[Senate Hearing 115-743]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 115-743
THE PLAN TO DEFEAT ISIS: KEY DECISIONS
AND CONSIDERATIONS
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 7, 2017
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web:
http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
39-614 PDF WASHINGTON : 2020
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
BOB CORKER, Tennessee, Chairman
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
MARCO RUBIO, Florida ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
CORY GARDNER, Colorado TOM UDALL, New Mexico
TODD YOUNG, Indiana CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming TIM KAINE, Virginia
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
RAND PAUL, Kentucky CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey
Todd Womack, Staff Director
Jessica Lewis, Democratic Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator From Tennessee.................... 1
Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., U.S. Senator From Maryland............. 2
Jeffrey, Hon. James, Philip Solondz Distinguished Fellow, The
Washington Institute, Washington, DC........................... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Bash, Jeremy, Managing Director, Beacon Global Strategies LLC,
Washington, DC................................................. 9
Prepared statement........................................... 10
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of the Hon. James Jeffrey to Questions Submitted By
Senator Todd Young............................................. 48
Responses of Jeremy Bash to Questions Submitted by Senator Todd
Young.......................................................... 53
Responses of the Hon. James Jeffrey to Questions Submitted By
Senator Edward J. Markey....................................... 55
Letter to Secretary of State Tillerson from Senator Todd Young... 59
(iii)
THE PLAN TO DEFEAT ISIS: KEY DECISIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS
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TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 2017
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Bob Corker,
chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Corker [presiding], Risch, Rubio,
Johnson, Gardner, Young, Barrasso, Isakson, Portman, Paul,
Cardin, Menendez, Shaheen, Coons, Murphy, Kaine, Markey,
Merkley, and Booker.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE
The Chairman. The Foreign Relations Committee will come to
order.
We thank our witnesses for being here, and all the Senators
who are here, and those who will come. I hope your experience
here today can be informative, as we take stock of our efforts
against ISIS.
Last month, President Trump asked for a new plan to defeat
ISIS. The preliminary draft should be completed by the end of
this month.
While the executive branch is looking at new options, I
think it is a good time for us to take a look at what has been
accomplished, what remains to be done, and what decisions need
to be made.
As the battle for Mosul continues and the preparations for
Raqqa begin, I hope we can get your perspective on what
additional steps to defeat ISIS could look like, and with whom
we should partner.
The fight in Iraq appears to remain on course, but huge
questions remain about the future of American influence and
what role Iran will play in a post-ISIS Iraq.
Unfortunately, in Syria, the problem has only gotten harder
with time. And now the Trump administration is faced with
choosing the least bad option. One decision they must make is
who to involve in the military campaign.
Who actually clears Raqqa could have wide-ranging strategic
consequences, whether it is the Kurds, Kurdish-supported Arabs,
Turkey and the Syrian opposition, or the Assad regime and its
allies.
I criticized the previous administration for a glaring
disparity between their anti-ISIS efforts and their diplomatic
efforts to end the Syrian civil war. I would appreciate your
perspectives on the logic that defeating ISIS without a
political solution in Syria will simply lead to another ISIS,
and whether or not it is possible to link the two strategies.
Finally, it is worth noting that the Department of Defense
was tasked as the lead agency in developing this strategy. This
is probably a good moment for us to examine the structure the
administration is using to lead the coalition and the role of
the State Department.
With that, I would like to thank you again for appearing
before the committee, and I look forward to your testimony, and
turn to our distinguished ranking member, Ben Cardin.
STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND
Senator Cardin. Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for
calling this hearing. To me, this is an extremely urgent
subject for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the United
States Senate, and the United States.
So I welcome our two witnesses, and I look forward to a
robust discussion.
President Trump now faces a key decision point on how he
will direct the fight against ISIL. Over the past 2 weeks, we
have all had a chance to see how President Trump handles
national security issues. I certainly hope that the risky and
chaotic start we have just seen on how he handled the Muslim
ban is not an indicator as to how he will handle ISIL.
Last week, we saw how he abandoned our allies like
Australia and appeased our enemies like Russia. It also remains
totally unclear how Mr. Trump's never-ending desire to make
nice with the Russians, even after they attacked our democratic
system, will influence his plans in Syria.
And President Trump's abandonment of our core American
values with his Muslim ban will also alienate the Muslim allies
we need to work with the Middle East to fight ISIL.
Any path forward fighting ISIL brings risks. Increasing
U.S. boots on the ground, directing U.S. troops to get closer
to the fight, or changing the rules of engagement, demand an
assessment of the risks to the U.S. forces and to civilians
living inside ISIS territory. Arming new groups like YPG in
Syria must be balanced against Turkish concerns and the desired
end state in Syria.
Changing the deepening U.S. involvement in the fight
against ISIS must be weighed against what we know from past
experience. U.S. forces on their own in this part of the world
only inflame resentment and become the target of violent
extremists.
There is no sustainable win against ISIS without a long-
term political solution. That means a political settlement that
ends the civil war in Syria, and removes Bashar al-Assad, and
ensures that Iraq has a government that is inclusive,
accountable, and reflective of its citizens' needs.
Mr. Chairman, every day we hear more about what is
happening in Syria. Today's report by Amnesty International,
that up to 13,000 people have been executed in a prison north
of Damascus in a hidden campaign authorized at the highest
levels of the Assad regime, is beyond disturbing.
This stomach-churning report is a must-read for those in
the Trump administration who want to move forward on
counterterrorism cooperation with Russia against ISIL. Russia's
military intervention was explicit to save their man in
Damascus, Bashar al-Assad.
This amounts to war crimes, and we cannot be complicitous
in covering up accountability for war crimes.
On January 28, President Trump issued National Security
Presidential Memorandum 3 directing the Department of Defense
to develop a new plan to defeat ISIS. This directive instructed
the Defense Department, as the chairman pointed out, to
collaborate across the U.S. Government, including the State
Department, the Treasury Department, and the intelligence
community.
This should alarm members of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee because a plan to defeat ISIS that is viewed
primarily through a military lens is not going to succeed. We
need to lead with a solution to the problem, not just a
military solution.
If we have learned anything from the experience of the last
decade, it is that the military fight is not even half of the
battle. Long-term, sustainable ends to conflict demand
political agreements; international donors; stabilization
activities; reconciliation initiatives; development expertise;
accountable local leadership; and, above all, patient,
consistent diplomacy and political engagement.
The State Department must be the leader in our counter-ISIS
strategy. The counter-ISIS strategy carried out by President
Obama, including military force, is one line of effort. It is a
critical line to our effort, to be sure, but just one element
in a holistic approach.
Equally important are cutting off terror funding, stopping
foreign fighter flows, countering ISIS propaganda and online
recruitment, and providing humanitarian assistance to the
innocent civilians in neighboring countries impacted by ISIS
depravity and violence.
Evidenced by this line of effort and more, President Trump
has clearly inherited the most capable, experienced people at
the State Department. I hope he uses them. We have the experts
there that can help us determine long-term strategy.
We have made progress in defeating ISIS. We have taken back
territory. We have been able to deal with circumstances on the
ground with the local forces. We need to build on that and
build on the expertise that we have already developed within
our State Department to make this work.
But one thing is clear to me and that is, we have to work
with our allies. I was pleased to see yesterday that President
Trump pulled back on his hostility toward NATO. That was a good
sign.
But threatening the relevancy of the United Nations or
embarrassing the President of Mexico or abruptly cutting short
a phone call with the Prime Minister of Australia will only
isolate America and our ability to really defeat ISIS through
the type of partnerships that we need globally.
So I hope that we can address these issues in a partnership
working with our allies. Australia, by the way, is one of our
closest allies in our war against ISIS. And I hope that we can
figure out a way in which this committee can weigh in.
One thing is clear to me. The Muslim ban is a recruitment
tool that will be used that will hurt our chances of defeating
ISIS.
And no, Mr. President, this is not like some other proposal
that has been made by previous administrations. This is much
more comprehensive and has clearly been interpreted and is
based upon the religion of the individuals, and that alienates
over 1.7 billion Muslims globally and countries working with us
in the coalition.
This ban needs to end, and the Congress needs to speak, and
I hope this hearing will be the beginning of our debate here in
this committee as to how we can help in regards to our fight
against ISIS.
The Chairman. Are you finished?
Senator Cardin. Yes.
The Chairman. I do want to agree on the 13,000 people that
supposedly have been hung. I think all of us have seen the
photographs that Caesar presented here, that the Holocaust
Museum put on display. I know you and I were there for that
ceremony.
And I do hope that, at the end of this, we do not forget we
have a major war criminal on our hands in Syria. And as we move
through this, he has got to be punished. He has got to be
brought to trial. He has got to be dealt with in the most
appropriate way, so I could not agree more.
I will say that, last week, in meeting with General Flynn,
the national security adviser, I do think that Mattis and
Tillerson have made a combine that neither one of them are
going to come forward with plans that the two of them have not
agreed to. But I agree that the State Department certainly
needs to be involved with this.
So with that, let me introduce our distinguished witnesses.
Our first witness is the Hon. James Jeffrey, currently with the
Washington Institute. Ambassador Jeffrey previously served as
the Ambassador to Iraq, the Ambassador to Turkey, the deputy
national security adviser to President George W. Bush.
We thank you so much for being here.
Our second witness today is Mr. Jeremy Bash, the managing
director at Beacon Global Strategies, a former chief of staff
to Leon Panetta at the U.S. Department of Defense and the CIA.
We want to thank you both for being here. I think you both
have done this before many times. Your written testimony,
without objection, will be entered into the record, and if you
can summarize in about 5 minutes, that would be great. We look
forward to questions.
Again, in the order introduced, if you would begin, I would
appreciate it.
Ambassador?
STATEMENT OF THE HON. JAMES JEFFREY, PHILIP SOLONDZ
DISTINGUISHED FELLOW, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Jeffrey. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, first
of all, and members of the committee, thank you very much for
having us here today. This is a really important and crucial
issue.
As you said, our written comments are submitted to the
record. I will try to summarize them. But frankly, the two of
you, in your opening statements, hit on most of my top points.
Number one, the President's directive to move very quickly
on ISIS with the goal of defeating it is exactly the right
strategy.
Number two, this has to be done in conjunction with the
State Department and Defense Department, because the military
operation is not the only operation. We will defeat ISIS as a
state. We will not eliminate it completely, for the same reason
we have not eliminated Al Qaeda completely. But getting rid of
it as a state, as a caliphate, is an extremely important step.
But how we do this politically, as you said, in relation to
Syria, to Iran, which is possibly an even greater danger in the
region, with Russia now involved in the region, is crucially
important. This is a watershed in the region, as we move to
eliminate in Raqqa and Mosul, equivalent to probably nothing we
have seen since the surge a decade ago.
Let us start first on the battle that we have before us,
because it is not won yet. Mosul is slowly being liberated from
ISIS, and that will eliminate ISIS, essentially, from Iraq,
other than some minor terrorist groups. The issue there will be
to keep it from coming back, as it came back again after its
predecessor was defeated in 2008 to 2010.
The Raqqa battle is the bigger battle. And as the chairman
said, there are several options.
Using the Kurdish YPG, which was what the Obama
administration did, has advantages. The problem is it does not
have the heavy weapons. It is violently opposed by Turkey, and
Turkey is essential to this battle, its airfields, its
logistics, its support. Turkey actually has troops in the fight
against ISIS.
So I am very concerned about going forward without getting
the Turks on board. That is possible, as someone who has spent
9 years in Turkey.
But it will not be possible until after the early April
referendum in Turkey about the presidency. For various internal
reasons, President Erdogan has to take a very tough line on the
Kurds, until that time. He has been more flexible in the past.
I think he can be flexible, if he is given a role in Raqqa, in
the future. So I hope we can look to that.
Inviting the Russians, Syrians, and Iranians in to be our
allies in this fight for a dozen reasons, including some you
just cited, is a very bad idea.
The Russian military capabilities, frankly, apart from
carpet-bombing civilians, are not impressive in this campaign
so far. And the Iranians and Syrians are feared and hated by
the people of eastern Syria. So we have to be very, very
careful about that.
But what is going to happen after we inevitably take Raqqa?
First of all, speed is important, and that is why I would
urge the Senate and the administration to consider upping
significantly the American enablers we have--advisers,
artillery, attack helicopters.
But also consider at least some ground forces, not just
ours but from other NATO forces, in the battalion level, a few
thousand people at most, to spearhead the attack, because what
I have seen in the battle in Mosul and the Turks and the battle
for Al Bab, this is going to be very tough without elite
forces.
But what happens on the day after? First of all, there are
immediate issues of providing relief to the people, ensuring
that one group does not go after the other group. But so far,
surprisingly, from what all I have seen in the Middle East, in
Iraq and to some degree in Syria, that has gone okay.
It is the longer term we have to watch. We need to be
present in Syria, and the battle against ISIS gives us an
opportunity to do so. We have two alliances we need to keep
steady. First, the Turks, who have essentially a no-fly safe
zone in the north of Syria, and the Kurds in Rojava, if we can
work out a way between the two, we will have a presence there,
and we can use that to leverage pressure on the Syrian
Government and on the Russians to maintain the Astana
ceasefire, which is absolutely critical and will be opposed by
Assad and, frankly, the Iranians, who want a total victory in
Syria, which is destabilizing for the whole region.
The other thing is, soon, the battle in Iraq is over. We
should learn from what happened in 2014, when ISIS returned,
that it is a mistake for us to get out of that country. Iraq is
crucial not only to prevent Sunni extremism but also as--I will
not say a buffer, but as a balancing country to Iran. And that
requires some sort of American presence, including at least a
minimal American military training presence. And I hope this
time we can do it.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Jeffrey follows:]
The Prepared Statement of Hon. James F. Jeffrey
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, Members of the Committee, thank
you for having me here to discuss this national security issue of the
upmost significance.
summary
The threats the Islamic State (ISIS) poses to our homeland and
those of our allies and partners, its destabilizing role throughout the
Middle East, and the recent success the U.S.-led coalition has had
against it, all argue for an immediate, intense effort to destroy this
terrorist scourge as our most urgent priority in the region. Published
reports and administration statements indicate the Trump administration
is fully behind this goal.
But while ISIS is the most urgent priority in the region, it is not
the only, or even the most dangerous, one. Iranian expansionist
activity, at times partnered with Russia, poses at least an equal
security risk to the region and key U.S. interests: stability of
regional partners, flow of hydrocarbons to the global economy, non-
proliferation and counter-terrorism. Defeating ISIS, while worthy in
itself, must be done in a manner to reinforce regional stability and
U.S. interests.
Today I would like to discuss considerations related to both the
defeat of ISIS itself, and possible `day after' scenarios, stressing
how the latter play into U.S. interests, and in turn depend on not only
whether, but how, and with whom, we defeat ISIS.
In short, our plan to take Raqqa in Syria, the key remaining
objective, should be done in conjunction with, rather than in
opposition to, Turkey. After the Turkish constitutional referendum in
early April Ankara should be willing, if it understands longer-term
U.S. goals, to accept additional support for the Syrian Kurdish YPG in
the Raqqa battle, assuming Turkish equities in Syria are supported. And
if the United States desires a rapid victory over ISIS, it probably
will have to commit more supporting forces, and possibly limited ground
combat formations.
The destruction of the ISIS `state' in Iraq and Syria, in the
context of the Syrian civil war, Iran's quest for hegemony, and Russian
reengagement, will be a watershed in the Middle East equivalent to the
U.S. march into Iraq, the Iranian revolution, and America's regional
intervention during the Yom Kippur conflict. Decisions taken over the
coming year by the United States and others will shape the region for
decades.
As U.S. vital regional interests are at stake in the post-ISIS
scenario, the United States should chose its political-military
strategy for the defeat of ISIS not only from a military but from a
political standpoint--to advance a `day after' scenario that keeps the
United States in the region, maintain our new (YPG) and old (Turkish
and Iraqi) relationships, push back Iranian ambitions and `manage' an
inevitable Russian presence.
the isis battle
As Graeme Wood has written in The Atlantic, the unique nature of
ISIS is based on its status as a ``Caliphate,'' a statelet with a
population, army, economy, and government, and a claim to the Caliphate
tradition from Islam's golden age. While ISIS has offshoots in
ungoverned territory throughout the Muslim world, its unique nature and
threat flows from its territory in Northwestern Iraq and Eastern Syria,
centered on Mosul and the ISIS capital, Raqqa. Taking those cities will
destroy the ISIS ``state'' and defeat ISIS in its current form and
dramatically reduce its threat to U.S. interests.
The U.S. led coalition's campaign against these two cities, while
coordinated, is militarily and politically differentiated. My focus in
both, while it will touch on military issues, will be the political
considerations underlying military decisions and goals.
IRAQ: By most accounts, the battle for West Mosul will take several
months. The coalition-Iraqi game plan for that campaign is well-
developed and succeeding. Once successful, the only major ISIS presence
in Iraq will be Hawijah, near Kirkuk, presumably an easy target. As the
Mosul victory nears, ground maneuvers, especially by the Kurdish
Peshmerga and the largely Shia Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), will
require careful U.S. engagement to avoid clashes and to advance longer-
term U.S. interests in Iraq.
SYRIA: By all accounts the United States is preparing for a final
push against Raqqa. But given the tenacity of ISIS defense of other
cities, capturing Raqqa will be a major undertaking. The United States
has options to generate forces for such a victory, but each has
significant political-military implications.
YPG-led operation: This was the preferred solution of the Obama
Administration but, according to press accounts, has been challenged by
the Trump Administration. It foresees an offensive organized around the
Syrian Democratic Force (SDF), led by the Syrian Kurdish YPG, but with
a minority of Sunni Arabs. But the SDF has only limited crew-served,
and little or no heavy, weapons. Urban warfare typically requires
integrated tank-engineer-infantry forces supported by fires. To develop
such a combined arms capability the United States would have to provide
heavy weapons.
Turkey is opposed to this given the YPG's relationship with the
Turkish Kurdish insurgent organization, the PKK, engaged in a bitter
internal conflict with Ankara. Turkey is not only opposed to the United
States arming the YPG, but also to the YPG moving into Sunni Arab
areas, particularly those occupying Turkey's entire Syrian border. It
is difficult to see how Washington could pursue anti-ISIS operations in
Syria without Turkish bases and other cooperation. In addition,
according to a draft report by the Washington Institute, all four major
Arab tribes around Raqqa are to one or another degree at odds with the
Kurds, raising a question of `the day after' in Raqqa if the city was
liberated by Kurds, or Arab elements under their control. Finally, a
largely YPG victory over ISIS in Raqqa and the expansion of the YPG
over a large swath of Arab territory, as now seen in the city of
Manbic, has troubling implications for regional arrangements post-ISIS,
including possible YPG cooperation with Iran and Assad.
Turkish Alliance: The Turks have offered to either lead or support
a coalition assault on Raqqa using their Free Syrian Army (FSA),
largely Arab allies, along with the Turkish armor-infantry taskforce in
northern Syria. According to reporting in the Washington Post February
2, the Turks are not seen as capable of carrying out this mission
themselves, and their stalled anti-ISIS offensive in al Bab strengthens
such an assessment. While the same Washington Institute report suggests
that the Raqqa tribes would be less antagonistic to a Turkish presence,
an expanded Turkish military role could be problematic for both the YPG
and the Assad-Iran-Russia coalition.
Combination: A joint effort on two fronts by the Turks/FSA and YPG/
SDF would put more military pressure on ISIS and potentially calm
Turkey's concerns about the YPG. Such a joint operation would be easier
for the United States politically than throwing its lot with a single
YPG or Turkish-led offensive, but would still require delicate
diplomacy. Turkey would need assurances on weapons to the YPG, and how
far YPG forces would move into Arab territory. However, while the YPG's
links with the PKK make it a threat to Turkey, part of President
Erdogan's hostility to the PKK and thus YPG stems from his political
alliance to win an early April Constitutional Amendment referendum.
Once that is behind him, he may be more flexible with the PKK and YPG,
as he was before Summer 2015. The YPG, in turn, would require
assurances that its core Kurdish territory would not be pressured by
Turkey.
Russian-Syrian-Iranian Support: The military capabilities of this
coalition are not apparent. Russian airpower routinely targets civilian
populations and lacks precision weapons. It is hard to see a military
advantage it brings which could not be met by a minor increase in
Coalition aircraft. Likewise, Syrian and Iranian surrogate infantry
capabilities are not impressive, and employing them in Sunni Arab areas
is risky. Moreover, unless it is clear that the United States, with
whatever above option it chooses, cannot take Raqqa, then the benefits
of recruiting Russia, Iran and Assad must be balanced against their
`sharing' a victory that the United States could obtain without them.
