new world, but to the extent that we have countries that
violate the international order, what is it that we do to bring
them back into the international order? Because I am concerned
that if at the end of the day, just to take Russia as one
example--but they are not the only ones--if you can ultimately
go ahead and invade Ukraine, take Crimea, continue to
destabilize eastern Ukraine, indiscriminately bomb civilians in
Aleppo, try to undermine the Baltic States, try to undermine
democracy across Europe, and have a cyber attack against the
United States in terms of our own democracy--regardless of
whether they succeeded or not, the mere fact that they tried
should be upsetting to the President of the United States and
to the average citizen and everybody in between. There has to
be consequences for that because otherwise the message to
countries globally and leaders globally is you can violate the
international order and ultimately face little if no
consequence.
So my question to you is, what are the best ways in which
we get countries that do violate the international order to
seek to bring them back within the international order?
Secretary Albright. Well, let me say I think that what we
have to do is look at all the tools in the toolbox in terms of
being able to bring them back. I believe that the previous
administration did the right thing in terms of imposing
sanctions on Russia for their behavior because what they did
was illegal. And I think part of it, though, now is how you get
others to be with us on it, so therefore, diplomacy and getting
the European Union to stay with the sanctions program I think
is very important. I also think that public diplomacy in this
is very important for people to speak out that are public
officials about what has happened because it is completely
illegal and needs to be called out.
The other part, however, is to use some silent diplomacy.
And I hope very much that when Secretary Tillerson goes to
Russia, that he makes very clear where we are on this because
unless we speak with one voice, it will be very hard for the
Russians to get the message.
And the other I think is in fact to see how generally the
international community can be on the same side of this. So it
takes diplomacy. I think sanctions have to remain in and to
make our message completely clear because if we do not, then it
will happen again somewhere else. And I would also use the
alliances that we have, NATO, to make those kinds of
statements.
Mr. Hadley. I think it depends on the country. I think most
Chinese understand that they have dramatically benefited from
this U.S.-led international order over the last 30 years in
terms of their own prosperity and security. And for China, the
way you bring them into the order is actually show them that
they can have a place at the table, that there needs to be
revisions to the international order to reflect the changes
that have occurred. That is why it was so important that
Congress finally changed the shares in the IMF so that China
would have a bigger role. I think we also ought to be receptive
to proposals for China to supplement that international order
like the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, which I think is
a good thing and I think the United States should have joined.
Russia is a different category. Russia has clearly ripped
up the international order in Europe, and that is why the
sanctions are appropriate. That is why it is important that we
be strengthening NATO, positioning troops in the Baltics and
the Balkans and the like so that Russia knows it cannot pull
again what it did in Ukraine.
The question is having put those sanctions and those
consequences for the violations for an order, do they want to
come back into an international order and how do you walk them
back into that order. I think that is the challenge for the new
administration.
Senator Menendez. Does it concern you, as it concerns me,
that the President as obviously the chief leader in foreign
relations has not raised the concerns about Russia that one
would think that he would even as he seeks to develop a new
relationship? But that does not stop you from calling out a
country that has violated the international order because when
you speak, Madam Secretary, of speaking with one voice, that
would be the most powerful voice to send a very clear message
to the Russians.
Mr. Hadley. I think that is right, but I echo the point
Senator Corker made. The evolution in the attitude of the
administration on Russia since the days of the campaign is
pretty dramatic, and it has changed. And it has changed because
of things that the new administration has heard from the
Congress, from friends and allies, and from things Putin has
done. So Tillerson is now going to go to Russia. There is a
policy review going on to try and set the policy for that. I
think we need to let this evolution go, and I think there will
be an opportunity pretty soon early on to see where the
administration is heading. But I think there has been a pretty
dramatic correction in their attitude toward Russia, and I
think it is a good thing.
The Chairman. I could not agree more. And I think people on
both sides of the aisle, as you mentioned, played a big role in
that evolution. I think Tillerson is going to be very much in
the main stream of U.S. previous thinking.
Senator Flake?
Senator Flake. Thank you.
Thank you for your testimony. Thank you for your long
service to the country.
I would like to know what are your thoughts--I apologize if
it has been asked before--with regard to the travel ban that
has been proposed. How is that viewed by our allies and our
adversaries? Does it work in our favor?
Secretary Albright. I do not think the travel ban works in
our favor. I think that it has made it a more dangerous place
for the United States. And a number of us have made that point
in terms of that it has become a recruiting tool. It is a gift
in many ways to ISIS.
It also I think undermines what America is really about. We
have not discriminated against people coming into this country
based on religion and ethnic background. And I really do think
that it has not been helpful.
I do think that a country is entitled to make decisions
about its immigration policies, and I do think that it would be
very useful if in fact there was an overall approach to what
our immigration policy should be.
Senator Flake. Thank you.
Mr. Hadley?
Mr. Hadley. Obviously, it is legitimate to say we need to
make sure we have the best vetting we can of refugees and
immigrants. That is fine. The problem with the ban, of course,
is it has had all the negative effects in terms of the
reactions about countries overseas and the Muslim community
here at home, and it has never been in effect. So it is the
worst policy you can have, all the negative effects and none of
the benefits because each version has been quickly suspended by
the courts.
I would hope the administration is using the time, during
the period that the ban has been suspended, to improve the
vetting process so that we, in some sense, do not need this
temporary ban and can get back into regular order. I do not
know whether they are doing that. I hope they are.
Senator Flake. Thank you.
You talked about the importance of a bipartisan foreign
policy. Sometimes I think we feel on this committee that we are
the last bastion of bipartisanship. But I do feel that it is
important.
What message is sent to our allies and our adversaries
abroad when there is disagreement, the failure to agree on an
AUMF, for example, and to speak with one voice on foreign
policy matters? Why does that matter to our allies and our
adversaries?
Secretary Albright. I think there are really two parts to
it. I do think we need to make clear that in a democracy, there
is discussion and respectful listening to other people's views.
That is one of our strengths. I think the question is how the
message is distributed in the first place, which makes it look
as though there is massive disorganization rather than a really
overall policy.
The other part that I think we often forget is that other
countries do not get a clear message about what we are about.
