    [Senate Hearing 115-448, Part 1]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                   S. Hrg. 115-448, Pt. 1

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2018 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                         ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                       ON

                                    S. 1519

         TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2018 FOR MILITARY
    ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
       FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
       MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER
                                    PURPOSES

                                   ----------

                                     PART 1

                  U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND AND U.S. AFRICA COMMAND

                             U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND

                             U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND

                U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND AND U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND

                   U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND AND U.S. FORCES KOREA

                          U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

                        U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

                               U.S. CYBER COMMAND

                                  ARMY POSTURE

                               AIR FORCE POSTURE

                      DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET POSTURE

                                  NAVY POSTURE

                                   ----------

        MARCH 9, 23; APRIL 4, 6, 27; MAY 2, 4, 9, 25; JUNE 13, 15, 2017

                [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

                                                     S. Hrg. 115-448, Pt. 1

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2018 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                         ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                       ON

                                    S. 1519

          TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2018 FOR MILITARY
        ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION,
        AND FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
        MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER
                                    PURPOSES

                                   __________

                                     PART 1

                  U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND AND U.S. AFRICA COMMAND

                             U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND

                             U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND

                U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND AND U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND

                   U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND AND U.S. FORCES KOREA

                          U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

                        U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

                               U.S. CYBER COMMAND

                                  ARMY POSTURE

                               AIR FORCE POSTURE

                      DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET POSTURE

                                  NAVY POSTURE

                                   __________

        MARCH 9, 23; APRIL 4, 6, 27; MAY 2, 4, 9, 25; JUNE 13, 15, 2017

                                   __________

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

                  [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                     Available via http://www.govinfo.gov/

                                   __________

                          U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

    39-567 PDF                   WASHINGTON : 2020

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

    JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Chairman		 JACK REED, Rhode Island
    JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma		 BILL NELSON, Florida
    ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi		 CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
    DEB FISCHER, Nebraska			 JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
    TOM COTTON, Arkansas			 KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
    MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota		 RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
    JONI ERNST, Iowa			 JOE DONNELLY, Indiana
    THOM TILLIS, North Carolina		 MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
    DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska			 TIM KAINE, Virginia
    DAVID PERDUE, Georgia			 ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine
    TED CRUZ, Texas				 MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
    LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina		 ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
    BEN SASSE, Nebraska			 GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
    LUTHER STRANGE, Alabama

                    Christian D. Brose, Staff Director
                    Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director

                                      (ii)

                                C O N T E N T S

                                 March 9, 2017

                                                                       Page

    United States Central Command and United States Africa Command...     1

    Votel, General Joseph L., USA, Commander, U.S. Central Command...     5
    Waldhauser, General Thomas D., USMC, Commander, U.S. Africa          29
      Command.

    Questions for the Record.........................................    74

                                 March 23, 2017

    United States European Command...................................    87

    Scaparrotti, General Curtis M. USA, Commander, U.S. European         91
      Command/Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.

    Questions for the Record.........................................   133

                                 April 4, 2017

    United States Strategic Command Programs.........................   141

    Hyten, General John E., USAF, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command..   144

    Questions for the Record.........................................   188

                                 April 6, 2017

    United States Southern Command and United States Northern Command   193

    Robinson, General Lori J., USAF, Commander, U.S. Northern Command   196
      and Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command.
    Tidd, Admiral Kurt W., USN, Commander, U.S. Southern Command.....   205

    Questions for the Record.........................................   249

                                 April 27, 2017

    United States Pacific Command and United States Forces Korea.....   261

    Harris, Admiral Harry B., JR., USN, Commander, U.S. Pacific         264
      Command.

    Questions for the Record.........................................   321

                                  May 2, 2017

    United States Transportation Command.............................   341

    McDew, General Darren W., USAF, Commander, U.S. Transportation      343
      Command.

    Questions for the Record.........................................   376

                                     (iii)

                                  May 4, 2017

    United States Special Operations Command.........................   395

    Whelan, Theresa M., Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for       398
      Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict.
    Thomas, General Raymond A., III, USA, Commander, U.S. Special       403
      Operations Command.

    Questions for the Record.........................................   445

                                  May 9, 2017

    United States Cyber Command......................................   457

    Rogers, Admiral Michael S., USN, Commander, U.S. Cyber Command;     460
      Director, National Security Agency; Chief, Central Security
      Services.

    Questions for the Record.........................................   517

                                  May 25, 2017

    The Posture of the Department of the Army........................   521

    Speer, Honorable Robert M., Acting Secretary of the Army.........   524
    Milley, General Mark A., USA, Chief of Staff of the Army.........   526

    Questions for the Record.........................................   562

                                  June 6, 2017

    The Posture of the Department of the Air Force...................   573

    Wilson, Honorable Heather A., Secretary of the Air Force.........   576
    Goldfein, General David L., Chief of Staff of the Air Force......   578

    Questions for the Record.........................................   628

                                 June 13, 2017

    The Department of Defense Budget Posture.........................   649

    Mattis, Honorable James N., Secretary of Defense, Accompanied by    653
      David L. Norquist, Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller,
      Chief Financial Officer, U.S. Department of Defense.
    Dunford, General Joseph F., Jr., U.S. Marine Corps, Chairman of     662
      the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

    Questions for the Record.........................................   712

                                 June 15, 2017

    Navy Posture.....................................................   723

    Stackley, Honorable Sean J., Acting Secretary of the Navy........   727
    Richardson, Admiral John M., USN, Chief of Naval Operations......   743
    Neller, General Robert B., USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps..   747

    Questions for the Record.........................................   790

    Appendix A.......................................................   804

                                      (iv)

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2018 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, MARCH 9, 2017

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

         UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND AND UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:29 a.m. in Room
    SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain
    (chairman of the committee) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Wicker,
    Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Perdue,
    Graham, Sasse, Strange, Reed, Nelson, McCaskill, Shaheen,
    Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King,
    Heinrich, Warren, and Peters.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman McCain. Good morning.
        The Senate Armed Services Committee meets this morning to
    receive testimony on the posture of U.S. Central Command and
    Africa Command.
        We are pleased to welcome our witnesses: General Votel and
    General Waldhauser. We thank each of you for your decades of
    distinguished service and for your leadership of our men and
    women in uniform.
        More than a decade and a half since the September 11th
    terrorist attacks, our Nation is still at war with terrorists
    that seek to attack our Homeland, our interests, our allies,
    and our partners. In this fight, our military servicemembers
    are doing everything we ask of them from North Africa to the
    Middle East to South Asia. Thanks to their tremendous talent
    and dedication, we have made important tactical and operational
    progress.
        Our military has gradually eroded ISIS's [Islamic State of
    Iraq and Syria] territorial control and removed key personnel
    from the battlefield. ISIS has been expelled from its Libyan
    stronghold in Sirte, and I am confident that soon the same will
    be true in Mosul and Raqqa. Our military has kept up the
    pressure on terrorists operating in countries like Yemen and
    Somalia. In Afghanistan, we have kept al Qaeda on the run and
    helped our Afghan hold the line against renewed Taliban
    assaults.
        But much to the frustration of the American people, this
    hard-won tactical progress has not led to enduring strategic
    gains. In fact, the sad reality is America's strategic position
    in the Middle East is weaker today than it was 8 years ago. The
    positions of Vladimir Putin's Russia and the Iranian regime and
    its terrorist proxies have improved. This is not a military
    failure. Instead, it is a failure of strategy, a failure of
    policy, and most of all, a failure of leadership.
        The fact is for at last the last 8 years, we have tried to
    isolate the fight against terrorism from its geopolitical
    context. Or as General Mattis put it 2 years ago, we have been
    living in a ``strategy-free environment'' for quite some time.
    The result is that we have failed to address and, at times,
    exacerbated the underlying conflict, the struggles for power
    and sectarian identity now raging across the Middle East. We
    have been unable or unwilling to either ask or answer basic
    questions about American policy in the region. We have been
    reluctant to act, and when compelled to do so, we have pursued
    only the most limited and incremental actions.
        We are fighting ISIS in Syria but ignoring the Syrian civil
    war that was its genesis and fuels it to this day. We are
    fighting ISIS in Iraq but failing to address the growing
    influence of Iran. We are fighting al Qaeda in Afghanistan but
    pretending the Taliban is no longer our problem. We are
    fighting al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen but
    refraining from confronting the threat posed by Iran's Houthi
    proxies. In short, we are treating the symptoms and ignoring
    the disease, and we should not be surprised at the results: a
    Middle East aflame, America's influence squandered, America's
    adversaries emboldened, America's friends disheartened, and
    America's policy options narrowed and worsened.
        This is the unfortunate inheritance of the new
    administration. Yet as difficult and complex as our challenges
    are in the Middle East, we have an opportunity to chart a new
    and different course. Seizing this opportunity will require
    more than just a plan for the accelerated defeat of ISIS. We
    have to raise our sights, look beyond the tactical and
    operational fight, and start answering some basic but difficult
    strategic questions. What enduring objectives do we hope to
    achieve across the Middle East? How will we achieve those
    goals, and on what timeline, and at what cost?
        In Iraq, Mosul will be retaken eventually, but that will
    only likely reignite the battle for the future of Iraq, a
    battle in which we have an important stake. What is America's
    policy and strategy to deal with the problems that lie ahead:
    combating the malign influence of Iran and its militias,
    addressing the future of the Kurds and their place in Iraq, and
    attenuating the disenfranchisement of Sunni Iraqis that gave
    rise to ISIS in the first place?
        Likewise in Syria, I believe Raqqa will eventually be
    liberated. But the closer we come to that day, the more it
    becomes clear that we cannot avoid difficult questions about
    Syria any longer. What is America's policy and strategy
    concerning a political transition in Syria, the future of Assad
    and his regime, the fate of the Kurds in Syria, and the
    influence of extremist forces from Sunni terrorists to Iranian-
    backed militias? In short, what is America's vision of an end-
    state in Syria?
        In Libya, the ISIS stronghold in Sirte has been degraded.
    But what remains is a divided nation littered with independent
    militias, flooded with arms, and searching in vain for
    legitimate governance and political unity. What is America's
    policy and strategy for addressing these conditions, which
    unless confronted will make Libya fertile ground for extremism
    and anti-Western terrorism?
        In Afghanistan, we have settled for a strategy of ``don't
    lose.'' The result is that last month, General Nicholson
    testified before this committee that this war is now in a
    stalemate after 15 years of fighting. After 15 years of
    fighting, we are in a stalemate. What is America's policy and
    strategy for rolling back a resurgent Taliban, for addressing
    the terrorist sanctuaries within Pakistan's borders, and
    pushing back against Iranian and Russian meddling? In short,
    what does victory look like in Afghanistan, and what is our
    strategy for achieving it?
        Across the region, Russian and Iranian influence is growing
    at America's expense. Russia and Iran even hosted Syrian peace
    talks in Moscow last year without America present at the table.
        Russia's cruise missiles crisscross the region while its
    aircraft indiscriminately target Syrian civilians. Iran's
    proxies wield lethal rockets and ballistic missiles with
    impunity, sensing that the nuclear deal shields them from
    American pressure. What is America's policy and strategy to
    counter Russian and Iranian malign influence that often
    manifests itself below the threshold of open conflict? How do
    we restore the trust of our regional allies and partners and
    convince them to forego hedging strategies that only add to
    uncertainty and instability?
        These are the major policy and strategy questions hanging
    in the balance. The stakes are high, not just for the stability
    of the Middle East and Africa, but for America's national
    security. It is not the job of our witnesses to provide answers
    to these questions. That is the job of the President, his
    administration, and the Congress. We owe our witnesses and the
    men and women they lead unambiguous national security
    priorities, clarity in our strategic thinking, and an
    unwavering commitment to provide them the resources required to
    support the necessary courses of action.
        Once again, I want to thank our witnesses for appearing
    before the committee today and look forward to hearing how the
    military efforts will help us achieve favorable strategic
    outcomes.
        Senator Reed?

                     STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Senator Reed. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
    to our witnesses not only for your appearing here today but for
    your extraordinary service to the Nation over many, many years.
    Also please relay our thanks to the men and women that you
    lead, and we appreciate their efforts extraordinarily so.
        You are in a situation of very challenging times in all of
    the areas of operation. This hearing is especially timely,
    given unfolding events on the ground in Iraq and Syria and the
    reported completion of a proposed strategy to accelerate
    efforts against ISIS. Our assistance to partners on the ground
    is helping them to make steady progress in reclaiming areas of
    Iraq and Syria once held by ISIS, most notably in Mosul.
        However, the situation in Syria seems to get more
    complicated by the day as different actors on the ground pursue
    divergent goals. Russia's continued support for the Assad
    regime fuels the country's civil war, enables the abuse and
    killing of the Syrian population, and allows ISIS to exploit
    the resulting instability for its own gains. Chairman of the
    Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dunford met with his Russian and
    Turkish counterparts just this week to discuss deconflicting
    operations in Syria, a battlespace that has become increasingly
    complicated as United States, Turkish, Russian, Iranian, Assad
    regime, and local partner forces converge in northern Syria.
    General Votel, we look forward to your update on these
    particular issues.
        According to public reports, the Defense Department has
    presented the White House with a draft strategy to accelerate
    progress against ISIS. While details of the strategy have not
    been publicly released, reports indicate that it retains many
    of the core elements of the strategy put in place under the
    Obama administration. General Dunford has described the
    strategy as a ``political-military plan'' and a ``whole-of-
    government approach'' requiring important contributions from
    other non-DOD departments and agencies, most notably the State
    Department.
        This is why it is so concerning to me that the Trump
    administration's budget would apparently cut the State
    Department by a reported 37 percent at the very time that we
    need a surge of diplomatic and other assistance efforts to
    achieve the political conditions necessary to ultimately
    prevail in our fight against ISIS. As then General and now
    Secretary of Defense Mattis warned this committee, ``if you
    don't fund the State Department fully, then I need to buy more
    ammunition.'' We just cannot keep buying bullets as the Trump
    administration is proposing.
        General Waldhauser, the importance of a robust interagency
    is perhaps of even greater importance in your area of
    responsibility, where you are primarily working by, with, and
    through partner military forces in conjunction with United
    States interagency efforts. General, as you share your
    assessment of current and future AFRICOM [United States Africa
    Command] efforts in places like Libya and Somalia, I look
    forward to hearing the ways you are incorporating a whole-of-
    government approach into your planning. Such incorporation is
    particularly important in places like these where conflict
    resolution will ultimately rely less on the military toolkit
    and more on generating the proper political conditions to
    sustain and build upon security gains.
        Turning back the CENTCOM [United States Central Command]
    AOR [Area of Responsibility], over the last few years, there
    has been a persistent focus on Iran's nuclear program and
    appropriately so. We passed the 1-year anniversary of the
    implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or
    JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action], in January, and
    Iran appears to be living up to its commitments under this
    agreement. However, the JCPOA only addresses one facet of the
    challenge posed by Iran. Its destabilizing activities in the
    region, ballistic missile development efforts, and
    unprofessional and dangerous behavior in the maritime
    environment continue.
        Sanctions related to Iran's nuclear program were successful
    because of the extraordinary unity within the international
    community. We must approach the remaining challenges in a
    similar way if we are to be successful in changing Iran's
    behavior. Any new sanctions must be carefully applied in
    concert with our international partners so that we do not give
    Iran a pretext to withdraw from the JCPOA and risk reversing
    the progress that has been made on limiting their nuclear
    ambitions.
        Last month, as the chairman indicated, General Mick
    Nicholson, Commander of Resolute Support and United States
    Forces-Afghanistan, testified that despite significant security
    gains and political efforts, Afghanistan is currently facing a
    stalemate. Further complicating the security landscape are the
    range of external actors, including Iran, Russia, and Pakistan,
    who seem intent upon interfering with the stability in
    Afghanistan. It was General Nicholson's assessments that
    increased troop levels for the NATO [North Atlantic Treaty
    Organization] train, advise, and assist mission, as well as the
    continued growth in the size and capability of the Afghan Air
    Force, would be necessary to break the stalemate.
        General Votel, the committee would benefit from hearing
    your assessment of the current situation in Afghanistan and
    what can be done to protect the hard-won progress that has been
    achieved and ensure that further progress is made.
        Again, thank you both for your continued service to the
    Nation, and I look forward to your testimony.
        Chairman McCain. I welcome the witnesses. Your written
    statements will be made part of the record. We will begin with
    you, General Votel. Welcome and thanks for the service that you
    both render to our Nation.

      STATEMENT OF GENERAL JOSEPH L. VOTEL, USA, COMMANDER, U.S.
                            CENTRAL COMMAND

        General Votel. Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed,
    distinguished members of the committee, good morning, and thank
    you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss the current
    posture and state of readiness of the United States Central
    Command.
        I am very pleased to appear today with my good friend and
    highly respected brother in arms, General Tom Waldhauser.
        I come before you today on behalf of the outstanding men
    and women of the command, military, civilians, and contractors,
    along with our coalition partners representing nearly 60
    nations. Our people are the very best in the world at what they
    do, and I could not be more proud of them and their families.
    Without question, they are the strength of our Central Command
    team.
        I have been in command of CENTCOM for about a year now. It
    has been an incredibly busy and productive period. Over the
    past 12 months, we have dealt with a number of significant
    challenges in Iraq and Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen,
    Egypt in the Sinai, the Bab al Mandeb Strait, and elsewhere
    throughout our area of responsibility. We are making progress
    in many areas, but as you know, there is much work that
    remains.
        We are also dealing with a range of malign activities
    perpetrated by Iran and its proxies operating in the region. It
    is my view that Iran poses the greatest long-term threat to
    stability for this part of the world.
        Generally speaking, the central region remains a highly
    complex area, widely characterized by pervasive instability and
    conflict. The fragile security environments, which reflect a
    variety of contributing factors, including heightened ethno-
    sectarian tensions, economic uncertainty, weak or corrupt
    governance, civil wars, and humanitarian crises are exploited
    by violent extremist organizations and terrorist groups such as
    al Qaeda and ISIS. These groups have clearly indicated their
    desire and intent to attack the U.S. Homeland, our interests
    abroad, and the interests of our partners and allies.
        At the same time, the central region is increasingly
    crowded with external nation states such as Russia and China,
    and they are pursuing their own interests and attempting to
    shift alliances.
        The point that I would emphasize to you is this, that while
    there may be other more strategic or consequential threats in
    regions in the world today, the central region has come to
    represent the nexus for many of the security challenges our
    Nation faces. Most importantly, the threats in region continue
    to pose the most direct threat to the U.S. Homeland and the
    global economy. Thus, it must remain a priority and be
    resourced and supported accordingly.
        The team at U.S. Central Command remains appropriately
    focused on doing what is necessary to protect our national
    interests and those of our partners. Our strategic approach is
    straightforward: prepare, pursue, and prevail. I will explain
    what I mean by that.
        We prepare the environment to ensure an effective posture.
    We actively pursue opportunities to strengthen relationships
    and support our interests, and when we do put our forces into
    action, we prevail in our assigned missions.
        I would also point out to you that today to the credit and
    professionalism of our armed forces and coalition partners, we
    are executing campaigns in the central region with
    significantly fewer U.S. Forces on the ground than in previous
    years. As you have seen clearly demonstrated in Iraq and Syria,
    Afghanistan, Yemen, and elsewhere throughout our area of
    responsibility, we have adopted a by, with, and through
    approach that places a heavy reliance on indigenous forces.
    While this approach does present some challenges and can be
    more time-consuming, it is proving effective and is likely to
    pay significant dividends going forward. Indigenous force
    partners continue to build needed capability and capacity and
    they are personally invested in the conduct of operations and
    thus inclined to do what is necessary to preserve the gains
    they have achieved going forward.
        We also have a vested interest in ensuring increased
    stability and security in this strategically important central
    region. To this end, I will close by highlighting three areas
    where I do believe, if we apply the appropriate amount of
    energy and effort, we can and will have a lasting impact in
    this part of the world.
        First, we must restore trust with our partners in the
    region while at the same time maintaining the strong trust of
    our leadership here in Washington. The fact is we cannot surge
    trust in times of crisis, and we must do what is necessary now
    to assure our partners of our commitment and our staying power.
        Second, we must link our military objectives and campaigns
    as closely as possible to our policy objectives and our other
    instruments of national power. In other words, we must rely on
    our military objectives and our soft power capability with
    desired national and regional strategic end states, recognizing
    that if we do not do this, we risk creating space for our
    adversaries to achieve their strategic aims.
        Finally, we must make sure that we are postured for purpose
    in the region. We must have credible, ready, and present force,
    coupled with foreign military sales and foreign military
    financing programs that serve to build and shape partner
    nations' capability in a timely and effective fashion.
        Ours is a challenging and important mission. Much is at
    stake today in the central region. We recognize this fact, and
    I assure you that the CENTCOM team stands ready and willing to
    do what is necessary to protect our national interests and the
    interests of our allies and partners.
        Let me close by thanking the committee for the strong
    support that you continue to provide to the world-class team at
    United States Central Command and particularly to our forces
    located forward in the region. As I said at the outset, the
    80,000-plus soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coast
    guardsmen, and civilians that make up the command are truly the
    very best in the world at what they do, and I could not be more
    proud of them and their families. I know that you are proud of
    them as well.
        Thank you again, and I look forward to answering your
    questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Votel follows:]

                 Prepared Statement by General Joseph L. Votel
                                 introduction.
        The outstanding men and women who make up the U.S. Central Command
    (USCENTCOM) Team are the very best in the world at what they do. The
    incredibly dynamic, volatile and tumultuous Central Region presents a
    complex convergence of compounding multi-faceted security challenges.
    Such an environment generates near continuous crisis action planning
    and response. These conditions demand a highly capable, vigilant
    capability at USCENTCOM Headquarters and our Service Component
    Headquarters, as well as forward throughout our area of responsibility
    (AOR). The exceptional individuals on the USCENTCOM Team expertly
    navigate this challenging environment. In doing so, they effectively
    protect and promote our Nation's interests and they represent our
    values wherever they go around the world. They work selflessly each day
    in support of our mission and the exceptional men and women serving in
    harm's way around the globe. We could not be more proud of them and
    proud of their families. They truly are the strength of our USCENTCOM
    Team.
        The Central Region is a fascinating area of the world. Spanning
    over 4 million square miles it is populated by 550+ million people from
    more than 20 ethnic groups representing multiple religions and speaking
    eighteen languages with hundreds of dialects. The region lies at the
    intersection of three continents and important commercial sea lanes,
    flight corridors, pipelines, and overland routes run across it
    supporting regional and global economic networks.
        It is also a highly-complex area, widely characterized by pervasive
    instability and conflict. The 20 nations that make up the Central
    Region have various forms of government, ranging from absolute and
    constitutional monarchies to theocratic, parliamentary, and
    presidential republics. The economic and social-political landscape is
    diverse, volatile at times, and rivalries often create tensions that
    affect security and stability. Violent extremist organizations (VEOs),
    such as the terrorist organizations al Qaeda and the Islamic State of
    Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), exploit these conditions to foment unrest,
    challenge or destabilize governments, and threaten the global economy
    and U.S. national interests.
        The turbulence across the region reflects a number of contributing
    factors or ``drivers of instability,'' including ethnic and sectarian
    hostilities between Shiite and Sunnis, and Arabs and Persians; economic
    uncertainty and sustained low oil prices that severely strain energy-
    based economies across the region, contributing to reduced government
    services and weakened prospects for economic growth; a
    disproportionately large youth population facing increasing poverty and
    unemployment, which may make them susceptible to unrest, radical
    ideologies, and VEO recruitment; expanding ungoverned or under-governed
    spaces, exploited by VEOs; civil wars, which are ``engines of
    instability'' all by themselves; worsening humanitarian crises,
    contributing to growing refugee and internally displaced person (IDP)
    populations; and, competition among outside actors, including Russia
    and China, seeking to promote their interests and supplant U.S.
    influence in the region. While we must take the necessary actions to
    counter immediate threats, such as ISIS in Iraq and Syria, we also need
    to find ways to address these and other root causes of instability if
    we hope to achieve lasting positive effects in that part of the world.
    This cannot be accomplished solely through military means. The military
    can help to create the necessary conditions; however, there must be
    concomitant progress in other complementary areas (e.g.,
    reconstruction, humanitarian aid, stabilization, political
    reconciliation). There are a variety of interagency programs and
    efforts underway that are essential to translating military gains into
    actual achievement of stated goals and objectives. Support for these
    endeavors is vital to our success.
        The current evolving security environment in the Central Region is
    further complicated by the fact that most challenges transcend borders;
    they are trans-regional (cutting across multiple combatant commands
    (CCMD)), all-domain (land, sea, air, space, cyberspace), and multi-
    functional (e.g., conventional, special operations, ballistic missile
    defense, cyber). Of note, the Middle East remains the global epicenter
    for terrorism and violent Islamist extremism. According to the
    Institute for Economics and Peace's 2016 Global Terrorism Index, the
    U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) AOR accounted for 78 percent of all
    terrorism incidents worldwide, and the turmoil stretches across CCMD
    seams into Africa, Europe, South Asia, and beyond.
        The security environment is further challenged by the emergence of
    a ``virtual caliphate'' and increased access and activity in the cyber
    domain. Ready access to the Internet, social media, and other messaging
    platforms has enabled a new generation of extremists to spread their
    radical Islamist views, incite widespread violence, and recruit new
    followers to their cause. As we have seen with the ongoing campaign to
    defeat ISIS, diminishment of the physical organization does not equate
    to the dismantlement of their virtual presence. To the contrary,
    terrorist organizations' activities in cyberspace enable them to remain
    relevant despite setbacks on the battlefield, while reaching out to
    direct, enable, and/or inspire audiences well beyond the region's
    geographic borders. Countering the ``virtual caliphate'' will require a
    concerted ``whole-of-government'' effort led by the people of the
    region. We can support our partners' activities, but their voices and
    influence will be required to achieve enduring positive results.
        We also acknowledge, particularly in the current resource-
    constrained environment, the need to find additional means for
    countering existing and emerging threats and deterring potential
    adversaries. No other country in the world has a military with a
    greater ability than the U.S. to achieve kinetic and non-kinetic
    effects and sustain those effects. Through the application of ``hard''
    and ``soft'' power capabilities, including kinetic strikes, raids, and
    information operations, we have been very effective at degrading and
    disrupting violent extremist networks in the USCENTCOM AOR and
    elsewhere around the world. It is an important and a necessary
    competency. However, a solely military response is not sufficient. We
    must continue to look for ways to further enhance our effectiveness
    through the application of military and non-military activities.
    Ultimately, we want to increasingly involve other elements of the U.S.
    Government and the International Community, recognizing that it is only
    through a combination of capabilities that we will achieve and sustain
    our strongest deterrence posture.
        This is especially true today given the changing character of
    warfare. For much of the past 15+ years our Nation has increasingly
    operated in the ``gray zone'' of military confrontation--that range of
    activities short of conventional conflict; a dangerous space in which
    miscalculation can easily occur, leading to escalatory conflict and
    misunderstanding. In the ``gray zone,'' adversaries employ
    unconventional methods that include cyber warfare, propaganda, and
    support to proxy elements in an effort to achieve their objectives
    while minimizing the scope and scale of actual fighting. At the same
    time, these unconventional methods increase tensions between partners
    by emphasizing competing priorities that detract from support for our
    common objectives (e.g., Turks and Syrian Kurds). To be successful in
    this ambiguous environment, we must find alternate ways to compete
    against our adversaries in the ``gray zone'' short of conflict, while
    collaborating with our partners to achieve our desired end-states.
        We must--and will--continue to pursue the many opportunities that
    exist today throughout the Central Region, recognizing that by pursuing
    these opportunities we will achieve improved stability and security in
    that challenged part of the world. As Sir Winston Churchill wisely
    stated, ``Difficulties mastered are opportunities won.'' The key to
    success is ensuring that we remain ready and capable of effectively
    countering all threats. We need to make sure that we have an accurate
    understanding of the situation. We must take care to build and
    cultivate strong relationships, here at home and abroad. We need to be
    responsive to our partners and always listen and strive to understand
    their points of view and priorities. We also need to be properly
    postured with the necessary capabilities, resources, and appropriate
    authorities to protect and promote U.S. and partner nations' interests.
        In recent years, we have been encouraged to see many of our
    regional partners take a more active role in providing for the security
    of their sovereign spaces. Ultimately, we want to empower our partners
    and allies by helping them build additional capability and capacity
    while strengthening relationships and improving cooperation and
    interoperability among nations. This is--and will remain--a top
    priority for the USCENTCOM Team at our headquarters in Tampa, Florida,
    as well as among our Component Commands, combined/joint task forces,
    and forward in the region.
        U.S. Central Command's Mission. ``USCENTCOM directs and enables
    military operations and activities with allies and partners to increase
    regional security and stability in support of enduring U.S.
    interests.''
        Our Strategic Approach. Our strategic approach is focused on
    protecting our national interests and those of our partners. It is
    designed to reflect our values, align our behaviors, and support the
    National Military Strategy. It is proactive in nature and endeavors to
    set in motion tangible actions in a purposeful, consistent, and
    continuous manner. Each aspect of our approach--Prepare--Pursue--
    Prevail--enables the next and collectively contributes to the
    successful achievement of our goals, objectives, and overall mission.
        Prepare the Environment--The volatile nature of the Central Region
    requires that we be well-postured to protect our enduring national
    interests. ``Well-postured'' means that we are ready to execute
    military tasks; physically and virtually present in the AOR; integrated
    in all our actions; responsive to the needs of our partners; and, able
    to provide options for our leadership. Proper preparation in advance of
    crises creates decision space for leaders and allows for the
    responsible and effective employment of available resources and forces.
    Well-prepared and motivated personnel with shared values provide a
    comparative advantage over our adversaries and competitors. Preparation
    of the environment--including agreements for assured access, basing,
    and overflight and the ability to adapt our expeditionary and enduring
    footprint--ultimately ensures a high level of readiness, increased
    responsiveness, and strong and productive relationships with partners
    and allies, all of which serve to enable our success in our various
    endeavors.
        Pursue Opportunities--In a region beset by myriad challenges we
    must always be on the look-out for opportunities to seize the
    initiative to support our objectives and goals. Pursuing opportunities
    means that we are proactive--we don't wait for problems to be
    presented; we look for ways to get ahead of them. It also means that we
    have to become comfortable with transparency and flat communications--
    our ability to understand our AOR better than anyone else gives us the
    advantage of knowing where opportunities exist. Pursuing opportunities
    also means we have to take risk--by delegating authority and
    responsibility to the right level, by trusting our partners, and being
    willing to trust our best instincts in order to move faster than our
    adversaries.
        Prevail in Conflict--There are no easy victories or quick wins in
    the USCENTCOM AOR--ours is an area of protracted struggles and
    conflicts. Our overriding objective, despite these challenges, is to
    prevail. Prevailing means winning; coming out on top of our
    adversaries. We prevail when our national interests and objectives are
    preserved; when we maintain decision space for our leaders; and, when
    we maintain and sustain our access, posture, and relationships with our
    vital partners. We choose to prevail ``by, with, and through'' our
    partners. Prevailing in this AOR requires resolve and resiliency--and
    continued momentum.
                        u.s. central command priorities.
        Ensure an Effective Posture--An effective posture with trained and
    ready forward-stationed forces and equipment demonstrates our
    tremendous capability and enduring commitment to our partners and
    allies in the region. It reassures them; it enables access and
    influence; and, it positions us to secure our enduring national
    interests. An effective posture also optimizes freedom of movement,
    deters state aggressors, and provides decision space and flexible
    response options for national-level decision makers.
        Strengthen Allies and Partnerships--A coalition approach--at home
    and abroad--expands our ability to operate on multiple fronts. Strong
    relationships based upon shared values create greater cohesion and
    enhance the effectiveness of available resources and capabilities.
    Integration with partners, within the region and beyond, enriches the
    benefit of our presence, mitigates resource constraints, and expands
    the reach of the force. By building the capacity of regional partners,
    we enable them to assume a larger share of the responsibility for
    securing their sovereign spaces.
        Deter and Counter State Aggressors--Effectively posturing to
    maintain freedom of movement, freedom of action, and freedom of
    navigation is essential to securing our enduring national interests and
    the interests of our partners and allies. We must also actively counter
    malign influence, and be prepared to confront aggression, while
    reducing the freedom of action of surrogates and proxies operating in
    the region.
        Disrupt and Counter Violent Extremist Organizations and their
    Networks--We must protect our Homeland from terrorist threats that
    emanate from the Central Region. We will accomplish this by degrading
    and defeating VEOs and their networks, including ISIS and al Qaeda and
    their associated forces, and by preventing the further spread of
    sectarian-fueled conflict and VEOs. Ultimately, our goal is to achieve
    a Central Region where improved security leads to greater stability,
    and where regional cooperation counters actors that threaten U.S.
    interests.
        Desired End States. Our efforts in support of partners throughout
    the USCENTCOM AOR are designed to achieve our desired end states. These
    end states include: USCENTCOM properly postured to protect U.S.
    interests; free flow of commerce and access to areas in accordance with
    international law; strong and supportive allies and partners; state
    aggressors deterred or countered; WMD safeguarded and use prevented;
    VEOs degraded and their influence eroded; and, lasting increased
    regional stability and security. The key to achieving these ends is the
    effective use of available ways and means to address challenges and
    pursue opportunities in the region.
        Challenges and Opportunities in the Central Region. Many conditions
    exist in the strategically-important Central Region that threaten
    stability, access to the region, and transit via maritime chokepoints.
    The resulting challenges--to include the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and
    Syria, Afghanistan, and Yemen, rising tensions with Iran, and increased
    provocative behavior by Iranian-backed elements in and around the Bab
    al Mandeb (BAM) Strait--clearly demand our attention and directed
    efforts. Among the dynamics contributing to the complexity of the
    current security environment are the same socio-political factors that
    caused the Arab Awakening, fomenting social unrest and creating
    conditions for sectarianism, violence, and extremism. In parts of the
    region, reforms have fallen short, politics remain exclusive, economic
    growth stagnates, education systems under-deliver, and/or social
    contracts are falling out of balance. Opportunities for youth remain
    limited. Concurrently, large-scale displaced populations stress already
    fragile economies, social welfare systems and security architectures.
    The resulting instability provides opportunities for VEOs and
    insurgents and those who actively provide support and sanctuary to
    them. Competition for water, oil, and other natural resources are other
    drivers of instability and conflict. Resurgent geopolitics and the
    continuation of national rivalries fuels inter-state hostility and may
    potentially hasten the pursuit of nuclear weapons. As we look to
    address the multitude of challenges present today across the USCENTCOM
    AOR, it is absolutely essential that we understand the conditions and
    root causes of the instability and turmoil. If not, our efforts are
    likely to be insufficient or even misdirected and any gains achieved,
    temporary.
        In addition to addressing challenges, we must pursue the many
    opportunities present today throughout the Central Region. Doing so
    will enable us, working together with our partners, to shape the
    security environment and increase stability across our AOR.
    Opportunities manifest in a variety of ways, including bilateral and
    multilateral exercises and training programs, Foreign Military Sales
    (FMS) cases, Foreign Military Financing (FMF) assistance, information
    operations and messaging, and other cooperative endeavors in support of
    common objectives. Most notably, by supporting and enabling partner-led
    operations we achieve shared goals while limiting U.S. investment and
    troop presence and increasing regional partners' capability,
    confidence, and overall stake in providing for the security of their
    sovereign spaces. For example, we continue to support the Iraqi
    Security Forces (ISF) and the Syrian Democratic Forces in their efforts
    to counter ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Also, in recent months we supported
    successful United Arab Emirates (UAE)-led operations in Yemen against
    the al Qaeda affiliate, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). In
    terms of future opportunities, we need to find ways to increase
    information sharing with key partners, like the UAE, to further enable
    their efforts. Enhanced information sharing with regional partners can
    also advance efforts against ISIS and other terrorist facilitation
    networks. We should pursue increasing our support for the Lebanese
    Armed Forces (LAF), which have demonstrated tremendous return on
    investment in recent years. The need for improved communication between
    and among elements, particularly regarding common regional disputes
    (e.g., Sunni-Shiite tensions, Kurdish expansionism) also presents
    opportunities and should be pursued by relevant elements of the U.S.
    Government (USG). The key outcomes achieved through the pursuit of
    these and other opportunities present in the Central Region are
    improved awareness and information-sharing, enhanced capability, and
    increased trust and confidence among partner nations, all of which are
    key components underpinning our mission in pursuit of our national
    interests. Thus, it is essential that we view all challenges with an
    eye for corresponding opportunities that provide the best means for
    addressing those challenges and achieving desired end-states.
        Given the trans-regional nature of the current security environment
    coupled with the competing demands for limited resources and
    capabilities, it is essential that we find efficiencies and alternative
    means for accomplishing stated objectives. This includes building and
    enabling coalitions comprised of willing partners, recognizing that
    collaboration enhances overall capability while providing a stronger,
    united front against potential adversaries; the sum of the parts is
    greater than the whole. The initial building blocks for strong
    coalitions are relationships. The cornerstone for effective enduring
    collaboration among coalition members is information-sharing which
    enables coalition compliant planning, resulting in successful execution
    of campaign goals and objectives. One quick-yield way to enhance the
    capability and effectiveness of our partners is by expanding our
    intelligence sharing with them. To date, we have seen significant
    return on investment each time we have made such allowances in support
    of our partners.
        Key Focus Areas. While the USCENTCOM Team manages a broad range of
    difficult challenges on a daily basis, a significant portion of our
    efforts and resources are necessarily focused in five priority areas.
    These five areas are: Operation Inherent Resolve (Iraq and Syria),
    Operation Freedom's Sentinel and Resolute Support Mission
    (Afghanistan), Iran, Yemen, and Countering Terrorism and Violent
    Extremism. Below are summaries, highlighting substantial challenges and
    efforts underway aimed at improving stability and security in each of
    these critical areas.
        Operation Inherent Resolve (Iraq and Syria). The Counter-ISIS (C-
    ISIS) Campaign has entered its third year and we are on track with the
    military plan to defeat the terrorist organization in Iraq and Syria.
    Our ``by, with, and through'' approach and operational level
    simultaneity strategy are working, and our partner forces continue to
    build momentum across the battlespace as we pressure the enemy on
    multiple fronts and across all domains. Together we are forcing the
    enemy to deal with multiple simultaneous dilemmas (e.g., ground
    operations, airstrikes, cyber activities, information operations, and
    discrete interdictions of resource flows). This is putting increased
    pressure on their operations and command and control capability while
    stretching their limited resources.
        The strength of the C-ISIS Campaign is the C-ISIS Coalition
    consisting of all branches of service and our Interagency and
    international partners, and the many contributions they willingly make
    to the fight against our common enemy--``The whole is greater than the
    sum of its parts.'' Without the support of the Coalition, our ``by,
    with, and through'' approach would not be doable.
        Our stand-off fires, including Coalition air and artillery, remain
    another lynchpin of the C-ISIS Campaign. Improved intelligence has
    enabled the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) to increase the
    number of deliberate strikes conducted in recent months, targeting
    ISIS's infrastructure, oil revenue sources, etc. Over the past year,
    the Coalition's precision effects campaign has removed dozens more ISIS
    senior leaders from the battlefield, attrited large portions of the
    organization's forces, further disrupted its command and control
    capability, and greatly degraded its pool of resources and access to
    replacements and personnel reinforcements. As the campaign progresses,
    and as ISIS shifts actions and behaves increasingly like a terrorist
    organization, hiding amongst civilians as a force protection measure,
    we will continue to make the necessary adjustments to our air
    operations. We want to target the enemy effectively, while also
    ensuring that we minimize collateral damage. International law requires
    it; and, when America's sons and daughters go to war, they go with our
    values. Thus, it is imperative that when we conduct operations we do so
    in such a way that we limit the loss of innocent lives.
        Over the past year, ISIS lost a significant amount of capability
    and large swaths of territory. The Iraqis are now in control of eastern
    Mosul, although clearing operations continue in several areas. In
    Syria, operations are ongoing in three key geographic areas--Raqqa,
    Manbij, and al Bab; it remains a very complex fight given multiple
    simultaneous activities and the management of partners and battlefield
    effects. In Iraq, in the coming weeks and months we will continue to
    support the Iraqi Security Forces as they complete the seizure of
    western Mosul. After Mosul operations are complete, we expect the
    Government of Iraq to prioritize military operations to recapture Tal
    Afar, Sinjar, and Hawija, and to secure the border in order to diminish
    ISIS' freedom of movement and ability to target major population
    centers. In Syria, the Syrian Democratic Forces have almost completed
    the isolation phase of Raqqa operations and will, in the coming months,
    begin operations to seize Raqqa, dismantling a key node in ISIS'
    external operations network. Additionally, we would look to continue
    our security operations along the Jordanian border to prevent re-
    infiltration of ISIS remnants.
        The cumulative effect of operations in Iraq and Syria has cut off
    key lines of communication for ISIS, while restricting their ability to
    bring in additional fighters and curbing their flow of financial
    resources. The terrorist organization is struggling financially and is
    experiencing low morale in its ranks and steady leadership attrition
    due to coalition airstrikes. There has also been a nearly 75 percent
    decline in ISIS's media and propaganda as compared to a year ago.
        Our efforts, in conjunction with our interagency and international
    partners' efforts, to stem the flow of foreign terrorist fighters--both
    into Syria and Iraq and also those attempting to return to their
    countries of origin--continue to bear fruit. The U.S. and Coalition
    member nations are highly concerned about the threat these experienced
    fighters present to our respective Homelands. We have made considerable
    progress identifying and targeting fighters and insurgent networks,
    principally through our Joint and Interagency targeting processes, and
    this will remain a priority.
        These processes will also help to combat the evolving hybrid threat
    (conventional and irregular warfare). U.S. Special Operations Command
    has been designated lead for external operations (EXOPs) for the U.S.
    military efforts and this has contributed greatly to organizing the
    broader efforts against this threat. Whole of government efforts and
    collaboration with partners have also played a key role in stemming the
    flow of foreign terrorist fighters (FTF). Spurred by the adoption of UN
    Security Council Resolution 2178 in September 2014, more than 60
    nations have enacted laws to restrict FTF travel. The U.S. now
    collaborates through information-sharing agreements with 59
    international partners to identify and track travel of suspected
    terrorists in real time.
        While we continue to make great strides towards countering ISIS
    trans-regionally, we recognize that we are dealing with a highly
    adaptive enemy. In particular, ISIS' use of chemical weapons and its
    evolving application of available off-the-shelf technologies that
    include unmanned aerial systems now used for both observation and to
    achieve lethal effects, poses a growing threat. For example, ISIS has
    reportedly used chemicals, including sulfur mustard and toxic
    industrial chemicals, in attacks more than 50 times in Iraq and Syria
    since 2014. Although the threat of chemical weapons has not slowed the
    Counter-ISIS Campaign, ISIS could further develop its chemical weapons
    capability. We are committed to working with partners to locate,
    secure, render harmless, eliminate or destroy any chemical and
    biological weapon materials found during the course of operations in
    Iraq and Syria, and to effectively remove this threat from our troops
    and civilian populations.
        We will defeat ISIS militarily; however, a lasting defeat of this
    enemy will not be achieved unless similar progress is made on the
    political front. Instability all but guarantees a resurgence of ISIS or
    the emergence of other terrorist groups seeking to exploit conditions
    to advance their own aims. We remain fully committed to the ``whole-of-
    government'' approach and continue to ensure our actions are
    synchronized with and supportive of the efforts of our partners across
    the Interagency and the International Community.
        This also holds true on the humanitarian front. UN-led efforts to
    date are having positive impacts and thousands of internally displaced
    persons (IDPs) have already returned to their homes. However, tough
    work remains, given the enormity of the humanitarian crises in Iraq and
    Syria and in neighboring countries. The growing number of displaced
    persons presents a unique set of challenges that include protection and
    assistance to civilians caught in the various conflicts, as well as
    assistance to those seeking asylum in neighboring countries.
        Regional actors--There is a significant number of players currently
    operating in Iraq and Syria with both common and competing interests.
    While they have been present for many years, several of them have
    become emboldened and have taken a more active role in addressing
    regional issues.
        In Iraq, we have seen encouraging progress made in the relationship
    between the leadership of the Government of Iraq (GoI) and the Kurdish
    Regional Government (KRG). This past year, for the first time since
    2013, Prime Minister al-Abadi met with President Barzani in Baghdad to
    discuss expanded cooperation between the ISF and the Kurdish Peshmerga.
    We also see increased collaboration between the ISF and elements of the
    Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). In November 2016, Iraq's parliament
    voted to fully legalize elements of the PMF, including but not limited
    to Shiite militias. While they are achieving some positive effects,
    their participation does present challenges, particularly post-Mosul
    offensive, as Iranian-backed elements of the PMF seek to increase their
    influence in the country through both military and political channels.
        Turkey remains an important NATO ally and Counter-ISIS Coalition
    member that supports the campaign through its operations and by
    providing access, basing, and overflight permissions. Some Turkish
    activities and rhetoric, however, have the potential to impact campaign
    momentum. Turkey's actions in northern Iraq continue to strain
    relations between the GoI and the KRG, which serves to further
    complicate the C-ISIS Campaign. Likewise, in Syria, Turkey has helped
    clear ISIS from its border, but Turkish-backed forces have also clashed
    with the Syrian Democratic Forces near Manbij and al Bab and we
    continue efforts to resolve tensions.
        Since Russia's entry into the Syrian conflict en masse in 2015,
    they have negatively impacted the regional balance of power. Russia's
    primary goal is to maintain Syria as a client state in the future and
    they have propped up the Assad Regime to support this overarching
    objective. Also very concerning is the fact that Russia's air
    operations have targeted civilians and U.S.-supported opposition
    groups. Without effective de-confliction measures, we see increasing
    opportunity for miscalculation and potential for unintended, counter-
    productive engagement between nation states. We are not currently
    coordinating or cooperating with the Russians; we are simply de-
    conflicting our air operations. This has become increasingly difficult
    in the crowded airspace as our operations come into closer proximity.
    In recent months, the Russians also introduced a number of new surface-
    to-air systems which can be employed to impact our freedom of maneuver.
    While our de-confliction efforts have been effective to date, as the
    fight expands in northern Syria and the battlespace becomes more
    congested, we should consider enhancing our de-confliction mechanisms
    with the Russians.
        We continue to see Iranian malign influence across Iraq and Syria.
    While they currently are focused on countering ISIS in Iraq, we remain
    concerned about Iran's efforts to prop up the Syrian regime against the
    opposition and its desire to exploit Shiite population centers to
    increase their malign influence, not just in Syria, but also in Arab
    states across the region. This supports their long-term aspiration to
    achieve regional hegemony. Moreover, we are watching closely for
    indications and warnings of decreasing Iranian concern regarding the
    threat posed by ISIS, leading to a potential shift to targeting U.S.
    and coalition personnel and infrastructure in an effort to influence a
    potential long-term U.S. security presence. Furthermore, we must take
    care to ensure that our actions do not unintentionally strengthen the
    Iranian position within the region.
        The military campaign plan to defeat ISIS is on track in both Iraq
    and Syria. The coalition's ``by, with and through'' approach is proving
    effective. Recognizing that ISIS will be defeated militarily, we want
    to ensure that we have an enduring posture in the region to support and
    enable partners' efforts to preserve security and stability. Iraq
    remains an anchor in the region and we would be wise to continue to
    support their efforts going forward. We have a willing partner in Iraq
    and Prime Minister al-Abadi has clearly articulated a desire for
    continued United States support post-ISIS. We are working with the GoI
    to finalize a Five-Year Plan to ensure enhanced cooperation. This
    presents an opportunity to preserve gains achieved to date, while
    strengthening key relationships and countering malign influence in the
    region.
        Operation Freedom's Sentinel and Resolute Support Mission
    (Afghanistan). The Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF)
    are beginning their third year with full responsibility for security
    with limited United States or coalition support. They continue to take
    the fight to the Taliban and, despite some territorial losses, have
    retained control of major population areas and key lines of
    communication. While the Taliban made gains in 2016, namely in the
    north and south, in most cases, the ANDSF quickly responded to and
    reversed some of those gains over the past year. While the balance of
    power favors the government, neither side is currently able to achieve
    its stated objectives. Looking ahead, it is essential that we continue
    to assist the ANDSF in addressing their capability gaps, particularly
    in the areas of aviation, casualty evacuation (CASEVAC), personnel
    management and development, logistics, and sustainment. Our sustained
    force presence, over 8,400 U.S. military personnel, will allow us to
    conduct counter-terrorism operations and meet our requirements for
    staffing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led Resolute
    Support (RS) Mission. However, the RS Mission still has a shortfall of
    a few thousand personnel needed to conduct the complementary mission of
    training, advising, and assisting the ANDSF.
        In 2015, United States Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) worked with the
    Afghans to develop a Sustainable Security Strategy based upon three key
    tenets: ``Fight, Hold, Disrupt.'' The strategy identifies areas the
    Afghans will hold, areas they will fight to retain, and areas where
    they will conduct an economy of force effort and disrupt the enemy if
    they appear, Afghan resources permitting. The ANDSF continues to make
    progress in implementing this strategy, thereby assuming a more
    proactive stance in addressing multiple threats while securing the
    population and denying terrorist safe havens. As General Nicholson, the
    commander of the RS Mission and USFOR-A stated, ``[The Afghans']
    ability to deal with simultaneous crises . . . is a sign of an army
    that's growing in capability, [and] that's maturing in terms of its
    ability to handle simultaneity and complexity on the battlefield.''
        While the ANDSF continues to make progress, they do face a number
    of significant challenges. Poor leadership and corruption are two key
    factors that need further improvement and President Ashraf Ghani has
    made addressing these issues a top priority for the Government of the
    Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA). The GIRoA established the
    Anti-Corruption Justice Center in 2016 with the help of the
    international community and has already tried, convicted, and sentenced
    senior Afghan officials for corruption. Below are other challenges and
    critical capability gaps must be addressed.
        ANDSF casualty rates--High ANDSF casualties remain a concern. This
    can be attributed to several factors, including poor leadership,
    corruption, tactics, and training. Deficiencies in ANDSF leadership
    occur primarily because of patronage vice merit-based appointments. The
    extensive use of static checkpoints and the lack of training on how to
    defend them, as well as a more aggressive posture--which has resulted
    in the ANDSF more frequently taking the lead and actively taking the
    fight to the enemy--have also contributed to an increased number of
    casualties. The ANDSF also experienced an increase in the number of
    insurgent attacks on inadequately protected fixed positions, and poor
    and corrupt leadership also may have contributed to higher casualty
    rates. The ANDSF lacked an operational readiness cycle (ORC) to ensure
    forces are well-rested and well-trained before returning to the fight.
    During the Winter Campaign this year, many ANDSF units successfully
    established ORCs, and our advisors have fostered an increased focus on
    company-level training and leadership development.
        Afghan Air Force--The Afghan Air Force (AAF) and Special Mission
    Wing (SMW) continue to build capability. Their ability to provide
    airlift, casualty evacuation, and aerial fires has steadily improved as
    the United States provides more aircraft to the AAF and as its pilots
    and crew gain additional operational experience. The Afghans are
    proving effective at integrating their AAF aviation assets as evidenced
    by a number of successful operations conducted over the past year.
    However, significant capability gaps remain. The current rotary wing
    fleet consisting primarily of the Russian-made Mi-17 is both undersized
    and proving to be more expensive and difficult to sustain than
    originally envisioned and is experiencing a higher than expected
    attrition rate. Going forward, transitioning from Russian to United
    States airframes will ensure Afghan forces have a more sustainable
    fleet that is interoperable with U.S. forces and will enhance the
    Afghans' ability to operate independently of coalition forces. The
    United States Government is considering a critical AAF initiative to
    replace the unsustainable Russian-manufactured aircraft fleet and make
    up for combat losses in Afghan transport helicopters by providing U.S.
    UH-60s. The DOD-request of $814.5 million for fiscal year 2017 for the
    first year of our plan to recapitalize the Afghan fleet provides
    funding to procure 53 UH-60s, with refurbishment and modification of
    the first 18; 30 additional armed MD-530F helicopters; 6 additional A-
    29 attack aircraft; and five AC-208s. The requested fiscal year 2017
    Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) budget, including the additional
    funds for the first year of this proposed aviation initiative, went to
    Congress on 10 November 2016. The fiscal year 2017 proposal is pending
    approval and we appreciate your support in reaching resolution as soon
    as possible to mitigate the gaps in Afghan aerial fires and lift
    capabilities. Transition from Mi-17 to UH-60 airframes will eventually
    eliminate reliance on Russian sourced parts for maintenance
    requirements. With our support, we can expect the AAF will continue to
    build needed capability over the next few years and into the future.
        Influence of external actors--Stability in Afghanistan is further
    challenged by the malign influence of external actors. The enablement
    of violent extremist groups operating inside of Afghanistan and along
    the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region, receiving sanctuary or support
    from outside governments, is of particular concern. So long as these
    elements remain, they will threaten our hard-earned gains and regional
    stability writ large.
        Pakistan's shared border with Afghanistan remains a safe haven for
    terrorist and violent extremist elements. There are 20 United States-
    designated terrorist organizations present today in Afghanistan and
    Pakistan. The Taliban serves as a facilitator to some of these groups'
    operations. The death of Taliban Supreme Leader Mullah Akhtar Mansour
    in a U.S. strike on 21 May 2016 had a disruptive impact on the Taliban
    and gave a psychological boost to the Afghans. However, the group still
    presents a formidable threat to stability in the Afghanistan-Pakistan
    (Af-Pak) sub-region. The convergence of these groups and, in
    particular, the convergence of the Afghan Taliban and its component,
    the Haqqani Network, and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, is of particular concern
    given the direct threat posed to United States and Coalition personnel
    and the Afghan Government. Key to improving the security environment in
    Afghanistan is eliminating sanctuary of militant groups in Pakistan's
    territory. The United States maintains consistent diplomatic pressure
    on Pakistan to take appropriate steps to deny safe haven and work to
    improve the security of the tumultuous Af-Pak border region.
        Illicit narcotics production and trafficking--Illicit narcotics
    production and trafficking continue to flourish in Afghanistan,
    particularly in areas where state institutions are weak. The United
    Nations Office on Drugs and Crime estimated 2016 Afghanistan poppy
    cultivation to be 201,000 hectares with a net opium yield of 4,800
    metric tons and a farm gate value of $900 million, which is a 57
    percent increase in revenue generated from the opium trade. In
    Afghanistan, a symbiotic relationship exists between the insurgency and
    narcotics trafficking where traffickers provide weapons, funding, and
    material support to the insurgency in exchange for protection.
    Additionally, some insurgent commanders traffic drugs to finance
    operations. However, trafficking is not limited to insurgent-controlled
    areas. The narcotics trade undermines governance and rule of law
    throughout Afghanistan and plays a critical role in underwriting
    corruption and a loss of confidence by the Afghan people in the GIRoA.
        Regionally, USCENTCOM supports law enforcement counterdrug and
    border security training, equipping of regional partners, construction
    activities, and information sharing initiatives to build the capacity
    of our security force partners that aid in the regional response to
    illicit drugs trafficking. Counterdrug activities are a critical
    component of USCENTCOM's theater security cooperation strategy; provide
    for regional engagement and comprise a significant source of security
    assistance funding in Central Asia. These efforts improve regional
    illicit drug detection and interdiction and improve overall border
    security for the detection of other forms of contraband, including
    weapons and IED materials.
        Amidst the challenges confronting Afghanistan today are many
    opportunities. Most notably, we have willing partners in the GIRoA and
    ANDSF and our collaboration in support of common objectives continues
    to pay significant dividends. Following are three areas in particular
    where potential ``game-changing'' opportunities exist and merit our
    sustained commitment.
        Government of National Unity--The Government of National Unity
    (GNU) survived several political crises in 2016. President Ashraf Ghani
    and Chief Executive Officer Abdullah Abdullah provided the leadership
    that has enabled progress to be made in a number of areas, as well as
    the development of the framework for enduring partnerships with NATO
    and the United States. Nevertheless, significant challenges still exist
    and must be addressed. While the NUG provides needed structure and a
    source of stability for Afghanistan, it remains fragile. Although the
    ANDSF has remained apolitical so far, failure of the NUG could threaten
    ANDSF cohesion and the progress achieved throughout the country. Our
    message to the political elites of Afghanistan has been that ``we
    respect your political progress, but please do not allow political
    tensions to undo the hard fought gains you have made.''
        The International Community's Demonstrated Commitment to
    Afghanistan--Thirty-nine NATO allies and partner nations committed more
    than 13,500 troops to sustain the Resolute Support Mission beyond 2016.
    Thirty nations have also pledged more than $800 million annually to
    sustain Afghan security forces through 2020. Combined with the
    requested United States commitment of $3.5 billion for fiscal year 2017
    and additional funding from Afghanistan, a total of more than $4.3
    billion has been pledged for the ANDSF for 2017. Additionally, 75
    countries and 26 international organizations confirmed their intention
    in 2016 at the Brussels Conference on Afghanistan to provide $15.2
    billion for Afghan development during the 2017-2020 period. The
    International Community's strong showing, coupled with the continued
    commitment of United States troops in Afghanistan beyond 2016, has
    bolstered Afghan confidence and resolve and will surely pay dividends
    going forward.
        Counter-terrorism (CT) Platform--The existence of violent extremist
    groups in Afghanistan requires a United States presence in the region
    that can monitor and address threats, even as the United States helps
    to build the Afghans' capability to deter terrorist exploitation of
    Afghan territory. As we adjust the U.S. CT mission, our support to the
    NATO TAA [Train, Advise, and Assist] mission will also evolve in the
    coming year. Currently, advisory efforts are at four of the six corps
    and police zone levels, in addition to the Afghan Special Security
    Forces (ASSF) and the AAF. In 2017, we will advise all six corps and
    police zones to provide critical support where needed to capitalize on
    the success and continued implementation of the sustainable security
    strategy.
        Although we see encouraging progress being made in Afghanistan, it
    remains a very challenging environment. While the ANDSF confronts
    difficulties in a number of areas, they are providing for the security
    of their country, achieving good effects against the Taliban, and
    building much-needed capacity and momentum while gaining increasing
    confidence in what is still a tough fight. Additionally, although it
    does face significant challenges, the GIRoA, under the leadership of
    President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah, has
    proven to be a reliable and willing partner. The United States and our
    coalition partners have invested greatly in Afghanistan over the last
    15+ years. The country merits our continued demonstrated commitment
    given our national security interests in the sub-region, namely
    protection of the U.S. Homeland. By strengthening our partners and
    weakening our enemies we will achieve increased stability in that
    strategically important part of the world.
        Iran. Iran poses the most significant threat to the Central Region
    and to our national interests and the interests of our partners and
    allies. We have not seen any improvement in Iran's behavior since the
    Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), addressing Iran's nuclear
    program, was finalized in July 2015. Iran aspires to be a regional
    hegemon and its forces and proxies oppose United States interests in
    Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, Gaza, and Syria, and seek to hinder achievement
    of United States objectives in Afghanistan and some Central Asian
    States. They also are working to subvert the GoI by establishing a
    long-term presence within Iraq's security forces. Of note, Iran exerts
    influence and a degree of control over the majority of the nearly
    100,000 Shiite militias within the PMF. Furthermore, Iran has expanded
    cooperation with Russia in Syria in ways that threaten United States
    interests in the region.
        The JCPOA removed a key threat posed by Iran for at least a number
    of years. Unfortunately, the agreement has led some to believe that we
    have largely addressed the Iranian problem set and that is not the
    case. In addition to its nuclear weapons potential, Iran presents
    several credible threats. They have a robust theater ballistic missile
    program, and we remain concerned about their cyber and maritime
    activities, as well as the activities of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary
    Guard Corps--Qods Forces (IRGC-QF) and their network of affiliates.
        Iran implements its strategy primarily within the ``gray zone,''
    the space short of conventional conflict where miscalculation can
    easily occur, leading to escalatory conflict and misunderstanding. Iran
    fosters instability by funding and promoting a threat network that
    employs provocation, violence, and covert arms transfers that serve as
    the stimulants for a range of conflicts across the region. It
    complements this subversive arm with conventional military provocation
    and overt threats to close key maritime sea lanes, especially at
    critical international economic chokepoints, namely the Strait of
    Hormuz and the BAM Strait, which puts global political stability and
    economic prosperity at risk.
        Recognizing that Iran poses the greatest long-term threat to United
    States interests in the Central Region, we must seize opportunities to
    both reassure our allies and shape Iran's behavior. In order to contain
    Iranian expansion, roll back its malign influence, and blunt its
    asymmetric advantages, we must engage them more effectively in the
    ``gray zone'' through means that include a strong deterrence posture,
    targeted counter-messaging activities, and by building partner nations'
    capacity. Through both messaging and actions, we must also be clear in
    our communications and ensure the credibility of U.S. intentions. Iran
    must believe there will be prohibitive consequences if it chooses to
    continue its malign activities designed to foment instability in the
    region. The United States Government should also consider communicating
    directly with Iran's leadership to improve transparency and lessen the
    potential for miscalculation.
        To further strengthen deterrence against Iran, we must also take
    the necessary proactive measures to build the capacity of partners and
    allies in the region. Ideally we want to improve interoperability,
    expand communication, and enhance security mechanisms. Stronger, more
    capable partners, able and willing to assume a greater role in
    countering Iran, will serve to further enhance deterrence and improve
    stability in the region.
        In addition to ready military actions, we must support the broader
    USG strategy with regard to Iran which should include new diplomatic
    initiatives that provide Iran with viable alternatives to its present
    course. While Iran continues to pose the most significant threat to
    regional security, we remain optimistic and believe that by taking
    proactive measures and reinforcing our resolve we can lessen Iran's
    ability to negatively influence outcomes in the future.
        Yemen. Yemen remains a critically unstable state engrossed in a
    civil war that has produced a significant humanitarian crisis and
    growing instability ripe for exploitation by VEOs, most notably al
    Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the ISIS affiliate, IS-Yemen.
    The lack of a comprehensive peace agreement that leads to a durable
    resolution of the conflict under a unified Yemeni Government further
    contributes to continued uncertainty in the country.
        The civil war between the Republic of Yemen Government (RoYG) and
    the alliance of Former President of Yemen Ali Abdullah Saleh- and
    Huthis has entered its third year with little progress made towards
    achieving an enduring resolution despite concerted efforts by the
    United Nations, the broader International Community, and regional
    stakeholders. While the United States is not directly involved in the
    civil war, we are providing limited assistance to the Kingdom of Saudi
    Arabia (KSA)-led coalition in an effort to help protect their
    territorial integrity and sovereign borders. Huthi forces have seized
    and attacked military border outposts inside KSA territory and continue
    to occupy Saudi lands. Ballistic missile attacks launched from Yemen
    have struck deep into the country causing casualties and potentially
    threatening the Islamic holy sites in Mecca. We will continue to work
    to resolve the conflict as an ending to the war through a comprehensive
    political agreement provides the surest security of Saudi's Arabia's
    border and territorial integrity, enables us to conduct counter-
    terrorism operations, allows the population to receive food and
    medicine, and blocks Iranian malign activities. Until the war is over,
    we will assist Saudi Arabia in its efforts to defend against these
    attacks and restore the territorial integrity of their country.
        Our primary focus in Yemen remains protecting the United States
    Homeland from threats posed by VEOs operating within Yemen's ungoverned
    spaces, while ensuring freedom of navigation and commerce through the
    southern Red Sea and the Bab al Mandeb (BAM) Strait. Al Qaeda in the
    Arabian Peninsula has indicated clear desire and ability to conduct
    attacks on the U.S. Homeland. Ongoing U.S. unilateral counter-terrorism
    operations and determined efforts by UAE in leading RoYG and Yemeni
    tribal forces, as demonstrated during the Mukalla offensive in April
    2016, have degraded and disrupted AQAP's operational networks and
    reduced their access to sources of financial support. Despite the
    complexity of the environment, our efforts aimed at degrading AQAP
    remain critical to protecting our national security interests in the
    region and must continue.
        In October 2016, the Iranian-supported BAM Maritime Threat Network
    (BMTN) demonstrated the ability to threaten freedom of navigation by
    successfully attacking a UAE vessel and a Saudi warship, and attempting
    to attack U.S. Navy warships in the southern Red Sea. We responded
    swiftly and decisively, destroying several Huthi coastal defense radar
    sites. While the origin of these attacks is found in the ROYG-Huthi
    conflict, the threats posed by the BMTN to the safe passage of vessels,
    either through deliberate action or unintentional acts, has the
    potential for significant strategic and economic impacts throughout the
    region. We continue to closely monitor the BMTN and remain prepared to
    promptly and decisively respond to any threats.
        Going forward, our efforts against violent, non-state actors and
    support for similar efforts by our regional partners will remain our
    primary focus in Yemen. At the same time, we continue to do what we can
    to enable ongoing diplomatic efforts aimed at achieving a resolution to
    the hostilities that pose an enduring threat to stability in the
    country and the region writ large.
        Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism. The Central Region
    remains the global epicenter for terrorism and violent Islamist
    extremism and the resulting turmoil continues to bleed across
    geographic combatant command ``seams.'' Terrorism and violent extremism
    represent trans-regional threats, where malign actors seek to exploit
    ungoverned and under-governed spaces and vulnerable, disenfranchised
    populations worldwide.
        One aspect of this threat that makes it particularly challenging is
    the terrorists' and VEOs' ability to operate across multiple domains
    and in both physical and virtual spaces. Today, the unprecedented
    global access achieved through the use of the Internet and various
    social media platforms enables terrorist and violent extremist groups
    to promulgate their radicalized ideologies while reaching a vast pool
    of potential recruits, many willing to conduct lone wolf-style attacks
    on behalf of these groups. Also, as we have seen with ISIS, the ability
    of violent extremist groups to operate effectively in the virtual
    battlespace, makes them more challenging to defeat due to the nature of
    that domain. As we degrade their physical capability, groups often
    shift focus to the virtual battlespace while their forces consolidate
    and regroup. We must continue to identify attributable and non-
    attributable methods and techniques for combatting groups in the
    virtual domain.
        We must also find ways to address the drivers of instability that
    create the conditions that allow these groups to flourish. The root
    causes of instability must be dealt with if we hope to achieve a
    lasting defeat of terrorist and violent extremist groups operating in
    the USCENTCOM AOR. The people of the region must lead this effort; we
    cannot do it for them. However, we can and will continue to support and
    promote their efforts wherever possible.
        We cannot allow terrorist groups and violent extremist
    organizations to operate uncontested, enabling them to grow stronger
    and expand their global reach. By working together with our Interagency
    Partners and the International Community, operating from multiple
    strategic platforms around the globe and across all domains, we will
    reduce the gaps and ``seams'' exploited by these groups and better
    protect our interests against this common threat.
        Our Partner Nations in the Central Region. Below are synopses of
    the current state of affairs, including challenges, opportunities, and
    status of our military-to-military (mil-to-mil) relationships with
    partner nations, except Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Iran, and Yemen which
    were addressed in the previous section, ``Key Focus Areas'' (see pages
    13-31).
        The Gulf States--The Gulf States are among our best partners in the
    region. The Gulf Cooperation Council's (GCC) willingness to provide
    basing and access for U.S. forces is crucial to our ability to operate
    militarily in the USCENTCOM AOR. The GCC countries provide critical
    nodes for achieving operational objectives and continued success
    against ISIS. Their troops and aircraft continue to play a key role in
    the ongoing fight against this terrorist organization. At leader-level
    summits in 2015 and 2015, the GCC countries committed to pursue
    collective defense initiatives, including joint counter-terrorism and
    ballistic missile defense; however, progress towards those ends has
    been relatively slow. Nevertheless, the GCC's desire to create a
    unified military command and more closely coordinated economic policy
    could create opportunities for greater interoperability between GCC and
    coalition forces over the medium- to long-term. While individual GCC
    nations' sometimes divergent foreign policies present an obstacle to
    achieving a unified defense posture, we remain committed to helping
    them achieve this desired end state through senior leader engagements,
    combined exercises, and more standardized equipment and training. As
    agreed upon at the May 2015 Camp David Summit, we have increased
    cooperation on maritime security, military preparedness, arms
    transfers, cybersecurity, counter-terrorism, and logistics
    interoperability. Our total GCC FMS open case portfolio is valued at
    over $150 billion and continues to help our partners defend their
    sovereignty and economic interests against emerging threats. As Gulf
    countries look to the United States for military equipment, training,
    and assistance, it is essential that we reinforce efforts to include
    them in our joint endeavors to defeat regional threats posed by violent
    extremism and Iran's malign influence. Through our continued support
    for and collaboration with our GCC partners we will positively impact
    stability and security in the strategically important Central Region.
        Bahrain is an important partner in the region, hosting USCENTCOM's
    naval component, United States Navy Central Command (NAVCENT) and U.S.
    Fifth Fleet Headquarters and Combined Maritime Forces in Manama at the
    Naval Support Activity Bahrain and Isa Air Base, respectively. The
    Bahrainis have actively supported coalition operations against ISIS in
    Syria since the start of the C-ISIS Campaign in September 2014,
    primarily by allowing us continued use and access to these facilities.
    They also continue to support Saudi-led operations in Yemen. We are
    making strides in our collaborative efforts to enhance the Bahraini
    Coast Guard's capacity, which aim to enable Bahrain to expand its role
    in countering piracy and violent extremism in the region's maritime
    domain. Internally, the Bahrainis are dealing with a tough domestic
    economic hit by low oil prices and a persistent, low-level threat from
    Iranian-backed militant groups, and we continue to provide appropriate
    assistance to help them address the security threat. While we have
    historically enjoyed a strong mil-to-mil relationship with our Bahraini
    counterparts, the slow progress on key FMS cases, specifically
    additional F-16 aircraft and upgrades to Bahrain's existing F-16 fleet,
    due to concerns of potential human rights abuses in the country,
    continues to strain our relationship. We continue to urge the
    Government of Bahrain to reverse steps it has taken over the past year
    to reduce the space for peaceful political expression in its Shiite
    population and have encouraged the Bahrainis to implement needed
    political reforms in the country while reassuring them of our strong
    commitment to our valued partnership.
        The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) is undertaking potentially far-
    reaching economic and related reforms under the banner of Vision 2030
    and the National Transformation Plan. The goal of these measures is to
    diversify the Saudi economy and generate increased economic growth in
    the wake of low oil prices, as well as expanded opportunities for the
    nation's burgeoning youth population. The Kingdom is a key regional
    leader, calling upon partner nations to join them in addressing
    regional challenges, including Iranian malign influence. Having
    actively supported the fight against ISIS in the early stages of the
    campaign, KSA shifted its priority of effort to Yemen in 2015 where it
    leads the coalition against the Saleh- and Iranian-backed Huthis, who
    continue to pose a threat to Yemen's internal stability, security in
    KSA's southern border region, and the flow of commerce through the Bab
    al Mandeb Strait. The Saudis also are concerned about the threat posed
    by VEOs operating in Yemen, including the al Qaeda affiliate, AQAP, and
    the ISIS affiliate, IS-Y. We are principally focused on helping KSA to
    improve its target development and accountability processes in order to
    reduce incidence of civilian casualties, while also providing them with
    focused logistics and intelligence sharing support. Our long-standing
    partnership with KSA remains critical to maintaining stability in the
    region given their influence in the GCC and among many Muslim-majority
    countries. Our mil-to-mil relationship represents the strongest
    component of that partnership and continues to serve as the foundation
    for productive collaboration. By continuing to provide opportunities
    for the Saudis to enhance their defense capabilities, mainly through
    our substantive training and exercise program and robust FMS valued at
    $109 billion in open cases, we aim to improve interoperability while
    effectively addressing challenges in pursuit of our shared security
    goals and objectives.
        Kuwait continues to be one of our strongest allies in the Central
    Region. Owing to the generous provisions of the Defense Cooperation
    Agreement, the Kuwaitis provide one of the most permissive environments
    in the USCENTCOM AOR with respect to access, basing, and overflight in
    support of U.S. and coalition presence in theater. Kuwait hosts the
    forward headquarters of USCENTCOM's army component, U.S. Army Central
    Command (ARCENT). Kuwait is also the most active combat support
    logistics hub globally and plays a critical role in support of ongoing
    operations in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. Kuwait utilizes its leadership
    role in the GCC to help mediate internal GCC rifts while promoting a
    regional response to crises. Kuwait has also led the GCC in helping to
    address the regional refugee crisis emanating from Syria and been an
    invaluable partner in supporting the Iraqi Government's C-ISIS efforts.
    Our mil-to-mil relationship with the Kuwaitis remains strong. Going
    forward we will look to pursue additional opportunities for joint
    training and further collaboration in support of common objectives.
        The relationship between the United States and Oman remains strong,
    strengthened by our shared interests in the region and expanding access
    to Omani bases and ports. Oman is consistently viewed as a source of
    stability in the Gulf Region, and its neutral stance has enabled it to
    serve as a key interlocutor, most notably with Yemen and Iran. Of note,
    in October 2016, Oman's leadership facilitated the release of two
    United States citizens held by the Huthis in Sanaa, Yemen.
    Additionally, Oman's strategic location on the Arabian Sea, outside of
    the Bab el Mandeb Strait and the Strait of Hormuz provides USCENTCOM
    with access to key logistical, operational, and contingency
    capabilities that are crucial to maintaining open sea lines of
    communication. While Oman does face significant challenges, namely a
    growing threat from VEOs in neighboring Yemen and a declining economy
    that could potentially impact its youth population, the leadership of
    the country is taking appropriate steps to address these and other
    issues. We enjoy a good relationship with the Omani military and will
    continue to work closely with them in support of shared interests.
        Qatar remains a highly valued partner, providing critical access
    and basing in support of coalition forces and operations being
    conducted in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and elsewhere in the Central
    Region. The country hosts more than 10,000 U.S. and Coalition
    servicemembers at Al-Udeid Air Base, home of USCENTCOM's Forward
    Headquarters, our air component, U.S. Air Forces Central Command
    (AFCENT), and its Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC). Qatar's Armed
    Forces also continue to support external operations in Syria and Yemen.
    In Syria, given their relationships with a wide range of actors,
    including more moderate elements, the Qataris are well-positioned to
    play an influential role in facilitating a political resolution to the
    conflict. Like most GCC countries, they continue to demand the removal
    of Bashar al-Assad as part of any resolution. Qatar has indicated a
    strong desire to enhance its partnership with the United States, both
    in terms of training engagements with U.S. forces and procurement of
    U.S. military equipment. Our continued role in their military
    modernization and development presents an invaluable opportunity to
    help expand their capability while strengthening our mil-to-mil
    relationship with a key and critical partner in the region.
        The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is one of our most steadfast and
    capable partners in the USCENTCOM AOR. The Emirates have clearly
    demonstrated a willingness and ability to take an active role in
    shaping outcomes in the Central Region. The country hosts more than
    4,000 U.S. servicemembers and provides critical support for U.S.
    operations, goals, and objectives. The UAE was among the first
    countries to join the Counter-ISIS Coalition in 2014. While their
    primary focus has since shifted to support the ongoing KSA-led military
    campaign in Yemen, UAE continues to provide support to several of the
    C-ISIS Coalition's key lines of effort, including counter-messaging,
    counter-financing, and stemming the flow of foreign fighters. In Yemen,
    the UAE serves as the leading ground element in ongoing operations
    against the Saleh- and Iranian-backed Huthis. The Emirates are also
    supporting our efforts to counter the al Qaeda affiliate, AQAP. In
    April, using local fighters and tribal militias, the Emirates played a
    critical role in liberating Mukalla, driving AQAP elements out of the
    port city and thereby denying them a key source of revenue. In
    conjunction with its military efforts, the UAE is heavily focused on
    providing humanitarian assistance to ease the crisis facing Yemen's
    population. We value our strong relationship with the Emirates and seek
    to build upon our robust mil-to-mil relationship, including by
    concluding a new Defense Cooperation Agreement that could serve as a
    foundation for expanded, mutually beneficial defense cooperation. We
    will work to expand our collaboration, specifically in the areas of
    security cooperation and foreign military sales. Additionally, we will
    work with the Emirates to promote their leadership role among partner
    nations in the region.
        The Levant--The Levant represents the epicenter of ethno-sectarian
    tension and conflict in the USCENTCOM AOR. Partner nations in this sub-
    region continue to struggle with the impacts of the fight against ISIS,
    as well as the ongoing civil war in Syria, which is an ``engine of
    instability'' in and of itself. The persistent conflict and resulting
    widespread unrest have caused an expanding humanitarian crisis with
    ramifications that reach far beyond the USCENTCOM AOR. Stability in the
    Levant is further complicated by competition for influence therein from
    outside actors, principally Iran and Russia. Many of the challenges
    present today in the Levant originate from or affect neighboring
    countries and thus are trans-regional in nature and require cross-COCOM
    coordination. We routinely work closely with our colleagues in United
    States European Command, United States Africa Command, and other USG
    agencies and organizations to ensure that our various efforts are
    complementary and well-synchronized.
        With its strategic location, control of the Suez Canal, enduring
    peace treaty with Israel coupled with a religious and cultural Pan-Arab
    influence, Egypt remains a stalwart partner in pursuit of shared Middle
    East policy objectives that include counter-terrorism, counter-violent
    extremism, and improved regional stability. Of particular concern is
    the threat posed by the ISIS affiliate, IS-Sinai which conducts
    frequent attacks against the Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF) and security
    services. While the EAF has managed to contain violence in the Sinai
    Peninsula without a comprehensive strategy to defeat IS-Sinai, we have
    a vested interest in helping them to effectively address this threat to
    ensure that the Sinai does not become a safe haven for extremist
    elements, including by providing additional bilateral military and
    security training. Egypt is further challenged by a weak economy and
    widespread unemployment or under-employment, as well as an aggressive
    approach to countering internal threats which makes its population
    highly susceptible to radicalization by extremist elements. Continued
    United States support to Egypt is crucial to our strategic partnership,
    and our long-standing, resilient mil-to-mil relationship represents a
    key pillar of that partnership. Over the past several months, we have
    expanded our collaboration while taking steps to bolster our force
    protection measures and rebalance the Multinational Force Observer
    (MFO) mission in the Sinai. In the coming months, we will continue to
    work closely with the EAF to further enhance their counter-terrorism
    capabilities and improve the security of their borders through
    continued engagement and our robust assistance and security cooperation
    programs.
        The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is one of our strongest and most
    reliable partners in the Levant sub-region. Jordan provides access,
    basing, and overflight equal to or greater than that provided by any
    other partner in the USCENTCOM AOR. The Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF)
    and the Royal Jordanian Air Force (RJAF) continue to make key
    contributions in support of the Counter-ISIS Campaign. With United
    States and coalition assistance, the JAF have fortified Jordan's
    borders with Iraq and Syria, while enabling the International
    Community's ongoing efforts to address the burgeoning humanitarian
    crisis manifesting inside of Jordan (8650,000 refugees) and in two
    camps located along the border in southern Syria (855,000-65,000 IDPs)
    . It is imperative that we remain actively engaged with our Jordanian
    partners. Jordan provides a much-needed moderate Islamic voice in the
    region and is a trusted intermediary in efforts to advance progress
    between the Israelis and Palestinians. Our strong mil-to-mil
    relationship and continued demonstrated support for the Government of
    Jordan, the JAF, and the RJAF remains critical to ensuring that Jordan
    is able to effectively manage the broad range of challenges facing the
    country and the region now and in the future.
        Lebanon remains a key partner in our efforts to counter violent
    extremism in the Central Region, and their ground forces offer one of
    the greatest returns on investment in the region. They are routinely
    countering groups that include ISIS and Al Nusra Front, denying them
    freedom of movement, and strengthening the country's border defenses
    with our continued support. United States security assistance to
    Lebanon has enhanced the Lebanese Armed Forces' (LAF) ability to
    counter malign influences and terrorist elements operating within the
    country. A strong and capable LAF acts as a counterweight to the
    militant arm of Lebanese Hezbollah (LH), while diminishing LH's claim
    as the sole ``resistance'' in Lebanon. While LH has been preoccupied
    with its involvement in the fight in Syria in support of the Assad
    Regime, the LAF has gained increasing credibility among the Lebanese
    populace as the most respected institution in the country. On 31
    October 2016, the Lebanese parliament ended the over two-year
    presidential vacancy with the appointment of President Michel Aoun, a
    Maronite Christian and leader of the Free Patriotic Movement Party.
    While this positive development ended political gridlock and restored
    government functions, significant challenges remain, exacerbated by the
    civil war in neighboring Syria. Of particular concern are the
    approximately 1+ million Syrian refugees in Lebanon. This population
    presents political, economic, and security challenges to Prime Minister
    Hariri and his newly formed government. In addition to straining
    national resources, the Syrian refugee population is mostly Sunni and
    thus could threaten the fragile sectarian balance of power in the
    country. The humanitarian burden facing Lebanon will require
    significant international assistance to bolster limited local
    resources. Our continued support for this valued partner is both
    merited and has proven to pay tremendous dividends as the LAF has
    routinely demonstrated the ability to make best use of U.S. assistance
    to increase its capability and capacity and bring about positive,
    measurable results.
        Central and South Asia--Our primary interests in the Central and
    South Asia (CASA) sub-region are to prevent the establishment of
    terrorist safe havens, assure continued United States access, and
    support the sovereignty and independence of partner nations. Our
    engagement strategy is focused on these three interests and
    strengthening our bilateral relationships with the seven partner
    nations. We also encourage multi-lateral cooperation amongst these same
    seven nations, and our annual CASA Chiefs of Defense Conference serves
    as a mechanism for facilitating expanded dialogue and increased
    cooperation. This past year, we also held the highly successful
    inaugural CASA Directors of Military Intelligence Conference. The
    increased participation and elevated levels of mil-to-mil discussions
    clearly convey increased appetite for further U.S.-led engagement.
        Despite increasing Russian, Chinese, and Iranian pressure designed
    to limit United States influence in the sub-region, the U.S. maintains
    its regional position by focusing on security cooperation areas where
    we have a comparative advantage such as counter-terrorism, border
    security, defense institution building, and professional development.
    Several CASA governments support transit of supplies to United States
    troops in Afghanistan through the Northern Distribution Network. We
    anticipate a continued need for these access routes. In this regard,
    our CASA partners have been and continue to be strong partners in our
    efforts to stabilize Afghanistan. Other areas of shared interest
    include countering violent extremism and counter-narcotics. Our
    training and exercise programs in the CASA sub-region clearly
    demonstrate our strong commitment to addressing these and other common
    challenges. For example, Exercise Steppe Eagle, traditionally a
    trilateral exercise with the United States, U.K., and Kazakhstan, has
    become more regional in scope with Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic
    also now taking part. Additionally, we are increasing multilateral
    collaboration with our CASA-wide annual USCENTCOM Exercise Regional
    Cooperation.
        We share two primary concerns with our CASA partners regarding
    stability and security in the region: 1) persistent worries about the
    long-term stability and viability of Afghanistan and 2) the threat
    posed by returning foreign fighters. The United States and NATO's
    continued commitment to the ongoing Resolute Support Mission in
    Afghanistan is helping to assuage these concerns, primarily by
    bolstering the Afghan security forces' ability to defend their security
    interests. At the same time, we continue to pursue opportunities that
    would allow for increased information sharing, improved border
    security, and enhanced training and multi-lateral collaboration to
    support our shared interests.
        While our efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan continue to require
    significant investment, elsewhere in the CASA sub-region we have
    clearly demonstrated the ability to achieve good effects with modest
    investments in terms of building partner nations' capabilities,
    improving multi-lateral cooperation, and addressing common security
    threats. Going forward, we intend to strengthen relationships and build
    on previous accomplishments while working together with our Interagency
    Partners to explore and pursue new opportunities in this strategically
    important part of the world.
        The United States-Kazakhstan relationship is our most advanced
    military relationship in Central Asia. We are making notable progress
    as the Kazakhstani Ministry of Defense continues to focus on
    institutional reform of its NCO corps, training management, human
    resources administration, and professional military education system.
    This progress continues despite enduring Russian influence and a
    Kazakhstani economy that is still recovering from the recent downturn
    in oil and gas prices. Kazakhstan remains the most significant regional
    contributor to Afghan stability, donating money to the ANA Trust Fund,
    continuing to provide educational opportunities to Afghans, and
    offering technical support services. Kazakhstan is also moving closer
    to a United Nations peace-keeping operations deployment with a unit
    that has been trained with U.S. assistance. Looking at future
    opportunities to strengthen our partnership, Kazakhstan has expressed
    interest in working with the United States to improve its logistical,
    medical, and engineering military branches. Kazakhstan also partnered
    with the Arizona National Guard through our State Partnership program,
    providing us the ability to assist in this effort.
        The Kyrgyz Republic, Central Asia's sole democracy, faces a number
    of challenges including economic and border security issues. The Kyrgyz
    Republic sees political pressure from its larger, more powerful
    neighbors, including Russia, hosting a small Russian airbase outside
    the capital, Bishkek. Despite ongoing challenges in our bilateral and
    security cooperation, we continue to seek opportunities to improve our
    mil-to-mil relationship. After a lengthy period of time during which
    few bilateral activities occurred, the Kyrgyz military may be
    increasingly receptive to higher level military engagements and
    expanded cooperation in the areas of border security, counter-
    narcotics, counter-terrorism, and countering violent extremism.
    Furthermore, we continue to assist the Kyrgyz in building a deployable
    peace-keeping (PK) hospital capability that should be ready to support
    United Nations PK operations in the near future. Looking ahead, we
    intend to pursue opportunities for increased cooperation while taking
    steps to strengthen our relationships with the Kyrgyz.
        Pakistan remains a critical partner in the counter-terrorism fight.
    Twenty U.S-designated terrorist organizations operate in the
    Afghanistan-Pakistan sub-region; seven of the 20 organizations are in
    Pakistan. So long as these groups maintain safe haven inside of
    Pakistan they will threaten long-term stability in Afghanistan. Of
    particular concern to us is the Haqqani Network (HQN) which poses the
    greatest threat to coalition forces operating in Afghanistan. To date,
    the Pakistan military and security services have not taken lasting
    actions against HQN. We have consistently called upon the Pakistanis to
    take the necessary actions to deny terrorists safe haven and improve
    security in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) along the
    Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. We have seen some promising
    coordination between the Pakistan and Afghanistan militaries aimed at
    addressing instability in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. The
    Pakistan military in particular continues to conduct counter-terrorism
    and counter-insurgency operations in the FATA and facilitate, via
    ground and air lines of communication, the sustainment of coalition
    operations in Afghanistan.
        This past year we became increasingly concerned about the growing
    threat posed by the ISIS affiliate, Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K).
    Although their operational capacity has diminished as a result of
    United States, Afghanistan, and Pakistan military operations, we remain
    focused on defeating the group in both countries. Of note, we were
    encouraged to see the Pakistani military plan and execute a recent
    named operation in which they set up simultaneous multiple blocking
    positions along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border in order to reinforce
    ANDSF efforts to disrupt IS-K activities.
        We also continue to see ongoing tensions between Pakistan and
    neighboring India. India remains concerned about the lack of action
    against India-focused militants based in Pakistan and even responded
    militarily to terrorist attacks in India-held territory earlier this
    year. We assess that these types of attacks and the potential
    reactions, increase the likelihood for miscalculation by both
    countries. Furthermore, India's public policy to ``diplomatically
    isolate'' Pakistan hinders any prospects for improved relations. This
    is especially troubling as a significant conventional conflict between
    Pakistan and India could escalate into a nuclear exchange, given that
    both are nuclear powers. Additionally, Pakistan's increased focus on
    its eastern border detracts from its efforts to secure the western
    border with Afghanistan from incursion by Taliban and al-Qaida
    fighters. Security along the western border will nevertheless remain a
    priority for Islamabad, as the Pakistani military seeks to expand
    border control and improve paramilitary security.
        While there are challenges with respect to the United States-
    Pakistani relationship, we have endeavored to maintain a substantial
    level of engagement with our Pakistani military counterparts. We
    continue to execute a robust joint exercise program. Most recently, the
    Pakistani Air Force sent airmen and aircraft to participate in Exercise
    RED FLAG and GREEN FLAG at Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada this past
    summer. The Pakistani military also continues to support our efforts
    elsewhere in the region; most notably, the Pakistani Navy is the most
    consistent and longstanding participant, second only to the United
    States, in Combined Task Force (CTF)-150 (counter-terrorism operations)
    and CTF-151 (counter-piracy operations) led by U.S. Naval Forces
    Central (USNAVCENT). Our relationship with Pakistan remains a very
    important one. We look forward to continuing our engagement with the
    Pakistani military leadership, to include the new Chief of the Army
    Staff, General Qamar Javed Bajwa, in the days ahead as we work together
    in pursuit of shared interests.
        Our mil-to-mil relationship with Tajikistan is deepening despite
    Moscow's enduring ties and the presence of the 201st Military Base near
    Tajikistan's capital of Dushanbe, Russia's largest military base
    outside of its borders. China has also initiated a much stronger
    military cooperation partnership with Tajikistan, adding further
    complexity to Tajikistan's multi-faceted approach to security
    cooperation. Tajikistan's long border with Afghanistan remains the
    nation's top concern, as the Taliban intermittently fights for control
    of Afghanistan's Kunduz province, which is less than 160 miles from
    Dushanbe. These border concerns remain a focus area for U.S. security
    cooperation as we continue to develop the Tajiks' capacity to address
    violent extremism, terrorism, and narco-trafficking; enhance border
    security; and, confront other trans-regional threats.
        Turkmenistan's UN-recognized policy of ``positive neutrality''
    presents a challenge with respect to U.S. engagement. Our efforts to
    date have focused primarily on training, including in the areas of
    counter-narcotics and medical services. Due to Turkmenistan's shared
    border with Afghanistan, the Turkmen remain concerned about the
    continuing instability in Afghanistan and, separately, the potential
    for the return of foreign fighters. We are encouraged somewhat by
    Turkmenistan's expressed interest in increased mil-to-mil engagement
    with the U.S. within the limits of their ``positive neutrality''
    policy.
        We are cautiously optimistic about the possibility of Uzbekistan's
    improved relations with its neighbors in the region following the first
    presidential succession in the nation's 25-year history. This is a
    promising development given Uzbekistan's central and strategic
    geographic location, in the heart of Central Asia and bordering
    Afghanistan. President Mirziyoyev has reaffirmed the country's
    unwillingness to allow other nations to establish military bases in
    Uzbekistan, its restriction against aligning with foreign military or
    political blocs, and its self-imposed restriction against any type of
    expeditionary military operations. Despite these limitations, our
    bilateral mil-to-mil efforts are focused on helping the Uzbeks improve
    border security, enhance their counter-narcotic and counter-terrorism
    capabilities, and prevent the return of foreign fighters into the
    country, which are shared U.S. interests in the region. We remain
    committed to these security assistance efforts. We also are helping the
    Uzbek military, which is the largest military in Central Asia, to
    professionalize its forces through advisory support and assistance to
    its professional military institutions.
        Required Programs, Capabilities and Resources. The security
    environment in the Central Region remains complex and highly volatile.
    To ensure we are able to effectively achieve our mandate to protect our
    national interests, we must be properly postured with the necessary
    capabilities and resources to pursue opportunities in support of our
    goals and objectives, and to prevail in our various endeavors
    throughout USCENTCOM's 20-country area of responsibility. Below are the
    programs, capabilities, and resources most critical to our success.
        Building Partner Capacity. Building Partner Capacity (BPC) is
    essential to achieving our objectives in the Central Region. To improve
    stability in the USCENTCOM AOR and mitigate the need for costly U.S.
    military intervention, we must be forward-leaning and empower our
    partners to meet internal security challenges and work collectively to
    counter common threats. BPC is a lower-cost alternative to U.S. boots
    on the ground, has longer-term sustainability, and is necessary for
    interoperable, combined coalition operations. As such it represents a
    high return investment in the future of the Central Region. By building
    capacity and enabling partners to assume a larger role in providing for
    the stability and security of their sovereign spaces, we will enhance
    regional stability while still maintaining our critical access and
    influence in the region. Other tangible by-products achieved through
    our BPC efforts include enhanced interoperability, improved security
    for forward deployed forces and diplomatic sites, continued access and
    influence, and more professional regional militaries comprised of
    forces learning the importance of rule of law and compliance with human
    rights norms. Continued support of key partners engaged in the ongoing
    military campaign to defeat ISIS in Iraq and Syria is particularly
    important. As important as long-term regional stability is BPC's focus
    on the threat environment and shaping the region is critical to better
    prepare and deter and counter state and non-state aggression. Our key
    partners' ability to procure U.S. weapons and equipment and increase
    interoperability with U.S. and coalition forces is critical to our
    success. Any reduction of U.S. assistance risks undermining our allies
    and creating a security vacuum for exploitation by state and non-state
    actors with counter-U.S. or violent intentions.
        Foreign Military Financing and Foreign Military Sales. For decades,
    United States security assistance provided to countries including Saudi
    Arabia, Jordan, Yemen, Kuwait and Egypt, has helped create lasting
    partnerships and improve regional stability. Foreign Military Financing
    (FMF) assistance and the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program enable
    countries to meet their defense needs, while also promoting U.S.
    national security interests by strengthening coalitions and enhancing
    interoperability between and among U.S. and coalition forces. When we
    provide defense systems through U.S. security assistance, we are not
    just providing our partners with capabilities, we are committing to a
    long-term relationship that includes sustainment of those capabilities.
    The complex and technical nature of advanced defense systems often
    require continuous collaboration between countries. This may include
    training and support in the use of the equipment, maintenance
    assistance, and, in some cases, continuing help to update and modernize
    the equipment throughout its life-cycle.
        Nevertheless, we must better anticipate our partners' requirements
    and find ways to improve our FMF and FMS programs' processes to better
    meet demand in today's high-paced global security environment. Delays
    in procurement and delivery can, over time, jeopardize relationships
    with buyer nations and the potential for future FMS and FMF
    transactions. It is imperative that we make the FMF and FMS processes
    more responsive to partner needs.
        In recent years we have seen an increase in restrictions placed on
    assistance provided to partner nations, limiting their ability to
    acquire U.S. equipment based on human rights and/or political
    oppression of minority groups. While these are significant challenges
    that must be addressed, the use of FMF and FMS as a mechanism to
    achieve changes in behavior has questionable effectiveness and can have
    unintended consequences. We need to carefully balance these concerns
    against our desired outcomes for U.S. security assistance programs--
    both DOD and State-funded--to build and shape partner nations'
    capability, interoperability, and self-reliance in support of broader
    U.S. foreign policy. We should avoid using the programs as a lever of
    influence or denial to our own detriment.
        USCENTCOM Exercise and Training Program. The USCENTCOM Exercise
    Engagement Training Transformation (CE2T2) program enhances U.S.
    capability to support contingency operations while improving readiness
    and maintaining presence and access to the region. At the same time,
    the program indirectly increases partner nations' operational
    capability; demonstrates mutual commitment to regional security;
    ensures an effective coalition posture; strengthens relationships; and,
    improves combined command, control, and communications interoperability
    (C3I). More importantly, in light of the fact that today's conflicts
    are increasingly trans-regional, all-domain, and multi-functional in
    nature, bilateral and multilateral exercises support the unity of
    effort requirement for coalition operations.
        The USCENTCOM CE2T2 program continues to grow in complexity and
    relevance with expanded participation throughout the USCENTCOM AOR
    during fiscal year 2016 and into fiscal year 2017. Last year, the
    command conducted 45 USCENTCOM- and/or Component-sponsored bilateral
    and multilateral exercises with 41 partner nations and spanning seven
    Geographic and Functional Commands. These exercises shape the
    perceptions of key audiences in the USCENTCOM AOR to support U.S.
    strategic goals of reassuring partners and deterring aggressive and
    malign behavior. Exercise objectives and outcomes include maintaining
    key relationships while demonstrating multilateral, as well as
    unilateral, capabilities. They also enable increased cooperation and
    interoperability with our partners and help to reinforce a strong
    military posture in the region. This helps counter any false perception
    of the U.S. ``abandoning'' the region.
        Continued, robust, and reliable funding is necessary to fully
    support exercises as planned. For example, insufficient resourcing of
    component requirements can result in curtailment or even cancellation
    of efforts like Exercise EAGER LION, an annual multi-lateral training
    event in Jordan. This sub-optimization of the USCENTCOM exercise and
    training program ultimately will affect U.S. Joint and Combined Force
    readiness and create a perceived lack of commitment to our coalition
    partners. Combined with BPC, FMS, and FMF, the USCENTCOM CE2T2 program
    also actively promotes and supports regional stability through
    increased partner action and capability. These engagements not only
    build interoperability at the highest levels of command, but the
    benefits derived at the lowest, tactical levels of command and
    logistics manifest in long-term professional and personal relationships
    among participating country staffs.
        Information Operations. Information Operations (IO) will continue
    to serve as a key element in shaping the environment to reduce or avoid
    conflict and as a force multiplier in the information space during and
    after major combat and counter-insurgency operations. We have an
    enduring responsibility to employ IO to counter trans-regional threats.
    By utilizing IO as a comprehensive, long-term capability to degrade
    VEOs' effectiveness and counter state-sponsored destabilizing
    activities across the USCENTCOM AOR, the USG [United States Government]
    helps to improve regional stability while reducing the requirement for
    deployed U.S. forces. The Department of Defense (DOD), in concert with
    other USG agencies, has developed several IO campaigns, leveraging the
    latest technologies, which operate in the information domain. These
    campaigns include counter-propaganda messaging in print media, radio,
    television, short message service, Internet, and social media, and take
    a proactive approach to coordinating these activities with the country
    teams and embassies in our AOR. The nature and scope of threats
    prevalent today in the USCENTCOM AOR necessitates a robust response,
    and IO is a cost-effective application of DOD resources to deter
    aggression, counter destabilizing behavior, and decrease the potential
    for kinetic operations in order to protect USG and partner nation
    interests in the Central Region.
        Cyberspace Operations. USCENTCOM cyberspace operations are built on
    the foundation of cyber readiness and include both Department of
    Defense Information Network (DODIN) Operations and command-centric
    Defensive Cyberspace Operations. Our top cyberspace priority is mission
    assurance; the goal is to preserve freedom of maneuver in cyberspace to
    assure access to both U.S. and foreign assets critical to military
    operations. Efforts include, but are not limited to, helping to set
    priorities and contributing to the desired end-state of denying
    adversaries the ability to operate on our networks and impact our
    missions. We recognize the importance of maintaining a holistic
    approach to this evolving capability that emphasizes the need for a
    synchronized effort across the whole-of-government. While the full and
    proper implementation of all available USG/DOD technical defenses plays
    a vital role, the human element is the most important factor to protect
    and defend from malicious cyber activity. Looking ahead, USCENTCOM will
    continue to adapt our network defenses to detect, deter, and better
    react to known or anticipated threats.
        Anti-Access Area Denial. Potential adversaries are actively
    investing in competitive responses that include anti-access/area denial
    (A2AD) systems to minimize U.S. influence and abilities. Adversaries
    are also pursuing ``layered defenses'' to directly challenge U.S.
    diplomacy and presence. An enemy may use combinations of kinetic (e.g.,
    ballistic/cruise missiles, moored/floating mines, small boat swarms,
    submarines, aircraft, drones, irregular warfare using proxies,
    terrorism, WMD) and non-kinetic (e.g., GPS jamming, spoofing, cyber
    hacking, EMP, underground facilities, dispersal/camouflage of weapons/
    assets, shielding from aerial/satellite surveillance, decoys)
    capabilities to inhibit projection of force and/or precision strikes.
        Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance Assets. USCENTCOM holds
    daily requirements for over 2,800 hours of full-motion video, thousands
    of still images, thousands of hours of signal intelligence, and other
    key intelligence collection sources. These requirements do not reside
    only in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, but span the entirety of the
    USCENTCOM AOR. It is the layering, synchronization, and prioritization
    of national, theater, and tactical ISR capabilities that enable
    USCENTCOM force protection of transition, stability, and combat forces.
    This critical capability also performs several key functions including:
    battlespace awareness for partner and U.S. operational commanders, as
    well as indications and warning to guard against strategic threats and
    miscalculation; identification of fixed ground networks and facilities;
    location and tracking of adversary operational elements and units;
    mapping and development of adversary command and control; interdictions
    of facilitation entities, suppliers, and supply routes; and,
    characterization and targeting of funding centers and other support
    nodes. Our greatest difficulties in this fight remain in the
    development of enemy networks, groups, cells, and nodes that fight from
    within the populace. There are critical airborne ISR functions that
    must be present to map this unconventional threat. In priority order
    they are: 1) full-motion video, 2) signals intelligence, and 3)
    geospatial intelligence. USCENTCOM's requirements consistently outpace
    theater airborne ISR capacity and capability and the demand will
    continue to grow. We are able to address some of the shortfall through
    cross-CCMD and partner-nation coordination and capacity development. We
    also need to explore innovative ways to develop capabilities for
    persistent ISR through experimentation and technology maturation and
    demonstration projects. Additionally, we need to address the shortfalls
    associated with processing, exploitation, and dissemination of
    collected intelligence. For the foreseeable future, in the absence of
    additional much-needed ISR assets, maintaining operational awareness on
    threats, risks, regional stability, and humanitarian crises will
    require constant attention, creative application of ISR, hard choices
    on the prioritization of resources, and the determination of acceptable
    risk to mission and forces.
        Precision Munitions. Highly accurate munitions are vital components
    of our kinetic strike and integrated air and missile defense
    capabilities, to dominate and counter our adversaries' increasingly
    sophisticated networks of coastal and air defenses coupled with
    precision ballistic missiles. Missile interceptors, air- and sea-
    launched cruise missiles, precision air-to-ground and air-to-air
    missiles, and long-range precision ground-to-ground missiles work in
    concert to counter the growing threats we face today. We appreciate
    Congress' continued support for the procurement/replenishment,
    development, and forward positioning of precision and specific purpose
    munitions that are critical to the way we currently fight--in urban
    areas, with very specific rules of engagement designed to protect
    civilians and limit damage to infrastructure.
        Counter Unmanned Aerial Systems (C-UAS). The enemy Unmanned Aerial
    Systems (UAS) threat and employment in the USCENTCOM AOR is rapidly
    evolving. Numerous non-state actors including ISIS, al Qaida, Taliban,
    Lebanese Hezbollah, and Fatah al-Sham are using both commercial-off-
    the-shelf and military drones to conduct operations against United
    States and coalition forces. This threat has evolved from
    reconnaissance and surveillance missions to weaponized drone attacks
    resulting in battlefield casualties. State actors continue to increase
    the sophistication of their UAS with all countries in the USCENTCOM AOR
    utilizing various classes of UAS for operations. Given the evolving
    threat, the need for an effective Counter-UAS capability that can
    defeat all classes of UAS remains a top priority. To address this
    problem, USCENTCOM is working with various defense agencies and
    industry through the Joint Urgent Operational Need (JUON) process to
    develop and acquire an effective system to employ against UAS. The
    ability to rapidly respond to this emerging threat is critical to
    mission success and requires increased funding to promote innovative
    solutions with expedited testing and rapid acquisition.
        Joint and Interagency Partners. To ensure success in the pursuit of
    shared goals and objectives, our Joint and Interagency Partners must
    also be properly postured with the necessary capabilities and
    resources. Below are two key partners that play a significant role in
    support of USCENTCOM's mission and merit continued Congressional
    backing.
        Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization (JIDO)--JIDO, an
    element of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, is an invaluable
    organization that is even more important as we fight by, with and
    through our partners with fewer resources, but more exposed U.S.
    personnel and equipment in the fight. Their ability to rapidly respond
    to emerging threats is essential to enabling our efforts to counter
    improvised threats (e.g., counter-facilitation, counter-tunneling,
    counter-UAS) and build partner capacity in support of our deployed
    warfighters. The expert JIDO personnel embedded within our formations
    at USCENTCOM's headquarters in Tampa, forward deployed, and across the
    globe, provide mission-critical analytical, planning, and rapid
    acquisition support. Having this invaluable joint organization that can
    expose the broader counter-IED network, identify future disruptive
    threats, stay in front of technological changes, and integrate our
    efforts across the Interagency to rapidly implement solutions is
    essential to our ability to protect our forces, defeat threat networks
    and build partner national capacity.
        Global Engagement Center--The best way to defeat an idea is to
    present a better, more appealing idea to vulnerable and undecided
    audiences. The State Department's Global Engagement Center (GEC)
    effectively coordinates, integrates, and synchronizes messaging to
    foreign audiences designed to undermine the disinformation espoused by
    violent extremist groups, including ISIS and al Qaeda, while offering
    positive alternatives. The Center is focused on empowering and enabling
    partners, governmental and non-governmental, who are able to speak out
    against these groups and provide an alternative to ISIS's nihilist
    vision. To that end, the Center offers services ranging from planning
    thematic social media campaigns to providing factual information that
    counters disinformation to building capacity for third parties to
    effectively utilize social media to research and evaluation.
        Required Authorities and Appropriations. Fluid environments require
    flexible authorities with sustained and timely funding to respond to
    changes in conditions and maintain momentum of operational forces. We
    sincerely appreciate Congress' continued support for key authorities
    and appropriations needed for current and future operations and
    response to unforeseen contingencies. The required authorities and
    resources listed below enable USCENTCOM to accomplish its mission and
    stated objectives in support of U.S. national interests and the
    interests of our partners in the Central Region.
        Iraq Train & Equip Fund (ITEF). Iraq's ability to defeat ISIS
    requires professionalizing and building the capacity of the Iraqi
    Security Forces (ISF), including military or other security forces
    associated with the Government of Iraq, such as Kurdish and tribal
    security forces or other local forces with a national security mission.
    Most notably, the ongoing Coalition Military Campaign to defeat ISIS
    relies on indigenous Iraqi Security Forces to conduct ground operations
    against the enemy and liberate ISIS controlled territory. They have
    risen to the task and are making progress in this ongoing endeavor.
    While the initial training and equipping of the ISF focused heavily on
    developing Iraqi Army (IA) Brigades to conduct offensive operations,
    future efforts will shift to sustainment of combat capability and hold
    forces to ensure that liberated areas remain under the control of the
    GoI and that these forces are able to counter remaining ISIS pockets
    and any other VEOs which may emerge and attempt to fill the void
    created by the defeat of ISIS. These hold forces will be a combination
    of local tribal fighters and police forces.
        Syria Train & Equip Program. Protecting the United States from
    terrorists operating in Syria and setting the ultimate conditions for a
    negotiated settlement to end the conflict in that country will require
    the continued training and equipping of Vetted Syria Opposition (VSO)
    forces. Additional recruitment, retention, resupply, and support are
    central to our strategy to defeat ISIS in Syria. Our revised training
    approach is proving successful, improving the effectiveness and
    lethality of the force on path to a projected strength of up to 35,000
    by the end of fiscal year 2017 and growing to 40,000 in 2018.
    Procurement and manufacturing lead times for non-standard weapons and
    ammunition and delivery from various foreign vendors complicates the
    already complex train and equip mission, so we appreciate as much
    flexibility as possible in authorizing and appropriating funds for this
    effort. The SDF and VSOs continues to advance in defeating ISIS and
    holding and defending liberated areas, while also assisting local
    authorities in providing humanitarian and security assistance to the
    populace.
        The Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF). Since 2005, United
    States provision of funds executed through ASFF has provided training,
    equipment, infrastructure, sustainment and salaries for a generated
    force of up to 352,000 Afghan National Defense and Security Forces
    (ANDSF) and 30,000 Afghan Local Police (ALP). ASFF plays a critical
    role in enabling the ANDSF to secure Afghanistan with an effective and
    sustainable force that is central to the United States strategy to
    prevent a Taliban or al Qaeda resurgence, defeat VEOs, and deny safe
    haven for external plotting against the United States Homeland and U.S.
    and partner nation interests in the region.
        Afghanistan Aviation Transition Funding--The proposed Afghan Air
    Force (AAF) and Special Mission Wing (SMW) aviation transition program
    is critical to addressing capability gaps in Close Air Support (CAS)
    and lift for the ANDSF. The program is designed to address the
    shortfall in available aircraft and trained pilots to ensure Afghan
    forces have the required aviation support and maintenance pipeline to
    move toward self-sustainment and increased independent operations. DOD
    plans to achieve these results by transitioning the AAF and SMW to
    U.S.-manufactured rotary wing platforms. Although the availability of
    trained pilots remains a particular challenge for the ANDSF, recent
    successes are producing capable pilots and the recap plan is designed
    to ease the human capital burden over time. The additional capability
    that would be gained through the aviation transition program will
    provide the Afghans needed overmatch against insurgents and terrorists
    while improving ground forces' effectiveness and reducing ANDSF's
    casualty rates.
        Coalition Support. The authorities and funding that underpin our
    ability to effectively conduct Coalition operations, including in
    support of partners whose contributions are critical, but who lack the
    resources to participate without our assistance, are key to our
    continued success. The Coalition Support Fund (CSF) provides the
    authority to reimburse certain Coalition partners for logistical and
    military support provided by that nation in connection with Iraq,
    Syria, and Afghanistan operations. The CSF also funds the Coalition
    Readiness Support Program (CRSP) which authorizes supplies, the loaning
    of equipment, and specialized training assistance to coalition forces.
    The CSF relieves the operational burden on U.S. forces and enhances the
    visibility of Coalition presence. This authority remains critical to
    our strategic approach to Coalition operations, including, but not
    limited to, the ongoing military campaign to defeat the terrorist
    organization, ISIS in Iraq and Syria, and our transition in
    Afghanistan. The capability and interoperability that CSF funding
    facilitates is crucial to our bilateral relations, Coalition operations
    and training with partner nations, and to the success of our broader
    strategic and trans-regional objectives. The Global Lift and Sustain
    and successor authority further complements this approach by enabling
    us to provide transportation and life support to select Coalition
    partners.
        Commanders' Emergency Response Program (CERP). CERP is authorized
    for local commanders to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and
    reconstruction requirements in Afghanistan, and may be used to make
    condolence payments for the loss of life, injury, or property damage
    resulting from U.S., coalition, or supporting military operations. The
    NDAA for fiscal year 2017 provides authority for ex gratia payments in
    Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria for damage, personal injury, or death that
    is incident to United States combat operations. CERP funded projects
    directly benefit the indigenous civilian populations in Afghanistan and
    demonstrate the positive effects of our presence, while also providing
    tangible, quick mitigation when coalition actions result in casualties
    or property damage to civilians during the course of military
    operations. CERP is a proven force multiplier and a key enabler in
    responding to urgent humanitarian needs and promoting security. Going
    forward, we want to ensure commanders engaged in the Counter-ISIS
    missions can provide immediate, but limited, small scale humanitarian
    assistance to ISIS liberated areas, until national and international
    relief agencies can provide that support. Our responsiveness is
    critical to quickly stabilizing those areas in order to begin the
    holding phase of the campaign and to counter ISIS messaging.
        Military Construction (MILCON). USCENTCOM stewards constrained
    resources and maintains an expeditionary approach to posturing
    capabilities in theater. We leverage existing infrastructure and host
    nation support and funding where possible, as well as maritime posture
    and reach back capabilities to meet steady state and surge
    requirements. In some instances, MILCON is required to establish
    infrastructure to support forces and equipment in the execution of
    their missions. Of note, USCENTCOM requires support for development at
    Muwaffaq-Salti Air Base (MSAB), Jordan and construction of the new
    Consolidated Squadron Operations Facility at Al Udeid, Qatar. These two
    projects are essential to our contingency and steady state operations
    and support the Defense Strategic Guidance. The projects will support
    executing our priority war plans by providing critical dispersed,
    resilient and flexible capacity to accept both steady state and
    enduring joint forces, multiple aircraft types and provide critical air
    C4I (command, control, communications, computers and intelligence) for
    current and future contingencies, theater and strategic surge and
    maritime operations within the USCENTCOM AOR. MILCON development is
    critical to support the realignment of U.S. forces operating from an
    expeditionary approach at various contingency bases scattered across
    the AOR to the required enduring posture approach necessary to protect
    U.S. interests and to sustain key bilateral relationships.
        Prepositioned War Reserve Materiel (PWRM). Service Prepositioned
    War Reserve Materiel and capability sets remain critical force
    multipliers required to execute USCENTCOM's most dangerous and critical
    contingency plans. The Services and Defense Agency prepositioned
    capacity provides a shock absorber in rapidly emerging contingencies,
    buys critical decision space for our national leadership, and mitigates
    the risk associated with the tyranny of distance when we are called
    upon to rapidly aggregate and reintroduce forces into the region.
        The U.S. Central Command Team. The outstanding men and women who
    comprise the USCENTCOM Team truly are our most important assets. They
    continue to make tremendous contributions on behalf of our Nation and
    our partners and allies around the globe. We must ensure they have
    everything they need to do their jobs effectively, efficiently, and as
    safely as possible.
        We also continue to benefit from the unique capability provided by
    our Coalition Coordination Center, which consists of more than 200
    foreign military officers from nearly 60 partner nations. They, too,
    are important members of our USCENTOM Team and play a critical role in
    strengthening the partnerships between our nations.
        We remain mindful of the fact that success requires that we work
    together, not just within the command, but also with our teammates from
    other combatant commands, our Component Commands, established combined/
    joint task forces, the Central Region's 18 county teams, and various
    agencies and organizations throughout the USG and the Interagency. Our
    close collaboration with counterparts at the U.S. State Department, the
    U.S. Treasury, CIA, FBI, and JIDO, for example, has paid enormous
    dividends in the pursuit of shared national goals and objectives. We
    look forward to continuing to work with them and others on behalf of
    our Nation.
        We also are incredibly grateful for the support of our families.
    They are highly valued members of our USCENTCOM Team and we could not
    do what we do without them. They make important contributions and
    tremendous sacrifices each and every day in support of us and on behalf
    of the command and a grateful Nation.
        The upcoming year promises to be a busy and challenging one in the
    Central Region. You can be assured that the world-class team at U.S.
    Central Command--which includes more than 80,000 soldiers, sailors,
    airmen, marines, coastguardsmen, and civilians stationed today
    throughout the USCENTCOM area of responsibility--is up to the task, and
    is highly-skilled, motivated, and stands ready to do whatever is
    necessary to accomplish the mission: defend our Nation and our
    interests, the interests of partners and allies, and improve stability
    and security in that strategically important part of the world.

                        USCENTCOM: Prepare, Pursue, Prevail!

        Chairman McCain. Thank you.
        General Waldhauser?

      STATEMENT OF GENERAL THOMAS D. WALDHAUSER, USMC, COMMANDER,
                      UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND

        General Waldhauser. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman
    McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished members of the
    committee, thank you for the opportunity to update you on the
    activities and efforts of United States Africa Command.
        I would like to also say it is an honor for me to sit next
    to my battle buddy here, General Votel.
        For the past 9 months, I have been honored to lead the men
    and women of this geographic combatant command. Africa is an
    enduring interest for the United States. Small, but wise
    investments in the capability, legitimacy and accountability of
    African defense institutions offer disproportionate benefits to
    America, our allies, the United States, and most importantly,
    enable African solutions to African problems.
        Parts of Africa remain a battleground between ideologies,
    interests, and values. Equality, prosperity, and peace are
    often pitted against extremism, oppression, and conflict.
        Today trans-regional violent extremist organizations on the
    continent constitute the most direct security threat to the
    United States. To address this threat, our military strategy
    articulates a long-term, regionally focused approach for a safe
    and stable Africa.
        Specifically, the strategy outlines an Africa in which
    regional organizations and states are willing and capable
    partners addressing African security challenges all while
    promoting United States' interests. The Africa Command strategy
    builds our partners' abilities to direct, manage, and operate
    capable and sustainable defense institutions. While we have
    achieved progress in implementing our strategy, threats and
    challenges still remain.
        In East Africa, we support African Union and European Union
    efforts to neutralize al-Shabaab and other violent extremist
    organizations operating in Somalia. We also support the
    eventual transfer of security responsibilities from the African
    Union mission in Somalia to the Somali National Security
    Forces.
        In 2016, al-Shabaab regained some previously held Somalia
    territory, and today the group continues to conduct attacks on
    AMISOM [African Union Mission in Somalia] forces, the national
    security forces of Somalia, as well as the federal government
    of Somalia.
        Additionally, we have also seen elements of ISIS begin to
    make inroads into Somalia, which will further test AMISOM
    forces and the federal government of Somalia as well.
        The instability in Libya in North Africa caused by years of
    political infighting may be the most significant near-term
    threat to the U.S.'s and allies' interests on the continent.
    Stability in Libya is a long-term proposition. We must maintain
    pressure on the ISIS-Libya network and concurrently support
    Libya's efforts to reestablish a legitimate and unified
    government. This is a significant challenge, and we must
    carefully choose where and with whom we work and support in
    order to counter ISIS-Libya and not to shift the balance
    between various factions and risks of sparking greater conflict
    in Libya.
        In West Africa, our primary focus is countering and
    degrading Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa. Since 2011, Boko
    Haram has consistently carried out attacks against civilians
    and targeted partner regional governments and military forces
    in the Lake Chad Basin region. With forces from Benin,
    Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria, we are working with the
    multinational joint task force located in Niger to enable
    regional cooperation and expand partner capacity to ensure Boko
    Haram and ISIS-West Africa do not further destabilize the
    region.
        The multinational joint task force has been successful in
    enabling multinational cooperation and coordinating
    multinational operations and placed a significant pressure on
    Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa.
        In Central Africa, through the combined efforts of military
    forces, civilian agencies, and nongovernmental organizations,
    we work to build the capacity of our partners to address
    regional threats, such as maritime security, illicit
    trafficking of goods and persons, the Lord's Resistance Army,
    and other criminal networks and enterprises.
        Africa-wide we support the efforts to enable African
    partners to respond to humanitarian crises, mass atrocities,
    disaster contingencies, and to support peace operations.
    Through the United States National Guard's State Partnership
    Program, along with their African partners, we have improved
    disaster management competency and readiness to assist
    civilian-led efforts. We continue to see great value in the
    National Guard's persistent engagement and fully support the
    State Partnership Program's efforts.
        Africa's security environment is dynamic and complex
    requiring innovative solutions. Even with limited resources or
    capabilities, Africa Command aggressively works with partners
    and allies to execute our missions and mitigate risk. Moving
    forward, we continue to focus our decisive effort on building
    African partner capacity and will continue to work closely with
    the international and interagency partners to make small, wise
    investments which pay huge dividends in building stable and
    effective governments, the foundation for long-term security in
    Africa.
        I am confident with your support Africa Command will
    protect and promote United States' interests and keep the
    United States safe from threats emanating from the African
    continent.
        Finally, on behalf of the United States Africa Command, I
    want to thank you for the opportunity to be with you this
    morning, and I also look forward to your questions. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of General Waldhauser follows:]

               Prepared Statement by General Thomas D. Waldhauser
        Chairman, ranking member, distinguished members of the committee,
    thank you for the opportunity to update you on the activities and
    efforts of United States
    Africa Command to protect and promote United States national security
    interests in Africa. Since I last spoke with the Senate, I have had 9
    months to examine the opportunities and challenges the United States
    and our partners face in Africa. As expected in an area of
    responsibility covering 53 countries, issues are complex and varied. I
    am confident we have the right strategic approach to meet these
    challenges, and our efforts, in coordination with the efforts of our
    allies and partners, will have a lasting impact on the security and
    stability of the African continent. It is an honor to lead the efforts
    of the men and women of United States Africa Command in this dynamic
    and rapidly changing strategic environment.
        Africa remains an enduring interest for the United States, and the
    53 nations in the Africa Command Area of Responsibility look to the
    United States for assistance but, more importantly, for leadership--
    leadership that advantages our partners as they turn challenges into
    opportunities. We can meet our military objectives and advance American
    interests with a combination of strategic patience, targeted
    investments, and strong partnership to achieve shared security
    objectives and maintain our long-term approach which contribute to the
    conditions for development and good governance to take root. If we
    focus on working with our African partners on developing local
    solutions to radicalization, destabilization, and persistent conflict,
    we will remain the security partner of choice for the next decade, all
    while upholding our American values. Africa, our allies, the United
    States, and, indeed, the world will benefit from our actions to promote
    stable and effective nation states and defense institutions in Africa.
        In order to accomplish this goal, the United States must remain
    engaged on the continent, investing in the capability, legitimacy, and
    accountability of African
    defense institutions. We must continue to enable African solutions by
    building partner capacity, instilling professionalism within defense
    forces, and increasing their respect for the rule of law. When
    necessary, we must be ready to conduct military operations to protect
    U.S. interests, counter violent extremist organizations, and enable our
    partners' efforts to provide security. To protect and promote United
    States national security interests in Africa, diplomacy and development
    are key efforts, and our partnership with the Department of State and
    the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is key to achieve
    enduring success. Together, we work to address the root causes of
    violent extremism, lack of accountable government systems, poor
    education opportunities, and social and economic deficiencies to
    achieve long-term, sustainable impact in Africa. More specifically, I
    want to thank Congress for the authority to support other USG agencies
    under the 2017 National Defense
    Authorization Act. We now have the flexibility to facilitate a whole-
    of-government approach, which is the best opportunity to assist Africa
    in creating sustainable African solutions. This approach benefits
    Africans and Americans and mitigates the considerable security risks we
    currently face.
                             strategic environment
        Africa's sustained economic growth, improved social development,
    and growing entrepreneur class are unlocking the continent's potential
    for international investment and trade, raising its geostrategic
    importance to the U.S while also attracting international competition
    for access, influence, and trade. Africa's continued commitment to
    democracy, evidenced by the January 2017 actions of the Economic
    Community of West Africa (ECOWAS) to uphold the election results in The
    Gambia, reinforces the strong foundation of shared values and
    commitment to good governance the United States has with its African
    partners. As the United States pursues opportunities for greater
    partnership with Africa, we must be cognizant of the negative
    external and internal forces seeking to counter our shared goals and
    not be constrained by them.
        Africa links directly to United States strategic interests as the
    continent strives for inclusion in the rules-based international order.
    Just as the United States pursues strategic interests in Africa,
    international competitors, including China and Russia, are doing the
    same. Whether with trade, natural resource exploitation, or weapons
    sales, we continue to see international competitors engage with African
    partners in a manner contrary to the international norms of
    transparency and good governance. These competitors weaken our African
    partners' ability to govern and will ultimately hinder Africa's long-
    term stability and economic growth, and they will also undermine and
    diminish United States influence--a message we must continue to share
    with our partners.
        Parts of Africa remain a battleground between ideologies,
    interests, and values: equality, prosperity, and peace are often pitted
    against extremism, oppression, and conflict. The strategic environment
    includes instability that allows violent extremist organizations to
    grow and recruit from disenfranchised populations. Currently, the
    greatest threat to United States interests emanating from Africa is
    violent extremist organizations (VEOs). Furthermore, these VEOs are
    competing for primacy over other extremist movements in Africa and
    aspire to incorporate large portions of the continent into their
    respective ideologies. They build partnerships with regional VEOs;
    exploit the vulnerability of Africa's youth population; and take
    advantage of ungoverned and under-governed spaces to target our
    partners, our allies, and the United States Africa's population faces
    large scale unemployment and disenfranchisement from corrupt
    governments and abusive security forces, making them prime targets for
    exploitation by criminal and terrorist organizations across the
    continent.
        In addition to the transregional threats of terrorism, Africa is
    vulnerable to conflict and instability from political, social,
    economic, and environmental challenges. These forces are driving the
    current migrant crisis. The migrant flow between Africa and Europe
    greatly concerns our European allies. Europe views the migrant crisis
    as its preeminent security and economic issue. The International
    Monetary Fund estimates the initial cost of direct support to refugee
    inflow into the EU [European Union] will average approximately $16-32
    billion annually. When the secondary costs of migrant integration,
    border policing, and regional support are added, the cost increases to
    an additional $150 billion annually for the EU. Unfortunately, this
    crisis will most likely continue in the near future, as many African
    countries are not able to stem the flow at home.
        Globally, 15 of the top 25 most fragile countries of the world are
    in Africa, according to the 2016 Fund for Peace ``Fragile State
    Index.'' At the root of this fragility is weak governance. While
    governance is not a core mission of the Department of Defense, we
    recognize that building professional, legitimate defense institutions
    is critical to enabling a population-centric approach to governance
    that prioritizes the security of the population over the security of
    the regime. Because of this, our work continues to support the efforts
    of the Department of State and USAID to develop legitimate, rights-
    respecting security forces and address the root causes of instability.
                                command approach
    Theater Strategy (5-20 Years)
        In order to address the challenges and secure United States
    interests in the Africa, our strategy articulates a long-term,
    regionally-focused approach for a safe and stable Africa. Specifically,
    the strategy outlines an Africa in which regional organizations and
    states are willing and capable partners addressing security challenges,
    the security of the African population, and United States interests in
    Africa.
    Although our strategy is regionally focused, many programs and
    activities are executed bilaterally further stressing the importance of
    willing and capable partners. Transregional VEOs not only constitute
    the most direct security threat to the United States emanating from
    Africa but are also the most dangerous threat to stability in East,
    North, and West Africa. The 2015 National Security Strategy calls on us
    to work with Congress to train and equip partners in the fight against
    VEOs, and the United States Africa Command Area of Responsibility one
    theater in that broader fight. However, training and equipping African
    partners for the tactical fight is insufficient to achieve long-term
    stability. United States and international assistance must build our
    African partners' ability to direct, manage, sustain, and operate their
    own defense sectors over time. Capable and sustainable defense
    institutions are critical in providing a secure environment for the
    deepening of democracy and broad-based development, which together can
    diminish some of the factors that attract vulnerable persons into
    violent extremism and criminality.
        Our approach assumes the continuation of limited available
    resources, both financial and personnel, to accomplish U.S. objectives.
    Thus, Africa Command will continue to operate with security force
    assistance as the decisive effort of our strategy. However, any
    reduction to our already optimized (but limited) resources would impact
    Africa Command's ability to support the National Security Strategy and
    National Military Strategy objectives.
    Theater Posture
        Our command approach is driven by a light, adaptable footprint
    enabling joint operations, protection of U.S. personnel and facilities,
    crisis response, and security cooperation. We continue to maintain one
    forward operating site on the continent, Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, home
    of Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa, Africa Command's lead for
    East Africa efforts. This base is essential to United States efforts in
    East Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. Camp Lemonnier serves as a hub
    for multiple operations and security cooperation activities, assuring
    access in the region, freedom of movement through the Gulf of Aden, and
    protecting U.S. interests. The importance of our forward operating site
    was evident during the execution, the past summer, of Operation Oaken
    Steel, the reinforcement of the United States Embassy in Juba, South
    Sudan, to ensure the protection of embassy personnel during the
    conflict between rival factions. For this operation, United States
    Forces based out of Camp Lemonnier, as well as Moron, Spain, deployed
    to our cooperative security location in Entebbe, Uganda, which provided
    an effective staging location for rapid crisis response.
        As part of the 2017 Theater Posture Plan, Africa Command closed
    five contingency locations and designated seven new contingency
    locations on the continent due to shifting requirements and identified
    gaps in our ability to counter threats and support ongoing operations.
    These contingency locations strive to provide the necessary access in
    crucial areas aligned with the Theater Campaign Plan.
    Theater Campaign Plan (2-5 Years)
        Africa Command's Theater Campaign Plan seeks to disrupt and
    neutralize transnational threats by building African partner defense
    capability and capacity, as directed in the 2015 National Security
    Strategy, in order to promote regional security, stability, and
    prosperity, while always protecting U.S. personnel and facilities and
    the United States' access on the continent. This approach balances
    efforts to strengthen defense institutions and conduct counterterrorism
    operations with African partners and international allies, such as
    France and the UK, in order to disrupt, degrade, and eventually defeat
    extremists. Additionally, Africa Command conducts assessments to
    measure the effectiveness of our security cooperation activities to
    ensure our Theater Campaign Plan is achieving the desired results.
        Africa Command is currently operating along five Lines of Efforts
    (LOE) 1) Neutralize al-Shabaab and transition the security
    responsibilities of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to
    the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS); 2) Degrade violent extremist
    organizations in the Sahel Maghreb and contain instability in Libya; 3)
    Contain and degrade Boko Haram; 4) Interdict illicit activity in the
    Gulf of Guinea and Central Africa with willing and capable African
    partners; and 5) Build peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and
    disaster response capacity of African partners.
    LOE 1:  Neutralize al-Shabaab and Transition AMISOM to the FGS
        In 2015, AMISOM recaptured significant territory from al-Shabaab,
    al-Qaeda's pre-eminent affiliate in East Africa. In 2016 after
    Ethiopian forces, operating independently from AMISOM, withdrew from
    Somalia, al-Shabaab regained some territory, and, today, the group
    continues to conduct attacks on AMISOM forces, the FGS, and the Somali
    National Security Forces (SNSF). We have also seen followers of ISIS
    begin to make in-roads into Somalia, which will further test AMISOM
    forces and the FGS. Sustained conflict and prolonged food insecurity
    have driven approximately one million refugees out of Somalia and into
    neighboring countries, like Kenya, who struggle with overflowing
    refugee settlements. Current and anticipated drought conditions have
    led to poor harvests and increased food insecurity throughout East
    Africa that has increased the risk of famine in Somalia. Large scale
    refugee migrations can destabilize regions already stressed to meet the
    basic needs of its own populations.
        Ten years of operations in Somalia have left AMISOM troop
    contributing countries fatigued. Somalia is dependent on AMISOM forces
    to provide security and conduct counter-terror operations. AMISOM is
    scheduled to begin withdrawing in 2018, and if this departure begins
    prior to Somalia having capable security forces, large portions of
    Somalia are at risk of returning to al-Shabaab control or potentially
    allowing ISIS to gain a stronger foothold in the country.
        Africa Command supports our partners' efforts to neutralize al-
    Shabaab and other violent extremist organizations operating in Somalia
    and supports the transfer of security responsibilities from AMISOM to
    the SNSF once conditions allow. Africa Command and the Department of
    State, working with a substantial international security assistance
    effort well-coordinated by the UN Special Representative to the
    Secretary General, operates through the venue of the Security Six (UN,
    European Union, United States, UK, Turkey, and the United Arab
    Emirates). This international effort aims to demonstrate sufficient
    progress in building the SNSF in 2017 to justify an extension of AMISOM
    beyond 2019. Central to the United States approach in Somalia is our
    partnership with the FGS. Working with the Department of State, we are
    encouraging the FGS to come to an inclusive agreement on its security
    architecture in order to build a sustainable SNSF that accounts for
    regional dynamics and continue to reach out to the regional and local
    governments of Somalia.
        Africa Command continues to support the counter-terrorism efforts,
    assist AMISOM troop contributing countries, assist in equipping and
    training the SNSF, enable international partners in their training
    efforts, and protect United States personnel in Somalia and the region.
    Our advise, assist, and accompany efforts, paired with our deliberate
    targeting of top-level al-Shabaab leadership, have had a significant
    impact in degrading al-Shabaab's effectiveness in East Africa, but
    those two efforts are not enduring solutions to Somalia's problems.
        With the inauguration of President Mohamed Abdullahi ``Farmajo''
    Mohamed in February 2017, Somalia has seen its first-ever peaceful
    transition of power and first non-transitional government since 2006.
    President Farmajo's platform promotes good governance and anti-
    corruption, and he has indicated further opening the door for increased
    coordination with the United States and the international community.
    His widespread popularity within Somalia suggests he has a personal
    interest in helping push the country towards one-person one-vote
    elections in 2020.
        While we continue to work with the Security Six partners to
    coordinate our efforts in support of the SNSF, our support to AMISOM
    troop contributing countries is constrained by the use of security
    cooperation funding and associated processes designed to train and
    equip forces over the long term rather than to support current
    operations. The new Chapter 16 authorities in the 2017 National Defense
    Authorization Act provide the needed funding flexibility--multi-year
    monies and up to five years sustainment monies--to further the progress
    of degrading and ultimately defeating al-Shabaab while protecting
    United States interests in East Africa. Africa Command is working with
    OSD and Congress to accelerate the notification and approval timelines
    to better tailor our training and equipping efforts with our AMISOM and
    Somalia partners.
    LOE 2:  Degrade Violent Extremist Organizations in the Sahel Maghreb
            and Contain Instability in Libya
        The instability in Libya and North Africa may be the most
    significant, near-term threat to United States and allies' interests on
    the continent. The multiple militias and fractured relationship between
    factions in east and west Libya exacerbate the security situation,
    spilling into Tunisia and Egypt and the broader Maghreb, allowing the
    movement of foreign fighters, enabling the flow of migrants out of
    Libya to Europe and elsewhere. Africa Command is working to ensure
    United States interests are protected and to enable our African
    partners to contain instability originating in Libya, counter violent
    extremist organizations in the Sahel-Maghreb, and develop the requisite
    defense institutions to maintain security in the region.
        Stability in Libya is a long-term proposition requiring strategic
    patience as the Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA) forms and
    develops. We must maintain pressure on the ISIS-Libya network
    concurrently with Libya's efforts to progress with political
    reconciliation. This is a significant challenge given Libya's
    absorption capacity for international support remains limited, as is
    our ability to influence political reconciliation between competing
    factions, particularly between the GNA and the House of
    Representatives. We must carefully choose where and with whom we work
    with to counter ISIS-Libya in order not to shift the balance between
    factions and risk sparking greater conflict in Libya.
                Degrade ISIS-Libya Network
        Our operations in Libya support the global coalition's efforts to
    defeat ISIS-Libya. Operation Oddysey Lightning (OOL) enabled GNA-
    aligned forces to successfully liberate the city of Sirte from ISIS
    control. However, even with the success of Sirte, ISIS-Libya remains a
    regional threat with intent to target United States persons and
    interests. We will continue to support Libyan partners and an
    international coalition to defeat ISIS-Libya and build the capacity of
    the region while limiting civilian casualties. OOL can serve as a model
    for future U.S. operations in the region by improving the battlefield
    capabilities and ethics of a partnered force, working on the partner's
    timeline without following planning-mandated timelines, remaining
    flexible to keep an international force together and most importantly,
    limiting civilian casualties.
                Support the Government of National Accord (GNA)
        Despite its success in Sirte, the GNA continues to struggle with
    controlling Tripoli, providing basic services, and exercising authority
    over security forces. The political situation in Libya remains
    extremely dynamic, and the GNA faces a host of political, economic, and
    security challenges. We continue to support the diplomatic,
    stabilization, and development activities of the U.S. Interagency. We
    must also continue to promote development of responsive and effective
    governance and ensure the rights of all Libyans are respected. These
    are foundational to long-term regional security. Additionally, the
    House of Representatives (HoR)--and their military arm, the Libyan
    National Army (LNA)--must play a constructive role in the development
    of a unified, functioning Libyan Government. While we recognize Libya's
    struggle for a unified government remains uncertain and may not
    materialize within the foreseeable future, a national security
    structure solution accommodating the HoR and LNA provides a path
    forward.
        In an effort to counter regional instability, Africa Command
    supports partners like Tunisia, a major non-NATO Ally. Africa Command
    is assisting the Tunisian military to develop and sustain Special
    Forces, border security capabilities and Tunisia's intelligence
    capability. Working with the intelligence community and our component
    commands, Africa Command is training Tunisian intelligence
    organizations through train, advise, and assist mentors. Our efforts
    include helping Tunisia to establish an intelligence school, an
    intelligence fusion center, and the development of a professional
    intelligence career field within the Ministry of Defense. This model
    demonstrates an effective means of building initial counterterrorism
    intelligence capacity, and then transitioning to sustainable
    intelligence capacity building within a partner's intelligence
    organizations, all focused on unit vice individual development. We also
    work with Tunisia to develop and enhance its rotary wing capabilities.
    Through foreign military sales and excess defense articles programs,
    Tunisia has procured eight UH-60M Blackhawks and 24 OH-58D Kiowa
    Warrior helicopters. Tunisia expects the Blackhawks to function as a
    multirole aircraft providing casualty evacuation, troop transport, and
    air assault capabilities, and the Kiowas to provide much needed
    reconnaissance, precision strike, and close air support capabilities.
    With the assistance of ongoing U.S.-provided air-to-ground integration
    training, these helicopters, added to the Tunisian operational
    inventory, sustained in part by the Department of State's Foreign
    Military Financing will provide better speed and response time during
    crises and a major boost to the modernization and capabilities of the
    Tunisian Armed Forces to conduct counterterrorism and border security
    operations in Tunisia.
                Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
        Along with the threat posed by ISIS, AQIM remains a significant
    threat to United States interests and the security of our African
    partners. AQIM in Mali continues to exploit ethnic resentments in
    central Mali and spread their influence rendering large areas of the
    country ungovernable. With Operation BARKHANE, France continues to lead
    the fight to counter violent extremists throughout the Sahel region.
    However, Mali's path toward greater stability and security remains
    unclear. The government, ex-rebel armed groups, and pro-government
    militias have demonstrated little political will to implement the peace
    accord signed in June 2015 and continue to commit human rights
    violations against civilians. The framework of political reforms and
    security measures, though imperfect, are the only existing solution for
    Mali to emerge, without further bloodshed, from the crisis that began
    in 2012.
        We continue to support France's counterterrorism operations in Mali
    against al-Qaeda affiliate groups and seek to increase our
    synchronization and coordination with their efforts. Continued airlift
    and logistical support is essential to France's efforts, and we must
    continue to provide this support if progress is to happen in this
    volatile region. Additionally, with the Department of State, we
    continue to support the troop contributing countries to the UN
    Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, which
    currently provides some measure of security in northern Mali. We
    continue to look for opportunities to take a more active role in
    defeating AQIM and supporting the accountable, inclusive governance
    that is key to durability and protecting our interests throughout the
    regions.
    LOE 3:  Contain and Degrade Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa
        A primary focus for Africa Command in West Africa is containing and
    degrading Boko Haram and its offshoot since last year, ISIS-West
    Africa. Since 2010, Boko Haram has carried out attacks against
    civilians and directly targeted partner regional governments and
    military forces in the Lake Chad Basin (Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, and
    Chad). Africa Command works with our Lake Chad Basin partners to expand
    partner capacity and capabilities to support regional cooperation and
    expand our African partner capacity and capabilities to ensure Boko
    Haram and ISIS-West Africa does not threaten partner, allied, or United
    States interests and do not destabilize the region.
        The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), an African-inspired and
    African-led initiative that includes Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and
    Nigeria, provides a critically important venue for planning and
    coordinating security operations and for linking intelligence to these
    operations. As a result, the MNJTF and its member states have
    considerable successes in enabling multinational cooperation and
    coordinating multinational operations, and have placed significant
    pressure on Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa. Thanks to this pressure,
    Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa are less able to inflict mass
    casualties than in the past, and they control only a fraction of the
    territory they occupied in 2014 and early 2015. Nonetheless, through
    the continuing threat of asymmetric attacks, Boko Haram and ISIS-West
    Africa sustain a reign of terror across much of Northeastern Nigeria
    and the border areas of the neighboring Lake Chad Basin countries, thus
    preventing millions of displaced persons from returning to their homes.
        The advent of ISIS-West Africa adds a new dimension to the
    insecurity of the Lake Chad Basin. This group, with official ties to
    ISIS, operates in a more disciplined fashion than Boko Haram; by
    avoiding attacks against Sunni Muslims and by forging relations with
    the local population, ISIS-West Africa could take deeper root in the
    Lake Chad Basin region, thus making it a greater threat to our
    partners. Although determined to defeat Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa
    and return stability to the region, the MNJTF faces significant
    challenges in maintaining pressure on Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa
    while simultaneously addressing competing individual security
    requirements in the face of individual financial constraints.
        Africa Command, while not engaged in direct military operations,
    supports the efforts of our Lake Chad Basin partners to counter Boko
    Haram and ISIS-West Africa by providing advisors, intelligence,
    training and equipment to complement other United States-provided
    equipment and logistical support. The P3 (France, U.K., United States)
    Cellule de Coordination et de Liaison (Coordination and Liaison Cell-
    CCL) coordinates international support to the MNJTF and its member
    states to ensure that such support is complementary and effective. This
    past December, the U.S. assumed 6-month rotational leadership of the
    CCL for the first time, and we are taking full advantage of this
    opportunity to strengthen P3 support for the MNJTF and its member
    states.
        Africa Command provides security force assistance directly to
    regional military partners in order to enable operations and build
    institutional capacity over the long term. For example, in 2016, we
    provided Niger two ISR-equipped Cessnas to enhance Niger's capacity to
    collect ISR to support its efforts to fight terrorism. This added
    capacity has had an important impact in bolstering Niger's ability to
    fight the terrorists. In 2017 we intend to provide Chad and Cameroon
    each with two ISR-capable Cessnas. Additionally, in Chad, we are
    working to strengthen border reconnaissance forces with training and
    equipment to bolster its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
    (ISR) capabilities. Cameroon likewise is a major recipient of United
    States security assistance via train and equip programs. In fiscal year
    2016 and fiscal year 2017, the United States invested over $123 million
    to expand Cameroonian ISR, command and control, and counter-terrorism
    force and logistics capabilities.
        While regional partners have assisted in slowing the progress of
    Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa, long-term success requires Nigeria to
    address development, governance, and economic deficiencies exacerbated
    by the humanitarian emergency, which serve as drivers of violent
    extremism in northeastern Nigeria and throughout the Lake Chad Basin
    region. Under the current Government of Nigeria's leadership, Nigeria
    is making progress but must still overcome systemic corruption and
    build the trust of civilian populations, including by protecting human
    rights abuses and holding accountable those who are responsible for
    abuses. Nigeria's success in addressing these governance and
    development issues is key to an enduring solution in the Lake Chad
    Basin.
        Despite gains made against Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa, nearly
    two million people remain displaced from their homes in Nigeria, and
    over 400,000 others are displaced in Niger, Chad, and Cameroon.
    Moreover, the international humanitarian community has identified
    famine conditions throughout the areas of hostility in northeast
    Nigeria, and continued violence in these areas prevents responders from
    delivering life-saving assistance, prolonging a man-made food crisis.
    Refugees and internally displaced persons mostly reside informally in
    makeshift camps or mixed in with host communities, which are themselves
    under great stress to meet basic needs and are vulnerable to
    exploitation. The large numbers flowing into receiving communities--
    some already stressed to meet basic food and security needs--may have a
    destabilizing effect on these communities. Africa Command continues to
    coordinate with the Department of State and USAID, who work closely
    with the United Nations and non-governmental organizations to alleviate
    suffering, implement reintegration programs, and promote stability in
    the region.
    LOE 4:  Interdict Illicit Activity in the Gulf of Guinea and Central
            Africa with Willing and Capable African Partners
        Africa Command also supports our African partners, international
    partners, and Interagency partners to interdict and counter illicit
    actors and their activities in Central Africa and the Gulf of Guinea.
    Our priority effort is to build the institutional capacity of our
    African partners to address the many forms of illicit activity that
    threaten their security and regional stability. This mission requires a
    whole-of-government approach, and we work closely with the Department
    of State, Department of Treasury/FBI, and components of the Department
    of Homeland Security to synchronize our approach and complement each
    other's efforts. These efforts are enhanced by having the Interagency
    embedded within Africa Command, a benefit to our mission.
                Countering the Lord's Resistance Army
        In Central Africa, led by the efforts of Special Operations
    Command-Africa, we have focused on working with the African Union
    Regional Task Force (AU-RTF) to counter the Lord's Resistance Army
    (LRA), one of the many illicit actors operating in the region. Uganda,
    the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic, and
    South Sudan have contributed forces to the AU-RTF, which has led
    military efforts to reduce the LRA's safe havens, capture key leaders,
    and promote defections. With advice and assistance from U.S. forces,
    the AU-RTF has been largely successful.
        Through the combined efforts of military forces, civilian agencies,
    and non-governmental organizations, the LRA is not a threat to central
    governments and populations centers, but reduced to areas of ungoverned
    spaces. Today, although the group's leader, Joseph Kony, remains at
    large, we estimate fewer than 150 Lord's Resistance Army fighters
    remain, and communities are better prepared to protect themselves.
                Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea
        Despite decreased United States reliance on African oil imports
    over the past three years, the resource-rich Gulf of Guinea region
    remains a strategic interest to the United States due to its role in
    the global oil market, its strategic location close to a major maritime
    trade route, the more than 74,000 American citizens in the area, and
    its exploitation as a transit point for illicit trafficking from the
    Americas to Europe. In the Gulf of Guinea, maritime security sector
    assistance consists of long-term efforts to build the capacity of
    African partners to achieve combined maritime law enforcement
    operations between the partners. Africa Command strongly supports the
    implementation of the 2013 Yaounde Code of Conduct through regional
    strategic zone agreements. The agreements promote shared law
    enforcement responsibility against piracy and armed robbery at sea;
    trafficking of drugs, arms, and persons; and illegal, underreported,
    and unregulated fishing. Cross-water boundary tracking and interdiction
    missions have been widely successful, and we look forward to working
    with our partners in the region to expand the capability in the coming
    years.
        In 2017, the Gulf of Guinea Commission will meet to finalize the
    Code of Conduct, converting the document into a binding agreement
    providing a valuable mechanism to build accountable governance,
    strengthen port and vessel security, and improve transparency.
    Furthering the building of maritime capacity, Belgium, France, Germany,
    and the UK regularly participate in regional maritime exercises and
    operations. Africa Command's efforts, led by United States Naval Forces
    Africa, target assistance and capacity building through the African
    Partnership Station, Exercise Obangame Express, and the Africa Maritime
    Law Enforcement Partnership Program.
    LOE 5:  Build Peacekeeping, Humanitarian Assistance, and Disaster
            Response Capacity of African Partners
        Africa Command supports United States Governmental efforts that
    enable African partners across the African continent to support
    disaster response and peace operations within their region or
    throughout Africa. Through the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA),
    our implementing partner, we build our partner's capacity to secure
    pathogens of security concern and improve partners' capabilities to
    respond to the deliberate or accidental release of materials of concern
    and to support civilian-led responses to infectious diseases. The
    Africa Partner Outbreak Response promotes effective military-civilian
    partnerships in the health and security communities and leverages best
    practices among African partners. Africa Command's support to this
    initiative maintains health security and mitigates the risks of another
    epidemic emanating from the continent.
        Another important implementing partner to Africa Command's crisis
    and disaster response efforts is the National Guard's State Partnership
    Program (SPP). The SPP and their African partners have improved
    disaster management competency and readiness to support civilian-led
    efforts. Currently, SPP has established partnerships with thirteen
    African nations to advance Africa Command and partner objectives.
    Africa Command continues to see the value of the National Guard's
    continuous engagement and fully support SPP's efforts.
        Additional programs building the capacity of our African partners
    are the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), the African
    Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership (APRRP) and the Women, Peace,
    and Security (WPS) programs. In partnership with the Department of
    State, GPOI is working to strengthen international capacity and
    capabilities to execute UN and regional peacekeeping operations. Though
    it is a global program, the preponderance of GPOI work is on the
    African continent, with 22 active African partner countries. Through
    GPOI, we aim to build sustainable, self-sufficient peace operations
    proficiencies in almost half of the countries in Africa to deploy and
    operate in UN and regional peace operations. We are also working
    collaboratively with U.S. and international stakeholders to improve the
    operational effectiveness of these missions. APRRP supplements the work
    we do through GPOI, enabling a deeper investment in six of the most
    capable African peacekeeping contributing countries to build their
    capacity to rapidly respond to emerging crises on the continent.
    Through APRRP, we are developing key enabling capabilities such as
    aviation; medical; engineering; logistics; command, control,
    communications, and information systems; and formed police units. GPOI
    and APRRP do not only help us to build the peacekeeping capabilities of
    partners in Africa (both for long-term sustainment or expansion of
    current contributions and for rapid response to emerging crises), but
    they also help to professionalize militaries through our training and
    equipping support, enhance defense institutions through their capacity
    building approach, and deepen our mil-mil partnerships.
        Africa Command recognizes for capacity building efforts to be
    effective, they need to align with Women, Peace, and Security (WPS)
    objectives. We do this by integrating a gender perspective into our
    military activities through two main efforts: 1) staff training and
    awareness, and 2) integration into the Theater Campaign Plan. For
    training and awareness, Africa Command hosts the Gender in Military
    Operations program, which solicits perspectives from African partners
    on gender issues within their military and during operations. For
    campaign planning, we integrate WPS concepts into peacekeeping capacity
    building, mil-to-mil engagements; training on human rights, rule of
    law, gender-based violence; and peacekeeping exercises. WPS works to
    professionalize our partners' militaries and build their effectiveness
    to meet security challenges.
        Africa Command's primary engagement with Southern Africa is also
    through this line of effort. Along with being the most stable region in
    Africa, the region fields some of the most professional and capable
    military forces on the continent. For example, at the August 2016
    Southern Africa Regional Leaders Seminar, topics such as climate
    change, environmental issues, uncontrolled migration, and health and
    disease capacity building were discussed, which speaks to Southern
    Africa's capacity to address advanced, global security issues. In the
    past year, South Africa, Zambia, and Malawi have contributed to United
    Nations peacekeeping operations in Sudan, South Sudan, the Central
    African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Furthermore,
    Malawi will host the upcoming Africa Land Forces Summit and Exercise
    Africa Endeavor, and South Africa is hosting Exercise Shared Accord to
    further develop its capacity to support peacekeeping operations. We are
    complementing Department of State efforts to train and deploy
    peacekeepers with development of the defense institutions necessary to
    promote sustained regional stability over time. Africa Command will
    also continue to develop the capacity of Southern African troop
    contributors to the UN Missions in the Central African Republic, the
    Democratic Republic of the Congo, and South Sudan.
        Our efforts, and those of the Department of State to build
    sustainable and self-sufficient peace operations capacity, to include
    rapid response capabilities, sustainable force generation and training
    institutions, and modest improvements to strategic mobility, enable our
    partners across East, North, West, Central, and Southern Africa to lead
    the response to the threats, man-made or natural, facing their regions.
                           implementing our approach
                Synchronization with Partners
        Africa Command relies on our strong international, interagency, and
    multinational relationships to achieve our objectives. Africa Command
    works with international partners to synchronize operations and
    security force assistance on the continent. Fourteen of our
    international partners are represented at Africa Command, co-located in
    our Multi-National Coordination Cell (MNCC). One particularly powerful
    enabler is the Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) concept (managed via
    United States Army Africa), which allows for relatively easy access to
    unassigned forces. The RAF executes a significant share of the Theater
    Security Cooperation activities in Africa, contributing meaningfully to
    mission success. Additionally, the United States leads and participates
    in multilateral planning groups for East Africa, North Africa, the
    Sahel Maghreb, and Naval Forces Africa recently concluded flag-level
    staff talks with its French service component counterpart to
    synchronize our combined strategic approach in the Gulf of Guinea. In
    East Africa, we are synchronizing security force assistance to AMISOM
    troop contributing countries and the SNSF. In North Africa,
    international partners are positioned to support international planning
    in support of stabilization efforts in Libya as conditions allow. In
    the Sahel Maghreb, we have begun to coordinate activities and do
    multilateral planning in support to the MNJTF in the Lake Chad Basin
    and operations in Mali.
        Also important to Africa Command's efforts are the diplomatic and
    development efforts of our Interagency partners, Department of State
    and USAID. Over the past three years, we have established an annual
    Africa Strategic Dialogue and Africa Strategic Integration Conference
    to coordinate and integrate our activities with the Department of State
    and USAID, working hand in hand to build the capacity of our partners
    and strengthen African defense institutions. In partnership with the
    Department of State, the Security Governance Initiative (SGI) builds
    the capacity of civilian and defense institutions who provide oversight
    to the security sector. With the six SGI partners (Ghana, Kenya, Mali,
    Niger, Nigeria, Tunisia), we support efforts to strengthen governance
    across the security sector. These long-term SGI efforts will improve
    the effectiveness and sustainability of U.S. security assistance
    investments and activities.
        Also essential to our mission is our relationship with other
    combatant commands. We coordinate with European Command for shared
    response forces. We rely heavily on our European allies such as Spain,
    Italy, and Greece for force projection out of southern Europe. Without
    these relationships, we could not execute our missions on the
    continent. We also coordinate with Central Command for shared response
    forces as well as Egypt and Arabian Peninsula equities. Lastly, we
    coordinate with Special Operations Command (through Special Operations
    Command-Africa) for counter-terrorism strategy and operations. An
    example of our cooperation with other combatant commands, both
    Operation Odyssey Lightning and Operation Oaken Steel required assets
    outside of Africa Command's assigned forces for extended periods of
    time, and this close cooperation helped achieve mission success in an
    efficient manner.
                Security Force Assistance Resources
        Our recent success in building the capacity and defense
    institutions of our African partners was only possible with funding
    provided by Congress through the Counter-Terrorism Partnership Fund
    (CTPF) and other programs. This funding, and the authorities provided
    to build the capacity of foreign security forces, has been essential to
    our success in enabling African partners and enhancing their capability
    to counter extremist organization within their borders and in support
    of collective regional efforts. Africa Command appreciates the
    flexibility provided by Congress with the new section 333 authority. We
    will continue to prioritize crucial airlift, ISR, command and control
    systems, sustainment, and force structure development of our African
    partners. We will ensure our investments in African defense
    institutions continue to directly support United States national
    interests.
        Programs such as the before-mentioned Security Governance
    Initiative and Counter-Terrorism Partnership Fund provide us the
    ability to work with our partners to strengthen their institutions.
    Institutions fashioned in accordance with the rule of law, protecting
    African citizens, and providing inclusive opportunities. Sustaining our
    efforts at current if not increased level of priority will ultimately
    determine if building partner capacity succeeds and if our African
    partners can improve security environments and progress toward good
    governance.
                Capability Constraints
        Africa's security environment is dynamic and complex requiring
    innovative solutions. Even with limited resources or capabilities,
    Africa Command leans forward, working with partners and allies, to
    execute its mission and mitigate risk. While the command has been able
    to succeed in multiple efforts, our mission is impacted by inconsistent
    resourcing of key requirements and capabilities. These constraints risk
    our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coast guardsmen, and civilians
    executing activities on the African continent. For example, only
    approximately 20-30 percent of Africa Command's ISR requirements are
    met. This limits situational understanding, support to operations, and
    fails to offer threat indications and warnings. For personnel recovery,
    Africa Command relies heavily on contract Search and Rescue assets due
    to lack of dedicated assets to support operations. Furthermore, African
    partners lack the capability and capacity to assist with personnel
    recovery missions. Integrating personnel recovery and surgical
    stabilization/medical sustainment capabilities are a moral obligation
    and essential for the proper care of U.S. servicemembers who risk their
    lives to protect our nation. Africa lacks a theater distribution
    network to support our forces. This issue manifests itself most
    significantly in West Africa where we have approximately 1,000
    personnel conducting 12 named operations across a nine nation region.
    This capability gap forces our personnel to revert to costly and
    ineffective ad hoc solutions. An effective hub and spoke distribution
    system would consolidate cargo, replace multiple commercial contracts,
    and eliminate the use of heavy military cargo planes and deliver an
    efficient low volume/low frequency sustainment solution. In Operation
    Odyssey Lightning (OOL), the United States military effort to support
    the Libyan Government against the ISIS, incorporating Afloat Forward
    Staging Base and amphibious ship capability into operational planning
    added to the successful execution of the mission. Currently, Africa
    Command has an unfilled requirement to maintain this capability, which
    would serve to fill critical personnel recovery and casualty evacuation
    shortfalls. Additionally, this amphibious capability, during OOL,
    supported maritime-based ISR operations, and Africa Command could
    further exploit this capability to support additional operations
    against regional threats.
        Our capability constraints are most profound in our support to the
    Department of State-led mission to protect U.S. personnel and
    facilities. Flexible posture through our cooperative security locations
    and contingency locations, complemented by the highly-valued Special
    Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force-Crisis Response at Moron Air Base,
    Spain the United States Special Operations Force-led Crisis Response
    Force in Baumholder, Germany and the East Africa Response Force in
    Djibouti, provide response options during crises. However, the tyranny
    of distance posed by the continent challenges that responsiveness, and
    we knowingly accept risk for operations. To mitigate this risk,
    finalizing the development of key cooperative security locations
    through Defense Cooperation Agreements with host nations, coupled with
    accurate indications and warnings from increased ISR and the ability to
    recover and evacuate our personnel, will ensure swift crisis response
    to all our embassy locations in Africa.
    Looking Toward the Future
        Moving forward, United States Africa Command continues execute its
    mission on the African continent. We continue to focus our decisive
    effort on building African partner capacity--and supporting African
    solutions to African problems. We continue to work closely with
    international and Interagency partners to make small, wise investments
    which pay huge dividends in building stable and effective governments--
    the foundation for long-term security in Africa. I am confident that
    with your support, Africa Command will protect and promote United
    States interests and keep the United States safe from threats emanating
    from Africa. Thank you for your continued support to our mission and to
    the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coast guardsmen, civilians,
    contractors, and families of the United States Africa Command.

        Chairman McCain. Thank you, General.
        General Votel, do you agree that we are in a stalemate in
    Afghanistan after 15 years?
        General Votel. Mr. Chairman, I do.
        Chairman McCain. In some measurements, maybe you could
    argue that when we go from control of 72 percent of the country
    to 52 percent, that is worse than a stalemate.
        Would you agree that one of the most disturbing things
    about the attack on the hospital yesterday--that attack was
    carried out by ISIS, not by the Taliban, which shows at least
    to this person that we are seeing an increase in influence of
    ISIS, as well as Russia providing weapons and the Iranians
    playing a greater role than in the past.
        I guess my question is, are we developing a strategy to
    break the stalemate, and is it going to require additional U.S.
    troops?
        General Votel. Mr. Chairman, the answer to your question is
    yes, we are developing a strategy, and we are in discussions
    with the Secretary and the Department right now. Both General
    Nicholson and I are forming our best advice and recommendations
    to the Secretary, and we look forward to moving forward with
    that.
        I do believe it will involve additional forces to ensure
    that we can make the advise and assist mission more effective.
        Chairman McCain. Already you have received a capability on
    rules of engagement which enhance your abilities to combat the
    enemy. Is that correct?
        General Votel. That is correct.
        Chairman McCain. We have got a very interesting and
    challenging situation in Syria, and that is the whole issue of
    the Kurds, our relationship with them, Erdogan's relationship
    with them, the importance of the use of Insurlik, the
    importance of our relationship with Turkey. I met with
    President Erdogan in Ankara recently. He is passionately
    opposed to Kurdish involvement and our support of the Kurds
    that I understand are going to be a very vital element in
    expediting the retaking of Raqqa.
        This is a complex situation, and it would take all my time,
    as you know, to go through all this. But I think there is a
    possibility of an impending conflict between Turkey and the
    Kurds as opposed to us all working together to try to defeat
    ISIS and remove them from Raqqa. Do you see that as a scenario
    that we should be concerned about?
        General Votel. I do, Mr. Chairman, and to that end, we are
    trying to take actions to prevent that from occurring.
        Chairman McCain. Well, we find ourselves in kind of a
    strange situation that we and the Russians are allied against
    the Turks, as far as the Kurds are concerned. Is that a correct
    assessment?
        General Votel. I would not necessarily say that we are
    aligned against the Turks. We certainly understand what their
    interests are and we understand their concerns about the
    partners that we are working with. Turkey is a vital partner in
    this effort here. We could not do what we are doing without
    them. Our efforts are to try to work through this tension
    through dialogue, through information, and through identifying
    alternatives that give us a way to move forward against ISIS
    without damaging the long-term relationship with a NATO
    partner.
        Chairman McCain. Well, as you know, we are working with the
    Kurds and arming and training them, and they are a very
    effective fighting force, the same Kurds that Erdogan has
    labeled as a terrorist organization and, in the view of some, a
    greater threat to Turkey than ISIS is.
        Who is going to sort all this out?
        General Votel. Well, I think there certainly has to be an
    effort, Mr. Chairman, at the military level, and there has to
    be an effort at the political level to address this.
        Chairman McCain. I am not sure there is an understanding of
    how seriously Erdogan views this issue, and I am not sure we
    appreciate the importance of the role that Turkey plays in our
    effort to retake Raqqa particularly in the use of Insurlik and
    other activities that require Turkish cooperation. Unless
    something changes, I foresee a train wreck here, and I am not
    sure that the administration recognizes how seriously
    particularly President Erdogan views the threat that he views
    that the Kurds oppose.
        Finally, General Waldhauser, let us talk about Libya a
    second. Who is the most powerful influence in Libya today?
    Briefly, what is the answer to this chaos?
        General Waldhauser. Thank you, Senator.
        It is difficult to say who is the most powerful partner
    right now inside Libya. If you took polls, you would see that
    the Libyan National Army has got great support in the east and
    the GNA [Government of National Accord] has support in the
    west. There needs to be accommodation of those two
    organizations in order to get to a political solution there.
        Chairman McCain. Does it bother you that Haftar has been
    visiting with the Russians and went out to a Russian carrier?
    Obviously, now the Russians may be assuming a role in Libya
    that they never had before.
        General Waldhauser. It is very concerning, Senator. Haftar
    has visited, as you said, on the carrier with the Russians. He
    has also visited in the country of Russia. Also this week, as
    reported in the open press, Siraj from the Government of
    National Accord has also visited Russia.
        Chairman McCain. As is the case with Afghanistan that I
    mentioned, I hope we will be developing a strategy as regards
    to Libya as the volatility of that situation can clearly lead
    to the rise of ISIS and other extremist organizations, as I
    know you are well aware, General.
        Senator Reed?
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        General Votel, you are now in the process of evaluating the
    mission and the strategy. For many years, the mission seemed to
    be very clear with respect to Syria and to Iraq of degrade and
    defeat ISIS. Now there are activities particularly around
    Manbij where you are in the process of trying to separate
    forces. The issue here really is not only define the mission,
    but preventing mission creep in terms of starting to find
    ourselves committed not just to destroying ISIS but to somehow
    refereeing a very complicated situation with Russians, Assad
    forces, anti-Assad forces, Turkish forces, Kurdish forces, and
    an array of other forces that you can allude to.
        How are you going to prevent that mission creep, or is
    there that possibility?
        General Votel. Well, thank you, Senator. Yes, I do agree.
    If we are not careful, we could find ourselves in a different
    situation. The presence of our forces in Manbij is not new to
    just the current situation. They have actually been on the
    ground since Manbij was secured here six or 7 months ago. They
    are principally there to ensure that ISIS is not able to
    reestablish itself in the area. We have undertaken a number of
    operations in that particular regard.
        As the situation is currently played out, that is the
    principal focus of our elements there. They do have the benefit
    by virtue of being there to also provide overwatch and, I would
    add, a measure of assurance not just for our local partners on
    the ground there, but I would also suggest for our Turkish
    partners. We understand what their concerns are about undue
    Kurdish influence in this particular area. The best way that we
    can keep an eye on that I think is through our well trained SOF
    [Special Operations Forces] forces on the ground.
        Senator Reed. One of the areas I touched upon in my
    comments was the interagency. General Waldhauser, can you
    accomplish your mission in AFRICOM if you do not have rather
    robust support by the State Department and other agencies,
    including our European allies?
        General Waldhauser. The short answer, Senator, is no, we
    cannot. We work very closely with various agencies, USAID, the
    State Department, and the like. I could give numerous examples
    if you would like of how we partner with them and how they
    contribute to development, which is so important in our
    mission.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        General Votel, likewise?
        General Votel. I absolutely agree.
        Senator Reed. As we go forward in terms of the new strategy
    that the President is asking for, one point he made was
    requesting a recommendation to change any U.S. rules of
    engagement and other U.S. policy restrictions that exceed the
    requirements of an international war. My sense is that the
    requirements and the authorities that the military has asked
    for is, one, they can do the job, but two, they also do things
    like minimize civilian casualties, provide for an appropriate
    relationship with the local populations, which helps you rather
    than hurts you. Is that still the sensitivity that you have? I
    mean, adherence to the minimum international law might not be
    the smartest military approach.
        General Votel. Well, we conduct all of our operations, of
    course, in accordance with the Law of Armed Conflict, and we
    bring our values to the fight wherever we are.
        I do not think those are particular limitations on us at
    this particular point. My advice here moving forward has been
    to ensure that our forces have the operational agility to
    maintain pressure and sustain our approach of presenting ISIS
    with multiple dilemmas and really pursuing a military strategy
    of simultaneous operations to really overwhelm them quickly.
    The preponderance of our discussions and our recommendations
    really fell within that area.
        Senator Reed. But again, the rules that we have adopted
    have been based on best military policy, not just adherence to
    arbitrary rules. We minimize casualties because it has an
    effect on the population that will hurt our operations. Is that
    correct?
        General Votel. Senator, that is absolutely correct. Seven
    hundred fifty thousand people in the west portion of Mosul. We
    certainly have to conduct our operations with the full
    knowledge that that is the situation.
        Senator Reed. Again, gentlemen, thank you for your service,
    and I look forward to continuing these discussions. Thank you.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Inhofe?
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Waldhauser, as you and I discussed in my office,
    Senator Rounds and I just returned from several areas in your
    command. You know, when you stop and look at it, it seems like
    it has been shorter than that, but it has been ten years since
    we started AFRICOM. The continent used to be divided in three
    different commands. Now, since that time, we have had a lot of
    successes.
        General Rodriguez, one of your predecessors said, ``Africa
    is an enduring interest to the United States and its importance
    will continue to increase as African economies, population, and
    influence grow.'' Do you agree with that statement?
        General Waldhauser. Senator, I do.
        Senator Inhofe. It was not long ago when Chuck Wald had the
    job that you have right now. He talked about the significance
    of Phase Zero. He actually wrote an article about the Phase
    Zero campaign, why is Phase Zero important, and how does it
    apply to AFRICOM. Could you make any comments about that?
        General Waldhauser. Senator, thank you. What I would say to
    that question is that the ability to engage with the population
    and have such exercises and engagements with agencies, as was
    previously described, things like education, health care, jobs
    for the significant youth bulge that is in Africa is very, very
    important. We have got to get at these drivers that make these
    individuals, young men especially, want to join groups like al-
    Shabaab. In order to get at that part of the problem, we need
    to be engaged with education, health care, jobs, and the like.
        Senator Inhofe. To preclude something from happening, head
    it off at the pass. I would agree with that.
        We were also in Afghanistan, General Votel, and we met with
    our servicemembers and, of course, the new President. General
    Nicholson and I--I think maybe we might be in my opinion--and I
    might be influenced by the fact that I knew the new president's
    predecessor, and there is no comparison. Summing up kind of
    what General Nicholson said--I will read this--a need for a
    long-term coalition commitment to Afghanistan, a need for
    increased coalition forces for training and assisting the
    Afghan military, the strength and the commitment of the Afghan
    people who want to take their country back from the insurgents,
    shifting the focus to winning versus not losing, the high
    casualty rate among the Afghan forces, the increase in
    territory controlled by the Taliban, the importance of cutting
    the Taliban's access to financing their operations.
        Do you pretty much agree with his assessment with what the
    situation is there?
        General Votel. I do, Senator.
        Senator Inhofe. Do you think that maybe, when we get some
    of these less than optimistic reports in these committee
    hearings that we have, that you get a little bit different idea
    when you are actually there? One of the things that I think we
    are not factoring in enough would be President Ghani. I would
    like to have your idea as to what a difference that can make
    because I can remember sitting there with his predecessor and
    then evaluating the situation, what his commitment is right now
    and what he really believes his people are going to be able to
    do.
        General Votel. Senator, I absolutely agree with you. I do
    think we cannot overestimate the strategic advantage of having
    a leader like President Ghani in place. His willingness to
    partner, his visionary ideas about this, and his general
    approach to bringing the coalition on board I think have been
    very good, and I think they provide us a very good opportunity
    to build upon.
        Senator Inhofe. With him and with your experience from the
    last fighting season that we had, since we are coming up now to
    the next fighting season, do you have any projection as to
    differences we might see with that leadership and where we are
    right now?
        General Votel. I think that we will continue to see very
    steady leadership from President Ghani and his government
    through the next fighting season. I think the challenge that we
    will have will be sustaining the Afghan forces as they move
    forward. As you have noted, as others have noted, they have
    absorbed a lot of casualties, and yet they have been resilient
    through that. But there is a need to ensure that they get into
    a normal operational cycle that allows them to recover, to
    rebuild themselves, to reset themselves, and then get back into
    the fight. I think that as we move forward, that will be the
    challenge that General Nicholson and I will have to manage.
        Senator Inhofe. I would agree with that. I think that there
    is an effect that the new president has on the fighting troops
    over there, on theirs, that will yield a better performance.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. The fighting season has begun earlier than
    ever in Afghanistan. True, General?
        General Votel. I think the fighting season does not end. I
    agree with you, Senator.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Peters?
        Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you to both of you today for testifying. I appreciate
    all that you do. You have a very difficult job and both of you
    do it with honor. Thank you so much for your service to our
    country.
        I represent in Michigan probably the largest Arab American,
    Muslim American community here in the United States and had an
    opportunity just recently to meet with a number of community
    members at the Islamic Center and heard some great concern from
    the Yemeni American community as to what they are seeing in
    Yemen in terms of Saudi Arabia and the operations, what seems
    to be indiscriminate bombing, the killing of large numbers of
    civilians. I think, according to some estimates, close to 4,000
    civilians have been killed in Yemen by a Saudi Arabian-led air
    campaign, which appears to them as indiscriminate and,
    according to them, does great damage to the United States.
    People see those Saudi attacks as related to the United States.
    There has been increasing recruitment for folks who want to do
    harm to the United States because of the actions that are being
    undertaken by the Saudi Arabians.
        So if you could comment, General Votel, a little bit about
    what is happening there to us, and what do you assess the cause
    of the large number of civilian casualties that we are seeing
    in Yemen and what can we do to reduce that?
        General Votel. Thank you for the question, Senator.
        I attribute those types of situations more to the
    competence of the forces that are operating there and their
    ability to properly target. As you are aware, we do not provide
    intelligence for those things. We do not make decisions for
    them.
        But yet, we have a relationship with Saudi Arabia. At my
    level and at levels below me, my air commander, a variety of
    subordinate commanders, we have engaged with our partner
    leaders in Saudi Arabia to talk to them about the effects of
    this and to provide opportunities for them to learn from our
    experience in terms of this and improve their capabilities in
    this particular regard. I think they have done that.
        In addition, I personally have reached out and talked to my
    counterpart about the importance of reaching out to
    international organizations like the ICRC [International
    Committee of the Red Cross], Doctors Without Borders, who also
    operate in these areas, and ask that they establish
    relationships and begin a discussion between the Saudi Arabian
    Government and Ministry of Defense and these particular
    organizations so we can better understand what is happening on
    the ground and we can begin to work through this. I am very
    happy to tell you that that is taking place now.
        Senator Peters. So you would characterize this as a
    training issue as opposed to some other factor that is
    causing----
        General Votel. I do not attribute it to deliberate
    decisions to target civilians. I attribute it to a growing need
    to develop a better and more precise targeting process for
    their operations.
        Senator Peters. Are we able to assist them in that?
        General Votel. We do not assist them directly with
    targeting on the ground, but we are able to, through our
    experience and through our people, engage them and help with
    their professionalism and give them the benefit of our
    experience and tactics, techniques, procedures, processes that
    we use to try to absolutely minimize those types of events. We
    are doing that.
        Senator Peters. Well, it is good to hear. Thank you.
        General Votel, to move to Syria now, you were recently
    quoted in The New York Times about saying that we want to bring
    the right capabilities forward, not all of those necessarily
    resident in the special operations community. If we need
    additional artillery or things like that, I want to bring those
    forward to augment our operations. I note today in the news
    there was an artillery unit that I believe is being positioned
    in Syria now.
        In your estimate, what is the right mix of conventional and
    special operations forces that are going to be required to
    succeed in Syria?
        General Votel. Senator, I am not sure I can give you an
    exact percentage-wise mix of this. But what I can tell you is
    that the way that we operate today with our special operations
    forces and unique capabilities they bring, through our
    experience of the last 15 or 16 years, we have become very
    comfortable and capable of operating together.
        What I have pledged to our commanders and what I expect
    from them is for them to ask for the capabilities that we need
    and then for us to ensure that we have the right command and
    control, the right force protection, the right resources in
    place to ensure that it can function properly together. That to
    me is much more important than a particular mix of whatever the
    capabilities are. I think as we move more towards the latter
    part of these operations into more of the stability and other
    aspects of the operations, we will see more conventional forces
    requirements perhaps.
        Senator Peters. Thank you, General.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Wicker?
        Senator Wicker. Let us get back to Afghanistan, General
    Votel. Do the Afghan people support the presence of the United
    States there?
        General Votel. I believe that they do, Senator.
        Senator Wicker. How do you measure that?
        General Votel. I think we measure that by favorability
    ratings that we see of them for the Government of Afghanistan
    and the activities that they are pursuing. I think we measure
    that through our direct contact with them with teams that we
    have out there on the ground and others that interact with the
    Afghan people on a regular basis.
        Senator Wicker. As a matter of fact, several years ago,
    there was a loya jirga convened of most Afghan leaders, and
    they overwhelmingly were in support of the United States
    presence there to protect them against what had happened
    before.
        Has there been another loya jirga, or do we simply assume
    that the elected leadership of the government represents them?
        General Votel. There has not been another loya jirga I
    think of the same scope that you referenced, Senator. But we do
    pay attention to the polling. I would note in some recent polls
    that I have seen, the favorability ratings for the Taliban are
    very low in the 6 to 7 percent range as opposed to much, much
    higher for the Government of Afghanistan.
        Senator Wicker. You had strong praise for President Ghani.
    How is the relationship there between the president and Mr.
    Abdullah who is his nearest competitor?
        General Votel. It has improved significantly. I contribute
    that directly to the engagement of our ambassadors on the
    ground who have personally invested in that and worked that
    relationship, and it has had a positive impact on our
    operations.
        Senator Wicker. Well, that is good to hear.
        Now, the information we have--and the chairman alluded to
    this--the Afghan Government controls 57 percent of the
    country's districts. A year and a half ago, that figure was 72
    percent. What happened?
        General Votel. Senator, I would tell you that there are
    other numbers out there. We have some slightly different ones,
    but they are in the general ball park of what you are saying.
        Senator Wicker. Generally, those numbers are correct.
        General Votel. In general.
        Senator Wicker. There has been a significant drop, as the
    chairman said, in a year and a half.
        General Votel. There have been areas that we would put into
    the contested space area here that have increased over the last
    year.
        Senator Wicker. Your testimony would be that this has not
    happened because the support among the Afghan people of our
    efforts has diminished.
        General Votel. I do not think so.
        Senator Wicker. Something we did?
        General Votel. I think this is the effect of the fighting
    that is taking place and of the efforts by the Taliban to be
    more resurgent in specific areas in Afghanistan.
        Senator Wicker. Well, okay. General Nicholson said in
    talking about the stalemate that what will break the stalemate
    are offensive capabilities such as special forces and allowing
    the air force to overmatch the Taliban. Also he said we have a
    shortfall of a few thousand troops in Afghanistan for the
    train, advise, and assist mission. Would you talk about those
    two aspects, and would you support a few thousand more American
    troops to get the job done in this mission?
        General Votel. Senator, with respect to the last part of
    your question, that is certainly a discussion we are having
    with the Secretary right now. I will not pre-stage a decision
    here. That is certainly his regard. But certainly I agree with
    what General Nicholson's approach is. I do agree that one of
    our efforts to improve the capabilities and equipment of the
    Afghan Air Force is a big part of this, as is improving and
    expanding their special operations capability.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you.
        General Waldhauser, the Wasp amphibious expedition did over
    100 consecutive days of strikes. It is considered to be an
    impressive success. What lessons have we learned from that
    deployment, and are we sending you what you need to get the job
    done in that respect?
        General Waldhauser. The Wasp and Marine aviation that was
    on board that ship was a significant contributor to the GNA
    forces and ridding Sirte of ISIS.
        Lessons learned at the tactical level have to do with
    coordination on the ground and special forces who were there on
    the ground, but I think it is important to point out that from
    1 August until middle of December there were nearly 500
    strikes. Most of them came from ISR platforms, but a lot of
    them, as you said, came from the ship. I think the ability to
    have zero civilian casualties in a very, very dense urban
    environment underscores the training and the professionalism of
    those who were conducting that operation.
        In sum, that was a huge asset for us. We actually borrowed
    it from CENTCOM in order to make it happen, but that is how we
    have to do business these days. AFRICOM and CENTCOM coordinate
    on various trans-regional asset changes, and that was an
    example where it worked very well.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you, sir.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Shaheen?
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Votel and General Waldhauser, thank you both for
    your testimony and for your service.
        General Votel, there has already been reference to the
    marines who have arrived in Syria. The Washington Post story
    this morning reports that the battalion landing team, 1st
    Battalion, 4th Marines, will man the guns and deliver fire
    support for U.S.-backed local forces who are preparing an
    assault on the city.
        First of all, is that accurate, and should we take that to
    mean an assault is imminent in Raqqa?
        General Votel. Well, certainly we will not talk about any
    timings of any of our particular operations. But our intention
    here with this--and this fell within the authorities that are
    provided to me right now was to ensure that we had redundant
    capable fire support on the ground to support our partners and
    ensure that we could take advantage of opportunities and ensure
    the continued progress that we have been seeing.
        Senator Shaheen. Are you comfortable that that gives us
    that progress and support that we need?
        General Votel. In conjunction with our excellent coalition
    air forces, yes, I am very confident that that will help us.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        Yesterday in our meeting--and we heard similar comments
    from General Nicholson when he was here talking about Russian
    influence in Afghanistan. They are trying to legitimize the
    Taliban and undermine our mission and NATO's mission there. Can
    you talk about what alternatives we have to respond to Russian
    activities there?
        General Votel. I think the best alternative that we have is
    to ensure that we demonstrate our commitment to the mission
    that we have in place here with the Government of Afghanistan.
    Certainly with our twofold mission, we focused on
    counterterrorism and then, of course, the train, advise, and
    assist mission. The most important thing we can do is send a
    very clear message that we are going to see this mission
    through and support the Government of Afghanistan in the way
    that they require with military capabilities and other things
    to ensure that they can be successful.
        Senator Shaheen. To what extent does our effort in Eastern
    Europe with NATO affect Russia's ability to undermine what we
    are doing in Afghanistan? How much do they need to be focused
    on what is happening in Eastern Europe?
        General Votel. From my perspective, I would like them
    totally focused on Eastern Europe and not on Afghanistan. I am
    being a little facetious here. I am not sure that I can comment
    that there is necessarily a direct relationship between that,
    Senator. Certainly I think if their attention can be drawn to
    other challenges, other problems that they are focused on, that
    helps us.
        Senator Shaheen. General Waldhauser, in your statement, you
    point out that long-term success in slowing the progress of
    Boko Haram and ISIS in West Africa requires Nigeria to address
    development, governance, and economic deficiencies, which are
    drivers of terrorism in that region. As we look at the future
    where one in four Africans are Nigerian, what happens in
    Nigeria has a huge impact on what happens throughout the rest
    of Africa. Do you agree with that?
        General Waldhauser. I most definitely do. With 182 million
    people in that country--it is the seventh largest country in
    the world--what happens there has a significant impact not only
    on the continent, but it could be in Europe and the United
    States as well.
        Senator Shaheen. To what extent do we feel like they are
    addressing the threat from Boko Haram and also addressing those
    deficiencies that have existed there?
        General Waldhauser. Senator, two weeks ago, I was in Abuja
    and talked with the acting vice president, and he is very, very
    aware of the fact that there is still much work that needs to
    be done in northeastern Nigeria both with Boko Haram and ISIS-
    West Africa. I came away from that visit in a positive way
    because there have been some human rights issues with the
    Nigerians, but they are taking that on. I mean, they are making
    some progress there. But I think the acting vice president or
    acting president understands there is still a threat. Boko
    Haram has weakened a bit, but they are still a threat. ISIS-
    West Africa is still there and they are still a threat. But
    this Lake Chad Basin region task force has been doing fairly
    well with at least trying to keep the problem inside the
    Nigerian borders.
        Senator Shaheen. Are they working to address the historic
    divisions between the Christian southern part of the country
    and the Muslim north? Are there any initiatives underway that
    help to resolve some of those historic conflicts?
        General Waldhauser. Senator, I am not aware of any per se.
    I would just say that in my discussions with senior leadership
    there two weeks ago, they have a fairly wide-ranging and
    overarching strategy of where they want to go which ultimately
    will turn over northeastern Nigeria to the police forces.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Fischer?
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Votel, since the nuclear deal with Iran was
    announced, Iran's behavior in the region, its support for
    terrorism, and its domestic repression--it appears to have
    gotten worse. Iran wields significant power in Syria, Lebanon,
    Iraq, and Yemen, and it seeks to destabilize our key allies.
    What do you see as Iran's goal in the region?
        General Votel. Senator, I believe Iran seeks to be the
    regional hegemon, to be the most influential country in the
    region.
        Senator Fischer. How would you characterize Iran's regional
    behavior since the nuclear agreement? Has it improved or has it
    worsened?
        General Votel. I would describe it as destabilizing to the
    region. It has not been helpful to anything that I can see
    going on across the region.
        Senator Fischer. How would you characterize Iran's
    relationship with Russia in the region?
        General Votel. Again, not having firsthand knowledge on
    that, I guess I would characterize it as they find areas of
    cooperation. I am particularly concerned how both Iran and
    Russia have cooperated to prop up the Assad regime and make
    them stronger. That is certainly of some concern. I do see that
    level of cooperation being very unhelpful to the things that we
    are doing across the region. I do not know what the long-term
    views of each of these countries might be and how that might
    play out, but it certainly looks like they are taking the
    opportunity of convenience to join efforts in some regard.
        Senator Fischer. I wanted to ask you your long-term view
    with regards to the United States and our position in the
    region, first of all, just with Iran's destabilizing activities
    but also with their relationship with Russia. Can you give us
    in your best opinion how that affects the United States and our
    involvement?
        General Votel. I can, Senator, and I will offer you my
    observation. It is based on my travels throughout the region
    over the last year and meeting with our partners across many of
    the countries. My consistent takeaway here is that the partners
    in the region would strongly prefer to have a relationship with
    the United States over any other nation that might be external
    to the Middle East. I think that is an opportunity for us to
    move forward on. We have long-term historical relationships
    with many of these countries, and we should capitalize on that
    as we move forward. I think that offers us the best
    opportunity.
        Senator Fischer. As we look over the last year, we have
    seen Iran has escalated its harassment of our vessels, our
    personnel in the Persian Gulf. Just last week, multiple fast
    attack vessels from the IRGC came close to a U.S. Navy ship in
    the Strait of Hormuz, and they forced it to change direction.
        What is CENTCOM doing to address that harassment that we
    are seeing by Iran?
        General Votel. First off, we are ensuring that our maritime
    forces have all the right rules of engagement and capabilities
    and training and techniques to deal with that, and I do believe
    they are effectively doing that. One of the first things I did
    after coming into command was get on a ship and go through the
    Straits of Hormuz so I could see it with my own eyes, and I was
    extraordinarily impressed with the maturity of our sailors and
    the judgment of our leaders as we went through that.
        More broadly, I think we have to hold Iran accountable for
    their actions. No other nation operates the way they do in the
    Arabian Gulf. Nobody does that in the Arabian Gulf. They need
    to be held accountable for that and they need to be exposed for
    those types of unprofessional, unsafe, and abnormal activities.
        Senator Fischer. It sounds like you are very concerned with
    Iran's growing asymmetrical capabilities, and that includes its
    acquisition of advanced cruise missiles, I would assume.
        General Votel. It does, Senator.
        Senator Fischer. What about naval mines, ballistic
    missiles, and UAVs [Unmanned Ariel Vehicles]? I guess when we
    are looking at our interests in the Persian Gulf and our
    allies' interests in the Persian Gulf, how do those growing
    threats affect that?
        General Votel. The way they affect us is they provide Iran
    with a layered capability where they can use their fast boats,
    they can use cruise missiles, they can use radars, they can use
    UAVs to potentially dominate specific areas. So this is a
    concern, and it is something that certainly we look at in our
    capabilities and it is something that we have engaged our
    partners in the region on on how we work together to mitigate
    the effects of that layered approach that Iran pursues in these
    critical chokepoints.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Warren?
        Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you for being here.
        I would like to return to an issue raised by Senator Reed.
    There is a big debate going on right now, as you know, about
    military spending, and of course, we need a strong military.
    But the military is not the only element of our national
    security strategy. Spending on security outside the military
    budget is very small. Diplomacy and development combined is
    about 1 percent of our annual budget, but it includes programs
    that promote democracy, human rights, the rule of law that
    boost economic growth, that improve access to education, that
    fight hunger, that treat infectious diseases, and it provides
    disaster relief around the world.
        General Votel and General Waldhauser, you command our armed
    forces in some of the most active and dangerous parts of the
    world. Do you think the activities of the State Department and
    other civilian partners are a waste of time and taxpayer money?
        General Votel. I do not, Senator.
        Senator Warren. Thank you.
        General Waldhauser. Senator, nor do I. They are a big part
    of what we do.
        Senator Warren. Thank you. I agree. But the Trump
    administration's blueprint budget would increase defense
    spending in some areas by massively slashing through other
    programs that are critical for our national security. Not every
    international problem is the same and the right tool is not
    always a military response. Recapping our State Department by
    cutting an already small foreign aid budget makes America less
    safe, and that is just not smart.
        I would like to turn to another issue, and that is the
    ongoing fight against ISIS in Iraq and in Syria. General Votel,
    you contributed to the Pentagon's plan to accelerate the fight
    against ISIS which Secretary Mattis delivered to the White
    House last week. I have every confidence that the U.S. military
    can defeat ISIS on the battlefield and help retake
    strategically important cities.
        But what I want to ask you is about what comes next. You
    are going to be mediating between armed opposition forces that
    dislike each other intensely in cities where existing
    infrastructure has been completely destroyed with a population
    that has been traumatized and displaced. What will it take to
    create conditions for normal life to resume in Mosul and Raqqa?
        General Votel. I think it starts certainly following up our
    military operations with good local governance and addressing
    humanitarian aid, addressing issues like demining, of restoring
    basic services to the people, of trying to bring additional aid
    in there so small businesses and other things can get going,
    and then the bigger aspects of governance can begin to take
    place. As we look at our military operations, particularly as
    we look at places like Raqqa or Mosul, what we have tried to do
    is ensure that our military planning is very closely linked to
    the political planning, what comes next so that we do not just
    finish a military operation and then just leave. It is
    important that we have local hold forces. It is important that
    we predetermine local governance that is going to come in and
    begin to take this over. I think that is an extraordinarily
    important point. The transition from military operations to the
    stability operations and things that come next I think is a
    significant lesson learned for us--relearned for us many times,
    and it is something that we have specifically focused on in
    this campaign.
        Senator Warren. Thank you. I am very glad to hear that,
    General. Planning for peace is hard. We did not do it after we
    toppled Saddam Hussein, and we are still paying a price for
    that blindness today. I do not want to see us turn around and
    make that same mistake again. I think we need to be very
    careful that we do not create an environment that breeds the
    next generation of extremists, and I am grateful for your work
    in this area. I am grateful to both of you for all that you are
    doing. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Reed [presiding]. On behalf of Chairman McCain, let
    me recognize Senator Cotton.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you.
        Gentlemen, welcome back to the committee.
        General Waldhauser, you were speaking with Senator Shaheen
    about Nigeria and the role that it plays not just in the
    African continent but around the world. Could you speak a
    little bit about what President Buhari's absence from the
    country means and what the status is right now of Nigerian
    politics for the committee?
        General Waldhauser. Senator, I would just have to say that
    open source reporting indicates that he is still in London
    receiving medical help. That was a topic that was not discussed
    with officials when I was there.
        But what I did observe was acting President Osinbajo has
    done extremely well. He is very competent. He has a, I would
    say, very wide view of the problems and issues, and he seems to
    want to get after them. He was definitely genuinely interested
    in making things happen, and I thought we had some very frank
    discussions with him on the way ahead with regard to our
    support for the defeat of ISIL-West Africa and Boko Haram.
        Senator Cotton. What is the level of political consensus
    and stability between the north and the south in that country
    right now?
        General Waldhauser. I really could not give you a fair
    assessment of that. It was not part of the discussion. We did
    not have that topic.
        Senator Cotton. I understand.
        Looking to the east, would you please discuss the strategic
    implications of China's new base in Djibouti and what it means
    for our presence there and throughout the Horn of Africa?
        General Waldhauser. The Chinese base is right outside Camp
    Lemonnier, about 4 miles or so from our base. The intention for
    that location was to provide a port for their ships to have in
    the area. They have about 2,200 peacekeepers on the continent.
    This is the first time for them that they have kind of
    journeyed in that direction. So right now, it is due to be
    completed later this summer.
        I would just say the concern that I have from an
    operational perspective is the operational security when we
    operate so close to a Chinese base. The Camp Lemonnier-Djibouti
    area is not only AFRICOM, but CENTCOM uses it, SOCOM uses it,
    TRANSCOM, EUCOM, and the like. It is a very strategic location,
    and visiting Djiboutian officials twice, I have talked with
    their president and expressed our concerns about some of the
    things that are important to us about what the Chinese can or
    cannot do at that location.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you.
        General Votel, you have already spoken with several
    Senators this morning about the stalemate in Afghanistan. For
    many years now, we on this committee and many leaders in the
    executive branch have been lamenting the existence of
    sanctuaries for the Taliban and other terrorist groups in
    Pakistan. As you think about the strategy to break this
    stalemate, what is the role of eliminating those sanctuaries
    inside of Pakistan? How do you plan to get after this
    longstanding problem?
        General Votel. Thank you, Senator.
        Pakistan, of course, remains a key partner in this fight
    here. I have been encouraged by my meetings with the new Chief
    of Army Staff, General Bajwan, and his commitment to help
    address this. They have done some things that have been helpful
    to us. Most recently they have supported General Nicholson in
    some operations along the border, making sure that they were
    well coordinated and doing the activities on their side of the
    border. That is a very positive sign and a move in the right
    direction. They have done things against the principal concerns
    that we have, the Haqqani Network and Taliban. But what we do
    need is we need that to be more persistent and continue to
    focus in that particular area. We will continue to engage with
    Pakistan throughout this.
        I think it is key to ensure that Pakistan and Afghanistan
    have a very good relationship. There certainly are tensions
    along the common border between those countries. I think a key
    role that we can play is in helping move that relationship
    forward.
        Senator Cotton. Let me ask you about a seam on the map
    between you and Harry Harris, but it is an important seam
    because it involves Pakistan and Afghanistan and India and
    PACOM [United States Pacific Command]. To what extent do you
    think Pakistan's Afghan policy is driven in part by its India
    policy and, in particular, whether an independent Afghanistan
    conducting its own foreign policy might be adverse to Pakistani
    interests?
        General Votel. Senator, I think Pakistan's view of the
    region I think as they look at their interests, it plays very
    largely in how they look at both sides of their country.
        Senator Cotton. One final question. Since the 1970s,
    Russia's influence throughout the Middle East has been minimal,
    thanks in large part to the diplomacy of Henry Kissinger and
    Presidents Nixon and Ford. How would you assess the level of
    Russia's influence in the region today?
        General Votel. Russia is attempting to increase their
    influence throughout the Middle East, as we have seen in Syria.
    We have seen them do things certainly with our longstanding
    partner Egypt and others across the region. It is my view that
    they are trying to increase their influence in this critical
    part of the globe.
        Senator Cotton. Do you think they have been successful in
    any of those attempts thus far?
        General Votel. Well, they certainly have been successful in
    supporting the Assad regime, and so that is certainly an
    example of that. I am hopeful that we will be able to reassert
    our own relationships as well.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you, gentlemen.
        Senator Reed. On behalf of Chairman McCain, let me
    recognize Senator King.
        Senator King. Thank you, Senator Reed.
        General Votel, let us talk about four areas where we are
    engaged in conflict: Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Afghanistan.
        By the way, I want to compliment you on your written
    statement. It is a primer on the region that I think should be
    required reading for everyone in this body. It is very well
    done, very thoughtful, and comprehensive.
        Who are our allies in Iraq? Who are we fighting next to?
    The ISF [Iraqi Security Forces]. Right?
        General Votel. That is correct, Senator.
        Senator King. And the Kurds.
        General Votel. The Peshmerga in the northern part of Iraq.
        Senator King. What religion are the members of the ISF and
    the Kurds?
        General Votel. They are Muslims.
        Senator King. In Syria we have got the Syrian Democratic
    Forces and also the Kurds?
        General Votel. We have Syrian Kurds and we are working with
    local Syrian Arabs, Turkmen and in some cases local Christian
    forces.
        Senator King. But the vast majority of those forces are
    Muslim. Is that correct?
        General Votel. That is correct.
        Senator King. In Yemen, UAE [United Arab Emirates], Saudi
    Arabia, those forces are Muslim?
        General Votel. Absolutely.
        Senator King. In Afghanistan, the ANSF, the Afghan National
    Security Forces, also Muslim?
        General Votel. They are Muslim.
        Senator King. One of the statements you made in your
    opening comments was that our strategy rests upon, quote, a
    heavy reliance on indigenous forces. Is that correct?
        General Votel. That is correct, Senator.
        Senator King. It is fair to say that the vast majority of
    those indigenous forces are Muslim.
        General Votel. That is the case today.
        Senator King. So it would be a mistake as a matter of
    national policy, rhetoric, or discussion if we attempted to
    alienate or marginalize Muslim citizens of anywhere in the
    world because these are our allies in all of the fights that we
    are engaged in in your area. Is that not correct?
        General Votel. I believe it is correct, Senator.
        Senator King. You talked about restoring trust with our
    partners in the region. Our partners in the region are all
    based upon Muslim societies. Is that not correct?
        General Votel. They largely are. It is largely a Muslim
    area.
        Senator King. The second area--and this has been discussed
    to some extent but again it is in your report on page 3 and 5
    of your statement. The goals that you define cannot be
    accomplished solely through military means, you say. The
    military can help create the necessary conditions. There must
    be concomitant progress in other complementary areas,
    reconstruction, humanitarian aid, stabilization, political
    reconciliation. On page 5, you say, however, solely a military
    response is not sufficient. This must be accomplished through a
    combination of capabilities if we are going to achieve and
    sustain our strongest deterrence posture.
        Again, just to put a fine point on what has been discussed
    previously, to solely rely on military strength in solving
    these very complex and difficult problems would be a serious
    mistake. Would you agree?
        General Votel. I would agree, Senator. I think we have to
    have a combination of all of our elements of power, hard power
    and soft power.
        Senator King. Thank you.
        Next question. This is a slightly different subject. You
    work with a lot of these allies. You work with these countries,
    with Iraq and other countries in the region. How would it be
    received in the Arab world if the United States relocates its
    embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem without a settlement of the
    Palestinian-Israeli conflict?
        General Votel. I think from my personal discussions with
    some in the region, I think that it would create some
    challenges for some of those countries.
        Senator King. Some challenges? Can you expand? Serious
    challenges?
        General Votel. It could potentially be very serious.
        Senator King. Does that include our staunch ally Jordan?
        General Votel. I believe, yes, sir, it does, Senator.
        Senator King. Thank you.
        Final question to both of you. Foreign military sales and
    foreign military financing programs--are they appropriately
    calibrated to meet your needs in the region? My sense is that
    that is an area where we could use some work.
        General Votel. From my perspective, Senator, the importance
    of the foreign military sales and foreign military funding
    programs is to help build capability for our partners that is
    interoperable with us. They generally want to buy U.S.
    equipment because it comes along with training. It comes along
    with sustainment, and it makes them more interoperable with us.
    I think we have to take a long-term view in terms of this, and
    I think it is in our interests for our partners in the region
    to use capabilities that are interoperable with ours.
        Senator King. General Waldhauser, in just a few seconds I
    have left, a quick update on the status of ISIS in Libya.
        General Waldhauser. The status of ISIS in Libya is they
    right now are regrouping. They are in small numbers, small
    groups. We tried to develop the intelligence, but after they
    left Sirte, we developed intelligence. We bombed them on
    January 18th and they were in the southern part of Libya. They
    have scattered again now. They are in small groups trying to
    regroup.
        Senator King. No longer control Sirte.
        General Waldhauser. Correct. No longer control Sirte. They
    were out of Sirte in the middle of December.
        Senator King. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain [presiding]. By the way, General Votel,
    just to complicate things further, Barzani, the leader of the
    Iraqi Kurds, does not support the KRG, the Syrian Kurds. Right?
        General Votel. That is correct, Chairman.
        Senator King. Senator Ernst?
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today and your time
    and attention to all of our questions.
        General Votel, we had an interesting conversation the other
    day, and as the chair of the Emerging Threats and Capabilities
    Subcommittee, you mentioned something to me that I thought was
    very interesting and something that I am concerned about. That
    is the increasing threat that is posed by ISIS's ability to use
    drones. We had a great conversation about that. What they are
    using you say was kind of a modified commercial, off-the-shelf
    drone. Can you tell us about that emerging threat and maybe
    describe for those on the committee exactly what they are using
    and what those capabilities are?
        General Votel. Thank you, Senator.
        What we are seeing I think are commercially acquired
    drones. They are generally quadcopters that are available I
    think very easily by anybody online or at other places,
    hobbyist locations. What they are able to do is, obviously,
    operate them for purposes of their own surveillance, and as we
    have seen in the news, in some cases they have been able to rig
    grenades and other things to them. They have been able to
    achieve some effects with that.
        It is concerning to our partners. It is certainly
    concerning to us. I think it is a reminder of just how savvy
    and challenging of an enemy that we are dealing with here, and
    I think it requires us to make sure that we are equally savvy
    in our approach to this, making sure we have the right tools to
    defend against these types of threats.
        Senator Ernst. Absolutely. Thank you. It reminds me of the
    early part of the Iraq war when the forces were using remote
    controlled cars with explosives as a first form of IEDs
    [Improvised Explosive Device]. Of course, through the years,
    they grew technologically advanced. I see something so simple
    as this that could become much more complicated over time.
        Do the Iraqi forces have the capabilities to defeat those
    drones?
        General Votel. We are working on providing them the
    capabilities. Right now, they enjoy protection against these
    threats in a number of areas largely because we have
    capabilities with our forces that are accompanying them and are
    located in their locations.
        Senator Ernst. Very good. Thank you.
        We also spoke about troop numbers yesterday and how random
    some of those numbers tend to be when you have that artificial
    boundary of a country line between Iraq and Syria. If you
    could, please share with the committee what is our role in
    that. Should that role of troop numbers and where those troops
    are located be left up to our on-the-ground combatant
    commanders? If you could just share a little bit of that
    conversation.
        General Votel. Senator, I think the more we can provide
    agility for our commanders on the ground to make decisions
    about where they need forces and when they need it, I think
    that is the most appropriate thing that can be done. I think we
    are most successful when we enable our very good and well
    qualified leaders and people on the ground to make decisions in
    the situations in which they see it. I am for making sure that
    we try to provide them the agility and the process around that.
    We certainly understand why it is important to look at things
    like numbers and stuff like that. It certainly drives our
    resources and budgeting and other aspects of that. That
    certainly has to be taken into consideration. But I look at
    this more from a flexibility and agility standpoint for our
    commanders on the ground.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you very much.
        General Waldhauser, thank you as well.
        As you know, Tunisia has sent more foreign fighters than
    any other country to join the ranks of ISIS abroad. In addition
    to supplying the foreign fighters, Tunisia struggles with
    containing the terrorist activity on their own soil, so much
    that they have had a physical wall built along the border with
    Libya in an attempt to deter terrorists from entering their
    country.
        Is AFRICOM currently equipped to address the potential
    influx of ISIS fighters returning home to Tunisia as we strike
    them elsewhere, whether it is in the Middle East or other
    places?
        General Waldhauser. Senator, I would have to characterize
    Tunisia as one of the bright spots on the continent. They are
    in the process of transforming their military to be more
    capable of dealing with terrorist threats. They have purchased
    equipment from the United States, which we are helping them
    with right now, helicopters and the like. We have people on the
    ground who are training, advising, and assisting their special
    operations forces. I believe the wall that you refer to is
    technical equipment provided by DTRA [Defense Threat Reduction
    Agency], as well as Germany, to help them contain the foreign
    fighter flow back and forth between especially Libya and
    Tunisia.
        But the bottom line is they are a bright spot. I visited
    them twice, and they are headed in the right direction. They
    are struggling with what to do with foreign fighters who
    return, but again, I think that is not a negative against them.
        Senator Ernst. Very good. Well, I appreciate it. Gentlemen,
    thank you very much for your input.
        Senator Reed [presiding]. Thank you.
        On behalf of Chairman McCain, let me recognize Senator
    Blumenthal.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to thank both of you for your service and, as you
    did in your testimony, General Votel, the outstanding men and
    women under both your commands who make us proud and who are
    doing such great work under your command. I want to join
    Senator King in thanking you for your testimony, which is a
    very, very enlightening for me, elucidating outline of the
    challenges and I would note for my colleagues particularly in
    your description of the next generation of cyber warriors or
    the use of cyber warfare by our adversaries going from the
    rather rudimentary weapons of the roadside bombs to the much
    more sophisticated use of cyber and, as my colleague has
    pointed out, drones and other challenges that face us there.
        I want to focus on Iran. In response to Senator Fischer's
    question about whether Iranian aggression has increased since
    the nuclear treaty, you pointed out that their conduct there
    has been destabilizing--the word you used was
    ``destabilizing''--and abnormal. Of course, we know Iran has
    tested an anti-ship ballistic missile there, a new Russian made
    S-300 missile air defense system, as well as harassing a Navy
    ship, the USS Invincible, in the Strait of Hormuz by sending an
    Iranian frigate within, I think, 150 yards, smaller boats
    within 600 yards. Last month, the Iranians fired a medium-range
    ballistic missile in violation of the U.S. Security Council
    resolution resulting in United States sanctions enforcement
    against 25 individuals and entities. That action was in
    violation of the U.N. resolution. But none of these other
    activities are in violation of the nuclear agreement. Are they?
        General Votel. My understanding, Senator, is the nuclear
    agreement did not address any of those other aspects of the
    Iranian threat.
        Senator Blumenthal. But would you agree with me that they
    do demand a response from the United States?
        General Votel. I would absolutely agree, Senator.
        Senator Blumenthal. Much more aggressive not only sanctions
    but warnings and actions against their partners in this effort,
    most prominently the Russians.
        General Votel. I would agree. I think we should use a
    combination of both diplomatic and other security-related tools
    here, economic tools to address this concern.
        Senator Blumenthal. Would you agree with me that the
    Russians through the Iranians, in effect, are testing us in
    that area because they are, in effect, aiding and abetting the
    Iranians in this increasing destabilizing activity?
        General Votel. Well, I would, Senator, and I would
    certainly point to a place like Syria where these two countries
    have essentially propped up a regime here and made them more
    capable, more powerful, and kept them from collapsing.
        Senator Blumenthal. But when we complain about the
    Iranians--and all of us probably in this room would agree with
    you that they are the major destabilizing influence in that
    area--we are talking as much about the Russians as we are about
    the Iranians.
        General Votel. Senator, in my comments here I was
    specifically talking about the Iranian threat. That is the one
    that we confront with. Certainly, as I mentioned also in my
    opening statement here, we are concerned about external actors
    and what their interests are in the region as well, and those
    can contribute to more destabilizing aspects as well. I think
    they have to be addressed--they both have to be addressed.
        Senator Blumenthal. How would you suggest that we should
    address the Iranian destabilizing influence of this regime?
        General Votel. I think there are a variety of things. I
    think the most important thing is to work with our regional
    partners here to ensure that we have a common approach to this.
    I think in some cases we should look at ways that we can
    disrupt their activities through a variety of means, not just
    military means. We have to expose them for the things they are
    doing. They should be held accountable for those things. I
    think we have to contest their revolutionary ideology, and it
    is not just the United States, but it has to be those in the
    region. Iran has a role in the region. They have been around
    for a long period of time. Nobody is trying to make Iran go
    away, but we are concerned about the destabilizing behavior
    that they pursue on a regular basis.
        Senator Blumenthal. My time has expired, but this topic is
    one that I think is profoundly important. I will have some more
    questions that I hope you and your staff perhaps can answer and
    maybe in a different setting as well.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        On behalf of Chairman McCain, let me recognize Senator
    Perdue.
        Senator Perdue. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        It is an honor to be here before you two gentlemen. Thank
    you for your great careers and what you are doing for our
    country today. I hope you will take this message back to your
    troops, that everything they do over there is not missed on us.
        I have a question about ISIS. General Votel, first of all,
    I think one of the first things that the President has done is
    ask for a 30-day review of the current strategy and so forth.
    Where are we in that process? What types of things can we
    expect to see in terms of our strategy there? I would like you
    also to address what is our end game, and can you talk about
    that today or should we wait until we see the 30-day review?
        General Votel. Senator, I think it is most appropriate for
    the Secretary who I believe has presented his findings to the
    new administration, and I think he is probably the person who
    is most appropriate to talk about the decisions and end states
    that will come out of that.
        Senator Perdue. Fair enough.
        With regard to ISIS in the Sinai, right now Egypt--there
    are daily efforts there I think. Can you give us an update on
    what is being done and what other countries are involved in the
    fight with ISIS? Give us an order of magnitude of the size of
    that action in the Sinai.
        General Votel. The Egyptians several months ago have
    deployed forces into the Sinai and specifically around the area
    where the multinational force is. That has been helpful. That
    has helped address a threat that was emerging there, and they
    are engaged on a regular basis in fighting ISIS in that
    particular area.
        Egypt is addressing this. We are helping them in some
    areas, particularly with some of our expertise in improvised
    explosive devices. They have asked for that, and so we have
    been key to help them with that in this particular area.
        Senator Perdue. Do we have any troops on the ground in the
    Sinai?
        General Votel. We do not have any troops on the ground that
    are fighting ISIS. We do have troops on the ground in the Sinai
    that are associated with the multinational force mission.
        Senator Perdue. Thank you.
        General Waldhauser, I want to go back to a question that
    was earlier asked of you about China's presence in Africa and
    particularly the base at Djibouti. Given what Russia has done
    with Crimea and now at Latakia and at Tartus, are you concerned
    that we will see other activity of base building in Africa?
    Have you had any other indications of either Russia or China
    developing permanent positions or presence in that theater?
        General Waldhauser. Senator, in 2013, the Chinese laid out
    a strategic plan of One Belt, One Road where they will have
    commerce that starts in China, goes down to Indonesia, the
    Malacca Straits, across over to Djibouti, up into Europe and
    back. That is roughly 60 countries and 40 percent of the global
    GDP [Gross Domestic Product] that goes on in that area. It is
    all about trade. This is their first endeavor in an overseas
    base, and it will not be their last.
        Senator Perdue. Thank you, sir.
        I want to ask one more question real quick. I am about out
    of time. But in Somalia and Sudan, there is a growing threat
    that there is a real serious famine that is about to happen if
    it has not already started there. What will that do to the
    military situation in that area?
        General Waldhauser. Well, first of all, in Somalia,
    Senator, this right now is the most pressing issue to the brand
    new president who was just elected this last month. Right now,
    there are over 6.2 million individuals who have been affected
    by it, and it has not been, to my knowledge, actually declared
    a famine yet. But in terms of combating al-Shabaab and the
    like, movement of people in those large masses has an impact on
    military operations.
        But the bottom line in Somalia is right now--and we have
    counterterrorism operations. We are trying to build up the
    national security forces. But that famine for the brand new
    president and this fledgling national government is the biggest
    thing on their plate. They have to do well in this because if
    they cannot provide for this famine, then Somalia, who has been
    without a national government for over 20 years, is going to
    question what the purpose and what contributions they will
    make.
        Senator Perdue. Thank you, sir.
        One last real quick question. In Moron, Spain, I was
    fortunate enough to meet and visit with some of your great
    marines there. They have got a very strong mission.
    Unfortunately, late last year, they had to move about half of
    their air assets back to the U.S. for training. Can you talk
    about readiness with regard to their mission in Africa?
        General Waldhauser. Senator, the impact right now is really
    capacity for us. We have had to kind of center their activity
    mostly on western Africa. Some of the missions we have in
    eastern Africa that they would have been able to deploy to in
    the past, we would have to coordinate with CENTCOM, and we have
    actually used marines from the Oregon MEU [Marine Expeditionary
    Unit] in CENTCOM on the ground in Djibouti to take care of
    crisis response activities, specifically South Sudan, that we
    had at that time. The readiness of the airplanes has gotten
    better, but when you go from 12 to 6, the capacity is cut in
    half. The impact is we have got to do a better job coordinating
    and sharing assets because the Africa continent is extremely
    large.
        Senator Perdue. Yes, sir. Thank you. Thank you both.
        Chairman McCain [presiding]. Senator Donnelly?
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you both for your service. We are so grateful for
    your hard work.
        General Votel, as we move forward in Mosul and some of the
    ISIS fighters head out, what efforts do we have in place to try
    to capture them before they head to Raqqa or to other areas, or
    where are they heading out to?
        General Votel. Well, Senator, thank you for the question.
        Our intention, of course, is to prevent them from getting
    out. The first part of all of our operations is to isolate the
    areas where we are, where our attacks are taking place by our
    partners, and where we are bringing our enabling capabilities
    so that we do not let anybody get out or get in. Being a
    desert, this is obviously a very porous area, so there probably
    are some that get out. I think they are generally moving into
    the middle Euphrates River valley, which is a location that is
    equidistant between Mosul and Raqqa.
        Senator Donnelly. A while ago, we were just outside
    Hadditha in Anbar Province meeting with the Iraqi leaders
    there. I just wanted to follow up. At that time, they were
    close to starvation, for a lot of their citizens. It was
    extremely difficult for all of their families. Where are we now
    in terms of solidifying Hadditha, Fallujah, Ramadi, those
    areas, and are they working with us and with the central
    government?
        General Votel. Senator, they are and we are making progress
    with the humanitarian aid and the needs of the people out in
    all of those areas. This I think is an area that we have to pay
    particular attention to as we move forward, particularly in the
    large urban areas. Our military operations--planning for those
    has to be done in conjunction with the humanitarian aid
    planning and providing for the needs of the people that will be
    left behind. I think this is a key aspect for us.
        Senator Donnelly. As we head toward Raqqa, we have seen
    that marines have come in. Are you getting everything that you
    need in terms of equipment, manpower, all of those things to
    take Raqqa back?
        General Votel. We are, Senator, and I am certainly in
    discussions with the Secretary about what we might need going
    forward.
        Senator Donnelly. Because I think our feeling is we do not
    want to not get this done as soon as possible because we did
    not provide you with the necessary equipment, necessary
    personnel.
        As we look at Raqqa and moving forward, obviously there is
    a lot of complication with the Turks and with others. How are
    all those pieces coming together for you?
        General Votel. Well, as you know, Senator, this is an
    extraordinarily complex area here. We are trying to work with
    an indigenous force that has tensions with a NATO ally. That is
    not an easy situation to move through. But I think the way we
    are addressing it is in the right way. We are being as
    transparent as we can. We are providing information. We are
    looking for options on a day-to-basis to ensure we can mitigate
    and minimize the tension that exists in this area. I will not
    try to tell you that there is an easy way through all this
    complexity. There is not. It is going to take a lot of hard
    work. It is going to take military work. It is going to take
    diplomatic work as we move forward. I do believe that is the
    approach that we are taking and I think that ultimately it will
    work for us.
        Senator Donnelly. I was going to follow up--you were kind
    enough to come by my office--to follow up and say I think your
    idea of complete transparency, here is what we are doing, here
    is what we are working on, here is how we plan to do it and to
    try to cooperate as much as we can with other countries, but to
    tell them this is the plan and this is where we are going seems
    to make a lot of sense to me.
        As you look at what has gone on in the Arabian Gulf, we
    just saw another incident with our ships recently. As we move
    forward, the distances seem to be less. They get closer. They
    get closer. Do we have a plan ready to go where at some point
    we say, you know, you have crossed the red line, and if they
    continue, that we take appropriate action?
        General Votel. Senator, I am very confident in our ship
    captains and in our crews for them to deal with the situation.
    I do believe they have the right rules of engagement. They have
    the right tools to prevent things, and in the case that
    prevention does not work or deterrence does not work, then they
    have the capabilities to defend themselves and take action. I
    am very confident in our people.
        Senator Donnelly. My guess is that there will become an X
    crosses Y point, and I just want to make sure that our captains
    and all of them are ready. I have the same confidence.
        General Waldhauser, as you look at your area of command,
    what do you see as our biggest challenge right now that you are
    dealing with?
        General Waldhauser. Senator, I think the biggest challenge
    perhaps is the development piece for the demographics of a very
    youthful population. 41 percent of the continent is under the
    age of 15. We have got to find a way to get at education,
    health care, hopelessness, livelihood, and the like in order to
    give those individuals a future because we could knock off all
    the ISIL and Boko Haram this afternoon, but by the end of the
    week, so to speak, those ranks would be filled. We know from
    those who have kind of come out of the forest and given
    themselves up, so to speak, that the reason they joined was
    they needed a job, they needed a livelihood. It is not, for the
    most part, in those regions about ideology. That is not the
    driver. It is those factors I just talked about that drive them
    into that line of work because there is nothing else for them
    to do. I think the youth bulge and the demographics and
    providing development and a way ahead for those youth are very,
    very important.
        Senator Donnelly. We cannot fight our way out of it. What
    we have to do is to try to give them hope and dignity and
    purpose I guess.
        General Waldhauser. Exactly. I am not the first. Many
    people, especially those in uniform, have said we cannot kill
    our way to victory here. This is about the long-term investment
    in capacity building because at the end of the day, that is
    what is going to try to help solve the problem especially on
    the African continent.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you. Thank you both for your
    service.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Tillis?
        Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Votel, thank you for spending the time with me in
    my office this week. General Waldhauser, welcome to the
    committee. Thank you both for your service.
        I will ask this of both of you. One area that I would like
    to get your feedback on is foreign military financing, foreign
    military sales and to what extent do we need to focus on that
    with some of our partner nations that you believe is helpful to
    you completing your missions in each of your commands. General
    Votel, we will start with you.
        General Votel. Thank you, Senator.
        I think foreign military funding, foreign military sales
    are extraordinarily important.
        Senator Tillis. Can you get more into specifics about
    certain areas where we need to really look at on a more
    immediate basis?
        General Votel. Yes, I do. I think certainly looking at
    ballistic missile capabilities for some of our Gulf partners is
    an important area. Certainly some of the aircraft programs out
    there--there is a great desire to have U.S. programs in many of
    these countries, and those are certainly areas where we have to
    pay strong attention.
        Senator Tillis. What sort of capabilities in Egypt? Senator
    Perdue asked you questions about the Sinai and increasing
    threat in that region because of the consolidation of ISIS and
    other entities. What kinds of things would be helpful in
    particular to Egypt in that area?
        General Votel. Well, certainly the suite of counter-
    improvised explosive device equipment we have out there,
    running from jammers to protected vehicles and a variety of
    things in between, I think would be extraordinarily helpful to
    them.
        Senator Tillis. Do you have any specifics? General
    Waldhauser, I want to go to you with the same line of
    questioning. But any specific things that you can provide us,
    any specific areas where we need to take a look at and maybe
    get back to where we are helping build that partnership with
    Egypt?
        General Votel. Senator, we do, and with your permission, we
    will look for an opportunity to come and talk with you
    specifically about that so we can get into some detail about
    what we think would be most useful for Egypt and in fact for
    other partners across the region.
        Senator Tillis. Thank you.
        General Waldhauser, same line of questions.
        General Waldhauser. Thank you, Senator.
        Interestingly, in Africa, the foreign military sales is a
    very interesting choice. Many of the countries that we deal
    with are not financially in good shape, and consequently the
    ability to pay and the ability to fund for long-term parts
    blocks behind that is a difficult task. I am not suggesting
    that we should alter the rules or change the rules, but I think
    we need to be very flexible when we deal with some of these
    poor countries and make sure we understand their absorptive
    capability so that what we are selling them they not only can
    use them in the first few years, but there will be a parts
    block behind that, if you will. There will be an institution, a
    logistical infrastructure behind that, that will allow them to
    keep these pieces of equipment, whether they be vehicles or
    maybe C-130 airplanes, keep them in good shape for years ahead
    and years to come.
        Senator Tillis. Thank you.
        On another subject--and it relates to foreign military aid.
    General Votel, when you were in my office, we were talking
    about Afghanistan. When I was there the year before last, at
    the time there was a concern that there was going to be a drop-
    off in foreign investment and the tools that Afghanistan needed
    for its economic development, which is a key part of
    stabilizing the country--what is the current situation there?
        General Votel. I think the situation looks good, both from
    a NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] standpoint and from
    a much broader international standpoint. The donation
    conferences and other things that have been convened here over
    the last year----
        Senator Tillis. Are we building a reliable stream, or is
    there another cliff that we have to be concerned with?
        General Votel. I think we are building a reliable stream
    out to the 2020 time frame and in some cases beyond that. I
    think the international community has stepped up to the plate
    in this particular area.
        Senator Tillis. Thank you.
        General Waldhauser, when General Votel and the people that
    we have assisting countries in CENTCOM are successful in Mosul
    and Raqqa, it seems to me the good news is maybe we are getting
    some level of success there. But I have got to believe that
    that is going to potentially cause some additional challenges
    for you. Can you talk about the ones that you are specifically
    concerned with?
        General Waldhauser. Senator, anytime you put pressure on
    the network and disrupt or dislodge ISIL from a certain area,
    movement will occur. That means the border countries toward
    that took place are very concerned about foreign fighters
    moving back and forth. That is one of the big concerns that we
    have. One of the issues that we have to deal with when we
    conduct operations, it is important that the neighbors of those
    countries know what we are trying to do and understand why we
    are trying to do that so we can help them with the foreign
    fighter flow if movement should occur.
        Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Kaine?
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Thanks to the witnesses.
        The Marine Corps doctrinal publication entitled
    ``Strategy'' has this phrase in it. What matters ultimately in
    war is strategic success, attainment of our political aims, and
    the protection of our national interests. History shows that
    national leaders, both political and military, have failed to
    understand this relationship, sow the seeds for ultimate
    failure, even when their armed forces achieve initial
    battlefield success. Battlefield brilliance seldom rescues a
    bad strategy.
        I have been heartened by the American military's
    performance on the battlefield. Very heartened with our
    partners against ISIL in Iraq and now Syria. Although we would
    not want to predict anything about timing, I think that we are
    going to continue to have battlefield success.
        What is our political strategy, say, following the fall of
    Raqqa that would lead us to have a belief that there is going
    to be a better next chapter to follow in Syria especially?
        General Votel. Senator, I am not sure I can comment on what
    the political strategy is. I do believe this is a key aspect of
    what Secretary Mattis and the administration are discussing
    right now with respect to what this looks like long-term.
        Senator Kaine. General Votel, I think that is a good
    answer. You are not commenting because the political strategy
    is really for the political leadership not the military
    leadership. The administration and Congress. You understand
    that Congress has a role in this as well, not just the
    administration.
        General Votel. I do, Senator.
        Senator Kaine. We are pursuing a war now based on an
    authorization that was passed in September of 2001. It is now
    nearly 16 years old. Do you think it would be helpful in terms
    of articulating a political strategy that would put the
    military mission into a context and to find an end result and a
    potential desired future state if Congress were to grapple with
    the question of the authorities and this desired end political
    strategy?
        General Votel. Senator, I think the current AUMF
    [Authorization for Use of Military Force] has provided what we
    needed, but I do believe an updated authorization certainly
    would send a stronger commitment to uniformed military of our
    commitment and desire to support them.
        Senator Kaine. In the CENTCOM space, if the military
    mission succeeds and Raqqa were to fall, do you still believe
    that the American mission against ISIL and al Qaeda will take a
    long time?
        General Votel. I do. This is a very savvy enemy, and they
    are adapting. Like we are adapting on the battlefield, they are
    adapting on the battlefield.
        Senator Kaine. Just like the ISIL attack----
        General Votel. Right.
        Senator Kaine.--in Afghanistan dressed as doctors attacking
    the hospital. This is a threat that is not going to go away
    just because Raqqa were to fall. Correct?
        General Votel. That is right. They will begin to adopt
    other forms, and we will need to be persistent against that and
    we will need to work with our partners to address that in both
    Iraq and Syria.
        Senator Kaine. Well, my colleagues know because I have said
    it a lot and others view it the same way, that this question of
    authorities--I do think it is past time for Congress to address
    it. Whether you think the 9-14-01 AUMF legally covers the
    battle against ISIL or not, I think there are prudent reasons
    at a minimum and I think legal reasons as well that we should
    tackle it.
        On the question of legal authorities, traditionally you
    need two kinds of legal authorities to be engaged in a military
    mission. You need a domestic legal authority and you need an
    international legal justification as well. The most common
    international legal justification for military action in
    somebody else's territory is that they invited you. We are
    conducting military actions in Iraq with the request and
    support of the Iraqi Government. We are conducting military
    operations in Afghanistan with the support and request of the
    Afghan Government. We just conducted a DOD ground operation for
    the first time in Yemen with the request and support of the
    Yemeni Government.
        Are we deploying marines in Syria at the request or with
    the permission of the Syrian Government?
        General Votel. We are not, Senator.
        Senator Kaine. What is the international legal
    justification for the U.S. taking military action in another
    country without the request of that country? We have criticized
    nations such as Russia, for example, for undertaking military
    actions in the Ukraine or Crimea without the request of the
    government.
        General Votel. Thank you, Senator. I think we certainly
    make a judgment about the ability of the government to make a
    decision. In that case I think what we are doing in Syria, we
    are looking at that as an extension of the authority to operate
    from Iraq.
        Senator Kaine. Iraq has had us in and we are cooperating
    with Iraq. We are there in Iraq at their request. But I guess
    the bottom line is there is no such request from Syria. We do
    not judge that government capable of making such a request, and
    we do not really recognize the legitimacy of Bashar al Assad's
    government. But you are saying that the international legal
    justification for American military action in a country that
    has not asked us is the fact that we are engaged in a military
    action in a country next door that has asked us?
        General Votel. I believe we are being extended that
    authority by our leadership to conduct those operations
    principally because we are operating against an enemy that
    operates on both sides of that border.
        Senator Kaine. If I might, one last question with respect
    to Yemen. We have had hearings in this committee about the
    ground operation in Yemen, which to my knowledge was the first
    ground operation by DOD forces in Yemen. There were a number of
    questions raised by that. I do not want to go into the
    classified briefing we had, but questions about was the mission
    compromised in some way in the advance. What intel was gained?
    There was some after-the-fact justification of the mission
    using video that actually had been taken in another mission. Is
    the DOD conducting an ongoing investigation of that mission to
    determine all lessons learned, what worked, what did not, and
    what we can do better?
        General Votel. Senator, thank you, and let me answer this a
    little more comprehensively.
        First and foremost, I am responsible for this mission. I am
    the CENTCOM Commander and I am responsible for what is done in
    my region and what is not done in my region. I accept the
    responsibility for this. We lost a lot on this operation. We
    lost a valued operator. We had people wounded. We caused
    civilian casualties. We lost an expensive aircraft.
        We did gain some valuable information that will be helpful
    for us. Our intention here was to improve our knowledge against
    this threat, a threat that poses a direct threat to us here in
    the Homeland. That was what we were focused on.
        There have been a number of investigations that have been
    initiated. Most of these are regulatory or statutory in terms
    of things that we normally do.
        When we lose an aircraft, there is both a safety
    investigation to ensure that we disseminate lessons learned for
    the broader fleet, and there is also a collateral investigation
    that tries to determine the specific reason why that happened
    and establishes accountability over that.
        We have done an investigation into the civilian casualties.
    That has been completed. The helicopter investigations are
    ongoing. The civilian casualty aspect has been completed, and
    we have made a determination based on our best information
    available that we did cause casualties, somewhere between 4 and
    12 casualties that we accept--I accept responsibility for.
        We have done a line of duty investigation, again a
    statutory investigation, on the death of Senior Chief Owens
    that determined that he was in the line of investigation.
        The key mechanism that I have, Senator, is the after-action
    review, and this is something we do with every operation we do.
    The intention here is to review the operation in great detail
    to understand exactly what happened. It is done with the chain
    of command in place. We have done that and I have presided over
    that. Based on my experience, nearly 37 years of service, I
    have certainly appointed a lot of investigations and I have
    been through a lot of these after-action reviews. When I go
    through these things, there are some specific things that I am
    looking for. I am looking for information gaps where we cannot
    explain what happened in a particular situation or we have
    conflicting information between members of the organization. I
    am looking for indicators of incompetence or poor decision-
    making or bad judgment throughout all of this.
        What I can tell you is that we did an exhaustive after-
    action review on this. I presided over that. It went down to a
    level that included people who were on the specific objective.
    As a result of that, I was satisfied that none of those
    indicators that I identified to you were present. I think we
    had a good understanding of exactly what happened on this
    objective, and we have been able to pull lessons learned out of
    that that we will apply in future operations. As a result, I
    made the determination that there was no need for an additional
    investigation into this particular operation.
        Senator Kaine. The only investigation that continues is the
    investigation--or the loss of the helicopters is still not
    complete.
        General Votel. That is correct, Senator.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman McCain. Just to follow up, General, there has been
    a lot of conversation about this particular mission and the
    point that some of us are trying to make that the heroism and
    sacrifice of those who served has nothing to do with the
    mission itself. In other words, we honor their sacrifice no
    matter what happened in the mission.
        When you have women and children killed, as you pointed
    out, the loss of a $70 million aircraft, you did not capture
    anyone as was part of the mission, that mission is not a
    success. But that happens in war. There is a thing called the
    fog of war. They did the best they could under very difficult
    circumstances. I hope in the process of your investigation,
    when heavy fire was encountered why the decision was made to
    continue the mission--I still do not think this committee has
    an answer to that question. But it does not question the
    loyalty and sacrifice and bravery when we question the mission.
        Unless we tell the American people the truth, the absolute
    truth, then we are going to revisit another war a long time ago
    where we did tell the American people the truth and we paid a
    very heavy price for it. There are 55,000 names engraved in
    black granite not far from here, and the American people were
    not told the truth about whether we were succeeding or failing
    in that war. Then because of that, it all collapsed. I hope
    that we will not forget that lesson, and in no way does it
    detract from the heroism and professionalism and sacrifice of
    the brave men and women who serve under your command.
        Senator McCaskill?
        Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to
    underline the comments you just made, and I do think it is
    important that we get answers to the questions about what
    happened at that moment in very difficult circumstances,
    admittedly, that heavy fire occurred and the decision was made
    to continue. I am also anxious to have the questions answered
    about the real value of the intelligence that was gathered. I
    think there have been some mixed signals about the value of the
    intelligence that was gathered.
        I want to talk to you today. I have spent an awful lot of
    time working on contracting in contingencies. I remember my
    very first trip to Iraq included a stop in Kuwait to look at
    contracting. I had an encounter with a general there that I
    will never forget. I will always admire him for being so honest
    with me because I was pointing out all of these massive
    problems with contracting, especially Log Cap 1, Log Cap 2 and
    all of those associated contracts. He looked at me and he said,
    Senator, I wanted three kinds of ice cream in the mess
    yesterday, and I do not care how much it costs.
        Now, while I admired him for his honesty, it kind of
    underscored for me that contracting oversight was not a core
    capability many times within commands within contingencies. If
    it were, we would not have this long trail of mistakes made
    going all the way back to Kosovo on contracting.
        I was upset yesterday when I saw the DOD IG [Inspector
    General] report coming out of Kuwait where they said that
    ineffective monitoring of contractor performance for the Kuwait
    base operations--a particular concern that the contracting
    officer representatives, which we have worked very hard--I
    mean, at the point in time I was over there, it was the worst
    guy in the unit got handed the clipboard, had no idea what he
    was supposed to do in terms of contracting oversight and did
    not do much. We have done a lot of work on this, training, and
    making sure people understand and with the standing up the
    Contracting Command.
        The fact that there is no consistent surveillance of these
    contracts in Kuwait, no assurance that the contract
    requirements have been met, and the entire $13 million
    performance bonus was paid even though it is not clear that it
    was earned, and maybe most worrisome, this environmental and
    health hazard that has been allowed to languish. It is fairly
    clear from reading this report that a stagnant wastewater
    lagoon went unresolved, that it was probably never constructed
    correctly, and it is really impacting the health and safety of
    some of our men and women that are stationed there.
        I need you to reassure me that we have not taken our eye
    off the importance of contracting oversight. This is not just
    you. This is also the ACC [Army Contracting Command] and the
    408th Contracting Support Brigade.
        General Votel. Thank you, Senator.
        I absolutely agree with you, and I recognize my
    responsibility as the CENTCOM Commander and as a senior leader
    in the Department of Defense to ensure that the expenditure of
    our national treasure and our resources is done in an effective
    and efficient manner. I look forward to an opportunity to talk
    with you specifically about this situation in Kuwait.
        Senator McCaskill. I would like that very much, and we will
    look forward to hearing from you directly. The thing that was
    the most frustrating about the contracting through much of the
    Iraq conflict before we did the contracting reforms that the
    Wartime Contracting Commission set out--and we codified all of
    those, most of them in this committee--the amount of money that
    was wasted was astounding. We just cannot afford it. We just
    cannot afford it.
        Let me briefly, in the time I have remaining--I know that
    they have covered Russia as it relates to what has been going
    on in Afghanistan. I am not sure that it has been touched on,
    what is going on in Nigeria, and would love you to speak to
    that, General Waldhauser, about the fact that we refused to
    sell them the Cobra attack helicopters because of the history
    of human rights problems. Undeterred by that history, of
    course, Russia stepped up and now sold them attack helicopters.
    They are now training the Nigerian military, including the
    special forces, instead of the United States.
        Could you give us any assessment of the impact of that,
    that Russia has stepped in where our better judgment said it
    was not a good idea and is now taking on that primary role with
    the Nigerian special forces?
        General Waldhauser. Senator, not only Nigeria but other
    countries on the continent. If there are easier ways to get to
    military sales, if countries come in, China, Russia, North
    Korea, for example--if they come in and do not have a lot of
    strings attached, then sometimes it is easier for those
    countries to purchase weapon systems from others than the U.S.
        We try to accommodate certain financial situations. I know
    the DSCA people that work for OSD try hard to accommodate that.
    When you look closely at the absorption capabilities of these
    countries--but again in many occasions, human rights is not an
    issue when it comes to weapon sales from countries other than
    the United States.
        Senator McCaskill. Well, I think it is something we need to
    worry about because it is, obviously, a powerful way to spread
    the influence and power of Russia. I think we all, no matter
    what our party is, have figured out in the last 6 months that
    this is a real threat to our country and to our national
    security.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Graham?
        Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I think you have been asked about soft power and the need
    for it. Both of you said it is an important tool in the toolbox
    to win the war. Is that correct?
        General Votel. That is correct, Senator.
        General Waldhauser. Yes, Senator. Yes.
        Senator Graham. You are warfighters extraordinaire. I
    appreciate you putting a plug in for soft power. Let me dig in
    with it. Can you win the war without it?
        General Waldhauser. I do not believe you can, Senator.
    Everything comes from security. Once you have a secure
    environment, development needs to take place, and that is where
    soft power kicks in.
        General Votel. I agree with, General Waldhauser.
        Senator Graham. Really, this war is about a glorious death
    being offered by the terrorists and a hopeful life by the rest
    of the world. Is that a pretty good description of what we are
    trying to do is offer a hopeful life to compete with a glorious
    death?
        General Votel. I think in very general terms, I think it is
    about that. It is about offering alternatives to people to the
    situations that they find themselves in.
        Senator Graham. The good news is that most people over
    there do not want what ISIL is selling. There is not a big
    demand for that product. Is that a fair statement?
        General Waldhauser. Certainly on the African continent that
    is true, very true.
        General Votel. I would agree with that, Senator.
        Senator Graham. Very few fathers and mothers want to turn
    their daughters over to ISIL if they do not have to. Is that a
    fair statement?
        General Votel. It is, Senator.
        General Waldhauser. Yes, Senator, it is fair.
        Senator Graham. Is it a fair statement we are not going to
    win this war without partners in the faith? The only way you
    can win this war is to have fellow Muslims fighting with us
    against ISIL.
        General Votel. It is my view that we have to have local
    forces engaged in this.
        General Waldhauser. That is what by, with, and through is
    all about, Senator.
        Senator Graham. Is it fair to say that most people in the
    faith reject this hateful ideology?
        General Votel. That is true, Senator.
        General Waldhauser. I agree.
        Senator Graham. I want the committee to understand that any
    budget we pass that guts the State Department's budget, you
    will never win this war. As a matter of fact, ISIL will be
    celebrating.
        What is Russia trying to do in Libya, General Waldhauser?
        General Waldhauser. Senator, Russia is trying to exert
    influence on the ultimate decision of who becomes and what
    entity becomes in charge of the government inside Libya. They
    are working to influence that decision.
        Senator Graham. They are trying to do in Libya what they
    have been doing in Syria?
        General Waldhauser. Yes. That is a good way to characterize
    it.
        Senator Graham. It is not in our national interest to let
    that happen. Is it?
        General Waldhauser. It is not.
        Senator Graham. The political situation in Libya is pretty
    fractured?
        General Waldhauser. It is very fractured, Senator.
        Senator Graham. The commander of their military is at odds
    with the political leader supported by the U.N. Is that fair?
        General Waldhauser. That is fair, yes.
        Senator Graham. If we do not fix that, it is going to be
    tough moving forward?
        General Waldhauser. We have got to get the entities,
    specifically Haftar and the government of national accord,
    together to make an accommodation in order to get any
    government moving forward.
        Senator Graham. Would you say that Secretary Tillerson is
    very important in this regard?
        General Waldhauser. Very important, Senator.
        Senator Graham. We need to put that on his radar screen.
        General Waldhauser. Yes, we do.
        Senator Graham. Syria. The Kurds that we are training,
    General Votel, are they mostly in line with the YPG [Popular
    Protection Units]? Are they YPG Kurds?
        General Votel. They are, Senator.
        Senator Graham. Is it fair to say that in the eyes of the
    Turks, the YPG Kurds are not much better, if any better, than
    the PKK [Kurdistan Workers' Party]?
        General Votel. Senator, that is the view of the Turks.
        Senator Graham. Is it fair to say that the YPG Kurds have
    sort of a communist/Marxist view of governing? That is what
    their manifesto says anyway.
        General Votel. Senator, I think it is fair to say that
    there is some affinity back towards that.
        Senator Graham. Is it fair to say that we have got to be
    careful about over-utilizing the YPG Kurds? Not only will it
    create problems for Turkey, other Kurds in the region do not
    buy into their agenda also.
        General Votel. I think it is important. That is why as we
    look to a place like Raqqa, we are attempting to do that with
    majority Arab forces.
        Senator Graham. Is it fair to say that how we take Raqqa
    can determine the outcome of Geneva in terms of a political
    settlement?
        General Votel. It is certainly a key operation. We will
    support that.
        Senator Graham. Is it fair to say that the balance of power
    on the ground in terms of Assad's regime that he is in a good
    spot?
        General Votel. He is in a better position than he was a
    year ago.
        Senator Graham. That the opposition has basically melted
    away because Russia, Iran, and Assad have gone after them full
    throated.
        General Votel. The support that has been provided by Russia
    and Iran has certainly enabled the regime.
        Senator Graham. Is it fair to say that most Syrians want
    two things: to get rid of ISIL but also to get rid of Assad
    because he slaughtered their families?
        General Votel. The Syrians that I have talked to I think
    would agree with that.
        Senator Graham. Is it fair to say it is in our national
    security interests for Damascus not to be handed over to Assad,
    a proxy for Iran, in any final settlement, that you cannot have
    Iran dominating Damascus?
        General Votel. Senator, I think that is certainly a
    decision for our political leadership to make, but I think
    there is a strong consensus.
        Senator Graham. Final thought. How we take Raqqa will
    determine if we can get a political settlement in Geneva if we
    do not change the balance of military power on the ground, go
    outside of this Kurdish construct, reassure the Arabs that we
    are a better partner than we have been in the past, we are
    going to give Damascus to the Iranians, if we help those Syrian
    Arabs who want to fight and take their country back from Assad
    and his brutal dictatorship, I think we can change the balance
    of power on the ground and get a better deal in Geneva. If the
    Trump administration is listening, how you take Raqqa will
    determine how successful we are in neutralizing Iranian
    influence and Russian influence.
        Mr. Chairman, you have been terrific on this issue. I want
    to thank you for your leadership.
        Chairman McCain. I thank you.
        I thank you, Generals, for your appearance here this
    morning. It has been very helpful to the committee and to
        the United States Senate. I know it is not your favorite
    pastime, but I think it is very important that we hear directly
    from you. Thank you for your leadership, and we do want you to
    be assured that we will do everything we can to support you as
    we go through what is a very complicated and difficult
    challenge.
        Senator Reed?
        Senator Reed. I simply want to thank you, gentlemen, for
    your service and for your testimony today. Please relay our
    thanks to the men and women who serve so well with you. Thank
    you very much.
        Chairman McCain. This hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:40 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

                  Questions Submitted by Senator David Perdue
                         avoiding past mistakes in iraq
        1. Senator Perdue. General Votel, I am concerned that we have not
    been setting conditions to make sure our grand gains against ISIS will
    hold and prevent al Qaeda in Iraq and Syria (AQAP) or other jihadists
    from backilling after the campaigns for Mosul and Raqqa are completed.
    How do we prevent this scenario going forward to ensure we do not
    repeat the mistakes of our force withdrawal from Iraq?
        General Votel. Our Coalition forces are employing the military
    instrument of power to defeat ISIS militarily in Iraq and Syria. It is
    important to note that the successful defeat of ISIS in Raqqah and
    Mosul does not mark the military defeat of ISIS; there remains more
    work to be done in Iraq and Syria to militarily defeat ISIS. That said,
    it is important to recall that the Coalition Military Campaign Plan to
    defeat ISIS is one part of the broader ``whole-of-government'' effort
    that is required to achieve a sustained defeat of the enemy. An inter-
    agency and inter-ministerial approach is required to address political,
    diplomatic and other underlying issues that Iraq and Syria will
    continue to face after the military defeat of ISIS. By defeating ISIS
    militarily, we set the conditions that will allow other agencies and
    ministries to take the necessary actions to achieve improved social,
    governance, and economic advancements in both countries.

        2. Senator Perdue. General Votel, in the counter-ISIS fight in Iraq
    and Syria, how should our plans take into account the political end-
    state for Iraq and Syria?
        General Votel. As we seek to defeat ISIS in Iraq and Syria, it is
    vital that we coordinate closely with our Interagency partners and
    particularly the Department of State, as well as with our Coalition
    partners to ensure that our military efforts to defeat ISIS contribute
    toward the achievement of broader political endstates in Iraq and Syria
    and enduring improved stability and security in the region. Our
    military actions help set the conditions for broader political and
    diplomatic efforts. In Iraq, for example, we actively work with our
    Embassy to ensure the mix of Iraqi forces engaged in the counter-ISIS
    fight will not complicate post-Defeat governance issues. In Syria, our
    forces have worked with both our Syrian Democratic Forces partners and
    our NATO ally Turkey to mitigate tensions and set the stage for
    locally-rooted governance structures in the aftermath of liberating
    territory previously seized by ISIS. In Iraq, we are also actively
    discussing our longer-term security engagement with the Government of
    Iraq, which can help ensure the lasting security Iraq needs to
    establish greater political and economic stability. Longer-term
    political objectives in Syria are more complicated, but we will ensure
    close alignment of our military and diplomatic efforts as we move ahead
    in the counter-ISIS campaign.
                 campaign against isis and its impact on syria
        3. Senator Perdue. General Votel, I understand that your efforts
    are directed at defeating ISIS in Iraq and Syria. If ISIS is defeated
    how does that affect the Assad Regime, and what will be the impact on
    the civil war in Syria?
        General Votel. The military defeat of ISIS will not, in and of
    itself, resolve the civil war in Syria. Our mission is the defeat of
    ISIS because it poses the greatest threat to U.S. national interests.
    The defeat of ISIS will serve to remove one threat from what is a
    crowded battlespace in Syria where a number of different elements are
    fighting one another. While we cannot presume that all of the same
    players will shift their focus and continue to fight in some capacity
    after ISIS is defeated, the removal of this threat may serve to
    increase pressure on the Assad Regime.

        4. Senator Perdue. General Votel, a post-conflict Syria with the
    murderous Assad regime at the helm will only serve to fuel extremism
    and instability in the region. What is the desired end-state in Iraq
    and Syria and how do we achieve that?
        General Votel. CENTCOM has been directed to militarily defeat ISIS
    in Iraq and Syria. We continue to work by, with and through our
    partners on the ground to ensure a lasting defeat of this enemy.
    Ultimately, we would like to see increased stability and security in
    both countries, borders that are respected by all parties, and
    inclusive governance in place that is characterized by the rule of law.
    To achieve this will require a ``whole-of-government'' effort led by
    the people in the region. We cannot do it for them.
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (isr) needs for centcom
                                  and africom
        5. Senator Perdue. General Votel and General Waldhauser, last year,
    I wrote both your commands to inquire about the importance of the Joint
    Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) platform to operations
    in your areas of responsibility. You both indicated that JSTARS was
    important to accomplishing your mission objectives. In your estimation,
    what percentage of ISR requirements are being met in your areas of
    responsibility with the current resources at your disposal, including
    the JSTARS fleet?
        General Votel. [Deleted.]
        General Waldhauser. USAFRICOM currently receives approximately 1
    percent of its fiscal year 2017 Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI)
    requirement. When JSTARS deployed in support of Operation ODYSSEY
    LIGHTNING, the additive collection sourced an additional 6 percent of
    AFRICOM's GMTI requirement. More importantly, JSTARS provided key
    refinement of collection areas, allowed new target discovery, and
    enabled multiple, simultaneous cross-cue events with other collection
    platforms, directly supporting the liberation of Surt, Libya from
    Islamic State in Iraq and al-Shams in Libya (ISIS-L).

        6. Senator Perdue. General Votel and General Waldhauser, despite
    your responses on the importance of JSTARS to your ISR capabilities,
    the JSTARS fleet is in need of recapitalization, and that recap is
    already behind schedule. As currently planned, there will be at least
    one year without any JSTARS online and a decade of decreased fleet size
    and readiness. What would a potential gap in the availability of the
    JSTARS fleet mean for you and your combatant commands' ISR
    requirements?
        General Votel. [Deleted.]
        General Waldhauser. AFRICOM's current ISR allocation is limited in
    number, and is an economy of force fleet, where each new crisis
    requires trading priority of effort against ongoing counter-VEO
    activities. Adding in the tyranny of distance inherent to the continent
    of Africa, any additional allocated asset that can synchronize
    capabilities, economize time and resources, and maximize operational
    flexibility of AFRICOM's current ISR footprint is an exponential
    enabler. JSTARS is that type of platform, providing that capacity. With
    the wide area search capability and vast sensor array of JSTARS, it
    enables AFRICOM to maximize our other ISR platform capabilities that
    have inherently smaller collection area footprints, reduces required
    collection times for other already overtasked assets, and increases
    correlation and accuracy of actionable intelligence.
                           root causes of instability
        7. Senator Perdue. General Votel, in your written testimony you
    state that, ``While we must take the necessary actions to counter
    immediate threats, such as ISIS in Iraq and Syria, we also need to find
    ways to address these and other root causes of instability if we hope
    to achieve lasting positive effects in that part of the world. This
    cannot be accomplished solely through military means.'' Can you expand
    upon that, and discuss what non-military means you have in mind for
    complementing our military efforts to address threats emerging from
    your area of responsibility?
        General Votel. Our non-military means must fully integrate our
    interagency capabilities. To address the root causes of the
    instability, our primary goal must be to promote good governance and
    stability. Our interagency efforts could include: disrupting terrorist
    finances by working to enhance our partner nations' finance and money
    laundering laws; encouraging our allies to establish strict border
    security initiatives and synchronizing foreign fighter and facilitator
    lists; deny terrorist freedom of movement by standardizing visa
    security programs and initiatives for better maritime container
    security; and enhance and reinforce the rule of law through expanded
    international law enforcement cooperation including the introduction of
    biometric equipment/training, expanded cooperation on drug enforcement,
    and expanded extradition authorities.

        8. Senator Perdue. General Waldhauser, what do you see as the role
    of non-military means to combat root causes of instability in Africa?
        General Waldhauser. Non-military solutions are necessary, if not
    always sufficient, to combat the root causes of instability in Africa.
    Instability can be caused by numerous factors, including demographic,
    social, economic, and environmental challenges that are further
    exacerbated by poor governance. Crises, including insecurity caused by
    violent extremism, further complicates already volatile circumstances.
    The extent to which African governments are able to meet the
    expectations of their citizens is key to enhancing stability. At United
    States Africa Command, we recognize that the development of
    institutions, both military and civilian, capable of responding to
    near-term crises while concurrently overcoming long-term challenges, is
    a key starting point to building stability. This is fundamentally a
    non-military task for which the Department of State, the U.S. Agency
    for International Development, and other civilian agencies, have the
    lead. As our Theater Campaign Plan says, United States Africa Command
    operations are intended to create the time and space for institution-
    building to occur. Our decisive efforts are building African partner
    capacity and strengthening partnerships. While these efforts are
    directed to building military capacity, we understand that this can
    only be effective if civilian institutions are improving at the same
    time. We therefore seek to work with colleagues from the Department of
    State and U.S. Agency for International Development to ensure that our
    efforts are well coordinated and working towards similar end states.
    More directly, United States Africa Command relies on Embassies to
    provide administrative support for housing, transportation, and
    assistance in visa issuance. These activities ensure host nation
    political actors understand and support United States Africa Command
    efforts, and they fulfill congressional requirements, including Leahy
    vetting.

        9. Senator Perdue. General Votel, can you talk about how the ``gray
    zone'' of warfare that you described (where adversaries employ
    unconventional methods that include cyber warfare, propaganda, and
    support to proxy elements in an effort to achieve their objectives
    while minimizing the scope and scale of actual fighting) necessitates a
    whole-of-government approach?
        General Votel. The ``gray zone'' of military confrontation
    represents the range of activities short of conventional conflict; a
    dangerous space in which miscalculation can easily occur, leading to
    escalatory conflict and misunderstanding. In the ``gray zone''
    adversaries employ unconventional methods that include cyber warfare,
    propaganda, and support to proxy elements in an effort to achieve their
    objectives while minimizing the scope and scale of actual fighting. At
    the same time, these unconventional methods increase tensions between
    partners emphasizing competing priorities that detract from support for
    our common objectives. To be successful in this ambiguous environment,
    we must find alternate ways to compete against our adversaries short of
    conflict, while collaborating with our partners to achieve our desired
    end-states. This requires synchronized diplomatic, economic,
    intelligence, information, and law enforcement engagement at the
    national level to maximize the effects of a limited military engagement
    and to reduce the strategic risk.
                                syria safe zones
        10. Senator Perdue. General Votel, earlier this year, President
    Trump said that he would, ``absolutely do safe zones in Syria'' to stem
    the flow of refugees into other countries. What impact would the
    establishment of safe zones in Syria have on the counter-ISIS fight and
    the destabilizing refugee crisis?
        General Votel. Safe zones require enforcement; if we are going to
    implement a safe zone, we will need to clearly determine what it is we
    are trying to accomplish with the establishment of the safe zone and
    dedicate sufficient resources to enforce the zone. If the U.S. military
    is the enforcement mechanism, it would expand our current mission from
    defeating ISIS to countering any actor(s) that poses a threat to
    protected elements within the safe zone. Given the complexity of the
    current security environment in Syria, that may include other extremist
    organizations, Syrian Regime elements, Russian forces, or other Syrian
    opposition elements. Effective protection of a safe zone requires
    significant air and ground assets as well as the requisite command and
    control. The need for additional capabilities would necessitate pulling
    resources away from the counter-ISIS fight and other operations and
    thus would potentially negatively impact the C-ISIS Campaign.
                               virtual caliphate
        11. Senator Perdue. General Votel, in your written remarks, you
    stated concern over the ``virtual caliphate'' that is emerging from
    terror groups' ready access to internet platforms to spread their
    messages of terrorism and hate. You also stated that, ``Countering this
    virutual caliphate will require a concerted `whole-of-government'
    effort led by the people of the region.'' Can you describe what you
    think this approach would or should look like?
        General Votel. Ready access to the Internet, social media, and
    other messaging platforms has enabled a new generation of radicalized
    Islamists to spread their extremist views, incite widespread violence,
    and recruit new followers to their cause. Countering this ``virtual
    caliphate'' will require a concerted `whole-of-government' effort led
    by the people of the region. We can support our partners' activities,
    but their voices and influence will be required to achieve enduring
    positive results. By promoting the voices of moderates in the region
    and helping our regional partners to increase opportunities available
    to their citizens, particularly young, educated and unemployed or
    under-employed individuals, we will help to provide an alternative to
    counter violent extremists. The U.S. should also assist and encourage
    efforts such as the Islamic Coalition, a group of 34 predominately
    Muslim nations formed to fight the ``disease'' of Islamic extremism.
    Partnerships such as this are invaluable to developing effective means
    to protect young people from radicalization and to spread positive
    alternative narratives to ISIS's malevolent story.

        12. Senator Perdue. General Votel, what can we do to support this
    endeavor?
        General Votel. Across the U.S. Government, we have made significant
    progress to counter social media messaging due in part to Congressional
    support for programs such as WebOps. Continued Congressional
    authorities and resourcing are imperative to enhance interagency
    efforts; specifically, the Combatant Command Information Operations and
    the Department of State Global Engagement Center capabilities.
                          iranian influence in africa
        13. Senator Perdue. General Waldhauser, I've seen concerning open
    source reports regarding growing Iranian influence and popularity among
    Nigeria's Muslim population. Our allies, the Saudis, are reportedly
    alarmed regarding the development of Iran's growing foothold in Africa.
    Could you comment on Iran's influence in Africa?
        General Waldhauser. Overall, Iran's efforts on the continent are
    minimal. Iran maintains embassies and cultural centers throughout
    Africa, and has been reaching out predominantly to the Shiite Muslim
    populations in Africa. Further, they claim Sunni Arabs treat Sunni
    Africans poorly and cite this as a reason for their continent-wide
    Islamic education effort. Some of their engagements appear to be aimed
    at improving Iran's image within Africa, and they leverage Joint
    Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to promote more open political and
    economic engagement and, possibly, to reduce Tehran's reputation as a
    foreign sponsor of terrorism.

        14. Senator Perdue. General Waldhauser, is Iran's growing influence
    in Africa of concern to you?
        General Waldhauser. Iran's efforts on the continent have trended
    more toward diplomatic and economic engagements. Saudi- and UAE-led
    financial contributions in African countries have targeted these
    engagements, and this to some degree is part of the Iran-Saudi (Shia-
    Sunni) rivalry. After the Shiite cleric execution in Saudi Arabia, a
    diplomatic row ensued and several African countries severed ties with
    Iran, opting for increased ties with Sunni states.

        15. Senator Perdue. General Waldhauser, do you think Iran has any
    intention of being a force for good in Nigeria?
        General Waldhauser. At this time, Iran probably wants to continue
    to provide ideological support and diplomatic protection to Nigeria-
    borne Shiite. Iran has rejected some Nigerian elite's labeling of the
    Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN)--the predominant Shiite group in
    Nigeria--as a violent extremist organization and has expressed concern
    over IMN's treatment. Iran will likely continue to support Shia
    communities in Africa.
                         magtf/marines in moron, spain
        16. Senator Perdue. General Waldhauser, last April I had the
    pleasure of visiting with the Special MAGTF that is based in Moron,
    Spain. These Marines are truly at the tip of the spear, especially as
    it relates to crisis operations and embassy emergency response in
    Africa. However, Marines are truly at the tip of the spear, especially
    as it relates to crisis operations and embassy emergency response in
    Africa. Can you speak to how this reduction impacts your ability to
    fulfill the mission?
        General Waldhauser. The January 2017 reduction of the SPMAGTF
    aviation assets by 50 percent has the potential to impact AFRICOM's
    ability to respond to multiple crisis events. The reduction included
    reducing twelve MV-22s to six, and four KC-130s to three. Further, the
    SPMAGTF must still fulfill two simultaneous roles: Operation New Normal
    response, and Personnel Recovery and CASEVAC response. This is not
    ideal, as combined alert and flight times will be over two-times
    greater than our current response time from notification to being
    overhead Misrata, Libya, from Moron, Spain. This makes EUCOM basing in
    Sicily and Souda Bay absolutely crucial as a way to reduce these
    response times.

        17. Senator Perdue. General Waldhauser, how has the reduction in
    aircraft impacted your ability to conduct training and exercises to do
    capacity building with African forces?
        General Waldhauser. The 50 percent reduction in the SPMAGTF
    aviation element limits AFRICOM's ability to incorporate this force
    into joint exercises that are designed to sustain readiness of our
    rotational forces and build African partner capability. A full
    complement of aircraft would permit their participation in additional
    exercises to improve partner capacity while also providing enough force
    structure to respond to a crisis.

        18. Senator Perdue. General Waldhauser, what are some of the top
    successes of this MAGTF that you'd like to highlight?
        General Waldhauser. Before their 50 percent reduction direct
    support aviation assets in January 17, the SPMAGTF had the capacity to
    operate from two separate and independent locations for an extended
    period in support of three named operations for AFRICOM. While forward
    deployed to Camp Lemonier, Djibouti during the unrest in Juba, South
    Sudan they were postured to provide faster response if tasked to
    increase protection of the United States Embassy. In addition to crisis
    response, SPMAGTF-CR-AF conducted 18 theater security cooperation
    missions in Uganda, Gabon, Cameroon, Ghana, Senegal, Togo, Benin, and
    Tunisia. The SPMAGTF also participated in 11 exercises and bilateral
    engagements with partner nations in the USAFRICOM and USEUCOM area of
    responsibility. They conducted six site surveys to support our
    embassies with validation, planning, and assessment of their Emergency
    Action Plans, thereby providing Department of State with an awareness
    on how DOD can support in operation New Normal reinforcement or
    evacuation.

        19. Senator Perdue. General Waldhauser, can you speak more broadly
    to the resourcing issue for AFRICOM--are you getting the resources you
    need to meet your requirements?
        General Waldhauser. The vast distances associated with the African
    continent combined with the remote distribution of our forces and
    diplomatic outposts makes resourcing for crisis response and Personnel
    Recovery a challenge. While resources across the continent are limited,
    the safety of our forces are a primary concern, and Personnel Recovery
    will continue as AFRICOM's top priority. We have agreements in place
    for mutual support with several partner nations, and the AFRICOM
    component forces are well integrated to support our requirements as
    best as possible to include those of interagency and international
    partners. In East Africa, we are currently sourced at 50 percent for
    Personnel Recovery Task Forces (PRTFs). A second PRTF is validated by
    the SECDEF as a requirement but is unsourced. With a second PRTF,
    AFRICOM could adequately cover the personnel who are operating outside
    the directed 6-hour response requirement. Risk is mitigated in North
    Africa by relying on the SPMAGTF as a multi-purpose solution; however,
    the aviation element of the SPMAGTF was reduced by half for fiscal year
    2017, limiting its response to a single crisis or operation such as
    either supporting New Normal crisis response or Personnel Recovery for
    Libya. In West Africa, where we have no pre-positioned Response Forces,
    AFRICOM mitigates risk through commercial Search and Rescue and
    casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) contract assets. As operations continue
    to expand, AFRICOM will likely require additional contracts at
    approximately $45 million per year.
                 kenya, somalia, and counter-al-shabaab efforts
        20. Senator Perdue. General Waldhauser, last week, the Military
    Times reported that the DOD sent recommendations to the White House to
    increase assistance to the Somali National Army in their fight against
    al-Shabaab militants. Reports indicate that this would include giving
    U.S. special operations forces greater ability to accompany local
    troops on military operations against al-Shabaab and easing
    restrictions on when the U.S. can conduct airstrikes against the group.
    Could you discuss the current support we are giving to the Somali
    National Army and African Union forces?
        General Waldhauser. Currently in Somalia, our efforts center on
    enhancing the Somalia National Army and supporting the African Union
    Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). We are providing Advise/Assist/Accompany
    teams to facilitate the development of the Somalia National Army, as
    well as providing security force assistance, by way of equipment and
    training, with a focus on logistics, sustainment operations, medical
    capabilities, and institution building. Additionally, Somalia is
    receiving training and equipment from the United Kingdom, United Arab
    Emirates, Turkey, United Nations, and European Union, of which AFRICOM
    is linked. The role of the United Nations Special Representative of the
    Secretary General for Somalia and the emergence of the Security Six
    (S6) group of international donors (U.S., UK, Turkey, UAE, EU, and UN)
    has led to a more cohesive international support structure. With
    regards to African Union forces, or AMISOM, we are enhancing their
    capabilities in Somalia with training in preparation for their
    deployment, non-lethal equipment for the mission, maintenance training
    on that equipment, as well as mission-specific equipment and training
    that address medical needs, counter improvised explosive devices, force
    protection, and information gathering. USAFRICOM efforts focus on
    facilitating AMISOM's mission success while not duplicating efforts of
    the other contributing entities.

        21. Senator Perdue. General Waldhauser, where does this fall in
    your priority list for the continent?
        General Waldhauser. Enabling the Somali National Security Forces to
    neutralize al-Shabaab and assume responsibility for securing Somalia is
    one of my top priorities. Additional authorities that allow AFRICOM,
    AMISOM, and the SNA to put pressure on al-Shabaab are important.
    Simultaneously, improving Somali governance is equally important.

        22. Senator Perdue. General Waldhauser, what results are you seeing
    from the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism program?
        General Waldhauser. The Partnership for Regional East Africa
    Counterterrorism (PREACT) is a State Department program, which began in
    2009, and is funded at $10 million providing multi-year authority to
    build sustainable partnership capacity and enhance the long-term
    resilience of governments and communities in East Africa to contain,
    degrade, and ultimately defeat the threat posed by al-Shabaab and
    affiliated violent extremist groups. Twelve countries are eligible for
    PREACT funding: Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Somalia, Tanzania,
    Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, South Sudan, Comoros, and Burundi. PREACT is
    a critical element of AFRICOM's counterterrorism resourcing strategy by
    providing additional resources to current DOD-funded programs. PREACT
    supports training and equipping of East African partner nation military
    units, specifically communications, logistics, intelligence and
    aviation advisors. Additionally, PREACT has improved regional
    coordination and interoperability by providing regional military
    intelligence training, regional vehicle maintenance and logistics
    training, regional combat medical training and Defense Institution
    Building (DIB). We see positive results from the PREACT program.
    USAFRICOM has used PREACT to the benefit of our CT and CVE initiatives
    in Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda and other countries in the region.
    These initiatives include incorporating USAID, Department of Justice,
    and Department of State towards our security cooperation relationship.
    The program provides partner nations with both hard and soft power
    capabilities through their military, law enforcement, and public
    diplomacy and development tools to 1) Neutralize al-Shabaab; 2) Elevate
    Governance Reform, Human Rights, and Inclusive Economic Growth; and 3)
    Strengthen Regional Cooperation. Between fiscal year 2009 and fiscal
    year 2016, PREACT funds have trained over 2100 counterterrorism
    personnel in a range of skillsets including military intelligence,
    civil-military operations, logistics, communications, and Counter-
    Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED). Partner nation personnel train
    both bilaterally and regionally, encouraging network building and
    collaboration in CT operation.

        23. Senator Perdue. General Waldhauser, can we realistically expect
    the Somali National Army to assume responsibility for security across
    the country by the time African Union forces are expected to withdraw
    by 2020?
        General Waldhauser. A complete transfer of responsibility from
    AMISOM to the Somali National Army will be difficult by 2020. However,
    there are two reasons for optimism in expecting significant progress
    toward this goal. In February, Somalia elected its first non-
    transitional government in over a decade. President Farmaajo ran on a
    platform of reform and is making great strides to establish a national
    security architecture and to push his government to develop and sustain
    Somali National Security Forces that are able, accountable, affordable,
    and appropriate. Additionally, the international community, to include
    AMISOM, has made great strides in expanding and synchronizing training
    pipelines for Somali National Security Forces, and will continue to do
    so through 2018. The combined thrust of institutional reform and
    increased training capacity will result in a significantly larger and
    more capable Somali National Security Force by 2020. While this may not
    be enough to fully replace AMISOM, it should be enough to enable
    conditions-based drawdown planning and persuade some AMISOM troop
    contributing countries to remain beyond 2020, if required--possibly
    through the next election in 2021. That said, AMISOM's declared
    departure date has been helpful in spurring Somalia and international
    planning efforts. Additionally, AMISOM's drawdown and eventual
    departure will also remove a Somali population grievance that al-
    Shabaab has been able to use in its information operations. Finally,
    there is potential for al-Shabaab to be degraded via reconciliation if
    broad Security Sector Reform gains steam. Al-Shabaab reductions via
    reconciliation would reduce the number of Somali National Security
    Forces required to replace AMISOM.
                                   __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Kirsten Gillibrand
                chain of command for counterterrorism operations
        24. Senator Gillibrand. General Votel and General Waldhauser, news
    reports indicate that the Administration is considering delegating the
    decision-making authority for counterterrorism operations to lower
    levels of the chain of command. Presumably, many of these operations
    will occur within your areas of responsibility. If this is done, how do
    we ensure that the impact of tactical and operational decisions made at
    your level do not have unintentional strategic consequences in the
    Middle East and Africa?
        General Votel. Regarding operational authorities, I can assure you
    that delegation occurs at levels that are wholly commensurate with the
    appropriate levels of military experience. Additionally, the rigorous
    processes and procedures ingrained through all levels of the Department
    of Defense--from the Secretary of Defense through the combatant
    commanders to the Combined/Joint Forces Commanders--ensure that, when
    given increased authorities, we have proactive measures in place to
    ensure that actions taken are responsible, appropriate and aligned with
    national objectives. I have the utmost faith in the men and women of
    CENTCOM to accomplish our directed missions. In addition, I'm in
    routine contact with my fellow combatant commanders and my subordinate
    commanders on day-to-day operations. COCOM commanders, including me and
    the commanders of EUCOM and AFRICOM work closely together to ensure
    that actions taken in our individual areas of responsibility do not
    have unintended strategic consequences in other areas.
        General Waldhauser. If there is a policy adjustment (changing the
    Presidential Policy Guidance for Procedures for Approving Direct Action
    Against Terrorist Targets Located Outside the United States and Areas
    of Active Hostilities (CT-PPG)) whereby the President delegates
    decision-making authority for CT operations, there are several existing
    and proposed mechanisms and strategies that ensure the effects of local
    tactical decisions within my area of responsibility do not have
    unintentional [negative] consequences in Africa or in other areas. At
    AFRICOM we exercise a rigorous decision making process whereby we
    continuously question the pros and cons of contemplated actions. We
    ``Red Team'' pending operational decisions to determine any unintended
    consequences our actions may have in Africa or other parts of the
    globe. We question whether our adversaries may capitalize on our
    actions in social media or other forums; and then, having decided the
    pros outweigh the potential cons, we use deliberate planning processes
    to develop mitigation strategies against those potential negative
    effects. On a more global basis, the new administration has charged DOD
    with a 30-day push to develop a strategy for the global defeat of ISIS
    and other violent extremist organizations. This effort complemented an
    endeavor ongoing for roughly the last 18 months to develop a DOD plan
    to counter transregional terrorist organizations, having recognized
    that our regionally focused efforts created seams between the Combatant
    Commands that our adversaries were able to exploit. DOD is developing a
    revised Global Campaign Plan to Counter Violent Extremists in response
    to the new administration's direction and policy guidance. This plan is
    designed specifically to ensure that the department applies a global or
    transregional view to its activities and operations to create
    synchronization of our efforts. Organizationally, the Joint Staff
    created a staff section led by a general officer to align our efforts,
    and has reaffirmed Special Operations Command as the combatant
    commander charged with ensuring global coordination of CT efforts. The
    strategies, plans, and organizations within DOD are designed to ensure
    that our local actions do not negatively impact global efforts.

        25. Senator Gillibrand. General Votel and General Waldhauser, are
    you getting the strategic guidance you need to plan and execute these
    types of operations?
        General Votel. Yes, we are getting the strategic guidance necessary
    to plan and execute these types of operations. I'm in frequent contact
    with Secretary Mattis and General Dunford and appreciate their
    continued support.
        General Waldhauser. From my perspective, we are getting the
    strategic guidance necessary to execute CT operations. The Secretary of
    Defense (SECDEF) provides the necessary military guidance.
    Additionally, there is emergent strategic guidance from the
    administration based on National Security Presidential Memorandum-3
    (NSPM-3). At USAFRICOM we seek to link these operations to a whole-of-
    government effort that address the long-term drivers of terrorism. The
    strategic guidance is necessary for the effective coordination of USG
    and international partner efforts across a planning horizon that
    includes post-conflict guidance on desired future conditions--both
    political and military. The political end-states also provides guidance
    for follow-on whole-of-government efforts after CT operations have been
    completed. Parts of Africa remain a battleground between ideologies,
    interests, and values. Equality, prosperity, and peace are often pitted
    against extremism, oppression, and conflict. Today, transregional
    violent extremist organizations (VEOs), coupled with an expanding youth
    bulge on the African continent, constitute the most direct security
    threat to our national interests. To address this threat, our military
    strategy articulates a long-term regionally focused approach for a safe
    and stable Africa. However, the military is not the only element of
    national power required to ensure stability on the continent. The
    robust support of our European allies and USG agency partners--the
    Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development, in
    particular--are essential for building and maintaining stability. This
    soft power is critical for USAFRICOM to achieve our long-term military
    strategy. Programs that promote democracy, human rights, the rule of
    law, economic growth, improved access to education, and addressing food
    instability are vital to the development of African countries. Factors
    such as lack of education and healthcare, hope for a future, and a
    clear path to an honest livelihood will all impact the expanding youth
    bulge in Africa. Providing a viable alternate path, and thus preventing
    those youth from being radicalized by VEOs, is the biggest challenge in
    Africa.

        26. Senator Gillibrand. General Votel and General Waldhauser, even
    if the authority to make operational decisions is delegated, do you
    believe that the President, as Commander in Chief, retains
    responsibility for an operation's success or failure?
        General Votel. As Commander-in-Chief, the President provides
    strategic guidance to military and civilian leadership, along with the
    authorities required to execute operations as directed. Military
    commanders retain ultimate responsibility for an operation's success or
    failure.
        General Waldhauser. Yes, the President's role as Commander in
    Chief, as articulated in Article II of the Constitution and further
    codified in the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, clearly establishes his
    position as the senior ranking member in the operational chain of
    command of our armed forces.

        27. Senator Gillibrand. General Votel and General Waldhauser,
    please explain the process by which you and your fellow combatant
    command colleagues will ensure that the President has the necessary
    information to make informed decisions about such operations.
        General Votel. As a combatant commander, I provide regular updates
    to the Secretary of Defense who reports to the President. Through these
    updates, along with other routine engagements with the Secretary and
    the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dunford, I and my
    fellow combatant commanders provide our best military advice and
    recommended courses of action for addressing issues and conducting
    operations. Additionally, major changes to existing operations or the
    introduction of new operations are coordinated through the interagency
    process which allows for concerns from outside Department of Defense to
    be voiced and for all elements of national power to be considered.
        General Waldhauser. The President can delegate to the SECDEF, who
    may further delegate to the combatant commanders a measure of decision
    authority bounded by time and geography to remove adversaries from the
    battlefield. When delegated, every measure will be taken to ensure our
    actions are limited to the minimum necessary to successfully engage
    individuals whose actions pose a threat to U.S. persons and interests
    around the globe. When delegated these counterterrorism authorities,
    current targeting principles will be employed:

        1.  The proposed action must clearly articulate why the targets
    need to be removed from the battlefield based on the threat they
    present to U.S. persons and interest.
        2.  We will ensure there is legal basis to target the individuals
    through consultation with combatant command judge advocates general,
    Office of General Counsel, and the National Security Staff legal
    advisors.
        3.  We will maintain the standard of near or reasonable certainty
    of positive identification of the targeted individuals or groups.
        4.  We will exercise extreme caution to ensure to best of our
    ability that non-combatants are not affected by our actions. AFRICOM
    regularly reports all its operations to senior leadership through the
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
                                    somalia
        28. Senator Gillibrand. General Waldhauser, Americans still
    remember how a routine raid to capture two Somali rebels in 1993
    disintegrated into one of the most lethal attacks on United States
    troops on African soil. Recent news reports indicate that the United
    States military may be taking a more active role in supporting African
    Union and Somali troops' counter-al-Shabaab efforts. What are the
    criteria by which ``self-defense'' strikes against al-Shabaab are
    currently selected and executed?
        General Waldhauser. Self-defense actions against al-Shabaab are
    conducted pursuant the ground force commander's inherent right and
    obligation to exercise self-defense under the Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE). Under the SROE,
    the U.S. may exercise self-defense to neutralize a hostile act or
    hostile intent when the lives of U.S. forces are at risk. The U.S.
    remains committed to our partners in eliminating terrorism and
    advancing security in the region. In certain circumstances, the U.S.
    may exercise self-defense of a properly designated partner force. In
    every case in which the U.S. takes military action, we are bound to
    adhere, as a matter of international law, to the law of armed conflict.
    This includes, among other things, adherence to the fundamental law of
    armed conflict principles of distinction, proportionality, necessity,
    and humanity.

        29. Senator Gillibrand. General Waldhauser, are news reports of
    Pentagon plans to increase U.S. offensive involvement in counter-al-
    Shabaab operations accurate?
        General Waldhauser. USAFRICOM has requested additional authority
    that will add flexibility and timeliness to the targeting and decision
    making process. If approved, these authorities will allow us to
    prosecute targets in a more rapid fashion. Employment orders will not
    be given unless we know exactly who we are attacking on the ground.

        30. Senator Gillibrand. General Waldhauser, if so, can you tell us
    what the President's response has been to that recommendation?
        General Waldhauser. We are pleased the President approved our
    request for the additional authority on March 29th. This strike
    authority, to be used in conjunction with the Federal Government of
    Somalia, will enhance our ability to support the AMISOM mission and
    troop contributing countries, as well as help us to maintain pressure
    on the VEO network in Somalia.

        31. Senator Gillibrand. General Waldhauser, how will the military
    incorporate lessons that we learned from the 1993 operation into any
    such plans?
        General Waldhauser. The 1993 Battle of Mogadishu, to include
    missteps and mistakes, has been a case study from which the Special
    Operations Community and the entire U.S. military has used to learn. In
    today's operating environment, updated tactics, techniques and
    procedures and advanced technologies are now incorporated during
    operations to implement the lessons learned from the Battle of
    Mogadishu.
                                  isil in iraq
        32. Senator Gillibrand. General Votel, media reports indicate that
    ISIL is returning to areas previously cleared by Iraqi security forces,
    such as Anbar and Salahuddin provinces, due to police authorities'
    inability to hold those areas, and a corrupt judiciary that allows some
    ISIL collaborators to abscond. Please share with us any additional
    information on this development that you have. I understand that you
    have a police force training effort underway in Mosul to guard against
    ISIL's resurgence after the city falls.
        General Votel. [Deleted.]

        33. Senator Gillibrand. General Votel, are you planning to expand
    this training effort to other Iraqi provinces?
        General Votel. [Deleted.]
                                      isr
        34. Senator Gillibrand. General Waldhauser, one of the issues that
    was raised wherever we went in Africa during a visit in 2015 was the
    limited amount of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets
    and the ability to share the intelligence we gathered with our partners
    on the ground. Do you currently have the necessary ISR capabilities for
    the operations you have described?
        General Waldhauser. AFRICOM's current ISR allocation partially
    satisfies operational requirements. AFRICOM has a Joint Staff validated
    23 Full Motion Video (FMV) orbit requirement, and is currently sourced
    with 7.75 FMV orbits. AFRICOM's current ISR allocation requires monthly
    prioritization for countering violent extremist organizations (VEOs)
    and monitoring emerging crises. Maximum flexibility for steady-state
    operations is achieved through active mission management of apportioned
    ISR platforms. AFRICOM utilizes the Global Force Management process to
    obtain additional ISR enablers appropriate for the threat and mission.

        35. Senator Gillibrand. General Waldhauser, are you now able to
    quickly share relevant information with our partners?
        General Waldhauser. Yes, USAFRICOM has established a number of
    sharing processes and procedures in order to support more agile
    information sharing with our partners on the ground. There has been a
    lot of work in the DOD and Intelligence Community Policy realm which
    have supported our efforts. On average, we are turning much of the
    information production the same day and in some instances can surge to
    support in near real time, as dictated by operational requirements.

        36. Senator Gillibrand. General Waldhauser, if not, what more can
    be done to make this process easier?
        General Waldhauser. USAFRICOM still requires input and programmatic
    funding from OSD to support a more robust architecture with which to
    disseminate and share classified information electronically to AFRICOM
    partners. In addition, annually supported OSD led security surveys
    would assist in ensuring information is managed and providing the
    appropriate level of security protection by the host nations. Lastly,
    support from the Air Force Battlefield Information Collection and
    Exploitation Systems (BICES) program office is necessary in
    accelerating AFRICOM's acquisition of the necessary communications
    architecture to be able to share classified information electronically.
                                   __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
                              iranian belligerence
        37. Senator Blumenthal. General Votel, Iran's continued and
    disturbing malign influence and actions over the last several weeks
    remain a key concern of mine. Within the last week, Iran has reportedly
    tested anti-ship ballistic missiles, tested a new Russian-made S-300
    missile air defense system, as well as harassed a U.S. Navy ship in the
    Strait of Hormuz by sending an Iranian frigate within 150 yards and
    smaller boats within 600 yards. Last month, the Iranians fired a
    medium-range ballistic missile in violation of a UN Security Council
    Resolution, resulting in U.S. sanctions enforcement against 25
    individuals and entities. What is CENTCOM doing to address Iran's
    recent actions?
        General Votel. Despite ongoing reductions in U.S. force posture in
    the region, CENTCOM addresses Iranian malign naval actions by
    maintaining a forward presence in the area of responsibility and is
    working to ensure that naval forces are enabled through appropriate
    rules of engagement, capabilities, and training. U.S. and partner
    forces in the region engage regularly in robust planning and training
    exercises to ensure readiness and to leverage complimentary
    capabilities. CENTCOM will continue to expose Iran's unique and
    unprofessional naval actions in order to hold them accountable.

        38. Senator Blumenthal. General Votel, how concerned are you with
    Iran's acquisition and testing of the S-300 missile air defense system
    and what is CENTCOM doing to address it?
        General Votel. Senator, it is a significant concern. Delivery of
    the S-300 culminated a sales agreement between Russia and Iran that
    CENTCOM has been monitoring since 2007. This system represents a
    significant improvement to Iranian lethality against conventional and
    fifth-generation advanced aircraft; however, I am confident in our
    tactics, techniques and procedures to defeat the S-300 in an open
    conflict. Of equal concern is how to deal with this system in peacetime
    should Iran choose to employ it to challenge U.S. or Coalition air
    superiority in the Arabian Gulf. While legacy Iranian surface to air
    missile systems, such as the S-200, could be used to threaten or harass
    commercial and military aviation in the Arabian Gulf, the S-300's
    increased lethality and capabilities could significantly expand their
    ability to impact routine CENTCOM operations in international airspace.
    We will continue to monitor the basing and movement of the S-300,
    ensure our aircrews continuously review their capabilities to operate
    safely and effectively in support of our current operations and will
    only alter mission profiles when absolutely necessary.

        39. Senator Blumenthal. General Votel, it is well known that Iran
    strongly backs and supports Hezbollah. What steps are you taking to
    counter the threat posed by Hezbollah?
        General Votel. CENTCOM works to Build Partner Capacity through
    Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Loans, exercises and training
    with regional partners in our area of responsibility to enable their
    ability to counter the military threat posed by Lebanese Hezbollah as
    part of the Prepare component of our regional strategy. Our mil-to-mil
    activities focus primarily on the Lebanese Armed Forces, to eventually
    provide a viable alternative to Lebanese Hezbollah. These efforts also
    contribute to diminishing the perception and narrative that Lebanese
    Hezbollah exists to defend Lebanon against the Israeli threat.
                                      isil
        40. Senator Blumenthal. General Votel, United States forces in
    Syria are authorized to operate to train, assist, and advise coalition
    partners to defeat ISIL. ISIL is no longer in Manbij. What authority
    justifies the Army's 75th Ranger Regiment's presence?
        General Votel. As part of the campaign against ISIS, the United
    States is using force against elements in Syria. The Coalition Forces
    Commander exercises authority as outlined in Joint Staff order to
    employ his forces in Syria as part of the overall campaign to defeat
    ISIS. As part of the overall campaign plan, small teams of United
    States special operations forces have also deployed to Syria to help
    coordinate United States operations with some of these indigenous
    ground forces. One of these indigenous partnered forces, the SAC/Syrian
    Defense Force, successfully liberated Manbij from ISIS and then
    transitioned governance to the Manbij Council. Coalition forces remain
    to ensure that ISIS is not able to reestablish itself in the area as
    part of the assigned complementary mission to advise and assist partner
    security forces operating in liberated areas, in this case--Manbij.
    Additionally, these forces provide over watch of the situation in
    Manbij and provide a measure of assurance to our partners. Currently,
    elements of the 75th Ranger Regiment are fulfilling this requirement,
    because they constitute the most appropriate and available force for
    the mission.

        41. Senator Blumenthal. General Votel, Marines have arrived in
    Syria to establish an outpost near Raqqa to fire artillery in support
    United States-backed forces fighting to retake Raqqa from ISIL. Between
    the Army and the Marines, this is a noticeable escalation of our
    involvement in Syria. How large is our force presence in Syria now?
        General Votel. [Deleted.]

        42. Senator Blumenthal. General Votel, Secretary Mattis presented a
    classified plan to the White House to defeat ISIL, as requested by
    President Trump in an Executive Order earlier this year. Although we
    have not seen the plan, there are reports that it could include an
    increased U.S. ground presence and military equipment. What was your
    role in the development of this plan?
        General Votel. Our Coalition Military Campaign Plan remains the
    Coalition's plan to defeat ISIS in Iraq and Syria, and of course we
    have shared our plan as well as other contingency plans with Secretary
    Mattis and his staff. My staff is working with the Joint Staff and the
    Office of the Secretary of Defense on the planning efforts to help
    inform the new administration, and I feel comfortable with my level of
    coordination, collaboration, and alignment with the Secretary, the
    Chairman, and our staffs.

        43. Senator Blumenthal. General Votel, to defeat ISIL, do you
    believe we need a more robust ground presence? If so, what would it
    consist of?
        General Votel. Our approach of providing advice, assistance, and
    key enabling capabilities in support of the indigenous forces in Iraq
    and Syria is working. Not only is it working, but the approach is
    important for a sustainable victory over ISIS, as it places the
    responsibility of defeating ISIS on those who continue living in the
    area. The ``by, with and through'' approach does require operational
    patience, but the indigenous forces have a vested interest in getting
    it right. I am satisfied with the force structure that we currently
    have in place to support our indigenous partners. However, if
    conditions on the ground dictate that we need additional assets to
    enable their maneuver better, we will make the necessary requests
    through appropriate channels.
                                    djibouti
        44. Senator Blumenthal. General Waldhauser, a new Chinese base is
    being built just a few miles from Camp Lemonnier. How will it impact
    our own installation and operations? Will we need to make operational
    adjustments? Are you concerned about security risks--be it physical or
    cyber?
        General Waldhauser. From an operational perspective, we have
    concerns about the Chinese presence in Djibouti. We will continue to
    remain vigilant in order to ensure every aspect of our operational
    security is in place and our operations are not degraded or
    compromised. In the meantime, we will continue to engage with the
    Government of Djibouti on issues that impede an amenable China-United
    States co-existence within their country. We will also look for
    opportunities to engage with China in meaningful ways to support our
    mutual interests for a stable and secure Africa.

        45. Senator Blumenthal. General Waldhauser, Djibouti is a strategic
    location for China, with half its oil imports passing through the
    Mandeb Strait providing a potential choke point. This creates a
    vulnerability requiring escorts for these ships. Do you have concerns
    that China will increase its naval presence in the area? What impact
    will that have on our operations?
        General Waldhauser. Djibouti is not only a strategic location for
    China but for the United States as well. China has contributed some
    naval assets to the Combined Task Force in the counterpiracy effort off
    Somalia, and this has helped the unified international effort. On the
    other hand, we have concerns about China's increasing presence in
    Djibouti. Though China is referring to its base as a ``support
    facility,'' this facility will be an operations base. As the Chinese
    begin to increase their naval presence at this facility, we must be
    vigilant on the possible impact on our operations and the likelihood
    that China could potentially use its base to support forward deployed
    assets, as well as grant access to Russia. With the distinct
    possibility of more naval assets in the area, we may have to increase
    our engagements with the Chinese to deconflict space for our
    operations.
                         military presense/force levels
        46. Senator Blumenthal. General Votel, an Afghan official disclosed
    to the Wall Street Journal that in December then President-elect Trump,
    in a conversation with Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, said he would
    support Afghan forces and entertain increasing troops following an
    assessment. Has an assessment been ordered?
        General Votel. Yes, there are parallel efforts ongoing within the
    National Security Council, Department of Defense, and CENTCOM. My
    staff, in conjunction with General Nicholson, is conducting a review
    and will provide recommendations to Secretary Mattis and General
    Dunford.

        47. Senator Blumenthal. General Votel, how important is the
    continuance of the NATO Resolute Support Mission in training, advising
    and assisting the Afghan Security Forces and institutions?
        General Votel. Senator, it is essential that there is a continuance
    of the NATO Resolute Support Mission. I'll echo comments made by
    General Nicholson, commander, Resolute Support that the 39 nations'
    four-year commitment made at the 2016 Warsaw Summit and Brussel's donor
    conference served to strengthen the Afghans' resolve and sent a strong
    message to the enemy. This support demonstrates that the international
    community remains committed to the success of both the mission and the
    Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2018 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, MARCH 23, 2017

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                         UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in Room
    SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain
    (chairman of the committee) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Wicker,
    Fischer, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Cruz, Sasse, Reed,
    Nelson, McCaskill, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly,
    Hirono, Kaine, King, Heinrich, Warren, and Peters.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman McCain. Well, good morning.
        The Senate Armed Services Committee meets this morning to
    receive testimony on the posture of United States European
    Command. I would like to welcome General Scaparrotti, who is
    back before the committee. I am sure he has been eagerly
    awaiting that opportunity. We thank you for your decades of
    distinguished service and for your leadership of our men and
    women in uniform.
        This morning, our thoughts and prayers are with the loved
    ones of the four innocent people killed and dozens more injured
    in an attack in the heart of London that police believe was
    inspired by radical Islamist terrorists. We stands in
    solidarity with the British people, committed as ever to our
    special relationship and to the common defense of our security
    and our values.
        Three years ago this last week, Russia violated Ukrainian
    sovereignty and annexed Crimea, a seminal event that revealed
    what had already been increasingly obvious for years: that the
    United States and our European allies confront an aggressive,
    militarily capable Russian Government that is hostile to our
    interests and our values and willing to use force not as a last
    resort but as a primary tool to achieve its revisionist
    objectives. Many believe this challenge had been consigned to
    the history books. Indeed, the United States operated under
    that assumption for far too long, drastically reducing our
    military presence, allowing our intelligence capabilities to
    wither, and unilaterally disengaging from the information
    fight.
        I might add that yesterday we received information that
    Sergei Magnitsky who was murdered by Vladimir Putin's thugs--
    his lawyer was thrown from a fourth floor room. I mean, this
    kind of stuff you cannot make up. It is an indication of
    Vladimir Putin's feeling of impunity that he can go around
    killing people without any penalty to pay. I am sure that what
    Mr. Putin was trying to do is send a message to anybody else in
    Russia who wants to stand up against him. I digress.
        Three years later, I regret to say the United States still
    has not adjusted to the scope, scale, and severity of the new
    strategic reality we face in Europe. We continue to lack
    coherent policy and strategy to deter conflict and prevent
    aggression in Europe. Despite important progress made through
    the European Deterrence Initiative, we still have no long-term
    vision for United States force posture in Europe, one that
    accounts for Russia's rapid military modernization, evolving
    nuclear doctrine, violations of the INF [Intermediate-Range
    Nuclear Forces] Treaty, advanced anti-access/area denial threat
    concentrated in Kaliningrad, and significant military buildup
    along its western border.
        Indeed, as General Scaparrotti points out in his written
    testimony--and I quote--``the ground force permanently assigned
    to EUCOM [United States European Command] is inadequate to meet
    the combatant command's directed mission to deter Russia from
    further aggression.''
        The new administration has an opportunity to turn the page
    and design a new policy and strategy in Europe backed by all
    elements of American power and decisive political will. General
    Scaparrotti, we hope you can help this committee begin to think
    through the basic requirements for such a policy and strategy
    and what resources and authority you need both as European
    Commander and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe to deter and, if
    necessary, defeat aggression against the United States and our
    allies.
        Some of the features of a new approach in Europe are
    already clear. For example, the need to enhance the forward
    presence of United States military forces and provide defensive
    lethal assistant to Ukraine. But we still have a lot of work to
    do in other areas, particularly in countering Russian
    disinformation and devising gray zone strategies for
    competition below the threshold of major conflict.
        What is also clear is that no United States policy or
    strategy in Europe can be successful without our NATO [North
    Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies. At the 2014 NATO Summit
    in Wales, the leaders of every NATO ally pledged to reach the
    goal of spending 2 percent of their GDP [Gross Domestic
    Product] on defense by 2024. The good news is that according to
    NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg, defense budgets across
    Europe and Canada increased by 3.8 percent last year, or by
    some $10 billion.
        This is important progress, but we must be careful not to
    reduce the NATO alliance of the notion of burden sharing to
    simply 2 percent. Our allies do not just need to spend more,
    they need to spend better. One senior European official
    recently said that Europe spends roughly 50 percent of the
    United States on defense, but produces just 15 percent of the
    capability because defense purchases are uncoordinated,
    duplicative, and inefficient. That is why enhancing European
    security is not just a job for NATO but also for the European
    Union, which has an important role to play in encouraging
    cooperative defense acquisition and operation of modernized
    defense equipment.
        Finally, we must never forget that the essential
    contributions America's allies make to our national security
    are not measured in dollars alone. After the September 11th
    attacks killed 2,600 Americans and 135 citizens of NATO
    countries, for the first time in history, our NATO allies
    invoked article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. NATO troops
    went to fight side by side with American troops in Afghanistan,
    and over 1,000 of them made the ultimate sacrifice.
        The price our NATO allies paid in blood fighting alongside
    us should never be diminished. We must never forget that
    America is safer and more secure because it has allies that are
    willing to step up and share the burden of collective security.
        Senator Reed?

                     STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
    holding this timely and important hearing.
        I join you in solidarity with our British allies and
    applaud your comments.
        Thanks also to General Scaparrotti for your nearly 40 years
    of service in the military, your leadership in Afghanistan,
    Korea, and now at United States European Command. Also, please
    pass along our sincere gratitude for the outstanding service of
    all the men and women who serve with you in EUCOM. Thank you,
    General.
        The transatlantic relationship is a cornerstone of U.S.
    national security and the international order established at
    the end of World War II. Our European allies and partners have
    stood with us in maintaining the peace, including in coalition
    operations in Afghanistan and fighting terrorist extremists in
    Iraq and Syria. The NATO alliance remains strong and is
    grounded in a shared vision of an integrated and stable Europe
    rooted in respect for sovereignty and political and economic
    freedom.
        I am concerned, however, about the mixed signals that the
    current administration seems to be sending regarding the United
    States commitment to NATO and the willingness to cut a deal
    with Russia. Secretary Tillerson's reported decision to skip a
    NATO foreign ministers meeting next month and take a trip to
    Moscow prior to a NATO summit in May has raised concerns in
    some European capitals. I urge Secretary Tillerson to
    reconsider his attendance at NATO next month and send a strong
    signal of our unwavering support for the alliance.
        The broad and growing challenges facing the EUCOM Commander
    mean that alliance unity is more important than ever. The
    cohesion of NATO is being directly threatened by Russia.
    President Putin has repeatedly shown he will use military force
    to assert a Russian sphere of influence over its neighbors and
    to undermine their further integration into Europe. Nowhere is
    this more evident than in Ukraine where Russia has used hybrid
    warfare tactics to seize Crimea and continues to support
    militarily and financially Russian-led separatists in eastern
    Ukraine, in violation of Russia's commitments under the Minsk
    agreements. As we heard at Tuesday's panel of distinguished
    former government officials, it is critically important that we
    assist Ukraine in resisting Russian pressure and instituting
    democratic reforms. A successful, reformed Ukraine would
    provide a powerful alternative to Putin's autocratic rule.
        The United States has taken significant steps in recent
    years to rebuild its military presence in Europe and reassure
    our allies and partners threatened by renewed Russian
    aggression. The European Deterrence Initiative, or EDI, and the
    NATO enhanced forward presence have increased the rotational
    presence of forces in Eastern Europe. In addition, while many
    NATO members to fall short of the 2 percent of GDP target for
    defense spending, defense budgets among NATO nations are
    increasing and a number of allies are making significant in-
    kind contributions as well. Questions remain, however, whether
    we have the appropriate mix of forces in Europe, both
    quantitatively and qualitatively, and I hope you will address
    these questions this morning.
        Russia is deploying the full array of tools in the Kremlin
    playbook to challenge the West. This includes aggressive
    actions in the nuclear realm. I agree with the experts on
    Tuesday's panel regarding the importance of responding strongly
    to Russia's fielding of a missile system in violation of the
    Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces, or INF, Treaty. In addition,
    Russia's nuclear doctrine of escalate to deescalate is not only
    deeply disturbing but potentially catastrophic.
        Also disconcerting is Russia's increasing boldness in using
    non-military tools to target Western democracies and advance
    Putin's strategic aims. Russia is employing an array of covert
    and overt asymmetric weapons in the gray zone short of military
    conflict, including cyber hacking, disinformation, propaganda,
    economic leverage, corruption, and even political
    assassination. To counter this insidious Russian interference,
    we must begin by recognizing it as a national security threat.
    Further, the intelligence community has warned that the kinds
    of Kremlin-directed malign activities witnessed in last year's
    United States presidential election are likely to re-occur in
    the future, including during elections in France, Germany, and
    elsewhere in Europe this year. Responding to this national
    security threat will require a whole-of-government approach and
    a comprehensive strategy for pushing back against Russia
    broadly.
        EUCOM faces a number of other challenges as well. This
    includes increasing instability in the Balkans where Russian
    influence operations are feeding Serbian resentments both in
    Serbia and among Bosnian Serbs. In addition, in the Balkans,
    where traditionally a moderate form of Islam has been
    practiced, there are growing Islamic Salafist influences as a
    result of a mosque-building campaign funded by Saudi Arabia. On
    its southeastern border, EUCOM must contend with the
    instability arising from Syria and the transnational threats
    emanating from that conflict. To the south, the migration
    crisis in the Mediterranean countries continues to strain
    European resources for security. General, I am interested in
    hearing how NATO is handling these myriad of problems and how
    the United States can be helpful.
        Again, I want to thank General Scaparrotti for his service
    and I look forward to this morning to his testimony.
        Chairman McCain. Good morning, General.

