    [Senate Hearing 115-763]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 115-763

                    IMPLEMENTATION OF POSITIVE TRAIN CONTROL

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

                             COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
                          SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                         ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                 MARCH 1, 2018

                                   __________

        Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
                                 Transportation

                  [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                    Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov

                                   __________

                          U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

    39-878 PDF                  WASHINGTON : 2020

           SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

                         ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                       JOHN THUNE, South Dakota, Chairman
    ROGER WICKER, Mississippi            BILL NELSON, Florida, Ranking
    ROY BLUNT, Missouri                  MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
    TED CRUZ, Texas                      AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
    DEB FISCHER, Nebraska                RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
    JERRY MORAN, Kansas                  BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
    DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska                 EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts
    DEAN HELLER, Nevada                  TOM UDALL, New Mexico
    JAMES INHOFE, Oklahoma               GARY PETERS, Michigan
    MIKE LEE, Utah                       TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
    RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin               TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
    SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia  MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire
    CORY GARDNER, Colorado               CATHERINE CORTEZ MASTO, Nevada
    TODD YOUNG, Indiana                  JON TESTER, Montana
                           Nick Rossi, Staff Director
                     Adrian Arnakis, Deputy Staff Director
                        Jason Van Beek, General Counsel
                     Kim Lipsky, Democratic Staff Director
                  Chris Day, Democratic Deputy Staff Director
                          Renae Black, Senior Counsel

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page
    Hearing held on March 1, 2018....................................     1
    Statement of Senator Thune.......................................     1
        Prepared statement of Edward R. Hamberger, President and
          Chief Executive Officer, Association of American Railroads.    67
    Statement of Senator Nelson......................................     3
        Prepared statement...........................................     4
    Statement of Senator Cantwell....................................    47
    Statement of Senator Hassan......................................    49
    Statement of Senator Klobuchar...................................    51
    Statement of Senator Udall.......................................    53
    Statement of Senator Blunt.......................................    54
    Statement of Senator Peters......................................    56
        Letter dated February 28, 2018 from Gilda Z. Jacobs..........    56
    Statement of Senator Blumenthal..................................    59
    Statement of Senator Fischer.....................................    61
    Statement of Senator Wicker......................................    62
    Statement of Senator Cortez Masto................................    64

                                   Witnesses

    Susan Fleming, Director, Physical Infrastructure, Government
      Accountability Office..........................................     6
        Prepared statement...........................................     7
    Hon. Barry J. DeWeese, Assistant Inspector General, Surface
      Transportation Audits, U.S. Department of Transportation.......    25
        Prepared statement...........................................    26
    David L. Mayer, Chief Safety Officer, New York Metropolitan
      Transportation Authority.......................................    33
        Prepared statement...........................................    34
    Richard Anderson, President and Chief Executive Officer, Amtrak..    37
        Prepared statement...........................................    39

                                    Appendix

    Response to written questions submitted to Susan Fleming by:
        Hon. John Thune..............................................    73
        Hon. Bill Nelson.............................................    74
    Response to written questions submitted to Hon. Barry J. DeWeese
      by:
        Hon. John Thune..............................................    76
        Hon. Bill Nelson.............................................    76
        Hon. Maria Cantwell..........................................    76
    Response to written questions submitted to Richard Anderson by:
        Hon. John Thune..............................................    77
        Hon. Roger F. Wicker.........................................    78
        Hon. Bill Nelson.............................................    80
        Hon. Maria Cantwell..........................................    81
        Hon. Richard Blumenthal......................................    81

                               IMPLEMENTATION OF
                             POSITIVE TRAIN CONTROL

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, MARCH 1, 2018

                                           U.S. Senate,
            Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:18 a.m. in
    room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. John Thune,
    Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
        Present: Senators Thune [presiding], Wicker, Blunt, Heller,
    Fischer, Gardner, Nelson, Cantwell, Klobuchar, Tester, Udall,
    Blumenthal, Baldwin, Markey, Peters, Hassan, and Cortez Masto.

                 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN THUNE,
                     U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA

        The Chairman. Good morning. We convene today's hearing at a
    critical time for positive train control, or PTC,
    implementation. The victims, families, and all those affected
    by the overspeed derailment of Amtrak 501 in Washington and the
    collision of Amtrak 91 in South Carolina remain in our thoughts
    and our prayers. These accidents underscore the importance of
    implementing PTC quickly, safely, and successfully.
        And while tragic grade crossing collisions like the one
    involving Amtrak Special Train 923 are not generally prevented
    by PTC, reducing the number of such incidents remains another
    important priority.
        We are now about 10 months away from the December 31, 2018,
    statutory deadline for PTC, and recent reports suggest many
    railroads will not fully implement this safety technology by
    the end of the year. More alarmingly, a new report from the
    GAO, which I requested and which will be presented today, finds
    7 to 19 commuter railroads are at risk for not even qualifying
    for a limited extension to work out software, testing, and
    interoperability issues.
        The Positive Train Control Enforcement Implementation Act
    passed by Congress and signed into law by President Obama in
    October 2015 extended the original deadline of December 31,
    2015, amid reports that no railroad could meet the deadline,
    and many railroads were contemplating halting passenger rail
    service or shipments of essential supplies for agricultural
    production and water purification.
        This Committee, on a bipartisan basis, took action to avert
    a rail shutdown and set a realistic framework for
    implementation. With this realistic framework in place,
    railroads should be able to get the job done.
        The law requires railroads to implement PTC by December 31,
    2018, and allows a railroad to apply for an extension of up to
    24 months to ensure that PTC works as intended if, and only if,
    that railroad meets important milestones like full PTC hardware
    installation, spectrum acquisition, and employee training, and
    meets other milestones, such as implementing PTC on a specific
    territory or initiating revenue service demonstration. For
    Class 1 freight railroads and Amtrak, the bar is higher: PTC
    must be implemented or in revenue service demonstration on a
    majority of the required territories or route miles.
        The law is clear: for each railroad, passenger or freight,
    all PTC hardware must be on board or in the ground by December
    31, 2018. The law also required revised PTC implementation
    plans to include transparent annual metrics and provide a new
    authority for the FRA to enforce those plans.
        To date, FRA has initiated cases against 14 railroads that
    failed to meet hardware installation milestones or adequately
    report progress in a timely manner. If railroads do not comply
    with the law by the year's end, I expect the FRA to take the
    enforcement action needed to bring railroads into compliance.
    Railroads should not count on any extensions to the statutory
    framework that Congress passed in 2015.
        To be sure, PTC installation is an enormously complex
    undertaking. To implement PTC, railroads must develop, acquire,
    and install new hardware components and complex software
    systems that are able to communicate with other railroads.
        There are different PTC systems, and each system has
    different configurations, and yet they all must work seamlessly
    across our Nation's interwoven rail network. There are a
    limited number of PTC hardware suppliers, and there are a
    limited number of individuals who have the technical expertise
    to program that hardware. Simply put, PTC is not an off-the-
    shelf technology, and a railroad can't simply flip a switch.
        Understanding these challenges, the Federal Government has
    provided substantial funding and financing to support for
    implementation. A new report from the Department of
    Transportation Office of Inspector General, which I requested,
    which will be also released today, shows DOT has awarded nearly
    $3 billion in grant and loan assistance with $2.3 billion
    provided to date and another $600 million on the way. This
    includes much of the $199 million that this Committee worked to
    include in the FAST Act. For instance, this financial support
    includes a $960 million loan and a nearly $100 million grant to
    support the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, one of our
    witnesses today.
        While not all financial assistance should come from the
    Federal Government with a significant amount of Federal support
    not yet expended, it is critical that grant and loan recipients
    deploy resources in a timely and efficient manner in advance of
    the deadline.
        I want to conclude my remarks by emphasizing what is at
    stake here. Failing to comply with the law is not an option. If
    commuter railroads do not meet the requirements of the law,
    there is a real risk of halting or reducing service. If so,
    millions of people who depend on commuter rail to get to work
    each day or to visit a doctor or see a family member could see
    their lives disrupted. Those entities that aren't on track need
    to look at successful examples and recommit their organizations
    to getting the job done.
        I will now turn to Ranking Member Senator Nelson for any
    opening remarks he might have.
        Senator Nelson.

                    STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON,
                       U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA

        Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And before I address the topic at hand, I want to wonder,
    what in the world is going on at the FRA? Because it was just
    reported yesterday allegations by Politico that the acting head
    safety regulator, Heath Hall, Heath Hall, of the Federal
    Railroad Administration, is in a huge conflict because,
    according to the report, throughout his tenure and even at the
    time of the Washington State railroad crash, the Acting
    Administrator was doing outside work as a public relations
    consultant. This was a violation of his ethics agreement, and
    it's very alarming for the safety of our railroads,
    particularly as the agency is tasked with the oversight of the
    positive train control implementation and its task with
    responding to these tragic series of crashes that we've had.
        Now to the issue at hand, I certainly appreciate the
    Chairman for calling this hearing on positive train control. I
    wish I could say that this technology was in place and working
    so that we wouldn't have to keep having these deadly accidents,
    but it's not the case. Instead, we're here again after another
    tragic crash that has killed several people and injured dozens,
    which could have been prevented with positive train control
    technology.
        In Washington State, an Amtrak train was speeding as it
    rounded into a curve, and it derailed onto the highway below,
    killing three people and injuring more than 60. The facts of
    the case are eerily similar to the 2015 crash in Philadelphia,
    where a speeding Amtrak derailed while traveling into a curve,
    killing eight and injuring hundreds. And just last month, an
    Amtrak train traveling in Florida was in a head-on collision
    with a CSX freight train. The engineer and the train conductor
    from Florida were killed in the collision, and more than 100
    people were injured.
        So these tragedies can be prevented, they should be
    prevented, and that's why the industry must do a better job of
    implementing positive train control and get it done quickly,
    and that's why the U.S. Government ought to crack down. We've
    heard for far too long from some in the industry that
    implementing positive train control is a complex and expensive
    process and that railroads have faced a series of challenges.
    We've heard this over and over and over. But more and more
    these arguments are becoming tiresome, especially in light of
    the fact that the railroads have had 10 years to get this done.
        Now, I know that railroads have had to overcome challenges,
    but railroads like BNSF, SETPA commuter rail, and others have
    made significant progress toward implementation, and they
    should be applauded. But some railroads are way behind the
    curve, and, shockingly, according to the DOT, a few have made
    zero progress, and, unfortunately, that includes many railroads
    in my state. Now, that's just simply unacceptable.
        In 2015, none of the railroads were near completion. So the
    railroads, the commuter rails, the states, the countless
    others, requested an extension of positive train control, as
    did the administration at the time in 2015. So reluctantly, we,
    sitting at this dais, discussed it, we granted additional time,
    but demanded real action, including completion of equipping the
    locomotives and the tracks, significant testing and evidence
    that their systems work, and new penalties for the Department
    to ensure that the railroads are meeting their deadlines.
        We provided $200 million in grant funding in addition to
    the more than $2 billion in Federal support that had previously
    been provided, and the effort was suppose to ensure that PTC
    was going to be done this year. We heard repeatedly that given
    a limited amount of time, railroads would be able to get the
    PTC in place, yet here we go again, just what the Chairman has
    said. And now it's become crystal clear that many of the
    railroads simply have not lived up to their agreement.
        And so I'm very--well, let me just say it this way, I'm not
    inclined to give any more additional time because, do we want
    more crashes that PTC could avoid? So it means that railroads
    need to make sure that they're doing everything possible to
    meet the 2018 deadline. States and the Department of
    Transportation have got to come together to ensure all
    available resources are being directed to this task. And,
    finally, the Department must use its authority to hold
    railroads' feet to the fire.
        Madam Secretary, the Department of Transportation ought to
    be cracking down. We have a responsibility to the traveling
    public to learn from these tragic crashes. We've got a
    responsibility to make sure that there is safety on the lines.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Nelson follows:]

       Prepared Statement of Hon. Bill Nelson, U.S. Senator from Florida
        I want to thank Chairman Thune for calling today's hearing on
    positive train control.
        We have met several times on this topic previously.
        I wish I could say that this technology was in place and working,
    so that we wouldn't have to keep having these deadly accidents.
        Unfortunately, that is not the case.
        Instead, we are here again after another tragic crash that killed
    several people and injured dozens, and which could have been prevented
    with positive train control technology.
        In Washington State, an Amtrak train was speeding as it rounded
    into a curve and derailed onto the highway below, killing three people
    and injuring more than sixty.
        The facts of this case are eerily similar to the 2015 crash in
    Philadelphia, where a speeding Amtrak train derailed while traveling
    into a curve, killing eight and injuring hundreds.
        Just last month, an Amtrak train traveling to Florida was in a
    head-on collision with a CSX freight train.
        The engineer and a train conductor from Florida were killed in this
    collision and more than a hundred people were injured.
        These tragedies can be prevented.
        And they should be prevented.
        That's why the industry as a whole must do a better job of
    implementing positive train control and get it done quickly.
        We've heard for far too long from some in the industry that
    implementing positive train control is a complex and expensive process
    and that railroads have faced serious challenges during implementation.
        But more and more these arguments are becoming tiresome, especially
    in light of the fact that the railroads have had ten years already to
    get this done.
        I also know that many railroads have overcome these challenges.
        Railroads like BNSF, Septa commuter rail, and others have made
    significant progress toward implementation and I applaud them for their
    work.
        But some railroads are way behind the curve and, shockingly,
    according to the Department of Transportation, a few have made almost
    zero progress.
        This includes railroads in my state of Florida.
        This is unacceptable.
        In many instances, it feels like deja vu.
        In 2015, none of the railroads were near completion.
        The railroads, commuter rails, states, and countless others,
    including the Obama administration, requested an extension of the
    positive train control deadline.
        Reluctantly, Congress granted additional time, but demanded real
    action from the railroads, including:

       Completion of equipping the locomotives and tracks

       Significant testing and evidence that their systems work,
            and

       New penalties for the department to ensure that railroads
            are meeting their deadlines.

        We also provided nearly 200 million dollars in grant funding, in
    addition to the more than two billion dollars in Federal support that
    had previously been provided.
        That effort was supposed to ensure that PTC would be quickly
    implemented.
        We heard repeatedly that, given a limited amount of time, railroads
    would be able to get positive train control in place.
        Yet, here we are again.
        And it's now become crystal clear that many railroads have not
    lived up to their end of the bargain.
        That's why I'm not inclined to give anyone additional time.
        We simply must get this done.
        That means railroads need to make sure that they are doing
    everything possible to meet the 2018 deadline.
        States and the Department of Transportation must come together to
    ensure that all available resources are being directed to this task.
        And finally, the department must use its authority to hold
    railroads' feet to the fire.
        We have a responsibility to the traveling public to learn from
    these tragic crashes and to improve safety on our rail lines.
        I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today on how we can
    meet that challenge.

        The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
        I want to welcome our panel of witnesses this morning and
    thank them for their testimony in advance, and ask them to give
    their opening statements.
        We first have Ms. Susan Fleming, who is the Director of
    Physical Infrastructure Issues at the Government Accountability
    Office; Mr. Barry DeWeese, who is Assistant Inspector General,
    Department of Transportation Office of the Inspector General;
    Mr. David L. Mayer, who is the Chief Safety Officer for
    Metropolitan Transportation Authority; and Mr. Richard
    Anderson, who is President and CEO of Amtrak.
        We'll start on my left, and your right, with Ms. Fleming.
    And I would ask, if you can, to confine your oral remarks as
    close to 5 minutes as possible. We'll make sure that your
    entire statement is included in the record, and that will
    maximize the opportunity for members to ask questions.
        Ms. Fleming, welcome, and please proceed.

    STATEMENT OF SUSAN FLEMING, DIRECTOR, PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE,
                    GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

        Ms. Fleming. Thank you.
        Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Nelson, and members of the
    Committee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss commuter
    railroads' implementation of positive train control, or PTC,
    and FRA's oversight of that effort. Despite rail safety
    improvements in recent years, additional accidents, including
    multiple fatal accidents in the past 3 months, show that more
    needs to be done.
        PTC is not designed to and cannot prevent all rail
    accidents. Nonetheless, successful implementation of PTC holds
    significant promise in helping avoid certain types of
    accidents, such as potentially catastrophic train-to-train
    collisions or high-speed derailments. However, our broader
    five-year body of work on PTC has found that implementation is
    costly and complex, has been fraught with challenges, and
    progress has been slow.
        While the implementation of PTC involves numerous
    stakeholders, my testimony today focuses on the 29 commuter
    railroads that transport approximately 500 million passengers
    each year, and FRA, which is charged with overseeing
    implementation.
        Turning to commuter railroads' implementation progress, we
    found, based on third quarter 2017 data, that most of the
    railroads reported progress in initial implementation
    activities, such as installing equipment on trains alongside
    tracks, acquiring radio spectrum, and employee training.
    However, progress varied widely across individual railroads, in
    part, because of their varying size and unique set of
    circumstances. For example, equipping locomotives was one of
    the areas of greatest variance. Thirteen had completed
    equipment installation, while six had not yet started. The
    remaining eight fell somewhere in between.
        Significant work also remains for the majority of commuter
    railroads to complete more technically complex and time-
    consuming implementation activities, such as field testing
    software and components, and revenue service demonstration,
    which tests trains operating PTC as part of regular operations.
    As of September, FRA had approved conditional certification for
    two railroads and was reviewing two other safety plans.
        Digging deeper, to estimate how many commuter railroads may
    have insufficient time to meet the December deadline or to
    qualify for an RSD-based extension, we analyzed commuter
    railroad scheduled milestones for installing the back office
    server and conducting field testing, which must be completed
    before entering RSD. Based on railroads' experience to date,
    and FRA's estimate of the amount of time it can take to
    complete these steps, over half of commuter railroads may be at
    risk of not meeting the December deadline or qualifying for an
    RSD-based extension.
        However, many factors could affect how many railroads are
    ultimately at risk. For example, some schedules may slip while
    others may benefit from applying lessons learned. FRA's
    resources and capacity will also affect how quickly it can
    review the increasing flow of submitted test plans, RSD
    applications, and safety plans.
        Speaking of FRA, I now want to turn to its role in helping
    ensure PTC is successfully implemented. FRA has provided
    substantial information to individual and groups of commuter
    railroads as well as highly praised individual assistance.
    However, we found two shortcomings with its approach. First,
    FRA has used a largely informal and often reactive
    communications approach. Second, many commuter railroads did
    not fully understand the agency's planned approach for
    reviewing and granting extensions or the criteria for applying
    for an extension. The statutory provision allowing for other
    alternative criteria approved by FRA instead of the RSD
    criteria generated the most questions.
        For the long term, we found that although FRA collects
    individual railroads' progress information, it has not used
    this information to prioritize resources using a risk-based
    approach. This will be essential given the year-end deadline
    approaching and anticipated significant increase in workload
    and oversight responsibilities that will clearly stretch beyond
    2020 and the yet to be tackled issue of interoperability.
        In conclusion, there is no ignoring the fact that the clock
    is ticking. Ten months and considerable work remains to either
    complete implementation or apply for an extension. Even with
    sustained commitment from all 25 commuter railroads that have
    yet to file a safety plan, it is highly unlikely that all will
    meet the extension or implementation deadline. Therefore, it is
    critical that FRA implement our two recommendations: first, to
    systematically communicate deadline extension criteria
    information and its planned approach, including how it will
    handle railroads that do not meet the deadline or extension
    criteria; and, second, to use a risk-based approach to
    prioritize its recommendations and workload. FRA agreed with
    our recommendations.
        Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement, and I would be
    pleased to answer questions that you or other members of the
    Committee may have.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Fleming follows:]

    Prepared Statement of Susan Fleming, Director, Physical Infrastructure,
                 United States Government Accountability Office
           Many Commuter Railroads Still Have Significant Additional
                 Implementation Work and Opportunities Exist to
                           Provide Federal Assistance
    What GAO Found
        The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) is responsible for
    overseeing railroads' (including commuter railroads') implementation of
    positive train control (PTC) by December 31, 2018. PTC is a
    communications-based train control system designed to prevent certain
    types of accidents and involves the installation, integration, and
    testing of hardware and software components. For example, railroads
    must install equipment on locomotives and along the track, and complete
    field testing, including revenue service demonstration (RSD)--an
    advanced form of testing that occurs while trains operate in regular
    service.
        GAO's analysis of commuter railroads' PTC scheduled milestones for
    two key activities necessary to meet the 2018 deadline or qualify for
    an RSD-based extension (one of the statutory options) found that as
    many as two-thirds of the 29 commuter railroads may not have allocated
    sufficient time to complete these milestones. Specifically, in
    comparing the commuter railroads' schedules to FRA's estimates of the
    time required to complete these milestones and the experiences of
    railroads that have already completed them, GAO's analysis found that
    from 7 to 19 commuter railroads may not complete the milestones before
    the 2018 implementation deadline or qualify for an RSD-based extension.
    For example, FRA estimates that field testing (one of the milestones)
    takes at least one year, but GAO found that 14 commuter railroads plan
    to start this testing less than a year before the 2018 deadline,
    increasing the potential risk that this milestone will not be
    completed. However, FRA has the authority to establish alternative
    criteria for an extension not based on RSD, and several other factors
    can affect commuter railroads' planned and future progress. As a
    result, the number of commuter railroads at risk of not meeting the
    deadline or qualifying for an extension could increase or decrease in
    the coming year.
        FRA's PTC management and oversight includes monitoring commuter
    railroads' progress, reviewing documentation, and sharing information
    with them, but the agency has not systematically communicated
    information or used a risk-based approach to help these railroads
    prepare for the 2018 deadline or qualify for an extension. GAO found
    that FRA has primarily used informal assistance, meetings with
    individual railroads, and participation in industry-convened groups to
    share information with commuter railroads, and in some cases the
    information conveyed has been inconsistent according to industry
    representatives. Some commuter railroads also told GAO that
    clarification about the agency's planned process for reviewing and
    approving extension requests would be helpful. Federal internal control
    standards state that management should externally communicate the
    necessary quality information to achieve its objectives. While FRA
    officials have said they are working to identify additional ways to
    convey extension-related information, they have not yet done so.
    Moreover, although FRA receives information from commuter railroads on
    their progress in implementing PTC, it has not used this information to
    prioritize resources using a risk-based approach. With the year-end
    2018 deadline approaching, and an anticipated significant increase in
    FRA's workload, targeting resources to the greatest risk can help
    better ensure that FRA effectively fulfills its oversight
    responsibilities and provides commuter railroads the information they
    need to prepare for the 2018 deadline or seek an extension.
                                     ______

        Chairman Thune, Ranking Member Nelson, and Members of the
    Committee:

        I am pleased to be here today to discuss our review of commuter
    railroads' implementation of positive train control (PTC).
        In the wake of rail accidents such as the 2008 Los Angeles,
    California, collision between a commuter train and a freight train,
    resulting in 25 deaths and over 100 injuries, legislation was enacted
    requiring certain freight, intercity passenger, and commuter railroads
    \1\ to implement PTC--a communications-based train control system
    designed to help control train movements, including braking--by
    December 31, 2015.\2\ While the safety of the rail industry has
    improved in recent years, additional accidents, including the recent
    Amtrak derailment in Washington state in late 2017, have demonstrated
    the continued need for technological improvements that could help slow
    or stop a train to reduce the risk of certain types of accidents such
    as train-to-train collisions and derailments caused by exceeding safe
    speeds.\3\ In total, 41 railroads, including 29 commuter railroads, are
    currently required to implement PTC. Commuter railroads provide
    approximately 490-million annual passenger trips over 8,440 miles of
    track. Their size varies significantly, from rail lines providing
    approximately one-million passenger trips a year to those providing
    over 80 million.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ ``Commuter rail passenger transportation'' means short-haul
    rail passenger transportation in metropolitan and suburban areas
    usually having reduced fare, multiple-ride, and commuter tickets and
    morning and evening peak period operations. 49 U.S.C. Sec. 24102(3).
        \2\ The Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-432,
    div. A, 122 Stat. 4848 (2008).
        \3\ While the cause of the December 18, 2017, Amtrak derailment
    near DuPont, Washington, is currently under investigation, the National
    Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB) initial review indicated that
    speed may have been a factor. NTSB's preliminary report indicates the
    final recorded speed was 78 miles per hour, while the authorized speed
    heading into the curve where the derailment occurred was 30 mph.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Our prior work on PTC implementation has found that it is a complex
    and lengthy process.\4\ It requires the integration of various
    components--including communication systems, hardware on locomotives
    and along the side of the track, and software in centralized office
    locations as well as onboard the train and along the track. In order to
    implement PTC, railroads must design, produce, and install more than 20
    major components that will ultimately communicate trains' locations,
    movements, and speed, and then slow or stop a train that is not being
    operated safely. Many of these components are new technologies being
    designed and developed for PTC, and railroads must integrate them with
    their existing systems. Full implementation of PTC involves a number of
    steps, including but not limited to: equipment installation, testing,
    certification, and achieving interoperability. Interoperability will
    enable trains to move seamlessly across track owned by different
    railroads with potentially different PTC systems. U.S. railroads often
    operate their cars as ``tenants'' on the track of another railroad,
    known as the ``host.'' The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) is
    responsible for overseeing railroads' implementation of PTC.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ GAO, Positive Train Control: Additional Oversight Needed As
    Most Railroads Do Not Expect to Meet 2015 Implementation Deadline, GAO-
    15-739 (Washington, D.C., Sept. 4, 2015) and GAO, Positive Train
    Control: Additional Authorities Could Benefit Implementation, GAO-13-
    720 (Washington D.C., Aug. 16, 2013).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        As part of our body of work examining railroads' progress in
    implementing PTC, we found in September 2015 that nearly all railroads
    did not expect to meet the originally mandated deadline of December 31,
    2015.\5\ In October 2015, Congress extended the deadline to December
    31, 2018, and established criteria that would enable FRA to grant
    railroads meeting certain requirements a further extension up to
    2020.\6\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ GAO-15-739.
        \6\ The Positive Train Control Enforcement and Implementation Act
    of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-73, Sec. 1302, 129 Stat. 568, 576-582 (2015),
    codified at 49 U.S.C. Sec. 20157.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        You requested that we examine commuter railroads' implementation of
    PTC. This statement describes the results of our review and focuses on:

       commuter railroads' progress in implementing PTC;

       how many, if any, commuter railroads may be at risk of not
            meeting the mandated PTC deadline or certain extension
            criteria, and what factors may be affecting implementation
            progress; and

       the extent to which FRA's management and oversight approach
            has helped ensure that commuter railroads either meet the
            deadline or qualify for an extension.

        To address these objectives, we reviewed applicable laws as well as
    applicable FRA and PTC regulations, reports, and guidance. We also
    interviewed FRA officials involved in PTC monitoring, enforcement, and
    technical assistance. To describe commuter railroads' progress
    implementing PTC, we reviewed the most recent available railroad
    quarterly data that the 29 commuter railroads submitted to FRA that
    outlines installation and implementation progress in selected areas as
    of September 30, 2017. We assessed the reliability of the data in these
    reports by reviewing them for anomalies, outliers, or missing
    information, among other things. Based on these steps, we determined
    that these data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes of
    describing progress in PTC implementation. To identify railroads that
    may be at risk of not meeting the PTC deadline or qualifying for
    certain extension criteria, we collected additional information from
    all 29 commuter railroads related to their planned schedules for key
    implementation milestones. We then compared this information against
    FRA estimates for how long these milestones may take and to the
    experiences of commuter railroads that have already completed these
    milestones. To obtain perspectives on factors that may affect
    implementation progress and FRA's oversight approach, we interviewed
    representatives from 19 commuter railroads. These selected railroads
    include: (1) 14 railroads that according to FRA were identified in May
    2017 as at risk of not meeting the 2018 full implementation deadline
    and not completing statutory requirements necessary to receive a
    deadline extension and (2) 5 other railroads that were further ahead
    with implementation and that varied in geographic location and size of
    rail system, among other factors. We also interviewed representatives
    from all 7 of the Class I freight railroads,\7\ which are also required
    to implement PTC; 5 major PTC equipment suppliers and contractors
    identified by FRA; and 2 railroad industry associations. Information
    from these interviews is not generalizable to all commuter railroads or
    all PTC stakeholders but provide valuable insights into implementation
    issues. Finally, we compared FRA's management and oversight approach to
    Federal internal control standards related to communications and risk
    assessment. Appendix I describes our scope and methodology in greater
    detail.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \7\ Freight railroads are classified by operating revenues. Class I
    railroads are those carriers having annual carrier operating revenues
    of $467 million or more.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        We conducted this performance audit from July 2017 to February 2018
    in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
    Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
    sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
    findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
    the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
    conclusions based on our audit objectives.
    Background
        Under the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008, a PTC system must be
    designed to prevent train-to-train collisions, derailments due to
    excessive speed, incursions into work zone limits, and the movement of
    a train through a switch left in the wrong position. Railroads may
    implement any PTC system that meets these requirements, and the
    majority of the 29 commuter railroads are implementing one of three
    primary types of systems: the Interoperable Electronic Train Management
    System (I-ETMS), the Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System, or
    Enhanced Automated Train Control (E-ATC).\8\ PTC's intended safety
    benefits can only be achieved when all required hardware has been
    installed and tested, and a train is able to communicate continually
    and in real time with the software and equipment of its own railroad
    and also with that of other railroads operating on the same tracks.
    Real-time communication is needed to account for changing track
    conditions, which may, for example, include temporary speed
    restrictions where railroad employees are conducting track maintenance.
    Figure 1 illustrates how one system is intended to operate.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \8\ Fifteen commuter railroads are implementing I-ETMS--the main
    system used by freight railroads. Six commuter railroads--located
    throughout the United States--are implementing E-ATC, and 5--on the
    Northeast Corridor between Boston and Washington, D.C.--are
    implementing forms of the Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System. Two
    of the remaining commuter railroads are implementing different types of
    PTC systems, and one has yet to determine what PTC system it will
    implement.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Figure 1: Basic Operation of the Interoperable Electronic Train
            Management System (I-ETMS)

                  [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Source: GAO./GAO-18-367T

        PTC's multi-step implementation process can be grouped into three
    primary phases (see fig.2). Each phase involves key activities for
    railroads to complete--such as installing PTC equipment--as well as the
    submission of key documents for FRA review and approval--such as test
    plans. Based on railroad data reported to FRA, most commuter railroads
    are currently in the second phase, which involves system design,
    installation, and testing. According to a recent FRA presentation,
    completing key activities within this phase is the near-term focus for
    many commuter railroads.
    Figure 2: Key Activities Railroads Must Complete to Implement Positive
            Train Control (PTC)

                  [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Source: GAO analysis of Federal Railroad Administration
    information./GAO-18-367T.