And I think that that is what is worrisome. I think some of you
were at the Munich security conference, and it was very clear
that people were very confused about what our message really
was when we speak and what are words and what are actions. And
so there is this balance between making clear that we respect
each other's ideas and then looking as though we do not have a
policy together.
May I say I really do understand the need to give a new
administration time. But I think there really is a question
about how long it takes, and that that is also providing
something negative. Most of us travel abroad, and I think that
people are confused. And we only have a certain amount of time
to set the message straight.
Senator Flake. Mr. Hadley?
Mr. Hadley. Bipartisan foreign policy is going to be much
stronger and sustainable. I worry that we are in a situation
that when we have a Republican President, we have a Republican
foreign policy, and then a Democratic President, we have a
Democratic foreign policy. And this back and forth flip-
flopping is not progress. The foreign policy successes we have
had are ones where we have had bipartisan support for a policy
that is sustainable over generations of political leaders,
quite frankly, whether Republican or Democrat. That is how we
ended the Cold War successfully. That is how we dealt with
Colombia. That is how we have dealt with the war on terror.
That is where we make progress. And this back and forth is not
working for us.
Senator Flake. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I could not agree more, and that is why I
think this next 6 months gives us an opportunity that frankly
we have never had. Generally speaking, I do not think there is
a strongly formulated foreign policy coming out of the White
House. I think that is an observation that is fair. And I think
we have an opportunity to shape that.
Senator Coons?
Senator Coons. Thank you, Chairman Corker, Ranking Member
Cardin, and thank you to both our witnesses for your lifetimes
dedicated to public service and to advancing American diplomacy
and to defending the post-Cold War order that we built and from
which we deeply benefit. I do think it is vital that this
committee in a bipartisan way engage in this conversation both
the administration and with the American people.
So let me ask you first. It was touched on earlier in
passing. Given the real disconnect between the political or
professional or elite class in Washington that pays attention
to foreign policy on a regular basis and is distributed around
the country and what we have seen in the last election cycle in
both parties, a deep skepticism about globalization, about
international engagement, how do we better explain to the
American people about the value of international engagement and
the need to secure our interests and promote our values? And
how would you structure that engagement in a way that actually
makes a difference and moves the needle so that we are not just
talking to ourselves, but we are engaging with and accountable
to our constituents as we try to craft an enduring world order
2.0? If you might, Madam Secretary.
Secretary Albright. I think the important part would be to
take it on the road, frankly. And I think that we not only need
to respect each other, but we need to respect the American
people and to explain what our foreign policy is about. I have
to say I keep trying to make foreign policy less foreign. And
basically what needs to happen I think is to identify it with
the interest of the people in X place. In many ways, people do
understand that we depend on an export market or that our
farmers appreciate Public Law 480 or that there are certain
aspects that definitely affect a specific district or region.
And what I would hope is that you all would go on the road. And
may I say that I volunteer to go on the road with any of you
because I think that it is important to have a discussion and
that takes it to the American people and understands that our
stake is the job of the President of the United States to
protect our people, our territory, and our way of life. That
depends on how we operate in the world, and we need to bring
the American people into that discussion.
Senator Coons. Thank you.
Mr. Hadley?
Mr. Hadley. I completely agree. At the end of our written
testimony, we gave you a bit of a road map because we think
Congress needs to lead this national dialogue. The Congress has
done it at times in our history, in the 19th century, the first
half of the 19th century over the Vietnam issues. I think there
is a huge opportunity for Congress on a bipartisan basis to
lead this debate.
I would urge you to figure out how to use the new media and
new vehicles. Madeleine and I have this long 80-page report,
which will put you right to sleep, though there is a lot of
good stuff in it. And we went out on the road with it, and she
would talk for 10 minutes. I would talk for 10 minutes. The
people at the Atlantic Council did a 3-minute video that is the
essence of the report. It is a better communication vehicle. I
would like to see the Congress figure out how to do the new
media so that the American people would look to Congress as the
forum for debate on major national issues. I think that is a
huge opportunity for you.
Senator Coons. I agree. I think we may conclude that the
outcome of these years is to make the Senate great again for a
variety of reasons.
As you both know, I have an annual conference in Delaware.
I have done it 6 years now--that is focused primarily on
Africa. It was to try and help explain to the people of my
state why I was going to Africa regularly and to help me get
better input from them about how it connects to faith
communities, to Diaspora communities, and to business concerns
and opportunities for our state. And I have looked to USGLC for
some partnership in expanding that and broadening it and
sustaining it. I would be enthusiastic about working with any
member of this committee because I frankly think when we go to
our home states in bipartisan pairs to talk about and hear
about the challenges we face, we strengthen and sustain our
long-term work.
Could I ask one more quick question, Mr. Chairman?
The Chairman. Sure.
Senator Coons. As we look at the world order, I am
particularly curious about India. We have, as you both
discussed, real challenges with both Russia and China and their
infractions or persistent and active actions to remake or
violate or break the world order. How do we better engage
India? And are you optimistic that they might be a solid
partner for us in strengthening and re-imagining the world
order?
Mr. Hadley. I think we have already started it. And again,
on a bipartisan basis, President Clinton actually started the
first outreach to India. The Bush administration built on it in
terms of the civil nuclear deal. The Obama administration
pursued it. We all did that because we saw India emerging as a
major global player and wanted it to be with us in maintaining
that U.S.-led international order, not undermining it. So I
think the foundation is laid, and I think there is a real
opportunity for the Trump administration to build on that
because India is increasingly a player and it is in our
interest for them to be so since we share a lot of common
values.
Secretary Albright. We are the world's oldest democracy.
They are the largest. We have an awful lot in common. And I
think that the bipartisan approach that Steve described--it was
great to go to India with President Clinton and then to have it
be picked up. And it goes to the business that we have been
saying earlier. You cannot have a Democratic foreign policy and
a Republican one. Things kind of take longer to evolve, and so
I really do think that it is an important relationship by
location as well as by character of what the country is about.
Senator Coons. Terrific. Thank you both.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Shaheen?
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you both very much for being here.