      STATEMENT OF GENERAL CURTIS M. SCAPARROTTI, USA, COMMANDER,
         U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND/SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, EUROPE

        General Scaparrotti. Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed,
    and distinguished members of the committee, I am honored to
    testify today as the Commander of the United States European
    Command. On behalf of over 60,000 permanently assigned
    servicemembers, as well as civilians, contractors, and their
    families who serve and represent our Nation in Europe, thank
    you for your support.
        Before starting, I would like to also express my condolence
    on behalf of the entire European Command team for the civilians
    and policemen killed and wounded in yesterday's terrorist
    attack in the UK [United Kingdom]. Our thoughts and prayers go
    out to these victims and their families impacted by this
    senseless attack. We strongly condemn this attack and will
    continue to stand shoulder to shoulder with our NATO ally and
    our partners to defeat terrorism.
        Chairman, the European theater remains critical to our
    national interests. The transatlantic alliance gives us a
    unique advantage over our adversaries, a united, capable
    warfighting alliance resolved in its purpose and strengthened
    by shared values that have been forged in battle. EUCOM's
    relationship with NATO and the 51 countries within our AOR
    [Area of Responsibility] provides the United States with a
    network of willing partners who support global operations and
    secure international rules-based order. Our security
    architecture protects more than one billion people and has
    safeguarded transatlantic trade which now constitutes almost
    half of the world's GDP.
        However, this security architecture is being tested, and
    today we face the most dynamic European strategic environment
    in recent history. Political volatility and economic
    uncertainty are compounded by threats to our security system
    that are trans-regional, multi-domain, and multi-functional. In
    the east, a resurgent Russia has turned from partner to
    antagonist as it seeks to reemerge as a global power. Countries
    along Russia's periphery, including Ukraine and Georgia,
    struggled against Moscow's malign activities and military
    actions. In the southeast, strategic drivers of instability
    converge on key allies, especially Turkey, which has to
    simultaneously manage Russia, terrorists, and refugee flows. In
    the south, violent extremists and transnational criminal
    elements spawn terror and corruption from North Africa to the
    Middle East, while refugees flee to Europe in search of
    security and opportunity. In the high north, Russia is
    reasserting its military presence and positioning itself for
    strategic advantage in the Arctic.
        In response to these challenges, EUCOM has shifted its
    focus from security cooperation and engagement to deterrence
    and defense. Accordingly, we are adjusting our posture, our
    plans, our readiness so that we remain relevant to the threats
    we face. In short, we are returning to the historic role as a
    warfighting command focused on deterrence and defense.
        EUCOM's transition would not be possible without the
    congressional support of the European Deterrence Initiative.
    Thanks in large measure to ERI, or EDI, over the last 12
    months, EUCOM has made clear progress with an enhanced forward
    presence or force presence, complex exercises and training,
    infrastructure improvements, increased prepositioning of
    equipment and supplies, and partner capacity building
    throughout Europe.
        But we cannot meet these challenges alone. In response to
    Russian aggression, EUCOM has continued to strengthen our
    relationship with strategic allies and partners, including the
    Baltic nations, Poland, Turkey, and Ukraine. EUCOM has also
    strengthened ties with Israel, one of our closest allies. Above
    all, EUCOM has supported the NATO alliance which remains, as
    Secretary Mattis said, the bedrock of our transatlantic
    security.
        Thus, EUCOM posture is growing stronger, and I remain
    confident in our ability to affect this transition. But there
    is much work to do. We must not only match but outpace the
    modernization and advances of our adversaries. We must invest
    in the tools and capabilities needed to increase effectiveness
    across the spectrum of conflict. We must ensure that we have a
    force that is credible, agile, and relevant to the dynamic
    demands of this theater.
        To this end, EUCOM has identified the following focus
    areas: ISR collection platforms that improve timely threat
    information and strategic warning; land force capabilities that
    deter Russia from further aggression; enhanced naval
    capabilities for antisubmarine warfare, strike warfare, and
    amphibious operations; prepositioned equipment to increase our
    responsiveness to crisis and enhance missile defense systems.
        Let me conclude by again thanking this committee's members
    and staff for their continued support of EUCOM not only through
    increased funding but also by helping us to articulate the
    challenges that lie before us. Support from other senior
    leaders and, above all, the public at home and across Europe is
    vital to ensuring that we have a ready and relevant force.
        This remains a pivotal time for EUCOM as we transition to
    meet the demands of a dynamic security environment. I remain
    confident that through the strength of our alliances and
    partnerships and with the professionalism of our
    servicemembers, we will adapt and ensure Europe remains whole,
    free, and at peace.
        Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Scaparrotti follows:]

              Prepared Statement by General Curtis M. Scaparrotti
                                i. introduction
        Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of this Committee, I am
    honored to testify before you in my first year as the Commander of
    United States European Command (EUCOM). It is a privilege to lead the
    great soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coast guardsmen, and
    civilians in this Command. They continue to demonstrate remarkable
    commitment, dedication, and selfless service both in Europe and across
    the globe. We all appreciate your continued support.
        The European theater remains critical to our national interests.
    The transatlantic alliance gives us an unmatched advantage over our
    adversaries--a united, capable, warfighting alliance resolved in its
    purpose and strengthened by shared values that have been forged in
    battle. EUCOM's relationship with NATO and the 51 countries within our
    Area of Responsibility (AOR) provides the United States with a network
    of willing partners who support global operations and secure the
    international rules-based order that our nations have defended together
    since World War II. Our security architecture protects more than one
    billion people and has safeguarded transatlantic trade, which now
    constitutes almost half of the world's combined GDP.
        Nevertheless, today we face the most dynamic European security
    environment in history. Political volatility and economic uncertainty
    are compounded by threats to our security system that are trans-
    regional, multi-domain, and multi-functional. In the East, a resurgent
    Russia has turned from partner to antagonist. Countries along Russia's
    periphery, especially Ukraine and Georgia, are under threat from
    Moscow's malign influence and military aggression. In the Southeast,
    strategic drivers of instability converge on key allies, especially
    Turkey, which has to simultaneously manage Russia, terrorists, and
    refugee flows. In the South, violent extremists and transnational
    criminal elements spawn terror and corruption from North Africa to the
    Middle East, while refugees and migrants fleeing persecution to Europe
    in search of security and opportunity. In the High North, Russia is
    reasserting its military prowess and positioning itself for strategic
    advantage in the Arctic.
        EUCOM fully recognizes the dynamic nature of this security
    environment, and in response, we are regenerating our abilities for
    deterrence and defense while continuing our security cooperation and
    engagement mission. This requires that we return to our historical role
    as a command that is capable of executing the full-spectrum of joint
    and combined operations in a contested environment. Accordingly, we are
    adjusting our posture, plans, and readiness to respond to possible
    future conflicts.
        This shift would not be possible without congressional support of
    the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI). Thanks in large measure to
    ERI, over the last 12 months EUCOM has made demonstrable progress.
    United States tanks have returned to European soil. United States F-15s
    and F-22s have demonstrated air dominance throughout the theater.
    United States naval forces have sailed throughout European waters.
    EUCOM has operationalized its Joint Cyber Center. With the approval of
    former Secretary Carter, EUCOM delivered the first new operational plan
    for the defense of Europe in over 25 years.
        ERI also supports high-end exercises and training, improved
    infrastructure, and enhanced prepositioning of equipment and supplies,
    while State Department and DOD funds build partner capacity throughout
    Europe.
        EUCOM has also continued to strengthen our relationship with allies
    and partners. Our relationship with Turkey endured a coup attempt with
    minimal disruption to multiple ongoing operations. EUCOM has
    strengthened ties with Israel, one of our closest allies. Above all,
    EUCOM has supported the NATO Alliance, which remains, as Secretary
    Mattis has said, the ``bedrock'' of our transatlantic security. Overall
    EUCOM is growing stronger.
                  ii. theater assessment--risks and challenges
        Over the past year I have highlighted three signature issues facing
    us in this dynamic security environment: Russia, radicals or violent
    extremists, and regional unrest--leading to refugee and migrant flows.
    At the same time, managing the political, economic, and social
    challenges posed by refugees and migrants is a consuming concern of our
    allies and partners.
    Russia
        Russia's malign actions are supported by its diplomatic,
    information, economic, and military initiatives. Moscow intends to
    reemerge as a global power, and views international norms such as the
    rule of law, democracy, and human rights as components of a system
    designed to suppress it. Therefore, Russia seeks to undermine this
    international system and discredit those in the West who have created
    it. For example, Russia is taking steps to influence the internal
    politics of European countries just as it tried to do in the United
    States in an attempt to create disunity and weakness within Europe and
    undermine the transatlantic relationship. Furthermore, Russia has
    repeatedly violated international agreements and treaties that underpin
    European peace and stability, including the Treaty on Intermediate-
    Range Nuclear Forces (INF) and the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces
    in Europe (CFE), and it is undermining transparency and confidence
    building regimes such as the Vienna Document and Open Skies, which
    provides greater transparency of posture and exercises in the region
        Russia's political leadership appears to seek a resurgence through
    modernization of its military. Russia is adjusting its doctrine,
    modernizing its weapons, reorganizing the disposition of its forces,
    professionalizing its armed services, and upgrading capabilities in all
    warfighting domains. Russia desires a military force capable of
    achieving its strategic objectives and increasing its power.
        Russia's aggression in Ukraine, including occupation and attempted
    annexation of Crimea, and actions in Syria underscore its willingness
    to use military force to exert its influence in Europe and the Middle
    East. In Ukraine, Russia's willingness to foment a bloody conflict into
    its third year through the use of proxy forces in the Donbas, and
    elsewhere, is deeply troubling to our allies and partners, particularly
    Russia's closest neighbors. In Syria, Russia's military intervention
    has changed the dynamics of the conflict, bolstered the Bashar al-Assad
    regime, targeted moderate opposition elements, and compounded human
    suffering in Syria, and complicated United States and coalition
    operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Russia
    has used this chaos to establish a permanent presence in the Middle
    East and eastern Mediterranean.
        This past year saw other significant demonstrations of Russia's
    renewed military capability, including the first ever combat deployment
    of the KUZNETSOV Task Force, nation-wide strategic exercises, joint
    air, ground, and maritime operations in Syria using new platforms and
    precision-guided munitions, and the deployment of nuclear-capable
    missiles to Kaliningrad. Russia's deployment in Ukraine and Syria also
    revealed increased proficiency in expeditionary combat and sustainment
    operations.
        Another key component of Russia's military advancement is its
    Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS). For example, in connection with
    its deployment to support the Assad regime in Syria, Russia fielded
    advanced Anti-Access / Area Denial (A2/AD) systems that combine command
    and control and electronic warfare capabilities, and long range coastal
    defense cruise missiles with advanced air defense platforms. EUCOM
    assesses that Russia plans to meld existing and future IADS systems
    into a central command structure to control all air defense forces and
    weapons.
        In the High North, Russia continues to strengthen its military
    presence through equipment, infrastructure, training, and other
    activities. Russia is positioning itself to gain strategic advantage if
    the Northern Sea Route opens and becomes a viable shipping lane between
    Europe and Asia.
        Most concerning, however, is Moscow's substantial inventory of non-
    strategic nuclear weapons in the EUCOM AOR and its troubling doctrine
    that calls on the potential use of these weapons to escalate its way
    out of a failing conflict. Russia's fielding of a conventional/nuclear
    dual-capable system that is prohibited under the INF Treaty creates a
    mismatch in escalatory options with the West. In the context of Putin's
    highly centralized decision-making structure, Moscow's provocative
    rhetoric and nuclear threats increase the likelihood of
    misunderstanding and miscalculation.
        In addition to recent conventional and nuclear developments, Russia
    has employed a decades-long strategy of indirect action to coerce,
    destabilize, and otherwise exercise a malign influence over other
    nations. In neighboring states, Russia continues to fuel ``protracted
    conflicts.'' In Moldova, for example, Russia has yet to follow through
    on its 1999 Istanbul summit commitments to withdraw an estimated 1,500
    troops--whose presence has no mandate--from the Moldovan breakaway
    region of Transnistria. Russia asserts that it will remove its force
    once a comprehensive settlement to the Transnistrian conflict has been
    reached. However, Russia continued to undermine the discussion of a
    comprehensive settlement to the Transnistrian conflict at the 5+2
    negotiations. Moscow continues to play a role in destabilizing the
    Nagorno-Karabakh dispute by selling arms to both parties--Armenia and
    Azerbaijan--while maintaining troops in Armenia, despite an
    international pledge to co-chair Minsk Group charged with seeking
    resolution of the conflict.
        Russia fiercely opposes one of our strongest EUCOM partners,
    Georgia, in its attempts to align with the European and transatlantic
    communities. Russia's occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia since
    its 2008 invasion the Georgian regions of has created lasting
    instability.
        In the Balkans, Russia exploits ethnic tensions to slow progress on
    European and transatlantic integration. In 2016, Russia overtly
    interfered in the political processes of both Bosnia-Herzegovina and
    Montenegro.
        Additional Russian activities short of war, range from
    disinformation to manipulation. Examples include Russia's outright
    denial of involvement in the lead up to Russia's occupation and
    attempted annexation in Crimea; attempts to influence elections in the
    United States, France and elsewhere; its aggressive propaganda
    campaigns targeting ethnic Russian populations among its neighbors; and
    cyber activities directed against infrastructure in the Baltic nations
    and Ukraine. In all of these ways and more, Russia is attempting to
    exert its influence, expand its power, and discredit the capability and
    relevance of the West.
    Radicals
        Violent extremists, most notably ISIS, pose a serious, immediate
    threat to United States personnel, our allies, and our infrastructure
    in Europe and worldwide. In 2016, there were major terrorist attacks in
    Berlin, Brussels, Istanbul, Nice, Paris, and elsewhere. ISIS has made
    its intentions clear: it seeks to overthrow Western civilization and
    establish a world-wide caliphate.
        While it's footprint in Iraq and Syria shrunk in 2016, since 2014,
    ISIS has significantly expanded its operations throughout Europe and
    now leverages its network to enable and inspire attacks by European-
    based extremists in their resident countries. Further, ISIS has
    exploited the migration crisis to infiltrate operatives into Europe.
    Since Turkey expanded its counter-ISIS role and advocacy for coalition
    operations in Mosul, it has experienced an increased number of
    terrorist attacks, and ISIS's leaders have called for more. We do not
    expect the threat to diminish in the near future.
        As a consequence of this threat, European nations have been forced
    to divert financial resources and military personnel to internal
    security. The impact of this reallocation is not yet fully appreciated
    and will likely persist for years. In short, violent extremism poses a
    dangerous threat to transatlantic nations and to the international
    order that we value.
    Regional Volatility
        In EUCOM's AOR, Russia's indirect actions have sought to exploit
    political unrest and socioeconomic disparities. Russian aggression in
    Ukraine has led to the deaths of approximately 10,000 people since
    April 2014. Recently in eastern Ukraine, Russia controls the battle
    tempo, again ratcheting up the number of daily violations of the cease
    fire and--even more concerning--directing combined Russian-separatist
    forces to target civilian infrastructure and threaten and intimidate
    OSCE [Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe] monitors in
    order to turn up the pressure on Ukraine. Furthermore, Moscow's support
    for so-called ``separatists'' in eastern Ukraine destabilizes Kyiv's
    political structures, particularly as Ukraine undertakes politically-
    difficult reforms to combat corruption and comply with IMF
    requirements.
        Ukraine seeks a permanent and verifiable ceasefire, the withdrawal
    of heavy weapons and Russian forces, full and unfettered access for
    OSCE monitors, and control over its internationally-recognized border
    with Russia. Russian-led separatist forces continue to commit the
    majority of ceasefire violations despite attempts by the OSCE to broker
    a lasting ceasefire along the line of contact.
        Turkey has long been and remains an ally of the United States. It
    now occupies a critical location at the crossroads of multiple
    strategic challenges. To its west, it implements the Montreux
    Convention, which governs transit through the Turkish Straits, and is
    committed to local solutions for Black Sea issues. To its north and
    east, Turkey maintains a complicated relationship with Russia. Ankara
    seeks to resume the level of trade with Moscow that it enjoyed prior to
    Turkey's November 2015 shoot down of a Russian fighter. Turkey has
    absorbed the largest number of refugees from Syria--almost three
    million. Despite these challenges, EUCOM continues to work closely with
    Turkey to enable critical basing and logistical support to the counter
    ISIS fight and supports Turkey to counter its terror threat.
        Although the flow of refugees to Europe has slowed, the refugee
    situation remains a significant challenge to our European allies and
    partners. The strain on the social systems of European nations,
    especially along the Mediterranean Sea, diverts resources that could
    otherwise go toward military and defense spending, and finding
    solutions has tested political relationships. EU [European Union]
    member states struggle to find a common, ``shared'' approach to admit
    and settle migrants. Both NATO and the EU, in conjunction with Turkish
    and Greek authorities, have committed law enforcement and military
    assets to this issue, including a maritime force in the Aegean Sea to
    conduct reconnaissance, monitoring, and surveillance.
        The Syrian civil war and the risk of spillover into neighboring
    states, including Israel, continue to threaten stability in Europe and
    the Levant. Despite assistance from the USG [U.S. Government] and the
    international community, the refugee population in Jordan and Lebanon
    has placed significant burdens on the government and local residents.
    Additionally, factional fighting in Syria has resulted in occasional
    cross-border fire into the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. Israel has
    avoided being drawn into the conflict in Syria but has taken military
    action to deny the transfer of advanced weapons to Hezbollah.
        The Balkans' stability since the late 1990's masks political and
    socio-economic fragility. Russia promotes anti-European views in this
    region by exploiting corrupt political systems, poor economic
    performance, and increased ethnic polarization. Additionally, Islamic
    radicals seek to take advantage of high unemployment rates, political
    turmoil, and socioeconomic disparities to recruit violent extremists.
        Iran's regional influence in the Levant continues to grow through
    its ongoing support to radical groups such as Lebanese Hezbollah,
    Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and paramilitary groups involved in
    the Syrian conflict and in counter-ISIS efforts across Iraq. Iran,
    which Israel views as its greatest existential threat, continues to
    transfer advanced conventional arms to Hezbollah and is clearly
    committed to maintaining Syria as the key link of the Iran-Hezbollah
    axis, which sustains a terrorist network in Syrian-regime controlled
    territory. Furthermore, Iran has taken advantage of the Syrian crisis
    to militarily coordinate with Russia in support of Assad.
              iii. theater assessment--strengths and opportunities
        EUCOM will meet these challenges and adapt to the new security
    environment by capitalizing on our strengths and building new
    capabilities. We are developing a credible and relevant force structure
    built for deterrence and defense and leveraging a unified and adaptive
    NATO Alliance, and transitioning into a command able to address the
    strategic challenges before us.
    Deter Russia
        EUCOM activities, facilitated by ERI funding, continue to be the
    primary demonstration of our deterrent capability.
        Increased Rotational Forces. ERI has directly supported an increase
    in the rotational presence of United States forces in Europe, a
    critical augmentation to EUCOM's assigned forces. For example, ERI
    funded Fort Stewart's 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team's deployment to
    Europe from March to September 2016. Also, ERI funded the deployment of
    F-22 fighters, B-52 bombers, and additional combat and lift aircraft to
    Europe as part of the ERI Theater Security Package. Looking ahead,
    continued congressional support for ERI will sustain these rotations
    and enable additional anti-submarine warfare capabilities complementing
    maritime domain awareness assets in Iceland that are included in the
    fiscal year 2017 ERI request. Additionally, rotational Marine units
    will operate from Norway and the Black Sea region.
        Trained and Equipped Component Commands. EUCOM has also used ERI to
    fund and field Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS), providing a rapid
    mobilization capability for additional armored units in Europe.
    Separately, EUCOM advocated for and received full support for a $220
    million NATO Security Investment Program project (i.e., paid for by
    NATO common funding) that will build warehousing and maintenance
    capability for staging APS stocks in Poland. Additionally, ERI funds
    dozens of projects to upgrade flight-line and munitions-storage
    infrastructure across eight NATO nations to support not only rotational
    presence but also training events in Eastern Europe. The Navy is using
    ERI to fund capability enablers and force rotations to support EUCOM
    and NATO exercises, including Mine Countermeasure Teams and additional
    flying hours specifically to enhance EUCOM's deterrence posture.
        Persistent Presence. ERI increased funding for United States forces
    in the Baltics, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and the Mediterranean during
    2016. In addition, ERI allowed EUCOM to continue our contribution to
    NATO's Air Policing mission by funding a continued fighter presence in
    theater with the 493rd Fighter Squadron at RAF Lakenheath in the UK.
        Complex Exercises with Allies and Partners. ERI expanded the scope
    of EUCOM's involvement in over 28 joint and multi-national maritime,
    air, amphibious, and ground exercises across 40 countries. In June
    2016, EUCOM participated in the Polish national exercise ANAKONDA,
    which involved approximately 31,000 Allied troops--including over
    14,000 U.S. personnel--and provided a robust demonstration of Allied
    defensive capabilities, readiness, and interoperability. ERI also
    supported Navy-led BALTOPS 16, the premier maritime exercise in the
    Baltic region with over 6,100 troops from participating nations.
    Utilizing ERI resources, the Air Force took part in over 50 exercises
    and training deployments across Europe. An Acquisition and Cross-
    Servicing Agreement concluded with the EU last December enables EUCOM
    to cooperate better with EU missions in the Balkans and elsewhere.
        Russia Strategic Initiative (RSI): EUCOM leads the Department of
    Defense's Russia Strategic Initiative (RSI), which provides a framework
    for understanding the Russian threat and a forum for coordinating
    efforts and requirements. RSI allows us to maximize the deterrent value
    of our activities while avoiding inadvertent escalation. In just over a
    year, RSI has created a number of analytic products for combatant
    commanders that will enable a more efficient application of existing
    resources and planning efforts.
        Deterring Russia requires a whole-of-government approach, and EUCOM
    supports the strategy of approaching Russia from a position of strength
    while seeking appropriate military-to-military communication necessary
    to fulfill our defense obligations in accordance with the Fiscal Year
    2017 National Defense Authorization Act. Going forward, we must bring
    the information aspects of our national power more fully to bear on
    Russia, both to amplify our narrative and to draw attention to Russia's
    manipulative, coercive, and malign activities. Finally, NATO and U.S.
    nuclear forces continue to be a vital component of our deterrence. Our
    modernization efforts are crucial; we must preserve a ready, credible,
    and safe nuclear capability.
    Enable the NATO Alliance
        As the United States manages multiple strategic challenges, our
    enduring strength remains NATO, the most successful alliance in
    history. NATO's leadership understands that the security environment
    has radically changed over the past few years. The Alliance has placed
    renewed emphasis on deterring further Russian aggression, countering
    transnational threats, such as violent extremist organizations, and
    projecting stability in the Middle East and North Africa, while
    fulfilling its commitments in Afghanistan.
        The Warsaw Summit last July was a significant demonstration of
    unity, cooperation, and strategic adaptation. As the member nations
    declared in NATO's Warsaw Summit Communique, ``We are united in our
    commitment to the Washington Treaty, the purposes and principles of the
    Charter of the United Nations (UN), and the vital transatlantic bond''.
    This unity is NATO's center of gravity, and the United States must
    continue to support solidarity among the Alliance nations.
        Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP). The signature outcome of the 2016
    Warsaw Summit was the decision to establish an enhanced Forward
    Presence (eFP) in the Baltics and Poland to demonstrate NATO's cohesion
    in defense of the Alliance. Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom, and
    the United States have begun deploying multinational battalion task
    forces to Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Poland respectively on a
    rotational basis. Defense Cooperation Agreements (DCAs) signed in 2017
    with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are facilitating the deployment of
    U.S forces to the three Baltic states. The United States serves as the
    framework nation for eFP in Poland and is working closely with the
    other framework nations and their host nations to ensure NATO's key
    deterrence and defense measures are capable and integrated.
        European Phased Adapted Approach (EPAA). EUCOM continues to
    implement the EPAA to defend European NATO populations, territory, and
    infrastructure against ballistic missile threats from threats outside
    the Euro-Atlantic region. In July 2016, the United States-funded Aegis
    Ashore facility in Romania became operational and transferred to NATO
    operational control. Work on the Aegis Ashore site in Poland
    (authorized and appropriated in fiscal year 2016 legislation) is
    underway and on track for completion by the end of calendar year 2018
    and operational under NATO operational control in mid-2019.
        Projecting Stability. NATO is a key contributor to ensuring
    security and projecting stability abroad. It is worth remembering that
    the first and only time the Alliance invoked the mutual defense
    provisions of its founding treaty was in response to the 9/11 attacks
    on the United States. Today, through NATO's Resolute Support Mission,
    over 12,000 troops (including over 5,000 non-U.S. personnel) provide
    training and assistance to Afghan security forces and institutions.
    NATO is committed to ensuring a stable Afghanistan that is not a safe
    haven for terrorists.
        Additionally, it is notable that all 28 NATO nations participate in
    the Counter-ISIS coalition. NATO committed AWACS surveillance aircraft
    and actively contributes to capacity building in Iraq. EUCOM actively
    supports NATO's goal of expanding its operations against this terrorist
    threat.
        Support to Washington Treaty. EUCOM provides support for key
    articles of the Washington Treaty, enabling NATO members to meet their
    collective security commitments. EUCOM conducts activities, such as
    security cooperation, to help allies meet their article 3 commitment to
    ``maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to
    resist attack.'' We have been able to reduce allies' dependencies on
    Russian-sourced, legacy military equipment thanks to ongoing
    congressional support for critical authorities and funding that provide
    shared resources. EUCOM also actively assists the Alliance when an ally
    declares, under article 4, that its territorial integrity, political
    independence, or security is threatened. The last time an ally invoked
    article 4 was 2015, when Turkey sought consultation following terrorist
    attacks. Most importantly, EUCOM is the force that backs the United
    States' commitment to article 5, which declares that an armed attack on
    one ally is an attack on all.
        NATO Spending Trends. At the Wales Summit in 2014, the allies
    pledged to reverse the trend of declining defense budgets and invest in
    the development of highly-capable and deployable forces. Today, in
    addition to the United States, four allies (Estonia, Greece, Poland,
    and the United Kingdom) meet the NATO guidelines for 2 percent of GDP,
    up from three in 2014. Allies' defense expenditures increased in 2015
    for the first time since 2009 and grew at a real rate of 3.8 percent in
    2016, with 22 member nations increasing defense spending. Allies are
    showing demonstrable progress toward their commitment to contribute 2
    percent of their GDP within a decade (by 2024).
        This is a positive trend, but allied nations must meet the 2
    percent mark with 20 percent allocated to the modernization of
    equipment and infrastructure. Critical ally and partner capability
    shortfalls remain, including strategic lift; intelligence,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); deployable command and control;
    air to air refueling; and air and missile defense. Further, both EUCOM
    and NATO are hampered by inadequate infrastructure that affects the
    ability to maneuver across the continent. The expansion of the Alliance
    to include former Eastern Bloc countries has exacerbated the lack of
    common transportation networks between the newer NATO members in the
    east and the more established allies in the west. EUCOM is working
    closely with NATO to identify and address infrastructure requirements
    to improve U.S. and NATO freedom of movement throughout the theater.
    Build Partner Capacity
        EUCOM has spent several decades working with the Department of
    State to help allied and partner nations develop and improve their
    military and other security forces. This partner capacity building has
    been accomplished with the support of this Committee, which has been
    generous in providing us the authorization we need to accomplish this
    critical task. I would highlight two activities in particular.
        Defense Institution Building (DIB). DIB helps partner nations build
    effective, transparent, and accountable defense institutions. For
    example, EUCOM fully endorses the work of the Defense Reform Advisory
    Board in Ukraine, which is helping to bring about both political and
    military reform as the Ministry of Defense, General Staff, and Armed
    Forces transition from centralized Soviet-style systems and concepts
    towards a Euro-Atlantic model. We also support defense institutions in
    Georgia, helping them improve their strategic logistics, human and
    material resource management, and institutional aspects of their
    training management system. Overall, our DIB efforts lay the groundwork
    for broader security cooperation activities.
        Joint Multinational Training Group Ukraine (JMTG-U). Together with
    forces from Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, the UK, and Canada using State
    Department-provided Foreign Military Financing and Ukraine Security
    Assistance Initiative funds, EUCOM trains, advises, and equips Ukraine
    security forces, helping them build the capacity to defend their
    sovereignty and territorial integrity. Our team, working through the
    Multinational Joint Commission, has developed Ukraine's institutional
    training capability so that Ukraine can create a NATO-interoperable
    armed force. Our efforts include the training of both conventional and
    special operations units, as well as advising Ukraine on defense reform
    priorities.
    Assist Israel
        EUCOM's mission to assist in the defense of Israel, one of our
    closest allies, remains a top priority. Success will depend on the
    continued support of Congress and our strong relationship with the
    Israel Defense Forces. Many aspects of our bilateral relationship have
    been guided by the Strategic Cooperation Initiative Program (SCIP)
    framework, which dates to the Reagan Administration. SCIP enables
    robust cooperation and coordination on a vast range of security
    matters. Going forward, we are working to update the SCIP to
    incorporate an examination of all major exercises to ensure each meets
    the three major pillars of our security relationship: (1) missile
    defense, air operations, and counter-terrorism; (2) managing the Weapon
    Reserve Stockpile for Allies-Israel (WRSA-I); and (3) ensuring Israel's
    qualitative military edge.
    Counter Transnational Threats
        Adopting a whole-of-government approach, EUCOM, together with its
    interagency partners, conducts initiatives to counter transnational
    threats including countering terrorism and the flow of foreign
    fighters, countering illicit finance networks, combatting the
    trafficking of persons and illicit substances; and building allied and
    partner security, investigative, and judicial capacity. In conjunction
    with the Departments of State, Justice, Homeland Security, and other
    federal law enforcement agencies, EUCOM works to monitor and thwart the
    flow of foreign fighters, support the dismantlement of facilitation
    networks, and build partner nation capacity to defeat violent
    extremism.
        Through our counter terrorism cell, EUCOM strengthens the global
    Counter-ISIS efforts in coordination with and support of U.S. Central
    (CENTCOM), Africa (AFRICOM), and Special Operations (SOCOM) Commands.
    We have focused on those who facilitate the ISIS brand and network
    through radicalization, financing, and propaganda.
        Also, EUCOM and NATO are working to increase ties with the EU to
    enhance the capabilities Europe can collectively bring to bear against
    transnational threats. These three organizational nodes foster a shared
    understanding of the threats, help match resources accordingly, and can
    address all elements of national power including diplomatic,
    informational, military, and economic. In order to realize this
    networked approach, EUCOM will support NATO efforts to expand the
    capability and capacity of Allied Joint Forces Command--Naples.
    Enable Global Operations
        EUCOM personnel actively support operations in AFRICOM and CENTCOM
    AORs. EUCOM's well-developed and tested infrastructure provides
    critical capabilities in strategic locations such as Incirlik, Turkey;
    Sigonella, Italy' and Moron and Rota, Spain. Basing and access in
    Germany, Greece, Italy, France, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom
    enable more timely and coordinated trans-regional crisis response.
                           iv. resource requirements
        Significant United States force reductions following the collapse
    of the Soviet Union were based on the assumption that Russia would be a
    strategic partner to the West. These reductions now limit United States
    options for addressing challenges in a changing European strategic
    environment. The strategic rebalance to Asia and the Pacific, combined
    with budget limitations in the Budget Control Act of 2011, have
    contributed to substantial posture reductions across our land and air
    domains. For example, between 2010 and 2013, two fighter squadrons and
    a two-star numbered air force headquarters were inactivated, along with
    associated critical enablers and staff personnel. In addition, the last
    two heavy Brigade Combat Teams (BCT), a two-star division headquarters,
    and a three-star corps headquarters were removed from Europe, leaving
    only one Stryker and one airborne brigade. As a result of the BCT
    losses, without fully-resourced heel-to-toe rotational forces the
    ground force permanently assigned to EUCOM is inadequate to meet the
    combatant command's directed mission to deter Russia from further
    aggression.
        Deterrence Posture. Going forward, we will need to continue
    maintaining capable forces for effective deterrence. EUCOM is
    coordinating across the DOD to obtain the forces we need in every
    warfare domain. This may include additional maneuver forces, combat air
    squadrons, anti-submarine capabilities, a carrier strike group, and
    maritime amphibious capabilities. We will continue to enhance our plans
    for pre-positioning equipment across the theater as a flexible
    deterrent measure and to exercise the joint reception, staging, and
    onward integration of CONUS-based forces into Europe.
        ERI Requirements. EUCOM's continues to require the ability to deter
    Russian aggression and counter malign influence while assuring allies
    and partners. We anticipate needing to continue deterrence measured
    initiated in previous ERI submissions to include: Army and Air Force
    prepositioning, retention of F-15 presence, improved airfield
    infrastructure improvements, and to address some new capabilities
    needed in the theater.
        Indications and Warnings (I&W). EUCOM's ability to provide
    strategic warning is critical to credible deterrence. A robust
    intelligence capability enables accurate analysis and rapid response in
    a changing theater security environment. This capability also supports
    the design of realistic exercises, posture alignment, and future
    requirements. Furthermore, when completed, EUCOM's Joint Intelligence
    Analytic Center at Royal Air Force Croughton will provide a dedicated,
    purpose-built intelligence facility collocated with NATO and AFRICOM's
    analytic centers that will enhance capability and capacity in both
    combatant commands and NATO. Finally, additional intelligence
    collection platforms in theater, such as the U-2, the RQ-4, and the RC-
    135, are required for accurate and timely threat information to support
    strategic decisions.
        Recapitalization Efforts. The European Infrastructure Consolidation
    effort announced in January 2015 enables EUCOM to divest excess
    capacity and consolidate missions and footprints at enduring locations.
    However, with aging infrastructure and little recent investment,
    recapitalization and consolidation projects are required to support
    warfighter readiness, command and control requirements, deployments,
    training, and quality of life. This Committee has been key to these
    critical efforts. We continue to modernize communications facilities
    and schools across Europe. Last year, Congress authorized the final
    increment for the Joint Intelligence Analysis Center, which enables the
    closure of RAFs Molesworth and Alconbury.
                                 v. conclusion
        Let me conclude by again thanking this committee's Members and
    staff for their continued support of EUCOM, not only through providing
    our requested funding, but also by helping us to articulate the
    challenges that lie before us. Support from other senior leaders and,
    above all, from the public at home and across Europe is vital to
    ensuring that we remain ready and relevant. This is a pivotal time for
    EUCOM as we transition to meet the demands of a dynamic security
    environment. I remain confident that through the strength of our
    alliance and partnerships, and with the professionalism of our
    servicemembers, we will adapt and ensure that Europe remains whole,
    free and at peace.

        Chairman McCain. Since a quorum is now present, I ask the
    committee to consider a list of 62 pending military
    nominations. All of these nominations have been before the
    committee the required length of time. Is there a motion to
    favorably report these 62 military nominations?
        Senator Reed. So moved.
        Chairman McCain. Is there a second?
        Senator Nelson. Second.
        Chairman McCain. All in favor, say aye.
        [Chorus of ayes.]
        Chairman McCain. The ayes have it.
        [The list of nominees follows:]
     Military Nominations Pending with the Senate Armed Services Committee
     Which are Proposed for the Committee's Consideration on May 23, 2017.
         1.  BG Sean L. Murphy, USAF to be major general (Reference No.
    92).

         2.  In the Navy there are 2 appointments to the grade of rear
    admiral (lower half) (list begins with John A. Okon) (Reference No.
    109).

         3.  In the Navy there are 19 appointments to the grade of rear
    admiral (lower half) (list begins with Edward L. Anderson) (Reference
    No. 111).

         4.  In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of captain
    (Susan M. McGarvey) (Reference No. 147).

         5.  In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of commander
    (Sheila I. Almendras-Flaherty) (Reference No. 168).

         6.  In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of captain
    (Adrian D. Ragland) (Reference No. 170).

         7.  In the Marine Corps Reserve there are 5 appointments to the
    grade of colonel (list begins with Mark S. Jimison) (Reference No.
    171).

         8.  In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of captain
    (Christopher R. Desena) (Reference No. 207).

         9.  In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of captain
    (Kenneth L. Demick, Jr.) (Reference No. 212).

        10.  In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of captain
    (Michael C. Bratley) (Reference No. 214).

        11.  In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of
    lieutenant colonel (Jason G. Lacis) (Reference No. 233).

        12.  In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of
    lieutenant colonel (Kevin J. Goodwin) (Reference No. 235).

        13.  MG Bradford J. Shwedo, USAF to be lieutenant general and
    Chief, Information Dominance and Chief Information Officer, Office of
    the Secretary of the Air Force (Reference No. 300).

        14.  MG Giovanni K. Tuck, USAF to be lieutenant general and
    Commander, Eighteenth Air Force, Air Mobility Command (Reference No.
    302).

        15.  LTG James C. McConvi11e, USA to be general and Vice Chief of
    Staff of the Army (Reference No. 303).

        16.  BG Stuart W. Risch, USA to be major general (Reference No.
    304).

        17.  MG Thomas C, Seamands, USA to be lieutenant general and Deputy
    Chief of Staff, G-1, U.S. Army (Reference No. 305).

        18.  Col. Mark E. Black, USAR to be brigadier general (Reference
    No. 306).

        19.  Col. Matthew V. Baker, USAR to be brigadier general (Reference
    No. 307).

        20.  BG Chris R. Gentry, USAR to be major general (Reference No.
    308).

        21.  BG Robert A. Karmazin, USAR to be major general (Reference No.
    309).

        22.  BG Marion Garcia, USAR to be major general (Reference No.
    310).

        23.  BG Joseph E. Whitlock, USAR to be major general (Reference No.
    311).

        24.  Col. Miguel A. Castellanos, USAR to be brigadier general
    (Reference No. 312).

        25.  Col. Windsor S. Buzza, USAR to be brigadier general (Reference
    No. 313).

        26.  Col. Randall V. Simmons, Jr., USAR to be brigadier general
    (Reference No. 314).

        27.  Col. Michael D. Wickman, USAR to be brigadier general
    (Reference No. 315).

        28.  In the Army there are 32 appointments to the grade of major
    general (list begins with Carl A. Alex) (Reference No. 316).

        29.  In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
    colonel (Kalie K. Rott) (Reference No. 317).

        30.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (Norma A. Hill) (Reference No. 318).

        31.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
    colonel (Frank C. Pescatello, Jr.) (Reference No. 319).

        32.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (Basim M. Younis) (Reference No. 320).

        33.  In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
    colonel (Stanley F. Gould) (Reference No. 321).

        34.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (Scott W. Fisher) (Reference No. 322).

        35.  In the Army Reserve there are 16 appointments to the grade of
    colonel (list begins with Gary L. Beaty) (Reference No. 323).

        36.  In the Army Reserve there are 2 appointments to the grade of
    colonel (list begins with Daniel J, Convey) (Reference No. 324).

        37.  In the Army there are 2 appointments to the grade of major
    (list begins with Sophia Dalce) (Reference No. 325).

        38.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
    (Dawn E. Elliott) (Reference No. 326).

        39.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
    colonel (DO12528) (Reference No. 327).

        40.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (Benjamin W. Hillner) (Reference No. 328).

        41.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (Celina S. Pargo) (Reference No. 329).

        42.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Paul
    R. Ambrose) (Reference No. 330).

        43.  In the Army there are 2 appointments to the grade of major
    (James L. Dungca) (Reference No. 331).

        44.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
    (Charles R. Burnett) (Reference No. 332).

        45.  In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of commander
    (Evan M. Colbert) (Reference No. 333).

        46.  In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of captain
    (Luciana Sung) (Reference No. 334).

        47.  In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of captain
    (William A. Schultz) (Reference No. 335).

        48.  In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
    commander (William L. McCoy) (Reference No. 336).

        49.  In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of Captain
    (Chris F. White) (Reference No. 337).

        50.  In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
    commander (Karl M. Kingry) (Reference No. 338).

        51.  In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of commander
    (Michael A. Polito) (Reference No. 339).

        52.  In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
    commander (Raymond J. Carlson, Jr.) (Reference No. 340).

        53.  In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of
    lieutenant colonel (Javier E. Vega) (Reference No. 341).

        54.  In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of
    major (Sergio L. Sandoval) (Reference No. 342).

        55.  In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
    commander (Christopher M. Allen) (Reference No. 343).

        56.  In the Army there are 3 appointments to the grade of brigadier
    general (list begins with Susan K. Arnold) (Reference No. 377).

        57.  Col. Richard J. Lebel, USAR to be brigadier general (Reference
    No. 378).

        58.  Col. Todd W. Lewis, USAR to be brigadier general (Reference
    No. 379).

        59.  In the Army there are 2 appointments to the grade of brigadier
    general (list begins with George N. Appenzeller) (Reference No. 380).

        60.  MG Steven R. Rudder, USMC to be lieutenant general and Deputy
    Commandant, Aviation, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps (Reference No.
    381).

        61.  In the Air Force Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade
    of colonel (James E. Thompson) (Reference No. 382).

        62.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
    colonel (Pablo F. Diaz) (Reference No. 383).

        63.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
    colonel (Craig A. Nazareth) (Reference No. 384).

        64.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
    colonel (Brian C. McLean) (Reference No. 385).

        65.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (Raymond C. Casteline) (Reference No. 386).

        66.  In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
    colonel (Daniel J. Shank) (Reference No. 387).

        67.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
    colonel (Christopher W. Degn) (Reference No. 388).

        68.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
    (Jason T. Kidder) (Reference No. 389).

        69.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
    (Tito M. Villanueva) (Reference No. 390).

        70.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
    colonel (Philip J. Dacunto) (Reference No. 391).

        71.  In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
    colonel (Stephen R. November) (Reference No. 392).

        72.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
    (Luisa Santiago) (Reference No. 393).

        73.  In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
    colonel (Robert J. Bonner) (Reference No. 394).

        74.  In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (Johanna K. Ream) (Reference No. 411).

        75.  In the Air Force Reserve there are 118 appointments to the
    grade of colonel (list begins with Paul R. Aguirre) (Reference No.
    412).

        76.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (Mohamad El Samad) (Reference No. 413).

        77.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Lana
    J. Bernat) (Reference No. 414).

        78.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
    colonel (Patrick K. Sullivan) (Reference No. 415).

        79.  In the Army Reserve there are 207 appointments to the grade of
    colonel (list begins with Derek L. Adams) (Reference No. 416).

        80.  In the Army Reserve there are 230 appointments to the grade of
    colonel (list begins with Rodney Abrams) (Reference No. 417).

        81.  In the Army Reserve there are 58 appointments to the grade of
    colonel (list begins with Christine N. Adams) (Reference No. 418).

        82.  In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
    commander (Aaron L. Witherspoon) (Reference No. 430).

        83.  In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of captain
    (John E. Fritz) (Reference No, 437).

        84.  In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of
    major (Michael S. Stevens) (Reference No. 451).

        85.  In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of
    major (Patrick J. Mullen) (Reference No. 452).

        86.  In the Marine Corps Reserve there are 45 appointments to the
    grade of colonel (list begins with Raymond L. Adams) (Reference No.
    453).

        87.  MG Laura J. Richardson, USA to be lieutenant general and
    Deputy Commanding General/Chief of Staff, U.S. Army Forces Command
    (Reference No. 467).

        88.  BG Charles N. Pede, USA to be lieutenant general and Judge
    Advocate General of the Army (Reference No. 468).

        89.  RADM Phillip G. Sawyer, USN to be vice admiral and Commander,
    Seventh Fleet (Reference No. 469).

        90.  MG Brian D. Beaudreault, USMC to be lieutenant general and
    Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations, Headquarters,
    U.S. Marine Corps (Reference No. 473).

    _______________________________________________________________________

    TOTAL: 818

        General, do you have any general comment about the attack
    yesterday in London and the significance of it?
        General Scaparrotti. Sir, the attack in London underscores
    again the dynamic environment in Europe. Europe is challenged
    by both a flow of terrorists returning to Europe from Syria and
    other places. They are challenged by an internal threat of
    those inspired by ISIS or directed by ISIS. This is an example
    of the attacks that we have seen in Europe in the past year. It
    is a difficult challenge. As I said, we remain solid and stand
    shoulder to shoulder with our allies in NATO to defeat this
    threat.
        Chairman McCain. The likelihood of further actions like
    this, particularly some that are self-indoctrinated, is very
    hard to stop.
        General Scaparrotti. It is, sir. I would just say that the
    number of threat streams that we have of this type within
    Europe is probably higher in Europe than any other part of the
    globe with the exception of the places that we are actually
    physically fighting in like Syria and Afghanistan and Iraq.
        Chairman McCain. Is there a connection between that and
    refugees?
        General Scaparrotti. The flow of refugees and those who
    move them, particularly criminal activities that will help move
    them--they also are more than willing to move both equipment,
    personnel, weapons, and people.
        Chairman McCain. As you know, there was an attempted coup
    in Montenegro by the Russians. The Montenegrin membership in
    NATO is pending, and 26 of the 28 nations I believe have
    already registered their approval. It is a small country, only
    650,000 people. It is very strategically located, as you know.
    What is your view of the importance of Montenegro especially
    since they have completed all of the very difficult procedures
    necessary to become eligible--what is your view of the
    importance of their inclusion in NATO?
        General Scaparrotti. Chairman, it is absolutely critical
    that they be brought into NATO. They have had this desire. They
    have met the map. It underscores NATO's outreach and ability to
    bring in those who want to determine their own means of
    government and become a part of NATO. If we were to lose this,
    it would set back many of the other countries and peoples,
    particularly in Eastern Europe, who are looking forward to and
    have their eyes set on the West and becoming a part of NATO.
        Chairman McCain. So it is very important.
        General Scaparrotti. I think it is critical, yes.
        Chairman McCain. I thank you.
        Finally, you talked about the military presence necessary
    for additional forces in Europe, but one of the problems we
    continue to face--for example, one of the causes of the
    attempted coup in Montenegro is the saturation of propaganda
    emanating from Russia. We all know the controversy here in the
    United States about our election, but we now see them active in
    the French election apparently, in the German election. But
    more importantly, they are inundating the Baltics in
    particular. What are our ideas other than ask for a strategy?
    What are our ideas as to how to counter what has emerged as one
    of the greatest threats to stability in Europe?
        General Scaparrotti. Chairman, I think, first of all, we
    have to confront this threat as it is, be sober-minded about
    it. We have to do it as an alliance and with our partners, and
    we have to call it out. We have to confront it. There seems to
    be a reluctance in many of the nations to actually confront it
    when we see it, publicly take it on. I think we as partners
    have to form together and begin to do this. As you said, it is
    prolific, and I believe we have got to confront it.
        Chairman McCain. We countered Russian propaganda during the
    Cold War with Radio Free Europe and Voice of America. All I
    have seen so far is disarray in Prague about the role, the
    funding, the strategies and all that. What do you think we need
    to do there to have our own effective counter-message to be
    sent? I know that is not exactly in your area of
    responsibility, but I think it is a kind of warfare.
        General Scaparrotti. Sir, it is. The Russians see this as a
    part of that spectrum of warfare. That is their asymmetric
    approach.
        I will start here. We have information operations that are
    military, and I have those that are countering malign influence
    in Europe. But what we really need is we need a whole-of-
    government approach, a whole-of-government information
    campaign, of which I am a small part of that. We need somebody
    in the lead of that, and then we need to finance it and form a
    governmental strategy. As you said, in the Cold War, we had
    one. There is a start on that. We have what is called the RIG,
    the Russian Information Group, which is the beginnings of that.
    But that has to be reinforced. It has to be financed. They have
    to have the authorities that they need to lead that forward.
        Chairman McCain. The lead on that would probably be the
    State Department. Right?
        General Scaparrotti. The RIG is co-chaired with EUCOM and
    the State Department is the lead. Yes, sir.
        Chairman McCain. So it would not help you any if we slashed
    the spending for the State Department.
        General Scaparrotti. No, sir.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Reed?
        Senator Reed. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        In fact, you anticipated one of the questions I wanted to
    raise about the malign influences in elections and
    institutional capacity that are evident in Europe today. I
    think I can safely say that we are really not organized to deal
    with it at this point. Is that correct?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir. I agree we can get much
    better organized to deal with this than we are today.
        Senator Reed. Let me just go a step further and say that in
    your estimate, what are the strategic effects that the Russians
    are trying to achieve by these activities? This is not sort of
    a random kind of just stir up trouble for the sake of stirring
    up trouble. What are the strategic objectives?
        General Scaparrotti. Sir, their overall objective is to
    undermine the governments that oppose them, to reinforce the
    political parties in each of those countries that might be
    aligned with them, to demonstrate the weakness of the West and
    undermine the U.S. and the West. They want to ensure that they
    can dominate particularly their periphery. They are doing that
    through this asymmetric approach.
        Senator Reed. Now, you have indicated that particularly
    with the European Defense Initiative and with the response
    initiative, we are beginning to reorganize, re-equip, et
    cetera. Can you give us a sense of your priorities? You had a
    long list of activities that you feel you have to undertake.
    But the top three issues that you have to get accomplished in
    the near future.
        General Scaparrotti. Sir, the top three that we have to get
    accomplished--I think, first of all, is we have to get our
    posture correct for deterrence, and that is across all the
    services. It not just--we tend to focus on the Army part of
    this, but each of the services play a role in that.
        Secondly, we have to ensure that our command has made the
    transition to a command that can command and control in the
    dynamic environment against an aggressor like Russia. We just
    recently had our command post exercise we have every 2 years.
    It was a great exercise, but what it laid out is the changes we
    have yet to make within the component commands in Europe in
    order to fight a foe like Russia.
        Senator Reed. With respect to Ukraine, our expert panel on
    Tuesday, who did a superb job, suggested that is really the
    critical arena at the moment. If they are able to subvert
    Ukraine, then that will send shock waves throughout Europe. Is
    that in your assessment? Just generally, how are we
    collectively, both NATO, the United States, EUCOM, and the EU,
    doing in terms of our efforts in the Ukraine?
        General Scaparrotti. I think the good news with respect to
    Ukraine is that we are unified and we are organized. NATO has a
    defense fund that supports it along very similar lines to the
    United States We are thankful to Congress for its funding of
    our activities there. In fact, we lead a multinational joint
    commission, which is actually the vehicle that among our allies
    and the United States, assesses and then directs the reform
    that needs to take place in conjunction with Ukraine. They also
    do the assessment of the needs in terms of equipment and
    training and guide that training. So we are actually doing that
    together with our partners, as well as NATO through that one
    body. I think it is very effective.
        Senator Reed. In that regard, a great deal--my impression
    is--of the civilian capacity building and the anti-corruption
    efforts is being done by the European Union. So their efforts
    are absolutely critical to U.S. success. Is that fair?
        General Scaparrotti. That is true, sir, and it is critical.
    Our connection to EU, as well as NATO's, has been in the
    forefront here for the past year or so for many reasons, and
    that is one of them.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Fischer?
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Welcome, General. It is nice to see you again.
        As you know, last week General Selva confirmed Russia's
    deployment of a weapon system that violates the INF Treaty. He
    went on to say that, ``the system itself presents a risk to
    most of our facilities in Europe, and we believe that the
    Russians have deliberately deployed it in order to pose a
    threat to NATO and the facilities within the NATO area of
    responsibility.''
        You touched on this in your opening statement on page 5,
    and you said that the system creates a mismatch in escalatory
    options. Could you please elaborate on what you mean by that
    and what the implications are of this deployment?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, this deployment gives them some
    advantage in terms of reach and precision within their systems.
    When we talk about escalation management, if there is a tension
    or a crisis with Russia, because of their doctrine and their
    view that they will escalate to dominate or escalate to
    deescalate, it creates a very tight range of options when we
    work through escalation management. So an enhancement like that
    just makes this a very restrictive and difficult management
    process you through in deterrence. It is that much more
    pressurized. So it is a critical enhancement. It is one that we
    need to respond to.
        Senator Fischer. You say we need to respond, and you just
    mentioned options, the word ``option.'' Secretary Carter talked
    about options. He mentioned counter-force, countervailing
    capabilities, active defenses, but we did not see any real
    action in order to pursue those. Do you think that we need to?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, I think we do.
        Senator Fischer. Which of these options do you think would
    be the most effective in dealing with this?
        General Scaparrotti. If I could, I would like to take that
    for a response for the record. I need to think about the
    comparison of those actually and tell you the best response.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        General Scaparrotti. [Deleted.]

        Senator Fischer. Okay. Thank you.
        General Scaparrotti. Thank you.
        Senator Fischer. At a recent hearing of the Strategic
    Forces Subcommittee, which I chair, we discussed the
    implications of Russia's nuclear strategy, often referred to as
    the escalate/deescalate. General Koehler, who is a former
    Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, made the point that
    the Russian approach reinforces the value of NATO remaining a
    nuclear alliance, as well as the need for the deterrent value
    provided by United States nuclear weapons that are stationed in
    Europe.
        In your written statement, you say that NATO and U.S.
    nuclear forces continue to be a vital component of our
    deterrence. Our modernization efforts are crucial. We must
    preserve a ready, credible, and safe nuclear capability.
        Do you agree that NATO must remain a nuclear alliance and
    that the United States must continue to station those nuclear
    weapons on the European continent?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, Senator, absolutely I do.
        Senator Fischer. Can you outline to us specific benefits
    that we receive by having those stationed there?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, first of all, it provides an
    immediate response that is within the NATO alliance as opposed
    to just the U.S. It represents the alliance in a response by 28
    nations, a commitment by 28 nations that we will deter and we
    will deter their nuclear forces. I think that alone is
    significant.
        Secondly, it gives us some other options because we have
    not only the U.S. but other contingents that provide essential
    capabilities within that nuclear capability. So there is more
    agility there as well.
        Senator Fischer. It recognizes the importance of
    deterrence. Thank you, General.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Shaheen?
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, General Scaparrotti, for being here this morning
    and for your service to the country.
        I want to follow up on the line of questioning that
    Senators McCain and Reed started on the whole information
    warfare issue. When former General Breedlove was before the
    committee earlier this week, he pointed out that recently
    Russia has established an information warfare division within
    its armed forces. Do you think NATO should be looking at
    something like that? Are there already efforts underway? You
    talked about the RIG group, but should we be doing more within
    NATO to address the propaganda that Russia is putting out
    throughout Europe and the United States, by the way?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, Senator. I think in the United
    States, we have organization I think to effectively operate.
    What we need to do is policy and then actions that flow from
    that within the United States. That is a whole-of-government
    approach. That is probably not the structure that we have in
    the way that we need it today. So it is more of a whole-of-
    government response I would tell you. I think we are pretty
    agile in the military, rather than establishing some
    information command, et cetera. We have smaller units that
    tactically execute these kinds of missions. I have them in
    EUCOM.
        Within NATO, NATO has taken this on as well, but it is
    somewhat nascent at this point. I think we do have to pursue
    that. I mean, we have got an adversary here who is using this
    to very good benefit, and we have to compete short of conflict
    in this area as well.
        Senator Shaheen. But as you point out, we do not really
    have a strategy to do that, and we do not have anybody in
    charge of that in the United States Government. I mean, we have
    the Global Engagement Center that is starting up in the State
    Department. I have spoken, as I am sure others have, with the
    continuation of the efforts we had during the Soviet Union when
    we had the Cold War and we had Radio Free Europe, and they did
    a terrific job in those days. But we do not have a continuation
    of that that is part of sharing and cooperating with factually
    presenting what is happening in the West compared to what is
    going on with Russia's propaganda.
        Where should that effort be located? Do you have thoughts
    about who should participate in that and how we better
    coordinate what we are doing?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, Senator, I do. I think actually
    that the RIG, the Russian Information Group, which I mentioned,
    is actually a good structure to start with. It has State as the
    lead, co-chaired with European Command. It has all of the other
    agencies involved in that. The GEC is a key leader in that,
    which has been empowered to do the communication piece of the
    State. But, you know, it is not robustly supported. I do not
    believe that it has the kind of focus and priority that we need
    to have. So, therefore, it exists but it needs to really be
    reinforced, funded. Then as you said, I think we have all the
    talent and creativity we need in this Nation to do this better
    than anybody else. We just need to decide to do it.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        There was a report. Actually I agree with you. I just want
    to make that clear.
        There was a report earlier this week about Russia training
    Kurdish fighters. It was not clear to me to what extent they
    were doing that. But how is Turkey responding to that report?
    Are they concerned about what Russia is doing, and how does
    that affect their sort of growing rapprochement with Russia?
        General Scaparrotti. Senator, I have not talked to my
    counterpart, the CHOD in Turkey, since this report came out. So
    we have not talked directly. I cannot tell you exactly what
    their response on this would be.
        But given my association with them and their concern about
    the PKK [Kurdistan Workers' Party] and associated groups, Kurd
    groups, that are aligned with them, I think they would have
    great concern about it. They want to ensure that the attacks
    that they have from the PKK are not reinforced in any way--
    Turkey does. They also want to ensure that they do not have--
    the cantonments in Syria are not connected in Syria so they
    have Kurdish entity across their entire across their entire
    southern border. Given those two objectives, I think they are
    very concerned about it probably.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Inhofe?
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General, last weekend, I was in the Ukraine and was
    observing their training. The 45th does a great job. In fact,
    that is the same group that not long ago was providing the same
    training of training in Afghanistan and Iraq. They are going to
    be there for a year long. I watched that, and there is really
    an art to that. They are doing a great job because most people
    will think that they are there to train the Ukrainians or
    wherever they are stationed, but they really there to train
    them to train the others, and there is a big difference. So I
    wanted you to know that they are really doing a good job.
        During the parliamentary elections in 2014, I was with
    Poroshenko and the crowd when, of course, they had that huge
    success, the first time in 96 years. No Communist is in the
    parliament there. As you know, it became very controversial
    after that took place and Putin started killing Ukrainians, and
    we wanted to provide the lethal defensive assistance. Our
    committee was pretty much unanimous on that. The administration
    was not that excited about it. So in both the fiscal year 2016,
    we authorized $300,000, in fiscal year 2017, authorized
    $350,000 for the security assistance for Ukraine, including
    lethal assistance such as anti-armor weapons.
        General Dunford during his nomination hearing said this.
    ``I think it is reasonable that we provide that lethal support
    for the Ukrainians. Frankly, without that kind of support, we
    are not going to be able to protect themselves against the
    Russia aggression.''
        So I would kind of like to get your idea. Do you agree with
    him? Do you agree also that we need to provide that assistance?
    What are we providing now and how much more should we?
        General Scaparrotti. Senator, thank you. In short, yes, I
    do agree with him. I have been there twice recently.
        I would note that I agree. The Guard is doing a very good
    job there and an important one in their training relationship
    with the Ukrainians.
        In terms of lethal support, the Ukrainians are in a very
    tough fight, which you saw. They are very disciplined soldiers.
    But they are facing what we say are separatists. They are
    actually Russian proxies in my mind. They are being provided
    very lethal equipment. The Russians are providing the
    separatists that. The Russians are also testing some of their
    new TTPs there. So we need to reinforce the Ukrainian military
    as much as we can and provide them the best opportunity to
    fight what is a very lethal Russian proxy at this point.
        Senator Inhofe. I agree with that. I have a question for
    the record as to what kind of equipment specifically we should
    do.
        But I want to mention one thing. Do you happen to know--his
    name is Fatmir Mediu. He was the Secretary of Defense in the
    Albanian defense. They had a meeting, and I happened to be
    attending that meeting--it was on January 31st--kind of a
    roundtable talking about ISIS and the threat in the Balkans. It
    was kind of revealing. Apparently a lot of the ISIS recruiting
    is taking place in the Balkans right now. Do you have any
    comment to make as to what our activity is there in terms of
    what the threat is there? Are we working with them as closely
    as we should?
        General Scaparrotti. I am very concerned about the
    stability in the Balkans, and one of the reasons is that what
    is generally a moderate or a Western-looking Islamic population
    is increasingly being affected by extremist influence there.
    Part of that is recruiting for ISIS. It is a trend right now.
    It is one I think we have to pay very close attention to.
        Senator Inhofe. Okay. That is good. I appreciate it.
        Now, my time has expired, but for the record, I would like
    to get as specific information as we could as to what best we
    could afford to send over there against the aggression that
    they have. Okay?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir. Thank you.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        General Scaparrotti. [Deleted.]

        Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Heinrich?
        Senator Heinrich. Welcome, General.
        As was mentioned earlier, it is being reported that our
    Secretary of State will be missing the NATO summit of foreign
    ministers in a couple weeks. This obviously comes at a time
    when the administration has criticized the value of NATO.
    Russia is meddling in European elections, and Russia is
    threatening our NATO allies in the Baltics.
        Do you have any opinions on whether this sends the right
    signal to our NATO allies? What kind of messages do you think
    we should be sending to our NATO allies at this time?
        General Scaparrotti. Senator, I think it is essential that
    our allies in NATO understand that we are absolutely committed
    to the alliance and continue to be a key leader within the
    alliance.
        I noted this morning that the Secretary-General and the
    Secretary had met, and they are looking for a date that all of
    the allies can meet for the foreign ministers conference. I
    hope that is, in fact, worked out and that becomes a reality.
        Senator Heinrich. As do I.
        General, Russian denial, deception, disinformation were all
    important parts of the hybrid warfare campaign that we saw
    during the illegal seizure of Crimea and its Russian support
    for separatists in eastern Ukraine. As EUCOM Commander, you
    lead much of the effort to identify and attribute Russian
    disinformation operations. Can you describe for us how Russia
    is organized to conduct this kind of information warfare and
    what techniques you are seeing on display in the Ukraine?
        General Scaparrotti. Thank you.
        When you are talking about this, you think about it in a
    military organization, but frankly, what I think is important
    is that Russia actually has a very broad set of groups to
    include their intelligence groups that are doing this. So they
    actually have a whole-of-government approach on this, which I
    think makes it one more difficult. It is one of the reasons
    that we also see what I think is a pretty rapid or agile use of
    social media, TV----
        Senator Heinrich. Absolutely.
        General Scaparrotti.--cyber, et cetera. So it is a force to
    be reckoned with at this point. I think it is that organization
    that gives them the ability.
        Senator Heinrich. Do you have recommendations in terms of
    building our capacity or that of our allies and partners in the
    region to be able to resist these kinds Russian influence
    activities?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, I think, first of all, in EUCOM
    we have elements that today have missions to counter Russian
    malign influence, both to identify it, counter it, and then,
    third, we are building partner capacity. We are exchanging
    techniques, et cetera. Estonia has an excellent cyber center of
    excellence, for instance. That is a key node in NATO. We work
    very closely with that. So we need to continue those kinds of
    partnerships and exchange of skill and understanding how they
    are working. I think, particularly as an alliance, we can
    counter this.
        Senator Heinrich. I think because of their proximity, we
    actually have a lot to learn from our Balkan partners, and
    given what we have seen even in our own elections, it is time
    to learn those lessons.
        Russia's air defense systems like the S-300 and S-400
    threaten to block our ability to be able to project power in
    the event of a conflict in the European region, particularly in
    the Baltics. This certainly undermines the United States and
    NATO's article 5 commitment to the defense of these allies and
    raises concerns about the alliance's ability to deter an
    increasingly aggressive Russia.
        How capable are the Russian air defense systems
    particularly in Kaliningrad?
        General Scaparrotti. Sir, I would just state in an
    unclassified venue, they are very capable. The newer systems
    like the S-400 is a definite enhancement in their capabilities.
    That is why we are concerned about it. As you stated, their
    location in Kaliningrad and Crimea and the Mediterranean
    provides difficulty for our access and mobility. We can counter
    this. I am confident of that.
        Senator Heinrich. Do you have opinions in that regard on
    what types of next generation technologies, for example, we
    will need to effectively counter the Russian A2/AD
    capabilities?
        General Scaparrotti. Up front what I talked about in terms
    of our advanced aircraft, fifth generation, enhanced munitions,
    particularly long-range precision munitions, electronic
    warfare, those things generally is what we need to continue our
    modernization efforts on. If you would like, I could give you a
    more specific in a classified response, obviously.
        Senator Heinrich. I would appreciate that, General.
        Thank you, Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Rounds?
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General, thank you for your service. I appreciate the
    opportunity to visit for just a few minutes today.
        With regard to Montenegro, the chairman had begun the
    discussion in terms of the possibilities that they could become
    a member of NATO. If they were to become a member of NATO, what
    would you expect the Russian response to be and how would you
    prepare for it?
        General Scaparrotti. Senator, I think we have probably seen
    their response in terms of their activity and their attempt to
    block that. I think to a certain extent, they know this is
    going to happen. I trust it will.
        In a conversation with one of NATO's ministers, one of the
    countries that has communication with Russian leadership, he
    shared with me that a Russian leader told him that Putin had
    said he lost Montenegro, but there will not be another
    Montenegro. I think that is an indication of how they think and
    how important it is to them that these other nations that seek
    to have a democratic government and turn to the West are under
    threat. It is one of the reasons that I think Russia continues
    to have frozen conflicts and be present in places like Georgia
    and Ukraine because it is their means of controlling that.
        Senator Rounds. You have got extensive background in
    Europe. You know a number of the European leaders. With the
    change in administrations, naturally there are going to be some
    questions in terms of policy changes, decision-making
    processes, and so forth. What questions are you getting from
    your European contacts in terms of leaders and what concerns do
    they have?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, I think, first of all, as a new
    administration comes in, they want to ensure that we are
    committed to the alliance and the security of the transatlantic
    AOR. For instance, Secretary Mattis at the first NATO meeting
    at the defense ministers conference made our commitment very
    clear, as did Vice President Pence, at Munich. I think that is
    critical. They look to that.
        They also now look to what are the policies and are the
    policies consistent with security in the transatlantic region.
    Of course, in a new administration, they are looking forward to
    policies with respect to NATO, policies with respect to
    Afghanistan and others.
        Senator Rounds. When it comes to doing your job, you
    clearly have to have the tools and the tools in proper working
    order in order to get the job done. If you could give us a list
    of those areas that you have the most concern with our
    capabilities today. I will just give you an example. The fact
    that right now if we have one task force leaving the
    Mediterranean coming through and another one going in, in some
    cases we are actually stopping in the middle of the
    Mediterranean and trading ammo because we do not have enough
    ammo to literally maintain operational capabilities in multiple
    task forces. Those types of things concern us. We have a
    nuclear submarine sitting at the dock because literally we
    cannot get the maintenance done on it so that it is certified
    to die at this stage of the game--a nuclear submarine. The
    readiness clearly is not there in some cases.
        Do you have issues right now under your command that you
    would share with us that you have concerns with?
        General Scaparrotti. Senator, I would like to get into
    detail in a classified or closed session. But generally I would
    say this. The demands of our security strategy today in the
    dynamic world that we are working in requires us to have more
    capacity than we have today in our armed forces. You noted the
    Navy. So in Europe, I do not have the carrier or the submarine
    capacity that would best enable me to do my job in EUCOM. It is
    sufficient, but it is not what ideally I would like to have to
    deter Russia, assure our allies, build their capacity, work
    with them on the basis that we need to work with them. So that
    is an example of the areas.
        Now, you mentioned munitions. I am concerned about that as
    well because we are using munitions today in those places where
    we are in conflict. The adversaries that we face, for instance,
    Russia or China or North Korea, will be high intensity
    conflicts. We have to invest in the stockpiles that we need,
    and we also have to invest in enhancing those munitions so as
    we look to the future, we do not find ourselves in a position
    where our adversaries have outpaced us.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, General.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Peters?
        Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, General Scaparrotti, for being here today. I
    certainly appreciate your testimony and also wanted to thank
    you for being very generous with your time at the Munich
    conference where we had an opportunity to discuss many of these
    issues at length.
        General, as you are well aware, we are increasingly relying
    on space, cyberspace, and fiber optic communications cables in
    all aspects of our lives. These systems are also critical for
    social and economic activity, and their assured access and
    availability is vital to the U.S. strategic stability. When you
    look at Russia's navy operations right now in the EUCOM
    theater, which includes a significant footprint in the Arctic,
    which is growing dramatically without necessary response from
    us, and a $2.4 billion expansion of the Black Sea fleet by
    2020, Russia appears committed to bolstering their military
    infrastructure on EUCOM's flanks. This increased OPSTEMPO
    includes naval activity that suggests that Russia right now is
    exploring undersea cable vulnerabilities at much greater
    depths, depths where the cables are difficult to monitor and
    breaks are harder to repair.
        So my question is, in general, what is your assessment as
    to whether or not we have sufficient redundancy within EUCOM's
    command and control architecture, to include ballistic missile
    defense systems, to withstand a coordinated attack on our
    undersea, terrestrial, and space-based communication systems
    that you rely on?
        General Scaparrotti. Sir, what I would like to do is
    respond to that in a classified venue so I can give you a very
    accurate answer.
        Senator Peters. Sure.
        General Scaparrotti. I am confident of our ability to
    operate today. As I just said, we just did our command post
    exercise, and we were looking at that. But we need to modernize
    what we have today in terms of command and control, as you
    noted, in order to have the right kind of resilience with the
    adversary that we face. You need a good deal of redundancy to
    be sure. That is one of the areas. If you note in a classified
    venue, what I have asked of OSD [Office of the Secretary of
    Defense], that is one of the key areas that I think we need to
    work on is the C-4 structure within Europe.
        Senator Peters. Well, I would appreciate that and actually
    following up on Senator Heinrich's questions too as you come
    back to brief on some of the A2/AD capabilities. I would be
    interested in learning more about that, particularly when it
    comes to next generation, what we need to be investing in today
    to be ready for the years ahead as warfare changes dramatically
    in the next few years.
        But based on capabilities, to follow up my last question
    here related to capabilities, in the fiscal year 2016 NDAA
    budget, I co-led an effort to enhance lethality of the Stryker
    vehicles with a 30 millimeter cannon. This was in response to
    an operational needs statement from the 2nd Cavalry Regiment
    where the Strykers were the heaviest vehicles permanently
    stationed in Europe at that time. I understand that the work to
    add the 30 millimeter cannon to Strykers is going well. The
    first prototype was successfully delivered last October, and
    training is beginning on those vehicles.
        The ERI also provides funds for upgrading the Abrams tanks
    to be prepositioned in Europe as well.
        So could you just provide an update on the need for this
    capability and if we need to continue to be moving forward and
    that any lapses in that upgrade either of the Abrams or the
    Stryker is a problem or not for you?
        General Scaparrotti. Senator, thank you very much.
        It is not a problem for me, but it is a priority----
        Senator Peters. Right.
        General Scaparrotti.--given the adversary that we have who
    continues to modernize. Particularly Russia is modernizing
    their armored force, as well as in each one of their services,
    they are making advancements. So it is critical that we outpace
    that, that we provide our soldiers in this case the very best
    equipment that we can and we continue to upgrade it.
        Abrams is a fine tank, but as technology changes, we can
    make upgrades to it and make it better, and we make it better
    in terms of defense as well. We owe that to our soldiers.
        Senator Peters. The Stryker as well?
        General Scaparrotti. The Stryker as well, absolutely.
        Senator Peters. Great. Thank you, General. I appreciate it.
        General Scaparrotti. Thank you.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Sullivan?
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General, good to see you. Thanks for spending time with a
    number of us in Munich.
        Do you agree that one of the most important strategic
    advantages we have in terms of our national security is that we
    are an ally-rich nation, our adversaries are ally-poor?
        General Scaparrotti. Senator, absolutely.
        Senator Sullivan. Do you also agree that the ally-poor
    nations like Russia, China, North Korea, Iran--that they
    recognize that--they do not have many allies at all--and that
    they try to undermine our alliances? Is that not what certainly
    Vladimir Putin is up to?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir. I think his intent is
    actually to fracture NATO, and I think it is because he does
    fear NATO. He knows the power of that alliance.
        Senator Sullivan. So given that, are we doing enough
    diplomatically, militarily right now--the Trump
    administration--to reinforce our alliances, expand our
    alliances, deepen our alliances? What is your assessment of
    what we are doing and what we could be doing better whether it
    is in the military realm or diplomatic realm? How are we doing
    on that?
        General Scaparrotti. Sir, I think we absolutely have a
    focus on building partner capacity, building our relationships
    with our partners. We are a leader in NATO. From a EUCOM
    perspective, that is something--I mean, we work on this every
    day. I do not think there is any question of that particularly
    on the military side. It is a very close relationship with our
    partners. It is day to day. It works both ways. We learn from
    our alliance partners as well.
        Senator Sullivan. Are there things that you recommend that
    we could do more of or better in that regard? It is really,
    really an important issue--or the Senate? We play a big role in
    terms of our allies, treaties.
        General Scaparrotti. Well, I think in terms of the alliance
    itself, here again, I keep coming back to it, but I think it is
    whole-of-government in the sense that every agency in the
    government does their part and it is clear to our allies that
    from every agency in the United States, that the alliance is
    important and it shows and demonstrates in its actions that the
    alliance is the bedrock of transatlantic security. So there is
    no disagreement in what they see in terms of action, not just
    on the military side but in terms of our diplomacy, our
    information, our economics, et cetera.
        Senator Sullivan. I wanted to switch over to an issue that
    a number of us have been focused on and we have had discussions
    on it, is what is happening in the Arctic and the increasing
    importance of that region in terms of strategic resources,
    transportation, a lot of concerns of our NATO allies like the
    Norwegians and others about the significant Russian buildup in
    the Arctic. As you know, it does not look like a friendly
    buildup: four new brigade combat teams, a new Arctic military
    command, very aggressive actions in the high north, including a
    military exercise that was a SNAP exercise with close to 50,000
    troops that EUCOM was barely aware of, which is kind of, in and
    of itself, not a good sign.
        A number of us, Senator King, the chairman, were concerned
    enough that we did not have a strategy on that. So we required
    the Secretary of Defense to actually put forward a new Arctic
    strategy. There is a classified and unclassified version. Have
    you read that?
        General Scaparrotti. I have not read it, no.
        Senator Sullivan. So I would highly recommend that you take
    a look at it because it is the new DOD strategy. It is not
    perfect, but it is a heck of a lot better than the one that was
    previously published by DOD, which was pretty much a joke. Of
    course, EUCOM has a lot of important elements to play in that
    strategy.
        But one of the things it emphasizes, it does talk about our
    strategic interests, which the last strategy did not even
    bother to do. But one of the things it emphasizes is looking at
    freedom of navigation operations, the ability to actually push
    back on the Russian buildup, which includes 40 icebreakers, 13
    more under construction, several new seaports and harbors.
        But although it emphasizes FONOPS [Freedom of Navigation
    Operations], do you think right now if Russia decided to deny
    access to vital United States or Arctic shipping lanes in the
    Arctic region, that you as the Commander of EUCOM--could you
    provide the President an option of conducting a surface FONOP
    to challenge that act like we are trying to do in the South
    China Sea, given our assets right now? Because the strategy
    emphasizes FONOPS, but it certainly seems like the means that
    we have right now would not enable you to make such a
    recommendation to the President. What do you think about that,
    General?
        General Scaparrotti. I think it is would depend as well on
    the circumstances in terms of location and time of year because
    of the assets that we have as well. As you know, the northern
    sea route lays in closest proximity to Russia's coastline as
    well, which complicates that given their military buildup. So
    we clearly need to invest more in the kind of assets that help
    us in the Arctic. So that is how I would respond to that,
    Senator.
        We can give options. We certainly need to improve our
    capabilities. I am concerned as well about our capabilities
    with respect to the high north and security of the North
    Atlantic, et cetera.
        Senator Sullivan. That is just a diagram of what the
    Russians are doing. It is pretty significant.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator King?
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        First, General, I want to thank you and your staff for
    preparing and presenting to the committee this map which I
    think is extraordinary. I am a great believer that you cannot
    confront your adversaries unless you understand them, unless
    you understand how they think. To me the amazing or very
    interesting and illuminating part of this map it shows the
    borders of the Soviet Union in 1989 and today the borders or
    Russia. Essentially from Putin's point of view, his border
    retreated about 1,000 miles across a whole front of eastern
    Europe. Clearly that is part of his world view in terms of
    Russia's proper place in the world. Would you agree?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir, I agree. That is why I think
    the map is illustrative because I think if you are Putin, you
    are looking out for Moscow and you see what I think he would
    consider to have been his strategic buffer. It tells you a bit
    about his mindset, and from what we know about him, he feels as
    though he has been encroached upon, that he has this sphere of
    influence that he believes is rightfully his. Of course, these
    are nations that have a right to determine their own
    government.
        [The information referred to follows:]
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        Senator King. Part of Russia's history is a kind of
    paranoia about the West, going back to Frederick the Great and
    probably Napoleon. They have, in fact, been invaded from the
    West. Again, that contributes to this mindset. Would you not
    agree?
        General Scaparrotti. I agree, sir. Yes, sir.
        Senator King. That gets to my real concern--and I have
    raised this in other hearings--both in the South China Sea or
    in Europe, is the danger of an accidental war, a danger of
    misunderstanding, confusion, leading to some kind of
    escalation.
        What protections do we have from a misunderstanding? For
    example, we deploy what we consider a defensive rocket battery,
    missile battery in Poland, and the Russians read that as an
    aggressive act, and it goes from there. How do we ensure that
    does not happen? As I view the world today, I think this is our
    gravest sort of state-to-state danger, is misunderstanding and
    leading to accidental conflict.
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir. The thing that I worry about
    the most just day to day is that there is a miscalculation or
    an issue where we have forces in close proximity. So how do we
    deal with that?
        First of all, there are international norms in the air, at
    sea, et cetera that day to day the Russians adhere to as well.
    We have seen violations of that on their part. But it enables
    us----
        Senator King. Deconfliction.
        General Scaparrotti. It is deconfliction. That is correct.
    It is a good word.
        The second thing is I think it is important that we
    communicate with them. Today we do that primarily through the
    media, et cetera. But we have, as you know, connection with the
    Russians for deconfliction. I think that communication is
    important because what I try to do in EUCOM----
        Senator King. Do you have direct lines of communication
    with your opposite number in Russia, for example?
        General Scaparrotti. I do not today.
        Senator King. Do you not think that would be a good idea?
    You could say, wait a minute, that missile was launched by
    accident, do not get alarmed. I mean, I think having that kind
    of communication and at the higher level, at the State
    Department or at the White House level, there should be the
    opportunity anyway for this kind of communication.
        General Scaparrotti. We do have communication for
    deconfliction within OSD today. It is limited. I agree with
    you. I think communication is an important component of
    deterrence, for instance. But I think also given Russia's
    behavior, there is some limitation to that. We should not
    reward them for some of their bad behavior as well. So we
    should do what we need to do to ensure we are safe and we
    deconflict.
        Senator King. I am not suggesting warning them. I am just
    suggesting if something occurs, you could get on the line and
    say, wait a minute. Do not misinterpret that. That is where the
    concern comes.
        General Scaparrotti. That is correct.
        Senator King. We talked a lot--and I just want to associate
    myself with many of the other comments about the information
    war. To me, the specific answer to our failure to engage
    successfully in the information war goes back to, I think, 1998
    or 1999 when we abolished USIA [United States Information
    Agency]. There is no single point in the United States
    Government today that is in charge of information, and I think
    it is inexcusable that the country that invented Hollywood and
    Facebook is being defeated on the information battlefield.
    Clearly, that is part of the war that we are engaged in. Putin
    is achieving great success in Europe and across the world and
    one would argue in many areas without firing a shot through
    effective use of information. I think our friends on the
    Foreign Relations Committee perhaps can consider that. But USIA
    was the point and now we do not have it. So I hope we can
    recover that capacity sooner rather than later.
        Thank you very much, General.
        Senator Reed [presiding]. On behalf of Chairman McCain,
    Senator Cruz please.
        Senator Cruz. Thank you very much, Senator Reed.
        General, good morning. Thank you for your service.
        The European theater continues to be a vital concern, a
    critical and complex region that will always be near the top of
    our national security priorities.
        I want to begin by focusing on the repeated reports we are
    seeing of Russia's growing support for the Taliban and for
    ISIS. General Nicholson testified last month that Russia is
    attempting to legitimize the Taliban and undermine the Afghan
    Government. Just a few weeks ago, General Votel expressed his
    concerns regarding the extent to which Russia has managed to
    prop up the Assad regime. In the same hearing, General
    Waldhauser said that Russia is trying to exert influence on the
    outcome of which entity emerges with control of the government
    inside Libya. That is a fairly comprehensive list of radical
    Islamic terrorist hotspots across the globe from Afghanistan to
    the Middle East to Africa and Russia seeking additional
    influence with each.
        How should this inform our future strategic choices with
    respect to Russia, and what impact would that have on your AOR?
        General Scaparrotti. Senator, thank you. I think those are
    all accurate. I agree with all their statements.
        I think actually that it is a part of Russia's intent to
    present themselves as a global power. In my view, where they
    are involved, they are not necessarily so concerned about the
    outcome, just that they can be a part of it. They can be seen
    as being a part of that. Whether it is an effective outcome I
    do not think it is as much of a concern to them.
        So that is what we need to take from this, more so from our
    point of view the fact that they are a spoiler often in many of
    these cases. So we also have to engage them in this manner, and
    we have to engage globally as well in these places in order to
    ensure that we have the proper influence.
        Senator Cruz. If Russia were to succeed in undermining the
    Afghan Government, what would the effect of that be on the NATO
    alliance?
        General Scaparrotti. It would be significant. I mean, NATO
    and the United States in my view must win in Afghanistan. I
    agree. I have seen the influence of Russia of late, an
    increased influence in terms of association and perhaps even
    supply to the Taliban.
        Senator Cruz. We have also seen over the past few months
    numerous instances of Russian aggression or hostile behavior
    such as Russian jets buzzing the United States Navy destroyer
    Porter and numerous intercepts of United States aircraft in the
    Baltic Sea. Some of these incidents have been exceedingly
    unsafe. Recently Russia also deployed a land-based cruise
    missile in clear violation of the INF Treaty. Also, a Russian
    spy auxiliary, gathering intelligence, ship conducted
    operations off the United States coast near our submarine
    bases.
        General, in your professional opinion, what should be the
    U.S.'s responses to these actions? How do we reduce Russia's
    flouting of international norms?
        General Scaparrotti. Senator, first of all, we must be
    strong in all that we do. We should confront them in each of
    these occasions or each of these incidents. Then we need to
    sail and fly every place that is within international norms and
    international airways and maritime. We just need to keep doing
    that. For instance, in the Baltic or in the Black Sea, these
    encounters are their means of showing us their displeasure for
    us being there. We have every right to be there. We have, in
    fact, increased our presence, and I think that is the right
    step, increase our presence and insist on the fact that we have
    every right within international law to operate there and
    continue to do so.
        Senator Cruz. Let me shift to a different question.
    American forces have conducted several deployments in support
    of Operation Atlantic Resolve to demonstrate our commitment to
    the stability of Europe. Recently 400 soldiers and 24 AH-64
    Apache helicopters deployed to Europe from Fort Bliss. However,
    earlier this month, the Army's Deputy of Chief for Operations,
    Lieutenant General Joseph Anderson, expressed concerns
    regarding sustainable readiness for the Army's future
    rotations. In essence, it sounds like soldiers that are coming
    home from one deployment will have less time to get ready and
    train before re-deploying to the European theater. That or the
    Army will be forced to reduce its global commitments.
        General, do you share the same concerns as General Anderson
    regarding this rotation of forces. What impact do you see in
    your AOR, and what do you recommend to improve the situation?
        General Scaparrotti. Senator, first of all, it is crucial
    that we continue the rotations within Europe for deterrence of
    Russia and for assurance and support of our allies, the
    commitments that we have made. But I do agree with General
    Anderson that, for instance, in the Army, as an Army officer,
    we are less than a 1-to-2 dwell. We are turning our people very
    quickly. It is the reason that our Chief has said that we need
    to grow our force, and we need to focus on readiness, as he is
    doing, because we are committed today at a very high rate.
        Senator Cruz. Thank you, General.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Cruz.
        On behalf of the chairman, Senator Donnelly please.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General, thank you very much for being here.
        We talk a lot about Russia's escalate to deescalate
    strategy or the idea that Russia has indicated through its
    words and its exercises that it sees the use of tactical
    nuclear weapons to supposedly deescalate a conflict as a
    realistic option.
        How should NATO respond to this? Does the United States
    have the capabilities whether through dual-use aircraft or
    strategic bombers to deter such an escalatory move?
        General Scaparrotti. Senator, thank you.
        As I have said, we should be strong in the face of both
    their rhetoric, their actions, and their modernization. We do
    have the capability to deter this. But we must remain strong
    and we must continue to modernize given the pace of their
    modernization so that in the future we continue our dominance.
        Senator Donnelly. I am just wondering personally. Do you
    think that Vladimir Putin and/or the Russians believe that they
    could use a nuclear weapon without a similar scaled response?
        General Scaparrotti. That is a good question. I think that
    about that a lot.
        They have said publicly that they see the potential of the
    use of a nuclear weapon in what we would consider a tactical
    and conventional means. That is just alarming.
        Senator Donnelly. I think it is a clear misunderstanding of
    who we are as well----
        General Scaparrotti. Exactly.
        Senator Donnelly.--is what I think.
        I was privileged to be over in Georgia and Ukraine not too
    long ago. My friend and fellow Hoosier, Senator Lugar, helped
    create the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program to
    combat the spread of weapons of mass destruction. While we were
    there, we spent a lot of time working with the Georgian and
    Ukraine Government in efforts to counter the smuggling of those
    materials.
        Russia has destabilized borders in both these countries,
    and I am concerned about the impact that has had on the ability
    to smuggle nuclear material through uncontrolled regions like
    eastern Ukraine. In Georgia, in fact, the special police unit
    calls those kind of areas the black holes. It is a serious
    threat given that the smuggling networks in these regions reach
    to the terrorist networks in the Middle East. That is the
    pipeline.
        I was wondering what EUCOM is doing to counter this effort
    at the present time.
        General Scaparrotti. Thank you, Senator. Your pipeline that
    you described is accurate.
        We have a transnational threats element within EUCOM. It is
    whole-of-government. It relies mostly on not just the military
    piece but mostly on other agencies within our government
    connection with our partners and allies, with Europol within
    EU, et cetera. It is a network essentially to help us highlight
    criminal networks. They are often very closely aligned and
    working with our terrorist networks. So that is one of the
    major things that we do. It is an important function, and it is
    a central part of our counter-transnational threats line of
    effort, which is one of our five lines of effort.
        Senator Donnelly. I want to follow on some of the questions
    my colleague, Senator Fischer, asked earlier about Russia's INF
    violations and their deployment of nuclear-armed ground-
    launched cruise missile. They have similar air and sea launch
    capabilities that do not violate the INF. Why do you think they
    are deliberately choosing to deploy a seemingly redundant
    capability on land?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, I think that it would provide
    them a capability internal to their country that gives much
    great reach, simply put.
        Senator Donnelly. Do you feel that all of the steps being
    taken in Kaliningrad with the Iskander short-range missiles--
    that the goal of all of that is to divide us, to undermine
    NATO, to try to separate the commitment from one to the other?
        General Scaparrotti. Senator, I think that is part of it. I
    think much of what they do is to undermine confidence in NATO,
    undermine confidence in the West. It is to threaten them with
    the idea that we can have control over a swath of your country
    or a number of countries in the region with these systems.
        Senator Donnelly. I want to thank you. You have a real
    challenge on your hands at this time, but we want you to know
    we are 100 percent behind you, that we will do everything we
    can to provide you with all you need and that you can tell all
    of our friends and allies over there that we have their back.
        General Scaparrotti. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Reed. On behalf of Chairman McCain, Senator Ernst
    please.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Thank you, General Scaparrotti, very much.
        It is good to know that you do support providing lethal aid
    to our Ukrainian friends. It seems like we all do agree that
    there should be that lethal assistance out there. I have made
    this clear to this administration. I made it clear to the last
    administration as well. But I do hope that this administration
    decides to provide the assistance as soon as possible.
        Recently I have grown increasingly concerned about Russia's
    use of tactical drones to spot for artillery and advanced
    technology for communication and GPS jamming. What types of
    advanced technologies are the Russians using against Ukraine
    and in other places as well? Is there specific technology that
    we should be considering when we are providing Ukraine the
    opportunity to counter that technology?
        General Scaparrotti. Thank you, Senator.
        Actually in Ukraine what we see the Russians do is somewhat
    what they have done in Syria, and that is use the Ukrainian
    conflict as a place that they can test some of their new
    technologies or TTPs, and one of them, as you mentioned, is the
    sensor to shoot our linkages between weapon systems and the use
    of drones, et cetera. That is a problem that we are working on
    hard ourselves because we are seeing a proliferation of that
    not just with the Russians but in some limited ways as well
    with terrorists. So we are working those technologies. The work
    with Ukraine provides us an opportunity to test some of the
    things that we are doing as well. We simply need to make EW
    [Electronic Warfare] and those kinds of things available to
    them that can help counter what the Russian proxy forces are
    bringing to bear there.
        Senator Ernst. Absolutely. Thank you.
        You also mentioned that you were concerned about the
    stability in the Balkans. On Tuesday, Ambassador Burns joined
    us here and highlighted Russia's increasing influence in
    Serbia. Specifically he did mention the recent coup and
    assassination attempt in Montenegro that was orchestrated by
    the Russians in Belgrade. In light of that effort targeting
    NATO interest, do you think we should have a more robust
    presence in Kosovo as a means to deter the Russians in the
    Balkans?
        General Scaparrotti. Senator, I do. I have been to the
    Balkans several times in recent months primarily to learn more
    myself about the actual situation there, but also to bring
    focus to it. The Russians are active in undermining our efforts
    in the Balkans today, and we need to provide additional
    interagency focus. I think this is a matter of not just the
    military support with, say, the Kosovo security force, et
    cetera, which we have troops in. I think it is also a
    diplomatic and informational effort with us and importantly
    with our partners because, as you know, NATO and the EU have a
    large role to play in the Balkans as well today and lead many
    of these organizational efforts. So we all need to work
    together. The military is a part of it. On that point, I would
    say we should not reduce our force size particularly the Kosovo
    security force because it is kind of the bedrock of stability
    right now. But we do need a much more robust diplomatic/
    informational effort among the alliance there.
        Senator Ernst. Absolutely. I think everything should be on
    the table at this point in reassuring and assisting our allies,
    our friends in the Balkans.
        Then just very quickly, you have mentioned the cyber center
    and how great it is, the cyber center that we have in Estonia.
    I will be meeting with their ambassador later to discuss their
    cyber defense center of excellence. So I am really excited
    about that opportunity.
        Can you just tell me very briefly how well EUCOM and NATO
    are prepared to defend against cyber attacks, especially those
    that are aimed at disrupting the elections that we will see
    ongoing in Europe?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, first of all, within EUCOM I
    think we are postured well to deal with cyber. Cyber Command
    works very closely with us, and literally it is a dynamic
    relationship because within the cyber domain, things change so
    rapidly. We just had our exercise here last month, we had an
    element from Cyber Command that acted as a component per se in
    EUCOM reporting directly to me. I think we are modernizing, we
    are moving forward. We have got good support. We have got a lot
    of work to do particularly in capacity.
        Within NATO, NATO recently determined that cyber was a
    domain at the Warsaw Summit. That was important because what it
    did is it provided direction to work doctrine and policy in a
    much fuller way which is the commander within NATO I need, and
    it gave me authorities to do more within cyber in NATO, which
    we need to do. So on the defensive side, pretty good. Beyond
    that, we are at the beginning of this in terms of NATO complete
    cyber capability.
        Senator Ernst. I do hope that is something that we can work
    on with them.
        Thank you for your great service, sir. Thank you.
        Chairman McCain [presiding]. Senator Warren?
        Senator Warren. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you for being here, General.
        I want to quickly ask about the importance of our non-
    military foreign assistance to your mission. When you appeared
    before this committee last year for your nomination as EUCOM
    Commander, you said--and I am going to quote you here--I
    strongly support the collaborative interagency approach. In my
    experience, it takes a network with all required agencies to
    defeat a threat network.
        So, General, do you still agree with that statement?
        General Scaparrotti. I do, absolutely.
        Senator Warren. The budget proposal put out by the Trump
    administration last week calls for a 29 percent cut to the
    State Department and significant cuts to other agencies with
    international responsibilities. General, would funding cuts to
    agencies that conduct diplomacy and development make your job
    as EUCOM Commander easier or more difficult?
        General Scaparrotti. It will make the job more difficult. I
    rely heavily on our relationships with the other agencies in
    our government. Within my headquarters, my POLAD is essentially
    one of my deputies, Ambassador Elliott. That gives you an
    example of the importance we place on it in EUCOM. Many of the
    things I have talked about this morning, counter-transnational
    terrorism--that is predominantly agency personnel from State
    and Treasury. It is not uniformed personnel that do those
    actions for EUCOM in the United States and Europe.
        Senator Warren. Thank you, General. I agree strongly on
    this.
        Russia is actively working to destabilize countries along
    its border and undermine unity within the European Union and
    NATO. They are doing this through a lot of indirect tactics
    like enabling separatist forces and disseminating propaganda
    and fake news. They even launched a cyber attack to influence
    the results of our election recently.
        But Russia is also investing in other kinds of asymmetric
    capabilities like disrupting communications through electronic
    warfare or working to evade United States and NATO surveillance
    and investing in space and cyber tools. According to press
    reports and arms control analysis, they violated the
    Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty by deploying ground-
    launched cruise missiles.
        The European Reassurance Initiative, ERI, has helped to
    counter some of these destabilizing activities. The United
    States has deployed equipment and rotated forces into Central
    and Eastern Europe, but I am wondering if this standard display
    of force is the best way to deter Russia now that Putin seems
    to rely more on indirect tactics.
        What I want to ask, General, is let us set aside
    conventional forces and prepositioned equipment for just a
    second, that it is there. What more can we do through ERI to
    address Putin's indirect and asymmetric tactics?
        General Scaparrotti. Through ERI, we are actually using
    these funds in some of the areas for the asymmetric activities
    to counter those malign influences. We have special operations
    forces that are supported by this that do military information
    support operations and activities in support of U.S.
    Government, particularly the embassy and the ambassadors in
    each of the countries. It supports us as well in cyber in
    operations. In other ways, there are means that perhaps--for
    instance, support in naval forces are seen as a ship, et
    cetera, but they are actually supporting those capabilities and
    those ships support us in other ways in terms of asymmetric
    means. So I agree with you, and we do have a focus on that.
        I would last say that part of this is we are learning too.
    I mean, part of that effort through ERI is to make sure we
    understand how they operate in this gray zone or hybrid
    activity. That is supported here as well.
        Senator Warren. Thank you very much, General. I think we
    need to be smart about responding to and deterring Russia's
    asymmetric aggression. It seems to me that we cannot think
    solely about deploying more troops and conventional military
    assets in Europe in order to counter Russia. We have got to
    have a very wide perspective on this. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Wicker?
        Senator Wicker. General, you mentioned on page 8 of your
    testimony the ceasefire violations in Ukraine, that the
    majority of them are being committed by Russian-led forces.
    Senator Warren mentioned fake news. How helpful are the OSCE
    monitors in giving us the correct picture there? Then I have a
    couple of other questions about OSCE.
        General Scaparrotti. Senator, thank you.
        OSCE is very important to this. One of the issues is that
    their job is to monitor activities and compliance with the
    agreement on both sides of the line of contact. In fact,
    Russia--it is well known that they intimidate and restrict the
    mission monitors in their job, which is one of the things that
    we need to encourage and insist that Russia stop doing and
    begin to allow the OSCE to do its job properly.
        Senator Wicker. What can we do in that respect?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, I think in that respect, sir, we
    need to bring the international community together with respect
    to Russia and their lack of movement on the Minsk. They say
    publicly they are in support of the Minsk agreement, but
    personally I think if you watch their actions, there does not
    seem to be steps taken on their part to do just that.
        Senator Wicker. They are doing a lot of exercises there and
    in all of Europe. One of the techniques they use to try to get
    around their commitments is the SNAP exercise designation. Can
    you tell us about that?
        General Scaparrotti. These exercises reflect Putin's focus
    on his modernization. It reflects his intent to make their
    forces more responsive to improve their mobilization, but it
    also is a part of intimidation I would say.
        The SNAP exercises themselves are typically broadcast as
    much smaller than they end up being. Some of them are not
    announced at all in contravention to the Vienna document and
    the treaties that we have there. So that is very disturbing,
    and it is a way that you can have miscalculation. We know in
    the past, at least with Crimea, they have used an exercise to
    shield what was a violation of the sovereignty of Ukraine.
        Senator Wicker. But they also continue to do exercises in
    Crimea. What is the significance of the most recent Russian
    exercise in Crimea?
        General Scaparrotti. To me the significance is that--well,
    there are several of them. One is that they do both defensive
    and offensive operations as a part of that SNAP exercise. They
    rehearsed attacks on the eastern border, actually flew toward
    it, those kinds of activities which are very disturbing and
    create a lot of angst along the eastern border and within EUCOM
    being able to watch this and understand what is their real
    intent. So it is the way they run the operations and without
    transparency that creates the problem.
        They have the right to do military exercises. They need to
    do them in a way that is constructive and aligned with our
    agreements.
        Senator Wicker. But they do not have a right to do the no-
    notice exercises under their agreements.
        General Scaparrotti. Under the agreement, it has to be
    announced if it is over 9,000 troops, and it has to be observed
    if it is 13,000 or more. There has to be an allowance for
    observers if we choose to do so. Their SNAP exercises are much,
    much larger than that, almost 100,000 if you take them in all
    the different exercises that happen simultaneously.
        Senator Wicker. Should we be concerned about trends in
    Russian activity in the North Atlantic?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, we should. They are more
    aggressive. They are reestablishing bases in the Arctic and
    North Atlantic. We have to go back to establishing the same
    deterrence that we practiced during the Cold War in my view.
        Senator Wicker. Is there a forum where we are engaging with
    them diplomatically about that?
        General Scaparrotti. I do not know the forum personally. I
    know that we have engaged with them diplomatically, but I could
    not tell you the forum, sir.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Hirono?
        Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General, you have mentioned several times the importance of
    the whole-of-government approach particularly to reassure our
    NATO allies and your concern that the contemplated cuts to the
    State Department, for example, and the Treasury Department by
    this administration would raise major concerns for you, also
    shared by Secretary Mattis. Is that concern that you express
    shared by our other combatant commanders?
        General Scaparrotti. Senator, I would say that you would
    have to ask them directly for their own personal opinion, but I
    will answer it this way. We operate with our interagency, and
    most of what we do today, even in the more direct actions that
    we have taken in, say, Afghanistan or Iraq have relied upon an
    interagency approach, a whole-of-government approach. That is
    the way we traditionally operate.
        Senator Hirono. It sounds as though that your concern or
    your commitment to the importance of a whole-of-government
    approach is one that is shared by our other commanders.
        You mentioned that there is a possibility, of course, of
    Russia's use of nuclear weapons, and there is always that
    possibility. But on the other hand, Russia has cyber capability
    that can be very effective, and one wonders why they should
    resort to conventional warfare if they can use cyber to do all
    kinds of damage. So, for example, Russia is currently
    conducting cyber operations in various countries, such as the
    Ukraine, Montenegro, by attacking military communications and
    secure databases, as well as power grids. In addition, they are
    using fake news and information operations to impact elections
    across the globe. This has magnified a wave of populist
    nationalism in Europe and impacted the recent United States
    elections.
        I think that you mentioned or you described that you are
    working with our allies to create a defensive approach to the
    cyber operations that Russia has deployed.
        I am wondering, though, has the question of what the U.S.
    would do if Russia's activities in affecting and disrupting the
    elections of our NATO allies, whether the question has come up
    where at some point we would say that these kinds of cyber
    attacks rise to the level of an act of war that would trigger
    reaction from us to support our NATO allies.
        General Scaparrotti. Senator, that is a matter of policy,
    but I think we are a member of NATO. NATO has said that article
    5 could be triggered by a cyber event. We are a member of that.
    So I think there is the occasion that that could occur. But,
    again, what we would do and what level that would be that would
    create a response is a policy decision.
        Senator Hirono. Something that we need to definitely
    discuss at the policy level.
        I think you mentioned in response to another question
    regarding our mil-to-mil communications with Russia that we do
    not necessarily want to reward their bad behavior. I am
    wondering, based on your communication with the administration,
    do you know what the administration's position is on the
    current Russian sanctions? Would rescinding these sanctions
    affect stability in Europe in your view?
        General Scaparrotti. I have not had the discussion with my
    leadership on the sanctions, Senator. I think that we must
    retain the sanctions. We put them in place as a result of their
    annexation of Crimea. It is another way that we, both the
    United States and the alliance in Europe, strongly show that
    that is unacceptable and we will maintain strength in the face
    of Russia's activities.
        Senator Hirono. So would any kind of cutting back on those
    sanctions not signal some kind of a retreat or weakness on the
    part of our U.S. commitment to NATO, for example?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, I think personally that if we
    were to relieve or cut back on those, Putin would see that as a
    very good thing, and it would reward him standing fast long
    enough to perhaps survive the sanctions themselves.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Senator McCaskill [presiding]. I am the acting chairman
    right now, and I have the pleasure of calling on myself.
        I am going to say for the record what needs to be said
    here, and that is that if we want to send the right signal to
    Russia, all of the work that we are doing, that you and your
    command are doing, which is so important, is an integral piece
    of that. All of the work we do with our allies in Europe is an
    integral piece of that. But a big piece of it is having a
    Commander in Chief that will say that right things to Russia.
    We do not have a Commander in Chief right now who is willing to
    say out loud what everyone knows about Putin and what he is
    doing in Europe and what he tried to do in the United States.
    Until we have a Commander in Chief that is willing to speak out
    against this thug and his behavior, I do not know that all the
    great work that you and your command can do is ever going to
    move the needle enough.
        I have said it, and I feel better. You do not have to say a
    word, not your place to say a word. I understand the role of
    the Commander in Chief in your life. But I wanted to say it and
    put it on the record.
        I was in Estonia. I would like to talk a little bit about
    what is going on in other places in nontraditional warfare. I
    was in Estonia last summer, and I was shocked how many
    Estonians told me--you know, we went to a coffee shop and we
    were talking to those who spoke English. They were saying how
    they really wanted to be part of NATO, but they were worried
    about the NATO soldiers being able to rape the citizens of
    Estonia and not be held legally accountable. I, of course,
    went, what?
        As it turns out, this is the other thing Russia is doing,
    that Russia is pushing propaganda through Estonia that NATO is
    somehow going to damage their sovereignty in terms of the
    enforcement of rule of law.
        Could you speak to that, General, that method that they use
    to try to undermine the support of NATO in the countries that
    they have designs on?
        General Scaparrotti. You stated it clearly. In fact, we are
    now in NATO--the first forces are going into the four nations,
    Estonia being one of them. We have already had a couple of
    incidents of just complete untruth--the incident never
    occurred--within days of the troops arriving. We prepared for
    this. We expected it. We were able to respond to those
    truthfully and quickly and debunk the false story. But it is
    something that I expect will continue.
        As you said, it obviously has--their disinformation
    obviously has some influence. If there is a consistent message
    from Russia in the east, it is to undercut the credibility of
    the United States and NATO at large, consistently.
        Senator McCaskill. Do we have a robust enough response to
    this kind of disinformation campaign? Are we focusing enough on
    this part of the warfare?
        General Scaparrotti. I think we are focused on it. I do not
    think we have a robust enough response at this point. I think
    we have to, both as the U.S. and also as allies, come together
    and take a more aggressive confrontation of Russia particularly
    in this gray area.
        Senator McCaskill. Yes. I would certainly hope that would
    be on NATO's agenda as to strategies moving forward to combat
    this kind of insidious disinformation that really does
    strengthen the efforts of Russia to use military might to
    intimidate and eventually move into countries that have no
    desire to be occupied.
        I also want to take a brief moment to talk about something
    I am like a broken record on and that is OCO [Overseas
    Contingency Operations]. The Congressional Research Service
    recently published an extensive report on OCO funding, and it
    states the obvious that those of us who are on this committee
    are painfully aware of, that this began truly for a contingency
    after 9/11 and has now morphed into something very ugly off the
    books in that we now have the European Reassurance Initiative
    in the OCO budget. We now even have base budgeting in the OCO
    budget.
        Talk, if you will, from your perspective, as you are asked
    to draw up your financial needs for your command, how you all
    are making a decision inside the Pentagon what you put in OCO
    and what you put in the base budget.
        General Scaparrotti. Well, ma'am, for instance, I will
    start with EUCOM. We have the outline of the use of ERI, what
    it is intended to do based on Congress' direction. I have a
    process where my component commands, the other services, make
    recommendations for funding in ERI. I have a board that
    eventually comes to me for a decision that, first of all, asks
    the question, is that in support of the intent of ERI, and if
    not, why is it in here. We will push it off to the base budget.
    Or even those areas where I think, you know what, that is a
    broader activity we are funding. It really ought to be in the
    base, not in ERI. So I have that system myself within EUCOM,
    and we draw that line hard because we appreciate ERI. We want
    to maintain the credibility of it and how we use it. It is
    fundamental to doing our job in EUCOM.
        Within OSD, there is a very deliberate process run by the
    DepSecDef and the Vice Chairman that all of us as combatant
    commands take part in. It is very detailed in terms of a look
    at each command and what we propose for a budget, what we
    intend to put in, and it looks at a cross section, as well, a
    comparison of each other. So it is a deliberate process.
        I would just say that I am in favor of moving funds into
    the base. We need predictable funding----
        Senator McCaskill. Right.
        General Scaparrotti.--so that we can actually make longer-
    term decisions and have more continuity. That would be better I
    think for the force as a whole as well.
        Senator McCaskill. This would be a good time for us to have
    the discipline, as the President has presented a budget that
    is--frankly, it is not a huge increase in the military. I think
    he is trying to make everybody believe it is a big increase to
    the military. I think it is only three percent higher than what
    President Obama recommended in his budget. But nonetheless, it
    is an increase. When everything else is getting cut, I think
    this would be a good time for us to bite the bullet--pardon the
    use of that particular analogy, but I think it would be time
    for us to be honest with the American people and put all of
    these items into the base budget so the American people
    understand what we are spending on the military as it compares
    to other parts of our budget.
        I thank you for your service. I thank all of the men and
    women who serve under your command. I think you have got a
    really important job now. I understand the importance of what
    you do now has been exacerbated by what Russia has done over
    the last 12 months and what they continue to do in democracies
    across the world. We are depending on you to be our front line
    eyes and ears to their aggression. I thank you very much.
        Chairman McCain [presiding]. Senator Blumenthal?
        Senator Blumenthal, Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to join in thanking you and the men and women under
    your command for their service in a critical area of the world
    for us and our national security.
        I understand you have just come back from a trip to Israel,
    and I would like to ask you what security concerns the Israelis
    raised with you, focusing specifically on the Iranian
    development, continuing development, of their ballistic
    missiles.
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir. Well, first of all, Israel
    is an extremely close ally of ours, a special ally. We in EUCOM
    have an excellent relationship with them. It is nearly daily
    contact. One of my missions is support of Israel and their
    defense.
        As I visited, their CHOD and I and their senior leaders
    obviously talked about their concerns about Iranian malign
    influence, as well as their missile capabilities. We work
    closely with them to support and complement their missile
    defense, for instance. In fact, one day of that trip, I met
    their air missile defense commander and went to look at some of
    their sites to ensure that we in EUCOM were supporting that
    fully.
        Beyond that, we discussed, for instance, their concern
    about Hezbollah and fighters gaining experience in Syria and
    other places and returning and what that might mean in the
    future, a concern about, obviously, Syria and the tri-border
    region as the conflict in Syria continues. So they live in a
    very tough neighborhood, and you can look in nearly every
    direction and have a threat.
        Senator Blumenthal, Is there more that we can and should be
    doing to strengthen their defenses against that kind of missile
    threat?
        General Scaparrotti. Senator, we are doing all that we can.
    I mean, we work with this closely to ensure that we do, in
    fact, reinforce their defense. In fact, there are more things
    we can do with their missile defense. We have people there this
    week working on that as well. I mean, it is a matter of
    modernization, change in environment. But we are doing that. To
    maintain their military edge is very, very important and also
    to maintain the war stocks that we have committed to them for
    use.
        Senator Blumenthal, But there is more that we can do and we
    are doing it.
        General Scaparrotti. We are, and we are focused on support
    of Israel.
        Senator Blumenthal, I take it, speaking of ballistic
    missiles, that you would agree with General Selva who testified
    earlier this week during the House Armed Services Committee
    that Russia is violating the INF Treaty.
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, I agree.
        Senator Blumenthal, I think in your testimony you used the
    word ``concerning.'' This is an extraordinarily important area.
    Is it not?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir, it is. It is an enhancement
    in capability that has a direct impact throughout the theater
    from my perspective.
        Senator Blumenthal, That is because, as you put it well in
    your testimony, it increases Putin's asymmetric options as this
    missile capability is built. The whole reason that the treaty
    exists is to stop this kind of development because it threatens
    to destabilize the whole confrontation--not confrontation, but
    the array of forces in that part of the world. Correct?
        General Scaparrotti. That is correct.
        Senator Blumenthal, Have you made recommendations as to
    what we should be doing about it?
        General Scaparrotti. I have made recommendations in the
    sense that we need to respond to this. We need to be strong in
    the face of it. I think the actions that we have recommended in
    EUCOM, in terms of posture, force structure, et cetera, are all
    a part of this, a part of the response that we need to have for
    Russia at large.
        Senator Blumenthal, Is there consideration, to the extent
    you may know of it, about additional diplomatic or military
    action that the administration may be taking to counter this
    threat to our security?
        General Scaparrotti. At this time, I have not had that
    discussion yet with that specific topic in terms of policy
    actions or actions that might be taken.
        Senator Blumenthal, Have you any expectation that that
    discussion will occur?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, I do.
        Senator Blumenthal, Can you give us a general time frame?
        General Scaparrotti. No, I cannot, but I would expect we
    will have it. Yes, sir.
        Senator Blumenthal, Well, I would urge that it be done
    sooner rather than later. With all due respect, I am not nearly
    as well informed as you, but I am extremely alarmed by this
    violation of the INF Treaty and what it represents
    strategically in that part of the world and what it reflects in
    the way of Russian intentions around the world. Thank you,
    General.
        General Scaparrotti. Thank you, sir.
        Senator Blumenthal, Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Apparently Senator King has not had
    enough.
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Fortunately, your
    microphone was off for the editorial comment.
        General, a couple of quick questions. Do you consider RT,
    Russia Television, an agent of the Russian Government?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, I do, sir.
        Senator King. It is my understanding that not only are they
    using RT in Europe, but they are also sniffing around or, in
    fact, looking into acquisitions of commercial television and
    radio capacity in Europe.
        General Scaparrotti. That is correct. I have been told in a
    number of countries that they are using fronts, but essentially
    buying local TV, and in one case recently, a social media
    network that is influential particularly with the young in the
    Baltics.
        Senator King. When you say buying local TV, you are talking
    about TV stations, not airtime.
        General Scaparrotti. That is right. They are buying TV
    stations and a social network company that does work on social
    media.
        Senator King. This is one more area of their what I
    consider very effective playing of a weak hand. They are
    aggressing upon us at a low dollar cost, but aggression
    nonetheless.
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir. I agree.
        Senator King. Different subject. Iceland. I was in Iceland
    recently, and it struck me as an incredible strategic location.
    Keflavik air base was dismantled--or not dismantled. It is
    still there, but it was deactivated around 2004 or 2005. It
    strikes me that this is such a strategic location. Do you
    believe that we should at least consider, subject to the
    approval of the people of Iceland, some reconstitution of our
    capacity there? I know we have rotational forces there but
    something more than that.
        General Scaparrotti. Senator, we do have rotational forces
    through there, but I think we should consider it. Again, it
    comes back to my concern about the high north, North Atlantic,
    and the increasing Russian threat from the North Atlantic fleet
    there. So that area is important to us to increase our
    activities with our allies to ensure that we deter Russia and
    we are very knowledgeable of their activities as well.
        Senator King. It struck me as a large, unsinkable aircraft
    carrier in the midst of the most strategic spot in the North
    Atlantic.
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir.
        Senator King. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator King, I met with the President of
    Iceland, and I know that General Scaparrotti has too. We have a
    PR [Public Relations] challenge there as well with the people
    of Iceland. Is that not true, General?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, I believe we do. I think NATO
    could do more work there as well in terms of perspective or
    receptiveness, Senator.
        Chairman McCain. They would be more receptive if it were a
    NATO kind of commitment rather than just the United States.
        General Scaparrotti. Well, in discussions, that is what has
    been discussed with me as the SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander
    Europe].
        Chairman McCain. Well, I thank you, General, and I
    appreciate, obviously, the important information you have
    provided the committee.
        I would just like to mention again what Senator King
    brought up, and that is this whole issue of this information
    warfare that is going on right now is something that crosses a
    lot of boundaries between State and Defense and intelligence
    and other agencies of government. Yet, every time I turn around
    and talk particularly to one of the smaller countries, that is
    one of their biggest issues is this propaganda that the
    Russians--and fake news, et cetera, ranging from what their
    obvious attempts at changing the outcome of the French election
    to the pressure on Latvia to alienate their Russian speaking
    population. So I hope we will move that issue up on our
    priority list. It seems to me it is kind of like the weather.
    We talk about it but we really do not do anything about it.
        There is a precedent for it. It was called the Cold War.
    How many people do we know that after The Wall came down who
    said I listened to Radio Free Europe? I listened to the Voice
    of America. It kept hope alive. Why can we not reconstitute
    something along those lines to get the message out? I do not
    think it would be hard to counter Russian propaganda given the
    kind of lifestyle they have in Russia.
        So I hope you will think about it, and we will continue to
    think about it. But whenever you get one of these issues that
    involves more than one agency of government, as you know, we
    have much more difficulty, whether it be cyber, or whether it
    be this information challenge that we are facing now.
        So we thank you, General, for visiting with us again and
    thanks for the great work. Senator King will come to Brussels
    and spend time with you as well. Thank you.
        General Scaparrotti. Thank you, Chairman. My privilege.
        [Whereupon, at 11:35 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                   Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
    colocation of the nato intelligence fusion center (nifc) with the eucom
                   joint intelligence assessment cell (jiac)
        1. Senator McCain. General Scaparrotti, hybrid threats challenge
    the NATO political decision making process because they obfuscate
    attribution. What is your assessment of intelligence sharing in NATO
    and what steps can be taken to improve it?
        General Scaparrotti. The quality and quantity of intelligence
    sharing between allies and NATO varies based on national interests and
    capabilities. There are a number of examples of timely and high quality
    intelligence sharing, such as in Afghanistan and Kosovo. Sharing within
    military organizations and Allied Command Operations is robust.
    However, even in the military spectrum, there are high interest areas
    that suffer from a dearth of intelligence sharing. There is also
    significant room for system based virtual collaboration tools to
    improve sharing of NATO products within the U.S. intelligence community
    that would allow more efficient IC exploitation of NATO intelligence
    collection and production. Encouraging nations to share intelligence
    with NATO is a persistent effort. Allies have varying levels of
    capacity and interoperability of systems to share national intel with
    NATO. NATO intelligence production is conducted on both BICES and the
    NATO Secret Wide Area Network (NSWAN), but often, the systems are
    unable to access the other systems data. NATO is hampered with an
    inability to organize, search and discover existing intelligence
    information within the NATO intel system. There is also no central
    designated management authority for that responsibility between the
    civilian and military sides of NATO. This includes RFIs, collection,
    and significant portions of production by NATO elements. Finally,
    outdated processes and system verification of U.S. ``read-ons'' to NATO
    SECRET limits efficient sharing of NATO data back to the U.S.
    Government and thus limits the effectiveness of sharing between the
    U.S. and NATO. Potential Areas for Improvement:

          Encourage allies with robust intelligence capabilities to
    contribute to NATO commensurate with capability.
          Ensure expanded use of BICES and that NSWAN workstations
    are cross-domain enabled.
          Central management and a more organized RFI process
    across NATO. The improvement of tools to allow more robust discovery of
    existing RFIs, finished production, and other structured intelligence
    data is necessary to prevent duplication and lack of access of
    available relevant information.
          Quicker implementation of a PKI-enabled solutions to
    allow those with access to NATO SECRET to access NATO-produced
    intelligence production on U.S. classified networks.

        2. Senator McCain. General Scaparrotti, in the preface to the book
    by General Sir Richard Shirreff, former Deputy SACEUR, titled ``War
    with Russia'', he wrote: ``Back in March 2014, there was a sense of
    incredulity among us western military leaders when it became
    increasingly clear that the ``annexation'' of Crimea was no less than a
    Russian invasion . . . In the days that followed we received regular
    updates from NATO's Intelligence Fusion Centre, as they listed the
    Russian tank armies and airborne divisions now preparing to invade the
    rest of Ukraine.'' It sounds like the NATO Intelligence Fusion Center
    was a vital source of intelligence during the Ukraine crisis in 2014.
    In your opinion and experience, why is the NATO Intelligence Fusion
    Cell important to NATO?
        General Scaparrotti. As a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
    organization, the NIFC operates outside of the NATO Command Structure,
    which allows it greater flexibility than other NATO intelligence
    organizations. The agility of the organization to provide timely
    intelligence and establish a common picture facilitates NATOs ability
    to detect and understand the geopolitical and military challenges in a
    complex and dynamic environment. Additionally, the NIFC's unique
    position as an international military headquarters outside the NATO
    command structure allows the NIFC to serve as a hub for coalition
    intelligence production. In this capacity the NIFC acts as a center for
    Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination (PED) of all-source
    intelligence production. Outside of Operation RESOLUTE SUPPORT, NIFC
    intelligence production has accounted for a majority of all NATO
    intelligence enterprise production over the past twelve months. The
    NIFC is the principle producer of GEOINT and targeting intelligence for
    Allied Command Operations. The NIFC continues to build capacity through
    sharing of tradecraft, process and methodology, enhancing
    interoperability and enabling intelligence sharing amongst allies and
    NATO partners.

        3. Senator McCain. General Scaparrotti, why is it important that
    the NATO Intelligence Fusion Cell be collocated with EUCOM's Joint
    Intelligence Analysis Center? What is lost if it is not collocated with
    the Joint Intelligence Analysis Center?
        General Scaparrotti. There are several reasons why it is important
    for the NATO Intelligence Fusion Center (NIFC) to remain collocated
    with the EUCOM Joint Intelligence Analysis Center (JIAC). If NIFC were
    to relocate independent from the JIAC, it would require the U.S., as
    the framework nation, to spend additional money to replicate the
    administrative and operational support presently provided. At a
    minimum, the U.S. would be required to re-create, and in some cases
    replicate, operational and administrative capabilities. NIFC relocation
    to an alternate facility would require increased manpower to sustain
    operations. NIFC relocation outside of the UK would require the
    consensus of all Allied nations, as well as legal and treaty
    negotiations with a new host nation. From an operational standpoint,
    collocation is a key enabler for U.S.-NATO intelligence collaboration.
    This includes promotion of U.S.-NATO intelligence interoperability,
    shared views of common threats, enhanced intelligence sharing,
    federation and burden-sharing, as well as smooth operational transition
    from unilateral/multilateral to NATO operations. Separating the NIFC
    from the JIAC and other collocated intelligence elements within the
    JIAC would degrade these operational advantages and require additional
    investment by the U.S. to replicate the core support capabilities and
    infrastructure.
                  u.s. force structure requirements in europe
        4. Senator McCain. General Scaparrotti, General Breedlove told the
    committee last year that: `` . . . our current force posture in Europe
    has been based on Russia as a strategic partner . . . '' This year your
    written testimony said: `` . . . the ground force permanently assigned
    to EUCOM is inadequate to meet the combatant command's directed mission
    to deter Russia from further aggression.'' In your opinion, what
    changes must we make to our current military posture in Europe to
    adjust to the current threat reality?
        General Scaparrotti. EUCOM force posture must continue to adapt to
    meet the complex and dynamic strategic challenges in our security
    environment. As I stated in my testimony, this means developing a
    relevant force structure across multiple domains and warfighting
    functions. We need additional Intelligence, Surveillance and
    Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, not only additional platforms, but
    the ability to analyze and disseminate their intelligence information.
    We also need additional land force capabilities, most notably a
    division-sized armor presence that includes a headquarters element;
    enablers such as fires, engineering, and combat aviation; and
    preposition equipment sets. Our naval capabilities must also increase,
    especially in anti-submarine warfare. We need to enhance our integrated
    air and missile defense to meet the strategic challenge of countering
    Russia's growing anti-access area denial capabilities. Lastly, we need
    to modernize and increase our munition stockpiles as our planning and
    targeting processes mature.

        5. Senator McCain. General Scaparrotti, NATO's missile defense was
    designed only to stop Iranian missiles. Do we need a reevaluation of
    European air and missile defense against Russia?
        General Scaparrotti. EUCOM views Russia as a significant threat
    with mature and growing capabilities to conduct comprehensive and
    coordinated attacks in our AOR. To counter this we should reevaluate
    ways to address our air defense capability gaps against advanced
    Russian air and cruise missile threats, but only in ways which will not
    destabilize the region geopolitically. EUCOM supports current U.S.
    national defense policy for Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD).

                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Jim Inhofe
                         u.s. force structure in europe
        6. Senator Inhofe. General Scaparrotti, EUCOM has been described as
    a lily pad, a forward staging area for multiple COCOMs to include
    EUCOM, AFRICOM, CENTCOM and PACOM. Is that true and why?
        General Scaparrotti. EUCOM's role in enabling global operations for
    not only the Geographic Combatant Commanders but also TRANSCOM,
    STRATCOM and SOCOM is pivotal for the efficient execution of worldwide
    military operations. EUCOM personnel routinely support operations in
    the AFRICOM and CENTCOM areas of responsibility. EUCOM's well-developed
    infrastructure provides critical capabilities in strategic locations
    like Incirlik, Turkey; Sigonella, Italy; Souda Bay, Greece; and Moron
    and Rota, Spain. Basing and access in many European countries (e.g.,
    Germany, UK, Italy, Spain, Greece, and Turkey) enable more timely and
    coordinated trans-regional crisis response.

        7. Senator Inhofe. General Scaparrotti, is a rotational force as
    effective and efficient as a deterrent force as permanent basing?
        General Scaparrotti. For the challenges we face in the EUCOM
    theater, no, permanent force structure is preferred over rotational
    forces. The Department of Defense evaluates numerous factors, such as
    operational requirements, costs, force management, readiness and
    political-military relationships, in their deliberations of whether to
    permanently station or rotationally deploy forces to a Combatant
    Commander. Numerous benefits would accrue to having additional
    permanent forces structure in Europe:
        1)  Increase operational flexibility and responsiveness;
        2)  Provide persistent presence for deterrence and response;
        3)  Enable dynamic presence for other Combatant Commands;
        4)  Enhance habitual relationships and interoperability with allies
    and partners;
        5)  Improve coalition partner capacity;
        6)  Demonstrate U.S. commitment and resolve;
        7)  Ensure access and bases for global operations;
        8)  Enable U.S. leadership of the NATO Alliance; and
        9)  Decrease costs associated with Operations and Maintenance and
    sustaining readiness of rotational forces.

        8. Senator Inhofe. General Scaparrotti, do you support permanent
    basing and additional infrastructure in Europe and specifically Eastern
    Europe? If so, what would that look like?
        General Scaparrotti. I support additional basing of U.S. Forces in
    Europe. Current U.S. national policy prohibits the permanent basing of
    U.S. Forces in parts of Eastern Europe due to the NATO-Russia Founding
    Act. Rotational U.S. and Allied forces in Eastern Europe provides a
    level of deterrence, posturing and assurance without violating U.S.,
    NATO and international agreements. Our efforts to provide the austere
    infrastructure in Eastern Europe is to support rotational U.S. forces.
    The European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) program is the current
    funding tool to improve infrastructure in Eastern Europe, both in
    support of rotational presence and to provide infrastructure
    capabilities that may be needed in a crisis.

        9. Senator Inhofe. General Scaparrotti, what concrete steps do you
    think need to be taken to change our force posture in Europe to deter
    Russia?
        General Scaparrotti. To change the force posture in Europe, we
    would need to establish whether we are going to rely on permanent or
    rotational forces, or a mix of the two. Based on that policy decision,
    I believe we need to develop the right mixture of permanent and fully-
    resourced heel-to-toe rotational forces in the various combat domains.
    In the land domain I believe we need a Division's worth of armored
    ground power, in addition to the two brigades presently stationed in
    Europe (the 173 Airborne Brigade Combat Team and the 2nd Cavalry
    Regiment). Additionally, a division headquarters element is required in
    theater, along with enablers such as fires, engineering, and combat
    aviation to support an armored division. Finally, the requisite
    preposition equipment sets are necessary for rapid deployment of combat
    capability into the European theater. In the sea domain, our naval
    capabilities must also increase, especially in anti-submarine warfare.
    We need to enhance our integrated air and missile defense to meet the
    strategic challenge of countering Russia's growing anti-access area
    denial (A2AD) capabilities. In the air domain we need to ensure we have
    air assets with the ability to defeat Russian A2AD systems. EUCOM needs
    to modernize and increase our munition stockpiles as our planning and
    targeting processes mature. Finally, EUCOM needs additional
    Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance capabilities, not only
    additional platforms, but the ability to analyze and disseminate their
    intelligence information.

        10. Senator Inhofe. General Scaparrotti, would it be useful to
    fully exercise NATO's ability to mobilize for combat in Europe, similar
    to what NATO used to do with its REFORGER Exercise from 1967 to 1993,
    to fully task NATO's combat capabilities and identify shortfalls?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, NATO, including the U.S. forces that
    support NATO, should more fully exercise the ability to mobilize for
    combat in Europe. Exercising Allied capabilities alongside the U.S. is
    absolutely central to this effort. ERI has allowed EUCOM to exercise
    more U.S. forces on the European continent. One recent example is the
    Baltic exercise SABER STRIKE 2017 where 22 allies and partners
    participated. In addition to NATO and partner exercises, ERI is also
    facilitating U.S. units' deployment to Europe to train and exercise
    with NATO's Very High Readiness Joint Task Force in that unit's
    training and validation events. Finally, as EUCOM rotates forces into
    Europe, it is actively sharing its Joint Reception, Staging, Onward
    Movement, and Integration lessons learned with allies to help inform
    NATO's own efforts to improve mobilization, mobility and freedom of
    movement across Alliance territory.
                          russia inf treaty violation
        11. Senator Inhofe. General Scaparrotti, on 8 March, General Selva,
    the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, confirmed that Russia
    is deploying nuclear-tipped ground-launched cruise missiles in
    violation of the 1987 INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) Treaty.
    And you reaffirmed that violation in your opening statement. This is
    the same missile that was tested in 2014 in violation of the INF
    Treaty. These missiles will add to existing Russian nuclear capable
    air- and sea-launched cruise missiles that can range most of Europe and
    the United States when launched off bombers and submarines. General
    Scaparrotti, what should be the U.S. response to their violation?
        General Scaparrotti. Russia's violation of the INF Treaty is but
    one example of their malaign military activity, and the U.S. should use
    all elements of its national power to respond strongly to this INF
    Treaty violation. The Treaty has a provision for a Special Verification
    Commission to resolve questions of compliance. When asked by the
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I will provide my best military
    advice. As you know, the Department of Defense is in the infancy stages
    of conducting its comprehensive Nuclear Posture Review as directed by
    the President in his 27 January 2017 memorandum on Rebuilding the U.S.
    Armed Forces. I am confident the review will yield a posture
    recommendation that ensures our nuclear deterrent addresses the Russian
    nuclear situation, and other 21st Century threats while maintaining our
    support to friends and allies.

        12. Senator Inhofe. General Scaparrotti, what is the military
    advantage provided to Russia by the deployment of these missiles?
        General Scaparrotti. Russia is developing intermediate-range
    missiles systems, such as the SSC-X-8 ground-launched cruise missile
    and the SS-X-28 ballistic missile, to strike critical infrastructure
    throughout Europe and Asia from behind Russia's air defense umbrella.
    These systems allow Russia to conduct strategic strikes at the same
    time reducing the vulnerability to counterattack.

        13. Senator Inhofe. General Scaparrotti, given the threats posed by
    Russian nuclear cruise missiles and other short-range nuclear systems,
    do you believe U.S. and NATO nuclear forces are adequate to counter
    Russian nuclear threats and strategy while assuring allies?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, the U.S. and NATO nuclear deterrent
    posture is credible against the Russian threat. The U.S. strategic
    nuclear forces are the supreme guarantee of the security of the
    Alliance and ensure our ability to respond to Russian nuclear
    developments. In Europe, the combination of modern dual-capable
    aircraft, reliable forward-deployed B61 nuclear weapons, and NATO
    supporting infrastructure assures our allies of continued U.S. support
    for nuclear deterrence in Europe.
                     anti-access, area denial capabilities
        14. Senator Inhofe. General Scaparrotti, Russia is developing Anti-
    Access and Area Denial, or `A2-AD', capacity in Kaliningrad, Crimea,
    and the Eastern Mediterranean Sea. General Scaparrotti, what is your
    assessment of Russian military modernization efforts and what worries
    you most?
        General Scaparrotti. [Deleted.]

        15. Senator Inhofe. General Scaparrotti, in your opinion, what
    should or can NATO do to counter it?
        General Scaparrotti. NATO will require adding new capabilities and
    increase readiness levels to counter the advancing A2/AD defense
    networks. NATO requires a holistic approach which must be implemented
    in peacetime, crisis and conflict. In my 2016 final assessment on
    implications of Russia's evolving A2/AD, I underlined three key
    requirements:
        1)  NATO has to relook at its peacetime activities and force
    presence.
        2)  In crisis, NATO will have to develop military measures to
    sustain a strategic coupling bridge to threatened nations.
        3)  In conflict, NATO will have to possess the right capabilities
    and quantities, also the required readiness to weaken or neutralize
    opposing A2AD. After the 2014 Wales Summit, NATO started to improve its
    strategic and operational plans. NATOs five Graduated Response Plans
    are tailored to specific threats, in which A2AD is addressed. The NAC
    has also tasked the NATO Military Authorities (SHAPE and ACT) to
    conduct an in-house simulation study. This will provide a deeper
    assessment of any potential additional measures, including forces,
    capabilities and readiness levels, required to counter A2/AD in
    conflict.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Deb Fischer
                   response to russia's inf treaty violation:
        16. Senator Fischer. General Scaparrotti, with respect to
    responding to Russia's recent deployment of a ground-launched cruise
    missile in violation the INF Treaty, Secretary Carter previously
    described three sets of options: counter-force capabilities,
    countervailing capabilities, and active defense. Which of these options
    do you think would be the most effective response in dealing with
    Russia's recent missile deployment?
        General Scaparrotti. [Deleted.]
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator David Perdue
                             nato defense spending
        17. Senator Perdue. General Scaparrotti, there has been a lot of
    attention placed on the 2 percent of GDP spending targets for NATO
    allies. How many of our NATO allies are currently meeting the 2 percent
    target?
        General Scaparrotti. Besides the United States, the United Kingdom,
    Greece, Estonia, and Poland are the other allies that currently meet
    the 2 percent spending targets. Romania is on track to meet 2 percent
    by the end of 2017, and we anticipate Lithuania and Latvia will meet
    the guideline by the end of 2018.

        18. Senator Perdue. General Scaparrotti, do you believe that the 2
    percent spending target is the right way to measure adequate defense
    spending in NATO? If not, what should the benchmark be?
        General Scaparrotti. It is essential that allies display the
    political will to provide required capabilities and deploy forces when
    they are needed. Allies also need to ensure forces are deployable,
    sustainable, and interoperable. The Defense Investment Pledge
    (guideline to spend a minimum of 2 percent of their GDP on defense and
    20 percent of their defense budgets on major equipment, including
    related R&D) agreed at the Wales Summit was an important step in this
    direction and today NATO reaffirms its importance. Derived in 2006, the
    2 percent and 20 percent guidelines were based on ``an average Ally'' .
    . . not those that have underinvested in defense for some time. Many
    allies have numerous capabilities which need replacement that requires
    prioritization and increased investment. Some allies that have endured
    years of military cuts and downsizing would likely have a challenge
    managing a large influx of funds as they no longer have sufficient
    expertise and numbers of staff in requirements, procurement, contract,
    quality assurance and acquisition management. Deployability and
    sustainability of Allied forces is also important. Allies continue to
    make important contributions to NATO operations, missions, and
    activities, as well as the NATO Command and Force Structures. Allies
    invest considerable resources in preparing their forces, capabilities,
    and infrastructure for Alliance operations, missions and activities
    that contribute to our collective security.

        19. Senator Perdue. General Scaparrotti, is there a story we're not
    getting when we see an ally is or is not meeting the 2 percent target
    or not?
        General Scaparrotti. Every nation spends to meet their individual
    National Defense plans and to meet their national security objectives.
    These are independent of NATOs spending target of 2 percent.
    Additionally, many nations measure defense spending differently, such
    as taking into account personnel costs operational costs, and costs
    associated with developing and retaining capabilities. Allies also
    measure the adequacy of their spending differently. Some view this in
    terms of capabilities or output, particularly deployability to support
    operations, missions, and activities to meet their own national
    commitments, within NATO, and in other international organizations such
    as the EU and UN.
                            relationship with turkey
        20. Senator Perdue. General Scaparrotti, during the attempted coup
    d'etat in Turkey last summer, the Turkish government cut off power to
    Incirlik Air Base leaving it without a commercial power supply for more
    than four days. Since the coup attempt, the Turkish government and
    state-controlled media have fueled anti-American sentiment and blamed
    the United States for a myriad of issues. At the same time, Turkey's
    relations with Russia have warmed considerably. Given these troubling
    trends, do you believe it would be prudent to assess alternative basing
    options for the Incirlik Air Base?
        General Scaparrotti. For the purposes of flexibility, we have
    assessed alternative basing options, not only for Incirlik Air Base but
    throughout the EUCOM AOR. Other combatant commands are doing this sort
    of contingency planning as well. While EUCOM is prepared to shift our
    assets from Incirlik if required, we are working closely with Turkish
    military and political leadership to ensure a long, continued basing
    and access relationship with our Turkish Ally.
                          communication with russians
        21. Senator Perdue. General Scaparrotti, Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff General Dunford met with his Russian counterpart twice
    this year--the first such meetings since the two militaries cut off
    communications in the wake of Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014.
    Could you describe to me the status of mil-mil relations and
    communications since 2014?
        General Scaparrotti. Military-to-military activities and
    communications with the Russians is limited by current United States
    law and policy. Section 1233 of the 2017 NDAA prohibits mil-to-mil
    engagement unless Russia ceases occupation of Ukrainian territory and
    abides by the terms and is taking steps to support the Minsk Protocols.
    Exceptions to the NDAA are authorized for items deemed in the U.S.
    national interest, but require a waiver from the Secretary of Defense
    and submission of a report to the appropriate congressional committees.
    We continue to follow Department guidance and coordinate with other
    combatant commands as required to support communications requirements
    in the Middle East, which includes de-confliction procedures for United
    States Forces operating in Syria.

        22. Senator Perdue. General Scaparrotti, do we know who to call
    should we need to de-escalate a situation?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, we have the ability to communicate with
    Russian military officials based on previous agreements and
    communications systems that we have continued to maintain.

        23. Senator Perdue. General Scaparrotti, are you aware of
    communications occurring among your State Department counterparts?
        General Scaparrotti. The RAND sponsored wargame, Reinforcing
    Deterrence on NATO's Eastern Flank, conducted in September 2016, was a
    unclassified wargame. As such, it was a good overview of the possible
    conflict, but is not fully accurate as it did not include a number of
    classified items that have been used in refining EUCOM's OPLAN such as
    the base planning facts and assumptions. The military OPLAN
    classification prevents us from sharing the full details with RAND and
    others. ERI had also not been fully developed when the study was
    completed. Adding these deterrence forces would have certainly had an
    impact on the outcome. Wargaming is an effective tool to test
    assumptions, synchronize activities and identify gaps in plans and
    operations. While valuable insight was collected from this wargame, it
    must be noted that the outcome represents only one outcome based upon
    one set of variables and conditions.
          rand study on reinforcing deterrence on nato's eastern flank
        24. Senator Perdue. General Scaparrotti, the RAND Corporation
    recently conducted a study entitled Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO's
    Eastern Flank: Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics (September 2016).
    This study explored the hypothetical consequences that could occur if
    Russia decided to reclaim the territory of the three Baltic republics.
    Using a war-game model, the study determined that, as presently
    postured, NATO cannot successfully defend the territory of the Baltic
    states. It also concluded that successful defense of the Baltics would
    require a force of about seven brigades, including three heavy armored
    brigades supported by airpower, land-based fires, and other ground
    combat enablers, to prevent the ``rapid overrun'' of the Baltic states.
    These conclusions are extremely troubling. In your view, were there
    things this study didn't take into account? Do you feel that this war-
    game framework presents a full and accurate picture of true military
    capabilities and outcomes?
        General Scaparrotti. The UK will remain a staunch United States
    ally and leading European military power. We expect the UK will
    strengthen their resolve within NATO as the country exits the European
    Union. The UK will also strengthen bilateral agreements, including with
    the United States, Germany and France. In the short-term, we don't
    anticipate defense investment will be affected by Brexit, however, if
    the pound does not recover, the UK will likely need to relook their
    defense spending plans.
                      impact of brexit on european defense
        25. Senator Perdue. General Scaparrotti, the United Kingdom serves
    as our storngest transatlantic ally and is the leading souce of NATO
    hard power in Europe. With the UK's exit from the European Union, many
    questions remain regarding whether the UK will still be willing (and/or
    able) to provide the same level of military and defensive capabilities
    to NATO in mainland Europe. In your view, what might be the short and
    longterm impacts of Brexit on European defense?
        General Scaparrotti. The UK will remain a staunch United States
    ally and leading European military power. We expect the UK will
    strengthen their resolve within NATO as the country exits the European
    Union. The UK will also strengthen bilateral agreements, including with
    the United States, Germany and France. In the short-term, we don't
    anticipate defense investment will be affected by Brexit, however, if
    the pound does not recover, the UK will likely need to relook their
    defense spending plans.

        26. Senator Perdue. General Scaparrotti, what impact might Brexit
    have on intelligence sharing and development of shared competencies and
    effectiveness across the continent?
        General Scaparrotti. We don't expect the UK's intelligence
    capability will diminish post Brexit. They will remain an effective and
    capable partner to the U.S., NATO and bilaterally across the continent.

        27. Senator Perdue. General Scaparrotti, should Britain be forced
    to scale down its support of NATO in Europe, do you believe Germany
    and/or France would be willing and able to fill the void of security
    and defense?
        General Scaparrotti. We don't expect the UK will scale down its
    support of NATO, rather, we think that the UK will strengthen their
    resolve within NATO as the country exits the European Union. The UK's
    requirements for continued collective defense and intelligence
    capability will not diminish post-Brexit, and NATO will remain the
    primary vehicle for the UK to address those requirements. In the
    unlikely event that the UK were to scale down NATO support, I believe
    that France and Germany will provide strong support to NATO well into
    the future. In reality, as allies increase capabilities with progress
    toward the Alliance's Wales goals to increase defense spending, this
    will result in increased capabilities available to NATO--including from
    Germany and France.
       counterterrorism (need to focus nato efforts more here to support
                                    europe)
        28. Senator Perdue. General Scaparrotti, counterterrorism is a main
    topic at every NATO gathering. According to NATO's website, NATO
    counterterrorism efforts focus on ``improving awareness of the threat,
    developing capabilities to prepare and respond, and enhancing
    engagement with partner countries and other international actors.''
    However, as we have seen over the last several years with the rise of
    the number of terrorist attacks--including coordinated attacks--across
    Europe, European countries still struggle with coordination of
    counterterrorism efforts and intelligence sharing. Do you feel that the
    United States should encourage NATO to place more of a focus on
    counterterrorism efforts? If so, how can the U.S. better assist our
    NATO allies in this regard?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, although the U.S. is encouraging NATO to
    do more to combat terrorism, there is more to be done. NATO's role in
    counterterrorism in European countries is limited due to the fact that
    sovereign nations retain the primary responsibility for their own
    domestic security. In short, NATO's mandate is external defense, not
    internal security. At the same time, NATO has an active role in the
    international community's fight against terrorism outside Europe by
    projecting stability along its periphery. This includes NATOs continued
    support of the Defeat ISIS Coalition, training and capacity building in
    Iraq, and operations in Afghanistan. The U.S. is actively challenging
    allies to further identify ways to increase NATO's support to global
    counter terrorism efforts. As the threat has increased in Europe, the
    U.S. is taking steps to increase assistance through intelligence
    sharing and encouraging allies to reciprocate through participation in
    emerging counter-terrorism structures within NATO. Two examples are the
    establishment of a terrorism intelligence cell within the Joint
    Intelligence and Security Directorate at SHAPE in Belgium, and the
    Regional Hub for the South being stood up at Allied Joint Force Command
    in Naples, Italy. These efforts require additional resources from all
    allies and NATO itself.

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2018 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                             TUESDAY, APRIL 4, 2017

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                    UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND PROGRAMS

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m. in Room
    SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain
    (chairman of the committee) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Wicker,
    Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Perdue,
    Strange, Reed, Nelson, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal,
    Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King, Heinrich, Warren, and Peters.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman McCain. Good morning.
        The Senate Armed Services Committee meets today to receive
    testimony on the posture of U.S. Strategic Command.
        We would like to welcome back General Hyten, who is making
    his first appearance before this committee as the Commander of
    U.S. Strategic Command. We thank you for your many years of
    distinguished service, General.
        Over the last 2 years, civilian and military leaders at the
    Department of Defense, from the Secretary of Defense on down,
    have warned this committee about, quote, a return to great-
    power competition. Nowhere is this reality more evident than in
    Russia's and China's intensifying efforts in the nuclear,
    cyber, and space domains, which are the focus of Strategic
    Command's mission.
        Russia continues to wield nuclear threats against allies
    that stand up to its aggression in Ukraine. It is well on its
    way toward completing the modernization of its strategic
    nuclear forces and has gone out of its way to deploy new
    nuclear capabilities not limited by the New START [Strategic
    Arms Reduction Treaty].
        Russia's deployment of a new nuclear ground-launched cruise
    missile in violation of the 1987 INF [Intermediate-Range
    Nuclear Forces] Treaty is a clear signal of the elevated role
    of tactical nuclear weapons in Russian military doctrine.
    Moreover, this violation leaves the United States as the only
    country in the world abiding by treaty limits on its
    intermediate-range missile forces, a dangerous asymmetry that
    has implications for effective deterrence not only in Europe,
    but the Asia-Pacific as well. Merely hoping that Russia will
    return to treaty compliance is insufficient to the seriousness
    of this threat. That is why Russia's violation of the INF
    treaty is so significant because it calls into question basic
    assumptions about United States nuclear policy, assumptions we
    must be prepared to reevaluate given the new realities of our
    strategic environment.
        China has one of the world's largest and most comprehensive
    missile forces, continues to modernize its nuclear capabilities
    by adding more road-mobile systems and submarine-carried
    nuclear weapons, and continues to pursue counter-space
    capabilities designed to limit our use of space.
        Beyond Russia and China, the breakneck pace of North Korean
    ballistic missile and nuclear testing in the past few years
    means that a North Korean missile tipped with a nuclear warhead
    capable of reaching our Homeland is no longer a distant
    hypothetical but an imminent danger. Iran's continued
    development and testing of advanced ballistic missiles suggests
    that its nuclear ambitions may have been delayed, but they have
    not been dashed.
        These growing nuclear threats from great powers and rogue
    states indicate that whatever well-intentioned hopes we had
    after the end of the Cold War, the United States can no longer
    seek to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national
    security strategy, or narrow the range of contingencies under
    which we would have to consider their use.
        That is why Congress has demonstrated its support for
    modernizing each leg of the nuclear triad, including a
    replacement for the air-launched cruise missile, through annual
    authorization and appropriations acts. Modernization is not
    cheap, but it is affordable: just 2 percent of the defense
    budget over the next 10 years, according to the CBO
    [Congressional Budget Office].
        General Hyten, you told the committee last year that any
    program delays or reductions in funding will increase the risk
    to strategic and extended deterrence mission requirements,
    negatively impacting global stability and our national
    security. We look forward to your assessment as to whether
    there may be any such delays.
        Finally, we understand that the Department of Defense will
    conduct a nuclear posture review, the first since 2010. That
    previous nuclear posture review stated: ``Russia and the United
    States are no longer adversaries, and prospects for military
    confrontation have declined dramatically.'' What a relief.
    General Hyten, the committee is interested in your assessment
    of how the strategic landscape has changed since the last
    review and what assumptions need to be reexamined.
        With respect to space, after years of prodding from this
    committee, I am pleased and, in some respects, impressed with
    Strategic Command's enhanced focus on responding to Chinese and
    Russian activities in space. We have come a long way in the
    past few years. But the fundamental fact remains: our space
    superiority is at risk. Russia and China are intent on
    exploiting our dependence on space to achieve an asymmetric
    advantage. To that end, both countries are investing
    significant resources and achieving real progress as they
    pursue, test, and demonstrate a full range of capabilities such
    as anti-satellite missiles, co-orbital weapons, jamming, and
    cyber.
        General Hyten, you were the architect of the Space
    Enterprise Vision when you were Commander of Air Force Space
    Command. I look forward to hearing more from you on what is
    required to sustain our space-based military advantage.
        Senator Reed?

                           SENATOR JACK REED

        Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let
    me join you in welcoming General Hyten to the committee. We are
    grateful for your service and for the dedication of the many
    men and women who serve with you.
        General, in a speech you gave earlier this year at
    Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation,
    you talked about the enormous responsibility you have assumed
    in ensuring our nuclear deterrent is capable of deterring
    threats that are existential to our Homeland. It is a sobering
    responsibility to be the one who will give advice to the
    President on the options before him and then be the one who
    must direct the execution of those options, and we appreciate
    the skill and the fidelity you bring to that task. Thank you,
    sir.
        The President has directed the Department to conduct a
    nuclear posture review to outline our strategy and posture. I
    look forward to considering that review when it is completed.
    As the chairman noted, the last one was done in 2010 and the
    threat environment today is considerably different. The most
    significant developments are Russia's nuclear modernization and
    its bellicose threats about its nuclear capability and the
    significant advancements made by North Korea in its nuclear
    missile programs.
        But there are other troubling advances. China is fielding
    its own SSBN [ballistic missile submarine] that will patrol the
    Pacific, which will hold most, if not all, of our Homeland at
    risk. In addition, Pakistan and India continue to develop their
    nuclear capabilities with tactical and long-range missiles,
    which in some cases reach well beyond their borders, affecting
    nations to which we have made security commitments.
        In other words, General Hyten, while Russia with its near-
    peer nuclear standing is and should be the focus of the next
    nuclear posture review, the landscape is quickly shifting. It
    has become multi-polar, and how we structure our deterrence and
    the military options are changing rapidly.
        Finally, we are now coming to grips with our own nuclear
    modernization. Because of the existential threat it deters,
    there has been bipartisan support for modernization of the
    nuclear triad in this committee. I am hopeful that this
    consensus continues because this is a 20-year acquisition
    program extending well beyond this and future administrations.
        Let me touch on a few other topics.
        In the area of space, we will value your expertise to
    develop long-term requirements and plans to counter the
    asymmetric threats to our space assets. I assume that will be
    discussed further in tomorrow's closed session.
        In the area of missile defense, you are responsible for
    synchronizing global missile defense planning and operations. I
    look forward to hearing your thoughts on the state of our
    Homeland and regional systems. The administration has called
    for a missile defense review, which also needs to address the
    topics contained in a provision of the fiscal year 2017 Defense
    Authorization Act, which include left-of-launch missile defeat
    capabilities, cruise missile defense of the Homeland, and the
    role of deterrence in missile defeat policy. We look forward to
    hearing your thoughts on this review and the ongoing
    improvements to our interceptors, sensors, and command and
    control system.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the testimony.
        Chairman McCain. Welcome back, General Hyten.

       STATEMENT OF GENERAL JOHN E. HYTEN, USAF, COMMANDER, U.S.
                           STRATEGIC COMMAND

        General Hyten. Thank you very much.
        Chairman McCain. By the way, your complete statement will
    be made part of the record.
        General Hyten. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Good morning, Chairman McCain and Ranking Member Reed,
    members of the committee.
        Since the end of World War II, strategic deterrence has
    underwritten our Nation's security and preserved our way of
    life. Our nuclear force has been and always will be the
    backbone of our Nation's strategic deterrence.
        Today the nuclear force of the United States is safe,
    secure, reliable, and ready. It is the foundation of the
    combatant command I am honored to lead.
        However, in the 21st Century, strategic deterrence is more
    than nuclear. It is the integration of all our capabilities in
    all domains across all the combatant commands, other
    governmental organizations, and alongside our allies.
        The global security environment we operate in has changed.
    Our adversaries are developing advanced nuclear and
    conventional weaponry that rivals our systems and capability
    and capacity. They fully understand the warfighting capability
    that cyber and space can enable. To maintain technological and
    operational superiority, our military must stay ahead of our
    adversaries. We must adapt and modernize.
        The primary focus of our deterrence modernization efforts
    must address the entire nuclear infrastructure: first, the
    platforms, the ICBMs [Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles], the
    submarines, nuclear capable heavy bombers with their associated
    tankers. Second, the actual nuclear weapons themselves; and
    finally, the nuclear command and control architecture that
    enables the entire enterprise. They are all essential to this
    security of our Nation.
        At a time when our adversaries have significantly
    modernized and continued to upgrade their nuclear forces,
    nearly all elements of the nuclear triad are operating beyond
    their designed service life. Any recapitalization program
    delays will further diminish these capabilities and affect our
    ability to execute our mission.
        Space is a warfighting domain just like air, ground,
    maritime, and cyber. We must normalize how we plan and operate
    in space. The same concepts that govern other military
    operations also apply in space. Efforts taking place with the
    interagency, allies, partners, and commercial industry to
    develop capabilities, integrate, and execute operations is
    beginning to pay dividends. Our integrated missile defense
    network continues to disseminate across the globe as a sign of
    our commitment to our allies and shared common defense.
        Ballistic missile proliferation is increasing as more
    countries acquire greater numbers of ballistic missiles while
    simultaneously advancing technical sophistication to defeat
    U.S. defense systems. In response, we must continue to advance
    our missile defense capabilities and forces to assure allies
    and deter adversary aggression.
        We are managing the unified command plan elevation of U.S.
    Cyber Command, which I fully support and engage with on a daily
    basis. Meantime, we also remain engaged with the Joint Staff
    and with United States Special Operations Command as they
    assume primary responsibilities to previous STRATCOM [Strategic
    Command] missions of joint intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance and combating weapons of mass destruction.
        U.S. Strategic Command is a global warfighting command. All
    of our deterrent forces remain safe, secure, reliable, and
    ready. The morale of the force is also very high. They
    understand again the critical importance of our missions.
    Nevertheless, the U.S. faces significant challenges in
    sustaining the critical capabilities that underpin our
    strategic deterrent. Our Nation's strategic capabilities must
    be a core focus of our national security spending, and I am
    sure that sustained congressional support, support from this
    committee, combined with the hard work of the exceptional men
    and women who support U.S. Strategic Command will ensure we
    remain ready, agile, and effective against both current and
    future threats.
        I look forward to engaging with you today and throughout my
    time as the U.S. STRATCOM Commander. Thank you for this
    opportunity, and I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Hyten follows:]

                      Prepared Statement by John E. Hyten
                                  introduction
        Strategic deterrence has underwritten our nation's security and
    preserved our way of life since the end of World War II. The early
    deterrence theorists in the 1950s and 1960s were able to make their
    ideas practical during a time of turbulence, rapid technological
    change, and a contest of two starkly different ideologies that divided
    the world in half. During this critical time, our theorists--hand in
    hand with our practitioners--helped carry the Cold War to a successful
    conclusion.
        Today, strategic deterrence is still foundational, but it is also
    different. Its core principles are the same. Our nuclear capabilities
    are the foundation and the bedrock for our defense.
        USSTRATCOM is a global warfighting command. All our forces, in all
    domains, stand ready today. Our nuclear forces are safe, secure,
    reliable, and ready--capable of responding wherever necessary and
    whenever our nation calls. These forces compel all potential
    adversaries to realize that any benefits they see in an attack on our
    nation, or our allies, will be far outweighed by the cost. Our nuclear
    triad provides military capabilities that give our leadership the
    flexibility and decision space to respond to any strategic attack. We
    also have space and cyberspace forces that are critical to the American
    way of war in every theater. We must employ them decisively, to include
    defending the space and cyber domains from threats.
        USSTRATCOM accomplishes seven assigned Unified Command Plan (UCP)
    missions; Strategic Deterrence, Space Operations, Cyberspace
    Operations, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations, Global Strike,
    Missile Defense, and Analysis and Targeting. Our vision is to improve
    our ability to effectively integrate these disparate missions to create
    an even more effective deterrent. We are working to identify gaps, and
    work with the services to program and organize for success. With this
    in mind, USSTRATCOM will continue to change to respond to this dynamic
    world. We are transitioning to a new Command and Control Facility and
    will continue to advocate for essential modernization programs.
    Simultaneously, we are ``in the fight'' every day, everywhere--which
    requires a constant focus on today with an eye toward tomorrow.
        Our ability to deter major power conflict also depends on our
    ability to deter in all domains--particularly space and cyber. We must
    think about any future national security construct from a multi-domain
    perspective and this involves strategic deterrence. Since 1992,
    USSTRATCOM has been the primary combatant command responsible for
    providing strategic deterrence for the United States. The ways and
    means have evolved, but the end state has endured. Peace is still our
    profession.
                          global security environment
        Russia warrants constant attention. Its security strategy makes
    clear that it is re-asserting itself as a global power. It is
    modernizing its conventional and strategic military programs,
    emphasizing new strategic approaches, declaring and demonstrating an
    ability to escalate, maintaining a significant quantity and variety of
    nuclear weapons, and according to Russian media reports, is developing
    hypersonic glide vehicles. Furthermore, Russia has engaged in
    destabilizing actions in Syria and Ukraine, while also developing and
    deploying weapons that violate the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces
    (INF) Treaty. Russia is also advancing development of counter-space and
    cyber capabilities.
        China is pursuing a long-term military modernization program across
    a range of conventional and strategic domains with implications in the
    Pacific region and beyond. Simultaneously, it is modernizing nuclear
    missile forces, and building out a secure, second-strike capability.
    Although China still professes a ``No First-Use'' doctrine, it is re-
    engineering its long-range ballistic missiles to carry multiple nuclear
    warheads. It also continues to develop and test its hypersonic-glide
    vehicle capability. China's pursuit of conventional global strike
    capabilities, offensive counter-space technologies, and exploitation of
    computer networks also raises questions about its global aspirations.
    These developments--coupled with a lack of transparency on nuclear
    issues such as force disposition and size--impact regional and
    strategic stability.
        Although North Korea is not an existential threat to the United
    States, it remains the most dangerous and unpredictable actor in the
    Pacific region. Pyongyang's evolving ballistic missile and nuclear
    weapons program underscore the growing threat. It continues to defy
    international norms and resolutions, as demonstrated by a number of
    provocative actions this past year, including their fourth and fifth
    nuclear tests. North Korea is also pursuing development of
    Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and Submarine Launched
    Ballistic Missiles capabilities, and an improved Intermediate Range
    Ballistic Missile. These developments highlight its commitment to
    diversify its missile forces and nuclear delivery options, while
    strengthening missile force survivability. North Korea also continues
    efforts to expand its stockpile of weapons-grade fissile material and
    has demonstrated its capability and willingness to conduct destructive
    cyber-attacks against the United States and its allies.
        Iran continues to develop ballistic missile, space, and cyberspace
    capabilities--and we remain focused on preventing the development of
    new threats in the region. While Iran continues to follow the mandates
    of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, we must remain vigilant to
    any Iranian intentions that indicate it will pursue nuclear weapons.
        Ungoverned or ineffectively governed regions remain incubators for
    those who seek to attack the world's peaceful societies. Transregional
    Terrorist Organizations (TTOs) recruit and operate freely across
    political, social, and cyberspace boundaries. The effect of weapons of
    mass destruction (WMD) in the hands of TTOs could be catastrophic,
    which highlights the importance of our national non-proliferation and
    counter-WMD efforts. The counter-WMD mission is now led by U.S. Special
    Operations Command (USSOCOM) but USSTRATCOM is committed to maintaining
    a close partnership. It is another essential element of deterrence.
                                  the problem
        For decades now, we have held a military advantage over our
    adversaries, both from a nuclear and conventional standpoint. That is
    starting to change. As our nation rightly focused on combating violent
    extremist organizations and the states that support them, other
    adversaries have taken the opportunity to develop advanced nuclear and
    conventional weaponry that rival many of our systems. That is not all:
    our adversaries are learning from each other and demonstrating advanced
    understanding of the cyber and space domains.
        One of our biggest challenges in the future will be staying ahead
    of the pace of change we see in our adversaries. We have a problem
    delivering timely responses to new threats. We don't move fast enough
    from concept to capability. The pace of change is rapid and demands us
    to change ahead of the evolving threats, but our processes favor
    preserving the status quo. We are risk averse, while our adversaries
    have not. Our industrial base is also fragile in many areas, which
    complicates our ability to stay ahead of, or in some regards stay even
    with, our adversaries.
                                   priorities
        I have three fundamental priorities in my command.
        Above all else, USSTRATCOM will provide strategic deterrence
    against any potential adversary. Our operations must be ceaseless,
    deliberate, and enabled by a focus on today's operations and a
    commitment to modernize our triad, our weapons, our command and
    control, our space, cyberspace, and missile defense capabilities. Our
    deterrence efforts must include proactively shaping and messaging any
    potential adversary.
        If deterrence fails, the nation counts on us for a decisive
    response. These responses must defeat any adversary with all the
    elements of our command's power, in all domains. We must work with all
    our components and task forces to achieve this outcome. However, mere
    execution will not suffice in the current strategic environment.
        Neither strategic deterrence nor decisive response will function
    without a resilient, equipped, trained, and combat-ready force. To that
    end, we must embrace the mentality that USSTRATCOM is a warfighting
    command. Our fight is each day, around the globe. This requires our
    forces to have depth in capability and breadth in capacity--we cannot
    do it alone. We must constantly challenge ourselves to integrate with
    allies, partners, the interagency, DOD, the Joint Staff, and other
    commands to cover our seams and gaps, and to ensure we capitalize on
    the unique capabilities that USSTRATCOM can bring to bear.
                               the nuclear force
        All elements of our nuclear forces will be assessed in the
    Administration's coming Nuclear Posture Review--but we have an
    excellent basis to begin this analysis.
        With regard to our nuclear weapons, I serve as a principal member
    of the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC): the interagency organization
    responsible for maintaining and managing the Nation's nuclear weapons
    stockpile. To ensure synchronization and unity of effort across the
    Department of Defense and the Department of Energy's National Nuclear
    Security Administration (NNSA) priorities, the NWC-approved Strategic
    Plan outlines an approach to sustain the enduring stockpile, align
    warhead and platform modernization efforts, and identify the essential
    NNSA industrial capacity required to maintain the Triad. A key element
    of the current strategy is the ``3+2'' vision to transition the
    stockpile of 11 warheads to three ballistic warheads and two air-
    delivered warheads. Assuming it remains consistent with the current
    Nuclear Posture Review, full realization of ``3+2'' requires long-term
    sustained commitment to the modernization and recapitalization of
    NNSA's infrastructure, as well as continued development of the human
    capital and science-based stewardship tools needed to certify and
    assess the stockpile.
        Our land-based ICBMs, sea-based Ballistic Missile Submarines
    (SSBNs), and nuclear-capable heavy bombers--with their associated
    tankers--provide strategic deterrence and stability. Considering this,
    our ICBM's are the most responsive, our submarines are the most
    survivable, and our bombers are the most flexible. Each element is
    essential to the security of our nation. The synergistic capabilities
    of the Triad present adversaries with a complex, multi-layered
    challenge that also hedges against unforeseen technical problems or
    changes in the security environment.
        The U.S. faces significant challenges to sustain the capabilities
    that will meet our enduring national security objectives. At a time
    when Russia and other countries continue to modernize and upgrade
    nuclear capabilities, nearly all elements of the U.S. nuclear weapon
    stockpile, delivery systems, and other infrastructure are operating
    beyond their designed service life. Maintaining strategic deterrence,
    assurance, and escalation control capabilities requires a continuing,
    multi-faceted, long-term investment approach.
        The investment in, and commitment to, our Nation's strategic
    capabilities must continue and planned sustainment and modernization
    activities must be completed on schedule. Any recapitalization program
    delay will adversely impact the execution of our strategic deterrence
    mission and degrade our ability--and ultimately our credibility--to
    deter and assure. Sustained Congressional support, stable and timely
    budgets, combined with the hard work of the exceptional men and women
    who support United States Strategic Command, will ensure that we
    continue to effectively deter strategic attack, assure our allies and
    partners, and address both current and future threats.
               nuclear command, control, and communications (nc3)
        Our nation's nuclear deterrent is only as effective as the command
    and control networks that enable it to function. Therefore, the NC3
    system must also be assured, reliable, and resilient across the full
    spectrum of conflict. Maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent requires
    modernization and recapitalization of key systems and capabilities
    throughout the NC3 architecture. The challenges posed by today's
    security environment make it increasingly important to optimize our NC3
    systems architecture while leveraging new technologies. Through
    continued funding for NC3 modernization programs, we will ensure
    effective command and control of the Nation's forces for many years to
    come.
        USSTRATCOM requires a NC3 capability comprised of interdependent
    systems, facilities, and platforms operating throughout the space, air,
    and terrestrial domains to both effectively execute strategic
    deterrence operations and provide support for the President as an
    essential component of the National Leadership Command Capability. As
    an example of this, USSTRATCOM is working with the White House,
    national laboratories, and the private sector to improve decision
    support capabilities, setting the conditions for timely and informed
    senior leader decision-making under any circumstance, in transit or at
    fixed locations.
        In the space domain, we are transitioning from the Milstar
    satellite communications system to the Advanced Extremely High
    Frequency (AEHF) satellite communications systems. AEHF, coupled with
    the requisite ground node and airborne platform Family of Advanced
    Beyond Line-of-Sight terminals (FAB-T) will extend capabilities to
    enable collaboration between the President and senior advisors under
    any circumstance to improve connectivity with our nuclear forces.
        Within the air layer, we are continuing efforts to replace the
    communications systems on the E-6B Airborne Command Post (ABNCP) and
    Take Charge and Move Out (TACAMO) aircraft as well as the E-4B National
    Airborne Operations Center (NAOC) to provide world-wide connectivity to
    the nuclear forces. In conjunction with communications update efforts
    such as the Low Frequency Transmit System (LFTS), the Air Force is
    pursuing a course of action to recapitalize the E-4B platform, which is
    approaching its end of service life. The selected platform must be
    capable of meeting all mission requirements assigned to the E-4B NAOC.
    Additionally, the Air Force continues efforts to field a very low
    frequency (VLF) and AEHF capability for the B-2 bomber fleet that will
    ensure beyond line-of sight connectivity throughout the spectrum of
    conflict.
        Within the terrestrial domain, the Air Force completed high
    altitude electromagnetic pulse hardening upgrades to its early warning
    radar sites and continues to modernize its Nuclear Planning and
    Execution Systems (NPES). The construction of the new USSTRATCOM
    Command and Control (C2) Facility, which will be a key component of
    nuclear and national C2 architecture. Although we still have some
    funding challenges and schedule risks, we remain on track for occupancy
    in 2018. This new facility will serve as a visible reminder to
    adversaries of our national commitment to maintain modern and effective
    NC3 capabilities.
                                     icbms
        With smart and consistent sustainment, modernization, and
    recapitalization, the ICBM force will continue to provide a responsive,
    reliable, safe, secure, and effective deterrent force for many decades.
    However, the Minuteman weapon system is far beyond its intended
    lifespan. Launch Facilities and Launch Control Centers require
    investment in repair and modernization. Additionally, vehicles and
    equipment used to support the Minuteman weapon system require an
    immediate, long-term investment. USSTRATCOM supports ongoing
    sustainment and modernization investments in the current Minuteman
    weapon system.
        Minuteman recapitalization is necessary to address the issues
    associated with operating a weapon system beyond its planned design
    life, and we must continue that sustainment until the deployment of the
    Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD), which will begin initial
    deployment in 2028.
        The GBSD program successfully completed Milestone-A last year and
    is progressing toward an integrated weapon system solution, including
    the flight system, weapon system C2 ground launch systems, and
    facilities. We continue to encourage cooperation between the Air Force,
    Navy, and industry as they develop the technologies to meet our
    deterrence needs.
        Protecting our force remains a top priority and USSTRATCOM supports
    completing the UH-1N Helicopter Replacement program, Payload
    Transporter Replacement, and the ICBM Cryptographic upgrade. These
    programs should not be difficult and the need is now. Additionally, we
    must update legal guidance, policy frameworks, and Rules of Engagement
    to defend all threats, particularly new threats like unmanned aerial
    systems.
                                     ssbns
        The Ohio-class submarine has been life-extended from 30 to 42
    years. Starting in 2027, one Ohio-class SSBN will retire each year,
    with no margin to extend them further. Continued support for staffing
    and improvements at naval shipyards, Trident Refit Facilities, and
    Strategic Weapons Facilities are critical to maintaining the necessary
    operational availability of the Ohio-class as it approaches end-of-
    life. USSTRATCOM continues to support and work with the Navy as it
    modernizes their SSBN force. As the Navy's ``number-one'' priority and
    USSTRATCOM's top modernization item, the design and production of the
    Columbia-class SSBN must continue for on-time delivery to meet its
    first strategic deterrent patrol in 2031. The 12 submarines in the
    class will serve as the survivable leg of the Triad through the 2080s.
    Ensuring that the Columbia-class SSBN remains on schedule and funded
    throughout the next decade is vital to prevent any capability gaps. Any
    delay will assert unacceptable risk on our sea-based nuclear deterrent.
        We fielded the Trident II D5 missile more than 25 years ago. The
    Navy has taken steps to extend the life of the Trident missile through
    the life of the Ohio-class, which enables it to serve as the initial
    baseline ballistic missile for the Columbia-class submarine. We share
    the Trident II system with the United Kingdom, as well as the design
    for the Common Missile Compartment for both countries' ballistic
    missile submarine classes. We must continue our commitment to the
    United Kingdom to ensure our strategic forces are equipped with the
    weapons systems needed to meet operational requirements into the
    future.
                                    bombers
        To ensure our bombers provide a credible deterrence and assurance
    capability, ongoing sustainment and planned modernization activities
    must remain on track. I support and appreciate the Air Force's
    continued emphasis to provide an effective and ready force.
        The B-52 will receive a radar system upgrade that will enhance
    weapons delivery, improve weather detection and avoidance, and aid
    aerial refueling operations. Potential advantages include range
    improvements, reduced air refueling demand, longer time-on-station, and
    a reduced maintenance footprint. The B-52's radar is a 1960s analog
    system, updated in the 1980s, and is now more than 20 years beyond its
    service life. Its Current Mean-Time-Between-Failure rate indicates a
    likelihood the radar will delay, degrade, or fail during a 20-hour
    mission.
        The B-52's structural life extends beyond 2050, but the B-52 TF-33
    engine has been in service since 1961 and is facing component wear and
    diminishing manufacturing sources. USSTRATCOM supports Air Force
    studies investigating the benefits of replacing B-52 engines. I support
    an engine upgrade for the B-52, as the result will be increased range,
    longer combat time-on-station, smaller maintenance footprint, and less
    of a tanker bill. The upgrade will ensure that the B-52 remains a
    viable component of the bomber force in the face of advanced threats.
        The B-2 fleet will receive the next generation of assured and
    survivable communication, VLF receivers, and survivability upgrades
    against modern threats to retain the platform's stealth attributes.
    Difficulty maintaining stealth attributes is the primary reason for
    downtime on B-2 aircraft. USSTRATCOM supports Air Force initiatives to
    fund upgrades to B-2 survivability, communications, and
    maintainability--this is critical to mission effectiveness and
    longevity of the nation's only penetrating bomber.
        As potential adversaries develop and deploy increasingly
    sophisticated anti-air defenses, the new B-21 will ensure we maintain
    an effective penetrating bomber capable of striking any target around
    the world. The B-21 is a key component of the Air Force Family of
    Systems portfolio, including ISR, electronic warfare, and long-range
    strike. It will provide the President with capabilities to hold targets
    at risk around the globe regardless of anti-access/area denial
    environments. Coupled with the Long Range Standoff (LRSO) cruise
    missile, the B-21 will deny adversaries safe havens and sanctuary.
        As is the case with other Triad systems, our bombers and their
    associated weapons are well beyond their intended service lives,
    requiring attention to maintain combat readiness. Legacy gravity bombs
    and the Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) meet current military
    requirements, but declining sustainability and survivability challenges
    require replacement systems. The B61-12 gravity bomb and LRSO must
    deliver on schedule to avoid any strategic or extended deterrence
    capability gaps.
        The B61-12 Life Extension and tail-kit adaptor programs are
    currently on schedule to deliver on time and preclude a capability gap,
    as both have progressed satisfactorily in engineering, manufacturing,
    and development. Both programs met fiscal year 2012-2016 milestones.
    The first production unit is planned for March 2020. Testing to date
    has shown the B61-12 accuracy requirement is achievable and the weapon
    will function as designed against required target sets. The B61-12 is a
    key element of the future air-leg of the strategic Triad and is
    required to maintain a continuous gravity nuclear capability by arming
    the B-2, B-21, legacy dual capable aircraft, and the F-35A. It will
    ensure continued support to NATO and our other partners around the
    world.
        The ALCM carries the W80-1 warhead and is launched solely from the
    B-52. Intended for Soviet-era threats, the ALCM's survivability in
    modern air defense environments is deteriorating. Designed in the 1970s
    and fielded in the early 1980s with an expected 10-year service life,
    the ALCM is encountering sustainability and viability issues from age
    related material failures, advancing adversary capabilities and
    diminishing manufacturing sources. Parts and materials designed for a
    10-year service life are now 35 years old, and are obsolete. Three
    Service Life Extension Programs (SLEP) are funded, but cannot keep pace
    with the rate of discovery of deficiencies. Funding for SLEPs and other
    sustainment issues are straining Operation & Maintenance funding.
    Operational and surveillance testing will reduce ALCM quantities below
    operational needs in 2030.
        The LRSO cruise missile will replace the ALCM. It will provide the
    President with a range of deterrent options consistent with nuclear
    policy objectives. It provides an effective counter to adversary
    capabilities and a challenge to their own defenses. The LRSO is the
    first missile system developed in unison with a nuclear warhead for
    many decades. Limiting resources or funding of either component will
    disrupt its entire concept-to-capability timeline. To conclude, the
    LRSO and W80-4 LEP programs must remain in synch and on time to
    preclude a capability gap.
                                     space
        Space is a warfighting domain just like the air, ground, maritime,
    and cyber domains. The DOD with the National Reconnaissance Office and
    Air Force Space Command have embarked on implementing their shared
    Space Enterprise Vision, which supports the National Space Policy and
    focuses on the concepts of operation, crew force, and systems required
    to prevail in a conflict that extends into space. I support this effort
    because we must normalize how we think of space, how we operate in it,
    and how we describe it to each other. It is unique for many reasons,
    but the concepts that govern other military operations: intelligence,
    maneuver, fires, protection, logistics, and C2 apply just the same.
        As of November of 2016, the Joint Interagency Combined Space
    Operations Center (JICSpOC) entered its initial phase of operations.
    The JICSpOC is a center that synergizes the National Reconnaissance
    Office, the National Intel Community and the DOD. It is focused on
    achieving interagency unity of effort while defending against space
    threats. In coordination with our partners and to eliminate confusion,
    we have decided to rename the JICSpOC to better describe its actual
    purpose. As of 1 April 2017, the JICSpOC will be called the National
    Space Defense Center. (NSDC).
        We have a combined space operations initiative with Australia,
    Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. The MOU, signed in 2013,
    continues in the spirit of cooperation with regular boards that make or
    recommend space policy decisions. A board in November 2016 directed the
    formation of general officer-led working groups for operations and
    exercises, capabilities and architectures, and policy. These working
    groups cross military and policy positions reside in the participant
    countries.
        We have other multi-national space operations initiatives as well.
    Notably, France and Germany were included for the first time in the
    Schriever Wargames in 2016.
        We conducted a Space Situational Awareness Table-Top Exercise in
    September of 2016, with partner nation participation from the UK,
    Canada, Australia, Japan, France and Germany. We are examining the
    prospect of inviting Italy and the Republic of Korea to follow-on
    exercises later this year. These initiatives are part of the multi-
    national collaborative environment we are fostering to expand
    international cooperation, strengthen stability in the space domain,
    and increase assurance and resilience.
        While we continue to build partnerships, new satellite
    communication (SATCOM) capabilities face significant funding
    challenges. These fielding issues must be resolved to prepare the U.S.
    to fight effectively in future conflicts. SATCOM capabilities
    associated with the Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) Wideband Code
    Division Multiple Access (WCDMA) are constrained by the availability of
    tactical terminals and issues in bringing the MUOS Radio Access
    Facility gateways into operation. The fielding of new AEHF Extended
    Data Rate (XDR) capabilities is improving over time, but delayed XDR
    terminal programs are hampering the transitions from Milstar to AEHF.
    Protecting wideband communications is essential to fighting effectively
    in the future. We must unify these separate service efforts under an
    interoperable standard to enable joint operations in contested
    environments. I support future operations leveraging the burgeoning
    commercial SATCOM industry.
        Joint force capability development notwithstanding, we have been
    successful in integrating the three-year Cooperative Research and
    Development Agreement (CRADA) initiative at the Joint Space Operations
    Center (JSpOC), with six commercial industry satellite systems and
    services owner operators. These owner operators are DigitalGlobe,
    Eutelsat, Intelsat, Inmarsat, Iridium, and SES-GS; and our objective is
    to improve the ability to deliver operational capability, lower cost,
    and reduce risk.
        These commercial partners are not under contract. The industry
    provides representatives to collaborate directly on the JSpOC floor in
    the areas of space operations and resiliency, decision support, threat
    mitigation, automated tools analysis, exercise participation, space
    catalog, common data standards and protocols. Current law does not
    allow government sponsorship of security clearances, badging and
    accesses unless under contract, and we could use some help in this
    area.
        USSTRATCOM is also actively engaged in DOD support to the Civil
    Space Traffic Management effort directed by the National Security
    Council, and led by the Federal Aviation Administration on behalf of
    the Secretary of Transportation. USSTRATCOM must continue to track all
    objects in space for national security purposes but we can share the
    data with others. We see a potential where the DOD and DOT jointly
    operate a mutually-supportive U.S. space traffic management enterprise
    that will foster more enhanced spaceflight safety for all operators
    including from government, civil, and commercial sectors across the
    globe, but we must be careful to do so in a way that does not adversely
    impact our national security.
                            joint electronic warfare
        Our peer and near-peer adversaries have studied U.S. capabilities
    and our ability to dominate the electro-magnetic spectrum is at risk.
    Many countries have organized for spectrum warfare with specific EW/
    spectrum warfare units. They have built electronic attack capabilities
    to counter virtually all of our spectrum dependent systems. Our
    military once had a focus and drive in this area, but we have lost much
    of our expertise. We must recommit our investments in systems,
    personnel, and training.
        The EW Executive Committee (EXCOM) is a step in the right direction
    to address the criticality of gaining and maintaining EMS superiority,
    which affects all domains. The Joint Concept for EMSO (JCEMSO), signed
    by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in March 2015 provides an initial
    concept vision for future electromagnetic spectrum operations. With a
    global perspective and UCP Joint EW mission area responsibilities,
    USSTRATCOM is engaged in Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations
    (JEMSO) advocacy across the doctrine, organization, training, materiel,
    leadership and education, personnel, facilities and policy on behalf of
    the Department.
                                missile defense
        Ballistic missile proliferation and lethality continues to increase
    as more countries acquire greater numbers of ballistic missiles and are
    increasing their technical sophistication to specifically defeat U.S.
    ballistic missile defense systems. In the past year, we continue to see
    missile tests from North Korea and Iran that cause us and our allies
    continued concerns. Their efforts to advance missile technologies
    threaten stability. In response, we must continue our efforts to
    advance capabilities and missile defense forces to assure allies of our
    commitment for a common defense and to deter further aggressions from
    these regional and transregional actors.
        As an essential element of the U.S. commitment to strengthen
    strategic and regional deterrence against states of concern, we
    continue to deploy missile defense capabilities and strengthen our
    missile defense postures. During the past year, we have operationally
    deployed the Aegis Ashore Missile Defense Complex in Romania as part of
    the European Phased Adaptive Approach Phase II and added additional
    Ground Based Interceptors (GBIs) as we remain on track to meet the
    objective of 44 GBIs by end of this calendar year. Continued
    investments toward our warfighter missile defense priorities are
    essential. Priority missile defense upgrades and capability
    advancements include:

          Increase of reliability and lethality of our interceptors
    to include the continued development of the Redesigned Kill Vehicles
    (RKV) for the GBI, completion of testing and deployment of the SM-3
    Block IIA capability, and future enhancements to the GBI, most notably
    the Multi-Object Kill Vehicle (MOKV).
          Sensor and discrimination capabilities to include the
    continued development of the Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) and
    increasing the sensor network based on the conclusion of the
    Department's Sensor Analysis of Alternatives. At some point soon our
    nation must commit to deployment of a global space-based sensor system
    with discrimination capability.
          Increase the robustness of regional missile defense
    capability and capacity to include continued deployment of the Aegis
    Ballistic Missile Defense and the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense
    (THAAD) capabilities and implementation of the recommendations from the
    Department's Joint Regional Integrated Air and Missile Defense
    Capability Mix (JRICM) study.

        We cannot be successful in this endeavor by investing solely in
    active missile defense capabilities--we must strengthen all pillars of
    missile defense including the capability to enable a left-of-launch
    capability in the Missile Defeat enterprise. We are exploring
    efficiencies that can be gained by fusing non-kinetic, cyber,
    electromagnetic, and kinetic capabilities to deny, defend, and defeat
    adversary threats. Furthermore, additional efforts should be invested
    in the Department's ability to find, fix, track, target, engage, and
    assess (F2T2EA) threats and the adoption of corresponding policy and
    organizational constructs.
        We must strengthen our collaboration with our allies and explore
    further integration of our collective capabilities toward an effective
    mutual defense. We are investing in collaboration with our allies
    across multiple venues, including the USSTRATCOM-hosted Nimble Titan
    wargame. This biennial wargame is conducted with our key allies in
    partnership with the Department of State and our Geographic Combatant
    Commands. We continually explore and experiment with potential
    collaboration and integration approaches with our allies to inform
    development of policy, military, and investment options.
        Finally, we depend on flight-testing--it is critical to assessing
    and validating the performance of the operational system in actual
    flight environments. The high cost of flight-testing often limits the
    number of flight test opportunities. The Missile Defense Agency
    endeavors to maximize the opportunity for learning to advance
    capability development through flight test success or failure. The body
    of data collected in flight-testing is robust, and we discover
    unexpected findings in every test. Flight test failures are unplanned,
    but when failures happen--learning occurs. The root cause is
    determined, corrective actions are implemented, and the overall
    capability of the system improves.
                                     cyber
        Cyber is still a critical mission assigned to USSTRATCOM. We
    continue to work closely with U.S. Cyber Command to ensure our nation
    is prepared to respond to any and all challenges within this domain. I
    applaud the direction signed into law in the fiscal year 2017 National
    Defense Authorization Act and remain committed to the elevation of U.S.
    Cyber Command to be a unified command as soon as possible. They will be
    providing a detailed posture statement on cyber in the near future.
                                  initiatives
        To ensure U.S. conventional power and deterrence are just as strong
    in the future as they are today, technological and operational
    innovation is crucial. The pace at which potential adversaries are
    improving their capability is a challenge. Holding adversary targets at
    risk will continue to be challenged as advanced offensive and defensive
    systems hinder our ability to effectively maneuver in anti-access/area
    denial environments. One of my top priorities is anticipating change
    and confronting uncertainty with agility and innovation. USSTRATCOM has
    been a participant with Third Offset Strategic Portfolio Reviews that
    ultimately lead up to Investment Decisions. One example of USSTRATCOM's
    contribution is the Global Operations Innovation Initiative (GOII).
        USSTRATCOM continues to be the lead advocate for development and
    deployment of Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) weapons systems, which
    can influence all forms of conflict and offset adversary advantages.
    While there are many hypersonic activities ongoing within the
    Department, I support CPS as the leading technology maturation effort
    in the realm of hypersonics.
        The challenge of holding adversary targets at risk will continue to
    grow as advanced offensive and defensive systems hinder our ability to
    maneuver in anti-access / area denial (A2AD) environments. CPS weapons
    will provide a responsive, long-range, non-nuclear strike capability
    against distant, defended, time-critical threats. Having a hypersonic
    strike capability enhances our overall deterrent posture by providing
    the President additional options to hold targets at risk that do not
    justify crossing the nuclear threshold.
        I support ongoing Department efforts to mature hypersonic boost-
    glide vehicles and non-nuclear warhead technologies through ground and
    flight-testing, as well as modeling and simulation efforts--we foresee
    an operational need for a CPS capability by the mid-2020s. While the
    next CPS flight test, scheduled for the 4th quarter of 2017, will
    demonstrate operationally representative flight components, our
    adversaries are developing similar long-range hypersonic strike
    weapons.
                                   conclusion
        USSTRATCOM is a global warfighting command. Today's deterrence
    forces remain safe, secure, reliable, and ready. Nevertheless, the U.S.
    faces significant challenges in sustaining the required capabilities to
    continue to provide strategic deterrence on behalf of our nation. Our
    Nation's strategic capabilities must be a core focus of our national
    security spending. I am sure that sustained Congressional support,
    combined with the hard work of the exceptional men and women who
    support United States Strategic Command, will ensure that we remain
    ready, agile, and effective in deterring strategic attack, assuring our
    allies and partners, and addressing both current and future threats.

        Chairman McCain. General Hyten, as we discussed and has
    been made well known, the Russians are in violation of the INF
    treaty. Is that true?
        General Hyten. Yes, Chairman, that is true.
        Chairman McCain. What does this mean for the threat to the
    United States and our European allies?
        General Hyten. It is a concern that we have to look at
    across the entire spectrum of what Russia has been doing.
    Russia has been modernizing their entire nuclear force. They
    started an aggressive effort in 2006. They continue that to
    this day. This breach of the INF Treaty that caused the
    deployment of a ground-launched cruise missile is a concern to
    us because we have not seen that for quite some time. It is
    another element we are going to have to consider as we look
    forward to how we deal with Russia.
        Chairman McCain. How would we deal with the ground-launched
    cruise missile itself?
        General Hyten. A single ground-launched cruise missile is
    not a significant threat to the United States or our allies. It
    shows the beginning of a deployment of a structure that could
    be a threat in the future.
        Chairman McCain. If it is deployed in a significant number,
    what does that do?
        General Hyten. We have no defense for it, especially in
    defense of our European allies. That system can range and
    threaten most of the continent of Europe, depending on where it
    is deployed. We will talk about that in detail in the closed
    hearing tomorrow, Senator. But it is a concern, and we are
    going to have to figure out how to deal with it as a Nation.
        Chairman McCain. There is certainly a compelling argument
    for Vladimir Putin's disregard for most norms of behavior that
    Russia, post Soviet Union, used to adhere to or even during the
    Soviet Union times.
        General Hyten. I believe that the United States has only
    effectively dealt with Russia over the years from a position of
    strength. I think the only way we can deal with them in the
    future is from a position of strength. I think the work of this
    committee and the work of my command can help that strength be
    established so we are in a good position to have future
    discussions with the Russians.
        Chairman McCain. It seems to me to regain that position of
    strength, we need to give you some help. Is that right?
        General Hyten. Yes, sir. I am asking for help on
    modernizing our entire forces and making sure we have the force
    structure that is needed to make sure we can deter not only
    today but in the future.
        Chairman McCain. What would be your priorities?
        General Hyten. Senator, my priorities are, first, to
    modernize the platform elements of the triad. I think when you
    look across the force----
        Chairman McCain. Which are?
        General Hyten. The platform elements of the triad are,
    first, the submarine, the Ohio-class replacement program, the
    Columbia. That is number one. The next is the GBSD, the ground-
    based strategic deterrent, the replacement for our Minuteman
    ICBMs. The third piece is the B-21 bomber, which the long-range
    standoff weapon associated with that. That is the replacement
    to the air-launched cruise missile.
        The second piece of the puzzle is the modernization of the
    nuclear weapons. The nuclear weapons themselves have to be
    modernized so they can last well into the coming decades.
        Finally, a very important piece that I am probably most
    concerned about right now is the nuclear command and control
    modernization that we have to have as we move into the coming
    decades.
        Chairman McCain. Under the present circumstances of
    sequestration, do you see any way of achieving all those goals?
        General Hyten. Senator, if we do not get stable budgets--
    when I spread all those programs out across the table--and I
    have--and I look at when they all deliver, they all deliver
    just in time. Take one example. The Columbia submarine. Every
    year that that program--if it slips 1 year, then the future
    commander of STRATCOM is down one nuclear submarine. Two years,
    two nuclear submarines. We know that because there is a certain
    time in the future where the Ohio-class submarine just will not
    go under the water anymore. Just the pressure on the vessel
    itself will not allow it to go down. That has to stay on time.
    If each of those programs delivers just in time and we do not
    have stable budgets, we know we already have a broken program.
    I am very concerned about the ability to have stable budgets to
    support those programs.
        Chairman McCain. What does a continuing resolution do to
    you and your plans that you just outlined?
        General Hyten. A continuing resolution makes it very hard
    to start new programs, which many of these programs will be new
    program starts. Each of these programs will ramp up in terms of
    funding over the years as we move from the development phase
    into a production phase. Every time you have a continuing
    resolution, you cannot ramp up the funding you need in order to
    do that. Every time that happens, you have a delay to the
    program. Every time that happens, you have a break to a
    contract. It is a very significant issue in terms of cost to
    the taxpayers, as well as risk to our national security.
        Chairman McCain. The men and women who are serving under
    your command?
        General Hyten. Yes, sir. I talked a while ago about the
    improved morale. One of the great things I saw when I came back
    to U.S. Strategic Command was the morale in the submarines and
    the missile fields and the bombers and the space capabilities,
    the cyber capabilities. They understand how important it is
    what they do, but they also are dealing with very old
    equipment. We have a commitment to them as a Nation that we
    need to give them the tools that they need in order to do their
    job. Their enthusiasm can only last a certain amount of time.
    If we do not follow through on that commitment, that morale
    will be brought into question.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Reed?
        Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Again, General, thank you for your service.
        In last year's National Defense Act, we asked for a review
    of all the options against our potential threats left-of-launch
    and right-of-launch. One of the issues that I think you will
    talk about in detail tomorrow but in public is the very little
    short time between a warning and a launch in many of our
    adversaries. The left-of-launch is something we have to look
    at. Right-of-launch, the first issue is boost phase.
        Can you give us an idea here of where we are with respect
    to boost phase interceptors?
        General Hyten. I can give more information in the closed
    hearing tomorrow. But at a general level, we do not have a
    significant or really any boost phase intercept capability. It
    is a very challenging technology because you basically have to
    be properly positioned with the right kind of weapons
    capability in order to respond to an immediate launch. If you
    look at the North Korean launch on February the 11th, out of a
    new location, a new capability, a new transporter, erector,
    launcher, all those things bring the time of warning down to a
    very small number. Therefore, you have to be properly
    positioned.
        Now, I will talk tomorrow about some new technologies that
    are becoming available that I think can begin to address that
    for the first time. But it is not in the near term, Senator.
        Senator Reed. But if we can pursue these technologies
    successfully, it would provide a significant advantage given
    the current deterrence we have.
        General Hyten. Yes, Senator. I cannot think of a better
    thing than if somebody launched a threat missile, to drop it
    right back on their head.
        Senator Reed. The nuclear posture review, as we both noted,
    is underway. Can you give us kind of an overview of the
    significant threats that this review will deal with and
    illustrate for us?
        General Hyten. The nuclear posture review just kicked off a
    6-month timing asked for by the administration and the
    Secretary of Defense. We are going at that. The first thing we
    will look at is the threat scenario. We will look at Russia,
    China, North Korea, and Iran in particular to make sure we
    understand what those threats are. Iran is in compliance with
    JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Iran] right now,
    which is keeping that nuclear capability down, but they still
    have aggressive missile programs that we need to look at. We
    will look across that spectrum of the threat. We will look at
    what Russia is doing in terms of violation of the INF treaty,
    and then we will look at military options in order to respond
    to what we see in the threat. That is the basic structure of
    the nuclear posture review.
        Senator Reed. One of the disconcerting comments that the
    Russians continue to make is that they have a strategy now of
    escalate to deescalate with nuclear weapons. I think you quite
    succinctly describe that escalate to deescalate is not that. It
    is escalate to win, which forces us to escalate to stop them
    from winning. You know, no pun intended, but it is an escalator
    to catastrophe in my view.
        Can you comment upon that statement? You know, how do we
    deal with that?
        General Hyten. I think it is one of the most challenging
    military questions you have. The good news is that we are
    addressing it with our geographic combatant commanders in
    large-scale exercises. We just did one with the European
    Command. We will do one with the Pacific where we actually
    address what those situations really would look like. It is
    important that we look at them seriously, understand what those
    pieces are. When we say escalate to win, what does that really
    mean? In order for us to win, we have two choices: one, to
    prevent that escalation; or two, respond in such a way after
    that escalation that they would want to stop any aggression
    that they have going on. Both of those are challenging
    situations, and we have to walk through the various options,
    which we are.
        Senator Reed. It would seem to me also that there has to be
    some means to communicate to avoid sort of the misstep, if you
    will. Is that part of the gaming you are doing, kind of how do
    we communicate our intention not to accept this but to engage
    again? Is that part of it?
        General Hyten. I continue to advocate engagement. I know
    Secretary Mattis has said we have had a long history of
    engagement, not a long history of success. I certainly agree
    with that statement. But, nonetheless, I would like to have an
    aggressive State Department engagement, an aggressive
    Department of Defense engagement that includes mil-to-mil
    engagements with my counterparts in Russia, China in
    particular. I think it is always better to be able to pick up
    the phone and talk to somebody before something bad really
    happens to have some kind of relationship. Also I want to look
    across the table and make sure they understand I am very
    serious about this business.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, General.
        General Hyten. Thank you, Senator.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Inhofe?
        Senator Inhofe. General Hyten, I think we would all ask
    about the same questions that have been asked by the previous
    two members, and it is always a surprise when people find out
    that there is some question as to whether or not we have the
    capability that we know around this table and that you know we
    do not. You have said, of course--you made it very clear we
    have the oldest nuclear arsenal in the world, warheads and
    bombs produced 30-40 years ago, B-52 and all of that.
        The last time the 10-year posture review took place, there
    were assumptions. The chairman mentioned this in his opening
    statement. One of the assumptions--and this was for the 2010.
    Number one, Russia is no longer an adversary, and number two--
    and this is kind of disturbing--though the role of nuclear
    weapons in the United States national security and U.S.
    military strategy has been reduced significantly in recent
    decades, further reductions can and should be taken. How do you
    respond to those two assumptions? Bring that forward to the
    current day.
        General Hyten. From a military perspective, I think it is
    always important that anybody that has the threat to
    fundamentally destroy your nation, which is what Russia and
    China both have, they have to be considered an adversary. I
    think not considering them an adversary causes you to make
    decisions that could put the Nation at risk. Therefore, I have
    always considered Russia to be an adversary, a strategic
    competitor. I think it is important for us to look at Russia
    that way.
        The second piece of the equation. If you look back not just
    to the 2010 nuclear posture review, but if you look back 20
    years--and that is across multiple administrations, multiple
    Congresses, change of leadership in the military--you see a
    fundamental de-emphasis of nuclear weapons in our national
    security strategy. Then look at what our adversaries have done
    in response to that.
        I think the assumption would be if we lower the reliance on
    nuclear weapons and our adversaries do the same thing, they did
    just the opposite. Russia in 2006 started a huge, aggressive
    program to modernize and build new nuclear capabilities. They
    continue that to this day. New ballistic missiles, new weapons,
    new cruise missiles, significant air-launched cruise missile
    capabilities, now the ground-launched cruise missile
    capabilities. China has done the same thing. Hypersonic glide
    vehicles on both sides that bring new threats to bear. Our
    adversaries have taken the exact opposite view of our de-
    emphasis and have emphasized those nuclear capabilities once
    again.
        Senator Inhofe. That is right. They say further reductions
    can and should be taken. That is where we have been. It is very
    disturbing. I think tomorrow in a closed session, you might be
    thinking about an answer to the question because you say that
    Russia has always operated from a position of strength. We need
    to talk about the relative strength between us and Russia.
        The last thing I would mention is we have not spent quite
    as much time that I feel would be justified with North Korea.
    Admiral Gortney said it was prudent to assume--now this is a
    year ago--that North Korea could conduct a nuclear strike on
    the United States despite assessments of a very low probability
    of success. Well, that has changed now I think. They have
    advanced a long ways.
        I think in your statement, North Korea are actively
    developing ballistic missiles that could range the continental
    United States, conducted a nuclear test in September of last
    year, and appeared to be preparing to conduct another test in
    the near future. It is very disturbing.
        If you were to look at Russia, China, and North Korea and
    Iran, what would you believe would be the greatest threat? What
    bothers you the most?
        General Hyten. I think Russia is the greatest threat. What
    I am concerned about most nights is North Korea because we do
    have an effective deterrent today that I believe deters our
    adversaries, and if you watch the way Russia acts, every step
    is slow, but they are taking steps forward. China. They are
    acting, but every step is measured. North Korea. I am not sure
    exactly what they are going to do tonight. Every time there is
    a launch, February 11th, March the 5th this year, the whole
    network comes up. We bring the entire power of my command to
    bear on the problem, the power of Northern Command. We are
    looking at what we have to do. The Pacific. They are all
    involved. Those are very concerning moments to me because every
    time they launch, we are not sure if this is a threat missile
    or not.
        Senator Inhofe. Well, yes. I think you could probably say
    that North Korea is different from the rest in that they are
    totally unpredictable. Is that accurate?
        General Hyten. They are. I guess totally unpredictable
    would be a fair statement, sir, because every time they launch,
    I am not sure what that launch is going to be. That would be
    the definition of unpredictable.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, General.
        General Hyten. Thank you, Senator.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Shaheen?
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, General, for being here today.
        I want to follow that line of thinking because in your
    statement, you have been clear with us that our nuclear
    capabilities are the foundation and the bedrock of our defense.
    Certainly we saw that deterrence model during the Cold War, and
    you talked about it just now in terms of China and Russia. But
    do we have any reason to believe that North Korea is deterred
    at all by our nuclear armaments?
        General Hyten. I would have to say that they are deterred
    to a certain extent because fundamentally the existence of
    their nation is threatened by our strategic deterrent
    capability. There is a deterrent value.
        But their actions clearly show that the deterrent is
    fundamentally different when we think about North Korea. What
    impacts Kim Jong-un, what impacts the North Korean actions is a
    very difficult thing to understand, to get after. But the thing
    about North Korea is that given where it is on the globe, it is
    very important that our actions are in line with our allies,
    especially South Korea and Japan, because talk about in your
    back yard, it is in the back yard of South Korea and Japan.
        Senator Shaheen. As we look at what options we have to
    respond to what North Korea is doing, clearly sanctions are
    one, and we have imposed those and there is an effort to look
    at even stricter sanctions. What other options do we have in
    response to what North Korea is doing?
        General Hyten. I think any solution to the North Korean
    problem has to involve China. I am a military officer. My job
    is to provide military options to the President, and along with
    the other combatant commanders, I will always have military
    options ready for the President if he deems, in association
    with Congress, that there is something that we have to do. I
    will provide those military options. That is my job.
        But I look at it from a strategic perspective, and I cannot
    see a solution that does not involve China.
        Senator Shaheen. But China has suggested they do not have
    as much influence as we think that they do. Do you think that
    is accurate?
        General Hyten. Again, if you talk about in your back yard,
    China is the definition of North Korea's back yard. The trade
    that North Korea has really goes north across the Chinese
    border and south from China into North Korea. That is a
    significant element. But I am a military officer, not a State
    Department official or an economic expert. But I just look at
    the world and it is hard for me to see a solution without
    China.
        Senator Shaheen. You briefly touched on cybersecurity in
    your opening statement. More and more we are seeing that cyber
    is being used as a weapon by our opponents. I have asked this
    question to several generals and have not gotten a very clear
    answer about how we better coordinate our cyber activities and
    whether we have a cyber strategy that involves not just
    responding but also being aggressive about how we use cyber.
    How should we be thinking about that? Do you think that is an
    accurate assessment, or am I missing something?
        General Hyten. I think it is still an element that is the
    subject of significant discussion. I will try to clarify it
    from my perspective, and hopefully that is helpful to you.
        From my perspective, there are two elements of cyber. One
    is the military element, and the other is the broader civilian
    use of cyber. They require two different sets of authorities.
    But when I look at the cyberspace domain, the authorities that
    I think we need as a nation are no different than any of the
    authorities that we have in space, and air and land and
    maritime. We need to have the authorities that if there is a
    bad actor, a bad guy that is in the cyberspace domain, the
    focus of our military has to be to attack and eliminate the bad
    actor. But we cannot do that in a way that impacts the domain
    that we are operating in. But we should not be restricted on
    following that actor, wherever that actor goes.
        Senator Shaheen. Well, in fact, do we not have blurred
    lines when it comes to cyber today because we have--or at least
    based on what I have read, it appears that we have cyber actors
    that are doing the work for nation states, but they may not be
    in the military. How do we address those kinds of threats?
        General Hyten. To me, if the question is what effect are
    they trying to create, if the effect they are trying to create
    is a military effect, then it is the responsibility of U.S.
    Cyber Command to be able to respond to that. If it is a
    criminal effect, it is not the responsibility of Cyber Command.
    It is the responsibility of the Department of Homeland
    Security, working with the FBI [Federal Bureau of
    Investigation] and other elements to work with those kind of
    pieces. We need to draw those lines clearly and focus on the
    effect and the target not on the domain itself. When we just
    focus on the domain itself, that is when we get all the
    confusion because cyber is everywhere. Why should we stop a
    military action because a server happens to be located in a
    specific territory, including the United States? We have to
    look at it as an operating domain. The effect and the target
    are the key.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much.
        General Hyten. Thank you, ma'am.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Wicker?
        Senator Wicker. General Hyten, thank you for your service
    and for your testimony today.
        Mr. Chairman, I would like to add into record at this point
    an article in DOD [Department of Defense] News by Jim Garamone,
    published March 31st of this year.
        Chairman McCain. Without objection.
        [The information referred to follows:]

          STRATCOM COMMANDER MAKES CASE FOR MODERNIZING NUCLEAR TRIAD

    March 31, 2017
    News
    By Jim Garamone
    DOD News, Defense Media Activity

        ROSSLYN, VA--Nuclear capabilities are the bedrock of American
    defense and will remain so, the commander of U.S. Strategic Command
    said at the Military Reporters and Editors annual meeting here today.

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

      Air Force General John E. Hyten, commander of U.S. Strategic Command,
    and members of his staff depart a 37th Helicopter Squadron UH-1N Huey
    near a missile alert facility on the F.E. Warren Air Force Base,
    Wyoming, missile complex, February 22, 2017. Hyten toured the facility,
    giving him insight into the responsibilities of the airmen executing
    the nation's nuclear deterrence mission. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt.
    Christopher Ruano

        Air Force General John E. Hyten said the United States has about
    the right numbers of nuclear weapons, but they need to be modernized.
                           Saluting Stratcom's People
        Hyten saluted the sacrifices of the servicemembers under his
    command who stand watch as they maintain America's nuclear deterrent
    and other missions.
        ``Deterrence will always be cheaper than war, and there is nothing
    more expensive than losing a war,'' the general said, quoting from Air
    Force Chief of Staff General David L. Goldfein.
        Hyten said it will take roughly 6 percent of the defense budget to
    modernize the country's nuclear arsenal. Right now, nuclear arms take
    about 3.5 percent of the budget.
        ``We have to increase [spending] somewhere between 2.5 and 3
    percent,'' he said. ``That leaves 94 percent of our defense budget to
    do the things we have to. When you think of the survival of our
    nation--and I think that is the most important reason we have a
    military . . . the backstop of all of that is the nuclear enterprise.''
                Nuclear Deterrent: Backbone of Homeland Defense
        The general said it would irresponsible to not fund nuclear
    modernization, as the nuclear deterrent is the backbone of Homeland
    defense.
        Hyten said people often ask him if it is possible to eliminate
    nuclear weapons. They want to know if he can imagine a world without
    nukes. ``And the answer is yes, I can imagine a world without nuclear
    weapons,'' he said. ``In fact, I know what a world without nuclear
    weapons looks like, because we had a world without nuclear weapons
    until 1945.''
        He asked the reporters to imagine what the world was like in the 6
    years preceding the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. ``In
    those 6 years, the world in conflict killed somewhere between 60
    million and 80 million people,'' he said. ``That's about 33,000 people
    a day, a million people a month.''
        As horrible as the world is today, he said, there is nothing
    remotely resembling this situation. The world has seen bloody
    conflicts--Korea, Vietnam, Desert Storm, Enduring Freedom and Iraqi
    Freedom were awful, but nowhere near the level of carnage the world had
    experienced, he said.
        What changed in 1945, Hyten said, was the reality of nuclear
    weapons. Nuclear weapons, he added, prevented the major power conflict
    that had plagued the world in previous centuries.
        ``They prevented the kind of wanton destruction that you saw in
    World War II, and somehow the world has stayed that way,'' the general
    said.
                 Necessity to Modernize Nation's Nuclear Triad
        Hyten said nuclear weapons undergird the motto of Strategic Command
    and its predecessor organization, the Strategic Air Command: Peace is
    our profession.
        Deterrence has changed in the 21st Century, Hyten said, and the
    command must modernize the nuclear triad and the command-and-control
    systems that are part of them.
        ``The submarines are the most survivable element of it; the ICBMs
    are the most ready; the bombers are the most flexible,'' he said.
    ``When you put those pieces together, it gives our nation the ability
    to withstand any attack and respond if we are attacked, which means we
    won't be attacked.''

        Senator Wicker. General, in this article, you state that we
    need to spend roughly 6 percent of the defense budget to
    modernize our country's nuclear arsenal. That would be an
    increase from 3.5 percent currently. Over what period of time
    do we need to increase from 3.5 percent to 6 percent of the
    defense budget?
        General Hyten. In broadest terms, it is 30 years, but that
    is not perfectly accurate because there will be a peak and a
    valley. It will peak as we go into significant production
    levels. That will happen in approximately 10 years. That
    production peak will continue for roughly another decade as we
    deploy the new capabilities across each of the platforms I
    discussed earlier. Then it will drop off again over the last.
    But roughly, it is a 30-year time frame.
        Senator Wicker. Well, how about for the next few years?
        General Hyten. For the next few years, there will be a
    significant plus-up, but it will not grow to 6.5 percent until
    we actually get into the development programs, which are a
    couple years away.
        Senator Wicker. You quote approvingly the Air Force Chief
    of Staff General Goldfein in this article. Is this a position
    of General Goldfein?
        General Hyten. That is the position of the United States
    Air Force and General Goldfein and the Acting Secretary
    Disbrow.
        Senator Wicker. Is it the position, to your knowledge, of
    the Secretary of Defense?
        General Hyten. To my knowledge, the Secretary of Defense
    supports--I know he supports modernizing the triad. He
    testified in front of this committee to that effect. But we
    will address all those issues in the nuclear posture review
    with the new administration. Just to emphasize that point
    again, I think it is a point to remember. The new
    administration will take a look at the entire threat posture,
    the entire modernization plan, but the Secretary of Defense,
    the Air Force leadership, and the Navy leadership have all
    pledged support to modernizing the triad.
        Senator Wicker. Now, in mentioning your priorities in
    response to an earlier question, you mentioned five priorities
    in modernization, and the first one you mentioned was
    submarines, the Ohio replacement or the Columbia-class. I was
    interested to see that you listed that first. Would it be
    correct to say that not only is the first thing you mentioned,
    but it is your first priority?
        General Hyten. The first priority is the triad. Inside the
    triad, the first priority is the submarine. But it is important
    to note that the triad as a whole has to be modernized.
    Nonetheless, if we do not get after the submarine, then we run
    a very precipitous risk in about a decade as the Ohio-class
    reaches end of life.
        Senator Wicker. That was going to be my next question. You
    painted a painted a pretty grim picture of the future of the
    Ohio-class if we do not start moving. I think you said that it
    will be dangerous to actually put it under the water.
        General Hyten. You can probably tell from my uniform I am
    not a naval officer.
        Senator Wicker. I do see that.
        General Hyten. But I do have good friends who are naval
    officers, who are submariners, and they have gone through the
    analysis with me in detail, including my deputy, Vice Admiral
    Chas Richard. We have gone through that in detail, and they can
    tell me that each submarine is built to go down under pressure
    a certain number of times, and once you reach the end of life,
    you know when that is and you can predict very accurately when
    that is. Once you reach the end of life, it cannot go down
    anymore. A submarine on the top of the water is not an
    effective deterrent.
        Senator Wicker. That end of life might occur as soon as
    when?
        General Hyten. It starts towards the end of the next
    decade. I can go into the details of when that would be in the
    closed hearing tomorrow, but it is towards the end of the next
    decade.
        Senator Wicker. What can you tell us in this venue today
    about the modernized features of this new Columbia-class
    submarine?
        General Hyten. I think the most significant element of the
    modernized feature is the actual nuclear reactor. The nuclear
    reactor on the Ohio-class systems basically required refuel and
    refit midway through its service life. The Columbia-class will
    have a 42-year reactor. Once it goes in service, besides the
    normal maintenance and routine servicing, it will not have to
    come back for a refueling of the reactor, which will allow us
    to operate with 12 Columbia submarines versus 14 of the Ohio-
    class.
        Senator Wicker. What about advanced materials in these new
    subs?
        General Hyten. There will be significant advanced
    materials, but I cannot talk about that in detail in this
    hearing. But it will be materials that will increase the
    survivability and performance of the submarine in a threat
    environment.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you, sir.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Kaine?
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Thank you, General Hyten.
        For the hearing last year, this posture hearing, the
    written testimony had this quote in it. There is continued
    adherence to the new strategic arms reduction, New START, by
    both nations. That is a quote, and that meant the United States
    and Russia. Is that still the case?
        General Hyten. That is still the case, Senator. The next
    key date is 2018. That is when we have to meet the New START
    limits. We are on track to do that. As far as we can tell, the
    Russians are on track to do that. But that 2018 date, early
    2018, we will watch that very closely.
        Senator Kaine. That testimony was also in the testimony
    from last year. We are on track to achieve New START limits of
    1,550 deployed warheads and 700 deployed delivery systems by
    February 2018. As far as you know, we are on track and the
    Russians are on track for their obligations as well.
        General Hyten. I know we are on track, and the reports I
    get from the intelligence community and from the State
    Department is the Russians are on track as well.
        Senator Kaine. Have you been directed to review the
    agreement or in any change our plans for compliance with the
    agreement?
        General Hyten. I have not been directed to review the New
    START agreement. I am reviewing the INF agreement based on the
    recent----
        Senator Kaine. Russian activity.
        General Hyten. Russian activity.
        Senator Kaine. But in terms of compliance with the New
    START agreement, you have not been directed to review or offer
    advice about changing strategies on compliance with New START.
        General Hyten. No specific direction on that, Senator.
        Senator Kaine. In your opinion, would it be in the U.S.'s
    strategic interests to increase our nuclear weapons stockpiles?
        General Hyten. I have stated on the record multiple times--
    I will state it on the record again today--I support the limits
    that are in the New START. I also look out to the future and
    understand there are non-accountable weapons especially in the
    Russian side that we need to start addressing. But from a
    strategic weapons perspective, I support the limits that are in
    the New START.
        Senator Kaine. Senator Wicker was asking you about the
    Columbia-class. Will the Columbia-class require a change in the
    design and plans for the Trident missile, kind of a design
    change?
        General Hyten. It will not require a design change. We will
    be able to walk into that. But Admiral Terry Benedict, the
    Director of Strategic Programs in the Navy, has begun to look
    at the Trident to make sure that we have a plan for how we
    would modernize that capability sometime in the future. But
    that is not on the near term list or on my priority list to
    worry about right now.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you for that.
        You have a brief section of testimony at page 13 of your
    written testimony about cyber. I applaud the direction signed
    into law in the fiscal year 2017 National Defense Authorization
    Act and remain committed to the elevation of U.S. Cyber Command
    to a unified command as soon as possible.
        Could you talk a little bit about what is the status of
    efforts to do that? Are there milestone dates that have been
    set, and what is our progress towards those milestones?
        General Hyten. Admiral Rogers, the Commander of U.S. Cyber
    Command--we have submitted our plan to the administration. It
    is now going through their evaluation. The administration gets
    a vote. The Secretary of Defense gets a vote. I will just say
    that both Admiral Rogers and I would like that to happen sooner
    rather than later just to normalize that command and make sure
    that we can kind of develop normal command relationships
    between Cyber Command and all the combatant commanders,
    including U.S. Strategic Command.
        Senator Kaine. This is a consensus set of recommendations
    that you have delivered to the administration.
        General Hyten. We have.
        Senator Kaine. The last question is this. Anti-access/area
    denial systems are more commonplace now. Does that render
    weapons like the B-61 sort of becoming obsolete, and is there a
    need for additional systems like gravity bombs as part of a
    future deterrent to take care of the A2/AD [Anti Access/Area
    Denial] systems?
        General Hyten. I think from the air perspective of the
    triad, the three elements: a stealth bomber, which is the B-21
    that can penetrate air defense systems; a gravity bomb that
    could provide flexible options because that provides the most
    flexible element of the triad because that gives the President
    the most time to make a decision; and then the air-launched
    cruise missile, which basically improves the flexibility of the
    B-21 because really the last thing you want to do is have a
    bomber that is only able to attack a target right below it. You
    want it to be able to reach out. Those three elements together
    create the most flexibility in the air leg of the triad, and
    that is our recommended program that the Congress has
    supported.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Fischer?
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Welcome, General. It is a pleasure to see you again.
        We have had some discussion on this in previous questions
    about the different geopolitical landscape that we are living
    in today, and some describe it as a return to the great-power
    competition. Russia and China are deploying far more capable
    nuclear systems than they were in 2010.
        What implications do you think that this has on our nuclear
    forces? Specifically, do you believe it increases their
    importance and the need to modernize them? You have touched on
    this, but I would like to hear your firm answer.
        General Hyten. The key element is always having a ready,
    reliable strategic deterrent. We have that today. Even though
    our adversaries have modernized their nuclear capabilities, we
    still have an effective deterrent. The question will we have an
    effective deterrent 10 years from now and 20 years from now.
    The answer to that has to be yes. That is why we have to
    modernize, and that is why it has to be a significant priority
    for this country.
        Deterrence is going to be expensive, but war is always more
    expensive than deterrence.
        Senator Fischer. The chairman asked you about the platforms
    and the need to modernize those. You were referring to the B-1
    and the GBSD [Ground Based Strategic Deterrent], the LRSO [Long
    Range Stand-Off], the Columbia-class, and the need to continue
    on and meet those deadlines and meet them in a timely manner to
    make sure that we do have the resources necessary.
        When we look at the new posture report that is going to be
    coming out, do you believe that that report should validate
    those programs?
        General Hyten. I do, and I have stated that to the
    administration. I have stated that to my boss. But the nuclear
    posture review should look at the entire enterprise. It should
    also look at things beyond what is in the triad. We should look
    at what do we have to do to respond to the INF breakout. What
    do we have to do to respond to now a ground-launched cruise
    missile? Hypersonic glide vehicles are threats that both Russia
    and China are building now. They are very significant in terms
    of our ability to see them and provide warning. We need to
    figure out how to deal with those. But I think the baseline is
    the triad, and the baseline is modernizing the triad.
        Senator Fischer. In response to Senator Inhofe, you were
    talking about the escalate/deescalate in our relationship with
    Russia. A former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown said in 1979
    that the Soviet spending has shown no response to United States
    restraint. When we build, they build. When we cut, they build.
        From your comments, I would assume that you agree with
    those remarks from Secretary Brown.
        General Hyten. Well, I look at the evidence, and the
    evidence is when we de-emphasize nuclear weapons, both our
    primary adversaries, Russia and China, have both increased
    their focus on nuclear weapons. Advanced capabilities. They
    also looked at now threatening space and threatening
    cyberspace. They went a significant direction and a different
    deterrent element than we did. I believe you always have to
    look at your adversaries and understand what they do and then
    make sure you are in a position of strength relative to your
    adversaries. That is what deterrence is all about.
        Senator Fischer. The chairman also asked you about Russia's
    violation of the INF treaty. Do you believe that we need to
    respond to that violation? The previous administration talked
    about counterforce options and countervailing capabilities,
    active defenses, but ultimately took no action to develop
    those. Do you think that we need to now?
        General Hyten. I think every step that Russia takes has to
    be responded to. This is just the next step, and we have to
    figure out as a Nation how to respond. It is not necessarily a
    military response, but the Nation has to figure out how to
    respond.
        Senator Fischer. In this setting, can you tell us which
    options you believe would be the most effective?
        General Hyten. No, ma'am, not in this setting. Those
    choices are my boss' choices as well. But I will be glad to
    talk to that in a closed hearing tomorrow.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you.
        In your opening statement, you note the unauthorized
    flights of unmanned aerial systems over Navy and Air Force
    installations. Can you discuss this in greater detail? Are
    these incidental activities, or do you believe they are
    deliberate actions?
        General Hyten. I think so far they have been incidental
    activities, but the fact that they are occurring and then if
    you watch what is happening overseas in the CENTCOM [Central
    Command] theater with the use of lethal UAVs [unmanned aerial
    vehicles] and the use of UAVs for surveillance on the part of a
    terrorist adversary, I am very concerned that those same kind
    of UAVs could be employed against our weapon storage
    facilities, especially on the nuclear weapon storage
    facilities.
        Just in the last week, I have signed out guidance to my
    forces to give them kind of parameters on how they should
    respond if they see a threat UAV or a surveillance UAV and to
    give them specific guidance. A young marine at King's Bay or an
    airman at F.E. Warren does not have to worry about what should
    I be doing when I see that. I provided very specific guidance
    that is classified guidance, but I would be glad to share that
    with the committee.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Warren?
        Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, General Hyten, for your leadership and for your
    generosity with your time yesterday visiting my office.
        I just quickly want to ask you about the importance of our
    non-military foreign assistance and other civilian instruments
    of national power to your mission. General, is it accurate to
    say that you work with the State Department and other civilian
    partners on nuclear nonproliferation and other efforts to
    detect and deter strategic threats to the United States?
        General Hyten. We have a very active role with the State
    Department not just on the nuclear side but on space and cyber
    as well because each of those is a very international set of
    issues, and the State Department has been very aggressive in
    working those issues along with U.S. Strategic Command and the
    other combatant commands as well.
        Senator Warren. Thank you.
        The budget proposal put out by the Trump administration
    calls for about a 29 percent cut to the State Department and
    significant cuts to other agencies with international
    responsibilities.
        General, I want to ask you a narrower question. Would
    funding cuts to agencies that conduct diplomacy and other
    civilian functions make your job easier or more difficult?
        General Hyten. I am not an expert on the budgets----
        Senator Warren. I am not asking you to be one.
        General Hyten. But I can tell you that I feel I desperately
    need and all the military commanders need an active foreign
    engagement process that uses the Department of State. We need
    that kind of partnership. We need the State Department reaching
    out into the international community. It cannot be left to the
    military to do those kind of pieces. The State Department does.
    I have had great relationships with men and women in the State
    Department that have helped us significantly over the years. We
    need to have that continue into the future, as well as other
    departments that reach out.
        Senator Warren. I take it from what you are saying--I am
    sorry to interrupt, but I just have limited time here--that
    significant cuts would make it more difficult for you to do
    your part of your job.
        General Hyten. I would have to look at where the cuts are,
    and I have not looked at where the cuts are. But I need that
    support.
        Senator Warren. You need that support.
        Let me ask you another question, General. As you know, the
    nuclear command, control, and communications, NC3 [Nuclear
    Command and Control], system is critically important to
    providing secure and agile communications between our field
    forces and the President in case of a nuclear attack or other
    nuclear-related emergency. You expressed concern before this
    committee last year about the aging capabilities of the NC3
    system and the need to modernize it. As Chairman McCain noted
    earlier, you publicly said just last month that, quote, any
    delay, deferment, or cancellation of NC3 modernization will
    create a capability gap potentially degrading the President's
    ability to respond appropriately to a strategic threat.
        I assume you still feel that way. Is that right?
        General Hyten. I do. It is my biggest concern on the
    modernization effort.
        Senator Warren. Biggest concern.
        Let me ask you, are you confident that the Department is
    providing the funding and staffing necessary to keep NC3 on
    track?
        General Hyten. I am confident that the Department has taken
    the right steps. The funding is now rolling in the right place.
    The staffing is not quite there yet, especially on the Air
    Force side. We had a hiring plan that was delayed slightly by
    the hiring freeze. We were given authority to waive that for
    critical nuclear missions. We have done that through the Air
    Force. The Air Force is now beginning to hire those folks.
        But the challenge is once you start hiring those people, it
    is not like overnight that all of a sudden the problem is
    solved. They have to come on board, become experts. That takes
    a matter of time. Even though the funding is flowing, we have a
    good plan, people are coming, it is not an overnight solution
    to the problem which is why it requires constant attention.
        Senator Warren. I appreciate that.
        We need to have a secure and reliable NC3 capability, which
    is why I agree that NC3 modernization without delay should be a
    top priority. We have the most potent nuclear triad on earth,
    but it becomes much less useful if NC3 ages out and does not
    work effectively.
        I have just under a minute left, but I would like to ask
    you very briefly about the resiliency of the satellite
    constellations that we rely on for civilian and military
    communications. Do you have confidence in the ability of our
    communications satellites to withstand jamming? How are you
    thinking about integrating our satellites into the Department's
    overall operational plan?
        General Hyten. I have not been happy with how we are
    structured from a resilient perspective with satellite
    communications. There are two elements. Number one, I think we
    need to change our architectures and build a more resilient
    architecture so that we can more effectively fight in the
    future. The second piece of that is that we have to figure out
    how to use the capabilities we have today in a better way. We
    have actually built significant anti-jam and warfighting
    capability into many of our satellites, but we do not have the
    means to effectively command and control it at the time of a
    fight. We need to work both of those things, Senator, in the
    future.
        Senator Warren. Thank you, and we can do more follow-up on
    this later. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Rounds?
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Hyten, first of all, thank you for your service to
    our country.
        In the Defense Science Board's February of 2017 task force
    report on cyber deterrence, two recommendations are provided to
    improve the cyber resilience of the U.S. nuclear forces. One
    recommendation was that the Secretary of Defense direct you to
    conduct an annual assessment of the cyber resilience of the
    U.S. nuclear deterrent, including all essential nuclear
    components. These would include nuclear command, control, and
    communications, as Senator Warren was alluding to, the
    platforms, the delivery systems, and the warheads.
    Specifically, you would be directed to state your degree of
    confidence in the mission assurance of the nuclear deterrent
    against a top tier cyber threat.
        What do you consider to be a top tier cyber threat to our
    Nation's nuclear systems?
        General Hyten. I see a top tier cyber threat being Russia
    and China in particular because they have the ability to
    threaten the existence of this Nation. One of the reasons you
    have to be able to protect the nuclear command and control
    capability is that is fundamental to deterrence. If that is
    ever brought into question, that lowers our deterrent posture
    to top tier threats, and we have to make sure we never allow
    that to happen.
        Senator Rounds. What can Congress do to help you mitigate
    this threat to our nuclear systems?
        General Hyten. I think the Congress can be very demanding
    of the services to make sure that as we modernize our nuclear
    command and control capability, we just do not modernize a 20th
    century architecture, in other words, move from 8\1/2\-inch
    floppy disks to 5-inch floppy disks. That is really not of
    interest. We have to modernize the entire architecture. As you
    see the modernization plans coming in, make sure, number one,
    it is a 21st Century information architecture, and number two,
    make sure that we are cyber secure as we go through that
    because we will introduce cyber vulnerabilities as we walk into
    that. But if you work it right from the beginning, you can make
    sure that that threat is mitigated as we go forward.
        Senator Rounds. The Defense Science Board also recommended
    that the DOD acquisition executive oversee immediate
    establishment of a program of action with milestones to support
    cyber certification of U.S. nuclear forces, as well as nuclear
    command, control, and communications. This certification
    process would assume considered adversary attack against
    nuclear systems based on extensive preparation. Examples are
    attacks via the supply chain, insider threats, and physical
    sabotage or attack, in addition to remote cyber attacks.
        Are you confident that the timeline for initial and full
    operational capability of the cyber mission teams that are
    tasked to support your command are proceeding at a pace that
    would enable you to meet such a certification? I noticed that
    you indicated that perhaps the Air Force is a little bit behind
    in their time frame.
        General Hyten. The answer is yes and no, Senator. Yes, I am
    happy with where the cyber mission force is going right now,
    but the no part is that I do not think the cyber mission force
    currently has the capacity necessary to meet all of the
    requirements that we have across the Department.
        We have also divided the cyber mission force, you know,
    assigned to different combatant commanders. I have certain
    assigned elements of the cyber mission force. General
    Scaparrotti does. Admiral Harris does. I think we have to start
    looking at cyber like we look at special operations, as a high-
    demand, low-density element that we need to allocate to the
    highest priority, and we have to look at that from the top
    level down. I will work inside the Department to advocate for
    those kind of capabilities because the demand signal is going
    to go nowhere but up and the capacity is not sufficient to meet
    all of the demand.
        Senator Rounds. As you know, until now, DOD has envisioned
    a force of up to 100 combat-coded B-21 bombers. I am very
    concerned this number may be a budget rather than strategy-
    driven determinative. Also I have heard discussion within the
    Air Force circles of the need for a larger number of these
    aircraft based purely on operational requirements. Do you think
    we may need more than 100 of these aircraft?
        General Hyten. I have not seen the bomber vector road map
    yet from the Air Force. I put a demand signal out from my
    command to the Air Force to let me see that plan because I want
    to be able to support that plan, but I have to see it. I have
    to see the details to understand it.
        From the top level, I think 100 is sufficient from an
    operational perspective, not a budget perspective. The reason I
    think it from a top level is that I have a certain requirement
    in the New START for a certain number of nuclear capable
    bombers, and then we have an additional capacity on the
    conventional side. When you put that together, you come to
    about 100.
        Nonetheless, I have not seen the details yet from the Air
    Force. I will see the details shortly. I know it is done.
    General Rand and General Goldfein have both told me it is about
    done. But I need to see that so I can better answer that
    question, Senator.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, General.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Peters?
        Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Hyten, thank you for being here. Thank you for your
    leadership as well.
        General Hyten, in your response to advance questions that
    you submitted to this committee last September, you agreed that
    additional analysis is needed before making a decision on
    whether to deploy an additional missile defense site, including
    an analysis of the missile threat specifically from Iran. You
    have also indicated that you believe the response to missile
    threats must consider, quote, the entire package of capability
    from additional interceptors to supporting sensors and command
    and control.
        In your testimony today, you identify three necessary
    missile defense upgrades including upgrading the kill vehicle
    of ground-based interceptors, continued development of long-
    range discriminating radar, and improving regional missile
    defense capabilities. I understand that some of these
    investments would improve a potential additional missile
    defense site. It would also be a part of that package and may
    make sense to make that investment.
        But in a March of 2015 briefing to the Subcommittee on
    Strategic Forces, Lieutenant General Mann, former Commander of
    the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, affirmed that
    the ground-based mid-course defense system remains our Nation's
    only defense against an ICBM attack.
        Without making a judgment--the question is without making a
    judgment on deploying an additional missile defense site--I do
    not expect that today. But if the decision is to deploy a new
    missile defense site, how long do you expect that construction
    would take? How long would it take to come online?
        General Hyten. The specific question is once you make a
    decision on an additional site, you are many years, 5 to 10
    years, away from that site being able to come online.
        Based on my confirmation hearing and my lack of full depth
    into it, I met with Admiral Sering, the Director of the Missile
    Defense Agency a few times now. We have gone through his
    programs. We can talk about that in a little more detail in the
    closed hearing. But fundamentally I see a need to have a
    reliable kill vehicle, a multi-object kill vehicle, better
    sensors, including a space-based layer for the mid-course
    discrimination, and then additional capacity.
        But I want to make sure that those priorities are
    understood to the committee because those priorities are
    important to me because if we just go for the additional
    capacity, I am not sure we are going to be making the right
    architectural decisions about how we deal with the pending
    threat in the future. I want to make sure we do that right. We
    have some time, not a lot of time, but we have some time to
    make those decisions.
        We will have a ballistic missile defense review in this
    administration in addition to the nuclear posture review. That
    will be another 6-month study that is not yet to kick off but
    will soon.
        Senator Peters. I want to expand a little on the `some
    time.' As you mentioned, you have to make the decision first to
    go forward with the site, but then you are looking to anywhere
    from 5 to 10 years before that site actually becomes
    operational. My concern is that if we wait until a country like
    Iran, for example, develops missiles that threaten the
    Homeland, we may be too late given that long timeline. That is
    why I know the work on an environmental impact study for
    potential sites is already underway.
        But maybe your assessment--are you confident that even if
    we started today, over 5 years or the 10 years, we would be
    able to construct these sites, that the missile threat from
    Iran and elsewhere will not continue to grow or eventually
    outpace our ability to bring these defenses online?
        General Hyten. I am always concerned about timelines
    because our acquisition system has not been very effective in
    the last 10 years in delivering things on time. When I give
    broad statements like 5 to 10 years, it is broad because the
    acquisition system is not very reliable in terms of defining
    what those pieces are. It is broad because there are policy
    debates that have to happen. But I think we are going to have
    to make that decision pretty soon about where we are going to
    go.
        I think we have the data we need, and we will feed that
    into the ballistic missile defense review. I would expect
    coming out of the ballistic missile defense review some very
    specific recommendations about what we have to do that will
    probably come from the Missile Defense Agency.
        Senator Peters. Thank you, General.
        General Hyten. Thank you.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Ernst?
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Thanks for your testimony today, General Hyten. I
    appreciate your candid comments, the comments that we had in
    our discussion yesterday in the office. I am grateful that we
    can have an open session so the folks in the Midwest can hear
    how important STRATCOM is to our global safety. The fact that
    STRATCOM is only 45 minutes from my hometown of Red Oak makes
    it even that much more important to the folks living in
    southwest Iowa. I look forward to hearing more on your answers
    today.
        We did talk a little bit about the Emerging Threats and
    Capabilities Subcommittee that I chair. I do appreciate your
    comments about STRATCOM and its contribution to developing the
    third offset strategy. That is very important in our
    discussions in that subcommittee.
        Yesterday in the meeting, you highlighted the need to also
    incorporate the concept of operations associated with the third
    offset strategy as we look towards defining it. From our
    nuclear triad to the stealth capabilities, it is vital to
    national security that the United States continues to stay
    ahead of its adversaries. You have talked about a number of
    those today.
        Can you explain the importance of developing a third offset
    strategy specifically as we watch our adversaries develop
    capabilities that match our own?
        General Hyten. I think the third offset strategy in its
    most simple terms is what is the next fundamental step that we
    have to take as a Nation to jump ahead of our adversaries. That
    is what the first two offsets basically were when you look back
    in time. I think the opportunity we have right now is how do we
    fundamentally change the human-machine interface. How do we
    change the whole command and control structure? How do we
    actually get to new capabilities?
        But as we look at these technologies and we look at the
    technologies both in Silicon Valley and Cambridge and a number
    of places where the Department of Defense is engaging, we have
    to put that in an operational context. You just cannot take a
    commercial technology and say, boom, there is your magic third
    offset. You have to figure out what is the operational
    construct that we are going to use in order to do that.
        In space, the Deputy Secretary of Defense has said that the
    interagency space operations center, which we just renamed the
    National Space Defense Center, so that everybody can understand
    finally what it is--it is a national space defense center--was
    the first operational element of that because basically we put
    a bunch of smart people in the room with a bunch of
    capabilities and said figure out how to go faster. It is
    amazing how fast they have been able to go when you break down
    all the barriers. This Nation can go fast. That is what the
    third offset is really about.
        But our acquisition process likes to go slow. That will be
    the challenge. How do we go fast in defining what the third
    offset is? How do we define those things and build them
    quickly, how to deploy it in the force to stay ahead of our
    adversaries and not become too bureaucratic about the next
    step?
        Senator Ernst. I appreciate that.
        You mentioned breaking down the barriers. We had a great
    conversation, a little off topic, but a great conversation
    about acquisition yesterday in the office. Do you think our
    failing acquisition system is impacting our ability to develop
    and procure the new technologies that are necessary for that
    third offset?
        General Hyten. I think the challenge that we have is it is
    not the people that do the acquisition. They are still
    spectacular people. But we have not delegated them the
    authority and responsibility, and we do not hold them
    accountable for making the decisions to deliver capabilities.
    All those decisions are brought up into this town into the
    Pentagon, into the Capitol, and it hurts the ability of a
    program director to actually make the decisions, work with the
    industry, and deliver those capabilities. They spend all their
    time trying to get a program through the Pentagon, not trying
    to deliver the capability we need as a Nation. I think
    fundamentally we have to change that focus to let those great
    people that do that business every day focus on delivering
    those capabilities and then hold them accountable because I
    grew up in that business as a young lieutenant and a captain
    and my bosses were held accountable. There were some
    spectacular failures. But I always remember there are 10 people
    in line to step and take those jobs because they wanted the
    authority and responsibility.
        Senator Ernst. I absolutely agree, and I think that is
    something that this committee should work on. Thank you,
    General Hyten, for your time.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Blumenthal?
        Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        I know that you recently toured the 37th Helicopter
    Squadron at Warren Air Force Base, and my question really
    concerns the fleet that protects the ICBM fleet and the
    national capital region. In early February, the Air Force
    announced their anticipated request for proposal for the Huey
    replacement program--as you know, that was to be released at
    the end of February--would not occur until this summer because
    none of the companies offering a replacement helicopter were
    able to meet all the threshold requirements. The Huey
    replacement program has been discussed in some form or fashion
    since, I think, 2001. The most recent acquisition strategy had
    the first operational helicopter delivery scheduled for the
    first quarter of fiscal year 2020, and it is now another year
    delayed by Air Force estimates to the second quarter of fiscal
    year 2021.
        In my view, we can ill afford this kind of delay. I have
    written numerous letters to the previous administration urging
    that they expedite this replacement.
        Do you have any opinions as to what can be done to expedite
    this program? Do you agree that it should be expedited I guess
    is the first question.
        General Hyten. Of all the things in my portfolio, I cannot
    even describe how upset I get about the helicopter replacement
    program. It is a helicopter, for gosh sakes. We ought to be
    able to go out and buy a helicopter and put it in the hands of
    the people that need it, and we should be able to do that
    quickly. We have been building combat helicopters for a long
    time in this country. I do not understand why the heck it is so
    hard to buy. I wrote the requirements document for that
    helicopter when I was Director of Requirements at Air Force
    Space Command in 2007, and now it is 2017, 10 years later, and
    we are still arguing about a helicopter.
        We had a request for forces in to provide a temporary
    replacement. I pulled that request for forces from STRATCOM
    because I want all hands on deck to get a new helicopter into
    the force that we should--as soon as possible. All I can tell
    you, Senator, as the Commander of Strategic Command, I will put
    every influence I can on the United States Air Force to deliver
    that capability sooner rather than later. I cannot tell you how
    upset I was when I pulled the RFF and shortly thereafter was
    told that there would be a delay in the program. That is just
    unacceptable to me.
        Senator Blumenthal. Well, your very forthright and valuable
    response has just eliminated a whole line of questions that I
    was going to have for you.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Blumenthal. But I do have one more question which
    concerns the Columbia-class.
        By the way, very seriously, I welcome your focus on this
    issue, and if there is anything I can do or I hope the
    committee can do--I do not mean to speak for the committee, but
    it is a simple but profoundly important problem to safeguard
    the ICBMs in the north capital region.
        General Hyten. Hugely important.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
        On the Columbia-class, are you satisfied with the pace of
    development of the Columbia-class, which is so important, as
    you mentioned earlier, to the triad program?
        General Hyten. I am. I am very appreciative of the United
    States Navy for making it the number one program in the United
    States Navy. I certainly agree with that priority. But there
    are a lot of challenges in the Navy portfolio, and the fact
    that they have made that the number one priority and the fact
    that the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Richardson, is
    going to be looking at that very closely gives me confidence
    that we will get there.
        Nonetheless, we require a stable budget, stable funding,
    aggressive approach by the United States Navy in order to do
    that. All those things are challenging in today's environment.
    But I am comfortable with where the Navy is right now.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Cotton?
        Senator Cotton. I would like to associate myself with the
    remarks of Senator Blumenthal on the helicopter program. I
    appreciate that you take the issue so seriously, General.
        Some claim that the long-range stand-off cruise missile, a
    new air-launched cruise missile, would be destabilizing. Do you
    believe the LRSO would be destabilizing, and if so, why? If
    not, why not?
        General Hyten. Senator, I do not believe it is
    destabilizing. I believe it is a critical element of our
    architecture. We have had air-launched cruise missiles, nuclear
    cruise missiles since 1960. The current fleet was first
    declared operational in 1981. An element of our architecture
    that our adversaries have significant numbers of like and
    modernized air-launched cruise missiles that can bring a threat
    to the United States tells me that we have to be able to have
    that capability as we look to the future. I do not believe it
    is destabilizing. I think it is a critical element of the
    architecture, and it has been an element of the architecture
    for many, many decades.
        Senator Cotton. Your recommendation is that we proceed with
    an LRSO program.
        General Hyten. I think it is essential to the modernization
    of the triad.
        Senator Cotton. You touched briefly earlier on the concept
    of having a stealth aircraft that has to be directly over the
    target. You are referring to the B-21 I presume.
        General Hyten. Yes, sir.
        Senator Cotton. Without a new air-launched cruise missile,
    you foresee a future in which that B-21 might have to penetrate
    into advanced air defenses rather than being able to use a
    stand-off cruise missile?
        General Hyten. I can show you the details tomorrow. I will
    bring a map tomorrow to show you why we need a mix of
    capabilities, B-21, gravity bombs, as well as the air-launched
    cruise missiles, so you can see the details. But those three
    elements are a critical part of the architecture. You want a
    bomber to be able to range beyond single point targets. It is
    not the survivability of the bomber. It is the ability of the
    bomber to access targets.
        Senator Cotton. But in an unclassified setting, it stands
    to reason if you do not have an air-launched cruise missile and
    the bomber has to be essential over the target, which means----
        General Hyten. It has to be over the target.
        Senator Cotton.--over the air defense systems.
        General Hyten. Which is over the air defense systems in
    many cases. But it also means that I am limited to the number
    of targets I can access.
        Senator Cotton. Stealth technology has advanced
    considerably over the last 30 years. Are our adversaries'
    radars advancing as well to counteract our advances in stealth
    technology?
        General Hyten. They are, and it is a game of point and
    counterpoint. We make an advance; they make an advance. The B-
    21 will stay ahead of those advances. We have to continue to
    stay ahead of those advances. That is another reason why the B-
    21 is an important element of the architecture.
        Senator Cotton. Another reason why the long-range stand-off
    cruise missile is an important development because we have to
    expect our adversaries' radars will continue to improve?
        General Hyten. There is always the opportunity of a
    breakout too. You do not want to be stuck in a one-solution
    game when you have the opportunity to have multiple solutions.
        Senator Cotton. I want to turn to the Intermediate-Range
    Nuclear Forces Treaty. You touched on that briefly earlier.
    General Selva has stated to the House Armed Services Committee
    that now Russia has deployed in operational mode a ground-
    launched cruise missile that violates the INF Treaty.
        How destabilizing is it to Europe and how threatening is it
    to our citizens and troops and interests in Europe for Russia
    to have that capability?
        General Hyten. The single missile is--and I will show you
    were it is deployed tomorrow. A single missile is not that
    destabilizing. The action of breaching that treaty and moving
    into that area and if they deploy large numbers and they move
    them into the west of Russia, that creates a very significant
    threat to our European allies. That is why I believe we need to
    address it right up front. As a whole-of-government, how do we
    respond to that decision by the Russians to break out of that
    treaty?
        Senator Cotton. Is it fair to say the INF Treaty is a
    treaty that is more beneficial to the United States than it is
    to Russia or was for the Soviet Union since we do not have many
    enemies on our borders who want to fire ground-launched cruise
    missiles at us?
        General Hyten. We have notified Congress and the
    administration that we are going to do a detailed assessment of
    the INF Treaty from all military aspects. We will do that as
    part of the nuclear posture review. But we are also going to do
    that as a--provide our military judgment to the political
    leadership of what that INF Treaty really means to the United
    States.
        Senator Cotton. When you say a whole-of-government effort,
    your point there is that the Department of State and the
    various international and economic agencies and organizations
    in our government have some role to play as well in determining
    what the American response to these INF Treaty violations will
    be?
        General Hyten. Especially the Department of State.
        Senator Cotton. From a military standpoint, is it
    threatening to U.S. interests to have potential Russian ground-
    launched cruise missiles counteracted only by 30-year-old
    aircraft and aging warheads in Europe?
        General Hyten. It is a concern to the European theater, a
    concern to NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization]. We have
    to work it as well inside the NATO alliance. Again, I am not in
    NATO. I do not have a NATO hat. I am not a diplomat. But
    fundamentally all of those elements have to look at the problem
    of a ground-launched cruise missile again which we have not
    seen in that part of the world for quite some time.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you, General. My time has expired.
        General Hyten. Thank you, Senator.
        Chairman McCain. Senator King?
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I would appreciate it, General, if you scientists could
    figure out a way that we could be in two places at once. This
    morning ironically there is a hearing upstairs in the Energy
    Committee where I just went and came back on cyber and our
    vulnerability.
        Let me ask a couple of questions. CYBERCOM is being
    elevated to a full combatant command, and you have talked about
    how that is proceeding. The next question is splitting CYBERCOM
    and NSA [National Security Agency] of the dual hat role. What
    has to happen for that to occur? In other words, where is the
    benchmark where we can start to talk about it? Because a full
    combatant command in CYBERCOM is a big responsibility.
        General Hyten. I will describe that in kind of two levels.
    We can have a more detailed discussion in the closed hearing
    tomorrow.
        But at the broadest level at the unclassified side, before
    we separate Cyber Command from the National Security Agency, we
    need to have Department of Defense service-owned cyber
    platforms to operate on. Again at the broadest unclassified
    terms, one of the reasons that Cyber Command and the National
    Security Agency are combined today is because they use the same
    platform. We need to have a different set of platforms.
        Now, there are acquisition programs of record being
    instituted to build those capabilities. Once those capabilities
    are built, I would be supportive of separating the two. But I
    will not advocate separating the two until we have a separate
    platform in the services that Cyber Command can operate on.
        Senator King. I appreciate that, and we can go into that in
    more detail.
        This is an interesting hearing because we are talking about
    cyber. We are also talking about nuclear. When we talk about
    nuclear, all the discussion is about a deterrent. That is what
    you have been talking about all morning. As near as I can
    tell--I have been going to these hearings for 3 or 4 years
    now--there is no coherent cyber deterrent strategy or doctrine.
    Do you agree that that should be a priority for our country to
    develop that strategy and doctrine and to make it public so our
    adversaries know that there will be consequences to results
    from a cyber attack?
        General Hyten. I think what is missing is a broader
    discussion of what 21st Century deterrence really means. That
    involves the nuclear capabilities as the backstop, but
    fundamentally space, cyber, conventional, all the other
    elements as well.
        When we talk about deterrence, we tend to fall back 50
    years ago to the deterrence model of the 1960s, 1970s, and
    1980s when it was a very broad nuclear deterrence discussion
    where we had mutually assured destruction----
        Senator King. It was a binary analysis.
        General Hyten. It was a binary analysis. Now it is a multi-
    variable analysis. Each of those has to be put in context. The
    context has to be the fact that we are actually not deterring
    cyber. We are not deterring space. We are deterring an
    adversary that wants to operate and do damage in those domains.
    That is what we have to deter.
        Senator King. We are deterring aggression, which may come
    in a variety of forms, one of which could be cyber.
        General Hyten. Yes, Senator. That is exactly right. At
    STRATCOM, we have created an academic alliance now with 35
    academic FFRDC partners to look at what 21st Century deterrence
    really means and trying to stimulate that debate in the Nation
    because I think it is an important discussion to have inside
    this Nation. What do we really mean by deterrence in the 21st
    Century? I think it is fundamentally different, but we have not
    fully defined it, thought through it, and had that public date.
        Senator King. I agree with you, but I agree that we need to
    have that public debate sooner rather than later.
        General Hyten. Yes, sir.
        Senator King. These attacks are occurring virtually daily.
        General Hyten. Yes, sir.
        Senator King. One other point on the CYBERCOM elevation.
    When you are talking about EUCOM [European Command] or NORTHCOM
    [Northern Command], you are talking about bombers and tanks and
    submarines and aircraft carriers. One of the different parts of
    cyber, it seems to me, is the interrelationship with the
    private sector, and that a cyber attack most likely will come
    on the private sector. The hearing we are having upstairs is
    about cyber in the energy sector. CYBERCOM cannot be simply
    military. There has got to be some, it seems to me, structural
    relationship to the private sector, particularly critical
    infrastructure. Would you agree?
        General Hyten. I think when it comes to cyber, we need to
    focus on the effect that is being created. There has got to be
    a common shared situational awareness in the cyber domain of
    what is going on. But the action to respond to whatever the
    issue happens to be has to be what the threat is and what that
    threat is trying to create in terms of harm to the United
    States. If it is criminal, then that is the Homeland Security
    side. If it is a military action against the United States,
    then it is the Cyber Command side. But the situational
    awareness has to be common.
        Senator King. But the defensive side of it may often take
    place within the private sector.
        General Hyten. The defensive side may be in the private
    sector. It may be in the private-public sector. It may be in a
    number of different places. But the situational awareness is
    the key.
        Senator King. I am just suggesting that the new CYBERCOM,
    when it is elevated, needs to think more broadly than simply
    within the Pentagon. It has to think in terms of relationships
    to these private sector critical infrastructure. It is not a
    typical guns and tanks analysis because you are dealing with so
    many of these--the threats are in the private sector.
        The nuclear posture review that is going on--I am looking
    forward to the results of that. Are there things we could and
    should be doing now on nuclear command and control? That seems
    to me one of the most serious vulnerabilities.
        General Hyten. It is. We have been a little slow in
    stepping up the hiring for the NC3 center inside the United
    States Air Force. That is now proceeding. But we have the
    resources going to the right place. We are hiring the right
    people, but it is not going to be an overnight solution because
    once you hire new people, they still have to figure out what
    they are going to do so they can move forward.
        But we need to be aggressive and have very tight oversight
    of what is going on there to make sure that that does not slow
    down. I think both the Air Force and the Navy have taken it
    seriously now, but it is building up from a very deficient
    state.
        Senator King. I just do not want command and control to be
    lost when we are talking about submarines and bombers.
        General Hyten. Absolutely. It is my number one concern from
    a modernization perspective.
        Senator King. Thank you, General.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Perdue?
        Senator Perdue. Thank you, Chairman.
        General, thank you for being here.
        I want to echo Senator Blumenthal's comments about your
    forthrightness. It is very refreshing. Thank you, sir.
        I want to pursue the nuclear development in Russia just a
    little bit. General Robinson in February of this year told the
    Toronto Star--and I quote--today Russian cruise missiles can
    reach us from ranges we are not used to. No longer do they have
    to enter or come close to North American airspace. That is a
    game changer. Do you agree with that observation, sir?
        General Hyten. I do agree with that.
        Senator Perdue. Sir, in 2012, the National Intelligence
    Council report stated, quote, nuclear ambitions in the United
    States and Russia over the past 20 years have evolved in
    totally opposite directions. Reducing the role of nuclear
    weapons in the United States strategy is a United States
    objective while Russia is pursuing new concepts and
    capabilities for expanding the role of nuclear weapons in its
    security strategy.
        Do you identify with that observation, sir?
        General Hyten. I do, and I cannot help but look at history
    and say when we started to de-emphasize nuclear weapons, our
    adversaries, not just Russia, but all our adversaries, started
    to modernize and build up their nuclear capabilities.
        Senator Perdue. There is some correlation to the North
    Korean development and Iran and China.
        General Hyten. China.
        Senator Perdue. Yes, sir. What we have seen in Russia then,
    by 2020 it is projected, I think, that Russia's nuclear triad--
    70 percent of its nuclear forces will be replaced by new
    systems. Sir, if we continue on the current path without a
    major radical change, what percentage of our triad will be
    supported by new systems?
        General Hyten. By what date?
        Senator Perdue. By 2020, which is the estimate in Russia.
    2020, 70 percent of their triad will be new.
        General Hyten. We will not be modernized by 2020.
        Senator Perdue. Right.
        General Hyten. Then I look at the INF Treaty to develop
    nuclear--these are all things they are doing just in the last 4
    years. They violated the INF Treaty. We talked about that.
    Their expanded deployment of air- and sea-launched nuclear
    cruise missiles not limited by the New START--you know, what
    they did in Crimea. They are threatening our allies with
    nuclear attack. They are actually using it in rhetoric openly
    now about intermediate-controlled nuclear acceleration to--
    accelerated to get a deceleration in aggressive posture. But
    they have also developed things in the sea, the underwater
    nuclear drone, the new nuclear submarine.
        My question is all of this rhetoric, the buildup in cruise
    missiles, intermediate-range nuclear-tipped cruise missiles,
    and their modernization of their nuclear force--what does all
    this suggest about the role of nuclear weapons in Russia's
    nuclear or their total national security strategy?
        General Hyten. It suggests that the nuclear weapons are a
    primary element of their overall national security strategy.
    You have to look at their investment. You look at their
    finances and how much money they are spending in this
    capability and the vast majority of their capability is going
    at strategic forces. That is primarily nuclear but also space
    and cyberspace to a smaller amount. But when you put those
    pieces together, you cannot help but say that that is their
    strategy for national security.
        Senator Perdue. What does that say to us in terms of our
    strategy of de-emphasizing this deterrent that we have had for
    70 years?
        General Hyten. Well, I believe that the last 20 years we
    have de-emphasized nuclear weapons, and that has created an
    imbalance in the approach of our adversaries that we have to
    address. That is why we need to modernize our capabilities
    across the board. We have to meet strength with strength. I
    never want to be able to have to sit down with a potential
    adversary and have a negotiation from a position of weakness.
        Senator Perdue. I agree, sir.
        General Hyten. Ever.
        Senator Perdue. Given that, how long will it take us, given
    the current procedures of acquisition and development to
    modernize the ICBMs over the entire triad?
        General Hyten. Sir, we are talking about a 30-year
    modernization program. We are talking about 15 years of
    development and production, and then modification and support
    as we go into----
        Senator Perdue. What we are really saying--I know that we
    are not in a classified environment, and I look forward to that
    conversation. What we are saying is from the reality today,
    given our past practice, is that from 2020 going forward,
    Russia is in a much more modernized position of acuity than the
    United States, and that will occur over the next 20 to 30
    years. Is that correct?
        General Hyten. Then we will modernize and then we will have
    a modernized capability.
        But the thing about a deterrent capability is it does not
    matter how old it is. It just matters whether it works.
        Senator Perdue. You are confident today that the triad is--
    --
        General Hyten. The stuff that we have today will work. The
    question is will it work 10 years from now, 15 years from now,
    20 years from now. That is where the risk comes in. That is why
    modernization has to be a priority. But we are ready today. The
    force is ready today. The force is motivated and understands
    they are the critical element of our Nation's security.
        Senator Perdue. That is comforting.
        I have one last question in my time remaining. You
    addressed it earlier about the helicopter, and I appreciate
    your anger about that, to be candid, sir.
        But we have also got a situation where in modernizing, you
    have to go through 60 stakeholders basically. I think that has
    been documented. You have said we do not move fast enough from
    concept to capability. What can we do to help you? What can you
    do to help us accelerate our ability to be fast?
        General Hyten. To me, the fundamental change that has to be
    is we have to put somebody in charge and just hold them
    accountable and let them go do their job. If they fail, get
    somebody else to go do that job. But we have so many people
    that make decisions. That takes forever to get through the
    process and get everybody to dot the I's and cross the T's and
    make sure everything is okay. It is almost impossible with the
    structure that we have created to go fast.
        That structure was created because of problems in the
    acquisition business. It was created because we had overruns
    and problems in the past. The way we fixed the problem is we
    did not hold somebody accountable. We created a new oversight
    mechanism to make sure that whether it is test or development
    or whatever it is, we have an oversight mechanism to look at
    everything and make sure that it is right. We have got to get
    back to the point where we put somebody in charge and hold them
    accountable.
        Senator Perdue. Well, that is very refreshing, General.
    Thank you for your testimony and your service.
        Thank you, Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. I would point out we made some progress in
    that direction by putting the service chiefs in the position of
    responsibility, but we certainly have a lot more to do.
        Senator Heinrich?
        Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Chairman McCain.
        Welcome, General Hyten.
        For starters, I want to ask, given the very real budget
    pressures that we find ourselves in, in your professional
    opinion should our priority at this point be modernization of
    our nuclear forces through completion of our life extension
    programs or should we be prioritizing the expansion of our
    nuclear forces with brand new weapon designs at this juncture?
        General Hyten. Are you talking about the nuclear weapons
    themselves or the----
        Senator Heinrich. Not the personnel. The weapons
    themselves.
        General Hyten. The weapons themselves. I think the focus
    has to be always ready, reliable weapons. The priority has to
    be the service life extension before we get to new weapons. But
    fundamentally at some point in the future, we have to be able
    to transition to those new weapons. The labs are very engaged
    in making sure we know exactly what the status is. I think the
    lab directors are some of the most incredible people that I
    have probably ever met, and they give me very good advice about
    how to do that. But the priority has to be the life extension
    first because you always have to be ready, and then when and if
    do we have to modernize and change the structure.
        Senator Heinrich. Well, I share your sentiments about the
    lab directors. We had a good briefing with them recently.
        Do you want to say anything else about the sort of sequence
    of the LEPs [Life Extension Programs] to ensure that we
    continue to have the near-term risk mitigated, or would you
    rather save that for another setting?
        General Hyten. I think I would like to save that for a
    closed session.
        Senator Heinrich. That is fine.
        Let us go on to talk a little bit about New START. What are
    the defense and intelligence benefits of the inspections, the
    database, the unique identifiers of Russia's strategic nuclear
    forces that we have secured through that arrangement? What
    would be the implications if those provisions went away?
        General Hyten. I cannot give you the details of what we
    learned in this forum, but what I can say at an unclassified
    level is that we get huge value from a bilateral verifiable
    treaty that allows us to see exactly what our adversaries are
    doing from a strategic weapons perspective. Now, the thing
    about a bilateral verifiable treaty is they also get that kind
    of insight from us. That always has to be part of the
    calculation as you go through.
        But we have an understanding of exactly what those
    capabilities are. They have those understandings of what our
    capabilities are. I think when they look at them, they get an
    assessment of the readiness of our force and the ability to
    provide a deterrent. I think that is a powerful message, and we
    get a message in return.
        Senator Heinrich. Do you think that both sides obviously
    get a little bit of a window into intent and posture that
    mitigates risk so that unintended consequences do not lead to
    an unnecessary escalation?
        General Hyten. Absolutely. I think every time that--well, I
    will just say when you walk in and you see a nuclear weapon for
    real and you see the readiness of the force to do that, you do
    not want that to be employed against you. That is an element of
    deterrence that is I think one of the most powerful elements of
    deterrence there is. You actually have to see it to embrace it.
    When the Russians see it, when we see it when we go there, that
    helps the deterrent posture across the globe.
        Senator Heinrich. Yes. I have to say I think that is a very
    insightful comment, and I would encourage all of my colleagues
    to make the effort to see our deterrent up close and personal.
    It is a very sobering impact that that has, and as somebody
    whose father lived through some of the test phases, I think the
    closer people can come to seeing the reality of that, I think
    the better their decisions will be made down the road.
        I want to ask you one last question before my time expires.
    Los Alamos Lab is the designated center of excellence for
    plutonium research. In your view, does our current strategy
    maintain the critical facilities and the capabilities for
    plutonium technology? Are we on schedule to meet the required
    production of plutonium pits by the late 2020s?
        General Hyten. The answer is yes, but I have concerns about
    the requirement in the late 2020s. I cannot remember if the
    number is classified. I just will not say the number.
        Senator Heinrich. That is fine.
        But the focus on those facilities needs to be acute.
        General Hyten. The focus on that facility has to be there
    all the time. In the near term, I am very comfortable with
    where we are. It is really 10-15 years from now that I have
    concern about maintaining the necessary capability to generate
    what we need for weapons.
        Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will yield
    back.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Tillis?
        Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Hyten, thank you for being here, and thank you for
    wearing that Carolina blue shirt. The Tar Heels wore it last
    night when they won the national championship or a similar
    color.
        General Hyten. I am glad I could help you out, Senator.
        Chairman McCain. It is breaking news.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Tillis. I wanted to really follow on to some
    questions that I think Senator Perdue got to at the end of it
    and it really made me think about asking you when you responded
    to the question from Senator Blumenthal regarding the
    helicopters. You know, we have got an acquisition environment
    now across all of DOD that thinks it is okay to take 10 years
    and 700 pages to spec the next generation handgun, fairly
    simple. The kind of weapons you are talking about are slightly
    more complicated.
        I would like to talk more about things that you would like
    for us to consider in terms of authorities or constraints that
    we have placed on you or the Department to really get to the
    root causes of some of these problems and delays that are very
    costly and, at the end of the day, threaten our national
    security.
        General Hyten. It is interesting for me. I started off in
    the acquisition business and then I went into operations, and I
    was happily an operator for almost 2 decades. Then the Air
    Force called me back in to be in acquisition again as a two-
    star.
        I came back in, and there were all these things that were
    broken. The first thing I did is I read the federal acquisition
    regulations. I actually read them. It was quite painful, but I
    read them. Then I read the JCIDS process for requirements, the
    DOD instruction that talks about--the chairman's instruction
    that talks about how you do requirements.
        What struck me as interesting is the law, the regulations,
    and the policy that has been put in place for requirements and
    acquisition actually allows you to be as streamlined as you
    want to be. It is all written right there. It is legal. You can
    do all those things. We just have chosen to implement a process
    that is not responsive.
        Senator Tillis. How do we fix that?
        General Hyten. I think what we have to do is you have to
    eliminate a lot of the bureaucracy that is in the middle.
        Senator Tillis. Who is that on?
        General Hyten. I think most of it is in--well, I will just
    describe from my perspective the way it was built. The way it
    was built was first we said we are going reform acquisition
    with the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act, and
    that was about 25 years ago. We said we are going to have a
    streamlined authority from a program director to a program
    executive officer to a service acquisition executive to a
    defense acquisition executive. At that time, those staffs were
    very small. In fact, the PEO staffs, the program executive
    officer's staffs, were in some cases 9 to 14 people.
        But then the OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] staff
    grew, and then the service staff had to grow to match the OSD
    staff. Then the PEO [Program Executive Office] staff had to
    grow to match the service staff. Then the program office had to
    grow in order to match those pieces.
        To me, you have to take every one of those and cut it out
    and go back to what was the intent of the law 25 years ago,
    which is the chain of command is the program director to the
    PEO, to the SAE [Service Acquisition Executive], to the DAE
    [Defense Acquisition Executive], and nobody else can get in
    between.
        Senator Tillis. Do you see any evidence that that is being
    addressed seriously?
        General Hyten. No, sir.
        Senator Tillis. Without that, then our modernization, the
    things that we are doing for service extension, they all suffer
    because there is an inherent cost in delay in new capabilities.
    Is that correct?
        General Hyten. That is correct.
        Senator Tillis. Somebody needs to own that. Actually
    somebody somewhere in these organizations--they need to own it.
    It is remarkable to me in just the 2 years that I have been
    here that we are having the same circular discussions at the
    expense of you being able to do your job even better than you
    are already doing it.
        General Hyten. The other thing I will point is we also need
    stable budgets.
        Senator Tillis. Well, I agree. That is where I think we
    have become the root cause of the problem because if you are
    making long-term investments and we are living paycheck to
    paycheck through 1-year CRs and we consider that success, we
    are a part of that problem.
        But it would really help us I think to get some incites
    into exactly what you talked about. We will follow up with your
    office.
        The last question I had--and it just reminded me based on
    something you said earlier about you have certain weapons that
    have reached their end of life or appear to. There were some
    people in the prior administration who were concerned that that
    maybe we were moving too quickly to decommission certain
    weapons. I thought I heard from you all that in fact they had
    reached their usable life, and if you did not decommission
    them, that there was just going to be additional cost and risk
    in maintaining them. Is that still a problem?
        General Hyten. I do not think it is a problem. We have a
    significant weapons inventory. When we get down to 1,550
    accountable warheads, we have significant warheads in the
    inventory to allow us to do that now and for the foreseeable
    future. I supported the decommissioning of those weapons. My
    predecessor did as well just because we have a number that we
    have to meet and we have the capabilities that were needed to
    meet it. We do not have to walk down any further.
        Senator Tillis. Thank you. I look forward to the hearing
    tomorrow.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Sullivan?
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General, thank you for your testimony and your service and
    your frank assessment on some of these issues.
        I appreciate your written testimony focusing on missile
    defense, and I would like to dig into some of those issues this
    morning.
        It is when, not if that North Korea is going to be able to
    range the continental United States with an intercontinental
    ballistic nuclear missile. Is that not correct?
        General Hyten. I believe it is, sir. I think they already
    have the capability to deploy an intercontinental ballistic
    missile. The question is when will they be able to mate a
    nuclear weapon to it.
        Senator Sullivan. It is going to happen. We have classified
    estimates of when it is going to happen, but you can say
    publicly that is going to happen.
        General Hyten. Yes. I will show you the dates the
    intelligence community predicts that it will happen when we
    talk tomorrow. It is fairly broad, but I will show you those
    dates.
        Senator Sullivan. One of my concerns has been if we know
    that that is going to happen, which we do, and the day that
    that does become public that they can do that, I think there is
    going to be a big demand that will be on the front page of all
    the newspapers and magazines that the leader of North Korea can
    range Chicago or Miami or New York City with a nuke. There will
    be a lot of demands to do something immediately because of
    that.
        If we know that is happening, it is my view that we should
    be focusing a lot on missile defense to make sure that we will
    have a 99.9 percent chance of shooting one or two or three of
    those down and be able to say publicly if you do do that, we
    will retaliate massively. That will buy whoever is in the White
    House some time.
        We talk about sooner. I think it is sooner rather than
    later. Can you give the committee a sense of why the date,
    February 11th, was so important in terms of this very troubling
    issue?
        General Hyten. Thank you, Senator. I am a big supporter of
    missile defense. I have been for my whole career.
        But February 11th was a very important date because that is
    the date----
        Senator Sullivan. February 11th of this year.
        General Hyten. Of this year. The North Koreans launched a
    new, solid, medium-range ballistic missile off a new
    transporter-erector-launcher. They published pictures for the
    entire world to see out of a place we had never seen before.
    That showed a new technology, a new North Korean capability to
    employ a very challenging technology for us because a liquid
    missile has----
        Senator Sullivan. Liquid fuel you are talking about.
        General Hyten. A liquid fueled----
        Senator Sullivan. Versus solid fuel.
        General Hyten.--versus solid has to be stacked, fueled. It
    takes time and we can watch. A solid rocket can be rolled out
    and launched at a moment's notice. If you noticed our history
    of building ballistic missiles, in the early days we built
    liquid fueled rockets, and we had some challenges because
    liquid fuel is a dangerous thing to try to keep ready and on
    alert. A solid is a much better solution. All of our inventory
    now is solids.
        Senator Sullivan. That was a major advancement by North
    Korea.
        General Hyten. It was. They moved what was demonstrated at
    sea onto land, onto a new launcher, and did it in a very quick
    way.
        Senator Sullivan. Let me ask you a related question. You
    talked about the history of our programs in terms of rockets.
    Do you think there is a culture that we have now with regard to
    missile defense? We had a provision in the NDAA last year that
    required the Missile Defense Agency to test at least once a
    year--try to test at least once a year. Do you believe we have
    a culture that focuses too much on always having successful
    operations in terms of testing? Why is it important to also
    allow us to fail?
        General Hyten. I think I have become part of that problem
    too because when Admiral Sering tests, I am either on the phone
    or waiting for that email that said did it work, did it work,
    did it work. That fundamentally creates the wrong kind of test
    environment.
        If you look at what North Korea is doing, test/fail, test/
    fail. I look at what I did when I was a younger officer in the
    space business. That is how you go fast. Von Braun in the early
    days of the rocket business--he had a 60 percent failure rate,
    maybe the greatest rocket scientist of all time. Can you
    imagine, if Admiral Sering in the Missile Defense Agency had a
    60 percent failure rate, what the newspapers would say? In
    reality, we should be asking was that a successful test. Did we
    learn what we needed to do to advance the system? Are we
    testing fast enough? Because North Korea is going fast, test/
    fail, test/fail, test/succeed, and they are learning. You can
    see them learning because that is the way you do the rocket
    business.
        Senator Sullivan. You think we should be doing at least
    testing once a year? Can we help with regard to that narrative
    and culture to make sure you are learning but not always having
    to make sure it is, quote/unquote, a successful test? Can a
    test that does not hit the target still be a successful test?
        General Hyten. In many case, we will create conditions
    where we do not want to hit the target, and then somehow it
    will still be portrayed as a failure. But we need to understand
    how long the interceptor can fly. We need to understand various
    things about a test. A test program is not just about hitting
    the target. Ultimately, the system is about hitting the target,
    and we have to learn fast as we go through that.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Cruz?
        Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General, it is good to see you. Thank you for your service.
    Thank you for being here. I enjoyed our visiting last month
    about the priorities for strategic deterrence and how to
    improve our capacities going forward.
        I want to focus a few minutes on questions involving space,
    which is one of the topics you and I discussed. Last week, your
    deputy, Vice Admiral Richard, testified before a Space Security
    Conference about offensive space capabilities and weapons that
    are being developed by China and Russia. He said that, quote,
    while we are not at war in space, I do not think we can say we
    are exactly at peace either. With rapidly growing threats to
    our space systems, as well as the threat of a degraded space
    environment, we must prepare for a conflict that extends into
    space.
        General, in your judgment, how significant is the threat to
    our space-based assets, and what would the impact be to our
    operations if they were degraded?
        General Hyten. It is significant and it is growing. You
    have to ask yourself why we have adversaries that are building
    weapons in space, weapons that can deploy into space, weapons
    that can jam our satellites, weapons that can jam GPS [Global
    Positioning System]. Why are they building that entire
    infrastructure? It is not because they are interested in the
    peaceful use of outer space. It is because they are looking to
    threaten the United States, and they have watched us for the
    last 20-plus years, ever since Desert Storm. They have watched
    us employ space to create a fundamental asymmetric advantage on
    every battlefield we are in. They understand if they are ever
    in a conflict with us, if they cannot challenge that advantage,
    they have a significant potential to lose. That is why they are
    committing such a huge amount of their national treasure to
    building those kind of weapons and capabilities.
        Our job is to make sure that we can always respond, always
    defend ourselves, always make sure that the asymmetric
    advantage that we have built over the years can be maintained
    in any conflict. We have to do that.
        Now, we hope to deter that conflict by demonstrating that
    to our adversaries, but nonetheless, if it does extend into
    space, we have to be ready to fight it.
        Senator Cruz. To what extent does our weapons targeting and
    navigation depend upon active GPS and live satellites?
        General Hyten. You know, it is interesting. The first space
    war is often referred to as the Desert Storm, the first Gulf
    War. But in that war, very few precision munitions--in fact, no
    precision munitions were dropped with GPS guidance. The only
    precision munitions were laser-guided munitions. Everybody
    remembers the video on television from that.
        But now almost every weapon we drop is a GPS-guided weapon.
    Almost our entire force structure is built on GPS guidance as
    we go through that. Our dropping of logistics off of aircraft
    are GPS-guided air drop systems now. The timing system for many
    of our weapons is GPS. Our artillery systems are guided by GPS.
    The guided multiple launcher rocket systems, the MLRS [Multiple
    Launch Rocket System], is a GPS-guided system in the Army. The
    Navy systems are GPS-guided. We have basically taken that huge
    advantage.
        In the future, we have to look at precision navigation and
    timing as a mission and build a resilience into that
    architecture, as well as defending GPS on orbit.
        Senator Cruz. What failsafes are there in the event of GPS
    or other satellite systems going down for our weapon systems
    still being able to operate, or for that matter, to what extent
    are our troops drilling in a no-satellite environment regarding
    navigation or weapon systems or otherwise?
        General Hyten. About 6 years ago, the Air Force did a study
    called a Day Without Space, and in that, they basically went to
    Nellis and on the range took GPS and satellite communications
    away from the aviators. It was not good. We were not ready to
    do that.
        But since that time, we have basically relearned how to
    operate in a GPS-denied environment, in a SATCOM-denied
    environment. We actually have a lot of those capabilities built
    in. We have the ability to use inertial navigation systems. We
    have the ability to use a compass and a map. Maybe we were
    spoiled because space was a benign environment. GPS was always
    there, and so we just assumed that it was going to be there.
        We cannot assume that anymore. We have to train for that.
    We have to train in all services and then build resilient
    systems to make sure that we have the capability to fight in
    any situation.
        Senator Cruz. Russia's aerospace forces are potentially
    working to deploy an anti-satellite weapon on its interceptor
    aircraft. A VKF [Russia's Aerospace Forces] squadron commander
    was quoted as saying, quote, a new missile is being developed
    for this aircraft capable of destroying targets in near space.
        General, how realistic is the threat to our satellites from
    Russia, and how should the United States respond to that
    threat?
        General Hyten. The threat from China is actually more near-
    term than Russia. I will show you the specifics tomorrow in the
    closed hearing of what those threats are.
        But I can tell you that it is real and they would not be
    committing resources to building that if they did not have some
    intent to use it in a conflict. When you see statements by
    Russian officers and Russian leaders about building
    capabilities to do that, I mean, why would they do that unless
    they were sending a message?
        Senator Cruz. What should we be doing about it?
        General Hyten. Number one, we have to always defend
    ourselves. We have to build the ability to defend ourselves
    against any of those threats. Number two, we have to build an
    offensive capability to challenge their capabilities in space
    as well. We will talk about what we are doing in that in the
    closed hearing tomorrow as well, Senator.
        Senator Cruz. Very good. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. General, thanks very much, and we look
    forward to tomorrow. Thank you for a very informative and
    helpful and important hearing. Thank you.
        We are adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:26 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

               Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
                                 uk submarines
        1. Senator Blumenthal. General Hyten, in 2014, Scotland held an
    independence referendum in which they voted to remain in the UK. When
    the Brexit referendum was held last year, the majority of Scotland did
    not support leaving the EU. Just last week, the Scottish Parliament
    held a non-binding vote in favor of holding a second independence
    referendum. Although the actual independence vote may be some time off,
    the leader of the Scottish Parliament would like to hold a vote between
    fall 2018 and spring 2019, while Prime Minister Theresa May would like
    to postpone until after Brexit in 2019. Scotland will need
    Westminster's consent to hold the independence vote. Scotland has
    expressed its desire to be a nuclear weapons-free state if it becomes
    independent. Currently, all four of the UK's Vanguard-class ballistic
    missile submarines are based in Scotland and there is no other base
    able to home port these boats in the UK. The Vanguard-class boats are a
    critical element of NATO deterrence, particularly when we are seeing
    increased Russian submarine patrols. Could this issue have any
    potential implications for the operations of our own ballistic missile
    submarines?
        General Hyten. We do not foresee a decision on Scottish
    independence and/or a nuclear free state impacting U.S. ballistic
    missile submarine operations.

        2. Senator Blumenthal. General Hyten, have you engaged with EUCOM
    or the UK regarding the basing of the UK's ballistic missile submarines
    or discussed contingency operations to address this potential issue?
        General Hyten. Yes, my staff and I conduct regular dialogues with
    the UK Ministry of Defense with respect to a wide range of contingency
    operations.
                              inf treaty violation
        3. Senator Blumenthal. General Hyten, Russia has deployed two
    brigades of ground-launched cruise missiles that United States
    officials say violate the INF Treaty (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
    Treaty). The INF Treaty was signed in 1987 to eliminate land-based
    intermediate and short-range ballistic and cruise missiles (310-3,400
    mile range). The Obama Administration claimed since 2014 that Russia
    had been developing this ground-launched cruise missile in violation of
    the INF Treaty, and Russia has continued to deny wrongdoing. By not
    voluntarily withdrawing from the treaty, and violating it instead,
    Russia's actions put the United States in a precarious predicament.
    Does the United States remain bound by the treaty when Russia is
    clearly not abiding by the terms, do we withdraw, or do we respond with
    sanctions or other countermeasures? Last month at the EUCOM hearing,
    GEN Scaparrotti told me that he agreed that Russia had violated the INF
    Treaty and had provided internal recommendations to DOD. This past
    Friday at a joint news conference with the British Defense Secretary,
    Secretary Mattis said, ``On the INF issue, we're in consultation with
    our allies and we are still formulating a way ahead. In fact, it will
    be addressed, I think, very, very soon as a matter of highest-level
    concern.'' In what ways can the United States pressure Russia to return
    or come into compliance? How can we convince Russia that violating this
    treaty is not worth the cost?
        General Hyten. We have no doubts that Russia possesses and is
    deploying weapons in direct violation of the INF Treaty. Russia shows
    no signs of coming back into compliance with its obligations. The
    status quo is untenable and the United States must consider all
    possibilities including a world without the INF Treaty Our nuclear
    modernization efforts are central to minimizing any advantages Russia
    seeks through violation of the INF Treaty The United States is also
    pursuing a strategy to improve coordination and integration among NATO
    states, while USSTRATCOM and USEUCOM work collaboratively to enhance
    integration and planning to mitigate any threats posed by this INF
    violation.

        4. Senator Blumenthal. General Hyten, how can we best protect our
    troops and allies from these deployed missiles without escalating the
    situation and while staying in compliance with the INF Treaty?
        General Hyten. The Department is examining this issue and potential
    response options within the series of ongoing strategy reviews In
    January, the President ordered a Ballistic Missile Defense Review to
    identify ways of strengthening missile-defense capabilities,
    rebalancing Homeland and theater defense priorities, and highlighting
    priority funding areas. How to best protect U.S. equities along with
    those of our allies from emerging threats such as these missiles will
    be considered in the review.

        5. Senator Blumenthal. General Hyten, how does Russia's violation
    of the INF Treaty impact efforts to renew New START (New Strategic Arms
    Reduction Treaty), which reduces Russia and our strategic nuclear
    arsenals? Do you believe we should continue to implement this treaty?
        General Hyten. It is too early to consider extending New START. We
    are focused this year on completing our reductions under the Treaty and
    ensuring Russia meets its obligations by February 2018 when the
    Treaty's limits go into effect Russia remains in compliance with New
    START and I support continued implementation. New START continues to
    provide predictability of, and transparency into, Russia's strategic
    forces However, I anticipate Russia's violation of its international
    commitments such as the INF Treaty will be a consideration in any
    future arms control discussions.

                                huey replacement
        6. Senator Blumenthal. General Hyten, at the hearing you testified
    that STRATCOM had a request for forces in to provide a temporary
    replacement. You pulled that request from STRATCOM because you wanted
    ``all hands on deck to get a new helicopter into the force as soon as
    possible.'' You went on to note, ``I can't tell you how upset I was
    when I pulled the RFF and shortly thereafter was told there would be a
    delay in the program. That's just unacceptable to me.'' Can you please
    explain why this request was rescinded?
        General Hyten. My rescission of the Request For Forces (RFF) was
    not intended to diminish the need for a replacement helicopter, but to
    support a focused effort on fielding a replacement aircraft as soon as
    possible As I stated in my hearing, this should be a simple and
    straight forward acquisition; I will continue to monitor this closely
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Donnelly
                        conventional prompt strike (cps)
        7. Senator Donnelly. General Hyten, you dedicated a significant
    portion of your written testimony to efforts by both the U.S. and our
    adversaries to develop hypersonic capabilities. Is the United States
    leading the way in the development of hypersonic glide vehicles, or are
    we behind the curve relative to countries like Russia and China?
        General Hyten. [Deleted.]

        8. Senator Donnelly. General Hyten, the conventional prompt strike
    activity is developing a non-nuclear capability for U.S. forces to hit
    highly defended, time-critical targets. In your testimony for this
    hearing, you wrote, ``Having a hypersonic strike capability enhances
    our overall deterrent posture by providing the President additional
    options to hold targets at risk that do not justify crossing the
    nuclear threshold.'' Do you see value in addressing conventional prompt
    strike in the upcoming nuclear posture review or other similar
    dialogues on deterrence?
        General Hyten. It would be premature for me to comment on the
    issues or scope of the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). However, I see
    utility in the role conventional prompt strike (CPS) capabilities
    provide towards enhancing U.S. deterrence or influencing strategic
    stability. Ongoing Departmental discussions on CPS policy and
    operations will continue and may be informed by the NPR or broader
    strategy reviews.

        9. Senator Donnelly. General Hyten, you stated in your written
    testimony that STRATCOM foresees an operational need for CPS by the
    mid-2020s. What factors are driving that timeline from your
    perspective?
        General Hyten. Proliferation of advanced air defense systems,
    development of long-range strike weapons, coupled with a long standing
    Combatant Command requirement to hold time sensitive targets at risk
    necessitate delivery of an operational CPS capability as soon as
    practical.

        10. Senator Donnelly. General Hyten, would a sea-based CPS
    capability meet STRATCOM's operational needs?
        General Hyten. Yes.

        11. Senator Donnelly. General Hyten, what are the advantages and
    disadvantages from your perspective of a sea-based versus land-based
    CPS capability?
        General Hyten. A flexible mix of sea and land-based capabilities
    offers important deterrent and warfighting attributes Land-based weapon
    systems provide a responsive, visible and persistent capability to
    address challenging targets Sea-based option allows global presence and
    an ability to operate in a contested environment to hold additional
    targets at risk.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie Hirono
                 partnering with industry for space technology
        12. Senator Hirono. General Hyten, we continue to see rapid growth
    in both the commercial and government space sector. U.S. Strategic
    Command has been successful in developing a cooperative research and
    development agreement with six commercial industry satellite systems
    and services operators to develop new space technologies. What
    additional ways can the DOD leverage the commercial sector capabilities
    in the growth of space technologies and advanced resources?
        General Hyten. To ensure our military can dominate in all phases of
    conflict, we need to think bigger and go faster to address rapid
    improvements in space and we can best do this by harnessing industry
    Low cost / rapid launch services, big data analytics, visualization
    tool and algorithm development, artificial intelligence, self-
    protecting networks, space debris removal, and satellite servicing are
    all areas ripe for further commercial sector partnering opportunities.
                          maui space surveillance site
        13. Senator Hirono. General Hyten, the Maui Space Surveillance Site
    combines operational satellite tracking facilities with a research and
    development facility. It is a unique facility with state-of-the-art
    electro-optical capabilities. How does this facility impact national
    security objectives and how important is it to keep this facility
    modernized and capable can this facility grow and modernize to retain
    the military advantage in the ever changing threat picture?
        General Hyten. The Maui Space Surveillance Site (MSSS) is an
    integral part of the Space Surveillance Network (SSN) designed to
    detect, identify, catalogue and track on-orbit man-made objects to
    facilitate safety of flight operations and/or provide warning of
    hostile actions in space MSSS hosts a unique mix of operational and
    research assets provisioned with visible and infrared sensors, adaptive
    optics, and telescopes to collect imaging and signature date on objects
    ranging from near-earth to deep space The geographic location and
    unique SSN capabilities provided by MSSS mandate continued sustainment
    and modernization of the facility.
                             threat of north korea
        14. Senator Hirono. General Hyten, it is clear that North Korea is
    committed to developing long-range missile technology. Most recently
    North Korea tested a solid-propellant SLBM variant. These types of
    weapons have very few indications and warnings. How well is the United
    States protected from the North Korean threat? What future requirements
    would you identify as necessary to defend the United States and in
    particular Hawaii from these types of threats?
        General Hyten. I believe we are postured to defeat a limited ICBM
    threat from North Korea with our current sensor architecture and
    Ground-based Midcourse Defense System In the future, as threats from
    North Korea evolve and grow more complex, continued and predictable
    funding is needed for persistent sensor tracking and advanced
    discrimination improvements; improved Ground Based Interceptor
    capacity; and programmed production of next generation Aegis BMD
    capable ships and interceptors, such as the Standard Missile (SM) IIA &
    SM-6. Finally, we need to continually invest in all pillars of missile
    defense (including passive defense, offensive operations, and command
    and control) to holistically address the evolving ballistic missile
    threats. Our priorities are improved sensors, improved kill vehicles,
    then increased capacity.
                            relationship with allies
        15. Senator Hirono. General Hyten, relationships with allies in the
    Asia Pacific are important to our overall national security in that
    region. Both Japan and Korea have Aegis equipped ships and the SM-3
    Block II missile is being developed in cooperation with Japan. How
    important are cooperative efforts such as this to improve missile
    defense capabilities? As space becomes more and more important to the
    United States and our allies, how important is cooperation in this
    arena?
        General Hyten. These activities are very important; one of the best
    ways we can mitigate potential adversary missile programs is to
    establish cooperative air and missile defense efforts with our partners
    and allies Moreover, improved cooperation in the space domain with
    foreign nations and commercial companies will preserve the space
    environment for the responsible, peaceful, and safe use for all.
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
                                   new start
        16. Senator Warren. General Hyten, Russian President Vladimir Putin
    is reported to have raised the idea of extending the New START beyond
    its current end date. But some have called for the United States to
    build and deploy new nuclear weapons, potentially even above New START
    levels. Do you believe that this would adversely affect United States
    national security and strategic stability with Russia?
        General Hyten. It is too early to consider extending New START. We
    are focused this year on completing our reductions under the Treaty and
    ensuring Russia meets its obligations by February 2018 when the
    Treaty's limits go into effect Russia remains in compliance with New
    START and I support continued implementation. New START continues to
    provide predictability of, and transparency into, Russia's strategic
    forces However, I anticipate Russia's violation of its international
    commitments such as the INF Treaty will be a consideration in any
    future arms control discussions.

        17. Senator Warren. General Hyten, the United States has said that
    it will retain no more than 60 nuclear-capable deployed bombers in
    order to comply with New START. Yet the Air Force plans to acquire 100
    B-21 bombers. Will only 60 of them be nuclear-capable, or are we
    planning for a fleet that will violate New START?
        General Hyten. Fielding of a nuclear capable B-21 does not
    represent a violation of New START. The planned fleet of 100 B-21s will
    be both conventional and nuclear capable. The New START provides each
    side with the flexibility to alter its force mix of strategic offensive
    arms to stay within applicable treaty limits. The United States will
    adjust its force structure as necessary to meet its arms control
    obligations
                                      lrso
        18. Senator Warren. General Hyten, you testified that the proposed
    new nuclear-armed cruise missile, the Long-Range Stand-Off weapon
    (LRSO), is not destabilizing because it replaces an existing weapon
    system. However, the current nuclear-armed Air-Launched Cruise Missile
    (ALCM) was only deployed on the B-52, not the B-2. In contrast, the Air
    Force plans to deploy LRSO on both its stealthy and non-stealthy
    bombers. Will our adversaries consider the deployment of a new stealthy
    bomber with a new stealthy nuclear-armed cruise missile to be a new and
    potentially destabilizing development?
        General Hyten. No, this development does not represent a
    significant change to an adversary's strategic decision calculus. Air-
    launched cruise missiles are not destabilizing because they do not pose
    the threat of disarming first strikes against Russia or China,
    regardless of whether they are deployed on penetrating or non-
    penetrating bombers The AGM-86B Air-Launched Cruise Missile, which has
    been deployed since 1982, and the low observable Advanced Cruise
    Missile in-service from 1990-2012, significantly complicated adversary
    air defense problems and posed a key element of the unsolvable dilemma
    essential to maintaining strategic stability Failure to recapitalize
    our bomber and cruise missile fleet in the face of continued
    advancements in integrated air defense systems (IADS) negates the
    effectiveness of the air leg of the Triad and simplifies the
    adversary's problem set. This, in turn, would incentivize a potential
    adversary to develop capabilities to degrade or defeat our remaining
    legs--an outcome which could be viewed as destabilizing on the face.

        19. Senator Warren. General Hyten, if China was developing a new,
    stealthy long-range bomber in combination with a stealthy long-range
    nuclear-armed cruise missile, would the United States consider that
    development destabilizing?
        General Hyten. Such a development would not impact strategic
    stability because it would not provide China the capability to conduct
    a disarming first strike against the United States.

        20. Senator Warren. General Hyten, the Air Force plans to produce
    LRSO cruise missiles in numbers roughly equal to the size of the
    current ALCM arsenal. The ALCM was fielded in the early 1980s when
    there was little conventional long-range standoff capability for
    bombers. Since then, several conventional standoff weapons have been
    introduced, and others have been significantly enhanced. Given these
    developments, can some of the LRSO scenarios be covered by conventional
    systems?
        General Hyten. The nuclear cruise missile force is sized to meet
    enduring strategic deterrence requirements; the unique contributions
    provided by a nuclear cruise missile (range, penetrating capability and
    destructive power) cannot be replicated using conventional weapons LRSO
    provides flexible options across the full range of threats, provides
    the ability to respond rapidly to technical challenges in other legs of
    the triad, and is a visible United States signal to deter adversaries
    and assure allies.
                              strategic stability
        21. Senator Warren. General Hyten, last week, you indicated that
    Strategic Command programs have made the world more stable. Do you
    believe that State Department and other international programs also
    contribute to international stability?
        General Hyten. Yes, military commanders rely on a whole-of-
    government approach to achieve national security objectives, including
    active foreign engagement from the Department of State.

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2018 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, APRIL 6, 2017

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

       UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND AND UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m. in Room
    SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain
    (chairman of the committee) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Wicker,
    Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Perdue,
    Graham, Sasse, Reed, McCaskill, Shaheen, Gillibrand,
    Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King, Heinrich, Warren,
    and Peters.

                     SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman McCain. Well, good morning.
        Since there is going to be a vote starting at 11:00, I
    believe we will try to expedite the process here, and I will
    forgo my opening statement except to welcome the witnesses and
    ask Senator Reed if he has an opening statement so we could get
    right through the witnesses after he completes that.
        Senator Reed. I am tempted to say yes, but smart enough to
    say no.
        Would you please include my opening statement in the
    record, Mr. Chairman?
        Chairman McCain. Both moving and important opening
    statements will be made part of the record.
        [The prepared opening statements of Chairman McCain and
    Senator Reed follows:]

               prepared opening statement by senator john mccain
        Washington, D.C.--U.S. Senator John McCain (R-AZ), Chairman of the
    Senate Armed Services Committee, delivered the following opening
    statement today at a hearing on the posture of U.S. Northern Command,
    U.S. Southern Command and U.S. Strategic Command:
        ``The Committee meets today to receive testimony on the posture of
    U.S. Northern Command, Southern Command, and Strategic Command to
    inform its review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year
    2017. I'd like to extend our appreciation to the witnesses for their
    many years of distinguished service and to the men and women of our
    military who defend our Nation every day.
        ``Admiral Tidd, this is your first time testifying before the
    Committee as the Commander of U.S. Southern Command. After nearly two
    months in command, I look forward to your assessment of the challenges
    within your area of responsibility as well as your strategy to confront
    them. It's clear that you face a daunting array of security and
    governance challenges in the region, yet SOUTHCOM continues to suffer
    from persistent resource shortfalls that undermine efforts to confront
    these challenges. I hope you will outline for the committee where you
    are being forced to accept the greatest risk as a result of these
    shortfalls.
        ``Of particular concern is the deteriorating situation in Central
    America, where feeble governance, endemic corruption, and weak security
    institutions are allowing transnational criminal organizations to
    operate with impunity. We of course must improve and adequately
    resource our drug interdiction strategy to combat these groups, but we
    must also renew our efforts to combat the real driver of drug
    trafficking--the demand here at home. The demand for the drugs that
    these groups traffic-heroin, methamphetamine, and cocaine--is too high
    and the profits too great to dissuade these criminals from their
    illicit actions.
        ``To be clear, the threat posed by these groups extends beyond the
    drugs they smuggle into our communities. The smuggling routes they
    control are also used to traffic weapons, bulk cash, and human beings.
    And as your predecessor General Kelly testified before this committee,
    `terrorist organizations could seek to leverage those same smuggling
    routes to move operatives with intent to cause grave harm to our
    citizens or even bring weapons of mass destruction into the United
    States.'
        ``On a more positive note, I am interested in your assessment of
    the ongoing talks in Colombia, and how you believe the United States
    can best support our partners as they enter a new and likely more
    challenging era. Colombia, once on the cusp of becoming a failed state,
    has emerged from decades of conflict as a stark example of what
    sustained United States support and engagement can achieve. It's
    vitally important that we continue to invest in our relationship during
    this critical period so as not to squander the extraordinary progress
    that has been achieved.
        ``I would like to take a moment recognize the military
    servicemembers conducting detention operations at Guantanamo Bay. Too
    often in the course of debating the future of the detention facility we
    lose sight of the remarkable men and women who serve honorably under
    extraordinarily difficult conditions. Admiral, please convey our
    deepest appreciation for their service and the professionalism they
    display each and every day on behalf of our nation.
        ``Admiral Gortney, I look to you for an update on the current state
    of United States-Mexican security cooperation and opportunities for our
    two nations two to strengthen this vital partnership. While Mexico's
    efforts to combat transnational criminal organizations have resulted in
    notable successes by capturing or killing senior cartel leaders such as
    El Chapo, the security situation remains highly volatile and continues
    to directly impact the security of our southern border. Heroin, largely
    produced in Mexico, continues to ravage communities all across the
    nation and demands a renewed effort to combat this scourge both in our
    streets and also at its source. I also look forward to your assessment
    of the increasing threat posed to the Homeland by the development of
    advanced missiles capable of carrying nuclear payloads by Russia, Iran,
    and North Korea.
        ``Admiral Haney, strategic threats to the United States and its
    allies have increased exponentially in just the few short years since
    you've taken the helm of Strategic Command. While nuclear, cyber, and
    counter-space threats generally have been on the rise, Secretary
    Carter's warning that `we're entering a new strategic era' has great
    implications for STRATCOM.
        ``The `return to great power competition' noted by the Secretary
    means that deterring Russia and China once again assumes primacy in
    your planning and operations. Whatever President Obama may have hoped
    for, the United States can no longer seek to reduce the role of nuclear
    weapons in our national security strategy, or narrow the range of
    contingencies under which we would have to consider their use.
        ``U.S. Strategic Command faces significant near and longer-term
    challenges. In about 15-20 years, U.S. nuclear submarines, ICBMs, air
    launched cruise missiles, heavy bombers, and nuclear-capable tactical
    fighters will have to be withdrawn from operational service, having
    been extended well beyond their original service lives. Modernization
    programs are in place to replace these systems, but there is no slack
    left in the schedule. Today's Congress supports fully the modernization
    of the United States nuclear deterrent. Any reduction in funding over
    the next decade, however, could delay the development of these
    replacement systems, increasing strategic risk at a time when Russia
    and other countries continue to modernize their nuclear capabilities.
        ``Russia, then, is your near term challenge. Russia's aggression in
    Ukraine and destabilizing actions in Syria take place under a nuclear
    shadow. Russia has threatened our NATO allies with nuclear strikes, is
    developing a new nuclear ground-launched cruise missile capable of
    ranging most of Europe, and has fired air- and sea-launched cruise
    missiles against targets in Syria--missiles that could be armed with
    nuclear warheads and flown against European and United States targets.
    So your task, Admiral Haney, is to ensure that Strategic Command is
    prepared to deter Russian nuclear provocations. This requires better
    intelligence about Russian nuclear capabilities and plans, a nuclear
    planning process tied to EUCOM and NATO operations, and a survivable,
    well-exercised, and ready nuclear force.
        ``Finally, as this Committee continues its review of the Goldwater-
    Nichols Act, we are interested to hear your views as to whether our
    defense enterprise is organized properly to perform the missions that
    cut across the functional and geographic boundaries we have drawn. We
    also welcome any ideas on reforms we might consider to make our defense
    enterprise more effective without minimizing the vital tasks that must
    be done.''

                prepared opening statement by senator jack reed
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also want to welcome our witnesses,
    General Robinson and Admiral Tidd. Thank you for your many years of
    service. I also want to thank your families, and the many men and women
    who serve in your commands for their commitment to our nation.
        General Robinson, your mission is to protect the Homeland, to deter
    and defeat attacks on the United States, and to support civil
    authorities in mitigating the effects of potential attacks and natural
    disasters. You are also dual-hatted as the Commander of the North
    American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), which brings unique
    responsibilities and partnering opportunities with Canada to deter and
    defend against threats to our nations. I look forward to hearing about
    your collaboration with Canada, especially as they prepare to unveil
    their defense review in the coming month.
        You are also responsible for the operation of our Homeland
    ballistic missile defense system. We look forward to hearing about your
    priorities for further improvements to the ground-based missile defense
    system. This is particularly important in light of North Korea's
    missile launches, which are occurring with increased frequency.
        Lastly, your relationship with the military leadership in Mexico,
    along with your collaboration with Admiral Tidd and other federal
    agencies, is critical to promoting security across our southern border.
    A number of problems along that border originate in the SOUTHCOM AOR,
    and efforts to address those problems require a whole-of-government
    approach.
        Admiral Tidd, I am quite concerned that the proposed cuts to the
    budget of non-defense agencies would be devastating to SOUTHCOM's
    mission, which is primarily a counter-narcotics and threat networks
    mission. While SOUTHCOM is focused on the supply of drugs, perhaps the
    larger problem is drug demand in this country. In 2015, more than
    52,000 Americans died from drug overdoses--more people than homicides
    and car crashes combined. We have lost half a million people in the
    last 15 years to the opioid epidemic. My state, Rhode Island, along
    with New Hampshire, West Virginia, and Ohio have been particularly hard
    hit by this epidemic.
        If we are serious about the drug epidemic in this country, we need
    to adequately fund not only fund our crucial military effort in
    SOUTHCOM, but also Health and Human Services, the FBI, the DEA, the
    Coast Guard, the FDA, and all the other agencies that are working to
    ensure the health and safety of the American public. Admiral Tidd, I am
    interested in hearing about how you work with other government agencies
    in your AOR.
        Finally, Admiral Tidd, we are all observing the humanitarian crisis
    in Venezuela and would like your perspective on how much longer the
    regime there can survive and how the crisis might spill over into
    neighboring countries.
        Admiral Tidd, General Robinson, thank you again for your service
    and appearing here today. I look forward to your testimony.

        Chairman McCain. Welcome to the witnesses, Admiral Tidd and
    General Robinson. Please proceed, General Robinson.

