

THE ROAD AHEAD: U.S. INTERESTS, VALUES,
AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

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BEFORE THE

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THURSDAY, MARCH 30, 2017

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m. in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Bob Corker, chairman of the committee, presiding.

Present: Senators Corker [presiding], Johnson, Flake, Gardner, Young, Cardin, Menendez, Shaheen, Coons, Udall, Murphy, Kaine, Markey, and Booker.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER, U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE

The CHAIRMAN. The Foreign Relations Committee will come to order.

I thank everyone for being here. We have two outstanding witnesses today.

And just as a housekeeping thing, I guess we have got another vote. So what we might try to do is get through opening comments now. We might run, go vote, and then come back. Again, we apologize especially having such distinguished people with us today.

We spent a lot of time in this committee looking at very specific foreign policy issues, and whether it is the challenges we face in the Mosul campaign in Iraq appears to wind down or down-in-the-weeds details of Venezuelan politics, we rightly focus much of our attention on the tactical and operational. There is not much time left for the truly strategic. I mean, let us face it. That is the way things have been both at the White House and here. That is why as chairman we have made it a priority to concentrate more of our time and energy on exploring the bigger questions facing our country and the world.

Members will remember that last year we were fortunate to hear testimony along those more strategic lines from former Secretary of State, James Baker, and former National Security Advisor, Tom Donelan, both of whom I know are friends of yours.

I should also make clear that we stand in a moment of exceptional opportunity to take the strategic thinking we are exploring at hearings like this and work together with a new administration and turn it into reality. We have a chance right now to join forces in a bipartisan way with the executive branch, which regardless of what side of the aisle you may be on, there is no question they are

more accessible and welcoming of input than any administration I have dealt with since joining the committee.

As a matter of fact, since I am getting a reaction from Hadley, I will just say that we had lunch with Tillerson last week. We are going to be breaking out in small groups to look at each of their 12 strategic regions. We are going to be doing the same thing with McMaster.

So as this administration moves ahead, they really are looking on a bipartisan basis for input. So it is even more important that you all are here today. And we thank you.

Members know we have already had, as I just mentioned, a productive working meeting with Secretary of State Tillerson yesterday. Ambassador Haley was in. I thought we had a great meeting with her. What we will learn today will help inform those future interactions with the executive branch, and if we seize this moment, it will help us craft solid foreign policies in a cooperative manner.

In my view, we face four critical areas of concern as we and the new administration move ahead.

First of all, over the past several years, we have seen a crisis of credibility emerge when it comes to the world's view of the United States. Put simply, people no longer believe that we can be counted on to do what we say we will do.

Second, we have a serious problem with prioritization. Since the end of the Cold War, the number of things being called national security priorities has expanded to an enormous laundry list. We spend too much time frankly on pet issues of specific interest groups, individual Members of Congress, and administration bureaucrats. And as the old saying goes, if everything is a priority, then nothing is a priority. And I hope you will help us with that today.

Third, our foreign policy has clearly and obviously become disconnected from the beliefs and desires of the American people. I mean, let us face it. One of the outcomes of this most recent election was about that. I mean, we have not done a good job of making sure people here in our country are connected with our foreign policy. We must have a national conversation about what constitutes core U.S. interests and policymakers who have to do a better job of squaring those interests and the policies we pursue to achieve them with the will of the folks that sent us here in the first place.

And then finally, we have to recognize that no matter what we talk about in this committee day to day, no matter what we discuss here this morning, the top threat, the top national security threat is us. It is us. And that is our inability to deal with our long-term fiscal situation. Everybody knows it. Secretary Albright has mentioned this in times past. I know Secretary Hadley has.

The other threats we face, North Korea, Russia, Iran, and all the rest, are significant, but so is the fact that we are staring down the barrel of the kind of fiscal situation that has led to the end of kingdoms, empires, and republics throughout history. And it is something that we have to grapple with.

I want to extend my great gratitude to the witnesses. I do not want to prolong my opening comments any longer. We look forward to your testimony, vigorous questioning. It is an honor to have you.

And with that, Senator Cardin.

**STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND**

Senator CARDIN. Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for convening this hearing and getting us two very, very distinguished witnesses. Their service to our country is legendary, and we thank you very much for everything you have done to strengthen America in your public service throughout your career and continuing your inspiration to foreign policy development in our country. So thank you both. It is a pleasure to have you here as we think about U.S. national security strategies in the years ahead.

When the Cold War ended some 30 years ago, we were told that we were at the end of history and that democracy, open borders, free trade, liberal economics, and pluralistic societies had emerged triumphant.

Yet, with the rise of populism, including here in the United States, with the renewed ideological challenges that we face from Russia, China, and the Middle East and with still ongoing struggles with ISIS in Syria and Iraq, for the balance of the 21st century we are very much in history once again.

Renewed and vigorous U.S. leadership of the sort that helped us chart the 20th century, the sort of leadership that the two of you have provided to multiple administrations have never been more necessary. Yet, the new administration seems to have a very different idea about how to exercise U.S. power in the world, ideas that in my view risk undermining key tools and mechanisms that enable U.S. leadership.

I am a firm believer in the enduring strength of the United States. Yet, I am concerned that our position as the leader of the free world is at risk. The ideas of democracy as a model and of development and diplomacy as tools for engagement are being significantly challenged. The European Project, which has been the source of security and prosperity for the past 70 years, is now being undermined with U.S. support for and in deference to far right wing efforts to undo European security and democratic architecture. The new administration appears to have elevated Russia and China to privileged positions ahead of our allies in a new game of great power politics.

Russia has attacked our democracy, illegally annexed Crimea, and invaded eastern Ukraine. Putin's Russia now considers itself in an existential struggle with the West, and all Russia's domestic problems, a weakening ruble, collapsing energy prices, labor unrest, are framed by the Kremlin as evidence of foreign hostility rather than the consequences of their own corruption and expansionist ambitions. In my view, Russia is a revisionist power that will cause further trouble across Europe and in the international order more generally. Russia sought to undermine and interfere in our elections, and how we respond to Putin's broader strategic game is one of the key challenges of our time. Therefore, your views and advice on Russia is something that I look forward to our discussion at this hearing.

Likewise, we welcome your perspectives on the rise of China, which has created anxiety through the Asia-Pacific region, raising

with it questions as to how best maintain the institutional order in East Asia that has so benefited the region and the globe for the past seven decades.

After World War II, the United States led the world towards peace, prosperity, and freedom. It did not come easy. We faced down threats from the Soviets, Saddam Hussein, Milosevic, and others, and we have done so effectively in the past. We need to renew and revitalize American power and leadership to advance U.S. leadership interests in the world, like continuing to take back ISIS-claimed territory and fighting the warped ideology of Al Qaeda. This challenge, this question about our commitment to basic principles, values, and norms of democracy is fundamental to our role in the world.

I am also interested in your views on the roles of good governance, transparency, democracy, human rights, and the development of a U.S. foreign policy toolkit. It is never more important than it is today. For too long, U.S. foreign policy has treated governance issues, anti-corruption, transparency, democracy, and civil society capacity building, as well as basic human rights and development, as secondary issues. Today we need to make sure that is not the case.

Yet, this administration seems to take as a given that the United States is not exceptional, rather than our form of government is no different than that of Russia or China, pursuing power narrowly, conducting foreign policy in a transitional way that are not our values. That is not what we are as Americans. The President and his inner circle may not talk about American values, but I will and I know both of you will. In the face of this assault of our values, we cannot be silent. We know that America derives its strength from its values, and we can never retreat from that core concept.

Lastly, I am interested in your perspective on how the Trump administration's proposal to slash about 36 percent from the State Department and USAID budgets will affect our ability to safeguard our Nation's interests. The deep cuts, accompanied by efforts to dismantle key U.S. foreign policy tools and institutions, comes at a time when we face massive humanitarian crises with 65 million people displaced or on the move and 20 million facing starvation in the coming weeks.

I recognize that Congress ultimately determines our spending priorities. I recognize that. But I am deeply concerned that the proposed cuts of the State Department and foreign assistance budgets suggest that the Trump administration could fatally undermine our ability to renew and revive our leadership at just a time when the leadership is increasingly essential.

So for all those reasons, I look forward to this discussion today as we talk about the future of U.S. foreign policy.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Thank you again both for being here.

I have never seen a President's budget ever become law—ever. So we know we are all going to shape that, and I know we all have an opportunity to shape the direction of the Trump foreign policy in ways that, candidly, we have not been able to shape other administrations because of just where they are in their thinking.

So your being here today is most helpful. We are glad to have former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, known to all of us, respected, and liked by all of us, and former National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley, known by all of us, liked by all of us, admired by all of us. Thank you for being here. If you could summarize your comments in about 5 minutes, any written documents you have will be entered into the record, without objection. And with that, I think the way your protocol is when you all do many joint assessments is Secretary Albright goes first. So if you would, please begin.

STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT, FORMER U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Thank you very much, Chairman Corker and Senator Cardin and distinguished members of the committee. And thank you for the opportunity to be here today. And in listening to the opening statements, we certainly have plenty to talk about and the fact that you see the role of this committee in the broad way that you do I think is very encouraging.

I am pleased to return to these familiar surroundings and to see so many good friends here. And I am also delighted to be able to appear alongside Steve Hadley who truly is one of the smartest and most principled people that I know.

We have worked together on a number of foreign policy initiatives in the years since we left office and most recently in co-chairing the Atlantic Council's Middle East Strategy Task Force. And we have done this not only because we happen to like each other, but also because we both fervently believe in the importance of bipartisanship in foreign policy. And this was a lesson that I learned from one of my first bosses, Senator Ed Muskie, when I worked as his chief legislative assistant.

I know that the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee share our belief in working across party lines because this committee has always been bipartisan in its approach. And proof of that can be found in the relationship that I was able to build with Chairman Helms. He and I truly were the odd couple. The "New York Times" called our friendship, quote, perfectly natural and utterly astonishing. But while our politics could not have been more different, we did put those differences aside in order to build common ground on issues such as NATO expansion, banning chemical weapons, and reorganizing the State Department.

My experience with Chairman Helms gave me an even deeper respect for the legislative branch of the government and the responsibilities assigned to it under Article 1 of the Constitution. This is Article 1 time. I know the members of this committee take those responsibilities very seriously, which is why Steve and I really are pleased to be able to be here today and to join you in exploring the road ahead for U.S. interests and U.S. values and the American people.

The hearing does come at a time of deep political divisions at home and heightened instability abroad when basic questions are being asked about how and why America engages in the world. As members of different political parties, Steve and I disagree on many things, but we are in vigorous agreement on how we see

America's role in the world. We both believe it is profoundly in America's interest to be engaged globally because our security and prosperity at home are linked to economic and political health abroad. This mindset is what led our country to construct the system of international institutions and security alliances after World War II, and it is why Presidents of both parties have worked to promote peace, democracy, and economic opportunity around the world.

The system that America built has not been perfect, but it has coincided with a period of security and prosperity unmatched in human history. And while many nations have benefited from the investments America has made in global security and prosperity, none have benefited more than the United States.

So we recognize that today the system is under stress in different ways that you all have mentioned, China, Iran, North Korea, resurgent Russia, and institutions of global governance are showing their age and coming under tremendous stress as we deal with unprecedented humanitarian challenges, including the prospect of four famines in sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East. And meanwhile, the value of our global engagement is also under question at home, and many Americans feel that their lives have been threatened rather than enhanced by it.

So I do think this popular dissatisfaction with international trade and technological change and the facelessness of globalization needs to be understood and acknowledged, but so do the consequences of disengagement. For while it is comforting to believe that we can wall ourselves off from the ailments of the world, history teaches us that whenever problems abroad are allowed to fester and grow, sooner or later they do come home to America.

Isolationism and retreat do not work. We know that because we have tried it before.

Now, most of you know that I was not born in the United States. Instead, I entered the world in Czechoslovakia only a year before the Munich agreement sacrificed my country's sovereignty in order to appease Hitler. In my early years, I saw what happened when America was absent, as it was in Munich, and what happened when America was present, as it was during World War II. The lesson I drew is that terrible things happen when America is not engaged, and that is a lesson I have shared with this committee on countless occasions whether testifying as a professor of international relations, Ambassador to the U.N., or Secretary of State.