        According to FRA officials, railroads must complete certain
    implementation steps sequentially, while other activities can be worked
    on simultaneously; for example, railroads may work to finish installing
    locomotive and wayside equipment while also beginning testing on an
    initial track segment.\9\ Furthermore, based on railroads' PTC
    implementation plans, the scale of implementation activities can vary
    by railroad, based on the size of the railroad and the number of
    components to be installed. For example, one relatively large commuter
    railroad must install computer hardware on 528 locomotives and 789
    wayside units along 218 route miles, while one relatively small
    commuter railroad's installation is limited to 17 locomotives and 35
    wayside units along 32 route miles.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \9\ In this statement, we use the term locomotive generally to
    refer to any of the variety of vehicles, such as cab cars and electric
    multiple unit trains, that commuter railroads may need to equip.
    Wayside units, located along the side of the track, include equipment
    such as communication towers or poles, switch position monitors,
    wayside radios, wayside interface units, and base station radios.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        According to FRA, full implementation of PTC is achieved when a
    railroad's system is FRA-certified and interoperable, and all hardware,
    software, and other components have been fully installed and in
    operation on all route miles required to use PTC. The PTC system is
    required to be interoperable, meaning the locomotives of any host
    railroad and tenant railroad operating on the same track segment will
    communicate with and respond to the PTC system, including uninterrupted
    movements over property boundaries.\10\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \10\ See 49 U.S.C. Sec. 20157. With certain exceptions, full
    implementation requires all controlling locomotives to be equipped with
    a fully operative and functioning onboard PTC apparatus, including the
    controlling locomotives of each host railroad and each tenant railroad
    operating on a PTC-equipped track segment. 49 C.F.R. Sec. 236.1006.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In early 2016, railroads required to install PTC had to submit
    revised implementation plans to FRA that included a schedule and
    milestones for specific activities, such as installing locomotive and
    wayside hardware, acquiring radio spectrum (if necessary), and training
    employees who will have to use and operate PTC systems.\11\ Railroads
    are required to report annually to FRA certain information on their
    implementation progress.\12\ As part of overseeing railroads' PTC
    implementation, FRA established a PTC Task Force in May 2015 to track
    and monitor individual railroads' progress. Railroads are also required
    to report quarterly to FRA on the status of PTC implementation in
    several areas such as: locomotives equipped, employees trained,
    territories where revenue service demonstration (RSD) has been
    initiated, and route miles in PTC operation.\13\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \11\ The Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 required that
    railroads submit an implementation plan for installing PTC by April 16,
    2010. When the PTC implementation deadline was extended to 2018 under
    the PTC Enforcement and Implementation Act of 2015, railroads were
    required to submit a revised implementation plan by January 27, 2016,
    to outline how and when each railroad plans to achieve full PTC
    implementation.
        \12\ Each railroad is required to annually report to FRA on PTC
    implementation progress in areas such as spectrum acquisition,
    installation progress, and the total number of route miles where
    revenue service demonstration has been initiated or PTC is in
    operation. See 49 U.S.C. Sec. 20157(c)(1); 49 C.F.R.
    Sec. 236.1009(a)(5).
        \13\ To effectively monitor each railroad's progress implementing
    PTC, FRA requires the submission of quarterly progress reports under
    its investigative authorities. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 20107,
    20902, 20157(c)(2); 49 C.F.R. Sec. 236.1009(h).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        FRA's oversight tools include assessing civil penalties if a
    railroad fails to comply with legal requirements, including a
    railroad's failure to comply with its implementation plan.\14\ FRA has
    a national PTC director, designated PTC specialists in the 8 FRA
    regions, and a few additional engineers and test monitors responsible
    for overseeing technical and engineering aspects of implementation and
    reviewing railroad submissions of documents and test requests. FRA
    officials told us they conduct various types of PTC-related work
    simultaneously, such as providing technical assistance to railroads,
    addressing questions, and reviewing documentation submitted by
    railroads. As railroads progress with testing and before completing
    implementation, FRA must review and approve a safety plan for each
    railroad and certify the PTC system.\15\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \14\ 49 U.S.C. Sec. 20157(e).
        \15\ 49 C.F.R. Sec. 236.1015.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Commuter railroads that will not be able to implement a PTC system
    by December 31, 2018, may receive a maximum 2-year extension if they
    meet six criteria set forth in statute. Specifically, commuter
    railroads must demonstrate, to the satisfaction of the Secretary of
    Transportation, that they have: (1) installed all PTC system hardware;
    (2) acquired all necessary spectrum;\16\ (3) completed required
    employee training; (4) included in a revised implementation plan an
    alternative schedule and sequence for implementing their PTC system as
    soon as practicable; (5) certified to FRA that they will be in full
    compliance with PTC requirements by the date provided in the
    alternative schedule and sequence; and (6) either initiated RSD on at
    least one territory \17\ required to have operations governed by a PTC
    system or ``met any other criteria established by the Secretary.'' \18\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \16\ Radio frequency spectrum is the medium for wireless
    communications and supports a vast array of commercial and governmental
    services. Commercial entities use radio frequency spectrum to provide a
    variety of wireless services, including mobile voice and data, paging,
    broadcast television and radio, and satellite services.
        \17\ FRA defines a territory as an entire installation/track
    segment as identified in a railroad's PTC implementation plan (e.g., a
    track segment, territory, subdivision, district, etc.). See, e.g., 49
    U.S.C. Sec. 20157(a)(3)(B)(vi); 49 C.F.R. Sec. Sec. 236.1003,
    236.1011(a)(5).
        \18\ These criteria are contained in 49 U.S.C.
    Sec. 20157(a)(3)(B)(i)-(v), (vii).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Progress Reported in Some Implementation Areas, but Significant Work
            Remains
        Most of the 29 commuter railroads have reported progress in some of
    the key areas of PTC implementation that FRA monitors, such as
    locomotive and wayside equipment installation, but the amount of
    progress reported varies across individual railroads (see fig. 3
    below).
    Figure 3: Status of Commuter Railroads' Installation of Locomotive and
            Wayside Equipment and Training of Employees Reported as of
            September 30, 2017

                  [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Source: GAO analysis of commuter railroad data submitted to the
    Federal Railroad Administration./GAO-18-367T

        a Two railroads reported over 100 percent of wayside
    equipment installed, and three railroads reported over 100 percent of
    employees trained. We included these railroads in the 91-100 percent
    complete bin.

        b Some commuter railroads reported that wayside
    installation was not applicable because they operate as a tenant
    railroad and that their host railroad is responsible for installing
    wayside equipment.

        Over half of the commuter railroads reported that they have made
    substantial progress in some initial implementation activities, while
    other railroads reported that they have made much more limited progress
    or have yet to begin equipment installation or employee training. For
    example, as of the end of September 2017:\19\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \19\ Railroads submitted quarterly implementation progress
    information to FRA for the period ending September 30, 2017. At the
    time of our review, this was the most recent information available.

       Locomotive Equipment Installation: 18 commuter railroads
            reported 50 percent or more of their locomotive PTC equipment
            was installed, and of these, 13 had completed installation. In
            contrast, 6 railroads reported that they had not started
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            installation of locomotive equipment.

       Wayside Equipment Installation: 16 commuter railroads
            reported 50 percent or more of their wayside PTC equipment was
            installed, and half of them reported that they had completed
            installation. In contrast, 7 reported that less than 20 percent
            of this equipment was installed.

       Employee Training: 11 commuter railroads reported completing
            PTC training for 50 percent or more of their employees
            requiring training. Of these, four reported that they had
            completed employee training. Thirteen commuter railroads had
            completed 10 percent or less of their employee training, and of
            these, 11 reported that they had not started training their
            employees. However, some commuter railroad representatives we
            spoke with stated that they are waiting to conduct training
            until their PTC system is closer to deployment. For example,
            representatives from one railroad told us they are waiting to
            conduct training so employees will be recently trained and
            familiar with PTC as the system is rolled out.

        Notably, commuter railroads reported that they have made the most
    progress in obtaining spectrum, which allows PTC components to transmit
    information about a train's movements and location. Specifically, 15 of
    the 17 railroads that require spectrum reported that they have obtained
    it.\20\ The two other railroads reported that they are in discussions
    to obtain leased spectrum.\21\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \20\ Twelve of the 29 commuter railroads do not require spectrum
    because, for example, they are implementing a PTC system that does not
    use spectrum or because they operate as a tenant-only railroad.
        \21\ The 7 Class I railroads created a consortium--PTC 220 LLC--to
    purchase radio frequency spectrum licenses that would address their
    needs, and in some cases, the consortium can lease radio frequency
    spectrum to non-Class I railroads for a fee. Most commuter railroads
    installing the I-ETMS system have opted to lease spectrum from PTC 220
    LLC.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Beyond the initial implementation activities, much work remains for
    the majority of commuter railroads to complete other key PTC activities
    that will enable them to complete implementation. PTC implementation
    requires many additional steps to integrate equipment and software
    systems that go beyond installing equipment and training employees, and
    the majority of commuter railroads reported that they continue to work
    to complete these steps, which are technically complex and time
    consuming. For example, as of the end of September 2017:

       Locomotives Fully Equipped and PTC-Operable: Fifteen
            commuter railroads reported that half or more of their
            locomotives were fully equipped and PTC-operable, meaning that
            all necessary onboard hardware and software is installed and
            commissioned, and is capable of operating over a PTC-equipped
            territory. Eight commuter railroads reported that none of their
            locomotives were fully equipped and operable.

       Field Testing: Thirteen railroads reported that they had
            begun field testing--a key implementation milestone that
            precedes RSD and allows railroads to assess how PTC components
            and software function together.\22\ FRA officials said that the
            testing phase can be a long and difficult process, as data
            obtained during field testing must prove the functionality of
            the system and be included as part of a railroad's application
            to enter RSD.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \22\ During the American Public Transportation Association's
    Commuter Rail Summit in summer 2017, FRA noted that railroads should,
    at that time, have been installing their systems as well as beginning
    testing, based on the agency's anticipated time frames necessary to
    complete the milestones necessary for an extension.

       RSD: Following successful field testing, FRA may grant a
            railroad approval to enter the next level of testing, RSD. In
            RSD, testing is performed on trains operating PTC as part of
            regular operations. According to FRA, RSD is the final phase of
            testing that a railroad completes in order to validate and
            verify its PTC system, and the results from RSD, along with
            earlier testing, are to be included in the safety plan a
            railroad submits to FRA. While six commuter railroads reported
            that they have begun RSD,\23\ most had not yet reached this key
            milestone--including some of the largest commuter railroads.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \23\ As of the end of September 2017, six commuter railroads
    reported that they had begun RSD on at least one track segment. Five of
    these railroads reported that all of their track segments were in RSD,
    while the other railroad reported that it had initiated RSD on 90
    percent of its track segments.

       Conditional Certification: Once FRA approves a railroad's
            safety plan, the railroad receives a PTC system
            certification.\24\ According to FRA officials, as of September
            30, 2017, only two commuter railroads were conditionally
            certified--meaning FRA has reviewed their safety plans and
            granted conditional approval for PTC operations, and the
            railroads are providing regular service in PTC operations--and
            two additional commuter railroads had submitted a safety plan
            for FRA review.\25\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \24\ 49 C.F.R. Sec. Sec. 236.1009(d), 236.1015. A PTC safety plan
    may include, among other things, a risk assessment, a hazard mitigation
    analysis, and a complete description of the railroad's training plan
    for employees and supervisors.
        \25\ One of the two commuter railroads submitted its safety plan
    jointly with the Class III railroad that provides freight service on
    the line.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Given the variation in commuter railroads' progress, especially
    related to completing later-stage PTC activities such as testing and
    developing safety plans, 13 of 29 commuter railroads told us they
    planned to seek a deadline extension, and the remaining 16 told us they
    do not intend to seek an extension. However, the number of commuter
    railroads planning to seek an extension is subject to change before the
    end of 2018.
    Over Half of Commuter Railroads May Be at Risk of Not Meeting the 2018
            Deadline or Criteria for RSD-based Extension, Though Numerous
            Factors Create Uncertainty
        Based on our analysis of the PTC schedules of the 29 commuter
    railroads, over half may not have sufficient time to complete
    activities needed to implement PTC by the end of 2018 or to qualify for
    an extension of that deadline by meeting criteria based on initiating
    RSD--for the purposes of this statement, referred to as an RSD-based
    extension. In particular, our analysis focused on the time likely
    needed for railroads to conduct RSD activities, because RSD is both the
    final step of field testing required by the 2018 deadline as well as
    one of the statutory options railroads have in seeking a deadline
    extension. For our analysis, we compared the amount of time railroads
    plan for completing two key milestones--installing the back office
    server and conducting field testing--to the amount of time FRA
    officials estimate is required for each milestone and to the
    experiences of railroads that have already completed RSD. However, it
    is important to recognize that numerous factors could affect railroads'
    planned and future progress. For example, commuter railroads could face
    delays due to unexpected issues with PTC components or FRA reviews of
    documents submitted by the railroads.
    Over Half of Commuter Railroads May Be at Risk
        In May 2017, FRA sent letters to 14 commuter railroads and their
    respective state departments of transportation and governors informing
    the recipients that they had not installed at least 50 percent of their
    required locomotive and wayside equipment. In these letters FRA raised
    concerns that these railroads were at risk of not meeting the 2018
    deadline and not completing requirements for a deadline extension.\26\
    Subsequently, in January 2018, FRA applied a more stringent benchmark--
    whether a railroad had installed at least 65 percent of all equipment--
    and determined that 13 commuter railroads remained at risk.\27\ Using
    this more stringent criterion, only one railroad had made enough
    progress installing equipment to no longer be classified as at risk by
    FRA.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \26\ FRA used railroads' equipment installation data as of the end
    of calendar year 2016 to make its determinations.
        \27\ FRA used railroads' data as of the end of September 2017 to
    make determinations, and our analysis confirmed this finding.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In addition to FRA's benchmarks for equipment installation, for our
    analysis we evaluated more broadly railroads' progress in completing
    other implementation activities that follow equipment installation and
    that FRA and stakeholders said are more difficult to achieve.
    Specifically, we analyzed commuter railroads' planned schedules for two
    key milestones to determine whether these railroads appear to have
    built sufficient time into their implementation plans to complete these
    and other activities by the 2018 deadline or to qualify for an RSD-
    based extension.\28\ The two key milestones we examined, both of which
    need to be completed before a railroad enters RSD, were:
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \28\ We assessed all commuter railroads against these milestones,
    regardless of whether a railroad planned to seek an extension. As noted
    above, railroads that do not plan to seek an extension have said that
    they will conduct RSD as the final step of required field testing, and
    railroads that do plan to seek an extension must by statute either
    initiate RSD on at least one territory or meet any other alternative
    criteria established by FRA. While these alternative criteria are not
    required to be based on RSD, we used RSD as a benchmark for our
    analysis based on FRA's three ``alternative criteria'' approvals to
    date; all of which have used RSD-based criteria (RSD testing on a
    segment of track versus RSD testing on an entire territory). According
    to an FRA official, it approved these three requests for alternative
    criteria because they were based on specific and quantifiable measures
    that happened to be RSD but could have been other specific,
    quantifiable measures.

       installing the back office server (BOS) and associated
            software necessary to connect and interface with wayside,
            locomotive, and dispatch equipment (the BOS transmits and
            receives data among this equipment that enables PTC to work);
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            and

       conducting field testing, in particular testing of installed
            infrastructure and initial assessments of the PTC system's
            overall functionality on trains that are not transporting
            passengers or operating during regular passenger service.

        Our analysis found that at least one quarter, and potentially up to
    approximately two thirds, of commuter railroads may not have sufficient
    time to enter RSD and, thus, may not meet the 2018 PTC implementation
    deadline or qualify for an RSD-based extension. These railroads vary by
    size and type of PTC system and by whether they plan to apply for a
    deadline extension. Specifically, our analysis found the following:

       Projection based on BOS status: Between 9 and 19 commuter
            railroads appear to be at potential risk of not meeting the
            2018 deadline or qualifying for an RSD-based extension based on
            our analysis. Our analysis found that the 6 commuter railroads
            already in RSD took an average of 10 months from installing the
            BOS to starting RSD.\29\ However, the schedules of 9 railroads
            indicate that they plan to install a BOS less than 10 months
            before the 2018 deadline. We believe that given past experience
            of other railroads, this places these 9 railroads at potential
            risk. Moreover, FRA officials estimate that it can take 2 to 3
            years for a railroad to install and prepare the BOS and
            associated software to support testing and RSD. Using FRA's 2-
            year installation estimate (which would require BOS
            installation before January 1, 2017) further exacerbates the
            potential risk of not meeting the deadline or of not qualifying
            for any RSD-based extension for up to 19 railroads.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \29\ The 6 railroads in RSD, on which we based one of our
    comparisons, vary in system size and PTC implementation system, but
    many of these railroads are relatively small based on the number of
    track segments each operates. Specifically, 3 railroads have a single
    track segment; 1 railroad has 3 track segments, and 2 railroads have 10
    or more track segments. In addition, one of these railroads is a tenant
    railroad and did not have to install wayside PTC equipment.

       Projection based on time allowed to conduct field testing:
            Based on our review of the planned schedules, between 7 and 14
            railroads may not have built sufficient time into their plans
            either to complete field testing ahead of the 2018 deadline or
            to qualify for an RSD-based extension. Commuter railroads and
            FRA officials told us that field testing is challenging and can
            take a substantial amount of time due to, for example,
            unanticipated issues and limited available track for testing
            given regular passenger operations. On average, our analysis
            found that the 6 commuter railroads already in RSD took 7
            months to move from starting field testing to starting RSD.
            However, 7 commuter railroads plan to start their field testing
            less than 7 months before the 2018 deadline. This situation
            raises concerns about their ability to conduct field testing
            before the 2018 deadline. Moreover, FRA officials told us that
            moving from the start of field testing to the start of RSD can
            take between 1 and 3 years, averaging about 2 years, and that
            most railroads under-estimate the amount of time needed for
            testing. When we applied the lower end of FRA's estimate, we
            found that it further increases the potential risk for 14
            railroads that plan to start field testing less than a year
            prior to the 2018 deadline. As a result, they could be at risk
            of not meeting the 2018 deadline or qualifying for an RSD-based
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            extension.

        We used RSD as a benchmark for our analysis of key milestones based
    on the importance of this benchmark in implementing PTC and on the
    three RSD-based alternative criteria that FRA has approved to date.
    While the three approved alternative criteria all include RSD, FRA has
    broad authority to approve ``any other'' alternative criteria even if
    not based on RSD, as noted above. One FRA official told us the agency
    approved these three alternative criteria requests because they were
    all based on specific, quantifiable measures, rather than because they
    included RSD in particular. FRA officials stated that they have not
    issued guidance on uniform alternative criteria because they will
    strive for railroads to meet the criteria for a deadline extension that
    are listed in statute and want the discretion to make determinations on
    a case-by-case basis. In addition, FRA officials said they want to
    ensure that each railroad's criteria are consistent with the statutory
    requirements for final implementation by December 31, 2020. Because it
    is unknown what alternative criteria FRA may establish in the coming
    months, which may not include RSD, it is difficult to determine at this
    time whether the railroads we found to be potentially at risk of not
    qualifying for an RSD-based extension might be more or less likely to
    qualify for an extension based on other, non-RSD criteria.
    Many Factors May Affect Commuter Railroads' Ability to Meet the
            Deadline or
            Qualify for an Extension
        Much uncertainty exists regarding railroads' ultimate
    implementation progress and their ability to meet the 2018 deadline or
    qualify for an extension. This uncertainty is due, in part, to the fact
    that PTC is a new way of operating and involves technologies that are
    more complex to implement than many other railroad capital projects.
    Furthermore, a number of factors can affect commuter railroads' planned
    and future progress, including unexpected setbacks installing PTC
    components and resources and capacity issues. Below we highlight some
    of the factors that that could affect implementation progress.
    Limited Industry Expertise and Resources

        Three out of five PTC contractors and suppliers and about half of
    the commuter railroads we spoke with acknowledged that industrywide,
    there are a limited number of individuals with PTC technical expertise
    available to successfully implement the technology. This can affect the
    ability of railroads and contractors to meet planned schedules. For
    example, one large commuter railroad said it took a year and a half to
    hire an internal expert to continue work on its PTC project. In
    addition, five commuter railroads told us that they faced other issues
    with their prime contractors missing their milestones; such issues,
    going forward, could impact railroads' progress during the coming year.
    Also, though most railroads we spoke to are relying on contractors,
    some commuter railroads may lack the in-house resources and expertise
    to plan and oversee a project as large and complex as PTC.
    Representatives from three commuter railroads we interviewed noted that
    PTC is not a traditional capital or construction project for a
    railroad; therefore, it requires additional expertise. FRA officials
    also stated that small commuter railroads may not have technical
    capacity or expertise with large contracts for such complex projects,
    especially given limited industry resources.
        In addition to limited expertise and resources, some commuter
    railroads told us they faced unexpected delays in obtaining PTC
    equipment, such as radios, from the supplier. Some PTC equipment is
    only available from a single provider, which can lead to delays
    executing contracts and obtaining equipment. Three commuter railroads
    we spoke with said they encountered issues executing contracts for PTC
    radios, in particular negotiating unique liability requirements sought
    by the only supplier of this equipment, which resulted in delays or
    higher overall costs to the railroads. One railroad noted that
    executing sole-source contracts for such circumstances is particularly
    problematic for state and public agencies.
    Interoperability and Host and Tenant Coordination

        As noted above, PTC is being implemented by different types of
    railroads using different systems, and achieving interoperability among
    PTC systems can complicate implementation. For example, Northeast
    Corridor railroads that are implementing versions of the Advanced Civil
    Speed Enforcement System need interoperability with freight railroads
    using I-ETMS. Even railroads that are installing the same PTC system
    have to take significant steps to ensure that systems will communicate
    and interoperate properly. In one case, a railroad told us that it is
    equipping its locomotives with equipment for multiple PTC systems to
    ensure that it can operate on various host railroads' tracks.
        Some commuter railroads that only operate as tenants on other
    railroads' tracks may be able to complete some PTC implementation work
    more quickly, as these railroads may benefit from work the host
    railroads already completed as they coordinate to implement PTC. For
    example, representatives from one commuter railroad we spoke with said
    they have to acquire and install PTC equipment on their locomotives but
    rely on the host railroads to install the remainder of the necessary
    PTC infrastructure. These tenant-only commuter railroads, however, have
    to coordinate field testing and RSD with the host railroads.
    Schedule Changes

        Unexpected issues with components or technology can also require
    additional time to complete certain activities, causing schedules to
    slip. Such issues could affect railroads currently on schedule as well
    as railroads pursuing aggressive schedules in an effort to overcome
    late starts or early setbacks. For example, representatives from 10
    railroads we spoke with said that installing the BOS and associated
    software, and ensuring it functions properly, can pose a challenge. One
    contractor told us that once the BOS is delivered to a railroad, a lot
    of testing work remains, and unexpected issues inevitably arise during
    testing, even if the BOS works according to all specifications.
    Representatives from one railroad said that despite strong
    organizational commitment to implementation and setting internal
    targets for progress, their PTC project schedule slipped many times
    over the course of implementation due to a variety of issues, including
    on-going software updates that caused delays while also straining the
    budget and burdening staff. Representatives from that commuter railroad
    also noted that equipping vehicles with PTC components took three times
    longer than originally expected (3 years instead of 1 year). However,
    some railroads are looking for ways to accelerate implementation. For
    example, representatives from one railroad said they made the difficult
    decision to cut some weekend passenger service to accelerate wayside
    equipment installation. Therefore, as representatives from one railroad
    articulated, given the schedule slippage experienced by railroads
    further along in implementation, railroads with aggressive schedules
    would have a limited ability to accommodate any additional delays.
    FRA's Resources and Capacity

        As the 2018 deadline approaches and railroads progress with
    implementation activities, the amount of documentation railroads will
    submit to FRA for review and approval is likely to increase
    significantly. For example, FRA reported in summer 2017 that it had
    taken between 10 and 100 days to review each of the test requests it
    received from railroads. As the 2018 deadline approaches, FRA will have
    to review a considerable amount of additional test plans and procedures
    as well as applications to begin RSD. In addition, FRA will have to
    concurrently review any safety plans that are submitted by railroads
    reaching the certification phase. At the American Public Transportation
    Association's (APTA) Commuter Railroad Summit in June 2017, FRA
    officials said that they expect each safety plan review--which involves
    all the regional specialists and some contract personnel--to take
    between 6 and 12 months to review. These plans are about 5,000 pages in
    length. FRA officials told us that reviewing all of the safety plans in
    a timely manner will be a challenge given staff resources. FRA has 12
    technical staff dedicated to the review of railroads' PTC documentation
    and monitoring of PTC testing. Representatives from 10 out of 19
    commuter railroads we interviewed said they are concerned about FRA's
    ability to review submitted documentation in a timely manner.
    Lessons Learned

        As railroads continue to progress with their projects and the
    industry becomes more experienced with PTC, railroads could benefit
    from lessons learned. For example, representatives from one railroad
    that is implementing I-ETMS, the system all large Class I freight
    railroads are implementing, told us that they anticipate being able to
    capitalize on lessons learned from freight railroads that have operated
    in RSD. By leveraging the freight railroads' experiences, one commuter
    railroad hopes to address issues before testing, rather than during,
    and therefore move more quickly through the testing process. If
    commuter railroads are able to apply lessons learned from other
    railroads' testing processes, then they may be able to accelerate their
    implementation efforts. Railroads may also accelerate implementation
    schedules as they become more adept at the overall testing process,
    which involves submitting test documents to FRA and scheduling multiple
    tests. This could potentially shorten the average time it takes a
    railroad to complete one or more of the key milestones analyzed. The
    two commuter railroads that have been conditionally certified told us
    they have met with other commuter railroads informally and have shared
    their project experiences as a way to facilitate information sharing.
    FRA Monitors Railroads' Progress but Has Not Systematically
            Communicated with Them or Prioritized Efforts
    FRA Monitors Railroads' Implementation Progress, Reviews Documents, and
            Shares PTC Information
        Since 2015, FRA has assumed additional roles and responsibilities--
    primarily through the PTC Task Force and regional PTC specialists--to
    monitor railroads' implementation progress, review required
    documentation, and share information about implementation steps and
    activities.

       Monitoring and Document Review: In response to a
            recommendation in our September 2015 report, FRA began to
            identify and collect additional information from the railroads
            to enable it to effectively track and monitor railroads' PTC
            progress.\30\ For example, in 2016, the PTC Task Force began
            collecting quarterly progress data and monitoring railroads'
            annual reports to track progress in meeting the PTC
            implementation milestones set out in railroads' implementation
            plans, such as locomotive equipment installed at the end of the
            year.\31\ As previously noted, the Task Force used this
            implementation progress data in May 2017 to identify 14
            commuter railroads at risk of not meeting the 2018 deadline or
            requirements for an extension. FRA also monitors railroads' PTC
            implementation through meetings with railroad and industry
            associations, visits to individual railroads, and reviewing and
            commenting on PTC documentation submissions, such as requests
            to begin field testing and RSD. FRA officials told us that they
            monitor railroads' progress to determine how much commuter
            railroads understand about the implementation process and to
            trigger discussions between FRA and the railroads. Regional PTC
            specialists are responsible for reviewing and approving
            requests submitted by railroads preparing to test system
            functionality as well as individual testing procedures
            describing the specific equipment and movements involved in
            each test.\32\ In addition, FRA officials told us that
            assessing civil penalties and sending commuter railroads
            letters of concern are the primary enforcement mechanisms they
            have available to oversee PTC.\33\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \30\ GAO-15-739.
        \31\ The PTC Task Force is comprised of FRA data analysts and
    subject matter experts responsible for PTC administrative and
    programmatic support, including collecting and tracking railroads' PTC
    data, managing documentation, and corresponding with railroads.
        \32\ Railroads submit certain information to FRA before beginning
    field testing for a PTC system, such as the date and location for the
    proposed testing, the planned test procedures, and other information
    for FRA's review and approval.
        \33\ To date, FRA has initiated enforcement actions against 10
    commuter railroads for either failure to complete one or more hardware-
    installation milestones that a railroad scheduled to complete during
    calendar year 2016, or for the failure to submit a timely annual PTC
    progress report to FRA by the statutory deadline. Thus far, 8 commuter
    railroads have paid or have agreed to pay civil penalties up to
    $12,000.

       Information Sharing: FRA officials said that they have
            primarily used informal assistance and participation in group
            meetings to convey information related to the implementation
            process and specific milestones necessary to meet the 2018
            deadline or qualify for an extension. FRA officials
            acknowledged that they do not have the capacity to provide
            frequent one-on-one assistance to all railroads given their
            growing PTC workload and limited agency resources. As such, FRA
            officials explained that in order to reach a wide audience
            given the approaching deadline, their current focus is on
            presentations at industry group meetings (e.g., APTA's Commuter
            Rail Summit) and specific PTC systems user-group meetings.
            FRA's regional PTC specialists told us they also provide
            direction on technical aspects of PTC implementation and
            testing, primarily by discussing issues at individual and
            railroad-industry meetings and providing informal feedback on
            commuter railroads' PTC documentation, such as testing
            requests.
    FRA Has Not Systematically Communicated Information to Help Railroads
            Prepare for the 2018 Deadline or to Qualify for Extensions
        While the majority of the railroad representatives we met with said
    FRA officials were consistently available to discuss issues that arise
    during day-to-day PTC implementation activities, the information
    conveyed by these officials has sometimes been inconsistent. In
    particular, FRA's heavy reliance on informal assistance and
    participation in group meetings to convey information to commuter
    railroads has led, at least on some occasions, to different or
    inconsistent information being communicated in different meetings. For
    example, representatives from one PTC equipment supplier said that FRA
    has not consistently commented on different railroads' test plans, and
    as a result, they have not been able to carry lessons learned on to
    other railroads' plans. In addition, while FRA's officials said their
    position has been consistent with the regulations stating that the host
    railroad must submit a safety plan to FRA, representatives from one
    railroad we met with said they had heard conflicting information from
    FRA. For example, these railroad representatives told us that FRA
    officials originally said commuter railroads that are only tenants on
    other railroads needed to submit their own safety plans but later
    stated at an industry association meeting that tenant railroads could
    be included in the host railroads' plans.
        In addition, commuter railroads have expressed a need for
    additional clarification about the criteria for applying for an
    extension. FRA officials also told us that they have received a lot of
    questions from commuter railroads about the criteria for an extension
    related to RSD or other alternative criteria. As noted above, to date,
    FRA has approved alternative extension criteria for three railroads,
    and in each case, the criteria involved RSD testing on a shorter track
    segment.\34\ However, representatives from one contractor working with
    several commuter railroads said it is unclear what ``alternative
    criteria'' FRA will approve to receive an extension. In addition,
    representatives from one commuter railroad stated that any opportunity
    to clearly outline FRA's interpretation of the PTC requirements,
    specifically the alternative extension criteria that could, for
    example, allow for a shorter test segment, would enable railroads to
    better position themselves to apply for an extension.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \34\ FRA officials said that to date, they have directed railroads
    with questions about qualifying for extensions to review the statutory
    criteria as well as the alternative criteria the agency has approved to
    date. An FRA official told us these approvals were based on the
    railroads' proposing specific, quantifiable alternative criteria,
    regardless of whether those involved RSD.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Representatives from some commuter railroads we met with were
    likewise unclear about the agency's approach to reviewing and granting
    extension requests. Representatives from three commuter railroads said
    clarification of FRA's planned approach would be helpful as the
    deadline approaches. According to FRA officials, the statute does not
    set a deadline by which railroads have to apply for an extension, and
    FRA has not set a deadline or indicated the latest date by which a
    railroad should apply. Nonetheless, for railroads that do not comply
    with PTC deadlines, FRA officials said they could impose civil
    penalties for each day a railroad fails to implement a PTC system by
    the applicable statutory deadline, but the agency has yet to determine
    how it will handle railroads that do not meet the deadline or receive
    an extension. With less than a year remaining before the 2018 deadline,
    FRA officials stated that they anticipate their workload is likely to
    increase as railroads submit additional documentation to review and
    continue to progress with testing.\35\ More systematic communication
    that delineates FRA's planned approach for the upcoming deadline and
    extension process may be critical for the agency to efficiently use its
    limited resources and convey consistent information to all the
    railroads.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \35\ In addition, FRA officials said they had begun exploring
    options to validate the information railroads will submit to
    demonstrate they have met the statutory requirements for installing PTC
    equipment to qualify for an extension as the 2018 deadline approaches,
    but the officials have yet to finalize an approach to verify railroads'
    information.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Standards for internal control in the Federal Government state that
    management should externally communicate the quality information
    necessary to achieve the entity's objectives. These standards also note
    that management should select the appropriate form and method of
    communication, so that information is communicated widely and on a
    timely basis.\36\ As we have previously found, the particular form of
    the agency's communication--for example, by oral presentation, written
    guidance, or formal regulation--will depend on multiple factors
    including the purpose and content of the specific communication and
    applicable legal requirements.\37\ Moreover, internal control standards
    indicate agencies should have standard processes in place to determine
    which form of communication is appropriate in each case.\38\ FRA
    officials told us that the agency could issue written guidance
    explaining how it has decided to apply its deadline extension authority
    and what type of information railroads will then need to submit to get
    an extension. However, FRA officials stated this written guidance would
    require time-consuming approval by the Office of Management and Budget
    under the Paperwork Reduction Act, and would make timely issuance of
    such guidance difficult. As noted, however, FRA may have the option to
    use less formal, less time-consuming methods of communicating key
    information about the extension process, such as webinars or conference
    calls, to communicate information more systematically. FRA officials
    acknowledged they are working to identify mechanisms such as these, but
    they have yet to do so. Absent systematic communication articulating
    the agency's planned approach for the extension process, railroads may
    not have the information they need to effectively prepare for the
    deadline or seek an extension.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \36\ GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
    GAO-14-704G (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 2014).
        \37\ GAO, Regulatory Guidance Processes: Selected Departments Could
    Strengthen Internal Control and Dissemination Practices, GAO-15-368
    (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 16, 2015).
        \38\ GAO-14-704G; GAO-15-368.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    FRA Has Made Limited Use of Implementation Progress to Prioritize
            Efforts and Mitigate Risks
        While FRA has taken steps to more closely monitor railroads'
    implementation progress, the agency has not prioritized its efforts,
    including its allocation of resources, based on an assessment of risk.
    In its 2015 Railroad Accountability Plan, FRA stated that its PTC data
    collection and monitoring efforts would allow the agency to inform,
    among other things, its resource allocation and risk mitigation.\39\
    While FRA has used its data to identify at-risk railroads, it has not
    used this information to prioritize how to allocate its resources or
    address risks. For example, as discussed earlier after reviewing
    railroads' data on their progress in installing PTC equipment, FRA
    notified 14 commuter railroads of their at-risk status in May 2017.
    However, while FRA officials said that they hold regular meetings with
    many--but not all--of the at-risk railroads, 9 of these 14 commuter
    railroads said that the formal letter they received did not ultimately
    trigger any change in the type of interaction they have with FRA. More
    recently, in December 2017, the Secretary of Transportation notified
    all railroads required to implement PTC by letter of the expectation
    that all possible measures be taken to ensure implementation
    requirements are met by the 2018 deadline. However, these letters made
    no distinction between railroads--that is, the same letter was sent to
    railroads with conditionally certified PTC systems and to railroads
    that reported completing no training or installing no locomotive
    equipment to date--nor did the letters describe how FRA's approach to
    working with the railroads would respond to their particular
    circumstances and risks.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \39\ FRA developed this plan as an internal document in response to
    recommendations in GAO-15-739.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        As noted above, FRA officials have stated that the agency does not
    have the resources to meet more frequently with or provide additional
    assistance to railroads. While the PTC Task Force helps monitor
    railroads' progress, FRA still employs fewer than 12 individuals with
    the requisite PTC expertise and experience to review technical
    documents and help railroads implement PTC systems.\40\ In an
    environment with limited agency resources, targeting agency efforts to
    areas of the greatest risk or highest priority areas is one way to
    leverage existing resources. According to standards for internal
    control in the Federal Government, management should identify, analyze,
    and respond to risks. In addition, FRA's Strategic Human Capital Plan
    states that developments including the rapid introduction of new
    technologies, such as PTC, demand that FRA continuously evaluate its
    programs and resources to adapt to changing demands.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \40\ According to FRA officials, the technical and programmatic
    staff and contractors supporting PTC implementation have recently
    expanded, and a procurement is underway for additional contractors to
    support PTC safety plan reviews.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        However, FRA has not fully leveraged the implementation progress
    data that railroads' submit to the agency to identify and develop a
    risk-based approach to prioritize agency actions. At present, it is
    unclear whether the agency's priorities are, for example, to help the
    largest commuter railroads meet the deadline or extension requirements,
    push those railroads that are very close to full implementation, or
    assist railroads that are in the earliest stages of their PTC project.
    For example, one regional PTC specialist we met with said that if he
    did not need to be reviewing documentation or observing railroads'
    field testing, he could spend more time with at-risk railroads. By not
    effectively targeting actions to help mitigate risks posed by railroads
    most at risk of not meeting the PTC deadline or qualifying for an
    extension, FRA misses the opportunity to leverage its limited resources
    by providing direct assistance in the areas of greatest need.
    Conclusions
        Much progress has been made in implementing PTC by commuter
    railroads. Nevertheless, about half of commuter railroads plan to apply
    for an extension, and many of the railroads' planned schedules raise
    questions about their ability to complete key implementation milestones
    and qualify for RSD-based extensions prior to the 2018 deadline. As the
    2018 deadline rapidly approaches, the need for clear information that
    is systematically communicated to all railroads implementing PTC
    becomes even more critical. FRA cannot expect to provide information
    and guidance to railroads individually, and therefore, adopting a risk-
    based communication strategy could help it more efficiently share
    information in the coming year. Moreover, the information FRA collects
    on railroads' progress has not been used to inform the agency's
    resource allocation decisions. Using this information to better
    allocate resources could help position FRA to better meet its
    responsibility to monitor and oversee PTC implementation in the future.
    Recommendations for Executive Action
        We are making the following two recommendations to FRA:

       The Administrator of FRA should identify and adopt a method
            for systematically communicating information to railroads
            regarding the deadline extension criteria and process.
            (Recommendation 1)

       The Administrator of FRA should develop an approach to use
            the information gathered to prioritize the allocation of
            resources to address the greatest risk. (Recommendation 2)
    Agency Comments
        We provided a draft of this statement to DOT for review and
    comment. In its comments, reproduced in appendix II, the agency
    concurred with our recommendations. DOT also provided technical
    comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
        Chairman Thune, Ranking Member Nelson, and Members of the
    Committee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to
    respond to any questions that you may have at this time.
                                     ______

                 Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
        This statement examines commuter railroads' implementation of
    positive train control (PTC). Specifically, this report addresses:

       commuter railroads' progress in implementing PTC;

       how many, if any, commuter railroads may be at risk of not
            meeting the mandated PTC deadline or certain extension
            criteria, and what factors may be affecting implementation
            progress; and

       the extent to which FRA's management and oversight approach
            has helped ensure that commuter railroads either meet the
            deadline or qualify for an extension.

        To address these objectives, we reviewed the Rail Safety
    Improvement Act of 2008, the Positive Train Control Enforcement and
    Implementation Act of 2015, and applicable Federal Railroad
    Administration (FRA) regulations, reports, and guidance. Our review
    focused on the 29 railroads FRA officials identified as commuter
    railroads required to implement PTC.\1\ We also reviewed previous GAO
    work on PTC \2\ and applied Standards for Internal Control in the
    Federal Government to FRA's role overseeing PTC implementation,
    including the principles that management should externally communicate
    the necessary quality information to achieve the entity's objectives
    and that management should identify, analyze, and respond to risks.\3\
    In addition, we interviewed representatives from 19 commuter railroads
    to further understand their implementation progress, factors that may
    be affecting progress, and the interviewees' perspectives on FRA's
    management and oversight of PTC implementation. We selected the 19
    railroads to include the 14 railroads that according to FRA were
    identified in May 2017 as at risk of both not meeting the 2018
    implementation deadline and not completing statutory requirements
    necessary to receive a deadline extension, as well as 5 other railroads
    that were further ahead with implementation and that varied in
    geographic location and size of rail system, among other factors.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Representatives of one of these railroads consider themselves
    to be an intercity passenger railroad, but we included them in our
    review because FRA tracks and monitors their progress among the
    commuter railroads required to implement PTC.
        \2\ GAO, Positive Train Control: Additional Oversight Needed As
    Most Railroads Do Not Expect to Meet 2015 Implementation Deadline, GAO-
    15-739 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 4, 2015), and GAO, Positive Train
    Control: Additional Authorities Could Benefit Implementation, GAO-13-
    720 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 16, 2013).
        \3\ GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
    GAO-14-704G (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 2014).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        We met with relevant FRA officials involved in PTC monitoring,
    enforcement, and technical assistance including the PTC Staff Director,
    regional PTC specialists working in each of the FRA regions where
    commuter railroads selected for interviews operate, and members of the
    headquarters-based PTC Task Force. In addition, we met with FRA Office
    of Railroad Safety specialists and engineers, among others. We also
    interviewed representatives from all 7 of the Class I freight railroads
    (which are also required to implement PTC), 5 major PTC equipment
    suppliers and contractors identified by FRA, and representatives from 2
    railroad industry associations--the Association of American Railroads
    and the American Public Transportation Association--to obtain their
    perspectives on commuter railroads' implementation of PTC, factors
    affecting implementation progress, and FRA's PTC management and
    oversight.\4\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ Freight railroads are classified by operating revenues. Class I
    railroads are those carriers having annual carrier operating revenues
    of $467 million or more. We interviewed all 7 Class I railroads
    operating in the U.S.: BNSF Railway, CSX Corporation, Kansas City
    Southern, Norfolk Southern, Union Pacific, Canadian National, and
    Canadian Pacific. We met with the following PTC contractors and
    suppliers: Ansaldo-STS, Alstom, Parsons, Siemens, and Wabtec.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        To identify commuter railroads' progress in implementing PTC, we
    reviewed railroads' third quarter progress reports submitted to FRA for
    the period ending September 30, 2017.\5\ We reviewed the most recently
    available quarterly data outlining the 29 commuter railroads'
    installation and implementation progress in selected areas as of
    September 30, 2017, including: locomotive equipment installed, wayside
    equipment installed, employee training, locomotives fully equipped and
    PTC-operable, spectrum obtained, the status of field testing, and
    revenue service initiated. As necessary, we also reviewed the narrative
    fields in the quarterly reports for additional context related to a
    given railroad's implementation activities and the extent of progress
    made in specific implementation areas. We assessed the data in these
    reports by reviewing it for anomalies, outliers, or missing
    information, and reviewing supporting narratives to ensure they aligned
    with the reported data, among other things. Based on these steps, we
    determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for our purpose
    of describing railroads' progress implementing PTC. We also reviewed
    other sources of information, such as PTC Implementation Plans,
    railroads' 2016 annual progress reports, and interviews with railroad
    representatives.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ The quarterly reports describe commuter railroads' installation
    and implementation progress from July 1 to September 30, 2017, and were
    due to FRA on October 31, 2017. In two cases, the quarterly reports
    include data from both the tenant and host railroad.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        To assess progress on locomotive equipment installation and wayside
    equipment installation, we compared the quantities installed to the
    total quantities required for PTC implementation. Similarly, to assess
    progress on employee training, we compared the number of employees
    trained to the number of employees required to be trained for PTC
    implementation. To assess progress in fully equipping locomotives to be
    PTC-operable, we compared the quantity of locomotives that are fully
    equipped and PTC-operable to the quantity required for PTC
    implementation. To assess progress on obtaining spectrum, we reviewed
    the quarterly update on spectrum. We concluded that a railroad had
    obtained spectrum if, for one or more area or location, it reported
    that spectrum was either (1) acquired but not available for use or (2)
    acquired and available for use. We also reviewed the narrative, as
    appropriate. For some railroads, we concluded that spectrum was not
    applicable because they use a PTC system that does not require
    spectrum, or because their host railroad is responsible for obtaining
    spectrum. To assess progress on field testing, we reviewed the third
    quarter status on installation and track-segment progress. We concluded
    that a railroad initiated field testing if one or more of its segments
    were reported as (1) testing or (2) operational/complete. To determine
    which railroads initiated revenue service demonstration (RSD), we
    reviewed the cumulative territories where RSD had been initiated. If
    the railroad reported that one or more territories had initiated RSD,
    we concluded that RSD had been initiated.\6\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \6\ For two railroads which used outdated quarterly report forms,
    we concluded that RSD was initiated if one or more route miles were in
    testing or revenue service demonstration.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Finally, to determine which railroads anticipate completing
    implementation before the December 31, 2018 deadline and which plan to
    seek any RSD-based extension, we obtained information from all 29
    commuter railroads to identify which railroads plan to implement PTC by
    the 2018 deadline and which plan to submit an alternative schedule
    (that is, a request for an extension) to implement PTC after the
    December 31, 2018 deadline.
        To identify commuter railroads at risk of meeting neither the PTC
    deadline nor any RSD-based extension criteria, we first reviewed data
    on railroads' progress installing PTC locomotive and wayside equipment.
    We did this because FRA used such installation progress to identify 14
    commuter railroads as being at risk and notified them via formal letter
    in May 2017.\7\ To confirm FRA's identification of commuter railroads
    that would be at risk based on an updated benchmark for the third
    quarter of 2017--railroads with less than 65 percent of total hardware
    installed--we analyzed railroads' reported locomotive and wayside
    equipment installation status as of September 30, 2017 to determine the
    percentage of total hardware installed for each commuter railroad.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \7\ FRA identified 14 commuter railroads that, as of December 31,
    2016, had installed less than 50 percent of all PTC system hardware
    required for the railroads' PTC system, as specified in its revised PTC
    Implementation Plan.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        To build on this analysis, we collected information from all 29
    commuter railroads on their actual and planned schedules for key
    implementation milestones. For the 19 commuter railroads we met with,
    we collected this information as part of our interviews, and for the
    remaining 10 commuter railroads, we collected this information by e-
    mail using a standard data collection instrument. The key
    implementation milestones covered procuring a prime contractor for PTC
    implementation; applying for and entering field testing and RSD, which
    is the final phase of field testing; installing the back office server
    (BOS) and associated software; and completing PTC implementation. This
    schedule information was collected between September 2017 and January
    2018.
        We compared the amount of time commuter railroads' planned for
    completing two key milestones to the amount of time that FRA officials
    estimate is required for each milestone and to the experiences of
    railroads that already initiated RSD. The two milestones are as
    follows:

       Install the BOS and associated software necessary to connect
            and interface with wayside, locomotive, and dispatch equipment.

       Conduct field testing of installed infrastructure, which is
            an initial assessment of the PTC system's overall functionality
            on trains that are not transporting passengers or operating
            during regular passenger service.

        We selected these two milestones because (1) each milestone follows
    equipment installation (which FRA had previously analyzed to assess
    commuter railroads PTC implementation progress); (2) a railroad must
    complete both to enter RSD; and (3) several interviewees, including PTC
    contractors and suppliers and FRA officials, said these activities are
    important project milestones that are complex and time consuming. We
    calculated the amount of time a commuter railroad planned for each
    milestone (with initiating RSD as the endpoint for each milestone), and
    compared that amount of time to two benchmarks:\8\ first, the
    anticipated length of time FRA officials said that the milestones have
    taken or may take, and second, the average amount of time (in months)
    that each milestone took the six commuter railroads that had started
    RSD as of September 2017. Since we used two benchmarks, we present a
    range of railroads that may not have sufficient time to complete these
    milestones and thus may be at risk of not meeting the 2018 deadline or
    qualifying for an RSD-based extension.\9\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \8\ We assessed all commuter railroads against these milestones,
    regardless of whether a railroad planned to seek an extension.
    Railroads that do not plan to seek an extension have said that they
    will conduct RSD as the final step of required field testing, making it
    a meaningful milestone, and railroads that do plan to seek an extension
    must by statute either initiate RSD on at least one territory or meet
    any other alternative criteria established by FRA. While these
    alternative criteria are not required to be based on RSD, we used RSD
    as a benchmark for our analysis based FRA's three ``alternative
    criteria'' approvals to date; all of which have used RSD-based criteria
    (RSD testing on a segment of track versus RSD testing on an entire
    territory). According to an FRA official, it approved these three
    extensions because they were based on alternative, specific, and
    quantifiable measures which happened to be RSD but could have been
    other specific, quantifiable measures.
        \9\ Two commuter railroads were seeking waivers or exemptions for
    PTC, and neither railroad was able to share planned schedule
    information for the milestones. Therefore, we included these two
    railroads in our count of railroads that may be at risk for both
    milestones, as FRA had not yet decided whether to approve either
    railroad's request. In addition, two other commuter railroads that
    operate only as tenants on other railroads' tracks were using the host
    railroads BOS. Since these railroads lacked a date for installing a
    BOS, we could not calculate the amount of time each planned for this
    milestone. One of these railroads is operating PTC in RSD, so we did
    not categorize it as at risk. The other railroad had begun functional
    testing, so we categorized this railroad as at risk based for the more
    stringent comparison.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                          Appendix II: Agency Comments
                  [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        The Chairman. Thank you, Ms. Fleming.
        Mr. DeWeese.

             STATEMENT OF HON. BARRY J. DeWEESE, ASSISTANT

           INSPECTOR GENERAL, SURFACE TRANSPORTATION AUDITS,

                   U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

        Mr. DeWeese. Chairman Thune, Ranking Member Nelson, and
    members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to this
    important hearing on positive train control, or PTC.
        Several fatal rail crashes over the past decade have
    heightened the need to implement PTC, one of the most complex
    and costly safety mandates that the rail industry has
    undertaken. The current deadline Congress has set for full
    implementation is at the end of this year.
        At this Committee's request, we are currently reviewing
    Federal funding support for PTC and DOT's oversight of that
    support. We plan to issue our full report this spring. And
    today I will share observations on three aspects of our ongoing
    review: one, the amount of Federal financial assistance for PTC
    projects; two, DOT's oversight of Federal funds invested in
    such projects; and, three, key funding challenges and concerns
    as the rail industry implements PTC.
        DOT has provided $2.9 billion to date for PTC
    implementation through a combination of grants and loans. As of
    September 30, 2017, $2.3 billion has been obligated. Rail
    systems can receive support from multiple sources, and at the
    time of our review, 29 rail systems have received Federal
    assistance.
        Our work also shows that PTC projects vary greatly,
    depending on railroad type and recipients' needs. For example,
    some recipients use their Federal funding to acquire wireless
    communications equipment, while others buy onboard equipment
    for locomotives. DOT's oversight of PTC funding varies as well,
    depending on the type of funding or financial support.
        Each DOT organization follows its existing oversight
    mechanisms for grants or loans. In the case of formula grants,
    the grantee has substantial discretion and flexibility on the
    use of funds. Regardless of oversight method, DOT cannot
    readily identify funding support or spending for PTC projects.
    Some PTC funding may be part of a larger grant, in those cases,
    recipients may not be required to capture or report PTC-
    specific spending to DOT. This makes it hard to determine which
    projects include PTC elements.
        DOT's grant management systems also generally track
    spending by broader budget codes, making it difficult to see
    what portion of Federal awards went to PTC versus non-PTC
    projects. Therefore, DOT currently relies, as did we, on the
    recipients to provide more accurate information on PTC funds
    when requested. Their financial systems typically captured more
    detailed data on spending and budget line items.
        Finally, we noted several funding challenges and concerns
    as railroads deploy PTC. While the extended deadline for
    implementation is fast approaching, not all of the funds
    obligated have been spent. Only four recipients have actually
    spent all of their provided funds, seven reported no
    expenditures at the time of our review, and the rest reported
    spending in the 50 to 75 percent range.
        It is important to note, however, that PTC funding support
    was provided at different points in time over the last decade,
    making it challenging to compare spending across various rail
    systems or to determine if the pace of spending has slowed
    implementation.
        In looking to the future, some recipients express concern
    about what it will cost to operate and maintain PTC systems
    once they are in place and how it will impact other safety
    priorities or their operational budgets. In 2016, the American
    Public Transportation Association estimated that operation and
    maintenance costs would run about $100 million a year for
    commuter railroads, but that long-term costs are still
    uncertain.
        A key watch item for DOT, Congress, and industry will be to
    instill a sense of urgency to deliver PTC while limiting any
    possible negative effects on the overall safety of the system.
    We are committed to working with the Department and this
    Committee to monitor the funding implications that could impact
    the deployment of PTC.
        This concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to
    address any questions from you or members of the Committee.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. DeWeese follows:]

    Prepared Statement of Barry J. DeWeese, Assistant Inspector General for
        Surface Transportation Audits, U.S. Department of Transportation
      Observations on Federal Funding Support for Positive Train Control
                                 Implementation
        Chairman Thune, Ranking Member Nelson, and Members of the
    Committee:

        Thank you for inviting me to this important hearing on positive
    train control (PTC) implementation. We are all here today in the
    interest of advancing safety to protect the traveling public. Over the
    last decade, several fatal rail incidents led the U.S. rail industry
    and congressional leaders to commit to implementing PTC on railways
    nationwide. In 2008, Congress enacted this requirement and set a
    deadline of December 31, 2015, through the Rail Safety Improvement Act
    (RSIA),\1\ after a devastating crash between a commuter train and
    freight train. Since that time, implementing PTC has been a priority
    for industry and the Department of Transportation (DOT). Recent
    accidents, such as the December 2017 derailment in Washington State
    that resulted in 3 deaths and more than 60 injuries, have renewed
    attention on this important issue and highlighted the difficulties in
    carrying out this critical mandate by congressional deadlines.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Pub. L. No. 110-432 (2008).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Citing funding and technical challenges, the industry did not meet
    the 2015 deadline, and Congress extended it by 3 years with the
    possibility of an additional 2-year extension if a railroad meets the
    statutory criteria set forth in the Positive Train Control Enforcement
    and Implementation Act of 2015.\2\ Since the enactment of the RSIA, DOT
    has been tasked with overseeing funding support for PTC implementation,
    including grants and loans.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ 49 U.S. Code Sec. 20157.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        My testimony today is based on our ongoing work, conducted at the
    request of this Committee, regarding Federal funding for PTC and the
    Department's oversight of those funds and other financial support.
    Specifically, my statement will provide our observations and
    information to date on (1) the amount of Federal financial assistance
    for PTC implementation and the types of projects, (2) the Department's
    oversight of the Federal funds invested in PTC projects, and (3) key
    funding challenges and concerns as rail systems implement PTC. We plan
    to complete our audit work and issue to this committee our final report
    with the agencies' responses in April 2018.
    Summary
        To reduce the number of rail crashes caused by human error, the
    U.S. rail industry and Congress are working to implement PTC systems,
    and DOT has provided $2.9 billion to date to implement PTC. However,
    $2.3 billion had been obligated as of September 30, 2017, which was the
    focus of our work since this was the actual amount available to
    recipients for expenditure. PTC is an advanced communication-based
    technology designed to prevent certain accidents caused by human error,
    including train-to-train collisions and derailments caused by exceeding
    safe speeds. However, PTC projects vary greatly based on the type of
    railroad, the need for interoperability, and available communication
    systems. The Department's financial oversight also varies, based on
    funding sources and other factors, with each organization following its
    own established oversight mechanisms. Our ongoing review has noted that
    the Department's financial and grant management systems do not always
    provide the detail necessary to identify PTC-specific costs. Instead
    DOT relies on the rail systems to provide accurate information. We are
    also finding that only a few funding recipients have used all of their
    PTC funds despite the approaching mandate. Some funding recipients are
    concerned about potential shortfalls in funding to operate and maintain
    PTC, which could result in funds being shifted from other safety
    priorities. These will be key watch items for the Department and
    Congress--as rail systems move forward with PTC implementation--to
    maintain a sense of urgency and ensure that there are no negative
    effects on the safety of the system despite the improvements that PTC
    can deliver.
    Background
        Since the 2008 fatal rail crash that led to the enactment of the
    RSIA, several other fatal rail incidents have strengthened the
    Department's commitment to implementing PTC nationwide (see table 1).

                  Table 1. Examples of PTC-Preventable Crashes
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Date              Location                    Incident
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    September 2008    Chatsworth, CA       A distracted engineer ran a
                                            Metrolink train through a red
                                            signal, causing a collision that
                                            killed 25 and injured 135.
    May 2011          Mineral Springs, NC  Human error contributed to the
                                            rear-end collision of two
                                            freight trains, killing two crew
                                            members and injuring two more
    June 2012         Near Goodwell, OK    Human inattentiveness contributed
                                            to the collision of two freight
                                            trains, killing three crew
                                            members.
    December 2013     Bronx, NY            An engineer fell asleep and
                                            caused a Metro-North passenger
                                            train derailment that killed 4
                                            and injured 61.
    May 2015          Philadelphia, PA     A distracted engineer accelerated
                                            into a sharp curve, causing an
                                            Amtrak derailment that killed 8
                                            and injured 185.
    December 2017     Near DuPont, WA      A derailment caused 3 deaths and
                                            over 60 injuries. The National
                                            Transportation Safety Board's
                                            investigation is expected to
                                            last 12 to 24 months.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Source: OIG

        The RSIA required Class I railroad main lines handling poisonous-
    inhalation-hazard materials and any railroad main lines with regularly
    scheduled intercity and commuter rail passenger service to fully
    implement PTC.\3\ A fully functioning PTC system must be able to
    precisely determine the location and speed of trains, warn train
    operators about potential problems, and take action if the operator
    does not respond to a warning. A PTC system is made up of more than 20
    major components in various stages of development, which must then be
    integrated and installed across the rail network.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ The RSIA defines main lines as those carrying 5 million or more
    gross tons of freight annually and authorizes the Federal Railroad
    Administration (FRA) to define the term ``mainline'' by regulation for
    passenger routes or segments over which limited or no freight railroad
    operations occur.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) identified rail systems
    \4\ as subject to congressional requirements for PTC implementation.
    Subsequently, eight of these rail systems were granted a waiver from
    the PTC statutory mandate, related to overarching FRA regulations for
    safety rule waivers.\5\ Of the 41 rail systems still required to
    implement PTC, per the statutory mandate, 25 are receiving Federal
    financial support. Four others have chosen to implement PTC and also
    receive Federal assistance--either because the rail system's future
    operations will be subject to the statutory mandate or because the rail
    system is a tenant railroad that operates on a track segment already
    required to have PTC. By the end of Fiscal Year 2017, 29 rail systems
    had received financial support from such sources as FRA, the Federal
    Transit Administration (FTA), and the Build America Bureau (BAB).\6\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ For the purpose of our review, we refer to all direct
    recipients of PTC funding as ``funding recipients'' and ``rail
    systems,'' whether railroads, commuter rail, etc.
        \5\ As implemented by 49 CFR 236.1019.
        \6\ The enactment of the FAST Act led to the July 2016 creation of
    BAB to oversee various grant and credit programs administered by the
    Department. BAB is responsible monitoring and reviewing the Railroad
    Rehabilitation and Improvement Financing (RRIF), Transportation
    Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA), and Private Activity
    Bonds (PAB) programs as well as the recently enacted Infrastructure for
    Rebuilding America (INFRA) grant program.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    DOT Provided $2.9 Billion for PTC Projects, With Nearly $2.3 Billion
            Obligated by End of Fiscal Year 2017
        As of the end of Fiscal Year 2017,\7\ approximately 60 percent of
    the U.S. rail systems required to implement PTC are receiving financial
    support. Specifically, 29 rail systems have received Federal
    assistance. According to estimates provided to us by the funding
    recipients, DOT has provided $2.9 billion to date to implement PTC.
    However, $2.3 billion had been obligated as of September 30, 2017,
    which was the focus of our work since this was the actual amount
    available to recipients for expenditure. Of this amount, the Department
    has obligated $1.3 billion through various Federal grants, and the BAB
    issued approximately $1 billion through a loan (see exhibit A). Funding
    recipients rely on various departmental funding programs to support PTC
    work, such as formula grants, discretionary grants, and loans.\8\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \7\ As requested, we reviewed DOT's funding and financing for
    implementation of PTC since 2008. For timely reporting purposes, the
    scope of this review includes funding that had been obligated by
    September 30, 2017 (end of Fiscal Year 2017).
        \8\ Formula grant programs are noncompetitive awards based on a
    predetermined formula. Unlike a formula grant, a discretionary grant
    awards funds on the basis of a competitive process. The Department
    reviews applications, in part through a formal review process, in light
    of the legislative and regulatory requirements and published selection
    criteria established for a program. Additionally, the Department is
    authorized to provide credit assistance, direct loans and loan
    guarantees to finance development of railroad infrastructure.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Federal funding grants ranged widely, depending on size of the rail
    system, the quantity and scope of projects, or the amount of funding
    requested. For example,

       Providence and Worcester Railroad received just under $1
            million for a single project to purchase and equip locomotives
            with on-board kits.

       Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority received
            approximately $181 million for a total of seven projects that
            included installing signals, interlocking, and right-of-way
            improvements throughout multiple rail lines.

        On average, those using Federal funding grants received $36.1
    million. In addition, two rail systems secured financial loans from the
    Department--approximately $967 million went to the New York
    Metropolitan Transportation Authority and, subsequent to the data
    collection portion of our review, Massachusetts Bay Transportation
    Authority borrowed $382 million.\9\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \9\ On December 8, 2017, BAB issued two loans to the Massachusetts
    Bay Transportation Authority. One was a RRIF loan for $220 million, and
    the other was a TIFIA loan for $162 million, for a total of $382
    million.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        A rail system can receive Federal support from multiple sources,
    whether as a direct recipient or through another grantee. Some
    railroads, such as Amtrak, receive funds both directly and indirectly.
    At the end of Fiscal Year 2017, the 29 rail systems mentioned above had
    received Federal assistance from 37 different funding recipients.
    Nineteen received funding from FRA, 25 from FTA, 7 from both FRA and
    FTA, and 1 was funded through a loan from BAB.\10\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \10\ This was the loan to the New York Metropolitan Transportation
    Authority discussed above.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Rail systems were at different points of implementation when they
    applied for Federal funding and may have used State or local money to
    pay for some PTC-related projects. Projects vary greatly based on the
    type of railroad, the need for interoperability,\11\ and available
    communication systems. For example, some funding recipients may seek to
    acquire wireless communications equipment, while others have obtained
    financial assistance to purchase onboard equipment for locomotives. The
    California High-Speed Train System is using awarded funds to produce a
    detailed design development plan for implementing PTC in the Caltrain
    corridor, which connects San Francisco and San Jose; the plan includes
    identifying the necessary interoperable interfaces. The Nashville
    Regional Transportation Authority received funding to cover its PTC-
    related costs on the Music City Moves commuter rail line that operates
    on the Nashville & Eastern Railroad. The two organizations have
    established an agreement concerning their shared responsibilities
    through September 2036.\12\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \11\ Commuter railroads often run on tracks owned by Class I
    freight railroads, as well as freights on commuter-owned track. All
    tenant railroads equipped with PTC must be interoperable with the PTC
    system installed by the host railroad.
        \12\ We plan to issue our final report in April 2018; it will
    include a description of all 54 PTC projects nationwide using Federal
    funding support.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    DOT's Oversight of Financial Support for PTC Varies
        DOT's oversight of Federal support for PTC implementation is
    generally dictated by the type of funding program, which is typical for
    all projects supported by the Department (see table 2 below for a list
    of grants, loans, and programs that support PTC implementation). Each
    DOT organization follows its own established oversight mechanisms for
    grant or loan procurement activities. These include a combination of
    recurring reviews of financial reports; regular phone calls, meetings,
    and e-mails with funding recipients; and onsite monitoring visits. In
    addition, BAB monitors financial plans and reviews credit worthiness
    throughout the span of a project to minimize the Federal Government's
    risk.
        While DOT relies on various oversight methods, those methods cannot
    readily identify the funding support or the PTC projects on which the
    funds were spent. With the exception of projects funded by the PTC-
    specific grant programs authorized by the Fixing America's Surface
    Transportation Act,\13\ DOT-awarded funds may support more than one
    project or other activities in addition to PTC. Consequently, when PTC
    is a component of a larger grant or loan, funding recipients may not be
    required to capture or report PTC-specific expenditures to the
    Department. This would be the case, for example, with Federal formula
    funding, which is apportioned to States based on population and not
    subject to DOT's discretion.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \13\ Pub. Law No. 114-94 (2015).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In addition, the Department's financial and grant management
    systems do not always provide the granularity necessary to precisely
    identify PTC costs. For example, grant management systems generally
    track expenditures by broader budget codes like ``signals,'' which may
    include signaling for PTC and non-PTC projects. As a result, it is
    difficult for FRA and FTA to extract PTC-specific spending from Federal
    awards for other types of activities, and the two agencies must rely on
    the rail systems to provide more accurate and detailed information. We
    obtained estimates from FRA and FTA on how much funding has been used
    for PTC but found that either the grantees had provided the information
    or the agencies' estimates were incorrect.
        Officials at the rail systems confirmed that they have more
    detailed information about expenditures and provided the information
    used in our review. More specifically, we found that the grantees'
    financial systems generally capture more data than DOT's grant
    management systems regarding expenditures and budget line items, which
    may include funding from local, State, and Federal entities. Each
    funding recipient uses its own financial tracking mechanisms to
    document all of its grants and issue reports to DOT agencies. These
    mechanisms range from internal controls for price and cost analyses to
    accounting software for tracking budgets, expenditures, and work
    progress.

