[Senate Hearing 115-768]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 115-768
THE VIEW FROM CONGRESS:
U.S. POLICY ON IRAN
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 28, 2017
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web:
http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
39-919 PDF WASHINGTON : 2020
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
BOB CORKER, Tennessee, Chairman
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
MARCO RUBIO, Florida ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
CORY GARDNER, Colorado TOM UDALL, New Mexico
TODD YOUNG, Indiana CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming TIM KAINE, Virginia
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
RAND PAUL, Kentucky CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey
Todd Womack, Staff Director
Jessica Lewis, Democratic Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator From Tennessee.................... 1
Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., U.S. Senator From Maryland............. 2
Singh, Michael, Lane-Swig Senior Fellow, Managing Director, The
Washington Institute, Washington, DC........................... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Indyk, Hon. Martin S., Executive Vice President, The Brookings
Institution, Washington, DC.................................... 16
Prepared statement........................................... 18
(iii)
THE VIEW FROM CONGRESS:
U.S. POLICY ON IRAN
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TUESDAY, MARCH 28, 2017
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:35 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Bob Corker,
chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Corker, Risch, Rubio, Gardner, Young,
Portman, Paul, Cardin, Menendez, Shaheen, Coons, Udall, Murphy,
Kaine, Markey, and Merkley.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE
The Chairman. The Foreign Relations Committee will come to
order.
We thank you for being here. We understand we have some
pretty unsavory witnesses. They get highly securitized before
they come in. We thank you for going through that and being
with us.
In today's hearing, we will discuss the next steps in our
Iran policy. One of my criticisms of the JCPOA is that it would
become our de facto Middle East policy, and Iran would expand
their destabilizing activities. I think we are seeing a lot of
that today.
Regionally, we have seen an escalation in Iranian
intervention. Iran, along with its allies in Russia, have
continued to prop up Assad at the cost of countless lives in
Syria. Iran's support for Shia militias in Iraq threatens the
interests of Sunnis and Kurds alike, not to mention the Shia in
Iraq that do not subscribe to the anti-American, zero-sum
politics of the militias that are there.
Iran is arming the Houthis in Yemen, who are, in turn,
attacking our Saudi allies and targeting our ships. Yemen now
faces a humanitarian crisis unprecedented in its history.
Iran remains the foremost state sponsor of terrorism. It
counts Lebanese Hezbollah, an organization that has killed
hundreds of Americans, as among its closest allies. Iran also
continues to detain several U.S. nationals.
Last week, many members of this committee joined together
in a bipartisan manner and introduced a bill to begin
rebalancing our Iran policy. With a new administration in
place, we have an opportunity to develop a comprehensive
strategy to deal with both Iran's regional activities and a
longer term threat of an Iranian nuclear weapon.
I know both of our witnesses have spent their careers both
in and out of government grappling with this issue, and I look
forward to hearing your ideas. We truly thank both of you for
being here, and I look forward to your testimony.
With that, I will turn to my friend, Senator Ben Cardin,
our ranking member.
STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND
Senator Cardin. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for
calling this hearing.
I want to thank both of our distinguished witnesses. They
may have had difficulty getting through security, but we are
glad that they are here and for their expertise in this subject
matter.
Iran deserves special attention, and this committee can, I
think, play a critical role. We have in the past. I think back
about the legislation that authorized the sanctions against
Iran for its nuclear activities. I congratulate Senator
Menendez for his leadership on that legislation.
It led to sanctions being imposed by the United States, and
then with the strong diplomatic efforts of our country and
leadership, we got other countries to join us. We were able to
isolate Iran to a point where they felt it was in their
interests to negotiate with us and our allies for a nuclear
agreement.
During that process, Mr. Chairman, under your leadership,
we were able to bring together different views on our committee
for the proper review of that legislation. I think, as a
result, the agreement was stronger and the public understood
what was going on. We had much more transparency. So I think we
played a very important role.
Well, we are now 15 months past the JCPOA. You and I both
opposed that agreement. It has been in force for 15 months, and
I strongly believe it would be against U.S. interests to
withdraw from the JCPOA or to take any actions that could be
interpreted to be in conflict with the JCPOA.
Having said that, Iran's activities today are as bad as
they have ever been, and probably worse. They are certainly
increasing their terrorist sponsorship in the Middle East, as
we see in so many different countries in that region. Their
record on violating the ballistic missile obligations are well-
known, well-understood. Their human rights violations against
their own citizens is horrible, one of the worst countries in
the world. They violate the arms embargo. And the list goes on
and on and on.
So it is appropriate that this committee take a look at
what we can do to make sure that, first, the Iran nuclear
agreement is honored so that Iran does not become a nuclear
weapons state. But then secondly, look at those activities that
were not covered under the JCPOA as to how we can play a
stronger role.
Mr. Chairman, I particularly want to thank you and Senator
Menendez for the work that we have done in bringing together a
bill that we introduced this week that will, I think,
appropriately isolate the activities that I previously
mentioned for a stronger position for U.S. leadership among our
allies to make sure that Iran understands: Yes, we will live up
to the JCPOA. Yes, we believe Iran nuclear ambitions must be
avoided. But there are other activities that are of equal
concern, and we are going to continue to speak out and take
action, if Iran does not change its sponsorship of terrorism,
if it continues to violate ballistic missile obligations, if it
violates arms embargo and human rights issues.
And that is exactly what our legislation does, and I thank
you for the efforts that we have made.
We have to recognize that there are other areas that we
need to be prepared in, in dealing with Iran. Under the JCPOA,
there are deadlines. After 5 years, the restrictions for
conventional weapons sales and technology go away. After 8
years, the restrictions on ballistic missile-related transfers
to Iran go away. At 10 years, all provisions of the Security
Council Resolution 2231, which brought the JCPOA into force,
are terminated.
So we need to start thinking about, as we reach those
dates, what are the appropriate policies for the United States
without the protections we have, that currently exist?
So it is important that we do that. It is difficult to find
someone willing to disagree with the notion that Iran's
behavior in the region is not getting worse. Every conversation
we have--what is going on in Syria, what is going on in Yemen,
what is going on with concerns in the Gulf States--Iran comes
into our discussions. So we need to take a very tough position.
Lastly, Mr. Chairman, I know you will be disappointed if I
do not at least mention once the Trump administration in my
opening statement.
I am concerned about whether we have a coherent policy from
the Trump administration. I know it is early. I understand
that. But take a look at the skinny budget that they presented.
It would diminish the U.S. role globally rather than
strengthening our ability to deal with issues that are a
concern of Iran.
So I think it is important that this committee speak. I
think it is important that the Trump administration is held
accountable, to make sure they understand the seriousness of
Iran in that region, and how we can constructively try to
modify its destructive behavior.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses.
The Chairman. Thank you so much. And please know we are all
independent and are just trying to make the best of life as we
find it. I do think that what we may see is an administration
over the next couple years that attempts to move to a place
where Iran is involved in zero enrichment. That would be, to
me, a place that most people on the committee would welcome, if
done appropriately.
So with that, let me introduce our two witnesses. The first
witness is Mr. Michael Singh, Lane-Swig senior fellow and
managing director of the Washington Institute. Our second
witness is the Honorable Martin Indyk, executive vice president
of The Brookings Institution.
You both have been here many times in the past. If you
could summarize your comments in about 5 minutes or so, without
objection, your written testimony will be part of the record. I
am sure people look forward to their questions. If you can just
begin in the order introduced? And again, we thank you both for
being here.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL SINGH, LANE-SWIG SENIOR FELLOW, MANAGING
DIRECTOR, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Singh. Thank you, Chairman Corker. It is an honor to be
here, and Ranking Member Cardin, members of the committee.
Let me first say congratulations on the bill. Iran has long
been one of these bipartisan issues, and it is great to see a
bipartisan bill that I think is a good bill on this issue. It
is very encouraging.
Iran is, I think, one of the most pressing challenges that
we face in the Middle East. It is the region's leading
revisionist state. It is determined to alter the balance of
power in the Middle East in its favor at the expense of the
United States and our allies. It seeks to accomplish this aim
through the destabilizing projection of power utilizing a sort
of Middle Eastern version of hybrid warfare.
And I would agree with you, Chairman, and you, Ranking
Member Cardin, that Iran's power in the Middle East has grown
steadily over the last 8 years and especially since the Iran
nuclear deal was signed. And there is a long list, and I will
not repeat that list, but it is a list that I think is getting
longer and getting worse.
That is not to say that Iran has not faced setbacks in the
region. Its relationships, for example, with its Palestinian
proxies, like Islamic Jihad and Hamas, I think have suffered in
the wake of the Arab uprisings. It has been challenged
certainly by the rise of ISIS. Just today we saw, for example,
an ISIS threat against Iran.
Russia's intervention in Syria has helped Iran in many
ways. It has helped save the Assad regime, which is a critical
ally for Iran. But it also has reduced Iran to a junior partner
and given Iran a bit of a challenge in that sense.
And U.S. allies, as a result of Iran, are more united in
the region than ever, and looking to the United States to join
them to press back on Iran.
Nevertheless, though, I agree with the general sentiment
that Iran poses a significant challenge to U.S. interests both
directly through all these things we mentioned and indirectly
by contributing to the environment of sectarian strife and
institutional breakdown in the region that has fueled the rise
of ISIS and other jihadist groups.
So, in response, I recommended in my written testimony and
in previous writings that the new administration adopt a
strategy of deterrence toward Iran, focused on ensuring that
Iranian leaders understand that any challenge to U.S. interests
and U.S. allies is going to come at a steep cost.
Such a strategy would advance three objectives: first,
preventing Iran not just from getting a nuclear weapon but from
further advancing its nuclear weapon capability and also
sharing nuclear weapons technology, not to forget that; second,
defeating Iranian ambitions to undermine our allies and reduce
our influence in the region; and third, to stop Iran from
supporting terrorist attacks and cyberattacks against us and
our allies.
I think that any such strategy faces formidable obstacles.
In the past, we have enjoyed strategic convergence with our
allies despite what other tactical disputes we had with them
because we could all agree that the nuclear issue was a threat
to us, to the Europeans, to Russia and China even.
That has been replaced, I think, by strategic divergence
because our allies outside the Middle East simply do not share
our threat perception of Iran. They have a very different take
on things. And Russia and China, of course, see Iran as a
partner. We saw just today the Iranian President is in Russia,
and the Iranian Foreign Minister said that Russia could use
Iranian bases on a case-by-case basis, which is remarkable in
the historical sweep of things for Iran.
In addition, in the nuclear deal, in the JCPOA, we agreed
to concede what I think were our most significant nonmilitary
tools--financial sanctions, oil sanctions--which really leave
us with weaker tools than we would like to have to confront
Iran's illicit behavior.
And I agree that those obstacles will grow steeper as time
goes on, as Iran is allowed to purchase conventional weapons
systems, test missiles, and get help with missiles. It needs,
for example, international help to develop an ICBM.
So to successfully accomplish our objectives despite these
obstacles, I think we need to pursue three lines of action.
First, with respect to the nuclear deal, I think we need to
use what is I think a real eagerness in the world for us to
remain within the deal as leverage to improve the deal, if I
could say that, first, to insist on a strict interpretation of
its terms to sort of use what is already on the page but in a
stricter way perhaps than we have so far; and, second, to reach
side understandings with European allies and others to
strengthen the deal sort of outside of the JCPOA framework, so,
for example, pressing the IAEA to be more aggressive in using
its existing inspection authorities, persuading our allies to
agree with us on protocols on punishing Iran for even minor
violations of the deal, which so far I think we have let pass
in the past year or so.
I think we also need to work with those allies and urge
them to work with us to address the big flaws in the deal. I
see those as, for example, delays in IAEA access in the
framework for inspections of suspect sites, nuclear sites; the
omission of Iran's missile activities--to me, missile
activities are part of a nuclear program, inherently; and, of
course, the deal's sunset in 10 to 15 years, which is probably
the biggest problem with the JCPOA.
But I do not think we can look at Iran policy as just
nuclear policy. I think that would be repeating a mistake that,
unfortunately, we have made in the past. We have to look at the
nuclear issue through the lens of a broader policy.
So the second line of action, I think, is countering
Iranian malign influence in the region. We have to push back on
Iran's actions in Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere while
strengthening our partners in those areas to deal with Iran
themselves. And I think we have to use our full range of policy
tools--military, intelligence, sanctions, diplomacy--to do
that.
And to gain the support of our allies outside the region
due to that strategic divergence I mentioned, I think we need
to, whenever possible, do this in frameworks that resonate with
those allies, so, for example, ending the Syrian conflict.
And then finally, the third line of action, strengthening
our allies' defenses against Iran, keeping in mind two
principles. First, it needs to be key to the actual threats
that Iran poses, things like proxy warfare, political
subversion, A2AD efforts embedded by Russia and China, for
example. And then second, I think we need to try to forge our
allies into a more effective multilateral alliance so this is
not just this sort of bouquet of bilateral alliances but no
real sort of multilateral structure to it, and I propose a
framework to do that.
Just to sum up here, in all of these efforts, I think our
policymaking needs to start with objectives, not with tactics.
I think we need to put behind us the tendency we have had, I
think over the last couple of decades, to sort of rule in or
out this or that policy tool as a starting point, and we need
to, instead, bring our full capabilities, which are formidable,
I think, to bear on this problem.
Second, I think we need to see this challenge in its
regional context. So, for example, I do not think we can
sustainably defeat ISIS if we do not also address Iran. So
these two strategies have to move together, and we need to
organize our bureaucracy accordingly.
And then finally, I would agree with Senator Cardin that we
need to invest in our own diplomatic capacity, which I think is
vital for wielding all those tools, making sanctions effective,
force effective and engagement effective. To me, international
unity will only amplify the pressure on Iran, and when gaps
develop between ourselves and our allies, that gives our
adversaries, whether it is Iran or somebody else, room for
maneuver. And I worry that those gaps will grow with the
elections in Europe this year and other developments that we
are seeing, and others will seek to exploit that.
Thanks very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Singh follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael Singh
Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, and Members of the
Committee, thank you for this opportunity to appear before you today to
discuss United States policy toward Iran.
Speculation regarding the new U.S. administration's policy toward
Iran often begins with the question of whether it will keep or scrap
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), as the nuclear deal
between Iran and the P5+1 countries--the United States, Britain,
France, Russia, and China, plus Germany--is formally known. This,
however, would be the wrong question with which to begin crafting a new
Iran policy. To start from this premise would be to perpetuate a
central mistake of the Obama administration: for 8 years, the United
States has viewed Iran policy through the lens of the nuclear
negotiations; it should now instead see the nuclear issue through the
lens of broader Iran policy. Iran's nuclear program is so concerning
not simply--or even primarily--because of the general U.S. interest in
nuclear nonproliferation but because of the broader threats Iran poses.
Iran is the Middle East's leading revisionist state, determined to
alter the regional balance of power in its own favor at the expense of
the United States and its allies. Although Iran's policies are far from
the only problem confronting America in the Middle East, they are
arguably the most important, and contribute in material ways to many
others: Iran's efforts to project power have destabilized Lebanon,
prolonged the Syrian civil war, and fueled resentment among Arab Sunnis
and the rise of jihadist groups like the Islamic State.
In response, the United States should pursue a strategy of
deterrence--ensuring Iran's leadership understands the costs of
challenging American interests and the benefits of accommodating itself
to the prevailing international and regional order. Yet Washington must
also recognize that Tehran is a difficult foe to deter: while it has
proven itself to be a rational actor, weighing costs and benefits and
choosing the course of action it deems best for regime interests, its
anti-Americanism is not a mere indication of prejudice but rather an
ideological pillar with which it will not easily part. This is why
better relations with the United States do not entice Iran, although
regime officials do appear to debate vigorously how best to manage ties
with Washington in light of Iran's other interests. Nor is Iran's
desire for regional dominance a recent flirtation: it has been one of
the region's most influential states for millennia, and its clashes
with the region's other ancient empires predate the rise of Islam. Any
Iranian regime--revolutionary or democratic, pro- or anti-Western--
would likely aim to play a leading role in the region. It is this
mixture of anti-American revisionism and hegemonic ambition that makes
the Iranian challenge so difficult.
A strategy of deterrence toward Iran should seek to advance three
broad objectives:
1. Nuclear. Prevent Iran from building or acquiring a nuclear
weapon, and from meaningfully advancing its nuclear weapons
capabilities (fuel fabrication, weaponization, and delivery). In
addition, prevent Iran from sharing nuclear weapons technology with
other states or nonstate actors.
2. Regional. Counter and defeat Iranian efforts to challenge
American interests in the Middle East and South/Central Asia or to
undermine U.S. allies in these regions. In addition, limit Iranian
malign influence and power-projection capabilities in these regions.