On the other hand, acceding to a token Russian role against Raqqa, or
more intensive intelligence sharing and air tasking coordination with
Moscow, could complement efforts described below aimed at Iran.
U.S. and NATO forces: One reason for recent success against ISIS
has been a loosening of restrictions, and personnel/equipment ceilings,
on U.S. force `enablers' (Joint Terminal Attack Coordinators--JTAC),
advisory teams, attack helicopters, artillery, and the rules of
engagement they operate under. Reportedly a further loosening is under
review in DoD, and that makes sense. A more decisive step would be the
introduction of limited U.S. and other NATO elite ground combat forces
in direct combat. In particular a relatively small (several thousand
strong) U.S. armor contingent could be a decisive force multiplier with
risk of casualties limited. From a political standpoint, a more robust
U.S. ground presence would reassure the Turks, YPG, and residents of
Raqqa about U.S. commitment and potentially increase their receptivity
to U.S. initiatives.
the day after
Once Mosul and Raqqa have been liberated, and the Caliphate
destroyed, the United States should engage diplomatically and
militarily to ensure that outcomes in both Syria and Iraq are
compatible with U.S. interests, especially the containment of Iran.
This task has both `immediate' and `long term' aspects.
The immediate goals are relief to liberated populations and
protection of civilians against ill-disciplined victorious factions.
Generally this effort has been successful in Iraq and on a smaller
scale Syria, so should not require extensive new U.S. involvement. But
governance and security decisions taken immediately will have an impact
on the attitudes of the population towards their liberators, and if
ill-considered could encourage a return of ISIS or al Qaeda. This is
obviously of interest to the United States.
The longer-term outcomes of the defeat of ISIS are of great import
to the United States, as noted in the summary. Apart from preventing a
new descent into chaos or extremist control, the U.S. interest for this
``Syria-Iraq theater'' is to preserve Iraqi unity and independence,
uphold the Astana Syrian cease fire, limit Iranian influence in Iraq,
react to Russia's regional expansion, and reconcile Turkey and the YPG.
To avoid any Syrian-Iranian effort to break the Astana ceasefire
and achieve a total victory over the opposition, the United States
should support the Turkish zone in Northern Syria, the Rojava and Afrin
YPG enclaves, and a `free zone' around Raqqa, including with some
temporary U.S. military training and liaison detachments inside Syria.
Reconciliation between Turkey and the YPG (and potentially the PKK)
would reinforce these efforts. The option of arming the FSA must stay
on the table. Such conditions offer the best chance of splitting Russia
off from Iran and Syria.
The U.S. military should press for a `stay-behind' train and
liaison presence of several thousand troops in Iraq, supporting both
Kurdish Peshmerga and Iraqi regular military forces. This likely will
require direct communications and a mix of `carrots and sticks' with
the Iranians, and with an inevitable risk of Iran lashing out at U.S.
forces there.
The above steps represent an initial political-military post-
conflict `shaping of the environment' to balance the various regional
actors, restore partners' credibility in U.S. military success and
commitments, and buy time for a more comprehensive policy towards the
region.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Bash?
STATEMENT OF JEREMY BASH, MANAGING DIRECTOR, BEACON GLOBAL
STRATEGIES LLC, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Bash. Mr. Chairman, distinguished Ranking Member Mr.
Cardin, members of the committee, and great public servant
Ambassador Jeffrey, I come at this issue having seen
counterterrorism and military operations through the prism of
those who led them at the CIA and the Defense Department.
And I think here is the bottom line. We have been talking
about Syria. We have been talking about Iraq. ISIS is a global
threat. ISIS is a global challenge. That is why I believe we
need a global, comprehensive strategy to defeat ISIS and
protect American national security interests.
This challenge is so urgent, so complicated, that, in my
view, the only way to accomplish it is to simultaneously use
the full measure of our diplomatic, military, law enforcement,
intelligence, economic, and public diplomacy efforts.
Now, let me make three quick points about the current
campaign, and Ambassador Jeffrey hit on some of them.
First, I think the campaign against ISIS in Mosul and in
Raqqa should be intensified. What does intensification look
like? Greater intelligence resources to track ISIS planners;
increased pace of airstrikes, particularly in Raqqa; training
and equipping those forces on the ground who can deny ISIS a
safe haven.
Point two, on the global front, we have to stay on the
offensive against ISIS everywhere. And I should also add Al
Qaeda. I know that is not the focus of this hearing, but let us
not focus--let us not lose sight of the important role that Al
Qaeda plays as well.
ISIS, we have to operate--they operate in the Sahel, to
Europe, to South Asia. And when American airpower is necessary,
as it was recently in Libya, I believe we should deploy it
without hesitation.
But in many cases, our work is going to entail the less
headline-grabbing activities: information-sharing, data
correlation, intelligence training, law enforcement training,
and diplomacy.
Take Europe, for example. There, we must keep our focus on
the travel of foreign fighters, work with our European allies
and partners. In most areas of the world, the main levers of
U.S. power will be this intelligence cooperation, the day-to-
day diplomacy. And that is why our campaign cannot, in my view,
be globally led by the military alone.
Point three, we must counter ISIS's use of social media,
Twitter, Telegram, and other outlets that they use for their
propaganda purposes. As this committee has recognized,
propaganda is an accelerant on the process of radicalization.
In that vein, our efforts should be geared toward working
with Muslim leaders here in the United States and in Muslim-
majority countries from Africa to the gulf to Southeast Asia,
to counter ISIS's narrative.
Turning now to the current administration's already stated
plans, and although the administration is only about 3 weeks
old, it actually has moved aggressively in some areas with
regards to counter-ISIS policy. I strongly support the
President's decision to conduct a quick review of the anti-ISIS
campaign. We do not want our momentum to stall.
However, I think there are some areas where I think the
administration's early steps warrant some adjustment.
First, we must make clear that we support our allies. They
are taking fire from ISIS at this very hour. For example,
Australia--Australia has fought with us in every war since
World War II. They are the second largest troop contributor to
the counter-ISIS effort. We have to thank Australia every
chance we get.
We also need the support of our NATO allies, and there will
be an opportunity later this spring for the President to make
that case clearly himself when he attends the NATO summit.
Second, we should ensure that diplomacy is on an equal
footing with military planning. We referenced the 28 January
directive. A comprehensive global strategy requires that the
State Department be on equal footing with the Defense
Department.
Third, in my view, we should repeal the Muslim-only ban,
and I say this strictly from a national security perspective.
Counterterrorism requires focus. If you put an entire
civilian populace under suspicion, you are inevitably going to
take your eye off the true threats. And worse, we have handed
ISIS, in my view, the ultimate recruiting tool.
Fourth, we should disavow taking their oil or torture.
These play into the worst fears of the very people we are
trying to enlist to support our efforts.
Finally, I agree with Ambassador Jeffrey. I would not
outsource the counter-ISIS campaign to Russia or to Iran or to
Assad. This is a very dangerous idea. Russia and Syria have
conducted hideous crimes, in my view. They liquefied the town
of Aleppo in a scene too horrible to allow it to be shown on my
own television in my living room when young children were
present.
Russia's misdeeds cannot be trusted, and the
administration, I believe, will inevitably come to this
conclusion after a period of time.
So, in conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the counter-ISIS campaign
has made important progress. ISIS has lost more than half its
territory. Many of its senior leaders have been taken off the
battlefield. They are being squeezed.
But we cannot and should not be complacent. Now is the time
to accelerate our campaign, intensify our efforts, and hasten
the defeat of ISIS on a global scale.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bash follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jeremy Bash \1\
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cardin, Distinguished Members of the
Committee, I am pleased to appear before you today, alongside one of
our country's great public servants, Ambassador James Jeffrey.
I come at this issue having seen counterterrorism campaigns and
military operations through the prism of those who led those efforts at
the Central Intelligence Agency and the Pentagon. In addition to
developing and executing these missions, it was the role of these
senior leaders to advise the President on the most fateful decisions a
President makes: whether to send our women and men into harm's way. A
President must be able to avail himself of information, facts,
expertise, and candid advice. From what I observed, the Commander in
Chief simply cannot do his job of keeping our country safe without
these critical inputs. Hearings like these provide one of those
critical inputs.
Decisions made in the White House Situation Room have enormous
consequences. I commend President Trump for taking the time last week
to travel to Dover Air Force Base to pay his respects to one of our
fallen heroes. I have made that trip myself and seen the bravery of the
family members whose loved ones we welcomed home. I do not think it is
possible to understand the stakes of these decisions until you see the
faces of the mothers and fathers, siblings and spouses, and most
poignantly, the young children of those who sacrifice everything for
our nation.
During my decade in government, we witnessed many false starts and
missteps in the effort to take on Al Qaeda--in Iraq, in the Arabian
Peninsula, in the Maghreb, and in Afghanistan and Pakistan. But over
time, we developed strategies to disrupt, dismantle and defeat the
senior leadership of Al Qaeda, stopping specific external plots, and
denying them the ability to plan and execute another large-scale attack
on our homeland. I believe there are lessons to be learned from both
the failures and the successes that can inform the plan against ISIS.
What is needed today is a comprehensive strategy to defeat ISIS and
protect American national security interests.
I use the term ``comprehensive strategy'' because this challenge is
so urgent and yet so complex that, in my view, the only way to
accomplish all of our objectives simultaneously is to employ the full
measure of our diplomatic, intelligence, military, law enforcement,
economic, and public diplomacy efforts.
I want to focus my testimony on four areas:
First, the campaign in Syria and Iraq;
Second, the global hunt for ISIS;
Third, the effort to counter ISIS propaganda, primarily online; and
Fourth, adjustments to the current approach against ISIS.
campaign in syria and iraq
The United States-led counter-ISIS campaign in Mosul, Iraq, and in
Raqqa, Syria, should be intensified to make it even harder for ISIS to
plan external operations. Intensification requires three elements:
First, we should devote greater intelligence resources to
tracking ISIS senior planners--their whereabouts, their communications
practices, and their ties to cells or individuals in Europe, Asia, or
the United States. I would urge any new Administration to conduct a
searching review of our intelligence posture against ISIS senior
leaders and make recommendations to upgrade that posture.
This is particularly important in light of the Feb. 4, 2017
article in the New York Times that revealed that ISIS leaders were in
direct communication with operatives in 10 out of the 40 attacks that
occurred outside of the so-called caliphate. In other words, a large
portion of attacks thought to be ``lone wolf'' attacks had an actual
operational connection to ISIS in Syria.
Second, we should increase the pace of air strikes against
ISIS targets, particularly in Raqqa. We have hit ISIS with over 17,000
airstrikes--including nearly 7,000 in Syria--since Operation Inherent
Resolve began. But we need more pressure. These strikes are necessary
to destroy the command-and- control infrastructure of ISIS. These
strikes also force ISIS commanders to choose between keeping their head
down or communicating with each other. We employed this strategy to
great effect from 2008-2012 against Al Qaeda senior leaders along the
Afghanistan-Pakistan border. We saw many plots stopped dead in their
tracks once air strikes took out the operational leader of the plot.
Third, we should continue to train and equip those forces on
the ground who can deny ISIS a safehaven. Training and equipping local
forces are necessary tools to avoid U.S. casualties and ensure that
counter-terrorist operations are not seen as U.S. efforts to impose a
solution from afar or plunder their natural resources. In Iraq, the
Iraqi military units have retaken about half of Mosul. We must continue
to work with the Iraqi military to finish the Mosul campaign. In Syria,
we should fund, train, and provide lethal offensive equipment to the
Syrian Defense Forces (SDF). The SDF represent our best chance to take
back ground in Raqqa.
I know there is not unanimity on this point. While this
option would have some near-term costs (such as creating friction with
Turkey), it must be weighed against the alternatives. Other forces in
the area are far less capable and will take too much time to mature.
And doing nothing is not an option, for as long as ISIS feels
comfortable in Raqqa, they will continue to look for ways to export
their terror. A successful operation to liberate Raqqa will require a
robust effort by Secretary Tillerson and his team to manage Ankara's
concerns.
One of the reasons that Assad must go is because he will
never allow a moderate opposition to exist in his country. He has
relentlessly attacked any moderate Syrian group, under the banner of
counterterrorism. He enjoys protection and support from Iran and
Russia. Keeping him in power will not help defeat ISIS; it will
maintain the status quo of a Syria in chaos. ISIS, Al Qaeda and other
terrorist groups will thrive in that chaos.
campaign to track down isis, al qaeda and their recruits world-wide
Intensification will put pressure on ISIS's strongholds in Syria
and Iraq. But the threat does not end there. We must stay on the
offensive everywhere ISIS or Al Qaeda operates, from the Sahel to
Europe to South Asia. These global efforts require coupling United
States capabilities with those of our allies and partners. We are
working with the French in Mali. We are working with African Union-led
forces in Somalia. We are working with key Gulf partners in Yemen. When
American airpower is necessary--as it was recently in Libya to degrade
an ISIS stronghold 1A\2\--we must deploy it without hesitation. But in
many cases, our work is going to entail the less headline-grabbing
activities such as information-sharing, data correlation, and law
enforcement and intelligence training.
In Europe, where ISIS has attacked with deadly effect, we must keep
our focus on the travel of foreign fighters, and work 24/7 with our
European allies and partners to track potential extremists, penetrate
the plots, and stop them before they hard innocent civilians. We must
strengthen our relationships in Europe and help them build their
counterterrorism capabilities.
In some areas of the world, such as Libya and Somalia, we will be
able to use air strikes and limited ground troops from the Special
Operations Forces. But in most areas of world--Europe, India, and
Asia--the main levers of U.S. power will be intelligence cooperation
and diplomacy. That is why our campaign cannot be led by the military
alone.
campaign to provide an alternative narrative to isis's propaganda
Perhaps more important to ISIS than a physical caliphate is a
virtual caliphate they have tried to create through their propaganda
and incitement, particularly on social media. ISIS's use of Twitter,
Telegram, and other social media outlets is well known. Of course, ISIS
claims in its propaganda to be representing the true nature of Islam,
but it is, in fact, perverting Islam.\3\
A recent study co-sponsored by the University of Chicago looked at
the 104 individuals in the U.S. who the Department of Justice charged
with ISIS-related crimes from 2014-2016.\4\ Two-thirds went to college.
Three-quarters had jobs or were in school. Many of these people had a
great deal to live for, but they were radicalized by terrorist
propaganda. Nearly 85 percent had exposure to propaganda videos, either
by ISIS or by Al Qaeda. Propaganda is an accelerant on the process of
radicalization.
American efforts to counter the propaganda of terrorists have been
met with mixed results. Fundamentally, the voices that will do the most
to discredit ISIS are voices from within Islam itself. Our efforts
should be geared toward working with Muslim leaders here in the U.S.
and Muslim-majority countries from Africa to the Gulf to Southeast Asia
to counter ISIS's narrative. When the American government is shown to
be behind these messages, they are apt to be disregarded or even
disbelieved.
I have been impressed with the energy and focus of the State
Department's Global Engagement Center and would urge Congress to
continue support for this activity.
adjustments to the current administration's approach
Although the new Administration is less than three weeks old, it
has already moved forward with several aggressive policy approaches
that will have an impact on the ISIS campaign. I strongly support the
President's decision to conduct a quick review of the anti-ISIS
campaign. We do not want our momentum in this campaign to stall, and
our allies and partners on the ground are awaiting the results of this
review. In other areas, however, I would seek adjustments to the
Administration's current course. My recommendations for the new
Administration are as follows:
1) Support our allies. Our allies in the anti-ISIS coalition are
working very hard to stop the next ISIS attack. We should stand by
them. For example, Australia has fought with us in every war since WWII
and is the second-largest contributor of troops to the counter-ISIS
effort. We should be thanking Australia every chance we get because we
need them in the fight that is currently underway. We also will need
the support of our NATO Allies, who continue to play a role in training
and equipping forces confronting ISIS. President Trump's decision to
attend the NATO Summit in May is the right decision.
2) Ensure that diplomacy is on equal footing with military
planning. The Presidential Memorandum of January 28 was addressed to
all relevant departments and agencies. The memorandum, in my view,
correctly catalogued ISIS's heinous record of depravity and the attacks
inside the U.S. that can be traced to ISIS. The memorandum goes on to
call for ``comprehensive'' strategy and plans for the defeat of ISIS. I
agree that a comprehensive strategy is required.
But the memorandum directs the Defense Department to develop the
Plan. The State Department, the Director of National Intelligence, and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff are directed to provide input and collaborate
with the Defense Department. As noted above, a comprehensive strategy
requires that diplomatic efforts be treated just as importantly as the
military efforts. The State Department and the Defense Department
should be tasked to develop the plan together. This is a small but
important fix. As this Committee appreciates, the solution in Syria is
not going to be found solely through military power. Military power is
necessary to stopping ISIS by force, but it is insufficient for the
broader effort to end the war in Syria or to conduct the global hunt
for ISIS operatives.
3) Repeal the Muslim-only ban. Counterterrorism missions require
focus. They require acquisition of specific time-sensitive information
that allow plots to be stopped. They require correlation of data with
real-time intelligence to screen those who would seek to do us harm.
When intelligence or law enforcement officials are required to put
entire civilian populations under suspicion, they take their eye off
real threats. Furthermore, by enacting a Muslim-only ban, we have
handed ISIS the ultimate recruiting tool. ISIS has already been
leveraging this propaganda online. A main theme of ISIS propaganda is,
in effect, ``look at how America is treating its own Muslims.'' Given
that thousands of students from the seven countries were affected,
given that Muslim families were separated, given that lawful permanent
residents were prohibited from entering the country in which they live
lawfully and permanently, ISIS has been given a tailor-made message for
its theme that America does not treat its own Muslim population on par
with its Christian population.
Late Sunday evening, 10 former national security officials,
including two former Secretaries of State, a former Secretary of
Defense, four former heads of the Central Intelligence Agency, a
Secretary of Homeland Security, and senior National Security Council
officials, filed a declaration with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
stating that the ban would not make the country safer from terrorism
and would, in fact, undermine those efforts.\5\ Those officials have
shouldered the solemn responsibility of protecting the country from
terrorism, and I agree with them that this ban cannot be justified on
national security grounds.
4) Disavow `taking their oil' and torture. Threatening to take
Iraq's oil or expressing support for torture plays into the worst fears
of the people we are trying to win over to our cause. It thus
undermines the brave and heroic work conducted every day by women and
men in the military, the diplomatic core, the intelligence and homeland
security community, and the Muslims who fight alongside us.
5) Do not trust Russia to handle ISIS for us. Outsourcing to Russia
the counter-ISIS effort in Syria is a dangerous idea that runs counter
to fundamental American interests and values. Russia lacks the
professionalism, the training, and political will to cooperate with us
in any serious way. Russia is not seeking cooperation with the United
States, but instead has worked consistently to undermine U.S. efforts
in Syria and the Middle East. The State Department and the Pentagon
tested the proposition that U.S. could work with Russia in Syria over
the past six months, and the test failed. Putin's Russia has sought to
use the Syria conflict as a way to end Russia's isolation from Ukraine,
bolster its last remaining foothold in the Middle East, undermine U.S.
influence in the region, and showcase its military improvements. Russia
has played their own game, which was to keep Bashar al-Assad in power
at all costs. The result is that Russia and Syria continue to kill
moderate Syrians in the name of counter-terrorism. They liquefied the
town of Aleppo, Syria, in a scene too horrible to allow to be shown on
TV in our living room when young children were present. Russia has
consolidated its position in Syria and will continue to work with its
Iranian allies to forestall American influence and interests in the
region. Russia's misdeeds have shown that they cannot be trusted and
the Administration will inevitably come to this conclusion after a
period of time.
conclusion
The counter-ISIS campaign has made important progress in both
taking terrorists off of the battlefield and in liberating civilian
populations. ISIS has lost more than half its territory. ISIS no longer
controls most major population centers. Its ability to recruit is
getting more difficult. Many of its senior leaders have been removed
from the battlefield. ISIS is being squeezed. But we cannot and should
not be complacent. Now is the time to accelerate the campaign,
intensify our efforts, and hasten the defeat of ISIS so that it no
longer threatens us.
I am pleased to answer any questions that you may have.