I had the opportunity to go with some other folks here to
the Munich security conference this year. And it struck me, as
we heard the Vice President come and address the group and said
all the right things about our relationship to Europe--we heard
that from Senator McCain. We heard that from General Mattis.
And yet, the Europeans who were there who I talked to were
still very anxious because they were hearing a different
message coming from the President. And it strikes me that one
of the challenges that we have right now is getting everybody
on the same page when it comes to our foreign policy. I think
one place that that continues to be an issue is in Europe
because of Russia and what Russia appears to be doing, but also
because of statements that have been made with respect to the
EU, to NATO.
I know you just finished your report on the Middle East and
issues have been raised here about Russia, China, India and
Africa. But it seems to me that one of the places where there
is the greatest potential for harm right now is in Europe with
Brexit, with what is happening in the elections with Russia's
meddling there.
So what can we do to--and given the importance of our
transatlantic relationship with Europe and the stability that
that has provided since World War II, what can we do to better
reassure our European friends and allies about our support for
Europe and for this relationship? And how can we help as there
are challenges that they are facing right now?
Secretary Albright. I also was at the Munich security
conference, and I think we have always been the center of
attention there but never in quite the way that was
uncomfortable in terms of what America's role was.
And I think that part of the issue with Europe is I happen
to believe that we always wanted to have a strong European
Union because they are potentially our best partners in doing
things in other parts of the world. They felt that we were not
paying attention to them enough, but they also have had serious
internal problems that the EU seems like a disconnected bunch
of bureaucrats whereas they have internal problems and we are
seeing them now.
I do think that the United States has to have a double
approach to this, which is to deal through the European Union
and NATO. And by the way, I am very glad that Secretary
Tillerson is now going to a NATO meeting.
Senator Shaheen. Me too.
Secretary Albright. But also to look individually at what
the countries need and want especially as there are stresses
and strains on it. I do think we have a vital relationship with
Germany, and Chancellor Merkel's visit here was an important
one. I hope the right messages really came through in terms of
our support. But I think we need to return to some realization
of the centrality of the Euro-Atlantic relationship, that it
has been the real basis of what our post-Cold War security has
been about.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Mr. Hadley. I think we are making progress on that. I did
not go to Munich, but I have heard from Madeleine and others
that that was the wrap. We have heard it from Mattis. We need
to hear it from President Trump. And my recollection is 3 days
later in his appearance before the joint session of Congress,
he embraced NATO pretty strongly. And I think that is helpful.
I think the fact that he is having some additional credibility
into our foreign policy, that we are going forward to the
deployments in the Baltic States and the Balkans, all that is
helping. And the evolution in the attitude of the
administration towards Russia and a more realistic attitude
towards Russia--I think all of that helps.
The NATO thing I think is in the process of being fixed.
I am more worried about the EU. President Trump recently
did say something like the EU is fine if that is what the
Europeans want. But he has put his finger on something. The
European Project does not have a lot of support in the rank and
file among the population. It has not been sold. There are real
reservations about it. And the EU actually needs to renovate
itself if it is going to save itself. And I think this is
really a message the Europeans need to hear.
Senator Shaheen. I appreciate that and I share that
concern.
One of the places where I think the EU could be more
helpful than it currently is is in the Balkans where the long
lead time--and I appreciate that we need to support those
countries or encourage them to move to more transparent
democratic processes. And, Secretary Albright, I would be
interested in hearing your thoughts about the Balkans. But it
seems to me that one concern has been it takes so long to get
through the process of joining the EU, that the public is
discouraged before you can get very far down that road and they
start looking elsewhere.
But, Secretary Albright, can you talk about--my time is up
I know, Mr. Chairman--just briefly respond on the Balkans?
Secretary Albright. Let me just say that part of the issue
generally is that success in kind of fragile democracies takes
longer than we think. And I am concerned about the fact that
after the Clinton administration left office, that not enough
attention was paid to the Balkans, that we thought it was all
done. It was not all done, and there really are questions. And
I think there are issues in fact, and it is germane to this
whole point. Where we are not active, the Russians are being
very smart in getting in in some form or another. And I think
that the EU membership activity is something that is useful and
takes too long. That is what happened in Ukraine.
And so I think the question is to realize that we are not
operating in a field where we have all the time that we want,
is that there is something else going on. And what Putin wants
is to break up Europe. That is my sense that that is his
agenda. And we should not be a part of it, and what we should
try to figure out is how to be supportive and push the process
forward and not just decide that everything is done everywhere.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Udall?
Senator Udall. Thank you to the panel very much for your
testimony today. It has been very engaging and very insightful.
And I thank the chairman for your statement in response to
Senator Young about the committee reviewing the 9/11 AUMF. I
think that is really important to do, and I think many of us
have been speaking up on that. And I know Senator Young is not
here, but I look forward to reviewing his AUMF.
Last week, I asked Secretary Mattis about the lack of an
AUMF in Syria. As you know, in Syria, the U.S. has not been
invited in by the government. U.S. military vehicles, heavy
artillery, and troops are in Syria. And it is easy to argue
that the United States has effectively invaded Syria, violating
the sovereignty of a country in the Middle East, which is a de
facto declaration of war.
Secretary Mattis, who I have great respect for, answered
the question that there was really no border between Iraq and
Syria, and the United States could not, quote, draw that
imaginary line in the midst of an enemy. But he also supported
the effort to pass a new AUMF, calling it, quote, a statement
of the American people's resolve. Unquote.
I understand Secretary Mattis' response. ISIS does not
respect international borders. But ISIS is not the only force
in Syria. The Assad government is still the internationally
recognized government, and it is being supported heavily by the
Russians and the Iranians.
I do not think it is right for the U.S. military to become
involved in the Syrian Civil War based on the 9/11 AUMF. I
voted for that AUMF as a House member. I never imagined that
vote being used to justify U.S. ground troops in Syria in the
year 2017, and I do not think anyone else who voted in favor it
did either.
So my questions to the panel, starting with Secretary
Albright, is do you think the 9/11 AUMF applies to the
situation in Syria. What does this mean, this situation we have
now, in terms of the international rules-based order? And are
you worried that the conflict could continue to spiral towards
a wider conflict that will further entrench the United States
in another Middle Eastern war?