3. Global. Prevent Iran from mounting terrorist attacks or
cyberattacks on the United States or U.S. interests, or from supporting
states and nonstate actors that seek to challenge U.S. interests.
The following paragraphs lay out a strategy for achieving these
objectives, the obstacles facing it, and concrete actions the new
administration can take to advance such a strategy.
background
Former president Barack Obama's legacy on Iran is contentious, to
say the least. His admirers consider not just the JCPOA but the
establishment of routine U.S.-Iran engagement to be among his foremost
foreign policy achievements. Detractors feel quite the opposite. Yet
when President Obama took office in 2009, views on Iran were not nearly
so polarized. Iran sanctions legislation enjoyed near-unanimous support
in Congress, and the American public consistently ranked Iran's nuclear
program as a top threat. Obama himself largely continued the approach
toward Iran developed by his predecessor, President George W. Bush--
unilateral and international sanctions and threats of military force
paired with multilateral diplomacy via the P5+1. Obama, however,
supplemented this strategy with a strenuous effort to establish direct
bilateral talks with Iran (past administrations engaged directly with
Iran, but direct U.S. contact on the nuclear issue had been predicated
on Iran suspending its uranium-enrichment-and plutonium-reprocessing-
related activities) and largely ended official U.S. questioning of the
legitimacy of the Iranian regime.
These departures, though perhaps originally intended to support the
preexisting strategy, eventually came to overtake it. Direct U.S.-Iran
talks largely supplanted the P5+1 negotiating format, and the agreement
that eventually emerged from these contacts fell well short of
satisfying longstanding international demands of Iran. Meanwhile, the
talks were pitched not only as a way to resolve the nuclear crisis but
also as the opening chapter in a hoped-for U.S.-Iran rapprochement.
Along the way, the United States largely refrained from challenging
Iranian efforts to project power in the Middle East and elsewhere and
even enjoined its traditional allies to ``share'' the region with
Tehran.
As a result, the Trump administration faces a vastly different
strategic landscape from that faced by the Obama administration in
2009. The most obvious difference is the JCPOA itself. Iran's nuclear
program is larger today than it was in 2009, even as its previous rapid
expansion has mostly been halted. Still, Iran continues to engage in
centrifuge research and development and to advance its missile
programs--the former being explicitly permitted by the JCPOA, the
latter having been omitted from it entirely. Iran has largely adhered
to the agreement, though a substantial reduction in International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reporting on Iranian nuclear activities and
various exemptions granted to Iran by the Joint Commission--a body
established by the JCPOA to adjudicate problems and disputes under the
deal--mean that such judgments must be made with caution. The United
States and other P5+1 members have also kept their side of the bargain,
despite Iranian complaints likely meant in part to extract additional
concessions from Washington, in part to deflect blame for Iran's
continuing economic problems, and in part simply reflecting the
ambiguous wording of the JCPOA. The reality is that while Iran's
reintegration into the global economy has been far from smooth, the
country has already reaped tremendous economic benefits from the JCPOA,
which stand only to increase as time passes.
Meanwhile, Iran's regional activities have grown inexorably over
the past 8 years. The control exerted by Hezbollah, an Iranian proxy,
and its allies over Lebanon has solidified. Iran's Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its proxies--a mix of Hezbollah
forces, Syrian paramilitaries, and Shiite militants from Iraq,
Pakistan, and Afghanistan--are arguably the strongest force on the
ground in Syria. Iran-directed or allied militias in Iraq have assumed
a prominent role in the fight against the Islamic State, having gained
the official sanction of the Iraqi State and the grudging acceptance of
the U.S. military. In both places, Iran has embarked on a distinct
strategic shift--from insurgency to counterinsurgency, and from
maintaining plausible deniability to touting its role by acknowledging
its support for Hezbollah and others, publishing details of funerals
held for Shiite militants and IRGC fighters, and, most prominently,
sponsoring well-publicized, on-the-spot visits by IRGC Qods Force
commander Qasem Soleimani. Elsewhere, the Iran-supported Houthis in
Yemen overthrew the country's internationally recognized government,
have fought Saudi and UAE forces to a stalemate, and appear to be
seeking control of the international Bab al-Mandab shipping channel.
Iranian support for the Taliban in Afghanistan has reportedly expanded
dramatically. And the IRGC has appeared to play a role in fomenting and
sustaining anti-government violence in Bahrain.
This is not to say that Iran has been successful everywhere. Ties
between Tehran and its Palestinian allies, especially Hamas, appear to
have deteriorated in the wake of the 2011 Arab uprisings. The rise of
the Islamic State has threatened Iranian interests in Syria and Iraq,
despite indications of limited cooperation between IS and the Assad
regime. Russia's intervention in Syria has been a mixed blessing,
saving the Assad regime--upon which Tehran depends as a channel for
projecting power in the Levant--but at the risk of reducing Iran to a
junior partner in that conflict. And Iran's stepped-up aggression,
combined with American disengagement, has spurred Gulf Cooperation
Council unity and joint action, albeit with mixed results.
Internationally, the JCPOA has not provoked the same internal
divisions among U.S. allies as it has in Washington. In Europe, the
agreement is hailed on the right and left alike as a signal
achievement, even by a French government that clashed with the Obama
administration over the latter's readiness to offer concessions and
keep its friends in the dark during talks. U.S. allies in Europe simply
do not share the American threat perception with regard to Iran; there
is almost no appetite in Europe for abandoning the JCPOA or taking
concerted action in response to Iranian regional activities. This is
the case even though Europe is arguably more threatened than the United
States by Iran, given the proximity of Iranian missiles and spillover
from the conflict in Syria, which is sustained by Iranian power. Russia
and China, for their part, see Iran as an ally, both in the Middle East
and internationally, as all three share a desire to see the U.S.
international role diminished.
This is one of the starkest changes facing the new administration.
Upon entering office, Presidents Bush and Obama each benefited from a
general strategic convergence with Europe, and even Russia and China,
given the priority each placed on nonproliferation as well as on
heading off a U.S.-Iran conflict. Because these states largely agreed
with U.S. goals, they could eventually overcome disputes over strategy
and tactics (e.g., European objections to the use of extraterritorial
sanctions). The Trump administration will face the opposite--a
strategic divergence between itself and these states, which pay little
heed to Iranian nonnuclear misbehavior and are keen to deepen their
relations, commercial and otherwise, with Tehran.
In the Middle East, of course, the situation is far different. U.S.
allies there--Israel, Turkey, and Sunni Arab countries alike--lacked
enthusiasm for the JCPOA. Even so, none currently advocate its
abrogation, given worries that the alternative--whether the resumption
of Iranian nuclear activities or a U.S.-Iran military conflict--would
be worse. However, all want the United States and others to push back
against what they see as Iran's increasing boldness in the region, and
none believe the JCPOA should be a brake on such a response. Among
these allies, only Israel has proven equal to the task of countering
Iran's regional activities--Tehran is essentially unchallenged by other
regional powers in Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq, and has managed in Yemen
and Bahrain to effectively play a spoiler role without attracting
direct retaliation. And just like U.S. allies elsewhere, some of these
states will develop strong post-sanctions economic ties with Iran
(e.g., transshipment via Dubai and energy links with Turkey) that may
mitigate their support for any coercive measures contemplated in
Washington.
As a result of such developments, any new U.S. strategy toward Iran
will have to overcome the following obstacles:
1. Issues regarding the JCPOA
Should the United States choose to walk away from the JCPOA absent
a clear Iranian violation, Washington will be diplomatically
isolated and experience significant difficulty rallying allies
around an alternative approach.
Adhering to the JCPOA--which only partially addressed U.S. concerns
about Iran's nuclear program and ignored entirely Iran's
nonnuclear challenges to U.S. interests--means for-going its
most effective sanctions instruments, such as blocking Iranian
oil exports or severing Iran from the international financial
system.
Even if the United States does continue to adhere to the JCPOA, its
allies outside the Middle East will be reluctant to cooperate
in any effort to counter Iran's regional and global nonnuclear
activities.
The JCPOA, if faithfully implemented by all sides, will permit the
growth of Iran's conventional and missile forces--on which U.N.
sanctions lapse after 5 and 8 years, respectively--and of its
economy and international trading links, which taken together
will improve Iran's strategic position and erode U.S. leverage.
2. Increasing Russian or Chinese military links with Iran, together
with Russia's expanded military footprint in the region generally, will
reduce U.S. freedom of action and undermine the credibility of military
options against Iran.
3. Deterioration over the past 8 years of U.S. strategic and
perhaps operational links with regional allies.
a new iran policy
To advance the three pillars of its nuclear, regional, and global
objectives with respect to Iran, the United States should adopt a
strategy of deterrence. Such a strategy requires Iran to believe that
challenging U.S. interests will be costly and, conversely, that playing
by the ``rules'' of the regional and international order will be
beneficial. But before turning to the specific policies that should
constitute such a strategy, discussing some general principles will be
useful:
Foster U.S. capability, credibility, and clarity. Harvard's Graham
Allison has observed that deterrence requires capability,
credibility, and clarity. Particularly vital to maintaining
deterrence are continuing to maintain a robust forward-deployed
military presence in the Middle East, exercising diplomatic
leadership in the region, and continuing to cultivate expertise
on Iran throughout the executive branch. The United States and
our allies should also avoid responding reflexively to Iran,
instead acting patiently and methodically to address Iranian
challenges to American interests.
Strengthen capabilities of U.S. allies. The United States should
aim to deter Iran not only through punitive action after, for
instance, a missile test or naval provocation but also by
strengthening allies' offensive and especially defensive
capabilities so that Iran will judge potential challenges as
having little chance of success.
Wield policy tools in concert. In this case and others, the United
States should wield policy tools in concert rather than
sequentially and should take no tools off the table, whether
military action or diplomatic engagement; historically, the
most effective approach to Iran has been that of diplomacy
backed by force or the credible threat of force.
Preserve international unity. Whatever actions the United States
takes, it should aim to preserve to the extent possible
international unity, and should in turn count on Iran to try to
split America from its allies.
Understand policy trade-offs. While the United States will need to
balance its efforts to deter Iran against other foreign policy
goals, U.S. officials should ensure they properly understand
those trade-offs. For example, pushing back against Iran does
not contradict but rather complements an effort to counter the
Islamic State, because Iran's activities, such as its support
for the Assad regime, have fueled the rise of IS.
Consolidate responsibility. Bureaucratically, the administration
should ensure that a single official at the State Department
oversees all aspects of Iran policy, with the aim of ensuring
that JCPOA implementation, regional policy, and other matters
are integrated into a single coordinated strategy rather than
treated separately or competitively.
pillar 1: enforcing and enhancing the nuclear deal
The JCPOA is a flawed agreement--it permits Iran too much nuclear
activity, does not address Iran's past weaponization activities or
missile development, and has insufficient provisions for guarding
against clandestine Iranian nuclear work. Moreover, its provisions
begin to expire within a decade. Nevertheless, it is part of the
reality that confronts the new administration, and Iran and U.S. allies
alike would resist its renegotiation. In walking away from the deal,
Washington would face the difficult task of devising a new strategy to
contain Iran's nuclear program and rallying allied support for such a
strategy in the face of intense international skepticism.
The United States should therefore neither scrap the JCPOA nor make
an absolute commitment to it, but rather make plain to Iran and to
other diplomatic partners that the deal's survival will depend on the
rigor with which it is enforced. Because those partners are eager to
preserve the JCPOA, the prospect of continued U.S. adherence will
provide leverage to insist on its enforcement and enhancement--not
through reopening the P5+1 process, but through strict interpretation
of the deal's terms and side understandings with European and other
allies on related issues. Iran also appears eager to preserve the
JCPOA, minimizing any risk that more rigorous enforcement alone would
prompt Iran to walk away from the agreement.
In ``rigorously enforcing'' the JCPOA, the Trump administration
should bear in mind that if Iran cheats on the deal, it will likely
seek to do so clandestinely, using undeclared facilities rather than
those under international monitoring. To guard against such an
eventuality, the administration should consider taking steps in the
following areas:
Boosting Transparency
Insist that the IAEA provide greater detail in its public reporting
on Iran's nuclear activities, akin to the reports it published
prior to the implementation of the JCPOA. While Iran is likely
to protest, such a step would help bolster public confidence
that Iran is, in fact, complying with its obligations.
Provide regular, unclassified reports to Congress on Iran's
compliance with the JCPOA, the progress of its nuclear and
dual-use procurement efforts, centrifuge R&D, and missile
development, and other states' compliance with the JCPOA and
remaining international sanctions.
Insist that any decisions of the JCPOA Joint Commission be made
public. According to the agreement, this requires consensus of
the group, which includes Iran, Russia, and China. However, the
United States and the EU3 (France, Germany, and the United
Kingdom) can predicate their support for Joint Commission
decisions on these states' agreement to transparency.
Intelligence Sharing
Continue to prioritize the allocation of intelligence resources for
monitoring Iran's nuclear activities, as well as possible
related risks (e.g., nuclear procurement from abroad or the
establishment of clandestine Iranian nuclear facilities in
third countries).
Establish a continuous intelligence-sharing mechanism with
European, Asian, and Middle East allies, as well as analytical
exchanges.
Fully fund intelligence collection on Iran, despite the rising
priority of other efforts such as the campaign to counter IS.
Inspections and Verification
Insist that Iran provide initial baseline declarations for all
materiel and components applicable to its nuclear program, such
as uranium stocks and centrifuge components. This will help
avert any discrepancy between, for example, centrifuge
inventories and centrifuge component manufacturing that could
point to an undeclared nuclear effort. Push the IAEA to use its
inspection authorities to verify these baselines.
Likewise, press the IAEA to be aggressive in using its inspection
authorities under the Additional Protocol, which complements
its Safeguards Agreement, and the JCPOA, especially with regard
to possible undeclared nuclear activities and end-use
verification for nuclear and dual-use procurement. A norm
should be established according to which such inspections are
not exceptional but rather part of the ordinary functioning of
the JCPOA, and thus need not precipitate crises.
Fully fund the IAEA to ensure no shortfall in its capacity to
implement the JCPOA.
Procurement and Counterproliferation \1\
Work to ensure that U.N. member states and the international
private sector understand their responsibilities with respect
to nuclear and dual-use exports to Iran.
Work to bolster the export-control capacity of all states,
especially those with a history of involvement in illicit
Iranian nuclear and missile procurement.
Restrict use of the procurement channel by Iranian entities with a
history of illicit procurement, or--in the case of nuclear
procurement--for civilian end users at unmonitored facilities.
Urge states to maintain a presumption of denial--rather than a
presumption of approval--for procurement-channel requests that
cannot be adequately vetted within the 30-day period specified
in the JCPOA.
Urge states--including Iran itself--to make nuclear and dual-use
exports to Iran outside the procurement channel a crime under
domestic laws.
Given the JCPOA's reliance on suppliers to verify end use of dual-
use items, press the IAEA to employ its inspection authorities
to conduct end-use verifications in suspicious cases or when
the supplier has shown signs of being remiss or unreliable.
Reinstate the U.N. Panel of Experts--eliminated with the adoption
of the JCPOA--or a similar body to independently assess Iran's
nuclear and dual-use procurement efforts.
Sanctions and Responding to Violations
The United States should continue to strictly meet its obligations,
but should resist any demand to exceed those obligations unless
Iran is willing to add to its own obligations; the U.S. (and
P5+1) commitment is to take certain actions, not to ensure
certain outcomes for Iran.
Make clear to other P5+1 members that Washington expects them to
enforce not only the JCPOA but also the wider-reaching
requirements of U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231 (e.g.,
its prohibitions against certain arms- and missile-related
exports to Iran) and any other relevant UNSC resolutions.
Urge states to enact domestic legislation, as the United States has
done, that will allow them to quickly reimpose sanctions should
Iran violate the JCPOA or should the deal otherwise unravel.
Together with the EU3 and other allies, develop protocols for
responding to violations of the JCPOA or U.N. resolutions,
including a menu of penalties short of full snapback for minor
infringements. Seek agreement with allies to no longer excuse
violations such as exceeding agreed limits on low-enriched
uranium stockpiles or skirting restrictions on heavy-water
production by storing excess quantities in neighboring Oman.
Emphasize that the military option remains on the table, and
maintain a robust presence and schedule of exercises to lend
credibility to that option.
Because the JCPOA does not address certain important aspects of
Iran's nuclear program--e.g., its missile program--simply enforcing the
deal rigorously is not enough. Rather, the administration will need
also to address critical flaws in the agreement that could permit Iran
to advance its nuclear weapons efforts even while fully complying with
the deal's terms.