    Table 2. Grants, Loans, and Programs That Have Funded PTC Implementation
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Funding or Financial Assistance
                Program               Oversight  Agency     Legal Citation
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    8American Recovery and           FRA                 Pub. L. 111-50
     Reinvestment Act of 2009
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Amtrak National Network Grant    FRA                 49 U.S.C. Sec.
                                                          24319
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    8Fixed Guideway Modernization    FTA                 49 U.S.C. 53090
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    FTA Revenue Bond                 FTA                 Sec.  3011 of Pub.
                                                          L. 105-178
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    8High-Speed Intercity Passenger  FRA                 Div. B, Pub. L. 110-
     Rail Grant                                           4320
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    New Starts                       FTA                 49 U.S.C. 5309
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    8PTC Implementation Grant        FTA                 Sec.  3028 of FAST
                                                          Act,
                                                         Pub. L, 114-940
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Railroad Rehabilitation &        BAB                 45 U.S.C. 822
     Improvement Financing (RRIF)
     Loan
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    8Railroad Safety Technology      FRA                 49 U.S.C. 201580
     Grant
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Research and Development Grant   FRA                 Pub. L. 115-31 and
                                                          previous
                                                          appropriations
                                                          acts
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    8State of Good Repair Formula    FTA                 49 U.S.C. 53370
     Grant
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Transportation Infrastructure    BAB                 Sec.  2001 of FAST
     Finance and Innovation Act                           Act,
     (TIFIA) Loan                                        Pub. L, 114-94
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    8Transportation Investment       FTA                 Pub. L. 115-31 and
     Generating Economic Recovery                         previous
     (TIGER) Grant                                        appropriations
                                                          acts0
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Urbanized Area Formula--         FTA                 49 U.S.C. 5307
     Economic Recovery
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    8Urbanized Area Formula Grant    FTA                 49 U.S.C. 53070
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Source: OIG

    Funding Recipients Are Concerned About Funding Shortfalls and Delays
        While approximately $2.3 billion has been provided for PTC
    projects, only 4 of 37 funding recipients have completely expended
    their Federal funds--and the extended deadline for PTC implementation
    is approaching at the end of this year. More than half of the
    recipients reported spending over 50 percent of their funds, and about
    40 percent reported spending over 75 percent.
        It is important to note that funding and financial assistance was
    made available at various points over the last decade, which makes it
    challenging to compare spending at rail systems. For example, FRA's
    Railroad Safety Technology Grants provided funds specifically for PTC
    implementation--$50 million in Fiscal Year 2010, $11 million in Fiscal
    Year 2015, and $25 million in Fiscal Year 2016. However, our analysis
    noted that nearly $15 million of the $25 million awarded in August 2016
    had not been obligated to the grantees.\14\ Similarly, out of the $197
    million authorized for PTC implementation under the FAST Act,
    approximately $190 million had not been obligated to the grantees, even
    though award selections were announced last May. Since grantees have
    yet to receive these dollars, we excluded unobligated grant awards from
    our analysis of Federal funds provided to rail systems for PTC
    implementation. Exhibit B provides the status of individual awards for
    the Fiscal Year 2016 Rail Safety Technology and Fiscal Year 2017 FAST
    Act grant programs.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \14\ The scope of this review includes funding obligated by
    September 30, 2017 (the end of Fiscal Year 2017).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In addition, some funding recipients are concerned about future
    shortfalls and delays in grant funding to support PTC, which could
    result in funds being shifted from other projects. Most funding
    recipients stated general concerns about budgeting for PTC
    implementation, which has led some to divert funds from other safety
    priorities. Of the funding recipients we surveyed, 12 of 34 respondents
    said PTC implementation was having a negative effect on other funding
    priorities or general rail service. One recipient pointed out that the
    $15.8 million in PTC-specific grants it received was minimal compared
    to the $310 million in Federal and State funds it had to divert to
    implement PTC, which delayed investment in state-of-good-repair
    projects elsewhere in the system. According to the recipient, these
    challenges reduced capital funds to a 15-year low.
        Other funding recipients expressed concerns about the uncertainty
    of ongoing operating and maintenance costs after PTC implementation and
    how that will affect their operational budgets. In 2016 the American
    Public Transportation Association estimated the operation and
    maintenance of PTC would cost commuter railroads about $100 million a
    year and stated that many rail systems were still uncertain about the
    magnitude of future long-term costs. Officials at FRA and FTA said they
    are aware of this concern, but they too are not sure whether additional
    funding will be allocated to support ongoing operational and
    maintenance costs after full PTC implementation.
    Conclusion
        PTC is one of the most complex and costly safety mandates ever
    undertaken by the railroad industry. Recent accidents, although rare,
    remind us that they can and do occur and have a profound impact on
    lives and communities. While the U.S. rail industry and Congress are
    committed to implementing PTC nationwide, progress has been slower than
    anticipated, and ensuring that the rail industry has a sense of urgency
    will be a key watch item for the Department. Given the potential impact
    on safety projects throughout the Nation's rail systems, the Department
    must also be mindful of industry concerns that the costs of operating
    and maintaining the PTC system, once implemented, could crowd out other
    safety-critical projects. We are committed to working with DOT and this
    Committee to monitor the funding implications that could impact
    railroads' deployment of PTC and expect to issue our final report in
    April 2018.
        This concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy to answer any
    questions you or other Committee Members may have.
                                     ______

    Exhibit A. Estimates of Federal Funding and Financing Obligated for PTC
                        Implementation by End of FY 2017

    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                      Estimated Total                                                             % Federal
                                         Funding Recipients             Cost of PTC         FTA Funds          FRA Funds        Total  Federal      Funds
                                                                       Implementation                                               Funds          Expended
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    1                           Connecticut DOT                           $180,000,000       $144,055,237         $3,836,100       $147,891,337        17.5%
    2                           Maryland DOT                               $30,458,627         $9,476,056           $642,445        $10,118,501        77.0%
    3                           New York DOT                               $54,214,286                $--         $3,000,000         $3,000,000         0.0%
    4                           New York Metropolitan                   $1,063,000,000        $90,236,669         $6,597,000        $96,832,669        88.5%
                                 Transportation Authority
    5                           Pennsylvania DOT                                   $--         $7,034,353         $1,350,000         $8,384,353        50.4%
    6                           Southern California Regional Rail         $240,365,079        $19,168,366         $9,005,446        $28,173,813        92.5%
                                 Authority
    7                           Amtrak                                    $232,800,000                $--       $187,820,938       $187,820,938        94.5%
    8                           California DOT                             $12,810,000                $--        $38,400,000        $38,400,000        86.1%
    9                           California High-Speed Rail                 $20,000,000                $--        $16,000,000        $16,000,000        99.0%
                                 Authority
    10                          Fort Worth & Western Railroad               $3,648,496                $--         $2,538,768         $2,538,767        20.0%
    11                          Illinois DOT                               $88,000,000                $--        $72,387,079        $72,387,079        93.2%
    12                          Michigan DOT                              $168,965,682                $--       $152,772,015       $152,772,015       100.0%
    13                          Missouri DOT                               $60,000,000                $--         $3,000,000         $3,000,000         0.0%
    14                          Providence & Worcester Railroad Co.         $1,300,000                $--           $965,832           $965,832         0.0%
    15                          Kansas City Southern (KCS) Railway        $300,000,000                $--         $1,867,449         $1,867,449        73.3%
                                 Company, MO*
    16                          Twin Cities & Western Railroad              $5,065,000                $--         $1,100,550         $1,100,550         0.0%
                                 Company
    17                          Washington State DOT                        $7,909,170                $--         $6,382,182         $6,382,182       100.0%
    18                          Alaska Railroad Corporation               $171,100,000        $77,211,524           $735,000        $77,946,524        89.5%
    19                          Dallas Area Rapid Transit (DART)           $44,500,000        $12,500,000                $--        $12,500,000         0.0%
    20                          Denton County Transportation               $20,000,000        $13,588,430                $--        $13,588,430        68.7%
                                 Authority
    21                          Florida DOT (SFRTA)                        $73,500,000         $6,725,482                $--         $6,725,482         7.5%
    22                          Fort Worth Transportation Authority                $--        $17,000,000                $--        $17,000,000         0.0%
    23                          Massachusetts Bay Transportation          $492,028,418         $2,560,000                $--        $ 2,560,000        74.0%
                                 Authority
    24                          Metra--Northeast Illinois Regional        $385,879,609       $155,948,676                $--       $155,948,676        60.7%
                                 Commuter Railroad Corporation
    25                          Minnesota DOT (Met Council)                 $4,400,000         $4,219,303                $--         $4,219,303        72.9%
    26                          Nashville Regional Transportation          $25,000,000         $2,425,445                $--         $2,425,445         0.7%
                                 Authority (RTA)
    27                          Northern Indiana Commuter                 $117,767,416        $11,073,177                $--        $11,073,177        75.5%
                                 Transportation District (NICTD)
    28                          North County Transit District              $87,292,969         $7,668,038                $--         $7,668,038        87.5%
    29                          Orange County Transportation                       $--         $4,147,427                $--         $4,147,427        57.9%
                                 Authority
    30                          Peninsula Corridor Joint Powers           $231,000,000        $27,433,269         $1,250,000        $28,683,269        96.5%
                                 Board
    31                          Prince William County/Potomac and          $14,192,000         $8,442,714                $--         $8,442,714        68.7%
                                 Rappahannock Transportation
                                 Commission
    32                          Regional Transportation District           $22,682,612         $5,512,543                $--         $5,512,543       100.0%
                                 (RTD)
    33                          Riverside County Transportation             $5,100,000         $2,095,447                $--         $2,095,447       100.0%
                                 Commission
    34                          San Joaquin Regional Rail                   $9,000,000         $6,400,868                $--         $6,400,868          52%
                                 Commission (SJRRC)
    35                          Southeastern Pennsylvania                 $310,000,000       $187,271,060                $--       $187,271,060        95.6%
                                 Transportation Authority (SEPTA)
    36                          Tri-County Metropolitan                    $14,000,000         $2,704,000                $--         $2,704,000         0.0%
                                 Transportation District of Oregon
                                 (TriMet)
    37                          Utah Transit Authority (UTA)               $31,158,524         $3,520,000                $--         $3,520,000         0.0%
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Grant Funding Totals                                                $4,527,137,888       $822,618,085       $509,653,804     $1,332,271,888       76.45%
    Grant Funding Totals, Without KCS                                   $4,227,137,888       $822,618,085       $507,786,355     $1,330,404,439       76.46%
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                           USDOT Loans Issued for PTC-Related Projects
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                New York Metropolitan                                                           $967,100,000       $967,100,000        15.1%
                                 Transportation Authority                                                             (RRIF)
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                Massachusetts Bay Transportation                            $162,000,000        $220,000,000       $382,000,000         0%**
                                 Authority                                                        (TIFIA)             (RRIF)
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                          Total with MTA Loan                           $4,527,137,888       $822,618,085     $1,476,753,803     $2,299,371,888       50.67%
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                      Total, Including Both Loans                       $4,527,137,888       $984,618,084     $1,696,753,803     $2,681,371,888       43.45%
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total, Including Both Loans but Without KCS                         $4,227,137,888       $984,618,084     $1,694,886,355     $2,679,504,439          43%
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    * Kansas City Southern is a Class I railroad that indicated it had received funding to enhance wireless communications capabilities in preparation for
      PTC implementation, including a conversion from their analog system to a digital communications system.
    ** The TIFIA and RRIF loans to the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority were issued after the end of Fiscal Year 2017 and are therefore outside
      the scope of our review. We provide these details to acknowledge that additional financing was issued.
    * Source: OIG analysis of information provided by PTC funding recipients. Note: $- as an implementation cost indicates an entity that received funds on
      behalf of a railroad operating within that State; e.g., Pennsylvania DOT does not own or operate its own railroad, but it received a grant from FTA
      that was used for SEPTA's system. Entities whose implementation costs were less than the total funds received partially funded other rail projects;
      e.g., California DOT provided funds to North County Transit District for Metrolink. Additionally, OIG noted several grants that were in process but
      not awarded by the end of Fiscal Year 2017. For example, Capital Metro is in the process of being awarded $12,762,969 for PTC implementation, and New
      Jersey Transit expects to receive an award of $10 million.

              Exhibit B. Examples of PTC Grants Pending Obligation
        During our analysis of FTA and FRA grant funding, we noted that a
    number of recent PTC-specific grants had been announced but were not
    documented in DOT's grant management systems. These grants had not yet
    been officially obligated and were technically still in the award
    process. We analyzed the status for grants in the two most recent
    announcements for PTC-specific funding, Fiscal Year 2016 FRA Railroad
    Technology Grants and Fiscal Year 2017 PTC Implementation Grants (see
    tables B1 and B2). FTA and FRA explained that once allocations for
    grants are made, the grantee must complete application requirements,
    including those for environmental and program review at the agency.
    Only when that work is completed can the grant be officially obligated.
    The DOT agencies stressed that most grants are eligible for pre-award
    authority, allowing pre-award expenditures on approved programs to be
    reimbursed after the funds are obligated. However, it is important to
    note that we did not include unobligated grants in our analysis since
    grantees have yet to fully receive the funding.

                            Table B1. Status of FY 2016 Railroad Technology Grant Recipients
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                        Grantee                          State   Grant Allocation        Status
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          1      American Short Line and Regional R.R. Association          DC         $2,500,000      Not Obligated
          2      Amtrak                                                     DC         $2,640,000      Not Obligated
          3      Caltrain                                                   CA         $2,880,000      Not Obligated
          4      Capital Metropolitan Transportation Auth.                  TX         $3,000,000      Not Obligated
          5      Fort Worth and Western Railroad                            TX         $2,560,000          Obligated
          6      Missouri DOT                                               MO         $3,000,000          Obligated
          7      North Carolina DOT                                         NC           $771,070      Not Obligated
          8      Providence and Worcester Railroad Co.                      MA           $965,832          Obligated
          9      Metrolink                                                  CA         $2,400,000          Obligated
         10      Sonoma-Marin Area Rail Transit/SMART                       CA         $3,000,000      Not Obligated
         11      Twin Cities and Western Railroad Co.                       MN         $1,100,000          Obligated
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                      $24,816,902        $14,791,070
                                                                                        Allocated      Not Obligated
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Source: OIG

                               Table B2. Status of FY 2017 FAST Act PTC Funding Recipients
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                        Grantee                          State   Grant Allocation        Status
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          1      Capital Metropolitan Transportation Authority              TX         $9,760,000      Not Obligated
          2      Florida DOT                                                FL         $1,840,000      Not Obligated
          3      Illinois DOT                                               IL        $18,870,000      Not Obligated
          4      Mass. Bay Transportation Authority                         MA         $7,820,000      Not Obligated
          5      Maryland Transportation Authority                          MD         $9,440,000      Not Obligated
          6      Missouri DOT                                               MO        $12,020,000      Not Obligated
          7      New Jersey Transit                                         NJ        $10,000,000      Not Obligated
          8      New York State DOT                                         NY        $33,750,000      Not Obligated
          9      Oregon DOT                                                 OR         $1,200,000      Not Obligated
         10      Peninsula Corridor Joint Powers Board                      CA        $21,680,000      Not Obligated
         11      Regional Transportation Authority/Metra                    IL        $20,200,000      Not Obligated
         12      Rio Metro Transportation Authority                         NM         $3,600,000      Not Obligated
         13      South Florida Regional Transportation Authority            FL        $31,630,000      Not Obligated
         14      Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority         PA         $5,800,000      Not Obligated
         15      Southern California Regional Rail Authority                CA         $3,200,000      Not Obligated
         16      Tri-County Metropolitan District of Oregon                 OR         $2,700,000          Obligated
         17      Utah Transit Authority                                     UT         $3,520,000          Obligated
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                       Total                                         $197,030,000       $190,810,000
                                                                                        Allocated      Not Obligated
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    *Source: OIG

        The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. DeWeese.
        Mr. Mayer.

      STATEMENT OF DAVID L. MAYER, CHIEF SAFETY OFFICER, NEW YORK
                 METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY

        Mr. Mayer. Chairman Thune, Ranking Member Nelson, and other
    members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to be
    here today. My name is David Mayer, and I am the Chief Safety
    Officer of the New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority,
    North America's largest transportation authority.
        Prior to joining the MTA, I spent 23 years with the
    National Transportation Safety Board, and from 2009 to 2014, I
    was Managing Director, the senior career official, there. I
    brought my two decades of experience in transportation safety
    as part of ushering in a renewed safety focus across the MTA.
        The MTA's two railroads, the Long Island Rail Road and
    Metro-North Railroad, PTC implementation schedule calls for us
    to meet all statutory requirements by the end of 2018. And
    while there are significant risks and challenges to our
    schedule, the MTA is working diligently to implement PTC in a
    safe, incremental, and controlled rollout. Our railroads are
    confident that they will continue to operate safely while PTC
    is implemented.
        Our commuter railroads are the Nation's busiest. With over
    1,400 passenger trains per day, our railroads provide nearly
    588,000 weekday trips. During peak periods, we dispatch trains
    every 90 seconds at both Penn Station and Grand Central
    Terminal. We have made significant progress in developing,
    testing, purchasing, and installing PTC. We have embraced the
    challenges of this effort and are working hard to mitigate
    schedule risks.
        PTC is not an off-the-shelf technology. There is no plug-
    and-play PTC system. We are designing, testing, and installing
    all at once, and we have to do this in a way that ensures we do
    not create any new safety hazards.
        Let me start by providing a snapshot of our status. Both
    railroads operate with a high degree of safety because current
    signal systems provide important safety protections, many of
    which have been added in incrementally as we progress toward
    full PTC.
        One of the requirements of PTC is to prevent overspeed
    derailments. Long Island already has overspeed protection on
    its entire system, and Metro-North has had this protection at
    critical curves and bridges. I'm pleased to tell you that as of
    yesterday, all of Metro-North's territory has been equipped
    with speed protection hardware, and properly equipped trains
    are currently protected, and in the coming weeks, Metro-North
    will extend this protection to all trains. In addition to
    enforcing these permanent speed restrictions, once PTC is
    operational, it will also enforce temporary speed restrictions.
        Another PTC requirement is preventing trains from entering
    work zones. Metro-North has implemented a system in 2013 that
    meets this PTC requirement and has been heralded as a model for
    the industry. Long Island will achieve this functionality once
    PTC comes online.
        Finally, PTC is intended to guard against train-to-train
    collisions and the movement of a train over a misaligned
    switch. At both railroads, existing systems provide these
    protections for all trains operating over 15 miles per hour.
    PTC will extend these protections for all speeds.
        I will now discuss our implementation status, identify
    risks to our schedule, and then outline our strategies to
    mitigate those risks.
        For the MTA's two railroads, we have secured 100 percent of
    the radio spectrum we need. We have installed 80 percent of the
    wayside hardware, and we have installed about 63 percent of the
    railcar equipment needed for compliance. We have also trained
    68 percent of the required personnel. The remainder of the
    installation and training will be completed in time to support
    revenue service demonstration.
        Both railroads have begun testing and compiling
    documentation in preparation for June applications to the FRA
    to enter RSD, which is a period that will illuminate any
    problems before beginning to systematically cut in PTC on the
    rest of our network.
        The MTA has set a highly aggressive, but achievable
    schedule. We control only so much of the schedule. Railroads
    around the country are simultaneously taxing a limited set of
    specialized resources. Although not a Federal requirement, our
    Board has maintained an independent third-party engineer to
    identify risks and ways to reduce them. For example, we've
    pressed our systems integrator to hire additional staff and to
    expend additional resources to complete the required work.
        In closing, PTC implementation at the MTA remains a vast
    undertaking. Our schedule still faces significant risks and
    technical challenges. We are working diligently every day to
    overcome these risks and challenges. We thank the states of New
    York and Connecticut and the Federal Government for helping us
    marshal the necessary resources to move this enormous effort
    across the finish line, including a $968 million loan sponsored
    by the FRA.
        The MTA is fully committed to operating safe and reliable
    railroads. Although our challenges are significant and unique,
    the MTA continues to aggressively work toward full PTC
    compliance before December 31, 2018.
        Thank you for giving us this opportunity to share with you
    the MTA's efforts to bring the promise of PTC into reality.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Mayer follows:]

          Prepared Statement of David L. Mayer, Chief Safety Officer,
                 New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority
        Chairman Thune, Ranking Member Nelson, and to other Members of the
    Commerce Committee, thank you all for the opportunity to be here today.
    My name is David Mayer and I am the Chief Safety Officer for the New
    York Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA), the Nation's largest
    transportation network.
        As Chief Safety Officer, I am tasked with crafting, implementing,
    and overseeing a variety of safety initiatives at MTA's agencies,
    working closely with agency Presidents and staff from across our
    agencies. Prior to joining the MTA, I spent 23 years with the National
    Transportation Safety Board and was Managing Director, the senior
    career official, from 2009 to 2014. I was recruited to the MTA to use
    my two decades of experience in the transportation safety field as part
    of an effort to usher in a renewed focus on safety across the MTA
    family agencies.
        I am here today to share with you the status of implementation of
    Positive Train Control (PTC) on the MTA's two commuter railroads: the
    Long Island Rail Road (LIRR) and Metro-North Railroad (MNR). This
    hearing is timely as just last week, MTA PTC implementation staff
    updated the MTA Board on the remaining schedule and our progress to
    meet the 2018 deadline. As stated to our Board, the MTA's schedule
    calls for us to meet all statutory requirements by the end of 2018.
        And while there are risks and challenges to our schedule, the MTA
    is working diligently to implement PTC in a safe, incremental, and
    controlled roll-out. Our approach to PTC implementation, coupled with
    other safety and cultural enhancements, has already yielded safety
    benefits. The LIRR and MNR are confident that they will continue to
    operate safely as PTC is implemented on schedule.
        MTA's two railroads are the Nation's busiest commuter railroads.
    With over 1,400 revenue trains per day, the railroads provide nearly
    588,000 trips on an average weekday morning, with a total of more than
    177 million trips annually. These two railroads operate some 2,400 rail
    cars along 1,381 track miles. The combined service territory spans
    nearly 5,000 square miles fanning out from New York City, and it serves
    a regional population of 15 million. Between the LIRR and MNR, we
    support 2,200 train movements of both passenger and work trains each
    day; this translates to as many as 303 trains per hour during peak
    service. To put this in context, the LIRR and MNR provide more commuter
    annual rail trips than the commuter rail agencies in Chicago,
    Philadelphia, Boston, Salt Lake City, and Los Angeles combined.
        Nowhere in this country has a fully designed PTC system been
    implemented on passenger rail networks as large, complex, and with as
    dense operations as the LIRR and MNR. During rush hour periods,
    hundreds of trains move in close succession through a series of complex
    switches and interlockings in Queens and the Bronx and into and out of
    our terminals in Manhattan and Brooklyn. During peak periods, we
    dispatch trains every 90 seconds at both Penn Station and Grand Central
    Terminal.
    MTA Service Area & PTC Landscape
        The MTA has taken an aggressive design-build approach to the
    development and implementation of PTC. The MTA has committed
    approximately $1 billion to support the development, testing,
    purchasing, and installation of PTC, and, significant progress has been
    made at our railroads toward meeting the statutory PTC requirements.
        PTC is not an 'off the shelf' technology; there is no plug-and-play
    PTC system. The PTC statute requires specific PTC functions; each
    railroad must design the technology from the ground up, prove that it
    works as intended and test technology in a phased roll-out on a network
    that is essentially running trains 24/7. And we have to ensure that we
    do not introduce any new safety hazards that weren't present before. To
    fulfill our statutory obligations, we are designing, testing, and
    installing concurrently. There are significant challenges in this
    design-build approach, but we have embraced these challenges and have
    risk mitigation strategies to remain on schedule.
        Let me start by providing the Committee with a snapshot of the
    railroad's current signal systems, which already provide critical
    protections against the types of accidents that PTC is intended to
    prevent. I will then discuss our implementation status, identify high-
    level risks to implementation and then outline our remaining schedule
    and risk mitigation strategies.
    MTA's Current Signal System Safety Benefits
        Both Metro-North and LIRR already operate with a high degree of
    safety because of functionality provided by their existing signal
    systems. The railroad's PTC design is an overlay onto each railroads
    existing signal systems and I would like to explain briefly the
    protections already provided by our existing systems, and how PTC will
    supplement those protections.
        One of the primary goals of PTC is to prevent overspeed derailments
    like the DuPont, Washington derailment last December. Since December
    2013, both MNR and LIRR have lowered the maximum allowable speed
    difference to no more than 20 mph at a number of critical locations.
    LIRR's existing network is already protected against derailments caused
    by overspeeding across its signaled network. I am pleased to tell you
    that as of yesterday, all of MNR's territory in New York and
    Connecticut has been equipped with Civil Speed Enforcement, and ACSES-
    equipped trains are currently protected from derailments due to
    exceeding permanent speed limits nine months ahead of the PTC deadline.
    Once PTC is fully installed, it will additionally enforce temporary
    speed restrictions, which is a layer of additional protection to the
    railroads' already robust systems.
        Another goal of PTC is the prevention of incursions into work
    zones. MNR implemented a system known as its Enhanced Employee
    Protection System, or EEPS, in 2013. This system, which won the APTA
    Gold Award for Safety, has been heralded as an industry model and
    already satisfies this portion of the PTC mandate at MNR. LIRR
    currently has track blocking and will implement an electronic Roadway
    Worker Protection System with PTC.
        Finally, PTC is intended to guard against train to train collisions
    and the movement of a train over a misaligned switch. At both
    railroads, both of these risks are already mitigated by our existing
    signal systems, which limit speeds at red stop signals and switches at
    interlockings to 15 miles per hour. The additional functionality to be
    provided by PTC will be to bring trains to a complete stop at these
    locations.
    Status of MTA's PTC Implementation
        I would now like to describe our current implementation efforts of
    the required PTC components. MTA's PTC design is overlaid onto our
    existing signal systems, as I described above; the idea is to provide a
    supplemental safety system, layered on top of the existing protections.
    And railroad's PTC system must be fully interoperable with every other
    railroad operating on the same network.
        For the MTA's two railroads, we have installed 80 percent of the
    wayside transponders and 87 percent of wayside interface units, 66
    percent of the radio cases, and antennas necessary to transmit PTC
    instructions to our trains. Both railroads have secured 100 percent of
    the necessary radio spectrum. For on-board equipment, the railroads
    have equipped 423 locomotives, or 56 percent. PTC will be installed in
    control centers for both our railroads, and the Systems Integrator
    (contractor) is continuing to develop and refine the software needed.
    The MTA has also trained 68 percent of their train and engine crews,
    rail traffic controllers, train maintenance personnel and signal
    maintainers. Those trainings are scheduled to advance at an aggressive
    pace and be completed by the end of 3rd Quarter 2018.
        As the MTA advances its installation of these components, our
    railroads are preparing to test pilot segments. The importance of pilot
    testing cannot be overstated. Both railroads have begun pilot testing
    in preparation for their application to the Federal Railroad
    Administration (FRA) for Revenue Service Demonstration (RSD). Getting
    the pilot lines into RSD is the most critical milestone that the
    railroads now face. Both railroads intend to submit their RSD
    applications to FRA this June. Both railroads have completed all
    hardware installations on their respective pilot segments, and in the
    months leading up to the filing of the applications, the railroads will
    be working closely with the System Integrator to complete the
    development of the core PTC software and to conduct site performance
    testing. This will enable the railroads to compile the necessary
    documentation to support the RSD Application and obtain FRA approval to
    proceed.
        Our schedule estimates FRA approval to allow RSD by the fall of
    this year. At the present time, we do not know how long the RSD period
    will last, but we are already engaged with FRA on our progress and the
    assumptions in our approved PTC Implementation Plan. Once the FRA
    determines that RSD has been successful, the railroads will be able to
    implement PTC on the rest of their territory.
    Implementation Risk Mitigation
        The MTA has set a highly aggressive schedule to meet all the
    statutory requirements for PTC but do not control all of the activities
    of this schedule. Railroads around the country are taxing the resources
    of a limited set of suppliers. When these suppliers' schedules slip,
    our schedules slip. As the deadline approaches, railroads across the
    country will be dependent on the FRA for timely review and approval of
    our plans and documents.
        The MTA is making every attempt to meet our schedule. Though not a
    Federal requirement, we have retained a third-party independent
    engineer work independently of our PTC implementation teams to identify
    areas of schedule risk and actions to reduce or eliminate these risks.
    We have pressed our Systems Integrator to hire additional staff and
    expend additional resources to complete the integrated testing
    necessary to prove the PTC system is safe and works as intended, and to
    resolve any unknown technical issues that may occur during testing. FRA
    staff have been and continue to be good partners in guiding the MTA in
    the development of the RSD and all other PTC matters.
    MTA PTC Development & Funding
        Since the passage of the original PTC mandate, the MTA has worked
    to meet regulatory milestones, collaborated with Amtrak and other
    railroads on interoperability issues, worked to secure the required
    spectrum, and competitively procured a System Integrator. The nearly
    $500 million contract awarded to the SI encompasses the engineering,
    design, and provision of all material components, wayside, onboard, and
    communication equipment.
        In 2015, U.S. DOT awarded a $968 million Railroad Rehabilitation
    and Improvement Financing (RRIF) loan to the MTA. The loan, which at
    the time was the largest ever awarded, is being used towards the
    installation of PTC, as well as for funding signal upgrades to some
    sections of non-signaled (dark) territory that were previously exempted
    from PTC protections due to low traffic density. As the MTA is
    committed to ensuring maximum safety, we are upgrading our dark
    territories to bring PTC safety benefits to our entire network. Thus
    far, the MTA has submitted approximately $350 million in reimbursable
    expenditures for funding via the RRIF Loan and we will continue to
    submit invoices twice a year as we accept delivery of PTC components
    and as vendors continue to submit invoicing. As you know, RRIF is a
    reimbursement based loan program; and per MTA's loan agreement,
    repayment of the loan begins in 2018 and continues over the next 35
    years.
    Additional MTA Safety Initiatives
        Though I have stated this before, it bears repeating: the MTA is
    committed to operating its railroads safely and reliably. PTC, while a
    promising life-saving technology, is only one important part of the
    safety of our transportation network.
        Despite a lack of Federal requirements, the MTA has developed and
    implemented the first-in-the nation comprehensive sleep disorder
    screening and treatment program. We plan to have screened every train
    operator, bus operator, and locomotive engineer--about 17,000 employees
    total--by the end of May 2018.
        Our railroads have also implemented the Confidential Close Call
    Reporting System (C3RS). As you know, C3RS is an FRA sponsored,
    voluntary, confidential program allowing railroad employees to report
    close calls. And this program is already providing safety tangible
    safety improvements at both railroads.
        Grade crossing safety has also been a major facet of the MTA's
    safety efforts. The MTA has increased its grade crossing awareness
    through public information campaigns and a partnership with Operation
    Lifesaver, as well increased police enforcement for grade crossing
    violations, and is currently performing a long-term study of the
    conditions at our crossings. A key aspect of this work is an
    unprecedented partnership with the local authorities responsible for
    the roadways that cross our tracks. Through this partnership, we are
    realizing important incremental safety improvements, one grade crossing
    at a time.
        Our safety program includes technological advancements that improve
    safety, including on-board cameras and alerters on our trains, and
    expanding track geometry programs to identify track problems before
    derailments occur.
    Conclusion
        PTC implementation at the MTA remains a vast undertaking--one that
    will not only make our system safer now but also long into the future.
    To be sure, our work schedule still faces significant schedule risks
    and technical challenges. We are working diligently every single day to
    overcome these risks and challenges. By the time we are done, a billion
    dollars will have been expended on this effort. We thank the States of
    New York and Connecticut and the Federal Government for helping us
    marshal the necessary resources to move this enormous effort across the
    finish line, including a $968 million RRIF loan sponsored by the FRA.
    The MTA continues to aggressively work toward full PTC compliance by
    December 31, 2018, even though our challenges are significant and
    unique. Thank you for giving us this opportunity to share with you and
    the public the efforts of the MTA to bring the promise of PTC safety
    into reality.

        The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Mayer.
        Mr. Anderson.