Secretary Albright. I do think that a new AUMF is necessary
because one can interpret and reinterpret. But the bottom line
is we need the American people to understand what our role is
in whatever country and especially in something that is as
complicated as what is going on. And there is a problem between
Iraq and Syria and where the border is, which is exactly the
reason why there needs to be more discussion of it.
I also think that we need to understand--the U.S. needs to
be more involved in the political aspects of this and in fact
understanding where Syria is going, how many things need to be
done.
And by the way, the Atlantic Council put out a terrific
film in terms of what the Russian role has been in terms of
breaking Aleppo and in terms of what the Russian role in that
has been. And Ambassador Haley I think has been terrific in
describing that.
So there needs to be a larger discussion about what we are
doing in Syria, what the future of Syria is, why we need to be
there, and the AUMF is the only way to do it. So I think that
having kind of followed the discussions on previous issues,
there is no question that it is a complex issue in terms of how
much power you give to the executive branch, what the duration
of it is, what the various component parts of it is, which is
exactly the reason why a deliberate discussion, a national one,
needs to be held.
Senator Udall. Mr. Hadley?
Mr. Hadley. I think the current AUMF does apply to what is
going on in Syria because Al Qaeda is there and ISIS is a
successor organization to Al Qaeda. So I do not think there is
any question about the authority of what we are doing.
Also, states have a responsibility to govern their
territory and make sure they are not used as a basis for attack
of their neighbors. And we know there is plotting going on in
Raqqa today directed against Europe and the United States. So
we have to defend ourselves against that. So I am not troubled
by that.
What I am troubled by is that if we make ultimately an
accommodation with Assad, we send the message to the world that
if you are brutal enough with your own people and kill enough
of them, the international community will let you stay in
power. And I think it is a terrible message to send to the
international community.
Senator Udall. Senator Corker, I would also like to put
into the record a ``New York Times'' editorial on this called
Congress's Duty in the War with ISIS. And it specifically
mentions our colleague, Senator Kaine, who has been pushing a
long time to urge that we address the issue of an AUMF and
really constructively look at this issue as a whole, Democrats
and Republicans, trying to get what I think you all are urging,
is a bipartisan foreign policy on these kinds of things.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The information referred to is located at the end of this
hearing transcript]
The Chairman. Thank you.
I know I have interjected more than I should, but Mr.
Hadley just stated he believes that the authority to go against
ISIS exists. The President Obama felt the same thing. And I
agree 100 percent that the authority is there. And I think a
debate on an AUMF, on the other hand, is timely and especially
with a new administration laying out a strategy.
I will say that it is a pretty short document, and it still
does not draw us into the full debate of what we should be
doing. So for us to think for a moment that writing some 2- or
3-page document about an AUMF really is the kind of thing that
I think these two are laying out. It is not. It is not. It
causes us to talk about a lot of things that are important, but
it in no way comes close to really focusing on a long-term
strategy.
But, again, I appreciate the conversation as it is.
With that, Senator Murphy.
Senator Cardin. Mr. Chairman, I would just interject just
very quickly.
Along with Senator Udall, I voted for the AUMF when I was
in the House. I really think Senator Udall is absolutely
correct. I think any of us who voted for it did not anticipate
it would be utilized as it is utilized today. The legal
interpretation of the language is subject to the legal
scholars, and I understand that. But the AUMF is a
congressional authorization, and it seems to me that it is the
responsibility of Congress to give authorization for the
contemporary needs and that was not done in 2001. I actually
think we are stronger if we can do it. So I just make that
point that I think it is the right thing for us to do.
The Chairman. I think most everybody is in agreement.
Again, I do not think that this administration nor the Obama
administration was operating without a legal basis when they
were going against Al Qaeda and ISIS. But I agree that it is
very healthy to update.
I said Murphy, but I meant Markey. Thank you.
Senator Markey. I always wanted to be named Murphy, but not
today. Markey is a much more rare Irish name. Thank you.
Two years ago, Mitchell Orenstein, Professor of Central and
East European Politics at the University of Pennsylvania,
observed that President Putin's hatred of NATO is well known
and that Russia under Putin can never become as democratic as
necessary to become a full member of the European Union or of
NATO. And Putin does seem to want to return to 19th century
global power politics where authoritarian governments rules
spheres of influence and have a free hand to suppress popular
aspirations and democratic government and also on the human
rights issue.
At his confirmation hearing in January, Secretary of
Defense Mattis said that Putin is trying to break NATO.
Likewise, he appears to be trying to break the EU.
So my question is, since we know what Putin is trying to do
in Europe and what he tried to do here in the United States--we
are all politicians up here so we know a get-out-the-vote
effort when we see it. Is, in your opinion, what Professor
Orenstein is talking about accurate? Are we in a situation
where we need to have a proactive policy? And what would be
your strategy for us to counteract Putin right now? What would
you have us do, the Europeans do in order to push back? Can you
give us a 1- or a 2- or a 3-step program that you would like to
see us actively implement?
Secretary Albright. Well, first of all, I think we need to
understand that Central and Eastern Europe was artificially put
under the Warsaw Pact and the power of the Soviet Union, and
when the Cold War ended, the big deal was how in fact to let
them be a part of a system where people could make up their own
minds about where they lived.
I am very proud to have been a part of NATO expansion in
the beginning, and I think that it is not just a military
alliance but also a political alliance that has great strength.
I do think--and I have read everything I can about what
Putin's strategy is and what their military doctrine is. It is
in fact to break up NATO. They see NATO as the major threat.
It was very interesting to be at the Warsaw Summit last
summer and, in fact, that there was a declaration that what we
needed to do, as far as the Russians or NATO, was to do
deterrence and dialogue. I have explained it sometimes like
this. It is a little hard to do both things at the same time.
But that is part of the issue, is that we need to show the
deterrence. And therefore, I think the movement of the forces
that have been undertaken by NATO makes sense. But we also need
to have a dialogue with the Russians because that was something
we began to do in terms of a Russia-NATO council and a way to
make them--not isolate them completely. So one has to say that
the alliance had not been against them, but that they really
need to be brought in as part of it.