Access Delays: The JCPOA essentially permits Iran to delay IAEA
inspector access to suspected undeclared nuclear facilities for
24 days. While it would be difficult to fully eradicate
evidence of work with radioactive materials in this timeframe,
nuclear-weapons-related work does not always require the
introduction of such materials; in these cases, 24 days would
be sufficient to destroy evidence. Even in instances where
radioactive materials had been introduced, Iran could use the
time to eradicate other evidence critical to determining the
purpose of the site in question. To address this problem, the
United States should insist that the relevant timeframe for
IAEA access to such sites is the 24-hour limit specified in the
Additional Protocol and that delays beyond this limit merit
penalties and could be grounds for reimposing sanctions.
Weaponization Efforts--or Possible Military Dimensions (PMDs): The
JCPOA does not require Iran to account for its past
weaponization work or to give the IAEA access to the sites,
personnel, and documents involved in this work. Rather, it
simply closes the IAEA's past PMD investigation in the interest
of moving forward. While there is no reason at this stage to
seek to penalize Iran for its past weaponization work, U.S.
(and P5+1) officials must act to fill any knowledge gaps
regarding how far that work progressed and to ensure that
weaponization-related sites and personnel have not resumed
their work. To that end, the IAEA should use its inspection
authorities to request access to the relevant sites and
personnel, not to reopen past investigations--which would be
inconsistent with the JCPOA--but to ascertain their current
activities.
Missiles: Arguably the biggest omission in the JCPOA concerns
Iran's missile activities. The JCPOA does not address them at
all, and UNSC Resolution 2231 scales back the previous ban on
missile testing by Iran and extends the prohibition on other
states assisting Iran with its missile development efforts only
until 2023. Because Iran will likely require international
assistance should it seek to develop an intercontinental
ballistic missile, this provision represents a significant
achievement for Tehran. The United States should seek allied
support for a fourfold response: (1) stricter enforcement of
existing sanctions targeting Iran's missile activities and the
adoption of new ones as needed; (2) a commitment to intercept
or otherwise respond to any Iranian missile test that endangers
the territory or forces of the United States and its allies;
(3) stepped-up efforts to interdict missile-related shipments
to and from Iran, as well as to gather and share the
intelligence required to engage in such interdictions; and (4)
strengthened and better-integrated missile defense in the
Middle East and Europe to negate any advantages Iran seeks to
gain by improving its missile capabilities.
Sunset: Whatever the JCPOA's strengths and weaknesses, it is a
temporary accord. Its restrictions, and those added by UNSC
Resolution 2231, begin to phase out as early as 2021 and will
expire almost in full by 2026-31. Thus, while the deal arguably
buys time for Iran's adversaries, it also does so for Iran--
affording the Islamic Republic a period to develop its
centrifuge and missile capabilities while shielded from the
harshest international sanctions. As a result, when Iran
eventually resumes the expansion of its enrichment- and
reprocessing-related activities, its ``breakout time'' could be
dangerously low and its ability to field a usable nuclear
missile could be dangerously advanced. To guard against this
eventuality, the United States should seek allied support for a
threefold response: (1) declaring as a matter of policy that
the United States and others will not passively accept the
further expansion of Iran's nuclear activities when the JCPOA
lapses; (2) seeking to negotiate the extension and expansion of
the JCPOA's restrictions on Iran's nuclear activities; and (3)
seeking to bolster the global nuclear nonproliferation regime
to comprehensively restrict states' fuel-cycle activities and
limit Iran's options when the JCPOA expires.
pillar 2: countering iran's regional and global activities
While the United States has focused its Iran policy on the nuclear
issue, American allies in the Middle East have been far more concerned
about what they see as Tehran's mounting efforts to project power in
the region. While Iran continues to operate mainly through proxies such
as Lebanese Hezbollah and Shiite militias in Iraq and elsewhere, its
regional activities are increasingly direct and overt. Iranian
officials, especially those affiliated with the IRGC, make no attempt
to hide the purpose of these activities--to project Iranian power to
the Mediterranean Sea, deter the United States, and weaken and
otherwise preoccupy its adversaries. Among Iran's goals is undercutting
the monopoly of force and national loyalty in target states by creating
alternate security, political, and religious institutions beholden to
Tehran. This pursuit not only amplifies Iran's power, it also
undermines already fragile state institutions and fuels sectarianism.
For various reasons, Iran relies on asymmetric and strategic power
rather than conventional power, and it will likely continue to do so
even if relaxed sanctions create opportunities for Iran to rebuild its
conventional capabilities.
Nevertheless, the United States should avoid the temptation to
reflexively oppose every Iranian action in the region--instead, the
focus should be on deterring Iran where it clearly challenges U.S.
interests and strategy. And because most U.S. allies outside the Middle
East do not share the U.S. threat perception with respect to Iran
(e.g., on its missile program or support for terrorism) and are leery
of reopening the nuclear issue, any effort to push back on the Islamic
Republic should emphasize the Iranian role in issues such as
instability in Syria and Yemen or human rights violations, which are
more likely to garner these allies' interest and support. In addition,
successful deterrence requires that the United States and its allies be
prepared to ease off these punitive measures if Iran moderates its
policies; otherwise, Tehran will have no incentive to do so.
Syria, Iraq, and Yemen
In Syria, the United States should seek to magnify differences
between Russia and Iran by continuing to emphasize the need for
President Bashar al-Assad to step down as part of a political
transition, a development Moscow may ultimately find more
acceptable than would Tehran.
Washington must insist, as part of any contacts with Russia
regarding Syria, on the withdrawal of Iranian forces and Iran-
backed foreign militias--including Hezbollah and Shiite
militants from Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan--and assert that
the United States and its allies reserve the right to take
direct action against these militias if they remain.
Any discussion of combating terrorist groups in Syria should cover
not only Sunni groups but also Iranian proxies such as
Hezbollah, which is designated as a terrorist group in the
United States and elsewhere.
Sanctions on the Assad regime and any Iranian or Iran-backed
individuals and entities supporting it should be strictly
enforced and, if necessary, enhanced; further, Iran should be
sanctioned for the provision of arms and other military support
to Syria--and to militias elsewhere in the region--in violation
of UNSC Resolution 2231 and other measures.
Extend the international coalition's mission in Iraq by at least 2
years, in order to demonstrate our ongoing (albeit limited)
commitment to Baghdad.
Extend funding to continue building and training the Iraqi Counter
Terrorism Service and Iraqi security forces.
Push Baghdad to resist undue Iranian influence (e.g., the
institutionalization of Iran-backed militias) and to abide by
U.N. resolutions on Iran (e.g., against arms transfers from the
Islamic Republic) and assist it in doing so.
With respect to Arab States, particularly those of the GCC,
Washington should press for greater outreach to and
coordination with Iraq.
In Yemen, efforts should be intensified to interdict arms, funding,
and other forms of support for the Houthis; Washington should
likewise increase regional intelligence sharing toward that
end.
The U.S. leadership must rally international partners to respond
forcefully to Iranian-backed threats to shipping through the
Bab al-Mandab Strait, using patrols, interdictions, and direct
action against any personnel threatening freedom of navigation
with missiles, mines, or other weapons.
Finally, Washington should publicize the role that Iran-backed
militias play in human rights violations across the region and
seek to impose international and unilateral sanctions on them
wherever Washington and the U.N. have not already done so.
Countering Iranian Provocations and Proxy Networks
Review U.S. Navy procedures for responding to unsafe and
provocative conduct by Iranian naval forces to ensure that Iran
is deterred and the risk of inadvertent clashes is minimized.
Maintain and, if needed, broaden freedom-of-navigation operations
to challenge excessive Iranian maritime claims in the Gulf.
Deepen intelligence sharing among U.S. regional allies on Iranian
arms shipments and provision of other support for proxies, and
interdict such support in concert with allies when intelligence
merits doing so.
Engage in discreet discussions with Israel and Arab allies
regarding new ways of countering Iran-backed militias, and
where this threat might spread next.
Press the U.N. to act in response to Iranian violation of the
prohibition on arms shipments to groups such as Hezbollah and
the Houthis.
Make clear to Tehran that attacks on U.S. forces or allies by
Iranian or Iran-backed forces will merit a firm and direct
response against Iranian interests; consider direct action
targeting Iranian proxies where U.S. interests are directly
threatened (e.g., safety of shipping through the Bab al-Mandab,
safety of U.S. vessels in the Gulf).
Publicly expose Iranian support for regional proxies through
declassification of intelligence and diplomatic and media
briefings; likewise, debunk exaggerated Iranian military claims
when appropriate.
Sanctions
Bearing in mind that sanctions are an important tool (even if not a
silver bullet), recognize that sanctions diplomacy--i.e.,
gaining the agreement of other countries to act in concert with
the United States to both amplify pressure on Iran and ensure
its compliance with existing measures--is just as important as
Washington's own adoption and enforcement of sanctions.
Strictly enforce existing sanctions on Iran--especially on the
IRGC and its proxies and affiliates--and add to them as
needed.\2\
Publish more extensive ``watch lists'' of IRGC-owned or affiliated
entities and front companies to help the international private
sector avoid doing business inadvertently with the IRGC.
Significantly expand the number of IRGC-related designations
and consider lowering the threshold of IRGC ownership/control
required for designation.
Conduct a review of Iran Air and other Iranian commercial airlines
to ensure that any aircraft sales to them satisfy the JCPOA
requirement of strictly civilian end-use.
Increase sanctions focus on less-traditional areas, such as
corruption, money laundering, and human rights, in order to
widen international support. Seek international condemnation of
Iran for its threats against Israel.
Press regional states to ensure compliance with sanctions on Iran
by boosting intelligence gathering, inspection of shipments,
and security of maritime and land borders (e.g., the Oman-Yemen
border); where needed, bolster their ability to do so.
Press states outside the region to not only commit to compliance
with Iran sanctions but to strengthen their compliance through
intelligence collection and steps to ensure that domestic laws
support sanctions enforcement.
Continue actively to educate the international private sector
regarding its sanctions compliance obligations with respect to
Iran.
Other Arenas
Step up intelligence gathering and international cooperation aimed
at the terrorism- and proliferation-related and criminal
activities of Iran and its proxies, especially Hezbollah,
outside the Middle East.
Given Iran's possession of nuclear materials and knowledge, and the
spread of nuclear fuel-cycle activities elsewhere in the world,
reinvigorate nuclear security efforts in the United States and
strengthen the global nonproliferation regime.
In accordance with any new U.S. ``cyber doctrine,'' warn Iran
against malign cyber activities directed at the United States
and its allies, and impose costs when Iran engages in such
activities.
pillar 3: strengthening u.s. regional alliances
While the credibility of punitive measures is important for
effective deterrence, a strong defense is arguably even more crucial.
To that end, bolstering U.S. allies in the Middle East should be a key
element of American policy toward Iran. Such an effort should be guided
by two principles. First, it should address the actual threats these
allies face. These are largely asymmetric in nature; Iran does not
challenge U.S. allies conventionally but rather through terrorism,
proxy warfare, political warfare, and subversion, similar to the
``hybrid'' or ``gray zone'' warfare waged by Russia in Europe. Iran
also wields a formidable missile force, putting a premium on theater
missile defense in response. Second, to the extent possible, the U.S.
goal should be to build a multilateral alliance system in the Middle
East, not a series of strong but disconnected bilateral alliances. The
Middle East--especially the Gulf--is crowded geographically, making
coordination and interoperability among forces an imperative. A
multilateral alliance--even if the region is decades removed from a
``Middle East NATO''--could also provide a platform for U.S. allies to
solve regional problems with minimal external intervention, a balance
that would be welcomed both in the region and in the United States.
Regional Coordination
As suggested earlier, revive the George W. Bush-era Gulf Security
Dialogue, expanded to include Jordan, Egypt, and Morocco. The
GSD had six pillars, all of which remain relevant: (1) GCC
defensive capabilities and interoperability; (2) regional
security issues; (3) counterproliferation; (4) counterterrorism
and internal security; (5) critical infrastructure protection--
to which cyberdefense should now be added; and (6) support for
Iraq. Other external powers, such as the European Union,
Russia, and China, should be invited to observe and contribute
expertise.
Through the GSD+3: (1) Bolster intelligence sharing and
intelligence fusion, with a particular focus on Iran and
terrorist groups. (2) Foster a dialogue on the coordination of
military procurement and training, and on increasing the
effectiveness of internal and external security institutions--
as opposed to merely the acquisition of larger and more
powerful arsenals. (3) Foster a dialogue on countering the
particular threats posed by Iran--to include antiaccess/area
denial, terrorism, cyberattack, missiles, and subversion and
political warfare--drawing upon lessons learned in the European
theater.
Look for opportunities to use the GSD+3 to engage with Israel,
particularly on issues of regional security,
counterproliferation, counterterrorism, critical infrastructure
protection, and strategic planning, with the aim of discerning
and preventing future regional threats.
Increase investments in regional ballistic missile defense.
Plan for the contingency of greater Russian and/or Chinese
cooperation with Iran and the strengthening of Iranian
antiaccess/area-denial capabilities that restrict the freedom
of action of U.S. and allied forces, drawing upon lessons from
the European and Asia-Pacific theaters.\3\
Bilateral Efforts
Initiate bilateral dialogue with each U.S. ally in the region to
determine its key vulnerabilities, shortfalls in effectiveness,
and equipment needs, drawing upon lessons from recent conflicts
such as Yemen.
Urge allies to make political, security, and economic institutions
more effective, responsive, and accountable to guard against
popular discontent and ensure resilience in the face of
subversion by Iran or extremist groups.
Initiate a high-level dialogue with Israel on regional threats,
including Iran and Syria, that consists largely of military and
intelligence officials but led by the White House and Prime
Minister's Office. Establish a trusted backchannel between the
White House and the PMO.
Work with Israel to prepare a plan for responding to a Hezbollah
missile attack on Israel, emphasizing deterrence not only of
Hezbollah but also of Iran.
Reinvigorate efforts to strengthen the Lebanese government and
loosen Hezbollah's grip on Lebanon, focusing especially on
reducing Hezbollah's arsenal and freedom of action.
Engagement With Iran
Maintain existing channels of diplomatic engagement with Iran.
However, when engaging Iran, do so multilaterally with regional
allies whenever possible.
Encourage U.S. allies to engage with Iran, but ensure they are
doing so from a position of strength, with U.S. support.
Expand the Iranian people's contact with the United States through
increased people-to-people exchanges and visa issuance. Express
support for human rights in Iran.
Avoid transactional engagement with Iran (e.g., on counternarcotics
and Afghanistan) that benefits the regime without prompting
improvements in Iranian policies on matters of core importance
to the United States and its allies.
Engagement should be seen as just another tool in the policy
toolkit, not as absolutely good or bad on its own merits; it
should be used as conditions and strategy dictate.
------------------
Notes
\1\ For a full treatment of this topic, see David Albright and
Andrea Stricker, ``The Iran Nuclear Deal's Procurement Channel:
Overcoming Post-Implementation Day Issues,'' Institute for Science and
International Security, April 21, 2016, http://isis-online.org/uploads/
isis-reports/documents/
JCPOA_Procurement_Channel_Post_Implementation_Day_21April2016_Final1_1.p
df.
\2\ For a full treatment of this issue, see Katherine Bauer,
Patrick Clawson, and Matthew Levitt, Reinforcing the Role of Sanctions
in Restraining Iran (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
February 2017), http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/
view/reinforcing-the-role-of-sanctions-in-restraining-iran.
\3\ For a full treatment of this issue, see Mark Gunzinger with
Chris Dougherty, Outside-In: Operating from Range to Defeat Iran's
Anti-Access and Area-Denial Threats (Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments, posted January 17, 2012), http://csbaonline.org/research/
publications/outside-in-operating-from-range-to-defeat-irans-anti-
access-and-area-denial.
The Chairman. Very good. Thank you so much.
Mr. Indyk?
STATEMENT OF HON. MARTIN S. INDYK, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT,
THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Indyk. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is
a pleasure to be back here in front of you and Senator Cardin
and your colleagues. I have to applaud the committee for the
excellent work that you are doing on a bipartisan basis, no
more importantly than here today in the question of what to do
about the challenge from Iran.
And in that context, I applaud the bill, and I also applaud
its actual mandating of a development of a strategy for dealing
with the Iranian challenge.
I want to associate myself with a lot of what my colleague
Michael Singh has said, and rather than repeat some of those
things, I would like to focus specifically on what I think the
necessary elements are of a pushback strategy.