     STATEMENT OF GENERAL LORI J. ROBINSON, USAF, COMMANDER, U.S.
       NORTHERN COMMAND AND COMMANDER, NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE
                            DEFENSE COMMAND

        General Robinson. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking
    Member Reed, distinguished members of the committee. I
    certainly am honored to be here today, pleased to testify with
    my very, very good friend, Admiral Kurt Tidd.
        North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and United
    States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) are two distinct commands,
    but they are unified in a common purpose. Every day, the men
    and women of NORAD and USNORTHCOM, soldiers, sailors, airmen,
    marines, coast guardsmen, and civilians, Americans and
    Canadians, stand ready to defend two great countries, the
    United States and Canada.
        Today our adversaries are seeking ways to extend their
    operational reach into North America and to hold us at risk.
    The men and women of NORAD and U.S. Northern Command stand
    watch, ready to defend against these adversaries. Today we have
    a competitive advantage against them.
        This advantage will not continue in the future, however, if
    we continue to operate under continuing resolutions. I echo the
    Secretary, the Chairman, the service chiefs in saying that
    developing the joint force we need in the future requires an
    actual budget this year. Continuing resolutions do not enable
    continuity of effort. We need an appropriations bill
    unrestricted by sequestration to upgrade our warfighting
    capabilities against threats to us here in the Homeland.
        These adversaries include North Korea, where Kim Jong-un
    continues his provocative behavior. He has conducted nearly
    three times as many ballistic missile tests as his father and
    grandfather did combined. North Korea uses what they learn from
    each test to make improvements to their missile capabilities.
    We are watching them very closely.
        We are also watching Iran as it develops a space program
    with potential dual-use technology.
        NORTHCOM is prepared to counter ballistic missiles should
    North Korea attempt to launch an attack on the United States.
    While I am confident in our ability to defend the Homeland
    today, we must keep improving. We are working in close
    partnership with the Missile Defense Agency to improve our
    sensors and the reliability of our ground-based interceptors.
        Also today, Russian cruise missiles can reach us from
    greater ranges than ever before. No longer do they have to come
    close to North American airspace to hold us at risk. But I am
    also confident in NORAD's layered approach to cruise missile
    defense. But again, we must evolve and we are doing so as our
    adversaries' capabilities increase.
        Senator McCain, at my confirmation hearing, you asked if I
    had ever visited the southwest border. 1 year later, I can tell
    you that I visited our southwest border on foot, by boat, by
    air, in a tunnel, and yes, sir, even on horseback. I have
    gained an appreciation for the incredible variety of terrain
    along the southwest border and how transnational criminal
    organizations and their networks can exploit that terrain.
        I have also stood with my great friend, Kurt, on the
    Guatemalan soil looking north to see firsthand the network
    challenges that SEDENA [Secretariat of National Defense] and
    SEMAR [Secretaria de Marina] face and what they are going to
    strengthen Mexico's southern border.
        To counter these threat networks, NORTHCOM [Northern
    Command] partners with law enforcement agencies, SOUTHCOM
    [Southern Command], other combatant commands, the intelligence
    community, military partners such as SEDENA and SEMAR, all the
    while supporting Secretary Kelly's requests. The men and women
    of NORTHCOM stand united in a common purpose, ready to face the
    threats of the United States and Canada today, and we are
    evolving to face the threats of tomorrow. Sir, we have the
    watch.
        Thank you again for giving me the opportunity to speak, and
    I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Robinson follows:]

                 Prepared Statement by General Lori J. Robinson
                                  introduction
        Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished members of
    the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to
    provide my assessment of the posture and future of United States
    Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace Defense
    Command (NORAD). I am here today on behalf of the active soldiers,
    sailors, airmen, marines, coast guardsmen, National Guardsmen,
    Reservists, DOD civilians, and members of the Canadian Armed Forces who
    are the foundation and the future of the defense of the United States
    and Canada. Strengthened by robust relationships with our interagency
    and regional partners, the men and women of USNORTHCOM and NORAD are
    dedicated to defending the United States and Canada; we accept this
    obligation as the most fundamental and enduring of our
    responsibilities.
        USNORTHCOM and NORAD operate in a strategic environment that is as
    ambiguous and dangerous as any in our recent history. Threats to the
    United States and Canada are increasingly global, transregional, all-
    domain, and multi-functional in nature. Forged by an indispensable
    partnership, the Commands operate both independently and
    synergistically, conducting complementary missions with a shared
    purpose of common defense. The synergies that exist between the two
    Commands enable us to conduct our missions expeditiously and seamlessly
    in the face of very real threats.
        As those who would do harm to our two countries develop new
    capabilities and harden their intentions, we have never had a greater
    need for agile, responsive capabilities to defend and protect our
    citizens. In the long term, strained resources, competing priorities,
    and emerging threats challenge our ability to meet all of our
    commitments, a dilemma that requires innovative solutions, including
    new ways of cooperating with allies and trusted partners. I believe our
    ability to maintain a resilient and flexible force that can respond in
    a crisis requires prudent and stable funding. As a Combatant Commander,
    I rely on the Services to provide me with ready and capable forces and
    equipment to defend the United States and Canada. While I am grateful
    for the support of this Committee, sequestration and a series of
    Continuing Resolutions have introduced resource uncertainty and
    compelled the Services to prioritize current readiness over end-
    strength and modernization, a decision that translates into risk to our
    strategic advantage and technological edge in future conflicts.
        USNORTHCOM and NORAD--two distinct Commands with a common purpose--
    remain steadfast in our responsibility to provide for the defense of
    the United States and Canada. Our Commands are working diligently with
    fellow Combatant Commands, our North American neighbors, and our
    interagency partners to defend the United States and Canada in depth.
                             strategic environment
        Today, the strategic environment we face is complex, characterized
    by a growing number of strategically significant actors who represent
    real challenges and risks to the United States and our regional
    partners. Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, and non-nation-state
    violent extremist forces are capable of varied attacks against North
    America in multiple domains, from multiple approaches, and at
    increasingly greater ranges. States and non-state actors have devoted
    significant research and resources to erode our physical standoff and
    decision space. The Homeland is no longer a sanctuary protected by
    oceans and other geography.
        Globalization and access to advanced technology gives a greater
    number of adversaries, both state and non-state entities, the ability
    to reach us conventionally and asymmetrically while obscuring their
    intentions. I believe a range of competitors will confront the United
    States and its partners and interests through intimidation,
    destabilization, and the use of force. The threats to the Homeland
    remain diffuse, less attributable, and increasingly complex. This
    outlook is challenging but not insurmountable, and it serves to
    reinforce the importance of USNORTHCOM and NORAD readiness to adapt and
    evolve to meet the demands of tomorrow.
                                     russia
        In an attempt to retain a sphere of influence in the post-Soviet
    era, Russia continues to exhibit increasingly aggressive behavior, both
    regionally and globally. Despite a declining economy and domestic
    pressures, Vladimir Putin continues to expand and diversify Russia's
    long-range strike capability, including land- and sea-based ballistic
    missiles, cyber weapons, and most recently, a new generation of highly
    precise, conventionally armed cruise missiles that can reach the United
    States and Canada. I know that these advanced capabilities provide a
    range of strike options that Russia could use to hold targets at risk
    in the United States and Canada in a crisis. Russia has chosen to be a
    strategic competitor with the United States, and their capabilities
    present an all-domain threat to USNORTHCOM and NORAD interests.
                                     china
        China's efforts to achieve regional preeminence and undermine U.S.
    influence are a growing concern. Beijing continues to modernize its
    military and pursue an expansion and diversification of its strategic
    forces capable of holding the United States at risk. China has added
    dozens of road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles to its
    longstanding force of silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles
    and has begun operating its first viable class of ballistic missile
    submarines, which adds a long-range, sea-based leg to China's nuclear
    retaliatory capability.
                                  north korea
        As part of its decades-long quest for strategic nuclear weapons,
    North Korea continues its provocative, coercive patterns and aggressive
    weapons development activity. 2016 was one of North Korea's most active
    years in terms of nuclear weapon and missile program development in
    pursuit of weaponizing a nuclear ballistic missile capable of reaching
    the United States. Pyongyang completed its fourth and fifth nuclear
    detonations, as well as its second consecutive successful satellite
    launch using an intercontinental ballistic missile-class booster, and
    conducted the nation's first successful tests of an intermediate-range
    ballistic missile and a submarine-launched ballistic missile. In his
    five years as Supreme Leader, Kim Jong Un has conducted nearly three
    times as many ballistic missile tests as his father and grandfather did
    in their combined 63 years in power.
        In 2016, North Korea suffered a series of embarrassing test
    failures, which could lead to some dismissive conclusions about the
    maturity of their development. However, it is Kim Jong Un's willingness
    to accept public failure that worries me the most. In contrast to his
    father, who used missile and nuclear tests primarily to extract
    diplomatic concessions, Kim is pursuing a systematic program to
    develop, test, and field a viable weapon system as a deterrent to a
    regime-ending attack. In many cases, failed tests provide just as much
    insight, if not more, than a successful test.
        Amidst an unprecedented pace of North Korean strategic weapons
    testing, our ability to provide actionable warning continues to
    diminish. North Korea's closed society and robust denial and deception
    capabilities challenge our ability to observe missile and nuclear test
    preparations, a concern that would be exacerbated in crisis or in
    wartime and complicate our ability to defend the United States.
                                      iran
        In contrast to Russia, China, and North Korea, Iran does not
    possess a nuclear weapon. Iran has committed considerable resources to
    a space launch program that has achieved technological milestones that
    could contribute to the development of longer-range missiles including
    intercontinental ballistic missiles. Iranian officials have announced a
    self-imposed 2,000 kilometer limit on missile ranges, providing the
    capability to strike Israel from launch sites in central Iran, but
    insufficient to threaten Western Europe or North America. However, Iran
    is developing advanced missile capabilities and conducting flight tests
    of systems--such as the medium-range missile Iran launched on January
    29th--that incorporate technologies that could be used to develop
    longer range systems. Those advancements could include future
    intercontinental ballistic missile technology capable of holding the
    United States at risk.
                                threat networks
        The emergence of adaptive threat networks introduces a range of
    challenges to the United States and our regional partners. Threat
    networks tend to operate in the seams of society and may traffic in
    licit or illicit goods and services. These networks are sophisticated
    and resilient, joining with other networks around the world and
    engaging in a wide array of threatening activities. The destabilizing
    and corruptive influence of these networks creates vulnerabilities that
    can be exploited by our adversaries and threaten our national security.
        I am concerned by an increasing convergence of activity over threat
    networks resulting in a multi-layered and asymmetric threat to our
    national security. The nexus between transnational criminals and
    transnational terrorists is not an operational one--the two groups do
    not appear to be actively collaborating today to conduct attacks in the
    United States. What concerns me more are the ways the transnational
    terrorists may be able to leverage the pathways established by threat
    networks, especially as their capabilities are diminished from
    operational setbacks overseas.
                              usnorthcom and norad
        USNORTHCOM and NORAD, in collaboration with key stakeholders,
    defend the United States and Canada from threats and aggression through
    an adaptive, flexible, and resilient defense enterprise underpinned by
    strong relationships, ready Commands, and responsive capabilities to
    fulfill the Commands' roles in the shared responsibility of the defense
    of our nations. Our combined and complementary USNORTHCOM and NORAD
    defensive capabilities must counter threats across all domains and be
    able to adapt and outpace evolving threats. We are proud of the
    histories of our Commands, but we will not rest there. Looking to the
    future, we will continue to adapt and evolve to meet ever-changing
    threats.
                                homeland defense
    Ballistic Missile Defense
        One of the prominent aspects of my role as the Commander of
    USNORTHCOM is our Ballistic Missile Defense mission. North Korea's
    unprecedented level of nuclear testing and ballistic missile
    development offers a sobering reminder that the United States must
    remain vigilant against rogue nation-states that are able to threaten
    the Homeland. I am confident in our ability to employ the Ground-based
    Midcourse Defense element of the Ballistic Missile Defense System to
    defend the Homeland against a limited long-range ballistic missile
    attack from North Korea. As adversaries continue to pursue credible and
    advanced capabilities, we too must evolve our missile defense
    capabilities to outpace increasingly complex threats. The relationship
    between USNORTHCOM, supporting Combatant Commands, and the Missile
    Defense Agency is the cornerstone of our ability to outpace these
    evolving threats.
        Today's Ballistic Missile Defense System's Ground-based Midcourse
    Defense is designed to intercept incoming threats in the midcourse
    phase of flight, a strategy which provides the largest window of
    intercept and maximizes the use of our interceptors. Synergistic and
    comprehensive improvements across the entirety of the Ballistic Missile
    Defense System, including advanced sensors and enhanced interceptors,
    are foundational to maximizing system performance. I support the
    Ballistic Missile Defense System development path set by Vice Admiral
    Jim Syring and his team at the Missile Defense Agency, whose priorities
    include, improving our persistent sensor architecture, operational
    effectiveness of our interceptors, lethality of our kill vehicles, and
    robust sustainment and testing.
        Modernization of our sensor architecture is essential to
    maintaining our strategic advantage and confidence in our ability to
    defeat evolving, more complex threats. Thanks to the men and women at
    the Missile Defense Agency, and the support of this Committee, we are
    on track to deploy the Long Range Discrimination Radar. This critical
    midcourse sensor will improve persistent coverage of the United States
    and improve our target tracking and discrimination capability against
    potential countermeasures, thereby improving the effectiveness of our
    ground-based interceptors.
        The Missile Defense Agency is in the final phase of fielding
    additional ground-based interceptors, which will result in a total
    inventory of 44 by the end of calendar year 2017. This robust inventory
    is essential to our ability to engage multiple threats, but it alone is
    not sufficient to address evolving future threats. In addition to
    continued modernization of the current Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicles, I
    believe it is imperative we continue with the engineering, design, and
    test work currently underway on the Redesigned Kill Vehicle.
    Furthermore, we need to explore innovative technical solutions such as
    the upgraded tactical ground-based interceptor booster with a 2- or 3-
    stage selectable mode designed to increase battlespace and, as we learn
    more from the Redesigned Kill Vehicle, explore the development of
    interceptor variants like the Multi-Object Kill Vehicle.
        Foundational to our confidence in the Ballistic Missile Defense
    System, and how we operationally employ it, are robust test and
    sustainment programs. I support the Missile Defense Agency's efforts to
    maintain a regular ground-based interceptor flight test cadence and a
    vigorous ground test program. With every flight and ground test, we
    learn more about the system's capabilities and discover new ways to
    optimize its performance.
        Our ability to defend the United States against ballistic missile
    threats is underpinned by the dedication of Missile Defenders like
    Staff Sergeant Caroline Domenich. Staff Sergeant Domenich is a member
    of the Alaska Army National Guard assigned to the 49th Missile Defense
    Battalion. She has served as a communications officer, is now a weapons
    officer in the Fire Direction Center at Fort Greely, Alaska, and was
    recently named the Missile Defender of the Year. I am grateful for the
    professionalism and proficiency of Staff Sergeant Domenich and her
    fellow Missile Defenders who stand ready to engage inbound threats when
    called upon to protect the United States.
    Aerospace Warning and Aerospace Control
        NORAD's Aerospace Warning and Aerospace Control missions are a
    vital component of the defense of the United States and Canada. Through
    the execution of Operation NOBLE EAGLE, NORAD defends our Nations'
    airspace around the clock and accomplishes this critical mission with a
    combination of armed fighters on alert, air patrols, aerial refueling,
    Airborne Warning and Control System surveillance platforms, the
    Integrated Air Defense System in the National Capital Region, and our
    ground-based Air Defense Sector surveillance detection capabilities.
    These assets allow NORAD to respond to both symmetric and asymmetric
    air threats to the United States and Canada.
        Since 9/11, more than 70,000 sorties have been flown in support of
    Operation NOBLE EAGLE. Continuous improvement of air domain awareness
    and intercept capabilities will ensure that NORAD forces can protect
    our most critical national infrastructure and maintain a basing
    architecture that defends key terrain and our most critical national
    infrastructure.
        With almost 58,000 general aviation aircraft registered within 250
    miles of the National Capital Region, we continue to look for ways to
    ensure we are using our Operation NOBLE EAGLE assets efficiently and
    effectively. In the years after 9/11, NORAD was frequently launching
    Operation NOBLE EAGLE assets to intercept general aviation aircraft
    that unintentionally violated restricted airspace around the National
    Capital Region. In an effort to reduce preventable intercepts, we
    started working with our interagency partners on a proactive outreach
    campaign to educate the general aviation community about restricted
    airspace and notify aircraft owners and pilots of upcoming airspace
    restrictions. The foundation of our ability to conduct meaningful
    community outreach is the tenacity of airmen such as Major Andrew
    Scott, a Public Affairs Officer assigned to our 601st Air Operations
    Center. Major Scott has been a member of the Florida Air National Guard
    since 2005 and is a key leader in our combat information cell. Major
    Scott and the 601st team have fostered strong relationships with our
    interagency partners, including the Federal Aviation Administration,
    the U.S. Coast Guard, and the Civil Air Patrol. As a result of the
    community outreach program, we are seeing a significant decrease in
    accidental airspace incursions, which lead to an 80 percent reduction
    in unnecessary launches of intercept aircraft and other tactical
    actions.
        In the late 1950s, when NORAD was established to defend North
    American airspace, the Soviet Union was the only nation-state capable
    of striking North America militarily. We were able to maintain physical
    standoff from our adversary by keeping Russian bombers out of missile
    range of North America. Today, that physical standoff has eroded due to
    technological advancements by our adversaries. Commanders today have
    much less decision space, in part because hostile actions can occur
    from greater ranges with little or no warning.
        Russia continues to use heavy bombers, surface vessels, and
    submarines to demonstrate its ability to launch advanced, long-range,
    conventionally-armed cruise missiles. These emerging capabilities
    constitute a real challenge to our air defense architecture, and NORAD
    faces an increased risk to our ability to defend the United States and
    Canada against Russian cruise missile threats. The increased standoff
    capability, low altitude, and small radar signature of cruise missiles
    make defending against them a technical and operational challenge. I am
    confident in the layered approach provided by our family of systems to
    conduct cruise missile defense. We continue to work with the Joint
    Integrated Air and Missile Defense Organization, the Missile Defense
    Agency, and other stakeholders to pursue improvements to our
    indications and warnings, surveillance, and engagement capabilities to
    meet the evolving challenges posed by advanced threats.
        We are nearly finished with the first part of our three-phase
    Homeland Defense Design effort, which is intended to enhance our
    ability to detect, track, and investigate suspicious aircraft, cruise
    missiles, and unmanned aircraft systems, and when necessary, cue our
    defense systems against the full spectrum of air threats. This year, we
    will continue to integrate advanced sensors in the National Capital
    Region and are on track to begin the second phase of the Homeland
    Defense Design in FY18 to expand aerospace surveillance capabilities.
    Phase 3 of our Homeland Defense Design is in concept development and is
    intended to validate and incorporate emerging technology and explore
    scalable and deployable options for the rest of North America.
        Our ability to find, fix, and finish air threats is largely
    dependent on the capability of the fighter aircraft that conduct
    NORAD's Aerospace Control Alert mission. Fundamental to the aircrafts'
    detect and track capability is the modernization of its radar systems.
    We are working with the U.S. Air Force to procure and field Active
    Electronically Scanned Array radars for our Aerospace Control Alert
    fighters, starting with the aircraft that defend the National Capital
    Region.
        In recent years, Russia's Long Range Aviation Command has assumed
    an increasingly significant role in Russia's military assertiveness,
    starting with regular out-of-area patrols in 2007 and spiking in 2014
    with more out-of-area patrols than in any year since the Cold War.
    Russian heavy bomber activity in the approaches to North America
    declined sharply in 2016, but a closer look reveals troubling new
    capabilities. Russia's strategic air forces spent much of the year
    cycling bombers through a modernization program that enables their
    aircraft to carry an advanced family of cruise missiles capable of
    holding the United States and Canada at risk.
        With our Canadian teammates, we continue to capitalize on existing
    synergies and identify opportunities to evolve NORAD into a more agile
    Command capable of outpacing the full spectrum of threats. We will
    continue to prioritize investments in detection and surveillance
    through advanced indications and warning technology to ensure we are
    able to deter and, if necessary, defeat the full spectrum of aerospace
    and other attacks on the United States and Canada.
    The Arctic
        The harsh Arctic environment and polar icecap have long enhanced
    North American security by providing a physical barrier in the northern
    approaches to the United States and Canada. Today, receding sea ice and
    growing interest in Arctic economic prospects are increasing human
    presence and activity in the region. I consider the foundation for
    defense, security, and safety in the Arctic to be whole-of-government
    cooperation and collaboration with our trusted partners. In 2016,
    USNORTHCOM and NORAD supported the development of the 2016 DOD Arctic
    Strategy and we will continue to focus on ways to ensure the Arctic is
    a secure and stable region where U.S. national interests are
    safeguarded, the U.S. homeland is defended, and nations work
    cooperatively to address challenges. For USNORTHCOM and NORAD, the
    Arctic remains a strategic avenue of approach and a region with
    evolving challenges. I believe it is important that USNORTHCOM and
    NORAD be prepared to operate in the this harsh environment for missions
    such as search and rescue, patrolling, or maintaining Aerospace Warning
    and Aerospace Control along the Alaskan and Canadian coastlines.
        In the near term, increased human activity in the region will
    demand close maritime coordination and unity of effort between
    international, interagency, and industry partners in response to an
    emergency. Last year, the U.S. Coast Guard and USNORTHCOM sponsored the
    Arctic-focused search and rescue exercise ARCTIC CHINOOK, a partnership
    field training exercise based on a maritime mass rescue scenario
    involving an adventure-class cruise ship operating in the Arctic that
    is forced to abandon ship after a catastrophic event.
        One of my roles is to be the DOD advocate for Arctic capabilities.
    I am responsible for collaborating with Arctic stakeholders to enable a
    holistic view of Arctic capabilities. Our Arctic Capabilities Advocacy
    Working Group provides a forum for DOD, interagency, and trusted
    international partners to identify requirements, capabilities, and
    shortfalls across the spectrum of DOD Arctic operations. Constrained
    budgets and demands from competing global priorities compel us to
    identify prudent opportunities to invest in material and non-material
    capabilities that enable us to ensure security and support safety in
    the Arctic.
        We are primarily focused on improving fundamental operational
    capabilities that support domain awareness, communications,
    infrastructure, and sustainable presence in the Arctic. For instance,
    with the support of the working group, we successfully advocated for
    the construction of an open-bay barracks in Utqiagvik (formerly known
    as Barrow), Alaska. This 40-person facility opened in January and is
    supporting Alaska Army National Guard exercises and training. In
    addition, through NORAD's collaboration with the Department of Defense
    and the Canadian Department of National Defence, we facilitated the
    release of the Mobile User Objective System to Canada, which will
    provide better communications commonality among the bi-national NORAD
    enterprise.
                      defense support of civil authorities
        As the Commander of USNORTHCOM, I provide DOD assistance to
    federal, state, local, territorial, and tribal authorities. Defense
    Support of Civil Authorities is a unique mission in that we facilitate
    DOD support in response to requests for assistance from civil
    authorities for a range of needs, including domestic emergencies, law
    enforcement support, man-made incidents, and natural disasters. Our
    civil partners are charged with the direct responsibility to respond to
    these crises and we work hard to develop and maintain the relationships
    necessary to deliver responsive capabilities when our partners request
    assistance.
                               natural disasters
        Our disaster response actions are most often in support of the
    Federal Emergency Management Agency, with whom we plan and train to be
    ready to provide timely and tailored DOD capabilities for a spectrum of
    contingencies.
        One of our key DOD partners in this endeavor is U.S. Transportation
    Command, on whom we rely to provide timely support of Federal Emergency
    Management Agency requirements. In addition to the transportation
    support they provide, their Joint Enabling Capabilities Command
    provides a trained and ready cadre of key subject matter experts to
    augment our Headquarters and deployed command and control forces with
    specialized transportation planning and communications capabilities.
        In 2016, we partnered with the Federal Emergency Management Agency
    and a host of other federal, state, local, and Canadian provincial
    authorities to conduct Exercise ARDENT SENTRY, our annual Tier 1
    disaster response exercise. The exercise simulated a 9.0-magnitude
    earthquake occurring in the Cascadia Subduction Zone, followed by a
    tsunami and several aftershocks along the coast of Washington, Oregon,
    Northern California, and British Columbia. This complex, integrated
    training environment offered USNORTHCOM an opportunity to practice our
    procedures and validate our processes with our federal, state, local,
    and multinational emergency responders.
        This year, our ARDENT SENTRY exercise will give us an opportunity
    to plan and exercise a bilateral and whole-of-government response to an
    improvised nuclear threat in the New York City region and in Halifax
    Canada. The scenario will enable Canadian and United States forces to
    practice collaboratively rendering safe several devices near Halifax.
    The next phase of the exercise will challenge our consequence
    management procedures with Canada, our Federal Emergency Management
    Agency Region II partners, the Department of Justice, and our
    interagency partners in response to two subsequent improvised nuclear
    device detonations and the resulting counterterrorism crime scene.
        DOD capabilities are only useful if they are accessible and
    responsive to emergent relief requests. Our rigorous training regimen
    was put to the test in October, 2016 when Hurricane Matthew was
    developing in the eastern Caribbean. To provide ready support to the
    Federal Emergency Management Agency's response plan, USNORTHCOM
    coordinated with the Services to provide six DOD installations as
    incident staging bases to facilitate the deployment of commodities
    (e.g. water, food, blankets, cots, and generators) by staging these
    items closer to the expected impacted areas, thereby reducing response
    time.
                                threat networks
        In my first eleven months as Commander of USNORTHCOM and NORAD, I
    have invested highly productive time visiting our southwest border and
    Mexico, garnering an increased appreciation of the threats to our
    borders. Transnational Criminal Organizations and their networks
    continue to affect conditions in Mexico and Central America, which
    introduces instability and creates challenges for our U.S. law
    enforcement partners responsible for securing our borders.
        The threat is fueled primarily by Transnational Criminal
    Organizations which function through vast networks that transcend
    physical, geographic, and societal boundaries. These networks are able
    to operate in legitimate society, which increases the likelihood of
    their survival despite the best efforts of law enforcement
    professionals. This challenge exists in the seams among U.S.
    institutions and far exceeds the ability of any one agency or nation to
    confront it. The global nature of these networks necessitates an
    unprecedented level of cooperative effort among federal, state, local,
    international law enforcement, and intelligence community partners and
    combatant commands. I believe countering threat networks is a long-term
    proposition that will require continuous effort, creative solutions,
    and a strengthening of the unified network of law enforcement, DOD,
    intelligence community, and international partners.
        USNORTHCOM continues to develop strong strategic security
    partnerships and foster opportunities to support to our domestic law
    enforcement partners. Our subordinate command, Joint Task Force North,
    recruits and employs Title 10 units to provide support to federal,
    state, and local law enforcement agencies. When requested, DOD assets
    are employed in support of an intelligence-driven, counter-network
    approach that simultaneously enhances unit readiness by allowing units
    to train on their mission essential tasks in a setting that
    approximates the environment common to many forward-deployed locations.
    In 2016, USNORTHCOM supported more than 150 all-domain, multi-agency
    domestic law enforcement operations, providing detection and monitoring
    capabilities, ground sensor platoons, unmanned aerial systems, mobility
    support, and analytical services. Our support contributed to law
    enforcement interdiction of $150M in illicit goods.
        The support we provide to our law enforcement partners is enabled
    through the determination and expertise of patriots like Sergeant
    Tanner Richie, a U.S. Marine Corps maintenance chief assigned to the
    2nd Ground Sensor Platoon at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. Originally
    from Santa Cruz, California, Sergeant Richie is a trained ground sensor
    operator and sensor system maintainer who has deployed on four Joint
    Task Force North missions in support of the U.S. Border Patrol. As the
    maintenance chief for the platoon, Sergeant Richie identified a way to
    leverage satellite communications infrastructure to provide expanded
    sensor capability in areas along the border that were previously
    unreachable by Very High Frequency radio employment. Through Sergeant
    Richie's ingenuity, USNORTHCOM is now able to provide increased ground
    sensor support to our law enforcement partners. The technical solution
    he tested along the border will have a lasting positive impact on
    ground sensor employment in the future.
        We continue to pursue opportunities to mature synchronization and
    interoperability among all the stakeholders operating on both sides of
    the U.S.-Mexico border. What began as an annual Border Commanders
    Conference to conduct senior-leader dialogue has developed into monthly
    cross-border coordination engagements, facilitated by USNORTHCOM's
    component command, United States Army North, to enable collaboration
    among U.S. law enforcement agencies and Mexican Military Region and
    Zone Commands. These engagements are an opportunity to share best
    practices and bilateral solutions designed to disrupt Transnational
    Criminal Organizations along the border. This bilateral collaboration
    further matured into concurrent patrols conducted by U.S. law
    enforcement and Mexico's Secretariat of National Defense (SEDENA) on
    respective sides of the border. The information sharing conducted
    through these concurrent patrols resulted in a recent seizure by SEDENA
    of 10,000 pounds of marijuana at the border.
        I see the DOD support role in this highly complex problem as
    critical, and I intend to improve the relationships and strengthen the
    support USNORTHCOM is able to provide to domestic law enforcement
    agencies and our international partners. In the near term, we will
    continue to explore options for enhancing our support to our law
    enforcement partners at the ports of entry who work tirelessly to stem
    the flow of illicit trafficking into the U.S. In addition, we will
    pursue synchronized planning and coordinated operations with our
    partners to illuminate the networks that threaten our National
    security.
                          theater security cooperation
    Canada
        The United States and Canada share the longest international border
    in the world, and our collaborative relationship is one of the closest
    and most extensive in history. This relationship reflects a unique
    friendship, underpinned by common values, that has evolved over the
    course of the last century. Our bi-national command, NORAD, is the gold
    standard for military collaboration providing for the common defense of
    our nations and people.
        A critical component of our operational defense framework is the
    tri-command relationship between USNORTHCOM, NORAD, and the Canadian
    Joint Operations Command. This steadfast relationship extends beyond
    our integrated USNORTHCOM and NORAD headquarters at Peterson Air Force
    Base to the Canadian commanders who have established relationships with
    U.S. counterparts across the border to ensure our countries can support
    each other when needed. Together, we are working to further integrate
    our operational framework into an adaptive continental defense
    arrangement that can function across multiple domains to defend the
    United States and Canada, while preserving each nations' unilateral
    ability to conduct national missions.
        As NORAD approaches our 60th year defending the United States and
    Canada, we need to evolve our bi-national defense to deter, and if
    necessary, defeat potential future attacks. We will continue to
    prioritize interoperability and all-domain command and control through
    regular operations, combined training and exercises, combined planning,
    information and intelligence sharing, and personnel exchanges to ensure
    we are capable of conducting operations together, across the spectrum
    of conflict.
    Mexico
        The relationship USNORTHCOM enjoys with Mexico's Secretariat of
    National Defense (SEDENA) and the Secretariat of the Navy (SEMAR)
    continues to evolve as a strategic institutional partnership. We
    routinely collaborate with the Mexican military as it seeks to prepare
    for and respond to internal security crises, contribute to regional
    security, and assume greater global responsibilities. They share our
    concerns over the negative impact of illicit flows on both sides of the
    border, and we are on a path toward a common military-to-military
    vision and strategy to address the mutual challenges that impact the
    security of both Nations.
        USNORTHCOM continues to pursue opportunities to build
    interoperability with our Mexican military partners through combined
    training and exercises. We focus on ensuring the timely delivery of a
    record Foreign Military Sales of over a billion dollars in UH-60 Black
    Hawk helicopters and High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles. We
    work closely with the U.S. interagency community and Mexican
    interagency organizations to support the Government of Mexico's
    Southern Border Strategy to improve security on their border with
    Guatemala and Belize.
        USNORTHCOM's ability to provide focused engagements, professional
    exchanges, and military training with Mexico is dependent on the many
    warrior-diplomats who build trust and confidence with their military
    counterparts. Master Gunnery Sergeant Cesar Huezo, is a U.S. Marine
    Corps Reserve liaison officer assigned to the Theater Security
    Cooperation Detachment at Marine Forces North. Master Gunnery Sergeant
    Huezo draws upon his personal experiences as an infantryman, light
    armored reconnaissance section leader, and intelligence Marine--as well
    as his civilian career as a trauma nurse--to develop a cadre of combat-
    skills instructors who provide focused training to the Mexican Marines.
    Since 2012, Master Gunnery Sergeant Huezo has developed instructional
    material and overseen training programs that enhanced the capacity of
    nearly 8,000 Mexican Marines.
        Today, we are witnessing an evolution of the Mexican military from
    an internally focused force to one that is willing and increasingly
    capable of providing security leadership in Latin America. Recently,
    and for the first time in their institutional history, Mexico agreed to
    co-host the April 2017 Central American Security Conference with U.S.
    Southern Command and USNORTHCOM. This forum will reinforce Mexican
    Armed Forces regional leadership throughout Central America, and I am
    confident it will serve as a catalyst for greater involvement in
    strengthening regional security. In the near term, both SEDENA and
    SEMAR are actively preparing to become force providers in United
    Nations Peacekeeping Operations.
    The Bahamas
        The U.S. and The Bahamas share a strong bilateral relationship
    founded on common interests in security, trade, and disaster response.
    Like many nations in the region, The Bahamas suffers from a surge in
    human and narcotics trafficking that contribute to a corresponding rise
    in violent crime. The Bahamian government is committed to close
    cooperation with the United States on law enforcement and maritime
    security concerns, as well as ways to counter illicit trafficking. This
    past December, we conducted our annual bilateral security cooperation
    table-top exercise with the Royal Bahamas Defence Force and mission
    partners in the Government of the Commonwealth of The Bahamas. The
    exercise challenged command and control structures, validated plans and
    procedures, and improved the Royal Bahamas Defence Force capability to
    provide maritime domain awareness, interdiction, and military
    assistance to civil authorities. We will continue our security
    cooperation efforts with the Royal Bahamas Defence Force with a
    priority focus on emphasizing maritime domain awareness, interdiction
    capabilities to counter illicit flows, and increasing disaster response
    capabilities.
                                   conclusion
        The men and women of USNORTHCOM and NORAD remain diligent and
    undeterred as we stand watch. The evolving nature of global,
    transregional, all-domain, and multi-functional challenges have erased
    the lines on the map, necessitating an integrated and synchronized
    approach to defending the United States and Canada. To meet the
    challenges ahead, we actively pursue opportunities to strengthen our
    relationships with fellow combatant commands, our North American
    partners, and the interagency community. We will emphasize precision,
    agility, and resilience to ensure we are ready to execute in the
    ambiguity of a crisis.
        We defend our countries by remaining ever vigilant, ever watching,
    and ever training as we fulfill our Commands' roles in the sacred
    responsibility of defending the United States and Canada. I am grateful
    for the support this Committee has provided our Commands and am truly
    honored to serve as the Commander of USNORTHCOM and NORAD. I look
    forward to your questions.

        ``We have the watch''

        Chairman McCain. Thank you.
        Admiral Tidd?

        STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL KURT W. TIDD, USN, COMMANDER, U.S.
                            SOUTHERN COMMAND

        Admiral Tidd. Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, members
    of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to address you
    today.
        I am pleased to be here with my NORTHCOM teammate, General
    Lori Robinson. Although we focus on distinctly different
    mission sets, our teams work together to keep our Nation safe
    from a range of challenges. While General Robinson and her team
    are directly responsible for defending our Homeland, SOUTHCOM
    extends that defense well beyond our borders throughout our
    southern approaches.
        Now, I want to do something a little bit different today
    with my opening remarks. I want to tell you a story. Picture
    this. We gain information on a group of individuals who are
    planning to make their way to the United States. They are
    carrying a weapon that will kill dozens of people and put
    hundreds more in the hospital. This powerful weapon will drain
    millions from our economy in terms of health care costs, crime,
    and lost productivity. It is neither high-tech nor new. We know
    exactly how dangerous it is. This weapon passes freely through
    our defenses as do hundreds more just like it.
        Chairman, members, I tell you this true story to point out
    an uncomfortable fact. Those people are members of a threat
    network, and the weapon that they move today is drugs. On
    average, 1 metric ton of cocaine will kill 10 Americans every
    year and harm hundreds more. Last year, we watched almost 450
    tons pass freely towards our country. What made it through
    translates into American lives lost and illicit profit that
    fuels instability and violence.
        Now, I tell you this story focused on drugs today because
    it is the scenario on which we have the best information, but
    these adaptive threat networks can move anything. What keeps me
    up at night is the potential for even more deadly cargo moving
    through these networks and directly into our cities. ISIS has
    encouraged its followers to exploit the vulnerability of the
    pathways leading directly into the United States in order to
    move weapons of mass destruction.
        To address this challenge, we are changing our approach to
    better understand and disrupt the immediate threats. We are
    working with our partners to reduce the vulnerabilities that
    allow these networks to exist in the first place, and we are
    expanding information sharing and building the capacity of our
    partners so that they can better secure their territory against
    these challenges.
        Now, today I also look forward to talking to you about
    other issues that we are addressing. Extremist networks like
    ISIS are radicalizing and recruiting individuals, and they are
    encouraging them to conduct attacks on U.S. and partner
    interests in our region. Russia, China, and Iran are actively
    engaging in Latin America. While most of their activities are
    not military threats yet, some do warrant examination.
        Even seemingly benign activities can build malign
    influence. With the peace accord now final in Colombia, a firm
    anchor for regional stability and one of our most trusted
    partners, Colombia still faces a challenging road ahead. We
    continue to stand together in defense of our shared interests.
        Lastly, detention operations at Joint Task Force Guantanamo
    remain a sensitive and a demanding mission that our men and
    women continue to execute with discipline and professionalism.
    Now it is time to address the infrastructure requirements that
    we have been putting off. The safety and the security of our
    troops depend on it.
        Finally, I would like to thank this committee for its
    unwavering support to the men and women both in uniform and out
    who serve our country. I look forward to answering your
    questions. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Tidd follows:]

                   Prepared Statement by Admiral Kurt W. Tidd
                                  introduction
        Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished Members of
    the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to address you today. On
    behalf of the men and women of U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), we
    appreciate your support to our team and to our partners in Central
    America, South America, and the Caribbean. I look forward to providing
    an update on our work defending the southern approaches to the U.S.
    homeland and promoting regional security and stability.
        Although other regions may figure more prominently on U.S. foreign
    policy and national security agendas, Latin America and the Caribbean
    is the region most connected to our own society, prosperity, and
    security. We are inextricably linked by our shared values, cultures,
    and the rapid flows of goods, services, people, and information
    throughout our hemisphere. Coupled with geographic proximity, these
    interconnections mean there's no such thing as a purely ``Latin
    American and Caribbean problem.'' Simply stated, security challenges in
    the region are likely to become security challenges to the U.S.
    homeland.
        Just consider the following. Threat networks aggressively operate
    across borders (including our own), moving anything and anyone and
    fueling violent crime on the streets of Tegucigalpa and Tucson.
    Individuals from across the world--some fleeing conflict and
    insecurity, some seeking economic opportunity, and some with possible
    ties to terrorism--can exploit the region's security vulnerabilities to
    attempt illegal entry into the United States. A mosquito-borne virus
    crosses an ocean and causes a regional and domestic health crisis.
    China, Russia, and Iran seek to expand their influence and challenge
    the international order and democratic principles of transparency, good
    governance, and rule of law abroad--and much closer to home.
        Although USSOUTHCOM has a tradition of excellence in interagency
    and regional cooperation, we believe `business as usual' is no longer
    sufficient to address these types of transregional challenges, or to
    embrace transregional opportunities. Higher-level guidance also demands
    we adjust our approach; the National Military Strategy directs the
    entire Joint Force to work in a more integrated manner to address the
    increasingly transnational, transregional, multi-domain, and
    multifunctional nature of today's security challenges. In response,
    USSOUTHCOM is becoming a more agile organization and redoubling our
    commitment to--and integration with--our partners. This isn't a matter
    of altruism; it's a matter of our national interests, because in this
    uncertain world our security partnerships are more important than ever
    before. Trust and understanding can't be surged when crisis hits, and
    complex threats can't be addressed by any one nation or agency. Mr.
    Chairman, it's simple, really: our security partnerships help create a
    layered defense of our homeland by keeping our shared home stable and
    secure.
                                  our approach
        USSOUTHCOM's main effort is countering threat networks. We also
    prepare for and respond to disasters and crises; and we build
    relationships to meet global challenges. We employ a networked approach
    that stops threats before they reach our nation's borders, destabilize
    our partners, or undermine the security of the Western Hemisphere. Our
    components and task forces--U.S. Army South, U.S. Air Forces Southern/
    12th Air Force, U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command/U.S. Fourth Fleet,
    U.S. Marine Corps Forces South, U.S. Special Operations Command South,
    Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) South, Joint Task Force (JTF)
    Bravo, and JTF Guantanamo (GTMO)--are often at the forefront of these
    efforts, and we appreciate the Committee's continued support to the
    entire USSOUTHCOM team.
                     security environment (the challenges)
        Threat Networks. Mr. Chairman, Members, if I were appearing before
    you in 1987, 1997, or even 2007, I would tell you that drug trafficking
    is the most significant security challenge in Latin America and the
    Caribbean. But it's 2017, and drugs--or any of the illegal commodities
    that move through our hemisphere--are not the only thing we have to
    worry about. The illicit flows of goods and people, and the violence
    and corruption these flows fuel at home and abroad, are the visible
    manifestations of complex, adaptive, networked threats. Transregional
    and transnational threat networks are now the principal threat to
    regional security and stability. These networks operate unconstrained
    by legal and geographic boundaries, unimpeded by morality, and fueled
    by enormous profits. Their interests, influence, capabilities, and
    reach extend beyond the responsibilities of any one Geographic or
    Functional Combatant Command, undercutting our national interests in
    multiple domains and many regions. They prey on weak institutions and
    exploit the interconnected nature of our modern financial,
    transportation and communication systems and the seams in our
    organizational boundaries. \1\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Convergence: Illicit Networks and National Security in the Age
    of Globalization. Center for Complex Operations, National Defense
    University, 2013.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Threat networks engage in a range of destabilizing illicit
    activities that further dangerous ideologies or generate profit.
    Violent extremist organizations like ISIS seek to radicalize and
    recruit vulnerable populations in the Caribbean and parts of Central
    and South America. Hezbollah members, facilitators, and supporters
    engage in licit and illicit activities in support of the organization,
    moving weapons, cash, and other contraband to raise funds and build
    Hezbollah's infrastructure in the region.
    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Criminal networks, in contrast, are motivated by wealth and power.
    Some are globally-integrated enterprises with worldwide reach--and
    profit margins that rival Fortune 500 companies. Some smuggle precursor
    chemicals and fentanyl from China into Central America and Mexico,
    where they produce extremely potent heroin that is driving overdose
    epidemics across the United States. Other networks move large shipments
    of cocaine to markets in the United States, West Africa, Europe, and
    Australia, while some reap enormous profits by illegally mining gold in
    Guyana, Peru, and Colombia. Many dabble in poly-crime activities,
    including kidnapping, money laundering, and extortion. Still other
    networks have diversified into the smuggling of weapons and people,
    including individuals who pose a potential threat to national
    security--through the region and into the United States.
        Although each of these activities undermines regional security, the
    most dangerous scenario is that terrorist organizations will exploit
    criminal capabilities or human smuggling routes to enter the United
    States. The most chilling manifestation, of course, is the possibility
    that terrorists with chemical or biological weapons--or the knowledge
    of how to build and employ them--will move through the region and
    attempt to infiltrate our Southwest border. This potential threat
    raises the question of criminal-terrorist collusion, which has been a
    topic of significant debate within the U.S. Government. I'd like to
    share my view on the subject.
        Conventional wisdom downplays the possibility that criminal and
    terrorist networks would actively collaborate in this part of the
    world. Observers are correct when they say that drug traffickers are
    likely reluctant to work with terrorists, and vice-versa. But here are
    the shortcomings I and many of our interagency partners see with this
    view: it presumes criminal networks exercise absolute oversight and
    control over their smuggling routes. It presumes they conduct thorough
    background checks and screen everyone and everything that moves along
    the region's illicit superhighways. It presumes that just because
    witting collaboration might not take place, unwitting collaboration
    couldn't. While this scenario may be unlikely, we and our partners know
    it is also not totally impossible.
        Mr. Chairman, I think about those smuggling routes that thread
    through our southern approaches and into our Homeland. Despite the
    heroic efforts of law enforcement, these are highly efficient systems
    that can move just about anything and anyone into our country. And what
    keeps me up at night is knowing I'm not the only one thinking about
    those routes--extremist networks like ISIS are thinking about them too,
    and how to use them.
    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Ultimately, the argument about whether criminal and terrorist
    networks collaborate or keep their distance from one another in Latin
    America distracts from the most important point. Both groups inhabit
    the same illegal orbits. They both seek to circumvent or subvert the
    rule of law. They both exploit the same permissive environment and
    could use the same key facilitators (money launderers, document
    forgers, and corrupt officials) to support their operations. By
    affecting the permissive environment, functions, and enabling
    activities that both types of networks rely on, we can help degrade
    criminal and terrorist networks alike.
        Regional Stability. In addition to the challenge posed by threat
    networks, Latin America and the Caribbean are also vulnerable to
    disasters, including earthquakes, hurricanes, droughts, and the
    outbreak of infectious diseases with the potential for secondary impact
    in the United States. Varying prevention, management, and response
    capabilities in the region--coupled with underlying challenges like
    chronic poverty and economic insecurity--can amplify the impact of
    disasters, contributing to other `push factors' that drive illegal
    migration.

                                             Apprehensions and Interdictions
                                          Source: Customs and Border Protection
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                      Fiscal Year 2015          Fiscal Year 2016
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Cubans (land and sea).......................................                   48,549                    60,311
    Haitians (land and sea).....................................                    3,435                     7,932
    Unaccompanied Children (from Northern Triangle).............                   28,396                    42,405
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Overall the region is stable, although the gap between public
    expectations and government performance manifests itself in social
    protests, most often against corruption and mismanagement of public
    resources. Bolivian citizens have engaged in mass protests to demand
    resolution to a severe water shortage, while Venezuela faces
    significant instability in the coming year due to widespread food, and
    medicine shortages; continued political uncertainty; and a worsening
    economic situation. The growing humanitarian crisis in Venezuela could
    eventually compel a regional response.
        Activities of China, Russia, and Iran. While threat networks and
    potential crises are immediate concerns, we also face strategic
    challenges. Over the past decade, China, Russia, and Iran have
    established a greater presence in the region. These ``external actors''
    require separate and serious consideration, especially as it relates to
    the broader global security environment. Knowing the political
    establishment in China, Russia, and Iran will likely scrutinize this
    testimony--and in the case of Russia, attempt to distort it--I'm going
    to choose my words with care.
        Mr. Chairman, I'll speak plainly: if we care about what's going on
    in the South China Sea, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East, it's worth
    keeping an eye on Chinese, Russian, and Iranian activity in this part
    of the world, too. For Russia, China, and Iran, Latin America is not an
    afterthought. These global actors view the Latin American economic,
    political, and security arena as an opportunity to achieve their
    respective long-term objectives and advance interests that may be
    incompatible with ours and those of our partners. Their vision for an
    alternative international order poses a challenge to every nation that
    values non-aggression, rule of law, and respect for human rights--the
    very same principles that underlie the Inter-American system of peace
    and cooperation. Some of what they're doing--while not a direct
    military threat--does warrant examination. Even seemingly benign
    activities can be used to build malign influence.
        Now the region's number two trading partner, China has courted
    Latin America through economic diplomacy, importing more and more raw
    materials, offering loans, and pledging billions in investments in
    infrastructure development. It sees its own development as contingent
    on the development of other countries, including those in Latin America
    and the Caribbean. \2\ Beijing cooperates with Latin America on space,
    potential nuclear power projects, and telecommunications networks,
    which could pose security concerns to the United States. China's
    military soft power lies in its ability to engage through offers of
    all-expenses-paid training, no-strings-attached defense sales and
    financing to regional militaries, and donations of equipment and
    humanitarian aid. China prioritizes engagement with regional
    organizations like the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States
    (CELAC) that exclude the United States, and seeks to leverage regional
    relationships to reshape international economic and financial
    institutions to its advantage. \3\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ The People's Republic of China, Policy Paper on Latin America.
    November 24, 2016.
        \3\ Ibid.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        As part of the Kremlin's aim to regain its status as a global power
    and prove its prowess to domestic audiences, Russia uses soft power
    tools in an attempt to challenge United States leadership in the
    Western Hemisphere and displace traditional U.S. Goodwill initiatives.
    Examples include the construction of an international police training
    facility in Nicaragua that will be used to provide regional
    counternarcotics training and the funding of a vaccine production plant
    that will supposedly make drugs accessible and affordable throughout
    Central America. Additionally, Russia seeks to discredit the United
    States through state-owned media like RT-Espanol and SputnikMundo,
    which spread misinformation to create doubts and distrust about U.S.
    intentions and policy towards the region and other parts of the world.
    The Russians are also engaging in some disquieting behavior, such as
    providing battle tanks to Nicaragua, which impacts regional stability
    and could cause its neighbors to divert vital resources (needed to
    fight threat networks and address developmental challenges) to maintain
    parity.
        As a continuing state sponsor of terrorism, Iranian involvement in
    the Western Hemisphere is always a matter of concern. With the easing
    of economic sanctions, Iran may be seeking to rebuild its relationships
    in the region. Tehran uses cooperative technological, economic, and
    diplomatic interests as the centerpiece of its regional diplomacy.
    Although on the surface it portrays its actions as innocuous, Iran
    could exploit its cultural centers to build networks, which could be
    leveraged to extend its influence and advance its interests.
        Broadly speaking, some of this outreach is concerning, especially
    to those of us who care about advancing human rights and promoting
    regional peace and stability. Keep in mind there's no Chinese, Russian,
    or Iranian equivalent of a Leahy Law, no comparable conditions on
    security assistance, no independent domestic media that carefully
    scrutinizes their activities. Their arms sales aren't tied to
    international protocols or human rights vetting. Their loans don't come
    with requirements to follow strict environmental or anti-corruption
    standards, or even clear terms and conditions for repayment. Their
    unscrupulous business practices and disregard for rule of law
    facilitates corruption, reduces trust in governments, and poses
    challenges to the norms and values that have brought prosperity and
    security for millions of people across our hemisphere.
        It's also worth noting that in recent years these actors have
    capitalized on the perception that the U.S. is disengaging from the
    region. Our partners plainly see that we are conducting fewer
    engagements; holding smaller and less frequent exercises; and that we
    have smaller U.S. military presence in regional embassies and fewer
    forces and platforms than ever before. When budget constraints limit
    our ability to engage with our regional partners, it sends a message
    that others can, and do, exploit.
        And while we should work harder to understand the true intentions
    of these actors, whatever they intend, in most cases our best response
    is to strengthen our own security relationships, rather than focus on
    ``countering'' or ``competing'' with the likes of China or Russia. At
    times--when it supports our interests and those of our partners--we
    should follow avenues for cooperation. At others, we might find we need
    to work with our partners to address negative influence or
    destabilizing actions. At all times, we should focus on being the best
    possible partner to the region.
        So it's on us to demonstrate our commitment by being an equal and
    principled partner; it's on us to earn, and keep, the region's trust.
    It's on us, because we lose relationships not as a result of any
    Chinese or Russian actions; we lose them, in large part, by not
    demonstrating the depth of our commitment to the region. Our leadership
    is weakened not because China or Russia offer compelling alternatives,
    but because it's not always clear to our network of allies and partners
    what's important to us. American (and Inter-American) principles are
    undermined not because they no longer matter, but because we and our
    partners don't do everything we can to protect and promote them. Mr.
    Chairman, it comes down to this: we have a choice. Success or failure
    in this region depends on us, what we stand for, and what we do, much
    more than it depends on anyone else.
         defending our southern approaches (what we're doing about it)
        To address many of these security challenges, we work with our
    network of interagency, regional, and non-governmental partners. I look
    forward to describing how our networked approach keeps our southern
    approaches defended, our nation safe, and our shared home secure.
        Countering Threat Networks. To keep pace with the challenge of
    threat networks, we must do more than just stop illicit commodities,
    and our Southwest border must be our last--not our first--line of
    defense. To that end, we are working with our interagency and regional
    partners to pressure threat networks along multiple fronts. We aim to
    degrade threat network capabilities, disrupt their operations, and
    affect the underlying conditions that allow them to flourish.
        Strengthening Interagency Partnerships. We have stood up
    communities of interests (COIs), meetings that bring together
    stakeholders from across the U.S. Government to share information and
    intelligence, expand understanding and awareness about networks and our
    activities to counter them, and predict how our efforts will affect
    their illicit operations. Last year, information sharing and support to
    tactical operations through our Central America COI--which is hosted by
    Joint Task Force (JTF) Bravo and includes over 700 participants from
    various U.S. Government agencies--helped dismantle major threat
    networks by targeting their leadership structure. While we've always
    supported our interagency partners, what's changed is how we're
    supporting them--and the combined effect we're having, together.

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Last year, our Countering Weapons of Mass
     Destruction (CWMD) COI, hosted the first of its
     kind regional conference on non-proliferation
     and WMD.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        By sharing information in the Central America COI, interagency
    participants are better prepared to enable one another to apply
    pressure across threat networks, forcing them to adapt on our terms--
    not theirs. As we put pressure on these networks, they are forced to
    move their operations and change their tactics, exposing them and their
    vulnerabilities. As law enforcement is able to arrest individuals, the
    group quickly analyzes and predicts the expected reaction across the
    entire network, which leads to a better understanding of how members of
    one network interact with each other and with other networks in the
    region.

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In 2016, the CENTAM COI supported a multinational
     intelligence-driven operation that resulted in
     the arrest of Wilter Blanco (the head of the
     Atlantic Cartel who reportedly plotted the
     assassination of the U.S. Ambassador and the
     Honduran President) by Costa Rican law
     enforcement.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Building on this COI success, we are establishing a permanent
    counter-threat network team inside our headquarters. In support of U.S.
    Government and regional partners, this team will analyze, fuse, and
    synchronize intelligence and operations to illuminate and affect threat
    networks. Through network mapping and outreach, elements of this team
    will also provide an amplifying capability to efforts by U.S. country
    teams, U.S. and partner nation law enforcement, U.S. Special Operations
    Command (USSOCOM) and other Combatant Commands to disrupt the flow of
    SIAs and the potential return of foreign terrorist fighters to the
    region. As part of this effort, we're partnering with the Intelligence
    Community to pursue innovative approaches to integrate unclassified
    open source, social media, and publicly available information (PAI) to
    better characterize the regional security environment and facilitate
    increased information and intelligence exchanges with regional and
    interagency partners.
        We also collaborate with the Department of State to encourage our
    partner nations to define and develop legal instruments against
    terrorism. Such legislation is critical to addressing radicalization
    and the return of battle-hardened ISIS fighters with combat experience.
    These individuals pose a significant threat, as they will be well-
    positioned to spread an extremist message and potentially execute acts
    of terror against our partner nations and U.S. citizens in the region.
    As this Committee knows, ISIS is emphasizing external attacks in
    response to increasing pressure in Syria and Iraq, and some of our
    partners have expressed concerns over the potential for ISIS-directed
    or inspired attacks in this part of the world. I share these concerns.
        To complement these efforts, we are expanding our coordination with
    U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and USSOCOM to support the
    Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as they target the smuggling
    operations of individuals who may pose terrorist risks. Last year we
    expanded our support to Homeland Security Investigation's (HSI)
    Operation CITADEL, a multi-year, multi-agency effort to dismantle human
    smuggling networks and identify migrants that may represent security
    threats while undertaking protection screening for those who may have a
    credible fear of persecution. Our planning support, intelligence
    capabilities, and airlift are enhancing HSI's ability to prevent
    persons of interest from transiting the region, reaching our borders,
    and potentially gaining entry into the U.S. Homeland.
        As this Committee knows, JIATF South is the gold standard of
    interagency cooperation. They were doing counter-threat network
    operations (if by a different name) long before the term existed. JIATF
    South supports interdiction operations that are force multipliers for
    evidence collection, grand jury proceedings, indictments, and
    extraditions, all of which lead to the eventual dismantlement of threat
    networks. While JIATF South's core detection and monitoring mission
    continues to support law enforcement efforts to stem record detected
    flows of cocaine and other illicit drugs, the task force is also
    broadening its support to interagency operations targeting global money
    laundering, bulk cash smuggling, and counter proliferation.

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In FY16, JIATF-S operations resulted in the
     detention of 780 drug traffickers and the
     disruption of 282MT of cocaine valued at over
     $5.5 billion.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Enabling partner nations. One key to addressing the illicit pathway
    and threat networks in the region is to help improve the capability of
    partner nations in the region to investigate, interdict and dismantle
    the networks. Enabling partner nation capacity is essential if we hope
    to address the permissive environment that permits these networks and
    pathways to operate.

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In 2016, USSOUTHCOM's DOD Rewards Program enabled
     our Colombian, Peruvian, and Panamanian partners
     to bring 26 members of terrorist organizations
     to justice.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Cooperation with Colombia remains essential as the National
    Liberation Army (ELN) and criminal networks seek to move in on former
    Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) held zones to fill the
    power vacuum and take over the lucrative global cocaine market. With
    coca cultivation and production in the Andean region approaching all-
    time highs, these networks could jeopardize recent Colombian security
    gains. To help Colombia contain this threat, we will continue to train,
    equip, and sustain key specialized units with Department of Defense
    authorities as well as via our partnership with the Department of
    State's Bureau of Political Military Affairs and Foreign Military
    Financing. We're also leveraging the U.S.- Colombia Action Plan for
    Regional Security (USCAP) to synchronize the delivery of counter-
    network capacity building efforts to confront the effects of
    transnational criminal networks and drug trafficking in the region.
    This program helps deepen the partnership between USSOUTHCOM, the State
    Department, the Colombian Ministry of Defense, and the six Central
    American and Caribbean recipient countries \4\ to improve
    interoperability against criminal networks.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ The six USCAP recipient countries are Costa Rica, Dominican
    Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Panama. To date, the
    USCAP program has trained 4,008 partner nation personnel (3,095
    military and 912 public security forces).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Elsewhere, USSOUTHCOM and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency
    (DTRA) joined the Department of State and the Federal Bureau of
    Investigation in cooperating with Brazil during the Rio Olympics. This
    successful partnership has provided new opportunities to work with
    Brazil in the areas of threat networks, CWMD, cyber, space, and
    information sharing. In the Caribbean, we are partnering with the
    Caribbean Community's Implementing Agency for Crime and Security
    (CARICOM IMPACS) and the Regional Intelligence Fusion Center (RIFC) to
    facilitate greater information sharing and close our capability gaps in
    addressing illicit flows of drugs, people with potential ties to
    terrorism, and foreign fighters. Along with the State Department, we
    are also supporting the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) in their
    development of a regional counterterrorism strategy and working with
    key partners like Trinidad and Tobago to illuminate and degrade
    extremist networks with global ties to ISIS and other dangerous groups.
        With the help of this Committee, our counternarcotics (CN) programs
    in Central America--including train and equip, infrastructure, and
    building partner nation capacity--play an important role in stabilizing
    the sub-region from the effects of threat networks. Our maritime
    capacity building efforts in the region have better enabled us to meet
    our detection and monitoring statutory obligations while ensuring the
    layered defense of the U.S. homeland. Central American partners are
    increasingly capable, playing a significant role in almost a quarter of
    JIATF South's maritime interdiction operations and conducting
    operations on their own, and with one another.
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        We've also helped enhance their land interdiction capabilities
    through training, essential infrastructure, and mobility and
    communication equipment. As a result, we've seen significant
    improvements across Central American security and military forces.
    Guatemala's Interagency Task Forces (IATFs) combine the best of
    military and law enforcement authorities and capabilities, helping
    control Guatemala's borders and stopping the illegal flow of people,
    drugs, and other threat network activity. Honduras has also made a
    concerted effort to dismantle threat networks, extradite suspected drug
    traffickers to the U.S., and eliminate corruption. Panama is coming off
    a record year disrupting threat network operations. As we seek to
    intensify combined operations, Panamanian efforts to counter a wide
    spectrum of threats showcase them as an increasingly capable partner
    and force multiplier at a critical geographic chokepoint. In the coming
    year, we will expand our support to Panama and Costa Rica to deter
    threat networks from moving into the southern portion of Central
    America's isthmus.
        Empowering public-private collaboration. Since threat networks are
    enabled by exploiting socio-economic vulnerabilities in the region, we
    seek to integrate the efforts and expertise of the private sector,
    NGOs, and civil society to mitigate those vulnerabilities and help
    create communities less vulnerable to criminal exploitation. We
    routinely conduct community support activities in Central America,
    South America, and the Caribbean as part of our humanitarian assistance
    program. Rather than the U.S. Government repairing schools, wells, and
    improving local hygiene and sanitation on its own, we instead work
    alongside our partner nations and NGOs, business, and academic partners
    to expand the reach and effect of these programs. This also supports
    our partner nations in acquiring these skills, which they can use to
    demonstrate state presence and reduce the influence of criminal
    networks.
        Preparing for and Responding to Disasters and Crises. Given the
    inevitability of natural disasters in Latin America, we work with our
    partners to improve our collective preparedness and response
    capabilities. Within our headquarters, we are focused on
    institutionalizing our own capabilities to provide agile and effective
    support to our interagency and regional partners. Within the region, we
    are strengthening our linkages to the very network of regional
    militaries, civilian agencies, and experts that we will cooperate with
    in the event of a crisis.

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    During the early stages of last year's Zika
     outbreak, the U.S. Naval Medical Research Unit 6
     (NAMRU-6) became the only U.S. Bio Safety Level
     III laboratory capable of testing for the Zika
     virus in South America, helping the Centers for
     Disease Control, Health and Human Services, and
     the Pan American Health Organization quickly
     track the progress of the virus.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Strengthening Interagency Partnerships. That cooperation starts
    with trust; it is the lynchpin of our ability to rapidly respond and
    work seamlessly with our partners. We build this trust during routine
    exercises and deepen it during crisis response operations. While most
    of our exercises involve multiple partner nations, INTEGRATED ADVANCE
    is dedicated to improving our integration with DHS, the Departments of
    State and Health and Human Services, and the State of Florida in the
    event of a Caribbean mass migration. This year's exercise stressed our
    ability to conduct migrant operations at Naval Station Guantanamo Bay
    and support interagency partners in responding to migrant landings in
    the United States.
        Last year, we deepened our already strong partnership with the U.S.
    Agency for International Development's Office of Foreign Disaster
    Assistance (USAID/OFDA). In April, we immediately responded to a
    request from USAID/OFDA to support the government of Ecuador in the
    aftermath of a devastating 7.8 earthquake. We deployed an airfield
    assessment team and a mobile air traffic control tower to increase the
    flow of humanitarian aid into Manta, one of the hardest-hit areas. In
    October, USSOUTHCOM stood up and rapidly deployed Joint Task Force
    (JTF) Matthew to support USAID/OFDA's Hurricane Matthew response
    efforts in Haiti.
        By leveraging forward-deployed forces already in the region, JTF
    Matthew provided a tailored, rapid response that was critical during
    the early stages of relief operations. Utilizing our presence at Soto
    Cano Air Base in Honduras and the U.S. Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, we
    moved elements from JTF-Bravo and a Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground
    Task Force (SPMAGTF) to Haiti within 24 hours. JTF-Bravo and the
    SPMAGTF team--which had previously been conducting security cooperation
    activities in Central America--provided unique U.S. military
    capabilities that significantly aided the delivery of humanitarian
    supplies and alleviated the suffering of hundreds of thousands of
    Haitians.
        Additionally, the immediate deployment of elements from U.S.
    Transportation Command's (USTRANSCOM) Joint Enabling Capabilities
    Command (JECC) was absolutely critical to our effective response. U.S.-
    based forces deployed aboard the USS MESA VERDE and USS IWO JIMA also
    provided robust relief from the sea. During the relief mission, we also
    coordinated with our U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) partners to deter
    potential migration in the aftermath of the hurricane and supported the
    Department of State's outreach to regional partners seeking to
    contribute to the response effort.
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        Finally, one of the most important response tools lies in our
    ability to predict crises and, if possible, avert their onset or
    mitigate their impact. We are analyzing early-warning signs of latent
    risks and underlying vulnerabilities to better identify potential
    instability or crises. This understanding will help us plan and execute
    activities that align with USAID's Disaster Risk Reduction Strategy and
    enhance our longstanding partnership to build local, national, and
    regional response capabilities. We have also partnered with the Pacific
    Disaster Center to utilize their risk management tool to simplify,
    integrate, and expedite the flow of information before, during, and
    after disaster strikes. Our assessments, which we conduct with our
    partner nations' FEMA-equivalents, civilian ministries, NGOs, and
    universities, provide a comprehensive understanding of partner nation
    disaster preparedness capabilities.
        Enabling Partner Nations. Exercises like PANAMAX, FUSED RESPONSE,
    TRADEWINDS, and FUERZAS ALIADAS HUMANITARIAS test multinational
    responses to an attack on the Panama Canal, the trafficking of WMD, a
    terrorist act, and natural disasters. Multinational exercises are the
    most important way we train with our partner nations and Allied
    military and security forces, helping improve interoperability,
    institutionalize preparedness and response measures, and building
    confidence in the United States as a reliable partner. These
    relationships and trust can help reduce the scope and duration of a
    crisis and increase the likelihood our partners can respond to crises
    on their own.

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    2,500 personnel from 20 nations participated in
     PANAMAX 2016. Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Peru
     played major leadership roles in the
     multinational and functional commands.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Along with DTRA, we are working with a diverse group of nations--
    Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Peru, Dominican Republic,
    and Brazil--to develop and enable WMD crisis response capabilities for
    both military and civilian first responders. This year, we look forward
    to deepening our collaboration with Chile and Argentina in this
    important effort. These partnerships demonstrate our enduring resolve
    and commitment to our partners in the face of the worst of potential
    disasters. We also include Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
    workshops in exercises like PANAMAX and UNITAS to help our partners
    understand and respond to the growing challenge posed by proliferation
    of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials.
        Regionally, our health and medical readiness engagements build
    partner nation capacity--including infrastructure, equipment, and
    skilled personnel--to prevent, detect, and respond to disease
    outbreaks. At the early stages of the Zika outbreak, the U.S. Naval
    Medical Research Unit 6 (NAMRU-6), based in Peru, established research
    sites in partnership with Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Paraguay,
    Bolivia, Venezuela, and Peru to actively support partner nation Zika
    response efforts. We also implemented a disease surveillance tool that
    strengthens Honduras' capabilities to address global health threats,
    and are working with Guatemala to do the same this year.
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        Many of our capacity-building efforts would not be possible without
    the dedication of our Active Duty, Guard, and Reserve forces,
    especially in our Components and the National Guard State Partnership
    Program (SPP). Last year, the partnership between the Florida National
    Guard and Barbados strengthened the Barbadian government's ability to
    respond to natural disasters with a focus on critical infrastructure
    and interagency collaboration. Massachusetts' partnership with Paraguay
    allows governmental agencies to access outlying communities that are
    often far from first responders. We appreciate the support Congress
    provides to SPP, which enables us to leverage the strength of our
    National Guard.

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    USSOUTHCOM is proud of the newest SPP
     partnership between Argentina and
     Georgia's National Guard, our 23rd
     State Partnership.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Empowering public-private collaboration. In addition to
    collaborating with our interagency and regional partners, we also seek
    to build a culture of crisis management and trust across our network of
    non-governmental partners. During the lead-up to the Rio Olympics, we
    partnered with international cruise lines and law enforcement agencies
    to share information about potential threats and ensure security
    protocols were in place. We are beginning work with the College of
    William & Mary's Violent International Political Conflict and Terrorism
    (VIPCAT) lab to help predict violence in partner nations, assess
    deterrence option effectiveness, and forecast tactical successes. We
    also regularly join chaplains in our partner nation militaries to
    engage religious leaders in the region about their role in disaster
    recovery and potential opportunities to work together when crisis hits.
        Led by U.S. Army South and U.S. Air Forces Southern/12th Air Force,
    our Beyond The Horizon and New Horizons humanitarian and civic
    assistance exercises incorporated more than 2,000 U.S., partner nation,
    and public/private participants from seven nations. This network
    treated nearly 30,000 patients, conducted 242 surgeries, and
    constructed schools and clinics in remote areas. Similarly, our
    training missions like JTF-Bravo's medical engagements and Continuing
    Promise bring together U.S. military personnel, partner nation forces
    and civilian volunteers to treat tens of thousands of the region's
    citizens. We are also building basic infrastructure like schools,
    medical clinics, and emergency operations centers and warehouses for
    relief supplies. These activities provide training opportunities for
    our own personnel, while also improving the ability of our partners to
    provide essential services to their citizens and meet their
    humanitarian needs during a disaster or emergency response, enhancing
    the legitimacy of regional governments.
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        Building relationships to meet global challenges. Whether we're
    remaining vigilant of the activities of Russia, China, and Iran,
    fostering greater regional and multinational cooperation against shared
    challenges, or reinforcing the rules-based international order,
    security partnerships are the foundation of everything we do. These
    partnerships--based on shared values, mutual respect, and principled
    U.S. and regional leadership--ensure our hemisphere remains a beacon of
    peace and prosperity.

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Last year we integrated 18 different U.S. and
     regional NGO, private sector, and academic
     organizations into various exercises and
     humanitarian missions. In total, these groups
     provided $2.5 million in gifts-in-kind donations
     of services and goods like medicine and food.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Strengthening interagency partnerships. Over the past year we have
    expanded our support to our interagency partners and fellow Combatant
    Commands to address the global challenges of Russia, China, and Iran.
    We work with the Intelligence Community and our diplomatic colleagues
    to build a better shared understanding of what they intend by their
    actions and how their activities in Latin America advance their
    respective global strategies. We routinely share information with U.S.
    European Command (USEUCOM), U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), and
    USCENTCOM on issues of mutual interest and concern. We also contribute
    to Department of Defense-wide deliberations on our strategic approach
    to the Russian problem set, and to the USPACOM-led China Strategic
    Initiative (CSI) to inform whole-of-government efforts. In the coming
    year, USSOUTHCOM and USPACOM will host a meeting with our Allies and
    partners in Southeast Asia and South America to share information on
    Asia-Pacific security and transregional threat networks.
        Enabling partner nations. While our capacity building efforts help
    partner nations address immediate threats, over time we seek to
    encourage a network of capable partners who contribute to international
    security and advance shared principles like good governance and human
    rights. Chile is a regular participant in USPACOM's annual RIMPAC
    exercise and will assume a greater exercise leadership role in the
    future. Colombia is leading an effort to integrate a block of Pacific
    Alliance nations into the Western Pacific Naval Symposium, and is
    expanding defense cooperation with South Korea, Japan, and potentially
    Vietnam. Colombia has entered into a partnership agreement with NATO,
    and we are working closely together on deepening this cooperation.
    Brazil is deepening its maritime security cooperation with West Africa,
    focusing on countering illicit trade between the South American and
    African continents. Many nations in the hemisphere have joined many
    other regional leaders in supporting UN peacekeeping operations around
    the world, including the UN mission in Haiti. Through the Global Peace
    Operations Initiative (GPOI), we have helped sustain critical partner
    capabilities for Guatemala and Uruguay peacekeepers in the Democratic
    Republic of Congo and Haiti; helped El Salvador deploy helicopters to
    the UN mission in Mali; and supported Peruvian airfield engineers to
    the Central African Republic.
        In Colombia, the 52-year conflict has also left the country among
    the world's most heavily contaminated by landmines, improvised
    explosive devices (IED), and unexploded ordnance (UXO), which affect 31
    of Colombia's 32 departments. As part of an interagency effort,
    USSOUTHCOM's Humanitarian Mine Action program provides `train-the-
    trainer' courses to instructors at the Colombian military's
    International Demining Training Center (CIDES), helping meet the
    Colombian government's goal by training 41 Army Platoons and 5 Marine
    Platoons. In this effort we are joined by the Department of State and
    the twenty other countries and European Union that came together as
    part of the Global Demining Initiative for Colombia. Humanitarian
    demining will spare thousands of additional victims, facilitate land
    restitution and resettlement of internally displaced persons, and help
    lay a foundation for rural economic opportunity--all essential steps
    for this valued partner to consolidate lasting peace. As they work
    through this process, Colombia and the Colombian people are counting on
    our steadfast commitment, and I thank the Congress for its continued
    support to this important bilateral partnership.
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        We also promote the continued professionalization of regional
    defense and security institutions. Transparent, accountable militaries
    and security forces help reinforce good governance by being responsive
    to civil authority and respectful of the rule of law. They are also
    better able to resist unwelcome coercive pressure by state (and non-
    state) actors. We have identified four key military imperatives to
    enhance professionalism in militaries across the region: respect for
    human rights; the institutionalization of a culture of enhanced
    `jointness;' \5\ the development of a professional non-commissioned
    officer (NCO) corps; and the pragmatic integration of gender
    perspectives into military operations. We consider these
    ``imperatives,'' as these interlocking, interdependent, and mutually
    supporting characteristics are the hallmarks of modern security forces,
    the foundation for successful coalition operations, and the bedrock of
    legitimacy with civilian populations.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ As part of enhanced `jointness' we encourage our partners to
    embrace inter-service, interagency, and inter-organizational mindsets.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        We advance these four areas in several ways. Now in its 20th year,
    our landmark Human Rights Initiative brings together representatives of
    military, security forces, civilian government, and civil society to
    work together to develop and strengthen human rights programs within
    the region's armed forces. We continue to see significant progress in
    this area; Guatemala recently announced its military will begin to
    withdraw from civilian policing duties, an important step heralded by
    many human rights NGOs. Educational institutions like the Inter-
    American Defense College (IADC), the William J. Perry Center for
    Hemispheric Defense Studies, and the Western Hemisphere Institute for
    Security Cooperation (WHINSEC) help our partners institutionalize these
    concepts and build their own network of civilian and military defense
    professionals. In Belize, Trinidad and Tobago, Guatemala, Chile, and
    Colombia, our Defense Institution Building and Defense Institution
    Reform Initiative programs promote the development of effective
    institutions that embrace interagency, joint, and public-private
    approaches.

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Since its creation, the IADC has graduated 2,732
     students from 26 nations. Alumni from the region
     include 3 presidents, 31 Ministers of State, 11
     senior level government officials, and 775
     generals and admirals.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Through our NCO development program, we supported the development
    of a Senior NCO Course in the Dominican Republic; the first designated
    Sergeant Major of the Army for Brazil and Chile; and joint senior
    enlisted meetings across multiple countries. We have also brought on a
    dedicated combat-proven Gender Integration Advisor to promote the
    inclusion of diverse perspectives in partner nation military
    operations. As part of this effort, we will host our second Women in
    the Military Conference in Guatemala, which will focus on effectively
    integrating fully trained and qualified military women into operational
    and peacekeeping units.
        Empowering public-private collaboration. We routinely engage with
    U.S. and regional academic centers and the private sector to discuss
    the implications of Chinese, Russian, and Iranian engagement in the
    region. This network of experts, economists, and business
    representatives can also help us, and our partners in the region,
    better understand potentially exploitative behavior by state and non-
    state actors alike. We also hold regular dialogues with members of the
    human rights community, including routine outreach to influential (and
    often critical) NGOs. This frank exchange of perspectives helps us
    better understand and address NGO concerns, and has also led to
    improved NGO awareness and support of USSOUTHCOM's mission and human
    rights efforts.
        Our no-fail mission: detention operations. Although most of our
    efforts are focused on engaging with our partners in Latin America, we
    also continue the safe, humane, legal, and transparent care and custody
    of the remaining detainees at JTF-GTMO. As many members of Congress
    have witnessed firsthand, the medical and guard force at JTF-GTMO are
    not merely caring for these detainees; they are providing the best of
    care. Our troops in close contact with detainees face periodic assaults
    and threats to them and their families, yet they remain steadfast in
    their principled care and custody role. Every day they demonstrate the
    same discipline, professionalism, and integrity as they confront the
    same dangerous adversaries as our men and women fighting in
    Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere around the world. I know this
    Committee, our Secretary of Defense, and our President applaud their
    commitment and share my pride in these young troops serving in this
    enormously sensitive and demanding mission, and we thank you for your
    continued support.
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         initiatives: harnessing innovation & taking care of our people
        To support our efforts, we've dedicated ourselves to becoming a
    platform for experimentation and innovation. We actively collaborate
    with our partner nations and the Services, and the defense technology
    enterprise, including the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
    for Research and Engineering and the Defense Innovation Unit
    Experimental (DIUx), private industry, and academia to test a range of
    technologies in the region. These collaborations have yielded some
    promising and ongoing experimentation with unmanned platforms, advanced
    sensor and communications systems, and small spacecraft technologies.
        In addition to embracing a culture of innovation, we're
    implementing several initiatives to improve how we support our team
    members. We deeply value the investment made by our partners in
    strengthening hemispheric cooperation by placing foreign liaison
    officers in our headquarters and subordinate staffs. We do not take
    those partnerships for granted, and are doing everything we can to
    strengthen and deepen them. We now include our partner nation liaison
    officers in many of our operations and intelligence briefings. Along
    those same lines, we are also expanding the use of communication
    platforms in our multinational exercises to improve real-time
    information sharing with participating partner nations and Allies.
        At USSOUTHCOM our people are more than just our most important
    asset; our people are largely our only assets and they are absolutely
    essential to our ability to do our mission. Previous reductions have
    had a disproportionate impact on our ability to engage with the region
    and within the U.S. Government. As an example, without intervention or
    staff realignment, we will soon have no liaisons placed with several
    key interagency partners--something I'm committed to fixing. So while
    we are not seeking to expand our headquarters staff, we are seeking to
    strengthen it. In an effort to improve interagency integration, we are
    committed to finding the right people from within our headquarters to
    serve as liaison officers across different agencies in the U.S.
    Government and in regional information-sharing centers. Not only does
    this improve awareness and collaboration, but also realigns our
    headquarters staff to maximize effectiveness and efficiency. We're also
    working to develop an agile workforce by equipping our team with
    skillsets and technologies needed to address complex challenges.
                                  requirements
        As we continue adapting to the evolving security environment and
    supporting efforts to enhance the defense-in-depth of our Southwest
    border, I will work with Congress to secure our southern approaches and
    enable our regional partners to address our common challenges. We
    appreciate the greater flexibility provided in the FY17 National
    Defense Authorization Act, as well as this Committee's efforts to
    codify the counterdrug authorities that are so critical to our efforts
    in the Western Hemisphere. We are concerned, however about some
    potential negative impacts these changes may have on our ability to
    equip our partner nations. We look forward to working with the
    Committee to ensure we minimize disruption to these effective programs
    that help build a layered defense of our homeland, and to discussing
    the best ways to support an effective counter-threat network approach.
        As this Committee knows, USSOUTHCOM has historically received
    minimal allocated and assigned forces. Until capabilities like
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), maritime support
    platforms; and analysis of open source/publicly available information
    (PAI) no longer outpace supply, commercial alternatives will remain the
    only immediately feasible options available to USSOUTHCOM.
        Mr. Chairman, I'd like to provide a more detailed overview of our
    main requirements.
        Countering threat networks. A critical element of dismantling
    threat networks involves affecting their financial and transportation
    sub-networks. Cocaine remains a source of enormous profit for many
    networks operating in the region, but we face significant limitations
    in stopping the deluge of drugs that reach our shores and streets. As
    this Committee knows, USSOUTHCOM has traditionally faced significant
    resource constraints. For the past several years, our Intelligence,
    Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and other force requirements have
    not been met due to competing global priorities. We have felt these
    impacts most acutely in our Detection and Monitoring (D&M) mission,
    where we have long received less than a quarter of our maritime and
    airborne requirements. The consequence is well-known to this Committee:
    although JIATF South detected a record amount of cocaine moving in the
    maritime domain last year, they were unable to target 75 percent of
    validated events due to a shortage of forces. That equates to hundreds
    of tons of additional cocaine on our streets, and nodes in that network
    that continue to operate rather than face disruption and prosecution.
    To that end, we greatly appreciate the additional funding from the
    Congress that allowed us to work with the U.S. Air Force to purchase
    contract aircraft to off-set the loss of Maritime Patrol Aircraft
    (MPA).
        Our detection and monitoring challenges are due in part to the low
    number of U.S. Navy platforms available to support JIATF South's
    mission. Since 2007, Navy long and medium range ship allocation has
    steadily decreased. The last time we were above 1.0 was 2014--and not
    by much. Since 2015, when the Navy's frigates were decommissioned, we
    have averaged a Navy presence of less than .50. Under the Commandant's
    superb leadership, our Coast Guard partners are doing everything they
    can, punching well above their weight by helping us partially fulfill a
    portion of our Title 10 detection and monitoring obligations. The USCG,
    however, cannot be the indefinite bill-payer for our statutory mission.
    This Committee is well aware of the maritime platform gaps we have
    experienced for the past few years. In the near term, we are exploring
    non-traditional alternatives to fill these requirements until more
    Littoral Combat Ships are in the fleet and available for assignment to
    USSOUTHCOM.
    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        A biometrics machine, similar to this one used in a board, search
    and seizure exercise aboard the USS Jason Dunham, is used to confirm
    identity. This technology catches people using fraudulent passports to
    travel and exposes criminal records. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass
    Communication Specialist 2nd Class Deven B. King/Released)
        To effectively counter threat networks, we need two types of tools:
    interoperable, multi-domain, tools that help us understand the
    environment, capture weak signals, and anticipate change (all-source
    intelligence capabilities and analysis); and tools that help us conduct
    sustained engagement and build capacity (Civil Affairs, MISO, medical
    teams, SOF capabilities, and SCO personnel). We also require biometrics
    equipment to identify and track individuals who may represent security
    threats; biometrics analytical capability to process, exploit and
    disseminate biometric collected data; and visualization technology to
    better coordinate and integrate operations with our partners. With
    these capabilities, we can do more than just chase after shifting
    trafficking routes or disrupt illicit commodities--we can have a more
    lasting and transformative effect countering the networks doing those
    activities. We also need staying power on land and at sea. A sustained
    Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) deployment and
    maritime forces would generate endurance and increase reach and impact
    in all of our counter-network operations. Given its dual use that
    supports both rapid response and countering threat networks, the
    SPMAGTF is extremely valuable, and we greatly appreciate Congressional
    support to the U.S. Marine Corps to resource this multi-mission force.
        As the Congress takes steps to address border security, I urge
    Members not to forget about the Caribbean. Like our USNORTHCOM
    partners, we are concerned by the vulnerability of this ``Third
    Border''--the Caribbean, where documented cocaine flow is the highest
    in 10 years. Improved security along the U.S.-Mexico border will likely
    increase security challenges in the Caribbean. Our island nation
    partners are ill-equipped to deal with an influx of threat networks and
    our force limitations hinder our ability to fully secure the Caribbean
    from illicit flows of SIAs, weapons, and narcotics.
        On a related note, our current long-distance radar solution in the
    Caribbean and Central America--the Relocatable Over-The-Horizon Radar
    (ROTHR) radar system--faces operational challenges. I am becoming very
    concerned over the construction of several hundred wind turbines as
    part of wind farms in Virginia and Texas. These farms could, and likely
    will, adversely impact our radar systems that provide a critical
    detection and monitoring capability to track illicit aircraft. This
    interference will degrade our capability to use these same systems to
    detect and track threat network operations in the maritime domain. We
    are working within the Department of Defense and with developers and
    stakeholders to develop potential mitigation solutions and exploring
    alternative technical solutions. Current law, however, dictates the
    Department assume the operational risk as well as the cost burden for
    testing, modeling, and risk mitigation for these types of projects--a
    potentially unlimited drain on resources.
        I would also like to go on record to express my unqualified support
    for resourcing our U.S. law enforcement, diplomatic, and development
    partners. Effectively securing our southern approaches requires a true
    team effort. The Department of Defense is just one contributor to the
    counter-network fight in the Caribbean and Americas; DHS, the
    Department of Justice, the Department of State, the USAID, and members
    of our Intelligence Community are key for any lasting success.
    Degrading threat networks requires effective partner nation law
    enforcement, judicial, and prison systems. A balanced package that
    includes assistance to strengthen governance, economic development,
    intelligence, and security is needed, as well as comprehensive efforts
    to stem our country's insatiable demand for illicit goods.
        Preparing to and responding to disasters and crises. Unfortunately,
    previous budget constraints on the Department of Defense's Combatant
    Commanders Exercise and Engagement (CE2) Program have forced us to
    reduce or significantly de-scope our exercise program. This impacts the
    readiness of our force and limits our ability to build and strengthen
    relationships. It's also a missed opportunity to project U.S. presence,
    which can affect the calculations of threat networks and potential
    competitors alike.
        When it comes to presence, the Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay
    plays a major role in the interception, screening, and repatriation of
    migrants as well as a place of protection for those who have a credible
    fear of persecution. It is also a critical distribution and staging
    area for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations in the
    Caribbean, as well as logistical support for forces conducting our
    detection and monitoring mission. Similarly, Soto Cano Air Base--which
    houses JTF-Bravo, Special Operations Forces, and the SPMAGTF
    headquarters--provides our only forward presence in Central America and
    allows us to efficiently support willing regional partners, provide
    continuous, adaptive support to counter-network operations, and respond
    immediately to natural disasters. Both these assets are critical to
    USSOUTHCOM, and we thank the Committee for its support to their
    continued operations and for the additional MILCON to address migrant
    operations at Guantanamo.
        Given the minimal forces traditionally allocated to USSOUTHCOM, it
    would be impossible for us to respond effectively to a crisis absent
    the depth and breadth of expertise available via U.S. Transportation
    Command's Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC). I would like to
    go on record expressing my unqualified support for this capability. Any
    move to disestablish and redistribute those resources back to
    individual Combatant Commands could deprive USSOUTHCOM of this
    invaluable resource.
        As this Committee knows, the U.S. military's unique capabilities,
    while exceptional, play a small role of short duration in any disaster
    response. We appreciate the support of the Congress to USAID, whose
    OFDA office provides our nation's frontline responders. These partners
    are the appropriate lead for addressing humanitarian crises and long-
    term development challenges that affect regional stability.
        Building relationships to meet global challenges. Programs like
    Foreign Military Financing (FMF), Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and
    International Military Education and Training (IMET) will remain
    foundational tools for building partner capacity, sustaining trust, and
    improving interoperability. Compared with the U.S. defense industry,
    Russian and Chinese arms are less reliable, significantly less capable,
    and come with almost non-existent maintenance or logistical support.
    They beat us handily, however, when it comes to faster and more
    efficient procurement.
        IMET is a critical program in this region that helps build a
    network of former students who understand our approach, share our
    values, and are willing and eager to work with us. Every seat in one of
    our courses is an opportunity to build partnerships with a new
    generation of leaders. The IMET experience also demonstrates that what
    we build lasts and that we are committed to the long-term investment of
    developing strong regional institutions.
        Detention Operations. Troop housing for our JTF-Guantanamo forces
    remains a priority concern. The facilities still fail to meet
    standards, and routinely suffer leaks and structural damage with every
    passing storm. While we escaped the brunt of Hurricane Matthew last
    year, a direct hit (even by a Category 2 storm) will have significant
    consequences. Our men and women deserve better.
                                   conclusion
        Mr. Chairman, some may ask if we can afford to remain engaged in
    Latin America, especially given the scope of challenges we face across
    the world. I believe, quite frankly, that we can't afford not to. To
    echo Secretary Mattis' statements during his confirmation hearing,
    ``islands of stability in our hemisphere are under attack by non-state
    actors and nations that mistakenly see their security in the insecurity
    of others.'' \6\ As I said earlier, when it comes to this region, we
    have a choice. With the support of the Members of this Committee, I am
    confident we will choose wisely. Thank you for your continued support
    to the men and women of USSOUTHCOM as they work to defend our southern
    approaches. I stand ready to answer your questions and look forward to
    our discussion.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \6\ James N. Mattis, Nomination Hearing Statement before the Senate
    Armed Services Committee

        Chairman McCain. Thank you very much, Admiral.
        General Robinson, North Korea tested another medium-range
    ballistic missile this week. Kim Jong-un, known to some as the
    crazy, fat kid, has stated his intention to test an ICBM. How
    confident are you that you can intercept a North Korean ICBM
    targeting the Homeland?
        General Robinson. Senator McCain, I am extremely confident
    of our capability to defend the United States of America and be
    able to intercept an ICBM should it reach our Homeland. Right
    now, as you know, he cannot reach our Homeland, but I am
    confident, should he do that.
        Chairman McCain. Admiral Tidd, your predecessor once
    testified before the Homeland Security Committee that he
    watches drug trafficking take place, particularly in the
    Caribbean, but does not have the equipment and funding
    necessary to intercept some of that drug trafficking. What is
    your assessment of your ability to intercept and stop drug
    trafficking that you can see but do not have the capability to
    address?
        Admiral Tidd. Senator, we continue to have those
    shortfalls. We continue to be able to see a significant amount
    of traffic heading towards the Central American peninsula.
    Unfortunately, we only have the resources to be able to
    intercept about 25 percent.
        Chairman McCain. Would you supply for the record what you
    need in order to be able to intercept 100 percent?
        Admiral Tidd. Simply put, more ships, more aircraft.
        Chairman McCain. Again, would you be a little more
    specific?
        Admiral Tidd. Yes, sir. For the record, we will provide the
    exact calculations.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Admiral Tidd. [Deleted.]

        Chairman McCain. I think we all know that there is an
    epidemic of fatalities due to some of these drugs being used by
    more and more Americans such as oxycontin, et cetera. So I
    think it is even more important now for us to have the ability
    to intercept these drug shipments.
        Are you seeing an increase or decrease or the same?
        Admiral Tidd. Senator, we are seeing the volume continuing
    to go up. We are seeing some significant improvement on the
    part of some of our partner nations in their ability to be able
    to conduct intercepts. But we still watch far more go by than
    we can actually act on.
        Chairman McCain. The volume of what drugs have you seen?
        Admiral Tidd. We are focusing on cocaine. That is what we
    principally see because it departs the SOUTHCOM region and
    heads north, but we are also aware that these threat networks
    that I spoke of previously are also actively engaged in the
    movement of precursor chemicals that produce the other drugs
    that you mentioned.
        Chairman McCain. In the NDAA, we called for greater
    cooperation with our military assets with our Border Patrol and
    other civilian agencies of government. Have we seen any
    progress in that area, General Robinson?
        General Robinson. Sir, I would say we actually have. In
    fact, last summer when I went down on the southwest border, I
    saw Marine Corps ground sensor platoons providing information
    to Border Patrol folks. I saw UASs on the border.
        Chairman McCain. Drones?
        General Robinson. Drones on the border providing
    intelligence capability, and I watched Army reconnaissance
    units----
        Chairman McCain. Are you satisfied with the level of the
    use and cooperative effort, understanding we have posse
    comitatus and we do not put our military in direct contact, but
    we are utilizing the assets of the military as well as we
    could?
        General Robinson. Sir, we are looking at ways, how can we
    continue to maximize our capability and capacity. I am working
    very closely with Army North Commander, Jeff Buchanan,
    specifically with Fort Huachuca and the drone capability and
    capacity there.
        Chairman McCain. Finally--and both of you may answer--if we
    continue sequestration, what does that do to your ability to
    carry out these responsibilities? I am specifically speaking
    about this flood of Mexican manufactured heroin, opioids, and
    others that are creating havoc in some parts of our society.
    Whichever one. Admiral Tidd?
        Admiral Tidd. In our case, anything that restricts the
    ability of the services to provide forces----
        Chairman McCain. Yes, but I am talking about sequestration
    specifically.
        Admiral Tidd. Sequestration will further limit the ability
    of the services to provide any resources to us.
        Chairman McCain. General?
        General Robinson. Sir, I totally work closely with the
    interagency, and so anything that takes away from----
        Chairman McCain. I am talking about sequestration
    specifically.
        General Robinson. Yes, sir.
        Chairman McCain. What are the effects of it on your ability
    to carry out your mission?
        General Robinson. Sir, the President nominated me and you
    confirmed me to defend the Homeland. If I looked at what the
    United States Air Force talks about in their ability to provide
    pilot capability, trained, ready pilots to defend the United
    States of America and in a year or so, they will be down 1,000
    pilots, will I be able to have the aircraft availability that I
    need to.
        If I look at ballistic missile defense and our ability to
    look at long-range discriminating radar and the capabilities as
    we move forward, I get concerned that that will have an effect
    on that.
        Those would be two things that I would say to you
    specifically.
        Chairman McCain. Thank you.
        Senator Reed?
        Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, Admiral Tidd and General Robinson, for your
    service. Please thank the men and women who every day support
    you and support us.
        Your commands depend significantly on other federal
    agencies. You both brought up the issue of drugs infiltration
    to the United States. That involves the Treasury Department in
    terms of going after the financial backers that are involved.
    Obviously, Homeland Security, the Coast Guard. Those are the
    ships I think you are talking about, Admiral, in terms of the
    more ships you need. They are not Navy ships. They are Coast
    Guard ships and aircraft.
        We have to reduce the demand. That means health care in the
    United States so that someone who has a problem does not go to
    the street and get drugs. They go to a health clinic and get
    rehabilitation, one hopes.
        So the point I would ask both Admiral Tidd and General
    Robinson is just the essential need to adequately fund and
    resources for other agencies that you work with. Is that
    essential to your mission? That is, even if we gave you
    everything you asked for, if you did not have those other
    components, you could not accomplish your mission.
        Admiral Tidd. Senator, that is correct. Particularly in the
    SOUTHCOM region, it is a team effort, and that team requires
    significant contributions to be made by the State Department,
    by the intelligence community, by our federal law enforcement
    agencies. The Department of Homeland Security is probably our
    staunchest ally in the work that we do. As I point out
    frequently, because of the commitment of Navy ships to other
    regions around the world, my Navy in the SOUTHCOM region all
    has white hulls and orange stripes. We could not do our job
    without the U.S. Coast Guard.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        General Robinson, your comments?
        General Robinson. Yes, sir. If you go back to Admiral
    Tidd's conversation about the networks and understanding about
    the commodity on the network, I want to understand what the
    commodity is on the network because everything I do to
    illuminate it, the disruption part of it comes to other lead
    federal agencies, whether it is DHS or CBP or whomever, and so
    any cuts that any of those folks take does not allow that
    disruption and end game of what happens to the information that
    I provide to them. So it is incredibly important as a team that
    we bring this together.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
        Admiral Tidd, one of the interesting things in your
    testimony and in our discussions is the presence of China and
    Russia. It is interesting that Russia has built an
    international police training facility in Nicaragua so that
    they are actively training Nicaraguans. That is a surprise to
    me because that used to be sort of a no-go zone. The only
    trainers were the United States.
        But the point is that it comes down to matching and
    exceeding that with our IMET program, which is a State
    Department program. Is that a fair judgment?
        Admiral Tidd. Senator, programs like IMET that you
    mentioned are critical to our ability to build the partnerships
    with the countries throughout the region to ensure that they
    have the trained individuals. It also creates partners who have
    a profound understanding of the United States because they come
    and they spend time in our schools. It pays enormous dividends.
    It is an investment often that does not pay off for 10 or 20 or
    sometimes 30 years, but it is an incredible investment in
    future relationships for our countries.
        We do watch closely what Russia and China and Iran are up
    to. They are countries that are countries of global concern,
    and it is important that we pay attention to what they do here
    in this theater.
        Senator Reed. Just a final question, Admiral Tidd, if I
    could. Venezuela is under huge pressure because of economics,
    politics, everything. Can you give us sort of a sense of the
    outlook?
        Admiral Tidd. Senator, the entire region is watching
    closely what happens in Venezuela. As you are well aware, when
    I mention the word ``Venezuela,'' tomorrow in the newspapers of
    Caracas will be stories that USSOUTHCOM is engaged in
    operations against Venezuela. Nothing could be further from the
    truth, but the reality is that the enormous economic
    instability that is taking place in Venezuela affects the
    entire region. The OAS is watching that very closely and taking
    very, I think, important action.
        Senator Reed. Just quickly. Are there Chinese, Russian
    interests in Venezuela? Would they take advantage of that type
    of disruption?
        Admiral Tidd. Both countries have significant economic
    involvement in Venezuela, and it would be difficult to imagine
    that they would not look to take advantage of further
    instability in that country.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Inhofe?
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Robinson, first of all, I am sure that you
    developed your horse skills during your tenure as the wing
    commander at Tinker Air Force Base. It has obviously come in
    handy.
        As I mentioned to you when you were in my office, I wanted
    to lay the groundwork for a question that I think is
    significant. Before this committee, General David Mann had
    said, and this is his quote. He said that there are nearly 30
    countries that possess ballistic missile capability. Together
    these countries have approximately 50 different variants of
    ballistic missiles. Additionally, there are currently 13 new
    intermediate-range and 8 intercontinental ballistic missile
    variants under development.
        Now, in 2009, the administration cut the missile defense
    budget by $1.4 billion, and then ultimately terminated the
    system that had been set up in both the Czech Republic and
    Poland for a ground-based interceptor. They terminated the
    multiple-kill vehicle and decreased the number of ground-based
    interceptors from 44 to 30.
        Now, you testified that the MDA [Missile Defense Agency] is
    really doing four things right now. One would be to increase
    the interceptors back to 44 from 30; secondly, upgrading the
    ground system hardware and software; number three, continuing
    development efforts on the re-designed kill vehicle; and number
    four, to deploy the long-range radar.
        Now, my question would be, do you think that these actions
    are sufficient to overcome the problems that you and I talked
    about and that you mentioned in your opening statement, if you
    do these things like additional improved sensors, additional
    improved ground-based interceptors? What else needs to be done,
    or is this enough?
        General Robinson. Well, sir, first of all, Happy Quail
    Breakfast Day. I apologize for not being there.
        Senator Inhofe. It is our 55th consecutive year I might
    add.
        General Robinson. Yes, sir, I know that, and it is a
    wonderful event.
        I believe the MDA strategy as they have laid out, improving
    the sensors for better discrimination, improving the
    reliability of the kill vehicle, and then looking at the number
    of ground-based interceptors is exactly the strategy that we
    should go based on what we see today.
        Senator Inhofe. I appreciate that.
        Admiral Tidd, I think it is safe to say that the under-
    resourced commands would be your command and AFRICOM. That is
    my opinion. Do you agree with that?
        Admiral Tidd. I do.
        Senator Inhofe. If you look at some of the programs--and
    Senator Reed mentioned the IMET [International Military
    Education & Training] program. I often look at these programs
    in the under-resourced area of AFRICOM such as the IMET
    program, which I have always thought is great. Once you develop
    a relationship at that stage of the careers of individuals, you
    got them. The obvious point is if we do not do it, China will.
        Secondly, the foreign military sales and foreign military
    financing. Is that something that should be expanded?
        So on those two programs, what do you think can be
    expanded, and are there any barriers to you from being able to
    expand those programs?
        Admiral Tidd. Senator, I think that the IMET program, as
    you describe, is probably one of the single most important,
    long-term investments that we can make in establishing
    positive, constructive relationships based on trust with our
    partners. There is nothing like an officer coming or a senior
    enlisted coming and studying in our schools and living in the
    United States and experiencing for themselves all that this
    country represents to be able to counteract the sometimes
    negative messages that they might see in the international
    press. When we have those opportunities, they are absolutely
    priceless. They pay off because we see time after time after
    time, particularly throughout our region, the senior military
    leaders of many of the services in the countries have trained
    in the United States. They have lived in our country. They know
    who we are. Frankly, I think our country and our culture sells
    itself. So I cannot place enough value on a program like IMET.
    We could always use more.
        One of the challenges is it is like most of the resources
    allocated based on a regional prioritization, and SOUTHCOM
    typically comes in at the bottom of that prioritization.
        Senator Inhofe. What about barriers to you improving these
    programs?
        Admiral Tidd. Thus far, we have not run into any other
    barriers except that we run out of money.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Shaheen?
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you both for being here and for your service to this
    country.
        You both mentioned the threats that transnational crime
    networks pose to the United States and to global stability for
    that matter. Admiral Tidd, you started out with a story about
    drug traffickers, which we have seen very directly in the State
    of New Hampshire where the heroin and opioid epidemic is a huge
    threat where we have the third highest overdose rate in the
    country. As Senator McCain pointed out, your predecessor talked
    about his inability to be able to intercept some of those
    traffickers because he did not have the equipment and the
    resources to do that.
        Can you talk about what you are doing currently to work
    with authorities in this country to intercept those drug
    traffickers?
        Admiral Tidd. I will address the southern most part of that
    point, and then I would defer to General Robinson to address as
    it comes closer to our border.
        Because we recognize the shortfall in U.S. platforms
    available to conduct the detection and monitoring mission, that
    is one of the reasons why we have shifted our focus from
    exclusively on the commodity itself to a focus on the networks
    that engage in the trafficking, thinking that if we can focus
    on those networks and find the areas where the networks overlap
    and then working with partner nations so that their law
    enforcement or their military or, in some cases, our U.S.
    federal law enforcement agencies have the authorities to be
    able to engage in that end game, we use our abilities to build
    the picture and then to share that picture in a way that can be
    used by those with the authorities to be able to conduct the
    disruption action.
        We think that by building a stronger interagency team that
    we will be able to apply pressure across the length and the
    breadth of the networks, recognizing that we may not directly
    touch the networks that are directly responsible for the
    movement of the opioids that are wreaking such havoc in your
    State but that any pressure that we apply across these networks
    will have a beneficial effect across the length and breadth.
        General Robinson. So, ma'am, you heard Admiral Tidd talk
    about that. One thing I think that is incredibly important for
    you and this committee to know, that Admiral Tidd and I meet
    about every other month to sit down and discuss what he just
    talked about. So the information that he has and that he is
    sharing with the lead federal agencies with his partner nations
    is the same information that I am sharing. So as we stood in
    Guatemala and the river that defined the barrier between
    Guatemala and Mexico, that information does not stop at that
    river.
        If you think about it then as a larger network, the things
    that he shares with my staff and my folks, whether it is intel
    sharing at border points, whether it is building partnership
    capacity to help partner nations, or whether it is direct
    linkages with Border Patrol and DHS, that information that he
    gets, that I get, that I provide either to lead federal
    agencies or partner nations so that they can take care of
    business at the end game.
        This relationship between the two of us is very strong, and
    we have a third partner that we bring into it, General Tony
    Thomas of Special Operations Command, to talk to us what is
    happening overseas to help inform that larger network.
        Senator Shaheen. The National Guard has a counter-drug task
    force that has provided critical support to law enforcement in
    New Hampshire. Do you all work with that counter-drug task
    force with the Guard as well?
        General Robinson. Ma'am, we work very closely with the
    Guard. The information that we get that I provide to lead
    federal agencies goes out to other agencies throughout the
    States.
        Senator Shaheen. When you and I met yesterday--and I
    appreciated the opportunity to sit down with you--one of the
    things we talked about was the northern border and the fact
    that what we have seen in New Hampshire is that there are some
    drugs going back and forth across our northern border as well,
    and I think that is less well known.
        General Robinson. Yes, ma'am. Again, I would say, as I
    mentioned yesterday, we have a very close relationship with the
    lead federal agencies in Canada as well with us. So that
    information not just stops at our southern border, but also
    goes to our northern border to share with our partners there.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        Just quickly. I am almost out of time, but I know you
    talked yesterday and again today in response to Senator Inhofe
    about sensors and kill vehicles and the need to continue with
    those programs. Are there any other improvements that you think
    we should take in order to address missile defense given North
    Korea's rising capabilities?
        General Robinson. Ma'am, I think we are on a very good,
    solid track where we are going and the strategy that we have
    today. Again, I would urge for a budget to have predictability
    so we can keep on that track.
        Senator Shaheen. I agree. Thanks very much.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Rounds?
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral Tidd and General Robinson, first of all, let me
    thank you both for your service to our country.
        General Robinson, on page 12 of your statement, you say the
    increased standoff capability, low altitude, and small radar
    signature of cruise missiles make defending against them a
    technical and operational challenge. Yet, in the very next
    sentence, you say I am confident in a layered approach provided
    by our family of systems to conduct cruise missile defense.
        What is this layered family of systems that we would be
    using in cruise missile defense? If you could describe those
    family members for me, please.
        General Robinson. Sir, I would tell you it comes on two
    approaches. If you look on the northern approach from Russia
    over Canada and Alaska, we are doing an analysis of
    alternatives to upgrade the radars that are there so that we
    can be able to detect, track, identify, and if necessary,
    engage at ranges to defend Canada and the United States.
        Senator Rounds. These are land-based radar systems.
        General Robinson. Sir, right now they are, but what I have
    done from a requirements process is defined, hey, I want to be
    able to do that at ranges to defend. I do not want to just say
    upgrade my radar because then you do not allow the people that
    think differently or different ways to look at that problem. So
    that is from the northern approach.
        Now here in the National Capital Region is the first part
    where we have sensors and capability here in the National
    Capital Region. If I go back out and then I look at my F-16's
    with the AESA radars and the ability to use them to be able to
    detect at longer ranges, we can do that.
        Senator Rounds. These are found in Block 50's?
        General Robinson. Yes, sir. I think it is Block 50's. All I
    have asked for the requirement is to be AESA radars. So we can
    be able to detect at ranges but, most importantly, sir, to be
    able to identify at ranges to be able to defend the National
    Capital Region.
        Then the last part of the layer for phase one is to what
    kind of radar or what kind of capability can I get to be able
    to look at longer ranges out over the eastern part of the
    United States and the ocean to be able to detect at even
    longer.
        So those are some of the layers that I talk about.
        As we go further, phase two and three is now more part of
    the country.
        Senator Rounds. I understand.
        You did not mention the F-15C models. Do they play into the
    when defending against the cruise missile threat?
        General Robinson. The F-15's? Yes, sir, they play into
    defending where in the United States. Yes, sir.
        Senator Rounds. My understanding is that there is a
    possibility that we will be looking at perhaps reducing the
    number of F-15C's due to the increasing costs of maintaining
    the structural integrity of that aircraft between now and the
    year 2020. Is that figured into your plans?
        General Robinson. Sir, from the conversations that I have
    had with the Air Force, which have been very small, I know that
    that is something they are looking at. Obviously, my voice
    would come into this to make sure that we have enough capacity
    to defend the United States from an air threat.
        Senator Rounds. What is the split between the number of F-
    15's that you have available versus the current number of Block
    50 or the F-16's that have the appropriate radar in them today?
        General Robinson. Sir, I do not have that number. I will
    take it for the record.
        Senator Rounds. Would you please?
        General Robinson. Yes, sir, I will.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        General Robinson. The U.S. Air Force provides NORAD with Aerospace
    Control Alert (ACA) alert fighter aircraft. 58 of the USAF F-15C
    aircraft are equipped with Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA)
    radar. At this time, no NORAD ACA F-16 aircraft are equipped with AESA
    Radar. The U.S. Air Force is in the process of modifying an additional
    47 F-15C ACA aircraft with AESA radar. In addition, the NORAD Joint
    Emergent Operational Need (JEON) for all 72 ACA F-16s was fully funded
    in H.R. 244, the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2017. Phase 1 of
    the NORAD JEON is scheduled to modify 24 aircraft (8 aircraft at the
    first three ACA bases). The first three ACA bases to receive AESA
    radars in Phase 1 are: 177th Fighter Wing, Atlantic City Air National
    Guard Base, NJ (F-16 Block 30); 113th Fighter Wing, Joint Base Andrews,
    MD (F-16 Block 30); and 169th Fighter Wing, McEntire Joint National
    Guard Base, SC (F-16 Block 52). In Phase 2 of the AESA fielding plan,
    48 additional F-16 ACA aircraft (of various Blocks, including 30, 40,
    and 42) from NORAD's other main operating bases will be modified with
    the AESA radar.

        Senator Rounds. I am just curious. Is there a plan in place
    to begin using F-35A's in the middle of this for this
    particular defense system?
        General Robinson. Sir, I know as the Air Force brings the
    F-35's on board, that will be a conversation that we will have,
    making sure that I have the right capability and the right
    capacity to defend in the air domain.
        Senator Rounds. The reason that I ask is it appears to me
    that this is one of the more serious threats that we have with
    air-launched cruise missiles. The second part is you have
    currently got F-15's and apparently there is some concern about
    their long-term viability. Your F-16's, which you have right
    now--you have got Block 30's, Block 40's and some Block 50's I
    understand.
        General Robinson. Yes, sir.
        Senator Rounds. The Block 40's which we have in South
    Dakota may very well be--if properly equipped with the
    appropriate radar, may very well be stand-in or at least be
    capable of handling part of that as the F-15's go on.
        I guess I am getting back down to is that part of the
    discussion that you are having, or are we not that far along?
        General Robinson. We are not that far along. The Air Force
    I think is just looking into that. As I can tell you, sir, I
    will assure you my voice will be a part of that conversation
    because of the importance of defending in the air domain the
    United States. Those are the capabilities that I use.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you.
        General Robinson. Yes, sir.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Peters?
        Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you to our witnesses. I appreciate, Admiral Tidd and
    General Robinson, your patriotism and your work in a very
    difficult job, and you do it with distinction. Thank you so
    much.
        First, Admiral Tidd, I want to have you kind of elaborate a
    little more on a point that you brought up to a question that
    Senator Reed asked related to the U.S. Coast Guard. In
    addition, to serving on this committee, I am the ranking member
    of a subcommittee that oversees the Coast Guard and am very
    concerned, as I know you have expressed, with some potential
    budget cuts for the Coast Guard.
        I would like you to elaborate a little more on what I think
    is a very powerful statement that you made that your Navy has
    white hulls and orange stripes, as to the impact that the Coast
    Guard has. Certainly we need to protect their resources so they
    continue to execute that mission. But I would like you to go a
    step further as to what additional resources do you think would
    be necessary for them to enhance their capabilities to support
    you.
        You have talked in your testimony about how this maritime
    border is certainly one that we have to pay a great deal of
    attention to, and perhaps our discussion should not be about
    defending funding for the Coast Guard. It should be about
    additional resources they need or could use to supplement the
    great work that you are doing now.
        Admiral Tidd. Well, Senator, obviously, I would defer to
    the expertise of the Commandant of the Coast Guard in terms of
    building the plan that would be required. But as I have said
    before, because of higher priority commitments for U.S. Navy
    warships in other parts of the world, the U.S. Coast Guard has
    surged additional capacity, almost doubling the number of
    cutters devoted to the USSOUTHCOM region. I know that that is a
    challenging responsibility that they are shouldering. We are
    very concerned that we are already shorthanded in the number of
    ships that we have available on the high seas and the Caribbean
    and in the eastern Pacific to be able to deal with the known
    cases of movement along those pathways. My concern is that the
    Coast Guard be able to continue to meet the commitments that
    they have established.
        Senator Peters. Well, I appreciate that.
        In your written testimony, you discussed as well the impact
    of your Navy ships in the area, and you talk about exploring
    nontraditional alternatives to fill these requirements until
    more littoral combat ships are in the fleet.
        Could you describe some of these nontraditional
    alternatives and also explain how they may compare to the
    capabilities of the littoral combat ship?
        Admiral Tidd. Not having yet had the luxury of having a
    littoral combat ship down in our region, I cannot tell you
    exactly how it would compare. But what we are trying to do is
    sensors on other types of platforms that come down there to be
    able to share information, working very closely with our
    partner nations, ensuring that they have the capability to be
    able to be out and to operate in the seas. We have tremendous
    support provided by other countries that also have interest in
    the region. For instance, France, the Netherlands, and Canada
    all periodically provide warships that contribute to that
    mission.
        But I very much look forward to the arrival of the first
    littoral combat ships in our theater. I think they have
    capabilities that are ideally suited for the theater that we
    are talking about.
        Senator Peters. Very good.
        General Robinson, also talking about Coast Guard assets but
    in the area of responsibility that you have, which is the
    Arctic, and the receding ice and the opening up of those sea
    lanes and the very significant Russian presence that exists up
    there. Could you speak a little bit about the importance of the
    U.S. Coast Guard in the Arctic region and how assets certainly
    cannot be reduced? In fact, we should be thinking about having
    a larger presence to counter a growing Russian presence.
        General Robinson. Sir, I would tell you that the Coast
    Guard presence in the Arctic is very important. If you recall,
    last summer, the cruise ship, Crystal Serenity, that went
    through for the first time having a cruise ship go through the
    Arctic, it talks about the need for the Coast Guard there in
    the Arctic. So I certainly support the Coast Guard and all
    their endeavors to be a part of that.
        Senator Peters. Great. Thank you very much.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Ernst?
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, Admiral. Thank you both for being
    here, Admiral Tidd, General Robinson. Thank you so much for the
    great work that you are doing on behalf of NORTHCOM and
    SOUTHCOM.
        Admiral Tidd, I will start with you and want to thank you.
    I see that the great State of Iowa has been able to provide yet
    a second sergeant major to SOUTHCOM. We are pleased that you
    are both here with us.
        I did appreciate meeting with you last week--last month.
    Excuse me. We had a very good conversation. During that
    conversation, you brought up the fact that you have seen more
    activities from the Russians. You mentioned that just a little
    bit earlier, as well as some other countries. You stated that
    it may not be with a military bent, but that there were some
    other activities that they were engaging in. Can you enlighten
    us as to the types of activities you are seeing from the
    Russians and why that would be of a national security interest
    to us?
        Admiral Tidd. Thank you, Senator.
        We have seen the deployment of ships, particularly frequent
    deployment of intelligence collection ships, that we know
    operate frequently on the east coast of the United States and
    then spend time down in the Caribbean. We have seen
    periodically the deployment of long-range aviation that comes
    down and spends a bit of time down in our theater.
        But probably of greater long-term concern is the very
    aggressive arms sales programs where Russia is down and talking
    with our traditional partners and attempting to displace the
    United States as the partner of choice.
        The part that I think is most troubling is we see they are
    engaged in a very aggressive misinformation campaign, basically
    peddling the story that the United States is not a reliable
    partner in Latin America, that we are not interested in the
    region, and that we are withdrawing from the region. It is
    troubling because of resource constraints that we have had and
    the requirement for the number of forces available in our
    theater. As that has declined, that plays directly into that
    narrative that Russia has been peddling.
        So these are relationships that we have with strong
    partners, and it is just up to us to be able to prove that we
    are the partner of choice.
        Senator Ernst. So not only do we need to maintain a
    presence there, but we also need to reinforce our own message
    to those areas.
        Admiral Tidd. Absolutely.
        Senator Ernst. Admiral Tidd, in February of 2017, the
    Associated Press reported that Trinidad and Tobago has become
    the largest per capita source of ISIS recruits in the western
    hemisphere. According to the report, as many as 125 fighters
    have traveled from the island to ISIS-controlled areas over the
    past 4 years.
        So are you concerned about the rise of ISIS [Islamic State
    of Iraq and Syria] in SOUTHCOM?
        Admiral Tidd. Senator, we are very concerned. There is, I
    think, a tendency often to think that ISIS is only present in
    the Middle East or North Africa, and the reality is ISIS is
    present here in the western hemisphere.
        You cited the case of foreign fighters that have gone over
    to Iraq and Syria to fight. Obviously, we are very concerned
    about the return of those fighters. But what has become more
    troubling is an active effort on the part of ISIS to
    communicate to radicalized individuals telling them stay home
    and conduct attacks in your home countries against your
    countries and the United States and our interests in this
    region. So you cited Trinidad and Tobago, but that is not the
    only country where we know that there is a presence of
    radicalized individuals to whom the ISIS message is very
    appealing, and I think it is an area that we have to pay close
    attention.
        Our counter-network approach that we are applying enables
    us to recognize this presence of ISIS in the theater when
    previously, when we focused exclusively on commodities,
    oftentimes we focused more on the criminal networks and did not
    pay attention to the fact that there are also terrorist
    networks as well.
        Senator Ernst. So those terrorist networks--they understand
    those pathways that are being used by various cartels and so
    forth, moving goods into the NORTHCOM area. Do you think those
    could be exploited then by those terrorist organizations?
        Admiral Tidd. ISIS, in one of the recent issues of Dabiq
    magazine, communicates directly in English language to
    radicalized individuals to attempt to exploit those pathways
    into the United States. So we have to assume that they are
    going to try.
        Senator Ernst. Those that are fighting in Iraq and Syria--
    how are they able to reach back into the Caribbean and
    radicalize the folks there? What do you think is the primary
    means of communication?
        Admiral Tidd. I think it is Internet. It is by cyber means.
        Senator Ernst. Cyber is something that you believe we
    should pay attention to then.
        Admiral Tidd. I think we all recognize that it is a domain
    that must bear increasing attention.
        Senator Ernst. Absolutely. I appreciate that.
        Do you think we are doing enough to counter ISIS's
    recruiting efforts in the SOUTHCOM region?
        Admiral Tidd. That is probably one of the areas of greatest
    work that we are engaged in. In order to work with our partner
    nations and in our discussions with them, they now recognize
    that they must pay attention to the radicalization phenomenon.
    We all, I think, had a wakeup call with the attacks that
    occurred in Paris, in Brussels, but also in San Bernardino and
    in Orlando that individuals can become radicalized and can
    conduct horrific attacks. It is up to all of us to work
    together, exchange information, and attempt to remove the
    conditions that lead to radicalization.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you. I appreciate that. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman McCain. Before I call on Senator King, I just want
    to make it clear to everyone, Admiral Tidd, if we are really
    serious about addressing this issue of flow of drugs into the
    United States of America that Senator Shaheen has described as
    so dramatically affecting her State, that we need to provide
    the assets. It is not something that is a mystery. Is that
    right? If we want to be far more effective, you would need the
    assets in order to do that. Is that correct?
        Admiral Tidd. Senator, that is correct.
        Chairman McCain. Senator King?
        Senator King. Thank you for asking my first question, Mr.
    Chairman.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator King. Admiral Tidd, your opening statement was very
    powerful and also disturbing, powerful because you describe
    this in terms of an attack, and that is what it is. It is an
    attack on our country. To talk about the numbers, since we have
    been sitting here, four people have died of overdoses in the
    United States. It is about four an hour, 37,000 people a year,
    one a day in my State of Maine. It is absolutely unacceptable
    to know that that is happening and to couple it with your
    testimony that you are only able to interdict 25 percent of the
    shipments you know of because of a lack of resources in the
    Coast Guard. Couple that with a proposed 15 percent cut in the
    Coast Guard budget, I just do not know how we can possibly turn
    a blind eye to the implications of this.
        I just want you to reiterate. Your testimony was that you
    are only able to interdict 25 percent of shipments you know of
    because of a lack of essentially Coast Guard assets. Is that
    correct?
        Admiral Tidd. Senator, it is due to a lack of any surface
    assets, whether it is U.S. Navy, U.S. Coast Guard, partner
    nations. I mean, it is a shortfall of platforms that are
    capable of conducting intercepts on tracks that we know are out
    there.
        Senator King. A cut in the Coast Guard budget, which would
    further constrain the provision of those assets, would not be
    in the national interest. Would it?
        Admiral Tidd. Senator, all I will say is I am absolutely
    dependent on the Coast Guard to conduct the operations that we
    are able to conduct.
        Senator King. There are not sufficient assets today. Is
    that correct?
        Admiral Tidd. That is correct.
        Senator King. Thank you. Your answer was very diplomatic.
        General Robinson, let us go to missile defense. You
    testified you have confidence in the missile defense structure
    that we have today, but we do not live in a static world. The
    North Koreans just in the last few months have gone from liquid
    fuel to solid fuel, which drastically cuts our warning time.
    Are we continuing to develop our capability, and what are the
    gaps? Where should we be focusing in order to strengthen our
    nuclear defense system?
        General Robinson. Sir, thank you for that.
        As you so rightly said, our lack of indications of warning
    is increasing. As we look to the future how do we ensure not
    just that but then when something launches to make sure that we
    have the right radar in the right place.
        Senator King. And discrimination in radar is also----
        General Robinson. You took the words right out of my mouth.
    I was going to talk about the ability to ensure that we have
    discrimination as we move to the future. So when you talk about
    our radars, it is to ensure that we have discrimination and
    ensure that we have an architecture that today is terrestrial,
    but tomorrow or maybe even more in the future will move to
    space. Those are the things that we need to continue looking as
    we move to the future is ensuring we have got the right radar
    at the right place at the right capability and with reliable
    kill vehicles.
        Senator King. So if you were granted a billion dollars to
    spend in this area, do you I take it that radar and
    particularly the discrimination radar would be where you would
    go first?
        General Robinson. That is where I would go first, sir.
        Senator King. Thank you.
        General, do you have any idea offhand an approximate number
    of Russian icebreakers that they have available in the Arctic
    region?
        General Robinson. No, sir, I do not. But I know they have
    more than we do.
        Senator King. If I said it was a low of 17 and a high of
    40, would that sound reasonable?
        General Robinson. Yes, sir.
        Senator King. How many icebreakers do we have available?
        General Robinson. I believe it is one.
        Senator King. One and a half.
        General Robinson. Okay, one and a half.
        Senator King. But the one that we have actually transits
    between Antarctica and the Arctic. Is that not correct?
        General Robinson. Yes, sir.
        Senator King. So the icebreakers, the essential
    infrastructure of the Arctic region, is the road builder in
    effect.
        General Robinson. Yes, sir.
        Senator King. This is a place where we really are in a
    serious deficit situation. The prior administration proposed
    the additional building of one icebreaker, but that is still a
    long way off.
        But do you see this as an important priority even though
    this would not be a naval asset but probably be a Coast Guard
    asset? But it is one that is crucial to our future in the
    Arctic. Is it not?
        General Robinson. Sir, I absolutely support the Coast
    Guard's endeavors to bring more icebreakers to the Arctic. As
    you suggested, it is a pathway for them.
        Senator King. One of the things that you are seeing in your
    command is a significant Russian buildup of military assets
    along their shore of the Arctic.
        General Robinson. Sir, I have seen their buildup. What I
    have also seen is Russian long-range aviation that comes east
    of the Urals that often does out-of-area flights that are in my
    AOR [area of operation].
        Senator King. That is another threat. We talked prior about
    the North Korean threat, but that is another threat that is--
    particularly that is the NORAD [North American Aerospace
    Defense Commnad] mission. Is it not?
        General Robinson. Yes, sir. You are exactly correct,
    defending the airspace both for the United States and Canada
    from the air domain.
        Senator King. A final short question. We have a seamless
    cooperation and agreement, arrangement, and working
    relationship with the Canadians in terms of NORAD?
        General Robinson. Absolutely, sir. It is a bi-national
    command.
        Senator King. Thank you.
        General Robinson. Yes, sir.
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Perdue?
        Senator Perdue. Thank you, Chairman. I really appreciate
    you bringing both these combatant commanders together.
        I have a particular concern about what Russia is doing in
    our hemisphere. I have a quick question for both of you.
        When you look at Russia--how they bracketed Europe with
    their facilities in Murmansk, Kaliningrad, Crimea, now Tortus
    and Latakia, I see them attempting to do the same thing here.
    So the Arctic, which was just mentioned--it looks like to me
    they have opened up a new Arctic command. They have got four
    Arctic BCTs [Brigade Combat Teams] they have now assigned up
    there. They have got 16 deep water ports north of the Arctic,
    40 icebreakers, plus 11 more on order, and we are down to one
    and a half icebreakers. I would like to know what your
    assessment--first of all, do you agree with that assessment,
    General? What is our--that you can talk about here--what is our
    tactical response to that buildup in the Arctic?
        General Robinson. So, sir, I would agree with your
    assessment. What I would tell you about response--I will parse
    it in a couple of different bins.
        First, as we watch the Russians come east of the Urals in
    the air domain, I ensure on my NORAD side that I have the right
    capability and capacity with adequate indications and warnings
    to make sure that we can defend Canada and the United States,
    specifically Alaska. So in the air domain, I do that.
        From a policy perspective, at the end of 2016, the
    Department policy put out an Arctic strategy, and that Arctic
    strategy talked about ensuring security, promoting safety, and
    promoting defense cooperation.
        Senator Perdue. I am sorry. Do we have an Arctic command
    today?
        General Robinson. No, sir. My job as the Commander of
    Northern Command is to provide--I am the advocate for Arctic
    capabilities. That is what I do. But I am in the process of
    writing a strategic estimate for the Arctic where I will be
    able to talk about theater security cooperation, talk about
    capabilities, and then kind of put my role out there with----
        Senator Perdue. Will you share that with the committee?
        General Robinson. I will when we are done. In fact, we
    should probably be done this fall, and I would be happy to
    share that estimate with you.
        Senator Perdue. Thank you.
        Admiral, in the Southern Command likewise--and this is not
    a recent development. It looks to me it is very obvious what
    Russia is trying to do here. They are bracketing us. They are
    already playing in our elections the same way they are playing
    in cyber warfare in Eastern Europe.
        In Latin America between 2001 and 2013, Russia sold Latin
    America $15 billion worth of arms. That is about 40 percent of
    what was sold in the region. When I look at what they are doing
    with Nicaragua particularly--oh, and between 2008 and 2011--I
    did not know this. If you look at what Russia sold, they have
    sold more than 3,000 surface-to-air missiles to the region,
    just in that 3-year period.
        In the last couple of years, particularly since 2014, in
    Nicaragua alone 50 combat tanks, an established ground station
    for a Russian satellite network, and they are talking about
    Russian-made fighter jets now to add to their fleet. As was
    reported last week in TASS, they are announcing joint military
    drills together in Nicaragua. I find this to be very
    destabilizing.
        Do you agree with that assessment? If so, what is our
    response to Russia specifically in Nicaragua and Venezuela
    relative to the fact that we have got troubled governments
    there anyway? How do we manage the diplomatic development and
    defense efforts in that area specifically relating to what
    Russia is doing?
        Admiral Tidd. Well, Senator, I think the first
    responsibility we have is to pay attention to it and not to
    ignore it and to ensure that if we are concerned about what
    Russia is engaged in in Eastern Europe, that we pay at least as
    much attention to what they are engaged in in our own
    hemisphere.
        As you point out, they have got historic relationships
    going back to the era of the Soviet Union with Nicaragua and
    with Cuba. They have developed them with Venezuela. They are
    one of the largest suppliers of high capability arms to
    Venezuela. So it is very troubling that as they establish
    themselves and become I suppose both the arms supplier but also
    having greater influence in those two countries right close to
    our own Nation, that ought to be a matter of some concern. We
    have to continue to pay attention to it.
        Our relationships with the countries in Latin America is
    strong, but they are relationships that must be tended to. We
    must continue to engage and we must continue to demonstrate not
    just by words but also by our action, our engagement, that we
    are reliable partners.
        Senator Perdue. Thank you both.
        Chairman, General Milley this week said that the lack of a
    budget and the potential danger of going to a CR [Continuing
    Resolution] bordered on professional malpractice. I want you
    two combatant commanders to know that at least one Senator here
    agrees with that 100 percent.
        I do not fully understand what a CR does to tie your hands
    in terms of moving money back and forth, but I take you at your
    word that it totally limits you from doing that. That to me is
    more dangerous than the total number. For one, I am standing
    firm with the chairman here that this is the most dangerous
    thing that we are facing right now.
        General Mattis said earlier this year that the debt was the
    greatest threat in the national security. Well, here is where
    the rubber meets the road. I want to pledge to both of you guys
    my personal full support to do whatever we can to make sure
    that we avoid that debacle.
        Thank you, Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Warren?
        Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, Admiral Tidd and General Robinson for being here
    and for your leadership.
        I just want to quickly underline a point that was raised by
    Senator King and Senator Reed, and that is about the importance
    of our non-military foreign assistance and other civilian
    instruments of our national power to your missions.
        So is it accurate to say that you work with the State
    Department, the Department of Homeland Security, and other
    civilian agencies in efforts to maintain security and stability
    in your regional areas of responsibility? General Robinson?
        General Robinson. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Warren. Thank you.
        Admiral Tidd?
        Admiral Tidd. Absolutely.
        Senator Warren. You know, the budget proposal put out by
    the Trump administration calls for about a 29 percent cut to
    the State Department and significant cuts to FEMA [Federal
    Emergency Management Agency] and other domestic agencies. I
    just want to ask in general, would funding cuts to agencies
    that conduct diplomacy, provide disaster relief, and perform
    other civilian functions make your job easier or make your job
    more difficult? General Robinson?
        General Robinson. It would make it more difficult, ma'am.
        Senator Warren. Admiral Tidd?
        Admiral Tidd. More difficult.
        Senator Warren. Thank you. I agree.
        Admiral Tidd, I want to turn back, if I can, to something
    you said last year. In your posture statement, you expressed
    concern about economic conditions and persistent threats to
    people's safety that caused the mass migration of unaccompanied
    children from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras back in
    2014. Are you still concerned about these underlying factors?
        Admiral Tidd. We think that we must continue to pay
    attention to the push factors. Insecurity in Central America is
    a significant push factor.
        Senator Warren. But are you worried about the gangs and
    other criminal networks that take advantage of these conditions
    to be able to recruit and to stay in business?
        Admiral Tidd. Yes, we are.
        Senator Warren. Do you think that lack of security and
    economic opportunity provide an opening for some of our
    adversaries to exert influence in these areas?
        Admiral Tidd. I think we are seeing that in a number of
    countries in Central America.
        Senator Warren. So let me ask you, Admiral Tidd. What more
    should the United States Government be doing to address these
    underlying conditions?
        Admiral Tidd. I think the efforts to provide some limited
    resources that are available in the case of Guatemala,
    Honduras, El Salvador, for them to develop a regional solution
    to a regional problem is very important. A very high bar
    condition has been set for them to receive those resources, but
    I think we must be realistic and we must help them achieve
    those standards because it is ultimately in all of our
    interests that they achieve them.
        Senator Warren. This is something you are working on now
    actively?
        Admiral Tidd. Senator, it is.
        Senator Warren. I appreciate it.
        I also want to note that in your posture statement last
    year, you thanked Congress for funding the State Department and
    USAID to implement the U.S. strategy for engagement in Central
    America to help address these root causes of migration.
        There has been a lot of talk about how to address unlawful
    immigration. By itself the tallest wall in the world will not
    help us if we choke off funding for non-military strategies to
    address the root causes of migration from Central America. I
    think that would be bad for regional stability and for our
    security.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Wicker?
        Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral Tidd, you state that the southern border should be
    the last line of defense not the first. Given the diminishing
    Navy presence dedicated to Southern Command, is the Coast Guard
    an increasingly valuable partner as a forward line of defense?
        Admiral Tidd. Sir, you know, we also talk about there is a
    third border, and that is the maritime border up through the
    Caribbean. The Coast Guard right now is the principal U.S.
    maritime force that is present in the Caribbean.
        Senator Wicker. I think they do a good job for you.
        Your testimony states that SOUTHCOM lacks the forces
    necessary to interdict about 75 percent of identified and
    validated drug trafficking targets. A successful interdiction
    requires two things: an end game asset, a boat or a helicopter,
    to stop the trafficker, and law enforcement authority to make
    the arrest. Does the Coast Guard's new national security cutter
    have these two attributes?
        Admiral Tidd. Senator, they do. The national security
    cutters are a superb platform, very capable, and frankly, they
    also have the sea-keeping abilities to operate in the eastern
    Pacific further offshore where the vast majority of the
    trafficking is occurring today. They are very valuable
    platforms.
        Senator Wicker. A U.S. national security cutter recently
    seized 16 tons of cocaine worth $400 million. In fact, the
    Coast Guard has reportedly seized about 100 metric tons of
    cocaine, about $3 billion worth since its first operational
    deployment.
        Do these national security cutters arguably pay for
    themselves in this regard?
        Admiral Tidd. Senator, I would never turn down an
    additional national security cutter operating in the SOUTHCOM
    region.
        Senator Wicker. One other thing. Your testimony states that
    Southern Command is dedicated to becoming a platform for
    experimentation and innovation, and this includes unmanned
    platforms and advanced sensors. So tell us about that. Expand
    on that testimony, if you will, sir.
        Admiral Tidd. Senator, in our efforts to find new and
    innovative ways to get after the resourcing problem, we have
    aggressively discussed with services and with the research and
    development organizations that we would be an ideal region to
    come and test out new technologies, perhaps new technologies
    that are being developed for a different theater, for a
    different problem set, but that we have a meaningful
    operational mission. We can provide real feedback and that my
    commitment as the combatant commander is to ensure that we
    eliminate any bureaucratic impediments to being able to bring
    them down and operate them, test them out for a period of time,
    and provide that feedback.
        Senator Wicker. Well, thank you very much, Admiral. I would
    like to invite you down to the Gulf Coast to the Stennis Space
    Center to see the cutting-edge research being done at the Naval
    Research Lab with regard to unmanned underwater vehicles and
    also the Navy Meteorological and Oceanographic Command
    operating a large fleet of UUVs [Unmanned Underwater Vehicles].
    You might want to come down and visit us, and perhaps you could
    leverage these installations as you push for new innovations.
        Admiral Tidd. Thank you very much, Senator.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Donnelly?
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to thank you both for being here today.
        I appreciate you taking the time to come by my office, both
    of you, to talk about the heroin crisis that is impacting
    Indiana and so many other States. We have heard from other
    members here today. It may be the single biggest threat to the
    safety and security of the people of my State, and I am
    convinced we need to everything--everything we can--to stop it.
    This is a whole-of-government effort.
        We heard the chairman talking about the 75 percent figure,
    and we have been talking about that for a while.
        As we look at this, in Indiana in 2015, we lost more people
    to opioid and heroin deaths than in car crashes, which forever
    was the biggest thing. Now this has changed it. The heroin is
    coming in from Mexico and it is coming in across borders that
    we actively monitor. It is not coming through the desert or
    over hills or over here or over there. It is coming through our
    cross points.
        So as we look at this, Admiral Tidd, we talk about the 25
    percent figure, that we catch 25 percent of what is coming in.
    The other 75 percent are killing my friends and neighbors. We
    have lost so many families, children and brothers and sisters.
        What I would love to see is, as the chairman was talking
    about, a plan. If we had all the resources, how much resources
    do you need? How much time will it take? What will we do? How
    do we stop it? Can you put that together for us?
        Admiral Tidd. Senator, we will be happy to work with our
    partners in Northern Command.
        I think as we discussed in your office, though, the
    challenge that we have is we are not going to interdict our way
    out of this crisis. This is going to be a challenge that will
    require a significant amount of work on the demand reduction
    side of the problem, as well as on----
        Chairman McCain. Could I interrupt, Admiral? We are not
    asking you to address the demand side. But if you are capable
    of stopping some of the flow, let us have that.
        Sorry, Senator Donnelly.
        Senator Donnelly. That is okay, sir.
        Admiral Tidd. Yes, Senator.
        General Robinson. Sir, if I could add. As we discussed in
    your office too, all the support that we give to Department of
    Homeland Security on the border is incredibly important,
    whether it is intel sharing or providing detection and
    monitoring to help them do their jobs there on the border.
        Senator Donnelly. I know you know the real-world effects.
    Let me tell you just a couple.
        I have a small town in southern Indiana, a town of 4,200
    people. The opioid crisis has hit it so hard--and this was a
    few years ago--174 cases of HIV in a town of 4,200 people.
        In another small town or small county, rural county, we had
    a shipment of heroin come in from Ohio. It was laced with
    fentanyl, which is 10 times more powerful than the heroin. In a
    2-hour period in one county, we had 10 overdoses and 1 death in
    a 2-hour period from this.
        As Senator Shaheen and others have said, this is not just
    an Indiana problem. This is a nationwide problem that is eating
    us alive. I always look and I go this might have been the young
    person who would have cured cancer, who would have found the
    key to ending diabetes.
        If we can stop that other 75 percent--and we can, and it is
    a resource issue. That is why I am so eager to get the plan of
    if we gave you the keys to the kingdom, so to speak, you have
    the resources, you have everything you need, so how do we do
    this because every day as we are sitting here right now, it is
    coming through the checkpoints.
        General Robinson, I wanted to ask you about Mexico's
    ability and willingness to work with us on this in
    collaboration. In your written testimony, you indicated Mexico
    is growing increasingly capable of helping us. What is your
    assessment of the capability and the will of the Mexican
    Government and security forces to work with us on combating
    this?
        General Robinson. Sir, I will tell you, having been on
    Mexico's southern border talking to their senior leadership
    about their strategy on the southern border, in addition to
    working very closely on the border with their military, the
    willingness of the Mexican military and them to work with us is
    very, very great. I have been very impressed.
        Senator Donnelly. The more you can send that message to
    them, the stronger and better off we will be because this
    really is a national emergency.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Cotton?
        Senator Cotton. Thank you, Admiral Tidd and General
    Robinson, for your testimony today and for your continuing
    service to our country.
        Admiral Tidd, how different is Russia's activities in Latin
    America today from the Soviet Union's activities there in the
    Cold War, if different at all?
        Admiral Tidd. I think that it is certainly not
    ideologically motivated like it was during the Cold War. It is
    motivated for economic reasons and for the ability to gain
    influence with countries in the region.
        Senator Cotton. To what extent is Russia and, for that
    matter, other hostile powers in the old world aiming to tie
    down the United States, our attention, and our resources in the
    new world so we cannot project power and influence into the old
    world?
        General Robinson. So, sir, I would say if you look
    specifically, as you mentioned, Russia as they have increased
    their capability and capacity, as they continue to work west of
    the Urals, the thing that I watch is them coming east of the
    Urals. On occasions, they will come over and power project or
    do out-of-area operations. That makes me then, as the Commander
    of NORAD, increase my levels of responsiveness and put force
    structure in the right place at the right time, should they
    power project.
        Admiral Tidd. I think if I could add to that, certainly in
    Latin America, they do not have vital strategic interests, and
    so they see these as opportunities to take advantage of at
    least a perception of the United States being focused in other
    crises in other parts of the world.
        Senator Cotton. Speaking of countries without vital
    strategic interest in Latin America, let us turn to Iran.
    Admiral Tidd, you state on page 9 of your written testimony,
    with the easing of economic sanctions, Iran may be seeking to
    rebuild its relationships in the region. Tehran uses
    cooperative technology, economic and diplomatic interests as a
    centerpiece of its regional diplomacy. Although on the surface,
    it portrays its actions as innocuous, Iran could exploit its
    cultural centers to develop networks, which could be leveraged
    to extend its influence and advance its interests.
        To your knowledge, are there deep cultural, historical,
    religious ties between Latin Americans and Persian Shiites?
        Admiral Tidd. No, Senator, not longstanding.
        Senator Cotton. I did not think so.
        You state earlier in your written testimony on page 4 and
    5, Hezbollah members, facilitators, supporters engage in licit
    and illicit activities in support of the organization, moving
    weapons, cash and other contraband to raise funds and build
    Hezbollah's infrastructure in the region. Hezbollah is the
    terrorist organization based in Lebanon, a cat's paw of Iran.
    To your knowledge, do Arab Shiites have deep cultural and
    historical ties with Latin America?
        Admiral Tidd. What I would observe is that Hezbollah has
    been present in this region in small pockets scattered
    throughout the region for decades. They have been actively
    engaged largely in criminal activities to raise funds to
    support the terrorist activities of Hezbollah in other parts of
    the world. But we also recognize that Hezbollah was responsible
    for the two terrible terrorist attacks on Jewish sites in an
    Israeli consular center in Argentina back in the 1990s. So they
    have been present here and we view them as probably the most
    dangerous of the terrorist groups present in this region.
        Senator Cotton. I want to zero in on one phrase in that
    statement: moving weapons, cash, and other contraband to raise
    funds. What kind of other contraband is Hezbollah moving in
    Latin America?
        Admiral Tidd. I think one of the more interesting ones,
    cars, basically movement of cars to raise money, to launder
    money in order to develop the resources to fund Hezbollah
    activities in the Middle East.
        Senator Cotton. What about drugs?
        Admiral Tidd. Yes, sir, drugs also.
        Senator Cotton. So Hezbollah, a declared terrorist
    organization that operates in the Middle East, is responsible
    in part for the drug flow in Latin America that has had the
    impact that you have heard Senators on this dais talk about
    today, killing Americans in our hometowns.
        Admiral Tidd. I would say they are one of a number. They
    certainly are not the largest, but they play a contributing
    role.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you.
        Senator Reed [presiding]. On behalf of Chairman McCain,
    Senator Kaine.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Thanks to our witnesses for your testimony.
        I want to just follow up on a couple of points that Senator
    Cotton was making. General Robinson, we talked, had a good
    visit in my office yesterday. You talked about the flows of
    drugs on the seam between NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM as sort of a
    system of systems. We have to look at it as networks and
    systems. If these distribution networks can bring drugs here,
    they could bring human trafficking. They could potentially get
    people in the United States, terrorists in the United States.
    They could bring weapons of mass destruction, biological
    agents. Is that how you both kind of look at this challenge?
    The interdiction of drugs is really important, but also it is
    important to disrupt these networks because they could also do
    us harm in other ways.
        General Robinson. Yes, sir. As we discussed, it is the
    importance of illuminating that network, understanding what is
    on it, and then whatever that commodity is, is making sure that
    the information for the customer of the commodity gets it so
    that can finish whatever activity they are doing. So your point
    is exactly right. That is why it is incredibly important that
    Admiral Tidd and I and our staffs share information because,
    again, it just does not stop at the river.
        Senator Kaine. Let us just focus on the commodity. There
    are all kinds of commodities we could worry about, but just the
    commodity of the drug trade. Admiral Tidd, you have talked
    about this, you know, 25 percent of what you know you can stop,
    and if you had more assets, you could stop more. I am all for
    that. So Coast Guard, military assets to stop more.
        But let us drill down on this. If you had enough assets to
    try to stop everything you knew about but there was still a
    significant demand for drugs in the United States, there would
    still be drugs that would get to the United States. Correct?
        Admiral Tidd. Yes, Senator. Unfortunately, I believe that
    to be true. These networks are very adaptive. If the price is
    right, they will work very, very hard to work around the bars
    that we try and put in their place. So it is a dynamic problem
    that we will continuously have to work at.
        Senator Kaine. Is there anything you can do within your
    military lane that would bring down drug demand, or is that
    other parts of our government?
        Admiral Tidd. I am not aware, at least not in USSOUTHCOM
    [U.S. Southern Command].
        Senator Kaine. So it is other parts of our government. So
    if we are going to deal with this significant national security
    issue, we ought to be funding the interdiction efforts to the
    degree that you talk about. But if we do not do anything on the
    demand side, we are going to continue to see the national
    security problem.
        Ultimately, this is about the budget. In the submitted
    budget, there is not only a proposed cut to the Coast Guard,
    there is a $100 million reduction of funds to SAMHSA, the
    Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration.
    There are dramatic cuts to CDBG [Community Development Block
    Grant] funds, which are often used by community drug
    prevention/drug treatment programs. This is an example of how a
    defense budget, SOUTHCOM, fits together with the non-defense
    budget, Coast Guard, which is under DOT [Department of
    Transportation]. It is part of non-defense discretionary.
    SAMHSA is part of non-defense discretionary. CDBG's funds are
    part of non-defense discretionary.
        So as we look at the sequester, there are so many things
    that are in the non-defense discretionary budget that are
    really about our defense. If we are not wise in those
    investments, we are going to continue to have this challenge of
    drugs flowing south to north and potentially creating networks
    that can move other commodities as well.
        Do either of you disagree with that?
        Admiral Tidd. Senator, what I would just observe is if
    somehow you could wave your hand and the drugs disappeared
    overnight, these same threat networks would engage in other
    activities in order to preserve their power and their access to
    resources. So that is why we focus on the networks. We have got
    to be able to bring pressure to bear on the networks.
        Senator Kaine. The chair and ranking on this committee have
    been so eloquent really since I got here to the Senate about
    the foolishness of the sequester. I understand why it was put
    in place in a vote in the summer of 2011, and then it went
    active March 1, 2013. But it was put in place at a time of a
    political reality where there were significant Republican
    majority in one house and then two but a Democratic President.
    So it was going to be kind of a budgetary check.
        I would just argue the GOP now has all the leverage, the
    White House and both houses. These non-defense expenditures of
    the kind that we are talking about, Coast Guard, SAMHSA
    funding, could help us deal with the drug problem. They are
    really important to our national security.
        I think the time is just to get rid of the caps, not just
    lift the caps on defense and then keep capping non-defense.
    Just lift the caps on both and let everybody make the case for
    what we need to interdict or make the case for what we need to
    bring down the demand on drugs. Especially with power all in
    the hands of one party right now, there is no danger that the
    Dems would sort of roll the majority on the budgetary side.
        But I think lifting the budgetary cap on defense without
    doing it on non-defense means we are going to hurt an awful lot
    of priorities that are in the non-defense side that actually
    directly contribute to some of these national security
    challenges that we are talking about.
        One other quick question. Activity of China in SOUTHCOM, to
    follow up on Senator Cotton. He asked really good questions
    about Russia and Iran. How about activities of China, military
    activities?
        Admiral Tidd. I would say right now that the activity is
    largely economic in nature. The military-focused activities--
    they are very aggressively engaged in an IMET-like program
    where they will seek to bring senior military leaders from
    throughout the region to Beijing for all expense paid trips.
    Again, it is an opportunity to influence the region and to
    displace the United States as the partner of choice in Latin
    America.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you.
        Thanks, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman McCain [presiding]. Senator Sullivan?
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I appreciate the witnesses' testimony.
        I think you are seeing this is helpful. I think is as
    important to this committee as it is to all of you, some
    bipartisan consensus on some key issues. A lot of us, my State
    of Alaska, is also dealing with the opioid problem in a massive
    way. There is concern about the Coast Guard's budget. I chair
    the subcommittee on the Commerce Committee that oversees the
    Coast Guard. I can tell you it is clear to me Secretary Kelly
    does not agree with cutting the Coast Guard's budget. So we are
    all going to work together on that, and I think it is a seam
    some ways between this committee and the Commerce Committee
    because the Coast Guard is a branch of the U.S. military and it
    is a very important branch of the U.S. military. So I think a
    lot of us are concerned on that.
        Then you have seen a lot of concern and interest in the
    Arctic, not just coming from the Senator from Alaska, but a
    bipartisan group of Senators are concerned about that.
        So, General Robinson, you are the advocate for the Arctic
    in terms of capabilities. There is a lot of talk about
    icebreakers. We have really one and a half. The Russians have
    40, building 13 more. Senator Perdue talked a lot about that.
        Have you actually been on one of the icebreakers that we
    have?
        General Robinson. No, sir, I have not.
        Senator Sullivan. So I was this weekend. The Polar Star,
    which is the heavy icebreaker, and the Healy, which is the
    medium icebreaker.
        I want to mention--and again, I am not sure which
    jurisdiction it is in terms of committees, but they are
    shameful. Shameful. The Polar Star was built in the 1970s with
    technologies from the 1960s. As Senator King mentioned, it
    deploys down to Antarctica. We should never--never--allow the
    men and women who serve in the U.S. military to deploy on such
    a bucket. This ship is a joke and it is dangerous. I encourage
    you as the advocate for the Arctic to go out and look at what
    our men and women who volunteer deploy on. These guys have to
    go on eBay to get parts for this ship. It is shameful. We
    should not have the men and women of the Coast Guard deploying
    on such an unseaworthy vessel, and we need to do something
    about it.
        You mentioned the new strategy on the Arctic. It talks
    about FONOPS [Freedom of Navigation Operations], which I think
    it is important. Do you think we have any remote capability of
    conducting FONOPS if the Russians tried to, say, block off sea
    transportation routes or block off access to resource
    development, all of which I guarantee at some point they are
    going to try and test us on? That is why they are building up
    so much capacity. Do we have any kind of capacity right now to
    conduct a FONOP that would try to push back on Russian
    aggression buildup in the Arctic?
        General Robinson. Sir, we have discussed that briefly, but
    I have not taken it to the next level of discussion.
        Senator Sullivan. I think the answer is no. But that is my
    view having been out there. Do you have an answer on that?
        General Robinson. Sir, we have discussed it briefly, but we
    have not taken it to the next level of discussion. I do watch
    where Russian ships are each and every day. I can tell you
    that.
        Senator Sullivan. Well, it is one of these things. We put
    out a strategy. It is the new DOD strategy. We say we are going
    to do this. My view is we do not have even the remote
    capability to do this. When we have a strategy that says we are
    going to do something and we do not have the capability to
    actually do it, it undermines U.S. credibility in the world.
    Lord knows, we need to get credibility back in our foreign
    policy and national security.
        Let me talk about missile defense. Do you agree that the
    threat to the Homeland is increasing almost daily?
        General Robinson. I think that Kim Jong-un very much wants
    to reach out and touch the Homeland.
        Senator Sullivan. So General Hyten said February 11th was a
    real, real important date, a bad date with regard to the
    security of the continental United States and Kim Jong-un's
    capability because they tested solid fuel rockets.
        I am not convinced at all. As a matter of fact, I do not
    think we have--I think we need to do a lot more with regard to
    missile defense. Do you agree with that?
        General Robinson. Sir, given the budget where we are today
    and today's budget and the strategy that we have of making our
    sensors better and making our kill vehicles better is the right
    strategy. I think if we have a different budget, then we can
    have a different strategy.
        Senator Sullivan. So let me ask you the question without
    your reference to the budget. Given the increasing threat,
    which everybody sees, given the likelihood--not the likelihood,
    the certainty that within 1, 2, 3, 4 years Kim Jong-un is going
    to be able to reach us with an intercontinental ballistic
    nuclear missile--do not worry about the budget. Just give me
    your military answer. Do you think we have done enough? Are you
    satisfied where we are on missile defense right now for our
    Nation?
        General Robinson. Yes, sir, I am.
        Senator Sullivan. I am not and we need to do a lot, lot
    more given this threat is going to be on our shores. He is
    going to have the capability to nuke cities in the Lower 48 at
    some point in the future. We know that. I do not think we have
    done enough on missile defense. I think we need to do a lot
    more.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Graham?
        Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Robinson, if we did a CR, would it substantially
    hurt your capability to defend the Homeland from such attacks?
        General Robinson. Sir, as you know, as a consumer of the
    services? capabilities, the U.S. Air Force--the chief testified
    yesterday about being down 1,000 pilots. I need trained and
    ready and qualified pilots to defend our airspace. If you look
    at the things that we are doing to delay maintenance and AWACS
    [Airborne Warning and Control] being one of those things to
    delay maintenance, I need an E-3 airborne also to help defend--
    --
        Senator Graham. So a CR would be hurtful.
        General Robinson. Yes, sir.
        Senator Graham. If we went back into sequestration next
    year, would that be disastrous?
        General Robinson. Yes, sir.
        Senator Graham. The same for you, Admiral.
        Admiral Tidd. Sir, the services are already challenged to
    provide resources for SOUTHCOM, and so anything that decreased
    the available resources is only going to make the matter worse.
        Senator Graham. That would include a CR and sequestration.
        Admiral Tidd. In my understanding, yes, sir.
        Senator Graham. How many ships do you need to cover your
    theater in not a perfect world but in a better world?
        Admiral Tidd. We have had a longstanding requirement for a
    combination of medium and high endurance platforms for as many
    as 23 surface combatants and accompanying aircraft.
        Senator Graham. How many do you have now?
        Admiral Tidd. On any given day, probably about six.
        Senator Graham. So do you think at the time they did the
    survey for 23, things have gotten better or worse in terms of
    the theater?
        Admiral Tidd. Sir, in that particular regard, they are
    worse.
        Senator Graham. So you got six ships. A long time ago, you
    said you needed 23 and things are worse now than they were when
    you said you needed 23. Okay.
        So, General Robinson, let us get back to North Korea. Do
    you believe that it is the intention of the regime to develop
    an ICBM that can hit the Homeland?
        General Robinson. Yes, sir.
        Senator Graham. Do you believe it is just a matter of time
    until they achieve that capability, unless something changes?
        General Robinson. Yes, sir.
        Senator Graham. Do you believe it is just a matter of time
    until they can miniaturize a nuclear to put on top of the ICBM?
        General Robinson. In my discussions with General Hyten,
    yes, sir.
        Senator Graham. So I guess there are two ways to deal with
    that threat. Never let the missile program mature to the point
    it can hit the Homeland. That is one. Is that correct?
        General Robinson. Yes, sir.
        Senator Graham. The other would be to have a missile
    defense system that could knock it down.
        General Robinson. Yes, sir.
        Senator Graham. What do you prefer?
        General Robinson. I prefer both.
        Senator Graham. I agree. That was like the best answer
    anybody could give.
        Do we have both?
        General Robinson. Today we have exactly what we need to
    defend the United States of America against North Korea.
        Senator Graham. So if a missile were launched from North
    Korea next year, we could knock it down?
        General Robinson. Yes, sir.
        Senator Graham. Do you agree with me it is better not to
    let them have that missile?
        General Robinson. Yes, sir.
        Senator Graham. So in terms of Homeland defense, what is
    the biggest threat to the Homeland, starting with North Korea
    and kind of listing threats that you see?
        General Robinson. Yes, sir. I worry about North Korea, as
    we were just discussing, from a ballistic missile defense
    perspective when I look at Kim Jong-un and his lack of
    indications and warning, as General Hyten talked about the
    other day, and all of that.
        I also look at Russia and their long-range aviation and the
    capability that they have provided.
        Right now, I pay attention to Iran because of some of the
    technologies that they are using.
        I also, obviously, watch China as they continue to go
    further and further away from----
        Senator Graham. So these are nation-state threats.
        General Robinson. Yes, sir.
        But I also am very concerned about the homegrown violent
    extremists and the things that can happen with them. This goes
    back to the conversation that Admiral Tidd and I had about the
    networks and what is on the networks.
        Senator Graham. Speaking of emerging threats, are you
    familiar with the increased use of drones by terrorist
    organizations?
        General Robinson. Yes, sir. I read that.
        Senator Graham. Do we need to up our game when it comes to
    dealing with potential drone attacks on the country?
        General Robinson. Sir, so as the person responsible for
    force protection over installations, I pay attention to that
    each and every day. I know that the Department--we are working
    very hard on a policy on what we do with that.
        Senator Graham. Do you think we need to change our laws at
    all to be able to deal with this threat?
        General Robinson. I think we need to understand what it
    could be and what it could do--from an installation
    perspective, what do we need----
        Senator Graham. Is it fair to say that in 5 years, this
    threat, if not unchecked, is going to get worse and more
    lethal?
        General Robinson. Sir, if you just look at the
    proliferation of drones itself and then you add to what you
    were just talking about and you mate those two together, I can
    only imagine.
        Senator Graham. Thank you both.
        Chairman McCain. Admiral Tidd, we would like to have a
    letter from you describing what additional assets that you
    could use effectively to apprehend all of those drugs,
    particularly in the Caribbean. That seems to be an area, as we
    tighten the border, of increased trafficking.
        General Robinson, we would like to know from you also if
    you could write us a letter how we can fully utilize the assets
    of our uniformed military in keeping with the posse comitatus
    rule so that we can maximize border security.
        Finally, General, would you believe that a definition of a
    wall could be electronics, could be towers, could be UAVs,
    could be anti-tunneling capabilities, surveillance towers, in
    other words dramatically increasing our capabilities through
    the use of technology?
        General Robinson. Sir, anything that disturbs, disrupts,
    and gets after the flow----
        Chairman McCain. I am asking would technology--that it be
    more effectively utilized. I am talking about towers. I am
    talking about----
        General Robinson. Yes, sir. Those are helpful as part of a
    wall.
        Chairman McCain. Well, then write us a note, would you, as
    to what assets you think could be used and construction and
    ways of preventing the flow not only of drugs, which has been a
    central theme of this hearing, but also the possible
    infiltration of terrorists as we see Mosul and Raqqa fall. We
    all know that these individuals are spreading out throughout
    the world. So we would appreciate that information from both of
    you, and I hope it is not too tough a task.
        General Robinson. Yes, sir.
        Chairman McCain. I am certainly glad to see this inter-
    service cooperation. It is a rare and beautiful event. Thank
    you.
        This hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:06 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                   Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
                          support for border security
        1. Senator McCain. General Robinson, how much support has NORTHCOM
    given to law enforcement addressing border security while training in
    terms of flight hours and man hours?
        General Robinson. USNORTHCOM provides title 10 operational support
    to U.S. Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) primarily through Joint Task
    Force North, a USNORTHCOM subordinate joint service command. USNORTHCOM
    provides military-unique support to LEAs under Fiscal Year 2019 NDAA
    Section 1004 authority within six support categories: 1) operational,
    2) intelligence, 3) general, 4) interagency synchronization, 5)
    engineering, and 6) technology integration. During fiscal year 2016,
    USNORTHCOM provided 10,417 flight hours and 159,053 man-days in support
    of federal LEA requests, providing support to LEA requests across all
    six categories.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
                             engagement in southcom
        2. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Tidd, in your written statement, you
    noted that adversarial nations are growing their influence in the
    SOUTHCOM AOR through outreach programs. You pointed out that nations
    like Russia, China, and Iran have no equivalent of a Leahy Law, and
    ``no comparable conditions on security assistance.'' How do we overcome
    our potential disadvantage to exert influence in the region?
        Admiral Tidd. It really boils down to being good partners and
    setting a good example that our partner nations will want to emulate--
    we must always strive to grow and strengthen our security partnerships
    throughout the region. One of the ways we do this is by building our
    partners' capacity to address shared threats. These efforts are often
    done by small mobile training teams that work closely with partners. We
    don't need brigades of people and aircraft carriers in this region.
    Small teams engaging at the right level are our strongest assets. Cuts
    to our personnel and programs in this theater are quickly noticed and
    feed into the misinformation campaign by Russia that we are no longer
    interested and withdrawing from the region. To thwart this
    misinformation, we need to continue activities like Information
    Operations to counter Russian propaganda and to stay engaged in the
    region by maintaining efforts to build partner nation capacity, to
    include programs funded by other agencies such as the State
    Department's IMET program. These programs allow us to strengthen
    relationships with like-minded nations, advance our security interests,
    share our views on the imperative of respecting human rights, the
    importance of rule of law, and respect for the rules-based,
    international order.

        3. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Tidd, is the Leahy Law impacting your
    ability to influence and shape behavior in the region?
        Admiral Tidd. The United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) is
    strongly committed to the Leahy Law. The law accomplishes our goal of
    ensuring that our partner nation military counterparts understand and
    comply with respect for human rights, a core U.S. value, and as we are
    seeing increasingly a shared value. Overall, we have seen that the law
    has had a net positive effect on a number of our Partner Nation
    military counterparts in the region, such as Colombia, leading them
    over time to place greater emphasis on their responsibility to respect
    and protect human rights. However, implementation of the vetting
    procedures has become increasingly more challenging as we adapt to
    congressionally mandated personnel cuts within the Department of
    Defense. Moreover, budget cuts to the Department of State would also
    significantly impact implementation of the law, and thus our security
    cooperation efforts, curbing our ability to influence and shape our
    partner nation military counterparts' human rights compliance
    throughout the region. If we are restricted from engaging with our
    partners, we can't help them make the very progress that Congress wants
    to see. Notably, our ability to work with partners who would benefit
    most from our engagement to support their continued progress on human
    rights is frequently restricted by conditions unrelated to the Leahy
    Law. One example of this was the conditions placed on security
    assistance for the Guatemalan Armed Forces in fiscal year 2014. Funds
    for security engagement were tied to the Government of Guatemala paying
    reparations for the construction of the Chixoy Dam and to the
    resolution of international private adoption cases between Guatemalan
    children and United States parents. One of the unintended consequences
    of this was that our Human Rights training for the Guatemalan Army had
    to be canceled. Conditions on assistance in fiscal year 2016 for
    Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador to implement the U.S. Strategy for
    Engagement in Central America in support of the Alliance for Prosperity
    in the Northern Triangle of Central America came with a series of
    conditions each of the Central American governments had to meet before
    75 percent of funds were able to be released. Withholding such a high
    percentage of funding, and tying it to such a broad list of conditions,
    may send the message to our military partners that the intent of the
    conditions is to withhold assistance, and not to promote positive
    change.
                               southcom resources
        4. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Tidd, in your written statement, you
    highlighted resource shortfalls that have negatively impacted your
    ability to accomplish SOUTHCOM missions. Can you briefly highlight
    national security implications of these shortfalls?
        Admiral Tidd. I support the prioritization of global challenges.
    However, as we resource the higher priority challenges, USSOUTHCOM's
    requirements, closer to the United States, are not being met. In some
    cases, previously allocated assets are being reassigned to Combatant
    Commands with higher priority missions, further exacerbating our
    shortfalls. As to national security implications, to give you one
    example, last year, we had very precise information on 449MTs of drugs
    en route to the United States that we could not target for interdiction
    because of lack of forces. That translates into thousands of American
    deaths and over $5Billion in illicit profits that fuel corruption and
    violence. USSOUTHCOM is also contending with compounding effects
    resulting from several years of undersourcing in the area of
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). As a Combatant
    Command charged with defending the southern approaches to the United
    States, lack of persistent ISR presents significant risk and a clear
    threat to national security. Shortfalls in posture and presence
    continue to present blind spots for us and a vacuum for our rivals to
    exploit.

        5. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Tidd, how would the planned buildup of
    our military across the services--personnel, ships, vehicles and
    aircraft--impact the ability of SOUTHCOM to execute its mission?
        Admiral Tidd. As a Combatant Command (CCMD), our requirements are
    sourced by the Services. Right now, the Services simply do not have
    enough forces to go around to fill all the CCMD requirements. Any
    buildup, maintenance, and modernization efforts for the Services could
    potentially lead to better resourcing of USSOUTHCOM requirements and
    increase our ability to execute our mission.

        6. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Tidd, what are your top three
    prioritized funding shortfalls?
        Admiral Tidd. Broadly speaking, our requirements fall into three
    primary categories--tools that allow us to (1) maintain awareness of
    and ability to effect the threat environment (ISR and analysis,
    maritime force packages, special forces activities, etc), (2) remain
    engaged with our partners (efforts to build partner capacity, special
    forces capabilities, International Military Education and Training,
    information operations, and conventional forces), and (3)
    Infrastructure upgrades and repairs to maintain health and welfare of
    U.S. servicemembers operating in the AOR. More specifically aimed at
    our requirement to execute our title 10 mission to detect and monitor
    illicit traffic heading toward the United States, we need what we call
    force packages. A force package consists of a medium to long range ship
    hosting a Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachment and capable of
    launching and recovering an over the horizon interceptor boat supported
    by a day/night airborne use of force capable helicopter along with a
    maritime patrol aircraft equipped with wide-area maritime search radar
    and infrared detection set (FLIR). We are required by the White House
    Office of National Drug Control Policy to stop 40 percent of the drug
    flow. Given the total amount of drugs that left the source zone last
    year (3,225 metric tons), we would have required 38 force packages to
    interdict 40 percent. On an average day, we have five. We also require
    ISR outside of the counternarcotics mission; persistent undersourcing
    of ISR over several years has created a serious challenge and lack of
    awareness of a spectrum of threats. People are our greatest resource.
    The personnel that make up USSOUTHCOM headquarters are our maneuver
    force--we have very few assigned or allocated forces in this region and
    rely heavily on headquarters manpower and contractors. We do not
    require a large footprint of forces, but the cuts to our Headquarters/
    maneuver force impact our ability to stay engaged in the region,
    feeding directly into the perception that the United States is
    withdrawing from the region, a perception on which Russia is quick to
    capitalize. Finally, after so many years of putting off infrastructure
    replacements at Guantanamo, we owe it to our Servicemembers to ensure
    their housing and other facilities are up to standards.
                     strategic threats to the united states
        7. Senator Inhofe. General Robinson, in February, you told the
    Toronto Star that, ``Today, Russian cruise missiles can reach us from
    ranges we're not used to. No longer do they have to enter or come close
    to North American airspace . . . this is a game changer.'' What are the
    implications of the deployment of these missiles on your ability to
    protect the United States?
        General Robinson. Deployment of Russian cruise missiles challenges
    our air defense architecture. I believe our way forward is to continue
    improving our indications and warning, as well as detection, tracking,
    and engagement capabilities, to enable interdiction of these cruise
    missile threats as far forward as possible.

        8. Senator Inhofe. General Robinson, what are we doing to defeat or
    at least mitigate this threat in the near and long term?
        General Robinson. There are no single-system ``silver bullet''
    options to address cruise missile threats. Current capabilities against
    cruise missile threats to the National Capital Region include Sentinel
    radars, limited surveillance coverage from advanced sensors, Aerospace
    Control Alert fighter aircraft, and ground-based air defense for cruise
    missile engagement. We are confident in the Department's Homeland
    Defense Design approach going forward, which will provide additional
    capabilities to better detect, track, and engage advanced cruise
    missiles, both within and beyond the National Capital Region.

        9. Senator Inhofe. General Robinson, in March, General Selva
    confirmed that Russia is deploying nuclear-tipped ground-launched
    cruise missiles in violation of the 1987 INF (Intermediate-Range
    Nuclear Forces) Treaty. What are the implications of the deployment of
    these missiles on your ability to protect the United States?
        General Robinson. Cruise missiles are a threat to the United States
    whether they are nuclear tipped or conventional. Our approach to defeat
    them is the same.

        10. Senator Inhofe. General Robinson, you have stated that North
    Korean leader Kim Jong Un is ``unpredictable and volatile'' and that
    ``North Korea uses what they learn from each and every test they do to
    make improvements to their missile capabilities.'' Are you able to
    accurately rely on North Korean indicators and warnings in order to
    take actions to protect the United States?
        General Robinson. We've made appropriate adjustments in light of
    shifts in North Korea warning timelines and capabilities, while working
    with our mission partners to enhance our ballistic missile defense
    capabilities to remain in an advantageous position going forward. I
    remain confident we can defend the United States against the current
    threat posed by North Korea.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Mike Rounds
                             cruise missile defense
        11. Senator Rounds. General Robinson, I am concerned that progress
    on the issues surrounding cruise missile defense (CMD) have remained
    stagnant over the past few years, after the previous NORTHCOM commander
    and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff started to sound the
    warning. Just last year Admiral Gortney testified on the need to
    develop effective responses to outpace the cruise missile threat. Yet
    this year's posture statement seems to counter this concern. What has
    changed between last year and this year concerning cruise missile
    defense?
        General Robinson. Nothing has changed from last year regarding the
    need to develop capabilities to outpace the cruise missile threat. This
    threat is very real and becoming more of a challenge each day. We rely
    on indications and warning and require detection capabilities to
    identify the threat as early as possible to engage it before it
    threatens our Homelands. I am confident, however, in our strategy going
    forward to enhance and obtain the required capabilities to defend both
    within, and beyond the National Capital Region, against the cruise
    missile threat.
                   layered approach to cruise missile defense
        12. Senator Rounds. General Robinson, when dealing with near and
    long term capabilities and potential gaps, I am concerned there is some
    disconnect between you as the combatant commander, and the Air Force as
    a force-provider. Specifically, this concerns the role of the F-15C and
    F-16 to support the CMD mission. In the context of the layered approach
    to CMD described in your testimony, has the Air Force requested your
    input to define requirements to counter this threat?
        General Robinson. We work closely, and routinely, with all of the
    Services and the Canadian Armed Forces to ensure the capabilities
    required to execute NORAD's layered cruise missile defense (CMD)
    strategy for North America are fully understood. Specifically, within
    the past five years, the U.S. Air Force has made significant
    investments in support of our CMD requirements for enhanced detection,
    tracking, and engagement capabilities against emergent threats through
    the Wide Area Surveillance radar program, F-15C, and F-16 AESA radar
    programs. We currently have F-15Cs that provide NORAD with AESA alert
    fighter capabilities and are working with the Air Force to upgrade F-
    16s with AESA capabilities to meet our urgent requirements. In the
    coming year, we are also working with the Air Force in the bi-national
    Northern Approaches Surveillance Analysis of Alternatives. This
    analysis will evaluate alternatives for future persistent, wide area
    air surveillance capabilities as the aging North Warning System reaches
    obsolescence.
                cruise missile defense--urgent operational need
        13. Senator Rounds. General Robinson, in 2015, First Air Force, the
    numbered Air Force tasked to assure air superiority and air sovereignty
    of the U.S., submitted an urgent operational need (UON) request to the
    Air Force Requirements Council. I understand this UON was to update
    block 30 F-16s with APG-83 AESA radars. However, the service did not
    fund it in fiscal year 2015, fiscal year 2016, or fiscal year 2017. I
    understand that having an AESA radar is necessary in performing the CMD
    mission. Are you consulted by the Air Force as they determine the final
    UON priority for all the combatant commands?
        General Robinson. Yes, NORAD works closely with all the Services,
    including the U.S. Air Force, to ensure our requirements are fully
    considered through the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development
    System and the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution
    processes. NORAD's urgent need addresses a capability gap within our
    Aerospace Control Alert (ACA) mission. This request was validated by
    the Joint Requirements Oversight Council in 2015 and divided into two
    phases of a Joint Urgent Operational Need (JUON). Phase 1 of the JUON
    upgrades 24 Air National Guard (ANG) F-16 aircraft with Active
    Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar; Phase 2 of the JUON upgrades
    48 additional ANG F-16 Aircraft with AESA radar. All 72 aircraft are
    projected to be modified with AESA radar by the end of 2020.
                                f-16 role in cmd
        14. Senator Rounds. General Robinson, since this AESA radar UON is
    now going on 2 years old, and given the potential for fighter force
    structure changes to include divestment of the F-15C, acquisition of
    the F-35A and the Air Force's desire to grow from 55 to 60 fighter
    squadrons, would you agree that this UON should be updated to reflect
    these changing conditions? Would one option be to expand the UON to
    encompass other variants of the Air National Guard F-16s beyond the
    block 30s?
        General Robinson. I believe we are on track to address our
    capability requirements as a result of recent activity with our Joint
    Urgent Operational Need (JUON) submission. The 2015 NORAD JUON was
    recently superseded by a NORAD Joint Emergent Operational Need (JEON)
    which was validated by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council on 18
    April 2017. The U.S. Air Force provides NORAD with F-15C, and F-16
    aircraft to support the Aerospace Control Alert (ACA) mission. All of
    the F-15C ACA aircraft are either already equipped or scheduled to be
    equipped with Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radars. Of the
    fourteen NORAD main operating bases included in our JEON, nine bases
    operate various blocks of the F-16 aircraft, including Block 30, 40,
    42, and 52.
                              f-16 radar upgrades
        15. Senator Rounds. General Robinson, a Government Accountability
    Office report released in late 2012 estimated that the F-16 AESA
    upgrades would cost about $1.8 billion for about 350 jets, or about
    $5.2 million per F-16. Recent testimony from the Air Force predicts
    that the F-15C will require upwards of $40 million of structural
    modernization each in order to keep these aircraft flying beyond the
    mid-2020s. F-16s with AESA radars are already sold to Taiwan (F-16V)
    and the United Arab Emirates (F-16 block 60) so it would appear the
    developmental costs and risk reduction have been mitigated. Is the
    decision to not fulfill the UON a fiscal one?
        General Robinson. The decision to not fulfill the JUON in 2016 was
    a fiscal one that is now resolved. The NORAD Active Electronically
    Scanned Array (AESA) urgent requirement for all 72 Aerospace Control
    Alert (ACA) F-16s was fully funded in H.R. 244, the Consolidated
    Appropriations Act of 2017.
                 northcom relationship with the force provider
        16. Senator Rounds. General Robinson, I would like to further
    understand the role of a combatant commander as a product consumer vis-
    a-vis the services' role to organize, train, and equip. Please comment
    on NORTHCOM's decision making process with regard to accepting risk and
    making ``strategic tradeoffs'' in fulfilling the Homeland defense
    mission if a service does not meet your requirements.
        General Robinson. As the Commander of USNORTHCOM, I advocate for my
    capability requirements throughout a collaborative decision-making
    cycle involving the Combatant Commands, Services, and other
    organizations throughout the Department of Defense. For example, I
    communicate my requirements via the Global Force Management (GFM)
    process in coordination with the Office of the Secretary of Defense
    (OSD), the Joint Staff, and the Services. I also work through the Joint
    Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) to identify
    gaps and associated capability requirements. We assess and mitigate
    those gaps via the Programming, Planning, Budgeting, and Execution
    (PPBE) process and through continual engagement with the Services and
    relevant entities within the Department of Defense.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
                  southcom response to large-scale emergencies
        17. Senator Nelson. Admiral Tidd, given the relative lack of assets
    and resources dedicated to the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility (AOR),
    how does the Command plan to respond to large-scale emergencies, should
    one occur?
        Admiral Tidd. In the event of a large-scale emergency or crisis, we
    follow standard procedures within the Department of Defense to request
    the forces needed to respond once we are directed to do so. We rely
    mainly on capabilities from the Global ResponseForce (GRF) and U.S.
    Transportation Command's Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC) for
    immediate response. These forces remain on a permanent ``Prepare to
    Deploy'' order and can deploy on short notice. For follow-on response,
    we request capabilities via the Global Force Management (GFM) Emergent
    process for requesting forces. Once the Joint Staff validates our
    request, the Services then work to fill those requirements as quickly
    as possible from available/ready forces. One of the most critical
    requirements in responding to a large-scale crisis is the ability to
    anticipate its onset, and if possible, prevent its impact. Capabilities
    that allow us to anticipate crises (visualization tools, analytic
    capability, and awareness gained through ISR and regional engagements
    and persistent presence) can significantly improve decision-making when
    every second counts. Maintaining real time situational awareness of
    potential natural hazards, along with building Partner Nation disaster
    preparedness and disaster risk reduction capacity through our
    Humanitarian Assistance Program, we maintain a posture to respond
    rapidly and mitigate the effects of crises.
    proposed cuts to u.s coast guard, department of state, and u.s. agency
                         for international development
        18. Senator Nelson. Admiral Tidd, effectively addressing the
    challenges you face in SOUTHCOM requires close coordination with and
    the support of agencies and departments like U.S. Coast Guard, the
    Department of State, and the United States Agency for International
    Development. How would cuts to these agencies and departments impact
    the work of SOUTHCOM?
        Admiral Tidd. Security is a team sport, especially in this region,
    where DOD does not have many resources. If we lose players from the
    field, it could have significant effects on our ability to defend the
    Southern approaches. Our partners across the U.S. Government are vital
    to our ability to accomplish this mission, and we are often in support
    of other lead federal agencies as we protect against threats to the
    Homeland. As an example, due to higher global priorities, USSOUTHCOM is
    assigned less than one Navy ship per year to execute our statutorily
    directed mission to detect and monitor illicit drugs heading to the
    United States. However, the U. S. Coast Guard provides an average of
    six ships per year for this mission. We would be completely unable to
    execute our Congressionally-mandated, statutory requirement without the
    support of the Coast Guard. Similarly, with a region at risk for
    natural disasters, drivers of instability and migration, and food
    insecurity, the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for
    International Development sponsor internal security and development
    programs that we complement and support through our theater security
    cooperation programs. Finally, without the professionals in the law
    enforcement and intelligence community, we would not be able to take a
    whole-of-government approach to detect and degrade the threat networks
    that challenge our national security.
                                   __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
                                   hezbollah
        19. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Tidd, Hezbollah has long been known
    for its support and activity--noticeably money laundering, terrorist
    attacks, and drug trafficking--in South America. Hezbollah first
    appeared in the region during the Lebanese Civil War in the 1980s. In
    1992, they were linked to an attack on the Israeli Embassy in Buenos
    Aires (29 deaths, 200+ injured) and in 1994 the bombing of a Jewish
    cultural center in the same city (killing 85). Hezbollah remains
    particularly active in the Tri-Border Area (where Argentina, Brazil,
    and Paraguay meet)--an area plagued by drug smuggling, money
    laundering, arms trading, counterfeiting, and unregulated borders. But
    it does not stop here--Hezbollah also has developed a drug trafficking
    and money laundering networks to launder from South America to the
    Middle East, facilitated by Venezuela. Venezuela's Vice President
    (sanctioned by Treasury for drug trafficking in February) also has
    connections to Hezbollah, as highlighted by press reports alleging his
    involvement in the fraudulent issuance of Venezuelan passports to
    people in the Middle East, noticeably people connected to Hezbollah.
    How would you characterize the threat from Hezbollah in your area of
    operation?
        Admiral Tidd. Hezbollah is the most capable terrorist group in the
    region, maintaining a regional infrastructure capable of supporting
    terrorist attacks with little to no warning. In contrast to al Qaida
    and ISIS, Hezbollah does not ask or expect its supporters and
    sympathizers to conduct terrorist attacks. Instead, Hezbollah has a
    dedicated military unit in Lebanon to accomplish terrorist attacks
    outside of the LEVANT, using that pre-established infrastructure
    throughout the world. Hezbollah is motivated to cultivate a
    relationship with the diaspora to maintain and develop an alternate
    source of funding to augments Iran's primary funding, to garner
    absentee political support and financing, and to develop contingency
    plans for Hezbollah in the event they decide to execute an attack.
    While Hezbollah does employ terrorist tactics, they only attack in
    response to perceived threats. Hezbollah would only escalate to an
    external attack against U.S. interest in the event there was
    significant cause based on potentially geopolitical issues with Iran or
    with the Hezbollah leadership cadre. To accomplish this mission
    Hezbollah develops contingency plans years in advance across the globe
    that would enable Hezbollah's terrorist branch to execute an attack
    with little to no warning, should they feel they need to conduct a
    response to an event. Unfortunately, to defeat any potential Hezbollah
    attack, we must disrupt attack infrastructure development before
    triggers or red lines are crossed.

        20. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Tidd, what are you doing to address
    the threat--including Hezbollah's terrorist activities, money
    laundering, and drug trafficking?
        Admiral Tidd. As previously mentioned, to defeat any potential
    Hezbollah attack, we must first detect and then disrupt attack
    infrastructure development before Hezbollah employs it. Therefore, in
    order to understand this threat network, USSOUTHCOM has been
    extensively involved in intelligence cooperation and sharing to include
    several multi-lateral and bi-lateral engagements with regional
    partners. Additionally, we routinely collaborate with and provide
    strategic analysis to support other U.S. Government Agencies such as
    the Department of Treasury and the law enforcement community to support
    operations that target Hezbollah and the involvement of Hezbollah
    supporters and members in drug trafficking and other illicit activity.
    We also continue to build our own networks of regional allies,
    organizations and agencies to enhance our partners' capacities to
    address security challenges writ large. Stronger regional allied
    networks build our partners' capacities by giving them access to
    greater resources to detect, attack, and reduce Hezbollah
    infrastructure in the region before it can be leveraged to threaten our
    interests or those of our partners in the region.

        21. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Tidd, what percentage of Hezbollah
    fundraising is derived from drug trafficking and what are the other
    major sources of profit?
        Admiral Tidd. Hezbollah benefits from funds generated by the
    loosely-connected enterprise of Lebanese Shi'a Muslim, clan-based,
    business networks involved in licit and illicit activity. Hezbollah
    benefits from a portion of these networks profits via family
    remittances, religious tithings, charitable organizations, and direct
    contributions. Collectively this augments Hezbollah's primary funding
    source coming from Iran. There is little risk and long term
    profitability associated with the sale of counterfeit goods vice the
    high risk drug trafficking activities some choose as a means to earn
    money. As a result, there is very likely far more illicit activity
    involving the sale of counterfeit merchandise compared to drug
    trafficking or involvement in weapons smuggling. Lebanese expats in the
    region are also involved in many other illicit businesses, just not
    equal to the extent of sale of all types of counterfeit products that
    range from purses to high end electronics.

        22. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Tidd, are you working to build the
    capacity of regional allies to address Hezbollah's malign activities?
        Admiral Tidd. Many of the skills gained by our partners from
    USSOUTHCOM's broader capacity building activities to address other
    regional security challenges are transferrable. Skills used to counter
    threat networks, threat finance, and narcotics can be applied across
    many other threats to include Hezbollah. Additionally, working with our
    partners, regional organizations, and other U.S. Government agencies to
    reduce corruption as well as un- and under-governed spaces (while not
    specifically targeted at Hezbollah) will counter many of Hezbollah's
    activities to build and maintain additional infrastructure in the
    region.

        23. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Tidd, what do you know about the
    links between Venezuela's Government and Hezbollah?
        Admiral Tidd. There have been a number of individuals within the
    Venezuelan government who are ideologically aligned with Hezbollah. A
    very small number of these individuals were involved in illicit
    activity that, via third party donations, likely resulted in an
    insignificant financial profit for Hezbollah. Additionally, Venezuelan
    travel documents have been sold to members of the Lebanese community.
    The Lebanese diaspora in Venezuela likely has relationships with a
    small number of local and regional Venezuelan officials to facilitate
    the transportation and sale of counterfeit merchandise. Additionally,
    some members of the Lebanese community are involved in drug trafficking
    and money laundering which is possibly facilitated by lower level law
    enforcement, military, or government officials. However, there is no
    official relationship between the government of Venezuela and
    Hezbollah.
                                   the arctic
        24. Senator Blumenthal. General Robinson, a March 22 article in the
    Washington Post noted that sea ice levels in the Arctic Ocean hit a
    record low--the smallest since record keeping began in 1979. This is
    troubling from an environmental standpoint, but more importantly for
    this hearing, it opens sea lanes in areas we did not have to worry
    about protecting in the past. Russia is expanding its capabilities in
    the arctic, the largest since the end of the Cold War, including
    reopening or building of six military bases. Russia is also expanding
    its reach and laying claim to part of the estimated 22 percent of the
    undiscovered gas and oil reserves located in the Arctic. The disparity
    in our icebreaker fleet is another area of concern. Russia's aggressive
    activity in the Artic is concerning and the U.S. needs to do more to
    assert its presence in the region. How is climate change impacting
    NORTHCOM operations? Is the thawing of the Artic impacted mission
    requirements?
        General Robinson. At this time, climate change and the thawing of
    sea ice in the Arctic do not affect my ability to conduct my Homeland
    defense and defense support of civil authority missions. The Arctic is
    a vast and harsh operating environment that requires uniquely trained
    and equipped forces to operate in this austere region. When we develop
    plans and strategies, we consider many factors, such as Russian
    military capabilities, the capabilities and capacities of our partners,
    and the operational environment. We are cognizant of the differences
    between the Eurasian Arctic and the North American Arctic and
    continuously evaluate changes in the operational environment to
    determine if those changes drive new capability requirements. We
    continue to look for opportunities to advocate for capabilities that
    will enable us to perform missions throughout our Area of
    Responsibility, to include safety, security, and defense of the Arctic.

        25. Senator Blumenthal. General Robinson, if this trend continues,
    there will be additional ocean to patrol and sea lanes to protect to
    our north. Has this impacted the number of ships and patrols required
    in the Arctic?
        General Robinson. Climate change has not impacted the number of
    ships and patrols I require in the Arctic. However, diminishing sea ice
    will eventually open a northern maritime avenue of approach to North
    America, highlighting the importance of the maritime warning mission
    for NORAD and the Homeland Defense mission for USNORTHCOM.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
                      impact of partnerships on the region
        26. Senator Hirono. Admiral Tidd, with regard to interagency and
    regional cooperation, in your written testimony you state that ``our
    security partnerships help create a layered defense of our Homeland by
    keeping our shared home stable and secure.'' Would you agree that the
    security of the region is not based solely on military might but also
    on diplomacy and developing relationships with allies?
        Admiral Tidd. Yes, I agree with that statement.

        27. Senator Hirono. General Robinson, what is your opinion of the
    border wall and its impact on relationships with our allies?
        General Robinson. In my role as the USNORTHCOM Commander, I am
    confident in the strength of the military-to-military relationships
    between my Commands and our international military partners within my
    Area of Responsibility.

        28. Senator Hirono. General Robinson, in your opinion, will our
    national security be increased by building a border wall?
        General Robinson. As the Commander of USNORTHCOM, I respectfully
    defer to national civilian leaders on matters of policy.

        29. Senator Hirono. General Robinson, if our relationship with
    Mexico is impacted negatively, how would it affect our ability to
    combat drug trafficking, human trafficking and anti-terrorism on the
    Southern border?
        General Robinson. The military-to-military relationship between the
    United States and Mexico is extremely strong and absolutely at an all-
    time high. I am confident in the strength of this important
    relationship and believe our shared goals on the U.S. southern border
    will remain a priority.

        30. Senator Hirono. Admiral Tidd and General Robinson, what impact
    does President Trump's ``America First'' policy have on relationships
    with our allies in the region?
        Admiral Tidd. We have not noticed any difference in our
    relationships with our partners in the region as a result of President
    Trump's policies. With very few exceptions, we enjoy strong
    partnerships with the countries in this region, who want to partner
    with the United States. I will comment that there are other countries,
    namely Russia and China, who are positioning themselves to step in as
    partners to these nations if there is a perception that the United
    States is withdrawing from the region.
        General Robinson. As the USNORTHCOM Commander, I can only speak to
    the mil-to-mil relationships with our partners within my Area of
    Responsibility. Those relationships remain strong, and I will continue
    to place great importance on continually building on our mil-to-mil
    partnerships.
                     funding to supporting federal agencies
        31. Senator Hirono. Admiral Tidd, in your statement you commented
    on the importance of other governmental agencies on the success of your
    mission. President Trump's budget prosed to cut a substantial portion
    of funding to the Department of State and USAID. If Department of State
    and USAID were forced to reduce their mission in the region due to
    funding issues, what impact would that have on your mission,
    particularly the humanitarian missions?
        Admiral Tidd. The United States military is never the lead in the
    event of a response to a humanitarian crisis. If DOD unique
    capabilities are required, we are called in to support USAID, the lead
    federal agency for humanitarian crisis response, with those
    capabilities (such as heavy air-lift). This region is particularly
    prone to natural disasters, averaging about 50 every year. If USAID
    funding is cut, I suspect that cost and duration of U.S. military
    involvement in humanitarian responses could increase, though I defer to
    USAID for more specific information on impact of funding cuts.
    Additionally, the development programs that are sponsored by USAID are
    incredibly important to mitigate the drivers of instability and
    migration in the region. The State Department is also a critical
    partner in this region. State programs such as FMS, FMF, and IMET are
    key to our relationship-building in the region--facilitating long-term
    relationships with future leaders of our partner nations. Also, the
    State Department has a robust program aimed at countering international
    crime, illegal drugs, and instability abroad that very closely
    complements the efforts of USSOUTHCOM in the Western Hemisphere. Given
    the already limited resources of DOD in this region, cuts to these
    vital programs run by our interagency partners would have a significant
    impact on regional security and our bilateral partnerships.

        32. Senator Hirono. Admiral Tidd, another agency that is facing
    potential reductions in the President's budget is the U.S. Coast Guard.
    You stated that the Coast Guard is ``punching well above their weight''
    by helping fulfill a portion of your title 10 detection and monitoring
    obligations. This is largely due to the maritime platform gaps that are
    occurring across the services and that Littoral Combat Ships play an
    important part in SOUTHCOM's mission. What impact would a Coast Guard
    budget reduction have on the security of the U.S. and defense of our
    nation?
        Admiral Tidd. I would defer to the Commandant of the Coast Guard
    for specifics on how cuts would impact his ability to execute his
    mission. What I can tell you is that the U.S. Coast Guard is currently
    our primary maritime force provider for our title 10 directed mission
    to detect and monitor illicit drugs heading toward the United States.
    If the Coast Guard receives significant cuts to its budget, that could
    impact its ability to source this critical mission.

        33. Senator Hirono. Admiral Tidd, can you describe in more detail
    what those platform gaps include? What additional resources would you
    need to cover all of the title 10 requirements that you have?
        Admiral Tidd. In order to target, detect, and disrupt illicit
    maritime traffic, we require what's called force packages. One force
    package consists of a medium to long range ship (hosting a Coast Guard
    Law Enforcement Detachment with an interceptor boat and one or more
    day/night capable helicopters with aerial use of force capability) and
    a maritime patrol aircraft equipped with wide-area maritime search
    radar and infrared detection set (FLIR). The White House's Office of
    National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) provides guidance to interdict 40
    percent of the known cocaine flow. This number was deemed the level at
    which the drug trafficking model would break or be seriously comprised.
    Based on the documented cocaine flow (3,225 metric tons) in 2016, we
    would have required 38 force packages to disrupt 40 percent of that
    flow. On any given day, we have five force packages available to
    support interdiction efforts. In addition to force packages, we also
    need to continue our efforts to build the capacity of our very willing
    partners to support the regional efforts to stem the flow of illicit
    traffic. We recognize that we cannot stop this illicit flow alone. The
    better trained and equipped our partners are to support these efforts,
    the more successful we will all be. As an example of our efforts in
    this area, we have provided interceptor boats and communications
    equipment to our partner nations to enable them to directly support the
    interdiction efforts of the Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-
    South) in Key West, which leads our mission to detect and monitor. As a
    result, in 2016, 42 percent of all JIATF-South supported disruptions
    involved our partner nations, in most of those, partner nation
    participation was critical to the success of the disruption. Finally,
    it is important that we continue to share intelligence and cooperate
    with the U.S. interagency and our partner nations. One critical
    component of that is to maintain the Relocatable Over-the-Horizon Radar
    system (ROTHR) fully functional and free of interference from wind
    farms that will likely degrade our capability to use these systems to
    detect and track threat network operations in the air and maritime
    domains.
                              littoral combat ship
        34. Senator Hirono. Admiral Tidd, in your written testimony you
    stated that no Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) have been assigned to your
    command so you have had to utilize other means, including relying on
    foreign allies, to accomplish SOUTHCOM's mission. Can you describe the
    importance of LCSs to SOUTHCOM's mission?
        Admiral Tidd. To execute our mission to detect and monitor illicit
    drugs, we require surface assets that have the capability to launch and
    recover helicopters and over-the-horizon interceptor boats. As you
    know, the LCS is equipped with those capabilities, which make it a very
    suitable platform for the missions in this region. Right now,
    USSOUTHCOM is allocated less than one Navy ship per year. Any
    opportunity to use LCS in this region would greatly increase
    USSOUTHCOM's ability to execute its mission.

        35. Senator Hirono. Admiral Tidd, what level of LCS assets would
    best enable SOUTHCOM to accomplish its mission?
        Admiral Tidd. As mentioned above, in order to meet the White
    House's requirement to interdict 40 percent of illicit flow in 2016, we
    would have required 38 force packages that include a surface asset with
    the capabilities available on the LCS--ability to launch and recover
    helicopters and over-the-horizon interceptor boats. As a CCMD, we
    outline our requirements broadly and rely on the different Services to
    source those requirements with appropriate platforms.
                  relationship with allies for missile defense
        36. Senator Hirono. General Robinson, relationships with allies in
    the Asia Pacific are important to our overall security strategy in that
    region. Both Japan and Korea have Aegis equipped ships and Japan has
    been a great partner in developing the SM-3 Block II A missiles. What
    additional steps should the U.S. take in order to continue to develop
    missile defense technologies with our allies?
        General Robinson. I defer to ADM Harris regarding efforts in his
    Area of Responsibility and to VADM Syring at the Missile Defense Agency
    regarding the potential benefits of joint program development with our
    allies.

        37. Senator Hirono. General Robinson, how important is the concept
    of working with our allies on missile defense?
        General Robinson. The Ground-based Midcourse Defense system, which
    I use to defend the United States, is not jointly developed with any
    allies. However, some of our supporting radars are located outside of
    the U.S. and provide benefit to our defense, as well as the host nation
    and region.
                                 role of china
        38. Senator Hirono. General Robinson, president Trump has stated
    that the U.S. will act alone if China does not take action to intervene
    in North Korea's quest for a nuclear capable ballistic missile. In your
    opinion, what is best policy toward China concerning the North Korean
    issue?
        General Robinson. As the USNORTHCOM mission is focused on the
    defense of the United States, I respectfully defer to others on matters
    of policy.
                          maui space surveillance site
        39. Senator Hirono. General Robinson, the Maui Space Surveillance
    Site combines operational satellite tracking facilities with a research
    and development facility. It is the only facility of its kind in the
    world and provides state-of-the-art electro-optical capabilities. What
    is the importance of this facility to national security and how
    important is it to continue to modernize the capabilities of this
    facility to continue to meet the emerging threats?
        General Robinson. USNORTHCOM relies heavily on space-based assets
    to defend our Homeland. However, because the Department of Defense's
    space surveillance mission falls under the purview of Air Force Space
    Command, I respectfully defer to General John Raymond for a more
    specific response to your question.
                             threat of north korea
        40. Senator Hirono. General Robinson, it is clear that North Korea
    is committed to developing long-range missile technology. Most recently
    North Korea tested a solid-propellant SLBM variant. These types of
    weapons have very few indications and warnings. From a missile defense
    perspective, how well is the U.S. protected from the North Korean
    threat?
        General Robinson. I am confident that we can defend the U.S. from
    the threat currently posed by North Korea. However, we closely monitor
    advancements and evolutions in their missile program to inform best use
    of our current capabilities, as well as capabilities required in the
    future.

        41. Senator Hirono. General Robinson, what future requirements
    would you identify as necessary to defend the U.S. and in particular
    Hawaii from the North Korean missile threat?
        General Robinson. We have the capability to defend the Homeland
    today from the North Korean threat, including Hawaii. My priorities
    remain to improve our persistent sensor architecture, as well as
    interceptor reliability and lethality. We are currently working with
    the Department through the Ballistic Missile Defense Review that may
    identify and prioritize potential improvements to further enhance
    ballistic missile defense protection of Hawaii.

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2018 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, APRIL 27, 2017

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

          UNITED STATES PACIFIC COMMAND AND UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in Room
    SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain
    (chairman of the committee) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Wicker,
    Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Perdue, Cruz,
    Graham, Sasse, Strange, Reed, Nelson, McCaskill, Shaheen,
    Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King,
    Heinrich, Warren, and Peters.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman McCain. Well, good morning.
        The Senate Armed Services Committee meets this morning to
    receive testimony on the posture of U.S. Pacific Command and
    U.S. Forces in Korea.
        Admiral Harris, I appreciate your appearance before the
    committee during this tense period in your area of
    responsibility. I want to express the appreciation of this
    committee for the service of the men and women you lead who
    defend our Nation every day.
        America's interests in the Asia-Pacific region are deep and
    enduring. That is why for the past 70 years we have worked with
    our allies and partners to uphold a rules-based order based on
    the principles of free peoples and free markets, open seas and
    open skies, and the rule of law and the peaceful resolution of
    disputes. These ideas have produced unprecedented peace and
    prosperity in the Asia-Pacific, but now the challenges to this
    rules-based order are mounting and they threaten not just the
    nations of the Asia-Pacific region but the United States as
    well.
        The most immediate threat is the situation on the Korean
    Peninsula. Kim Jong-un's regime has thrown its full weight
    behind its quest for nuclear weapons and the means to deliver
    them. Unfortunately, the regime is making real progress. A
    North Korean missile with a nuclear payload capable of striking
    an American city is no longer a distant hypothetical but an
    imminent danger, one that poses a real and rising risk of
    conflict. Indeed, as Admiral Harris said yesterday in testimony
    before the House, North Korea already has the conventional
    capability to strike United States territory. I look forward to
    hearing your assessment of North Korea's nuclear and missile
    programs, the military options your forces offer to our
    Commander in Chief and their readiness to carry them out if
    called upon.
        I welcome the news that the deployment of the THAAD
    [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense] missile defense system to
    South Korea and other capabilities in the region will soon be
    completed. It is shameful that China has retaliated against
    South Korea with economic and cyber means in response to its
    support for this deployment. This committee understands that
    deploying this system is a joint alliance decision that is
    necessary to defend our ally, South Korea. Admiral Harris, we
    welcome your views on whether further enhancements to United
    States missile defenses or our conventional military posture
    are required in Northeast Asia to counter the threat from North
    Korea.
        For years, the United States has looked to China, North
    Korea's longtime patron and sole strategic ally, to bring the
    regime to the negotiating table and achieve progress toward a
    denuclearized Korean Peninsula. We have done so for the simple
    reason that China is the only country that may have the
    influence to truly curb North Korea's destabilizing behavior.
    China has repeatedly refused to exercise that influence.
        I welcome the Trump administration's outreach to China on
    the issue of North Korea. As these discussions continue, the
    United States should be clear that while we earnestly seek
    China's cooperation on North Korea, we do not seek such
    cooperation at the expense of our other vital interests. We
    must not and will not bargain over our alliances or over
    fundamental principles of the rules-based order.
        As its behavior toward South Korea indicates, over the last
    several years, China has acted less and less like a responsible
    stakeholder of the rules-based order in the region and more
    like a bully. It has economically coerced its neighbors,
    increased its provocations in the East China Sea, and
    militarized the South China Sea. Meanwhile, with a rebalance
    policy too heavy on rhetoric and too light on action, years of
    senseless defense cuts, and now the disastrous decision to
    withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, United States
    policy has failed to adapt to the scale and velocity of China's
    challenge to the rules-based order. That failure has called
    into question the credibility of America's security commitments
    in the region.
        This committee has grown increasingly concerned about the
    erosion of America's conventional military overmatch as states
    like China and North Korea develop advanced capabilities to
    counter our ability to project military power. While America's
    military remains the most powerful on Earth, we must adapt to
    the new realities we face. We must think differently about
    forward basing and force posture, logistics and mobilization,
    and take steps to reshape the capabilities of our joint force
    for the renewed reality of great power competition.
        Specifically on the issue of munitions, this committee has
    heard testimony each year about the qualitative and
    quantitative shortfalls we have in our munitions, but we have
    seen little action from the services to finally turn the corner
    and address this issue with the seriousness it requires.
    Admiral Harris, I am interested in your views on munitions
    requirements and what it will take to meet them.
        The new administration has an important opportunity to
    chart a different and better course. At our hearing earlier
    this week, our panel of expert witnesses agreed there was a
    strong merit for a, quote, ``Asia-Pacific Stability
    Initiative.'' This initiative could enhance U.S. military power
    through targeted funding to realign our force posture in the
    region, improve operationally relevant infrastructure, fund
    additional exercises, preposition equipment, and build capacity
    with our allies and partners. Admiral Harris, I am eager to
    hear your thoughts on this kind of an initiative.
        Admiral, I think there is some symbolism in your appearance
    today and the information that the Chinese are now building
    their own aircraft carrier. I am sure that as an old naval
    aviator, that that has some interest for you.
        Senator Reed?

                     STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to thank you, Admiral Harris, for being here today.
    We understand how difficult this time must be for you and for
    General Brooks and all the men and women that you lead. We want
    you to express our great appreciation for their efforts.
        It is clear to me, especially after the thoughtful
    discussion we had on Tuesday with our outside panel, that there
    is no set of options that lead to quick and certain strategy on
    North Korea. While I believe that we should pursue and exhaust
    every diplomatic option to bring the North Korean regime to the
    negotiating table, those options are somewhat limited. China
    provides the lifeline for North Korea, and China, for its own
    national security interests, seems unwilling to exert the type
    of pressure that is needed to convince the regime that
    denuclearization is the only path forward. Even if China were
    willing to exert that type of pressure, it seems that Kim Jong-
    un is so determined to pursue his nuclear program that he is
    willing to risk impoverishing and starving his own population
    to achieve his dream of becoming a nuclear-capable state.
        There are military options, but they are risky. A
    comprehensive strike on nuclear facilities may precipitate a
    catastrophic retaliation against the civilian population of
    Seoul or against our bases and servicemembers in South Korea or
    Japan. A surgical strike, while less risky, may not deter the
    North Korean regime and runs the risk of emboldening Kim Jong-
    un. Complicating factors, of course, are the stockpile of
    chemical and biological weapons at his disposal and road-mobile
    missile launchers spread across the countryside.
        North Korea's nuclear and missile program is an immediate
    and grave national security threat. Admiral Harris, I ask that
    you tell us how you are preparing for every contingency on the
    peninsula.
        While North Korea poses an immediate national security
    threat, we must not lose sight of the potential long-term
    threat that China poses to the rules-based order in the Asia-
    Pacific region. Whether it be economic coercion of its smaller,
    more vulnerable neighbors or undermining the freedom of
    navigation that we all depend upon, China has not demonstrated
    a willingness to rise as a responsible global leader.
    Therefore, I believe it is critical that we empower and engage
    countries in Southeast Asia and South Asia to protect their own
    waterways and provide them with economic alternatives to main
    regional stability, preserve United States standing in Asia,
    and allow the economic growth and stability that has
    characterized the region for the last 50 years to continue.
        Again, thank you, Admiral, for your service, and thank you,
    Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Admiral?

      STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL HARRY B. HARRIS, JR., USN, COMMANDER,
                     UNITED STATES PACIFIC COMMAND

        Admiral Harris. Thank you, Chairman McCain and Senator Reed
    and distinguished members. It is an honor for me to appear
    before this committee.
        There are many things to talk about since my last testimony
    14 months ago, and I regret that I am not here with my
    testimony battle buddy, General Vince Brooks, but I think you
    would all agree that he is where he is needed most right now on
    the Korean Peninsula.
        Mr. Chairman, I request that my written posture statement
    be submitted for the record.
        Chairman McCain. Without objection.
        Admiral Harris. As the PACOM Commander, I have the
    extraordinary privilege of leading about 375,000 soldiers,
    sailors, airmen, marines, coast guardsmen, and DOD civilians
    serving our Nation over half the globe. These dedicated
    patriots are doing an amazing job, and thanks to them, America
    remains the security partner of choice in the region.
        That is important because I believe that America's future
    and economic prosperity are inextricably linked to the Indo-
    Asia-Pacific, a region that is poised at the strategic nexus
    where opportunity meets the four considerable challenges of
    North Korea, China, Russia, and ISIS.
        It is clear to me that ISIS is a threat that must be
    destroyed now, but as we eliminate ISIS in the Middle East and
    North Africa, some of the surviving fighters will likely
    repatriate to their home countries in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. We
    must continue to work with likeminded nations to eradicate ISIS
    before it grows in the PACOM area of responsibility.
        Then there is North Korea, which remains the most immediate
    threat to the security of the United States and our allies in
    Japan and Korea. North Korea has vigorously pursued a strategic
    strike capability with nuclear tests and ballistic missile
    launches which it claims are intended to target the United
    States, South Korea, Japan, and just earlier this week,
    Australia. Make no mistake. Kim Jong-un is making progress on
    his quest for nuclear weapons and a means to deliver them
    intercontinentally. All nations need to take this threat
    seriously because North Korea's missiles point in all
    directions. North Korea's capabilities are not yet an
    existential threat to America, but if left unchecked, it will
    eventually match the capability to hostile rhetoric.
        I know that there is some debate about North Korea's intent
    and the miniaturization advancements made by Pyongyang, and I
    will not add to that speculation. Regardless, my job is to
    provide military options to the President, and because PACOM
    must be ready to fight tonight, I must assume that Kim Jong-
    un's nuclear claims are true. I know his aspirations certainly
    are.
        That is why General Brooks and I are doing everything
    possible to defend the American Homeland and our allies and the
    Republic of Korea and Japan. That is why the ROK [Republic of
    Korea]-United States Alliance decided last July to deploy
    THAAD, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense System, which
    would be operational in the coming days and able to better
    defend South Korea against the growing North Korean threat.
        That is why the USS Carl Vinson carrier strike group is
    back on patrol in Northeast Asia.
        That is why we must continue to debuted America's newest
    and best military platforms in the Indo-Asia-Pacific.
        That is why we want to continue to emphasize trilateral
    cooperation between the United States, South Korea, and Japan,
    a partnership with a purpose if there ever was one.
        That is why we continue to call on China to exert its
    considerable influence to stop Pyongyang's unprecedented
    weapons testing. While recent actions by Beijing are
    encouraging, the fact remains that China is as responsible for
    where North Korea is as North Korea itself.
        In confronting the reckless North Korean regime, it is
    critical that we are guided by a strong sense of resolve both
    privately and publicly, both diplomatically and militarily. As
    President Trump and Secretary Mattis have made clear, all
    options are on the table. We want to bring Kim Jong-un to his
    senses and not to his knees.
        We are also challenged in the Indo-Asia-Pacific by an
    aggressive China and a revanchist Russia. China continues a
    methodical strategy to control the South China Sea. I testified
    last year that China was militarizing this critical
    international waterway and the airspace above it by building
    air and naval bases on seven Chinese manmade islands in the
    disputed Spratlys. Despite subsequent Chinese assurances at the
    highest levels that they would not militarize these bases,
    today they have these facilities that support long-range
    weapons emplacements, fighter aircraft hangars, radar towers,
    and barracks for their troops. China's militarization of the
    South China Sea is real.
        I am also not taking my eyes off of Russia, which just last
    week flew bomber missions near Alaska on successive days for
    the first time since 2014. Russia continues to modernize its
    military and exercise its considerable conventional and nuclear
    forces in the Pacific.
        Despite the region's four significant challenges since my
    last report to you, we have strengthened America's network of
    alliances and partnerships. Working with likeminded partners on
    shared security threats like North Korea and ISIS is a key
    component of our regional strategy. Our five bilateral defense
    treaty alliances, Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the
    Philippines, and Thailand, anchor our joint force efforts in
    the Indo-Asia-Pacific.
        We have also advanced important partnerships with India and
    Indonesia, Malaysia and New Zealand, Singapore and Sri Lanka,
    Vietnam and others, all with a view toward reinforcing the
    rules-based security order that has helped underwrite peace and
    stability and prosperity throughout the region for decades.
        But there is more work to do. We must be ready to confront
    all challenges from a position of strength and with credible
    combat power.
        I ask this committee to support continued investment to
    improve military capabilities. I need weapon systems of
    increased lethality, precision, speed, and range that are
    networked and cost effective. Restricting ourselves with
    funding uncertainties reduces warfighting readiness. I urge
    Congress to repeal sequestration and to approve the proposed
    Defense Department budget.
        Finally, I would like to thank Chairman McCain and this
    committee for proposing and supporting the Asia-Pacific
    Stability Initiative. This effort will reassure our regional
    partners and send a strong signal to potential adversaries of
    our persistent commitment to the region.
        As always, I thank the Congress for your enduring support
    to the men and women of PACOM and to our families who care for
    us. Thank you very much, and I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Harris follows:]

               Prepared Statement by Admiral Harry B. Harris Jr.
        Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished members of
    the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
    today. This is my second posture assessment since taking command of
    U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) in 2015. During this time, I've had the
    extraordinary privilege to lead the soldiers, sailors, marines, airmen,
    coast guardsmen, and Department of Defense civilians standing the watch
    in the vast Indo-Asia-Pacific region. These men and women and their
    families inspire me with their relentless devotion to duty, and I'm
    proud to serve alongside them.
        This past January 1st, USPACOM commemorated its 70th birthday. For
    70 years, our joint military forces have protected the territory of the
    United States, its people, and its interests throughout the Indo-Asia-
    Pacific region. Working in close concert with other U.S. Government
    agencies, defending our Homeland and our citizens is always ``Job
    number one'' at USPACOM. It is my top command priority. Together with
    our allies and partners, USPACOM enhances stability in the region by
    promoting security cooperation, responding to contingencies, deterring
    aggression, and, when necessary, fighting to win. This security
    approach is based on shared interests, partnerships, military presence,
    and readiness.
        The United States has enduring national interests in the Indo-Asia-
    Pacific. In fact, I believe America's future security and economic
    prosperity are indelibly linked to this critical region, which is now
    at a strategic crossroads where real opportunities meet real
    challenges. Of the five global challenges that currently drive United
    States defense planning and budgeting--ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and
    Syria), North Korea, China, Russia and Iran--four are in the Indo-Asia-
    Pacific. We cannot turn a blind eye to these challenges. We must not
    give any country or insidious non-state actor a pass if they purposely
    erode the rules-based security order that has served America and this
    region so well for so long.
        Rising from the ashes of World War II, the rules-based
    international order, or what I sometimes call, ``the Global Operating
    System,'' has kept the Indo-Asia-Pacific largely peaceful and created
    the stability necessary for economic prosperity in the United States
    and countries throughout the region. Ironically, China is the country
    that has benefitted the most. The collective respect for, and adherence
    to, international rules and standards have produced the longest era of
    peace and prosperity in modern times. These conditions are not
    happenstance. In my opinion, they have been made possible by a security
    order underwritten by seven decades of robust and persistent U.S.
    military presence and credible combat power. This security order has
    been reinforced by America's five bilateral security alliances with
    Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), the Philippines, and
    Thailand. This order is further bolstered by our growing partnerships
    with India, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, Sri Lanka,
    Mongolia, and Vietnam.
        This Global Operating System upholds critical principles--the rule
    of law, adherence to standards, peaceful resolution of disputes,
    freedom of navigation for all civilian and military vessels and
    aircraft, and open access to the sea, air, space, and cyberspace
    domains. Its outcomes are two-fold: enhanced security and unimpeded
    lawful commerce. Sustainable security requires effective and enduring
    institutions, both civilian and military, that are guided by these
    principles. Defense, diplomatic, and development efforts are
    intertwined and continue to reinforce each other to promote stability
    in both conflict-affected and steady state environments to build and
    sustain stable democratic states.
        The Indian and Pacific Oceans are the economic lifeblood linking
    the Indian Subcontinent, Southeast Asia, Australia, Northeast Asia,
    Oceania and the United States Oceans that once were physical and
    psychological barriers that kept us apart are now maritime
    superhighways that bring us together. Each year, approximately $5.3
    trillion in global trade transits the South China Sea and $1.2 trillion
    of this sea-based trade involves the United States fifty-five percent
    (55 percent) of the global gross domestic product (GDP) comes from this
    region (including the U.S.). Five of America's top ten trading partners
    are in the Indo-Asia-Pacific and it's a destination for one-fourth of
    our exports. The diverse region drives global economic growth and is
    home to the world's two largest economies after the United States
    (China and Japan) and led by the three fastest growing large economies
    (China, India, and the `ASEAN Five' (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines,
    Thailand, and Vietnam)). Nine of ten megacities in the world are in
    this region (including Karachi, Pakistan).
        The Indo-Asia-Pacific has the world's most populous democracy
    (India), and is home to more than half the world's population. Some
    estimates predict that percentage could rise to near 70 percent by
    2050, which will lead to further competition for dwindling resources.
    Indonesia, an important security partner of the United States, is a
    maturing democracy, and the world's largest Muslim-majority state.
    Eleven of the top 15 largest militaries in the world are in or adjacent
    to the region, as are two-thirds of the nine countries that possess
    nuclear weapons.
        Simply stated, what happens in the Indo-Asia-Pacific matters to
    America. The region needs a strong America, just as America needs the
    region.
        In fact, the need for American engagement in the Indo-Asia-Pacific
    is demonstrated in the long history of United States commitment to the
    region. It's overwhelmingly in America's security and economic
    interests to defend the rules-based order against challengers that
    would seek to unilaterally rewrite it or alter its fundamental
    principles. It's overwhelmingly in America's interests to deepen our
    diplomacy in the region while backing up peaceful resolution of
    disputes with undisputed, credible combat power. It's overwhelmingly in
    America's interests to remain the region's security partner of choice
    by working closely with our allies and partners who share our
    commitment to uphold peace, economic prosperity and security.
        This document is my assessment of the regional security challenges
    and opportunities of strategic value. First, I will outline some of the
    specific challenges we face in the Indo-Asia-Pacific including threats
    to the Homeland. I will highlight critical needs in order to seek your
    support for budgetary and legislative actions to improve United States
    military readiness in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. I will discuss the
    value of U.S. strategic force posture and forward presence and how
    these preconditions improve the readiness of our joint force to fight
    tonight, enhance our ability to reassure allies and partners, and
    maintain regional stability. Finally, I will discuss how USPACOM
    strengthens existing alliances and cultivates critical partnerships
    with regional actors--both of which deliver strategic benefits and
    improve readiness to protect and defend U.S. interests.
                                    overview
        As we look ahead to the next quarter century, if not the next few
    months or years, security and stability are threatened by a range of
    regional state and non-state actors who are challenging the rules-based
    security order that has helped underwrite peace and prosperity for
    America and throughout the region for over 70 years.
        North Korea continues to disregard United Nations sanctions by
    developing, and threatening to use intercontinental ballistic missiles
    and nuclear weapons that will threaten the United States Homeland.
    China has fundamentally altered the physical and political landscape in
    the South China Sea through large scale land reclamation and by
    militarizing these reclaimed features. Beijing continues to press Japan
    in the East China Sea, is stepping up diplomatic and economic pressure
    against Taiwan, and is methodically trying to supplant United States
    influence with our friends and allies in the region. Furthermore, China
    is rapidly building a modern, capable military that appears to far
    exceed its stated defensive purpose or potential regional needs.
    China's military modernization is focused on defeating the United
    States in Asia by countering United States asymmetric advantages.
    China's military modernization cannot be understated, especially when
    we consider the Communist regime's lack of transparency and apparent
    strategy. China is committed to developing a hypersonic glide weapon
    and advanced cyber and anti-satellite capabilities that present direct
    threats to the Homeland. China's near term strategy is focused on
    building up combat power and positional advantage to be able to
    restrict freedom of navigation and overflight while asserting de facto
    sovereignty over disputed maritime features and spaces in the region.
    Russia is modernizing its military and once again exercising its
    conventional forces and nuclear strike capabilities in the Pacific,
    which also threaten the Homeland. Transnational terrorists, inspired by
    and in some cases led by ISIS, have set their sights on the Indo-Asia-
    Pacific by supporting and encouraging attacks in Indonesia, Bangladesh,
    Philippines, and Malaysia while recruiting and fund-raising there and
    elsewhere. Drug trafficking, human smuggling, piracy, weapons
    proliferation, natural disasters--as well as illegal, unreported, and
    unregulated fishing--further challenge regional peace and prosperity.
        To counter these challenges, USPACOM is enhancing U.S. force
    posture, presence, and resiliency, while modernizing U.S. force
    capability and training to ensure our forces are ready to fight tonight
    and win in any contingency. USPACOM is working with our many and
    invaluable allies and partners on a bilateral--and increasingly
    multilateral--basis to address these common challenges. The growth in
    multinational ``partnerships with a purpose'' demonstrates that the
    countries in the Indo-Asia-Pacific view the United States as the
    security partner of choice. By working together, we enhance capability
    and capacity to respond to the range of threats endemic to the region.
                                 key challenges
        North Korea: North Korea remains our most immediate threat in the
    Indo-Asia-Pacific. It dangerously distinguishes itself as the only
    country to have tested nuclear weapons in this century. As former
    Secretary of Defense William Perry once said, we must deal with North
    Korea ``as it is, not as we wish it to be.'' Kim Jong-un has stated
    repeatedly that denuclearization is not an option. He is on a quest for
    nuclear weapons and the ballistic missiles capable of delivering them
    intercontinentally. The words and actions of North Korea threaten the
    United States Homeland and that of our allies in South Korea and Japan.
    That's North Korea as it is.
        I know there's some debate about the miniaturization and other
    technological advancements made by Pyongyang. An aggressive weapons
    test schedule, as demonstrated by yet another ballistic missile launch
    this April, moves North Korea closer to its stated goals. As a military
    commander, I must assume that Kim Jong-un's claims are true--his
    aspirations certainly are. USPACOM must be prepared to fight tonight,
    so I take him at his word. That means we must consider every possible
    step to defend the United States Homeland and our allies. That's why
    the ROK-United States alliance has decided to deploy THAAD--the
    Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system--in South Korea as soon as
    possible. That's why the United States continues to call on China--
    North Korea's principal ally--to exert its considerable influence to
    stop Pyongyang's unprecedented campaign of nuclear weapons ballistic
    missile tests. That's why we continue to emphasize trilateral
    cooperation between Japan, ROK, and the United States That's why
    American leaders and diplomats continue to rally the international
    community to loudly condemn North Korea's unacceptable behavior.
        North Korea vigorously pursued a strategic strike capability in
    2016. We assess that the progress made in several areas will encourage
    Kim Jong-un to continue down this reckless and dangerous path.
    Pyongyang launched more ballistic missiles last year than it did in the
    previous few years combined. This included the first launches of the
    Musudan intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) and the
    developmental submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). Both systems
    experienced noteworthy--and often spectacular--failures, but they also
    both achieved some successes. Just as Thomas Edison is believed to have
    failed 1000 times before successfully inventing the electric light
    bulb, so too, Kim Jong-un will keep trying. One of these days soon, he
    will succeed. The 2016 SLBM test and the numerous land-based tests
    employed solid-fuel engines, another indication that Kim Jong-un is
    continuing to modify and improve missile reliability and performance.
    Those successes advance North Korea's technical and operational base
    and allow continued development. Aggressive rhetoric since the New Year
    strongly suggests North Korea will not only continue to test these
    proscribed systems, but is also likely to attempt a first launch of a
    similarly prohibited intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).
        At the same time, North Korea's nuclear scientists and engineers
    are hard at work attempting to transform fissile nuclear materials into
    reliable nuclear weapons. Pyongyang defied the international community
    and detonated nuclear devices five times--including two in 2016. Kim
    Jong-un has threatened the pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons against
    the United States and other regional targets. Kim's strategic
    capabilities are not yet an existential threat to the United States,
    but if left unchecked, he will gain the capability to match his
    rhetoric. At that point we will wake up to a new world. North Korea's
    existing capabilities are already a significant threat to several of
    our regional treaty allies and the 90,000 United States troops
    stationed in the Western Pacific.
        North Korea fields the fourth largest conventional military in the
    world. Despite a number of noteworthy shortfalls in training and
    equipment, we must take seriously the substantial inventory of long-
    range rockets, artillery, close-range ballistic missiles, and expansive
    chemical weaponry aimed across the Demilitarized Zone at the Republic
    of Korea and United States forces stationed there. North Korea also
    maintains sizeable numbers of well-trained, highly disciplined special
    operations forces. Pyongyang made a point recently of publicizing a
    Special Forces exercise that attacked and destroyed a detailed mock-up
    of the ROK Presidential complex in an attempt to underscore the
    capability and lethality of its forces.
        Pyongyang's emphasis on strategic and military capabilities comes
    at the expense of the North Korean people, who continue to struggle
    with a lifeless economy and international isolation.
        In confronting the North Korean threat, it is critical that the
    United States be guided by a strong sense of resolve both publicly and
    privately in order to bring Kim Jong-un to his senses, not his knees.
        China: The rapid transformation of China's military into a high-
    tech force capable of regional dominance and a growing ability to
    support aspirations for global reach and influence is concerning. A
    February 2017 study from the International Institute for Strategic
    Studies (IISS) concluded that Chinese weapons and air power in
    particular are ``reaching near-parity with the west.'' Studies from
    DOD's Office of Net Assessment further confirm this trend in our
    decreasing capability overmatch. I agree with these reports. Our
    dominance in high tech advanced weapons cannot be taken for granted. To
    do so would be a strategic mistake.
        China's activities on the seas, in the air, and in cyberspace have
    generated concerns about its strategic intentions. For the past 2
    years, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has been implementing an
    extensive reorganization which has so far included the creation of
    geographically focused Theater Commands, each organized and equipped
    for specific regional contingencies. This reorganization may be the
    most important development in the PLA's growing ability to organize for
    modern combat. The structural reforms that created the Theater Commands
    institutionalized a joint command and control concept to allow the PLA
    to maximize the individual services' warfighting strengths into a more
    cohesive joint force. However, it is likely to take several years
    before the full benefit of this change is realized. One early indicator
    that China is already addressing some of the challenges of joint
    operations is the recent unprecedented appointment of a Navy Admiral to
    replace an Army General as the commander of the largely maritime-
    focused Southern Theater.
        China's equipment development and fielding programs are
    comprehensive and impressive. The PLA Navy (PLAN) boasts some of the
    most advanced warships in the region, including the Type 052D (Luyang-
    III) guided missile destroyer and the Type 039A (Shang) attack
    submarine. Within the next 2 years the first Type 055 (Renhai) guided
    missile cruisers will join the fleet. These modern, multi-functional
    ships can support a range of missions and employ sophisticated air
    defense, surface attack, and subsurface munitions, including anti-ship
    missiles with ranges far exceeding existing U.S. Navy anti-ship
    weapons. The PLAN's aircraft carrier program is progressing with the
    CV-16 (Liaoning) serving as a test and development platform while China
    builds its first indigenous aircraft carrier, anticipated to be at full
    operational capability early in the 2020s, and expected to be a spiral
    upgrade in capabilities. CV-16's deployment to the South China Sea in
    December and January showed China's growing ability to employ carrier-
    based aviation. The Type 094 (Jin) ballistic missile submarine can
    launch nuclear missiles capable of reaching parts of the continental
    U.S.
        The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and Naval Air Force (PLANAF) are
    similarly fielding greater numbers of advanced fighters, bombers, and
    special mission aircraft while aggressively developing new platforms.
    Flying prototypes of J20 and J31 multi-role fighters portend a near-
    term capability to field near-5th generation fighters. A new heavy lift
    transport (Y-20) will give China a greater ability to move troops and
    equipment anywhere in the world. New and/or upgraded bombers,
    electronic warfare, command and control, and anti-submarine aircraft
    all expand PLA abilities to conduct a wide range of operations.
        PLA ground forces are large, modern, and well trained. Also
    reorganized in 2016, the PLA increasingly operates in combined arms
    formations--integrating attack helicopters, artillery, electronic
    warfare, and other arms into their training activities. They've
    incorporated some of the training methods used by the U.S. (e.g.,
    combat training centers with dedicated opposing forces and
    instrumentation) to increase realism and sophistication in their
    training.
        Another component of the ongoing PLA reorganization is the
    expansion of capabilities and numbers of the PLA Navy Marines. While
    the full scope of the change is unclear--some reports have the number
    of marines increasing five-fold to as many as 100,000 troops--what is
    clear is the growing importance China places on building the ability to
    project power using an expeditionary capability. PRC media has
    highlighted recent marine deployments for training in harsh weather
    conditions and on unfamiliar terrain. Chinese leadership likely
    envisions using the expanded marine capability as an expeditionary
    force to both seize Taiwan and protect Chinese interests overseas.
        The PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) controls the largest and most diverse
    missile force in the world, with an inventory of more than 2,000
    ballistic and cruise missiles. This fact is significant because the
    U.S. has no comparable capability due to our adherence to the
    Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty with Russia.
    (Approximately, 95 percent of the PLARF's missiles would violate the
    INF if China was a signatory.) The PLARF is organized for a range of
    missions, with large numbers of missiles targeted against Taiwan, and
    others intended to strike targets as far away as Guam and the so-called
    second island chain, and intercontinental-range missile capable of
    delivering nuclear weapons to strike the continental United States.
    China is also heavily investing in advanced missile technologies like
    hypersonics and, on average, launches more than 100 missiles each year
    for training or research and development.
        The PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) was established last year
    to better manage and employ the PLA's impressive array of cyber, space,
    and other specialized capabilities. The PLASSF is a potential game-
    changer if it succeeds in denying other countries the use of space, the
    electromagnetic spectrum, and networks.
        To train and integrate these capabilities, Chinese forces have
    increased the scope of operations in number, complexity, and geographic
    range. Submarine deployments to the Indian Ocean, air exercises in the
    Middle East, and port visits to Europe or South America are on the
    rise. For example, President Xi will travel to Djibouti in the near
    future to officially open the Chinese naval base there. The base is
    strategically positioned on the narrowest point of the strategic strait
    of Bab al Mandeb, a key intersection for international commercial and
    defense related navigation. This base could support Chinese force
    projection through the Indian Ocean and into the Mediterranean and
    Africa.
        An encouraging sign that China is willing to shoulder a greater
    role in international affairs is the expansion of Chinese peacekeeping
    missions, something we promote in our interactions with the PLA. My
    goal remains to convince China that its best future comes from peaceful
    cooperation, meaningful participation in the current rules-based
    security order, and honoring its international commitments.
        Territorial Disputes and Maritime Claims:  A number of friction
    points where competing territorial claims overlap exist throughout the
    Indo-Asia-Pacific, e.g., between Russia and Japan (Northern
    Territories) and between the Philippines and Malaysia (Sabah)--but none
    are as fraught with the potential for escalation and military conflict
    as the South and East China Seas.
        South China Sea: The United States takes no position on competing
    sovereignty claims in the South China Sea, but we encourage all
    countries to uphold international law, including the law of the sea as
    reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention, and to respect unimpeded
    lawful commerce, freedom of navigation and overflight, and peaceful
    dispute resolution.
        There are three notable disputes over territorial sovereignty in
    the South China Sea. The first dispute is between China, Taiwan, and
    Vietnam over the Paracel Islands, which China took by force from
    Vietnam and has occupied since 1974. The second dispute is between
    China, Taiwan, and the Philippines over Scarborough Reef. In 2012, the
    United States brokered a deal between the Philippines and China where
    both countries committed to keep their naval forces away from
    Scarborough. While the Philippines honored the commitment, China
    continued to operate with its Navy and Coast Guard and, soon after,
    expelled Philippine fishermen. The third dispute involves multiple
    claimants within the Spratly Islands where China, Taiwan, Vietnam,
    Brunei, Malaysia, and the Philippines each claim sovereignty over some
    or all of the features.
        The past year included some major developments in the status of
    these disputes. The landmark ruling by the Arbitral Tribunal under the
    Law of the Sea Convention (the Tribunal) in July 2016 addressed the
    status of features and maritime claims specified in the Philippines'
    arbitration case. While the tribunal did not rule on the sovereignty of
    specific features, the tribunal did declare a number of China's
    maritime claims and actions unlawful. However, China ignored the ruling
    and maintains and even articulated new excessive maritime claims
    throughout the South China Sea. All the activities underway before the
    ruling, including the militarization of the artificial landforms
    created by China and the provocative actions of military and law
    enforcement forces, continue unabated.
        China's military-specific construction in the Spratly islands
    includes the construction of 72 fighter aircraft hangars--which could
    support three fighter regiments--and about ten larger hangars that
    could support larger airframes, such as bombers or special mission
    aircraft. All of these hangars should be completed this year. During
    the initial phases of construction China emplaced tank farms,
    presumably for fuel and water, at Fiery Cross, Mischief and Subi reefs.
    These could support substantial numbers of personnel as well as
    deployed aircraft and/or ships. All seven outposts are armed with a
    large number of artillery and gun systems, ostensibly for defensive
    missions. The recent identification of buildings that appear to have
    been built specifically to house long-rang surface-to-air missiles is
    the latest indication China intends to deploy military systems to the
    Spratlys. During my Congressional testimony last year, I reported my
    belief that China was clearly militarizing the South China Sea. China's
    activities since then have only reinforced this belief. We should cease
    to be cautious about the language we use to describe these activities.
    Despite its claims to the contrary, China has militarized the South
    China Sea through the building of seven military bases on artificial
    islands constructed through the large-scale damage of a fragile
    environment in disputed areas.
        The presence of these military capabilities undermines China's
    consistent claim that these massively expanded features are for safety
    and humanitarian purposes. Recently China has tried to obscure the
    military purposes of its Spratly Islands efforts by calling for private
    investment, residential settlement, and tourism. The latter may prove
    especially problematic as China's land creation effort over the past
    few years has destroyed the once vibrant marine ecosystem surrounding
    the features.
        China's naval, coast guard, maritime militia, State Oceanic
    Administration, and air force presence in the South China Sea remains
    substantial. China Coast Guard (CCG) ships remain present near Chinese
    outposts and other features. CCG and PLAN ships also continue to
    control activities near Scarborough Reef, a feature also claimed by the
    Philippines. In February, China announced it was seeking to revise its
    domestic Maritime Traffic Safety Law to empower its maritime services
    to control or penalize foreign ships operating in ``other sea areas
    under the jurisdiction of the People's Republic of China'' beyond those
    allowed under international law as reflected in the Law of the Sea
    Convention. Given China's continued rejection of the Tribunal ruling
    and continued articulation that much of the South China Sea is ``under
    its jurisdiction,'' we can only assume China intends to improperly
    apply its domestic law to foreign ships operating lawfully in the area.
        China protests the legal and long-standing United States presence
    in the South China Sea by falsely claiming Washington is the cause for
    tensions. United States military forces have been operating routinely
    and persistently on, below, and above the South China Sea for more than
    70 years--this hasn't changed. What has changed the status quo in the
    South China Sea in recent years is the increased coercive behavior by
    China's military, Coast Guard, and a vast network of private vessels
    controlled by the PRC that act as a maritime militia of ``little green
    fishermen.'' Furthermore, China's unprecedented artificial island
    construction and land reclamation has increased tensions with other
    claimants and its neighbors. The United States has consistently called
    for all claimants to find a peaceful, diplomatic resolution to their
    land and maritime disputes in the South China Sea.
        Specifically, since 1979, the U.S. Freedom of Navigation program
    has peacefully challenged excessive maritime claims by coastal states
    all around the world (including those of our friends and allies). This
    program consists of diplomatic communications and operational
    assertions, which are not provocative and are not a threat to any
    country. These operations are conducted globally to maintain open seas
    and open skies, which underpins economic prosperity for the U.S. and
    all countries.
        Freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) are conducted for exactly
    what the title says--to exercise the right of all nations to operate
    freely at sea and in the air wherever international law allows. In
    2016, USPACOM forces conducted three FONOPs near disputed features in
    the South China Sea. These and future routine FONOPs demonstrate that
    the U.S. military will continue to fly, sail, and operate wherever
    international law allows, especially where excessive maritime claims
    attempt to erode the freedom of the seas.
        East China Sea: Tensions between Japan and China over the Senkaku
    Islands continue to worsen. This past year saw a sharp rise in the
    number PLAAF aircraft operating over the East China Sea. China
    persistently challenges Japan's administration over the islands by
    deploying warships into the area, sailing Coast Guard ships inside the
    territorial waters surrounding the Senkakus, and protesting Japanese
    reconnaissance flights. The presence of military and law enforcement
    assets in close proximity to one another and the accompanying rhetoric
    create an environment conducive to miscalculation and unintended
    incidents. United States policy is clear here: the Senkakus are under
    the administration of Japan and we will defend them in accordance with
    the United States-Japan Treaty on Mutual Cooperation and Security.
    Secretary Mattis recently said during his trip to Japan that, `` . . .
    our longstanding policy on the Senkaku islands stands. The United
    States will continue to recognize Japanese administration of the
    islands and as such Article 5 of the United States-Japan Security
    Treaty applies.''
        Russia: Although focused on Europe and the Middle East, Russia is
    engaged militarily and politically in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. I share
    General Lori Robinson's view that Russia continues to exhibit
    increasingly aggressive behavior, both regionally and globally.
        The Russian Pacific Fleet operates and exercises throughout the
    region. The second Borey (Dolgorukiy-class) nuclear ballistic missile
    submarine transferred to the Pacific Fleet last fall, and the Kremlin
    announced the acquisition of 6 new advanced Kilo attack submarines for
    the Pacific by 2021. The Russian Pacific Fleet's five Project 949A
    (Oscar II) nuclear-powered guided missile submarines have a mission to
    track and attack aircraft carriers and other priority targets--
    including land targets--in the event of war. In late 2015 Russia
    announced a plan to upgrade the Oscar II to fire new, more-advanced
    long-range missiles. The first Steregushchy-class guided missile
    corvette was commissioned in January 2017 with more planned as part of
    ongoing military modernization efforts. Russian troops and warships
    held combined island-seizure training with China in the South China Sea
    last summer. On land, Russian forces fielded long-range anti-ship
    missiles along the coast, moved S-400 strategic air defense missiles to
    the east, and stationed the advanced Su-34 fighter-bomber to patrol the
    skies. Nuclear-capable bombers continue to fly missions focused on
    rehearsing strikes on the U.S. mainland or regional targets.
    Additionally, Russia has introduced a new generation of highly precise,
    conventionally armed cruise missiles that can reach the United States
    and our allies.
        Of particular note are Russian efforts to build presence and
    influence the high north. Russia has more bases north of the Arctic
    Circle than all other countries combined and is building more with
    distinctly military capabilities.
        Russian economic and political outreach brings both positive and
    negative impacts for the region. Expanding exports of Russian natural
    gas and oil provides new, diversified sources for Asia's growing energy
    demands. Japan and ROK are among the leading importers of Russian coal.
    Japanese investment in the Russian Far East may prove extraordinarily
    helpful to regional growth and stability. Russia also seeks to mitigate
    the effects of international sanctions imposed in response to its
    military operations in Ukraine, and may be trying to wedge itself into
    new relationships by opportunistically providing economic aid packages
    and military assistance (e.g., the Philippines).
        ISIS / Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs): ISIS is a clear
    threat that must be defeated. The main geographic focus of the United
    States-led counter-ISIS coalition has rightfully been in the Middle
    East and North Africa. As ISIS is defeated in Iraq, Syria and Libya, it
    will undoubtedly seek to operate in other areas. Increasing numbers of
    returning fighters alone have already forced USPACOM to think ahead
    about ``what's next'' in the fight against ISIS. As I mentioned earlier
    in this testimony, there are far more Muslims living in the Indo-Asia-
    Pacific than in the Middle East and North Africa. The vast majorities
    are peaceful people who seek to live lives free from the curse of
    terrorism. Even if a very small percentage of the Muslims in the
    USPACOM AOR are radicalized, there could be deadly results.
        In 2016 alone, we witnessed ISIS-inspired terrorism in Bangladesh,
    Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Additionally, it's clear to
    me that as our military operations in the Middle East continue to deny
    ISIS territory, some foreign fighters originally from the Indo-Asia-
    Pacific will try to return home. They'll come back to their home
    countries radicalized and weaponized. We must stop them now at the
    front end and not at the back end when the threat can become more
    dangerous. We cannot do it alone. To halt ISIS' cancerous spread, we
    must work together with like-minded nations in the region and across
    the globe.
        USPACOM seeks to advance multinational partnerships with a purpose.
    Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand are
    partners we are engaging to tackle the threat against ISIS and other
    VEOs. Many Indo-Asia-Pacific countries like Australia and New Zealand
    have joined the coalition dedicated to ISIS' complete destruction.
    Through multinational collaboration, we can eradicate this disease
    before it metastasizes in the USPACOM area of responsibility.
        Countering violent extremism in the Indo-Asia-Pacific requires
    close collaboration with United States Government interagency partners
    like the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of Treasury,
    and the various agencies of our intelligence community. Through an
    interagency network reinforced by liaison officers embedded in USPACOM
    headquarters and Special Operations Command (SOCOM) we are able to
    leverage tools from across our government to fight terrorist
    organization.
        Transnational Crime: Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs),
    many of whom operate as sophisticated global enterprises that traffic
    in human beings, weapons, drugs and other illicit substances, exist
    throughout the Indo-Asia-Pacific. The revenue from criminal endeavors
    threatens stability and undermines human rights. Corruption follows
    wherever these organizations flourish, weakening governments and
    contributing to regional instability.
        Methamphetamine and amphetamine-type stimulants continue to be the
    primary drug threat in to the U.S. from the region. Joint Interagency
    Task Force-West (JIATF-W) reports that while Asia-sourced
    methamphetamine production is significant, methamphetamine produced
    elsewhere supplements the region's increasing demand. Maritime
    container shipments of China-sourced chemicals account for the bulk of
    the precursors used by Latin American drug trafficking organizations to
    manufacture methamphetamine and heroin, most of which is intended for
    the U.S. market--a direct threat to the U.S. Homeland. Additionally,
    China-sourced fentanyl and new psychoactive substances are now a
    growing threat to the United States.
        While much remains to be done, USPACOM forces, including JIATF-W,
    are coordinating with our interagency and foreign partners to address
    these threats.
        Proliferation Issues: The Indo-Asia-Pacific has the busiest
    maritime and air ports in the world. Technological advances have
    outpaced many countries' ability to effectively manage export controls
    to counter the proliferation of component technology. Trade includes
    dual-use technology, such as commercial items controlled by the
    nuclear, ballistic missile, and chemical/biological weapons control
    regimes, including manufactured or re-exported materials from other
    countries with limited export control enforcement. USPACOM's Countering
    Weapons of Mass Destruction (C-WMD) community supports proliferation
    operations throughout the Indo-Asia-Pacific by addressing concerns
    through key leader engagements, combined and joint exercises, and
    international security exchanges focused on counter proliferation
    activities.
        Natural Disasters: The Indo-Asia-Pacific region remains the most
    disaster prone region in the world. 75 percent of Earth's volcanoes and
    90 percent of earthquakes occur in the ``Ring of Fire'' surrounding the
    Pacific Basin. According to a 2015 UN report, disasters over the last
    10 years took the lives of a half a million people in the region, with
    over 1.5 billon people affected and damages of over a half a trillion
    dollars.
        In the 2015 Nepal earthquake response, in coordination with the
    Nepalese government and USAID, USPACOM's Joint Task Force 505 delivered
    about 120 tons of emergency relief supplies and transported 553
    personnel and conducted 69 casualty evacuations. This last fall USS
    Sampson (DDG 102) and Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft
    assisted New Zealand in its response to an earthquake on its South
    Island.
        While disaster response is not a primary USPACOM focus, a key
    element of our Theater Campaign Plan (TCP) is building capacity with
    allies and partners to improve their resiliency and capability to
    conduct humanitarian assistance/disaster response (HA/DR). HA/DR
    cooperation is also an effective means to deepen and strengthen
    relationships. USPACOM's Center for Excellence for Disaster Management
    (CFE-DM) increases regional governments' readiness to respond to
    natural disasters by serving as a node for distribution of best
    practices. Our service components are prepositioning HA/DR stocks to
    facilitate timely response and to build access. When possible, U.S.
    military forces can and do assist with unique capabilities in the areas
    of air and sealift, infrastructure restoration, and emergency medical
    support.
        Budget Uncertainty: Fiscal uncertainty injects substantial risk to
    USPACOM's long-term mission. The Budget Control Act and yearly
    Continuing Resolutions degrade USPACOM's ability to effectively plan.
        I've said this many times before--sequestration must be repealed.
        In 2013, sequestration cut every defense program equally. As a
    result, real readiness suffered. For example, we were forced to cancel
    an important joint exercise, Northern Edge. We need predictable funding
    to meet our current mission requirements and to prepare for the future.
    Keeping self-imposed spending cuts is a long-term threat to our
    national security.
        Fiscal uncertainty and reduced funding levels have forced the
    services to make offsets in crucial investments toward modernization,
    infrastructure, and future readiness. These tradeoffs will continue to
    have a negative impact on the Indo-Asia Pacific Theater strategy.
    Equally important, the uncertainty of the current fiscal landscape
    places a heavy burden of unpredictability onto our servicemembers and
    their families, our government civilians, Department of Defense
    contractors, and supporting industry. The U.S. will experience degraded
    warfighting capabilities unless decisive actions are taken to end
    fiscal uncertainties.
        The strategic priorities from the Services must be funded to
    provide USPACOM what we need in order to provide for the national
    defense.
        Without a bipartisan agreement that provides relief from the Budget
    Control Act caps, the Department of Defense will be forced to decrease
    investments that have given our warfighters the technological edge they
    have enjoyed for decades. Our near-peer competitors like China and
    Russia are quickly closing the technological gap. I need weapons
    systems of increased lethality that go faster, further, are networked,
    are more survivable, and affordable. If USPACOM has to fight tonight, I
    don't want it to be a fair fight. If it's a knife fight, I want to
    bring a gun. If it's a gun fight, I want to bring in the artillery, and
    the artillery of all of our allies. As I said during Congressional
    testimony last year, sequestration could reduce us to wielding a butter
    knife in this fight. We must not let that happen. In order to deter
    potential adversaries in the Indo-Asia-Pacific, we must invest in
    critical capabilities, build a force posture that decreases our
    vulnerabilities and increases our resiliency, and reassure our allies
    and partners while encouraging them to be full and cooperative partners
    in their own defense and the defense of the rules-based international
    order.
                             critical capabilities
        The most technical, high-end military challenges America faces in
    the region continue to grow. While forward presence, alliances, and
    partnerships address these challenges, USPACOM requires our most
    technologically advanced warfighting capabilities to fully meet them.
    The critical capabilities in this section demand our attention and
    treasure. We must preserve our asymmetric advantages in undersea and
    anti-submarine warfare, and we must strengthen our abilities to counter
    strategies designed to limit our freedom of action.
        China has developed and fielded capability and capacity to
    challenge our regional maritime dominance. I need increased lethality,
    specifically ships and aircraft equipped with faster and more
    survivable weapons systems. Longer range offensive weapons on every
    platform are an imperative. Then we must network this force and take
    advantage of man-machine teaming to improve our responsiveness.
        Pacing the threats we face in this region is not an option in my
    playbook. We must work hard and invest the money to outpace the
    competition to develop and deploy the latest technology to USPACOM.
    Examples include Navy Integrated Fires and the AEGIS Flight III
    destroyer and its Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR)--essential tools
    in today's complex operating environment.
        Munitions, Fuels, and Logistics Networks: Critical munitions
    shortfalls are my top warfighting concern. Munitions are a large part
    of determining combat readiness in pursuit of national strategic
    objectives. We are short in ``here-and-now'' basic munitions like small
    diameter bombs. Our near-peer competitors continue to modernize their
    weapons systems and leverage new technologies to close capability gaps
    between us and them. We must maintain our capability to operate in
    contested environments. Additionally, we must continue to expand cross
    domain fires capabilities and focus on joint integration to strengthen
    deterrence and enable joint combined maneuver.
        Priorities include long-range and stand-off strike weapons, anti-
    ship weapons, advanced air-to-air munitions, theater ballistic/cruise
    missile defense, torpedoes, naval mines, and a Cluster Munitions
    replacement. With respect to ship-to-ship and air-to-ship munitions
    that allow us to defeat an aggressor from greater range, we are looking
    at capabilities similar to Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) and
    Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile--Extended Range (JASSM-ER). In
    the air-to-air realm, I am seeking advancements in munitions that will
    provide us an advantage in a denied environment, such as the AIM-120D
    and AIM-9X2 air superiority missiles. We must modernize and improve our
    torpedo and naval mine capabilities to maintain our undersea advantage.
    Continued improvements in the capability and capacity of ballistic/
    cruise missile defense interceptors will further enhance Homeland
    defense capabilities and protect key regional nodes from aggressive
    action. In support of the Korean Peninsula, I support efforts to
    acquire a replacement for Cluster Munitions--we need an Area Effects
    Munition replacement now.
        As new inventory becomes available, current storage capacity will
    become critical. Current, legacy storage locations are inadequate to
    store specific types of modernized munitions and meet the requirements
    of fiscal year 2021 Department of Defense Explosive Safety Standards.
    To meet security and safety standards for future inventory, additional
    new military construction (MILCON) will be required. When munitions
    storage MILCON projects lose to competing projects and are not funded
    we put unnecessary risk on our personnel. We must fund these MILCON
    projects.
        Fuel is a critical commodity, and its strategic positioning is a
    key pillar of our logistics posture. Ensuring we have the right fuel,
    in the right amount, at the right location, at the right time, is vital
    to USPACOM's ability to project power throughout the Indo-Asia-Pacific.
    I remain committed to building the capacity of our prepositioned war
    reserve stocks of fuel, including resiliency of the facilities,
    infrastructure, and supply chain on which these stocks depend.
        Finally, our nation's ability to project power rides on the
    backbone of airlift and sealift. This is most true in USPACOM. Our Air
    Force made tough decisions to transition airlift to Backup-Aircraft
    Inventory (BAI) status and transition Active Components to Guard and
    Reserve in order to meet budget constraints. Unfortunately, these
    decisions resulted in a lack of flexibility and readily available
    capacity for combatant command war plans. Today's global competition
    for airlift resources hinders the joint force's ability to promptly
    achieve operational objectives. In war, this shortcoming can result in
    greater loss of life, increased risk on USPACOM-fielded forces, and
    risk to our Nation's credibility with partners and allies. I remain
    concerned about the current airlift posture and support an increase in
    airlift capacity, resources, and innovative deployment technologies.
    The long-term health of the U.S. flag commercial fleet and the
    availability of the merchant marine is also a concern.
        Taken collectively, these individual gaps and shortfalls in our
    logistics capabilities represent overall erosion in USPACOM's
    operational readiness and require an initiative like APSI [Australian
    Strategic Policy Institute] to reverse those negative trends. A
    strategic initiative to arrest and reverse those trends would be
    beneficial and worth consideration.
        Air Superiority: In order to deter potential adversaries in the
    Indo-Asia-Pacific we must possess the capabilities that allow us to
    gain air superiority at a time and place of our choosing and we must be
    able to maintain that air superiority long enough to complete critical
    missions. For the last several decades the U.S. has enjoyed unmatched
    air superiority including 4th generation fighters and air-battle-
    management platforms. Our potential adversaries, however, are rapidly
    closing the gap as both Russia and China have fielded their own
    versions of 5th generation fighters just as the United States has begun
    the fielding of our 5th generation platforms in the Pacific. While we
    continue to invest in 5th generation platforms, we must also find
    innovative ways to make our 4th generation aircraft more capable.
    Regardless of the pace of 5th generation fielding, these 4th generation
    platforms will be in our active inventory for years to come and we will
    have to rely on them to address the same threats.
        Undersea Warfare: Roughly 230 of the world's 400 foreign submarines
    are in the Indo-Asia-Pacific, of which approximately 160 belong to
    China, North Korea, and Russia. Potential adversary submarine activity
    has tripled from 2008 levels, requiring a corresponding increase of
    United States activity to maintain undersea superiority. China is
    improving the lethality and survivability of its attack submarines and
    building quieter, high-end diesel and nuclear powered submarines. China
    has four operational nuclear-powered Jin-class ballistic missile
    submarines (SSBNs) and at least one more may enter service by the end
    of this decade. When armed, a Jin-class SSBN will give China an
    important strategic capability that must be countered. Russia is
    modernizing its existing fleet of Oscar-class multi-purpose attack
    nuclear submarines (SSGNs) and producing their next generation
    Severodvinsk Yasen-class SSGNs. Russia has also homeported their newest
    Dolgorukiy-class SSBN in the Pacific, significantly enhancing its
    strategic capability. USPACOM must maintain its asymmetric advantage in
    undersea warfare capability including our attack submarines, their
    munitions, and other anti-submarine warfare systems like the P-8
    Poseidon and ship-borne systems. Additionally, the Integrated Undersea
    Surveillance System (IUSS), including the Surface Towed Array Sensor
    Systems (SURTASS), plays a key role to theater operations and must be
    resourced appropriately to ensure it remains relevant. Maintaining pace
    with submarine activity growth is necessary and I support the Secretary
    of the Navy's 2016 Force Structure Assessment which calls for a 355-
    ship navy including 66 attack submarines.
        Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR): The challenge
    of gathering credible deep and penetrating intelligence cannot be
    overstated. The Indo-Asia-Pacific presents a dynamic security
    environment requiring flexible, reliable, survivable deep-look and
    persistent ISR to provide indications and warning and situational
    awareness across a vast geographic area. As previously noted, USPACOM
    faces a variety of challenges and potential flashpoints. Our treaty
    allies rely on U.S. ISR capabilities to support mutual defense
    treaties. ISR is required to prevent strategic surprise, buy decision
    space for national leadership, accurately assess the security
    environment and, if necessary, defeat potential adversaries. Continued
    advancements of our near-peer competitors requires additional
    advancements to how our intelligence is collected and processed--
    including the risks involved--to avoid greater long-term risk. Our ISR
    capabilities must be suited to our unique operating environment.
        Space and Cyberspace: USPACOM relies on space based assets for
    satellite communications (SATCOM), ISR, and Positioning, Navigation,
    and Timing (PNT) capabilities to support missions across the range of
    military operations. USPACOM's region spans over half the globe and
    space-based assets are high-demand, low-density resources. As the space
    grows increasingly congested and contested, our adversaries have and
    continue to develop means to deny our space-enabled capabilities.
    USPACOM requires resilient and responsive space based capabilities to
    support operations. China continues to pursue a broad and robust array
    of counter-space capabilities, which includes direct-ascent anti-
    satellite missiles, co-orbital anti-satellite systems, cyber-attack and
    exploitation, directed energy weapons and ground-based satellite and
    PNT jammers.
        Freedom of maneuver across the cyberspace domain is critical to
    USPACOM's ability to execute military operation. We face constant
    threats in this domain from both state and non-state actors and must
    ensure we have a robust and capable cyber force, as well as the
    equipment necessary to operate and defend the U.S. military's portion
    of the Department of Defense Information Network within USPACOM's area
    of operations. In addition, USPACOM requires an agile and defensible
    network infrastructure to enable information sharing and collaboration
    with our mission partners. This network infrastructure will foster
    better command and control in joint and coalition efforts, and will
    provide a true fight tonight communication capability that does not
    currently exist.
        Our offensive cyber capabilities, currently under the
    responsibility of USCYBERCOM, continue to develop. As the command and
    control relationships continue to mature between USPACOM and
    USCYBERCOM, and between USCYBERCOM and its subordinate headquarters, we
    continue to advocate for increased unity of effort and unity of command
    for all cyber forces within USPACOM's area of operation. It is
    important that we strike the right balance between maintaining a
    sufficiently capable cyber force within our theater working directly
    for USPACOM and its subordinates and developing a capable cyber force
    under USCYBERCOM.
        Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD): USPACOM faces unique
    IAMD challenges despite efforts to forward station additional IAMD
    sensors and weapons capabilities in the Indo-Asia-Pacific to protect
    our forces and allies. Hawaii, Guam, and our Pacific territories are
    part of our Homeland and must also be defended. North Korea's
    persistent research, development and active testing of both its missile
    and nuclear programs and China's development and operational fielding
    of advanced counter-intervention technologies that includes fielding
    and testing of highly maneuverable re-entry vehicle/warhead (i.e.,
    hypersonic weapons) capabilities challenges U.S. strategic,
    operational, and tactical freedom of movement and maneuver. Other
    notable challenges include challenging new cruise missiles and Unmanned
    Aircraft System (UAS) technologies.
        USPACOM's IAMD priority is to establish a persistent, credible, and
    sustainable ballistic missile defense presence by forward deploying the
    latest advancements in missile defense technologies to the Indo-Asia-
    Pacific. Accordingly, TPY-2 radars in Japan, the THAAD system on Guam,
    and the Sea-Based X-band Radar (SBX) based in Hawaii defend the
    Homeland and our allies. USPACOM and USFK with the support of the DOD,
    the U.S. Army and MDA are working bilaterally with South Korea to
    ensure the emplacement of a THAAD battery on the Korean peninsula in
    the next few months. The U.S. Navy is moving forward with the port
    shift of the USS Milius from San Diego to Yokosuka, Japan in 2017.
    Since the arrival of the USS Benfold and USS Barry to Japan in fiscal
    year 2016, the U.S. Seventh Fleet is in a better position to support
    the United States-Japan alliance with more flexible missile defense
    capability. USPACOM will continue working with Japan, the ROK, and
    Australia to improve our level of staff coordination and information
    sharing and the goal of creating a fully-integrated Ballistic Missile
    Defense (BMD) architecture that must also address the increasing cruise
    missile threat.
        Innovation: Innovation continues to be critical to addressing
    USPACOM's capability gaps and maintaining our military advantage.
    USPACOM partners with DOD-wide organizations, national laboratories,
    and industry to provide innovative solutions to fill capability
    requirements. USPACOM also continues to work closely with the OSD
    Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO) to develop and field game-changing
    technologies for the Indo-Asia-Pacific. USPACOM recognizes that
    advances in artificial intelligence, machine learning, large data
    analytics, and predictive forecasting will enable our warfighters to
    make better decisions and to confront the challenges of our near-peer
    adversaries. The DOD Third Offset Strategy provides the mechanism to
    invest in innovative capabilities that will enhance the joint
    warfighter given the challenges in the Indo-Asia-Pacific Theater. As I
    have stated, this is not about winning wars on the cheap, as some
    critics may suggest. It's about winning wars on the smart. USPACOM will
    continue to push the boundaries of innovation and ``fail smartly'' so
    that we can ultimately develop and field the best solutions for the
    joint warfighter.
        Fires . . . Achieving Multi-Domain Battle (MDB): Over the past two
    decades, China has developed numerous ground and air launched missile
    systems that far outrange United States systems. They have done this at
    a fraction of the cost of some of our more expensive systems.
    Constrained in part by our adherence to the INF treaty, the U.S. has
    fallen behind in our ability to match the long-range fires capabilities
    of the new era. China is not a signatory to the INF treaty and the
    other main signatory, Russia, has repeatedly violated the treaty as
    they develop capabilities that could prevent the United States from
    fulfilling its alliance obligations.
        Just as our adversaries have adapted to counter our asymmetric
    advantages, we, too must adapt the way we fight to leverage new
    technologies and approaches to operations to maintain our edge. We need
    systems that are fast, long-range, lethal, survivable, networked,
    rapidly deployable, and maneuverable. Given existing technology, such
    systems should be relatively inexpensive.
        With this in mind that I have become a strong advocate for the
    operational concept known as Multi-Domain Battle (MDB). The Deputy
    Secretary of Defense has called MDB, ``the first operational concept of
    the third offset.'' MDB is the ultimate joint concept that allows a
    commander to achieve cross-domain effects. Because of this, it gives a
    commander multiple options from across the joint force and confuses our
    adversaries by making them face multiple dilemmas. MDB calls for
    combined arms operations across all domains with joint force
    capabilities being brought to bear in the long-range fight as well as
    close combat. Recognizing that we may no longer be able to maintain
    broad sea and air control as we did in the past, one benefit of MDB in
    the Indo-Asia-Pacific is the addition of ground, space, electromagnetic
    spectrum, and cyber forces operating across archipelagic regions to
    augment sea and air forces to create temporal pockets of dominance that
    can be exploited to gain tactical and operational advantage.
        We already have much of the capability for MDB in our force.
    However, one of the biggest capability gaps in terms of joint effects
    is the lack of connectivity between the Navy's Cooperative Engagement
    Capability (CEC), Army's THAAD and Patriot Systems, and the USMC's C2
    systems. I know the Services are working on this problem. The
    technology is out there and the proof is in the lethal systems
    developed by our adversaries. More importantly, MDB requires a new
    jointness to bring it all together. MDB conceptualizes bringing
    jointness further down to the tactical levels allowing smaller echelons
    to communicate and coordinate directly while fighting in a
    decentralized manner that still allows for clearance of fires and
    deconfliction of efforts. I have tasked my component commands at
    USPACOM to test this operational concept in a major exercise. We are
    well on our way to meeting that goal thanks to a great team of service
    component commanders and their organizations.
                strategic force posture in the indo-asia-pacific
        The tyranny of distance and short indications and warnings
    timelines place a premium on robust, modern, and agile forward-
    stationed forces at high levels of readiness. USPACOM requires a force
    posture that credibly communicates U.S. resolve, strengthens alliances
    and partnerships, prevents conflict, and in the event of crisis,
    responds rapidly across the full range of military operations.
    USPACOM's force posture is also supplemented by the deployment of
    rotational forces and the fielding of new capabilities and concepts
    that address operational shortfalls and critical gaps.
        Global Force Management (GFM): The Department of Defense is
    continuing several GFM initiatives that include adding the Navy's
    newest airborne early warning and control aircraft, the E-2D Advanced
    Hawkeye, to the USS Ronald Reagan Strike Group in Japan, and increasing
    the presence of ballistic missile defense-capable surface ships. The
    Army is stationing a THAAD battery in South Korea and maintains the
    rotation of an Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT), plus enabling
    forces, to the Korean Peninsula. The Army also continues to support
    collective training and forward presence across the region through
    Pacific Pathways, thus enhancing partnership opportunities, avoiding
    permanent basing, and increasing Army readiness. The Air Force deploys
    a broad range of assets to the region, including F-22s, F-16s, E-8s,
    RC-135s and strategic bombers, including B-52, B-1 and B-2 bombers, to
    maintain presence in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. The forward stationing and
    deployment of 5th generation airframes to the region continues to be a
    priority for USPACOM--notably the Marine Corps has deployed the first
    F-35B squadron based in Japan. The Marine Corps continues to execute a
    reduction in the footprint on Japan by distribution of the capability
    across the region. Rotational forces west of the International Date
    Line are positioned to deter and defeat potential aggressors in the
    region.
        Force Posture Initiatives: As geopolitical issues and challenges in
    the security environment continue to evolve, the importance of
    infrastructure recapitalization and the fielding of advanced
    capabilities have increased. In support of USPACOM's ability to execute
    national tasking and meet national objectives, fiscal year 2017
    military construction projects support the arrival of next-generation
    platforms and capabilities to include the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
    (Kadena Air Base, Japan), DDG-1000 Zumwalt-class Destroyers (San Diego,
    California and forward operating locales), RQ-4 Global Hawk (Andersen
    Air Base, Guam), and C-130J Super Hercules transport aircraft (Yokota
    Air Base, Japan). Other investments support increased resiliency for
    the joint force via projects in Japan, Guam, and Australia, increased
    critical munitions storage capacity in California and Guam, and quality
    of life investments for our forces and their families in South Korea
    and Japan.
        Host country support at established locations remains robust. Two
    examples of this include our efforts in Korea (Yongsan Relocation Plan
    and Land Partnership Plan), and Japan (Okinawa Consolidation and the
    Defense Policy Review Initiative). In support of these initiatives, the
    Government of Japan committed up to $3.1 billion to help realign U.S.
    Marines from Okinawa to Guam and other locations. This funding includes
    approximately $300 million for the joint military training ranges
    Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas (CNMI). Additionally, the
    Government of Japan committed $4.5 billion to expand the airfield and
    associated facilities at Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni. Finally, The
    Japan is also funding Okinawa Consolidation and the Futenma Replacement
    Facility at 8$4 billion. Outside of the above initiatives, Japan and
    Korea continue to provide other support, which play a critical role in
    supporting U.S. presence in the region.
        Furthermore, USPACOM is expanding its activities to include the
    continued execution of the Marine Rotational Force-Darwin (MRF-D),
    Enhanced Air Cooperation (EAC) in Australia, and Bilateral Air
    Contingent Events-Philippines (BACE-P. Additionally, we are attempting
    to increase presence by seeking the assignment of additional ISR and
    BMD assets in the region.
        USPACOM continues to execute five major force posture initiatives:
    (1) United States-Japan Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) / USMC
    Distributed Laydown, (2) United States Forces Korea Realignment, (3)
    Resiliency, (4) Agile Logistics and (5) Agile Communications.
        DPRI/USMC Distributed Laydown: DPRI is a vital part of the larger
    U.S. military Integrated Global Basing and Presence Strategy. A major
    goal of DPRI is to create an environment that supports the enduring
    presence of United States forces in Japan. USPACOM maintains
    significant focus and effort on these initiatives. DPRI is one of the
    largest construction efforts since the end of the Cold War. Much work
    by both the U.S and Japan remain, but progress is being made towards
    realigning United States Marines from Okinawa to Guam and build-up of
    facilities at other locations such as Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS)
    Iwakuni.
        Another critical cooperative effort, the Futenma Replacement
    Facility (FRF) at Camp Schwab/Henoko, will enable the United States to
    fulfill its security obligations to Japan while also enabling the
    return of MCAS Futenma to Okinawa. More than ever before, United States
    troop presence in Okinawa matters today. The presence of U.S. forces
    brings unique capabilities that cannot be replicated. It was
    encouraging to see the 10 February joint statement between President
    Trump and Japan Prime Minister Abe that reaffirmed the commitment of
    both countries to construct the FRF. This solution maintains our
    presence at Marine Corps Air Station Futenma for another decade until
    the FRF is completed.
        USFK Realignment: The consolidation of United States forces in
    Korea via the Land Partnership Plan (LPP) and Yongsan Relocation Plan
    (YRP) continues to move ahead and is a success story. Construction will
    triple the size of Camp Humphreys and increase the base's population to
    846,000 troops and family members. The ROK is bearing the majority of
    the relocation's cost, committing $10 billion. USPACOM appreciates the
    Congress' continued support of DOD's largest peace-time relocation
    project.
        Resiliency: USPACOM resiliency efforts include investment in a more
    robust infrastructure in ally and partner countries, ensuring proper
    dispersal and optimization of critical enablers including communication
    nodes, fuel repositories, medical readiness, logistic support equipment
    and infrastructure, and the hardening of discrete facilities. For
    example, USPACOM continues to harden facilities in Guam as well as
    enhancing airfields at dispersed sites throughout the theater.
        Agile Logistics: USPACOM continues to face significant force
    posture challenges, the largest being the distance and fragility of the
    lines of communication within the Indo-Asia-Pacific. The tyranny of
    distance and short timelines to respond to crises require investment in
    infrastructure to properly preposition capabilities and capacity
    throughout the region. Ensuring that our logistics--munitions, fuel,
    and other war materiel--are properly prepositioned, secured, and
    available to meet requirements is essential to providing flexible and
    rapid force closure in support of national defense planning.
        Agile Communications: The ability to communicate with our allies
    and partners underpins all efforts from command and control
    interoperability through logistics coordination. Today's Defense
    communications systems continue to be hampered by obsolete encryption
    technology that forces us to build or contort information networks to
    comply with restrictive information sharing policies. Our acquisition
    systems cannot support the pace of rapid information technology
    advancements. As a result, we are not fully postured with the latest
    technology to interoperate with multiple partner combinations over all
    the phases of military operations. Furthermore, we will not have the
    communication capacity and sharable encryption capability to support
    the most modern warfighting platforms and associated weapon systems as
    they are built and deployed.
        Readiness: USPACOM is a ``fight tonight'' theater with short
    response timelines across vast spaces. Threats as discussed earlier
    require U.S. military forces in the region maintain a high level of
    readiness to respond rapidly to crisis. USPACOM's readiness is
    evaluated against its ability to execute operational and contingency
    plans, which place a premium on forward-stationed, ready forces that
    can exercise, train, and operate with our partner nations' militaries
    and follow-on forces able to respond to operational contingencies.
        Forward-stationed forces west of the International Date Line
    increase decision space and decrease response times, bolster the
    confidence of allies and partners, and reduce the chance of
    miscalculation by potential adversaries.
        The ability of the U.S. to surge and globally maneuver ready forces
    is an asymmetric advantage that must be maintained. Over the past two
    decades of war, the U.S. has of necessity prioritized the readiness of
    deploying forces at the expense of follow-on-forces and critical
    investments needed to outpace emerging threats. A shortage of ready
    surge forces resulting from high operational demands, delayed
    maintenance periods due to sequestration, and training pipeline
    shortfalls limit responsiveness to emergent contingencies and greatly
    increase risk. These challenges grow each year as our forces downsize
    while continuing to deploy at unprecedented rates. We are at risk of
    overstressing the force if the Services are not assured fiscal
    stability to establish conditions to reset their force elements.
        Fiscal uncertainty requires the Department to accept risk in long-
    term engagement opportunities with strategic consequences to U.S.
    relations and prestige. Continued budget uncertainty and changes in
    fiscal assumptions in the FYDP degrade USPACOM's ability to plan and
    program, leading to sub-optimal utilization of resources. Services must
    be able to develop and execute long-term programs for modernization
    while meeting current readiness needs. Budgetary constraints have
    limited procurement and fielding of 5th generation fighter aircraft (F-
    35) in sufficient quantities to maintain pace with potential adversary
    advancements. Modernization of 4th generation aircraft (F-15, F-16, F/
    A-18) is essential to prevent capability gaps. Much of the supporting
    infrastructure in the Pacific and on the West Coast of the U.S.
    mainland was established during World War II and during the early years
    of the Cold War. The infrastructure requires investment to extend its
    service life but the Services struggle to maintain infrastructure
    sustainment, restoration, and modernization accounts at appropriate
    levels. If funding uncertainties continue, the U.S. will experience
    reduced warfighting capabilities and increased challenges in pacing
    maturing adversary threats.
                              allies and partners
        Strengthening and modernizing alliances and partnerships are top
    USPACOM priorities. USPACOM's forward presence, force posture, and
    readiness reassure allies and partners of United States commitment to a
    stable and secure Indo-Asia-Pacific. USPACOM is building a network of
    likeminded nations committed to the current rules-based order that is
    anchored by our treaty allies. Partnerships with many other countries
    and organizations create an environment of cooperation that allows us
    to work together on the shared challenges we face.
        Bilateral and Multinational ``Partnerships with a Purpose'':
    USPACOM is directly connected to regional leaders. I am in frequent
    communication with my regional counterparts and appreciate the ability
    to reach out at any time to share perspectives. USPACOM maintains a
    close link with allies and partners through staff exchange and liaison
    officers, in addition to a series of formal bilateral mechanisms. In
    Australia, key engagements stem from the ANZUS treaty obligations, and
    are guided by USPACOM's principal bilateral event with Australia, the
    Military Representatives Meeting. Similarly, USPACOM's military-to-
    military relationship with Japan is guided by the annual Japan Senior
    Leader Seminar. Military Committee and Security Consultative Meetings
    are the preeminent bilateral mechanisms that guide the ROK and United
    States alliance. Each year, USPACOM, with the Armed Forces of the
    Philippines, co-hosts the Mutual Defense Board and Security Engagement
    Board to deal with 21st-century challenges. USPACOM conducts annual
    Senior Staff Talks with Thailand to address security concerns and
    reinforce United States commitment to democratic principles. Formal
    bilateral mechanisms also exist with non-alliance partners throughout
    the region, including India, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, and
    Vietnam.
        Our multilateral cooperation is further enhanced by numerous Flag
    and General Officer (FOGO) exchange officers that work for the U.S. at
    USPACOM. These foreign officers from our ``Five Eye'' (FVEY) partners
    (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and United Kingdom) serve under my
    Command as fully integrated members of the USPACOM team. Our operations
    and intelligence watch centers are FVEY environments. Our service
    components also have embedded FOGOs serving as Deputy Commanders and
    senior staff officers.
        The future lies in multilateral security mechanisms. USPACOM is
    broadening key bilateral relationships into multilateral partnerships
    with a purpose that will more effectively address shared security
    concerns. For example, United States-Japan-ROK trilateral coordination
    in response to North Korean provocative behavior is improving. The ROK
    and Japan each recognize that provocative actions by North Korea will
    not be isolated to the peninsula and greater coordination and
    cooperation are required. Historical tensions between the nations have
    lessened and cooperation and collaboration with the ROK [Republic of
    Korea] have improved. United States-Japan-ROK trilateral cooperation is
    benefitting from these developments. The November 2016 signing of the
    Japan-ROK General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA)
    is a major accomplishment in improving bilateral relations between
    Seoul and Tokyo, and lays an essential foundation for expanding
    cooperation enabling the United States to work more closely with both
    allies. This cooperation also led to two successful United States-
    Japan-ROK trilateral missile defense information link maritime
    exercises in 2016. I look forward to increasing the frequency and
    complexity of trilateral information sharing while simultaneously
    enhancing trilateral security cooperation.
        To encourage multilateral cooperation, USPACOM hosts the Chiefs of
    Defense Conference (CHODs) annually. The CHODs conference location
    normally rotates between Hawaii and a regional partner. In 2016, 31
    countries attended the CHODs conference in Manila, Philippines. USPACOM
    also participates in Australia-Japan-United States trilateral defense
    dialogues, including the Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF).
    The 2017 conference will be held in Victoria, British Columbia, in
    September.
        The trilateral relationship between the United States, Japan, and
    India is growing stronger. All three countries share democratic values,
    interests in protecting sea lanes of commerce, and respect for
    international law. The three sides launched a trilateral HA/DR working
    group at the first Ministerial meeting in 2015 and agreed to establish
    a maritime domain awareness working group. On the security front, all
    three countries participate in India's increasingly complex annual
    Malabar military exercise as well as the multinational Rim of the
    Pacific exercise. As a next step, USPACOM is encouraging the addition
    of Australia to form a quadrilateral partnership with a purpose. India,
    Japan, Australia, and the United States working together will be a
    force for the maintenance of the Global Operating System.
                                     allies
        Australia: The United States-Australia alliance anchors peace and
    stability in the region. Australia plays a leading role in regional
    security, capacity-building efforts and addressing disaster response.
    Australia is a key contributor to global security and a significant
    contributor to counter-ISIS efforts in Iraq and Syria and the Resolute
    Support mission in Afghanistan. With the implementation of force
    posture initiatives, the Marine Rotational Force-Darwin successfully
    completed its fifth deployment while increasing its presence from 1,177
    to 1,250 U.S. Marines. The sixth deployment began this month and will
    include four MV-22 Osprey aircraft, providing a more robust capability.
    Cooperative activities under Enhanced Air Cooperation, another force
    posture initiative, formally commenced in February 2017 with the
    deployment of F-22 aircraft to northern Australia. The United States
    and Australia are increasing collaboration in counter-terrorism, space,
    cyber, integrated air missile defense, and regional capacity building.
    Australia is procuring high-tech U.S. platforms that will further
    increase interoperability. These include the F-35A Lightning II, P-8
    Poseidon, C-17 Globemaster III, EA-18G Growler, Global Hawk UAVs, and
    MH-60R helicopters. To enhance interoperability, the Australian
    Government provides a General Officer and Senior Executive (civilian)
    to USPACOM and a General Officer to United States Army Pacific on a
    full-time basis. Australia has also set a goal of reaching 2 percent of
    its GDP on defense spending over the next decade.
        Japan: The United States-Japan alliance remains the cornerstone for
    peace and stability in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. Operational
    cooperation and collaboration between USPACOM and the Japan Joint Staff
    continue to increase. Japan's Peace and Security Legislation
    authorizing limited collective self-defense and the revised Guidelines
    for United States-Japan Defense Cooperation have significantly
    increased Japan's ability to contribute to regional stability more
    broadly. Japan continues to support USPACOM activities to maintain
    freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, and remains concerned
    about Chinese activities in the East China Sea.
        Republic of Korea (ROK): The United States-ROK alliance remains
    ironclad. We continue to work with our ROK allies as they move toward
    obtaining the capabilities required under the Conditions Based OPCON
    Transition Plan (COT-P). In response to the evolving threat posed by
    North Korea, the United States and the ROK made an Alliance decision to
    deploy a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system to the ROK
    to improve the Alliance missile defense posture. North Korea's
    provocative actions, and its refusal to engage in authentic and
    credible negotiations on denuclearization, compelled our Alliance to
    take defensive measures. The decision to deploy THAAD to the Korean
    Peninsula is based solely on our commitment to defend our allies and
    our forces from the North Korean threat.
        The Philippines: The United States-Philippine alliance remains
    resolute. Through frank and frequent dialogue with Philippine
    leadership we continue to maintain a robust defense relationship
    comprised of 258 activities for calendar year 2017, which include joint
    and service-to-service exercises. All plans, activities, exercises, and
    construction in the Philippines are done in close coordination with,
    and with the full approval of, Philippine leadership. On January 12,
    2016, the Philippine Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Enhanced
    Defense Cooperation Agreement and the new Philippine administration is
    also supportive of this agreement. Project development at various
    Philippine bases will improve interoperability and build partner
    capacity of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in Maritime
    Security, Maritime Domain Awareness, and HA/DR capabilities. We remain
    committed to supporting the AFP to counter-terrorism not only in the
    Southern Philippines, but in the tri-border area in Sulu and Celebes
    Seas. At the request of several Philippine administrations, Special
    Operation Command Pacific (SOCPAC) continues to provide counter-
    terrorism support and assistance. We will continue to consult with the
    Government of the Philippines and tailor our activities and assistance
    to address our shared security concerns. I am convinced that with some
    strategic patience and mutual respect, our Philippine alliance will
    remain strong and continue to stabilize the region as it has for over
    60 years.
        Thailand: The longstanding United States-Thailand alliance is
    supported by deep bilateral military-to-military ties that go back to
    our 1950 Agreement Respecting Military Assistance between the
    Government of the united States of America and Government of Thailand.
    Thailand offers unique training opportunities and essential logistical
    nodes for our forces. The most significant exercise being Cobra Gold,
    the largest multilateral military exercise in Southeast Asia. I spoke
    at the opening ceremony for this year's exercise in February and
    reiterated United States commitment to Thailand. Thailand is committed
    to a return to democracy with national elections in 2018, and we remain
    important alliance partners. I remain convinced that the best way for
    the United Statesto promote security and healthy civil-military
    relations in Thailand is to engage more, not less, with Thai military
    leadership.
                                    partners
        India: India continues to emerge as a significant strategic
    partnership in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. In June 2016, India was
    designated as a Major Defense Partner to the United States This
    declaration is unique to India and places it on the same level as many
    of our closest allies for the purposes of defense trade and technology
    sharing. United States and Indian militaries participated together in
    three major exercises and more than 50 other military exchanges this
    past year, in addition to conducting a joint-course in peacekeeping for
    ten African partners. We signed the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of
    Agreement (LEMOA) after more than a decade of negotiation to further
    deepen our military-to-military relationship and serve as a force
    multiplier during exercises and real world HA/DR operations. We also
    held our first annual 2+2 United States-India Maritime Security
    Dialogue last year to help identify and implement our common strategic
    interests. The United States-India Defense Technology and Trade
    Initiative (DTTI) continues to expand opportunities for cooperation,
    adding new working groups to focus on areas of mutual interest. Defense
    sales are at an all-time high with U.S.-sourced airframes, such as P-
    8s, C-130Js, C-17s, AH-64s and CH-47s. We recently concluded a deal for
    145 M777 howitzers. USPACOM will continue to advance the partnership
    with India as the ``new normal'' by strengthening our relationship and
    working toward additional enabling agreements that enhance
    interoperability between our forces.
        Indonesia: Indonesia plays an essential role in the security
    architecture of the region. We maintain a robust defense relationship
    comprising 221 activities for calendar year 2017. USPACOM continues to
    partner with Indonesia, particularly in maritime security. Indonesia
    desires to play a larger role in international economic and security
    issues. Their goal to provide 4,000 deployable peacekeeping troops by
    2020 is another important area where we can engage. Indonesia continues
    to build and exercise in strategic maritime border areas to bolster its
    defense capabilities, and has concerns with Chinese activities in the
    vicinity of the Natuna Islands.
        Malaysia: Our close security ties with Malaysia are based on our
    Comprehensive Partnership. Malaysia's regional leadership role,
    technologically advanced industry, sizeable economy, and capable
    military make it an important partner in securing peace and prosperity
    in Southeast Asia. We continue to assist Malaysia in building an
    amphibious force to address non-traditional threats in and around their
    territorial waters. Malaysia has reached a trilateral agreement with
    the Philippines and Indonesia for improving the maritime security
    environment in the Sulu and Celebes Seas. Malaysia also has an on-going
    dispute with China with respect to the Luconia Shoals, which China also
    claims. Nevertheless, Malaysia has demonstrated the capacity and
    resolve to contribute to regional security, and we continue to support
    Malaysia's emerging maritime security requirements.
        Mongolia: Mongolia endures as a small yet strong partner in
    Northeast Asia and continues to demonstrate staunch support for U.S.
    regional and global policy objectives--especially those linked to the
    Global Peace Operations Initiative and security operations in
    Afghanistan. The government engages with the U.S. and other countries
    as part of their ``Third Neighbor'' policy. Mongolia also markets
    itself as a model for emerging democratic countries such as Burma,
    Nepal, and Timor Leste. I visited Mongolia last summer and spoke at the
    KHAAN QUEST 2016 closing ceremony, reaffirming that USPACOM's goals are
    to assist the Mongolian Armed Forces through their defense reform
    priorities to include development of professional military education
    for officers and non-commissioned officers, developing a professional
    NCO corps, and developing an Air Force and ready Reserve Force. The
    Mongolians punch above their weight and we should continue to support
    them where we can.
        New Zealand: Our military-to-military relationship has reached new
    heights over the past 2 years, despite longstanding differences over
    nuclear policy. Relations remain strong and are the most encouraging in
    decades. The November 2016 visit of the USS Sampson (DDG 102), the
    first ship visit to New Zealand in more than thirty years, marked a new
    milestone. New Zealand remains a respected voice in international
    politics and a leader in the South Pacific that shares common security
    concerns with the United States, including the need to address
    terrorism, transnational crime, and maritime security.
        Singapore: A key strategic partner in Southeast Asia, we depend on
    Singapore for its insights on regional dynamics and its support to
    United States security priorities. Singapore has been a major security
    cooperation partner for over a decade and provides us invaluable access
    including hosting of Littoral Combat Ships, Maritime Patrol and
    Reconnaissance Aircraft, and the Seventh Fleet's Logistics Force
    headquarters. Recently, our partnership expanded into new areas
    including cyber security and counter-proliferation. We conduct dozens
    of military exercises with Singapore each year and Singaporean military
    officers regularly attend United States professional military
    education. This combination of forward deployed forces, logistics, and
    deep training relationships contributes to readiness, builds deeper
    ties and allows the U.S. to promote maritime security and stability
    with regional partners.
        Sri Lanka: President Sirisena, elected in January 2016, is serious
    about addressing Sri Lanka's human rights issues. Throughout the last
    year he continued Sri Lanka's path toward reconciliation and democracy
    following its civil war. I believe it is in America's interest to
    increase military collaboration and cooperation with Sri Lankan forces.
    Accordingly, I visited Sri Lanka last November--the first 4-star to do
    so since 2008. USPACOM has expanded military leadership discussions,
    rule of law training, increased naval engagement, and focused security
    cooperation efforts on defense institution building in areas such as
    demobilizing and military professionalism. I look forward to continuing
    to expand our relationship in the future
        Vietnam: Vietnam continues to expand cooperation with the United
    States at a moderate, but steady pace. USPACOM provides support for
    Vietnam's modernization and capacity building, focusing on maritime
    security, peacekeeping, and disaster response. The United States will
    transfer maritime security vessels including maintenance and training
    packages to Vietnam's Coast Guard over the next few years, which will
    build their capacity for maritime domain awareness. In addition, we are
    discussing a proposal to improve our mutual ability to cooperate in the
    field of HA/DR as well as enhance ongoing bilateral cooperative
    activities.
                                other key actors
        Oceania: Maintaining strategic influence in Oceania is becoming
    ever more important to United States national security. The provisions
    included in the Compacts of Free Association with the Federated States
    of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Republic
    of Palau are important mechanisms that guide the relationships,
    including U.S. obligations for their defense. In return, these
    agreements provide assured access to the three Compact Nations in a
    contingency situation. They also give the U.S. authority to grant or
    deny access to another nation's military forces which allows the U.S.
    to maintain a clear strategic line of communication across the Pacific.
    I strongly urge Congress to pass legislation to approve and implement
    the 2010 Palau Compact Review Agreement at the earliest opportunity.
    The passage of this legislation will have a significant impact on our
    defense relationship with Palau, and will provide a measurable
    advantage in our strategic posture in the Western Pacific. Continued
    U.S. commitment to defend the Compact Nations and to partner with other
    Pacific island countries enhances American influence and sends a strong
    message of reassurance throughout the region.
        ASEAN: ASEAN turns 50 this year and the United States will
    commemorate the 40th year of United States-ASEAN dialogue relations.
    The United States and ASEAN share the common principles of a rules-
    based order, respect for international law, and the peaceful resolution
    of disputes. The ten ASEAN member states, under the chairmanship of
    Laos last year and the Philippines this year, continue to seek ways to
    improve multilateral security engagements and advance stability in the
    Indo-Asia-Pacific. During this past year, the United States
    strengthened its commitment to ASEAN with engagements at the Secretary
    of Defense and Presidential levels where agreement on whole-of-
    government approaches to shared challenges in areas of maritime
    security and maritime domain awareness were reached. Throughout the
    past year USPACOM participated in ASEAN exercises, key leader
    engagements, and practical multilateral cooperation related to the
    spectrum of shared transnational challenges. Malaysia and the United
    States will co-chair the ASEAN Expert Working Group on Humanitarian
    Assistance and Disaster Relief with Malaysia over the next three years.
        Burma: Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy's election
    victory was a historic milestone. While challenges remain during the
    transition to civilian leadership, USPACOM's goal is to support and
    empower the civilian government, while encouraging the
    professionalization of its military. Our assistance through defense
    engagement programs is designed to bring together civilian and military
    officials to promote cooperation and understanding. These limited
    programs also promote the development of a professional military in a
    democratic system of government and broaden the exposure of isolated
    military officials to international norms of conduct and civilian
    control.
        China: The United States-China relationship remains complex. While
    Chinese actions and provocations create tension in the region, there
    are also opportunities for cooperation. USPACOM's approach to China is
    to cooperate where we can to collectively address our shared security
    challenges, but remain ready to confront its provocative actions where
    we must. USPACOM's engagements with the People's Liberation Army,
    governed by section 1201 of the fiscal year 2000 NDAA, improve
    transparency and reduce risk of unintended incidents.
        USPACOM conducted numerous bilateral and numerous multilateral
    engagements last year with China. USPACOM co-led the United States-
    China Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) plenary and
    working group focused on operational safety in November 2016.
    Encounters between our forces at sea and in the air are generally safe,
    but the MMCA provides a forum for continuous dialogue to identify and
    address safety issues when they arise.
        Areas of common interest that allow military cooperation include
    counter piracy, military medicine, and disaster response. USPACOM
    forces participated in the annual Disaster Management Exchange with the
    People's Liberation Army in Kunming, China designed to share HA/DR
    lessons learned from real world events. USPACOM encourages China's
    participation in international efforts to address shared challenges in
    a manner consistent with international law and standards.
        Taiwan: Democratic elections in January 2016 reflect the shared
    values between Taiwan and the U.S. The United States maintains its
    unofficial relations with Taiwan through the American Institute in
    Taiwan and we continue supporting Taiwan's security. USPACOM will
    continue to fulfill United States commitments under the Taiwan
    Relations Act. Continued, regular arms sales and training for Taiwan's
    military are an important part of that policy and help ensure the
    preservation of democratic institutions. As the military spending and
    capability of the PRC grow every year, the ability of Taiwan to defend
    itself decreases. We must continue to help Taiwan defend itself and
    demonstrate United States resolve that any attempt by China to force
    reunification on the people of Taiwan is unacceptable.
            activities, direct reporting units, and mission partners
        Security Cooperation and Capacity Building: USPACOM's Security
    Cooperation approach focuses on building partner readiness, reducing
    partner capability gaps, and building partner capacity. One of the more
    powerful engagement resource tools is the State Department's Foreign
    Military Financing (FMF). FMF enables USPACOM to meet regional
    challenges to include border security issues, disaster response,
    counterterrorism, and maritime security.
        USPACOM will continue to leverage the fiscal year 2016 NDAA section
    1263 ``Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative'' authority to
    enhance maritime domain awareness and maritime capacities and
    capabilities of partners and allies in the South China Sea region,
    through assistance to, and training of, partner and allied country
    maritime security forces.
        USPACOM will continue to rely on FMF as a source of providing major
    end items to eligible countries. MSI support notified pursuant to the
    section 1263 authority should be viewed as complementary and additive
    in nature to these FMF plans. Under MSI, PACOM plans to provide niche
    capabilities, more multi-mission types of equipment, and connective
    tissue that will help partners better deploy and employ these maritime
    security capabilities--both domestically to protect their sovereign
    territory and as a means of fostering greater regional
    interoperability.
        Additionally, USPACOM is looking forward to leveraging the
    consolidated Security Cooperation authority in fiscal year 2017 NDAA as
    a responsive tool for building partner capacity as security situations
    and relationships evolve. I am concerned the changes in the fiscal year
    2017 NDAA could impact both operational support to foreign law
    enforcement and capacity building efforts focused on countering
    narcotics flows and transnational crime. We are currently working with
    the rest of the Department of Defense to develop the policies needed to
    implement this new law.
        Maritime Domain Awareness: Southeast Asian partners support United
    States security cooperation efforts in the area of maritime domain
    awareness. USPACOM will continue to leverage MSI and the new section
    1263 authority and other existing authorities to develop multilateral
    approaches to information sharing to develop a regional maritime
    picture. USPACOM and the Daniel K Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for
    Strategic Studies (DKI APCSS) co-hosted a policy level workshop on best
    practice for information sharing. Additionally, the Philippines,
    Australia, and the United States co-hosted an operational level
    workshop to discuss regional maritime security best practices. These
    workshops facilitate whole-of-government discussions on maritime
    challenges that support creation of a regional maritime domain
    awareness network to share information between Southeast Asian
    partners. USPACOM will continue to support these workshops to improve
    regional awareness. We need to go beyond Maritime Domain Awareness to
    improve our partners' and allies' multi-domain awareness and increase
    their domain denial capability so that they can better protect their
    territory and enforce their maritime rights.
        Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI): Indo-Asia-Pacific
    countries provide over 30 percent of the world's uniformed peacekeepers
    to United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations worldwide and of these
    peacekeepers, 62 percent of the peacekeepers come from the 12 GPOI
    partners in the Indo-Asia-Pacific where they support 15 of the 16 UN
    peacekeeping missions. Not only is GPOI helping to build the capability
    and capacity of our partners to deploy forces, the USPACOM GPOI is
    focused on providing high-quality, action-oriented, challenging
    scenario-based training so that peacekeepers are better prepared to
    implement the mandates contained in UN Security Council Resolutions--
    protecting vulnerable civilians, halting conflict-related sexual
    violence, working to put a stop to the use of children soldiers,
    addressing misconduct and trying to bring long-term peace and security
    to conflict torn regions. Partners are working towards meeting program
    goals of achieving self-sustaining, indigenous training capability.
    Most recently in March 2017, USPACOM and Nepal cohosted Shanti Prayas-
    3--a multinational peacekeeping exercise--training personnel from 34
    countries for deployment to UN peacekeeping missions. USPACOM will
    continue improving partner military peacekeeping skills and operational
    readiness and provide limited training facility refurbishment. This
    program not only supports our efforts to improve UN peacekeeping, it is
    also helping to strengthen interoperability with U.S. forces and builds
    the trust required to improve interoperability in other relevant areas.
        Joint Exercise Program: USPACOM's Joint Exercise Program
    deliberately synchronizes frequent, relevant, and meaningful readiness
    exercises and engagements across the Indo-Asia-Pacific region to ensure
    the joint force is prepared for crises and contingency operations. This
    important joint exercise program, funded through the Combatant
    Commander Exercise Engagement Training Transformation (CE2T2) program,
    provides the critical means and enablers to improve readiness of
    forward deployed assigned forces. It also advances many Theater
    Campaign Plan objectives to include strengthening our alliances and
    partnerships while sustaining USPACOM's military preeminence. USPACOM
    appreciates Congress' continued support of these important programs to
    maintain progress made in joint readiness.
        Joint Interagency Task Force-West (JIATF-W): The drug trade in the
    Indo-Asia-Pacific is a growing concern that threatens regional
    stability as drug trafficking organizations expand into new markets and
    develop new and disturbing partnerships across the globe. USPACOM
    combats drug trafficking in the region through JIATF-W by disrupting
    flows of drugs and precursor chemicals that transit the region and
    hardens the theater against the continued growth of transnational
    criminal organizations.
        Chinese and, to a lesser extent, Indian chemical producers continue
    to be the primary source of precursors for synthetic drugs, including
    powerful synthetic opioids like fentanyl, as well as more traditional
    drugs like cocaine and heroin. JIATF-W identifies avenues of
    cooperation with the government of China on this issue to assist United
    States law enforcement with seizures of these chemicals and drugs.
    JIATF-W identified and tracked chemical flows resulting in the seizure
    of roughly 140,000 kilograms of methamphetamine precursor chemicals in
    2016.
        As demonstrated by its effect on the Philippines, the illicit drug
    trade can have far reaching, and even strategic impacts. The internal
    pressures caused by criminal organizations and their operations, as
    well as the associated corruption and the demands placed on society by
    the need for treatment and prosecution, can and do cause enormous
    stress on governance. These stresses ultimately affect United States
    interests in the region. JIATF-W continues to build partner capacity to
    counter illicit trafficking of narcotics in the coastal areas of the
    Philippines, Vietnam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Maldives, Sri
    Lanka, and the border regions of Bangladesh and Thailand.
        In Australia, cocaine prices reach ten times the retail prices in
    the United States, providing a strong incentive for drug traffickers to
    expand their reach across the Pacific. The drug trade feeds enormous
    amounts of cash back into the Mexican and South American drug cartels.
    This, in turn, contributes to challenges faced by our law enforcement
    agencies on the Southwest border. JIATF-W works closely with agencies
    throughout the South Pacific, including the French Armed Forces in
    Polynesia, as well as both Australian and New Zealand law enforcement,
    military and intelligence services to counter this lucrative drug
    trade.
        Center for Excellence for Disaster Management (CFE-DM): CFE-DM
    increases capacity of U.S. and partner nation military forces to
    respond effectively to disasters through its education training and
    applied research and information sharing programs. The Center annually
    trains about 8,000 military and civilian annually. This includes
    training deployable forces and foreign audiences. Broad based
    partnerships encourage a robust collection of best practices.
        The Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (DKI
    APCSS): While DKI APCSS is no longer a Direct Reporting Unit to
    USPACOM, I have formally designated it as a ``Mission Partner'' to
    underscore its importance to the USPACOM mission set. DKI APCSS builds
    and sustains key regional partnerships and partner nation capacity and
    in enhances cooperation on regional security challenges. The Center's
    courses, workshops, dialogues, and alumni engagements directly support
    OSD-Policy and USPACOM priorities and are integrated into USPACOM's
    Theater Campaign Order. Focus areas include rule-of-law based
    governance emphasizing civilian oversight of militaries, defense
    institution building, enhancing regional security architecture--
    particularly ASEAN, collaborative approaches to maritime security and
    domain awareness and counterterrorism, and improved capability and
    cooperation in HADR. DKI APCSS has major competitive advantages in
    location, credibility, convening power, and alumni network. Those
    advantages and the Center's focus on substantive and sustainable
    outcomes have broadly improved security sector governance.
    Specifically, this organization is leading DOD in the implementation of
    UNSCR 1325 (Women, Peace, and Security) and the U.S. National Action
    Plan to achieve greater inclusion of women in the security sector.
        Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC): U.S. Transportation
    Command's JECC responds rapidly and effectively to events in the Indo-
    Asia-Pacific. JECC's support is critical to USPACOM's ability to
    facilitate rapid establishment of joint force headquarters, fulfill
    Global Response Force (GRF) execution, and bridge joint operational
    requirements by providing mission-tailored, ready joint capability
    packages. JECC supports real-world real world contingencies and
    operational plans.
        Logistics Support Agreements (LSAs): USPACOM continues to view LSAs
    as critical Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) enablers. We have 14
    agreements in the region, to include the recent agreement with India.
    We continue to actively work with eligible but as yet uncommitted
    partners to conclude as many of these agreements as possible, and I
    personally stress their importance in my engagements with partner
    country leadership. The logistics agreement with Japan was especially
    useful during the Kumamoto earthquake disaster, and I often share this
    experience with our other partners.
        Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar (PASOLS): PASOLS is
    an annual forum that brings together senior logisticians from 30
    countries in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. The goal is to strengthen regional
    cooperation, improve interoperability, and develop partner capacity to
    cooperatively address regional challenges. Singapore hosted PASOLS 45
    in November 2016. PASOLS is our most important annual logistics
    engagement event.
        Pacific Amphibious Leaders Symposium (PALS): PALS is an annual
    forum that brings together senior leaders of allied and partner nations
    throughout the Indo-Asia-Pacific to discuss key aspects amphibious
    operations, capabilities, crisis response, and interoperability. 22
    countries participated in PALS 2017, which was hosted by the Republic
    of Korea Marine Corps.
                                   conclusion
        United States interests in the Indo-Asia-Pacific are real and
    enduring. The growing challenges to our interests are daunting and
    cannot be overstated. In order to deter potential adversaries in the
    Indo-Asia-Pacific, we must continue to invest in critical capabilities,
    build a force posture that decreases our vulnerabilities and increases
    our resiliency, and reassure our allies and partners while encouraging
    them to be full and cooperative partners in their own defense and the
    defense of the rules-based international order. Our allies and partners
    are hedging and need reassurance. We must demonstrate our commitment in
    actions. The good news is that America's resolve is strong. I ask this
    committee to continue support for future capabilities that maintain our
    edge and prevent would-be challengers from gaining the upper hand.
        Thank you for your enduring support to the USPACOM team and our
    families who live and work in the Indo-Asia-Pacific--a region critical
    to America's future.