America is not an ordinary country that can just put our narrow interests first and forget about the rest of the world. We are the indispensable nation, and it would be a terrible mistake to pretend otherwise. But we should also remember that there is nothing in the word "indispensable" that means alone. We want and need other countries to have the desire and capacity to work alongside us in tackling global problems.

The testimony Steve and I have submitted for the record makes a bipartisan case for continuing American global leadership in partnership with our allies while acknowledging that the international order needs refurbishment, as do most humans and institutions over 70 years. Drawing on the work of the Middle East Strategy Task Force, we also outline a new approach for dealing

with the chaos and disorder of that region. In a moment, Steve is going to provide a brief overview of that strategy, but since we are both really looking forward to questions, I would just make a couple of points before I turn over to him.

First, decades of experience have taught us that in order for America to engage effectively in the world, we need to be able to use every tool in our national security toolbox, and this includes diplomatic pressure, economic leverage, technical assistance, and threat of force. Any one of these tools is ineffective on its own, which is why Steve and I are opposed to the steep and arbitrary cuts to the State Department international affairs budget, which have been proposed by the Trump administration. Our diplomats work every day at considerable sacrifice to ensure that the United States has superb representation and that our interests demand that our military needs to achieve its mission. We cannot have that on the cheap.

The truth is that foreign assistance, including programs aimed at promoting democracy, is among the most efficient and valuable tools that we have. And in the long run, nothing is more expensive than poverty, suffering, and war. So we have to invest the resources needed to make sure that our citizens are protected and our diplomats succeed. And this is especially true today when our personnel are often in danger in conflict areas and when our diplomats face criticism from would-be autocrats who do not like their advocacy for democracy, American values, and American non-governmental organizations.

As Senators and members of this committee, I know that you take your responsibilities very seriously to ensure that all of our instruments of national power are properly funded and that you will join us in rejecting these unwise cuts.

As we consider America's role, another point worth emphasizing is that we need to be clear not only about what our Nation is against in the world, but what we are for. We cannot and will not give in to those who threaten us or who conspire to kill our citizens, but neither can we allow any enemy to cause us to abandon our ideals that made America a symbol of liberty and justice.

For more than 200 years, our country's strength has come from our inclusiveness. You cannot tell an American by his or her last name. You all know me as Madeleine Albright, but in fact, my name is Marie Jana Korbelova. America has always been able to lead the world because we spoke and listened to people from vastly different cultures. Today I wear my pin of the Statue of Liberty. In today's era of interdependence, these are traits that we have to retain.

And so as I said earlier, this hearing comes at a time of great consequence for our country and the world. So I thank you very, very much for your attention and for your interest in what we can do together. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Albright and Mr. Hadley follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT AND STEPHEN J. HADLEY

Thank you Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, and other distinguished members of the committee.

We are grateful for the opportunity to testify before you this morning on the road ahead for U.S. interests, values, and the American people. In our testimony, we would like to offer our perspective on the current challenges to the international system, share some insights relevant to this topic from our Middle East Strategy Task Force, and suggest some ways in which Congress might be able to help forge a new bipartisan consensus on American foreign policy.

AMERICA'S ROLE IN THE WORLD

This hearing comes at a time of deep political divisions at home and heightened instability abroad. At this pivotal moment, we believe there needs to be a national debate about how and why America engages in the world. We also believe that Congress has a vital role to play in convening this debate, given its representative nature and the responsibilities given to it by the Constitution.

Over the past 70 years, Democratic and Republican administrations alike have understood that American security and prosperity at home are linked to economic and political health abroad, and that America does better when other countries have the incentive and the capacity to work alongside us in tackling global challenges. This is why we constructed a system of international institutions and security alliances after World War II. They provided a framework for advancing economic openness and political freedom in the years that followed.

The international order America built and led has not been perfect, but it has coincided with a period of security and prosperity unmatched in human history. And while many nations benefited from the investments America made in global security and prosperity, none benefited more than the United States.

Yet today, the value of America's global engagement is under question. A substantial number of Americans feel that their lives and livelihoods have been threatened rather than enhanced by it. They view international trade as having shuttered the factories at which they worked, immigrants as threatening their standard of living or safety, and globalization as undermining American culture.

This popular dissatisfaction needs to be understood and acknowledged. Washington needs to ensure that the benefits of America's international engagement are shared by all of our citizens. But we also need to be clear about the consequences of disengagement. For while it is comforting to believe that we can wall ourselves off from the ailments of the world, history teaches us that whenever problems abroad are allowed to fester and grow, sooner or later, they come home to America.

Isolationism and retreat do not work; we know because we have tried them before.

We also know, from recent experience, that if America recedes from the global stage, people in Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East will increasingly look elsewhere for inspiration and guidance—whether to authoritarianism or extremist ideology.

In our opinion, such a shift would be harmful to the interests of those populations, but it would be harmful above all to the interests of the United States, because our security and our prosperity depend on having friends abroad that share our values—including our belief in the rule of law, freedom of movement, and access to markets.

Neither Russia nor China proclaim the same loyalty to those principles as we do. Were they to fill a vacuum left by the United States, it could very well mark a return to a balance of power system, where the world's major powers competed militarily for territory and spheres of influence at great human and financial cost. This is a world to which none of us should want to return.

America's continued global leadership cannot be taken for granted, but a retreat into isolationism is not preordained. We have an opportunity—and, in our view, an obligation—to defend those aspects of the international system that work in the twenty-first century, and to adapt those that do not.

In doing so, we should acknowledge that the existing order is in need of revision and refurbishment. The international system was designed for a different era, and it requires a renewal of purpose and a reform of its structures. Its mission should more clearly extend beyond preventing war in Europe to include stabilizing other strategic regions that affect our well-being. Its approach should reflect the fact that long-term stability depends on well-governed states whose leaders are seen as legitimate by their people. And its structure must be adapted to the realities of a world in which power is more diffuse, so other countries can take on a greater role commensurate with the contributions they make and the responsibilities they assume.

China, Russia, and other countries should understand that there is a larger place for them at the decision-making table, provided they are constructive and respect the interests of other nations. And they need to understand that there will be costs if they do not.

For this and other reasons, U.S. military power will remain vital in a renewed international order. We appreciate efforts to ensure that our military remains the best-trained, best-equipped, and best-led force on earth. Given the variety of threats facing our country, it makes sense to continue upgrading and enhancing our country's military capabilities and deterrent power. But we strongly believe that it would be a mistake to increase defense spending at the expense of other critical investments in national security—especially those in diplomacy, development, democracy, and peacebuilding.

We know from experience that force, and the credible possibility of its use, are essential to defend our vital interests and keep America safe. But as one of us has said in the past, force alone can be a blunt instrument, and there are many problems it cannot solve. Our military leaders would be the first to tell you that they cannot succeed in their missions without the vital capabilities that our civilian agencies bring to the table. Gutting these capabilities will put an unacceptable burden on our men and women in uniform, and would make America less safe. We need to fund these other civilian elements of American power as robustly as we do the military element.

We recognize that government can always be made more efficient and effective, but the best way to accomplish that goal is to build a budget based on a sound strategy. This administration first needs to take the time to staff the Departments and agencies, and to develop a national security strategy. As members of the legislative branch, it is your responsibility to ensure that every dollar is spent wisely, but it also your responsibility to protect our national security institutions from arbitrary and senseless cuts.

THE MIDDLE EAST STRATEGY TASK FORCE

No region has seen more death and suffering or presented more challenges to the international order than the Middle East, with outcomes that have frustrated both Democratic and Republican administrations. The Middle East is likely to be an important test case in the coming years—the region in which the international order gets rejuvenated for a new era or ceases to function entirely.

From 2015 to 2016, we served as Co-Chairs of the Atlantic Council's Middle East Strategy Task Force, which sought to understand better the underlying challenges in the region and to articulate a long-term strategy for meeting them. Our goal was not to develop a new U.S. strategy, but to understand the role that the U.S. can play in supporting a larger international effort led by the region itself.

One of our initial insights was that we face not just a crisis in the Middle East, but from the Middle East having global impact. The roots of this crisis lie in a long history of poor governance in many states in the region. The Arab Spring was a consequence of the dissatisfaction of increasingly connected and empowered citizens with a number of political leaders who ruled ineptly and often corruptly. Where leaders sought to quash these popular protests by force, the result in most cases was Civil War.

The four civil wars raging in the Middle East—in Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen—have had destabilizing consequences for the region and beyond. They have produced the ungoverned spaces and grievances that have allowed terrorist groups to direct or inspire attacks in the West. They have also created the greatest worldwide refugee crisis since the Second World War, the devastating human cost of which has been coupled with profound effects on our own domestic politics and those of Europe.

The challenges we face in the Middle East bear some resemblance to those of post-war Europe. Countries torn apart by war will need to determine the new shape of their governments, and how those governments interact with their people. The entire state system will need to be shored up so that countries are less prone to subversion, supported by effective regional institutions to mediate conflicts and prevent them from spiraling into all-out war.

But there are also important differences between the modern Middle East and post-war Europe. There is no magnanimous victor in the mold of the Allies, with the will and capability to reshape the region from the outside. New global and political realities mean that no Marshall Plan is in the offing for the rebuilding of the Middle East. The American people have no appetite for this, and the people of the region, too, are tired of being beholden to outside powers. The Middle East must chart its own vision for the future.

There is reason for hope. The fact is that now, more than any time in the Middle East's modern history, the region has significant capabilities and resources of its own to define and work toward this vision and secure better opportunities for its

people. And more than ever, there are also indications that people and some governments in the Middle East have the will to take on the region's hard challenges.

Although not always evident at first glance, there are promising developments happening in the Middle East, even in the most unexpected places. In Saudi Arabia, female entrepreneurs are founding startup companies at a rate three times that of women in Silicon Valley, as they begin to claim their rightful place in Saudi civic life. In Egypt, the social enterprise Nafham is using technological solutions to address the problem of overcrowding in Egyptian schools. And in Jordan, Syrian refugees are using innovative 3D printing technology to help develop more affordable prosthetic limb components for friends and neighbors who bear the physical scars of Bashar Assad's war on his own people. The region's vast population of educated youth, commonly understood to be a liability, can in fact be a tremendous asset.

Some governments are beginning to understand that their future depends on promoting these efforts and partnering with their people to build a common future. Tunisia is showing that revolution need not result in either chaos or authoritarianism, but can begin a transition to an inclusive, democratic future. The UAE has led the way for positive economic and social reforms and Saudi Arabia has now adopted its own vision for the future. Jordan is making its own efforts. These can be examples for other countries in the region.

Renewed and enhanced American leadership is needed in the Middle East. But not to impose our will militarily or otherwise. Instead, America has a clear interest in supporting and accelerating the positive changes that are already happening. The goal of our strategy in the region should be to help the Middle East move from the current vicious cycle in which it finds itself to a more virtuous one—one in which the Middle East no longer spawns violence and refugees, is not a drain on international resources, and does not through its instability and political vacuums aggravate great power competition.

With this goal in mind, U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East should be informed by a set of guiding principles that represent the new reality of the region since 2011.

First, the old order is gone and is not coming back. Stability will not be achieved until a new regional order takes shape. The region should assume the principal responsibility for defining this new order, which should offer the people of the region the prospect of a stable and prosperous future free from both terrorist violence and government oppression.

Second, disengagement is not a practical solution for the West. Disengagement will only allow the region's problems to spread and deepen unchecked, creating further threats. Instead, it is in the interest of the United States and others to help the Middle East achieve a more peaceful vision. But their role must be different from what it has been in the past. Rather than dictating from the outside how countries should behave, they should support and facilitate the positive efforts that some people and governments in the region are beginning to take.

Third, a strategy for the region should focus on more than counterterrorism. Pernicious as they are, groups like ISIS and Al Qaeda are not the sole cause of the current crises. Even if these groups disappeared tomorrow, others would arise in their place so long as the underlying grievances that led to the Arab Spring remain unresolved.

Fourth, sectarian and ethnic rivalries are not as entrenched or inevitable in the Middle East as many assume. Instead, they wax and wane with broader tensions in the region. Achieving political solutions to the civil wars would go far in stanching these communal tensions. To this end, empowered local governance will be essential going forward, so as to allow people the freedom to shape their own communities.

Finally, the Middle East cannot build a better future without the active participation of the people of the region—including women, youth, minorities, and those displaced by conflict. If enabled and empowered, they can be the engines of job creation, help motivate the broader population, and innovate solutions to the region's economic and social problems. It is high time for all of us to bet on the people of the region, not just on the states.