------------------
Notes
\1\ Former Chief of Staff, Department of Defense under Secretary
Leon Panetta; former Chief of Staff, Central Intelligence Agency under
Director Leon Panetta; former Chief Counsel, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence; current Managing Director, Beacon Global
Strategies.
\2\ http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/19/politics/us-airstrikes-libya-
isis/
\3\ For that reason, I prefer not to use the term ``Islamic,'' lest
it legitimate their efforts; I prefer ``Islamist,'' or simply
``terrorist.''
\4\ See Trump's Travel Ban Misses the True Threat: Homegrown
Terrorism by Michael Morell, foreignpolicy.com, Feb. 2, 2017 (citing a
study from the Chicago Project on Security and Threats.)
\5\ http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/general/2017/02/06/17-
35105%20opposition%20exhibit.pdf
The Chairman. Well, thank you both. I am going to ask one
question and reserve the rest of my time.
But it is interesting. We have talked about the Kurds. We
talked about the Kurdish-supported Arabs. We talked about
Turkey and Syrian opposition. We talked about the Assad regime
and its allies. You referred to American presence. You did not
yet.
So tell us. What is the U.S. role in this?
Ambassador Jeffrey. It is a pretty complicated single
question, Mr. Chairman.
The U.S. role, first of all----
The Chairman. In Raqqa. In Raqqa.
Ambassador Jeffrey. In Raqqa.
The Chairman. In Raqqa, what is the U.S. role?
Ambassador Jeffrey. The U.S., as the head of a coalition,
has the overall command and control of the various operations
being conducted now by what is called the Syrian Democratic
Forces, which is, essentially, largely----
The Chairman. The Kurds and Arabs.
Ambassador Jeffrey. And a few Arabs.
And the U.S. has people embedded with them, coordinates
with them. It has not really given the Kurds weapons. It has
given some light weapons to the Arab component of the SDF.
And so, basically, it is seen as the overall military
campaign against ISIS, focused on ISIS as a state, and Mosul
and Raqqa. And this is essentially the western side of the
offensive.
The question is, given the United States' list of allies in
the region, including Turkey, how can we ensure the maximum
rapid defeat of ISIS and the taking of Raqqa? And that raises
questions about who our allies are and how we coordinate all of
these folks, because while many of them agree on fighting ISIS,
they do not agree on each other, sir.
The Chairman. Well, it is the question. And no offense, it
has not been answered.
So, Mr. Bash, I am not trying to be offensive here. It
seems it is the question everybody is dancing around, for lots
of reasons. But you mentioned not outsourcing it to all these
people, so what does that mean?
Mr. Bash. Three aspects of the U.S. role. First,
intelligence-gathering, human intelligence, signal intelligence
collection; second----
The Chairman. I am not asking--I want to know what it means
to not outsource it? Gathering intelligence is not taking
Raqqa. Please be specific with your answer.
Mr. Bash. Forward air controllers by U.S. special
operations forces.
And the third element I believe would be training, funding,
providing lethal offensive equipment to the Syrian Democratic
Forces.
The Chairman. And that would be--those are the only people
that we should be in coordination with, not the Turks.
Mr. Bash. Well, of course, I think we have to dialogue with
the Turks, because, as Ambassador Jeffrey noted, we have to
have them on board, ultimately, for our efforts there.
Ambassador Jeffrey. Mr. Chairman, I can add to my answer.
We do need the Turks in the fight. We need two parallel fronts,
I believe, for political reasons, and possibly for military.
Again, I think we need at least some ground combat American
troops to support the other forces we have in there, if we want
this to go quickly and if we want to have some influence on
what folks do after the day.
The Russians put some of their elite special forces troops
in a combat as opposed to advisory role. They did not get in a
quagmire, and they had considerable success.
The Chairman. Do you agree with that?
Mr. Bash. I do believe we will need some of our special
operations forces on the ground, yes.
The Chairman. And those would be ground troops then?
Mr. Bash. Well, they would be troops, U.S. troops. Whether
they would conduct direct action missions or they would be in
an advise and assist role, and assisting the local elements, I
think we would have to hear from the commanders on the ground
that will be most affected.
But I would have no problem with some small number of U.S.
special operations forces----
The Chairman. Do you get the sense that the Pentagon will
recommend having U.S. forces on the ground in Raqqa?
Ambassador Jeffrey. The Pentagon, sir, I believe, from my
experience there, and Jeremy has worked there and I have worked
with it for 50 years, basically takes the mission that the
President and the Congress gives it and then turns it into
options.
It is hard for me to believe, if you let that process work
out and you say we want to destroy ISIS as a state, we want to
do this quickly, and we want to have influence on the ground
with our allies afterward, that you would not at least consider
a small element of U.S. ground troops.
And I will be specific. I am talking maneuver battalions,
perhaps an armored battalion. You saw how effective tanks have
been in Mosul with the Iraqis against ISIS. Who is going to
provide the armor in Raqqa?
I would say we need to look at that very carefully.
The Chairman. Thank you. I had known you had made those
comments in the past and was just trying to tease that out.
I just want to say, we are working through all kinds of
proxies here. And it is very difficult to control what proxies
do. And I mean, it is the one question I think that really is
not being discussed as openly or as candidly--I know it is
going to be discussed at one point, at some point. So that is
why I am asking the question.
Ambassador Jeffrey. With my experience, including 45 years
ago in uniform, a few American troops on the ground up there
with the people who are doing the fighting have not only a
tremendous multiplier effect on the military effectiveness,
they can win the confidence and the trust of the people on the
ground. And that has a huge impact on the political side of
things, as well as the military.
The Chairman. Thank you so much.
Senator Cardin?
Senator Cardin. Mr. Chairman, thank you for that line of
questioning. I think it is extremely helpful.
And it really underscores my concern with the Department of
Defense being the lead rather than the State Department,
because, Ambassador Jeffrey, I think you answered the question
as the Department of Defense will answer the question. You have
a military mission. These are the options. The President
selects one of those military options. And, yes, we have
immediate success on the military operation.
But long term, we do not have a solution, and we are back
to where we were, in a long process with perhaps emboldening
the recruitment of extremists.
So this is a complicated situation. No one denies that. We
welcome the review by the Trump administration. We are dealing
with the realities that Russia and Iran are in Syria. And as
both of you pointed out, we cannot deal with Russia in Iran,
and I agree with that completely. But they are there, so how do
we frame a response with the realities of Russia in Iran?
We have coalition partners that have different priorities
and strategies than we do. Turkey has a different strategy.
Saudi Arabia has a different priority. How do we deal with the
realities of our coalition partners?
So there is no easy answer. My concerns are the risks that
you both brought out of more American troops on the ground.
What does that mean? Or if we are talking about--and can we
control the numbers, when we start with a small number and the
mission requires additional military support and America has
the strongest military.
Are we going down a path that is going to lead to a
significant increase in our military commitment on the ground,
which we know leads to long-term challenges that are hard to
overcome?
And secondly, if we are not on the ground and we are
supporting military operations, and we see large civilian
casualties, does that add to our challenges of long-term
success in the region, since we have delegated that to the
opposition or troops that may not be as sensitive to what
happens with civilian casualties?
Any comments either one of you have about that observation?
How do you overcome that? How do we ensure that we are not
going down a path of major increase in U.S. presence through
ground troops, which has historically proven to be
counterproductive, or we are complicit in a large number of
civilian casualties?
Ambassador Jeffrey. I share your concern, Senator, having
spent years in Vietnam and Iraq, classic examples of being
bogged down in conflicts.
First of all, when I said you give DOD a mission and it
will rack and stack the options, I am talking about the
military side of the mission, and that is correct. That is not
the whole mission and I know----
Senator Cardin. But they are being placed in the lead here,
which has me concerned.
Ambassador Jeffrey. I realize that. But the person who is
being placed in the lead, Secretary Mattis, who I have had many
experiences with in both tours in Iraq, is someone who knows
the political side of things and knows he needs that political
battle buddy, if you will, just like Crocker and Petraeus a
decade ago on the surge, so I think that you will get that.
But still, from the military side of it, there is a
military component to this, and there are various military
solutions.
Inserting more American troops, as you said, raises
political as well as military and questions of casualties, but
it can cut both ways. If you give the U.S. military a concrete
military goal, be it liberating Kuwait in 1990 or, for that
matter, taking down Saddam in 2003, the military is able to
generate the forces and do it.
The question is the political question of the day after. We
had a pretty good but not complete answer in 1991. We did not
have a good answer in 2003. And by default, we passed that on
to the military, and we all know, in this chamber, what
happened.
That is something I would be absolutely opposed to. But
that should not force us to go back and say we cannot even use
ground forces for military missions. The point is we cannot use
ground forces for armed nation-building, sir.
Senator Cardin. Ambassador Jeffrey, I agree with your
point. I have all the confidence in our military carrying out a
military mission. And I want Mr. Bash to respond.
But also, if you could, include in your answer how the
rumored executive order dealing with black sites by the
administration, and the executive order dealing with
immigration and refugees, how does that play into our
strategies in regards to Syria?
Mr. Bash. On detention and interrogation, we have not
engaged in enhanced interrogation or employed those black
sites----
Senator Cardin. What if there was an executive order that
led us down that path?
Mr. Bash. Right. That is my point, Mr. Ranking Member,
which is we have not employed those since President Bush--not
President Obama--President Bush emptied the black sites in
2006. And now, 11 years later, we have been actually able to
protect our country from a large-scale terrorist attack.
So I think those tactics are totally unnecessary, and I
think it would be a huge mistake for the administration to
return to enhanced interrogation or, as the President calls it,
torture, and detention in black sites.
On the issue of U.S. forces on the ground, look, I think we
can learn a lot of lessons from taking out Al Qaeda's--
decimating Al Qaeda's senior leadership along the Afghanistan-
Pakistan border, where we did not have a lot of ground troops
that we could use.
We used a lot of intelligence and a lot of precision
airstrikes. We were able to basically suppress them and prevent
them from their external operations, which really fundamentally
is our biggest priority when it comes to ISIS in Iraq. We do
not want them planning external plots. So I think we should put
an emphasis on that.
As for U.S. forces on the ground, I would not draw a line
and say no boots on the ground or have some policy like that. I
think we probably do have to have U.S. special operations
forces on the ground. In what quantity and specifically how
they are armed or trained, I think that is a point of
conversation.
Senator Cardin. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Johnson?
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
According to our hearing briefing, in the fight in Mosul,
we have about 65,000 combination Iraqi, Kurdish, Peshmerga,
Sunni tribesmen engaged in that battle, about 5,000 U.S.
troops, 3,500 coalition personnel. We have been at that now for
about 4 months.
How much longer is that going to go on? Just a quick
estimate.
Ambassador Jeffrey. Three or 4 more months, probably,
Senator, unless they crack.
Senator Johnson. So that is an 8-month effort with more
than 70,000 troops. Is Raqqa going to be easier or more
difficult than Mosul?
Ambassador Jeffrey. The assumption from troop levels and
such that I have heard is that it is not as heavily defended or
as dug in as Mosul, that Mosul is where they decided, ISIS, to
make their big fight. And we have had good success pushing
close to Raqqa with the YPG and the Syrian Democratic Forces
over the past six months.
Nonetheless, we should not underestimate how tough any of
these fights are with these guys, because with Raqqa, that will
be their Alamo.
Senator Johnson. So do you think we will need substantially
less than 70,000 total combined troops to take over Raqqa?
Ambassador Jeffrey. Of the 70,000 troops that have been
committed, Senator, probably 10,000 to 15,000 are actually in
offensive combat roles into the city that--the Iraqi
counterterrorism service, which is very good; the Ninth Armored
Division, which provides most of the heavy weapons; some of the
Iraqi National Police division, which is actually also an elite
force; and bits and pieces of several other----
Senator Johnson. So you have 15,000 good Iraqi troops,
again, close to 10,000 good American and coalition troops. That
is 25,000. Are we going to need 25,000 for Raqqa?
And I am going to go back to the chairman's question. Who
is going to provide those?
Again, to say the Syrian Democratic Forces, when we had the
debate over the Syrian Authorization for Use of Military Force,
who is leading it? I mean, there are 1,200 different Syrian
groups. Where is this force?
Ambassador Jeffrey. The Syrian Democratic Forces, which is
essentially a camouflage of the Kurdish Syrian YPG, has about
25,000 forces, not all of which could be committed to the Raqqa
battle.
I do not think that is enough troops, and I think that is
one reason why we are going slow.
Senator Johnson. So let us say we have a combination of
U.S., coalition and I guess Kurdish YPG or Peshmerga forces to
clear it, to take Raqqa. Who is going to hold it?
Who is going to hold the territory in Syria so that Assad
just does not flow right back in there? We clear it out, and
they hold it.
Mr. Bash. I think we need to have an element of the SDF
play the hold role, along with other coalition allies and
partners. And I think we cannot do this alone, and I think they
cannot do this alone, but there are no other options.
Senator Johnson. Define the element of the SDF. Who are
they? Where are they? I just heard they are really camouflaged
Kurdish forces, so those are the Kurds. That is not going to go
over well with Turkey.
We can throw these things out, but realistically, is that
even possible?
Ambassador Jeffrey. You are absolutely right, Senator. The
four major tribes around Raqqa, we just did research at the
Washington Institute, none of them are enthused about Kurds
coming in. They have had long-standing, essentially disputes
and conflict with the Kurds.
There is an Arab element in the Syrian Democratic Forces.
The State Department people who are operating that are
optimistic about that, less so--people outside the
administration are less so. It is one reason why we want to see
the Free Syrian Army, who we have better contact with, because
we did train some of them. And we are working with the Turks
indirectly, and the Turks----
Senator Johnson. You trained some of them. In the hundreds?
Ambassador Jeffrey. In the thousands over the past few
years on various clandestine programs.
Senator Johnson. So how many Free Syrian forces do we have?
Ambassador Jeffrey. It gets squishy on numbers, but you are
talking about somewhere between 20,000 and 30,000, counting
both the YPG, the other Arabs----
Senator Johnson. Again, those would be Kurdish forces.
Ambassador Jeffrey. Those are mostly Kurdish forces.
Senator Johnson. So if it is primarily Kurdish forces to
clear Raqqa, they are going to kind want to hold it, are they
not?
Ambassador Jeffrey. That is the default position of every
military force I have ever seen in the Middle East, Senator. It
does not mean that, at the end of the day, that is what
happens. But you have to take that into consideration.
It is one reason why I am concerned about putting all of
our weight on that particular force.
Senator Johnson. Diplomacy follows facts on the ground,
right? So facts on the ground, if a military force takes over a
city, they are going to hold it.
Ambassador Jeffrey. If diplomacy has a big enough
sledgehammer, it can push things in its way. But again, it is
one reason why you need American forces on the ground in some
numbers. It is why you have to have a very strong American
command-and-control.
Senator Johnson. But the question is still American forces
bolstering whom? I still have not gotten the chairman's
question answered. Who is going to fight this fight? Who is
going to hold?
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Shaheen?
Senator Shaheen. Thank you all very much for being here to
discuss what is obviously a very thorny issue. And I share both
of the views that you have expressed about the importance of
reassessing at this stage our policy with respect to ISIS.
I also agree with both of you, as Senator Cardin has said,
that the military piece is the easy piece. It is the diplomatic
and what comes next that is the hard piece.
So tell me how we do that, because I think we talk about
the specifics of the military aspects of this kind of conflict
because it is easier to understand and it is easier to do when
you think about we can put X number of troops on the ground. We
can provide X number of flights. We can do X number of bombing
raids.
But how do we build governance, local governance, in a
country like Syria that has had no civil society groups at all,
that has been decimated?
And as you both point out, we have not done well. We did
not do it well in Vietnam. We did not do it well in Iraq. In
Afghanistan, it still remains to be seen what the outcome is
going to be.
So what are the building blocks that we need to do if we
are going to get this right, in terms of balancing the
diplomatic mission of this effort with the military mission?
So either one of you can go first.
Ambassador Jeffrey. I think Senator Johnson made a pretty
good case that actually the military side of it is not the
easier part of it, that we have to answer a lot of questions on
the forces and that. And that also feeds into, Senator Shaheen,
who will hold the ground afterwards?
Senator Shaheen. That is the question that I am asking.
What happens the day after?
Ambassador Jeffrey. There are several problems with your
question, and it is a legitimate and very important question.
One is, anybody who thinks he or she can give a really good
answer to it has not seen what I have seen over the past 30 or
40 years.
Secondly, it also depends on some outside conditions. We
looked at this, including this chamber, 20 years ago in the
Balkans, and some of the same questions came up. I was involved
in that. One thing I learned is, if you can get the basic
diplomacy of the region right so that you do not have outside
forces trying to undercut whatever messy situation, temporary,
messy, sloppy situation you have on the ground, because that is
the only situation you have, it kind of works.
In Bosnia, which is a very, I do not want to hurt the
Bosnian Government or people, but it is a very, de facto, very
jury-rigged thing.
Senator Shaheen. Yes, I am familiar with that. But I am
still not clear on what you think should happen as part of that
governance, getting it right.
Ambassador Jeffrey. Most importantly, we need some kind of
understanding, shared or accepted or forced on Iran and Russia
and Turkey and, to a lesser extent, the Arab states, on what
the order in Iraq and Syria should look like, how independent
those countries should be and how free of influence from the
outside, and the outside is mainly Iran, under these
circumstances.
If we can get that under control, local forces in these
areas, with help from the international community, with help
from us, with help from NGOs, can slowly build up.
That is what we did in the Balkans. We did it outside in,
where we fixed the diplomacy in the region. We got everybody
more or less on board, and then we had several decades to
tinker at reconciliation at the village level, digging wells
and that kind of thing.
If you try to start with digging wells and reconciliation
when the Iranians, the Pakistanis, the Syrians, and others are
sending in people to kill the folks doing it, believe me, it
does not work. I have seen it.
Senator Shaheen. So I agree with you. It does not work.
So, Mr. Bash, what is the likelihood we are going to get it
right, given what is happening with Russia, with Iran, with
Iraq, with the fragility of Mr. al-Abadi's leadership in Iraq?
What are the chances that is----
Mr. Bash. The likelihood that we will know even if we are
getting it right is very low, because I think this is
fundamentally a generational struggle. And as Ambassador
Jeffrey laid out, there are so many elements that have to play
out over such a long time that this is going to require the
patient work of our diplomats and our coalition partners over
time to find partners on the ground who want to be responsible
for their own country.
We cannot want it more than them, and it is going to
require us convincing them to take ownership of their own
country. And I am referring specifically to Syria in that case.
At the end of the day, I do not believe Assad is going to
be a reliable partner. I think he is going to sow chaos and
cause destruction and mayhem as long as he is there. So
fundamentally, I think any plan to defeat ISIS, in terms of
ejecting it completely, ejecting the conditions for ISIS on the
ground in Syria, has to include the removal of Assad.
Senator Shaheen. We had a briefing in the Armed Services
Committee last week from the Institute on the Study of War, and
they suggested that defeating ISIS was not ultimately going to
solve our problem, that they would be replaced by another
terrorist group. In fact, if we look at areas that have been
cleared in Syria of ISIS, that Al Qaeda has moved in to some of
those small villages and that they have picked right up and are
taking over in terms of governance.
So do you share that view? And how does that affect what is
happening right now, in terms of the military situation?
The Chairman. Briefly, please.
Ambassador Jeffrey. As a terrorist group, people are right,
in any situation like Syria, but unlike Iraq where when ISIS
has cleared, essentially government authority has been
reinstated, so that would be my argument to your other
question. There are ways to make things work, because nobody on
the outside is trying to mess with what is going on with Iraq
today, once ISIS is driven out.
Syria is different. Other people will pop up, as long as
you have a situation that is as chaotic as Syria is.
But even then, ISIS is unique as it is a state. It has an
army. It controlled, at its height, 5 million, 6 million, 7
million people. That is what made it such a threat to the
region and a threat to project power against Europe and against
the United States.
That will go if we defeat it. If we do not solve Syria, and
we do not solve the mess that will be afterwards, we are still
going to have terrorist groups, but it will be a different
order of magnitude.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
It is with a slight degree of trepidation that I disagree
with the only female member of this committee. I think, in
Syria, my observation has been it has been that we have not
been able to come up with a real military strategy, whether it
is others or not. We have tried all kinds of train-equip, not
tried it enough, in my opinion. But to me, we are where we are
today----
Senator Shaheen. I was talking theoretically, not
specifically.