        Chairman McCain. Thank you, Admiral, and thank you for the
    outstanding job and your outstanding leadership that you are
    exhibiting in these very difficult and challenging times.
        Admiral, would you say that it is an accurate statement to
    say that the crisis on the Korean Peninsula now is reminiscent?
    It reminds one of a gradual Cuban Missile Crisis.
        Admiral Harris. Sir, I will just say that I think the
    crisis on the Korean Peninsula is real. It is the worst I have
    seen. I am not a student of the Cuban Missile Crisis, but what
    I know of it, it seems that we are faced with a threat and a
    leader who is intent on achieving his goal of a nuclear
    capability against the United States.
        Chairman McCain. That leader does not always behave in a
    rational fashion. Is that correct?
        Admiral Harris. That is correct, sir. I believe to ascribe
    terms like ``rational'' or ``irrational'' to Kim Jong-un is
    probably not helpful because he is what he is and we have to
    deal with the Kim Jong-un that is. I believe that he does have
    some kind of calculus that ends up in decisions. He takes the
    information and makes a decision, and those decisions are often
    brutal and the decisions are there to keep him and his family
    in power in North Korea.
        Chairman McCain. It is clear that his goal is a nuclear
    weapon and the means to deliver it to the United States of
    America. Is there any doubt in your mind?
        Admiral Harris. There is no doubt in my mind, Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. There is some question, given the
    difficulty of getting real reliable intelligence as to how
    close he is to reaching that goal?
        Admiral Harris. There is some doubt or questions within the
    intelligence community whether he has that capability today or
    whether he will soon have that capability. I have to assume
    that he has it, as do my fellow combatant commanders, Lori
    Robinson and John Hyten. We have to assume that the capability
    is real. We know what his intentions are and he is moving
    toward them.
        Chairman McCain. It is not a matter of whether. It is a
    matter of when.
        Admiral Harris. It is clearly a matter of when.
        As I said yesterday, KJU [Kim Jong-un] is not a leader who
    is afraid to fail in public. I talked about Thomas Edison. He
    tried a thousand times before he got the light bulb to work.
    KJU is going to continue to try until he gets his ICBMs to
    work.
        Chairman McCain. What does THAAD do for us in South Korea?
        Admiral Harris. I think the point that KJU's rhetoric--and
    he has threatened the United States and cities by name, and
    just this week, he threatened Australia by name. I think his
    rhetoric, if you were to project it on a graph, is going in one
    direction. Then his capability is approaching--the line of his
    capability is approaching the line of his rhetoric. Where those
    lines cross, I believe we are then at an inflexion point and we
    wake up to a new world.
        Chairman McCain. What does THAAD do for us?
        Admiral Harris. THAAD enables us and our South Korean
    allies to defend South Korea or a big portion of South Korea
    against the threat from North Korea. It is aimed at North
    Korea--the systems. It poses no threat on China.
        Chairman McCain. Is it not incredibly difficult to counter
    the 4,000 artillery pieces that the North Koreans have on the
    DMZ [demilitarized zone] which could attack a city of 26
    million people?
        Admiral Harris. It is, sir, and THAAD is not designed to
    counter those kinds of basic weapons.
        Chairman McCain. What is designed to do that? Anything?
        Admiral Harris. We do not have those kinds of weapons that
    can counter those rockets once they are launched.
        Chairman McCain. They can launch--they have the capability
    of a launch of those rockets.
        Admiral Harris. At this very moment, they have that
    capability, Senator.
        Chairman McCain. What do you make of China's reaction to
    our emplacement of THAAD, a purely defensive system? Does that
    give you an idea of China's real intentions about North Korea?
        Admiral Harris. I have said before, Chairman, that I
    believe it is preposterous that China would criticize South
    Korea or the United States for emplacing a purely defensive
    missile system against the North Korean threat when that North
    Korean threat owes its survival, if you will, to China. I
    believe that China, rather than criticize the United States or
    South Korea for defending ourselves, should rather put that
    energy toward convincing Kim Jong-un to stop his nuclear
    ambitions.
        Chairman McCain. We should be a bit skeptical about our
    ability to persuade the Chinese to break Kim Jong-un's quest
    for nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them.
        Admiral Harris. I have been skeptical up to the recent
    discussions between President Trump and President Xi. I think
    that we are seeing more activity, proactive, positive activity,
    from China in this case than we have seen in a long time. I
    remain cautiously optimistic but certainly hopeful.
        Chairman McCain. You would not rely on that.
        Admiral Harris. It is too early to tell, sir. It has only
    been a month or so, and it is too early to tell.
        Chairman McCain. I mean you would not rely on it at this
    time.
        Admiral Harris. I would not bet my farm on it.
        Chairman McCain. We thank you, Admiral. Senator Reed?
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Admiral
    Harris.
        Admiral Harris, I understand yesterday that you, in
    response to the House questions, took responsibility for the
    miscommunication regarding the Carl Vinson carrier group. First
    of all, I commend you for standing up and being accountable and
    responsible. That is what naval officers do. I think we better
    take significant steps to avoid such confusion in the future.
    It was quite detrimental not only here but, as you know, in
    South Korea particularly where there was a great deal of
    concern. In some quarters, they felt that they had been misled,
    indeed. I would urge you to ensure that such a miscoordination
    or miscommunication does not happen in the future.
        Admiral Harris. Yes, sir. Again, as I said yesterday, I am
    accountable and responsible for the communications that came
    out of that evolution. I am sorry that it happened, and all I
    can say is I will do better in the future.
        Senator Reed. Let me raise an issue that is linked to our
    diplomacy. We are asking China to take a much more assertive
    role in urging the North Koreans to decease and desist. Your
    view in terms of what concessions we should make, if any, to
    the Chinese to get them to cooperate. As both the chairman and
    I pointed out and as you pointed out, they are posing
    significant challenges to the rule of law in the Pacific, and
    we cannot ignore that. Your comments on this issue.
        Admiral Harris. Senator, I believe that great powers can
    walk and chew gum at the same time, and by that, I mean I think
    we can compliment and be grateful for China's efforts in North
    Korea even as we criticize them, rightfully so, and hold them
    accountable for actions that run counter to the international
    rules and norms elsewhere, in this case the South China Sea. I
    think we can do both, and we should do both. I do think China
    as a great power can handle that criticism on the one hand
    while they are dealing with this important critical
    international security issue on the other.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        Obviously, we are trying to approach the North Korean issue
    with a comprehensive strategy, diplomacy, military action,
    military preparedness certainly. One aspect is information
    warfare. My sense--and I am not the expert you are, but Kim
    Jong-un is paranoid about his own people and what information
    they are getting. Do you think we are making a sufficient
    effort to get information into North Korea through various
    means so that we can begin to bypass the Dear Leader and go to
    the people and that could create pressures on him to forestall
    his nuclear ambitions?
        Admiral Harris. I believe we are making an effort. I am not
    witting of the totality of that effort. I do believe that the
    people in North Korea revere Kim Jong-un. I believe that the
    idea that somehow we could--or somehow that they could rise up
    against Kim Jong-un, if the situation in North Korea became so
    dire, I think that might be a hollow hope. I believe that they
    consider him a god king, and they truly revere him as their
    leader. That is just based on what I have read in the press and
    reports of reporters who see the North Korean people start to
    cry and all of this and get emotional when he comes out on
    stage, and they seem to be real tears. I think that he has a
    hold on his people, that they are not going to rise up from
    beneath and topple him.
        Senator Reed. Again, I think your perception is much closer
    to the situation on the ground, but anything we can do to
    either raise questions--I do not think they will prompt an
    uprising immediately--not only questions among the population
    but questions among the Dear Leader, Kim Jong-un, that his
    people are being sort of influenced or there might be elements
    within the country that are thinking and embracing other ideas
    could be some leverage. I think we have to pursue aggressively
    this information operation. My sense is we are not.
        Admiral Harris. I must agree with you there.
        Senator Reed. Just one other issue. China has refused
    arbitration--to acknowledge the decision of the arbitration
    clause under the Law of the Sea with the Philippines, et
    cetera. We do have a successful example of Timor-Leste and
    Australia of working together, and that might be a model maybe
    just rhetorically that we could use with the Chinese and see if
    we could move them towards more cooperative aspects with the
    Philippines.
        Admiral Harris. I agree with you there.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        Admiral Harris. There are several good examples just in the
    Indo-Asia-Pacific where arbitration has worked, both parties
    have given a little and gotten a lot, and the overall picture
    in the region has been one of increased civility rather than
    decreased stability.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Admiral.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Inhofe?
        Senator Inhofe. Admiral, I think what has happened in the
    last few days has served as a wakeup call to the American
    people. Of course, we had our hearing on Tuesday. Four pretty
    smart people came to the same conclusion. We have you today,
    and of course, we have what happened yesterday at the White
    House, as well as other places in the House.
        We actually talked about this, and it has been obvious to
    those of us at this table that over a period of time, North
    Korea has, going all the way, arguably, back to the Scud, the
    times of the middle 1970s, progressing up to the Nodong and the
    Taepodong 1 and Taepodong 2, and then ultimately coming up to
    the statement that he makes that declares that North Korea--
    this is Kim Jong-un declares that, ``It is in final stages and
    preparations to test an intercontinental ballistic missile.''
        I think people now realize that it is an imminent threat.
    They really have not. I know that you deal in military circles
    and you are dealing with people who know what threat is. Those
    of us around this table are dealing with the general public,
    many of whom do not understand that.
        We had the hearing on Tuesday. They agreed that North Korea
    currently represents the single most imminent--they use
    ``imminent''--threat. Victor Cha testified, and this was his
    quote. He said the pace of North Korea's development shows that
    it wants to be able not just to field one missile that could
    reach the United States but a whole slew of them. The panel all
    agreed on that. We are getting to really talking about serious
    things here.
        You just now in response to a question or a comment by the
    chairman said that it is not a matter of if, but a matter of
    when.
        I think it is our job, and it is incumbent upon the
    military as well as us to let the American people know the
    nature of the threat that is out there.
        Now, last year, Senator Rounds and I led a group to your
    area, and we talked about some of the things that were taking
    place at that time. We came back and we had that hearing that
    you referred to. In the hearing, you were asked the question as
    to what are your needs there in terms of resourcing yourself
    adequately to meet the threats. Let us keep in mind that was a
    year ago, and the threat has totally been enhanced since that
    time. What would those needs be today as opposed to what we
    thought they were a year ago?
        Admiral Harris. Sir, last year, I commented that I had the
    forces to fight tonight, to respond tonight to any threat from
    North Korea or anywhere else for that matter. I still believe
    that today. I have the forces in place to fight tonight if
    necessary.
        What I am concerned about are those follow-on forces, the
    forces themselves, and also how those follow-on forces would
    get to the region in terms of airlift and sealift. I am worried
    about that.
        I am also worried about things like small diameter bombs
    and other kinds of munitions, anti-air warfare weapons for our
    fighter aircraft, adequate numbers of AIM-9D and AIM-120
    missiles. I worry about the shortage of anti-ship missiles,
    whether it is long-range anti-surface missiles, more Tomahawk,
    whatever, but a long-range anti-surface missile.
        I would like to see a fifth SSN in Guam, but more than the
    fifth SSN in Guam, our Nation is facing a significant shortage
    in terms of submarine numbers. As the combatant commander, for
    example, I only get 50 percent of the submarines that I think I
    need, but that is based on a 52-submarine force, and by the end
    of 2020, the Navy projects that attack submarine force will go
    down to 42. My requirements will not go down, but the pool from
    which they will be sourced is going to drop dramatically. I
    worry about that significantly as I look at the threat from
    North Korea, potential threat from China and from Russia.
        Senator Inhofe. Yes. We are going to be depending on you to
    advise us in not generalities but as you are getting into right
    now, priorities and the needs that you have. We will depend on
    that.
        I am also encouraged that our allies are more dependable
    than what they have been in the past. Is it your impression
    that they see this threat that is out there as we do? Does this
    open the door for maybe even more allies coming in our
    direction?
        Admiral Harris. I believe it does. If we define allies as
    partners like you are talking, you know, we only have five
    defense treaty allies in the world, and they are all in the
    Indo-Asia-Pacific. We have other countries that are close to
    us, that are partners with us. Singapore comes to mind, for
    example, Malaysia, Indonesia, India, Vietnam. These are
    countries that I think seek the United States as a security
    partner of choice.
        Senator Inhofe. Yes. Well, I appreciate that very much. My
    time has expired, but I would like to just ask one more
    question. You made the statement we should cease to be cautious
    about the language we use to describe these activities. Can you
    define that a little bit for us?
        Admiral Harris. I am not sure in what context you are
    referring to.
        Senator Inhofe. Okay. That was a quote. I will do that for
    the record and give you the context because it is something
    that a lot of us did not understand.
        Admiral Harris. Yes, sir.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Nelson?
        Senator Nelson. Admiral, thank you for your service, and
    you are certainly in the center of the action.
        Let me just reiterate here what you have said. You said
    that the Korean leader is intent on accomplishing his goals as
    a nuclearized nation. His goal is a nuclear warhead--these are
    my words, but I think it is what you meant--married to an ICBM
    that would have the capability of getting to the U.S. You said
    it is, in your opinion, not a matter of if, it is a matter of
    when. Is that a correct interpretation of what you have said?
        Admiral Harris. It is correct, sir.
        Senator Nelson. Okay.
        You also offered your opinion that you would not bet that
    China can basically deter the DPRK. Is that correct?
        Admiral Harris. To be clear, I have felt in the past that
    China, though it has the capability to influence and affect
    North Korean behavior, for a number of reasons it has chosen
    not to exert the full range of its influence.
        I think we are in a different place now. I think the jury
    is out. It is early days? We will have to see if China has
    changed its view of its willingness to influence KJU.
        Senator Nelson. Based on their previous activity, there is
    no indication that you think that that is going to occur,
    although you are hopeful.
        Admiral Harris. Right, sir. I mean, past performance is no
    indicator of future productivity. Up to a month or two ago, I
    would agree with that statement completely. After all, I made
    the statement. From a month ago forward, we are seeing some
    positive behavior from China, and I am encouraged by that. I
    think we should let this thing play out a little bit and see
    where it goes.
        Now, part of that, though, Kim Jong-un and the North Korean
    regime--you know, they can do something precipitative in the
    intervening period to test us, so we have to be careful and
    sensitive to that as well.
        Senator Nelson. Precisely.
        Up to this point, has China done anything that would give
    you an indication that they are going to be helpful to the
    United States in getting the Leader to back off of his intent
    to nuclearize an ICBM?
        Admiral Harris. Sir, I do not know for a fact what China
    has done in the last month or so. I know that they are active
    in working the problem set, but I do not know the specifics of
    what they have done. All I see are the activities that Kim
    Jong-un has done in the last month or so.
        Senator Nelson. That is still on his march to a nuclearized
    ICBM.
        Admiral Harris. I think it is, though in the last month, he
    has not tested a nuclear weapon. He has tested five this
    century and he has not tested a sixth. He has not launched an
    ICBM in the last month or ever. I do not know if there is a
    cause and effect or whether it just did not fit his schedule.
    Again, it is early days on this. I think we would be best
    served to see if this has a positive outcome or not and let
    President Xi work this issue as he and the President said they
    agreed they would.
        Senator Nelson. Sure.
        If China does not deter him, there is only one deterrence
    left, and that is the United States kinetic action. Is that
    what it looks like?
        Admiral Harris. I do not want to say that there is only
    that option left. I think if China's efforts fail, then we are
    back to where we were, status quo ante, if you will, to try to
    throw some Latin in there. At that point then, as the President
    has said, all options are on the table. I think he means just
    that: all options are on the table. My job in that framework is
    to provide military options, but there are other options I am
    sure. I would leave it to those experts to come up with those
    options. My options are hard power options.
        Senator Nelson. In your hard power options, you need
    additional materiel.
        Admiral Harris. I need additional materiel in the long run,
    but that is not to suggest that the hard power options that the
    U.S. military can provide the President would not be effective
    tonight, and they would be effective tonight if called upon to
    execute them.
        Senator Nelson. Final question. There was a report in The
    Washington Post--I think it was David Ignatius--several weeks
    ago in essence saying that the failures of the North Korean
    launches are directly attributable to the United States Is that
    anything that you want to talk about here?
        Admiral Harris. No, sir. It is not anything I want to talk
    about here.
        Senator Nelson. Okay.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Wicker?
        Senator Wicker. Admiral Harris, thank you for being here.
        As PACOM Commander, did you participate in authoring the
    2016 Force Structure Assessment?
        Admiral Harris. I participated in the run-up to that.
        Senator Wicker. Okay.
        Well, the Force Structure Assessment (FSA) called for a
    355-ship Navy, and in that regard, I want to follow up on a
    line of questioning from Senator Inhofe and drill down on that.
        Actually what the FSA said is that in a perfect world
    unconstrained by the budget, the requirement is 653 ships
    fleet-wide, but by accepting risk and understanding the
    financial restrictions that we have, the requirement is 355
    ships.
        Now, I want to help you get the ships you need. I want to
    help the Navy get the ships they need. When I am told 355 ships
    is the requirement, I believe that.
        Now, you mentioned to Senator Inhofe that you do not have
    enough submarines. You also mentioned some ammunition there.
    Let us talk about ships. How many submarines do you have now
    and how many do you need?
        Admiral Harris. Sir, I would prefer to give you those in a
    different setting on precise numbers.
        I will say that I only get half of what I need. I have a
    stated requirement that is based on steady state things that we
    do with our submarines today, and then I have a requirement
    that is based on warfighting, so in our war plans, these war
    plans state a requirement for X number of submarines in Y
    number of days. Those are two kinds of metrics. You got a
    number of submarines that you need to fight the war if it
    happens, and then you have got a number of submarines that I
    need today to do the day-to-day operations in the region. In
    today's numbers, I get about half of what my formally stated
    requirement is.
        Senator Wicker. You get half of 52.
        Admiral Harris. No, sir. I get half of my requirement.
    Fifty-two is the total number of attack submarines that the
    Navy has. My number of requirements is irrespective of the
    number of submarines the Navy has, but the number of submarines
    that I get are based on the number of submarines the Navy has.
    It is not just me. It is all the combatant commanders have
    these requirements, Central Command, EUCOM, and every other
    COM.
        Senator Wicker. Let me just ask you. If the Navy gets its
    355 ships and you get your portion of it, what will you be
    capable of doing that you cannot do now?
        Admiral Harris. The first thing is my steady state
    requirements in order to do the things that we do today in the
    climate that we are in will be much better. My fight tonight
    forces that I have to have ready to respond to a North Korean
    aggression or Chinese coercion or something like that--those
    forces will be more robust. Most importantly, the follow-on and
    surge forces will be available on shorter timelines. Today
    those follow-on forces are delayed by any number of reasons,
    and that delay is felt in terms of increased risk, longer
    timelines, and increased depths of Americans. If I have the
    number of ships that the Navy is asking for and the number of
    jets the Air Force is asking for and on and on, then both my
    ready to fight tonight forces will be richer, the timelines to
    get follow-on forces will be shortened, and the density of
    those follow-on forces will be thicker.
        Senator Wicker. Well, let me just say I think at some point
    it is going to be helpful to this committee if you are a little
    more specific about those details.
        Let me just follow up on something that Chairman McCain
    asked about. The threats that we have from North Korea now--
    there is the intercontinental ballistic missile. There is a
    better chance than not that we could shoot that down if that
    happened. There are these 4,000 short-range missiles. Your
    testimony is that there is essentially no defense from the
    South for those short-range missiles.
        Admiral Harris. Those are not missiles. Those are mostly
    artillery.
        Senator Wicker. Artillery, okay. There is no defense.
        Admiral Harris. Right. I mean, you are trying to shoot down
    an artillery round.
        Senator Wicker. Then the chairman asked you--and I do not
    think I understood the answer--what does THAAD get us.
        Admiral Harris. THAAD allows us an intercept capability to
    shoot down at the high altitude level ballistic missiles that
    go from North Korea to South Korea. It is a Terminal High
    Altitude Area Defense System aimed at ballistic missiles from
    North Korea against South Korea. That is a short distance
    across the earth, but the missiles have a high atmospheric
    altitude. That is what THAAD gives you.
        THAAD is part of a system that the South Koreans have. They
    have Patriot and they have the like. That is what those systems
    are designed for, to give an umbrella, if you will, to protect
    South Korea.
        Senator Wicker. It seems to me the chairman's point is the
    dramatic point, and that is that there is this short-range
    artillery and we have no defense should North Korea decide to
    unleash those.
        Admiral Harris. I think we should develop that capability.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you.
        Admiral Harris. Yes, sir.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Shaheen?
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Harris,
    thank you very much for your service to the country and for
    your leadership at this challenging time.
        One of the things that we heard from a panel of private
    sector but some former officials on North Korea on Tuesday was
    that the only impetus to encourage China to engage with North
    Korea in the way that we would like in order to help us get
    them to back down on their nuclear program would be if we
    initiated much more extensive sanctions on China with respect
    to their financial system or if they believed that there was
    imminent threat of war on the Korean Peninsula. Do you think
    that is an accurate analysis based on your experience with
    China in the region?
        Admiral Harris. Senator, I think it is an accurate
    analysis. I think there is some room in the sanctions regime,
    but there is not a lot left in there but there are some and we
    should apply all of those that we can before we are left with
    only the other choice.
        Senator Shaheen. Again, to be clear, they were suggesting
    that the sanctions should be on China on their financial
    system.
        Admiral Harris. There are some areas in the sanctions
    regime that we have not yet explored, and I think we should
    explore those before we do the kinetics.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        Everyone has acknowledged, obviously, that North Korea is
    working towards a nuclear weapon, and that is one of the things
    that has changed in North Korea. Have we seen an escalation of
    rhetoric from Kim Jong-un or are we seeing very much the same
    kinds of rhetoric but we are paying more attention to it today
    because of the nuclear threat?
        Admiral Harris. I think we are seeing increased rhetoric. I
    mean, just this week, he threatened Australia. This week, he
    said he was going to shoot out--sink the Carl Vinson with a
    single shot, which is ridiculous, but he said it. He is
    increasing his rhetoric. At the same time, he is continuing his
    aggressive weapons development. I think they are both going
    hand in hand. He had that parade last week which showed off all
    the weapon systems and stuff like that. I think all of that in
    combination lets me know and should let us all know that he is
    intent on his objective and he is moving toward that objective
    apace.
        Senator Shaheen. How much of a concern is it that at a time
    when we are trying to get China to work with us on North Korea,
    we are also very concerned about what they are doing in the
    South China Sea, their increasing effort to expand control of
    the seas in Southeast Asia? How much of a difficulty does that
    present for us as we are trying to work with them?
        Admiral Harris. As I said earlier, I do not think that it
    poses too much of a difficulty for a Nation like the United
    States. We should be able to compliment and applaud China's
    efforts on the one hand and then be willing to criticize them
    for the bad things they do on the other. I think from China's
    perspective, they can receive that criticism and continue to do
    the thing that benefits not just us but benefits them. A
    nuclear North Korea or the United States response to a nuclear
    North Korea, as you said, affects China almost as much as it
    would affect North Korea. I think it is in their best interest
    to do this and listen to what the international community, not
    just the United States, but the international community is
    saying about this.
        Senator Shaheen. I appreciate that you have taken
    responsibility for the Carl Vinson, and I understand as the
    Commander you would do that. As we are thinking about the
    messages that we send to North Korea, to China, to both our
    allies and enemies, how concerned should we be about that kind
    of a mixed message? Yesterday, one of the things that obviously
    got a lot of attention was the briefing at the White House of
    all of the Senators, which I assume North Korea watched very
    closely, as did most people. How should we think about being
    consistent about the messages that we are sending to the
    region?
        Admiral Harris. I agree with you. I think we should be
    consistent. The messaging was my fault not simply because I am
    the combatant commander, but it was my fault. I take the
    responsibility for it.
        What I said at the time was that we were going to pull the
    Carl Vinson out of Singapore. We were going to truncate the
    follow-on exercise that it was going to have with Australia,
    cancel the Australian port visit, and then send it to Northeast
    Asia. I did not specify a time in there. There was a lot of
    press reporting on that that implied that it was now, now, now.
    I could have stepped in and corrected that, and I did not. I
    feel responsible for that and I am remiss for not doing that.
    That is all on me. The messaging on this comes out of Pacific
    Command. I regret that it happened. I will try to do better,
    but it is on me.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Fischer?
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, Admiral Harris, for being here today.
        Some believe that our nuclear forces exist only to deter a
    nuclear attack on the Homeland here in the United States, but I
    think the recent events on the Korean Peninsula demonstrate the
    value of our extended deterrence commitments and the role that
    our nuclear forces play in assuring our allies of our resolve
    as well.
        Can you talk about the value that our allies place on our
    nuclear umbrella and the importance of modernizing our nuclear
    forces so that we can continue to deter our adversaries and
    also to reassure our allies?
        Admiral Harris. Ma'am, I think our allies are as dependent
    on our nuclear umbrella as we are. I think the shows of force
    that we provide against our adversaries are important. We have
    the USS Michigan, a guided missile SSGN--it is not a ballistic
    missile deterrent, but it is a guided missile submarine--is in
    Busan, South Korea right now. I think that sends a powerful
    signal of solidarity with our South Korean ally, and at the
    same time it shows the North Koreans that we are serious about
    our defense commitment to our ally on the peninsula.
        I think that the modernizing of our nuclear deterrent is
    absolutely critical to our Nation for our survival, and that
    means the follow-on Ohio-class submarines. That means the long-
    range strike bomber and upgraded ground-based ICBMs. I think
    the three together, the triad, is a proven success story. We
    should not experiment with some other formula. It has worked so
    far, and I think it will work well into the future. We must
    commit as a Nation to modernizing that force.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir. If we are going to have
    the message of deterrence and assurance, we need to stick to
    that modernization plan then. Correct?
        Admiral Harris. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Fischer. Last year, General Scaparrotti, who was
    then the Commander of the United States Forces in Korea, stated
    that the ISR was his top readiness challenge. He said, ``The
    United States Forces Korea requires increased multi-discipline,
    persistent ISR capabilities to maintain situational awareness
    and provide adequate decision space for the USFK, PACOM, and
    national senior leaders.''
        Can you discuss how the ISR enables your operations in the
    PACOM region and also in relation to the Korean Peninsula
    specifically?
        Admiral Harris. Yes, ma'am. I will try to stay on the right
    side of the classification here without getting into too many
    specifics.
        ISR, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, is the
    term that we apply to our ability to watch our adversaries, and
    we want to watch them all the time. There is not enough ISR to
    go around to meet all of the requirements of all of the
    combatant commanders. I have stated my requirements. This is
    like the submarine discussion. Central Command, who is fighting
    the fight today in the Middle East, AFRICOM in North Africa,
    and so on--they have their requirements for ISR also. It comes
    out of a pool, and all the services contribute to the pool in
    different ways.
        So I do not have what I need. I do not have the ability to
    persistently watch my adversaries all over the Indo-Asia-
    Pacific, over half the globe, 24/7. And I need it 24/7. I need
    it whatever 60 times 24 hours is. I need that minute by minute,
    and I do not have that. That is what General Scaparrotti was
    getting at, was persistent ISR. I am convinced that today, even
    though he is the European Command Commander, he would like more
    ISR as well.
        Senator Fischer. Can you give us some kind of idea on what
    percentage of those requirements you have fulfilled, if you
    have half? Do you have two-thirds?
        Admiral Harris. No. I probably have a tenth of my
    requirements are fulfilled.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Peters?
        Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Admiral
    Harris, for your testimony here today.
        Admiral Harris, you referenced in your written testimony
    that 9 out of 10 mega-cities in the world are in the Pacific
    Command's area of responsibility, and certainly given our
    conversation here today, Seoul is in the front and center of
    what we are talking about. It is my understanding that the
    number of mega-cities in the world is expected to expand in the
    coming years, and I expect that growth will continue in the
    Indo-Asia-Pacific theater as well.
        I am concerned, as well as I know a number of other folks,
    that our military is not adequately prepared for operations in
    mega-cities, so whether it is to fight or it is to assist in
    humanitarian assistance or disaster relief missions.
        I would like your opinion, Admiral, on how we should
    conduct training, and do you believe that additional training,
    particularly with the Army and Marine Corps, should focus on
    operations within mega-cities?
        Admiral Harris. Thanks, Senator. Just to be clear, that 9
    of 10--I stole a city from Joe Votel. One of those cities is
    Karachi, Pakistan, which is in his AOR but right next to mine.
        I believe the Army and the Marine Corps are getting after
    this issue of fighting in heavily urban terrains. I believe
    that they need to continue to do that for the reasons you have
    outlined, but also we are working with our allies and friends
    in the region to improve their capability at the same time we
    are working to improve our capability to fight in those dense
    urban environments.
        Senator Peters. Admiral Harris, as you know, China's One
    Belt, One Road strategy seeks to secure China's control over
    its continental and maritime interests but with the hopes of
    dominating Eurasia and exploiting natural resources for future
    economic gains. Such designs place the country at odds with the
    United States but also nations like Japan and India. Currently
    China's economy budget is four times greater than those of
    India. I want to talk a little bit about India and its
    importance to us.
        However, India is an ambitious and growing country both in
    population and its economy. China and India naturally have
    competing interests at stake on the continent and adjoining
    maritime domain. India has expressed concerns over China's
    recent expansion into the South China Sea and perceived
    strategic goals in the region, also given the fact that India
    is a democracy, certainly shares many values with us here in
    the United States.
        I would be curious as to how you view India's role in the
    future in the Indo-Pacific region and what we should be doing
    to strengthen that relationship and if there anything in
    particular that you would like to see expanded so that we can
    work more closely with our friends in India.
        Admiral Harris. Thank you, sir.
        I have made India a formal line of effort at Pacific
    Command because I believe it represents a tremendous
    opportunity for the United States at large and for PACOM in
    particular in the mil-to-mil space.
        We share democratic values with India. We are the world's
    two largest democracies. We share cultural values with Indian
    Americans that live and work and lead in our country. I think
    in the mil-to-mil space, we are in a very good place and
    getting better. India is purchasing a lot of American
    equipment. The world's second largest C-17 fleet, for example,
    is Indian. The Indians have P-8 Poseidon aircraft, U.S.
    helicopters, Howitzers, and on and on. I think there is a lot
    of opportunity there, and I think we should continue to work
    that.
        We are heavily involved--when I say ``we,'' the Navy is
    heavily involved in working with the Indians on the development
    of their aircraft carrier, their indigenous aircraft carrier.
    That is an exciting program. I think that India's geostrategic
    interests align perfectly with ours in terms of being concerned
    about China and in terms of the intersection of China and
    India, including along their long land border but especially in
    the Indian Ocean, especially in the approaches to the Indian
    Ocean, the Andaman Islands and the like.
        I welcome an improved relationship with India. They have
    invited me twice in the last 2 years to speak at their Raisina
    Dialogue, which I have accepted, and I want to continue to
    improve and grow the relationship between our two countries.
        Senator Peters. Thank you, Admiral.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Cotton?
        Senator Cotton. Admiral, welcome back. Thanks to you and
    all the men and women you lead in Pacific Command.
        I want to talk today about the strength of missile forces
    in the Indo-Pacific. Given the vast distances in that theater,
    missiles are a critical component of any country's security,
    including ours.
        How many of China's land-based missile forces do you
    estimate have a range of 500 to 5,500 kilometers?
        Admiral Harris. In an unclassified venue, Senator, over 90
    percent fall in that range.
        Senator Cotton. How many missiles do you have that fall
    into that range?
        Admiral Harris. I have none, sir.
        Senator Cotton. You have none.
        Admiral Harris. Right.
        Senator Cotton. Why do you have none?
        Admiral Harris. Because that range, 500 to 5,500
    kilometers, is defined in the INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear
    Forces] Treaty, the Intermediate Nuclear Force Treaty, which
    prohibits nuclear and cruise missiles and ICBMs--or nuclear and
    conventional cruise and ICBMs or ballistic missiles in that
    range. We adhere to the INF Treaty religiously, as we should.
    It is a treaty that we signed on for.
        China is not a signatory to the treaty. They are not
    obliged to follow that treaty, and we cannot legitimately, in
    my opinion, criticize China for developing weapons that
    contravene the treaty because they did not sign onto it.
        Senator Cotton. The only two parties to the treaty are
    Russia and the United States.
        Admiral Harris. That is correct. There are some successor
    states from the Soviet Union that the treaty applies, but it is
    really us and Russia are the signatories to the treaty. General
    Selva just testified recently that Russia has violated the
    treaty in the conventional sense with a conventional cruise
    missile. At the end of the day, what you have is you have a
    treaty that binds theoretically two countries, one of which
    violates it without being held to account. The other adheres to
    it rigidly, as it should. Then all the other countries in the
    world are not obliged to follow the treaty, and they do not.
    Those countries that are of concern, of course, are China in my
    region and Iran in General Votel's.
        Senator Cotton. Since you mentioned General Selva's
    testimony, I think this is what you are referring to. He spoke
    to the House Armed Services Committee last month in which he
    said the Russians have deployed a land-based cruise missile
    that violates the spirit and intent of the Intermediate Range
    Nuclear Forces Treaty and they do not intend to return to
    compliance. Is that what you were referring to?
        Admiral Harris. It was, sir.
        Senator Cotton. You agree with that assessment?
        Admiral Harris. I do.
        Senator Cotton. The INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
    Treaty] Treaty was originally reached between the United States
    and the Soviet Union after the buildup of, first, Soviet forces
    in the late 1970s and then our own forces, along with NATO, in
    1983, so it was geared primarily towards the European theater.
    Is that correct?
        Admiral Harris. It was geared toward the Soviet Union,
    Senator, in a bipolar world. This was at the height of the Cold
    War, and now we are in a multi-polar world where we have a lot
    of countries that are developing these weapons, including China
    that I worry about. I worry about their DF-21 and DF-26 missile
    programs, their anti-carrier ballistic missile programs, if you
    will.
        INF does not address missiles launched from ships or
    airplanes, but it focuses on those land-based systems.
        I think there is goodness in the INF Treaty. Anything you
    can do to limit nuclear weapons at large is a general good
    probably. The aspects of the INF Treaty that limit our ability
    to counter Chinese and other countries? cruise missiles, land-
    based missiles, I think is problematic.
        Senator Cotton. As you say, since the United States and
    Russia are the only two parties to the treaty and you and
    General Selva and several other United States Government
    officials have said that Russia is violating the treaty, that
    means the United States is the only country in the world--the
    only country in the world--that unilaterally refuses to build
    missiles that have a range of 500 to 5,500 kilometers.
        Admiral Harris. That is correct.
        Senator Cotton. Do you think that we should consider
    renegotiating or withdrawing from the treaty or declaring
    Russia in material breach?
        Admiral Harris. I would never advocate unilateral
    withdrawing from the treaty because of the nuclear limitation
    part of it. I do think we should look at renegotiating the
    treaty. We should consider that because, as you say, there are
    only two countries that signed onto it, and one of them does
    not follow it. That becomes a unilateral limitation on us.
        Senator Cotton. One final question then. There are three
    scenarios. One is Russia comes back into compliance. The United
    States and Russia comply. Two is we somehow withdraw from or
    abrogate or declare Russia in material breach so we are no
    longer unilaterally controlled. Or we continue the status quo
    where we unilaterally are the only country that refuses to
    develop those missiles. Surely, whatever you think between one
    and two, we cannot accept three going forward. Can we?
        Admiral Harris. Right.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you.
        Senator Reed [presiding]. Thank you.
        On behalf of the chairman, Senator Warren, please.
        Senator Warren. Thank you, and thank you for being here,
    Admiral Harris.
        In your posture statement last year, you described the
    Asia-Pacific rebalance as, quote, a strategic whole-of-
    government effort that guides and reinforces our military
    efforts integrating with diplomatic, political, and economic
    initiatives. Do you still agree with that statement, Admiral?
        Admiral Harris. I do, ma'am, but, you know, we labeled it
    ``the rebalance'' in the previous administration, and in the
    early days of the previous administration, we labeled it ``the
    pivot.''
        Senator Warren. Yes.
        Admiral Harris. I think the labeling of whatever it is we
    do is less important than the whatever it is we do.
        Senator Warren. That is actually the part I wanted to focus
    on because I agree with you on this.
        I just have a simple question right here and that is
    whether or not funding cuts to agencies that conduct diplomacy
    and development and perform other civilian functions would make
    your job easier or more difficult.
        Admiral Harris. I believe it would make it more difficult.
    I am reminded of what a famous French foreign minister
    Talleyrand said to the head of the French army, Marshal Ney--he
    said when my profession fails, yours must come to the rescue. I
    think that we are not in a good place if we are that
    bifurcated, but also I believe if the State Department fails
    earlier because of funding, then we will have to, ``Come to the
    rescue sooner.'' I would rather push that off to the right
    rather than bring it to the left.
        Senator Warren. Yes. That is a very powerful point.
        I just want to note for the record that the Trump
    administration in its budget blueprint calls for about a 29
    percent cut to the State Department and significant cuts to
    other agencies with international responsibilities. Obviously,
    there is a strong military component to the Asia-Pacific and
    keeping us safe there, but as you say, it takes a lot more in
    this vital region to keep us safe.
        I want to shift, if I can, to North Korea. We are dealing
    here with a real threat from a dangerous, unstable nuclear-
    armed state. Despite tough sanctions, North Korea continues to
    be provocative. I am concerned that this is a brewing crisis
    that would escalate without warning.
        We went over to the White House yesterday, and the
    administration said again that the time for strategic patience
    is over. Now, I think it is still not clear precisely what
    their new strategy is. By all accounts, North Korea is
    continuing its effort to develop a nuclear-armed
    intercontinental ballistic missile system that could reach the
    continental United States coastline. In recent days,
    administration officials have talked about shooting down a
    North Korean ballistic missile test.
        So, Admiral, could you talk a little bit about the
    strategic considerations that we must take into account before
    taking such an action? What are the up sides and down sides to
    shooting down one of their test missiles here?
        Admiral Harris. There is a capability issue. There is a
    geometry issue of where that missile is going and all of that.
    If they are launching a test missile that we think is going to
    land in Korea or Japan, then I think we are obligated to do
    what we can.
        Senator Warren. I understand that. Just shooting down a
    test missile in general. You know, as I understand it--I have
    been trying to read about this--experts on North Korea's war
    plans say that Kim Jong-un would likely respond to United
    States military action with massive escalation against South
    Korea, Japan, perhaps even the United States if we shot down a
    test missile. I am just asking. Do you agree with that
    assessment? If so, how is it that the administration should
    take this dynamic into account as it formulates its North Korea
    policy?
        Admiral Harris. A lot of what you are asking, Senator, is
    being deliberated in the administration now. I am in a
    difficult position when asked to comment on ongoing process
    deliberations. I am going to defer on that.
        But I will say that if we do not maintain credible combat
    power to confront Kim Jong-un's testing and his development
    goals, then we are going to be in a position to be blackmailed
    by KJU. I think that is probably a worst place to be. I think
    that we will all agree that everything that has been done up to
    this point has not worked in deterring Kim Jong-un, so all of
    the military capabilities that we have, all of our alliances,
    and all of that, have not deterred Kim Jong-un's desires to
    achieve a nuclear weapon that can reach the United States. We
    must stop that somehow. Those options I think are on the table.
    All of those options are on the table.
        Senator Warren. The ``somehow,'' though, is the question. I
    see that I am out of time. I am going to quit here and we can
    continue this conversation later. That is precisely the
    question we are trying to ask about and why it is that I am
    asking the question about what the up sides and down sides are
    if we take action directly on one of these testing missiles,
    whether or not it escalates and this gives him provocation to
    invade South Korea, to bomb Japan otherwise.
        Admiral Harris. I think he can manufacture whatever
    provocation he wants to attack South Korea or Japan or us. I
    think that the manufacture of provocations resides with him.
        Senator Warren. I appreciate that, but I have to say on
    this one, Admiral, I think that we need the administration to
    be clearer about what they have in mind here. You rightly say
    this is under discussion, but what that means to me at this
    point is that no one knows exactly what it is that we plan to
    do here. If no one knows here in the United States, if the
    American people do not know, if Kim Jong-un does not have some
    idea of what the response will be if he continues this testing,
    I think it is difficult for it to have any kind of deterrent
    effect. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. On behalf of Chairman McCain, Senator
    Ernst, please.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Admiral, thank you very much for being here today. I know
    the region is in a really precarious time and situation, but we
    do appreciate you taking time out to be with us.
        In a February speech, you warned the audience of the perils
    of linear thinking, saying instead that we need to think
    exponentially in order to develop strategies and technologies
    that give us an asymmetric advantage over regional threats. I
    absolutely 100 percent agree with you.
        As chair of the Emerging Threats and Capabilities
    Subcommittee, I am very, very frustrated with the oftentimes
    slow and very, very expensive nature of our defense
    acquisitions. You have even said this. You said that Lady Gaga
    was able to use over 300 drones during her Super Bowl halftime
    show, and why is it that she has that technological advantage
    and we cannot capitalize on that.
        How important is it that we are able to rapidly develop
    things like directed energy weapons and swarming micro-drones
    and, more importantly, if we had these technologies today,
    would we have more and better options in order to manage
    threats that are posed by North Korea and China?
        Admiral Harris. I think, Senator, that innovation, in
    general, is one of those asymmetric advantages that America
    enjoys over every adversary. We are in a place now where our
    adversaries recognize that, and they are trying to close that
    innovation gap.
        They do it in a number of ways. They send their best and
    brightest students to American universities, and then they get
    educated here and they go back home and they carry that
    knowledge back to them. They also do it illegally. They steal
    our secrets. They steal our industrial processes, and they
    shorten their acquisition timelines dramatically, so they can
    field things at a rate faster than we can.
        We are often encumbered, rightly so, by law, regulation,
    and policy, and I think that we should look at trying to figure
    out how to shorten that process. The law is important,
    obviously. Regulations are important. Policy is important, but
    when the three in combination allow us to be overtaken in
    technological development by those countries that would do us
    harm, I think we should step back and look at that and ask
    ourselves is this the right way forward.
        I am pleased with things like the DIUx effort that has been
    undertaken by the Department, the SCO effort, the Special
    Capabilities Office, that resides in OSD to try to go flash to
    bang quicker, and things like that.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you. I do agree. I think it is
    important that we are able to move rapidly. You are absolutely
    correct about the regulations and the laws. Great. They were
    there for a purpose, but we do have to go back and I think
    scrutinize some of those regulations to make sure that we are
    able to move as rapidly as some of our near-peer competitors or
    even those that are not near-peer competitors with off-the-
    shelf technology.
        You mentioned ISIS in some of your comments, and in your
    testimony, of course, active engagement between the United
    States and our partner countries is very critical to
    maintaining the stability in that region, not just with those
    state actors like North Korea but also with partners, engaging
    those partners in the fight against ISIS.
        If you could, can you speak to the importance of engaging
    some of those partners and how we are moving forward in that
    fight against ISIS?
        Admiral Harris. Sure. In the Indo-Asia-Pacific, the
    countries that we work closest with in the ISIS fight are
    Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Bangladesh. That is
    us, Australia, and New Zealand that are involved in this effort
    to work with those countries to help them fight that threat
    themselves. The entity that does that for me is SOCPAC, Special
    Operations Command Pacific, and Major General Bryan Fenton and
    his team are actively engaged in providing advice and
    assistance to those countries, most principally right now in
    the southern Philippines. I am encouraged by the work they are
    doing. I think it is God's work and I am pleased with where we
    are in that fight in the Indo-Asia-Pacific.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you very much. Thank you, Admiral.
    Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Senator Reed. Senator Sullivan has to go to the floor to
    preside. Senator Hirono has graciously yielded to Senator
    Sullivan.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and my
    colleague, Senator Hirono, from Hawaii, I very much appreciate
    letting me jump ahead.
        In Alaska and Hawaii, we have a lot invested in this, as
    you know, Admiral, given that our citizens are going to be
    impacted sooner than anyone else with regard to the
    intercontinental ballistic missile threat.
        I just want to begin by thanking you again for your
    service, Admiral.
        Would you agree that we are clearly in a more direct threat
    phase with regard to the North Korean challenge to our
    citizens?
        Admiral Harris. I agree, Senator.
        Senator Sullivan. We were all over at the White House
    describing a strategy, integrated strategy, that the
    administration is putting together with regard to very focused
    initially on enhanced diplomacy. Do you also believe that the
    threat of military force or at least keeping it on the table
    actually enhances our diplomatic efforts?
        Admiral Harris. It does. I believe that the best
    enhancement to diplomacy is a strong military capability.
        Senator Sullivan. You mentioned the unprecedented weapons
    testing. I have a chart that I want you to take a look at and
    also not if but when North Korea will have a capacity to range
    the continental United States. Again, Alaska and Hawaii would
    be ranged earlier with the ICBM. The chart shows that Kim Jong-
    un has actually conducted more tests than his father and
    grandfather combined. Do you see that abating at all?
        Admiral Harris. I do not see it abating at all if the
    trajectory remains as you have depicted it on the graphic.
        Senator Sullivan. He is learning even when he fails.
        Admiral Harris. Right, and he is not afraid to fail in
    public.
        Senator Sullivan. One thing just for my colleagues here, we
    are going to be working on a bipartisan enhanced Homeland
    missile defense bill, and I certainly think that is in order
    and hopefully we will be able to get a number of members on
    this committee to be cosponsors of that.
        Admiral, I next want to turn to the South China Sea and the
    issue of freedom of navigation operations. Earlier you had
    mentioned at high level assurances that the Chinese were not
    doing that. Standing next to the President in the rose garden,
    President Xi stated, ``China does not intend to pursue the
    militarization of these islands.'' What do you make of that
    statement by the President of China?
        Admiral Harris. I wanted to believe him.
        Senator Sullivan. Since he made that I think it was a year
    and a half ago, what has happened?
        Admiral Harris. They have militarized the South China Sea,
    sir.
        Senator Sullivan. Despite the fact that the president was
    standing next to our President, that was not an accurate
    statement.
        Admiral Harris. The reality is that China has militarized
    the South China Sea.
        Maybe it is the other graphic, but if you look at a graphic
    of Fiery Cross Reef, you will see a 10,000-foot runway, weapons
    emplacements, fighter aircraft hangars, and barracks for
    troops. Clearly that facility which is 700 acres, a military
    facility--all that capability does not exist to rescue the odd
    fisherman that gets lost out there.
        Senator Sullivan. This committee, as you know, has been
    very interested in our policies and execution with regard to
    freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea. The
    Trump administration is developing its own policies. I was
    supportive of Secretary Carter's pronouncements of flying,
    sailing, and operating anywhere international law allows, but
    the execution of that was done rather meekly.
        Could you give us a sense as the new administration is
    developing these policies, what principles they should be
    looking at, the important role of whether we are doing it under
    innocent passage or not? Also when you look at this last graph,
    this last chart, you see that the Scarborough Shoal has not
    been militarized yet, but it is very strategic. What would
    happen if that became militarized by China? What should we do
    to stop that militarization? Should we draw a red line at that
    important geographic point in the South China Sea? Just give us
    a sense on those issues, innocent passage, allies, Scarborough
    Shoal, what we should be looking at, what the new Trump
    administration should be looking at in terms of their FONOPS
    [U.S. Freedom of Navigation Operations] policy in the South
    China Sea.
        Admiral Harris. So, Senator, I have made it clear to this
    committee and other testimonies in other committees that I am a
    supporter of freedom of navigation operations. I think we
    should do them not to send a signal about territoriality or
    sovereignty or anything like that. We should send a signal that
    we do, in fact, fly, sail, and operate wherever international
    allows. The freedom of navigation operations exist just for
    that reason, to exercise our freedom of navigation and the
    freedom of navigation that is exercised or could be exercised
    by all countries in the world.
        One of the beneficiaries of our freedom of navigation
    operations in the South China Sea would be China, for example,
    in other waters. That is the right of all nations to operate in
    accordance with international law. I believe we should continue
    to do those.
        There is a whole range of them, whether you challenge what
    is considered an illegal baseline claim, whether you do
    innocent passage and do not notify a country who maintains that
    you must notify them before you do an innocent passage, or you
    can go within a 12-mile territorial limit of an island or
    feature or whatever that does not deserve one under
    international law. There is any number of ways to conduct
    freedom of navigation operations, and we should not limit
    ourselves to any of those.
        With regard to Scarborough Shoal, I think it is an
    important part of this region for the reasons depicted on that
    chart. It would give China a, ``trifecta of bases in the South
    China Sea with Woody Island, the Paracels to the northwest, the
    Spratlys and their seven bases there to the south, and then
    Scarborough Shoal would give them a key base in the
    northeast.'' They have not done that yet.
        I hesitate to draw red lines. I think red lines are
    problematic for a number of reasons, but we should communicate
    clearly with China that we do not want them to reclaim and then
    militarize Scarborough Shoal.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Admiral. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Senator Reed. On behalf of Chairman McCain, Senator Hirono,
    please.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Aloha, Admiral Harris. Always good to see you. Thank you
    for your service.
        There is a lot of focus, of course, on the ongoing and the
    heightened threat from North Korea, and in light of that, of
    course, I want to ensure that Hawaii is adequately protected.
        PMRF [Pacific Missile Range Facility] is a national
    treasure that cannot be replicated anywhere else with its
    undersea and missile testing ranges. There has been discussion
    about operationalizing Aegis Ashore located at PMRF. Is Hawaii
    adequately protected at this time given intelligence
    assessments of North Korea's current capability and the missile
    defense systems we have in place? Going forward, as North
    Korea's capabilities advance, what will be needed to defend the
    United States and in particular Hawaii from North Korean
    advancements?
        Admiral Harris. Thanks, Senator. I agree with you that
    Pacific Missile Range Facility on Kauai is a national treasure.
    I have gone on record as supporting the idea that we should
    develop and acquire a defensive Hawaii radar that gives Hawaii
    the ability to see the space, if you will, in the face of
    potential ballistic missile attacks. We have the SBX. That is
    the X-band radar that sits on a self-propelled oil platform
    that has to be sustained and refurbished and all of that. I
    think a land-based permanent facility to do that--a defensive
    Hawaii radar--is necessary.
        I believe today General Robinson will tell you that Hawaii
    is adequately defended. I think in the future as North Korea
    continues its weapons development program, that we need to look
    at all ways to improve the defense of Hawaii, including ground-
    based interceptors. I think we should study putting ground-
    based interceptors in Hawaii. I a not smart enough to know if
    we should or not, but I think we should study it and I think
    that would be the complement to a defensive Hawaii radar.
        Senator Hirono. Do you have any sense as to the time frame
    for moving from the radar capability that you say we need to
    develop right now and going with the ground-based?
        Admiral Harris. No, ma'am. I do not have an idea.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you.
        Congress has called for headquarters reductions in recent
    years, and while I agree with reducing redundancy where it
    makes sense and eliminating waste, I am not a fan of salami
    sliced percentage cuts across headquarters entities. I am a
    strong advocate of taking a look at each headquarters
    operations, the personnel mix, the evolving threats and
    challenges that face us, as well as previous growth of a
    particular headquarters before recommending any cuts.
        As you mentioned in your testimony, PACOM has been in its
    AOR [Area of Responsibility] for four of the five challenges
    which drive United States defense planning and budgeting. That
    is in your AOR. Can you talk about PACOM headquarters in terms
    of staffing levels over the last 20 years or so, reductions you
    have taken or are about to be applied in light of the
    challenges you face, including a hostile North Korea, a rising
    China, Russia, and ISIS in your AOR? How will actual and
    proposed staffing reductions impact PACOM's ability to succeed
    with all of the challenges you face?
        Admiral Harris. Yes, ma'am. Over the past 40 years, PACOM
    has averaged less than 800 personnel, and that is officers,
    enlisted personnel, and DOD civilians. We have been pretty
    consistent over 40 years at that level, and PACOM is the
    largest geographic combatant command with one of the smallest
    staffs.
        That said, I think we all should seek efficiencies where we
    can, but I am not supportive of the idea of salami slicing
    either. Across that 40 years of staff manning levels at PACOM,
    the threat has increased because in that intervening 40 years,
    we do not have a bipolar world anymore. We have the threats I
    talked about in my testimony, China, Russia, North Korea, and
    ISIS. I continue to--and my staff--we continue to work closely
    with OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint
    Staff on our manning levels.
        Senator Hirono. I would like for us to be very cognizant of
    the kind of impacts the across-the-board types of cuts will
    have.
        You have already mentioned--if you do not mind, Mr.
    Chairman, I would like to get to one more question. You have
    already mentioned the support that you have for AFSEA. In your
    written testimony, you state that you have concerns about some
    of the changes made to security cooperation authorities in the
    2017 NDAA. I just wanted to give you an opportunity to tell us
    how these changes could impact the DOD counternarcotic
    interests, national crime programs in the PACOM AOR.
        Admiral Harris. It could potentially, depending on how the
    cuts are actually effected, it could dramatically affect Joint
    Interagency Task Force West, which goes after counternarcotics
    programs.
        I am also concerned about programs like IMET, International
    Military Education and Training, which I think is one of the
    best foreign assistance programs out there because that is
    where we bring foreign bright, up and coming mid-grade officers
    to the United States for senior military education for a year
    at a time with their families, and they get immersed in
    American culture, ideas and living in an environment where we
    practice daily civilian control of the military. I think it is
    important that we fund these programs, and I am concerned if
    those programs were to be cut.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you for that.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Reed. On behalf of Chairman McCain, Senator Rounds,
    please.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, sir.
        Admiral, first of all, thank you for your service to our
    country. I think the first time that we met was in Hawaii. I
    was on Senator Inhofe's CODEL with him. Your briefing to our
    CODEL that day was alarming, to say the least, and an eye-
    opening with regard to the breadth, the scope, the size of the
    area in which your team was responsible for the security not
    just of our forces but in conjunction with our allies as well.
        One item that caught our attention at that time was simply
    the time frame in which to respond to adversarial activity. I
    would like to talk about some of the newer technologies that
    are being employed or that may be very well employed in the
    near future. In particular, when we talk about the unique
    problem set that you have got there, the trifecta of few land-
    based areas from which to operate extreme distances, some of
    the most challenging and contested environments to operate in,
    I believe the deterrence value of long-range strike to hold
    targets at risk, targets that are quickly becoming harder and
    harder to access, what are your thoughts on the possibility of
    a conventional warhead variant of the proposed long-range
    stand-off weapon?
        Admiral Harris. So, Senator, I think that we are going to
    have to look at that in terms of INF because currently that is
    the law, that is the treaty that we follow if you are talking a
    land-based capability. We are not limited in air and surface
    launch.
        Senator Rounds. Thinking about air-launched----
        Admiral Harris. I think we should explore all of that
    because more capability against the threats we face is what is
    needed in the Pacific Command.
        Senator Rounds. What about with regard to hypersonics?
    Right now I think in open source documents, there is some
    pretty clear evidence that both Russia and China have been
    looking at hypersonics, the ability to deliver weapons at mach
    5.0.
        Admiral Harris. I have to be careful when I talk
    hypersonics in an open hearing. I am concerned about Chinese
    and Russian hypersonic weapons development, and I have
    expressed those concerns in the right places.
        Senator Rounds. Is this an area where perhaps our own
    technology development needs to be reviewed in terms of our
    ability to respond to those possible threats?
        Admiral Harris. I think that we must improve our ability to
    defend against and conduct--defend against hypersonic weapons
    and develop our own hypersonic weapons. Again, in the
    development of hypersonic weapons, offensive hypersonic
    weapons, we are going to run up against treaty restrictions.
        Senator Rounds. We have been talking now about some unique
    types of new weapon developments, both ours and theirs. At the
    same time when we talk about readiness, it seems that we get
    caught up and we assume that we are simply being able to
    maintain the readiness that is necessary.
        I would like to give you an opportunity to talk a little
    bit about perhaps our lack of readiness in some areas. In
    particular, I am thinking right now, as an example, every time
    we get together with a team of experts such as yourself, we
    hear some perhaps horror stories about the inability to even
    take care of some of our existing assets. In particular, I am
    going to draw attention to the fact that we have got the USS
    Boise sitting at port, not in depot but at port. Here is a
    nuclear-powered submarine, which is not operational at this
    time, and I understand that there are two other boats in the
    same category.
        Can you give us any anecdotal or additional information on
    other areas in which you have seen or have been frustrated by
    our inability to maintain the readiness necessary for you to do
    your mission?
        Admiral Harris. That is one of the issues that fall into
    the service chiefs bailiwicks, if you will. Their
    responsibility is to man, train, and equip the force for use by
    the combatant commanders and meeting the national command
    authority's responsibilities. I too share your concerns when I
    look across the enterprise, not just at the Navy but across the
    enterprise, at shortfalls in follow-on force and surge force
    readiness.
        Senator Rounds. Are you prepared to give us any examples?
        Admiral Harris. No, sir, not in this hearing.
        Senator Rounds. All right. Thank you, sir.
        Admiral Harris. Thank you, sir.
        Senator Rounds. Once again, thank you for your service,
    sir.
        Admiral Harris. Yes, sir.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        On behalf of the chairman, let me recognize Senator
    Donnelly.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral, thank you so much for your service to the country.
        When we were home here in the Senate working in our States
    was when this developed with the aircraft carrier. Based on the
    words of the President and Secretary Mattis, I spent that time
    in meeting after meeting with people in Indiana telling them
    how serious we take this North Korea situation and telling them
    we take it so serious that we have our aircraft carrier, the
    Carl Vinson, heading to North Korea right now. It turned out
    that was wrong. I felt misled and I think my constituents were
    misled as well.
        What I do not understand is that when those comments were
    made, how nobody said anything that, hey, this is wrong. This
    is not correct. My question is how do we make sure this does
    not happen again. I know other members asked about this as
    well. I do not want to be in a position of having the people in
    my State think one thing and the reality is something else when
    we all take a pledge that we will speak truth to power, that if
    we see something that is not correct, we will tell people. We
    will let them know. You know, I have a great concern about
    that.
        Admiral Harris. Sir, I cannot say I am sorry enough, but I
    will try----
        Senator Donnelly. No. I am not asking you to say you are
    sorry.
        Admiral Harris. I am accountable for and responsible for
    the messaging that came out of that Carl Vinson issue. At the
    end of the day, what we said was the Carl Vinson was leaving
    Singapore, truncating its exercise, canceling its port visit,
    and heading to Northeast Asia. That is where it is today. It is
    within striking range of North Korea if the President were to
    call on it.
        Now, that messaging was not done well, and that messaging
    is on me.
        Senator Donnelly. Actually it was--we heard the President
    and Secretary Mattis say exercises are being canceled. It is
    heading to North Korea right now. Some day I am going to the
    cemetery. I hope it is not next week. I hope it is not next
    year, but at some point I am going to the cemetery. I would say
    I am going to the cemetery. That is technically correct. I just
    want to make sure that the information I give to the people in
    my State is accurate, and if you can make sure, if you see
    something that you look at and you go, look, this really seems
    sideways, that it be communicated right away so that the people
    of this country actually know what is going on and our allies
    know what is going on.
        Have you seen any sanctions against North Korea that have
    worked or that have slowed down Kim Jong-un's efforts?
        Admiral Harris. None.
        Senator Donnelly. None.
        Have you seen in the last month or the last couple of
    months Kim Jong-un slow down his efforts to achieve his goals
    of mating up the nuclear warhead with missiles?
        Admiral Harris. I have not seen anything in the last--since
    I have been at Pacific Command. In the last month, though,
    since President Trump and President Xi got together and
    President Xi and China seemed to be more willing to exercise
    their influence on North Korea, North Korea has not done any of
    the testing that Senator Sullivan showed on his graph, the bad
    testing, the nuclear test or ICBM testing. I think it is early
    days yet to draw a direct correlation. I think we are going to
    have to wait and see and give President Xi and China a chance,
    assuming that in that interim period, Kim Jong-un does not do a
    nuclear test or an ICBM test or something like that.
        Senator Donnelly. What is your understanding--and by that I
    mean PACOM's understanding--of China's biggest influence point
    pushing back against North Korea where North Korea will pay
    attention?
        Admiral Harris. Where China's?
        Senator Donnelly. Where China's biggest strength to slow
    down North Korea and their efforts is.
        Admiral Harris. I think their biggest strength in doing
    that is economic. Eighty percent of North Korea's economy is
    China-based. 80 percent. I think China has a powerful lever to
    apply on North Korea. From China's perspective, you know, they
    are concerned about two things. They are concerned about a
    unified Korean Peninsula that is aligned with the United
    States, and they are worried about refugees, should North Korea
    collapse precipitously.
        Senator Donnelly. The time went by so fast. I have a
    million more questions for you, but I will only ask one more
    and that is the rules of engagement for our ships. Are any of
    our ships sailing solo right now near North Korean waters? If
    so, do we have a plan that if they are intercepted or engaged,
    that we have air cover for them immediately, that we have
    fellow ships coming by immediately so that they are protected
    and we do not have another Pueblo type situation?
        Admiral Harris. That is a great question. All of our ships
    that are operating in the Sea of Japan east sea area operate
    under standing rules of engagement. They have what they need in
    my opinion and belief to defend themselves.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Reed. On behalf of Chairman McCain, Senator Perdue,
    please.
        Senator Perdue. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral, thank you and thank you for all the men and women
    in your theater.
        You know, since the Barbary pirates and our first spy
    frigates, the United States has always dealt with our foreign
    policy and our national interest from a position of strength. I
    am very concerned, as we sit here today, that we are in the
    middle of a paradigm shift relative to the other super powers.
        In your mind since 2000, China has spent or is spending
    today approximately six times more on their military. These are
    constant dollars, 2016 dollars. Is that directionally correct
    in your mind, about six times compared to just 15 years ago?
        Admiral Harris. Probably, sir, but I do not have the data.
    I have sent the curve, and the curve is dramatic in the amount
    of defense spending that they are doing based on just what they
    tell us and they are probably spending higher.
        Senator Perdue. Well, that is what I want to get to. The
    Stockholm International Peace Research Institute--and I believe
    that China is spending more than even these numbers reveal.
    That is an 11 percent compound annual growth rate just since
    2000.
        Here is the real problem. In 2017, they are going to spend
    about $240 billion, but adjusting for purchase power parity, in
    real terms, apples to apples to the United States, that is $826
    billion compared to our $630 billion. Directionally would you
    think that is reasonable to look at it that way?
        Admiral Harris. I think it would be. We have looked at
    purchasing power parity in a general sense with regard to
    China, and they reached that purchasing power parity point
    already in comparison with the United States.
        Senator Perdue. I lived over there. I have manufactured
    over there. I have sold over there. When you adjust the
    currency and the ability that they have to buy their weapons
    and their systems cheaper than we are and I look at the
    developments just this year--you know, you educated me a year
    or so ago about their DF-26, the carrier killer, the first
    aircraft was coming online this year, the fact that 95 percent
    of their missiles violate the INF Treaty, and that they far
    outrange our capabilities today. Would you say today, sir, that
    China is on parity with the United States military capability
    in the Pacific region?
        Admiral Harris. I would not in terms of our asymmetric
    advantages and the quality of our equipment and our people.
    That said, quantity has a quality all its own, and they are
    swiftly moving to exceed the United States in terms of numbers
    of ships and submarines and aircraft and the like, so we have
    to continue to work and resource those asymmetric advantages
    that we have. Certainly China is trying to close that gap in
    every regime.
        Senator Perdue. Within the next five years, if you continue
    that trajectory, there is every reason to believe on a
    purchasing power parity basis that they will actually double
    the amount of investment that we have in the military. That is
    just a projection.
        What I am concerned about is this. Independent of the
    money, I believe we have a supply chain war. You have talked
    about it today. It takes us much longer. It is much more
    expensive. We have many more regulations to go through. Tell us
    what we can do to help you as a combatant commander compete in
    the supply chain war that you have to deal with as well. Your
    quote here today is I do not have what I need today against the
    current threats. We know that their threats are only going to
    increase geometrically over the next 5 to 10 years. I believe
    they have got a 2025 strategy, and I am very concerned. You
    have talked about that as well. Tell us what we can do to help
    you, sir.
        Admiral Harris. Senator, I think that the best thing that
    the Congress can do to help me today is end sequestration and
    give us a budget.
        Senator Perdue. When you look at the China strategy in the
    Southeast Asia region, particularly in the South China Sea, it
    is pretty easy. You have said they militarized it. I agree with
    that. What are there intentions for that outer ring of islands?
    It looks like the next level of national interest--I am talking
    about Marianas and Guam, all the way to Palau in that area.
    Have you see any indications now that they have sights on those
    as well?
        Admiral Harris. Not indications like what we are seeing in
    the South China Sea where they are doing land reclamation
    activities and that kind of stuff, island building. They are
    working to influence countries in that region, small island
    nations, economically to bring them in line with their world
    view.
        Senator Perdue. Two last questions real quick. Are you
    concerned about the PLA's recent reorganization? Then also the
    Russia-China cooperation is at a higher level now than it has
    been in 30 years. Are you concerned about those two
    developments?
        Admiral Harris. I am concerned about the former, which is
    the PLA's reorganization into joint theater commands. We went
    through a period of joint integration, if you will, as a result
    of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in the late 1980s--mid 1980s.
    Since then I think we have become a much more effective joint
    fighting force across our military. I think China is learning
    from that. They watch it, they study. They are going to this
    theater joint combined command structure. I think that will
    make them better. It certainly made us better. I worry about
    that.
        Then your second question?
        Senator Perdue. The Russia-China cooperation, their
    military cooperation.
        Admiral Harris. I think that is more temporary because they
    need each other right now more than anything else. I would not
    be concerned about a long-term alliance with Russia and China
    if history is a guide.
        Senator Perdue. Thank you, sir.
        Admiral Harris. Thank you.
        Senator Reed. On behalf of the chairman, Senator
    Blumenthal, please.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, sir, for being with us again, and thank you to
    you and the men and women under your command for their
    extraordinary service to our Nation.
        When you were here last year, you told me that you were
    concerned about Russian and Chinese undersea warfare
    capabilities, specifically their modernized submarines. You
    noted, number one, the Russians took no break from developing
    submarine capability following the Cold War and they have
    ballistic missile submarines now in their force fleet in the
    Pacific. Number two, the Chinese are building a new class of
    such submarines that may have the capability to threaten us.
    You also told us that your submarine requirement in PACOM still
    has not been met.
        In your testimony this year, you mentioned a second
    ballistic missile submarine in the Pacific and the Russians
    plan to build and send six new attack submarines to the Pacific
    by 2021. You state--I am quoting--``Potential adversary
    submarine activity has tripled from 2008 levels--tripled--
    requiring a corresponding increase of U.S. activity to maintain
    undersea superiority.''
        You, I think, support the Navy's 2016 force structure
    assessment which calls for an increase from 48 to 66 attack
    submarines as part of a larger 355-ship Navy. In February,
    Acting Secretary of the Navy Sean Stackley submitted to
    Secretary Mattis an accelerated fleet plan which supports three
    additional Virginia submarines, one more in fiscal year 2021,
    fiscal year 2022, and fiscal year 2023, respectively. Are you
    supportive of this accelerated plan, and do you believe that it
    will give you, give our Nation the necessary capability to
    address these looming and increasing threats from both Russia
    and China in the Pacific?
        Admiral Harris. Sure, sir. I am completely supportive of
    the plan, and I am completely supportive of the effort to move
    to the left construction of these Virginia-class submarines.
    They will clearly increase our Nation's capability and, if
    assigned to PACOM, PACOM's capability. Three or four are
    inadequate in the grand scheme based simply on my requirements,
    which have to be adjudicated with the requirements of all the
    other combatant commands who have legitimate needs for
    submarines in their regions as well.
        Senator Blumenthal. Can you give us an assessment of our
    adversaries' anti-submarine warfare capability?
        Admiral Harris. Today the U.S. reigns supreme in the
    undersea realm and in anti-submarine warfare. Our adversaries,
    particularly China and Russia, are closing that gap because
    they understand that the gap exists and they are working to
    reduce our asymmetric advantage. I think that we have to
    continue to keep that advantage. I do not want it to be a fair
    fight if we have to go into a fight with these folks. That
    means that we have to continue to resource the development and
    to continue development of our undersea capability and our
    anti-submarine warfare capabilities.
        Senator Blumenthal. Does North Korea have significant anti-
    submarine warfare capability?
        Admiral Harris. They do not.
        Senator Blumenthal. Are they developing that capability?
        Admiral Harris. They are working on it. They are trying.
    They have submarines. They have a lot of them, a lot smaller
    submarines. They are diesels. They have an SSB which is a
    ballistic missile capable diesel submarine. They recognize the
    advantages and what the submarine gives them in terms of
    warfighting, but they are a long way from developing a
    submarine force that is comparable to any other country that we
    talk about in the region.
        Senator Blumenthal. On the F-35, in your testimony you
    note, ``the forward stationing and deployment of the fifth
    generation airframes to the region continues to be a priority
    for your command.'' Do you continue to believe that the F-35 is
    necessary in that part of the world for the defense of our
    allies? Japan is going to be acquiring them and others.
        Admiral Harris. Senator, I believe that the F-35 is
    critical most in PACOM than any other region of the world
    because of the threat that we face and what the F-35 brings to
    the fight. The F-22's also from Hawaii and Alaska. Those fifth
    generation fighters will allow us to get inside the A2/AD, area
    denial/area defense, capabilities of our adversaries,
    particularly China and the region. We are going to need fifth
    generation fighters to get in there, and they provide that.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you very much, Admiral. Thanks
    for your great work at PACOM and throughout your career. Thank
    you.
        Senator Reed. On behalf of the chairman, Senator Graham,
    please.
        Senator Graham. Thank you.
        Admiral, I want to echo that, to thank you for your service
    and all those who are with you here today and in your command.
        Is China's activity in the South China Sea, in terms of
    militarizing the region, getting better or worse or about the
    same?
        Admiral Harris. I am not sure what better means, but they
    are militarizing more now than they were last year.
        Senator Graham. I would say that is worse.
        Admiral Harris. From our perspective, that is worse.
        Senator Graham. Did they understand that we are serious
    about that is a bad thing?
        Admiral Harris. I believe they are.
        Senator Graham. They apparently do not care.
        Admiral Harris. To date.
        Senator Graham. How do we make them care?
        Admiral Harris. I think we have to demonstrate credible
    combat power on the one hand and powerful diplomacy on the
    other.
        Senator Graham. Is it fair to say that unless something
    changes, North Korea is likely to have an ICBM with a nuclear
    warhead that can reach America by 2020?
        Admiral Harris. I do not want to put a timeline on that,
    sir, in this hearing. It is safe to say that they will have one
    soon. They will match rhetoric to capabilities.
        Senator Graham. Okay, great.
        Why do they want that missile?
        Admiral Harris. I beg your pardon?
        Senator Graham. What is the purpose of having that missile?
        Admiral Harris. One, they want to be recognized as a
    nuclear power, and two, they want to ensure their survival.
        Senator Graham. In their mind, it is an insurance policy?
        Admiral Harris. Partly.
        Senator Graham. From an American point of view, what kind
    of threat does that present to us?
        Admiral Harris. It presents today, even though I do not
    believe they have the full capability today, they threaten the
    28,000 American troops in South Korea plus their families,
    55,000 American troops plus their families in Japan, our South
    Korean and Japanese allies and----
        Senator Graham. What about the Homeland? If they get an
    ICBM with a nuclear weapon attached, what kind of threat do you
    see at the Homeland?
        Admiral Harris. Depending on the nuclear weapon, depending
    on the missile, it could reach the eastern seaboard. They could
    reach us right here in this building.
        Senator Graham. Is it fair to say that is what they want to
    do in the western part of the United States? California is
    probably an easier target initially.
        Admiral Harris. I believe they want to be able to threaten
    the United States.
        Senator Graham. Well, what kind of threat would that be to
    us? That would be a bad thing. Right?
        Admiral Harris. That would be a terrible thing, sir.
        Senator Graham. Do you believe it should be the policy of
    the United States never to let that happen?
        Admiral Harris. I beg your pardon?
        Senator Graham. It should be the policy of the United
    States to never allow North Korea to develop an ICBM with a
    warhead that could hit America.
        Admiral Harris. I believe that is correct.
        Senator Graham. Do you believe that the only way they will
    change that policy--their desire--is if they believe that the
    regime could be taken down by us if they continue to develop an
    ICBM? Without credible military threat in the mind of North
    Koreans, they are going to plow ahead.
        Admiral Harris. I believe that generally, but I believe
    that China might be able to exert its influence.
        Senator Graham. Do you believe China could change North
    Korea's behavior absent a belief by North Korea that we would
    use military force to stop their ICBM program?
        Admiral Harris. I do not.
        Senator Graham. Do you believe that China would act
    stronger and more bold if they believed credible military force
    was on the table to stop North Korea?
        Admiral Harris. I do.
        Senator Graham. It seems to me that the policy of the
    United States, given the Admiral's advice--and you are really
    good at what you do--that we should all agree that it is not
    good for America for North Korea to have an ICBM with a warhead
    attached, and it is really not good for China. Is it?
        Admiral Harris. I believe it is not good for China.
        Senator Graham. Why do they not believe that?
        Admiral Harris. Because they have their own calculus, their
    own----
        Senator Graham. Do you think they are beginning to reshape
    their calculus in light of our reaction to North Korea?
        Admiral Harris. I hope so, but it is early days.
        Senator Graham. In terms of China--leverage on North Korea,
    you said it was substantial.
        Admiral Harris. Their leverage is potentially substantial.
        Senator Graham. The best way to avoid a military conflict
    with North Korea over their missile program is for China to
    wake up North Korea to the reality of what threat that presents
    to North Korea and China. Is that fair to say?
        Admiral Harris. That is fair to say.
        Senator Graham. Is it also fair to say that we do not have
    any intentions of invading North Korea at all? Nobody has told
    you get ready to invade North Korea.
        Admiral Harris. That is not fair to say, sir. I believe the
    President has said that all options are on the table.
        Senator Graham. Yes, but I mean we are not going to just go
    in and take North Korea down.
        Admiral Harris. Sir, I do not want to get into what we
    could or could not do.
        Senator Graham. Well, North Korea thinks we are going to
    invade at any moment. Do you think that is part of our national
    security strategy is without provocation to attack North Korea?
        Admiral Harris. I think North Korea has provided
    provocation already in terms of----
        Senator Graham. Without provocation, it is not our policy
    to attack North Korea.
        Admiral Harris. They have provoked us already, sir.
        Senator Graham. I said but if they stopped it, they do not
    have anything to worry about.
        Admiral Harris. Then we will have to look at it.
        Senator Graham. That is all I am saying.
        Admiral Harris. That is a decision that----
        Senator Graham. If North Korea is listening, none of us
    want to invade your country.
        Senator McCaskill. They are.
        Senator Graham. Okay, well, good.
        Here is the point. All of this military force going that
    way is to deter them from being able to hit us and protect our
    allies. Right?
        Admiral Harris. Right.
        Senator Graham. We are trying to deter them from hurting
    us. We are not sending a bunch of people over there to invade
    their country without provocation. Is that fair to say?
        Admiral Harris. Right.
        Senator Graham. Good. I hope they understand that and I
    hope China understands that. Thank you.
        Admiral Harris. Yes, sir.
        Senator Reed. On behalf of the chairman, Senator McCaskill,
    please.
        Senator McCaskill. Thank you.
        Last year, Admiral, General Scaparrotti testified at this
    hearing that North Korea has one of the largest chemical and
    biological weapons stockpiles and research programs in the
    world. Do you agree with that assessment?
        Admiral Harris. I do.
        Senator McCaskill. Do you believe that the facts that we
    know about the death of the half brother to Kim Jong-un was
    likely assassinated with VX nerve agent?
        Admiral Harris. I do, Senator. That is just based on open
    source reporting.
        Senator McCaskill. Right. We have not confirmed that it was
    used.
        Admiral Harris. I beg your pardon?
        Senator McCaskill. We have not independently confirmed that
    it was used.
        Admiral Harris. I have not seen reporting to reflect that.
        Senator McCaskill. Do you know enough about their delivery
    capabilities of chemical and biological weapons at this point
    to adequately be prepared to defend our allies and our American
    soldiers and families in the surrounding vicinities?
        Admiral Harris. I do not know enough about all of their
    capabilities, including those that we saw or probably saw in
    Malaysia. I think that is part of the readiness calculus that
    we have to go through when we consider the threat from North
    Korea.
        Senator McCaskill. Do you have the appropriate CBRN, which
    is an acronym for the record that is our defense, equipment
    necessary for chemical and biological attacks?
        Admiral Harris. I believe that General Brooks does have
    that for the forces that are in Korea now.
        Senator McCaskill. Okay. What about in Japan?
        Admiral Harris. I cannot speak to that.
        Senator McCaskill. I would love a follow-up on that.
        Admiral Harris. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator McCaskill. You know, we do chem Stuff at Fort
    Leonard Wood in Missouri. It is our biological defense center,
    and I am concerned if they are using nerve agents to kill
    family members, they certainly are not going to hesitate to use
    nerve agents to kill American soldiers and our South Korean
    allies and innocent citizens. I would like to follow up on
    that.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]

        Admiral Harris. You bet.
        Senator McCaskill. Do you think we should deploy THAAD to
    Japan?
        Admiral Harris. I believe that is a decision that Japan is
    going to have to make. I think that Japan should have some kind
    of a system like that, but whether it is THAAD or Aegis Ashore
    or both or some other system, they are going to have to make
    that decision.
        Senator McCaskill. As you know, I had the opportunity to
    take an exhausting tour of all of our anti-ballistic missile
    systems last year, and you kindly hosted us when we were at
    PACOM, but had a chance to be in both South Korea to see
    Patriot systems, understand that THAAD was going in and also,
    obviously, in Guam to observe the THAAD. I just want to make
    sure we know what the needs are in terms of THAAD in light of
    what North Korea is up to.
        Admiral Harris. We work with Japan and describe the
    capability that THAAD would provide that would give them also
    Aegis Ashore and potentially other systems. That will be a
    Japanese decision. It could be----
        Senator McCaskill. We indicated to them that we would be
    cooperative in trying to deploy THAAD to Japan.
        Admiral Harris. Right.
        Senator McCaskill. Okay.
        Admiral Harris. To be clear on that, I have not reached an
    agreement with Japan on deploying THAAD.
        Senator McCaskill. Right.
        Admiral Harris. That is a different issue than your initial
    question, which was should Japan buy THAAD.
        Senator McCaskill. Right.
        Admiral Harris. If they buy it, then it is theirs and it
    relieves me of the burden of having to deploy it and the joint
    force.
        Senator McCaskill. Right.
        Admiral Harris. I think that whole decision, whether they
    buy THAAD or Aegis Ashore or asks us to support them or
    whatever, that is a decision yet to be made.
        Senator McCaskill. It seems to me that the discussion that
    we are trying to have about pressure on China to do the right
    thing, especially in light of what I learned from you in terms
    of China's activities, the militarization in the South China
    Sea, that the more talk we have publicly about THAAD more
    places, I think the more it behooves what I think is our policy
    right now as it relates to North Korea.
        Very quickly. I do not think anybody has touched on what I
    have been really confused by and worried by in light of how
    important the Philippines is to the United States military.
    Could you assess the current situation of the United States-
    Philippines relations? Because I know what strategic importance
    those islands have to your capability of defending United
    States of America.
        Admiral Harris. So, ma'am, I believe that we are in a
    reasonably good place in the mil-to-mil space with our forces
    in the Philippines, AFP [Phillipine Armed Forces], if you will.
    We have a range of activities that we continue to do with the
    AFP, including Balikatan, which is the big exercise that kicks
    off next month in May.
        Our EDCA, that is Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement--
    that is the five Philippine bases that we have agreed with the
    Government of the Philippines to improve in some cases for us
    to use. That is proceeding apace.
        Most importantly, our Special Operations Command folks are
    active in the southern Philippines to combat terrorism in
    conjunction with and in support of the armed forces of the
    Philippines. Our guys are doing the advising and assisting but
    not the direct action. That is the responsibility of the armed
    forces of the Philippines there, and I think that is working.
        Senator McCaskill. Duterte is not having a negative impact
    on the mil-to-mil relationship is what you are telling me.
        Admiral Harris. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator McCaskill. Well, that is reassuring because he kind
    of goes in the category with Kim Jong-un in terms of what the
    hell. Right?
        Admiral Harris. We are in a good place in the mil-to-mil
    space with the Philippines.
        Senator McCaskill. Right. Thank you.
        Chairman McCain [presiding]. Senator King?
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        First, sort of parenthetically your exchange with Senator
    Ernst about the importance of innovation, the center of
    innovation in this country is, of course, Silicon Valley and
    those innovative industries that are located in other parts of
    the country. We had testimony a couple months ago that Silicon
    Valley essentially will not deal with the Defense Department
    because of the, I would call it, Byzantine--but that would be
    an insult to the Byzantine Empire--the cumbersome and slow
    process in our procurement. That is an urgent national priority
    in my opinion. I just wanted to echo that conversation.
        The second point I think that is important, all the
    discussion we have had in the last few days about North Korea
    and the last few weeks and months have focused on the ICBM and
    the threat to the Homeland via a missile.
        The other problem that I think deserves attention is that
    North Korea is a serial proliferator of nuclear technology, and
    I think as serious a threat as an ICBM is a nuclear weapon, a
    nuclear warhead in the hold of a tramp steamer sponsored by
    ISIS headed into Miami or the Port of Baltimore. That to me is
    an imminent threat that is almost as dangerous as the ICBM
    threat. That has got to be part of this calculation.
        Here is my question. Historically, the regimes in North
    Korea have gone through these cycles of provocation and rising
    tension and then there has been some negotiation and
    concessions. If this is part of that pattern, what does Kim
    Jong-un want?
        Admiral Harris. So, Senator, I do not think it is any
    longer a part of the pattern of his grandfather and his father.
    As you correctly stated, in the past, they have gone into this
    provocation cycle. I have talked about it a lot in Hawaii where
    there is a provocation, there is a negotiation, and there is a
    concession. It is peaceful for a while, and then the cycle
    starts again. I think Kim Jong un has elevated that to a cycle
    of provocation, provocation, provocation. What he is seeking
    his own independent nuclear deterrent in order to threaten the
    United States and to ensure the continuance of his regime.
        Senator King. To follow up on Senator Graham's questions,
    if you go back to history, this situation that we are in now
    has often been analogized recently to the Cuban Missile Crisis.
    Part of the settlement in that case was we had a military force
    and the threat of military force. We had the blockade, but
    ultimately there was an agreement not to invade Cuba. That was
    part of the agreement that ended up with the missiles coming
    out.
        Is this a moment--if regime preservation is his goal, is
    there a moment where we could enter into those kinds of
    negotiations?
        Admiral Harris. Sir, I do not want to limit the President's
    options as he decides which course of action to take. I will
    simply say that in the Cuban Missile Crisis, the key to that
    was credible combat power that allowed diplomacy to act.
        Senator King. I completely agree.
        Admiral Harris. I believe that my part of this problem set
    is to provide that credible combat power in the face of North
    Korean provocation.
        Senator King. I totally accept that. I understand that the
    Vinson has to be there and all the other capabilities that we
    have, and that is part of this process. I am talking about how
    do we eventually get out of this, and that involves some
    discussion of what is it that is necessary to end this.
        China is a little puzzling to me because we have always
    talked about economic pressure. China has, I agree, total
    pressure ability with regard to North Korea. There is no law
    that says that the missiles that he is developing and the
    nuclear weapons only can go south and east. He is as close to
    Beijing as he is Tokyo. If I were China, I would not want a
    nuclear-armed guy right on my border who could threaten me. It
    seems to me that China really has to start to think about the
    threat that--if he achieves this, suddenly he can threaten
    anybody within 1,000 miles.
        Admiral Harris. I agree with you there.
        Senator King. Finally, we talked about the vulnerability of
    Seoul. As I talk to people in Maine, they are surprised to
    learn that Seoul is about 30 miles from the North Korean border
    from the DMZ and the enormous threat from just artillery. We
    talked about that we do not have any defense for that now.
        Do the technologies that have been developed in conjunction
    with the Israelis, David's Sling and Iron Dome, have any
    relevance in this case?
        Admiral Harris. Sir, I do not know. I am not smart enough
    on that. I will have to get back to you on that.
        Senator King. I would appreciate that because that is a
    technology that has been effective in defending Israel from
    short-range rockets, and perhaps it would be something that
    would change the military calculus.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]

        Admiral Harris. I will get back to you, sir.
        Senator King. Thank you, Admiral.
        Chairman McCain. Well, thank you, Admiral. I think that
    what we are talking about that the North Koreans have is
    rockets, which would not lend itself to Iron Dome defenses.
        These are very difficult and challenging times, and it is
    very fortuitous that you are here before this committee
    particularly after the briefing that we had yesterday at the
    White House. You have been able to give us some of the details
    that only a military commander can provide us with and will
    help us to make judgments.
        I do not think any of us are predicting conflict, and I
    think it would be wrong for us to do that, but I also believe
    that we should make every preparation. Although military
    activity would be a last resort, it is something that we cannot
    completely rule out. I emphasize it would be absolutely, I
    know, this President's last resort.
        You are the tip of the spear, Admiral, and so the fact that
    you will have men and women ready, if called upon, in the
    testimony you have given today is reassuring to this member and
    I believe to the other members of the committee. I know how
    much you look forward to coming back and testifying before this
    committee. I know it is one of the highlights of your time as
    Commander in the Pacific, but this testimony today was
    extremely important and I thank you for taking the time and
    speaking in a very informative and articulate fashion.
        Senator Reed?
        Senator Reed. Mr. Chairman, I concur.
        Once again, Admiral, thank you and make sure you thank the
    men and women under your command.
        Chairman McCain. This hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:48 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Jim Inhofe
                           recent north korea actions
        1. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Harris, how does the recent spike in
    missile and rocket testing by North Korea shape future United States
    plans and requirements on the Korean Peninsula?
        Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]

        2. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Harris, what is your assessment of the
    security challenges East Asia will face if North Korea continues to
    test nuclear weapons and develop longer range ballistic missile
    capabilities in violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions?
        Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]
                          broader asia-pacific region
        3. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Harris, what do you see as United States
    security priorities in the Asia-Pacific region?
        Admiral Harris. USPACOM's first priority is to ensure that the
    United States Homeland, citizens, and critical infrastructure are
    secure from threats and challenges in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.
    This is accompished by maintaining credible combat power which is
    postured, equipped, and operated in a manner that leaves little doubt
    in adversaries' minds that the U.S. will defeat them should deterrence
    fail. We closely synchronize with USSTRATCOM and USNORTHCOM. Our second
    priority is to be ready to fight tonight. This is accomplished in all
    domains by maintaining high states of materiel and training readiness,
    the presence of power projection capabilities forward in the theater,
    and joint force resiliency generated by the dispersement of our
    capabilities and the decisive aggregation of effects. Our third
    priority is to lead the national focus on the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.
    Resident within this region are the 4 potential adversaries (China,
    North Korea, Russia, and ISIS) that we will either fight tonight or who
    currently represent the greatest, long term existential threats to the
    United States. Only the continuous presence of the United States, by,
    with, and through our allies and partners for the last 70 years has
    kept the Indo-Asia-Pacific region from devolving into major regional
    conflict. Our fourth priority is to have unity of purpose. Unity of
    purpose will be attained by accomplishing the ends specified by the
    National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the
    Global Employment of the Force through the execution of the USPACOM
    Theater Strategy, the Theater Campaign Plan, and the Theater Campaign
    Order. This method specifically aligns policies, plans, programs, and
    processes, up and down the chain of command. Our approach to the above
    is based on partnership, presence, and military readiness. USPACOM
    recognizes the global significance of the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, and
    understands that challenges are best met together. Therefore, we will
    remain an engaged and trusted ally and partner, committed to preserving
    the security, stability, and freedom necessary for enduring regional
    prosperity. We will collaborate with the Services and other combatant
    commands to achieve our mission. We must communicate effectively to
    convey our intent and resolve through clearly aligned words and
    actions. We must synchronize externally to achieve unity of effort
    within the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Interagency to enhance
    the effectiveness of our strategic approach, which consists of four
    core elements: Maintain credible combat power and work with the
    Services and DOD to build the right force of the future. Maintain a
    network of like-minded allies and partners to cultivate principled
    security networks which reinforce the rules-based international order.
    Continue to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows
    and encourage others to do the same. Be ready to counter the coercive
    actions of regional competitors. Counter transnational threats and
    challenges, including terrorism and illegal/illicit trafficking, and be
    ready to respond to natural disasters.

        4. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Harris, how would you prioritize the
    challenges and threats in the region?
        Admiral Harris. In the near-term, North Korea represents a clear
    danger to regional peace and stability, and remains the most dangerous
    and unpredictable state in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. Pyongyang shows no
    willingness to seriously discuss denuclearization, and I assess that
    Kim Jong-un (KJU) will never do so. He is committed to developing
    nuclear weapons and the technology to make them small enough to
    effectively threaten the U.S. KJU declared in his New Year's address
    that he would test an intercontinental ballistic missle (ICBM) capable
    of reaching the U.S. mainland. We witnessed KJU's apparent successful
    ICBM test launch on July 3, 2017; and although it was not capable of
    reaching the U.S. mainland, it could have reached the state of Alaska.
    For the longer-term, China will be the United States primary strategic
    competitor. China continues to rapidly transform its military into a
    high-tech force capable of regional dominance, with a growing ability
    to support China's desire for global reach and influence. The People's
    Liberation Army implemented an extensive reorganization, which included
    the creation of geographic Theater Commands, each organized and
    equipped for specific regional contingencies. With significant
    investments in advanced military systems, along with unresolved
    territorial and resource disputes, a continued lack of transparency on
    China's strategic intent has many nations in the region concerned about
    future Chinese actions. China is also using its economic power to
    expand its regional and global influence and to weaken United States
    ties with Indo-Asia-Pacific nations. The most significant example of
    this approach is the ambitious ``One Belt, One Road'' initiative, wich
    is China's effort to expand through influence throughout Eurasia and
    across the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Russia's military and political
    commitment to the Indo-Asia-Pacific also continued to grow over the
    past year and it remains an existential threat to the United States.
    The Russian Pacific Fleet has stepped up deployments to promote Russian
    influence throughout the region, to include visits to traditional
    United States allies such as the Philippines. Military forces in the
    Eastern Military District are being modernized after decades of
    neglect. Finally, the Indo-Asia-Pacific is seeing a rise in extremist
    violence inspired, and in some areas supported, by the Islamic State of
    Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in the Philippines, Bangladesh, Indonesia, and
    Malaysia. The recent ISIS-Philippines occupation of the Islamic City of
    Marawi in Mindanao points to the scale of the ISIS threat in the
    region.

        5. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Harris, what more do we need to do to
    regarding our alliances and partnerships in the region?
        Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]

        6. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Harris, are our alliances and
    partnerships on solid footing or do we have reason to be concerned?
        Admiral Harris. I would characterize our alliances with Australia,
    Japan, and ROK as ``solid''; our alliance with Philippines as
    ``stable''; and our alliance with Thailand as ``needs work.'' I believe
    our partnerships with India, New Zealand, Singapore, Indonesia,
    Malaysia, and Vietnam are solid. That said, in all cases, we must
    actively nurture and strengthen them. The behavior of North Korea,
    China, and Russia, and the growth of Violent Extremist Organizations
    such as ISIS, are cause for concern for all nations in the Indo-Asia-
    Pacific region. These challenges drive our long-standing alliances and
    partnerships closer and present opportunities for stronger security
    cooperation with countries such as Vietnam, India, Indonesia, Malaysia,
    and Sri Lanka. Our alliance with Australia is an anchor of peace and
    stability in the region and globally. We rely heavily on Australia for
    its leadership and advanced military capabilities across all
    warfighting domains. This year marks the 75th anniversary of the battle
    of Coral Sea, as well as the 99th anniversary of World War I's Battle
    of Hamel--the first time the United States and Australia fought
    together and the first time United States troops fought under foreign
    command. No other nation has fought alongside the United States more in
    the 20th and 21st Centuries than Australia. High-level engagements in
    New York in May (POTUS and Australian Prime Minister), and Sydney in
    June (Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff, and me with our counterparts), exhibit the continued
    bond between our two countries. The United States-Japan alliance is a
    principal source of strength in the region and globally, with Japan a
    strong partner in our efforts to pressure North Korea to abandon its
    nuclear ambitions, and in our efforts to improve Chinese behavior in
    the region. I believe the senior leader engagements between Japan and
    the U.S. over the last few months, as evident in President Trump's and
    Prime Minister Abe's recent meetings at the G20, Secretary Mattis'
    visit to Japan in February (his first overseas trip as SecDef),
    SecDef's phone calls with Defense Minister Inada following North Korean
    provocations, and my meetings with Prime Minister Abe, Foreign Minister
    Kishida, and Defense Minister Inada in May 2017, clearly demonstrate
    the commitment our nations have in maintaining regional, as well as
    global, peace and security. I look forward to increased cooperation and
    information sharing among the United States-Japan-ROK trilateral
    partnership, and I see great potential for a future United States-
    Japan-Australia-India quadrilateral partnership. The United States-
    Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance remains ironclad. North Korea
    continues to present a clear and dangerous threat to the United States,
    the ROK, and Japan, and I continue to call for more trilateral
    cooperation among our three nations. In the Philippines, while I look
    forward to continued and close cooperation in areas central to both our
    national and security interests, including humanitarian assistance and
    disaster relief, counterterrorism, cyber security, and maritime
    security, the new political leadership there continues to send mixed
    signals about how valuable it views its alliance with us. Our Enhanced
    Defense Cooperation Agreement progress remains on schedule and
    conversations between us and the Philippine Armed Forces (AFP) reassure
    us of their continued commitment to the alliance. We are also assisting
    the AFP in their important counter-terrorism campaign against ISIS in
    the southern Philippines. In February 2017, I reiterated the United
    States commitment to Thailand when I spoke at the opening ceremony of
    Exercise Cobra Gold, the largest multilateral military exercise in
    Southeast Asia. This was the first visit by a PACOM Commander since
    their coup in 2014. Also, as with the Philippines, Thailand is sending
    mixed signals regarding its view of the value of its alliance with the
    United States vis-a-vis China. We will continue to work with Thailand
    to advance prosperity and security for our nations and to encourage
    them to return to a fully functioning democracy as soon as possible,
    but I am concerned about China's growing influence. As I've said
    before, the best way to promote security and healthy civil-military
    relations in Thailand is to engage more, not less, with the Thai
    leadership.

        7. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Harris, are there specific areas or
    countries that need particular focus?
        Admiral Harris. Yes, there are several allies and partners in the
    Indo-Asia-Pacific that require additional focus for different reasons.
    Thailand and Philippines United States military engagement in Thailand,
    especially at the senior leader level, was limited in the wake of the
    2014 coup. Only recently have those engagements returned. Our
    engagement with some components of the Philippine security forces was
    limited as result of human rights abuses by their government's counter-
    narcotics campaign. In the voids created by the limited military-to-
    military engagement with Thailand and the Philippines, China and Russia
    aggressively worked to fill the security vacuum caused by our absence.
    Both political leaderships in Thailand and the Philippines have sent
    mixed signals about the value they place in their alliances with the
    United States, particularly vis-a-vis China and Russia. In the future,
    changes or cancelations of U.S. military engagements should be
    considered to be amongst the last, rather than the first, reaction to
    bad behavior by the government or national security forces. By
    remaining present and engaged with military partners, the U.S. military
    can be an enduring example of proper conduct for militaries and police
    forces, specifically with respect to compliance with human rights and
    international law. Japan and Republic of Korea (ROK) Japan and the ROK
    are dealing with the increased threat posed by North Korea's rapidly
    advancing missile and nuclear programs. Both countries benefit from
    advanced ballistic missile defense (BMD) foreign military sales and
    assistance, which provides the U.S. an opportunity to build trilateral,
    integrated BMD systems. While the tri-lateral relationship between
    United States-ROK-Japan is improving, there is still mistrust between
    Japan and ROK that limits full intelligence sharing and operational
    interoperability. India USPACOM has designated India a priority line of
    effort. While India continues to position itself to take on more of a
    leadership role in the Indian Ocean region, the U.S. should take the
    opportunity to strengthen the United States-Indian relationship.
    Designating India as a Major Defense Partner is the right step in this
    direction. USPACOM continues to grow the military-to-military
    relationship with the Indian Armed Forces. Taiwan We remain steadfastly
    committed to working with Taiwan and its democratic government to
    provide the defense articles necessary and consistent with the
    obligations set out in the Taiwan Relations Act We stand for the
    peaceful resolution of any issues in a manner acceptable to people on
    both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

        8. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Harris, how is China's resurgence
    affecting our longstanding partnerships and alliances in the region?
        Admiral Harris. From a military standpoint, China's resurgence is
    causing anxiety and concern for our allies and partners in the region.
    In some cases, this anxiety is bringing our alliances and partnerships
    closer, and is opening more opportunities to cooperate with our
    partners in the region, especially those partners with whom we have not
    had a historically strong relationship. However, in other cases, a
    combination of enormous economic pressure by China and uncertainty
    regarding United States commitment to the region weakens our alliances
    and partnerships. These countries are hedging their bets.

        9. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Harris, does North Korea's increasing
    belligerence offer opportunities to develop new or strengthen existing
    alliances in the region?
        Admiral Harris. North Korea's provocations, nuclear tests, and
    recent numerous ballistic missile launches have strengthened our
    alliances with Japan and Republic of Korea (ROK), as well as
    strengthened our relationships with other Indo-Asia-Pacific allies and
    partners. Specifically, North Korea's actions have encouraged more
    United States-Japan-ROK trilateral defense cooperation on Ballistic
    Missile Defense, Maritime Security and Interdiction efforts
    (enforcement of UN Security Council resolutions), and cyber and space
    collaboration in the region. These activities strengthen cooperation
    between our two key allies in Northeast Asia. In October 2016, the
    Chiefs of Defense from Japan, ROK, and the United States held their
    first face-to-face meeting to discuss these ongoing threats from North
    Korea. These trilateral events improve teamwork, readiness, and the
    capability to respond quickly to various situations in the Indo-Asia-
    Pacific region, ranging from disaster relief to maritime security
    activities. Any opportunity we have to participate together is a
    tangible symbol of U.S. commitment and reflects a shared interest in
    ensuring a climate for regional stability and security.
                          force posture in the pacific
        10. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Harris, do you believe the United
    States currently has adequate forces and assets in Asia-Pacific to
    mitigate risks and respond to any contingencies that may occur?
        Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]

        11. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Harris, if not, what additional forces
    and assets do you need?
        Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]

        12. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Harris, do you think we need to
    continue to expand and/or harden our facilities to ensure our forward
    forces can survive to operate?
        Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]

        13. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Harris, the United States and our
    allies have missile defense capabilities in theater to include Aegis
    and THAAD. Do we need additional missile defense assets to counter the
    growing North Korean threat?
        Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]
                                south china sea
        14. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Harris, what impact does the deployment
    of Chinese military to include surface-to-air missile system and
    continued Chinese expansion into the South China Sea have on United
    States national security and national security of our partners in the
    region?
        Admiral Harris. China's militarization of its Spratly Island
    outposts provides the Chinese military the ability to detect, track,
    target, and strike United States and allied naval and air forces
    throughout Southeast Asia and eastward beyond the first island chain.
    Chinese surface-to-air missiles and anti-ship cruise missiles, if
    deployed to the Spratly Islands, would greatly increase the risk to my
    forces operating in the South China Sea. Equally concerning is the
    potential impact such a capability would have on China's ability and
    willingness to take assertive action toward our allies and partners in
    the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. China desires to exercise control over
    the entirety of its South China Sea claims, deny operational space to
    the United States military, and compel other South China Sea coastal
    states to relinquish their territorial claims. A fully-militarized
    South China Sea will only serve to enable China to more aggressively
    pursue these ends. In any combat scenario in the East and South China
    Seas against China, I will have to devote assets and resources to knock
    out these outposts to ensure I have freedom of maneuver in the South
    China Sea. More broadly, further deployment of military weapon systems
    to Chinese-claimed features in the Spratly Islands will heighten
    regional tensions, pose a direct challenge to the security interests of
    U.S. regional allies and partners, and increase the risk of military
    conflict in the region. Although all Southeast Asian nations seek to
    avoid a military confrontation with China and seek a peaceful
    settlement of the South China Sea dispute, many Southeast Asian
    nations, particularly those with disputed claims in the South China
    Sea, would likely perceive the presence of advanced Chinese weapon
    systems in disputed regions of the South China Sea as the closing of
    negotiating space. While some may acquiesce in the face of Chinese
    militarization, others will likely seek to militarily strengthen their
    own position vis-a-vis China, thereby increasing the risk of a military
    conflict in the region.

        15. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Harris, what actions do you believe
    might be necessary to stop further build-up in the East and South China
    Seas?
        Admiral Harris. Credible combat power offers the greatest potential
    for meeting the Indo-Asia-Pacific region's complex security issues and
    serves as the USPACOM strategy's main effort. Above all else, it
    enables our ability to win in combat. Strengthening our military
    capacity can successfully deter conflict and coercion, and will enable
    us to respond decisively when needed. Enhancing our force posture and
    persistent presence in the region allows USPACOM to maintain a higher
    pace of training, transits, and operations in the East and South China
    Seas. To achieve these goals, I believe the following actions must be
    taken: Modernization will ensure that effective capabilities exist to
    achieve U.S. objectives. Increases in force laydown will provide
    USPACOM the posture presence needed to assure allies and partners of
    U.S. commitment. Physical presence is the most effective means to deter
    the China from escalation in the East and South China Seas. This is
    accomplished through freedom of navigation operations as well as multi-
    lateral and bi-lateral exercises. In order to reverse the erosion of
    the United States advantages against China, the Department of Defense
    must enhance credible combat power by investing in new cutting-edge
    capabilities, deploying our most modern air and maritime capabilities
    forward, and distributing these capabilities more widely across the
    Indo-Asia-Pacific region. Develop effective, low-cost Integrated Air
    and Missile Defense capabilities, both ashore and at sea, to preserve
    our capability to fight and win inside the threat envelope against
    Chinese intermediate range ballistic missile, anti-ship cruise missile,
    and air-launched ballistic missile threats. Operationalize the United
    States-Japan Alliance. The United States-Japan alliance is the center
    of gravity for United States military strategy in the Indo-Asia-
    Pacific. The recent United States-Japan Guidelines for Defense
    Cooperation, along with recent revisions to Japan's laws, present an
    unprecedented opportunity for a new level of alliance cooperation that
    can be defined as ``integrated'' as opposed to merely ``coordinated.''

        16. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Harris, what are you thought about the
    ``South China Sea Initiative'' that provides authority to build
    maritime security and maritime domain in the South China Sea region,
    through assistance to, and training of, partner nation maritime
    security forces?
        Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]

        17. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Harris, in your written testimony, you
    stated [QUOTE] ``We should cease to be cautious about the language we
    use to describe these activities.'' That ``China has militarized the
    South China Sea through the building of seven military bases on
    artificial islands [ . . . ] in disputed areas.'' What do you mean by
    ceasing to be cautious about the language we use?
        Admiral Harris. Words matter. The United States must cease using
    ambiguous language and actions that allow China to reshape the rules
    based international order. Specifically, in regard to the South China
    Sea, the United States must be clear in both our words and our
    operations that the seven artificial features are not entitled to
    claims of sovereignty and therefore the building and militarization of
    them is not in accordance with international law. Secretary Mattis
    emphasized this point on 2 June 2017 at the Shangri-La Dialogue: ``We
    oppose countries militarizing artificial islands and enforcing
    excessive maritime claims unsupported by international law.'' The
    United States must continue to publicly expose China's vast
    militarization of the seven artificial features and counter the PRC
    narrative that the reclamation is only for search and rescue purposes.
    We must continue to fly, sail, and operate in close proximity of these
    artificial features and overfly these features in accordance with
    international law. We should not refer to them as ``reclaimed.'' China
    created them by destroying the fragile ecosystem and pouring concrete.
    Based on the ruling of the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea
    (ITLOS), we should also cease referring to China's 9-dash line as ``so
    called''; it is ``illegal,'' pure and simple. Finally, we should cease
    referring to the People's Liberation Army (PLA) as a ``near-peer
    competitor.'' They are a peer competitor in the Indo-Asia-Pacific, and
    I deal with them from that perspective.
                         chinese military modernization
        18. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Harris, why do you believe that China
    is investing so heavily in its military in the last 2 years?
        Admiral Harris. China has clearly stated that it has aspirations to
    be the preeminent regional power as part of its ``China Dream.'' Those
    long-term aspirations are driving China's so-called ``strong military
    dream,'' which envisions a People's Liberation Army (PLA) that
    establishes a global presence and assumes the role of the region's
    preeminent military power before the middle of this century. To this
    end, the PLA is focused on building a military that can fight any
    number of regional conflicts; can project power globally; and perhaps
    most importantly, can directly counter U.S. military power. Achieving
    these goals requires sustained investment and build-up, which is
    precisely what we are seeing from China.

        19. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Harris, what are the strategic
    implications of this more capable Chinese military and nuclear force,
    especially in the context of Chinese provocations in the Asia-Pacific
    region?
        Admiral Harris. A more capable Chinese military and nuclear force
    provide credibility to China's narrative that the United States will
    not stand by our alliances and partnerships. China's belief is that the
    United States would be unwilling to accept the elevated risks that a
    more-capable Chinese military and nuclear force could present during an
    armed conflict. This narrative sows doubt within the leadership of our
    allies and partners, which may make them reconsider their levels of
    cooperation with the United States and China. Previously, many of them
    hedged economic cooperation with China against security cooperation
    with the United States. Now these countries find themselves under
    increasing pressure to abandon security cooperation with the United
    States in favor of security cooperation with China. China has many more
    missiles, ships, and combat aircraft in the Indo-Asia-Pacific than we
    do. Qualitatively, they are not as good as we are. They are not
    globally deployed as are we, as approximately 95 percent of the Chinese
    military operates on mainland China or within the first island chain.
    However, this gives them the advantage of an ``interior lines'' battle
    in East Asia. China, therefore, holds the regional quantitative
    military advantage. The United States presently maintains a qualitative
    advantage in terms of military capabilities, but this is being eroded
    rapidly by China's modernization programs. One example is in the area
    of hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV). China has the most aggressive HGV
    research and development program in the world and is on track to
    develop hypersonic weapons against which the United States has little
    ability to detect, and no capability to engage. Continued increases to
    both the quantity and quality of these advanced weapons systems could
    likely enable China to overcome any qualitative advantages we currently
    enjoy. We must continue to maintain our presence and enhance our
    qualitative military advantages in order to defeat China in any future
    armed conflict. The U.S. must also continue to demonstrate commitment
    and resolve to defend our allies and help our partners. Most, if not
    all, of these countries are already tremendously outmatched by the
    Chinese military. Absent a credible United States commitment to defend
    them, they are likely to yield in the face of increasing Chinese
    military and economic pressure. This would shift the regional security
    order to China's advantage and significantly harm the U.S's position in
    the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.

        20. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Harris, how should the U.S. address
    this development?
        Admiral Harris. By ensuring our own military power is credible.
    China is rapidly building a modern, capable military that appears to
    far exceed its stated defensive purpose or potential military needs.
    China's military modernization is focused on countering the United
    States in the Indo-Asia-Pacific by overcoming our asymmetric
    advantages. To address Chinese military investment and modernization,
    the United States must focus on: Sustaining enhanced U.S. credible
    combat power forward. Assuring our allies and partners of unwavering
    U.S. commitment. Widening the U.S. qualitative military advantage
    relative to China. Increasing the security capacities and capabilities,
    collectively and compatibly, of our allies and partners in the region.
    Ensuring freedom to continually access shared domains and use the
    global commons. Encouraging and facilitating the peaceful resolutions
    of sovereignty disputes. Cooperating with China, as permitted, when our
    shared security interests overlap.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Roger Wicker
                counter-artillery defense for republic of korea
        21. Senator Wicker. Admiral Harris, you stated that North Korea
    possesses around 4,000 artillery rounds which could strike the Republic
    of Korea and United States forces stationed there. You also stated that
    Pacific Command lacks a defensive capability to intercept artillery
    barrages. What Department of Defense programs, if any, are developing
    counter-artillery defenses? Is fielding such a capability important to
    execute your warfighting mission on the Korean Peninsula? Is the
    Israeli Iron Dome system effective against artillery? If so, would
    Pacific Command benefit from deploying Iron Dome, or a comparable
    system, on the Peninsula?
        Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
                   india's role in maritime domain awareness
        22. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Harris, yesterday, you testified that
    ``[India] represents a tremendous opportunity for the United States . .
    . in particular in the mil-to-mil space.'' In addition, you stated that
    you do not have the persistent ISR you need to watch our adversaries.
    In your professional military opinion, would increasing India's
    military capability to project power in the Indian Ocean Region--
    particularly through maritime domain awareness systems like advanced
    UAVs [Unmanned Aerial Vehicles] and necessary intelligence-sharing
    agreements--help address your current gap in capability in the Indo-
    Pacific?
        Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]

        23. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Harris, given Congress' strong
    support for India--including its designation as a major defense partner
    of the U.S. in last year's NDAA--do you agree that the United States
    should be India's defense partner of choice when it comes to advanced
    UAVs and that surrendering this market to foreign competitors would
    weaken our ability to positively influence regional security trends? In
    your professional military opinion, what are the advantages of
    partnering with India on advanced UAVs?
        Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]
                               kc-46 pacom basing
        24. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Harris, Alaska will have over 100 5th
    Generation aircraft by 2020, including F-22s and F-35As. Given the KC-
    46A Pegasus' enhanced capability to carry 114 passengers and 18 pallets
    of cargo--over 3 times more in both categories than a KC-135--it has
    the ability to expedite the deployment of fighter squadrons in response
    to any contingency. Critically, this includes the capability to
    virtually self-deploy fighter squadrons with the maintenance and
    support packages needed to hit the ground running upon arrival in
    theater--providing ``Rapid-Raptor'' like capabilities while freeing up
    logistical resources for other uses. What are the possible strategic,
    operational, and tactical advantages of basing the KC-46A in Alaska?
        Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]

        25. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Harris, as the PACOM commander, if
    the Secretary of the Air Force and Chief of Staff of the Air Force--as
    a part of their strategic basing process--asks for your opinion of a
    preferred basing location of a KC-46A squadron in PACOM based on
    current requirements, in your professional military judgement, what
    would your opinion be and why?
        Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Luther Strange
                       future of the littoral combat ship
        26. Senator Strange. Admiral Harris, I think your comment in your
    testimony on the importance of Pacific Command are spot on: ``what
    happens in the Indo-Asia-Pacific matters to America, and the region
    needs a strong America just as America needs the region.'' To show
    America's commitment in the PACOM (``pay-com'') AOR (Area of
    Responsibility), we must be present and visible with capable assets
    across more than 100 million square miles. I believe this requirement
    is a major driver behind the results of the Navy's latest force
    structure assessment. Would you agree that a 350 ship Navy, or larger,
    is critical to your mission in the Pacific?
        Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]

        27. Senator Strange. Admiral Harris, growing our Navy to such an
    extent will certainly take many years. Would you also agree that we
    must begin that growth at once?
        Admiral Harris. Yes, I do and I echo ADM Richardson's comments from
    The Future Navy White Paper from May 17, 2017, that ``we need this more
    powerful fleet in the 2020s, not the 2040s.''

        28. Senator Strange. Admiral Harris, I note with pleasure your past
    praise for the very successful deployments of Littoral Combat Ships to
    your AOR. Could you repeat for the committee your ideas about the
    important role this ship class will play in the Indo-Asia-Pacific
    region?
        Admiral Harris. I've gone on record as being a fan of the littoral
    combat ship (LCS) in both of its principal hull designs, and I believe
    that the LCS adds to the whole range of operations and missions that
    USPACOM has in the region, to include peace operations and humanitarian
    assistance. All that said, I have also testified that I want a more
    lethal ``up-gunned'' version of the LCS (including backfill of current
    LCS) to include anti-ship missiles and improved self-defense. I
    appreciate the push from Congress for these needed improvements. Once
    outfitted, these LCS upgrades will allow us to increasingly distribute
    our lethality across the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. I want to
    acknowledge our great friends in Singapore who allow us, on a
    rotational basis, to deploy LCSs to their country. This partnership
    helps us to provide a persistent presence in the South China Sea in
    order to to ``normalize'' operations and reinforce the international
    framework of norms, standards, rules, and law.
                           future of missile defense
        29. Senator Strange. Admiral Harris, I found your testimony on Kim
    Jong-un's determination to obtain a nuclear weapon to be most
    interesting. I'm reminded that the Commander, United States Northern
    Command, General Robinson, testified here that he finds the situation
    in North Korea to be increasingly frightening and that he believes that
    Kim Jong-un has transitioned his father's strategy of instability for
    concessions--a sort of blackmail by nuclear testing--to one of nuclear
    and ballistic missile testing to achieve a program that could act as a
    viable deterrent and perhaps give him a first strike capability. Could
    you elaborate on the dangers associated with this apparent shift in
    strategy; the change in motivation from ``bluster for concessions'' to
    an actual objective of successful attack on the U.S. and our allies?
        Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]

        30. Senator Strange. Admiral Harris, can you comment for the record
    on the validity and urgency of this threat?
        Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]

        31. Senator Strange. Admiral Harris, with the rising tensions with
    North Korea and the proximity of Hawaii as the closest state to PRK,
    could you comment for the record on how you would characterize the
    threat to Hawaii and our current defensive capabilities? You have
    previously cited on record your desire to activate the aegis ashore
    site at PMRF with the Standard 3 Missile in order to enhance our
    defense immediately; and a number of subject matter experts have
    publically shared your views. Has your opinion on this or the urgency
    surrounding the need to activate the site changed?
        Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]

        32. Senator Strange. Admiral Harris, MDA has indicated plans to
    develop a new discrimination radar (HDR-H) in order to enhance defense
    of Hawaii against the North Korean threat. Are you concerned that MDA's
    plan is a new development program, in a remote location which will not
    be operational until 2024 at the earliest? While more and larger
    sensors are always desirable, based on the imminent threat, should we
    be more focused on a near-term defense solution? Would you advocate
    spending resources on leveraging the existing assets (Aegis Ashore, AN/
    TPY-2, THAAD) and filling the launchers with additional inventory or
    procuring the new discrimination radar?
        Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]

        33. Senator Strange. Admiral Harris, appreciating Hawaii's unique
    location relative to the threat and the challenges that presents from a
    defense perspective (cruise missiles, ICBMs, Sub-Launched Threats, Air
    Threats), should a new radar for HI be designed as strictly an ICBM
    radar or should it be more multi-functional?
        Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Lindsey Graham
                                      f-35
        34. Senator Graham. Admiral Harris, earlier this year, Marine
    Fighter Attack Squadron (VMFA) 121 deployed ten short takeoff and
    vertical landing F-35B variants to Iwakuni, Japan. In your view, in the
    face of advancing near-peer threats, how critical is increased presence
    of F-35 for your Area of Operations?
        Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]

        35. Senator Graham. Admiral Harris, it is my understanding that the
    Navy has recently demonstrated a beyond the horizon capability with the
    integration of the F-35 as a node to support Naval Integrated Fire
    Control-Counter Air (NIFC-CA). What is the significance of the
    exercise?
        Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]
                                   __________
                    Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
        36. Senator Reed. Admiral Harris, in your written testimony you
    made the following statement:
            ``The PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) controls the largest and most
            diverse missile force in the world, with an inventory of more
            than 2,000 ballistic and cruise missiles. This fact is
            significant because the U.S. has no comparable capability due
            to our adherence to the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF)
            Treaty with Russia. (Approximately, 95 percent of the PLARF's
            missiles would violate the INF if China was a signatory.)''
            The INF treaty covers ballistic and cruise missiles in the 500-
            5500 kilometer range that are launched from ground-based
            systems, but not missiles launched from aircraft or ships. Our
            aircraft, which provide a continuous bomber presence from Guam,
            can launch a range of weapons and missile systems and we are
            replacing our air launched cruise missile system with the long
            range stand off weapon with very advanced capabilities. Our
            ships can launch an array of ballistic and cruise missiles from
            above and below water, in particular with our SSGN fleet and
            attack submarines deploying Tomahawk missiles. Likewise, the
            Department is making a considerable investment it a
            Conventional Prompt Strike Capability, CPS (formerly
            Conventional Prompt Global Strike) whether from land or from
            sea. Finally, the best way to counter a particular capability
            deployed by the Chinese rocket forces may not be to deploy
            matching rocket systems.

        Senator Reed. Admiral Harris, given these circumstances, it seems
    that withdrawing or renegotiating the INF treaty with Russia may bring
    marginal benefits in the PACOM AOR but could have devastating effects
    for the EUCOM and CENTCOM AORs. Why should the United States take such
    high risk given all of these assets and our concerns about Russia?
        Admiral Harris, in a March 2017 report to Congress by the U.S. Army
    on the use of ballistic and cruise missile systems that violate the
    current INF Treaty, a Table Top Exercise (TTX) was performed for the
    Western Pacific, which U.S. PACOM and its subordinate elements
    participated in.
        Admiral Harris. I will defer questions concerning the USEUCOM and
    USCENTCOM areas of responsibility (AOR) to General Scaparrotti and
    General Votel, respectively, and speak only to the benefits and risks
    associated with the USPACOM AOR. Russia is expanding the deployment of
    its land-based, advanced anti-ship cruise missile batteries within the
    Indo-Asia-Pacific region and into the Arctic. These land-based,
    advanced anti-ship cruise missiles fall into the ranges banned by the
    Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. These deployments alone
    provide evidence from the Indo-Asia-Pacific theater that Russia has
    abrogated from the INF Treaty. General Selva, Vice Chairman of the
    Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified to this before Congress last March.
    Other nations will be emboldened to embark upon or expand upon their
    own intermediate range weapons programs and deployments should we not
    compel the Russians to fully return to compliance. In 1987-1988, when
    the INF Treaty was signed and became effective, China and North Korea
    were not the threats to the United States that they are today. The
    uninhibited development and fielding of land-based HGV weapons by
    Russia and China tip the qualitative military advantage quickly into
    their favors. Though the INF Treaty permits sea and air launched
    missiles with ranges between 500km--5,500 km, United States planes and
    ships must come inside the Chinese and Russian anti-access/area denial
    (A2AD) umbrellas to deploy missiles. While the U.S. contends with a
    triple threat (air, land, and sea), our potential adversaries contend
    with only a double threat (air and sea). The lack of land-based weapons
    requires U.S. bombers, ships, and submarines (to include SSGNs) in
    quantities we do not have to assure allies, dissuade potential enemies,
    and respond to crisis. With China and Russia aggressively increasing
    the numbers and capabilities of their air and maritime assets, the
    imbalance will continue to increase and put our nation at greater risk.
    For example, the Navy fulfills 50 percent of my stated submarine
    requirements, and the expected reductions from 52 to 42 submarines will
    further exacerbate the problem. Furthermore, there are only four SSGNs
    in the total U.S. inventory, two of them assigned to USPACOM (i.e., USS
    Ohio SSGN-726 and USS Michigan SSGN-727) and all will be phased out by
    2028 as the Virginia Payload Module is designed to replace the SSGN
    capability. The A2AD umbrellas reduce the costs that the U.S can
    impose, while simultaneously raising the level of risks to U.S forces.
    This imbalance reduces our abilities to deter armed conflict and
    presents significant challenges to U.S. forces, should our competition
    turn lethal. Should the United States prove unsuccessful in getting the
    Russians to return fully to INF Treaty compliance, or stop the
    continued growth of Chinese and North Korean missile programs, then we
    should look at renegotiating the treaty so that we can acquire the
    qualitative, intermediate-range advantages, needed to successfully
    deter future armed conflicts or to defeat adversaries should deterrence
    fail. As it is in 2017, the INF Treaty is unilaterally self-limiting
    for the United States--the Chinese are not obligated to follow it and
    the Russians are ignoring it. To hold onto an outdated treaty is to put
    our forces and citizens at risk.

        37. Senator Reed. Admiral Harris, did U.S. PACOM take into account
    in the TTX a possible combined use of existing SSGNs, attack submarines
    using either a CPS or Tomahawk missiles and / or heavy bombers (B-52,
    B-2 and B-21) using JASSM, JASSM-ER and the existing AGM-86 cruise
    missile or LRSO particularly in contested A2AD environments?
        Admiral Harris. The TTX scenario did include the use of existing
    SSGNs, attack submarines using Tomahawk missiles, and heavy bombers (B-
    52 and B-2) using JASSM, JASSM-ER and the existing AGM-86 cruise
    missile in contested anti-access/area denial environments. Conventional
    Prompt Strike (CPS), future bomber platforms, and long range stand-off
    weapons (LRSO) were not included in the study since the scenario's
    operational timeframe was set during 2019-2020. CPS, B-21, and LRSO are
    not projected to be fielded in that timeframe; therefore, they were not
    available for the study team and role players to employ during the TTX.

        38. Senator Reed. Admiral Harris, did U.S. PACOM take into account
    the ability of heavy bomber platforms (current and future) to fully
    load out with the LRSO or even the current version of the cruise
    missile the AGM-86, nuclear or conventional?
        Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]

        39. Senator Reed. Admiral Harris, did U.S. PACOM take into account
    in terms of escalation ladders, the role that our existing nuclear
    deterrent plays, particularly our air and submarine legs?
        Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]

        40. Senator Reed. Admiral Harris, did U.S. PACOM take into account
    the combined escalation control of conventional systems discussed so
    far and our nuclear deterrent for escalation dominance?
        Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]
                                   __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
                                     russia
        41. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Harris, you indicated that there
    were four separate incidents of Russian long-range combat aircraft last
    week near American airspace off of Alaska. These are the first
    instances of such flights since 2015, and the last time a succession of
    flights like this occurred was in 2014. North American Aerospace
    Defense Command (NORAD) noted the flights were not provocative or
    unprecedented. However, American and Canadian jets were scrambled to
    intercept or to simply monitor these Russian bombers that came from
    eastern Russian. We are not the only country experiencing this
    activity, as Japan has scrambled their fighter jets in response to
    Russian aircraft approaching their coastline. Further, Russian and
    Filipino relations seem to be warming just as American-Filipino
    relations are facing difficult times following President Duterte's rise
    to power. While the United States normally conducts war games with the
    Philippines, this year it will focus on humanitarian exercises, while
    reports note that the Philippines and Russia are considering naval
    cooperation and possible drills that are likely to be further discussed
    when Duterte visits Moscow next month. In you testimony you acknowledge
    that Russia is ``engaged militarily'' in your AOR and that, ``Russia
    continues to exhibit increasingly aggressive behavior, both regionally
    and globally.'' Should we be concerned about Russia's activity in the
    Asia-Pacific? How has it changed in recent years?
        Admiral Harris. Yes, we should be concerned about Russia's
    activities in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. Russia's strategic forces based
    within the Pacific threaten the United States. Additionally, Russia's
    increased activities in the Indo-Asia-Pacific divert resources and
    attention that we, our allies, and partners could otherwise place
    against North Korea, China, and Violent Extremist Organizations.
    Russian activity has changed in recent years in the following ways:
    Increased numbers of improved and new attack and ballistic missile
    submarines Increased numbers of modern surface ships Increased numbers
    of upgraded strategic bombers Increased deployments of advanced anti-
    ship cruise missiles batteries, in an anti-area access denial umbrella,
    that extend from the Indo-Asia-Pacific region into the Arctic
    Exploitation of strategic seams emerging within United States
    alliances, such as the Philippines Offers of advanced military sales to
    China Cultivation of their existing military relationships with India,
    Vietnam, and Indonesia Exploitation of sanctions imposed on North Korea
    by both the United States and China.

        42. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Harris, what is your assessment of
    Russia's interest in the Philippines? What do you think it signifies,
    and how concerned should we be?
        Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Donnelly
                        conventional prompt strike (cps)
        43. Senator Donnelly. Admiral Harris, it is my understanding that
    PACOM--alongside STRATCOM and EUCOM--has identified the development and
    fielding of a Conventional Prompt Strike system as a high priority. Is
    that correct?
        Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]

        44. Senator Donnelly. Admiral Harris, is the United States leading
    the way in the development of hypersonic glide vehicles--or are we
    behind the curve relative to countries like Russia and China?
        Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie Hirono
                  advances to space and satellite technologies
        45. Senator Hirono. Admiral Harris, we continue to see rapid growth
    in both the commercial and government space sector. What additional
    ways can the DOD leverage the commercial sector capabilities in the
    space and imagery industry? Can Pacific Command benefit from access to
    commercial imagery?
        Admiral Harris. USPACOM uses commercial imagery extensively today.
    During natural disasters, USPACOM relies almost exclusively on
    commercial imagery for comprehensive damage assessments for tactical
    responders, partner nations, and nongovernmental organizations.
    Additionally, USPACOM routinely uses commercial imagery to supplement
    government satellite and airborne collection. As new commercial imagery
    systems are fielded that provide greater revisit, larger area of
    coverage, and more diversity in sensor type, I believe USPACOM will
    benefit from access to the imagery. I'm very interested in any advances
    the commercial industry is making in high revisit and radar satellite
    capabilities; however, this data must be available to USPACOM through
    contract and must be accessible through imagery dissemination
    architectures.

        46. Senator Hirono. Admiral Harris, the Maui Space Surveillance
    Site combines operational satellite tracking facilities with a research
    and development capability. Can you talk about the importance of this
    facility to national security as well as the need to ensure that
    capabilities such as this are modernized to keep up with the ever
    changing threat picture?
        Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]
               united states strategic policy toward asia-pacific
        47. Senator Hirono. Admiral Harris, a panel of Asian-Pacific
    experts testified before the Senate Armed Service Committed on the
    current state of United States policy in the region. The consensus from
    the group is that there is no current coherent, holistic strategy to
    address the region. What advice and recommendations would you give to
    President Trump when attempting to develop an Asia-Pacific Strategy?
        Admiral Harris. Concerning the development of an Indo-Asia-Pacific
    Strategy, I am already providing my advice to the Secretary of Defense
    and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They, in turn, will advise
    the President. My responsibility is to ensure the President has a
    powerful, lethal, and ready military force in the Indo-Asia-Pacific in
    the event the other instruments of national power, specifically
    diplomatic and economic, fail. Russia and China specifically have
    assessed that they can ``out cycle'' the United States whole-of-
    government decision making cycle during competition short of armed
    conflict. During competition short of armed conflict, the U.S. military
    is a supporting effort. The U.S. military deters conventional and
    strategic attacks against the Homeland and our allies, and preserves
    freedom of access to the shared spaces. U.S. military actions provide
    the President with the opportunity to bring the instruments of our
    national power--diplomacy, information, and especially economics--into
    the competition. Only this will ultimately maintain United States
    primacy in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region and across the globe.
    Currently, we are competing with Russia and China with the military
    instrument alone in many ways, while the Chinese, especially, compete
    holistically with all the instruments of their national power. This is
    inversely reminiscent of the competition short of armed conflict that
    occurred during the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet
    Union, where the U.S. competed with all the instruments of national
    power for decades and prevailed. Ultimately, across the whole-of-
    government, we must acknowledge the existential dangers we face from
    China, Russia, and North Korea; convince the American people of these
    real dangers; and then fully commit our people and our resources
    totally toward winning this competition.

        48. Senator Hirono. Admiral Harris, would you agree that a strong
    United States presence in the Asia-Pacific plays a significant role in
    promoting the security and stability of the region and that any
    strategy should include a strong U.S. presence?
        Admiral Harris. Yes, I wholeheartedly agree that a strong United
    States presence in the Indo-Asia-Pacific plays a significant role in
    promoting the security and stability of the region and that any
    strategy must include a strong United States presence in region. A
    strong U.S. military presence deters conventional and strategic attack
    against the U.S. Homeland, and assures our allies and partners of
    unwavering U.S. commitment. Regional stability and sustained access to
    the shared domains and space preserve the established international
    rules-based order and presents opportunities for the U.S. Government to
    holistically employ the main instruments of U.S. national power--
    diplomacy, information, and especially economics.
                           missile defense in hawaii
        49. Senator Hirono. Admiral Harris, with the rising tensions with
    North Korea, how do you characterize the missile threat to the United
    States and our current defensive capabilities? You have previously
    supported operationalizing the Aegis Ashore site at PMRF as a possible
    solution to meet the North Korean missile threat. What are your current
    thoughts on the threat as well as the urgency to bolster our missile
    defense capabilities?
        Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]

        50. Senator Hirono. Admiral Harris, the MDA is considering the
    development of a new discrimination radar (HDR-H) to enhance the
    defense of Hawaii against the North Korean missile threat. This would
    likely be a new acquisition program which might not be available until
    2024. While more and larger sensors are always desirable, based on the
    current threat, should we be more focused on a near-term defense
    solution? What are your thoughts on leveraging existing assets to meet
    the current threat?
        Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]

        51. Senator Hirono. Admiral Harris, Hawaii's unique location
    relative to the threat presents challenges from a defense perspective
    (cruise missiles, ICBMs, Sub-Launched Threats, Air Threats), what are
    the pros and cons of developing a radar to solely identify and track
    ICBM's versus a radar that is more multi-functional?
        Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]
                       united states policy toward china
        52. Senator Hirono. Admiral Harris, President Trump met with
    President Xi Jinping of China about reining in its ally North Korea. He
    stated publically that the United States will act alone if China does
    not take action. In your opinion what is best strategic policy toward
    China?
        Admiral Harris. While the United States and China share common
    interests toward denuclearization on the Korean peninsula, I do not
    believe China is doing all it can do to pressure North Korea to abandon
    its nuclear ambitions. I believe we must continue to communicate our
    concerns to China and call on it to exert its influence and stop
    Pyongyang's unprecedented campaign of nuclear weapons and ballistic
    missile tests. If China continues to support the North Korean regime
    economically and politically, then the United States must increase
    pressure on China to do more. Importantly, I believe we must, across
    the whole of our government, view China for what it is--a competitor of
    the United States Beijing certainly views us through this lens.

        53. Senator Hirono. Admiral Harris, the panel earlier this week
    proposed that the use FONOPS be delegated to you, the CMDR PACOM,
    without the requirement to seek guidance from SECDEF. How important are
    these exercises and what are your thoughts on the proposal to delegate?
        Admiral Harris. The U.S. Freedom of Navigation Program is a whole-
    of-government effort to protect long-standing principles of freedom of
    navigation. The program involves both diplomatic and operational
    challenges to protest excessive maritime claims, wherever they occur.
    The Department of Defense maintains a comprehensive freedom of
    navigation operations (FONOPS) program that seeks to methodically
    challenge excessive maritime claims in order to preserve the rights,
    freedoms, and uses of the sea and airspace, guaranteed to all nations
    under international law. Since I report directly to SECDEF, delegation
    of Tier III FONOPS against China without direction or guidance from him
    would be problematic (he has delegated to me lesser Tier FONOPS,
    broadly). That said, I am pleased with the new approach to FONOPS of
    late, with less tactical involvement by the National Security Council
    staff--we are conducting these as a military operation under the
    direction of the SECDEF with broad, overarching guidance from the White
    House.
                 importance of diplomacy in asia-pacific region
        54. Senator Hirono. Admiral Harris, President Trump has publically
    stated that he intends to cut the budget at the Department of State by
    37 percent. How would such a cut impact your ability to be successful
    in the Asia-Pacific Theater?
        Admiral Harris. I believe it is vital that we continue to integrate
    our military efforts with the other instruments of national power--
    diplomatic, information, and economic initiatives. My staff works
    closely with the Department of State (DOS) to ensure our activities and
    messages are mutually reinforcing. The DOS's Foreign Military Financing
    (FMF) program is one of the more powerful engagement tools that we use
    to meet regional challenges, including border and maritime security
    issues, disaster response, and counterterrorism. The International
    Military Education and Training (IMET) program is critical to our
    efforts to identify and train future leaders and increase
    interoperability in the region. As I have said before, it's in
    America's interests to deepen our diplomacy in the Indo-Asia-Pacific
    region, while backing up peaceful resolution of disputes with
    undisputed, credible combat power.

        55. Senator Hirono. Admiral Harris, State Partnership Programs are
    an important part of our mil-to-mil relationships around the world. How
    would you assess their value in the Asia-Pacific theater and are there
    opportunities for establishing new relationships?
        Admiral Harris. Highly valuable. The State Partnership Program
    (SPP) delivers quality, long lasting relationships and capability with
    partner nations in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region through consistent
    security cooperation engagements. The SPP helps partner nations'
    military and civilian organizations conduct security cooperation in
    ways that resonates well and effectively builds trust. The Indo-Asia-
    Pacific would benefit from the expansion of the SPP. Additionally,
    expanding SPP will advance USPACOM's Theater Campaign Plan objectives.
    Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Papua New Guinea (preferably as part of an
    Oceania Collective) are USPACOM's top three priorities for inclusion in
    the SPP.
                relationship with allies in asia-pacific region
        56. Senator Hirono. Admiral Harris, in the missile defense realm
    both Japan and Korea have Aegis equipped ships. Japan has spent a lot
    of capital developing the SM-3 Block II missiles. How can we use on
    mil-to-mil and other cooperative ventures to build stronger
    relationships with our allies?
        Admiral Harris. One of the best ways is to improve the policy
    approval process timelines, especially associated with Foreign Military
    Sales of sophisticated U.S.-made military equipment to our high-end
    allies and partners. Many of them are daunted by our processes and
    therefore turn to other countries as sources for similar technologies.
    Technology release reviews, for example, negatively impact defense
    modernization acquisitions of our closest allies and strategic
    partners. Recent F-16 upgrade requests from Singapore, Indonesia, and
    Thailand have been subject to significant delays pending interagency
    technology release approvals and concessions. Similarly, the sale of
    Missile Technology Control Regime Category I Unmanned Aerial System
    (UAS) entails a ``strong presumption of denial'' for export. The recent
    year-long approval process for the sale of the SeaGuardian UAS to India
    demonstrates the difficulties in providing enhanced capabilities to a
    country we have designated a Major Defense Partner. India is the first
    country, outside of NATO and other treaty allies, for which the United
    States has overcome the strong presumption of denial. That said,
    provisos to the sale have compelled India to seek UAS solutions from
    competing nations like Israel.
                              security cooperation
        57. Senator Hirono. Admiral Harris, you mentioned in your written
    testimony that you have concerns with some of the changes to Security
    Cooperation authorities that were made in the fiscal year 2017 NDAA.
    Can you provide more detail on how those changes may affect the DOD
    counternarcotics programs in the USPACOM AOR and if you have any
    recommendations to improve the program?
        Admiral Harris. The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017 significantly altered
    the Department of Defense's (DOD) longstanding authority to provide
    counternarcotics (CN)-related support to foreign law enforcement
    agencies. These authorities were previously established in section 1004
    of the fiscal year 1991 NDAA, as amended, and were codified by the
    fiscal year 2017 NDAA in 10 U.S.C. Sec.  284 (counterdrug support to
    law enforcement) and 10 U.S.C. Sec.  333 (training and equipping).
    While these changes expanded some of the authorities in limited
    situations, the majority of the changes have limited Joint Interagency
    Task Force (JIATF) West's ability to conduct operations and
    activities--most significantly impacting training, operational
    flexibility and construction--previously conducted under the old
    authority. There are three significant challenges from this
    legislation: First, the law prohibits the use of DOD's dedicated
    counterdrug appropriation to fund capacity building efforts using the
    authorities under 10 U.S.C. Sec.  333, and eliminates dedicated
    counterdrug capacity building authorities. This dedicated, stable
    funding stream has allowed JIATF West to develop long-term, measurable
    programmatic approaches over multiple years to develop strong
    relationships and build effective partners. These efforts have a
    demonstrable track record in developing capable forces to disrupt drug
    related transnational crime, and help to extend governance to under-
    governed areas. The transition of these efforts to an annual
    competition for scarce overall DOD security cooperation resources will
    likely result in less consistent performance from the CN program
    efforts, and diminishes the utility of the DOD CN program as an entree
    for DOD with non-traditional partners. This makes it more difficult to
    address non-traditional and asymmetric challenges in the theater.
    Second, the law requires Congressional notification and a 15-day review
    period for actions taken under 10 U.S.C. Sec.  284. In cases where
    support is provided to foreign law enforcement, Secretary of State
    (SECSTATE) coordination is also required. For activities that are
    directly tied to law enforcement operations, such as providing aerial
    reconnaissance, a 15-day wait period, especially subsequent to the
    coordination requirement, would likely render such support untimely and
    useless. Under this requirement, by the time a USPACOM asset, such as a
    maritime patrol aircraft, could be authorized to deploy, it would no
    longer be useful. Third, previous authority for construction of bases
    of operation to support counterdrug operations was capped at $3
    million. This limit was sufficient to allow construction of remote
    outposts in logistically challenging locations and to expand the
    operational reach of partner nation security forces in under-governed
    areas like the Sulu Sea. 10 U.S.C. Sec.  284, however, lowers the cap
    for construction authority to $750,000. The lower cap will still allow
    for smaller projects like training range improvements, which are useful
    and will continue to be done; however, it is insufficient to help push
    security forces into difficult to reach areas, which is extremely
    useful for improving the overall security and stability in the theater,
    and is at least as important as developing sustainable training
    facilities. Recommendations to address each of these areas are as
    follows: Specifically authorize the Drug Interdiction and Counterdrug
    Activities Defense Appropriation to be used when conducting CN
    activities under Title 10 U.S.C. Chapter 16, including Sec.  333.
    Eliminate the requirement for SECSTATE coordination and Congressional
    notification for tactical support provided under Sec.  284. Raise the
    construction limit under Sec.  284 to the unspecified minor military
    construction threshold (currently $3 million).
                                  eagle vision
        58. Senator Hirono. Admiral Harris, Eagle Vision is a system
    operated by the Hawaii Air National Guard and several other units
    around the country and overseas. It has proven to be a valuable
    resource in working with our friends and allies in military exercises
    as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts. As a
    combatant commander in a theater filled with allies as well as the
    conditions and potential for a variety of natural disasters, what are
    your thoughts on the importance of systems such as this which can be
    used to work with our allies and assist others in times of need?
        Admiral Harris. Eagle Vision is a very capable, mobile imagery
    system that has been proven in the field and has been quite reliable.
    Most recently, we deployed Eagle Vision to the Philippines in support
    of U.S. Pacific Air Forces' (PACAF) Bilateral Air Component Exchange
    (BACE) program with the Philippines. PACAF and Air National Guard
    members assisted the Philippine government with training on how to task
    and employ commercial imagery in response to Humanitarian Assistance/
    Disaster Relief (HA/DR) operations as well as tasking for imagery of
    the Spratly Islands. During natural disasters, USPACOM relies almost
    exclusively on commercial imagery to provide comprehensive damage
    assessments to tactical responders, partner nations, and
    nongovernmental organizations. USPACOM's primary source for commercial
    imagery is through the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency
    consolidated imagery dissemination architecture. This architecture
    allows for rapid dissemination of commercial imagery to the
    headquarters as well as tactical forces. During most HA/DR operations,
    USPACOM provides imagery support from garrison, sending annotated
    products forward as needed. In the event of a large scale disaster,
    USPACOM may require a forward based commercial imagery dissemination
    and production capability to which deploying Eagle Vision would be an
    option.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
                  impact of a preemptive strike on north korea
        59. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Harris, there has been speculation
    that the United States may conduct a preemptive strike against North
    Korean launch facilities or nuclear infrastructure. Can you talk about
    what kind of military response that we and our allies could expect from
    North Korea in the event of a preemptive military strike?
        Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]

        60. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Harris, what are the costs and risks
    associated with that decision and what could our allies South Korea and
    Japan expect?
        Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]
                 commercial remote sensing satellite providers
        61. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Harris, in response to a question at
    the hearing about intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, you
    state: ``I don't have the ability to persistently watch my adversaries
    all over the Indo-Asia Pacific, over half the globe, 24/7. I need it
    24/7. I need it whatever 60 times 24 hours is. I need it that minute by
    minute . . . I probably have a 10th of my requirements that are
    fulfilled.'' There has been a growth in U.S.-based commercial remote
    sensing satellite providers in the past few years. These companies
    offer new capabilities for breadth of coverage and revisit rates for
    overhead satellite imagery, with new companies projected to
    significantly increase the total number of satellites operating in
    orbit providing persistent coverage. Can Pacific Command benefit from
    access to this new imagery?
        Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]

        62. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Harris, have you had experience
    working with any of these new providers?
        Admiral Harris. USPACOM is increasing its use of commercial remote
    sensing products every year as the tasking and delivery mechanisms
    improve timeliness. Through the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
    (NGA), USPACOM has access to electro-optical imagery from U.S.
    companies such as Digital Globe who provide imaging from the World View
    and GeoEye electro-optical satellites, and synthetic aperture radar
    imagery (SAR) from foreign companies such as Radarsat (Canada), Cosmo/
    Sky Med (Italy), and TerraSAR-X (Germany). Foreign electro-optical
    imaging can be provided by Spot (France). These commercial images are
    particularly useful in humanitarian assistance/disaster response (HA/
    DR) support because the imagery is unclassified, allowing us to release
    it to non-governmental organizations and foreign nations. Commercial
    imagery can also be used to fill in collection gaps for areas difficult
    to collect with National Technical Means due to collection competition,
    and also to augment National Technical Means in providing coverage
    persistence over high value targets. The commercial electro-optical
    imagery our analysts receive is outstanding and the quality continues
    to improve.

        63. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Harris, whose responsibility is it to
    make sure you have access to these new sources?
        Admiral Harris. The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)
    maintains the contracts to purchase U.S. and international commercial
    imagery and then to make it available for users via their Geospatial
    Intelligence Library Architecture. Existing commercial imagery can be
    discovered and accessed through NGA's Net-centric Geospatial-
    Intelligence Discovery Services (NGDS) on both classified and
    unclassified networks. New collection requirements are coordinated with
    NGA via USPACOM's Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC). The
    collection management team within the USPACOM JIOC will then register
    these requirements through NGA collection management tools on either
    network.
                      counter rocket, artillery and mortar
        64. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Harris, during the hearing you
    repeatedly answered that there is no defense against the thousands of
    rockets, artillery, and mortar rounds from North Korea. In the past
    several years, there have been significant advances in directed energy
    weapon systems including high energy lasers that have been tested at
    White Sands Missile Range and elsewhere and successfully engaged dozens
    of artillery and mortar rounds. How could a low-cost per shot C-RAM
    weapon system with infinite magazine capacity and precision targeting
    contribute to your mission?
        Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]

        65. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Harris, do you believe that directed
    energy weapon systems are a solution that could help fill the
    capability gap against RAM that you face on the Korean peninsula?
        Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]

        66. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Harris, if so, as a combatant
    commander, would you consider submitting a UONS or JUONS for this
    capability?
        Admiral Harris. Yes. I would consider all viable options that would
    expedite the fielding of a capability to deter, disrupt, and if
    required, defeat adversary activities against the United States,
    allies, and partners in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
                  investment in u.s. research and development
        67. Senator Warren. Admiral Harris, last year, the Department
    reported that China is investing heavily in R&D, including in ``applied
    physics, material science, high performance computing, innovative
    electronics/software development, electro-optics, aerospace technology,
    automation/robotics, high-energy physics, and nanoscience, just to name
    a few.''

        Admiral Harris, would we improve our chances of maintaining future
    superiority over China if we increase our R&D investments in similar
    advanced technologies?
        Admiral Harris. Yes. Our chances of maintaining future superiority
    over China would be improved with increased research and development
    investments. USPACOM partners with DOD-wide organizations, national
    laboratories, and industry to provide innovative solutions to fill
    capability requirements against continually evolving threats.
    Specifically, I am supportive of research and development in the areas
    of hypersonic weapons (defensive and offensive), as well as artificial
    intelligence, machine learning, large data analytics, and predictive
    forecasting to enable our warfighters to make better informed decisions
    and confront the challenges of our near-peer adversaries. While I
    believe that American technological superiority is one of our
    asymmetric advantages over China, Beijing also understands this and
    clearly sees this as a gap they must close if they are to realize their
    out-sized ambitions.

        68. Senator Warren. Admiral Harris, what specific areas of
    technology or research do you believe hold the most promise in the
    Pacific theater?
        Admiral Harris. We must strengthen our abilities to counter
    strategies designed to limit our freedom of action and we must preserve
    our asymmetric advantages in undersea and anti-submarine warfare. Our
    near peer adversaries continue to modernize their weapon systems and
    are quickly closing the gap between us. Advanced weapon technologies
    such as hypersonic weapons are vital to help counter the tyranny of
    distance and anti-access/area denial demands in the Indo-Asia-Pacific
    region. We need systems that are fast, long-range, lethal, survivable,
    networked, rapidly deployable, and maneuverable. Priorities include
    long-range and stand-off strike weapons, anti-ship weapons, advance
    air-to-air munitions, theater ballistic/cruise missile defense,
    torpedoes, naval mines, and a cluster munitions replacement.
                                 climate change
        69. Senator Warren. Admiral Harris, a Defense Department report
    from 2 years ago observed: ``Global climate change will have wide-
    ranging implications for U.S. national security interests over the
    foreseeable future because it will aggravate existing problems--such as
    poverty, social tensions, environmental degradation, ineffectual
    leadership, and weak political institutions[.]'' In short, this DOD
    report described climate change as ``a threat multiplier.''

        Senator Warren. Admiral Harris, do you agree with this assessment?
        Admiral Harris. Yes. Our current and future operational plans, for
    both steady state and conflict, must continue to consider climate
    change impacts.

        70. Senator Warren. Admiral Harris, how are you integrating climate
    change risks into your plans and operations for the Asia-Pacific
    region?
        Admiral Harris. USPACOM integrates climate change risks as outlined
    in the ``All Hazards'' Line of Effort in the USPACOM Theater Campaign
    Plan (TCP). Our focus here is two-fold. First, we must be ready to
    respond to natural disasters throughout the broad Indo-Asia-Pacific
    region. Second, our forces must take into consideration sustainable
    resource management and critical resource security. USPACOM coordinates
    these efforts with a variety of interagency partners, including the
    Office of United States Foreign Disaster Assistance and other USAID
    entities, the Department of State, the Department of Homeland Security,
    and the Department of the Interior. This interagency coordination
    effort helps USPACOM in a number of key operational areas: crisis and
    contingency planning; protection of vulnerable populations in support
    of counter-terrorism efforts; pandemic and infectious disease
    prevention; as well as humanitarian assistance/disaster response.
    USPACOM is also developing partnerships focused on building the overall
    resilience of the State of Hawaii and nesting the resilience of USPACOM
    installations within that framework. A recent example of our efforts
    was in May 2017 when USPACOM hosted the seventh annual Pacific
    Environmental Security Forum in Alaska. This forum seeks to develop
    foreign nation capacity in several environmental security areas through
    combined projects within the USPACOM area of responsibility. Sessions
    on project concept development were followed by three days of
    discussions on the Department of Defense Climate Change Adaption
    Roadmap, the protection of commons in a civilian-military context, and
    military environmental programs. The 2016 forum was co-hosted by Fiji
    and the 2018 forum will be co-hosted by Mongolia. These forums provide
    opportunities for the U.S. and our international partners to identify
    risks and vulnerabilities from the effects of climate change, resource
    scarcity concerns, as well as other environmental challenges, and to
    find areas for collaboration to address these vulnerabilities toward
    securing regional stability.
                           persistent, long-range isr
        71. Senator Warren. Admiral Harris, in your testimony before SASC
    last year, you said that ``the Indo-Asia-Pacific presents a dynamic
    security environment requiring flexible, reliable, survivable deep-look
    and persistent ISR to provide indications and warning and situation
    awareness across a vast geographic area.'' Do you still agree with this
    statement?
        Admiral Harris. Yes. USPACOM's intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance (ISR) requirements have grown significantly, and become
    even more important over the past year. I fully expect these
    requirements will continue to increase as China's military grows in
    both size and capability, and as North Korea aggressively advances its
    missile and nuclear programs. The actions of both China and North Korea
    threaten peace and stability in the region and present serious
    challenges to U.S. interests. In addition to my requirement to
    continuously monitor China and North Korea, I must also maintain
    awareness on resurgent Russian military activity in the Indo-Asia-
    Pacific, along with a growing threat from Violent Extremist
    Organizations. While the requirements have grown exponentially, the ISR
    capabilities and capacity within USPACOM have essentially remained the
    same.

        72. Senator Warren. Admiral Harris, in its Integrated Priority
    List, PACOM identified ISR gaps, which if addressed would better
    support Pacific theater exercises and maritime operations. In this
    context, how important are long-range surveillance capabilities in the
    Pacific, particularly in light of China's deployment of long range
    surface to air missile systems?
        Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]

        73. Senator Warren. Admiral Harris, are you concerned about our
    ability to meet current and future ISR requirements in light of this
    threat?
        Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]

        74. Senator Warren. Admiral Harris, do you have the budget and
    authority necessary to expedite fielding of capabilities to meet these
    needs, and if not, what do you require in order to be able to do so?
        Admiral Harris. No, I do not have the budget or the authority to
    expedite fielding of capabilities to meet persistent, long-range
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) needs. The
    Services are responsible for funding and fielding these capabilities.
    Persistent, long-range ISR was identified as deficient within my area
    of responsibility and was prioritized within my Integrated Priority
    List (IPL) for fiscal year 2019-2023. I will review the full-range of
    IPL concerns and submitting issue nominations during Program Budget
    Review 2019 to address these issues.

        75. Senator Warren. Admiral Harris, is PACOM currently conducting
    any ISR-related demonstrations and experimentation of long range multi-
    spectral imaging systems; if not, do you have plans to do so or what
    would be required to allow you to do so?
        Admiral Harris. [Deleted.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2018 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                              TUESDAY, MAY 2, 2017

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                      UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m. in Room
    SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain
    (chairman of the committee) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Wicker,
    Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Cruz, Sasse,
    Strange, Reed, Nelson, McCaskill, Shaheen, Gillibrand,
    Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King, Heinrich, Warren,
    and Peters.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman McCain. Good morning. The Senate Armed Services
    Committee meets today to receive testimony from General Darren
    McDew on the posture of the United States Transportation
    Command [TRANSCOM].
        TRANSCOM is more than just a functional command that moves
    personnel and materiel from place to place. It is a crucial
    asset on which our military's global power projection depends
    and one we must not take for granted.
        As General Patton once said, ``The officer who doesn't know
    his communications and his supply as well as his tactics is
    totally useless.''
        General McDew and his predecessors have warned Congress for
    years that the proliferation of anti-access/area denial
    capabilities pose significant challenges for our transportation
    and distribution networks in contested environments.
        Put simply, any assumption that TRANSCOM will have
    uncontested access to international airspace and sea lanes in a
    future conflict is increasingly outdated.
        Transport ships and aircraft can be held at risk over
    greater and greater distances. Our logistic networks are
    centered on large air and sea ports, which serve as efficient
    hubs, but are also vulnerable to attack. Then there are threats
    on the digital battlefield.
        Even as cyber intrusions have become increasingly
    prevalent, nearly 90 percent of TRANSCOM's missions are still
    executed over unclassified commercial communication networks.
    This vulnerability extends operational risk to every single
    combatant command that TRANSCOM supports on a daily basis.
        This committee understands that efforts are currently
    underway to develop an overarching global plan that would
    articulate how TRANSCOM would operate in a contested
    environment, whether that be in the air, at sea, or in
    cyberspace.
        General, I look forward to an update on this plan today and
    ask that you provide as many details as possible as to
    preliminary findings of this effort.
        I also hope you can discuss TRANSCOM's inaugural wargame,
    which took place last fall and examined mobility and
    distribution operations in a contested environment. Too often,
    operational wargames focus exclusively on combat capability and
    take combat logistics as a given. Combat capability is
    obviously important, but it does not matter much if it never
    arrives to the fight or cannot be sustained once it does. I
    look forward to hearing the lessons learned in TRANSCOM's
    wargame.
        General McDew, it has been almost 2 years since your
    confirmation hearing before this committee, and I am looking
    forward to hearing the steps you have taken to address some of
    our shared concerns and what more needs to be done. In
    particular, this committee understands the readiness and
    modernization challenges across the Department of Defense also
    affect TRANSCOM.
        A look at sealift, for example, reveals the same downward
    spiral we have seen elsewhere in the military. Budget cuts mean
    fewer new ships. Existing ships get older. Maintenance gets
    more expensive and more difficult. Readiness suffers. More
    money is siphoned from future modernization to pay for current
    readiness.
        Military Sealift Command's organic surge sealift fleet is
    essential for rapid response in the event of a crisis or
    wartime scenario. But the average age of ships in our surge
    fleet is now 39 years. Over a recent 5-month period, less than
    60 percent of sealift ships were able to activate during
    planned exercises due to various maintenance problems.
        The requirement for so-called roll-on/roll-off ships has
    been relatively stable since the 1990s. But since Desert Storm,
    the surge sealift fleet has been cut nearly in half to just 27
    ships. We are already 10 ships short of the current
    requirement, enough to move two full armor brigade combat
    teams. Over the next 6 years, another nine will age out.
        So while I look forward to hearing how TRANSCOM plans to
    address its readiness and modernization challenges, I do so
    fully aware that it cannot truly do so unless we in the
    Congress step up and do our jobs, repeal the Budget Control
    Act, and provide full and steady funding to meet our national
    security requirements.
        General McDew, the committee thanks you for your continued
    service to the Nation, we look forward to your testimony today.
        Senator Reed?

                     STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Welcome, General McDew, to the committee for your
    testimony. Thank you for your service and the service of all of
    the men and women of TRANSCOM. We are knowledgeable and
    appreciative of the critical role that TRANSCOM plays, and
    thank you for your leadership.
        The work of TRANSCOM may be invisible to many, but it is
    critical because it delivers what our forward-deployed
    personnel need when they need it. While TRANSCOM performs
    thousands of operations successfully, it is facing a number of
    daunting challenges. While all the military works to respond to
    potential and actual cyberattacks, TRANSCOM faces a unique set
    of cyberthreats because it must work with private sector
    entities in the transportation and shipping industries to
    support DOD [Department of Defense] deployment operations.
        Three years ago, the committee issued a report on certain
    aspects of the TRANSCOM cybersecurity situation. General McDew,
    we would like to hear what steps you have taken to respond to
    the issues identified in that report and any others you may
    have identified since you assumed command.
        The Ready Reserve Force, a group of cargo ships held in
    readiness by the Maritime Administration, is aging and will
    need to be modernized over the next decade, as the chairman
    pointed out eloquently.
        DOD also needs to ensure that the Civil Reserve Air Fleet,
    or CRAF, program, which provides as much as 40 percent of
    wartime airlift needs, remains viable after operations in Iraq
    and Afghanistan, and will be able to provide needed surge
    capacity in the future. I would appreciate an update on how
    TRANSCOM intends to ensure these fleets are ready to meet the
    command's requirements.
        Our global transportation capability, owned and managed by
    TRANSCOM, has been one of our asymmetric advantages for many
    years now. However, we cannot assume that potential adversaries
    will allow us free rein in this area in the future.
        General McDew, as you said in your prepared statement about
    future conflicts, we expect contested global sea lanes and air
    routes to a degree we have not faced since World War II. We are
    interested in hearing how you are addressing the growing
    reality that the access you enjoy now may be increasingly
    challenged.
        General McDew, thank you again for your service, and I look
    forward to your testimony.
        Chairman McCain. Welcome, General.

     STATEMENT OF GENERAL DARREN W. McDEW, USAF, COMMANDER, UNITED
                     STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

        General McDew. Thank you very much, Chairman. I am glad
    that you pointed out that it has been 2 years since I have been
    here. I have a quick opening statement, but I would like to say
    that my daughter-in-law has forgiven you.
        If you remember, 2 years ago, I sat here and I had a chance
    to introduce my family. Over my left shoulder was my brand-new
    grandson, Henry. Henry was a bit of a rotund child at about 6
    months old, and you pointed out that he had not missed many
    meals.
        [Laughter.]
        General McDew. Most of us got a chuckle. My daughter-in-law
    did not get a chuckle from that.
        Chairman McCain. Please ask her to accept my apologies. It
    is a beautiful grandchild.
        [Laughter.]
        Chairman McCain. Oops.
        General McDew. But it is now part of the Congressional
    Record.
        [Laughter.]
        General McDew. Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and
    distinguished members of the committee, it is an honor and a
    privilege to be with you here today representing the men and
    women of our United States Transportation Command. I thank you
    for your continued support of our dedicated professionals, all
    working together to provide our Nation with a broad range of
    strategic capabilities and options.
        I also want to emphasize the vital role our commercial
    industry plays, what I call our fourth component in our
    success.
        It is worth noting yesterday was the 30th anniversary of
    USTRANSCOM's core staff standing up at Scott Air Force Base,
    and we have been going strong ever since, 30 years of history.
        I can say confidently that your United States
    Transportation Command stands ready to deliver our Nation's
    objectives anywhere at any time. We do this in two ways. We can
    provide an immediate force tonight through the use of airlift
    and air refueling fleets. We can provide a decisive force, a
    decisive force when needed through the use of strategic sealift
    and surface assets. You see it every time you read or hear the
    news.
        When North Korea increased its provocation of our Pacific
    allies, America responded with assistance. USTRANSCOM delivered
    that assistance in the form of missile defense systems,
    personnel, and support equipment, moving by sea and air 3,000
    miles across the Pacific Ocean.
        When you read about America's brigade combat teams rolling
    through Europe, it was USTRANSCOM's ability to provide a
    decisive force to reassure European allies.
        When America needed B-2 stealth bombers to fly 11,000 miles
    from Missouri to Libya and back, it was our air refuelers that
    got them there.
        From national disasters to epidemics to acts of war, the
    men and women of USTRANSCOM are ready to deliver this Nation's
    aid, assistance, and, indeed, hope to the world. These missions
    must execute without fail.
        All the while, these great professionals quietly manage a
    myriad of daily tasks around the globe, most of which Americans
    will never read about. It takes diligence, skill, and
    innovation to provide that kind of readiness for America, and
    the men and women of USTRANSCOM have never let us down. I am
    proud to serve next to them, and I say with confidence that our
    organization is ready to respond when our Nation calls.
        That confidence, however, is not without concern. The
    environment we operate in today is increasingly complex, and we
    expect future adversaries will be all the more versatile and
    dynamic, forcing us to adapt, change, and evolve.
        Furthermore, we are viewing potential adversaries through a
    transregional, multidomain, and multifunctional lens. Properly
    understanding the potential threats posed by China, Russia,
    Iran, and North Korea, as well as violent extremists, in a
    global context is of utmost concern for our future national
    security. In each of these scenarios, logistics plays a
    critical but often overlooked role.
        Today, USTRANSCOM is critically examining how we execute
    our logistics mission in the contested environments of the
    future, a space we have not had to operate in logistically
    speaking for a very, very long time. We are exercising and
    wargaming these logistic scenario, forcing planners of every
    ilk to account for transportation's vital role and for, for the
    first time, potential loss.
        Earlier this year, USTRANSCOM held its first-ever contested
    environment wargame, imagining a scenario where we did not
    dominate the skies or own the seas. This wargame uncovered a
    surprising amount of lessons learned, which we have already
    started to absorb. We have adapted our tactics, techniques, and
    procedures accordingly, but we still have work to do.
        I am also concerned about our national strategic sealift
    capability. Any further delay to the recapitalization of our
    military sealift fleet creates risk in our future ability to
    deploy forces across the globe.
        These concerns are compounded further by Merchant Marine
    shortages and the reduction of U.S.-flagged vessels.
        With today's resources, we are capable of meeting today's
    logistics needs. However, if we, together, do not take action
    soon, many of our Military Sealift Command vessels will begin
    to age out by 2026. A significant portion of the DOD's wartime
    cargo capability moves on these ships.
        As a bridging solution, and with your approval, we can
    purchase used ships until we can build new ones ourselves. This
    will not solve the problem forever, and we will need your help
    for all of it.
        My final concern is the threat of attack from the cyber
    domain. Although cybersecurity is a DOD-wide focus area,
    USTRANSCOM is distinctly vulnerable because the majority of the
    command's transportation data resides within and travels
    through the unsecure commercial Internet. Furthermore, unsecure
    networks and systems of our commercial transportation service
    providers coupled with critical infrastructure requirements
    almost wholly reside outside of our control.
        In light of these challenges, USTRANSCOM is focusing our
    cyber efforts on discipline, design, and defense, in order to
    ensure we continue to accomplish our mission. The command is
    collaborating with U.S. Cyber Command, DOD agencies, Federal
    cyber organizations, industry, and academia to identify and
    mitigate gaps and shortfalls, as well as to seize opportunities
    to advance our cyber resilience and improve mission assurance.
        I thank you again, Chairman McCain and Ranking Member Reed
    and the members of the committee, for inviting me to speak to
    you today to represent this 30-year-old command, USTRANSCOM.
    Our TRANSCOM team will continue to provide joint solutions to
    ensure our Nation is able to deliver an immediate force tonight
    and a decisive force when needed anywhere in the world.
        I respectfully request my written testimony be submitted
    for the record, and I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General McDew follows:]

                 Prepared Statement by General Darren W. McDew
                                  introduction
        The United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) delivers
    National objectives on behalf of the United States, and has proudly
    done so for nearly three decades. As we near our 30th anniversary, we
    stand ready to deliver an immediate force through our airlift and air
    refueling assets or a decisive force with our strategic sealift assets
    when and where needed. Our delivery of these forces assures an
    unparalleled global expeditionary capability and gives our Nation
    options when needing to respond to a variety of crises. Ultimately,
    this unmatched capability extends a helping hand or projects combat
    power anywhere, at any time and provides a key strategic advantage for
    our Nation. We must continue to invest in and preserve our edge. Our
    ability to sustain strategic power projection is challenged on several
    fronts by potential adversaries growing ever more capable. However, we
    continue to look forward and innovate as we face challenges,
    uncertainties, risks, and complex demands placed upon the unique
    capabilities we provide daily to our Nation.
                                    mission
        USTRANSCOM delivers full-spectrum global mobility solutions
    supporting our Nation's requirements in peace and war. In the simplest
    terms, we provide viable national security options to the National
    Command Authorities. Those options range from immediate humanitarian or
    combat deliveries by our airlift and air refueling fleets, to the
    global delivery of the Nation's decisive combat power via our strategic
    sealift fleet. While ensuring the readiness and availability of these
    options on a daily basis, the command also leads the Joint logistics
    enterprise which is the foundation on which every other Department of
    Defense capability rides.
        Although transportation remains USTRANSCOM's core competency, our
    span of influence extends from the source of supply, through each
    segment of the DOD supply chain to any designated point of need.
    Through logistics enterprise forums, the Services, Combatant Commands,
    DOD interagency partners and commercial providers, we continue to
    collaborate with logistics leaders in order to better identify,
    prioritize, and close capability gaps within the enterprise. Since
    2009, these efforts have resulted in efficiencies and cost avoidances
    for the DOD distribution supply chain of nearly $1.6 billion, which
    translates to more buying power for the Services.
        In addition to our primary mission of providing full-spectrum
    global mobility solutions, our subordinate command, the Joint Enabling
    Capabilities Command (JECC), provides decisive, rapidly deployable
    joint command and control capabilities. By doing so, they assist in the
    initial establishment, organization, and operation of joint force
    headquarters.
        The JECC is a unique Total Force joint organization that delivers
    highly effective, cost efficient, joint planning, public affairs, and
    communications capabilities to all combatant commanders. This
    Subordinate Command is alert-postured to respond across the full range
    of military operations. They routinely deliver high-impact mission-
    specific teams of experts who produce executable solutions for emergent
    global crises. In fact, they provided more than 40,000 man-days of
    support that touched every combatant command in 2016; notably providing
    key Joint Task Force staff and planning expertise within 72 hours to
    assist Southern Command in responding to Hurricane Matthew. In
    addition, the JECC's robust support to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
    of Staff Combatant Command Exercise and Training program improved our
    National proficiency, knowledge, preparation, and response to emergent
    events.
        The JECC continues to have significant forces deployed in support
    of missions around the globe, including direct support to ongoing
    counterterrorism operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Their ability to
    deliver highly effective joint planning, public affairs, and
    communications capabilities have enabled better integration of DOD,
    U.S. Government, and partner responses to strategic challenges in every
    part of the world.
                             operating environment
        Today's diverse global security environment is dramatically
    different and more complex than the one we operated in for the last 30
    years. China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and violent extremist
    organizations continue to challenge us in new ways, ultimately
    demanding new and innovative solutions. As we look to the future, we
    expect trans-regional, multi-domain, and multi-functional conflicts
    will define our future operating environment. A global view is
    essential in such conflicts. Fortunately, USTRANSCOM has operated
    globally every day since its inception.
        We also expect that future conflicts will cross regional boundaries
    and potential adversaries and peer competitors will field numerically
    superior forces with near-technological parity. Those adversaries are
    aware the United States has become accustomed to geographically-
    isolated conflicts and enjoyed technological superiority over its
    adversaries, so we expect contested global sea lanes and air routes to
    a degree we have not faced since World War II. Potential adversaries
    seek asymmetric means to cripple our force projection and sustainment
    capabilities by targeting critical military and civilian assets, both
    within the U.S. and abroad. Additionally, our enemies continue to use
    our dependence on the cyber domain against us. With those challenges in
    mind, every soldier, sailor, marine, airman, Coast Guardsman and
    Department of Defense (DOD) Civilian of USTRANSCOM and its Component
    and Subordinate Commands recognizes it is our duty to ensure the
    Command remains postured to operate in such an environment and
    effectively answer the Nation's call, should it come.
                                  our approach
        To effectively operate in that future environment, we are focused
    on four priorities: ensuring readiness today while advocating for
    future capabilities, advancing our capabilities in the cyber domain,
    evolving the command for tomorrow, and championing an innovative,
    diverse, and agile workforce.
        In prioritizing today's readiness while keeping an eye toward
    future capabilities, we are advocating for the right mix of personnel,
    platforms, systems and training to ensure we can provide the global
    transportation and logistics capabilities our Nation requires. By
    making the right investments today in enhancements for our air, sea and
    surface fleets, we will ensure USTRANSCOM delivers the Nation's
    objectives tomorrow. Through this pursuit, we posture to meet the full
    range of Unified Command Plan roles and missions in current and
    emerging trans-regional transportation, logistics, and patient movement
    requirements.
        Improving our cyber defense allows USTRANSCOM to operate freely and
    effectively. We continue to broaden our scope to actively evaluate and
    mitigate our command and control, weapon system, and infrastructure
    vulnerabilities, while identifying and advocating for the critical
    capabilities, policies, and procedures that ensure mission
    accomplishment.
        As a global Combatant Command charged with delivering national
    objectives in tomorrow's dynamic security environment, we must
    challenge our assumptions, accurately forecast trends that shape that
    future environment, and develop the technologies and ideas that
    maintain our Nation's competitive advantage. In our pursuit to
    continuously evolve for tomorrow, we established a relationship with
    the Defense Innovation Unit Experimental to expedite the implementation
    of logistics- and cyber-based technologies such as commercial cloud-
    based technologies which can provide Infrastructure-as-a-Service,
    Platform-as-a-Service, and Software-as-a-Service offerings to host
    USTRANSCOM's unique applications. These and other initiatives will
    increase our responsiveness, agility, efficiency, and operational
    processes, while enhancing transparency with our customers and
    positioning us ahead of emerging challenges and threats.
        Finally, our approach recognizes USTRANSCOM requires a talent rich,
    diverse, creative, adaptive, and innovative workforce to survive today
    and thrive in tomorrow's dynamic environment. We will create this
    workforce by recruiting, developing, and retaining the best talent
    America has to offer. We recognize that doing so requires us to remove
    cultural, procedural, and policy barriers along the way such as
    significant civilian hiring reform. We appreciate the attention
    Congress has placed on this issue with the recent passage of
    legislation in the 2017 NDAA creating a streamlined civilian on-campus
    recruiting authority, fast tracking the ability to hire talented
    personnel for critical positions in an ever-more competitive
    marketplace. Initiatives improving the speed at which talent can be
    hired, and opening aperture to additional fast-tracked hiring
    authorities and policy flexibility, ensures better access to streams of
    talent benefitting USTRANSCOM.
                             state of our readiness
        Without reservation, USTRANSCOM stands ready to deliver on behalf
    of the Nation today. However, as our approach to the future operating
    environment indicates, there are challenges that demand our attention
    to ensure our readiness is never called into question. These challenges
    fall into the following broad categories: airlift and air refueling,
    sealift, surface, budget, and workforce issues.
    Airlift/Aerial Refueling
        Air Mobility Command (AMC), a Component Command of USTRANSCOM,
    provides an incredible capability to our Nation and the world. As one
    Total Force team with commercial partners, AMC provides airlift, aerial
    refueling, air mobility support, and aeromedical evacuation around the
    globe, supporting eight combatant commands while operating in 23
    countries.
        On average, tankers are conducting aerial refueling operations
    every 5 minutes over the skies of Iraq and Afghanistan. Additionally,
    AMC refuels fighter squadrons across the Pacific Ocean to ensure a
    constant presence throughout the Pacific and refuels nearly all of our
    North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies during operations and
    exercises around the globe. Yet the scarcity of forces and their
    current distribution, coupled with the high operations tempo placed
    upon them, comes at a cost to the health of the KC-10 and KC-135
    fleets.
        Currently, the KC-46A program is on track to deliver 179 aircraft
    by 2028, which will enhance operational agility. The delivery of these
    aircraft over the next few years remains a critical investment to
    ensure we can continuously project power around the world, whether in
    support of humanitarian relief missions or combat operations.
        The delivery of the KC-46A alone, however, will not address present
    concerns with the allocation and distribution of the global tanker
    fleet. For example, since 2011, the authority of the USTRANSCOM
    commander to manage tankers globally has been constrained by
    congressional language prohibiting changes to command and control of
    scarce KC-135 forces. As global tanker requirements continue to expand,
    we are seeing more cases where the requirements of a given combatant
    command are in competition with others. At the same time, we recognize
    a trans-regional, multi-domain, and multi-functional operating
    environment combined with proliferating anti-access and aerial denial
    threats will only place greater strain on the air refueling force.
    Although we continue to work closely with AMC and the Joint Staff to
    mitigate the effects on the global tanker fleet, the restriction in
    place since 2011 continues to limit the USTRANSCOM commander's ability
    to exercise operational control of high demand Pacific and European
    tanker forces necessary to meet global and national defense
    requirements.
        Also key to air mobility are our airlift assets and the additional
    capabilities commercial industry brings to the fight. For our part, the
    C-17 and C-5 continue to provide strategic airlift the world over while
    our C-130s meet tactical airlift needs in every region of the globe. We
    are seeing stress on the strategic airlift fleets and have some
    concerns about hard choices that have been made to close Active Duty C-
    17 squadrons with an eye toward buying that capability back in the
    Reserve component. While both components are capable, maintaining the
    right balance is critical so we do not create a situation where
    mobilization is needed for every new mission that might arise.
        On the commercial airlift side, our Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF)
    partners commit aircraft to augment DOD airlift during contingencies
    and/or emergencies in exchange for government airlift business while
    also providing commercial airlift services to DOD during peacetime.
    USTRANSCOM closely coordinates with the Department of Transportation
    (DOT) in administering the CRAF program. This steadfast relationship
    has historically provided lift for roughly 40 percent of all DOD air
    cargo and 90 percent of all passenger movements in direct support of
    our warfighters. Our 24 CRAF carriers remain ready to support DOD
    readiness requirements with cargo and passenger support worldwide and
    we will continue to rely on viable and healthy CRAF program in the
    future. To ensure the relationship with our CRAF partners remains
    robust, we've begun contracting with them based on early demand
    signals, allowing us to move workload to them which would have
    otherwise been handled by our organic aircraft. This has the dual
    benefit of providing additional workload to our CRAF partners while
    also reducing flying hours in our organic fleet.
    Sealift
        Historically, nearly 90 percent of wartime transportation
    requirements are delivered through strategic organic and U.S. flagged
    commercial sealift. In fact, our strategic sealift fleet provides the
    ability to deliver a decisive force over great distances. Our U.S. Navy
    component, the Military Sealift Command (MSC), provides sealift
    capabilities through ship chartering, prepositioning, and sustainment
    operations while also executing operational command over the Maritime
    Administration's (MARAD) Ready Reserve Force ships during
    contingencies. Without a healthy and viable U.S. Commercial Sealift
    Fleet, MSC Surge Fleet, and MARAD's Ready Reserve Force, our Nation's
    military may not be able to deploy as quickly and efficiently as it can
    today.
        The National Security Directive on Sealift and the Sealift
    Emergency Response Programs provide assured access to U.S. flagged
    commercial sealift assets, Merchant Mariners, and the global intermodal
    capability required to augment government owned (organic) sealift
    capabilities during contingencies. This assured access is provided via
    the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA) which ultimately
    ensures the U.S. maintains its capability to meet sealift requirements
    in peace, crisis, or war. The VISA program provides a responsive
    transition from peace to contingency operations through pre-coordinated
    agreements for U.S. flagged commercial sealift capacity and systems to
    support DOD's contingency sealift needs. It allows USTRANSCOM to meet
    mobilization requirements in a rapid fashion.
        At the core of the VISA vessels are our Maritime Security Program
    (MSP) partners, who are essential to our wartime U.S. commercial
    sealift capability, and all are participants Sealift Emergency Response
    Programs. Over time, MSP has provided access to required commercial
    U.S. flag shipping assets, while also supporting the pool of Merchant
    Mariners needed to operate MSC's Surge and Ready Reserve Fleet. In this
    way, the MSP significantly contributes to the supply of Merchant
    Mariners available to serve on U.S. vessels in time of war while
    mitigating future risk to our national commercial capacity.
        Along with MSP, The Merchant Marine Act of 1920, also known as the
    Jones Act, provides an additional pool of trained Merchant Mariners and
    sealift capacity. It does this, and contributes to national defense, by
    subsidizing a robust, domestic, maritime industry including U.S.
    industrial shipyard infrastructure for building, repairing, and
    overhauling U.S. vessels.
        Ensuring a healthy U.S. fleet has proven difficult in the larger
    global context where international shipping has slowed while the
    industry as a whole has ended up with an excess of ships. Excess supply
    has caused prices to fall, which has put considerable financial
    pressure on U.S. flagged vessels. Unfortunately, the U.S. flagged
    international commercial fleet and Mariner pool has shrunk over time;
    while we have contingency plans, further reductions may cause us to
    investigate other options such as using more foreign flagged
    international commercial vessels manned by foreign crews during crisis
    or war. American shipping companies continue to re-flag vessels to
    foreign nations, diminishing the size of our commercial fleet, although
    that fleet stabilized in recent years at around 80 today. While the
    U.S. flagged commercial fleet remains the most effective means for us
    to obtain the necessary sealift capability to meet national defense
    needs, we are considering a range of options to ensure that we retain
    the ability to deploy a decisive combat force at the time and place of
    our choosing. Those options may include new approaches to preserving
    essential capabilities in the Ready Reserve Force, which among other
    options, may include non-U.S. built vessels.
    Sealift Fleet Recapitalization
        Since the 1990s, DOD mobility studies have indicated a requirement
    for nearly 20 million square feet of Roll-on/Roll-off (RO/RO) capacity
    to promptly transport materiel wherever needed in defense of the
    Nation's interests in major conflicts abroad. This includes over 15
    million square feet of organic RO/RO capacity on 65 total ships and
    nearly 4.5 million square feet of U.S. flagged commercial RO/RO
    capacity gained through VISA. However, we are projecting a loss of 4.5
    million square feet of organic surge RO/RO capacity by 2033 as these
    vessels reach the end of their service life, with an accelerated loss
    expected between 2026 and 2031. The organic vessels tasked to meet this
    requirement are becoming obsolete or unsustainable. Our organic surge
    vessels, for example, have an average age of 39 years and will begin to
    reach their 50-year service life in the 2020s. This will result in a
    critical sealift capacity shortfall, which limits our ability to
    support the national security requirements. In addition to the RO/RO
    capacity loss, 10 of 12 special-capability ships will age out of the
    fleet between 2020 and 2024. These ships provide expeditionary
    capabilities such as over-the-shore fuel distribution and crane lift to
    austere or damaged ports, a critical necessity for the deployment of
    ground forces and for operations in a contested environment. The aging
    and loss of sealift capacity places a particular urgency on the need to
    explore options for maintaining critical capabilities, without which
    the Nation's strategic sealift capability to support future operations
    will be at risk. We are working closely with the U.S. Navy to maintain
    the full spectrum of strategic sealift capabilities required to move
    U.S. forces in current and future operational environments.
        In order to keep the recapitalization strategy on track and achieve
    success in the near term, the used vessel acquisition component must
    start as early as fiscally possible. This component seeks to purchase
    vessels leaving MSP or other commercial vessels regardless of country
    of origin. The acquired vessels would replace the aging organic vessels
    for a fraction of the cost of new construction and could remain in
    service for several decades. Congressional support will be needed to
    gain the necessary authorities and funding for this effort.
        Additionally, DOD's current organic surge fleet is composed of
    several steam-propelled ships. The manning of these ships with seasoned
    steam certified engineers is a growing concern as commercial industry
    is expected to retire all steam ships by the early 2020s, while we need
    to operate them until 2035 unless recapitalization efforts allow us to
    replace them sooner. As commercial industry retires their steam ships,
    our access to a civilian pool of steam-certified engineers and mariners
    may fall severely (and eventually be) eliminated.
    Surface
        Since the first stage in delivering a decisive force happens on the
    ground, our Nation's infrastructure of roads, rails, and ports plays a
    fundamental and crucial role in the deployment and sustainment of the
    Joint force. USTRANSCOM closely partners with the Department of
    Transportation (DOT) and other Federal and State entities to ensure
    infrastructure within the continental U.S. is ready to support DOD
    deployment and distribution needs.
        USTRANSCOM, through its Army component the Military Surface
    Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) represents the interests and
    requirements of the DOD to access and safely utilize both private and
    public transportation infrastructure and services. Currently, the
    public sector road network remains capable of meeting DOD ground
    transportation needs while providing adequate access to commercial
    trucking capacity to meet current and anticipated surface
    transportation needs.
        Just as the availability and safety of drivers and roadways are
    critical to national defense, our national rail system is of equal
    importance. Through our Railroads for National Defense Program, and
    close collaboration with civil sector rail officials and DOT's Federal
    Railroad Administration, we assess the ability of the U.S. rail system
    to support military needs. Currently the rail network required to
    deploy our force is in place and viable. In the next fifteen years,
    however, we face age-mandated retirements of some of our uniquely
    capable DOD railcars. We are developing a plan in close collaboration
    with the Department of the Army to retain this critical transportation
    capability.
        To successfully execute our deployment mission, USTRANSCOM also
    relies on a collection of both DOD and commercially-owned U.S.
    seaports, designated as Strategic Seaports. The primary mission of the
    Strategic Seaport Program is to ensure DOD has access to sufficient
    seaport infrastructure to meet contingency deployment needs. None are
    more important than the main West and East Coast ports of Military
    Ocean Terminal Concord (MOTCO) and Military Ocean Terminal Sunny Point
    (MOTSU).
        MOTCO on the West Coast is indispensable to USTRANSCOM's support of
    U.S. Pacific Command's operations and DOD's military capability in the
    Pacific Theater. Due to the nature and size of this mission, no
    suitable alternatives exist on this coast and MOTCO's infrastructure
    assets require critical upgrades and maintenance to remain relevant in
    the current military environment. Current efforts are centered on
    preserving the operability of MOTCO's primary pier until it can be
    replaced. We are also examining additional options for MOTCO to become
    a modern ammunition port, fully capable of safe and efficient
    operations to enable uninterrupted delivery of ammunition to the
    Pacific theater.
        At MOTSU, significant infrastructure improvements within the last
    few years have enhanced our ability to support the EUCOM, AFRICOM, and
    CENTCOM combatant commanders' operations and allow the terminal to meet
    throughput requirements. We continue to work with the Department of the
    Army to preserve both seaports by finding and applying resources to
    reduce risk and prevent capability gaps.
        Although our nation's roads, rails, and ports play a fundamental
    role in the deployment and sustainment of our Armed Forces, nothing is
    more important than the people and their families who support and
    execute the mission, at home and abroad. The Defense Personal Property
    Program provides our Service members, DOD Civilians, and their families
    with an effective and efficient system for the relocation, storage, and
    management of their household goods and privately-owned vehicle (POV)
    shipments. As a testament to our partnership with the Deputy Assistant
    Secretary of Defense for Transportation Policy, the Services, and
    commercial transportation service providers, the Defense Personal
    Property Program enables nearly 875 service providers to support the
    movement of approximately 70,000 POVs and around 430,000 household
    goods shipments globally each year.
        An initial review and analysis of the Defense Personal Property
    Program identified that the end-to-end household goods value chain
    lacked proper alignment to consistently produce high quality relocation
    services due to lack of a single program manager and the need for more
    commercial capacity. Consequently, stakeholders from across the
    Department have collaborated on initiatives to recommend to key leaders
    from the military Services. Additionally, the Defense Digital Service
    recently assessed our primary software and customer interface within
    the Defense Personal Property System and found that while we are
    working toward reasonable solutions to the problems our customers have
    with the system, we are plagued by common problems that can be overcome
    by focused effort and assistance from the Defense Digital Service.
    Although still a work in progress, these initiatives are intended to
    improve the move experience for our Service members while
    simultaneously posturing the program for institutionalized and
    sustained continuous improvements. Addressing the challenges of program
    accountability, customer service, entitlements, standardization, and
    automation provides an opportunity to incorporate updated technologies
    and processes that will improve the quality of life and security of our
    Service members, DOD Civilians, and their families.
    Budget Uncertainties
        USTRANSCOM's mobility readiness depends highly on our financial
    health, which in turn relies on the financial posture of Services that
    provide the capabilities we use to execute our critical missions.
    Notably, the Budget Control Act and recent Continuing Resolutions have
    forced the Services to prioritize immediate operational needs over
    prudent long-term planning and investment, decisions that ricochet
    inefficiencies through the logistics and transportation enterprises.
    More generally, sequestration's impact on readiness, mission
    operations, and modernization funding will result in the Services being
    unable to adequately man, train, and equip mobility forces thus
    presenting a significant readiness challenge. Irregular budgets
    jeopardize critical mobility acquisition programs like the schedule for
    the KC-46A program which addresses significant challenges with our
    aging aerial refueling fleet.
        Additionally, our overall readiness and that of other combatant
    commands is influenced by the joint training and exercises conducted
    solely through resources provided by the Combatant Commander's Exercise
    Engagement and Training Transformation program. With an increased
    emphasis on trans-regional, multi-domain, and multi-functional
    operations, adequate support to combatant command joint training and
    exercise programs is as critical as ever.
        As we head into fiscal year 2018, we are projecting adequate
    financial levels to ensure our readiness, but remain vigilant in light
    of budget uncertainty. While maintaining our overall readiness, we
    continue to focus on our commitment to becoming audit ready by
    complying with the initiatives of the Financial Improvement and Audit
    Readiness (FIAR) program. At the same time, as we move to multi-modal
    operations and new Plan, Order, Ship, Track and Pay processes, we are
    integrating FIAR throughout those processes to ensure audit compliance.
    Furthermore, we continue to work closely with our DOD counterparts to
    ensure Transportation Financial Audibility throughout the Department.
    In an effort to ensure our business processes remain relevant today and
    into the future, we are striving to be cost-competitive and more
    transparent with our customers while simultaneously seeking ways to
    provide a lower, more predictable rate structure. These actions enhance
    our coordinating role across the deployment and distribution enterprise
    and ultimately enhance the support we provide the warfighter.
    Availability of the Transportation Workforce
        Each mode of our transportation network (air, surface, and sea)
    requires commercial and/or military operators such as truck drivers,
    aircraft pilots, and sealift mariners. These operators allow USTRANSCOM
    to transport forces and materiel to the point of need and to return our
    ill and injured to appropriate medical care. Worsening shortages of
    these operators limit our ability to successfully deliver required
    combat power across the globe.
        In order to respond anywhere in the world in a matter of hours,
    appropriate manning levels of both Air Force and commercial pilots are
    essential. In fact, all DOD aerial refueling and nearly all strategic
    aeromedical evacuation capability relies on the availability of the
    U.S. Air Force aircrews from the active and Reserve components.
    Additionally, USTRANSCOM's organic and commercial airlift capabilities
    deliver roughly 10 percent of all transportation requirements and
    continue to be a significant force multiplier for the Nation by
    delivering an immediate force overnight into an area of operations when
    needed. Pilot manning will remain vital for the near and long-term
    future of this critical USTRANSCOM capability.
        Our Mobility Air Forces and commercial airline partners, however,
    are experiencing manning shortages. Reduced undergraduate pilot
    training quotas, changes in force structure, and declining retention
    (along with aggressive airline hiring for the foreseeable future) will
    require a concerted effort if we are to mitigate potential negative
    impacts across the active and Reserve components of the U.S. Air Force.
    By comparison, U.S. commercial airlines, including our partners
    participating in the CRAF program, expect a pilot shortage of roughly
    35,000 pilots through the year 2031. Contributing factors include
    retirements exacerbated by statutory age limits (i.e., max of 65 years
    old), an increase in new airline transport pilot certificate
    requirements, and the continuous growth of the global airline industry.
        While monitoring the health of pilot manning, we are keenly focused
    on the strain the trucking industry continues to feel due to the
    commercial truck driver shortage (current shortage of 75,000 with a
    projection of 890,000 by 2027). The industry's ability to attract and
    retain qualified commercial truck drivers required to move freight for
    the DOD and the Nation is a growing concern. Persistent shortages are
    caused by several factors such as quality of life, younger generations
    not seeking out the truck driving profession, and the pursuit of more
    desirable job alternatives. Due to the shortage of operators, the
    trucking industry is currently operating at greater than 95 percent
    capacity leaving little to no surge capacity for DOD. In an effort to
    address and reverse the shortage of drivers, the DOT Federal Motor
    Carrier Safety Administration implemented initiatives such as granting
    test waivers for military members with previous commercial motor
    vehicle experience and expanding their experience validation timeline
    from 90 days to one year. These efforts are the first steps in
    addressing the shortage; however, they may not be sufficient to
    alleviate likely impacts in times of increased demand for DOD's surge
    requirements. To combat this issue, we are continuously engaged with
    industry and conducting ongoing analysis and reviewing plausible
    alternatives, such as increasing the use of multiple modes (rail and
    truck) and un-manned vehicles.
        We will continue to monitor and manage the manning shortages across
    our three fundamental domains. While supporting DOT's efforts in
    reversing current trends, we remain determined to ensure a sufficient
    pool of transportation operators are available to provide our Nation
    transportation options.
                           advancing the cyber domain
        The greatest challenge USTRANSCOM faces every day is the threat of
    attack from the cyber domain. Although cybersecurity is a DOD-wide
    focus area, USTRANSCOM is distinctly vulnerable because the majority of
    the Command's transportation data resides within and travels through
    the unsecure commercial internet. Furthermore, unsecure networks and
    systems of our commercial transportation service providers, coupled
    with critical infrastructure vulnerabilities around the globe, almost
    wholly reside outside our control and pose significant risk to mission
    assurance. Due to these challenges, USTRANSCOM is prioritizing our key
    cyber concerns. The Command is collaborating with U.S. Cyber Command,
    DOD Agencies, Federal cyber organizations, industry, and academia to
    identify and mitigate gaps and shortfalls, as well as to seize
    opportunities to advance our cyber domain capabilities.
        We have and will continue to encourage industry partners to join
    together in a transportation-related Information Sharing and Analysis
    Organization, focused on supporting DOD's transportation mission. Our
    current partnership with the National Defense Transportation
    Association (NDTA) Cybersecurity Committee and our semiannual
    Cybersecurity Roundtables that have drawn interest from across
    government, industry, and academia are cornerstones of our efforts to
    build a more responsive, aware, and collective approach to mission
    assurance.
        For example, through our partnership with the NDTA Cybersecurity
    Committee, we seek to address: cybersecurity issues of mutual concern,
    rapid sharing of threat information, the application of best practices,
    and, research on existing and emerging cybersecurity technology and
    development activity. The committee provides a mechanism to address
    urgent concerns, such as cybersecurity contract language and the
    exchange of unclassified and sensitive information between USTRANSCOM
    and industry partners.
        However, there is still much more to do in order to address our
    current and future cyber capabilities. People, processes, and
    technology are all key areas where we can enhance our cyber resiliency.
    Specifically, we must grow and retain a highly skilled cyber workforce;
    clarify cybersecurity roles and responsibilities across the critical
    infrastructure sector; implement acquisition policy to provision cloud
    services and other innovative cyber solutions at the ``speed of need.''
    We also need to ensure that DOD can rapidly share threat and
    vulnerability information with our commercial partners while continuing
    to improve cybersecurity compliance reporting that enables informed
    risk management decisions appropriate to the situation at hand. We will
    continue to work with U.S. Cyber Command, DOD Agencies' cyber
    organizations, Department of Homeland Security, and commercial
    transportation partners to mitigate cyber risks to global distribution
    operations.
                             evolving for tomorrow
        Beyond the contested cyber domain, we recognize we will face new
    challenges across the other domains as well. As mentioned, we expect
    future conflicts are increasingly likely to occur in an environment
    contested across all domains, subsequently restricting our freedom of
    action. Adversaries and geopolitical competitors have the ability today
    to challenge our freedom of movement from deployment to employment
    using kinetic and non-kinetic means to disrupt, delay, or deny
    operations. This creates an environment that places our strategic
    assets at great risk. As our Joint force prepares to face this
    challenge, operational plans must reflect the anticipated attrition of
    both combat and mobility assets and associated personnel.
        Future conflicts within the contested environment will also greatly
    challenge global patient movement operations. USTRANSCOM currently
    operates the best patient movement system in the world, safely and
    efficiently moving thousands of our nation's ill and injured Service
    members to the medical care they need every year. We are not content,
    however, to rest on our successes. Recognizing future adversaries might
    be able to limit our access to the air and cyber domains, we are
    aggressively exploring surface movement solutions to ensure we remain
    the best in patient movement no matter the threat or environment. We
    continue to partner with the Services to expand maritime patient
    movement capabilities and we are working to rebuild our ability to move
    patients by rail. Our Nation's joint casualty stream must be supported
    by joint patient movement capabilities that are interoperable, multi-
    modal, and capable of functioning in a cyber-compromised environment.
    Synchronized policies, training, and research and development are
    needed across the DOD to ensure we remain the best in safely moving our
    ill and injured whenever and wherever needed.
        We also conducted a Future Deployment and Distribution Assessment
    focused on deployment and distribution in a contested environment. This
    assessment solidified our concerns about the challenges of conducting
    operations in contested environments and again highlighted that our
    global network (to include partners and allies) is at risk from threats
    in all domains--land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace.
        Finally, we hosted our inaugural contested environment war game
    aimed at creating a common understanding of our operations in contested
    environments. We also sought to recognize the enterprise-wide
    challenges and develop prioritized mitigation efforts to enable future
    operations in those environments. The war game also addressed the
    necessary investments in planning and collaboration with the entire DOD
    logistics enterprise necessary to develop appropriate mitigation
    strategies for these threats. Finally, the war game highlighted the
    need for multiple operating options to ensure resiliency, agility, and
    responsiveness in future conflicts. An important insight from the war
    game is that operational plans and fleet sizing considerations must
    account for the loss of capital assets. These vital principles ensure
    realistic planning and aligned with risk, resulting in operational
    resiliency across all domains in future contested environments.
        Based on these findings and published defense guidance, we will
    work with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, CAPE to initiate a
    new mobility requirements study once defense strategic guidance and the
    supporting elements, such as defense planning scenarios, mature.
             championing an innovative, diverse, & agile workforce
        In light of all of the challenges and opportunities ahead of us, we
    recognize our people are our greatest resources and are the ones who
    will rise to those challenges and seize the opportunities. At the same
    time, it is clear the competition for talent is becoming more acute.
    Given that, we are working to recruit, develop, and retain the best
    talent America has to offer. At the heart of that effort we completed
    our first-ever headquarters Human Capital Strategic Plan setting short
    and long term goals for cultivating and managing our large professional
    civilian workforce. We also entered into an agreement with Defense
    Logistics Agency that created an individual civilian experiential
    development opportunity. Goal of effort is to address how USTRANSCOM
    and Defense Logistics Agency can work together to collectively develop
    the skills, knowledge, and effectiveness of our civilian workforce. We
    expect this initial agreement to serve as a baseline we can expand upon
    in the future. Beyond these early accomplishments, we are positioning
    ourselves to remain competitive in attracting future talent by
    identifying and establishing developmental positions within USTRANSCOM.
                                 our commitment
        For nearly three decades, our Nation has turned to USTRANSCOM's
    strategic power projection capability to respond rapidly to global
    threats and disasters. Today, USTRANSCOM continues to deliver 21st
    Century, enterprise-wide, global expeditionary capabilities to the
    joint force. Anticipating and adapting to challenges will allow us to
    perform our missions in an ever-changing security environment. These
    missions continue to trend toward non-permissive, remote, austere, and
    widely-dispersed locations, but this team of transportation and
    logistics professionals always finds a way to deliver our national
    objectives. Our continuous focus on the resiliency and preservation of
    the Joint logistics enterprise while advocating for the right
    investments in our cyber-enabled air, sea, and surface fleets ensures
    we can deliver the Nation's objectives tomorrow.
        Continued Congressional support, coupled with the hard work of the
    professional men and women of USTRANSCOM and our components, will
    ensure we are ready to deliver the Nation's Objectives. We will
    continue to address challenges and vulnerabilities and advocate for
    innovative solutions as we provide the joint force options for
    delivering an immediate force tonight and a decisive force when needed.
    ``Together, we deliver!''

        Chairman McCain. Thank you. Without objection.
        Thank you very much, sir.
        A major concern for the Navy is a lack of sufficient U.S.-
    flagged ships and robust Merchant Marine to meet future demand.
    Is that a major concern of yours?
        General McDew. Yes, it is, Senator.
        Chairman McCain. Do we have any plans, that you know of, to
    rectify that?
        General McDew. Chairman, I believe that we are working very
    closely with the United States Navy. The Navy understands the
    depth of the problem.
        Chairman McCain. Do we have any plans to rectify that
    shortfall?
        General McDew. There is a Navy recapitalization plan that
    is being built right now. It should be unveiled in the next few
    weeks. I do not want to get ahead of the Navy, but we worked
    very closely with them on that.
        Chairman McCain. The real secret is that our ability to
    move supply and support modern military forces, to a large
    degree, rests on the support it receives from private sector
    companies, right?
        General McDew. It does.
        Chairman McCain. Suppose we are in a combat scenario. Can
    we continue to rely on those private companies or corporations
    to supply us with what we need?
        General McDew. Our U.S.-flagged fleet of ships has been a
    reliable partner for decades. The Merchant Marine force that
    does this work is a viable and proud patriotic unit.
        Chairman McCain. I guess I am talking about having to
    transport troops and materiel into a contested region. Can we
    rely on these nonmilitary companies, such as UPS [United Parcel
    Service] and DHL and Maersk and others to go into combat areas?
        General McDew. Chairman, our first force to go into these
    contested environments is our organic aircraft and organic
    sealift ships.
        Chairman McCain. Yes, and that is some 600 refueling
    tankers to transport one combat team, according to the
    information I have. Do we have the capability to move a
    sufficient number of individuals and materiel into a combat
    zone without relying on civilian sources of transportation?
        General McDew. Chairman, it depends on what sufficient
    means. If we are going to----
        Chairman McCain. Let's take Korea. Suppose that a conflict
    broke out in Korea, and the North Koreans have some limited
    antiship capability. Can we rely on those nonmilitary
    corporations to go into--maritime capabilities to go into
    contested areas, into combat zones?
        General McDew. Today, Chairman, I would not call upon the
    commercial industry to go into a contested environment. We have
    organic----
        Chairman McCain. So you have sufficient capability to move
    what we need without relying on them? Is that correct?
        General McDew. We have a sufficient force today, and I have
    talked to General Vince Brooks and his staff, to provide him
    what he needs in the first 30 days organically. Beyond that, we
    will have to continue to assess how much continues to flow and
    how much of that we can mitigate the threat by the time we have
    to get to the use of commercial vessels.
        Chairman McCain. According to what I am told, it can take
    200 C-17 sorties to deploy a single brigade combat team. Is
    that your correct assessment?
        General McDew. I would not like to argue numbers with you
    at all, but I do know that----
        Chairman McCain. I am not getting into an argument. I am
    saying that this is the information that is provided to us by
    the Department of Defense. It is not my opinion. That is the
    information that we have from the Department of Defense.
        Are you able to ensure that global force projection is a
    primary capability given the assets that we have and not having
    to rely on non-DOD capabilities for, say, a conflict in Korea?
        General McDew. It is not easy. However, with a global
    force, and that is what U.S. Transportation Command is, and we
    use the forces that are available, we can do 200 C-17 sorties.
        Chairman McCain. You can do 200 C-17s, and that gives you
    one brigade combat team. I doubt, if there is a conflict in
    Korea, that one brigade combat team would be sufficient for us
    to reinforce our forces on the ground in Korea.
        What I am saying, General, is that we are reliant to a
    larger and larger degree on the private sector companies, and
    there is great question amongst many experts that we do not
    have the capability, say in Korea, say in Eastern Europe, to
    resupply and maintain our ability to carry out success in
    combat.
        Now are you telling me that we can and are and have that?
        General McDew. We do not have the capability that I wish we
    had, but we have a capability that can provide a force when
    needed. The force that General Brooks is asking me to deliver
    can be delivered initially by our organic fleet. We have put a
    lot of capability into----
        Chairman McCain. In contested areas?
        General McDew. We have put a lot in the commercial sector
    that we cannot rely on in contested areas. But the initial
    force can be brought by organic fleets, and then we will have
    to see what we can do after that.
        It is a challenge because of how we have gotten to where we
    have gotten to.
        Chairman McCain. Well, General, to ``see what we can do
    after that'' is not comforting to this committee.
        Senator Reed?
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Let me focus on the issue of cyber, which you brought up,
    and I brought up in my comments.
        As you know, the committee did a report based upon
    incidents of your contractors, private contractors, in June
    2012 through June 2013, where there were cyber breaches. I
    thank TRANSCOM, because they cooperated in the report. Just a
    few points emerged that were very critical, and I wanted to get
    your sense of how much progress you have made.
        First, there appeared to be confusion within DOD about what
    information relating to cyber compromise of private sector
    contractors may be lawfully shared. That is one issue.
        Second, TRANSCOM had not provided other DOD components or
    the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] a list of
    operationally critical contracts about whom the command would
    like to be alerted when a compromise occurs. Then there were
    gaps in cyber reporting requirements contained in TRANSCOM's
    contracts.
        Although I must give you credit, sir, because TRANSCOM was
    the first DOD component to require contractors to report cyber
    intrusions.
        Can you comment on these issues and, in general, where we
    are?
        General McDew. Senator, we have transformed our view of
    cyber. Last year, cyber roundtables that we did, we did three
    separate sets of cyber roundtables to get us to a different
    level of awareness and knowledge. What that has driven us to do
    is that our contracts are now more cyber-aware. The way we deal
    with contractors is more cyber-aware. We are asking industry to
    partner with us to set a higher cyber standard.
        The problem we have is, sitting in the seam between DOD and
    commercial industry, is that the rule sets are different. We
    can defend the Department of Defense networks, but we do not
    have any control over what happens in the civil networks.
    Sometimes, a commercial company is disincentivized to report an
    intrusion. Sometimes, they do not have the wherewithal to know
    that they have had an intrusion.
        Those things need to be squared away. So we are partnering
    with CYBERCOM [United States Cyber Command] and also the
    interagency to see where the FBI and DHS [Department of
    Homeland Security] can maybe look at those intrusions
    differently. I am having a meeting with them later this week
    because I believe the commercial viability of the company is
    one thing. National security is another. Because a company is
    intruded upon, it is not always just a commercial problem.
        Senator Reed. Are you planning to suggest legislative
    proposals that would give the Department of Defense more
    authority in this regard, or clarify its authority? Maybe
    clarification is a better word.
        General McDew. I am not sure that DOD needs more authority,
    but I believe a bridging of the gap between DOD and the rest of
    the Federal Government is needed to happen, and to see where we
    can square that.
        Senator Reed. Let me follow up on two of the questions that
    Senator McCain asked.
        First, as we move to more emphasis on the Pacific,
    particularly North Korea, there is the issue of platforms, both
    air and sea. But there is also the issue of facilities. Do you
    have an assessment of the needs for docks or airfields that
    have to be repaired or remediated so that you can continue to
    operate?
        General McDew. We do a regular annual assessment, a
    rotating assessment through every year. We publish an en route
    master plan of ports and rail all around the world.
        We believe we have sufficient facilities globally to handle
    most contingencies. Unfortunately, until you get into the
    fight, you do not know specifics about which exact ones you are
    going to need when, because you do not know what the enemy is
    going to take away from you.
        So based on initial assessments, we do it, and then we
    continue to assess as the enemy moves and we countermove.
        We believe that, in the early days, as we provide ways to
    mitigate the threat, maybe we have greater access in some
    places that we do not think of using now, and we have to be
    resilient enough to go to those places.
        Senator Reed. With regard to the issue of ships
    particularly, or aircraft going into contested areas, do you
    have any contractual authority to compel them to do that? Or do
    they have an opportunity in the contract to just simply
    decline?
        General McDew. So it is twofold. We also have a
    responsibility to them to not send them into harm's way if they
    are not prepared to go, in particular with the Civil Reserve
    Air Fleet.
        Right now, with the FAA [Federal Aviation Administration],
    the FAA trusts us to make the determination of when a place is
    sufficient to send in a commercial aircraft. We owe that to
    them. We also owe them a little bit better training on tactics
    and procedures, and maybe some way of how to operate in a
    convoy environment.
        My Military Sealift Command commander right now is trying
    to work with commercial industry to see where we can strengthen
    their ability to operate at least on the edges of the contested
    environment.
        Senator Reed. Again, is there any consideration to
    legislation that might give you more appropriate authorities in
    this regard? Because the problem the chairman has pointed out
    is a real problem.
        General McDew. The problem is, indeed, real. We have gone
    down the path of trying to work with industry because they have
    been beside us a long time. We believe they will want to. But
    we do not want to put a ship in harm's way, because losing the
    ship is worse than not sailing the ship.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Inhofe?
        Senator Inhofe. General McDew, one of the problems that we
    have when you are trying to move this equipment, the function
    that you perform, it is either by sea or by air. Air,
    obviously, is the one that meets the needs because you do not
    have a lot of the time that you normally would have to be
    dealing with.
        But we also know the risks that are out there. We know the
    surface-to-air capability of the enemy. We know the air-to-air
    capability. We know those problems that exist. As was pointed
    out by the chairman in his opening statement, we are not able
    to handle the capacity by air, so it ends up being by ship.
    Then you have problems there too.
        So with the age of our fleets right now, 39 years for the
    ships, and then when you look at the C-5s, C-17s, you look at
    what we are doing right now at Tinker Air Force Base, trying to
    take the KC-135s down to the skeleton and then just rebuilding
    them, how big of a problem do you see this today and as you
    look into the future, to perform the functions that you are
    supposed to be performing with just the sheer age of this
    stuff? The KC-46 will not be around for some time to relieve
    this. So what kind of a problem is this?
        General McDew. Senator, recapitalizing all of those fleets
    is a problem. Doing it underneath the budget constraints we
    have had will be nearly impossible.
        We owe the Congress possibly better numbers. I have been
    part of propelling some numbers of tankers that are needed to
    provide help around the globe, the number of ships. Our
    contested environment wargames tell us that those numbers may
    not be sufficient, because we have never, in the history that I
    can remember, planned for attrition of our logistics. We have
    not fought for 70-plus years an adversary that can do that to
    us.
        So age is one level of attrition. Enemy action is another
    level of attrition. Lack of sufficient maintenance so that it
    is reliable is another.
        The tanker problem, if we are going to go after 12
    airplanes a year, of the KC-46, of recapping, that is going to
    produce risk long-term as these airplanes continue to age as we
    recap.
        Senator Inhofe. That is true. It is also, as you are making
    the decisions now, I can remember when we were making decisions
    on the C-17. I remember we talked about at one time that it was
    going to be 210. Then it was going to be--anyway, when Cheney
    came along and actually increased that.
        But every time you make those changes, you are affecting
    risk. That is the thing that concerns me.
        Now the chairman brought out our reliance upon the private
    sector in some of these areas. I was reading in your prepared
    statement, and I will just repeat it here: ``Unfortunately, the
    U.S.-flagged international commercial fleet and Mariner pool
    has shrunk over time. While we have contingency plans, further
    reductions may cause us to investigate other options, such as
    using more foreign-flagged international commercial vessels
    manned by foreign crews during crisis or war. American shipping
    companies continue to re-flag vessels to foreign nations,
    diminishing the size of our commercial fleet.''
        Now, we had said that our commercial fleet should be able
    to take care of some 90 percent of the need. My concern is
    every bit as much the reliance upon the other countries as it
    is being reliant upon the private sector. Do you agree with
    that?
        General McDew. Senator, we have always been a Nation that
    has had a large enough maritime fleet, and we have been a
    maritime country, and we have always had the ability to do that
    indigenous to U.S.-flagged vessels.
        Senator Inhofe. Yes, that is what we have always been able
    to do. That is not the case now.
        General McDew. We are in jeopardy now. Now we are at about
    80 ships.
        Senator Inhofe. This is a new threat that was not there
    before, and I agree with that, and I am concerned about that.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Shaheen?
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General McDew, thank you for being here. I certainly
    appreciate what you said in your statement about the importance
    of TRANSCOM to any action we take anywhere in the world, so
    thank you, and everyone who serves in TRANSCOM.
        As I know you are aware, the 157th Air Refueling Guard Wing
    is at Pease in New Hampshire. We are one of those places that
    is going to first get the KC-46A tankers. I have had a chance
    to go up with the 157th and watch them refuel and am amazed at
    the skill and precision that all of those fliers have and how
    important it is to have that refueling capability as we are
    looking at what we need to do around the world.
        While I appreciate what you said about our problems are not
    going to be solved by the KC-46, can you talk about how
    important it is to have those planes delivered? I know the
    delivery date has slipped a little bit, so what are we doing to
    make sure that they are coming in on time where we need them to
    go?
        General McDew. Senator, behind the cyberthreat, tanker
    recap is probably my number one priority. If there was one
    thing that keeps me awake at night, that is the ability to
    provide the air refueling support that we need globally to
    respond anywhere around the world at the time of our choosing.
    The 157th is one of those units that we count on to do that.
        The KC-46 recap, or recapping takers writ large, is a very,
    very important program that cannot be allowed to slip much
    more. We are already assuming some level of risk, and that is
    before we learned about the things that we have going on in
    contested environments. We do not plan for losing tankers. If
    we do not recap them, any loss is more catastrophic.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I certainly agree with that.
        I know that when we were in Afghanistan and Iraq, one of
    the challenges that we had at the height of those conflicts has
    been the ability to have our fuel keep up with the actions that
    were going on in the field. One of the things that I think the
    military has done an excellent job of is research into
    alternative ways to make us less dependent on those fuel lines
    and particularly foreign sources of oil.
        Can you talk a little bit about how you see the importance
    of those alternative fuels as you are looking at TRANSCOM's
    future?
        General McDew. Senator, I believe that a level of
    resilience across the entire portfolio is needed. The ability
    to have different sources of fuel, the ability to have
    different methods of delivering that fuel, DLA [Defense
    Logistics Agency] and all of our partners really work hard at
    that. I think it is important that we cannot just be relying on
    one source for anything.
        Senator Shaheen. Are you concerned about the progress that
    they are making? How are we doing? Is there any branch that is
    falling behind that we need to be worried about?
        General McDew. You know, with technology, always faster is
    better. But sometimes, the journey is important as you are
    going down new innovative paths.
        So I cannot tell anybody that is falling behind. But I
    think research and development on different ways of doing fuel
    is going to be important.
        Senator Shaheen. Just following up a little bit on the
    cyber concern, what more can we do on this committee to support
    the efforts to address both the intrusions and the cyberattacks
    that we are seeing? How can we help encourage the private
    sector that we are relying on to come to the table? Do we need
    to give you more authority? Do we need to take action that is
    going to address the private sector? What should this committee
    be looking at to support your efforts?
        General McDew. I would ask, Senator, that this committee
    and all the committees in the Congress, as well as the American
    public, become as paranoid about the cyberthreat as I have
    become.
        Senator Shaheen. Oh, I think we are pretty paranoid,
    actually.
        General McDew. I am not sure in the commercial industry
    that every CEO [Chief Executive Officer] sees the cyberthreat
    as something beyond their commercial viability, and I am not
    sure every CEO understands that it is CEO business and not the
    IT [information technology] department's business.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, a very important observation.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Rounds?
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General McDew, thank you for your service to our country.
        A unique and significant part of the Nation's air mobility
    resource is the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, as the chairman has
    indicated, commonly referred to as CRAF. The average American
    may be surprised to know that, in 1991's Operation Desert
    Storm, 60 percent of all deployed troops and 25 percent of all
    cargo airlift went by commercial carriers, not military
    airlift.
        At the time, the Air Force had about 330 C-5s and C-141s
    for strategic airlift. Today, your posture statement says the
    CRAF requirement has grown from 60 percent to 90 percent for
    all passengers, and from 25 percent to 40 percent of all cargo.
        Meanwhile, the latest numbers that I have been shown, there
    are roughly 280 C-5s and C-17s in the inventory for this
    mission. This reduction of 50 aircraft since 1991, combined
    with the erosion of sealift availability, tells me that our
    ability to project military power is increasingly tied to our
    commercial air segment, blurring the lines between military and
    nonmilitary organizations required for national defense.
        Specifically, you have noted that one of the greatest
    challenges that TRANSCOM faces is from cyberattacks. Because it
    is not a DOD entity, the Civil Reserve Air Fleet resides
    outside the direct reach of CYBERCOM. How can we make certain
    that this fleet receives the same level of cyber defense as our
    strategic air units?
        General McDew. Right now, I have no mechanism to ensure
    that that can happen. I do not have the authority to compel a
    commercial industry to bring their standards up to the level
    that we have inside, nor are we assured exactly what that
    standard is. We do know that inside the Department of Defense,
    USCYBERCOM and others have established a standard that we
    believe that our networks are protected. Outside, I guarantee
    you that every CEO thinks that they have the level that they
    think they need. Reconciling what they think and what the
    reality is is important.
        Sharing information across from DOD to commercial industry,
    the Federal Government to commercial industry, is one. I can
    talk to CEOs, and I have talked to some that have no idea that
    they have been attacked. That is a problem.
        So before you can ensure that they are protected, they have
    to have the wherewithal to know that they have been attacked.
        Senator Rounds. The Department of Homeland Security, which
    is charged with protecting critical infrastructure, defines it
    as the assets, systems, and networks, whether physical or
    virtual, so vital to the United States that their
    incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect
    on security, national economic security, national public health
    or safety, or any combination thereof.
        My question, I guess, would be, given our significant
    reliance on CRAF, would you consider it to be critical
    infrastructure?
        General McDew. I would, and I would also broaden the
    definition. There are many more things, because of the risk we
    have taken in the portfolio over the last couple decades, many
    more things are in the private sector. All of those things I
    rely upon for national security, and many of those things are
    not thought of that way on a regular basis.
        Senator Rounds. Are there any other nonmilitary elements
    critical to TRANSCOM's mission that you would consider critical
    infrastructure?
        General McDew. Critical, I do not want to get into the
    actual definition of critical, but there are elements of
    commercial, everyday use--road, rail, seaports--that are all
    critical. When we need to go to war as a Nation, they are all
    critical.
        Senator Rounds. What interaction does TRANSCOM have with
    the Department of Homeland Security regarding such
    infrastructure?
        General McDew. Most of our links are through the Department
    of Transportation. We do have links to the Department of
    Homeland Security. We meet regularly. I have a liaison officer
    from both the FBI, and we work extensively with the
    interagency.
        The problem is, I do not know if we have sung loud enough.
    We have just learned a number of things ourselves over the last
    year about how vulnerable we are. We have learned some things
    over the last year on how we can protect ourselves better. Now
    we are able to be a better partner, I believe, in the
    interagency.
        Senator Rounds. General, thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Hirono?
        Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General, it is good to see you. Thank you for your service.
        I want to talk about Red Hill. The Red Hill Bulk Fuel
    Storage Facility at Joint Base Pearl Harbor is a key component
    of the Navy's operations in the Pacific and Asia to provide
    secure underground fuel storage for ships and aircraft, and it
    is of vital strategic importance.
        For anyone who has not visited the Red Hill Bulk Fuel
    Storage Facility, it is massive. The engineering feat to create
    that facility is on the order of Hoover Dam, so we are talking
    about a huge facility.
        Can you discuss the impact that this secure storage
    facility has on the reliability and resilience of refueling in
    the Pacific? What would happen if this facility were closed?
        General McDew. I cannot speak directly to that one. That
    would be more in the purview of DLA and partners at the Defense
    Logistics Agency.
        However, anything that lessens our ability to have fuel
    available in the Pacific region is detrimental to our ability
    to go to war.
        Senator Hirono. Have you ever visited this facility?
        General McDew. Not directly, Senator.
        Senator Hirono. If you ever get to Hawaii, please do so. I
    am sure you do get to Hawaii. Please do so.
        The Air Force has been using Active Associate Units for
    many years. These can be very strong units showing the
    collaborative capabilities of joint Active Duty and Guard
    organizations.
        What are your thoughts on Active Associate Units? Could you
    use more in the tanker and airlift fleet?
        General McDew. Senator, Active Associate Units have been a
    part of our DNA [deoxyribonucleic acid] in the transportation
    business since the 1960s. They have been a viable way of
    augmenting and strengthening our ability to provide air
    refueling, in particular in airlift. I think it is vital going
    forward that every unit--and I believe the Air Force has this
    as part of their plan--every unit in the KC-46 will be
    associated in some way. We can do more with many.
        Some units are better at this than others and have a proven
    track record. Some need some help. As we go forward, I believe
    that we will get better and better at doing this in the future.
        Senator Hirono. Admiral Harris testified before SASC
    [Senate Armed Services Committee] last week that, of the five
    global challenges that currently drive U.S. defense planning
    and budgeting, four are in the Asia-Pacific region.
        How does tyranny of distance in the Asia-Pacific region
    impact your planning for the projection of forces and
    sustainment in the region? How would those plans be modified if
    more than one global challenge needed to be immediately
    addressed in the region?
        General McDew. I do not like to disagree with my good
    friend Harry Harris, and I understand why he focuses on that
    particular region. I tend to focus on the globe, and there is
    not one of those problems that is not resident everywhere on
    the globe.
        So for my portfolio, it is a global problem. It is a
    transregional problem. We need to be able to make sure that
    every combatant commander that has a region understands that
    they may not be the primary effort, depending on what is
    happening around the globe.
        Senator Hirono. So since you look at the threats globally--
    and, of course, PACOM [United States Pacific Command]
    represents 51 percent of the world's area. So especially with
    the threat of North Korea, how do you go about determining what
    resources you would place with regard to the needs of our
    combatant commanders?
        General McDew. We respond to the priorities set by the
    Secretary of Defense and through the Joint Staff. So the
    priority of effort must be set. Right now, the priority of
    effort is providing General Vince Brooks and Harry Harris the
    resources they need to ensure that they can respond to whatever
    provocative actions are taken by North Korea. If they are no
    longer the priority of effort, we swing to some other part of
    the world. We do not have the resources to be everywhere for
    everybody.
        Senator Hirono. So you say right now the priority area is
    the DMZ [Demilitarized Zone] and Pacific Command, Harry Harris?
        General McDew. I may have misspoken slightly. So I did say
    that. I am giving a lot of effort to Harry Harris and Vince
    Brooks because I know that they have a challenge that they are
    facing immediately. Scaparrotti, Votel, all of them have issues
    that they are dealing with, and we try to work around the globe
    for all of them.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you.
        This question has come up before, our reliance on
    commercial assets for power projection and sustainment. If sea
    lanes and air lanes are compromised, how will the U.S. either
    defend our commercial partners or assume a larger role in
    transportation?
        General McDew. Senator, one of the reasons that I started
    calling the commercial industry my fourth component, I have an
    air component, I have an Army component, I have a Navy
    component, but a very important component that we have not
    looked at in that way is the commercial industry. Some of my
    predecessors actually would not even call them our partners,
    would not say the term out loud. I understand why they did it
    at the time.
        But in today's environment, I have to and must rely on this
    commercial industry to get things done. So we owe them a better
    view of their resilience. We owe them a better view of how they
    are going to contend in contested environments. We owe that to
    them in partnering with them.
        Senator Hirono. So you are taking specific steps to bring
    them more into an understanding of the challenges that we face?
        General McDew. Absolutely. Through organizations like the
    National Defense Transportation Association, which most of them
    are members of, we work on subcommittees to try to get after
    these problems.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Ernst?
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General, it is good to see you. Thanks for being here. Your
    grandson I am sure is quite lovely. My own daughter, we called
    her chubbo-bubbo when she was a baby as well.
        But thank you for your testimony this morning. I do
    appreciate you being here.
        As a transportation officer, I do have a lot of respect and
    understanding of the important role that TRANSCOM plays for all
    of us that have served in uniform, so thank you so much.
        The risk you describe from the cyberthreats to the
    refueling shortfalls could have incredible impacts on our
    national security. I am glad we are addressing those today.
        You mentioned in your testimony that your tankers are
    conducting aerial refueling operations every 5 minutes over the
    skies of Iraq and Afghanistan. When I hear about that, I think
    about how we are misallocating fourth generation fighter jets
    and tankers to bomb a pickup truck when they could be keeping
    Russia or China at bay.
        To me, it highlights why the services need to continue
    pursuing highly lethal and low-cost solutions in one theater to
    allow better use of high-cost technologies where they are
    needed most.
        Can you describe to me, General, how pursuing more cost-
    effective tactics on the battlefield can help alleviate some of
    the stress that we have put on TRANSCOM?
        General McDew. First of all, Senator, thanks very much.
    There are a bunch of folks in the cornfields of Illinois right
    now that loved every statement that you had to say about the
    wonders of the transporters.
        What we do, I believe, does keep the 4-plus-1 priorities
    and our enemies at bay. They understand that we still have the
    capacity to bring a decisive force or an immediate force when
    needed. I still believe that most adversaries get that. We are
    challenged in how well we can do it, how long we can do it. But
    I still believe it causes them pause.
        Going forward, how long will it stay that way? Innovation
    will help us. We have to get after autonomy. We have to get
    after a lot of different ways that we can use cheaper methods
    in some regions because we will never have enough resources to
    place them in every region around the world permanently.
        Senator Ernst. Truly. Thank you. I appreciate that.
        General, U.S. special operations teams are some of the most
    utilized forces against our current enemies. But unfortunately,
    their remote locations and need for secrecy create quite a
    unique transportation challenge. As you probably know, the
    special forces team that led the American invasion in
    Afghanistan rode in on horseback.
        Just tying in with that, what challenges do you face in
    TRANSCOM when you are seeking to support our special operators?
        General McDew. One is to let General Thomas know that I do
    not have horses.
        Senator Ernst. No stables, no horses.
        General McDew. General Thomas and his team and our team at
    TRANSCOM talk regularly. We understand that they are in small
    places with small teams doing big business. So we work very
    closely with them on both how they contract, how they supply
    themselves, and we try to make sure that we are giving them the
    value of our expertise. They do a lot of things well. We do
    this well.
        Senator Ernst. Very good. I appreciate that.
        You had given some inspiring remarks on innovative thinking
    last month, telling your servicemembers that you needed true
    innovation and not just technology. I do agree with that.
        I also agree with your remarks about our failing
    acquisition system. As you say, taking 10 years to develop a
    weapons system will leave us behind our adversaries.
        How is that failing acquisition system impacting TRANSCOM?
    What can we do a better?
        General McDew. It is a broad problem as you know, Senator.
    One of the things is it is everything from how we train our
    acquisition professionals who do the best they can with the
    tools they are given to giving them better tools and then
    giving them different expectations.
        Sometimes commanders need to be more involved with setting
    an expectation for what is going to come out of that
    acquisition process and how quickly, and then sometimes we have
    to press the system because on the edges of the regulations are
    opportunities. Maybe we have not explored all the edges, but we
    do need to get after better training and better tools.
        Senator Ernst. Fantastic. Thank you, General, for being
    here today.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator King?
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        First, General, I did not know until today that you spent
    your first 5 years in the Air Force at Loring Air Force Base.
        General McDew. Actually, 5.5 years, six winters.
        Senator King. Five and a half years, six winters. I always
    knew you were a man of insight, intellect, and character, and
    now I understand where it came from. Aroostook County will do
    that for you.
        I also understand Senator Shaheen mentioned----
        Chairman McCain. I think we need regular order here.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator King. I will not violate Rule 19, Mr. Chairman.
        But I have to mention 101st Air Refueling Wing in Bangor. I
    was with the chairman in Qatar a couple years ago, and they
    were proudly serving there. We affectionately refer to them as
    the Maniacs, and they do a wonderful job.
        In fact, they allowed me to fly the boom in one of the
    planes. For some reason, they did not allow me to fly the boom
    when there was a jet aircraft attached to it.
        General McDew. I appreciate that.
        Senator King. Yes, I thought that you might want to know
    that.
        I know Senator Rounds talked a bit about the cyber issue. I
    am gravely concerned because, as you have testified, your
    capacity is very dependent upon commercial partners. You said
    that every CEO says they are safe, and I do not believe it. I
    hope that you can do more than admonish them. I would hope that
    we have these contracts with them, which they believe are
    profitable, that is why they enter into them, but the
    contracts, in my view, should have conditions that take
    seriously this threat, because this could be a critical
    disruption that would absolutely devastate our ability to
    respond to a crisis.
        General McDew. Senator, one of the first steps we believe
    is setting a clear cybersecurity standard. That standard has to
    continue to evolve as we learn more and the tools get better in
    how we defend networks, so it cannot be a static requirement.
        The next thing we probably need to get to is some level of
    third-party verification that companies are complying with said
    standard, and we are not there yet, but we are working with
    industry right now to try to get after both of those.
        Senator King. Testing the system, wargaming or testing the
    system to be sure that it actually will work under a stressful
    condition, a red team kind of approach, which I know that other
    areas of the government do, and I think it has been very
    effective. So that is an area of vulnerability I hope that you
    will really focus upon, because when we need it, we have to
    have that commercial capacity there.
        General McDew. Right. Senator, as you know, right now, we
    have no authority to compel commercial industry to do that, nor
    am I seeking it. Right now, we are working with them to
    collaboratively get to a place, and also working with DHS and
    FBI to try to help them----
        Senator King. Well, but I would suggest you do have
    contracts with these folks, and they are getting paid high-test
    U.S. dollars, and that gives you some power to make some pretty
    serious requirements. I urge you to set your general counsel
    loose on that issue.
        Let me go back to the wargame, which I understand you
    participated in. Was it successful? Well, I will leave the
    question at that, and then we will explore the answer.
        General McDew. When I first started doing wargames and
    exercises as a young officer, success was defined differently.
    As I am a little bit more senior now and have become a senior
    citizen in the United States military, success is a level of
    knowledge attained at the end of it that you can do something
    with.
        Senator King. Exactly. That was going to be my question.
    Success is not winning. Success is learning.
        General McDew. So that journey was so profitable for us as
    a command that I cannot even put a dollar figure on it. It is
    now driving everything we think about mission assurance in our
    portfolio--everything.
        Senator King. Let me ask about a specific problem that I
    think we are all facing, we are certainly facing in the Air
    Force generally, and it faces you both in commercial and Air
    Force--the pilot shortage, the looming pilot shortage.
        Isn't that essentially a kind of logistical challenge? We
    cannot get troops places if we do not have pilots. There is a
    shortage--Senator Cotton and I are having a meeting on this in
    the next several weeks--in the Air Force, but it is happening
    on the commercial side as well. Is this a concern?
        General McDew. It is a concern. We are actually showing
    shortages across several places in our portfolio, from mariners
    to pilots to truck drivers. Each of those has its own problems
    in the manpower solution area. Right now, the Air Force Chief
    of Staff and the Commander of Air Mobility Command are trying
    to meet with the CEOs of the major airlines to get after how
    they may partner differently to improve that problem.
        Senator King. A final question. Are you comfortable with
    the relationship with the commercial industry on the sealift
    side, on the air side, that they will be there when we need
    them, I guess is the question?
        General McDew. I am. I am confident, Senator. But I am also
    confident that they do not know where ``there'' is. I am
    confident that we have not fully defined the ``there'' for them
    yet enough, and we have not thought our way through, what does
    it mean to go to war reliant upon this much commercial activity
    in a contested environment?
        Senator King. I would suggest that wargaming and stress-
    testing would be very important, particularly where you do not
    have direct control over these assets.
        General McDew. We are with you, and we are working on it
    right now.
        Senator King. Thank you very much, General.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Tillis?
        Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        General McDew, thank you for being here.
        Just to briefly touch on the cyber discussion, if I were
    planning a way to disrupt your ability to play your role in the
    logistics chain, it would be one of the first places. I would
    go find a supplier network.
        If you go back and take a look at the exercise, the 580
    Stryker tires, I do not know how much you have in inventory,
    but at that scale, to a large engagement or a large deployment,
    I would go after whatever that supply chain looks like and try
    to disrupt their ability to communicate with your organization.
        The one question I would like to get an answer to, though,
    is that I think if you are going to try to get--you know, it is
    the weakest link. If the DOD feels relatively comfortable that
    they are protecting their systems, that is great. But if major
    suppliers in the supply chain are vulnerable, then it does not
    really matter. It just means that you are not going to be able
    to execute.
        So why wouldn't we start creating, in your acquisitions
    hat, or with your expertise in acquisitions, a tiebreaker? We
    have to come up with standards, and I get the third party. I
    used to be in a firm that did ethical hack testing.
        So you need third party verification, but why not a
    tiebreaker between potential contractors that depends upon
    their level of sophistication and impenetrability? Why wouldn't
    you be seeking the authorities, if it is necessary, for you to
    have that baked into any kind of acquisition contracts or RFPs
    [Requests for Proposals] or selections going forward?
        General McDew. I believe we have the authority right now to
    bake it in. We may not have the full knowledge on how to bake
    it in. So we are working on those very things. I have
    challenged my acquisitions team to some of those very things.
        What we have found over time, if the commercial industry is
    my fourth component, it is better to work with them than
    against them, so we believe that we are working together, maybe
    not as quickly as we want, so I may have to turn the heat up a
    little bit.
        The first heat is to set a clear, definable cyber standard
    that evolves over time, and then go after third-party
    verification to ensure they are in compliance.
        Senator Tillis. Senator King brought up the recent exercise
    with the 12 ships, five failures, and I already mentioned the
    Stryker tires. I am not sure if just learning is winning.
        If you were to scale that, I mean, this is obviously a
    wargame. This is not the added level of complexity of actually
    going into a contested area, and that by itself can create
    distractions and probably cause a higher failure rate just
    because things are moving quickly. It looks like, based on what
    I have read, that it did look like it was a lack of training on
    the part of contractors, at least for the Stryker. I am not
    sure about the ships.
        Where are you getting the resources to do that? How do you
    actually get them trained up to a level to where you can rely
    on this pretty significant component on contractors?
        General McDew. Anyplace that we look inside of our
    portfolio, we are struggling on a regular basis with how you
    get beyond what you can do on a daily basis. I have sufficient
    manpower and expertise to do our job every single day. Under
    sequestration, we lost some manpower, but we are still
    sufficient to do that work every day.
        What we are struggling with right now is our ability to
    think forward, our ability to innovate, our ability to come
    after resiliency standards, and to be resilient ourselves.
        We have gotten so efficient and lean that some of this
    stuff just takes more time because you do not have the people
    there to do it.
        Senator Tillis. It seems to me, based on some responses to
    some of the other members, that we have the ability for a
    short-term--to basically be able to support in a short-term
    environment. But if we got into a protracted environment, it
    does not sound like you have a high level of confidence that
    whatever we may be able to perform over some period of time,
    that we could do it on a sustained basis. Is that fair to
    characterize your comments that way?
        General McDew. I think some of it is I am a bit
    inarticulate. I am trying not to pin myself down by specifying
    a period of time. ``Protracted'' is a word that can mean
    anything to anybody. Is it 1 month, 2 months, 6 months?
        In some of the conflicts, depending on the level of
    classification we can talk, we can go up to 6 months fairly
    easily. Beyond 6 months, there is a challenge. So it depends on
    what conflict and what the level of contested environment there
    is as to how far that protraction can be.
        Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Peters?
        Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General McDew, it is great to have you here. Before I ask
    you a few questions, I have to join some of my colleagues in
    giving accolades to Michigan Air National Guard and to our
    127th Air Refueling Group out of Selfridge.
        General McDew. Can I get the chairman to acknowledge one
    thing? During my confirmation hearing, he chastised me because
    I actually said nice things about all the units as every
    Senator brought up their units. I have refrained from doing
    that this time.
        [Laughter.]
        Chairman McCain. An impressive improvement.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Peters. Well, I will give those accolades, and I
    appreciate your nod. They are doing a great job, General.
        My question is, China has made significant investments
    globally in ports and railways. By some estimates, China has
    some degree of investment in nearly two-thirds of the world's
    top 50 ports, which handle 67 percent of the global container
    volume.
        The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States,
    or CFIUS, reviews transactions that result in control of U.S.
    businesses by foreign entities to determine if there could be
    an impact on national security. But CFIUS does not have a role
    if there is not a U.S. nexus for an investment, merger, or
    takeover.
        I know you have a very deep understanding of the link
    between investments in strategic assets and U.S. national
    security. But my question is, should analysts in the U.S.
    Government and military pay more attention to foreign
    investment in strategic assets like ports around the world?
        General McDew. Yes, Senator.
        Senator Peters. Could you elaborate, please?
        General McDew. In my business, I did not know the two-
    thirds number, but I do not see many ports around the world
    where the Chinese are not investing. I know that on one level
    in this country, we are linked economically, and they are not
    an adversary today, but they have the potential to be one in
    the future.
        Anybody that is investing globally in ports, and if we are
    a maritime Nation, we ought to be concerned about their
    feelings about freedom of access and how we operate around the
    globe, and they have not shown that freedom of access means the
    same to them as it does to us.
        Senator Peters. So are you concerned then about the
    potential for strategic investments by other nations could have
    on your ability to operate? Is that what I am hearing from your
    answer?
        General McDew. I am and that is one of the reasons that I
    spend a great amount of my time traveling around the world, in
    particular working with the State Department, strengthening
    relationships that we have in countries, and having them fully
    understand why those relationships are important, and their
    ports and their rail infrastructure are important to us.
        Senator Peters. We have talked a great deal about some of
    your challenges in terms of capacity to move both fuel and
    heavy material with sealift operations. If you could talk a
    little bit about pre-positioned forces and the importance of
    that? Certainly, one way to deal with the challenges of moving
    something from A to B, is to already have moved it to B prior
    to a conflict. We have challenges in Europe to move heavy
    material, should we see increased aggressive behavior there,
    certainly with what is happening in Korea as well.
        Please discuss the importance of pre-positioned forces. Do
    you believe that perhaps we should consider increasing the
    amount of pre-positioned equipment in various strategic
    locations?
        General McDew. I believe, first, Senator, we need a clear
    strategy of what we want to achieve in a particular region.
    That strategy then needs to be informed by the resourcing to do
    whatever that strategy would call us to do.
        Pre-positioning forces have always been important resources
    for us. They have become more important as we have withdrawn
    forces from places around the world and brought them back into
    the CONUS [Continental United States], because now we are a
    projecting force. With that, as you said, having stuff already
    at B is very, very helpful.
        To ensure that each one of those stocks is fully upgraded--
    i.e., is it new equipment? Is it equipment that has at least
    been tested? Is all of the equipment set there? All of that is
    important, and it all plays together.
        Senator Peters. Thank you, General. I appreciate it.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Cruz?
        Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General, thank you for your service and dedication to the
    country.
        Last week, Admiral Harry Harris addressed the resources
    requirements to conduct military operations in the Asian-
    Pacific in the event of hostilities. He told this committee
    that he had the forces in place to ``fight tonight, if
    necessary,'' but that what concerned him was the ``follow-on
    resources'' and how those follow-on resources would get to the
    region in terms of airlift and sealift.
        General, do you share Admiral Harris' concerns?
        General McDew. I believe that Admiral Harris has a right to
    be concerned because it is his AOR [area of responsibility]. I
    believe that he has a point to be made in that any time we have
    to project a force, we ought to be concerned about how it is
    going to get there.
        We are no longer assured that everything that we send from
    the CONUS will arrive at its point of destination. It could be
    because it is old. It could be because of weather. It could be
    because the enemy had a vote. So I am concerned.
        Now, from my discussions with him and with General Vince
    Brooks, the immediate follow-on forces that he needs, we are
    ready to send.
        Senator Cruz. So what most worries you with respect to our
    ability to flow resources into the Asia-Pacific theater?
        General McDew. Our ability to rely upon the commercial
    industry, which we will have to rely on over time, and how long
    the environment remains contested and to what level. Each of
    those are a bit of unknowns, and how we will maneuver through
    that space is going to be vitally important for how long
    protraction is and what protraction will mean.
        Senator Cruz. So let's shift to a different topic.
        In the past decades, the United States has had the luxury
    of having secure air and sea lines of communication. Given the
    increasing anti-access/area denial efforts of China, there is a
    chance we could be denied that luxury in a future conflict.
        A recent article by Dean Cheng, a senior fellow at the
    Heritage Foundation, posited that, ``The ability of the Chinese
    to deploy substantial forces into the central Pacific would
    place American logistics and support forces at risk. The loss
    of one or more underway replenishment ships would rapidly
    curtail the ability of the American surface forces, including
    aircraft carriers, to operate.''
        What is TRANSCOM's plan to replenish ships and aircraft in
    the event that we must fight our way into an area where anti-
    access/area denial has succeeded?
        General McDew. Senator, without getting into too much level
    of classification, I can tell you that we are in new territory.
    As you said, we have not been in this place in decades. I
    believe that the Navy, in particular, the Air Force, are both
    working on plans that get back to dominating those domains, but
    realizing that the logistics infrastructure has not been
    challenged for so long, it is just a new place for us, and we
    are having to go after that.
        I believe that we are making progress, not as fast as we
    all want.
        Senator Cruz. On another topic, one of the critical
    backgrounds of Air Mobility Command is the tactical airlift
    capacity of the C-130 Hercules. The 136th Airlift Wing, part of
    the Texas Air National Guard, and you are free to defy the
    Chairman and praise them vociferously, is flying C-130Hs and
    performing extraordinarily well.
        You expressed concern in your House testimony last month
    that, ``Continued modernization efforts in our C-130H fleet
    must be prioritized as a relatively inexpensive means of
    maintaining critical capacity.''
        Could you expand on those sentiments?
        General McDew. I believe that one of the things we have to
    look at as we look at our tactical airlift capability is to
    ensure that all of those units that fly those airplanes have
    the wherewithal to fly in the new airspace and are modern
    enough to continue to be a viable resource.
        I was an old C-130 pilot myself. I flew E models. If anyone
    had E models today, I would say that we need to retire them all
    until they are all gone.
        Depending on which level of H, it is just a matter of a
    software upgrade, so I believe we are okay. I would make sure
    that we are not overprioritizing C-130s to the detriment of
    takers right now, because that is a higher priority need for
    me.
        Senator Cruz. Thank you, General.
        Chairman McCain. Senator McCaskill?
        Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Good to see you, General. I know well that cornfield you
    referenced. It looks familiar since it is right across the
    border. I understand the importance of Scott Air Force Base not
    just to TRANSCOM and our military but to the region in St.
    Louis. I am a big fan of all the work you do there, and I am
    pleased that we are having this hearing today.
        Let's talk a little bit about contested environments and
    airlift in contested environments. Since my colleague from
    Texas was talking about his unit, I know you know I am going to
    mention the 139th, because, as you are well-aware, this is an
    international training school for resupplying contested
    environments. That is obviously Rosecrans, once again, right in
    the heart of America. We call it the top gun of airlift. I
    think that is an accurate description since I have run into
    people who have been trained at Rosecrans literally all over
    the world, particularly when I have been to Iraq and
    Afghanistan.
        Could you talk a little bit about the plan for testing new
    equipment that we are going to have dedicated to training
    rather than having to pull these aircraft out of units for
    training that they are trying to site for C-130Hs, each a
    different variant, with a training wing?
        We are hopeful, obviously, that that would get sited at St.
    Joe because of the inherent capabilities we have and the
    advantage of the location and the already international
    clientele we have in terms of our allies getting trained in
    this important resupplying in contested environments.
        Talk to me, if you would, about the 139th Airlift and the
    training that goes on there, and what your view is of that
    capability in terms of training in contested environments?
        General McDew. I believe that the instructors that we have
    at Rosecrans are some of the best in the C-130 business. They
    have a lot of experience. They have been flying the airplane
    for a long time, and they are steeped in tactics, techniques,
    and procedures for the aircraft. So it is a resource that we
    have to rely on as we go talking more broadly about contested
    environments.
        I have tasked Air Mobility Command to lead a contested
    environment summit. I would hope, and I have to believe, that
    they will have Rosecrans members there to help us get after
    solutions to our contested environment wargame level of
    learning.
        We have learned a bunch of things that should scare us. Now
    we are going after what we do about it and how we fix and
    mitigate some of these concerns.
        Senator McCaskill. Let me talk a little bit about your
    testimony, which I found stunning, the shortage of 75,000
    licensed drivers in the trucking industry, and understanding
    how important this is for our capabilities in terms of supply
    and resupply.
        The projected shortfall is due to increase to 890,000
    drivers by 2027. The current shortage has the trucking industry
    operating at a 95 percent capacity every day, which basically
    leaves no surge capacity for high-volume DOD requirements in a
    time of conflict without severely disrupting commercial
    services across the country, which is a whole other price we
    would have to pay in our economy if that were the case.
        While I want to make sure that we are making it as easy as
    possible for trained military to transition into civilian life,
    and, obviously, we have a lot of great truck drivers that are
    trained in the military--once again, trained in my state at
    Fort Leatherwood--I am worried that even if we put every single
    truck driver we train in the military into the civilian
    trucking industry, we are still not going to have enough.
        So let me ask you, have you all looked--I worry about
    driverless trucks, in terms of what it is going to do to jobs
    in this country. But have you all began to talk about, in the
    future, the use of driverless trucks in this capacity? Could
    you speak to that for a few moments?
        General McDew. Senator, we have actually looked at autonomy
    across a broad portfolio, from ships to trains to trucks to
    airplanes. We believe that you must have that level of
    technological advancement as you go forward.
        Somewhere along the way, we are losing the young men and
    women who grew up wanting to be truck drivers and airplane
    drivers and train drivers. With a lack of capacity, the
    technology will have to take over. We just have to have this
    technology going forward.
        I believe the advances being made by some in the civil
    sector is pretty impressive.
        Senator McCaskill. It is. I know that we have some
    autonomous buses going now and other trucks.
        Have you reached out to some of the companies doing this to
    see if it would be possible for you all to do some pilot work,
    maybe over on the base at Scott, to begin to get your arms
    around what driverless trucks would feel like in terms of your
    need to supply our troops?
        General McDew. Most of that work is being done in the
    services, in the organized train and equip role. The Army is
    working a lot on autonomous vehicles. The Navy has some
    autonomous vehicles. The Air Force is also working with some
    semiautonomous and autonomous work through DARPA [Defense
    Advanced Research Projects Agency].
        Senator McCaskill. Great.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Warren?
        Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you for being here, General.
        I want to quickly ask about the importance of our
    nonmilitary agencies and assistance to your mission.
        TRANSCOM maintains a presence around the world, and we need
    other countries, ports and rail and road networks to be
    upgraded and to be secure, so that those countries can receive
    our military equipment. We rely on diplomatic agreements with
    other countries for our pre-positioned equipment.
        So I just want to ask, General, would a reduction in
    funding to the civilian agencies and programs that enable your
    global distribution networks make your job easier or harder?
        General McDew. Senator, our job as a COCOM [combatant
    command] with global responsibilities relies on every partner
    we can get our hands on. One of our biggest partners is the
    State Department, and a lot of interagency partners around the
    globe, because they help us build relationships in the areas
    that we cannot be at on a regular basis. You cannot build a
    relationship when you need a relationship.
        Senator Warren. Right. So I take it the answer is, it would
    make your job a lot harder.
        General McDew. It would make it a little harder.
        Senator Warren. It would make it a little harder. I agree
    with this, and I point out that the administration is seeking
    significant reduction to the Department of State and to USAID
    [United States Agency for International Development].
        Of course, our military is critically important to our
    security, but we cannot forget that nonmilitary programs are
    critical enablers of the military to do the jobs that you need
    to do.
        Now, General, I also want to ask you another question. When
    you testified in front of the House Armed Services Committee
    several weeks ago, you said that getting C-5s out of the backup
    inventory was your number one priority for the NDAA [National
    Defense Authorization Act]. The upgraded C-5 is currently our
    only cargo aircraft that can make a transcontinental flight
    without refueling.
        So, General, would having those additional C-5s back in
    inventory help mitigate your aerial refueling challenge by
    providing more capacity to move cargo without needing to
    refuel?
        General McDew. I believe we can also do a transcontinental
    flight with a C-17. But the C-5s, we need those additional C-5s
    back in the inventory. I believe the Air Force has just
    recently committed to doing that over the next few years, so
    that will be very, very helpful.
        Senator Warren. All right. Can you just expand just a
    little bit on the importance of the C-5? Why the C-5 is a
    critical piece of equipment for you to get your job done?
        General McDew. It is the totality of the mission set.
        First, we have limited numbers of strategic assets. The C-5
    provides an outsized cargo capability and a long-range
    capability. Having been on the receiving end at a deployed
    location of a C-5's stuff, there is nothing like a C-5 load
    full of the stuff arriving time after time after time if you
    are standing up an operation quickly.
        Senator Warren. Right. I understand it is the only aircraft
    that can carry two Abrams tanks, or that it can carry six
    helicopters simultaneously.
        So I take it that is a good boost to efforts on the ground.
        General McDew. That is a good thing.
        Senator Warren. That is right. Good.
        Well, I just want to say, making sure that we have every
    available C-5 seems pretty important to me, not to mention the
    fact that we have invested a lot of money to upgrade them, and
    now they are sitting on the ramp. The economics of that just do
    not add up.
        Westover Air Reserve Base in Massachusetts has eight of
    these aircraft, and the people there tell me that these planes
    are in use pretty much all the time, and I am sure they would
    welcome additional C-5s to be able to work on their mission.
        So thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Blumenthal?
        Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, General, for your service. I would like to focus
    a little bit on a topic that has been raised before, the
    cyberthreat, and ask specifically about your experience so far
    with some of the contractors.
        Are they required to report to you incidents or episodes of
    attacks, cyberattacks by a nation-state?
        General McDew. I believe that is a Federal requirement, but
    they are required to report.
        Senator Blumenthal. Do they report to you?
        General McDew. I believe they report to an organization
    called DC3. I am trying to remember. I have to get back to you
    on what that stands for. We speak in acronyms, and sometimes we
    forget what the acronym actually stands for. But they actually
    report through an organization I believe that is part of DHS.
        Senator Blumenthal. Part of what, sorry?
        General McDew. Department of Homeland Security.
        Senator Blumenthal. So they do not report to the Department
    of Defense?
        General McDew. Not that I am aware of.
        Senator Blumenthal. But they are under contract with
    Department of Defense.
        General McDew. Right.
        Senator Blumenthal. Why aren't they reporting to you?
        General McDew. Let me be more clear about that afterward. I
    will get back to on the record for that. I am trying to
    remember exactly the reporting chain. The reporting requirement
    may be dual, and I do not want to misspeak.
        Senator Blumenthal. I am somewhat surprised that they are
    carrying out an essential national security and defense
    mission; they are under attack, just as they would be as if
    they were conducting a convoy in Afghanistan; and the
    Department of Defense is not informed directly.
        General McDew. Well, part of it, Senator, is ``attack.''
    Let's talk about ``attack'' for a second.
        Let's say today, and I hate to name a company, because it
    will get somebody in trouble. If someone is not necessarily
    contracted with us and they get attacked, that is the same as
    if they are actually contracted with us and they get attacked.
        So I do not care where they report to, because if an
    adversary gets on their network and stays on their network, it
    does not matter whether they are actually doing my work at the
    time when the adversary moves laterally through their network
    and potentially invades my network.
        Senator Blumenthal. That is exactly the reason, General,
    why I think they should be reporting to you, because even if
    they are attacked--well, let me put it differently. It makes no
    difference whether they do civilian as well as military work.
    If they are attacked, it is an attack on a network that is
    performing national security military work and potentially not
    only undermines the function they do for you but gains entry
    into your computer networks----
        General McDew. Absolutely.
        Senator Blumenthal.--the Department of Defense computer
    networks. So I am somewhat at a loss to know why they are not
    instantaneously telling you, we have been attacked by Russia or
    China.
        General McDew. Part of it is I cannot do anything about it.
    This organization that they would report to has partnerships
    and alliances with the Department of Defense. So the Department
    of Homeland Security in their role to have the non-DOD side of
    cyberdefense is partnered with DOD and CYBERCOM.
        So that organization that would respond to an attack is
    linked that way. My organization would be interested to know
    that that company has been attacked, but we would rely on
    others to do something about it. We would like to know because
    then it would tell us what we could do with that organization
    going forward.
        Senator Blumenthal. Well, I would think for a variety of
    reasons you would like to know. Have you ever asked? Have you
    ever sought that information?
        General McDew. So that information-sharing is what I am
    really talking about. We have good information-sharing in some
    areas. It can be better across the entire spectrum, because
    most of the time, the attack or the intrusion takes place and
    no one thinks it is an attack or an intrusion. It can look like
    a harmless mechanical failure.
        Senator Blumenthal. Let me ask you this. Would you like
    that information directly?
        General McDew. I think I do need it directly. I do not need
    it as quickly as CYBERCOM needs it or DHS needs it, but I need
    the information.
        Senator Blumenthal. You do need to directly.
        General McDew. Right.
        Senator Blumenthal. When you talk about it, you do not need
    it as quickly, if it is made available to them, it can be made
    available to you.
        General McDew. Absolutely.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General McDew. The unfortunate thing, Senator, is that the
    speed of this domain does not comport well to how we do
    information-sharing. Things happen so quickly, and we have to
    not think about sharing. We just have to share in a classified
    way.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
        Chairman McCain. General, all I can say is that we need to
    share. We also need to have an ability, either your
    organization or someone, to respond and to try to prevent,
    which is one of the major issues that this committee is having
    to address since certainly the last administration did not.
        Jack?
        Senator Reed. No, sir. I am fine.
        Chairman McCain. Thank you, General.
        General McDew. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you.
        [Whereupon, at 10:56 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                   Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
                          big picture transcom issues
        1. Senator McCain. General McDew, at this time, could TRANSCOM
    respond to two concurrent global contingencies?
        General McDew. [Deleted.]

        2. Senator McCain. General McDew, can today's TRANSCOM operate in a
    contested environment?
        General McDew. Yes, TRANSCOM can operate in contested environments;
    however, we expect significant challenges to our freedom of action. We
    expect that future conflicts will cross regional boundaries and
    potential adversaries and peer competitors will field numerically
    superior forces with increasing-technological parity. Those adversaries
    are aware the United States has become accustomed to geographically-
    isolated conflicts and enjoyed technological and logistical superiority
    over its adversaries, so we expect contested global sea lanes and air
    routes to a degree we have not faced since World War II. Furthermore,
    we expect significant challenges which could delay and degrade services
    in the support of combatant commanders and its Allies. Potential
    adversaries seek asymmetric means to cripple our force projection and
    sustainment capabilities by targeting critical military and civilian
    assets, both within the U.S. and abroad. Additionally, our enemies
    continue to use our dependence on the cyber domain against us. While it
    is true that a significant cyber related incident has the potential to
    disrupt and/or delay mission timeliness, TRANSCOM does possess the
    means to mitigate these challenges on the Department of Defense
    Information Network. However, unsecure networks and systems of our
    commercial transportation service providers, coupled with critical
    infrastructure vulnerabilities around the globe, almost wholly reside
    outside our control and pose significant risk to mission assurance.
    With those challenges in mind, the Command remains postured to operate
    in such an environment and effectively answer the Nation's call.

        3. Senator McCain. General McDew, do you believe that TRANSCOM can
    facilitate the mobilization sustainment of our armed forces if they
    were called to respond to a contingency in Russia or North Korea?
        General McDew. Yes, TRANSCOM can facilitate mobilization
    sustainment of our armed forces if they were called to respond to a
    contingency in Russia or North Korea. However, the age of the fleet
    across our strategic sealift portfolio drives increased risk to the
    Joint Force--if not recapitalized to retain capacity. For instance, the
    average age of our government-owned fleet exceeds 39 years. Without a
    valid sealift recapitalization plan, more than 50 percent of the
    sealift capacity provided by the fleet will be lost by 2034. The DOD
    will experience elevated risk without a recapitalization plan of the
    organic Surge Fleet, by either degraded power projection or being
    forced to rely on foreign flagged ships. Additionally, the commercial
    fleet has been in decline over the past several decades and while we
    can meet force closure requirements today with acceptable delays,
    additional reductions in the fleet put force closure at risk.
    USTRANSCOM continues to examine how we execute our logistics missions
    in contested environments by exercising and war-gaming logistics
    scenarios, account for transportations' vital roles, and for the first
    time potential losses. Any loss to the military sealift could severely
    impact our logistics mission.

        4. Senator McCain. General McDew, what assumptions do the COCOMs
    make for operational planning as to the readiness and capability of
    TRANSCOM?
        General McDew. COCOMs prepare operational plans (OPLANS) assuming
    an unconstrained environment where the combat forces required to carry
    out those plans and the corresponding sustainment stocks will be
    delivered on time and on target. In the rare case where a gap exists in
    the TRANSCOM deployment and distribution enterprise, the COCOMs assess
    the gap against the requirement to determine acceptability. All OPLANS
    are supportable with or without acceptable risk.

        5. Senator McCain. General McDew, do the Department's operational
    plans for regional and global contingencies assume 100 percent
    logistics, 100 percent of the time?
        General McDew. Yes, past mobility studies have assumed uncontested
    environments with secure air and sea lines of communications based on
    expected air and sea superiority. Future mobility analysis will
    consider contested environment challenges and will incorporate both
    operational readiness and attrition considerations. TRANSCOM advocates
    for cyber awareness for regional and global contingencies. For
    instance, nearly 90 percent of TRANSCOM's missions are still executed
    over unclassified commercial communications networks. TRANSCOM's
    challenge is the requirement that our commercial transportation service
    providers are able to provide critical services during times of crisis.
    It is not only reasonable to expect degradation and disruption of
    services during a crisis--it is expected. Furthermore, disruption of
    services not only could be the result of cybersecurity incidents, but
    also should be considered in the context of any event, man-made or
    natural, that poses significant consequences to mission assurance. Due
    to the large extent upon which TRANSCOM relies upon its commercial
    partners and the subsequent lack of visibility into the applicable
    cyber terrain and authority to monitor and assess their ability to
    operate during disruptions, TRANSCOM assumes a higher risk to mission
    assurance. This vulnerability extends operational risk to every single
    combatant command that TRANSCOM supports on a daily basis.

        6. Senator McCain. General McDew, as it can take 8200 C-17 sorties
    to deploy a single brigade combat team, how will TRANSCOM adapt to
    ensure that global force projection remains a primary capability of the
    armed forces?
        General McDew. TRANSCOM has many authorities that can be brought to
    bear to ensure United States' global force projection in all modes of
    transportation, organic and commercial. We work with the Services and
    our Components (Air Mobility Command, Military Sealift Command, and
    Surface Deployment and Distribution Command) to maintain organic
    transportation capabilities, as well as our commercial partners to
    supplement that capability, and ensure viable transportation solutions.
    On a routine basis TRANSCOM works with CCMD planners to review and
    update their deliberate and contingency operational plan force flow
    actions to assure the most efficient movement of forces into an AOR.
    These movements are a conglomerate of air and surface solutions. When
    an event occurs in an AOR that requires a rapid buildup or movement of
    forces, the priority of that mission is increased. Thus, if capacity is
    not immediately available to transport all requirements, the higher
    priority mission would take precedence and lower priority requirements
    would be adjusted to ensure necessary transportation capacity remains
    intact for remaining global requirements.

        7. Senator McCain. General McDew, what considerations in OPLANs are
    used to account for attrition in our air, sea, and land lines of
    communication during conflicts with a great power competitor?
        General McDew. [Deleted.]

        8. Senator McCain. General McDew, do we have the necessary
    railheads, airfields, and related infrastructure to support the
    European Deterrence Initiative? If not, what is being done to remedy
    this shortfall?
        General McDew. In an uncontested operation we have the necessary
    railheads, airfields, and related infrastructure to support inter-
    theater logistics to United States European Command (USEUCOM). However,
    we have identified contested environment challenges as we support the
    European Reassurance Initiative. As planning matures, we continue to
    refine our network and identify CONUS, intra-theater logistics, and
    resilience requirements to meet the maturing demand. Additional
    requirements will be worked with the Services and USEUCOM.
                             contested environment
        9. Senator McCain. General McDew, TRANSCOM has gained considerable
    experience over the past 15 years supporting extended combat operations
    in the Middle East, with the larger operating bases positioned in
    relatively permissive environments.
        General McDew. See answer to question #10.

        10. Senator McCain. General McDew, how will TRANSCOM'S job be
    different when supporting a conflict in a contested environment, and
    what is TRANSCOM doing to prepare for the different set of challenges
    this kind of conflict would impose?
        General McDew. [Deleted.]

        11. Senator McCain. General McDew, does TRANSCOM have the resources
    need to support a conflict in a contested environment? If not, what are
    the primary shortfalls?
        General McDew. While we have a sense of the challenges a contested
    environment would present, we do not yet have the objective data to
    understand critical factors such as attrition. We are building that
    understanding through wargames and exercises. The next Mobility
    Capability Requirements Study (MCRS) will help complete the picture and
    inform a resource discussion. That said, we know current challenges
    such as the readiness of the tanker and the strategic sealift fleets
    will be exacerbated in a contested environment. It is for this reason
    initiatives such as fully funding the strategic airlift fleet, the
    tanker recapitalization and the strategic sealift recapitalization
    remains critical. TRANSCOM's ability to build redundancy in routes,
    nodes, and transportation systems, is critical to assuring the
    deployment mission. In most cases, TRANSCOM does not have its own
    resources to counter contested environments. We depend on joint
    capabilities (such as missile defense, port protection, etc.) to
    protect critical nodes and assets from interdiction. TRANSCOM is also
    dependent on the Department of State and the geographic CCMDs to
    negotiate access to alternate ports and Air/Ground Lines of
    Communication. Additionally, because the TRANSCOM enterprise primarily
    works in the ``chasm'' between the DOD networks and the nation-wide
    commercial networks through which we interface with our commercial
    partners, TRANSCOM requires authority to monitor and assess cyber
    terrain owned and operated by Commercial Transportation Service
    Providers in order to react and respond to disruptions during times of
    crises and thus ensure mission assurance.

        12. Senator McCain. General McDew, in March 2016, you said that
    emerging contested environments pose a significant challenge to
    transportation and distribution networks. However, the assumption that
    the U.S. military will have uncontested access to international
    airspace and sea-lanes between these nodes in the future is no longer
    valid. When a theater of operations is a contested by lack of control
    over air or ground space, who has responsibility for ensuring that the
    needed materiel is delivered to the point of employment--TRANSCOM or
    the services? What responsibilities do host nations have?
        General McDew. TRANSCOM serves as the single coordination and
    synchronization element on behalf of and in coordination with the Joint
    Deployment and Distribution Enterprise (JDDE) to establish processes to
    plan, apportion, allocate, route, schedule, track movements, and
    redirect forces and supplies per the supported commander's intent. The
    supported combatant commander (CCDR) is responsible to plan, identify
    requirements, set priorities, and redirect forces and sustainment as
    needed to support operations within the respective Area of
    Responsibility. Visibility through the JDDE provides the CCDR the
    capability to see and redirect inter-theater and intra-theater force
    and commodity flow in support of current and projected priorities. The
    geographic CCMDs, in coordination with the Department of State, will
    also coordinate with host nation(s) to determine what type of support
    and force protection they can or are willing to provide.

        13. Senator McCain. General McDew, if responsibility is shared
    among TRANSCOM, the services, and host nations, what mechanism(s)
    ensure that gaps in the needed logistics support are not present, and
    can be addressed if discovered after operations commence?
        General McDew. Communication between the supporting CCMD and the
    supported CCMD in prior deliberate planning and then as a crisis or
    contingency unfolds ensures that gaps in the needed logistics support
    are addressed and mitigated. Constant dialogue at CCMD and component
    levels ensure that as gaps appear, transportation solutions are
    developed to meet operational requirements once actions commence. This
    dialogue between CCMD also informs the services, partner nations, and
    industry if there are capability gaps that must be addressed on a
    broader global scale.

        14. Senator McCain. General McDew, what areas of operations would
    be challenging for the joint distribution and deployment enterprise,
    and what mitigations is TRANSCOM planning for those areas? Does it
    require the services to generate more capabilities to counter A2/AD
    environments, such as countermine capabilities or ISR capabilities?
        General McDew. [Deleted.]
                          resiliency versus efficiency
        15. Senator McCain. General McDew, as our adversaries field
    precision guided weapons, we must continue to review if our efficiency
    has hampered our ability to remain resilient in how we approach
    alternative logistics platforms and how the U.S. confronts threats to
    key logistics choke points such as the Panama or Suez Canal. Our
    current approach relies on large and efficient transports moving
    materiel to large efficient hubs. The last tactical mile is a bit more
    distributed, but we rely on large known Aerial Port of Debarkations, A-
    PODS, and Sea Ports of Debarkation, S-PODs, in theater until that last
    leg. These are known targets that could be very hard to defend against
    precision weapons in a conflict. How is TRANSCOM ensuring resiliency of
    our crucial lift capability while not losing efficiencies previously
    created?
        General McDew. TRANSCOM is experienced at building a distribution
    network robust enough to endure global events. We are first and
    foremost focused on warfighting effectiveness, but must also account
    for efficiency as good stewards of taxpayer dollars. As we face new
    trans-regional challenges, strategic agility has grown in importance.
    Over the past decade we have seen the patient movement enterprise swing
    from west to east in a matter of hours after a volcanic eruption. Our
    team, in collaboration with the Geographic Combatant Command and
    Department of State, developed an extremely flexible ground lines of
    communications system across Europe and Asia to mitigate reliance on
    the routes through Pakistan. When those routes closed, the entire
    enterprise including vessels enroute to Karachi, shifted to alternate
    ports and routes without impacting the Theater Mission. Our ability to
    pivot is reliant on having sufficient authorities in place to shift the
    enterprise.

        16. Senator McCain. General McDew, additionally, how does TRANSCOM
    plan for disruption to key chokepoints as vulnerabilities to global
    logistics?
        General McDew. [Deleted.]
                                aerial refueling
        17. Senator McCain. General McDew, you have described the KC-46
    tanker, which is expected to replace almost 40 percent of the Air
    Force's tanker fleet, as the highest priority among the command's
    various recapitalization needs. The KC-46 program originally planned to
    make an initial production decision in August 2015, but had to delay
    the decision nine months, to May 2016, because of development problems
    causing changes to test and delivery schedules. Do you have the
    authority you need to exercise operational control of the current and
    future refueling fleet to fulfill your mission requirements?
        General McDew. The ability to globally swing air refueling assets
    is paramount to TRANSCOM's ability to support national objectives and
    fulfill responsibilities as the DOD single manager for transportation.
    There are Congressional restrictions that inhibits TRANSCOM's ability
    to move global air refueling assets quickly to meet emergent needs.
    Section 8072 (b) of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2012 states
    that no funds available to DOD may be obligated to modify command and
    control relationships to give TRANSCOM operational and administrative
    control of the C-130 and KC-135 forces assigned to the Pacific and
    European Air Force Commands. While this restriction does not prevent
    the day to day mission from getting done, it does hamper my ability to
    execute the mission in support of combat operations. With current
    scarcity of air refueling aircraft the TRANSCOM Commander needs the
    authority and agility to optimize the utilization of this fleet.

        18. Senator McCain. General McDew, is current KC-46 procurement
    profile sufficient to meet your mission requirements?
        General McDew. [Deleted.]

        19. Senator McCain. General McDew, what will be the impact on
    current operations and the current maintenance of existing air
    refueling aircraft because of the production delays of the KC-46
    program?
        General McDew. The impact of production delays is the increased
    cost of operating and maintaining the legacy fleet. It is important to
    emphasize that our legacy tanker retirement strategy is dependent upon
    the timing of the KC-46 aircraft delivery schedule. As you're aware,
    delays in KC-46 deliveries have postponed legacy tanker retirements to
    now begin no earlier than fiscal year 2019. Even with on-track
    delivery, the current procurement profile may not be sufficient to meet
    rising demands for this capability.

        20. Senator McCain. General McDew, what short to mid-term
    mitigation plans does TRANSCOM have in place to address any air
    refueling shortfalls that may occur?
        General McDew. Mitigation plans, regardless of short-, mid- or
    long-term, is a constant balancing of competing theater priorities in
    which TRANSCOM must both set the theater and set the globe, improve
    utilization, and enhance the agility of our tanker fleet. We simply
    cannot afford to over-source and under-utilize individual theater air
    refueling capabilities. TRANSCOM acknowledges Geographic Combatant
    Commands will require enough air refueling capability to cover their
    fight-tonight risk. But, DOD and TRANSCOM cannot afford to source
    tankers to bring any one individual Geographic Combatant Command's risk
    to zero while increasing risk globally and to other Combatant Commands.
    TRANSCOM, within its existing Unified Command Plan (UCP) authorities
    and with Joint Staff leadership, can foster a holistic effort to
    develop a more agile way to allocate tanker forces across trans-
    regional lines and refine utilization standards for allocated forces.
    We are also working closely with the Joint Staff to better de-conflict
    large exercises with large deployment and redeployment of rotational
    forces.

        21. Senator McCain. General McDew, what are some potential steps
    that could be taken in the near and mid-term to ensure that TRANSCOM is
    able to effectively and efficiently meet its requirements?
        General McDew. From the supply side, we need to achieve a
    sustainable operations tempo that will allow us to begin to recover
    readiness for the seasoning and retention of our aircrew and the
    maintenance of our aircraft. This may mean difficult choices to not
    participate in some lower priority exercises or to not support missions
    that can be completed with reduced tanker support. From the demand
    side, we will have to scrutinize the current utilization rates and
    posture of our forces around the globe and eliminate restrictions to
    tasking assets across regional geographical boundaries to increase
    agility and mutual support. For example, currently law prohibits
    USTRANSCOM from exercising command and control of aerial refueling
    tankers in the U.S. Pacific and European Command. Legislative relief
    would enable USTRANSCOM to use air refueling assets more effectively
    and efficiently; enhancing the overall readiness. In the mid-term it
    may be wise to reexamine the balance of our forces that we have placed
    in the Active Component versus the Reserve Component based on the tempo
    we are operating the Joint Force. Additionally, the current mission
    capability rate of the KC-135 must be maintained or exceeded to ensure
    adequate tanker availability since the majority of those forces reside
    in the Reserve Component. Lastly, we must not slip on the timing of
    acquisition and recapitalization programs like the KC-46 and strategic
    sealift.
                        peacetime versus wartime demands
        22. Senator McCain. General McDew, in March 2016, you told the
    House Armed Services Committee that efforts were underway to develop a
    base plan for all phases of TRANSCOM's operations. The effort was to
    result in an overarching global plan that would articulate: how
    TRANSCOM coordinates, synchronizes, and executes its joint distribution
    and deployment responsibilities; and how TRANSCOM would operate in a
    contested environment. What is the status of this effort?
        General McDew. The Global Campaign base plan is on target for the
    end of the summer 2017 completion with the remaining annexes of the
    overarching campaign plan to be completed summer 2018.

        23. Senator McCain. General McDew, assessing the transportation
    feasibility of OPLANs is one of TRANSCOM's major responsibilities. How
    often are OPLANs modeled to determine transportation feasibility?
        General McDew. As directed by Joint Staff, TRANSCOM conducts up to
    two transportation feasibility assessments (TFA) per year for each of
    the current problem sets.

        24. Senator McCain. General McDew, how often are two plans modeled
    for simultaneous transportation feasibility?
        General McDew. For a directed problem set, TRANSCOM models the
    family of operational and concept plans from all the CCMDs, supported
    and supporting, that address the assigned problem. For programmatic
    purposes, TRANSCOM has and continues (at least once per year) to model
    simultaneous execution of multiple problem sets.

        25. Senator McCain. General McDew, in developing the base plan, has
    TRANSCOM identified any areas or issues that merit more attention from
    Congress or DOD?
        General McDew. TRANSCOM areas of concern include (but are not
    limited to):
        1)  Recapitalization of sealift capacity is a need which must be
    addressed now. Some ageing ships in the Ready Reserve Force must be
    replaced to ensure we can meet force deployment requirements until new
    sealift ship construction begins. Part of the recapitalization strategy
    is a bridging solution to allow purchase of used vessels, which may
    include used foreign built vessels, to fill the gap. We are submitting
    a proposal to Congress for that authority.
        2)  We are concerned for the pool of merchant mariners who man our
    ships. As the U.S. flag international fleet continues to decline, the
    mariner labor pool also declines, putting at risk our ability to surge
    forces overseas and to sustain them for the duration of the conflict.
    The risk, due to further decline of available merchant mariners and
    U.S. flag ships, will be increased reliance on foreign owned/operated/
    crewed vessels to transport U.S. forces in a contingency.
        3)  TRANSCOM needs the flexibility to manage mobility forces on a
    global scale. The most stressed of those forces today are air refueling
    tankers; yet, the law prohibits from exercising operational control of
    KC-135s in USPACOM and USEUCOM. Relief from that restriction would
    enable TRANSCOM to use air refueling assets more effectively and
    efficiently, and enhance the overall readiness of those forces.
        4)  KC-135 forces remain stressed while KC-46 production is
    expected to remain at 15 per year. KC-46 production is crucial to
    replacing the aging fleet and must stay on track. The current fleet of
    455 tankers (average age of KC-135 is 55 and KC-10 is 3) must grow to
    at least 479 to meet minimum wartime requirements. At this time,
    emerging contested environments continue to put greater demand on the
    global aerial refueling fleet.
        5)  The National Guard and Reserve Component are under increased
    stress from years of high operational tempo (OPTEMPO) at a level that
    is commensurate with Active Duty forces. I am concerned the high
    OPTEMPO, combined with a highly leveraged Guard and Reserve Component
    and length of time for mobilization, will lead to reduced readiness for
    future contingencies. Highlighting our concern with a balance of the
    air mobility forces, over 70 percent of aeromedical evacuation
    capability, nearly 60 percent of the tanker capability, and over 50
    percent of airlift capability reside in the Guard and Reserve
    Component. Specifically for airlift aircraft, 40 percent of C-5s, 32
    percent of C-17s, and 69 percent of C-130s reside in the Guard and
    Reserve; yet, aircrews comprise a much higher percentage: 55 percent of
    C-5 aircrews, 74 percent of C-17 aircrews, and 71 percent of C-130
    aircrews reside in the Guard and Reserve. The planned buyback of C-17
    aircraft currently in backup inventory for the Air National Guard and
    Reserve--will exacerbate the Active Duty/Reserve component imbalance,
    reduce readiness over time, and further limit access to aircraft. The
    C-5M is proving to be a very capable aircraft, but current plans call
    for retaining 12 C-5Ms in backup aircraft inventory. Placing a portion
    of those C-5Ms into the Active Duty force would help meet current
    demand, better balance the strategic airlift fleet, and provide the
    TRANSCOM with greater flexibility.
                           transcom inaugural wargame
        26. Senator McCain. General McDew, in October 2016, TRANSCOM
    conducted its inaugural wargame in to examine mobility and distribution
    operations in a contested environment. TRANSCOM's components,
    subordinate commands, and distribution partners participated in the
    wargame. In discussing the wargame, a TRANSCOM official noted that
    operational wargames tend to focus on combat operations and do not
    consider logistics concerns because TRANSCOM officials participate in
    other DOD wargames to ensure a realistic, transportation, distribution,
    and logistics environment. What were the results of the wargame and
    what challenges, if any, were identified?
        General McDew. In general, the Services' and CCMD wargames are more
    focused on kinetic effects and less on the logistics necessary to
    support those robust kinetic operations. Subsequently, while we've
    enhanced our support to the Services' and CCMDs' wargamers, we've
    injected substantial logistics reality into game designs in an effort
    to help validate plan feasibility. We have discovered through our
    participation in these games, that a future contested environment will
    mandate that logistics planning efforts mirror the rigor of operational
    planning efforts.

        27. Senator McCain. General McDew, did TRANSCOM wargame its
    transportation support for specific operational or contingency plans?
        General McDew. The wargame used regional scenarios, but did not use
    specific operational or contingency plans.

        28. Senator McCain. General McDew, did TRANSCOM's wargame involve
    potential attrition of mobility forces? If yes, what were the results
    and the implications for the current numbers of mobility forces? If no,
    why not?
        General McDew. The wargame involved discussion of potential
    attrition of mobility forces. The discussion highlighted the
    criticality of ensuring operational planners understood the possibility
    and resulting implications of mobility force attrition. The wargame
    also validated the need for an increased emphasis on the need to invest
    in the recapitalization of air refueling, air lift and sea lift assets.
    It also validated the significance of maintaining the readiness of
    existing mobility forces and our Reserve Component.

        29. Senator McCain. General McDew, how often does TRANSCOM plan to
    conduct future wargames?
        General McDew. The plan is, at a minimum, to conduct an annual
    wargame, with additional games dependent on the continued development
    of our wargame staff and funding assistance from the Quad Chairs of the
    Defense Wargaming Advisory Group (DWAG)
                                 cybersecurity
        30. Senator McCain. General McDew, cyber intrusions into
    operationally critical contractors pose a threat to defense operations.
    Today nearly 90 percent of TRANSCOM's missions are executed over
    unclassified communication networks, to include communications with
    commercial partners. Further, because TRANSCOM is a supporting command,
    all combatant commands share this risk to operations. A 2014 inquiry by
    the Senate Armed Services Committee into cyber threats facing TRANSCOM
    and its contractors found 50 successful intrusions or other cyber
    events targeting TRANSCOM contractors in 2012 and 2013. The inquiry
    also found gaps in requirements that resulted in many cyber intrusions
    not being reported to the command. Who is targeting TRANSCOM and why,
    and what makes TRANSCOM a particularly attractive cyber target?
        General McDew. [Deleted.]

        31. Senator McCain. General McDew, TRANSCOM planned on
    incorporating cyber incident reporting language into most of its
    contracts by 2016. Where does TRANSCOM stand in terms of achieving this
    goal?
        General McDew. TRANSCOM continues to work closely with its
    commercial partners to incorporate more stringent and timely reporting
    requirements into Transportation Service Provider and information
    system development contracts to create an environment of information
    sharing and collaboration. To that end, TRANSCOM has determined its
    contracts provide operationally critical support in accordance with the
    reporting requirements defined in the Defense Federal Acquisition
    Regulation Supplement (DFARS) clause 252.204-7012, ``Safeguarding
    Covered Defense Information and Cyber Incident Reporting.'' This
    requires reporting of cyber incidents that affect a covered contractor
    information system or the covered defense information residing therein,
    or that affect the contractor's ability to perform the requirements of
    the contract that are designated as operationally critical support and
    identified in the contract. The designation of operationally critical
    support has been incorporated into our readiness contracts and
    continues to be incorporated into TRANSCOM contracts through
    modifications and renewals.

        32. Senator McCain. General McDew, beyond reporting on cyber
    incidents, what mechanisms are in place to enable or require
    contractors to strengthen their cyber defenses?
        General McDew. TRANSCOM contracts follow the requirements set forth
    in DFARS clause 252.204-7012. TRANSCOM is also currently working
    internally and with industry to incorporate additional contract
    language in all TRANSCOM transportation contracts to further address
    the security posture of its industry partners. Additionally, TRANSCOM
    continues to partner with organizations across industry, academia, and
    the Federal Government to increase mission assurance by identifying and
    mitigating gaps, seizing opportunities to advance cyber domain
    capabilities, and enhancing information sharing. TRANSCOM also works
    closely with the Defense Cyber Crime Center (DC3), DHS, and the Federal
    Bureau of Investigation to seek opportunities to keep the command's
    industry and commercial partners informed of cyber threats and
    cybersecurity best practices.

        33. Senator McCain. General McDew, TRANSCOM is increasingly
    challenged by aging and obsolete infrastructure issues that affect
    equipment, ports, IT systems, and more. What are your biggest concerns
    in this area, and how is TRANSCOM addressing and mitigating these
    issues?
        General McDew. My biggest concern is Mission Assurance across the
    entire TRANSCOM Enterprise. To address this concern, we conducted a
    Mobility Strategic Portfolio Review which identified top critical areas
    of concern regarding critical infrastructure and cyber-related
    dependencies. TRANSCOM is currently undertaking an Office of the
    Secretary of Defense Program Decision Memorandum directed Cyber
    Mobility Thin Line Study of two ports identified in the portfolio
    review. This assessment will analyze these two facilities holistically
    to identify critical areas to focus on mitigating the effects of cyber
    disruption and degradation. Additionally, TRANSCOM's Cloud Center of
    Excellence team is partnering with Defense Innovation Unit Experimental
    to evaluate & prototype commercial cloud-based technologies such as
    Infrastructure-as-a-Service, Platform-as-a-Service, and Software-as-a-
    Service. These technologies offer TRANSCOM the ability to host its
    unique unclassified applications while offering greater security and
    availability. The team will also evaluate cloud security and
    application development technologies to prototype a TRANSCOM security
    boundary within a commercial cloud environment, satisfying our Cyber
    Security Service Provider responsibilities. TRANSCOM has also
    implemented several cyber resiliency and digital diversity projects
    that will enhance mission effectiveness, improving cyber reliability by
    increasing back-up speed and capacity while eliminating single points
    of failure.
                                    sealift
        34. Senator McCain. General McDew, TRANSCOM is responsible for all
    of the U.S. military's sealift assets. Military Sealift Command (MSC)
    provides ocean transportation and sustainment for the Navy and the rest
    of DOD, operating about 115 ships daily around the world. Operated by
    civilians, these ships support ongoing operations around the globe.
    Recently, the Navy has called for a more distributed fleet with
    distributed lethality to extend the global reach of its combatant ships
    although the Navy's distributed lethality concept is new and has not
    been fully incorporated into Navy commands and fleets. The MSC fleet
    will need to provide the logistics support required by globally
    distributed operations, and do so during a period of uncertainty as
    fleets transition to cover a larger geographical area. At the same
    time, MSC platforms, such as the Expeditionary Fast Transport (formerly
    designated the Joint High Speed Vessel), are taking on new roles to
    compensate for the declining numbers of amphibious ships in fleet. How
    are MSC's mission requirements evolving? What implications do these
    have for the command's personnel and force structure?
        General McDew. TRANSCOM is responsible for 61 of the Nation's 115
    strategic sealift assets (15 MSC and 46 MARAD). The maritime system has
    deteriorated, is more stressed, and more contested than ever before,
    and this is the environment in which we must operate. Emerging
    contested environments pose a significant challenge to the personnel,
    ships, ports and Sea Lines of Communication employed by MSC. The threat
    is no longer a ``hypothetical'' in some distant future. Mariners,
    capital assets, and equipment that convey national power are at risk.
    Similarly, advances in technology have created a commensurate reliance
    on its application, creating critical vulnerabilities, particularly in
    cyberspace. We must overcome these evolving challenges and be prepared
    to operate in both communications and cyber contested environments
    while also operating in contested waters requiring tactical proficiency
    and maneuver. We must adapt our force structure, personnel, and
    training to meet these challenges. Implications include increased
    training, more robust self-defense capability and increases in Command,
    Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) capability.

        35. Senator McCain. General McDew, what personnel and training
    challenges have impacted the MSC, and what effects do these pose to
    maintaining warfighting readiness?
        General McDew. MSC is implementing new training requirements for
    our mariners to better operate in a blue-water contested environment.
    This training runs the gamut of warfare areas (e.g. convoy operations,
    electro-magnetic maneuver warfare, anti-submarine warfare, etc.)
    Additionally, the increasing tempo of harassment and ``Grey War''
    activities by state and non-state actors, requires adaptation to ensure
    mission accomplishment. This puts a heavy demand on our personnel (both
    military and civilian) to meet the demands to maintain a specific
    warfighting readiness level. As an example, civilian crews are now
    faced with understanding and practicing tactical mission-area skills
    such as Emission Control, Undersea Warfare, Information Operations,
    tactical maneuvering, tactical communications and more.

        36. Senator McCain. General McDew, in what ways will DOD and
    TRANSCOM equip the MSC fleet with technology that ensures secure
    communication in contested environments?
        General McDew. To date, MSC has stood up a Backup Network
    Operations Center (BNOC) to provide redundancy to the command's Afloat
    Network Operations Center (ANOC). The BNOC will ensure seamless and
    uninterrupted communications with the MSC fleet if the primary network
    operations center is disrupted for any reason (cyber-attack, natural
    disaster, power outage, fire, or physical attack). We are updating and
    improving emissions control procedures, guidance, and training on ships
    so crews can minimize and/or avoid detection when operating in a
    contested environment. Additionally, we have plans to install secure,
    anti-jam Global Positioning System (GPS)/Position Navigation Timing
    systems on ships and at ashore facilities. MSC is also currently
    working with Service and Joint commands to explore innovative ways to
    better protect communication systems from external threats when
    operating in a contested environment. Program Objective Memorandum-19
    initiatives have also been submitted to upgrade MSC wideband satellite,
    High Frequency radios, and GPS capabilities on MSC ships to improve the
    fleet's ability to operate in a contested environment. Also, the
    command placed cybersecurity professionals at the TRANSCOM Joint Cyber
    Center and the command's Network Operations Centers to improve
    cybersecurity readiness and information sharing. Finally, we are
    conducting comprehensive vulnerability and threat assessments of
    traditional and non-traditional IT systems in an effort to harden
    communication, navigation, and ship control systems against cyber-
    attacks. Furthermore, the command is upgrading the Naval Modular
    Automated Communications system on ships to provide a backup means of
    receiving record message traffic if the primary messaging system fails
    or is degraded when operating in a contested environment.

        37. Senator McCain. General McDew, how will TRANSCOM prepare
    civilian mariners to continue missions in the event of a cyber-degraded
    environment?
        General McDew. The preparation necessary for cyber-degraded
    environments must reside in commercial industry and in the accession
    sources that train and credential mariners for their commercial
    employment. TRANSCOM will continue to work with the Department of
    Transportation, the Maritime Administration and industry partners to
    emphasize the need for mariners to retain the skills necessary to
    operate in cyber-degraded environments including age old maritime
    navigation skills using sextants and current charts. Many MSC ships are
    equipped with multiple or redundant communication capabilities which
    can minimize or mitigate the effects of cyber or other adversary
    threats while operating in a contested environment. In the event of a
    complete communication or business system outage, MSC is developing
    manual backup procedures to ensure critical information or orders
    continue to flow over available communication capabilities. MSC is
    taking a multi-pronged approach to prepare mariners to continue
    missions in the event of a cyber-degraded environment. To increase
    cybersecurity and mission assurance MSC has taken the following
    actions:
          Created enhanced cybersecurity training requirements and
    qualifications for Ships Communications Officer (SCO) / Radio
    Electronics Technician (RET) positions for civilian mariners serving on
    ships supporting TRANSCOM and is working with Operating Company and
    union representatives to establish cybersecurity, computer network, and
    communication system training qualifications and standards for
    Electronic Officers and Electro Technical Officers.
          Formally requested seats in Navy training courses. This
    also applies to SCOs and RETs serving on MSC Fleet Ordnance and Dry
    Cargo vessels supporting TRANSCOM.
          Begun planning for mariners to participate in In Port C4/
    IT training events to increase individual and crew proficiency. In the
    fall of 2017, TRANSCOM will conduct its annual cyber exercise ULTIMATE
    GUARDIAN in partnership with the Command's annual staff exercise TURBO
    CHALLENGE. During this event, TRANSCOM and Component staffs will plan
    and execute high-end Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise
    operations in a contested cyber environment. Spanning three months, the
    exercise will incorporate a requirement for significant merchant
    mariner support. TRANSCOM has extended an invitation to commercial
    industry partners via the Command's Private Sector Representative to
    participate in addressing the challenges presented to maritime
    operations in degraded or denied cyber environments.
                                     marad
        38. Senator McCain. General McDew, along with other government
    agencies, such as the Maritime Administration (MARAD) and the U.S.
    Coast Guard, TRANSCOM ensures surge sealift vessels are ready to deploy
    in the event they are activated. In addition, these agencies assess the
    availability of mariners who make up the pool of civilian U.S. Merchant
    Mariners available to crew government sealift ships when activated. To
    what extent is TRANSCOM actively monitoring the mariner pool? What are
    the methods by which TRANSCOM identifies the total number of mariners
    in this pool?
        General McDew. The National Security Directive on Sealift assigns
    the Department of Transportation (DOT) the responsibility for
    determining whether adequate commercial maritime manpower is available
    to support the operation of reserve ships during a crisis. This
    responsibility is delegated to MARAD and TRANSCOM who then work closely
    with the Office of Maritime Workforce Development to address mariner
    availability. To determine adequate mariner supply, DOT/MARAD uses the
    U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) Merchant Mariner Licensing & Documentation
    System database, and union and non-union labor information. Although
    TRANSCOM does not access the database for specific individual mariner
    credential information, it collaborates with DOT/MARAD on the number of
    ships in the U.S. flag fleet that employ the mariners with the specific
    credentials necessary to operate DOD surge fleet vessels. In this way,
    TRANSCOM maintains awareness of the size of the mariner pool and its
    trends. To determine the mariner demand, DOT/MARAD and TRANSCOM monitor
    the number of billets required on all Government-owned, Commercially-
    Operated and Commercially-Owned, Commercially-Operated vessels that
    sail using mariners with credentials needed for the organic surge
    fleet. The 2017 National Defense Authorization Act requires MARAD to
    convene a Maritime Workforce Working Group to identify the number of
    U.S. citizen mariners that have the necessary USGC merchant mariner
    credentials needed to crew the U.S. flag fleet and surge sealift fleet
    in times of National Emergency; assess the USCG Merchant Mariner
    Licensing and Documentation System; and make recommendations to enhance
    the availability and quality of interagency data. TRANSCOM is an active
    participant in the working group.

        39. Senator McCain. General McDew, does TRANSCOM have a forecast
    concerning whether the available number of qualified and experienced
    mariners will be adequate in the future to support a large-scale
    activation of an extended duration (i.e., beyond 6 months)?
        General McDew. MARAD's, Office of Maritime Workforce Development
    collaborates closely with TRANSCOM to understand trends in the mariner
    workforce to inform future mariner adequacy forecasting. According to
    DOT/MARAD, the number of contract mariners is sufficient to meet the
    initial sealift surge when government reserve sealift ships are
    activated, but will severely challenge our ability to sustain crewing
    requirements over an extended period which requires rotation of crew
    members on both government and commercial vessels.

        40. Senator McCain. General McDew, are there opportunities to
    leverage existing assets--such as MARAD's Ready Reserve Force or MSC's
    organic sealift fleet in reduced operating status--to provide
    experience and train mariners?
        General McDew. Yes, activations of the Ready Reserve Force or MSC's
    surge fleet provide training opportunities for mariners especially for
    steam vessel mariners. However, these activations are insufficient in
    both number and duration to provide sufficient experience and train
    mariners alone. Subsequently, our best opportunity to train and
    maintaining qualified, proficient, and actively sailing mariners is to
    maintain a robust U.S. flagged fleet for both international and Jones
    Act trade.
                             roll-on/roll-off ships
        41. Senator McCain. General McDew, since the early 1990s, mobility
    studies have concluded that the U.S. needs approximately 19 million
    square feet of Roll-on/Roll-off (RO/RO) capacity. However, some have
    noted that DOD may be challenged to meet this capacity requirement as
    the organic surge sealift fleet starts reaching the end of its service
    life in the early 2020s. By 2023, 9 of the 50 RO/ROs in the DOD surge
    fleet--approximately 1.6 million square feet--will likely age out. What
    limitations do TRANSCOM and DOD currently face that impede their
    ability to develop a recapitalization plan for the surge sealift fleet?
        General McDew. In order to maintain the surge capacity and
    expeditionary capabilities provided by the Ready Reserve Force (RRF)
    portion of the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) and the MSC's
    Surge Fleet, the U.S. Navy has developed a hybrid recapitalization
    strategy. In the short-term this strategy seeks the authority to
    purchase used vessels, regardless of where they were constructed. Used
    vessels may be needed to fill gaps in the event the long-term strategy
    (new construction) is not able to meet the entire capacity requirement.
    In addition to the purchase of used vessels, service life extensions
    will maintain current vessels to bridge the capacity gap until the
    long-term strategy of new construction is able to be implemented to
    provide replacement capacity in the early 2030s to the late 2040s. The
    legislative authority to acquire used vessels is critical to TRANSCOM's
    ability to meet rapid power projection requirements and to the Navy's
    ability to execute its hybrid strategy to replace capacity to meet
    long-standing sealift requirements as validated in the Mobility
    Requirements and Capabilities Study (MRCS). The Navy's hybrid strategy
    provides sufficient capacity and capability in the short-, mid- and
    long-term with the authority provided by this legislative proposal.
    Approval in this legislative cycle is necessary to seek appropriations
    in near-term budget cycles to recapitalize critical mission capability
    and capacity and preserve the Nation's power projection capabilities.

        42. Senator McCain. General McDew, what assessments has TRANSCOM
    completed to understand these issues and what, if any, progress has
    TRANSCOM made to address them?
        General McDew. TRANSCOM has completed multiple assessments starting
    as far back as the 1990s specifically focused on addressing
    Departmental sealift requirements. Individual options these studies
    have highlighted include: New build for the Surge Fleet New build for
    Marine Prepositioning Squadrons (MPSRONs; acquire new builds for
    MPSRONs and rotate MPSRON vessels to Surge Fleet) Extended Service Life
    (ESL) to 60 years Purchase vessels aging out of MSP Purchase vessels on
    world market Charter build Lease-to-purchase (long-term lease of used
    foreign ships, purchase at end of lease) Lease Dual-Use Vessel (DUV)
    The bottom line is that no individual option is acceptable; a hybrid
    recapitalization strategy as outlined previously best sustains sealift
    capabilities for the short-, mid-, and long-term.

        43. Senator McCain. General McDew, are cargo requirements from the
    1990s mobility studies still accurate under current warfighting needs?
        General McDew. The sealift requirement has been and will be
    enduring. All major mobility studies since the early 1990s report a
    total sealift requirement of about 19-20 million square feet of
    capacity, with about 10.2 million square feet required in the current
    Surge Fleet (50 vessels). Most ships must cycle to-from theater
    multiple times to meet anticipated cargo delivery requirements.
    Specifically, the Mobility Capabilities Assessment (MCA), published May
    2013, reported 3+ sailings on average for timely closure of the
    required forces. The sealift requirement is met with a combination of
    organic and commercial vessels; the surge fleet is available for
    tasking in five days and provides the majority of capacity required to
    deliver forces. The Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA)
    programs average response time is 18 days (8-25 day range) and
    enrollment has been declining in recent years. Once the new defense
    strategy is published, it will be necessary to conduct the thorough
    analysis needed to match strategy to requirements.
                            distribution operations
        44. Senator McCain. General McDew, as DOD's Distribution Process
    Owner, TRANSCOM is responsible for overseeing the overall
    effectiveness, efficiency, and alignment of DOD-wide distribution
    activities. One responsibility of the distribution process owner is to
    oversee the overall effectiveness, efficiency, and alignment of
    department-wide distribution activities. In October 2011, GAO reported
    that there appeared to be confusion over whether TRANSCOM--as
    Distribution Process Owner for DOD--or the services had responsibility
    to get needed materiel to the point of employment. Specifically, GAO
    reported that DOD's view that TRANSCOM as Distribution Process Owner
    should not have any oversight over the last leg of distribution
    indicates confusion within and outside of DOD regarding TRANSCOM's
    role. Has DOD clarified this apparent disconnect in where
    responsibility lies? If so, what actions have been taken to address
    this disconnect/confusion since the GAO report was issued? If not, what
    has prevented DOD from resolution?
        General McDew. The draft 2017 UCP is currently in coordination and
    has updated language to address the role of the DOD's Distribution
    Process Owner (DPO) function and provide clarification with regards to
    responsibilities. Upon approval of the draft UCP, the updated DPO
    language will reflect TRANSCOM's Joint Deployment and Distribution
    Coordinator role subsequently clarifying DPO roles and
    responsibilities.

        45. Senator McCain. General McDew, what other key issues or
    challenges is TRANSCOM currently addressing in its role as the
    Distribution Process Owner?
        General McDew. As the DPO, TRANSCOM is currently addressing the
    lack of a distribution network in Western Africa. USAFRICOM requires a
    logistics network that meets current operational needs in austere
    environments with little to no infrastructure, which provides Low
    Volume/Low Frequency distribution solutions, and is flexible enough to
    meet operational surge requirements. TRANSCOM assisted USAFRICOM in the
    creation of the West Africa Logistics Network (WALN) to provide full
    spectrum common user logistics support in West and Central Africa.
    Another challenge TRANSCOM is addressing as the DPO is finding
    alternate routes to and within the USCENTCOM AOR should the Straits of
    Hormuz or the Bab Al Mandeb Strait become non-permissive. In an effort
    to solve this problem, we are using a network model to simulate the
    effects of closure, determine alternate Aerial Ports of Debarkation
    (APODs) and Sea Ports of Debarkation (SPODs) for delivery options, and
    determine how much volume the Trans Arabian Network is expected to
    handle in order to support normal sustainment flow. The Trans Arabian
    Network is expected to make inter- and intra-movements within USCENTCOM
    countries easier.

        46. Senator McCain. General McDew, what additional tools would help
    TRANSCOM in carrying out these responsibilities?
        General McDew. TRANSCOM is developing a computer model of the
    deployment and distribution network. Once developed, the model will
    simulate the effects of major combat operations on the global
    distribution network and help determine if other transportation nodes
    should be employed. Additionally, TRANSCOM is creating a repository of
    distribution data. This repository will allow TRANSCOM (or any other
    DOD organization) to access a single source to obtain the information
    necessary to perform distribution analytics and recommend changes.

        47. Senator McCain. General McDew, does TRANSCOM have the ability
    to conduct its oversight role through the distribution pipeline all the
    way to final delivery to the warfighter?
        General McDew. To a degree, TRANSCOM leverages processes,
    collaboration, and IT enabling capabilities to influence and monitor
    most distribution activities to the point of need in theater. However,
    we do not yet have the enterprise IT architecture to support the level
    of integrated oversight I would like to provide.

        48. Senator McCain. General McDew, does TRANSCOM have the
    visibility over distribution performance from major bases to outposts
    necessary to fully oversee the effectiveness of the DOD-wide
    distribution system and coordinate potentially necessary improvements
    to the system?
        General McDew. In most cases the answer to this question is no,
    TRANSCOM does not have universal visibility over distribution
    performance from major bases to outposts. TRANSCOM assesses
    distribution performance for wholesale requisitions, the vast majority
    of which originate at Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) depots. TRANSCOM
    collects various Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) events along the
    pipeline until the requisition reaches the service supply activity
    which processes the Materiel Receipt Acknowledgment (MRA). It is these
    EDI events which form the backbone of distribution assessment. The MRA
    is the EDI event which most closely aligns with the designated point of
    need and therefore that is where distribution assessment, and
    associated visibility by TRANSCOM, stop. Further, TRANSCOM does not
    currently receive EDI event data beyond the MRA. To do so would require
    the Services to provide this data.
                             global response force
        49. Senator McCain. General McDew, the Global Response Force (GRF)
    was established with the objective of providing the Secretary of
    Defense with an array of rapidly deployable forces to enhance DOD's
    ability to respond quickly to worldwide contingencies. GRF forces are
    also intended for augmenting the geographical combatant commands'
    capability to respond to unforeseen challenges and opportunities.
    TRANSCOM plays a critical role in the success of the GRF's worldwide
    mission by providing timely and adequate global mobility support and
    other joint capabilities. What approaches, if any, has TRANSCOM taken
    to identify additional capabilities that it may need to enable
    TRANSCOM's capabilities designated for the GRF?
        General McDew. TRANSCOM constantly engages with each Combatant
    Command to determine both current and future joint requirements. The
    analysis of those joint requirements provides insight into possible
    future capabilities which might be developed and added to the existing
    TRANSCOM capabilities designated for the GRF. It is important to note
    that GRF requirements are an important planning factor for current
    TRANSCOM airlift, tanker and sealift recapitalization efforts.

        50. Senator McCain. General McDew, how does TRANSCOM work across
    organizational lines to integrate its capabilities with those of other
    components?
        General McDew. TRANSCOM, and the component commands, are force
    providers for our Joint Task Force--Port Opening (JTF-PO) enabling
    capability. When a requirement comes to us from a GCC, we stand up a
    JPT (Joint Planning Team) with the appropriate component
    representatives to ensure we put the right team size and composition to
    meet the mission. We also integrate on a daily/weekly/monthly basis in
    the development and execution of our Turbo Distribution exercise
    program, published directives, and briefings. External to TRANSCOM, we
    have successfully integrated DLA expeditionary capabilities under the
    authority of TRANSCOM to deploy in tandem with our JTF-PO elements; we
    continue to pursue collaboration with U.S. Army Forces Command and
    Interagency partners to enhance joint mobility capabilities. This
    includes further developing and codifying integrated capability
    relationships with Navy Expeditionary Combat and U.S. Army Forces
    Command for integration of units supporting sea port of debarkation
    (SPOD) operations. Additionally, the Joint Enabling Capabilities
    Command (JECC), a TRANSCOM subordinate command, continually coordinates
    with CCMDs and mission-partners to ensure it understands mission-
    partner requirements. These habitual relationships allow JECC to remain
    abreast of joint requirements, anticipate joint priorities, and provide
    support in accordance with integrated planning priorities in order to
    better align its capabilities to support joint force commanders. The
    JECC routinely participates in priority exercises with each CCMD and
    that provides an opportunity for JECC forces to maintain currency in
    each area of responsibility by participating in well-resourced, high
    fidelity environment scenarios. Additionally, it allows CCMDs to
    partially fulfill their training requirements by learning to work with
    other organizations like the JECC, enabling the seamless integration of
    deploying personnel in future operations. The JECC also conducts
    quarterly Mission Rehearsal Exercises (MRXs) in order to validate the
    JECC's ability to fulfill its GRF mission requirements.