               STATEMENT OF RICHARD ANDERSON, PRESIDENT
                  AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, AMTRAK

        Mr. Anderson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
    members of the Committee. My name is Richard Anderson. I began
    serving as President and CEO of Amtrak on January 1, 2018,
    following my tenure for 10 years as CEO and Executive Chairman
    of Delta Air Lines; COO and CEO of Northwest Airlines;
    President of Commercial Businesses at United Health Group; and
    a state court prosecutor in Houston, Texas.
        As the only Amtrak CEO without a background in rail, I
    bring a different perspective. In 1971, many doubted that we'd
    see passenger rail play such a large role in transportation in
    America. Our services, our railroad, our infrastructures
    support hundreds of millions of rail transportation trips a
    year. It's also clear, as you look at our 47-year history, that
    at times we've underinvested in rail travel and certainly some
    safety aspects of the business.
        Amtrak is essentially operated as a freight railroad
    carrying passengers rather than a world-class passenger
    transportation company. And while freight railroads have done a
    great job in their business model of improving safety,
    passenger rail must operate in America at a much higher
    standard of care, and that means we need to implement in
    America and establish a standard of a Safety Management System
    based upon the FAA SMS program that's in place today in
    aviation.
        Recent incidents, including the terrible derailment of 501
    near DuPont, Washington, and the collision of Train 91 in
    Cayce, South Carolina, conclusively demonstrate the need for an
    SMS system, as recommended by the NTSB, and we have commenced
    implementation of SMS at Amtrak.
        Getting to PTC, it's the most important aspect of the
    Safety Management System, and it must be the safety standard
    for all passenger rail in America. Without PTC, the system in
    America for passenger trains is vulnerable to single points of
    human failure. And today we train engineers to memorize routes,
    trees, boulders, intersections, and signals, and the loss of
    situational awareness or forgetting a single rule, forgetting
    to throw a switch, we have no basic systems to act as a risk
    mitigation for basic human error.
        Amtrak is a leader in PTC. It's installed already on
    virtually all of the Northeast Corridor. We're set to complete
    installation on the tracks and equipment we own or control by
    the December 31 deadline. For those areas of our network that
    rely on tracks of other railroads, we are closely cooperating
    with them as they progress on their own PTC installations.
        Amtrak has to operate on 20 different railroads among three
    different PTC systems. We're working with the railroads that
    operate on Amtrak infrastructure to equip their rolling stock
    with PTC on our railroad.
        It has been a difficult undertaking for the industry, and
    we are likely, and, in fact, I think we will, as a country,
    confront scenarios where PTC is not operational by the deadline
    you've established. First, some routes outside the Northeast
    Corridor will face a situation where the host railroads can
    apply for an alternative implementation schedule out to 2020
    under the law. At Amtrak, through our SMS program, we have to
    determine whether we continue to operate in non-PTC territory
    and apply the principles of our Safety Management System to
    mitigate those risks.
        Second, there are host railroads, like Canadian National,
    that appear unlikely to achieve sufficient progress to year's
    end to apply for the implementation schedule. Some of this
    isn't clear yet. For those route segments, we are required by
    law to suspend service.
        Third, a portion of our services will operate on routes
    that receive mainline track exclusions, and actually Amtrak
    will, even after the deadline, operate potentially on hundreds
    of miles of track that are not required to have any PTC, and
    among those are what are called dark railroads, where there are
    no signal systems. We are reevaluating, in light of 501, 91,
    506, 188, and 89, whether that really is a best practice if you
    have a very high standard of care.
        And, lastly, there may be railroads that operate over our
    tracks which won't be commissioned, and under the present law,
    Amtrak cannot permit noncompliant equipment on the railroad.
        So I think we have some basic challenges, and I think that
    it's highly probable that there will be parts of passenger rail
    that are not going to be compliant by the deadline.
        But, one, we should establish PTC as the standard for
    passenger rail in America, including dark territory and
    including covering the areas that are today excluded by the
    law.
        Second, all passenger railroads in America must be early
    adopters of the Safety Management System promulgated in a
    rulemaking now by FRA and consistent with Bob Sumwalt's
    recommendations from NTSB.
        Third, we need to apply SMS methodologies and determine how
    we get to an equivalent level of safety for non-PTC and dark
    railroads.
        And, lastly, I think the Committee is going to be
    challenged on how much discretion to give FRA in terms of the
    implementation deadline, or there may be significant
    cancellations of sort of necessary transportation. I know you
    may not want to hear that, but it is the reality of when you
    listen to all the testimony.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Anderson follows:]

               Prepared Statement of Richard Anderson, President
                      and Chief Executive Officer, Amtrak
        Good morning, and thank you Chairman Thune, Ranking Member Nelson,
    and all of the members of this Committee for holding this hearing on
    rail safety and Positive Train Control. My name is Richard Anderson,
    and I serve as the President and Chief Executive Officer of Amtrak. My
    term as CEO began January 1 and, prior to this, I served as Co-CEO with
    Wick Moorman since July. Previously, I served as the CEO for Delta Air
    Lines, CEO for Northwest Airlines, and the President of Commercial
    Business at United Health Group.
        Amtrak is committed to running the safest rail system for our
    customers and our employees. We have seen what can be achieved when
    stakeholders work together toward a common goal, as demonstrated by the
    commercial aviation system which last year achieved the remarkable feat
    of zero passenger fatalities. Amtrak has achieved strong results in the
    past and can and must do the same again for the intercity passenger
    rail industry.
        Sadly, the recent incidents have demonstrated that we are far from
    that goal today. Though the circumstances of each of these accidents
    are quite different, the tragic derailment of Train 501 near DuPont,
    Washington, the grade-crossing incident near Crozet, Virginia, which
    impacted many of your colleagues, and most recently, the collision
    between Amtrak Train 91 and a CSX freight passenger train near Cayce,
    South Carolina remind us that there are still too many gaps in the U.S.
    rail network's current safety systems.
        I am here today to pledge to you that, despite these incidents,
    Amtrak is a safe railroad that is becoming safer each day. All of us at
    Amtrak are doing all that we can with the resources we have to make
    sure that incidents like these don't occur again. I will chronical some
    of the many steps we've taken in response to these varied incidents
    and, more generally, describe our work to adopt a more predictive and
    global approach to safety. I will also present areas where broader
    policy discussion and greater resources are needed to strengthen safety
    across the diverse network of freight and commuter railroads that host
    the vast majority of Amtrak's route miles.
    Positive Train Control
        One of the most critical tools that the rail industry needs to
    vastly improve safety is the prompt implementation of Positive Train
    Control (PTC) technology. Amtrak is confident that the installation of
    PTC on the required routes nationwide will make the entire U.S. rail
    network safer for passengers, railroad employees, and the cities and
    towns which the national rail network traverses.
        Amtrak has long been a leader in the installation of PTC, having
    already deployed systems almost universally where we control the tracks
    including on most of the Northeast Corridor (NEC), the busiest railroad
    in North America. As we've already pledged in a letter to
    Transportation Secretary Chao, we are set to complete the installation
    of PTC on the few remaining elements of the infrastructure we control
    and on all of our equipment by the December 31, 2018 Federal deadline.
        For the tracks we use but do not own or control, we are cooperating
    with our freight and commuter host railroads as they advance their
    obligations to complete PTC installations, which are required either
    because of the presence of our trains or the haulage of certain
    hazardous material. Additionally, the various freight and commuter
    railroads that operate over Amtrak's infrastructure must equip their
    rolling stock with PTC for use on our railroad and we are working
    cooperatively with them to advance these tasks.
    PTC in Context
        Railway operations in the United States are complicated, with
    multiple companies and agencies required to cooperate closely to ensure
    the safe, reliable, timely operation of various types of trains across
    differing networks. To integrate PTC into this complex environment has
    been a significant undertaking for the industry and its suppliers.
    While Amtrak has been eager to bring this technology online, it has
    been a difficult process and has required the dedication of significant
    resources, both in terms of funding and of our personnel.
        To place PTC in its proper context, permit me to explain how PTC is
    designed and how Amtrak operates. PTC relies on three interdependent
    elements, all of which must be in place for the system to function. The
    first includes equipment that must be installed on the locomotives by
    owners and operators. Second, trackside equipment must be installed by
    host railroads along the protected routes that monitor signals,
    switches, and track circuits. Third, there are computer sys-tems,
    called back office servers (BOS), which link the locomotives and the
    trackside equipment while integrating more information about the
    network. Additionally, each host railroad and rail operator must have a
    BOS and it needs to be correctly integrated before the system can be
    operational. All of this must be done in the proper sequence, and for
    the carriers required to use the system, it must be achieved in
    accordance with the timetables set by law.
    Locomotive Installation
        The first part of a PTC system is the equipment installed on
    locomotives and cab cars, which monitors a train's position and speed
    and activates braking as necessary to ensure compliance with speed
    restriction and territorial limits. The complexity of our operations
    requires Amtrak to use three different PTC systems across our network.
    Since 2000, Amtrak's Northeast Corridor operations permitted to exceed
    125 mph have depended on our first form of PTC called Advanced Civil
    Speed Enforcement System, or ACSES. By the end of 2015, to meet the
    original deadline of the 2008 Rail Safety Improvement Act, Amtrak had
    enabled ACSES for all our loco-motives, cab cars and trainsets
    operating on the NEC. For equipment that operates on a 98-mile stretch
    of track Amtrak owns in Michigan and to permit higher speed operation
    on the newly purchased and upgraded line owned by the State, we have
    installed a second form of PTC equipment, called ITCS.
        Finally, to operate across the other host railroads that make up 72
    percent of the miles our trains travel, we are also installing a third
    form of PTC in our locomotives to integrate with the I-ETMS system in
    use by freight railroads. Having already PTC commissioned 338 units, we
    are on target to have 447 Amtrak-owned units fully commissioned and
    ready to operate before the December 31, 2018, deadline. Apart from our
    locomotives and rolling stock, several of our state partners also own
    their own equipment which we operate and maintain. Amtrak is working
    with these owners and various suppliers to help achieve compliance
    prior to year's end.
    Trackside Equipment
        The second part of a PTC system is the trackside equipment, which
    monitors railroad track signals, switches, and track circuits. By law,
    each railroad owner is responsible for installation of PTC equipment on
    the tracks within their rights-of-way. Additionally, the hosts are
    responsible for reporting their PTC trackside readiness schedule to the
    Federal Railroad Administration (FRA). Amtrak is working with the host
    railroads to develop an implementation schedule for PTC integration and
    testing. While 13 out of 20 host railroads that will be using I-ETMS
    have not provided a notice of intent to start PTC testing, the four
    Class I railroads that own the majority of the track over which Amtrak
    operates (BNSF, CSX, NS, and UP) have all provided letters of intent.
        Regarding the trackside installations for which Amtrak is
    responsible, Amtrak completed the ACSES PTC implementation on all but a
    few miles near terminals and stations on the NEC in December 2015 and
    on the Harrisburg Line during the first quarter of calendar year 2016.
    On our Michigan Line, trackside PTC implementation on our segment was
    fully completed in 2011 and the State-owned portion of our route to
    Detroit will be completed by June 2018. Installation of the ACSES PTC
    system on Amtrak's Springfield Line will be completed by late Fall 2018
    and we will soon begin hardware installation on the portions of the
    Hudson Line in New York which we control, with implementation expected
    by December 31, 2018.
    Back Office Servers (BOS)
        The third part of a PTC system is the back office server, which
    stores all information related to the rail network and trains, and
    transmits authorization for individual train movements. Each host
    railroad and each rail operator will have a BOS that enables the
    necessary information exchanges. For a BOS to be operational, the
    tenant who operates over a host railroad must establish a dedicated
    two-way communication link between their BOS and the host BOS, a
    process known in the field as federation. Amtrak's ACSES system does
    not require a BOS, so Amtrak only needs a BOS for its ITCS system in
    Michigan and its I-ETMS operations over freight hosts. Amtrak's BOS
    will pass crew and train information to the host railroad system, as
    well as to the locomotives themselves. Operability of Amtrak's BOS is
    currently scheduled for April 2018, though we are looking to accelerate
    its delivery through our vendors. Once it is operable, federation with
    the BOS of each individual host railroad must commence before PTC
    operations can occur.
    Next Steps for PTC Implementation
        While PTC relies on completing these three components, the next
    vital steps in deploying PTC include testing and training. Once Amtrak
    and a host have linked their BOS units, testing of the system will
    proceed, beginning this spring, to verify functionality along with
    system interoperability testing to ensure that all of the disparate
    components work together correctly. As for training, Amtrak is
    implementing a training plan for 1,300 locomotive engineers and 2,200
    conductors that includes classroom training and, once the PTC system is
    active, field training. We are taking steps as part of this training to
    prepare our employees for what will likely be the phased deployment on
    routes as different hosts and territories are brought online.
        The industry as a whole is already moving forward, so it is
    important to note that some of our partners will have PTC implemented
    and operational in time for the December 2018 deadline. In this case,
    we will continue to operate passenger rail service with the certainty
    that operational PTC is on that route.
        However, a phased implementation brings us to a number of
    challenging policy questions facing Amtrak, FRA, Congress and the
    various railroads we interact with across our network. It is now clear
    that we are likely to encounter four different scenarios where PTC is
    not yet operational by the end of the year.
        First, there will be carriers that have made sufficient progress to
    apply to FRA for an alternative PTC implementation schedule under the
    law. In these instances, Amtrak's equipment will be ready for PTC
    operation, but additional work, testing or approvals are still required
    by the host railroad before the system is considered functional. We
    believe a significant number of routes outside of the NEC will face
    this situation. The question we must ask ourselves is whether we
    continue to operate over such routes until PTC is turned on and if so,
    what additional safety protections are appropriate to reduce risks?
        Second, there will be carriers over which we operate who appear
    unlikely to achieve sufficient progress to apply for an alternative PTC
    implementation schedule by year's end. For any such route segments,
    Amtrak will suspend operations until such time as the carrier becomes
    com-pliant with the law.
        Third, there are areas over which we operate for which there is an
    FRA ``Mainline Track Exclusion'' in place exempting that segment from
    the PTC requirements based on the low levels of freight and passenger
    train traffic or the presence of low-speed operations, such as in yards
    and terminals. We are currently reviewing our policy on operating
    passenger trains on Exclusions to determine whether we have adequate
    safety mitigation practices in place for each territory and in certain
    areas, where signal systems are not in place, we will reconsider
    whether we operate at all.
        Lastly, there may be railroads that operate over Amtrak tracks in
    the NEC which may not have sufficient PTC-commissioned rolling stock by
    the December 31, 2018 deadline to operate normal services. Under the
    present rules, Amtrak cannot permit non-compliant equipment to be used
    over our railroad after the deadline and we will be working closely
    with our partners and the FRA to determine the best way to address this
    situation.
        To be clear, Amtrak has not made any decisions to cease train
    operations across our network or on any specific routes at this time.
    Instead, we are going to thoroughly analyze each route on a case-by-
    case basis and consider the appropriate strategies for enhancing safety
    on such routes after the December 2018 deadline. In particular, as we
    assess these routes, we know that some of them are shared with our
    commuter partners who face their own challenges to reach the deadline.
    We will assist our commuter partners, where we can, to reach the
    deadline or to find viable alternatives to bridge the gap. It would not
    be prudent to force more commuters onto our highways in already
    congested urban regions; rail remains the best and safer solution.
        While we work to meet this deadline, I think it's also important to
    acknowledge the role that Federal funds have and will play in the
    implementation of these systems for passenger and commuter rail. Amtrak
    has certainly been the recipient of some of these funds and acknowledge
    their critical role in allowing us to meet our deadlines. We are also
    aware of the additional funding likely needed by our commuter partners
    to help fully implement PTC as quickly as possible. In addition, there
    will be an ongoing maintenance cost associated with PTC systems, which
    for some may be a financial hardship in future years and could require
    further Federal investment. We appreciate and acknowledge the important
    role Federal funding has in improving rail safety.
        As we prepare to operate in a PTC environment, I do think it is
    worth noting that PTC was designed to address specific vulnerabilities
    in train operations--train-to-train collisions, over-speed derailments,
    incursions into work zones, and misaligned switches. Thus, PTC is not a
    complete technology answer as there are events that PTC does not
    address -such as when a car or truck crosses over tracks at a crossing,
    certain track defects, or other incidents like rockslides.
        I raise this not to take anything away from PTC and the important
    capabilities it offers the rail industry, but simply to be clear about
    how we cannot rely on PTC alone. Safety depends on the hard work and
    vigilance of thousands of our trained and dedicated employees and on
    the appropriate levels of investments being made in the network's
    infrastructure. For instance, while the number of total U.S. train
    accidents has declined by 14 percent over the past four years and
    accidents involving passenger trains accounted for only 2.5 percent of
    all accidents, according to the FRA rail safety database, grade
    crossing and trespasser incidents remain high. In 2017, there were
    1,880 grade crossing accidents involving 243 fatalities and a separate
    552 trespasser fatalities. PTC will help protect against many of the
    human factors-caused accidents that occur across the U.S. rail system,
    but having made progress against this vulnerability, we must also turn
    our attention and, the attention of the highway and motorist
    communities, to the startling loss of life that occurs on a daily basis
    when motorists and pedestrians occupy the right of way ahead of a
    train.
    Safety and Amtrak
        Amtrak, as the Nation's intercity passenger rail carrier, has long
    recognized our unique requirement to have strong protocols in place to
    make riding the rails safe. In many areas, we go above and beyond FRA
    requirements and industry practice. For example, Amtrak requires a full
    annual physical evaluation for every engineer, including sleep apnea
    screening, whereas FRA simply requires an exam once every three years.
    Amtrak requires that newly promoted engineers are evaluated monthly for
    their first year of service, whereas FRA has no special requirements
    for evaluation of newly promoted engineers. Amtrak engineers and
    conductors are required to attend annual training for recertification,
    whereas FRA only requires full recertification every three years. In
    addition, Amtrak's drug and alcohol testing protocols exceed Federal
    requirements. Our testing regimen is so strenuous that employees
    understand that a random drug test in the course of the year is not
    just possible, it is likely.
        We're also taking other steps, such as installing inward-facing
    cameras. These cameras monitor locomotive and engineer performance and
    are installed in Amtrak trains along routes in the Northeast, Midwest,
    and West and we are actively working to install them on Amtrak trains
    nationwide. Reviewing the data from these cameras, coupled with the
    data from our efficiency testing programs, provides us an excellent
    view of operational issues to be addressed in future training programs.
        While many of these efforts draw on safety practices used by some
    of our partners in the freight rail industry, since we are carrying
    people, we believe we must also draw on the expertise of other safety-
    critical industries. Our goal is to build upon our good practices and
    take them to the next level to deliver the world-class safety that our
    customers deserve and expect.
        To put us on the path to reach that goal, just last month Amtrak
    hired a new Executive Vice President and Chief Safety Officer, Ken
    Hylander. Ken is a widely respected member of the transportation safety
    community with more than thirty years of service--in addition to being
    a former colleague of mine at Delta Airlines. Ken reports directly to
    me to ensure his position has full authority and maximum impact. Amtrak
    has consolidated several previously separate resources, including
    System Safety, Compliance and Training, Environmental Compliance,
    Sustainability, and Public Health underneath him.
    Safety Management System (SMS)
        Ken's primary objective will be to implement a Safety Management
    Systems (SMS) to improve our safety culture. SMS will revitalize
    Amtrak's safety programs by primarily strengthening hazard
    identification and complimentary mitigation programs. An SMS is a
    proactive risk management system, which will move us toward a more
    predictive safety management method at an organizational level. Having
    a safety culture that continually identifies, and mitigates, future
    risk is the proven way to improve overall safety performance. It has
    been a cornerstone of im-proving safety in many industries, including
    aviation, health care, and energy--and it is also the right system for
    Amtrak.
        A positive safety culture means an organization that easily
    facilitates and is receptive to safety discussions; that is committed
    to and practices risk reduction; that recognizes and accepts a healthy
    balance between centralized policy and procedure control and the value
    of local knowledge. A safety culture requires the reporting of safety
    issues at all levels. It is intolerant of recklessness and willful
    disregard for safety practices and learns from its mistakes. Safety
    culture emerges over time. Daily decisions and actual practice will
    define our culture. A good safety culture and a successful SMS are
    interdependent.
        We will know as a company that we have arrived at a good SMS when
    we (1) have better safety data available for decision making, (2) can
    analyze safety risks before we do something, not after; and 3) have
    closed-loop processes that find hazards, mitigates them, and verifies
    efficacy. Additionally, our safety processes will be fully integrated
    into our organizational decision-making and supported by strong
    oversight to ensure compliance with the practices we want to implement.
    At a personal level each Amtrak employee will know his or her role in
    the safety process.
        We know that implementation of an SMS is a significant
    undertaking--it requires our organizational commitment. SMS demands
    that all safety related procedures must be carefully documented,
    universally understood, and unfailingly applied. SMS is designed to
    advance that outcome by formalizing our knowledge into processes,
    checklists, and governing documentation to improve consistency. Amtrak
    believes the implementation of SMS will truly take our safety
    performance to the highest level of service. These efforts are in line
    with the NTSB's recommendation that Amtrak and our unions implement a
    SMS Program and generally consistent with the Risk Reduction Program
    approach mandated by this Committee in the 2008 Rail Safety Improvement
    Act and required by FRA through the development of a System Safety
    Program.
    Conclusion
        When the Amtrak board asked me to lead their railroad, they did so
    with the expectation that I would bring an outsider's perspective to
    the business. This mandate, combined with the events of the past few
    months, compels me to examine our business practices and think
    carefully about ways in which an elevated safety focus would alter how
    we operate. Some of these changes have been made, and several more of
    them are now underway. Let me present some ex-amples.
        We are changing our policies on operating on host railroad
    territories with temporarily inoperable signal systems. While we are
    evaluating two different approaches, they both boil down to reducing
    speed significantly in these circumstances in advance of known hazards.
    While we see such a change as fully warranted, they may result in
    operational impacts to our host railroads and our trains, and we will
    need to work with our hosts to determine the best ways to minimize
    those impacts.
        Building on the changes to our operations when signals are
    unavailable, Amtrak will change how we operate through sections of
    track with no signals at all, so-called `dark territory,' which is also
    exempted from the PTC mandate. Approximately 1 percent of our current
    or planned routes transit through dark territory, totaling 222 miles in
    Indiana, Maine, New York, Quebec, and Vermont. We believe it is time to
    reevaluate the risks that accompany such operations and adopt a new
    approach, particularly as the implementation of PTC will provide even
    greater safety margins beyond traditional railroad signaling on the
    vast majority of our routes. Based on hazard analyses and mitigation
    options, the application of new technologies like switch position
    indicators; altered operating practices; signal system and PTC
    investments or rerouting or route abandonments may all be appropriate
    for such dark territory. Working together with our host railroads and
    local stakeholders, we need to quickly evaluate the risks and take the
    necessary steps to ensure we don't leave sections of our network
    unnecessarily vulnerable.
        Amtrak is organizing a centralized standards, training, and quality
    assurance organization for engineers and conductors moving away from a
    former regional approach to training and safety oversight. Our aim is a
    more robust, consistent, and unified approach to these issues, which
    will serve as a vital resource across our network. Similarly,
    immediately following the December derailment of Train 501, we adopted
    a new policy that requires approval from the heads of our operations
    and safety departments before our personnel operate over new or
    modified routes. While Amtrak had general procedures for new routes
    prior to that incident, they were managed regionally and we believe a
    central review by our safety and operating experts and a single array
    of consistent standards will strengthen outcomes.
        A related initiative is the revamping of our trainmaster and road
    foreman staffing to provide more support and training for our engineers
    and conductors. These positions directly manage our front-line
    employees who operate our trains and we are re-thinking our
    qualification training standards and identifying the additional
    resources--both manpower and technology--to enable our crews to benefit
    from industry leading approaches to procedural and operational training
    regimens. We will look carefully at how the commercial aviation
    industry has applied simulation, and more recently, virtual reality as
    well as augmented reality, to make our training more realistic and more
    effective to serve our crews and customers better.
        Strengthening safety is a continuous process. Amtrak's
    responsibility is to lead safety across our industry and serve as good
    stewards of the vital resources that we receive from Congress and the
    Administration to help us implement these advancements. Likewise,
    railroads alone can't solve all of the issues, as grade crossing and
    trespasser accidents require a broader effort of local, state and
    Federal stakeholders to educate motorist and pedestrians, better equip
    vulnerable crossings, limit public access to rights of way and
    strengthen enforcement.
        I have great confidence in Amtrak's dedicated workforce and the
    commitment I see across our company to becomes the safest passenger
    railroad in North America, but there is work to be done to improve the
    entire rail system. While the challenges described today are difficult,
    they can be overcome. At Amtrak, we owe our customers nothing less.
        Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today, and I
    welcome your questions.

        The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Anderson.
        Ms. Fleming, you testified that 7 to 19 commuter railroads
    may not even hit the milestones necessary to qualify for an
    extension beyond December 31, let alone fully implement PTC. I
    want to drill down a ways to see what we can do to improve the
    situation. What can these railroads be doing in the next 10
    months to best advance PTC implementation?
        Ms. Fleming. You know, I think, where possible, it's really
    important to get management and the Board on board to make some
    important decisions in order to keep moving forward. We've
    heard from some of the railroads that are further along that
    they've had to make service adjustments in order to finish
    installation of equipment or to begin testing. We also heard
    from some of the railroads that it's really important that the
    railroad be actively involved in all phases of the project
    rather than solely relying on your contractors.
        And then I think the last thing would be is there are some
    railroads that are further along, and there are opportunities
    to take full advantage of user groups and industry forums to
    capitalize on some of the best practices and lessons learned
    from these railroads.
        The Chairman. And do you think it's realistic that all that
    get done in 10 months?
        Ms. Fleming. You mean to meet the deadline?
        The Chairman. Mm-hmm.
        Ms. Fleming. Our analysis shows that no, that depending on
    how you cut the data, as many as half of the railroads may not
    meet the deadline or have enough time to meet the criteria to
    qualify for an RSD extension.
        So I think part of the problem is that some of the
    railroads have some heavy lifting to do. They haven't begun the
    second phase, which is really where you have to deal with some
    of the complexity and time-consuming things, installing the
    back office server, field testing. The railroads that have done
    those things, on average, it could take them 7 to 10 months,
    but from FRA's perspective, you're talking about 1 to 3 years.
    So if these railroads haven't started tackling some of that,
    the time is running out for them.
        The Chairman. You also recommended that FRA improve its
    communication with railroads and better prioritize its
    resources and workload regarding PTC. And based on your
    recommendations, I intend to send a letter to the new
    Administrator of FRA inquiring about the agency's plan to
    address the recommendation that you have raised in your report.
        Ms. Fleming. I appreciate that.
        The Chairman. Mr. Mayer, according to your projections,
    Metro-North and Long Island Rail Road are scheduled to have PTC
    operating on all lines by December 31 of this year. And while I
    appreciate the aggressive schedule, I want to make sure the
    traveling public has a clear-eyed understanding of the
    likelihood of this outcome. At this point, can you guarantee
    that Metro-North and Long Island Rail Road will not file for an
    extension from the December 31, 2018, deadline?
        Mr. Mayer. Well, our schedule is a doable schedule, but as
    I said in my remarks, it is a schedule that has risk. And as we
    move forward through each stage, we don't know exactly what
    we're going to encounter. We believe we can have all lines in
    operation by the deadline, but if we don't, the schedule does
    allow for or the law does allow for an alternative schedule
    compliance, and we're certain that we can be able to meet that
    if we have to.
        The Chairman. Ms. Fleming, in follow-up to that question,
    GAO studied how long certain steps take to implement PTC,
    including the testing and demonstration phases. How does MTA's
    schedule compare with the information that you learned in your
    reviews and analysis?
        Ms. Fleming. Quite frankly, it looks a little bit tight,
    and I think it's because, again, having to tackle some of the
    more complex, time-consuming activities, you know, I know that
    they have a pretty ambitious schedule, but, you know, things
    can happen, particularly as you start the testing phase. And,
    again, FRA's own estimate on average puts railroads at about 2
    years to complete that phase.
        So I think it's ambitious, and it doesn't maybe account for
    some of the glitches that you can find, the bugs that you can
    find, through testing. And even installing the back office
    server, we found that the railroads that are far along, it took
    them at least 10 months on average, but, quite frankly, from
    FRA's perspective, you're again looking at a couple years.
        Mr. Mayer. Mr. Chairman, if I could add, we certainly don't
    disagree that this is an extraordinarily aggressive and tight
    schedule, and it has our challenges. That said, at least for
    our railroads, as we enter revenue service demonstration, it
    won't be the first time that we've been testing. I mentioned
    that we're able to provide speed enforcement on both of our
    railroads, and particularly Metro-North Railroad, we have been
    testing for 2 years, and that's why we're able to incrementally
    provide speed enforcement. I won't tell you that we won't
    encounter problems when we add the back office server and we
    move to full-up revenue service demonstration, but it gives us
    some degree of confidence that other railroads may not have
    about that phase.
        The Chairman. Mr. Anderson, you stated that there may be
    railroads that operate over Amtrak tracks in the Northeast
    Corridor that will not have PTC on their locomotives, and you
    stated that Amtrak cannot permit such locomotives to be used on
    its tracks after the PTC deadline. Based on your understanding
    of the progress of your tenant railroads, how likely is it that
    Amtrak will prohibit these commuter railroad locomotives from
    operating on its tracks?
        Mr. Anderson. I think that the factual situation will arise
    whether or not technically allowed to operate on the tracks.
    And I think what we have to work on with some of those are
    mitigation plans. We have some extra ACS-64 locomotives where
    we could provide the propulsion and the T&E crews, but this
    gets back to my point, that I think the reality is--and to your
    question about what FRA is doing--Ron Batory is actually doing
    a really good job pulling all the railroads in. We have another
    two-day session with him on March 4 and 5, and really going
    through every single milestone for each one of the railroads
    that operate on Amtrak or where Amtrak operates off its own
    infrastructure.
        And I think we're going to get confronted, as a policy
    question, with that issue. I mean, do you have a commuter
    railroad that carries a couple hundred thousand people a day,
    you know? Can you practically? And is it the right policy to
    not have that railroad operate and put everybody on roads? So
    the question is, What other mitigation steps can you take? What
    things can we do, as a host, with our partners on the Corridor
    to mitigate those issues and be certain that we still provide
    safe operations?
        The Chairman. Which commuter railroads do you think are
    most at risk?
        Mr. Anderson. I think Metro-North, NJT, are probably the
    two that we understand, but we will know more as Ron Batory
    works with us. And we're working very close with Metro-North.
    We're working very close with NJT. We want to see them succeed.
    That's our responsibility as a steward of that, of the
    Northeast Corridor.
        The Chairman. My time is expired.
        Senator Nelson, I understand you want to defer to Senator
    Cantwell.
        Senator Nelson. Yes. Senator Cantwell is the one that
    requested this hearing, so I want to defer my time for her and
    just say at the outset that here we are, 3 years later,
    confronting the same thing that we confronted 3 years ago, that
    several railroads are not going to be ready, and it's going to
    lead to more crashes. When is enough, enough?
        The Chairman. Senator.