The Chairman. Yes. I think the military component in Syria
has, by far, been the most difficult, unanswered question.
There has been a lot of diplomacy, but diplomacy without
changing facts on the ground has been fairly hollow.
Senator Young?
Senator Young. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bash, in your written testimony, you discussed the fact
that diplomacy needs to be on equal footing with military
planning in a successful strategy to defeat ISIS. I agree,
which is why I sent a letter to that effect to Secretary of
State Tillerson.
I request unanimous consent the letter be entered into the
record.
The Chairman. Without objection.
[The information referred to is located at the end of this
hearing transcript]
Senator Young. Ambassador Jeffrey, based on your years of
experience as a senior diplomat, your time at DOD and CIA,
would you agree that the largest number of victims by far of
radical Islamic terrorists, whether it is ISIS or Al Qaeda and
its affiliates, have been Muslims?
Ambassador Jeffrey. Absolutely.
Senator Young. Mr. Bash, based on your years of experience,
do you agree?
Mr. Bash.: Yes.
Senator Young. And both of you, would you agree that the
vast majority of Muslims oppose terrorism?
Ambassador Jeffrey. They do.
Mr. Bash. Yes.
Senator Young. Would you agree that if we are ever going to
defeat radical Islamic terrorists and their depraved ideology,
we will need to work closely and collaboratively with
predominantly Muslim governments and populations?
Ambassador Jeffrey. I do, and we actually do.
Mr. Bash. Yes.
Senator Young. And would you agree that ISIS and Al Qaeda
would love for the U.S.-led campaign against them to be
characterized as a war of religion or a war of civilizations?
Ambassador Jeffrey. That is exactly what they claim it is
and what they hope we will fall into.
Mr. Bash. Yes, I agree with that.
Senator Young. So within a week after the 9/11 attacks,
President George W. Bush visited the Islamic Center of
Washington. He said, ``These acts of violence against innocents
violate the fundamental tenets of the Islamic faith.'' He
continued, ``America counts millions of Muslims amongst our
citizens, and Muslims make an incredibly valuable contribution
to our country. Muslims are doctors, lawyers, law professors,
members of the military, entrepreneurs, shopkeepers, moms and
dads. And they need to be treated with respect. In our anger
and emotion, our fellow Americans must treat each other with
respect.''
Would you both agree that such a statement not only honors
American values, but it is also factually correct and
strategically smart?
Ambassador Jeffrey. I agree.
Mr. Bash. It was a very wise statement.
Senator Young. Thank you.
Mr. Bash, in your prepared statement, you discussed ISIS's
use of online propaganda and incitement, their ``virtual
caliphate.''
You also cite the Chicago Project on Security and Threats.
This study examined 112 cases of individuals who perpetrated
ISIS-related offenses, were indicted by the U.S. Justice
Department for such offenses, or both, in the U.S. between
March 2014 and March 2016. Eighty-three percent of those
studied had watched ISIS propaganda videos.
As you state, propaganda is an accelerant on the process of
radicalization. You also state that American efforts to counter
the propaganda of terrorists have been met with mixed results.
Working with Muslim leaders, what specific steps can the
United States Government and the State Department take to
better counter ISIS propaganda that has played such a
significant role in terrorist radicalization and recruitment?
Mr. Bash. I think, most importantly, we have to convince
the Muslim majority countries of the region to speak up about
what Islam, in their view, stands for and what the proper view
of Islam is, and to work with their local leaders and their
local religious leaders to articulate that vision.
And that just cannot be done from government podiums. It
has to be done where ISIS and others communicate, particularly
online and social media.
Senator Young. So to facilitate that sort of conversation,
those sorts of messages being delivered, what role, as you see
it, might this committee play?
Mr. Bash. I think supporting the efforts of and looking at
the efforts of the Global Engagement Center at the State
Department and other public diplomacy efforts on that vector
are appropriate.
Senator Young. And what is your assessment of the Global
Engagement Center? And how do you measure success or falling
short?
Mr. Bash. They have had a couple reboots. I think some of
our efforts have had some false starts. My sense, and I do not
have this with great specificity, I would like to look into it,
is that, in recent months, they have had a renewed energy, a
renewed focus. And I think they have had a good team in place
there, and I hope that they continue to.
Senator Young. How do we measure success, both of you, with
respect to information, operations, cyber strategies, public
diplomacy? It is unclear to me. We emphasize this a lot, but
how do we measure success? I am running out of time, but if you
have any thoughts on that, either of you.
Ambassador Jeffrey. You cannot look at the inputs, because
that is typically what we do. How many people we have, how many
messages we get out.
Basically, it is feedback from communities that basically
tell folks who we trust in those communities that they like
what they are hearing. And a lot of it has to be us supporting
people so that folks do not even know it is coming out of the
United States, or it is coming from the West, but it is coming
from people--and they are all over the Middle East--who
essentially abhor what ISIS and Al Qaeda are doing.
Mr. Bash. I would just add one thing, Senator. CSIS, under
the leadership of my old boss, Secretary Panetta, and Tony
Blair, conducted a countering violent extremism study and
commission. They reported out just after the election. And
there is a lot of good polling information in there and a lot
of good information about how to measure the impacts of some of
these efforts.
Senator Young. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Markey?
Senator Menendez. Senator Markey has gone.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both, for your testimony.
Mr. Bash, I appreciate the comprehensive nature that you
mentioned in your testimony, because from my own personal
perspective, I think it is one of the aspects--although we say
we have a comprehensive plan, I think we have fallen far short
from a comprehensive plan, and I appreciate the efforts that
you laid out. I think they are spot on in terms of what we
need, and I hope the administration will actually take to heart
some of what you have said.
I want to particularly ask about Russia.
President Trump has indicated he would like to cooperate
with Russia to defeat ISIS. My question is, is this a realistic
proposition? Russia is and has repeatedly shown its interest in
the region in supporting a war criminal like Assad, and the
latest reports just magnify the brutality of that regime,
collaborating with leading state sponsors of terrorism in Iran.
In fact, over the weekend, a Kremlin spokesman said,
``Russia has friendly relations with Iran. We cooperate on a
wide range of issues. We value our trade ties. We hope to
develop them further.''
So between sentiments like that and the President's
national security adviser putting Iran on notice, how viable is
a partnership with Russia in combating ISIS? It does not seem
to me that that has been their central focus in the region.
Mr. Bash. Let me answer it this way, Senator. We tested
that proposition. The Secretary of State, the Secretary of
Defense, tested that proposition, and the test failed.
Russia utterly lacked the professionalism, the training,
and the political will to cooperate with us. It was not just
that their military actions were imprecise and targeted
civilians. They did those things. It was that they actually
would not coordinate with us and would not work with us in any
productive fashion.
And I believe what they were fundamentally trying to do in
reaching out to us to coordinate was to establish their own
foothold in Syria, to end their global isolation from what they
had done in Europe and Ukraine, and to try to challenge and
undermine our interests around the world.
So I think not only would it not be productive, it would
actually be counterproductive.
Senator Menendez. So let me just say, it seems to me that
while we have not had the comprehensive strategy I think we
need, I do think that President Trump is inheriting a
functioning coalition that has avoided blowups in Iraq and
taken back all the cities except half of Mosul, trained up
Iraqi forces, kept Shia militants largely sidelined from the
main battles, and done all of that while keeping Americans out
of combat and off the frontlines.
So what happens from here on is on the President's watch.
In that regard, when you say that Iran--when the President
says that Iran is taking over Iraq more and more every day, I
wonder how that kind of talk plays in Iraq. Unlike Putin's
Russia, which is totally authoritarian, al-Abadi and Iraqi
democratic politics are subject to far more consequences of
language like that. There is only so much they can absorb,
versus entities that are as authoritarian as Putin's Russia is.
And so, Ambassador Jeffrey, what do you say to that?
Ambassador Jeffrey. It was not helpful, and, of course, the
Iraqis immediately reacted and said, heaven forbid, we have
nothing to do with Iranians.
The point is, Iran is probably the most important player in
Iraq. But it is not like in Lebanon where it actually controls
essentially a monopoly of force or can generate a monopoly of
force and basically dictate to the government.
It has two major obstacles.
One obstacle is, of course, the religious authorities in
Najaf, who have a different view of Shia Islam and do not turn
to Iran.
The second one is the oil that Iraq pumps. It is one of the
major reasons why Iran is not reaping the kind of financial
rewards of selling oil now after the nuclear agreement, because
oil prices are low. And one of the major reasons for that is
Iraq's success.
And the Iraqis, including the Shia Arab Iraqis, do not want
to be a vassal state of Iran. And there are ways that we in the
international community can help Iraq stay independent of Iran,
but it requires sustained engagement on our part, and it
requires us recognizing that Iran is the problem. And up until
very recently, we have not had that, sir.
Senator Menendez. I agree. It requires us recognizing Iran
as a problem. It requires us recognizing that Russia is
complicit with Iran in a variety of serious issues.
It also has to have some sensitivity for President Trump to
understand that when he says what he says about Iraq, when he
says we are going to take their oil, it undermines the effort
of a nascent government and their ability to be cohesive and be
less dependent on Iran. That, to me, is a critical part of the
fight against ISIS.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Portman?
Before I get to that, though, this is something I have been
saying for some time. This is not a recent thing. But I mean,
in fairness, this has nothing to do with the current President,
nor any defense. I mean, Iran has huge influence over the
parliament there. There is no question, is there?
And I have been saying for a couple years now that
everything we are doing there is, to a degree, making Iraq a
better country for Iran. I mean, I know we want to maintain our
influence, but, I mean, there is some truth to that somewhat
rhetorical statement, is there not?
Ambassador Jeffrey. About every third morning I get up and
I would agree with that. But the other two mornings, I see what
goes on there. The way that people welcomed us back, Senator,
in 2014 and 2015, and how we have been able to forge this force
that is now fighting effectively against a very tough enemy--we
also have the Kurds in the north who are very close to us and
can play a very interesting role in balancing that ship of
state.
And the Iraqis, what they do not want to do is be enlisted
in any American campaign against Iran. They want to stay
neutral, if they can. That is one reason why they resist the
Saudis and others, because they want them to say, ``We are
Arabs. We are against Iran.''
Again, if Iran could have had its way, Iraq's oil exports
would have been capped way below what Iran's were, and Iran
would have reaped the benefits of much higher oil prices. But
Iran was smart enough to know they could not demand that
because the Iraqis would say no.
That is what I look at is, what would Iran like to do in
Iraq that it cannot do? And the next big question is us trying
to keep our forces on.
The Chairman. Well, we will find out as soon as Mosul is
taken, will we not?
Senator Portman?
Senator Portman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me dig a little deeper into the discussion we had
earlier about Russia and their role.
In response to Senator Menendez's question, Mr. Bash, you
said that you believe that Russia's intent is to have a
stronger foothold in the Middle East, particularly in Syria,
and that they also were seeking to move away from the political
isolation based on their actions in Eastern Europe.
I think it is more than that, and I think it is an attempt
by Russia to try to work on a grand bargain, as we talk about
around here, which would be to relieve some of the sanctions,
certainly the sanctions related to Crimea and probably what
they are doing on the Eastern border of Ukraine, maybe some of
the human rights sanctions, in exchange for a fight against
ISIS. So I think we have to look at what has actually happened.
I guess the first question I would have for you is with
regard to the government that they are backing in Syria and
have kept in power, in effect, which is Assad. I mean, do you
think that the Assad's regime, particularly the barrel-bombing
of civilians, the chemical weapons use, this atrocity we heard
about over the weekend, the attacks against moderate rebel
groups, do you think these sorts of things have escalated the
conflict and fueled the growth of ISIS in Syria?
Mr. Bash. Very much so. I think Syria creates the petri
dish in which an ISIS can grow, and Assad's policies accomplish
that.
I agree with the premise of your statement that the whole
mode of Syria and Assad is to do these things in the name of
counterterrorism, in the name of fighting ISIS, when, in fact,
what they are doing is liquidating the entire part of the
country that could be a moderate opposition and that could
actually assume power.
And that is why he is doing it, because it is a threat,
fundamentally, to his seat of power. He is doing that with the
umbrella and tactical and operational support of Russia.
Senator Portman. So it is to say that, by backing Assad, it
has helped with regard to the fight against ISIS, which is what
this hearing is about.
Second would be, how effective has Russia been at going
after ISIS? My sense is, from all the reporting we are getting,
and a letter from groups that have now documented this, that
Moscow has targeted the non-ISIS forces far more than they have
ever targeted any ISIS forces or other extremist forces.
Is that your understanding? Do you agree that Russia and
Iran devoted the bulk of their efforts in Syria to defeating
the moderate opposition rather than going after ISIS?
Ambassador Jeffrey. I do, Senator. And there is a long
tradition of that. During the Iraq campaign, Assad was allowing
Al Qaeda volunteers to come through Damascus and go over the
border and support the Al Qaeda attacks on us and on the Iraqi
Government. And we have seen this with Assad basically cutting
deals, particularly in the oil area, with ISIS over the past
years and focusing on the more moderate groups.
And with the Russians, they have done one campaign against
ISIS. They seized Palmyra. But you will notice that ISIS took
it back, so I am not impressed with their military capabilities
against ISIS, let alone their political motivations.
Senator Portman. You mentioned that earlier, on the
military capabilities. That was interesting.
Let me ask you the question then. Would either of you think
that it would be in our interests as a country to lift the
Ukraine-related sanctions in exchange for Russian cooperation
in the Middle East against ISIS?
Mr. Bash. In my view, that grand bargain would be a
horrible deal for the United States. We would get all the
downside and none of the upside.
Ambassador Jeffrey. I agree. The only argument for lifting
sanctions on Ukraine is a deal on Ukraine. It is a totally
separate issue.
But even if it were linked somehow, I still have to ask,
what does Russia bring to the fight other than endorsing the
very worst elements in the region that fuels conflict, fuels
extremism, and does not tamp it down?
Senator Portman. Ambassador, based on your broad experience
in the intelligence community and national security community,
how do you feel about relieving sanctions when the underlying
reason for the sanctions, the cause of the sanctions, is not
addressed? Does that not send a terrible signal to our allies
and our adversaries alike, that the United States does not
stand by the reasons we put these sanctions in place?
Ambassador Jeffrey. Absolutely. And sanctions, particularly
the sanctions we have against Russia right now, are having a
significant effect on the Russian economy, and that is a good
thing. And it also gives us leverage to get them to, first of
all, contain their own aggressiveness in the Ukraine and
possibly, eventually, someday, do a deal.
But until they do a deal, the sanctions should stay on.
Senator Portman. Thank you. I have very little time, but I
want to echo some of the comments that my colleague Senator
Young said in terms of our fight against ISIS. This is a
hearing about that issue. And in the Governmental Affairs
Committee, we have had some of these same discussions, how to
get the Global Engagement Center to be more effective.
As you said, we have had a difficult time putting the U.S.
Government policies together to be able to effectively counter,
particularly online, much less involving, as you suggest,
Muslim-majority countries and the Muslim community here in a
more effective way. I think that is our most significant
challenge.
So I am going to follow up with some questions in writing
for both of you on that, following up on some hearings we have
had in the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
Committee.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Murphy?
Senator Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I hope that this administration recovers from a very rocky
start on America's relationship with the world, but if they do
not, this committee is going to be incredibly important in
providing oversight and asking some questions.
I think this administration has made some really stunning
mistakes when it comes to the counter-ISIL campaign.
They have launched a new strategy with the Department of
Defense in the lead. This panel has told us that State should
be equivalent to Defense in plotting that strategy.
They have suggested that Russia will be a key component to
the military strategy. This panel has told us that Russia
should have no part of that military strategy inside Syria.
They have launched a ban on immigration from Iraq and
Syria. This panel has told us that that, in fact, could feed
recruitment efforts of the very groups that we are fighting.
But, frankly, I think all those mistakes would be dwarfed
by a decision on behalf of this administration to put U.S.
combat troops into Syria.
And so, Ambassador Jeffrey, I just want to drill down a
little more on this question, because it is one of your
recommendations. I am trying to understand how we would limit a
large deployment of troops--you recommend in the thousands--to
a military mission. The reality, I would imagine, is that,
after the military objective was accomplished, and this very
complicated, convoluted process of sorting out who controls
Raqqa began, the United States military presence could not
leave, because having invested major treasure and perhaps lives
in securing Raqqa, we would not leave the distribution of power
to a set of players that were under our control during the
invasion.
And so I guess I am worried about a military deployment,
because I do not understand how it does not end up in the same
way that Iraq did, that we are bogged down, that we cannot
leave, that we have so much at stake that we need to keep that
military presence there in order to try to have some say over
the distribution of power.
But you seem to suggest that we could have a purely
military role and then leave the politics to somebody else,
even though that is not how things have played out in previous
military engagements in the region.
Ambassador Jeffrey. This committee is right to look
carefully at any suggestion of American ground troops, given
our history that has been rocky in that regard.
That said, I would point out that, as we heard, we have
some 5,000 troops involved in things that, to an outsider,
would look very close to combat--Apache helicopters, artillery,
special forces teams conducting raids, advisers at the
battalion level essentially calling in strikes--5,000 troops
doing that, along with 3,500 other allies from NATO countries,
Australia and such, already in the fight in Mosul. And we are
reinforcing the number of troops.
So it is not a question of having forces on the ground.
Senator Murphy. But is that not a little unfair? Is not the
question of Mosul post-invasion very different than the
question of Raqqa and Syria post-invasion?
Ambassador Jeffrey. Absolutely. But, again, I am just
simply stating that we already have forces on the ground in a
more or less quasi-military mission, and we are going to have
to answer questions. We will have to answer questions on Mosul.
It is a lot easier than Raqqa, but it still will have issues of
who goes where in Tal Afar and Sinjar Mountains, and west and
east Mosul. People are focused on this all of the time. And the
same thing in spades would occur in Raqqa.
Again, I am not saying that you go in and then leave. It is
just that major combat units do not assume the responsibility
of securing a population and jumpstarting some kind of economic
and social transformation. That is what we did in Iraq. It is
what we are still doing--or we did up until recently--in
Afghanistan. And it is a highly questionable strategy.
Senator Murphy. Do we, and either one of you can answer
this--maybe I will pose it to Mr. Bash.
Let us set aside the military objective of crushing ISIL.
Does the United States have a national security interest, a
vital national security interest, as to which one of the
surrounding powers ultimately prevails in the future Syrian
Government?
Is it a vital U.S. national security interest as to whether
the Turks or the Saudis or the Russians end up having the most
influence inside a future Syrian Government?
Should we stick around just to make sure that ISIS is
defeated, or should we stick around to try to sort out who has
influence?
I would be glad to have both of you answer it, but I am
short on time.
Mr. Bash. I think we have an interest in stability and in
good governance, and a partner there that we can work with. Its
precise complexion, I am not sure we have a large interest. But
I would say I would not want it to be Iran and Russia, because
we already know their complexion. We already know that they
will work to undermine U.S. interests.
The other countries you referenced could, I think, be
constructive partners.
Senator Murphy. I would, Mr. Chairman, turn it back over,
but we would beg for the Syria pre-conflict, Syria in which
Iran and Russia essentially had proxy control over that
government. That I think a lot of us would wish that that
scenario was still the reality on the ground.
So I just challenge the notion that, in the end, that is a
vital national security interest of the United States.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Do you want to answer that, Ambassador?
Ambassador Jeffrey. Very quickly, in that happy era,
Senator, Iran was not seen in the region as being on the
offensive.
And secondly, Iran's control over Syria was quite limited.
Syria was negotiating with the Israelis. Syria was working
closely with the Turks. Syria was off with the North Koreans
developing a nuclear capacity that Iran not only did not know
about but was shocked to hear.
So it was a much more independent Syria, and it was not
part of, essentially, a front against the rest of the region
that we have right now.
The Chairman. But this hearing, I mean, there are a lot of
great questions being asked, and they are very difficult to
answer, are they not? And that is why I think Syria is in the
shape that it is in today.
Senator Paul?
Senator Paul. I would like to go on record as saying that
it would be a really rotten, no good, bad idea to have ground
troops in Syria, and very naive to think you are going to put
1,000 troops in there and everybody is going to welcome us,
very presumptuous to think we are going to decide who takes
Raqqa and who occupies Raqqa.