I think we are all familiar with the kind of dangers that
Iran poses and the way over the last 4 decades since the
Iranian revolution it has used its proxies, whether it is
Hezbollah or Shia militias, its own Iranian Revolutionary Guard
force or support of Shia populations or even Shia rebels like
the Houthis in Yemen, to exploit the cracks that exist in the
Sunni world and advance the hegemonic ambitions for the region.
And one would have to say, when you look back at what they
have done over the last 4 decades and where they are today,
they have had considerable success. They have established an
arc of influence that stretches from Lebanon on the
Mediterranean Sea across Syria in the Middle East heartland, to
Iraq and Bahrain on the gulf, and to Yemen on the Red Sea.
Iran has been assiduously pursuing this effort and has a
big stake in it. The Iranians live in a strategic environment.
They have practiced the art of strategy since the days of Cyrus
the Great 600 years before the birth of Christ, and they have
formidable capacities for dealing with and promoting their
ambitions in the region.
Therefore, any new American strategy to counter Iran's
threats needs to take account of the way, in the Middle East,
everything is connected, particularly for the Iranians.
So if we push back on Iran in Yemen, as the Trump
administration is now considering doing, that may well stir up
the Shia population in Bahrain. If we push back on Iran in
Syria, there is a lot of loose talk about that today, they
might well use the Shia militias in Iraq to undermine our
effort to eliminate the crisis there or encourage Hamas to
launch rocket attacks on Israel from Gaza.
In short, countering Iran's regional ambitions is a deadly
business, and we should approach it with the seriousness it
requires, as I know this committee is doing.
What we need is a comprehensive, integrated, and
sustainable pushback strategy. But in pursuing it, we should be
careful about making threats unless we are prepared to back
them up, and we should be wary of declaring objectives that we
have neither the will nor the capacity to achieve. I hoped that
that era was over.
I this morning will just very quickly outline the six
elements that I think are necessary in a comprehensive strategy
towards pushing back Iran.
The first, as Senator Cardin has mentioned, is the need to
rigorously enforce the JCPOA, the Iran nuclear deal. That is
the first element, most importantly because, as long as it is
rigorously enforced, it provides us with time to deal with the
challenges that Iran is posing to us across the Middle East
region. With it, everything becomes easier. Without it,
everything becomes more difficult because we have to deal with
the challenges of Iran's nuclear capabilities and the potential
for a nuclear arms race that they would trigger.
The second element is support for the Iraqi Government of
Haider al-Abadi and the Iraqi Armed Forces as they campaign to
defeat ISIS and regain control of Mosul and the Sunni regions
in Iraq. That is important because, as a result of the last
Gulf War, the gates of Babylon were opened to Iran and they
moved in very quickly and very effectively to establish their
dominance over the previous Maliki government.
Today, al-Abadi seeks to take some distance from Iran, but
he needs help to do so. And we, together with our Sunni allies,
can counterbalance Iran in Iraq, and we have an opportunity
particularly to do so in Mosul and to make sure that the Shia
militias are not able to move in there and establish control in
the wake of our forcing ISIS out.
That is a critical post-reconstruction challenge that we
have to succeed in, not only to prevent ISIS from rebuilding
itself in some other form even more malignant, but also to
prevent that land bridge that Iran is seeking to establish from
Iran across northern Iraq through Syria to Lebanon.
The third element in the pushback strategy is promoting an
effective political resolution of the civil war in Yemen. The
idea that the Yemen civil war can be resolved by military force
alone is an illusion which will only get us more sucked into
the quagmire that Saudi Arabia and the Emirates, our Arab
allies there, are already engaged in.
To apply military pressure to produce a more reasonable
outcome at the negotiating table is not an unreasonable
approach. But to only focus on a military solution will be a
problem that Iran will exploit. It is a low-cost way of
diverting us from the other more important areas.
My time has expired, and I will just quickly mention that
Syria is the most complicated problem. Perhaps we can get into
it in the discussion. We should not underestimate that Iran has
a core interest there, and, with 25,000 forces on the ground,
has embedded itself both within the Assad government and
institutions and on the ground there.
And we do not, Mr. Chairman, have a vital interest in who
controls Syria. Iran does. If we can push them out of Syria
eventually, that would be a huge setback to them. But they will
fight very hard to preserve their position, and we need to be
very smart about the way we go about it, in terms of setting
more modest objectives to restrict their ability to operate
there and to insist that any political resolution requires the
withdrawal of both armed forces, which would give us the
legitimacy to demand that the Iranian-controlled forces
withdraw.
The last two elements, one is to concern our activities
with our like-minded allies in the region, something, I think,
we have a real opportunity to do.
And finally, the controversial point that I make at the end
there, but I think it is important, that as we build up our
leverage on Iran, including with the sanctions that you are
introducing here and the potential sanctions for any
misbehavior or failure to fulfill the JCPOA, we should engage
in negotiations with Iranians making clear what our
requirements are in terms of ending their export of the
revolution, ending their destabilization of our allies and the
threatening of our allies in the region, and accepting controls
on their missile and nuclear activities, particularly in the
period after the sunset.
I think that a combination of these elements can achieve,
over time, a pushback of Iran, and I applaud the committee for
taking it on.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Indyk follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador Martin S. Indyk
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me to address the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee today on a matter of considerable import:
the bipartisan legislation to counter Iran's destabilizing activities.
As well as imposing sanctions on the IRGC for the organization's
involvement in terrorism, and on individuals involved in Iran's
ballistic missile program, the CIDA legislation also mandates the
administration to:
. . . develop and submit to the appropriate Congressional
committees a strategy for deterring conventional and asymmetric Iranian
activities and threats that directly threaten the United States and key
allies in the Middle East, North Africa, and beyond.
While the legislation imposes sanctions designed to address the
threat posed by Iran's development of intercontinental ballistic
missiles, it clearly seeks to embed that effort in a broader approach
that contends with Iran's destabilizing activities in the Middle East.
Developing that strategy is an urgent priority because Iran's hegemonic
ambitions threaten the interests of the United States and its Middle
Eastern allies.
Through the sponsorship of terrorist organizations like Hezbollah
and Palestine Islamic Jihad, the control of Shia militias like the Badr
Brigade in Iraq and the Liwa Fatemayoun in Syria (whose troops come
from Afghanistan), the deployment of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards
Al Qods force, and the provision of missiles and other arms to Houthi
rebels in Yemen and other proxies across the region, Iran has gone a
long way to achieving its regional ambitions. It has established an
``arc of influence'' that stretches from Lebanon on the Mediterranean
Sea, across Syria in the Middle East heartland, to Iraq and Bahrain on
the Gulf, and to Yemen on the Red Sea.
Iran has been assiduously pursuing this effort since the overthrow
of the Shah almost 4 decades ago when it began its unceasing efforts to
export its revolution to the Middle East and beyond. In the 1990s, for
example, when I had responsibility for Iran policy in the Clinton
administration, we pursued a strategy of containment to deal with the
threat that was already manifest. That was part of a two-branch
strategy, in which President Clinton sought to advance a comprehensive
Arab-Israeli peace as the second branch. The calculation in those days
was that the more progress we made in peacemaking, the more effective
we would be in containing the Iranian revolution, and the more
effectively we isolated Iran, the more progress we would be able to
make in advancing peace.
The Iranians, who live in a strategic environment and have
practiced the art of strategy since the days of Cyrus the Great, 600
years before the birth of Christ, were successful in countering our
approach by systematically undermining our efforts to advance Arab-
Israeli peace, using their proxies, Hezbollah, Palestine Islamic Jihad,
and Hamas. Had we succeeded in achieving a breakthrough to peace
between Israel and Syria in those days, which was actually much closer
than the Israeli-Palestinian deal we were also pursuing, the Iranians
would have suffered a strategic setback that might well have changed
the course of Middle Eastern history.
But that is conjecture. What is not conjecture is the fact that
Syria remains the lynchpin of Iran's strategy for dominating the Middle
East heartland. Therefore, any new American strategy to counter Iran's
threats needs to take account of the way that, in the Middle East,
everything is connected. Push back on Iran in Yemen, and they might
well stir up the Shia population in Bahrain. Push back on Iran in
Syria, and they might well use the Shia militias in Iraq to undermine
our effort to eliminate ISIS there, or encourage Hamas to launch rocket
attacks on Israel from Gaza.
Back in 1996, when the Iranians thought we were making progress in
brokering peace between Israel and Syria, they ordered Hezbollah to
launch a terrorist attack on the Khobar Towers in Dahran, Saudi Arabia,
killing 19 U.S. Air Force personnel. They are quite capable of
repeating that exercise today against American troops in Syria or Iraq.
As Senator Cotton knows, since he asked the question of General
Dunford, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in his confirmation
hearings in 2015, the Iranians may have been responsible for the deaths
of as many as 500 American soldiers in Iraq during the Surge, by
supplying explosively formed penetrators (EFPs)to Shia militias.\1\
In short, countering Iran's regional ambitions is deadly business
and we should approach it with the seriousness it deserves. What we
need is a comprehensive, integrated and sustainable ``push-back''
strategy. But in pursuing it, we should be careful about making threats
unless we are prepared to back them up, and we should be wary of
declaring objectives that we have neither the will nor capacity to
achieve. Above all, we should be mindful of the logical consequences of
our strategy and think those through before launching on a course that
could well have the opposite effect of what we intended. For all these
reasons, I applaud the sponsors of the bill and the members of this
committee for seeking to deliberate on these weighty matters.
The rigorous enforcement of the Iran nuclear deal is the first
element in a push-back strategy. That will likely be unwelcome to some
members of this committee, but in my view, it is essential to its
success. Whatever the perceived shortcomings of the JCPOA, it has
succeeded in creating a vital 10-year window in which the region is not
threatened by Iranian nuclear capabilities and the nuclear arms race
that they would inevitably trigger. Nothing is easy about countering
Iran in the conflict-ridden Middle East, but everything becomes easier
if we do not have an Iranian nuclear threat to contend with at the same
time.
As long as the Iranians strictly adhere to the agreement, the
United States and its regional allies will have gained vital time to
develop and implement the other elements of the push-back strategy.
That time is essential because the Iranians have entrenched themselves
across the region. They will not easily or quickly be extracted, if at
all. We will have to be prepared to play a long game and the JCPOA
makes that possible.
The second element in the push-back strategy is support for the
Iraqi government of Haider al-Abadi and the Iraqi Armed Forces as they
campaign to defeat ISIS and regain control of Mosul and the Sunni
regions of Iraq. Since the toppling of Saddam Hussein opened the gates
of Babylon to Iran, Iraq's Shia majority has fallen under the heavy
influence of Iran.
Eliminating that influence is not an achievable or necessary
objective given the historic and religious ties between the neighboring
Shias of Iraq and Iran. But providing an effective counter-balance to
Iran's influence in Baghdad is eminently achievable since it is
welcomed by the current Iraqi government, which was not the case under
the previous Maliki government.
For years, that effort has also been hobbled by the unwillingness
of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Arab States to engage meaningfully with
the Iraqi government, which they branded as ``Persian.'' But the recent
visit of the Saudi Foreign Minister to Baghdad, and the Saudi effort to
engage with the Sunni tribes of Iraq, presages a new approach which
needs to be encouraged and sustained.
This will be particularly important, as the elimination of ISIS in
Iraq will generate a huge post-conflict reconstruction challenge in
Mosul and the other liberated Sunni regions. If Iranian-directed Shia
militias fill the vacuum created by the defeat of ISIS, Iran will have
achieved one critically important step in establishing a land bridge
from Iran through Iraq to Syria and Lebanon. It will also have created
the conditions for the eventual return of Sunni jihadist groups like
ISIS and its Al Qaeda precursor, perhaps in an even more extreme form,
because the Sunnis of Iraq will not accept Shia dominance of their
lives. That is why Sunni State support for a major American-led, post-
war reconstruction effort is essential.
The third element in the push-back strategy is effective promotion
of a political resolution of the civil war in Yemen. The Trump
administration is currently considering stepping up military support
for Saudi Arabia and the UAE in their 2-year long military campaign in
Yemen.\2\ This makes sense only if it is wedded to a diplomatic
strategy for ending the war, which has already caused thousands of
civilian casualties and vast human suffering. Otherwise, the United
States will be sucked into the Yemen quagmire like so many outside
powers before us.
Greater U.S. military engagement also needs to be weighed in the
context of the larger regional strategy that this Committee is calling
for. Yemen is a low-cost way for Iran to distract the United States and
its Gulf Arab allies from the much more strategically consequential
challenges in Iraq and Syria. Already, some 50 percent of Saudi
Arabia's military capacity, and a large part of the UAE's, is devoted
to the Yemen conflict, whereas all that Iran is doing to tie them down
is to supply the Houthis with military materiel and financial support.
No doubt, gains on the battlefield can impact the dynamics at the
negotiating table. In that regard, a successful effort to take control
of the Red Sea port of Hodeida, could impact the Houthi calculus and
lead to greater seriousness and reasonableness on their part in the
negotiations. But American support needs to be conditioned on the
pursuit of a political solution by our Saudi allies as well.
The fourth element in the push-back strategy is to reduce Iran's
influence in Syria. This is by far the most difficult and complicated
component of the strategy. Developing and implementing it is not helped
by loose talk about the unrealistic objective of ``pushing Iran out of
Syria.'' That may well be the desirable end-state but we need to
recognize that neither we, nor the Russians, have the will or capacity
to achieve it in current circumstances.
Iran has developed a formidable presence on the ground in Syria.
With encouragement from Asad's Alawite-dominated regime, the Iranians
have penetrated the institutions of government that remain in Syria.
They have also embedded some 25,000 forces in the government-controlled
areas of western Syria. Those forces comprise some 5,000 IRGC, Basij
and Iranian Army elements that provide the commanders, advisors and
trainers of the larger Shia militias; some 3-5,000 highly trained
Hezbollah fighters from Lebanon; and some 20,000 Shia militiamen
recruited from Afghanistan and Pakistan. These forces are significantly
larger than what is left of the Syrian army or the Russian forces now
deployed there. They were responsible for the Asad regime's
reconquering of Aleppo and they remain in control of much of the areas
in the north-west where they are taking responsibility for the well-
being of Syrian citizens there, much as Hezbollah did in southern
Lebanon.
The Iranian-controlled presence is bolstered by two factors that
must not be ignored in developing the push-back strategy:
The Iranian-Asad alliance, which was forged by Asad's father in the
1980s, when Syria was the only Arab State to side with Iran in
the decade-long Iraq-Iran war. Since then, Asad's son has
become ever-more dependent on them for his survival, no more so
than in the present. Asad will not demand their departure
because it will lead to his demise. And Russia will therefore
not demand it either because they fear the consequences of the
collapse of the Asad regime more than they value any putative
partnership with the United States.
Iran's ``core interest'' in retaining a foothold in Syria because
it is the lynchpin of its wider hegemonic strategy. If it loses
that foothold, it will seriously jeopardize Hezbollah's control
of Lebanon, the crown jewel of Iran's regional position. That
means Iran will mightily resist any effort to force it out of
Syria and has considerable ability to do so. The United States
has never viewed Syria as a core or vital interest and we
therefore do not have the will or interest in deploying the
forces necessary to achieve that objective.
Russia does have a long-standing strategic interest in Syria
because of its port facilities for the Russian navy and its role as a
platform for the projection of Russian influence across the region.
Russian and Iranian interests overlap in Syria in their common
objective of maintaining the Asad regime in power. But they are also
rivals for influence in Damascus, and Asad relishes the opportunity to
play them off against each other. Exploiting that rivalry has
advantages for an American strategy of reducing Iranian influence in
Syria. However, that game has strict upper limits. Russia will not
cooperate in the undermining of its own influence in Syria for the sake
of a partnership with the United States. It did that in the 1970s,
which led to the loss of its presence in Egypt. It will not repeat that
mistake. The idea that Russia will force Iran out of Syria is therefore
a dangerous fantasy. And the idea that we should pay for such a fantasy
by removing the Ukraine sanctions on Russia would constitute strategic
malfeasance, given the impact that would have on our allies in Europe,
particularly in Eastern Europe.
We should therefore set more modest objectives. We can, for
example, press Russia to deny Iran port facilities in Syria. An
Iranian-controlled port would enable Iran more easily to ship weapons
to Hezbollah. That would severely exacerbate the conflict between Iran
and Israel, something Russia has an interest in avoiding. Similarly, we
should support Israel's insistence that Russia press Iran and Hezbollah
not to send their forces south to the Golan Heights. That would risk
creating one front across southern Lebanon into the Syrian Golan, which
would constitute a highly destabilizing threat to our Israeli ally.