                   STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL,
                      U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON

        Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Senator Nelson. Thank you for
    your indulgence.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for both you and the Ranking
    Member organizing this hearing. And clearly the discussion of
    positive train control and implementation has become a all too
    live debate in the State of Washington with the horrific crash
    that killed three people and injured 80 in the State of
    Washington. So what the discussion you're having right now is
    about how do we move forward in that same vein? I know, as it
    relates to Washington State, the rail Amtrak uses in Washington
    that is owned by BNSF will be compliant by the end of this
    year. Is that right, Mr. Anderson?
        Mr. Anderson. Yes, Senator, it will.
        Senator Cantwell. So it will only be those, you know,
    separately run tracks and the question on their compliance. Is
    that correct?
        Mr. Anderson. That's a correct statement.
        Senator Cantwell. So on the line that was--where the
    accident occurred, it's a question about whether they'll be
    compliant.
        Mr. Anderson. They will be PTC-compliant before the
    deadline.
        Senator Cantwell. OK. So if I could ask, because as this
    discussion continues with the Committee about those sites that
    are going to be compliant and noncompliant and where we're
    going to run, if I could just show a picture--oh, it's already
    there. This is the warning sign, right? It's like a highway, I
    guess, in the sense of your exit is coming up, but in this
    case, slow down to 30 miles an hour, right? They see that sign
    at 2 miles, at 1 mile, at one half mile, and as the curve
    starts, right? But I think in this case--well, we don't know
    all the NTSB investigation will say, but instead of going 30,
    they didn't have the situational awareness to--they didn't
    observe this, and hit that curve on its maiden route at speeds
    we think over 50 miles per hour above the limit. So this is
    going to continue to be a real live discussion in other places.
        Now, just to clarify, in this situation, under positive
    train control, if they blew by this signal at more than 30
    miles an hour, the train would be automatically slowed down or
    stopped, is that correct?
        Mr. Anderson. Correct.
        Senator Cantwell. So that implementation, you wouldn't need
    the situational awareness in that instance, but it is still
    something that you would want to have implemented with your
    engineers, is that correct?
        Mr. Anderson. Correct. And actually we need to go further
    than the PTC regulation and establish a standard of 100
    percent. If you're a passenger and you get on a train in
    America, you need to be PTC-compliant or PTC-equivalent. I just
    don't think there's any other way to deal with the risk of
    single human error. I walked that track the night after the
    accident, and you see the curve and you see the signs, and it
    really makes such a compelling case for PTC because we could
    have avoided it.
        Senator Cantwell. Well, I think that's what the Ranking
    Member was just saying, that, yes, we should have mandated
    something in 2015 that now we're going to discuss what's going
    to happen when it's not in place by the end of the year for
    certain tracks and services, right?
        Mr. Anderson. Correct.
        Senator Cantwell. And so I'm understanding your House
    testimony that you doubted that Amtrak would operate on any
    rail line that wasn't PTC functioning by the end of the year.
        Mr. Anderson. Yes. That hasn't been very popular.
        Senator Cantwell. And so does the Committee have a list of
    that, of where those areas are?
        Mr. Anderson. We can give you a list of those.
        Senator Cantwell. OK.
        Mr. Anderson. But, yes, we do have--and they touch my
    estimate is probably somewhere between 300 to 700 miles of
    track we operate on.
        Senator Cantwell. And so just for the riding public on rail
    services, not knowing where PTC exists and doesn't exist, what
    is Amtrak going to do to increase the situational awareness
    training that is important for those lines that don't have PTC?
    Or is Amtrak just going to take a hard-and-fast line, no more
    commuter rail transportation after December 31 without PTC?
        Mr. Anderson. Look, that's the sort of Sisyphean problem,
    which is on the one hand we support Amtrak assets and trains
    and T&E crews and maintenance, we support probably a half a
    billion trips a year, so it's an essential part of what we do.
    On the other hand, it's not very comforting being the President
    of Amtrak and running trains on dark railroads.
        So I think the first thing is we have to--and after 501, we
    immediately improved our oversight and hands-on engagement of
    our road foremen in our crew briefing rooms. We've revamped our
    operating procedures for commissioning new routes. It takes my
    approval now to go through the gating process under our SMS for
    a new route.
        We have reduced headcount in the headquarters, and we're
    going to redeploy those resources to the field for more road
    foremen and assistant road foremen, and in our transportation
    organization.
        We put in new rules for operating on signal-suspended
    railroads. And we're implementing well in advance of the FRA
    deadlines a rail safety SMS program.
        But we still remain exposed. And even after PTC--now, PTC
    will be on the Defiance Bypass and all of the Cascades, but
    even after that, and I can share with you, it's a great
    question, the places where we, even after the deadline, if you
    assumed every railroad complied with the rule, we are still
    going to have significant sections of passenger rail operations
    without PTC, and I think that is a level of risk that we
    shouldn't be prepared to take as a railroad, and my Board at
    Amtrak has taken that position.
        Senator Cantwell. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know my
    time has expired, but this certainly was a very costly incident
    to the Pacific Northwest, and we--our sympathies are with the
    families who have lost loved ones. The issue is that we need to
    make sure that the traveling public is safe----
        Mr. Anderson. Absolutely.
        Senator Cantwell.--and that these, both situational
    awareness and technologies, are at the best available--or the
    assessment that you're just making is implemented.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Anderson. And we are deeply sorry to the communities in
    Washington. And we have admitted all liability, and we are
    generously settling those claims and covering all the costs for
    the State of Washington.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cantwell.
        Senator Hassan.

                   STATEMENT OF HON. MAGGIE HASSAN,
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE

        Senator Hassan. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And thank you to our
    panelists this morning. I appreciate your being here very much
    and the work you do very much.
        I'll start with a question to Mr. Anderson and Mr. Mayer.
    As you may know, the NTSB recently reported the undiagnosed
    obstructive sleep apnea was a causal factor in two separate
    commuter train derailments, in September 2016 and January 2017.
    These two derailments collectively involved the injury of over
    200 people and the death of one. The NTSB noted that the
    Federal Rail Administration does not require medical screenings
    for its safety-critical workers to guard against disorders such
    as sleep apnea.
        The lack of Federal standards and testing requirements
    around this issue I think is reckless and has clearly led to
    deaths and injuries in the rail sector. So we obviously need to
    do something about it. I recently wrote a letter to FRA calling
    on them to remedy this situation.
        So, Mr. Anderson and Mr. Mayer, what steps are you taking
    to protect rail workers and the commuters who depend on them
    from harms caused by undiagnosed sleep apnea?
        Mr. Anderson. Well, first, you're right. And so at Amtrak--
    the FRA rule is a physical for an engineer every 3 years. Our
    rule is every 1 year, and we require screening for sleep apnea;
    when diagnosed, you're taken out of service. We want our
    engineers to get the proper treatment. There are proper
    treatments.
        Senator Hassan. Yes.
        Mr. Anderson. So we are big believers, from an SMS
    standpoint again, our safety management system tells us we have
    to mitigate the risk from sleep apnea, and so our program is
    set up to do that.
        Senator Hassan. Great. Thank you.
        Mr. Mayer. We set up a program that we believe leads the
    industry in this. We decided to screen all of our locomotive
    engineers on both of our railroads as well train operators on
    the New York City subway system, I realize not the subject of
    this hearing----
        Senator Hassan. Yes.
        Mr. Mayer.--but that's thousands of individuals. We've been
    on a very aggressive schedule to do this, just screen thousands
    of individuals and make sure that they have the treatment that
    they require. And we'll be having passed through and screened
    every one of those job titles by the end of May.
        Senator Hassan. That's good to hear. Thank you.
        To Ms. Fleming, is this a problem that merits further
    attention by the GAO?
        Ms. Fleming. You know, it's not an area that we've looked
    into, but we'd be happy to work with you and the Committee on
    this issue. It sounds like a very important issue.
        Senator Hassan. I think it is, especially because, as both
    of these witnesses answered, there is also treatment for sleep
    apnea.
        Ms. Fleming. Right.
        Senator Hassan. So it's not an either/or thing, we just
    need to make sure we're identifying it and treating it.
        Mr. Anderson, I wanted to follow up a little bit with you
    on the issue of what happens to lines that may not be PTC-
    compliant by the deadline. And in my case, I'm concerned about
    lines in Vermont, which obviously serve constituents of mine in
    New Hampshire and, as I understand it, are exempted from the
    requirement.
        So to follow up on some of the other questions you've
    gotten, you testified before the House Transportation Committee
    and stated that you doubted whether service would continue for
    areas that did not have PTC in place by 2018. We've heard
    concerns about how this could impact the Vermonter's service,
    which travels through New Hampshire, and constituents are
    obviously concerned.
        So, again, is there a way that we can address safety
    concerns, but also not take these lines, which were exempted
    under the statute, out of service? They're so critical for
    people in our states and businesses, too.
        Mr. Anderson. Yes, Senator. And after you expressed that to
    us, and after my testimony in the House, we have undertaken
    under our SMS risk assessment program what steps we could take
    in the short run----
        Senator Hassan. Right.
        Mr. Anderson.--to mitigate operations on dark railroads and
    non-PTC railroads. I do think that--and we have an R&D project
    underway at Amtrak to determine whether we can use technologies
    from Europe that don't require as much trackside investment,
    but would give us speed restrictions and signal location. And
    there may be mitigation efforts like slow speeds coming up on
    switches, requiring the conductor in dark territory to ride in
    the front of the cab.
        Senator Hassan. OK.
        Mr. Anderson. So we are putting it through candidly as what
    we did in aviation, and we're putting it through that same sort
    of alternative means of compliance because we realize the
    importance of our service. And the Vermonter is a really good
    route for us.
        Senator Hassan. Yes.
        Mr. Anderson. So it's not one that economically or
    otherwise you would ever be motivated to do anything to----
        Senator Hassan. Right.
        Mr. Anderson.--but as a practical matter, after you go to
    Washington and walk down, you know, and sit at one of these
    accident sites, it sharpens your focus.
        Senator Hassan. Of course it does, and we are very glad for
    that sharp focus. Thank you all very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Hassan.
        Senator Klobuchar.

                   STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR,
                      U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA

        Senator Klobuchar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, welcome, Mr. Anderson.
        I think I'll start with you, Ms. Fleming. While the FRA
    collects information from commuter railroads on their progress
    in implementing PTC, the GAO has found that the FRA is not
    using this information to prioritize resources to those
    railroads most likely to miss the deadline. I would think that
    a risk-based approach would help with PTC implementation. What
    specific information does the FRA need to collect that would
    help target support where we need it the most?
        Ms. Fleming. You know, I think that they really need to
    consider, as a recommendation, to have--to use the information
    that it collects and to apply more of a risk-based approach.
    You know, they're going to be getting significant documentation
    coming their way in the next months and leading up to 2020,
    everything from test waivers, RSD applications, and safety
    plans. To give you a sense of what that means, for now, it has
    been taking FRA 10 to 100 days to review a test waiver, but the
    safety plans are 5,000-plus pages, and they told us that they
    won't be able to review more than two or three a year. So if
    you do the math, that's pretty much a heavy lift.
        And also it means the FRA needs to think about, you know,
    what do they do? Do they then target the railroads that carry
    the most passengers, work with them? Do they work with the
    railroads that are close to being there and push them over the
    hump? Or do they target their resources to work with the
    railroads that are really struggling and may need more
    handholding and some assistance so that they can kind of tackle
    some of these challenges?
        Senator Klobuchar. Mm-hmm. And what do you think they
    should do?
        Ms. Fleming. We are going to leave that up to them because
    I think--you know, there are 12 PTC experts right now, and I
    know FRA is looking to hire a few more. You know, we've heard
    that the individualized, you know, attention, that one-on-one,
    has been great, but there are only 12 folks, and there are a
    lot of railroads that could use some guidance. And the other
    recommendation really speaks to the fact that, again, it's more
    of an informal reactive approach, and we think that the
    downside of that is that there could be inconsistent
    information be relayed, maybe even inaccurate information.
        So they need to, at this juncture, have more of a
    systematic communication with all the railroads in terms of,
    what are they looking for in terms of the criteria, the
    application process and the criteria for the extension. How are
    they planning to review and approve these? I think railroads
    just need a lot of good information right now.
        Senator Klobuchar. OK. Mr. Anderson, a different topic that
    I don't think has been focused on very much, and that's rail
    crossing safety. And I know that you mentioned that in 2017
    there were 1,880 grade crossing accidents. And while PTC we
    know is very crucial safety technology, it's not always
    equipped to handle those kinds of incidents at all, and we've
    had a few of these in our state.
        So what is Amtrak doing to address rail crossing safety?
        Mr. Anderson. In our legend grant, we support the Federal
    Highway program, which allocates about $250 million a year for
    investment in rail crossing safety. This is the single biggest
    safety issue for rail in America. Over 250 to 300 deaths a
    year, and completely preventable with the right infrastructure
    investment in rail crossing, and I think the work that the FRA
    historically has done has been quite successful in terms of
    driving down accidents at rail crossings. So it's something
    that is a solved problem, we just have to put the investment in
    the infrastructure.
        Senator Klobuchar. So you would like to see investment help
    with that.
        Mr. Anderson. We did. We put it in our legend grant request
    and endorsement of the Federal Highway programs for more
    investment in grade crossings. What we should do is just a
    Pareto analysis of the highest risk to the lowest risk, and
    then just target investment after investment after investment
    to just drive the number down.
        Senator Klobuchar. OK. And by the way, thanks for your
    leadership. I know there's a lot going on, and I appreciate you
    stepping up.
        Mr. Anderson. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Klobuchar. Thank you.
        Mr. Anderson. Good to see you.
        Senator Klobuchar. Good to see you. You still live in my
    state, so there you go.
        Mr. Anderson. I still do part-time.
        Senator Klobuchar. He still does, yes. He loves our state
    even when it's one degree.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Klobuchar. Mr. Mayer, coming from a border state,
    and as Co-Chair of the Canadian-U.S. Inter-Parliamentary Group,
    I'm concerned about the level interoperability of rail safety
    technology with Canadian rail operators, who have had a few
    issues. Do you want to just briefly comment on this so I can--
    Mr. Mayer? Thank you.
        Mr. Mayer. We don't operate up into Canada, but
    interoperability is extremely important to us. We should
    track--we should corridor with Amtrak. Long Island Rail Road
    operates over Amtrak tracks into and inside of Penn Station,
    and our New Haven line on Metro-North territory functions as
    the Northeast Corridor that Amtrak operates over. And so we are
    committed to interoperability. We will be interoperability when
    we bring PTC online, and we will find a way to continue to
    operate together safely and legally.
        Senator Klobuchar. All right. Thank you.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Klobuchar.
        Senator Udall, then Senator Blunt.

                     STATEMENT OF HON. TOM UDALL,
                      U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW MEXICO

        Senator Udall. Thank you very much, Chairman Thune and
    Ranking Member Nelson, for convening this hearing. We all know
    there have been a number of accidents that could have been
    prevented if appropriate safety measures had been in place, and
    I think several of you have highlighted that in your testimony.
    But even the best technology cannot prevent human error, both
    on trains and abandoned vehicles on tracks.
        I'm concerned about the ability of small commuter railroads
    being able to sustain the cost for full implementation of
    positive train control. However, every railroad, commuter or
    freight, must operate with high safety standards to ensure the
    protection of the public and the protection of railroad
    employees.
        Ms. Fleming, are low-risk railroads, like the Rio Metro
    Rail Runner in New Mexico, able to operate safely under a risk
    mitigation plan and without positive train control until they
    are able to have a system operational?
        Ms. Fleming. So what the risk mitigation strategy would lay
    out, it's a plan for operating trains that would fall below the
    threshold that requires positive train control. So it wouldn't
    necessarily provide the same benefits as a fully operational
    PTC system. And it allows the railroad to have a grace period.
    So it basically allows them to operate under that plan, but
    ultimately they still would be required to implement PTC at
    some point.
        Senator Udall. Thank you for that answer.
        Mr. Anderson, in your testimony, you outlined the ways,
    including training centralization, that Amtrak is improving its
    safety culture. This is essential to ensure the safety of
    workers and passengers alike. Can you clarify the timeframes
    when these various actions will be operational?
        Mr. Anderson. Thank you for the question. And I would start
    out by offering that we have very--a really good workforce of
    conductors and engineers that work really hard to operate a
    safe railroad. We are--right now I hired an Executive Vice
    President and Chief Safety Officer from the aviation industry,
    reports directly to me, and it is a daily process now at
    Amtrak. We have already implemented our new signal suspension
    policies. We will shortly have completion of our engineer
    qualification on new routes to address the issues that we had
    in 501 out in Washington. So it's an ongoing process.
        I will say that the SMS program, which is in an NPRM right
    now with FRA, has a deadline of November, and we plan on filing
    our SMS plan well in advance of November. This is imperative.
    It's the single biggest priority we have at Amtrak right now.
        Senator Udall. Thank you.
        And, Mr. Mayer and Mr. Anderson, cybersecurity protection
    measures are extremely important for all businesses, but
    especially for transit systems, where a cyber intrusion could
    cause death or extreme property destruction. What are the steps
    that you are taking to prevent cyber attacks? And if you cannot
    provide a complete answer now, you're welcome to respond in the
    record.
        Mr. Mayer. I can certainly tell you a little bit about
    cybersecurity. First of all, I would point out that PTC is a
    layer onto the engineer, so it can slow or stop trains, but it
    is not a remote control capability for trains. So there's a
    limited protection there just in the basic functionality. That
    said, the FRA has strict cybersecurity rules for PTC
    implementation, and I know our railroads are working very hard
    with Amtrak as we implement a secure PTC solution. Amtrak was
    the recipient of a grant from the FRA for cybersecurity
    development for PTC. The consortium of railroads that are all
    designing around the Amtrak system are working very hard to
    ensure that our systems are secure, and we are using industry
    best practices and NIST-approved encryption to roll this
    technology out.
        Senator Udall. Great. Mr. Anderson, I assume you agree with
    most of that, right?
        Mr. Anderson. I agree, and I'd like the chance to come
    brief you because we have a lot of work underway on this.
        Senator Udall. That would be great.
        Just a quick final question. Each railroad system has
    determined which PTC technology it will use. And there was no
    Federal coordination in selecting software use. Can each of you
    address how your systems will ensure that the technology
    installed will be interoperable across technology platforms and
    rail systems?
        Mr. Mayer. The--Amtrak has been using its system for a
    number of years, and so the railroads that interoperate with
    Amtrak have chosen to develop systems that are based on the
    Amtrak solution. Now, that's been a challenge. We've been able
    to use about a third of the Amtrak solution right off the
    shelf. Another third has needed a major rewrite. And a final
    third is a complete ground-up software development project. But
    that said, because we are all based on a common platform, and,
    quite frankly, because our engineers and our technical staffs
    speak with each other on a daily basis, we are confident that
    we will arrive at an interoperable PTC solution across our
    different railroads.
        Senator Udall. Great. Thank you very much.
        My time is exhausted. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Udall.
        Senator Blunt.

                     STATEMENT OF HON. ROY BLUNT,
                       U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI

        Senator Blunt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Let's follow up on Senator Udall's question a little bit.
        Mr. Anderson, you mentioned, I think, that you use 20
    different railroads' track and three different systems--let's
    follow up on what that you were asked and what Mr. Mayer sort
    of commented on that. How do you make that work? Is there a
    reasonable way to make those three different systems work? And
    do you have the same equipment running on tracks where there is
    more than one system? And just tell us a little bit about that
    challenge.
        Mr. Anderson. OK. So in the Northeast Corridor, it's an
    Amtrak-developed system because of the speeds that operate on
    the Acela, and it's called ACSES, and ACSES is the standard in
    the Corridor. The freight railroads that operate in the
    Corridor have to operate with ACSES, which is the Amtrak system
    that's been around for a while, but they have also have
    something called ETMS, which is the standard that the Class 1
    freight railroads have established around the country, so
    they're dual-equipped.
        Because we run on catenary in the Corridor, the ACS-64
    locomotives are electric, they stay in the Corridor. So that
    equipment is dedicated there. In Michigan, we have a different
    system, ICTS, because we run at higher speeds with passenger
    rail, and that is just for the folks that operate or the
    railroads that operate on the line zoned by Amtrak in the state
    of Michigan--three routes in Michigan. We tend to have
    dedicated locomotives rather than dual equipping----
        Senator Blunt. And as long as you do that, do you think
    that creates a long-term ability for you to deal with the
    different systems on the different railroads----
        Mr. Anderson. It does.
        Senator Blunt. Different equipment is the answer?
        Mr. Anderson. Well, ultimately, you would like
    simplification in a single piece of equipment because if a
    locomotive breaks down and you have another locomotive there,
    you want to be able to substitute it, but if it doesn't have
    the right equipment on it, you're not going to be able to. So
    ultimately we will probably go through a process of dual
    equipping, but for now, the way you can get to the deadline is
    have--which we sort of dedicate different types of equipment to
    different regions anyway. It will work practically for us to
    have the third EMTS, which is the--I don't know if I got the
    acronym right--is the system that the Class 1 freight railroads
    use around the United States.
        Senator Blunt. And how does the back office server relate
    to all of this?
        Mr. Anderson. The back office server is basically a
    computer system that for Amtrak is operated by Rockwell
    Collins. Rockwell Collins bought something called ARINC, which
    is the company that connects airplanes in the sky, and----
        Senator Blunt. You know something about that, too.
        Mr. Anderson. Well, yes.
        [Laughter.]
        Mr. Anderson. Yes, I do. And so Amtrak, because we had to
    federate, that is, have interoperability with so many
    railroads, and on two different systems outside the Corridor.
    ACSES doesn't have to federate, so ACSES in the Corridor runs
    standalone. The other two, we rely on Rockwell Collins to
    operate the basic server farm to federate all of the other
    railroads that we operate on and to operate that server farm
    for us so that the trains and the dispatchers all communicate.
        If I were going to suggest one thing for the Committee that
    could accelerate all this, get the presidents of Alstom,
    Siemens, Wabtec, and Rockwell Collins, and put the four of them
    right here because much of this technology that we're talking
    about depends upon software development and hardware
    development by those OEMs, and that's--those are the--those are
    probably the biggest critical dependencies right now.
        Senator Blunt. Thank you. Maybe the Chairman took down
    notes as to future hearings we could have on this.
        Mr. DeWeese, you mentioned that there was a substantial
    lack of drawdown by some of the railroads on the money that
    they have access to. Are you evaluated in any way from that?
    What would be a reasonable amount of money still to be left
    where they could be done by the end of the year? And what
    clearly is a recipient of funds that has not drawn down funds
    that would relate to them complying with the goal? Is there any
    way there you're following up with the railroads that aren't
    drawing down the funds they need?
        Mr. DeWeese. I certainly think that the level of
    expenditure is an indicator of something. You know, the scope
    of our work, as I mentioned, was really trying to piece
    together the puzzle of who got the money, you know, where did
    it go, and sort of what is the level of expenditures and what
    did they spend it on?
        You know, our--we didn't do a deep dive into spending
    habits. We didn't dive into the spending rates. It's a function
    of many different things. It could be when they got the money.
    So even though there is zero percent expenditure, it could be
    that they only recently received their funds. We didn't do any
    analysis to really show in the time that we had that even
    someone who had spent 80 percent of their funds is going to
    meet the deadline versus someone who has not spent that level
    of funding.
        It depends on the size of the railroad. It depends on the
    types of projects, the size and scope of the projects that
    we're talking about. Some railroads may have one project, and
    they were able to spend their money quicker than another
    railroad that may have multiple projects. So it's a function of
    many different things.
        And I think just the level of effort that it took, you
    know, my team to really piece together the funding angle, we
    really weren't able to do a deeper dive into some of the issues
    that you're talking about, but I do think it's an important
    one.
        Senator Blunt. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Blunt.
        Senator Peters.

                    STATEMENT OF HON. GARY PETERS,
                       U.S. SENATOR FROM MICHIGAN

        Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank you to our witnesses for being here today to
    discuss what is truly a very critical issue, and it's very
    personal to me as well. On May 12, 2015, a very--some close
    friends of mine, Gilda and John Jacobs, lost their daughter
    Rachel on an Amtrak 188 derailment in Philadelphia, and she
    sent a letter to the Committee for Committee members. And, Mr.
    Chairman, I would like to enter this letter into the record
    with unanimous consent.
        The Chairman. Without objection.
        [The information referred to follows:]

                                                      February 28, 2018

    Dear Committee Members:

        As we do often, this weekend, my husband John and I visited the
    grave of our daughter Rachel. And each time I go, I cry for her, her
    now 5 year old son Jacob, her husband Todd, and my daughter, Jessica.
    We all lost a part of ourselves, and our family, and the world mourns
    her loss as well.
        Rachel's life and the lives of 7 others were needlessly cut short
    when the AMTRAK train they were riding on derailed May 12, 2015. And it
    could have been prevented had PTC been installed and activated on the
    tracks and train. It has been almost three years and yet more trains
    have derailed, others passengers have died, and scores of others have
    been injured. And yet PTC has not been installed or activated on all
    passenger trains in our country. My anger is seething.
        I want to quote the testimony of AMTRAK's CEO to the House of
    Representatives' Transportation and Infrastructure Committee a few
    weeks ago, in which he told Congressional members: ``[A]s a matter of
    U.S. policy, PTC should be required for all passenger rail trips in
    America.'' I agree wholeheartedly. Unfortunately and inexplicably, that
    has not occurred.
        I recognize that the Federal deadline is in place for the
    implementation of PTC by the end of this year, with a potential
    extension with FRA approval to the end of 2020. The railroad lobby has
    been successful in extending the date for compliance once already and
    will likely seek further extensions from you in the coming months. This
    is totally unacceptable, wrong, and those requests should be denied.
    Thousands of lives are in danger every single day and every hour that
    passenger rail trains are permitted to continue to carry passengers on
    rail lines that are unsafe. The passengers on board those trains could
    be your child, your spouse, your mother, your colleague, your office
    mate, and, as we saw again last month in Crozet, Virginia, you as
    members of Congress.
        I, for one, will never step foot on an AMTRAK train, nor should
    you. They are clearly unsafe until this life-saving technology is
    implemented. Without PTC, the question is now if another train
    derailment will occur, but when. In fact, I believe that Congress
    should mandate that passengers be informed whether or not PTC is
    installed and activated on a train before a passenger boards a train
    until all trains are in compliance.
        Before my current job as CEO of a public policy nonprofit, I spent
    30 years in local, county, and state government as an elected official.
    I have held leadership positions in my caucuses, passed legislation,
    knocked on thousands of doors, and met with thousands of people over
    the years. I have been held accountable for my actions and the actions
    of my colleagues. And that is the way it should be.
        Yet the inaction of Congress, the lack of oversight and
    accountability, and the failure to insist that passenger trains
    accelerate the installation and implementation of safety equipment have
    caused more death and human destruction. The responsibility of this
    oversight rests on the shoulders of each and every senator and
    representative who took an oath to serve the public.
        Please step up to do what is right. Don't let my daughter's death
    be in vain. Please protect the public from deadly foot dragging. Do not
    let the railroad lobby convince you that it is too costly or too
    difficult to do the right thing now.
        There are human lives behind the decisions and indecisions you
    make.
                Sincerely,
                                                Gilda Z. Jacobs

        Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And I think it's important. It's a letter that will be
    entered into the record, but I would like to read the first two
    paragraphs, if I may, for the Committee members.
        ``Dear Committee Members,'' and this is written by Gilda
    Jacobs, ``as we do often, this weekend my husband, John, and I
    visited the grave of our daughter, Rachel. And each time I go I
    cry for her, her now 5-year-old son, Jacob, her husband, Todd,
    and my daughter Jessica. We all lost part of ourselves and our
    family, and the world mourns her loss as well.''
        ``Rachel's life and the lives of seven others were
    needlessly cut short when the Amtrak train they were riding on
    derailed May 12, 2015, and it could have been prevented had PTC
    been installed and activated on the tracks and train. It has
    been almost 3 years, and yet more trains have derailed, other
    passengers have died, and scores of others have been injured,
    and yet PTC has not been installed or activated on all
    passenger trains in our country. My anger is seething.''
        I think we can all relate to that and share that anger as
    well.
        Mr. Anderson, I know you're new in the position at Amtrak,
    and I know you care deeply about each and every passenger that
    rides on your train as well, and you've expressed that here
    today as well as in a previous hearing. But I think your
    viewpoint on this is particularly insightful now, coming from
    the airline industry, and I know as a leader in the airline
    industry, you focused on safety, and the airline industry now
    has an enviable record when it comes to safety.
        You have always given very candid assessments of the
    situation. I'm going to ask you to give a very candid
    assessment today. As you come into this industry and you look
    at how PTC has not been moving forward, the industry
    continually comes forward, says, ``We need more time,'' ``We
    need more time,'' what do you think is going on, and why has
    the railroad industry not been able to do this when we have
    seen successes in aviation?
        Mr. Anderson. I think, speaking for passenger railroad and
    being new to Amtrak, is what I said in my remarks, which is we
    tend to think of ourselves as a freight railroad that carries
    passengers rather than a world-class passenger railroad modeled
    after the great passenger railroads around the world. And when
    you take that approach and you take the approach that we had in
    aviation with the SMS systems that have been at the core of
    driving the improvements in aviation--and how the SMS systems
    in aviation got started was in the mid nineties, there were a
    series of accidents from about 1993 to 1997, and as a result of
    that, we made huge investments in technology and in SMS
    systems.
        And I think what we have to do in the industry is stop
    thinking of ourselves as an extension of the freight railroad
    industry. They do a really good job, and their safety record is
    improving, but we carry passengers, and that's a much higher
    standard of care. And I don't think the industry has focused on
    having that same commitment to safety management systems and
    compliance.
        Senator Peters. So they haven't had the commitment. Do you
    believe they've had the time to do that?
        Mr. Anderson. I believe we have had the time. I mean, we
    went through these sorts of exercises in aviation with
    controlled flight into terrain, wind shear warning systems,
    collision avoidance systems in midair, which were the three big
    drivers of issues in aviation. All three of them got solved
    with technology that we installed in the cockpits of all
    airplanes.
        Senator Peters. So the industry has had the time, they've
    have an extension, they may be asking for more time, as we
    heard from Ms. Fleming, half of the railroads aren't going to
    be compliant, but yet there seems not to be a focus. And it
    doesn't seem to be a resource issue.
        Mr. DeWeese, you mentioned that many of them have not--in
    fact, only a few funding recipients have used their PTC funds.
    So they're not spending the money. They have the time. Then is
    this a question of commitment? And if there's a lack of
    commitment, that is a serious, serious problem, when we have
    people dying on our railroads. So the industry is going to need
    to answer to that.
        Thank you.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Peters.
        Senator Blumenthal.

                 STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BLUMENTHAL,
                     U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT

        Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        And I want to thank the Chairman for his very strong words
    and strongly expressed admonition at the beginning of this
    hearing about the urgency of this system and his stated
    intention to contact appropriate Federal authorities about the
    GAO report. In fact, I was very disappointed in a response from
    the Secretary of Transportation to a letter that I led with 14
    of my colleagues demanding answers regarding DOT's enforcement
    plan about positive train control. All she really said was that
    the Department was, quote, considering all options.
        The industry needs to know that there will be penalties,
    that enforcement will be rigorous, that, in effect, there will
    be no tolerance for delay, and that the six criteria that have
    to be met are not some expanded timeline, they are conditions
    that will be interpreted narrowly and specifically. If they
    have no such warning, then the prediction made by one member of
    the Long Island Rail Committee just last week, Mitchell Pally,
    said he would be, quote, significantly surprised if DOT and FRA
    levy fines in the event of a failure to meet the deadline. If
    that's the mindset of the industry, it will be a self-
    fulfilling prophesy, and we cannot allow an additional delay
    after all these years.
        I was really alarmed, Ms. Fleming, by the GAO report, which
    said that there was a risk, to use your word----
        Ms. Fleming. Mm-hmm.
        Senator Blumenthal.--of two-thirds of the commuter
    railroads failing to meet those deadlines. I am not sure what
    you meant by ``risk,'' but for me, it means that on the present
    trajectory, they will not meet those deadlines because of the
    information and data that you provided in the report.
        With respect to MTA, last week MTA's project lead for PTC
    implementation, Debbie Chin, announced, quote, Our plan is to
    get it done by the end of the year. But Metro-North also
    announced that you're just 61 percent complete overall, leaving
    many of your customers--and I am a very active one, in fact,
    I'm going to be riding the train home tonight hopefully--
    whether, in fact, you're going to meet the deadline.
        I would like a commitment from you that you will meet the
    2018 deadline, and that Metro-North will have positive train
    control implemented, in operation, by then.
        Mr. Mayer. Senator, first of all, our schedule calls for us
    to meet the deadline. We believe our schedule is achievable, as
    Ms. Fleming testified, and as we agree, there are significant
    schedule risks, but right now, it's our intent and our plan to
    meet the deadline.
        I testified earlier that on the railroad that you and I
    both ride on a frequent basis, we have over--thanks to 2 years
    of testing, we have cut in civil speed enforcement capabilities
    on all of the Metro-North lines, and later in the month, we'll
    be enforcing speed limits, and that's incremental----
        Senator Blumenthal. You would agree with me that this
    technology has been proven over the years?
        Mr. Mayer. No, sir. It's not off-the-shelf technology. It
    hasn't been proven. We're proving it every day of the week that
    we test it and build it.
        Senator Blumenthal. And what would prevent you from
    achieving that end of your deadline?
        Mr. Mayer. Our most important challenges are the delivery
    of software. There's been a lot of talk here about office
    software to make the portions of the PTC system that are
    dependent on software communicate and operate. So our biggest
    challenge is software. And we also heard some discussion from
    Ms. Fleming about the time it may take the FRA to approve the
    applications.
        Senator Blumenthal. This system has been implemented
    elsewhere, correct?
        Mr. Mayer. Our operations are very different than
    elsewhere. We are the densest railroads in the country.
        Senator Blumenthal. But the same kinds of systems should be
    applicable regardless of how dense the systems are, wouldn't
    you agree?
        Mr. Mayer. No. The railroads, although we look very
    similar, we are extremely different in signal systems,
    communication capabilities, and operational control.
        Senator Blumenthal. And are you on a path to completing
    whatever software issues have arisen?
        Mr. Mayer. We believe so, sir. That's a major deliverable
    from our systems integrator, and we have encouraged them to
    hire staff. Our own engineers are assisting with them. They are
    reaching out to programmers around the world and are doing
    everything that we know how to motivate them to deliver.
        Senator Blumenthal. Is that the major obstacle to your
    completing the system on time?
        Mr. Mayer. Yes. If we were testifying a year ago, we might
    talk about hardware and delivery of that, but the main obstacle
    that we're facing is software and ultimately FRA approval.
        Senator Blumenthal. Well, I would like a detailed report
    and a meeting with Metro-North on those obstacles, what you are
    doing to meet and overcome those obstacles, what resources, if
    any, additionally are necessary, and why you would not meet the
    end-of-year deadline? I don't want to hear in 6 months that
    you're not meeting it.
        Mr. Mayer. We look forward to meeting with you, Senator.
        Senator Blumenthal. And I might just say, finally, this
    system, positive train control, is not a new system. It is a
    proven technology. It has been around for years and years.
    There may be software challenges in Metro-North's sphere, but
    those challenges also have been around for years and years.
    It's not like we're discovering a new planet here or a new kind
    of equipment. I think, in my view, and, frankly, in the view of
    many of your customers, there will be no excuse for Metro-North
    failing to meet that 2018 deadline.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
        Senator Fischer.