Do you not think the people there would be aghast to think
we are, 3,000 miles away, going to decide who is going to take
over Raqqa and who is going to occupy it? That Assad is just
going to let us waltz in, and Mr. Bash says, oh, we are just
going to remove Assad.
The assumptions of all of this, the naivete of thinking,
oh, my goodness--but here is the other problem. We can win any
battle, but when we win, we usually go big. So there have been
many people, the Powell Doctrine of go big or do not go, 1,000
soldiers--and then the other problem. Let us say we could win
with 1,000 soldiers. Senator Murphy is exactly right. The
mantra is always stay, stay, stay, we must stay forever. And if
we leave, that is our fault for leaving. There is no exit from
a situation like this.
But I would say that when you look at a war like this, let
us say we were to go in and defeat those who were there, to
defeat ISIS, do you think that is the end? No. When a big force
comes, they are going to shrink away and they will fight until
the end of time. And they will fight against an American target
if Americans are the target.
This is a war within Islam, and I think we should be
supportive and try to amplify those who are trying to defeat
this aberration, but let us not make it our war.
Look, there are 200,000 Peshmerga. There are 200,000 Iraq
soldiers. There are 100,000-some-odd in the Syrian army. There
are 600,000 in the Turks. And there are 15,000 ISIS. And we
have to go over there to defeat them?
I think we ought to think this thing through and think that
this will not be the end. This will be the beginning.
And I guarantee the voices are loud and strong. Everybody
says we should have stayed in Iraq. Everybody is still saying
we should stay in Afghanistan. Are we going to stay everywhere
forever?
So I think we need to think through whether or not this
needs to be an American-led battle for Raqqa, and that, all of
the sudden, the Kurds are going to waltz in and Assad is going
to love that and the people who live in Raqqa are going to love
having the Kurds there?
I mean, these are pretty naive assumptions, and we have to
be, I think, concerned and think through before we say, oh, we
are going to put 1,000 Americans as we go into Raqqa. Perhaps
maybe 1,000 people from Raqqa might be better than 1,000
Americans, you know?
You know, I am not opposed to putting some money in there
to help them with weapons, to help them. But putting 1,000
Americans in there is a really, really terrible idea.
You can both respond, or chastise me, or however you would
like to respond. I am open to it.
Ambassador Jeffrey. It is a hard question to try to push
back against, Senator, because we have had a lot of bad
experiences. Again, and as one who has argued constantly that
we are not welcome when we go big on the ground in the Middle
East, in particular, and that we often have very ambiguous
social and economic missions that keep us tied down, and that
is wrong, I find myself in an almost contradictory position.
But I am very confident in what I am saying for several
reasons.
First of all, do we want to destroy not Al Qaeda, because
we cannot destroy Al Qaeda. You are absolutely right. What we
can do is destroy something that looks a lot like a state and
an army, because we are good at that. We can break those
things. And almost nobody else is really good enough.
You are absolutely right about the numbers you have cited,
and I think absolutely right that all of those king's horses
and king's men have not done that well against ISIS.
Senator Paul. But we are going to remove Assad and tell
Russia to leave? You know, Assad, look, Assad is winning right
now. I mean, I would think he is on the ascendancy.
And I would say, a couple years ago, there was a
possibility. I think there is almost no possibility that Assad
is going. There is almost no possibility that Russia is going
anywhere.
How long have they had a base in Syria? I would say it is
pretty important to them. I am not saying it is right or wrong.
I am just saying it is pretty important to them.
The ultimate answer here is a diplomatic one. You need
Turkey to get along with the Kurds, which they do not. You need
them to want to defeat ISIS more than Assad. You need to get
Assad involved in this as well, and to agree that it is in his
best interests to get rid of ISIS. But it cannot be removing
Assad, if you want Assad to help with this at all.
But ultimately, all the region needs to be somehow unified.
But that is the problem. That is the conundrum. It is a
virtually impossible task.
But putting 1,000 Americans in the middle of a battle in
Raqqa is a very bad idea.
Ambassador Jeffrey. To clarify, I never said using American
troops or even American diplomacy to get rid of Assad. I think,
for the moment, Assad in the part of Syria where he is, is not
part of the solution but it is part of the facts.
I am talking about using an American force for a very
specific military mission that nobody else has seemed to figure
out how we are going to break it.
Senator Paul. It will happen without us. It can happen with
our support, but it is a really bad idea to put American troops
in the assault on Raqqa.
Mr. Bash. May I just add one thing?
The Chairman. Absolutely. Yes, sir.
Mr. Bash. You are undoubtedly correct, Senator, that all of
the enumerated problems that you laid out cannot be solved by
us alone. It certainly cannot be solved by a small number of
U.S. forces. It is one of the reasons why I do not think the
Defense Department alone can be the lead on this.
However, if we resolutely focus on one narrow aspect of our
national interest, it is preventing Raqqa from being a safe
haven for ISIS to conduct external operations and plots that
could attack Europe and the United States. And I would just
commend for the committee's review this article in the New York
Times on February 4th that stated that 40 percent of the so-
called lone-wolf terrorists that have deployed around the
world, actually, there was an operational connection between
them and ISIS senior leaders in Raqqa.
So while we are not going to solve all the problems, if we
can put more pressure, either through airstrikes, special
operations forces, smaller application of military force to
keep a suppression force on ISIS command-and-control, we might
be able to reduce that number from 40 percent to 20 percent to
10 percent, and reduce the possibility that ISIS can conduct
attacks that can kill innocent Americans.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Kaine?
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
And thanks to the witnesses. This will be very helpful as
we review what the administration brings to us. I appreciate
your testimony today.
Ambassador Jeffrey, I am looking at your written testimony,
and you said a version of it in your verbal testimony.
The last page, ``The U.S. military should press for a
'stay-behind' train and liaison presence of several thousand
troops in Iraq, supporting both Kurdish Peshmerga and Iraqi
regular military forces.'' And you believe that that is
necessary to avoid ISIS rushing back in to claim space that is
a vacuum.
In your verbal testimony, you said let us not repeat the
mistake that led to the 2014 rise of ISIS.
I just want to drill into this one for a second. You are
not suggesting we should stay in Iraq over their objection or
be an occupier, correct?
Ambassador Jeffrey. No, not that we would be able to.
Senator Kaine. So the idea is, we should stay because what
we provide adds value and they would want us to stay. But the
political reality of that, it seems to me there have been two
things in the last 2 weeks that are going to make this harder.
The notion that the U.S. President is saying we want to
take Iraqi oil will make them, if they take that seriously, a
little bit skittish about us staying.
And second, a decision to ban Iraqis from coming into the
United States, even Iraqis that helped the American military
when they were there, that is also going to make Iraqis a
little bit skittish about a continued U.S. presence.
And I imagine both of these things are probably being used
by Iran right now to say, you see, is the U.S. your friend,
when they will not let Iraqis come into their country? Is the
U.S. your friend when their President is saying we are going to
take oil?
Do you not think it is pretty important, as a matter of
policy, that we fix these things if we want to try to convince
Iraq that we should be a partner going forward, rather than
somebody that they want to leave after Mosul falls?
Ambassador Jeffrey. I could not agree more. On taking
Iraq's oil, the Iraqis, if asked, would have to comment on that
and say--in fact, they have. But I do not think they really
believe that.
Now, where you have a point, sir, is on the immigrant
decision, the executive order. The thing, from a policy
standpoint, that was I think the only really troubling thing,
leave aside the constitutional and the humanitarian and the
other, was including Iraq. Because who are the others? Five
failed states in the middle of chaos and Iran. That is why it
did not have much of an impact in the larger Middle East,
because those are not countries like Pakistan and Egypt and
Saudi Arabia and Turkey that are now major players.
Iraq is different though. It is a serious ally of ours. It
is a functioning country. It also has an Al Qaeda and an ISIS
presence.
But it should not have been on that list. I think it was a
mistake to go on it. We all know the genesis of that list from
the seven countries that you could not go back to in the last
administration. And somebody did not think.
But if there is one thing I am pretty sure of from my many
years of watching government is that whatever mistakes this new
administration makes in the next years, Senator, they will not
make that specific mistake again.
Senator Kaine. I pray that that is the case, and I think
that there is still time to fix it, and I hope it is fixed
either in the courts or here or by an administration that
rethinks it.
Second, and this is to follow up on some questions both
Senators Portman and Menendez were asking, candidate and
President Trump has said that he expected Russia's help in
defeating ISIS. I think we would all agree that has been
virtually nonexistent thus far. And I think the testimony that
you gave in connection with Senator Portman's question is the
expectation, that that will dramatically change, that Russia
will be an ally in defeating ISIS, you would have to be quite a
risk-taker to take that bet right now, do you not agree?
Mr. Bash. Yes. I think Russia feels more emboldened, not
more in the mode of doing what we want them to do.
Senator Kaine. And President Trump last week said he
thought Russia would assist us in keeping Iran in check, and
then Russia immediately came out and said, no, Iran is an ally
of ours. We are trading partners. We are allies. And we want a
deeper relationship.
So would you also agree that any expectation that Russia
would be a check against Iranian ambitions would be pretty darn
naive right now?
Ambassador Jeffrey. Now that is a different and interesting
question, Senator.
There may be a little bit of light there. The reason is--
and I am not normally a Russia expert, but I have had 2 weeks
with the Russians over the last year, mainly on Syria and Iraq
and Iran. And there is a difference.
There is a way to split them off. Russia wants to have a
lot more influence in the Middle East, but it is backing a
horse, Iran, which sees the Middle East as a clash of Shia and
Sunni Islam, with itself leading the Shia forces and the
revolutionary forces, the Islamic forces. But the bulk of the
region, which is Sunni Muslim, sees that as an abhorrent threat
to their very existence. And that puts Russia in a funny
position.
I do not think Russia really wants to help Iran and Assad
seize all of Syria. I think that they really are halfway
serious about the Astana ceasefire, and we ought to be able to
build on that. And I think that they will not be able to
actively limit what Iran is doing in the region. Relations are
too close.
But it would be really nice if they could be careful on how
and how rapidly they sell our weapons to Iran and how strongly
they support Iran on the Security Council.
Senator Kaine. And do you predict they will be careful?
Ambassador Jeffrey. I predict that there may be a deal
there, but I am not sure. It is going to be hard, and they will
want something in return.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, sir.
Senator Isakson?
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As usual, you
made a very prophetic statement when you opened the questioning
period, when you said, after all, we are really just talking
about a bunch of proxies fighting over each other. And if you
listen to everything that has been said, that really is true.
The lives that are on the ground, except for the few of the
United States of America, are lives that are fighting for a
proxy that has nothing to do with the country they are from or
the religion that they are in. I just wanted to make that
observation. That makes it different.
I have been listening to everybody. I have been thinking,
there have been two times in the United States' history when we
were attacked and had great loss of life. One was Pearl Harbor.
We lost almost 3,000 Americans in 1 day. The other was 9/11 in
New York where we lost 3,000 Americans in 1 day.
And the result of World War II and the attack on America at
Pearl Harbor was we ultimately declared war both in the Pacific
and with the Axis powers in Europe.
Since 9/11/2001, we have fought a lot of battles. We have
made a lot of declarations. But there is not, to my knowledge,
a declaration of the global effort to fight ISIL.
Am I correct there?
The Chairman. Say that one more time?
Senator Isakson. Is there a declaration somewhere on the
global fight to disrupt ISIL? Any declaration of war?
The Chairman. No, I think the administration has relied
upon the '01, saying that they are a derivative of Al Qaeda.
And last week, in meeting with the national security adviser,
we began discussing this very topic and maybe a way forward.
But go ahead.
Senator Isakson. My reason for bringing it up is just to
comment on everything that we have listened to. The one thing
that is missing from the two great comparisons, which is 9/11
and Pearl Harbor, is the result after Pearl Harbor was pretty
quickly a coalition of freedom-loving people who joined
together in a powerful force to take on the Axis powers and, in
fact, Nazi Germany.
I would submit to you that the enemy we face today,
although it does not have a territory, does not have a uniform,
does not have a recognized leader, is every bit as lethal,
every bit as awful, and every bit as big a threat to America as
was the World War II effort against Nazi Germany and the Axis
powers in the Pacific.
I just want to make the point, we need to make that
declaration at some point in time. And we need to find out if
our friends are going to rally to the declaration or sit on the
sidelines and watch.
Right now, everybody who could be a friend of the United
States in fighting, with the exception, and there are
exceptions, the Swedes in Afghanistan. There are a lot of
countries helping us here, there, and yonder. But in terms of
an absolute commitment of the countries' commitment to the
effort, they are not there, because there is not a declaration
there.
And I am doing all the talking, not asking questions, and I
am sorry about that. But I just had to make that point, because
it is something we are eventually going to have to do.
Mr. Bash, you made a statement a minute ago, or in your
speech, about we ought to stop the Muslim-only order, and then
you made a statement that working with Muslim leaders in
America, we ought to come to a decision.
Who are those Muslim leaders? Has there been any assembly
of those Muslim leaders that you know of? Or do you know who
they are?
Mr. Bash. I think there are a number of leaders of
organizations and communities here in the United States who
have stepped forward and expressed a willingness to work
together with the U.S. Government, to work together with law
enforcement, who have worked with the Department of Homeland
Security and other agencies and departments that are interested
in providing funds, and resources to those elements that are
engaged in countering violent extremism activities and to
looking out for those communities.
Senator Isakson. Is there an equivalent in the Muslim world
to either the Pope or Billy Graham?
Mr. Bash. Not that I am aware of.
Senator Isakson. Just wondering. We need to find that
person somewhere or that title. That would be the place to
start negotiating and bringing them in the conversation,
because I think they have a lot to lose too. I mean, I have a
number of Muslim friends. I had a Muslim roommate when I was in
high school in a foreign exchange program. I have a great
respect for the faith. But they have as much to lose in this
war as anybody else has.
Mr. Bash. It is a good point. And my dad is here, who is a
member of the clergy. And it is interesting to see different
religions and the hierarchy that governs them. And I think you
have put your finger on an issue that I think we need to work
through.
Senator Isakson. My last point is, the reference was made
during Senator Shaheen's questioning to Vietnam and Iraq as two
examples of where, when it was over, there was not a plan to
keep it going, and, therefore, we lost. There was no nation-
state built.
Of course, in Vietnam, we basically lost. We left without
winning.
But in Iraq, we ultimately won with a surge of 130,000
troops that went into Iraq. Then we put in provincial
reconstruction teams and the State Department and USAID in
those regions to really bring back Iraq to a civilized society.
And we only lost Iraq when we took out that remaining small
residual force, military force, that was there.
My only point is, at some point in time, you probably have
to make the decision that you are going to have to have some
military presence over a protracted period of time if, in fact,
victory is important enough to you to send troops to take over
that country--just look at Japan and Germany today, 70 years
after World War II.
And I thank you for the time, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
If I could, would one of you all respond to Senator
Isakson's premise that ISIS is something that deserves a global
effort equal to what we did in World War II?
Ambassador Jeffrey. I do not think it is as big a threat to
the United States. I put ISIS in the same category as the
Islamic State.
Essentially, Sunni extremist, radical movements are a
threat to the region. They are definitely a threat to Europe
because they have very strong, if you will, footholds in Muslim
communities in Europe.
I do not see them as a threat to us because they do not
have that kind of situation that you have, for example, in
France, in Belgium, and in Britain.
And their ability to strike us, other than periodically by
terrorist attacks, will be limited as long as they are not
allowed to have a state. And the reason that ISIS has been
pretty effective launching these attacks, as Jeremy Bash said,
is because it has the ability to motivate people around the
world. That is why job one in the fight against terror has to
be to bash the ISIS state.
I do think, though, and I know you have talked about this
before in this committee, that an authorization for the use of
military force against ISIS would be a good idea because, as
you said, Senator, we are still operating on 1.2, but then we
got it back down to one authorization that tracks the immediate
post-9/11 period. And I think it would be perhaps helpful to
clarify exactly the questions that the Senator and many other
Americans have raised.
The Chairman. But marshaling efforts around the world to
deal with this is not something that you would disagree with?
The order of magnitude of the threat may be different, from
your perspective, but----
Ambassador Jeffrey. The overall mess that is the Middle
East, and much of that has one or another Islamic component--
certainly, Sunni Islamic extremism in Iran, which is an Islamic
entity of another sort, taken as a whole, has obviously been
for a long time--look at our military engagements there--and
will continue to be a major risk for the security of the entire
world. And it pulls in other countries like Russia today,
perhaps China tomorrow. And that is the danger too.
So it is a very big priority for our foreign policy and our
national security, to try to get the region under control. I
think, in that sense, it is a major effort. But I would not
say--it is not a war on a specific thing the way it was in
World War II.
Mr. Bash. May I just add, Mr. Chairman, may I just add, we
do have a global coalition and I would not want to leave anyone
with the impression, particularly our coalition partners, that
we do not think that they are there in the fight with us. They
very much are. They are taking fire, and they are doing some
very important things alongside our diplomats, our intelligence
officers, and our troops. That is point one.
But point two, I think it is worth it, since we have just
come through an election, to refresh that and to refresh that
statement, refresh that declaration. With Congress in the lead,
I think it is very appropriate.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Coons?
Senator Coons. Thank you, Chairman Corker.
I have three basic lines of questioning.
One will simply continue that, which is to follow up on one
of your opening statements, Mr. Bash, to ask about the global
affiliates of ISIS that have pledged allegiance to the
caliphate. And I want to explore with you a little bit what
that really means, how much control there really is, what sort
of coordination there really is.
Second, I will ask about how we prevent Iran from expanding
their hegemony into Syria after the fall of Raqqa and into Iraq
after the fall of Mosul.
And then third, a number of my colleagues have covered, and
you have spoken to directly, a number of President Trump's
unhelpful statements about seizing Iraq's oil, the impact of
his saying he would reinstate torture, and then, most
importantly, the executive order banning refugees from seven
majority Muslim countries.
But let us take those in order, if we could.
First, in the Sahel area, I paid a fair amount of attention
to it as chair of the Africa Subcommittee my first years, and
in Southeast Asia region, others have raised, you have ISIS
affiliates. But my superficial impression is that they are not
tightly aligned, not funding each other, not sharing technology
and weaponry and training. But perhaps I am missing a core
point.
You did, in your opening, and I think it is important,
emphasize that Australia has been our ally in virtually every
undertaking in the last century. That NATO is an absolutely
crucial partner. And I just wanted to give you, Mr. Bash,
Ambassador Jeffrey, a moment to speak to the global
consequences and the importance of reaffirming our coalition
partners.
Mr. Bash. Well, I think the specific operational ties vary
in different situations. Actually, if you look at--I read
through that statement that the White House released last night
about the terror attacks that, in their view, have been
underreported. And actually, so many of those were those that
were inspired or enabled by ISIS's propaganda, their
incitement, and their ideas.
And that is their main weapon. That is their main export.
That is how they do their business. And, by the way, it is
pretty effective.
Ambassador Jeffrey. Let me tackle the containing of Iran.
The first thing we have to do, and this would be a change from
the last administration, is to recognize that Iran is a problem
in the region and that America, with its friends and allies in
an economy of force way, needs to push back. And that will set
the stage for cooperation with a lot of friends who believe the
same way.
But specifically, there is a ceasefire that the Russians
and the Iranians and the Turks and the Syrians put together for
Syria, the Astana one. The Turks are willing to live with that,
even though their side lost, basically. The Russians put it
together and have some interest in it. The Syrians, the Assad
government, does not really like it. It wants to retake the
whole country on the back of Iranian surrogates and Russian
airplanes. And Iran is probably there with Syria.
But I think that the first thing is we should embrace that.
We should put people into those negotiations, bring in the
Europeans, and put pressure on Russia, as part of our
relationship with Russia, that we want that thing to hold.
Also, with Turkey.
And I think that there is a real chance of that happening
because retaking the rest of Syria is not an easy job, and the
Russians seem not to want to get bogged down in Syria, despite
their military victory in Aleppo.
In the rest of the region, you have a situation in Yemen
that is quite critical. You have a situation that is brewing in
Afghanistan with Iran. You have a situation that is relatively
quiet but it is not good in Lebanon.
But throughout the region, basically, it should be clear
that the United States is going to work in various ways against
the expansion of Iranian influence. And that is totally aside
from the nuclear agreement.
Senator Coons. I could not agree with you more, that
containing Iranian aggression, attempts at expanding their
hegemony, is a key goal for our foreign policy, both in our
engagement after Mosul is retaken and in how we act in the
region.