With these guiding principles in mind, we have, in our Middle East Strategy Task Force report, proposed a two-pronged strategy that we think will be able, over time, to change the trajectory of the region in a more positive direction, to the benefit of people in the region and the United States.

The first prong involves outside actors helping partner countries in the region to wind down the violence, starting with the four civil wars. This means containing the spread of the current conflicts and accelerating diplomatic efforts to resolve them, while addressing the staggering humanitarian crises that they have generated.

The most immediate priorities must be 1) mitigating the current human suffering in Syria and 2) recapturing the territory that ISIS now controls. A third, longer-term priority is to contain Iran's aggressive foreign policy behavior while still exploring opportunities to engage with it.

Achieving these priorities will require a limited but greater degree of American and allied engagement in the region, diplomatic as well as military. This greater engagement and the kind of concrete steps we recommend in our report, taken together, will rally and reassure America's friends and allies in the region, send a message of strength to its adversaries, and provide additional leverage for the United States to work with all internal and external players to end these destabilizing wars.

The second prong of the strategy, which must be pursued simultaneously with the first prong, seeks to support now those bottom-up efforts that will create the social basis for stability and prosperity. This means supporting the citizen-based entrepreneurial and civic activity occurring throughout the region. It also means encouraging regional governments to facilitate these efforts, to invest in the education and empowerment of their people, and to address the societal, economic, and governance issues that are key to future peace and success.

Ultimately, this prong seeks to unlock the significant human potential in the Middle East.

Governments in the region need to create the enabling environment for individuals to deploy fully their talents, whether as innovators, entrepreneurs, or just engaged citizens. This means better and fairer legal and regulatory frameworks, but also more inclusive, effective, transparent, and accountable governance more generally.

The United States should support those governments that are trying to create such an enabling environment. The idea is to create a "more-for-more" relationship with countries in the region that are trying to do right by their people. The more ambitious the efforts for change in the region, the more support countries should expect from the United States—not as charity or aid, but because it is a good investment of resources likely to yield solid returns on our security. By the same token, where countries are not taking steps for change, they should not expect support—not because we wish to punish them, but because it would be a waste of our own limited resources.

Most importantly, the American approach toward the Middle East needs to be colored with a good deal of humility. This is the most difficult problem that either of us has seen in our careers, and it won't be solved overnight. We all should be steeled for the long term, and prepared to weather setbacks when they come—and they will. But the good news is that our country has succeeded at long-term foreign policy challenges such as this before, not least the rebuilding of Europe after World War II and ending the Cold War. America's efforts were strengthened by a bipartisan national consensus regarding the importance of these missions and the soundness of the principles upon which they were based. It is time to forge a similar national consensus on our approach to the Middle East and, more broadly, the world.

CONCLUSION: THE ROLE OF CONGRESS

Congress, especially the U.S. Senate, has an incredibly important role to play in forging such a consensus. It is our belief that Congress should:

- 1) Help start a national debate regarding America's role in the world;
- 2) On the basis of that debate, forge a bipartisan strategy for American leadership to build a revised and revitalized international order for the 21st century;
- 3) Insist that American efforts to defeat ISIS and al Qaeda are embedded within a larger strategy to make the Middle East over time more stable and prosperous;
- 4) Ensure that U.S. efforts at diplomacy, peacebuilding, advancing democracy and development do not get shortchanged as we increase our expenditures on defense; and
- 5) Through its legislative actions, provide reassurances to our friends and allies regarding America's continued commitment to their defense and to a rules-based international system.

We thank you again for this opportunity to testify before you and look forward to your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much. I know this committee is thankful you changed your name——

[Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN.—in that I have great difficulty with those kinds of things.

So the Honorable Mr. Hadley.

**STATEMENT OF HON. STEPHEN J. HADLEY, FORMER U.S.
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR, WASHINGTON, DC**

Mr. HADLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Cardin, distinguished members of this committee. I appreciate the opportunity to be with you here this morning.

One of the great privileges I have enjoyed since leaving government is being able to work with Secretary Albright on bipartisan efforts to try and solve some of these foreign policy challenges we face. And I am honored to be with her again this morning.

She has set out and summarized our views in our written testimony. I would like to just elaborate on three points, if I could.

First, the state of the U.S.-led rules-based international order. As Madeleine has so eloquently pointed out, for 70 years since the end of World War II, the centerpiece of American grand strategy has been to build and lead an international order that has advanced the causes of freedom, prosperity, and peace at home and abroad.

But this international order is under enormous strain for the reasons that you are all aware of. Madeleine and I would argue that the reason for the current chaos and conflict and disorder in the world today is precisely because that U.S.-led international order is breaking down in the face of these challenges. At the same time, this global order needs to be adapted to the changes in the international environment that have occurred and to take account of the real grievances and concerns expressed by American voters in the last presidential election.

This presents an opportunity, an opportunity for the Congress to work with the Trump administration, for Republicans and Democrats to work together on this common project, how to adapt and revitalize a U.S.-led international order.

Congress can begin by conducting a national debate on what a revised and revitalized order would look like through a series of structured hearings. And these need to be held not just in Washington but throughout the country to ensure that congressional deliberations reflect the views of all Americans.

A good place to start in this debate, I would argue, is a recently issued Brookings Institution report written by a bipartisan group of foreign policy experts, of which I was one, entitled Building Situations of Strengths.

Second, let me say a word about the Middle East. This new international order and American leadership will be sorely tested in the Middle East, and as described in our Atlantic Council Middle East Strategy Task Force report, the goal of any strategy for the region should be to help the people in countries of the Middle East change the trajectory of events towards a more positive future. And any effort to do that is going to have to reflect the new reality in the region since 2011 and the following guiding principles.

First, the old order is gone and it is not coming back. The region itself needs to assume the principal responsibility for defining and building a stable and prosperous Middle East free from both terrorist violence and government oppression.

Disengagement is not a practical solution for the United States. Disengagement will only allow the region's problems to spread and deepen unchecked, creating further threats. That is what we have seen for the last 5 or 6 years.

But the role of the West must be different than what it has been in the past. Rather than trying to impose its will on the region, outsiders like the United States must support and facilitate the positive efforts of the people and governments in the region. And there are some and we talk about them in our report.

A strategy for the region needs to focus more than on just counterterrorism. Pernicious as they are, even if groups like ISIS and Al Qaeda were to disappear tomorrow, others would arise in their place so long as the underlying grievances that led to the Arab Spring remain unresolved.

Sectarian and ethnic rivalries are not as entrenched or inevitable in the Middle East as many assume. They wax and wane with the broader tensions in the region. Achieving political solutions in the civil wars, along with empowered local governance, letting local communities take more responsibility for their own future, can go a long way towards reducing these communal tensions.

The Middle East cannot build a better future, however, without the active participation of the people of the region, including women, youth, and minorities. If enabled and empowered, they can be the engines of job creation and innovative solutions to the region's problems. It is high time for us to start betting on the people of the region and not just on the states in the region.

So our report outlines a two-prong strategy.

The first prong involves outside actors helping countries in the region to wind down the violence starting with the civil wars. This means containing the spread of the current conflicts and accelerating diplomatic efforts to resolve them while addressing the staggering humanitarian crisis they have generated. This will require increased diplomatic and military engagement from the United States and its friends and allies, something that is already beginning to see under the Trump administration building on what was done by the administration before it.

The second prong of our strategy, which must be pursued simultaneously and in parallel with the first, seeks to support now those efforts in the region that will create the social basis for longer-term stability, prosperity, and peace. This means supporting the bottom-up citizen-based entrepreneurial and civic activity that is already occurring throughout the region. And it means supporting those governments in the region that are facilitating these efforts, that are investing in the education and empowerment of their people, and that are providing them with uncorrupt and effective governance. And there are some. You see it in UAE. You see it in Tunisia. You are beginning to see progress in Saudi Arabia. We need to build on these efforts.

Finally, let me say a word about the significance of this last point, this prong two, for the budgetary guidance recently issued by the administration.

Madeleine and I agree that we must continue to upgrade and enhance our Nation's military capabilities and deterrent power. There is no question about that. But accomplishing the second prong of

the Middle East strategy we outlined requires the non-military civilian instruments of our national security toolkit, diplomacy, trade and investment, development assistance, reconciliation, peace-building skills, and sound political advice. And these, of course, are exactly the things that have been targeted in the administration's recent preliminary guidance.

Military forces can push ISIS out of Iraq, Syria, and the territory it controls, but they will return if those liberated lands do not enjoy some measure of political stability, societal reconciliation, and economic progress. And such progress requires the very non-military elements of national power targeted by the recent budget guidance.

Failing to win the peace after so many have fought so bravely would be an insult to the memory of those who laid down their lives in service to our Nation.

Thank you again for the chance to testify this morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, both.

Again, we apologize for the order of what is happening in the Senate today. I think what we will do, if it is okay with our ranking member—it is 10:37 now—is let us reconvene at 10:50. So you guys do not have to sit there. You can come back here and make calls. As matter of fact, let us reconvene at 10:55 to give us a chance to get over and get back and get settled. And then we will come back for questioning at that time, if that is okay. I think it is better for everybody here, everyone's questions, and for us to have a session that linear, if you will. So we will be back at 10:55. Thank you so much.

[Recess.]

The CHAIRMAN. The Foreign Relations Committee will reconvene.

I just will ask a question. I usually defer, but I am going to ask just one.

We had a great meeting with Tillerson last week just to go through I think every member of the Democratic side and there were three members on the Republican side missing, but a large group. I think most of us up here support the efforts that our Nation, Hadley, while you were in office, put forth relative the PEPFAR. Unbelievable what we have done.

I think we all understand we put forth one-third of the food aid in the world, and we are thankful especially at this time of tremendous famine around the world, manmade conflicts creating famine. We are thankful for that. I plan to be in the region in the next couple weeks to highlight that.

But we also know the State Department is really bloated. We have realized through some hearings recently there are 54 special envoys. I mean, it is ridiculous. I mean, you look at the names of these. It is just absolutely—it will make your blood boil that there is this much.

Tillerson has gotten over there, and I think he wants to reform it and transform it. I know Condi Rice is going to be up here today talking to Republicans about the foreign operations budget. And again, I am saying I support those things that are transformative. I really do.

Slavery. I mean, I hope we are going to be able to use the same principles that we have used with PEPFAR on modern slavery today with 27 million people.

At the same time, much of what we have done for years is just doubling down on the Cold War model of buying influence towards no end.

So is it not somewhat healthy to have a discussion about the State Department, about the fact that for years we have been working around ineffective Assistant Secretaries by creating envoys, about the fact that we have programs that basically need to be—so that we can do things that make a difference like Electrify Africa, like the food aid reforms that have been put in place? So is this not a healthy discussion for Congress to be having at this moment knowing that, again—I could not agree more with Secretary Albright. We have to lead the world, and with that comes resources. And to the extent we are not successful diplomatically, our young men and women in uniform, who we treasure, are going to be in harm's way in more instances than they otherwise would be.

Mr. HADLEY. I would agree with you completely. I think, though, you have to start from the premise that these non-military elements are important and that our young men and women who served in Iraq and Afghanistan will tell you and have told you they cannot achieve their military mission if they do not have a robust non-military civilian partner in all these areas to work with them. So if we start with that premise, then the question is we ought to try to have these non-military elements to be as efficient and effective as they can be. And the question is how you get there.

And my recommendation would be Secretary Tillerson, nominated by the President, confirmed by the Senate, to head the State Department—why not give him some time to learn his organization, figure out how he wants to reorganize it and strengthen, and then on the basis of his plan for the Department, come to the Congress of the United States and say I can cut these things, I can eliminate these things, but some of these things actually maybe I need to plus up.

I think the concern we have is it seems across-the-board meat axe rather than pursuant to a plan, and it seems to be premised on the notion that we do not need these non-military elements as part of our national security toolkit. If we can agree that we need them and the goal is then to make them more effective and to shrink them and make them more efficient where that is appropriate, then the question is how do you do that. And I think that is what you as a committee should be looking to Secretary Tillerson to do and give him the time to do it. That would be my view.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is kind of what is happening. Is it not? I mean, the President's budget—I mean, it goes in the waste basket as soon as it gets here. So is that not what is happening? Secretary Albright?