                    STATEMENT OF HON. DEB FISCHER,
                       U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA

        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Ms. Fleming, in your testimony, you noted that the field
    testing phase can be a long and difficult process. In your
    discussions with Class 1 and other railroads, can you talk
    about some of the events or unseen circumstances that could
    delay and extend field testing or revenue service
    demonstration? Can you elaborate on some of that?
        Ms. Fleming. So the six railroads that are at RSD, for
    them, the average was 7 months, but FRA's estimate is field
    testing could take an average of 2 years. And I think until you
    go through that, you don't know what bugs there will be and how
    to work through that.
        Some railroads have made the tough decision to suspend
    operations and to conduct that testing around the clock. So I
    think, you know, you don't know kind of what you're going to be
    coming up against until you start going through that. So I
    think each railroad, it has been kind of a tricky phase of
    implementation.
        Senator Fischer. Can you give us some examples, though, on
    what events could delay that implementation? What are some of
    those unseen circumstances that delay it?
        Ms. Fleming. You know, can I provide that for the record?
    Because I think I'm going to have to go through our work papers
    a little bit more and get some good examples for you.
        Senator Fischer. OK. That would be great. Thank you.
        Also, the FRA appears to be taking an approach to PTC
    implementation that says railroads that have completed all PTC
    component installation and actually operate PTC for trains
    across their networks cannot be considered fully PTC-compliant
    and, therefore, must request a PTC extension because of the
    slower progress of other railroads to use their network. In
    other words, a railroad that finishes everything within their
    control would need to file for an extension even if they were
    using PTC for their trains and have the capability of
    communicating with other railroads.
        Do you believe that the FRA may consider a railroad fully
    implemented, not when the railroad itself has met the
    requirements within its control, but when all operations on a
    track are PTC-compliant regardless of who is responsible?
        Ms. Fleming. To be honest, it's unclear, and I think that's
    another area where FRA really needs to articulate, what does it
    plan to do come January 2019? We've asked them, and we didn't
    get a satisfactory answer. And I think it's important
    information that the railroads need to understand. What does
    that mean come January, if you've kind of dotted your i's and
    crossed your t's, but some of the other folks that you share
    tracks with haven't? And I think they owe it to the railroads
    at this point, since we're approaching the deadline, to answer
    some of those questions that railroads have.
        Senator Fischer. Do you think there would be benefits if
    the FRA, instead of the railroads, to be quoted, early
    adopters, if they're allowed and reasonably comply with the law
    beginning in 2018?
        Ms. Fleming. You know, again, I think that's something the
    FRA should consider and to think about. Does that make sense?
    Does that meet their criteria?
        They also, quite frankly, have at their fingertips where
    they can use alternative criteria that is not RSD-based, and I
    think that's another area that railroads are like, ''Well, what
    does that look like? What does that mean?`` And so FRA, I
    think, needs to, you know, work with the railroads and try to
    help them understand, what are examples of that? what would
    meet their threshold?
        So they have some options at their fingertips, but they
    haven't done a good job of articulating what that means.
        Senator Fischer. Do you have any suggestions on how we can
    encourage FRA to do that?
        Ms. Fleming. I think the Chairman announced today that he's
    planning to send a letter, and I think that may be a good
    opportunity to seek out some of the clarifications that we all
    have.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you.
        Mr. DeWeese, in your report, you noted that two commuter
    railroads utilize the Railroad Rehabilitation and Improvement
    Financing loans to implement the PTC technology. However, those
    programs--the program has billions in loan authority provided
    by Congress that could have been used for PTC. So why is the
    RRIF funding not being used more extensively for positive train
    control?
        Mr. DeWeese. Thank you for the question. It wasn't a
    question certainly that we asked as part of the scope of this
    effort, but we have done work in this before in the last few
    years, and I think it's a number of factors that are at play
    here. I think it could be the lengthy application review
    process. As you know, that can go anywhere from 90 days to
    many, many months. It can also be the costs that are involved.
    I mean, there are loan application fees and credit risk
    premiums that have to be paid, and that could be--that could
    discourage some of your smaller commuter railroads for applying
    for these loans.
        The Class 1s may rely on their capital budgets to be able
    to finance, you know, some of the investment projects, so you
    may not see them, you know, applying for these loans. But we
    certainly reported years ago that, you know, a way to
    streamline the process. The Build America Bureau, you know,
    sort of was intended to consolidate all these credit programs
    and to streamline the process and put procedures in place. I
    think that's to be determined, quite frankly. And, you know, we
    have work that we're going to be planning. I know GAO, too, is
    going to be looking at the Bureau. So maybe together we'll be
    able to figure that out and look at how they plan to do
    oversight of these programs.
        Senator Fischer. OK. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
        Senator Wicker.

                  STATEMENT OF HON. ROGER F. WICKER,
                     U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSISSIPPI

        Senator Wicker. Thank you. And I guess members of the panel
    realize that many members of this Committee have two other
    hearings scheduled at the same time, and so we've been coming
    in and out. But thank you for your patience and being here.
        Let me just observe generally. We've had some pretty
    explicit statements on the part of the Committee Chairman and
    also the Ranking Member, and I understand the testimony today
    has not been particularly encouraging about our ability, our
    collective ability, to have this requirement fulfilled by the
    end of the year.
        I do think the Chairman and Ranking Member's statements
    indicate that, on behalf of the Congress, they're trying to say
    that patience is running out. And, I mean, clearly we're going
    to try not to shut down train traffic around the country at a
    date certain, but we need whoever to understand that we need to
    get the attention of those responsible and get a timetable that
    will work and avoid, if I might say, a train wreck coming
    either figuratively or literally. So I thank Chairman Thune and
    Ranking Member Nelson for going ahead and being explicit there.
        I might as well ask about an area of particular importance
    to me, which is Amtrak from Mobile to New Orleans.
        You know, the Southern Rail Commission, Mr. Anderson, had
    hoped for a longer route, and it seems, though, that the real
    interest there and the real possibility for making it work
    sooner is to take this real heavily populated area, I mean,
    Mobile is a major city. The gulf coast of Mississippi is
    heavily populated. And New Orleans, of course, is one of the
    major cities of the South in terms of population and potential
    traffic. So the Commission has trimmed its proposal to that.
        And so I'm just hoping that you can give me some
    encouragement about making that actually work. I think if the
    schedule can accommodate passengers and accommodate the public,
    and if the trains are reliable and they run on time, this could
    be a winner because the population is there.
        So how is PTC going between New Orleans and Mobile? When
    will it be complete? What impact will it have on Amtrak? And
    also I understand you talked about this, but are we OK with the
    interoperability of the freight and passenger technology on
    PTC?
        Mr. Anderson. The interoperability piece with the four
    large Class 1 freights is going well. We've actually federated
    or are in the process of what's called federating, which is
    hooking our system up to their system so it speaks to our
    locomotives. That process is going well, particularly well with
    BNSF and Union Pacific; they've been real leaders. And it----
        Senator Wicker. Not particularly well with whom?
        Mr. Anderson. Well, it's going--it's going better with them
    because they're moving along, but Norfolk Southern has done a
    good job with us, and we still have some work to do with CSX.
    So----
        Senator Wicker. We certainly want to encourage CSX to be
    part of that----
        Mr. Anderson. We do. Now, let me get to your question.
    Look, I actually think that well-timed, well-run service
    between New Orleans and Mobile is a winner, especially if it's
    both ways, three times, four times a day. Those are big
    population centers. I'm from the gulf coast. I live on the gulf
    coast. So I'm familiar with that part of the world. It would
    work.
        The problem is until our preference rights and incremental
    cost rights under the 1971 statute that created Amtrak are
    properly enforced--you know, right now the question for
    reintroduction of that service from CSX was $2 billion.
        So the challenge we have in all of these markets where we
    have routes like that that make good sense, we've never been
    able to get the preference right that Amtrak has on the
    freights enforced, and we've never been able to really get them
    to think straight about true incremental costs because that's
    what Congress said in 1971.
        Senator Wicker. You say the law is there, it's just not
    enforced?
        Mr. Anderson. It has never been enforced.
        Senator Wicker. And whose responsibility is it to enforce
    that law?
        Mr. Anderson. Hopefully yours.
        Senator Wicker. Well, we are the legislative branch. Who
    is--what is the enforcement office?
        Mr. Anderson. STB.
        Senator Wicker. OK.
        Mr. Anderson. And we'd like a private right of action under
    the statute.
        Senator Wicker. So the statute would have to be amended.
    The law is there, but it's not as you would like it to be.
        Mr. Anderson. The law is there, but since 1971, there has
    never been any effective enforcement over the preference
    action. That's why the long distance service that Amtrak runs
    at massive delays.
        Senator Wicker. And so the Surface Transportation Board, if
    they were of a mind to, could enforce it as an agency, but you
    would like some sort of cause of action provided for in the
    statute.
        Mr. Anderson. Correct.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you, sir.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
        Senator Cortez Masto.

               STATEMENT OF HON. CATHERINE CORTEZ MASTO,
                        U.S. SENATOR FROM NEVADA

        Senator Cortez Masto. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        And like Senator Wicker, I appreciate your patience with us
    coming in and out. That's why your testimonies are so
    important. Your written testimonies as well are very helpful.
    And thank you for being here today.
        I know that my colleagues who manage the congressional
    transportation appropriations, namely, Senators Collins and
    Reed, have recently written to Secretary Chao about the need to
    get moving and spending down millions in Fiscal Year 2017
    funding to help facilitate progress on the PTC at the FRA. As a
    matter of course, the FRA reported to our staffs that there are
    only eight railroads with conditionally certified PTC safety
    plans, four more under review, and more than 25 who haven't
    even submitted.
        So, Mr. Anderson or Mr. Mayer, what is the average size and
    complexity of either these PTC safety or implementation plans
    generally? Can you talk about that?
        Mr. Mayer. So our railroads have submitted PTC
    implementation plans. Our next step will be in the months ahead
    as we submit revenue service demonstration applications. And,
    as Ms. Fleming testified, they are extremely complicated, long
    documents. But we are running tests now, collecting data, and
    making plans to be able to file those applications. We've also
    had recent interactions with the FRA that's helped us to
    understand exactly what's going to be required of us.
        Senator Cortez Masto. And so talk a little bit about that
    because, how long does it take? Does it take the experts at the
    FRA a while to review and certify them?
        Mr. Mayer. For our revenue service demonstration
    application, we have allowed 8 weeks in our schedule, and the
    FRA has told us they will make every effort to do that, but we
    will need them to hold up that end in order to be able to stay
    on schedule.
        Senator Cortez Masto. And is there a time-frame that you
    can point to that normally this takes to get through it?
        Mr. Mayer. We've never been through it before, so I can't
    answer that.
        Ms. Fleming. I can answer that.
        Senator Cortez Masto. OK, please.
        Ms. Fleming. For test waivers, it's taking FRA anywhere
    from 10 days to 100 days, but for the safety plans, which can
    be 5,000 pages or more, they said they can only review two or
    three a year.
        Senator Cortez Masto. OK. OK. Thank you.
        So let me follow up. Ms. Fleming, your testimony also
    underscored the fact that the FRA lacks a clear extension
    review and appeal process. So then I would ask Mr. DeWeese and
    Ms. Fleming, can you outline the progress that you've seen in
    staffing up the necessary personnel and experts internally at
    the FRA and whether it has been sufficient to help facilitate a
    faster progress on certification of PTC on the national network
    where it's required?
        Ms. Fleming. So my understanding, there are 12 PTC experts
    right now. That's not a lot, particularly given that we see in
    the next 10 months plus going into next year their workload and
    capacity really coming into play. They're going to be starting
    to get the test waivers, the RSD applications, the safety
    plans. So we have suggested that they really consider
    prioritizing, having a risk-based approach, figuring out,
    ``Where do we put the resources? What's the best bang for the
    buck? Do we go after the railroads that have the largest
    passengers? Do we go after the railroads that are really
    struggling and have a long ways to go? Do we go after the
    railroads that maybe just need a push to go over the wall?''
        And so we leave it up to them, but we really think, you
    know, with just having 12 people in-house, with all of these
    documents and approval processes coming their way, they're
    going to really need to think about their approach.
        Senator Cortez Masto. And has the administration's hiring
    freeze had an impact on why there are only 12 people in-house?
        Ms. Fleming. You know, I think it has been this way for a
    while. This is--it's hard to get these folks. There are a
    limited number of PTC experts out there.
        Senator Cortez Masto. OK.
        Ms. Fleming. And so I just don't think that there's a long
    queue of people that you can draw from.
        Senator Cortez Masto. OK. And can I ask--I know I've heard
    the narrative that there is some--plenty of Federal funding has
    been made available to the railroads, and we've heard that
    today, and we're not making fast enough progress on PTC.
        Mr. Mayer, would you agree with that sentiment?
        Mr. Mayer. Yes. We are grateful for the RRIF loans
    sponsored by the FRA in the State of Connecticut and the State
    of New York. We have a significant amount of money available to
    us to complete our work. We have submitted invoices in the
    amount of about a third of those funds and will draw down and
    then begin to pay back that loan.
        Our problem, honestly, is not really money, and more money
    wouldn't help us move faster. Our bottleneck is, as was just
    alluded to, the lack of qualified talent, the lack of PTC
    expertise. Every railroad in the country is looking for that
    same small pool of talent, and we're working with our systems
    integrator to creatively tap the talent that exists to help us
    develop the software that's necessary.
        Senator Cortez Masto. Thank you. I appreciate that.
        I notice my time is up. I'll submit the rest of my
    questions for the record.
        Thank you again for being here.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cortez Masto.
        We have others here. I would like to just, if I might, ask
    a question and maybe direct this, principally at least, to Mr.
    Mayer and Mr. Anderson.
        But we've talked a lot about the role of the FRA in this,
    and I'm wondering what additional guidance or information, if
    any, from FRA would be helpful for you as you continue to meet
    the implementation requirements?
        Mr. Mayer. You know, as I just mentioned, we have recently
    received some clarification and some informal assistance from
    the FRA to help us understand the road ahead for us. It has
    been very helpful.
        Our main concern at this point is FRA resourcing to
    receive, process, and approve our revenue service demonstration
    application. The time-frame is going to be very tight, but if
    there's anything that this Committee can do to help them tap
    into additional resources, either new hires or perhaps even
    talent within the Department of Transportation and other modal
    administrations, that may be helpful.
        Mr. Anderson. I agree with that. You could have everything
    installed and be operating in revenue service, but we've got to
    truncate that time that FRA is going to take in order to
    certify because if it's 6 to 8 weeks at the end, that's--you
    know, we're 10 months out. That's number one.
        Number two, Ron Batory is leading an effort industrywide to
    have everyone in on a regular basis in his office where we go
    through, hours at a time, line by line, installations all over
    the country in that effort. He needs to--he's done a good job
    of it, and he's got to spearhead it for the whole industry.
        The Chairman. Unfortunately, he should have been there
    about 6 months ago in the job, but I've heard this reiterated,
    in response to questions that have been posed by members of the
    Committee, but this is a very complex and challenging
    undertaking, we all agree with that. But it sounds like, if I
    heard correctly, the most challenging aspect remaining for full
    implementation is software. At least that's okay. And it sounds
    like you've talked a little bit about how you plan to overcome
    that challenge. Good.
        Anything else to add before we wrap up?
        Mr. Mayer. You know, one thing that I would add--and thank
    you, Senator--is, you know, we've heard a lot about commitment.
    We understand that this Committee and the Congress in general
    is committed to PTC implementation. We heard a little talk
    about the MTA board of directors.
        I would want to end by pointing out that our Board of
    Directors is extremely clear that PTC is a very, very high
    priority and absolutely essential for us to bring online and
    further provide for the safety of our customers. And that
    commitment extends to our chairman, our managing director, our
    two railroad presidents, and the entire implementation team. We
    are working as hard as we can possibly work to bring the
    promise of PTC into reality.
        The Chairman. And we hope we will continue that. I mean, I
    think you heard today us convey the sense of urgency that we
    attach to getting implementation done in accordance with the
    requirement and the deadline. So let us know as this moves
    forward, and I'm going to be consulting, obviously, with the
    FRA, but what additional help you might need, if there's
    anything that this Committee or the Congress can do.
        I'm going to ask unanimous consent to insert a statement
    for the record, from the Association of American Railroads on
    the implementation of PTC.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Prepared Statement of Edward R. Hamberger, President and Chief
              Executive Officer, Association of American Railroads
        On behalf of the Association of American Railroads (AAR), thank you
    for the opportunity to discuss positive train control (PTC). AAR
    members account for the vast majority of North American freight
    railroad mileage, employees, and revenue.
        In this testimony, I will review what positive train control is and
    what it is meant to do; the progress railroads have made in the
    development and implementation of this technology; and what to expect
    going forward. While other railroad entities use each Class I
    railroad's tracks--Amtrak, commuter railroads, and shortlines--my focus
    will be on Class I freight railroads and their PTC operations.
        The bottom line is that by December 31, 2018, all Class Is will
    have completed PTC installation, just as Congress required. Further, by
    the end of this year PTC will be in operation on the vast majority--
    approximately 80 percent--of Class I PTC route-miles network wide, with
    some Class I railroads planning to be fully implemented on their
    networks. Between 2018 and 2020, remaining Class I railroads will be
    completing PTC implementation, consistent with statute. All railroads
    will continue their work on resolving technical operational challenges
    that will inevitably rise, which Congress anticipated and specifically
    provided protection for in its 2015 law. They also will be addressing
    perhaps the biggest challenge of PTC implementation: interoperability
    with each other and with their tenant passenger and shortline
    railroads.
    What is Positive Train Control?
        ``Positive train control'' (PTC) describes technologies designed to
    automatically stop a train before certain accidents caused by human
    error occur. Under the Rail Safety Improvement
        Act of 2008 (RSIA), passenger railroads and Class I freight
    railroads are required to install PTC on main lines used to transport
    passengers or toxic-by-inhalation (TIH) materials.\1\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ TIH materials are gases or liquids, such as chlorine and
    anhydrous ammonia, which are especially hazardous if released into the
    atmosphere.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Specifically, PTC as mandated by the RSIA must be designed to
    prevent four major types of train accidents: train-to-train collisions;
    derailments caused by excessive speed; unauthorized incursions by
    trains onto sections of track where maintenance activities are taking
    place; and the movement of a train through a track switch left in the
    wrong position.\2\ The PTC system now being installed to meet this
    statutory mandate is an overlay system, designed to be failsafe and
    meant to supplement, rather than replace, existing methods of
    operation.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ A switch is the infrastructure that controls the path of trains
    where two sets of tracks diverge or converge.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Positive Train Control is an Unprecedented Technological Challenge
        To work as it should, a PTC system must be able to determine the
    precise location, direction, and speed of trains; warn train operators
    of potential problems; and take immediate action if the operator fails
    to act after a warning is provided by the PTC system. For example, if a
    train operator fails to begin stopping a train before a stop signal or
    slowing down for a speed-restricted area, the PTC system will override
    the operator and apply the brakes automatically before the train passes
    the stop signal or enters the speed-restricted area.
        A PTC system consists of three main elements that are integrated by
    a fourth critical element, the wireless data communications system. An
    onboard or locomotive system monitors a train's position and speed and
    activates braking as necessary to enforce speed restrictions and
    unauthorized train movements; a wayside system monitors railroad track
    signals, switches, and track circuits to communicate data on this local
    infrastructure needed to permit the onboard system to authorize
    movement of a locomotive; and a back office server stores all
    information related to the rail network and trains operating across it
    (e.g., speed restrictions, movement authorities, train compositions,
    etc.) and transmits this information to individual locomotive onboard
    enforcement systems. Finally, all of these are integrated by a wireless
    data communications system that must move massive amounts of
    information back and forth between the back office servers, the wayside
    equipment, and the locomotive's on-board computers.

                  [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Such a system requires highly complex technologies able to analyze
    and incorporate the huge number of variables that affect train
    operations. A simple example: the length of time it takes to stop a
    freight train depends on train speed, terrain, the weight and length of
    the train, the number and distribution of locomotives and loaded and
    empty freight cars on the train, and other factors. During the
    operation of a single train over a single operating segment of track
    known as a sub-division, the length of time and the distance needed to
    stop that train may change 100 or more times due to changes in the
    factors mentioned above. A PTC system must be able to take all of these
    factors into account automatically, reliably, accurately and in real
    time in order to safely stop the train wherever it may be along its
    route.
        PTC development and implementation constitute an unprecedented
    technological challenge. Some of the development and installation tasks
    associated with the Class I railroads' efforts include:

       A complete physical survey and highly precise geo-mapping of
            the more than 54,000 route-miles on which PTC technology will
            be installed, including more than 450,000 field assets along
            the right-of-way (e.g., mileposts, curves, rail and highway
            grade crossings, switches, signals, track vertical profiles and
            horizontal geometry).

       Installing more than 28,500 custom-designed ``wayside
            interface units'' (WIU) that provide the mechanism for
            transmitting information from signal and switch locations along
            the right-of-way to locomotives and railroad facilities.

       Installing PTC technology on more than 17,200 Class I
            locomotives.\3\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ As just one example of the magnitude of the PTC implementation
    effort, it takes about one person working for about one month to
    install all of the necessary PTC equipment on a single locomotive. It
    will take approximately 1,400 staff-years to install PTC on all of the
    Class I locomotives that require it.

       Installing PTC technology on nearly 2,100 switches in non-
            signaled territory and completing signal replacement projects,
            including upgrades to PTC-compatible signal technology, at some
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            14,500 locations.

       Developing, producing, and deploying a new radio system
            specifically designed for the massive data transmission
            requirements of PTC at tens of thousands of base stations and
            trackside locations, and on more than 17,200 locomotives.

       Developing back office systems and upgrading and integrating
            dispatching software to incorporate the data and precision
            required for PTC systems.

        In all these areas, Class I railroads have already made tremendous
    progress. Figure 2 has details on the status of Class I PTC
    installations at the end of 2017.

                  [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Additionally, as shown in Figure 3, at the end of 2017, the Class I
    railroads already had in operation more than 30,000 route-miles, or 56
    percent, of the 54,000 route-miles that will eventually be equipped
    with PTC. To be clear, each Class I railroad will install 100 percent
    of PTC wayside, back office, and locomotive hardware and complete all
    required training by the end of 2018 and expect to have nearly 80
    percent of required PTC route-miles operational by the end of 2018.

                  [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        The AAR estimates that, as of the end of 2017, freight railroads
    together have spent more than $8 billion--of their own funds, not
    taxpayer funds--on PTC development and deployment, and expect to spend
    more than $10 billion by the time PTC is fully operational nationwide.
    This does not include the hundreds of millions of additional dollars
    needed each year to maintain the railroads' PTC systems once they are
    initially installed.
    Testing and Validation is Essential for Safe Operation and Full
            Interoperability
        From the outset, railroads' efforts were focused on development and
    testing of technology that could meet the requirements of the RSIA,
    particularly those related to interoperability, and that could be
    scaled to the huge requirements of a nationwide system. For example,
    production and installation of the new radios--necessary to meet PTC's
    immense communication demands--became possible only after a long period
    of development and testing. Essential software and hardware for many
    PTC components had to be developed and deployed, and then rigorously
    tested. Only after technology is actually installed and exposed to the
    rigors of day-to-day operations can the task of testing each of the
    individual parts, and the system as a whole, be completed under real
    world conditions.
        This task is made particularly complex by the need to ensure that
    PTC systems are fully and seamlessly interoperable across all of the
    Nation's major railroads. It is not unusual for one railroad's
    locomotives to operate on another railroad's tracks. When that happens,
    the ``tenant'' locomotives must be able to communicate with, and
    respond to conditions on, the ``host'' PTC system. Put another way, a
    CSX locomotive must behave like a Norfolk Southern locomotive when it
    is traveling on NS track; a BNSF locomotive must be compatible with
    Union Pacific's PTC system when it is on UP track, and so on. All the
    while, each railroad has its own operating rules designed to address
    specific conditions on its property, all consistent with FRA
    regulations, but further adding to this complexity. Ensuring this
    interoperability has been a significant challenge.
        Interoperability appears to also have been a significant problem in
    Europe where the European Union's first ``interoperability directive''
    was published in 2001. It was not until 2016 that sufficient technical
    progress in either hardware or software had been made to allow the
    first deployment of an early stage, interoperable system. However, much
    work remains to be done to cure both technical and institutional
    problems that keep their current technology from being fully equivalent
    to that required under U.S. statute. To date, only 2,400 miles of track
    in the EU are equipped with this new generation technology. The EU does
    not expect that a 30,000-mile ``core'' network will be deployed before
    2030; a full build out over 73,000 miles of the most densely used
    portions of the European network is not expected to be completed before
    2050.\4\,\5\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ European Court of Auditors, Special Report No. 13, A Single
    European Rail Traffic Management System: Will the Political Choice Ever
    Become Reality? European Union, Luxembourg, July 2017.
        \5\ European Commission, Delivering an Effective and Interoperable
    European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS)--The Way Ahead,
    Commission Staff Working Document, Brussels, November 2017.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        It is critical that the huge number of potential failure points in
    PTC systems be identified, isolated, and corrected. By necessity, a
    mature, well-functioning PTC system is enormously complex, and it is
    not realistic to think it will perform flawlessly day in and day out,
    especially upon initial implementation. That is precisely why testing,
    first in a simulated environment and then under real-world operating
    conditions, is so important. Unfortunately, the failure of a single
    part within a complex PTC system can mean the system does not work as
    it should. When that happens, the fail-safe nature of PTC means that
    trains are not able to operate normally on affected rail lines until
    the failure is corrected, a situation railroads are facing today as
    they proceed toward PTC implementation. U.S. railroads are working hard
    to limit negative impacts on their customers associated with PTC
    rollouts, but these impacts will be a fact of rail life particularly
    until the system fully matures.
        Every day, as railroads finalize their PTC installation and expand
    PTC operations, additional accident avoidance becomes possible.
    However, as other train control systems implemented in other countries
    demonstrate, there is risk in improperly designed, installed, or
    operated PTC systems. This is not just a speculative concern. Since
    2008, there have been a number of incidents worldwide in which
    accidents resulting in deaths and injuries occurred on rail lines that
    had PTC-like systems. Insufficient testing of PTC design or equipment
    has been identified as the cause in two high profile accidents
    involving significant fatalities.\6\,\7\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \6\ In 2011 a pair of trains on a high-speed line in China equipped
    with a PTC-like system collided, resulting in 40 deaths and 192
    injuries. Investigation of cause revealed that installation of a
    Japanese ``off-the-shelf'' PTC-like system had failed to recognize and
    accommodate local operating conditions and rules and had not been
    properly adapted to the dispatching and train management processes used
    on the Chinese line.
        \7\ In 2013 a high-speed train in Spain derailed while exceeding
    the speed limit on a sharp curve at the end of the high-speed section
    of the railway, killing 79 passengers and injuring 139. The high-speed
    portion of the route was equipped with a PTC-like system, but failed to
    warn the locomotive engineer of the speed-restricted curve and also
    failed to take action to slow the train. Investigation of cause
    determined that the failure of the system to intercede was due to both
    design flaws and a failure of the operational components of the system.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        These concerns make it essential that a railroad's first priority
    must be to implement PTC correctly, and to test and validate it
    thoroughly.
    Conclusion
        Railroads have devoted enormous human and financial resources to
    develop a functioning and reliable PTC system, and progress to date has
    been substantial. Class I railroads remain committed to safely
    implementing PTC as quickly as feasible. By the end of 2018, each Class
    I railroad will have implemented PTC or initiated revenue service
    demonstration on, at a minimum, 51 percent of its required PTC route-
    miles or subdivisions; have 100 percent of the necessary wayside, back
    office, and locomotive hardware installations completed; have all
    required spectrum in place; and have all required employee training
    completed.
        In addition, network-wide approximately 80 percent of required PTC
    route-miles are expected to be operational by the end of 2018. While
    several Class I railroads plan to be fully implemented by the end of
    this year, all Class I railroads will be fully implemented no later
    than 2020. In the meantime, Class I railroads will continue to work
    with each other and their tenant passenger and shortline railroad
    partners to successfully achieve full interoperability, which is the
    largest remaining challenge to a fully implemented national PTC system.

