[Senate Hearing 115-733]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 115-733
RECENT U.S. NAVY INCIDENTS AT SEA
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 19, 2017
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via http://www.govinfo.gov/
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
38-896 PDF WASHINGTON : 2020
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Chairman
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma, Chairman JACK REED, Rhode Island
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi BILL NELSON, Florida
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
TOM COTTON, Arkansas JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
JONI ERNST, Iowa RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina JOE DONNELLY, Indiana
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia TIM KAINE, Virginia
TED CRUZ, Texas ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
BEN SASSE, Nebraska ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
LUTHER STRANGE, Alabama GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
Christian D. Brose, Staff Director
Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
_________________________________________________________________
September 19, 2017
Page
Recent U.S. Navy Incidents at Sea................................ 1
Spencer, Hon. Richard V., Secretary of the Navy.................. 4
Richardson, Admiral John M., USN, Chief of Naval Operations...... 6
Pendleton, John H., Director, Defense Force Structure and 9
Readiness Issues, Government Accountability Office.
Questions for the Record......................................... 46
(iii)
RECENT U.S. NAVY INCIDENTS AT SEA
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TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 2017
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:08 a.m. in
Room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John
McCain (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Wicker,
Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Strange,
Reed, Nelson, McCaskill, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal,
Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King, Heinrich, Warren, and Peters.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman McCain. Well, good morning. This committee meets
this morning to receive testimony on recent U.S. Navy
collisions at sea, including USS [United States Ship] Lake
Champlain, USS Fitzgerald, and the USS John S. McCain, as well
as the grounding of USS Antietam.
We welcome our witnesses: The Honorable Richard Spencer,
Secretary of the Navy; Admiral John Richardson, Chief of Naval
Operations; and Mr. John Pendleton, Director of Defense Force
Structure and Readiness Issues at the Government Accountability
Office.
I'd like to take a moment to recognize family members who
have lost loved ones in the Fitzgerald and McCain collisions,
who are here with us today as our honored guests. From the
Fitzgerald, Eric Rehm, the wife of Chief Petty Officer Gary
Rehm; Stephen Ritsuko and Shono Douglass, parents and brother
of Petty Officer Third Class Shingo Douglass; Senior Chief
Petty Officer Victor and Carmen Sibayan and their son, Luke,
parents and brother of Petty Officer First Class Carlos Victor
Sibayan; Wayne and Nikki Rigsby, father and stepmother of
Seaman Dakota Rigsby; Darrold Martin, Chief--father of Petty
Officer First Class Xavier Martin. From the McCain, Jennifer
Simon, wife of Petty Officer First Class Kevin Bushell, and his
mother, Karen Bushell, along with her wife, Anne Shane; Rachel
Eckels, mother of Petty Officer Second Class Timothy Eckels;
Theresa and Austin Palmer, mother and brother of Petty Officer
Second Class Logan Palmer.
Let me express my deepest condolences to you all on behalf
of this committee, the U.S. Senate, and the American people.
Your presence here today reminds us of our sacred obligation to
look after the young people who volunteer to serve in the
military.
Would those individuals who I just named stand so that we
can recognize their presence here?
Thank you. And God bless.
The USS John S. McCain was named after my father and
grandfather. I remember the ship-launching ceremony, nearly 25
years ago. My wife, Cindy, continues to serve as the ship's
sponsor. So, believe me, these tragedies are personal for me
and my family, as well, and we share in your sorrow.
My commitment to all of you is that we will get to the
bottom of these incidents. It's simply unacceptable for U.S.
Navy ships to run aground or collide with other ships. To have
four such incidents in the span of 7 months is truly alarming.
This committee takes seriously its oversight role. We will
identify shortcomings, fix them, and hold people accountable.
We will learn lessons from these recent tragedies to make the
Navy better, and all who serve in it safer.
I know our Navy leaders share these goals and will work
together with us to achieve them. To that end, I hope our
witnesses will help the committee better understand what
happened with regard to these incidents. We are interested in
the status of investigations, common factors or trends
identified, root causes, corrective actions, and accountability
measures. We'd also like to know the extent and cost of damage
to the ships, and operational impacts of unanticipated repairs.
Finally, we ask you to highlight the areas in which we, in
Congress, can assist to help ensure the safety and proficiency
of our sailors, including changes to current law.
I'm deeply concerned by Mr. Pendleton's written testimony,
which indicates 37 percent--that's over one-third--of the
training certifications for U.S. Navy cruisers and destroyers
based in Japan were expired as of June. As he notes, this
represents more than a fivefold increase in the percentage of
expired warfare certifications for these ships in the last 2
years. I would point out, warfare certifications are a ship's
ability to fully be prepared to engage in combat. Press
reporting paints an even bleaker picture. The McCain had
experienced expired training certification in 6 of the 10 key
area--key warfare mission areas. The Fitzgerald had expired
certification in all 10 mission areas.
Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson, I don't need to
tell you that this is troubling and it is unacceptable. We
acknowledge and appreciate the accountability actions the Navy
has taken to date. The Navy has relieved two commanding
officers, a commander and captain. It has issued 20 reprimands
to other officers and enlisted sailors. Since August 23, the
squadron two-star strike group and three-star fleet commander
will all have been relieved, for cause. I assure you that this
committee will do everything we can to support the Navy
leadership's efforts to course correct, but we must also call
you to task and demand answers. As leaders of our Navy, you
must do better.