I also think that it would be useful--they have been in
violation of the INF Treaty, and I think it is always worth it
to call out what is wrong and then try to figure out how to
have a dialogue on the issues that we can agree with. I do not
believe in spheres of influence. I think those countries need
to be able to make up their own minds.
Senator Markey. Mr. Hadley?
Mr. Hadley. I would do four things. One, strengthening
NATO. That means more European spending turning into real
operational capability, the reposition of forces in the Baltics
and the Balkans and Central and Eastern Europe to deter Russia,
and reaffirming our commitment to NATO and NATO members'
commitment to each other.
Second, I think we need to support the EU to renovate
itself and build popular support among its populations so it is
a vital institution. And then I would hope it would open its
door to further membership.
Third, we need to counter--you know, Russia is waging a war
against Western principles of democracy and freedom and making
the case for authoritarianism. And we are not even in that game
anymore.
And finally, I think we have to help Ukraine succeed, but
do it in a way that does not commit it to becoming anti-
Russian. That is a delicate balance.
I think those are the four things we need to be attending
to.
Senator Markey. Does Brexit harm the EU in a way which
strengthens Russia?
Mr. Hadley. It probably does. But that is not why the
Brexit vote went the way it did. It went because the concept
lost the support of British people.
Senator Markey. But does it support strengthening of EU,
your point number two? Does Brexit then undermine the EU? I
understand the reason why it moved that way, but is the effect
of it a harming of----
Mr. Hadley. In the short run, it probably undermines the
EU. The question is, does it provoke the EU to revitalize
itself and to reengage its populations? If it does, then maybe
at some point the UK would think to reconsider its decision.
Senator Markey. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Very good. I hope that is the outcome.
Senator Murphy?
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I worry that sometimes when we are talking
about this administration's policy on Russia, we selectively
read comments and actions from the administration to create a
policy that we want to be true but is not really true yet. Just
as recently as a few days ago, the President of the United
States was sending out tweets suggesting that news of Russian
interference in the U.S. election was fake. And so I want to
believe that realists in this administration are ultimately
going to create a more sensible Russia policy. I do not know
that the President is there yet. He seems to advertise that
pretty regularly to people who follow him.
And I read the 40 percent-30 percent recommended cut to the
State Department in that same vein. That is an absolute gift to
the Russians. They project their power not just through
military means but through propaganda and energy bullying,
through outright graft and intimidation. And you know, it is
really the State Department programming that is most effective
in pushing back on that.
So, Secretary Albright, I wanted to ask you in that context
a more general question, which is about our expectations for
what the result of our national security budget should be as we
approach 2017 and 2018. The President has made it pretty clear
that he does not believe that the United States' interests can
be adequately protected with current appropriations levels for
the Department of Defense, and he has recommended a pretty
robust increase, an increase that I think will get bipartisan
support.
But let me ask you about what our expectations should be
for the State Department budget. Do you think that we can
adequately protect the U.S. interests abroad--Russia, as an
example--with the current appropriations for the State
Department? I.E., should we be in a debate about a 40 percent
cut versus flat funding, or should we be suggesting that if the
Defense Department is going to get plussed up to meet these new
threats, then we also have to demand that our nonkinetic tools
get similar attention?
Secretary Albright. I have to say I always was in a
difficult position when I saw the size of the defense budget
versus the size of the foreign policy budget, I mean, 10 times
as much and kind of the weak partner in this, when in fact the
kinds of work in terms of diplomacy, our programs where we were
talking about education, for instance, and exchanges and our
public diplomacy and our assistance programs. There is no way
that this can be done by cutting the budget. It is barely
adequate in the first place. And then the United Nations bills
and dues come out of that, various support things. And I think
that we are undercutting our own power by cutting the State
Department budget.
I do think it is worth always looking at where savings can
be made, but the Pentagon might do that also. But I think that
we are undercutting the power of the United States and the
security of the American people if in fact we cut the State
Department budget.
Senator Murphy. Mr. Hadley, I wanted you to maybe try to
operationalize one of your key recommendations, which is with
respect to the proxy wars playing out in the Middle East today.
You have one recommendation in which you say, listen, the
Middle East has to sort of take control of their own affairs.
And yet, with respect to Iran, you do recommend that we
continue to try to push back against their advancements in the
region. Those two maybe do not square with each other in part
because the U.S. has lent unprecedented levels of support to
the Saudis, military support, over the last 8 years to help
them win that battle in the region.
Maybe operationalize this, maybe in the context of Yemen--a
place where the proxy war is real. It exists today. There are
right now proposals on the table from the Trump administration
to lend new serious military support to the coalition, mainly
to the Saudis. And yet, it does not seem like there is any
diplomatic component to that strategy. There is a potential
diplomatic solution, a political solution inside Yemen, but
today it does not seem as if there is any effort in the
administration to try to find that. You sort of suggest
threading the needle, pushing back against Iran while keeping
the door open to political negotiation and discussion. Is Yemen
an example in which ultimately a political solution has to be
found and if you close that door, you are closing yourself off
to any real potential settlement there?
Mr. Hadley. Yes. I think it is the difference between what
we call prong one of our strategy and prong two. In terms of
winding down the civil wars, the countries in the region cannot
do it themselves. Outside intervention is required with the
support of friends and allies in the region.
Prong two, which is renovation of these societies, the
countries and the peoples in the region have to take the lead
on that. We have to support them.
Yemen. Difficult problem. Of course, we need a diplomatic
solution. And I think what the Saudi and UAE and the
administration are talking about is a way to get to a
diplomatic outcome. People do not understand. I was told just
yesterday that there were 70 strikes, missile and rocket
strikes, from Yemen into Saudi and 400 schools have been closed
in Saudi Arabia because of the threat posed from Yemen. So this
is a real national security challenge. And what the Saudis and
UAE wanted to see is an American policy that understands and
helps them deal with that challenge. And I think the changes
that are being contemplated are useful in that respect.
I know you have talked to all of them, and they say to you
the same thing they say to me. They want to get in a situation
where there is a political resolution that is acceptable to the
Yemenis but that does not have the Houthis, which represent
about 70,000 or 80,000 folks, taking over the whole country.