Mr. HADLEY. Maybe you can make it happen.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Thank you very much. And I agree with the way Steve has framed this, but I have somewhat mixed feelings in terms of the State Department.

I think that there are a lot of people there that are dedicated American servants and need to be respected for what they do. And so I have not liked some of the kind of descriptions of them as kind of useless and not doing the things that they are supposed to do.

I do think that, as Steve said, we need to have the functions that the State Department does. It is a complicated place, and it is a place where most of the people actually are serving abroad. That is part of the issue. And the question then is what is the size of our missions, how do they operate, whether they sit behind walls because they are afraid of security or whether they go out and do, as Condi actually talked about, expeditionary and really go out there and be a part of it. So I think that there needs to be a discussion about it.

What I am troubled by, I have to tell you, is that I think that it is important to give the new Secretary of State time. And people say it is early, but soon it will be too late. And I think, therefore, there really has to be a better sense of what is going on at the State Department and to have them have a feeling that they are part of America's representation and that they are respected, and that this will not be just reorganization for the sake of reorganization. It is complicated. It takes time and it takes away in some way from the mission of what our diplomats do, which is to be engaged abroad and to represent our country, which then leads I think to the larger question that both of you raised, what is our national security policy. When are we going to be clear about the direction in which this administration is going in terms of the whole-of-government approach to it and what is the role of the State Department?

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just move to—I usually do not take any time on the front end—a couple things.

Number one, we had witnesses in last week, Republican and Democrat, who had worked in the State Department, who basically talked about these special envoys as being workarounds, that in essence, when they had somebody that was not effective, we would create a special envoy. So I am really referring to testimony from folks within the State Department.

Secondly, the President, as I understand it—and we are working closely. They are developing a strategic vision. It is going to be due in September, and we are going to be very involved in that. So they have come into office—let us face it—in many cases had no institutional support. We are, hopefully, going to help with some of that, and you are helping with that today. So that is happening over the next 6 months.

And I think that Tillerson feels, just for what it is worth, that he has got professionals there that he is working with. We would like to have some nominations. When we thought we were going to be in the personnel business, we are not. We have no nominations. But he told us the other day he is working with people who have been there for years. They are very professional. They are helping him immensely. He will take his time to do what he is doing.

So, again, I look at the budgetary piece. I do not know when we take it up, but it seems like to me it is going to be a long time from now—is it not—where we actually deal with next year's appropriations. So, again, as I look at this, I think there is a lot of "hair on fire" discussions.

Mr. Hadley, you know, you were kind of Tillerson's agent I think in coming in. You engaged and Condoleezza Rice. So I assume that

you being his agent and wafting him into this position, you can have some influence over this.

But, again, I do not see this as being quite the way people are laying it out. I think it is much healthier. And I do agree that lopping everything off to support defense is the wrong place.

Senator Cardin?

Senator CARDIN. Well, Mr. Chairman, just because we have not done fiscal year 2017, you think we are not going to get to fiscal year 2018 for a while. I understand that.

I wish it was true that the President's budget was thrown in the waste basket, but it is very much referred to by stakeholders and it is a message to stakeholders, whether they are American or whether they are international. And it is troublesome. What really worries me is at times used as a yardstick. And if the President's budget is used as a yardstick with the programs under the Secretary of State, we have serious challenges in this Congress. So I am with you. Throw it in the waste basket.

Just one quick question, if I might, on the State Department and trying to figure out where it is going. We have had some really good discussions with the Ambassador to the United Nations, and she is going through significant change there in a very open, transparent way, and I think is giving confidence to our mission at the United Nations, as well as the international community, that America is going to be a player.

I do not see that from the Secretary of State. He has a different way of operating. He does not hold press conferences. He does not do things in an open way. And, Secretary Albright, you got to fight within any administration as a cabinet officer for what you believe in, but if you do not have a more open way of how you are doing your business, does he cede power by not getting a better way to broadcast what he is doing?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Well, I do think that having a public voice makes a big difference. And the Secretary of State is the person that publicly describes what our policies are and the direction that we are going in.

As I said, I do think that Secretary Tillerson is somebody that has not been a part of a governmental system. So I think that he is entitled to have some time to figure out what is going on.

But I do think that one of the issues—and you have spoken about this. We all have a number of times—the Russians are actually very good at propaganda. That is their specialty. I think we need to be better at public diplomacy which explains what our position is, and the Secretary of State is the main person to do that. Therefore, silence is not a good idea.

I think that Ambassador Haley has really done a terrific job. There is no question. And I think I may be one of the few people that truly understands the relationship between Secretary of State and U.N. Ambassador, having been both. It is a peculiar relationship, if I may say so, because what happens is the U.N. Ambassador is an instructed Ambassador, but at the same time, a member of the Principals Committee that is required to have an independent voice. And so the question is how they actually do relate, how they work together. And I think that Ambassador Haley has

really done a great job in explaining our position internationally. She is appreciated in New York and internationally.

I wish that the Secretary felt more comfortable taking the press with him when he goes abroad because they provide an echo chamber of what is going on in terms of how others understand what our policies are.

Senator CARDIN. That is very helpful.

I want to get both of your responses to a real concern I have about human rights. We have seen more and more atrocities around the world, what is going on in Syria, what is going on in South Sudan. We can mention many, many other countries where atrocities are going on. It just points out the importance of dealing with the seeds of discontent and U.S. presence in the global community through what we do at the Department of State.

I am concerned how high of an elevation these issues will be in critical meetings that are going to be taking place shortly. President Trump will be with President Xi. How important is it that human rights be on that agenda, that there be mention of our concern about what China is doing in repressing its own people so that America's values and ideals are at the table?

We know that the Secretary of State will be traveling to Russia. How important is it for him to meet with opposition people or NGOs in order to show Mr. Putin that America stands by its values?

President Sisi will be here from Egypt. How important is it on the agenda that the reform issues that are so critically important to the Egyptians are on the agenda between the President at that meeting? And if they are not, what signal does that send?

I will take both of your answers.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Let me just say that I do believe that it is essential for the United States to make our value system clear. I believe in a moral foreign policy.

I think the question always is how do you combine idealism and realism. I had real problems with this because I did not know whether I was an idealistic realist or a realistic idealist. And in many ways it is a false dichotomy because you need both. And I have often compared policy to a hot air balloon. You need the idealism in order to get the balloon up, and then the ballast of realism to give it a direction. So you need both.

But in terms of when the Secretary of State or the President of the United States or anybody goes out in order to represent us, I think the human rights issues have to be on the talking points because if they are not, then people do not understand that it is a basic aspect of our foreign policy. And whenever I went out, we went through various talking points and business, but always I raised the human rights issues wherever I was. And I did have kind of a trick which I would say I have come a long way, so I must be frank. And it really is one of the basic aspects of American foreign policy.

I am deeply troubled by the fact that the Secretary was not there to present the Human Rights Report, that this administration has not really spoken on the values aspect of our foreign policy because it is a basic aspect of it. I also do think it is important to meet with opposition people. But I think this balance always, to be completely

fair about it, is a balance between the realism and the idealism, and you figure out what you can do where. But it is a mistake if it is not brought up.

Senator CARDIN. Let me take the chairman's prerogative and ask Mr. Hadley as the advisor to Secretary Tillerson, what advice will you give him on these issues?

Mr. HADLEY. I am not an advisor to Secretary Tillerson. I think he is a terrific candidate for Secretary of State.

Look, Ambassador Haley is a practicing politician. She has been dealing with media. She knows the role they play. Tillerson is a former Fortune 100 chief executive officer. As he said, he is an engineer. Give him some time to make the transition. It is a difficult transition he is trying to make. He is an engineer. He learns the facts and then follows the facts. And I think we need to give him some time to do that. And I am encouraged at what the chairman said that from the standpoint of this committee, he will be given the time to figure out how to strengthen and make more effective our State Department. That is where it ought to happen.

Basically on your question of human rights, I think the pursuit of our ideals in our foreign policy is one of the most realistic things we can do because a world that is more based on our ideals is going to be a more congenial place for America and the United States. So this notion that there is a war between realism and idealism I have never embraced.

Second, you indicated you are having a good dialogue with the administration. I would put this issue of the role of human rights in our foreign policy on that dialogue and have a candid discussion about how to do it. It is I think a fairly subtle mix of some things you do publicly, some things you say privately, and some tradeoffs and compromise you make because human rights is not the only thing that is in our interest to pursue. It is a delicate matter.

And Egypt is a good case. And we say in this report that we have done we need to embrace Egypt. We need to show we are going to be a strong ally. We need to maintain our military assistance. I think if you put your arm around a country and show that you are a strong friend and ally and stand with them, it is easier to have a candid conversation where you say to President Sisi, you cannot crack down your country into stability. In the end of the day, there will be no long-term stability until you open up your politics in a way that is consistent with the pressure you face from the terrorism. But that is the only way to get true stability. I think you have got to reassure someone before you deliver that message.

Senator CARDIN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. So I want to apologize to everybody for both of us having gone over.

And I just want to say, look, I had strong disagreement with the foreign policy positions coming in on January the 20th. I have seen a significant evolution—significant—on NATO, on Israel, on China, on numbers of issues. And I really believe that once we can all get past what happened on November the 8th, this committee has more opportunity to shape this administration than at any time I have seen since I have been here in 10 years. And I think that is a positive thing.

Senator Young?

Senator YOUNG. Thank you, Chairman.

Thank you so much, Madam Secretary, Mr. Hadley, for appearing before this committee.

The first thing I would like to ask you about relates to our organization over at the State Department. State and USAID seem to operate in stovepipes of sorts as we carry out our diplomacy efforts, our aid efforts, and the stovepiping continues not just within our State Department and USAID but across agencies as we look to try and improve our diplomatic efforts. Our interagency coordination seems to be fertile for improvement, at least from this vantage point.

So, Mr. Hadley first, if you please, and then perhaps Secretary Albright. Do you believe it would make sense to establish a statutory requirement for State and USAID to periodically produce and submit to this committee a national diplomacy and development strategy in direct support of our national security strategy? It would establish real diplomatic and development priorities, objectives, metrics, balance ends and means. At least that would be the idea. I will be quiet for now and get your thoughts on this.

Mr. HADLEY. I think it is a terrific idea. What I would hope to see is that we get a national security strategy out of the White House and the administration that reflects the priorities of the President hopefully this fall. And then that document would be taken to develop a national defense strategy, if you will, with the Defense Department in the lead and the kind of national diplomacy development and democracy strategy out of the State Department. And I would hope those two organizations would develop their products on an interagency basis and in coordination with each other because in theaters like Iraq and Afghanistan, they have to be mutually supportive.

The hardest thing in the government is integration. It is all organized with vertical cones, with people operating in their narrow spaces. And the hardest thing is to integrate across those in service of a national strategy. And we need the kind of process you described to give that strategy and to integrate and give people basically the plans for going forward to achieve that strategy.

Senator YOUNG. Secretary Albright?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. I do believe that we need to have more of a whole-of-government approach to all of this. In addition to the Defense Department, there are other parts of the government that also need to be a part of it. We were talking earlier today with some people about the Agriculture Department needs to be a part with Public Law 480 and how it affects our farmers, et cetera.

So one of the things, frankly, Secretary Clinton tried under this thing called the QDDR of trying to bring more rationality to the State Department budget and the USAID budget. I have to tell you I tried because part of the thing that you want to do is to have there be some relationship between the projects that USAID does and American policy.

But I do think the stovepiping hurts. I cannot tell you how many various reorganizations I have looked at ever since even the Carter administration on how to bring all this together.

Senator YOUNG. So do you think codifying the QDDR—

Secretary ALBRIGHT. I think would make a difference.

Senator YOUNG.—would help?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Yes. But it also is in terms of the preparation of it, that kind of action together is good.

Senator YOUNG. Let me briefly pivot to the AUMF, I know something you have spoken to in a previous hearing here on the Hill. On March 22nd, we had Secretary of Defense Mattis testify before the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, indicating that he thought that a new AUMF focused on ISIS would be a statement of the American people's resolve. It would hearten our allies, something of importance to this committee certainly, and give our troops a sense of purpose.

You echoed your support for that, Mr. Hadley. You said you thought it would be a good thing in response to Representative Banks in your testimony at the HASC recently. Secretary Albright, you indicated that you thought you believed that there needs to be an AUMF.