Let me just ask a quick question. Since you both identified
ISIS propaganda, their ability to reach out and radicalize, as
their most effective weapon, does it not simply strengthen and
expand the reach of that weapon to have an executive order in
place that correctly or not is being characterized throughout
the Muslim world as an anti-Muslim ban.
Mr. Bash?
Mr. Bash. It has already been utilized by ISIS sympathizers
on Telegram, one of the social media entities I referenced
earlier. And one of the arguments, just to put a little bit of
a sharper focus on it, is ISIS has always said, hey, let us
look at how America treats its own Muslim population, and you
can judge America that way.
And then when we do not allow back into the country lawful,
permanent residents who are of the Muslim faith, back into the
country that they are legally here, and we do not allow others
to be reunited with their families, we do not allow the tens of
thousands of students who are studying in our own universities
and colleges to actually be here or to travel home and come
back, I should say, then I think it actually validates, in some
ways, ISIS's claim.
Senator Coons. Well, Ambassador, I appreciate you also
observing that Iraq should not have been included. I think it
is a pressing security threat for us to have partners in an
ongoing fight now not allowed to come here for training, for
consultation, those who kept troops alive on the battlefield
not able to come home.
And it is my hope we will find ways to address this.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. If I could--I agree with that, but are you
saying the others should have, in making that statement? And
are you agreeing with that?
Mr. Bash?
Mr. Bash. I am sorry. I do not understand the question, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. The statement he made was Iraq should not
have been included. I agree with that. But that sets the
premise the others should have.
Mr. Bash. I think the construct of the ban was ill-
conceived. I think banning travel from entire populations
without regards to specific intelligence and terrorism threats
I think was a mistake for reasons that we have talked about.
So my recommendation would be to look at vetting
procedures--I think that is always appropriate--but not to do
it in the context of a travel ban.
The Chairman. Senator Gardner?
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to both of you for your endurance today. It is a
heavily attended committee hearing, which is a very good thing,
I think, for the committee. So thank you very much for being a
part of it.
Mr. Bash, I want to clarify or follow up a little bit on
the answer you gave to Senator Young, talking about the Muslim
faith. I do not want to put words in your mouth, so I want to
make sure I understood what you said.
In talking about it, I think the question about most
people, the predominant majority of people in the Muslim faith
are of peace and reject terrorism, an overwhelming number. But
you said, when he asked what more should be done, I think, Mr.
Bash, you said something about we need those to share, we need
people to share a proper review of Islam.
Could you talk a little bit more about that, what you mean,
who you mean, and what can be done about that?
Mr. Bash. As I have traveled in the Middle East, and I was
there not long ago speaking with leaders, particularly in the
gulf, I mean, their view, and I credit this, is that what ISIS
has done successfully, and to some degree what the supreme
leader has done in Iran on Shia side, is perverted Islam and
perverted the religion, done things in the name of the religion
that, in the view of more moderates in the region, is not
consistent with the way they think Islam should be practiced.
And I think we should listen to those people, and I think
we should empower them and look for ways to have their view of
their own religion----
Senator Gardner. But is that not something we have been
trying to do since over a decade ago, looking for those voices,
trying to strengthen those voices----
Mr. Bash. Yes.
Senator Gardner.--trying to find a platform for those
voices. So why have all those efforts failed, if we still need
to do it?
Mr. Bash. We have been trying to do it. We need to do it
more. I would not put it in a binary of it has worked or it has
failed. There are places where it has worked. There are places
where it has not worked.
I think we need to, obviously, expand the efforts so that
it works in additional places.
Senator Gardner. Again, this is something that we have been
talking about. We have been pursuing it at the Global
Engagement Center. This conversation has been held multiple
times before this committee on how do we find those moderate
voices, those reasonable voices that agree with the vast
majority of people in the faith that reject this?
So I would love to follow up more with how we can do a
better job, because I do put it in the terms of have we
succeeded or have we failed, because, if it is still happening,
if ISIS is still radicalizing people, if their ideology is
spreading, then we have not succeeded.
So anyway, I think we can follow up a little bit more on
that.
I want to talk a little bit about, Ambassador Jeffrey, in
your statement, you said that it is difficult to see how
Washington can pursue anti-ISIS operations in Syria without
Turkish bases and other cooperation. Can you talk a little bit
about the Turkish-Russia activities and what that means for the
U.S.?
Ambassador Jeffrey. Turkey has had a 250-year running
conflict with Russia to its north. Russia's expansion in the
16th through 19th century came at the expense of Turkish
territories, to a significant degree in the Balkans, in Crimea,
and in other places, the Caucasus.
And so there is a deep suspicion, and it is a classic case
of, if you have two major powers in one area, they tend to not
get along.
That said, there are energy ties and other ties with
Russia. Russia is a big player. Turkey knows it.
The current war, of course, with the fight in Syria where
Russia and Turkey were on opposite sides. You know the history.
Turkey shot down the Russian fighter that went into Turkish
territory. A strong reaction but still a limited reaction on
the part of Putin, and a military offensive that Putin
supported in Aleppo against the forces that Turkey was backing.
Turkey was backing, very strongly, forces who wanted to
overthrow Assad. Some of them were people who we would not want
to work with, but a lot of them in the Free Syrian Army were
people we were also working with. We cooperated with Turkey to
train many of those people.
Then, at the end of the day, Turkey wanted to do a no-fly
zone, ultimately. And they wanted to do it with us. They wanted
to have a no-drive zone. They eventually did it themselves, and
they seized a huge chunk of northern Syria, partially to block
the Kurds but also to go after ISIS and also to put pressure on
Assad. They had a three-way purpose in that.
But they were evermore disappointed that we were not in the
fight with them in any sort of way. They did not see a policy
toward Syria, and they did not see a policy toward Iran. And
frankly, I think they were right.
And at the end of the day, they were presented with a fait
accompli. Their side lost the battle of Aleppo. The western
Syrian battle was basically over. And to save what they could
of their Free Syrian Army Forces, many of whom are still under
arms and coordinating with the Turks, they decided to work this
deal with the Russians, the Astana ceasefire.
But the Turks are very unhappy at Assad's violation of
this. They keep on saying, at least for the record, that they
are opposed to Assad. They think he needs to go. And they are
uncomfortable with this second-class status that they have been
given with Russia.
And, thus, I think they are very willing to work with us.
And I see all kinds of signs----
Senator Gardner. There are no threats to U.S. interests in
Syria or Iraq as a result of the Russian-Turkey operations?
Ambassador Jeffrey. No, I do not. I think that Turkey feels
forced into this. They would love to have a situation where
they could--I do not want to paint too--where they could play
us off against the Russians. We will not like it, but it is
better than where we are now, because right now, there is no
gain. They just basically have to go along with the Russians.
Senator Gardner. I am out of time, but at some point, we
can follow up a little bit more about ISIS and Jakarta, and the
attacks in Jakarta in 2016, Southeast Asia. I think it is
important that we view ISIS and this issue not just as a Middle
East or Europe or even a distant threat to the U.S., I think
somebody had said, through attacks but also talk about what is
happening in Southeast Asia.
The Chairman. Senator Rubio is walking down, if you would
like to filibuster by asking about that.
Senator Gardner. I would love to ask that question.
The Chairman. If Senator Cardin does not object.
Go ahead.
Senator Gardner. Just again, I will make it quick, talk
about Southeast Asia, talk about the threat that ISIS poses.
About 600 known fighters in Southeast Asia right now. We have
counterterrorism efforts in place.
Are those sufficient? Do we need to do more? How is our
partnership on counterterrorism efforts proceeding?
Mr. Bash. I think we could always do more in the field of
intelligence cooperation and law enforcement training. We have
had some good experience with countries in Southeast Asia
countering the Al Qaeda threat in the aftermath of 9/11.
Of course, you referenced Indonesia. That is where Hambali
was. In working with allies and key partners there, we
successfully took him down.
Again, this is a place where I think Australia could be
critical, because as you talk to officials in Canberra, one of
the things that they are very concerned about is the ISIS
threat in Indonesia, in Jakarta, in Bali, and elsewhere. And
they can play a very constructive role in working with us
there.
Senator Gardner. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
Thank you both for being here. It is a busy day, a busy
night, a long night.
And I apologize if this has been asked before. Let me just
ask your opinions on the following, and that is, there has been
a lot of talk, some out there arguing, well, you know, Assad is
a bad individual but he is better than the alternative.
I have often said that, irrespective of what happens in
this conflict, as long as--given both the nature of the Assad
regime and everything that has transpired, that as long as
Assad is in power, or those close to him are in power, given
what has occurred in Syria, there will always be--Syria will
always be ripe for a Sunni resistance to his rule, that it is
difficult to go to someone who has had their family
slaughtered, who has faced deep oppression, and somehow ever
get them to fold into national unity under the rule of an
individual responsible for those these sorts of horrific acts.
Do you share that view, that it will be very difficult if
not impossible for Syria to ever be peaceful and unified as
long as someone with as much blood on his hands as Assad is in
power?
Mr. Bash. I strongly agree with that statement, Senator
Rubio. Assad has used chemical weapons to kill at least 1,400
of his own civilians, including several hundred children. As we
noted earlier in the hearing, we had to witness on our own
televisions, in a manner that was inappropriate for young
children to be in the living room when these scenes were being
shown, the way the Assad forces were liquidating the city of
Aleppo and slaughtering civilians and making it impossible for
relief organizations to be there.
So I agree 100 percent with your statement.
Ambassador Jeffrey. The Assad system is exactly what you
described, Senator, because as Jeremy said, it is absolute
brutality against the entire population, with some exceptions,
of Syria. Anybody who gets in the way gets thrown in jail, gets
tortured, and the mass slaughter of thousands of civilians,
poison gas, all of that.
It is possible to imagine scenarios where Assad is left in
power as a figurehead as part of some kind of compromise of
countries in the region and outside of the region agree to, as
long as the system goes away. But as long as that system, which
only goes on one speed, which is oppression full out,
continues, you are not going to have peace in Syria. And
without peace in Syria, you are not going to have peace in the
region.
Senator Rubio. Yes. I guess the broader point I have always
been driving, and it sounds like you both either directly agree
or largely agree with, is that there are a lot of people who
talk about this notion that Assad is terrible but he is better
than the alternative. I guess my argument is, as long as Assad
is there, given everything that has transpired, you are
basically providing the fuel and the conditions. Even if ISIS
is wiped out, you already see Jabhat al-Nusra, or whatever
their new name now is, stepping into that void.
In essence, given everything that has occurred, there will
always be a Sunni resistance that will tend toward
radicalization in some cases, if no other alternative is
available. I just make the argument to people that Assad is one
of the reasons why we have an ISIS. He is not a counter to
ISIS. He is, in many ways, one of the reasons that accelerated
the rise of ISIS and those radical Sunni elements within Syria.
I know I am running out of time and I know you have had a
long hearing, so let me just ask you this. There is also some
discussion out there about basically figuring out a way for the
United States to leverage or to peel Russia off of their
alliance with Iran and, in particular, work jointly together on
trying to defeat ISIS in Syria and beyond.
But I guess my point is, how realistic do you think that
sort of strategy is? And what would we have to give up, in your
estimation, in other parts of the world in order to entice
Vladimir Putin to both cut ties with Iran or at least the
alliance they established with Iran, albeit an alliance of
convenience, and also become more active participants in the
fight against ISIS? How realistic is that strategy, which I
know others have flirted with? And what would we probably have
to give up in other parts of the world to make that something
that Putin would find enticing?
Mr. Bash. Senator, the United States of America tested that
proposition over the last 6 months, and the test failed. We
tried to enlist them in a productive manner in Syria, and their
military operations were imprecise, counterproductive, and they
did things in the name of counterterrorism that were actually
counterproductive to our efforts; in other words, taking out
the moderate forces that could be a leave-behind force in
Syria.
So I think I agree with the premise of your question. And I
do not believe that we could do a grand bargain with Russia
where we outsource the ISIS fight or somehow enlist their
effort to moderate Iran's influence.
Ambassador Jeffrey. Specifically, on the ISIS fight,
absolutely not, other than carpet-bombing civilians, there is
nothing they really can do militarily in this campaign.
The larger question of Iran, assuming we have what I would
consider a healthy strategy toward Iran--which we did not in
the last administration; they are working on it now in this
administration--then there are areas where you can try to peel
off Russia because Russian and Iranian interests are not
identical.
But that is a longer term effort, and it should not start
with giving them any invites to the Raqqa battle.
The Chairman. If I could highlight, again, Russian troops
are not even trained to deal with this type of issue that we
have in Raqqa. Is that correct? I mean, all they can really do
is what you just mentioned, carpet-bomb. They are of no use,
are they, relative to a ground effort in Raqqa?
Ambassador Jeffrey. They had some very high-end forces that
we would call special forces, but they are closer to the 75th
Ranger Regiment; that is, highly trained light infantry. And
they did deploy some of those people at times, which is why I
cited that earlier in my argument that we need to put some
elite ground troops in.
And those forces are pretty good, but they are nothing in
numbers or quality like what we have between the United States
and our NATO allies. We have tens of thousands of people who
can do that and who have been doing this for a decade in
Afghanistan and Iraq.
The Chairman. Senator Cardin?
Senator Cardin. Well, let me thank you for your testimony.
As I was listening to the members ask their questions and your
responses, I think there is general consensus here that we do
not want to see U.S. military in a sustained ground combat
operation. There are different views here as to whether it is
appropriate for us to interject our special forces and how we
interject our special forces, or how we deal with the
uncertainty of what occurs, where we may need to use U.S.
forces for rescue, need U.S. forces for an urgent need.
And I say that because President Obama submitted an AUMF
that restricted our combat to no sustained ground combat
operations, and we all scratched our heads at the time and
said, what does that mean?
And I agreed with the chairman that it was impossible for
us to get unity to pass an AUMF. We have disagreements whether
the 2001 AUMF covers the operations today, and that is never
going to be fully resolved because there is no way to resolve
that, whether it covers it or not. The President is operating
under it, and there is no way of really legally challenging it,
other than through the appropriations process, which is a tool
that will not be used, because it affects the safety of our
military.
So I mention that because, Mr. Chairman, we are going to
have to revisit this at some point, because I do think there is
general consensus against us using combat troops on a sustained
basis in Syria or Iraq, that that would be counterproductive
or, by the way, in the other regions in which ISIS is now
operating.
That would be, I think, looked at as counterproductive
because it would be used as a recruitment tool. It would make
it more difficult for us to govern after the combat operations
are over. And you are not going to be able to hold unless you
have the local will and capacity to hold regions.
For all those reasons, we have to be cautious. We want to
get rid of ISIS. We want to get rid of terrorists. But we have
to have a game plan.
Mr. Chairman, you have been one of the first to point out
that that may not have been true in our Libya campaign. We did
not have an idea what was going to happen after we got involved
in Libya.
So I just make that as a word of caution. And I would
welcome our two witnesses, and maybe would ask this for the
record, how would you frame an AUMF where Congress is weighing
in to support the operations, recognizing that many of us would
be reluctant to an open-ended AUMF because we believe we have
responsibility to authorize sustained operations, and we are
not prepared to give that congressional authority today?
So it would be interesting to see.
But as far as the use of our military, I could not agree
with you more. They have the capacity, the unique capacity. No
other country can do what we can do, whether it is our combat
troops or whether it is our special forces troops or whether it
is the people who are in intelligence in the military, they do
the best. And without their participation, it is hard to
imagine we could come to any type of successful completion to
what is happening today against ISIS.
So I think there is probably more agreement than
disagreement. But the question of how does the Senate, how does
the Congress, weigh in is a much more difficult assignment. If
you have thoughts on that, I would be willing to listen.
Ambassador Jeffrey. As an advocate for non-sustained ground
troops--and, of course, definitions are everything--what are
ground troops? Are they a forward observer team? Is it special
forces on a raid? I am talking about essentially a number of
maneuver battalions, 500 to 800 strong American units
participating in ground fire and maneuver.
I think that if we can do operations without that, we
should because we are basically in internal conflicts and we
want to, for many reasons, put the burden on the locals, but as
much local as possible, as much American engagement as
necessary.
And we come very close to that, Senator, with the 10,000
troops we have in Afghanistan. They get involved in more
fighting than the folks do in Iraq that we have, the 5,000.
The second thing is, I am troubled by this artificial line
that special forces can go out and do raids and shoot people up
and get shot in the process, and artillery can fire and Apache
helicopters can fire rockets, but that is not ground combat.
But a U.S. tank company cannot lead an assault on a very dug-in
ISIS force.
If we could do this with somebody else, fine, but let us
not wait. The Mosul battle has been going on. And, all in all,
it is successful. But it has been going on for 3 and a half
months, and we still have to take the hardest part of the city
in the west.
And there is a cost to doing these things. Maybe we will be
okay, but every month you get bogged down in a conflict, there
is a risk that something will happen, an ally will fall out, a
new development will come in. There is something to be said for
rapidity in any operation, diplomatic or military.
In terms of an authorization for the use of military force,
I think there were two elements, if I remember, because I gave
testimony either here or in the House on authorization. And the
two concerns were, first of all, the limitation on sustained
use of ground troops. I think that needs to be worded
differently because it just was troubling from many
standpoints.
Senator Cardin. We are all looking at new language these
days.
Ambassador Jeffrey. The other thing was, there was--I do
not know whether it was a geographic--it was everywhere in the
world. And that was a little bit troubling too. If you are
going to authorize the use of military force, as this chamber
knows very well, dating back to 1964, you really have to be
careful what you authorize.
Senator Cardin. And then, lastly, there was a challenge of
whether this would be the exclusive use of the authority,
whether we would repeal 2001 or whether 2001 would still stay
in. So there were different--and whether it would have a sunset
or not have a sunset.
There were many open issues about how we would do this, so
it was not free from challenges. But the bottom line is, what
is the appropriate authorization for the use of force by
Congress?
Mr. Bash. And maybe I will add as a coda, Senator Cardin,
if you just tell the Defense Department, ``Give us some
options,'' the last slide is going to be the low, medium, and
high option. And I sense the struggle here among all of us to
figure out what are the right numbers, what are the right
missions, what are the right capabilities we want to have in
country.
And I think the premise of this hearing, and my
recommendation would be, do not make that decision in
isolation. Think about the comprehensive approach. What else
are we doing diplomatically? Who else is with us in the fight?
What is the nature and capability of the ground forces of local
partners that we will be employing? How good and precise are
our airstrikes? What kind of intelligence precision do we have?
I think if you look at the entire picture, that will inform
the low, medium, and high decision that the Defense Department
will inevitably come forward with.
Senator Cardin. Thank you all.
The Chairman. Thank you both. Of course, the authorization
is something that I think we will be dealing with here in the
next couple months.
I think the first step, as it relates to Syria, is to have
the administration lay out a plan and for them to come before
us and talk about the details of that. I think this hearing has
been really, really useful in that regard.
Back to the AUMF component, I mean, that would then help us
as it relates to Syria itself. But then there is this global
issue that we are dealing with, that each circumstance could
develop into something very different.
So just for what it is worth, I know that you had some
things on the floor. I am not sure there is that much unanimity
on what we should do. There was a lot of conflicting thoughts.
I think that there are many people who believe that, when
you authorize the military, you should just authorize the
military. And then I think there are others that feel like
there should be more of a management there relative to what we
do.
But again, here, today, the hearing is really about what we
are going to do right now in Syria. I know that is what Mattis
has been charged to do. My guess is Tillerson will be highly
involved in that.
And I think this whole issue that you both are alluding to
relative to ground troops, not to be pejorative, the last
administration's reticence caused much of that to occur. It has
no doubt affected where we are today. I mean, we keep looking
in all of the--I do not really see a force on the ground by
itself that is capable, on one hand, of dealing with this. We
have elements that do not particularly get along well with each
other.
And so it is going to be interesting, as they walk through
this process, to try to weave the Turks, the Arab-supported
Turks, the Arab-supported Kurds, the Kurds, the Russian-Iran
component, trying to weave that together into something that is
coherent to me is going to be very, very difficult. And I think
this hearing has been most useful in describing that,
describing those complications.
Jeffrey, if you would, if you were the person waving and
describing how it is going to be most focused, which of those
areas would it be?
Ambassador Jeffrey. Really quickly, one, we wrung our hands
about the Balkans for 3 years because of exactly all of those
same complications. And then we acted. And suddenly, almost all
of them melted away. They melted away good enough for
government work.