And they have not been able to get there. And I think what they
are trying to design is a strategy to support our friends and
allies in the region, get some progress on the ground, and to
set up a situation where there could be a diplomatic outcome.
That I think is what they are trying to do. I hope they
succeed.
The Chairman. Senator Kaine?
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks to the witnesses.
My chair will be disappointed in me if I do not just weigh
in on the amen chorus on the AUMF. I do think we are in a
position--and I agree with the chair that it is a propitious
time because of the change of the administration, because of
the development of the anti-ISIS plan that hopefully we will be
briefed on, but also because of the deepening level of conflict
in new theaters. We have seen the first ground operations by
the United States military in Yemen and significantly
increasing ground operations beyond just special forces in
Syria.
And the activity in Syria raises a tough question because
unlike Iraq or Yemen or Afghanistan, we are not in Syria at the
request of the government. Russia was invited into Syria by the
government, and Vladimir Putin had the Duma vote on it before
he went in.
And so this is just a time where for many reasons--there
are many of us who actually feel like the current operations
are not authorized by domestic law, and the source of our
belief is comparing the 9/11 authorization that Congress
rejected--the request that President Bush made was turned down
and the wording that the administration asked for. And the
original wording would clearly have covered everything. But
Congress rejected a broad AUMF and decided to make it narrower.
So many of us feel like we really are on legal thin ice.
But be that as it may, the lawyers will differ about this.
I think the time is right and I look forward to the discussion
as the change of administration and new strategies are in
place.
A lot of good questions have been asked that I was going to
ask, but you have already covered it.
Let me just bring you into a new area we have not talked
about yet.
I was at two subcommittee hearings yesterday. One was about
the U.S.-Mexico relationship, and one was about sort of
strategy vis-a-vis China. And it was interesting.
The U.S.-Mexico relationship. There was a lot of concern
that some of the rhetoric from the President might have an
effect on domestic Mexican politics and possibly increase the
odds of a Chavez type leader being elected President of Mexico.
We talked a little bit about that.
On the China hearing, we talked about China's increasing
investments in Venezuela and other nations to our south in the
Americas. And Robert Gallucci, Ambassador Gallucci, was the
witness from Georgetown, and he basically said yesterday, you
know, China actually has a much more defined strategy about the
southern hemisphere, Africa and Latin America, than the United
States does.
This is a hearing about big picture thinking, about if we
are engaged around the big picture definition of strategy, how
about the Americas? How about Yukon to Patagonia? Where should
our thinking about these 37 nations of a billion people after
the Colombian ceasefire, without war for the first time
probably in recorded human history--how should we be thinking
about the Americas as we are articulating a strategy so it is
not just a northern hemisphere or NATO or east-west route that
our diplomats travel but that we take the responsibilities in
the southern hemisphere, especially in the Americas, seriously?
Secretary Albright. Let me just say our policies vis-a-vis
in the hemisphere have always been complicated. It is a little
bit damned if you do, damned if you do not in terms of mucking
around or not paying attention.
But I do think without making it be a sphere of interest,
which I think we have to be very careful about, I do think we
need to have better relationships that are respectful. And you
mentioned Colombia. Colombia is a perfect example of a
bipartisan foreign policy that actually took quite a long time
to effectuate.
I do think that we need to look at what is necessary in
those countries, whether it has to do with the problems that
they have, some created by us and the drug issues that come up,
but also how to see how the OAS can operate. We talk a lot
about the role of regional organizations these days. The OAS
was the original one in all of this. And I think it is
important to look at where that goes.
I also do think the other point is the Chinese are willing
to come in wherever there is a vacuum. We have seen that not
only in this hemisphere but also in Africa and other places.
And I think that we have to be very careful about what is going
on. But I think we have not paid enough attention. I think what
has helped, frankly, is the change in our relationship with
Cuba and potentially so that when President Obama went to an
OAS meeting or the Summit of the Americas, that was not the
only subject----
Senator Kaine. Yes. It cleared out an obstacle that was an
obstacle for a lot of the other nations.
Secretary Albright. And so I do think that there are
opportunities, and it has to be viewed but not as us taking
advantage of Latin America, but having it be genuinely a
partnership in terms of the issues that take place.
Senator Kaine. Mr. Hadley?
Mr. Hadley. I agree with what Madeleine has said.
You know, we have had a lot of literature now talking about
a North America strategy, which we did not talk about that way
10 years ago. I would like to hear us have a western hemisphere
strategy.
The Chinese I think appreciate the importance of Latin
America perhaps at this point more than we do. And I think the
fact that Chavinistas are sort of in decline in Latin America
is a real opportunity for us to engage in a hemisphere-wide
dialogue about where do we want this hemisphere to go in this
21st century. And I would like to see us start thinking about a
hemispheric strategy, not just a North American strategy.
Senator Kaine. Thank you so much.
Thanks, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Thank you both for being here. We all admire so much the
work that you have done and continue to do.
I noticed Secretary Albright probably took a step back at
some of my comments about the State Department. I just want to
say, look, I think we have lost the American people on foreign
policy in many ways, and I think this last election was in some
ways about it. I appreciate the comments that have been made
about us maybe going out into the country discussing these
things. I think that would be very important. But I think there
is a huge disconnect between the American people and our
foreign policy. And I think that is partially our fault, you
know, a lot of reasons for that. And I think to an extent we
can do everything we can both at the U.N. and at the State
Department to make sure that everything we are doing matters
and that we are not doing wasteful things that do not matter. I
think that actually builds a case for us to be able to do some
of the important, transformative things that I see us doing
around the world.
So I am all for Secretary Tillerson and what he is doing. I
really am. I could not be more in support of his efforts to
look at the organization. He will do that in conjunction with
us. He will not be behind what happens here budgetarily because
we always do things way beyond when we are supposed to. So I am
actually very excited about that and encouraging him on.
I think Nikki Haley last night was laying out--I know that
she is planning on significant reforms--significant reforms--
that seem to be being received very well by our partners there
on the U.N. Security Council.
So those things excite me because what they do is not
weaken us. They build strength when people think that what we
are doing is connected to, number one, making sure we are
spending our monies wisely, but also towards our national
interests.