Why do you believe there needs to be an AUMF? I will start with you, Secretary Albright.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. I think, first of all, because the old ones are not really representative of what is going on now and, second, because I think that we need a public debate about what America's role is in the world. And in many ways, an AUMF is a very good vehicle for it. I know Senator Kaine has been talking about this for some time. I do believe in the executive/legislative relationship on this.

But most of all, I think the American people need to understand why we send our troops somewhere, what is the purpose of it, how does it add, and it is a great mechanism for actually forcing a national debate that Steve and I have been talking about generally is necessary and especially given what has already been said by some of you, which is we are in a different kind of a world. And the American public needs to witness their representatives having this serious discussion.

Senator YOUNG. Well, I agree with you. That is why I have introduced an AUMF, Senate Joint Res. 31, on March 2nd.

Mr. Hadley, anything to add to the Secretary's commentary?

Mr. HADLEY. I agree with Madeleine. I have not read the resolution you introduced. But we need a new AUMF to clarify the mission and the authorities in light of the fact that we have a new administration in the White House.

Second, we need the kind of national debate Madeleine talked about.

And third, the Congress needs to be on record in support of this effort against ISIS. You are the vehicle for the expression of the popular will, and you need to be on record.

Senator YOUNG. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I know that Mattis has developed a strategy. He gave it to the President 30 days ago. That was not accepted, as I understand it. They are reworking it. But we do wish for them to come up and lay out their new strategy, and I think that would be the appropriate time for us to take up an AUMF when we have a new administration and really tease out where we are going. So I think that is very healthy.

Senator Menendez?

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you both for your extraordinary service to our country and for consistently coming back to the committee to give us insights. We appreciate it.

I want to focus on one part of your testimony where you talk about the international order. And you mentioned—and I am going to quote directly from your written testimony—China, Russia, and other countries should understand that there is a larger place for them at the decision-making table provided that they are constructive and respect the interests of other nations. And they need to understand that there will be costs if they do not.

My question is understanding your views that the international order needs to be updated in terms of its institution, its magnitude to deal with the realities of the new world, but to the extent that we have countries that violate the international order, what is it that we do to bring them back into the international order? Because I am concerned that if at the end of the day, just to take Russia as one example—but they are not the only ones—if you can ultimately go ahead and invade Ukraine, take Crimea, continue to destabilize eastern Ukraine, indiscriminately bomb civilians in Aleppo, try to undermine the Baltic States, try to undermine democracy across Europe, and have a cyber attack against the United States in terms of our own democracy—regardless of whether they succeeded or not, the mere fact that they tried should be upsetting to the President of the United States and to the average citizen and everybody in between. There has to be consequences for that because otherwise the message to countries globally and leaders globally is you can violate the international order and ultimately face little if no consequence.

So my question to you is, what are the best ways in which we get countries that do violate the international order to seek to bring them back within the international order?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Well, let me say I think that what we have to do is look at all the tools in the toolbox in terms of being able to bring them back. I believe that the previous administration did the right thing in terms of imposing sanctions on Russia for their behavior because what they did was illegal. And I think part of it, though, now is how you get others to be with us on it, so therefore, diplomacy and getting the European Union to stay with the sanctions program I think is very important. I also think that public diplomacy in this is very important for people to speak out that are public officials about what has happened because it is completely illegal and needs to be called out.

The other part, however, is to use some silent diplomacy. And I hope very much that when Secretary Tillerson goes to Russia, that he makes very clear where we are on this because unless we speak with one voice, it will be very hard for the Russians to get the message.

And the other I think is in fact to see how generally the international community can be on the same side of this. So it takes diplomacy. I think sanctions have to remain in and to make our message completely clear because if we do not, then it will happen again somewhere else. And I would also use the alliances that we have, NATO, to make those kinds of statements.

Mr. HADLEY. I think it depends on the country. I think most Chinese understand that they have dramatically benefited from this U.S.-led international order over the last 30 years in terms of their own prosperity and security. And for China, the way you bring them into the order is actually show them that they can have a place at the table, that there needs to be revisions to the international order to reflect the changes that have occurred. That is why it was so important that Congress finally changed the shares in the IMF so that China would have a bigger role. I think we also ought to be receptive to proposals for China to supplement that international order like the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, which I think is a good thing and I think the United States should have joined.

Russia is a different category. Russia has clearly ripped up the international order in Europe, and that is why the sanctions are appropriate. That is why it is important that we be strengthening NATO, positioning troops in the Baltics and the Balkans and the like so that Russia knows it cannot pull again what it did in Ukraine.

The question is having put those sanctions and those consequences for the violations for an order, do they want to come back into an international order and how do you walk them back into that order. I think that is the challenge for the new administration.

Senator MENENDEZ. Does it concern you, as it concerns me, that the President as obviously the chief leader in foreign relations has not raised the concerns about Russia that one would think that he would even as he seeks to develop a new relationship? But that does not stop you from calling out a country that has violated the international order because when you speak, Madam Secretary, of speaking with one voice, that would be the most powerful voice to send a very clear message to the Russians.

Mr. HADLEY. I think that is right, but I echo the point Senator Corker made. The evolution in the attitude of the administration on Russia since the days of the campaign is pretty dramatic, and it has changed. And it has changed because of things that the new administration has heard from the Congress, from friends and allies, and from things Putin has done. So Tillerson is now going to go to Russia. There is a policy review going on to try and set the policy for that. I think we need to let this evolution go, and I think there will be an opportunity pretty soon early on to see where the administration is heading. But I think there has been a pretty dramatic correction in their attitude toward Russia, and I think it is a good thing.

The CHAIRMAN. I could not agree more. And I think people on both sides of the aisle, as you mentioned, played a big role in that evolution. I think Tillerson is going to be very much in the main stream of U.S. previous thinking.

Senator Flake?

Senator FLAKE. Thank you.

Thank you for your testimony. Thank you for your long service to the country.

I would like to know what are your thoughts—I apologize if it has been asked before—with regard to the travel ban that has been

proposed. How is that viewed by our allies and our adversaries? Does it work in our favor?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. I do not think the travel ban works in our favor. I think that it has made it a more dangerous place for the United States. And a number of us have made that point in terms of that it has become a recruiting tool. It is a gift in many ways to ISIS.

It also I think undermines what America is really about. We have not discriminated against people coming into this country based on religion and ethnic background. And I really do think that it has not been helpful.

I do think that a country is entitled to make decisions about its immigration policies, and I do think that it would be very useful if in fact there was an overall approach to what our immigration policy should be.

Senator FLAKE. Thank you.

Mr. Hadley?

Mr. HADLEY. Obviously, it is legitimate to say we need to make sure we have the best vetting we can of refugees and immigrants. That is fine. The problem with the ban, of course, is it has had all the negative effects in terms of the reactions about countries overseas and the Muslim community here at home, and it has never been in effect. So it is the worst policy you can have, all the negative effects and none of the benefits because each version has been quickly suspended by the courts.

I would hope the administration is using the time, during the period that the ban has been suspended, to improve the vetting process so that we, in some sense, do not need this temporary ban and can get back into regular order. I do not know whether they are doing that. I hope they are.

Senator FLAKE. Thank you.

You talked about the importance of a bipartisan foreign policy. Sometimes I think we feel on this committee that we are the last bastion of bipartisanship. But I do feel that it is important.

What message is sent to our allies and our adversaries abroad when there is disagreement, the failure to agree on an AUMF, for example, and to speak with one voice on foreign policy matters? Why does that matter to our allies and our adversaries?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. I think there are really two parts to it. I do think we need to make clear that in a democracy, there is discussion and respectful listening to other people's views. That is one of our strengths. I think the question is how the message is distributed in the first place, which makes it look as though there is massive disorganization rather than a really overall policy.

The other part that I think we often forget is that other countries do not get a clear message about what we are about. And I think that that is what is worrisome. I think some of you were at the Munich security conference, and it was very clear that people were very confused about what our message really was when we speak and what are words and what are actions. And so there is this balance between making clear that we respect each other's ideas and then looking as though we do not have a policy together.

May I say I really do understand the need to give a new administration time. But I think there really is a question about how long

it takes, and that that is also providing something negative. Most of us travel abroad, and I think that people are confused. And we only have a certain amount of time to set the message straight.

Senator FLAKE. Mr. Hadley?

Mr. HADLEY. Bipartisan foreign policy is going to be much stronger and sustainable. I worry that we are in a situation that when we have a Republican President, we have a Republican foreign policy, and then a Democratic President, we have a Democratic foreign policy. And this back and forth flip-flopping is not progress. The foreign policy successes we have had are ones where we have had bipartisan support for a policy that is sustainable over generations of political leaders, quite frankly, whether Republican or Democrat. That is how we ended the Cold War successfully. That is how we dealt with Colombia. That is how we have dealt with the war on terror. That is where we make progress. And this back and forth is not working for us.

Senator FLAKE. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I could not agree more, and that is why I think this next 6 months gives us an opportunity that frankly we have never had. Generally speaking, I do not think there is a strongly formulated foreign policy coming out of the White House. I think that is an observation that is fair. And I think we have an opportunity to shape that.

Senator Coons?

Senator COONS. Thank you, Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, and thank you to both our witnesses for your lifetimes dedicated to public service and to advancing American diplomacy and to defending the post-Cold War order that we built and from which we deeply benefit. I do think it is vital that this committee in a bipartisan way engage in this conversation both the administration and with the American people.

So let me ask you first. It was touched on earlier in passing. Given the real disconnect between the political or professional or elite class in Washington that pays attention to foreign policy on a regular basis and is distributed around the country and what we have seen in the last election cycle in both parties, a deep skepticism about globalization, about international engagement, how do we better explain to the American people about the value of international engagement and the need to secure our interests and promote our values? And how would you structure that engagement in a way that actually makes a difference and moves the needle so that we are not just talking to ourselves, but we are engaging with and accountable to our constituents as we try to craft an enduring world order 2.0? If you might, Madam Secretary.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. I think the important part would be to take it on the road, frankly. And I think that we not only need to respect each other, but we need to respect the American people and to explain what our foreign policy is about. I have to say I keep trying to make foreign policy less foreign. And basically what needs to happen I think is to identify it with the interest of the people in X place. In many ways, people do understand that we depend on an export market or that our farmers appreciate Public Law 480 or that there are certain aspects that definitely affect a specific dis-

strict or region. And what I would hope is that you all would go on the road. And may I say that I volunteer to go on the road with any of you because I think that it is important to have a discussion and that takes it to the American people and understands that our stake is the job of the President of the United States to protect our people, our territory, and our way of life. That depends on how we operate in the world, and we need to bring the American people into that discussion.

Senator COONS. Thank you.

Mr. Hadley?

Mr. HADLEY. I completely agree. At the end of our written testimony, we gave you a bit of a road map because we think Congress needs to lead this national dialogue. The Congress has done it at times in our history, in the 19th century, the first half of the 19th century over the Vietnam issues. I think there is a huge opportunity for Congress on a bipartisan basis to lead this debate.

I would urge you to figure out how to use the new media and new vehicles. Madeleine and I have this long 80-page report, which will put you right to sleep, though there is a lot of good stuff in it. And we went out on the road with it, and she would talk for 10 minutes. I would talk for 10 minutes. The people at the Atlantic Council did a 3-minute video that is the essence of the report. It is a better communication vehicle. I would like to see the Congress figure out how to do the new media so that the American people would look to Congress as the forum for debate on major national issues. I think that is a huge opportunity for you.

Senator COONS. I agree. I think we may conclude that the outcome of these years is to make the Senate great again for a variety of reasons.

As you both know, I have an annual conference in Delaware. I have done it 6 years now—that is focused primarily on Africa. It was to try and help explain to the people of my state why I was going to Africa regularly and to help me get better input from them about how it connects to faith communities, to Diaspora communities, and to business concerns and opportunities for our state. And I have looked to USGLC for some partnership in expanding that and broadening it and sustaining it. I would be enthusiastic about working with any member of this committee because I frankly think when we go to our home states in bipartisan pairs to talk about and hear about the challenges we face, we strengthen and sustain our long-term work.

Could I ask one more quick question, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Sure.

Senator COONS. As we look at the world order, I am particularly curious about India. We have, as you both discussed, real challenges with both Russia and China and their infractions or persistent and active actions to remake or violate or break the world order. How do we better engage India? And are you optimistic that they might be a solid partner for us in strengthening and re-imagining the world order?