Finally, as in Yemen, we should do what we can to promote a
political resolution of the Syrian civil war, one that leads eventually
but inevitably to Asad's departure. In that context, we should insist
that one requirement of the political settlement should be the
departure of all foreign forces. That principle was incorporated into
the Taif Agreement, which ended the Lebanese civil war and eventually
resulted in the peaceful departure of Syrian forces from Lebanon.
Syrians, who do not want Iranian-controlled militias dominating them in
a post-conflict era, will welcome inclusion of that principle. And it
will provide us with the legitimacy to demand their eventual departure.
The fifth element in the push-back strategy it to concert the
capabilities of our regional allies in a regional security framework
that can sustain a long-term, burden-sharing effort. The United States
is fortunate to have capable regional strategic partners in Israel,
Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the Sunni Arab States, that share a common
interest in countering Iran's threatening ambitions. Each, however, has
its own strategic perspective. Our NATO ally Turkey, for example, has a
strong interest in preventing Iran from establishing a land bridge
across northern Iraq to Syria and has moved ground forces into Iraq to
block that prospect. But it will not cooperate in any effort that
strengthens the Syrian Kurds. Similarly, Egypt sees Iran as a regional
competitor but does not want to exacerbate the Sunni-Shia sectarian
conflict for fear that it will advantage Sunni extremists. An effective
strategy will therefore need to be based on a variable geometry that
builds on the common interest of countering Iran while allowing for
specific differences that may condition the involvement of some of our
regional partners.
Nevertheless, there is a new readiness across the region to work
together, despite their differences. For example, Turkey has just
normalized relations with Israel; the Gulf States are developing their
security relations with Israel; and Egypt's security cooperation with
Israel is unprecedented. It is time to test the readiness of our allies
to come together in a regional security arrangement that will allow us
all more effectively to coordinate our efforts against Iran.
The sixth element of the push-back strategy is to lay the
foundations for negotiations with Iran about its ambitions and behavior
in the region. The Iran nuclear deal, notwithstanding its shortcomings,
demonstrates that it is possible to reach enforceable agreements with
Iran, using sanctions and concerted diplomacy as leverage to achieve
our objectives. This sanctions bill, complemented by the five other
elements of the push-back strategy, if successfully developed and
implemented, provide a basis for engaging Iran in a negotiation that
focuses on:
Iran's efforts to export its revolution and interfere in the
domestic affairs of Arab States across the region
Iran's destabilizing regional activities and its sponsorship of
terrorism
Iran's ICBM program and its nuclear activities after the expiration
of the JCPOA.
Negotiations are not a concession to Iran, nor a sign of weakness,
as long as they are backed by sanctions and the other elements of the
strategy that I have outlined here, and as long as they are fully
coordinated with our regional allies. But they represent a way to
signal to Iran that we and our regional allies are willing to have a
constructive, normalized relationship with it, even recognize its
status as a regional power, if it is willing to change its troubling
behavior in fundamental ways. Indeed, if the Iranians prove willing to
engage in a serious negotiation about these issues, we should even be
prepared to signal to them a willingness to consider lifting our
bilateral sanctions, i.e. putting a carrot as well as a stick on the
table.
Mr. Chairman, it should be clear from this testimony that
developing an effective strategy for dealing with the threats posed by
Iran is a complicated and difficult challenge. But the dangers of not
doing so are clear and present. I applaud the committee for taking on
the task.
------------------
Notes
\1\ ``Iran Linked to Deaths of 500 U.S. Troops,'' Military Times,
July 14, 2015. http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/capitol-
hill/2015/07/14/iran-linked-to-deaths-of-500-us-troops-in-iraq-
afghanistan/30131097/.
\2\ Karen de Young and Missy Ryan, ``Trump Administration Weighs
Deeper Involvement in Yemen War,'' The Washington Post, March 27, 2017.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-
administration-weighs-deeper-involvement-in-yemen-war/2017/03/26/
b81eecd8-0e49-11e7-9d5a-a83e627dc120_story.html?hpid=hp_rhp-top-table-
main_usyemen-720pm%3Ahomepage%2Fstory&utm_term=.a313a0a0eb67.
The Chairman. Thank you.
As is the case, I typically defer and retain some time for
interjections. I would like to just make one--Mr. Indyk, your
comments made me think about this.
There was a strong divergence of opinion on this committee
about the nuclear deal, and each person expressed themselves
and voted the way they saw fit, and the deal went into play.
What is pretty remarkable is I am not aware of any committee
member since the beginning of this year that has called for it
to be torn up.
So as we move toward pushing back against Iran, which I
hope we will do because I think we all realize that this was
about one thing and that was a nuclear agreement, the fact is
that the committee has stayed together on not ripping the
agreement up but enforcing it, I would say radically, some
people would say extremely. And I appreciate the comments that
our witnesses have made.
So we have a beginning base here where I think people
understand we are collectively together on enforcing. We would
like to push back against Iran's other activities. And we
meticulously, in this bill that has been introduced, stayed
away from anything relative to the nuclear agreement.
And then I think we all understand that, down the road, we
still have work to do, that after year 8, in particular, you
start diminishing down to a zero breakout time. So as a
committee, we have additional work to do, if we really wish to
keep them from getting a nuclear weapon at some point.
But I just say those things to say we have a pretty good
point of beginning reference here, and I thank you for
highlighting that. Hopefully, we will work together to again
push back against the many other activities that are taking
place in the region and, as has been mentioned by both
witnesses, diplomatically work very closely with our allies
and, let's face it, not so much allies, all of whom are
involved in this deal to make sure that Iran never gets a
nuclear weapon.
With that, Senator Cardin?
Senator Cardin. Let me thank both of our witnesses. I found
your testimonies to be very helpful.
You both agree that the United States should not
unilaterally withdraw from the JCPOA. I see that in your
statements and your written comments, and I agree with that. I
think that would isolate us diplomatically.
You both agree that the United States must be actively
engaged in diplomacy. We see that in Iraq particularly, as Iraq
is reaching a critical point with Mosul falling. And if Iraq's
central government is not able to fill the void of confidence
of all communities and security of all communities, we know the
Shia militia and Iran will try to develop more influence in
Iraq, allowing, enabling Iran greater influence in the region
than they have.
It seems to me the immediate issue about Iran's influence
in that region is Russia. Russia is facilitating Iran in Syria.
Russia is permitting Iran to finance terrorist operations in
that region. And when we talk to our Gulf partners, Yemen, for
example, Iran is very much involved in creating that
instability.
Mr. Indyk, you indicated that it would be fantasy to give
Russia relief in regards to Ukraine in exchange for their help
in Syria because they will not deliver in Syria. At least that
is the implication.
So what should we do in regards to Russia's support for
Iran? Is there any way that we can divide that and be able to
minimize Iran's support from Russia?
Ambassador Indyk. Thank you, Senator Cardin.
Michael Singh referred to the fact that Russia and Iran are
not exactly on the same page. I think we need to understand
that, from the beginning. They have a common interest in Syria
in propping up the Assad regime, but they are rivals for
influence in Syria.
The Iranians, as I have described it, have a core interest
because of the way that that advantages everything else that
they are trying to do in the region to establish their
hegemony. The Russians have a long-time strategic interest in
Syria, one which, by the way, we never really challenged
because we did not see it as much of a threat to our own
strategic interests. They have port facilities there. They now
have airbases.
And this has proved to be important to them, not only in
terms of their objectives in Syria, which is to ensure that the
regime survives and there is no chaos that they fear would come
from the regime's overthrow that would spread and infect the
Muslim populations in their own country.
So they have a very real interest and real concern there.
But they have no particular interest beyond the way the
Iranians can help keep the Assad regime in power. They have no
particular interest in helping Iran in Syria. And certainly, if
there were to be an effective ceasefire, which is coming apart
at the moment, but were they able to effect that and the
political process could be put in place, then I think that the
competition between them would accelerate.
Senator Cardin. Let me just interrupt on that. I agree with
you. I understand Russia has limited interest. We heard they
have limited interests in protecting the Assad regime. But it
has been going on for years, and they are still there.
So they may have limited interests in dealing with the
objectives of Iran, but they are partners in this. How do we
divide them?
Mr. Singh, do you have a suggestion here?
Mr. Singh. I do not disagree with Ambassador Indyk. I think
it is going to be awfully hard.
I agree with the proposition that, in the long run, they do
not have the same interests. And we see that Russia is trying
to expand its influence in the region not just in Syria but
sort of peppering its influence throughout the region, as we
see with these Russian special forces who are in Egypt now, for
example, reportedly.
But I think right now, and for the foreseeable future in
that conflict in Syria, they need each other operationally. I
think for Russia, Iran is the ground force. And as we know
ourselves, if you are only putting in an air force, you need
also a ground force to go in and sort of direct things there
and hold things.
And for Iran, I think that the Assad regime would have
fallen were it not for Russia's air intervention and artillery
intervention.
So they need each other operationally for now, even if they
do not have the same interests, and that poses a real obstacle
to any effort to split them.
Senator Cardin. So we have defined the problem. We do not
know a strategy to unlock their cooperation. That is a very
good point, that they need each other. And for the foreseeable
future, there is very little that is going to change that
equation.
Is that what we are all saying?
Mr. Singh. I would say though that is for now. That is for
as long as they are in this phase of the conflict in Syria.
Perhaps as this conflict develops, for example, as our plans
towards Raqqa develop and so forth, that will change.
And there I agree with what Ambassador Indyk said, that
ultimately, the way to drive a wedge between Russia and Iran is
by focusing on Iran's desperate need, I think, for the Assad
regime to remain in place and Russia's lack of that need, for
example. I think we can focus on removing all foreign forces
from Syria, which is something Iran cannot accept but Russia
perhaps can be more open to.
Senator Cardin. I will just add one last point. We could
also concentrate on what we do about Russia. That is why there
is a bipartisan bill here to put more pressure on Russia to
make Syria a heavier cost for them in their partnership with
Iran.
The Chairman. Senator Gardner?
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, both of you, for your time and testimony today.
Mr. Singh, in the beginning of your testimony, you talked
about areas in which Iran has grown in strength because of the
JCPOA. You mentioned some of them in your written testimony.
Could you perhaps talk about them openly in the hearing,
ways Iran has been strengthened as a result of the JCPOA in a
fashion the United States is not comfortable with?
Mr. Singh. Of course, Senator. I would be happy to do so.
And I would say in the wake of the JCPOA, rather than directly
because of the JCPOA, perhaps, just to be a little bit more
cautious about it. But I think we can see this across the
region.
In Lebanon, you have Hezbollah, which is an Iranian proxy.
It has a stranglehold now on the government. Our efforts to
sort of promote the sovereignty of the Lebanese Government I
would say have fallen a bit by the wayside over the past
several years.
In Syria, I think it is really the Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps which is calling the shots for the Assad regime,
bringing in foreign fighters from Afghanistan and Pakistan, and
facing, frankly, very few obstacles to doing that.
In Iraq, you have these deeply entrenched Iranian-backed
militias who are, I think, a big threat to the sovereignty of
Baghdad and will be a real challenge post-liberation of Mosul,
as perhaps these communities start eyeing one another warily.
In Yemen, as has already been mentioned, we have Iranian
forces not only providing arms to the Houthis by sea and by
land but also, according to our military forces, connected to
these anti-ship cruise missile attacks on U.S. forces and
commercial shipping in the Bab al-Mandab Strait, which to me is
a problem which we cannot pay enough attention to, because that
is just an absolutely critical maritime chokepoint.
We have seen missile testing from Iran in absolute defiance
of Resolution 2231, which enshrines the JCPOA. And while the
United States has responded with some sanctions, we have seen
basically silence from the rest of the world. Even though they
urge us to keep up our end of the deal, we have not seen them
too eager to enforce Resolution 2231 against Iran.
Senator Gardner. If I could interrupt right there, because
you mentioned the strategic convergence and then, of course,
the strategic divergence. And both of you, Ambassador Indyk as
well as you, Mr. Singh, talked about our allies and the way we
see Iran versus perhaps some others, and the divergence that we
now see.
Why the divergence when you talk about the activities that
you have seen and the bad behavior, whether it is missile
testing, further exploration of the missile program? Why the
divergence?
Mr. Singh. Well, I think when it comes to the nuclear
threat, again, we could all sort of agree that nuclear
proliferation was a bad thing.
When it comes to terrorism, though, I think for many of our
allies in, say, Europe or certainly Russia and China, they are
less likely to sort of take the terrorism threat coming from
Iran seriously. They certainly take seriously the threat of
terrorism from, say, ISIS and jihadist groups, but they tend to
dismiss it from Iran, in part because they do not see it as
much on their soil.
Now, actually, there has been Iranian-sponsored terrorism
on European soil. For example, there was a Hezbollah attack in
Bulgaria, I believe, just in the past few years. They also I
think take the missile threat less seriously for a variety of
reasons, frankly.
This is why I say, when we do approach these allies, I
think we have to approach them in a way which is not simply
focused on let's push back on Iran but it is focused on the
broader region and the impact that Iran's activities have on
issues like Syria or, say, human rights, where they, frankly,
may show more interest.
Senator Gardner. And if you go back to a week ago, March
21, 2017, the United States sanctioned 30 entities and
individuals in relation to the Iran, North Korea, and Syria
Nonproliferation Act. Iran claimed that these sanctions
violated the JCPOA.
Could you talk a little bit about that, any step we take,
nonnuclear sanctions undermining the JCPOA, at least in their
belief?
Mr. Singh. They will claim this, I think, for every step
that we take, that we are violating the JCPOA, because they
know that this is an effective negotiating tactic with our
partners. It will get others in Europe and elsewhere to put
pressure on us not to take these steps even though these are
steps which clearly do not violate the JCPOA. I think that
needs to be recognized very clearly.
And I think it is also their attempt to use leverage
against us, to get us to be cautious, to get us to maybe dilute
some of the steps we would have otherwise taken and to sort of
take it easy on things.
They are trying to extract as much as they can out of this
deal. And, frankly, we should expect them to do that.
Senator Gardner. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard, do you
believe that the United States should designate them as a
foreign terrorist organization?
Mr. Singh. I tend not to think that. I do believe that we
should punish them and sanction them for their support for
terrorism, but I am wary about sort of picking and choosing
good guys and bad guys within the Iranian regime. I think that
we need to recognize that Iran----
Senator Gardner. There are good guys and bad guys within
the Iranian regime.
Mr. Singh. Well, I think, we need to recognize that Iran is
a state sponsor of terror, and, from my point of view, Iran
will use various organs of its government in pursuit of these
goals, supporting terrorism, for example, the Ministry of
Intelligence and Security, the Basij forces and so forth.
And I am always a bit wary when folks seem to think, well,
maybe the Revolutionary Guard is somehow a rogue element that
is not carrying out state policy. To me, our real problem here
is state policy, and I think we need to remain focused on that.
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Coons?
Senator Coons. Thank you, Chairman Corker and Ranking
Member Cardin, for convening this important hearing and our two
compelling witnesses, and for your leadership in making
possible bipartisan legislation in this area.
As has been thoroughly reviewed by our witnesses today,
despite the JCPOA, Iran continues its bad behavior, to preach
anti-Semitism and call for the destruction of Israel, to build
its military arsenal and support terrorism throughout the
region, to conduct ballistic missile tests in violation of
numerous U.N. Security Council resolutions, and to detain
Americans and violate the human rights of its citizens and
Iranians.
These are not the actions of a responsible state seeking to
rejoin the international community, and it is because of these
provocations that we need to take stronger action to disrupt
their destabilizing actions and their regional alliances.
So I was glad to join with 13 colleagues, both Republicans
and Democrats, to introduce new, tougher sanctions language, as
you have reviewed.
Let me ask, if I could, first, Mr. Singh, about freedom of
navigation. Iran has increasingly harassed both American and
allied vessels in the Persian Gulf.
What is their goal? What is their purpose behind these
incidents? And how do we respond in a way that does not risk a
miscalculation or inadvertent clashes between American and
Iranian ships?
Mr. Singh. Well, you are absolutely right, Senator. There
were 35 of those incidents in 2016. According to our Navy, the
Iranians are getting more aggressive and less predictable.
I have had the honor and privilege of actually sitting with
our sailors as they try to sort through these threats. I can
tell you, if it was not for the professionalism of our Navy,
things would be much, much worse.
Why does Iran do it? I think they do it for a number of
reasons. Part of it is just chest-thumping. They want to show
that they are sort of confronting the United States in ways
which they can then go and sort of splash over sort of the
Internet and market to show that they are to be taken
seriously.
In part, they can do it because they know that we will be
professional. They have a long history of interacting with our
Navy. They know that we are not rash in our actions, and they
are taking advantage of that, to an extent.