I do not think we did enough here today to really talk
about what our core national interests are. And I know that is
sometimes difficult in a setting when each person has their
particular issue. But my sense is we really do have--and I
could wrong, and I know there are still tensions about the
November 8th election, but I think we have got more opportunity
than ever--than ever--to come up with a bipartisan strategy on
the various areas of the world that matter. I really believe
that.
And Secretary Gates, who I admire as much I do our two
witnesses, has continually talked about the Cold War, and I
think he is exactly right. We had 50 years of common policy.
And I do not want to diminish our Cold War warriors, but that
is much easier than where we are today with various issues that
are happening around the world.
So this is a wonderful time for our committee, for great
members like you who have been so engaged in these things, have
lived overseas, care about these issues deeply. I cannot thank
you enough for your contributions.
I understand that you would like to have this report
entered into the record, and without objection, it will be.
[The material referred to above can be accessed at the
following url:]
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/
MEST_Final_Report_web_1130.pdf
The Chairman. And if you want to say any closing comments
that you were not asked about or you want to get something out
that you would like to vent, you would be more than welcome for
that right now.
Secretary Albright. Thank you, because I do not want this
to seem out of order, but let me just say the following thing.
I teach at Georgetown in the School of Foreign Service, which
are people that want to think about having an international
career. And I am getting questions as to whether they should
take the Foreign Service exam or be a part of our diplomatic
service given what is going on. And so I think we need to think
about what the future of diplomacy is, and part of it has to do
with the money now. But I also think, just so you know, there
is kind of a weird feeling.
The other part that bears specifically--and we have been
talking about educating the American people in many ways. The
ban and the immigration policy has made it very complicated for
universities to welcome students from foreign countries. I can
tell you that that is what is absolutely basic in terms of
having an American population that understands what our needs
are, what our policies are vis-a-vis the rest of the world. So
we need to think about the next generation in terms of having
this discussion and how it is affecting what the future of
America's position is in the world.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Well, I would like to respond and Kaine may
want to also. But, look, as a person who travels pretty
extensively around the world, I would say to these young
students, absolutely. We have got a whole generation of people
who are retiring out of the Foreign Service that have been
around for many, many years, and I cannot imagine a better time
to be taking the Foreign Service test and to be coming into the
service diplomatically. We have more problems today than we
have ever had, it seems, and they need to be dealt with in this
manner.
As it relates to the administration, I think that Senator
McConnell may have said it best. I do not always quote him. But
I would not pay attention to what is being said. I would pay
attention to what is being done. And I think if you look at
people like Tillerson, Mattis, McMaster coming in, I just have
a sense that we are going to end up in a pretty decent place as
it relates to our foreign policy. I cannot speak to some of the
messages that are going out, but what I can say is I think we
have some really capable people that are in these positions
that truly are embracing Congress more so than I have ever seen
a group come in. And I think if we can move beyond some of the
shocks that have occurred and some of the statements that are
made, I think we can truly put in place together, help put in
place some great policies for our country.
So I do not know if you want to retort to that.
Secretary Albright. Thank you very, very much. I think I
speak for both of us that this was a remarkable opportunity to
air views, and I hope that in some settings we can continue to
do that because I believe that it is time for a national
debate. And I cannot think of a better group of people to do it
with than all of you.
The Chairman. Well, thank you. Thank you both.
There will be some questions that will come in. We would
like to leave the record open until Monday afternoon. To the
extent you have time, we would appreciate if you would answer
those. I know you have staff members who will help you with
that. But it has been a real pleasure and an honor for us to
have you and thank you.
[Whereupon, at 12:23 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
The Committee Received No Response From the Hon. Madeleine K. Albright
for the Following Questions Submitted by Senator Todd Young
Question. In your joint prepared testimony, you write quote ``The
international system was designed for a different era, and it requires
a renewal of purpose and a reform of its structures.'' I chair the
subcommittee that oversees multilateral organizations. Can you provide
specific examples as to how you believe the structures of the
international system should be reformed?
[No Response Received]
Question. Do you have specific recommendations for reform and
organizational restructuring at the Department of State and the United
States Agency for International Development?
[No Response Received]
Question. In addition to serving as Secretary of State, you also
served as Ambassador to the United Nations. You have said that you
believe reforms are necessary at the U.N. What specific reforms do you
believe are necessary at the U.N.?
[No Response Received]
__________
The Committee Received No Response From the Hon. Stephen J. Hadley for
the Following Questions Submitted by Senator Todd Young
Question. In your joint prepared testimony, you write quote ``The
international system was designed for a different era, and it requires
a renewal of purpose and a reform of its structures.'' I chair the
subcommittee that oversees multilateral organizations. Can you provide
specific examples as to how you believe the structures of the
international system should be reformed?
[No Response Received]
Question. Do you have specific recommendations for reform and
organizational restructuring at the Department of State and the United
States Agency for International Development?
[No Response Received]
__________
The Committee Received No Response From the Hon. Madeleine K. Albright
for the Following Questions Submitted by Cory A. Booker
Question. Hadley/Albright--West Bank, Entrepreneurship and USAID
Budget: I was in Ramallah in the West Bank in August and had the
opportunity to visit a USAID-supported start up incubator, meet
Palestinian entrepreneurs, and engage in discussion with heads of
start-ups in the West Bank and Gaza.
Through this program, the Leaders E-Zone, USAID is working with the
tech and communications sector in the West Bank and promoting a culture
that encourages innovation and supports entrepreneurs. These young
people are models for the next generation of young Palestinians, and
the most effective counter to the violent ideologies of extremist
groups that also try to recruit young people. Unfortunately, in the
budget that President Trump has proposed, programs such as these would
be cut.
a. What is the effect of these types of programs?
b. Will funding the military with $54 billion create the same types
of outcomes as these USAID programs?
c. How should we be supporting these outcomes-based programs?
[No Response Received]
Question. Hadley/Albright--Civilian Casualties: General Townsend
said yesterday there was a ``fair chance'' American aircraft were
involved in the March 17 airstrike that brought down a building in
Mosul, killing as many as 200 civilians. If the United States is found
to have brought the building down, and the number of deaths continues
to climb toward 200, the incident would be the worst civilian casualty
event since the American invasion of Iraq in 2003. This comes on the
heels of other airstrikes where civilians have died.