        51. Senator McCain. General McDew, how does TRANSCOM determine if
    it is able to provide the necessary airlift to meet the most stressing
    potential GRF employments and where is that readiness captured?
        General McDew. TRANSCOM Joint Distribution Process Analysis Center
    (JDPAC) conducts studies in-house to determine if we are able to
    provide the necessary airlift to meet the most stressing potential GRF
    employments. As an example, the House National Defense Authorization
    Act for Fiscal Year 2016, H.R. 1735, Accompanying Report 114-102,
    recently directed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to submit a
    report on the strategic vision and plan for an adequately resourced,
    trained, equipped, and manned effective global response force. In order
    to support that effort and identify and assess the capacity and
    readiness of aircraft lift and maritime ships to transport the GRF,
    TRANSCOM conducted an end-to-end analysis involving a notional crisis
    for illustrative purposes. The notional scenario involved deploying the
    GRF Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) to East Africa for a crisis.
    This scenario was chosen because it involved a likely use of and
    location for the GRF. Additionally, the austere nature of the operating
    environment significantly stressed the mobility system. The analysis
    helped us to better understand the process of assessing strategic lift
    for deploying a GRF force package.

        52. Senator McCain. General McDew, to what extent has TRANSCOM
    assessed its ability to muster airdrop-qualified pilots and crews to
    support potential large-scale GRF missions?
        General McDew. Air Mobility Command has conducted a number of
    studies to ensure we have the capacity to support the GRF. From an
    airdrop perspective, we have adequate airlift pilots and aircrews to
    exceed what our war plans call for today, but cannot rest on our
    laurels. The Air Force is experiencing shortages in aircrew and is
    developing incentives and reforms in order to increase retention.

                   coordination with other combatant commands
        53. Senator McCain. General McDew, what is TRANSCOM's relationship
    with the Combatant Commands when it comes to managing the distribution
    of materiel onward from air or sea ports of debarkation all the way
    through to the last tactical mile?
        General McDew. TRANSCOM communicates regularly with the Combatant
    Commands. When managing the distribution of material onward from air
    and sea ports of debarkation through the last tactical mile, TRANSCOM
    coordinates with the Combatant Commands. The Combatant Commands are
    responsible for the last tactical mile. Thus, TRANSCOM does not
    maintain visibility beyond the ports of debarkation. That said, when
    requested, TRANSCOM will (and has) helped GCCs manage onward
    integration when requested. The Geographic Combatant Commander and the
    services own the systems which provide visibility beyond the point of
    debarkation to the point of need and they are best suited to direct and
    assess the distribution of that materiel to the Warfighter. The GCC
    owns the theaters assets, processes, contracts, etc. which control
    distribution beyond the point of need. The DPO ends its coordination
    influence at the point of need and the GCC is empowered to use the
    resources at his disposal to exercise the joint function of sustainment
    per the needs of the mission.

        54. Senator McCain. General McDew, how does this collaboration
    happen today, and how do you think it could be improved?
        General McDew. TRANSCOM hosts major reoccurring planning
    conferences and participates in GCC exercises with the Combatant
    Commands to synchronize force deployment, redeployment and sustainment
    operations. Additionally, as a global combatant command, TRANSCOM
    routinely provides extensive planning and execution support to GCC
    exercises, acting in its role as coordinating authority for JDDE
    operations. The goal of this support is to assist CCMDs with training
    for deployment, distribution and redeployment execution. TRANSCOM
    regularly visits GCCs and develops supporting plans and Transportation
    Feasibility Assessments for GCCs' operations plans. TRANSCOM meets
    twice a year with the GCCs to establish a holistic understanding of
    their future deployment requirements. Additionally, the annual Global
    Distribution Synchronizer seminar (attended by representatives from all
    combatant commands, Joint Staff, OSD, and DLA) identifies Global
    Distribution Network issues and develops issue resolution plans.
    TRANSCOM collaborates with the GCCs from the earliest notification of
    distribution requirements and stays engaged through execution to
    measure Time Definite Delivery metrics. Once post execution metrics are
    gathered, TRANSCOM once again collaborates with the GCCs, Suppliers,
    and Transporters to use the results of the metrics to ensure continuous
    process improvement. The new National Military Strategy and the
    Chairman's push for Globally Integrated Operations to deal with the 4+1
    challenges in the Trans-regional, Multi-domain, Multi-functional (TMM)
    operating environment will also drive improvement in collaboration
    across the Joint Force by bringing combatant commanders together to
    work across their historic geographical and functional boundaries.
                              gao high risk report
        55. Senator McCain. General McDew, the DOD Supply Chain Management
    has been on GAO's High Risk Report since 1990. Added to that list in
    2005, Materiel Distribution is one of the two remaining sub-categories
    of Supply Chain Management that GAO assesses to be at risk. As the
    Distribution Process Owner, what aspects of materiel distribution are
    most in need of attention from TRANSCOM?
        General McDew. As materiel distribution is embedded in--and
    therefore reliant on--the cyberspace domain, the security of that
    domain stands out as TRANSCOM's most significant challenge requiring a
    whole-of-government approach to mitigate. Because 90 percent of
    transportation and logistics operations are carried out by commercial
    providers, USTRANSCOM missions rely on unclassified networks and
    systems also used by our numerous commercial partners. The defense of
    these systems is critical to protecting movement information and
    requires a holistic partnership with the Department of Homeland
    Security, other interagency entities, and commercial industry.
    Additionally, we are in the beginning stages of migrating our
    unclassified systems to cloud-based technology with the goal of
    migrating the entirety of our unclassified and classified networks to
    the cloud to increase security, access, and reliability. This risk
    mitigation is my highest priority and represents a first step toward
    reinforcing both our military and commercial providers' readiness,
    resiliency, and ability to secure material distribution activities from
    disruption. A second concerning aspect of materiel distribution is
    management of the massive amounts of data throughout the Joint
    Deployment and Distribution Enterprise. To mitigate our risk in supply
    chain management, we must instill a culture that treats distribution
    data as a precious commodity to be standardized, protected, and
    leveraged as a documented responsibility of TRANSCOM in our Joint
    Deployment and Distribution Coordinator role. Currently, the
    availability, aggregation, and ability to make timely decisions to
    operate a data-centric, predictive materiel supply chain is lacking
    authority, oversight, and technology to drive distribution
    responsiveness required to meet the evolving needs of warfighter
    readiness. Elevating the data culture supporting materiel distribution
    to levels that parallel commercial best practices requires assistance
    from the Strategic Capabilities Office, Defense Innovation Unit--
    Experimental (DIUx), and funding to nominate TRANSCOM as the
    ``pathfinder'' for big data within the Department of Defense. Finally,
    to ensure materiel distribution readiness in the future, we must
    address the recapitalization of the strategic sealift fleet. Some aging
    ships in the Ready Reserve Force must be replaced to meet future force
    deployment requirements while waiting for new sealift construction. We
    have submitted our proposal to Congress for the authorities to purchase
    used vessels, currently pending NDAA approval, and ask for special
    attention on this matter to ensure TRANSCOM's ability to deploy
    military strength when required.
                        force structure recapitalization
        56. Senator McCain. General McDew, during your confirmation hearing
    in 2015, you said that there were a number of recapitalization efforts
    that would need to take place over the next 5 to 10 years that would
    become problematic if sequester were triggered. Now that our joint fear
    has become our shared reality, what shortfalls will TRANSCOM face in
    the coming years?
        General McDew. [Deleted.]
                           maritime security program
        57. Senator McCain. General McDew, the 2003 Maritime Security
    Program (MSP) provides support for up to 60 active, commercially
    viable, militarily useful, privately-owned U.S.-flag vessels. MSP
    vessels have been key contributors to our nation's efforts in
    Afghanistan and Iraq over the last decade, moving over 50 percent of
    all military cargo--over 26 million tons--to the Middle East. Under the
    MSP program, participating operators are required to make their ships
    and commercial transportation resources available upon request by the
    Secretary of Defense during times of war or national emergency. In
    addition, MSP vessels are required to leave the program once the vessel
    is 25 years old. While the program can support 60 ships, recently the
    program has had as few as 57. In an effort to attract and maintain
    participants in the program, MARAD has requested an increase to the
    stipends provided to participants. To what extent is TRANSCOM
    monitoring the health and viability of the MSP?
        General McDew. TRANSCOM considers MSP critical to meeting our
    ability to deploy and sustain forces across the globe. We closely track
    and report capacity levels monthly and compare it to our mobility
    requirements to ensure the command's strategic sealift portfolio is
    adequately sized to meet any contingency. MSP is a joint program
    between MARAD and TRANSCOM and both organizations are involved in all
    transactional requirements associated with the program to ensure it
    continues to meet national defense needs. In the rare case when the 60-
    ship program was filled to 57 ships, TRANSCOM worked closely with MARAD
    to fill the vacancies with modern, efficient, roll-on/roll-off capacity
    which is TRANSCOM's number one priority for vessel type to support our
    force projection capability. The short gap in time to bring the program
    from 57 to 60 ships was required to allow the contractors adequate time
    to strike a balance between meeting TRANSCOM's priority for fill while
    also achieving commercial viability.

        58. Senator McCain. General McDew, what is TRANSCOM's assessment of
    the health of the MSP program at this time?
        General McDew. MSP continues to be a critical component of our
    strategic sealift portfolio and is even more important today as we've
    seen the commercial U.S. flag fleet slowly decline over the past couple
    of decades. Today with only 80 U.S. flag ships engaged in international
    trade, MSP represents 83 percent of the total U.S. flag fleet's roll-
    on/roll-off force projection capacity. The importance of the program is
    evident when you compare this to the U.S. flag fleet capacity in 2006
    when the program grew from 47 to 60 ships and 96 ships were engaged in
    international trade and only 62 percent of the roll-on/roll-off
    capacity came from MSP. The provisions within the program ensure that
    not only TRANSCOM has access to 60 of the most militarily useful
    capacity in the U.S. flag fleet, but also has access to an extensive
    network of commercial intermodal capabilities and a pool of qualified
    U.S. merchant mariners available to crew our government-owned fleet
    when activated.

        59. Senator McCain. General McDew, are there opportunities to
    replenish the surge sealift fleet with ships formerly in the MSP?
        General McDew. Yes, the MSP may provide opportunities to
    recapitalize the surge sealift fleet, if section 2218 of title 10
    United States Code is amended to provide the Secretary of Defense the
    discretionary authority to purchase used vessels constructed in
    shipyards outside of the United States. MSP vessels are part of the
    DOD's transportation solution to meet military mobility requirements
    and are full partners in the movement of military equipment. As these
    vessels reach the end of their useful commercial life, they still have
    substantial service life available and proven military utility, making
    them excellent candidates for the Ready Reserve Force and the Military
    Sealift Command surge fleet.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
                    rapid deployment capabilities of kc-46a
        60. Senator Sullivan. General McDew, the KC-46A has over three
    times the pallet and personnel carrying capability of the KC-135. Can
    you explain the strategic capabilities of the KC-46A that make it more
    than simply a new Tanker, but rather a key to increased global
    mobility? Does the U.S. Air Force consider these capabilities when
    deciding main operating base decisions for the KC-46A?
        General McDew. The KC-46 is being procured as part of a tanker re-
    capitalization effort and will primarily accomplish the air refueling
    mission. In addition to increased cargo and passenger capacity, the KC-
    46A offers additional capabilities to the air refueling mission. These
    include both centerline boom and drogue, wing air refueling pods,
    receiver air refueling, and updated communications, navigation,
    surveillance, and datalink capabilities which provide increased
    flexibility to the global reach air refueling mission. The Air Force
    Strategic Basing Process evaluates potential main operating base
    locations using criteria which includes operational factors.

        61. Senator Sullivan. General McDew, Does TRANSCOM plan to use KC-
    46s to rapidly deploy 5th generation fighters to theater with
    maintenance and support personnel as passengers? What are the arguments
    for and against collocating this KC-46A``Rapid Pegasus'' capability
    with the 100 5th gen fighters at Eielson AFB, AK? What type of message
    would that send to North Korea, China, and Russia?
        General McDew. Our tanker fleet will be used in conjunction with
    our airlift fleet to meet our nation's wartime mobility requirements.
    The KC-46A Strategic Basing process is still underway and therefore we
    cannot speculate on the advantages or disadvantages of any particular
    base or location. To date, the Air Force has identified five
    continental United States Main Operating Bases. Bases in Alaska are
    considered part of the United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) area of
    responsibility (AOR) and will be evaluated in future strategic basing
    actions.

        62. Senator Sullivan. General McDew, what TRANSCOM priorities weigh
    heavier in an OCONUS basing decision than the ability to rapidly deploy
    5th generation fighters and meeting local refueling mission
    requirements? What would be the arguments against basing the KC-46A in
    Alaska?
        General McDew. TRANSCOM prioritizes all Defense Transportation
    System movements, to include aerial refueling, based on the Chairman of
    the Joint Chiefs of Staff priority system for that movement. The Air
    Force Air Mobility Command (AMC) must continually balance forces at
    Outside Continental United States (OCONUS) locations with CONUS-based
    forces to plan for and execute missions in any forward area of
    operation worldwide. The KC-46A Strategic Basing process is still
    underway and therefore we cannot speculate on the advantages or
    disadvantages of any particular base or location. To date, the Air
    Force has identified five CONUS Main Operating Bases. Bases in Alaska
    are considered part of the PACOM AOR and will be evaluated in future
    strategic basing actions.
                retain low mileage kc-135's to increase capacity
        63. Senator Sullivan. General McDew, Would you agree that instead
    of simply replacing some of the KC-135 fleet with KC-46s, we should
    retain some of best condition KC-135s and use them to enhance our
    tanker capacity?
        General McDew. In order to maintain the most capable fleet within
    current budget constraints, Air Mobility Command (AMC) carefully
    reviews each aircraft's flying hours, operational capabilities, pending
    sustainment investments, and other critical life limiting factors, such
    as structural fatigue and corrosion. Collectively, these elements will
    help AMC make the best operational and economic decision on the
    remaining KC-135 fleet. The emerging contested environments can put
    greater demands on the global air refueling tankers, which must be
    addressed in the near future. Any attrition would exacerbate the
    stressed aerial refueling fleet, which will only number at 479 by
    fiscal year 2019 if there are no further delays in the KC-46
    production.

        64. Senator Sullivan. General McDew, in result of the fiscal year
    2015 NDAA there was a business case analysis for the 168th ANG Air
    Refueling Wing, which found that the 168th meets only 52 percent of
    mission requirements locally. This was before Eielson was selected to
    receive 54 F-35's in 2020. Would you agree that meeting less than 50
    percent of mission requirements deserves a hard look at adding more
    tanker capacity to Alaska?
        General McDew. The Air National Guard conducted this business case
    analysis and is therefore best positioned to answer this question about
    the 168th ARW local mission support. However, due to the existing
    shortfall in tanker capacity and the growing need for tanker support
    globally, I am seeking authority for operational control of KC-135s in
    U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) and U.S. European Command (USEURCOM).
    This authority currently restricted in law will enable more effective
    and efficient use of KC135s and enhance overall readiness of these
    forces.
                                   __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
                             cyber breach reporting
        65. Senator Blumenthal. General McDew, you testified that
    commercial companies that contract with TRANSCOM are required to report
    a cyber breach within their network to DC3. What is the specific
    reporting requirement? Do you believe this reporting requirement is
    sufficient?
        General McDew. TRANSCOM contracts follow the requirements set forth
    in the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS)
    252.204-7012, Safeguarding Covered Defense Information and Cyber
    Incident Reporting. (DFARS) 252.204-7012: (c) Cyber incident reporting
    requirement. (1) When the Contractor discovers a cyber-incident that
    affects a covered contractor information system or the covered defense
    information residing therein, or that affects the contractor's ability
    to perform the requirements of the contract that are designated as
    operationally critical support and identified in the contract, the
    Contractor shall--(i) Conduct a review for evidence of compromise of
    covered defense information, including, but not limited to, identifying
    compromised computers, servers, specific data, and user accounts. This
    review shall also include analyzing covered contractor information
    system(s) that were part of the cyber incident, as well as other
    information systems on the Contractor's network(s), that may have been
    accessed as a result of the incident in order to identify compromised
    covered defense information, or that affect the Contractor's ability to
    provide operationally critical support; and (ii) Rapidly report cyber
    incidents to DOD at http://dibnet.dod.mil. With regard to sufficiency,
    I believe the current requirement is a positive development for DOD
    contracts, however, this requirement does not fully address the need
    for timely reporting during time of crisis for our most critical
    contracts. For our most critical contracts, we must define and ensure
    we are notified of any cyber-related events that impact our commercial
    partners ability to execute their (and subsequently our) mission in a
    rapid manner. We are working to incorporate more stringent and timely
    reporting requirements into out information system development
    contracts to ensure source code and technology are not compromised
    while in development. This will result in our systems being more secure
    once they are implemented. We plan to add these more stringent
    requirements into our contracts in the coming months as our contracts
    are renewed or completed.

        66. Senator Blumenthal. General McDew, please describe the steps
    required by a commercial company contracted with TRANSCOM if the
    company experiences a breach to their cyber network. Who is a company
    required to report the incident to? What roles do the Department of
    Homeland Security and the Department of Defense play in this reporting
    process? How do these agencies assist in addressing a breach and
    protecting the DOD network?
        General McDew. In addition to the reporting requirements described
    in DFARS 252.204.7012, 2(c) Cyber incident reporting requirement the
    Contractor must also take the following actions pursuant to DFARS
    clause 252.204-7012 and as applicable to the incident: (d) Malicious
    software. When the Contractor or subcontractors discover and isolate
    malicious software in connection with a reported cyber incident, submit
    the malicious software to DOD Cyber Crime Center (DC3) in accordance
    with instructions provided by DC3 or the Contracting Officer. Do not
    send the malicious software to the Contracting Officer. As stated in
    the DFARS excerpt the company must report to the DOD's Defense
    Industrial Base (DIB) Cyber Incident Reporting & Cyber Threat
    Information Sharing Portal via http://dibnet.dod.mil. The DC3 receives
    and disseminates reports on behalf of the DOD. There are several
    organizations that receive the disseminated report based upon their
    assigned DOD roles. TRANSCOM--Receives reporting and performs risk
    determination based upon effected contractor. CYBERCOM--Receives
    reporting for potential situational awareness and indications Defense
    Security Service--May receive report if the contractor is a Cleared
    Defense Contractor. Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
    Technology and Logistics, (USD/AT&L)--If there is an actual breach and
    information is exfiltrated, AT&L is responsible for damage assessment.
    While the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is not mandated as part
    of the contractually required response, contractors may voluntarily
    provide information to a number of organizations that have reporting
    relationships with DHS. These include: National Cybersecurity and
    Communications Integration Center (NCCIC), United States Computer
    Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) and Industrial Control System
    Computer Emergency Readiness Team (ICS-CERT). These organizations
    provide mechanisms to share reporting with the U.S. Government with a
    certain level of protection and anonymity. TRANSCOM subscribes to DHS
    dissemination mechanisms. The DHS has responsibilities to the Federal
    Government, with the exception of DOD, to protect the U.S. Government
    networks. They provide some emergency response capability to the DOD
    depending on the nature of the breach. Finally, TRANSCOM is addressing
    this issue by defining more stringent, timely cybersecurity incident
    reporting requirements to ensure we are notified of any cyber-related
    events that impact our commercial partners' ability to execute their
    (and subsequently our) mission in a rapid manner. We are also
    incorporating more stringent and timely reporting requirements into our
    information system development contracts to ensure source code and
    technology are not compromised while in development. This will result
    in our systems being more secure once they are implemented. We plan to
    add these more stringent requirements into our contracts in the coming
    months as our contracts are renewed or re-competed.

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2018 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                             THURSDAY, MAY 4, 2017

                                   U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                    UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in Room
    SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain
    (chairman of the committee) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Wicker,
    Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Perdue, Cruz,
    Reed, Nelson, McCaskill, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal,
    Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King, Heinrich, Warren, and Peters.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman McCain. Good morning. The Senate Armed Services
    Committee meets this morning to receive testimony on the
    posture of the U.S. Special Operations Command, known as SOCOM.
        I would like to welcome Ms. Theresa Whelan, who is
    representing the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
    for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, and General
    Tony Thomas, the Commander of SOCOM. I thank our witnesses for
    appearing before the committee and for their many years of
    dedicated service to the Nation.
        The purpose of today's hearing is to hear directly from the
    senior civilian and military leaders responsible for ensuring
    our special operations forces are trained, equipped, and ready
    to confront what is the most complex and daunting set of
    national security challenges our Nation has faced since the
    Second World War.
        In response to the increasing threats, our combatant
    commanders around the world have developed a seemingly
    insatiable demand for the unique capabilities of our special
    operators. That is especially true in the fight against
    terrorism.
        For the last 15 years, special operations forces have been
    heavily engaged in the fight against global terrorist groups.
    As a result, SOCOM's budget has emphasized optimizing and
    sustaining counterterrorism capabilities. This is unlikely to
    change anytime soon. The United States will remain engaged in
    global counterterrorism operations of varying scope and
    intensity for the foreseeable future, and special operations
    forces will continue to play a vital role.
        But we must be careful never to equate special operations
    with counterterrorism. Special operations forces must be
    prepared to perform a variety of other critical missions beyond
    counterterrorism, missions that will continue to grow in scale
    and importance, and demand more from our special operations
    forces.
        China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are becoming more
    aggressive in challenging United States interests and partners
    through the use of asymmetric means that often fall below the
    threshold of conventional conflict. The ability of our special
    operators to conduct low-visibility special warfare operations
    in politically sensitive environments make them uniquely suited
    to counter the malign activities of our adversaries in this
    domain.
        Put simply, special operations forces have an indispensable
    role to play in great power competitions and global
    counterproliferation.
        The challenges posed by militarily advanced great powers
    will require the development and employment of new technologies
    and capabilities. It also warrants a serious review of the need
    for additional special operations force structure.
        However, posturing a force to effectively operate in this
    domain will not be possible until we in Congress step up and
    repeal the misguided and disastrous defense spending caps and
    forthcoming defense budget cuts required by law in the Budget
    Control Act. Persistent budgetary uncertainty undermines the
    ability of our military leaders to plan and forces them to
    choose between near-term readiness to support ongoing
    operations and optimizing the force and its capabilities to
    address emerging and future requirements.
        This is not sustainable, and this is not right.
        I look to our witnesses to explain how SOCOM is attempting
    to balance the need to support ongoing operational warfighting
    requirements while also ensuring that the force is prepared to
    deal with emerging threats, as well as describe in detail where
    budget shortfalls are forcing you to accept risk.
        Lastly and most importantly, I expect our witnesses to
    provide the committee with an update on the overall health of
    the force and what is being done to mitigate the impact to our
    operators and their families. Fifteen years of continuous
    combat operations in back-to-back deployments have placed
    enormous strain on the force, challenging readiness,
    resilience, and retention.
        We owe our operators and their families who have given so
    much in defense of our Nation the support that they deserve.
        Again, I thank our witnesses for being with us today and
    look forward to their testimony.
        Senator Reed?

                     STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me
    also join you in thanking our witnesses for appearing today to
    discuss the United States Special Operations Command and the
    readiness of our special operations forces. You are both ably
    leading your respective organizations through a period of both
    high operational tempo and also significant transition.
        The United States Special Operations Command, or SOCOM,
    recently celebrated the 30th anniversary of its establishment
    by Congress. Those 30 years, and particularly the last 15, have
    been characterized by great successes, including the operation
    that killed Osama bin Laden. SOCOM's history also includes
    tragedies that resulted in the loss of brave special operators.
        Fortunately, our special operations forces have learned
    from each of these events and have emerged as a stronger and
    more capable force.
        General Thomas, the high quality of men and women you lead
    today are a testament to that lineage.
        SOCOM is unique within the Department of Defense as the
    only functional combatant command with service-like
    responsibilities for the training, equipping, organization, and
    readiness of special operations forces.
        When Congress created SOCOM, it also established the
    position of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
    Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, or ASD/SOLIC, to be the
    service secretary-like civilian tasked with day-to-day advocacy
    and oversight of special operations forces. For many reasons,
    including competing responsibility for other policy matters,
    the ASD/SOLIC has not adequately fulfilled the mandate to date.
        The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of Fiscal
    Year 2017 sought to address this issue with a number of reforms
    designed to optimize the partnership between the Commander of
    SOCOM and the ASD/SOLIC for the benefit of special operations
    forces. For that reason, we are pleased to have Ms. Whelan, the
    Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense SOLIC, testifying today
    in the service secretary-like role envisioned by last year's
    reforms.
        We look forward to receiving an update from both of you as
    to the progress you have made toward achieving the goals of
    last year's bill and what we expect over the next several
    years.
        Our special operations forces remain heavily engaged in the
    fight against ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria], al Qaeda,
    and other violent extremist organizations, sometimes directly,
    but more often in support of local partner forces on the
    ground, as we have seen most prominently in Iraq and Syria. I
    hope both of you will give us your assessment of what, if
    anything, we can do to accelerate progress in defeating these
    groups.
        While the last 15 years of special operations deployments
    have been primarily focused on countering violent extremist
    groups, there is growing realization that special operations
    forces, and the unique skillsets that they possess, may be
    called upon for other missions as well.
        General Thomas, you and many in your community have sought
    to characterize this so-called gray zone of competition short
    of direct military conflict. We saw such tactics most notably
    as part of Russia's eventual illegal annexation of Crimea, and
    should expect more such challenges as adversaries pursue
    efforts against the United States and other countries.
        I hope that you will provide the committee with your views
    on the suitability of special operations to direct gray zone
    challenges today and what changes in special operations
    capabilities and authorities, many of which were designed to
    confront the terrorist threat, may be necessary.
        Given the demand for special operation forces across these
    various mission sets, we must always remain mindful of the
    already high operational tempo faced by our special operators
    and their families. SOCOM has sought to mitigate the stress of
    these repeated demanding deployments through the of the Force
    and Family Initiative. I look forward to an update on the
    lessons learned from this initiative and SOCOM's plans going
    forward.
        General Thomas and Ms. Whelan, I hope you will pass along
    the committee's admiration and thanks to our special operators
    and their families for the tremendous sacrifices they make in
    support of our national security.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Ms. Whelan?

     STATEMENT OF THERESA M. WHELAN, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
         DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS/LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

        Ms. Whelan. Thank you, Senator. Chairman McCain, Senator
    Reed, and distinguished members of the committee, I am honored
    to appear before you today in my capacity as the Acting
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-
    Intensity Conflict. I am pleased to share the table with
    General Tony Thomas, who has served at the forefront of the
    special operations forces at all levels of command. Our entire
    SOLIC team is proud to partner with him and his command in
    forging the future of DOD special operations.
        I would like to thank you and your predecessors for the
    foresight to create SOLIC and USSOCOM 30 years ago, and for
    your commitment to maintaining that vision over the last three
    decades. We are grateful for this committee's strong support
    for special operations, as evidenced by the resources,
    authorities, and depth of understanding you provide in your
    oversight. Our military is stronger and more capable due to
    your efforts.
        Today, I will focus on three topics: winning the current
    fight and defeating emerging threats, building on the
    foundations of section 922 ASD/SOLIC authorities, and
    continuing to hone the edge of SOF [Special Operations Forces]
    personnel and capabilities.
        SOF is a vanguard force in countering emerging threats at
    the leading edge of the modern security landscape. In the last
    15 years, we encountered a networked enemy, we flattened our
    organizations and accelerated our targeting cycles, and we
    built a network to defeat them. We now face advanced
    transregional threats that demand greater levels of
    coordination and collaboration, and we are redoubling our focus
    on building relationships and international and interagency
    partners.
        Today, SOLIC provides advocacy for the special operations
    budget, which is approximately 1.8 percent of our defense
    budget in 2017. We directly manage over two billion dollars in
    various budgets that support counterterrorism and
    counternarcotics efforts.
        The three decades-long partnership between SOCOM and SOLIC
    has generated a force capable of dealing with emerging threats
    and a force that is able to translate those gains across the
    Department. We will win the fight against VEOs [Violent
    Extremist Organizations] and protect our citizens, vital
    interests, allies, and partners.
        This requires a long-term strategic approach that combats
    terrorists, disrupts terrorist networks, discredits extremist
    ideologies, and diminishes factors that contribute to
    recruitment and radicalization.
        Sustained funding and flexible legislative authorities have
    been instrumental to those efforts. I want to thank the
    committee for establishing section 127(e), formerly known as
    section 1208, as a permanent authority. The maturation of this
    program has provided our warfighters a powerful tool to employ
    to support our allies, attack our enemies, and protect our
    force, and it is a great example of interagency synergy enabled
    by strong congressional support and oversight.
        Congressional support for countering threat finance and
    transnational organized crime is also crucial to our efforts.
    Terrorists, insurgents, and other threat networks depend upon
    illicit revenue streams and criminal facilitators for logistics
    support, money laundering, or obtaining weapons and fraudulent
    documents.
        Thank you also for codifying the responsibilities of ASD/
    SOLIC's important oversight role, comprised of the
    complementary tasks of monitoring and advocacy in the fiscal
    year 2017 NDAA.
        USSOCOM has made dramatic advances during wartime in
    response to urgent battlefield demands, gains that require an
    institutional foundation to endure. The service secretary-like
    authorities in section 922 serve as a strategic linchpin
    ensuring that we lock in these hard-won gains.
        These authorities have empowered the Special Operations
    Policy Oversight Council, which we have used over the past year
    to resolve base infrastructure and casualty evacuation issues
    among SOCOM and the services. Ultimately, these gains can be
    leveraged across the entire force with SOF best practices in
    technology and talent management serving as templates for the
    Department in addressing emerging challenges.
        A key part of SOLIC's role is to advance the state-of-the-
    art in concepts, technologies, and strategies for both humans
    and hardware. Our Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office
    leads this effort with SOLIC developing cutting-edge
    technologies for SOF, the interagency, and law enforcement.
        The SOF Truths state that humans are more important than
    hardware. As we continue to provide agile and innovative
    capabilities, we must also continue to build and sustain an
    elite work force suited to the unique and diverse demands of
    21st Century warfare.
        We will also continue to work closely with Congress to
    ensure that we have the right policies, agile authorities, and
    necessary resources to employ SOF effectively. I thank Congress
    for its continuing support of our men and women in uniform, and
    their families, and I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary Whelan follows:]

                 Prepared Statement by Secretary Theresa Whelan
                                  introduction
        Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and other distinguished
    members of the Committee, I am honored to appear before you today in my
    capacity as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
    Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict (SOLIC). I am pleased to share this
    table with General Tony Thomas, who has served the special operations
    force (SOF) community at all levels of command. Our entire SOLIC team
    is proud to partner with his command in forging the future of special
    operations on behalf of the Department of Defense and the American
    people.
        We are grateful for this committee's strong support of special
    operations, as evidenced by the resources, authorities, and depth of
    understanding you provide in your oversight. We pledge to make the best
    use of these resources to accomplish all special operations mission
    sets--including defeating the threat networks of terrorists, illicit
    traffickers, and transnational criminals; denying the acquisition,
    proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction; and countering
    unconventional threats. At the same time, we appreciate your support in
    advancing SOF warrior care and force resiliency through the
    Preservation of the Force and Family--which places psychologists,
    counselors, and exercise physiologists into the daily routines of SOF
    to perform 'preventative maintenance,' catching and resolving problems
    before they become chronic--and SOF-for-Life initiatives.
        As part of its roles and responsibilities, the OASD(SO/LIC)
    provides oversight and advocacy for the special operations budget,
    which is approximately 1.8 percent of our defense budget in 2017.
    Additionally, we directly manage over two billion dollars in various
    budgets that support our counterterrorism and counternarcotics efforts,
    such as the Counterterrorism Fellowship Program, the Combating
    Terrorism Technical Support Office, and the counternarcotics budget. We
    ensure that these investments are leveraged to provide return on
    investment across the strategic landscape, the interagency, and across
    the joint force.
        I am here to report to you on the current and anticipated strategic
    environment that our Nation's special operations enterprise will face
    during this time of transformation. As global events shape our
    environment, our special operations mission continues finding, fixing,
    and finishing an innovative enemy while harnessing these trends and
    technologies for our own advantage. Let me begin by discussing that
    rapidly evolving environment and its effect on combating terrorists,
    state-sponsored unconventional warfare, and illicit networks that
    include, but are not limited to, transnational organized crime. I will
    then describe three SO/LIC focus areas that will allow us to: 1) win
    the current fight and defeat emerging threats, 2) build on the
    foundation of the section 922 authorities, and 3) hone the edge of SOF
    personnel and capabilities.
       strategic environment: the megatrends of individual empowerment,
                diffusion of power, and demographic instability
        When John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt wrote their seminal work
    Networks and Netwars in 1991, they introduced the now-ubiquitous
    phrase: ``it takes a network to defeat a network.'' Their work foresaw
    changes in the nature of warfare, which shaped how both we and our
    enemies encounter each other. Previously, al Qaeda leveraged the
    advantage of flat networks to strike fielded forces and vulnerable
    targets around the world. In response, we built our own global network
    to harness these trends and seize the initiative.
        Where al Qaeda leverages globalization and franchised network
    structures to threaten our interests, the Islamic State in Iraq and
    Syria (ISIS) evolves its threat networks further, presenting new
    analytical and operational challenges by harnessing emerging
    megatrends. ISIS thrives in the volatile space carved out by these
    trends. This generation of VEOs adopts the latest technology to
    communicate on the battlefield and to influence new individuals and
    groups on behalf of the organization. They also use existing tools in
    novel ways--the non-state equivalent of the ``gig economy''--and adapt
    so quickly that they overcome most governmental decision cycles. This
    generation of threats is challenging U.S. national security interests
    in ways we have not seen before. Social media allows ISIS to connect
    with individuals who share alienation and grievances. Digital
    innovation, both in warfighting and communications technologies, is a
    key to their success. Technologies such as 3D printers, mobile
    applications, and the dark web help enable illicit trade on an
    exponentially increasing scale and have contributed to the growth in
    the number and power of illicit groups. As these groups leverage the
    darker side of these megatrends, SOF must adapt and innovate in order
    to disrupt threat networks and deter unconventional adversaries.
    30 years of ussocom and asd (so/lic): sof at the intersection of global
                                   megatrends
        This year, we celebrate the 30th anniversary of both USSOCOM and
    ASD(SO/LIC). It is appropriate for us to reflect and build upon the
    past as we look to the future. For the latter half of the past 30
    years, war has transformed our nation's special operations community
    from a unique, specialized force that occupied a crucial niche in our
    security posture into a vanguard force that is reshaping our world. In
    combatting terrorists, special operations forces have built flat
    networks that bridge interagency divides down to the tactical level.
    Inherently joint, our special operations warfighters have continued to
    support global U.S. Government objectives by leveraging critical
    interagency and international partnerships. These boundary-spanning
    networks minimize our tactical response time while radically
    accelerating innovation. They also counter illicit threat networks,
    such as drug, weapons, and human trafficking, that fuel terrorist
    organizations and organized criminal enterprises. SOF support in
    Afghanistan for counter illicit drug trafficking has resulted in
    increased interdiction of opiates in various forms, reducing this
    funding resource for the Taliban and other insurgent and criminal
    groups.
        Transregional threats like ISIS and transnational organized crime
    like drug cartels are demanding greater levels of coordination and
    collaboration from their--including operational planning, resource
    requirements, and information sharing. Effectively disrupting ISIS and
    other threat forces, requires all tools of U.S. national power,
    including diplomatic, intelligence, military, economic, financial,
    information, and law enforcement capabilities. The innovations the
    special operations enterprise has built to defeat adaptive threat
    networks are informing emerging concepts of unconventional and
    conventional warfare alike. In this way, SOF leads in Department-wide
    innovation, fielding, and optimizing emerging technologies and theories
    of warfighting.
               win the current fight and defeat emerging threats
        We must win the protracted fight against terrorist organizations
    and their enabling networks in order to protect our Homeland, our
    citizens, and support our allies and partners. This will require a
    long-term strategic approach to support the U.S. Government and
    international partnerships. Within this DOD strategy, SOF contributes
    its unique capabilities to combat terrorists, disrupt adversary
    networks, discredit extremist ideologies, and diminish those factors
    that contribute to recruitment and radicalization. Sustained funding
    and flexible legislative authorities will continue to be instrumental
    in the defeat of priority terrorist organizations like ISIS and al
    Qaeda.
        In light of U.S. conventional dominance, adversary powers are
    increasingly turning toward unconventional warfare to pursue their
    objectives. State sponsors of unconventional warfare, such as Russia,
    China, and Iran, have doctrinally linked conventional, warfare, and
    cyber warfare, information operations, clandestine, criminal, and other
    activities to undermine United States and allied national security
    objectives, particularly in ways and places that fall below thresholds
    conventional U.S. Government or international response. Our special
    operations forces are exploring the capabilities and authorities
    required to defeat these challenges to our influence and our interests.
        At the same time, I want to thank the committee for establishing
    section 127e--formerly known as section 1208--as a permanent authority.
    The maturation of this program has provided our warfighters a powerful
    tool to employ to support our allies and confront our enemies and is a
    great example of strong congressional support and oversight.
        Congressional support for countering threat finance (CTF) and
    transnational organized crime is crucial to both of these efforts.
    Terrorist, insurgents, and other threat networks depend upon illicit
    revenue streams and criminal facilitators for logistical support, money
    laundering, or the procurement of weapons and fraudulent documents.
    These activities often involve both state and non-state actors in
    spaces between traditional war and peace. As the global synchronizer
    for DOD counter-threat finance, USSOCOM is uniquely positioned to
    synchronize efforts across the geographic combatant commands to disrupt
    the threat finance systems of ISIS, as well as other illicit networks.
    USSOCOM works alongside the National Guard Bureau and USG [United
    States Government] components in CTF teams in each GCC [Gulf
    Cooperation Council]. Together, they provide essential support to
    military operations and to interagency law enforcement partners. The
    CTF teams analyze financial intelligence, integrate intelligence and
    operations, and coordinate and execute CTF activities. Countering
    threat finances disrupts and weakens terrorist and criminal adversaries
    in ways and places that traditional military weapons typically cannot
    reach. This capability is valuable across the full spectrum of
    conflict, including irregular and unconventional warfare. These efforts
    have enabled action against drug trafficking and other illicit
    networks, as emerging counter-network doctrine and technologies help
    unmask dark networks that threaten our national security. CTF efforts
    have proven to be a cost-effective tool to impact threatening forces
    and transnational criminal organizations, whether through law
    enforcement actions, designations, sanctions, or--as in the case of
    ISIS--through military actions against economic and financial targets.
        The unique skills, culture, and capabilities underpinning SOF's
    success against these dark networks enable the command to serve as
    synchronizer against complex problem sets. As with CTF, this expertise
    underwrites the recent transfer of the counter-WMD mission set, which
    USSOCOM recently inherited as a result of changes in the Unified
    Command Plan.
     transform the enterprise: building on the foundations of section 922
                                  authorities
        We appreciate the committee's support in codifying the
    responsibilities of the ASD (SO/LIC) to provide oversight and advocacy
    for SOF. As our force continues to adapt to meet the enduring challenge
    of global campaigns against global threats, we find ourselves at an
    institutional crossroads. SOF has made dramatic advances during wartime
    in response to urgent battlefield demands, gains that require an
    institutional foundation to endure. SOLIC has completed a preliminary
    analysis of previous and newly assigned functions and activities to
    determine where there are gaps and associated risk. Currently SOLIC is
    reviewing whether these functions are directed by law or directed by
    Department guidance in order to make recommendations to our senior
    leaders on the divestiture of non-legally binding responsibilities. In
    overseeing SOF acquisitions, technology, logistics, personnel,
    readiness, and talent management functions, SOLIC will be positioned to
    institutionalize these hard-learned lessons of contemporary conflicts.
    The ``Service-secretary-like'' authorities in section 922 serve as a
    strategic linchpin, ensuring that we lock in these hard-won gains.
        The fiscal year 2017 NDAA codified the Special Operations Policy
    Oversight Council, which we have used over the past year to resolve
    Department-wide SOF-related issues, such as base infrastructure. We are
    already serving in a `Service-secretary-like' role in approving waivers
    for mission-essential positions under the current civilian hiring
    freeze. We now sit alongside our colleagues from USSOCOM at budgeting
    and programming Deputy Management Action Group meetings. Our office is
    currently implementing the full scope of these far-reaching
    authorities, even as we benchmark concepts from these initial gains. By
    leveraging existing Service processes and relationships, we aim to
    minimize administrative burden and focus on architecture building and
    strategic awareness. Ultimately, we intend to leverage these gains for
    implementation across the entire force.
               honing the edge of sof personnel and capabilities
        A key part of ASD(SO/LIC)'s role is to leverage our elite force to
    advance state of the art concepts, technologies, and strategies for
    both humans and hardware. For our operators, we strive to improve
    mental and physical performance on the battlefield and to take care of
    them and their families at home. For hardware, our investments in
    technologies and our policy advocacy for special operations
    capabilities give our SOF the tools they need to get the mission done.
        The Countering Terrorism Technical Support Office (CTTSO) develops
    cutting edge technologies for SOF, the interagency, and law
    enforcement. For instance, we are exploring deep learning and big data
    analytics to sharpen strategies for outcompeting our adversaries. We
    are also investing in better technologies to analyze and present fused
    information to the warfighter. CTTSO's ability to leverage
    crowdsourcing pathways has helped field data tools that support
    operational preparation of the environment in ways we never thought
    possible. The versatility of these tools allows small tactical units to
    conduct a broad spectrum of military, special warfare, and cyber
    operations. Because the CTTSO model is inherently collaborative, these
    gains are leveraged across the interagency, as well as with
    international, state, and local governmental partners.
        The first SOF Truth states that ``humans are more important than
    hardware.'' Therefore, as we provide agile and innovative capabilities
    in support of high-priority U.S. national objectives, we must also
    continue to build and sustain an elite workforce suited to the unique
    and diverse demands of 21st Century warfare. SOF has borne the weight
    of grueling deployments and protracted overseas contingency operations
    over the course of the last decade, and we have accordingly turned our
    culture of innovation toward fostering and protecting our people.
                                   conclusion
        As we look back at the last thirty years, we note that SOF has
    consistently remained at the leading edge of global megatrends. This
    past year has been no exception. We have diligently leveraged your
    investment by deriving key concepts for the larger force from that
    experience. The small portion of the budget that supports our nation's
    SOF provides a tremendous return on investment. We are applying your
    support and oversight to institutionalize a decade and a half of hard-
    earned warfighting lessons and advances the goal of a joint SOF
    enterprise. With these authorities, we will continue to evolve how we
    man, train, and equip our force in order to: win the current fight and
    defeat emerging threats; transform the special operations enterprise;
    and hone the edge of SOF. We will continue to work closely with
    Congress to ensure we have the right policies, agile authorities, and
    enhanced oversight structure in place to employ SOF effectively.
        I thank Congress for its continuing support of our men and women in
    uniform and their families, and look forward to your questions.

        Chairman McCain. General Thomas?

      STATEMENT OF GENERAL RAYMOND A. THOMAS III, USA, COMMANDER,
                UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

        General Thomas. Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and
    distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
    opportunity to appear before you today. I am especially
    grateful to be here today with Principal Deputy Assistant
    Secretary Whelan in a session dedicated exclusively to special
    operations as it provides us the opportunity to discuss in
    detail the unique requirements, capabilities, and challenges
    associated with your United States Special Operations Command.
        This body legislated us into existence a little over 30
    years ago to act as a unique Department of Defense
    organization, a dual-hatted, service-like entity responsible
    for the manning, training, and equipping of special operations
    forces, as well as a globally focused, functional combatant
    command.
        In fulfilling the first role, which continues to be our
    primary function, I believe we have consistently provided the
    world's best special operations forces to the geographic
    combatant commanders. However, it is in the second role, as a
    globally focused combatant command, where SOCOM has evolved the
    most.
        As we carry out both of these roles today, special
    operations forces are more relevant than ever to the current
    and enduring threats facing our Nation. We have been at the
    forefront of national security operations for the past three
    decades, to include continuous combat over the past 15.5 years.
    This is historic period has been the backdrop for some of our
    greatest successes, as well as the source of our greatest
    challenge, which is the sustained readiness of this magnificent
    force.
        We are thankful for the resources you have provided not
    only to operate this force but also to perform the critical
    sustainment efforts that underpin our most precious resource--
    our people.
        Last month was particularly difficult for the United States
    Special Operations Command, losing its 407th hero, Staff
    Sergeant De Alencar, a father of five, in a firefight in the
    Nangarhar Province of Afghanistan while operating alongside his
    Afghan partners. Then last week, we lost Ranger Sergeants
    Thomas and Rogers, our 408th and 409th casualties,
    respectively.
        This comes on the heels of 16 other combat fatalities since
    I assumed command a year ago. It is a stark reminder that we
    are a command at war and will remain so for the foreseeable
    future.
        My current priorities for the command fall into three broad
    categories. First, we must win the current fight, which
    consists of carrying out assigned missions running the gamut
    from defeating Islamic extremism, both Sunni and Shia, to
    countering Russian aggression, to preparing for contingencies
    in Korea, as well as various security operations to defend the
    Homeland. Second, we must continue to transform our enterprise
    to remain relevant in the rapidly changing security
    environment. Finally, we must take care of our people and their
    families as they form the foundation upon which our force is
    built.
        My first year in command has seen us focused on these
    priorities as we transform the way the Department of Defense
    looks at many of the national military strategy challenges in
    our role as the coordinating authority for countering
    transregional threats. More recently, we have also poured
    significant resources into defining our role as the
    Department's synchronizer for countering weapons of mass
    destruction.
        Both of these substantive roles are additive to the current
    missions, where approximately 8,000 special operations forces
    are deployed in over 80 countries, working with international,
    interagency, and DOD [Department of Defense] partners in
    support of the geographic combatant commanders' priorities.
        This focus is also occurring during a period of
    unprecedented recapitalization of substantive parts of our
    warfighting capability, to include the conversion of our entire
    C-130 fleet to J model C-130s, as well as other major
    platforms. We are extremely thankful to the services for
    enabling this transformation of the force, as it sets us on the
    path for success for decades to come.
        We are equally grateful for the support of Congress for the
    required resourcing that, in turn, has produced a SOCOM which
    is relevant to all the current and enduring threats facing the
    Nation. We appreciate your continued oversight and advocacy for
    your United States Special Operations Command, and I look
    forward to your questions today.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of General Thomas follows:]

              Prepared Statement by General Raymond A. Thomas, III
                                opening remarks
        Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you
    for the opportunity to address you today as the 11th Commander of
    United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). This is my first
    address on the posture of U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF). Even in
    the short span of my first year in command we've seen the world evolve
    in complexity and the desire for SOF continue to increase. While
    challenges endure, and new ones emerge our force continues to evolve in
    the attempt to present options and decision space for our national
    leadership. During my remarks, I would like to highlight the breadth of
    missions where SOF is integral to the support of the current National
    Military Strategy (NMS), as well as how we are adapting to future
    challenges and transforming our capabilities. It goes without saying
    that None of this is possible without the professionalism, talent, and
    innovative problem solving capabilities of our most precious asset, our
    people, the decisive edge, who constitute the greatest Special
    Operations Force in history.
                         the formative evolution of sof
        Last month we celebrated the 30th Anniversary of the creation of
    USSOCOM as a result of The Goldwater-Nichols Act and the Nunn-Cohen
    Amendment--prescient pieces of legislation that created U.S. Special
    Operations Command from an ad hoc, individual service-based
    confederation of capability to become both a highly effective service-
    like entity and an extraordinarily collaborative and effectively
    networked global functional Combatant Command. USSOCOM's service-like
    responsibilities continue to be the command's primary focus providing
    the world's best SOF to the Geographic Combatant Commanders. We look
    forward to working closely with the Assistant Secretary of Defense/
    Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict's (ASD/SOLIC) assigned
    role in our chain of command in the title 10 role of manning, training,
    and equipping the force.
        USSOCOM has evolved enormously since its inception. Rather than a
    mere ``break-glass-in-case-of-war'' force, we are now proactively
    engaged across the ``battle space'' of the Geographic Combatant
    Commands (GCCs), providing key integrating and enabling capabilities to
    support their campaigns and operations. We operate and fight in every
    corner of the world as an integrated joint, combined and interagency
    force. Today, there are approximately 56,000 Active Duty, 7,400
    Reserve, Guard, and 6,600 civilian personnel across the SOF enterprise.
    On a daily basis, we sustain a deployed or forward stationed force of
    approximately 8,000 across 80-plus countries. They are conducting the
    entire range of SOF missions in both combat and non-combat situations
    with a wide variety of Joint, Interagency, International, and Multi-
    national partners.
        We have recently taken on a number of new roles intended to
    leverage our global perspective on problems, and focus our unique
    capabilities in support of not only the GCCs, but also the Department
    of Defense (the Department) as a whole. First, we are the designated
    coordinating authority for trans-regional terrorist organizations and
    other threat networks. Acting in support of the Chairman and the
    Secretary of Defense, our responsibility in this role is to provide a
    coherent global framework for action and synthesize the perspectives
    and inputs of the Geographic Combatant Commanders into a single
    comprehensive military assessment of DOD's global counter-terrorism
    efforts. This assists the combatant commands, the Chairman, and the
    Secretary in understanding and prioritizing efforts to counter violent
    extremist networks that operate across GCC boundaries in pursuit of a
    coherent and effective campaign.
        To date, our team's combined quarterly assessments, supported by
    productive dialogue with our mission partners and the integration of
    dozens of other assessments conducted by combatant commands, combat
    support agencies, and specialized task forces, have led to specific
    recommendations for the conduct of the Counter-Violent Extremist
    Organization effort. Specifically, we have identified the necessity to
    understand and address the underlying infrastructure that terrorist
    organizations use to generate and sustain their ``combat power,''
    especially their enablers which include foreign fighters, financing and
    strategic communications. We have galvanized international and
    interagency focus on the effort in the form of Operation Gallant
    Phoenix, a SOF-led activity, designed to empower, support and integrate
    the efforts of our international (currently 19 foreign members with
    several others in the queue), interagency, and Joint Force partners to
    disrupt trans-regional terrorist networks and their ability to develop
    and field foreign fighters. Through information sharing, our partners
    support security and law enforcement actions against these networks,
    and inform decision makers on border security, identification of legal
    remedies and tools, and the structuring of counter-messaging campaigns.
        Our second new responsibility is the assumption of the Countering
    Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) synchronization mission for the
    Department of Defense, recently transferred from USSTRATCOM. In this
    role, we are responsible for maintaining the DOD CWMD Campaign,
    establishing intelligence priorities, monitoring global operations and
    conducting assessments. We are publishing a new Global Campaign Plan to
    provide a comprehensive, trans-regional approach which integrates
    ongoing regional and interagency efforts. We have also established a
    CWMD Coordination Center to design, execute and assess this new trans-
    regional approach and connect to other USG Departments and Agencies, as
    well as international partners. The Center leverages the resources and
    skills of multiple agencies that will result in a multi-layered
    comprehensive approach to address the CWMD problem set. In coordination
    with the Geographic Combatant Commands, we will conduct this campaign
    attempting to focus more intently on the transregional nature of
    identified portions of the CWMD challenge and assess effectiveness
    towards national objectives, while providing resourcing and strategic
    recommendations to the Chairman and Secretary.
        While the Department is addressing our stated requirements, USSOCOM
    has already implemented temporary manning strategies to mitigate risk
    as we transfer funding and manpower, hire new personnel, and build a
    network of partners. We have an established counter-terrorism (CT)
    network and a committed partner in the Defense Threat Reduction Agency
    to assist us as we move into this mission space. We are no stranger to
    adapting and building our network, and we have embraced this mission as
    we do all others--bringing focus and energy to some of the nation's
    most complex challenges.
        While we have evolved and now field an unmatched capability to
    conduct counter-terrorism operations with our partners and execute a
    select set of niche missions in support of the Joint Force, this
    expertise is not necessarily tailored to compete with near-peer
    competitors. We are focused on transformation as rapidly as possible
    across a broad range of mission capabilities.
                   sof in today's competitions and conflicts
        The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff identified five current
    and enduring threats in the new National Military Strategy (NMS):
    Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs), Russia, Iran, North Korea, and
    China. Although constituting only 2 percent of the Department's budget
    and about 2 percent of its manpower, as a Combatant Command with global
    responsibilities, USSOCOM plays a critical role in the campaigns
    against each of these. While not a panacea nor a stand-alone solution,
    SOF produces substantive results at low cost, and with a potentially
    low profile / signature. However, none of the challenges can be
    effectively dealt with in isolation as they are interrelated and cut
    across GCC boundaries. USSOCOM is striving to be part of our whole-of-
    government efforts to face these threats.
        Violent Extremist Organizations. The threat posed by VEOs remains
    the highest priority for USSOCOM in both focus and effort. Special
    Operations Forces are the main effort, or major supporting effort for
    United States VEO-focused operations in Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq,
    Yemen, Somalia, Libya, across the Sahel of Africa, the Philippines, and
    Central/South America--essentially, everywhere al Qaeda (AQ) and the
    Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) are to be found. Our priorities
    are disrupting external attack capability, destroying/neutralizing AQ
    and ISIS, developing a long-term approach to defeat and/or counter
    VEOs, and building partner capacity--helping our partners stabilize
    their environment and secure gains. SOF are also engaged in countering
    aggressive Iranian behavior that not only destabilizes the Middle East,
    but also, stokes sectarianism. SOF activities are in support of the
    GCCs' efforts toward a strengthened deterrence posture, targeted
    counter-messaging activities, and building partner nations' capacity.
        This methodology is more comprehensive than simple counter-
    terrorism, and is an important part of an overarching whole-of-
    government approach to advance broader national security objectives.
    Organizations such as ISIS and AQ are trans-regional threats that
    require the Joint Force to work with partners across the U.S.
    Government as well as coalition partners. It requires focused effort to
    secure and hold our gains by empowering local entities within and among
    the populations that terrorists exploit. As we move forward in our
    coordinating authority role within DOD, we are committed to further
    developing this comprehensive approach to support the U.S. military's
    integration across the range of activities that like-minded
    organizations are pursuing. In this vein, we appreciate the NDAA
    mandate to expand the role of the State Department's Global Engagement
    Center, with whom we work, which provides critical counter messaging
    against state and non-state actors--a key to ultimately defeating
    organizations such as ISIS.
        Russia. Our second priority in terms of resources and impact is
    supporting United States European Command (USEUCOM) in countering
    Russian aggression in Europe. As Secretary Mattis pointed out, Russia
    is seeking control over the economic, diplomatic, and security
    decisions of its neighbors. Further, Russia has reemerged as a
    strategic competitor of the United States around the globe. This trend
    is most pronounced in the post-Soviet space, where Russia has shown
    itself as willing to act aggressively to limit United States and
    Western institutions there. They are particularly adept at leveraging
    unconventional approaches to advancing their interests and it is clear
    they are pursuing a wide range of audacious approaches to competition--
    SOF often present a very natural unconventional response. USEUCOM is
    responding by using European Reassurance Initiative funding to deter
    Russia and reassure Allies, including by working with NATO to build
    more effective defense institutions in partner nations. In support of
    this, we have had persistent SOF presence for over 2 years in nearly
    every European country on Russia's western border (Baltics, Poland,
    Romania, Ukraine, Georgia)--assuring our allies and partners while
    building host nation and NATO capabilities to compete short of conflict
    in a hybrid environment. Our current focus consists of assuring our
    allies through building partner capacity efforts to counter and resist
    various types of Russian aggression, as well as enhance their
    resilience. We are working relentlessly with our partners and the
    Department of State to build potency in eastern and northern Europe to
    counter Russia's approach to unconventional warfare, including
    developing mature and sustainable Special Operations capabilities
    across the region. In support of GEN Scaparrotti, we will continue to
    refine our SOF posture to strengthen these partnerships in order to
    deter or respond to aggression in the region, as well as reassure our
    allies and contribute to a broader deterrent effect.
        North Korea. USSOCOM has recently focused more intently on the
    emerging threat that is of growing concern to us as well as most of our
    DOD teammates--the nuclear threat of an increasingly rogue North Korea.
    Although previously viewed as a regional threat, North Korea's
    relentless pursuit of nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic
    missiles, facilitated by a trans-regional network of commercial,
    military, and political connections, make it a threat with global
    implications. In response, United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) and
    United States Forces-Korea (USFK) are focused on sustaining credible
    combat power in the region, maintaining unrelenting resolve in the face
    of multiple provocations, and sustaining partnerships with our closest
    allies. We maintain a persistent and rotational presence on the
    peninsula, working with our increasingly capable South Korean partners
    to prepare for future crises. In the meantime, we are actively pursuing
    a training path to ensure readiness for the entire range of contingency
    operations in which SOF, to include our exquisite CWMD capabilities,
    may play a critical role. As previously noted, we are looking
    comprehensively at our force structure and capabilities on the
    peninsula and across the region to maximize our support to USPACOM and
    USFK. This is my warfighting priority for planning and support.
        Iran. Iran uses both traditional state-based military capabilities
    and a network of terrorist, sub-state, and non-state partners to
    conduct operations, actions, and activities that incite violence and
    threaten U.S. security interests. It relies on militias and a range of
    partner organizations to expand its influence and develop access to key
    areas. SOF activities are in support of CENTCOM's efforts toward a
    strengthened deterrence posture, targeted counter-messaging activities,
    and building partner nations' capacity. Our priority remains
    illuminating this Iranian network in order to understand its
    capabilities as it seeks to expand its influence. We also support and
    assure Israel and regional Gulf partners with foreign internal defense
    and security force assistance, aiding their efforts to counter Iranian
    threats.
        China. China is pursuing a long-term, comprehensive military
    modernization program designed to improve its armed forces' capability
    to fight short duration, high intensity regional conflicts. China is
    intent upon expanding its regional and global influence, while
    developing capabilities to limit our ability to project power in the
    Pacific. SOF actions support USPACOM's efforts to focus on building
    military-to-military relations with China, focused on risk reduction.
    At the same time, we maintain persistent SOF presence in over a dozen
    countries in the USPACOM AOR [Area of Responsibility]--assuring our
    allies and building partner capabilities to address complex threats.
    The SOF community has worked to connect experts across the region, and
    between regions, to share lessons learned that provide opportunities to
    help our partners grow more effectively.
        Other Challenges. Although the five NMS threats are the priority
    challenges for DOD, we remain focused on other parts of the world in
    terms of presence and engagement. The USSOUTHCOM Commander recently
    testified that aspects of the NMS-specified threats in the Southern
    Hemisphere are likely to become security challenges to the U.S.
    Homeland itself. Four out of the five named challenges are active in
    this region. To help mitigate these challenges, USSOUTHCOM's lines of
    effort are focused on countering threat networks, preparing for and
    responding to disasters and crises, and building relationships to meet
    global challenges. SOF are actively supporting Interagency efforts that
    range from counter-threat financing, for which USSOCOM is the DOD lead,
    to counter-terrorism. We will continue to assure allies and support
    efforts to counter malign activities in Latin America while working to
    undermine transnational criminal networks. We have learned that the
    best way to deal with competition short of conflict is to match the
    range of tools we have at our disposal to the needs of the Ambassadors
    and GCCs. We recently hosted a Senior Leader Seminar focused on special
    interest aliens that involved representatives from USNORTHCOM,
    USSOUTHCOM, Secretary Kelly from the Department of Homeland Security
    (DHS), other members of the IA, and various South and Central American
    Country Teams. We enjoy tremendous collaborative efforts as part of the
    team that provides layered security relative to our southern border and
    beyond.
                               the sof advantage
        USSOCOM provides a focused set of unique capabilities to deal with
    the challenges facing our Department and Nation today. Maintaining a
    forward presence in strategically important areas, leveraging
    established relationships, and identifying and addressing problems
    before they become full blown crises. Our ability to see, understand,
    and act across geographic boundaries is what allows SOF to operate
    globally at the speed of war, provide value to the GCCs, and provide
    options and decision space to national leadership. Additionally, we
    have increased the lethality, precision and mobility of our forces over
    time, which assists us in rapidly repositioning and focusing--providing
    enhanced options and effects.
        Although SOF are effective across the spectrum of conflict, we are
    most optimally employed ``left of bang''--pre-crisis. We believe that
    specialized application of SOF alongside partner nations, the Joint
    Force, and the Interagency conducting activities across the spectrum of
    conflict allows us to present options that best serve our national
    interests. In fact, a critical component of our effectiveness in the
    field is the ability to work with the Services, defense agencies, and
    interagency partners to support forward deployed forces. We have
    approximately 30,000 personnel actively engaged in providing support to
    deployed units in the areas of intelligence collection and analysis;
    Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) operations; cyber
    operations; exploitation activities; and communications and logistics
    support.
                   transformation: the next evolution of sof
        While we are fully committed to winning the current fight, we are
    simultaneously working to prepare for the conflicts of tomorrow. We are
    always searching for improvements and relentlessly pursuing our next
    advantage. Key to this effort is USSOCOM's approach to requirements
    validation and acquisition, which allows us to rapidly field resources
    to those forces actively engaged in the fight. We appreciate Congress'
    continued resourcing of these efforts--I assure you we will continue to
    maximize the return on that investment.
        Our current budget supports recapitalizing our platforms as well as
    developing our technological capabilities for dealing with near-peer
    competitors and competition short of armed conflict. Programmatically,
    we remain focused on enhancing Service-provided platforms with Major
    Force Program-11 funds to provide for the unique needs of our force. As
    always, the effectiveness of our investments is highly dependent upon
    the investment decisions of the Services.
        A good example is seen in the success of our critical AC/MC-130J
    aircraft re-capitalization efforts, which include Radio Frequency
    Countermeasures, Terrain Following Radar, Airborne Mission Networking
    and Precision Strike Packages. We have taken delivery of 10 new AC-130J
    Ghostriders and remain on track to declare Initial Operational
    Capability by the end of 2017. In our legacy Gunship fleet, we fielded
    eight up-gunned AC-130W Stinger IIs with 105mm large caliber guns and
    immediately deployed this enhanced capability to the fight in Syria and
    Iraq.
        To improve our intelligence and analysis capabilities, we have
    distributed acquisition efforts across the air, ground and maritime
    domains--particularly for those systems and platforms that support
    operations in remote locations. We are developing and fielding
    interoperable, networked sensors built to enable common operational and
    intelligence pictures as well as feed data into all-source analysis
    tools. This further assists us in leveraging interagency partnerships.
        As previously noted, our effectiveness over the last 15 years does
    not necessarily equate to success against near-peer competitors. We
    also require urgent investments in capabilities necessary for denied
    battlefields of the future. This includes submersibles, terrain
    following / avoidance and all-weather radar, advanced electronic attack
    capabilities, countermeasures, and precision munitions. We must enhance
    our effectiveness in partnership with the services. For example, we
    look forward to continuing work with the Department of the Navy to
    develop and enhance new options to support undersea operations--a key
    SOF capability. This is not a one way relationship. Recently the Army
    leveraged the efforts of our AT&L directorate to determine their future
    ground mobility vehicle. We continue to refine both our tactics and
    technological developments to enhance our man hunting and network
    defeat capabilities.
        To integrate the advantages of rapidly evolving technology, we are
    making investments that will pay dividends for future mission sets. For
    example, ``deep / machine learning'' will help us mitigate thousands of
    man-hours spent on sorting through vast sums of data. The analysis of
    publically available information; the processing, exploitation, and
    dissemination of information, specifically, ISR data; and sensitive
    site exploitation, are all wide-open areas for the application of this
    technology. We are pursuing technology which can be applied to open
    architectures, enabling rapid upgrades and integration of commercial
    off-the-shelf capability to leverage the latest advancements in data
    analytics and machine learning.
        USSOCOM continues to build networks and venues that support
    innovation in our research, development, and acquisition programs.
    These networks include industry, academia, and other government
    organizations. The command also continues to support agile acquisition
    with appropriate venues, including SOFWERX--our open collaboration
    facility that has now been in operation for over a year and has
    successfully brought hundreds of non-traditional partners together to
    work on our most challenging problems.
        A key part of the unique capabilities that SOF bring to the fight
    is the ability to fight in contested areas, often leveraging and
    enhancing the capabilities of indigenous partner forces. Accordingly,
    we continue to invest in ways that allow SOF to assist our partners
    better: command and control; ISR; Building Partner Capacity (BPC); and
    Aviation Foreign Internal Defense. The emphasis for all partner
    capabilities is on systems and infrastructure which is organically
    sustainable. An enhanced ability to leverage local relationships will
    ultimately help us better influence regional outcomes.
        We also continue to invest in safeguarding our networks and
    communication infrastructure. USSOCOM has a unique service-like
    responsibility to provide all of SOF with networks and communications
    capability through the SOF Information Environment (SIE). The Global
    Enterprise Operations Center (GEOC) located at USSOCOM HQ manages
    network operations for over 70,000 SOFNET users around the world, to
    include over 1,200 deployed nodes. The ability to share information
    across our network--from the unit deployed forward to the USSOCOM
    Headquarters--provides us with a key advantage in dealing with the
    information-rich environment we find ourselves in today. Defending the
    SIE requires sustained investment for cyber defense sensors and tools.
        A continuing key area of concern for SOCOM (cited over our last
    five years of testimony) is our reliance on Overseas Contingency
    Operations funding, or OCO. Since 9/11, we expanded the size of our
    force by almost 75 percent in order to take on mission-sets that are
    likely to endure. OCO underwrites much of that growth, which remains
    critical to ensuring SOF readiness. OCO represents about 28 percent of
    our fiscal year 2017 budget--triple the rate of OCO reliance among the
    Services. Approximately 90 percent of USSOCOM's OCO funds enduring
    capabilities, which are applicable to the threats beyond the current
    combat environment. Ultimately, we must reconcile the nature of SOF's
    work, which requires enduring structure and capabilities, with the
    relatively temporary funding achieved through OCO. Migrating this
    funding to the base budget over time will provide SOF a degree of
    certainty in tomorrow's turbulent security environment that enables us
    to better program for, train, and equip our joint force.
                             the sustainment of sof
        Our people are our single greatest resource. The goal continues to
    be to recruit, assess, and select the very best, providing them the
    requisite training and experience, empowering them to exercise their
    initiative and problem solving abilities, while managing them over a
    potential career in SOF. This is underpinned by an ethos and process to
    build in resiliency and provide the best possible care system for
    servicemembers and their families.
        It is critical that SOF preserves its high state of full-spectrum
    readiness in order to support enduring, priority tasks while
    maintaining the ability to surge in support of major contingencies.
    Healthy dwell rates and Personnel Tempo are essential here. Most SOF
    units are employed to their sustainable limit, while some are
    consistently under that goal. Despite growing demand for SOF, we must
    prioritize the sourcing of these demands as we face a rapidly changing
    security environment. As we work to support the GCCs in addressing the
    challenges they face, we are constantly on guard against overcommitting
    this relatively small force.
        Another key aspect of sustainment is our dependence on our Service
    and interagency partners. The Services provide the foundation upon
    which we build our force. This includes recruitment, acquisitions,
    intelligence, mobility, and logistics support--to name just a few. Many
    of the programs we have are based on Service investments and we often
    point out that a major shift in Service priorities will require a
    reassessment of our own. Our purchasing power and our readiness are
    inextricably linked. We will continue to work with all of the Services
    as well as Congress to ensure we preserve these foundations. In support
    of these efforts, we have scheduled annual war fighter talks with all
    of the Services, as well as key interagency partners (DIA, NSA, NGA,
    CIA), to integrate our approach to developing and resourcing the force.
        Our interoperability with the Services also extends to the
    operations we conduct. Today we support the Joint Force in countering
    ISIS in Syria and Iraq, in Afghanistan, and elsewhere around the world.
    Examples of our interoperability occur every day, most recently in
    Sirte, Libya, where Special Operators assisted Libyan forces in re-
    taking the city relying heavily on over 450 airstrikes conducted by our
    Joint Force partners. Similar relationships are routine throughout all
    areas of active hostility, such as with the 5th Fleet in the CENTCOM
    AOR and multiple service and IA partners in the Philippines, where our
    SOF Headquarters ensure we remain closely nested with theater service
    components as an integral component of the Joint Force. Today we are
    more than simply interoperable with the Services . . . we are truly
    interdependent.
        We are also highly dependent on the capabilities that reside within
    the defense agencies, such as the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA),
    the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), the Defense Information Systems
    Agency (DISA) and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). With
    improvised threats, we continue to see examples of our adversaries
    taking commercial off-the-shelf technologies and manipulating and
    employing them as weapons as well as surveillance systems, such as
    small Unmanned Aerial Systems (sUAS). The recent integration of Joint
    Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization (JIDO) with DTRA provides us with
    an expanded ability to counter the improvised threats confronting our
    force today.
        We invest heavily in developing relationships with our interagency
    partners, as well, such as the Department of State, the Central
    Intelligence Agency, the National Counter Terrorism Center, and others.
    In total, we have 36 Special Operations liaison officers working across
    16 agencies. This is indicative of the importance we place on whole-of-
    government solutions to the problems we all share--integrated efforts
    being the objective.
        Operational requirements demand that we recruit, assess and select
    mentally and physically resilient SOF who can anticipate, respond, and
    adapt to any operating environment; excel in ambiguous situations; and
    are skilled at operating in the human domain in order to deal with
    population-centric conflicts. In addition to rigorous training, SOF
    require specialized education in areas related to our unique mission
    sets. SOF-specific education opportunities are an investment in our
    people and we will continue to augment Service-provided career
    development programs. A critical component to how we accomplish this is
    through the efforts of our Joint Special Operations University, or
    JSOU, which shapes the future strategic environment by not only
    providing specialized joint professional military education through
    specific undergraduate and graduate curriculum, but also through
    engagement with partner nations militaries. It is imperative we
    continue to provide the most highly trained and educated force to
    support persistent, networked, and distributed GCC operations to
    advance our nation's interests. Furthermore, it is critical that we
    continuously develop their talent by providing demanding, realistic
    training and placing people in the right jobs at the right times to
    gain valuable experience. In doing so, we empower our people while
    challenging them to exercise their initiative and make difficult
    decisions. Maintaining this highly trained and experienced force is the
    critical objective--it enables everything we do.
        Because USSOCOM is significantly engaged in current operations, we
    continue to incur casualties, along with training injuries and
    illnesses. Caring for over 6,000 Active Duty wounded and ill SOF
    Service Members, our Warrior Care program--a peer program to the
    Service Warrior Care programs--remains the gold standard for SOF
    Service Members and families whose resiliency has been challenged by a
    life-altering wound, injury, or illness. Recognized by Congress as one
    of USSOCOM's Service-like responsibilities, the USSOCOM Warrior Care
    Program (also known as the Care Coalition) executes our mission of
    returning wounded, ill, and injured SOF personnel to their units,
    maintaining their experience within the force and capitalizing on the
    immense investment of time and resources invested in them. The USSOCOM
    Warrior Care Program conserves its Service Members at rates higher than
    the conventional Service programs due to our focus on retention.
        The Preservation of the Force and Family (POTFF) initiative remains
    a command priority, and we are deeply grateful for Congress' support
    for the resources required to execute this effort. The POTFF program
    enables us to build in physical, psychological, spiritual, and social
    resilience in our servicemembers and their families to cope with the
    unique challenges of this demanding profession. The unique demands
    placed on SOF requires specialized attention to reduce injuries, speed
    recovery, and assure the overall well-being of our force. With your
    support, we've been able to place professional staff and equipment at
    our operational units where they have paid huge dividends in sustaining
    our warriors and their families. In partnership with academia, we are
    studying how we can continue to enhance the application of the POTFF's
    holistic approach to improve the effectiveness and sustainment of our
    force.
        Although the command has made progress in reducing suicides, we
    still have a great deal of work to do. Through our partnerships with
    the Services and academia, we are analyzing how to better predict and
    prevent suicidal behaviors. We recently completed an analysis of SOF
    suicides over the past four years and are using what we learned to
    inform our suicide prevention strategy going forward. We will improve
    suicide prevention training for our military members and their families
    by addressing the underlying cognitive processes that lead to suicides
    and providing enhanced screening of our military members.
        One consequence of our high PERSTEMPO is the challenge it creates
    for our families (over two-thirds of our force are married). Ensuring
    our families are cared for is a necessary component of our readiness
    posture. The Department of Defense as well as the Military Services
    have provided outstanding resources and support for USSOCOM families. I
    am also deeply appreciative of Congress's support in allowing the
    command to tailor family programs that are geared toward meeting the
    specific needs of our community. This support enabled the command to
    conduct pre and post-deployment programs, SOF unit orientations, and
    programs that enrich marital and parental relationships. This year we
    are using the pilot family program authority to develop suicide
    prevention training for families, given we have found that spouses are
    often the first to notice when their partners are struggling.
                                   conclusion
        In closing, I would like to emphasize my three priorities for SOCOM
    now and into the future. First, SOCOM is fully committed to winning the
    current and future fights. Second, we must transform our force to be
    prepared to deal with all future adversaries. Finally, we must continue
    to place the greatest emphasis on selecting, retaining, and empowering
    our people, and sustaining them and their families.
        I would like to thank you for your continued support of USSOCOM and
    our people. As we adapt to new roles and challenges, I look forward to
    sustaining an open dialogue with Congress on how we can work together
    to safeguard America's security interests.

        Chairman McCain. Thank you, General.
        General, how are the spending caps under the Budget Control
    Act impacting the readiness and capabilities of special
    operations forces?
        General Thomas. Chairman, that has been a consistent
    challenge over the last couple years as two of the things that
    we would endeavor to control in terms of predictability, and
    that is the deployment tempo and the resourcing of our force.
    Resourcing has not been very predictable over the last several
    years, and the potential for continued cuts undermines both our
    readiness and our modernization going forward.
        Chairman McCain. So what does that do to morale?
        General Thomas. Chairman, indirectly, I think, obviously,
    it affects the morale of our servicemembers who are concerned
    about the support of the Nation and this body.
        Chairman McCain. When it is not predictable as to where and
    when they will be required because of budget constraints. True?
        General Thomas. Chairman, it is true. Yes, there is a
    ripple.
        Chairman McCain. How can you plan, in this budgetary
    environment, when we lurch from crisis to crisis?
        I guess I am a little redundant here, but when I look at
    this map of where all of your people are, spread all over the
    world, it seems to me at least we owe them some kind of
    predictability.
        Let me ask, what is your assessment? Do you know when we
    will see an updated counter-ISIS strategy from the
    administration?
        General Thomas. Chairman, we are currently working on
    updating that strategy.
        Chairman McCain. What is your assessment of Russia's malign
    activities aimed at destabilizing Eastern Europe and our NATO
    allies?
        General Thomas. Chairman, as I think you know, we are
    supporting General Scaparrotti's efforts to both discern and
    determine the nature of Russian aggression, as well as to
    compete short of conflict in the various countries where it
    occurs.
        Chairman McCain. Have you seen the Russia malign activities
    increase, decrease, or stay the same?
        General Thomas. Chairman, I would assess they are a steady
    state of aggressive activities.
        Chairman McCain. How do you think we deter that?
        General Thomas. Chairman, I think by, with, and through our
    allies is the primary approach. I think we have great support
    and great opportunity there, and we are continuing to enhance
    that approach.
        Chairman McCain. Has the European Reassurance Initiative
    had a positive impact?
        General Thomas. It has, Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Do you think we are in a ``stalemate'' in
    Afghanistan, as General Nicholson testified before this
    committee, in light particularly of recent successful, at least
    in their view, Taliban attacks, including the killing of over
    100 Afghans at a base?
        General Thomas. Chairman, I am aware of General Nicholson's
    description of the current status of the fight as a stalemate.
    I recently returned from visiting Afghanistan where you know
    our special operations forces play a key role with our
    associated forces.
        It is, admittedly, a very tough fight, and we are beginning
    yet another fighting season. I would offer, though that, in
    terms of stalemate, the one objective we had for why we went
    there in the first place that we have accomplished over the
    last 15.5 years is the avoidance of another attack from that
    area. That certainly is an accomplishment and something that we
    need to reinforce going forward.
        Chairman McCain. But if you have a ``stalemate,'' that
    means that it does not end, doesn't it?
        General Thomas. Chairman, I understood the commander's
    assessment of stalemate as an opportunity to change the
    strategy.
        Chairman McCain. But that opportunity, if the present
    status quo prevails, then there is no end to it. In other
    words, what do you think needs to be done to end a stalemate?
        General Thomas. Chairman, I think that General Nicholson
    and the Secretary are pursuing new initiatives to----
        Chairman McCain. What do you think is needed, General
    Thomas?
        General Thomas. Chairman, we are integral to the discussion
    on what is needed going forward. Again, I am supporting the
    commander there, and supporting our Secretary of Defense in
    terms of the strategy----
        Chairman McCain. You know, you testified before this
    committee that you would give your opinion, if it is requested
    by this committee. I will ask you again. What do you think
    needs to be done in Afghanistan to end a stalemate?
        General Thomas. Chairman, I think the critical factor is
    the commitment, the commitment to some enduring state that has
    not been described effectively in the past. I think the new
    strategy is going to establish that definition of what----
        Chairman McCain. Does that mean, in your view, additional
    troops commitment?
        General Thomas. Chairman, additional troops are being
    considered, changes to the ROE [Rules of Engagement]----
        Chairman McCain. In your opinion, do you think it requires
    additional troops?
        General Thomas. Chairman, right now, I think we have an
    adequate number of my troops, special operations forces, on the
    ground.
        Chairman McCain. Of your troops, you think you have enough?
        General Thomas. I do.
        Chairman McCain. How often do your average individuals
    under your command serve overseas?
        General Thomas. Chairman, I believe what you are getting at
    is the deployment tempo for folks.
        Chairman McCain. Right.
        General Thomas. It varies across our force. In some cases,
    various parts of our force, various components are in a 1-to-
    1.2 worst-case deployment.
        Chairman McCain. Meaning how many months deployed versus
    how many months back in the United States?
        General Thomas. With that ratio I just described, they are
    about a 1-to-1, so 6 months or so deployed, if that is the
    rotation, 6 months back. That is the worst case. In the best
    case, we have been able to establish a balance of 1-to-3, so
    for every 6 months deployed----
        Chairman McCain. Isn't it a significant strain to have half
    your time deployed? Doesn't that put a lot of strain on the
    individuals and their families?
        General Thomas. Chairman, that worst case is actually less
    than the DOD's desired rate, and we are endeavoring to get that
    back in balance.
        Again, that is not our entire formation. That is only parts
    of our formation. But it is unsustainable, to your point.
        Chairman McCain. I thank you, General.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        To both Ms. Whelan and General Thomas, do you believe that
    both SOCOM and SOLIC have an adequate seat at the table when
    discussions are made about budget acquisition and other issues
    impacting your force, vis-a-vis the other services?
        Ms. Whelan?
        Ms. Whelan. Thanks for the question, Senator.
        Actually, I think that the recent language in the NDAA in
    section 922 has significantly improved the ability of ASD/SOLIC
    to gain a seat at the table. To that point, specifically, we
    recently used that language to justify getting a separate seat
    for ASD/SOLIC on the Deputy Secretary's management action
    group, which previously SOLIC did not have.
        We have also gained a separate seat for SOLIC on the Deputy
    Secretary's SAP [Special Access Program] Oversight Council.
    SOCOM has a number of special access programs that we
    previously had not been able to manage independently.
        Further, within the Department, we have established a tiger
    team to cross departmentwide in order to determine other areas
    in which ASD/SOLIC needs to gain additional authorities and
    abilities within the Department to represent SOCOM and have a
    seat at the table.
        One other recent accomplishment is I think we will have a
    seat for SOCOM in the upcoming defense strategy development
    process.
        Senator Reed. General Thomas, any comments?
        General Thomas. Senator, I would reinforce Theresa's
    points. We very much embrace the recent language that
    reinforces ASD/SOLIC's role as a service-like entity. We are
    well-represented at all of the appropriate venues.
        It sometimes takes reminding that we are unique in that
    case, because we are seen as either one or the other, and we
    sometimes have to remind folks that we are both, a service-like
    entity and a combatant command.
        But you have empowered us to be at the table for all those
    venues, and we are adequately represented. Thank you.
        Senator Reed. Secretary Whelan, are there any
    responsibilities you have that you feel might be more
    effectively and efficiently carried out by another entity? You
    have a broad range of responsibilities. Is there anything that
    should be repositioned?
        Ms. Whelan. Within ASD/SOLIC, I think that there is
    consistency, actually, across the portfolio in terms of the
    types of activities that the Assistant Secretary is responsible
    for. In terms of the Assistant Secretary's role in providing
    policy oversight, all of the activities that ASD/SOLIC has
    purview over are in some way related to either the employment
    of SOF forces or the environments in which SOF forces operate.
    Whether they be SOF MISO [Military Information Support
    Operations] capabilities, civil affair capabilities, foreign
    internal defense capabilities, training capabilities, and, of
    course, counterterrorism capabilities, the portfolio is
    consistent in that context.
        Senator Reed. My understanding, and correct me if I am
    inaccurate, is that you also have responsibility for
    information warfare?
        Ms. Whelan. Yes, Senator, information warfare does fall
    under the purview of ASD/SOLIC.
        Senator Reed. But you do not have responsibility for cyber
    operations. As we know, cyber operations and information
    warfare, on the other side, our adversaries seem to be one,
    merged together, with each day.
        Ms. Whelan. Correct, Senator. It is a seam. There are a lot
    of seams, as you all know, within our organizational structure,
    and it is difficult. If you eliminate one seam, you will create
    another. So it is kind of a difficult balance to strike.
        One of the things that we have done, though, is SOLIC
    recently put out a strategy for operating in the information
    environment. This strategy impacts the entire Department, to
    include the cyber warriors in the Department. So we have an
    integrated interdepartmental approach to implementing that
    strategy.
        Right now, we are going through a capabilities-based
    assessment of that strategy to determine where we have
    additional needs and where we have seams that we need to fix in
    order to operate effectively.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        Just a final and very quick question. As the Chairman has
    noted, we have threats that are not strictly counterterrorism
    today with this gray area of operations. Section 1208, which I
    think has been very useful, as you have described it, is
    focused more on counterterrorism. Is there anything we have to
    do to give you that same degree of authority with respect to
    these gray areas in unconventional warfare rather than
    counterterrorism?
        General Thomas, your comments?
        I have no time.
        General Thomas. Senator, we are actively pursuing both the
    authorities and the resources that would enable more enhanced
    unconventional warfare operations. Again, we are very
    appreciative of what 1208 does for us, and that is actually--I
    mean, it is very--kind of enthusiastic. Its similar authority,
    similar resourcing might be advantageous for the force and for
    the Nation for unconventional warfare purposes, and I look
    forward to having that continuing discussion with you and
    others.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Inhofe?
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I do want to pursue this a little bit, in terms of your
    response to the Chairman's question in terms of the adequacy of
    the force.
        But I want to first mention your activity in Africa, which
    really surprised me. I can remember when we first brought
    AFRICOM [Africa Command] along, and we started paying attention
    to what is going on over there, the potential threats there,
    the terrorism that is infiltrating the countries. So I know you
    have been active over there. I have talked to a lot of the
    African leaders. Very complimentary on some of the results that
    we are getting.
        This surprises me, because AFRICOM did not even come online
    until the first of 2008, and yet, if you go back to 2006, the
    deployments to Africa have increased by more than 1,600
    percent. It went from 1 percent to 17 percent in terms of
    deployments outside the United States. That is huge. That is a
    lot of increase in activity.
        In addition to combating terrorism and the expanding
    network of violent extremism organizations, General Thomas,
    what impact, what can you elaborate on, on your activities in
    Africa? It is an inordinate increase, in terms of percentage,
    when you realize that some 17 percent of all deployments are
    actually affecting Africa.
        General Thomas. Senator, I would actually attribute that to
    our adversaries' activities. The migration of ISIS and al Qaeda
    to Africa, to ungoverned spaces over the preceding decade has
    been palpable. You know the specific locations. I probably, in
    an open session, should not get into the details of where and
    what. But we have endeavored to move where they have tried to
    establish new provinces, new areas of influence, in support of
    General Waldhauser and AFRICOM.
        So that transition over time has really been driven by
    adversarial action. But I think the good news is that we have
    had the ability to move those locations and attempt to defeat
    and disrupt them where they try to reside.
        Senator Inhofe. I do not think anyone anticipated back in
    2008 or even in the years since then that the activity would
    increase as it has there, so I am interested in following
    through with that.
        On the idea of what you guys are in a position to handle
    right now, most of the deployed SOCOM forces, 55 percent, went
    to the Middle East. Next was Africa, that was 17 percent. Then
    Europe, 13 percent, and 9 percent.
        Now, when you look at the optempo that was involved over
    there, in your written testimony, you acknowledge that
    adversary powers are increasingly turning toward unconventional
    warfare to pursue their objectives.
        But maybe I misunderstood you when you responded to the
    question of the Chairman, that you are adequately staffed to
    carry on these functions. Is that not an accurate recollection
    I am having?
        General Thomas. Senator, we are adequately staffed to
    maintain the current tempo, the current distribution of special
    operations forces. It is a strain. It is certainly not an easy
    burden, but we are adequately resourced.
        Senator Inhofe. I am looking for the quote that we had.
    Yes, this would have been from the House committee yesterday. I
    cannot find it right now, but there were quotes that--here it
    is right here. You said most special operations forces units
    are employed to their sustainable limit.
        Now, to me, that seems a little inconsistent with being
    adequately staffed. You went on to talk about as or more
    challenged as a conventional force by the problem of suicide,
    other problems in the ranks that come with what I consider to
    be over-deployed.
        What are some of the problems that you are facing that give
    you the indication that maybe you are not adequately staffed?
        General Thomas. Senator, again, we can sustain the current
    rate of deployment. It is something we scrutinize every day.
        You mentioned, the Chairman mentioned early on, that there
    is a large demand signal from our geographic combatant
    commanders to do the things they have to do. As a service, one
    of our roles, we aim to meet their requirements. As a global
    combatant command, we also attempt to synchronize special
    operations activity to the greatest efficacy possible. I think
    we are doing that, to the degree we can.
        There are challenges on the force. You mentioned certainly
    some of the more dire symptoms. We address them directly every
    day. That is large focal point for us.
        I would have to thank all of you as well for providing us
    the tools that we did not have a decade ago to build in
    resiliency for our force in terms of our Preservation of the
    Force and Family, and also for our ability to care for our
    warriors in the event of mishaps, injuries, et cetera. We did
    not have that capability. You helped us gain it over time, and
    that is a critical part of how we sustain ourselves.
        Senator Inhofe. Well, as one member of this committee, I
    look at some of the results, some of the problems that you
    have, and I have to question as to whether or not it is
    adequately staffed.
        One short question, I know my time has expired, but you can
    do this for the record, if you like, Ms. Whelan, there is some
    confusion, as I mentioned to you earlier, in the words that you
    use when you are talking about adversary powers increasing,
    turning toward unconventional warfare. You said, ``exquisite
    integration across multiple components of not only the Defense
    Department, also the United States Government, as a key
    challenge to confronting growing threat.''
        You might, for the record, since my time has expired,
    elaborate a little bit on that. Would you do that?
        Ms. Whelan. Yes, Senator. We would be happy to.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Ms. Whelan. Our adversaries have specifically calibrated their
    model of unconventional warfare to exploit the seams in our interagency
    process. We must bridge seams among U.S. Government departments and
    agencies in ways that go beyond mere procedural coordination, and we
    must operate with a shared purpose. For classification reasons, I
    cannot fully describe the range of these cross-functional teams in this
    document. That said, we have convened experts from across DOD and other
    U.S. Government departments and agencies to understand our adversaries'
    strategy and operations. As we gain insight into one layer of the
    problem, we discover additional layers. After identifying the problem
    and understanding the environment, U.S. Government departments and
    agencies move to develop a solution. We have established new working
    groups to apply novel analytical capabilities, especially in the fields
    of information operations and indications and warning. We develop and
    test response options while drawing on history for operable models.
    Furthermore, many of the principles and structures developed during the
    long war against terror are applicable against other unconventional
    adversaries.

        Chairman McCain. Senator Hirono?
        Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to thank both of our witnesses for your service. In
    particular, I would like to thank the men and women that you
    lead in our armed services, both in the military and in the
    civilian side, and, of course, particularly the Special Ops
    Command in the Pacific arena who provide great support to the
    Asia-Pacific region.
        Secretary Whelan, guidelines for the use of force were
    established by President Obama in the 2013 Presidential Policy
    Guidance. The rules include the requirement for a ``near
    certainty'' that the terrorist target was present and that no
    civilians would be injured or killed.
        There is no legal requirement that President Obama's
    successors adhere to the same rules. President Trump has
    recently directed you to advise him on any recommended changes
    to the rules of engagement, and there were reports that there
    were a large number of civilian casualties after the raid in
    Yemen recently.
        Have the rules of engagement requirement of near certainty
    that no civilian casualties will result been modified for
    special ops missions?
        Ms. Whelan. Thanks for the question, Senator. Absolutely
    not.
        Senator Hirono. Are there differences in the steps a
    conventional force would take versus special operations to
    prevent collateral civilian loss of life during missions?
        Ms. Whelan. Senator, I will let General Thomas answer that
    question.
        Senator Hirono. General Thomas?
        General Thomas. Senator, no is the answer. We both adhere
    to the Law of Armed Conflict. There are different techniques in
    terms of how we develop targets, but the same absolute standard
    applies.
        Senator Hirono. So these rules of engagement that require
    near certainty that your target is there and that you will
    minimize collateral damage, that was applied in the Yemen case?
        Ms. Whelan. Yes, the rules of engagement were not changed
    for the Yemen case.
        Senator Hirono. Although there was a high number, we were
    told maybe 200 or so civilian casualties, that did not result
    in a review of what happened there?
        Ms. Whelan. There have been extensive reviews of what
    happened, after-action reports, and lessons learned, but the
    casualties were not a result of a change in the rules of
    engagement.
        Senator Hirono. What were they the result of?
        Ms. Whelan. They were a result of operational circumstances
    that the forces on the ground found themselves in.
        Senator Hirono. I see.
        General Thomas, in your testimony, you identify SOFWERX as
    a SOCOM initiative to support agile acquisition with
    appropriate venues. This is an open collaboration facility in
    Florida that has been in operation for over a year and has
    successfully brought hundreds of nontraditional partners
    together to work on your most challenging problems. I think
    that is a really good idea, although we have a lot of
    innovators and idea folks all over the country, also in Hawaii.
        How do you search for ideas, collaborators, and solutions
    outside of your SOFWERX construct?
        General Thomas. Senator, you actually teased out the bigger
    part of the problem. I have the luxury of commanding 70,000 of
    the best, most creative problem solvers in the world. How I
    marry them up with the absolute innovation that is everywhere
    in terms of industrial approaches is the real challenge.
        But SOFWERX is one way we are doing that, where we are
    compressing the space between academia, innovators,
    businessmen, and our operators in the pursuit of very specific
    problems. So you might imagine the whole gamut of issues that
    we are endeavoring to accomplish there that are enabling our
    force. But we are able to do that and go into rapid fielding
    and accelerated fielding of capabilities that enable our force.
        So a relatively new initiative, SOFWERX, about 1.5 years
    old, but also already paying some huge dividends for us.
        Senator Hirono. So based on your experience so far with
    SOFWERX, would you recommend that something like this, maybe a
    physical location for PACOM [Pacific Command] or other
    commands?
        General Thomas. Senator, the Defense Department is actually
    endeavoring to do this at a number of different locations.
    Secretary Carter certainly invested in the valley. There are
    other initiatives around the United States, tapping into the
    various laboratories and academic facilities.
        I cannot speak to where the Department is going in terms of
    the Pacific and where we might invest out there, but I am sure
    we are interested in wherever we can tap into that kind of
    innovative capability.
        Senator Hirono. I hope you all will take a look at
    spreading the opportunity around, because there are a lot of
    small businesses all over the country who could provide the
    kind of innovation that you are seeking.
        The Pentagon has acknowledged more than 100 United States
    special operation forces operating with Iraqi units in and
    around the Mosul with upwards of 600 more playing a support
    role in staging bases farther from the frontlines.
        This is for General Thomas. Can you comment on the
    seemingly ever-increasing use of special operation forces? Do
    you think we are relying too heavily on special ops?
        General Thomas. First and foremost, we are not a panacea.
    We are not the ultimate solution for every problem. You will
    not hear that coming from us. That has been misconstrued in
    some media circles. Everything we are doing is in concert with
    conventional forces, with our allies, completely integrated.
        I just visited Mosul. I was there about 3 weeks ago. Mosul
    was my hometown for 15 months, from 2007 to 2008, so I am very
    familiar with how daunting that challenge is.
        In that area, you have a mix of conventional forces. I met
    with a brigade commander from the Army who was there. We had
    our special operations forces and our forces all integrated
    with the Iraqis, who are doing the majority of the fighting and
    incurring most of the casualties there. So it is an absolute
    blend of all of our forces, and I think the right mix.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Wicker?
        Senator Wicker. Thank you both.
        Let's talk about collaboration with your international
    counterparts. Which one of you would like to discuss the extent
    to which we collaborate with our international allies? General?
        General Thomas. Senator, in a word, extensively. At almost
    every part of our formation, you will see where we are
    endeavoring to bring everyone in who has a part of the problem.
        I am very appreciative that the Director of National
    Intelligence has enabled us to crush through pre-existing
    prohibitions for information-sharing, probably one of the most
    powerful things that we have in this day and age, to be able to
    share exquisite information that the United States has that we
    may or may not be intent on acting on, but be able to share
    that with our allies and enable them to act.
        But that is at almost every point of our formation, where
    that level of collaboration is ongoing right now. So
    ``exquisite'' is the best way I can describe the extent of the
    collaboration, and getting better every day.
        Senator Wicker. Is there anything else you need in the next
    NDAA to help you there? Do you have what you need?
        General Thomas. Senator, I believe we certainly have no
    restrictions that I can mention to you nor that I can specify
    to right now. So we feel very enabled there.
        As I mentioned, the intelligence community is finding ways
    to enable us more every day, certainly with the concerns of
    safeguarding methods and sources and things like that, but with
    a lean toward sharing and collaborating more than we have ever
    done before.
        Senator Wicker. I understand you have a particularly strong
    relationship with our neighbors to the north in Canada.
        General Thomas. A phenomenal relationship, yes, Senator.
        Senator Wicker. What can you tell us in this non-classified
    setting about Exercise Vital Archer?
        General Thomas. Senator, hard to go into detail about that
    exercise, which we recently completed, as I think you know. But
    it is part of a cycle, if you will, to ensure our
    interoperability with our neighbors, with one of our greatest
    partners, for a very specific mission set that is of critical
    interest to both Canada and us.
        Senator Wicker. Let me shift then to special boats and say,
    first of all, that we in Mississippi are thankful and honored
    to have Special Boat Team 22 headquartered in our state.
        Would you describe the ways in which these special boat
    teams contribute to different missions?
        General Thomas. Senator, I recently had the privilege of
    running all over Stennis here about a month ago, and getting
    out on the water in some of those capabilities. They are
    integral to many of our activities around the globe. NAVSCIATTS
    [Naval Small Craft Instruction and Technical Training School],
    the institution that you have there as well, is also a critical
    enabler for many of our foreign allies.
        So, again, two phenomenal aspects of our portfolio that are
    important to everything that we are doing.
        Senator Wicker. We are continuing to do a lot of
    significant work in riverine environments.
        General Thomas. Where it applies, Senator, we certainly
    have that capability, and we continue to improve it.
        Senator Wicker. Where does that apply?
        General Thomas. Senator, on several locations around the
    globe that probably would be best to address in a closed
    hearing.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        General Thomas. WARCOM maintains a 1.0 Riverine detachment
    capability. Each detachment consists of 2 x SOC-R Boats and 15
    Personnel. The SOC-R detachment is deployed under Force
    Tracking Number 6170CTS3411 in support of the SOUTHCOM Theater
    Campaign Plan conducting theater security co-operation missions
    as well as prepared to conduct contingency operations and
    directly support the Counter-Drug/Counter Narco-Terrorism lines
    of effort in the SOUTHCOM AOR. The SOC-R detachment is deployed
    to Columbia.

        Senator Wicker. Okay. Let me just say, to follow up on the
    Chairman's line of questioning about Afghanistan, I just think
    it is very important for you to know, and for everyone
    listening to know, that we need to move beyond anything that
    puts us at a stalemate in Afghanistan.
        This is an important fight that we need to win, and there
    is every reason that we should be able to do that. We have a
    populace in Afghanistan who supports our presence there. The
    overwhelming majority of the ethnic groups, of the tribes,
    appreciate what we stand for and look to the United States for
    leadership.
        So to the extent that either of you, both of you, can give
    us correct and helpful information about how to move past what
    some people have described as a stalemate, to me, is very, very
    helpful.
        Ms. Whelan?
        Ms. Whelan. Senator, I think we are actually actively
    looking at adjustments to the approach in Afghanistan right
    now. I expect that these proposals will go to the President
    within the next week, and the intent is to do just that, to
    move beyond the stalemate and also to recognize that
    Afghanistan is a very important partner for the United States
    in a very tricky region. We want to maintain that partnership
    with Afghanistan, and we want to ensure that Afghanistan
    reaches its potential. So that is the objective of the
    strategy, sir.
        Senator Wicker. That is very good to know. Thank you.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Heinrich?
        Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Chairman.
        Thank you both for being here. Please pass along our
    gratitude to everyone who serves in your command. I think the
    work they do every day has an enormous amount of respect from
    all of our constituents, and we should be very grateful for
    that.
        General Thomas, yesterday, I want to thank you for just
    sitting down with me in my office. You and I discussed a number
    of things.
        The high operational tempo was one of the things we touched
    on. One of the things you mentioned to me that really stuck in
    my head are the numbers. You also indicated that now somewhere
    between 28 percent and 30 percent of your funding is now from
    war supplemental, or OCO [overseas contingency operations]
    funding, versus 7 percent across the other Military Services.
        I was hoping you could talk a little bit about what that
    means in terms of that budgetary overreliance on OCO and how
    that impacts your ability to plan and execute your mission.
        General Thomas. Senator, thanks for the question and thanks
    for the opportunity to discuss a number of issues with you in
    more detail yesterday.
        I mentioned the two things that I look to that pressurize
    us most are unpredictable deptempo, and certainly there are
    aspects of that are affecting our force, and resourcing, the
    predictability or not of resourcing, which has been challenging
    over time.
        We are monitoring very closely the budget discussions. We
    are integral to all those budget discussions. Truthfully, I am
    somewhat sanguine that we will get the resources required to
    continue to pursue the tempo and the effects that we are
    producing right now.
        You pointed out my one concern is that we have trended to
    be much, much more dependent on operational contingency funds
    than anybody else in DOD. So the current budget would push us--
    --
        Senator Heinrich. If your overall budget were held flat,
    would you rather have that in base budget or would you rather
    see it over in the OCO?
        General Thomas. Senator, I hope that we will be able to get
    consideration to move that into the base over time. Again, I
    have talked with Secretary Mattis, so I do not want to appear
    inconsistent. The Department is not pushing that as
    aggressively for the remainder of the other services because
    they are only leveraged to OCO to about a 7 percent degree. We
    are 30 percent or near 30 percent right now. So that is some
    risk that we certainly would like to mitigate over time.
        Senator Heinrich. One of the other things we mentioned and
    talked a little bit about is the contributions out at Cannon
    Air Force Base. Would you take a moment and talk a little bit
    about the importance of the RPA [Remotely Piloted Aircraft]
    contribution that happens there? Do you have concerns with
    regard to operational tempo? We have made huge investments in
    the facility over the years because of the growing mission,
    but, obviously, the tempo has been incredible.
        General Thomas. Senator, I think this committee is very
    aware that ISR [Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance] is a
    significant portion of our portfolio, to the tune of about one-
    fifth of our investment strategy on any given annual basis. It
    runs the gamut from tactical ISR all the way to high-end ISR
    that our Air Force component produces, which is the best in the
    world. It is better than anything on the planet.
        Cannon plays a critical role in terms of the basing and
    training of that ISR capability, both manned and unmanned. Then
    the range complex there allows us to work it every night. So,
    again, state-of-the-art ISR capability produced by our Air
    Force and others that we leverage on a consistent basis.
        Senator Heinrich. I also want to commend SOCOM's interest
    in pursuing what General Goldfein described as silent sabotage
    with regard to directed energy. An airborne high-energy laser
    on a C-130 gunship could certainly deliver a number of
    capabilities before and during clandestine ground operations.
        Do you want to share any thoughts you have on how directed
    energy might contribute to your future mission and how SOCOM's
    plans for developing that system are coming along?
        General Thomas. Senator, as we discussed yesterday, we see
    a number of applications for high-energy weapons capabilities,
    so we are interested from a number of approaches. You mentioned
    that we have offered to base it on one of our platforms as a
    test basis. That was relatively easy for us to offer up and
    obviously gives us kind of an immediate developmental
    capability. So, again, very interested, not exclusively a SOCOM
    pursuit----
        Senator Heinrich. Do you feel good about Air Force's
    willingness to get in that game as well?
        General Thomas. I do. We have a phenomenal relationship
    with General Goldfein and the Air Force.
        We have actual annual service talks with all the services
    to talk through how we can crush through our combined equities,
    and the relationship with our sister services is phenomenal. I
    have no concerns.
        Senator Heinrich. My time has expired here, but I also want
    to express a willingness to work with you on the 1208-like
    issues with regard to unconventional warfare.
        Thank you all for being here today.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Ernst?
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        To Ms. Whelan and General Thomas, thank you so much for
    being with us today. As a soldier and a citizen, I want to
    thank you very much for your relentless work on the
    battlefield. As the spouse of a former SOF operator, I want to
    thank you for SOCOM's dedication to the health and wellness of
    those operators and especially the commitment that you have to
    those servicemembers' families. So thank you very much for
    being here.
        General Thomas, during your confirmation hearing, we spoke
    about SOCOM's Preservation of the Force and Family, POTFF,
    initiatives. As you know, I am glad to see that SOCOM has done
    a lot in those areas to help our special operations warriors
    and their family members. The wounded warriors especially is an
    interest of mine. I would encourage everybody on this committee
    to take a look at those programs and learn more about them.
        Can you give us just a brief update on POTFF and
    specifically on THOR 3 [Tactical Human Optimization, Rapid
    Rehabilitation and Reconditioning]? I had the opportunity to do
    PT [physical therapy] at a THOR 3 facility with some of your
    operators. It was an experience.
        Can you tell us if SOCOM has the support it needs from
    Congress for these types of programs?
        General Thomas. Senator, thanks for the question. Thanks
    more specifically for your personal support for this critical
    capability.
        It is, admittedly, an awkward acronym, POTFF, Preservation
    of the Force and Family, but it captures the essence of what we
    are trying to enable, focused on both our force and, arguably,
    something that we talked about but did not have the resourcing
    before, the readiness and the preservation of our families.
        It literally builds in or enables us to build in resilience
    prior to and in preparation for potential deployment for both
    our servicemembers and their family members across a broad
    array of approaches--psychological, physical, spiritual--that
    again has paid huge dividends for us.
        You mentioned a specific aspect of that that pertains
    mostly to the physical maintenance and the physical recovery of
    our force. But over time, this committee and the Congress has
    enabled us to put the right infrastructure in place with the
    right technicians, therapists, and psychologists, et cetera, to
    provide state-of-the-art, as good as anything on the planet,
    sustainment capability for our individual operators, our
    individual servicemembers, and their families.
        Command Sergeant Major Patrick McCauley and I go around the
    formation. We get nothing but rave reviews from the force. In
    some cases, in fact, the challenge forces in some of our most
    distant locations where smaller forces, they are looking for
    the same capability, and we are finding ways to parlay that to
    them as well, as opposed to just at the larger special
    operation installations.
        Senator Ernst. Outstanding. It is a great program. Thank
    you, sir, for being so supportive of that.
        It is not surprising that so many of our SOF warriors, even
    after injury, are able to get back into that fight. While I was
    at THOR 3 with a dear friend of mine from Iowa, we met another
    one of his teammates who had also been injured. He had a near,
    at the hip amputation and had a prosthetic. He has been able to
    return to the fight because of those facilities. But he has
    been back to Afghanistan a number of times.
        But we also have those warriors who are not able to deploy
    again. So what is SOCOM doing to utilize their talents and
    abilities even after injury if they cannot deploy? Are there
    things that we should look at as Congress to enable those
    warriors to stay on duty?
        General Thomas. Senator, you touched on one of the unique
    challenges that we have, that most of our servicemembers, even
    despite extraordinary wounds, debilitating wounds for any other
    human being, desire greatly to continue serving. So you
    highlighted one example. I can highlight dozens where we have
    been able to accommodate individuals to stay in the force and
    to continue to contribute.
        You mentioned an amputee. We have amputees that are
    operating as operators, frontline operators, special forces,
    SEALs, the tip of the spear although way through all of our
    supporting functions.
        Again, our goal is, if they want to continue serving, we
    find a way to enable that. You have given us the wherewithal,
    the committee has given us the wherewithal to be able to do
    that through our Warrior Care program.
        Senator Ernst. Very good. I appreciate that very much.
        I do have a few other questions. We will get to those. Just
    a quick yes or no, though.
        President Trump today is saying that he does support
    leaving troops in Iraq in the fight against ISIS. Is that
    something that you would support?
        General Thomas. Senator, I support the strategy, so
    whatever the nature of the special operations support is
    required to obtain our objectives, I am supportive.
        Senator Ernst. Ms. Whelan?
        Ms. Whelan. Yes, actually, we are totally linked, and the
    strategy is based on our requirements of the generals on the
    ground.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Kaine?
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Thanks to the witnesses. I have a concern and a question.
        On the concern side, on the SOCOM website, you have a SOF
    Truths, five of them. One of them is, most special operations
    require non-SOF assistance. That seems pretty obvious. I have a
    concern about what I worry is a sort of growing SOF myth, and
    that is you can do special forces and have special forces and
    nothing else to accomplish your goals. Even conversations in
    this body sometimes are, well, we do not want to use ground
    troops, no boots on the ground, but it is okay to use special
    forces.
        I sometimes think that is a little bit of not really a
    military calculation but kind of more of a political one, that
    ground troops are a little bit more notable, special forces
    tend to be more covert, so we can do things with special forces
    and not really have to be accountable for it to the public.
        Am I right to worry about that?
        General Thomas. Senator, I think you are right to worry
    about the perception. It is something that we battle all the
    time. There have been too many books and movies and
    publications that might imply that we go it alone, do it alone,
    and that is completely incorrect.
        Certainly, I share your concern that that is out there, but
    it is something that we push back on all the time. It is just
    not the case.
        Senator Kaine. A question Senator Wicker asked you about,
    collaboration with international partners, I want to focus on a
    piece of that, the training that you do. I think one of the
    best parts of our DOD budget, and it is a very small part of
    the budget, is the training work that we do with other nations,
    either bringing military leaders of other nations here or doing
    training with countries all over the world.
        Senator King and I have done some traveling and have seen
    U.S. special forces doing training in some tough parts in the
    world that are pretty impressive. Without saying anything in an
    open setting that you should not, talk a little bit about the
    scope of the training activities that our special forces are
    involved in with partners all over the world.
        General Thomas. Senator, we are consistently trying to
    align ourselves with the appropriate partner forces where our
    national interests pertain in the interest of building their
    capability to the range of missions that they might be required
    to do.
        I think we are pursuing a much more enlightened training
    approach, all the way through security force assistance. Where
    I think my fellow combatant commanders would tell you that we
    are probably not keeping pace is in terms of the bureaucracy
    that pertains to foreign military sales and things of that ilk.
    I know we are trying to get those to be as coherent as possible
    going forward. That would help us.
        But I think we are doing a much better job of identifying
    partner forces ahead of time that need various capabilities,
    and we are pressing to make sure they have that capability.
        Senator Kaine. This training, when you do it, it is not
    only about just shear military capacity-building. It is also
    about rules of war and human rights and elevating professional
    standards in these militaries around the world, and that is all
    for the good.
        General Thomas. Senator, you are nailing what I think is
    one of the critical aspects of it. It is literally imparting
    our American values to them in the means of a military-to-
    military relationship.
        Too often, in my mind, the first billpayer is that
    military-to-military relationship when we have missteps, and we
    are the first to address it. If we even get a scent of
    extrajudicial killings or inappropriate behavior, we address
    that immediately with the respective element. But we are
    attempting to bring their understanding of what we believe is
    the right way to conduct combat operations along as part of our
    training.
        Senator Kaine. One of the most important things I think we
    can do is kind of be the partner of choice as other nations are
    looking to build capacity, and I think there is probably no
    area more than special forces where we are really seen as a
    partner of choice by nations all around the world. That is a
    great way to build relationships and improve capacity,
    compliance with rule of law.
        So I commend you on that and look forward to talking about
    that more as we get into working on the NDAA together.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Sullivan?
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Ms. Whelan, General, thanks for your testimony.
        General, I appreciated the opportunity to meet with you and
    your team yesterday. I wanted to follow up on some of our
    discussions.
        Obviously, we focus a lot here on ISIS and al Qaeda and
    some of the other terrorist groups. But certainly, one of your
    most important missions is the counter-WMD [weapons of mass
    destruction] mission. As the threat is growing from North
    Korea, Iran, it is not just a direct threat. As you know, it is
    a proliferation threat. I think that is going to be an enduring
    mission for you and your team and the SOF Command for decades.
        So in 2016, in the unified campaign plan, it was amended to
    transfer responsibility from STRATCOM [United States Strategic
    Command] to SOCOM for the synchronization of DOD's global
    counter-WMD strategy. To the extent you can discuss it in an
    open hearing like this, what are the things that we can do to
    support that critically important mission in terms of
    resources? How is the transfer going? Are there any other
    things that this committee should be aware of to help you most
    effectively focus and undertake that critical mission?
        General Thomas. Senator, thanks for the question, and
    thanks for the time yesterday as well.
        As you mentioned, this is an enormous and incredibly
    important mission set that we accepted responsibility for in
    January. So January of this year was when it was officially
    assigned to us from the Department of Defense. We have had
    about 4 months to work our enhanced appreciation for all that
    entails. Obviously, we had studied ahead of time, but there is
    nothing like embracing a mission to really understand it.
        We have had a chance to do our first of what is a
    semiannual synchronization session with all the interagency
    partners that are part of this problem set, all the geographic
    combatant commanders, our international partners, a really,
    really valuable session that we conduct semiannually.
        We are currently now trying to confederate all the ongoing
    activities so that we can provide the Secretary an assessment
    here. I am aiming for the August timeframe to give him a
    comprehensive assessment of where we are in terms of the United
    States Government policies and objectives for countering
    weapons of mass destruction, where we are from a DOD approach,
    and relative to both our interagency and our international
    partners.
        So, again, we are leaning into this mission as aggressively
    as we do most everything at SOCOM. But it is obviously much,
    much bigger than us, and we are honored to have that
    coordinating role for the Department of Defense, and we are
    endeavoring to provide the best product possible for the
    Secretary and the Department.
        Senator Sullivan. As you undertake that analysis and that
    transfer of authority over to you, which has already happened,
    please make sure that this committee--I can almost guarantee
    you that you would get bipartisan support for additional
    responsibilities or resources that you will need with regard to
    that critical mission, so please keep us posted.
        Let me ask this, it is kind of related to Senator McCain's
    and Senator Kaine's question.
        We seem to have, in some ways, adopted a strategy of
    fighting our wars now with a combination of SOCOM forces and
    airpower. But in your professional military opinion, what other
    capabilities would be beneficial to help our forces and our
    country bring success in places like Iraq or Syria or
    Afghanistan?
        I know you are looking at that issue, but there is kind of
    this, and I think it is a theme here, you are hearing a bit of
    a myth that, once the SOCOM men and women are on it, everything
    is good to go. But we know that there are a lot of other
    capabilities and other forces that need to bring to bear.
        Specifically, what do you see as most important in terms of
    other capabilities, supporting or even in the lead?
        General Thomas. Senator, it is kind of ironic, I am running
    through my brain right now 80 different countries, 8,000
    special operations forces forward deployed, and I cannot think
    of a single circumstance where we are not dependent on another
    service, another supporting function out there--not one.
        So if and when it has been described as special operations
    forces by themselves, it is a misconception.
        Now, unfortunately, in some cases, we are too prominent,
    too prominent because it is interesting, it is, again, the
    stuff of too many books and movies. But we are not doing
    anything by ourselves.
        The good news is, as we go into a problem, as special
    operations goes into a problem, I consider the entirety of the
    DOD inventory at our disposal, and vice versa. That is, I
    think, the benefit of the joint force approach, that we do not
    feel constrained that there is nothing available in the DOD
    arsenal that we cannot leverage, and they look at us in the
    same fashion.
        So, again, that is happening about anywhere I can imagine,
    anywhere I have been lately, without any shortcomings.
        Senator Sullivan. So you are integrated, for example, with
    marines who are doing artillery fire missions with you in Iraq
    right now?
        General Thomas. I think I mentioned to you I will not get
    into specifics, but I just visited some marines that were
    shooting more 155 ammo than I can supply them right now, and
    they are integral to everything we are doing.
        Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator King?
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Ms. Whelan, I could not help notice your former title of
    Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
    Operations Low-Intensity Conflict.
        When I was a junior staff member in this body 40 years ago,
    I once called OMB [Office of Management and Budget] for an
    administration witness. They gave me a title. He said I am
    sending you so and so, the principal deputy. I said I do not
    know these titles. What does that mean? The fellow gave me an
    answer, which if I ever write a book about Washington, it will
    be the title of my book. The answer was, ``He is at the highest
    level where they still know anything.''
        [Laughter.]
        Senator King. I just want you to know that you are at that
    level, and I am now above it. So I have never forgotten that.
        General Thomas, there has been a lot of talk about tempo.
    Let me go back to the left about tempo and talk about
    retention, recruitment, and throughput. Do you have adequate
    people in the pipeline to maintain the tempo that you are at
    today?
        General Thomas. Senator, again, something that we look at
    incredibly closely every day. The answer is we are having some
    challenges for portions of the force for recruitment. I
    contribute some in terms of Army special operations forces to
    the downsizing of the Army, partly for some internal challenges
    that I think we have rectified.
        But in some cases, we have had some challenges. I think we
    are trending in the right direction now though going forward,
    but we had some temporary challenges over the last couple
    years.
        Senator King. I certainly hope that you will let the
    committee know about those issues. If there are recruitment and
    retention issues that our actions here can help to alleviate,
    we certainly want to do that.
        General Thomas. Will do, Senator.
        Senator King. Ms. Whalen, the command-and-control is an
    issue that is of some concern. Do you believe that we have
    effective command-and-control of the special operations forces?
        I am concerned about interested parties, your command,
    geographic combatant commanders, service components, all
    receive and share information in a quick and efficient manner.
    Talk to me about command-and-control.
        Ms. Whelan. Certainly. I will actually also let General
    Thomas comment on this as well.
        But I think from our perspective, in the SOLIC oversight
    role, we actually have excellent command-and-control. In fact,
    I think the integration of our forces between SOCOM and the
    combatant commands that they support, the regional combatant
    commands----
        Senator King. So if there is an action of special operation
    forces in a particular geographic area, the combatant commands
    are integrated, they know what is going on.
        Ms. Whelan. Actually, Senator, the way it works is that
    SOCOM forces, the SOF forces actually fall under the command of
    the combatant commander, the geographic combatant commander. So
    the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is fully in charge of the
    operations that take place in their Area of Responsiblity
    (AOR). For example, if you are looking at the CENTCOM [United
    States Central Command] AOR right now, General Votel and his
    subordinate commanders, that is the chain of command that
    operates all of the forces that are in that AOR right now, to
    include special operations forces.
        Not necessarily for this forum, but there are some specific
    elements that operate under a slightly different chain of
    command, although still under General Votel's purview but with
    more direct access to General Votel that belong to General
    Thomas.
        But there is total integration, and nothing happens in a
    geographic commander's AOR that he does not know about.
        Senator King. General Thomas, you are comfortable with the
    structure?
        General Thomas. Senator, absolutely comfortable. I
    reemphasize Theresa's point. There are no special operations in
    the world right now that are not under the command-and-control
    of geographic combatant commander.
        There are provisions for exceptions in some scenarios.
    Truthfully, the exceptions are single digits over the course of
    our history where SOCOM could be the supported commander. But
    day in, day out, all of our operators right now are under the
    control of a geographic combatant commander.
        I have combatant command of all special operations forces,
    and I apportion them to their respective geographic combatant--
    --
        Senator King. There is always coordination with the
    combatant command?
        General Thomas. Always, constant, incessant. Senator, our
    role for synchronizing is where these geographic combatant
    commanders get to their prescribed limits. So you might
    imagine, for CENTCOM, for instance, as their borders literally
    butt up to other geographic combatant commanders, Syria to
    Turkey, Yemen to Somalia, Egypt to Libya, that is where we play
    a critical function of synchronizing special operations
    activities across those respective geographic combatant
    commanders.
        Again, they fight the forces. We provide a transregional
    perspective and role.
        Senator King. Ms. Whelan, my time is up, but very quickly,
    you mentioned information warfare. What does that consist of?
        Ms. Whelan. Information warfare is a complex set of
    functions that include some of our military information support
    teams, as well as some of our communications specialties. There
    is a whole list. I know you are short on time, Senator, if you
    like----
        Senator King. Perhaps you could, for the record----
        Ms. Whelan. Absolutely.
        Senator King.--give us a definition of what that is.
        Ms. Whelan. We will take that for the record and get you
    the answer.
        Senator King. Thank you very much.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Ms. Whelan. Although there have been several references to
    ``information warfare'' in this hearing, our current doctrine uses the
    term Information Operations, which is defined as ``integrated
    employment, during military operations, of information-related
    capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence,
    disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and
    potential adversaries while protecting our own.'' Examples of
    information operations-related capabilities include Military
    Information Support Operations, Military Deception, Electronic Warfare,
    and Cyberspace Operations, among others. As I mentioned earlier, we are
    implementing our 2016 Strategy for Operations in the Information
    Environment, which describes the Joints Staff's development of a new
    joint concept that I expect will change some of the terms we associate
    with military operations, actions, and activities in the information
    environment.

        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Cotton?
        Senator Cotton. Thank you both for coming today.
        General Thomas, thank you, in particular, for your service,
    and all the men and women underneath your command.
        Over the last 8 years, there has been some tension between
    civilian and uniformed services over the number of flag
    officers that we have seen grow in all the services. The
    committee made an effort to reduce the number of flag officers
    last year.
        I have heard some generals and admirals, though, say that
    when the civilian command authority reserve decision-making
    power to the highest levels, decision-making power that was
    once delegated to colonels and captains and, heaven forbid,
    even lieutenants on the battlefield in Iraq and Afghanistan in
    the last decade, then we should expect to see an increase in
    the number of flag officers.
        Have we begun to see in the last 4 months more delegation
    of operational decision-making authority back to where I
    suggest it belongs, in the hands of commanders who are on the
    frontlines?
        General Thomas. Senator, the short answer is yes.
        I am a little bit humored by how you described the
    situation in that my youngest son, who just gave up company
    command of the 82nd recently wrote to me and said since when
    did we stop letting company commanders command companies? My
    response to him was, Michael, that question has been asked
    since time immemorial. Where and how are you restricted right
    now?
        But I think, to your overall point, that while certain
    authorities had been elevated to very senior levels, I
    typically ask our force, are you empowered at the right level
    with the right ROE to do your job? I think it is turning in
    that direction.
        Senator Cotton. As that delegation occurs, do you think we
    might see a concomitant decline in the number of flag officers
    in the Pentagon who need to make those decisions for our
    company and field grade officers in the field?
        General Thomas. Senator, I would tell you, truthfully, flag
    officers in the Pentagon are not empowered to make those
    decisions because they are not in the chain of command. So I
    think the right folks in the chain of command are being
    empowered to make the decisions that you certainly experienced
    from your time in combat. We are going back in that direction
    positively.
        Senator Cotton. On a related note, last month, we deployed
    the Massive Ordnance Air Blast in Afghanistan for the first
    time. There was some media controversy about that, about why
    that bomb was deployed.
        At what decision would something like that be made?
        General Thomas. Senator, I think it was described that that
    decision was in General Nicholson's authority, so he had the
    capability, he had the discretion and decision-making to deploy
    it.
        I think you know we used it as an area denial weapon in an
    area that we have been having a protracted fight with ISIS and
    the Khorasan in Nangarhar Province in Afghanistan. So I think
    it was the right deployment of a weapon system that avoided a
    more extensive of loss of life.
        I mentioned Sergeant De Alencar and our two rangers who
    died out in the area recently.
        So, again, that decision-making authority was General
    Nicholson----
        Senator Cotton. The commander in Afghanistan.
        General Thomas. The commander on----
        Senator Cotton. Not the Chairman, nor the Secretary of
    Defense, the National Security Adviser, the President.
        General Thomas. No.
        Senator Cotton. Deciding what kind of ordnance to employ,
    would you say that is a decision for commanders in the field to
    make?
        General Thomas. I believe it is.
        Senator Cotton. They do not need to get approval from
    anyone 8,000 miles away in Washington?
        General Thomas. I think that could actually cause great
    risk to the force, if it had to go back that way.
        Senator Cotton. I hope all the rest of our bombs are
    overcoming the laws of their mother. Are they?
        General Thomas. I think they are over their grieving.
        Senator Cotton. Good.
        Another question I want to raise is the relationship
    between special operations forces and conventional forces. By
    definition, special operations forces are special. They do
    amazing things, but they are limited in numbers and focused in
    mission.
        Would you agree that you cannot simply flood special
    operations forces and expect them to be a substitute for what
    our conventional forces or what a broader strategy would do?
        General Thomas. Senator, I agree, and, more pragmatically,
    we do not have the forces, the special operations forces, to do
    that. So it is not a viable solution.
        Senator Cotton. So special operations forces are an
    important complement to conventional forces in a broader
    strategy, but they cannot be a substitute for either?
        General Thomas. Agreed, Senator.
        Senator Cotton. A related question, does that mean that if
    we expect to increase the number of special operations forces,
    or the mission sets that we provide them, or the operational
    tempo at which we deploy them, we also need to see a
    concomitant increase in the number of conventional forces as
    well to support those missions?
        General Thomas. I think that is a good assumption, Senator.
        Senator Cotton. All right. Thank you.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Peters?
        Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you to our witnesses here today for your insightful
    testimony.
        General Thomas, I would like to go back to something you
    brought up in your testimony as well as to a question earlier
    from a panelist, and that is the SOFWERX effort that is
    undergoing right now to bring together academia and industry
    and some high-tech work.
        As you know as well as anyone, the nature of warfare is
    going to change dramatically in the years ahead. Technology
    focus will be greater than ever. In the past, the military has
    always been a leader in that area and will continue to do that.
    But one difference is that what we are seeing now in the
    civilian industry is accelerating in terms of new innovations.
        We have, in Michigan, TARDEC [U.S. Army Tank Automotive
    Research Development and Engineering Center], which is the
    Army's tank and vehicle research lab, which is also working on
    the model that you have mentioned. But I was just curious, I
    know your effort is only about 1.5 years old now, but what
    would you consider the major takeaway of that effort in the
    last 1.5 years? Or perhaps a lesson that you have learned in
    that 1.5 years that is going to be instructive for entities
    like TARDEC and others to emulate?
        General Thomas. Senator, I could probably on the record
    provide you a list of initiatives that have actually resulted
    in fielding capabilities to our forces, so some very specific
    dividends that have come out of that environment.
        Truthfully, our director of Acquisition Technology and
    Logistics is leveraging that platform every day. For instance,
    the Counter-Unmanned Aerial System challenge that cropped up
    recently in Iraq and Syria, which was relatively nuanced, we
    were able to pour some very directed resources at that, have
    what he calls a collision of academia, technicians, operators,
    come together on that problem, among others, to really crash on
    it in a hurry and, more importantly, leverage off-the-shelf
    technologies, things that would otherwise take an inordinate
    amount of time to get to the field.
        So if I can, I would like to provide you a list of
    specifics of what we have accomplished and, more importantly,
    what we are endeavoring to do going into the future.
        Senator Peters. I appreciate that.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        General Thomas. Through efforts at SOFWERX we have been able to
    identify and discover many new and novel technologies, capabilities,
    ideas and process to facilitate accelerating the acquisition cycle.
    These efforts begin with building a robust network across many
    spectrums of innovation in the private and academic sectors, commercial
    markets and the DOD. A representative sample includes the following:

    New Products: Through rapid prototyping efforts, SOFWERX has produced
    new designs for consideration to enable more rapid follow-on
    acquisitions for:

          Prototype/initial design for next generation
    communication systems for SOF vehicles for consideration in future
    acquisition strategies
          Concept and initial design for new bow bumpers for SOF
    boats that are in prototype manufacturing for further testing
          Developed Casualty Evacuation modifications for MRZR SOF
    vehicles--provided to units for local build
          Initial design studies for weaponizing SOF surface
    combatant boats for consideration in future acquisition strategies

        SOFWERX has conducted or facilitated rapid evaluation of commercial
    off-the-shelf (COTS) products for potential SOF use, either for
    immediate needs or for future concepts:

          Go-Tenna: Allows use of cell phones as point to point and
    network radios; analyzed and prototyped alternative antennas for SOF
    use
          Open source software--enables rapid fielding of
    capabilities, especially with partner nations
          Commercial drones--both how to use them with COTS
    software for radically low-cost ISR, as well as how to exploit current
    drones for Counter-Unmanned Air System capabilities

        SOFWERX has proven to be a venue which attracts unique products for
    potential SOF use, which has reduced barriers to entry and has
    facilitated interaction with new and unique suppliers:

          Hendricks Motor Sports STEED--an electric powered cart to
    increase range of SOF tactical units
          Fly-board Air--Novel single-man flying machine invented
    in France
          Virtual Reality Demo--Enabled operators to experiment
    with next-generation Virtual Reality/Augmented Reality systems

    New Ideas: SOFWERX has aided in inspiring and inaugurating new ideas
    that can transform how SOF approaches thinking and solving the most
    challenging problem sets:

          Use of biological models as a means to better understand
    counter-terrorism
          Next generation design concepts to power Light Tactical
    All-Terrain Vehicles (fuel cells, hybrid, etc.)
          Non-Radio Frequency communications for SOF (e.g. magnetic
    resonance) for enhanced survivability

        New Business Models: SOFWERX is a springboard for using new
    business models to reach non-traditional business partners,
    technologists, hackers/makers and other individuals with novel
    solutions:

          Developing a SOF-unique workflow on Amazon to potentially
    enable rapid discovery/purchase/delivery of equipment for partnered
    operations
          Fostering new solutions to SOF problems through prize
    challenges; 10 prize SOF prize challenges have been executed to date
          Fostering new solutions to SOF problems (especially in
    the data arena) with Hackathons. Hackathons have also identified a
    large pool of local talent which can be leveraged to solve SOF problems

        New Networks: SOFWERX has enabled us to establish and broaden our
    relationships with a wide spectrum of non-traditional DOD partners:

          SOFWERX has already established a network of over 6000
    members
          Academia--USF is now developing advanced payload
    solutions for SOF cubesats
          Hacker/Maker network--400+ non-DOD affiliated hackers and
    makers are networked in with SOFWERX. SOFWERX is being dubbed as the
    ``friendly feds'' space, allowing access to ideas, products, and
    innovations
          Far Ridgeline Reviews--enables us to assemble world-
    leading talent on specific challenges to include most recently a
    session on Machine Learning.

        More information on many other events and activities to include
    Hackathons, Science, Technology, Engineering and Math (STEM) events in
    the local community can be found on the SOFWERX website at sofwerx.org.
        SOCOM is pursuing wearable robotics technology in the form of an
    actuated exoskeleton as part of the Tactical Assault Light Operator
    Suit (TALOS). This test-ready prototype suit is currently in
    development and planned to begin operator assessment in late 2018.
    SOCOM's goal is to develop a next generation technologically advanced
    combat operator suit that provides unmatched and unprecedented
    advantage to our Special Operations Forces Operators as they execute
    the most complex and high risk mission sets. TALOS will provide the SOF
    Operator of the future enhanced survivability, capability, and
    situational awareness.
        SOCOM is partnering with the Army on plans, strategies and
    innovative research in the field of robotics and autonomous systems.
    Special Operations Forces (SOF) interdependence and interoperability
    with conventional forces remains a top priority for USSOCOM especially
    regarding emerging technologies. Earlier this year, TALOS leadership
    visited U.S. Army Tank Automotive Research Development and Engineering
    Center (TARDEC) to collaborate on investments in the field of
    autonomous robotics. SOCOM recently benefited from a visit by key
    TARDEC staff members, namely Dr. Robert Sadowski (Chief Roboticist for
    the Army), to discuss the TALOS program and the Army's robotic and
    autonomous systems strategy. USSOCOM plans to continue its integration
    with the U.S. Army in the autonomous robotics and exoskeleton fields to
    ensure the prudent investment of our finite Special Operations
    resources.
        We are collaborating with the Services on various unmanned
    underwater and ground systems. While the SOF operator will always be
    the key element to our success, we foresee robotics and autonomous
    systems playing an increasing role in support of our SOF formations to
    better enable safe, efficient and effective mission completion.
        We also use a wide range of remotely piloted aircraft and are
    experimenting with, in conjunction with the Services, various unmanned
    underwater and ground systems. While the SOF operator will also be the
    key element to our success, we foresee robotics and autonomous systems
    playing an increasing role in support of our SOF operator to better
    enable him or her to complete the mission safely and effectively.

        Senator Peters. I would also like to do a deeper dive,
    perhaps with some folks there to talk specifically about some
    of the work that they are doing and how we can replicate that
    in other places, because I think this is critically important
    in future warfare.
        As you know, and you have alluded to it in your answer
    there, autonomy and robotics will probably have some of the
    greatest potential to change how we conduct warfare.
        In fact, I was struck that, last week, the Marine Corps
    conducted an exercise at Camp Pendleton on the future of
    amphibious warfare, which included using robots as the first
    boots on the ground, resupplying troops with drones, and even
    robots providing covering fire for those marines.
        In general, how do you see autonomy and robotics changing
    battlefield tactics in some of your operations? It appears this
    is coming a lot quicker than folks may have anticipated.
        General Thomas. Senator, I would like to think we are at
    the forefront or writing all the initiatives that pertain to
    that. As you might imagine, our mission set, especially our
    direct-action mission set, entails an element of risk that we
    are trying to mitigate for literally the number one man in a
    formation that could absolutely be mitigated through robotics
    and other kind of sensory improvements over time.
        So we are pursuing that actively. I was going to ask, if
    your time allows, that maybe we can get you to come visit in
    Tampa. We have had several visitors come in and actually
    provide us other opportunities to connect with academia and
    industry to some of the other activities that you mentioned.
        Senator Peters. I would appreciate that opportunity.
        What do you consider some of the main benefits and
    tradeoffs that we need to consider as this technology moves
    forward?
        General Thomas. Right now, it is a practical challenge for
    us, because, as you might imagine, we have tried to push the
    application of robotics where just the agility, in terms of
    sensory capability, decision-making, and physical capabilities
    of robotics just are not there yet. But nonetheless, we are
    pushing in that regard. But we see some great opportunities.
        Senator Peters. Great. Thank you, General. I appreciate it.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Cruz?
        Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Good morning. Welcome. Thank you both for your service to
    our Nation, particularly at this perilous time.
        General Thomas, in recent months, special operations forces
    from across the services have made the ultimate sacrifices in
    conflicts around the world. Most recently, a number of brave
    special operators lost their lives fighting ISIS in
    northeastern Afghanistan. The reduction in conventional forces
    in Afghanistan and the closure of a majority of combat outposts
    and forward operating bases in the country has left a
    considerable gap in United States presence in critical enemy
    engagement areas.
        Would special operations forces in Afghanistan be better
    supported if there were a greater presence of conventional
    soldiers in combat outposts and forward operating bases
    throughout the country?
        General Thomas. Senator, I think General Nicholson and
    others are looking at enhancing the capability in terms of
    train, advise, assist, so more conventional forces that would
    thicken the ability to advise and assist Afghan forces. That
    would absolutely be to our benefit.
        Right now, you mentioned the casualties that we recently
    incurred. Those are accompanied operations. That is where our
    special operations forces are accompanying Afghan special
    operations capabilities.
        Ultimately, we want to make them capable of doing it on
    their own, and we are certainly making some progress there. But
    I think parallel efforts to advise and assist the larger
    conventional capabilities of the Afghan forces would absolutely
    enhance the effort.
        Senator Cruz. Do the special operations forces have the
    dedicated assets and resources that they need to fight and win,
    given so many competing areas of conflict around the world? Are
    you ever put into a position where you are forced to choose
    which mission to fully support and what can be accomplished
    with less dedicated assets?
        General Thomas. Senator, to answer your first question, I
    do think we have adequate resources to task.
        The bigger challenge, which was prefaced by the Chairman at
    the beginning, is that, from a DOD standpoint, we are a
    microcosm of the DOD from a global approach, in that we are
    trying to provide the necessary special operations requirements
    to all the geographic combatant commanders at the same time
    with a relative prioritization.
        The Secretary and the Chairman are endeavoring to make sure
    that prioritization is as precise as it needs to be for us as
    service components so that we can support the effort and
    priority, but it is a challenge. We, like the Department, are
    trying to do a lot of things at the same time in a challenging
    world, so that has some inherent friction to it.
        Senator Cruz. On a different topic, I understand that the
    decision regarding which combatant command would be responsible
    for weapons of mass destruction has been decided, and that,
    starting in January, it now falls under your command at the
    Special Operations Command.
        This is obviously a critical component of our Nation's
    nuclear deterrent and counter-WMD programs that have a major
    responsibility, including nuclear, chemical, and biological
    agents.
        Could you please comment on how the addition of WMD
    responsibility has affected current and future operations?
        General Thomas. Senator, I mentioned previously that we
    absolutely embrace the enormity of this mission. It is much,
    much bigger than special operations and SOCOM, so we are
    looking to leverage as much of the rest of the interagency
    community and our international partners to accomplish our
    Government's objectives in this regard as we can.
        Right now, we have the resourcing required to embrace this
    set, and we are in discussion for what we need going forward. I
    mentioned earlier that I hope to provide an assessment to our
    Secretary of Defense in August in terms of a comprehensive
    review of what we are trying to accomplish from a U.S.
    Government policy and strategy objective, and how well we are
    doing.
        So, again, we look forward to providing that to the
    committee as well, once we brief the Secretary.
        Senator Cruz. Ms. Whelan, do you have additional thoughts
    on the impact of WMD responsibility under SOCOM?
        Ms. Whelan. Senator, thanks for the question.
        I think we fully supported the decision to shift the
    responsibility to SOCOM. SOCOM has the capabilities on that, we
    were intended to utilize to address this issue, so I think,
    organizationally, it made a tremendous amount of sense to us to
    move it from STRATCOM to SOCOM, so we fully support.
        Senator Cruz. Thank you very much.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Warren?
        Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you for being here. I just want to quickly ask about
    the importance of our nonmilitary agencies and programs to your
    mission.
        For much of the past decade, special operations forces have
    deployed around the globe 24/7, and we often think of them as
    conducting raids and taking out terrorists. But I understand
    that a big part of your mission is actually to advise and
    assist local forces to build their own capacity.
        General, how important is our State Department to that
    mission?
        General Thomas. Senator, the relationship to the State
    Department is indescribably critical, both at the State
    Department level, but I would offer, as I mentioned earlier, we
    are in 80 different countries, and we look to have the most
    enhanced relationships possible with every one of those
    countries through our country team. If that is not the baseline
    for our United States Government approach, then we are flawed
    from the start.
        Senator Warren. So at the national level and at the country
    level.
        Would a reduction in funding to the State and USAID [United
    States Agency for International Development] that conduct
    foreign assistance in diplomacy make your job easier or make
    your job harder?
        General Thomas. Senator, as you are implying, it makes
    their job harder, which I think, by extension, would make our
    job harder. So I cannot calculate the specific cost, but I know
    an already strained State Department would be more pressed to
    do their job.
        Senator Warren. Good. Thank you. That is very helpful.
        The administration is seeking a significant reduction in
    the State Department and USAID budgets. Diplomacy and
    development are critical for alleviating the very conditions
    that contribute to the security challenges that SOCOM confronts
    every single day.
        Now, if I can, I would like to return to a question that
    Senator Sullivan raised about SOCOM's responsibility as the
    lead organization for countering WMDs. I know that this
    responsibility was shifted over to you to ensure that we are
    paying enough attention to the nuclear proliferation threat and
    to ensure that we are synchronizing the WMD work with the
    counterterrorism mission so that we can prevent a terrorist
    group from ever getting a hold of a nuclear weapon.
        This mission, as I understand it, includes three lines of
    effort: preventing the acquisition of WMDs by foreign powers,
    containing and reducing WMD threats, and responding to a WMD
    crisis.
        As I understand it, you seem pretty prepared to tackle the
    first of those, given your hard-won experience using
    intelligence to track bad actors over the past 15 years. WMD
    threats and responding to WMD crises are going to require some
    new skills here.
        General, to the extent that you can in an open session, can
    you just say a word about what you see as the biggest
    challenges in taking on this new responsibility?
        General Thomas. Senator, absolutely. You mentioned that we
    were already pre-established in various aspects of this mission
    set. I think to Secretary Whelan's earlier comment, I think
    that is what made it an almost natural fit for the mission to
    transition to us, that we have a pre-existing approach and
    process, kind of an ethos to dealing with transregional
    terrorism. I think there was a natural application or kind of a
    fungible application to the WMD set.
        Going forward though, even from a first blush assessment,
    the biggest challenge for all of us is seeing and sensing the
    nature of the threat in an environment that runs the gamut from
    dual-use technology, proliferation of nefarious items in the
    same stream as things that are for the good of industry and not
    of a nefarious use.
        So I really see the major onus as we go forward is
    determining how we, both DOD and the interagency, see and
    assess the threat and obviously can enable operations to do
    what we need to do, whether it is disruption of activities or
    something else. So the most daunting challenge I think will be
    of an intelligence variety in terms of assessing the threat.
        Senator Warren. Thank you. I appreciate that.
        I understand that the committee has asked you to prepare a
    report on the resources, personnel, and authorities you are
    going to need to carry out this mission. I understand you are
    working on that. I know it will be very helpful.
        General Thomas. Yes, ma'am, we are.
        Senator Warren. Good. Can I ask you one last quick
    question? That is, Senator Sullivan asked about what you needed
    from us to carry out the mission. I just wanted to see if you
    could say a word about what you expect to receive from
    Strategic Command, who is giving up this mission, in terms of
    personnel and funding.
        General Thomas. Ma'am, we are actually still co-joined with
    Strategic Command for this mission set. So as they shifted the
    set specifically to us, there are still a number of co-related
    activities that have kept us co-joined. They did transfer an
    entity with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency that was part
    and parcel of their approach that came directly to was and is
    integral to what we are doing now. But we are also addressing
    what we think are the future requirements to enhance this
    mission.
        Senator Warren. Do you expect more transfers to occur?
        I am going to quit, Mr. Chairman, because I am over my
    time.
        General Thomas. I am hopeful that within the Department,
    not necessarily from STRATCOM, which is a busy command with a
    profound portfolio, but I am hopeful that within the
    Department, that the resources that we describe will be
    resourced.
        Senator Warren. All right. Thank you. Your job to stop the
    proliferation of nuclear weapons is powerfully important, and
    we want to make sure you have the resources you need. Thank
    you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Rounds?
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Ms. Whelan and General Thomas, first of all, thank you for
    your service to our country.
        In the 2014 QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review], manpower
    requirement for Special Operations Command was approximately
    72,000. However, this number was capped at 69,000 due to budget
    constraints. It is clear the world is not any safer now than it
    was in 2014. I would expect the current demand on your
    operations has not been diminished, and, if anything, it has
    been increased.
        What is the current manpower requirement for SOCOM to meet
    its global requirements? Is additional force structure
    required?
        General Thomas. Senator, I believe our stated requirement
    is the requirement. We are working to refine, if there is any
    needed growth in the future.
        I am thankful, as you mentioned, that, in spite of the fact
    that we did not receive the growth that was prescribed and
    validated, that we have had tremendous support from across the
    Department in terms of augmentees and additional units that
    have enabled us to continue to pursue our jobs.
        So again, I am thankful that the Department has
    reapportioned to allow us to do what they have asked us to do.
        Senator Rounds. When you were not allowed or not authorized
    the amount requested, clearly, then, you have to take on
    additional risk in certain areas. Where is that risk at, at
    this time? Where did you have to take on additional risk?
        General Thomas. Senator, again, I think, without getting
    into details of specific locations and activities, there was
    curtailment in terms of some of our activities.
        Senator Rounds. Diminished operations.
        General Thomas. Diminished operations. Then, as I
    mentioned, in many cases, we merely went back to the Department
    and said, while we cannot grow it or maintain it internally,
    might we receive additional augmentation? In almost every case,
    they have afforded that to us.
        Senator Rounds. Recent testimony from both the U.S. Navy
    and the U.S. Air Force has identified a significant difficulty
    in retaining qualified pilots. How is pilot retention going for
    special operations aviation?
        General Thomas. Senator, a great question. Senator King
    asked the earlier question about recruitment and retention. I
    should have mentioned that we are experiencing similar
    retention challenges to the Air Force and others relative to
    the enticement of pilots to join industry. So it is something
    that is certainly affecting us right now, and we are trying to
    come up with creative alternatives or solutions to rectify
    that.
        Senator Rounds. So you are indicating that you do have the
    same challenges as everyone else has on it and----
        General Thomas. To a lesser degree, but, yes, we have that.
        Senator Rounds. To a lesser degree.
        General Thomas. Yes, we do.
        Senator Rounds. Okay. Does USSOCOM need service-like
    acquisition authorities for the purposes of developing,
    acquiring, and sustaining special operations technology,
    equipment, and services?
        General Thomas. Senator, we enjoy those authorities right
    now. Interestingly, we do not have all the authorities that the
    services have. They have some unique authorities. Usually folks
    think it is a flip on that, that special operations have unique
    authorities that enable us. There are actually some authorities
    inherent in the services that we are looking to gain over time.
        Senator Rounds. Could you specify?
        General Thomas. Specifically, I cannot get into the
    technical aspects of it.
        Senator Rounds. For the record, would you provide us with
    that?
        General Thomas. I would be glad to do that. But again, I
    would also emphasize that our structure with our director of
    AT&L [Acquisition, Technology and Logistics] working directly
    for me with a streamlined relationship with our program
    executive officer has enabled us to do some pretty
    extraordinary things too. So we are very well-enabled. We are
    looking to try to enhance and have all the tools that the
    services have.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        General Thomas. Yes. USSOCOM could benefit from 10 U.S.C. Sec.
    2353 Research and development projects using grants or cooperative
    agreements or 10 U.S.C. Sec.  2373 Procurement of experimental
    purposes. In addition any new flexible acquisition authorities that may
    be enacted. These authorities will ensure USSOCOM is able to leverage
    flexible, innovative acquisition methods afforded the Services. Title
    10 section 167 clearly states the Commander of USSOCOM shall be
    responsible for ``the development and acquisition of special
    operations-peculiar equipment'' with an acquisition executive
    ``responsible to the commander for rapidly delivering acquisition
    solutions'' and ``subordinate to the Defense Acquisition Executive in
    matters of acquisition, subject to the same oversight as the service
    acquisition executives.'' However, authorities often flow from Congress
    directly to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the
    Military Departments without specific mention of ASD (SO/LIC) or
    USSOCOM. Without explicit authorities, ASD(SO/LIC) and USSOCOM pursue
    individual staffing actions for required authorities. Recent examples
    include approval to conduct Other Transaction Authority for Prototype
    Projects and the authority to conduct Prize Challenges. We are working
    with the Department for the authority to engage in Grants and
    Cooperative Agreements. The pursuit of each of these individual
    authorities is time consuming and contrary to the intent of rapidly
    development capability for our operators. If it is the intent of
    Congress that USSOCOM acquisition exercise the same authorities as our
    service counterparts, ASD(SO/LIC) and USSOCOM would benefit from
    overarching language that recognizes USSOCOM's acquisition authority as
    equivalent to a Military Department.

        Senator Rounds. Cyber capabilities are critical when it
    comes to your operations as well. I suspect you would agree
    with that. Can you share with us right now your ability to
    maintain a cyber superiority with regard to the operations that
    your--let me put it this way. Clearly, you have to be able to
    maintain cybersecurity when it comes to your operations. Can
    you describe for us the challenges you have, shortcomings you
    may have, or needs that you may have with regard to
    cybersecurity capabilities?
        General Thomas. Senator, I would start by expressing my
    appreciation to CYBERCOM [United States Cyber Command] for the
    great capabilities that they have provided us, much like they
    have to other combatant commands, to first and foremost protect
    our infrastructure. Again, we have some very, very valuable
    resources to do that.
        Similarly, we are working with them closely to enhance our
    offensive capabilities, the cyber capabilities that must be
    integral to our approach to the full spectrum of combat
    operations going forward. Again, I think we have endeavored to
    have some pretty nuanced approaches, again thanks to CYBERCOM
    and others who have helped enable us.
        Senator Rounds. My time has expired.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you.
        Chairman McCain. Senator McCaskill?
        Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you both for being here and preparing for this
    hearing today.
        I wanted to emphasize at the start that, according to the
    materials I reviewed, countering Russian aggression is the
    number two priority.
        Is that correct, General Thomas?
        General Thomas. Senator, right now, that is the number two
    priority, although I would tell you it is being challenged by
    our preparations for Korea.
        Senator McCaskill. As I look at the map that we have, the
    only place you have more deployed other than EUCOM [United
    States European Command] is, in fact, CENTCOM, correct? It is
    the number two deployment?
        General Thomas. Yes, ma'am. That is accurate.
        Senator McCaskill. You have 1,400 forces deployed to
    protect against Russian aggression right now?
        General Thomas. Ma'am, working with our partners in the
    respective countries, we do.
        Senator McCaskill. In addition to that, could you ballpark
    how many other American military personnel are we putting on
    the frontlines to counter Russian aggression?
        General Thomas. Senator, I cannot speak specifically to the
    other complementary forces that are out there, other than to
    say that we are closely linked with them in terms of----
        Senator McCaskill. Would it be thousands of American
    military in the countries on the western border of Russia?
        General Thomas. Senator, I think you would have to discern
    between those assigned to Europe and additive forces. But I do
    not have the specific numbers.
        Senator McCaskill. Okay. The point I am trying to make is,
    we are putting real resources out there in the military going
    after Russian behavior. We have determined and you have
    determined, and the military leadership has determined, that
    Russia is a problem.
        I just want to emphasize that because it is frustrating to
    me that they try to break the backbone of democracies all over
    the world, and we consider it such a threat that we are putting
    the biggest treasure we have, which are the lives of men and
    women of our military, on the frontlines of this aggression,
    but there does not seem to be a sense of urgency about Russia.
    I wanted to underline that as I began.
        The other thing I want to talk to you about today is I had
    a chance to review the GAO [Government Accountability Office]
    report that was recently released. It is a classified report.
    Have you had a chance to look at that, General Thomas?
        General Thomas. Senator, I am not aware of that specific
    GAO report. Regarding what subject, ma'am?
        Senator McCaskill. Countering ISIS and its effects?
        General Thomas. I have not seen that report, no, ma'am.
        Senator McCaskill. I highly recommend it to you. I think it
    would be very helpful to you.
        Since you are the key DOD element responsible for global
    antiterrorism operations, several of the recommended oversight
    questions seem really particularly relevant to your command.
    For example, the problems that we are having, we have spent
    billions trying to train and equip the military in both Iraq
    and Afghanistan. Would you agree with that, General?
        General Thomas. We have, Senator.
        Senator McCaskill. We continue to spend billions trying to
    do both of those things, correct?
        General Thomas. Correct, Senator.
        Senator McCaskill. I am not sure that we are getting
    adequate information about how much success we have had. I
    think that it would be helpful to know what steps have been
    taken to address the challenges to train and equip regarding
    the underlying factors that have caused the personnel shortages
    in Iraq. We continue to have insufficient numbers of soldiers
    even to round out units in Iraq.
        I think with the amount of money we are spending, it would
    be great, you may not be prepared today, but since you all are
    so involved in the train and equip, it would be helpful for us
    to get more information about, what is the problem? Are we
    adjusting what we are doing? Or are we just pouring in money
    and still having folks walk away and still have people who we
    have trained and equipped show up on the other side?
        General Thomas. Senator, I can guarantee that for every
    problem that you have identified, we are endeavoring to try to
    rectify it. I will work with General Votel, the CENTCOM
    Commander, to make sure we get you a response on the record for
    the concerns that you have, ma'am.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        General Thomas. We continue to work closely with our CENTCOM
    partners in both Afghanistan and Syria. Specifically, in Afghanistan,
    we continue to take the fight to the Taliban and retain control of both
    major population centers as well as key lines of communication.
    Additionally, the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces have
    demonstrated the ability to rapidly respond to and reverse gains made
    by the Taliban during limited engagements. In Syria, over the past
    three years our partners have taken significant strides against ISIS.
    By successfully pushing ISIS out of numerous towns and cities while
    cutting key lines of communication, we have seriously damaged ISIS
    through significant losses in people and equipment which has led to a
    decreased capability to engineer offensives in Syria as well as
    orchestrating attacks against the United States directly. I defer to
    the CENTCOM Commander for more specific operational details in both
    Afghanistan and Syria.

        Senator McCaskill. I know that DOD recently revised the
    train and equip program in Syria. As you are well-aware, we had
    a number of problems, especially the first attempt at train and
    equip that was disastrous.
        Could you tell us what have been the results of the
    revisions that occurred in the train and equip mission in Syria
    in 2016?
        General Thomas. Ma'am, there are really two different
    programs that I think you are referring to there. One was the
    one that was certainly challenged. I think we have made great
    strides. I am hesitant to get into details in an open forum in
    terms of the very, very capable surrogate forces that we are
    now leveraging in Syria and certainly with the organic forces
    in Iraq. But we have gone----
        Senator McCaskill. I learned about some of that when I was
    in Jordan.
        General Thomas. Very good.
        Senator McCaskill. But what kind of assurances do you feel
    like we have now that the individuals associated with the
    terrorist organizations of either Syria or Iran are not
    benefiting from our train and equip missions?
        General Thomas. In my particular lane, where our special
    operations are supporting CENTCOM activities, I am very
    comfortable that we are vetting them to the degree that we are
    very certain that we are not contributing to those particular
    threat organizations.
        But, again, I will get you more for the record.
        Senator McCaskill. That would be terrific.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Tillis?
        Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Thomas, it is good to see you.
        Ms. Whelan, you as well.
        I was just back down at Fort Bragg a couple weeks ago. I
    get down there frequently, probably they are sick of seeing me.
    But it is such an important part of what we do globally that I
    want to send the message there.
        I know that many of my members have asked questions about
    the stress on the force and optempo and a number of those
    things. What I would like to maybe spend my time on has more to
    do with the employment side and my capacity as Personnel
    Subcommittee chair.
        I know that, in your opening testimony, you said we must
    continue to place the greatest emphasis on selecting,
    retaining, and empowering our people and sustaining them and
    their families.
        With two-thirds of the SOCOM force married, what more do
    you think we need to do? The nature of their mission is such
    that even the relative stress level has to be higher because
    there is so much that the person back stateside does not know
    what is going on.
        What do you think we need to do to more of to provide
    better support for the families of our SOCOM forces?
        General Thomas. Senator, I mentioned earlier to a similar
    question that I am very thankful to the committee that you have
    actually given us some tools that have allowed us to put our
    money where our intent is.
        I think, for years, our approach to family readiness was
    sort of, be ready, your spouse may or may not deploy. We did
    not actually build in specific resilience to that eventuality,
    the fact that it is on the training schedule, that you folks
    will deploy.
        We have also been able to leverage, as you might imagine,
    you described our operator experience, a lot of experience, a
    lot of repetitions downrange. Our spouses have had the same
    experience. We have been able to leverage their experience for
    how we can be more thorough in our preparation to build in the
    resilience and to deal with their problems as they occur over
    time.
        So, again, I am thankful that you have given us the means
    to get after this, and I think we are doing it much more
    comprehensively every day.
        Senator Tillis. Have you given any thought, as you are
    looking at recruiting and retention side of things, are there
    any things that have arisen, other things that we should
    consider to help you retain our best and brightest?
        If you cannot answer that in specifics now, we would like
    it for the purposes of the subcommittee so they can instruct
    our recommendations for the NDAA.
        But if you have any off the top of your head, Ms. Whelan,
    or you, General Thomas?
        General Thomas. Senator, I do not have any specific
    requirements right now. We are always looking to see, if and
    when retention challenges come up, how we can mitigate those.
    But at the moment, I do not have any specific requests.
        Ms. Whelan. Sir, we do not either. However, one of the
    issues that we will be looking at within SOLIC, and as part of
    the clarified responsibilities for SOLIC oversight, is this
    issue of retention and how we might be able to work with SOCOM
    to ensure that we have the resources we need.
        Senator Tillis. We just want to make sure that we get you
    the tools that you need, because it costs a lot of money to get
    these people to the level that they can be deployed, and we
    want to make sure that we focus on retention and valuing our
    men and women and their families.
        In my remaining time, I would like to talk a little bit
    about--I know the demand is outstripping supply in terms of
    your ability to fulfill all the demands. One question that I
    have is whether you believe, in some instances, because of the
    nature of funding and the nature of the conflicts we are in, if
    there is some amount of what your command focuses on that the
    need would be better satisfied by the service lines or others.
        In other words, if we have a legitimate demand for
    additional special operations, is there a component of the
    demand that you are fulfilling now that could arguably be
    fulfilled through some other vehicle outside of SOF?
        General Thomas. Senator, I field a similar line of
    questions from our Secretary of Defense consistently. We are
    looking at that very aggressively.
        Most recently, we completed our annual process to align
    forces 2 years out, so where we think special operations forces
    are required in priority relative to that of geographic
    combatant commanders. So it literally produced a one through
    end list of what we are doing in priority and a plan to discuss
    that in detail with the Secretary in terms of here is where we
    could offramp, and here is the risk or the price to be paid in
    terms of either cessation of missions or things of that like.
        But we are looking at that very closely, on how we can
    mitigate the pressure on the force in terms of number of
    missions we are doing.
        Senator Tillis. Thank you.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Blumenthal has arrived.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Thomas, your command now has responsibility for
    countering weapons of mass destruction across all of the
    combatant commands, correct?
        General Thomas. Senator, we are the coordinator for the
    Department of Defense. That is correct.
        Senator Blumenthal. Including use of chemical agents.
        General Thomas. That is correct, all elements of weapons of
    mass destruction.
        Senator Blumenthal. You may be familiar with a new Human
    Rights Watch report this week that cites a number of recent
    incidents, including the one April 4th that triggered our
    missile attack, but others in December 2016 when there were two
    and another in March 2017. All involved with the use of nerve
    agent weaponry in Syria. Apparently, they killed at least 159
    people, they reported in the New York Times.
        The New York Times reported, in addition, use of other
    chemical agents, principally chlorine, since the April 4th
    attack that led to our missile strike.
        Are you aware of that report? Do you have information to
    corroborate those reports?
        General Thomas. Senator, I have not seen that specific
    report. I am aware of all or most of those incidents. I am
    surprised you did not mention use of VX at the Malaysia
    International Airport as another egregious use of an incredibly
    nefarious weapons system in an open area.
        Senator Blumenthal. I am sure you have information about
    the support or complicity of the Russians in these attacks, do
    you not?
        General Thomas. Senator, I am aware of the nature of all
    those attacks and the actors involved. Again, probably in an
    open session, I would probably be circumspect to discuss the
    specifics of some of the intelligence that pertains.
        Senator Blumenthal. Would you be prepared to talk about
    Russian involvement in these attacks in a different setting?
        General Thomas. Senator, I would be glad to talk about any
    actors' involvement in any of these episodes.
        Senator Blumenthal. I am not sure exactly how to ask this
    question, General, and I hope you will bear with me.
        But is there a reason why the American people should not
    know about Russian complicity and involvement in these war
    crimes? They are war crimes. If the Russians are aiding and
    abetting them, why should the American people be denied that
    information?
        General Thomas. Senator, I think the American public should
    know the extent to whoever is employing weapons of mass
    destruction and chemical weapons. As much as we understand who
    and how, that could and should be divulged to the American
    public.
        Senator Blumenthal. So the rules about your providing us
    information in this setting are made by others, not by
    yourself, obviously, so I am not meaning any disrespect to you.
        But I am absolutely perplexed as to why we should not make
    more widely known the involvement of Russians in war crimes,
    only one of them so far widely reported, that led us to launch
    a missile strike at the base where Russians currently are
    stationed. They had to know about the use of sarin in that
    attack on Assad's own people.
        So I hope that we are able to disseminate that information
    more widely to the American people. I respect your position and
    the rules that apply to you. But you do have information about,
    let's call them other actors who are aiding and abetting Bashar
    al-Assad in these criminal attacks, murderous acts on his own
    people, is that correct?
        General Thomas. Senator, we are focused on everyone who is
    inclined to use these kinds of weapons.
        Senator Blumenthal. Is there any sort of defense that can
    be provided to the people of Syria by the United States against
    these types of weapons?
        General Thomas. Senator, as you might imagine, the
    equipment required for the array of weapons that may or may not
    still be in the Syrian arsenal would be extensive, so I am sure
    it is a daunting logistics challenge to try to provide that
    kind of equipment.
        Again, I think your first point, disrupting the use or the
    employment of the weapons systems is probably the most
    effective thing you could do.
        Senator Blumenthal. General, my time has expired. I really
    appreciate both you and Ms. Whelan being here today and your
    service to our Nation and the service of every single man and
    woman under your command. Thank you very much.
        Chairman McCain. I thank the witnesses. This hearing is
    adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:25 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Jim Inhofe
                            interagency integration
        1. Senator Inhofe. Ms. Whelan, in response to questioning from Rep.
    Stefanik in your May 2nd hearing before the HASC [House Armed Services
    Committee] Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, you said
    ``the challenge we are facing right now is how to achieve that level of
    exquisite integration across multiple components of--not only the
    Defense Department, but also the U.S. Government.'' Please amplify what
    concrete steps you are taking to achieve that level of integration
    across the whole-of-government?
        Ms. Whelan. Our adversaries have specifically calibrated their
    model of unconventional warfare to exploit the seams in our interagency
    process. We must bridge seams among U.S. Government departments and
    agencies in ways that go beyond mere procedural coordination, and we
    must operate with a shared purpose. For classification reasons, I
    cannot fully describe the range of these cross-functional teams in this
    document. That said, we have convened experts from across the DOD and
    other U.S. Government departments and agencies to understand our
    adversaries' strategy and operations. As we gain insight into one layer
    of the problem, we discover additional layers. After identifying the
    problem and understanding the environment, U.S. Government departments
    and agencies move to develop a solution. We have established new
    working groups to apply novel analytical capabilities, especially in
    the fields of information operations and indications and warning. We
    develop and test response options while drawing on history for operable
    models. Furthermore, many of the principles and structures developed
    during the long war against terror are applicable against other
    unconventional adversaries.
                                force structure
        2. Senator Inhofe. General Thomas, in response to my questioning
    regarding the adequacy of SOCOM force structure, you assured the
    Committee that SOCOM's force structure is adequate to maintain current
    commitments at your present operational tempo. Even still, you
    acknowledge that ``most Special Operations Forces units are employed to
    their sustainable limit.'' If an emergent situation causes demands for
    SOCOM forces to surge unexpectedly, what will be the impacts to
    existing critical SOCOM assigned missions/obligations?
        General Thomas. We believe that if called upon to surge
    unexpectedly in support of emergent situations we will sustain our
    assigned critical missions/obligations. After meeting the initial
    crisis requirement, if the contingency turns into a protracted
    engagement, SOCOM would have to re-level the battlefield in an effort
    to prevent creation of vacuums in critical Areas of Operations.

        3. Senator Inhofe. General Thomas, do you feel that you have
    sufficient Special Operations Forces available at any given time to
    respond to emerging crises?
        General Thomas. Yes, based upon our models and review of our
    required support to the most demanding current OPLAN [Operation Plans],
    we have determined that we will be able to support and meet most
    requirements under an emerging crisis. Our contingency response surge
    forces come from a combination of forces at the top end of the Train/
    Ready Pool and dynamic reallocation.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Joni Ernst
                        navy rotary wing support to sof
        4. Senator Ernst. Ms. Whelan and General Thomas, previously, the
    Navy had two dedicated special operations helicopter squadrons, HSC-84
    and HSC-85, both units part of Naval Air Forces Reserve. The Navy
    retrograded each of these squadrons from deployed positions in CENTCOM
    and PACOM respectively is order to disestablish them. After
    Congressional intervention, HSC-85 was not disestablished, and has
    returned, after more than a year recovering from diminished resources,
    to the PACOM area of operations in support of Special Operations
    Command Pacific.
        With HSC-84 disestablished, support for special operations forces
    training has drastically diminished, especially for Naval Special
    Warfare Command. Additionally, several combatant commander requests for
    forces (RFF) in support of component SOF have gone unfilled. Despite
    this reduction in rotary wing support from the Navy to SOCOM, the Navy
    has not published a plan for recapitalization of HSC-85's aging HH-60H
    helicopters. Ms. Whelan and General Thomas, are you concerned about the
    lack of attention the Navy is paying to these helicopter squadrons, on
    whom SOF forces have heavily depended for training and operational
    support since September 11, 2001?
        Ms. Whelan. USSOCOM is very dependent on Military Department
    support to enable Special Operations Forces (SOF) missions. During the
    fiscal year 2015 and 2016 budget cycles, the DOD carefully considered
    HSC-84/85 support to SOF in the program budget review. After
    discussions and deliberations between the U.S. Navy and USSOCOM during
    the fiscal year 2016 program budget review, USSOCOM decided to
    establish an internal capability to provide rotary-wing support for
    Naval Special Warfare Command training requirements. I am unable to
    speak for the U.S. Navy on its specific plans for recapitalizing aging
    HH-60H helicopters, but I support the Navy's plan to maintain the
    capability and capacity provided by its HSC 85 helicopters.
        General Thomas. Navy Rotary Wing Support to SOF is an important
    example of the necessity of support from the services to SOF. We are
    very appreciative of the tireless efforts in Congress to ensure this
    and many other critical support capabilities from the services continue
    without interruption. At this time, we are unable to speak for the Navy
    on their plan to recapitalize HSC-85's aging HH-60H helicopters. We
    have a keen interest in maintaining the capability and capacity
    provided by the Navy in the form of HSC-85 well into the future.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
                   socom cold weather training in the arctic
        5. Senator Sullivan. General Thomas, Russia has significantly
    expanded their presence in the Arctic, including two new Arctic
    brigades that regularly train and operate in the High North. Can you
    talk about the importance of cold weather training for Special
    Operators given current and emerging requirements? Given Russia's
    posture, do you see this need increasing or decreasing?
        General Thomas. Environmental training has always been and remains
    integral to USSOCOM and our Special Operations Forces. Our Special
    Operators consistently maintain and exploit movement in conventionally
    restricted operational terrain, including extreme cold weather
    environments to conduct specified Special Operations core activities.
    Arctic terrain is one of the most difficult to sustain, navigate and
    dominate but our Special Operators, at the team level (12-16
    personnel), are well trained and acclimated with the proper skills and
    equipment to infiltrate and attack line of communications, logistic
    bases, air defense sites, and command and control facilities. Given
    Russia's posture as you described it, I see this need as only
    increasing.

        6. Senator Sullivan. General Thomas, the diverse and expansive
    environment in Alaska, as well as opportunities for joint training with
    the Air Force, Army, and our National Guard--who have developed
    procedures to operate in extremely harsh Arctic conditions--makes
    training in Alaska ideal for preparing operators for cold-weather
    missions. Currently, the Naval Special Warfare Cold Weather Detachment
    on Kodiak, Alaska trains the next generation of Navy SEALs to operate
    in cold-weather, but not Arctic, conditions. Given emerging threats in
    the Arctic, are you exploring the possibility of increased Arctic
    training in Alaska to meet potential mission requirements in the High
    North?
        General Thomas. The training available to our Special Operations
    Forces at Naval Special Warfare Cold Weather Detachment Kodiak, Alaska
    is invaluable as it exposes every SEAL to the cold weather maritime
    environment during SEAL Qualification Training (SQT). The focus,
    historically, during the course was primarily cold water operations and
    was lacking in Artic terrain training, specifically the mountainous
    environment. USSOCOM has taken steps to incorporate basic
    mountaineering into the course at NSW Cold Weather Detachment Kodiak
    and NSW is presently realigning the placement of the curriculum during
    SQT to facilitate execution of SOF core activities with fully trained
    SEALs in a cold weather maritime environment.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
                  u.s. marine corp reserve component of socom
        7. Senator Nelson. Ms. Whelan and General Thomas, the U.S. Marine
    Corps is the only service without a Reserve unit within SOCOM.
    Currently, Marine Special Operators are being assigned to Reserve Force
    Reconnaissance units if they want to continue uniformed service by
    transition to the Reserve after their Active Duty service. Ms. Whelan
    and General Thomas, when will it be time to establish a Reserve Marine
    Special Operations component of SOCOM?
        Ms. Whelan. Neither SO/LIC nor USSOCOM is pursuing the
    establishment of a MARSOC [Marine Corps Forces Special Operations
    Command]-like unit in the Marine Corps Reserve Component at this time.
        General Thomas. MARSOC commissioned CNA, a nonprofit research and
    analysis organization, to study this issue. Specifically, CNA was asked
    to study the feasibility of the formation of a Marine SOF Reserve
    unit--that study was completed and delivered in January 2013. The study
    concluded that such a unit was not feasible or supportable for several
    reasons: MARSOC's small size and the current/projected low density of
    0372s (MARSOC's Active Duty structure includes just 859 Active Duty
    0372s). A concern across all services of maintain SOF Training and
    skill levels among guardsmen and reservists. The study instead
    recommended that MARSOC utilize the Individual Mobilization Augmentee
    Detachment (IMA Det) as a method to tap into those few 0372s within the
    Reserves. MARSOC has done this, and the IMA Det continues to provide
    Reserve 0372 Marines an opportunity to stay connected to special
    operations and to contribute to MARSOC's operational efforts. MARSOC
    and SOCOM can certainly re-evaluate this option if the Marine Corps
    increases the size and structure of MARSOC beyond its current size.

        8. Senator Nelson. Ms. Whelan and General Thomas, has SOCOM
    examined utilizing these blended Force Recon and MARSOC units to
    alleviate the demand on Active Duty SOCOM units?
        Ms. Whelan. Neither SO/LIC nor USSOCOM is pursuing the
    establishment of a MARSOC-like unit in the Marine Corps Reserve
    Component at this time. To date, there has not been a demand signal
    from USSOCOM to the Marine Corp for the creation of a MARSOC-like unit
    under the auspices of the U.S. Marine Forces Reserve.
        General Thomas. No, this is not currently an initiative that either
    MARSOC or SOCOM are exploring. MARSOC and SOCOM have instead focused on
    advancing integration and interoperability between conventional and SOF
    capabilities in the joint operating environment. The complexities of
    `blending' conventional units and SOF units are significant, even when
    considering conventional units as capable and well-trained as Marine
    Force Reconnaissance. There are major differences between the
    individual skills of Force Reconnaissance Marines and the individual
    skills of the Critical Skills Operators of MARSOC. Each community
    trains its Marines very aggressively so they can accomplish their
    prescribed missions. The missions, however, are quite different in many
    respects and have few points of overlap. Additionally, operational
    employment at the unit level requires months of unit training prior to
    deployment; such a unified training plan and subsequent deployment can
    only be accomplished with unified command and control. The Force
    Reconnaissance unit would need to be ``chopped'' to MARSOC and then
    operate under the existing MARSOC C2 structure. This also assumes that
    the Marine Force Reconnaissance community are available and not in
    demand for conventional operational employment; instead, Force
    Reconnaissance capabilities are operating at high tempo. This is not to
    say that conventional augmentation of SOF is infeasible. MARSOC has
    been augmented with specific individuals from the larger Marine Corps
    for operational employment multiple times. These individual
    augmentations have been very successful for several reasons: The
    augmentation was for staff and command and control at the Battalion
    level or higher. The augmentees possessed MOS skills that are not
    readily available within MARSOC. The individual Marines reported to
    MARSOC far enough in advance of the deployment to receive the training
    necessary to integrate into the SOF C2 node.
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Claire McCaskill
       gao report--countering isis and its effects, key oversight issues
        9. Senator McCaskill. General Thomas, what steps has the DOD been
    taking to address challenges to our train and equip program regarding
    the underlying factors that have caused Iraqi Security Forces personnel
    shortages?
        Public reporting, in the recent past, discussed how our train and
    equip program with Syrian opposition forces has been less than
    successful. The DOD recently revised this train and equip program in
    2016.
        General Thomas. Senator McCaskill, thank you very much for this
    question. However, I respectfully defer to the CENTCOM Commander for
    the specifics on the Syria Train and Equip revision.

        10. Senator McCaskill. General Thomas, what have been the results
    of the 2016 train and equip program revisions?
        General Thomas. We continue to work closely with our CENTCOM
    partners in both Afghanistan and Syria. Specifically, in Afghanistan,
    we continue to take the fight to the Taliban and retain control of both
    major population centers as well as key lines of communication.
    Additionally, the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces have
    demonstrated the ability to rapidly respond to and reverse gains made
    by the Taliban during limited engagements. In Syria, over the past
    three years our partners have taken significant strides against ISIS.
    By successfully pushing ISIS out of numerous towns and cities while
    cutting key lines of communication, we have seriously damaged ISIS
    through significant losses in people and equipment which has led to a
    decreased capability to engineer offensives in Syria as well as
    orchestrating attacks against the United States directly. I defer to
    the CENTCOM Commander for more specific operational details in both
    Afghanistan and Syria.

        11. Senator McCaskill. General Thomas, what assurances do you have
    that individuals associated with terrorist organizations or the
    governments of Syria or Iran are not receiving the benefits of this
    train and equip program?
        General Thomas. [Deleted.]
                             counter-russia efforts
        12. Senator McCaskill. General Thomas, to the degree that you can
    do so at an unclassified level, what specific actions have Special
    Operations Forces taken over the last two to three years aimed at
    countering Russian aggression?
        General Thomas. USSOCOM remains committed to continuing to enhance
    situational understanding of the environment as it relates to Russia
    and our Allies / Partners. As an integral part of USEUCOM's Global
    Campaign Plan--Russia (GCP-R), Special Operations Command Europe
    (SOCEUR) has developed a supporting plan to meet the objectives and
    tasks laid out in USEUCOM's OPLAN in countering Russian aggression.
    Broadly, SOCEUR is currently: Building Partner Capacity with NATO
    Allies and Partners to increase capacity and capability. Increasing
    interoperability between NATO Allies / Partner SOF and conventional
    forces to increase capacity and capability. Increasing interoperability
    between NATO Allies / Partner SOF and both USSOF and U.S. conventional
    forces to increase capacity and capability.
                                   __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
                        navy rotary wing support to sof
        13. Senator Blumenthal. Ms. Whelan and General Thomas, previously,
    the Navy had two dedicated special operations helicopter squadrons,
    HSC-84 and HSC-85, both units part of Naval Air Forces Reserve. The
    Navy retrograded these squadrons from deployed positions in CENTCOM and
    PACOM respectively in order to disestablish them. After Congressional
    intervention, HSC-85 was not disestablished, and has returned, after
    more than a year recovering from diminished resources, to the PACOM
    area of operations in support of Special Operations Command Pacific.
    With HSC-84 disestablished, rotary wing support for special operations
    forces training has drastically diminished, especially for Naval
    Special Warfare Command. Additionally, several combatant commander
    requests for forces (RFF) for rotary wing support of component SOF have
    gone unfilled. Despite this reduction in rotary wing support from the
    Navy to SOCOM, the Navy has not published a plan for recapitalization
    of HSC-85's aging HH-60H helicopters. Ms. Whelan and General Thomas,
    are you concerned about the Navy's lack of a sustainment plan for their
    single helicopter squadron dedicated to SOF support, on whom SOF forces
    have heavily depended for training and operational support since
    September 11, 2001?
        Ms. Whelan. USSOCOM is very dependent on Military Department
    support to enable Special Operations Forces (SOF) missions. During the
    fiscal year 2015 and 2016 budget cycles, the DOD carefully considered
    HSC-84 and HSC-85 support to SOF in the program budget review. USSOCOM
    decided to establish an internal capability to provide rotary-wing
    support for Naval Special Warfare Command training requirements after
    discussions and deliberations between the U.S. Navy and USSOCOM during
    the fiscal year 2016 program budget review. I am unable to speak for
    the U.S. Navy on its specific plans for recapitalizing aging HH-60H
    helicopters, but I support the Navy's plan to maintain the capability
    and capacity provided by its HSC 85 helicopters.
        General Thomas. Navy Rotary Wing Support to SOF is an important
    example of the necessity of support from the services to SOF. We are
    very appreciative of the tireless efforts in Congress to ensure this
    and many other critical support capabilities from the services continue
    without interruption. At this time, we are unable to speak for the Navy
    on their plan to recapitalize HSC-85's aging HH-60H helicopters. We
    have a keen interest in maintaining the capability and capacity
    provided by the Navy in the form of HSC-85 well into the future.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
                     countering weapons of mass destruction
        14. Senator Heinrich. General Thomas and Ms. Whelan, SOCOM has
    recently been entrusted with leading the important counter-Weapons of
    Mass Destruction mission for the Department. Do you anticipate any
    additional resource or personnel requirements to adequately support the
    Counter WMD mission?
        General Thomas. Yes, USSOCOM will have additional requirements to
    support the CWMD mission. However, before addressing requirements, I
    want to ensure the committee understands USSOCOM's new role with regard
    to DOD's CWMD mission. USSOCOM is not responsible for ``all things
    CWMD'' within DOD. This mission transfer from USSTRATCOM to USSOCOM is
    about advocacy and synchronization of DOD's CWMD planning efforts.
    Specifically, my charge, from the draft UCP, is to advocate for and
    synchronize DOD's CWMD efforts in support of other combatant
    commanders, Departmental priorities, and as directed, other U.S.
    Government agencies in support of the DOD CWMD Strategy. While this new
    role broadens USSOCOM's scope of responsibility, it remains separate
    and distinct from its current SOF specific CWMD roles; which it will
    maintain without change. USSOCOM anticipated additional requirements
    would be necessary to accomplish the recently assigned DOD CWMD Mission
    and is working through the Department's processes to realign resources
    to the Command. All funding and manpower currently maintained by
    USSTRATCOM will transfer to USSOCOM in fiscal year 2018. The transfer
    will be submitted to congress as part of the President's Budget
    submission. In the interim, USSOCOM has realigned operations and
    maintenance to initiate the transition. We have also executed interim
    bridge contracts to provide us manpower to facilitate the integration
    of the new mission into USSOCOM and develop the processes to execute
    the mission. It may take up to 2 years before all the necessary
    resources and validated headquarters manpower positions are in place or
    realigned (46 personnel at MacDill AFB and 58 personnel at Fort
    Belvoir). Next summer, I plan on conducting a review of our
    organizational construct, manpower, and resourcing to determine if we
    got it right. I believe we do, but I want to validate our construct and
    processes after completing several evolutions.
        Ms. Whelan. This change has been resource neutral for DOD as a
    whole. DOD continually analyzes resource and funding requirements as
    part of the normal staffing process for any planning effort. Most
    recently, during the fiscal year 2018 Program Review, some funds and
    human resources were reallocated from USSTRATCOM to USSOCOM for the
    Counter-Weapons of Mass Destruction mission in accordance with a
    jointly approved implementation plan. This has been reflected in the
    President's Budget. If General Thomas determines that there are
    additional resource requirements, he can bring those forward to DOD for
    consideration during the fiscal year 2019 Program Review.

        15. Senator Heinrich. General Thomas and Ms. Whelan, New Mexico is
    home to two national security laboratories which have a primary mission
    in nuclear weapons but also make significant contributions to chemical,
    biological, radiological and nuclear defense. I encourage you to
    partner with those laboratories when you need additional expertise and
    support. What plans, if any, do you have to partner with our national
    laboratories?
        General Thomas. USSOCOM has a long standing collaboration and
    partnership across the Department of Energy (DOE) as well as with the
    United States National Laboratories. These relationships span all
    aspects of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Our relationship and
    coordination with DOE is essential to the SOF CWMD mission; thus having
    a permanent DOE Liaison Officer on my staff. Their collective technical
    support and open collaboration is critical to our success as the nation
    addresses difficult challenges countering WMD. Specific to the DOE
    laboratory complex, USSOCOM historically executes projects with both
    Sandia and Los Alamos National Laboratories across multiple WMD
    disciplines. Additionally we have ongoing activities with Kansas City
    National Security Campus, and the Lawrence Livermore, Pacific
    Northwest, Nevada National Security Site, Savannah River, Idaho, and
    Oak Ridge National Laboratories. A recent visit to Sandia National
    Laboratory by the USSOCOM Deputy Commander further reinforced our
    partnership and showcased Sandia's ability to anticipate and resolve
    national security challenges. All that said, I see that we have a real
    opportunity in our new role to achieve two objectives with respect our
    lab partnerships: 1) achieve greater efficiency in the collaborations
    we encourage between DOD entities and our interagency (and in
    particular DOE) partners; and 2) enhance the output of knowledge,
    initial basic research, and potential new technologies to further
    strengthen our ``whole-of-government'' means to mitigate the threats
    from state and non-state actor interest and intent in development and
    acquiring WMD capabilities.
        Ms. Whelan. The DOD routinely relies on the national laboratories
    for their technical expertise in a wide range of scientific fields,
    including this area of national security concern. I defer to General
    Thomas for any specific plans that USSOCOM has for partnering with the
    national labs.
                    distributed common ground system (dcgs)
        16. Senator Heinrich. General Thomas, since fiscal year 2010, SOCOM
    has spent $367 million to develop, procure, operate, and maintain its
    DCGS-SOF program. From fiscal year 2018 through fiscal year 2020, SOCOM
    is expected to spend another $168 million on the program. It is my
    understanding that this program is still not fully fielded and is said
    to have performed poorly during its most recent user testing event. It
    is also my understanding that after repeated requests from deployed
    operators, SOCOM acquired a working commercial ``bridging'' alternative
    in 2016 which is already fully fielded and meeting the needs of users
    in combat. When will all elements of the DCGS-SOF program reach fully
    operating capability (FOC)?
        General Thomas. There are four components of Distributed Common
    Ground System-Special Operations Forces (DCGS-SOF); Silent Dagger,
    providing signals intelligence Processing, Exploitation and
    Dissemination (PED), and Full Motion-Video (FMV) PED, are fielded and
    operational now. DCGS-SOF Enterprise data search and discovery has been
    accessible on operational networks since 2012, however the value of
    Enterprise will not be fully realized until integration of analysis
    capabilities provided through the All Source Information Fusion (ASIF)
    component. ASIF is planned to begin fielding initial capabilities in
    the second quarter of fiscal year 2018 and be fully fielded in the
    third quarter of fiscal year 2020.

        17. Senator Heinrich. General Thomas, have there been any changes
    to cost and schedule estimates for full fielding?
        General Thomas. The initial goal of fielding All Source Information
    Fusion (ASIF) capabilities during the first quarter of Fiscal Year 2017
    was delayed for further refinement and integration into the Enterprise.
    Integration is ongoing with an evaluation planned in June 2017,
    followed by final testing in December 2017. Current cost estimates
    remain within budgeted amounts.

        18. Senator Heinrich. General Thomas, how many users are currently
    leveraging the commercial ``bridging'' solution? How many users are
    currently using the equivalent components of DCGS-SOF?
        General Thomas. The information below aggregates data for Secure
    Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet) users. The user base ranges
    from HQ USSOCOM, to Components, to Theater Special Operation Commands,
    and down to subordinate units. The commercial ``bridging'' solution
    data reflects fixed and tactical nodes, while the DCGS-SOF Enterprise
    has fixed nodes. Based on the most recent statistics from April 2017,
    commercial ``bridging'' solution users exceed 2,600 per month, and
    DCGS-SOF Enterprise are less than 100 per month. The DCGS-SOF user base
    will increase with integration and fielding of the ASIF capability.

        19. Senator Heinrich. General Thomas, if the commercial
    ``bridging'' solution is already providing working capabilities in
    combat, how much consideration has SOCOM given to moving away from
    DCGS-SOF toward a commercial solution?
        General Thomas. DCGS-SOF is an integration of Commercial-Off-The-
    Shelf and existing Government-Off-The-Shelf capabilities acquired
    through free and open competition and under a strategy of Government As
    Integrator (GAI). As part of the GAI strategy, SOCOM staff have
    assessed alternatives and determined the best value for the government
    at the time. Since December 2016, DCGS-SOF has had the direct attention
    of my senior level staff with bi-weekly updates to my Chief of Staff.
    SOCOM is planning an evaluation of DCGS-SOF Enterprise and ASIF
    capabilities in June 2017 with a program review at my level in July
    2017. I assure you DCGS-SOF is receiving considerable attention with
    all alternatives being considered.

        20. Senator Heinrich. General Thomas, what decision was made based
    on that consideration, and what were the rationale and justification
    behind that decision?
        General Thomas. The current DCGS-SOF strategy is Government As
    Integrator (GAI) to integrate best of breed commercial and existing
    government technologies through an open architecture. This allows the
    government to maintain control and flexibility of the solution and
    direct the evolution of capability through insertions of new and next
    generation technology. By managing the integration of multiple
    commercial capabilities, the government is not beholden to a single
    commercial entity. The bridging solution provides significant
    capabilities to SOF, however it does not meet all of our requirements
    and it is expensive. The GAI strategy can provide capabilities that
    exceed the current bridging solution while managing costs over the long
    term. I assure you we are taking a hard look at the current strategy
    and the program review in July 2017 will assess progress to determine
    if a change in strategy is warranted.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
                             acquisition processes
        21. Senator Hirono. Ms. Whelan and General Thomas, the
    congressional armed services committees have brought about many
    acquisition improvements to the DOD acquisition process, including the
    Rapid Innovation Fund, which awards of $250 million in follow-on Phase
    III funding. Has SOCOM been able to benefit from some of these
    streamlined acquisition processes? Do you have recommendations for
    other segments of the acquisition process that should be reviewed or
    could be improved?
        Ms. Whelan. ASD Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC)
    and USSOCOM have indeed benefitted from the many acquisition process
    improvements, and we appreciate congressional efforts to streamline our
    ability to develop and deliver capability to Special Operations Forces
    rapidly. In fiscal year 2017, USSOCOM received $3 million in Rapid
    Innovation Funds (RIF) and plans to use these funds to bridge the gap
    from concept/idea development resulting from its numerous innovation
    activities, such as SOFWERX, into either science and technology
    activities or, when ready, directly into a program of record. These
    funds will help ensure our special operators have the opportunity to
    take part in the development and assessment of promising technologies.
    SO/LIC also has used RIF Phase III in the Combating Terrorism Technical
    Support Office (CTTSO), which develops cutting-edge technologies for
    and with special operations forces (SOF) and all of DOD, law
    enforcement, other U.S. Government departments and agencies, and
    international partners. CTTSO will use $2.5 million of fiscal year 2016
    RIF Phase III for projects such as ``Speech Technologies in Tracking,
    Targeting, and Locating in Noisy Environments'' and ``Portable
    Petroleum Identification Device'' (fuel authentication). The speech
    technologies project will support USSOCOM, the High-Value Detainee
    Interrogation Group (HIG), and others, and we expect it to provide a
    real-time, high-performance capability to collect and process audio
    signals in noisy environments. The fuel authentication project also
    supports USSOCOM and seeks to develop a capability to identify whether
    or not petroleum products originate from a legitimate source. We are
    currently in the process of evaluating projects for fiscal year 2017
    RIF Phase III and expect to execute $3.0 million in such projects. In
    addition to the RIF, Phase III, SOF has benefitted from other
    acquisition process improvements such as the Secretary's Rapid
    Acquisition Authority (RAA). In 2012, USSOCOM used $91 million in RAA
    to upgrade much of the PC-12 light mobility aircraft fleet to highly
    capable U-28A models for intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance. We work diligently to ensure that acquisition
    authorities are as available to USSOCOM as they are to the Military
    Departments. Relevant statutes often vest acquisition-related authority
    in the Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the Military
    Departments without specific mention of ASD(SO/LIC) or Commander,
    USSOCOM. We then have to make a case requesting that the Department
    provide USSOCOM with those additional authorities. The DOD continually
    looks for ways to improve its requirements and acquisition processes.
    To improve its rapid acquisition capability, DOD has established the
    Quick Reaction/Rapid Acquisition Community of Interest to expedite the
    acquisition of warfighter capabilities. ASD(SO/LIC) and USSOCOM are
    active participants in this group of 20 organizations led by the
    Director, Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, in OUSD(AT&L).
        General Thomas. Yes, USSOCOM has benefited from and is very
    appreciative of the efforts to streamline our ability to rapidly
    develop and deliver capability to Special Operations Forces.
    Specifically, USSOCOM requested and received $3 million Rapid
    Innovation Funds. Our intention is to utilize these funds to bridge the
    gap from concept/idea development resulting from our numerous
    innovation activities, such as SOFWERX, into either science and
    technology activities or, when ready, directly into a program of
    record. These funds will assist in funding projects and ensuring our
    military operators have the opportunity take part in the development
    and assessment of promising technologies. We do not seek any specific
    additional changes to other segments of the acquisition process but we
    continue to seek the same authorities as our Service acquisition
    counterparts. Title 10 section 167 clearly states the Commander of
    USSOCOM shall be responsible for ``the development and acquisition of
    special operations-peculiar equipment'' with an acquisition executive
    ``responsible to the commander for rapidly delivering acquisition
    solutions'' and ``subordinate to the Defense Acquisition Executive in
    matters of acquisition, subject to the same oversight as the service
    acquisition executives . . . '' Relevant statutes often flow from
    Congress directly to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of
    the Military Departments without specific mention of ASD(SO/LIC) or
    USSOCOM. Without explicit authorities, ASD(SO/LIC) and USSOCOM pursue
    individual requests through the Department for required authorities.
    Recent examples include approval to conduct Other Transaction Authority
    for Prototype Projects and the authority to conduct Prize Challenges.
    We are currently working with the Department for the authority to
    engage in Grants and Cooperative Agreements.
                         navy seal submarine equipment
        22. Senator Hirono. Ms. Whelan and General Thomas, the SEAL
    Delivery Vehicle and the dry deck shelter are projects the Navy has
    been working to facilitate Navy SEAL access to areas of operation. This
    was recently demonstrated when the Ohio-class, guided-missile submarine
    Michigan deployed to the South Korean port of Busan equipped with a dry
    deck shelter. How important is this equipment in terms of the Navy Seal
    mission? Are program requirements being met? Do you have any concerns
    with the acquisition of these two systems?
        Ms. Whelan. SOF units require specialized underwater systems that
    improve their warfighting capability and survivability in harsh
    operating environments. The SEAL Delivery Vehicle (SDV) and Dry Deck
    Shelter (DDS), when coupled with fleet support, provide the Department
    of Defense a unique capability to access denied waters and coastlines.
    These assets can fulfill critical Intelligence Community collection
    requirements and, when needed, provide the ability to engage the enemy
    successfully and conduct operations associated with SOF maritime
    missions. SOF's primary undersea mobility concern is the capability gap
    created by the scheduled decommissioning of the Ohio-class Guided
    Missile Submarines (SSGNs). SSGNs serve as SOF's Large Volume Host
    (LVH) and can support two DDSs for deployed SOF operators and command
    and control. Two DDSs enable deployed SOF to launch more frequent
    sorties and self-recover disabled SDVs. When unforeseen contingencies
    arise, launching a second SDV or quick reaction force may be the only
    way to preserve life and execute the mission. In addition, LVHs provide
    greater available capabilities and increased space for necessary
    berthing, planning, medical support personnel, and mission-critical
    materiel storage. As the four SSGNs are decommissioned between 2026 and
    2028, SOF will lose its LVH capability. This will result in a severe
    degradation of SOF maritime capabilities. Although U.S. Special
    Operations Command (USSOCOM) is working with the Navy staff to mitigate
    the risks associated with the impending LVH loss, the Navy must balance
    fiscal constraints and competing strategic priorities within the
    submarine force against SOCOM's LVH requirement. Between fiscal year
    2018 and fiscal year 2020, USSOCOM's Underwater Systems program will
    replace the SDV with the next-generation SEAL delivery platform, the
    Shallow Water Combat Submersible (SWCS). The SWCS will continue to use
    the DDS as ocean interface with submarines. USSOCOM and the Navy are
    modernizing the six DDSs in inventory and are working to outfit the
    DDSs with the ability to mate with multiple submarine hosts, improving
    the DDSs availability. These two systems are dependent on a decreasing
    number of suitable host submarines; and, due to cost constraints, fewer
    submarines will be certified to conduct Special Operations than
    originally envisioned. Finally, USSOCOM's Underwater Systems program is
    developing the Dry Combat Submersible (DCS). The DCS will better allow
    the insertion and extraction of SOF and other payloads at strategic
    distances into denied areas. As this capability becomes available,
    integrating it into the fleet will be critical. In order to do so,
    USSOCOM and the Navy must address interoperability and certification.
        General Thomas. SOF have conducted missions in the most challenging
    environments, including undersea clandestine insertion, using combat
    submersibles and SOF operators launched and controlled from specially
    configured host submarines. These missions, involving some of the more
    sensitive and important operations pursued by the U.S. military, have
    taken place across a spectrum of locations, conditions, and threats.
    The SEAL Delivery Vehicle (SDV), launched from a host submarine
    equipped with a Dry Deck Shelter (DDS) is the most capable means of
    accessing high threat and denied areas. We are concerned that the four
    SSGNs are being decommissioned in the 2020s with no plans to
    reconstitute the unique Large Volume Host Submarine (LVHS) capability.
    These four submarines are significantly more capable than existing
    Virginia-class submarine hosts and have payload and habitability
    capacity to support extended, flexible SOF operations. The dual DDS
    capability provides SOF undersea mobility redundancy, quick reaction
    forces, and personnel recovery. There is sufficient volume for special
    mission equipment, dedicated mission planning spaces, and berthing. The
    DDS has undergone a successful service life extension reaching into the
    2040s and there are 11 SDVs in Sustainment.
                          force structure requirements
        23. Senator Hirono. General Thomas, do you see the current trend to
    rely on Special Ops forces as a long-term reality? If there is a long-
    term increase, do you have the force structure you need? If not, what
    is your best estimate of the force structure increase required to
    maintain sustainable dwell times, morale and effectiveness for SOCOM?
        General Thomas. There are sufficient SOF to respond to most
    emerging crises currently in the world today. The size of SOF is driven
    by the rotational base needed to meet day-to-day global operations in
    support of counterterrorism, counter-WMD, and Building Partnership
    Capacity goals. USSOCOM's force structure is deemed sufficient to meet
    National Crisis Response and Counter Terrorism requirements, but SOF is
    continually assessing the force to ensure that it will be able to
    support the national strategy. USSOCOM's Campaign Plan is designed to
    meet Steady State and Operational Plans, but all SOF operations/
    deployments require the Service's Combat Support/Combat Service Support
    to provide the necessary temporary infrastructure that does not exist
    in most areas of operations. With multiple contingencies to execute, a
    risk assessment and prioritization of the specific requirements,
    capability and capacity dedicated to the operations must continuously
    be analyzed to determine the optimum force levels. SOF continues to
    relook the Component force mix and specific skill sets necessary to
    build the force of the future. Constructing the force of the future
    while maintaining the current force creates an environment of competing
    strategies to meet the possible emerging threats through
    reconstitution, training, equipping, while developing new areas of
    expertise. This effort continues to stretch the boundaries of SOF's
    creativity, flexibility, adaptability, and resiliency. Compiling all of
    these metrics will force SOF to remain adaptable as it expands its
    capability and capacity to meet any emerging threats.

        24. Senator Hirono. Ms. Whelan and General Thomas, do you think
    that we as a country are relying too heavily on the Special Ops forces
    to handle too many missions? As the Special Ops end strength grows, do
    we run the risk of hitting a point where the ``special-ness'' of the
    force begins to deteriorate?
        Ms. Whelan. The DOD is very sensitive to the demands that we place
    on USSOCOM and special operations forces to meet our national security
    requirements and objectives. We always strive to match requirements
    with the best capabilities to achieve those objectives. Our Global
    Force Management process helps us in allocating the right force,
    including special operations forces, against the highest priorities.
    Yes, we recognize special operations forces are in high demand and are
    heavily committed to multiple missions. Where and when we can, DOD
    transitions missions to other forces, as appropriate. But, considering
    the current security environment, I envision that special operations
    forces will continue to be asked to do quite a bit into the foreseeable
    future. As for end-strength growth and deterioration of the ``special''
    in special operations forces, I defer to General Thomas to assess the
    effects on his Command's unique qualities.
        General Thomas. Although I do not think that we rely on SOF to
    perform too many missions, I recognize we are close, and have at times
    come dangerously close to doing so. I am therefore constantly vigilant
    to prevent over use of SOF. SOF is relevant against all of the threats
    facing us in this rapidly changing security environment, and we will
    remain so in the future. The seemingly ever-increasing demand for SOF
    causes us to prioritize the sourcing of the requirements the Global
    Combatant Commanders place upon us, and the Departments' National
    Military Strategy informs that prioritization. As our numbers grow, we
    do indeed risk losing that which makes Special Operations Forces truly
    special. For that reason, the vigilance that I mentioned above includes
    a special care to ensure that our standards and processes for
    recruiting, assessment, selection, and training of special operations
    personnel remain inviolate. Because our people are our most precious
    asset and that which make SOF truly special, I will continue to
    prioritize our efforts to grow, sustain, and take care of our force and
    their families.
                        navy rotary wing support to sof
        25. Senator Hirono. Ms. Whelan and General Thomas, the Navy
    previously operated two dedicated special ops helicopter squadrons,
    HSC-84 and HSC-85 as part of the Reserves. Plans were made to
    deactivate these squadrons, which supported CENTCOM and PACOM. After
    Congressional intervention, HSC-85 was not deactivated, and has
    returned to the PACOM area of operation. SOCPAC relies heavily on this
    support. With HSC-84 deactivated, support for special operations forces
    training has been reduced, especially for Naval Special Warfare
    Command. What are the impacts of the reduced level of support with the
    deactivation of one of these squadrons? Does it negatively impact
    readiness and capabilities of special operations forces which we rely
    on heavily? Are requests for support going unfulfilled?
        Ms. Whelan. USSOCOM has internally reallocated some of its rotary
    wing assets to support prioritized Naval Special Warfare Command
    training and readiness requirements. As with any limited resource,
    training support requests are prioritized and some lower priority
    requests may not be fulfilled.
        General Thomas. Navy Rotary Wing Support to SOF is an important
    example of the necessity of support from the services to SOF. We are
    very appreciative of the tireless efforts in Congress to ensure this
    and many other critical support capabilities from the services continue
    without interruption. As mentioned, the disestablishment of HSC-84 has
    had significant impact on the force. Rotary wing training requests have
    gone unfilled approximately ten percent more since their deactivation.
    This deficiency is primarily felt by the Naval Special Warfare and
    Marine Special Operations Commands. However, we are mitigating such
    shortfalls by leveraging bilateral training opportunities between the
    Special Operations Aviation Regiment and these units to the maximum
    extent possible through our Joint Air Asset Allocation Program.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Gary Peters
                                    sofwerx
        26. Senator Peters. General Thomas, thank you for your testimony on
    SOFWERX and response to my question and questions from my colleagues.
    Please provide a representative sample of solutions successfully
    developed by SOFWERX, to include context on the problem SOFWERX
    attempted to solve and how SOFWERX collaborated with individuals, the
    private sector, and academia to develop a solution.
        General Thomas. Through efforts at SOFWERX we have been able to
    identify and discover many new and novel technologies, capabilities,
    ideas and process to facilitate accelerating the acquisition cycle.
    These efforts begin with building a robust network across many
    spectrums of innovation in the private and academic sectors, commercial
    markets and the DOD. A representative sample includes the following:
    New Products: Through rapid prototyping efforts, SOFWERX has produced
    new designs for consideration to enable more rapid follow-on
    acquisitions for: Prototype/initial design for next generation
    communication systems for SOF vehicles for consideration in future
    acquisition strategies Concept and initial design for new bow bumpers
    for SOF boats that are in prototype manufacturing for further testing
    Developed Casualty Evacuation modifications for MRZR SOF vehicles--
    provided to units for local build Initial design studies for
    weaponizing SOF surface combatant boats for consideration in future
    acquisition strategies SOFWERX has conducted or facilitated rapid
    evaluation of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products for potential
    SOF use, either for immediate needs or for future concepts: Go-Tenna:
    Allows use of cell phones as point to point and network radios;
    analyzed and prototyped alternative antennas for SOF use Open source
    software--enables rapid fielding of capabilities, especially with
    partner nations Commercial drones--both how to use them with COTS
    software for radically low-cost ISR, as well as how to exploit current
    drones for Counter-Unmanned Air System capabilities SOFWERX has proven
    to be a venue which attracts unique products for potential SOF use,
    which has reduced barriers to entry and has facilitated interaction
    with new and unique suppliers: Hendricks Motor Sports STEED--an
    electric powered cart to increase range of SOF tactical units Fly-board
    Air--Novel single-man flying machine invented in France Virtual Reality
    Demo--Enabled operators to experiment with next-generation Virtual
    Reality/Augmented Reality systems. New Ideas: SOFWERX has aided in
    inspiring and inaugurating new ideas that can transform how SOF
    approaches thinking and solving the most challenging problem sets: Use
    of biological models as a means to better understand counter-terrorism
    Next generation design concepts to power Light Tactical All-Terrain
    Vehicles (fuel cells, hybrid, etc.) Non-Radio Frequency communications
    for SOF (e.g. magnetic resonance) for enhanced survivability. New
    Business Models: SOFWERX is a springboard for using new business models
    to reach non-traditional business partners, technologists, hackers/
    makers and other individuals with novel solutions: Developing a SOF-
    unique workflow on Amazon to potentially enable rapid discovery/
    purchase/delivery of equipment for partnered operations Fostering new
    solutions to SOF problems through prize challenges; 10 prize SOF prize
    challenges have been executed to date Fostering new solutions to SOF
    problems (especially in the data arena) with Hackathons. Hackathons
    have also identified a large pool of local talent which can be
    leveraged to solve SOF problems. New Networks: SOFWERX has enabled us
    to establish and broaden our relationships with a wide spectrum of non-
    traditional DOD partners: SOFWERX has already established a network of
    over 6000 members Academia--USF is now developing advanced payload
    solutions for SOF cubesats Hacker/Maker network--400+ non-DOD
    affiliated hackers and makers are networked in with SOFWERX. SOFWERX is
    being dubbed as the `friendly feds' space, allowing access to ideas,
    products, and innovations Far Ridgeline Reviews--enables us to assemble
    world-leading talent on specific challenges to include most recently a
    session on Machine Learning. More information on many other events and
    activities to include Hackathons, Science, Technology, Engineering and
    Math (STEM) events in the local community can be found on the SOFWERX
    website at sofwerx.org.
                           homeland security and wmd
        27. Senator Peters. General Thomas and Ms. Whelan, how does SOCOM
    coordinate with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in countering
    weapons of mass destruction to protect the Homeland?
        General Thomas. One of my responsibilities as the DOD's
    synchronizer of CWMD planning is to ensure the Department's efforts
    support our U.S. Interagency partners. The coherent application of all
    instruments of U.S. national power is required to counter weapons of
    mass destruction and their enablers successfully. To enhance these
    linkages, I have integrated our interagency partners, to include the
    Department of Homeland Security, into DOD's CWMD Transregional
    Synchronization Process and as active participants in our community of
    action. I am establishing a User Defined Operational/Intelligence
    Picture that will allow not only all of DOD to share critical
    information but will also allow USG IA to participate. As we further
    develop CWMD User Defined Operational/Intelligence Picture, I see a
    real opportunity to use this vehicle and newly invigorated coordination
    and collaboration mechanisms to drive more cooperation, prioritization,
    and urgency of addressing as far left of event as possible the
    potential for sensitive materials or actual WMD to cross into the
    United States. Additionally, I am going to capitalize on our already
    widespread SOF network to help foster a routine battle rhythm that
    builds common understanding with the Interagency in an effort to
    further enhance effectiveness and unity of effort across the USG CWMD
    efforts This network includes Special Operations Support Teams (SOSTs)
    located throughout the interagency, to include DHS. I plan to leverage
    these resources as the DOD Synchronizer. I am committed to placing the
    right people within and around the USG interagency and with our Partner
    Nations to ensure close relationships--relationships that enable us to
    coordinate our efforts, collaborate to solve problems, and understand
    each other's roles and responsibilities.
        Ms. Whelan. As DOD synchronizer of countering weapons of mass
    destruction (CWMD) planning, USSOCOM ensures that DOD efforts support
    partners throughout the U.S. Government. In order to counter WMD
    effectively, all instruments of U.S. national power must be
    synchronized. To achieve that objective, USSOCOM is facilitating the
    integration of the Department of Homeland Security, along with other
    interagency partners, into DOD's CWMD Transregional Synchronization
    Process. Moreover, USSOCOM is building a User-Defined Operational/
    Intelligence Picture that will allow U.S. Government departments and
    agencies to share critical information. Finally, the well-established
    special operations forces (SOF) network of Special Operations Support
    Teams (SOSTs) creates a liaison network throughout these departments
    and agencies that enables coordination, collaboration, and mutual
    understanding.

        28. Senator Peters. General Thomas and Ms. Whelan, does SOCOM
    notify Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and DHS of threats of WMD or
    sensitive materials that could be headed to the United States' borders
    or ports of entry?
        General Thomas. USSOCOM's new role and responsibilities as
    synchronizer of DOD CWMD planning efforts will not change how CBP or
    DHS are notified of potential threats to the United States. Those
    processes are well established through the Intelligence Community,
    USNORTHCOM, and other USG Departments and Agencies.
        Ms. Whelan. The processes for notifying CBP or DHS are well-
    established through the Intelligence Community, USNORTHCOM, and other
    U.S. Government departments and agencies. USSOCOM's new role and
    responsibilities as DOD CWMD planning synchronizer will not change how
    CBP or DHS are notified of potential threats to the United States.

        29. Senator Peters. General Thomas and Ms. Whelan, what role does
    SOCOM have in informing or participating in the development of
    technology to detect proliferation threats?
        General Thomas. WARCOM maintains a 1.0 Riverine detachment
    capability. Each detachment consists of 2 x SOC-R Boats and 15
    Personnel. The SOC-R detachment is deployed under Force Tracking Number
    6170CTS3411 in support of the SOUTHCOM Theater Campaign Plan conducting
    theater security co-operation missions as well as prepared to conduct
    contingency operations and directly support the Counter-Drug/Counter
    Narco-Terrorism lines of effort in the SOUTHCOM AOR. The SOC-R
    detachment is deployed to Columbia.
        Ms. Whelan. USSOCOM enables technology development toward detecting
    proliferation threats by investing in emerging technology and informing
    technological trends. For instance, USSOCOM has played a long-standing
    role in developing SOF capabilities to detect, track, and defeat
    proliferation threats. With the participation of the Geographic
    Combatant Commands, USSOCOM will assess DOD's CWMD efforts as part of
    an overall DOD CWMD Campaign Plan. This allows USSOCOM to identify and
    prioritize gaps and seams, which in turn allows USSOCOM to synchronize
    mission demand with capabilities requirements and to advocate for
    studies and resource development.

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2018 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                              TUESDAY, MAY 9, 2017

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                          UNITED STATES CYBER COMMAND

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in Room
    SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Wicker,
    Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Perdue,
    Graham, Sasse, Strange, Reed, Nelson, McCaskill, Shaheen,
    Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King,
    Heinrich, Warren, and Peters.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman McCain. Good morning.
        The committee meets today for a hearing on the posture of
    the United States Cyber Command.
        We are pleased to welcome back Admiral Mike Rogers, the
    Commander of U.S. Cyber Command, Director of the National
    Security Agency, Chief of the Central Security Service, and
    several other titles I believe. We are grateful for your many
    years of distinguished service and for your appearance before
    the committee today.
        Threats to the United States in cyberspace continue to grow
    in scope and severity. But our Nation remains woefully
    unprepared to address these threats, which will be a defining
    feature of 21st Century warfare.
        As a result, this committee has focused its attention on
    cybersecurity. We have expressed our concern at the lack of a
    strategy and policy for addressing our cyber threats. We were
    hopeful that after years without any serious effort to develop
    a cyber deterrence policy and strategy from the last
    administration, the new administration promised one within 90
    days of the inauguration. But 90 days have come and gone and no
    such policy and strategy have been provided.
        While inaction from the executive branch has been
    disheartening, this committee has not stood still. In fact,
    this committee has adopted more than 50 provisions over the
    past 4 years focused on organizing, empowering, and enabling
    the Department of Defense to deter and defend against threats
    in cyberspace.
        But cyber is an issue that requires an integrated, whole-
    of-government approach. We simply do not have that now. The
    very fact that each agency of government believes it is
    responsible for defending the Homeland is emblematic of our
    dysfunction. We have developed seams that we know our
    adversaries will use against us. Yet, we have failed to summon
    the will to address these seams through reform.
        Our allies, most notably, the United Kingdom, have
    recognized the need for a unified approach. I look forward to
    hearing from Admiral Rogers his assessment of the recently
    established National Cyber Security Centre in the UK [United
    Kingdom] and whether a unified model would help address some of
    our deficiencies here in the United States.
        The Coast Guard also presents an interesting model that
    should be evaluated for addressing some of our cyber
    deficiencies. The Coast Guard has an interesting mix of
    authorities that may be just as applicable in cyberspace as
    they are in territorial waters. They are both an agency within
    the Department of Homeland Security, as well as a branch of the
    Armed Services. They can operate both within the United States
    and internationally and can seamlessly transition from law
    enforcement to military authorities. A cyber analogue to the
    Coast Guard could be a powerful tool for addressing gaps that
    impede our existing organizational structure. It could also
    serve as a much-needed cyber first response team responsible
    for immediate triage and hand-offs to the appropriate federal
    entity for further response, remediation, or law enforcement
    action.
        As for the efforts at the Department of Defense, I
    understand that Cyber Command is still on track to reaching
    full operational capability for the training of the Cyber
    Mission Force in the fall of 2018. But unless we see dramatic
    changes in future budgets, I am concerned these forces will
    lack the tools required to protect, deter, and respond to
    malicious cyber behavior. In short, unless the services begin
    to prioritize and deliver the cyber weapons systems necessary
    to fight in cyberspace, we are headed down the path to a hollow
    cyber force.
        I also am concerned with the apparent lack of trained
    people ready to replace individuals at the conclusion of their
    first assignments on the Cyber Mission Force. Unfortunately, we
    have already heard about some puzzling issues. Specifically,
    out of the 127 Air Force cyber officers that completed their
    first tour on the Cyber Mission Force, none went back to a
    cyber-related job. That is unacceptable and suggests a
    troubling lack of focus. It should be obvious the development
    of a steady pipeline of new talent and the retention of the
    ones we have trained already is essential to the success of the
    Cyber Mission Force.
        Admiral Rogers, we look to you to help us better understand
    if we should take a closer look at if the existing man, train,
    and equip models of the services are sufficient or if we should
    consider a different model. Later this week, we plan to have
    another cyber hearing with outside experts of which we plan to
    ask if we should be considering the creation of a cyber
    service.
        Admiral Rogers, welcome back. This is, I am sure, one of
    numerous pleasures you have of coming before this committee.
    Welcome.
        Senator Reed?

                     STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let
    me join you in welcoming Admiral Rogers. As you point out, Mr.
    Chairman, the frequency with which the Admiral is called up to
    testify to the committee is a testament of not just his
    importance, but the importance of cyber in the severe
    challenges we face in this domain. So, again, thank you
    Admiral, for your service and your dedication.
        We have faced serious and growing threats in cyberspace,
    from espionage, theft of intellectual property, and destructive
    attacks on the networks and systems that support our military
    and our economy, including critical infrastructure. Now we and
    our allies in Europe are experiencing firsthand that we are
    also vulnerable to the manipulation and distortion of
    information through cyberspace, which Russia is exploiting to
    threaten the bedrock of our democracy and our shared
    international institutions.
        The Armed Services Committee has for years emphasized the
    importance of developing the means and the strategy to deter
    cyber attacks. Now the scope of what we must defend against and
    deter has expanded, and the task takes on even greater urgency.
        In just a year's time, we begin an election season once
    more, and the intelligence community has warned that Russia's
    election interference is likely to be a new normal.
        While our decentralized election system has been designated
    as critical infrastructure, we lack an effective integrated and
    coordinated capability to detect and counter the kind of
    influence operation that Russia now routinely and continuously
    conducts. We do not yet have a strategy or capability to deter
    such actions through the demonstrated ability to conduct our
    own operations of this type.
        Secretary Carter commissioned a Defense Science Board task
    force on cyber deterrence. Prominent former officials, such as
    former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Dr. James Miller,
    served on this task force and have testified to this committee
    twice this year. They advocate rapidly developing the ability
    conduct operations for cyberspace to threaten, quote, what key
    leaders on the other side value the most, which in the case of
    Russia could included their own financial wellbeing and status
    in order to deter influence operations and cyber attacks
    against us.
        Achieving a credible deterrent requires integration of
    capabilities and focused policy development across the
    Department of Defense, as well as through the whole-of-
    government involving DOD [Department of Defense], the State
    Department, the intelligence community, DHS [Department of
    Homeland Security], and the Justice Department. We have not
    seen evidence yet that the new administration appreciates these
    urgent problems and intends to address them.
        For Cyber Command, specifically the committee has heard
    concerns that our military cyber forces are almost exclusively
    focused on the technical aspects of cyberspace operations, such
    as detecting network intrusions, expelling intruders, and
    figuring out how to penetrate the networks of adversaries. The
    concern is that this focus misses the crucial cognitive element
    of information operations conducted through cyberspace. Those
    actions are designed to manipulate perceptions and influence
    decision-making.
        Admiral Rogers, these are critical issues, and there is
    much work to do, and I look forward to your testimony and your
    views on these urgent matters. Thank you, sir.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Welcome back, Admiral.

    STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL MICHAEL S. ROGERS, USN, COMMANDER, UNITED
                    STATES CYBER COMMAND; DIRECTOR,
       NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY; CHIEF, CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICES

        Admiral Rogers. Thank you, sir.
        Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and members of the
    committee, thank you for your enduring support and the
    opportunity today to talk about the hardworking men and women
    of United States Cyber Command. I welcome the opportunity to
    describe how Cyber Command conducts efforts in the cyberspace
    domain and supports the Nation's defense against sophisticated
    and powerful adversaries.
        The Department of Defense recognized 7 years ago that the
    Nation needed a military command focused on cyberspace. U.S.
    Cyber Command and its subordinate elements have been given the
    responsibility to direct, operate, secure, and defend the
    Department's systems and networks which are fundamental to the
    execution of all DOD missions.
        The Department and the Nation also rely on Cyber Command to
    build ready cyber forces and to be prepared to employ them when
    significant cyber attacks against the Nation's critical
    infrastructure require DOD support.
        The pace of international conflict and cyberspace threats
    has intensified over the last few years. Hardly a day has gone
    by during my tenure at Cyber Command that we have not seen at
    least one significant cybersecurity event occurring somewhere
    in the world. This has consequences for our military and our
    Nation at large. We face a growing variety of advanced threats
    from actors who are operating with evermore sophistication,
    speed, and precision. At U.S. Cyber Command, we track state and
    non-state adversaries as they continue to expand their
    capabilities to advance their interests in and through
    cyberspace and try to undermine the United States national
    interests and those of our allies.
        Conflict in the cyber domain is not simply a continuation
    of kinetic operations by digital means. It is unfolding
    according to its own logic, which we are continuing to better
    understand. We are using this understanding to enhance the
    Department and the Nation's situational awareness and
    management of risk.
        I want to update you on our initiatives and plans to
    address that issue of situational awareness and risk
    management.
        Our three lines of operations are to provide mission
    assurance for DOD operations and defend the Department of
    Defense information environment; to support joint force
    commander objectives globally; and to deter and defeat
    strategic threats to U.S. interests and critical
    infrastructure.
        We conduct full spectrum military cyberspace operations to
    enable actions in all domains, ensure the U.S. and allied
    freedom of action in cyberspace, and deny the same to any
    adversaries.
        Defense of DOD information networks remains our top
    priority, of course, and that includes weapon systems,
    platforms and data. We are completing the build-out of the
    Cyber Mission Force, as you heard the chairman indicate, with
    all teams scheduled to be fully operational by the end of
    fiscal year 2018. With the help from the services, we are
    continually increasing the Cyber Mission Force's readiness to
    hold targets at risk.
        Your strong and continuing support is critical to the
    success of the Department in defending our national security
    interest, especially as we comply with the recent National
    Defense Authorization Act directive to elevate Cyber Command to
    unified combatant command status. As you well know, I serve as
    both Commander of U.S. Cyber Command and Director of the
    National Security Agency. This dual-hat appointment underpins
    the close partnership between Cyber Command and NSA [National
    Security Agency], a significant benefit in cyberspace
    operations. The institutional arrangement for providing that
    support, however, may evolve as Cyber Command grows to full
    proficiency in the future. The National Defense Authorization
    Act in a separate provision also described conditions for
    splitting the dual-hat arrangement once that can happen without
    impairing either organization's effectiveness,. This is another
    provision I have publicly stated that I support pending the
    attainment of certain critical conditions.
        Cyber Command will also engage with this committee on
    several other matters relating to the enhancement of the
    Command's responsibilities and authorities over the coming
    year. This would include increasing our cyber manpower,
    increasing the professionalization of the cyber workforce,
    building capacity, and developing and streamlining acquisition
    processes. These are critical enablers for cyberspace
    operations in a dynamically changing global environment.
        Most or all of these particulars have been directed in
    recent National Defense Authorization Acts, and along with the
    Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Joint
    Staff, we will work with you and your staffs to iron out the
    implementation details.
        Cyber Command personnel are proud of the roles they play in
    our Nation's cyber efforts and are motivated to accomplish
    their assigned missions overseen by the Congress and
    particularly this committee. They work to secure and defend
    DOD's systems and networks, counter adversaries, and support
    national and joint warfighter objectives in and through
    cyberspace. The Command's operational successes have validated
    concepts for creating cyber effects on the battlefield and
    beyond. Innovations are constantly emerging out of operational
    necessity, and the real world experiences we are having in
    meeting the requirements of national decision-makers and joint
    force commanders continue to mature our operational approaches
    and effectiveness over time.
        This, combined with agile policies, faster decision-making
    processes, increased capabilities, broader concepts of
    operations and smarter command and control structures, will
    ensure that Cyber Command attains its full potential to counter
    adversary cyber strategies.
        The men and women of Cyber Command thank you for your
    support and appreciate your continued support as we confront
    and overcome the challenges that lie ahead of us. We understand
    that a frank and comprehensive engagement with Congress not
    only facilitates the support that allows us to accomplish our
    mission, but it also ensures that our fellow citizens
    understand and endorse our efforts executed on their behalf. I
    have seen the growth in the Command's size, budget, and
    mission. That investment of resources, time, and effort is
    paying off, and more importantly, it is helping to keep
    Americans safer not only in cyberspace but in other domains as
    well.
        I look forward to continuing the dialogue of the Command
    and its progress with you in this hearing today and in the
    months to come. I look forward to answering your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Rogers follows:]

                Prepared Statement by Admiral Michael S. Rogers
        Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and Members of the Committee,
    thank you for your enduring support and the opportunity today to
    represent the hard-working men and women of United States Cyber Command
    (USCYBERCOM). I welcome the opportunity to describe how USCYBERCOM
    leads Department of Defense (DOD) efforts in the cyberspace domain and
    supports the nation's defense against sophisticated and powerful
    adversaries.
        The Department of Defense recognized seven years ago that the
    nation needed a military command focused on cyberspace. USCYBERCOM and
    its subordinate elements have been given the responsibility to direct,
    operate, and secure the Department's systems and networks, which are
    fundamental to the execution of all DOD missions. The Department and
    the nation also rely on us to build ready cyber forces and to be
    prepared to employ them when significant cyber-attacks against the
    nation require DOD support.
        USCYBERCOM has been a sub-unified command under U.S. Strategic
    Command (USSTRATCOM) since its creation in 2010. The command includes
    six operational-level headquarter elements, assisted by U.S. Coast
    Guard Cyber, a component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
    USCYBERCOM's action arm is the Cyber Mission Force (CMF), which
    comprises 133 teams and is continuing to build to a total of
    approximately 6,200 military and civilian personnel. All of those CMF
    teams reached at least initial operational capability in 2016. Many
    have attained full operational capability (FOC), and I expect all of
    them will attain FOC status by 1 October 2018, just 15 months from now.
        I want to update you on our initiatives and plans for that time to
    come. Our three lines of operations are to provide mission assurance
    for DOD operations and defend the Department of Defense information
    environment; to support joint force commander objectives globally; and
    to deter or defeat strategic threats to U.S. interests and critical
    infrastructure. We conduct full spectrum military cyberspace operations
    to enable actions in all domains, ensure U.S. and Allied freedom of
    action in cyberspace, and deny the same to our adversaries. I have
    asked that our Command and its components focus their efforts in
    several areas to ensure we can accomplish missions, both now and in the
    future. Defense of DOD information networks remains our top priority,
    of course, and will move this beyond a network focus to one that
    includes weapon systems/platforms and data. We will also continue
    progress on the CMF build and attainment of FOC for all teams, while
    increasing the CMF's readiness and its ability to hold targets at risk.
    We will posture the CMF to deliver effects across all phases of
    operations; to improve operational outcomes by increasing resilience,
    speed, agility, and precision; to generate operational outcomes that
    support DOD strategy and priorities; to create a model for successful
    Reserve and National Guard integration in cyberspace operations; and
    finally to strengthen partnerships across the government, with our
    allies, and with the private sector.
        Your strong and continuing support is critical to the success of
    the Department in defending our national security interests, especially
    as we comply with the recent National Defense Authorization Act
    directive to elevate USCYBERCOM to unified combatant command status. As
    you well know, I serve as both Commander of USCYBERCOM and Director of
    the National Security Agency and Chief, Central Security Service (NSA/
    CSS). This ``dual-hat'' appointment underpins the close partnership
    between USCYBERCOM and NSA/CSS--a significant benefit in cyberspace
    operations. The institutional arrangement for providing that support,
    however, may evolve as USCYBERCOM grows to full proficiency in the
    future, as I shall explain below.
                          the cyber threat environment
        The pace of international conflict and cyberspace threats has
    intensified over the past few years. We face a growing variety of
    advanced threats from actors who are operating with ever more
    sophistication and precision. At USCYBERCOM we track state and non-
    state adversaries as they continue to expand their capabilities to
    advance their interests in and through cyberspace and try to undermine
    the United States' national interests and those of our allies.
        America faces multiple challenges from non-state cyberspace actors
    who impact our citizens and our economy, which now depends on trusted
    data. For instance, over the last year we have seen increased use of
    ransomware against individuals and businesses who find their data
    locked and are forced to pay in order to regain control of their files
    and intellectual property. Such threats primarily fall under the
    jurisdiction of law enforcement authorities, particularly the Federal
    Bureau of Investigation and the Secret Service. Nevertheless, criminal
    actors become a military concern when malicious state cyber actors pose
    as cyber criminals, or when cyber criminals support state efforts in
    cyberspace. This means that we take notice when cybercriminals employ
    tactics, techniques and procedures used by state adversaries.
        My main concern relates to state-based cyber actors, whose
    malicious activities have only intensified since I spoke to this
    Committee last year. As we have seen, cyber-enabled destructive and
    disruptive attacks now have the potential to affect the property,
    rights, and daily lives of Americans. We are particularly concerned as
    adversaries probe and even exploit systems used by government, law
    enforcement, military, intelligence, and critical infrastructure in the
    United States and abroad. We have seen states seeking to shape the
    policies and attitudes of democratic peoples, and we are convinced such
    behavior will continue for as long as autocratic regimes believe they
    have more to gain than to lose by challenging their opponents in
    cyberspace.
        At the operational level of conflict, states are incorporating
    cyber effects to support their military operations. As early as 2008,
    for instance, the Russian incursion in Georgia was accompanied by a
    denial-of-service attack against Georgia's government Internet services
    as well as the defacement of content on official web pages. We are not
    yet seeing true, combined-arms operations between cyber units and
    ``kinetic'' missions, although we have spotted hints of this occurring
    in Syria and Ukraine as the Russians attempt to boost the capabilities
    and successes of their clients and proxies. In general, these and other
    conflicts feature cyber operations by all sides; Russian government
    sites, for example, have sporadically been attacked by sympathizers
    from Ukraine. Advanced states continue to demonstrate the ability to
    combine cyber effects, intelligence, and asymmetric warfare to maintain
    the initiative just short of war, challenging our ability to react and
    respond. Further, states clearly continue to leverage cyberspace to
    conduct significant, widespread, intelligence operations. Access to
    large volumes of data enable Insider threats; defending against these
    is a critical requirement of the current and future landscape.
        U.S. Cyber Command has seen indications that several states are
    investing military resources in mining the networks of the Department
    of Defense and its contractors. On a daily basis, state cyber actors
    coordinate and execute exploits and scans of the DOD Information
    Networks (what we now call the DODIN) as well as related governmental
    and private systems. These activities are often automated, and they can
    include well-crafted spear-phishing expeditions. We assess that the
    motivation behind these efforts is predominantly espionage, but the
    mere possibility that an adversary might establish a persistent
    presence in DOD networks is always a grave concern; such intrusions,
    when they occur, are quite disruptive and expensive to remediate.
        A still-greater concern is the persistence of adversary attempts to
    penetrate critical infrastructure and the systems that control these
    services. We assess that several countries, including Iran, have
    conducted disruptions or remote intrusions into critical infrastructure
    systems in the United States. Last year, for example, the Justice
    Department announced indictments of seven Iranians for cyber
    disruptions of U.S. financial institutions. The Attorney General
    reported that 46 U.S. companies together suffered tens of millions of
    dollars in losses as a result of the attacks. In addition, in late 2015
    a malware tool (Black Energy) identified in energy-sector systems
    worldwide was implicated in a malicious cyber attack against Ukrainian
    power systems. The Department of Homeland Security has been warning
    systems administrators at critical infrastructure sites in the United
    States and abroad about sophisticated cyber threats from malicious
    actors employing Black Energy. In December 2015, the cyber actors who
    had deployed Black Energy in Ukraine briefly cut off electricity to
    hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians, possibly in support of Moscow's
    aims in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. Infiltrations in United States
    critical infrastructure--when viewed in the light of incidents like
    these--can look like preparations for future attacks that could be
    intended to harm Americans, or at least to deter the United States and
    other countries from protecting and defending our vital interests.
        Violent extremist organizations constitute another focus for
    USCYBERCOM. For over a decade, they have used the Internet to publicize
    their malicious actions to intimidate opponents and win sympathizers.
    As we know from the reporting and analysis of respected journalists and
    think tanks, groups like ISIS conduct sophisticated multi-media
    campaigns that spread its messages swiftly and globally. While ISIS
    uses the Internet to recruit followers and solicit contributions in the
    West, its media campaign also effects viewers closer to home in the
    Middle East, boosting morale among ISIS fighters, frightening
    opponents, and promoting the false narrative that the Arab future
    inevitably belongs to a radical Salafist brand of Sunni fundamentalism.
    This information campaign through cyberspace has directly and
    indirectly impacted Americans, inciting attacks on Americans and the
    citizens of our European allies, who have suffered even worse assaults
    than we have seen here. Legitimate Internet media outlets obviously
    have no interest in lending social spotlights to terrorists by hosting
    violence or propaganda material, and regularly remove these messages
    and advertisements when they spot them (or the content is brought to
    the companies' attention). Yet ISIS is resilient and persistent, and
    continues to spread its message. In addition, ISIS and other violent
    extremists communicate over encrypted channels to maintain command and
    control of their operatives and forces.
        Examples like these foretell an uncertain future. Several trends
    could complicate it still further, like the growing ``Internet of
    Things'' providing millions of new Internet-connected devices for
    adversaries to exploit. Today, consumers who can hardly keep up with
    patching their laptops and updating their cellphone operating systems
    are wondering how to upgrade the firmware on their home security
    cameras or Wi-Fi extenders to keep their families and homes from being
    victimized by malicious cyber actors. Technological developments are
    outpacing laws and policies, and indeed will have long-term
    implications that we have only begun to grasp.
                        u.s. cyber command in operation
        Hardly a day has gone by during my tenure at USCYBERCOM that we
    have not seen at least one significant cyber security event occurring
    somewhere in the world. This has consequences for our military and our
    nation at large. I want to reiterate what I told this Committee last
    year: every conflict around the world now has a cyber dimension.
    ``Cyber war'' is not some future concept or cinematic spectacle, it is
    real and here to stay. The fact that it is not killing people yet, or
    causing widespread destruction, should be no comfort to us as we survey
    the threat landscape. Conflict in the cyber domain is not simply a
    continuation of kinetic operations by digital means, nor is it some
    Science Fiction clash of robot armies. It is unfolding according to its
    own logic, which we are continuing to better understand. We are using
    this understanding to enhance the Department's situational awareness
    and manage risk. In light of this trend, I am convinced that we as a
    nation created our own military capability in cyberspace not a moment
    too early. Our government and military have gone from wondering whether
    we have a systemic computer security problem to recognizing that the
    problem can spread in seconds.
        Let me explain how our Department of Defense cyberspace capability
    has progressed at USCYBERCOM over the last year. The Cyber Mission
    Force attained initial operational capability, with the last team
    reaching this milestone in October 2016. Our component commanders are
    moving out to ensure our people get training and certifications
    required to reach full operational capability for each CMF team.
    Achieving FOC, however, is not the ultimate goal. We must ensure the
    CMF also achieves and sustains a high level of readiness, just like any
    other military force.
        My first mission priority as Commander of USCYBERCOM remains the
    defense of the DOD information network, which encompass millions of
    network devices, hundreds of thousands of users, well over ten thousand
    network enclaves, the data they carry, and the networked technology
    embedded in weapon systems and other operational platforms. Real-world
    defensive cyberspace operations have sharpened USCYBERCOM's ability to
    detect, confine, and eradicate threats from DOD networks and systems.
    At the same time, adversary cyberspace operations have grown more
    sophisticated and assertive, resulting in intrusions that have strained
    the abilities and capacity of DOD cyber forces. With broad authorities
    to operate within DOD networks, USCYBERCOM has been able to experiment
    with operational models and tradecraft, improving the effectiveness and
    efficiency of defensive missions. Our techniques are being adopted and
    refined across the force, making intrusion response more predictable
    and effective. USCYBERCOM has improved DOD network defenses through the
    implementation of new authorities, innovative command and control
    structures, and operations informed by offensive planning and
    intelligence (particularly signals intelligence).
        USCYBERCOM executes its DODIN defense mission in part through Cyber
    Protection Teams (CPTs)--the defense-focused forces within the CMF.
    These teams have real-world experience dealing with sophisticated
    intruders in DOD systems. The CPTs conduct internal defensive measures
    to protect key DOD terrain in cyberspace, coordinating with local
    defenders in the cybersecurity service providers, including those
    aligned to USCYBERCOM under Global Force Management guidance. The CPTs
    work with system owners, administrators, and local network defenders to
    find vulnerabilities and hunt for intruders inside DOD networks. This
    approach embodies the Department's shift to an operational mindset.
    Should adversary activity be detected, CPTs track, confine, and expel
    malicious actors using time-tested doctrinal principles consistent with
    those employed in the other domains. CPTs share what they learn with
    other network defenders, offensive operations planners, and the
    Intelligence Community. USCYBERCOM's continual efforts to adapt to the
    shifting threat environment have resulted in considerable gains to
    DODIN security and resiliency.
        In addition, as the operational sponsor of the Joint Information
    Environment (JIE), USCYBERCOM is working with partners to improve the
    security of the DODIN. These efforts include implementation of Joint
    Regional Security Stack (JRSS) enterprise cybersecurity capabilities,
    integration of IT systems management into the cyberspace operations
    framework, and development of technical and operational frameworks that
    will enable establishment of comprehensive cybersecurity practices
    within DOD and mission partners.
        The Defense Information Systems Agency serves as DOD's ``Internet
    service provider'' and thus plays a vital role in securing and
    defending the DODIN. Its director is dual-hatted as the commander of
    one of USCYBERCOM's operational components, Joint Force Headquarters
    (JFHQ)-DODIN, which is tasked with directing and executing global DODIN
    operations and defensive cyberspace operations. This component oversees
    the Command Cyber Readiness Inspection (CCRI) process in collaboration
    with local network administrators. CCRIs help JFHQ-DODIN assess DODIN
    systems for compliance with cybersecurity directives and USCYBERCOM
    orders; inspections thus support USCYBERCOM and DOD Chief Information
    Officer-led efforts to improve the Department's cybersecurity
    accountability.
        USCYBERCOM works with the Services, NSA and the Defense Cyber Crime
    Center (DC3) to ensure the CPTs are optimally manned, trained, and
    equipped. This includes development and acquisition of new capabilities
    as technology advances; the building of realistic training
    environments; and resourcing and refining of new models for CPT
    deployment and operations. USCYBERCOM also seeks to enhance the
    Department's situational awareness of the status of the DODIN and
    adversary activities, to extend protection from the network level down
    to weapons systems, and to develop capabilities and common approaches
    for linking cybersecurity risk (beyond compliance) to mission assurance
    in order to inform warfighting decisions and mitigation efforts.
        USCYBERCOM's missions extend far beyond the defense of the DODIN.
    In particular, the Command supports the geographical and functional
    combatant commands in their operations and missions. This is the
    business of the USCYBERCOM's Cyber Combat Mission Force. The Cyber
    Combat Mission Force is the operational-level offensive forces of the
    CMF, comprising Combat Mission Teams (CMTs) and Combat Support Teams
    (CSTs), aligned to the combatant commands to support their execution of
    military operations. The CMTs and CSTs are manned, trained, and
    equipped by their parent services, which exercise oversight of the
    combat forces they generated through the Joint Force Headquarters
    (JFHQ) associated with each Service cyber component.
        USCYBERCOM is working to synchronize cyber planning and operations
    across the entire joint force. Since gaining the Secretary of Defense's
    approval for this proposal in early 2016, USCYBERCOM has implemented a
    process to allocate limited CMF resources among the commands as ``high-
    demand, low-density'' military assets. Currently in implementation,
    this process will enable USCYBERCOM to balance national and
    operational-level priorities, enabling the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
    of Staff to guide the former through the Command in a crisis while
    providing tailored capacity forward to support the combatant commands
    when a situation moves towards actual conflict. USCYBERCOM is also
    helping the combatant commands build cyber effects into their planning
    processes so that cyberspace missions are synchronized with operations
    in the other domains. Indeed, in some situations, USCYBERCOM is the
    supported command.
        Achieving Full Operational Capability in the Cyber Mission Force is
    our goal, but we acknowledge that reaching that milestone is only a
    capability metric and not a measure of overall readiness. CMF readiness
    is a shared responsibility between USCYBERCOM and the Services, and
    over the last 15 years of conflict we have recognized the costs of
    continuous operations and seen those costs grow the most in ``high-
    demand, low-density'' units--like our CMF teams. We employ teams before
    they are FOC, which is comparable to employing fighter squadrons before
    they are fully manned or equipped. Achieving and sustaining readiness
    is going to require a comprehensive set of solutions, ranging from an
    agreed upon readiness model between USCYBERCOM and the Services, to
    ensuring the manpower depth necessary to accommodate professional
    development, technical proficiency, and career predictability. I am
    confident we will achieve Full Operational Capability by our 30
    September 2018 deadline, but I acknowledge that the true challenge will
    be sustaining the readiness of the CMF and the remarkable men and women
    who serve within the teams. We have a duty to them, and we must ensure
    that they are well trained, prepared, and mission-ready.
        USCYBERCOM is executing its missions to support operations against
    violent extremists, especially across the U.S. Central Command's area
    of responsibility (and is helping U.S. Special Operations Command's
    efforts as well). About a year ago, Secretary Carter facilitated this
    support by issuing an execute order that, among other things, helped
    USCYBERCOM by authorizing us to ``task organize'' for specific missions
    expected to last weeks, months, or longer. The result of this change
    was a new organization, Joint Task Force (JTF)-Ares, established by me
    as the Commander of USCYBERCOM in the spring of 2016 to coordinate
    cyberspace operations against ISIS. JTF-Ares' mission is to provide
    unity of command and effort for USCYBERCOM and coalition forces working
    to counter ISIS in cyberspace. The JTF model has helped USCYBERCOM to
    direct operations in support of USCENTCOM operations, and marks an
    evolution in the command-and-control structure in response to urgent
    operational needs.
        JTF-Ares has helped strengthen unity of efforts against ISIS across
    international coalition and domestic partners, reinforcing USCYERCOM's
    informal role as a hub for whole-of-government cyber planning and
    execution against terrorist organizations and targets. Cyber effects
    can be achieved at-scale and with remarkable synchronization when
    mission partners share plans, accesses, capabilities, and tactics in
    support of common objectives. USCYBERCOM, working with the National
    Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and the various departments and agencies
    engaged in this campaign, is using opportunities such as the defeat-
    ISIS campaign to build trust among operational partners.
        USCYBERCOM expects to make progress through 2018 in several key
    areas. The Command will complete the CMF build, work with DOD partners
    to equip the CMF, resource and refine command-and-control structures
    and processes, and develop policies, plans, and operational concepts
    that support national-level and joint warfighting needs. USCYBERCOM
    seeks with DOD and Intelligence Community partners to overcome
    organizational and technological challenges associated with supporting
    offensive operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical
    levels. Finally, USCYBERCOM will collaborate with allies and partners
    to enable collective defense and develop cyber ``response actions''
    that provide options to decision makers from pre-crisis through kinetic
    operations across all phases of conflict.
        Defending the nation in cyberspace is complex in both technical and
    policy terms. Like all combatant commands, USCYBERCOM is authorized
    only on order from the President (or the Secretary of Defense if the
    President is unavailable) to defend against a threat to the nation that
    would qualify as a ``use of force'' under international law. The Cyber
    National Mission Force (CNMF) focuses on countering adversaries'
    malicious cyber activities against the United States and prepares to
    conduct full-spectrum cyber operations against adversaries when
    directed. The CNMF is building a force of National Mission Teams
    (NMTs), National Support Teams (NSTs), and National Cyber Protection
    Teams (N-CPTs). Partnering with NSA, the CNMF tracks adversary cyber
    actors to gain advantages that will enable the United States to
    preclude cyber-attacks against U.S. national interests. The CNMF is
    working with operational partners to develop and exercise the
    capabilities and operational concepts needed to enable combined and
    coalition operations (when authorized) in partnership with other
    government and appropriate private-sector partners.
        USCYBERCOM manages only a portion of the ``whole-of-Nation'' effort
    required to defend America's critical infrastructure. The Command works
    with civilian agencies under their authorities to help protect national
    critical infrastructure and to prepare for scenarios in which U.S.
    military action to defend the nation may be required. \1\ The Command
    is expanding its ties with the Reserves and the National Guard. Indeed,
    cyber response teams operating under Guard authorities can perform a
    variety of missions in support of state, local, and private entities
    (which operate independently under their own authorities). Recent
    legislation to incentivize information sharing will also help the
    Command and DOD to work more closely with the private sector in
    mitigating threats outside of government and military systems. The
    federal government has created a framework for implementing official
    channels to share information, and clarifying the lanes in the road for
    U.S. Government assistance to the private sector. Whatever USCYBERCOM's
    ultimate role in that process is determined to be, I continue to tell
    all audiences that we adhere strictly to the Constitution and law in
    guarding civil liberties and privacy.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The Department of Justice (particularly the Federal Bureau of
    Investigation) is the lead for cyber-related investigations and law
    enforcement, while the Department of Homeland Security takes the lead
    for national protection and recovery from cyber incidents.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Command is increasing its efforts in the areas above in
    alignment with the 2015 DOD Cyber Strategy. The Department, as you
    know, is engaged in a broad effort to improve the security of its
    information enterprise and to build a culture of cybersecurity. Doing
    so requires measures well beyond hardening the network architecture,
    and it cannot be accomplished in just a year or two, even with
    unlimited resources. The strategy is to replace the old infrastructure,
    to harden what we are maintaining while increasing its capability, and
    to grow a workforce possessing outstanding cybersecurity awareness and
    practices. Beyond that, we must understand that determined adversaries
    can sometimes bypass even the best security, and thus we must build our
    skills, as well as an operational mindset, for defeating them in our
    own networks.
        These efforts, of course, depend on skilled, focused, and motivated
    people in a trained and ready force. USCYBERCOM tapped the expertise of
    NSA to deliver intensive training for cyber personnel, initially taking
    the lead in training operators from the Service cyber components who
    graduate to join the CMF teams. This hybrid arrangement will come to an
    end, with the Services resuming responsibility and authority for
    training CMF personnel at the end of 2018. In keeping with DOD's Total
    Force concept, the Reserve component and the National Guard will also
    help to build the force. This requires flexibility with organizational
    requirements and manning standards, but it is already helping to
    increase the manpower and expertise we can put against some of our most
    difficult challenges.
        USCYBERCOM is maturing its methods for identifying requirements and
    developing capabilities. The Command last year established a
    capabilities development team for performing this task, and that group
    has already done much good. It is doing so not only by working with
    industry, academia, and other agencies to identify promising ideas, but
    also in learning how to utilize the data we already generate from our
    own operations (particularly on DOD systems) to spot useful and/or
    anomalous patterns. The Command generally lacks NSA's authorities in
    acquiring the tools for such initiatives, but Congress recently
    authorized USCYBERCOM acquisition authority for up to $75 million each
    year through the end of fiscal year 2021 to rapidly deliver acquisition
    solutions for ``cyber operations-peculiar'' capabilities. We look
    forward to reporting to the Committee soon on how we are executing this
    authority.
        USCYERCOM has now matured to the point where it brings vital
    capabilities to the defense of American interests on a daily basis. In
    light of the increasing severity of cyber threats, Congress in the
    National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2017 directed the
    President to elevate USCYBERCOM to the status of a full unified
    combatant command. Elevation implicitly recognizes the importance of
    cyberspace to our national security. I support this step, although the
    timing and process for elevation are being worked out within the
    Department, and we expect to have more details to report to the
    Committee as they emerge. We will pay particular attention to the
    implementation of the Act's provisions regarding authority for the
    acquisition of ``cyber operations-peculiar'' capabilities. As you know,
    the language in this section parallels that granted to U.S. Special
    Operations Command. USSOCOM's requirements, however, are not always
    congruent with those to support operations in the cyberspace domain,
    and thus authorities in the one field might not always be directly
    analogous to those in other. We are working with Committee staff to
    ensure that our implementation comports with Congress's intent.
        The recent National Defense Authorization Act in a separate
    provision also described some conditions for splitting the ``dual-hat''
    arrangement, once that can happen without impairing either
    organization's effectiveness. This is another provision I have publicly
    stated I support pending the attainment of certain crucial conditions.
    I have offered this caveat because the challenges in cyberspace are
    some of the greatest facing America. Meeting tomorrow's threats
    requires leaders who can devote their time and energy to building the
    capabilities of USCYBERCOM and NSA while guarding the rights and
    liberties of U.S. persons protected by our Constitution. We have not
    yet matured the Command to a point where splitting the two hats would
    not functionally impair mission effectiveness. If that point is reached
    on my watch, I intend to keep the Committee fully informed of the
    conditions set for the split and how they are met.
        USCYBERCOM will also engage with this Committee on several other
    matters relating to the enhancement of the Command's responsibilities
    and authorities over the coming year. These would include enhancing the
    professionalization of the cyber workforce, building capacity and
    developing capabilities, and streamlining acquisition processes. Most
    or all of these particulars have been directed in recent National
    Defense Authorization Acts; and along with the Office of the Secretary
    of Defense for Policy and the Joint Staff, we will be talking with you
    and your staffs to iron out the implementation details.
                                   conclusion
        Thank you for inviting me to talk with you today about U.S. Cyber
    Command and its work. The Cyber Mission Force approaching full
    operational capability, and USCYBERCOM is poised to become a mature
    unified combatant command. USCYBERCOM personnel are proud of the roles
    they play in this endeavor, and are motivated to accomplish the many
    missions assigned to them and overseen by the Congress, particularly
    this Committee. They work to counter adversaries and support national
    and joint warfighter objectives in and through cyberspace on a
    previously unattainable scale and in a sustainable manner. Innovations
    are constantly emerging out of operational necessity. These, if
    supported with agile policies, decision-making processes, capabilities,
    concepts of operation, and command and control structures, will help
    USCYBERCOM realize its potential to counter adversary cyber strategies
    in and through cyberspace. The Command's full-spectrum successes have
    validated concepts for creating cyber effects on the battlefield and
    beyond. Real-world experiences in meeting the requirements of national
    decision-makers and joint force commanders have driven operational
    advances that need time to mature. With the Cyber Mission Force now at
    initial operational capability, USCYBERCOM is demonstrating its
    contribution to comprehensive U.S. Government approaches to countering
    adversary strategies in and through cyberspace.
        The men and women of U.S. Cyber Command thank you for your support,
    both in the past and in the big tasks ahead of us. We understand that a
    frank and comprehensive engagement with Congress not only facilitates
    the support that allows us to accomplish their missions, but also helps
    ensure that our fellow citizens understand and endorse our efforts on
    their behalf. I have seen the growth in the command's size, budget, and
    mission. That investment of resources, time, and effort is paying off,
    and more importantly, is helping to keep Americans safer, not only in
    cyberspace but in the other domains as well. I look forward to
    continuing the dialogue over the Command and its progress with you in
    this hearing today and over the months to come. Now I would be happy to
    address your specific questions and concerns.

        Chairman McCain. Thank you, Admiral.
        We have seen another Russian attempt to affect the outcome
    of the election in France. Do you see any slackening, a
    reduction in Russian/Chinese efforts to commit cyber attacks
    and even affect elections?
        Admiral Rogers. No, I do not.
        Chairman McCain. Have you seen any reduction in Russian
    behavior?
        Admiral Rogers. No, I have not.
        Chairman McCain. The Defense Science Board told this
    committee, at least for the next decade, the offensive cyber
    capabilities of our most capable adversaries are likely to far
    exceed the United States' ability to defend key critical
    infrastructures. Do you agree with that assessment of the
    Defense Science Board?
        Admiral Rogers. I agree that the offensive side in general
    has the advantage over the defense, which is why the ideas of
    deterrence are so important here. How do we shape and change
    opponents' behavior?
        Chairman McCain. In order to do that, we would have to have
    a policy followed by a strategy. Right?
        Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir.
        Chairman McCain. Do we have that now?
        Admiral Rogers. No, sir, but the new team is working on
    that. I want to make sure we all understand that.
        Chairman McCain. The check is in the mail?
        So do you agree we should--we have got the Federal Bureau
    Investigation as the lead for law enforcement. The Department
    of Homeland Security is the lead for critical infrastructure
    and defending government computer networks. The Department of
    Defense is the lead for defending the Homeland, defending
    military computer networks, and developing and employing--is
    the status quo sustainable?
        Admiral Rogers. It is sustainable, but my question is: is
    it the most effective way to generate outcomes?
        Chairman McCain. Is it the most effective? That is a better
    question. Thank you.
        Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir. My recommendation, my input to
    this process has met our challenges. So we built a foundation
    with a series of very specialized and distinct
    responsibilities, and yet I think what experience has taught us
    over the last few years is our ability to respond in a much
    more integrated, focused way is really the key to success here.
    I think that is the challenge. How do we more formally
    integrate these capabilities across the Government?
        Chairman McCain. Do we need a cyber corps?
        Admiral Rogers. I am not a proponent. Within the DOD, I am
    not a proponent of the idea of a separate cyber force or
    service, and that is for the following reasons. In my
    experience, to be successful in cyber, you not only need to
    understand the technical aspects of this, but you need to
    understand the broader context in which cyber evolutions occur.
    Somewhere in the world, there is a man or woman sitting on a
    keyboard directing an operation. My concern is if we went with
    a very unique service approach to this, we would generate a
    force that was incredibly technically proficient but not
    necessarily deep in understand of the broader context. I think
    using a service-based model is a stronger way to go about doing
    this.
        Chairman McCain. Well, as I mentioned in my opening
    remarks, 127, whatever it is, in the Air Force. Not a single
    one stayed in cyber. Are you getting the kind of cooperation
    that you need to have trained people at work in your command?
        Admiral Rogers. I have talked to all the Service Chiefs
    personally over the course of the last year on this topic. I
    have one service that I am particularly highlighting to them
    saying, look, we need to change the policies here. What I have
    suggested to the services is the Cyber Mission Force, that part
    which I am responsible for, I acknowledge is only one part of
    the Department's broader cyber needs.
        Chairman McCain. Was that message received by the United
    States Air Force?
        Admiral Rogers. They are clearly still working their way
    through this. They have a broader set of challenges with
    respect to manpower at large. I personally had a chief of staff
    of the Air Force come out to Fort Meade. I sat him down and
    said here is what I am seeing. Do I have the right picture? Is
    this accurate? He has come back to me and said, no, Mike, you
    have an accurate sense that we are not where we need to be, and
    here is what I am trying to do to get there. My job is to help
    him and also to keep the pressure on to make sure we sustain
    this.
        Chairman McCain. In your job, you have to look at
    scenarios. Give us the best scenario and the worst scenario.
        Admiral Rogers. For?
        Chairman McCain. For cyber attacks on the United States.
        Admiral Rogers. The worst worst case scenario in my mind
    has a couple dimensions to it: outright destructive activity
    focused on some aspects of critical infrastructure----
        Chairman McCain. Including space?
        Admiral Rogers. It could be space, and then in addition to
    outright destruction, the other thing that concerns me--there
    are two other things. The second thing would be, in terms of
    worst consequence, do we see data manipulation on a massive
    scale. Most cyber activity data has been penetration and
    extraction.
        Chairman McCain. Like changing voting rolls.
        Admiral Rogers. Yes. So what happens if we go in and we
    change data? That is a very different kind of challenge for us.
        Then thirdly to me the other element of a worst case
    scenario, what happens when non-state actors decide that cyber
    now is an attractive weapon that enables them to destroy the
    status quo. That is kind of the worst end, if you will.
        Chairman McCain. The best.
        Admiral Rogers. The best is----
        Chairman McCain. We develop a policy followed by a
    strategy----
        Admiral Rogers. We continue to make improvements both in
    capacity, as well as the broader deterrence piece.
        Chairman McCain. Thank you, Admiral.
        Senator Reed?
        Senator Reed. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Again, thank you, Admiral.
        As you have pointed out and I think we both pointed out, in
    terms of technical aspects of cyber, detecting intrusions,
    preventing intrusions, penetrating other networks, Cyber
    Command has been in the forefront. But this issue, which you
    allude to, of cognitive operations, information warfare,
    changing public opinion, et cetera--have you been tasked to
    conduct such operations--to prepare to conduct such operations?
        Admiral Rogers. No, we have not. That is not right now in
    our defined set of responsibilities per se.
        Senator Reed. Is it in anybody's federal responsibility to
    your knowledge?
        Admiral Rogers. I will not get into the specifics in an
    unclassified forum. There are some things we are doing right
    now, for example, in the fight against ISIS [Islamic State of
    Iraq and Syria] with combatant commanders in this regard. I do
    not want to go any deeper, if I could.
        Senator Reed. That is fine.
        Admiral Rogers. But I think one of our challenges is if
    information is now truly going to become a weapon almost in
    many ways, how are we going to optimize ourselves to deal with
    this world? We had much of this skill. If you go back to the
    Cold War, when I first started my journey in uniform, we had
    extensive infrastructure, extensive expertise. As the Soviet
    Union collapsed, we decided perhaps that expertise is not
    required. We did away with many of the institutions. Many of
    the individuals who had the skill sets are no longer with us. I
    think we need to step back and reassess that.
        Senator Reed. So I would assume if you have not been tasked
    to do that, that your expertise in cognitive warfare is rather
    limited in terms of what you just mentioned, the skill sets,
    the personnel.
        Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir. I would be the first to admit it
    is not what our workforce is optimized for.
        Senator Reed. Certainly not comparable to what we are
    perceiving from other actors around the globe.
        Admiral Rogers. Certainly not on a day-to-day basis.
        Senator Reed. Within DOD, my knowledge suggests that SOCOM
    [Special Operations Command] has been given the lead on
    information operations.
        Admiral Rogers. Broadly.
        Senator Reed. Broadly. Is there any integration with Cyber
    Command?
        Admiral Rogers. Oh, we work very--SOCOM is one of those
    partners that I mentioned. So we do work very closely, General
    Thomas and I.
        Senator Reed. I think the other issue too--and it has come
    up in the context of all of our comments this morning--is that
    this is a mission that goes across several different
    organizations. In fact, we have heard comments about how the
    State Department in some areas has--go back to the Cold War.
    They were doing the Voice of America. They were doing all the
    radio towers. It is a new world. They do not have either the
    expertise or the resources, et cetera. So no one seems to be
    doing this aggressively. Is that a fair estimate?
        Admiral Rogers. Certainly we are not where we need to be.
        Senator Reed. In terms of Russian operations, were you
    aware of the penetration of the election in 2016 in terms of
    the active involvement of Russian entities directly or
    indirectly?
        Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir.
        Senator Reed. What actions did you take? Just simply
    informing your superiors? Was that it?
        Admiral Rogers. So here is where I have to differentiate
    between my role as Commander of Cyber Command and the Director
    of the National Security Agency. As the Director of the
    National Security Agency, as I have publicly testified before
    other committees, when NSA first gained initial knowledge in
    the summer of 2015 that the Russians were engaged in an effort
    to access political institutions, we informed the Federal
    Bureau of Investigation, which has overall responsibility to
    inform those organizations. As the Director of NSA, I do not
    deal directly with them.
        In turn, I then make sure that DOD and other elements
    within the government have that awareness. That is where my
    role as Cyber Command comes in. So at Cyber Command, I become
    aware of efforts in terms of intrusions and hacks directed
    against U.S. infrastructure. I turn to myself and make sure
    that the DOD system is optimized to withstand--because they
    were coming after DOD at the same time. In addition, we
    coordinate with the Department of Homeland Security. Is there a
    requirement? Are you looking for DOD? For example, if we had
    defined the voting infrastructure as critical infrastructure,
    then under the set of duties assigned to Cyber Command, had the
    President or the Secretary of Defense determined that DOD
    needed to insert themselves in this, I would have been tasked
    to do that at Cyber Command.
        Senator Reed. If you had been tasked, you would have been
    prepared technically to try to disrupt these operations.
        Admiral Rogers. Yes.
        Senator Reed. Then again, given--I am sure we have all been
    looking back. The after-action reports are still being written
    about 2016. In your estimate, we have to be much, much better
    prepared for 2018 and beyond. Is that fair?
        Admiral Rogers. I apologize, Senator.
        Senator Reed. After looking at the experience in 2016, as
    you just described, knowledge of penetration, attribution to a
    foreign state, going after key systems in this country, some of
    which have now been designated as critical infrastructure, we
    have to be much, much better prepared for 2018, 2020, and
    beyond.
        Admiral Rogers. I agree. I apologize. I did not hear that.
        Senator Reed. No, no. That is fine, sir. Thank you very
    much.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Inhofe?
        Senator Inhofe. Admiral Rogers, it would be unfair for me
    to ask you to evaluate the article I showed you this morning
    because you have not read it yet. The title pretty much says
    it. It says--it appeared this morning--are cyber crooks funding
    North Korea's nukes? How does Kim Jong-un come up the billions
    to pay for nuclear tests. Increasingly successful online bank
    heists provide a lot of the funding. Does that make sense to
    you?
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        Admiral Rogers. I am not going to get into specifics in an
    unclassified forum, but we have publicly acknowledged we have
    seen the North Koreans use cyber in a criminal mechanism, if
    you will, to generate monetary resources.
        Senator Inhofe. It has to come from somewhere.
        Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir.
        Senator Inhofe. When you look at it, you kind of
    eliminate--you come down to that conclusion that they might be
    right on this.
        Admiral Rogers. Although I would highlight this is only one
    element of the North Korean broader attempts to generate
    revenue and get it back to North Korea.
        Senator Inhofe. Well, you know, when we look and see the
    growth in this thing from 2006 to 2015, the number of cyber
    attacks has climbed by 1300 percent. We have all visited about
    the policy or the lack of policy in making the decision. There
    is some thought that maybe there is too much authority at the
    top. It was General Goldfein that was quoted in December of
    last year. Actually before this committee, he said if we want
    to be more agile, then the reality is that we are going to have
    to push decision authority down to some lower levels in certain
    areas. Does that make sense?
        Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir. We have highlighted in the cyber
    arena to Secretary Mattis, as he has assumed his new
    responsibilities, I think this is an important area that we
    need to reassess particularly within the cyber arena.
        Senator Inhofe. Just a matter of a few weeks ago, we
    happened to be in Israel and we met and talked to their
    national cyber director, Dr. Eviatar Matania. For a cyber
    subcommittee meeting, he actually came over and we had--it was
    Senator Rounds who was with me at that time. Of course, he
    chairs the subcommittee, and we had a meeting that I think was
    pretty productive. Dr. Matania was pretty careful not to say
    that perhaps they might be doing something better there than we
    are doing. He said it is much more complex in the United States
    because of the size and all of that. But he also pointed out
    three things that were significant. I just wonder if you had
    any thoughts or if you studied their system and maybe some
    other countries too to see what they are doing.
        Admiral Rogers. With the case of Dr. Matania, there is a
    reason why every time I am in Tel Aviv, I see him, and every
    time he is in the United States, he sees us.
        Senator Inhofe. I knew that was the case. He said the same
    thing.
        Admiral Rogers. So we can learn from each other. In fact,
    we are talking about some potential test cases that we could
    use with a new team in place. So we will see how that plays out
    over time. But I look to him.
        One of the things that I have learned in my journey in
    cyber is there is no one single organization, group, or entity
    that has all the answers. So it is about the power of
    partnerships here and how do you create a system that enables
    you to gain insight and knowledge from a whole host of
    partners, some within the United States, outside the United
    States, within the government, the academic world, industry. He
    is one example of the power of that.
        Senator Inhofe. I kind of got that impression too.
        When General Alexander was in that position, he spent some
    time out at the University of Tulsa. I know there are many
    other schools too. The chairman asked the question, are we
    having access to the people that are going to become necessary
    to staff this new, very serious problem that we have? Is there
    an effort going back to some of these schools and to promote
    the programs as were promoted in that particular university?
        Admiral Rogers. Oh, there is. Between NSA and Cyber
    Command, we have relationships right now with over 200 academic
    institutions around the United States because that is in part
    the future workforce for us, although one thing I try to
    highlight is be leery of creating a cyber force where everyone
    is cookie cutters. We need to get a broad range of skills and
    experience here. Some people are going to be really good at
    this, and they will not necessarily have advanced education,
    but they have spent much of their personal life in this. So we
    have got to build a construct where we can get that full
    spectrum of capability.
        Senator Inhofe. We look and we see what some of these
    countries are doing. Putin, when he came in after their
    parliamentary election and they did not have any communists for
    the first time in 86 years--he started doing things in addition
    to just the coming in and declaring a level of warfare. He also
    started working. Apparently, according to Poroshenko, they have
    used cyber capabilities to attack the Ukrainian Government more
    than 6,500 times over the last 2 months. So this is something
    that is happening. It is happening all over the world, and you
    see something like the example in Ukraine that did not take any
    lead time, and all of a sudden, they are already inflicting
    that type of harm. I am sure that you are right on top of
    everything that is happening with this.
        Admiral Rogers. We are trying.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Nelson?
        Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, Admiral, for your public service.
        In response to Senator Reed, you said that you were aware
    of Russian attempts to interfere in our election. Were you
    aware of Russian communications with members of the Trump
    campaign team?
        Admiral Rogers. Now you are into my role as NSA. I am here
    as Cyber Command. I am not going to publicly get into that,
    sir.
        Senator Nelson. I understand your reluctance, but I also
    see you not just Cyber Command. I see you as the NSA Director.
    Okay.
        The chairman mentioned and asked you is this what we see--
    this behavior--is this a new normal, to which you responded I
    think somewhat regretfully yes.
        Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir.
        Senator Nelson. How should we counter these kind of cyber-
    enabled information operations, and who has the responsibility
    for these kind of operations?
        Admiral Rogers. In terms of Russian execution of the
    operations or our response? I apologize. I am trying to
    understand.
        Senator Nelson. Both.
        Admiral Rogers. Both. Well, in the case of the Russians,
    again if you refer to the publicly available intelligence
    community assessment, we identified multiple Russian security
    elements that were involved in this campaign.
        With respect to what should we do, the first is I think we
    need to publicly out this behavior. We need to have a public
    discourse on this. Those nation states, groups, or individuals
    that would engage in this behavior--they need to know that we
    are willing to publicly identify them and publicly identify the
    behavior.
        Secondly, I think we have got to make this much more
    difficult for them to succeed. That means hardening our
    systems, taking a look at our election process, which is not
    Cyber Command's role, but I think broadly we need to look at
    this end to end and ask ourselves what changes do we need to
    make in this structure.
        Thirdly, I think as a society, as a Nation, we need to
    acclimatize ourselves to the idea that we are, in many ways,
    back into a time frame of disinformation, false news--it goes
    to Senator Reed's point--manipulation of media. You got to be a
    much more discerning reader, so to speak, in many ways in the
    world that we are living in right now.
        Lastly, I think we also need to make it very clear to those
    nation states or groups that would engage in this behavior it
    is unacceptable, and there is a price to pay for doing this.
        Senator Nelson. At this point, it sounds, listening to the
    answers to the previous questions, that we are really in a
    position that we cannot prevent a cyber attack on things like
    our critical infrastructure.
        Admiral Rogers. Again, when we say prevent, it is one of
    the reasons why deterrence becomes so important. The goal
    should be we want to convince actors you do not want to do
    this. Regardless of whether you could be successful or not, it
    is not in your best interest, and you do not want to engage in
    this behavior.
        Senator Nelson. In a different setting that is secure,
    would you share with us where we have either, under the threat
    of an attack or an attack, deterred, the word you just used--
    ``deterrence''----
        Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir. I can share with you in a
    classified setting where we have either driven them out of a
    network or----
        Senator Nelson. That would be very helpful.
        Now, would you consider a critical infrastructure voter
    registration rolls?
        Admiral Rogers. I think that one of the challenges--if you
    go back to the process we used to identify the current 16
    defined critical infrastructure areas in the private sector, we
    tended to look at that from a very industrial--is there an
    output associated with it? One of the things I think that we
    need to be thinking about now is not that an output is not
    important because an election generates an output, but does
    data and information exist in areas that is of critical
    consequence to us as a Nation. We really did not look at it
    that way in simplistic terms, and I think we need to. We need
    to reassess it.
        Senator Nelson. We sure better because if someone shows up
    to vote and suddenly they find out they are not a registered
    voter because, indeed, it has been attacked and the data has
    been manipulated and taken them off the rolls, that is pretty
    serious.
        Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir.
        Senator Nelson. That is critical infrastructure.
        Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir. We need to take a look at that
    definition.
        Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Wicker?
        Senator Wicker. Thank you.
        Let me follow up on the chairman's statement with regard to
    the Air Force cyber officers not remaining in that field of
    work. Would one of the reasons be because they do not view it
    as a good career path?
        Admiral Rogers. No. If I could say when we say not in that
    field, the experience we are seeing is they are taking officers
    that are rolling out of the Cyber Mission Force, that structure
    that I am responsible for, and employing them in other areas in
    cyber in the Department. That is why I say part of the
    challenge, if you are a service, you have a wide spectrum of
    cyber requirements beyond just what Cyber Command is
    responsible for. It is why I am trying to make the argument
    with the Services what we need to do is--and I have talked to
    them and said, look, I think something on the order of a third
    should stay with us, the rest we should then look how do we put
    them elsewhere with this within this broader cyber enterprise
    to build the cyber level of expertise across the Department.
        I do not want to make it sound like what the Air Force is
    doing is just ripping people, once they finish their 3 years
    with us, so to speak, and then making them airplane mechanics,
    for example. That is not what we are seeing at all.
        Senator Wicker. Okay. For the third you would like to keep,
    do you think that is a good way to get to be a four-star?
        Admiral Rogers. Oh. Do you mean could you build a career
    over time?
        Senator Wicker. Right.
        Admiral Rogers. Clearly in the military we are moving into,
    I am not the last person who is going to be doing this as a
    four-star I do not think.
        Senator Wicker. With regard to the cyber service, which you
    are doubtful about, do I understand Britain does have such a
    cyber force?
        Admiral Rogers. No. Their structure is less a cyber service
    and more a combination of active as well as significant
    reserves.
        Senator Wicker. Is anybody trying this? Are any of our
    allies trying this?
        Admiral Rogers. There is nobody right now who has really
    gone to a single cyber service. Most are trying to take--within
    the existing service structure, can you create a dedicated work
    specialty, so to speak, where that is what you do for your
    career. That is what is being done by most nations around the
    world.
        Senator Wicker. Well, keep us posted on that.
        Now, on page 2 of your written testimony, you say advanced
    states continue to maintain the initiative just short of war,
    challenging our ability to react and respond.
        So what constitutes an act of war in your opinion or in
    terms of the policy of the agency?
        Admiral Rogers. So, first, I am not a lawyer and I am not a
    policy individual. That question at its heart is about legality
    and policy.
        It is clear that we do not--and not just the United States.
    I would argue broadly internationally we have not yet reached a
    broad consensus on how you would define in clear, actionable
    terms what an act of war within the cyber arena looks like. To
    date----
        Senator Wicker. How are we going to do that?
        Admiral Rogers. We are going to get our policy people
    together. We are trying to discuss this broadly. Again, it is
    outside my lane, but I know we are involved in broad
    discussions both internally within the U.S. Government, as well
    as with foreign partners, about how we develop a broader
    consensus on that.
        Senator Wicker. Well, help us out, though, because it may
    not be in your lane. You are not a lawyer you say. But you
    would certainly be one of the first people I would ask in terms
    of what sort of act in your judgment would go beyond this
    threshold of war.
        Admiral Rogers. Personally for me, what I look to do is
    could we define a set of criteria, intent, impact, the tactics
    or techniques that were used, for example--could we develop a
    set of very specific criteria that would help us define this
    rather than this broad--``nebulous'' is the wrong word because
    it implies people are not really focused on it, but this rather
    general kind of conversation we often tend to find ourselves
    in. I am trying to mentally work myself through how could we
    get this down to a more specific set of attributes that would
    then help us. I see those attributes that, therefore, would be
    defined as an act of war as an example.
        Senator Wicker. One other thing. You say technical
    developments are outpacing laws and policies. We certainly find
    that in the commerce area also.
        But do you need anything new in this next NDAA [National
    Defense Authorization Act] that you do not have now?
        Admiral Rogers. Specific to the NDAA in broad terms, my
    input to the process has been we need to reassess authorities
    and delegation. We need to take a look at do we have the right
    investments in manpower. Are we investing in the right
    capabilities? I am very honored that the Department has focused
    on this mission. There should not be any doubt in anybody's
    mind. There is focus on this mission set. I am the first to
    acknowledge cyber competes with a broader range of priorities
    and needs. But the argument I am trying to make is within those
    priorities, I think cyber is pretty high and we need to focus
    the investment and prioritize it and we cannot be willing to
    accept 5 to 10 years for development cycles, whether it is
    getting the right people, whether it is training them. That is
    just not going to get us where we need to be.
        Senator Wicker. To the extent that laws and policies are
    being outpaced, tell us what you need. Let us know what you
    need.
        Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Gillibrand?
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Following the line of questioning by Senators Nelson and
    Reed, one of the issues raised by Russian intervention in our
    election is how our government as a whole responds to cyber
    attacks and how it escalates its response. Do you believe that
    there is a coherent plan in place to allow the Federal
    Government, in coordination with state and local governments,
    to respond to major cyber attacks on the country and to
    escalate the response as appropriate?
        Admiral Rogers. To be honest, Senator, I do not know enough
    to accurately answer the question because some parts of that
    strategy would be outside my purview, and I am just not smart
    about all the--I am not trying to be a smart ass, but part of
    this is just outside my knowledge. I am just not in a position
    to say categorically yes or no.
        Senator Gillibrand. I was concerned by your earlier
    responses that your strategy is deterrence because I do not see
    how deterrence is going to work with regard to Russia since we
    have seen a continuation of an interest on their part to hack
    our systems and hack other countries' systems and their
    elections. I guess what I am looking for from you is leadership
    in coordination with other government agencies throughout the
    U.S. Government to be prepared for our next election.
        Admiral Rogers. Oh, yes, ma'am. I am part of this.
        If I could, I do not think you heard me say that I thought
    our strategy was deterrence. What I thought at least I
    communicated was deterrence should be a part of a broader
    strategy. It should not be the only thing. I am the first to
    acknowledge that.
        Senator Gillibrand. Do you think particularly the
    transition between private companies and a government
    response--are there the authorities in place to accomplish
    these transitions effectively? If not, what kind of authorities
    might you need?
        Admiral Rogers. I do not know if it is--there is certainly
    an authorities aspect to it, but part of this, I am wondering,
    is cultural. So the government comes to a private entity. You
    saw this in the Russian hack scenario, and the Government
    informs this private entity the Russians have penetrated your
    system. Here is where they are. In some cases, the responses
    are, hey, we want to work with you. That is great. Thanks. Can
    we come back? In some cases, it is thanks very much, and we
    never hear anything. In some cases, it is I do not believe you.
    In some cases, it is that is not the role of the federal--you
    saw this play out in, for example, some states' response to the
    election----
        Senator Gillibrand. Correct.
        Admiral Rogers.--where some states came back and said, hey,
    look, that is your guys' role.
        Senator Gillibrand. That is the testimony we have heard in
    a few hearings now. So I am highly concerned that if you do not
    have the authority or some aspect of the Federal Government
    does not have authority to say to a secretary of state, we
    recognize it is a state's right to run elections. We recognize
    that you chose the technology that you want to pursue. We
    recognize this is a states rights issue. But if you do not have
    a level of sophistication that has been certified as cyber-
    protected, it is not adequate.
        So what I really hope you can come to this committee with
    is a list of authorities you might need to put in place before
    the next election because it is not adequate to defer this to
    any secretary of state in any given state that they think they
    are covered. We need assurances that they are covered by the
    most highly sophisticated cyber experts in our Government. I
    think a lot of that cyber expertise is being developed by the
    Department of Defense.
        Admiral Rogers. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Gillibrand. But I think your leadership and
    coordination is so necessary.
        Admiral Rogers. Yes, ma'am. Please, I do not dispute that
    at all. Much of what you are asking me, though, really falls
    under the Department of Homeland Security, and I do not want to
    speak for DHS because Secretary Kelly should be able to speak
    for himself.
        I do acknowledge, particularly if we were to define this as
    critical infrastructure, clearly DOD has a role here.
        Senator Gillibrand. Agreed.
        Admiral Rogers. There is no doubt about that. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Gillibrand. With regard to the most recent French
    election, we saw that in that election emails of the successful
    French candidate, Emanuel Macron, were dumped online after a
    previous hacking. There was also a rumor of campaigns launched
    against him on the Internet, and the head of the German
    domestic intelligence agency accused Russia of hacking the
    Bundestag in preparation for Germany's upcoming presidential
    elections.
        How can the United States leverage our cyber and other
    capabilities to prevent Russian interference in not only our
    elections but those of allies and partners? Should we have a
    role? What capabilities does CYBERCOM bring to the table to
    help deal with these type of threats?
        Admiral Rogers. So this is much more in my role as the
    Director of NSA than Cyber Command.
        But if you take a look at the French elections, for
    example--again in an unclassified hearing, I am not going to
    get into specifics. But we had become aware of Russian
    activity. We had talked to our French counterparts prior to the
    public announcements of the events that were publicly
    attributed this past weekend and gave them a heads-up, look, we
    are watching the Russians. We are seeing them penetrate some of
    your infrastructure. Here is what we have we seen. What can we
    try to do to try to assist?
        We are doing similar things with our German counterparts,
    with our British counterparts. They have an upcoming election
    sequence. We are all trying to figure out how can we try to
    learn from each other, and that is much more my NSA role than
    in my Cyber Command role.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Admiral.
        Admiral Rogers. Yes, ma'am.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Fischer?
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, Admiral, for being here today.
        As you know, there has been some debate about our use of a
    geographically based counterterrorism strategy where legal
    authorities to conduct operations depend considerably on where
    they take place. To what extent are your operations in
    cyberspace similarly dependent upon the declared areas of
    active hostilities?
        Admiral Rogers. So that is an issue for us. Authority is
    often granted by a defined geographic space. The point I try to
    make to policymakers is the challenge in the cyber arena, the
    infrastructure--let us take ISIS, for example--that ISIS might
    be using is not necessarily physically in Syria and Iraq, but
    is in other areas. We need to be able to have an impact on
    that. I apologize. I do not want to go into this broadly in an
    unclassified forum. But we have that challenge. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Fischer. Are you bound then by the limitations that
    are set forward in the presidential policy guidance?
        Admiral Rogers. Oh, yes, ma'am. I have to meet PPD-20, for
    example.
        Senator Fischer. So when you are looking at that and we
    look at the interconnectedness of the nature of cyberspace, so
    what impact does that have on your operations? Do you have the
    necessary ability to meet the requirements of the combatant
    commanders, the geographic combatant commanders?
        Admiral Rogers. Not as fast as I would like. Again, I am
    not going to get into the specifics in an open forum.
        But some of the things we are doing against ISIS, this very
    issue came to a bit of a head. We were able to work it out
    through the interagency process, and we were granted the
    authorities to execute some of the ongoing activity that we are
    doing against ISIS that extends beyond the immediate physical
    environment of Syria and Iraq. But I am the first to
    acknowledge it was not the fastest process in the world. It was
    a very complete process I am the first to acknowledge that.
        Senator Fischer. Do you have suggestions for any changes
    that Congress needs to make in order for you to respond----
        Admiral Rogers. Before I go to Congress, I am trying to
    have a dialogue with my own immediate bosses about so what
    might such a framework look like, and I think I owe them time
    to come to their own conclusions first.
        Senator Fischer. I understand that that presidential policy
    from 2013 is being reviewed by the Department. Is that correct?
        Admiral Rogers. Again, it is not a Department document. It
    is a presidential document.
        Senator Fischer. Is the Department reviewing it?
        Admiral Rogers. We are broadly looking at cyber authorities
    right now at large. Again, I provided an input to the Secretary
    with, hey, sir, here are my views on what are some of the
    things that we might want to look at.
        Senator Fischer. So CYBERCOM is involved in that review.
    Based on your experience, where do you think improvements
    should be made?
        Admiral Rogers. Well, the positive side for me is
    everything I am hearing from the current team is they
    acknowledge that the structures that are in place are not fast
    enough. That is a good step for me because I am not spending a
    lot of time in a debate. Now it is, okay, so what do we do. If
    you accept that premise, what should we do?
        Again, because that is an ongoing topic of discussion, I
    would just rather not publicly get into this. I think I owe
    them the time for them to come to their conclusions, although
    they are reaching out to us. I have no complaints in that
    regard.
        Senator Fischer. Do you anticipate that the Secretary will
    be bringing forward to this committee any conclusions that are
    made then?
        Admiral Rogers. I do not know, ma'am. I do not want to
    speak for the Secretary.
        Senator Fischer. Okay.
        Admiral, in testimony before the House Armed Services
    Committee in 2015, you mentioned an unresolved question about
    applying, quote, DOD-generated capacity in the cyber arena
    outside the government in the private sector. Can you elaborate
    on this? Specifically, what type of capacities do you believe
    would be beneficial, and what kind of gaps are you trying to
    fill?
        Admiral Rogers. So it goes to some of the points that many
    of you made already this morning about, for example, if we are
    going to defend critical infrastructure, DOD is going to
    execute a mission and defend critical infrastructure. One of
    the points I am trying to make is I do not want to show up in
    the middle of a crisis for the first time I have interacted
    with some of these sectors. Just my experience as a military
    individual teaches me discovery, learning while you are moving
    in contact with an opponent is a painful way to learn.
    Increased loss. It takes so much more time, and you are not
    effective and efficient.
        The argument I am trying to make is building on the sector
    approach with critical infrastructure, which I think is very
    sound, can we not create standing mechanisms where I, the DOD,
    DHS, the private sector can operate 24/7 and operate with, hey,
    so what are we all seeing out there.
        Senator Fischer. Do you support the deployment of
    government sensing capabilities on the private sector?
        Admiral Rogers. In a perfect world, what I would probably
    prefer would be could we create a structure where the private
    sector could share the--because they are putting sensors,
    putting telemetry on their networks. Could you not share that
    with us rather than us go in and do it? My first recommendation
    would be could we not create a mechanism where we can take
    advantage of the investments and the capabilities the private
    sector is already making.
        Senator Fischer. Can we do that now?
        Admiral Rogers. In some areas, we do that now. But I want
    to make it much more institutionalized and much more real time
    for me anyway.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator King?
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The first question, Admiral, for the record. We have been
    having these hearings now for 4 years, and we talk about the
    problem and everybody is absolutely convinced that this is a
    very serious problem. I would appreciate it, given the fact of
    the depth of your knowledge and the work that you do, if you
    could supply for the record the five things you think we should
    do. Talking about it is important, but action. What are the
    five actions? If you would think about it, have some of your
    smart people think about it, whether it is legislation or
    regulation or new relationships, communication, I think all of
    us would find that helpful. This is an echo of Senator Wicker's
    question earlier.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        [Deleted.]