I think the Middle East is more difficult. We are in a very
dangerous situation with multiple foes, with multiple
complications. I think that if Iran understands we are going to
contain Iran; Russia understands that we are not going to try
to throw it out of the Middle East but that we are also going
to watch carefully what it does in the region; Turkey believes
that we are not going to develop this relationship with what
they think is a potentially existential threat, the YPG branch
of the PKK in Syria; and that the Iraqis know that we are not
going to try to use them against Iran but that we also do not
want to go away, I think that, bit by bit, we can put this back
together because we have the military, we have the political,
we have the economic power.
And when you add up all of our allies and friends in the
area--we have not talked much about Israel, about Saudi Arabia,
about all these other countries--they are capable of being
mobilized for some kind of plan like this.
And I think it is eminently doable over time, but we have
to start with whacking ISIS and making it clear that Iran is
somebody that we are not going to let take over the region, and
it will flow from there.
The Chairman. I think that is a good way to close the
hearing. If you would answer questions, we are going to leave
them open until close of business tomorrow, Thursday. I know
that you have other things that you do during the day. But if
you can answer those as quickly as possible, we would
appreciate it. Thank you both. I think this has been an
outstanding hearing, and I think it has caused everyone up here
to think about this in a little different way, and we will have
hopefully something that comes out of the administration that
can be supported and can be successful with the help of your
testimony today.
So thank you. The meeting is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:09 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of the Honorable James Jeffrey to Questions
Submitted By Senator Todd Young
Question. What are your detailed assessments of the State
Department's Global Engagement Center?
Answer. Under former DoD Assistant Secretary Lumpkin the Center has
taken a more indirect approach working with those in the region and in
the United States who are more closely connected to communities
vulnerable to jihadist recruitment. The difficulty with this Center
with its current and former programs is that, first, measurement of
success is extremely difficult. Second, its `target audience', those
tempted to support or join violent Islamic movements, is an extremely
small portion of the global Muslim community, and their motivations
typically are highly differentiated from individual to individual.
Nevertheless as an element in a whole-of-government approach to violent
Islamic extremism, the Center should be supported.
Question. As ISIS loses territory in Iraq and Syria, should we
expect many ISIS fighters to attempt to flee and return to their home
countries or to travel to ungoverned or weakly governed areas
elsewhere? Should we expect them to travel to the U.S. or Europe in
order to conduct terrorist attacks? How will most of the ISIS fighters
go about fleeing Iraq and Syria? Will they flee through Turkey? Is
Turkey doing all that it can to prevent this terrorist exodus? How can
the U.S. help capture or kill these terrorists as they flee Iraq and
Syria?
Answer. At least the foreign fighters will flee Iraq and Syria once
the ISIS `state' is defeated, as their inability to speak local
dialects makes them identifiable to security authorities once they are
no longer `embedded' in an ISIS community. Some will travel to the
Sinai, possibly Libya, Yemen, or Afghanistan, but many likely will try
to return to their homelands, especially in Western Europe or the
former Soviet Union. Given the already extensive vetting of foreigners
traveling to the U.S. receive, and the likely intensification of that
under the Trump administration, few are likely to reach the U.S. Many
will unfortunately be more successful reaching Europe, a concern for us
as attacks by them there threaten the security and stability of
American allies.
Only a small number of American citizens have joined jihadist
movements in Syria and Iraq, but they pose a potential threat because
as citizens they are not routinely vetted upon reentry into the U.S..
Specific intelligence programs are important to identify such people.
There is also a limited danger of European passport holder veterans of
jihadist campaigns entering the U.S. for example via the visa waiver
program. The Obama administration modified that program to deal with
this threat and every indication is that the Trump administration will
further intensify it.
Clandestine travel of jihadist elements from Syria and Iraq is
currently easiest through Turkey, but Lebanon, Jordan, Iran, and Saudi
Arabia cannot fully control their borders either. Turkey of late has
taken extraordinary efforts to shut down ISIS-linked sponsors and
sympathizers, but could do more. The U.S. is already working very
actively with all of these border states. Assisting them with
intelligence, training and certain military and intelligence equipment
to enhance their effectiveness should be a central priority once the
ISIS `state' is defeated.
Question. Do you both believe that there will be no durable defeat
of ISIS in Syria if the U.S. agrees to a Russian demand to keep Assad
in power and fails to insist on the establishment of an inclusive
government in Damascus that protects rather than murders its own
people?
Answer. It is possible to envisage an end to ISIS as a state and
army even if Assad were to stay in power, if the U.S. remained very
active against ISIS remnants in Syria and Iraq. However, as long as
Assad remains in power a major portion of Syria's Sunni Arab
populations will resist him, and some doing so will join ISIS (or al
Qaeda). While ISIS may not be able to reconstitute its `state' with
control of wide swaths of territory, it certainly could sustain itself
as an underground terrorist organization able to attack the Syrian
population and government, and those of its neighbors. It also could
launch or inspire terrorist attacks in the U.S. or Europe.
The end of the Assad regime, particularly, as the question noted,
if replaced by a more inclusive and decent government, will reduce
dramatically the recruitment appeal of ISIS. While ISIS could still
survive, its strength and capabilities would be dramatically weakened.
Finally, as long as Assad remains in power, Iran continues its
expansion throughout the region, and in particular Assad and his
Iranian allies attempt to conquer all of Syria, there is a risk of a
region-wide Sunni-Shia conflagration. Under those circumstances large
numbers of recruits could flock to ISIS or al Qaeda as they are seen as
among the most effective fighters in a religious conflict with the
Shia.
Question. Do you both believe it is in U.S. national security
interests to retain U.S. military personnel in Iraq after the fall of
Mosul, if so why? How many troops, where, and for what purpose? Do you
believe the Iraqi government will want to keep U.S. troops in Iraq
after the fall of Mosul? Do you believe Iran will try to expel the U.S.
military presence in Iraq after the fall of Mosul?
Answer. It is very much in the U.S. interest to keep a contingent
of troops in Iraq, in Baghdad itself and on a handful of Iraqi bases
including those in the north in the Kurdistan Regional Government. The
ostensible purposes of these forces, probably around 5,000 in number,
would be to, as planned in 2011, train Iraqi forces, exchange
intelligence, and assist in counter-terrorist operations against ISIS
or al Qaeda remnants. But such a presence would support broader U.S.
diplomatic goals by demonstrating U.S. engagement and interest in Iraq,
giving the U.S. `eyes on' for developments in the Iraqi armed forces,
and potentially enabling other Western nations or NATO to, keep small
training contingents in Iraq, as in the past and again currently
against ISIS,.
Once ISIS is defeated some Iraqi elements for nationalistic
reasons, and others influenced by Iran, will certainly push for a total
U.S. withdrawal. There are strong arguments which the U.S. and those
desiring our forces can make in response: First, the need to integrate
the over $10 billion of military equipment Iraq has purchased from the
U.S; Second, the failure of Iraqi security forces against ISIS after
the U.S. withdrew in 2011; Third, the need to keep the KRG, which is
very interested in U.S. forces remaining on its territory, within the
Iraqi union. More subtly, many Iraqis would see a U.S. presence as
`balancing' Iranian influence which is resented by Iraqis of all ethnic
and religious backgrounds.
A legal basis for the U.S. presence could be found in the
``Strategic Framework Agreement'' of 2008 between the U.S. and Iraq,
and the various exchanges of letters governing the U.S. presence since
2014.
Question. Do you believe we should establish safe zones in Syria?
What are some of the benefits and challenges associated with
establishing safe zones in Syria? Where in Syria do you believe these
safe zones should be located? Who would defend and secure these safe
zones on the ground? Would you support the U.S.-led coalition
protecting these safe zones from the air?
Answer. There are already informal `safe zones' in Syria, a small
one along the Jordanian border where the U.S. and others have trained
the Syrian resistance, the Turkish zone west of the Euphrates for about
95 miles, and up to 20 kilometers deep, and the Syrian Kurdish PYD
``Rojava'' areas of Korbane East of the Euphrates, and in Afrin
northeast of Aleppo. The U.S. could expand those zones, for example to
include the areas around Raqqa once liberated.
U.S. advisors and U.S. aircraft routinely operate in those areas.
While there is not a formal `no fly zone' declared or defended,
deconfliction between the U.S. and coalition aircraft (and Turkish
aircraft in the Turkish zone) and Syrian and Russian aircraft routinely
occur, and the U.S. by press accounts has scrambled fighters on
occasion to intercept Russian or Syrian air missions over `our' areas.
The U.S. working with Turkey and local forces could `formalize'
these regions for the following purposes: (1) invite in refugee
agencies to establish refugee centers, thus relieving refugee pressure
on the EU and reducing the threat of jihadists traveling to the U.S. or
other NATO states; (2) leverage these zones to enforce the Astana cease
fire for Syria; (3) advance the goal shared by the U.S. and most of the
region to see a post-Assad inclusive government of Syria; (4) use these
zones as `lily pads' to operate with local forces against ISIS remnants
and al Qaeda.
The U.S. along with Turkey and whichever coalition forces wish
could establish `control' over these zones with fighter aircraft,
drones and surface-to-air missiles. (Critics of the idea stress that
the U.S. and allies would have to operate within the `umbrella' of
Syrian and Russian air defense. They forget that Russia and Syria have
conducted their operations inside the `fan' of U.S., Turkish, NATO,
Arab states and Israeli radar, air defense and fighter-interceptor
forces continuously).
Question. As areas in and around Mosul are liberated, how is the
Iraqi government doing managing the behavior of the Shia Popular
Mobilization Forces (PMF) to avoid the mistreatment of Sunni residents
that could make them susceptible to ISIS recruitment? When ISIS
controlled areas are liberated, how is the Iraqi government doing in
rapidly restoring government services and establishing inclusive
governance? Do you agree that the Iraqi government's ``Phase IV
operations'' in Sunni majority areas are essential to the durable
defeat of ISIS in Iraq? How can or should the State Department and
USAID support the Iraqi government's efforts to establish responsive
government services and inclusive governance for Sunni populations to
prevent the return of ISIS?
Answer. Apart from some initial outrages by PMF elements in
liberated zones in 2014 and again during the 2016 Fallujah campaign,
the PMF elements have behaved tolerably well with exceptions (typically
by more Iran-oriented elements) throughout Iraq.
Once areas are liberated the most important `initial steps' are to
provide immediate relief (medical, nutrition, etc), reestablish local
police forces, and remove the PMF elements. There are government
institutions both local and federal that can quickly engage or be
reinstituted as we have seen in Anbar and Saladin provinces. More
sustained, as noted, ``Phase IV'' counterinsurgency efforts in
economic, political and security realms for reconstruction and
reconciliation will be needed to discourage elements of the Sunni
population from joining ISIS or al Qaeda elements. As the U.S. has
learned in its own Phase IV operations, however, durable success is
uncertain, long-term, and resource intensive. Nevertheless, any
palpable progress, combined with a more inclusive political attitude on
the part of the Baghdad central government towards its Sunni citizens,
likely will deter many from again taking up arms.
The U.S. can assist first with immediate relief and assistance
programs and efforts to reconcile former foes, including through USAID
and NGO's such as USIP. More generally, the more engaged the U.S. is in
Iraq, and in particular with a long-term military presence, the more
leaders in the Sunni (and Kurdish) communities will put their faith in
a unified and democratic Iraq. That is the ultimate barrier to
reconstitution of ISIS or al Qaeda.
Question. What do you believe were the main weaknesses of the Obama
administration's approach to ISIS? What should the U.S. be doing in
Iraq and Syria that we are not?
Answer. Initially, the Obama administration made light of the
threat, notably in the President's quip about it being the ``J-V'',
although members of his own administration, outside observers, and
Iraqis, were warning publicly of ISIS' threat as early as late 2013.
The Obama administration's lack of effective response after ISIS seized
the city of Fallujah in January 2014 was especially irresponsible. Its
initial response after the fall of Mosul in June 2014 was too limited,
although justified by the effort to leverage U.S. firepower in return
for a replacement to Prime Minister Maliki, who contributed greatly to
ISIS's rise by his neglect and oppression of the Sunni Arab population.
After August, with Maliki's replacement and the commencement of U.S.
airstrikes, the administration led the effort to slowly roll ISIS back,
but this effort was characterized by half-measures, an obsessive
commitment to zero civilian casualties, a preoccupation with avoiding
U.S. casualties and a significant U.S. force deployed, and, in general,
a lack of political will to win. The result again was a very slow
liberation of territory from ISIS as well as one setback, the fall of
Ramadi, to some degree the fault of the U.S.
After November 2015 the administration gave the ISIS fight a much
greater priority, loosened somewhat tight rules of engagement,
committed more advisors, and initiated some `ground combat
operations'--SOF raids, artillery, attack helicopters. The effort
against ISIS thereafter gained momentum, but is still hampered by the
U.S. refusal to put any U.S. ground maneuver units into the battle.
As noted in my written testimony, the U.S. needs a stronger
military effort against ISIS, generated by more U.S. forces committed
to combat, including perhaps limited--battalion or brigade level--
ground maneuver forces, and diplomatic coordination of our various
allies including in Syria the Kurdish YPD and its allied Arab
contingent in the Syrian Defense Force (SDF) and the Turkish army and
its allied Free Syrian Army (FSA). Military success against ISIS and
diplomatic success unifying U.S. allies will also assist the U.S. in
dealing with the larger questions of Iraq, Syria and Iran noted in
answers to 3, 4 5, and 6 above.
Question. As ISIS loses territory in Iraq and Syria, shouldn't we
expect it to transform into a more traditional terrorist insurgency in
both countries? What should the U.S. and our partners be doing now to
prepare for that predictable development?
Answer. There is no doubt that ISIS will seek to act as an
insurgent force just as it was (under the name ``al Qaeda in Iraq'')
before the Syrian civil war.
Our major step to avoid that would be to continue the coalition and
the `all-elements-of-government' approach, essentially the
recommendations made for U.S. and others' courses of action in 1-5
above. In addition the containment of Iran by the U.S. will eliminate
one of the major recruiting tools for ISIS.
Question. Is Iraqi Prime Minister Abadi in danger of losing his
position? Why? What would be the implications of that for U.S.
interests?
Answer. Abadi's government is weak. Apart from his own
organizational problems this stems primarily from in-fighting among
Shia factions but also to a serious split between the Kurdish parties
and the lack of a unified Sunni political movement that could support
him as the `least bad' of Shia political leaders. Iran in particular is
maneuvering to either replace or weaken him, probably by supporting a
return to power of former Prime Minister Maliki.
Nevertheless the Kurds and Sunni Arabs likely prefer Abadi to any
other leader, Muqtadah al Sadr although unstable has a large following
and also would prefer Abadi to Maliki, as would most of the senior
clerics in Najaf. So Abadi may be able to hold on to his position.
Losing Abadi as prime minister, especially if replaced by Maliki or
another figure seen as close to Iran, would be a disaster for the U.S.
and for the effort to avoid a resurgence of ISIS, which would be
facilitated by a pro-Iranian government in Baghdad especially if led by
Maliki.
The U.S. can avoid this by remaining engaged in Iraq. A U.S.
military presence has to be adroitly `sold' to the Iraqis, in
particular involving neither U.S. `bases' nor an officially `permanent'
or `combat' presence. The Iranians will react against that, which
argues for warning Iran that if it wants Iraq to be stable and united
it should not oppose a limited U.S.presence which would have the same
goal.
Question. In order to durably defeat ISIS and to prevent the
emergence of other Sunni insurgent and terrorist groups, do you believe
it is important for Sunnis in Iraq and Syria to feel fully represented
in Baghdad and Damascus? Do you believe a failure to establish such
governance will ensure that ISIS and other Sunni insurgent groups will
continue to find a sympathetic population from which to recruit?
Answer. The more integrated Sunni Arabs feel themselves to be into
governments in Baghdad (where if democratic they will be in the
minority) and in Damascus (where as long as Assad and his Alawite
ethnic group rule their role will be constrained), the less they will
turn to ISIS or other Sunni extremist groups. But the U.S. even at the
height of its presence struggled to reach true Sunni Arab integration
into the Baghdad government, and the Syria civil war is largely about
that question. Thus this is a very difficult task to fully accomplish.
Nevertheless, good faith efforts in either capital towards
inclusiveness, palpable economic and security progress in Sunni Arab
areas, and engagement by the international community led by the U.S.
(seen as more balanced to the Sunni Arabs) all can reach a `good enough
to work' level and keep recruitment to radical groups under control.
Question. What is your assessment of the post-coup crackdown there?
How would you assess current relations between the U.S. and Turkey?
What is your assessment of Turkey's evolving relationship with Russia?
Answer. For Turks, the Gulenist-inspired and probably organized
military coup of July 15 is equivalent to our 9/11, in part because
unlike earlier coups it was not organized or supported by the military
top leadership, and saw military personnel indiscriminately mowing down
unarmed Turkish civilians.
What is going on now in retaliation is a major effort to arrest and
try those involved directly in the coup or in the ``clandestine'' side
of the Gulenist movement, as well as a much greater effort targeting
hundreds of thousands of people allegedly linked to the more overt
elements (education, banking, business, media, religion) of the
Gulenist movement. These people typically lose jobs in the civil
service or quasi-public professions. Such purges have been common after
earlier upheavals and coups in Turkey, but there is little doubt that
President Erdogan, rattled by his near assassination during the coup,
is using these purges to strengthen his rule and intimidate opposition
including in the media and among Turkish Kurdish groups.
Relations between the U.S. and Turkey are very poor despite a
seeming convergence of interests against ISIS, Iran and to some degree
Russia. Erdogan and former President Obama had at the end a very chilly
relationship. Major points of contention now are the Turkish request
for extradition of Fetullah Gulen, the accused ring-leader of the July
coup, who is a green card holder resident in Pennsylvania, and the U.S.
support in the fight against ISIS for the YPG, seen by the Turks
accurately as a subsidiary of the anti-Ankara Turkish Kurdish PKK
insurgency. More generally, the Turks believe Washington did not live
up to its commitments, first to help overthrow Assad, and second, to
keep the YPG east of the Euphrates River in Kurdish areas. U.S. leaders
are unhappy with Turkey's flirtation with Russia, but in fairness
Turkey felt abandoned in Syria by the U.S. and after the fall of Aleppo
decided it had to make the best possible deal with the winner.
Turkey's relationship with Putin is one of necessity and
convenience and is transactional in nature. The primary reason as noted
just above was the fall of Aleppo as well as U.S. policy decisions.
Turkey however has lucrative energy and other economic interests with
Russia that influence its decision-making with Moscow. That said,
Turkey and president Erdogan personally are very concerned about
Russian encroachment into the region (and in the Black Sea, Caucasus,
and Southeastern Europe) but feel the U.S. in the past has not shown
equivalent concern. More concern about Russia (including its semi-
alliance with Iran) on the part of the U.S., some action even short of
extradition concerning Fetullah Gulen, and a more balanced U.S.
approach to the final battle against ISIS in Syria between the YPG/SDF
and the Turks and their FSA allies, together could rectify much of the
current strains in the relationship quickly.
Question. What is the status of Iraq's energy sector?
Answer. Iraq's success developing its extraordinarily large oil and
eventually gas reserves is a credit to the Iraqi people and to the
efforts of the international community and to the U.S. engagement in
Iraq. Encouraged by the U.S. Iraq invited in western and other
International oil and gas companies including Exxon and Chevron and
many smaller U.S. energy sector firms to develop its energy sector. The
KRG government did the same in the north.
As a result Iraq today is the second largest OPEC oil producer,
reaching levels including the KRG of over 4.5 million barrels/day
produced by late 2016 (the OPEC quotas approved in November 2016 will
reduce this by several hundred thousands of barrels/day at least
theoretically), and well over 3.5 million barrels/day exported from the
south and north. This has been one of the major factors (along with
U.S. tight oil production) for the more than 50% fall in oil prices
globally since 2014 and thus much less expensive gas at U.S. tanks, as
well as a reduction of inflation world-wide.
The Iraqis have significant problems with additional expansion of
their southern fields to reach Saudi levels of 7-10 million barrels/day
produced, beginning with delays in a salt water injection program to
pump up to 10 million barrels of sea water into wells to increase
efficiency and exploit fully hard-to-reach reserves. In addition, the
KRG and Baghdad are repeatedly in political conflict over the nature of
contracts let by the KRG, the percent of southern oil revenue `owed' to
the KRG, and the KRG's effective control over the Kirkuk oil field and
its exports since ISIS drove a physical wedge between Kirkuk and
central Iraq. Currently they have reached with U.S. urging another
limited compromise oil export and revenue policy but tensions remain.