In the same operation that killed a Navy SEAL in Yemen, local media
say airstrikes killed women and children. Local activists and
journalists also say an airstrike killed at least 46 people in a mosque
in Syria.
I was heartened that Gen. Votel has opened an investigation into
the civilian casualties in Mosul. What do you think should be
part of this investigation? What would give human rights groups
and others confidence that this investigation is thorough and
transparent?
Do you believe these casualties are connected in some way to a
relaxation in the rules of engagement?
What do you believe is the risk of accruing so many civilian
casualties?
[No Response Received]
Question. Albright--Youth Bulge: NDI, the organization you Chair,
has done tremendous work in supporting democracy and broadening civic
participation, especially among youth. We have talked about the youth
bulge in many of the countries this committee talks about the most:
60% of the population across the Arab world is under the age of 30.
In Yemen, 75% of the population is under age 30.
In Mali, the median age is 15.9
In Tunisia youth unemployment among graduates is around 30%. That
doesn't include those who have no college education.
You and NDI have worked extensively in Tunisia in the wake of the
Arab Spring to bring the youth who galvanized the revolutions that
swept the Middle East into the political environment. You mentioned to
me last year that our institutions are not keeping up with the pace at
which the world moves today--that our tools and our norms have not
adapted to the current environment.
What investments should we be making in young people to enable them
and their governments to harness their energy and demand for
inclusion?
What risks do we face if we do not?
[No Response Received]
Question. Albright/Hadley--Transatlantic Relationship: President
Trump has called NATO obsolete, was supportive of the Brexit vote
indicating his indifference to the European Union, and has described
Chancellor Angela Merkel's policy of welcoming refugees fleeing
violence in their homes as ``catastrophic.''
All of these comments have been music to Russia's ears who sees
NATO as a threat. The German Foreign Minister said Trump's attitudes on
the transatlantic relationship has ``caused astonishment and
excitement, not just in Brussels.'' Meanwhile, NATO officials listened
to Trump's comments ``with concern.''
What do you think is the status of the transatlantic relationship?
What do we stand to lose in a breakdown of this economic, trade,
and security relationship? Who stands to gain from this
breakdown?
What are some steps that we should be taking to reassure our
European allies of our commitment to the transatlantic
relationship?
[No Response Received]
__________
The Committee Received No Response From the Hon. Stephen J. Hadley for
the Following Questions Submitted by Senator Cory A. Booker
Question. Hadley/Albright--West Bank, Entrepreneurship and USAID
Budget: I was in Ramallah in the West Bank in August and had the
opportunity to visit a USAID-supported start up incubator, meet
Palestinian entrepreneurs, and engage in discussion with heads of
start-ups in the West Bank and Gaza.
Through this program, the Leaders E-Zone, USAID is working with the
tech and communications sector in the West Bank and promoting a culture
that encourages innovation and supports entrepreneurs. These young
people are models for the next generation of young Palestinians, and
the most effective counter to the violent ideologies of extremist
groups that also try to recruit young people. Unfortunately, in the
budget that President Trump has proposed, programs such as these would
be cut.
a. What is the effect of these types of programs?
b. Will funding the military with $54 billion create the same types
of outcomes as these USAID programs?
c. How should we be supporting these outcomes-based programs?
[No Response Received]
Question. Hadley/Albright--Civilian Casualties: General Townsend
said yesterday there was a ``fair chance'' American aircraft were
involved in the March 17 airstrike that brought down a building in
Mosul, killing as many as 200 civilians. If the United States is found
to have brought the building down, and the number of deaths continues
to climb toward 200, the incident would be the worst civilian casualty
event since the American invasion of Iraq in 2003. This comes on the
heels of other airstrikes where civilians have died.
In the same operation that killed a Navy SEAL in Yemen, local media
say airstrikes killed women and children. Local activists and
journalists also say an airstrike killed at least 46 people in a mosque
in Syria.
I was heartened that Gen. Votel has opened an investigation into
the civilian casualties in Mosul. What do you think should be
part of this investigation? What would give human rights groups
and others confidence that this investigation is thorough and
transparent?
Do you believe these casualties are connected in some way to a
relaxation in the rules of engagement?
What do you believe is the risk of accruing so many civilian
casualties?
[No Response Received]
Question. Hadley--Press Accountability: I challenged Secretary
Tillerson during his confirmation hearing about his views on the press.
It was my assessment that as CEO of ExxonMobil, he was not accountable
to the American people and only to his shareholders and so did not
display much interest in engaging with the press. In fact, ExxonMobil's
policy was to avoid press interactions.
My concern at the time was that Tillerson would bring that same
attitude toward the press into this role at the State Department. We've
seen exactly that concern play out. The Secretary did not take a press
pool with him on his first Asia trip and after weeks of not holding
daily press conferences, started them for a few short weeks, and has
again stopped them. Two weeks ago, several of my colleagues joined me
in a letter to the Secretary expressing our concern about his evasion
of the press.
a. Are you concerned by these stark breaks in precedent?
b. What message do you think this sends to others around the world
who are cracking down on independent media, journalists, and civil
society groups that depend on the U.S. as a beacon for transparency and
accountability?
[No Response Received]
Question. Albright/Hadley--Transatlantic Relationship: President
Trump has called NATO obsolete, was supportive of the Brexit vote
indicating his indifference to the European Union, and has described
Chancellor Angela Merkel's policy of welcoming refugees fleeing
violence in their homes as ``catastrophic.''
All of these comments have been music to Russia's ears who sees
NATO as a threat. The German Foreign Minister said Trump's attitudes on
the transatlantic relationship has ``caused astonishment and
excitement, not just in Brussels.'' Meanwhile, NATO officials listened
to Trump's comments ``with concern.''
What do you think is the status of the transatlantic relationship?
What do we stand to lose in a breakdown of this economic, trade,
and security relationship? Who stands to gain from this
breakdown?
What are some steps that we should be taking to reassure our
European allies of our commitment to the transatlantic
relationship?
[No Response Received]
congress's duty in the war with isis
[new york times, march 25, 2017]
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