        Senator King. Second, we talk about this. We talk about
    this, we have got to approach this with a whole-of-government
    approach. I really think the term should be ``whole-of-
    society.''
        Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir.
        Senator King. Because this is an odd situation where you
    have got government for sure, but the vulnerable elements are
    in the private sector, the electric grid, the financial system,
    the gas pipeline system. We had a situation--I think it was in
    2011--where there was a cyber bill. It was regulatory. It would
    have applied to the private sector. It failed. There was great
    resistance in the private sector to a regulatory approach.
        We do not ask the private sector to defend themselves
    against Russian bombs or missile attacks from North Korea. We
    do that. What about a system whereby we work with the private
    sector to assist them financially in installing the kind of
    defensive measures that might be important, and in exchange,
    they would get perhaps some limitation of liability. Of course,
    they would get free stuff. The question is how do we do that
    without them just taking their foot off the gas and not
    protecting themselves.
        Admiral Rogers. I mean, certainly incentivizing behavior
    generally tends to produce better outcomes in our society than
    the penalization piece. It is a much broader issue than me.
        But I think the core point you raise is the point I was
    trying to make with Senator Fischer. Traditionally in our
    society, we often have very strong walls between what is a
    private function and what is a government function. I think
    cyber shows that much of what we are seeing is a national
    security issue, and therefore, it requires a whole-of-Nation
    approach to how we are going to handle this.
        Senator King. Which involves new levels in creative
    thinking about how to interface between the government and the
    private sector because we could have a perfect government
    system, but if Wall Street goes down, it is going to be chaos.
        Admiral Rogers. I agree.
        Senator King. On the issue of policy, Senator Rounds and I
    supported an amendment that got into the National Defense Act
    last year that essentially said to the administration 180 days
    a report is due on military/non-military options available for
    deterring and responding to imminent threats. That date is
    coming, just to remind you. It is June 23rd by my calculation.
        Admiral Rogers. It is in June. Yes, sir.
        Senator King. This is a way of trying to force what Senator
    McCain has talked about about the development of a cyber
    policy, and then the President has 180 days after that to
    describe the actions carried out in cyberspace that may warrant
    a military response. We have got to get through this.
        Admiral Rogers. I know OSD [Office of Secretary of Defense]
    is working on it. They have the lead here. They will respond
    formally. We have been part of that process.
        Senator King. Well, I am just delighted that that is being
    worked on because I think one of our big gaps when we talk
    about what do we need to do, a policy and a strategy, as the
    chairman has mentioned, is absolutely critical because right
    now deterrence does not work unless there is a strategy and
    unless we know about it.
        Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir.
        Senator King. Finally, I think as we talk about this, if
    you think about what the Russians did in 2016, there were
    really three components. One was hacking and leaking. The other
    was attempted hacking in terms of the voting system, which we
    have talked about, which I think is a very serious issue. But
    the other is information and the manipulation of information.
    That is very hard to get at, especially in a place that has the
    First Amendment.
        I would suggest that one of the things we need to be
    thinking about--and this is not necessarily in your
    jurisdiction--is a heightened level of digital literacy in this
    country. People have to understand when they are being misled
    and manipulated, and perhaps they need to be given tips on how
    to do that. My wife has a sign in our kitchen that says, ``The
    most difficult thing on the Internet is to determine the
    authenticity of quotes,''--Abraham Lincoln.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator King. But we have got to be educated. Our public
    has to understand that this is a whole new level of--way of
    manipulating. There were all kinds of reports in the French
    elections that Macron had bank accounts in the Cayman Islands.
    It is not illegal to say he had them. But how do you defend
    themselves against that? I just would urge you to be thinking
    about this. How do we educate our people to be more discerning
    when they read something incredible on the Internet?
        Admiral Rogers. It is a brave new world out there in the
    information dynamic for all of us.
        Senator King. It is particularly challenging in a country
    that values free expression.
        Admiral Rogers. Right.
        Senator King. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Rounds?
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral Rogers, first of all, thank you for your service to
    our country.
        Wearing two hats, what is the earliest date that you think
    CYBERCOM should be elevated to a combatant command? If there
    are criteria, would you share the criteria?
        Admiral Rogers. This is an ongoing policy issue, so I am
    not going to get into the specifics. I think that is not fair
    to my bosses. My input has been this is something I think we
    can do in a reasonably short period of time, make the initial
    steps.
        Senator Rounds. Is there a set of criteria that you would
    expect to be completed before such a move was made?
        Admiral Rogers. We have identified the steps within the
    Department. We have identified the steps that we would need to
    take to elevate to a combatant command. So again, that is why I
    say I am confident we could do this in a very short period of
    time.
        Senator Rounds. Could you share with the committee in terms
    of what some of those activities have to be?
        Admiral Rogers. We have identified we need to shift current
    responsibilities from STRATCOM [Strategic Command] down to us.
    We need to make changes to the unified command plan, which is a
    document signed by the President of the United States. It is
    the formal document that actually outlines what combatant
    commanders exist, what their defined responsibilities are, if
    there is a geographic aspect to those responsibilities. We have
    got to make those changes, and then we have identified
    investments in manpower as well.
        Senator Rounds. There would be an advantage in some ways to
    having two separate organizations. While the information that
    would be shared perhaps would be shared in a different manner,
    the sharing of that information could continue on, but the
    activities of the two would be different.
        Could you share a little bit about the positive side of
    making a move like that?
        Admiral Rogers. I am on record as saying that my
    recommendation to this process has been that--and I did not
    believe this when I came into the job, but after about 6 to 9
    months, I came to the conclusion, being in the two jobs, the
    right answer in the long term is to separate the two. They will
    still remain closely aligned because Cyber Command and NSA will
    still continue to work in the same battlespace in many ways, so
    to speak. It will still be a unique relationship, but in the
    long run, I think it is the right thing to do.
        I have also said, look, there is a series of steps we need
    to take to make sure that each organization, as it shifts from
    the structure we originally created, is optimized to continue
    to achieve successful outcomes. There are some things we need
    to do particularly on the Cyber Command side, but it is all
    within reason to me. It can be done within a reasonable period
    of time and a reasonable level of investment.
        Senator Rounds. How do you classify the private sector
    critical infrastructure that is vital to the DOD mission? What
    efforts is CYBERCOM undertaking to protect private sector
    critical infrastructure that is vital to the DOD mission? I am
    not talking about trying to classify all the other stuff.
        Admiral Rogers. No, no. I understand.
        Senator Rounds. But just the items that are critical to DOD
    activity.
        Admiral Rogers. So we try to partner closely with the
    Defense Security Service and the Defense Cyber Crimes Center to
    make sure that those critical businesses and infrastructure
    that we, the DOD, count on have access to information. The
    TRANSCOM [Transportation Command] commander and I spent a lot
    of time focused on this. How do we make sure that the--because
    he, in particular, his organization, not that it is unique to
    TRANSCOM. It is probably at a greater level where their mission
    execution day to day is so dependent on capabilities resident
    in the private sector. He has probably got a greater challenge
    here than most. We are talking about how can we speed up
    processes.
        I would like to see over time can we create a different
    relationship. It is hard right now to deal direct because of
    the law and the framework we have created over time. I would
    like to see if we could potentially look at how we might amend
    that so we could deal more directly with a specific set of
    companies that have a direct relationship or provide a unique
    set of capabilities or infrastructure for DOD. I am working
    that with TRANSCOM.
        We have also picked, in a couple places, Hawaii and Guam,
    for example, that are a little more isolated where it is a
    little easier, a couple test cases on how we can partner
    between the DOD and critical infrastructure on the islands,
    power and a few other things to highlight how do we work
    together very closely because there is no alternative generator
    capability, for example, off island that we are going to pipe
    in power. If we have problems with the power on the island
    distribution system, we got major problems for DOD.
        Senator Rounds. I think sometimes we forget just how
    critical these cyber aspects are, and when we talk about the
    different domains that we fight in, air, land, sea, space, and
    cyber.
        Can you think of any of the other areas that we require
    dominancy of that we would maintain dominancy in if we do not
    have dominancy in cyber?
        Admiral Rogers. Well, it is one of the comments I made in
    my verbal opening statement. We not only are our own mission
    set, so to speak, but our success helps to underpin the ability
    of the rest of the Department. I am not saying it is the only
    determinant, but it is a foundational element of the
    Department's broader ability to execute its mission sets across
    the breadth of DOD missions.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, sir.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Heinrich?
        Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Chairman.
        Welcome back, Admiral Rogers.
        It has become really evident to me as a member of both the
    Intel Committee and this committee--it has become crystal clear
    that Russia has really mastered this domain of digital
    disinformation and that they have effectively set up a
    situation where they are coordinating paid trolls, fake
    automated social media accounts, bots, as they call them, and
    state-backed news outlets to really amplify stories very
    effectively that serve their interest. That is true of what we
    would call fake news. It is also true of any real news that
    simply serves their interests or undermines U.S. policy.
        So these capabilities are proving to be just as politically
    disruptive both in our elections and day-to-day business, as
    well as what we have seen in Europe, as to the Russian hacking
    that we have seen.
        So does Cyber Command have a role to play in meeting this
    new what I would describe as a threat, not just a reality? Or
    do you see it as wholly outside your lane?
        Admiral Rogers. I would not say it is wholly outside. There
    is a broader issue to me, and information is one aspect of it.
    If you look at, for example, the way the spectrum and the
    network world are converging, if you look at the way the
    information dynamic is playing out, one of the questions that
    we are trying to come to grips with broadly within the
    Department, although I will be the first to admit I am so
    focused right now on trying to execute the missions I have been
    assigned--part of my input to this process has been let me get
    the structures set before we start throwing more stuff on the
    life raft.
        But I am trying to conceptualize in my own mind, so how are
    we going to bring together electronic warfare, cyber, and the
    information dynamic because it is all blurring in this digital
    world that we are living in. How do we do this in an integrated
    way? Right now, we are not there yet. We are still trying to
    figure out what is the right was forward.
        Senator Heinrich. Do you have people assigned to look at,
    for example, just the issue of when you have thousands and
    thousands of bots out there and they serve as a forcing
    mechanism, they look like social media accounts in Wisconsin or
    Michigan or somewhere else in the United States, but they are
    really just automated accounts that take a story that has
    interested 10 people and makes it look like it is of interest
    to 10,000. Suddenly it is on my social media feed or my news
    feed on my iPhone.
        Have we looked at capabilities for simply making it clear,
    even to the companies whose platforms those are on, that those
    accounts are not genuine accounts? Because it seems to me if
    you take that amplification piece out, even if it is on a
    constant rolling basis, you would have a dramatically
    diminished impact from this.
        Admiral Rogers. Yes, although there are couple points, if I
    could.
        First, remember much of the scenario you just went through
    is about domestic and both as NSA and Cyber Command, we are
    focused largely--NSA--we are focused externally. Cyber Command
    we are largely focused externally. So I will monitor bots
    infrastructure external to the United States. When it comes
    to----
        Senator Heinrich. Well, bot farms typically are overseas.
    However, they are appearing to be domestic accounts but they
    are not attached to actual people in the United States.
        Admiral Rogers. But one of the phenomena we are starting to
    see is you are certain to see a migration of capability from
    the external infrastructure that we have been aware of and
    observing for some period of time. The way this is going to go
    next in my opinion, you are going to start to see this in
    domestic manipulation. That is a part that for us right now,
    no, I am not really directly involved in.
        We do, as part of the broader government effort participate
    in generating insight that we share with major social media
    providers to say, hey, this is activity that we are seeing that
    we believe to be false or that we believe to be criminal or we
    believe to be supporting of particular groups that are a threat
    to the Nation.
        Senator Heinrich. So you are actually able in relatively
    real time to share information with big social media providers.
        Admiral Rogers. In some cases, and I would not argue that
    it is necessarily immediate real time because one of the things
    that I try to do is kind of get a critical center--get enough
    that I can try to show them a comprehensive effort here as
    opposed to coming to them with, hey, here is the count today,
    here is 10 the next hour because we are in the early stage of
    this. I am trying to engender a broader dialogue about, look,
    there is systematic here that both of us have got to be looking
    at. We got to stop looking at this one individual----
        Senator Heinrich. Exactly. I think it speaks to the
    relationship you were talking about. Whether you are talking
    about the financial services sector, the utility sector, or in
    this case, social media and media, we need to have those
    relationships in place to be much more responsive than we
    currently are.
        Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir.
        Senator Heinrich. Thank you.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Ernst?
        Senator Ernst. Thank you.
        Admiral Rogers, it is good to see you again.
        During Senator Fischer's line of questioning, you had
    answered that you do not want to show up in the middle of a
    conflict, you do not want to have to learn about the enemy on
    the move. I agree. I would also say that conversely we also
    want to know about our friendlies, and we do not want to learn
    about them on the move either.
        Going back to the National Guard, we have corresponded back
    and forth a number of times. We want to make sure that you know
    about those friendlies and the capabilities that they bring
    into your organization, should they ever be needed. So I did
    drop a bill earlier this year to ensure that DOD will start
    tracking these capabilities.
        But from your perspective, what more can we be doing to
    help CYBERCOM connect with our National Guard and their
    capabilities? What else can we do?
        Admiral Rogers. So I feel pretty good about knowledge and
    awareness. I never thought as a commander--but I can walk you
    through what Kansas is doing, Pennsylvania is doing, Delaware,
    Virginia, Washington, California. Again, it is kind of
    interesting to me. I think to myself, wow, Rogers, you are in a
    very different world here.
        The biggest challenge that I am still trying to work--and
    it is one I have outlined about six different priorities for
    Cyber Command for calendar 2017. I said, hey, these are six
    things we are going to focus on. One of the six is about
    creating a model for Reserve and Guard integration. So I am
    trying to partner with Northern Command, as well as the
    National Guard Bureau, General Lengyel and his team, about,
    okay, so we are seeing the investments that the Guard and the
    Reserve is making, which I am very supportive of and
    appreciative of. Now, how do we create the mechanisms so we can
    actually apply that in real time?
        We are doing some things now, for example, where Air Force
    is activating--and in fact, I have reviewed the activation
    sequence in the Guard out to fiscal year 2020 for the Guard
    units we are going to bring on in active status to meet the
    requirements that the Air Force has for the Cyber Mission Force
    that I command, I lead.
        But what I am trying to get to is if we have a major cyber
    event, I feel very comfortable about we understand who is going
    to do what. What I am curious about is what happens if it is
    not something catastrophic, if it is not something that
    necessarily trips a threshold where the DOD active force is
    viewed as the primary responsibility. But how do we use those
    Guard and Reserve capabilities in instances where the active
    side is not necessarily going to be the lead? How do we make
    sure the capabilities are there? How do we apply them? What is
    the command and control structure that is in place?
        We do that now in terms of defense support to civil
    authorities. That is very mature in terms of how we respond to
    natural disasters. We have got a great process there. Support
    to FEMA [Federal Emergency Management Agency], the Northern
    Command's role. I am trying to argue we got to spend a little
    more time on the cyber piece of this.
        Senator Ernst. Absolutely. I would agree wholeheartedly.
    Maybe it runs parallel to our civil support teams where they
    provide backup in case of any sort of incident, the Super Bowl,
    and things like that. We always have them on standby. As we
    look at major events and progression, whether it is elections
    or other significant events, throughout the year, we have those
    Guard capabilities.
        Admiral Rogers. Can I make one other point? I apologize. I
    did not mean to interrupt.
        One of the other challenges in the Guard construct, the
    Guard's construct is a geographic construct based on the state.
        Senator Ernst. Yes.
        Admiral Rogers. One of the challenges, again, I am trying
    to work my mind through--and I had this discussion with the
    Council of Governors and the TAGs [The Adjutant General]. In
    many instances, the infrastructure that a state is going to be
    counting on from a cyber perspective in the cyber arena does
    not necessarily physically reside in the state. How do we take
    advantage of the Guard structure more broadly and not just--I
    am not saying that the state piece is not important, but I am
    trying to figure how do we overlay a largely geographic and
    state-defined construct on something that is not always defined
    by immediate geography, if that makes sense.
        Senator Ernst. It does make sense. It absolutely does make
    sense.
        I know a number of my colleagues, moving on to a different
    topic, have talked about personnel and how do we keep personnel
    there. So there have been a lot of suggestions about bringing
    civilians in to fill in the gaps.
        But during Secretary Mattis' confirmation, he also stated
    that the warrior ethos is not a luxury. It is essential when
    you have a military. As we look at things like lateral
    accessions and flexible career paths, how do we make sure that
    warrior ethos is not being diluted?
        Admiral Rogers. I am the first to admit. It is one reason
    why I have argued be leery of creating a cyber force that is
    predominantly civilian. No disrespect to my civilian teammates.
    But we want that warrior ethos and culture. Secondly, in the
    law of armed conflict, there were things legally that a
    uniformed military member of a nation state can do that a
    civilian cannot within a legal framework.
        So civilians play an important role here. Do not get me
    wrong. That is one of the reasons why I believe that the right
    construct for us is to bring the total spectrum, Active, Guard,
    Reserve, contractor, civilian, private sector. It is our
    ability to bring it all together, not one single slice. So I
    would be leery about swinging the pendulum too far in one
    direction away from the military piece of that.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you for laying that out. I appreciate
    your time, Admiral Rogers.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Hirono?
        Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Office of the Director of National Intelligence
    released an intelligence community assessment on Russian
    activities and intentions in recent U.S. elections. General
    Clapper testified regarding this report yesterday in the
    Judiciary subcommittee.
        So we all know that Russia interfered with our elections.
    So do you view President Putin's actions in this regard as a
    cyber attack?
        Admiral Rogers. Again, ma'am, that is a legal and a policy
    discussion. My point is it should be viewed as unacceptable.
    That is the bottom line to me. This is not a behavior you want
    to encourage. This is not a behavior we want to accept, nor is
    this a behavior I think we want to see repeated.
        Senator Hirono. I think we all share that. How to get there
    is the challenge.
        What is your opinion of the role of the military and
    intelligence agencies in preventing these types of events in
    the future?
        Admiral Rogers. So, first, from an intelligence
    perspective, our job, speaking as the Director of NSA, is to
    generate insights and knowledge that help inform potential
    response and the ability also, if we can get ahead of the
    problem, to identify it in advance, intent, a nation where
    actors intend to do something, that then alarms policymakers
    and military commanders with the ability to engage in
    operations or choices that clearly communicate to that other
    party, hey, we know what you are thinking about doing. You do
    not want to go down this road.
        On the Cyber Command side, again, if we define election
    infrastructure as critical infrastructure to the Nation and we
    are directed by the President or the Secretary, I can apply our
    capabilities in partnership with others, because we will not be
    the only ones, the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI
    [Federal Bureau of Investigation]. I can apply those
    capabilities proactively with some of the owners of these
    systems.
        Senator Hirono. It was very clear by General Clapper
    yesterday that Russia will continue these efforts. In fact, we
    know that they have been doing this since the 1960s or 1970s,
    but it is just that they have many more tools in their toolbox
    to interfere with our elections. So you are still awaiting
    direction from the President for everyone to coordinate their
    efforts to stop this kind of behavior on Russia's part?
        Admiral Rogers. No. I am saying I do not have a defined
    mission here. No one has changed that yet.
        Senator Hirono. We need to do that for everybody to come
    together. Thank you.
        The Services continue to increase cybersecurity
    capabilities and develop advanced tools to combat cyber
    attacks. PACOM [Pacific Command] has placed a focus on advanced
    cyber and anti-satellite capabilities. How does CYBERCOM work
    with the other combatant commands like PACOM to counter the
    cyber threats they face?
        Admiral Rogers. So I partner with--I was just in Honolulu 2
    weeks ago with Admiral Harris and his team sitting down and
    going, hey, because I try to get out there about--for example,
    Hawaii, just an example. I am there generally every 6 months. I
    try to do this with all the combatant commanders everywhere
    around the world, sit down face to face with where are we, are
    we meeting your requirements.
        Cyber Command in many ways--much of what we do functions to
    support others. We exist to support and enable the success of
    others. So I always tell our team much of our success is going
    to be defined by others, not by us, and that is the way it
    should be. We spend a good deal of time aligning capability to
    meet specific combatant commander requirements, working with
    the combatant commanders as to what should be the priority for
    how those capabilities are applied. In many instances, I want
    them to set the priority, not me. I have an opinion that we
    will partner together, and so, for example, that is what we are
    doing now in the Pacific from both a defensive and an offensive
    side.
        Senator Hirono. In your meetings with the other combatant
    commands, then is part of your function to encourage--to make
    sure that we do not have unnecessary duplication of effort
    across the services?
        Admiral Rogers. So I try to make the argument, cyber is a
    high-demand/low-density capability, just like ISR
    [Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and
    Reconnaissance], just like SOF [Special Operations Forces],
    just like ballistic missile defense. Therefore, the same kinds
    of processes that we put in place to make sure we are
    maximizing the finite capability we have, we have got to do the
    exact same thing in cyber.
        Senator Hirono. We know that we have challenges facing
    military recruiters in attempting to fill their cyber-related
    billets as other government agencies and the private sector try
    to fill their requirements as well. I would like to know
    specifically how important is it to continue non-military
    federal investments in education, particularly in the STEM
    [Science, Technology, Engineering and Math] programs, for
    American youth in order to meet the growing need of Cyber
    Command and other----
        Admiral Rogers. Right. So as I said, our workforce is going
    to be a spectrum from the Active, the Guard and Reserve,
    civilian, and contractors. For the civilian contractor and much
    of that active piece, much of this education is going to be
    done by the private sector, not by the government. So it is one
    reason why, as I said, we have relationships, if my memory is
    right, with over 200 academic institutions. It is one reason
    why I spend a fair amount of time as a senior commander going
    to universities around the United States about so how are we
    going to create the human capital of the future in this. It is
    one reason why I spend a lot of time talking to the private
    sector about so tell me how you generate a workforce. How do
    you retain it? I acknowledge that there are some differences,
    but are there some things I could learn from you about what
    works for you? Because it cannot be all about money.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you for that proactive posture.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Tillis?
        Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Admiral Rogers, it is good to see you again. You have been
    on the job about 2 years. Right?
        Admiral Rogers. 3 years, sir.
        Senator Tillis. Three.
        Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir.
        Senator Tillis. If you were to go back 3 years ago and you
    were in the same committee hearing, would the answers have
    changed substantially in terms of our current--where, in other
    words, have we made significant progress?
        Admiral Rogers. Where we made significant progress, we have
    capability. We are actually using it. We have got a good way
    ahead. We have got a commitment to that way ahead. So that is
    what I would have said as we----
        Senator Tillis. But as you go through this, Admiral, if you
    think about looking at our near-peer competitors, they too are
    3 years further along.
        Admiral Rogers. Right.
        Senator Tillis. Is the gap narrower or wider now between
    our capabilities to defend ourselves and to potentially respond
    to some attack?
        Admiral Rogers. Narrowing. The gap is narrowing.
        But to continue what I think was the point you are trying
    to make, but I would also tell myself, Rogers, you are not
    moving fast enough. We got to move faster. We got to
    prioritize. I am the first to acknowledge that. We are not
    where I want to be.
        Senator Tillis. What about over the last 3 years, the sense
    of ownership in the private sector? I for one think we are
    making a huge mistake if we leave this hearing or if the
    private sector thinks we are coming up with a solution that
    they all benefit from. They are a part of an infrastructure
    that we cannot possibly be expected to--this is sort of like,
    you know, we are the police, back to Senator King's point. We
    have to respond when an attack occurs to try and figure out who
    did it and what the consequences should be. But we all need to
    have some sort of security ourselves in our businesses, in our
    homes, and our states. How well have they really improved over
    the last 3 years since you have been in the position?
        Admiral Rogers. It is uneven by sector. Some sectors, boy,
    have really made significant improvements; others, no.
        To go to your point, the analogy I try to use, look, it is
    hard to expect the police force to stop burglaries if you are
    going to leave every one of your doors not just unlocked but
    open. You are going to turn all the lights on, and you are
    going to leave the house for an extended period of time.
        Senator Tillis. A sign saying ``not at home.''
        Admiral Rogers. Just say--right--hey, feel free. That is
    not going to get us where we need to be.
        Senator Tillis. Well, how do we move the ball? We had
    TRANSCOM in here for a hearing just last week or week before.
    How do we actually get to a point where we put pressure on the
    private sector not to mandate, but to maybe use it as a
    distinguishing factor when we are choosing between one
    potential contractor or supplier and another one in terms of
    the extent to which we believe that they are fully protected or
    protected as much as they can be in this space?
        Admiral Rogers. I think it goes to a combination of we need
    to change the basic contract language about it and set minimum
    expectations if you want to do business with the DOD.
        Senator Tillis. Is that within your current authorities?
        Admiral Rogers. I am sorry, sir?
        Senator Tillis. Is that within current authorities?
        Admiral Rogers. Yes, and we have made some across the
    Department. We have made some changes in contractual language,
    but I think the evolution has shown us we got to be more
    specific.
        Senator Tillis. To what extent is your command trying to--
    in the discussion--I think it was with TRANSCOM--we were
    talking about needing some sort of third party--there needs to
    be something out there to make sure that our suppliers, maybe
    even state agencies, are adhering to some baseline standards.
    To what extent is your command involved in that or who owns
    that?
        Admiral Rogers. So we do not do that right now, but that is
    one of those changes I talked about, how do we change the
    relationship between DOD and its core private capability
    providers, infrastructure providers. Perhaps one of the things
    contractually you look at is so if you want to do business with
    us, you are signing up potentially to the idea that we can do
    an assessment, we can do an inspection. I think we need to work
    our way through that, but that is the kind of thing I think we
    need to be thinking about.
        Senator Tillis. I think it is critically important. We have
    to also look at the reality that they have got a supplier base,
    that the people that we contract with need to make sure they
    are holding their supplier base up to the same standard. I will
    just repeat what I always say in these committees. You can find
    a weaker link. All you can do is understand the supply chain
    and go after that one critical, seemingly innocuous component
    that shuts down your ability to repair a grid component or to
    repair some weapon in the supply chain.
        In my remaining time, can you tell me a--after elevation
    and the dual-hat split, how do you envision a standalone
    command operating? What are the priorities?
        Admiral Rogers. Well, again, now we are into a kind of
    ``what if'' scenario. So I would rather not go down--I just do
    not like getting into ``what if'' kinds of things. That
    decision has not been made. That is a broader policy issue. I
    have had the opportunity to provide input to that process, but
    now we need to let the process play out and see what kind of
    bottom line the decision-makers come to. I just think that is
    fair and that is what we owe them.
        Senator Tillis. Thank you.
        Senator Reed [presiding]. On behalf of Chairman McCain,
    Senator Warren, please.
        Senator Warren. Thank you.
        I want to quickly ask about the importance of our non-
    military agencies and programs to your mission, which includes
    defending the United States against cyber attacks by foreign
    and non-state actors. Our State Department promotes
    international norms of responsible behavior in cyberspace, and
    it helps make our partners and allies more cyber secure--I
    think you have already talked about that some--and counters
    online radicalization and recruitment by non-state actors like
    ISIS every day.
        So, Admiral Rogers, you lead the best cyber warriors in the
    world. But I want to ask, would reductions in funding to the
    State Department's cybersecurity and counter radicalization
    programs make your job easier or harder?
        Admiral Rogers. Tougher.
        Senator Warren. I agree. I am concerned about the
    significant reductions to non-DOD departments proposed by the
    administration. These agencies provide critical support for
    your work, and I just want to make sure that does not get
    overlooked.
        What I also want to do is follow up on a question that
    Senator Hirono asked. Last year, the Russians stole private
    emails and splattered them all across the Internet to help
    their preferred American presidential candidate. Last week, the
    Russians did exactly the same thing in order to help their
    preferred French presidential candidate. The United States of
    America needs to step up its game here. I know that you are a
    key part of that.
        Now, you stated in your prepared testimony, Admiral, that
    improving DOD's network defenses and building a cybersecurity
    culture depend on skilled people. So I would like to press you
    on the question of how we recruit and retain cyber warriors.
    Admiral, let me see if I can do this the right way.
        We had a hearing recently in our military personnel
    subcommittee, and one of the witnesses said that the military
    recruiting system is so focused on filling quotas that they end
    up recruiting only for the military of today, not targeting the
    best suited to execute the missions that we are going to need a
    decade from now.
        So, Admiral, can you tell us about your recommendations to
    ensure that we are recruiting the right talent for the cyber
    jobs and threats that we will face tomorrow?
        Admiral Rogers. So my experience to date--knock on wood--
    has been I am very happy with the quality of individuals that
    we are seeing.
        Senator Warren. I understand.
        Admiral Rogers. We are exceeding retention broadly on the
    uniformed side. I have got a little more concern on the
    civilian side actually right now in terms of retention,
    particularly on the NSA side of my responsibilities.
        The thing that is helping us at the moment is this
    workforce views themselves as the digital warriors of the 21st
    Century, and their self-image is we are on the cutting edge of
    something brand new and every day we are shaping the future in
    a way that nobody else gets to do. We are doing things that
    nobody else on the outside gets to do. They are empowered by
    the mission. I am not going to pretend their leadership is
    perfect. But my sense is they think we got a focus, we got a
    vision, and we are driving it.
        So I am constantly as a leader looking for what are the
    indicators if that is changing, how do I get ahead of this, and
    then what are the skill sets that I need not today but maybe 2
    years from now, maybe 5 years from now.
        Data is one area I would highlight. I am sitting here
    saying to myself right now we are probably not optimized for
    the data requirements of the near term. So what kind of data
    skills do I need? Is that a uniformed skill? Do I look at
    civilians to do that? Would a contractor make more sense? Is
    that something that the Reserves could do because they can put
    people in a skill set, and then, boy, they are going to stay
    there and do that? That is probably an example of where I am
    saying to myself maybe we need to be looking at--it is still in
    my mind. We have not developed a formal plan, so to speak.
        Senator Warren. But I am glad to hear it. You are looking
    out. I love the focus on data, you know, critically important
    here.
        In the 2017 Defense Department authorization, we gave a lot
    of flexibility on how to recruit talent specifically. So let me
    just ask, do you have all the authorities you need, or do we
    need more exemptions, for example, from federal hiring laws and
    other changes in the system to help you in your recruiting
    efforts not just today but 6 months from today and a year from
    today and a few years from today?
        Admiral Rogers. Well, right now I feel good about military
    recruitment. I find our ability to hire on the civilian side--
    we are lagging. Part of this is I tell our team is this
    something we are failing to understand. Do we have a lack of
    knowledge of our own system that we are not optimizing the
    system to generate the outputs we need? I am not at a stage yet
    where I have decided the answer is I have to go ask for more
    authority, but I have told the team, look, if we come to the
    conclusion that we have to ask for more authority, guys, that
    is what we are doing. We have got to take advantage of the
    willingness of this committee, the Department to work with us
    when it comes to flexibility on the human capital piece.
        Senator Warren. Good.
        I know how much you have invested in our cyber military
    force and the mission force overall. You have made enormous
    progress. But I do hope you will let us know.
        Admiral Rogers. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Warren. Let us know more in advance rather than
    later. It takes a little while to get things through around
    here. But let us know because if you need more flexibility, you
    should have more flexibility. Thank you, Admiral.
        Admiral Rogers. Thanks.
        Chairman McCain [presiding]. Senator Perdue?
        Senator Perdue. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Admiral, good to see you again. Thank you for everything.
        In testimony we heard earlier this year, the Defense
    Science Board said--and I quote--for at least the next decade,
    offensive cyber capabilities of our most capable adversaries
    are likely to far exceed the United States' ability to defend
    key critical infrastructures. Do you agree with that from the
    Defense Science Board?
        Admiral Rogers. I said broadly. Clearly things favor the
    offensive side. Part of our challenge is much of our
    infrastructure represents investments and decisions and
    priorities made decades ago, and they are not reflective of the
    digital world we find ourselves in today. The cost of replacing
    that fixed infrastructure is huge, and so it is not likely that
    we are going to replace all of that infrastructure in the
    immediate near term. Just the scale is just beyond the ability
    of our society or our Nation right now.
        Senator Perdue. So we are primarily focused on defense,
    deterrence, and detection right now from your earlier
    testimony, even today in this written testimony. My question
    is, in an open hearing like this, is there anything you can
    tell us about what we are doing on the offensive side? Are we
    developing offensive capabilities as well?
        Admiral Rogers. So we have acknowledged that we are
    developing offensive capabilities. We have acknowledged that we
    are employing those capabilities in the fight against ISIS. I
    apologize. I would just rather not get into the specifics.
        Senator Perdue. I understand.
        I would like to move over to the question of the day, and
    it is how do you stand up this force over the next few years.
    Training is a very major part of this, as you have said.
    Between 2013 and 2016, under CYBERCOM's supervision, the Office
    of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff were supposed
    to come to an agreement on a joint federated training program
    funded by the Services for the training of the Cyber Mission
    Force. Can you update us on the status of that agreement and
    where we stand today on that?
        Admiral Rogers. So we will transition to that model in
    2018. The initial outfit, if you will, of the Cyber Mission
    Force, using much of NSA's infrastructure--we signed up,
    speaking now as the Director of NSA, to use much of NSA's
    structure, our schoolhouses, our National Cryptologic School,
    for example, to do much, not all, but to do much of the
    training associated with the initial build-out of the mission
    force. That build-out, full operating capability is due to be
    completed, and we are on track for September 30, 2018. The
    agreement then was at that point responsibility for training
    and development, long-term sustainment of the Force would
    transition to a Service structure. We are on track to do that
    right now.
        Senator Perdue. So does that mean that each Service would
    be responsible for developing their own cyber warriors?
        Admiral Rogers. So what happens is we have a mandated
    training standard by position, each Service then oftentimes
    partnering. For example, right now there is Navy training in
    Pensacola that all the Services use, for example, because we
    all then get together and say so given this single common
    standard, given this single, agreed-to qualification process,
    what is the best way across the Department to make this work.
    What Service has the best capacity, best capability? How do we
    manage throughput broadly? That is the only way to maximize
    this.
        Senator Perdue. You mentioned context earlier, which is why
    you do not favor a unified force.
        Admiral Rogers. Right. I was thinking about an integrated
    cyber----
        Senator Perdue. I understand. I get it.
        So having some experience in large organizations, I am
    concerned about that tradeoff. There is a balance.
        Admiral Rogers. Right. Yes, sir.
        Senator Perdue. We are in a crisis stage right now--I think
    you would agree to that--with regard to our ability to detect
    and deter at this point. I understand long-term the ideal might
    be to have the Service because of the context dimension.
        In the interim phase when we are in this crisis mode,
    though, do we have a sense that that might be counterproductive
    to our ability to stand up to the immediate threats?
        Admiral Rogers. It would be difficult to do it today in a
    short term. That would take a long-term investment, significant
    structural, cultural changes. It is another reason why I would
    argue optimize the structures and the mechanisms that are in
    place. Now, we also got to hold them accountable. Do not get me
    wrong. You just cannot turn to them and say, well, just do what
    you always do. There has to be accountability and oversight.
        But I am comfortable that the current approach is going to
    generate the outcomes we need, even as I acknowledge it is not
    moving as fast as I would like. We got a huge mismatch between
    current capacity and capability, and what I know is the
    requirement. We are always in a tail chase.
        Senator Perdue. You mentioned earlier that the history has
    been the extraction of data from the system, that hacking--the
    primary motive from Russia and China, primarily state actors,
    has been the extraction of data.
        In North Korea, we saw a little bit of a different attack
    where they went in and actually started placing what I would
    call a sleeper embedded code, whatever, for a bigger mega event
    later. Do we see a continuing growth in that type of activity?
    Have we seen any evidence of that in the U.S.?
        Admiral Rogers. You do. You see every nation state engaged.
    They will penetrate a system. They will look to not just
    extract but study it, understand it, see where it connects to.
    Can they use this as a jumping off point to get to somewhere
    else?
        One of the things we are always looking for is so if a
    system has been penetrated, has the actor manipulated, changed,
    amended a configuration so they can gain access separately now.
    That is one of the key things we always look for when we are
    trying to do mitigation once someone has penetrated a system.
        So it is the full spectrum. The simple answer is yes. It is
    the full spectrum.
        Senator Perdue. Have we seen any in the U.S., any evidence
    of that in the U.S.?
        Admiral Rogers. I have seen nation states engaged in
    activity in the U.S. where they clearly are interested in a
    long-term presence, not just extracting data.
        Senator Perdue. Thank you, Admiral.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Peters?
        Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral Rogers, always a pleasure to see you and enjoy your
    testimony as always.
        My question involves the U.S. semiconductor industry, which
    right now faces some major challenges. In addition to some
    fundamental technological limits that are being reached in that
    area, there has also been a concerted strategic push by China
    to reshape the market in its favor using industrial policies
    backed by over $100 billion in government-directed funds. With
    semiconductor technology critical to the operation of critical
    U.S. defense systems, I am very concerned that China's
    industrial policies pose a real threat to U.S. national
    security.
        Although we have a range of tools, which you are very
    familiar with, to deal with this, the principal mechanism to
    manage it is the interagency Committee on Foreign Investment in
    the U.S., or CFIUS. Within the DOD, as you know as well, NSA is
    a key contributor to the CFIUS national security assessment.
    DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency], the Military Services, the
    combat commands all have a role in this process as well.
        But my question is considering CYBERCOM's leading role
    within the Department, how is the command postured to support
    the CFIUS process for potential foreign mergers and
    acquisitions that have perhaps significant implications for the
    DOD cyber mission?
        Admiral Rogers. So we predominantly interact in the CFIUS
    process on the NSA side. But one of the implications I think
    for the future--again, it is just one input I have tried to
    make to the new team is I think we need to step back and
    reassess the CFIUS process and make sure it is optimized for
    the world of today and tomorrow because I am watching nation
    states generate inside knowledge about our processes. They
    understand our CFIUS structure. They understand the criteria
    broadly that we use to make broader policy decisions about is
    an investment acceptable from a national security perspective.
    My concern is you are watching some nation states change their
    methodology to try to get around this process.
        Senator Peters. Do you feel that CFIUS is adequately
    resourced and authorized to make the kinds of changes that you
    think we need----
        Admiral Rogers. I am not smart enough because we are just
    one element in this process, and it is not something that the
    DOD at large or Cyber Command or NSA runs per se. But I do
    think we need to step back and ask that kind of question to
    ourselves. Just my gut just tells me that that is one of the
    things we need to be doing.
        Senator Peters. I would like to turn back to some of the
    discussions that we have had related to the involvement of the
    private sector, which has to be intimately involved in any kind
    of security operations. I know your teams have operated Cyber
    Guards, over the years, exercises. The most recent on you were
    involved in, simulating an attack on the Northeast, attacks on
    Gulf oil facilities, ports across California. All of these
    entities, of course, are privately owned and not part of the
    Department of Defense.
        A recent GAO [Government Accountability Office] study,
    looking at some of the prior exercises, cited concerns that
    large portions of the exercise take place in a classified forum
    which places some inherent limitations on public and private
    sector participation. Although the arrangement certainly is
    designed to protect sensitive plans and capabilities--and we
    all fully realize the importance of doing that--the approach
    also may fall short in preparing participants for a real world
    cyber emergency, which potentially could be catastrophic.
        So my question is, how are you balancing the need for
    security with the realities of a cyber threat landscape that
    may ultimately necessitate very broad support from uncleared
    citizens and entities?
        Admiral Rogers. So it is one of the reasons we changed the
    structure of Cyber Guard over time and tried to bring more in
    the private sector. So if you look at the scenario that you
    talked about that we did last year in terms of we simulated
    activity directed against the power grid in the east, the
    petroleum industry in the Gulf, and port sectors on the West
    Coast. We went to several private companies within each of
    those sectors and said, hey, we would like you to participate
    in this. What do we need to make that happen?
        We also increasingly are going to the private sector in
    terms of private sector companies that run the infrastructure
    associated with supporting those entities. We have added that
    to the Cyber Guard arena.
        So I am trying to see can we create an exercise in
    addition. We do tabletop exercises, which are not quite--Cyber
    Guard is huge. It is like a thousand individuals.
        We also do regular tabletop exercises where we talk at a
    high level so we can skirt some of the security aspects of the
    classification aspects of this and bring in the private sector.
    We do that out at the Fort Meade complex several times a year
    separately from Cyber Guard.
        Senator Peters. Thank you, Admiral.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Cotton?
        Senator Cotton. Thank you, Admiral Rogers. Welcome back.
        I want to talk about Russia today and how they hacked into
    those emails and released them last year. I want to touch on
    that.
        Specifically Senator Warren a few moments ago continued to
    refer to the President as Russia's preferred candidate. I think
    she is referring there to the intelligence community assessment
    of January 6th, primarily written by your agency, the NSA,
    along with the CIA and the FBI.
        This brings to mind a curiosity from the report that I
    wanted to raise with you and ask about. In the key judgments,
    the report says we also assess Putin and the Russian Government
    aspired to help President-elect Trump's election chances, when
    possible, by discrediting Secretary Clinton and publicly
    contrasting her unfavorably to him. All three agencies agree
    with this judgment. CIA and FBI have high confidence in this
    judgment. NSA has moderate confidence.
        Could you explain the discrepancy for us?
        Admiral Rogers. I would not call it a discrepancy. I would
    call it an honest difference of opinion between three different
    organizations. In the end, I made that call. So if anybody is
    unhappy, Mike Rogers is the accountable individual.
        When I looked at all the data, I was struck by for every
    other key judgment in the report by multiple sources, multiple
    disciplines, and I was able to remove almost every other
    alternative rationale I could come up with in my mind for,
    well, could there be another reason to explain this. In the
    case of that one particular point, it did not have the same
    level of sourcing and the same level of multiple sources from
    different perspectives, you know, human intelligence, signals
    intelligence.
        I still believe that it made sense. I still believe that it
    fit within the context, and I still agreed with the judgment.
    But I did say from a professional analytic perspective, I am
    not quite at the same confidence level as my two counterparts
    in the form of John Brennan and Jim Comey.
        Senator Cotton. The one particular point being going from
    saying Russia wanted to hurt Secretary Clinton's chances, in
    addition help Donald Trump's chances.
        Admiral Rogers. Correct.
        Senator Cotton. Those are hard to disentangle--right--since
    in our election system we have to first pass the post as long
    as you do not have a----
        Admiral Rogers. In this case, there was some pretty
    specific intelligence that seemed to differentiate that there
    were specific thoughts on the part of the Russians on each of
    the aspects of that statement, if you will.
        Senator Cotton. Obviously, we cannot discuss those
    classified matters, but there is a lot of open source matters
    as well. President Trump, for instance, was the candidate who
    wanted to build up our defenses, expand our missile defenses,
    accelerate nuclear modernization, pump more North American oil
    and gas. None of those things seemed to be very favorable to
    the Kremlin. Did your agency take those things into account?
        Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir.
        Senator Cotton. Also if you look back over the last 8
    years, just a quick rundown of what I could recall--I am sure I
    am missing some--the Obama administration in 2009 reset
    relations with Russia 6 months after it invaded Georgia.
        The year 2010, signed New START [Strategic Arms Reduction
    Treaty], which I would say was a better treaty for Russia than
    us.
        The year 2012, in a hot mike moment with Dmitry Medvedev,
    President Obama said he would have more flexibility on
    ballistic missile defense after his election. He also mocked
    his opponent at a presidential debate saying that Russia as our
    number one geopolitical foe.
        The year 2013 was the red line fiasco in Syria with
    Russia's closest Middle East ally when President Obama accepted
    Vladimir Putin's offer to remove chemical weapons from Syria,
    which we now know was a failed effort.
        The year 2014, we stood largely idly by during the Crimea
    invasion and did not offer defensive weapons when Russian-
    backed separatists started fighting in the Donbass despite
    bipartisan support from this committee. By that point, we had
    long since been ignoring INF [Intermediate Nuclear Forces]
    Treaty violations that our military now acknowledges.
        The year 2015, Russia had a massive surge into Syria and
    continued its effort to block U.N. [United Nations] Security
    Council resolutions.
        The year 2016, they pummeled Aleppo into submission. In
    private, they objected to numerous provisions that I wrote in
    the Intelligence Authorization Act that would hold Russia to
    account in its espionage effort, and they increased the amount
    of times they are buzzing aircraft and warships in Europe and
    the Arctic.
        President Trump promised to reverse those policies.
    Secretary Clinton largely campaigned on continuity. That does
    not sound to me like something that the Kremlin would be happy
    about.
        Admiral Rogers. I am just going by the intelligence. It was
    very clear in the intelligence of Russians' perceptions.
        Senator Cotton. Do you think given that 8-year history of
    the Obama administration that Russian intelligence and
    leadership felt emboldened to undertake the hacks of those
    email systems and release them?
        Admiral Rogers. Now you are into political judgment, sir,
    and that is just not my area.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you very much.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Kaine?
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Just to follow up, Admiral Rogers, on this issue of
    moderate confidence, did you have a high degree of confidence
    that there was an effort to discredit one candidate and only a
    moderate degree of confidence that there was an effort to
    support----
        Admiral Rogers. If you read the key judgments, what it says
    is I concurred in the report in the sense that we had high
    confidence in the judgment that the Russians clearly were
    trying to undermine our democracy and discredit us broadly,
    that they wanted to specifically make sure candidate Clinton
    did not win and to undercut her effectiveness should she have
    won.
        Senator Kaine. High confidence in that.
        Admiral Rogers. Right. High confidence in that and that it
    was just the last part about--and their judgment was they
    wanted candidate Trump to win. That was one of the objectives--
    --
        Senator Kaine. We had testimony in this committee probably
    a year and a half ago by General Dunford where he was asked the
    question I think by Senator Manchin which was the nation state
    that he would view as our most significant adversary. He
    testified, based on their capacity and intent, he thought that
    would be Russia.
        Just in your domain, cyber, the cyber domain, do you view
    Russia as an adversary? They have taken actions that have put
    them in the position as an adversary of the United States in
    the cyber domain.
        Admiral Rogers. I am watching them engage in behaviors that
    I think are destabilizing and not in our best interests in
    cyber.
        Senator Kaine. Would you also agree that France is an ally?
    They are a NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] ally and
    they are also a coalition partner in Afghanistan.
        Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir.
        Senator Kaine. You are aware of the reports in the last few
    days that there was significant evidence tying Russia to a
    hacking effort to destabilize the French election. That is
    something we should take seriously when an adversary tries to
    destabilize the government of an ally. Would you agree?
        Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir.
        Senator Kaine. There was an article in the New York Times
    the day before the election, Saturday, the 6th, with a
    fascinating headline. ``U.S. Far Right Activists Promote
    Hacking Attack Against Macron,'' and the article was about the
    effort by groups in the United States to immediate spread the
    hacked documents in many instances before even WikiLeaks was
    able to.
        If we should take seriously an adversary's cyber attack on
    the democracy of an ally, should we be indifferent or concerned
    about efforts of Americans to work together with or in parallel
    with an adversary attacking the democracy of an ally?
        Admiral Rogers. I apologize. I am not sure I am
    understanding.
        Senator Kaine. You have testified in response to my
    question that we ought to take seriously if an adversary tries
    to cyber attack and destabilize the democracy of an ally. If
    American organizations are working together with or in parallel
    with an adversary----
        Admiral Rogers. A foreign counterpart?
        Senator Kaine.--as they are trying to attack the government
    of an ally France, should we be in different to that, or should
    we take that seriously as well?
        Admiral Rogers. We need to be concerned.
        Senator Kaine. Okay. If we are concerned about that, if the
    U.S. Government should be concerned in this case--and I will
    introduce this article for the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

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        Senator Kaine. If we should be concerned about the efforts
    of folks in the United States to work together with or in
    parallel with an adversary like Russia attacking an ally like
    France, where should that concern lie in the Federal
    Government? Is that a law enforcement matter? Is it a DHS
    matter? Is it an NSA matter, or is it a Cyber Command matter?
        Admiral Rogers. I would argue it depends on the specifics
    of the scenario. I am not trying to be dismissive, Senator. It
    is a very complex question.
        Senator Kaine. I will put the article in for the record,
    and there is, I think, more to come on this.
        But if individuals or organizations in the United States,
    for example, were taking hacked documents from an illegal
    Russian hack of the French system and trying to disseminate it
    to affect the French election, this is something we should be
    concerned about. Where would that concern lie within----
        Admiral Rogers. My first thought would be the FBI, but
    again, that is not necessarily a fully informed opinion, but it
    is the first thing that comes to my mind.
        Senator Kaine. All right.
        Let me ask you this. There has been some debate in the last
    couple of days about whether there is such a thing as a good
    shutdown of the United States Government. Can you see any
    circumstance under which Cyber Command's mission would be
    benefited by a shutdown of the Government of the United States?
        Admiral Rogers. No. If I could, I know you are asking for a
    yes or no. The number one issue that my workforce often raises
    with me is what we went through in 2013, and it is now 4 years
    later. I still--every time there is the merest hint in the
    media of this even potentiality, I get, sir, are we going to go
    through this again, sir? You said this was not going to happen,
    sir. I thought they were committed to us and our mission. Sir,
    I do not want to work in an environment where every couple of
    years I am just getting jerked around about am I going to come
    to work, am I going to get paid, do they value what I do. Hey,
    sir, we just want to do the mission. We just need the support
    to keep moving forward.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Admiral.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Graham?
        Senator Graham. Thank you, Admiral. Thank you for your
    service.
        Director Comey said a couple of days ago--I guess it was
    last week in the hearing that I was involved in in Judiciary--
    that Russia is still interfering in American politics. Do you
    concur with that?
        Admiral Rogers. Yes.
        Senator Graham. He also said that among nation states, he
    thought Russia had the most capability and the biggest intent
    in terms of interfering in the future. Do you agree with that?
        Admiral Rogers. Yes.
        Senator Graham. Do you agree that it was Democrats in 2016?
    It could be Republicans in the next election?
        Admiral Rogers. Yes. I would argue this is not about
    politics. This is not about party. This is about an effort
    against the strategic interests of every citizen of this
    Nation.
        Senator Graham. I agree with you 1,000 percent.
        Do you they agree they could do this in congressional
    races, House and Senate----
        Admiral Rogers. Yes.
        Senator Graham. Do you agree that if somebody does not make
    them pay a price, they are going to keep doing this?
        Admiral Rogers. Yes.
        Senator Graham. All right. Unmasking. A lot of talk about
    it. Are you aware of any incidental collection on 2016
    candidates on both sides of the aisle?
        Admiral Rogers. I am not going to get into specifics in an
    unclassified forum about collection at large. But I will say we
    certainly acknowledge that incidental collection occurs, but we
    also have a very strict process----
        Senator Graham. Can we build that out a bit?
        Admiral Rogers.--for what we do with it.
        Yes, sir.
        Senator Graham. The only way you can actually collect on an
    American citizen inside the country is to have a FISA [Foreign
    Intelligence Surveillance Act] warrant.
        Admiral Rogers. Get a FISA warrant. Yes, sir.
        Senator Graham. Or if an American citizen is incidentally
    in a conversation with somebody you are already following.
        Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir.
        Senator Graham. Unmasking is a request to your
    organization, I want to know who American citizen one was.
        Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir.
        Senator Graham. How many of those requests did you get in
    2016?
        Admiral Rogers. I think we have publicly acknowledged----
        Senator Graham. Around 2,000.
        Admiral Rogers. 2,000. I think it is----
        Senator Graham. How many people can request the unmasking
    of American citizens?
        Admiral Rogers. If you are an authorized recipient of the
    intelligence, we use two criteria. Number one, the requester
    must be asking this in the execution of their official duties.
    It cannot be something that would be need to know. Number one
    has to be in the execution of their official duties. Number
    two, the revealing of a U.S. person has to provide context and
    greater value for the intelligence. Again, it just cannot be I
    am just curious.
        Senator Graham. I got you.
        So within our government, are there 10 people--10 groups
    that groups that can do this? Twenty?
        Admiral Rogers. In terms of authorizing the unmasking?
        Senator Graham. Yes. No, to make the request.
        Admiral Rogers. No, it is broader than that. If you are on
    the distribution--if you are on the authorized distribution for
    our intelligence reporting, you can ask. It does not mean it
    gets approved, but you can ask.
        Senator Graham. Does the National Security Director--one of
    those--I mean----
        Admiral Rogers. The National Security Advisor? Yes, sir.
    They are normally on the distribution for most, not all.
        Senator Graham. Is there a record of every request made?
        Admiral Rogers. Yes.
        Senator Graham. So there is a record of who made the
    request to unmask the conversation involving the American
    citizen.
        Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir.
        Senator Graham. There is a record whether or not you
    granted it.
        Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir.
        Senator Graham. Is there a record of what the person did
    with the information once they got it?
        Admiral Rogers. No. There is also a record of the basis of,
    so why did we say yes. Remind every individual, if I could,
    once we unmask, once we authorize an unmasking, we authorize
    the unmasking only to that individual. What do I mean by that?
    So if we unmask a report that went to a particular individual,
    we do not unmask the report for everyone who got that report.
    Only the individual that we----
        Senator Graham. They are told not to share it with----
        Admiral Rogers. They are specifically told. This does not
    change the classification.
        Senator Graham. General Flynn was caught up in a
    conversation with the Russian ambassador. You are familiar with
    that story in the press.
        Admiral Rogers. I am familiar with the story. Yes, sir.
        Senator Graham. Assuming he did not have a FISA warrant
    allowing us to collect on him, it would be a case of incidental
    collection following the Russian ambassador. Does that sense?
        Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir.
        Senator Graham. We would know how that conversation was
    revealed and to who it was revealed through the request of your
    agency.
        Admiral Rogers. If we unmasked and it was based on an NSA
    report. Remember, NSA will not be the only agency that
    potentially could have gotten the conversation.
        Senator Graham. Got you, but you are the primary one.
    Right?
        Admiral Rogers. I would argue again it depends. If you look
    at Title 1 warrants, the FBI----
        Senator Graham. I am not talking about warrants. I am
    talking about----
        Admiral Rogers. Incidental. So I would argue there is
    probably a greater potential on the FBI side than NSA just
    generally in terms of collection.
        Senator Graham. Of incidental collection?
        Admiral Rogers. Incidental with U.S. persons.
        Senator Graham. So we could either ask the FBI or you.
        Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir.
        Senator Graham. So somebody took that information that we
    gained through collection with Flynn and gave it to the
    ``Washington Post.''
        Admiral Rogers. Somehow it got to the media.
        Senator Graham. That is a crime.
        Admiral Rogers. That is a leak, and that is illegal. Yes,
    sir.
        Senator Graham. Are you concerned about people taking the
    law in their own hands no matter how noble they think the event
    would be?
        Admiral Rogers. Oh, yes, sir, which is why I have gone to
    my workforce in writing and said let us make sure we understand
    what the professional ethos of our organization is. We do not--
    if I could finish, sir. We do not engage in this behavior, and
    if I catch you engaging in this behavior, I will hold you
    criminally liable and you have no place----
        Senator Graham. Mr. Chairman, can I ask for additional 30
    additional seconds?
        The bottom line here, it is possible for the Congress to
    find out who requested unmasking of American citizens, who that
    information was given to, and that is possible for us to know.
        Admiral Rogers. On the NSA side, that is part of the
    ongoing investigation with the primary oversight committees
    that we are going through right now.
        Senator Graham. Do you know if Susan Rice ever asked for an
    American citizen to be unmasked?
        Admiral Rogers. I would have to pull the data, sir. I
    apologize.
        Senator Graham. Thank you.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Blumenthal?
        Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, Admiral Rogers, for being here again and thank
    you for your service.
        We have heard repeatedly in this room, as well as yesterday
    with Director Clapper, that the Russians will continue
    attacking the United States unless they are forced to pay a
    price. And you agree.
        Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir.
        Senator Blumenthal. Right now, are they being forced to pay
    a price?
        Admiral Rogers. Certainly nothing that is changing their
    behavior.
        Senator Blumenthal. Nothing that is changing their
    behavior, and clearly nothing that will change their behavior
    in the future because, to quote you or paraphrase you, they
    have more to gain than to lose by continuing this kind of
    attack.
        Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir.
        Senator Blumenthal. Can you recommend to us what kinds of
    measures should be taken? I know you have been asked this
    question before. In fact, you were asked when you last
    testified here. You said that tools like sanctions can be an
    effective option. But so far, the sanctions in my view are way
    less than they should be. Do you agree that sanctions can and
    should be increased to provide a price that the Russians------
        Admiral Rogers. So now you are into a policy judgment. I
    will only say sanctions I think have proven to be an effective
    tool in many scenarios. I am not going to argue that they are
    perfect and they work all the time.
        Senator Blumenthal. But there will be a point where a cyber
    response should be appropriate.
        Admiral Rogers. Potentially although I would highlight when
    we think about deterrence, we need to think more broadly than
    just cyber. Just because someone comes at us in cyber, does not
    mean we should automatically default to, well, it has got to be
    an exact response in kind. I think we need to think more
    broadly and play to our broader strengths as a Nation.
        Senator Blumenthal. There is no question that the Russians
    attacked this country through cyber. Would you agree that
    Americans who colluded or cooperated with that attack also
    should be held accountable?
        Admiral Rogers. Broadly yes, but again, now you are
    starting to get into a legal and a policy piece, and that is
    just not my lane in the road.
        Senator Blumenthal. Well, your lane includes defending this
    Nation from cyber attack.
        Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir. But not necessarily action
    against particular individuals.
        Senator Blumenthal. Well, let us talk about a group of
    Americans who may have colluded or cooperated with the Russians
    in enabling or encouraging this kind of attack. By the way,
    they violated criminal laws if they did so. Would you not agree
    that they should be held accountable and that an investigation
    of it is appropriate and necessary?
        Admiral Rogers. I agree an investigation is appropriate and
    necessary, and if they violated the law, then, yes, sir. I am
    just not an attorney. I am not a lawyer. I am not a law
    enforcement individual. It is not my area of expertise.
        Senator Blumenthal. But unless they are made to pay a price
    as well, the Russians will be enabled and encouraged in the
    future.
        Admiral Rogers. Yes, sir.
        Senator Blumenthal. They will be paying less of a price as
    well.
        Admiral Rogers. Right.
        Senator Blumenthal. I feel like we are in a time warp here
    because when you were last here, we agreed that we need a
    policy and a strategy, as the chairman has articulated so well,
    and we still do not have one. Can you tell the American people
    whose responsibility it is to develop that strategy and policy?
        Admiral Rogers. It is ultimately the executive branch.
    There are multiple components, but ultimately it boils down to
    the executive branch. As I have said, look, we have a new team
    in place. They are working their way through this. In fairness
    to them, this is not a--this is a complicated topic with a
    whole lot of complexity and nuance. I know that these
    discussions are ongoing. I have been a part of some of them. I
    am grateful that the team is willing to reach out and say, hey,
    Admiral Rogers, from your perspective, what do you think, what
    do you see, what are you thinking about. So I do not want
    anybody walking away thinking nothing is going on, no one is
    thinking, they are not attempting to proactively try to grapple
    with these very tough problems.
        Senator Blumenthal. Well, I just want to conclude by
    stressing again that forcing the Russians to pay a price for
    their attack on this country requires compelling Americans who
    colluded or cooperated with them to pay a price, but also a
    strategy and policy for knowing when there is a cyber attack on
    this Nation, when it is an act of war that should prompt a
    response in the cyber domain or in other military domains and
    economic sanctions that also may force them to pay a price.
    Right now, our policy of deterrence is in my view an abject
    failure.
        Admiral Rogers. Not achieving the desired result. That is
    clearly true. Yes, sir.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
        Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator McCaskill?
        Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Good to see you, Admiral. Thank you for your service.
        We have heard over and over again in multiple hearings--and
    we have got our cyber hearing in Homeland Security tomorrow. So
    this is really timely for me--about poor information sharing
    and understanding the challenges of classified information.
        My staff has tried to chart the national cybersecurity
    structure for me. The one thing that sticks out to me is this
    cyber unified coordinated group. It appears to me to be really
    the only place that our structure is set up under PPD-41 where
    the private sector entities really seem to plug into the
    national structure. The interesting thing is this cyber unified
    coordinated group is supposed to be in response to a
    significant cyber event. That is the operative phrase.
        In the United Kingdom, the NCSC [National Cyber Security
    Centre] has real-time collaboration with emphasis on exchange
    of classified information on an ongoing basis.
        My first question for you is has the cyber unified
    coordinated group ever been called into a session. Has there
    ever been ongoing meetings? Have there been any meetings of
    this particular group that is laid out in PPD-41?
        Admiral Rogers. It does interact. It does operate. I would
    be the first to admit, ma'am, I have to take the question for
    the record about has it ever physically met.
        We participated in it, and I am trying to remember if it is
    done. Some of the work we do virtually. We will take an issue
    and we will do it via email and video conference. If I could,
    if you would like, I can take that for the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        [Deleted.]

        Senator McCaskill. Yes, because I am trying to think. It
    seems to me like to me the Russian thing is a significant cyber
    event. I guess my problem is with this, I know we have spent a
    lot of time today struggling about what our policy is. It looks
    like to me that we do not really have anywhere where there is
    an ongoing meeting structure that integrates the private sector
    into what is a pretty convoluted setup that we have right now.
        Admiral Rogers. Could I disagree slightly, if I could?
        Senator McCaskill. Sure.
        Admiral Rogers. I think it is fair to say that at a sector
    level we do have constructs that enable that to occur. But one
    of the things the hack points out--for example, the Russian
    influence effort points out is we do not have a sector labeled
    U.S. election infrastructure like we do in power, like we do in
    transportation.
        Senator McCaskill. Although DHS has named election
    infrastructure as part of their critical infrastructure----
        Admiral Rogers. Right, now.
        Senator McCaskill.--responsibility.
        Admiral Rogers. Yes, ma'am. Now.
        Senator McCaskill. That happened last year maybe in
    response to this. I hopefully will find out more tomorrow.
        I guess it seems to me that when someone is impacting our
    elections, that overlooks all because if you look at this list,
    our national policies certainly impact chemical, commercial,
    communications, manufacturing, dams, I mean everything gets
    impacted.
        Admiral Rogers. Right.
        Senator McCaskill. Forget about Russia for a minute. Are
    you familiar with the UK [United Kingdom] model?
        Admiral Rogers. Yes, ma'am, very much so.
        Senator McCaskill. So why are we not doing that? What is
    wrong with it and why are we not emulating it more?
        Admiral Rogers. So, first, let us look at what the UK model
    is. They basically--I am going to paint a simplistic picture.
    They turned to their intelligence structure, in this case, GCHQ
    [Government Communications Headquarters], which NSA's
    equivalent. They turned to GCHQ and said you have the
    preponderance of capability, insight, expertise. We would like
    you to take a portion of that capability, and we are going to
    create this National Cyber Security Centre. In fact, the
    individual who runs it, a guy I have worked with for a long
    time, is a GCHQ employee. They decided that in their construct
    they were comfortable with that.
        For us on the U.S. side, we have always been less
    comfortable with the idea of, well, do you want the
    intelligence world to be the primary interface, if you will,
    with the private sector. For our UK teammates, they are just
    very comfortable with that. Their view is it is about aligning
    the greatest expertise and capability with the private sector,
    and there is not quite the same baggage or at least history or
    tradition.
        Because of that, on the U.S. side, we have taken a very
    fundamental different approach, I am hoping with this new team
    coming in, this is opportunity for us to step back and say to
    ourselves are we happy with the way this is working. I have not
    seen your diagram, but you have heard me say for a long time we
    have got to simplify the complexity of this structure to the
    outside world because if you are in the private sector and you
    are trying to figure out so who am I supposed to be dealing
    with and why this time was it you and the last time it was that
    organization and the next time you are telling me you want me
    to go there. We have got to simplify this.
        Senator McCaskill. Well, I am down for that. I think the
    curse and the blessing is how protective we are of classified
    information. I understand that challenge. But boy, oh, boy,
    pulling this group together after a significant cyber event,
    there is going to be a lot of Monday morning quarterbacking
    over whether or not more information should have been shared.
        Admiral Rogers. If I could also make one point. I agree
    with everything you said, but I would remind people perfect
    information sharing in terms of classified in and of itself
    will not necessarily fix every problem. If you look at
    reactions to the Russian hack, there were plenty of
    organizations that were provided the specific insights who just
    opted, for a variety of reasons, not to react in the same way.
    That was not about classification. So I just want to make
    people--I just want us to think us to think about, hey, this is
    the simple cure-all.
        Senator McCaskill. I get it.
        Admiral Rogers. I am not trying to say that you are
    painting that, ma'am.
        Senator McCaskill. No. I know it is not the simple cure,
    but I know that that underlying disease about information
    sharing goes deep and it is calcified. I want to make sure that
    we are aware of that.
        Admiral Rogers. Yes, Senator.
        Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Admiral.
        Senator Reed [presiding]. On behalf of Chairman McCain,
    Senator Shaheen, please.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, Admiral, for being here and for the job that you
    do.
        Just to pick up a little bit on Senator McCaskill and the
    issue of classified versus unclassified, the challenge with, in
    this case, the Russian hack with so much of the information
    being classified is that the American public does not know what
    is going on. When the American public does not know what is
    going on on an event of this magnitude, that is a real
    challenge for our democracy.
        I was not able to hear your testimony and the questions,
    obviously, because I was in another hearing. But I know that
    there have been a number of questions about the Russian hacking
    and what that means. But have you talked about what in the big
    picture that means? What is Russia really trying to do with the
    hack of our electoral system, with the hack of France, with the
    interference in Germany, with what they have done in many of
    the Balkan countries, in Eastern Europe? What is their goal?
        Admiral Rogers. Well, I am going to talk about the U.S.
    side and then talk about it more broadly.
        So on the U.S. side, as we indicated, speaking to you now
    as the Director of NSA, as we said in the intelligence
    community assessment, three primary goals we thought.
        First was to undercut the United States and its broad
    principles of democracy and try to send a message, hey, look,
    these guys are every bit as inconsistent as everybody else.
    They are not this high-on-the-hill, perfectly white and perfect
    structure. Look, they have pettiness. They work against each
    other. So to undercut our democracy.
        Secondly, they clearly had a preference that candidate
    Clinton not win, and they also wanted to ensure if she did win,
    that she was weakened.
        Then the report talks about the third objective was to
    try--and this is where NSA has a difference confidence level
    than my other teammates. But I agree with the judgment that the
    third objective was to help candidate Trump win. If you look at
    the activity they have done in the United States, if you look
    at the activity they have done in France, in Germany, they
    clearly are trying to help ensure that leaders they believe
    might be more inclined--it does not mean that they necessarily
    are, but the Russians appear to be assessing that some leaders
    might be more inclined to be supportive of their positions,
    their views, might engage in policies more favorable from a
    Russian perspective. You saw that just play out in the French
    election where there clearly was a difference between these two
    candidates and their views of Russia and the things they were
    talking in the campaign about if they won, what would some of
    their choices be in terms of national security policies for
    France and how that might impact the Russians.
        Senator Shaheen. But is the overarching strategy not not so
    much who the winners and losers are, but it is to undermine the
    public confidence in a democracy and how it works?
        Admiral Rogers. That is why I say that is a part of it. I
    am sorry if I did not make that jump on the foreign side as
    well. It is the same thing. That is an aspect of it.
        Senator Shaheen. Right. So just as they are engaging in a
    military buildup, just as they are engaging in the cyber
    intrusions, that the other thing they are engaging in is an
    effort to undermine Western democracies. That is another way
    they are going to undermine the West.
        Admiral Rogers. Right, to weaken them, to forestall their
    ability to respond because there is no political consensus
    because they distrust their institutions as citizens, et
    cetera. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Shaheen. So I was in Poland after the Munich
    Security Conference and met with a number of officials there.
    Some of the people that we met with suggested that they were
    very concerned that we had not responded to the Russian attack
    of our election system. One of the things that really impressed
    me was the person who said, you know, if you are not willing to
    do anything about what Russia did in the United States
    intervening in your electoral system, fundamental to your
    democracy, how should we have any confidence that you will
    defend us when the Russians come after us.
        So what does it say to our allies that we have not been
    willing to take any overarching action against Russia for what
    they did? We have not been willing to pass stronger sanctions.
    We have not been willing to do other efforts to take action
    against them because of their interference. What does that say
    to our allies?
        Admiral Rogers. So I can certainly understand why our
    allies would be perplexed. If this conduct occurred, why are we
    not seeing X, Y, or Z? I certainly can understand that.
        One of the things we try to assure our allies, though, is
    this is one aspect of a broader set of issues. You should not
    question--it depends on the relationship, but in broad terms,
    you should not call into question our long-term commitment to
    you, for Poland, for example. Do not let there be any doubt of
    that.
        Senator Shaheen. So we are more committed to Poland than we
    are to addressing Russia's----
        Admiral Rogers. That is not what I said.
        Senator Shaheen. I know it is not what you said. But it
    leaves open to interpretation that assumption. So thank you.
        Admiral Rogers. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        Admiral Rogers, thank you for your testimony today. As
    always, we appreciate your service, and would you communicate
    to your colleagues our appreciation for their service also?
        On behalf of Chairman McCain, the hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:48 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
          organization for security and cooperation in europe (osce)
                   cybersecurity confidence building measures
        1. Senator Wicker. Admiral Rogers, the Organization for Security
    and Cooperation in Europe's (OSCE) 57 participating states have
    developed two sets of confidence building measures (CBM) to reduce the
    risks of conflict in cyberspace. CBMs can make cyberspace more
    predictable and less prone to misunderstandings. The first CBM
    established official contact points and communications lines to better
    share information and prevent misunderstandings resulting from cyber
    activities. The second CBM focused on enhancing interstate
    cybersecurity cooperation including, for example, mitigating attacks on
    critical infrastructure.
        Do you agree that such cooperative development of CBMs is helpful
    and in the national interest? What more can Cyber Command do to support
    CBM development?
        Admiral Rogers. [Deleted].
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Michael Rounds
                             taclane trusted sensor
        2. Senator Rounds. Admiral Rogers, I understand that NSA has a
    concept to protect unclassified network systems called TACLANE Trusted
    Sensor (TTS), and that this system has been piloted a number of times
    since 2013 within the Department of Defense. Additionally, I understand
    this system is currently undergoing additional pilot projects both
    within NSA and among the defense industrial base.

        Based on the pilot demonstrations completed so far, do you believe
    the TTS approach shows promise for broader application?
        Admiral Rogers. [Deleted].

        3. Senator Rounds. Admiral Rogers, what are the current pilot
    programs intended to demonstrate?
        Admiral Rogers. [Deleted].

        4. Senator Rounds. Admiral Rogers, what is the timeline for
    completing and evaluating these pilot programs?
        Admiral Rogers. [Deleted].

        5. Senator Rounds. Admiral Rogers, if the current pilot projects
    demonstrate a significant increase in the ability to detect intrusions
    on unclassified networks and increases the ability to respond, what
    would be the logical next step to more broadly deploy this capability
    to defend Department of Defense unclassified network systems?
        Admiral Rogers. [Deleted].

        6. Senator Rounds. Admiral Rogers, are there limitations that must
    be overcome before broader deployment would be possible?
        Admiral Rogers. [Deleted].
                                cyber workforce
        7. Senator Rounds. Admiral Rogers, given the importance of
    providing an able and diverse cyber workforce with regard to skills and
    geography, what initiatives are you undertaking to leverage academic
    institutions to train a capable cyber workforce and enable these
    personnel to support your mission within the geographic vicinities of
    these institutions?
        Admiral Rogers. [Deleted].

        8. Senator Rounds. Admiral Rogers, further, how do we ensure that
    the right brick and mortar and network infrastructure is in place to
    provide education and training at these institutions in order to arm
    the workforce with the critical knowledge, skills and abilities
    required for a qualified and ready workforce?
        Admiral Rogers. [Deleted].
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator David A. Perdue
                  efficiencies in cyber--training and networks
        9. Senator Perdue. Admiral Rogers, during your testimony, we
    briefly discussed the prospect of a joint, federated training program
    for the training of the cyber mission force (CMF). As I stated in the
    hearing, I believe we're in a fiscal environment where we simply can't
    afford waste and a security environment where we can't afford to have
    our services out of sync on this critical issue. What synergies can be
    achieved by training our cyber warriors jointly, and would we avoid
    duplication and waste by doing so?
        Admiral Rogers. [Deleted].

        10. Senator Perdue. Admiral Rogers, we covered this in our exchange
    in the hearing, but could you more thoroughly update me on the status
    of the forthcoming agreement on a joint, federated training program
    funded by the services for the training of the cyber mission force
    (CMF)?
        Admiral Rogers. [Deleted].

        11. Senator Perdue. Admiral Rogers, which service is the furthest
    along in their training of the cyber mission force?
        Admiral Rogers. [Deleted].

        12. Senator Perdue. Admiral Rogers, in your view, would it make
    sense to have the service that's furthest along take the lead for a
    joint training program and facility?
        Admiral Rogers. [Deleted].

        13. Senator Perdue. Admiral Rogers, has any other branch invested
    the same level of resources into cultivating a pipeline for increasing
    the DOD's cyber workforce as the Army has?
        Admiral Rogers. [Deleted].
            efficiencies in cyber--joint modernization of the dodin
        14. Senator Perdue. Admiral Rogers, you are responsible for defense
    of the DOD information network (DODIN); however, each of the Services
    are responsible for modernizing their networks, and every Service
    appears to be taking a different approach. Does it make sense to have
    each of the services developing their own networks?
        Admiral Rogers. [Deleted].

        15. Senator Perdue. Admiral Rogers, does it make sense not to have
    one uniform standard or one agency responsible for providing core
    network capabilities to the entire Department of Defense?
        Admiral Rogers. [Deleted].
                                   __________
                    Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
     constraints and issues regarding ``cognitive'' information operations
                               through cyberspace
        16. Senator Reed. Admiral Rogers, what are the legal and policy
    obstacles to DOD conducting ``cognitive'' information operations?
        Admiral Rogers. [Deleted].

        17. Senator Reed. Admiral Rogers, in terms of shielding the
    American people from consuming Government messaging in this age of
    globally interconnected networks, has the delineation become obsolete
    between information operations and messaging conducted overseas and not
    in the United States?
        Admiral Rogers. [Deleted].
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Claire McCaskill
                       national cyber security structure
        18. Senator McCaskill. Admiral Rogers, PPD-41 was signed on July
    26, 2016, creating the Cyber Response Group and makes it responsible
    for producing U.S. Government policy and strategy. The CRG is comprised
    of federal agencies, including the DOD, and the U.S. Government's
    relevant cyber centers, including CYBERCOM's JOC.
        Has the CRG met to discuss national strategy and policy since PPD-
    41 being published?
        How many times and when?
        Has CYBERCOM been a part of these meetings? How many times?
        Admiral Rogers. [Deleted].

        19. Senator McCaskill. Admiral Rogers, PPD-41 also creates the
    Cyber Unified Coordination Group (UCG), which is tasked as the primary
    method for coordinating at the operational level between and among
    federal agencies in response to a significant cyber incident. The
    operative words being ``in response to,'' meaning it is a temporary
    entity.
        Has a UCG ever been stood up since PPD-41 being published?
        If so, how many times, when, and in response to what incident(s)?
        If so, and given the ad hoc nature of a UCG, which entities were
    involved in each UCG that was stood up?
        Admiral Rogers. [Deleted].
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
                    role of military in protecting industry
        20. Senator Hirono. Admiral Rogers, actors that participate in the
    ``cyber world'' include state and non-state actors, as well as
    government agencies, civilians, and businesses. This leads to a
    confluence of interests such as national security, consumer and privacy
    interests, and economic interests where security and openness are in
    tension. What is the correct balance of government intervention to
    ensure that personal rights are not infringed upon, national security
    interests are protected and U.S. industry can operate in the worldwide
    economy without handcuffing it with regulations and government
    developed standards?
        Admiral Rogers. [Deleted].

        21. Senator Hirono. Admiral Rogers, is the military the best entity
    to defend the public sector/private business sector against cyber-
    attacks?
        Admiral Rogers. [Deleted].

        22. Senator Hirono. Admiral Rogers, is the U.S. military properly
    resourced to defend the U.S. Government and the public sector at the
    same time?
        Admiral Rogers. [Deleted].
                        legal framework for cyber issues
        23. Senator Hirono. Admiral Rogers, the Department of Defense has
    been tasked with three cybersecurity missions: 1. Defend the military's
    network; 2. Provide offensive cyber support to military commanders; and
    3. Defend the nation from a cyber-attack of significant consequence. Is
    the legal framework in place to authorize the use of force against
    cyber threats in the United States and have the appropriate rules of
    engagement been developed to ensure that the level of force is
    appropriate to the threat?
        Admiral Rogers. [Deleted].
                 how cyber security affects the private sector
        24. Senator Hirono. Admiral Rogers, in the 2015 FAST Act (5 year
    highway reauthorization act), Congress designated the Department of
    Energy as the lead agency for cybersecurity in the energy sector. The
    2015 Cyber Information Sharing Act similarly designated the Department
    of Homeland Security with similar responsibility for coordinating with
    the private sector. What statutory or agency-level changes would you
    recommend to enhance the flow of information and overall cooperation
    between CYBERCOM, the Department of Energy, and DHS to enhance
    cybersecurity in the energy and broader private sectors?
        Admiral Rogers. [Deleted].
                                   __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Angus S. King, Jr.
                  securing the united states from cyber attack
        25. Senator King. Admiral Rogers, after several years of hearings
    on cyber threats and the role of U.S. Cyber Command, there is no doubt
    that cyber threats against the United States are real and dangerous.
    However, the government has taken little action to counter these
    threats.
        Please describe and prioritize five actions that U.S. Government
    actors can take now to better secure U.S. networks and infrastructure
    from cyber attack. Your suggestions could be legislative or regulatory
    in nature, or they could concern relationships that should be formed,
    for example.
        Admiral Rogers. [Deleted].

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2018 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                             THURSDAY, MAY 25, 2017

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                                  ARMY POSTURE

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:36 a.m. in Room
    SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Wicker,
    Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Perdue, Cruz,
    Reed, McCaskill, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, King,
    Heinrich, Warren, and Peters.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman McCain. Good morning.
        The Armed Services Committee meets this morning to receive
    testimony on the posture of the United States Army and the
    fiscal year 2018 defense budget request.
        I am pleased to welcome Robert Speer, Acting Secretary of
    the Army, and General Mark Milley, Chief of Staff of the Army.
    This committee is grateful for both of you and your many years
    of distinguished service and your continued leadership of our
    Army.
        Sixteen years of war have tested the Army, perhaps more
    than any other service. Time and again, our soldiers have met
    the test and proved their commitment, courage, and
    determination. It is the duty of this committee and this
    Congress to do their utmost to provide them with the support
    they need and deserve.
        That starts by recognizing that our Army is still at war.
    At this moment, 186,000 soldiers are deployed in 140 locations
    around the globe. They are fighting terrorists and training our
    partners in Afghanistan, supporting the fight against ISIS
    [Islamic State] in Iraq and Syria, all the while reinforcing
    the defenses of our allies from the Korean DMZ to NATO's
    eastern flank. The burden imposed on our soldiers only grows as
    threats to our Nation increase and sequestration remains the
    law of the land.
        Given current operational demands, restoring readiness must
    be the Army's first priority. The sad reality is that the focus
    on readiness issues in recent years has made little to no
    difference. For yet another year, just over one-third of the
    Army's brigade combat teams are ready for deployment and
    decisive operations. Just three of the Army's 58 brigade combat
    teams are at the highest level of readiness. The Army still
    does not plan to return to full spectrum readiness until 2021
    at the earliest.
        The President's Budget request is supposed to be focused on
    restoring readiness. The buildup, the administration says, will
    have to wait a couple of years. That ignores what Army leaders
    have testified to this committee, which is that inadequate end
    strength is forcing the Army to consume readiness as fast as it
    produces it. In other words, the Army will never truly restore
    readiness until it begins to grow. Yet the President has
    submitted a fiscal year 2018 budget request that calls for zero
    additional soldiers.
        Meanwhile, the Army is woefully behind on modernization,
    and our soldiers are increasingly unprepared to confront the
    harsh realities of 21st Century warfare. Analyses by the
    National Commission on the Future of the United States Army,
    the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Army itself
    have pointed to glaring capability gaps in mobility, lethality,
    and survivability. These problems will only get worse as
    adversaries such as Russia continue to modernize their forces.
    Put simply, our Army lacks both the adequate capacity and the
    key capabilities to win decisively.
        We cannot move quickly enough to modernize our Army and
    give our soldiers the advanced capabilities they need to
    prevail against a determined peer adversary. Yet today, the
    Army has still not decided upon a comprehensive Army
    modernization plan for the future. Indeed, despite the great
    potential of advanced technologies, from Active protective
    systems to reactive armor to lethal munitions, the Army does
    not have a major armored fighting vehicle under design for the
    first time in nearly a century. It is little wonder our current
    National Security Adviser, General McMaster, remarked a year
    ago that the Army is--and I quote--outranged and outgunned by
    many potential adversaries.
        The Army's modernization woes are undoubtedly connected to
    the service's disastrous acquisition record over the last two
    decades: too many underperforming of canceled programs, too few
    real capabilities fielded, and far too much taxpayer money
    wasted. Tens of billions of dollars were squandered on programs
    like the Future Combat System, the Comanche attack helicopter,
    the Crusader howitzer, the Joint Tactical Radio System, and the
    Distributed Common Ground System-Army. Most recently, the
    committee has learned of the failure of the Warfighter
    Information Network-Tactical, or WIN-T [Warfighter Information
    Network-Tacticle]. This program--I urge my colleagues, if they
    do not pay any attention to anything I say today--this program
    has cost the taxpayer over $6 billion and has yet to meet the
    requirements of our warfighters. $6 billion.
        But even with all that said, it is also true that the Army
    will never recover from this troubled acquisition history if it
    is paralyzed by fear of repeating it. This committee has acted
    in the last two defense authorization bills to empower the
    leaders of Military Services in the acquisition process. I urge
    our witnesses to use these new authorities to drive bold
    change.
        Building a modern Army that can win decisively in the harsh
    environs of 21st Century warfare will require visionary
    leadership. You will have to learn the lessons of the past,
    make tough decisions, take and manage real risks, and hold
    yourselves and those under your command accountable for
    results. When you do so, you will always have an ally in this
    committee because I believe our soldiers cannot afford the
    false choice between readiness and modernization. We can and
    must do better.
        Senator Reed?

                     STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
    holding this very important hearing. The Army is the first
    service to testify before the full Senate Armed
        Services Committee on their fiscal year 2018 budget
    request.
        I would like to join you in welcoming Acting Secretary
    Speer and General Milley at today's hearing. We commend both of
    you gentlemen for your service to our country and for your
    steadfast leadership of the Army.
        In light of the new challenges facing the Army from
    rebuilding readiness and modernization, it underscores how
    important it is that we confirm a permanent Secretary of the
    Army.
        The President's fiscal year 2018 budget submission for the
    Department of the Army includes $166 billion in total funding,
    of which $137.1 billion is for base budget requirements, and
    $28.9 billion is for overseas contingency operations. This
    represents roughly a $5.1 billion increase over the fiscal year
    2017 request.
        As the committee considers the Army's funding request, we
    must always be mindful of our national security challenges. It
    is highly unlikely that the demand for Army forces will
    diminish in the near future. Currently more than 180,000
    soldiers, Active, Reserve, and Guard, are serving in over 140
    countries, and while we continue to field the most capable
    fighting force in the world, 16 years of sustained military
    operations, focused almost exclusively on counterterrorism, has
    taken a toll on the readiness of our soldiers. Today, less than
    one-quarter of our Nation's Army is ready to perform their core
    wartime missions, and some critical combat enabler units are in
    far worse shape. In addition, the evolving threats facing our
    Nation impacts readiness as the Army needs to train to fight a
    near-peer competitor in a full spectrum environment.
    Unfortunately, while additional funding is important, it is not
    the sole solution to restoring readiness levels. It will take
    both time to rebuild strategic depth and relief from high
    operational tempo.
        I applaud the Army for making readiness their number one
    priority, and General Milley, I look forward to your thoughts
    on the Army's progress.
        While readiness is vital, we cannot neglect investments in
    the modernization of military platforms and equipment. The
    Army's fiscal year 2018 budget request, $27.8 billion for
    modernization efforts, which includes $18.4 billion for
    procurement and $9.4 billion for research, development, test,
    and evaluation activities, is the current request. I would like
    to know if our witnesses feel confident that the funding for
    modernization is adequate.
        A recent focus of this committee has been to improve DOD
    acquisition processes, as the chairman mentioned, to help
    reduce costs and to deliver the best new technologies and
    systems for our operational forces more quickly. I hope we can
    hear more about Army's successes in improving acquisition, what
    role the Chief is playing in those changes, and what, if
    anything, this committee can do to be supportive.
        In the area of personnel, the budget requests the same
    Active Duty end strength as enacted in the 2017 NDAA while
    again seeking measures to slow the growth of personnel costs.
    The President's budget requests a pay raise of 2.1 percent;
    modernization of the military health care benefit, including
    cost sharing fees; and further implementation of the blended
    retirement system, which will begin in 2018. I hope to hear
    from the witnesses their views on the cumulative impact these
    changes will have on the Army and its ability to recruit and
    train the best for Military Service.
        I applaud the Army for its integration of women into all of
    its formations, without restriction, including combat and
    special operations units, an evolution that I believe will
    greatly enhance the Army's ability to fill the ranks with the
    very best. The Army will need to recruit from all corners to
    meet the higher end strengths, and it is imperative that the
    Army not lower standards.
        I understand there may be calls by some to increase the
    Army's Active Duty strength in 2018 above the President's
    budget request. I caution that there must be a plan in place to
    use these additional personnel and to pay for them. Training
    and readiness are important, even paramount, and maintaining
    and enhancing the fighting ability of the force we have must
    take precedence over recruiting a larger force that may not be
    ready.
        Finally, as I have stated previously, enforcing budget
    discipline through the Budget Control Act is ineffective and
    shortsighted. I believe the Senate in a bipartisan fashion
    should repeal the BCA [Budget Control Act] and establish a more
    reasonable limit on discretionary spending in an equitable
    manner that meets our domestic and defense needs. While
    sequestration is the law of the land, budget requests that
    exceed the spending caps are not useful because they allow the
    military to plan for funds that are likely not forthcoming,
    adding to the uncertainty DOD seeks to avoid.
        There are many urgent issues to discuss this morning. I
    thank our witnesses for appearing before the committee. I look
    forward to their testimony.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Welcome, Secretary Speer.

    STATEMENT OF HONORABLE ROBERT M. SPEER, ACTING SECRETARY OF THE
                                  ARMY

        Secretary Speer. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the
    committee, I speak to you on behalf of our soldiers, civilians,
    families about the current state of America's Army.
        Your Army continues to march towards increased readiness
    while gaining momentum on modernization. Over the past year,
    the Army has been rebuilding readiness to counter the threats
    to the United States and our allies. You have heard General
    Milley talk about readiness as our number one priority, and I
    have witnessed firsthand the readiness needs as I visited
    soldiers across our Army over the past 4 months. I saw the
    strain a high demand for Army forces puts on our total Army,
    their families, our civilian workforce. Frequent deployments
    and aggressive training schedules needed to prepare our units
    are taking their toll.
        The pace of operations is as high as it has been in the
    past 16 years. Units are as busy at home as they are when they
    are deployed. I have seen and heard these impacts watching
    training and learning from senior leaders, soldiers, families
    at town halls like the one I recently attended at Fort Bragg.
    Soldiers told me what they are going through and the impacts of
    constant deployments and training. I met soldiers training at
    Fort Stewart, and a month later, I saw these same soldiers at
    the National Training Center just months after returning from
    Europe, adding additional stress to Army families.
        I thank Congress for the fiscal year 2017 budget, a
    critical step of easing the strains while rebuilding readiness.
    Just a few weeks ago, I was with both regular Army and National
    Guard soldiers working shoulder to shoulder with our NATO
    partners in Europe. These forces rely upon readiness
    investments you made to organize, train and equip them, and
    make this country safe, deterring Russian aggression and
    reassuring our allies in Europe.
        Your funding stopped the decline of Army manning levels. It
    ensured deploying units like the soldiers from Fort Drum I met
    in Europe now have the increased flying hours to fund readiness
    improvements. Fiscal year 2017 funding enables us to modernize
    aircraft, armored vehicles, and air and missile defense
    systems. Your authorization has also increased investments in
    our ammunition stocks and upgraded infrastructure and
    production line capacities in the Army's organic industrial
    base. This is a good first step ensuring we have the munitions
    we need and into the future.
        Our $137.2 billion fiscal year 2018 budget request sustains
    1,018,000 total Army. This Army will be capable of meeting
    global obligations while investing in capabilities for wartime
    operations and challenges. This budget builds on the fiscal
    year 2017 by continuing readiness improvements. It begins a
    long-term effort to improve long-range fires, air missile
    defense, continues to replenish munitions stocks and provide
    advance protective systems for combat vehicle and aviation. It
    begins to fill shortfalls in transportation capabilities, and
    it will sustain increased armored brigade combat teams and
    combat aviation brigades, both in high demand across the globe.
        If we do not get the money we request, we will not be able
    to modernize our Army and thus continue to mortgage our future
    readiness. Above all, the Army needs sufficient, sustained,
    predictable funding to restore balance and reduce risk.
        The Budget Control Act and continuing resolutions cause
    uncertainty. They force us to make trades and prioritize
    readiness over other investments, raise the defense caps. It is
    far more cost effective for the Army to balance current
    operations and future modernization when we can rely upon
    predictable funding that extends beyond a single year's budget.
        We are the stewards of the funds you provide on behalf of
    our Nation. We are committed to Secretary Mattis' emphasis to
    rebuild and reform our processes and resources efficiently and
    effectively.
        To this end, the Army will conduct a financial statement
    audit on 30 September this year and will remain audit-ready.
    The Chief and I are aggressively reforming acquisition
    processes. We must deliver capabilities to warfighters quicker
    and at lower cost.
        I want to provide every soldiers, civilian and family
    members, the care and respect they deserve. The Army is making
    progress against stamping out sexual assault, sexual
    harassment, and retaliation, and other offensive behaviors. As
    a former Army officer married to a former Army officer and the
    father of four, this is a personal priority. We demand respect
    among our soldiers and civilians and will not tolerate
    destructive behavior in our formation.
        In addition, our continuing Soldier 2020 initiative of
    standards-based assignment regardless of gender is working and
    saw success at Fort Benning, Georgia.
        Thank you once more on behalf of the men and women of our
    Army. Your funding for fiscal year 2017 restored the balance to
    our Army. We are asking you to provide resources in the fiscal
    year 2018 request and provide budget predictability into the
    future. With your help, the Army will continue to build
    readiness and modernize to meet the challenge.
        Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
        Chairman McCain. Thank you.
        General Milley?

    STATEMENT OF GENERAL MARK A. MILLEY, USA, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE
                                  ARMY

        General Milley. Thanks, Chairman McCain and Ranking Member
    Reed, and all the distinguished members of the committee for
    the opportunity to testify today.
        I just want to take a moment to publicly express to our
    great ally, the British people, the condolences of the entire
    United States Army on the horrific attack against the innocent
    in Manchester. This should also serve as a stark and brutal
    reminder to all of us that our efforts against ISIS and their
    fellow terrorists are righteous and just. ISIS must be
    destroyed and ISIS will be destroyed.
        For the past 16 years, the United States Army has
    continuously provided trained and ready forces in Afghanistan
    and Iraq as we simultaneously executed a wide array of missions
    in support of the geographic commanders around the world, as
    the chairman noted earlier, in Europe, Korea, Africa, South and
    Central America, with 180,000 troops in 140 countries. About 40
    or 50 percent or so of the demand from the combatant commanders
    is met by Army forces, and about 70 percent of unexpected
    emergent demand is met by Army forces. The bottom line is the
    United States Army continues to meet all missions required of
    us and we still remain the best ground combat force in the
    world.
        However, as the chairman earlier pointed out, the United
    States is increasingly being challenged and gaps in both
    capability and capacity have emerged. You, this Congress,
    recognized that, and your support in the fiscal year 2017
    budget stopped the downward trend in readiness and capacity for
    the Army. The Army is making very, very slow and very steady
    progress but slow progress in our core warfighting skills
    across the Total Force, and we still have much, much more work
    to do to achieve full spectrum readiness and modernization.
        The most significant help we can get from Congress,
    frankly, is a steady, predictable funding line, raise the BCA
    top line, and stop using CRs from year to year. Adequate and
    predictable funding is absolutely vital to combat ISIS, fully
    recover our readiness, address capacity and capability
    shortfalls, and is a critical first step to set the conditions
    for improving future readiness that will be needed in an
    unforeseen contingency. If the BCA and the CRs continue to
    define our resourcing, then we risk reversing our readiness
    recovery that has just begun, and it will result in a hollow
    Army. That will show up in the blood of our soldiers on some
    unknown future battlefield.
        While I recognize the Code Pink protesters behind me and I
    recognize their right to protest, everyone should be mindful
    that the right to protest is purchased with a soldier's blood.
        Combat is unforgiving, and it is more unforgiving on armies
    that are not manned, trained, equipped, or well led. Advances
    by our adversaries are real. It is not fake news. Their
    advances in capability, capacity, and their increasing
    willingness to use that military instrument of power in foreign
    adventures.
        The cumulative effect of persistent and destructive budget
    instability is increasing risk not only for the Army, but for
    the Nation. Readiness, capacity, and capability to deter or, if
    necessary, to fight and win wars is very, very expensive. We
    know that. The cost of preparation is always far less than the
    cost of sacrifice and the pain of regret. The current
    battlefield against terrorists is already very lethal, but a
    future battlefield against a near-peer or regional threat will
    prove far more lethal. Our adversaries study us and they are
    rapidly leveraging technology, improving their capabilities,
    and are clearly asserting themselves in many ways both seen and
    unseen. I am telling you time is not our ally. Witness the
    almost weekly provocations by North Korea, to cite just one
    example.
        We request your support for this budget, which we recognize
    increases the defense caps imposed by the BCA, but we need this
    and we need it now before it is too late.
        Specifically, the Army requests congressional support for
    our readiness and modernization priorities. In readiness, we
    want to retain the end strength increases authorized in the
    fiscal year 2017 bill to fill the force structure to combat
    levels of manning. We want to continue investment in high
    quality home station and combat training center OPTEMPO
    [Operational Tempo] and the operations and maintenance to
    support that. We want to increase our aviation and ground
    maneuver capacity, replenish critical ammunition stocks, and
    continue supporting our efforts to maintain aging equipment. In
    modernization, our future readiness by another term, we ask for
    your support for air and missile defense, long-range fires,
    preferred munitions, mobility and lethality improvements for
    our brigade combat teams, Active protection systems for air and
    ground capabilities, assured mission command electronic
    warfare, cyber, and vertical lift.
        We recognize that the American taxpayer entrusts us with a
    significant amount of money to meet those requirements, and we
    will be diligent stewards of our resources and enforce
    accountability to make effective use of every dollar. Senator
    McCain, I commit to you that we will not make the mistakes of
    the past in the acquisition process.
        Your support the fiscal year 2018 budget will ensure our
    soldiers are ready for the missions of today, as we prepare for
    the unforeseen conflicts of tomorrow.
        I thank you for the opportunity to testify and look forward
    to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary Speer and General
    Milley follows:]

    Prepared Statement by the Honorable Robert M. Speer and General Mark A.
                                     Milley
                                  introduction
        We thank Congress for the fiscal year (FY17) budget that allows us
    to improve readiness. With consistent, strategy-based funding over
    time, the Army can increase capacity, train contingency forces, close
    critical modernization gaps, and rebuild installation and training
    infrastructure--all while maintaining excellence in the execution of
    current operations. To that end, an increase in the budget caps and a
    defense budget sized to achieve the objectives in the Defense Planning
    Guidance are critical to the United States Army accomplishing assigned
    missions to a standard expected by the American people.
        Over the past 15 years of war, the Army has continuously provided
    trained and ready forces for combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
    to a standard of excellence equal to any in our Nation's history.
    Simultaneously, the United States Army has executed a wide array of
    combatant commander missions, providing forces to Europe, the Pacific,
    the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and the Homeland. Today, the
    United States Army assigns or allocates over 187,000 soldiers to meet
    combatant commander requirements. However, the fiscal impacts of the
    Budget Control Act of 2011 and continuing resolutions have required the
    Army to take risk when meeting current operational requirements while
    maintaining a ready force for major combat operations.
                             strategic environment
        The United States Army forms the foundation of the integrated Joint
    Force facing several U.S. national security challenges. For almost two
    decades, the Army has provided the majority of United States forces
    fighting two prolonged counterinsurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan.
    United States Army capabilities are key to deterring Russian, Chinese,
    Iranian, and North Korean challenges to United States national
    interests. Additionally, United States Army soldiers defend the
    Homeland against intercontinental ballistic missiles and provide
    support to civil authorities in the event of unforeseen natural and
    man-made disasters.
        Russia is likely to continue employing a mix of conventional and
    unconventional military capabilities to achieve its policy objectives.
    Russia's conventional capabilities are formidable and, in many areas,
    challenge ours and those of our allies and partners. The Army
    contributes 34,000 soldiers in support of United States European
    Command's effort to deter acts of aggression and ensure America's
    safety and security. The forward presence of United States soldiers is
    the keystone of our Nation's ability to assure North Atlantic Treaty
    Organization (NATO) Allies and non-NATO partners, deter adversaries,
    and act in a timely manner if deterrence fails. We must invest in
    strategically prepositioned equipment stocks in addition to rotational
    and permanently stationed forces on the ground in Europe today. The
    result of prepositioned stocks in conjunction with forward deployed and
    rotational forces increases assurances to our allies and deters
    potential enemies.
        The Army has about 71,000 soldiers in the Indo-Asia Pacific to
    counter a myriad of security challenges from regional adversaries,
    violent extremist organizations, and natural disasters. In South Korea,
    the Army serves alongside our Republic of Korea counterparts to deter,
    and if necessary `Fight Tonight' against an increasingly dangerous
    North Korea. China's disputed territorial claims and assertive actions
    in the South and East China Seas increase tensions with many friends
    and allies. Additionally, ISIS-inspired attacks in Bangladesh,
    Indonesia, the Philippines, and bombings in Thailand in 2016,
    demonstrate the persistent terrorist threat in South and Southeast
    Asia. Specific Army investments that provide the Joint Force a more
    comprehensive rapid response force in the Pacific include: enhanced
    joint integrated air and missile defense, offensive and defensive
    counter-electronic warfare, and cyber capabilities. Additional
    investments support rotational forces to South Korea and a robust
    training and exercise program to increase interoperability and build
    partner capacity with our friends and allies.
        The Middle East and Central Asia are rife with threats and
    challenges. Iran's growing ballistic missile activities, cyber threats,
    and interference in Syria further threaten stability in the Middle East
    and the security of our allies. Russian intervention in Syria and
    increased influence throughout the region while ISIS continues a
    campaign of terror across the Middle East, adds to instability and
    inhibits long-term progress in the region. The Army's presence in the
    Middle East assures access, builds a foundation of trust, and prevents
    the ongoing conflicts from spilling over to other regions, including
    the Homeland. Nearly 42,000 soldiers throughout the area support the
    defeat of ISIS in Syria and Iraq, deny enemy safe havens in
    Afghanistan, deter Iran, support Turkey, assist with the stability of
    Jordan, and build partner capacity with our partners.
        United States Army and African partnerships promote regional
    stability and provide increased awareness and flexibility. United
    States Africa Command employs United States Army forces in small teams
    and units that train with African security forces, assist in building
    capable defense institutions, and support counter-extremist and other
    contingency operations. These efforts assist our African partners in
    their fight against violent extremist organizations--ISIS, al-Shabab,
    and Boko Haram. During fiscal year 2016 over 9,000 soldiers deployed
    throughout Africa. These soldiers participated in over 250 security
    cooperation events, exercises, and missions in more than 30 countries;
    highlighted by Central Accord 2016 in Gabon, where over 1,000 soldiers
    participated with counterparts from 11 African nations as part of a
    peacekeeping training event.
        Approximately 4,000 soldiers support military operations in Central
    America, South America, and the Caribbean. Transregional terrorist
    organizations, transnational organized crime, and violent extremist
    networks are the principal threat to regional security and stability.
    United States Army forces, including aviation, intelligence,
    communication, special operations, and logistics units, actively
    support partner nations' efforts to disrupt, degrade, and dismantle
    these threat networks operating in the region. In October 2016, in
    response to Hurricane Matthew and at the request of the U.S. Agency for
    International Development, the first Category 5 Atlantic hurricane
    since 2007, U.S. Southern Command stood up a Joint Task Force to
    support United States Government disaster relief operations in Haiti
    and Jamaica. U.S. Southern Command deployed United States Army air
    assets, including CH-47 Chinooks, UH-60 Black Hawk utility helicopters
    and HH-60 Medical Evacuation helicopters, which provided the ability to
    quickly move heavy loads of humanitarian aid, conduct medical
    evacuation missions, transport key leaders around the area, and conduct
    early reconnaissance flights to identify the hardest hit areas. The
    efforts of these soldiers assisted in the delivery of more than 349,000
    pounds of relief to areas devastated by Hurricane Matthew.
        At home and abroad, the United States Army secures, operates, and
    defends its networks and conducts cyber operations against a growing
    array of sophisticated cyber adversaries. The Army secures and operates
    its global enterprise network through four Theater Signal Commands and
    five Regional Cyber Centers. The Army has 41 Active Component Army
    Cyber Protection Teams that conduct cyber operations against near peer
    adversaries, ISIS, and other global cyber threats. We are building an
    additional 21 Reserve Component Cyber Protection Teams giving the Army
    62 Total Force Teams. These teams deliver effects against our
    adversaries in support of ground commanders, defend military networks,
    secure Army weapons platforms, and protect critical U.S.
    infrastructure. We request congressional support of our fiscal year
    2018 budget to continue to modernize our global enterprise network and
    advance defensive and offensive cyber capabilities to safeguard the
    Nation's security interests.
        In sum, over 187,000 soldiers support combatant commander
    requirements worldwide. Our soldiers directly contribute to our
    Nation's efforts to defeat ISIS, support governance in Afghanistan, and
    deter conflict throughout Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. This
    steady demand for trained and ready Army units provides our Nation with
    the ability to defeat adversaries, assure our partners, and deter
    potential aggressors.
                         impacts of fiscal uncertainty
        For the past five years, the Army has been working to build and
    sustain a ready force. However, this has been a significant challenge
    due to the Budget Control Act of 2011, Continuing Resolutions, and
    unforeseen changes in the strategic environment that include an
    assertive Russia, an increasingly threatening North Korea, and ISIS
    controlling territory across Iraq and Syria. To respond to the current
    strategic environment, the Army has chosen to prioritize readiness.
        While the Army remains focused on accomplishing the current
    missions of the combatant commanders, the negative impacts of the
    Budget Control Act of 2011 have been significant. These impacts include
    a smaller Army, spending less on modernization, and deferring
    installation maintenance. The consequences are real and will manifest
    themselves if the Army is required to fight in a major conflict.
    Congressional support for a Base Realignment and Closure authority
    would allow the Army to invest in readiness and modernization programs
    rather than excess infrastructure.
        Over the last 8 years, the Army reduced end strength by over
    100,000 soldiers. This reduction included removing 17 brigade combat
    teams from the Army. To meet the end strength reduction targets, the
    Army reduced forward stationed forces in Europe and Korea, replacing
    them with rotational forces from the United States. The impact of this
    reliance on rotational forces is a deployment tempo that rivals the
    surge periods in Iraq and Afghanistan.
        Over the same 8-year period in which we reduced the Army by 100,000
    soldiers, Continuing Resolutions and constrained funding under the
    Budget Control Act of 2011 forced us to pay short-term bills at the
    expense of long-term investments. A consequence of underfunding
    modernization for over a decade is an Army potentially outgunned,
    outranged, and outdated on a future battlefield with near-peer
    competitors. The Army's combat platforms include tanks, helicopters,
    infantry fighting vehicles, artillery, and short range air defense
    systems that are decades old. As technology continues to advance, our
    Army risks falling further and further behind. In short, the Army's
    lack of investment in modernization is eroding our competitive
    advantage in ground combat operations.
        Additionally, the Army deferred maintenance of our installations
    for many years. The Army generates readiness on the installations where
    soldiers live, work, and train. Installations provide the platforms
    where the Army focuses on its fundamental task--readiness. Our military
    construction investment remains at historically low spending levels and
    focuses on replacement of failing and obsolete training, operations,
    maintenance facilities, and footprint consolidation. Deterioration of
    our installations adversely impacts soldier and family quality of life,
    maintenance of equipment, deployment of forces, and our ability to
    mobilize reserve components.
        Overall, the Budget Control Act of 2011, Continuing Resolutions,
    and unforeseen changes in the strategic environment have forced the
    Army to prioritize readiness. The tradeoffs were a smaller Army,
    smaller investments in modernization, and deferring installation
    maintenance. The principal negative impacts of these tradeoffs have
    been stress on the force, eroded competitive advantage, and
    deteriorating installations. Immediately increasing the defense cap and
    predictably funding the Army as requested are the most important
    actions Congress can take to address the changing needs of the global
    security environment.
                           readiness to fight tonight
        Readiness deters and wins wars. An investment in readiness is time
    consuming and expensive, but the only thing more costly than funding
    readiness is the loss of life associated with sending soldiers into
    battle unready. Ultimately, the United States Army must be prepared to
    respond to crises in sufficient numbers with sufficient training and
    equipment to fight and win with little-to-no notice. The National
    Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2017 end strength increase of
    28,000 soldiers over the fiscal year 2017 President Budget's proposal
    is much appreciated to ensure the Army has fully manned formations.
    With a fully resourced end strength, the Army can sustain its global
    commitments. The fiscal year 2018 budget translates into better
    training, increased equipment, installation maintenance, additional
    munitions, and increased modernization that will improve the United
    States' ability to meet the requirements in the Defense Planning
    Guidance.
        In 2014, the United States Army began the transition from training
    for a decade-long counterinsurgency campaign to training for major
    combat operations. Over the next 2 years, the Army's challenge is to
    balance the requirements of remaining regionally engaged, while
    simultaneously preparing to meet the demands of a globally responsive
    contingency force. As a result, the Army increased resources provided
    to Combat Training Centers and home station training. Throughput at
    Army Combat Training Centers increased over 10 percent--an increase
    from 17 to 19 brigade combat team rotations annually. These rotations
    challenge unit commanders at the brigade and battalion-level with
    realistic training scenarios that integrate unmanned aerial vehicles,
    cyber, intelligence, electronic warfare, communication, fire support,
    and aviation assets.
        In addition to increased training opportunities, the Army initiated
    the Associated Units Pilot in order to build readiness and
    responsiveness across the Total Force. Under this program, the Army
    associates Army National Guard and Army Reserve units with a gaining
    Regular Army unit commander and vice versa--associates Regular Army
    units with gaining Army Reserve and Army National Guard commands. The
    receiving unit commander is responsible for approving the associated
    unit's training program, reviewing its readiness reports, and assessing
    its resource requirements. Associated units also train with their
    gaining units to the maximum extent feasible, including leader
    development, field training, command post exercises, and combat
    training center rotations. Congressional support for these efforts will
    increase Army readiness by shortening the post-mobilization training
    time required for combat and combat enabling units of the Army National
    Guard and the Army Reserve.
        An adequately manned and trained Army deserves the best available
    equipment when responding to crisis. Last year, the Army established
    the Rapid Capabilities Office to acquire equipment and services quickly
    and at less cost. Targeting the mid-term time horizon, the Rapid
    Capabilities Office works with select industry partners to address
    critical modernization gaps including assured positioning, navigation,
    and timing; counter-electronic warfare; automation; and cyber
    capabilities. The Rapid Capabilities Office is already providing
    electronic warfare capabilities to Army forces in Europe and, with
    Congressional support, will provide deployed soldiers with next-
    generation batteries and a supplemental positioning, navigation, and
    timing capability by 2020.
        Additionally, the Army must provide state-of-the-art equipment in
    sufficient quantities to the units responding to crisis. To respond to
    crises in a timely manner, the Army positions sets of military
    equipment around the world. These sets, Army Prepositioned Stocks,
    decrease deployment time because they place military equipment closer
    to the potential point of need. Army Prepositioned Stocks, in
    conjunction with strategic sealift and airlift, provide Joint Force
    commanders with faster access to needed combat formations and enablers
    in order to reassure our allies and, if necessary, defeat our
    adversaries. The accelerated growth of Army Prepositioned Stocks in
    Europe positions equipment for a division headquarters, two Armored
    Brigade Combat Teams, one Field Artillery Brigade, and division
    enablers for rapid access by the Joint Force Commander. Similarly, Army
    configured Prepositioned Stocks in Asia shortens the timelines
    associated with a contingency in the Pacific Command. With
    congressional support, increased investment in Army Prepositioned
    Stocks in Europe and Asia will underwrite the ability of national
    leaders to provide flexible options consistent with United States
    national interests.
        There is no greater responsibility in the Army than to lead
    American soldiers in peace or war. Leader development is critical now
    and for our future. Professional military education combined with
    practical experience in leadership positions is the principal way the
    Army builds leaders. With Congressional support, the end product of
    increased investment in leader programs is officers and non-
    commissioned officers (NCO) of competence and character, fit to lead
    men and women in combat.
                        modernization: equipped to fight
        Army modernization advances materiel solutions that enable the Army
    to retain our advantage against advanced adversaries and a broad range
    of other potential threats. The Army's fiscal year 2018 budget request
    prioritizes the requirements necessary to deter and, if required,
    defeat near-peer adversaries. The Army modernization priorities are:
    air and missile defense; long range fires; preferred munitions;
    mobility, lethality and protection of our Brigade Combat Teams; active
    protection; assured positioning, navigation and timing; electronic
    warfare; cyber; assured communications; and vertical lift. The Army
    also requests congressional support to improve our soldier and combat
    service support equipment.
        The air defense and long range fires portfolios contain our most
    urgent and pressing capability need to respond to challenges we have
    not faced in decades. Our potential adversaries have substantial anti-
    access and area denial capability, with many weapons and munitions
    whose quantity, range, and lethality have significantly improved.
    Specifically, we need to rapidly improve and procure our Army Tactical
    Missile System and Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System rockets,
    develop a cannon delivered area effects replacement munition, and
    improve the industrial base supporting the production of our precision
    and preferred munitions. To mitigate the increased risk to the maneuver
    force from airborne threats, such as rotary wing and fixed wing
    aircraft, Unmanned Aerial Systems, and cruise missiles, the Army is
    recapitalizing the existing Avenger systems and Stinger missiles, while
    developing the next generation of kinetic and non-kinetic short range
    air defense capabilities.
        The Army has developed a Combat Vehicle Modernization Strategy for
    our Abrams, Stryker, Bradley, Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle, and
    Howitzer fleets. These programs are ready to go into production. Our
    request includes increased funding to reduce the currently programed
    30-year replacement timeline. It also includes funding to enhance the
    mobility and lethality of our light infantry units by providing them
    with both the ground mobility vehicle and the mobile protected
    firepower vehicle. All of our vehicles need to be protected against
    rocket propelled grenades and anti-tank missiles. However, quantities
    of armor protective technology are limited. The request includes
    funding for additional protective technology, which is currently
    available only in limited quantities. These active protection systems
    use sensors, radar, computer processing, fire control technology and
    interceptors to defeat incoming anti-tank missiles. This capability
    will save American lives.
        Similar to combat on physical battlefields, friendly and enemy
    forces fight for dominance in space, cyber, and the electromagnetic
    spectrum. The Army is developing anti-jam antennas that guard against
    attacks on our global position systems. Additionally, the Army is
    leveraging off-the-shelf hardware and software solutions to address
    shortfalls in offensive and defensive cyber capabilities. We are also
    developing the Multifunction Electronic Warfare system, to provide
    commanders the ability to plan, detect, defend, and attack in the
    electromagnetic spectrum. Vital to the success of our soldiers on the
    battlefield, we are adapting our tactical radio waveforms to protect
    our communication network. Congressional support will enable the Army
    to increase capabilities and reduce risk in space, cyber, and the
    electromagnetic spectrum.
        Our communications network is critical to enable mission command of
    ground combat operations. We request support to accelerate fielding of
    mission command network systems and increase procurement of the Joint
    Battle Command Platform to decrease software vulnerabilities and
    increase interoperability. Congressional support of the request will
    enable the Army to increase capability and reduce risk.
        The Aviation portfolio adopts the recommendation of the National
    Commission of the Future of the Army to retain more Apache units, but
    cannot support aggressive modernization under the current Budget
    Control Act of 2011 caps. To implement the Commission's
    recommendations, the Army is incrementally procuring new Apache
    aircraft by slowing the modernization of the UH-60 Blackhawk program.
    This strategy extends the modernization timeline for Apaches from
    fiscal year 2026 to fiscal year 2028 and Blackhawks from fiscal year
    2028 to fiscal year 2030. We also need to pursue a rapid solution for
    aircraft survivability given the proliferation of anti-aircraft weapons
    on the battlefield. Additionally, we are expanding the production of
    the Hellfire missile to meet current demand while transitioning to the
    Joint Air-Ground Missile to prepare for possible future contingencies.
    The Army's fiscal year 2018 budget request includes funding increases
    in aviation munitions, survivability, and modernization.
        Our soldiers remain the backbone of every Army capability, and our
    infantry units must be equipped with modern weapons. We request support
    to increase readiness by completing M4A1 Carbine pure-fleet fielding,
    developing Next Generation Squad Weapons, procuring anti-tank weapons,
    such as the Javelin and tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided
    (TOW) anti-tank guided missiles, and beginning procurement of the
    Lightweight Command Launch Unit for Javelin. Additionally, we seek
    congressional support for a variety of simulators and virtual training
    devices to significantly increase the repetition and experience base of
    our soldiers and leaders at the tactical level in individual,
    collective, squad, and small unit operations given intense, complex,
    combat scenarios.
        Our ability to project and sustain combat power over long distances
    and for long durations is key to winning wars. We request support for
    shortfalls in bridging, tank transport, and tank recovery that limit
    the maneuverability of the Army's Main Battle Tank on the battlefield.
    We also seek to increase procurement of our Joint Light Tactical
    Vehicle and Heavy Equipment Transporter, modernize our watercraft, and
    upgrade our medical capabilities for combat casualty care. This
    includes procuring the Maneuver Support Vessel (Light), completing the
    Landing Craft Utility 2000 service-life extension, and completing the
    command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance upgrades. Congressional support is
    needed to enable these initiatives for Army and Joint Force mobility
    and sustainment.
             soldiers, civilians, and families: our greatest asset
        People join the Army to defend our Nation and its people. In turn,
    we must take great care to support those who step forward and answer
    the call to the colors. We request continued support for competitive
    pay and compensation and family programs, housing, and infrastructure
    improvements. We will continue soldier 2020 initiatives' standards
    based assignments regardless of gender; Sexual Harassment Assault
    Response and Prevention (SHARP) initiatives to prevent and reduce
    harassment or assault against male or female soldiers.
        Additionally, Army Civilians as part of the Army generating force,
    ensure the readiness and availability of our formations that support
    the Joint Force commander with more than 16,000 Army Civilians serving
    overseas supporting combatant commanders. We are committed to ensuring
    quality support to our soldiers, civilians, and their families that
    strengthens the bonds within our Army team, while simultaneously
    advancing our efforts to increase readiness.
                           the army's budget request
        The Army's fiscal year 2018 base budget request is $137.2 billion,
    a 5.3 percent increase from our total fiscal year 2017 base request of
    $130.3 billion. The major budget goals for fiscal year 2018 are
    readiness to meet today's global challenges and focused modernization
    of our equipment. As part of these goals, the Army will upgrade
    aviation and ground combat platforms, while increasing investments in
    short range air defense, long range fires, aviation, network, combat
    vehicles, soldier equipment, combat service support and installations.
        Additionally, we are accountable for the resources to produce the
    outcomes required. We are also committed to the efficient and effective
    use of those resources by improving and reforming our processes. As
    mandated by Congress in the 2010 and 2012 National Defense
    Authorization Acts, the Army will be audit ready by September 30, 2017.
    We are strengthening internal controls, developing standard business
    processes, retaining supporting documentation, and improving system
    controls. The Army will continue to implement corrective action plans
    to resolve deficiencies, with an overall goal of improving a culture of
    accountability and fiscal stewardship of our Nation's resources.
                                   conclusion
        We thank Congress for the fiscal year 2017 budget and their
    continued support of the United States Army and the American soldier.
    Now is the time to substantially increase readiness, improve
    modernization, and increase capacity. Readiness remains unequivocally
    our number one priority--it underpins everything the Army does. We have
    an opportunity to fix readiness losses and prepare for the future.
    However, building a professional Army takes time. To build readiness,
    soldiers require specialized and sufficient training; modern, properly
    maintained equipment; sufficient quantities of the proper munitions;
    and stability. To sustain readiness, the Army requests congressional
    support for its modernization efforts--aviation, network, combat
    vehicles, long range fires and short range air defense, soldier
    equipment, and combat service support. We request that Congress
    increase the caps in the Budget Control Act of 2011, provide sufficient
    funding to fully man and train our current formations and allow us to
    close critical gaps in modernization. These actions will ensure that
    our soldiers are ready for the missions of today, as well as for the
    unforeseen conflicts of tomorrow.

        Chairman McCain. Well, thank you, General Milley, and thank
    you, Mr. Secretary.
        Mr. Secretary, do you believe the return of the Budget
    Control Act caps for 2018 is the most critical and immediate
    threat that the Department of Defense is facing?
        Secretary Speer. Mr. Chairman, I absolutely do. The Budget
    Control Act caps for our defense puts us at tremendous risk. If
    they return, we would lose $15 billion of purchasing power,
    which would degrade readiness, it would degrade our
    modernization even further.
        Chairman McCain. OCO [overseas contingency operations] is a
    gimmick.
        Secretary Speer. The funding for OCO cannot be relied upon
    for the long run, and we need that predictable funding.
        Chairman McCain. General Milley, I was struck. You
    mentioned the words ``hollow Army.'' This committee has not
    heard that since General Shy Meyer came over and said it back
    in the 1970s. How far away are we from a hollow Army?
        General Milley. I believe, Senator, that if we continue on
    the road and we execute the BCA and go back BCA caps in
    fundings and continuous CRs, it will result in a hollow Army.
        How far away? I think right now what you did last year was
    you stopped a downward trend. You halted it, stopped the
    bleeding, so to speak. We turned the corner, and we are, in
    fact, making slow but steady progress in readiness. If that
    stops, we will eventually, in the not too distant future, have
    a hollow Army and put soldiers at risk on the battlefield.
        Chairman McCain. The trend as you see it right now?
        General Milley. For the Army's trend in terms of readiness,
    I think we have stopped it, stopped the downward trend, and I
    think we started to recover last year with the monies that you
    gave us.
        Chairman McCain. But----
        General Milley. We have a long way to go.
        Chairman McCain. The fact is that this budget may, at least
    as far as readiness is concerned, just stop the bleeding.
    Right? It does not address the urgent need for modernization.
    Is that a correct statement?
        General Milley. There is modernization, obviously, in the
    budget. We put about 26 percent or so into modernization. That
    is relative because in 2008, we had roughly speaking three
    times that amount of money into modernization. If you go back
    15 or 20 years, it is significantly more. So your assessment is
    correct. Our modernization has been sacrificed for current
    readiness.
        Chairman McCain. Can I just, again, go back to this
    acquisition? Future Combat System, $20 billion; Comanche, $5.9
    billion; Crusader, $2.2 billion; helicopter, $500 million;
    Ground Combat Vehicle, $1 billion; Distributed Common Ground
    System-Army, $3 billion; Joint Tactical Radio System, $11
    billion. Of course, now we are looking at this WIN-T debacle.
    As you know, 2 years ago, we passed legislation that gave you a
    lot more control over acquisition. What has happened since
    then? Control and input I guess is a better description.
        General Milley. I thank you for that, and we have made
    actually quite a bit of reforms in the acquisition system
    already. It is not 100 percent complete yet, but a key thing
    that we have done is reinserted the commanders into the
    acquisition process. For many years, it was staff-centric.
        I am personally inserted into it in a big way, along with
    the Vice Chief of Staff of Army. We reenergized what was called
    an AROC [Army Requirements Overnight Council] system which had
    gone fallow for a while, and that is meeting weekly and it
    determines the requirements of the systems. We have also
    initiated the Rapid Capabilities Office (RCO). The bottom line
    is what we are trying to do is through insertion of the Chief
    and others in uniform into the acquisition system, is to reduce
    the time and speed up the procurement and get the taxpayer the
    best bang for the buck, so to speak.
        Chairman McCain. Yet, it still seems to take years before--
    --
        General Milley. It does. It is frustrating.
        Chairman McCain. You know, somebody told me the other day
    that the aircraft that I flew, the A-4--when they put out A-4
    Skyhawk, that it took 4 weeks. Four weeks and they were ready
    to let a contract. Now we were just discussing a new
    replacement for the incredibly failed LCS, and they said we may
    be ready for an Request for Proposal (RFP) by 2020.
        What is the difference, General? If some of us feel
    frustrated, it is hard for us to continue to fight for more
    money when we see $6 billion wasted on one program. So give me
    some comfort, either one of you?
        Secretary Speer. Well, Chairman, I think you heard some of
    it already in terms of that, and we thank you for what you have
    allowed already to push it down, the role of the Chief back
    into that pushing it back down to the services and more rapid
    decisions. A lot of that $40 billion plus you just read off are
    a disgrace.
        At the same time, we are getting after--we cannot hold the
    future mortgage notes. So we do need to modernize. The list the
    Chief gave you is a good start. We are working on a regular
    basis to push those down, involving costing, doing strategic
    portfolio analysis the Chief is heavily involved in. We have
    got to get costing and quicker decision-making processes and
    make informed rapid decisions in fielding this equipment.
        Chairman McCain. Is it of interest that 90 percent of
    defense spending is in the hands of five companies?
        Senator Reed?
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        General Milley, Army readiness--the brigade combat team is,
    as I understand, now roughly 30 percent. Is that a fair
    judgment about the readiness status?
        General Milley. Roger. That is correct. The exact readiness
    I would be happy to brief you or your staffs in a classified
    session, but as an order of magnitude, sure.
        Senator Reed. We are in that ballpark.
        General Milley. Right. The goal, of course, is 66 percent.
        Senator Reed. Sixty-six percent. What are the two or three
    key steps that you have to take, you think, to get from what it
    is today to that 66 percent?
        General Milley. There are several of them, but the most
    significant right now, the drag, if you will, is manning. Many
    of these units are not at the full manning level, and that
    drags down their readiness in terms of the reporting system we
    have, but also in terms of going out to training and/or
    deployment. We have a significant amount of non-deployables
    still. We have dropped that number by two-thirds over the last
    five years. There is still a significant amount of non-
    deployables. So if we fill units at 95 percent and you have 10
    percent non-deployables, it takes you to 85 percent. You take
    away the day-to-day grind. You are down to 80 percent or less
    that goes out to training. That is not a good thing. You should
    at least be 90-95 percent when you go out to training, you go
    to the Combat Training Center, JOTC [Jungle Operations Training
    Center]. So manning is a critical drag on the system.
        We have made improvements because of the money you gave us
    in terms of spare parts and making the equipment better. So
    that is a good news story there. The manning has continued to
    drag.
        So with the authorization in 2017 to take us to 476, what
    we want to do is make the existing force structure whole. There
    are some minor force structure increases in this budget
    request. We want to make the force structure that does exist
    complete, whole, and fully ready before we move on to the next
    step, which is expanding the Army.
        Senator Reed. In that regard, I understand 10 percent of
    the non-deployable personnel are non-deployed for medical
    reasons.
        General Milley. About 85 to 90 percent actually are
    medical. The rest of them are legal and other reasons.
        Senator Reed. How are you trying to get at that? Is there
    something in terms of enhanced training or lifestyle or
    anything else? That seems to be a significant problem.
        General Milley. Yes. The majority of those are orthopedic
    type injuries. Most are recoverable with some extended
    profiles. So they are non-deployable in the short term. Total
    Army, out of the 1 million-plus troops, about 20,000, about 2
    percent or so, are hard down. They will never be able to
    deploy. Those we are working through the IDEF system. The
    number of days it takes to process them has come down from well
    over a year, in the 370s-390s range of days. We got it down by
    100 days to 270. So we are trying to chip that away so that
    reduces the number of permanent, non-deployables down, and the
    VA then picks up their care. There are several things we have
    to do internal to the organization.
        Senator Reed. One thing I assume you have to do is improve
    recruitment and retention in order to just fill up the current
    existing force structure. Is that accurate?
        General Milley. Our recruitment and retention right now at
    this point are meeting the goals. Last year, we had 100 percent
    across the board. To date this year, we are about 80 percent or
    so for recruitment and we are about 75 percent to date--of
    course, the year is not finished yet--on retention. With the
    increase in the end strength authorization to 476, we
    significantly increased the recruiting and retention missions.
    I think we will be within 1 percent, plus or minus, of
    achieving that by 1 October.
        Senator Reed. In terms of modernization, there is a
    tendency to make incremental improvements in equipment. As the
    chairman pointed out, when it takes so long to develop a new
    system, that incremental improvement is, in many cases, almost
    obsolete by the time it gets to the troops. If you are looking
    for a leap-ahead system, is there one out there that you think
    would make a huge difference?
        General Milley. It depends on the category. In the area of
    shoot, there are some technologies in laser, electromagnetic
    guns. There are some things being done with powders, et cetera
    that can reduce the footprint of powder. So there are some
    significant enhancements in the S&T and R&D world that we are
    exploring aggressively, and some of those are already being
    employed by the Navy in quantities but they are not sufficient
    yet for ground combat.
        In terms of move, there are a lot of things that we are
    looking at in terms of robotics and autonomous systems.
    Chairman McCain mentioned the tank. I could not agree more. The
    M1A1 Abrams tank was commissioned when I was a lieutenant in
    1980. That would be the equivalent of someone coming in, when I
    was commissioned, training on the M4 Sherman from World War II.
    His comment about quoting H.R. McMaster about outgunned and
    outranged is accurate. We need a significant 10X level
    improvement in our ground combat vehicle, in our tank, in
    Bradley.
        Is there something on the horizon? We are going to continue
    with incremental improvements to those two systems in the near
    term while we explore the possibility for 10X improvement.
    There are some bright lights out there. Look, for example, at
    what Tesla just did. They have cars now that were $100,000 and
    $40,000, and they just beat out GM and Ford, and they do not
    have an engine. They are running on a battery. There are some
    serious possibilities in there for application to military use,
    and we are looking at that.
        There are some exploratory studies being done in materials,
    significant material development that can provide the same
    protective power at a much significantly less weight. So there
    are things in the area of move. You know, move should
    communicate sort of binning.
        For communications, Chairman McCain mentioned WIN-T and the
    others. The communications architecture of the United States
    Army--and I would argue even the United States Department of
    Defense--is a critical capability and at the same time, a
    critical vulnerability, as it is for most other nation states.
    There is some significant--and I do not want to go into too
    much on it for classification purposes. There are some
    significant changes and improvements that must be made in the
    short term on our ability to have assured communications. I
    will just leave it at that.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Inhofe?
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        We have had hearing after hearing after hearing, and we
    talk about the threat level that is there. I think we all
    agree. I want to talk about that.
        On this acquisition thing, I was 8 years in the House on
    the House Armed Services Committee before coming over here 20
    years ago. With a business background, it drives you crazy to
    see these things happen. We went through this thing, and I
    guess the figure on that, the chairman just talked about, is
    $20 billion. That was from 2001 to 2010. Then along came the
    Crusader. I was here during that time. That actually was
    terminated by Bush in his administration.
        So when you make the statement, General Milley, that you do
    not want to make the mistakes of the past, how can you do that
    unless we improve the acquisition system? You were
    complimentary of the chairman that we have made last year some
    changes where you have a greater impact on making those
    decisions. Still they were made by the administration. In fact,
    in the case of the Crusader, one of the really outstanding guys
    on the House Armed Services Committee resigned. He quit because
    of the fact that we got--you get that huge investment. Then you
    turned around and abandoned it.
        So I guess my question to you is, is what we did in
    starting to give you more latitude and helping with those
    decisions on acquisition and terminations--do we need to go
    further?
        General Milley. I believe, yes, we do. I do appreciate the
    reforms that were made in the last cycle, and they have made a
    difference. I can see that in several systems, small systems
    like the pistol--you saw that--up to larger systems that we are
    doing for like the ITEP engine for the UH-60 and several other
    programs that are out there, the PIM program for the Paladin
    and others that are out there. So there is a difference being
    made. In terms of big ticket items like a brand new tank or a
    brand new helicopter, no, not yet. Part of that is because of
    limitations in current and existing technologies.
        I do think there has been progress made, and I do think
    that the enhanced authorities that were given to the chiefs has
    made a difference and I appreciate that.
        Senator Reed. You mentioned the PIM program, which of
    course was taking an old system and upgrading it as opposed to
    a brand new system. Was that the right decision at that time?
        General Milley. I believe yes. Again, it goes back to
    technologies. My assessment is we are on the cusp, within 10
    years, of a fundamental change in the character of warfare and
    the character of ground warfare.
        Senator Inhofe. You also talked about in response to the
    question--I think it was Senator McCain--about a hollow Army. I
    chaired a committee of the Vices just 3 weeks ago, and at that
    time, it was Wilson with the Air Force, and he had said we are
    already there in the Air Force in terms of the hollow Air
    Force. A few of us up here are old enough to remember the
    Carter administration and how we tried to recover from that. I
    am sure we are trying to keep from having that happen again.
        Now, before Senator Sullivan starts talking because he is
    going to penetrate this a lot more than I will because there is
    not time, but when you look at all the threats that are out
    there, a lot of us have come to the conclusion that really
    North Korea is it for two primary reasons. One, it is run by a
    mentally deranged guy that no one can predict. Secondly, they
    are rapidly getting to the point, as came out from the
    examination by Senator Sullivan yesterday or the day before
    with that capability. I think they said it is not a matter of
    if but when.
        So just concentrate, if you would, just on North Korea for
    the remainder of my last 45 seconds here if you agree with us
    in terms of that being the greatest threat.
        General Milley. Well, Senator, we are in a current war
    against ISIS and probably the greatest capability out there
    remains Russia. Clearly North Korea is probably the most
    dangerous, close, in terms of time, threat in my view that the
    United States faces. They are rapidly developing an
    intercontinental ballistic missile with a nuclear weapon
    attached that can range the continental United States. I do not
    think that we should allow that, and I do not think that is the
    policy of this Nation. I believe the President of the United
    States, when he says that if China does not solve it, the
    United States will. So I think that is the right approach, but
    I do think it is increasingly dangerous. There is no question
    the path they are on. I do not want to go into things that we
    would do, but it is dangerous.
        Senator Inhofe. I do believe in the hearings that we have
    had, both the civilians and uniforms alike have talked about
    how great the threat is. I appreciate the fact that you are
    doing it. We do not have the credibility out on the stump to
    talk about this, and particularly when you have a media who
    does not believe you. With the military talking about it, I
    think that is significant. So I do applaud you and the others
    for not veering away from the threat that is out there and it
    is very real.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Blumenthal?
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you both for your distinguished service to our
    Nation.
        I want to pursue the questioning on North Korea. You said
    close in terms of time to developing an intercontinental
    ballistic missile. How close?
        General Milley. I would rather take that into a classified
    session, Senator, with all due respect. There is a variety of
    analyses out there, and there are ranges. I would be happy to
    walk you through at least what I know from my perspective, and
    we can get some experts in to brief you as well, if you would
    like.
        Senator Blumenthal. Would the American people be well
    served by more information about this threat so that they do
    appreciate what the facts are?
        General Milley. I think that is probably an accurate
    statement, sure.
        Senator Blumenthal. In terms of the troops that the United
    States Army has at potential risk from conventional artillery,
    how many would you estimate are in harm's way?
        General Milley. Well, the United States has publicly 28,500
    troops of all branches in Korea. Roughly speaking, about 20,000
    of those are Army. North Korea tube, conventional tube, and
    rocket artillery has extensive range. It can range all Seoul.
    It can range most of the military compounds. So our troops are
    at risk in Korea.
        Senator Blumenthal. In your testimony, you mentioned the
    importance of vertical lift in the Army's modernization
    priorities. As you know better than any of us, the Blackhawk
    has served the United States Army for some 35 years. It
    continues to be the aviation backbone of the Army. Could you
    tell us what the state of negotiations are for the next
    procurement of Blackhawks?
        General Milley. We have got--I want to say--48 that we have
    put into this budget. We are also working on the ITEP engine
    which is equally as important as the airframe in order to
    enhance the capability of the Blackhawk to fly at high
    altitude, around 6,000 feet or so, and at high temperatures
    around 95 degrees. So both the procurement of additional
    helicopters and the modernization of an improved engine are
    significant for the lift capability of the Army.
        Senator Blumenthal. Was the expectation from the future
    years defense program projected for fiscal year 2018 not that
    there would be 60 not 48 helicopters in the budget?
        General Milley. I would have to go back and check that
    number, Senator.
        Senator Blumenthal. Do you believe that more than 48 are
    necessary?
        General Milley. Yes. I mean, in order to flesh out and
    replace existing aircraft. Sure. When we get past 2018, we have
    plans to do that.
        Senator Blumenthal. A number of your colleagues, heads of
    services, have said that the greatest threat or perhaps one of
    the greatest threats, if not the greatest threat, to our Nation
    is cyber. I have noted in your testimony that relatively little
    analysis has been included about cyber.
        General Milley. Cyber is a very serious threat. Others have
    testified openly that the opening shots of a large-scale
    conflict are likely to begin with cyber, and various people
    have testified to that and you see that in writings. I would
    probably concur with that. Cyber is a very serious capability
    out there.
        What we in the Army are doing is fielding 61 what we call
    cyber protection teams, and 41 of those are in the regular Army
    and 21--or correction--20 are in the--41 and 21, 62--for the
    National Guard and the United States Army Reserve. Of the ones
    in the regular Army, they should all reach full operating
    capability by the end of 2018.
        Senator Blumenthal. The chairman and I have noted--and I
    apologize for interrupting you, but I am limited in terms of
    time--that there really is no cyber strategy. Without a cyber
    strategy, there can be no cyber policy. I think I am quoting
    almost directly what the chairman said yesterday. That has been
    a failing, to be very blunt, under a number of administrations.
    Would you agree that we need a cyber strategy to determine, for
    example, what is an act of cyber war? How do we respond to a
    cyber attack in the cyber domain?
        General Milley. A fair question. I think that that needs to
    be debated. It is a question that needs to be asked and
    answered. It is not asked and answered right now. Well, what
    constitutes an act of war in cyberspace? I am certainly not in
    a position to answer that.
        In terms of capability, the Army does have a cyber strategy
    for capabilities, capability development. Our emphasis is on
    defense for the Army. The national part does offense. The
    service is doing defense. What is important for us is to
    protect our network, protect our ability in the electromagnetic
    spectrum from everything from degraded operations or a complete
    shutdown, all the way to spoofing and mimicking and so on and
    so forth.
        We have set up, as far as I know, in the world live cyber
    range at the National Training Center. So all of our tactical
    units now are cycling through the training center where they
    are being exposed to an enemy, free thinking up for out at the
    training center, that executes high end cyber operations
    against our own units. Our soldiers are learning to come to
    grips with that. It is a very interesting thing to go watch to
    see how our forces operate with the WIN-T or any of the other
    communications systems we have where they are under constant
    attack from the enemy. They are getting degraded, and we have
    to relearn how to operate with limited degraded communications
    and our connectivity to higher headquarters and the JC units.
        So we do have a strategy for capability development, but
    the national strategy you are talking about--I think that is
    fair.
        Secretary Speer. I would like to also add to that. When it
    comes also to the individuals and the people we are assessing
    and training, of the 41 Active components, cyber teams, 33 of
    them are already mission capable, fully mission capable.
    Another eight are initial capabilities. The Cyber Center of
    Excellence, as well as private industry, are working out on a
    regular basis to incorporate additional capabilities and
    understanding. We are assessing individuals on training and
    development into the Reserve components as well.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Secretary Speer. Thank you,
    General.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Wicker?
        Senator Wicker. Secretary Speer and General Milley, let me
    start off by asking about the Lakota, the Army's primary
    training helicopter and how the situation currently affects the
    industrial base. The last production contract was awarded in
    2015. There is an ongoing legal dispute which is expected to
    remain in the courts until late this year. Absent new orders
    soon, the manufacturing plant may be forced to lay off workers.
        The fiscal year 2017 omnibus appropriated $198 million to
    purchase 28 Lakotas. There is a clear directive in the language
    the Army must obligate the funds to buy Lakotas, although this
    has not happened.
        I know this is an important program because the Army
    requested $100 million in fiscal year 2018 for 13 additional
    Lakotas.
        How are we coming on the directive to obligate the funds to
    buy the 28 Lakotas from the fiscal year 2017 omnibus bill, and
    where are our prospects for moving along on the 2015 contract?
        Secretary Speer. Senator, I think you hit it initially. We
    need the Lakotas in terms of the training base and get them
    down there in terms of Rucker to go. The 2017 funding is held
    up in that same protest. So we need to buy against that
    contract to be able to deliver on a timely basis, and that
    current contract is under protest, and we hope that will be
    resolved next quarter of this year. Then we will be able to put
    the additional funds on contract and request an additional 28.
        Senator Wicker. So that would be July, August, or
    September.
        Secretary Speer. We are hoping so, later this summer, yes.
        Senator Wicker. General, you do agree that this is a very
    important program?
        General Milley. I will be candid, Senator. It is important.
    It has utility. A Lakota aircraft will not survive a nanosecond
    in combat. It is good for administrative use. It is good for
    running soldiers around at home station, and it is very good
    for training.
        Senator Wicker. It is a training----
        General Milley. It is a training platform. So I do not want
    to overstate its importance. What we need to invest our
    aviation dollars into primarily are combat utility aircraft and
    attack aircraft. The Lakota has a purpose. It has a place in
    the system. That is why we put the money in there, but I do not
    want to overstate or elevate its importance within the pantheon
    of aviation.
        Senator Wicker. Well, let me shift to one other thing in
    the time I have remaining. I want to ask about Mine Resistant
    Ambush Protected Vehicles (MRAPs). In 2013, the Army decided to
    divest a large portion of MRAPs. Things are different now than
    they were in 2013. We are ramping back up in Afghanistan. ISIS
    is more of a threat than it was then. Is it time to take a
    fresh look at the MRAP program?
        Secretary Speer. I think in terms of the MRAPs, we did
    retain a set of MRAPs for this kind of operation and
    contingency, and I believe we have sufficient MRAPs of
    different varieties and variants to support. Now, I can go back
    and look and come back to you in terms of the latest review on
    MRAPs, but the current threat in terms of decisive action,
    training, and obligation is where the biggest risk is for the
    longer term. We do, I believe, have sufficient variants of
    MRAPs to do operations against ISIS or counterterrorism.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator King?
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to talk a bit about procurement to either or both.
    What lessons has the Army learned from the procurement problems
    that we have had in the past with the Comanche, the Crusader,
    Future Combat System? Are there lessons learned that we can
    apply to future acquisitions?
        Secretary Speer. We could spend all day on the lessons
    learned on those. I think we got after a lot of them. First of
    all, we took the decision-maker----
        Senator King. I only have five minutes.
        Secretary Speer. I got it Senator. Part of the decision, if
    you look at the laundry list, was we removed the decision-maker
    from where the functional decision of the requirement was. We
    have built in layers and layers of decision-making processes
    that took too long. Cost was not an informed cost. We made
    decisions at the end of the requirements after we spent a lot
    of money when we could have made discoveries much earlier on.
        So that is part of what the Chief is getting at and I am
    getting at in terms of this. We have got to get cost early in
    front. We have got a decision allowed to fail up front. We got
    to be able to prototype on those things. We have got to put the
    warfighter back into the decision process down where the
    execution of that program goes.
        Senator King. Was one of the problems expansion of
    requirements and complexity of requirements?
        Secretary Speer. I think the complexity of the requirements
    expanded and it had always been there technology-wise. Again,
    the requirement was best understood by the individuals who were
    building the requirement and have to provide feedback on how
    well they are doing with the requirement on the delivery of the
    capability.
        Senator King. Well, General Milley, on this point, we had a
    very interesting hearing in the Airland Subcommittee a couple
    weeks ago on a new rifle for the Army to replace the M-4. One
    of the things we learned was that the current M-4 caliber
    ammunition will not penetrate the newly developed body armor of
    our adversaries, which is to me a disaster in waiting.
        Your thoughts on a new weapon and how do we do the
    procurement in a timely and cost effective way and avoid some
    of these problems that we have had in the past. First, do you
    think this is an important area of attention? Second, can we
    pull it off in a reasonable amount of time at a reasonable
    cost?
        General Milley. I think yes and yes. I think it is
    critically important. Seventy percent of American casualties
    are ground forces, typically infantry, special forces type
    units, or units performing infantry missions. The small arm and
    the other equipment, to include body armor, SAPI plates, and so
    on is critical, and we ought to be providing the very, very
    best for our soldiers that our Nation can provide.
        The 5.56 round--we recognize that there is a type of body
    armor out there that it does not penetrate--we also have that
    body armor ourselves--and that adversarial states are actually
    selling that stuff on the Internet for about 250 bucks.
        So, yes, there is a need and there is an operational need,
    and we think we can do it relatively quickly.
        The key on any of these things is not so much the rifle. It
    is the bullet. It is the ballistics of the bullet. Down at Fort
    Benning, we have done some experiment and developmental work.
    We think we have a solution. We know we have developed a bullet
    that can penetrate these new plates.
        Senator King. Does this bullet require a new rifle?
        General Milley. It might but probably not. It could. The
    bullet can be chambered in various calibers. I do not want to
    get into the technicals of ballistics, but it can be modified
    to 5.56, 7.62 or----
        Senator King. Is there a possibility of an off-the-shelf,
    an existing rifle that could be an upgrade to the M-4?
        General Milley. Yes. There are several options out there.
        Senator King. That would be an option.
        General Milley. There are absolutely options.
        Senator King. I commend that option to you.
        The fiscal year budget request holds the Army end strength
    at 476,000, 343,000 National Guard, 199,000 Reserve. Are those
    numbers sufficient in your professional judgment to meet the
    challenges that we have in terms of readiness and assuming a
    higher level of training and readiness? Secondly, how long does
    it take? If we decide we need 10,000 more or 20,000 more end
    strength, how long does it take to get from decision to troops
    in the field?
        General Milley. The first part of that question, is it
    enough, so to speak. That depends on what we are asked to do.
    Secretary Mattis is leading a very rigorous and detailed
    strategic review of the defense planning guide into the
    national military strategy. That review will be done probably
    sometime in the fall. When that review is done, that will give
    us our baseline of how big and what capabilities we will need
    across the board as a military, not just the Army.
        In the meantime, we do already have a national military
    strategy and a defense planning guidance. As I testified last
    year, I thought that the capacity and the size of the force and
    the capability and the modernization of the weapons systems did
    not meet that. Four hundred seventy-six improves it, but no, it
    still does not meet the worst case requirements that are
    outlined in the national military strategy and the defense
    planning guide.
        Senator King. Second question. How long does it take to
    build up?
        General Milley. Well, to build units--to put a brigade
    together from scratch I would say would take about three years
    to get them at a reasonable level of training. Soldiers coming
    through basic training and Advanced Individual Training (AIT),
    individual replacements--they are falling in on existing force
    structure and existing units, and that takes considerably less
    time. Then one of the things we are introducing in this bill is
    security force assistance brigades which are essentially chains
    of command of an infantry chain of command, for example, an
    infantry brigade. They will be used for deployment overseas to
    do advise and assist missions, like what you see in Iraq and
    Afghanistan today. That will free up the brigades that are
    there. We will put those back together again. Then it will
    shorten the timeline for rapid expansion. We plan on
    introducing five of those. We have got two in this particular
    budget for the request.
        So it varies by type unit, but on average I would say
    between one and three years, three years being the outside to
    put together enough of the force and the collective training
    assuming you had the people and the money to support that.
        Senator King. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Cotton?
        Senator Cotton. Gentlemen, thank you for your appearance
    this morning.
        I want to return to an issue that Senator McCain foot
    stomped in his opening statement, WIN-T, the Warfighter
    Information Network-Tactical. It is the way the soldiers
    communicate on the battlefield. In 2003, the Army planned for
    future combat systems that would, among other things, network
    together soldiers and vehicles. That program was canceled in
    2009 at the cost of approximately $18 billion. WIN-T was part
    of the Future Combat Systems program. After Future Combat
    Systems was canceled, it was another attempt by the Army to
    conduct secure battlefield communications and networking.
        General Milley, I have seen credible reports that WIN-T has
    ineffective line-of-sight communications, is not survivable. It
    is too fragile to survive in a contested environment, and has
    an electromagnetic signature so loud that it particularly would
    call for enemy artillery on the top of its users' heads. Have
    you seen similar reports?
        General Milley. Yes. What we have done is, with the
    authorities the chairman and the committee and the Congress
    gave us a couple years ago, I and the Vice Chief of the Army,
    along with a small group of people are driving a rigorous,
    thorough, and painful review of the entire communication
    electromagnetic capabilities of the U.S. Army, which WIN-T is
    one part of, because we have the same concerns.
        Frankly, my concern is these systems may or may not work in
    the conditions of combat that I envision in the future with
    this changing character of warfare because of what you just
    cited, line-of-sight, electromagnetic spectrum, the inability
    to operate on the move, the inability to operate in large,
    dense, complex urban areas or complex terrain. There is a whole
    series of other things. It is fragile and it is vulnerable.
        So we are taking a very, very, very deep, hard, and wide
    look. We have probably got about six weeks or so because what I
    want to do is make sure I can get it into any changes to this
    cycle, the markups that we can, if we need to. There are piece
    parts of it that work very well. There are others that are not
    so good. We are taking a hard look.
        As you may or may not be aware, I have received a letter
    from the House with 176 signatures on it and a letter from the
    Senate with several signatures on it asking me to accelerate
    that program. I am not going to accelerate it until I am
    convinced it will work in combat against the enemies of our
    country that may be coming in the future.
        So that is kind of where we stand right now. I owe you and
    this committee and others a rigorous review within about 4 to 6
    weeks or so.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you, General. I am aware of those
    letters. My first priority is delivering functional systems to
    our warfighters on the front lines. My second priority is good
    value for our taxpayers. The political implications of these
    contracts in members' districts are a very low priority
    compared to those for me, as I am sure they are for you as
    well. We have spent about $6 billion so far on WIN-T. Have we
    not?
        General Milley. That is correct.
        Senator Cotton. If the program is not working, it does not
    seem, like you say, that we should be accelerating more money
    into that program until we can get it to work or we can find a
    replacement. Is that a fair assessment?
        General Milley. Correct. That is where we are at. I am
    trying to figure out exactly what parts of it could be
    accelerated or brought online, others that we need to not
    continue to put good money after bad programs, and make sure
    that the system as a whole--a holistic review of the system--is
    something that is going to be effective in what we think will
    be a dynamic, combined arms maneuver fight on a very, very
    highly contested and lethal battlefield.
        Senator Cotton. Well, I appreciate that and I appreciate
    the effort you have put into not just these kind of
    communications programs. We have discussed before the
    Distributed Common Ground System and its problems. You were
    discussing earlier some of the issues with small arms that the
    Army has had. I want to encourage you to continue to use those
    authorities. Most of these problems arose long before you took
    office. I want to encourage you to continue to try to address
    them and resolve them at the speed that our warfighters need,
    not the speed of bureaucrats in Washington.
        I want to turn briefly to the European Reassurance
    Initiative. I know you have taken it very seriously. I am
    encouraged by the heel-to-toe deployments we have seen of
    armored Brigate Combat Teams (BCTs) as part of the initiative.
    Do you think a permanent armored BCT presence would be
    preferable, though, to a perpetual state of deployment?
        General Milley. My recommendation, my preference for a lot
    of reasons is a rotational schedule, heel-to-toe rotational
    schedule, which has the effect of a permanent unit in there in
    terms of battlefield effect, but it does not come with the cost
    and overhead of a permanently stationed force. I know Chairman
    Thornberry in the House has asked us to take a look and cost
    that out. Others are interested in permanent stationing.
        At this point, my recommendation is continued rotational
    forces vice permanent station. What that gets you is
    flexibility when you are over there where you can move from one
    country to another because these forces will not be pinned down
    to a single installation. You will not have to resurrect all
    the commissaries, the PXs, and the schools, et cetera. Families
    will not be put into a potential conflict zone, and you will
    get battle focused training and increased unit cohesion for the
    unit training. I think the way to go is rotational for the
    brigade combat team, but I am willing to take a good look at
    it.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you.
        Secretary Speer. Senator, could I add to that? When I
    visited the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) operations
    currently in Europe, I would add that the brigade commander
    said the same thing in terms of units. It is the best training
    he has had, how well he was spread across the theater of
    operations. If he were stationed in one location, he would have
    to go across and spread his organization anyhow on a recurring
    basis.
        The combat aviation brigade may be a different situation.
    There were challenges there, but I think we are working through
    this. There were tremendous lessons learned coming out of that
    kind of rotation for readiness.
        Senator Cotton. Well, thank you. I have heard similar
    things on my trips to the Baltics, an important reminder for
    the American people that we are not just deploying troops there
    for the benefit of those nations but for the very good training
    that our troops receive there as well. Thank you, gentlemen.
        Chairman McCain. General, the WIN-T program has been in
    existence for over a decade. Is that correct?
        General Milley. That is correct. Yes, Senator.
        Chairman McCain. So should we expect a decision on WIN-T on
    the part of the administration at some point after we have
    spent $6 billion?
        General Milley. Yes.
        Chairman McCain. Do the taxpayers of America not deserve
    something better than that?
        General Milley. Absolutely. That is why we began 4 months
    ago--the Vice and I and others----
        Chairman McCain. So it took nine and a half years before we
    undertake an extensive review.
        Senator Heinrich?
        Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Chairman.
        Secretary Speer, yesterday the Army's budget was released,
    and again there were no military construction projects to
    support the testing and evaluation missions at White Sands
    Missile Range. That actually makes 18 years in a row now, and
    certainly White Sands is not alone. So I am concerned that the
    Army is not currently prioritizing testing infrastructure, nor
    are the other services. I know that others share my concern
    that the Pentagon is not doing enough to upgrade our testing
    capabilities, which would ultimately allow us to keep our
    competitive edge over our adversaries.
        So, Secretary, do you believe that the Department is
    effectively managing and allocating resources for military
    construction projects at our test ranges?
        Secretary Speer. I think broadly as part of the overall
    situation within military construction, we still continue to
    take a little bit of risk in the military construction. What we
    do find--and I believe--and I can go back and confirm this--
    within is we put additional restoration and modernization to
    upgrade facilities within the budget, which included the test
    range. We doubled that amount this year for restoration and
    modernization. We have a $10.8 billion backlog in such
    restoration and modernization requirements.
        Senator Heinrich. I would just urge you to look really
    closely at test ranges generally. I think you are taking a lot
    more risk there than you are in other places, and it is just
    absolutely critical in terms of developing the technologies
    that are going to pay off for our warfighters in the future.
        In a related issue, as you are aware, White Sands is
    managed by the Army, but it is a test range that the Air Force
    and Navy use as well. Does it make sense for the Army to be the
    only service responsible for funding major military
    construction projects on what is a tri-service testing range?
        Secretary Speer. Well, Senator, much like other
    installations, we are the executive agent or we are the owner
    of it. That is the way we prioritize. We work together with our
    sister services to identify requirements across the joint
    community, and I think we will continue to do so. I think it
    has been in the past predictable funding and level of funding
    to get at the stability to take care of things on a recurring
    basis, and we took risk over time on those things. You have my
    commitment. I will go back and review those things because I
    would agree, as part of what we talked about earlier in the
    acquisition process, earlier testing and the ability to look at
    things earlier in the testing cycle is very important.
        Senator Heinrich. I appreciate your commitment on that.
        I want to just highlight one military construction project
    at White Sands in particular because it sort of tells the story
    of what is being passed up over the course of the last two
    decades. The network communications center for the range was
    built in 1962. It actually caught fire a couple years ago, but
    it has not been a priority in recent years. I think in the era
    of big data and technology, a modern information facility is
    pretty critical for transmitting the vast amounts of data that
    pass through White Sands at this point for the data that is
    being generated during those tests. So that is just one
    particular example.
        General Milley, I really appreciated your comments earlier
    about some of the things that are on the horizon in terms of
    emerging technologies and some of the things that are really
    right in front of us. In April, Admiral Harris testified before
    this committee and stated several times that we have no defense
    against North Korean rockets, North Korea artillery, North
    Korean mortar rounds. From a defensive standpoint, does the
    Army have an effective indirect fire protection capability at
    this time?
        General Milley. Against what type of indirect fire?
    Rockets, missiles?
        Senator Heinrich. Rockets, artillery, mortar rounds.
        General Milley. We have capabilities that can shoot down
    incoming missiles, such as THAAD [Terminal High Altitude Area
    Defense] and Patriot.
        In terms of bullets, tube artillery, or close-range
    rockets, we are experimenting right now with hyper velocity
    capabilities. We think we can field those pretty shortly. I
    think you have seen some of that both in the media and have
    been briefed on it by Will Roper at DOD. That is an Army
    program he is working on and we are funding that. That will be
    important if we can make that happen, and that will increase
    significantly our capability to shoot down incoming rounds.
        Senator Heinrich. In addition to kinetics, which tend to be
    incredibly expensive on a per round basis, I was very pleased
    to see that the Army budgeted for next generation weapons
    systems by funding the 50 kilowatt high energy laser on a
    Stryker vehicle. I think that shows enormous potential, not
    just potential. I think we are at a place now where we have
    shown that we can shoot down mortars with realistically funded
    lasers and do it on a very low cost per shot capability. So I
    would urge you to continue to focus on that.
        General Milley. I do not want to mislead you. These
    programs are not ready for prime time yet in the fielded force.
    So you are talking several years there of consistent,
    predictable funding to make those real, developed, and
    distributed to the force--several years. If an event happens
    prior to then, there is significant risk to those enemy weapons
    systems that you talked about.
        Senator Heinrich. I think we may differ on just how far out
    that timeline is.
        General Milley. Okay.
        Chairman McCain. The fact is the situation today is that
    they literally have the capability to set Seoul on fire. Is
    that correct?
        General Milley. I think that North Korean capability that
    is arrayed north of the DMZ [Demilitarized Zone] is very
    significant, and it would do unbelievable damage. It would be a
    tragedy of immense proportions on the city of Seoul with 27
    million people and a population density of four times that of
    New York City. It would be huge. Their tube and rocket
    artillery alone can pump in a quarter of a million rounds a day
    into that city. It would be huge. It would be enormous.
        Chairman McCain. Thank you.
        Senator Sullivan?
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Milley, Mr. Secretary, good to see you. General and
    Mr. Secretary, I appreciated the opportunity to visit
    yesterday.
        I wanted to follow up on Senator Inhofe's questions with
    regard to North Korea. So it has been stated a number of times
    in this committee by military experts that it is no longer a
    matter of if but when North Korea is going to have an
    intercontinental ballistic nuclear missile that can range the
    entire United States of America. Do you agree with that
    assessment? If but when.
        General Milley. Well, I would say it depends on what we do,
    Senator.
        Senator Sullivan. Well, let me actually get to that.
        By the way, I actually agree with Senator Blumenthal's
    point about allowing the American people to have a sense of
    when that may or may not be approaching. Of course, there are
    estimates, both classified and unclassified, but I think
    getting it out there will prepare the U.S. public for a really
    challenging national security issue that I do not think a lot
    of people are paying attention to.
        Yesterday in testimony or two days ago in testimony,
    Director Coats stated it was the policy of the United States to
    prevent that capability from ever being realized. Is that your
    understanding of the policy, General?
        General Milley. Absolutely, my understanding of the current
    United States Government's policy is to prevent North Korea
    from fielding an intercontinental ballistic missile with a
    nuclear weapon to strike the continental United States.
        Senator Sullivan. So that is a red line in some ways.
        General Milley. I would not use that word. I do not use any
    words like that. I believe that is the United States policy, is
    to prevent that capability from being fielded by North Korea.
        Senator Sullivan. So if we had to take action against North
    Korea to prevent that from happening, would your United States
    Army forces and the entire weight and power of the U.S.
    military dominate the battlefield to make sure we achieve that
    goal, if we had to?
        General Milley. I believe yes, but I do not go much beyond
    that. Absolutely yes. Us and the ROK [Republic of Korea] Army
    would dominate the battlefield. North Korea would not succeed,
    and North Korea would lose. The cost would be huge, but North
    Korea would lose.
        Senator Sullivan. Let me--actually two questions. Do you
    need anything more? What do you need from this committee or the
    Congress to ensure that we would dominate and prevail if that
    day, God forbid, ever came?
        General Milley. I think the priorities that we laid out in
    our opening statements and are in the budget--that is what I
    think we need. Most importantly, we need predictable funding
    over time.
        Senator Sullivan. Let me ask. General, you and I have both
    talked about the book, T.R. Fehrenbach's ``This Kind of War,''
    a number of times, the whole issue of no more Task Force
    Smiths. Could you describe what a war with North Korea would
    look like and would it be similar to what we have seen over the
    last 15 years in Iraq and Afghanistan?
        General Milley. No, it would not look anything like the war
    in Iraq and Afghanistan.
        Senator Sullivan. What would it look like?
        General Milley. Well, it depends on, you know, our actions,
    action, reaction, counteraction. There are several different
    possibilities. I do not want to go into any great detail on any
    of them.
        Senator Sullivan. What would it likely look like?
        General Milley. If there was a full-blown war on the Korean
    Peninsula, just as Secretary of Defense Mattis said the other
    day, it would be tragic on an unbelievable scale, and the
    levels of violence would be immense and it would be the likes
    of which the world has not seen since the Second World War. It
    would be huge, and there would be huge amounts of casualties.
        Senator Sullivan. On both sides.
        General Milley. On both sides, yes. It would be horrific. I
    do not want to go into the details of what that would look
    like, and that would get into the realm of speculation of our
    contingency plans, and that would be inappropriate in an open
    hearing.
        Senator Sullivan. You emphasized in a recent interview that
    our soldiers through their training need to be able to be
    miserable again to--I do not think you used the term, but it
    was mentioned in an article in the ``War on the Rocks''
    magazine--embrace the suck, as they say in the Marine Corps and
    the Army. Are we conducting that kind of rigorous training
    right now, do you believe, that would prepare soldiers for that
    kind of war mentioned in T.R. Fehrenbach book ``This Kind of
    War'' where we do not have logistics bases? We have miserable,
    miserable conditions. People are suffering. Are we conducting
    that kind of training to prepare our forces.
        General Milley. Yes. We have shifted back to combined arms
    maneuver on a dynamic battlefield against a high end, near-peer
    threat. We have shifted away from fixed sites, constant flows
    of--in our training constant flows of logistics. We have gone
    through 16 years of war where we conditioned as an institution
    COPs and FOBs, and some of those had pretty significant quality
    of life capabilities. Others were very austere. There were many
    COPs up in Afghanistan or Iraq that were not very well
    outfitted at all.
        By my point in saying what I said about being miserable is
    that we have got to train ourselves and condition ourselves for
    a type of war in which you are unlikely to have this steady
    stream of continued logistics beyond perhaps water, ammunition,
    food, and some medical. All these other things, you know, chew
    huts, hot showers every day, sleeping in a bed, so on and so
    forth--those will probably not be available if we fight against
    a highly competitive dynamic regional or near-peer power. The
    land battle will be unbelievably violent and units will have to
    move every hour or two just to survive. Logistics and lines of
    communications will be cut off, and units are going to have to
    be able to be independent of thought and mind. Your
    communications are going to be degraded. It is going to be
    significant, and we need to train to that. That is exactly how
    we have shifted our training in the last couple of years.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Warren?
        Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you for being here today.
        I want to quickly ask about the importance of our non-
    military agencies' programs to the Army's mission. I have asked
    every combatant commander the following question, and to a
    person, they have almost all given the same answer. General
    Milley, would a significant reduction in funding to the State
    Department and other non-defense security agencies and programs
    make the Army's job of defending America easier or harder?
        General Milley. Well, Senator, I am not going to comment on
    funding levels for other agencies.
        Senator Warren. I am not asking you to.
        General Milley. I would just say that we in the Army or we
    in the military--armies do not go to wars. Nations go to wars,
    and we need and require in combat operations and most
    importantly to secure the gains of combat operations, secure
    the peace, so to speak--we need the State Department, USAID
    [United States Agency for International Development], FBI
    [Federal Bureau of Investigation], Commerce, CIA [Central
    Intelligence Agency], all these other agencies because the
    military does not do things alone. We do it as part of an
    interagency and joint team and an allied team.
        Senator Warren. Thank you very much, General. You know, I
    agree. The administration is seeking nearly a 30 percent
    reduction in the Department of State and USAID. Our military is
    critically important to our security, but we cannot forget that
    non-military programs are also critical enablers of our
    military so that you can do your job and so America can do its
    job.
        I want to ask you another question, and that is about the
    WIN-T system. I understand there has already been some
    conversation about it. I know that there were significant
    problems with the first version, delays, but that those seemed
    to be solved in the 2.0 version of this. More to the point,
    there is no obvious substitute. This is the only communications
    program that is available for the Army that works on the move.
        The question I have relates to this. General, you said
    several times that on the future battlefield, it is imperative
    that soldiers keep moving. You told the Association of U.S.
    Army at their annual meeting last year that in the Army of the
    future, if you stay in one place longer than two or three
    hours, you will be dead.
        As I understand it, under the current timeline, it is going
    to take the Army about 20 years to fully field the upgraded
    WIN-T system. In 20 years, that upgraded system is likely to be
    obsolete.
        So given your comments about the importance of constant
    mobility, the fact that this is our communications in a
    circumstance where we have got to have a lot of mobility, why
    is the Army taking so long to field this piece of equipment?
        General Milley. Well, I mean, you missed some previous
    comments. Right now, it is under a rigorous review that is
    being led by senior leadership of the Army, the Secretary and
    the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. I have concerns about not
    only WIN-T, but WIN-T is a subset of a larger network of
    systems. I have concerns about its interoperability, line of
    sight to operate in complex terrain, it survivability and
    vulnerability to enemy systems, its ability to operate on the
    move.
        The bottom line is I have some serious hard questions that
    have not yet been satisfactorily answered as to whether this is
    going to work. I believe I will come to that resolution within
    the next six weeks or so. Like I told Senator McCain, I will be
    happy to and I intend to report out to you on the status of
    that. So I am reluctant to accelerate anything unless I know
    this thing is going to work.
        On the second part of it as to why has it taken so long, I
    mean, that is one of my concerns. A system that is not going to
    get fielded--it has already been in development for 10 years. A
    lot of this stuff is already out of date. So the entire
    acquisition approach, especially in information technologies--
    we need to review that. It is one thing to build rolled
    homogenous steel and guns and tanks and vehicle systems. The
    technological speed of advance in the commercial sector on
    information technologies is far more rapid than anything that
    the government's acquisition system is capable of handling. So
    by the time we even come up with the requirements and start
    doing prototyping and experiments and tests, these systems are
    already out of date.
        So there is a fundamental issue in the IT [Information
    Technology] world--it is not just WIN-T--it is much broader
    than that causes me to be skeptical from an acquisition and
    procurement standpoint on WIN-T in particular but other systems
    involved in it as well.
        Senator Warren. Well, I appreciate that, General, and I
    appreciate our responsibility to try to make the procurement
    system work better and work better for you, particularly in an
    area where there is a lot of innovation and change over time.
        I also assume--and I am glad you are looking at this--that
    if the WIN-T system is working and we do not have another
    substitute, that we will make a decision and then try to move
    quickly on it one way or the other.
        General Milley. Right.
        Senator Warren. Thank you, General.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Ernst?
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today.
        I appreciated Senator King's comments talking about small
    arms and the need for modernization and the fact that our 5.56
    does not penetrate Russian body armor. I think that was a
    really important point that was brought out at my subcommittee
    hearing and one of the reasons I think many of us will agree on
    the need to prioritize small arms modernization in this year's
    NDAA.
        So, General Milley, once the Army does settle on a caliber,
    then would you rather have something that could be specifically
    built for infantry forces and the Army at large, or would you
    accept something that could be purchased off the shelf?
        General Milley. I do not know that the two of those are
    mutually exclusive. There are systems out there today on the
    shelf that, with some very minor modifications, could be
    adapted to munitions that we are developing at Fort Benning
    that could be used to penetrate these SAPI plates that our
    adversaries are developing. So it is not necessarily an either/
    or proposition on that one. I think there are weapons out there
    that we can get in the right caliber that can enhance the
    capability of the infantry soldier.
        Senator Ernst. That is good and I am glad to hear you say
    that because I think there could be some potential savings if
    we are looking at systems that could be modified, taken off the
    shelf and used for our soldiers. I think that would be
    something that would be very beneficial to our forces.
        Retired General Scales testified at that subcommittee
    hearing, and he spoke about a weapon that could fill the role
    of both the machine gun and the rifle, a light machine gun and
    the basic rifle. So is the need for the machine gun a higher
    priority than that of just a basic rifle, or would they be at
    the same level of priority?
        General Milley. They are both very important. They
    complement each other. I think what he is talking about is what
    the marines are adopting is the M-27. We are taking a hard look
    at that and are probably going to go in that direction as well,
    but we have not made a final decision on it.
        Infantry squads, infantry platoons--they got to have an
    automatic weapon for suppression. They got to have the
    individual weapon as well. So you need both. It is not one or
    the other. You have to have both in order to be effective in
    ground combat.
        Senator Ernst. Absolutely. Thank you, General, very much.
        Today I am introducing a bill with Senator Gillibrand that
    would require each branch of the military to educate
    servicemembers on sexual assault prevention before they
    actually leave for boot camp and if they choose to do the
    delayed entry program, which many of our young men and women
    do. The bill also states that those classes should be conducted
    in person and cover the proper use of social media. So we would
    actually have a live human being standing in front of those
    young men and women presenting that class rather than taking a
    computer course or just reviewing PowerPoint slides on their
    own.
        Sexual assault really is a societal problem, and we really
    do need to have continuous education on that. We do do that
    once we have members in the service. We really do need to start
    as soon as possible. What more can we do to curb military
    sexual assault in the Army?
        Secretary Speer. Well, Senator, I think we are doing a lot
    and we are continuing to adapt more. We are working with
    private/public partnerships with folks within the national
    colleges. I think you may have heard already from Bob Caslen at
    West Point. He is doing the same thing to the TRADOC [Training
    and Doctrine Command] schools.
        I saw something I was very excited about. I know you talk
    about personal people in terms of teaching, but I saw some very
    immersive type leader training using synthetic training
    environments providing very real individuals who provide input
    through those systems of their life story and how to combat,
    how they respond, and what happened to them.
        So there are a lot of things that will cross either through
    individual training incorporating into the schoolhouses that we
    continually try to educate leaders on how to handle, to educate
    individuals that they need to come forth and provide that they
    have been assaulted or harassed. Anything that we find that we
    find useful and improves the situation is definitely welcome to
    look at.
        Senator Ernst. Very good. I am glad to hear that. I just
    think there is more that we can do. The point is to prevent the
    problem before it ever happens. That is the intent of this bill
    is to get the message out before they even enter into the
    service. I have often thought that it should be one of their
    peers rather than like the old lady of the battalion standing
    in front of them and lecturing them. So just having that human
    face-to-face contact I think will be very important in moving
    this forward.
        So thank you, gentlemen, very much for being here today.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Peters?
        Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, thank you for your excellent testimony here
    today. It has been fascinating.
        Earlier this month, Major General William Hicks, the
    Director of Strategy, Plans and Policy in the Office of the
    Deputy Chief of Staff, indicated that the Army is--and I will
    quote him--thickening our armor posture going forward and plans
    to create a 16th armored brigade team through conversion. This
    is on top of plans to create a 15th armored battalion next
    year.
        So with that, I would be interested to better understand
    the Army's plan for additional armored brigades and to equip
    those brigades with some more modern versions of both the
    Abrams tank and the Bradley fighting vehicles.
        General Milley. In short, over the last 15-16 years of
    combat, we rewickered the Army and created a highly dense
    infantry force, and we reduced our armored capability, as our
    air defense, our artillery, et cetera. As we come out of a war
    against terrorists and insurgents or we shift gears a little
    bit and start looking at near-peer regional competitors, it is
    clear to us that we need to rebalance the force structure with
    additional armored capability. So that is the logic behind it.
        Our armored brigade combat teams right now are at a less
    than a 1-to-2 deployment-dwell ratio. So we need additional
    armored capabilities. So we made a decision to go ahead and
    convert an infantry brigade combat team at Fort Stewart and put
    that back into tanks and make that an armored brigade combat
    team. We intend to do the same thing in the coming year.
        As far as equipping that, we have had to do a pretty
    sophisticated set of logistics moves that AMC and General Gus
    Perna are doing that with Forces Command and General Abrams,
    but I think we will be successful in making that transition and
    equipping those armored forces. That is a critical capability
    that we need to do to rebalance the force.
        Senator Peters. Well, having said that, General--and I
    agree that that is a critical capability particularly with the
    changing nature of some of the threats particularly in Europe.
    I appreciated your earlier comments about having a forward
    presence in Europe to help our allies as part of the European
    Reassurance Initiative. I know both of you mentioned--Secretary
    Speer you mentioned this as well in your written testimony
    about the growth of Army prepositioned stocks in Europe, which
    include both, at division headquarters, two armored brigade
    combat teams and a field artillery brigade.
        So my question is how are we doing when it comes to
    prepositioning some of this vital heavy equipment in Europe,
    and is there anything else that you may need from Congress?
        Secretary Speer. You know, I got the chance to go see that,
    and they are doing extremely well. As a matter of fact, there
    is an emergency deployment readiness exercise where we used the
    enhanced systems sets out of the prepositioned stock to train
    and show deployment capability of those. They are loading,
    bringing it between the 2017 and 2018 funding that we have
    received and are requesting, fills those position stocks that
    you just laid out. In addition to that, NATO [North Atlantic
    Treaty Organization] is adding at Povitz a NATO-funded location
    to add that part of the prepositioned stock in Poland.
        We are not fully up in terms of, I think if I recall right,
    four of the nine prepositioned stocks are fully 90 percent
    capable. Some of the funding--we need predictable, long-term
    funding to make sure we can continue to field those
    prepositioned stocks and then, in addition to that, make sure
    that we upgrade and get the most current systems being fielded
    traded out.
        Senator Peters. General, do we need additional armor
    prepositioned in Europe?
        General Milley. We are planning to do that and that is the
    update that Secretary Speer just gave, was the equipment sets
    that are over there, armored equipment sets, as far as in
    addition to a rotational brigade, so you will end up with one
    Stryker, one airborne, one armored brigade, and then there is a
    division headquarters over there, along with the enablers of
    artillery and aviation and so on.
        Is there a requirement for more? That is really a
    geopolitical question. What does it take to deter further
    aggression from the Russians? How much American ground forces
    are required in combination with air and naval forces in order
    to deter any more aggression, say, into the Baltics or anywhere
    else beyond the Ukraine? Those are under study and analysis. We
    think that is an adequate amount of force right this minute,
    but conditions can change. So I would have to update you later
    if conditions change. We think our plan right now for ERI
    [European Reassurance Iniative] is adequate to the need.
        Senator Peters. Thank you.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Rounds?
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, thank you for your service to our country.
        When we first envisioned the cyber force nearly seven years
    ago, the threat was far different than what it is today. As the
    role of cyber in military operations has matured and as we look
    towards the need to develop a cyber deterrence strategy, I am
    curious as to whether or not we should be evaluating whether
    the size or composition of the force is sufficient to meet the
    growing demand. Is there a process underway to determine if 62
    Army cyber teams is sufficient, and if not, should there be
    one?
        General Milley. There is a process, it is led by Lieutenant
    General Nakasone. He is the commander of our cyber, and as you
    recall, Army cyber is a subordinate component headquarters or
    organization to USCYBERCOM [United States Cyber Command] led by
    Admiral Rogers.
        There is a continuous evaluation in terms of need. I
    expect, frankly, in the comings years it to grow. We just made
    it a branch a short while ago. We have established an Army
    Cyber Center of Excellence down at Fort Gordon. We brought in a
    couple of thousand young soldiers that joined that branch. It
    is one of the more popular branches coming out of the military
    academy and ROTC [Recruit Officer Training Course] to seek
    commission in. I frankly think we are in the very early stages
    of the growth, significant growth, of a cyber branch within the
    United States Army and more broadly across all of the services
    within DOD. So I fully expect to grow in the coming years in
    the cyber realm.
        Senator Rounds. Section 1647 of the fiscal year 2016 NDAA
    required the cyber vulnerability assessment of all major
    weapons systems by the end of 2019, how is the Army supporting
    these assessments, and what, if anything, can you share in what
    I recognize as being an unclassified forum about the work that
    is being completed?
        General Milley. I would actually like not to do that in an
    open hearing other than to say we are actively participating in
    the vulnerability assessment and to say that Army systems, like
    every other system, in both civil society and the military--
    most of them have cyber vulnerabilities, and we are working
    very, very, very hard and as fast as humanly possible to put in
    protective measures both organizational, training, doctrine,
    but also equipment, software and hardware. It is an area of big
    focus. I would like to stop there in terms of the specifics.
        Senator Rounds. Let me just ask, you have had a number of
    questions and comments today about WIN-T. Is that system WIN-T
    considered a major weapons system with regard to a
    determination of cyber vulnerability?
        General Milley. Yes.
        Senator Rounds. So the WIN-T is also undergoing the same
    cyber vulnerability tests as the other major weapons system.
        General Milley. Yes.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you.
        Let me ask. Section 1650 of the fiscal year 2017 NDAA
    required the cyber vulnerability assessment of Department of
    Defense critical infrastructure by the end of 2020. How is the
    Army supporting those assessments, and what, if anything, can
    you share in this, once again, in an unclassified forum, about
    the work?
        General Milley. I would let the Secretary answer that, but
    I would give you the same answer.
        Secretary Speer. I would give you the same answer. I think
    you have seen some anecdotal stuff, for instance, where both
    the Pentagon is using Hack the Pentagon. You have seen us doing
    Hack the Army and some cyber assessments to see how well the
    software and some of the things that we have the capabilities
    and the infrastructure to protect. I think the rest is left
    unsaid.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you.
        General Milley, you indicated earlier in your conversations
    today that--and I am going to paraphrase somewhat--within 10
    years, there will be a fundamental change in the way that we
    conduct warfare. Could you just elaborate on that a little bit,
    please, for us?
        General Milley. Sure. I separate it into two.
        One is the nature of war, which I think is immutable and is
    unlikely to change, and that has to do with war is a form
    politics by violent means. It is fog and friction and fear and
    confusion and so on and so forth. Those sort of human things
    that are out there--that is probably not going to change. It
    has not changed in 10,000 years. It is probably not going to
    change in the future.
        The character of war does change on occasion, and one of
    the drivers--not the only driver--is technology. Other drivers
    are social change, et cetera. So one of the things that led,
    for example, to Napoleon's success was a political change in
    France, a revolution, that allowed him to have a levee en
    masse, that allowed him to have an Army of the people, so to
    speak. He was fighting against other armies of monarchs whose
    soldiers were either mercenaries or draftees. They did not have
    a choice. The French people of Napoleon's army thought they
    were fighting for a country and a cause, and they bought into
    this thing. So that was an example of a political change that
    changed the character, and that enabled Napoleon to conquer
    Europe.
        Other technological changes or things like the rifle or the
    barbed wire or the introduction of the airplane, tracked
    vehicles, mechanization, the radio--and they were very
    significant in between World War I and World War II.
        Today what I perceive happening is the confluence of
    societal changes that are rapidly happening. We are moving
    beyond 6 billion people in the world, getting to 8 billion
    people in the world, and roughly speaking about 90 percent of
    them are going to be living in highly dense, complex urban
    areas. If war is about politics and politics is about people,
    wars and armed conflict, especially on the ground part of it--
    they are going to be fought in urban areas, highly complex,
    dense urban areas. That is a significant fundamental societal
    change to change how the American Army fights, where we fight,
    what the doctrine is, how we train the leaders, things like the
    communications systems and so on and so forth. We are going to
    have to adapt to that change, and that is coming within, for
    sure, 10 years.
        The other technological things like the introduction of
    lasers, rail guns, robotics, autonomous systems, artificial
    intelligence--they are fast approaching very, very quickly.
    They will be, I believe, a significant introduction into both
    air, maritime, space, cyber, and ground warfare. If you combine
    all of those things together--and there are many, many more--I
    think you end up with a fundamental change in the character of
    war. What will be important is that country which connects
    those dots and applies those new technologies and those
    societal changes and adapts the best--those countries will
    prevail. Those countries that do not--they will fail. They will
    lose a war. There is nothing more expensive than that. So when
    I said time is not on our side, that is part of what I meant.
        We have got to urgently move out because our adversaries
    are moving out. Russia and China are moving out. North Korea--
    we see it every week. They are moving towards the development
    of nuclear weapons. The United States of America needs to step
    up our game when it comes to these changes because we are
    facing a fundamental change, and we need to end up on the other
    end of that change in a better position than we are right now.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Perdue?
        Senator Perdue. Thank you, Chair.
        Thank you both for being here and for your service.
        General Milley, back in February--and first of all, I am
    embarrassed and I want to apologize that we are sitting here
    having to have this type of conversation. We are sitting here
    at a time when the U.S. Army is the smallest it has been since
    World War II. The disinvestment, particularly in the last 8
    years, threatens the security of our country. General Mattis
    said it best, that the national debt is the greatest threat to
    our national security. Here we see why.
        I want to talk about readiness first. I have one question
    quickly after that.
        General Allen just in February before the Subcommittee on
    Readiness told us that one-third of our BCTs, one-fourth of our
    combat aviation brigades, and half of our division
    headquarters--only half--were deemed ready at that point. He
    also went on to say that only three of our, I think it is, 58
    BCTs in total, including Guard and Reserves could be called
    upon to fight tonight.
        How does this budget proposal allow you to address that? By
    the end of 2018, if you were to get the amounts in this
    request, how many of our BCTs would be ready to fight? How
    would you assess the readiness that we just described here?
        General Milley. Our readiness objective for the regular
    Army is 66 percent of the formations are at the highest level
    of combat readiness, and our objective for the Reserve
    component, both National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve, is 60
    percent of their enabling capabilities.
        Right now, that comment about a third--that is still
    relatively true. I would rather give you a detailed--it has
    changed since General Allen has testified, and it has gotten a
    little bit better. As I briefed earlier, it is slow progress,
    not the level that I would like to see.
        With this budget, with the completion of the 2017 budget,
    we still have part of that year to go. The enactment of the
    2018 budget--I think we will see significant improvement
    because readiness is cumulative, and I think based on our
    current projections, assuming we hold constant things like
    OPTEMPO and we get steady, predictable funding, then I think
    you will see significant improvement in readiness by the end of
    2018 for sure. It will not necessarily be at the objective
    level, but it will be a significant improvement over what it is
    today.
        Senator Perdue. How much would you need to get the
    objective level?
        General Milley. Steady, predictable funding for several
    years in a row and a growth in the size of the force. We chose
    in this particular budget to flat line the end strength growth.
    If more money became available, I certainly would like to see
    that----
        Senator Perdue. So if you were to get a CR [Continuing
    Resolution] at any point in that 4- or 5-year period you are
    talking about that would tie your hands to redivert or to
    divert money from one area to another to address this
    readiness, how would that impact your ability to do what you
    are talking about doing?
        General Milley. CRs hurt. I will let Secretary Speer--he is
    a finance guy, and he knows more about how they hurt than I do,
    but I can tell you they hurt.
        Secretary Speer. One thing about the CRs, especially the
    longer term they go, but any CR,--they have a cumulative
    effect, and that is part of what we are coming out of from
    2013, 2014, 2015 on not only in terms of the ability for a
    commander to know and sustain predictability for training and
    what they are going to do, they are by nature conservative. So
    when they see the funding may run out, they react differently.
    They can be risk-averse to that. You start making bad
    purchasing decisions, and those types of things go on.
        Senator Perdue. You make shorter-term decisions is what you
    are saying.
        Secretary Speer. Correct.
        Senator Perdue. Less optimal decisions than you would make
    if you had a steady runway of dependable funding.
        General Milley. They are more expensive.
        Secretary Speer. More expensive too. I mean, they hold
    things to the very end, and you have a whole bunch of purchases
    at the end of the year that you do not get the best bargain
    for.
        General Milley. It is a crazy way to do it, this CR thing
    is--just one man's opinion I suppose, but I would say it is a
    crazy way to do it.
        Senator Perdue. Sir, I come from a different world too. I
    come from the business world. I have never seen this done
    anywhere else in the world. It is absolutely absurd that we are
    going to do that and tie your hands about allowing you to move
    money from one department to another, to even adapt to reduce
    levels of spending.
        Our procurement program--I think you mentioned just now.
    One of the competitive issues that I believe--and you just said
    it--that will make winners and losers in the future is how
    quickly we can adapt technology to the battlefield. It sounds
    to me like with what we have been doing compared to what China
    is doing particularly with the rise of their investment--they
    are spending about $826 billion a year in comparable terms on
    their military today. That compares to our $600 billion, just
    to put that in perspective. In addition, they can bring things
    to market so much quicker. Would you elaborate on that just a
    little bit and how China is outpacing us in terms of bringing
    new technologies to the battlefield?
        General Milley. Your assessment is accurate, they have made
    significant advances. We are in the 38th year I guess since
    Deng Xiaoping and the 1979 reforms. So they have made a massive
    economic improvement in their society for 37 consecutive years.
    It is the largest economic shift in global power in 5
    centuries. When that happens, inevitably throughout history,
    significant military capability follows. That is what we are
    seeing, we are seeing a significant development of Chinese
    military capability, and it is relatively rapid. They are not
    at 100 percent of our levels yet in some areas, but in other
    areas they have developed capabilities that are quite
    challenging. The specific capabilities--I would prefer not to
    talk about them in open session, but it is a significant
    capability that they are developing.
        Senator Perdue. Thank you both.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Reed?
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Just one quick follow-up question with respect to small
    arms. To what extent, if we adopted a new round, would it
    impact the interoperability of our relationship with NATO
    countries, the rounds that they have? Related to that is, what
    would it cost us to refurbish the worldwide stockpile, which
    exists now, 5.56 and 7.62?
        General Milley. Those are all part of the analysis that we
    are doing down at Benning. Just to put your mind at ease a
    little bit, what we have developed is a 7.62 bullet. So it is
    not like something that is not in the inventory anywhere. We
    have developed a pretty effective round down at Fort Benning.
    We think that we can get that into production here in a year or
    two and get that fielded out to the force. It is 7.62, not
    5.56.
        But not everybody necessarily needs a 7.62--this idea that
    the entire Army--everybody needs the same thing all the time--
    is not necessarily true. There are some units, some infantry
    units, that are much more highly likely to rapidly deploy than
    others and conduct close quarters combat that we would probably
    want to field them with a better grade weapon that can
    penetrate this body armor that we are talking about.
        Senator Reed. Would this round be interoperable with NATO
    allies?
        General Milley. I probably should owe you a specific
    answer. I think yes. It is a 7.62 round. So I think the answer
    is yes. Let me get you a specific ballistics answer.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        General Milley. The Army's current 5.56mm and 7.62mm cartridges are
    all NATO standard rounds which can be chambered and fired in NATO
    standard weapons. These include:

         5.56mm:
          - M855A1: Enhanced Performance Round (EPR) is the primary combat
    round
          - M856A1: Tracer round
          - M995: Armor Piercing round (War Reserve)
          - M1037/M862: Short Range Training Ammunition

         7.62mm:
          - M80A1: EPR is the primary combat round
          - M62A1: Tracer round
          - M993: Armor Piercing (War Reserve)
          - M973: Short Range Training Ammunition Ball for use in training
          - M974: Short Range Training Ammunition Tracer for use in
    training
          - M118: Long Range is the primary round for the M110 Semi-
    Automatic Sniper System

        In order to address peer and near-peer threat increases in Soldier
    protection, the Army is in the process of qualifying the 7.62mm XM1158
    Advanced Armor Piercing (ADVAP) round which is also a NATO standard
    caliber round. The XM1158 is planned for Low Rate Initial Production
    (LRIP) in fiscal year 2019 with quantities being added into the war
    reserve in fiscal year 2020. There will be 35 million rounds in the war
    reserve for contingency operations. The Army will spend a total of $420
    million to include research and development, qualification and LRIP at
    Picatinny Arsenal and Full Rate Production at Lake City Army Ammunition
    Plant (LCAAP).
        The Army is also in the process of research and development for the
    next generation squad weapon systems with anticipated fielding in
    fiscal year 2023 to replace the 5.56mm M249 SAW and M4 Carbine. This
    system will address peer and near-peer threats at greater ranges. The
    caliber is not yet selected but is anticipated to be in the range of
    5.56mm, 6.5mm, 6.8mm or 7.62mm. It is currently too early to determine
    the total cost of development and fielding of this new ammunition. The
    Army anticipates better cost fidelity upon selection of the weapon,
    ammunition type and caliber, which is projected for fiscal year 2021.

        Senator Reed. Thank you, sir.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Cruz?
        Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Good morning, gentlemen. Welcome. Thank you for your
    service to our Nation particularly at this time of great
    challenges abroad and rising perils. I want to thank you both
    for your work particularly on the fiscal year 2018 defense
    budget and your commitment to rebuilding our military
    capability to keep this Nation safe, to restore our readiness,
    and make sure we are in a position to defeat our enemies and to
    defend the Homeland.
        I want to talk about several aspects of the budget. The
    first concerns Fort Hood and other Texas bases, which is we
    visited the barracks and other facilities at Fort Hood and
    other Texas bases. The bachelor enlisted quarters are currently
    at unacceptable habitable levels. I understand that MILCON
    [Military Construction] spending has been limited due to the
    operational challenges causing the services to make difficult
    budget decisions. Can you share with this committee your
    commitment to providing the necessary sustainment and
    restoration and modernization of these facilities to keep them
    functioning at a habitable level?
        Secretary Speer. So, Senator, I would agree with you. The
    past non-predictable funding, the problems of lower funding we
    had has created some strain which generates some readiness from
    the institutional base of the installations. We have--and thank
    you so much for the fiscal year 2017 budget--added additional
    resources to sustaining those installations, to include Fort
    Hood. We have asked for, inside the fiscal year 2018 budget,
    double the restoration and modernization previously. We got
    over $1 billion more than we had in fiscal year 2017. So we
    will get after both not only Fort Hood but other installations
    in terms of improving modernization and readiness of the
    facilities. MILCON has not been plused up as much. We are still
    taking some risk, and we will have to look at that in terms of
    the total infrastructure of the installations in the future.
        Senator Cruz. Thank you.
        Let me turn, General Milley, to a different topic, which is
    that prepositioned stocks in South Korea are planning to move
    back to the continental United States to equip a new armored
    brigade combat team. Could you expand on the reasons why the
    prepositioned stock has to be relocated from a forward-deployed
    location supporting rotational units to outfit an ABCT
    [Armoured Brigade Combat Team] that will be stationed in the
    U.S.?
        General Milley. Thanks, Senator. Two things. One is that
    equipment is over there prepositioned for a force to arrive for
    training or otherwise. The intent is that the armored units
    that deploy there will deploy with their equipment. As I
    mentioned earlier to one of the Senators, for the last 15-16
    years, our force--we restructured ourselves to fight an
    insurgency and counterterrorist fight, and we went with
    infantry heavy, which is appropriate for that type of fight. As
    we look at the world ahead, we need to rebalance a little bit.
    So we need to increase our armored brigade combat team
    capability. So we want to convert one infantry to an armored to
    create a 15th and then create a 16th after that. That
    equipment--the key set you are talking about--will be necessary
    to create that 16th armored brigade. Absent that, we will not
    be able to do it given the money that we have and the vehicle
    inventory that we have. So that is the logic behind it. It is
    an element of risk, but we think it is acceptable level of risk
    because that particular unit would be the one going anyway.
        Senator Cruz. Let me turn to a different question, which is
    that the President's budget keeps regular Army BCTs at 31,
    without any increases across the Active Duty National Guard or
    Reserve forces. Does this budget contain any provisions that
    would aid in the future reactivations of new BCTs?
        General Milley. Yes. It was 30, and this budget request
    keeps 31. That one is the airborne brigade up in Alaska. So
    that is where you get your 31st one.
        There are modest increases in force structure built into
    this budget. One of the ones that relates to your question is
    the security force assistance brigades. They are the chains of
    command. Think of them as the chain of command from staff
    sergeant on up of an infantry brigade. They will train
    together. They will work together, and they will deploy as
    advisors to places like Iraq, Afghanistan, and other places
    where we think advisory help for indigenous forces.
        They will not have soldiers in them, though. They will not
    have the privates and the sergeants and the corporals, et
    cetera. So if we need to expand rapidly, they do form the
    basis, the nucleus, the leadership piece of a brigade combat
    team that we could bring soldiers through basic training and
    AIT [Advanced Infantry Training] and fold them underneath that
    chain of command, and you could very quickly have an additional
    brigade must faster than building one from scratch. We plan on
    building five of those, four in the regular Army, one in the
    Guard. That would be an expansion there.
        The other part of that is what we are trying to do with
    this budget is fill the holes of the existing force structure,
    and then we are going to want to come back to you in the 2019
    budget with what we think is the optimal force structure for
    the national military strategy and the defense planning
    guidance. Secretary Mattis is currently leading us through a
    very rigorous review of that, which we expect the results--we
    will be finished with it probably in the fall. Once we are done
    with that, we come back in 2019 with here is how we think we
    make ourselves right-sized for the challenges we think we face.
        The last budget stopped the bleeding, this budget is to
    steady the ship and start the increase, as slight as it is, in
    readiness and modernization and modest increases in capacity. I
    hope that answers the question.
        Senator Cruz. Thank you, General.
        Senator Reed [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Cruz.
        Gentlemen, thank you for your testimony, for your service.
    On behalf of Chairman McCain, let me call the hearing
    adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:31 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                  Questions Submitted by Senator James Inhofe
                               army end strength
        1. Senator Inhofe. General Milley, understanding that the ultimate
    size of the Army will largely depend on the outcome of the ongoing
    National Security Strategy review, what is the correct end strength
    number for each Army component to meet present enduring Combatant
    Command requirements and contingency operations?
        General Milley. Until the National Security Strategy review is
    complete, I cannot provide exact end strength numbers by component.
    However, under the current national military strategy and defense
    planning guidance, increases above 1.018 million soldiers (476,000
    Regular Army; 343,000 National Guard; 199,000 Reserves) would enable
    the Army to better fulfill all of its requirements at more acceptable
    levels of military risk.
                             current army readiness
        2. Senator Inhofe. General Milley, you testified that the readiness
    goal for Army BCTs is roughly 66 percent. We further know from open
    testimony that we are not even close to that goal, with only about one-
    third of BCTs ready currently. What practical steps can we take to
    bring us closer to the 66 percent readiness goal?
        General Milley. The additional end strength for Active and Reserve
    components provided in the fiscal year 2017 National Defense
    Authorization Act (NDAA), will improve the manning levels inside
    Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) gaining additional readiness. In fiscal
    year 2017, we emphasized decisive action training at home station and
    at our Combat Training Centers (CTC). Building on our gains in fiscal
    year 2017, we have requested increased funding for CTC rotations and
    emergency deployment readiness exercises (EDREs) in fiscal year 2018.
    These exercises will improve readiness of forces preparing for
    deployment and contingency operations. We have also increased funding
    for BCT home station training to above 90 percent of the total
    requirement for Regular Army units and above 80 percent for Army
    National Guard units.
        Beginning this year, and increasing in fiscal year 2018, all Army
    National Guard BCTs receive additional man-days with associated pay and
    allowances. We are increasing the number of Army National Guard BCT CTC
    rotations from two to four per year.
        Additional resources for home station training, increased
    maintenance for aviation that includes the 4 AH64 Battalion's in the
    ARNG, and increased EDRE funding would all help accelerate our
    readiness. These items were included in the fiscal year 2018 UFR
    Letter.
        Army-wide, we are also aligning BCTs with ongoing missions, so that
    it builds readiness at the least risk to contingency and war plan
    demands.
        Finally, to achieve the optimal readiness of our BCT formations,
    sustained, sufficient, and predictable funding for required manning
    levels, modernization, and sustainment are critical.

        3. Senator Inhofe. General Milley, of the four pillars of readiness
    (manning, equipment, leader development, training), which are you most
    comfortable with in its current state, and which one concerns you the
    most?
        General Milley. In its current state, the manning pillar presents
    the least concerns due to recent approved increases in end strength,
    however that does not mean we are comfortable with its current state--
    it is only a beginning in an area that saw reduction by 80,000 soldiers
    in the last 8 years. The increase in end strength should not be
    mischaracterized as an increase in the overall Army; it will fill gaps
    in the existing force structure. We're not increasing the brigades and
    divisions; we're filling holes in existing units.
        Most concerning is the equipment pillar. With the passing of the
    fiscal year 2017 Consolidated Appropriations Act, procurement efforts
    will begin to address known shortfalls and gaps in combat systems and
    most importantly in munitions, electronic warfare, cyber programs, air
    and missile defense, long-range fires, protection and mobility
    programs. However, this will not fully reverse the effects of
    constrained funding and multiple years of continuing resolutions.
    Without predictable steady funding in the years ahead we will be
    required to continue to leverage future modernization to achieve
    current readiness requirements.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
                      army fiscal year 2018 unfunded list
        4. Senator Cotton. General Milley and Secretary Speer, if Congress
    decides to add additional resources for a second set of up-gunned
    Stryker vehicles, would the Army find this consistent with their needs
    given the threat?
        General Milley and Secretary Speer. Yes, additional resources for a
    second set of up-gunned Stryker vehicles would be consistent with Army
    needs given the threat. Stryker lethality is included in our Fiscal
    Year 2018 Unfunded Requirements List and it will better equip our
    maneuver forces against peer and near-peer threats.
                 distributed common ground system-army (dcgs-a)
        5. Senator Cotton. General Milley, ``Last we spoke, I was assured
    that the Army was on track to comply with Section 113 of the NDAA
    regarding DCGS-A and that the Army Chief of Staff was fully aware of
    that effort. As of now, the Army has 27 days to award a contract for a
    working commercial solution that will be fielded Army-wide for users at
    the division and below levels. I am concerned because it appears that
    the Army has still not defined its requirements, begun a competition,
    or made any concrete steps towards meeting those requirements. So, is
    the Army going to award a contract by June 21 that will give users from
    the division and below a working capability?''
        General Milley. The Army is complying with Section 113 of the
    National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) regarding Distributed Common
    Ground System-Army (DCGS-A). The Army will not award a contract by June
    21, 2017. However, to comply with the NDAA, the Army has conducted
    comprehensive market research to solicit feedback on available
    commercial capabilities and will submit a waiver request to the
    Secretary of Defense to allow the Army to award a contract. To date,
    industry has provided valuable data on current commercial off-the-shelf
    and non-developmental products and their feedback has directly informed
    the requirements. U.S. Army Forces Command has also participated in the
    requirements process in order to provide input on what capabilities
    soldiers need. I will personally review and approve the final
    requirements document to support this effort. Direct industry
    engagements and well-defined requirements are necessary steps prior to
    awarding a contract for a commercial solution or non-developmental item
    that will be fielded Army-wide for users at the tactical levels.
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Claire McCaskill
                               cbrn preparedness
        6. Senator McCaskill. General Milley and Secretary Speer, please
    provide, in a classified format if necessary, current assessments on
    the timeline in which the United States believes that North Korea will
    have the capability of: Successfully launching an ICBM; Successfully
    launching an ICBM capable of ranging any portion of the continental
    United States; Successfully launching an ICBM capable of ranging the
    entire continental United States; and Successfully launching an ICBM
    with a nuclear warhead.
        General Milley and Secretary Speer. [Deleted.]

        7. Senator McCaskill. General Milley and Secretary Speer, do you
    feel confident that Army forces generally, and in the Pacific theater
    specifically, have the CBRN equipment necessary to defend United States
    troops against a potential chemical or biological attack by North
    Korea?
        General Milley and Secretary Speer. Yes, We are confident that the
    Army has broadly equipped its soldiers, and the United States Forces
    Korea, 8th Army and United States Army Pacific Command specifically,
    with the most ready and modern capabilities as it relates to defending
    themselves against a CBRN attack from North Korea.
        However, as a result of frequent provocations from North Korea,
    which is armed with chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, and given
    the advances in technology in the area of Chemical, Biological,
    Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) defense, the Army is continuing to seek
    opportunities to improve the CBRN equipment, capabilities and capacity
    available to defend U.S. troops against a potential attack in the
    Pacific theater.
        In Fiscal Year 2018 (FY18) Army and Joint Chemical and Biological
    Defense Program budget requests, we have sought to maximize investments
    in CBRN readiness on the Korean peninsula. Additionally, the Army's
    Fiscal Year 2018 Unfunded Requirements List includes requests to
    deliver improved CBRN decontamination and radiological detection
    capabilities to the Army forces on the Korean peninsula.

        8. Senator McCaskill. General Milley and Secretary Speer, in 2016,
    the National Commission on the Future of the Army identified CBRN
    response and defense as a critical shortfall in Army capabilities in a
    major contingency operation.
        Do you agree with the shortfall identified by the Commission? If
    so, what have you done or plan to do to address the shortfall? How many
    additional soldiers should we be training?
        What are some of the potential consequences in an overseas military
    conflict of having a gap in our Chemical, Biological, Radiological and
    Nuclear response capabilities?
        What are the consequences of this gap to the Army's ability to
    respond to an attack on the Homeland?
        General Milley and Secretary Speer. The Army agrees with the
    National Commission on the Future of the Army report with regards to
    shortfalls related to Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
    (CBRN) capabilities and modernization.
        To address these concerns, we requested additional funding in the
    President's Budget 2017 Request for Additional Appropriations which
    allows us to procure chemical protective ensembles to meet contingency
    requirements, as well as fund improved early warning to detect
    potential chemical attacks in the Central Command area of
    responsibility.
        Likewise, the Army's Fiscal Year 2018 President's Budget submission
    and our continued work with the Joint Chemical and Biological Defense
    Program are also informed by the Commission's recommendations on CBRN
    modernization.
        The Army continually seeks opportunities to improve CBRN
    capabilities and capacity within larger readiness and modernization
    efforts to ensure we have the most ready force available to address the
    broad threats of modern warfare.
        With regards to training, the Army fully recognizes the importance
    of preparing soldiers to operate in a CBRN environment and fully
    resources CBRN training executed by all units in the force structure.
    As we field modernized equipment to address emerging and advanced
    threats, we ensure soldiers receive the needed training to close the
    shortfall.
        Gaps in the Army's CBRN response capabilities, whether in a
    military conflict or in the Homeland, could increase risk to soldiers
    and delay mission accomplishment. We maximize investments in our CBRN
    force structure and training to best minimize consequences to the
    warfighter within our current capabilities. In the Homeland, the Army
    has made a concerted effort over the last few years with regards to
    CBRN defense and protection through forces, training and equipment in
    support of the CBRN Response Enterprise. Using the Total Force
    approach, 18,700+ personnel in CBRN response capable units from the
    Active Component, Reserve Component, and National Guard may be called
    upon to provide a wide range of capabilities to save lives and protect
    property. The CBRN Response Enterprise consist of 57 Civil Support
    Teams, 10 Homeland Response Forces, and 17 CBRN Enhanced Response Force
    Packages which normally respond in State Active Duty under State
    control; and one Defense CBRN Response Force and two Command and
    Control CBRN Response Elements which provide the Federal response under
    USNORTHCOM.
        Additional readiness and modernization efforts are highlighted in
    the Army's Fiscal Year 2018 Unfunded Requirements List, which seeks
    opportunities to accelerate improved radiological detection systems,
    expand decontamination capabilities to United States forces in Korea,
    increase readiness of our Stryker Nuclear, Biological and Chemical
    Reconnaissance Vehicle fleet, and deliver improved protective masks and
    ensembles to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear forces for
    both warfighting and Homeland defense missions.

        9. Senator McCaskill. General Milley and Secretary Speer, last year
    I had the privilege of meeting U.S. Army soldiers responsible for
    operating anti-ballistic missile weapons systems.
        Do you believe it is advantageous for the United States to deploy
    additional anti-ballistic missile capabilities to Japan?
        Do you believe THAAD is necessary?
        General Milley and Secretary Speer. Yes, it is advantageous to
    deploy additional anti-ballistic missile capabilities, where needed.
    Missile Defenses are less provocative than offensive systems, protect
    critical assets and population centers, assure our Allies, and preserve
    capabilities should deterrence fail.
        U.S Patriot and THAAD are some of the Army's most in-demand
    systems. Increasing United States missile defense in Japan must be
    balanced. Japan already has considerable defenses including Patriot
    batteries with advanced missiles.
        The Department developed the ``THAAD Global Posture'' to maximize
    strategic flexibility in order to respond to war plans and contingency
    demands. Not adhering to that Global Posture footprint would make it
    very difficult to meet other world-wide requirements.
                                   contracts
        10. Senator McCaskill. General Milley and Secretary Speer, in 2015,
    the GAO found (GAO-16-46) that, in 2013, the Army reported nearly 80
    percent of the $9.7 billion it obligated for contracted services--such
    as professional and management support--were for services that were
    closely associated with inherently governmental functions. What is the
    Army doing to ensure that we are either transitioning these types of
    contracted roles to DOD permanent hires, or else ensuring that such
    contracted services result in savings to the taxpayer?
        General Milley and Secretary Speer. The Army continues to comply
    with the statutory requirements to review its inventory of contracted
    services and, to the extent possible, reduce contracted services for
    functions that are closely associated with inherently governmental
    functions. However, the existing constraints on the size of the
    civilian workforce and force manning levels impede our ability to in-
    source functions deemed to be closely associated with inherently
    governmental functions. Because the Army is managing to a civilian end
    strength limit, it is difficult for Army organizations to move this
    contracted work in-house.
        Although it is possible that some of these contracted positions may
    be saving the taxpayers money, we generally have not done the cost
    comparisons to show which labor source would be most cost effective
    because, given the current civilian end strength limitations, there is
    no option to in source those positions. In fiscal year 2014 we in-
    sourced 14 positions; in fiscal year 2015 we in-sourced 14 positions;
    in fiscal year 2016, 141 positions, and so far in fiscal year 2017, we
    have in-sourced 56 positions.
        In addition to transitioning from contracted services to permanent
    civilian positions, in an effort to reduce costs, the Army is carefully
    considering the extent to which contracted services in operational
    theaters may be transitioned to either DA civilian or military
    personnel. Many Army units have deployed to Afghanistan without all of
    their support personnel in order to remain within the force management
    level restrictions. Now that the administration has lifted these
    restrictions, it may be possible for the Army to shift these functions
    currently performed by contractors, such as aviation maintenance, base
    security, and UAS operators, back to the military personnel that have
    been trained in those areas.

        11. Senator McCaskill. General Milley and Secretary Speer, in 2016
    the GAO recommended (GAO-16-119) that the DOD, to the extent possible,
    revise programming guidance to collect information on how contracted
    services will be used to meet requirements beyond the budget year, but
    rather into the Future Year Defense Program. What steps has the Army
    taken to bring this recommendation into reality and practice?
        General Milley and Secretary Speer. To bring the Government
    Accountability Office's recommendation into reality, the Army first
    initiated a trial process with select commands in fiscal year 2016
    (FY16) to collect and analyze contracted service requirements and
    funding. In fiscal year 2017, the Army is continuing this effort by
    updating the existing data collected and further expanding the number
    of participating commands. The Army expects to be fully operational by
    the end of fiscal year 2018. The Army defined the contracted services
    per the Federal Acquisition Regulation 37.101--a ``contract service''
    is one that directly engages the time and effort of a contractor whose
    primary purpose is to perform an identifiable task rather than to
    furnish an end item of supply. This includes services performed by
    either professional or nonprofessional personnel whether on an
    individual or organizational basis.
              cooperation with the department of homeland security
        12. Senator McCaskill. General Milley and Secretary Speer, the
    military has long embraced the concept of `jointness' wherein each
    branch of service works hand in hand with the others. This has made our
    military more capable and better trained to accomplish their mission.
        Do you agree the military, and the National Guard in particular,
    should closely embrace the concept of `jointness' and increase
    coordination with DHS to ensure they are prepared to respond to a
    massive CBRNE attack against the United States Homeland?
        Would you agree joint training opportunities are an effective way
    to integrate the functions of the National Guard and DHS in a disaster
    response situation?
        Will you commit to working with DHS to increase combined training,
    including training conducted by the CBRNE school at Fort Leonard Wood,
    and ensure the National Guard is fully prepared to meet this important
    mission?
        General Milley and Secretary Speer. I agree that the Army,
    including the National Guard, should work closely with DHS and other
    government agencies to ensure we are prepared to respond to any CBRNE
    attack. Title 32 and Title 10 National Guard CBRN Response Enterprise
    element leaders are currently working to forge more in depth
    relationship to ensure ``jointness'' across the Total Force. I also
    agree that joint training is one of the most effective ways to
    integrate Army and DHS functions in a disaster response scenario. There
    are already a number of opportunities for soldiers, Regular Army and
    National Guard, to train alongside DHS responders at Fort Leonard Wood.
    These include both collective and individual training. The National
    Guard also participates in the DHS National Exercise Program which
    ensures DHS and National Guard senior leaders have the opportunity to
    exercise interagency coordination procedures with OSD and DHS/FEMA.
        The National Guard leverages training opportunities at Maneuver
    Support Center of Excellence (MSCOE)/CBRNE School at Ft Leonard Wood
    and continues to work with MSCOE/CBRNE School to ensure DHS
    requirements are properly represented in Army Requirements Oversight
    Council (AROC) processes. I am committed to close coordination with the
    Services, OSD, and DHS to prepare for a whole of Government response to
    any largescale CBRNE incidents or attacks in the United States
    Homeland. We recognize the critical role Ft. Leonard Wood plays in that
    effort.
                                     cyber
        13. Senator McCaskill. General Milley and Secretary Speer, what
    types of enemy cyber effects are brigade combat teams faced with during
    their rotations at Army Combat Training Centers? How well are they
    prepared to face these effects?
        General Milley and Secretary Speer. Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs)
    face a hybrid threat, meaning Cyber Opposing Forces (OPFOR) transition
    their effects between those used by state and non-state actors,
    including organized criminal elements, in cyberspace. The intent of the
    effect is to degrade BCT mission command capabilities or to assist in
    information warfare campaigns. Examples of effects used in the last 6
    months to degrade mission command include a denial of service attack on
    the BCT network, repeatedly restarting critical domain infrastructure,
    phishing attacks, and exfiltration of operational and intelligence
    information allowing the OPFOR to conduct kinetic attacks and
    information warfare campaigns. Examples of effects used for information
    warfare campaigns include injecting false information into a mission
    command system and defacing the unit webpage with a propaganda message.
    Additionally, OPFOR frequently targets the BCT's usage of the
    electromagnetic spectrum (EMS), degrading friendly tactical
    communications and conducting local denial of GPS, affecting BCT
    positioning, navigation, and timing ability.
        The Army is continuing its efforts to grow, train and equip the
    Cyber Force through the institutional recruiting, training and
    equipping processes. In general, BCTs that have not yet been fielded
    with cyber trained and equipped manpower lack organic capability and
    capacity to effectively respond to enemy cyber effects during Combat
    Training Centers (CTC) rotations. During CTC pilot rotations where Army
    Cyber Command has provided embedded augmentation of trained and
    equipped personnel, the BCTs have been very successful in blocking and
    defeating the opposing force cyber effects. In many cases, application
    of basic cybersecurity practices (password management, log monitoring,
    and firewall configurations) would minimize the impact or ability to
    conduct an effect. Recent Cyber Electromagnetic Activities (CEMA)
    Support to Corps and Below (CSCB) supported rotations at CTCs have
    greatly improved the BCTs ability to execute cyberspace operations and
    electronic warfare to enable dominance of the cyber, electromagnetic,
    and information environments. The lessons learned from these CSCB
    rotations will inform many aspects of doctrine, organization, training,
    materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities and policies (DOTMLPF-P)
    and education initiatives going forward.

        14. Senator McCaskill. General Milley and Secretary Speer, in what
    ways is the Army coordinating with private sector owners and operators
    of critical infrastructure that is part of the defense industrial base?
        General Milley and Secretary Speer. The Army is working closely
    with prime and sub-contractors of the weapons platforms assessed in
    response to section 1647 of the National Defense Authorization Act
    (NDAA) for fiscal year 2016 requirements to help them better understand
    the threat and identify vulnerabilities in their enabling Platform
    Information Technology (PIT). The Army intends to pursue a similar
    relationship with the private sector entities involved with the
    Facility Related Control Systems and Industrial Control Systems
    assessed in response to the requirements of section 1650 of the fiscal
    year 2017 NDAA. As we evolve these assessment programs into enduring
    capabilities, the Army will maintain this reinforcing relationship with
    the private sector entities that build and maintain our systems and
    infrastructure.
        Army Materiel Command (AMC) is working to improve its critical
    infrastructure, and the cybersecurity posture of its supporting Cleared
    Defense Contractor (CDC) networks (often connected directly to Army-
    owned systems) through efforts to gain better visibility (utilizing
    ARCYBER Cyber Protection Teams) of the vulnerabilities associated. The
    long term improvements, however, will be through changes to contracting
    language; AMC is currently preparing to enter into negotiations with a
    supporting CDC to modify a contract to support stricter cybersecurity
    requirements and increased visibility.
                               gender integration
        15. Senator McCaskill. General Milley and Secretary Speer, what is
    the Army's plan to continue to recruit women into the newly opened
    ground combat jobs?
        General Milley and Secretary Speer. The Army is recruiting across
    the spectrum of the eligible population. The Army Marketing Research
    Group has developed products developed to highlight diversity and to
    appeal to potential female candidates for service. The Army has
    conducted more than 40 local, regional, and national media engagements
    focusing on integration efforts and highlights many of the stories of
    female soldiers on official social media accounts as a standard
    practice.

        16. Senator McCaskill. General Milley and Secretary Speer, what is
    the Army's plan to increase inclusion of women into the special
    operations career fields?
        General Milley and Secretary Speer. The Army is actively seeking
    female candidates who can meet the physical, cognitive, and non-
    cognitive qualifications for special operations career fields. Many
    female soldiers already work in Special Forces units as Civil Affairs
    officers; Special Forces units draw upon special female-only teams in
    order to meet mission requirements. Special Operations Command's
    implementation plan mirrors the Army's lines of effort (transform
    accessions, talent management, communicate and educate, and assessment
    of progress). The Army is committed to ensuring all qualified and
    interested candidates, whether male or female, have the opportunity to
    meet the rigorous standards for the special operations career fields.

        17. Senator McCaskill. General Milley and Secretary Speer, have we
    seen any harm to readiness since women began serving as leaders in the
    infantry, armor, field artillery, or other combat arms?
        General Milley and Secretary Speer. No. The integration of women
    into combat arms branches has not adversely affected the readiness of
    the Army.

        18. Senator McCaskill. General Milley and Secretary Speer, do you
    believe the success the Army has had in opening positions to the entire
    talent pool could be replicated by other services?
        General Milley and Secretary Speer. Yes. However, the Services
    differ in their missions which may drive Service specific recruiting.
    Although the Army has had success with a standards based leaders first
    strategy for integrating women, we are open to sharing this approach
    and lessons learned with the other Services.
                        european reassurance initiative
        19. Senator McCaskill. General Milley and Secretary Speer, while
    the overall budget for the European Reassurance Initiative was
    increased by 65 percent in the president's budget, the amount allocated
    to build partner capacity was cut significantly ($32 million or 63
    percent). This is even more concerning paired with State Department
    cuts in the Foreign Military Financing program and the complete
    elimination of the program to NATO states bordering Russia (Estonia,
    Latvia, Lithuania). With these cuts how are our allies and regional
    partners to be assured that the United States takes seriously the
    threat of Russian aggression and the potential harm to regional
    stability?
        General Milley and Secretary Speer. NATO allies and partners are
    assured of the United States' commitment to regional stability through
    the continuous presence of an Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) and a
    Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) along with forward stationed presence,
    that continue to partner with NATO allies and partners in bilateral and
    multilateral exercises throughout eastern Europe from the Baltics to
    the Balkans. The United States is also a framework nation in the NATO-
    led enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) initiative which places battalion-
    sized combined arms battle groups in the three Baltic States and
    Poland. This is a visible demonstration of the United States commitment
    to collective defense and that the United States takes the threat of
    Russian aggression seriously. Additionally, although the amount of
    funding dedicated to building partner capacity has decreased, the
    amount dedicated to exercises and training has increased. As the focus
    of Atlantic Resolve shifts from reassurance to deterrence, more
    emphasis is placed on interoperability and deterrence exercises that
    build on the capacity and capability gains achieved from previous
    efforts at building partner capacity.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Donnelly
                abram tanks and bradley fighting vehicle funding
        20. Senator Donnelly. General Milley, over the last several months,
    the Army has made clear that it wants to create additional armored
    brigades and that it wants to equip these brigades with the most modern
    combat vehicles. Please explain the Army's plan for additional armored
    brigades and what you need from Congress to resource the Army's plan to
    significantly expand the number of armored brigade combat teams.
        General Milley. The Army wants to create two additional Armored
    Brigade Combat Teams (ABCTs) and add one ABCT set of equipment to Army
    Prepositioned Stocks in Europe.
        To accelerate the creation of additional ABCTs, the Army will begin
    the conversion of a regular army Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) to
    an ABCT at Fort Stewart, Georgia, in October 2017. This ABCT will
    complete its conversion and training in June 2019. This ABCT will be
    fielded with the M1A1 AIM-SA Abrams tanks and the M2A2 ODS-SA Bradley
    Fighting Vehicles sourced from the conversion of the 81st ABCT
    (Washington Army National Guard) to a Stryker Brigade and Army stocks.
    Modernization of these Abrams and Bradleys will take place sometime in
    the future as assets become available. In addition, the Army is looking
    at opportunities to convert a second IBCT to an ABCT. The location and
    timeline for this conversion is still being determined.
        The Army is also building an additional ABCT set of equipment in
    Europe as part of the European Defense Initiative. The funding for this
    ABCT is part of the fiscal year 2017 appropriation and the fiscal year
    2018 budget request and we anticipate requesting additional funding in
    future budget requests so we can begin fielding in fiscal year 2020.
        What the Army needs from Congress is full support of the $1.16
    billion (B) in Fiscal Year 2018 Base Funding request for Army Combat
    Vehicle Modernization programs and the additional $834 million (M) that
    is included in the Fiscal Year 2018 Unfunded Requirements list.
    Further, the Army needs timely passage of the required Fiscal Year 2018
    Appropriations and Authorization. Any delay in funding will extend the
    timeline for fielding these ABCTs.
                           dfars cybersecurity issue
        21. Senator Donnelly. General Milley, in the fiscal year 2013 and
    the fiscal year 2015 NDAA, Congress included provisions requiring
    contractor reporting on network penetrations and cloud computing
    (Section 941 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for
    fiscal year 2013 (Pub. L. 112-239) as added by Section 1632 of the NDAA
    for fiscal year 2015 (Pub. L. 113-291)). I'm told that DOD subsequently
    added several additional requirements. Commercial off the shelf
    equipment has been exempted from these new requirements, but other
    commercial equipment has not. Have you examined the impact this issue
    will have on the Army if DOD does not exempt commercial equipment from
    the DOD-added regulations? Are you aware of any plans to extend this
    exemption to commercial equipment or otherwise address this issue ahead
    of the implementation deadline of December 31, 2017 to ensure suppliers
    can meet the needs of the Army?
        General Milley. DFARS clause 252.204-7012 is required in all
    solicitations and contracts, including solicitations and contracts
    using Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) part 12 procedures for the
    acquisition of commercial items. The clause is not required for
    solicitations and contracts solely for the acquisition of COTS items.
    Procurements solely for the acquisition of COT items are extremely
    unlikely to involve covered defense information or operationally
    critical support.
        When the acquisition of commercial items involves covered defense
    information (i.e., any information that requires safeguarding or
    dissemination controls pursuant to and consistent with law,
    regulations, and Government-wide policies), such as cases when
    commercial items, services, or offerings are tailored to meet a
    particular customer's requirement. DFARS clause 252.204-7012 will
    apply. There is no flexibility that allows commercial equipment
    suppliers to operate outside the scope of this clause.
        It is my understanding that flexibilities within the DOD policy
    allow the Army to continue working with commercial equipment suppliers
    to ensure the needs of the Army are met, while also improving
    cybersecurity at all levels of the supply chain to prevent the loss of
    covered defense information. I am unaware of any specific issues that
    would require Army to examine the impacts of 48 CFR 204.73,
    Safeguarding Covered Defense Information and Cyber Incident Reporting.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
                                  counter uas
        22. Senator Heinrich. General Milley, I appreciated our exchange at
    the hearing regarding next generation weapon systems to counter
    rockets, artillery, and mortar. In 2013 the Army demonstrated a 10-kW
    class laser and successfully engaged over 90 mortar rounds and several
    UAVs with its High Energy Laser Mobile Demonstrators (HEL MD). At the
    time, Army officials said mortars and UAVs were representative of the
    threats faced by United States and allied forces in the battlefield.
    The Army's investment this year in a 50 kilowatt high energy laser on a
    striker vehicle is a welcome decision that will help greatly in terms
    of SWaP. I look forward to being an advocate for this program during
    budget deliberations, but I will also continue to encourage military
    leadership across services to not let perfect be the enemy of the good.
        In terms of counter UAS, adversaries continue to procure low-cost
    Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) and have armed them for military
    purposes. In May, 2017 at the Special Operations Forces Industry
    Conference, GEN Thomas stated that in 2016 the ``most daunting problem
    was an adaptive enemy who, for a time, enjoyed tactical superiority in
    the airspace under our conventional air superiority in the form of
    commercially available drones and fuel-expedient weapons systems, and
    our only available response was small arms fire.'' In response to such
    threats, the Marine Corps will procure and deploy five Compact Laser
    Weapons Systems (CLWS) as an urgent need to expand C-UAS capabilities
    against small UAS. Additionally, this effort will help will identify
    the future technology and policy concerns of a directed energy Ground
    Based Air Defense Program of Record.
        Significant advances in directed energy high energy lasers in
    recent years has proven that this technology is effective against the
    entire Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage and Assess UAS kill chain. This
    technology has been demonstrated at recent DOD exercises such as live-
    fire exercise at White Sands Missile Range and the U.S. Army's Maneuver
    Fires Integration Exercise (MFIX) and is ready to be operationalized.
    Does the Army intend to employ high energy lasers for C-UAS
    capabilities similar to Marine Corps introduction of CLWS?
        General Milley. The Army intends to continue to explore the
    development of high energy lasers and their uses against both unmanned
    aircraft systems (UAS) and rocket, artillery and mortar (RAM) threats
    and has conducted exercises and test events demonstrating these
    systems. Specifically, the Army is partnering with the USMC in pursuit
    of the CLWS technology for mutual benefit. The Army is also exploring
    testing configurations including the Mobile Expeditionary High Energy
    Laser (MEHEL) and the High Energy Laser Mobile Test Truck (HELMTT). The
    Army will continue testing and development of lasers and will field
    systems as soon as they are technologically ready.

        23. Senator Heinrich. General Milley, if so, please explain the
    strategy and types of systems the Army intends to utilize.
        General Milley. The Army has multiple testing configurations in
    development, including the Mobile Expeditionary High Energy Laser
    (MEHEL), which is a Stryker-based platform, and the High Energy Laser
    Mobile Test Truck (HELMTT), based on a Heavy Mobility Expanded Tactical
    Truck (HEMTT). Space and Missile Defense Command (SMDC) is the Army
    proponent for these initiatives. These platforms are used for testing
    application only in order to demonstrate developmental technology. They
    do not represent a materiel solution for the Army's current existing
    requirements to defeat air threats including unmanned aircraft systems
    (UAS), rocket, artillery and mortar (RAM), fixed-wing and rotary-wing
    aircraft, tactical ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles. Depending
    on the success of ongoing laser science and technology efforts, the
    Army intends to incorporate viable directed energy solutions to
    mitigate these threats as part of a tiered and layered approach to air
    defense.

        24. Senator Heinrich. If not, please explain the C-UAS strategy.
        General Milley. See Answer to Question 23.

        25. Senator Heinrich. General Milley, is there an Army acquisition
    strategy for high energy laser systems demonstrated at MFIX? If so,
    please explain.
        General Milley. Yes. The purpose of Maneuver Fires Integration
    Experiment (MFIX) is to partner with the Fires Battle Lab to begin
    working through tactics, techniques and procedures, gain feedback from
    and build the trust with soldiers that will be vital for the successful
    transition and employment of advanced technologies such as High Energy
    Lasers (HEL).
        The specific HEL technologies that the Army exercised during MFIX
    16 and MFIX 17 were scheduled as critical knowledge points along our
    path to demonstrating a 50kW-class capability with the Multi-Mission
    High Energy Laser (MMHEL) in fiscal year 2021 (FY21). In support of the
    Maneuver-Short Range Air Defense (M-SHORAD) future objective capability
    as well as the full 100kW-class capability for the High Energy Laser
    Tactical Vehicle Demonstrator (HEL TVD) in fiscal year 2022 in support
    of the Indirect Fire Protection Capability (IFPC) Inc 2-I Program of
    Record (POR). Program Executive Office Missiles and Space is the
    transition partner and Program Office of Record for all Army Air
    Defense capabilities, both kinetic and directed energy, including both
    the M-SHORAD and IFPC Inc 2-I PoRs.
                                   dosimeters
        26. Senator Heinrich. General Milley and Secretary Speer, the
    recent rise in nuclear threats from countries like North Korea and Iran
    and non-state actors such as ISIS, who are making serious and dangerous
    attempts to obtain nuclear material to create a ``dirty bomb'', puts
    our service men and woman at increased risk for exposure to dangerous
    levels of radiation. These threats necessitate that our service men and
    women have the best and most capable radiation detection systems
    available. I am concerned that some of the currently fielded systems
    may not meet that high standard requirement. Is it true that at least
    half of the Active Army's personal dosimeters and readers, developed
    over 30 years ago with now outdated technology, do not measure and
    record the range of dose presented by radiological threats on today's
    battlefields and, in many cases, cannot be calibrated to function in
    any capacity, thus making them obsolete and non-mission capable?
        General Milley and Secretary Speer. Yes, it is true that currently
    half of the Army's Dosimeter (AN/PDR 75) readers are based on outdated
    technology.
        As a result, the requirement for the Joint Personal Dosimeter-
    Individual (JPD-IND) was approved in March 2016. The Army is
    operationally testing JPD-IND in the second quarter of fiscal year 2018
    and the Full Rate Production Decision is scheduled for later in fiscal
    year 2018, with Initial Operating Capability in fiscal year 2020.

        27. Senator Heinrich. General Milley and Secretary Speer, what kind
    of risks does this pose for our nation's servicemembers and what
    readiness shortfalls does it create for the Army as a whole?
        General Milley and Secretary Speer. This does not present readiness
    shortfalls, rather it increases risk on the battlefield. The current
    Army combat dosimeters (DT-236) gather radiation exposure data but do
    not allow for `real-time' assessment and warning of soldiers' radiation
    exposure. This system requires measurements be taken manually,
    individually, with a separate reader (AN/PDR 75 or AN/PDR 75A) at the
    company level. Soldiers and leaders have no knowledge of their exposure
    until the mission is complete, risking unintended exposure to
    potentially detrimental or lethal amounts. Understanding the `real-
    time' radiation exposure status of units would allow commanders to make
    informed risk decisions on troop employment operations to meet mission
    requirements.

        28. Senator Heinrich. General Milley and Secretary Speer, given
    this significant nuclear threat and low readiness level of our current
    detection systems, what is the Army's acquisition plan to rapidly
    complete fielding of a modern dosimeter system capable of detecting
    radiation on the battlefield that is not susceptible to being
    incapacitated by electromagnetic pulse?
        General Milley and Secretary Speer. The Army intends to field the
    Joint Personal Dosimeter--Individual (JPD-IND) as a personal dosimeter
    at the soldier, platoon and company level. The JPD-IND is intended not
    to be susceptible to incapacitation by electromagnetic pulse. With each
    soldier having a JPD-IND assigned to them, the exposure rate data will
    be transmitted from the soldier through the squad, platoon and company
    levels electronically. The Army is operationally testing JPD-IND in the
    second quarter of fiscal year 2018 and the Full Rate Production
    Decision is scheduled for later in fiscal year 2018, with Initial
    Operating Capability in fiscal year 2020.

        29. Senator Heinrich. General Milley and Secretary Speer, recent
    news reports have highlighted current problems facing soldiers and
    veterans seeking treatment at the Department of Veterans Affairs whose
    radiation exposure was not recorded or tracked. Unfortunately this
    spans across exposure at Pacific island nuclear test sites in the
    1950s, in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, around the Fukushima nuclear
    disaster, and via depleted Uranium use in current operations. These
    examples demonstrate the urgent need and application for modern
    personal dosimeters that provide a legal record of radiation exposure
    for each soldier. This recorded information can then be kept as part of
    the soldier's medical record and provides a soldier with a
    comprehensive record of radiation exposure over his or her entire
    career. It also provides the same information to medical professionals
    at the Army and Department of Veterans Affairs who can then treat those
    servicemembers and veterans.
        I commend the Army Reserve and Army National Guard for ensuring
    that 100 percent of their soldiers have the most modern and capable
    personal dosimeters. I understand, however, that the Active Army
    currently has a significant readiness shortfall in this area, having
    supplied only 50 percent of your soldiers with personal dosimeters that
    provide a legal record of any radiation exposure.
        Given this current readiness shortfall and the near-term nuclear
    threat in places like North Korea, Syria and Ukraine, what is the
    Army's acquisition plan to close the technology gap and complete
    fielding of cost effective modern dosimeters capable of accurately
    detecting nuclear threats and providing all servicemembers a legal dose
    of record of radiological exposure over the entire length of their
    careers?
        General Milley and Secretary Speer. The Joint Personal Dosimeter--
    Individual (JPD-IND) is the Army's acquisition solution to close the
    capability gap. The JPD-IND will be fielded to every soldier and
    provide the capability to track and record the soldier's radiological
    exposure over time.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Gary Peters
                           hmmwv rollover mitigation
        30. Senator Peters. Secretary Speer, I have been concerned about
    the issue of HMMWV rollovers and the numerous injuries and fatalities
    caused by these accidents. I understand that the Army has been moving
    toward a solution to mitigate this issue. In my most recent
    correspondence from the Army on this issue in October 2016, I was
    advised that an acquisition decision was being made for fiscal year
    2018. What are the Army's plans to install technology to mitigate
    rollovers of vehicles in the HMMWV fleet?
        Secretary Speer. The Army remains interested in improvements in our
    light tactical vehicle fleet, which will consist of both High Mobility
    Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) and Joint Light Tactical Vehicles
    for several years to come. We continue to anticipate making a decision
    on the balance of HMMWVs and JLTVs in the fleet during fiscal year
    2018, including modernization of enduring HMMWV vehicles. Known safety
    technologies like Antilock Brake System and Electronic Stability
    Control can play an important role in reducing potential injuries and
    deaths from rollover accidents, and we will begin incorporating them in
    the upgraded M997A3 HMMWV ambulances in the first quarter of fiscal
    year 2018--which will be fielded to all components. The Army continues
    to investigate and move toward qualifying potential upgrade kits for
    existing HMMWV vehicles and we anticipate incorporating these
    technologies in future modernization efforts, consistent with available
    funding.

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2018 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                             TUESDAY, JUNE 6, 2017

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                               AIR FORCE POSTURE

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:39 a.m. in Room
    SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Wicker,
    Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Perdue, Cruz,
    Graham, Sasse, Strange, Reed, Nelson, McCaskill, Shaheen,
    Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King,
    Heinrich, Warren, and Peters.

                OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN

        Chairman McCain. Good morning.
        This committee meets today to consider the posture of the
    Air Force in the context of our review and oversight of the
    fiscal year 2018 defense budget request.
        I welcome our witnesses: Secretary of the Air Force Heather
    Wilson and Chief of Staff of the Air Force General David
    Goldfein.
        This committee honors the outstanding men and women of the
    United States Air Force. On this anniversary of D-Day, we
    recognize the service and sacrifice of all generations of our
    armed forces, and we are guided by their example.
        Hearings like this are an opportunity to reflect on whether
    we are meeting the highest constitutional responsibility, to
    ensure that our armed forces have the resources they need to
    provide for the common defense. The simple answer is that in
    recent years, we have not. With growing threats around the
    world, we have asked our men and women in uniform to do more
    and more, but we have not given them what they need. America's
    airmen and our other servicemembers have paid the price.
        The Budget Control Act and sequestration remain the law of
    the land. The military buildup we need and that the President
    promised remains illegal. There is still no serious progress
    being made to change that. The self-inflicted wounds of these
    budget cuts have produced the smallest, oldest, and least ready
    Air Force in our history. Currently the force is short 1,500
    pilots and 3,400 maintainers. I repeat currently the Air Force
    is short 1,500 pilots and 3,400 maintainers.
        This is a full-blown crisis, and if left unresolved, it
    will call into question the Air Force's ability to accomplish
    its mission. Americans become Air Force pilots because they
    love to fly high-performance aircraft and they become
    maintainers to work on those aircraft. If budgets do not allow
    these servicemembers to do their jobs and perform the mission
    they love, they will vote with their feet, and there is no
    retention bonus high enough to win a bidding war with the
    commercial airlines.
        At the same time, America's adversaries are developing and
    fielding new warfighting technologies: fifth generation
    fighters, advanced air defense systems, and sophisticated
    space, cyber, and electronic warfare capabilities. Taken
    together, these advances are eroding America's military
    technological advantage. The skies that America has dominated
    are once again becoming contested airspace.
        To meet this challenge, the Air Force is committed to an
    ambitious set of modernization initiatives: F-35A fighters, B-
    21 bombers, KC-46A tankers, JSTARS, Compass Call, AWACS, and a
    new trainer aircraft, not to mention a modernized nuclear
    force. But there is simply no way all of these important yet
    expensive modernization programs will fit into the projected
    Air Force budget.
        Unfortunately, the President's fiscal year 2018 budget
    request does not sufficiently address the problems. It is
    only--and I repeat--only--a 3 percent increase over President
    Obama's defense plan, which explains why the Air Force has
    identified a detailed list of unfunded requirements totaling
    $10.7 billion. The budget calls for 46 F-35A's, far fewer than
    the 80 needed each year to put a dent in the Air Force's
    fighter capacity shortfall. The Air Force is expected to be
    almost 500 fighters short in fiscal year 2018, and that
    shortfall will grow to nearly 1,000 by fiscal year 2032 on the
    current program of record.
        Money alone will not address these problems. The Air Force
    must use its new acquisition authorities and avoid the mistakes
    of its many past acquisition failures.
        For example, while the F-35 is finally approaching the end
    of its long and arduous system design and demonstration phase,
    I remain concerned about the program's ability to finish on its
    latest--I emphasize ``latest''--delayed schedule and within its
    already massive budget. I am particularly concerned with the
    affordability and execution of the plan for block 4 follow-on
    modernization.
        Similarly, the B-21 will provide a much needed
    modernization of our aging bomber force. But this committee and
    the American people deserve to know more about how the Air
    Force intends to use the $2 billion in research and development
    funding for this program, as requested for the coming fiscal
    year.
        Modernization of the nuclear triad, to include a
    replacement for the air-launched cruise missile, is critical
    and has bipartisan support in Congress. Modernization is not
    cheap but it is affordable, and the reality is the costs of not
    modernizing our nuclear triad are far greater.
        On the KC-46, while I am glad that taxpayers will not foot
    the bill for the repeated delays, thanks to the use of fixed
    price contracts, I am concerned these delays will affect the
    scheduled introduction of this critical capability.
        Finally, we must confront challenges in the information
    domain. Despite some growth in this budget request, space
    program budgets are at 30-year lows and decision-making is
    fragmented across more than 60--I repeat--60--offices in the
    Department of Defense. Questions also remain about the Air
    Force's commitment to the national cyber mission. Last year, of
    the 127 Air Force officers that completed cyber basic training,
    not one--not one--was retained on the Cyber Mission Force. When
    it comes to the development of information technology, all of
    the Military Services continue with one costly failure after
    another, as seen recently in the Air Force's new Air Operations
    Center program. As the information domain of warfare becomes
    more important than ever, there is growing evidence to suggest
    that the Air Force and the Department of Defense are not
    organized to succeed in this vital national mission.
        Restoring readiness, recapitalizing our combat aircraft
    fleet, and reinvesting in modernization will require strong
    personal leadership, accountability, and a frank assessment of
    the Air Force's true warfighting requirements, not simply what
    insufficient funding can accomplish. This committee expects
    you, Secretary Wilson, and you, General Goldfein, to provide
    the leadership our airmen deserve.
        Senator Reed?

                     STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let
    me join you in welcoming Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein.
    Thank you and welcome to the committee, and we are eager to
    hear your testimony on the plans and programs of the Department
    of the Air Force in our review of the fiscal year 2018 annual
    authorization request.
        We certainly are grateful to the men and women of the Air
    Force for their truly professional service and to their
    families for their continued support.
        Over the past 15 years, Air Force personnel and equipment
    have played a key role in supporting our national security
    goals in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere around the world.
    During this lengthy period, we have relied heavily on Air Force
    strike aircraft to take on important ground targets, Air Force
    manned aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles to provide
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support, and Air
    Force tankers and cargo aircraft to support coalition air
    operations.
        Our witnesses this morning face huge challenges as they
    strive to balance the need to support ongoing operations and
    sustain readiness with the need to modernize and keep the
    technological edge in the three critical domains of air, space,
    and cyberspace. The Air Force has produced a budget that, even
    with proposed budget increases, reflects tough decisions.
        The budget increases the Air Force is proposing in fiscal
    year 2018 would week to increase readiness, address shortfalls
    in munitions, address shortfalls in pilots and maintenance
    personnel, and modernize our strategic deterrent capability.
        In addition, the Air Force faces a continuing challenge in
    managing the costs and progress of its major acquisition
    programs, including the Joint Strike Fighter, the most
    expensive DOD acquisition program in history, and a new tanker
    and a new bomber.
        After considerable discussion within the Department and
    between the Department and Congress, the Air Force last year
    laid out a number of plans to improve the shortfalls within the
    remotely piloted aircraft, RPA, operator community. This was an
    area where Chairman McCain and I pressed the Department to live
    up to previous commitments to fully support RPA operations and
    avoid overstressing RPA crews and their families. I would ask
    that the witnesses give us an update on the progress the Air
    Force is making on these plans.
        Due to ongoing operations, primarily in CENTCOM, the
    Defense Department has been striving to catch up with the
    demand for munitions both for our forces and for coalition
    partners. I am pleased to see that the Air Force budget starts
    on a path to make up lost ground on our munitions inventories.
        I am also pleased that this budget request does not
    resurrect painful battles from previous years such as retiring
    the A-10 aircraft, retiring either the U-2 or the Global Hawk
    remotely piloted aircraft or retiring other high-demand, low-
    density aircraft before replacements have been fielded.
        In this request, the administration is asking for an
    increase in the Department of Defense top line of roughly $54
    billion above the total budget for fiscal year 2018 prescribed
    by the Budget Control Act. Of that total, the Air Force budget
    would constitute an increase of roughly $15 billion. However, I
    must point out, as the chairman has, unless Congress can
    achieve a broad and bipartisan agreement to repeal or modify
    the BCA, any approval of the $15 billion increase for the Air
    Force will trigger sequestration of a similar amount.
        The President's budget ignores this problem by making cuts
    of roughly $54 billion in non-defense discretionary as a way of
    balancing the increases for defense. From my perspective, this
    is an untenable position, particularly as the budget reduces
    programs that contribute to national security, such as State
    Department operations.
        Mr. Chairman, I look forward to working with you and other
    members on resolving the difficult position the Defense
    Department and all federal agencies are placed in due to the
    BCA and sequestration. We simply cannot continue down this
    path.
        Secretary Wilson, General Goldfein, thank you again for
    appearing before our committee, and I look forward to your
    testimony.
        Chairman McCain. Secretary Wilson?

    STATEMENT OF HONORABLE HEATHER A. WILSON, SECRETARY OF THE AIR
                                 FORCE

        Secretary Wilson. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. I would ask
    that our written statement be put into the record.
        Chairman McCain. Without objection.
        Secretary Wilson. Rather than go through the written
    testimony in detail, I would just like to summarize a few
    things and highlight a few things for the committee, and then
    ask the Chief to say a few things as well.
        The first is this. The Air Force is too small for what the
    Nation expects of it. The fiscal year 2017 budget began to
    arrest that decline and to restore the readiness of the force,
    but there is a lot more that needs to be done.
        So what does the fiscal year 2018 budget do? What are the
    big outlines of that budget? Well, there are hundreds of
    programs in there, but there are two major themes.
        The first is to continue to restore the readiness of the
    force. For the Air Force, readiness is first and foremost about
    people and their training, but also about munitions. Those two
    things are highlighted in the fiscal year 2018 budget. We have
    proposed to increase the end strength of the Air Force in this
    budget for Active, Guard, Reserve, and civilians.
        The second major theme in this budget is to continue the
    modernization, to make the force more lethal. The top three
    priorities in that are fighters, tankers, and bombers. But it
    is not limited to that. Over the next 5 to 10 years, the Air
    Force will be modernizing across the board in order to meet the
    threats that we see arrayed against us.
        The third thing that I would like to highlight is the Air
    Force role in space. My role, in addition to being Secretary of
    the Air Force, is the principal advisor to the Secretary of
    Defense with respect to space for all of the Department of
    Defense. It is a responsibility that I take quite seriously.
    The Air Force has served as the leader for space for 54 years.
    We provided GPS for the world and transformed not only the way
    we fight, but the way all of you probably navigate yourselves
    around this city. We do missile and nuclear detonation warning.
    We do weather, secure command and control, communications. All
    of those are Air Force missions.
        When the Chief and I were young officers, space was a
    benign place. In fact, we always thought of it as a benign
    place up until actually quite recently. Our adversaries know
    how heavily we depend upon it and that we are vulnerable. We
    must expect that war of any kind will extend into space in any
    future conflict, and we have to change the way in which we
    think and prepare for that eventuality.
        The budget proposal for fiscal year 2018 has a 20 percent
    increase for Air Force space. It does several things that the
    Air Force is trying to do in concert with the Army, the Navy,
    and other government agencies. We need situational awareness,
    not just keeping a catalog of what is up there, but really
    knowing what is up there and how it is moving in near real
    time.
        Secure command, control, and communications. We are moving
    towards an integrated battle management control system, which
    is funded in this year's budget where the Army, the Navy, the
    Air Force, and other government agencies will be able to have a
    clear site picture and be able to operate in space. No one-off
    science experiments anymore in the control of satellites. It
    has to be integrated for a common picture.
        Assured access to space is also something we are continuing
    in this budget. Competition is reducing the cost of launch
    services. Currently we have got two providers for medium and
    heavily launch: SpaceX, the Falcon 9, which we will be sending
    in the next Air Force payload up into space in August, and
    emerging small satellites have other launch capabilities that
    are very interesting to us, including Orbital ATK and others.
        We need to be able to defend ourselves in space, not just
    systems but also strategies and tactics, anti-jamming, GPS. We
    now have initial capability for the National Space Defense
    Center that is funded in this budget with new capabilities.
    Last year, they did exercises that led to the top 40 user needs
    across all of the services, and we are changing the way in
    which we train for space, training to prevail in space and not
    just operate in a benign environment.
        As the Air Force Secretary, I am also looking at how we
    organize the Department of Defense for space so that we
    integrate it, normalize it, and elevate it as part of the joint
    warfighting team. That means not just operations but also
    policy development and acquisition strategies.
        So this budget does not get us all--you know, we are not
    going to recover readiness in a single year. We are not going
    to modernize in a single year either. But this proposed budget
    for the next year continues recovering readiness and continues
    to modernize to make the force more lethal.
        With that, I would like the Chief to add some things.

     STATEMENT OF GENERAL DAVID L. GOLDFEIN, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE
                               AIR FORCE

        General Goldfein. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
        Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, members of the
    committee, it is an honor to be here.
        It is an honor also to rejoin with Secretary Wilson some 40
    years after we started together at the Air Force Academy, and I
    want to thank Secretary Mattis for recommending her to the
    President, for nominating her, for this committee confirming
    her. It ought not go without notice that 24 hours after she
    became our Secretary of the Air Force, she was sitting beside
    me and two of our space warriors testifying before Senator
    Fischer and the Space Subcommittee. That gives a new meaning to
    the word ``fights on.'' So, Madam Secretary, it is an honor to
    serve with you and be on your wing once again.
        So building on Secretary Wilson's opening statement, I
    would like to spend just a few moments, because I know you are
    eager to get to questions, and briefly describe the missions
    our airmen are performing today to defend the Homeland, to own
    the high ground, and to project power with allies and partners,
    because it is a rather diverse set of missions. To understand
    the Air Force, you actually have to look through two lenses.
    The first lens is that which we do here in the Homeland to
    defend the Homeland and to project power abroad, and the second
    lens is that which we do when we are deployed and based forward
    to contribute to global campaigns.
        For the Air Force, it begins with the nuclear enterprise,
    and side by side with the United States Navy, we are
    responsible for two of the three legs of the nuclear triad. On
    our worst day as a Nation, our responsibility is to ensure that
    the President is where he needs to be when he needs to be
    there, and he stays connected through nuclear command and
    control to the nuclear enterprise. For an airman, that remains
    job one.
        To produce a common operational picture so that the
    President can make those decisions, very often, as the
    Secretary mentioned, that information comes to us from space.
    It is your United States Air Force that is responsible for
    flying 12 constellations in space from everything from
    precision navigation and timing to early warning to the
    protected and unprotected communications that we all rely on.
    We have been the stewards of space since 1954, and as you heard
    from the Secretary, we joined a long line of Secretary-Chief
    teams who take on this responsibility.
        Someone has to turn the 1's and 0's into decision quality
    information, and that lies heavily on the United States Air
    Force. Thirty-five thousand airmen that take the sensing that
    we do from the six domains, air, land, sea, space, cyber, and
    undersea, and turns that into a common operational picture and
    decision quality information for leaders to make decisions.
        Like our sister services, we are contributing cyber talent
    and building cyber mission teams to support the combatant
    commander, Admiral Rogers, in his responsibility to defend the
    Nation in cyber and to execute cyber capabilities. If you heard
    jet noise this morning driving here to work, it was probably
    two F-16's from the Air National Guard that scrambled this
    morning from Andrews Air Force Base to protect our critical
    infrastructure just as we do at bases around the United States
    as part of Operation Noble Eagle. Those missions I just
    described are only what your Air Force does here in the
    Homeland to protect the Homeland and contribute to global
    campaigns.
        Now I will shift to that second lens, which is what we do
    when we are based abroad and deployed, and it begins with air
    superiority, freedom from attack, and freedom to maneuver. We
    are proud of our track record that a soldier, sailor, airman,
    or marine on the ground has not been attacked from the air
    since 1953, and under our watch, we will continue that record.
    For an airman it is nothing short of a moral obligation. When a
    soldier, sailor, airman, or marine on the ground or at sea
    hears jet noise, we never want them to look up. We want them to
    know it us.
        Once we gain and maintain air superiority, we operate on a
    series of bases across the globe, and every two and a half
    minutes, an aircraft takes off or lands delivering critical
    supplies or equipment somewhere where it is required, whether
    for humanitarian relief operations or in combat support. Very
    often those locations are not secure, and we use our air
    commandoes, our special forces, to secure those locations so
    that we can operate.
        I cannot give you a better example of holding targets at
    risk for the President than two B-2's that took off out of
    Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri, flew 32 hours roundtrip,
    16 air refuelings, dropped 80 munitions on two training camps
    in Libya, 10 seconds from their planned time over target.
        Then finally, in the fight against ISIS [Islamic State of
    Iraq and Syria], it is your Air Force that is leading the
    campaign when it comes to taking out the enemy. Whether you
    want to talk about command and control or personnel recovery or
    tanking or the strikes that occur, it is your Air Force that
    continues to lead the way over there working under General
    Townsend and the joint task force and General Nicholson to take
    the fight against the enemy.
        Every mission I just described for you is a growth area to
    the Secretary's point about being too small for the missions
    that we are being asked to perform. Every mission I described
    for you is a no-fail mission, and every mission I described for
    you, our adversaries are investing to take away our advantages.
        Twenty-six years of continual combat since Operation Desert
    Storm has taken a toll. As the Secretary mentioned, the fiscal
    year 2017 budget stopped the bleeding after years of budget
    instability, and this budget request begins to set the table
    for recovering and rebuilding our force. The Secretary said it
    right. We did not get here overnight, and we are not going to
    recover overnight. But with your help, with the help of this
    committee, we will give our airmen and their families the
    quality of service and the quality of life they deserve.
        Thank you, and we look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary Wilson and General
    Goldfein follows:]

           Prepared Statement by The Honorable Heather A. Wilson and
                           General David L. Goldfein
                       the future of air and space power
        Air and space power are vital to our nation's security. Any
    objective evaluation of today's U.S. Air Force reaches stark
    conclusions.

          First, the Air Force is too small for the missions
    demanded of it and it is unlikely that the need for air and space power
    will diminish significantly in the coming decade.
          Second, adversaries are modernizing and innovating faster
    than we are, putting at risk America's technological advantage in air
    and space.

        The resources provided in fiscal year 2017 have begun to arrest the
    readiness decline. The Fiscal Year 2018 President's Budget request
    begins to restore readiness and increase the lethality of the force.
    Future budgets must focus on modernization and continued readiness
    recovery so that we can defend the Homeland, own the high ground, and
    project power in conjunction with allies.
    An Air Force in Demand
        Today's Air Force is growing after a period of significant decline
    and we must continue to increase the size of the force. Currently, the
    Air Force includes 660,000 Active, Guard, Reserve and civilian airmen,
    compared to 946,000 just 26 years ago when we fought in Operation
    Desert Storm--a 30 percent reduction.
        The Air Force also reduced its aircraft inventory over this same
    period from 8,600 to 5,500 aircraft. We have 55 combat-coded fighter
    squadrons across the Active Duty, Guard, and Reserve, compared to 134
    squadrons during Desert Storm.
        Before 1991, the Air Force bought approximately 510 aircraft per
    year. In the past 20 years, we have averaged only 96 per year. Today,
    the average age of our aircraft is over 27 years.
        And, unlike during the Cold War, Air Force aircraft have been
    flying in combat for 26 straight years. When the Islamic State of Iraq
    and Syria (ISIS) sought to consolidate power in Syria and northern Iraq
    in 2014, the U.S. Air Force surged to the fight. Since then, airmen
    have executed over 70 sorties daily against ISIS targets. Coalition air
    forces have put over 80,000 weapons against enemy targets in over
    26,000 airstrikes in Iraq and Syria since the campaign began. Over 70
    percent of those strikes have been conducted by the U.S. Air Force.
        Last year alone, MQ-1 and MQ-9 remotely piloted aircraft crews flew
    more than 351,000 hours and employed more than 3,000 weapons, removing
    thousands of enemy combatants from the battlefield and protecting U.S.
    and coalition forces.
        Air Force intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance provides
    warfighters over 6,000 intelligence products per day that are used to
    identify enemy targets and initiate 70 percent of Special Operations
    Forces assaults on terrorists.
        Air Force-operated space-based sensors provide around-the-clock
    global coverage for missile warning, nuclear detonations and other
    threats.
        Air Force cyber operators blocked more than 1.3 billion malicious
    connections in 2016 alone, an average of more than 40 malicious
    connections per second.
        While we continue to extend the life of old aircraft, materials
    suffer fatigue and maintaining old equipment is time consuming and
    expensive.
        We are short of maintainers and pilots. While flying hours to
    defeat ISIS overseas is a priority, training to confront near peer
    adversaries has suffered. We are at our lowest state of full spectrum
    readiness in our history. Only 50 percent of our squadrons are ready to
    conduct all of the missions assigned to them.
        The decisive warfighting advantages we hold over our near peer
    adversaries are diminishing.
        Air and space superiority--owning the high ground--is not America's
    ordained right. We cannot take it for granted. We must plan for it,
    equip for it, train for it and fight for it.
    The Changing Security Environment
        Adversaries are rapidly developing new capabilities to control air
    and space. They seek to undermine the credibility of our alliances,
    contest our freedom of maneuver, and neutralize our ability to project
    power. Over the past several years, their targeted investments in
    critical capabilities have outpaced our own.
        Russia continues its aggression and malign influence in Ukraine and
    Syria while seeking to return to great power parity with the United
    States by modernizing its military.
        China is fielding new defense platforms at a startling pace and
    continues to expand its regional influence in the East and South China
    Seas.
        North Korea is accelerating nuclear and missile testing. Their
    actions in the Pacific increase risk of miscalculation and threaten the
    security of our allies and the Homeland.
        Iran continues to support international terrorist organizations and
    extend its negative influence throughout the Middle East while
    modernizing an array of military capabilities.
        Each of these state actors possesses or is pursuing advanced long-
    range capabilities with the potential to strike American soil.
        At the same time, violent extremist organizations and individuals
    inspired by them are threatening America and our allies.
        Potential adversaries are quickly closing the gap in the decisive
    warfighting advantages we have held for decades. As their capabilities
    become stronger, the international order will grow more unstable and
    the strategic risks to American security and our global interests will
    increase. Staying ahead of these trends will require a concerted,
    coordinated effort.
    Stopping the Decline
        The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2017 begins to arrest the
    decline and focuses on starting to restore the readiness of the force.
    The funds for fiscal year 2017 address critical capability shortfalls,
    and enable us to start to address delayed procurement and modernization
    of our force. This is a critical first step in restoring the Air
    Force's capabilities to meet future threats. We must have stable,
    predictable budgets that include strategy-driven funding.
        We also add our voice to the chorus of concern that budget
    instability is itself a significant problem. Continuing resolutions, or
    worse, sequestration, puts at risk our ability to successfully
    accomplish what our nation asks of us.
        A failure to provide relief from the current Budget Control Act
    caps would cut $15 billion from the Air Force budget--a reduction that
    would further hollow out the force and set us back years.
    Restoring the Force
        Looking ahead, we are focused on restoring readiness, cost-
    effective modernization, innovation for the future, and developing
    exceptional leaders. These areas of focus will allow us to defend the
    Homeland, own the high ground, and project power in concert with our
    allies.
        Of course, there is an assumption behind our plans. As a nation,
    since the end of World War II, America has chosen to be a global power,
    capable not only of defending the Homeland, but gaining and maintaining
    dominance over areas of operation abroad. We have an Air Force that
    provides global mobility, global intelligence surveillance and
    reconnaissance, global strike, and global command and control to
    protect our vital national interests in concert with allies.
        Threat drives strategy; strategy drives force posture. America's
    national security interests continue to be global in scope, requiring
    an Air Force which goes beyond Homeland defense or regional power
    projection.
    Restoring Readiness
        The Air Force budget recognizes that we cannot restore our
    readiness in a single year. When we lose an F-22 avionics specialist
    with 10 years of experience, we cannot hire another person with 10
    years of experience on the F-22. We have to recruit them, train them,
    mentor them and, most importantly, retain them.
        For the Air Force, readiness is first and foremost about people.
    Personnel--Restoring Readiness
        The fiscal year 2017 budget increased Active Duty manpower to
    321,000 airmen. The Fiscal Year 2018 President's Budget request
    continues to rebuild the force to 325,100 Active Duty airmen, while
    also adding 800 reservists, 900 guardsmen, and 3,000 civilians. The
    Total Force will increase to 669,611 people from 660,707 in fiscal year
    2017. The additional personnel are focused on increasing maintainers--
    particularly for the F-16 and F-35A, increasing remotely piloted
    aircraft crews, and increasing pilot training capacity by adding two
    new F-16 formal training squadrons. It also allows us to reduce
    critical gaps in our space, nuclear, cyber, and intelligence career
    fields.
        Pilot retention continues to be a significant concern. We project a
    deficit of approximately 1,500 total Active, Guard, and Reserve pilots
    at the end of fiscal year 2017 and trending further negative in the
    near term. Our fighter pilot shortage has already reached crisis levels
    and we will be approximately 1,300 Total Force fighter pilots below the
    requirement at the end of this fiscal year. There will be no single
    solution and no quick fix for the pilot shortage. This budget expands
    pilot training, continues incentive pay and bonuses, increases
    administrative support at the squadron level, improves readiness, and
    funds flying hours.
        This budget request also includes 1,168 military and civilian
    positions to support squadron commanders so that ``additional duties,''
    which were shifted to operators, aircrew, and maintainers over years of
    personnel cuts and most recently in the wake of sequestration and the
    Budget Control Act, can be performed by dedicated support staff.
        Squadrons are where readiness is generated and sustained, and where
    airmen and families thrive. It is also where leadership matters the
    most. We are working to revitalize squadrons as the most essential
    level of command and the heart of our Air Force. Over the coming year,
    the Air Force will be reviewing leadership development, particularly at
    the squadron level.
        In order to restore readiness, the budget request includes $6.2
    billion to fund flying hours at maximum executable levels and $11.9
    billion to fund weapons system sustainment (parts, maintenance and
    logistics support) to near the maximum executable level. While the
    budget for flying hours decreases slightly from fiscal year 2017, this
    reduction is largely because of a decline in fuel costs.
        Further, the Fiscal Year 2018 President's Budget request funds a
    continuation of 641 Active, Guard, Reserve, and civilian positions
    dedicated to Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR).
        Finally, this budget request is vital for the quality of life for
    our airmen and their families--funding a 2.1 percent increase in
    military pay, a 3.2 percent increase in basic allowance for housing,
    and a 3.4 percent increase in subsistence.
    Munitions--Restoring Readiness
        In addition to adding people and training, this budget request also
    addresses munitions. In the fight against ISIS in Iraq and Syria, the
    Air Force has delivered more than 56,000 direct attack munitions from
    the air. That is more than we used in all of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
        Our use of munitions in operations is out-pacing production.
    Working with industry, the Fiscal Year 2018 President's Budget request
    funds maximum factory production of the most critical munitions,
    including the Joint Direct Attack Munition, the Hellfire missile, and
    the Small Diameter Bomb.
    Cost-Effective Modernization
        While restoring readiness is primarily about the size of the force,
    quality training, and munitions, for the long term the Air Force must
    modernize its weapon systems and equipment to defeat emerging threats.
        The Fiscal Year 2018 President's Budget request budget prioritizes
    our top three acquisition programs to modernize the force: the F-35A
    fighter, the KC-46 tanker, and the B-21 bomber.
        The F-35A is essential to our national security--a stealthy multi-
    role fighter needed to own the high ground and project power against
    increasingly capable adversaries. This budget request funds the
    purchase of the next 46 F-35A fighters with a goal of reaching 60 per
    year in the future. The budget also focuses on restoring readiness and
    modernizing our 55 combat-coded fighter squadrons.
        We have enhanced our air refueling capability by entering initial
    production of the KC-46 Pegasus tanker. The KC-46 program modernizes
    our aerial refueling fleet, providing global mobility for the joint
    force and our allies. The Fiscal Year 2018 President's Budget request
    buys 15 more KC-46 aircraft. The Air Force expects to sustain steady
    state production of 15 KC-46 aircraft a year throughout the Future
    Years Defense Program (FYDP).
        We are rapidly developing the B-21 Raider long-range strike bomber.
    The B-21 will form the backbone of our future bomber force, ensuring
    the ability of our nation's leaders to hold targets at risk around the
    world with both conventional and nuclear weapons.
        While the F-35 fighter, the KC-46 tanker and the B-21 bomber are
    our top modernization priorities, there are a number of other
    modernization efforts supported in the Fiscal Year 2018 President's
    Budget request. These include the modernization of F-22A, F-15, and F-
    16 aircraft so that they remain viable, along with B-52, B-1, and B-2
    bombers for strategic delivery of advanced munitions.
        In the realm of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, the
    Air Force continues to support the MQ-9 Reaper, RQ-4 Global Hawk, and
    RC-135 Rivet Joint upgrade strategies.
        The Fiscal Year 2018 President's Budget request supports special
    operations and combat search and rescue with the purchase of two HC-
    130J and five MC-130J aircraft. We also sustain our commitment to
    command and control by funding several upgrades to the E-3 Airborne
    Warning and Control System (AWACS).
    Modernizing the Nuclear Deterrent
        All legs of our nuclear triad need to be modernized. The last major
    recapitalization of U.S. nuclear forces occurred in the 1980s. In the
    case of the Air Force, maintaining our aging nuclear weapons systems is
    becoming more expensive and less practical.
        Nuclear deterrence underpins national security for the United
    States and our allies. The Air Force stewards two legs of the nation's
    strategic nuclear deterrent and operates 75 percent of the nuclear
    command, control, and communications for the President and the military
    chain of command. Additionally, forward-based nuclear capable aircraft
    are a key component of the U.S. commitment to deter attack on our NATO
    allies.
        The intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force represents the
    most responsive leg of the nuclear triad. The dispersed basing of our
    land-based deterrent enhances strategic stability by creating an
    extraordinarily high threshold for a large-scale conventional or
    nuclear attack on the U.S. Homeland. The air-delivered leg of the triad
    and dual-capable fighters provide a recallable, and highly visible
    force to extend deterrence, demonstrate resolve, and signal U.S.
    strategic commitment to our allies.
        In addition to the B-21 bomber, the Air Force is committed to
    modernizing the nuclear enterprise by replacing Air-Launched Cruise
    Missiles with the Long Range Stand-Off munition, modernizing ICBMs with
    the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD), replacing the UH-1N
    helicopter, and making targeted investments in nuclear command, control
    and communication.
    Meeting the Space Threat
        For decades, the United States enjoyed unimpeded freedom of action
    in space. This benign environment allowed us to operate satellites for
    intelligence collection, missile warning, weather monitoring,
    communications, and precision positioning, navigation, and timing
    without considering how to protect these systems. That environment no
    longer exists. Our adversaries understand the advantages we derive from
    space and are actively pursuing capabilities to diminish them. In
    future conflict, space will be contested.
        The Air Force has been the leading Military Service responsible for
    space systems for 54 years, and the Secretary of the Air Force is the
    principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense on space.
        Over the last several years, the U.S. Air Force has been developing
    operational concepts to ensure freedom of action in space, changing the
    way we train our space force, and integrating space with the joint
    force.
        The Fiscal Year 2018 President's Budget request increases the Air
    Force's space investment funding from $6.5 billion in fiscal year 2017
    to $7.8 billion, a 20 percent increase. This increase represents a 27
    percent increase in research, development, testing and evaluation
    (RDT&E) for space systems and a 12 percent increase in space
    procurement.
        The budget request includes a fixed price block buy of Space Based
    Infrared Systems (SBIRS) 5 and 6 satellites. The budget funds purchase
    of terminals, ground control systems, and related communications
    security for satellites and funds three launches as part of the Evolved
    Expendable Launch Vehicles (EELV) program.
        To fill a gap in weather coverage, the budget request funds a
    weather satellite through the Operationally Responsive Space (ORS)
    office.
        While our existing Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites
    remain healthy, we face increasing risk from potential adversary
    advances, and will improve anti-jamming and secure access to military
    GPS.
        The Air Force budget also funds the continuation of the Space
    Security and Defense Program and the National Space Defense Center
    where we are experimenting with concepts to ensure freedom of action in
    space and resilience in an integrated center that includes all sister-
    services, as well as the intelligence community. It also funds
    improvements in space situational awareness, which is foundational for
    space control, integrated ground systems and improved training of space
    forces.
        Our budget supports the continued integration and normalization of
    space in the joint warfighting environment and places a high priority
    on space to ensure that our space systems continue to operate in a
    contested environment. We would prefer that war not extend into the
    space domain, but must be prepared to win if it does.
    Modernizing Cyber
        The Fiscal Year 2018 President's Budget request funds 39 offensive
    and defensive cyber teams that are on track to be fully operational in
    fiscal year 2018. The budget anticipates an increased reliance on
    contractors for basic information technology and cloud services so that
    military members can focus on advanced threats and warfighter missions
    as part of the joint force.
    Innovation for the Future
        Research, development, test and evaluation are critically important
    for a technically oriented service. The Fiscal Year 2018 President's
    Budget request includes a significant increase in funding for systems
    development and testing for the B-21, the Global Positioning System
    Operational Control System (OCX) and the Long Range Standoff weapon.
    Funding is also included for engineering and risk reduction for the
    Presidential Aircraft (PAR), Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar
    System (JSTARS) replacement, and the new Combat Rescue Helicopter.
        Funding for basic and applied research related to longer-term
    national security challenges remains flat in this budget request,
    although funding for long term research on air dominance is increased
    significantly. Over the next several years, the Air Force will seek to
    increase basic and applied research in areas where we must maintain the
    competitive advantage over potential adversaries, including game-
    changing technologies like hypersonic vehicles, directed-energy,
    unmanned and autonomous systems, and nanotechnology.
    Accelerating Procurement
        To prevail against a rapidly innovating adversary, the Air Force
    must get capability from the lab bench to the warfighter faster than
    ever before.
        In the Fiscal Year 2017 National Defense Authorization Act,
    Congress expanded acquisition authorities for the services. Taking
    advantage of this flexibility, the Air Force is sponsoring an
    experiment in August 2017 to evaluate low-cost, permissive environment
    attack aircraft. While this is an experiment, not a procurement, the
    project has gone from approval by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force
    to an operational capabilities assessment in five short months.
        The Air Force is also testing new procurement methods with early
    stage, highly innovative companies who do not normally do business with
    the Department of Defense. If successful, we will seek to replicate
    this approach. While not appropriate for large system development,
    these kinds of projects can open the pathway to rapid innovation for
    air and space dominance.
    Infrastructure and Military Construction
        Constrained by the Budget Control Act, the Air Force has
    prioritized combat and not infrastructure. The Fiscal Year 2018
    President's Budget request includes $2 billion for military
    construction. The beddown of new missions, combatant commander needs,
    and strengthening the nuclear security enterprise have been given
    priority for the limited funding available.
        In addition, the Fiscal Year 2018 President's Budget request funds
    construction of improved ranges at the Utah Test and Training Range and
    Red Flag in Nevada so that we can train using the full range of
    capabilities available to our aircrews in the F-35A. The budget also
    funds additional virtual and constructive, or ``synthetic'',
    Operational Training Infrastructure (OTI). Synthetic capability
    provides opportunities to test and train against the world's most
    significant threats at reduced cost.
        The Air Force supports the Department of Defense request for
    authorization to conduct a Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round in
    fiscal year 2021. Completing the more detailed analysis once a BRAC is
    authorized will have value, and may highlight opportunities for some
    savings. Enduring savings from BRAC recommendations will leave more DOD
    resources available for future force structure or readiness
    requirements. BRAC also allows us, if the analysis supports it, to
    reposition forces or station new forces in locations that optimize
    their military value.
    Conclusion
        The Fiscal Year 2018 President's Budget request begins to restore
    Air Force readiness with a focus on people, high quality training,
    squadron support, and critical munitions.
        The budget request also invests in top priority procurement to
    increase the lethality of the force with the F-35A fighter, KC-46
    tanker, and the B-21 bomber while also making significant investments
    in space, the nuclear deterrent, and special operations.
        As we enter our 70th year as a separate service and our 26th year
    of continuous combat operations, we have presented a budget that starts
    to turn the corner by building on the fiscal year 2017 budget that
    arrested years of decline.
        As important as program funding is, we also need budget certainty.
    A return to the current Budget Control Act caps will pose
    unmanageable--and unacceptable--risks to our ability to protect
    America's vital national interests.
        We request that Congress support this budget and provide fiscal
    predictability for the Air Force so that we can support the National
    Military Strategy by defending the Homeland, owning the high ground,
    and projecting power in conjunction with allies.

        Chairman McCain. Thank you, General. Thank you, Madam
    Secretary.
        The way we read it, there is a three percent increase in
    defense spending in this budget over former President Obama's
    number. Do you think that is sufficient, General?
        General Goldfein. Chairman, I would say it is a good start.
        Chairman McCain. Good start. So if we do three percent per
    year for the next 10 years, that is a great start.
        General Goldfein. No, sir, not at all. What this one does
    is it is arresting the decline that we have seen over the
    years. It is only a start to where we need to get to with
    stable budgets that we can plan for.
        Chairman McCain. So we need more than three percent in the
    future. Is that correct?
        General Goldfein. Sir, it is not only correct, not only do
    we need three percent, we need more than budgets that give us
    only one year of spending in which the first third of that year
    is unexecutable because of continuing resolutions.
        Chairman McCain. When do you project the Air Force to
    achieve full spectrum readiness?
        General Goldfein. Sir, we have said before and it is
    continual to say that it is going to take us approximately 8
    years to be able to get to full spectrum readiness with stable
    budgets.
        Chairman McCain. How many fighter aircraft do you need to
    fulfill a national military strategy?
        General Goldfein. One thousand nine hundred is the total
    number of combat coded aircraft required.
        Chairman McCain. How many do we have now?
        General Goldfein. We have right now--let me get that answer
    for you to make sure I have it exactly right.
        Chairman McCain. Take a guess.
        General Goldfein. Right now, we are down to about--total
    number of fighters--we have just short of about 1,500.
        Chairman McCain. 1,500 fighters short.
        How many bombers do you need to fulfill the national
    military strategy?
        General Goldfein. We predict approximately 175 is what we
    are going to need.
        Chairman McCain. How many do we have now?
        General Goldfein. Right now, in terms of B-52's, we have
    76. We have 20 B-2's, and we have 62 B-1's. While I do not have
    the total number of fighters exactly, you know, just to give
    you a rundown of the number we actually have on hand, we have--
    --
        Chairman McCain. Before you go on, you state the Air Force
    will be 1,500 pilots short by the end of this fiscal year,
    1,300 of them fighter pilots. Those numbers seem to be getting
    worse and not better.
        General Goldfein. They are.
        So we are taking two approaches, Chairman, on this. First
    of all, there is a national approach because the reality is the
    Nation currently does not produce the number of pilots required
    to service military and commercial aviation requirements. I
    recently hosted a meeting with CEOs from the major airlines,
    the regional airlines, and the major industry representatives,
    and we talked about how we could partner together to find win-
    win solutions to increase the supply of pilots to service those
    both.
        Chairman McCain. So this shortfall came as a surprise to
    you?
        General Goldfein. No, sir. We projected this shortfall some
    years ago. However, what did come not as a surprise but
    something that was not within our control is the fact that the
    airlines project that they are going to require 4,500 pilots a
    year for the next 10 years.
        Chairman McCain. I knew it. Why were you surprised?
        General Goldfein. Well, sir, I will tell you. I would not
    say we were surprised. I will say that the numbers that they
    were going to require we had not seen coming.
        Chairman McCain. Secretary Wilson, the planned delivery
    date for the KC-46 continues to slip. When will the first
    aircraft be delivered, and when will the 18th be delivered?
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, there is a meeting this morning
    in the Pentagon about the risk on the schedule. We think that
    there is some risk particularly in the testing schedule, and
    Boeing does not agree with that risk. The meeting is actually
    going on right now. We did an independent assessment on timing,
    and we may see a couple of months' slip is what I am hearing
    informally. But as soon as we get the readout from that
    meeting, we will let you know.
        Chairman McCain. All of this comes as a surprise?
        It is understandable to keep the B-21 specific warfighting
    capabilities classified, but it is difficult to understand why
    you should keep other aspects of the program under the veil of
    secrecy. Do the American people not deserve to understand more
    about what their dollars are being spent on such as $2 billion
    in R&D [research and development] money requested in this
    year's budget?
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, we are very open with the
    appropriate committees in the Congress about exactly what we
    are doing and what we are spending it on.
        Chairman McCain. That is not true, Madam Secretary. That is
    simply not true. The American people need to know if we are
    going to spend $2 billion on what? On R&D?
        Does the Air Force plan on releasing any further details on
    the program? If so, when will you do so?
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, there is always a balance
    between not telling our enemies what we are doing and making
    sure we are forthcoming with the representatives of the
    American people.
        Chairman McCain. I totally agree with you. But I have never
    seen anything like this one.
        What is the long-term plan for how long you will keep
    fourth generation fighter aircraft in your combat aircraft
    inventory and how the Air Force will keep them relevant in
    today's threat environment?
        General Goldfein. Chairman, we are going to keep fourth gen
    aircraft into the 2040s, and so what you will see in this
    budget, in addition to buying fifth gen aircraft, is actually
    modernizing our fourth gen.
        Here is what we found. When we talk about the fighter
    inventory, what we have found and continue to develop is the
    ability to actually fly these aircraft together in a
    complementary fashion. So the fourth gen actually makes fifth
    gen better, and fifth gen actually makes fourth gen better.
        Chairman McCain. Can you tell me a program that has been on
    time and on schedule in the last 20 years?
        General Goldfein. Yes, sir.
        Actually when you take a look at--and you called it on the
    F-35. The reality of the F-35 program is when you make a
    decision to do three things at once, which is to develop new
    technology, procure that technology simultaneously, and make it
    an international program with a number of international
    partners, those three things in concert actually I believe is
    what contributed most to the cost growth and the time frame it
    has taken us to bring that to bear.
        Chairman McCain. So we had never learned that lesson
    before?
        General Goldfein. I do not think we have learned it to the
    level of this program. Especially I do not think that in the
    new age of the cybersecurity environment that we live in, I
    think that we are learning every day what it means in the
    business of information and sharing infusion and the challenges
    that gives it. It goes to a point that you made about
    information technology and just how do we go about procuring
    it.
        Chairman McCain. Well, I can assure you it has been a
    source of great frustration on this committee because it was
    obvious to us exactly what was happening, and it happened.
        Senator Reed?
        Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, Madam Secretary, General Goldfein.
        Let me go back to the RPA [Remotely Piloted Aircraft]
    issue. There has been for the last several years great stress
    on the RPA community. Secretary Carter tried to address that by
    moving from 65 missions down to 60. Can you give me an update--
    and then, Madam Secretary, you might join in--of where we are
    and what are you doing to ensure we have a very adequate RPA
    capability?
        General Goldfein. Yes, sir, Senator. So that is probably
    the most important decision that we have made in this business
    was when we stopped the exponential growth of combat lines and
    caps because, as you remember, just about the time we started
    trying to get the weapon system healthy, we would have three
    more caps added. Who can blame the soldier, sailor, airman, or
    marine on the ground who wants to have someone overhead who is
    telling them what is behind the town, what is behind the
    village, what is behind the hill before they go it?
        So when we actually stopped the growth at 60 caps, that
    allowed us to actually start building the force to a healthy
    weapon system. As you may recall, the first target we were
    shooting at was a 10-to-1 crew ratio. That begins to get to a
    healthy force, and we will achieve that this year.
        The other thing that we have done is we have built the
    instructor cadre force up so that we can actually increase the
    influx in the pipeline that is bringing the crews in that we
    need for the future.
        We are also standing up two bases now. One we have just
    announced. The preferred alternative is Shaw Air Force Base to
    actually do a mission there, and then we are going to stand up
    another base that can expand the enterprise so that you
    actually can get the mission synergy that happens when you
    actually combine an RPA squadron with another mission that it
    actually supports when it flies.
        All those things are in the works, and so my report to you
    is we are on glide slope for the plan that we laid out for you.
    There is work ahead that needs to be come. I am not declaring
    victory, but we have made some significant progress.
        Senator Reed. One element that was mentioned was not
    requiring that the lead pilot at least be a commissioned
    officer, but to look at a warrant officer or an NCO. When I was
    at Nellis last year, I saw a lot of very experienced non-
    commissioned officers who could switch seats pretty quickly. Is
    that being considered?
        General Goldfein. It is. The first three have graduated.
    Our second class is going through right of enlisted operators.
    Because the MQ-19 was the most stressed, we chose the RQ-4 as
    the weapon system to begin this program. So now we are laying
    these individuals into each of our training classes, and then
    we will continue to grow the force accordingly.
        Senator Reed. Madam Secretary, any comments?
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, the only thing I would add is
    that the fiscal year 2018 budget does continue to fund the get
    well plan for the RPA pilots, and we now have about 2,200 RPA
    pilots, including that first group of enlisted operators.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, ma'am.
        Again, General Goldfein, retention is one of the critical
    issues. The chairman has mentioned it. You have mentioned it.
    The Secretary has mentioned it. Last year, we looked at this
    issue and we discovered--at least our insights were anyone who
    wanted a bonus got the maximum bonus. So the bonus was seen as
    sort of like they owe me this, rather than this is something
    that is going to affect my decision to stay or go.
        In fact, we asked you to go ahead and start allocating
    bonuses based on critical needs, not just everyone gets one,
    and we assumed that the bonus could be the most obvious and
    most immediate way to enhance retention. You seemed to--well, I
    will not put words in your mouth.
        But, one, tell us where we are with the bonus issue. Also
    tell us what types of arrangements you think you can make with
    the airlines to get additional pilots.
        General Goldfein. Yes, sir. So, first, what we are focused
    on is a combination and a balance between quality of service
    and quality of life. The aviation bonus goes in the quality of
    life category, and so we really appreciate this committee and
    Congress' support to allow us to up the number from $25,000 to
    $35,000.
        But we tiered that based on a business case analysis that
    looks at how long does it take to actually train that pilot in
    that particular career field, what is the cost associated with
    that, and what is our projections for retention. Based on that
    model and weighting, we have now come up with a tiered approach
    that now pays against that particular model.
        We are in our first year of that. I expect we will get an
    assessment of its impact and whether it is having the desired
    impact, and that we may come back to this committee for
    additions in terms of authorizations.
        But we are looking at a number of areas. You know,
    retention comes down to this balance because pilots--Chairman,
    I think you said it in your opening statement. Pilots join to
    fly high-performance aircraft. Maintainers join to maintain
    high-performance aircraft. When we do not have the readiness
    that allows them to do that, that is going to have a direct
    relation to readiness, and I would submit to you it has a
    direct relation on morale because morale and readiness are
    absolutely inextricably linked.
        So we are taking an approach where this is about 100 swings
    of the axe at the trunk of this tree, and we are not going to
    swing. It is not swinging until we continue to see the
    retention numbers go up. So this is about revitalizing the
    health of our squadrons to make sure that where we do our
    fighting from, which is in squadrons, our squadrons are
    healthy. This is making sure that we have the right support
    structure in those squadrons so the pilots are able to do the
    flying. This is about making sure that pilots have a balance in
    terms of what they are doing. Let me give you a vignette.
        I just came from Shaw Air Force Base. A young F-16 pilot at
    Shaw Air Force Base in a 4\1/2\ year tour--this is what that
    tour looks like today on this smaller force: 1 year deployed to
    the desert, 1 year remote to Korea, four 2-week deployments to
    support Red Flag or other high-end training, four 1-week
    deployments that do weapons systems kinds of specific training,
    6 weeks to squadron officer school. That 4\1/2\ year assignment
    will allow that pilot 18 months total at home in 4\1/2\ years.
    So the Secretary and I are looking at a number of things that
    we can do to bring them more balance in addition to the
    financial piece that the Congress has authorized.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Inhofe?
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        We have done a lot of talking about the size of our Air
    Force, and it seems like it might be a good idea to put it in a
    perspective. Do you happen to know what the size of our Air
    Force was during the Desert Storm related to what that size is
    today? Either one of you.
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, it is about 30 percent smaller
    than it was in Desert Storm.
        Senator Inhofe. Thirty percent smaller than it was in
    Desert Storm.
        Secretary Wilson. Yes, sir.
        Senator Inhofe. Would you say we are in a much greater
    threatened position today than we were during----
        Secretary Wilson. We have the same level of tasking today
    as we did during Desert Storm, and we have 55 squadrons rather
    than----
        Senator Inhofe. You know, I think it is important to have
    people like you and the uniforms particularly to be talking
    about this because the American people do not know that. You
    have heard me say this before. But that is a very frustrating
    thing when you go back and you are talking to real people who
    are listening to false reports from the media assuming that we
    have this great, superior power that we have historically had
    perhaps in some times of our history but do not have today.
        I had a hearing in the subcommittee I chair on readiness.
    We had the four Vices there, and it was the Vice Chief of the
    Air Force, General Wilson--no relation I guess--who made the
    statement, after we talked about it for a while, are we in the
    same situation, a similar situation, that we were facing back
    in the late 1980s when we had a hollow force? I was very proud
    of him because he said, yes, we are, and he went into some of
    the details as to what we were back at that time compared to
    where we are today.
        General Goldfein, what are your thoughts about that?
        General Goldfein. Sir, I absolutely align with that
    statement. I think it is important too for us to have a common
    understanding and a definition of what constitutes a hollow
    force because that term gets thrown around a lot. I actually
    went back and Senator McCain actually, sir, you gave a
    definition of this in 1993. I think it actually captures it
    still for today. You said readiness is not a matter of funding
    operations and maintenance at the proper level. It is not a
    matter of funding adequate numbers of high quality personnel.
    It is not a matter of funding superior weapons and munitions or
    funding strategic mobility and prepositioning or funding high
    operations tempos or funding realistic levels of training at
    every level of combat. Readiness is all of these things and
    more. A force begins to go hollow the moment it loses overall
    mix of combat capabilities in any one critical area. That
    definition in 1993 applies today.
        When we talk about the hollow force, we got to talk about
    holistically all of those things that go into producing a ready
    force, and it is training and it is personnel and it is
    equipment. They all have to come together.
        Senator Reed. That is good, General Goldfein.
        You know, I think again that is something we need to talk
    about, and while you say it is difficult to define what a
    hollow force is, the general public does know about a hollow
    force. They knew the conditions that we faced back in the late
    1980s and how similar they are today.
        Just for a minute, I want to touch on the BRAC [Base
    Realignment and Closure] recommendations. The budget, it is my
    understanding, is looking toward the years what--2021 to be
    looking at a possible BRAC and making preparations before that
    time?
        General Goldfein. Yes, sir. I think you will see from the
    Secretary of Defense a request for a BRAC, I believe in 2021 is
    what you will see coming in from the Secretary.
        You know, from our perspective, we tend to focus on the
    ``C,'' closure, but I will tell you for the Air Force, it is as
    much about the ``R,'' realignment. We have got some great
    examples of how we have been able to, with the help of Congress
    and this committee, realign forces in order to become more
    combat-capable and more lethal. For me, it is as much about
    realignment as it is about closure.
        Senator Inhofe. Yes, but you have to keep in mind that one
    of the facts is that there has not been a BRAC round yet--and I
    have been involved in these BRAC rounds since 1987--where they
    have not lost money the first 3 years or so. This is one of the
    big problems.
        This is at a time that is different than most times in the
    past. We really cannot afford to be paying for something that
    we do not need, and the second thing is we do not know, once we
    start rebuilding, what our needs are going to be. I am sure
    that that probably came to their attention when they were
    making that decision not to do something until that time.
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, if I could just add.
        Senator Inhofe. Yes, of course.
        Secretary Wilson. with respect to base realignment and
    closure, one of the things that I think we really need to do is
    look at infrastructure based on the needs of the warfighter,
    and for the Air Force, that is less about square footage and
    concrete than it is airspace and capabilities to be able to
    train as we will fight not only today but into the future. Some
    of the language with respect to base closure restricts us from
    doing some of that analysis, and I think we need to do that
    analysis to be able to tell where we have excess capacity and
    of what kind.
        Senator Inhofe. Well, my time has expired, but for the
    record, General Goldfein, you said--I looked it up in your
    written statement. It was not there. But you said for every
    mission that I have described to you in your opening statement,
    you said our adversaries are advancing. I would kind of like to
    have in a written statement of where we are relative to our
    adversaries out there, something that you probably would not
    want to talk about here anyway.
        General Goldfein. Yes, sir.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Gillibrand?
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary Wilson, during your confirmation hearing, I asked
    you for your attention on continuing contamination issues with
    water supplies across the U.S. The Air Force, including the Air
    National Guard, is dealing with contamination as a result of
    perfluorinated chemicals (PFCs), expelled by firefighting units
    on these bases. There are two known sites in New York, one at
    the 106th on Gabreski and one of the 105th in Newburgh. Until
    recently coordination seemed to be moving forward at Gabreski,
    though not in Newburgh, though I understand that cooperation
    has now ceased.
        My staff was briefed that all mitigation work and
    negotiations on cooperative agreements has ceased because the
    Air Force is assessing whether it has the authorities to pay
    for any mitigation or cleanup on non-federal land. Are you
    aware of this issue? My staff was told that there should be a
    determination by early summer.
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, I am aware that the Defense
    Department is looking at this across all of the services and
    all of our installations. I think the Air Force was a little
    bit out in front of others in saying, all right, do we have a
    problem, do we have an issue at any of our bases. So we have
    done more assessment than perhaps the other services had. I
    know that the Office of the Secretary of Defense is looking at
    this both with respect to particular bases but also more
    generally with respect to how we move forward on any cleanup.
        Senator Gillibrand. Can I have your commitment that you
    will work with my staff to make sure that if you do need
    additional authorities, we put that in the NDAA [National
    Defense Authorization Act] so that you have the authorities you
    need?
        Secretary Wilson. Yes.
        Senator Gillibrand. Will you commit with my office to work
    with the relevant local authorities to address any adverse
    consequences resulting from the negotiations that were ongoing
    at Gabreski?
        Secretary Wilson. We will. I would say that this has now
    become something that the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
    Installations and Environment folks are also involved in, as
    well as their general counsel. So we are just one piece of the
    force on that.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
        General Goldfein, I watched the news last night about a
    leaked memorandum concerning breaches by Russia into our
    electoral infrastructure. The nature of that was about a hack
    into a vendor who does perhaps voter registration.
        I have been talking a lot about the role of our military
    and particularly the role of our National Guard and how we
    increase our cyber capabilities by using the National Guard
    specifically since you are going to have experts within the
    National Guard who work in the cyber field as part of their day
    jobs. Can you imagine any function where we can use the
    National Guard particularly to serve as a conduit between
    State, local, and the Federal Government, as well as the
    private sector because of their unique abilities? One such area
    is perhaps a way to work with the States to certify that our
    elections are cyber-protected because, obviously, the best
    cyber personnel we have--many of them are within the armed
    services as part of the Guard.
        General Goldfein. Yes, ma'am. As a matter of fact, you will
    see that as we are building up our 39 cyber mission teams, a
    significant part of that is from our Guard and Reserve. There
    are title authorities that we have got to work our way though
    in terms of when you are serving in a title 10 status, Active
    Duty, or title 32 status, working in the States. But what we
    have found, especially in the cyber business, is where we can
    really leverage industry and especially young men and women who
    are working in the cyber business in a civilian capacity that
    can then also do part-time work with the military in the Guard
    and Reserve is a powerful combination. We are leveraging that
    very heavily.
        Senator Gillibrand. If you need any additional authorities
    or have any concerns about retention, keeping the best people
    at Cyber Command, please advise this committee because we would
    like to make sure you have access to all the cyber warriors you
    need for all of these functions moving forward.
        General Goldfein. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Gillibrand. Are there any obstacles that you see
    now for having the cyber force that you need?
        General Goldfein. No. I think our biggest challenge is that
    we have got to balance the talent between that which serves
    under Admiral Rogers and his responsibilities as the CYBERCOM
    commander, that which we require to be able to protect our
    cyber vulnerabilities, ensure that we can operate to do the
    missions I described for you in our opening statement, and that
    which has to serve the combatant commanders who have got cyber
    equities built into their campaign plans.
        We are building this force right now at the same time, and
    so we are having to now, as we build this capability, ensure
    that we fill all three of those bins simultaneously. So it is
    just going to take some time, and we are looking for all kinds
    of creative ways to build as fast as we can.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Wicker?
        Senator Wicker. General, we might as well settle this on
    the record. How do you pronounce your last name?
        General Goldfein. Sir, ``feen'' is fine.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Wicker. General Goldfein then. We are 1,500 pilots
    short; by the end of this calendar year, 1,300 of those fighter
    pilots, 3,000 maintainers short. I was a little unclear about
    how many aircraft short we are going to be.
        General Goldfein. Yes, sir. I would like to clear the
    record too. I said 1,500. I actually did the math wrong. Part
    of my philosophy degree. It is 2,031 is the current number of
    aircraft that we have on the inventory.
        The number of aircraft we need relative to all of the
    missions that we perform--and this is beyond fighters and
    bombers. This is big wing command and control. This is
    intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance. This is across all
    of those. This is Joint Stars, this is Compass Call. All of the
    missions we perform--those are the areas where we have got to
    recapitalize and modernize for the future to ensure that we
    have all of those mission areas covered.
        Senator Wicker. Well, what figure would that be? We have
    2,031 current. How many do we need?
        General Goldfein. 1,900 combat coded fighters is what we
    require. We are projecting 175 bombers. We are working right
    now a bomber road map that lays out the combination--one of the
    things that we are working hard on is that we have in the past
    rolled out plans after we have done all of our planning without
    actually including Congress in the dialogue. We are in the
    process right now of actually socializing our bomber road map
    that achieves the 175 total that we need.
        Senator Wicker. Okay. Well, if you get your budget request
    this year, how many pilots short are we going to be and
    maintainers short are we going to be at the end of next year,
    at the end of 5 years?
        General Goldfein. So if there is no change, right now we
    are projecting that we will be 1,300 fighter pilots alone short
    by the end of this year. That is just fighter pilots.
        Senator Wicker. But you are asking for a budget number that
    would improve that. Are you not?
        General Goldfein. We are.
        Senator Wicker. If you get your numbers, how are we going
    to look in 5 years?
        General Goldfein. Well, our hope, based on all the things
    that we are doing--that is why I described it as it is not one
    thing that we are doing. It is 100 things that we are going
    after that go after both quality of service and quality of life
    because we are not going to buy our way out of this with money.
    There is no way we are going to ever be able to----
        Senator Wicker. You cannot give us that number of how you
    hope to look in 5 years?
        General Goldfein. Yes.
        Senator Wicker. Are you still going to be 1,500 pilots
    short in 5 years?
        General Goldfein. I hope that we are not, and I say
    ``hope''----
        Senator Wicker. Can you do that based on your budget
    request?
        General Goldfein. We can definitely get started, but we do
    not know yet, for instance, pilot bonus is a classic example--
    --
        Chairman McCain. What does ``get started'' mean, General?
        General Goldfein. Sir, what it means is that we put in
    place those measures that start moving forward on increasing
    quality of service and quality of life across the pilot force.
    So the budget has the aircraft bonus in it this year. We are
    going to have to assess to see how that works relative to how
    many we retain.
        Senator Wicker. Suffice it to say, it is hard for you to
    give us specific numbers to project.
        Let me do this. I think Senator Inhofe mentioned the
    general public. Help the general public understand what we are
    not getting done now because of these shortfalls. What can we
    not do? Help the taxpayer understand why this is crucial to us.
        Secretary Wilson. Sir, one of the things that happened
    after sequester and ISIS reared its ugly head in Iraq and
    Syria, the Air Force and the rest of the services did what they
    should do, they surged to the fight. That means we have pilots
    in the desert fighting and putting, you know, 26,000 airstrikes
    on the ISIS target since 2014. Twenty-six thousand. That is
    more airstrikes than we did in Operation Desert Storm--or
    rather, Iraqi Freedom. So they are in the fight, but that is
    not a high-end, near-peer kind of fight.
        What we are most worried about is that those crews, when
    they come back, are not ready for some of the potential high-
    end conflicts that we might face where there is integrated air
    defense and where we do have to fight in order to own the
    airspace over any potential adversary. That is where the risk
    is, and it is not that we would not surge to that fight, but
    the losses would be higher and it would be a harder fight.
        Senator Wicker. Are our allies and our adversaries having
    this same problem with pilot shortages?
        Secretary Wilson. Yes.
        Senator Wicker. Specifically Britain? Specifically Russia,
    China?
        Secretary Wilson. The airlines are a global industry, and
    we are seeing it in the other services in the United States,
    and we are also seeing a shortage globally of pilots. The Chief
    mentioned the number of pilots that are being hired annually by
    the airlines. It is actually higher than the airlines
    themselves predicted. So they were predicting about 3,200. I
    think last year they hired 4,500 or something like that. So it
    was higher than they initially projected. There is a demand for
    pilots and it is a global demand.
        General Goldfein. Sir, just to be clear because you had
    said allies and adversaries. We do see that our allies are
    facing--as an international air chief, I have discussions with
    all of my allies to talk about what--because this movie is
    coming to a theater near them. But I cannot say that for our
    adversaries. We have seen no indications of a slowdown for
    adversaries.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Blumenthal?
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I do not want to put you on the spot now, but in terms of
    our allies, if you could provide some numbers as to how they
    are seeing the same kind of challenges, that would be very
    helpful. If you could also provide in writing, after this
    hearing, a rundown or summary of what they are doing, if they
    are doing anything different than ourselves, but exactly what
    they are doing.
        We have seen this problem coming, as you well know. I asked
    about it at the Airland Subcommittee--Lieutenant General
    Nowland was testifying in March. I asked about it last year. I
    was going to send a letter asking for more detailed
    information, and I decided not to do so on the assurance that
    this kind of information would be forthcoming. But if you could
    provide that kind of information, General Goldfein or Madam
    Secretary, I would appreciate it.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Secretary Wilson. The U.S. Air Force does not track readiness
    statistics with regard to other nations pilot readiness issues. Some
    Foreign Military Sales programs with partners are experiencing delays
    in training, such as the F-16, due to a limited number of USAF pilots
    available to support ally and partner training. USAF's other aviation
    sales with partners are being supported. In previous discussions with
    other Air Chiefs, we understand they are also facing budget issues,
    which has an impact to their aviation readiness. We are working with
    partners to improve integration of flight activities with coalition
    partners where mutually advantageous in support of national security
    strategies.