Mr. HADLEY. I think we have already started it. And again, on a bipartisan basis, President Clinton actually started the first outreach to India. The Bush administration built on it in terms of the civil nuclear deal. The Obama administration pursued it. We all

did that because we saw India emerging as a major global player and wanted it to be with us in maintaining that U.S.-led international order, not undermining it. So I think the foundation is laid, and I think there is a real opportunity for the Trump administration to build on that because India is increasingly a player and it is in our interest for them to be so since we share a lot of common values.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. We are the world's oldest democracy. They are the largest. We have an awful lot in common. And I think that the bipartisan approach that Steve described—it was great to go to India with President Clinton and then to have it be picked up. And it goes to the business that we have been saying earlier. You cannot have a Democratic foreign policy and a Republican one. Things kind of take longer to evolve, and so I really do think that it is an important relationship by location as well as by character of what the country is about.

Senator COONS. Terrific. Thank you both.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Shaheen?

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you both very much for being here.

I had the opportunity to go with some other folks here to the Munich security conference this year. And it struck me, as we heard the Vice President come and address the group and said all the right things about our relationship to Europe—we heard that from Senator McCain. We heard that from General Mattis. And yet, the Europeans who were there who I talked to were still very anxious because they were hearing a different message coming from the President. And it strikes me that one of the challenges that we have right now is getting everybody on the same page when it comes to our foreign policy. I think one place that that continues to be an issue is in Europe because of Russia and what Russia appears to be doing, but also because of statements that have been made with respect to the EU, to NATO.

I know you just finished your report on the Middle East and issues have been raised here about Russia, China, India and Africa. But it seems to me that one of the places where there is the greatest potential for harm right now is in Europe with Brexit, with what is happening in the elections with Russia's meddling there.

So what can we do to—and given the importance of our transatlantic relationship with Europe and the stability that that has provided since World War II, what can we do to better reassure our European friends and allies about our support for Europe and for this relationship? And how can we help as there are challenges that they are facing right now?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. I also was at the Munich security conference, and I think we have always been the center of attention there but never in quite the way that was uncomfortable in terms of what America's role was.

And I think that part of the issue with Europe is I happen to believe that we always wanted to have a strong European Union because they are potentially our best partners in doing things in other parts of the world. They felt that we were not paying atten-

tion to them enough, but they also have had serious internal problems that the EU seems like a disconnected bunch of bureaucrats whereas they have internal problems and we are seeing them now.

I do think that the United States has to have a double approach to this, which is to deal through the European Union and NATO. And by the way, I am very glad that Secretary Tillerson is now going to a NATO meeting.

Senator SHAHEEN. Me too.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. But also to look individually at what the countries need and want especially as there are stresses and strains on it. I do think we have a vital relationship with Germany, and Chancellor Merkel's visit here was an important one. I hope the right messages really came through in terms of our support. But I think we need to return to some realization of the centrality of the Euro-Atlantic relationship, that it has been the real basis of what our post-Cold War security has been about.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you.

Mr. HADLEY. I think we are making progress on that. I did not go to Munich, but I have heard from Madeleine and others that that was the wrap. We have heard it from Mattis. We need to hear it from President Trump. And my recollection is 3 days later in his appearance before the joint session of Congress, he embraced NATO pretty strongly. And I think that is helpful. I think the fact that he is having some additional credibility into our foreign policy, that we are going forward to the deployments in the Baltic States and the Balkans, all that is helping. And the evolution in the attitude of the administration towards Russia and a more realistic attitude towards Russia—I think all of that helps.

The NATO thing I think is in the process of being fixed.

I am more worried about the EU. President Trump recently did say something like the EU is fine if that is what the Europeans want. But he has put his finger on something. The European Project does not have a lot of support in the rank and file among the population. It has not been sold. There are real reservations about it. And the EU actually needs to renovate itself if it is going to save itself. And I think this is really a message the Europeans need to hear.

Senator SHAHEEN. I appreciate that and I share that concern.

One of the places where I think the EU could be more helpful than it currently is in the Balkans where the long lead time—and I appreciate that we need to support those countries or encourage them to move to more transparent democratic processes. And, Secretary Albright, I would be interested in hearing your thoughts about the Balkans. But it seems to me that one concern has been it takes so long to get through the process of joining the EU, that the public is discouraged before you can get very far down that road and they start looking elsewhere.

But, Secretary Albright, can you talk about—my time is up I know, Mr. Chairman—just briefly respond on the Balkans?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Let me just say that part of the issue generally is that success in kind of fragile democracies takes longer than we think. And I am concerned about the fact that after the Clinton administration left office, that not enough attention was paid to the Balkans, that we thought it was all done. It was not

all done, and there really are questions. And I think there are issues in fact, and it is germane to this whole point. Where we are not active, the Russians are being very smart in getting in in some form or another. And I think that the EU membership activity is something that is useful and takes too long. That is what happened in Ukraine.

And so I think the question is to realize that we are not operating in a field where we have all the time that we want, is that there is something else going on. And what Putin wants is to break up Europe. That is my sense that that is his agenda. And we should not be a part of it, and what we should try to figure out is how to be supportive and push the process forward and not just decide that everything is done everywhere.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Udall?

Senator UDALL. Thank you to the panel very much for your testimony today. It has been very engaging and very insightful.

And I thank the chairman for your statement in response to Senator Young about the committee reviewing the 9/11 AUMF. I think that is really important to do, and I think many of us have been speaking up on that. And I know Senator Young is not here, but I look forward to reviewing his AUMF.

Last week, I asked Secretary Mattis about the lack of an AUMF in Syria. As you know, in Syria, the U.S. has not been invited in by the government. U.S. military vehicles, heavy artillery, and troops are in Syria. And it is easy to argue that the United States has effectively invaded Syria, violating the sovereignty of a country in the Middle East, which is a de facto declaration of war.

Secretary Mattis, who I have great respect for, answered the question that there was really no border between Iraq and Syria, and the United States could not, quote, draw that imaginary line in the midst of an enemy. But he also supported the effort to pass a new AUMF, calling it, quote, a statement of the American people's resolve. Unquote.

I understand Secretary Mattis' response. ISIS does not respect international borders. But ISIS is not the only force in Syria. The Assad government is still the internationally recognized government, and it is being supported heavily by the Russians and the Iranians.

I do not think it is right for the U.S. military to become involved in the Syrian Civil War based on the 9/11 AUMF. I voted for that AUMF as a House member. I never imagined that vote being used to justify U.S. ground troops in Syria in the year 2017, and I do not think anyone else who voted in favor it did either.

So my questions to the panel, starting with Secretary Albright, is do you think the 9/11 AUMF applies to the situation in Syria. What does this mean, this situation we have now, in terms of the international rules-based order? And are you worried that the conflict could continue to spiral towards a wider conflict that will further entrench the United States in another Middle Eastern war?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. I do think that a new AUMF is necessary because one can interpret and reinterpret. But the bottom line is we need the American people to understand what our role is in

whatever country and especially in something that is as complicated as what is going on. And there is a problem between Iraq and Syria and where the border is, which is exactly the reason why there needs to be more discussion of it.

I also think that we need to understand—the U.S. needs to be more involved in the political aspects of this and in fact understanding where Syria is going, how many things need to be done.

And by the way, the Atlantic Council put out a terrific film in terms of what the Russian role has been in terms of breaking Aleppo and in terms of what the Russian role in that has been. And Ambassador Haley I think has been terrific in describing that.

So there needs to be a larger discussion about what we are doing in Syria, what the future of Syria is, why we need to be there, and the AUMF is the only way to do it. So I think that having kind of followed the discussions on previous issues, there is no question that it is a complex issue in terms of how much power you give to the executive branch, what the duration of it is, what the various component parts of it is, which is exactly the reason why a deliberate discussion, a national one, needs to be held.

Senator UDALL. Mr. Hadley?

Mr. HADLEY. I think the current AUMF does apply to what is going on in Syria because Al Qaeda is there and ISIS is a successor organization to Al Qaeda. So I do not think there is any question about the authority of what we are doing.

Also, states have a responsibility to govern their territory and make sure they are not used as a basis for attack of their neighbors. And we know there is plotting going on in Raqqa today directed against Europe and the United States. So we have to defend ourselves against that. So I am not troubled by that.

What I am troubled by is that if we make ultimately an accommodation with Assad, we send the message to the world that if you are brutal enough with your own people and kill enough of them, the international community will let you stay in power. And I think it is a terrible message to send to the international community.

Senator UDALL. Senator Corker, I would also like to put into the record a “New York Times” editorial on this called Congress’s Duty in the War with ISIS. And it specifically mentions our colleague, Senator Kaine, who has been pushing a long time to urge that we address the issue of an AUMF and really constructively look at this issue as a whole, Democrats and Republicans, trying to get what I think you all are urging, is a bipartisan foreign policy on these kinds of things.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The information referred to is located at the end of this hearing transcript]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

I know I have interjected more than I should, but Mr. Hadley just stated he believes that the authority to go against ISIS exists. The President Obama felt the same thing. And I agree 100 percent that the authority is there. And I think a debate on an AUMF, on the other hand, is timely and especially with a new administration laying out a strategy.

I will say that it is a pretty short document, and it still does not draw us into the full debate of what we should be doing. So for us to think for a moment that writing some 2- or 3-page document about an AUMF really is the kind of thing that I think these two are laying out. It is not. It is not. It causes us to talk about a lot of things that are important, but it in no way comes close to really focusing on a long-term strategy.

But, again, I appreciate the conversation as it is.

With that, Senator Murphy.

Senator CARDIN. Mr. Chairman, I would just interject just very quickly.

Along with Senator Udall, I voted for the AUMF when I was in the House. I really think Senator Udall is absolutely correct. I think any of us who voted for it did not anticipate it would be utilized as it is utilized today. The legal interpretation of the language is subject to the legal scholars, and I understand that. But the AUMF is a congressional authorization, and it seems to me that it is the responsibility of Congress to give authorization for the contemporary needs and that was not done in 2001. I actually think we are stronger if we can do it. So I just make that point that I think it is the right thing for us to do.

The CHAIRMAN. I think most everybody is in agreement. Again, I do not think that this administration nor the Obama administration was operating without a legal basis when they were going against Al Qaeda and ISIS. But I agree that it is very healthy to update.

I said Murphy, but I meant Markey. Thank you.

Senator MARKEY. I always wanted to be named Murphy, but not today. Markey is a much more rare Irish name. Thank you.

Two years ago, Mitchell Orenstein, Professor of Central and East European Politics at the University of Pennsylvania, observed that President Putin's hatred of NATO is well known and that Russia under Putin can never become as democratic as necessary to become a full member of the European Union or of NATO. And Putin does seem to want to return to 19th century global power politics where authoritarian governments rules spheres of influence and have a free hand to suppress popular aspirations and democratic government and also on the human rights issue.

At his confirmation hearing in January, Secretary of Defense Mattis said that Putin is trying to break NATO. Likewise, he appears to be trying to break the EU.

So my question is, since we know what Putin is trying to do in Europe and what he tried to do here in the United States—we are all politicians up here so we know a get-out-the-vote effort when we see it. Is, in your opinion, what Professor Orenstein is talking about accurate? Are we in a situation where we need to have a proactive policy? And what would be your strategy for us to counteract Putin right now? What would you have us do, the Europeans do in order to push back? Can you give us a 1- or a 2- or a 3-step program that you would like to see us actively implement?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Well, first of all, I think we need to understand that Central and Eastern Europe was artificially put under the Warsaw Pact and the power of the Soviet Union, and when the Cold War ended, the big deal was how in fact to let them be a part

of a system where people could make up their own minds about where they lived.

I am very proud to have been a part of NATO expansion in the beginning, and I think that it is not just a military alliance but also a political alliance that has great strength.

I do think—and I have read everything I can about what Putin's strategy is and what their military doctrine is. It is in fact to break up NATO. They see NATO as the major threat.

It was very interesting to be at the Warsaw Summit last summer and, in fact, that there was a declaration that what we needed to do, as far as the Russians or NATO, was to do deterrence and dialogue. I have explained it sometimes like this. It is a little hard to do both things at the same time. But that is part of the issue, is that we need to show the deterrence. And therefore, I think the movement of the forces that have been undertaken by NATO makes sense. But we also need to have a dialogue with the Russians because that was something we began to do in terms of a Russia-NATO council and a way to make them—not isolate them completely. So one has to say that the alliance had not been against them, but that they really need to be brought in as part of it.