Question. As we consider optimal U.S. military posture in Iraq
after the fall of Mosul, what lessons should we learn from the
withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq in late 2011?
Answer. First we have to be aware of the reasons why despite an
Obama administration effort we were not successful:
--Iranian interference: The U.S. did little to counter this, which
ranged from lobbying in the Iraqi parliament to lobbing Improvised
Rocket-Assisted Missiles at our bases and installations. If we attempt
to leave troops behind after ISIS is defeated, which as noted above I
have advocated, we will have to either intimidate the Iranians or
convince them that any U.S. presence would be limited and not offensive
(i.e., aimed at Iran) in nature.
--Parliamentary endorsement of legal immunities for U.S. troops:
This is a reasonable demand on the part of the U.S. but proved
impossible to obtain from the Iraqi parties that made up the majority
of the Iraqi parliament. All Iraqi parties except the Sadrists with 15%
of parliamentary seats agreed that U.S. forces could stay on, but only
the Kurdish parties with less than 20% of seats supported a
parliamentary endorsement of legal immunities for U.S. troops. Such
immunities understandably are usually a sine qua non for stationing of
U.S. troops within foreign countries. The Iraqi government was willing
to give written immunities, and has done so in fact in 2014 to secure a
return of U.S. forces against ISIS, but such executive branch immunity
can easily be challenged in a parliamentary system. If the U.S. does
keep troops on in Iraq it will have to accept the ambiguous immunities
provided by executive letter, as there is essentially no chance the
Iraqi parliament would vote for them.
--Popular resistance: Except among Iraq's 15-17% Kurdish population
less than 20% of Iraqis polled indicated interest in having U.S. troops
remain in Iraq, according to essentially all polls in the 2010-2011
period. Iraqis may have learned from the 2014-17 experience that
American forces are essential to their security, or perhaps they have
not, under the influence of Iranian and rabid nationalist propaganda.
--Direct Presidential Engagement: President Obama was less engaged
personally with the effort to keep troops on, although he formally
accepted the recommendation to seek an enduring troop presence. Such
engagement however is essential both to convince Iraqi leaders, and to
take the difficult steps outlined above--keeping American troops in an
ambiguous situation in terms of legal immunities; limiting the size,
location and missions of U.S. troops; and dealing in one or another way
with Iranian objections.
__________
Responses of Jeremy Bash to Questions
Submitted By Senator Todd Young
Question. What are your detailed assessments of the State
Department's Global Engagement Center?
Answer. I have not performed a detailed assessment of the State
Department's Global Engagement Center. I have worked in the past with
the recent leader, Mr. Michael Lumpkin, whom I think very highly of. He
was a strong and capable leader when I served with him at the
Department of Defense. The mission of the center--to coordinate USG
counterterrorism messaging--is sorely needed. ``Winning the argument''
is a crucial piece to winning the battle against terrorist networks.
From anecdotal evidence, it appears to me that the Center is focused on
the correct activity--specifically empowering third party voices who
have the background and credibility to counter jihadist narrative and
propaganda. I also have a sense that the Center would benefit from
increased funding and support, but I have not performed an assessment
of its resources or staffing.
Question. As ISIS loses territory in Iraq and Syria, should we
expect many ISIS fighters to attempt to flee and return to their home
countries or to travel to ungoverned or weakly governed areas
elsewhere? Should we expect them to travel to the U.S. or Europe in
order to conduct terrorist attacks? How will most of the ISIS fighters
go about fleeing Iraq and Syria? Will they flee through Turkey? Is
Turkey doing all that it can to prevent this terrorist exodus? How can
the U.S. help capture or kill these terrorists as they flee Iraq and
Syria?
Answer. It is reasonable to assume that as ISIS loses territory,
some of its fighters will attempt to flee to Europe, North Africa, and
possibly farther. Those who attempt to come to the United States likely
would do so with a specific operational plan. Turkey could provide one
route, but there are, in theory, multiple routes that an ISIS fighter
might employ. The most effective way to penetrate plots and counter
threats is to focus intelligence collection on specific targets and
work with the intelligence services of countries in the region to track
the travel of suspected ISIS operatives. If the terrorist is traveling
through Europe, the interdiction is likely going to occur by the
intelligence and law enforcement agencies of the host government.
Question. Do you both believe that there will be no durable defeat
of ISIS in Syria if the U.S. agrees to a Russian demand to keep Assad
in power and fails to insist on the establishment of an inclusive
government in Damascus that protects rather than murders its own
people?
Answer. Yes, I do believe that.
Question. Do you both believe it is in U.S. national security
interests to retain U.S. military personnel in Iraq after the fall of
Mosul, if so why? How many troops, where, and for what purpose? Do you
believe the Iraqi government will want to keep U.S. troops in Iraq
after the fall of Mosul? Do you believe Iran will try to expel the U.S.
military presence in Iraq after the fall of Mosul?
Answer. I believe that it will likely be necessary to have a
military presence in Iraq for the foreseeable future. The presence does
not have to be large, and its role can be circumscribed carefully. As
for whether the Iraqi government will welcome such a presence, I
believe it will. Iran will continue to work against U.S. interests
across the region, including in Iraq. Iran's sponsorship of proxies
that may attack U.S. forces is a contingency for which U.S. forces
should prepare.
Question. Do you believe we should establish safe zones in Syria?
What are some of the benefits and challenges associated with
establishing safe zones in Syria? Where in Syria do you believe these
safe zones should be located? Who would defend and secure these safe
zones on the ground? Would you support the U.S.-led coalition
protecting these safe zones from the air?
Answer. Probably so. However, I would want a current briefing from
military leaders before suggesting the specific contours or location.
In general, I believe the U.S. could do more to protect innocent
civilians. I would support the U.S.-led coalition protecting these safe
zones.
Question. As areas in and around Mosul are liberated, how is the
Iraqi government doing managing the behavior of the Shia Popular
Mobilization Forces (PMF) to avoid the mistreatment of Sunni residents
that could make them susceptible to ISIS recruitment? When ISIS
controlled areas are liberated, how is the Iraqi government doing in
rapidly restoring government services and establishing inclusive
governance? Do you agree that the Iraqi government's ``Phase IV
operations'' in Sunni majority areas are essential to the durable
defeat of ISIS in Iraq? How can or should the State Department and
USAID support the Iraqi government's efforts to establish responsive
government services and inclusive governance for Sunni populations to
prevent the return of ISIS?
Answer. Yes, I share the view that the Iraqi government must do a
better job of including Sunnis in the governance of Iraq going forward.
As the Iraqi government ``holds'' the territory liberated from ISIS, it
is essential that the people in those liberated areas have faith in the
government agencies controlling the territory. This faith will be
undermined if Iraqi government officials allow Shia elements to
marginalize and persecute the Sunni. Working with the Iraqi government
on countering sectarianism is one of the most important roles that the
U.S. government can play in Iraq.
Question. What do you believe were the main weaknesses of the Obama
administration's approach to ISIS? What should the U.S. be doing in
Iraq and Syria that we are not?
Answer. As I have testified, I believe that the military campaign
against ISIS in Syria and Iraq should now be intensified. I also
believe, however, that the military campaign in Syria and Iraq is only
one dimension on of the problem. ISIS is a global threat. As such, we
must redouble our effort to work with allies and partners--including in
Europe--on issues such a intelligence sharing and data correlation so
that we can track travelers and penetrate plots. We also need to do a
better job countering ISIS's message, primarily by identifying and
leveraging Arab and Muslim voices in the region who can refute ISIS's
claims about the religious obligation of engaging in terrorism.
Question. As ISIS loses territory in Iraq and Syria, shouldn't we
expect it to transform into a more traditional terrorist insurgency in
both countries? What should the U.S. and our partners be doing now to
prepare for that predictable development?
Answer. The U.S. government should plan for a scenario in which
remnants of ISIS live on as an insurgency force for many years. Most
importantly, the U.S. should plan for and resource a long-term
presence--not necessarily military but probably State Department-led--
to help with governance and anti-insurgency activity.
Question. Is Iraqi Prime Minister Abadi in danger of losing his
position? Why? What would be the implications of that for U.S.
interests?
Answer. I do not believe I have the requisite information to
predict that Abadi is in position of losing his position.
Question. In order to durably defeat ISIS and to prevent the
emergence of other Sunni insurgent and terrorist groups, do you believe
it is important for Sunnis in Iraq and Syria to feel fully represented
in Baghdad and Damascus? Do you believe a failure to establish such
governance will ensure that ISIS and other Sunni insurgent groups will
continue to find a sympathetic population from which to recruit?
Answer. Yes.
Answer. Yes.
Question. What is your assessment of the post-coup crackdown there?
How would you assess current relations between the U.S. and Turkey?
What is your assessment of Turkey's evolving relationship with Russia?
Answer. (Assuming the first question refers to Turkey:) I think it
would be a mistake for Turkish leadership to go overboard in purging
the Turkish military. Turkey needs a strong and professional defense
force, and Erdogan should--in my view--focus more on addressing the
concerns that led to the coup attempt, rather than trying to ensure
that all of his opponents are imprisoned. The U.S. and Turkey have a
strong foundation upon which to build an enduring alliance. Turkey is a
NATO ally. In broad strokes, we share many of the same concerns in the
region, including regarding terrorism and threat posed by the Assad
regime. As for Turkey's relationship with Russia, I do not put much
stock in it. Turkey and Russia have strategic interests that collide.
Russia would like to prop up Assad, and Russia would like to peel
Turkey away from NATO. As such, the warming of Turkey-Russian relations
will have its limits. Turkey will soon see Russia's true intentions are
to undermine the West and maintain its proxy state in Syria.
Question. What is the status of Iraq's energy sector?
Answer. Iraq has resources that could help it become a leading
energy exporter--and, if managed properly, those funds could generate
economic development for Iraq. I strongly disagree with those who
suggest that the United States should have, or should in the future,
``take Iraq's oil.''
__________
Responses of the Honorable James Jeffrey to Questions
Submitted By Senator Edward J. Markey
Question. Over the past year, I have frequently expressed concern
that tactical successes against ISIS will not bring about its strategic
defeat unless:
1. Military operations are done in ways that not only avoid harming
civilian populations, but pro-actively protect them; and
2. Our ground-force partners and we plan for and aggressively
broker political arrangements among divergent groups in the areas where
we are fighting ISIS to protect the people, provide necessary services,
and restore and support legitimate local government.
Last month after Iraqi forces pushed ISIS out of East Mosul initial
reports showed children returning to school, but more recent reports
raise serious concerns. On Friday, Reuters reported that people in West
Mosul feel abandoned by the government, which they say is doing little
to provide assistance with immediate post-conflict relief and
stabilization, and is obstructing former local police officers who want
their old jobs back.
As we look toward West Mosul, the UN refugee agency predicts that
250,000 people could flee, on top of the 160,000 who have already fled
the fighting in East Mosul.
In my view the most crucial political question presented in the
battles against ISIS is what our partners and we plan for and do
before, during, and after battle to address humanitarian requirements,
resolve local political conflicts, and restore and support legitimate
local authorities.
What is your perspective on the adequacy of what the Iraqis and we
are doing to plan along these lines, and on the implementation of such
plans during and following offensive operations against ISIS?
Answer. This is a difficult question. Delaying military operations
to protect civilian populations and to ensure all elements are in
place, for initial relief of, and particularly for longer term
economic, security and political care for, liberated civilian
populations could well be a mistake. First, there is a military price
to pay for delay, as well as a political/diplomatic cost. A campaign
against ISIS is a serious endeavor that fully engages the U.S. and
other states, and necessarily distracts Washington and its famously
limited `bandwidth,' as well as diverts concrete military and
diplomatic resources, from potentially equally important issues (Iran,
North Korea, China, Russia) which don't involve immediate life and
death decisions. There is thus a benefit beyond ISIS to finishing this
phase of the struggle with it quickly.
Second, while the above holds in most circumstances, it is
particularly salient when a population is under the sway of ISIS.
Having been on the scene and dealing with civilians traumatized by its
predecessor, al Qaeda in Iraq, repeatedly, I believe the messiest
liberation, assuming mass casualties are avoided, is better for the
civilian population (totally apart, as noted above, from the other
advantages of defeating ISIS) than leaving it in the horrific hands of
ISIS. The reports I have read of the treatment of the population in
West Mosul under siege documents this, and the cruelty of ISIS as long
as the siege continues is compounded by the lack of foodstuffs and
medicine.
Third, Iraq (or other states in the Middle East, with the exception
of Turkey and Israel) usually never get really good at dealing with
liberated populations. We have seen many foul-ups and inadequate relief
in other liberated areas. But in each case the Iraqi government effort,
assisted as it should be by the U.S., other governments, and NGO's, has
turned out to be `good enough' to keep people sufficiently nourished,
housed, and secured to allow a gradual return to their homes.
Again, such actions are terribly inadequate in some cases, usually
riddled with incompetence and inefficiency, and occasionally by
deliberate retaliation, but that unhappy set of circumstances must be
considered not in isolation but in comparison to (1) the realistic
standard of `best' under such conditions (even when the U.S. military
was leading relief and rehabilitation, e.g., after the battles for
Najaf and Fallujah in 2004, `best' was not much better than what the
Iraqis have been doing); and (2) the costs, first to the civilian
population, and then to the broader military campaign and diplomatic
goals, of allowing such considerations to delay defeating an enemy like
ISIS and leaving hundreds of thousands of quasi-hostages in their
brutal hands during a siege.
Question. In his memorandum directing Secretary Mattis to develop a
new plan to defeat ISIS President Trump required him to recommend,
``changes to any United States rules of engagement and other United
States policy restrictions that exceed the requirements of
international law regarding the use of force against ISIS.''
Presumably, the President is thinking of reducing the weight that
commanders give to the risk of civilian casualties. This is of
particular concern in a place like West Mosul, which is very densely
populated.
I am very concerned that we not step onto a slippery slope toward
the type of military operations that were all too common in the
twentieth century, that Syrian and Russian forces displayed a few weeks
ago in Aleppo, and that President Putin used in Grozny during Russia's
brutal campaign in Chechnya seventeen years ago.
What is your perspective on the risks inherent in President Trump's
requirement that Secretary Mattis recommend changing the rules of
engagement in Iraq and Syria? How would the people who we seek to
liberate from ISIS perceive such changes, considering that they are the
same people most likely to be hurt if our commanders give less weight
to the risk of civilian casualties when making targeting decisions?
Answer. Military effectiveness, political results (to which
military efforts must be ultimately subordinate), and treatment of
civilians on battlefields are all in dynamic tension. Discussions with
senior U.S. military and Iraqi officials involved in the campaign
against ISIS indicate that the Obama administration rules of engagement
(ROE) may have been so tight as to have impacted adversely operations.
The ISIS seizure of Ramadi in 2015 has been cited in this regard. To
some degree ROE has been loosened over the past 14 months, thus
President Trump might have been focused on earlier ROE.
Nevertheless, there is still some indication that ROE are too
tight. Given the dynamic tensions related to this question, it is
important to first lay out the range of considerations.
Since World War II the United States has not engaged in the
deliberate targeting of civilian populations that you cited in regard
to Russian bombing of Aleppo. Those acts are violations of the Geneva
Conventions and seen as such by the U.S. military. I am confident we
can rule out any Department of Defense recommendation to use anything
like those tactics. On the other hand, even the most meticulous
attention to avoiding civilian casualties--and the ROE of the Obama
administration ROE against ISIS, against terrorist targets regionally,
and in Afghanistan, come as close to `meticulous attention' as I am
aware of related to a force seriously conducting combat--by that
administration's own admission, have led to the deaths of hundreds of
civilians.
The absolute standard of no strike unless one is sure of no
civilian casualties (essentially the standard used by the Bush
administration in drone strikes against terrorists), is not possible in
`normal' rapid combat. (i.e., in drone strikes an abort, usually not
noted by the target, does not mean the strike cannot be done later. But
under normal combat conditions protecting ones own or allied forces,
destroying enemy personnel, and seizing ground, all require rapid
action.)
A concern about the Obama ROE was the levels of command and
clearance that were required before a strike could be approved. This
delayed strikes, at times with tactically significant costs. Easing of
those preconditions, while still maintaining policies to avoid civilian
casualties by restricting the type of ordnance, use of warnings before
strikes, and prioritizing intelligence collection to the status of
civilians near strikes, all make sense.
The issue of political impact of civilian casualties at any level
is also complicated. Tens of thousands of French civilians were killed
by U.S. bombing during the campaign to liberate France, yet the French
population was extremely welcoming of American forces. Again, the
dynamic of final ends and relative costs are in play between results of
military action as seen by a population and civilian casualties, just
as between military results and `day after' readiness to care for
civilians liberated as discussed above. U.S. strikes in 2015 and 2016
in Kunduz, Afghanistan led to significant civilian casualties, and an
investigation of a strike on a hospital, but little outcry from the
population or from the Afghan Government. Whereas typically strikes in
the Afghan countryside especially in Pashtun areas led to strong local
and governmental reactions.
In the case of ISIS many civilians in Mosul might opt for a limited
increased risk of casualties (they have been very low in this campaign
compared to the numbers of civilians near the fighting) in return for
more rapid liberation from ISIS, similar to the population of Kunduz.
Question. In his prepared testimony, Mr. Bash stated that, ``We
must keep our focus on the travel of foreign fighters, and work 24/7
with our European allies and partners to track potential extremists,
penetrate the plots, and stop them.''
Secretary of Defense Mattis, in testimony at his confirmation
hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, stated that Russian
President Vladimir Putin is ``out to break NATO.'' It is also clear
that President Putin is working to undermine the European Union through
intelligence-led influence campaigns to help extreme nationalist, anti-
EU parties in European elections, much as he did in our election last
year.
Meanwhile, President Trump has called NATO obsolete and expressed
sympathy for the idea of EU disintegration.
It seems to me that while it is very important for European allies
to cooperate with us, it is critically important for them to cooperate
closely with each other, particularly with respect to their security
and justice systems.
How do you rate the risk that President Putin's attacks on European
integration will undermine cooperation against ISIS? How does President
Trump's anti-NATO and anti-EU rhetoric affect that risk? If NATO or the
EU disintegrate, will that make it easier or more difficult for ISIS to
plan and carry out attacks in Europe or the United States without being
detected and apprehended beforehand?
Answer. Our role--all in all extraordinarily positive--in the world
since 1940 has been placed at risk by President Putin's effort to
replace the rule-of-law global order based international system with a
return to rapacious 19th century great power competition, which
produced World Wars I and II.
If President Trump does not recognize that then his foreign policy
efforts, and surely his goal to `make America great,' will fail. This
does not preclude deals or cooperation with Moscow, but does require
that we recognize our benefits from and interest in this international
order and under no circumstances accept a weakening of it in return for
tactical Russian concessions or facilitation on specific issues.
Key to that order is our system of alliances and international
organizations. NATO and the EU are at the center of them. They provide
the operational levers for the Europeans--with a population more than
50% greater than ours, and a GDP equal to ours, to mobilize themselves
in support of our efforts around the world, be it joint action in
Afghanistan or against ISIS, earlier in the Balkans, or against Russian
aggression in the Ukraine or earlier in Georgia. Putin realizes this,
and also recognizes that Europe is in certain respects the most
vulnerable of his ``enemies,'' so he is putting much effort into
undermining European institutions.
Even rhetoric on the part of the U.S. against the EU or NATO (and
so far we have not seen or heard of concrete actions taken or pending)
demoralizes those who believe in these institutions, and undercuts
faith in the U.S. as a reliable, predictable partner. Obviously actions
taken and not taken by the EU and by our NATO European partners can
weaken ties with the U.S., and more persuasion or even pressure on them
could be an effective strategy. But given the emotional, psychological
and historical factors at play, U.S. questioning of its own, or EU or
NATO state commitments to the ``Atlantic Community'' beyond a certain
point will undercut the ability of European states through NATO and the
EU to cooperate with the U.S.
Specifically, NATO and the EU provide mechanisms for common action
against terrorists, including ISIS. Of particular concern is European
military commitment in the anti-ISIS coalition, which at present is
considerable, and intelligence sharing, which is essential for
protection of both North America and NATO Europe.
__________
Letter to Hon. Rex Tillerson from Senator Todd Young
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