        Senator Blumenthal. I want to focus on the UH-1N Huey,
    whose average fleet is about 40 years old and continues to
    operate under a waiver to protect our ICBM [Intercontinental
    Ballistic Missile] fleet and the National Capital Region.
    Earlier this year, the Air Force announced that the anticipated
    request for proposal for the Huey replacement would be delayed
    from February to July, which in turn will delay the delivery of
    the first operational helicopter by a year to the second
    quarter of fiscal year 2021.
        I discussed my frustration with this delay when STRATCOM
    [Strategic Command] Commander General Hyten came before this
    committee in April, and I will be understated. He was critical
    of the Air Force's inability to quickly procure a helicopter
    desperately needed to fulfill STRATCOM's requirements.
        I led a bipartisan letter to Secretary Mattis urging him to
    do everything in is power to expedite the fielding of new
    helicopters, but I have received as yet no response. I
    understand he has a lot of challenges and responsibilities. I
    am not being critical of him.
        But the plain fact is that an existing military aircraft
    already in the inventory is well suited for these missions, and
    I hope that after much delay, this acquisition process will
    proceed with a medium lift helicopter that meets General
    Hyten's needs.
        So let me ask you, Madam Secretary. As you know, during
    your confirmation process, you committed in writing to me--I am
    quoting--if confirmed, I will ensure the Air Force remains
    committed to delivering a UH-1N replacement with needed
    capabilities on schedule and within budget. Now that you are
    confirmed, what actions specifically--and I put the emphasis on
    the word ``specifically''--are you taking to fulfill this
    commitment?
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, I have been briefed on the UH-1N
    program. Initially the strategy was to try to buy something
    that is just coming down the line and get more of them that are
    coming down the line that are being bought for other purposes.
    Apparently none of the potential airframes could do that
    without some kind of a modification, and each of them had
    different kinds of modifications. So the Air Force took a step
    back, and the July RFP [Request for Proposal], as I understand
    it, is on track to be released.
        Senator Blumenthal. That is on track now.
        Secretary Wilson. That is what I have been told.
        Senator Blumenthal. There will be no slippage in that
    schedule.
        Secretary Wilson. That is what I have been told as of this
    last week.
        Senator Blumenthal. Let me turn to, if I may----
        Chairman McCain. Does that mean you will ascertain that it
    will be done on time?
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, I have been told that the RFP is
    supposed to be released in July, and I have no reason to
    question what I have been told.
        Senator Blumenthal. If there is any slippage, will you
    commit to reporting to this committee as soon as there is any
    indication--I mean, any indication--that that schedule may at
    all be delayed again?
        Secretary Wilson. Yes.
        Senator Blumenthal. The combat rescue helicopter. As you
    know, the HH-60G Pave Hawk helicopters, the most deployed
    Department of Defense rotary wing asset, has been responsible
    for saving 12,000 lives--12,000 lives. The high operational
    tempo in Iraq and Afghanistan for these helicopters performing
    personnel recovery and combat search and rescue missions means
    that the current aircraft are nearing the end of their useful
    life with declining readiness rates. It is an essential
    program. We have to be sure that it remains on track. The
    program successfully reached its critical design review just
    last week, finalizing the build plan for the Sikorsky-made
    helicopter and paving the way to begin building the first test
    helicopters.
        Let me ask you, General Goldfein. This program is critical.
    It is lifesaving. It is essential to readiness. This year's
    budget requests just $354.5 million for the combat rescue
    helicopter program. That is $100 million lower. It is a $100
    million decrease from what was anticipated last year. For a
    program that is so critical, how do you justify such a
    reduction in funding?
        General Goldfein. Yes, sir. As we do with all of the
    programs, we look at how fast we can bring on that capability
    and how do we sustain that capability over time. You said it
    exactly right. When it comes to combat rescue, we are the
    service that is responsible for fighting our way to a point of
    injury and actually providing critical combat care in that
    golden hour and being able to bring folks out. The combat
    rescue helicopter is an absolutely critical component of that.
    So the $100 million shortfall that you referred to is a
    disconnect that we continue to watch and ensure that we look at
    as we spread the program out over time.
        Senator Blumenthal. Well, General, I apologize. I do not
    mean to interrupt you but my time is expiring.
        I just want to say the word ``disconnect'' is one of the
    all-time euphemisms that I have heard in this room. It is a--
    forgive me. I mean no disrespect to you. It is a disservice to
    the men and women who need that helicopter and who will be
    looking up. They are going to be looking up to see when those
    helicopters are arriving to save them from serious injury
    during that golden hour. This decrease is a disservice to our
    men and women in uniform.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you to both of you for your service to our country.
        With regard to the B-21 program, there have been
    conflicting reports and testimony from the Air Force about how
    many B-21's the service intends to buy. When is the correct
    date that we will start talking about the actual number? We
    have had reports from the generals which say 80 to 100. One
    hundred is the minimum. We will start with 100 and go from
    there. One hundred sixty-five seems like the more realistic
    number.
        Last year, we had an amendment that became part of the NDAA
    that directed a force mix study to refine what this should look
    like, and the report deadline has passed. Why is it that the
    service says it needs exactly 1,763 F-35's but has not produced
    a precise number of B-21 that it will require? Secretary
    Wilson?
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, it is my understanding that it
    is 100 B-21's. There was some confusion, and I think the Air
    Force actually corrected this yesterday in the newspaper about
    what the total number of bombers would be, and I believe that
    number is actually 165.
        Senator Rounds. It is 165 or is it 100?
        Secretary Wilson. One hundred B-21's, 165 total bombers in
    the Air Force.
        One caveat I would make is that there is a national
    security strategy review that is currently underway, and one of
    the reasons why you do not have a 5-year defense plan in the
    formal submission is because that national security strategy,
    which will drive our force structure, is underway.
        General Goldfein. Senator, I will just second that to say
    that in the bomber mix in the road map that we are socializing
    now with Congress, it is 165 total bombers, and of those 165
    bombers, it is 100 B-21's.
        We do that based on our assessment of combatant commander
    requirements and targets that they require us to hold at risk
    in their operational war plans, not only the geographic
    combatant commanders, but also General Hyten in his
    responsibility for the nuclear enterprise. So we do our troop-
    to-task, if you will, assessment based on supporting combatant
    commander requirements and objectives that they are being given
    to be able to hit.
        Senator Rounds. General Goldfein, at what date in the
    future is this determined to be the day that we are shooting
    for? At what point in time are we talking about this being the
    goal, to have 165?
        General Goldfein. In terms of the total numbers that we
    will buy to?
        Senator Rounds. Yes. In other words, the B-21 we all know
    is not coming on line for a number of years yet. Are we talking
    about the year 2030, 2035, 2040? What is the number that we are
    shooting at for having 165 bombers of all sorts?
        General Goldfein. Between the 2020 and 2030 time frame. But
    the way we will manage that, because remember, right now we
    have B-52's, B-2's, B-1's, and B-21's that will come on board--
    as the B-21 comes on board, then what we are socializing is
    then how do we then reduce the existing infrastructure so that
    we can keep the bomber force at a stable platform.
        We are also working to ensure that as we look at what bases
    that we look at for bomber force structure, that the bases that
    actually have current bomber capabilities will retain bomber
    force structure for the future. So all of that is coming
    together to ensure that we have a solid bomber road map going
    forward.
        Senator Rounds. Is there any question but that bomber
    number 100 is going to be less costly per copy than bomber
    number 25?
        General Goldfein. Well, we amortize those over time. So
    what we learned in the B-2 was, of course, when we did our cost
    projections and then we stopped the buy at 21 aircraft, all of
    those costs were borne by 21 aircraft. We never want to go down
    that path again. So 100 aircraft is going to have those costs
    amortized over time. If we buy 130 aircraft, it is going to be
    lower cost over time because you amortize over the cost of the
    fleet. So for us, we think the sweet spot is at least 100
    bombers when it comes to the B-21.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you.
        I am just curious. When we talk about space, I think we
    began a discussion here on it, but I just want to get into this
    a little bit more and I think it is very important that we
    emphasize how critical it is, not only air, land, and sea, but
    we do have the domains of cyber and space. You have already had
    some questions here about cyber and your commitment with cyber.
        Let me get into space just a little bit. I think it is
    critical that you share with this committee and the American
    people how serious the threats are to our ability to operate in
    space and how quickly we need to begin the process of
    strengthening our defenses for our products or our equipment,
    which is in space now and in the future. Could you elaborate on
    that, please?
        Secretary Wilson. Sir, I was on the House Permanent Select
    Committee on Intelligence in 2007 when the Chinese demonstrated
    the ability to launch a missile into space and destroy a
    satellite. They targeted and destroyed and created all kinds of
    debris from one of their old weather satellites. I think that
    got people's attention.
        But that is not the only thing that is going on with
    respect to threats to our space capabilities. There are threats
    from space itself and threats from the ground. There is also
    the issue of trying to jam space-based assets that the United
    States relies upon. So we have to assume that because we are so
    dependent on space, that our adversaries know that and they are
    developing capabilities to deny us the high ground in that way.
    We have to plan for that eventuality.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you.
        General Goldfein. Sir, where the Secretary and I are
    focused is in four key areas relative to moving forward on this
    migration or evolution of space as a benign domain to a
    warfighting domain where we have the responsibility for gaining
    and maintaining space superiority, much like I talked about air
    superiority previously.
        The four key areas that we are focused on are, first, how
    do we ensure that we have got good, solid strategy and policy
    that comes to us that then we can then build good concept of
    operations, which we are right now in the process of finalizing
    in joint publications to speak to the language of joint
    warfighting as we normalize space as a joint warfighting
    domain.
        From those concept of operations comes solid requirements
    as the joint chief that you would look at for space, and as the
    Chief of Staff of the Air Force, I am responsible for
    requirements to be able to ensure that we build solid
    requirements and we hold those firm.
        From solid requirements, then we look at how we acquire and
    how we ensure that we have acquisition authority that acquires
    at a pace that outpaces the enemy.
        Finally, as the Secretary mentioned before, it is how do we
    organize, train, equip, and present ready forces to be able to
    fight and win in space if a war extends there.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Hirono?
        Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General, the Eagle Vision system, which provides
    unclassified imagery, has proven to be very valuable in
    military operations and exercises with our allies, as well as
    in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions.
        Senator Graham and I have been strong proponents of this
    system, and as you know, we have a unit in the Hawaii Air
    National Guard, which has proven very useful in mil-to-mil
    exercises and HADR [Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster
    Relief] missions.
        So I want to commend you for including Eagle Vision in your
    budget request at a level which will allow program stability
    and the necessary resources to maintain important capabilities
    such as SAR [synthetic aperture radar]. I think this is a very
    good investment which will continue to produce significant
    dividends. So, again, I thank you for your attention to Eagle
    Vision.
        Secretary Wilson, I am very concerned about stability in
    the Asia-Pacific area even as we see all kinds of
    conflagrations in the Middle East, as well as in Africa and
    other parts. So peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific is
    essential and is important for the United States to project
    strength and reassure our allies, particularly in light of the
    actions of China and North Korea.
        Do you envision an expanded role for the Guard and Reserve
    components in future Asia-Pacific missions? What additional
    assets does the Air Force envision directing to the Asia-
    Pacific area of operations?
        Secretary Wilson. Well, Senator, of course, we organize,
    train, and equip forces for the combatant commanders, and we
    also have tens of thousands of airmen who are stationed forward
    permanently and others that rotate through the Asia-Pacific
    theater. We also announced yesterday that as we bring KC-46's
    to McConnell Air Force Base, Kansas, that the KC-135's that are
    there are going to move up to Fairford to support the air
    bridge with tankers across the Pacific. So it is an important
    theater for us. We support the combatant commanders'
    requirements for warfighting and their operating plans.
        Senator Hirono. Are you saying that we are doing enough to
    make sure that enough resources are going toward the Asia-
    Pacific theater?
        General Goldfein. Ma'am, I will just offer to you that the
    rebalance to the Pacific has actually been more about what we
    have taken risk in elsewhere to be able to maintain a steady
    presence in the Pacific region. If you take a look historically
    over time, the Air Force component has actually not changed
    significantly. We have kept forces on Guam, forces on the
    peninsula, forces in Japan, forces in Hawaii and Alaska.
        So what has happened is we have actually taken forces, as
    we have gotten smaller over time, from the European theater
    primarily, here in the Homeland, but we have kept our forces in
    the Pacific relatively stable. So I would offer to you that my
    projection, based on the size of the force we have and the
    global responsibilities we have--you will see that the Pacific
    laydown will probably remain relatively unchanged.
        Senator Hirono. I thank you for that because I think that
    the Asia-Pacific area of the world needs to remain as stable as
    we can, especially as we know with North Korea doing what it is
    doing and China's continuing buildup of their military.
        I know that the budget challenges--you often have to weigh
    readiness, modernization, and additional capabilities versus
    MILCON [military construction]. This is for you, General. What
    impact does limited MILCON funding have on the capability to
    fulfill your mission requirements, and what is the Air Force
    doing to mitigate mission impact resulting from reduced MILCON
    funding?
        General Goldfein. Yes, ma'am. As we have focused on the
    current fight and combat operations, we have taken risks in
    MILCON, and the challenge for a service that fights from its
    base--I mean, go back to that Whiteman example I gave you with
    the B-2 strike. We had to fight Whiteman before we fought the
    B-2, meaning we project power from our bases.
        So our focus on MILCON, really our priorities, has been
    first and foremost combatant commander critical needs. The
    second priority has been new mission beddown. So those bases
    that are getting KC-46's, F-35's--that is part of that program.
    So we focus MILCON efforts there, and the third that we have
    gone to is what we call worst first, and that is where we
    compete MILCON projects and there is actually very little money
    that we are able to put towards those when we look at all the
    other competing priorities. So for an Air Force, the impact is
    our being able to project power from those bases.
        One good news story, though, I will tell you is investments
    we have made in the European Reconstruction Initiative, ERI
    [European Reassurance Initiative], because it has become very
    clear to the combatant commander that our ability to push
    forward forces quickly is going to be based on our access and
    the bases we can operate on. So we do have a fair amount of
    investment to ERI that is helpful.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Ernst?
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, Secretary Wilson and General
    Goldfein, for being in front of us today.
        General, SOCOM [Special Operations Command] proved that a
    low-cost but highly lethal platform is an incredible asset to
    our current battlefield, and the Combat Dragon 2 program took
    retired OV-10's and outfitted them with commercial off-the-
    shelf technology. They flew 120 combat missions and employed 63
    advanced precision kill weapon systems in an 82-day deployment.
        As the Air Force conducts its testing this summer on light
    attack aircraft, how are you leveraging the previous
    experiences that SOCOM has had?
        General Goldfein. Yes, ma'am. Having been involved
    personally in both Combat Dragon 1 and Combat Dragon 2, we are
    calling this, to a certain extent, Combat Dragon 3. We are
    leveraging all of the experience and all of the lessons we
    learned from that.
        What is important about this particular experiment, which
    aligns exactly with some of the additional authorities that
    Congress has given to the Service Chief and the service
    secretary, is it allows us to actually go out to industry and
    ask what do you have that is shovel ready, that there is not a
    lot of development costs that we could actually put into the
    fight and acquire, if we chose to very quickly.
        But equally important to that is what kind of a network
    will they be able to connect to. So as we look at the fight
    against violent extremism that extends from the Philippines to
    Nigeria and everywhere in between, how do we actually network
    this capability so that we can actually then produce the combat
    value we need? That is the next step of the Combat Dragon
    series. It is not only to look at the platform. It is actually
    to look at the network it rides on.
        We are hopeful that when we see what industry comes forward
    in the first phase of this that we are going to hold this
    summer in New Mexico, that we will be able to go on to a
    follow-on phase, which will be a combat demonstration.
        Senator Ernst. That is very good to hear.
        We know that we have seen successes in that program
    already. So if you were funded, then would you be able to move
    forward much faster in some of those trials then and actually
    see this platform through fruition sooner because of those
    proven successes?
        General Goldfein. Ma'am, actually we got the money in. It
    actually does not cost us that much, quite frankly, to run an
    experiment because for very few dollars that we have been able
    to put forward in the budget, we have got a partnership now
    with industry who have chosen to come in and show us what they
    have. So actually we do not need additional funding for the
    experiment. The question will be really, okay, what have we
    learned from the experiment and then what do want to go forward
    from there. That is the time when we will be definitely coming
    back to Congress.
        Senator Ernst. Very good. I think it is a great example of
    taking what we already have and fitting it towards the wave of
    the future with the technology, and so if we have already
    proven that--and I am sure you will see the same level of
    success in your experimentation, but we need to move quickly on
    that. I appreciate the fact that you do have knowledge of that.
        Secretary, we continue to see life support systems
    grounding entire fleets of our advanced fighters due to
    physiological episodes. We saw with the F-22 not too long ago,
    and today we are seeing that in the T-45's and F-18's.
        Surprisingly, despite multiple sensors in the generating
    systems, we do not monitor the oxygen level right before
    inhalation or right when the pilot exhales. It is my
    understanding that the same applies to the F-35.
        Would monitoring what exactly pilots are inhaling and
    exhaling not be important?
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, I will probably take that for
    the record. The aircraft that I am most familiar with most
    recently that had the problem was the Navy F-18. I will ask the
    Chief whether he is aware of any problems that we have had
    recently with Air Force aircraft. But as to what the F-35
    actually uses on inhalation and exhalation, I will have to get
    back to you.
        Senator Ernst. Okay.
        General, do you want to address that?
        General Goldfein. Yes, ma'am. We actually have a little bit
    of history with the F-22 as well. What we learned in the F-22
    was that what we train to, which was to understand the
    indications of hypoxia, which is having less oxygen than you
    would normally need at altitude--we learned in that system--the
    way it works is actually the pilots were getting too much
    oxygen. What we did not know at the time that we learned
    through that study was that too much oxygen will actually give
    you some of the same symptoms.
        So we went back and we retrofitted that in terms of how we
    operate. So now we are looking at what we learned from that
    particular test and series and applying that to what--we are
    helping the Navy with what they are doing with their F-18's. We
    are just now beginning to look at the F-35 from the same lens.
        Senator Ernst. Very good. I think monitoring throughout the
    system is important, but actually what they are taking in and
    exhaling is probably pretty smart to do as well. So I
    appreciate it.
        Thank you both for being here today.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Peters?
        Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you to both our witnesses here today.
        Secretary Wilson, during your confirmation, we discussed
    the Air Force strategic basing plan for the F-35A, basing
    operations 5 and 6. I understand that site survey teams are
    visiting the five candidate bases of the summer, and we are
    expecting a decision on the preferred and reasonable
    alternatives due sometime later this year.
        You, as you always have, stressed the need for readiness,
    and the Air Force has successfully used the Active associate
    unit model to provide for increased training opportunities and
    share equipment and knowledge between the Active, Guard, and
    Reserve components.
        Does the Air Force intend for all Air Guard units receiving
    F-35's to become an Active associate unit and host Active Duty
    airmen at these bases that you are aware of?
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, I do not think that that was one
    of the requirements.
        I would also tell you that, yes, there are site surveys
    going on. I intentionally do not ask about the status of those
    surveys until they are ready to fully brief me on their
    analysis. So I keep my hands off until the analysis is ready,
    and then it is presented to me as a whole.
        Senator Peters. So that was not a requirement to your
    knowledge, but certainly that is something that would be a
    positive. Is that correct, General?
        General Goldfein. Yes, sir. We first start off in the
    basing process determining what will be the lead at that base.
    So, therefore, when we talk about ops 5 and 6 or 7, we first
    say this is going to be an Air National Guard base. This is
    going to be an Active. This is going to be a Reserve.
        We have a separate process that takes a look at the values
    of associations, and so we look at every base to determine
    where we can actually get value from an association, whether
    that be a classic or an Active association or Reserve
    association. We actually do not start down the path in the
    beginning. We establish a lead for that base, which service
    will be lead or which component will be lead, and then we look
    at it from a purpose of an association.
        Senator Peters. If I could follow up as part of some of the
    criteria, it is my understanding that close proximity to large
    airspace in this decision is very important, those that have
    advanced threat emitters. Is that accurate that that is going
    to be a significant factor as you are evaluating potential
    sites?
        General Goldfein. Yes, sir, it is.
        Senator Peters. Does the Air Force consider support or
    opposition in an installation's community as part of that
    process, the impact of potential lawsuits and others that could
    delay the basing process? I would assume you are looking for an
    active and vibrant community that is very excited about the
    basing. Would that be an accurate assessment?
        General Goldfein. Yes, sir. The community involvement
    relative to an increasingly deployed force because families of
    these airmen live in the communities, and it is the communities
    that wrap their arms around them and take care of them. It is
    the schools that the kids go to. All of that plays in when we
    are taking a look at particular bases.
        Senator Peters. Thank you.
        Secretary Wilson, the 110th attack wing of the Michigan Air
    National Guard flies the MQ Reaper, as you are aware. While the
    aircraft they fly can be anywhere in the world, we are very
    proud that the pilots are sitting in Battle Creek, Michigan.
        Their base currently has only one ground control station
    despite having space for three, and this limits the number of
    combat air patrols that the pilots and operators at the 110th
    can contribute to. If there is ever a technical issue, for
    example, with any of their existing consoles, the wing is
    unable to fly at all or they may have to reallocate their
    pilots somewhere else at additional expense. Given the demand
    for persistent ISR [Intelligence Surveillance and
    Reconnaissance] coverage, as well as strike capabilities,
    installations hosting RPA [Remotely Piloted Aircraft] wings
    should hopefully have the equipment necessary to contribute to
    the flight.
        Secretary Wilson, in response to a question for the record
    that I submitted during your confirmation hearing, you said
    that, if confirmed, you would review this high-demand program
    to ensure that we are using the resources we have to accomplish
    the mission expected of us cost effectively. To date, have you
    been able to review allocation of resources for RPA missions at
    places like Battle Creek but certainly other places around the
    country as well? What is the Air Force's plan to ensure that
    the RPA mission is properly resourced?
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, the fiscal year 2018 budget does
    fund what we call the RPA get well plan. The hardest part, as I
    understand it, for the RPA mission is the people part, and it
    is making sure that we do not take on more. There is an
    insatiable demand for intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance, and the decision to say we just cannot keep
    exponentially expanding this without getting the people trained
    and getting this right has been part of that get well plan. So
    the people part appears to be the long pole in the tent.
        Senator Peters. Thank you.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Perdue?
        Senator Perdue. Thank you, Chairman.
        Thank you both.
        I want to make one comment for the record. It is awfully
    reassuring, Mr. Chairman, that 40 years later we have two
    people leading our Air Force who are esteemed graduates of our
    beloved Air Force Academy. So congratulations to you both.
    Thank you for being here and for your careers.
        I have two quick questions. Madam Secretary, I do not have
    time. We could spend all day talking about this. The budget is
    the number one concern here. I am concerned that we are not
    funding you at the level to where you can meet the missions
    that you need to meet to protect our country and fulfill the
    missions that the General laid out earlier.
        Today we are in a different world than we were just 10
    years ago. China is spending in equivalent dollars $826 billion
    on their military. To put it in perspective, we spend about
    $600 billion in this budget. The Air Force gets about 20
    percent, a little more than 20 percent of that budget, as I
    understand it today. The threats today are probably more
    dangerous than anytime in my lifetime especially.
        What I am concerned about is we are putting arbitrary
    constraints on you guys, and we have not had a bottoms-up look
    at this thing since 2011 when Secretary Gates at that point did
    a 5-year analysis, and for 2016, his estimate was a little over
    $100 billion more than we actually spent in 2016. In 2016, we
    spent 3.1 percent of our GDP on our military. That is 100 basis
    points less than our 30-year average. That is about $200
    billion. So I can triangulate around this $200 billion number a
    number of different ways.
        My question to you today is, Madam Secretary, if we do not
    remove this Budget Control Act limit, what will that mean to
    the Air Force this year, and what will it mean to us over the
    next 5 years?
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, if the Budget Control Act limit
    is not fixed, if we have to go through sequester, that will be
    a $15 billion cut.
        Senator Perdue. Five to zero or one to five?
        Secretary Wilson. One to five billion.
        Senator Perdue. What would that mean to end strength,
    readiness, capacity----
        Secretary Wilson. That would mean we would go through
    pretty much what we did after sequester in the 2013 time frame.
    We would have to stop flying hours. We would have to ground----
        Senator Perdue. Sorry to interrupt. We are only flying
    about 150 hours a year right now for a pilot. Correct?
        Secretary Wilson. It would be devastating.
        Senator Perdue. That is devastating.
        So here is the question. If that were to happen, can you
    fulfill your mission that was laid out earlier so articulately
    by the General in terms of the mission of the Air Force today?
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, we are too small for what the
    Nation expects of us now, and sequester would further----
        Senator Perdue. Thank you. That is the answer I was looking
    for.
        I want to move on to space. General, you made a comment
    after--well, let me first put a little background in here. You
    mentioned, Secretary, that China ten years ago and just again
    in 2014 has demonstrated a capability, but Russia is also
    demonstrating capabilities today. In an unclassified
    environment, the GAO [Government Accountability Office]
    mentioned earlier this year that they have identified 60
    stakeholder organizations that get involved in the decision-
    making process in our space programs.
        General, you made a comment and I agree with you 100
    percent. That is no way to run a railroad. Sixty voices cannot
    and will not produce a coherent acquisition strategy.
        Would you elaborate on that and help us understand what
    that should look like?
        The Rumsfeld Commission as early as 2001 called this out,
    and here we are 16 years later still debating just the
    institutional organization and the organization itself. We have
    a person that now is Chief of the Air Force telling us that
    this is no way to run a railroad. I agree.
        General Goldfein. Yes, sir. Without walking it back through
    those four lines of effort where we are focused where the
    Secretary and I are moving forward, this really comes down to a
    discussion about acquisition and acquisition authority and
    really decision authority. When you look at the 60 different
    folks that are in the organization now that each can say no or
    slow down the progress, the challenge we face is really one of
    decision authority. How do we actually ensure that we can make
    decisions, have the accountability in the process so we can
    move forward and acquire a capability at a pace that is faster
    than our adversaries.
        Senator Perdue. Sir, is this a little bit like the cyber
    development that we are going through as a military? Is this
    something we should look at organizationally from the military
    standpoint in terms of space and cyber? Madam Secretary, you
    may want to jump in on that as well.
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, actually in the last National
    Defense Authorization Act, this committee and the Congress gave
    instructions to the Department of Defense to move decision
    authority back to the Air Force. We are trying to move forward
    with that.
        In addition, there was a number of work done on
    organization before I arrived. I am taking a hard scrub brush
    to that as to how we organize ourselves better both for
    operations and for policy and acquisition so that we can get
    rapid decisions. There are a lot of people who have to have
    insight, but that does not mean that everybody gets a veto. So
    we will be looking at that over the spring and summer here to
    make decisions to make sure the right people are aware but the
    decision authority is clear and fast.
        Senator Perdue. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Warren?
        Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you to our witnesses for being here.
        I want to quickly ask about the importance of our non-
    military agencies and programs to the Air Force mission.
    General Goldfein, would a significant reduction in funding to
    the State Department and other non-defense security agencies
    and programs make the Air Force job of defending America easier
    or harder?
        General Goldfein. Ma'am, I will align with the Secretary of
    Defense who has clearly stated it would make it harder.
        Senator Warren. Yes. Thank you. I agree. In fact, I have
    asked every combatant commander that same question, and to a
    person, they have all given me essentially the same answer.
        So what I ask about now is about cyber defenses. We need to
    be completely sure that our aircraft and our other critical
    systems cannot be hacked by an adversary and that they are
    going to work when we really need them. Secretary Wilson and
    General Goldfein, in your 2018 budget request, you highlight
    the importance of improving the cyber resiliency of both new
    and existing weapons systems, making sure that the Air Force
    systems can stay operational or can bounce back quickly even in
    the face of aggressive cyber attacks.
        That said, a few months ago, in the Airspace and Cyber
    Conference, General Pawlikowski, the Commander of the Air Force
    Materiel Command, said it would take five to seven years for
    the Air Force to become fully cyber secure in part because the
    budget process had not yet made it a priority. Right now, the
    new Cyber Resiliency Office for Weapons Systems (CROWS), as
    only five full-time people.
        I know the Pentagon is a big bureaucracy. I know it does
    not always move as quickly as you would like. But I would like
    to ask how does the Air Force's fiscal year 2018 budget
    prioritize securing vulnerabilities in existing weapons
    systems, and what can we do right now this year to make this a
    priority?
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, let me start out by saying in
    this year's budget, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed a
    look at how we organize ourselves with respect to cyber and set
    up cyber defense teams. The Air Force is responsible for 39 of
    those. This year, we will reach the full 39 and that is funded
    in the budget.
        Beyond that, there is the responsibility to try to make
    sure that our systems are secure, both our communications
    systems but also our weapons systems. That has to be built into
    every element of procurement that we are pursuing. As I
    understand it, it is not done by a particular center. It is
    done in every single acquisitions system, and it is a huge
    challenge.
        I would also say that it is a rapidly evolving target
    space, and so trying to maintain cybersecurity both for our
    systems and more broadly is one of the greatest challenges that
    we face as a Nation.
        Senator Warren. So I appreciate what you are saying here
    and the importance of changes in our acquisition system. So let
    me just switch over to that immediately.
        General Goldfein, what kind of changes do you believe we
    need to make to our acquisition systems in order to execute on
    your vision of multi-domain command and control?
        General Goldfein. Yes, ma'am. Thank you.
        Currently when we look at weapons systems procurement, I
    would offer that we are coming out of the industrial age where
    you think about the weapon system and the munition and the
    sensor, and then you figure out how to connect it. I think we
    are getting into an age where victory is going to go to those
    who actually can connect together capabilities in the future in
    new ways of doing business.
        What that means is you have got to focus on the highway
    before you focus on the truck, and so getting the network
    right, having common system architecture, having a common set
    of standards so that what we procure not only in the Air Force
    but in the Army, the Navy, and the Marine Corps--it is going to
    be how we connect these things up that is going to matter most
    in the future.
        For the Air Force of the future, it is going to be old and
    new, manned and unmanned. It is going to be conventional and
    unconventional. We are going to have parts that are exquisite
    that penetrate and those that stand off. It is going to have
    all of the above, and the challenge for us in the future to
    move forward is how do we connect them.
        Senator Warren. So I applaud your vision here. I am just
    asking in my few remaining seconds about how we need to change
    our acquisition system so we can accomplish that vision. I see
    the Secretary shaking her head. She is very much there on the
    vision. Do we need to make changes in the acquisition system to
    get there?
        Secretary Wilson. I would say two things.
        One is we need to take full advantage of the authorities
    which you have given us and sometimes take some risk,
    calculated risk, to do things quickly. We are actually doing a
    scrub of our existing acquisition authorities and what we are
    not taking advantage of and where we should push the envelope
    this summer.
        The second thing is--and I will just give you an example.
    The integrated battle management command and control system for
    space is in this year's budget. That came out of an experiment
    authorized by the Congress last year on space. It is a common
    architecture for all kinds of space systems, and it says if you
    cannot hook into that common architecture for the common
    picture for command and control, you are not going to build the
    next satellite system. We are not doing one-off stovepipes. It
    has to be integrated and drive that through, and we are
    actually driving that through a very rapid acquisition system.
        Senator Warren. Thank you very much, and I want to see if I
    can get you up to Massachusetts to talk to our CROWS folks up
    there too.
        Secretary Wilson. You bet you.
        Senator Warren. Okay, good. Thank you.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Sullivan?
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Madam Secretary, General Goldfein, good to see you both. It
    is always impressive to me to hear about just how broad the
    mission set is for the Air Force. Please pass on our
    compliments to the professionalism in the service of the men
    and women you are leading.
        I wanted to provide one example of that professionalism. In
    the last two months in Alaska, the F-22 pilots, Guard and
    Active, and the KC-135 pilots have done missions to intercept
    Russian Bear bomber runs at America's sovereign airspace five
    times in the last two months. Five intercepts, different ones.
        General Goldfein, what are the Russians up to, and in your
    discussions and the tank and the Joint Chiefs, what should be
    our response?
        General Goldfein. Sir, we are seeing an increase in Russian
    activity when it comes to long-range aviation.
        Senator Sullivan. Are they testing our NORAD capabilities?
    I mean, what are they doing? What do we see them trying to do
    right now. That is a lot of intercepts in a two-month period.
        General Goldfein. It is. It is a combination of things that
    we are seeing relative to them reaching out with advancements
    in aviation that they have invested in. We are also seeing this
    as much in the Pacific theater as well. We see that not only
    from Russia but also from China. So we have seen long-range
    aviation increases.
        I will just give one example. I was talking to my
    counterpart in Japan, and he was telling me that Japan for this
    year will actually--they will actually exceed over 1,000
    intercepts this year, which is more than they have ever had in
    their history.
        Senator Sullivan. Are we learning something from our
    perspective on the intercepts of the Chinese or Russian bomber
    flights?
        General Goldfein. We learn something on every particular
    intercept. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sullivan. Let me ask another question. Last year's
    NDAA provided the Air Force guidance with the KC-46 OCONUS
    beddown. As you are looking to make that decision, some of the
    guidance talked about the ability to support multiple combatant
    commanders in their different warfighting capabilities. Your
    training area is collocated with other Air Force assets like
    fifth generation fighters, part of an air bridge to the Asia-
    Pacific. Are you familiar with that provision of the NDAA?
        General Goldfein. Yes, sir, I am.
        Senator Sullivan. Are you, Madam Secretary?
        Secretary Wilson. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sullivan. What are the three key lessons that we
    have learned in the ongoing development and deployment of the
    F-35?
        General Goldfein. I would say overall the most important
    lesson we have learned is the importance of information fusion
    and how we can take an aircraft and be able to sense both what
    it can do on the aircraft with what it does off the aircraft to
    able to then be the quarterback for a formation.
        Very quickly let me just give you a sense of what I saw
    when I went to Red Flag recently and saw the F-35's debut.
        I flew the F-117. In the first generation of stealth, we
    actually had a switch in the cockpit called the stealth switch.
    We flipped the switch. All the antennas would stow. All the
    emissions would stop, and we would close off the world.
        The F-35 actually connects into the network before the
    pilot climbs the ladder. In Nellis Air Force Base, we have a
    cyber protection team, cyber mission teams that are engaged in
    a cyber war that are doing this on a cyber range, and the
    impacts are being fed to the cockpit and on the displays of the
    F-35 pilot.
        We had space activities and actually space capabilities
    taking place in the middle of the campaign, and the impacts of
    those were actually on the displays and on the helmet of the F-
    35. He is calling audibles for the formation at 2 o'clock in
    the morning based on the impacts of the space and cyber wars
    before he even crosses into enemy territory. It is about the
    fusion of capability of information that the F-35 brings.
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, there is one other thing that I
    think is going to be--sometimes when you have vastly new
    capabilities, the people who are using those capabilities, the
    pilots that are out there, start to think of new ways of doing
    things. So I think we are only at the beginning of the
    innovation that we are going to see in the way in which we
    fight with these new tools. So I think it is just starting. It
    will change the way we fight.
        The night before I was sworn in, we had dinner at the
    Chief's house, at Air House, with the head of the Israeli Air
    Force. The Israelis still fly. The Chief of Staff still flies.
    We do not let our Chief of Staff still fly. He said something.
    As soon as he met me, he said I have had seven sorties in the
    F-35, and he said this is a game changer. There is nothing like
    it. This is an air chief who has flown the F-16, the F-15, the
    F-4 and done all of those in combat as an Israeli in the Middle
    East, and he said there is nothing like this in the world. This
    changes the game.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Shaheen?
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you both for being here and for your service to this
    country.
        Secretary Wilson, as I know you are aware, we have had
    issues in Portsmouth, New Hampshire with the water because of
    perfluorinated (PFCs) compounds, that have gotten into the
    drinking water for the City of Portsmouth because of the former
    Air Force base at Pease. The levels there are 12 and a half
    times higher than what as the provisional health advisory from
    the EPA [Environmental Protection Agency]. We have more than
    1,500 Granite Staters who have lived and worked around the air
    base who have learned that their blood contains elevated levels
    of these chemicals. I very much appreciate the Air Force's
    efforts to date to try and help address the pollution from the
    operations there at Pease.
        You provided funding to ATSDR [Agency for Toxic Substances
    and Disease Registry], which is the federal agency that
    conducted a feasibility assessment on the health study for
    those exposed to the contaminated water. But my understanding
    is that the Air Force has said it is not able to fund a follow-
    on health study. Can you talk about why that is and what can be
    done to address this, which is a continuing threat to people in
    the sea coast region?
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, I am familiar somewhat with this
    issue. I think the question is whether the Air Force is the
    right entity to do--and whether we even have the authorities to
    do a human health study on a civilian population around the
    base. I think the general counsel's offices, both in the Office
    of the Secretary of Defense, as well as the Air Force, are
    taking a look at that, and then we are happy to work with you
    and others on what is the best way to do a human health study.
    That is not our core competency, honestly.
        Senator Shaheen. No. I certainly understand that the Air
    Force would not be doing the study itself. I also understand
    that the Navy funded ATSDR to do a study at Camp Lejeune, a
    similar kind of health study, and I just wondered what is the
    difference between the Navy's ability to do that and the Air
    Force's. Is that just willingness? Is there some other issue
    there?
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, we heard from your staff. In
    fact, we got from your staff the tip with respect to Camp
    Lejeune, and we have asked the general counsel to talk to the
    Marine Corps and Navy general counsel, find out how they did
    that and see if we can find you an answer.
        Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. I very much appreciate
    that, and I know the people in New Hampshire do as well.
        General Goldfein, I want to follow up on the comments about
    the KC-46 because I understand that Senator McCain earlier
    raised his concerns about where we are with the program and
    some of the delays. But one of the other challenges with
    getting this new refueling tanker out are the changes that need
    to be made at some of the bases to address the beddowns, the
    sustainment, restoration, and modernization. Can you talk about
    those challenges as well?
        General Goldfein. Yes, ma'am. So right now in the 2018
    budget, we have funded new mission MILCON to make sure that we
    are meeting our responsibilities for the beddown because, as
    you know, you have to have some of that completed before the
    weapon system actually arrives. This morning, we are actually
    performing--our acquisition lead is actually doing a schedule
    review with the company on where we are relative to the
    schedule. As of this time, we still believe that we are going
    to be able to absorb the delays at McConnell and Altus and that
    we will be back on track by the time we actually then arrive at
    Pease Air Force Base. So the 2018 budget has MILCON in it.
        Senator Shaheen. Great. Thank you very much.
        Secretary Wilson, there has been a lot of news in the last
    2 days about what is happening in Qatar in the Middle East and
    the Arab countries who have expressed their concern about the
    way Qatar is operating a number of things with respect to Iran
    and Saudi Arabia. I wonder if you are concerned at all about
    our air base there and the operations that we need to continue
    to perform out of Qatar and the challenges that we are seeing.
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, the air operations at Al Udeid
    are continuing without interruption. Of course, the Air Force
    and the Department of Defense has a number of backup plans and
    those kinds of things. But it is our hope that this resolves
    itself with or without the assistance of the American Secretary
    of State. So from our perspective, it is largely at this point
    a diplomatic issue and our air operations continue unabated.
        Senator Shaheen. So there has been no threat that we have
    to remove our air base there.
        Secretary Wilson. No.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Donnelly?
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to thank both of you for being here, Ms. Wilson and
    General Goldfein.
        I want to return to an issue I have discussed with both of
    you before, which is the future of the 122nd fighter wing in
    Fort Wayne, Indiana. We have put this to bed it seems about
    three times, but it keeps coming up. I was just with our
    adjutant general and wing commander in Fort Wayne last week,
    and I can tell you they are doing an incredible job in their A-
    10 mission.
        Prior to the A-10 retirement ban, the Air Force was
    planning to bring F-16's from Hill Air Force Base to Fort
    Wayne. We would have been starting that mission conversion this
    year. Just yesterday, there was an article about those Hill F-
    16's now on their way to Holloman Air Force Base in New Mexico.
    I understand that given current conditions.
        But when that decision process began, General Mark Welsh
    who was then the Air Force Chief of Staff, asked for a meeting
    with me in my office, and he made a rock solid commitment that
    the Air Force would be maintaining a manned air combat mission
    in Fort Wayne.
        General Goldfein, you and I met less than a month later,
    just prior to your confirmation hearing, and you told me you
    would honor General Welsh's commitment.
        Ms. Wilson, you and I discussed the same issue in a meeting
    in your confirmation hearing March of this year, in which you
    said that if a commitment has been made, we will stand by it.
        I want to make sure that this commitment to maintaining a
    manned air combat mission at Fort Wayne will be kept. Ms.
    Wilson?
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, the A-10 is at Fort Wayne and we
    have no intention of removing it. It is there for the
    foreseeable future, and they will have that manned combat
    mission. We have no intention of changing that.
        Senator Donnelly. We have been promised a follow-on mission
    once the A-10--if and when it leaves.
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, our intention is not--we made
    the decision to keep the A-10's. So we are keeping the A-10's
    and we have no intention of taking that away from the Guard.
        Senator Donnelly. General Goldfein?
        General Goldfein. Sir, I agree with the Secretary. The
    reality is we need that wing flying the A-10 right now, and so
    we made a decision in this budget to keep the A-10.
        Senator Donnelly. Well, my question is how long does right
    now last.
        Secretary Wilson. This does not have the five-year budget
    in it, but we are keeping the A-10's for the foreseeable
    future, which is five or ten years at least.
        Senator Donnelly. Let me ask you something else.
        One of the things I have been working on is mental health
    and mental health services for our servicemembers. I appreciate
    the commitment both of you have made to improve the mental
    health and the resiliency of our airmen and military families.
    The Jacob Sexton Act, which is legislation that was passed,
    provides for a robust annual mental health assessment for every
    servicemember. The Air Force has said in the past that the
    Sexton Act requirements would be fully implemented by October
    of 2017. Are we still on track to meet that target?
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, we are on track to meet that
    target. But in my view it is more than that. Every morning when
    the Chief and I start the morning----
        Senator Donnelly. The Sexton Act there is more than that
    too, but I was just trying to find out about that in
    particular.
        Secretary Wilson. The thing to me that is heartbreaking
    about this is how many mornings we come in and the status
    report includes a suicide, Active, Guard, and Reserve. They
    come up in our morning reports, and somehow we have to get to
    that ``we man'' culture that says we try to take care of each
    other and identify problems and get people help when they need
    it.
        Chairman McCain. Could I interrupt? Madam Secretary,
    section 702 of the Defense Authorization Act required it. So
    are you going to implement the law or are you going to have
    meetings and talk about it?
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, we are implementing the law.
        Chairman McCain. All right. Thanks.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Goldfein?
        General Goldfein. Sir, one of the things that we are
    looking at is the Special Operations Command has a very
    successful program called Preservation of the Force and Family
    (POTFF) for an acronym. What they have asked is an important
    question, and the question is, if we would take an aircraft off
    the line at a certain point for scheduled maintenance, check
    it, pull panels, make sure it is good, get it back on the line,
    and then later do depot maintenance, which is a heavier look,
    if we would do that for machines, what would it look like if we
    did that for people?
        Now we are following their lead on a program that looks at
    how do we take airmen off the line at a certain point and make
    sure we pull panels, if you will, and take a look at how they
    are doing, how they are doing financially, how are they doing
    with their career, how they are doing at home, how are they
    doing spiritually. Once it is scheduled maintenance, the stigma
    goes away because everyone is doing it, and then we do a later
    time and we pull them off for depot maintenance, which is a
    deeper look.
        So we have three bases now that we have started this. We
    call it Task Force True North. We are moving out on this, and
    we are going to look at that across the entire Air Force
    because I think SOCOM has got the model for success.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I would just like to say that I kind of felt like I got
    half an answer on the A-10's because there is a commitment for
    an ongoing manned mission, and as long as I am here, I will
    make sure that commitment is kept.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Thank you also, Senator Donnelly. Twice I
    have kind of heard, well, yes, we see the law but we are not
    implementing it. I have to tell you, Madam Secretary and
    General, we are going to have to start imposing some penalties
    if you do not carry out the law. That is our job. That is our
    job, not to give you an option as to whether we are going to do
    something or not. If it had been entirely up to you, the A-10
    would be down in the bone yard in Tucson. So we are going to be
    looking at provisions that we put in the bill in the last 2
    years, which are reform provisions, and frankly, we are going
    to have to impose some penalty if you do not carry out the law.
    It is sort of a fundamental.
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, we will carry out the law.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. But so far you have not. Anyway, we will
    give you a list of those that we have mandated, and
    unfortunately, then if you do not get it done, we are going to
    have to add it to the bill that there is going to be some kind
    of penalty for not doing it. We take our jobs very seriously
    and we take the Constitution very seriously.
        Senator Graham?
        Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Madam Secretary, how many political appointments are
    available to the Department of the Air Force?
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, there are I believe six that are
    confirmable, in addition to me.
        Senator Graham. Are all of them moving forward? Are there
    names to fill these slots?
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, there are two that we are still,
    I believe, interviewing for, but the other ones--we have a
    preferred nominee that is in some point in the process.
        Senator Graham. This is June. When do you think they will
    get to the committee?
        Secretary Wilson. Sir, I do not know.
        Senator Graham. Does this impede your ability to do your
    job?
        Secretary Wilson. It is becoming difficult, yes.
        Senator Graham. Where is the problem? At the White House?
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, I am not really sure.
        Senator Graham. Could you let us know?
        Secretary Wilson. Yes, sir.
        Senator Graham. This committee--the chairman has decided, I
    think, to mark up the 640 versus 603. From the Air Force point
    of view, could you use some of that money?
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, we have a list of unfunded
    requirements.
        Senator Graham. How much is that?
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, it is a little more than $10
    billion.
        Senator Graham. I think all the unfunded requirements are
    $30 billion. So 603 plus 30 is 633. So we are not far off. So
    if you had $10 billion more on top of what the White House
    requested, that would be a good thing. Is that right, General?
        General Goldfein. Yes, sir. It absolutely would be a good
    thing.
        Senator Graham. In terms of threats, from 2011 until today
    when sequestration first kicked in, how would you describe the
    threats to the Nation in terms of more or less?
        General Goldfein. Sir, absolutely more, and I think the
    framework that the Secretary and the Chairman have laid out,
    which you are familiar with, the Four Plus One, China, Russia,
    Iran, North Korea, and violent extremism--I can say that in
    each one of those areas, the threat has increased.
        Senator Graham. In terms of the ability to deal with those
    threats, sequestration is the law of the land. It kicks back in
    this year. What would happen to the Air Force's ability to deal
    with these threats if we went back to sequestration levels?
        General Goldfein. Sir, I want to be very clear and it is
    what all the Joint Chiefs have testified before. We will be
    unable to execute the Defense Strategic Guidance under
    sequester.
        Senator Graham. Do you agree with that, Madam Secretary?
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, yes, I do.
        Senator Graham. From the Air Force's point of view, who is
    our greatest foe? Maybe you can name a couple, and does the
    budget this committee is proposing--does it give you the
    resources adequately to deal with those foes?
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, when we look at the world and
    the threats we face, there is China, North Korea, Russia, Iran,
    and violent extremism that we principally focus on. All of
    those threats are growing in different ways. I would say that
    this budget builds----
        Senator Graham. Let us just talk about the air threat, from
    a nation state air threat.
        Secretary Wilson. China is very rapidly modernizing its air
    force. North Korea, as you well know, is seeking to have an
    intercontinental ballistic missile capability and the ability
    to deliver a nuclear device. I think that concerns us all. Iran
    also is developing its missile capability and sponsoring
    terrorist organizations, and the Russians are also modernizing
    their military.
        Senator Graham. General, what advice would you give the
    Congress in terms of this dilemma? Is it better for us to allow
    the ICBM [Intercontinental Ballistic Missile] to be developed
    with a warhead on top that could reach America and have a
    missile defense system to deal with the threat with the
    assurance that if you ever launch toward us, we will destroy
    North Korea? Or is it better from a Homeland security
    perspective not to allow them to have that capability to begin
    with?
        General Goldfein. Sir, I would align with current policy
    which stated that it is better not to allow them to have it.
        Senator Graham. That means, as a last option, military
    force if diplomacy fails?
        General Goldfein. Well, sir, my responsibility is to
    provide the President options and to ensure that he has the
    options to do what he needs to do.
        Chairman McCain. Senator King?
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Madam Secretary--did you have a follow-up question,
    Senator?
        Senator Graham. No.
        Senator King. I want to follow up on Senator Shaheen's
    questions. I am concerned about Al Udeid. In the last 24 hours,
    Saudi Arabia, UAE [United Arab Emerits], Bahrain, and Egypt
    have cut off diplomatic relations with Qatar. Have you been in
    touch with any officials of those countries or in Qatar
    directly since that has taken place to guarantee, if you will,
    the continued viability of our operations at Al Udeid?
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, I am going to ask the Chief to
    follow up on this as well.
        I have not personally been in touch with them, but we have
    information from Al Udeid, as well as the combatant commander
    there, and I know the Chief has talked directly.
        Senator King. General?
        General Goldfein. Sir, so I have talked directly to the
    commander there who has assured me that----
        Senator King. Our commander.
        General Goldfein. Our commander, our air commander, who
    lives at Al Udeid, and you may know that I lived there for 2
    years from 2011 to 2013 as the Air Component Commander. I am
    very familiar with the Qataris and the region, having spent 2
    years traveling the region.
        What I will tell you is that he assured me that they are
    working right now through the ambassador and the country team,
    that this is a diplomatic lead effort, and now militarily there
    is no impact to our operations. I will tell you that we always
    build alternative contingencies to be able to continue
    operations.
        Then I will just share with you--again, this is in
    diplomatic lanes, but the military element to it--as the region
    works this out and the GCC [Gulf Coast Countries] countries
    work this out--one of my responsibilities as the Air Component
    Commander was to be the area defense commander and to build a
    collective defense of the Arabian Gulf.
        Senator King. That is what worries me is the split creates
    a new reality that we have not seen before.
        General Goldfein. We spent 2 years--and it has been built
    on since then--talking to the countries in the region to ensure
    they understood that individually, when it comes to countering
    Iranian behavior and especially Iranian missile threats--you
    know, from the UAE to Iran is about a 5- to 7-minute time of
    flight, and so we worked together to ensure that the nations
    understood that collectively they actually had what they need
    to defend themselves.
        Senator King. I do not mean to interrupt you, but I want to
    get to some other subjects. But I think the point is they have
    understood it in the past. The question is do they understand
    now and what are the implications of what happened yesterday--
    --
        General Goldfein. Yes, sir. That is the point, that
    militarily they need to work through this to ensure they can
    maintain a collective defense.
        Senator King. General, let me go to the pilot shortage. I
    met with younger pilots, mid-career pilots, and they do not
    point to budget issues. They point to quality of life issues,
    and particularly as they get on in their careers, they end up
    flying desks more than they fly airplanes. What is the
    bottleneck? If you had to identify three factors to address,
    what are they, one, two, three?
        General Goldfein. I want to thank you and Senator Cotton
    for both taking the time to talk to these pilots.
        Number one, I get asked all the time--when I am home, I am
    not home. As soon as I get back from a deployment, I am going
    to go remote again or I am going to go something else. So just
    the time at home. So we are working on ways that we can create
    space in the calendar, just a basic scheduling.
        Number two is to get them airborne because pilots who do
    not fly are not going to stay and get them the flying hours.
        Senator King. Part of the problem there is we do not have
    enough maintainers. Right?
        General Goldfein. Exactly.
        Senator King. It is a shortage of a shortage.
        General Goldfein. That is why in this budget you will see
    us going after personnel as our number one readiness issue to
    ensure that we have the critical skills to get the aircraft in
    the air to get them flying.
        The number three part of this is to remove what I would
    call a series of things that are just irritating over time. As
    we have gotten smaller, the workload and the burden----
        Senator King. Paperwork----
        General Goldfein.--has come to the smaller force. I am sure
    you heard this loud and clear. So we are putting civilians into
    squadrons to take on some of that workload. We are looking at
    building healthy squadrons. We are looking at all those things
    that go into building a healthy atmosphere so we can get at
    this because it is just as much about quality of service as
    quality of life.
        Senator King. Is any one person in your organization in
    charge of this retention issue?
        General Goldfein. Yes, sir. Lieutenant General Chris
    Nowland, who is my A-3, is overall in charge. He has got the
    lead within the Air Force. I have got the lead within the Joint
    Chiefs because this affects all of the services, and my
    commander for Air Mobility Command that actually works with the
    civilian airlines every day because he has the civilian reserve
    air fleet--he has got the lead for working with industry. So we
    are working it from a national level, internal to the Air
    Force, and across the joint team.
        Senator King. Well, I appreciate that, and I hope that
    General Nowland wakes up every morning saying how are we going
    to solve this problem because we have got to solve it. This is
    not a budget issue really. This is an organizational issue.
        Finally, I am out of time. I just want to say we have
    talked a little bit about the F-35 and the B-21. If what
    happened to the F-35 happens to the B-21, I am going to find
    you. We have got to see that that does not happen. We have got
    to learn those lessons. The country cannot afford either the
    time or the money in order to field the B-21 efficiently and
    cost effectively.
        General Goldfein. Sir, you can be assured I am the chief
    requirements officer for the B-21, and I expect to be held
    fully accountable.
        Senator King. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Cotton?
        Senator Cotton. Thank you and welcome, Secretary Wilson.
    Congratulations. General Goldfein, good to see you again.
        I want to build upon what Senator King was speaking about
    on pilot retention. As you know but as some members of the
    committee and the public may not know, Senator King, my ranking
    member on the Airland Power Subcommittee recently held a
    roundtable breakfast with several company grade officers, a few
    young majors as well who are pilots, unfortunately, some of
    whom have decided to leave the service already and go to the
    airlines. As Senator King says, this cannot be only a monetary
    issue. This committee offered $35,000 in bonuses last year. I
    suspect we could double or even triple that at some serious
    expense without increasing retention numbers that much because
    although these pilots found the bonuses were nice to have, when
    you amortize that out over the years of commitment they are
    taking on and some of the other, as you call them, irritants,
    General Goldfein, it simply did not make sense. Not only can
    the airlines in the long run probably pay them more, but they
    can give them a lot more stability as well. You can go to an
    airline and predict exactly which 10 or 12 days a month that
    you are going to be flying the way you cannot in the Air Force.
        I want to commend you on your efforts to try to eliminate a
    lot of those non-essential duties that are an irritant for our
    young pilots so they can get back to focus on flying. I want to
    commend you for your focus on pushing command authorities back
    down to the squadron level. I know your push to add civilians
    to the squadrons to alleviate some of this additional
    administrative workload has really made a difference in the
    morale and those pilots appreciate it.
        Senator King mentioned flight time. That is flight time in
    the short term of being able to get in the cockpit and fly. But
    we also heard an opinion on the long term as well that many of
    these young men and women join the Air Force because they want
    to fly. They do not want to sit at desks. They do not want to
    be PowerPoint warriors, and to put a fine point on it, they do
    not want to be Chief of Staff of the Air Force. They respect
    you. They admire what you have accomplished in your career, but
    they look back at what Captain or Major Goldfein was doing and
    saying I want to do that for most of my career or all of my
    career. They say they are simply not allowed to. The Air Force
    forces them to move on and up.
        They suggested we take a look at what is called a tactical
    track to allow officers who want to spend their career when
    they are at the peak of their skills to remain flying F-15's or
    F-16's or B-2's or what have you. Is this something the Air
    Force has under consideration?
        General Goldfein. Sir, we are looking at it.
        But I also want to make sure that we are clear. If you put
    a piece of paper in front of Captain Goldfein and said, listen,
    Captain, if you want to stay flying and never do anything else,
    all you got to do is sign here and you will never make it past
    lieutenant colonel, I would have signed it in a second. That is
    exactly what our young captains feel like. But them we give
    them a leadership position and they understand what it feels
    like to actually lead young men and women into combat.
    Hopefully we hook them, and so there are some things in a
    career that we want them to do. While we are looking at
    different tracks, what I do not to do is to have young officers
    who have not had the chance to actually show what they are made
    of relative to leadership, opportunities, much like I am sure
    you experienced as you were leading soldiers--once you do it
    and you realize the fact that you can actually have an impact
    on people's lives, I want to make sure that we do not close
    doors to those young officers who may find that they actually
    can be great chiefs of staff some day.
        Senator Cotton. Captain Goldfein was a pretty good pilot.
    Was he not?
        General Goldfein. He was the best pilot in the Air Force.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Cotton. It is funny. You know, those captains and
    majors said they are the best pilots, and the colonels and the
    generals are over the hill.
        General Goldfein. Boy, if we do not have that today, then
    we got bigger problems.
        Senator Cotton. But Captain Goldfein made that decision at
    a different time in the Air Force in its size and funding. We
    are facing, as we have heard from Senator McCain, Senator Reed,
    Senator Wicker, Senator King, something of a crisis in fighter
    pilot retention. Maybe we might lose one or two candidates for
    Chief of Staff of the Air Force in 2035, but I think that we
    have to consider this option for 900 or 1,100 pilots short,
    however many pilots we are short.
        General Goldfein. Absolutely. We are continuing to look at
    that.
        Beyond this, if I can just take 30 seconds, the other part
    of this is the life in the squadron and this idea of service
    and making sure that we do not ever lose the fact because we
    have had a lot of discussions here about all the different
    issues. The Secretary and I are committed to swinging away at
    this. But there is a big part of this that is also the reason
    that you joined the Army and I joined the Air Force, which was
    to serve, to be part of something bigger than ourselves, to be
    able to make a difference in the world, to be a better version
    of ourselves. All that still occurs, and we want to make sure
    that we capture that in our young airmen we have today as we go
    forward.
        Senator Cotton. I understand. The Army and Air Force are
    different institutions, though. In the Army, it is the junior
    enlisted who are at the tip of the spear. They are driving
    vehicles. They are manning the crew-served weapons. Senior
    enlisted and officers are controlling the element. In the Air
    Force, it is your officers that are at the tip of the spear. It
    is Captain Goldfein who is out flying missions in combat and
    getting shot down in combat. It is something that we have to
    take into account when we look at the way the two services
    organize their affairs.
        One final point. A lot of issues with the level of online
    training. I know this is something both of you have looked at.
    But for the record, I just want to say that our pilots who are
    flying missions need to get the kind of basic training in
    critical issues like sexual harassment, sexual assault
    prevention. We heard reports of some of our pilots, though
    getting mandatory online training, things like preventing human
    trafficking, which is a very important and noble goal but maybe
    better suited for law enforcement or intelligence and so forth.
    So I hope you will take a careful look at all of the training
    requirements we are putting on pilots who need to get more time
    in the cockpit or more time with their families.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Kaine?
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Thank you to the witnesses.
        Just a point to follow up on a question or comment that
    Senator Graham made, this question about the pace of
    appointments. The President tweeted the other day that the
    hollowness was because of Democratic obstruction. I very much
    was offended by that. The President has forwarded to us by my
    counting about 20 percent of the nominations that are the
    Senate-confirmable positions. Eighty percent there has not been
    a nominee forwarded to us in June, and certainly on the
    committees that I serve that are national security committees,
    the Armed Services and the Foreign Relations Committee, the
    pace of the chair, once the nominations are here from the White
    House, has been to move them through committee pretty quickly.
    I am not aware of things slowing down on the floor on these
    positions, and so I will just make that as a statement for the
    record. I think the facts will bear that out.
        There has been some good testimony about the pilot issue,
    shortages of pilots, a great discussion with Senator Cotton.
    You mentioned the numbers on maintainers. The numbers on
    maintainers are maybe even more challenging. Could you each
    describe what you are doing to try to deal with that shortage?
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, this budget also includes an
    increase in maintainers. One of the reasons that we cannot
    recover in a single year, no matter how much money you put at
    it, is because readiness requires not just an avionics tech who
    has got 1 year of experience, but you got to have those mid-
    level NCOs [Non Commissioned Officers], the supervisors, the
    experts on the job, and there is only so much you can
    accelerate experience. So one of the things that is a real
    concern on the retention side is trying to keep those
    maintainers so that you have got a balanced force across all of
    the different ranks. It is a real challenge if you have a very
    young force without that hands-on skill and that experience to
    know how to fix this problem right now. So it is a challenge.
        Senator Kaine. If I am correct, the maintainer workforce is
    an interesting mixture of Active, Guard, and Reserve, some
    civilians in that workforce. So it is an interesting human
    resources issue. But you have some breadth of talent from the
    different posts to pull from in meeting maintainer needs.
    Correct?
        General Goldfein. Yes, sir. One of the things that we are
    doing is we have shifted to civilian and contract maintenance
    for all those flying operations that are actually not
    deployable to combat. So for our training--our training is
    primarily civilian contract maintenance. So we freed up the
    blue suit, if you will, to take on that deployable piece of it.
        The challenge we find, though, is that in the smaller
    force--I will give you one vignette. When I started flying
    airplanes, I would walk out to the airplane. I would meet a
    dedicated and assistant crew chief at the airplane. We would
    walk around the airplane. I would strap it on. We would go. I
    would get to the end of the runway, and a different set of crew
    chiefs would be there to what we call last chance or end of
    runway. They would pull the pins. They would arm the bombs.
    They would make sure we were good to go, and we would take off,
    fly to a destination and there would be a different maintenance
    crew that would be there.
        Here is what it looks like today in many places. You taxi
    slow because the crew chief, the one crew chief has got to get
    in the bread van and drive to the end of the runway and be that
    same crew chief that pulls the pins and arms the bombs. On our
    worst day, you fly slow because that crew chief has got to jump
    on a C-17 with his toolkit and get to the destination to meet
    you when you arrive.
        The problem is it masks the problem because if you were to
    go to the data and said did you taxi on time, yes. Did you take
    off? Did you make your mission? Did you recover? Yes. The issue
    is we did it on the back of that smaller force, and that is
    what we cannot sustain as the threats go up and the demand
    signal goes up.
        Senator Kaine. A very good answer. That is informative.
        Let me ask you a question about one item that is in this
    budget that I thought was interesting. I do not really have an
    opinion about it. But your budget proposes to move 10,000
    civilian acquisition personnel from the O&M [Operations and
    Maintenance] account to the research, development, test, and
    evaluation account. I just thought that was interesting, and
    could you describe a little bit your thinking in terms of
    moving that amount of personnel? That is a big move.
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, I do not think their jobs are
    changing. It is just a question of----
        Senator Kaine. Right. How will they be managed and where
    they fit.
        Ms. Wilson.--where they fit and what the real work is they
    are doing, and the finance people felt that they were better
    accounted for as research, development, test, and evaluation
    rather than the O&M side.
        Senator Kaine. Is this just sort of where they are
    accounted for in the budget, not only are their jobs not
    changing, but sort of the chain of command and the reporting?
    How they report will not change either?
        Secretary Wilson. That is correct, that it is really just
    an accounting change.
        Senator Kaine. If that is not correct, I would love it if
    you could provide additional written response, but if it is
    correct, you do not need to provide an additional answer.
        The last thing is we are dealing with the new fifth
    generation aircraft, not only the Air Force, but the Navy and
    Marines as well. Their training range is off the coast in
    Virginia and North Carolina. Do you have make changes to allow
    those ranges to be fully utilized by fifth generation aircraft?
        General Goldfein. We do with some, and that is that the
    ranges that we have to train relative to certain scenarios and
    the threat laydown of emissions that allows us to actually
    collect on emissions and then fight against an adversary
    scenario--all those are investments that you have to make.
        Interesting, though. So when I grew up flying airplanes,
    you would go to the airplane for your advanced work and you
    would go to the simulator for your basic work. So you do
    emergency procedures, you know, basic capabilities in the
    simulator to prepare you for the high-end training in the
    aircraft. In fifth generation, we are seeing a bit of a
    reversal. To be able to actually train up with all of your
    capabilities against an adversary with all of their
    capabilities, very often we can replicate that the best in the
    virtual world. Now what we are looking at is how do you combine
    virtual capabilities with live and constructive, which would be
    computer generated, to actually get to the highest level of
    training. So you are going to see in this budget a fairly
    significant investment in virtual and simulation to be able to
    get our physical ranges connected with our simulators as we go
    forward.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Heinrich?
        Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you both for being here and thank you for your
    service.
        General Goldfein, just quickly. I think you may have
    answered this briefly. But can you tell me a little bit about
    the KC-46, the delay? For States like North Carolina and
    Seymour Johnson for our planning purposes, what are we looking
    at? Is that 18-month delay real? Could we go further? Just some
    idea for planning purposes.
        General Goldfein. Yes, sir. So right now this morning, our
    service acquisition executive is actually holding a schedule
    review and looking at exactly where we are. We think that there
    may be a couple months now that we are looking at for delay. It
    is combination of the contractor not anticipating some of the
    challenges with FAA certification, a little bit in the testing
    and getting the data points that are required go into that.
        Our best estimate right now is that we are going to be able
    to absorb the delays at McConnell and Altus and that we will be
    back on track by the time we get to Pease in terms of delivery
    schedule. If that changes, we will report immediately.
        Senator Tillis. Thank you.
        Secretary Wilson, I think the chairman touched on military
    health care reform. Can you talk a little bit about how the
    component model is actually going to drive efficiencies, maybe
    break down stovepipes? How does it work?
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, all of this is being implemented
    now, and the services are looking at what kinds of pieces stay
    with the services and how do we combine this to provide more
    efficiency and honestly reduce some of the overhead in each of
    the services to run a military health care system. So all of
    the implementation is moving forward with the Office of the
    Surgeon General and the Defense Health Care Administration.
        There is a lot of pieces to this. There is a lot of
    contracting that is going on and a lot of decisions about how
    do we move forward to this new, more integrated system. So
    there is a lot of work that is going on.
        Senator Tillis. I have another question just on the
    business side of your responsibilities. It has to do with the
    audit. How are we doing for 2017?
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, I actually checked on that
    yesterday. We will declare audit readiness at the end of this
    fiscal year. Fiscal year 2018 will be the first fully audited
    year. So all of that data will be subject to audit. I think as
    you understand probably better than most, we expect in the
    first year we are going to have audit findings. We are going to
    find problems. That is why you do an audit.
        Senator Tillis. That is great.
        Secretary Wilson. So that is good. Then we start to
    routinely respond to those and improve our financial systems
    and its management.
        Senator Tillis. Talk a little bit on--now that you have
    been around for ages, a little bit on initiatives with respect
    to acquisition reform. I do not know, when you and I met in our
    office, if I brought in my 680-page prop of the next generation
    handgun, which actually started in the Air Force and then found
    its way across the lines of service. But what specific actions
    are you trying to take--either General Goldfein or Secretary
    Wilson--that give me some hope that we are going to find a way
    to right-size acquisition processes to the mission requirement?
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, we are trying to look at--and
    this summer, at the end of June, we have kind of a retreat with
    all of the senior offices in the Air Force, as well as the
    senior civilians in the Air Force. With the senior civilians, I
    have asked them to take a whole half-day chunk of time and let
    us look at what are the authorities we are currently using.
    Where are we doing this to ourselves, not driven by statute or
    regulation, but what can we do ourselves? Let us look at the
    processes and look at where we can take advantage of new
    authorities that have been given to us and how we will
    systematically do that for every procurement.
        There are some procurements that are more complex than
    others, and there are some areas where I found that we are
    being very aggressive in using authorities, particularly
    special authorities for special situations. How do we then use
    that and roll that back into the regular way in which we do
    business? We will be doing a half-day retreat on that in late
    June.
        Senator Tillis. General Goldfein?
        General Goldfein. Yes. Just to build on the Secretary's
    point, one of the areas that the Secretary and I have talked a
    lot about and we are looking at is how do we acquire
    information technology. It may be that we ought not ever put
    two acronyms in the same sentence, IT and RFP, because the
    reality is if you try to acquire information technology as a
    weapons system or as a platform, it is already too slow because
    whether we want to talk about the cybersecurity issues we
    talked about earlier or the fact that it just changes at such a
    fast pace, we are looking at a holistic view on how do we
    acquire information technology because it is so central to our
    future as we look at networking together capabilities.
        Senator Tillis. And to your spend.
        General Goldfein. Absolutely.
        Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Heinrich?
        Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Secretary Wilson, General Goldfein, welcome to both of you.
        On Friday, I was very pleased to see that the environmental
    assessment was completed and found no significant impact for
    the two additional F-16 squadrons to operate at Holloman Air
    Force Base. I think this is another testament both to the
    quality of the range and the airspace near Holloman, as well as
    the support for the military in the Alamogordo area.
        Like you have both said, there is no quick fix to the pilot
    shortage we have, but I will certainly work with my colleagues
    to ensure that you have the budget and resources to help train
    more pilots. If the Air Force identifies any unfunded
    requirements as it relates to solving this problem, please seek
    our help because we are very serious about meeting your needs
    in this front.
        To both of you, in addition to pilots, we obviously have
    the shortage of maintainers for both F-16's and F-35's. You
    have heard about that from some of my colleagues this morning.
    I think we lose roughly 6,000 maintainers a year just due to
    retirements and separations.
        So I want to ask how much do you rely on the National Guard
    to help fill in some of that challenge in terms of the gap
    there? How can we strengthen that partnership? For either of
    you.
        General Goldfein. Sir, I will be really clear. We could not
    perform our mission of the United States Air Force without the
    Air National Guard in any of the areas where we have actually--
    because the way we have organized, you know, we are one Air
    Force with three components. You can go onto a C-17 and walk up
    into the cockpit and say, okay, who is Guard, who is Active,
    who is Reserve, and all three hands will go up.
        So in terms of maintenance specifically, one of the things
    that the Air National Guard brings us is the experience level
    of having worked on one platform for the majority of their
    career. So I cannot tell you the number of times I go and I
    will find an Air National Guard crew chief and they can
    redesign the thing for you because they have been working all
    this time.
        So in this budget, you will see that we are looking at
    putting in a second shift of maintenance at the Air National
    Guard locations to then be able to bring more pilots into the
    Air National Guard so they can experience a young pilot more in
    the Air National Guard where I have that volume of experience
    there. So we rely very heavily on them.
        Senator Heinrich. Well, I know there is a very active
    interest in the Air Guard in New Mexico in playing a strong
    role with regard to maintainers, and if we can help facilitate
    that, please do not be shy.
        Obviously, we are seeing an increased amount of competition
    in space from Russia and China, as well as other threats in
    space. For either of you, do you believe that our satellite
    launch capabilities are responsive and resilient enough to meet
    these increasing threats?
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, we had a huge problem in this
    country in the 1990s with access to space, and the country at
    that time made a significant investment in space capability and
    the ability to launch, and it paid off and is showing results.
    The benefit now is that we are seeing competition and it is
    bringing the price down for access to space.
        One of the things that is in this budget--we faced a
    potential gap in weather coverage from satellites, and one of
    the things that is in this budget is using the Operationally
    Responsive Space force to do that satellite and get that
    satellite up as a gap-filler in coverage for weather.
        Senator Heinrich. I am very glad that you brought up
    Operationally Responsive Space, and I was incredibly pleased to
    see that this year's budget request included a significant
    increase in funds for ORS. Can you talk a little more about the
    Air Force's plans for the future of that program and how the
    office's rapid acquisition authorities can contribute to the
    Air Force's mission in space as we move forward?
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, that office, as well as a couple
    of others, particularly with respect to space, have
    demonstrated the ability to rapidly acquire things and get
    things up and on orbit. I think this weather satellite is a
    good example of where it is filling a gap. By being able to
    move quickly to look at an opportunity and fill a gap, we are
    able to serve the needs of the warfighter.
        Senator Heinrich. I am very excited about the prospects for
    Operationally Responsive Space.
        I also just want to take my last few seconds here and say I
    think there is the next generation of launch companies that are
    looking at small payloads, whether it is Virgin Gallactic or
    Vulcan Aerospace or Orbital ATK [Alliant Tech Systems]. I
    really encourage you to look at some of those ideas too. I
    think the more distributed, the more responsive, the more
    flexible and the quicker we can field some of these things, the
    quicker we will be able to meet some of the gaps we have with
    our adversaries.
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, I would say we have a couple of
    things here. One is this is the model of the X-37, which will
    be going up again. It is a reusable vehicle and it will be
    going up again on top of a SpaceX launcher in August. I think
    the Chief has a cube sat as well. So they are getting smaller,
    able to be put on multiple different platforms, and there are
    some very exciting things happening in commercial space that
    bring the opportunity for assured access to space at a very
    competitive price.
        Senator Heinrich. Fantastic.
        Thank you, Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Cruz?
        Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary Wilson, General Goldfein, welcome. Good
    afternoon. Thank you for your service. Thank you for your
    testimony today.
        I wanted to start by talking about the F-35. A number of
    military leaders have commented on the advantages of fifth
    generation fighters and the transformative impact that they are
    having on our fleet. In January, the Red Flag exercises--my
    understandings were that the performance of the F-35 was
    exceptional and there have been reports of kill ratios in the
    order of 20 to 1.
        Can you explain to the committee the F-35's performance at
    Red Flag and also the impact it is having both on our ability
    to defend ourselves and our allies?
        General Goldfein. Yes, thanks, Senator. Let me just
    describe for you the mission that I witnessed out there at Red
    Flag on F-35's debut.
        So the first thing is that the mission commander, who is a
    mission commander check ride--he is leading 100 aircraft into
    conflict, and it is what we call Big Dollar Night, which means
    that we put up the most adversary defenses we could both on the
    ground and in the air against him. He has got 100 aircraft.
    Before he climbs the ladder, the F-35 is already connected into
    the network and it is actually getting information fed to it on
    what is going on in the cyber war that is taken on with a full
    cyber mission team and a cyber protection team that are
    fighting in the cyber domain and actually taking out nodes that
    the mission commander, the F-35 pilot has assigned to the cyber
    teams there to take out.
        While he is flying to the tanker to get gas, the space war
    is raging, and he is getting fed information into the cockpit
    on what is going on in the space war relative to actual
    techniques that are going on at 2 o'clock in the morning on the
    Nellis range. He is calling audibles for the formation as the
    quarterback as he goes in to take out enemy targets. In the
    middle of the fight, he gets information fed to him that he has
    got a high-value convoy that he has to go find, fix, and finish
    and assess in the middle of the fight while he is taking out
    targets, and he does that through his means available.
        While that is going on, he is told an F-16 was shot down
    and he has to coordinate an entire combat search and rescue in
    the middle of the fight. While that is going on, he has got to
    do a special ops insertion.
        The fusion of information that allows him to be able to
    quarterback that formation and operate on a completely
    different level than we have enjoyed before is the networking
    capability that the F-35 brings. So we are no longer talking
    about F-35 versus J-20. We are talking about F-35 in a family
    of systems as the quarterback that can actually call audibles
    and move the formation as we go into conflict. That is the game
    changer that it brings.
        Senator Cruz. Last week, I had the opportunity to fly an F-
    35 simulator, and I will say the technology on the plane is
    remarkable, so much so that in the simulator I was able to land
    on a carrier which I could promise you I lack the skills to do
    remotely, which means it truly is made idiot-proof and that I
    did not crash into the carrier and kill a bunch of people in
    the simulator. So let me commend you on that.
        The Air Force's budget submission for fiscal year 2018
    would purchase 46 F-35A's, which is two less than fiscal year
    2016 and one fewer than was enacted in the 2017 budget. But it
    appears that the Air Force believes that you require 60 F-35's
    based on an additional 14 that are listed in your unfunded
    requirements list. Can the both of you tell the committee if
    you think 46 F-35's is an accurate number and what you believe
    is necessary to meet our defense needs?
        General Goldfein. Sir, this is purely a function of
    resources available, given all the other competing priorities
    across all the other mission sets that we perform, not the
    least of which is a safe, secure, reliable nuclear deterrent,
    everything we are doing in space, everything we are doing in
    cyber. So 46 is essentially all we could get to in this
    particular budget, which is why you have seen us lean forward
    on the unfunded priority list with the additional ones.
        While not part of your question, if I could just take one
    minute, just to honestly say thank you for your work on moving
    forward on the NASA strategic plan. It is really important to
    us because we partner with them on so many things in space. So
    thank you for that.
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, I would say that the Air Force's
    objective is to try to get to 60 F-35's steady state production
    for the buy, and we are budget constrained.
        Senator Cruz. Thank you.
        Let me ask one more on the topic General Goldfein just
    raised, which is space, and the Air Force is seeking a 20
    percent increase for space systems, totaling $7.7 billion in
    the 2018 budget. Do both of you feel that a 20 percent increase
    is sufficient, given the rapidly growing threats in space and
    the dependence that so many of our systems have on maintaining
    our capabilities in space?
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, there are some items on the
    unfunded requirements list that are related to space,
    particularly space defense requirements. I think it is about
    $200 million. This budget is a significant increase in space.
    As you mentioned, it is about a 20 percent increase, and there
    are a lot of innovative new things in there, particularly
    secure, command, control, and communications, some additional
    things with ability to defend systems in space. So I think
    there is a lot of progress here, but there is no question there
    is much more to be done.
        Senator Cruz. Let me ask both of you to elaborate. This is
    a topic we have discussed in classified hearings as well. Just
    elaborate, to the extent you can in this open hearing, on the
    magnitude of the threats we face in space and what the impact
    could be if we are not prepared to deal with them.
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, you are right, that this is
    difficult to talk about in an open hearing. But we are all
    familiar with the test that the Chinese did in 2007 to show
    that they could launch a telephone pole, if you will, and
    destroy a weather satellite that was one of their dead weather
    satellites. But the ability to launch and intercept an orbiting
    satellite--they demonstrated it for the world to see and put a
    lot of debris into space as a result. So the Chinese clearly
    have that capability. The capability is not just kinetic and
    from the ground, though. We are vulnerable with respect to
    jamming satellites, with respect to trying to disconnect
    satellites and communications systems, as well as other kinds
    of threats.
        So we are very heavily dependent on space, and our
    adversaries know it. It is no longer a benign environment. We
    are going to have to fight for it.
        Senator Cruz. General?
        General Goldfein. Sir, I would just add that this is the
    primary focus for the Secretary and I as we look at this change
    from treating space historically as a benign domain from which
    you sense, monitor, and report to a domain from which we have
    to be prepared to fight and win and gain and maintain space
    superiority if a war extends into space or starts in space. I
    align with General John Hyten who has said there is no such
    thing as war in space. There is just war. But if it extends
    into space, we have got to be ready. So our focus is on making
    that shift not in terms of how we acquire but actually perhaps
    most importantly, the culture required for a warfighting
    element that actually treats space as a warfighting domain.
        Senator Cruz. Thank you very much.
        With that, this hearing is concluded.
        [Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
                   Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
                           air force fighter aircraft
        1. Senator McCain. General Goldfein, what is your required total
    aircraft inventory level for fighter aircraft for fiscal year 2018?
        General Goldfein. Unconstrained by fiscal requirements and based on
    current strategy, the Air Force requires 2,500 total fighter aircraft.

        2. Senator McCain. General Goldfein, what is your projected total
    aircraft inventory level for fighter aircraft for fiscal year 2018?
        General Goldfein. Total fighter aircraft inventory for fiscal year
    2018 is 2031.

        3. Senator McCain. General Goldfein, what is your required total
    aircraft inventory level for fighter aircraft for fiscal year 2028?
        General Goldfein. Unconstrained by fiscal requirements and based on
    current strategy, the AF needs 2,500 fighter aircraft to field 70
    combat fighter squadrons.

        4. Senator McCain. General Goldfein, what is your projected total
    aircraft inventory level for fighter aircraft for fiscal year 2028?
        General Goldfein. Current plans support a total fighter force of
    1,943 aircraft in 2028.

        5. Senator McCain. General Goldfein, what is your required primary
    mission aircraft inventory level for fighter aircraft for fiscal year
    2018?
        General Goldfein. Unconstrained by fiscal requirements, the Air
    Force requires 81,500 primary mission aircraft inventory designated
    fighter aircraft.

        6. Senator McCain. General Goldfein, what is your projected primary
    mission aircraft inventory level for fighter aircraft for fiscal year
    2018?
        General Goldfein. By the end of fiscal year 2018 the Air Force is
    projected to have 1,135 primary mission aircraft inventory designated
    fighter aircraft.

        7. Senator McCain. General Goldfein, what is your required primary
    mission aircraft inventory level for fighter aircraft for fiscal year
    2028?
        General Goldfein. Unconstrained by fiscal requirements, the Air
    Force requires 81,500 primary mission aircraft inventory designated
    fighter aircraft.

        8. Senator McCain. General Goldfein, what is your projected primary
    mission aircraft inventory level for fighter aircraft for fiscal year
    2028?
        General Goldfein. Current plans support a total of 1,204 PMAI
    aircraft in 2028.

        9. Senator McCain. General Goldfein, based on the differences, if
    any, between your required and projected primary mission aircraft
    inventory levels for fighter aircraft for fiscal year 2018, can you
    characterize the risk the Air Force will assume in meeting the
    requirements of the National Military Strategy?
        General Goldfein. At the unclassified level, the U.S. is currently
    assuming a significant level of increased risk based upon the current
    and projected Air Force fighter force structure.

        10. Senator McCain. General Goldfein, based on the differences, if
    any, between your required and projected primary mission aircraft
    inventory levels for fighter aircraft for fiscal year 2028, can you
    characterize the risk the Air Force may assume in meeting the
    requirements of the National Military Strategy?
        General Goldfein. At the unclassified level, the U.S. is currently
    assuming a significant level of increased risk based upon the current
    and projected Air Force fighter force structure. As we look toward the
    future, the risk only increases based upon current funding levels.
        11. Senator McCain. General Goldfein, can you itemize your current
    55 combat fighter squadrons by component, mission design series, and
    primary assigned aircraft numbers?
        General Goldfein.

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                       Current          FY18 Prog
                         MWS                                 Component           -----------------------------------
                                                                                   CC Sqs    PMAI    CC Sqs    PMAI
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A-10                                                                     AD         4       75        4       75
                                                  ------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                            ANG         4       72        4       72
                                                  ------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                           AFRC         1       24        1       24
                                                  ------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                          Total         9      171        9      171
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    F-16                                                                     AD        13      282       11      249
                                                  ------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                            ANG        11      207       11      207
                                                  ------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                           AFRC         2       48        2       51
                                                  ------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                          Total        26      537       24      507
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    F-15C                                                                    AD         3       66        3       61
                                                  ------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                            ANG         5       90        5       85
                                                  ------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                           AFRC         0        0        0        0
                                                  ------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                          Total         8      156        8      146
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    F-15E                                                                    AD         6      138        6      138
                                                  ------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                            ANG         0        0        0        0
                                                  ------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                           AFRC         0        0        0        0
                                                  ------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                          Total         6      138        6      138
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    F-22                                                                     AD         5      105        5      105
                                                  ------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                            ANG         1       18        1       18
                                                  ------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                           AFRC         0        0        0        0
                                                  ------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                          Total         6      123        6      123
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    F-35                                                                     AD         0       22        2       50
                                                  ------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                            ANG         0        0        0        0
                                                  ------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                           AFRC         0        0        0        0
                                                  ------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                          Total         0       22        2       50
                                                  ------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total                                                                    AD        31      688       31      678
                                                  ------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                            ANG        21      387       21      382
                                                  ------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                           AFRC         3       72        3       75
                                                  ------------------------------------------------------------------
    Overall                                                               Total        55    1,147       55    1,135
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Two Active Duty F-16 Squadrons transition to FTUS to help pilot
    production.
                           air force bomber aircraft
        12. Senator McCain. Secretary Wilson, can you detail the
    acquisitions activities you plan on executing in the B-21 Raider
    program's engineering and manufacturing development phase with the $2
    billion dollars you requested in the Fiscal Year 2018 President's
    Budget?
        Secretary Wilson. The Fiscal Year 2018 President's Budget will
    support the B-21 Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase as the
    program continues to proceed through detailed design work, software
    development, and other activities associated with this stage of
    aircraft development. Additional details can be provided to those
    appropriately cleared at a higher classification level.

        13. Senator McCain. General Goldfein, what is your required total
    aircraft inventory level for bomber aircraft for fiscal year 2028?
        General Goldfein. The Air Force currently has 158 bombers (76 B-
    52s, 62 B-1, and 20 B-2). Based on current strategic guidance and the
    growing demand for long range strike airpower, the AF needs a minimum
    of 100 B-21 bombers, and a mix of legacy bombers, for a total inventory
    of 175 aircraft. General Rand from AF Global Strike Command is working
    to schedule a briefing with Senator McCain and Senator Reed on the need
    for 175 bombers, which is called the ``AF Bomber Vector''.
                                    manpower
        14. Senator McCain. General Goldfein, how many pilots short is the
    Air Force today, and of those, how many are fighter pilots? What are
    the projected numbers at the end of fiscal year 2018?
        General Goldfein. At the end of fiscal year 2016, the Air Force had
    an overall Total Force pilot shortage of 1,555 pilots of which 1,211
    were fighter pilots. The projections (based on current dynamics) for
    the end of fiscal year 2018 indicates a Total Force pilot shortage of
    2,121 pilots of which 1,335 are fighter pilots.

        15. Senator McCain. General Goldfein, how many space operators is
    the Air Force short?
        General Goldfein. The question of how many space operators we are
    short is nuanced. Technically speaking, the number of space operators
    we have is higher than the number of space positions we currently have
    on the books. However, two important details must be considered when
    evaluating this. First, in the past 2-3 years the Air Force has over-
    assessed space officers above the normal accession rate in order to
    replenish manning levels that were negatively affected by the Budget
    Control Act (BCA). The result is there are several hundred additional
    space personnel that have less than 3 years on Active Duty.
    Alternatively, BCA related manpower decisions are reflected in our more
    senior Field Grade Ranks (Majors and Lt Cols) where we are several
    hundred short and therefore understaffing our senior positions in the
    HQs, Combatant Commands, Joint Staff and Command and Control areas.
    Secondly, the space operations billet structure was designed before
    space became a contested environment and the work to reevaluate that
    structure has only recently begun in earnest. We are aggressively
    working to assess exactly how many more space operators are needed and
    in what kinds of units to effectively contest the space domain. In the
    very near future we will be in a better position to articulate the new
    space operator manpower requirement.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Deb Fisher
                                  lrso / gbsd
        16. Senator Fisher. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, is the
    Air Force committed to awarding the Technology Maturation and Risk
    Reduction (TMRR) contracts for both the Long Range Standoff missile
    (LSRO) and the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) programs before
    the end of this fiscal year, and are you on track to do so?
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. The Air Force is committed
    to awarding GBSD and LRSO TMRR contracts in the fourth quarter of
    fiscal year 2017. Both programs are on track to achieve this goal.
                              space force / corps
        17. Senator Fisher. General Goldfein, during the recent hearing in
    the Strategic Forces subcommittee on space policy, you commented on the
    idea of a separate space force or corps and suggested that
    administratively separating space could reduce operational integration.
    Can you elaborate on how such an action could negatively affect
    operations or create problematic stovepipes?
        General Goldfein. The Air Force's priority is to ensure the nation
    has the capabilities so urgently needed to prevail against the threat.
    As the fielding of counter-space capabilities accelerates, the United
    States cannot afford the significant resource and time disruptions a
    separate space force would create. A separate space service would incur
    significant expense for Service-specific administration and dilutes
    funding needed to pursue space superiority initiatives. As the
    enterprise matures, with the involvement of each of the other Services,
    DOD is laying the foundation for a well-defined space culture with a
    warfighter mindset for the contested domain.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator David Perdue
             joint surveillance target attack radar system (jstars)
        18. Senator Perdue. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, I was
    disappointed that in your written testimony, as you discussed
    procurement priorities, you failed to mention the recap for the JSTARS
    platform. Could you confirm to this committee that JSTARS still remains
    the number 4 acquisition priority for the Air Force?
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. JSTARS Recap remains in the
    top tier of Air Force acquisition programs.

        19. Senator Perdue. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, what is
    being done to ensure there is not a JSTARS capability gap?
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. To avoid a capability gap,
    the Air Force continues to make progress towards JSTARS Recap Initial
    Operational Capability in fiscal year 2024 or sooner. The Air Force
    will brief any potential options to the Congressional Defense
    Committees as directed in the Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA and Appropriations
    Act. In addition, the Air Force will continue to assess E-8C service
    life, operational availability, and sustainment costs in coordination
    with the JSTARS Recap fielding schedule to determine how and when to
    phase out the legacy fleet.

        20. Senator Perdue. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, is the
    Air Force currently pursuing a JSTARS recap on a faster timeline to
    ensure that there is not a capability gap? What type of resources would
    you need to do so?
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. The Air Force established
    source selection criteria to emphasize meeting or beating a scheduled
    fiscal year 2024 IOC. Additionally, the program undertook a Radar Risk
    Reduction (RRR) effort to mitigate schedule and technical risk. If
    there are opportunities to accelerate after selecting the prime
    contractor and integrated solution, the Air Force will include this
    information as part of the brief/report to the Congressional Defense
    Committees as directed in the Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA and Appropriations
    Act.

        21. Senator Perdue. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, would
    you consider looking at an interim solution on a new frame?
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. The Air Force considered a
    variety of options as part of the 2011 Analysis of Alternatives.
    However, recapitalizing the E-8C fleet on a commercial derivative
    aircraft with an enhanced radar, modern battle management command and
    control suite, and robust communications remains the best option. If a
    gap is unavoidable, the Air Force will consider all possible options to
    provide Combatant Commander's with some of the JSTARS unique
    capabilities until the fielding of JSTARS Recap.

        22. Senator Perdue. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, I'm
    concerned that keeping the legacy JSTARS fleet online for another
    decade will be costly, and increase aircraft time spent in depot
    maintenance. As we see the assessment from Boeing that the current
    fleet of JSTARS can be kept online longer, do the maintenance plans
    you've budgeted for ensure that there aren't lengthy depot backlogs to
    perform the overhauls needed to keep these planes flying longer than
    originally intended?
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. The Air Force remains
    committed to improving E-8 depot maintenance outcomes. The Fiscal Year
    2018 Presidents Budget request allows the Air Force to continue
    implementing needed improvements for reduction of the duration and cost
    for programmed depot maintenance.

        23. Senator Perdue. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, given
    the backlogs that have persisted at the Lake Charles facility, have you
    given any thought to making the depot maintenance of the recapped fleet
    organic? What savings could be achieved by co-locating the flying
    mission and maintenance in the future?
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. The Air Force will consider
    potential cost savings as part of our assessment during the Engineering
    and Manufacturing Development phase to determine the best operating and
    depot maintenance location(s).
                    jstars and the coming acquision bow wave
        24. Senator Perdue. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, you
    mentioned in your written testimony that before 1991, the Air Force
    bought approximately 510 aircraft per year. But now, in the past 20
    years, we have averaged only 96 per year. After fifteen years of
    sustained combat operations, sequestration, and continued high
    operational tempo, the Air Force is the smallest, oldest, and busiest
    it has been since its inception. The JSTARS recap is really just one
    example of how we're keeping current fleets of aircraft on the job much
    longer than they were ever intended. So many of our platforms are
    coming to the end of their useful service life all at once. How you
    plan to deal with this oncoming bow wave of acquisition, and how you
    plan to balance this with readiness and ongoing maintenance issues?
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. The Air Force continues to
    sequence new capabilities and current capacities to reduce or minimize
    the bow wave. In fiscal year 2018, and in accordance with the direction
    of the new administration, the Air Force focused investments on
    readiness and maintenance shortfalls at the expense of modernization
    programs. Without increased total obligation authority and the ability
    to manage force structure, to include divesting legacy systems, the Air
    Force will be challenged to effectively develop the future force
    America needs. Tough decisions will have to be made and that will
    induce risk in certain areas. The future Air Force needs Congressional
    support today that provides increased and consistent funding along with
    the authorities to manage the oncoming bow wave of acquisition programs
    to effectively balance readiness, force structure, and modernization.

        25. Senator Perdue. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, what is
    the Air Force doing to get our acquisition process moving in a faster,
    more efficient way? Are there additional authorities or flexibility you
    need to achieve better acquisition speed?
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. The Air Force is pushing
    authorities to the lowest appropriate level, leveraging commercial and
    government best practices, and removing unnecessary reporting and
    reviews to continue to improve the efficiency of the acquisition
    process. Air Force acquisition regularly conducts process improvement
    activities to effectuate changes that enhance the cost and speed of
    acquisition.
        Reductions in statutory reporting and certification requirements
    that divert manpower, such as the acquisition scorecard 15 days
    following Milestone decisions and Secretary/CSAF certification of
    Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) reviews, would enable more efficient
    operations.
                                a-10 replacement
        26. Senator Perdue. General Goldfein, I understand that your budget
    request for fiscal year 2018 calls for keeping the A-10 in service for
    at least 5 more years and includes funding for A-10 modifications in
    coming years. General Goldfein, you said last year in an interview
    that, ``when we made the decision on retiring the A-10, we made those
    decisions prior to ISIS, we were not in Iraq, we were coming out of
    Afghanistan to a large extent, and we didn't have a resurgent Russia.''
    Have the facts on the ground in the fight against ISIS changed the
    calculus of the Air Force in the retirement of the A-10?
        General Goldfein. Yes. The Air Force recently completed a year-long
    Combat Air Force Fighter Force Study focused on balancing capacity for
    today's fight while developing capabilities required to win against
    peer competitors. The results of the study include the necessity for
    173 A-10s to provide one training unit, six combat squadrons, and
    associated test assets for capacity for the foreseeable future.

        27. Senator Perdue. General Goldfein, what are your plans for the
    future of the A-10 fleet and ensuring we have the right platform to
    perform its vital close air support mission?
        General Goldfein. With the resources allocated in the Fiscal Year
    2018 President's Budget the entire fleet (283) is funded through fiscal
    year 2020. The F-35 & A-10 comparison is one component of the Initial
    Operational Test & Evaluation Block 3F scheduled for late fiscal year
    2019. No decision is final until we have the final IOT&E report.

        28. Senator Perdue. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, if money
    weren't an issue, and we were budgeting based on threat and need--would
    you keep the A-10?
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. Based on forecasted threats,
    the A-10 and other 4th generation aircraft face mission effectiveness
    challenges in the contested and highly contested environments. The A-10
    is an early 1970's design that will be aged 56+ years by 2030 but still
    proves useful in the permissive environment but is becoming more
    expensive to operate. The Air Force will continue to face a capability
    gap in contested environment counter-land missions. The Air Force will
    need to keep some A-10s until a more appropriate capability can be
    delivered to mitigate contested environment counter-land capability
    gaps and additional aircraft are fielded to recapitalize our air-to-
    ground capabilities.
                          current air force readiness
        29. Senator Perdue. General Goldfein, you stated in your written
    testimony that ``the Air Force is too small for the missions demanded
    of it, and it is unlikely that the need for air and space power will
    diminish significantly in the coming decade.'' How would you asses Air
    Force readiness today?
        General Goldfein. Today, we remain the finest Air Force in the
    world. We are a dominate force engaged across the world countering
    violent extremists, assuring allies and deterring foes. However, our
    relative advantage over potential adversaries is decreasing rapidly and
    in some cases it has closed. We must be prepared to win decisively, and
    that means we must ensure America's airmen are resourced and trained to
    fight alongside the Army, Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard--the joint
    military team--to meet national security obligations.
        Twenty-six years of continuous combat operations combined with
    turbulent budgets have eroded Air Force readiness to less than 50
    percent full-spectrum ready--predominantly due to insufficient manning.
    The USAF readiness recovery strategy focuses on disciplined,
    synchronized investment in readiness accounts in sequential order. The
    first priority is our longest-lead requirement: Active Duty end
    strength--up to 321,000 by the end of 2017--and eventually 350,000 over
    the next five to seven years. Next, investment in the training and
    sustainment enterprises, both of which require 3-5 years of lead time
    due to industrial and human processes. Finally, as global rotational
    demands permit, we will be ready to increase flying hour funding to
    facilitate more robust home-station training activities. In short, each
    readiness 'lever' must be engaged at the proper time and in
    coordination with the other levers.

        30. Senator Perdue. General Goldfein, how many of your squadrons
    are ready to conduct missions assigned to them?
        General Goldfein. Today, we remain the finest Air Force in the
    world. However, our relative advantage over potential adversaries is
    decreasing rapidly and in some cases it has closed. We must be prepared
    to win decisively, and that means we must ensure America's airmen are
    resourced and trained to fight alongside the Army, Navy, Marines, and
    Coast Guard--the joint military team--to meet national security
    obligations.
        Squadrons are the basic building block of combat air power.
    Currently less than 50 percent of Air Force Combat squadrons are full-
    spectrum ready--predominantly due to insufficient manning. We consider
    80 percent full spectrum ready to be a historically achievable goal.
    Our readiness recovery strategy focuses on disciplined, synchronized
    investment in readiness accounts in sequential order. The first
    priority is our longest-lead requirement: Active Duty end strength--up
    to 321,000 by the end of 2017--and eventually 350,000 over the next
    five-seven years. Next, investment in the training and sustainment
    enterprises, both of which require 3-5 years of lead time due to
    industrial and human processes. Finally, as global rotational demands
    permit, we will be ready to increase flying hour funding to facilitate
    more robust home-station training activities. In short, each readiness
    'lever' must be engaged at the proper time and in coordination with the
    other levers.

        31. Senator Perdue. General Goldfein, when do you project the Air
    Force to achieve full spectrum readiness? What resources do you need to
    get there?
        General Goldfein. Given the time required to recruit and train
    airmen, the Air Force projects no substantial readiness improvement
    until fiscal year 2020 to 2021, when conditions are expected to be set
    for readiness recovery. ``Full-spectrum readiness'' means units are
    fully trained and equipped to fight and win against near-peer
    adversaries in contested environments with advanced warfighting skills.
    Unit readiness assessments are constantly monitored against the
    requirements of the National Military Strategy (NMS) for major force
    elements. The Air Force's goal will not likely be achieved by the end
    of the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).
        The USAF readiness recovery strategy focuses on disciplined,
    synchronized investment in readiness accounts in sequential order. The
    first priority is our longest-lead requirement: Active Duty end
    strength--up to 321,000 by the end of 2017--and eventually 350,000 over
    the next five-seven years. Next, investment in the training and
    sustainment enterprises, both of which require 3-5 years of lead time
    due to industrial and human processes. Finally, as global rotational
    demands permit, we will be ready to increase flying hour funding to
    facilitate more robust home-station training activities. In short, each
    readiness 'lever' must be engaged at the proper time and in
    coordination with the other levers. The Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA and
    Fiscal Year 2018 President's s Budget begin to set the conditions for
    readiness recovery. With continued congressional support the Air Force
    will recover readiness.
                             f-15 retirement rumors
        32. Senator Perdue. Secretary Wilson, there have been reports that
    the Air Force is considering retiring the F-15C. The Air Force
    currently has a significant fighter capacity problem; retiring any
    fleet of fighters in the next decade would only exacerbate the capacity
    issue. America already has the smallest Air Force in history with only
    303 combat coded air superiority fighters (F-15C and F-22). If the Air
    Force retires the F-15C fleet in 2025, only 123 of these unique
    fighters (F-22s) would remain. How would their retirement contribute to
    alleviating the Air Force's fighter inventory shortfall?
        Secretary Wilson. Air-to-air success hinges on 5th generation, or
    better, capabilities in the future air superiority fight. By the late
    2020s the F-15C has significant survivability issues within a near-peer
    conflict with or without defensive modifications. The AF is leveraging
    the F-35's low-observable characteristics in air-to-air and Suppression
    of Enemy Air Defenses missions. Therefore, we are considering the value
    of recapitalizing F-15Cs with F-35s to ensure sufficient survivability
    within the Counter-Air mission. Budget constraints and limits on how
    quickly AF manpower can grow dictate that the AF will struggle to grow
    much beyond 55 fighter squadrons in the near-term. The more survivable
    F-35 is being procured at a rate of 2.5 squadrons per year. That
    recapitalization should focus on replacing our highest cost, single
    mission, 4th generation fighter where future, mission specific, threats
    drive the need for enhanced survivability.

        33. Senator Perdue. Secretary Wilson, why would the Air Force be
    considering the retirement of the F-15C?
        Secretary Wilson. Air-to-air success hinges on 5th generation, or
    better, capabilities in the future air superiority fight. Paired with
    the total cost of the fleet, and desired upgrades, the F-15C is less
    affordable than other options as the AF increases the ratio of 5th
    generation fighters and sustains a minimum of 55 combat squadrons.
    Additionally, the F-15C is nearing the end of its economic service life
    and the Service Life Extension Programs being considered offer limited
    return compared to the total cost of ownership. According to estimates,
    it is more affordable for the AF to maintain and upgrade F-16s to
    accomplish missions within future uncontested environments than it is
    to attempt to maintain an F-15C fleet for that need. The more
    survivable F-35 is being procured at a rate of 2.5 squadrons per year.
    That recapitalization should focus on our highest cost, single mission,
    4th generation fighter where future mission specific threats drive the
    need for enhanced survivability.
                                audit readiness
        34. Senator Perdue. Secretary Wilson, the Department of Defense and
    all the Armed Services continue to fail in their ability to achieve a
    clean financial audit. What actions have you taken to ensure the Air
    Force can achieve a clean audit opinion by the end of fiscal year 2017,
    as is required by law?
        Secretary Wilson. The Air Force is required to be ready to undergo
    an audit by an Independent Public Accounting Firm by the end of fiscal
    year 2017. The Air Force will be ready by that date and will undergo
    its first full financial statement audit in fiscal year 2018. We do not
    expect an unmodified (``clean'') opinion immediately, however, I am
    committed to addressing the findings raised by our auditors, and to
    strengthening our accounting systems environment. Consistent with other
    federal agencies who have adopted this strategy, this will best
    position us for an unmodified opinion in the future.

        35. Senator Perdue. Secretary Wilson, will you have a clean audit
    opinion for the Air Force by the end of this fiscal year? If not, why?
        Secretary Wilson. The Air Force is committed to achieving full
    financial statement audit readiness by the end of fiscal year 2017 and
    is on track to assert audit readiness in accordance with NDAA
    requirements. We do not expect to achieve an unmodified (``clean'')
    audit opinion in this audit. The audit will identify issues we will
    need to address and remediation of audit findings will become standard
    practice. Our primary barrier to an immediate unmodified opinion is the
    nature of our systems environment that didn't adequately address audit
    requirements. However, we have made significant progress in improving
    the auditability of our budgetary accounts and the reconciliation of
    our Funds Balance with Treasury. To sustain this progress, the Air
    Force is implementing its Information Technology modernization roadmap
    to sunset legacy systems, to fully automate our business processes, and
    to strengthen our internal controls. These continued actions, combined
    with responsiveness to our audit findings, will continuously improve
    financial management.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Luther Strange
                                air guard issues
        36. Senator Strange. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, I know
    you are aware that Montgomery, Alabama's Dannelly Field, home of the
    Alabama Air National Guard 187th Fighter Wing, is one of five
    installations around the country under consideration by the Air Force
    for operational bases for new F-35A aircraft. I enjoyed the opportunity
    to discuss this issue with you recently and, as you know, I feel
    strongly that Dannelly Field is your absolute best choice for home
    basing these new fighter aircraft.
        That being said, my colleagues in the Senate from each of the five
    states in consideration sent a letter to the Air Force Chief of Staff
    and Acting Secretary of the Air Force just a few months back citing our
    unified support for the Air Force's Strategic Basing Process that has
    been used to determine which installations should receive the F-35. We
    commended the Air Force for the creation of this objective and
    transparent process, as a repeatable, dependable and public strategic
    basing process that is fair to all participating locations. Do you
    support the existing Air Force's strategic basing process and do you
    anticipate any changes to that process moving forward?
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. Both General Goldfein and I
    support the Air Force strategic basing process and will maintain its
    core principles of transparency, repeatability, and mission driven
    selection. Additionally, we will continue to review the process to
    ensure we remain aligned to meet the warfighting demands of the Air
    Force as we make future basing decisions.

        37. Senator Strange. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, will
    you hold to the Air Force's current timeline of late summer to early
    fall to identify and announce its next two bases for the F-35?
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. The last site survey is
    scheduled for the end of July 2017 and we are on target to announce the
    Preferred and Reasonable Alternatives decision late this summer,
    culminating in a final basing decision summer 2019 after the completion
    of the environmental assessment process.
        On November 15, 2016 the Air Force announced the five candidate
    locations for the next two operational F-35 locations which included:
    Truax Air Guard Station, Wisconsin; Gowen Field Air Guard Station,
    Idaho; Jacksonville Air Guard Station, Florida; Dannelly Field Air
    Guard Station, Alabama; and Selfridge Air National Guard Base,
    Michigan.
                                readiness issues
        38. Senator Strange. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, our
    military has suffered from severe neglect and the stresses of war for
    the past 8 years. This first budget request of the Trump administration
    is a good start to turning that around, but more needs to be done
    rapidly as our fighting forces are in critical need of digging out of a
    readiness hole. I understand that many issues are demanding your
    attention. Can you speak specifically to how you plan to balance the
    management of Air Force end strength with the need for procurement and
    R&D?
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. Given the current topline,
    our fiscal year 2018 budget balances capability, capacity and
    readiness. That includes balancing end strength with the need for
    procurement and R&D. Although the Air Force could use more topline as
    expressed in our unfunded requirements list, we are driving forward
    with the necessary balance. Permanent relief from the Budget Control
    Act will begin to improve readiness. Although we cannot instantly
    remove the stress on the force resulting from the last 26 years of
    continual conflict, our fiscal year 2018 budget begins to undo the
    damage.

        39. Senator Strange. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, what is
    the current level of combat air forces readiness for full spectrum
    operations? What do you consider adequate readiness levels and when do
    you expect readiness levels achieve that mark?
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. Currently the Air Force is
    less than 50 percent full spectrum ready predominantly due to
    insufficient manning. We consider 80 percent full spectrum ready to be
    a historically achievable goal. The readiness recovery strategy focuses
    on disciplined, synchronized investment in readiness accounts in
    sequential order. The first priority is our longest-lead requirement:
    Active Duty end strength--up to 321,000 by the end of 2017. Next,
    investment in the training and sustainment enterprises, both of which
    require 3-5 years of lead time due to industrial and human processes.
    Finally, as global rotational demands permit, we will be ready to
    increase flying hour funding to facilitate more robust home-station
    training activities. In short, each readiness 'lever' must be engaged
    at the proper time and in coordination with the other levers.

        40. Senator Strange. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, if the
    current operational tempo were to increase, what would be the effect on
    readiness?
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. If operational temp
    increases, a further reduction in full-spectrum readiness will occur.
    High operational tempo substantially reduces the opportunity for units
    to train for their full mission set. The Air Force needs both time and
    resources to rebuild readiness. Currently, time available to train
    (generate readiness) is severely limited by ongoing rotational
    deployments. In short, after years of force reductions, we have a
    supply-demand mismatch. Two possible solutions exist: reduce the
    number/length of deployments to sustainable levels or increase the Air
    Force capacity to meet rotational demand to permit readiness growth.

        41. Senator Strange. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, what
    about AF readiness when it comes to the nuclear enterprise and
    operating in a contested space environment? Should we have concerns
    there?
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. Air Force space-based
    capabilities are key enablers for the Nation's nuclear deterrent,
    providing missile warning and supporting nuclear command, control, and
    communications. The nuclear enterprise remains ready to meet combatant
    commander requirements in all environments through a combination of
    ground, airborne, and space-based capabilities.

        42. Senator Strange. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, please
    list your priorities among personnel end strength, procurement and
    research and development.
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. The fiscal year 2018 budget
    balances capability, capacity and readiness priorities between end
    strength, procurement, and research and development in an effort to
    undo the damage of the Budget Control Act (BCA) and sequestration.
    These priorities include increasing end strength to 325,100 Active Duty
    airmen, and 669,600 Total Force airmen, continuing to fund and support
    our top three acquisition priorities, F-35, KC-46, and B-21, as well as
    continuing to invest in our key mission areas including nuclear, space,
    cyber, ISR, and legacy fighter capability.

        43. Senator Strange. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, how do
    you plan to overcome the deferred maintenance backlog that the Air
    Force has accumulated over the last few years?
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. The Air Force will seek to
    minimize near-term risks to readiness by making tradeoffs within weapon
    system sustainment to minimize the impact to those readiness
    requirements. As was the case in previous fiscal years, the Air Force
    will make adjustments throughout the year to optimize funding to ensure
    availability of aircraft to meet mission requirements.

        44. Senator Strange. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, in
    broad terms, what do you think the Air Force should look like in 25
    years?
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. Air and space superiority
    will continue to be paramount to national security. We must enable
    airmen to plan and direct forces for high velocity, operationally agile
    operations at a tempo no adversary can match. We must build the
    capacity for simultaneous operations, and recruit the right talent to
    operate in increasingly complex and contested environments. Enterprise
    efforts such as Air Superiority 2030 and Multi-domain Command and
    Control (MDC2) are in motion to test concepts. We are currently
    conducting Data-to-Decision experimentation to enhance how we leverage
    data to increase lethality. We are also learning from the efforts at
    the Consolidated Mission Control Center where they are pushing the
    envelope on common data standards, info sharing, and modern networks.
    The Space Enterprise Vision lays out a roadmap of future systems and
    capabilities that will provide a space force resilient to attack. From
    these initiatives we are driving new ways of acquiring our command and
    control systems so that leading edge technology is always in the hands
    of our command and control airmen. Robust networks will give the Joint
    Force the ability to sense the globe through the six domains of air,
    space, cyberspace, land, sea, and undersea, and merge data into
    decision-quality information for commanders. If the Air Force can
    achieve a networked military capability that reflects a common
    operating picture for the decision maker, we will reach decision speed
    our adversaries cannot match and produce effects the enemy will have
    difficulty countering.
                               space/lift issues
        45. Senator Strange. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, the Air
    Force should be commended for fostering competition in the EELV
    program. Given that legacy launch providers operate under different FAR
    requirements, please explain how the Air Force is awarding launches on
    criteria other than Price?
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. For EELV launch service
    competitions, all launch providers are proposing to the same FAR
    requirements under each Request for Proposal (RFP). In addition, the
    source selection evaluation criteria for each EELV launch service
    competition is based on specific mission requirements that take into
    account a wide array of mission unique factors. For EELV launch service
    competitions, the evaluation criteria has included a number of
    evaluation factors in addition to price. Those factors include
    technical performance (mass-to-orbit, orbital accuracy, launch CONOPS,
    etc.), schedule (integrated schedule and work closure plans), and past
    performance.

        46. Senator Strange. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, if all
    providers are certified, is there weighted criteria being used to award
    launches and could you explain the weighted criteria (such as,
    reliability, schedule certainty and past performance)?
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. Yes, the Air Force plan for
    future launch service competitions is to use a combination of source
    selection techniques from across the best value continuum that are
    tailored for each mission. The relative importance of the factors vary
    based on each mission's unique requirements. For EELV launch service
    competitions, the evaluation criteria has included a number of
    evaluation factors in addition to price. Those factors include
    technical performance (mass-to-orbit, orbital accuracy, launch CONOPS,
    etc.), schedule (integrated schedule and work closure plans), and past
    performance.

        47. Senator Strange. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, there
    was an agreement reached in the EELV program law suit between the Air
    Force, Department of Justice and EELV new entrant Space X. The
    agreement appears to dictate the terms of a defense procurement,
    thereby favoring one competitor. Have you been read into that
    agreement? Could you please explain to the committee why Congress has
    been blocked from understanding the terms of this secret agreement?
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. I have reviewed the
    acquisition strategy for upcoming EELV launch competitions and am
    confident that the terms of the EELV procurements will be fair and
    reasonable and will not provide an unfair competitive advantage to
    either certified provider. With respect to the mediation agreement that
    settled SpaceX's 2014 bid protest, that agreement is subject to a Court
    of Federal Claims nondisclosure order. The Air Force does not have the
    authority to release the mediation agreement to anyone not admitted to
    that order.
                               space/lift issues:
        48. Senator Strange. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, it is
    important that we assess what authorizations are required for critical
    AF programs. It is the committee's understanding that the cost to
    develop a new rocket engine is somewhere between 1.5 and 2 billion
    dollars. Can you briefly outline the levels of private and U.S.
    Government investment in the two newest rocket engines being developed
    to replace the Russian RD-180 engine currently in use?
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. The Air Force currently has
    four other transaction authority (OTA) agreements with industry for
    rocket propulsion systems, all of which require shared cost investment
    between the government and industry. These investments initiate the
    transition from the RD-180 by investing in critical Rocket Propulsion
    System technologies.
        The OTA with SpaceX is for the development of the Raptor rocket
    propulsion system prototype. The total potential investment, including
    all options, is $184.2 million. The total potential Government
    investment, including all options, is $61 million. The total potential
    investment by SpaceX, including all options, is $122.8 million.
        The OTA with Orbital ATK is for the development of prototypes of
    the GEM 63XL strap-on solid rocket motor, the Common Booster Segment
    (CBS) solid rocket motor, and an Extendable Nozzle for Blue Origin's
    BE-3U upper stage engine, all intended for use on an Orbital ATK next
    generation launch vehicle. The total potential investment, including
    all options, is $305.1 million. The total potential Government
    investment, including all options, is $180.2 million. The total
    potential investment by Orbital ATK, including all options, is $124.8
    million.
        The OTA with ULA is for the development of the Vulcan BE-4 and
    Advanced Cryogenic Evolved Stage (ACES) rocket propulsion system
    prototypes. The total potential investment, including all options, is
    $335.9 million. The total potential government investment, including
    all options, is $201.7 million. The total potential investment by ULA,
    including all options, is $134.2 million.
        The OTA with Aerojet Rocketdyne is for the development of the AR1
    rocket propulsion system prototype. The total potential investment,
    including all options, is $804,044,478. The total potential Government
    investment, including all options, is $536,029,652. The total potential
    investment by Aerojet Rocketdyne, including all options, is
    $268,014,826.
        These Rocket Propulsion Systems were proposed by industry for
    commercial launch systems that can be enhanced to meet more stressing
    National Security Space requirements. The Air Force intends to release
    a Request for Proposal (RFP) later this summer for Launch Service
    Agreements to complete the development of the replacement launch
    systems continuing the shared industry/government investment approach.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
                    encroachment on test and training ranges
        49. Senator Nelson. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein,
    encroachment of activities incompatible with military test and training
    operations on our bases and ranges remains a major problem. In 2006
    Congress established the Military Mission Line, prohibiting oil and gas
    activities, and any activities conducted in preparation for oil and gas
    activities, in the Eastern Gulf in order to protect the test and
    training range there. The Department of Defense has said that the
    ``vital importance of maintaining this moratorium cannot be
    overstated.'' Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, how important is
    it to the Air Force's test mission as well as training and readiness to
    continue to protect the Eastern Gulf Test and Training Range from this
    kind of encroachment?
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. Preserving the Military
    Mission Line from encroachment of oil and gas exploration and drilling
    is critical to the current and future combat success of the joint
    warfighter. The Eastern Gulf Test and Training Range supports force
    readiness with supersonic air combat training for frontline fighters
    like the F-22 and the F-35, live-fire air-to-air and air-to-surface
    training, air-to-air missile testing, electronic warfare, drone
    targeting, and Naval sub-surface, air-to-surface and surface-to-surface
    testing, including mine and counter-mine operations.
        Safety footprints of our current weapons systems are growing with
    faster launch speeds and higher launch altitudes. Future systems with
    hypersonic speeds will increase the size of the safety footprint. Large
    cleared footprints are required to ensure debris, some extremely large,
    falls safely into the eastern Gulf of Mexico--without any underlying
    oil or gas operations. Logistics support of the oil and gas
    infrastructure will require additional maritime and air traffic, as
    well as, the potential for spectrum encroachment placing an undue
    burden on military operations. Additionally, foreign national
    involvement in energy related activities creates an opportunity for
    international, covert monitoring and/or disruption of essential
    military testing and training.
        Encroachment of the Eastern Gulf Test and Training Ranges for oil
    and gas exploration and drilling will interfere with the following test
    and training capabilities:

          AIM-120 and AIM-9 testing for F-15, F-16, F-22 and F-35
          Patriot Live-Fire training
          Airborne mine detection and neutralization test and
    training from helicopter towed systems
          Tomahawk cruise missile test and training
          Training for Air Force, Navy and Army aircraft to include
    the release of chaff and flares
          Naval Air Station Pensacola student pilot training
          Combined F-35 pilot training
          F-16 Follow-On Test and Evaluation
          F-15E Flight Test

        Additionally, such encroachment will curtail system development and
    testing of the following warfighter required future capabilities:

          Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile--Extended Range
          Long Range Standoff Weapon
          Long Range Anti-Ship Missile
          Patriot Testing
          Railgun Testing
          Hypersonic weapons testing
                      major range and test facility bases
        50. Senator Nelson. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, last
    year's National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) expressed my concern
    and the concern of this committee that our Major Range and Test
    Facility Bases are unable to maintain pace technologically with our
    advanced fifth and sixth generation weapons delivery systems and new
    hypersonic systems. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, how do you
    see high fidelity simulation upgrades at these ranges factoring into
    effective testing of our newest weapons delivery systems and munitions?
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. The Air Force benefits from
    both open air testing and simulation data to inform the development and
    fielding decisions necessary to equip our force with advanced weapon
    systems. In the fiscal year 2017 President's Budget, the Air Force, in
    conjunction with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, allocated
    approximately $700 million to new and ongoing critical investments over
    the Future Years Defense Program in facilities and capabilities within
    the Air Force Major Range and Test Facility Base. These investments
    directly address effective testing of 5th generation and beyond
    aircraft and weapon systems. Current and planned investments include
    the following:

          Guided Weapons Effects Facility
          o Fourth test lane expansion provides a 33 percent increase in
    test capacity for Infrared Countermeasures hardware-in-the-loop testing
    necessary for determining performance of IR aircraft self-protection
    systems.

          Gulf Test Range Upgrades
          o  Gulf Range Test Expansion Package #2 doubles the width of
    Eglin instrumented water range (from 100 to 200 miles) necessary to
    evaluate large footprint air-to-air engagements.
          o  Next Generation Munitions Test Environment continues upgrading
    gun and munitions test infrastructure, developed and procured common
    data instrumentation and acquisition systems, and replaced
    environmental test chambers/facilities supporting gun and arena test
    capabilities.

          Benefield Anechoic Chamber
          o  Advanced Warfare Test and Evaluation Capability continues
    development, procurement, and integration of state-of-the-art
    simulators and threat signal generation capabilities.
          o  Next-generation Electronic Warfare Environment Generator
    system allows the Services to replicate high-density, modern threat
    signals in controlled environments in both laboratories and open-air
    ranges, including Eglin AFB.

          Hypersonics Test Infrastructure Projects
          o  Significant investment to develop and demonstrate a facility
    that closes the critical test and evaluation gaps by providing a clean
    air, variable speed up to Mach 7+ test facility with long runtime
    enabling the development and acquisition of future hypersonic systems
    and vehicle propulsion systems.
          o  Upgrades the existing Arnold Engineering Development Center
    arc heater test facility to provide a materials testing environment for
    the glide/cruise and pullout phases of hypersonic systems in the mid-
    pressure range up to approximately Mach 18.
          o  Develops airborne data collection system to support hypersonic
    testing.

        Going forward the Air Force continues to pursue high fidelity
    simulation upgrades to supplement open air testing, provide high-end
    threat replication, and to provide best value to the taxpayer with
    additional government owned organic capabilities.
        To effectively test newly developed long-range and/or hypersonic
    weapons, delivery systems, and munitions in an A2AD environment, along
    with our ability to defend against near-peer competitors with similar
    offensive capabilities, it is essential that Major Range and Test
    Facilities properly simulate likely wartime scenarios. This requires
    test ranges and airspace clearances sufficient to accommodate vast
    distances and hypersonic speeds of advanced weapons. Additionally,
    recapitalization is necessary to ensure that ranges and test facilities
    have emitters, sensors, and networks that can provide high fidelity
    simulations of various A2AD environments. Without modernization of
    Major Ranges and Test Facilities, our nation cannot be sure that
    taxpayer investment in capabilities development and weapon program
    requirements will yield systems that can effectively attack or defend
    against advanced near-peer threat capabilities.'' The Air Force
    benefits from both open air testing and simulation data to inform the
    development and fielding decisions necessary to equip our force with
    advanced weapon systems.
                           space range infrastructure
        51. Senator Nelson. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, in 2017
    the Eastern Range in the Atlantic expects to support 35 space launches,
    with that number growing to 48 launches annually in the next few years.
    This represents tremendous growth from previous years, which saw 7 to
    18 launches annually. Not only is launch tempo increasing, the number
    of launch vehicles is growing, fulfilling the national objective of a
    competitive domestic launch industry. Much of the Air Force's range
    infrastructure on both the Eastern and Western Range is decades old.
    Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, with assured access to space
    becoming increasingly important, what is the Air Force doing to keep
    pace with the growing need to replace and modernize space-based systems
    in terms of space launch infrastructure?
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. The Air Force is continuing
    to incrementally modernize range infrastructure, safety systems, and
    tracking systems while investing in new scheduling and planning tools.
    These efforts have ensured a very high rate of Range system
    availability and performance to meet launch customer needs in the near
    term. The Eastern and Western Ranges are essential contributors to
    meeting our nation's space superiority needs and the Air Force is
    refining a long-term strategy to support the Space Warfighting
    Construct.
                          the space domain in conflict
        52. Senator Nelson. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, space is
    no longer a neutral domain. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, are
    we currently postured to be able to utilize our space-based
    capabilities in the event we are engaged in a conflict with an
    adversary capable of targeting or denying the use of these systems?
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. In addition to important
    changes being implemented in the Space Mission Force (SMF) and Space
    Enterprise Vision (SEV), the Air Force is in the process of standing up
    a new Deputy Chief of Staff for Space Operations (AF/A11) and a
    supporting staff. This new organization will provide a new focus by
    providing a dedicated Lieutenant General-led organization to
    concentrate on the formulation, coordination, dissemination,
    implementation and execution of Air Force space strategy, plans,
    policy, guidance, requirements, integration and synchronization
    required to strengthen the advocacy for and stewardship of Air Force
    missions and capabilities. While these are important organizational
    steps, the overall United States space enterprise today is not
    currently resilient enough to survive a conflict extending into space.
    Our potential adversary's capabilities are continually evolving and we
    must continue to invest in the technologies and personnel necessary to
    maintain our space superiority in this increasingly contested domain.
    The Fiscal Year 2018 President's Budget addresses that reality, but
    more future investment is required in the face of advanced,
    demonstrated, and evolving threats.
                                   __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
                                huey replacement
        53. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, the
    Air Force's unfunded request list includes a request for yet another
    mitigation effort for the current Huey fleet--$8.5 million for a
    special mission aviator crashworthy seat. I'm concerned that we are
    forced to continue funneling funding into the ailing fleet of Hueys
    while the Air Force is delaying the procurement of new helicopters.
    What efforts are you taking to expedite the acquisition process? How is
    this year's budget working to achieve this?
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. The Air Force is committed
    to a full and open competition to procure up to 84 UH-1N replacement
    helicopters as soon as possible. The Fiscal Year 2018 President's
    Budget fully supports this by requesting $108.6 million for the UH-1N
    replacement program. Until the UH-1N Replacement is fielded in the
    fiscal year 2020/2021 timeframe, we must continue to address safety
    concerns of the current fleet. The fiscal year 2018 unfunded priority
    list requirement for crashworthy seats addresses the risk of serious
    injury or death in the event of a flight accident.
                                      f-35
        54. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, your
    testimony states that the F-35A is the Air Force's top modernization
    program. How many F-35s would you ideally procure to meet our defense
    needs?
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. A stable F-35A buy rate of
    60 per year will give time for effective and efficient procurement,
    basing decisions and the requisite growth in manpower that operates and
    maintains those aircraft. The program of record is 1,763 and that has
    not changed. But total numbers is not as important right now as our
    rate of procurement. We are working toward 60 per year, but 80 per year
    would be better.

        55. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, the
    Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) shows another delay for the 60 F-
    35As per year procurement plan. Two years ago it was to begin in fiscal
    year 2018, last year it was pushed to fiscal year 2021, and now it has
    been delayed to an undetermined date beyond FYDP projections. How are
    we going to get to 60 F-35As per year when you continue delaying
    production increases?
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. The Air Force is comfortable
    with the current glide slope to attain 60 F-35s per year (80 per year
    would certainly be better) in the out years. Investment at this rate
    provides a balanced future fighter force mix that recapitalizes the
    right 4th generation forces before Economic Service Life drives
    inefficient investment decisions. Any further delay to reaching the 60
    aircraft per year goal will put additional stress on the readiness and
    capability of our existing 4th and 5th gen aircraft and their
    personnel. A delay would also impact our ability to deliver sufficient
    capacity and capability to meet national strategic objectives.

        56. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, I am
    concerned that if we delay procurement, it will negatively impact cost
    and affordability--for us and our allies invested in the program. Are
    you concerned about the adjustments made to the long-term planned
    procurement pace for the F-35?
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. The Air Force is pursuing a
    buy rate of 60 aircraft per year as quickly as possible. However, for
    industry and the service to reach this number, we need sufficient
    funding and a supply chain that can meet the demand. We are working
    aggressively with our industry partners to ensure we drive unit price
    as low as possible while demonstrating required supply chain capacity,
    resulting in an affordable and sustainable production profile.
    Investment at this rate will provide a balanced future fighter force
    mix with sufficient capacity and capability to meet national strategic
    objectives.
                                 pilot shortage
        57. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, as
    discussed in the hearing, the shortage of pilots is not just a problem
    for the United States, but also our allies. Please provide a
    comprehensive list of allies that are experiencing this same challenge,
    to what degree they are short pilots, and what they are doing to
    address and mitigate risk. What can we learn from our allies' efforts
    to address our own pilot shortage?
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. The U.S. Air Force does not
    track readiness statistics with regard to other nations pilot readiness
    issues. Some Foreign Military Sales programs with partners are
    experiencing delays in training, such as the F-16, due to a limited
    number of USAF pilots available to support ally and partner training.
    USAF's other aviation sales with partners are being supported. In
    previous discussions with other Air Chiefs, we understand they are also
    facing budget issues, which has an impact to their aviation readiness.
    We are working with partners to improve integration of flight
    activities with coalition partners where mutually advantageous in
    support of national security strategies.
                                   __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Kirsten Gillibrand
                       niagara falls air reserve station
        58. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, I
    was so pleased that the 914th at Niagara Falls Air Reserve Station was
    chosen to convert to a KC-135 mission. I was there last year and was
    pleased with the progress. The one thing we need now is a KC-135 flight
    simulator, to serve both the 914th and other units. We currently have
    an empty building on the base, built to hold a C-130 simulator, making
    the basing of one that much easier for the Air Force. I have mentioned
    this to Air Force leadership before to express my belief that
    addressing this shortcoming will improve overall readiness for the Air
    Force and Air Reserves. Can you give me an update on any decisions
    about basing KC-135 simulators?
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. The Air Force tanker
    enterprise is critical to our national security and the readiness of
    our Total Force tanker fleet is a high priority for the Air Force. The
    composition of our tanker force is changing as we anticipate deliveries
    of the KC-46A Pegasus in the coming years, but the KC-135 will remain
    the predominant element of the fleet for years to come.
        As we plan for fielding of the KC-46, we are taking action to
    reposition KC-135s and their associated training devices and support
    equipment. The conversion of Niagara Falls from the C-130 to the KC-135
    is one example.
        As additional KC-135 units convert to the KC-46, we anticipate
    there could potentially be additional aircrew training devices that may
    be available for relocation to remaining KC-135 units. If and when
    these future training device decisions are made, our focus will remain
    on maximizing support to warfighter operational requirements while
    balancing KC-135 crew force training requirements.
                                lc-130 skibirds
        59. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, the
    Arctic is becoming more and more important to our national security
    policy. New York is home to the only ski-equipped C-130s in the world.
    These four LC-130 ``skibirds'' perform vital missions on behalf of the
    National Science Foundation in Antarctica, as well as training in
    Greenland. They have also been part of joint training missions with
    Canada. However, these planes are aging, and are in need of
    modernization in order to continue their amazing work. To my
    understanding, there have been discussions as to whether the United
    States Air Force will take over responsibility for the four planes
    currently owned by the National Science Foundation. Can you please
    provide an update on these discussions concerning our LC-130s and
    whether the Air Force's proposed fiscal year 2018 budget reflects
    changes to ownership of the planes?
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. The 109 AW in Schenectady,
    NY, has a total of 10 LC-130H aircraft; six are ANG-owned and four are
    National Science Foundation (NSF)-owned. Overall, there has been
    productive engagement with the NSF but a final decision regarding the
    transfer of the four NSF-owned LC-130Hs to the ANG has not been
    reached. Back in February, the Secretary of the Air Force Office of
    Manpower and Reserve Affairs (SAF/MR) received a formal request from
    the NSF to provide an estimate of the cost to transfer four NSF LC-130
    aircraft to the ANG. The ANG provided a coordinated response back to
    SAF/MR and they had a follow-on meeting with the NSF in April to
    discuss the costing details. Based on those discussions, the NSF
    indicated that they needed more time to conduct research and determine
    a way forward. To-date, the NSF has not submitted any additional
    requests for information regarding the transfer of its four LC-130
    aircraft to the ANG. Since a transfer decision is still pending, it is
    not included in the Fiscal Year 2018 President's Budget.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Donnelly
               nuclear modernization and trusted microelectronics
        60. Senator Donnelly. General Goldfein, you have stated in the past
    that the Air Force will pursue commonality and collaboration on nuclear
    modernization when and where it makes sense. An area that makes sense
    to maximize collaboration between the Air Force and Navy are the unique
    radiation-hardened microelectronics required for elements of our
    nuclear deterrent. Beyond microelectronics, what other areas do you
    view as smart candidates for expanded collaboration across the
    services?
        General Goldfein. The joint Air Force-Navy commonality assessment
    completed in March 2016 identified 47 components as commonality
    candidates between the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) and
    Trident D5 programs. Four specific commonality areas were prescribed in
    the request for proposal package for the GBSD technology maturation and
    risk reduction phase. Specifically, 1) guidance subsystem architecture;
    2) model-based systems engineering; 3) common electronic parts program;
    and 4) common test telemetry and termination systems.

        61. Senator Donnelly. General Goldfein, I am concerned about the
    long-term viability of our nation's fragile nuclear industrial base and
    our ability to buy trusted strategic parts in the future. How are the
    Air Force and Navy nuclear programs coordinating on acquisitions in
    order to synchronize future needs and sustain the industrial base?
        General Goldfein. The Air Force's ICBM demonstration and validation
    (Dem/Val) program ensures the infrastructure is in place to address
    both planned future efforts and emerging issues. The Navy, along with a
    significant number of our industry partners, is a participant in the
    Dem/Val program. Current Dem/Val efforts support legacy and future
    strategic system programs.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie Hirono
                               space capabilities
        62. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, it is
    often said that the best defense is a good offense. Following this
    rhetoric, the U.S. would we be required to dismantle space capabilities
    of foreign actors in order to defend from attacks. Are we currently
    positioned to be able to continue to operate and utilize our space-
    based capabilities in the event we are engaged in a war that extends
    into space? If not what else needs to be done?
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. Our priority is to ensure
    the Air Force continues to provide resilient space effects to all
    warfighters and to ensure we are fully prepared to fight and win a
    conflict that extends into space. To do this, we are adjusting how we
    organize, train, and equip through the Space Mission Force (SMF) and
    Space Enterprise Vision (SEV). The SMF is emphasizing advanced training
    of our space operators while also giving them time to develop new
    tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to protect our assets and
    mitigate adversary actions. This training and these TTPs will also
    drive the discussion of the rules of engagement and authority structure
    required to operate in a contested space environment. The SEV lays out
    a roadmap of future systems and capabilities that will provide a space
    force resilient to attack. We are also working to ensure acquisition
    authorities are held at the appropriate levels to ensure we can acquire
    appropriately resilient systems while limiting unnecessary duplication
    of effort. Finally, we have started national-level policy discussions
    to determine the messages we want to send to our allies and adversaries
    and to advance policies that allow tactical commanders the ability to
    operate in a real-time ``battlefield'' environment. While these are
    important first steps, we must continue to adjust from the paradigm of
    operating in a benign space environment to that of a contested arena
    through additional investment in resilient systems, operations
    training, and organizational design.
                         eroding competitive advantage
        63. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, we have
    heard testimony from all of the combatant commanders that the
    technology and capability gap is closing as the computing power,
    nuclear weapons, cruise and theater ballistic missiles, and
    sophisticated air defense systems of our enemies are becoming more
    effective. How quickly is our competitive advantage eroding? What
    additional assets are required to prevent the gap from closing that are
    not currently included in the Fiscal Year 2018 Presidential Budget?
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. Our competitive advantage is
    eroding at an alarming rate. In order to reverse this trend, we need to
    strike the right balance between capability and capacity in air, space
    and cyberspace domains. This will require a significant funding
    commitment to begin rebuilding the Combat Air Force and accelerate
    development of new concepts. The Air Force currently has a plan to
    balance capability and capacity for the Combat Air Force through 4th
    and 5th generation fighter modernization, and 5th generation fighter,
    long range bomber, and preferred munitions procurement.
        Efforts that will require increased funding to maintain our
    competitive advantage include: 4th generation fighter service life
    extensions and modernization, 5th generation fighter capability
    development and procurement, multi-domain command and control, position
    navigation and timing, electromagnetic spectrum superiority, integrated
    air and missile defense, integrated intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance, airbase resilience, and adaptive basing.
                           creation of a space force
        64. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, there
    has been renewed debate regarding the need to create a `space force'
    separate from the Air Force, either stood up as a separate Service or
    aligned under the Department of the Air Force similar to the USMC
    relationship with the Department of the Navy. What is the Air Force's
    opinion of such proposals?
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. As the fielding of counter-
    space capabilities accelerates, the United States cannot afford the
    significant resource and time disruptions a separate space force would
    create. A separate space service would incur significant expense for
    Service-specific administration and dilute funding needed to pursue
    space superiority initiatives now. Since the early 1990s, the
    Department has been integrating space support into joint operations.
    Now, with space becoming a contested domain, we must shift from a
    mindset of integrating support for terrestrial forces to integration of
    space into the multi-domain war fight. Creating a separate Space Corps
    or Space Force while transitioning from a benign to a warfighting
    domain would diffuse and distract from the efforts proposed and
    underway to address gaps and shortfalls in the space enterprise.
                                energy security
        65. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, U.S.
    energy security is a vital component to our national security. The need
    to reduce energy consumption, use clean alternative energy sources, and
    increase U.S. security is closely tied to our overall national security
    and an important goal for all our branches of the military. How has the
    Air Force prioritized its long-term energy needs in this budget
    request? How does the request highlight efforts to increase U.S. energy
    security? Do you view these efforts as yielding long-term dividends in
    terms of budgetary savings and operational effectiveness?
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. The Air Force considers
    energy security, efficiency and capability when we identify
    requirements and as we develop our budgets. In addition, we give
    favorable consideration to projects that improve energy resilience.
    Investments to enhance the efficiency and resiliency of aircraft
    platforms and critical facilities provide significant long-term
    benefits for the nation, and we will continue to pursue them.
        The Air Force prioritizes energy investments to focus on mission
    assurance. For example, for installation energy, the Air Force takes a
    holistic approach that values resilience, cost effectiveness and
    cleanliness, while primarily relying on third party financing. As
    codified in our Energy Flight Plan (http://www.safie.hq.af.mil/
    Programs/Energy/), our approach translates into three lines of effort:
    defining our vulnerabilities, providing self-sufficient utility scale
    power on or near the installation, and leveraging investment in
    technologies to improve our resiliency.
        We are working closely with utility commissions, utilities, energy
    service providers, communities, and other stakeholders to improve our
    energy resilience, and taking advantage of all the authorities provided
    to us by Congress. For example, the Air Force is looking at bi-
    directional microgrids to allow the Air Force to push excess power off
    base in support of civil authorities; using real estate and other
    authorities to offer utility companies battery storage opportunities on
    our installations; and developing mutually beneficial renewable and
    non-renewable on-base power generation capabilities that support both
    the defense mission and U.S. energy security.
        With respect to aviation operations, we are concentrating on three
    lines of effort. We are focusing on identifying and incorporating new
    technologies (e.g., adaptive jet engines) while also better
    understanding how these investments affect the energy posture of our
    operational plans. Additionally, we are integrating new sustainment
    techniques to improve weapons system efficiency and effectiveness.
    Finally, we are incorporating new tools and methods into operational
    processes to maximize combat capability and readiness of our forces.
        Over the long-term, we are focusing on assured operational
    effectiveness so our installations continue to provide defense for the
    nation in the face of physical attack, cyber-attack, or natural
    disaster affecting our bases or the national electric grid.
    Additionally, we continuously pursue the most cost effective methods,
    which generally result in budget savings.
                                   __________
                    Questions Submitted by Senator Tim Kaine
                        mid-atlantic regional spaceport
        66. Senator Kaine. Secretary Wilson, as you know, in addition to
    Air Force launch sites at Cape Canaveral and Vandenberg, State
    Spaceports like the Mid-Atlantic Regional Spaceport at Wallops in
    Virginia and the Pacific Spaceport Complex in Alaska are playing an
    increasingly important role in provide assured access to space for the
    Department of Defense. These State-owned and operated spaceports have
    provided second launch sites for the Air Force on the East and West
    Coasts, which provides a critical second point of access to key
    inclinations and orbits that are important to our national security.
    This ensures increased resiliency in the case of natural disasters or
    security threats to launch sites. They are also very affordable launch
    sites because the infrastructure development, maintenance and
    operations costs are largely covered by the state and other users. Both
    spaceports are currently working with the DOD on various missions and
    launches, but there is much more potential to take greater advantage of
    these assets to support of national launch infrastructure and access to
    space. As you look at ways to reduce launch costs and improve
    resiliency in space launch, how will the Air Force and other Defense
    launch customers make even greater use of spaceports like Wallops for
    small and medium launch opportunities, including a greater cadence of
    Operationally Responsive Space and other missions?
        Secretary Wilson. The Air Force work will with other partners such
    as NASA, the intelligence and the missile defense communities to
    leverage the benefits of non-federal spaceports when it is appropriate
    to support National Security Space requirements.
        While National Security Space launch requirements are largely met
    by EELV-class vehicles from the two federal launch sites Cape Canaveral
    Air Force Station and Vandenberg Air Force Base, state sponsored sites,
    including the Mid-Atlantic Regional Spaceport (MARS) at Wallops in
    Virginia and the Pacific Spaceport Complex in Alaska (PSCA), have
    supported launch operations and suborbital test missions for generally
    smaller classes of launch vehicles. Next summer, the Air Force plans to
    launch the NROL-111 mission on a Minotaur I, from MARS and the Missile
    Defense Agency plans to resume ballistic missile defense flight testing
    from PSCA beginning in the third quarter of fiscal year 2017. With the
    support of Congress, there are federally-funded efforts underway to
    improve Spaceport infrastructure at MARS (Wallops) and PSCA (Kodiak) to
    enhance the capabilities of these spaceports to provide resiliency
    options for small to medium-class launches.

        67. Senator Kaine. Secretary Wilson, additionally, the fiscal year
    2017 Omnibus contained a provision directing the Director of National
    Intelligence and the Department to put together a report on making
    greater access of these launch capabilities. Could you provide an
    update on the status of this report and when the Committee may expect
    to receive it?
        Secretary Wilson. This report is currently being drafted by the
    National Reconnaissance Office's (NRO) Office of Space Launch (OSL).
    OSL is working closely with the Air Force's Space and Missile Systems
    Center's Launch Enterprise Directorate (SMC/LE) to draft this report
    and coordinate it through the Intelligence Community and the Air Force.
    The NRO and the Air Force will work to meet the 3 August suspense
    stipulated in the fiscal year 2017 Omnibus.

        68. Senator Kaine. Secretary Wilson, given that the U.S. has only
    four spaceports (Cape Canaveral (FL), Vandenberg (CA), Wallops (VA),
    Kodiak (AK)) capable of launching national security, civil and
    commercial satellites to orbit--with only two launch sites on each
    coast--it's safe to say that these represent a critical element of our
    national infrastructure, resiliency and assured access to space.
        Secretary Wilson. The Air Force continues to evaluate critical
    elements of our national security infrastructure as part of the Space
    Warfighting Construct. Current federal launch infrastructure requires
    continued sustainment but is sufficient to meet comprehensive national
    security launch needs in the near term. The Air Force will continue to
    work with other partners, such as the intelligence and missile defense
    communities, to leverage the benefits of non-federal spaceports where
    appropriate to support National Security Space requirements.

        69. Senator Kaine. Secretary Wilson, given that all four of these
    launch sites, including the two State Spaceports in Virginia and
    Alaska, are used to launch DOD assets into orbit, do you consider these
    spaceports to be critical infrastructure for the United States? How
    does the Air Force and other DOD users ensure that these spaceports,
    especially the non-Federal spaceports, are maintained and upgraded to
    ensure that we maintain no less than these four points of access to
    space?
        Secretary Wilson. The Air Force continues to evaluate critical
    elements of our national security infrastructure as part of the Space
    Warfighting Construct. The Air Force will continue to work with other
    partners, such as the intelligence and missile defense communities, to
    support and leverage the benefits of non-federal spaceports where
    appropriate to support National Security Space requirements.
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
                        mit lincoln lab west lab project
        70. Senator Warren. Secretary Wilson, MIT Lincoln Laboratory is the
    nation's preeminent Department of Defense research and development
    Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC) focused on
    critical national defense technology problems. The current facilities
    are in an accelerating decline and a great deal of the Lab's work is
    being done in obsolete 1950s-era buildings. Unless these facilities are
    modernized in the near term, their worsening condition will prevent MIT
    Lincoln Laboratory from effectively meeting Air Force and Defense
    Department requirements for advanced research and development. I was
    greatly encouraged that the Air Force and the Department of Defense
    committed to funding a facilities modernization plan at MIT/LL in the
    Future Year Defense Program (FYDP) released with the fiscal year 2017
    Budget. That FYDP committed to constructing a Compound Semi-Conductor
    Laboratory--Microelectronics Integration Facility (CSL-MIF), currently
    programmed at $225 million in the Air Force's fiscal year 2019 Military
    Construction budget, and an Engineering Prototype Facility (EPF)
    programmed for fiscal year 2022 at $216 million. Secretary Wilson, can
    you give me your assurance that you will continue to support these
    critical projects as the Air Force builds the fiscal year 2019 Budget?
        Secretary Wilson. I agree that modernizing research facilities,
    such as MIT's Lincoln Laboratory, are critical to maintaining our
    technological advantage over potential adversaries. I will continue to
    consider these priorities as we build the fiscal year 2019 budget.
                        funding for science & technology
        71. Senator Warren. Secretary Wilson, while I was pleased to see a
    $5.2 billion increase in your budget request for Research, Development,
    Test and Evaluation, I was disappointed to see that within that amount,
    Science & Technology funding is actually being cut relative to last
    year. Secretary Wilson, during your confirmation hearing, you expressed
    support for increasing Science & Technology funding. Do you continue to
    support those increases?
        Secretary Wilson. The Air Force believes that cutting-edge science
    and technology research is a cornerstone of our Air Force, and is
    supported in the Fiscal Year 2018 President's Budget Request for Air
    Force Science and Technology (S&T), which is a $97.4 million increase
    from the Fiscal Year 2017 President's Budget.

        72. Senator Warren. Secretary Wilson, why does basic and applied
    research funding matter, and what are your priorities for early-stage
    research?
        Secretary Wilson. Air Force basic and applied research sits at the
    center of an innovation network that includes our partners in the other
    Military Services, DARPA, as well as those of the National Science
    Foundation, NASA, the Department of Energy and National Institute of
    Standards and Technology. Our Air Force S&T basic research needs to
    leverage these scientific results and transition innovative
    breakthroughs into applied research for military applications and then
    on to the acquisition community. While the Air Force identified some
    important research thrusts some time ago, I expect the Air Force will
    review that strategic look over the next year in a broad effort that
    includes labs, academia, and industry.

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2018 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                             TUESDAY, JUNE 13, 2017

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                      DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET POSTURE

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:29 a.m. in Room
    SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Wicker,
    Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Perdue,
    Graham, Strange, Reed, Nelson, McCaskill, Shaheen, Gillibrand,
    Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King, Heinrich, Warren,
    and Peters.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman McCain. Good morning. The Senate Armed Services
    Committee meets this morning to receive testimony on the
    Department of Defense's [DOD] fiscal year 2018 budget request.
        We welcome Secretary Mattis, Chairman Dunford, and
    Secretary Norquist, and thank you for your many years of
    distinguished service and your leadership of our men and women
    in uniform.
        Before we begin, we all want to acknowledge the service and
    sacrifice of Sergeant Eric Houck, Sergeant William Bays, and
    Corporal Dillon Baldridge. These three soldiers from the Army's
    101st Airborne Division were killed this weekend in
    Afghanistan. The thoughts and prayers of this committee are
    with their loved ones.
        The sacrifice of these heroes is a painful reminder that
    America is still a nation at war. That is true in Afghanistan,
    where, after 15 years of war, we face a stalemate and urgently
    need a change in strategy and an increase in resources, if we
    are to turn the situation around.
        We also remain engaged in a global campaign to defeat ISIS
    [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] and related terrorist groups,
    from Libya and Yemen, to Iraq and Syria, where United States
    troops are helping to destroy ISIS and reclaim Mosul and Raqqa.
        Meanwhile, threats around the world continue to grow more
    complex and severe. North Korea is closing in on the
    development of a nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic
    missile [ICBM] that can target our Homeland. Iran continues to
    destabilize the Middle East and seeks to drive the United
    States out of the region.
        At the same time, we have entered a new era of great power
    competition. Russia and China, despite their many differences,
    are both modernizing their militaries, developing advanced
    capabilities to undermine our ability to project power
    globally, threatening their neighbors, and challenging the
    rules-based world order. Russia, in particular, continues to
    occupy Crimea, destabilize Ukraine, threaten our NATO allies,
    bolster the murderous Assad regime in Syria, and pursue a
    campaign of active measures to undermine the very integrity of
    Western democracies.
        With thousands of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
    marines deployed in harm's way around the globe, those of us
    who are charged with the awesome responsibility of providing
    for the common defense must ask ourselves if we are doing
    everything possible to support our brave men and women in
    uniform to meet the challenges of an increasingly dangerous
    world and succeed in their mission.
        I am sad to say that we are not. In response to rising
    threats, we have asked our military to do more and give more
    but have given less and less to them.
        Our witnesses' opening statements are a harsh indictment of
    this failure, but they are right. I implore my colleagues to
    listen carefully to their testimony and heed their admonition
    to us.
        Since 2011, spending caps mandated by the Budget Control
    Act [BCA] have led to a 23 percent cut to the defense budget.
    These reductions, compounded by growing fiscal uncertainty and
    continuing resolutions, have left our military with shrinking
    forces, depleted readiness, and aging equipment. This has put
    the lives of our men and women in uniform at greater risk, as
    this committee has heard in testimony for years from our
    civilian defense leaders and senior military officers.
        The administration's fiscal year 2018 budget request, if
    enacted, could help to arrest the decline in our military's
    readiness. But ultimately, and unfortunately, it falls short of
    the President's commitment to rebuild our military. The
    proposed defense budget of $603 billion is both arbitrary and
    inadequate--arbitrary because the topline is simply what was
    written into the Budget Control Act 6 years ago prior to the
    sequester cuts, and inadequate because it represents just a 3
    percent increase over President Obama's defense plan.
        It is hardly surprising, then, that this committee has
    received lists of unfunded requirements from the military
    services totaling over $31 billion, all of which Secretary
    Mattis testified last night in the House Armed Services
    Committee that he supports. Our military service leaders have
    testified to this committee that this budget would stanch the
    bleeding, but we owe our men and women in uniform more than
    that.
        It has been said that this budget request focuses on
    readiness, and it is true that the requested funding increases
    would make the current force more ready for the next year. But
    ultimately, readiness is more than training hours and time on
    the ranges. Real readiness requires sufficient capacity to
    enable our troops simultaneously to conduct operations, prepare
    for deployment, rest and refit, and focus on the challenges of
    tomorrow. This budget delivers no growth in capacity, which
    means that the joint force will continue to consume readiness
    as quickly as it is produced. These increases in capacity are
    reflected in each service's unfunded requirements.
        True readiness is also modernization, because if we
    mortgage future capability to pay for present commitments, we
    have achieved little, especially at a time when our adversaries
    are moving at an alarming rate to erode America's military
    technological advantage and call into question our ability to
    project power.
        Here, too, unfortunately, this budget request poses the old
    false choice between readiness and modernization. The fact is
    that $603 billion simply is not enough to pay for both
    priorities, which is why the services' unfunded requirements
    are heavy on the procurement of new and additional capabilities
    that are desperately needed.
        All of this presents this committee, and this Congress,
    with a significant choice. The administration's budget request
    is just that--a request. Ultimately, it is our independent
    responsibility to authorize and appropriate funding for our
    military at levels and in ways that we believe sufficient to
    provide for the common defense. I believe that this budget
    request is a start, but we can and must do better.
        This will not be possible, however, as long as the Budget
    Control Act remains the law of the land. This defense budget
    request and the additional funding that our military needs is
    literally illegal under the Budget Control Act. This law has
    done severe damage to our military. It has harmed the
    Department's ability to plan and execute budgets effectively
    and efficiently. It has ground the Congress' budget and
    appropriations processes to a halt. Worst of all, there are 4
    more years of BCA caps to go.
        We cannot go on like this. Our men and women in uniform
    deserve better. It is time for the Congress to reinvest in our
    military, restore readiness and capabilities, rebalance our
    joint force, and renew America's military advantage.
        To do so, we must revise or repeal the Budget Control Act.
    We must give our troops what they need to succeed, today and in
    the future.
        Will the politics of this be difficult? Yes. But the
    question all of us here must answer is: How much longer will we
    send our sons and daughters into harm's way unprepared before
    we get over our politics and do our jobs?
        Senator Reed?

                     STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
    holding this hearing to consider funding levels for the
    Department of Defense to maintain our Nation's military.
        I also want to welcome our distinguished witnesses this
    morning and thank them for their service to our Nation.
        I want to join with the chairman in paying tribute to the
    soldiers of the 101st who gave their lives, and their families.
    They are examples of thousands and thousands of Americans who
    serve, and their families here at home who serve here with
    them.
        Today, we consider the fiscal year 2018 Trump
    Administration budget that seeks $574 billion in base funding
    and $65 billion for Overseas Contingency Operations.
        As we all know, the Budget Control Act, the BCA, of 2011,
    and the sequester, are still law of the land, and this budget
    request for DOD exceeds the BCA defense spending cap by $52
    billion. Rather than negotiate with Congress or propose an
    outright repeal of BCA and the sequester, President Trump
    proposed to offset an increase in defense spending with a $52
    billion cut in nondefense spending. But unless the BCA is
    changed, the offset will seriously harm nondefense spending and
    fail to prevent across-the-board cuts reclaiming the $52
    billion, leaving DOD in a worse position.
        We have already held many hearings this year where senior
    civilian and military leaders have repeatedly urged us to
    remove the BCA caps and end sequestration. Like Chairman
    McCain, I believe it is time to repeal the BCA. Setting
    arbitrary thresholds on defense and nondefense spending has not
    made our country safer, and it has not fixed our broader fiscal
    problems, nor do these caps, which were set nearly 6 years ago,
    accurately reflect what our military needs in order to confront
    today's threats, or the kind of domestic investment we need to
    keep America competitive and strong.
        Let me be clear. I am not opposed to increased military
    spending. Democrats have and will continue to support robust
    defense spending. But it is the duty of this committee to
    carefully review the budget proposals presented by the
    President to ensure that the funds are allocated properly so
    that our fighting men and women have what they need to complete
    their mission and return home safely. Every member, regardless
    of party, takes this duty seriously.
        I also believe that our budget must reflect our Nation's
    core values and take care of Americans who remain at home. Our
    military personnel have a vision of the America they are
    fighting for, and it is our duty to protect that. I, therefore,
    have grave concerns about the President's Budget Request,
    because it robs from Peter to pay Paul. The President's
    proposal increases defense spending, but it also eliminates
    $17.3 billion from the State Department's efforts to prevent
    wars and foster peace, which is the very kind of spending that
    Secretary Mattis has said is so crucial to our military
    efforts. It also slashes funding for health investments like
    the NIH [National Institute of Health] and CDC [Centers for
    Disease Control], and training for health care professionals to
    fight against global public health epidemics, such as Ebola,
    before they reached the U.S. This budget request also
    eliminates programs that help vulnerable Americans here at
    home.
        Certainly, our military needs additional resources to climb
    out of the readiness hole it is in and, at the same time, deter
    conflict with near-peer competitors, but I do not believe we
    should do so at the expense of diplomacy and vulnerable
    Americans.
        I would also note that for over the last 15 years, we have
    found it important enough to send our brave men and women to
    war, but we have not had the courage to raise revenues to pay
    for these wars, as this Nation has historically done. As we
    examine what funding requirements are necessary for the safety
    and security of our country, we need to look at our federal
    budget in much more context. The BCA's delineation between
    defense and nondefense spending has had the unfortunate effect
    of pitting each category of funding against the other. Instead,
    we would be better served if we considered the needs of our
    Nation holistically.
        I also believe that it would be best if we examined the
    President's Budget Request in the context of an overall
    National Security Strategy. Such a strategy, however, has not
    clearly emerged as we enter the sixth month of this
    administration.
        We seem to careen from one foreign policy crisis to
    another, many of which are the administration's own making.
    This takes up valuable energy and attention at a time when
    there are several significant national security challenges on
    which we need to be focused.
        Secretary Mattis and General Dunford, you have been
    consummate professionals and steady hands in a tumultuous time,
    but we face many difficult decisions, both strategic and
    budgetary, that demand the kind of leadership and engagement
    that only a grounded and focused President can provide. I look
    forward to working with you and my colleagues as we address
    these important issues. I am proud that this committee has
    always worked in a bipartisan fashion during this process. I
    look forward to working with the chairman and all the committee
    members to come to a reasonable agreement again this year.
        Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Secretary Mattis, welcome back.

     STATEMENT OF HONORABLE JAMES N. MATTIS, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
     ACCOMPANIED BY DAVID L. NORQUIST, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
       COMPTROLLER, CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
                                DEFENSE

        Secretary Mattis. Thank you, Chairman McCain, Ranking
    Member Reed, and members of the committee. I appreciate the
    opportunity to testify in support of the President's Budget
    request for fiscal year 2018. Mr. Chairman, I request the
    committee except my written statement for the record.
        I am joined by Chairman Dunford and the Department's new
    comptroller, Under Secretary of Defense David Norquist. Thank
    you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee for your swift
    consideration and the Senate's confirmation of Defense
    Department nominees.
        This budget request holds me accountable to the men and
    women of the Department of Defense. Every day, more than 2
    million servicemembers and nearly 1 million civilians do their
    duty, honoring previous generations of veterans and civil
    servants who have sacrificed for our country. It is my
    privilege to serve alongside them.
        We in the Department of Defense are keenly aware of the
    sacrifices made by the American people to fund our military.
    Many times in the past we have looked reality in the eye, met
    challenges with the help of congressional leadership, and built
    the most capable warfighting force in the world. There is no
    room for complacency, and we have no God-given right to victory
    on the battlefield. Each generation of Americans, from the
    halls of Congress to the battlefields, earn victory through
    commitment and sacrifice.
        For 4 years, the Department of Defense has been subjected
    to or threatened by automatic, across-the-board cuts as a
    result of sequester, a mechanism meant to be so injurious to
    the military it would never go into effect. But it did go into
    effect, and as forecast by then-Secretary of Defense Panetta,
    the damage has been severe, hollowing out our force.
        In addition, during 9 of the past 10 years, Congress has
    enacted 30 separate continuing resolutions to fund the
    Department of Defense, thus inhibiting our readiness and our
    adaptation to new challenges.
        We need bipartisan support for this budget request. In the
    past, by failing to pass a budget on time or to eliminate the
    threat of sequestration, Congress sidelined itself from its
    active constitutional oversight role. Continuing resolutions
    coupled with sequestration blocked new programs, prevented
    service growth, stalled industry initiative, and placed troops
    at greater risk.
        Despite the tremendous efforts of this committee, Congress,
    as a whole, has met the present challenge with lassitude, not
    leadership.
        I retired from military service 3 months after
    sequestration took effect. Four years later, I returned to the
    Department, and I have been shocked by what I have seen about
    our readiness to fight. While nothing can compare to the
    heartache caused by the loss of our troops during these wars,
    no enemy in the field has done more to harm the combat
    readiness of our military than sequestration.
        We have only sustained our ability to meet America's
    commitments abroad for our security because our troops have
    stoically shouldered a much greater burden. But our troops'
    stoic commitment cannot reduce the growing risk.
        It took us years to get into this situation. It will
    require years of stable budgets and increased funding to get
    out of it.
        I urge members of this committee and Congress to achieve
    three goals. First, fully fund our request, which requires an
    increase to the Defense budget caps. Second, pass a fiscal year
    2018 budget in a timely manner to avoid yet another harmful
    continuing resolution. Third, eliminate the threat of future
    sequestration cuts to provide a stable budgetary planning
    horizon.
        Stable budgets and increased funding are necessary because
    of four external factors acting on the Department at the same
    time.
        The first force acting on us that we must recognize is 16
    years of war. When Congress approved the all-volunteer force in
    1973, our country never envisioned sending our military to war
    for more than a decade without pause or conscription. America's
    long war has placed a heavy burden on men and women in uniform
    and their families.
        A second concurrent force acting on the Department is the
    worsening global security situation that the chairman spoke
    about. We must look reality in the eye. Russia and China are
    seeking veto power over the economic, diplomatic, and security
    decisions on their periphery. North Korea's reckless rhetoric
    and provocative actions continue, despite United Nations
    censure and sanctions, while Iran remains the largest long-term
    challenge to Mideast stability. All the while, terrorist groups
    murder the innocent and threaten peace in many regions while
    targeting us.
        A third force is adversaries actively contesting America's
    capabilities. For decades, the United States enjoyed
    uncontested or dominant superiority in every operating domain
    or realm. We can generally deploy our forces when we wanted,
    assemble them where we wanted, and operate how we wanted.
    Today, every operating domain--outer space, air, sea, undersea,
    land, and cyberspace--is contested.
        A fourth concurrent force is rapid technological change.
    Among the other forces noted thus far, technological change is
    one that necessitates new investment, innovative approaches,
    and new program starts that have been denied us by law when we
    have been forced to operate under continuing resolutions.
        Each of these four forces--16 years of war, the worsening
    security environment, contested operations in multiple domains,
    and the rapid pace of technological change--require stable
    budgets and increased funding to provide for the protection of
    our citizens and for the survival of our freedoms.
        I reiterate that security and solvency are my watchwords as
    Secretary of Defense. The fundamental responsibility of our
    government is to defend the American people providing for our
    security, and we cannot defend America and help others if our
    Nation is not both strong and solvent.
        So we in the Department of Defense owe it to the American
    public to ensure we spend each dollar wisely. President Trump
    has nominated for Senate approval specific individuals who will
    bring proven skills to discipline our Department's fiscal
    processes to ensure we do so.
        This first step to restoring readiness is underway thanks
    to Congress' willingness to support the administration's
    request for an additional $21 billion in resources for fiscal
    year 2017 to address vital warfighting readiness shortfalls.
    Your support put more aircraft in the air, ships to sea, and
    troops in the field. However, we all recognize that it will
    take a number of years of higher funding delivered on time to
    restore readiness.
        To strengthen the military, President Trump requested a
    $639 billion topline for the fiscal year 2018 defense budget.
    This year's budget reflects five priorities.
        The first priority is continuing to improve warfighter
    readiness begun in 2017, filling in the holes from tradeoffs
    made during 16 years of war and 9 years of continuing
    resolutions and Budget Control Act caps.
        The second priority is increasing capacity and lethality
    while preparing for future investment driven by the results
    from the National Defense Strategy we are working on now. Our
    fiscal year 2018 budget request ensures the Nation's current
    nuclear deterrent will be sustained and supports continuation
    of its much-needed modernization process.
        The third priority is reforming how the Department does
    business. I am devoted to gaining full value from every
    taxpayer dollar that is spent on defense, thereby earning the
    trust of Congress and the American people. We have begun
    implementation of a range of reform initiatives directed by the
    2017 National Defense Authorization Act [NDAA], and we are on
    track to enter into a full agency-wide financial statement
    audit, as required by statute.
        I urge Congress to support the Department's request for
    authority to conduct a 2021 base realignment and closure, or
    BRAC, round. I recognize the careful deliberation that members
    must exercise in considering this, but BRAC is one of the most
    successful and significant efficiency programs we have. We
    forecast that a properly focused base closure effort will
    generate $2 billion or more annually and, over a 5-year period,
    that would be enough to buy 300 Apache attack helicopters, 120
    F-18 Super Hornets, or four Virginia-class submarines.
        The fourth priority in the fiscal year 2018 budget request
    is keeping faith with servicemembers and families. Talented
    people are the Department's most valuable asset, but we must
    continually balance these requirements of investment in our
    people against other investments critical to readiness,
    equipping, and modernizing the force to ensure the military is
    the most capable warfighting force in the world. Investment in
    military compensation, blended retirement, the military health
    system, and family programs are essential to fielding the
    talent we need to sustain our competitive advantage on the
    battlefield.
        Our fifth priority is support for Overseas Contingency
    Operations. The Fiscal Year 2018 President's Budget requests
    $64.6 billion focusing on operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and
    Syria; increasing efforts to sustain NATO's [North Atlantic
    Treaty Organization] defenses to deter aggression; and global
    counterterrorism operations. ISIS and other terrorist
    organizations represent a clear and present danger, and I am
    encouraged by the willingness of our allies and partners to
    share the burden of this campaign alongside us.
        Moving forward, the fiscal year 2019 budget informed by the
    National Defense Strategy will have to make hard choices as we
    shape the 2019 to 2023 defense program. The Department will
    work with President Trump, Congress, and this committee to
    ensure future budget requests are both sustainable and provide
    the Commander in Chief with viable military options that
    support America's security.
        In summation, first, I need the BCA caps lifted and a
    budget, not a continuing resolution, passed on time, and
    elimination of future sequestration cuts, so we can provide a
    stable and adequate way ahead on budgets.
        For those who are concerned we are not asking for
    sufficient dollars, please consider the following. For 2017, as
    a supplemental, we asked for $30 billion and the Congress
    provided $21 billion for our administration to address
    readiness shortfalls.
        Second, this fiscal year, President Trump has requested
    $574 billion plus $29 billion in the Department of Energy [DOE]
    budget, plus $65 billion for Overseas Contingency Operations.
    This is a 5 percent growth over what the Department had for
    2017.
        This request is $52 billion above the Budget Control Act
    defense caps. We have underway at this time a National Security
    Strategy review, and that will give us the analytic rigor to
    come back to you for the fiscal year 2019 to fiscal year 2023
    budget request when we will build up our military to confront
    the situation that the chairman and I have laid out in our
    written statements.
        I am keenly aware that each of you understand the
    responsibility we share to ensure our military is ready to
    fight today and in the future. I need your help to inform your
    fellow Members of Congress about the reality facing our
    military and the need for Congress as a whole to pass the
    defense budget on time.
        Thank you, members of the committee, for your strong
    support over many years and for ensuring our troops have the
    resources and equipment they need to fight and win on the
    battlefield. I pledge to collaborate closely with you for the
    defense of our Nation in our joint effort to keep our Armed
    Forces second to none.
        Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. Chairman Dunford is
    prepared to discuss the military dimensions of the budget
    request.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary Mattis follows:]

             Prepared Statement by Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis
        Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished members of the
    committee, I appreciate the opportunity to testify in support of the
    President's budget request for fiscal year 2018.
        I am pleased to be joined by Chairman Dunford and the Department's
    new Comptroller, Under Secretary of Defense David Norquist.
        This budget request holds me accountable to the men and women of
    the Department of Defense. Every day, more than two million Service
    members and nearly one million civilians do their duty, honoring
    previous generations of veterans and civil servants who have sacrificed
    for our country. I am mindful of the privilege it is to serve alongside
    them.
        We in the Department of Defense are keenly aware of the sacrifices
    made by the American people to fund our military. Many times in the
    past we have looked reality in the eye, met challenges with
    Congressional leadership, and built the most capable warfighting force
    in the world. There is no room for complacency and we have no God-given
    right to victory on the battlefield. Each generation of Americans, from
    the halls of Congress to the battlefields, earn victory through
    commitment and sacrifice.
        And yet, for four years our military has been subject to or
    threatened by automatic, across-the-board cuts as a result of
    sequester--a mechanism meant to be so injurious to the military it
    would never go into effect. In addition, during nine of the past ten
    years, Congress has enacted 30 separate Continuing Resolutions to fund
    the Department of Defense, thus inhibiting our readiness and adaptation
    to new challenges.
        I need bipartisan support for this budget request. In the past, by
    failing to pass a budget on time or eliminate the threat of
    sequestration, Congress sidelined itself from its active Constitutional
    oversight role. It has blocked new programs, prevented service growth,
    stalled industry initiative, and placed troops at greater risk. Despite
    the tremendous efforts of this committee, Congress as a whole has met
    the present challenge with lassitude, not leadership.
        For much of the past decade, my predecessors and prior members of
    the Joint Chiefs of Staff testified that sequestration and the
    continued use of Continuing Resolutions would result in a steady
    erosion of military readiness. In 2013, then-Secretary of Defense Leon
    Panetta, former Chairman of the House Budget Committee and the former
    Director of the Office of Management and Budget, testified sequester
    was ``guaranteed to hollow out the force.''
        I retired from military service three months after sequestration
    took effect. Four years later, I returned to the Department and I have
    been shocked by what I've seen with our readiness to fight. For all the
    heartache caused by the loss of our troops during these wars, no enemy
    in the field has done more to harm the readiness of our military than
    sequestration. We have only sustained our ability to meet America's
    commitments abroad because our troops have stoically shouldered a much
    greater burden.
        It took us years to get into this situation. It will require years
    of stable budgets and increased funding to get out of it. I urge
    members of this committee and Congress to achieve three goals:

          First, fully fund our request, which requires an increase
    to the Defense budget caps;
          Second, pass a fiscal year 2018 budget in a timely manner
    to avoid yet another harmful Continuing Resolution; and
          Third, eliminate the threat of future sequestration cuts
    to provide a stable budgetary planning horizon.

        Stable budgets and increased funding are necessary because of four
    external forces acting on the Department at the same time.
        The first force we must recognize is 16 years of war. This period
    represents the longest continuous stretch of armed conflict in our
    Nation's history. In more than a quarter century since the end of the
    Cold War, our country has deployed large-scale forces in active
    operations for more months than we have been at peace.
        When Congress approved the All-Volunteer Force in 1973, our country
    never envisioned sending our military to war for more than a decade
    without pause or conscription. America's long war has placed a heavy
    burden on men and women in uniform and their families.
        In recognition of these demands, Congress devoted more resources to
    recruiting and retaining members of the military. As a result,
    personnel costs as a fraction of the defense budget have risen over
    time.
        Meanwhile, the war has exhausted our equipment faster than planned.
    Congress and the Department could not anticipate the accumulated wear
    and tear of years of continuous combat use. We have had to procure
    replacement gear and spend more money to keep gear serviceable and
    extend its service life. Due to this extensive use of our equipment
    across the force, operations and maintenance costs have also increased,
    rising faster than the rate of inflation during the past 16 years.
        Worn equipment and constrained supplies have forced our personnel
    to work overtime while deployed or preparing to deploy. That too has
    placed an added burden on the men and women who serve and on their
    families. This further degrades readiness in a negative spiral, for
    those not in the fight are at a standstill, unable to train as their
    equipment is sent forward to cover shortfalls or returned for extensive
    rework.
        My predecessor, Secretary Gates, stated annualized real defense
    budget increases and efficiencies of two to three percent above
    inflation are needed to sustain the All-Volunteer Force in a way that
    keeps personnel, modernization, and readiness accounts in balance. In
    the six years since the passage of the Budget Control Act, a period of
    declining, flat, or modestly increasing budgets, we have not kept this
    balance.
        Not long ago we convinced ourselves that when we pulled out of Iraq
    and ceased combat operations in Afghanistan, we would take two or three
    years to ``reset and reconstitute'' the force. Today's operations
    dictate the best we can do is ``reset and reconstitute in stride,'' a
    reality that imposes its own stress on the Force.
        A second concurrent force acting on the Department is the worsening
    global security situation. Our challenge is characterized by a decline
    in the long-standing rules-based international order, bringing with it
    a more volatile security environment than any I have experienced during
    my four decades of military service.
        The most urgent and dangerous threat to peace and security is North
    Korea. North Korea's continued pursuit of nuclear weapons and the means
    to deliver them has increased in pace and scope. The regime's nuclear
    weapons program is a clear and present danger to all, and the regime's
    provocative actions, manifestly illegal under international law, have
    not abated despite United Nations' censure and sanctions.
        We also look on the prospect of a new era, one governed by today's
    economic realities and returning once again to a balance of powers. A
    return to Great Power competition, marked by a resurgent and more
    aggressive Russian Federation and a rising, more confident, and
    assertive China, places the international order under assault. Both
    Russia and China object to key aspects of the international order so
    painstakingly built since the end of World War II. Both countries are
    making their objections known by challenging established international
    norms, such as freedom of the seas and the sovereignty of nations on
    their periphery.
        Moreover, the breakdown of the broader Mideast order has given rise
    to terrorist groups, including Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq
    and Syria (ISIS). Security vacuums have allowed a revolutionary Iranian
    regime to sow violence, provoke wider Sunni-Shia confrontation, and
    pursue regional hegemony. More broadly, this need to preserve our
    security also requires us to sustain the international presence in
    Afghanistan to help stabilize the South Asia region and deny terrorists
    a safe haven.
        Instability in the Middle East spills over into other regions.
    Extremists and extremist ideologies have spread to Europe, Africa, and
    Asia. Numerous countries are dealing with forced migration of people
    seeking to escape violence and despair, reminding us that problems
    originating in ungoverned or combat torn areas don't remain there. The
    United States is engaged in the Middle East to help restore order and
    give the people who live there a more hopeful future, building a better
    security situation for Americans who want a safer and more prosperous
    world for our future.
        As one observer of the world has noted, we are ``faced with two
    problems: first, how to reduce regional chaos; second, how to create a
    coherent world order based on agreed-upon principles that are necessary
    for the operation of the entire system.'' That observer, Dr. Henry
    Kissinger, and his fellow members of the Greatest Generation witnessed
    first-hand the costs of military unpreparedness. They learned the
    paramount need to prevent hostile states from gaining dominance. And
    they understood that while there is no way to guarantee peace, the
    surest way to prevent war is to be prepared to win one.
        Under any circumstances, however, reducing regional chaos in tandem
    with our interagency partners and international allies to help foster a
    coherent order requires adequate diplomatic and military resources.
        Adversaries contesting the United States constitute a third force
    impacting the Department. For decades the United States enjoyed
    uncontested or dominant superiority in every operating domain or realm.
    We could generally deploy our forces when we wanted, assemble them
    where we wanted, and operate how we wanted. Today, every operating
    domain is contested.
        Outer space, long considered a sanctuary, is now contested. This
    creates the need to develop capabilities and capacities for more
    resilient satellites designed to withstand persistent kinetic and non-
    kinetic attack.
        Our dominance of the air is challenged by the proliferation of
    advanced integrated air defense networks and 5th-generation aircraft.
    The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, longer range weapons, and
    unmanned systems will help us impose our will on potential adversaries
    while preserving our aircraft and crews in combat.
        Our command of the seas is threatened by long-range, land-based
    guided munitions battle networks designed to attack our ships at
    increasingly longer ranges. Our undersea superiority, unquestioned
    since the end of the Cold War, and a key competitive advantage, is
    challenged by both Russia and China.
        Our dominance on land in conventional, high-end combined arms
    maneuver is threatened by the introduction of long-range air-to-surface
    and surface-to-surface guided weapons, advanced armored vehicles and
    anti-tank weapons, and tactical electronic warfare systems.
        Cyberspace is now a contested operating realm at the strategic,
    operational, and tactical levels of war.
        Finally, our air, naval, ground and logistics bases are all under
    threat of accurate, all-weather, day-night guided munitions
    bombardment. This will complicate our operations and make passive and
    active base defenses more necessary and urgent.
        A fourth concurrent force acting on the Department is rapid
    technological change. Among the other forces noted thus far,
    technological change is one that necessitates new investment,
    innovative approaches, and when necessary, new program starts that have
    been denied us by law when we have been forced to operate under
    Continuing Resolutions.
        Rapid technological change includes developments in advanced
    computing, big data analytics, artificial intelligence, autonomy,
    robotics, miniaturization, additive manufacturing, meta-materials,
    directed energy, and hypersonics--the very technologies that ensure we
    will be able to fight and win the wars of the future.
        Many of these advances are driven by commercial sector demands and
    research and development. New commercial technologies will change
    society, and ultimately, they will change the character of war. The
    fact that many of these technological developments will come from the
    commercial sector means that state competitors and non-state actors
    will also have access to them, a fact that will continue to erode the
    conventional overmatch our Nation has grown so accustomed to.
        In this competitive environment, the Department must pay much more
    attention to future readiness, and regaining our Joint Force
    conventional overmatch over time. We must be willing and able to tap
    into commercial research, recognize its military potential, and develop
    new capabilities and the operational and organizational constructs to
    employ them faster than our competitors.
        We must also be prepared to deal with technological, operational,
    and tactical surprise, which requires changes to the way we train and
    educate our leaders and our forces, and how we organize for improved
    Departmental agility.
        Improving our future readiness, rapid adoption of off the shelf
    technologies, and preparing to deal with surprise are critical to
    modernization efforts, but constrained budgets and acquisition
    regulations have limited our ability to keep pace with rapid changes
    and sustain our competitive advantage.
        In response to these realities, the Department must develop new
    weapons and capabilities, adjust concepts of operations, adapt our
    training, and spend more time war-gaming and exercising to improve our
    ability to fight and win.
        Each of these four forces--16 years of war, the worsening security
    environment, contested operations in multiple domains, and the rapid
    pace of technological change--require stable budgets and increased
    funding to provide for the protection of our citizens and for the
    survival of our freedoms. Because as expensive as it is for the
    American people to fund the military, it is far less costly in lives
    and treasure than a conventional war that we are unable to deter
    because we are seen as weak.
        I reiterate that security and solvency are my watchwords as
    Secretary of Defense. The fundamental responsibility of our government
    is to defend the American people, providing for our security--and we
    cannot defend America and help others if our Nation is not both strong
    and solvent. So we in the Department of Defense owe it to the American
    public to ensure we spend each dollar wisely. President Trump has
    nominated for Senate approval specific individuals who will bring
    proven skills to discipline our Department's fiscal processes to ensure
    we do so.
        This first step to restoring readiness is underway thanks to
    Congress' willingness to support the Administration's request for
    additional resources in fiscal year 2017 to rebuild our most urgent
    needs. Your support of $21 billion in additional resources allowed the
    Department to address immediate warfighting readiness shortfalls and to
    help fund the acceleration of the fight against ISIS.
        This additional fiscal year 2017 funding addresses vital
    warfighting readiness shortfalls, a necessary investment to ensure our
    military is ready to fight today, by putting more aircraft in the air,
    ships to sea, and troops in the field. Additionally, the funding
    provided for more maintenance, spare parts, training time, flying
    hours, munition stocks, and manpower.
        We all recognize that it will take a number of years of higher
    funding delivered on time to restore readiness. To strengthen the
    military, President Trump requested a $639.1 billion topline for the
    fiscal year 2018 defense budget. Of this topline, $574.5 billion
    supports Department of Defense base budget requirements--warfighting
    readiness and critical program requirements, including intelligence
    community requirements. The balance, $64.6 billion, supports Overseas
    Contingency Operations (OCO) requirements.
        The Department's fiscal year 2018 base budget with its $52 billion
    increase above the National Defense Budget Control Act cap is the next
    step to building a larger, more capable, and more lethal joint force.
    The fiscal year 2018 budget reflects five priorities: restoring and
    improving warfighter readiness, increasing capacity and lethality,
    reforming how the Department does business, keeping the faith with
    Service members and their families, and supporting Overseas Contingency
    Operations.
        The first priority is continuing to improve warfighter readiness
    begun in fiscal year 2017, filling in the holes from trade-offs made
    during 16 years of war, and six years of continuing resolutions and
    Budget Control Act caps. This budget request, as directed by the
    National Security Presidential Memorandum ``Rebuilding the U.S. Armed
    Forces'' issued on January 27, 2017, identifies and improves shortfalls
    in readiness, specifically in training, equipment, maintenance,
    munitions, modernization, and infrastructure.
        The 30-Day Readiness Review, completed as part of the development
    of the fiscal year 2017 Request for Additional Appropriations,
    identified significant challenges to recovering readiness, including
    budget uncertainty, high operational tempo, and the time required to
    rebuild readiness properly. As a result of this review, the Department
    submitted the fiscal year 2018 budget request to enable the Joint Force
    to counter national security threats, fulfill steady-state demand, and
    implement readiness recovery plans.
        The Army remains globally engaged with more than 180,000 Soldiers
    committed to combatant command deterrence and counterterrorism
    operations. The fiscal year 2018 budget will restore a larger, more
    capable and lethal modernized force to defeat emerging regional and
    global near-peer adversaries. Combat Training Center rotations and home
    station training will help the Army develop capabilities for full-
    spectrum warfare. Additional Soldiers, training, and equipment will
    enable the Army to make significant progress towards restoring and
    sustaining readiness longer.
        The Navy will continue implementation of its Optimized Fleet
    Response Plan, reduce the long-term maintenance backlog, and train to
    ensure the Fleet is ready to fight. Requested funding provides stable
    and predictable maintenance and modernization plans, and forces trained
    to a single full-mission readiness standard. Predictably building
    readiness with continued implementation of the Optimized Fleet Response
    Plan will increase aircraft carrier availability, fund ship operations
    to the anticipated level of required operational days, and improve
    quality of work and quality of life for sailors.
        The Air Force will restore funding to its Flying Hour Program,
    increase aircraft sustainment, and grow training resource availability.
    These steps will enable personnel to regain proficiency in critical
    skill areas. Investments into training ranges will increase capacity
    and modernize the simulated threats our young men and women need to
    overcome to counter adversaries. The Air Force will also invest in home
    station high-end training, reducing the requirement to deploy for
    training.
        The Marine Corps is committed to remaining capable of responding to
    crises anywhere around the globe. Fiscal year 2018 investments
    emphasize readiness for deployed and next-to-deploy forces, maintenance
    for aging platforms, and funding to maintain critical modernization
    programs. Fully integrated Combined Arms Exercises for all elements of
    the Marine Air Ground Task Forces will help recover full-spectrum
    readiness.
        The second priority is increasing capacity and lethality while
    preparing for future investment in the fiscal year 2019 budget, driven
    by results from the National Defense Strategy. The fiscal year 2018
    budget request addresses resource gaps in the capabilities, readiness,
    and capacity needed to project power globally in contested
    environments, while emphasizing preparedness for future high-end
    security challenges. The budget request supports this priority through
    investment in advanced capabilities to reassert our technological edge
    over potential future adversaries, while having more units ready to
    fight.
        The fiscal year 2018 budget request seeks to fill the holes and
    achieve program balance before beginning to significantly grow capacity
    in future years. Part of achieving a more capable force involves
    pursuing innovative ways to develop the force and concepts of operation
    to reverse unfavorable cost ratios adversaries would seek to impose on
    the United States in future warfighting environments. The fiscal year
    2018 investments include power projection capabilities, nuclear
    modernization, a stronger missile defense, space-based systems, and
    cyberspace operations. Several of these options will expand the
    competitive space to our advantage vice allowing an adversary to define
    a conflict. Our budget request also ensures that the nation's current
    nuclear deterrent will be sustained, and supports continuation of its
    much needed modernization process.
        The third priority is reforming how the department does business. I
    am devoted to gaining full value from every taxpayer dollar spent on
    defense, thereby earning the trust of Congress and the American people.
        The Department is committed to reforming the acquisition enterprise
    to improve its ability to be innovative, responsive, and cost
    effective. The Department has begun implementation of a range of reform
    initiatives directed by the 2017 NDAA, to include disestablishment of
    the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
    Logistics, and the establishment of the Under Secretaries for Research
    and Engineering, and for Acquisition and Sustainment. Consistent with
    section 901 of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year
    2017, this change will be in effect by February 1, 2018, or sooner if
    I'm able to set the necessary conditions.
        The fiscal year 2018 budget request includes notable reform
    efforts. I urge Congress to support the Department's request for
    authority to conduct a 2021 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round,
    a cornerstone of our efficiencies program. The Department currently has
    more infrastructure capacity than required for operations--and
    foreseeable growth scenarios won't appreciably change this. I recognize
    the severity of BRAC's impact on communities and the careful
    consideration that members must exercise in considering it. In order to
    ensure we do not waste taxpayer dollars I would therefore greatly
    appreciate Congress' willingness to discuss BRAC authorization as an
    efficiency measure. That authorization is essential to improving our
    readiness by minimizing wasted resources and accommodating force
    adjustments. Waste reduction is fundamental to keeping the trust of the
    American people and is a key element of the efficiency/reform efforts
    that Congress and the Administration expect of us. Of all the
    efficiency measures the Department has undertaken over the years, BRAC
    is one of the most successful and significant--we forecast that a
    properly focused base closure effort will generate $2 billion or more
    annually--enough to buy 300 Apache attack helicopters, 120 F/A-18E/F
    Super Hornets, or four Virginia-class submarines.
        During fiscal year 2018 the Department is on track to enter into a
    full, agency-wide financial statement audit as required by statute. As
    part of this effort, the Department has established a Cost Decision
    Framework that leverages commercial best practices. This initiative
    will give decision makers the information they need to make a fully
    informed, cost-based decision.
        The fourth priority is keeping faith with Service members and
    families. Military and civilian personnel are the foundation of the
    Department of Defense. The Nation's commitment to these patriots
    willing to serve our country is built into the fiscal year 2018 budget
    request and is demonstrated by the number of initiatives and programs
    to support their professional development and their personal and family
    lives.
        Comprising roughly one-third of the Department of Defense budget,
    military pay and benefits are the single largest expense category for
    the Department. I believe providing competitive pay and benefits is a
    necessity to attract and retain the highly qualified people needed in
    today's military. The right people are the Department's most valuable
    asset, but we must continually balance these requirements against other
    investments critical to readiness, equipment, and modernization to
    ensure the military is the most capable warfighting force in the world.
    Balancing resources is particularly important as the Department
    reshapes the force needed to remain effective in an uncertain future.
    Investment in military compensation, Blended Retirement, the Military
    Health System, and family programs are essential to fielding the talent
    we need to sustain our competitive advantage on the battlefield.
        The fifth priority is support for Overseas Contingency Operations.
    The Fiscal Year 2018 President's Budget requests $64.6 billion,
    focusing on Operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, increasing
    efforts to sustain NATO's defenses to deter aggression, and global
    counterterrorism operations. Specifically, ISIS and other terrorist
    organizations represent a clear and present danger. The United States
    remains united and committed with the 66 nations of the Defeat-ISIS
    Coalition--plus the European Union, NATO, Arab League, and Interpol--to
    destroy ISIS. We will continue to support partner nations' diplomatic
    and military efforts through a security cooperation approach. I am
    encouraged by the willingness of our allies and partners to share the
    burden of this campaign.
        The fiscal year 2019 budget, informed by the National Defense
    Strategy, will grow the All-Volunteer Force. The Department will work
    with President Trump, Congress, and this committee to ensure the budget
    request we present for fiscal year 2019-2023 is sustainable and that it
    provides the Commander-in-Chief with viable military options in support
    of America's security.
        Judicious spending of America's public money is critical to
    ensuring security while maintaining solvency. We already know we face a
    dilemma between increasing personnel end strength and force structure
    on the one hand, and investing in equipment as well as research and
    development on the other hand. These challenges are compounded by the
    pressing need to recapitalize the nuclear triad and the sealift fleet
    in the 2020s. The President's Nuclear Posture Review will look at all
    elements of U.S. nuclear forces to ensure that our nuclear deterrent,
    including our command, control, and communication systems, are
    appropriately tailored to deter emerging 21st Century threats.
        I know we will have to make hard choices as we develop our new
    defense strategy and shape the fiscal year 2019-2023 defense program.
    With the help of Congress, I am confident we can build a force that is
    necessarily more lethal without placing an undue burden on the American
    economy.
        I am keenly aware members of this committee understand the
    responsibility each of us has to ensuring our military is ready to
    fight today and in the future. I need your help to inform your fellow
    members of Congress about the reality facing our military--and the need
    for Congress as a whole to pass a budget on time.
        Thank you for your strong support and for ensuring our troops have
    the resources and equipment they need to fight and win on the
    battlefield. I pledge to collaborate closely with you for the defense
    of our Nation in our joint effort to keep our Armed Forces second-to-
    none.
        Chairman Dunford is prepared to discuss the military dimensions of
    the budget request.

        Chairman McCain. General Dunford?

    STATEMENT OF GENERAL JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., U.S. MARINE CORPS,
                 CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

        General Dunford. Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed,
    distinguished members of this committee, thank you for the
    opportunity to join Secretary Mattis and Under Secretary
    Norquist with you today.
        I am honored to represent your men and women in uniform,
    and it is because of them that I can begin by saying, with
    confidence, that your Armed Forces remain the most capable in
    the world.
        However, the competitive advantage that the United States
    military has long enjoyed is eroding. A number of factors have
    contributed to the erosion. Chairman McCain, you mentioned
    several of these in your opening comments.
        Since 9/11, an extraordinarily high level of operational
    tempo has accelerated the wear and tear of our weapons and
    equipment. Meanwhile, budget instability and the Budget Control
    Act have forced the Department to operate with far fewer
    resources than required for the strategy of record.
        As a consequence, we prioritize near-term readiness at the
    expense of replacing aging equipment and capability
    development. We also maintain a force that consumes readiness
    as fast as we build it. We lack sufficient capacity to meet our
    current operational requirements while rebuilding and
    maintaining full spectrum readiness.
        The Secretary and the Service Chiefs have addressed the
    dynamic in their testimonies, and I fully concur with their
    assessments. But beyond current readiness, we are confronted
    with another significant challenge that I assess to be now near
    term. While we have been primarily focused on the threat of
    violent extremism, our adversaries and potential adversaries
    have developed advanced capabilities and operational approaches
    specifically designed to limit our ability to project power.
    They recognize that our ability to project power is a critical
    capability necessary to defend the Homeland, advance our
    interests, and meet our alliance commitments.
        As Secretary Mattis alluded to, Russia, China, and Iran
    have fielded a wide range of cyber, space, aviation, maritime,
    and land capabilities specifically designed to limit our
    ability to deploy, employ, and sustain our forces. Russia and
    China have also modernized their nuclear arsenal while North
    Korea has been on a relentless path to field a nuclear-armed
    ICBM that can reach the United States.
        In just a few years, if we do not change the trajectory, we
    will lose our qualitative and our quantitative competitive
    advantage. The consequences will be profound. It will affect
    our nuclear deterrence, our conventional deterrence, and our
    ability to respond, if deterrence fails.
        Alternatively, we can maintain our competitive advantage
    with sustained, sufficient, and predictable funding. To that
    end, the fiscal year 2018 budget is an essential step. However,
    this request alone will not fully restore readiness or arrest
    the erosion of our competitive advantage. Doing that is going
    to require sustained investment beyond fiscal year 2018.
        Specific recommendations for fiscal year 2019 and beyond
    will be informed by the forthcoming National Defense Strategy.
    However, we know now that continued growth in the base budget
    of at least 3 percent above inflation is the floor necessary to
    preserve just the competitive advantage we have today, and we
    cannot assume that our adversaries will stand still.
        As we ask for your support, we recognize the responsibility
    to maintain the trust of the American taxpayer. We take this
    responsibility seriously, and we continue to eliminate
    redundancies and achieve efficiencies where possible.
        Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you
    this morning, and, more importantly, thank you for ensuring
    that America's sons and daughters never find themselves in a
    fair fight.
        With that, Chairman, I am prepared to take questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Dunford follows:]

              Prepared Statement by General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr.
        Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished members of this
    committee, thank you for the opportunity to join Secretary Mattis in
    appearing before you today.
        The U.S. military's competitive advantage against potential
    adversaries is eroding. Over the last decade, sustained operational
    commitments, budgetary instability, and advances by our adversaries
    have threatened our ability to project power and we have lost our
    advantage in key warfighting areas. The Fiscal Year 2018 Budget Request
    will allow the Armed Forces to meet operational requirements, continue
    rebuilding warfighting readiness, and place the military on a path to
    balancing the Defense program. However, without sustained, sufficient,
    and predictable funding, I assess that within 5 years we will lose our
    ability to project power; the basis of how we defend the Homeland,
    advance U.S. interests, and meet our alliance commitments.
                             strategic environment
        In today's strategic environment, five key challenges--Russia,
    China, Iran, North Korea, and Violent Extremist Organizations--most
    clearly represent the challenges facing the United States military.
    They serve as a benchmark for our global posture, the size of the
    force, capability development, and risk management.
        Over the past several decades, each of these state actors have
    developed capabilities and operational approaches to counter our
    strategic and operational centers of gravity. The United States'
    decisive victory in Desert Storm in 1991 was a wake-up call for our
    adversaries. For Russia and China, specifically, the lessons-learned
    spurred dramatic tactical, operational, and strategic adaptations.
    Observing the power and efficacy of precision guided munitions and
    combined arms maneuver, both countries accelerated modernization
    programs to asymmetrically counter U.S. advantages. They adapted
    operational constructs to incorporate anti-access technology and
    employed new doctrines to leverage high-tech weaponry across all
    domains. These efforts sought to limit U.S. freedom of navigation, deny
    our ability to gain and maintain air-superiority, negate the capability
    of our precision munitions, and limit our ability to employ
    sophisticated command and control systems.
        Today, Russia continues to invest in a full-range of capabilities
    designed to limit our ability to project power into Europe and meet our
    alliance commitments to NATO. These capabilities include long-range
    conventional strike, cyber, space, electronic warfare, ground force and
    naval capabilities. Russia is also modernizing all elements of its
    nuclear triad and its non-strategic nuclear weapons. These capabilities
    are intended to enable Russia to counter United States and NATO power
    projection and undermine the integrity of the NATO alliance.
        Similarly, China has embarked on a significant program to modernize
    and expand strategic and conventional military capabilities. They have
    expanded their nuclear enterprise and made investments in power
    projection, space, cyber, hypersonic weapons, cruise missiles, and
    ballistic missiles--even as they continue to build out their physical
    presence in the South China Sea. China is also investing heavily in 5th
    generation fighters, air-to-air missiles, air defense systems, and sea
    and undersea anti-access technologies to limit our ability to project
    power, operate freely, and meet our alliance commitments in the
    Pacific.
        Russia and China are not alone in these pursuits. North Korea's
    nuclear weapons development, combined with efforts to develop a
    nuclear-capable ballistic missile capability, is specifically intended
    to threaten the security of the Homeland and our Allies in the Pacific.
    Over the past year, North Korea conducted an unprecedented number of
    missile tests. Moreover, North Korea has demonstrated a willingness to
    use malicious cyber tools against governments and industry. These
    actions destabilize the region and pose an increasing threat to U.S.
    and our allies.
        Iran seeks to assert itself as the dominant regional power in the
    Middle East. They continue to support international terrorist
    organizations like Hezbollah, and support proxies in Syria, Iraq, and
    Yemen to assert influence and counter the influence of the United
    States and our Allies. They actively seek to destabilize their
    neighbors, and employ naval capabilities that threaten freedom of
    navigation. At the same time, they are modernizing an array of
    ballistic missiles, missile defense, space, cyber, maritime, and cruise
    missile capabilities.
        Finally, Violent Extremist Organizations such as ISIS and al Qaida
    remain a threat to the Homeland, our Allies, and our way of life.
    Violent extremism is fundamentally a transregional threat and a
    generational struggle that requires our military to work with
    interagency and coalition partners to disrupt external attacks, and
    dismantle their capabilities wherever they emerge. Even with the
    success of our continued efforts to defeat the Islamic State in Iraq
    and Syria, the threat of Islamic terrorism will remain.
        A review of these five challenges demonstrates that the U.S.
    military requires a balanced inventory of advanced capabilities and
    sufficient capacity to act decisively across the range of military
    operations. As a nation that both thinks and acts globally, we cannot
    choose between a force that can address ISIS and other Violent
    Extremist Organizations, and one that can deter and defeat state actors
    with a full range of capabilities. Nor do we have the luxury of
    choosing between meeting our current operational requirements and
    developing capabilities that we will need to meet tomorrow's
    challenges.
        However, as a result of sustained operational tempo and budget
    instability, today the military is challenged to meet operational
    requirements and sustain investment in capabilities required to
    preserve--or in some cases restore--our competitive advantage.
        Sustained operational tempo and demand have forced the Department
    to prioritize near-term readiness at the expense of modernization.
    Additionally, a conscious choice was made to limit the size of the
    force in order to preserve scarce resources necessary for essential
    investments in immediate upgrades to critical capabilities. As a
    result, today, demand for high-demand/low-density specialties often
    outpaces supply. Particular stress is felt in specialties such as ISR,
    missile defense systems, naval expeditionary forces, special operations
    forces, global precision strike units, and cyber forces. Additionally,
    over the past 2 years, munitions expenditures in ongoing operations
    against Violent Extremist Organizations exacerbated existing
    shortfalls.
        Making matters worse, for the past five years, the Budget Control
    Act (BCA) has forced the Department of Defense (DOD) to operate with
    about $450 billion less than planned and required. These reductions
    have been aggravated by repeated Continuing Resolutions (CR) which
    hamper long-term investment and often result in increased costs. For
    nine of the last ten years, the Department of Defense has operated
    under some type of CR, delaying critical new starts, deferring
    installation and infrastructure modernization, and canceling major
    training events. A year-long fiscal year 2018 CR would cut $33 billion
    from the Department's request, further exacerbating these problems.
        Based on these factors, the Army has been forced to prioritize
    near-term readiness and now faces a shortage of critical capabilities
    and capacities in armor, air defense, artillery, and aviation. These
    deficiencies are made worse by manpower shortfalls in critical military
    specialties and training resource constraints. Consequently, the Army
    is limited in its ability to man, train, and equip fully-ready Brigade
    Combat Teams (BCT) and other critical enablers required to deploy,
    sustain, and protect servicemembers operating around the world.
        For similar reasons, the Navy faces readiness challenges in both
    ships and aircraft. Operational requirements and capacity constraints
    in shipyards and aircraft depots have increased the time and cost
    required to conduct major repairs. Maintenance delays, low stocks of
    spare parts, lack of training ordnance, and aging infrastructure impair
    the Navy's ability to conduct integrated training. As a result, the
    Navy is limited in its ability to meet operational demand for maritime
    capability and power projection, especially in contested environments.
        The Air Force is also challenged to balance operational demands and
    invest for the future. Today, the Air Force is short almost 1,500
    pilots, including 800 fighter pilots, and more than 3,400 maintainers
    across all components. They lack sufficient resources to adequately
    support both 4th and 5th generation training. And they have delayed
    investment in 4th generation aircraft modifications while limiting the
    fielding of 5th generation strike-fighters. The result is fewer trained
    pilots available to deploy, over-tasked and aging aircraft, and delays
    in modernization programs required to defeat near-peer adversaries.
        Over the last several years, the Marine Corps has been forced to
    delay planned investments in infrastructure, Command and Control, and
    ground systems required to build, train, and launch combat ready
    forces. Today, the Marine Corps lacks sufficient Ready Basic Aircraft
    for training and deployments and has delayed procurement of the F-35,
    CH-53K, MV-22, and KC-130J aircraft. These delayed investments limit
    the Marine Corps' strategic flexibility and inhibit its ability to meet
    operational demands.
        If these trends continue, and the constraints of sequestration are
    not lifted, the Department will have to cut force structure, as the
    tradeoffs required to maintain the capability and capacity of the
    current force are no longer sustainable. Going forward, the Department
    of Defense requires sustained, sufficient, and predictable funding to
    meet current operational requirements, restore readiness shortfalls,
    and place us on a path toward restoring our eroded competitive
    advantage.
    impact of fiscal year 2017 request for additional appropriations (raa).
        Congress' willingness to support the Administration's request for
    additional resources in fiscal year 2017 was a necessary first step to
    reverse the impacts of under-investment over the last five years. The
    fiscal year 2017 appropriation yielded improvements in immediate
    warfighting readiness by providing funding for modest increases to end
    strength that primarily filled holes in existing units, funding full
    spectrum training, beginning to replenish depleted ammunition stocks,
    and continuing the restoration and modernization of critical systems.
        However, the fiscal year 2017 Appropriations Bill did not fully
    address the Department's modernization and procurement requirements and
    significant, long-term readiness challenges remain. The Services'
    inability to fully fund procurement of key platforms continues to
    hamper readiness by limiting the number and types of platforms
    available for initial entry training, individual proficiency, and
    collective training. Because of this, the military begins the fiscal
    year 2018 budget cycle in a less healthy position than if the fiscal
    year 2017 RAA was fully funded, making full and on-time funding of this
    budget even more critical.
            intent of the fiscal year 2018 budget: what does it do?
        The Fiscal Year 2018 Budget Request builds on the readiness
    recovery started in fiscal year 2017, starts to fill the holes created
    by the BCA, and begins to balance the program. It enables the
    Department to meet operational requirements, begin rebuilding mid- and
    long-term readiness, and begin restoring capability and capacity
    necessary to improve lethality. These are essential first steps in
    arresting the erosion of the military's competitive advantage.
        In Afghanistan, fiscal year 2018 investments will reinforce
    improvements in the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. In
    Iraq and Syria, the Budget Request funds emerging requirements and
    provides sufficient funding and authority for the defeat-ISIS train and
    equip fund. In Europe, the Budget Request provides a 40 percent
    increase in funding for the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) that
    sustains ongoing assurance efforts, and improve the capability of the
    United States forces and our Allies to deter potential Russian
    aggression.
        To rebuild warfighting readiness, the Army will fully man its
    combat formation, fund 19 Combat Training Center rotations in fiscal
    year 2018, and increase resources for home-station training to ensure
    units maximize full spectrum readiness. The Navy will provide flying
    hours and increase depot maintenance to enable integrated air/sea
    training. The Air Force will invest in training required to improve 4th
    and 5th generation warfighting capability. The Marines will increase
    funding for flying hours, logistics, and engineering units, and focus
    training resources on amphibious and combined arms operations.
        Maintenance resources included in the Fiscal Year 2018 Budget
    Request also improve readiness. The Army will prioritize maintenance
    for equipment coming out of theater in order to prepare it for unit
    training and refill prepositioned stocks in Europe and the Pacific. The
    Navy will add critical workforce capacity that reduces ship and
    aviation depot maintenance backlogs. The Air Force will conduct overdue
    weapons system sustainment, increase maintenance for inter-theater
    airlift, and execute recapitalization of critical systems. The Marines
    will prioritize maintenance for MV-22, rotary wing, and fighter
    aviation to improve its survivability, mobility, and lethality.
        To begin restoring capacity and lethality across the force, the
    Fiscal Year 2018 Budget makes critical investments in Tactical Air
    (TACAIR), ships, space, and cyberspace, and begins essential nuclear
    recapitalization efforts. Investments in TACAIR enable the Air Force,
    Navy, and Marine Corps to continue procurement of 5th generation
    fighters and fund upgrades to 4th generation fighters that fill
    shortfalls and begin to grow capacity. The Air Force will procure 46 F-
    35As and begin upgrades to F-16s. The Navy will procure 4 F-35Cs and 14
    F/A-18E/Fs to mitigate its strike fighter shortfall. The Marines will
    procure 20 F-35Bs. These investments, coupled with investments in
    modernization of depot maintenance facilities, allow us to begin
    reversing the impact of delays in TACAIR modernization over the past
    five years.
        The Fiscal Year 2018 Budget Request supports the Navy's growth by
    supporting the procurement of 9 ships and continuing necessary
    investments to upgrade and modernize nuclear aircraft carriers,
    destroyers, littoral combat ships, Ticonderoga-class cruisers,
    amphibious assault ships, and submarines. These investments are
    essential to enabling the Navy to project power, ensure forward
    presence and deterrence, ensure access to the global commons, and
    provide ballistic missile defense.
        Continued improvement in space-based systems enables us to better
    protect satellites, improve tracking/discrimination capabilities, and
    continue domestic launch development. Cyberspace investments prioritize
    hardening information networks, defending against cyber-attacks, and
    continuing to build, train, and equip cyber mission forces and maturing
    cyberspace command and control. These advances improve both offensive
    and defense space and cyberspace capabilities and enhance the
    resiliency of our systems and networks.
        The Fiscal Year 2018 Budget Request also invests in upgrades to the
    nuclear enterprise, including inter-continental ballistic missiles,
    nuclear submarines, strategic bombers, and command and control systems.
    Continuing to maintain a secure and effective nuclear deterrent is
    essential to defending the Homeland.
        However, the Fiscal Year 2018 Budget Request alone will not fully
    restore readiness or arrest the military's eroding competitive
    advantage. Reversing the impact of the past five years of sustained
    operational tempo and budget instability requires sustained investment
    beyond fiscal year 2018.
     what fiscal year 2018 budget request doesn't do: areas for continued
                                  investment.
        Specific recommendations for fiscal year 2019, and beyond, will be
    informed by the results of the National Defense Strategy. Today,
    however, we know that continued investment is needed to execute
    responsible growth in capacity, build advanced capabilities, and
    restore the long-term readiness. These investments are essential to
    ensuring our ability to project power and maintain a credible strategic
    deterrent.
        We continue to consume readiness as fast as we build it and lack
    sufficient capacity to both meet today's operational requirements and
    rebuild the competencies necessary to defeat near peer adversaries. As
    a result, our units are training to meet their assigned missions at the
    expense of training for their designed mission. To break this cycle, we
    must increase capacity in critical areas such as C4ISR, fighter
    aircraft, armored BCTs, amphibious ships, and special operations
    forces. This additional capacity will allow us to meet today's
    requirements and prepare for tomorrow's.
        We must also invest in advanced capabilities required to defeat
    near-peer adversaries. As we have prioritized readiness for ongoing
    operations, our adversaries have prioritized investment in technologies
    that exploit our vulnerabilities and limit our ability to project
    power. To ensure our competitive advantage, we must accelerate
    investments in systems that defeat adversary anti-access capabilities
    at sea and under the sea, improve our ISR resiliency, guarantee access
    to space and cyber, and enable us to defeat integrated air defenses.
    These advanced capabilities are vital to maintaining the U.S.
    military's competitive advantage in all environments and across all
    domains.
        It is also essential that we restore Comprehensive Joint Readiness,
    the ability of the U.S. military to deploy, employ, and sustain itself
    anywhere in the world, while maintaining the flexibility to transition
    from one crisis to another, across the range of military options. This
    requires sufficient capacity, the necessary capabilities, and iterative
    training. Our Air Force must possess the right mix of 4th and 5th
    generation aircraft and have sufficient capacity to conduct integrated
    training. Our Navy must grow and modernize while preserving a globally-
    present fleet, capable of sailing and operating anywhere in the world.
    The Army and Marine Corps must fill unit short-falls and upgrade ground
    tactical vehicles while expanding full spectrum training. These
    investments are essential to projecting power in contested environments
    against any adversary and operating across the spectrum of conflict.
        Additionally, we must invest in maintaining a credible strategic
    deterrent. Due to fiscal constraints, we have delayed modernization of
    all three legs of the nuclear triad and are now approaching decision
    points with no remaining schedule margins. Over the coming decades we
    must recapitalize our inter-continental ballistic missiles, ballistic
    missile submarines, strategic bombers, and many of our command,
    control, and communication systems. Recapitalization costs will be
    significant and can no longer be delayed if the United States wants to
    maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent.
                                   conclusion
        Today, despite the challenges facing us, our military is the most
    capable military in the world. We need sustained, sufficient, and
    predictable funding to grow sufficient capacity, develop the correct
    mix of advanced capabilities, and ensure a ready force. These
    investments are necessary to ensure our ability to defend the Homeland
    and project power when and where required. With your help and
    commitment, we can preserve our competitive advantage and ensure that
    we never send America's sons and daughters in to a fair fight.

        Chairman McCain. Secretary Norquist?
        Secretary Norquist. Mr. Chairman, I have no separate
    opening remarks.
        Chairman McCain. Thank you.
        Secretary Mattis, the committee received unfunded
    requirement lists from each of the military services that
    amounted to more than $31 billion. Have you reviewed those
    unfunded requirements lists?
        Secretary Mattis. I have, Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Do you agree these are military
    requirements that should be funded?
        Secretary Mattis. Chairman, I think we have our priorities
    right in the base budget, but I have reviewed the unfunded
    requirements. I believe it is $33 billion, and I think if we
    were to receive more money, those requests are appropriate.
        Chairman McCain. I guess my question is, is it your request
    that we give you $31 billion more?
        Secretary Mattis. Chairman, I am here to defend the budget
    as it stands because I can defend every priority there. If the
    Congress were to allocate additional funds to national defense,
    I believe the unfunded priorities lists give good priorities.
        Chairman McCain. So you are satisfied with what is
    basically a 3 percent increase in budgetary requirements?
        Secretary Mattis. Chairman, when it comes to defense, sir,
    at this point, I think that the President's Budget is allocated
    appropriate to the priorities. The priorities listed by the
    Service Chiefs, as we go more deeply into the readiness
    challenge, are certainly well-tuned to what we need.
        I would be happy to see more money, if the Congress was to
    allocate additional funds along the lines of the unfunded
    priorities lists.
        Chairman McCain. Well, I appreciate your willingness to
    cooperate. But a lot of times, we depend on your
    recommendations in shaping our authorization and
    appropriations.
        Secretary Mattis. Yes, sir. I cannot think of any
    priorities I would put in place of the unfunded priorities
    list, if we are given additional money, sir. That would be a
    decision by you. I have to represent the President's Budget,
    since he is having to deal with a wider portfolio than just
    defense.
        Chairman McCain. Let me put it this way, will this 3
    percent increase give you the confidence that we need that we
    are doing everything we can to make sure that our men and women
    serving in uniform are adequately equipped and trained and
    ready to fight?
        Secretary Mattis. Chairman, it took a good many years to
    get into the hole we are in. It will not be enough in itself to
    take us where we need to go. It is going to be a campaign, as I
    laid out, that started with our request for an additional $30
    billion during this fiscal year, the growth that we have in the
    2018 budget. When I get done with the defense strategy and
    review that, we will be coming back to you for more and
    probably along the lines of close to 5 percent growth, 3 to 5
    percent growth for 2019 to 2023.
        But, no, it will not take us the whole way. It is in the
    right direction.
        Chairman McCain. It is now mid-June. Congress has not
    passed a fiscal year 2018 budget, something that should
    embarrass every Member of the Senate and House. Neither the
    House nor the Senate has started drafting or considering
    appropriations bills, because there is no resolution of the
    topline.
        This body knows what needs to be done, a bipartisan budget
    deal to set the budget levels, but it has refused to begin such
    work. If we do not begin negotiating today, it is very likely
    the military once again will begin the fiscal year on a
    continuing resolution.
        What would be the impacts of starting this year on a
    continuing resolution at the Budget Control Act levels, or $52
    billion less than your request?
        Secretary Mattis. Chairman, it can only worsen the
    readiness situation we face now, which has been laid out
    starkly, I believe, by the Service Chiefs, if we go in with a
    continuing resolution.
        Chairman McCain. The first conversation that you and I had
    was about a strategy for Afghanistan. We are now 6 months into
    this administration. We still have not got a strategy for
    Afghanistan.
        It makes it hard for us to support you when we do not have
    a strategy. We know what the strategy was for the last 8 years:
    Do not lose.
        That has not worked. I just mentioned in my opening
    statement that we just lost three brave Americans.
        When can we expect the Congress of the United States to get
    a strategy for Afghanistan that is a departure from last 8
    years which is, do not lose?
        Secretary Mattis. I believe by mid-July we will be able to
    brief you in detail, sir. We are putting it together now, and
    there are actions being taken to make certain that we do not
    pay a price for the delay. But we recognize the need for
    urgency, and your criticism is fair, sir.
        Chairman McCain. Well, I am a great admirer of yours, Mr.
    Secretary, and so are those men and women who have had the
    honor of serving under you. But we just cannot keep going like
    this. You cannot expect us to fulfill the three requirements
    that you gave--funding increase, pass a budget, present a
    stable budget--if you do not give us a strategy.
        I hope you understand that I am not criticizing you, but
    there are problems within this administration. I was confident
    that within the first 30 to 60 days we would have a strategy
    from which to start working. So all I can tell you is that,
    unless we get a strategy from you, you are going to get a
    strategy from us. I appreciate our wisdom and knowledge and
    information and all of the great things, with the exception of
    some to my left here, but the fact is, it is not our job. It is
    not our job. It is yours.
        I have to tell you, the frustration that I feel is
    obviously palpable because it is hard for us to act when you do
    not give us a strategy, which then leads to policy, which then
    leads to authorization, which is our job. So I hope you
    understand that we are going to start getting more vocal in our
    criticism of not having a strategy for Afghanistan.
        Do you agree that we are not winning Afghanistan?
        Secretary Mattis. Sir, I understand the urgency. I
    understand it is my responsibility. We are not winning in
    Afghanistan right now, and we will correct this as soon as
    possible.
        I believe the three things we are asking for stand on their
    own merit, however, as we look more broadly at the protection
    of the country. But in no way does that relieve me of the need
    to deliver that strategy to you, sir.
        Chairman McCain. I thank you, General, and I understand
    very well, as do members of this committee, that some of this
    is beyond your control. But at some point, we have to say,
    look, the Congress owes the American people a strategy which
    will then lead to success in Afghanistan. I am sure that the
    three names that I just mentioned in my opening statement,
    their parents and their wives and their husbands and their
    families, members of their family, are very aware that we have
    no strategy.
        So let's not ask these families to sacrifice any further
    without a strategy which we can then take and implement and
    help you. I am fighting as hard as I can to increase defense
    spending. It is hard when we have no strategy to pursue. So I
    hope you understand the dilemma that you are presenting to us.
        Secretary Mattis. I do, sir.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Reed?
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Secretary, as we discussed in your testimony, and in
    the chairman's and in my testimony, even if you get the
    additional $52 billion, with sequestration in place, you would
    essentially have to turn around and forfeit that in across-the-
    board cuts. Is that your understanding?
        Secretary Mattis. Yes, sir.
        Senator Reed. Those across-the-board cuts would be more
    disruptive than anything I could conceive, because there would
    be no prioritization. It would just be taking from the most
    sensitive program and, in fact, leaving money in programs that
    might not even need it. Is that correct?
        Secretary Mattis. That is correct, sir. It would be
    injurious. Again, it would sideline both this committee and
    myself in making wise decisions.
        Senator Reed. Did you make that point to the President, in
    terms of the ultimate consultation about this budget, in his
    role as Commander in Chief?
        Secretary Mattis. I assure you, sir, President Trump is
    keenly aware of this situation.
        Senator Reed. What is his position on sequestration?
        Secretary Mattis. I would prefer to speak to mine, sir,
    because I can speak most authoritatively there. The bottom line
    is the administration believes that the Congress has to repeal
    the Budget Control Act and the sequestration that follows.
        Senator Reed. But wouldn't it be not only appropriate but
    essential that that be incorporated in the President's Budget
    because the ramifications of sequestration are clearly played
    out in every aspect of the budget? Remaining silent, as I
    believe he did in the budget, leaves a lot of people wondering
    what is his real position or does he even understand what is
    going on?
        Secretary Mattis. Senator Reed, we are part of the
    executive branch and Article One of the Constitution gives you
    that authority to deal with that very situation. I think we all
    know what needs to be done. I have heard it from Republicans
    and Democrats on this committee for a long time.
        Senator Reed. But the interesting thing is I have not heard
    a clarion call from the President and also a practical response
    and solution as to how we not only undo the BCA but how do you
    then allocate resources between defense spending, domestic
    spending, and other spending. Without that, again, it goes in
    the same trajectory of no strategy.
        There is no budgetary strategy here either. It is just,
    ``Congress do something.'' I thank the chairman's point is, it
    is very late in the game, and the ability for us just
    institutionally to rewrite a budget, to reallocate resources
    between defense and nondefense, to increase defense spending
    without any guideline or framework from the administration, it
    is not impossible, it is very difficult.
        Do you sense that?
        Secretary Mattis. Senator Reed, we have submitted a
    presidential budget for the Department of Defense. We believe
    that is guidance. We have submitted the unfunded priorities
    list from the Pentagon, in accordance with the will of
    Congress, and we believe that is guidance for what we need.
        Senator Reed. Just a final point, Mr. Secretary. I do, like
    all my colleagues, respect you immensely. But the budget that
    is submitted will not work. If nothing is done to change the
    BCA, sideline the BCA, the $52 billion we give you, we will
    take back, in fact in a more harmful fashion even if we did not
    give it to you. If we just left the BCA levels, at least you
    could prioritize.
        So let me just change gears for a moment. Have you received
    direction, you and your colleagues in the national security
    agencies, from the President to begin intense planning and
    preparation for what appears to be an inevitable renewal of
    cyberattacks by Russia against the United States, particularly
    in the context of elections? Have you received any guidance?
        Secretary Mattis. We are in constant contact with the
    national security staff on this, and we are engaged not just in
    discussing the guidance but in actual defensive measures, sir.
        Senator Reed. That guidance, the President has clearly laid
    out, in some type of authoritative way, the mission to protect
    the country in this respect? Or is it something just collateral
    to your discussions?
        Secretary Mattis. Senator, I am under no confusion
    whatsoever of my responsibilities in the organizations I have,
    the National Security Agency and Cyber Command, about what we
    are supposed to be doing right now. We are taking active steps
    that I can brief you on in a closed hearing.
        Senator Reed. So, General Dunford, I think you testified
    previously that Russia represents the most significant threat
    to the United States, not only in their new area denial systems
    that I think you alluded to, but also in their cyber
    operations. Is that still your position?
        General Dunford. It is, Senator. I included their nuclear
    capability as well as their behavior.
        Senator Reed. Again, finally, in my last few seconds, do
    you believe that is the position of the President of the United
    States, that Russia, particularly in all these new dimensions,
    is the most significant threat to the United States, Mr.
    Secretary?
        Secretary Mattis. Sir, I prefer to let him speak for
    himself on that. I can assure you that, from law enforcement to
    the intelligence agencies, and all that information is
    available and briefed to the President, we are recognizing the
    strategic threat that Russia has provided by its misbehavior.
        Senator Reed. But you recognize it. The question is, does
    he recognize it?
        Secretary Mattis. Sir, I have had full support, for
    example, for the European Reassurance Initiative [ERI], where
    we are sending more troops to Europe. They are not being sent
    there for any reason other than to temper Russia's designs. I
    have had full support on the things that we have had to do in
    order to address Russia's choices.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
        Thank you, General Dunford.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Wicker?
        Senator Wicker. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you for your
    service.
        Let me just say this about sequestration. When I think
    about the failure of this Congress and this government to deal
    with this, I look in the mirror and I take my share of the
    responsibility. One thing that has not been said is that the
    reason we got to sequestration to start with is that there is
    two-thirds of American spending that is on autopilot. It is
    very popular programs, the entitlement programs, Medicare,
    Medicaid, Social Security, and, of course, interest on the
    debt. Sequestration was meant to focus us on that two-thirds of
    the budget that we do not deal with every year.
        We have been unwilling politically to do that on both sides
    of the aisle. Until we do that, we are not going to really be
    able to get back to the problem that got us to sequestration to
    start with.
        But let me talk about something, Secretary Mattis, that
    might save us a good deal of money, and that is multiyear
    procurement authority, which is assumed in your budget
    proposals for destroyers, fast attack submarines, and V-22
    aircraft.
        It is my understanding that the Cost Assessment and Program
    Evaluation office, or CAPE, that the Navy and OMB all agree
    that savings would be significant if we go with multiyear
    procurement authority, but we lack at this point a preliminary
    determination to begin to implementation this. A final
    determination can come later, but we need the preliminary
    determination.
        So are you aware of this situation, Secretary Mattis? Do
    you agree that the assumption in your budget is correct, that
    this will save money? Can you help us on this?
        Secretary Mattis. Senator, I have no doubt it would save
    money to have multiyear procurement, especially of things that
    take a lot of steel, a lot of equipment to build. The economies
    of scale allow for enormous savings. We would have to have a
    repeal of the BCA Act in order to give the confidence to
    industry that they can buy that stuff and it will not sit in
    the shipyard when funding dries up the next year.
        So again, we come right back around to the very thing the
    chairman and the ranking member have been discussing about what
    BCA does to us. It removes the chance for even wise investment
    of the money you give us, sir.
        Senator Wicker. Okay, but at this point, the immediate
    situation is that I need you to commit to this committee that
    you will intervene to ensure that we get the preliminary
    determination necessary to move us forward at that point. We do
    not need to repeal BCA to get that done. Will you help us on
    that?
        Secretary Mattis. We will help you. Yes, sir.
        Senator Wicker. All right. Thank you very much.
        Now let me ask you, in the remaining time, I appreciate
    what has been said about winning in Afghanistan. Now I noticed,
    over the last few days, a group of my colleagues have advocated
    just, ``It has been too long. We need to look at the timetable.
    A decade and a half is too much. We just need to pull out and
    let Afghanistan take care of itself.''
        Let me just say I think that would be a massive mistake
    which would affect the security of Americans. I hope you agree
    with that.
        So if you could comment on that, but also define for us
    what winning in Afghanistan means. If we are successful there
    and have a follow-on force that is not involved in combat, much
    as we have had for 70 years in Europe and a long, long time in
    South Korea, that would be certainly something that I could
    live with.
        But if you would comment on that in my time remaining?
        Secretary Mattis. I believe you are correct that to walk
    away from this, we have already seen what can come out of these
    kinds of spaces, these ungoverned spaces. The problems that
    originate there do not stay there. They come out. They threaten
    all of us. They threaten the world order. They threaten our
    economy. They threaten our very country.
        As far as what does winning look like, the Afghan
    Government, with international help, will be able to handle the
    violence, drive it down to a level that local security forces
    can handle it. With our allies, it would probably require a
    residual force doing training and maintaining the high-end
    capability so that the threats, should they mature, we can take
    them down and keep this at a level of threat that the local
    government and the local security forces can handle.
        It is going to be an era of frequent skirmishing, and it is
    going to require a change in our approach from the last several
    years, if we were to get it to that position.
        Senator Wicker. Do the people of Afghanistan want us there?
        Secretary Mattis. There is no doubt the majority do, sir.
    The reason the Taliban and Haqqani use bombs is because they
    cannot win at the ballot box, and they know that.
        The people do want us there, and that is based on loya
    jirga outcome. That is the rather large assembly of local and
    provincial and national level leaders. Plus, it is based on
    polls not run by the United States but by other organizations.
        I have no doubt the majority want us there. Not all of them
    do, but the ones who do not are not the ones who are looking
    forward to Afghanistan's future as we think it ought to look,
    we and the Afghan people.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you, sir.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Gillibrand?
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to continue the line of questioning started by the
    ranking member.
        I am deeply concerned about the success of Russian
    information warfare efforts in influencing the course of the
    2016 elections here in the United States, as well as its
    efforts to destabilize democracies across the globe.
        How is the Department working with other Federal agencies
    to counter Russian information warfare in the United States and
    the hacking of our electoral systems? How are you working with
    our partners and allies to fight these efforts? Secretary
    Mattis?
        Secretary Mattis. First of all, ma'am, there is constant
    information flow defining the problem as critical, because they
    try to do it in a deniable manner. So we work inside our
    interagency effort, law enforcement, everything from FBI [the
    Federal Bureau of Investigation] and any other police
    organization that gets information on this, but it mostly has
    been FBI. Our intelligence agencies work together, too.
        We have good sharing of information, and we also work with
    our allies, sharing information back and forth. You have seen
    some of that. Some of it can be released. You will see it in
    the newspaper, about what is going on in other nations'
    elections right now, for example, in Europe.
        Senator Gillibrand. This morning, Bloomberg reported that
    Russia managed to hack 39 States' electoral systems and
    attempted to alter data, though it was not successful.
        Last week, a leaked NSA [National Security Agency] document
    suggested that GRU [the Main Intelligence Directorate],
    Russia's military intelligence agency, attacked a company that
    provides software to manage voter rolls in eight States,
    including New York. The attackers then used that information
    they stole to launch targeted attacks against 122 local
    election officials just 12 days before the election.
        This information highlights the urgent need to protect our
    election infrastructure from cyberattack going forward to
    protect our democratic process. During the last election,
    several National Guard units assessed the States' election
    systems from these types of intrusions.
        Senator Gillibrand. Do you think there is a role for the
    National Guard, with its unique authorities, in assisting and
    securing election systems?
        Secretary Mattis. There may be, ma'am. I think our
    organization right now is still adapting to this new domain.
    One of the reasons we do not want continuing resolutions [CR]
    is because we have to do new things. I also assume in something
    like this that what you just outlined is not the whole problem.
    It is worse.
        Senator Gillibrand. Do you think we should consider a 9/11-
    style commission to just do a deep dive on where are our cyber
    vulnerabilities, what are the 10 things we need to do to
    prevent cyberattack in the future, in the same way the 9/11
    commission made recommendations that, frankly, have subverted
    terror attacks, certainly in New York State, over the last
    decade, because those recommendations really did have an impact
    on how to protect against future terrorism?
        Secretary Mattis. Senator, I would have to look at what is
    the problem we are trying to solve. I think reorganization of
    Cyber Command [CYBERCOM] and NSA along the lines that have been
    proposed by the Congress, I think that also is part of defining
    the problem and defining the defensive measures that we need to
    take.
        But I would not be against something like that. I would
    have to look at what the specific problem is it would be
    assigned to do, but I am not against that.
        Senator Gillibrand. It would just make recommendations to
    prevent another cyber hack of our elections, just the same way
    the 9/11 commission did it, basically impaneling nonpartisan
    experts in cyber to just come up with the 10 things we need to
    do.
        Secretary Mattis. Yes, I will just tell you we have efforts
    underway to do these very things right now. But at the same
    time, I am not against what you are proposing.
        Senator Gillibrand. Okay. I want to talk a little bit about
    sort of the world order, in my last 1.5 minutes.
        President Trump's decision to withdraw from the Paris
    Climate Agreement was just one of the several signals to the
    world that the administration is repositioning the United
    States not as a global leader but as a country focused
    exclusively on its interests. Upon his return, National
    Security Adviser H.R. McMaster and Gary Cohn wrote in the Wall
    Street Journal, ``The President embarked on his first foreign
    trip with a clear-eyed outlook that the world is not a 'global
    community' but an arena where nations, nongovernmental actors,
    and businesses engage and compete for advantage.''
        Our defense strategy has been predicated on working with
    allies to maintain the stability of different regions of the
    world, and yet this op-ed suggests that we would only work with
    allies and partners when it suits us. Is the Department
    redrawing its defense strategy around this new paradigm?
        Secretary Mattis. We do work by, with, and through allies.
    We have alliances. We have bilateral agreements. I think that
    we will continue to be working alongside others.
        The Greatest Generation came home from World War II and
    said, like it or not, we are part of the world. That is a
    philosophy that guides our foreign policy, as well as our
    military policy.
        Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Mike Mullen, former Chairman of
    the Joint Chiefs, and former National Security Adviser Jim
    Jones just wrote an opinion piece on the same topic, and you
    said something similar several years ago, that the less we
    invest in diplomacy, the more we invest in bullets.
        Do you still agree with that analysis?
        Secretary Mattis. Yes, ma'am. It has to be a whole-of-
    government approach to the world. Absolutely.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Fischer?
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Good morning, gentlemen. I would like to thank you both for
    your service and for being here today.
        First, I would like to note my appreciation for this
    budget's strong support for nuclear modernization and the
    comments that both of you made on this issue in your prepared
    comments. I know, Mr. Secretary, you alluded to that in your
    opening statement as well. I was pleased to see the
    Department's request reflect the necessary prioritization for
    that nuclear modernization, so thank you for that.
        General, in your opening statement, you said that you
    assess that, within 5 years, we will lose our ability to
    project power. Can you put that in context? What does being
    unable to project power do to our ability to protect our
    Homeland and deter conflict, meet our obligations to our
    allies, article 5 under NATO, for example?
        General Dunford. I can, Senator. From my perspective,
    really since the 1990s, China, Russia, other countries, have
    studied United States capabilities from precision munitions to
    our ability to project power. We identify that as--we call it
    our center of gravity, but our source of strength, the ability
    to project power when and where necessary to advance our
    interests, to meet our alliance commitments.
        We think that plays an important role in deterrence. It
    plays an important role in assuring our allies that we can meet
    our alliance commitments.
        In the specific areas where they have invested in--anti-
    ship cruise missiles, anti-ship ballistic missiles, electronic
    warfare capabilities, cyber capabilities--all focus to prevent
    us from projecting power when and where necessary to accomplish
    our objectives. So they want to keep us from getting into the
    area. This is both the case with Russia with regard to our NATO
    alliances and China with regard to meeting our commitments in
    the Pacific. They want to keep us from being able to deploy
    forces into the area and to operate freely within the area.
        So when I talk about competitive advantage, in my judgment,
    the problem that we are trying to solve is to continue to be
    able to do what we have historically been able to do, and that
    is simply to project power when and where necessary.
        Again, I mentioned the role it plays in assuring our allies
    and meeting our commitments. I also believe that source of
    strength plays a very, very important role in deterring
    potential adversaries from initiating provocation or conflict.
        Senator Fischer. You mentioned that 5-year period. Do you
    believe that it is in doubt now?
        General Dunford. It is eroding now. We have historically
    had the ability to do that, not uncontested but in a decisive
    way. I think our competitive advantage has eroded right now.
        We would be challenged in projecting power today. We have
    done some very careful analysis at a classified level looking
    function by function at our current capabilities, our
    adversaries' current capabilities, the path of capability
    development that we are on, the path of capability development
    that our adversaries are on. What we have seen is an erosion
    over the past 10 years.
        In our judgment, we will get to the point where we would
    suffer significant casualties and significant time delays in
    meeting our objectives and projecting power in 5 years.
        Senator Fischer. In 5 years. Do you think now that,
    regardless of our intent, we do not have the capability to act
    unless we change the path we are on?
        General Dunford. Senator, I do not think there is any
    question that, unless we change the path we are on, we are
    going to be at a competitive disadvantage, qualitatively and
    quantitatively.
        Senator Fischer. So that is pretty consequential, isn't it?
        General Dunford. Senator, to me, it affects our ability to
    deter conflict. It affects the confidence that our allies have
    in our ability to meet our commitments. At the end of the day,
    it makes it a more dangerous world, because both nuclear
    deterrence and conventional deterrence would be affected.
        Senator Fischer. If we are unable to meet the needs of the
    force that we have now, that they are incapable or that they
    are not ready, do you believe that any leader will send that
    force into the battle?
        General Dunford. I think it would be very difficult for a
    leader to send a force in battle when his military leadership
    would articulate the risk associated with doing that.
        I do want to make it clear, I believe we have a competitive
    advantage over any potential adversary today. What I am doing
    now is projecting into the future based on a trend line that we
    have seen over the past decade where we will be if we do not
    turn it around.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you.
        Secretary Mattis, in the last 4 weeks, the United States
    has conducted three strikes against pro-regime forces that
    threaten coalition soldiers in Syria. Do I have your assurance
    that we are going take any and all measures necessary to
    protect our forces in that area?
        Secretary Mattis. Absolutely, Senator. Those are self-
    defense strikes, and the commander on the ground has the
    authority to take whatever action necessary, and I support
    that.
        Senator Fischer. Okay. During your confirmation hearing,
    you talked about how Russia had chosen to be a strategic
    competitor. With respect to engagement with Russia, you stated,
    ``I am all for engagement, but we also have to recognize
    reality and what Russia is up to. There is a decreasing number
    of areas where we can engage cooperatively and an increasing
    number of areas where we are going to have to confront
    Russia.''
        Do you believe this is still an accurate characterization
    of Russia's behavior?
        Secretary Mattis. I think there are very modest
    expectations for finding areas of cooperation right now with
    Russia until they change their behavior.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Heinrich?
        Senator Heinrich. Thank you.
        Mr. Chair, first, I want to associate myself with the views
    of 16 former senior military leaders who submitted a letter
    today in support of foreign assistance. Specifically, they made
    the following point. ``Proactive conflict prevention strategies
    are far less expensive in terms of resources and lives expended
    than reactive use of our Armed Forces.''
        This is signed by a number of folks we will all recognize,
    from General Breedlove to Admiral Mullen to General Petraeus to
    General McChrystal. I think we should keep that in mind when we
    review the President's Budget, which I believe is particularly
    shortsighted with regard to foreign assistance.
        I want to move now, Secretary Mattis, to something you said
    at your confirmation hearing in January. I asked you for your
    assessment of the key threats to our vital interests and at
    what priority level. You said that the principal threats start
    with Russia.
        Do you still view Russia as a significant threat to the
    United States?
        Secretary Mattis. Yes, Senator, I do.
        Senator Heinrich. Can you walk us through a little bit how
    this year's budget request invests in the resource areas, the
    programs, and the initiatives that can help counter those
    threats posed by Russia?
        Secretary Mattis. Senator, I think the European Reassurance
    Initiative [ERI] alone of $4.8 billion is designed with one
    target in mind. That is to dissuade Russia from thinking that
    this is a time when they want to test NATO or the Americans.
        I would also point out that, in terms of technology, we are
    looking at specific technologies that address some of the
    maturing threats that they have--air, space, underwater, that
    sort of thing.
        I think, too, that the investment in pre-positioned
    equipment that allows us to move forces quickly into an area
    would cause a change in their strategic calculus, as far as the
    risk from their behavior, from their perspective, would go up.
        There is also a fair amount of ground munitions and
    airfield enhancements that are going on specifically targeted
    to your concerns, Senator.
        Senator Heinrich. I want to thank you for that. I think
    those are all very important investments.
        One of my concerns is that the Russians employed a set of
    hostile, highly asymmetrical tools during our election last
    year, and that for the cost of a fraction of a single ship,
    they were able to use very low-cost tools like hackers, trolls,
    and social media bots to manipulate our media and even
    penetrate our political and election structures.
        Do we have an overall strategy to meet that threat either
    in CYBERCOM or as a whole-of-government approach?
        Secretary Mattis. Sir, we have vulnerability assessments
    and analyses going on that cause us to buttress our defenses in
    different areas to shift our filtering of information and to
    shift our focus or intelligence services to define the problems
    to a level that we can figure out what to do about them.
        So is there an overall strategy? We are working on a
    broader strategy that this would be part of. But right now, we
    have enough definition that we do not have to delay taking
    steps at this time intel-wise and defenses-wise against the
    Russian threat.
        Senator Heinrich. Should there be consequences when Russia
    does this kind of thing?
        Secretary Mattis. Absolutely. I mean, that is a decision
    that has to be taken by the Commander in Chief and certainly
    with the Congress' support, involvement. I think that this sort
    of misbehavior has got to face consequences and not just by the
    United States but more broadly.
        Senator Heinrich. I could not agree more.
        I want to shift gears a little bit in my last 40 seconds or
    so.
        You know my interest in directed energy weapons systems.
    They have enormous potential to be a game-changer, the kind of
    thing that we have seen change asymmetry in the past for our
    warfighters.
        Section 219 of last year's defense bill instructs the
    Secretary of Defense to designate a senior official at the
    Pentagon to have principal responsibility for the development
    and transition of directed energy weapons systems. As of today,
    it is my understanding that this position remains unfilled.
        Secretary, can I have your commitment today to meet this
    requirement and to assign someone this critical responsibility
    at the Pentagon?
        Secretary Mattis. Yes, sir. Thank you for bringing it up. I
    did not know I had that responsibility. I am learning more
    every day. If that is a responsibility you have assigned, it
    will be done. I will tell you that, right now, I have been
    briefed on directed energy R&D [research and development] and
    advances, so I know people are working it right now. But if we
    have not filled that line number, that assignment, I will get
    onto it.
        Senator Heinrich. I appreciate that very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Cotton?
        Senator Cotton. Thank you, gentlemen.
        I want to associate myself with the remarks about our
    budget picture that Secretary Mattis had and Chairman McCain
    had. I will say that I agree with Chairman McCain. I think the
    President's Budget is inadequate to the threats that we face.
        But the more fundamental problem is the Budget Control Act,
    and the simple solution, colleagues, is to repeal the Budget
    Control Act. From Senator Fischer all the way down to my right,
    and Senator Donnelly all the way down to Senator Peters, not a
    single one of us was here in the summer of 2011 and voted for
    that bill.
        The Budget Control Act is not the Constitution, and the
    112th Congress was not the Constitutional Convention. We should
    simply repeal it.
        Now some people say it is going to increase the deficit,
    but it is not going to go into effect. We know that. We know
    exactly what will happen. We will have a continuing resolution
    in September. We will have some kind of 2-year budget in
    October, November. We will have an omnibus in December 2017, an
    omnibus in December 2018. Then we will do it all again in 2019.
        Let's simply repeal the Budget Control Act and take our
    responsibilities seriously and own up for our annual budgeting
    cycle. I would urge all the Democrats and all the Republicans
    on this committee to work together to do so in the Senate
    itself.
        Now, off my soapbox.
        Mr. Secretary, the Open Skies Treaty allows for aerial
    surveillance of military forces. United States and Russia are
    both parties. However, according to the State Department,
    Russia has not been playing ball lately. They are denying the
    United States overflight of certain parts of their territory.
        I know that we have sought resolution with Russia on these
    matters. My understanding is those efforts have come up empty.
        Does the United States believe that Russia is in violation
    of the Open Skies Treaty?
        Secretary Mattis. We are meeting on that issue. I have been
    briefed on it, and we will be meeting with the State Department
    and the national security staff here in the very near future.
    There certainly appears to be violations of it, but I have to
    go into the meeting and figure out that I have all the
    information.
        Senator Cotton. Would you care to elaborate in a classified
    manner, in this setting, on the nature of those violations?
        Secretary Mattis. There are areas that we have been
    prevented from overflying. I think some of the other aspects of
    it, I would prefer to talk privately with you. But that is one
    of the clear, to me, violations.
        Senator Cotton. Could we get your commitment to submit a
    response on the record, classified or unclassified, as
    appropriate, once you have had those consultations?
        Secretary Mattis. I would prefer to do it even before I had
    the consultation. I can get it to you right away. I can tell
    you what we know right now, what we believe right now, and then
    we can update you later, sir.
        Senator Cotton. That is fine, if we can get that on the
    record in writing.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Secretary Mattis. The Administration has determined that Russia is
    in violation of certain provisions of the Open Skies Treaty. First, it
    has established a limit of 500 kilometers over the Kaliningrad Oblast
    for all Open Skies flights originating from Kubinka airfield (rather
    than any portion of the 5,500 kilometer distance that Open Skies
    flights should be able to fly). Second, Russia has refused to allow
    Open Skies flights within a 10-kilometer corridor along its border with
    the Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Third, Russia has
    failed to provide air traffic control facilitation during certain Open
    Skies flights and improperly invoked the doctrine of force majeure to
    require deviations from agreed flight plans. These actions violate
    Russia's obligations under provisions of articles VI, VIII, and Open
    Skies Consultative Commission Decision 3/04 of the Treaty on Open
    Skies.

        General Dunford, while we are on the topic of Russian
    treaty violations, our EUCOM [European Command] commander,
    General Scaparrotti, testified in March, saying, Russia has
    repeatedly violated international agreements and treaties that
    underpin European peace and stability, including the Treaty on
    Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces and the Treaty on
    Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.
        Do you agree that Russia is in violation of both those
    treaties?
        General Dunford. I do, Senator.
        Senator Cotton. So let's put this plainly then. If Vladimir
    Putin wanted, he could hold United States troops in Europe at
    risk with nuclear-armed cruise missiles, and our only choices
    would be, one, we send 30-year-old F-16s with 30-year-old
    weapons against state-of-the-art Russian defenses, or we have a
    choice to escalate a tactical crisis to a strategic one by
    responding with long-range bombers or intercontinental missiles
    or submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Is that the situation
    we face in EUCOM right now?
        General Dunford. Senator, that is a good reason why we have
    argued to modernize our nuclear enterprise and make sure we
    have an effective deterrent, an effective response.
        Senator Cotton. One of the modernization priorities is the
    air-launched cruise missile, which is going on 40 years now.
    General Selva said, ``A decade from now, ALCMs [air-launched
    cruise missiles] will not be able to penetrate Russian air
    defenses, and, therefore, there is an urgency to their
    replacement.''
        Given Russia's treaty violations and the imbalance between
    American and Russian nuclear forces, and the age of ALCM, do
    you agree that it is an urgent priority to replace the ALCM
    with the long-range standoff cruise missile?
        General Dunford. Senator, as you know, we are going through
    a Nuclear Posture Review right now.
        What I would say is this, the third leg of the triad, the
    bomber, needs to be able to penetrate. It needs to be able to
    achieve effects. That is the criteria that we should have going
    into the Nuclear Posture Review.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you.
        To conclude, we had Admiral Harris from PACOM [Pacific
    Command] in a few weeks ago as well. He pointed out that
    although China is obviously not a party to the INF
    [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] Treaty, if they were, over
    90 percent of their missiles would be banned by it. So the
    situation that we face is the INF Treaty gives China a lethal
    advantage over American forces in the Pacific. Russia is out-
    right ignoring the INF Treaty in Europe. We have no matching
    response to either of those threats. Even if we did, it would
    be illegal because we are literally the only Nation in the
    world that restrains itself from developing intermediate-range
    cruise missiles.
        Is that right?
        General Dunford. Senator, it is. I think what is important
    about the Chinese capability is that is in that category of
    anti-access/area denial that we discussed earlier, where the
    large number of missiles and rockets that they have do present
    a challenge to us as we try to project power.
        Senator Cotton. It seems a critical strategic problem that
    we face. I know that you gentlemen are working to address it. I
    hope that we can do everything possible to help you. Thank you.
        General Dunford. Senator, there is a wide range in the
    fiscal year 2018 budget. Frankly, we started in 2017, a wide
    range of capability areas, where we requested resources
    designed specifically for those challenges that you have
    articulated.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Warren?
        Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you to our witnesses for being here today.
        I want to ask about what is happening between Qatar and its
    neighbors. Last week, Saudi Arabia severed all diplomatic and
    economic ties with Qatar. Almost immediately, Bahrain, the UAE
    [United Arab Emirates], Egypt, and Yemen did the same.
        This crisis began in part because it was reported that the
    leader of Qatar gave a speech praising Iran and criticizing
    other countries in the region. Now it appears that that was
    fake news and that the leader of Qatar gave no such speech. Now
    the media has reported that the FBI believes that it was
    actually the Russians who planted the story.
        I do not want to ask a question that depends on classified
    information, so let me ask this question instead. If the news
    reports are accurate, what motive would the Russians have had
    for doing something like that?
        Mr. Secretary, might you be able to answer that?
        Secretary Mattis. I think a disruption of the international
    order is something that Russia, in a shortsighted way, thinks
    works to their benefit. I think it does not, but I cannot speak
    for them.
        I think what you are seeing here, though, is the continued
    prevalence of threats not just to our own country, not just to
    Western Europe democracies, but they are trying to break any
    kind of multilateral alliance, I think, that is a stabilizing
    influence in the world.
        Senator Warren. Good. Good, in terms of your description.
    This is very helpful, and I hope we are going to be able to get
    to the bottom of this.
        Our intelligence agencies have told us that the Russians
    conducted a successful cyberattack against our 2016 elections.
    A few months later, the Russians tried to do the same thing in
    France. Now it appears they are trying to take this to a whole
    new level.
        So I also, though, would like to ask for your help to
    clarify the U.S. policy on this current dispute. After the
    Saudis cut off diplomatic and economic ties, the President
    immediately tweeted his support for the move, saying, and I am
    going to quote here, ``So good to see the Saudi Arabia visit
    with the King and 50 countries already paying off.''
        But soon afterward, Secretary of State Tillerson called on
    those countries to ease the Qatar blockade, saying it was,
    ``hindering United States military operations in the region and
    the campaign against ISIS.''
        Then, in testimony to this committee, the Air Force
    Secretary contradicted Secretary Tillerson and said that the
    dispute was, in fact, not impacting air operations at Al Udeid,
    our base in Qatar.
        Secretary Mattis, can you please clarify? What is the
    policy of the United States Government toward the current
    dispute among gulf countries in the Middle East?
        Secretary Mattis. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator, the Secretary of the Air Force was referring to
    the operations at that one airbase. There is more than that
    going on in the region. So she was quite correct in what she
    was saying about that.
        Secretary Tillerson was nonetheless correct as he looked
    more broadly at the situation where we have to work with many
    of what we call Gulf Cooperation Council states together.
        We have friends in the region, Senator, who have problems.
    They admit it. One of the issues that came up when President
    Trump visited Saudi Arabia was their effort to turn off the
    spread of rabid ideologies that undercut stability and create
    the kind of the ocean in which the terrorists swim, that sort
    of thing.
        So we have friends out there. We have to work with them.
    Our policy is to try to reduce this problem. But at the same
    time, we have to make certain that we are all working together
    and there is no funding, whether it be from a state or from
    individuals in the state, who can get away with it because
    there is a lack of oversight or law or that sort of thing.
        So there are a lot of passions at play here. It is not tidy
    as we deal with it.
        Senator Warren. I understand that Qatar needs to do more to
    fight terrorism in the field. I just want to make sure I
    clarified the point and understood it correctly.
        General Dunford, is the Qatar blockade affecting United
    States military operations?
        General Dunford. Senator, it is not.
        Senator Warren. Okay.
        General Dunford. We are watching that very, very closely,
    but we have had good cooperation from all the parties to make
    sure that we can continue to move freely in and out of Qatar
    where we have both an important airbase as well as the
    headquarters forward of the United States Central Command.
        Senator Warren. Good. Thank you very much.
        I just want to say this cyberthreat appears to be getting
    bigger and bigger, more and more dangerous, taking on multiple
    permutations. I think that means it is really important, and I
    am going to ask you later for an update on the status of trying
    to implement our Cyber Command elevation. But this is something
    we have to fight back against.
        Secretary Mattis. We are on track with elevation.
        Senator Warren. Good.
        Secretary Mattis. It is going fine. I do not see any issues
    there. There are some other things about splitting them that we
    are working through, but we will work through it.
        Senator Warren. Good. Powerfully important.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Rounds?
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, thank you for your service to our country.
        General Mattis, Secretary Mattis, do you see any way that
    the current budget could be operational with the Budget Control
    Act still in existence?
        Secretary Mattis. I believe Congress is going to have to
    remove the Budget Control Act in order for that to happen, so
    for this budget to go through.
        Senator Rounds. Would it be fair to say that a continuing
    resolution has never saved money with regard to any of the
    defense programs?
        Secretary Mattis. Sir, I guarantee you continuing
    resolutions cost us more money for less capability.
        Senator Rounds. Last week, Dr. Wilson and General Goldfein
    talked about the B-21 program and reiterated the importance
    that it stay on time and on budget.
        The program ramps up next year from $1.3 billion to $2
    billion requested for 2018. I also understand that a CR or a
    return to BCA funding levels could jeopardize funding for this
    and ultimately affect the timely fielding of this critical
    component of our future national security.
        General Dunford, you just mentioned the fact that we
    absolutely have to have the long-range strike bomber with
    regards to our plans for delivering any type of weapons against
    the upgraded threats of our peer competitors. Would you care to
    comment on the need for the continuation on a timely basis of
    the development of the B-21?
        General Dunford. Senator, I cannot comment on the timing.
    What I can tell you is we have done three Nuclear Posture
    Reviews since 2010 that I am aware of. All of them have
    validated the need for triad and emphasized the need for a
    bomber that had assured access.
        So completely supportive of that, and I know that General
    Goldfein and the Secretary of the Air Force have testified as
    to the challenges with the timing of the B-21. I think that
    they have assured the committee that their leadership will be
    decisive in that program.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you.
        Secretary Mattis, for more than a year now, we have talked
    about cyber and about the need to define policy with regards to
    cyberattacks within the United States. We have put within the
    NDAA, the 2017 NDAA, a directive that the administration
    deliver a policy or a proposed policy back to Congress by
    December of this year. I believe that since this is coming
    through the NDAA, it is going to fall under your purview to see
    that it gets done. This would not necessarily identify an act
    of war, but rather those acts of aggression which are of
    sufficient duration, similar to what a kinetic attack would be,
    that it would impact our country.
        Do you know if that study or that planning is ongoing at
    this time or if there is specific direction for individuals
    within the administration to comply with that NDAA directive?
        Secretary Mattis. Sir, I want to get back to you with a
    detailed answer on that one. I understand the question. I am
    not prepared to answer it right now.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Secretary Mattis. The recently signed Cybersecurity Executive
    Order, dated May 11, 2017, requires the Department of Defense to work
    with the other Executive Branch departments and agencies to develop
    strategic options for deterrence. Completion and consideration of this
    additional work will result in a more responsive and comprehensive
    report. I anticipate delivering this report to Congress by late summer
    2017. The report requested in section 1654 subsection (b) of the 2017
    National Defense Authorization Act will be provided to Congress 6
    months thereafter.

        I know that we have an awful lot of work going on. We are
    engaged in the operations. But the specific answer to your
    question I do not have right now. But I will get back to you.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, sir.
        General Dunford, the need for cyber superiority, I think
    sometimes when we talk about air, land, and sea, and space,
    sometimes we forget to add in the fact that cyber is connected
    in all sequences. They are all connected.
        Could you just share a little bit with the committee about
    the need to upgrade the cyber capabilities and our ability not
    only for defense but to be able to attribute the attacks, to
    defend against them but then to go back and respond? One step
    farther on that is to be able to survive the attack in such a
    fashion that we actually can respond afterwards.
        General Dunford. Senator, thanks.
        First, I would tell you that as we have analyzed today's
    conflicts and future conflicts, I would agree with you
    completely. We used to talk about multidomain. Now we talk
    about all domain. You refer to all of them: sea, land, air,
    space, and cyberspace. So we do expect cyberspace to be
    integral to any campaign that we would conduct in the future.
        The requirements start with making sure that our own
    network is protected. We provide support to the rest of
    government but our own network is defended, to include our
    command and control systems. We talked earlier about nuclear,
    our nuclear command-and-control systems.
        But our mission of defense in the Department also requires
    us to be able to take the fight to the enemy, which is an
    integral part of any campaign that we would wage. That requires
    us, as you suggested, one, to be able to attribute attacks and
    then provide the President with viable options in response.
        Although I would tell you the one thing that we emphasize
    is that just because the enemy chooses to fight in cyberspace
    does not mean our response has to be limited to cyberspace. In
    other words, we may experience a cyberattack, but we will take
    advantage of the full range of capabilities that we have in the
    Department to respond.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Kaine?
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you to the witnesses for your testimony and for your
    service.
        In March, you each testified before the Defense
    Subcommittee of Senate Appropriations on a topic that I care
    deeply about, which is Authorization for Use of Military Force
    [AUMF] in the ongoing military effort against ISIS. The record
    would reflect, Secretary Mattis, you stated, ``I would take no
    issue with the Congress stepping forward with an AUMF. I think
    it would be a statement of the American people's resolve, if
    you did so. I thought the same thing for the next several
    years, I might add, and have not understood why the Congress
    has not come forward with this, at least to debate, because I
    believe ISIS is a clear and present danger we face.''
        The testimony of General Dunford on March 22nd, the same
    hearing, ``I agree with the Secretary. I think not only would
    it be a sign of the American people's resolve but, truly, I
    think our men and women would benefit from an Authorization for
    Use of Military Force that would let them know that the
    American people, in the form of their Congress, were fully
    supportive of what they are doing out there every day as they
    put their lives in harm's way.''
        Is that still an accurate reflection of both your views
    sitting here today in June?
        Secretary Mattis. Yes, it is, Senator, for me.
        General Dunford. Absolutely, Senator.
        Senator Kaine. Senator Flake and I are members of the
    Senate Foreign Relations Committee and have introduced an
    authorization trying to square some difficult circles dealing
    with these nonstate actors--ISIS, the Taliban, Al Qaeda--trying
    to appropriately exercise congressional oversight without
    micromanaging functions that are functions for the Commander in
    Chief and his staff, and I would appreciate very much both of
    you individually but also the administration generally trying
    to work with us.
        The head of Senate Foreign Relations, Chairman Corker, has
    indicated a desire to move on this, and we would very much like
    to work in tandem with you to hopefully get this to a place
    that will express the congressional resolve that you discussed
    in this testimony.
        Secretary Mattis. Happy to work in concert with you, sir.
        Senator Kaine. Great.
        General Dunford. Absolutely, Senator. Thank you.
        Senator Kaine. Great. Thank you. I do not have any other
    questions.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Perdue?
        Senator Perdue. Thank you, Chair.
        I want to clear one thing up. First of all, I have the
    utmost respect for you guys, and, God help us, we have to have
    you be successful. But there is zero chance, zero--I am on the
    Budget Committee. There is zero chance that the budget process
    is going to work. The best this year, the best we can hope for,
    is that we will--there are 43 working days left before the end
    of this fiscal year. We are headed for another CR, unless we
    have an omnibus. So the best we can hope for today is an
    omnibus.
        The budget process is broken. It is why we are sitting here
    today. It is why we are at a historic low in terms of spending
    on our military.
        We will not fix this long term. We can argue about $20
    billion, $30 billion, $50 million. I am going to tell you in a
    second I think the number is much bigger than that.
        I need help on two things.
        One, help us with an audit. You have my full support. We
    are going to try to get the money for you, but we have to have
    an audit.
        Second, we need a bottom-up analysis of mission-based need.
    We are going to hypothesize about how much you need. You have
    answered questions about it. But I want to give a little
    history today.
        In my lifetime, we have disinvested in the military three
    times--this is significant--once in the 1970s, once in the
    1990s, and once just recently in the last 8 years, such that,
    today, we are spending 3.1 percent of our GDP [Gross Domestic
    Product] on our military. The low point was 2.6 percent in
    2000. A lot of people refer back to 2000. That was prior to 9/
    11, prior to ISIS, prior to all the things that have changed
    our world in the last 15 years.
        But we recapped only one time in my lifetime, and that is
    in the 1980s. We called ourselves recapping in the 2000s, but
    we chewed that up in 16 years of war, as you just said,
    Secretary. We have not built new aircraft carriers or
    submarines or airplanes.
        Here we are, where most of our major platforms are maturing
    at exactly the same time that we have to rebuild and recap. It
    is estimated that, by 2000, Russia will have--70 percent of
    their nuclear triad will be absolutely new technology. It is
    estimated it will take us 30 years to get to just 70 percent
    there.
        So we have an estimate here that says that, based on the
    historical average of 4.1 percent, that is the redline there,
    the difference between where we were last year at 3.1 percent
    and 4.1 percent, that 100 basis points on our economy is $200
    billion.
        The other way to triangulate about need is Bob Gates in
    2011 put a 5-year mission-based need requirement out. In 2016,
    estimated, his estimate for 2016 is $130 billion more than what
    we have.
        Then the last one I want to give you is this, and that is,
    General, you said our mission is to make sure our sons and
    daughters never have to fight in a fair fight. I agree 100
    percent with that. Historically, though, the country with the
    biggest economy is always the 800-pound gorilla. Today, China
    has reached us in purchasing power parity. Their economy is the
    same size as ours.
        There is every reason to believe that they are going to
    continue to outpace us with a population that is four times our
    size. There is no reason to believe that will not continue to
    happen.
        My problem is this, is that China this year will spend $826
    billion in equivalent money compared to our $677 billion. That
    is if we get everything you want. So already, they are spending
    more in equivalent terms than we are, significantly more.
        So when I triangulate this, we are somewhere between--this
    is this year--$130 billion to $200 billion. That does not count
    the real full recap that we are talking about. By the way,
    Gates did that before ISIS, Crimea, Ukraine, before a lot of
    the things that we know today.
        So what we are really looking at here is a situation where,
    over the next 30 years, just the Navy alone, just to rebuild--
    this is not operations--CBO estimates it is $26 billion.
        So, Secretary, my question to you is, I know you are a
    historian, how do we, not just this year, how do we develop a
    long-term plan to make sure, in an environment where every
    dollar, where every dime we are already spending on the
    military, the VA [Department of Veterans Affairs], and all
    domestic programs is borrowed--that is our discretionary
    spending. That is 25 percent of what we spend. Every dime of
    that is borrowed, because in the last 8 years, we borrowed 35
    percent of what we spent. In the next 10 years, projected, we
    will borrow another 30 percent of what we are going to spend.
        In that environment, how do we develop a long-term
    strategic plan that helps us achieve what the general has said
    that our mission is? I agree with that mission, by the way.
        Secretary Mattis. Sir, we need to have a strategic dialogue
    with the Congress and determine what you can do. At that point,
    we will have to adapt the strategy to whatever level of
    resources you can give us to avoid a strategic mismatch and
    protect the country.
        Senator Perdue. Sir, with due respect, you mentioned one
    time before that you are working on a mission-based estimate
    now. It is going to take some time to come together, for that
    to come together. Is that correct?
        Secretary Mattis. There is a strategy review underway, sir,
    yes.
        Senator Perdue. General Dunford?
        General Dunford. Senator, there are really two pieces to
    this. We have been involved over the last 18 months in doing a
    comprehensive analysis of what we are using as benchmarks for
    the joint force. So we have looked carefully at China, Russia,
    North Korea, Iran, and then violent extremism, as not
    predictive as that being the only threats we will face but with
    the key assumption being that, if we benchmark our capabilities
    and capacities against one or combinations there of those
    challenges, we will have the right force.
        We have carefully gone through and done a functional
    analysis that we are going to share with the committee at the
    top secret level that basically takes a look at our relative
    competitive advantage or disadvantage by functional area
    against each one of those challenges and the aggregate effect
    of those competitive areas and our ability to meet our
    objectives in a conflict.
        Regardless of where the Secretary goes with the defense
    strategy, what we intend to do is provide the Secretary with
    very clear--you asked for a bottoms-up, needs-based
    prioritization. I believe we are in a position right now to
    provide the Secretary recommendations for bottom-up, needs-
    based requirements.
        Again, what we have done is we have taken all the analytic
    work that has been done against each one of those problems sets
    and dissected it so we can make clear recommendations
    maintaining our competitive advantage. We have identified where
    we need to be 5 years from now and what specific programs will
    help us get there. Obviously, the latter part of that is a work
    in progress. We will continue to review that constantly.
        But I feel like for the first time in many years, as a
    result of an emphasis on that assessment, so over the last 18
    months, we are going to be in a position to have a very good,
    constructive dialogue with the Secretary, and the Secretary
    will be better empowered to have a good, constructive dialogue
    with the Congress and be able to outline our requirements, and,
    more importantly, the specific impact of either meeting or not
    meeting those requirements and our ability to achieve our
    objectives against those states that we are using as a
    benchmark.
        Senator Perdue. When can we expect that?
        General Dunford. It is available right now. We have started
    to talk to the committee about that, Senator. We are informed
    now by some detail work that has already been done on a couple
    of those problems sets. The work is actually reflected in this
    year's budget recommendations.
        Secretary Mattis. The briefs, Senator, allowed me to come
    forward with the degree of confidence I have about what it is
    we are asking for and to support the unfunded priorities lists
    that were submitted. This is where I got the background, the
    rigor, to understand the need for it, sir.
        Senator Perdue. I thank the chair.
        Chairman McCain. Let me point out again, Mr. Secretary, and
    I am not without sympathy, but unless we have a strategy, it is
    hard for us to implement a policy. It is now 6 months. Members
    of this committee, particularly Senator Reed and I, but
    everybody, we want a strategy. I do not think that is a hell of
    a lot to ask.
        I know that there are problems within the administration.
    But, honestly, what you just said is fine. But what is the
    strategy? I do not think that the last 8 years are exactly what
    we have in mind. So right now, we have a ``don't lose''
    strategy, which is not winning.
        General Dunford, I appreciate very much what you are doing.
    I remember 2 years ago going over to the Pentagon and you
    telling me about all these studies that are going on. That is
    fine. Where is it?
        I understand that one of the problems is within the
    administration itself. But please do not tell us that we have a
    strategy when we do not.
        Secretary Mattis. Chairman, we have entered a strategy-free
    time, and we are scrambling to put it together. But anyone who
    thinks a strategy, an integrated, interagency, whole-of-
    government strategy can be done rapidly is probably someone who
    has not dealt with it. It is, according to Dr. Kissinger, the
    most complex series of threats that he has ever seen in his
    lifetime, and he is a master of dealing with these kinds of
    issues.
        We are working it. As far as the strategy for Afghanistan,
    it is coming very shortly. We have broader strategies that we
    are building on, having to do with NATO and allies in the
    Pacific. You have seen us engage with those people as we make
    certain that we are drawing strength from allies, too. We are
    not putting this all on the backs of the American taxpayer, the
    American military.
        But it does take a lot of effort to walk into the level of
    strategic thinking that we found and try to create something
    that is sustainable.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Shaheen?
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you Secretary Mattis, General Dunford, Under
    Secretary Norquist, for being here this morning.
        I would like to continue to pursue the question of
    strategy. My question is about strategy in Syria. The map that
    everyone has at their place and that we just put up on the
    board is a map that was produced by the Washington Institute
    for Near East Policy. This weekend, the Russian Ministry of
    Defense announced that pro-regime forces have reached the Iraqi
    border.
        This comes as Russia-backed forces encircle United States
    troops and their partners in al-Tanf and seemed to raise
    questions about our strategy to clear ISIS along the Euphrates
    River Valley.
        So my question is, were we expecting the Russians to come
    down and make the move that they did around al-Tanf and to
    encircle our troops? What is our next move because of that?
        Secretary Mattis. Senator, as you know, we are in Syria in
    a defeat-ISIS campaign based on the President's decision of
    about a month ago now when he met with President Erdogan. We
    have chosen to arm the Syrian Democratic Forces. We had taken
    out already the Manbij area, which is where the attacks on
    Brussels and Istanbul and Paris originated. That was taken
    down. The next move is against Raqqa.
        We have shifted the operational arc to first invest or
    surround the locations where the enemy is located, so that
    their foreign fighters cannot escape and get home to Europe, to
    America, to Southeast Asia. That fight, they crossed the line
    of departure about a week ago, a little bit less than a week
    ago, going into Raqqa, and the fighting is now deep inside the
    city.
        As far as the al-Tanf situation, that was another operating
    area that we had. I did not anticipate that the Russians would
    move there. We knew it was a possibility. I did not anticipate
    it at that time, but it was not a surprise to our intelligence
    people who saw the potential for them to move out in that
    direction.
        The Middle Euphrates River Valley, clearly Assad, thanks to
    the Russians and Iranian support, is flexing his muscle. He is
    starting to feel a little more optimistic about his strategic
    situation. Certainly, they are moving to break through to their
    garrison that is surrounded at Deir Al-Zour.
        Senator Shaheen. I appreciate that. I guess the second
    question I had was, does that compromise our strategy for
    clearing ISIS in the Euphrates River Valley?
        Secretary Mattis. It certainly is complicated. Let me have
    the chairman talk about the military situation on the ground
    there.
        Senator Shaheen. Can I also ask you, General Dunford, if
    you would talk about, deconfliction aside, how we are or are
    not working with the Russians in Syria?
        General Dunford. I can, Senator.
        First, without splitting hairs, the media reports of us
    being encircled are not accurate. We still had freedom of
    movement outside of al-Tanf area, and we are not limited from
    moving up toward the Euphrates River Valley at this time.
        I talk to, as the Secretary does, our commander at the
    United States Central Command, if not daily, multiple times
    each day. So there are not large numbers of forces, pro-regime
    forces, out there. They have, in fact, moved to the border. But
    they have not restricted our movement.
        To that point, our deconfliction mechanism with the regime
    via the Russians is still effective in allowing us to prosecute
    the campaign.
        Senator Shaheen. I guess I was asking not about the
    deconfliction but about the other ways in which we are or are
    not working with the Russians. So I understand that
    deconfliction efforts are going on.
        General Dunford. Sure. The only thing that we are doing,
    Senator, with the Russians is communicating with them to
    deconflict to ensure the safety of our aircrews and our
    personnel on the ground at the military-to-military level.
        Meanwhile, Secretary Tillerson is leading an effort dealing
    with the Foreign Minister of Russia to take a look at what
    might be done to address Syria as a whole to include the
    political solution.
        But today, on a day-to-day basis, we have three main
    mechanisms to communicate with the Russians. We have a direct
    communication between our Air Operations Center and the
    Russians on the ground in Syria. We have a three-star channel
    that is on the joint staff. It is my J5 that communicates with
    his counterpart on the Russian general staff. Then I speak
    routinely to the chief of defense, General Gerasimov. In fact,
    I have spoken to him twice in the past week to ensure that we
    address the safety of our personnel and our ability to continue
    to prosecute the campaign against ISIS.
        So to the extent that we are doing more than deconfliction,
    that is a political dialogue taking place led by Secretary
    Tillerson. But right now, we are completely informed by the
    NDAA language that restricts any kind of mil-to-mil cooperation
    with the Russians limited to deconfliction in Syria. So we are
    compliant with the law at this time.
        If there is a need to do something more than that, my
    understanding is that the Secretary of Defense, for national
    security interests, purposes, can waive the requirement and
    allow us to do more with the Russians, if that meets our
    interests inside of Syria.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        Can I ask a follow-up question, Mr. Chairman?
        Chairman McCain. Yes.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        There have been reports about the political efforts that
    Secretary Tillerson is undertaking through Tom Shannon to go to
    St. Petersburg, and the news reports have suggested that that
    could involve our exchanging sanctions, the removal of the
    Russian dachas, the facilities that we seized back in December,
    in the United States.
        Secretary Mattis, have you been consulted about what is
    being proposed there? Are you troubled by the idea that we are
    going to do these exchanges without having any proof that
    Russia is changing their behavior?
        Secretary Mattis. I have not talked to Secretary Tillerson
    about that, ma'am. We have extensive talks every week, mostly
    every day. That has not been one of the issues that I have
    brought up with him or he has brought up with me. I stay more
    on the military factors, like what your map lays out here, that
    sort of thing.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Inhofe?
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I am sure it did not go unnoticed the people coming and
    leaving. We have three hearings going on at the same time, so I
    will be very brief.
        I was here for your opening statement, Secretary Mattis.
    You said that you came back out of retirement and you were
    shocked at what you saw. You have been very upfront. You made
    the statement that, for decades, America has been uncontested,
    and that is no longer the case now.
        So times are different now. I do think it is great, very
    effective for the uniforms to be talking about this. You know,
    I cannot do that. Those of us up here do not have the
    credibility that you have when you are speaking from your vast
    experience.
        We are facing, in my opinion, the greatest threat this
    country has ever faced. So when we talk about that, and we look
    at the attention that our military has been getting, I go back
    to 1965 when 52 percent of the total Federal spending was on
    defense, and then that slowly degraded down to today when it is
    15 percent.
        So when it gets right down to it, is a lot of this the fact
    that we have just not prioritized the military budget? I mean,
    we are faced with something, the threat is great. When you have
    people like General Milley coming out and saying, as he did at
    the Army posture hearing last month, he said we are outranged
    and outgunned. We are being very honest with the American
    people.
        But do you think we have just gotten to the point over a
    period of time where we are not giving the proper priorities to
    defending America?
        Secretary Mattis. Senator, I know there were a lot of
    contributing factors, but I do not know how we can restore the
    strength that we all know that we need if we do not start with
    repeal of the BCA and at least open the door to effective
    action by the Congress oversight and funding. Right now, it is
    like we have tied ourselves up in a knot.
        Senator Inhofe. Do you agree with that, General?
        General Dunford. Senator, I do. I mean, we have to
    benchmark our military capabilities against our national
    interests and the threats that we face. I think what we tried
    to do is paint a picture where we have a disconnect. We are on
    a trend where the military capabilities and capacities we have
    are insufficient to meet our national interests in the context
    of the threat has that has grown.
        As Secretary Mattis said, Secretary Kissinger, and I have
    used this expression many times, describes this as the most
    volatile and complex period since World War II.
        Certainly, sitting where I sit, I could not agree more with
    that assessment.
        Senator Inhofe. If you just single out end-strength, and I
    was looking at a chart that you may have in front of you, I do
    not know, but you take out the Reserve and the National Guard,
    just take the Army Active, the Air Force Active, the Navy
    Active, and the Marine Active, you have made statements, or the
    administration has made statements, for example, that the Army
    Active needs to be at about 540,000, and yet this budget is
    coming up with 476,000, a steady figure from fiscal year 2017.
    Then the same thing is true with the Air Force. We talked about
    the necessity for having 361, and it is at 325, and the same
    with Navy, and the same with Marines.
        So I would just ask, we have talked about how adequate the
    budget is. Do you really think it is adequate, in terms of end-
    strength? We are not meeting the goals that--apparently, you
    were in on the decisions. Both of you were somewhat in on the
    decisions as to where we should be in the four services on just
    end-strength alone.
        What am I overlooking here?
        Secretary Mattis. Senator, I believe what we face right now
    is the reality that we are already asking you to bust the BCA
    cap by $52 billion. We are trying to be informed by the reality
    of what the law says. But, at the same time, we are not being
    shy telling you where we are really at, in terms of what we
    need.
        But I think we need to work together and come up with a
    solution here, because I do not know how I would bring
    something to you that laid out a budget for what you pointed
    out here, when the BCA--I would have to completely ignore this,
    and I am ignoring it already to the tune of $52 billion. Well,
    the President is, with the budget that he submitted.
        It just seems to me that we have to have the kind of
    discussion that Senator Perdue, Chairman McCain, Senator Reed
    have brought up, and get a grip on reality here, because it is
    like we are all walking around like we are victims.
        Senator Inhofe. Yes, you are right. I appreciate the
    answer. We have to do all we can. I still think it is back to
    priorities, and a lot of people out there in the real world
    agree with me.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Let me just point out again, Mr.
    Secretary, a 3 percent increase over the Obama proposed budget
    is not enough. So whether we do away with BCA or not, and that
    is our problem, our problem with you is that it is a 3 percent
    increase over the Obama administration. Everybody agrees that
    that is not enough.
        So if we are going to bust the BCA, then why don't we bust
    it to what we really need rather than come forward here and
    complain all about the BCA when what you are asking for is not
    sufficient? At least, that is the view of the military
    commanders that I have talked to.
        Senator Donnelly?
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to thank our witnesses for being here with us.
        As leaders, you both made a strong commitment to improve
    the mental health and resiliency of our servicemembers and
    their families. I appreciate your leadership on this issue.
        As we discussed before, in section 701 of the fiscal year
    2015 NDAA, Congress passed what we call the Sexton Act
    requirement, which requires every servicemember, Active, guard,
    or Reserve, receive a robust mental health assessment every
    year.
        The Department has said in the past that the Sexton Act
    requirement would be fully implemented across all services by
    October 2017.
        Secretary Mattis, will this be fully implemented by October
    2017?
        Secretary Mattis. I do not know right now, Senator. I will
    get back to you with the best estimate I can give you. As you
    are no doubt aware, that is a significant requirement. It is a
    very labor-intensive requirement for the number of mental
    health professionals that would be needed to do that. But let
    me get back to you and tell you where we are at on meeting that
    deadline date.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Secretary Mattis. The Department's Periodic Health Assessment (PHA)
    memo tasked the Services to implement the new annual PHA, which
    includes the mandated mental health assessment by September 30, 2017.
    The current status shows that most locations will complete
    implementation by September 30, 2017. However, complete Service-wide
    implementation will be delayed until early 2018 due to information
    technology issues being worked by Navy Afloat, and some Navy Reserve
    and Marine Corps units.

        Senator Donnelly. That would be great. It is critically
    important.
        Also, Secretary Mattis, we discussed one time the
    challenges with a proper transition. General Chiarelli has
    worked on this extensively, on the handoff from Active Duty to
    the VA in regard to the formulary and in regard to making sure
    that it is a smooth transition.
        Are the Department and the VA working closely on this? Do
    you think progress is being made at this time? What has
    happened sometimes, not to get too off-script or whatever, is a
    lot of Active Duty, when they become vets, medicines that they
    are dependent on, that are critically important, are not
    available when it flips over to the VA side, or a different one
    is handed off, which causes significant problems. I want to
    make sure that, in the transition, that the DOD and the VA are
    working tightly together to get this done properly.
        Secretary Mattis. Sir, I believe that both the committees
    will be briefed very soon, both VA and this one will be briefed
    very soon. We have made significant progress on electronic
    health records. That is actually one of the contributing
    factors to how we will do this right.
        We have, I believe, right now, according to people who have
    been involved in this for many years, in one case over 2
    decades, we have never had a closer relationship between DOD
    and VA, targeted right at this transition, the records and the
    formularies.
        Senator Donnelly. I want to ask a little bit about
    Afghanistan, to follow up on what the chairman was asking. You
    both have done extraordinary work there over the years.
        Some years ago, I was with the Marine MEU [Marine
    Expeditionary Unit] out in Helmand Province and tried to figure
    out the strategy. They were doing an extraordinary job, but it
    almost seemed like a place put down in the middle of Taliban
    Highway in every other direction.
        As we look at this, I know we are waiting for the plan, but
    what does success look like a year from now, in your view?
    What, in your mind, makes the situation better?
        Secretary Mattis. Sir, I believe that the violence will be
    reduced significantly, especially in the population centers
    where most of the people live, that the Afghan Government has a
    degree of integrity in what it is contributing to its people,
    the government services, the corruption has been driven down.
    But most of all, that the Taliban no longer has the freedom of
    movement that we are seeing right now, that it has been rolled
    back.
        Senator Donnelly. General?
        General Dunford. Senator, I probably would add to that to
    the mitigation of Afghan casualties. That has been a great
    concern in 2015 and 2016, the number of casualties the Afghan
    forces have experienced. I think one of the ways that we get
    after that is by more effectively assisting them both in
    planning operations and delivering combined arms, more
    specifically the aviation capability. So continuing to grow
    their aviation capability and providing them support while they
    grow their aviation capability will be a key piece of
    mitigating casualties.
        Senator Donnelly. Do you think we are in better shape now
    than we were last year at this time? Or do you think it has
    gone backwards?
        General Dunford. I do not assess that we are in better
    shape than we were last year, Senator.
        Senator Donnelly. General Mattis?
        Secretary Mattis. I think Taliban had a good year last
    year, and they are trying to have a good one this year, sir. I
    think we may be able to, by a change in some of our concepts of
    operations, help them with air support and fire support. That
    will put the enemy on their back foot.
        Right now, I believe that the enemy is surging right now.
        Senator Donnelly. Well, we look forward to the report, and
    I would still love to talk to both of you or one of you or your
    team about Raqqa and some of the situations about some of the
    Indiana folks there.
        Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Ernst?
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Gentlemen, thank you very much for being here today. We
    appreciate your advice to this committee and your service to
    our great United States.
        Secretary Mattis, open invitation to ruck march with Team
    Ernst at any time--any time. The Vice Chief of Army and I
    solved most of the world's problems this morning. We just need
    you to fill in the gaps. So you are welcome at any point.
        Gentlemen, a counter-ISIS strategy in Southeast Asia is
    something that I have continued to push for, which was why I
    was excited to hear this weekend United States special
    operation forces were assisting the Government of the
    Philippines in taking back the ISIS-held town of Marawi.
        Until 2014, we used to have a sizable counterterrorism
    mission in the Philippines, and we have known about this threat
    for a very long time. Unfortunately, we have not returned to
    that area in order to counter some of ISIS's bad deeds.
        So, General Dunford, as we target a terrorist enemy that
    wishes to strike our Homeland, how does our counterterrorism
    commitment in the region also help ward off other adversaries
    like China and Russia?
        General Dunford. Senator, do you want me to hit those two
    separately?
        Senator Ernst. Absolutely.
        General Dunford. First of all, with Southeast Asia, in
    addition to our presence in the Philippines with
    counterterrorism, the Congress funded what is called the
    Maritime Domain Awareness Initiative. That helps countries in
    the region, specifically Indonesia and Malaysia in the
    Philippines, to have a common understanding of the maritime
    domain, particularly the flow of foreign fighters, criminals,
    and those kinds of things.
        The other thing that we have done is we have incorporated
    Southeast Asian nations into what we call Operation Gallant
    Phoenix. That is our intelligence and information-sharing
    architecture, which allows us to take a transregional approach
    to violent extremism.
        Separately, our forward presence in the Pacific, to include
    the fielding of our most modern capabilities, the P-8, the F-
    22, F-35, and our routine Pacific presence operations, are
    designed to deter conventional conflict and specifically
    conventional conflict with China and North Korea in the region.
        Senator Ernst. Do you see that as being effective also in
    the areas of Malaysia and Indonesia?
        General Dunford. In terms of deterring conventional
    conflict, I do. I view the most dangerous threats in Malaysia
    and Indonesia to be the threat of violent extremism.
        Senator Ernst. Okay, so ISIS or----
        Secretary Mattis. Senator, if I could just add one point
    here. We have talked about the lack of strategy earlier.
        In 2014, we canceled the named operation that we had down
    there, perhaps of a premature view that we were gaining
    success. Without that, we lost some of the funding lines that
    we would have otherwise been able to offer.
        So what the chairman has brought up is completely correct,
    but it again shows the lack of strategy that we inherited
    there. I just got back from Shangri-La where the chairman and
    other Members of the Congress were. This came up, and we are
    working closely with the Philippines right now, for example,
    with both manned and unmanned aircraft as they try to retake
    Marawi there in Mindanao.
        So this is an ongoing issue. What you are bringing up I
    think is going to loom larger, if we were having this hearing a
    couple months from now. So we have to take steps to get this
    back under control and support Indonesia, Malaysia, and
    Philippines, along the lines that your questioning leads us to.
        Senator Ernst. Yes. Thank you for bringing up the Shangri-
    La Dialogue, Mr. Secretary.
        While you were there, the other countries that participate
    in that dialogue, what type of support are they looking at
    coming from the United States? What can we offer them?
        Secretary Mattis. Yes, ma'am. Much of it is along the lines
    of what the chairman just mentioned with Operation Gallant
    Phoenix. It is getting the intelligence and sharing the
    information, where everything from Interpol to all the secret
    services of various nations work together, so that
    transnational threats are tracked when they go over the
    nation's borders, when they flee from one to another. Gallant
    Phoenix is critical. Also, other intelligence helps.
        I would add there that is where our strategy of working by,
    with, and through allies helps take the load off us. For
    example, Singapore has offered ISR [intelligence, surveillance,
    and reconnaissance] surveillance aircraft to the Philippines.
    That is the way we need to get everybody working together out
    there against this threat and not carrying the full load
    ourselves.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you.
        Just very briefly, because I am nearly out of time, our
    special operators have a dwell time of about a 1:1 ratio. This
    was mentioned by General Votel in one of our conversations
    recently.
        What can we do?
        I will tell you it is because they want that. I mean, they
    will not say no when they are given a mission, and I think that
    is incredibly important, that they stand up to their
    obligations. But what can we do to increase their dwell time
    beyond expanding their forces? Is there a way we can push their
    talents out to the conventional forces?
        Secretary Mattis. Some of these missions, due to our
    conventional forces capability today compared to 2001, we have
    now Army infantry, Army brigades, Marine battalions that can
    pick up some of these missions, take the load off, take the
    work off of the special operators and that sort of thing. Where
    you want relationships, we still want to use the special
    operations forces.
        Chairman, do you have anything to add?
        General Dunford. The only thing I would say, Senator, is
    the Secretary actually directed me several weeks ago to do an
    analysis of all of our special operations requirements today
    and look for opportunities to substitute with conventional
    forces for exactly the reason you are talking about. We are
    concerned about the deployment to dwell ratio, which is not
    only a factor from a human perspective, and families. It also
    precludes them from training for the full range of missions
    that we may require them for. We do not want them, as you know,
    to be singularly focused on the current fight. We want them to
    be prepared, just like the rest of the force, to be prepared to
    support us across the spectrum.
        Senator Ernst. Absolutely. Thank you, gentlemen.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Blumenthal?
        Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you both for your extraordinary service to our
    Nation, and all the men and women under your command. Thank you
    for being so forthright and helpful in your answers today to
    our questions.
        I want to ask about the F-35s, which are on the unfunded
    priorities list. I believe there are 24 of them.
        Would you support including them, assuming that you receive
    additional funds from the Congress?
        Secretary Mattis. Do you mean the support that goes with
    the aircraft to make them fully capable?
        Senator Blumenthal. Correct, and the additional aircraft as
    well.
        Secretary Mattis. Yes, sir.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
        As to helicopters, I have written a bipartisan letter along
    with a number of my colleagues to the appropriators, asking for
    an additional $327 million to fully fund the 60 helicopters
    that are necessary to reach the state of readiness for our
    National Guard that they have asked to be. Would you support
    that as well, assuming that the Congress provides funding?
        Secretary Mattis. I would have to look at the priorities we
    place more broadly. But I mean, it sounds reasonable, sir. I
    would have to look at it, in particular.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
        Secretary Mattis. Yes, sir.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Secretary Mattis. The fiscal year 2018 budget request supports my
    priorities to continue to improve warfighting readiness and increase
    capacity and lethality, and includes twenty-four Blackhawks at a cost
    of $493 million. While sixty additional helicopters might be
    executable, they do not represent my highest priority nor were they
    included in the Army's or National Guard's most recent unfunded
    requirements submission. The fiscal year 2018 budget request reflects
    my highest, balanced priorities, which allow the Department to continue
    to rebuild readiness while repairing damage from five years of unstable
    budgets and budget caps in preparation for future investments.
    Ultimately, the power of the purse is invested with Congress, and we
    will responsibly execute the funding that Congress approves.

        Senator Blumenthal. A number of our military leaders, past
    and present, have characterized the greatest threat to this
    Nation as being cyber warfare. There was a report in the
    Washington Post just yesterday, as a matter of fact, that
    hackers allied with the Russian Government, you may have seen
    the report, have devised a cyber weapon that essentially has
    the potential to disrupt our electronic grid, completely cause
    chaos in our electric systems that are vital to daily life in
    this country--an alarming report.
        Have you seen it? Do you agree that it is accurate?
        Secretary Mattis. I have seen it. I believe that this
    threat is real, and none of us are ignoring this threat at all.
    There is a lot more going on in this regard, sir, that I can
    discuss in a private setting.
        Senator Blumenthal. I would appreciate that opportunity.
        Would you agree with me and with others that cyber is one
    of the greatest threats, perhaps the greatest threat, in terms
    of warfare today?
        Secretary Mattis. It is certainly one of the tops, sir,
    because it cuts across all domains, air, surface. It impacts
    our nuclear command-and-control. Certainly, our very
    institutions, whether it be democratic or banking or whatever,
    are vulnerable to this sort of attack.
        Senator Blumenthal. Would you agree that the Russian
    hacking and cyberattack on our systems during the last election
    was an act of war?
        Secretary Mattis. I would leave the--I know it was a
    hostile act. Whether or not it crosses the threshold for war,
    sir, I am not a lawyer. But there is no doubt it was a hostile
    act directed against our country.
        Senator Blumenthal. Would you agree with me that we need a
    better definition and a policy? It may involve lawyers or
    others. I am not sure lawyers are the best to define it. But
    wouldn't you agree that we need a better policy defining what
    is an act of war in the cyber domain?
        Secretary Mattis. I think clarity in this regard would help
    in terms of deterrence and response. Absolutely.
        Senator Blumenthal. I want to, in my remaining time, focus
    on an area that is extraordinarily important to our Nation,
    even though it is not the kind of glamorous, shiny toy area
    that attracts most attention.
        President Trump's budget cuts the Department of Labor's
    worker training budget by 36 percent. At a time when we are
    working to modernize our military with particular emphasis on
    the nuclear triad, the Department of Defense will be relying on
    the defense industrial base to recruit and hire and train
    thousands of workers across the country: in my own State of
    Connecticut at Pratt & Whitney, thousands of workers to build
    the engines that are necessary for the Joint Strike Fighter; at
    Electric Boat, thousands of workers necessary to build the
    submarines that are so essential to our national security.
        Yet, we are cutting the funding necessary for training
    those workers, the welders, the pipefitters, the engineers,
    designers, people with real skills that are essential to our
    national defense.
        Would you agree with me that our national security really
    requires that funding be restored?
        Secretary Mattis. Sir, I believe there is a need for the
    kind of people you are referring to. There is an apprenticeship
    program I know the Department of Labor is starting. I do not
    know the details of it. But it is directed exactly at the
    skills that you have just been citing, but I cannot tell you
    more about it other than to say that would probably be the best
    place to get information about what is actually in the
    President's Budget to address this.
        Senator Blumenthal. I know the Labor Department budget is
    out of your direct jurisdiction, but it affects our military
    capability.
        My time has expired, but this subject is intensely
    important to the future of our Nation, and I hope that you will
    support efforts to increase the funding necessary for
    apprenticeship and training and other such skill-enhancement
    programs.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Graham?
        Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Graham. Secretary Mattis, you famously said, as a
    Marine Corps commander, that if you cut the State Department's
    budget, you need to buy me more ammo. Do you still stand behind
    that idea?
        Secretary Mattis. That was probably a rather simplistic way
    to point out that we have to engage with whole-of-government,
    and yes, sir, I still stand by the theory.
        Senator Graham. So you believe soft power is an essential
    ingredient to winning the war on terror?
        Secretary Mattis. I think America has two powers,
    fundamental power, sir, the power of inspiration, the power of
    intimidation. You have to work together, and the State
    Department represents inspiration overseas.
        Senator Graham. Do you agree with that General Dunford?
        General Dunford. I do, Senator.
        Senator Graham. Mr. Norquist, has anybody asked you a
    question yet?
        Secretary Norquist. Senator Perdue made a reference to the
    audit, but I think the time ran out before----
        Senator Graham. I am going to give you a question, but you
    have to be quick.
        Secretary Norquist. Okay.
        Senator Graham. Where will TRICARE costs be in terms of DOD
    spending in the next decade?
        Secretary Norquist. Where will which costs be?
        Senator Graham. TRICARE costs.
        Secretary Norquist. I do not have those numbers at my
    fingertips, sir, but I know that the overall is $51 billion for
    all of the defense health costs.
        Senator Graham. Well, look at it, because I think you are
    going to find it to be really encroaching on the defense
    budget. We need TRICARE reform.
        Secretary Norquist. Correct. The health care costs of
    defense have gone up significantly year after year.
        Senator Graham. All right. Thank you.
        General Dunford, when we liberate Mosul, and I am sure we
    will, would you recommend a residual force to stay behind, of
    Americans?
        General Dunford. Senator, I do believe the Iraqis are going
    to need support after Mosul, but I would also point out that
    the end of Mosul is not the end of combat operations in Iraq.
    There is much more work to be done.
        Senator Graham. Absolutely right. So the day that we get to
    the end of combat operations, is it your testimony, as Chairman
    of the Joint Chiefs, that we would be wise as a Nation to leave
    a residual force to prevent ISIL and other radical groups from
    coming back?
        General Dunford. My assessment is that that support for the
    Iraqis would be strategically important.
        Senator Graham. To the United States.
        General Dunford. To the United States.
        Senator Graham. Do you agree with that, Mr. Secretary?
        Secretary Mattis. I do, sir.
        Senator Graham. Do you agree that, from a Homeland security
    point of view, the outcome in Afghanistan matters, in terms of
    whether it is a failed state or a stable country?
        Secretary Mattis. Yes, Senator, I do.
        Senator Graham. Do you believe that every soldier serving
    in Afghanistan today, American soldier, is an insurance policy
    against another 9/11?
        Secretary Mattis. An insurance policy?
        Senator Graham. Against another 9/11 coming from
    Afghanistan?
        Secretary Mattis. Oh, yes, absolutely, sir.
        Senator Graham. Do you agree with that, General Dunford?
        General Dunford. I do. I do, Senator.
        Senator Graham. If anybody falls in the service of the
    country in Afghanistan, they died to protect the Homeland?
        General Dunford. I do not think there is any question. I
    would also point out that I believe strongly that the pressure
    that we have put on terrorist groups inside of Afghanistan over
    the last 15 years is the reason we have not seen another 9/11
    from that part of the world.
        Senator Graham. As a matter of fact, it is one of the best
    purchases you could have, in terms of dealing with the
    international terrorism, is Afghanistan. Do you agree with
    that, both of you? It is a good place to be, in terms of
    countering international terrorism.
        General Dunford. It is a center of international terrorism,
    sir, in the number of groups there, and we have to confront
    them there.
        Senator Graham. All right, thank you very, very much.
        Saudi Arabia. Do both of you support the arms deal to Saudi
    Arabia negotiated by President Trump?
        Secretary Mattis. I do, sir.
        Senator Graham. General Dunford?
        General Dunford. Senator, that is really a policy decision.
    I will defer to the Secretary.
        Senator Graham. Okay, militarily, do you think it would be
    wise for us to help Saudi Arabia?
        General Dunford. The only military judgment consideration
    is, how does that fit into the qualitative military edge for
    the Israelis, and it has been looked at through that lens. It
    is not a challenge.
        Senator Graham. All right, let's get back to this right
    quick, General Mattis. If Congress rejects this arms deal, what
    message are you sending to Iran?
        Secretary Mattis. I believe Iran would be appreciative of
    us not selling those weapons to Saudi Arabia.
        Senator Graham. The type of weapons we are talking about
    selling would make Saudi Arabia more effective on the
    battlefield in places like Yemen, not less, because of the
    precision nature of the weapons.
        Secretary Mattis. With proper training, it can have that
    effect. Yes, sir.
        Senator Graham. Okay.
        North Korea. Is it the policy of the Trump administration
    to deny North Korea the capability of building an ICBM that can
    hit the American Homeland with a nuclear weapon on top? Is that
    the policy?
        Secretary Mattis. Yes, it is, Senator Graham.
        Senator Graham. That policy has to have all options on the
    table to be meaningful, including the military option?
        Secretary Mattis. That is correct, sir.
        Senator Graham. The military option would be devastating
    for the world at large, but the President and you have to
    balance the interest of Homeland security against regional
    stability.
        Do you think China gets it this time, that we are serious
    about stopping North Korea?
        Secretary Mattis. I have no doubt that China thinks we are
    serious about stopping North Korea, sir. It is principally a
    diplomatic-led effort right now to try to denuclearize the
    peninsula.
        Senator Graham. Last question. What signal would we be
    sending to Russia if Congress failed to act for punishing them,
    if Congress failed to push back against Russia's interference
    in our election, if we gave Russia a pass? What message would
    that send to Putin? What message would that send to our allies?
    What would you recommend that the Congress do about Russian
    aggression? Do you support more sanctions?
        Secretary Mattis. Sir, I believe that we have to make very
    clear what behavior we want to see in the international
    community and what behavior we will not stand for. We need to
    make that clear in the Congress, in the executive branch, and
    in our alliances.
        Senator Graham. Do you agree with that, General Dunford?
        Chairman Dunford. Senator, I do. Although, having spoken to
    Secretary Tillerson, I would hope that anything we do with
    regard to Russia would be done in conjunction with the State
    Department. Meanwhile, I can assure you we are preparing for
    the military dimension of the problem.
        Chairman McCain. With a 3 percent increase over the Obama
    administration's defense appropriations, we are going to take
    care of all those things. Is that right, General?
        General Dunford. Chairman, I was responding to the Russia
    challenge. I think the fiscal year 2018 budget is giving us
    some significant resources to deal with the Russia challenge.
        Chairman McCain. So 3 percent is sufficient, in your view?
        General Dunford. Chairman, all I can tell you is that the
    prioritization within the topline that we have been given is
    the right prioritization.
        As I indicated earlier, I believe the requirements that the
    services have provided over and above the budget are legitimate
    requirements.
        Chairman McCain. So 3 percent is enough?
        General Dunford. Chairman, I also stipulated that I believe
    we need a minimum of 3 percent just to maintain the competitive
    level we have right now. The Secretary and I described it, as
    indicated, we need at least 5 percent for several more years to
    come before we can be competitive.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Nelson?
        Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, Senator King has to go to a
    funeral, so he asked for 2 minutes of my time, if I may give
    that to him?
        Chairman McCain. Senator King?
        Senator King. Thank you. Just a couple points, Mr.
    Chairman. I think it is important, and I hate to be bringing
    more bad news, but in thinking about our budget and the budget
    future, the looming threat that I see, in addition to all those
    we have discussed today, is interest rates.
        An easy way to think about this: 1 point of increase in the
    interest rate on our national debt equals the Air Force. The
    entire Air Force budget would be encompassed in a 1 percent
    increase in interest rates. Three percent would encompass the
    entire defense budget. Five percent would encompass almost the
    entire discretionary budget.
        I do not think there is any doubt that interest rates are
    headed up. So that is an additional factor that we have to
    think about, in terms of our development of the budget.
        Secondly, there is what I call the modernization bulge
    coming, which CBO [the Congressional Budget Office] estimates
    to be $400 billion over the next 10 years. That is for the B-
    21; the Columbia submarine, the Ohio replacement; the B-21; and
    then the whole nuclear. So that is another problem that we have
    to deal with and still maintain current budget levels.
        So I think the situation is even more grim than what we
    have talked about this morning, because of those additional
    factors that are not generally discussed in terms of this.
        We have talked a lot about unconventional threats that we
    are facing. Cyber and the attack on our electrical system are
    clearly attacks. We have not talked about hybrid war, and I
    worry that Crimea is a precursor of a way, for example, to
    attack the Baltic states without tanks rumbling across the
    border.
        Finally, Mr. Norquist, I hope that you will take very
    seriously the necessity for the audit, which we have been
    hearing about for years. I think, as I recall, 2017 was
    supposed to be the year the Department of Defense was ready.
        So my folks in Maine say, how can they possibly do this
    without an audit? I hope to have a report back from you and
    perhaps we can have a hearing just on that.
        So those are the points that I wanted to make. I want to
    thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony today.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, Senator Nelson.
        Senator Nelson. Thank you for your public service.
        I want to follow up on the quote that Senator Graham quoted
    you, with regard to the State Department. Are we giving up
    options that were previously available to us to exercise before
    we reach an armed conflict by a budget that is substantially
    cutting the State Department and other agencies of soft power,
    such as USAID [the United States Agency for International
    Development]?
        Secretary Mattis. Senator Nelson, I have not looked in
    detail at the State Department. I cannot tell you what is
    actually being cut and what is being retained. I would have to
    direct that to Secretary Tillerson, because I am not competent
    to answer it.
        Senator Nelson. Well, I would suggest that you look at it,
    because if you are supporting a budget that whacks the State
    Department and USAID, you well know you are not only a warrior,
    you are a diplomat as a commander who utilizes all those other
    agencies of government in projecting your soft power. This is a
    budget that substantially decreases the State Department and
    USAID.
        So I understand the sensitivity. You do not want to answer
    that. But that is going to be something you are going to have
    to face.
        Let me ask you, are you satisfied in your statements with
    regard to the United States support of article 5 in the NATO
    treaty? Are you satisfied that you have assured our allies that
    America supports article 5?
        Secretary Mattis. I have, sir. I believe the President has
    just recently done so right from the White House.
        Senator Nelson. Was it in his speech and he took it out
    when he was over there?
        Secretary Mattis. I think he believed that, by being there,
    that was--those actions spoke louder than any words. But he has
    put it in his speech since then, as you know, just here in the
    last couple days.
        Senator Nelson. All right, let me ask you, do you think
    that the existing sanctions are enough to deter further Russian
    aggression in Ukraine and Syria, the sanctions against Russia?
        Secretary Mattis. Sir, it is hard to tell what influences
    Putin. I think he is not acting in the best interests of the
    Russian people. As such, I think that whatever the Congress
    does, so long as it leaves us some flexibility to our Secretary
    of State and our President to negotiate as we try to get out of
    this spiral that is going downhill, make the point about where
    you stand, sir, but leave some flexibility in execution to
    those who have to diplomatically engage and try to reverse
    this.
        Senator Nelson. Would additional economic sanctions against
    Russia help, in your opinion?
        Secretary Mattis. I think if they were conditioned on
    failure of the diplomats to gain some kind of common approach
    to get out of the jam that Russia is putting everyone in.
        Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Reed. [Presiding.] On behalf of Chairman McCain,
    Senator Sullivan, please.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, thank you for your service.
        There has been a lot of discussion today about the budget
    and a continuing resolution. One of the issues that seems to be
    forgotten here is, last year, actually, the Appropriations
    Committee, Defense Approps, voted out of committee, almost
    unanimously, a defense budget. Unfortunately, it came to the
    floor last summer right around this time, and it was
    filibustered.
        So if we did that again, Secretary Mattis, would that be
    helpful, to have a defense budget that we worked on, voted out
    of committee, and then be filibustered? Is that helping our
    troops, if that happens again? I certainly hope it does not
    happen again, but I am just trying to get your view on it.
        Secretary Mattis. I think it would be horrible for our
    country, as well as our troops, sir.
        Senator Sullivan. You know, Secretary Mattis, I really
    appreciate your focus on the Asia-Pacific. I know it was not
    lost on our key allies in the region that that was your first
    trip as the Secretary. Your recent visit to Singapore with the
    Shangri-La Dialogue I also think was important for a whole host
    of reasons.
        I am sorry I could not have joined you. I had an event that
    was even more important than the Shangri-La Dialogue, which was
    a high school graduation of one of my daughters. Otherwise, I
    would have been with you.
        I read your speech and the Q&A [question & answer]
    afterwards. I thought it was outstanding.
        Can you succinctly state United States policy as it relates
    to freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea and
    other areas, just so both our allies and adversaries are aware
    of it?
        Secretary Mattis. Yes, sir.
        We operate freely in international waters, and we do not
    accept unilateral inhibitions on the international waterways
    and their use, or airways.
        Senator Sullivan. Are we going to continue to do that on a
    regular basis, with our allies, if possible?
        Secretary Mattis. We will unilaterally or in league with
    our allies. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sullivan. So I read in the press that USS Dewey
    conducted a FONOPs [Freedom of Navigation Operation] near
    Mischief Reef within the 12 nautical miles, and we even
    conducted military-type training, a man overboard mission,
    according to the press reports. The Chinese, according to press
    reports, protested that.
        What was our response in response to their protest?
        Secretary Mattis. To reiterate that we operate in
    international waters, sir.
        Senator Sullivan. I also very much appreciated your focus,
    and, General Dunford, your focus on the importance of our
    allies. You highlighted that quite well in your Shangri-La
    Dialogue speech.
        Can you just touch on that again for the committee's
    benefit and the benefit of the American people, just how
    important our allies are not only in the Asian-Pacific but
    globally in terms of us securing our national security
    objectives?
        Secretary Mattis. Senator Sullivan, there is an awful lot
    of talk about asymmetric advantages and competitive advantages
    and disadvantages. I would put our allies and our alliances
    from NATO to the Pacific, bilateral, multilateral, as our
    asymmetric advantage, especially if you put a list of our
    allies alongside a list of China's allies or Russia's
    alliances. You can see the proof coming through from history
    that nations with allies thrive and those without them do not
    thrive.
        Senator Sullivan. So we are an ally-rich Nation, and our
    adversaries and potential adversaries are ally-poor. Is that
    one way to look at it?
        Secretary Mattis. That is a perfect way to look at it.
        Senator Sullivan. So we should be working to deepen those
    alliances and expand them, correct?
        Secretary Mattis. Absolutely.
        Senator Sullivan. Do you think everybody in the
    administration gets that and is doing that?
        Secretary Mattis. As you know, sir, Secretary Tillerson and
    I work very closely together exactly along these lines. He
    leads foreign policy. I provide military factors and buttress
    his efforts.
        I also know that, in terms of Homeland Security, Secretary
    of Homeland Security Kelly is working with our closer allies
    around the hemisphere but also further out to try to protect
    the country.
        So I see it being a theme that is being carried forward.
    Yes, sir.
        Senator Sullivan. Let me just finish up, maybe follow up on
    a couple questions Senator Graham asked about North Korea. I
    actually very much appreciated what the President and Vice
    President did when they invited 100 U.S. Senators over to the
    White House to get the briefing with the President there, the
    Vice President, H.R. McMaster, and all of you. I thought that
    was actually very useful, very important.
        One element that I thought was very important was that you
    were clearly trying to get the Congress, in a bipartisan way,
    to be supportive of this new strategy. I think, as you know,
    Mr. Secretary, our country is at its most powerful when the
    executive branch and the legislative branch are working
    together on difficult issues, when Democrats and Republicans
    are working closely together on difficult issues, which is why
    I thought what the President did that day, bringing everybody
    over to hear about our strategy firsthand from you and others,
    and General Dunford, was so important.
        Is a nuclear ICBM armed in North Korea the most significant
    threat we face right now as a Nation?
        Secretary Mattis. It is certainly the one that is in the
    hands of a potential rogue state that we have to consider.
        Senator Sullivan. Is it increasing? Increasing, that threat
    is increasing, heightening?
        Secretary Mattis. No doubt, every test, we assume they are
    learning from it, sir.
        Senator Sullivan. So we need more missile defense
    capabilities for our Nation?
        Senator Sullivan. Right now, I believe we can protect the
    Nation. As we look to the future, absolutely.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I might have a
    few follow-ups, if there is time.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
        On behalf of Chairman McCain, Senator Peters, please.
        Senator Peters. Thank you, Senator Reed.
        Thank you to our witnesses today. I appreciate this very
    interesting and informative testimony.
        Secretary Mattis, in your testimony, you describe rapid
    technological change as an important force acting on the
    Department. In fact, I believe you highlight it as one of the
    four major forces that we have to confront.
        You and I have had the opportunity in my office to talk
    about how robotics and autonomous systems, artificial
    intelligence, all these other technologies will fundamentally
    change warfare in the next 10 years, perhaps much sooner than
    that. The private sector is leading on many of these
    developments.
        For example, Ford Motor Company, General Motors, will
    likely have a production self-driving automobile in the next 4
    to 5 years out in the marketplace, which is much sooner than
    most people, I think, realize.
        Secretary Mattis, you stated in your testimony, in fact,
    that the fact that much of this technological change will come
    from the commercial sector may expose it to state competitors
    and nonstate actors.
        So I am concerned that, in recent years, China has
    strategically weaponized investment in joint ventures in the
    United States as a method of improving its capabilities and
    obtaining advanced United States technology. The Committee on
    Foreign Investment in the United States, or CFIUS, is the U.S.
    Government entity responsible for vetting foreign investment in
    the U.S. for national security risk. But I am concerned that
    CFIUS is both outdated and overburdened, and may not be really
    up to the challenges that we are facing today.
        Admiral Rogers testified last month before this committee
    that our adversaries understand our CFIUS structure and its
    limitations, and some nation-states have actually changed their
    investment methodology to get around the process that we have
    in place.
        So my question is to both of you, Secretary Mattis and
    General Dunford. Is there a national security benefit to taking
    a tougher line against certain types of investment from nations
    that pose a clear threat to our national security, like China?
        Secretary Mattis. Absolutely. There is. I completely agree
    with your view that CFIUS is outdated, sir, and needs to be
    updated to deal with today's situation.
        Senator Peters. General?
        General Dunford. I couldn't agree more, Senator. I think,
    of the many challenges that we look at very carefully, the
    theft of intellectual property, particularly as it pertains to
    defense programs, is of great concern.
        Senator Peters. If we go through some reforms of CFIUS,
    which I am in the process of working with Senator Cornyn and
    others to do that, are there any specific recommendations that
    you would have for us in changing the CFIUS process?
        Secretary Mattis. Senator Peters, let me send you a note
    that outlines some. I would tell you right up front that there
    is a lack of restrictions on investment in certain types of
    technology that we must have put in place. But I can give you a
    more inclusive list of where our thinking is at on this, if you
    just give me a couple days, sir.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Secretary Mattis. The Department and other members of the Committee
    on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) carefully review
    each case for risks to our national security that arise from the
    transaction. The CFIUS regulations limit the transactions that the
    Committee can review. A tougher line against a broader range of covered
    transactions and intellectual property transfers would benefit our
    national security by preventing technology transfer to adversarial and
    competing nations. The Deputy Secretary of Defense recently established
    a cross-functional working group to develop policy options to address
    the risks of technology and intellectual property transfer to
    adversaries. These changes are integral to national security and we
    support the legislative efforts to strengthen the Committee.

        Senator Peters. I appreciate that. Thank you so much. That
    would be very helpful.
        In closing, given the fact that this is one of our major
    threats that we have to face, which is rapid technological
    change, and the list that you put in your opening testimony,
    are there any particular technologies that you are most
    concerned about, and ones that we need to be investing more in
    our own capabilities? This is to both Secretary Mattis and to
    General Dunford.
        Secretary Mattis. Let me come back to you again in private.
    I would prefer--these are areas that are very sensitive, and I
    do not want to let our adversaries know which ones we are
    looking at. But we will explain exactly what we are looking at,
    sir.
        Senator Peters. I understand that. I appreciate that.
        General, I assume that is your same position.
        General Dunford. Absolutely, Senator.
        Senator Peters. Good. I will look forward to working with
    both of you. Thank you.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Secretary Mattis. The list I gave covers the majority of
    technological areas that we foresee as giving us a dramatic advantage
    in warfare. However, technology has become global and countering those
    same technologies has become a challenge. I envision the Under
    Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering as the Department's
    champion to lead the way forward on innovation ensuring that we
    leverage our service, industry, academia, and allied partners.

        Chairman McCain. [Presiding.] Senator McCaskill?
        Senator McCaskill. I know the chairman has mentioned this
    several times, but I think repetition matters, in terms of
    getting this message out to the American people.
        The President said that he was going to have historic
    increases in defense spending. At one point, the President said
    he was going to expand the Army from 480,000 to 540,000.
        It is my understanding, as the chairman has mentioned,
    that, in fact, the President's request for the military was
    exactly 3 percent higher than President Obama's. Furthermore, I
    assume you all agree that it calls for zero additional
    soldiers. Correct?
        Secretary Mattis. That is correct, right now.
        Senator McCaskill. So does he not know that this is not a
    historic request? Does he not know--I mean, what I worry about
    is the American people are being told over and over again,
    ``Well, we are going to have a really big, I mean, we are going
    to fund our military. Our military, this is a huge increase and
    request.'' The reality is so different than the rhetoric coming
    out of the White House, Mr. Secretary.
        I worry that the American people will not understand that
    we have not even begun to do what we need to do, in terms of
    bringing our combat brigades to where they need to be.
        I hate to sound like a ``me, too.'' I think I would have to
    be a mini-me to you, Mr. Chairman. But I am worried that there
    is some misrepresentation going on.
        Secretary Mattis. Well, Senator, if you look at the $30
    billion we asked for as fast as we came in to address immediate
    readiness problems, and the--I would just call it the situation
    that we have inherited that demands more, we are trying to put
    together a coherent program on the run while we are engaged
    overseas, while we have numerous crises unfolding, while we are
    still getting people approved through the Senate, nominated to
    the Senate, and get the consent of the Senate to get them in.
    There is a fair number of things going on at one time.
        That is not to say we should not continue to work along the
    lines that we are together, but I have to come to you with a
    coherent plan where I can confidently say that the money you
    throw into this is going to be spent wisely.
        Senator McCaskill. I think that is fair.
        Secretary Mattis. I did not say that we are asking for
    enough money in this budget.
        Senator McCaskill. Well, he is.
        Secretary Mattis. That is why we have a 5-year program
    coming to you.
        Senator McCaskill. I appreciate and I know you are in a
    difficult position. I just think it does not help our cause, in
    terms of adequately funding our military, if the President is
    giving the country the impression that he is. That is the point
    I was trying to make.
        In addition to the strategy the chairman is asking for
    Afghanistan, I am awaiting the strategy on ISIS, which was
    supposed to be ready 30 days after the President took office.
    We still do not have that.
        Finally, what I want to turn to is strategy on cyber. I am
    really worried. We spend a lot of time worrying about Russians
    hacking politicians. I am worried about the Russians hacking
    our military and doing the things they are doing in terms of
    planting stories and gathering information.
        Fancy Bear, who has been identified by our intelligence and
    all of the intelligence experts as one of the premier agents of
    Russia in terms of cyber warfare, of the people that Fancy Bear
    has targeted outside of the former Soviet Union, 41 percent of
    them are either current or former members of the military,
    according to a recent analysis.
        Russia hacked the Twitter account of Central Command.
        We know that Russia has co-opted a very well-known veterans
    site that originally began in America. I do not want to use the
    name of it, because it will chase people to the site, and it
    has totally been co-opted as a Russian proxy.
        In fact, the Americans who began the site, they were seen
    in video at a meeting of the folks they are working with in
    Damascus, and the big, giant, oversized pictures behind them
    were of Assad and Putin. This is a site that is asking veterans
    to--helping them find jobs, ostensibly helping them find help
    for cancer treatment. Veterans are giving personal information
    to the site.
        We know that attractive women are going on Facebook. In the
    old days, you would send a spy into a bar that the military
    frequented and try to gain relationships one drink at a time,
    as this recent article pointed out. But now, they can do it
    through a Facebook page.
        So are you all all hands on deck, as it relates to the way
    military personnel and veterans--I know General Breedlove, they
    went after him. Are you all really paying attention to the
    corrosive ability of Russia to influence our military through
    direct contact through social media with our veterans through
    these proxy sites?
        Secretary Mattis. I know that training is probably the
    number one way to armor our people against this sort of thing,
    and training is perishable. It has to be ongoing. I have no
    complacency about this.
        I will see if the Chairman has anything to offer.
        But I will just point out that we have funded Cyber
    Command. We have all sorts of things going on with NSA that
    keeps us posted, puts protections, firewalls, into place.
        We have blocked a number of times, as you have seen,
    malicious malware being used where we were not affected. That
    was not because we were lucky. That was because we were
    throwing obstacles in the path and building firewalls as fast
    as we could. All you can do is stay ahead of these. You cannot
    build one and say, ``There. I can go home now.''
        So training and constant attention to the protective
    measures, I can guarantee you, is ongoing. I am briefed weekly
    on this, and the brief itself is pages long, as I look at the
    various blocks and countermeasures we are putting in place and
    what we are finding out about what various actors are up to.
        Anything else, Chairman?
        General Dunford. Senator, I would probably say two things.
        I do believe, and I have seen it, that the Service Chiefs,
    in particular, have really changed the command climate with
    regard to cyberspace and emphasized that, and treated
    violations of the protocols associated with our information
    technology as violations of UCMJ [Uniform Code of Military
    Justice] in holding people accountable.
        So as the Secretary said, it is about training. It is also
    about accountability. I think our culture of accountability
    with regard to information technology has changed a great deal.
        I also think, with the support of the Congress, our cyber
    capabilities, while we continue to need to grow them, have
    grown quite a bit. The 133 cyber mission teams that you all
    approved, 70 percent of them now are fully operational capable.
    I think if we had this conversation 24, 36 months ago, we would
    have been talking about just getting out of the gate. Now 70
    percent of them are fully operationally capable.
        In the coming months, we will have 133 of those teams that
    are fully operationally capable and continue to identify
    requirements to make sure that we can stay out in front of the
    threat.
        But I think the Secretary used the word complacency. I
    think your fundamental question is, do we get it? Are we
    changing the culture? Are we taking effective action to deal
    with threat? I do think we have significantly changed the
    culture. None of us believe we are where we need to be.
        Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I would say that one of the things that worried me the most
    in this article I read was that there was a purported story of
    a Russian soldier in Syria, and how he had been heroic in the
    way he had died fighting ISIS, and that this spread like
    wildfire through troops in various places.
        We have seen an uptick in the popularity, the approval
    rating, of Putin and Russia in this country. I just worry that
    they are really insidiously trying to insert combat-related
    stories that reflect favorably on Russian soldiers, when
    instances may not even be true. That is infecting our troops
    with maybe less than a clear eye about what Russia is and about
    what Russia is trying to do.
        I just wanted to put that on the record.
        Secretary Mattis. This is also understood throughout NATO,
    Senator. The German Minister of Defense, she was explaining to
    me how one of their soldiers deployed to Lithuania, I think it
    was, was alleged to have raped a Lithuanian girl. ``Here come
    the German bad soldiers,'' a completely made-up story, trying
    to undercut the cohesion of NATO.
        I am just pointing out that this is a military problem. It
    is accepted as a military problem. We are working it.
        But I think we have a long way to go up against this rather
    imaginative enemy that we have.
        Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Sullivan has some additional
    questions.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, I just wanted to follow up on the North Korea
    discussion briefly.
        Mr. Secretary, General Dunford, I know you are Korean War
    history buffs in many ways. I heard you talk about the Korean
    War, as a matter of fact, yesterday in your House Armed
    Services testimony.
        General Dunford, you talked about a potential conflict on
    the Korean Peninsula. Seoul residents would face casualties
    unlike anything we have seen in 60 or 70 years. General Milley
    had similar testimony a couple weeks ago before this committee
    about what a conflict on the Korean Peninsula could be like.
        Mr. Secretary, you just mentioned the rapidly developing
    threat that the North Koreans present in terms of an
    intercontinental ballistic missile. To Senator Graham's
    question, you stated it was the policy of the Trump
    administration to prevent them from getting that capability. I
    think you have strong support from most members of the
    committee on that.
        But it certainly does seem like those two issues are going
    to start colliding here relatively soon. I know there are a lot
    of ways to prevent them from getting that kind of capability,
    left of launch kind of activities.
        But if one of those ways was a decision to take some kind
    of preemptive military action, I believe that that would
    clearly trigger Congress' Article One authority with regard to
    declaring war, and you would need this body's authority to take
    such action.
        Do you agree with that? Has that been a discussion in the
    Trump administration? It is a very big issue that I am not sure
    has gotten enough attention.
        Secretary Mattis. I have not brought that issue to the
    President's attention, sir. Right now, as you know, from Mar-a-
    Lago, where the President met with his counterpart, to
    Secretary Tillerson and I, who will be following up with our
    counterparts in the next week or 2 weeks here in Washington as
    we have strategic security dialogues, we are doing everything
    we can to avoid resorting to war, in terms of protecting
    ourselves and our allies.
        Senator Sullivan. I think it is an issue that should be on
    somebody's radar screen, not that we want that, but part of
    what the President has been trying to do, and I am fully
    supportive, is get the Congress to be supportive of his policy,
    like I mentioned. That is why I thought the briefing at the
    White House a few months ago was actually very useful.
        But to continue to have that support, we need to be
    involved. I think that is something that this committee needs
    to be cognizant of, but also the White House does as well.
        Let me ask one final question. In the past 6 weeks, the
    Russians have sent Bear bomber missions off the coast of Alaska
    that have been intercepted by our F-22s based there five times
    in the last 6 weeks.
        What do you think the Russians are up to with this kind of
    very persistent checking of our NORAD [North American Aerospace
    Defense Command] systems? That is a pretty active engagement.
    Last time, it was not just with Bear bombers but with fighter
    escorts. What do you think they are trying to do in the Arctic?
    What are they trying to achieve? Why are they so active up
    there?
        Secretary Mattis. Sir, I am not sure what they are trying
    to achieve there. When you look at the combination of their
    cyberthreats to democracies, when you look at what they are
    doing in Syria, the Bear bombers, as you put this panoply of
    activities together, it is very, very concerning, and we are
    going to have to turn this around. The cycle has got to be
    turned around.
        I think it is going in the wrong direction, in terms of
    stability and peace. This is where miscalculations can occur.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. I thank the witnesses for their patience.
    I thank them for their responses.
        I want to emphasize again, Mr. Secretary, it is not your
    fault, not yours, Secretary Norquist, General Dunford. But we
    are not going to sit still while you settle the internecine
    strife that is obviously going on, which is preventing this
    strategy from coming forward.
        We are moving forward with authorization, with
    appropriation. Without a strategy, it makes our job 10 times
    harder.
        I think we have been pretty patient with you. We are going
    to start putting pressure on, because we need a strategy. To
    sit here June 13th, 2017, and say, ``Well, don't worry. We are
    going to be coming forward with a strategy,'' things are
    happening too rapidly in the world.
        So you have my greatest respect and admiration, but we are
    not doing the job for the American people that they expect us
    to do. So it is what it is.
        I thank the witnesses, and I thank you for being here.
        The hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 12:16 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
                            north korea provocations
        1. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Mattis and General Dunford, it is no
    longer an ``if'' North Korea gets a nuclear-capable ICBM that can reach
    cities like Chicago and New York, it is a ``when.'' From a missile
    defense perspective, how would you characterize tomorrow's threat from
    North Korea and the need to quickly address it?
        Secretary Mattis. The Department of Defense has been preparing for
    this eventuality since we began deploying the Ground-based Missile
    Defense system in 2004, and we have been continually updating and
    improving that system. The 2013 decision to increase from 30 to 44
    interceptors arose from the realization that the threat from North
    Korea was increasing. I am confident that our Homeland missile defense
    system is capable of dealing with this threat. I am overseeing the
    Department's review of our missile defense policies and programs. We
    will use the results of this review to ensure that we stay ahead of the
    threat.
        General Dunford. North Korea is aggressively pursuing nuclear-
    capable ICBMs, and will undoubtedly seek to produce as many ICBMs as
    they can to directly threaten the United States Homeland. Our missile
    defense capabilities must advance to keep ahead of the North Korean
    threat. To achieve this, we must invest more now into a layered missile
    defense system that better protects the Homeland and negates the
    advantages North Korea seeks in continued development.