What can we do? I think that we need to be creative about
the way that we conduct our sort of freedom of navigation
operations, challenging not only what Iran is doing in terms of
confronting our Navy but challenging some of their illegitimate
maritime claims, because they claim territorial seas there
which we and others do not recognize.
And you are right. We have to be careful about escalation.
But I think we can be more creative than we have been.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Mr. Singh.
Let me ask further, if I could, Mr. Indyk, about
interdictions and Americans detained in Iran.
We have been successful both directly and with some allies
in some interdictions of weapons flows into the Houthis and
regionally, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, as well as into Yemen. What
can Congress do to support enhanced and more effective
interdictions?
And my last question, Mr. Indyk, and I would be interested
in Mr. Singh's response as well, do you believe the
administration taking a harder line on Iran will imperil
American citizens detained in the country? And what more could
we be doing to advocate for the release of Bob Levinson and
other Americans currently detained?
Ambassador Indyk. In terms of what Congress can do, I do
think that you are already doing what is necessary in terms of
sending a strong signal for opposition to what Iran is doing in
the region.
As far as the interdiction is concerned, that is ongoing,
as you pointed out. I think that we should certainly have as
part of the pushback strategy an interdiction strategy designed
to cut off any kind of arms supplies to any of the different
proxies that the Iranians are using.
And the operation now in Hodeidah, which the administration
is now considering giving greater support to, that is the port
on the Red Sea in Ethiopia, I think has a strategic logic to
it. Denying Iran the ability to access that port is very
important.
So I think there are a range of things we can do in terms
of stepping up the interdiction. And there are other countries
in the region with naval capabilities who are also able to do
that, and that is in the context of a regional approach in
which we concert our activities with our regional allies, which
is something I also suggested.
Senator Coons. Any thoughts on Americans detained? Any
thoughts about hostages or others?
Mr. Singh. Let me just say, on interdictions, very quickly,
two things which I would suggest are, number one, interdictions
are really based on intelligence more than anything else. And I
do think we need to be sure that we remain laser-focused on
intelligence-gathering on Iran. There are a lot of competing
priorities in the region. Maybe that means expanding the
overall sort of resources for intelligence in the Middle East.
But without the intelligence, you cannot do the interdictions.
I think we also need to press the executive branch to
publicize interdictions. We used to do roadshows when we would
catch Iranians supporting Iraqi militias, the Taliban, and so
forth. I would like to see us do more of that, frankly.
On American citizens, look, I would say I think we had,
relatively speaking, an accommodating policy toward the
Iranians over the past several years, and there were a lot of
American citizens who were taken hostage by the regime. Part of
that is due to the fact that a lot of that is driven by
domestic Iranian factors. But I do not think, frankly, that we
do ourselves any favors by trying to be accommodating and
thereby sort of maybe helping American citizens. Actually, I
think when Iranians believe there is a price to be paid for
taking hostages, then they might think twice about doing it.
Senator Coons. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, sir.
Senator Young?
Senator Young. Thank you, Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your appearance here today and
testimony to these issues.
Mr. Singh, in your testimony, you speak to the importance
of appointing a single official at State to oversee all aspects
of Iran policy, from JCPOA implementation to more broadly our
policy with respect to Iran and throughout the region, the need
for an integrated, coordinated strategy running through one
person over at the State Department.
Why is it, our current State Department as organized, is
not able to produce a single, integrated strategy with respect
to Iran? Speak to the deficiencies, as you see them, in the
current org structure over at State that prevents that.
Mr. Singh. Sure. Well, you know, we do have a tendency to
appoint envoys or sort of special officials for this or that
aspect of not just Iran policy but policy in general. So we
have a coordinator for JCPOA implementation, for example.
But what we often lack is then a sort of official who can
oversee all of that, and not only oversee all of Iran policy
but then connect the dots with Iran policy, counter-ISIS
policy, maybe what we are doing in Syria. You would like that
person to be maybe the Assistant Secretary of State for Near
Eastern Affairs. But it turns out that person is often
disempowered, and maybe other pieces of the policy are over at
the White House or DOD and so forth.
Why can't we do it? It is hard to answer that question. In
part, it is just sort of the managerial choices of Secretaries
of State or administrations.
Senator Young. And, Mr. Indyk, I will be interested, based
on your experiences from 1997 to 2000 as Assistant Secretary of
Near Eastern Affairs. I know you can speak to this.
But what managerial choices might be made differently by a
Secretary of State, through the President's direction, to help
facilitate change in this area?
Mr. Singh. Well, what I personally would like to see is I
would like to see an official at the State Department, say the
Assistant Secretary for NEA, have authority over Iran policy.
They could have people under them, for example, who coordinate
the JCPOA or coordinate sanctions and so forth. And then that
person should report to a pretty well-organized interagency
process that looks at all of Iran policy that is maybe led by a
Deputy National Security Adviser or something like that.
Senator Young. Mr. Indyk, do you agree with that? And
surely this has been put forward before as an idea, but
nonetheless, Presidents and Secretaries of State continue to do
an end-run around the bureaucracy, as it were, and I try not to
say that disparagingly. There are very competent people at the
State Department. But there are these end-runs that are created
around the existing bureaucracy, despite what strikes me as a
compelling recommendation put forward probably many, many
times.
Ambassador Indyk. Well, I was both an Assistant Secretary
for the Near East and a special envoy for the Palestinian
negotiations.
Senator Young. You are well-situated to speak today.
Ambassador Indyk. Thank you.
And in this case, as Michael has suggested, I do think that
Iran policy should be concentrated in the hands of an effective
and empowered Assistant Secretary for the Near East, and that
is because that Assistant Secretary has control over all of the
embassies in the region and all of the staff within the bureau.
But it is really important that that person be empowered by
the Secretary of State to be able to implement the policy.
Senator Young. So why has this not happened? I am going to
press you a little bit on this. And perhaps you do not know,
but either of you?
Ambassador Indyk. Why has it not happened?
Senator Young. Why have we not empowered our Assistant
Secretaries to own the regional policy not just in this area
but in other areas of the world?
Ambassador Indyk. Well, I think they are way behind in
terms of making those appointments, and they need to get those
people in place.
The Chairman. He means in any administration.
Senator Young. Across administrations.
Ambassador Indyk. Oh, in the time that I was Assistant
Secretary, I am describing a situation that I had. I think at
the time, different Secretaries of State have different
approaches, and the proliferation of special envoys is, I
think, a bad thing, because it dissipates the focus and reduces
the effectiveness. So I think it is important to empower not
just the Middle East Assistant Secretary but all of the
Assistant Secretaries. There is too much to do outside in the
world for the Secretary of State and the Undersecretaries.
But the other point is the one that Michael made. There has
to be a lash up with the White House and the National Security
Adviser and his deputy because that is where the policy gets
coordinated across the bureaucracy, and that is essential. The
strategy needs to be devised in cooperation between those two
parties in order for it to be effective.
Senator Young. Very briefly, are there any other
organizational reforms that this committee should be aware of
that would facilitate the creation of coordinated, integrated
strategies in this region and other regions?
Mr. Singh. I think quite a few. I would have a pretty long
answer to that, and I will try to be succinct, I guess.
I know there has been a lot of debate about the State
Department budget. I am not personally enthusiastic about
draconian cuts to the State Department budget, but it has
increased significantly over time. And I think, for the State
Department to argue for more, it needs to show that it is
spending its current budget wisely.
And I think, frankly, if you ask State Department
employees, and I was Foreign Service Officer for 9 years, they
are less focused on the budget. Of course, they would love to
have a bigger budget, as every bureau or agency would. But what
they are focused on is, do individual employees have
significant responsibility? Is there room for advancement? Is
there room for reward if you are doing well? And is the agency
overall working well?
And to me, we have taken away from that over time. So, for
example, when we had the second Deputy Secretary of State
position, which I understand the new administration will not
fill, to me that gave sort of supporting services a seat at the
policy table, and that was not appropriate. We have, I think, a
lot of bureaus that have been created at the State Department,
which maybe are not functioning well, maybe are not necessary
and should be folded in elsewhere.
And when you create bureaus, remember, you are not just
sort of focusing on an issue but you are creating sort of a
stress on shared services, on embassies overseas, because all
those folks want to go overseas.
And there is much more to this answer, but I think there is
plenty that can be done.
Senator Young. Well, I will look forward to continuing the
dialogue. I do want to be respectful of my colleagues. Perhaps
this committee should weigh in when bureaus are created in the
future.
Thank you.
The Chairman. I will say, as my first interjection, we
pulled up the numbers of envoys. It is more than the number of
employees I thought we had at the State Department, so it is a
long list.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. And I think what you all have suggested is a
very good one, and that is empowering the people who have
control over these areas and not dissipating their power by
working an end-run with an envoy that may be working an end-run
around an ineffective Assistant Secretary. I do not know. But
if that is the case, changes need to be made, it would seem.
Senator Kaine?
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Good hearing and good
testimony thus far.
When I am in the region, one of the things that I often
hear is a concern by others in countries all around the region
of being kind of trampled in a proxy war between Iran and Saudi
Arabia, and they feel like they are under the foot of it and
they hope that they would one day not be under the foot of it.
Recently, there have been two different developments that I
have been interested in, and I would just like you to comment
on them. One, Iran and Saudi Arabia worked out a deal for
pilgrims from Iran to come to Mecca for Hajj after this 1-year
sort of interruption of it. And second, the GCC in December
decided, and I think Saudi Arabia must have been tacitly
approving this, that there would be some potential for
discussion about cooperation between GCC nations and Iran. The
Iranian President went to Kuwait, I believe, and then the
Kuwaiti Foreign Minister paid a visit to Iran.
Talk a little bit about the prospects that you would see
for GCC cooperation with Iran and whether if not a warm
relationship at least the temperature and the tension could
somewhat be abated in that kind of a dialogue?
Ambassador Indyk. Senator, thank you for the question.
I think that lowering the flames of sectarian conflict is
an interest of the United States, if it is possible to do. And
normalizing relations between our Gulf Arab allies and Iran is
also a desirable end-state to aim for. But it depends on Iran
changing its objectives and behavior.
So in a tactical area of Hajj pilgrimage, which is
important to the people of Iran, and the Saudis have
responsibility for the Hajj, they need to find a way to make
that work. It is both a Saudi responsibility and an Iranian
Government interest to enable their people to go on Hajj. So in
a narrow area of common interest, they can figure that one out.
More broadly, as you suggested, there is a willingness on
the part of the GCC to actually engage with Iran if Iran is
prepared to change its behavior. The three points that I made
about the things that we should engage with Iran to talk to
them about are the same things that they are talking about. And
what their real concern is, is that the Iranians are seeking to
encircle them, destabilize them, using Shia populations where
they can, Iraq and Bahrain being the most obvious examples.
So I think that there is very much a desire on their part
to move out, if they can, from this endless conflict, which has
been going on for decades now and causes a huge amount of
tension in the region and disruption. But they feel very
strongly that unless Iran understands that it is not going to
get away with this, they are not going to be able to engage
with them.
That is why I also think they will not oppose us engaging
with Iranians, as long as it is part of a push-back strategy
because that is consistent with them, and as long as we
coordinate with them rather than do it behind their backs.
Senator Kaine. Mr. Singh?
Mr. Singh. Sure. I agree with a lot of what Martin said.
I do want to say, though, that I am skeptical about this
sort of premise of an Iran-Saudi Arabia rivalry in the region.
Certainly, there is a longstanding rivalry between Iran and the
Gulf States that predates the 1979 Islamic Revolution, but it
is important to bear in mind that it is not just the Gulf Arabs
but also the Turks, the Israelis, most of Iran's neighbors who
have a lot of problems with Iran. And I think that is largely
because of Iran's strategy for pursuing its objectives, for the
objectives themselves and for the strategy of going about its
business, because Iran does engage in proxy warfare, political
subversion, and really seeks as an aim to weaken the
institutions and weaken the sort of security state of its
neighbors.
I think a lot of what Iran is doing, for example, in Yemen
is duplicating its strategy in Lebanon where it is trying to
create a sort of security preoccupation for an adversary that
would otherwise maybe be focused on Iran.
So I agree with Martin that they will try to find some
stability. They are neighbors. They do not want to live in a
state of constant tension and conflict. But until Iran's
strategy changes, I do not see any of this going away.
And bear in mind, just one last thought, that Iran does
not, I think, see Saudi Arabia as its main rival. It sees the
United States as its main rival in the region. That is how I
think Iran conceives of itself. So it is really trying to push
back first and foremost on our presence and influence in the
region.
The Chairman. Senator Portman?
Senator Portman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you
holding the hearing.
Mr. Singh, you noted in your testimony something I thought
was interesting, which is that you believe that the Iranian
nuclear program is dangerous because Iranian foreign policy is
dangerous, and as I look back over what happened over the last
several years, it seems to me that one of the mistakes the
previous administration made was failing to link the
negotiations over an Iran deal with other issues that are
unrelated, not to the weapons program, but to creating
instability in the region. And we have talked a lot about that
today.
At the time, I remember the Obama administration arguing
that, if we could just get this agreement done, then we would
be able to have leverage over Iran on these other issues and
hold them accountable. I think just the opposite happened, to
be frank with you. I think because we were so afraid they were
going to walk away that we pulled back, in terms of holding
them accountable on nonnuclear behavior.
I just wonder if you could give us your sense of what we
should do now. You talked about several ideas, but I look at
what is happening in Yemen, you talked about proxy wars. You
look at Hezbollah. Frankly, I think the immediate danger to the
region is not nuclear. It is conventional and specifically
Hezbollah and Israel.
I also look at what is happening in the sea lanes. You
mentioned that today. You talked about some new issues outside
the Straits of Hormuz and what is happening with them harassing
our naval ships and also commercial vessels, certainly the
missile testing, all of which has just continued unabated. And
there has not been any leverage that has been applied, based on
the agreement.
So we have a new administration. We have a fresh start.
Again, you have laid out various ideas. I am going to challenge
you both. Give us the two most important ideas that each of you
have to deal with the nonnuclear behavior in the region.
Mr. Singh. Well, Senator Portman, let me say, first, I
agree with your analysis. I think one of the most important
ideas we could have for pushing back on Iran in the region is
to sort of reverse the paradigm through which we have
approached this issue for the last 8 years, I would say. I
think that Iran was inappropriately seen as primarily a
nonproliferation problem.
And in a sense, we, as I said, viewed Iran policy through
the lens of the nuclear negotiations. It is that not the
nuclear issue is not important. It is absolutely critical, but
largely not just because of proliferation but because Iran is
such a threat to the region.
And I think we now need to reverse that. We need to see the
nuclear issue and the JCPOA through the lens of our efforts to
counter the broader threats that Iran poses. So we cannot
subordinate our efforts to push back on Iran to any desire to
preserve the JCPOA. I think we should want to preserve the
JCPOA for a lot of reasons that have already been mentioned,
but not if it means having to act against our own interests,
not if it means having to refrain from addressing those broader
threats that Iran poses.
The second idea is essentially that, again, by doing that,
by showing our partners in the region, by showing our allies in
the region that we are not just focused on, say, the ISIS
threat, we are not just focused on, say, Syria or this or that,
but we are focused on pushing back on Iran, I actually think
that that will unlock cooperation at a sort of broader
strategic level around the region. I think we will get a better
hearing when it comes to, say, helping Iraq from our allies or
pushing back on the Assad regime in Syria if they believe that
we are strategically on the same page as they are.
Senator Portman. I could not agree with you more. You did
manage to dodge my question about giving me your top two, so I
am going to move to Mr. Indyk.
Ambassador Indyk, you give me what your top two are.
Ambassador Indyk. Look, the first one is a novel idea of
having a comprehensive strategy for dealing with Iran's
challenges in the region.
Senator Portman. Bringing our partners in, the Gulf State
countries and others.
Ambassador Indyk. Yes, but a comprehensive strategy that
deals with all of the places where they are pushing and
promoting their hegemonic ambitions.
Senator Portman. Number two?
Ambassador Indyk. And number two is to understand where the
priorities need to be. The two most important places for a
pushback strategy are Iraq and Syria. There is a real
opportunity in Iraq because we have something to work with now,
and our Sunni Arab allies are, for the first time--they
regarded the regime as Persian and they did not want to deal
with them. For the first time, they are ready to engage with
the al-Abadi government and to help with that effort to deal
with the aftermath of the elimination of ISIS.
But Syria is much more complicated. We have much less to
deal with.
But those are the two most important places where we can
have an impact and where we can start to take apart Iran's----
Senator Portman. Listen, I was encouraged to hear what you
said about the Iraqi Prime Minister being interested in
actually having some distance from Iran.
He was here, as you know, last week. We had an opportunity
to visit with him. I mean, I sensed a little change in the
attitude as well.