I also think that it would be useful—they have been in violation of the INF Treaty, and I think it is always worth it to call out what is wrong and then try to figure out how to have a dialogue on the issues that we can agree with. I do not believe in spheres of influence. I think those countries need to be able to make up their own minds.

Senator MARKEY. Mr. Hadley?

Mr. HADLEY. I would do four things. One, strengthening NATO. That means more European spending turning into real operational capability, the reposition of forces in the Baltics and the Balkans and Central and Eastern Europe to deter Russia, and reaffirming our commitment to NATO and NATO members' commitment to each other.

Second, I think we need to support the EU to renovate itself and build popular support among its populations so it is a vital institution. And then I would hope it would open its door to further membership.

Third, we need to counter—you know, Russia is waging a war against Western principles of democracy and freedom and making the case for authoritarianism. And we are not even in that game anymore.

And finally, I think we have to help Ukraine succeed, but do it in a way that does not commit it to becoming anti-Russian. That is a delicate balance.

I think those are the four things we need to be attending to.

Senator MARKEY. Does Brexit harm the EU in a way which strengthens Russia?

Mr. HADLEY. It probably does. But that is not why the Brexit vote went the way it did. It went because the concept lost the support of British people.

Senator MARKEY. But does it support strengthening of EU, your point number two? Does Brexit then undermine the EU? I under-

stand the reason why it moved that way, but is the effect of it a harming of—

Mr. HADLEY. In the short run, it probably undermines the EU. The question is, does it provoke the EU to revitalize itself and to reengage its populations? If it does, then maybe at some point the UK would think to reconsider its decision.

Senator MARKEY. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Very good. I hope that is the outcome.

Senator Murphy?

Senator MURPHY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I worry that sometimes when we are talking about this administration's policy on Russia, we selectively read comments and actions from the administration to create a policy that we want to be true but is not really true yet. Just as recently as a few days ago, the President of the United States was sending out tweets suggesting that news of Russian interference in the U.S. election was fake. And so I want to believe that realists in this administration are ultimately going to create a more sensible Russia policy. I do not know that the President is there yet. He seems to advertise that pretty regularly to people who follow him.

And I read the 40 percent–30 percent recommended cut to the State Department in that same vein. That is an absolute gift to the Russians. They project their power not just through military means but through propaganda and energy bullying, through outright graft and intimidation. And you know, it is really the State Department programming that is most effective in pushing back on that.

So, Secretary Albright, I wanted to ask you in that context a more general question, which is about our expectations for what the result of our national security budget should be as we approach 2017 and 2018. The President has made it pretty clear that he does not believe that the United States' interests can be adequately protected with current appropriations levels for the Department of Defense, and he has recommended a pretty robust increase, an increase that I think will get bipartisan support.

But let me ask you about what our expectations should be for the State Department budget. Do you think that we can adequately protect the U.S. interests abroad—Russia, as an example—with the current appropriations for the State Department? I.E., should we be in a debate about a 40 percent cut versus flat funding, or should we be suggesting that if the Defense Department is going to get plussed up to meet these new threats, then we also have to demand that our nonkinetic tools get similar attention?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. I have to say I always was in a difficult position when I saw the size of the defense budget versus the size of the foreign policy budget, I mean, 10 times as much and kind of the weak partner in this, when in fact the kinds of work in terms of diplomacy, our programs where we were talking about education, for instance, and exchanges and our public diplomacy and our assistance programs. There is no way that this can be done by cutting the budget. It is barely adequate in the first place. And then the United Nations bills and dues come out of that, various support things. And I think that we are undercutting our own power by cutting the State Department budget.

I do think it is worth always looking at where savings can be made, but the Pentagon might do that also. But I think that we are undercutting the power of the United States and the security of the American people if in fact we cut the State Department budget.

Senator MURPHY. Mr. Hadley, I wanted you to maybe try to operationalize one of your key recommendations, which is with respect to the proxy wars playing out in the Middle East today. You have one recommendation in which you say, listen, the Middle East has to sort of take control of their own affairs. And yet, with respect to Iran, you do recommend that we continue to try to push back against their advancements in the region. Those two maybe do not square with each other in part because the U.S. has lent unprecedented levels of support to the Saudis, military support, over the last 8 years to help them win that battle in the region.

Maybe operationalize this, maybe in the context of Yemen—a place where the proxy war is real. It exists today. There are right now proposals on the table from the Trump administration to lend new serious military support to the coalition, mainly to the Saudis. And yet, it does not seem like there is any diplomatic component to that strategy. There is a potential diplomatic solution, a political solution inside Yemen, but today it does not seem as if there is any effort in the administration to try to find that. You sort of suggest threading the needle, pushing back against Iran while keeping the door open to political negotiation and discussion. Is Yemen an example in which ultimately a political solution has to be found and if you close that door, you are closing yourself off to any real potential settlement there?

Mr. HADLEY. Yes. I think it is the difference between what we call prong one of our strategy and prong two. In terms of winding down the civil wars, the countries in the region cannot do it themselves. Outside intervention is required with the support of friends and allies in the region.

Prong two, which is renovation of these societies, the countries and the peoples in the region have to take the lead on that. We have to support them.

Yemen. Difficult problem. Of course, we need a diplomatic solution. And I think what the Saudi and UAE and the administration are talking about is a way to get to a diplomatic outcome. People do not understand. I was told just yesterday that there were 70 strikes, missile and rocket strikes, from Yemen into Saudi and 400 schools have been closed in Saudi Arabia because of the threat posed from Yemen. So this is a real national security challenge. And what the Saudis and UAE wanted to see is an American policy that understands and helps them deal with that challenge. And I think the changes that are being contemplated are useful in that respect.

I know you have talked to all of them, and they say to you the same thing they say to me. They want to get in a situation where there is a political resolution that is acceptable to the Yemenis but that does not have the Houthis, which represent about 70,000 or 80,000 folks, taking over the whole country. And they have not been able to get there. And I think what they are trying to design is a strategy to support our friends and allies in the region, get

some progress on the ground, and to set up a situation where there could be a diplomatic outcome. That I think is what they are trying to do. I hope they succeed.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Kaine?

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thanks to the witnesses.

My chair will be disappointed in me if I do not just weigh in on the amen chorus on the AUMF. I do think we are in a position—and I agree with the chair that it is a propitious time because of the change of the administration, because of the development of the anti-ISIS plan that hopefully we will be briefed on, but also because of the deepening level of conflict in new theaters. We have seen the first ground operations by the United States military in Yemen and significantly increasing ground operations beyond just special forces in Syria.

And the activity in Syria raises a tough question because unlike Iraq or Yemen or Afghanistan, we are not in Syria at the request of the government. Russia was invited into Syria by the government, and Vladimir Putin had the Duma vote on it before he went in.

And so this is just a time where for many reasons—there are many of us who actually feel like the current operations are not authorized by domestic law, and the source of our belief is comparing the 9/11 authorization that Congress rejected—the request that President Bush made was turned down and the wording that the administration asked for. And the original wording would clearly have covered everything. But Congress rejected a broad AUMF and decided to make it narrower. So many of us feel like we really are on legal thin ice.

But be that as it may, the lawyers will differ about this. I think the time is right and I look forward to the discussion as the change of administration and new strategies are in place.

A lot of good questions have been asked that I was going to ask, but you have already covered it.

Let me just bring you into a new area we have not talked about yet.

I was at two subcommittee hearings yesterday. One was about the U.S.-Mexico relationship, and one was about sort of strategy vis-a-vis China. And it was interesting.

The U.S.-Mexico relationship. There was a lot of concern that some of the rhetoric from the President might have an effect on domestic Mexican politics and possibly increase the odds of a Chavez type leader being elected President of Mexico. We talked a little bit about that.

On the China hearing, we talked about China's increasing investments in Venezuela and other nations to our south in the Americas. And Robert Gallucci, Ambassador Gallucci, was the witness from Georgetown, and he basically said yesterday, you know, China actually has a much more defined strategy about the southern hemisphere, Africa and Latin America, than the United States does.

This is a hearing about big picture thinking, about if we are engaged around the big picture definition of strategy, how about the Americas? How about Yukon to Patagonia? Where should our

thinking about these 37 nations of a billion people after the Colombian ceasefire, without war for the first time probably in recorded human history—how should we be thinking about the Americas as we are articulating a strategy so it is not just a northern hemisphere or NATO or east-west route that our diplomats travel but that we take the responsibilities in the southern hemisphere, especially in the Americas, seriously?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Let me just say our policies vis-a-vis in the hemisphere have always been complicated. It is a little bit damned if you do, damned if you do not in terms of mucking around or not paying attention.

But I do think without making it be a sphere of interest, which I think we have to be very careful about, I do think we need to have better relationships that are respectful. And you mentioned Colombia. Colombia is a perfect example of a bipartisan foreign policy that actually took quite a long time to effectuate.

I do think that we need to look at what is necessary in those countries, whether it has to do with the problems that they have, some created by us and the drug issues that come up, but also how to see how the OAS can operate. We talk a lot about the role of regional organizations these days. The OAS was the original one in all of this. And I think it is important to look at where that goes.

I also do think the other point is the Chinese are willing to come in wherever there is a vacuum. We have seen that not only in this hemisphere but also in Africa and other places. And I think that we have to be very careful about what is going on. But I think we have not paid enough attention. I think what has helped, frankly, is the change in our relationship with Cuba and potentially so that when President Obama went to an OAS meeting or the Summit of the Americas, that was not the only subject—

Senator Kaine. Yes. It cleared out an obstacle that was an obstacle for a lot of the other nations.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. And so I do think that there are opportunities, and it has to be viewed but not as us taking advantage of Latin America, but having it be genuinely a partnership in terms of the issues that take place.

Senator Kaine. Mr. Hadley?

Mr. HADLEY. I agree with what Madeleine has said.

You know, we have had a lot of literature now talking about a North America strategy, which we did not talk about that way 10 years ago. I would like to hear us have a western hemisphere strategy.

The Chinese I think appreciate the importance of Latin America perhaps at this point more than we do. And I think the fact that Chavistas are sort of in decline in Latin America is a real opportunity for us to engage in a hemisphere-wide dialogue about where we want this hemisphere to go in this 21st century. And I would like to see us start thinking about a hemispheric strategy, not just a North American strategy.

Senator Kaine. Thank you so much.

Thanks, Mr. Chair.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Thank you both for being here. We all admire so much the work that you have done and continue to do.

I noticed Secretary Albright probably took a step back at some of my comments about the State Department. I just want to say, look, I think we have lost the American people on foreign policy in many ways, and I think this last election was in some ways about it. I appreciate the comments that have been made about us maybe going out into the country discussing these things. I think that would be very important. But I think there is a huge disconnect between the American people and our foreign policy. And I think that is partially our fault, you know, a lot of reasons for that. And I think to an extent we can do everything we can both at the U.N. and at the State Department to make sure that everything we are doing matters and that we are not doing wasteful things that do not matter. I think that actually builds a case for us to be able to do some of the important, transformative things that I see us doing around the world.

So I am all for Secretary Tillerson and what he is doing. I really am. I could not be more in support of his efforts to look at the organization. He will do that in conjunction with us. He will not be behind what happens here budgetarily because we always do things way beyond when we are supposed to. So I am actually very excited about that and encouraging him on.

I think Nikki Haley last night was laying out—I know that she is planning on significant reforms—significant reforms—that seem to be being received very well by our partners there on the U.N. Security Council.

So those things excite me because what they do is not weaken us. They build strength when people think that what we are doing is connected to, number one, making sure we are spending our monies wisely, but also towards our national interests.

I do not think we did enough here today to really talk about what our core national interests are. And I know that is sometimes difficult in a setting when each person has their particular issue. But my sense is we really do have—and I could be wrong, and I know there are still tensions about the November 8th election, but I think we have got more opportunity than ever—than ever—to come up with a bipartisan strategy on the various areas of the world that matter. I really believe that.

And Secretary Gates, who I admire as much I do our two witnesses, has continually talked about the Cold War, and I think he is exactly right. We had 50 years of common policy. And I do not want to diminish our Cold War warriors, but that is much easier than where we are today with various issues that are happening around the world.