        The Chairman. We will keep the hearing record open for a
    couple of weeks. And I know there are members who have
    indicated a desire to submit questions for the record. So if
    our witnesses could respond as quickly as possible to those so
    that we can close the record out, it would be greatly
    appreciated.
        Thank you all for this. I think this is an important
    hearing, a timely hearing, and a very important update for us
    in terms of what's happening with respect to this very
    important safety issue.
        This hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

                                A P P E N D I X

         Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. John Thune to
                                 Susan Fleming
        Question. The Committee is aware that some Class I railroads may
    require their tenant short line railroads to have PTC-equipped
    locomotives when operating any of the Class I's lines equipped with
    PTC, potentially prior to the applicable statutory or regulatory
    deadlines. While the most recent GAO engagement focused on commuter
    railroads, we understand GAO has interviewed short line railroads
    representative in connection with some of its past work on PTC.
        a. Does the GAO have any data on this issue, including how many
    short line railroads are impacted?
        Answer. GAO has not conducted recent work related to short line
    railroads' PTC implementation efforts, and we do not have any data
    directly related to this issue.
        From our understanding, Class Is can determine whether one of their
    connecting short lines must install onboard PTC equipment, depending on
    the working arrangement between the Class I and short line. Given this,
    an unknown number of short line railroads may be installing PTC
    components as directed by Class Is.
        FRA's appears to be tracking implementation progress for a few
    short line railroads. For example, the Q4 2017 data from quarterly and
    annual reports available on FRA's website includes: (https://
    www.fra.dot.gov/app/ptcprogress/2017q4)

       Alaska

       Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis

       Kansas City Terminal

       Belt Railway

       Portland and Western (also covers TriMet)

        b. What potential challenges do short line railroads face in
    meeting these requirements?
        Answer. In GAO-15-739, we reported that according to FRA, 10
    smaller--or Class II/III--railroads are required by RSIA to implement
    PTC because they support passenger traffic. Of these, GAO interviewed
    Alaska, Belt Railway of Chicago, Kansas City Terminal, Nashville and
    Eastern, New Orleans Public Belt, Pan Am Railways, Portland and
    Western, Saratoga and North Creek, Terminal Rail of Saint Louis. We
    also interviewed three Class II/III railroads that are not required by
    statute to implement PTC on their track, but are equipping locomotives
    with PTC because they will run on PTC-equipped track. Some Class II/III
    railroads are being required to equip their locomotives with PTC
    because they are a tenant and their host railroad has indicated they
    must equip.
        In GAO-15-739, representatives of one Class II/III railroad
    indicated to us that they will use their Class I host railroad's back
    office system, but others indicated they may have to develop their own;
    this may be costly and these railroads may lack in-house resources to
    maintain such systems. Representatives also told us that they are
    exploring the use of a virtual back office that would be shared among
    several railroads and managed by a third party.
        In GAO-15-739, three of the Class II/III railroads and 1 commuter
    railroad we interviewed said that they have received limited guidance
    and instruction from their Class I host railroads regarding the extent
    to which they need to equip with PTC and when they should be equipped,
    making it difficult for them to begin PTC implementation. However,
    three Class II/III railroads and thee commuter railroads stated their
    Class I railroad hosts were communicating with them and, in some cases,
    had been helpful in addressing vendor issues. FRA officials told us
    that FRA will not get involved in this issue because it is a commercial
    arrangement between two private entities.

        c. To your knowledge, has the Department of Transportation assessed
    the potential for freight rail service disruptions if short line
    railroads do not meet these deadlines?
        Answer. We have not conducted recent work focused on specific
    actions taken by DOT related to short line railroads' implementation of
    PTC. The scope of our review was focused on commuter railroads'
    implementation progress and DOT's management and oversight of their PTC
    implementation. DOT, via a December 2017 letter from Secretary Chao to
    all the Class I railroads, intercity passenger railroads, and state and
    local transit authorities, stressed the urgency and importance of
    safely implementing PTC systems in the upcoming year to meet the
    December 31, 2018 deadline. Given this, the agency does not appear to
    be focused on short line railroads' implementation at this time.
                                     ______

        Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Bill Nelson to
                                 Susan Fleming
        Implementation Status. Ms. Fleming, you took a deep dive look into
    how consumer railroads are working to implement positive train control.
        Question 1. How concerned are you about the status of
    implementation by these railroads?
        Answer. We found that most of the 29 commuter railroads
    implementing PTC have reported progress in some of the areas of initial
    implementation that the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) monitors,
    such as locomotive and wayside equipment installation, but the amount
    of progress reported varies across individual railroads. However,
    beyond the initial implementation activities, much work remains for the
    majority of commuter railroads to complete other key PTC activities
    that will enable them to complete implementation such as field testing
    and interoperability. Based on our analysis, some of the commuter
    railroads that told us they did not plan to seek an extension beyond
    2018 appear to be at risk of not meeting the requirements to qualify
    for an extension, let alone complete implementation before the end of
    2018.
        Commuter railroads unable to implement a PTC system by December 31,
    2018, may receive a maximum 2-year extension if they meet certain
    statutory criteria. Based on our analysis of the PTC schedules of the
    29 commuter railroads, we found that over half may not have sufficient
    time to complete activities needed to implement PTC by the end of 2018
    or to qualify for an extension of that deadline by meeting criteria
    based on initiating revenue service demonstration (RSD).
        GAO's analysis of commuter railroads' PTC scheduled milestones for
    two key activities necessary to meet the 2018 deadline or qualify for
    an RSD-based extension (one of the statutory options) found that as
    many as two-thirds of the 29 commuter railroads may not have allocated
    sufficient time to complete these milestones. Specifically, in
    comparing the commuter railroads' schedules to FRA's estimates of the
    time required to complete these milestones and the experiences of
    railroads that have already completed them, GAO's analysis found that
    from 7 to 19 commuter railroads may not complete the milestones before
    the 2018 implementation deadline or qualify for an extension.

        Question 2. What challenges led to this point? Why were some
    railroads able to make such progress and others were not?
        Answer. A number of factors can affect the progress of commuter
    railroads' implementation of PTC, including limited industry expertise
    and resources, or unexpected schedule changes. In addition, PTC
    implementation is a complex and lengthy process. It requires the
    integration of various components, many of which are new technologies
    that must be integrated with existing systems. About half of the
    commuter railroads we spoke with acknowledged that industrywide, there
    are a limited number of individuals with PTC technical expertise
    available to successfully implement the technology, which can affect
    the ability of railroads and contractors to meet planned schedules. In
    addition, some commuter railroads told us they faced unexpected delays
    in obtaining PTC equipment, such as radios, from the supplier. Some PTC
    equipment is only available from a single provider, which can lead to
    delays executing contracts and obtaining equipment.
        Unexpected issues with components or technology can also require
    additional time to complete certain activities, causing schedules to
    slip. Such issues could affect railroads currently on schedule as well
    as railroads pursuing aggressive schedules in an effort to overcome
    late starts or early setbacks. For example, representatives from one
    railroad said that despite strong organizational commitment to
    implementation and setting internal targets for progress, their PTC
    project schedule slipped many times over the course of implementation
    due to a variety of issues, including on-going software updates that
    caused delays while also straining the budget and burdening staff.
        For those railroads that have made more progress with
    implementation, we heard that early commitment from agency leadership
    and support from the board to implement PTC helped encourage progress
    throughout the project and enabled management to make tough decisions
    to constantly progress. Officials from one of these railroads told us
    they made difficult decisions that would enable them to move forward
    with the overall project.

        Question 3. Does implementation of positive train control by any of
    the Florida railroads raise particular concern for you?
        Answer. In January 2018, Sunrail and TriRail were both identified
    among the 13 commuter railroads FRA identified as at risk of not
    meeting the 2018 deadline and not completing requirements for a
    deadline extension. FRA made these determinations based on whether a
    railroad had installed at least 65 percent of all equipment as of the
    end of September 2017. Florida East Coast Railway/All Aboard Florida
    was not identified as at risk by FRA, but the railroad has had multiple
    fatal grade crossing accidents in the last year.
        Much uncertainty exists regarding railroads' ultimate
    implementation progress and their ability to meet the 2018 deadline or
    qualify for an extension. This uncertainty is due, in part, to the fact
    that PTC is a new way of operating and involves technologies that are
    more complex to implement than many other railroad capital projects.
    Furthermore, a number of factors can affect commuter railroads' planned
    and future progress, including unexpected setbacks installing PTC
    components and resources and capacity issues.

        DOT Oversight. Ms. Fleming, the Department of Transportation should
    be providing clear and consistent guidance to railroads, particularly
    as they near the deadline.
        Question 4. How is the Department doing at this task?
        Answer. We found that FRA monitors railroads' PTC implementation
    progress, but has not systematically communicated information to help
    them prepare for the 2018 deadline or to qualify for extensions. Since
    2015, FRA has assumed additional roles and responsibilities--primarily
    through the PTC Task Force and regional PTC specialists--to monitor
    railroads' implementation progress, review required documentation, and
    share information about implementation steps and activities. While the
    majority of the railroad representatives we met with said FRA officials
    were consistently available to discuss issues that arise during day-to-
    day PTC implementation activities, the information conveyed by these
    officials has sometimes been inconsistent. Commuter railroads also
    expressed a need for additional clarification about the criteria for
    applying for an extension, and representatives from some commuter
    railroads we met with were unclear about the agency's approach to
    reviewing and granting extension requests.
        In addition, FRA has made limited use of implementation progress
    information to prioritize its efforts and mitigate risks. FRA has not
    fully leveraged the implementation progress data that railroads' submit
    to the agency to identify and develop a risk-based approach to
    prioritize agency actions. At present, it is unclear whether the
    agency's priorities are, for example, to help the largest commuter
    railroads meet the deadline or extension requirements, push those
    railroads that are very close to full implementation, or assist
    railroads that are in the earliest stages of their PTC project. By not
    effectively targeting actions to help mitigate risks posed by railroads
    most at risk of not meeting the PTC deadline or qualifying for an
    extension, FRA misses the opportunity to leverage its limited resources
    by providing direct assistance in the areas of greatest need.

        Question 5. What more could be done by the Department to assist
    commuter railroads--especially those that are falling behind?
        Answer. As the 2018 deadline rapidly approaches, the need for clear
    information that is systematically communicated to all railroads
    implementing PTC becomes even more critical. FRA cannot expect to
    provide information and guidance to railroads individually, and
    therefore, adopting a risk-based communication strategy could help it
    more efficiently share information in the coming year. Moreover, the
    information FRA collects on railroads' progress has not been used to
    inform the agency's resource allocation decisions. Using this
    information to better allocate resources could help position FRA to
    better meet its responsibility to monitor and oversee PTC
    implementation in the future. Given this, GAO recommended that FRA: 1)
    identify and adopt a method for systematically communicating
    information to railroads regarding the deadline extension criteria and
    process, and 2) develop an approach to use the information gathered to
    prioritize the allocation of resources to address the greatest risk.

        Grade Crossing Safety. My state continues to top the list for
    grade-crossing collisions and fatalities. In recent months, we have
    seen a renewed problem with grade crossing safety following the start
    of higher speed rail service.
        Question 6. What steps should we be taking to better address grade
    crossing safety?
        Answer. During the course of our PTC review, we did not conduct the
    work necessary to answer this question. GAO has ongoing work in the
    area of grade crossing safety, and anticipates issuing a final product
    in Fall 2018.
                                     ______

         Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. John Thune to
                             Hon. Barry J. DeWeese
        Question. The Committee is aware that some Class I railroads may
    require their tenant short line railroads to have PTC-equipped
    locomotives when operating any of the Class I's lines equipped with
    PTC, potentially prior to the applicable statutory or regulatory
    deadlines. Did any short line railroads that received Federal funding
    raise this issue to DOT OIG?
        Answer. OIG did not receive any tenant railroad responses
    indicating that host railroads had set additional deadlines for their
    PTC implementation; however, our line of questioning focused primarily
    on decisions related to the use and access of funding. During our
    information gathering, we did note three railroads that were not
    independently subject to the congressional requirement were
    implementing PTC because their host railroads were doing so. In
    addition, some tenant railroads mentioned that their host railroads'
    technical specifications and the need for interoperability would
    ultimately impact the types of equipment they purchase.
                                     ______

        Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Bill Nelson to
                             Hon. Barry J. DeWeese
        Funding for Positive Train Control. Mr. DeWeese, you found that the
    Federal Government has provided more than two billion dollars in
    support to help implement positive train control. Yet, some believe
    that much more is needed to help commuter railroads.
        Question 1. Is funding a challenge for commuter railroads? What
    kind of additional support might they need?
        Answer. Our recent audit identified the amount of Federal funding
    provided to implement positive train control; we did not assess future
    needs. While the commuter railroads we contacted did not identify
    funding as a challenge to meeting the December 2018 congressional
    deadline, they did express concern about costs that will arise after
    full PTC implementation. Those costs, as well as the potential for
    funding shortfalls, remain uncertain and will be key watch items going
    forward. We will continue to work with the Department and Congress to
    monitor funding implications that could impact railroads' deployment
    and sustainment of PTC.

        Grade Crossing Safety. My state continues to top the list for
    grade-crossing collisions and fatalities. In recent months, we have
    seen a renewed problem with grade crossing safety following the start
    of higher speed rail service.
        Question 2. What steps should we be taking to better address grade
    crossing safety?
        Answer. We share your concern. While our office has not studied
    this topic in recent years, we are currently planning an audit to
    assess the Department's progress in advancing grade crossing safety. We
    will reach out to your staff as we finalize our audit objectives.
                                     ______

       Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
                             Hon. Barry J. DeWeese
        Speed Limit Action Plans. Mr. DeWeese, the FAST Act requires
    passenger railroads to come up with speed limit action plans for any
    place there is a speed reduction of 20 miles-per-hour or greater. Speed
    limit action plans are meant to help prevent incidents like the Amtrak
    Cascade Train 501 derailment in DuPont, WA by creating numerous
    warnings for the engineer that they need to reduce their speed.
        Question 1. Do you know if the Department of Transportation
    approved Amtrak's speed action plan for the curve in DuPont, WA?
        Answer. At this time, we do not have information on the
    Department's approval process or the status of Amtrak's speed action
    plan for the curve in DuPont, WA.

        Highway-Rail Grade Crossing Safety. I would like to address the
    topic of safety issue, highway-rail grade crossings. The City of
    Lakewood sits on the new Point Defiance Bypass Rail line where the
    DuPont derailment occurred.
        The city has 7 grade crossings within its city limits. They are
    understandably concerned about safety at these crossings given that
    over 30 percent of rail related fatalities occur at grade crossings.
        Question 2. Mr. DeWeese, In November 2016, the FRA released their
    model for state highway-rail grade crossing action plans. The FAST Act
    requires the FRA to create a rule requiring state to submit their
    action plans. Can you update me on the status of this rule?
        Answer. While we have reviewed grade crossing safety in the past,
    our office has not studied this topic in recent years. In the next few
    months, we will initiate an audit that will assess FRA's progress in
    advancing grade crossing safety, and we will be in a better position to
    provide an update at that time. We will reach out to your staff as we
    finalize our audit approach.
                                     ______

         Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John Thune to
                                Richard Anderson
        Question 1. As you noted, many commuter rail passengers ride on
    trains that use the Northeast Corridor or connect to Amtrak trains.
        a. Could you provide a comprehensive overview of Amtrak's
    interactions and planning to date with each commuter railroad that may
    not fully implement PTC by December 31, 2018 or qualify for an
    extension?
        Answer. Amtrak has regular communication with the commuter
    railroads that use our infrastructure or on which we are a tenant
    through a cross-departmental approach aimed at allowing us to
    understand and prepare for likely outcomes as implementation and
    installation of positive train control (PTC) progresses throughout the
    year. As progress is made in PTC implementation, we adjust our planning
    and options based on the needs of Amtrak and individual commuter
    railroads and maintain strong coordination across our 46 state network
    through focused oversight of our Assistant Vice President of
    Operations.
        More specifically, Amtrak's Engineering Department works with
    commuter railroads on a weekly and often daily basis. They discuss way-
    side installation, boundary locations and testing of the PTC system.
    This is important since all responsible parties need to be involved in
    testing to allow our equipment and teams to communicate effectively.
        The Amtrak Mechanical Department works on a monthly or more
    frequent basis with the various commuter agencies to ensure there is
    regular progress on installation of relevant on-board hardware
    installed in the locomotives. Amtrak Operations also communicates
    monthly with the commuter agencies to monitor and update progress with
    implementation and installation of the overall PTC system.
        At this point in time, we are confident that most commuter agencies
    relevant to the Amtrak network will qualify for extensions.

        b. From both a safety and business perspective, could you speak in
    more detail to what you see as the impact of potential service cuts on
    the overall transportation network in the region?
        Answer. At this time, Amtrak continues to assess the readiness of
    its commuter tenants on the Northeast Corridor and is working closely
    with all agencies to progress forward with implementation. We are not
    yet prepared to make any definitive statements on the outcome of their
    efforts to implement PTC and any impacts on past service this year as
    much of the necessary work is scheduled to be achieved this fall.

        c. What information, if any, has FRA provided to you on how it
    expects to handle a tenant or connecting railroad not meeting the
    statutory deadline?
        Answer. Amtrak continues to have regular discussions with FRA on
    how hosts manage PTC implementation with tenants and connecting
    railroads. The FRA's PTC symposiums have helped facilitate
    communication between tenants and hosts as well as clarifying
    expectations.

        d. What guidance, if any, has FRA provided to you on how it expects
    Amtrak to handle a tenant or connecting railroad not meeting the
    statutory deadline?
        Answer. Amtrak continues to have regular discussions with FRA on
    how hosts manage PTC implementation with tenants and connecting
    railroads, but have not received official guidance on this matter.

        Question 2. As you know, Amtrak operates over host railroad track
    where a host railroad may not implement PTC by December 31, 2018, or
    qualify for an extension. Following-up on a commitment at the hearing,
    please provide a list of the services, routes, or lines which may cease
    at the end of the year due to a host railroad not fully implementing
    PTC or not meeting the statutory deadline, and please detail the
    likelihood and underlying issues relevant for the decision.
        Answer. There has been significant progress since the hearing on
    locations where Amtrak had concerns about a host's implementation
    schedule or ability to qualify for extensions or exemptions. Since the
    hearing, many of these concerns have been addressed and we have
    received significant information from hosts to confirm compliance or
    exemptions have been filed in accordance to the law.
                                     ______

      Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Roger F. Wicker to
                                Richard Anderson
        Question 1. Mr. Anderson, in your testimony you stated that ``well
    timed, well run service between New Orleans and Mobile is a winner''. I
    agree. You further stated that, ``the question for reintroduction of
    that service from CSX was $2 billion''. As you know, the Gulf Coast
    Working Group, created by Congress in the FAST Act, identified the
    preliminary capital cost estimates for restoring service to Orlando, FL
    to be $117,672,000, with annual operating cost estimates at $5,480,000
    for the long-distance route and $6,970,000 for a twice daily State-
    supported route between New Orleans, LA and Mobile, AL. Amtrak was part
    of the working group and supported its conclusion.
        Congress, in S. Rept 115-138, the Appropriations Committee report
    accompanying S. 1655, the FY18 Senate Transportation, Housing, and
    Urban Development Appropriations Act, endorsed the findings of the Gulf
    Coast Working Group when it stated the following:

            Gulf Coast Rail Service.--Section 11304 of the FAST Act
            required the Gulf Coast Working Group [GCWG], consisting of
            FRA, Amtrak, the Southern Rail Commission [SRC], railroad
            carriers, State and local governments, and others, to evaluate
            all options for restoring passenger rail service in the gulf
            coast region, select a preferred option for service, develop an
            inventory and cost estimate of capital projects to restore
            service, and identify Federal and non-Federal funding to
            restore service. The GCWG report, released on July 17, 2017,
            identified the preferred options as a daily long-distance route
            that extends Amtrak's existing City of New Orleans service from
            New Orleans, Louisiana to Orlando, Florida and a new daily
            State-supported route from New Orleans, Louisiana to Mobile,
            Alabama. The preliminary capital cost estimates for restoring
            service is $117,672,000, with annual operating cost estimates
            at $5,480,000 for the long-distance route and $4,000,000 for
            the State-supported route. These cost estimates are dwarfed by
            the $2,300,000,000 estimate previously determined by industry,
            which also raised concerns with on-time performance [OTP]
            requirements and delays at drawbridges. The Committee believes
            the GCWG report more accurately reflects these concerns and is
            a more realistic cost estimate, but directs Amtrak and DOT to
            continue working with the host railroad and the Coast Guard to
            refine cost estimates.

        a. Is your testimony in agreement with the Gulf Coast Working Group
    and Amtrak staff or is it supporting the CSX assessment?
        Answer. My testimony was a reference to the wide gap, as also noted
    by the Appropriations Committee report, between CSX's proposal and the
    GCWG report. Like the Appropriations Committee, Amtrak believes that
    the GCWG report is a more accurate and realistic assessment of the host
    railroad-related challenges and solutions.

        Question 2. Mr. Anderson, during the hearing, you further stated
    that Amtrak's ``preference'' and ``incremental cost rights'' are not
    properly enforced.
        a. Please describe the impact of lack of enforcement of these
    rights on restored service between New Orleans, LA and Mobile, AL.
        Answer. Lack of enforcement of Amtrak's rights, in particular
    preference over freight transportation, has led to a severe
    deterioration in the on time performance of Amtrak service. The largest
    cause of delay to Amtrak trains on host railroads is Freight Train
    Interference, typically caused by a freight railroad requiring an
    Amtrak passenger train to wait so that its freight trains can operate
    first. Host railroads often choose to delay Amtrak trains with hundreds
    of passengers on them in favor of their trains carrying coal, garbage,
    crude oil, empty freight cars, or any freight that the host chooses to
    prioritize. Very often, a host railroad will make Amtrak passengers
    follow the same slow freight train for more than 50 or even 100 miles.
        During FY 2017, Amtrak trains were delayed by freight trains on
    host railroads almost 100,000 times. These delays totaled more than one
    million minutes (or 17,500 hours). These delays, which continue to
    increase at an alarming rate, threaten the viability of major portions
    of Amtrak's network and therefore threaten Amtrak's capability to
    expand service at all, including in the New Orleans-Mobile corridor.
        Moreover, a New Orleans-Mobile service will not be successful if
    our customers, and your constituents, experience such delays on a
    regular basis.

        b. Please describe your plan for addressing this issue.
        Answer. Amtrak continues to exercise every available opportunity to
    collaborate with willing hosts to share data and otherwise work
    together to identify and address delays--whether due to Freight Train
    Interference or other factors. However, for such efforts to be fully
    successful, host railroads must be motivated to run Amtrak well.
    Unfortunately, this currently is not the case with some host railroads.
    Current law prevents Amtrak from taking action in response to host
    railroad violations of Amtrak's preference rights. Amtrak's FY2019
    Legislative and Grant Request to Congress includes a proposal to
    correct this problem by allowing Amtrak a private right of action with
    respect to preference, so that Amtrak can protect its rights just as
    any other company would if its rights were being violated.

        Question 3. Mr. Anderson: As you know, Senator Cochran and I, along
    with our colleagues from Louisiana and Alabama, are working to restore
    passenger rail service along the Gulf Coast. The Southern Rail
    Commission is currently pursuing a state-supported route between New
    Orleans, LA and Mobile, AL to restart service along the gulf coast. The
    long term goal is ultimately to add the long distance route to Orlando,
    FL.
        a. It is my understanding that Positive Train Control (PTC) will be
    in place between New Orleans, LA and Mobile, AL on time. Please confirm
    whether this is true and, if not, please provide specific information
    about remaining gaps in installing PTC along this corridor.
        Answer. The New Orleans to Mobile segment is not owned by Amtrak,
    but this is our understanding as well. The host railroad, CSX, should
    be able to provide an update on progress for implementation.

        b. It is also my understanding that PTC may not be installed by the
    deadline on track that is east of Mobile, AL and which may one day be
    part of the long distance route to Orlando, FL. Can you confirm that a
    state-supported route from New Orleans, LA to Mobile, AL would not be
    impacted by the status of PTC on track east of Mobile, AL?
        Answer. This segment is also not owned by Amtrak, but this is our
    understanding as well. The host railroad, CSX, should be able to
    provide an update on progress for implementation. You are correct that
    the status of PTC implementation east of Mobile will not impacts the
    potential State Support service we are seeking to advance with the SRC
    to the west.

        Question 4. Recently, Politico reported that a spokesman for the
    freight railroad Canadian National stated the railroad was scheduled to
    complete installation of PTC on time. The spokesman further stated that
    ``the City of New Orleans corridor will be the first completed, and
    multiple subdivisions in the corridor are in revenue service
    demonstration.''
        a. Can you confirm that this is correct?
        Answer. This segment is not owned by Amtrak. The host railroad,
    Canadian National, should be able to provide an update on progress for
    implementation.

        b. If not, please provide describe the status of PTC on the City of
    New Orleans route and the impact upon Amtrak's revenue service on that
    route.
        Answer. This segment is not owned by Amtrak. The host railroad,
    Canadian National, should be able to provide an update on progress for
    implementation. While we are in regularly communication with Canadian
    National, they would be able to provide the most accurate and up-to-
    date information on this route.

        c. Please provide information describing the status of PTC on
    Amtrak's Crescent route and the impact upon Amtrak's revenue service on
    that route.
        Answer. This segment is not owned by Amtrak, but Amtrak has
    completed interoperability testing on this route between Washington, DC
    and New Orleans. The Amtrak project schedule calls for beginning
    operations with PTC in the fall of 2018 after final software upgrades
    are ready.
                                     ______

        Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Bill Nelson to
                                Richard Anderson
        Positive Train Control. Mr. Anderson, Florida relies on Amtrak
    service to provide access to long-distance rail service for many
    cities.
        Question 1. What is the status of positive train control on routes
    you travel in Florida? When will it be implemented?
        Answer. There has been significant progress since the hearing on
    locations where Amtrak had concerns about a host's implementation
    schedule or ability to qualify for extensions or exemptions. Since the
    hearing, many of these concerns have been addressed and we have
    received significant information from hosts to confirm compliance or
    exemptions have been filed in accordance to the law. In Florida, we are
    working with both the South Florida Regional Transportation Authority
    and SunRail as they progress forward in their work to achieved
    Alternate Schedules for implementation from the FRA. Assuming that such
    schedules are granted, Amtrak is undertaking hazard analysis and risk
    mitigation plans for operations over the territory until PTC becomes
    operational.

        Grade Crossing Safety. Panel, my state continues to top the list
    for grade crossing collisions and fatalities. In recent months, we have
    seen a renewed problem with grade crossing safety following the start
    of higher speed rail service.
        Question 2. What steps should we be taking to better address grade
    crossing safety?
        Answer. We continue to look for opportunities to address grade
    crossing safety and we have long supported outreach programs. The most
    prominent program is ``Operation Lifesaver,'' a nonprofit public safety
    education and awareness organization dedicated to reducing collisions,
    fatalities and injuries at highway-rail crossings and trespassing on or
    near railroad tracks. However, more needs to be done and we still
    believe the safest grade crossing is the one that does not exist.
    Several of the host railroads have programs in place that financially
    incentivize communities to remove public grade crossings and we
    strongly believe that more funding and focus on upgrading those grade
    crossings that necessary with enhanced traffic control and safety
    features is justified. Similarly, where new public grade crossings are
    introduced it is imperative that active warning devices are installed.

        Washington State Crash. Mr. Anderson, the Amtrak derailment in
    Washington State is eerily similar to the 2015 derailment in
    Philadelphia. In the last transportation bill, Congress mandated that
    railroads evaluate curves where the speed drops in hopes of preventing
    a similar crash.
        Question 3. Did Amtrak evaluate the curve near DuPont, Washington
    prior to starting service? What actions did you take to address it?
        Answer. In light of the open and ongoing NTSB investigation we are
    unable to provide this information at this time. It is important to
    note that the NTSB has publicly released that had an automatic-braking
    system been operational, it would have applied the brakes to slow and
    stop the train.

        Question 4. Could a derailment like the one in Washington State
    happen in Florida or elsewhere? What steps are you taking to prevent
    that from happening?
        Answer. The possibility of a train derailment is present across the
    Nation's railroad network from a variety of possible risk areas.
    However, many of the recent accidents involving Amtrak trains have
    involved over-speed situations that Positive Train Control could have
    prevented. Thus, we believe PTC or the application of technology and
    operating practices that achieves PTC-equivalency must be standard for
    all Amtrak routes and that this technology will make the entire U.S.
    rail network safer for passengers, railroad employees, and communities.
    While some question the need for PTC on low-density territory, our
    recent experience has shown that over-speed relative to signal
    indications and permanent or temporary speed restrictions is a
    significant risk and this risk exists regardless of traffic levels on a
    given route. As the leader in the installation of PTC for decades,
    having already deployed systems across nearly all of tracks we control,
    we have strong corporate experience with both the benefits of having
    PTC installed and the risks associated with its absence.
        For the tracks we use but do not own or control, we are cooperating
    with our freight and commuter host railroads as they advance their
    obligations to complete PTC installations, which are required either
    because of the presence of passenger trains or certain hazardous
    material. Additionally, the various freight and commuter railroads that
    operate over Amtrak's infrastructure must equip their rolling stock
    with PTC for use on our infrastructure and we are working cooperatively
    with them to advance these tasks.
                                     ______

       Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
                                Richard Anderson
        Speed Limit Action Plans. Mr. Anderson, the FAST Act requires
    passenger railroads to come up with speed limit action plans for any
    place there is a speed reduction of 20 miles-per-hour or greater. Speed
    limit action plans are meant to help prevent incidents like the Amtrak
    Cascade Train 501 derailment in DuPont, WA by creating numerous
    warnings for the engineer that they need to reduce their speed.
        Question 1. Had Amtrak created a speed action plan for the curve in
    DuPont, WA, where the derailment occurred?
        Answer. In light of the open and ongoing NTSB investigation we are
    unable to provide information related to the 501 derailment. However,
    Amtrak did comply with the FAST Act requirements for speed limit action
    plans.

        Question 2. Can you explain what measures were in place to warn the
    engineer that he needed to reduce the speed of the train?
        Answer. The information publicly released by the NTSB confirmed
    that a 30 mph speed-limit sign was posted on the engineer's side of the
    train to remind engineers about the upcoming curve. It was posted two
    miles before the curve.

        Question 3. Can you identify what you are doing to learn from this
    derailment to update all your speed limit action plans?
        Answer. We have and will continue to review our speed limit action
    plans. The need for full implementation of Positive Train Control is
    critical. PTC will prevent over-speed derailments. PTC must be standard
    for all Amtrak routes and this technology will make the entire U.S.
    rail network safer for passengers, railroad employees, and communities.
    Amtrak is a leader in the installation of PTC, having already deployed
    systems across nearly all of tracks we control.
        For the tracks we use but do not own or control, we are cooperating
    with our freight and commuter host railroads as they advance their
    obligations to complete PTC installations, which are required either
    because of the presence of passenger trains or certain hazardous
    material. Additionally, the various freight and commuter railroads that
    operate over Amtrak's infrastructure must equip their rolling stock
    with PTC for use on our infrastructure and we are working cooperatively
    with them to advance these tasks.
        In addition, Amtrak established system wide qualifications
    standards for our train and engine personnel and is in the process of
    expanding our use of simulation for training and route qualification.

        Highway-Rail Grade Crossing Safety. I would like to address the
    topic of safety issue, highway-rail grade crossings. The City of
    Lakewood sits on the new Point Defiance Bypass Rail line where the
    DuPont derailment occurred.
        The city has 7 grade crossings within its city limits. They are
    understandably concerned about safety at these crossings given that
    over 30 percent of rail related fatalities occur at grade crossings.
        Question 4. Mr. Anderson, can you tell me how Amtrak is working to
    make highway-rail grade crossings safer?
        Answer. We continue to look for opportunities to address grade
    crossing safety and we have long supported outreach programs. The most
    prominent program is ``Operation Lifesaver,'' a nonprofit public safety
    education and awareness organization dedicated to reducing collisions,
    fatalities and injuries at highway-rail crossings and trespassing on or
    near railroad tracks. However, more needs to be done and we still
    believe the safest grade crossing is the one that does not exist.
    Several of the host railroads have programs in place that financially
    incentivize communities to remove public grade crossings and we
    strongly believe that more funding and focus on upgrading those grade
    crossings that necessary with enhanced traffic control and safety
    features is justified. Similarly, where new public grade crossings are
    introduced it is imperative that active warning devices are installed.
                                     ______

     Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Richard Blumenthal to
                                Richard Anderson
        Implementation of Positive Train Control. Mr. Anderson, under one
    scenario, Metro-North completely implements PTC by December 31, 2018.
    That's the only acceptable option in my book.
        Under a second scenario, Metro-North does just enough to get a
    series of extensions of the deadline to implement from the FRA--known
    technically as the ``alternative schedule.''
        I want to consider the impact of a third, nightmare scenario:
    Metro-North fails to qualify for any extension at all. In that
    scenario, several things would happen. Metro-North should be properly
    penalized. But Metro-North would not be the only railroad affected by
    its failure to comply with the law. Amtrak would be, too. If Metro-
    North's track isn't PTC-compliant, I understand Amtrak will need to act
    accordingly. That means Amtrak service could completely cease on track
    in Connecticut from the New York border to New Haven. That could sever
    one of the country's key transportation arteries, leading to even more
    congestion on the highways and in the air up and down the Eastern
    Seaboard.
        In your testimony you envision this problem. You state, ``For any
    such route segments'' without PTC implemented or having failed to
    qualify for an ``alternative schedule,'' ``Amtrak will suspend
    operations until such time as the carrier becomes compliant with the
    law.''
        Question 1. Does this statement apply to Metro-North?
        Answer. At present, we believe that Metro-North will qualify for an
    extension but we recommend you seek confirmation of this status with
    them directly. As you know, Amtrak will conduct risk assessments for
    all routes which do not have operable PTC by December 31, 2018. The
    risk assessment outcome will result in developing operational and/or
    technological recommended enhancements on a route-by-route basis that
    we can deploy until PTC is operational. However, if Metro-North were to
    fail to qualify for an extension at all, Amtrak would not be able to
    operate over their infrastructure.

        Question 2. What would happen to the riders who depend on Amtrak
    service between New York and Boston if Metro-North fails to implement
    PTC by December 31, 2018, or qualify for any extension?
        Answer. Amtrak does not have a plan at this time since we have been
    informed by Metro-North that they expect to meet the deadline or file
    for an extension. However, this segment is not owned by Amtrak. The
    host railroad, Metro-North, should be able to provide an update on
    progress for implementation.

        Question 3. Are you confident that in 2019 you will be able to
    continue service on tracks you currently use between New York and
    Boston?
        Answer. Yes.

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