But on the ground, do you see that? In other words, do you
see the Shia forces in Iraq, not the Iranian forces, being
willing to also have some distance? You talked about the
necessity of Mosul not being a victory for Iran and its
surrogate forces, but do you see the other Shia community in
Iraq also being willing to encourage that distance?
Ambassador Indyk. Well, I think the key is what comes from
the top. If we have a government that is prepared to look after
the interests of all of its separate communities rather than to
favor one over the other, that is a huge advance.
And in terms of the Shia militias, the Shia community, that
is an incredibly complicated and delicate issue, because we do
not need the Shia militias to create problems for us as we
prosecute the war against ISIS in Mosul.
Senator Portman. My time has expired, and I do not want to
hold my other colleagues up, but I look forward to following up
with you on that particular issue.
Thank you, Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Before turning to Senator Merkley,
there are 54 envoys, special envoys. Most of them are vacant. I
know each person here probably has their special one they would
like to see reinstated, but maybe a good starting point would
be for all of them to remain vacant for a while.
Senator Merkley?
Senator Merkley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The question I would like to have you all elaborate on is
it seems to me there is a disconnect between America's position
and the U.N. resolutions regarding ballistic missiles. Our
position really is that development of medium-range missiles or
longer range missiles are directly a threat, a threat to the
region. And we are developing legislation for sanctions that
speak specifically to ballistic missile programs.
But if we look at the U.N. resolutions, the U.N. resolution
is kind of, well, not so clear. It ``calls upon,'' rather than
requiring, Iran to refrain from conducting missile tests. And
then it has a provision that refers to ballistic missiles that
are designed to carry nuclear warheads. And that, by the way,
is a step back from the previous U.N. resolution, which said
``ballistic missiles capable,'' which is more of a reference to
throw-weight.
So while we are focusing in on the ballistic missiles as
inherently a threat, the U.N. has had this design to carry
nuclear weapons or warheads language.
And so to what degree did we attempt to pursue the pure
opposition to the ballistic missiles program itself? Did we not
have that support at the U.N.? To what degree do our allies
share our view versus the U.N. language view? And how will that
affect our ability to bring the international community
together in our effort to oppose the Iranian ballistic missile
program?
Mr. Singh. Well, Senator, you are absolutely right.
Resolution 2231 weakens previous international sanctions
against Iran missiles in the two ways you mentioned and then,
of course, by making temporary the ban on helping Iran with its
missile program. That will expire 8 years from the
implementation of the JCPOA, so I think in 2023. That in a way
is the most critical piece because if Iran wants an ICBM, it
will need international assistance, and under this resolution
perhaps could get that international assistance starting in
just now 7 years.
We fought, I mean, in the mid-2000s, I can tell you, I
cannot really say whether the Obama administration pressed to
have this in the negotiations. I think they did at first and
then dropped it. We pressed very hard in the initial
resolutions, 1696, 1737, and so forth, to get missiles into
these resolutions, because we saw, in part as a result of our
North Korea experience, that missiles really cannot be divorced
from a nuclear program.
There was pushback against that by allies in Europe,
Russia, China. Remember, Russia and China are the ones
supplying this stuff to the Iranians, as well as the North
Koreans who, of course, were not part of that process. And we
faced that pushback, and I imagine that, today, you will see
the same sort of pushback not only from Russia and China but
maybe also from European States.
Why is that? Part of that is they simply want sort of
smooth relations. They want this thing to succeed, and so they
do not want to sort of add to the existing problems by pointing
out the sort of nasty things that Iran is doing. That is why I
think it is important that we take quite a firm and unwavering
position on it because, you know, down the road, we do not want
to be in a position with Iran that we are in now with North
Korea, worrying about that sort of ICBM threat.
Senator Merkley. Thank you.
Ambassador Indyk. I will not take up more of your time,
Senator, because I agree completely with what Michael said.
Senator Merkley. Okay. Thank you.
I want to turn then to the additional protocol as part of
JCPOA and where Iran signed on to the additional protocol but
has not yet brought it into force.
What needs to happen there? What should be happening? Are
they behind schedule? Is it a problem?
Mr. Singh. I believe, in the JCPOA, Senator, and I do not
have the text in front of me, that what Iran agreed to do is to
basically enforce the additional protocol and then, after a
number of years, seek parliamentary approval, ratification, of
that additional protocol. So it is effectively sort of putting
it into practice, but they have not officially ratified it. I
assume that is meant to sort of mirror whatever sort of
concessions we are making in the JCPOA.
The real issue is how will we interpret its additional
protocol obligations, because in the additional protocol is
this 24-hour time frame, for example, for IAEA inspectors to
gain access to suspected nuclear sites. Now some will tell you
that that is sort of a broad authority. Some will tell you, no,
that is actually quite a narrow authority and it does not help
us very much.
I think it is important that we push very much for the
former interpretation to become sort of routine, to become
practice regardless of what the legalities may be.
Senator Merkley. Thank you.
Ambassador Indyk. If I could, just as a general point, I
think it may seem obvious, but it is very important to keep on
pressing on all of these issues all along the way so that the
Iranians understand very clearly that we are watching, we are
enforcing in a very rigorous way, because I believe if they get
any sense that there is any leeway, they will take advantage of
that.
Senator Merkley. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. If I could, Senator Merkley, first of all,
thank you again for being on the committee. The point you
brought up about ``called upon'' was an issue that was of great
discussion when we were going through this. I know that
Secretary Kerry was in the sales mode, obviously. I mean, I
understand that.
But this was something where the committee was very
concerned that we had weakened this provision. He declared
that, in fact, no way, they cannot develop, and we can go back
and look at the record on multiple occasions where it was an
absolute declarative statement they cannot develop ballistic
missiles of any kind. And I would love to do that, but this is
obviously where we have ended up, and I think that is one of
the reasons the bill that has been laid out is important, or
something similar to it, to push back on this issue.
But I appreciate you bringing that up and just know that it
was a point of major contention as people were trying to decide
whether they were going to support it or not.
Senator Paul?
Senator Paul. Mr. Indyk, I think all religions, to a
certain extent, are intolerant. Would you say there is a
difference there in degree of religious intolerance or
description of religious intolerance between the Shia people of
Iran and the Wahhabism religion of Saudi Arabia, leaving, I
guess, for the moment the government out and sort of the degree
of tolerance between the two branches of Islam?
Ambassador Indyk. It is a difficult question to answer, and
I am not an expert. I would just make two general points, which
is I think that the Wahhabi strain of Sunni Islam is an
intolerant strain. Shias are a minority within the Muslim
religion and have suffered and feel persecution as a result of
that status.
And so it is interesting, when you ask about the people,
the Jewish community of Iran is actually, although it suffers
from second-class citizenship and is constantly being watched
and, on occasion, there are unjustified arrests and so on, but
as a community, they are able to function there in a way that
Jewish communities in the Arab world have not been able to
survive. So that broad statement----
Senator Paul. The reason I bring it up is that, when we are
looking for solutions, if you talk to Iranian Americans in this
country, they are very open to engagement with Iran, and I
think they are very open as far as their religious beliefs
being more tolerant than, I think, the Wahhabism.
I think also when we look at say, oh, we must push back
against Iran, it is sort of like who pushed whom first? Who
provoked whom first? And how far back do you go? We can go back
tit-for-tat to 800 A.D., to 832 A.D. or something, you know?
But I think there is some truth, when you look at the
problems over there, that Iran does see things regionally. They
are interested in their region of the world, and they push back
against people who push against them. Who pushed first? I do
not know.
In Syria, there are 25,000 Iranian troops. Well, there is a
whole lot of Sunni folks on the other side that are being
funded by the Gulf States as well. The same in Yemen.
Who is right? Who are the better people? Should we be
involved in any of these skirmishes back and forth? Is there an
answer?
You know, we talk a lot about a summit to try to figure out
the Israel-Palestine issue. It seems to me an even more
important summit would be a summit between the Gulf States,
including Saudi Arabia and Iran. Every one of these are proxy
wars throughout the region.
But I do say that we get fixated on Iran, and we forget
about the danger of Wahhabism throughout the world. When I see
the dangers, I see if you want to get involved in a regional
war, you will be opposing Iran somewhere in the Middle East.
But even if you are not there, Wahhabism is teaching hatred of
America throughout the world and funding it.
And most of our terrorism has really come from the radical
brand, and most of the monetary support for radical Islam and
terrorism throughout the world is coming from Saudi Arabia and
their money, not from Iran. Iran kills people, certainly. They
are not any angels over there, but they are killing people in
their regional wars for their regional interests.
And I think we forget about that because we get so alarmed
over Iran that we think Iran is sort of this worldwide menace,
and they are coming tomorrow to New York. Well, no, 16 people
from Saudi Arabia came to New York and wreaked havoc on us. And
I think it is important that we not forget that there is a
religious intolerance on one side that I think really is
alarming and needs to be discussed.
And I do not necessarily think we have the answer. Islam
will have to figure out their own answers to these problems.
But I think we should not lose sight of that as we go forward.
Your comments, Mr. Indyk?
Ambassador Indyk. Thank you, Senator Paul. I think I would
make two points.
The first is, in terms of who started it, I am not sure
that that is particularly useful. But I can tell you, from my
own experience, and I am sure Michael has had similar
experience, that the Iranians are very aggressive in terms of
trying to export their revolution and trying to promote their--
--
Senator Paul. They would argue in Yemen that Saudi Arabia
and the Qataris are quite aggressive in getting involved in a
war there as well.
Ambassador Indyk. Look, I am sure they would argue that,
but they would be wrong.
But anyway----
Senator Paul. You do not think there has been Saudi
aggression in Yemen?
Ambassador Indyk. No, I think that the Saudis intervened
because they faced a threat from the Houthis with Iranian-
supplied weapons.
Senator Paul. You do not think there is a possible----
Ambassador Indyk. I do not----
Senator Paul.--effort in bombing a funeral procession? You
do not think there are repercussions for a thousand years of
the Saudis bombing a funeral possession in Yemen?
This is not all Iran, and I am not a supporter of Iran and
their government, but there are problems on both sides of this
war. It is messy, and there are sometimes no good people in a
war.
Ambassador Indyk. I agree with that. And if you saw my
testimony, I argue that we need to be actively engaged to try
to find a political solution to that conflict. But we have been
actively engaged for a very long time in trying to find a
political solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. That is
one I have been heavily involved in, and I tell you that the
Iranians have been purposefully subverting our efforts.
What is it their business to be subverting that? If they
are so tolerant, why would they be opposed to that effort to
make peace?
Senator Paul. I am not saying the Iranian Government is. I
think there is a difference between the Shia form of Islam in
Iran and the others.
And I think the best way to look at this is to ask a
Western woman where you would rather live, under Wahhabism or
under the Shia regime. And I think the Shia religion is
actually more tolerant in Iran than the Wahhabism is of Saudi
Arabia.
Mr. Singh. Can I chime in?
The Chairman. You can chime in for one second, yes, sir.
Mr. Singh. I just want to say one thing, just to remind
everybody, I am skeptical of the Sunni-Shia sort of framework
for looking at regional issues. Do not forget that Iran does
support Sunni jihadist groups. They are not strictly acting as
sort of a sectarian Shia power but often acting in a quite
cynical way to support groups like the Taliban, Islamic Jihad,
Hamas, and so forth.
The Chairman. Very good.
Senator Murphy?
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, just for fun, I actually looked back earlier
today on the hearings that this committee did in the same month
in the first year of President Obama's presidency. And this is
apropos of nothing, but just to tell you how as many things
change, lots of things stay the same. So our hearings that
month were U.S. strategy regarding Iran, prospects for
engagement with Russia, more effective strategy for
counterterrorism, return and resettlement of displaced Iraqis.
Those could be the titles of hearings again, maybe under
different circumstances.
But a reminder that as the people inside the administration
change, it seems that the problems confronting this country and
our friends do not. It is interesting, 8 years later.
Thank you for being here, both of you.
Let me ask Senator Paul's question in just a slightly
different way, because he and I, and I think a lot of members
of this committee, are very concerned about the lack of
questions that are asked, in general, by this Congress about
the U.S.-Saudi relationship and the flow of Saudi dollars not
directly to the Sunni extremist groups but to the version of
Islam that forms the building blocks of Sunni extremism.
So what is the bigger threat to the United States, Sunni
extremism or Shia-based extremism?
Ambassador Indyk. I think they are both a threat. They pose
different kinds of threats.
The Shia extremism, I think Senator Paul is right. We are
talking there about the Iranian Government, which is seeking to
export its revolution and seeking to promote its hegemonic
ambitions as a regional power. So the combination of those
circumstances makes it particularly deadly and quite effective.
The Sunni extremism that we see manifest itself in some
state support for but basically Islamist movements, the extreme
nature especially in ISIS and Al Qaeda and so on, they
certainly grew out of an extremist, intolerant form of Wahhabi
Islam. And if you want to trace back the origins of this, we
can see it in the two events that happened in the late 1970s,
which was the Iranian revolution on the one side and the
takeover of the mosque in Mecca on the other side.
And as a result of that, both of them started to export
their extremist forms of----
Senator Murphy. I agree, respectfully, when you think about
the world. But, I mean, every attack against the United States
thus far has been by Sunni-based extremist groups, at least
when we are talking about----
Ambassador Indyk. Attacks against the Continental United
States.
Senator Murphy.--the Continental United States.
Ambassador Indyk. Not against Americans and not against
American soldiers.
Senator Murphy. Right.
Ambassador Indyk. You know, the Iranians and certainly
Hezbollah have undertaken terrorist attacks against Americans
for some time.
Senator Murphy. And inside of Iraq during the Iraq war,
certainly.
Ambassador Indyk. Saudi Arabia.
Senator Murphy. Lebanon.
Mr. Indyk, let me ask you another question. You made, I
think, a very profound point, which is that while we absolutely
have an interest in getting ISIS out of Syria, there is a
question as to whether it is a vital U.S. national security
interest as to who ultimately controls Syria.
So let me ask you just to drill down on that a little bit
more because there is a question now as to whether we have 500,
1,000, 2,000, troops there. Already there are reports that U.S.
troops are not just getting ready for retaking Raqqa but are
actually sitting in between different factions that may be
interested in fighting each other for the ultimate control of
the battlespace.
So as we think about our military strategy there, how do we
right-size that military strategy to make sure that,
ultimately, we are not the arbiter of who controls Syria once
ISIS is gone? Because I fear that we are going to sort of
quietly make a military commitment that ultimately binds us to
sort of hold territory and sort out the balance of power even
after ISIS is gone. And I think you agree that that is,
ultimately, an important question but not necessarily one that
should cost hundreds or thousands of U.S. lives.
Ambassador Indyk. Certainly not the one that would cost
large casualties for Americans. I agree with you. I think that
our approach needs to be to provide what is necessary on the
ground to ensure the defeat of ISIS and then to make sure that
what comes in the wake of that defeat is a post-conflict
reconstruction effort that is led by the people who live there.
And there needs to be, I think, a very specific focus on
building up the capacities for governance of the people who
live in those areas. And because it is such a mosaic, we have
to be very, very careful about how to do that.
But it is their business; it is not ours. We should support
them. There is, I think, an international coalition that would
be willing to help out in that process. But it really needs to
be one in which we are supporting it, not in there taking
control of those areas.
The Chairman. Thank you, sir.
Senator Rubio?
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
Thank you both for being here.
We talked about Iran. I want to start with some key
assumptions to allow us to kind of analyze the region. I do not
think either one of you would disagree with this assessment. In
fact, I think, in your written statements you both alluded to
this, the three things that kind of drive Iranian decision-
making across the spectrum, from so-called moderates all the
way to the clerical folks.
Number one is sort of a hegemonic view of the region
largely tied to, my understanding is, their view of Persian
culture and how ancient it is in comparison to, for example,
the Gulf kingdoms and the like, which they view as kind of
newer, inferior cultures in their mind. They certainly have
great pride in--and by the way, that is not new to this regime.
That was also part of the thinking of the shah who was secular,
right?
The second is they view themselves as protectors of Shia
minorities throughout the region. So in addition to involving
themselves in some of these conflicts, they view themselves as
the protectors of these minority groups in different parts or
in some cases majority groups who are not in majority power in
some places.
And the third is this sort of anti-Western, anti-U.S. view
that Western interference in the region has imposed all these
sorts of Western institutions, and that is how they view
Israel, as a Western creation, but also the U.S. military
presence.
Number one, do you both agree with that assessment? And
number two, would you agree that those are widely held
positions throughout the political spectrum in Iran? They may
debate how to pursue this engagement with the United States,
but what I just described is widely held across the political
spectrum in Iran?