        2. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Mattis and General Dunford, Kim
    Jong-Un is different from his father and grandfather because he
    understands that failed in missile tests ultimately produce successful
    ones. As General Hyten stated, ``I think they [North Korea] already
    have the capability to deploy an intercontinental ballistic missile,
    the question is when will they be able to mate a nuclear weapon to it .
    . . North Korea's going fast; test, fail, test, fail, test, succeed.
    And they're learning and you can see them learning, because that's the
    way you do the rocket business.'' Does the rapid pace of his testing
    worry you, as it worried General Hyten?
        Secretary Mattis. Yes, the pace of North Korea's advance in this
    area is concerning. I take this threat very seriously.
        General Dunford. North Korea's ongoing ICBM and nuclear weapon
    development is aggressive and troubling. Since 2016, North Korea has
    conducted over 34 ballistic missile tests, including the July 4 and 28
    ICBM launches, as well two nuclear tests. This pace of development has
    increased tremendously over previous years, and I expect this pace of
    testing to continue. For this reason, we must continue to apply
    pressure to constrain resources supporting North Korean ICBM and
    nuclear development, and further strengthen our military deterrence and
    defense in conjunction with our allies to halt the pace and reduce the
    threat.

        3. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Mattis and General Dunford, 2 weeks
    ago in response to North Korea's provocations, I introduced the
    Advancing America's Missile Defense Act of 2017 and we already have 14
    bipartisan cosponsors supporting this legislation. In your respective
    personal opinions, do you support increasing the capability and
    capacity of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, including
    increased GBI capacity, space-based sensors, and more missile defense
    testing?
        Secretary Mattis. We continue to expand the Ground-based Missile
    Defense system as reflected in the fiscal year 2018 budget request.
    Additionally, the Department is conducting a Ballistic Missile Defense
    Review that will address the potential need for additional Ground-based
    Interceptors, ground-based and space-based sensors, and testing. It
    would be premature to speculate on the results of that review.
        General Dunford. North Korea has expanded the size and
    sophistication of its ballistic missile forces, from close-range
    ballistic missiles to ICBMs, and has conducted an unprecedented level
    of nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches since 2016, including
    its fourth and fifth nuclear tests and two ICBM tests. Given the threat
    we face today from North Korea, I support the current GMD program of
    record. The ongoing Ballistic Missile Defense Review will further
    inform the department on enhancements that can be made to increase the
    capability and capacity of the GMD system.
                       congressional authorization of war
        4. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Mattis, given the depth of your
    knowledge of military history, would you agree that before authorizing
    any potential pre-emptive action against North Korea--an action that
    could lead to the next war--the President of the United States would
    first have to ask Congress under its ``War Powers'' authority within
    article I, section 8, clause 11 of the U.S. Constitution?
        Secretary Mattis. I understand that opinions of the Department of
    Justice Office of Legal Counsel and historical precedents establish
    that the President has the power to commit U.S. forces abroad as well
    as to take military action for the purpose of protecting important
    national interests even without specific prior authorization from
    Congress. I understand that this independent authority of the President
    derives from the President's unique responsibility as Commander in
    Chief and Chief Executive. This understanding of the Constitution
    should not be mistaken to diminish the importance of the Congress in
    such matters. Particularly in the case of major or prolonged conflicts,
    express congressional authorization is an important demonstration of
    national resolve.
                       russian activity in the high north
        5. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Mattis, what message do you think
    the Russians are trying to send us with their five recent long-range
    aviation flights near American and specifically Alaskan airspace? Are
    they testing our responses?
        Secretary Mattis. The flights did not demonstrate a serious effort
    to test our responses. Russia's repeated flights were likely designed
    to express its displeasure with a series of events that it perceives to
    be against its interests.

        6. Senator Sullivan. General Dunford, when was the last time we've
    seen activity like this? When was the last time they sent Flankers to
    accompany their bombers, and do we know if these their bombers are
    armed?
        General Dunford. [Deleted.]

        7. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Mattis and General Dunford, what are
    the next steps that you think we be taking to respond to Russia's
    continued provocative behavior? What can or should we be doing to
    respond in the Arctic?
        Secretary Mattis. Russia must be held accountable for its
    provocative and destabilizing behavior, including for its alarming
    messages regarding the use of nuclear weapons; treaty violations; the
    use of hybrid warfare tactics to destabilize countries along its
    periphery; and involvement in hacking and information warfare. We will
    counter Russian activities when Russia chooses to act contrary to
    United States interests. The United States should and will continue
    working with our Allies to increase defense spending and to enhance the
    readiness and responsiveness of our forces in the European theater. We
    will also continue to build capacity in those Allied and partner
    nations most susceptible to Russian pressure. In addition to this hard
    power defense capability, countering Russian hybrid tactics requires an
    integrated, whole-of-government effort. Where Russia employs hybrid
    tactics, Russia must face consequences that persuade it that the costs
    of engaging in cyber attacks and malign influence campaigns will be
    greater than the expected benefit. The Department of Defense recognizes
    the need for the utmost diligence in assessing the presence and
    capabilities of foreign military forces in the Arctic, including those
    of Russia. In response to these assessments, the Department will
    regularly review requirements as the threats and conditions in the
    Arctic evolve. The Department of Defense must balance having adequate
    capabilities, capacities, and readiness to execute missions in the
    Arctic against other global requirements. As in other areas where we
    confront complex challenges, the Department is working to leverage the
    capabilities of our allies and partners to complement our own
    capabilities.
        General Dunford. Russia has undertaken a significant effort to
    expand its military capabilities in the Arctic, including rebuilding
    bases and infrastructure in its northern territories, establishing
    Coast Guard facilities, and dedicating military personnel and assets to
    Arctic service. I am not aware of provocative behavior by Russia in
    this region; however, should there be in the future, we are prepared to
    defend the U.S. against any aggression, to include that which might
    originate from the Arctic region. Addressing capability gaps in key
    enablers, particularly command and control, ISR, domain awareness, and
    remote sensing and observing, must remain a priority to ensure our
    ability to conduct Arctic operations.
                 dod strategy for the indo-asia-pacific region
        8. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Mattis, I know that the Department
    is currently flushing out its new strategy for the Indo-Asia-Pacific.
    Can you share some of the details of this new strategy?
        Secretary Mattis. The Department is in the process of drafting a
    National Defense Strategy that will articulate our approach to
    challenges across the globe, as well as the Department's Asia-Pacific
    strategy, in accordance with statutory reporting requirements. Without
    getting ahead of those strategy review processes, I can say that the
    Asia-Pacific is both the primary strategic theater and an area in which
    we have a deep and abiding commitment to reinforcing the rules-based
    international order. As Vice President Pence stated in April, we will
    defend that order ``upon which the region's progress, past, and future
    depends.''

        9. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Mattis, how does this strategy
    differ from the previous Administration? How is it similar?
        Secretary Mattis. Although I do not want to get ahead of the
    National Defense Strategy process that is underway, I can highlight
    some of the key challenges the Department faces in the Asia-Pacific to
    be addressed in the new strategy.
        First, the most urgent and dangerous threat to peace and security
    in the Asia-Pacific is North Korea. In addition to taking further steps
    to protect the Homeland, the United States, in close coordination and
    cooperation with the Republic of Korea and Japan, will increase
    diplomatic and economic pressure until North Korea finally and
    permanently abandons its nuclear and ballistic missile programs.
        Second, although I welcome China's economic development, the United
    States cannot accept Chinese actions that impinge on the interests of
    the international community, undermining the rules-based order. The
    Department will continue to protect the freedom of navigation and
    overflight and other lawful uses of the sea, such as the unimpeded flow
    of lawful commerce, in the vital South China Sea and beyond. The United
    States seeks a constructive, results-oriented relationship with China,
    where we responsibly manage competition and areas where we disagree.
        Third, violent extremist organizations, including fighters
    returning from the Middle East, and local individuals radicalized by
    malicious ideologies, seek to gain ground in Southeast Asia. To address
    this challenge, the Department remains committed to leading the Defeat-
    ISIS Coalition and is conducting other efforts, including partnering
    with countries in the region, such as the Philippines, Singapore,
    Malaysia, and Indonesia to improve information sharing and maritime
    domain awareness.
                        freedom of navigation operations
        10. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Mattis, given the recent freedom of
    navigation operation near Mischief Reef, can this committee safely
    assume that the U.S. will resume routine and regular FONOPs in the
    South China Sea to the point where they are no longer newsworthy?
        Secretary Mattis. Yes.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
                    encroachment on test and training ranges
        11. Senator Nelson. Secretary Mattis and General Dunford,
    encroachment of activities incompatible with military test and training
    operations on our bases and ranges remains a major problem. In 2006
    Congress established the Military Mission Line, prohibiting oil and gas
    activities, and any activities conducted in preparation for oil and gas
    activities, in the Eastern Gulf in order to protect the test and
    training range there. The Department of Defense has said that the
    ``vital importance of maintaining this moratorium cannot be
    overstated.'' Secretary Mattis and General Dunford, how important is it
    to test operations as well as training and readiness to continue to
    prevent this kind of encroachment in the Eastern Gulf Test and Training
    Range?
        Secretary Mattis. The Eastern Gulf of Mexico operating areas and
    warning areas provide a critical national defense complex for advanced
    weapon testing and joint training exercises. The protections provided
    by the Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act of 2006, or similar
    instrument, must remain in order to protect this unique operating
    environment.
        The Department of Defense supports the development of our nation's
    domestic energy resources in a manner that is compatible with military
    training, testing, and operations. In all areas, we work to determine
    if there is an acceptable mitigation strategy to minimize impacts,
    although the test mission in the Eastern Gulf of Mexico does present
    some unique compatibility challenges. The Department is an active
    participant in the new National Outer Continental Shelf Plan
    established by the President's Executive Order of April 28, 2017,
    ``Implementing an America First Offshore Energy Strategy.'' Through
    this new forum we will work with the Department of Interior to ensure
    that our current and future combat capabilities are protected well
    beyond the 2022 expiration of the military mission line.
        General Dunford. The Joint Staff defers to the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense to provide this answer.
                      major range and test facility bases
        12. Senator Nelson. Secretary Mattis and General Dunford, last
    year's National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) expressed my concern
    and the concern of this committee that our Major Range and Test
    Facility Bases are unable to maintain pace technologically with our
    advanced fifth and sixth generation weapons delivery systems and new
    hypersonic systems. Secretary Mattis and General Dunford, how do you
    see high fidelity simulation upgrades at these ranges factoring into
    effective testing of our newest weapons delivery systems and munitions?
        Secretary Mattis. High fidelity simulations are essential to the
    effective testing of our newest weapons delivery systems and munitions.
    The increased capability and complexity of advanced fifth and sixth
    generation weapons and new hypersonic systems under development cannot
    be adequately tested with current test capabilities. Furthermore,
    traditional test methodologies often fail to measure mission
    effectiveness of system-of-systems across an expanded, distributed
    battlespace. High fidelity simulations being developed to test our
    latest air platforms, such as the Joint Simulation Environment, are
    essential to effectively testing our newest weapons delivery systems,
    hypersonic systems, and munitions. Using the Test and Training Enabling
    Architecture, the Joint Mission Environment Test Capability links high
    fidelity simulations with test capabilities at our Major Range and Test
    Facility Base so that advanced weapons systems can be set in a more
    realistic and robust test environment. In an effort to more fully
    leverage the benefits of high fidelity simulations, we are maturing
    technologies to improve multi-level security interoperability;
    streamline our model development, integration, and validation
    processes; and expand the incorporation of cyber effects into these
    complex, distributed test events.
        The Department will continue funding ongoing efforts to: (1)
    identify test and evaluation (T&E) instrumentation requirements; (2)
    develop additional operationally realistic live-virtual-constructive
    modeling and environments; (3) manage spectrum shortfalls; and (4)
    develop additional T&E range capabilities. An ongoing initiative
    includes the development of an enterprise library of common cyber and
    electronic warfare threat capabilities and methodologies. This library
    will improve acquisition program testing for our fifth and sixth
    generation capabilities by ensuring the most current validated threat
    representations are used across the development cycle.
        General Dunford. Secretary Mattis, high fidelity simulation is
    essential to effective testing of new weapons delivery systems and
    munitions to counter near-peer competitors. It is critical that major
    range and test facilities are recapitalized to have emitters, sensors,
    networks, and telemetry capabilities that can provide high fidelity
    simulation of various anti-access area denial environments to properly
    simulate potential wartime scenarios.
                     services support to special operations
        13. Senator Nelson. Secretary Mattis and General Dunford, in your
    testimony, you both referred to some conventional forces with
    specialized missions or increased capabilities as force multipliers for
    special operations forces. The Navy Reserve has one such unit, known as
    HSC-85, which is currently continuously deployed in the PACOM theater
    of operations. HSC-85 provides dedicated rotary wing support to Naval
    Special Warfare and other SOF while deployed as well as in training.
    Their sister squadron, HSC-84, flew alongside the 160th Special
    Operations Aviation Regiment for over ten years in Operation Iraqi
    Freedom, providing support to all levels of special operations in that
    theater before being disestablished by the Navy, arguably before
    complying with the full requirements placed on the Navy as a
    prerequisite to their disestablishment in the fiscal year 2016 NDAA.
    HSC-85 and HSC-84 were previously known as Helicopter Combat Support
    (Special) Squadrons HCS-4 and HCS-5. These squadrons have been
    providing dedicated special operations support since the Vietnam
    conflict when their predecessors Helicopter Attack Squadron (Light)
    HAL-3, HAL-4, and HAL-5 protected our Brown Water Fleet operations
    there. Secretary Mattis and General Dunford, how important is it for
    the individual services to continue to man, train, and equip HSC-85 and
    other force multipliers that provide support to special operations?
        Secretary Mattis. The Department continues to invest in and focus
    on the Asia-Pacific region because of the long-term consequences of
    regional instability, the emerging regional threats, and the long-
    standing U.S. role in ensuring the region's stability. The fiscal year
    2018 budget identified select investments as part of a broader effort
    in rebuilding the military to be more ready, capable, and lethal,
    particularly for forward deterrent forces. This effort included funding
    to support infrastructure investments necessary to station a fifth
    submarine in Guam by fiscal year 2020; procurement of 14 cutting edge
    F/A-18 E/F (Super Hornet) aircraft; procurement of 2 Flight III Burke-
    class destroyers equipped with a new sensor suite to counter the most
    advanced weapons of near-peer competitors; funding of maintenance,
    repair, and modernization of our surge sealift ships; and other,
    targeted investments to improve resiliency; expand and diversify
    munitions; enhance intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
    (ISR), undersea, and long-range strike capabilities; and demonstrate
    other advanced operational capabilities while improving force
    availability for major contingency operations. The Department currently
    is in the process of drafting a National Defense Strategy that will
    inform the fiscal year 2019 budget request, including areas for
    additional investment in capabilities suited to the challenges we face
    in the Asia-Pacific. Future investments will focus on rebuilding our
    military to be more ready, capable, and lethal, particularly our
    forward deterrent forces.
        General Dunford. The U.S. Navy is best suited to provide further
    details addressing your concerns with regards to man, train, and equip
    the HSC-85 and other force multipliers that provide support to SOF.
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Claire McCaskill
                                     qatar
        14. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Mattis and General Dunford, can
    you please outline the national security impact of the recent decision
    by a number of Gulf Cooperation Council members to sever diplomatic
    ties with Qatar from each of your perspectives, both policy and
    military?
        Secretary Mattis. The rift within the Gulf Cooperation Council has
    not affected U.S. military operations in the region. However, the U. S.
    continues to press for a resolution to this conflict. Our common
    security is a top priority, and our Gulf partners, including Qatar,
    play important roles in the region by hosting our forces and providing
    support to the Defeat-Islamic State in Iraq and Syria coalition. United
    States efforts to resolve this crisis are being led by the Department
    of State, with the Department of Defense playing a supporting role.
        General Dunford. The Gulf Dispute concerns us because the U.S.
    considers each primary party to be an important partner in the region.
    The Gulf Dispute has diminished intra-Arab trust and confidence and
    serves to distract GCC members from their collective security. Impacts
    on U.S. military operations have been negligible and the Joint Force
    continues to benefit from access, basing, and overflight permissions
    from the Gulf States. Moreover, we support the Department of State-led
    approach to resolving the dispute, and look forward to continued
    military cooperation in the region.

        15. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Mattis and General Dunford, has
    this decision had any immediate impact on our counter-ISIL campaign?
        Secretary Mattis. The rift within the Gulf Cooperation Council has
    not affected U.S. military operations in the region. U.S. military
    aircraft continue to conduct missions in support of ongoing operations
    in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan. Qatar has also provided additional C-17
    airlift support for Defeat-Islamic State in Iraq and Syria operations
    that was previously deployed in Yemen.
        General Dunford. The diplomatic rift between Qatar and the Gulf
    Cooperation Council (GCC) remains a concern. It has had no immediate
    operational impact on our Defeat ISIS military campaign in Iraq and
    Syria.

        16. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Mattis and General Dunford, do
    either of you foresee any long-term impact on our counter-ISIL
    campaign?
        Secretary Mattis. I do not expect the rift within the Gulf
    Cooperation Council to affect the Defeat-Islamic State in Iraq and
    Syria campaign. However, the coalition is stronger when our partners
    are also working together. I encourage all our partners in the region
    to reduce tensions and work towards common solutions that enable
    regional security.
        General Dunford. If the stalemate continues, there is a greater
    chance of further escalation by Qatar or its neighbors, which could at
    the very least, distract from our long-term Defeat ISIS and
    counterterrorism efforts in the region.

        17. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Mattis, the Defense Security
    Cooperation Agency stated in a November 2016 letter certifying the
    national security rationale for the sale of defense materials to Qatar,
    including the F-15, ``This proposed sale enhances the foreign policy
    and national security of the United States by helping to improve the
    security of a friendly country and strengthening our strategically
    important relationship. Qatar is an important force for political
    stability and economic progress in the Persian Gulf region.'' Does the
    Department still believe that the proposed sale of defense items is in
    the foreign policy and national security interests of the United
    States? If not, please provide the Department's rationale for changing
    this position.
        Secretary Mattis. Qatar is a strong partner in the region and
    provides critical support to the Defeat-Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
    (D-ISIS) campaign. In addition to hosting United States forces, Qatar
    recently contributed eight C-17 aircraft to support D-ISIS operations.
    The sale of F-15 fighter aircraft will continue to increase our
    interoperability and enhance Qatar's capability to join in future
    coalition operations. I recognize that Qatar can improve in certain
    areas, and Qatar is committed to improving its counterterrorism
    efforts. The Department will continue to strengthen our partnership
    with Qatar and work together to enable regional security.
                                   __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
                                saudi arms deal
        18. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Mattis, while in Saudi Arabia
    last month, the President announced a so-called $110 billion arms deal.
    Full details of this deal remain elusive. What is your assessment of
    the Saudi arms deal and its impact on Israel's qualitative military
    edge? Were you consulted?
        Secretary Mattis. The arms deal with Saudi Arabia was designed to
    augment the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's ability to protect its borders
    and counter terrorist threats. The Department was consulted on the deal
    and supports the Department of State's determination that it does not
    adversely affect Israel's qualitative military edge. As it does with
    all sales and exports of defense articles to the Middle East, the
    Department of State conducted a significant review of the capabilities
    to ensure that they do not adversely affect Israel's qualitative
    military edge.

        19. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Mattis, what threats are the
    weapon systems in this deal meant to counter in particular?
        Secretary Mattis. This package provides full-spectrum capabilities
    that fall broadly into five categories: border security and
    counterterrorism; maritime and coastal security; air force
    modernization; air and missile defense; and cybersecurity and
    communications upgrades. The package will significantly augment the
    Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's capabilities to help deter regional threats,
    including the growing conventional and asymmetric threats from Iran,
    and the threat from al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula. This package
    will also enhance the Kingdom's ability to protect its land and
    maritime borders and contribute to coalition counterterrorism
    operations.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Donnelly
                           mental health--sexton act
        20. Senator Donnelly. Secretary Mattis, following up on a question
    I asked during the hearing, section 701 of the fiscal year 2015 NDAA
    includes what we call the Sexton Act requirement, which requires that
    every servicemember--Active, Guard or Reserve--receive a robust,
    person-to-person mental health assessment every year. In the past, the
    Department and Services have testified to this committee that this
    requirement would be fully implemented by October 2017. What is the
    current status of the Department's efforts to move toward full
    implementation of the Sexton Act?
        Secretary Mattis. By September 30, 2017, the annual Department of
    Defense (DOD) Periodic Health Assessment (PHA), which incorporates the
    fiscal year 2015 NDAA section 701 requirements for DOD Mental Health
    Assessment (MHA), will be used to provide mental health assessments for
    all Active Duty Service members. However, since the assessment is web-
    based, there will be a small number of Service members? (Navy Afloat,
    some Marine Corps and Navy Reserve) who do not have access to computers
    and will not be able to implement the DOD PHA until 2018. Additionally,
    due to the need of a contract modification, Guard and Reserve Service
    members who rely on the Reserve Health Readiness Program will not be
    able to implement the DOD PHA until early 2018.

        21. Senator Donnelly. Secretary Mattis, when do you expect the
    Department to issue regulations for the administration of the
    requirements under section 701 of the fiscal year 2015 NDAA?
        Secretary Mattis. The Department of Defense issued the revised DOD
    Instruction 6200.06, ``Periodic Health Assessment (PHA) Program'', on
    September 8, 2016. The revised instruction includes the fiscal year
    2015 NDAA section 701 requirement for Mental Health Assessment. In
    addition, the Defense Health Agency procedural instruction for the new
    requirement was published on May 9, 2017.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie Hirono
                                      dpri
        22. Senator Hirono. Secretary Mattis, as you know I have been
    closely following the Defense Policy Review Initiative and the
    relocation of Marines in the Asia-Pacific region. Between the new
    lawsuit planned by the governor of Okinawa to halt construction of the
    Futenma replacement facility, environmental issues and concerns with
    training ranges proposed for the CNMI, the pathway to accomplishing the
    current plan appears complicated. And this is with the current national
    government in Japan who agrees with the current plan. What is the
    current status on the progress of the established plan?
        Secretary Mattis. In February, President Trump and Japan Prime
    Minister Abe reaffirmed the commitment of both countries to the
    realignment plan, and to the construction of the Futenma Replacement
    Facility (FRF) and the return of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma.
        Even though the Okinawan prefectural government has submitted
    another lawsuit regarding the FRF, the Government of Japan (GoJ) is
    confident that it will prevail again in court, and has in fact not
    halted construction in the face of this lawsuit. The seawall and
    supporting shoreline road are being expanded every day. In Guam, a
    favorable biological opinion on July 19th from the Fish and Wildlife
    Service has opened the door to the potential award of more than $750
    million in construction projects by the end of this calendar year,
    including the foundational $309 million utilities and site improvement
    project for the future Marine Corps Base Guam. Approximately $500
    million of these contracts would come from Japanese-provided funding.
    On August 11, 2017, the U.S. Treasury received $235.8 million for new
    construction and design projects from the GoJ fiscal year 2017 budget.
    The total GoJ contribution to date is more than $1.5 billion of a $3.1
    billion commitment.
        The logic of the relocation, land returns and FRF remains sound. In
    order to retain a politically sustainable force posture for United
    States forces in Japan, especially Okinawa, we must reduce our
    footprint and return land to the GoJ. Because we are relocating some of
    our forces to Guam, relatively close to the current location of the
    Marines in Okinawa, the GoJ is willing to fund a substantial portion of
    the construction cost. This relocation is consistent with our overall
    Pacific posture strategy which is a more geographically distributed,
    operationally resilient, and politically sustainable force posture
    provides the United States, with flexible crisis response options to
    meet a wider range of potential regional contingencies.

        23. Senator Hirono. Secretary Mattis, are we at a point where the
    U.S. should begin to consider alternatives to the current plan to
    ensure that the relocation meets the operational requirements of the
    force?
        Secretary Mattis. President Trump and Prime Minister Abe affirmed
    their commitment to the realignment plan, and I have provided similar
    assurances to my Japanese counterpart. I assess that the plan is
    executable, and my staff will continue to monitor its progress.
                           focus on the asia pacific
        24. Senator Hirono. Secretary Mattis, is the department continues
    to focus our military forces on threats the Asia-Pacific, there are
    clearly new challenges in terms of available resources with many
    worldwide threats and challenges to address. The U.S. focus on the
    Pacific is on strengthening alliances; encouraging a more
    interconnected region and building U.S. military and allied
    capabilities. How does the fiscal year 2018 budget proposal affect the
    military focus on the Pacific region and readiness of our troops in the
    region and are sufficient resources requested in the Fiscal Year 2018
    President's Budget to accomplish these goals?
        Secretary Mattis. The fiscal year 2018 budget request reflects my
    priorities for investments within the Asia-Pacific across a range of
    capabilities, including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance;
    undersea and long-range strike capabilities, and advanced technologies
    to meet evolving regional challenges. The Department is working toward
    the development of an Asia-Pacific Stability Initiative (APSI) to close
    program gaps where United States Pacific Command has unique combat
    capability, capacity, and/or readiness needs. APSI will bolster U.S.
    forces in the region, in part, by improving resiliency, expanding and
    diversifying munitions, and investing in and demonstrating other
    advanced operational capabilities. For the realignment of U.S. forces,
    the fiscal year 2018 budget request includes $262 million in military
    construction funding for the relocation of forces to Guam and $76
    million in military construction funding to support rotational
    initiatives in Australia. Japan is funding $3.1 billion of the
    estimated $8.7 billion cost to realign United States forces from
    Okinawa. The Republic of Korea is sourcing 92 percent of the total
    $10.7 billion cost for relocation of United States forces from Seoul
    and other areas.
        General Dunford. The fiscal year 2018 budget request addresses and
    prioritizes our five strategic challenges (Russia, China, North Korea,
    Iran, and violent extremist organizations) targeting investments in
    capability, capacity, and readiness. This budget includes sufficient
    funding to support our commitments in the Asia-Pacific region. However,
    our competitive advantage is eroding and without adequate and stable
    funding we will be challenged to maintain these commitments.
                                      apsi
        25. Senator Hirono. Secretary Mattis, while at the Shangri La
    Conference you stated that you ``look forward to working with them to
    develop an Asia-Pacific stability initiative that complements the
    ongoing large-scale investment in our budget to improve and reinforce
    the U.S. military's capabilities across the region.'' Chairman McCain
    proposed the Asia Pacific Stability Initiative, which suggested $7.5
    billion in funding for United States forces and their allies in the
    Asia-Pacific. In what areas (geographic and/or functional) would you
    recommend that resources be directed if such an initiative were
    authorized by Congress?
        Secretary Mattis. The Department continues to invest in and focus
    on the Asia-Pacific region because of the long-term consequences of
    regional instability, the emerging regional threats, and the long-
    standing U.S. role in ensuring the region's stability. The fiscal year
    2018 budget identified select investments as part of a broader effort
    in rebuilding our military to be more ready, capable, and lethal,
    particularly for forward deterrent forces. This included funding to
    support infrastructure investments necessary to station a fifth
    submarine in Guam by fiscal year 2020; procurement of 14 cutting edge
    F/A-18 E/F (Super Hornet) aircraft; procurement of 2 Flight III Burke-
    class destroyers equipped with a new sensor suite to counter the most
    advanced weapons of near-peer competitors; funding of maintenance,
    repair, and modernization of our surge sealift ships; and other,
    targeted investments to improve resiliency; expand and diversify
    munitions; enhance intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance,
    undersea, and long-range strike capabilities; and demonstrate other
    advanced operational capabilities while improving force availability
    for major contingency operations. The Department currently is in the
    process of drafting a National Defense Strategy that will inform the
    fiscal year 2019 budget request, including areas for additional
    investment in capabilities suited to the challenges we face in the
    Asia-Pacific. Future investments will focus on rebuilding our military
    to be more ready, capable, and lethal, particularly our forward
    deterrent forces.
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
                           elevation of cyber command
        26. Senator Warren. Secretary Mattis, last year, this committee
    directed the Department of Defense to elevate Cyber Command to a full
    unified command, and gave Cyber Command unique ``Service-like''
    authorities to train and equip. Please provide a status update and
    timeline for the elevation of Cyber Command.
        Secretary Mattis. The decision to elevate U.S. Cyber Command to a
    Unified Combatant Command rests with the President. The Department
    continues to prepare for elevation as directed in fiscal year 2017
    National Defense Authorization Act and is postured to implement
    elevation, should the President decide to do so.

        27. Senator Warren. Secretary Mattis, how will the organization of
    Cyber Command be changed to accomplish the functions that the military
    services currently provide?
        Secretary Mattis. Following a Presidential decision to elevate U.S.
    Cyber Command to a Unified Combatant Command, as the command matures,
    the Department will continue to evaluate opportunities to train and
    equip cyber forces in a more efficient and effective way.

        28. Senator Warren. Secretary Mattis, will additional personnel be
    required, and if so, will those personnel be military or civilian?
        Secretary Mattis. Yes, additional personnel will be required for
    the elevation of U.S. Cyber Command. The Department submitted an
    increase of 111 civilian full time equivalents in its Fiscal Year 2018
    President's Budget request to support the initial elevation of U.S.
    Cyber Command to a full Combatant Command.

        29. Senator Warren. Secretary Mattis, does the Department's fiscal
    year 2018 budget request reflect the elevation of Cyber Command, and if
    so, how?
        Secretary Mattis. The Department has requested $38 million in its
    fiscal year 2018 budget for the initial elevation of U.S. Cyber Command
    to a Unified Combatant Command. The funding will support additional
    manpower requirements for headquarters functions, facilities,
    information technology, and security needs for the new Unified
    Combatant Command.

        30. Senator Warren. Secretary Mattis, will resources for additional
    assigned mission and personnel be taken from Service budgets or does
    the Department intend to request additional funding for Cyber Command?
        Secretary Mattis. The Department continues to assess the best
    approach to fund the new Unified Combatant Command and will establish a
    working group to address issues such as these once the President
    announces his decision on when to elevate the command. In general,
    however, the Department intends to take a resource-neutral approach,
    including by shifting resources as appropriate from U.S. Strategic
    Command.
                targeting military personnel for disinformation
        31. Senator Warren. Secretary Mattis and General Dunford, on June
    12, 2017, Politico reported that the Russians have launched an
    aggressive disinformation and propaganda campaign explicitly targeting
    U.S. military personnel. According to Politico, their methods include
    ``friending servicemembers on Facebook while posing as attractive young
    women to gather intelligence'' and ``targeting the Twitter accounts of
    Defense Department employees with highly customized phishing attacks.''
    Have you seen any evidence to indicate that a Russian disinformation
    campaign is targeting servicemembers?
        Secretary Mattis. Yes, Department counterintelligence organizations
    have identified several instances of such activity directed against
    U.S. and allied personnel.
        General Dunford. Yes, we have. Russia targets both the general
    United States populace, as well as specific segments of society, to
    include military Service members, as part of their information
    operations and influence and disinformation campaigns. The cyberspace
    domain, to include electronic communication and social media, are
    relatively permissible environments for Russian state and state-
    affiliated actors.

        32. Senator Warren. Secretary Mattis and General Dunford, can you
    describe what the Department is doing to educate servicemembers about
    this threat?
        Secretary Mattis. It is Department policy that Counterintelligence
    Awareness and Reporting (CIAR) training on foreign intelligence entity
    threats, methods, reportable information, and reporting procedures
    shall be provided to Department of Defense (DOD) personnel within 30
    days of initial assignment to or employment in a DOD Component, and
    every 12 months thereafter. The Military Department counterintelligence
    organizations are required to assist Department of Defense components
    in establishing a CIAR training program.
        General Dunford. Our counterintelligence officers and analysts
    closely track foreign actors' efforts to target Defense Department and
    military personnel. DOD personnel are trained regularly on
    counterintelligence awareness and reporting. They are also regularly
    briefed on how to employ best operations security practices when using
    the internet and social media.

        33. Senator Warren. Secretary Mattis and General Dunford, have you
    instructed commanders to discuss how to recognize and respond to these
    types of activities with their units?
        Secretary Mattis. Commanders receive Counterintelligence Awareness
    and Reporting (CIAR) training as required by Department policy. All
    Department personnel are required to report contacts, activities,
    indicators, behaviors, and cyber threats associated with foreign
    intelligence entities. Personnel who fail to report such matters may be
    subject to criminal penalties or administrative action.
        General Dunford. Our counterintelligence officers and analysts
    closely track foreign actors' efforts to target Defense Department and
    military personnel. DOD personnel are trained regularly on
    counterintelligence awareness and reporting. They are also regularly
    briefed on how to employ best operations security practices when using
    the internet and social media.
                              rules of engagement
        34. Senator Warren. Secretary Mattis and General Dunford, I am
    concerned about reports that the Administration will no longer publicly
    reveal how many civilian casualties were caused by U.S. forces, but
    will instead provide an aggregate ``coalition'' number. Please describe
    any changes from previous policy in how the Department of Defense
    estimates and reports civilian casualties incurred during U.S.
    operations.
        Secretary Mattis. Reporting on the number of civilian casualties
    resulting from all Coalition strikes, rather than only from strikes by
    U.S. aircraft, is meant to increase transparency of operational matters
    by reporting more and reflecting more accurately the Coalition nature
    of the Combined Joint Task Force--Operation Inherent Resolve mission.
    The Department of Defense (DOD) takes seriously reports that its
    operations have caused civilian casualties, and substantial efforts are
    made to review each report, regardless of the source of the
    information. DOD seeks to investigate each credible report as
    thoroughly as possible, subject to practical limitations. The U.S.
    military takes the greatest care in all theaters of operation to
    mitigate the risk of harm to civilians, and we recognize that
    minimizing civilian casualties furthers mission objectives, helps
    maintain the support of partner governments and vulnerable populations,
    and enhances the legitimacy and sustainability of U.S. operations
    critical to our national security. Not only do we train our forces on
    civilian harm mitigation and continually seek to improve our
    implementation of best practices, we have also developed a robust
    system of investigating credible reports of civilian harm so that we
    can take appropriate steps to address such incidents and draw lessons
    from our operations to further enhance the protection of civilians.
    U.S. Central Command's public reports and releases regarding civilian
    casualty assessments, once completed, can be found at http://
    www.centcom.mil/media/press-releases.
        General Dunford. The Executive Order on Civilian Casualty reporting
    remains in effect-and applicable to the Department of Defense.
    Commander Joint Task Force Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF OIR) is
    responsible for reporting and investigating allegations of civilian
    casualties. Since CJTF-OIR assumed responsibility from U.S. Central
    Command for this task (in October 2016) press releases referred to
    ``Coalition'' air strikes, although, in reality, the information only
    related to strikes from U.S. aircraft. In order to increase
    transparency of operational matters, from May 2017, reporting of
    civilian casualties from ``Coalition'' strikes now accurately reflects
    the Coalition nature of Operation Inherent Resolve. OIR targeting and
    strike processes are not run by a single nation. While aircraft from
    numerous countries may take part in a single strike, another nation may
    be involved in the target development, and another nation in the target
    approval. We fight as a coalition and it would be impossible to say
    only one nation was responsible for an effort that takes a team to
    execute. The Department's decision to report civilian casualties using
    an aggregate ``coalition'' number is borne of the complexities in this
    modern battlespace, and reflects the high degree of importance that our
    coalition partners and allies place on their own conduct, as well as
    the high standards to which DOD holds itself. We take civilian
    casualties seriously and continue to go to extraordinary lengths to
    avoid all unintentional loss of civilian life. No force in the history
    of warfare has been as precise.

        35. Senator Warren. Secretary Mattis and General Dunford, have the
    rules of engagement for U.S. forces operating in areas of hostilities
    changed in any way from the previous Administration? If so, please
    describe these changes.
        Secretary Mattis. Since assuming office, I have not issued any
    changes to the rules of engagement. I do not anticipate any changes to
    the rules of engagement for U.S. forces that would change the
    extraordinary efforts we take to reduce the risk of harm to civilians
    in our operations, including acting in accordance with the law of war.
    The Department will keep Congress fully informed on these matters.
        General Dunford. The Rules of Engagement for U.S. forces operating
    in areas of hostilities have not changed in any way since
    Administration turnover.

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2018 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, JUNE 15, 2017

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                                  NAVY POSTURE

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m. in Room
    SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee Members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Wicker,
    Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Perdue, Cruz,
    Strange, Reed, McCaskill, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal,
    Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, and Peters.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman McCain. Good morning.
        The committee meets today to receive testimony on the plans
    and programs of the Department of the Navy for fiscal year
    2018.
        I want to thank each of our witnesses for their
    distinguished service to the Nation, as well as the sailors,
    marines, and civilians they lead who are serving around the
    world today.
        In recent months, our Nation's senior civilian defense and
    military leaders have testified to this committee about the
    severe threats we face around the world. They have reported
    shortfalls in readiness, that our military advantage over our
    potential adversaries is eroding, and the dire need for new,
    modern capabilities.
        And yet, as Secretary Mattis testified here on Tuesday, the
    greatest immediate threat that our military faces is right here
    in Washington: fiscal uncertainty, continuing resolutions,
    arbitrary and inadequate caps on defense spending, 4 more years
    of the Budget Control Act (BCA), and the threat of
    sequestration.
        We desperately need a new approach. Unfortunately, the
    Administration's fiscal year 2018 budget request is
    insufficient to meet the challenges we face, rebuild the
    readiness and capacity of our force, and regain our military
    technological advantage. It is no wonder then that the
    Department of the Navy submitted over $8 billion in unfunded
    priorities.
        Our Navy has been too small for more than a decade. Despite
    a requirement for more than 300 ships since 2006, the fleet has
    remained between 270 and 290 ships. These capacity shortfalls
    have largely driven present readiness challenges. Ten-month
    deployments are becoming the norm when it used to be six.
    Carrier strike group presence gaps in key regions are annual
    occurrences. More than half of Navy F-18s are not ready for
    combat. There is a backlog of more than $14 billion in afloat
    and ashore readiness.
        A Navy of 355 ships, with the right mix capabilities, is an
    appropriate goal. But this budget request makes no progress
    toward it. However, steps can be taken this year to grow the
    fleet, and this committee will consider all options.
        Similarly, this budget request only supports a Marine Corps
    of 185,000 marines and 31 amphibious ships, despite a
    requirement for 194,000 marines and 38 amphibious ships.
    Meanwhile, Marine Corps aviation is in crisis. Fewer than half
    of Marine F-18s are ready for combat. As a result, non-deployed
    Marine aviation squadrons are short of the number of aircraft
    needed to train or respond in a crisis.
        The budget request will help the Navy and Marine Corps to
    stanch the bleeding, but we can and must do better than that.
    We need to expand and modernize our maritime forces because our
    adversaries are not standing still. Indeed, as Chairman Dunford
    testified on Tuesday, ``The competitive advantage that the
    United States military has long enjoyed is eroding. In just a
    few years, if we do not change trajectory, we will lose our
    qualitative and quantitative advantage.''
        Our Navy and Marine Corps must be sufficiently sized and
    capable of projecting greater power over greater distances from
    the air, the sea, and beneath it. We need new concepts of
    operations and new programs that enable them. In particular,
    the Navy needs a carrier airwing with greater range and
    striking power, especially through unmanned platforms. And I
    continue to urge the Department of the Navy to examine how
    smaller aircraft carriers could improve current plans for super
    carriers and amphibious ships and provide a more capable,
    credible maritime force.
        At the same time, as we advocate for increased defense
    spending, all of us must remain equally committed to exercising
    rigorous oversight of acquisition programs to ensure the best
    use of limited taxpayer dollars. I assure you this committee
    will.
        Initial cost overruns more than doubled the cost of each
    littoral combat ship (LCS). Development costs for the ships and
    their modules now exceed $6 billion, and they keep rising.
    Meanwhile, key warfighting capabilities of the LCS, including
    mine countermeasures and antisubmarine warfare, have fallen
    years--I repeat--years--behind schedule and remain unproven.
    Because of long-running cost, schedule, and performance issues
    with this program, I support the Department's proposal to
    pursue, as quickly as possible, full competition in selecting a
    new frigate with greater lethality and survivability. The Navy
    should procure the minimum number of LCSs necessary to keep the
    workforce viable to compete for new frigates. Secretary
    Stackley has testified that would be one LCS in fiscal year
    2018, not more. I want to emphasize, Secretary Stackley
    testified that would be one LCS in fiscal year 2018, not more.
        On the Ford-class aircraft carrier, while it is encouraging
    to see the ship finally delivered to the Navy, the request for
    the Gerald R. Ford, or CVN-78, exceeds the cost cap by $20
    million. In addition, the Navy wants to award the construction
    contract for the third ship, the Enterprise, or CVN-80, in
    March 2018 at a cost of $13 billion, which is $1.6 billion more
    than the previous ship. This is unacceptable for a ship
    certified to be a repeat design that will deliver just 3 years
    later. Secretary Stackley and Admiral Richardson, I would like
    an explanation.
        Similarly, given the importance of replacing our aging
    Marine Corps amphibious vehicle and aircraft fleets, the Marine
    Corps must learn the lesson of past failures, such as the
    expeditionary fighting vehicle, and deliver these needed
    capabilities on time, at cost, and up to expectations.
        Some of the greatest threats and challenges of the future
    will be in the maritime domain, so it is important for this
    committee to ensure that our Navy and Marine Corps are not only
    ready for today's fight but also developing the capabilities
    for tomorrow's fights. This budget request is a start, but I am
    afraid it is not enough.
        We should not ask our military to choose between readiness
    and modernization, between present needs and future needs. We
    owe our sailors and marines and all of our men and women in
    uniform more than that, a lot more. They serve and fight and
    sacrifice for us every single day. Let us do no less for them.
        Senator Reed?

                     STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
    want to join Senator McCain in welcoming Secretary Stackley,
    Admiral Richardson, and General Neller to the committee this
    morning to testify on the plans and programs of the Department
    of the Navy for fiscal year 2018. We are grateful to all of
    your service and particularly grateful to the men and women who
    you lead, and please express our consideration and thanks to
    them.
        I especially want to thank Secretary Stackley for his many
    years of service to the country, both in the Navy and on this
    committee. This may be your last appearance as Secretary. Thank
    you very much for a job well done.
        Chairman McCain. I am sure this is a sad moment for
    Secretary Stackley.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Reed. He was very upbeat when speaking before. But
    thank you again, Mr. Secretary.
        Our witnesses face significant challenges as they strive to
    balance the need to support ongoing operations and sustain
    readiness with the need to modernize and keep the technological
    edge so critical to military success.
        The Department of the Navy faces serious readiness
    problems, caused by deferred maintenance, reduced steaming and
    flying hours, and canceled training and deployments. The
    continued emphasis on readiness in this year's budget will
    address some of the Navy's most serious readiness problems, and
    I am interested in hearing the witnesses' views on this matter.
        I am also interested in understanding what, if anything,
    the Navy is doing to accelerate overhaul of the USS Boise, an
    attack submarine that is prevented from operating because her
    diving certifications have expired. That is one blatant example
    of the readiness challenges that you face. The current plan
    would fail to get this boat recertified until sometime in 2019.
        All areas of our naval forces are maintaining an extremely
    high operational tempo. This high level operations tempo
    contributed in part to the conclusion in the Chief of Naval
    Operations (CNO) new force structure assessment calling for
    increases in the goal for the Navy fleet from 308 ships to a
    level of 355 ships.
        Demand is overwhelming for attack submarines, air and
    missile defense cruisers, destroyers, and strike fighter
    inventories. In addition, the Navy is now in its 5th year of
    operating with fewer than the required 11 aircraft carriers.
    And during the next decade, as a first priority, the Navy will
    need to buy a new class of strategic missile submarines to
    replace the Ohio-class submarines. I am interested in hearing
    how the Navy is managing current demands on its assets and how
    it plans to manage future modernization demands, particularly
    how it is using the National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund as we
    begin procurement funding of the Ohio replacement, the now
    Columbia-class program, as we begin that this year.
        Commandant of the Marine Corps General Robert Neller has
    stated that the ``recapitalization of our force is essential to
    our future readiness with investments in ground combat
    vehicles, aviation, command and control, and digitally
    interoperable protected networks.'' The Marine Corps continues
    to make modernization of ground vehicles a priority by
    developing the amphibious combat vehicle to replace the aging
    inventory of amphibious assault vehicles, as well as partnering
    with the Army to develop the joint light tactical vehicle. I
    would welcome an update from our witnesses on the status of
    these programs and if they believe there will be significant
    delays in fielding due to delays in the acquisition program.
        The Department of the Navy budget has its usual number of
    significant programs, some of which have issues with their
    execution. The chairman has pointed out in detail many of
    those. Last year, I raised the issue of the Navy submitting a
    budget that would leave the Navy in default on the multiyear V-
    22 tilt-rotor aircraft contract, a problem that was solved for
    you when the fiscal year 2017 DOD [Department of Defense]
    Appropriations Act provided three additional aircraft. This
    year, the Navy is asking for approval of a 7-year multiyear
    contract for the same V-22 program. I would like to hear why we
    should depart from the normal 5-year multiyear contract regimen
    as established in title 10 of the United States Code and why we
    should count on the Department of the Navy to pay more
    attention to living up to the terms of multiyear contracts than
    was the case last year.
        The Defense Department's defense strategic guidance, issued
    in January 2012, followed by the 2014 QDR [Quadrennial Defense
    Review], announced a renewed strategy for U.S. military
    orientation on the Asia-Pacific. Consistent with that strategy,
    the Defense Department has been working to realign U.S.
    military forces in South Korea and Okinawa and plans to
    position Navy and Marine Corps forces in Australia, Singapore,
    and possibly elsewhere in the region. I am interested in
    hearing how the Navy is implementing these strategic decisions.
        In this request, the Administration is asking for an
    increase in the Department of Defense (DOD) topline of roughly
    $54 billion above total budget for fiscal year 2018 prescribed
    in the Budget Control Act. Of that total, the Navy budget would
    constitute an increase of roughly $12 billion. However, I must
    point out that unless Congress can achieve a broad and
    bipartisan agreement to repeal or modify the BCA, any approval
    of the $12 billion increase for the Department of the Navy will
    trigger sequestration of a similar amount.
        The President's Budget addressed the issue by making cuts
    of roughly $54 billion non-defense discretionary as a way of
    balancing the increases for defense which, from my perspective,
    is an untenable position. In fact, it will not accomplish that
    unless the BCA is modified because you will forfeit what you
    are given even in a more confusing and disorienting way. So we
    must find another way.
        I thank the witnesses and I look forward to their
    testimony.
        Chairman McCain. Thank you.
        Welcome to the witnesses. Mr. Stackley, we will begin with
    you. Welcome back.

     STATEMENT OF HONORABLE SEAN J. STACKLEY, ACTING SECRETARY OF
                                THE NAVY

        Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
    distinguished Members of the committee. Thank you for the
    opportunity to appear before you today with the CNO and the
    Commandant to testify on the Department of the Navy's 2018
    budget request.
        We are extremely grateful for your committee's continued
    strong support for our Navy and Marine Corps, and we look
    forward to working closely with you on this budget request.
        As the Nation's forward global force, your Navy and Marine
    Corps stand ready to respond to crisis every hour of every day
    around the world from the North Atlantic to the Mediterranean,
    from the Straits of Hormuz to the Straits of Malacca and the
    vast expanses of the Pacific Ocean and on the ground in 41
    countries around the world. One hundred ten thousand sailors
    and marines and more than one-third of our fleet are deployed
    today conducting combat operations, international exercises,
    maintaining maritime security, providing strategic deterrence,
    and responding to humanitarian crisis and disaster.
        The value of our forward presence and our ability to
    conduct prompt sea-based operations is the surest deterrent to
    conflict and guarantor of our national interests. Maintaining
    the skill of these operations relies upon our ability to
    maintain a high state of operational readiness. And we have
    been increasingly challenged to do so by the growing imbalance
    between the size of the force, the operational demand placed on
    the force, and the funding available to operate and sustain the
    force. Years of combat and high operational tempo have
    accelerated the aging of our ships and aircraft, increased our
    maintenance requirements, drawn down munitions and supply
    parts, and impacted training. Budget constraints, budget
    uncertainty, and continuing resolutions have exacerbated these
    issues with the net impact being a decline in the material
    condition of our ships and aircraft. Accordingly, our priority
    in this budget request has been placed on funding maintenance,
    spares, training, and munitions and to increase steaming days
    and flying hours.
        It is critical that we make these course corrections
    without turning to our modernization and procurement accounts
    as bill payers. For maintaining our readiness, we will
    ultimately rely upon growing the force to match the challenges
    that lie ahead. So building readiness is the priority in 2018
    and building the size of the Navy and Marine Corps and the
    capability that the Nation needs will be the priority in the
    defense strategy review and our 2019 budget.
        With this budget, the Department requests your support to
    procure nine ships in 2018: the aircraft carrier Enterprise,
    two Virginia-class submarines, two Arleigh Burke-class
    destroyers, two littoral combat ships, one of which is to
    follow an amended budget proposal, a fleet oiler, and a towing,
    salvage, and rescue ship.
        The budget request also includes advanced procurement
    critical to the Navy's top shipbuilding priority, the Columbia-
    class ballistic missile submarine program.
        We are committed to improving our cost on the carrier
    program while delivering this critical capability for the
    future Navy. We have held costs essentially constant on the
    CVN-78 the past 6 years, and have made significant reductions
    on CVN-79 currently in construction. We are committed to
    further improvements upon the estimated costs on the
    Enterprise, CVN-80, submitted in this year's budget.
        We are seeking your support to continue with the multiyear
    procurement strategies that have yielded substantial savings
    and provided critical stability to the highly successful
    Virginia submarine and Arleigh Burke destroyer programs.
        And we are seeking your support as we transition from the
    littoral combat ship to a frigate design that will provide
    multi-mission capability and increased survivability for our
    small surface combatant program. The three littoral combat
    ships appropriated in 2017 with the additional ships we are
    requesting this year help fill our gap with small surface
    combatants and ensure a healthy industrial base for a
    competitive frigate down-select in 2020.
        The budget request continues the steady recapitalization of
    Navy and Marine Corps aviation capability. In total, we plan to
    procure 91 manned and unmanned aircraft as we shift from large-
    scale developmental efforts to mature production for most of
    our major Navy aviation programs.
        Of particular note, the budget request includes funding for
    24 F-35 and 14 Super Hornet aircraft which will help to arrest
    the decline in our strike fighter inventory while keeping us on
    target for six squadrons of fifth generation aircraft from our
    carrier decks in the 2024 time frame.
        We are requesting congressional approval for a third B-22
    multiyear procurement in 2018, which will provide the most
    affordable method to procure the final 65 aircraft of the
    program.
        This budget supports an end strength of 185,000 marines,
    the proper size for today's mission. The Marine Corps invested
    in selected ground capabilities to conduct sustained
    distributed operations and address changes in the operational
    environment, including procurement of the amphibious combat
    vehicle, a replacement of about one-third of the legacy Humvee
    fleet with a joint light tactical vehicle, and survivability
    upgrades to the amphibious assault vehicle.
        No quantity of next generation ships or aircraft will bring
    victory without the skilled, dedicated, and talented sailors,
    marines, and civilians who build, maintain, and operate our
    Navy and Marine Corps and who provide our naval forces with our
    asymmetric advantage. Despite 16 years of combat operations,
    extended deployments, and reserve mobilizations, today's force
    is the most talented and high-performing in history.
        In return, it is our responsibility to provide the
    incentives to attract and the conditions to ensure all who are
    qualified to serve in the Navy and Marine Corps can do so while
    creating a review that promotes dignity and respect for all.
    This remains a top priority for the Department.
        Our priority in this year's budget request is to rebuild
    the readiness and lay the foundation for future growth in terms
    of numbers of ships and aircraft and advanced capability of the
    force.
        To support these objectives, we will need to make certain
    reforms to the way we do business to ensure that we are being
    the best stewards possible with the taxpayers' funds. However,
    we will also need your support in breaking the cycle of
    continuing resolutions and in providing the increase, outlined
    and detailed by the President's Budget request, to the defense
    caps imposed by the Budget Control Act. Absent decisive action
    by Congress to cut the Gordian knot we know as the BCA, our
    military's ability to provide for the Nation's defense will
    decline by every dimension you choose to measure.
        I want to thank this committee for your enduring support to
    our sailors, marines, civilians, and their families, and I look
    forward to answering your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Stackley follows:]

                Prepared Statement by Honorable Sean J. Stackley
                                i. introduction
        Mr. Chairman, distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for
    the opportunity to appear before you today to testify regarding the
    Department of the Navy's 2018 President's Budget request.
        Having the opportunity to serve our sailors, marines, and
    civilians--a force of over 800,000 strong--as the Acting Secretary of
    the Navy is an extraordinary privilege that brings with it
    extraordinary responsibility. The Members of this Committee understand
    with full recognition the quality and dedication of our men and women
    in uniform who willingly put their Nation before themselves; who stand
    ready to respond to crisis every hour, every day, around the world; and
    who willfully sacrifice their livelihood and, if need be, their very
    life so that we here in America may enjoy the freedoms we cherish so
    deeply. The dedication, professionalism, unwavering commitment to duty,
    and sacrifice shown by our sailors and marines and their families, and
    the corps of professional civilians who support them, is the foundation
    upon which our national security is built.
        As the Nation's forward global force, the men and women of your
    Navy and Marine Corps are fully deployed, continuously present afloat
    and ashore, promoting and protecting the national interests of the
    United States. If called, they are prepared to ``fight tonight'' and
    win. But, by operating forward, by maintaining a high state of
    readiness, by participating in international exercises and providing
    assurance to our partners and allies, by securing the maritime and
    ensuring access to the global commons, by performing the full spectrum
    of missions assigned--from humanitarian assistance to strategic
    deterrence--our greater objective is to dissuade our adversaries and
    ultimately, to deter potential conflict. To this end, the Navy and
    Marine Corps operate as part of the larger Joint Force, uniquely
    providing the sovereignty and persistence of a sea-based force able to
    operate wherever the waters reach and able to rapidly maneuver ashore
    as an expeditionary force with air and ground support. It is this
    ability to operate independently for sustained periods that places
    naval forces in such a high demand that combatant commanders' peacetime
    requests for naval forces exceed the capacity of the currently sized
    force. Careful management of our training, maintenance, and deployment
    cycles, however, has ensured our presence and our readiness to meet the
    Nation's highest priority demands as directed by the Secretary of
    Defense.
                            ii. operational overview
        In the past year, from Norway to the Baltic, from the Black Sea to
    the Mediterranean, from the Horn of Africa to the Arabian Gulf, from
    the west coast of Africa to the straits of Malacca, from the Philippine
    Sea to the Sea of Japan, to the coasts of the Americas, and on the
    ground in 37 countries around the world, on any given day greater than
    100,000 sailors and marines have been continually deployed, operating
    multiple carrier-strike groups, amphibious ready groups, Marine
    Expeditionary Units, squadrons, submarines, and battle staffs. Our
    presence in regions of interest around the world demonstrates U.S.
    commitment to these regions, strengthens our alliances and
    partnerships, and ensures our readiness to respond to any provocation.
        We are a nation at war and the value of our forward presence and of
    our ability to conduct prompt, offensive sea-based operations is
    exercised every day. Throughout the course of the past year, greater
    than 2,000 strike sorties flown from the decks of the Dwight D.
    Eisenhower (CVN 69) and George H.W. Bush (CVN 77), along with
    electronic warfare support from Marine Corps squadrons based at
    Incirlik Air Base, have supported Operation Inherent Resolve in the
    fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). More
    recently, upon the presidential order to respond to Syria's use of
    chemical weapons, USS Ross (DDG 71) and USS Porter (DDG 78) were
    present and ready to strike with their complement of Tomahawk missiles.
    While present forward in 5th and 6th Fleets aboard Makin Island and
    Bataan Amphibious Ready Groups, marines from the 11th and 24th MEUs
    [Marine expeditionary units], deployed ashore to provide time critical
    artillery and security support in Northern Syria. Marines from II MEF
    [Marine expeditionary force] established Task Force Southwest in
    Helmand Province to assist our Afghan partners in retaining control of
    that contested area. Meanwhile, our Navy SEALS [sea, air, and land],
    Marine Corps Special Operating Forces, and supporting expeditionary
    elements continue to execute counter-terrorism operations in support of
    our theater special operations commands.
        Concurrent with the high tempo of combat operations, we continue
    our heavy engagement in the conduct of international naval exercises
    and training. In June 2016; 6th Fleet units completed Exercise BALTOPS,
    a high-end joint exercise, demonstrating American and NATO [North
    Atlantic Treaty Organization] resolve in the Baltic Sea region. The
    following month, the U.S. Navy joined with our NATO, Baltic and Black
    Sea partners for the 15th iteration of Exercise Sea Breeze. In the
    following months, in the Arctic, our Marines participated in the
    Norwegian-hosted exercise Cold Response, testing warfighting skills in
    a cold weather environment. Currently, Marines are conducting the Sabre
    Strike 2017 exercise throughout the Baltic region and Poland with our
    NATO allies. In the Straits of Hormuz, 5th Fleet conducted its
    international MCMEX [mine counter mine sercurity exercise] with 30
    international partners to hone our skills and demonstrate our resolve
    to ensure freedom of navigation. Half the world away, in the Pacific
    region, the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps participated in 69 international
    exercises to strengthen our partnerships and demonstrate our
    commitment. The 25th anniversary of the Rim of the Pacific Exercise
    (RIMPAC) brought together 26 maritime nations, including China, along
    with 40 ships and submarines, over 200 aircraft, and 25,000 personnel
    for the largest international maritime exercise in the world. Seventh
    Fleet units operating alongside our Japanese and Indian partners
    conducted the trilateral Exercise Malabar in the Philippine Sea focused
    on anti-submarine warfare and search-and-rescue capabilities. In
    Thailand the Navy and Marine Corps participated in the major
    multilateral exercise Cobra Gold and in Korea we participated in
    Exercises Foal Eagle and Keen Resolve with our South Korean allies,
    showing steadfastness in the face of North Korean provocations. We
    conducted multiple Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT)
    engagements with countries ranging from Singapore to Brunei. On May 30,
    Pacific Partnership 2017 concluded in Nha Trang, Vietnam. In addition
    to Vietnam, Pacific Partnership 2017 conducted mission stops in Sri
    Lanka and Malaysia and was the first such mission completed solely
    utilizing an expeditionary fast transport vessel (T-EPF). This small
    sampling of our international engagements is enabled by a robust
    forward presence across the globe.
        The foundation of our naval forces' credibility as reliable
    partners and as an effective deterrent is our forward presence. From
    the vast expanses of the Pacific, to the restricted waters of the
    Arabian Gulf, to the Caribbean, the North Atlantic, the Mediterranean,
    and the Gulf of Aden, we are on watch around the clock.
        Our permanent forward presence in the Mediterranean has
    strengthened with the homeporting of four Aegis Ballistic Missile
    Defense Destroyers in Rota, Spain, and with achieving initial
    operational capability of the United States AEGIS Ashore Missile
    Defense System in Romania in 2016.
        The Marine Corps Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force--
    Crisis Response, based in Moron, Spain, provides regional capabilities
    to instantly respond to crises ranging from non-combatant evacuation,
    to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, to combat operations.
        With its permanently stationed patrol craft, mine countermeasures
    ships and rotating combat forces, the United States 5th Fleet, from its
    headquarters in Bahrain, provides a clear signal of the American
    commitment to the region. Our leadership and participation in the
    Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) in the Indian Ocean, together with 31 of
    our partner nations, promotes maritime security, helps defeat
    terrorism, and combats piracy in the Arabian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, Gulf
    of Aden, and the Red Sea.
        The value of our presence is not limited to the Indian Ocean. In
    2016, a United States-led naval training maneuver in the vicinity of
    the Gulf of Guinea transformed into a counter-piracy mission where
    navies from the United States, Ghana, Sao Tome and Principe, Togo, and
    Nigeria tracked a hijacked tanker through the waters of five countries
    and successfully freed the vessel and rescued the hostages.
        Permanently present on the east coast of Africa, United States
    naval forces command and operate the United States sole forward
    operating base on that continent, Camp Lemonnier. In support of
    Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa and working closely with our
    African partners, our presence improves cooperation among regional
    maritime forces, builds maritime law enforcement capacity and
    capability, and strengthens maritime domain awareness in order to
    constrict operating space for maritime crime and piracy.
        The Navy and Marine Corps maintain a consistent presence across the
    vast expansiveness of the Pacific and Indian Oceans, the world's most
    rapidly growing, dynamic, and increasingly important region. With
    forces permanently stationed in Hawaii, Guam, Korea, Singapore, and
    Japan and deployed from our east and west coasts, our commitment to
    this potentially volatile region continues to strengthen. In early
    2017, the Marine Corps relocated the first operational squadron of F-
    35Bs to Iwakuni, Japan from Yuma, Arizona and increased the capability
    of its rotational aviation combat element in Darwin, Australia with
    four MV-22 Ospreys. The Marine Corps continues its realignment of
    forces across the Western Pacific to enhance our deterrent posture
    while simultaneously reducing the footprint of United States bases in
    Okinawa. With our permanent stationing of 35 ships, 38,000 sailors, and
    24,000 marines in the Western Pacific to include a Carrier Strike Group
    centered on USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76), the 31st Marine Expeditionary
    Unit and an amphibious ready group (ARG) centered on USS Bonhomme
    Richard (LHD 6); combined with a robust rotational deployment of
    carrier strike groups, amphibious ready groups, surface combatants,
    submarines, aircraft, and supporting forces, our commitment to the
    stability and security of the Asia-Pacific region is clear to all who
    would question it.
        In our own backyard, U.S. Navy surface, air, and shore-based assets
    are forward and present throughout the western hemisphere. Under
    Operation Martillo, our Cyclone-class patrol coastal ships USS Zephyr
    and USS Shamal, with embarked U.S. Coast Guard law enforcement
    detachments, seized over 5,000 kilograms of contraband in interdiction
    operations in 2016. USNS Spearhead recently concluded Continuing
    Promise 2017, visiting Guatemala, Honduras, and Colombia to conduct
    civil-military operations including humanitarian assistance, training
    engagements, and medical, dental, and veterinary support. Last October,
    in response to Hurricane Matthew and at the request of the U.S. Agency
    for International Development, 100 marines from Special Purpose Marine
    Air Ground Task Force--Southern Command, USS Iwo Jima, USS Mesa Verde,
    and elements of the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit provided
    humanitarian assistance/disaster relief to the people of Haiti.
        These are but a few examples of the daily operations of our sailors
    and marines. Forward deployed and ready, our naval forces project our
    national values through their frequent international engagements and
    humanitarian assistance or disaster relief operations, and protect our
    national interests through their mobility, agility, and combat power.
                            iii. building readiness
        Maintaining the readiness of our naval forces is key to maintaining
    the scope and scale of operations demanded of them. We have been
    increasingly challenged in our ability to do so, however, by the
    growing imbalance between the size of the force, the operational demand
    placed on the force, and the funding available to operate and sustain
    the force. Since 2001, about 100 ships have routinely been deployed
    each day in response to operational requirements. During this same
    period, the size of the battle force has drawn down by 14 percent,
    resulting in a steady increase to deployment lengths and the
    operational tempo of the force. Schedules for training and maintenance
    have been compressed as a result. Years of high flying hour operations
    have accelerated the aging of our airframes, increased our maintenance
    requirements, drawn down available supply parts, broken the
    engineering-material-maintainers `line of balance,' and increasingly
    impacted availability of aircraft for training and surge operations.
    Budget constraints, budget uncertainty, and Continuing Resolutions have
    exacerbated these issues that stretch from the flight line to the gun
    line to our depots. Each of these factors has placed added strain on
    our ships, aircraft, tactical vehicles, and the sailors and marines who
    deploy with them.
        The budget environment throughout this period has increased the
    challenges to our sailors' and marines' ability to perform their
    mission. Since passage of the Budget Control Act, in particular, our
    increased operational tempo has been met with a decreasing budget, when
    measured in constant dollars. The net impact of this increased
    operational tempo under the pressures of a reduced budget has been a
    decline in the material condition of our ships and aircraft and
    training of our sailors and marines. In order to meet our immediate
    commitments, we have placed priority on ensuring the readiness of our
    deployed forces and our `next to deploy' forces, but we are
    increasingly challenged to meet future deployment commitments or to
    surge forces in time of need due to the steady erosion to readiness of
    the Total Force that has occurred during this period.
        Reversing this trend requires that we first rebuild the warfighting
    readiness of the current force. Accordingly, our priority in the fiscal
    year 2017 budget, including the Request for Additional Appropriations,
    and in the fiscal year 2018 budget request is to fully fund our
    maintenance and training accounts. We must do this, however, without
    turning to our modernization and procurement accounts as the `bill
    payer,' for maintaining our readiness in the long term will require
    that we grow the force in terms of capacity and lethality to match the
    demands that are placed upon it.
        The fiscal year 2018 budget request funds ship operations and ship
    depot maintenance to 100 percent of the forecast requirement to rebuild
    our readiness at the unit level. Equivalent measures are being taken to
    fund flying hours and aviation depot maintenance to rebuild aviation
    readiness.
        Funding for spare parts has been increased to reduce logistic delay
    time and ultimately to increase steaming days and flying hours. The
    planning, engineering, and maintenance support manpower at the naval
    shipyards and aviation depots has been increased in order to align the
    workforce to the projected workload. Major shipyard equipment and IT
    infrastructure is being modernized at a rate above benchmarks to
    improve workforce performance, execute maintenance more efficiently,
    and reduce work stoppages. When and where needed, we are leveraging the
    skill sets and capacity of private industry to augment our efforts.
    These investments in people, the industrial plant, and the industrial
    base are critical to improving shipyard and aviation depot throughput
    and capacity and, more importantly, to increasing the operational
    availability of our highest demand assets--our nuclear aircraft
    carriers and submarines and tactical aircraft. It is important to note,
    however, the effects of multiple years of insufficient resources cannot
    be corrected in one budget year; the Department will require stable,
    predictable funding over multiple years to achieve sustained positive
    results.
        Looking forward, we're working closely with industry on our most
    critical ship modernization and aviation programs to improve
    reliability in the near term (therefore reducing maintenance
    requirements) and to invest in planning, engineering, material, and
    facilities in support of long term maintenance and modernization
    requirements.
        Investment in ship maintenance contributes to growing the fleet in
    addition to enhancing current readiness. Ensuring each ship in our
    inventory reaches its expected service life with the possibility of
    extended service allows the Navy to grow more rapidly. The Navy is
    embarking on a detailed study of how this might be accomplished and
    where investment should be prioritized. Employment of this maintenance
    strategy does not alleviate the need for a robust shipbuilding account.
    These ships will eventually have to be retired and replaced. As
    responsible stewards of our taxpayers' dollars we believe this approach
    will allow us to grow the fleet at a faster, more economical rate.
        Alongside our depots, our operational installations are a major
    component of the Department's readiness requirements. Navy and Marine
    Corps installations provide physical environments essential for
    individual, unit, and Total Force training; force deployment; materiel
    sustainment; unit recovery; and equipment reconstitution. Fiscal year
    2018 funded the requirement for Department of the Navy facility
    sustainment nearly 10 percent above 2017 funding levels. Within this
    funding level, we are careful to preserve critical facility components
    and to perform facility maintenance that affects the health and safety
    of sailors, marines, and their families. However, we continue to carry
    risk in facility sustainment and will need to closely monitor and
    manage the material condition of our many facilities. Over and above
    facility sustainment, military construction also increased by about 10
    percent in fiscal year 2018, with priority placed on these capital
    investment projects that will preclude mission failure, increase
    facility optimization, and sustain critical power, cyber-security, and
    utility capacity.
        The Department of the Navy (DON) fully supports the Department of
    Defense request for authorization to conduct a Base Realignment and
    Closure (BRAC) round in 2021. Enduring savings from BRAC
    recommendations will leave more DOD resources available for future
    force structure or readiness requirements. Although Navy and Marine
    Corps infrastructure capacity is about right, completing the more
    detailed analysis once a BRAC is authorized will have value, and may
    highlight opportunities for some savings.
                             iv. building the force
        The naval force is confronting new challenges in the 21st Century.
    The United States is facing a return to great power competition, as
    Russia and China demonstrate both the advanced capabilities and the
    desire to act as global powers in their own discrete self-interest. The
    Russian Navy is operating at a pace and in areas not seen since the
    mid-1990s. The Chinese Navy is continuing to extend its reach around
    the world. Assertive competitors with peer-like military capabilities
    have emerged that will contest our interests globally and test the
    resilience of our alliances. Potential adversaries with less military
    power are gaining capabilities through the proliferation of advanced
    technologies that challenge our ability to ensure maritime access and
    freedom of navigation in the littorals. Our adversaries are pursuing
    advanced weapon systems at a level and pace of development not seen
    since the mid-1980s and both near-peer nations and non-state actors
    pose credible threats to our security.
        The Department of the Navy is responding by investing in capacity
    and advanced capabilities that increase the size and lethality of both
    the current and future force, providing our sailors and marines with
    what they need to fight and win a 21st Century conflict.
        The 2018 budget request continues the steady recapitalization of
    Navy and Marine Corps aviation capability. The balance has shifted from
    large scale development efforts of prior years to mature production and
    modernization of in-service aircraft for most of our major aviation
    programs; while our most advanced aircraft--from the fifth generation
    Joint Strike Fighter to the CH-53K Heavy Lift helicopter to the high
    altitude long endurance unmanned MQ-4 Triton--are rapidly transitioning
    to full rate production.
        Our shipbuilding program is informed by the Chief of Naval
    Operations' 2016 Force Structure Assessment (FSA). The larger force and
    mix of ships outlined in the FSA reflect extensive analysis regarding
    our operational cycle and the changing security environment. While
    there is general agreement that we must increase the size of our fleet,
    the potential timelines associated with fleet expansion require that we
    implement improvements in concept development, research and
    development, and rapid fielding efforts to accelerate the fielding of
    advanced capabilities that will provide our fleet a force multiplier
    effect. As well, given the budget challenges inherent to expanding our
    fleet size, we will need to further our efforts to drive down the
    cost--in terms of both time and money--associated with our major
    programs. Ultimately, the affordability challenges associated with
    building this larger fleet will need to be addressed in the context of
    the pending Defense Review.
        As the Nation's expeditionary force in readiness, the Marine Corps
    has been continuously engaged in major combat and crisis response
    missions over the past 16 years, resulting in a force that, in the
    absence of change, would be improperly structured or equipped to meet
    the demands of a future operating environment characterized by complex
    terrain, technology proliferation, information warfare, and an
    increasingly non-permissive maritime domain. This budget supports a
    Marine Corps end strength of 185,000 marines, the proper size for
    today's mission. The Marine Corps is proposing force capability changes
    to meet the demands of the future operating environment of 2025 and
    beyond. Additional analysis will address modernization and the
    acquisition of capabilities necessary for the future fight.
        From aviation to ships to tactical vehicles to trained sailors and
    marines, the immediate priority on building readiness and improving the
    wholeness of the current force paces our ability to grow force
    structure in 2018. Building the Navy and Marine Corps to the size that
    the Nation needs will require increased investment over an extended
    period of time, beginning in the future years of the Defense Plan, as
    informed by the pending Defense Strategy.
    Shipbuilding
        The Fiscal Year 2018 President's Budget request invests in the
    modernization of our current platforms and weapons; supports
    procurement of seven major warships and two auxiliary ships: the
    Enterprise (CVN 80) Ford-class aircraft carrier, two Virginia-class
    (SSN) attack submarines, two Arleigh Burke-class (DDG 51) guided
    missile destroyers, two Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), one John Lewis-
    class fleet oiler, and one (T-ATS) towing, salvage and rescue ship; and
    continues advanced procurement for the lead ship of the Columbia-class
    ballistic missile submarine program.
        The first new design aircraft carrier in 40 years, Gerald R. Ford
    (CVN 78) was delivered to the Navy in May. The Ford is delivering on
    promised capability, as demonstrated by land-based, pier-side, and at-
    sea testing to-date. The cost for this new ship class remains of great
    concern, however, and the Navy and industry are focused on capturing
    lead ship lessons learned, refining the ship construction process,
    capitalizing on technological improvements, and enhancing shipbuilder
    facilities to drive down cost. Cost performance on CVN 79 is promising
    thus far, and we are committed to expanding ongoing cost control
    initiatives to further reduce ship cost.
        The Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) program, the
    planned replacement for the Ohio-class and an element of our nation's
    strategic deterrent triad is the Navy's top shipbuilding priority. The
    program is executing detailed design efforts in preparation for
    ordering long lead time material in fiscal year 2019 and starting
    construction in fiscal year 2021. The program's delivery schedule is
    tightly aligned to the retirement schedule of our current ballistic
    missile submarine inventory. Cost, schedule, and technical performance
    on this program are being thoroughly managed to ensure we deliver on
    time, on budget, and on target per our requirements.
        The Virginia-class SSN program continues to deliver submarines that
    are operationally ready to deploy within budget. On May 27, the Navy
    accepted delivery of the future USS Washington (SSN 787), the 14th
    submarine of the Virginia-class. The Block IV contract for 10 ships
    continues co-production of the class through fiscal year 2018. The Navy
    intends to build on past success with a Block V Multiyear Procurement
    (MYP) contract for 10 boats, planned for fiscal year 2019. This
    represents an increase of one submarine in fiscal year 2021, while also
    introducing two new capabilities to the fleet--the Virginia Payload
    Module and Acoustic Superiority.
        With 64 ships at sea and 12 additional ships under construction or
    on contract, the Arleigh Burke-class (DDG 51) program is the Navy's
    most successful shipbuilding program. Like the Virginia program, the
    Navy intends to build on past success with a MYP for ten DDG 51s
    beginning in fiscal year 2018. These ships will incorporate upgrades to
    integrated air and missile defense which is being introduced in the
    fiscal year 2017 ships.
        Complementing the DDG 51, the lead ship of the Zumwalt-class (DDG
    1000) delivered in May 2016, and is now in its homeport undergoing
    combat systems activation with completion scheduled for fiscal year
    2018. The remaining two ships of the class are under construction.
        The Navy is planning and executing the modernization of 11
    Ticonderoga-class cruisers (CG 63-73); critical to providing dedicated
    Air Defense Commander (ADC) capability through the 2030s. The Fiscal
    Year 2018 President's Budget requests funding to execute the ``2-4-6''
    plan on 7 of the 11 CGs. The remaining four CGs, which have Ballistic
    Missile Defense (BMD) capability, will receive modernization to their
    hull, mechanical and electrical systems in fiscal year 2021 to support
    their operation through their engineered service life.
        The 2016 FSA revalidated the warfighting requirement for a total of
    52 small surface combatants, including the littoral combat ship (LCS)
    and a future frigate. To date, nine LCS ships have delivered and 17 are
    in construction or under contract, and all are on track to deliver well
    within the congressional cost cap. Three additional ships were
    authorized and appropriated in fiscal year 2017 which, with the
    additional ships supported by this year's budget, ensure continued
    production and will further mitigate the potential for layoffs at both
    shipyards while the Navy refines the requirements and acquisition
    strategy for the future frigate. The LCS program continues to
    incrementally field its mission systems.
        LCS 4 is currently deployed with the first instantiation of an
    over-the-horizon missile capability. The LCS surface-to-surface missile
    module with Longbow Hellfire is currently in testing and on track for
    introduction in 2018, and the mine countermeasure and anti-submarine
    warfare mission modules are in testing, targeting introduction in
    fiscal year 2019 and 2021, respectively.
        The Navy is revising its requirements for the future frigate to
    increase its multi-mission capability, lethality and survivability. The
    Navy currently assesses that adding these capabilities to the frigate's
    design will delay its procurement to fiscal year 2020. We will work
    closely with industry as we release the draft Request for Proposal for
    this new ship class; continually update our assessment of the frigate
    schedule, assess the effects of this and other shipbuilding contract
    awards on the industrial base, and make any appropriate modifications
    to our plan for fiscal year 2019 LCS procurement as necessary to ensure
    healthy competition for the future frigate program.
        This Navy continues to build toward a 34 amphibious ship force by
    fiscal year 2022. The appropriation by Congress for USS Richard M.
    McCool Jr. (LPD 29) in fiscal year 2017 supports both amphibious lift
    requirements and the industrial base. In conjunction with the Navy's
    fiscal year 2016 award for the USS Bougainville (LHA 8), the Fleet
    oiler (T-AO 206), and LX(R) design, LPD 29 provides for an effective
    transition to LX(R) in fiscal year 2020.
        To help offset challenges associated with increasing our fleet
    size, the Navy is expanding its global reach through the development of
    unmanned capabilities that will augment our manned platforms. Most
    recently, the Navy designated the Large Displacement Unmanned
    Underwater Vehicle (LDUUV) as a Maritime Accelerated Capability Office
    program to accelerate unmanned underwater vehicle capability, and
    released a Request for Proposal to industry to develop an Extra Large
    Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (XLUUV) that will have extended range and a
    modular payload capability. These UUVs will aid in the intelligence
    assessment of the operational environment as well as respond to the
    combatant commander's mission needs.
        Similarly, surface operations will be augmented through an
    integrated team of manned and unmanned autonomous capabilities and
    capacity. Ongoing investments in autonomy and mine countermeasure
    technology will continue to reduce the threat of mines in contested
    waters while also reducing the risk to our sailors while conducting
    this dangerous mission.
    Aviation
        The Department is continuing the recapitalization of our aviation
    assets ranging from our strike fighter aircraft to Marine Corps heavy
    lift helicopters, and Navy maritime patrol aircraft, while continuing
    our efforts with unmanned systems. In fiscal year 2018 we plan to
    procure 91 manned and unmanned aircraft for the Navy and Marine Corps.
    Our investment prioritizes capability, capacity, and wholeness as we
    restore aviation readiness.
        Navy Carrier Air Wing composition will be a mix of 4th generation
    and 5th generation fighter aircraft squadrons (F/A-18 E/F and F-35C),
    leveraging each aircraft's strengths and capabilities to provide over-
    match against expected threats while providing a cost efficient force
    structure. The fiscal year 2018 President's Budget request keeps the
    Department of the Navy on a path to have 5th generation aircraft
    comprise 50 percent of its tactical aviation assets in the Pacific
    Command Area of Responsibility by 2024.
        The F/A-18 A-D was designed for, and has achieved, a service life
    of 6,000 flight hours, performing as expected through its design life.
    In addition to the maintenance and modernization work the Navy is
    currently executing to extend the life of the F-18A-D inventory to
    9,000 flight hours, we are working to transition to the newer and more
    capable Super Hornets and F-35 as quickly as possible to eliminate the
    increasing cost, at both the flight line and depot level, of keeping
    legacy aircraft in service.
        The fiscal year 2018 budget request includes funding for 14 Super
    Hornets in fiscal year 2018 with additional aircraft required in the
    outyears to arrest the decline in our strike fighter inventory and
    enable older aircraft to be pulled from service for mid-life upgrades
    and service life extension. The F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet will be the
    numerically predominant aircraft in the Carrier Air Wing through the
    mid 2030s.
        The future of the Department's tactical aircraft relies on 5th
    generation F-35B and F-35C aircraft. The F-35 brings unprecedented low
    observable technology, modern weaponry, and electronic warfare
    capability to naval aviation. These aircraft will recapitalize some of
    our oldest aircraft--our legacy F/A-18s and AV-8Bs--which are rapidly
    approaching the end of their service lives. In 2015, Marine Fighter
    Attack Squadron 121 became the world's first F-35 squadron to achieve
    operational capability and is now forward deployed in Japan. In 2018,
    the Navy and Marine Corps team will deploy two Amphibious Ready Groups
    with embarked Marine Expeditionary Units; each with a detachment of F-
    35Bs aboard ship marking the first extended at sea deployments for the
    F-35. The Navy's first F-35C squadron begins transition in 2018;
    initial operational capability is expected by early 2019, and the first
    deployment on an aircraft carrier is planned for 2021. This budget
    procures 20 F-35B and 4 F-35C aircraft in fiscal year 2018.
        The EA-18G Growler is a critical enabler for the joint force,
    bringing fully netted warfare capabilities to the fight and providing
    unmatched agility in the electromagnetic maneuver warfare environment.
    Growlers have flown more than 2,300 combat missions to-date and are
    meeting all operational commitments. Carrier-based and expeditionary
    electronic attack capabilities will increase significantly with
    introduction of the next generation jammer, which is currently
    scheduled to complete testing in 2022.
        MV-22 Osprey vertical lift capabilities, coupled with the speed,
    range, and endurance of fixed-wing transports, enables execution of
    missions that were previously unachievable. The Marine Corps' Osprey
    fleet continues to experience a high operational tempo with multiple
    MEU deployments and two Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force-
    Crisis Response deployments in support of Africa Command and Central
    Command. During 2016, the 15th Active component squadron achieved full
    operational capability, with the 16th scheduled for June 2017. Fiscal
    year 2018 begins procurement of the Navy CMV-22B variant in support of
    the carrier on-board delivery mission and represents the first year of
    the next V-22 MYP contract.
        The Marine Corps CH-53E Super Stallion is the only heavy lift
    helicopter in the Department of Defense inventory. The CH-53E will
    remain in service until 2030 to accommodate transition to its
    replacement, the CH-53K, which, with 27,000lbs lift capacity at a
    mission radius of 110 nautical miles, nearly triples the lift
    capability of the legacy CH-53E. In fiscal year 2016, the Marine Corps
    initiated a CH-53E reset to ensure the remaining aircraft possess the
    longevity to complete the transition. Procurement of the CH-53K is
    ongoing, with 51 procured in the FYDP [Future Years Defense Program] in
    support of the total buy of 200. Transition will begin in 2019 and is
    forecast to complete in 2030.
        Combining the reliability of the Boeing 737 airframe with avionics
    that enable integration of modern sensors and robust military
    communications, the P-8A Poseidon recapitalizes the anti-submarine,
    anti-surface, and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR)
    capabilities of the aging P-3C Orion. Seven (of 12) squadrons have
    completed transition, with all squadrons scheduled to complete
    transition by fiscal year 2020. The P-8A program is meeting all cost,
    schedule, and performance parameters; has achieved and surpassed
    reliability standards for operational availability and is providing
    game changing capability to the fleet. Program savings have enabled
    procurement of one added aircraft (7 total) in fiscal year 2018 with no
    increase to the budget.
        The Department continues steady progress developing and fielding
    unmanned aviation assets, building towards future air dominance through
    an integrated team of manned, unmanned, and autonomous capabilities.
    These teams of systems will conduct ISR, real-time sensor fusion, and
    electronic warfare, increasing battlespace awareness and precision
    strike capability.
        The MQ-4C Triton will be a core capability of Navy's Maritime
    Patrol and Reconnaissance Force and deliver persistent maritime ISR as
    a force multiplier for the Coalition and Joint Force, as well as the
    Fleet Commander. Triton will deploy with early operational capability
    in 2018. Fielding of the multi-intelligence configuration will enable
    retirement of EP-3 aircraft in 2020.
        The Navy is developing the MQ-25 unmanned mission tanker, the first
    carrier-based unmanned program, to extend the range and reach of the
    Carrier Air Wing and greatly reduce the need for F/A-18E/F aircraft to
    serve as mission tankers. The MQ-25 was designated a Maritime
    Accelerated Capability Office program by the Chief of Naval Operations
    and Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and
    Acquisition, and was also designated by the Secretary of Defense as a
    Key Performance Parameter 'Reduction Pilot Program' per National
    Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2017. The Navy plans
    to release a request for proposal for air system development in fiscal
    year 2017 and down-select to a single contractor in fiscal year 2018.
        Looking to the far future, the Department has initiated a Next
    Generation Air Dominance Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) study. The AOA
    is investigating technology and program investment requirements to
    recapitalize Navy F/A-18E/F and EA-18G tactical aviation platforms in
    preparation for their anticipated retirement beginning in the late
    2020s.
    Ground Forces
        Marine Corps invested in select ground capabilities to conduct
    distributed operations and address changes in the operational
    environment. Key investments include the Ground/Air task Oriented radar
    (G/ATOR) and the Common Aviation Command and Control Systems (CAC2S) to
    enhance the ability of the Marine Air Ground Task Force to coordinate
    and synchronize distributed C2 sensors and systems. Amphibious and
    ground maneuver capability will be preserved and upgraded by
    accelerating legacy Assault Amphibious Vehicle survivability upgrades,
    procurement of 204 Amphibious Combat vehicles (ACV) and the replacement
    of about one third (6,895 vehicles) of the legacy high mobility, multi-
    purpose, wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) Fleet with the Joint Light Tactical
    Vehicle (JLTV).
        The ACV program is the Marine Corps' highest ground modernization
    priority and is using an evolutionary, incremental approach to replace
    the aging AAVs with a vehicle that is capable of moving marines ashore,
    initially with surface connectors and ultimately as a self-deploying
    vehicle. ACV consists of two increments. The first increment will field
    a personnel carrier with technologies that are currently mature. The
    second increment provides mobility improvements and delivers
    specialized mission variants.
    Munitions and Weapons Systems
        Standard Missile-6 (SM-6) provides theater and high value target
    area defense for the Fleet, and with integrated fire control, has more
    than doubled its range in the counter-air mission. SM-6 Block I testing
    in April 2017 successfully completed live fire requirements per the
    program of record and is on schedule to declare full operational
    capability later this year.
        The Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) provides another layer to
    the Navy's defended battle-space. Two ESSM Block 2 Controlled Test
    Vehicle flight tests were successfully conducted this May with IOC for
    AEGIS platforms scheduled for 2020 and Ship Self Defense System
    platforms in the 2022-2023 timeframe.
        The inner layer of the Fleet's layered defense is the Rolling
    Airframe Missile (RAM) Block 2 designed to pace the evolving anti-ship
    cruise missile threat and improve performance against complex stream
    raid engagement scenarios. In fiscal year 2017, the RAM Block 2 Program
    continued to demonstrate outstanding performance through successful
    Fleet and ship qualification firing events. The RAM Block 2 will
    proceed to a Full Rate Production (FRP) Decision Review in fiscal year
    2018.
        The Navy's Cruise Missile Strategy provides for the development of
    stand-off attack capabilities from air, surface, and undersea platforms
    against targets afloat and ashore. Key tenets are to 1) maintain and
    upgrade legacy cruise missiles; 2) pursue advanced near-term
    capabilities; and 3) plan and develop next generation integrated
    solutions.
        First, the Department's plan is to sustain the Tomahawk Block III
    and Block IV cruise missile inventory through its anticipated service
    life via a mid-life recertification program, enabling the Department to
    support Tomahawk in our active inventory through the mid to late 2040s.
    In concert with our recertification program we will integrate
    modernization and technological upgrades and address existing
    obsolescence issues. In addition, the Department is developing a
    Maritime Strike Tomahawk (MST) capability to deliver a long-range anti-
    surface warfare capability.
        Second, the Department will field the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile
    (LRASM) to meet near to mid-term anti-surface warfare threats. LRASM is
    pioneering accelerated acquisition processes. Currently, the Department
    anticipates LRASM to meet all warfighting requirements, deliver on-
    time, and cost within approximately 1 percent of its original program
    cost estimate.
        The Department also plans to develop follow-on next generation
    strike capabilities. We intend to develop an air-launched weapon to
    address long-term surface threats and a surface and submarine launched
    Next Generation Land Attack Weapon (NGLAW). NGLAW will have both a
    long-range land strike and maritime capability that initially
    complements, and then replaces, the Tomahawk.
        The Department is also continuing to invest in modernization of
    air-to-air weapons. The Fiscal Year 2018 President's Budget requests
    funds for upgrade and procurement of AIM-9X Sidewinder and AIM-120D
    Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM). The AIM-9X Block
    II/ II+ Sidewinder is the fifth generation variant of the Sidewinder
    family and is the only short-range infrared air-to-air missile
    integrated on Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force strike-fighter
    aircraft, incorporating advanced technology to achieve superior
    maneuverability and increase the probability of intercept of adversary
    aircraft. AMRAAM provides an air-to-air first look, first shot, first
    kill capability, while working within a networked environment in
    support of the Navy's Theater Air and Missile Defense Mission.
        The Department continues investments in other weapons lines,
    including the Small Diameter Bomb II (SDB II), the Advanced Anti-
    Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM) and AARGM Extended Range (ER), Joint
    Air-to-Ground Missile, Advanced Precision Kill Weapons System (APKWS)
    II, and direct attack weapons and general purpose bombs.
        SDB II provides an adverse weather, day or night standoff
    capability against mobile, moving, and fixed targets, and enables
    target prosecution while minimizing collateral damage. SDB II will be
    integrated into the internal carriage of both DON variants of the Joint
    Strike Fighter (F-35B/F-35C) and externally on the Navy's F/A-18E/F.
        The AGM-88E AARGM is a medium-range air-to-ground missile employed
    for Suppression and/or Destruction of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD/DEAD).
    The AARGM cooperative program with the Italian Air Force transforms the
    HARM into an affordable, lethal, and flexible time-sensitive strike
    weapon system. AARGM is in full-rate production and is operationally
    employed on F/A-18 and EA-18G aircraft. The AARGM-ER modification
    program was a new start in fiscal year 2016 and will increase the
    weapon system's survivability against complex and emerging threat
    systems and affords greater stand-off range for the launch platform.
        This budget continues a 5 year integration effort of JAGM Increment
    1 onto the Marine Corps AH-1Z helicopter and continues to fund JAGM
    procurement leading to IOC in fiscal year 2020. JAGM will replace the
    Hellfire and Tow II missile systems for the Department. APKWS II
    provides precision guidance capability to the Department's unguided
    rocket inventories, improving accuracy and minimizing collateral
    damage. Program production continues on schedule, meeting the needs of
    our warfighters in today's theaters of operations. Marine Corps AH-1W
    and UH-1Y helicopters achieved IOC in March 2012 and the Marine Corps
    AH-1Z platform was certified to fire APKWS II in June 2015. To date,
    these platforms have expended more than 190 APKWS II weapons during
    combat missions.
        The Fiscal Year 2018 President's Budget procures additional Joint
    Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) kits to enhance the Department's
    readiness. In 30 months of Operation Inherent Resolve, the Department's
    aircraft have expended more than three times the number of 500lb JDAM
    kits than were procured during the same period. This significant demand
    has required the Navy to reduce the number of 500lb JDAM available for
    training in order to preserve warfighting inventory. Additionally,
    fully funding the general purpose bomb line item is critical to
    sustaining the Department's inventory for ongoing combat operations and
    replenishing it for future contingencies.
    Space
        The Department's Joint and Fleet space operations are vital to the
    employment of naval capabilities and provide assured command and
    control; persistent maritime battlespace awareness; maneuver to include
    physical, cyber and the electromagnetic spectrum; and integrated fires.
    However, access to space is no longer guaranteed. The National Security
    Space Strategy defined the current and future space environment as
    driven by three trends: congested, contested, and competitive. The
    Department will maximize the utility of space-based assets and assure
    continued access in the face of growing adversary space capabilities by
    increasing space-related proficiency throughout the force and with
    targeted science and technology and research and development
    investments.
    Cyber
        Building our force is not limited to new platforms that operate in
    the traditional domains of sea, undersea, air and space, but also in
    the newest warfighting domain: cyber. With the exponential growth and
    ubiquitous availability of advanced computing methods and information
    technology today's highly networked environment, our Navy and Marine
    Corps must operate effectively in cyberspace. The Services require
    unconstrained access and assured capabilities in cyberspace to execute
    the full range of military missions. We must lead in both offensive and
    defensive use of this new domain and building cyber resiliency into our
    networks to allow us to ``fight through'' a cyber attack.
        Cyber resiliency ensures that when an attacker gets through our
    defenses, we rapidly detect and react to the anomalous cyber activity
    in a way that allows us to continue critical operations, or ``fight
    through,'' while we restore the integrity of that portion of the
    network. Cyber defense-in-depth is achieved by surveillance and
    reconnaissance within our networks to detect malicious activity. Navy
    and Marine Corps Cyber Commands leverage layers of sensors, analysts,
    and cyber specialists to assure maritime missions and protect data. In
    addition to defense and assured access, the Navy and Marine Corps are
    prepared to deliver cyber effects at a time and place of their choosing
    across the full range of military operations in support of Naval and
    joint commanders' objectives.
    Industrial Base
        The Department of the Navy cannot accomplish its mission, maintain
    readiness, or modernize the force without its partners in industry.
    Building readiness and building the force require a strong and
    integrated relationship with our industrial base private-sector
    partners. We will continue to work closely with our prime contractors
    as procurement plans unfold to ensure our equipment, system, and
    component suppliers are equally able to support the increased demand
    associated with building a larger fleet. We have utilized contracting
    tools such as MYPs, block buy contracts, Economic Order Quantity (EOQ)
    buys, Capital Expenditure (CAPEX) incentives, and Shipbuilding
    Capability Preservation Agreements to provide a stable commitment to
    our industry partners, supporting long range planning focused on
    affordability and cost control which increases our buying power. We
    will continue these initiatives to provide stability and mitigate
    volatility at the supplier level and improve productivity, efficiency,
    and competitiveness across the supplier base. We appreciate past
    congressional support for these efforts and your continued support in
    the future. While the different industrial sectors face different
    challenges, common among all is the need for predictable and stable
    programs which are dependent on a stable budget. We also welcome
    Congress's support in providing that budget stability.
                          v. taking care of our people
        The men and women of the Department provide our naval forces and
    Nation with an asymmetric advantage. No quantity of next generation
    ships or aircraft will bring victory without the skilled, dedicated,
    and talented sailors, marines, and civilians who build, maintain, and
    operate our Navy and Marine Corps. Despite 16 years of combat
    operations, extended deployments, and reserve mobilizations, today's
    force is the most talented and high performing in history. But just as
    the American technological advantage in warfare is not something we can
    take for granted, we also cannot simply assume that we will always
    attract America's best and brightest to serve in our all-volunteer
    military and civilian workforce. With a turnover of approximately
    95,000 sailors, marines, and 60,000 civilians a year, providing the
    incentives to attract and the environment to thrive remains a top
    priority for the Department. The desire to serve remains strong in
    America and the Navy and the Marine Corps are achieving overall
    recruiting objectives. We are, however, experiencing increasing
    challenges due to an improving civilian labor market, a limited pool of
    eligible candidates, and increases in accession goals.
        The Department's civilian workforce is an irreplaceable partner in
    our naval service and one of the most technologically advanced and
    innovative workforces in the world. More than half of our civilians are
    scientists, engineers, mathematicians, and logisticians and to sustain
    that workforce into the future the Department continues to leverage
    strategic partnerships with science, technology, engineering and math
    (STEM)-related groups and educational institutions to highlight naval
    service as a rewarding career option.
        Maintaining our warfighting advantage requires diversity of
    experience, background, and ideas. The Department draws upon the widest
    pool of talent and backgrounds to maximize combat effectiveness.
    Through policy and practice, we have set the conditions to ensure all
    who are qualified to serve in the Marine Corps and Navy can do so while
    creating an environment that promotes dignity and respect for all. In
    2016, the Department of the Navy opened the training pipelines in every
    occupational specialty to women. In May 2016, two female marines
    graduated from joint Army/Marine Field Artillery Basic Officers Leaders
    Course; one graduated first in her class and the other in the top 5
    percent. In April 2017, a Marine 2nd Lieutenant graduated from the Army
    Armor Basic Officer Leaders Course to become the first female marine
    tank officer. Additionally, the first four enlisted women infantry
    marines completed training and reported to Marine infantry battalions
    in December 2016. In the Navy, female officers serve on all combatant
    platforms, and female enlisted sailors serve on all platforms where
    berthing facilities are available. The first female enlisted sailor
    earned her submarine qualification and received her Submarine Warfare
    pin in August 2016. In the recruiting arena, we are actively
    emphasizing these integration efforts on service websites and include
    images of female representatives whenever possible, aimed at
    encouraging women to enter recently opened occupational fields.
        Having invested in recruiting the best talent available, we must
    retain it. We remain watchful of an increasingly competitive
    marketplace for talent in an improving economy. While we met the
    aggregate enlisted retention goals for fiscal year 2016, we continue to
    experience challenges and shortfalls in some communities, such as
    information warfare, nuclear technical fields, special warfare, and
    advanced electronics. Officer retention remains at historically high
    levels due, in large part, to judiciously offered incentive pays and
    bonuses, improved mentoring, recent efforts to add flexible career
    options, and an increased emphasis on life-work integration
    initiatives. However, specific Active Duty officer inventory shortfalls
    remain in aviation for certain type/model/series and nuclear-trained
    surface warfare officers. We are actively addressing these shortfalls
    through targeted incentives and other retention tools.
        The Navy and Marine Corps Reserve continue to be a vital part of
    the Navy and Marine Corps team and the Total Force. Mobilizing and
    employing Reserve sailors and marines facilitates employing the Active
    component to meet other operational and warfighting requirements,
    maintain unit integrity, and ensure Fleet readiness. Twenty percent of
    the Navy Reserve conducts operational support across the globe every
    day, to include squadrons from the Maritime Support Wing flying fixed
    and rotary wing missions in the South China Sea and reserve Coastal
    Riverine Units conducting high value escort missions off the Horn of
    Africa.
        The Department is also working to ensure our personnel policies and
    programs are keeping pace with the innovative human resources
    environment of the private sector. The Fleet Scholar Education Program
    (FSEP) allows our best and brightest officers to learn at America's
    most prestigious universities. The FSEP provides a total of 30 fully
    funded full-time graduate education opportunities with participant
    selection from the highest performing officers from each community.
    Career broadening programs improve the intellectual capital of our
    officer corps, providing sought after opportunities for our best and
    brightest.
        We have focused on helping sailors and marines maximize their
    personal and professional readiness by assisting them and their
    families with the mental, physical, and emotional challenges of
    military service. Providing a holistic approach to maintaining the
    health and resilience of our force, we have made improvements to
    physical fitness and nutrition programs, enriched family support
    programs, developed financial literacy training, and prioritized mental
    wellness. Both services extended fitness center hours of operation and
    are piloting 24/7 centers in a number of locations. Morale, Welfare,
    and Recreation programs like Adventure Quest and Single Service members
    provide a variety of programs promoting physical activity and a healthy
    lifestyle. MilitaryChildCare.com, an innovative online child care
    information, request, and reservation system, which will be fully
    operational this June, will allow our families to secure critical child
    care services anywhere in the world before they execute a Permanent
    Change of Station (PCS) move. The Marine Corps and Navy expanded
    financial literacy training throughout the military lifecycle with
    topics relevant to life and career touch points, particularly important
    as we transition to the Blended Retirement System. Earlier this year
    the Navy released a financial literacy mobile app to enhance access to
    training, references, and guides as well as resources for the
    transition to the Blended Retirement System.
        Despite our commitment to providing the highest quality of life to
    our sailors and marines the tragedy of suicide continues to plague our
    institution as it does to society as a whole. The Department has made
    strides in arresting the incidence of suicide and continues to seek
    promising paths to prevention.
        During the past year, the Navy launched the Sailor Assistance and
    Intercept for Life (SAIL) program, a research-based non-clinical
    intervention strategy, modeled after the successful Marine Corps
    Intercept Program, that provides rapid assistance, on-going risk
    assessment, and support for sailors who have exhibited suicide-related
    behaviors. The Marine Corps has initiated Death by Suicide Review
    Boards to gain in depth understanding of all marine deaths by suicide.
    Although the Marine Corps and Navy have reduced military suicides from
    the peak numbers seen a few years ago, we must continue our efforts to
    increase resiliency, promote help seeking, and provide treatment and
    support for those in need.
        Among our foremost responsibilities is to provide a safe and
    supportive work place to our employees. Whether in the cockpit of an
    aircraft, the engine room of a ship, or the office of an ashore
    facility, the leadership of the Navy and Marine Corps recognize that we
    cannot be successful in our mission if our people are not secure in
    their environment.
        The occurrence of physiological episodes (PE) in our legacy
    tactical aircraft and trainers has emerged as the number one aviation
    safety priority. From senior Navy leadership to our engineers and
    maintainers, to our aircraft manufacturers and NASA [National
    Aeronautics and Space Administration] and the Mayo Clinic, a
    comprehensive review of the design, the facts, circumstances, and
    processes surrounding PEs has been launched to arrest the increase in
    PEs in our F/A-18 and T-45 aircraft. The entire naval aviation
    enterprise is focused on resolving this issue and we will keep the
    defense committees and staff apprised of our findings and progress. In
    the interim, we are taking every measure to ensure our aviators are
    afforded the highest standards of safety as they perform their
    inherently hazardous mission.
        An environment that allows our sailors, marines, and civilians to
    thrive is also one that is respectful to all, free of harassment,
    bullying, and assault. Sexual assault is a crime that is not tolerated
    within the naval service. Those who report a sexual assault are
    supported by over 240 sexual assault response coordinators, 8,000 full
    and part-time victim advocates, 252 legal personnel, 164 criminal
    investigators, and 215 medical forensic examiners. We have a robust and
    effective Sexual Assault Prevention and Response program and Victims'
    Legal Counsel that together encourage increased reporting and provide
    critical support to those who come forward. We are also taking steps to
    prevent and respond to perceptions of retaliation or ostracism on the
    part of the courageous individuals who report these crimes--whether by
    the chain of command or peers. While there is still much work to be
    done, reporting across the Department has increased twofold since 2012,
    and, based on surveys, our estimated number of assaults on
    servicemembers has almost halved during that same time. Our leaders, at
    all levels, are held accountable to ensure every member of our Navy-
    Marine Corps team can excel in an environment that maximizes their
    talents and rejects those who would degrade or diminish another
    servicemember.
        A respectful environment is not limited to physical spaces but
    includes the virtual and on-line environments where so many social
    interactions occur. Discovery and investigation into the toxic and
    predatory behavior harbored by the Marines United Facebook group has
    uncovered instances of a breakdown of good order and discipline within
    our services. The discovery of this toxicity led to a comprehensive
    investigation of the non-consensual sharing of intimate images by
    sailors and marines, the extension of counseling and legal support to
    potential victims, the review and update of policy and regulations to
    cover this internet enabled scourge, and the commitment to hold
    offenders accountable.
        Finally, as a Department, we remain dedicated to strengthening our
    investment in the ethical development of our sailors, marines, and
    civilian employees to further their competence, confidence, character,
    and integrity such that their day-to-day actions and decisions are
    motivated by and aligned with the Department's core values of honor,
    courage, and commitment. We have given priority to analyzing and
    updating training curricula and educational programs across the
    Department to emphasize the importance of ethical behavior and to
    diminish instances of destructive behavior. Our people are our
    competitive advantage and we have no higher priority than to provide
    the tangible and intangible incentives that will allow us to continue
    to recruit and retain the nation's best and brightest.
                              vi. good stewardship
        In the quarter century since the end of the Cold War, the global
    threat environment has only become more challenging as multiple
    competitors seek to disrupt America's leadership role in the world.
    Ubiquitously available innovations in technology and information
    combined with increasing pressures on the Federal budget mean that we
    cannot simply outspend our competitors and expect to retain our
    advantage. We cannot just spend more, we must spend more smartly. We
    must know where every dollar is spent and incorporate innovative
    business practices to optimize the marginal value of our investment.
    Auditability
        A critical step in improving stewardship of the funds the
    Department of the Navy is entrusted with is to undergo a full financial
    audit in fiscal year 2018. Over the past years the Department has been
    working to put the tools and business processes in place that will
    allow an independent auditor to assess our financial statements,
    transactions, and assets. The Marine Corps reached this milestone a
    year early in fiscal year 2017 and the Navy is leveraging lessons from
    the Marine Corps to improve its audit readiness.
        The Department of the Navy is not approaching audit as a discrete
    test of our financial reporting but rather as a continual year round
    process to improve management of the significant resources with which
    we are entrusted. Standardizing our business processes and
    strengthening our internal controls will not only ensure financial data
    accurately reflects our business activities and minimize opportunities
    for the misuse of funds, but as importantly, it will improve the
    visibility of our management of the billions of dollars that it takes
    to build, operate, and maintain our naval forces. This visibility, in
    turn, will allow us to better direct those funds consistent with the
    Nation's priorities.
        The process of preparing for audit has also improved the culture of
    accountability throughout the Department, as every senior leader across
    the Navy-Marine Corps team embraces their role in developing and
    enforcing appropriate internal controls. Senior leaders are assigned
    responsibility for the correction of identified audit deficiencies and
    their leadership and actions provide the ``tone from the top'' which
    highlights the importance of effective controls and audits to all
    business managers. Performing business processes in a standardized way
    and retaining key documentation is the new normal for all who spend
    taxpayer dollars.
        The Department of the Navy understands the value audits will
    provide in maximizing the value of every tax dollar spent. Given the
    complexity and size of our operations, we anticipate that an
    unqualified audit opinion will be several years away, but as annual
    full audits of the Department of the Navy begin in 2018, we will
    constantly assess the results for opportunities to develop and
    implement the cultural, process and system changes needed to hold
    ourselves accountable and to maintain the trust and confidence of the
    American people.
    Business Reform
        The processes, tools, and systems that we use to manage the
    business of your Navy and Marine Corps have evolved over the past two
    centuries of successful naval operations. By implementing discrete
    business improvements over time, the Department, to date, has
    maintained its edge. Just as our competitors have leveraged the
    accelerating pace of technology development and absorption, however, so
    must the naval services leverage and embrace improvements in technology
    to better manage the processes that ultimately deliver our Nation's
    warfighting capability and ensure that we retain that edge.
        The Department of the Navy embraces the President and Secretary of
    Defense's initiative to reform government. Improvements in data
    collection, storage, and analysis provide abundant opportunities to not
    only reduce cost but also to improve our decision making in every
    Department activity from warfighting to personnel management to audit
    and real property management. The tremendous gains in commercial
    enterprise valuation over the past decade have not been through the
    implementation of efficiencies, but rather through rapid boosts in
    productivity enabled by information and technology. To the extent
    possible, the Department is committed to leveraging the innovations
    increasingly employed by commercial industry to improve the
    productivity of our business management processes and systems. Such
    innovations include appropriate migration of data storage and
    applications to the commercial cloud, continued consolidation and
    standardization of our data centers, and improved business intelligence
    and analysis capability.
        Opportunities for improved productivity are not limited to the
    modernization of our business IT systems. Exponential advancements in
    manufacturing processes and materials, artificial intelligence, energy
    capture, storage and transmission, and virtual and augmented reality
    offer abundant opportunities to reform and improve not only our
    business processes but also the productivity of our personnel,
    training, acquisition, and maintenance activities.
        Nor are the opportunities for improved stewardship limited to
    technology; process, policy, and leadership can also drive the agility
    and innovation that leads to a more productive enterprise. The
    Department of the Navy has welcomed the additional acquisition
    flexibilities provided through the fiscal year 2016 and fiscal year
    2017 NDAA. Consistent with congressional intent we are capitalizing on
    the flexibility inherent to mid-tier acquisition and acquisition
    agility provisions provided from Fiscal Year 2016 NDAA (Section 804)
    and Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA (Section 806), respectively. Additionally, we
    have implemented an accelerated acquisition approach with the
    Department of the Navy that encourages and enables the rapid
    development and transition of emerging technologies and engineering
    innovations to address critical Navy and Marine Corps warfighting
    needs. The Large Displacement Unmanned Underwater Vehicle and the
    carrier-based launched Unmanned Aerial Vehicle System are being managed
    as accelerated capability programs with the direct senior leadership
    involvement necessary to enable streamlined risk acceptance and
    decision making.
        The Department of the Navy is actively expanding and strengthening
    our network of partnerships, seeking further collaboration with
    traditional and non-traditional industry, laboratories, and academic
    institutions as well as international partners. In a combined effort
    between the Secretariat, the Marine Corps, the Navy, and industry, we
    recently conducted a Ship to Shore Maneuver Exploration and
    Experimentation exercise in which we demonstrated over 100 innovative
    technologies and concepts from varied industry partners, universities,
    and naval labs. Such Rapid Prototyping, Experimentation and
    Demonstration (RPED) projects will inform our concepts and requirements
    and shorten the cycle between the identification of a capability gap
    and the delivery of a suitable solution.
        Our reform efforts, focused on improving productivity, will evolve
    as new opportunities are revealed. To maintain our reform momentum we
    have invigorated a Department of the Navy Business Council to provide
    four star level oversight and support for our continual reform efforts.
                                vii. conclusion
        The Navy and Marine Corps team is organized, manned, trained, and
    equipped to assure our allies, deter aggressors, and, when necessary,
    defeat our adversaries and serve as an outward symbol of our Nation's
    resolve. Developing and maintaining globally present and operationally
    relevant naval forces that provide timely, agile and effective options
    to national leaders as they seek to advance our national security
    interests requires that we take the longer view.
        As a maritime nation, our security and prosperity is dependent upon
    our freedom of the seas in time of peace and our command of the seas in
    time of war. America's naval forces' ability to shape and influence
    events while advancing and protecting American interests around the
    world traditionally relies upon a force whose strength is measured in
    terms of numbers of ships, aircraft, and munitions; increasingly relies
    upon advanced capabilities involving unmanned systems, advanced
    sensors, stealth, electromagnetic maneuver, directed energy, and
    hypersonics; and always relies upon the quality and dedication of
    America's sailors and marines. Our future success in providing for our
    Nation's security will ultimately rely upon Congress to provide the
    resources we need to build, operate, and maintain the force; to deliver
    the necessary advanced capabilities; and to attract, train, and retain
    the best of America's young men and women to serve in our Navy and
    Marine Corps. In exchange, we are committed to being excellent stewards
    of those resources to ensure we deliver the maximum warfighting
    capability for every dollar provided by the taxpayer.
        Our priority in this year's President's Budget request is to
    rebuild the readiness and lay the foundation for future growth--
    capacity and lethality--of the force. The Department fundamentally
    requires a predictable, timely budget--something that has been elusive
    throughout the years operating under the Budget Control Act--to meet
    this priority. We will also need an increase to the Budget Control Act
    caps, as outlined in detail by our President's Budget request. Timely
    passage of a full year appropriation at the requested level will
    provide for the most efficient execution of the resources provided by
    Congress, while bringing stability to our workforce and our industrial
    base, and enabling the Department to most effectively train, maintain,
    and deploy the force.
        I want to thank this Committee for your enduring support to our
    sailors, marines, civilians, and their families, and for your past
    support for our key programs that support the naval force our Nation's
    needs. The Fiscal Year 2018 President's Budget request is properly
    balanced to support the needs of the United States Navy and the United
    States Marine Corps and ensures we are better prepared to fight and win
    our Nation's battles today and in the future. I look forward to working
    with you in the furtherance of our maritime capabilities.

     STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL JOHN M. RICHARDSON, USN, CHIEF OF NAVAL
                               OPERATIONS

        Admiral Richardson. Good morning, Chairman McCain, Ranking
    Member Reed, and other distinguished Members of the committee.
    I want to thank you for the privilege to be here today with my
    colleague, General Neller, and the Secretary of the Navy, to
    represent our Navy team, our sailors, civilians, and their
    families.
        Before I begin, I would like to take a moment to add my
    voice on behalf of the Navy to the chorus of voices who are
    hoping and praying for Congressman Scalise and the other
    victims of yesterday's brutal attack. We all admire their
    strength and toughness and send our best wishes for a quick
    recovery.
        I want to take some time this morning to briefly outline
    where your Navy stands today and where we need to go. I am
    recently back from travels to Rota, Singapore, and Guam. Our
    sailors are in harm's way around the world facing rising
    threats. They are talented. They are dedicated, and they are
    laser-focused on their mission. This is despite the growing
    challenges of the security environment and the challenges that
    we have imposed by inconsistent, delayed, and inadequate
    funding.
        Today I hope to convey a sense of urgency. Our adversaries
    are improving more quickly than we are. I agree with the
    chairman that our advantage is eroding. We must increase our
    naval power today, pick up the pace, and maintain our winning
    advantage.
        This effort starts by ensuring that we have a firm
    foundation for solid growth, restoring wholeness or balance.
    This began with the fiscal year 2017 budget, which helped
    arrest readiness declines. I thank the committee for that
    support.
        But more needs to be done. The challenges are sufficiently
    deep that it will take both predictable and sufficient funding
    and some time to fully recover. As you pointed out, sir, we
    have got hundreds of aircraft grounded due to maintenance
    backlogs and spare shortages. Our pilots do not fly enough. Our
    maintainers are struggling to keep planes that are working up
    in the air. We have not funded spare parts at the required
    levels.
        Maintaining our ships is also a struggle. Submarines and
    warships are tied up to the pier unable to submerge or get
    underway. I know that many of you are focused on adding more
    ships to the fleet, and I am focused on that too. But if I
    cannot repair a ship that has already been bought and paid for
    to go to sea, I forfeit the good, hard work of our
    predecessors. And the net effect is the same as not buying a
    ship. It is one less ship today at sea and U.S. naval power
    suffers.
        We are making strides here. As I mentioned, the 2017 budget
    was a great help to restore a lot of readiness. The fiscal year
    2018 request will capitalize on that investment and restore
    balance and wholeness so we can grow moving forward. There is
    lots we need to do to shore up the force that we have. We need
    that firm foundation.
        As articulated in a white paper about the future Navy I
    released, we also need a larger and more capable fleet. Even as
    we shore up wholeness, the budget request preserves the program
    growth for the Navy. It invests in emerging technologies for
    the future. It provides a balanced approach that starts the
    acceleration of naval power from a firm foundation.
        As I talk to our sailors who are forward deployed,
    protecting America from attack, promoting our interests around
    the world, they are as focused as ever on the mission. I know
    that you share my immense pride in them. But there is also a
    growing sense in the deployed fleet that we back here
    Washington just do not get it. It sometimes seems like we live
    in a parallel universe. And I urge that we bring these two
    realities together and close that gap quickly.
        As an example, they are already hearing that our fiscal
    year 2018 budget may not get passed in time, resulting in a
    ninth consecutive continuing resolution. It is getting harder
    to explain to our sailors and their families and to those who
    might want to join. But I am very hopeful. I pass on that
    optimism to them. We are willing to team together to do
    whatever it takes, working together with you with your support
    to get them the resources and support that they need and that
    they deserve.
        Again, I thank you for the privilege and opportunity to be
    here today, and I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Richardson follows:]

                Prepared Statement by Admiral John M. Richardson
        Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished Members of
    the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today
    to discuss the Navy's fiscal year 2018 budget request. This budget is
    the second step along a three-year path that started in fiscal year
    2017. In fiscal year 2017, Congress approved funding that helped to
    plug the most urgent readiness holes in the fleet. The fiscal year 2018
    request is focused on continuing to stabilize the ship--restoring
    balance that will serve as a solid foundation for next year's
    investments, which will be informed by the pending National Security
    Strategy and National Military Strategy and chart a course to growing
    our size and capabilities. We would not even be having this
    conversation were it not for passage of the fiscal year 2017 bill.
    Thank you both for the final bill, and for supporting the
    Administration's request for additional Overseas Contingency Operations
    funding.
        The Navy submits this request in a time of increasing competition.
    The world in general, and the maritime environment in particular, is
    fast-paced, increasingly complex, and uncertain. The challenges we face
    are more diverse, interconnected, and arriving more quickly than we had
    anticipated. Our maritime rivals are quickly becoming stronger. There
    is a need for urgency; we need to pick up the pace if we are to
    maintain a position of naval leadership in the world. Your sailors are
    out every day, all around the world, going into harm's way and
    undaunted by the threats that they face. Their equipment is worn. Too
    frequently, they don't have enough spare parts, and their stocks of
    munitions are lower than they need. But they are tough, dedicated, and
    proud of what they do. Back here at home, there is less evidence that
    we get it. There is little sense that our margin is shrinking, that
    time matters, and that we must take action. Again, your support in
    fiscal year 2017 is important progress, and your Navy is very grateful.
    But there is much more that still needs to be done.
        This places a growing premium on what we in the Navy often refer to
    as wholeness. For the Navy, wholeness is striking a balance of
    capabilities that are ready to meet our missions today, complemented by
    the additional investments that will enable us to sustain those
    capabilities over time.
        The heartbeat of the Navy is its people--this is where wholeness
    begins and ends. This budget request reflects increases in both
    military and civilian personnel. On the military side, we are
    requesting an additional 4,000 Active Duty and 1,000 Reserve personnel
    to man modernized cruisers and destroyers, as well as littoral combat
    ships; properly support moves for our sailors and their families; grow
    our cyber capabilities; and to implement our digital training
    initiatives. We are also adding almost 3,700 civilian personnel to
    conduct ship and aircraft maintenance, increase security at our bases,
    and provide engineering and other developmental support for new manned
    and unmanned aircraft, cyber, and tactical operations.
        The most significant investments in our fiscal year 2018 budget
    request build upon the funding provided in fiscal year 2017: the Navy
    added $3.4 billion this year and hopes to continue to achieve and
    better maintain readiness over the next 5 years. Afloat readiness
    accounts are almost all funded to either their full requirement or the
    maximum amounts that could be spent. These investments are designed to
    help reverse years of significant strain on the fleet. The funding will
    buy the gas so that our ships and aircraft can fully train and deploy.
    It will increase the stocks of spare parts to keep those platforms
    running or quickly restore them to service if something should wear out
    or break. They will also provide for increased cyber resilience and
    defense, and support modest improvements to our facilities.
        As our competitors seek areas of advantage, our modernization
    accounts will ensure our current platforms remain competitive through
    their expected service lives. The fiscal year 2018 budget request
    sustains most of our major modernization programs, across the undersea,
    surface, and air domains. We also sustained our planned investments in
    missiles, ship self-defense systems, and torpedoes in this request, and
    increased funding for additional weapons in future years.
        Even as we invested in enhancing our readiness, our fiscal year
    2018 budget request also supports moving into the future. We fully
    funded the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine's fiscal year
    2018 program requirements, the Navy's contribution to our Nation's
    strategic nuclear deterrent and our highest shipbuilding priority. We
    support procurement of nine ships in this fiscal year, and another 33
    across the Future Years Defense Plan. We made minor adjustments to our
    planned aircraft purchases, requesting one additional P-8A maritime
    patrol aircraft in this year's request and reducing our expected
    purchases of F-35C fighters from 6 to 4.
        The final element of our efforts to strike the best balance across
    our fiscal year 2018 budget request is focused on advancing key
    technologies that will make our current platforms more capable,
    providing new ways to counter high rates of fire more effectively and
    affordably. To that end, we have developed a new strategy to accelerate
    introduction of lasers and laser-enabling technologies into the fleet,
    and increased the funding in this and future years. We have funded the
    research and development of the next generation land attack weapon,
    hyper-velocity projectile, and hypersonic defense. And this request
    sustains our investments in autonomy and unmanned air, surface, and
    undersea vehicles.
        We are adjusting our investments in tactical networks and
    supporting capabilities, and have asked for $15 million to support a
    small but empowered office to spearhead Navy digital warfare and
    enterprise efforts. As just one example, one of our most impactful
    digital efforts is the transformation of the information systems that
    support our Manpower, Personnel, Training and Education (MPTE)
    enterprise. The MPTE modernization project will consolidate information
    from over 50 different databases in order to support tailored,
    flexible, and modern talent management and human resources support for
    our sailors. Our initial steps toward implementation are leading us to
    redesign our processes; in just one area, these changes have increased
    the number of travel claims processed by 28 percent per employee, 38
    percent faster, with zero errors. Once we move claims processing fully
    online, we project manpower savings of over 80 percent. We are
    requesting $35 million this year to move these critical transformation
    efforts forward, which will extend across our MPTE enterprise.
        This budget request acknowledges the growing prominence of
    information warfare through increased investments in survivable
    networks, electromagnetic maneuver warfare, and offensive and defensive
    cyber programs. Cyber protection of critical warfighting systems will
    provide the capability to automatically harden applications on naval
    platforms, reducing vulnerability to cyber attacks. The budget request
    also recognizes that as we advance technologies we must accelerate our
    adoption of training that leverages latest educational methods and
    tools, particularly the employing a combination of live, virtual, and
    constructive (LVC) training. By increasing our investments by $217
    million, we ensure that we keep our operators at the center of our
    plans, ensuring that they will be able to most effectively fight their
    ships, submarines, aircraft, and networks. Finally, we continue to seek
    ways to exploit the advantages offered by smart manufacturing
    technologies, including tools for shipyards and depots to speed
    production, reduce maintenance and sustainment costs, and enhance
    operations and logistics. These are just some of the highlights of the
    Navy's fiscal year 2018 budget request, building upon fiscal year 2017
    readiness investments to achieve greater wholeness, both now and into
    the future. However, the perfect warfighting capability is useless if
    it arrives late to the fight. Getting a new capability to the fleet
    first, before any competitor, is decisive. As important as any specific
    capability, we also need speed. Time matters, and we are not moving
    fast enough. The Congress has a major role to play here. Becoming more
    competitive starts with stable, adequate funding--the Navy simply
    cannot stay ahead in a system in which we operate without a budget over
    30 percent of the time. Stable and reliable funding allows our
    suppliers to manage their workforce and costs more effectively, which
    in turn reduces our costs. It gives our industry partners the
    confidence to invest in advances that make their processes faster and
    more efficient. We also need to better align our strategy with our
    budgets. We cannot achieve wholeness when we continue to be asked to do
    more around the world than our funding levels can support.
        Within the Navy, we are rededicating ourselves to a single-minded
    focus on building leaders, who are building the best possible teams. In
    the past year, we have issued an updated leader development framework
    to help guide the advancement of sailors as leaders of both character
    and competence--the two necessary ingredients for professional
    leadership. We also issued a framework that is informing advancement
    strategies for our Navy civilians, to guide strategies that are
    tailored to their particular areas of expertise.
        I am grateful for the additional acquisition authorities that the
    Congress has given to me and my fellow Service Chiefs, and have learned
    a lot as I have started to execute them. Many of my colleagues in
    industry that do both commercial and Defense Department work describe
    two ways of doing business: the ``competitive way'' and the
    ``government way.'' They describe their worlds as consisting of
    parallel universes that operate at vastly different speeds. In the
    ``government way,'' we take over 7 years to move from starting to look
    at potential information technology systems to initial operations. The
    ``competitive way'' took deep learning from an idea to GO champion in
    the same amount of time. Too often, the ``government way'' ignores the
    fact that going slow--or worse, doing nothing--incurs risks that are
    often much higher than acting imperfectly. In the ``government way,''
    there are too many people that can say no. In the ``government way,''
    there are layers upon layers of oversight, many of which have their
    origins decades ago, in a time when there were no computers. I am
    working with the Department and industry to examine our methods against
    the need to deliver quality in a way that is also timely and cost-
    effective. Make no mistake, continuing to operate in ``the government
    way'' imposes costs and risks as real as any others we might be trying
    to avoid. To that end, right-sizing and modernizing our installations
    and facilities will be an important part of our future competitiveness;
    although the Navy believes its infrastructure capacity is about right,
    completing the more detailed analysis once a BRAC is authorized will
    have value, and may highlight opportunities for some savings.
        Within the Navy, we are taking steps to accelerate acquisition.
    There are two elements to our approach. The Rapid Prototyping,
    Experimentation, and Demonstration (RPED) process seeks to develop and
    field prototypes to find solutions to fleet problems. The Maritime
    Accelerated Capabilities Office (MACO) process streamlines and
    accelerates the acquisition decision making process so that
    capabilities can be delivered to the fleet as fast as possible.
        These new ways of doing business are enabled by engaging with
    industry much sooner in the acquisition process, both to help refine
    the requirements process and to make it more efficient. As a part of
    this, we have been increasing our outreach to small businesses, which
    are often the most agile of our performers. And I am routinely calling
    both on our own Navy team as well as our partners in industry to
    challenge assumptions that we have grown to take for granted--
    assumptions about how long it takes to design or build everything from
    our most simple to most complex platforms. We are shifting our mindset
    from technological miracles that deliver in the distant future, to one
    of achievable and meaningful advances today that can be pushed forward
    into the future through faster iteration. We must design and build all
    of our future platforms with modernization in mind.
        Finally, together we must develop a more competitive approach to
    defining our future. I have been focused on getting better insight and
    control of research and development funding so that it can be
    prioritized to the areas of most decisive advantage. We need more
    targeted investments, with well understood risks, that include time to
    delivery as a critical discriminator.
        If our efforts here are going to succeed, I will need your help. I
    welcome the greater accountability you have given me, but would ask you
    to look hard at areas where oversight can be pruned back to less
    onerous levels. Which oversight functions are best performed by the
    Navy Secretariat, by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, or both?
    What steps can we take to maintain sufficient checks and balances, but
    that also recognize the competition that we cannot ignore? These are
    difficult questions, but ones that the world in which we find ourselves
    in demands that we answer. I look forward to working with you in this
    vital area, and to answering your questions.

    STATEMENT OF GENERAL ROBERT B. NELLER, USMC, COMMANDANT OF THE
                              MARINE CORPS

        General Neller. Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed,
    distinguished Members of the committee, thank you all for the
    opportunity to appear today and answer your questions.
        I would fully endorse the comments of both Secretary
    Stackley and my shipmate, Admiral Richardson, and what they
    have said about our current situation in the Navy and Marine
    Corps.
        I would also add the best wishes of all marines and our
    families to those that were injured yesterday, wishing them a
    speedy recovery.
        I know this committee and the American people have high
    expectations for their Marines as our Nation's force in
    readiness. You expect your marines to operate forward as part
    of that Navy-Marine Corps team, engage with our partners, deter
    our adversaries, and respond to crisis. And when we fight, you
    expect us to win. You expect a lot of us and you should.
        This morning, as we hold this hearing, more than 36,000
    marines are forward deployed and engaged doing just what you
    would expect them to be doing. Our role as the Nation's
    expeditionary force in readiness informs how we man, train, and
    equip our Corps. It also prioritizes the allocation of
    resources we receive from Congress.
        Unstable fiscal environments of the past have required us
    to prioritize the readiness of that forward deployed force over
    those at home station. Those marines forward are the ones that
    immediately respond to crisis. Those marines are protecting our
    embassies around the world. Those marines are currently
    conducting air and artillery strikes in Iraq and Syria. Those
    marines are training and advising Iraqi and Afghan armies.
    Twenty-four thousand of those marines are in the Pacific, west
    of the international dateline, deterring adversaries and
    ensuring our allies.
        And I assure you that those forward-deployed marines are
    well trained and well led and well equipped. However, after 15
    years of war and budget instability, this has come at a
    compounded cost to our non-deployed marines, our ready bench
    back home. The fiscal year 2017 appropriations bill is a good
    down payment to improve the readiness of this bench and move us
    forward to further recapitalize and modernize the force.
        That said, the instability of the past 8 years and the
    continued legislative reality of budget limitations disrupt our
    ability to program long-term activities and potentially sustain
    these improvements to both our current and our future
    readiness. To continue to meet operational commitments,
    maintain a ready force, and at the same time modernize for the
    future, your Marine Corps requires fiscal stability and
    adequate resources.
        While supporting requirements abroad, we continue to
    innovate, leverage technology, invest in new systems, and
    redesign our force through two new initiatives called Sea
    Dragon 2025 and Marine Corps Force 2025. We must adapt both the
    capabilities we possess and the thought process we bring to the
    battlefield because our adversaries have continued to advance
    their capabilities and capacities. Our ability to fight and win
    into the future depends upon modernization. Modernization is
    future readiness.
        So as we look forward, priorities for this year remain
    continued readiness recovery, implementation of the beginning
    of Force 2025, and the acceleration of our modernization
    initiatives to build a more lethal Marine Corps. We do not want
    our marines to enter a fair fight, and though we remain a
    lethal and ready force, the margin between us and potential
    adversaries has closed. And with your support in addressing the
    present and future challenges and the shortfalls we have, we
    will be better postured to fight and win our Nation's battles
    now and in the future.
        I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Neller follows:]

                 Prepared Statement by General Robert B. Neller
                                    preface
        Your Marine Corps remains the Nation's expeditionary force in
    readiness, able to answer the Nation's call in any clime and place. In
    meeting that mandate, marines are forward-deployed and forward-engaged
    responding to crises around the world--managing instability, building
    partner capacity, strengthening allies, projecting influence--meeting
    the requirements of our geographic combatant commanders. At home, our
    recruiters are working hand-in-hand with local communities, recruiting
    the best and brightest Americans our Nation has to offer and
    consistently achieving our recruiting goals. We appreciate the recent
    passage of the fiscal year 2017 funding. This is a down payment to
    improve our readiness and move us forward to recapitalize and modernize
    the force. That said, the fiscal instability of the past 8 years and
    the continued reality of continued budgetary uncertainty disrupt our
    ability to program long term activities and directly challenge our
    efforts to improve current and future readiness. To continue to meet
    operational commitments and maintain a ready force, your Marine Corps
    requires fiscal stability.
        Both in training and operationally, our Marines are busy; the
    current deployment tempo is on par with the height of operations in
    Iraq and Afghanistan. While supporting requirements abroad, we also
    continue to invest time and energy in developing the Marine Corps
    operating concept and its supporting Marine Corps Force 2025
    initiative. The changes within these institutional efforts will help us
    mitigate against an increasingly volatile operating environment. Our
    potential adversaries continue to advance their military capabilities
    and build capacity; because of their advances in technology and
    information use, we must adapt both the capabilities we possess and the
    thought processes we bring to the battlefield. As we look forward, our
    priorities for this year remain: readiness recovery, implementation of
    the Force 2025 initiative, and the acceleration of our modernization
    initiatives to build a more lethal 5th generation Marine Corps.
                                  your marines
        In the past year, your marines demonstrated the relevance of
    expeditionary naval forces by executing approximately 20 amphibious
    operations, 200 operations, and 70 major exercises. A strong demand
    remains for marines and tailored Marine Air-Ground Task Forces [MAGTF],
    driving an aggressive operational tempo. Marines in the operating
    forces are averaging a 2-to-1 deployment-to-dwell ratio, typically
    deploying for 6 months, then spending 12 months or less at home station
    before deploying again.
        Our Nation has marines on the ground in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
    Syria today, and our commitment is growing. We have increased the
    number of Marine advisors in Afghanistan beyond our partnership with
    the Republic of Georgia's Liaison Teams. In April, we deployed marines
    as part of Task Force Southwest training and advising the Afghan
    National Army. Additionally, Marine tactical aviation squadrons are
    supporting operations in Syria, Iraq, and Libya from forward-deployed
    locations afloat and ashore.
        Our Navy and Marine Corps teams continue to perform as a flexible,
    agile, and responsive maritime force. In 2016, the Marine Corps
    deployed more than 11,000 marines aboard Navy warships. This past year,
    five separate MEUs supported every geographic combatant commander,
    participating in exercises and executing major operations. The 31st
    MEU, our forward deployed naval force in the Pacific, performed foreign
    disaster relief (FDR) operations in Kumamoto, Japan, after a 6.5
    magnitude earthquake and 7.0 aftershock struck in April.
        Our Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (SPMAGTF) remain
    engaged. Our SPMAGTF assigned to USCENTCOM [U.S. Central Command]
    provides dedicated Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP)
    support to Operation Inherent Resolve, while simultaneously delivering
    a flexible force for crisis and contingency response. Those marines
    continue to work with the 1st and 7th Iraqi Army Divisions advising and
    assisting in the fight against ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq and the
    Levant]. In United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM), our SPMAGTF
    stands ready to support embassies through reinforcement, evacuation,
    and operations as required. Last July, marines deployed to reinforce
    the U.S. embassy in South Sudan and have remained, ensuring State
    Department personnel are able to provide critical support to the people
    of South Sudan. SPMAGTF-Southern Command (SPMAGTF-SC) deployed for a
    second time to Latin America, primarily focusing on theater security
    cooperation (TSC) and training in Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, and
    Belize. At the request of the U.S. Agency for International
    Development, marines from SPMAGTF-SC provided FDR to more than 750,000
    Haitians in the wake of Hurricane Matthew. SPMAGTF-SC were the first
    marines on scene, arriving within 48 hours of notification, flying more
    than 250 flight hours, and distributing 290 tons of relief supplies
    over the course of 12 days.
        Marine Corps activities in the Pacific are led by Marine Forces
    Pacific (MARFORPAC) headquartered in Honolulu, Hawaii, with a forward-
    stationed Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), III MEF, headquartered in
    Okinawa, Japan. III MEF contributes to regional stability through
    persistent presence. Marines remain the Pacific Command's (PACOM)
    forward-deployed and forward-stationed force of choice for crisis
    response. The Nation has 22,900 marines west of the international date
    line, operating within the Asia-Pacific theater. This past January, the
    first operational F-35B squadron deployed to Japan, bringing extensive
    capabilities while simultaneously augmenting operational forces in the
    area. The Marine Rotational Force-Darwin (MRF-D), a 6 month unit
    rotation, based in Australia's Robertson Barracks, is in its fifth year
    of operation. More than 1,000 marines participated last year, taking
    part in three major exercises over the course of 7 months. This April,
    MRF-D returned to Australia with MV-22 Ospreys. Of note, this was the
    first ever Trans-Pacific flight by III MEF MV-22 Ospreys, displaying
    the operational reach these aircraft bring to the Marine Corps.
        The Marine Corps maintains a vital relationship with the State
    Department, providing security at our embassies and consulates. Today,
    marines are routinely serving at 176 embassies and consulates in 146
    countries around the globe. Marine Security Augmentation Unit (MSAU)
    teams deployed 62 times last year at the request of the State
    Department, executing 19 embassy/consulate and 43 VIP [President and
    Vice President of the U.S. and Secretary of State] security missions.
        Last year, the Marine Corps, in conjunction with combatant
    commanders and the Marine forces component commands, conducted more
    than 160 security cooperation activities, including exercises, training
    events, subject matter expert exchanges, formal education key leader
    engagements, and service staff talks. The relationships we forge with
    allies assure them of our commitment, deter adversaries, build partner
    capacity, and set conditions to surge and aggregate with a joint,
    coalition, or special operations force for major theater combat
    operations. Partnering also trains our marines for environments in
    which we are likely to operate. Your support has allowed the Marine
    Corps to operate globally and reap the benefits of those international
    relationships.
    Marine Corps Operating Concept and Force 2025
        The challenges of the future operating environment demand that our
    Nation maintain a force-in-readiness, capable of global response. In
    the strategic landscape, we find that Nations compete fiercely for
    natural resources, extremist groups employ violence to achieve
    nefarious ends, cyber-attacks are on the rise, and advanced weaponry
    and weapons of mass destruction continue to spread across the world.
    Additionally, due to universal access to information, rapid advancement
    in robotics, and new weapons technologies, serious threats have emerged
    with increasing speed and lethality.
        In the last year, we invested considerable time and energy
    formulating the Marine Corps Operating Concept (MOC) and its supporting
    Marine Corps Force 2025 initiative. These institutional efforts were
    spurred by a critical self-assessment that revealed the Marine Corps is
    not organized, trained, equipped, or postured to meet the demands of
    the rapidly evolving future operating environment. We arrived at this
    conclusion after a close examination of the current and future impacts
    of complex terrain, technology proliferation, information warfare, the
    battle of electro-magnetic signatures, and an increasingly non-
    permissive maritime domain on the Marine Corps. The MOC embraces our
    naval character, expeditionary mindset, and professional approach to
    constantly improve and build on our foundations of maneuver warfare and
    fight as a combined arms force. The challenges of the future will
    impact how we organize our Corps and ultimately fight and win our
    Nation's battles. This concept is a starting point addressing how we
    will design, develop, and field a future force. It reaffirms the
    importance of maneuver warfare and combined arms. In the past, we
    successfully conducted maneuver warfare employing combined arms from
    the air, land, and sea. Now, changes in the operating environment and
    adversary capabilities drive us to increase emphasis on maneuver in a
    cognitive sense, expanding our employment of combined arms to space and
    cyberspace.
        Concurrent with our MOC design, we conducted extensive
    collaboration, war gaming, experimentation, and analysis to design a
    balanced MAGTF optimized for the future in an effort dubbed Marine
    Corps Force 2025. We continue to identify and, when able, acquire
    practical, affordable, and effective ways to protect our networks;
    practice information environment operations; configure capable tactical
    units; recruit, educate, and train leaders on multi-domain warfare;
    increase our long-range fires capability; develop reconnaissance and
    counter reconnaissance forces; leverage automation and robotics to
    augment marines; develop innovative logistics capabilities and systems;
    and further our warfighting capabilities within the littorals. The
    Marine Corps must modernize and change to deter conflict, compete and,
    when necessary, fight and win against our adversaries.
    Manpower
        The center of gravity of the Marine Corps is its people, and the
    American people trust us with this precious resource--their sons and
    daughters. Our core values of honor, courage, and commitment are
    engrained in our culture. Marine leaders have a moral obligation to
    ensure the health and welfare of the Nation's marines from the day they
    commit to serve. We take this responsibility seriously and strive to
    maintain the trust and confidence of Congress and the American people.
    Taking care of marines and their families is a key element of overall
    readiness, combat effectiveness, and warfighting.
        Our comprehensive package of services seeks the holistic fitness
    and readiness of our marines and their families--body, mind, and
    spirit. We continue to prioritize support through programs like: force
    fitness, sexual assault prevention and response, suicide prevention and
    response, behavioral health, Wounded Warrior Regiment, personal and
    professional development, and transition assistance. The Marine Corps
    remains focused on solutions to reduce destructive behaviors,
    particularly sexual assault, suicide, and hazing. We are dedicated to
    eradicating bullying, degrading, and abusive behavior committed online
    or in person. The abuse of alcohol is a known factor and contributor
    across the spectrum of force preservation issues and negatively impacts
    the readiness of our force. We have to minimize these destructive
    behaviors. We believe that preserving our commanders' ability to lead
    in this area is a vital element to reaching this objective.
        We appreciate the continued support from Congress, specifically the
    most recent end strength approval of 185,000 marines. We will create
    the most lethal, capable, and ready 185,000 marines our resources will
    permit. That said, one continuing challenge is that the Marine Corps
    operating forces are currently averaging less than a one-to-two
    deployment-to-dwell ratio. This tempo is not sustainable as it does not
    provide options to train to our full mission sets and it puts
    unreasonable strain on our marines and families. Ideally, we seek to be
    a one-to-three deployment-to-dwell force. A deliberate and measured
    capacity increase, reduction of our operational tasking, or a
    combination of the two, are solutions that would put us on the path to
    improve our deployment-to-dwell ratio. Our Marines want to deploy,
    serve our Nation, and protect our country from threats overseas.
    However, we owe our marines and their families the appropriate
    deployment-to-dwell time to allow them to learn, re-focus, reflect on
    their most recent deployment, and train for the next deployment or
    contingency.
    Readiness
        Marines have a unique perspective on readiness. The congressional
    intent for marines to serve as the ``Nation's Force-in-Readiness''
    guides who we are and what we do--being ready is central to our
    identity. As a force, we must remain ready to fight and win across the
    range of military operations within all warfighting domains. Fiscal
    reductions and budget instability has been the norm for the past eight
    years and has consequently eroded our readiness. As resources
    diminished, the Marine Corps protected near-term operational readiness
    of its deployed and next-to-deploy units to meet operational
    commitments; this has come at a compounded cost. Non-deployed units,
    our ``ready bench,'' can still deploy with minimal notice but, if
    required, would not be as ready or capable as necessary. More reliable
    funding and support of the annual budget request must be there if we
    are to improve our readiness and our ability to respond to crises.
        A lack of amphibious warships, ship-to-shore connectors (SSC), and
    mine countermeasure capabilities (MCM) puts the Nation at a severe
    disadvantage. The Navy and Marine Corps team requires 38 amphibious
    warships to support two Marine Expeditionary Brigades and to provide
    the Nation a forcible entry capability. Our current amphibious warships
    need updated, resilient and interoperable command and control systems.
    As a maritime Nation, we need to be fully capable of exploiting the sea
    as maneuver space in an age when the proliferation of anti-access
    weapons continues to increase. This includes the ability to operate
    freely in international waters and airspace. Thirty-eight amphibious
    warships offer us agility and resilience in an unpredictable and
    dangerous security environment. Along with these warships, the Navy and
    Marine Corps team requires SSC that are survivable and reliable. Our
    current Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) fleet averages 25 years of
    service and our Landing Craft Utility (LCU) attained Initial Operating
    Capability (IOC) in 1959--three years prior to Senator Glenn orbiting
    the earth for the first time. MCM capabilities are continually
    underfunded. The Navy and Marine Corps team needs prudent and
    consistent funding to rectify these issues through multi-year
    procurement and block-buy of amphibious warships, SSC, and MCM.
        Marine aviation is in the midst of a focused readiness recovery
    effort. We have developed an extensive plan to recover readiness across
    every type/model/series (T/M/S) in the current legacy inventory, all
    while we continue to procure new aircraft. We are realizing steady
    improvements in aviation readiness, but the plan requires sustained
    funding, parts and supply support, flight operations, and time. Each T/
    M/S requires attention and action in specific areas: maintenance,
    supply, depot backlog, and in-service repairs.
        The F-35 Lighting II is more than just the next fighter, it brings
    unprecedented low observable technology, modern weaponry, and
    electronic warfare capability to the Navy and Marine Corps team.
    Delivering this transformational capability to our front-line forces as
    soon as possible remains a priority. The accelerated procurement of
    this aircraft is essential as our legacy fleet of AV-8B, F/A-18, and
    EA-6B aircraft are rapidly approaching end of service life. Though more
    expensive than these legacy aircraft, the capabilities we receive in
    return for our cost share in the joint program make it a wise
    investment. We are aggressively seeking ways to reduce operations,
    maintenance, and sustainment costs for this program. This aircraft is
    currently demonstrating its ability to support the MAGTF and is
    expanding the capabilities of Marine aviation today.
        The CH-53E is another example of an aircraft that needs to be
    replaced--not extended--as this is the most cost effective solution.
    Entering service in 1981, the out-of-production CH-53E Super Stallion
    is 55 aircraft short of the required inventory and cannot meet the lift
    needs of today's Marine Corps. Its replacement, the CH-53K, costs
    approximately 30 percent more, but provides three times the lift
    capability under the same conditions, and is the only maritime, heavy-
    lift helicopter capable of supporting current and future warfighting
    concepts. The CH-53K is capable of supporting 100 percent of the
    MAGTF's lift requirements for approximately the same projected
    operating and support (O&S) cost of the legacy CH-53E. The CH-53K will
    provide increased range, payload, interoperability, and survivability.
        The Marine Corps is executing a post-combat reset strategy to
    reconstitute and increase readiness of our ground equipment. We have
    reset 92 percent of our ground equipment, with 65 percent returned to
    the operating forces and our strategic equipment programs. Our war
    reserve includes geographically prepositioned combat equipment, located
    both afloat and ashore. We remain focused on this recovery effort and
    appreciate your support. That said, our ground equipment is old. Our
    amphibious assault vehicles were fielded in the 1970s, with many of our
    other ground systems fielded in the 1980s. Much like our aviation
    assets, our ground systems must be procured and fielded to our marines
    in a faster manner, at lower operating costs and improved capability.
        Marine Corps bases and stations support marines and their families
    and serve as training, sustainment, and deployment platforms. They
    provide the capability and capacity to support the force and are
    integral to combat training. To maintain near-term unit readiness, we
    have accepted risk in facilities sustainment. While prioritizing
    deployed readiness, our infrastructure and facilities continue to
    decline. Taking risk in Facility Sustainment, Restoration and
    Modernization (FSRM) requirements has resulted in the degradation of
    our infrastructure, creating increased long-term costs. FSRM is
    currently funded only to meet the most urgent life, safety, and health
    issues. Improving the current state of our facilities is the single
    most important investment to support training, operations, and quality
    of life. In addition to FSRM, we require investment in military
    construction to support the fielding of new platforms; facilities
    necessary to meet improved training standards and operational readiness
    enhancements; replacement of inadequate facilities; improvement of our
    safety and security posture, and relocation of forces.
        To address these challenges, we have developed an Infrastructure
    Reset Strategy (IRS). Designed to improve infrastructure lifecycle
    management and ensure infrastructure investments are aligned with
    Marine Corps capability-based requirements, IRS supports the
    warfighting mission and contributes directly to current and future
    force readiness. Additionally, under this strategy, we will sustain
    infrastructure and installations as capable, resilient, right-sized
    platforms to generate force readiness and project combat power across
    the range of military operations. The Marine Corps service
    infrastructure capacity is about right; however, the IRS does address
    reducing excess and aging infrastructure to improve readiness and
    stability. The Marine Corps supports a Department of Defense request
    for authorization to conduct a Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC)
    round in 2021 based on the needs of other services, and to reinforce
    efforts planned through our IRS to optimize facilities posture to
    support increased readiness.
        Readiness is not just about equipment supply and maintenance, but
    also the quality and challenging nature of our training through the
    mental, spiritual, and physical readiness of marines and sailors across
    the force. Readiness reflects through an organizational attitude and
    confidence, knowing that it can respond to and win in any crisis
    because it has been properly organized, led, trained, and equipped.
    Modernization
        History has not been kind to militaries that fail to evolve, and
    the global change we are witnessing is rapid and dramatic. Your Marine
    Corps must be manned, modernized, and ready to meet the demands of a
    future operating environment as defined by our National Military
    Strategy. The development, procurement, and fielding of a 5th
    Generation Fighter, the F-35 Lightning II, is just one aspect of our
    modernization efforts. We are modernizing our entire aviation force,
    increasing the lethality of our infantry, and ensuring our combat
    support and logistics are the most modern and capable. The result we
    aim to achieve is a Marine Corps that is the most advanced and ready--a
    5th Generation Marine Corps. Capable of dominating the battlefield in
    all five domains--air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace--a 5th
    Generation Marine Corps will use information, an integral part of each
    domain that must be leveraged, as the thread to connect them. This
    requires transforming MAGTF command and control capabilities through a
    unified networked environment that is ready, responsive, and resilient.
    The 5th Generation Marine Corps is a modernized force required to meet
    and prevail against any adversary on the multi-domain battlefield of
    the future.
        The Marine Corps must progress to stay ahead of the current
    security environment while mitigating future conflict or face becoming
    a force unable to deter and defeat future adversaries. Budget cuts
    since the Department of the Navy top line peaked in 2008, coupled with
    fiscal uncertainty, forced us to utilize limited resources to ensure
    the readiness of deployed forces and sacrifice end strength, home
    station readiness, infrastructure sustainment, and quality of life
    programs, as well as delay critical modernization. We need to modernize
    rapidly, to replace ``old iron'' with new, reliable, sustainable, and
    affordable equipment across the MAGTF. We need the continued support of
    Congress to increase the production rate of our acquisition programs
    while funding future modernization initiatives. Further, the
    recapitalization of our force is essential to our future readiness with
    investments in ground combat vehicles, aviation, command and control,
    and digitally-interoperable protected networks. Marines will continue
    working to do what we do today better than ever, while exploring ways
    these tasks might be done differently. The Marine Corps will persist in
    developing and evolving the MAGTF through innovation and
    experimentation, ensuring it is able to operate in all domains of
    conflict.
        The Marine Corps Warfighting Lab leads our experimentation effort
    to capitalize on existing and emerging technologies and MAGTF level
    exercises. In conjunction with our coalition partners, the Navy and
    Marine Corps team has experimented with dispersed sea-based SPMAGTFs;
    integrated MAGTFs in heavily defended littoral environments;
    incorporated emerging digital technologies with aviation platforms and
    our ground forces; and conducted naval integration with interoperable
    Special Operations Forces. We will continue to emphasize
    experimentation and innovation during our exercises as a way to inform
    the development of distributed doctrine and future operating concepts.
    Exercises serve as a test bed for experimentation and innovation as we
    search for faster, cheaper, and smarter acquisition processes and
    programs. Expect the Marine Corps to continue pursuing technologies
    that enhance our warfighting capabilities such as unmanned aerial
    systems (UAS) and robotics, artificial intelligence, additive
    manufacturing, and autonomous technologies that provide tactical and
    operational advantage. We have seen success in some of these
    initiatives and require consistent funding to better plan our
    modernization efforts.
        Effective planning produces unit cohesion and leadership in our
    operating forces, and financial predictability for our modernization
    programs. The ability to properly plan achieves stability and
    predictability for our personnel and families, ensures ample time to
    train, and fosters development of our small unit leaders. Modernization
    is critical to our future readiness.
    Our Challenges and Solutions
        Our most immediate challenge is resolving the significant readiness
    issues that have grown over the past 15 years. Collectively, fiscal
    inconsistency, spending cuts, and accumulating wear and tear after
    years of combat operations have depleted our readiness and delayed
    planned recapitalization and modernization efforts. Though our forward
    deployed forces are ``full up'' and ready for whatever comes their way,
    our ``bench'' has become shallow--particularly for aviation. We also
    lack sufficient amphibious lift. Our minimum requirement is 38
    amphibious warships and we presently stand at 31, getting to 34 within
    the current Future Years Defense Plan. Due to this shortage, we have
    deployed two ground-based SPMAGTFs that have added deployment tempo to
    the Force.
        Over the past year, the Marine Corps dedicated nearly every
    operational MV-22 Osprey squadron to source its global commitments, and
    the increased utilization rates on these airframes affect the longevity
    of their service life. To reduce operational tempo and continue to meet
    operational commitments, we cut MV-22 and KC-130J aircraft from our
    SPMAGTFs in CENTCOM and AFRICOM. Additionally, F/A-18 readiness
    challenges necessitated a reduction of the number of F/A-18 aircraft
    assigned to squadrons from 12 to 10. Exacerbating our concerns in
    aviation is a potential exodus of seasoned pilots and maintenance
    personnel to the commercial airline industry. We ask for your support
    for the fiscal resources we have requested to retain the talent in
    which we have invested. With the continued support of Congress, Marine
    aviation will recover its readiness by recapitalizing our aging fleet,
    while at the same time accelerating the procurement of new aircraft to
    meet our future needs and support our ground forces.
    Conclusion
        The unpredictability of the security environment and unknown future
    facing our Nation today reaffirms the wisdom of the 82nd Congress--the
    vital need of a strong force-in-readiness. Marines are honored to serve
    in this role. We do not want to enter a fair fight; therefore, we must
    build a 5th Generation Marine Corps that has no peer on the
    battlefield. As we continue to innovate, leverage technology, and
    invest in new systems, our current plan includes advanced infantry
    weapons, the rapid procurement of the Amphibious Combat Vehicle and
    Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, long-range precision fires, and counter-
    UAS capabilities. It also increases fielding rates of the F-35B and C,
    continues the CH-53K procurement, begins research and development of a
    Group 4/5 unmanned aerial system capable of being sea-based, and
    continues to build manned-unmanned teaming capabilities. The plan as
    described depicts a roadmap to rebuild and modernize America's Marine
    Corps. With the continued support of Congress in addressing present
    challenges and shortfalls, we will be better postured to fight and win
    our Nation's battles now and into the future. The American people
    expect and deserve nothing less from their Marine Corps.

        Chairman McCain. Well, thank you very much.
        Admiral Richardson and General Neller, what are the
    implications of returning to a Budget Control Act level of
    spending in fiscal year 2018?
        Admiral Richardson. Sir, as we have talked about, we have
    been trying to restore readiness, restore wholeness, and
    provide a firm foundation.
        Chairman McCain. Will 3 percent real growth do that for
    you?
        Admiral Richardson. Sir, we are ready to defend this
    budget, but it is clear that we need more and a Budget Control
    Act, a BCA level of funding would reverse any kind of gains----
        Chairman McCain. What about a 3 percent real growth?
        Admiral Richardson. Sir, we look forward to about a 5
    percent growth is what the projections are.
        Chairman McCain. When do you project your services will
    achieve full-spectrum readiness under the present scenario?
        Admiral Richardson. For the Navy, that looks to be in the
    early 2020s.
        Chairman McCain. General?
        General Neller. It will be about that same time, Chairman.
    Full-spectrum in a future fight, though, is going to take more
    than that because the spectrum has expanded to cyber, to space,
    the information, long-range precision munitions, electronic
    warfare. So the capabilities that we have today are adequate,
    but they are not going to be adequate for the future.
        Chairman McCain. Both of you referred to the fact that
    according to various studies, in particular one from RAND,
    although that was one from several, that showed that our
    potential adversaries are closing the potential gaps that exist
    between our capabilities and theirs. Is that your view,
    Admiral?
        Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir, it is.
        General Neller. Yes, it is, Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. You know, one of the great disasters I
    have seen recently is the LCS. The minimum operational
    capabilities necessary to meet the warfighters' needs for the
    three LCS mission modules have been delayed by a cumulative 26
    years and counting. To date, very few capabilities have reached
    IOC. Guns, boats, helicopters, parts of the mine hunting
    package without the ability to find mines or any antisubmarine
    warfare capability.
        Who is responsible and who has been held accountable? We
    will begin with you, Admiral Richardson.
        Admiral Richardson. Sir, I will be the accountable person
    for that, and I am committed to making sure that we take the
    LCS fleet----
        Chairman McCain. When you say held accountable, have you
    been reduced in rank? Have you been--in other words, you have
    been held responsible. I said not only who is responsible but
    who has been held accountable. Any change in your lifestyle
    since we have had three LCS mission modules delayed by 26 years
    and counting?
        Admiral Richardson. Well, we have taken several measures to
    make that LCS fleet more capable. We are working to rationalize
    that program both from the way we organize and operate, the way
    we man, the way we train that force, and looking to increase
    the lethality and survivability of the LCS fleet as well. I
    will be accountable for that, sir.
        Chairman McCain. Everybody agreed that we needed one. All
    of a sudden, now we need three. How did that happen? Can you
    explain that to me?
        Admiral Richardson. Sir, we are committed to, as you said,
    moving towards a more capability and more lethal and survivable
    frigate program. And the bridge between now and that program
    when we let that contract in 2020 will not only contribute to
    the small surface combatants but also contribute to the health
    of the industrial base.
        Chairman McCain. When did it happen? We were told for most
    of the year, about 364 days, that all they needed was one, and
    all of a sudden, bang, now we need three. How did that process
    transpire? Can you tell me?
        Admiral Richardson. Sir, we continue to learn about the
    industrial base and we react as we get that information.
        Chairman McCain. I see. So for most of the year, you were
    given one set of information and then in the brief week to 10
    days, we were given additional information that called for two
    additional LCSs. Is that how the system works?
        Admiral Richardson. Sir, we get the information. We learn
    in real time and we provide you information as soon as we get
    it.
        Chairman McCain. Well, I would be interested in, if you do
    not mind, for the record how we jumped from one LCS to three
    just literally in a matter of days after months of being told
    that we would only need one. There is more there than meets the
    eye, Admiral, I say with great respect.
        [The information follows:]

        Admiral Richardson. The Navy's 2016 Force Structure Assessment
    revalidated the requirement for 52 Small Surface Combatants (SSC).
    While a Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) provides valuable capability as a
    focused-mission ship, the Navy is transitioning to the more capable,
    multi-mission Guided Missile Frigate (FFG(X)). To allow adequate time
    to define the FFG(X) requirements, thoroughly evaluate design
    alternatives and mature the design, the Fiscal Year 2018 President's
    Budget (PB-18) defers the first year of FFG(X) procurement to fiscal
    year 2020 with additional LCS being procured in fiscal year 2018 and
    fiscal year 2019. Changes to LCS and FFG(X) procurement will have no
    effect on deliveries and deployments of LCS in the near term and will
    result in the FFG(X) having much greater warfighting capability and
    flexibility to meet Fleet and combatant commanders' requirements. The
    original PB-18 request included one LCS in fiscal year 2018, which,
    when combined with the LCS Congress added in the fiscal year 2017
    Appropriations Act, would allow the Navy to leverage past and current
    investments in our shipyard workforce and infrastructure. To further
    reinforce the SSC industrial base, the Navy's PB-18 request was amended
    to include two LCS. Until a force of 52 SSCs is achieved, there is
    operational risk. The Navy is also seeing challenges in meeting the
    requirements for attack submarines (51 against a requirement of 66) and
    large surface combatants (87 against a requirement of 104). Operational
    risks associated with these shortfalls can be mitigated by using
    alternate platforms, such as amphibious ships or Expeditionary Mobile
    Base ships, to deliver the capabilities necessary to conduct the
    required missions.

        Chairman McCain. Secretary Stackley, the Navy breached the
    cost cap for CVN-78. Do you believe that it has?
        Secretary Stackley. Sir, right now our estimate for CVN-
    78--we are trying to hold it within the $12.887 billion number
    that was established several years ago. We have included a $20
    million request in this budget pending our determination
    regarding repairs that are required for the----
        Chairman McCain. Is that a breach of Nunn-McCurdy?
        Secretary Stackley. Not at this point in time, sir. We are
    going to continue to evaluate whether that additional funding
    will be required. We are doing everything we can to stay within
    the existing cap, and we will keep Congress informed as we
    complete our post-delivery assessment.
        Chairman McCain. The problem is we have not been informed.
    So either bust the cap and breach Nunn-McCurdy or you notify
    us. You have not done either one.
        Secretary Stackley. Sir, we have been submitting monthly
    reports regarding the carrier. We have alerted the concern
    regarding the repairs that are being required for the motor-
    turbine generator set, and we have acknowledged the risk
    associated with those repairs. However, what we are trying to
    do is not incur those costs--avoid costs by other means, and as
    of right now, we are not ready to trip that cost cap.
        Chairman McCain. Well, it is either not allowable or it is
    allowable. If it is not allowable, then you take a certain
    course of action. If it is allowable, then you are required to
    notify Congress. You have done neither.
        Secretary Stackley. If we need to incur those costs, they
    will be allowable costs. We are trying to avoid that at this
    stage in time, sir.
        Chairman McCain. I agree. But we were supposed to be
    notified. I can tell you that you are either in violation of
    Nunn-McCurdy, or you are in violation of the requirement that
    we be notified. You have done neither. There are two scenarios.
        Secretary Stackley. Sir, we have not breached the cost cap.
    If it becomes apparent that we will need to go above the cost
    cap, we will notify Congress within the terms that you all have
    established.
        Chairman McCain. Okay. Well, I will get it to you in
    writing, but you still have not answered the question because
    when there is a $20 million cost overrun, it is either
    allowable and then we have to be notified one way. If it is not
    allowable, Nunn-McCurdy is breached. But anyway, maybe you can
    give us a more satisfactory explanation in writing, Mr.
    Secretary.
        [The information follows:]

        Secretary Stackley. Section 122 of the John Warner National
    Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2007, as
    amended, establishes a $12,887 million cost cap (in FY 2013
    dollars) on the total amount of procurement funds that may be
    made available for the CVN 78. The Navy is working diligently
    to hold costs within that cap.
        The Navy has included a $20 million request in this budget
    pending our determination regarding repairs required to the
    damaged Main Turbine Generator #1, which occurred during first-
    of-class shipboard testing. We will continue to evaluate
    whether that additional funding will be required, and will keep
    Congress informed as we complete our post-delivery assessment.
    If it becomes apparent that we will exceed the cost cap, we
    will notify Congress within the terms established by Section
    122.

        The President's budget request includes a down-select for a
    new frigate. What has changed from the previous frigate
    acquisition strategy?
        Admiral Richardson. Sir, I will speak to that. I will tell
    you that the threat has changed. It has become more
    challenging. The way we operate has changed, operating the
    fleet under new concepts. We want that frigate to be relevant
    in a distributed maritime operational concept. And so the
    combination of those two, with any changes in the fiscal
    environment, have caused us to readdress the requirements for
    the frigate.
        Chairman McCain. Does it frustrate you at all that the
    President's budget request includes a down-select for a new
    frigate in 2020?
        Admiral Richardson. No, sir. It is fine. We are hunkered
    down. We want to get to that transition as quickly as we can.
        Chairman McCain. It is going to take us 2 and a half years
    to have a down-select for a new frigate. Right?
        Admiral Richardson. By the time that we define the
    requirements, which we are just about done with, I will work
    with industry to find what I will call the knees in the curves
    and what is possibly technologically on a cost and schedule and
    risk that is definable. I think 2020 is an aggressive target.
    If we can go faster, we will.
        Chairman McCain. Why is it that there is one of these every
    6 months, and it is a pretty complicated technology that we are
    talking about? Somehow it does not take 2 and a half years to
    include a down-select. Suppose we had a down-select in 2020.
    Then when would we first see the first frigate?
        Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. Our timeline right now--the
    CNO described complete requirements. Our next step is to go out
    to industry to share those requirements with industry. They
    will start their design efforts. We will put a request for
    proposals out in 2018 to get the proposals in 2019 with an
    award in 2020. We would expect industry to complete their
    detailed design. It will take them a year, year and a half to
    complete their detailed design while they order material, about
    a 3-year build span. So we would expect the frigate to be in
    the water ready for delivery in the 2024 time frame.
        Chairman McCain. So we are talking about 7 years.
        Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir.
        Chairman McCain. Is that satisfactory to you?
        Secretary Stackley. Given that we are just now producing
    the requirements document, as the CNO said, if we can
    accelerate that, we will. But what we do not want to do is
    incur additional risk. We do not want to take on the risk that
    they took on in the LCS program where they established non-
    realistic schedules and procedure when the design was not
    mature.
        Admiral Richardson. Sir, if I could add on to that. I think
    we are completely united with you to work with industry to
    accelerate this acquisition process as fast as we can. But as I
    know you know, moving into construction before you have a
    mature design is just a recipe for cost overruns and schedule
    delays that we have lived with before. And so we are working
    very closely with industry in very new ways to try and move
    this faster.
        Chairman McCain. Well, I have well exceeded my time. But
    the A-4 aircraft was--the request was 4 weeks and the aircraft
    was starting production several weeks later. Tell me what has
    changed, Admiral.
        Admiral Richardson. Sir, the process has changed quite a
    bit since the A-4 aircraft.
        Chairman McCain. Compare 7 years over a few weeks that the
    sophistication of the technology is such that it takes 7 years
    to start developing an aircraft as opposed to 4 weeks, or in
    the case of the SR-71, which in those days was not
    unsophisticated, a couple of weeks. There is something wrong
    with the acquisition process, and we have tried to put you in
    charge and engage. We have tried to get the process moved
    forward. Why should it take 2 and a half years for a
    manufacturer to come up with the technology to build an
    aircraft or a ship? Well, these are very vexing problems.
        Senator Reed?
        Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary Stackley, last year in the Defense Authorization
    Act, we expanded some of the authorities under the National
    Sea-Based Deterrence Fund, including the ability to contract
    for continuous production of the common missile compartment for
    the Columbia. Can you estimate how much this has saved the
    taxpayer?
        Secretary Stackley. Sir, across the board in terms of the
    Columbia program, we are leveraging everything that you all
    provided in terms of the National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund
    with the specific regarding the continuous production. And we
    do not target just the Columbia, but what we really are looking
    at is the run of production. We have used numbers on the order
    of $1.2 billion.
        Senator Reed. Of savings.
        Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir, future savings.
        Senator Reed. Future savings.
        Do you need any additional authority for the National Sea-
    Based Fund to accelerate these future savings and to increase
    them?
        Secretary Stackley. In the 2018 budget request, no. But we
    are continuing to explore opportunities. Frankly, there will be
    significant opportunities because what we have got is a very
    unique ship construction program over a period of time, and to
    the extent that the business case supports it, we are going to
    want to be able to pull work to the left as best as possible to
    drive costs down and provide the stability that we need for
    that program.
        There are going to be issues in the industrial base. Today
    we spend a lot of our time with the shipbuilders, but the
    issues that we are going to be tackling next are going to be in
    the industrial base that are layers below the shipbuilders
    where they do not have the stability. They do not have the
    large volume and they do not have the certainty that we will
    need to provide so that they can drive cost out of the material
    that they will be providing to the builders.
        Senator Reed. So essentially you are talking about the
    savings in the supplier base not the final construction phase.
        Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. Half the cost comes through
    the supplier base, and to the extent that we can reduce their
    costs, then we get a compounded benefit.
        Senator Reed. And Secretary Stackley or General Neller,
    this year you are asking for approval of a 7-year multiyear
    contract of the V-22. And the U.S. Code is 5 years. That is the
    law. Why do we need 2 additional years for this multiyear
    procurement contract?
        Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. We are coming to the end of
    production in this 7-year period for the V-22 program. And our
    procurement rates frankly have been stretched over a 7-year
    period. Typically aviation programs will see a tail-up at the
    end of production. So what we are trying to do is capture the
    end of production, avoid the tail-up with economic order
    quantity material procurements inside of the multiyear. We
    would be able to take care of the vendor base early and overall
    drive the cost out of the program to the extent possible. So it
    is more about affordability than any other factor, and between
    our 65 aircraft and potential FMS [foreign military sales], we
    are looking to provide as much stability as possible to the
    industrial base to drive those costs down.
        Senator Reed. So one of the primary factors here is the
    anticipated termination of procurement of the V-22. Is that
    correct?
        Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. We reach our inventory
    objective at the end of the 7-year period.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        The LCS. The chairman has gone into great detail and I
    think very thoughtful detail about this vessel. Admiral
    Richardson, right now, my understanding--and correct me if I am
    wrong. It is not capable of the mine sweeping mission. It is
    not capable of the antisubmarine mission. What missions is the
    ship capable of performing?
        Admiral Richardson. It is currently capable for its anti-
    surface warfare (ASW) mission. Sort of that module has been
    delivered and deployed. The ASW, antisubmarine warfare, and the
    mine countermeasure mission module's capability is on track to
    deliver in time for deployment in the early 2020s, prioritized
    the mine countermeasure mission because, as you know, we are
    running out--we are sunsetting the current capability there.
    But we are devoted to maintaining a continuous capability for
    MCM.
        Senator Reed. There have been some comments that the LCS is
    difficult to keep up with the speed with the carrier task force
    that is moving as fast as it can to avoid detection or
    engagement. Is there any validity to that?
        Admiral Richardson. I will tell you I would take the
    question and say it is not really designed as a ship that would
    operate like that, moving across vast distances with a carrier
    strike group. We would employ that ship in a different way.
        Senator Reed. But as I understand--and again, I am
    certainly not the expert on naval operations, but as we move
    towards the Pacific and particularly as we encounter rising
    adversaries, it is more likely that we be engaged in these
    types of blue water operations. Is that fair?
        Admiral Richardson. That is fair. And that is why we have
    the plan to forward deploy those in Singapore and in theater so
    that they are there providing that presence, contributing to
    that distributed fleet level maritime operation.
        Senator Reed. And, Secretary Stackley, the chairman talked
    in detail about the carrier program, and I just want to
    understand. There is an issue with the catapult system, its
    ability to launch aircraft, particularly aircraft that have all
    of their fuel tanks in place. Apparently it can launch if there
    are no fuel tanks or a few fuel tanks. Is this issue of the
    catapult system different than the issues you addressed in
    terms of the overall capability and cost overruns of the
    carrier?
        Secretary Stackley. I would not describe it that way, sir.
    What we are going through right now is developing the bulletin
    for launch and recovery of the various type model series
    aircraft in the fleet that will be operating off of the
    carrier. And so we started at Lakehurst where we have the land-
    based system, and they basically start slow and build up in
    terms of launching and recovering the aircraft. In that process
    with F-18s with fuel tanks attached, a vibration was detected.
    And so now what they are doing is going back through the
    software and adjusting the system to remove that vibration. And
    so today they are renewing that testing at Lakehurst in advance
    of when we will first do launch/recovery operations on the Ford
    later this summer.
        I am going to call it a systems tuning effort that is
    taking place right now. Each aircraft is, frankly, going to be
    tuned by EMALS, the electromagnetic aircraft launching system,
    so that it optimizes the launch and recovery of those aircraft
    for that configuration.
        Senator Reed. And these problems will be--you are
    anticipating with the new ships these problems will be solved.
        Secretary Stackley. Absolutely, yes, sir.
        Chairman McCain. And how much has been the cost of that
    experiment?
        Secretary Stackley. I would have to get you the specifics
    regarding----
        Chairman McCain. A couple hundred million. Right?
        Admiral Richardson. The total system? Yes, sir.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Inhofe?
        Senator Inhofe. In the committee, we have heard repeatedly
    in recent months from all the Services about the present global
    threat environment that we are in and our lack of adequate
    readiness. At our hearing, we had Dan Coats last month, the
    Director [of National Intelligence]. He highlighted the threats
    from North Korea, China, Russia, Iran, terror networks around
    the country. And as bad as the global threat situation is, it
    does not seem likely to get better in the future.
        Now, the Navy plays a central role in American response to
    all of these threats. And it seems like--my observation is that
    we have heard less from the Navy about the threats and our
    readiness situation than we have the other Services. Would you
    like to get on record now? Do you agree with the rest of the
    Services about the level of threat and the inadequacy of our
    response? Any comments?
        Admiral Richardson. Sir, I completely agree, and I have
    been clear and consistent and on the record about the fact that
    our margin is eroding, that the threats are rising, and we need
    to move faster.
        Senator Inhofe. And you too, General Neller?
        General Neller. Sir, I think we have been maybe not as
    animated but pretty consistent in our comments on our concern
    about the closing gap between potential adversaries and
    ourselves and our need for modernization----
        Senator Inhofe. That closing gap. That is a scary thing. I
    think when you say maybe more animated, maybe we need to be
    more animated because--and I have said this several times--we
    at this table up here do not have the credibility that you guys
    in uniform have to let the American people know what this
    threat is. And so I would just encourage more.
        General Neller. Senator, I hear you. I would say if you
    read--and I will just state it. In our Force 2020, our Marine
    operational concept, the tenet is we are not currently
    organized, trained, and equipped to face a peer adversary in
    the year 2025. And that is where we need to go.
        Senator Inhofe. General Neller, the first operation of the
    F-35 squadron, VMFA-121, declared its initial operating
    capability in 2015. Earlier this year, they relocated to Japan,
    becoming the first forward-deployed permanent F-35 squadron.
    The squadron participated in joint exercises with South Korean
    partners earlier this year, and we got lots of good reports.
    Would you kind of elaborate on how well they did?
        General Neller. Yes, sir. One hundred twenty-one did some
    operations on the Korean Peninsula. They just recently went to
    Alaska and operated in an Air Force joint combined operation up
    there, kind of a version of Red Flag up there. I have not
    gotten the classified report, but from every report that I have
    received, their ability to operate, taking advantage of their
    fifth generation capabilities, be stealthy, not be seen, take
    advantage of that, and gain a high ratio of kills to losses
    over the adversary has been pretty consistent. I do not want to
    get into the specifics of that.
        And their readiness, which was something with a new
    airplane, because as the CNO said, one thing that the
    appropriations in 2017 and what 2018 does, we have underfunded
    our parts and spares, not just for ground equipment but for
    aviation equipment. And so we are working on that. And their
    readiness has been about what we expected. We have run into
    some problems. I have met with the squadron CO [commanding
    officer] in Iwakuni, and there were some things we did not know
    about getting parts and spares in through a foreign country and
    some customs things, and we are working through that. They
    actually have better readiness in Alaska, being in the United
    States, than they did because of their ability to get access to
    parts. But they are doing actually a little bit better
    maintenance-wise, and operationally they are doing everything
    that we expected.
        Senator Inhofe. Yes. Well, maintenance is another area. I
    wanted to get a couple things on the record. You know, we get
    the reports that I guess 62 percent or so, 63 percent of the F-
    18s are broken, are not working properly. Fourty-seven percent
    of all of the naval aircraft are having problems. Our depots
    are critical. As chair of the Readiness Subcommittee, which I
    have been for a number of years, I understand the key role that
    depots play in sustaining our aging force. And we have an aging
    force that we have never had anything like before.
        I have been encouraged by the Air Force depot operations at
    Tinker, and I have seen firsthand how they are extending the
    service life to planes that we never thought we would have to
    be doing this at this age. And they are keeping the airmen
    flying, all the while saving about $2.4 billion. So they are
    doing a good job in the depots.
        A GAO report--I think it was in June just a couple weeks
    ago--concluded--and quoting from this--``the readiness recovery
    for the Navy is premised on the adherence to deployment and
    maintenance schedules.'' And they are critical that the Navy
    has had difficulty completing maintenance on time. Do you agree
    with that criticism, Secretary Stackley?
        Secretary Stackley. Yes, I do, sir. And we have been
    pulling every lever we can to improve upon that. But that has
    been part of the challenges that we are dealing with.
        Senator Inhofe. It is another challenge.
        Secretary Stackley. In the particular case of the aircraft,
    we are bringing aircraft that had been flying above their
    historic fly rates into the depots, trying to extend their
    service life from 6,000 hours designed up to 9,000 and greater.
    And what that all adds up to is a lot of unknowns when you are
    bringing them in the depot that result in an extended period of
    time to take care of either adding to service life or taking
    care of the necessary repairs. So we are trying to learn from
    that history, become far more predictive so when the Super
    Hornets enter that same stage, that we have a far better
    engineering understanding of what needs to be done and we are
    better postured and prepared to do the work.
        Senator Inhofe. A good clarification.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator McCaskill?
        Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, I am sure all of you are acutely aware--and the
    chairman made some passing reference to it in his opening
    statement--about the atrocious level of readiness when it comes
    to F-18 Super Hornets currently in the Navy and Marine Corps.
    Recent numbers listed up to 62 percent of the F-18s and 74
    percent of the Marine F-18s as unfit to fly and grounded
    pending needed maintenance. This readiness rate puts increased
    strain on those aircraft that are still air-worthy as they pick
    up the slack, which just exacerbates the problem.
        I was heartened when I learned that a plan was being
    discussed to order 24 more of these tried and true aircraft on
    existing production lines. I was equally disheartened when that
    number arrived at our office as the number of 14.
        Since this has been the number one slot in the unfunded
    priority list for the third year in a row, I need to understand
    how that 24 number got to 14 and what those 10 fighter jets--
    the money for those--what that was used to pay for.
        Secretary Stackley. Yes, ma'am. Let me start with this and
    maybe the CNO would like to join.
        We do not look at just the fiscal year 2018 column. We look
    at the total number of Super Hornets that we need to add to our
    inventory to address the challenges that we are going to be
    facing when the Super Hornet is going through the same service
    life extension program that the legacy F-18s are. And we think
    that we need a solid 80, and that number may go up. We will
    have to see our review during the POM-19 [program objective
    memorandum] process. To meet a solid 80 that we have laid in
    over the 5-year program.
        In the near year, 2018, when we look at industrial base
    considerations, we also factor in foreign military sales. So we
    are working hard on the foreign military sales side, which I
    think you are well familiar with that involves a significant
    quantity of aircraft which, in addition to the 14 that we have
    laid into the budget, gives us that front-end stability. And
    then as you look in the following years in the FYDP, the 5-year
    defense plan, we get to our ultimate 80.
        Bottom line is we believe we need a solid 80 as a threshold
    in terms of dealing with the risks associated with our TACAIR
    [tactical air] in the future. The 14 in fiscal year 2018
    reflects a balance between our budget constraints and bringing
    in foreign military sales aircraft to manage across the
    industrial base. That is kind of the crux of it.
        And one minor correction. The readiness issues that you
    cited for our strike fighters--those are our legacy F-18s that
    are suffering those numbers. Right now, the Super Hornets are
    doing well. They are doing well. They have not entered that
    stage of their service life where we are seeing the challenges
    that we are seeing today on the legacy, and we want to get out
    in front of that.
        Admiral Richardson. Ma'am I will add on to that.
        First, I agree with everything that the Secretary said. And
    these aircraft will help maintain inventory as the Super
    Hornets enter that life cycle extension program. We are working
    very closely with industry. As the Secretary said, we are
    learning the lessons of the legacy Hornets so that that process
    goes much smoother. But we are going to need about 80 aircraft
    to maintain inventory while they go into their life cycle
    extension.
        Senator McCaskill. So the number that was arrived at was
    for production stability in light of budget constraints as
    opposed to using 10 of those jets to pay for some other system.
        Admiral Richardson. The first requirement was the total
    number of aircraft we need, and then we had to figure out how
    best to buy that within our budget constraints.
        Senator McCaskill. Got it.
        Back in 2016, General Neller--and at that hearing, I
    believe General Milley was here with you. We have been briefed.
    The staff has been briefed in January where the service
    representatives responsible for monitoring and providing
    briefings on the topic stated full gender integration appears
    to be moving forward as intended and, most significantly,
    stated no measurable negative impact on readiness.
        With that briefing in January, I would like to repeat the
    question I asked of you in 2016 when I asked if you supported
    the measure to require women to register for the selective
    service. At that point in time, you indicated that you did,
    along with General Milley. I just wanted to double check and
    make sure that you still believe that it is an important step
    forward that we require all Americans to register for selective
    service, not just one gender.
        General Neller. It is my personal opinion, yes.
        Senator McCaskill. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Cotton?
        Senator Cotton. Thank you.
        Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony.
        Every other member of this committee so far has spoken
    about the budget, so I will as well. I will simply reiterate
    today and maybe every time in the future, as Cato did with
    Carthage, the Budget Control Act must be repealed. The 112th
    Congress was not the Constitutional Convention. The Budget
    Control Act is not the Constitution. Congress has made it clear
    that we cannot abide by those caps, so why do we simply not
    repeal it and do our constitutional duty of appropriating money
    every single year, in particular since every Senator on this
    dais from Deb Fischer to that end and Joe Donnelly to that end
    did not even vote on the Budget Control Act.
        General Neller, I had the opportunity yesterday to attend
    the funeral of one of your marines at Arlington National
    Cemetery. Thank you for sending a representative there. Private
    1st Class Larry Roberts was a sniper. He died in November, 1943
    in the Tarawa Atoll. He, along with several others, could not
    be identified for decades, but ultimately, thanks to the work
    of Honor Flights and the Defense POW/MIA [Prisoner of War/
    Missing in Action] Accounting Agency his remains were
    identified and he was laid to rest. He had a small family,
    obviously, as an 18-year-old man who sacrificed his life 74
    years ago. He did not have a wife or children. But the children
    of his parents' siblings were there to pay their respects. In
    some ways, I feel that the people who most need to know about
    that funeral are your marines and your sailors and our soldiers
    and our airmen that if they go missing or captured or are
    killed, that our country will spare no expense. We will not
    rest. We will bear any burden to find them and bring them home
    and let them rest in honor the way they deserve.
        You said earlier, General Neller, in response to a question
    from Mr. Inhofe that you were not organized to face a peer
    adversary in 2025. Could you explain more about why that is the
    case?
        General Neller. Congressman, since 9/11, we have organized,
    trained, and equipped the force to fight a counterinsurgency
    and conduct stability ops. The training that I had as a junior
    officer and then later as a regimental commander to fight
    primarily a combined arms fight against a peer ground combat
    force was not required. And so we did what we needed to do to
    meet the current threat. And we recognized several years ago--
    many of my predecessors--that we had started to lose our
    capability to conduct combined arms in the more traditional
    sense.
        Now when you take the current operating environment and
    what we anticipate the future operating environment, when you
    add space, cyber, information, the long-range precision
    weapons, the use of different capabilities, active protection
    systems, unmanned aircraft, our adversaries have taken this
    time when we have been focused on CT [counter-terrorism] and
    the insurgencies to develop these capabilities. And although we
    still retain one-on-one against them, I think, an edge, the
    edge has closed. And so we need to look at our force and the
    capabilities we have.
        So our intent is, with the end strength of 185,000 we have
    been given by the appropriations, to start that process, to
    increase the number of marines that do electronic warfare,
    increase the number of marines that do command and control,
    increase the number of marines that do cyber, increase the
    number of marines that do information, that do air defense and
    those capabilities that we think are going to be important in
    that type of an environment. And if we are able to grow the
    force, we will continue to add to that capability and, at the
    same time, remodernize the legacy force and make it more
    survivable and lethal.
        Senator Cotton. To achieve decisive victory over a peer
    competitor in 2025, it sounds like you are stressing more the
    skill sets and the training that your marines have rather than
    the absolute number of marines you need?
        General Neller. You get into the question, Senator, as you
    know, of capacity and capability. So right now, the focus is on
    the capability sets. And it is going to take a long time. With
    all due respect to my own tribe, the infantry tribe, I can make
    a competent individual infantry marine in about 6 to 9 months.
    It is probably a little bit longer now because the requirements
    are much more complicated.
        But the marines and, I would say, the sailors, the airmen,
    and the soldiers we are going to need in the future to do these
    other things are going to be expensive and are going to take
    time to grow and build. You've got to recruit them. You've got
    to find them. You've got to train them, and then you have got
    to keep them. So right now, we are focused on capacity--or on
    capability over capacity, but eventually we are going to have
    to get to the capacity question.
        Senator Cotton. Admiral Richardson, you face some of the
    same challenges with personnel. You have introduced a number of
    talent management programs to recruit, train, and retain the
    best people. Could you give us an update on that and maybe
    discuss the next steps, especially as it relates to pilots
    since we have seen the kind of pressures the Air Force faces
    with their pilots?
        Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir. And I agree completely with
    the Commandant in terms of what the stressors are and how to
    achieve that balance between capability and capacity. You have
    got to be there with credible options to provide decision-
    makers the options that the Navy and the Marine Corps team is
    responsible for delivering.
        In terms of talent management, we have got our Sailor 2025
    initiative which really is a bundle of about 40 different
    initiatives that get after that.
        With respect to your specific question on pilots, the very
    most urgent thing we have to do is get their aircraft ready to
    fly. Our pilots joined the Navy and the Marine Corps to fly
    high performance aircraft. That is why they came. That is why
    they want to stay, and so that is our first priority.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you.
        Senator Reed [presiding]. On behalf of Chairman McCain,
    Senator Blumenthal, please.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Senator Reed.
        Welcome, gentlemen, and thank you for your extraordinary
    service and for your candid and forthcoming answers today.
        Admiral Richardson, you know of my longstanding support for
    our undersea warfare superiority. And I was very, very
    gratified to see that the Navy has heeded my calls and others
    and added a second Virginia-class submarine in fiscal year 2021
    where there was previously just one because of the beginning of
    the Columbia-class production. This signals that the Navy is
    confident that the industrial base has that capability and, I
    take it, ready to meet the challenge.
        I see that the budget allows for an accelerated fleet plan
    for fiscal year 2021, but it deviates from the plan in fiscal
    year 2022, which has no additional money for attack submarines.
    Can you explain that fact?
        Admiral Richardson. Sir, we continue to work very closely
    with the industrial base within the fiscal guidance that we
    have to maximize and maintain our undersea superiority. As you
    know, sir, because you are so deeply involved, many parts of
    that industrial base have really been leaned out by the sort of
    minimum production rates that we have got, particularly the
    nuclear part of that industrial base where we are in many areas
    the sole customer and there is only one provider. So I have got
    the team looking at what is the capacity, provided stable and
    consistent funding that sent that signal of confidence from the
    government that they would invest in new production lines, et
    cetera to maybe increase the rates further still.
        Senator Blumenthal. Let me just cut through what I think
    you are saying. You have doubts about the capability of the
    industrial base to produce that additional submarine in fiscal
    year 2022?
        Admiral Richardson. No, sir, no doubts. I just want to make
    sure that we are understanding the theoretical limits of that
    base to see how far we can go.
        Senator Blumenthal. Well, I want to make sure that we
    understand the practical limits and what we meet and exceed
    those limits because we need to produce that additional
    submarine in fiscal year 2022. Would you agree?
        Admiral Richardson. We will take every submarine that we
    can get right now, sir.
        Senator Blumenthal. Well, I do not know quite how to put it
    more bluntly, but I hope that we can work together because I
    will do whatever is necessary to make sure that we have both
    the funding and the capability in terms of training and skill
    education and so forth in Connecticut, which is where we
    produce submarines, to make sure that we meet that schedule
    because I consider it vital to our national security.
        Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir. I agree.
        Secretary Stackley. Sir, can I offer----
        Senator Blumenthal. Yes. I am sorry. Mr. Secretary?
        Secretary Stackley. In the defense strategy review leading
    into the 2019 budget request, we are going to be taking a very
    hard look at this. Our domination of the undersea domain is
    clear today. We have to ensure that we do not lose that grip,
    and the CNO's future fleet plan highlights the need for
    additional attack submarines.
        That all said, we are just today at the point in which we
    are producing two Virginia-class submarines per year. We are
    going to add the Ohio replacement, the Columbia 2. That will
    get us to three. Going the next step to three Virginias per
    year, commensurate with the Columbia-class, that is another
    element of risk.
        So while we are going to look at it hard and we are going
    to determine what needs to be done, we have not done that yet.
    We will do that with full collaboration with the Congress
    because we all have to be in this together. So as we go through
    the review, as we identify the risks, the steps that would need
    to be taken, we will work closely with you and the other
    interested members of committees to determine what is possible
    and then how to get there.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. I look forward to working
    with you on that issue.
        General Neller, in your testimony, you note that the CH-53K
    is, quote, ``the only maritime heavy lift helicopter capable of
    supporting current and future warfighting concepts.'' I take
    that statement and others in your testimony as a strong
    endorsement of this program. Can you please explain to the
    committee why you consider this aircraft so important and why
    the funding should be authorized for the additional helicopters
    in the NDAA, please?
        General Neller. Well, Senator, we need a marinized aircraft
    to stay aboard ship so it is not affected by corrosion, and we
    have to be able to lift all parts of the ground combat element
    ashore. The CH-53K is going to lift a third more than any other
    helicopter in the world, including the CH-53 Echo we have now,
    which was fielded in 1981. So the capabilities of this
    airplane--it is a completely new airplane, composite body,
    wider, incredibly more powerful, and we believe it is going to
    be more reliable, which will drive the cost down. So we could
    put money back in the 53 Echo, but we decided several years ago
    that that just was not cost effective, and we are resetting
    those airplanes, the Echoes, now because their readiness was
    actually near that or maybe even more dramatically bad than the
    F-18s. So we need this airplane. We need new iron.
        The aircraft is on schedule. We are watching the price very
    closely because there are some price concerns, but I think we
    are in a good place. But we would ask that we get the support
    to continue to procure this airplane. And I will do my very
    best to monitor the progress and make sure it is on time and on
    schedule and on cost.
        Senator Blumenthal. Well, I just thank you and conclude by
    saying I agree strongly that the CH-53E, as you say in your
    testimony, should be replaced, not extended, and I hope the
    committee will join in that view. Thank you.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        On behalf of the chairman, Senator Rounds, please.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, sir.
        Gentlemen, thank you for your service to our country.
        I would like to talk about readiness. I would like to talk
    specifically about spare parts and maintenance. General Neller,
    I think to Senator Inhofe's question, you were pushing pretty
    hard to talk about the need for spare parts and the need to be
    able to repair the equipment that you have got. I would like to
    give you an opportunity to share just how serious the situation
    is right now and the need to continue to improve the
    availability of parts for all aspects of the operations that
    you are responsible for, sir.
        General Neller. Well, thank you, Senator.
        As I have learned as we have gone through the fiscal year
    2017 and the 2018 budget, particularly the aviation but to some
    degree with the ground equipment, we have not funded parts and
    spares at our requisite level. You would think it would have
    been funded at 100 percent but it was funded well below that,
    in some cases at 75 percent. So if you fund readiness or parts
    and spares at 75 percent, the best you can expect is 75 percent
    readiness. You want 100 percent readiness, you've got to pay
    for the parts and spares and that costs money.
        So to Senator McCaskill's comment about F-18s, right now of
    the F-18s that we require, we have 75 ready basic aircraft, but
    of those that are on the line, 47 are short parts right today.
    Now I get parts. I can fix those airplanes. Now, they may be on
    a schedule of service.
        And I can say that same about ground equipment.
        So we are making it and we are making the ready force as
    forward deployed on the backs of our soldiers, sailors, airmen,
    and marines that are out there taking parts off one end item
    and putting it on another to get that one ready to go, so
    they've got to do all the work twice. I do not want them to
    have to do that because it takes extra work and then it goes
    back to what the CNO said. Okay, we are the top dog in this
    league and you are going to give me the parts to fix this
    stuff. And my aircrew want to fly, and the maintainers should
    not have to do the work twice.
        So we would ask your support, I think, in the proposed
    budget for 2018, and you will see some more of that in the
    supplemental is focused on continuing that. What we have
    started now is a beginning movement toward improved readiness.
    There is slight but consistent improvement. I mean, the number
    of ready basic aircraft that we have on the line is almost 90
    more than it was a year ago. It is still not where it needs to
    be. No one is declaring victory. But if we get continued
    support for high level parts and spares, we will continue to
    make progress.
        Senator Rounds. Admiral Richardson, I have kind of got the
    same question for you, and that is when it comes to spare parts
    but not just spare parts but also munitions. Do you have the
    munitions and the spare parts that you need to do your job?
        Admiral Richardson. Well, with respect to aviation, it is
    one team with the Marine Corps. It is naval aviation that we
    talk about. And so those problems that the Commandant
    highlighted--that is a naval aviation situation. And so we
    share that. And I would say that we both share also the
    shortfall in munitions. And so the budget request before the
    Congress now includes almost record level funding for parts
    funded to the maximum executable value there to restore those
    parts and then also includes funding for more munitions.
        Senator Rounds. Which munitions are you short today?
        Admiral Richardson. What we would call the preferred
    munitions. So these are precision munitions. Those are the ones
    that are most used and will be most useful in the fight, and
    then undersea weapons as well, torpedoes.
        Senator Rounds. Senator Inhofe also talked a little bit
    about depot and depot activity. I am just curious. You do
    depots particularly for aviation, and you operate them. You are
    having challenges right now because you have got a whole lot of
    F/A-18s that have got to undergo a lot of work, work that has
    not been done in the past but it needs to be done now because
    of their age.
        It seems to me that the Air Force would be challenged in
    the same way. They have got aircraft that they are putting
    hours on as well.
        Is there a formal avenue for Air Force and Navy depots to
    share information concerning best practices?
        Admiral Richardson. Sir, there is an avenue. I would have
    to check on exactly the formality of that. But we are
    collaborating and learning lessons back and forth in just about
    everything that regards aviation.
        Senator Rounds. Is there a formalized process to look at
    best practices at a depot in terms of where, one, the Navy or
    the Air Force are working and learning the best ways to do it
    and sharing systems analysis between the two?
        Admiral Richardson. There is.
        Mr. Secretary, do you want to----
        Secretary Stackley. Sir, that is clearly an opportunity
    where we can do better. It is an informal process. There is
    close dialogue right now between the systems commands, Navy,
    Marine Corps, Air Force. But when we look at the practices
    across the depots, they are very different. And so now we are
    informally pulling out the best practices. It is an opportunity
    that we have got to take advantage of and we are working on it.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you. Thank you, sir.
        My time has expired.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
        On behalf of the chairman, Senator Donnelly, please.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you all for your service.
        I appreciate the commitment you made to improving the
    mental health and resiliency of our servicemembers and
    families. I brought this up to every service and to Secretary
    Mattis earlier this week. As you may know, Congress passed the
    Sexton Act as a part of the fiscal year 2015 NDAA requiring
    every service provide a robust annual mental health assessment
    for every servicemember. It is the law.
        I have been told in the past that the Sexton Act
    requirements would be fully implemented in the Navy and Marine
    Corps by the date of October 2017. Admiral, can you confirm you
    are still on target?
        Admiral Richardson. Sir, we are still on target.
        Senator Donnelly. General, can you confirm you are still on
    target?
        General Neller. Yes, sir, to the best of my knowledge.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
        General, I would also like to invite you, if you have the
    time. We have Naval Surface Warfare Center-Crane in Indiana.
    They do a lot of work for the Corps, do a lot of terrific work
    for the Corps. And if you can figure out a way to get there, we
    would love to have you.
        General Neller. Yes, sir. I will do that because the
    parents of this young man live in Dubois and I need to go back
    and see them anyway.
        Senator Donnelly. I will go with you.
        Admiral Richardson, one of the many areas of Crane's work
    that we have discussed is their contribution to the netted Navy
    vision. Can you tell us more about your current plans on that
    and what we can do to support that vision?
        Admiral Richardson. Sir, the netted Navy vision really is
    that we would provide a complete level of connectivity between
    our Navy and other joint service sensors, including maybe even
    private sector sensors, connect those through our platforms,
    our command centers, and into our payloads. Key to that will be
    making sure that we have the confidence in all of our systems
    down to the chip level that these things are free of tampering,
    that they are integral and cannot be hacked into or do not have
    any kind of a software in them. This is the type of work that
    Crane does for us, getting down to the microscopic level to
    make sure that we are getting what we pay for.
        Senator Donnelly. General, what is your biggest concern
    right now as the commander of the Corps, the biggest challenge
    that you face?
        General Neller. I think the overall readiness of the force,
    and that is more than just the material readiness and the
    airplanes, the helicopters, the tanks, the LAVs [light armored
    vehicles], the weaponry. I believe that that is fixable. My
    concern is the tempo that we are operating under. And we are
    going to get young men and women that want join and we are
    still recruiting, but for the first time, I am seeing that our
    career force, particularly our senior enlisted, are starting to
    show the effects of 15 to 16 years of war. And we need them to
    stay because they are the ones that keep this thing going, and
    then they teach the young marines that come in what right looks
    like.
        So I have some concerns about that, and part of that
    concern I think they have is then you want to see that there is
    commitment from leadership and commitment from the Nation to
    not just recognize what they have done the last 15 years but
    also to make sure that they have got the new equipment and the
    new gear and the new capabilities they need to be successful,
    if and when they have to go back and fight again.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
        Admiral, what is your biggest concern right now?
        Admiral Richardson. Sir, very similar to the Commandant's,
    the current pace of operations and the relative pace of
    improvement, and the gap between that challenge and sort of the
    stable level of support that they need. And that has manifested
    itself in the major discussion we have today in terms of
    readiness. It will continue to manifest itself in the future in
    terms of modernization. And that will come back and start to
    affect our most valuable asset, which is our people where you
    have been focused like a laser on making sure we take care of
    the people. Once that happens in an all-volunteer force, that
    is very difficult to recover. It takes a long time to build a
    sergeant or a chief petty officer, and that is a difficult
    thing. If they leave, that is hard to recover.
        Senator Donnelly. The last question I would like to ask is
    just in the last few days, an Iranian naval vessel flashed a
    laser on a Marine helicopter. Have you and the Commandant
    worked out a scenario to make sure that our men and women are
    protected, that we take appropriate steps, and that we have
    this figured out in advance as to what we are going to do?
        Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir. All of those commanders in
    theater have the equipment, the rules of engagement, and the
    authorities they need to make sure that they and their teams
    are protected.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Reed. On behalf of Chairman McCain, Senator Ernst,
    please.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, gentlemen, for joining us today. We certainly
    appreciate your dedication and service.
        We have heard a number of points made about acquisition and
    the fact that we need to do this in a much more efficient
    manner. And, Secretary Stackley, I would like to start with
    you, sir.
        I was pleased to hear that the Navy has actually increased
    their outreach to small businesses as a way to speed up the
    failures that we have seen in the acquisition process. And our
    small businesses can provide the Department with a lot of much
    needed products. As a matter of fact, we have a very small
    company in Iowa, in small town Iowa, that provides a pump that
    is on every single Navy ship. And what additional authorities
    can we provide to the Department in order to speed up the
    acquisition process? And how do we increase the outreach that
    we have to those small businesses?
        Secretary Stackley. Yes, ma'am. Let me first start with the
    authorities. I believe we have tremendous authority already,
    and what we have got to do is become better practitioners in
    terms of using those authorities.
        Senator Ernst. And how do we do that?
        Secretary Stackley. I press on our acquisition team. It is
    like go use every authority that you have got, use the great
    weight of the government behind you to tackle some of these
    issues. Do not let, frankly, the bureaucracy become the
    problem. So I think we have authorities that we need, and we
    are not hesitant to come to you all to--frankly, it is not more
    authority that we need--unlock some of the burdens that we have
    got so we can speed up. And I know that the CNO and the
    Commandant and I with our acquisition team--we are trying to
    push the boundary. We want to be told to slow down and not the
    alternative.
        With regards to small business, this takes a lot of work
    and it is work that is well worth it. I can tell you that
    yesterday I walked into the office of the Acting Assistant
    Secretary of the Navy, side by side with the Commander of Naval
    Sea Systems Command. We were sitting down to talk to one small
    business on one matter that this small business had getting
    through a certification with the Naval Sea Systems Command.
        Driving to do this, because we are not going to win foxhole
    by foxhole in the small business arena, but I have got to train
    every acquisition manager, professional that small business is
    your best friend. We have a phrase that we use that small
    business is big business for the Department of the Navy. They
    bring innovation. They bring speed. They bring, frankly, a very
    friendly cost structure. But they are not well adept at dealing
    with the large government. So what we have got to do is tailor
    our processes for them, engage with them, make them a part of
    the team and not have them intimidated or otherwise blocked
    from entry.
        So, first, in terms of authorities, I think we are well
    equipped with authorities. We will not be hesitant to come and
    request additional authorities or relaxations of some of the
    existing language that encumbers us. And with regards to small
    business, we look for every opportunity, every forum. What I
    have got to get is every program manager, every acquisition
    professional to recognize that--it does not have to be a Boeing
    or a Lockheed or a Northrop Grumman or a General Dynamics that
    you are dealing with. You have to start to deal with the small
    businesses that bring the innovation and are so good for the
    Navy.
        Senator Ernst. Very good. I appreciate that, Secretary. So
    the takeaway I think for the committee is that you have the
    authorities you need. You need perhaps less of the regulation
    and rules, less burdensome oversight. Is that correct?
        Secretary Stackley. Yes, ma'am. What has happened over the
    decades is language has been added provision by provision,
    authorization act by authorization act telling us how to do our
    business. And what we are recognizing--I think what everybody
    is recognizing--is all of these interlocking requirements are,
    in fact, slowing us down. What we need is good order and
    discipline, but if we have too much prescriptive language in
    telling us how to do our job, it will slow us down. So we have
    got to work. We have got to tailor where we can within our
    authorities, and we have to work with you all to identify where
    we have what I would call dead language that requires us to do
    things that add no value but that do cost us time and money.
        Senator Ernst. Very good. Thank you. So peeling back some
    of those regulations will be important.
        And just very briefly, General Neller, while we are on
    acquisition, a question to you. Why is the Marine Corps just
    now beginning to look at the M-320 grenade launcher for the
    infantry when the Army has been using this for the past 8
    years? I might think that is a little bit of waste of money if
    the Army has successfully used this for a number of years in
    combat.
        General Neller. Senator, I saw that article today, and that
    is the first time personally. I mean, we talk about weapons. In
    fact, General Shrader was in my office. We talked about ammo,
    M-27, different types of weapons that we are looking at and
    trying to create as much commonality with the Army because they
    can buy in economy of scale. No one has ever come up to me and
    said, hey, the M-203 is not getting it done. We need a new
    grenade launcher. So I will have to get back to you. Clearly,
    though, if it is a better, more effective, more efficient way
    to deliver that particular munition, then we are all over it.
        Just real quick, I am way out of my lane on small business,
    but I will tell you that we talked a lot about stability of the
    budget. And every one of those big contractors out there you
    talked about is really made up, I have learned, of a bunch of
    small businesses. You know, the big guy can survive if there is
    inconsistency in the funding. That small business--they cannot
    because they've got to buy product. They've got to put on
    workers. And if there is a CR, you cannot go. That is what
    kills us because that is where our parts and spares come from
    in many cases, from these small businesses. So that is why it
    so important that we get budget stability.
        But I will get back to you and I owe you an answer on the
    grenade launcher.
        [The information follows:]

        General Neller. The Marine Corps is always interested in
    acquiring combat systems that will enable our marines to
    successfully execute their missions and dominate on the
    battlefield. I will certainly ask Headquarters Marine Corps to
    consider pushing forward on this new grenade launcher to take
    advantage of what the Army has already learned.

        Senator Ernst. Absolutely. Thank you, gentlemen.
        Yes?
        Admiral Richardson. If I could just pile on the acquisition
    piece. We are talking with industry, and those industries that
    do business both in the private sector and the government. I
    think I mentioned in my written statement it is almost like two
    worlds in terms of achieving quality and predictability. So
    just to Secretary Stackley's point, they estimate that that
    overhead costs us 20 percent. And that 20 percent impedance is
    often just too high for small business to get over. And so I
    think that we help the Navy, we help the government, we help
    the taxpayer, and we help small business by cutting through
    that. It is a significant amount.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you very much, gentlemen. I appreciate
    it.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Ernst.
        On behalf of Chairman McCain, Senator Kaine.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you.
        And thanks to all the witnesses for your testimony.
        I just have one question. It is kind of a long-term
    question that I would like you to address. And, Admiral
    Richardson, if you would be first.
        We are grappling with, in some of these hearings, the
    proposal to grow the Navy from 308 ships to 355. And I am on
    the Budget Committee too, and we have folks who are on the
    Budget Committee. We have folks who are appropriators as part
    of this committee. If you are growing the Navy to that level,
    there are other changes that you are going to be contemplating
    as well, depending upon the mixture of ships. Some of the ships
    have aviation support elements to them. So what might that mean
    for naval and marine aviation? Many of those ships have marine
    expeditionary units connected to them. What might that mean for
    the Marines and particularly end strength numbers?
        And I know you are probably early into the thinking about
    this, but let us look down the road a little bit. If we get
    over some of the concerns about sequester and we start to
    budget based on priorities instead of trimming our priorities
    to deal with budget uncertainty, as we grow to 355, what should
    we expect from you to us around additional changes like
    aviation, personnel, et cetera? And if you could each tackle
    that, that would be helpful.
        Admiral Richardson. Sir, I will be happy to start. You have
    hit the nail right on the head, sir. And the idea or the
    concept is wholeness. And so I would advocate that we do not--
    as we grow the Navy, we have to grow it in balance. So
    certainly there is a fundamental role for capacity, more ships.
    But as we do that, we are going to have to make sure, to the
    point that has been very clearly made today, we buy the
    infrastructure to support those ships, the pier space, the
    power, everything they will need to dock those ships, the crews
    to man them, the parts to maintain them, the maintenance
    programs, if there is an aviation component to that, that we
    need to buy the aircraft. And so maintaining that balance as we
    grow will be absolutely critical, otherwise we will just have a
    large and potentially hollow Navy. We will need to maintain
    that wholeness.
        Senator Kaine. Secretary Stackley?
        Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. I think the CNO captured it
    pretty well. Separately I can describe that the CBO
    [Congressional Budget Office] has put out a report that
    describes the cost for a 355-ship Navy. I think they have
    captured some of those additional costs so that we can go into
    this eyes wide open. In the near term, building that Navy you
    described going from a 308-ship Navy to a 355-ship Navy--we are
    not at that 308-ship Navy yet. So we do not get to 308 ships
    until about the 2022 time frame.
        So we are building out the infrastructure, building up the
    manpower, the things that we need to support a 308-ship Navy
    today. What we need to be doing is planning on those additional
    elements that would go as we continue to grow the size of the
    force. And it is not just about ships. It is going to be the
    aviation element. It will be the Marine Corps element.
        And when you take that 355 number and you say what is the
    difference between 308 and 355, the biggest elements are attack
    submarines, destroyers, or a cruiser replacement, one carrier,
    and then getting our amphibs up to the full complement. So
    rather than just talk about a number of 355, you start to look
    at those specific elements. What do we need to grow that
    capability, and what are we going to do in the interim because
    it is going to take a while to get there.
        Senator Kaine. General Neller, how about the Marines' not
    just platforms but some of the personnel that might be involved
    in growing at that level?
        General Neller. Senator, as the Secretary said, the
    majority of the growth is going to be--we get to 38 amphib
    ships. We are doing things with Marine forces now on land that
    we would prefer to be doing from the sea. So I think at our
    structure now, we could support the manning. There are some
    other things. We put combat cargo----
        Senator Kaine. So you might shift some land-based----
        General Neller. We would take people from doing things they
    are doing now. Then we would take advantage of the ships.
        Now, I will also tell you, though, that there are other
    things, as the Secretary and the CNO said. You know, every
    amphib ship--I mean, I've got to put marines on there. I've got
    to put Marine aviation on there. I've got to put Marine combat
    cargo personnel on there. But I have also got to have LCACs
    [landing craft air cushions] and LCUs [landing craft
    utilities]. I've got to have those surface connectors. And you
    look in the budget. That is something that is in the
    supplemental. That is a program. It is not a lot of money. But
    those connectors allow us to do the job and to go from over the
    horizon to put that force ashore, to exchange forces at sea at
    the sea base. So the connectors are something that would
    probably have to be grown, and certainly we would not get there
    if we do not fund the current program that we have.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Thanks to the witnesses.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        On behalf of Chairman McCain, Senator Sullivan, please.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And, gentlemen, thank you for your service and testimony.
        Last year around this time, we had done essentially what
    the Joint Chiefs had requested of the Congress. Our
    Appropriations Committee moved a defense appropriations bill
    out of committee--it was very bipartisan, I think only one
    dissenting Senator--on to the Senate floor. Last summer, we
    moved to vote on it, and unfortunately it was filibustered. So
    we went to the usual playbook of a CR [continuing resolution],
    omnibus at the end.
        A number of us want to try and do that again, not
    filibuster it, but get a no-kidding budget out on the floor,
    voted on. Would that be your preferred course for the men and
    women in the military that we do that? Admiral?
        Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir, by far the preferred course
    to pass the budget using normal procedures.
        Senator Sullivan. General?
        General Neller. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sullivan. Mr. Secretary?
        Secretary Stackley. I would say it is the only acceptable
    course, sir.
        Senator Sullivan. Well, we are going to try and do that.
    And hopefully there will not be another filibuster and
    hopefully there will not be another continuing resolution. That
    is what we should be doing. It is good to hear that that is
    exactly what you want and the other courses of action are not
    helpful to our troops. Is that not correct? You are all
    nodding.
        Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir.
        Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir.
        General Neller. Senator, I think that would go back to
    reinforce what the CNO said. I think it would restore
    confidence in the rank and file of all men and women in the
    Armed Forces that they understand that what is happening in
    this city, they get it that we get it, and----
        Senator Sullivan. And they are watching. Like that
    filibuster last year, people said, oh, nobody saw that. The
    troops saw that.
        Admiral Richardson. You would be amazed, sir, at how
    insightful and tuned in your sailors and marines and soldiers
    are. They are watching this closely. The Commandant and I both
    get out around the world to talk to forward-deployed forces. At
    an all-hands call, a junior sailor will stand up and ask these
    questions. This is the sense that we do not get it that is
    arising. So I fully support that, sir.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
        I wanted to just mention, you know, a number of us, the
    chairman, myself have been working with the service chiefs and
    DOD on the importance of the Pacific laydown of our forces, the
    Marines, the Navy, the Air Force. As the chairman said, we need
    to get this right. We need to make this strategic not tactical.
    If we do not get it right, we are going to be paying for it for
    the next 50 years. I have talked to Secretary Mattis about
    this.
        I just want to mention we look forward to working with you
    because I do believe it needs to be military, executive branch,
    and this committee and the Congress to make sure we get that
    right. So I just want to mention I look forward to continuing
    to working with you, the other service chiefs, and OSD [the
    Office of the Secretary of Defense] on this important
    initiative to getting our Pacific forces laydown correct
    because a lot of us do not think it is optimized right now. It,
    in some way, has been static for decades, and we want to work
    with you on that.
        Admiral Richardson, I want to talk a little bit about the
    Arctic. The Department of Defense in January this year came out
    with a new Arctic strategy. It was directed by this committee
    and the Congress. It is much better than the old one. It talks
    about FONOPS [Freedom of Navigation Operations], opening sea
    lanes, and lines of communication and commerce, transportation,
    protecting the sovereignty of the Arctic, the resources
    particularly as countries like Russia and China continue to
    build up forces and capabilities in the region.
        I read the Arctic's 2014 road map put out by the Navy, the
    Navy's Arctic road map. As we pursue 300 to 355 ships, in this
    strategy it talked about the importance of looking at ice
    hardening some of these ships. What ships would you see we
    would need to look at ice hardening? And do you believe this
    Arctic strategy needs to be updated now that the Secretary of
    Defense has put out a much more robust strategy that was
    directed by this committee?
        Admiral Richardson. Sir, I think that the answer to all
    your questions is precisely the effort that we are undertaking
    this summer as we refresh our strategy in light of the national
    defense strategy review that we are doing.
        Senator Sullivan. So are you going to update this strategy?
        Admiral Richardson. We will update that strategy, yes, sir.
        Senator Sullivan. And in terms of ice hardening ships, we
    have a 355-ship fleet that we are looking at.
        Admiral Richardson. Right.
        Senator Sullivan. What kind of ships would you believe we
    need to ice harden so we can conduct the kind of FONOPS that
    the current strategy lays out but, to be perfectly blunt, we do
    not have the capability to do it?
        Admiral Richardson. It is absolutely true, we do not. We do
    not have the capacity or the capability. And so I owe you those
    answers as an output of the strategic review, sir. I do not
    want to give you a guess right now, but it would be those types
    of ships that would have decisive impact.
        Senator Sullivan. And one final question. During your
    confirmation hearing, you mentioned the importance of working
    with the Coast Guard to cut through the red tape to work on
    upgrading and building out an icebreaker fleet. Right now, we
    have two icebreakers. One is broken. The Russians have 40. They
    are building 13 more. They are controlling what General Mattis
    called strategic terrain of the Arctic. Have you made any
    progress with the Coast Guard on that?
        Admiral Richardson. We have made some progress. We have
    formalized our arrangements in terms of acquiring icebreakers.
    We have set up an office to get started on that. We are looking
    at now the requirements for that icebreaker. We are bringing
    all of our shipbuilding expertise to make sure that we support
    the Coast Guard in executing their mission. And so we have made
    some good progress this year.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain [presiding]. Should an icebreaker cost $1
    billion, Admiral?
        Admiral Richardson. Sir, it does not seem that way, but we
    are working with the Coast Guard to review that.
        Senator Sullivan. And take 10 years to make?
        Admiral Richardson. Sir, it goes back to you need to get
    faster in acquisition.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Gillibrand?
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Welcome, all of you, and thank you for your extraordinary
    service.
        General Neller, can you give us an update on the progress
    that you have made with the Marines United misconduct?
        General Neller. Well, Senator, since I last appeared in
    front of this committee, we had a number of initiatives we have
    taken. We formed a task force of a number of marines, men and
    women, who gave us more insight into this. We have worked with
    NCIS [Naval Criminal Investigative Service]. They have gone
    through literally thousands and thousands of pictures, looking
    for individuals they could identify. We have had people come
    forward. There were eventually 65 subjects. Fifty-nine were
    sent to commands for disposition. Many of them--there was not
    sufficient evidence to forward them. To date, there were 33
    dispositions. The rest are still under investigation, resulting
    in one administrative separation, five NJPs [non-judicial
    punishments], 20 adverse administrative actions, and no action.
    There were also two other NJPs, and there is one pending a
    court martial.
        So we have not stopped. We have required every marine to
    sign an administrative acknowledgement that they understand
    what their responsibilities are on social media and that
    actions that would degrade, defame, be derogatory, discrediting
    to another marine or to the institution make them potentially
    subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice. I know that
    the Congress has worked and we are working with the Congress on
    certain legislation about the use of someone else's picture on
    social media without their permission. I have gone personally,
    as all of my leaders have gone, and spoken to literally tens of
    thousands of marines and made them understand what their
    responsibilities are.
        And more importantly, I think--and I have said this
    publicly and I will say it here in front of this committee--the
    social media things that we have seen have been--were just
    indicative of a problem with our culture that we did not
    properly respect or value the contributions of women in our
    Corps. And that is the problem we have to fix.
        Senator Gillibrand. So out of the 65 subjects, none have
    been court martialed?
        General Neller. One is pending, ma'am.
        Senator Gillibrand. And what does that mean?
        General Neller. That they are in the process of getting the
    article 32 and whether they will end up going to a court
    martial.
        Senator Gillibrand. And were any of the people--were any of
    the 65 subjects commanders?
        General Neller. Not to my knowledge, but I would have to
    take that for the record and get back to you.
        [The information follows:]

        General Neller. No, none of the 65 subjects were commanders. Judge
    Advocate Division (JAD) reviewed all reports that have been input into
    the DASH system since the beginning of the Marines United scandal. No
    commander has been the subject of a complaint. JAD also confirmed this
    information with the Equal Opportunity and Diversity Management Branch
    (MPE) in Manpower and Reserve Affairs. JAD and MPE work together to
    track reported cases of social media misconduct.

        Senator Gillibrand. I am concerned that for those who were
    found to have been--are being held responsible that you chose
    NJPs. Why did that happen?
        General Neller. In going through this process, it became
    apparent to me and the leadership that there was some
    perception that there were not certain actions that commanders
    could take. And you know that I cannot prescribe an action to
    be taken by a commander because that would be considered undue
    command influence. But we have made it clear and we have given
    commanders a guidebook as part of this process. These are your
    options. These are the things you can do based on your
    investigation. The one thing you cannot do is nothing. You have
    to investigate this and come to some conclusion.
        So this is not over. This is not going to end. And we have
    tried to set this up, myself, the Assistant Commandant, the
    Sergeant Major, where this education process, changing our
    culture, task the human talent management, the things that we
    are doing with it for diversity in the force are going to go
    forward as we try to change the culture.
        But as far as specific actions against specific people, I
    have to be careful and I allow commanders to take their
    responsibilities as command and we follow through on these
    things and make sure there is going to be some adjudication,
    just like I can tell you any allegation of sexual assault made
    in the Marine Corps--I can tell you exactly how every single
    one of those allegations, whether substantiated or not--how
    they ended up and where they were adjudicated at.
        Senator Gillibrand. Well, I am concerned about it because
    our percentage of cases going to court martial are going down.
    Our percentages of convictions are going down. So I am very
    concerned about the judgment of the commanders when they make
    these judgments that they are not taking these crimes seriously
    enough. I mean, I am very troubled that they chose to do NJP
    instead of taking these cases to court martial. It is not an
    example of having no evidence. You know which photos are
    posted. You know where they came from. There are evidentiary
    trails to be made. So I would not say that it is likely that
    these are cases where they just could not prove their case. I
    think it sends the wrong message. If you are not taking these
    crimes seriously as an enormous disruption of good order and
    discipline, I fear that it is not going to change behavior.
        General Neller. Senator, I understand your concern. On the
    court martial I would tell you that the Marine Corps, with
    regard to sexual assault, has the highest number of cases or
    percentage of cases taken to court martial and convictions. On
    this particular social media, again, we are still in the
    process. This is not over and we will see what happens. But I
    understand your concern, and I will get back to you as we
    further progress in this process.
        Secretary Stackley. Ma'am, if I could just add one comment.
    I have been separately reviewing these side by side with the
    CNO and the Commandant. And one thing that we collectively came
    to agreement on was we need to strengthen our regulations to
    give commanders greater options and ability to prosecute
    deeper. And so we have put out an interim change to naval
    regulations that would give them greater authority to prosecute
    these cases going forward.
        And at the same time, I know that Congress is looking at an
    act that would strengthen our case. And I would ask that our
    general counsel and JAG [Judge Advocate General] continue to
    work with Members, both on the Senate and the House side, to
    ensure that it has the teeth that we are looking for so that we
    can prosecute these individuals.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Peters?
        Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And to each of our witnesses today, thank you for your
    service and your testimony today.
        Senior leaders have stated that the littoral combat ship is
    one of the Navy's most capable platforms. The LCS continues to
    meet stated Navy requirements and operational demands--it is my
    understanding from both combat commanders--and helps us achieve
    a goal of a global presence to reassure our allies, deter our
    adversaries, and ensure our peace, freedom of navigation, and
    international maritime commerce.
        In addition, because the LCS closes critical capability
    gaps that exist in today's fleet, the continuation of the LCS
    program will also enhance the Navy's warfighting posture.
        And these are reasons that I have often looked to to
    continue to support the LCS program and was pleased to hear the
    administration has requested a second LCS in the fiscal year
    2018 budget request.
        Admiral Richardson, could you describe the Navy's
    requirement for small surface combatants and whether the budget
    request for two LCS allows the Navy to meet that requirement?
        Admiral Richardson. Sir, we are committed to making the LCS
    program as capable as possible. We are working through the
    engineering and reliability issues that we saw with the first
    few ships. We have a stated requirement for 52 small surface
    combatants, and LCSs contribute to that requirement.
        Senator Peters. Thank you.
        And, Secretary Stackley, you have previously testified
    about the importance of maintaining active shipyards and
    uniquely skilled workforce, including the need to avoid, I
    believe, ``the sawtooth effect of hiring and firing at
    shipyards.'' The Navy says it wants to ensure continued
    production of the LCS and the frigate. Could you please explain
    what that means? And is one ship through a yard every other
    year enough?
        Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. Right now, we are
    establishing a full and open competition for the frigate in
    2020, and both of our LCS builders are strong competitors for
    that future frigate. So we want to ensure that they are a
    healthy competitor and they maintain their viability in the
    interim.
        You described one ship every other year per shipbuilder.
    When we submitted the budget, the budget that is on the Hill
    reflects one ship in 2018. Congress added one ship in 2017. So
    our strategy at the time was we would take the three ships in
    2017, combined with one in 2018, to ensure that each of the
    builders has a ship in 2017 and 2018 while we continue to look
    at 2019 and what unfolds in the industrial base in the interim.
        That is being revisited with regard to--there is a minimum
    sustaining rate, which would be one per year, and then there is
    the what we refer to as optimum or economic rate, which is the
    three ships every 2 years per builder.
        So we are straddling those numbers and the decision was to
    add another ship in 2018, and that amended budget submit is
    pending.
        Senator Peters. Thank you.
        I would like to talk a little bit about the future of
    warfare as we look out in the next 10 years and how it will
    change dramatically. I recently met with the leadership from
    the Army Capabilities Integration Center, and we discussed what
    the future battlefield will look like and the pros and cons of
    autonomous vehicles, artificial intelligence, all of these new
    cutting-edge technologies that will create opportunities but
    also some tremendous challenges for us to meet.
        So my question is, both Admiral Richardson and General
    Neller, just a broad question. How do you envision robotics and
    autonomous technology transforming both sea and amphibious
    warfare? And, General Neller, I read recently in ``Seapower''
    about a technology demonstration at Camp Pendleton which showed
    off some futuristic applications, including drones, robots,
    mobile networks, autonomous systems, unmanned underwater craft,
    unmanned boats that can swarm, some pretty interesting things
    that you are working with in the Marine Corps. If you could
    elaborate on that for me, please. And then, Admiral Richardson,
    if you would follow up.
        General Neller. Senator, I think there is huge, huge
    opportunity here with robotics and artificial intelligence. At
    the same time, I think there is some risk. I know right now
    that we could probably have an autonomously driven vehicle, but
    then if I have that vehicle in a convoy, who is going to
    operate a weapon system on that? If that vehicle breaks down
    and has a flat tire, who is going to fix that flat tire?
    Because I have got no driver. I cannot autonomously fix a flat
    tire. The same thing with any vehicle. You start to take
    advantage of technology and you reduce the number of crew.
    Then, okay, somebody has got to fight the fire on the ship.
    Somebody has got to pull security while you repair the vehicle.
    Somebody has got to man the weapon system while somebody
    sleeps. So there are these trades. So I think that is what we
    are struggling with.
        The things we saw in California--there were a number of
    vendors out there, a lot of small businesses, a lot of people
    who have a lot of ideas that took certain things that we think
    have promise. There were about four or five of them that we are
    going to continue to work with and see if we can turn them into
    programs. And I have to get caught up in the acquisition matrix
    where it slows us down.
        So I think there is a lot of there there, whether it be
    unmanned aircraft. One of my highest priorities is to create a
    group, four or five, unmanned aircraft that can take off and
    land from the deck of a ship and to use that to replace attack
    helicopters. So I think that is something that has got to
    happen because we do not want to be tied to a long runway. We
    want to be able to come from the sea.
        So all those things. You pick an area. Whether it is under
    sea, on the land, in the air, there is a lot of opportunity
    there and we continue to work with both our marines and our
    sailors and industry to try to take advantage.
        Admiral Richardson. Sir, I will pile on and say not only
    unmanned but autonomous--I think that there are a number of
    uses. And we are pursuing with aggression unmanned undersea,
    unmanned surface, and unmanned aircraft.
        I would say in addition to unmanned and related to autonomy
    is this idea of information warfare and the role of information
    in whether it is cyber, space, or whatever. That is going to be
    a decisive difference, and so we have stood up the Digital
    Warfare Office to unite our efforts across the Navy to give us
    a coherent approach to information warfare as it pertains to
    the future of naval combat.
        Senator Peters. Thank you very much. Appreciate it.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Warren?
        Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank you to our witnesses for being here.
        I heard Senator Gillibrand earlier mention the problem of
    sexual harassment online and the problem with the loophole in
    the law. Senator Sullivan and I have an amendment to close that
    loophole, and I just want to say thank you very much, Mr.
    Secretary and General Neller, for supporting that. I think we
    could make an important difference here.
        I want to quickly ask about the importance of our non-
    military agencies and programs to the Navy mission. Admiral
    Richardson, would a significant reduction in funding to the
    State Department and other non-defense security agencies and
    programs make the Navy's job easier or harder to do?
        Admiral Richardson. Harder, to be blunt about it, ma'am.
        Senator Warren. I will take blunt.
        Admiral Richardson. So the lack of diplomacy and those
    sorts of other elements of national power--if those are not
    there, it makes our mission harder.
        Senator Warren. Thank you very much. I appreciate that. I
    have asked every combatant commander basically the same
    question and gotten pretty much the same answer over and over.
    And I think it is really important.
        Now, Admiral Richardson, we spend of lot of time in this
    committee talking about how many ships you need. Last year, the
    Navy conducted its own assessment and determined that the
    number was 355. But as you recently reminded us in your paper,
    ``The Future Navy,'' not all ships are created equal, and
    actually some have better technology, better upgraded
    capabilities. In fact, you said that even a 355-ship Navy using
    current technology is insufficient. Admiral, can you just say a
    word more about what that means and what kind of technology you
    think the fleet is lacking?
        Admiral Richardson. First, ma'am, if I could, it was not
    just our assessments, but there is a family of assessments out
    there that talk about the size of the Navy, the future of the
    Navy, and they all converge around the mid-300s in terms of
    number of platforms. So we feel that we are on pretty solid
    ground there.
        My point was, though, that if we just continue to build
    more of the Navy we have today, that will be insufficient to be
    superior and to meet our Nation's needs in the future. And so
    not only do we have to increase capacity, but the capability of
    those platforms each has to be increased. And then, as we
    talked about, networking them together, that combined
    capability, the ability adapt and combine differently through a
    network also has to be pursued.
        Senator Warren. Right, and that makes a lot of sense to me
    that we need to be building with an eye toward the technologies
    of the future and what will give us a competitive advantage
    there.
        In the same paper, you talk about a modular approach where
    the hull of the ship is built to last for decades, but the
    sensors and systems on board can be swapped out as technology
    advances. And it seems to me that makes a lot of sense because
    we keep what still works and we upgrade the parts that do not.
    But that sure is not how we are building ships today.
        Secretary Stackley, given your prior acquisition
    experience, what changes do you think we would need to make to
    our acquisition system in order to achieve Admiral Richardson's
    vision?
        Secretary Stackley. Yes, ma'am. First, I describe that we
    are on that path. The fundamental first thing that we have got
    to do is move across the board to what we refer to as open
    systems architecture so that we are not tied to a design that
    is effectively owned by whoever the original equipment
    manufacturer was, and then we are tied to that organization to
    upgrade our ships. In an open systems design, we would be able
    to bring all of industry to bear to tackle our capability needs
    and that same design would foster a modernization approach that
    is timely and affordable. So step one is open systems
    architecture.
        Step two is we, the government, have to have access to both
    the intellectual property and the data rights, but we have to
    know what we are going to do with that so that we can upgrade
    along the way.
        But a third, critical part, which is not so much about
    acquisition, more about the way we do business, is a tighter
    link between our intel communities and our technical community
    so that we are looking far enough ahead to understand where is
    the threat going and we can technically get there faster. And
    what we want to do is we want to move at the speed of
    technology, not the speed of administration. So the question
    that we have to be continually asking ourselves is when will
    technology allow us to get us there and then drive, drive,
    drive in that direction and not let the process control our
    speed.
        And then the last--it is in line with the authorization act
    from 2017--is greater access to commercial. So you all have
    given us the ability to use alternate approaches to acquisition
    and emphasized the need to go greater commercial. We cannot
    carry the development bill on our backs. We have to look at
    where is commercial technology going and design our ships in
    this open systems approach so we can leverage that development
    on the commercial side to help our warfighting problems.
        Senator Warren. Thank you.
        I am going to try to stay close to my time limit and just
    say I am going to submit some questions for the record about
    the progress you are making toward that and also about the
    budget on research. And I will put those in the record.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator Wicker?
        Senator Wicker. Thank you.
        Secretary Stackley, Senator Reed asked you earlier about
    the catapult issue, and you indicated that the Navy is fixing
    the problem. Can you confirm that the first Ford-class carrier
    will be ready for operations in 2020 with the first deployment
    in 2022?
        Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. That is exactly the schedule.
    We are on path of that schedule. With specific regards to the
    electromagnetic aircraft launching system, that land-based
    testing associated aircraft by aircraft is taking place as we
    move forward, and the first launch and recovery of aircraft to
    test the shipboard system is targeted for August. And then what
    we will do is we will march through each type model series
    aircraft well in advance of the 2020 timeframe.
        Senator Wicker. So problems, yes, but it is not going to
    slow you down.
        Secretary Stackley. Correct.
        Senator Wicker. In terms of the deployment goal.
        Admiral Richardson, in January of this year, I understand
    that for the first time since World War II, there were no
    aircraft carriers deployed anywhere, none of ours. Is that
    correct?
        Admiral Richardson. There was a time earlier this year when
    we had nobody on deployment. It was a very short period of
    time.
        Senator Wicker. Well, how long of a period of time was it?
        Admiral Richardson. Like a week or something.
        Senator Wicker. How many aircraft carriers do we have?
        Admiral Richardson. We have 10 aircraft carriers right now.
        Senator Wicker. And so what was the reason for that?
    Obviously, that is unusual. What happened there?
        Admiral Richardson. A lot of it was just a matter of
    scheduling, and we have a number of aircraft carriers in
    maintenance. And so it is just the ratio of the demands to the
    supply and adhering to our OPTEMPO requirements.
        Senator Wicker. So nothing to be concerned about, not
    noteworthy.
        Admiral Richardson. Sir, this is the road to 355. That is
    the major concern is that we avoid these types of problems
    going forward, that our Navy is big enough and capable enough
    to meet all of those demands.
        Senator Wicker. So if I mentioned that on the floor later
    on today, that would be a good point to make. Is that right,
    sir?
        Admiral Richardson. That we need a larger Navy? Yes, sir.
        Senator Wicker. Now, Secretary Stackley, let me ask you
    about the V-22 and the DDG destroyers and the Virginia-class
    submarines and multiyear authority. I asked Secretary Mattis
    Tuesday about these three multiyears, and he told this
    committee there is no doubt they could save money. And he
    committed to helping us in this regard, particularly with the
    Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, or CAPE.
        What are your views on this, and can you help us in this
    regard?
        Secretary Stackley. Well, absolutely the multiyears will
    save money. That is our big push for why we want get those
    across. And with regards to the CAPE's assessment that goes
    with this budget submission, we have their assurances. I have
    seen the letters that are coming over to the Hill today to meet
    your timelines.
        Senator Wicker. So there will be letters coming over today
    for a preliminary assessment.
        Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir.
        Senator Wicker. That is excellent news. Thank you very
    much. I did not know that until now. So that is a positive
    development.
        One more thing. Secretary Stackley, on page 11 of your
    testimony, you describe two types of unmanned underwater
    vehicles (UUV), a large and an extra large UUV. Will these
    large and extra large UUVs count as ships toward the 355-ship
    goal? Why or why not? Is an intelligence assessment the limit
    of the capability of these proposed systems, and how far away
    are we from having these types of capabilities?
        Secretary Stackley. Let me first describe that we are not
    planning on counting these in our 355. They are not inside the
    355-ship force structure assessment that the CNO has
    accomplished. However, I think he has also been clear in this
    future fleet plan to describe how we have to leverage these
    capabilities because it is going to take us decades to get to
    355 ships. But these capabilities are within our reach today,
    and they do a great job in terms of filling gaps that we have
    today with our smaller size Navy and they do missions that we
    cannot do with our submarines and our surface ships. So, no,
    they do not add to the 355.
        In terms of level of maturity, I was just out on the West
    Coast a few weeks ago looking at an example of an XLUUV,
    extremely impressive capability, fairly mature technology. Now
    what we have to do is explore how we would employ such vehicle
    inside of our concept of operations and what that means in
    terms of installing capabilities on board. Right now, it is a
    platform without specific capabilities. We have to decide what
    mission, and then the installation of those.
        Senator Wicker. Do you anticipate capabilities beyond
    intelligence assessment?
        Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. I think we are already
    working on--I think the CNO should probably answer that, but I
    think we are already working on concept of operations that go
    along that line.
        Senator Wicker. Mr. Chairman, if the CNO could respond
    briefly.
        Admiral Richardson. Sir, we could see them delivering
    payloads to different areas. The access that an undersea
    vehicle give is something--that, combined with underwater
    payload, you can conceive of a whole number of missions in
    terms of what those things can deliver well beyond
    intelligence.
        Senator Wicker. How soon?
        Admiral Richardson. How soon for?
        Senator Wicker. Might we have that?
        Admiral Richardson. We are pushing as hard as we can. I am
    looking for something in the next few years.
        Senator Wicker. Less than a decade?
        Admiral Richardson. Far less than a decade.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCain. Senator King?
        Senator King. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
        Following up on this last point about the multiyear, I am
    totally in favor of multiyear contracts. It stabilizes the
    industrial base, saves the taxpayers money. I think it is a
    very sensible way to go. But, Admiral Richardson, you testified
    a few minutes ago moving into construction before you have a
    mature design is a recipe for disaster. And that has been my
    judgment from all these hearings we have had, whatever the
    weapon system is.
        My only concern about a multiyear on the flight III
    destroyers is whether we have a mature design. CRS
    [Congressional Research Service] says that a stable design is
    generally demonstrated by having built at least one ship to
    that design and concluding, through testing and operation, that
    the design does not require any substantial change during the
    contract.
        So that is what worries me about the multiyear on the new
    flight III destroyer. Admiral Richardson, if you have any
    thoughts on that. I just want to be careful. It is not a
    question of doing it. It is a question of when we do it in
    terms of the maturity of the design.
        Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir. I will start and Secretary
    Stackley can finish.
        That is a very mature design. First, it is a modification
    to an existing design. It is not a clean sheet design. We are
    at a very mature point in terms of the design aspects of that
    flight III destroyer.
        Secretary Stackley. If I could add. We measure various
    metrics and things, and the first thing you look for is that
    you complete a critical design review before you go into the
    contracting phase. And in fact, the critical design review for
    the flight III was completed last November.
        The next thing that we have been focused on is level
    completion of design, and today the flight III design is about
    86 percent complete and everything is on track for it to be 100
    percent complete prior to start of construction.
        Senator King. That would be 100 percent complete prior to
    bidding or prior to start of construction?
        Secretary Stackley. Prior to start of construction.
        Senator King. Well, those are two different things. It is
    hard to bid on something that is not fully designed.
        Secretary Stackley. Sir, I would tell you that we have
    never been in a position where we bid on a new ship program of
    any sort where it is a totally complete design.
        Design is broken down into different phases. So the phase
    of design that is necessary for the shipbuilders to complete
    their bid will be done. The next phases that they will press
    into are the details associated with taking this design and
    breaking it down to the design products that the mechanic on
    the factory floor needs.
        Senator King. When do you under this scenario--you say the
    letters are coming over today. When would you assume going
    through the steps that bids would be submitted?
        Secretary Stackley. For the multiyear?
        Senator King. Correct.
        Secretary Stackley. I would expect probably within 6
    months.
        Senator King. Within 6 months of now, by the end of this
    year. Is that what you are suggesting?
        Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir.
        Senator King. And by that time, you are presuming we would
    be beyond event the 86 percent design.
        Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir.
        Now, I would describe--I would use some other shipbuilding
    programs as examples. The Columbia program that is our number
    one priority that we are totally focused on--we were on this
    design for 10 years prior to contract award--her target is 83
    percent complete design at start of construction because she is
    a new ship design. So that is at start of construction.
        We are looking at 100 percent at start of construction and
    greater than 83 percent when they submit the bids. And the most
    recent new ship program that was competed was the Coast Guard
    offshore patrol craft, and the point in time when industry
    submitted their competitive bids for about a $2 billion-plus
    program, they were maybe 50 percent complete.
        Senator King. And I would say we do not know the outcome of
    that yet. That ship has not been built.
        Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir.
        Senator King. So we do not know where that is going.
        Let me change the subject. First, Secretary Stackley, I
    want to compliment you on the testimony you gave about small
    businesses. You are absolutely right. We had some appalling
    testimony here 2 or 3 months ago from representatives of the
    technology industry who said that the smaller Silicon Valley
    companies will not even bid. They do not want to get involved
    with the Pentagon because it is too complicated and too
    burdensome. So anything you can do to clear the way for many of
    these small, innovative companies in terms of regulations,
    time, forms, paperwork I think is to be commended.
        Secretary Stackley. I would just add two things. One, we
    have assigned every deputy program manager across the
    Department of the Navy as the small business advocate for all
    their program responsibilities. And I will give you one
    example. I got an email from a small business the other day who
    described how he can save $40 million on our carrier program,
    and the problems that he was having matching up with, as the
    CNO described, the impedance mismatch with the large
    government. So I have taken his notion. I put him side by side
    with the deputy for shipbuilding working the carrier program to
    break that logjam free. It does require that level of effort,
    but the savings, the opportunities are huge.
        Senator King. Excellent. I really appreciate it.
        Mr. Chairman, could I ask one follow-up question?
        A lot of the testimony today I think has rightfully focused
    on not only the 355-ship Navy but the deployability, if you
    will, of the Navy we have. And I would appreciate it, for the
    record--and this may exist in various documents, but it would
    be nice to see it in one document--of what is the percentage of
    readiness of all of the equipment. For example, General Neller,
    you mentioned there are 47 out of 70 F-18s that are lacking
    parts. I would like to know what that figure is for destroyers,
    amphibs, submarines.
        In other words, it does not matter what the nominal Navy
    is. The real question is what ships do we have that are ready
    to fight. And I would like to see an analysis--God forbid there
    was a two-front attack or the major problems we are
    anticipating or preparing for. If it occurred tomorrow, how
    much of the fleet and the personnel are trained and equipped,
    all of those things so we can compare, as I say the nominal
    Navy with the ready-to-fight Navy.
        Admiral Richardson. Senator, we track that, and I will get
    on your calendar and we will walk you through that.
        Senator King. I would very much appreciate that. I think
    that is important. I just think we need to fully understand
    that. And I commend you for focusing in this budget on these
    issues of getting a higher level of maintenance and repair.
        General Neller, one final question. You have 185,000 as
    your end strength, but that is at a one-to-two dwell-to-
    deployment. That seems to be a high stress level on your
    people. Talk to me about the deployment-dwell ratio.
        General Neller. Senator, at 185,000, in the aggregate it is
    about one-to-two. There are some communities that are below
    that, harder than that. There are some that are better. When I
    came in the Marine Corps in the 1980s, we were a one-to-three
    force. That is the long-term sustainable I think not just for
    the maintenance of our gear and the training of our force but
    also for our families. So we have been at one-to-two. We can
    continue to sustain it, but I think now we are seeing both the
    effects on retention of senior career marines and on the wear
    and tear on the gear because if you are turning stuff a third
    faster, you are going to put more miles and hours on the stuff.
        Senator King. And if retention goes down, that is going to
    cost the taxpayers a lot of money.
        General Neller. Then so now you have to--if you cannot
    retain your experienced middle management and you have got to
    do more maintenance on gear that is already older, you start to
    get in a spiral, and then now we find ourselves where we are.
    And we are starting to dig ourselves out, but it is going to
    take time and it is going to take resources and stability in
    the budget.
        Senator King. Thank you. Thank you very much, gentlemen.
        Senator Reed [presiding]. Senator Perdue, please.
        Senator Perdue. Thank you, Chair.
        First, I want to apologize, Admiral and General Neller. I
    have only been here 2 years, but I want to apologize to you.
    Congress has defrauded the American people. And worse, it has
    defrauded in my opinion the men and women in uniform for the
    last 43 years. In the last 43 years, our budget process has
    only funded the Federal Government four times. One hundred
    seventy-eight CRs have been used in those 43 years, and the
    last time we funded the Federal Government fully was before
    1980. We have 25 work days in the United States Senate between
    now and the end of this fiscal year. Twenty-five. There is no
    chance that we are going to fund this Federal Government the
    way that budget law in 1974 prescribes that would allow us to
    debate and fully fund our military. This has got to stop. I
    want to apologize for that.
        I want to move to my question.
        Just know there are some people working to try to change
    that. I would tell you I've got your back and others have, but
    I do not know that yet because this is such an institutional
    dysfunction, and it puts our men and women at risk. It puts the
    future of this country at risk because it endangers it. We have
    talked nothing but dollars and cents today. If you had the
    money, it would not be a problem. We have got the innovation,
    the technology, the capital. It does not matter. We could
    defend our country. We are not giving you the money you need. I
    have a question about that.
        In the world, Admiral, there are about 400 submarines
    totally in the world. Is that directionally correct?
        Admiral Richardson. That sounds about right, yes, sir.
        Senator Perdue. In the Asia-Pacific, Admiral Harris tells
    there are about 230 of those are in the Asia-Pacific region,
    including the Indian Ocean as well. How many submarines do we
    have allocated to the Pacific right now--attack submarines, not
    the boomers, just the attack submarines.
        Admiral Richardson. On a neighborhood of 30.
        Senator Perdue. A little less than 30. Right? That is what
    Admiral Harris--he confirmed that.
        And our plan in 2020, say, the next 10 to 15 years--we have
    52 attack submarines in our inventory today. Our plan in the
    Navy is taking that down to 42. So we basically have 30 attack
    submarines trying to keep up with over 200 submarines in that
    area. And 160 of those, by the way, of the 230 are China,
    Russia, and North Korea.
        Sir, how are we going to mitigate that? And give us some
    confidence that those 30 boats are going to be able to protect
    us in the Pacific.
        Admiral Richardson. Sir, we are going to mitigate that in
    every way we can. That will be a combination of some of the
    unmanned undersea vehicles that we talked about. That will
    help. We are looking to increase production of submarines. And
    so the addition of the submarine in 2021 was one step in that
    direction. We are looking to see what the industrial base can
    bear with respect to taking that even higher. We are looking at
    life extensions of the current submarines. So it will help us
    through that trough. But I tell you we will be below
    requirements. The new requirement is 66 submarines.
        Senator Perdue. That is part of the 355----
        Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir.
        Senator Perdue.--long-term plan, 30-year plan. I think the
    number that CBO estimates is $26 billion a year--Secretary, is
    that right--for the next 30 years. That is $800 billion on
    those.
        Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir.
        Senator Perdue. And we do not have a capital budget in the
    Federal Government. That is one of the problems. We do this on
    cash flow year to year to year. That is the biggest problem I
    have found coming from the business world. You are buying
    multi-million dollar--billion dollar platforms. One of the
    SSBNs is what? Ten billion dollars a copy I think. Is that not
    about correct, Admiral? The SSBN, the new Columbia-class?
        Admiral Richardson. We are looking at a per unit cost about
    half that.
        Senator Perdue. That is good news.
        But we are trying to replace 14 Ohio-class with 12
    Columbia-class. What period of time is that projected over? And
    is that still in your current thinking, the current plan?
        Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir. And there is good engineering
    logic behind that. By virtue of putting a life-of-the-ship core
    into one of those SSBNs, we eliminate the need for a long
    midlife refueling overhaul. And so we get more operational
    availability of that submarine. That allows us to cover down on
    the same mission in the strategic triad with----
        Senator Perdue. By the time we get to commissioning those
    12 Columbia-class, how far past the useful life will the Ohio-
    class submarines be? In other words, what kind of gap----
        Admiral Richardson. There is zero margin in that plan. It
    is end to end. We have stretched the Ohio-class out to longer
    than any other class of submarine we have ever built. And so
    there is no more margin for that transition. In fact, we go
    down to 10 SSBNs for a while in that transition period, really
    kind of banking on reliability of the submarines to get us
    through that.
        Senator Perdue. Thank you, guys, for your service. Thank
    you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Perdue.
        And on behalf of Chairman McCain, let me thank you for your
    testimony and your service.
        And on behalf of the chairman, I will announce that the
    committee is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:51 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
                               f-35b/c importance
        1. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Stackley, Admiral Richardson, and
    General Neller, how important is the F-35B/C program for the future of
    naval and marine aviation and would you agree that realistic training--
    which requires large amounts of airspace and high-end threat
    representation--is necessary for the success of the F-35B/C?
        Secretary Stackley, Admiral Richardson and General Neller. The F-35
    with its 5th generation capabilities underpins future Navy and Marine
    Corps manned aviation, and realistic training is essential. Having
    training ranges of the right size with the right capabilities to
    conduct, monitor, and then reconstruct and debrief the exercise, along
    with maintenance and support, are all critical to effective and
    efficient training.
     joint pacific alaska range complex (jparc) importance to f-35 training
        2. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Stackley, Admiral Richardson, and
    General Neller, the Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex (JPARC), which
    has the largest joint overland training area in the U.S. with airspace
    the size of Florida, Surface to Air Missile and Close Air Support
    Training, and a dedicated Air Force Aggressor Squadron, is an ideal
    location for Navy and Marine F-35s to train to both high-end and near-
    peer threats and low-intensity operations. Can you elaborate on how the
    Navy and Marines plan on training in the JPARC, a range with unique
    characteristics that enables realistic F-35 training?
        Secretary Stackley, Admiral Richardson and General Neller. The Navy
    and Marine Corps routinely participate in training exercises based at
    JPARC, including Red Flag-Alaska and Northern Edge. The Marine Corps
    routinely conducts Aviation Combat Element coordinated training at
    ranges in Arizona and South Carolina and has recently conducted F-35
    specific training at JPARC. Navy Carrier Air Wings conduct the majority
    of their advanced pre-deployment training at the Fallon Range Training
    Complex in Fallon, Nevada. The Fallon infrastructure has been developed
    over considerable time and expense to support the coordinated
    operations and specialized training required for carrier-based
    operations. The JPARC facility has almost 5 times the training airspace
    (13,000 vs 65,000 square miles) available at Fallon. As air combat and
    strike warfare continue to evolve, with longer range intercepts and
    enhanced standoff strike capabilities, additional space for air combat
    maneuvering and training could become an important consideration in
    selecting training locations. The Navy and Marine Corps will continue
    to consider JPARC as a potential training location as the F-35 training
    plan continues to evolve.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator David Perdue
                          marine corps depot readiness
        3. Senator Perdue. General Neller, you stated in your written
    testimony that, ``We have reset 92 percent of our ground equipment,
    with 65 percent returned to Operating Forces and our strategic
    equipment programs.'' Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany, is one of
    only two depots in the nation for the Marine Corps, and it is
    responsible for rebuilding and repairing ground combat and combat
    support equipment to support Marine installations on the East Coast and
    the ongoing conflicts in CENTCOM [Central Command]. The base in Albany
    had over $200 million of equipment damaged in a tornado in January,
    which also negatively impacted readiness and required acquisition
    strategies to be revised. How does the fiscal year 2018 budget request
    seek to remedy this damage and restore Marine Corps readiness?
        General Neller. The Marine Corps has one organic depot with two
    production plants; one located in Albany, GA and the other located in
    Barstow, CA. Marine Corps Logistics Command is on track to execute
    $33.1 million in fiscal year 2017. Future funding is planned as
    follows: Fiscal year 2018--$61.2 million; fiscal year 2019--$52
    million; and fiscal year 2020--$103.8 million. The funding plan will
    meet the immediate requirements associated with remedying the damage
    resulting from the tornado and will help restore the Marine Corps'
    readiness. In the USMC Fiscal Year 2018 Unfunded Priorities List, we
    requested $43.4 million for a combat vehicle warehouse in Albany, GA.
    We have received authorization for that amount from the HASC [House
    Armed Services Committee] and SASC [Senate Armed Services Committee].
    HAC-M [House Appropriations Committee-Military] has also appropriated
    that amount. We look forward to continuing to work with Congress to
    fund this important project.

        4. Senator Perdue. General Neller, how does this damage impact your
    acquisition strategy for the year?
        General Neller. The January 2017 tornado has not shown any
    significant adverse impact on execution of sustainment activities for
    military equipment in accordance with acquisition strategies,
    applicable to fiscal year 2017, developed by Program Executive Officer/
    Marine Corps Systems Command. To date, no military equipment has been
    identified as requiring replacement, via re-acquisition, as a result of
    damage caused by the storm. The availability of a production plant in
    Barstow, CA (one of two as part of the Marine Corps' organic depot),
    along with remote storage activities throughout the Continental United
    States, has enabled diversion of military equipment and Operating
    Material and Supplies (OM&S) for organic storage in support of
    acquisition and fielding operations.

        5. Senator Perdue. General Neller, how soon do you expect to see
    the full amount of the damage at this depot repaired?
        General Neller. The Marine Corps' strategy is to repair the all of
    the tornado related damage to military equipment over the next three
    years. Funding is planned as follows: Fiscal year 2018--$61.2 million;
    fiscal year 2019--$52 million; and fiscal year 2020--$103.8 million.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Luther Strange
                             force structure needs
        6. Senator Strange. Admiral Richardson, the Navy is continually
    assessing force structure and has conducted its latest force structure
    assessments during the past year. Please explain what these studies
    show. In particular, without considering Washington budget politics and
    budget caps from previous Congresses, how many ships does the Navy
    really need to meet today's global threat, and within that number how
    many LCS/Frigates are realistically needed?
        Admiral Richardson. To meet today's global threats, many recent
    studies conclude that naval forces most effectively provide credible
    options to national leaders, and recommend the need for a larger and
    more capable naval fleet that can arrive more quickly to address the
    growing pace of maritime security challenges. This will require
    building more ships as well as innovation to incorporate new
    technologies and new operational concepts. The Navy's 2016 Force
    Structure Assessment identified a requirement for 355 ships to achieve
    national tasking and goals, of which 52 ships are small surface
    combatants (LCS/Frigates). While the Navy has been on a growth path in
    recent years, an exponential change will be required to reach and
    sustain sufficient numbers faster--and that change is dependent upon
    relief from the Budget Control Act, continuing resolutions, and fiscal
    uncertainty.
                           effects of budget request
        7. Senator Strange. Admiral Richardson, how can the Navy possibly
    meet growing force structure goals with a 66 percent reduction in the
    LCS/Frigate shipbuilding rate, as proposed in your budget request?
        Admiral Richardson. The Navy's 2016 Force Structure Assessment
    revalidated the requirement for 52 small surface combatants. While the
    Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) provides capability as a focused-mission
    ship, the Navy is transitioning to the more capable, multi-mission
    Guided Missile Frigate (FFG(X)). To allow adequate time to define
    FFG(X) requirements, thoroughly evaluate design alternatives and mature
    the design, the fiscal year 2018 President's Budget (PB-18) defers the
    first year of FFG(X) procurement to fiscal year 2020 with additional
    LCS being procured in fiscal year 2018 and fiscal year 2019. The Navy
    is exploring all options to grow the force, including increases in
    shipbuilding, extending the service life of current ships, and
    reactivating ships. Informed by the National Defense Strategy, the
    fiscal year 2019 budget will prioritize building a more lethal Navy.
    Increasing naval power is contingent upon stable and increased funding
    above the current Budget Control Act defense spending caps.
                        required operational capability
        8. Senator Strange. Admiral Richardson, what will be the effect on
    the fleet in terms of required operational capability to conduct combat
    operations if Congress agrees to cut the LCS/Frigate shipbuilding rate
    from the current 3 ships per year profile to only 1 ship per year? Is
    this prudent?
        Admiral Richardson. The Navy's 2016 Force Structure Assessment
    revalidated the requirement for 52 small surface combatants (SSC).
    While the littoral combat ship (LCS) provides valuable capability as a
    focused-mission ship, the Navy is transitioning to the more capable,
    multi-mission guided missile frigate (FFG(X)). To allow adequate time
    to define the FFG(X) requirements, thoroughly evaluate design
    alternatives and mature the design, the fiscal year 2018 President's
    Budget (PB-18) defers the first year of FFG(X) procurement to fiscal
    year 2020 with additional LCS being procured in fiscal year 2018 and
    fiscal year 2019. Changes to LCS and FFG(X) procurement will have no
    effect on deliveries and deployments of LCS in the near term and will
    result in the FFG(X) having much greater warfighting capability and
    flexibility to meet Fleet and combatant commanders' requirements. The
    original PB-18 request included one LCS in fiscal year 2018, which,
    when combined with the LCS Congress added in the fiscal year 2017
    Appropriations Act, would allow the Navy to leverage past and current
    investments in our shipyard workforce and infrastructure. To further
    reinforce the SSC industrial base, the Navy's PB-18 request was amended
    to include two LCS. Until a force of 52 SSCs is achieved, there is
    operational risk. The Navy is also seeing challenges in meeting the
    requirements for attack submarines (51 against a requirement of 66) and
    large surface combatants (87 against a requirement of 104). Operational
    risks associated with these shortfalls can be mitigated by using
    alternate platforms, such as amphibious ships or expeditionary mobile
    base ships, to deliver the capabilities necessary to conduct the
    required missions.
                                industrial base
        9. Senator Strange. Secretary Stackley, there are 21,000 men and
    women at two shipyards, and 1,200 suppliers in 45 States, who support
    the current littoral combat ship shipbuilding program. Should Congress
    agree to cut its shipbuilding rate by 66 percent as proposed in your
    budget, what is the impact on the shipyards, the workforce, efficiency,
    competition, and price? Are any of these factors positively affected?
        Secretary Stackley. Recognizing the criticality of the Small
    Surface Combatant industrial base, the Administration amended the
    fiscal year 2018 budget request to add a second littoral combat ship
    (LCS) after an assessment of the impact to the industrial base due to
    procuring only one LCS in fiscal year 2018. Lockheed Martin/Fincantieri
    Marinette Marine and Austal USA have each invested considerable capital
    resources to modernize and upgrade their facilities to support serial
    production, and the LCS shipyards are currently producing two ships a
    year on average. Reductions in procurement rate would increase the
    price of LCS. At lower build rates, fixed costs allocated across a
    smaller workload base will result in higher overhead rates. Impacts on
    production efficiency and competition are less predictable and it is
    incumbent upon the Department to structure its acquisition strategy for
    the remaining ships of the LCS program alongside the subsequent Frigate
    program such that these impacts are mitigated to the extent possible.
    While procuring at a less than optimal rate is undesirable, the
    Department's intent to procure LCS beyond the 32-ship objective
    previously set for the program is motivated by our intent to support
    the industrial base as we transition to the future Frigate, but
    constrained by the limitations imposed by the Budget Control Act.
    Including the fiscal year 2018 amended budget request, there are 21
    ships in the backlog across the two shipbuilders. This backlog provides
    a significant amount of workload to mitigate the impact of procuring
    fewer ships in fiscal year 2018 and fiscal year 2019, allowing them to
    maintain stability and be competitive for the Frigate award in fiscal
    year 2020.
                                effects of cuts
        10. Senator Strange. Secretary Stackley, we have all be down this
    road before. What happened to weapon system unit costs when B-2 bomber
    production quantities were cut from 100 to only 20 aircraft? Or the
    Seawolf submarine when production was cut from 30 to only 3 hulls?
        Secretary Stackley. Originally, the Seawolf submarine program was
    established to procure 29 submarines. In December 1991, the Seawolf
    construction profile was restructured due to the reduced threat
    resulting from the end of the Cold War. In January 1992, the Seawolf
    program was terminated following the procurement of the lead ship, SSN
    21. Congress later restored the second Seawolf submarine, SSN 22, in
    May 1992. Subsequently, the 1993 Secretary of Defense bottom-up review
    recommended the construction of a third Seawolf submarine in an effort
    to bridge the production gap and preserve the industrial base until
    construction of a new submarine design in 1998. The Fiscal Year 1996
    National Defense Authorization Act authorized the third Seawolf (SSN
    23) submarine. Reduced production quantities resulted in unit cost
    increase of Seawolf submarines. At lower build rates, the fixed costs
    allocated across a smaller workload base resulted in higher overhead
    rates and the loss of bulk economy procurement. The weapon system unit
    cost can be represented by the average procurement unit cost (APUC)
    which includes non-recurring costs of $672 million spread across the
    ship program. The APUC for 29 Seawolf-class ships was $1,305 million in
    1990 base year dollars. After the class reduction, the APUC for three
    Seawolf-class ships was $2,606 million in 1990 base year dollars.
                             meeting global threats
        11. Senator Strange. Secretary Stackley, if you truly want to grow
    the Navy and respond to serious emergency global threats, why would the
    Navy not expand the LCS/Frigate program rather than cut it way back at
    this time?
        Secretary Stackley. The Navy's 2016 Force Structure Assessment
    revalidated the warfighting requirement for a total of 52 small surface
    combatants. While the littoral combat ship (LCS) provides capability as
    a focused-mission ship, the Navy needs to transition to the more
    capable, multi-mission guided missile frigate (FFG(X)). To allow
    adequate time to define FFG(X) requirements, thoroughly evaluate design
    alternatives and mature the design, the Fiscal Year 2018 President's
    Budget (PB-18) defers the first year of FFG(X) procurement to fiscal
    year 2020 with additional LCS being procured in fiscal year 2018 and
    fiscal year 2019. Consistent with the Secretary of Defense's three-
    phase campaign, PB-18 focuses on restoring readiness and addressing
    pressing shortfalls in fiscal year 2017-2018, in order to build a
    strong foundation for growing a larger, more capable, more lethal force
    starting in fiscal year 2019. This will ensure today's Navy is fully
    ready and that our 275 ships are properly maintained to reach the end
    of their service life. Informed by the National Defense Strategy, the
    fiscal year 2019 budget will prioritize building a larger force.
    Increasing naval power is contingent upon stable and increased funding
    above the current Budget Control Act defense spending caps.
                            lcs shipbuilding program
        12. Senator Strange. Secretary Stackley, you are in your current
    position in large part because you are widely respected for your
    abilities to manage complex weapon system acquisitions. In your
    professional opinion, would you say that the LCS/Frigate shipbuilding
    program before Congress is ``optimal''? ``Efficient''? ``Good''?
        Secretary Stackley. At the current production rate, the littoral
    combat ship (LCS)/frigate shipbuilding program is efficient and the
    ships are providing capability that fills a gap in the fleet. The
    Navy's fiscal year 2018 budget request includes two LCS, which, when
    combined with the LCS Congress added in the fiscal year 2017 Omnibus,
    would keep both LCS shipyards operating, not at their most efficient,
    but at or above a sustaining rate required to keep them competitive for
    the pending guided missile frigate (FFG(X)) program. The Navy's 2016
    Force Structure Assessment revalidated the warfighting requirement for
    a total of 52 small surface combatants. While LCS provides much needed
    capabilities as focused-mission ships, the Navy also needs to
    transition to the more capable, multi-mission FFG(X) to increase the
    operational capabilities required by fleet commanders. As maritime
    threats continue to evolve and as the operating environment becomes
    increasingly complex, the Navy is placing greater emphasis on
    distributed operations, highlighting the need for a FFG(X) with
    improved lethality and survivability as a part of the full complement
    of 52 small surface combatants (SSC). The President's Budget 2018
    submission programs the first year of FFG(X) procurement in fiscal year
    2020 to provide adequate time to define FFG(X) requirements, thoroughly
    evaluate design alternatives, and mature the design. In view of this
    potential and otherwise devastating gap to the industrial base, and
    within the constraints of the Budget Control Act and the priorities of
    the fiscal year 2018 budget, the Department's current request for two
    LCS in fiscal year 2018 reflects the best balance between requirements,
    budget, and industrial base.
                        dual source acquisition strategy
        13. Senator Strange. Secretary Stackley, the Nation has invested
    about $14 billion in the LCS program so far, achieving two successful
    and competitive production lines, which actually was your decision and
    recommendation to Congress in the first place. What are your plans to
    maintain a competitive dual source acquisition strategy, and a level
    playing field between vendors, for the LCS/frigate program?
        Secretary Stackley. As critical elements of the Navy's small
    surface combatant family of ships, the littoral combat ship (LCS)
    provides much needed capability as a focused-mission ship while the
    guided missile frigate (FFG(X)) will provide an even more capable,
    multi-mission ship to increase fleet commander flexibility in
    operations. To allow adequate time to define FFG(X) requirements,
    thoroughly evaluate design alternatives and mature the design, the
    President's Budget (PB) 2018 submission defers the first year of FFG(X)
    procurement to fiscal year 2020 with additional LCS being procured in
    fiscal year 2018 and fiscal year 2019. The Navy's fiscal year 2018
    budget request continues the competitive dual source strategy by
    including two LCS, which, when combined with the LCS Congress added in
    the fiscal year 2017 Omnibus, would keep both LCS shipyards viable
    ahead of the pending FFG(X) competition, allowing the Navy to leverage
    past and current investments in our shipyard workforce and
    infrastructure. To meet the requirements for the FFG(X), the Navy will
    conduct a full and open competition between U.S. shipbuilders for this
    future ship class. The acquisition plan calls for a competitive down-
    select to a single design employing mature capabilities. This
    competitive single design approach for the 20-ship class should provide
    the best overall performance and cost, when factoring planned
    procurement rates and sustainment costs. This approach also leverages
    the investment to date in the LCS program as the two LCS shipbuilders
    have optimized their operations towards this sized ship and this
    production rate.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
                    encroachment on test and training ranges
        14. Senator Nelson. Secretary Stackley, encroachment of activities
    incompatible with military test and training operations on our bases
    and ranges remains a major problem. In 2006 Congress established the
    Military Mission Line, prohibiting oil and gas activities, and any
    activities conducted in preparation for oil and gas activities, in the
    Eastern Gulf in order to protect the test and training range there. The
    Department of Defense has said that the ``vital importance of
    maintaining this moratorium cannot be overstated.'' Secretary Stackley,
    how important is it to test operations as well as training and
    readiness to continue to prevent this kind of encroachment in the Joint
    Gulf Range Complex (JGRC)?
        Secretary Stackley. The Eastern Gulf of Mexico operating areas and
    warning areas provide critical opportunities for advanced weapons
    testing, joint training exercises, and operational and unit level
    training. Emerging technologies such as advanced fighters and sub-
    surface systems will require testing and training space free from
    interference in the future. It is vital to maintain our ability to
    conduct testing and training operations in the Eastern Gulf of Mexico
    without encroachment, and we support maintaining the Military Mission
    Line moratorium. The Department of the Navy supports domestic energy
    development that is compatible with the military mission, and is
    willing to explore opportunities to develop energy without encumbering
    military readiness activities.
                      major range and test facility bases
        15. Senator Nelson. Secretary Stackley, last year's National
    Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) expressed my concern and the concern
    of this committee that our Major Range and Test Facility Bases are
    unable to maintain pace technologically with our advanced 5th and 6th
    generation weapons delivery systems and new hypersonic systems.
    Secretary Stackley, how do you see high fidelity simulation upgrades at
    these ranges factoring into effective testing of our newest weapons
    delivery systems and munitions?
        Secretary Stackley. Continued high fidelity simulation upgrades at
    the Major Range and Test Facility Bases (MRTFB) are critical to keep
    pace with both U.S. advanced 5th and 6th generation weapons delivery
    systems and the threats they are intended to operate against. Navy
    MRTFB Ranges and Laboratories are working in collaboration to develop
    advanced high priority threats and threat laydowns to be utilized at
    the MRTFB to conduct effective testing of new 5th and 6th generation
    systems. The Joint Simulation Environment (JSE) is in development to
    support test and evaluation of advanced 5th and 6th generation weapons
    systems and associated warfighting tactics. The JSE combines a mix of
    immersive simulation, hardware in the loop, advanced ground test with
    aircraft installed systems, and flight test techniques to deliver a
    robust 5th and 6th generation Live--Virtual--Constructive (LVC)
    environment for test and training. The Navy and Air Force are working
    in collaboration to develop robust 5th/6th Generation Enterprise
    Modeling and Simulation (M&S)/LVC test and training solutions which
    focus on the ability to assess capability performance vice platform
    centric evaluations. Additionally, the Navy will also look to leverage
    capabilities which will be developed under the Air Force / TRMC
    Hypersonic Test Investment Program (HyTIP) established in response to a
    2016 Resource Management Decision. Beyond the MRTFB, the Navy is
    working to integrate simulation and test capabilities across the Naval
    Research & Development Establishment to create a multi-domain
    development, prototyping, assessment, and test environment to support
    5th/6th gen innovation and evaluation. As weapons and threats grow in
    complexity, it will be critical to complement live flight test/training
    on DOD Ranges with a continuum of M&S, LVC methods, and advanced ground
    test in labs and chambers to fully understand 5th/6th generation
    performance and test/train in future warfare environments. The Navy
    MRTFB is fully engaged in ensuring Ranges, Labs, Chambers, and M&S are
    prepared to support the 5th/6th generation challenges.
                             navy reserve aviation
        16. Senator Nelson. Secretary Stackley and Admiral Richardson, Navy
    Reserve aviation ``hardware units''--squadrons flying tactical air,
    maritime patrol, and rotary wing platforms--have been systemically
    disestablished over the last 5 years. With the exception of HSM-60,
    these units are all flying the oldest variants of their aircraft in the
    fleet--F/A-18A, HH-60H, and P-3--with no plan to transition them to
    more current series. This reduction severely limits opportunities for
    aviators to serve at a cost effective level of readiness, whether they
    be Selected Reserve or full time support personnel. Further reduction
    of communities limits the professional opportunities for full time
    support personnel. Secretary Stackley and Admiral Richardson, what is
    the Navy's plan to retain qualified, experienced aviators in the ready
    reserve?
        Secretary Stackley and Admiral Richardson. Navy Reserve aviation is
    an invaluable part of the Total Force. Navy Reserve provides both
    operational support and strategic depth across a broad spectrum of
    Naval Aviation mission sets. In addition to the platforms you mentioned
    above, the Navy Reserve provides 100 percent of the Navy's organic
    intra-theater cargo lift capability flying C-40 and C-130 aircraft.
        The Department of the Navy has no plans to reduce Navy Reserve
    aviation capability over the Future Years Defense Plan. The Reserve
    component has successfully affiliated separating Active Duty aviators
    at a rate of over 70 percent since 2010.
        Under the recently released officer bonus policy the Navy Reserve
    offers four aviation bonuses:
        1) Selected Reserve aviators receive a $10,000 bonus when they
    affiliate with the Navy Reserve.
        2) Full time support department head aviators are eligible for up
    to $25,000 per year based on aviation manning requirements and type,
    model, series of aircraft.
        3) Full time support commanding officer aviators are eligible for
    $18,000 per year to remain past their command tours.
        4) Selected Reserve and Full Time Support aviators are eligible for
    aviation incentive pay of up to $840 per month based on years of
    aviation service.
        Historically, aviation bonuses have proven effective in addressing
    retention problems in specific communities and experience levels in
    order to attract and retain high-quality personnel to meet fleet
    requirements. As a result, we have been highly effective in retaining
    this talented pool of officers within the current force structure.
                             strategic laydown plan
        17. Senator Nelson. Secretary Stackley and Admiral Richardson, the
    Navy has long held the belief that strategic dispersal of capital
    ships--particularly the aircraft carrier--is important. In the Pacific
    Fleet, our carriers are dispersed between Washington, California, and
    Japan. In the Atlantic Fleet, all of our nuclear carriers--including
    new carriers under construction--are stationed in Hampton Roads. Does
    the Navy still believe there is a need to disperse our carrier fleet on
    the East Coast to reduce risk from natural or man-made disaster?
        Secretary Stackley and Admiral Richardson. The Navy remains
    committed to the strategic dispersal of the CVN force. Additional East
    Coast CVN homeports would reduce risk and provide strategic flexibility
    in the event of natural disaster, man-made calamity, or attack. Current
    fiscal constraints dictate that the Navy continue to defer the
    investment to build new capacity or repurpose existing infrastructure
    to develop another East Coast CVN homeport. The Navy's current SLD Plan
    (SLD17) does not reflect another East Coast CVN homeport; however,
    SLD18 will re-evaluate the strategic dispersal of our CVN force in
    light of the fiscal and strategic environment.

        18. Senator Nelson. Secretary Stackley and Admiral Richardson, if
    cost is the issue in carrying out dispersal of our nuclear powered
    aircraft carriers are there savings to be had by reducing risk in
    dispersing our non-nuclear capital ships--namely amphibious assault
    ships, which are virtually co-located with our aircraft carriers on the
    East Coast for the most part?
        Secretary Stackley and Admiral Richardson. The Navy remains
    committed to the strategic dispersal of our force. Additional East
    Coast dispersal would reduce risk and provide strategic flexibility in
    the event of natural disaster, man-made calamity, or attack.
        Current fiscal constraints dictate that the Navy continue to defer
    the investment in another East Coast CVN homeport. Additionally, there
    are no savings from dispersing additional amphibious assault ships on
    the East Coast. For example, Mayport has limited pier space as a result
    of current homeporting of an amphibious readiness group and littoral
    combat ships. The Navy's current Strategic Laydown and Dispersal Plan
    (SLD17) does not reflect another East Coast CVN homeport or additional
    amphibious assault force dispersal; however, SLD18 will re-evaluate the
    strategic dispersal of our CVN and amphibious assault ship forces in
    light of the fiscal and strategic environment.
                          amphibious fleet operations
        19. Senator Nelson. Admiral Richardson and General Neller, the
    inherent flexibility of amphibious ships and the Navy-Marine Corps team
    is in high demand. In the past year, we have seen amphibious ships
    support everything from humanitarian support to Haiti following the
    devastation of Hurricane Matthew to delivering ordinance against ISIS
    [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] across combatant commander areas of
    operation. Do we have enough amphibious ships and associated units to
    meet the challenges posed by our near-peer competitors?
        Admiral Richardson and General Neller. If the Navy and Marine Corps
    were to fully meet COCOM demand, we would require more than 50
    amphibious warships in the battle force inventory. Based on the best
    analysis and keeping affordability in mind, the Commandant and I have
    determined the force structure to support the deployment and employment
    of 2 MEBs simultaneously and provide surplus capacity to respond to
    contingencies with the necessary depth to conduct maintenance is 38
    amphibious warships. The 2016 Force Structure Assessment also holds the
    amphibious warship requirement as 38 ships. With the delivery of
    PORTLAND by the end of 2017, amphibious warship inventory will be 32
    and reach 33 in fiscal year 2019. To grow to and sustain 38, we will
    need relief from the Budget Control Act (BCA), and stable, predictable
    annual budgets with an end to Continuing Resolutions. The procurement
    of highly capable LPD 17 and LHA 6 ship classes coupled with increased
    investments in maintenance and modernization of legacy ships is
    critical to closing our amphibious warship shortfall. The amphibious
    warships embarked with a combination of technologically superior MV-22,
    F-35B, RQ-21, and other future autonomous/robotic systems will enable
    the Navy/Marine Corps fighting team to operate in uncertain and
    contested environments and to disperse and aggregate forces over a much
    larger area. Indeed, we are now deploying our Amphibious Ready Groups
    (ARGs) in a distributed manner, allowing a single ARG/MEU to
    concurrently meet prioritized operational requirements of multiple
    combatant commanders.

        20. Senator Nelson. Admiral Richardson and General Neller, for the
    past 16 years, the Marine Corps has focused on counter-insurgency
    operations, largely in landlocked locations. As you prepare for
    potential future conflicts, like in Asia-Pacific, the Marines are
    returning to their amphibious roots. What are you most concerned about
    in conducting amphibious assault and other maritime operations in an
    anti-access area-denial environment?
        Admiral Richardson and General Neller. Anti-ship missiles and enemy
    aircraft are a significant risk to conducting amphibious and force
    sustainment operations that enable sea control and project naval power
    ashore in a contested environment. For this reason the Amphibious Ready
    Group (ARG) or a larger Amphibious Task Force (ATF) would require
    temporary and localized battlespace superiority at the time and place
    of our choosing, realized through organic shipboard enhancements or
    holistic battle force deployment/employment (``up-gunned'' ESG's or
    SAG's) force protection measures before conducting Joint Forcible Entry
    operations in a contested area. Employing the MAGTF as the ``inside
    force'' is a critical enabler for sea control and power projection in a
    peer contested environment. The sophistication, reach and lethality of
    modern anti-ship threats dictates the need for persistent and
    integrated ISR and layered mobile defense with suppression, space
    effects, cyber, and/or electronic attack over an extended area;
    adequate point defense systems for the amphibious ships, preferably
    with the defense in depth afforded by escorts with greater anti-ship
    missile defensive capability; and fully networked/integrated organic
    embarked F-35Bs with defensive counter air capabilities, all supported
    through survivable and resilient logistical nodes. Mining is also a
    significant risk to amphibious operations, whether in the deep water,
    shallow water, very shallow water, surf zone, or beach zone, each
    present unique challenges (technology, manpower, etc.) with detection
    and neutralization. The Navy is in the process of transforming from
    legacy ship integrated organic systems to the Modular MCM Force,
    requiring a careful balance of maintaining/integrating legacy
    capability while procuring new technology and refining accompanying
    tactics, techniques, and procedures. The Navy and Marine Corps are
    working closely to address capability gaps in MCM and assault breaching
    capabilities. Regarding other maritime operations, the inherent
    flexibility of amphibious forces affords combatant commander's the
    opportunity to distribute capabilities to both enhance our
    effectiveness and complicate the enemies' problem, potentially reducing
    the risk of operating in a contested environment.
                     u.s. southern command naval operations
        21. Senator Nelson. Secretary Stackley, Admiral Richardson, and
    General Neller, transnational crime and smuggling networks pose a
    significant threat to the United States. Many of these networks access
    the U.S. via the SOUTHCOM region. Secretary Stackely, in your written
    testimony, you specifically mention successes of two patrol coastal
    ships stationed in Mayport. What more can the Navy Marine Corps Team do
    to support the operations conducted by Joint Interagency Task Force
    South and SOUTHCOM?
        Secretary Stackley and General Neller. Support to the Joint Task
    Force and SOUTHCOM is coordinated and prioritized through the Joint
    Staff and the Secretary of Defense with forces manned, trained, and
    equipped by the service chiefs and the Military Departments. The Navy
    and Marine Corps have a long history of supporting SOUTHCOM exercises
    and will continue to do so as capability and capacity allow. In the
    near term, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Defense, the
    Marine Corps plans to continue the rotational deployment of a Special
    Marine Air Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) to conduct training and other
    Theater Security Cooperation activities.
        Admiral Richardson. Navy continues to source forces to capacity,
    however, we do not have sufficient force structure to meet all global
    combatant commander demand. Navy's annual force offering serves as the
    CNO's best military advice to the Chairman and Secretary of Defense for
    the global employment of naval forces. In addition to annual Global
    Force Management (GFM) resourcing, Navy continues to seek opportunities
    to provide increased presence to SOUTHCOM via non-GFM actions, such as
    providing presence during changes in ship homeport transits and
    littoral combatant ship (LCS) class testing Additionally, to meet
    today's global threats, many recent studies recommend the need for a
    larger and more capable naval fleet that can arrive more quickly to
    address the growing pace of maritime security challenges. The Navy's
    2016 Force Structure Assessment identified a requirement for 355 ships
    to achieve national tasking and goals, of which 52 ships are small
    surface combatants (LCS/Frigates), some of which could provide presence
    to SOUTHCOM. While the Navy has been on a growth path in recent years,
    an exponential change will be required to reach and sustain sufficient
    numbers faster--and that change is dependent upon relief from the
    Budget Control Act, continuing resolutions, and fiscal uncertainty.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
                                  shipbuilding
        22. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Stackley and Admiral Richardson, do
    you agree that the Navy's shipyards require significant infrastructure
    investment in order to support the increasing maintenance and
    modernization needs of the fleet and sustain operational availability?
    What challenges do you see to implementing these needed improvements
    and how do you recommend overcoming them?
        Secretary Stackley and Admiral Richardson. Significant investments
    are required to modernize naval shipyard (NSY) infrastructure.
    Requirements are being developed by the Navy in three phases:
        Phase 1: 2013 NSY Infrastructure Report to Congress (RTC)--Near
    term requirements that preserve and maintain functional capability and
    maintain safety and habitability of existing plant; includes seismic,
    dry dock certification, and flood prevention requirements. The original
    17 year plan was based on the 6 percent investment level. Funding was
    increased to support a 15 year plan as a result of the Nuclear
    Enterprise Review. Current investment levels are adequate to maintain
    existing mission-essential infrastructure functionality but do not
    provide appreciable productivity improvements across the four naval
    shipyards.
        Phase 2: Dry Dock Plan--Identifies NSY dry dock investments needed
    to support CVN 78 class, SSN 774 class, and known future class
    requirements, as well as dry dock investments needed to resolve
    flooding, seismic, and material condition/certification issues. This
    plan is currently being finalized by the Navy, and is expected to be
    completed by August 15, 2017. This study will be updated to include all
    Fleet dry dock requirements, which is expected to be issued by February
    2018.
        Phase 3: NSY Infrastructure Optimization Plan--This optimization
    plan will identify NSY infrastructure investments needed to support
    increasing maintenance and modernization needs, improve shipyard
    throughput, and return mission days to the Fleet. These requirements
    will be prioritized by return on investment and improvements to depot
    maintenance execution. Estimated completion date for initial issuance
    of this plan is February 2018.
        Challenges expected in implementing the Phase 2 and 3
    infrastructure investment plans are budget uncertainty, competition for
    funding with other warfighter requirements, de-confliction of facility
    and dry dock improvements at the public shipyards with ongoing ship
    maintenance workload, and environmental and historical constraints.
    Mitigations include identifying and planning robust infrastructure
    requirements with defendable returns on investment and mission impacts,
    robust pre-solicitation market research and outreach to private
    industry, smart scheduling of infrastructure investments to prevent
    impacts to submarine and CVN availabilities, early identification of
    environment and historical constraints and engagement with appropriate
    stakeholders during project development.
                                   dry docks
        23. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Stackley and Admiral Richardson, dry
    dock capacity is a driving factor in scheduling and executing
    maintenance on our ships and submarines, and I understand the Navy is
    reviewing a plan to increase the dry dock capacity across our
    shipyards. Could you please discuss the importance of increasing dry
    dock capacity and provide an update on the plan?
        Secretary Stackley and Admiral Richardson. With the introduction of
    new ship classes, upcoming inactivation and reactor compartment
    disposals, environmental vulnerabilities, and current projected
    workloads, dry dock constraints in the public and private shipyards
    will directly impact the scheduling and execution of maintenance on
    ships and submarines.
        The dry docks at the public shipyards require investments to
    increase physical capacity, upgrade electrical equipment and utilities,
    and mitigate seismic vulnerabilities. The current workload forecasts
    indicate that private shipyard dry docks will be at capacity from
    fiscal year 2018 through fiscal year 2021. To assess the ability of
    public and private shipyard dry dock capacity to support future
    maintenance requirements, the Naval Sea Systems Command is performing
    an overarching study using a three-prong approach:
          A public naval shipyard study is under way to assess
    current dry dock capacity and survivability. This study is expected to
    complete by August 15, 2017.
          The Navy Surface Fleet Availability Scheduling Team has
    performed a study identifying steps to mitigate private shipyard dry
    dock constraints through fiscal year 2018, including use of coast-wide
    bid contracts to allow for out of homeport dry docks as required. A
    private sector dry dock review covering fiscal year 2019 through fiscal
    year 2021 is in progress. Potential options include use of dual-docking
    to reduce dry dock durations, review of frequency of docking, and use
    of out of homeport dry docks. This review is expected to be complete by
    January 2018.
        A feasibility analysis and dry dock investment study to support
    Fleet-wide maintenance availability schedules at the private shipyards
    through 2040 is expected to be complete by February 2018.
                         accelerated promotion program
        24. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Stackley and Admiral Richardson, the
    Accelerated Promotion Program (APP) allows the public shipyards to
    compete with the private sector by guaranteeing engineers hired into
    the four pubic shipyards at the GS-5 or GS-7 levels will be eligible
    for a one-time accelerated promotion to the next higher-grade after
    successful completion of a six-month training program. Do you believe
    the Accelerated Promotion Program benefits the shipyards with workforce
    retention? What other difficulties do you experience in retaining the
    workers who have received specialized training?
        Secretary Stackley and Admiral Richardson. Yes, the APP greatly
    benefits the public naval shipyards in their ability to attract and
    retain engineering talent. The largest pay differential for entry level
    engineers at the naval shipyards and the private sector exists in the
    earliest stages of a shipyard engineer's career. At the point an
    engineer typically reaches his or her full performance level at the GS-
    11 or GS-12 level, their annual pay is typically comparable to job
    market levels in the area. The APP allows the naval shipyards to
    progress engineers to their full performance level earlier, assuming
    satisfactory performance and training progression is achieved.
    Retention of shipyard employees who have specialized training continues
    to be a challenge for all four naval shipyards in Portsmouth, Norfolk,
    Puget Sound and Pearl Harbor. Competition for these critical skills,
    and the leadership qualities these naval shipyard employees possess,
    are highly sought after by private industry. The ability of the private
    sector to offer higher salaries in competitive job markets like the
    Puget Sound region or the Chesapeake-Tidewater area, impacts the
    ability to retain employees. In addition to APP, the naval shipyards
    have been using the full suite of available tools to help retain these
    highly skilled personnel including, retention incentives, student loan
    repayment programs, quality step increases, performance award programs,
    child day care programs, rehired annuitants to help mentor and develop
    newer employees, and increased coaching, mentoring, and development
    programs.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie Hirono
                              shipyard maintenance
        25. Senator Hirono. Secretary Stackley and Admiral Richardson, the
    Navy's 2018 budget request includes a significant increase for ship
    maintenance. The Navy intends to increase the maintenance workforce
    from 33,850 to 34,988 at the four public shipyards. The Navy's current
    training regimen for new depot maintenance workers takes time to train
    and educate these new employees to become significant contributors to
    the team. It will take some time to train these new shipyard employees
    and for them to gain the needed experience. What is the Navy doing to
    fill vacancies for more experienced individuals? What is the current
    status of recruitment and retention at our shipyards?
        Secretary Stackley and Admiral Richardson. The Navy plans to
    increase the total naval shipyard maintenance workforce from 33,850 to
    36,100 full-time equivalent (FTE) employees by fiscal year 2020, as
    requested by the President's Budget for 2018. The four public shipyards
    recruit new employees through the use of job fairs, outreach to local
    high schools and trade skill schools in their respective areas, along
    with extensive travel to career fairs at colleges and universities
    throughout the United States in search of the best candidates possible.
    The public shipyards also actively recruit and use exiting veterans
    hiring authorities to leverage the experience and skill sets gained by
    military personnel that are leaving or have left military service.
    Since naval ship maintenance is a unique skill set, vacancies created
    by the more experienced employees leaving are normally filled by less
    senior but experienced employees progressing through their careers
    within the shipyards, and then those lower level positions which
    require less experience are typically backfilled through external
    hiring.
        Recruitment and retention of shipyard employees continues to be a
    challenge for all four naval shipyards. There is strong competition
    from the private sector for the critical skills and leadership
    qualities experienced shipyard employees possess. The ability of
    private companies to offer higher salaries, particularly in a
    competitive job market like the Puget Sound region or the Chesapeake-
    Tidewater area, impacts the shipyard's ability to retain employees. The
    public shipyards have been using the full suite of available hiring
    flexibilities to meet its hiring needs within the constraints and
    limitations of budgets and local market factors. Tools such as
    relocation and recruitment incentives for its mission-critical and
    hard-to-fill positions, superior qualification appointments to try and
    meet local job market salary variations, as well as direct and
    expedited hiring authorities are being employed. To help retain
    personnel the shipyards are using Accelerated Training and Promotion
    Programs, retention incentives, Student Loan Repayment Programs,
    Quality Step Increases, performance award programs, rehired annuitants
    to help mentor and develop critical skills, and increased coaching,
    mentoring and development programs. The Navy will continue to pursue
    all available opportunities to recruit and retain employees at our
    public shipyards.
        Table 1 shows the recent hires, attritions, and onboard personnel
    at the naval shipyards.

                          Table 1: Naval Shipyard Hires and Attritions, Fiscal Years 2013-2017
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                         FY17 (June)
                                                         FY13         FY14         FY15         FY16          *
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Hires..........................................        1,720        3,574        5,241        3,295        1,369
    Attritions.....................................        2,071        1,959        2,245        2,339        1,533
    Onboard........................................       28,932       30,610       33,545       34,508       34,344
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    * The Navy expects 2,975 new hires and 2,215 attritions by the end of fiscal year 2017 with a total onboard of
      approximately 35,238.

                           focus on the asia pacific
        26. Senator Hirono. Admiral Richardson and General Neller, as the
    department continues to focus our military forces on the threats faced
    in the Asia-Pacific, there are clearly challenges in terms of available
    resources with all of the competing threats around the world. The
    United States' focus in the Pacific is on strengthening alliances;
    encouraging a more interconnected region; and building U.S. military
    capabilities. How does the fiscal year 2018 budget proposal affect the
    military focus on the Pacific region and readiness of our troops?
        Admiral Richardson and General Neller. The Indo-Asia-Pacific region
    remains a key part of the defense strategy. The President's Budget for
    fiscal year 2018 (PB-18) supports development of advanced capabilities
    to pace the threats in the region and provide a quantum capability
    upgrade to the overall force posture in the Pacific. The Asia-Pacific
    rebalance was a guiding principle of our fiscal year 2018 strategic
    laydown plan, and the President's Budget 2018 investments in readiness
    and infrastructure are essential to generating the combat ready forces
    that support the Department of Defense's global posture. The Marine
    Corps continues to strategically deploy platforms with the most
    advanced capabilities to the Asia-Pacific theater.
                                   corrosion
        27. Senator Hirono. Secretary Stackley, Admiral Richardson, and
    General Neller, estimates show that corrosion costs the DOD about $20
    billion per year; however, only very limited resources are spent on
    corrosion mitigation efforts to include research and development.
    Corrosion impacts all of the Services. It affects ground combat
    vehicles, ships and aircraft. Pretty much any system our military uses.
    It has been reported that over half of the Marine Corps' F-18 fleet is
    grounded due to corrosion. Is the Department of the Navy's corrosion
    prevention effort resourced and empowered to lead anti-corrosion
    efforts within the Navy? Is it important to think about and plan for
    anti-corrosion efforts in the early acquisition phases for our major
    programs such as aircraft, ships and ground vehicles? How are Navy and
    Marine Corps efforts in battling corrosion tied to the Department of
    Defense's Office of Corrosion Policy and Oversight?
        Secretary Stackley and Admiral Richardson. Is the Department of the
    Navy's corrosion prevention effort resourced and empowered to lead
    anti-corrosion efforts within the Navy?
        Yes, the Department of Navy (DON) maintains an established,
    department-wide corrosion Cross Functional Team (CFT) to address
    corrosion concerns. This program comprises the DON System Commands
    (SYSCOMS) working together to address both common and platform-specific
    corrosion issues. The program works on reducing corrosion through
    research and development efforts, adding corrosion-resistant product
    designs, training and educating the fleet on preventative and
    corrective corrosion maintenance, and developing technically sound and
    operationally viable maintenance procedures for the system life cycle.
        Each of the SYSCOMS directs engineers, scientists, and subject
    matter experts to address corrosion-related issues that occur over the
    lifecycle of all Navy assets. Over the last two years (fiscal years
    2015 and 2016), the DON has resourced and spent an average of $10.1
    billion on combating and controlling corrosion.
        Is it important to think about and plan for anti-corrosion efforts
    in the early acquisition phases for our major programs such as
    aircraft, ships and ground vehicles?
        Yes, the DON follows the guidance for acquisition laid out in
    Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 5000.02, requiring planning
    for corrosion control of all DON acquisitions. This planning influences
    the development of the Systems Engineering Plan (SEP), Life Cycle
    Sustainment Plan (LCSP), and the Test and Evaluation Master Plan
    (TEMP). The DON has anti-corrosion efforts for aviation, ship, ground,
    space, and naval warfare, as well as facilities and infrastructure
    acquisition programs. As an example, the Virginia-class program has
    implemented numerous new construction corrosion control and corrosion
    avoidance materials, including: the use of high solids paints in tanks,
    voids, and free-floods with expanded use of powder coatings;
    nonmetallic sail coatings; and inherently corrosion resistant composite
    materials for gratings, access plates, and covers.
        How are Navy and Marine Corps efforts in battling corrosion tied to
    the Department of Defense's Office of Corrosion Policy and Oversight?
        The Navy Corrosion Control and Prevention Executive (CCPE) serves
    as the Department's primary contact with the DOD Office of Corrosion
    Policy and Oversight (CPO) as required by title 10 USC Sec. 2228. The
    DON CCPE collaborates with the DOD CPO and the other service CCPEs to
    coordinate policy and share best practices that lead to cross-service,
    force multiplier initiatives. The DOD CPO supports these initiatives
    and DON efforts by funding research and development of corrosion
    control products and processes.
        General Neller. Is the Department of the Navy's corrosion
    prevention effort resourced and empowered to lead anti-corrosion
    efforts within the Navy? The Marine Corps Corrosion Prevention and
    Control Program (CPAC) for ground combat equipment is resourced and
    empowered to lead anti-corrosion efforts within the Marine Corps
    concerning ground combat equipment. The Marine Corps has designated a
    Corrosion Executive within the CPAC Program Management Office (PMO) who
    is responsible to coordinate with the Department of the Navy's
    corrosion executive and the Department of Defense Office of Corrosion
    Policy and Oversight. This interaction allows for productive
    collaboration to leverage Department of Defense-wide corrosion
    initiatives and align them for application associated to multi-domain
    operating concepts while meeting the expeditionary nature of Marine
    Corps operating concepts.
        Is it important to think about and plan for anti-corrosion efforts
    in the early acquisition phases for our major programs such as
    aircraft, ships and ground vehicles? Yes, corrosion is not only a
    sustainment concern; it needs to be addressed from program/system/
    equipment inception through disposal (i.e., ``cradle to grave'').
    Corrosion Prevention and Control (CPC) at the early stages in a system
    development can result in a reduction of Total Ownership Cost (TOC). On
    ground combat equipment, the Marine Corps has established and
    implemented a robust centralized Corrosion Prevention and Control
    (CPAC) Program that focuses on extending the useful life through up-
    front research, engineering and sustainment activities within our
    Marine Corps Systems Command, Systems Engineering and Acquisition
    Logistics (SEAL) group. This approach extends to our acquisition
    professional program managers within Marine Corps Systems Command and
    Program Executive Office (PEO) staffs to reduce the down-stream
    maintenance requirements and associated readiness costs through the
    identification, implementation and development of corrosion prevention
    and control products, materials, technologies and processes throughout
    not only the acquisition of a new system, but throughout its entire
    lifecycle.
                                 cyber funding
        28. Senator Hirono. Admiral Richardson and General Neller, as
    Russia, China, and other adversaries develop cyber capabilities to
    actively challenge and attack the United States and its allies, it is
    evident that we are continuing to bolster the capabilities to counter
    these attacks. The fiscal year 2018 budget request includes
    approximately $8 billion for cyber spending, which is a 16 percent
    increase from last year's amount. How does the proposed budget address
    the concern with building a capable cyber force and increasing the
    number of cyber positions in the military Services? What is the primary
    focus for your cyber forces?
        Admiral Richardson. The Navy is committed to developing a capable
    cyber force to defend Navy networks and to support Joint Cyberspace
    Operations. Navy cyber force investments in fiscal year 2018 focused on
    service specific investments in Defensive Cyber Operations (DCO) and in
    maturing and operating the Navy's contribution to the Joint Cyber
    Mission Force (CMF). The CMF conducts full-spectrum cyberspace
    operations and is a key element in protecting the fleet from cyber-
    attacks while preserving America's strategic influence in key regions
    around the world.
        Navy fiscal year 2018 cyber investments are designed to improve
    cyber space situational awareness and continue to build support for key
    CMF requirements for access platforms, cyber tools to include Cyber
    Protection Team Deployable Mission Support Systems, and other critical
    CMF equipping issues, such as a persistent training environment needed
    for all CMF teams to become fully operational and maintain warfighting
    ability. Investments will also improve the CMF training pipeline, to
    include new dedicated student billets to minimize lag time spent
    awaiting training. The increase in the fiscal year 2018 cyber budget
    funding also supports positions for Cyber Tool Developers and support
    contractors, who will develop tactics and tools to improve our rapid
    capability development in the dynamically changing cyberspace domain.
    DCO investments will improve overall cyber situational awareness, by
    adding personnel to monitor and analyze cyber sensor data as well as
    Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation to deliver technical
    enhancements to support them. Together these investments will provide
    significant improvements to Navy networks resiliency, which is needed
    to counter the increasing cyber threat.
        General Neller. The Marine Corps is committed to developing a
    capable cyber force to defend Marine Corps networks and to support
    Joint Cyberspace Operations. Cyber force investments in fiscal year
    2018 focused on service specific investments in Defensive Cyber
    Operations (DCO) and in maturing and operating the Navy's contribution
    to the Joint Cyber Mission Force (CMF). The CMF conducts full-spectrum
    cyberspace operations and is a key element in protecting from cyber-
    attacks while preserving America's strategic influence in key regions
    around the world. Fiscal year 2018 cyber investments are designed to
    improve cyber space situational awareness and continue to build support
    for key CMF requirements for access platforms, cyber tools to include
    Cyber Protection Team Deployable Mission Support Systems, and other
    critical CMF equipping issues, such as a persistent training
    environment needed for all CMF teams to become fully operational and
    maintain warfighting ability. Investments will also improve the CMF
    training pipeline, to include new dedicated student billets to minimize
    lag time spent awaiting training. The increase in the fiscal year 2018
    cyber budget funding also supports positions for cyber tool developers
    and support contractors, who will develop tactics and tools to improve
    our rapid capability development in the dynamically changing cyberspace
    domain. DCO investments will improve overall cyber situational
    awareness, by adding personnel to monitor and analyze cyber sensor data
    as well as Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation to deliver
    technical enhancements to support them. Together these investments will
    provide significant improvements to network resiliency, which is needed
    to counter the increasing cyber threat.
                        freedom of navigation operations
        29. Senator Hirono. Admiral Richardson, China continues to build
    out the man-made islands they have reclaimed from the South China Sea.
    What are your thoughts on the importance of Freedom of Navigation
    exercises? What is the current status of U.S. FONOPS? Are the Navy and
    PACOM still making the requests to conduct these operations?
        Admiral Richardson. U.S. national security and commerce depend upon
    the freedoms of navigation and overflight, as recognized in U.S. policy
    and international law. For decades, the U.S. has challenged
    restrictions on freedom of navigation and overflight through the U.S.
    Freedom of Navigation (FON) Program. The FON Program combines
    diplomatic action and non-confrontational, operational assertions of
    navigation and overflight rights to maintain U.S. operational
    flexibility. FON operations are conducted in an open, even-handed
    manner, challenging excessive maritime claims based on principle rather
    than identity of the coastal State asserting the claim. For example, in
    fiscal year 2016, DOD challenged the excessive maritime claims of 22
    different coastal States including allies, partners, and other
    countries. FON operations in the South China Sea are only a small
    portion of the overall program in the Asia-Pacific region and
    throughout the world. That said, we continue to regularly conduct FON
    operations in the Asia-Pacific, as we have routinely done in the past
    and will continue to do in the future. Summaries of these operations
    are released publically in the DOD annual FON Report, 2016 report,
    please see Appendix A.

                               APPENDIX A

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