So this is a wonderful time for our committee, for great members like you who have been so engaged in these things, have lived overseas, care about these issues deeply. I cannot thank you enough for your contributions.

I understand that you would like to have this report entered into the record, and without objection, it will be.

[The material referred to above can be accessed at the following url:]

https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/MEST_Final_Report_web_1130.pdf

The CHAIRMAN. And if you want to say any closing comments that you were not asked about or you want to get something out that you would like to vent, you would be more than welcome for that right now.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Thank you, because I do not want this to seem out of order, but let me just say the following thing. I teach at Georgetown in the School of Foreign Service, which are people that want to think about having an international career. And I am getting questions as to whether they should take the Foreign Service exam or be a part of our diplomatic service given what is going on. And so I think we need to think about what the future of diplomacy is, and part of it has to do with the money now. But I also think, just so you know, there is kind of a weird feeling.

The other part that bears specifically—and we have been talking about educating the American people in many ways. The ban and the immigration policy has made it very complicated for universities to welcome students from foreign countries. I can tell you that that is what is absolutely basic in terms of having an American population that understands what our needs are, what our policies are vis-a-vis the rest of the world. So we need to think about the next generation in terms of having this discussion and how it is affecting what the future of America's position is in the world.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I would like to respond and Kaine may want to also. But, look, as a person who travels pretty extensively around the world, I would say to these young students, absolutely. We have got a whole generation of people who are retiring out of the Foreign Service that have been around for many, many years, and I cannot imagine a better time to be taking the Foreign Service test and to be coming into the service diplomatically. We have more problems today than we have ever had, it seems, and they need to be dealt with in this manner.

As it relates to the administration, I think that Senator McConnell may have said it best. I do not always quote him. But I would not pay attention to what is being said. I would pay attention to what is being done. And I think if you look at people like Tillerson, Mattis, McMaster coming in, I just have a sense that we are going to end up in a pretty decent place as it relates to our foreign policy. I cannot speak to some of the messages that are going out, but what I can say is I think we have some really capable people that are in these positions that truly are embracing Congress more so than I have ever seen a group come in. And I think if we can move beyond some of the shocks that have occurred and some of the statements that are made, I think we can truly put in place together, help put in place some great policies for our country.

So I do not know if you want to retort to that.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Thank you very, very much. I think I speak for both of us that this was a remarkable opportunity to air views, and I hope that in some settings we can continue to do that because I believe that it is time for a national debate. And I cannot think of a better group of people to do it with than all of you.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you. Thank you both.

There will be some questions that will come in. We would like to leave the record open until Monday afternoon. To the extent you have time, we would appreciate if you would answer those. I know you have staff members who will help you with that. But it has been a real pleasure and an honor for us to have you and thank you.

[Whereupon, at 12:23 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

THE COMMITTEE RECEIVED NO RESPONSE FROM THE HON. MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT FOR THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR TODD YOUNG

Question. In your joint prepared testimony, you write quote “The international system was designed for a different era, and it requires a renewal of purpose and a reform of its structures.” I chair the subcommittee that oversees multilateral organizations. Can you provide specific examples as to how you believe the structures of the international system should be reformed?

[No Response Received]

Question. Do you have specific recommendations for reform and organizational restructuring at the Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development?

[No Response Received]

Question. In addition to serving as Secretary of State, you also served as Ambassador to the United Nations. You have said that you believe reforms are necessary at the U.N. What specific reforms do you believe are necessary at the U.N.?

[No Response Received]

THE COMMITTEE RECEIVED NO RESPONSE FROM THE HON. STEPHEN J. HADLEY FOR THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR TODD YOUNG

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[No Response Received]

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[No Response Received]

THE COMMITTEE RECEIVED NO RESPONSE FROM THE HON. MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT FOR THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY CORY A. BOOKER

Question. Hadley/Albright—West Bank, Entrepreneurship and USAID Budget: I was in Ramallah in the West Bank in August and had the opportunity to visit a USAID-supported start up incubator, meet Palestinian entrepreneurs, and engage in discussion with heads of start-ups in the West Bank and Gaza.

Through this program, the Leaders E-Zone, USAID is working with the tech and communications sector in the West Bank and promoting a culture that encourages innovation and supports entrepreneurs. These young people are models for the next generation of young Palestinians, and the most effective counter to the violent ideologies of extremist groups that also try to recruit young people. Unfortunately, in the budget that President Trump has proposed, programs such as these would be cut.

- a. What is the effect of these types of programs?
- b. Will funding the military with \$54 billion create the same types of outcomes as these USAID programs?
- c. How should we be supporting these outcomes-based programs?

[No Response Received]

Question. Hadley/Albright—Civilian Casualties: General Townsend said yesterday there was a “fair chance” American aircraft were involved in the March 17 airstrike that brought down a building in Mosul, killing as many as 200 civilians. If the United States is found to have brought the building down, and the number of deaths continues to climb toward 200, the incident would be the worst civilian casualty event since the American invasion of Iraq in 2003. This comes on the heels of other airstrikes where civilians have died.

In the same operation that killed a Navy SEAL in Yemen, local media say airstrikes killed women and children. Local activists and journalists also say an airstrike killed at least 46 people in a mosque in Syria.

- I was heartened that Gen. Votel has opened an investigation into the civilian casualties in Mosul. What do you think should be part of this investigation? What would give human rights groups and others confidence that this investigation is thorough and transparent?
- Do you believe these casualties are connected in some way to a relaxation in the rules of engagement?
- What do you believe is the risk of accruing so many civilian casualties?

[No Response Received]

Question. Albright—Youth Bulge: NDI, the organization you Chair, has done tremendous work in supporting democracy and broadening civic participation, especially among youth. We have talked about the youth bulge in many of the countries this committee talks about the most:

- 60% of the population across the Arab world is under the age of 30.
- In Yemen, 75% of the population is under age 30.
- In Mali, the median age is 15.9
- In Tunisia youth unemployment among graduates is around 30%. That doesn’t include those who have no college education.

You and NDI have worked extensively in Tunisia in the wake of the Arab Spring to bring the youth who galvanized the revolutions that swept the Middle East into the political environment. You mentioned to me last year that our institutions are not keeping up with the pace at which the world moves today—that our tools and our norms have not adapted to the current environment.

- What investments should we be making in young people to enable them and their governments to harness their energy and demand for inclusion?
- What risks do we face if we do not?

[No Response Received]

Question. Albright/Hadley—Transatlantic Relationship: President Trump has called NATO obsolete, was supportive of the Brexit vote indicating his indifference to the European Union, and has described Chancellor Angela Merkel’s policy of welcoming refugees fleeing violence in their homes as “catastrophic.”

All of these comments have been music to Russia’s ears who sees NATO as a threat. The German Foreign Minister said Trump’s attitudes on the transatlantic relationship has “caused astonishment and excitement, not just in Brussels.” Meanwhile, NATO officials listened to Trump’s comments “with concern.”

- What do you think is the status of the transatlantic relationship?
- What do we stand to lose in a breakdown of this economic, trade, and security relationship? Who stands to gain from this breakdown?
- What are some steps that we should be taking to reassure our European allies of our commitment to the transatlantic relationship?

[No Response Received]

THE COMMITTEE RECEIVED NO RESPONSE FROM THE HON. STEPHEN J. HADLEY FOR THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CORY A. BOOKER

Question. Hadley/Albright—West Bank, Entrepreneurship and USAID Budget: I was in Ramallah in the West Bank in August and had the opportunity to visit a USAID-supported start up incubator, meet Palestinian entrepreneurs, and engage in discussion with heads of start-ups in the West Bank and Gaza.

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- What do you believe is the risk of accruing so many civilian casualties?

[No Response Received]

Question. Hadley—Press Accountability: I challenged Secretary Tillerson during his confirmation hearing about his views on the press. It was my assessment that as CEO of ExxonMobil, he was not accountable to the American people and only to his shareholders and so did not display much interest in engaging with the press. In fact, ExxonMobil’s policy was to avoid press interactions.

My concern at the time was that Tillerson would bring that same attitude toward the press into this role at the State Department. We’ve seen exactly that concern play out. The Secretary did not take a press pool with him on his first Asia trip and after weeks of not holding daily press conferences, started them for a few short weeks, and has again stopped them. Two weeks ago, several of my colleagues joined me in a letter to the Secretary expressing our concern about his evasion of the press.

- a. Are you concerned by these stark breaks in precedent?
- b. What message do you think this sends to others around the world who are cracking down on independent media, journalists, and civil society groups that depend on the U.S. as a beacon for transparency and accountability?

[No Response Received]

Question. Albright/Hadley—Transatlantic Relationship: President Trump has called NATO obsolete, was supportive of the Brexit vote indicating his indifference to the European Union, and has described Chancellor Angela Merkel’s policy of welcoming refugees fleeing violence in their homes as “catastrophic.”

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[No Response Received]

CONGRESS'S DUTY IN THE WAR WITH ISIS
[NEW YORK TIMES, MARCH 25, 2017]

3/30/2017

Congress's Duty in the War With ISIS - The New York Times

The New York Times | <https://nyti.ms/2nR6EN7>

SundayReview | EDITORIALS

Congress's Duty in the War With ISIS

By THE EDITORIAL BOARD MARCH 25, 2017

On the verge of driving the Islamic State out of Mosul, once Iraq's second-largest city, the United States and its allies are beginning a push to recapture Raqqa, the Syrian city that is the de facto capital of the self-declared caliphate.

Hundreds of Syrian rebels and their American military advisers, backed by American artillery and attack helicopters, have started shutting down the western approaches to the city. There is talk of reinforcing the roughly 900 American troops who are now in the country. Instead of conducting airstrikes and relying on Syrian and Kurdish forces for ground operations, as they have done for months, the Americans are now involved with tanks and troops, a more direct and far riskier role.

But as the American military is doing its job, Congress is refusing to do its duty. Nearly three years into the war against ISIS, lawmakers have ducked their constitutional responsibility for making war by not passing legislation authorizing the anti-ISIS fight. This is not merely a bureaucratic issue. While the president has the power to order troops into battle, the founders were adamant about ensuring that only Congress could commit the nation to protracted overseas military actions.

Since President Obama began the fight against ISIS in 2014, the Pentagon has operated under the 2001 authorization for the use of military force that was passed

after Al Qaeda's 9/11 attacks. But that justification is of questionable legality because ISIS did not exist when the authorization was approved.

The United States can claim a legal basis for its involvement in Iraq because Baghdad sought American help, which includes airstrikes, drones and thousands of troops, some of whom trained Iraqi units and others who are advisers now positioned close to the fighting. But there has been no such request from the Syrian government, which believes that a U.S.-led attack on Raqqa would be illegitimate unless it were coordinated with Damascus, the chief Syrian negotiator to peace talks in Geneva, Bashar Ja'afari, said on Friday. Such coordination is unlikely, given how little the Pentagon thinks of President Bashar al-Assad and his Russian backers.

Past efforts to enact a new ISIS-related authorization of military force, by Senator Tim Kaine, a Virginia Democrat, and others, have been stymied because of congressional fecklessness. But Mr. Kaine is quietly soliciting support for a new proposal. The issue received fresh attention last week when Senator Tom Udall, a New Mexico Democrat, told Defense Secretary Jim Mattis that it could be argued that the United States had "effectively invaded northern Syria, violating the sovereignty of a country in the Middle East."

Mr. Mattis replied that because ISIS had basically erased the border between Iraq and Syria, the United States could not "draw that imaginary line in the midst of an enemy" and say it's safe on one side. Even so, he said he would "take no issue" if Congress passed a new authorization, viewing it as a "statement of the American people's resolve" to fight ISIS.

More than just a political endorsement of the troops, however, a new authorization of force could make Congress seriously debate how the rest of the war against ISIS will be fought, and to consider a crucial decision the administration must make soon on whether to arm Syrian Kurds for the Raqqa fight and risk alienating Turkey, a NATO ally.

Congressional inaction may invite an even bigger problem. The Trump administration intends to bring future ISIS detainees to the Guantánamo Bay prison. Once that happens, as the former Bush administration lawyer Jack

3/30/2017

Congress's Duty in the War With ISIS - The New York Times

Goldsmith wrote on the Lawfare blog, court challenges could lead to findings that the war against ISIS is unlawful.

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A version of this editorial appears in print on March 26, 2017, on Page SR8 of the New York edition with the headline: Congress's Duty in the War With ISIS.

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