Mr. Singh. Yes, Senator. I would agree.
I think when it comes to the protector of Shia, it is
probably more complicated in the sense that, as I said, it is a
cynical regime that does not hesitate to support Sunni jihadist
groups, which are quite anti-Shia, and also the supreme leader
of Iran likes to style himself as leader of all Muslims.
But I think that it is roughly true, what you said.
Senator Rubio. And by the way, working with the Sunni
groups in the region for geopolitical purposes or as leverage
on the United States, or what have you, is true, but if there
is a Shia group somewhere in some country, Iran is always
viewed, at least the supreme leader, as the protector of that
group or at least has an obligation to move in.
Here is why I asked you that. Embedded in all of this is
this conversation about what Iran is going to look like 20
years from now, so we have had successive Presidents now reach
out with the hope of somehow strengthening the hands of what we
term moderates at the expense of the clerics who, by and large,
my understanding of the power of the supreme leader is
basically the same as a monarchy that has almost entire power
that delegates down to some of the elected branches some day-
to-day control. But in the end, the supreme leader is the
ultimate authority on how much space they have, and that
includes any upcoming elections.
So I guess my point is, as you look now to the future,
knowing what you both know about Iran, what hope is there,
whether it is a change in a new supreme leader, which I think
many people anticipate will happen here fairly soon for one
reason or another and/or through elections, what hope is there
of a leadership in Iran, based on what we know about these
assumptions, that moves them a little bit more in the direction
that will, indeed, allow them to perhaps reconsider some of the
decisions they are making in the region? Or are we really
looking at an intractable situation in the foreseeable future
that, no matter who comes to power, both as the next supreme
leader and/or President, we may call them moderates because of
their approach on some of these issues, maybe a little bit less
conflicted, but, by and large, you are dealing with people that
believe Iran has a right to be the predominant power in the
region because of their history and Persian culture, who views
it their obligation to have to engage in the protection of
Shia, and who continue to hold this view that this sort of
Western presence in the region has undermined the region and,
in many ways, redefined it?
In essence, what hope is there of a transition to something
a little different for the foreseeable future?
Ambassador Indyk. We have been hoping for that transition
for the last 40 years, and what we have seen is that, on
occasion, a more moderate leader will be elected as President.
We had it in the case of President Khatami. We had it in the
case of President Rouhani, compared to his predecessor.
But what we do not see is change in the fundamental
attitudes of the supreme leader, who, I agree with you, has
real overriding control, and the institutions which he commands
and is able to use, whether it is Basij or the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard Corps or the MOAS, to advance these various
ambitions that are both hegemonic and revolutionary.
And so, therefore, the big question is, what will the next
week supreme leader be like, and whether, after perhaps 5
decades, we will see some thawing of the inspirations that are
fueling these problematic behaviors. But that is an unknowable
situation.
I think that we need to continue to test the proposition by
holding out the potential for Iran to take up its place as a
regional power but one that does not threaten its neighbors and
seek to destabilize them, and does not seek to export its
revolution to Shia minorities that creates an instability in
these neighboring countries.
And if they are willing to engage in a constructive way, we
should be willing to respond. We need to hold that out for
them. We also need to avoid hoping that somehow it is going to
happen. We will know it when we see it.
Mr. Singh. I would agree with that. I would say that those
we consider hardliners and those we consider moderates in Iran,
like President Rouhani, they are all committed to the survival
of the regime. And anti-Americanism is a pillar, an ideological
pillar, of the regime.
So you may have moderates like Rouhani and Zarif who are
more pragmatic when it comes to engagement with the West,
especially economic engagement, but I think there is only so
far they are willing to go. Of course, even when they go that
far, they are accused of being antirevolutionary, as we have
seen in the last few weeks, by the more hardline forces.
I do not think that reflects the people of Iran. I think
the people of Iran are not necessarily wedded to those ideas,
and I would like to see us engage more with them. And I think
that even in, say, a post-regime situation, it is easy to
envision that you could have, say, military elements and so
forth who still see the United States as an obstacle to, say,
hegemony for Iran in the region and are not eager to work with
us or really to have any dealings with us, or see us as an
enemy.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Very good.
Senator Menendez?
Senator Menendez. I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, thanks
for holding an important hearing, and both of you for your
insights for the committee.
Let me say, this weekend marks 2 years since the JCPOA was
announced in terms of its outline. And in those 2 years,
outside of the nuclear activity, I think little has changed in
Iran's historical strategic objectives and objectives
throughout the region, and we can trace that from since the
early 2000s where Iran has been testing the resolve of the
international community's arms control protocols by testing
ballistic missiles, tests that went on in October and November
2015, tests that were followed in March 2016, January of this
year, all in violation of various U.N. Security Council
resolutions.
In January of this year, the U.N. itself declared that Iran
had participated in arms transactions that likely violated the
arms embargo that is still in place.
More broadly, Iran has ramped up its support for terrorist
networks throughout the Middle East. It is building on a multi-
decade strategy to exert more influence around the Middle East.
In addition to its high-profile stalwart allies like Hezbollah
and Hamas, it has increased its support for irregular Shia
militias in Bahrain, Afghanistan, Iraq, Kuwait, and elsewhere.
So I understand the aspirational desires of hoping that
Iran can come into an understanding with its leadership of the
international order, but so far, I have not seen it. And if
anything, I have seen it demonstrably go the other way.
And I am sure we all do not need to be reminded that Assad
would be much weaker were it not for the support of his friends
both in Moscow and in Tehran.
So that is why I appreciate Senator Corker, Senator Cardin,
and my efforts, along with others, in having legislation that,
regardless of whether you voted for or against the JCPOA, there
should be efforts to try to get Iran to recognize that there
are consequences for violating the international order and to
try to bring it back into the international order.
But if you can do all of these things and not have any real
consequence, then you will continue to do them, especially if
you believe that it ultimately pursues your interests.
I always want to, in a hearing on Iran, just mention
American citizens detained in Iran, a number that regrettably
has increased in the past. I particularly would like to point
out Robert Levinson, some of whose children and a grandchild he
has never met are my constituents. He has been missing now for
more than 10 years. And I want to urge the administration and
the Government of Iran to take all steps necessary to bring him
home. We are going to continue to cast a spotlight on him.
But I want to go to the questions, while we seek to be
aspirational, how do we--I believe that aspiration is a good
thing, but you also sometimes have to put some hard work behind
it to make it happen. So I notice with interest--and sometimes
I feel like I listen to some testimony, I am not saying any of
yours, but elsewhere, about this equivalency or some type of
moral equivalency.
Why does Iran need to be so engaged with Hezbollah? I
noticed in your written remarks that you had said that Iran has
embarked on a distinct strategic shift from insurgency to
counterinsurgency, from maintaining plausible deniability to
touting its role by acknowledging its support for Hezbollah,
publishing details of funerals held for Shiite militants, IRGC
fighters, and it goes on and on.
Why is that? And why is it that we should not look at that
with some degree of real concern?
Mr. Singh. Thank you, Senator. I think we should look at it
with a degree of--not just a degree of concern but great
concern.
You know, as I said, initially, Iran sought to maintain its
plausible deniability. Hezbollah would deny that it got its
funding from Iran or its weapons from Iran, and we have seen
that shift. I think, frankly, it is because they could no
longer maintain--it was no longer plausible, let's say, that
deniability. They could no longer maintain that because you had
so many Hezbollah fighters in Syria, Hezbollah fighters also in
Iraq. You had Iranian officers dying in Syria and Iraq. And, of
course, they would have funerals, which were not secret.
So I think they tried to shift the narrative. You know, it
is undeniable that it is hard to connect fighting against Sunni
Arabs in Syria to Hezbollah's purported mission of
``resistance'' to Israel. But that is exactly what Iran and
Hezbollah do, they try to connect what they are doing in Syria
and Iraq to this sort of anti-American, anti-Israeli mission,
and they tout it relentlessly.
I do not think that many people buy this, frankly, but it
has been a real marked shift in the Iranian narrative.
Senator Menendez. What is our best strategy to at least try
to curtail their engagement and their support for Hezbollah and
other entities that are destabilizing the region?
Ambassador Indyk. I would say, Senator, that the first
thing we have to be very aware of and make sure that it does
not happen is that Hezbollah moves to the south in Syria and
into the Golan Heights and sets up a front across southern
Lebanon and the Golan Heights, which is adjacent to it.
They are trying to do that now with Iranian support. They
have been probing in that direction. The Israelis have made it
clear it is a redline for them and will do what they can to
prevent it.
But, in other words, we need to put a break on what they
are doing first before we can somehow start to dismantle it.
Hezbollah has taken heavy casualties, the heaviest of all in
terms of troops on the ground in Syria. But in the meantime,
they still have been building their capacity in Lebanon. I
think the latest Israeli estimate is they have 140,000 rockets
that can be rained on Israeli cities.
So what we are talking about is very well trained now,
battle-hardened, highly capable, and very well-armed, and in
control of the Lebanese Government, and nobody makes any
illusions about that anymore. The Lebanese Government says that
Hezbollah is their army now. They did not used to say that
either.
So, progressively, they have grown a lot stronger, and the
challenge is, therefore, a lot greater. We cannot easily disarm
them. We can prevent them, I think--we would have to work with
the Russians as well--from moving south into the Golan.
But in terms of what you do with the broader challenge that
Hezbollah confronts us with, in Lebanon, in particular, we have
very little to work with there anymore. And I do not have a
good idea of how we can take them apart in Lebanon. What we can
do is, over time, try to limit their and Iran's position in
Syria. And if we can do that, then, over time, we may be able
to impact their position in Lebanon.
The Chairman. Thank you.
I know Senator Rubio has another question. I have to run
and do something else. I am going to say a few things and then
turn it to him and Senator Cardin.
But thank you for being here. People will have additional
questions, I know, so we will close the record at the close of
business on Thursday, if you could respond fairly quickly to
those questions.
The Chairman. We appreciate very much you being here.
I will probably write one relative to supporting democracy
movements within Iran itself, and how we should look at those
things. I know there was a tremendously missed opportunity back
in 2009. I understand there were negotiations underway, but it
seems there is more that we could be doing there also.
But again, thank you both for being here.
With that, Chairman Rubio.
Senator Rubio. [Presiding.] Just two quick points. I would
encourage you both, as you work on your scholarship and as you
talk to others, I think two immediate flashpoints we are going
to see, and I think you would both agree, are upon ISIS's
defeat in Iraq is what the Shia militias do vis-a-vis the
United States, and whether they begin to immediately turn to
attack us, because I think Iran should be held responsible if
they do.
You talked about Hezbollah. I just returned from the
region. There is widespread expectation that war between Israel
and Hezbollah is inevitable. And I would say there are elements
in the Lebanese Government that are not pro-Hezbollah. The
Prime Minister is an example. His father was assassinated by
Hezbollah.
And the argument that they make, and I am just reporting
back what they say, is anything we can do to strengthen the
Lebanese army and the Lebanese armed forces undermines
Hezbollah's ability in the country. That is a broader topic.
Here is the one I wanted to ask you both about, and it is
related to Iran but it is a little broader.
In Bahrain, we have, I think, a 70 percent Shia population
but a Sunni governing class. I really felt, and perhaps I was
wrong, but I really felt a few years ago there was an
opportunity, because at the time, many of the Shia groups in
Bahrain were not asking for the overthrow of the King or the
elimination of the monarchy. They were just asking for more
political representation. And I really believe that had a space
been created at that moment, that that provided a unique
opportunity. And perhaps I was wrong about that.
That did not happen, and I think that actually opened the
door for more Iranian influence because, since all the other
doors were closed, that was the only avenue that was there.
As far as U.S. policy in the region, when things like that
emerge in the future, my argument to Bahrain was they are an
important ally, but the situation they face is unsustainable in
the long-term and the better thing to do is to create an
internal accommodation over time that allows the Shia to be
more represented in government and, therefore, less susceptible
to Iranian argument.
I think that is a part of our strategy toward Iran and the
region as well. It is not to allow these aggrieved parties to
have no other option but Iran.
I do not know if either one of you have done any extensive
amount of work on the Bahraini question in terms of the broader
policy with regards to Iran.
Mr. Singh. Senator, I would agree with that. I think that
it is good, friendly advice to our allies that they look to
sort of embrace their own populations, that they look to be
accountable to their populations as a way to defend against
Iranian inroads.
This is the same advice--I know you are interested in
Russia and Eastern Europe, Senator--the same advice we give
Eastern European governments, is make sure you are including
those Russian minorities in your country, embracing them,
treating them as full citizens, so that they do not become a
potential vector for Russian influence in the country, make
sure you are addressing issues like corruption and so forth,
which are often, again, an open door for Russian influence and
Russian leverage over the political process.
And I think this is something that all of our allies,
especially in the Gulf, need to pay attention to, that part of
defending against Iran is ensuring that your own political and
economic institutions are inclusive and resilient and
accountable.
On the question of Hezbollah and proxies, I could not agree
with you more. I think we need to look not just at the existing
proxies but where new ones may emerge because it is clearly
part of Iran's broader strategy.
Look at the Houthis. Maybe they are not exactly a proxy
now, but will they be in the future? Might there be new proxies
in Syria?
And I do think we have tools to push back at them. In
Lebanon, we do have a government to work with and allies that
we can work with who I think, frankly, we have ignored for the
past 8 years.
We do have a U.N. Security Council resolution, 1701, that I
worked on that I think also has been largely ignored.
We have a Shia community in Lebanon which is not, I think,
well-represented by Hezbollah but is often terrorized by
Hezbollah because, you know, they like Shia as long as you
listen to them, but if you do not, you are in trouble.
And then, of course, we have the ability to publicize the
fact that Hezbollah and these other Shia proxies, they are not
resisting Israel. They are not resisting the United States.
They are killing Muslims. They are killing Arabs. That is what
they are actually doing on the ground. And I think we can be
absolutely clear about that.
Ambassador Indyk. I think you are absolutely right about
Bahrain, but I imagine that, after they listen to you, they
turn around and say that is just another naive American
advancing democratic ideas, but we know better.
I think there is kind of an attitude in the region that has
become quite scornful of the notion of what is referred to as
democracy or the freedom agenda or so on. I think there has
been a real setback in that regard, and it is difficult to make
the case, and it is especially difficult to make the case when
you have the Iranians out there looking to exploit these Shia
populations, because then you have a bad guy that you can
always point to, to excuse Iran's actions or lack of actions.
So I think in the current circumstances, it is a very hard
argument to make. I think Bahrain would have been far better
off if they followed your advice, but they have consistently
gone the other way.
And then, of course, there is the influence of big brother
next door, Saudi Arabia, because it too sees the Iranians as an
encircling threat. To give them their credit, I think the
deputy crown prince deserves a lot of credit for this Vision
2030 effort to transform Saudi society even while all this is
going on. It is something we need to get behind.
But I think we just need to recognize that, in the current
environment, our ability to actually change their minds on
these things is going to be very difficult to do. It does not
mean we should not do it.
Senator Rubio. Sure. Just to be clear, I am not naive
enough to believe that Bahrain is going to look like New
Zealand any time in the near future in terms of their politics
internally. I am saying that, for example, if you look at the
Jordanians who have slowly but surely begun to make steps in
the right direction--and it is a balance. If you move too
quickly, it could unravel. If you move too slowly, it could
unravel.
But I do think, if you do not give 70 percent of your
population the belief that they have a role to play in your
politics--and the reforms that were being asked for 3 or 4
years ago were not outrageous. If you do not accommodate for
that, that pressure builds and it provides the opportunity for
Iran to take advantage of it. And that was my argument at the
time.
So, Senator Cardin?
Senator Cardin. I just really want to thank our two
witnesses. I found this very, very beneficial. I am not
surprised. We have a great deal of respect for your knowledge
in this area, and we will be calling upon you.
So the hearing was on Iran, and we talked about Lebanon, we
have talked about Iraq, we talked about Saudis, we talked about
UAE, we talked about Israel, we talked about Russia. There is
no question that Iran is engaged in a lot of the geopolitics of
the entire region and, of course, has an impact directly on our
national security.
So this is a continuing battle. There is no simple solution
here. There is no easy path forward. And we have to be mindful
as we move in one direction. As I think, Ambassador Indyk, you
pointed out, there is an opportunity in a different direction
for problems to arise, and I think we have to evaluate that
very carefully.
One thing is certain to me. We do need a clear U.S. policy,
and it must be one of engagement in that region and it has to
be done in a way that puts U.S. security interests--but does
not drag us into conflicts where a military solution is not an
answer.
So I appreciate very much both of your testimonies, and we
intend to rely upon you as we move forward.
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
And I want to thank both of you for being here.
And with that, the meeting is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
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