Particularly, I'd like to know why the recommendations of
the GAO [Government Accountability Office] and other relevant
reviews, such as the 2010 Fleet Review Panel, were not
effectively implemented and maintained. The lives of the 17
sailors lost in the Fitzgerald and McCain collisions were
priceless, and I mourn their loss. These preventable incidents
also come with a very real pricetag, in terms of cost to
taxpayers. I understand the current estimate for repairs is
approximately $600 million. But, the cost will also be felt in
unexpected deployments for other ships to meet operational
requirements.
I'm also concerned by the apparent difficulty of navigating
safely in the western Pacific. With three of these ships now
nondeployable for months or years, due to damage repairs, there
are serious questions about our maritime readiness to fight in
response to North Korean, Chinese, and Russian aggression. The
ongoing reviews directed by Secretary Spencer and Admiral
Richardson must quickly get to the bottom of this and identify
root causes, corrective actions, and further accountability
actions. Time is of the essence. I hope these reviews fully
examine how discrete changes over the years have resulted in
prioritizing the need to do more with less, which has come at
the expense of operational effectiveness. These changes include
longer deployments, so-called optimal manning of ships, less
hands on and initial training, less time for maintenance, less
time to train, and an officer personnel system governed by
laws, like the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act and the
Goldwater-Nichols Act, which were put in place more than three
decades ago and which may have created a preference for breadth
of experience over depth of technical experience. We need to
look seriously and rigorously at all of these types of systemic
contributing factors. I would like your assurance, Secretary
Spencer, that you will do so, and that, as you consider
additional accountability actions, you will look at all levels
of command, as appropriate.
While we are focused on incidents at sea today, this
committee recognizes that the current readiness crisis affects
all of our military services. It is part of a larger, deeper
trend of forcing military units, at the tactical level, to try
to do too much with too little. In the last 3 years, fatal
training accidents have taken the lives of four times more
servicemembers than our enemies have in combat. This cannot
continue.
Unfortunately, this is an issue of command. There's plenty
of blame to go around for the deteriorated state of our
military. We cannot ignore Congress's responsibility. Years of
budget cuts, continuing resolutions, and sequestration have
forced our military to maintain a high operational tempo with
limited resources. We know that has come at the cost of
training, maintenance, readiness, effectiveness, and the lives
of too many brave young Americans. Our Service Chiefs,
including the Chief of Naval Operations, have testified
repeatedly that the Budget Control Act and sequestration are
endangering the lives of our men and women in uniform. My dear
friends, we were warned.
To fix this problem, we must all do better. Military
leaders must make honest assessments of their requirements and
request the full extent of what they need. In turn, we, in
Congress, must provide these resources in a timely and
predictable way. That is the only way to truly restore the
readiness of our force. It is the only solution to ensuring
that accidents like this do not happen again. It is the bare
minimum we owe to the brave men and women who risk their lives
to defend our Nation.
Senator Reed?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to join Senator McCain in welcoming Secretary
Spencer and Admiral Richardson and Mr. Pendleton to the
committee this morning to testify on the issues surrounding the
recent accidents and the Department's plan for determining what
went wrong and what steps need to be taken to ensure such
accidents do not occur in the future.
Service in the Nation's Armed Forces can be very dangerous.
The country is saddened whenever we lose one of America's sons
or daughters, but it is particularly disturbing when young
people are casualties in the course of conducting normal
peacetime operations. I want to extend my condolences to the
families of those who were lost. I know I join all my
colleagues and Chairman McCain in expressing our profound
sympathy for your loss.
We should not prejudge the outcome of the internal Navy
reviews of the circumstances around these accidents. However,
we do know that the Department of the Navy has been facing
serious readiness problems caused by deferred maintenance,
reduced steaming and flying hours, and canceled training and
deployments. In addition, the Navy, like other services, has
also been operating at a very high tempo for a long period.
These conditions have been aggravated by many years of budget
constraints and uncertainty which have forced leaders into
making difficult decisions. All these factors have inevitably
taken a toll on Navy commanders and Navy operations.
Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson, I ask your
commitment that you are giving this situation your full
attention, that you will follow these investigations wherever
they lead, and that you will share all findings with Congress.
We must do all that is necessary to provide and sustain our
Navy and all our Armed Forces.
Again, I thank the witnesses, and I look forward to the
testimony.
Chairman McCain. Secretary Spencer.
STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD V. SPENCER, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
Mr. Spencer. Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed,
distinguished members of this committee, I want to thank you
for the opportunity to appear before you and talk about the
state of our Navy.
Before we move forward, though, I want to express our
deepest condolences to the families and loved ones and the
crews who have lost one of their own in the last few months.
Having looked into the eyes of many of these families, and
shared time with them, knowing that their returned ones
returned home in a flag-draped casket, I know my words are
completely insufficient. To the families present, please know
that Polly and I have you in our thoughts and prayers.
The 17 sailors from the USS Fitzgerald and John S. McCain
were sons, brothers, husbands, fiances, uncles, and friends.
They were patriots, and they will not be forgotten. We pledge
our full support to their families and crews. We're going to
back our words with actions. We have a problem in the Navy, and
we're going to fix it.
In addition to the investigations already initiated, we are
conducting two thorough reviews. The CNO's [Chief of Naval
Operations] comprehensive review will take a look at the
tactical and operational situation at hand. My strategic
readiness review will be an independent team comprised of
military and industry experts that will look and examine root
causes, accountability, long-term systemic issues, and then
provide remedial insight. These reviews will complement and
enhance each other, providing the depth and criticality to
the--that the situation demands.
After I've received and reviewed the recommendations from
our teams, I will act, to the limits of my authority, to change
processes and acquire any needed capabilities in order to
protect our people.
I'm here today to impress our sense of urgency and to
highlight a way forward to renew a culture of safety and
training across the fleet. We will take lessons learned from
the recent tragic events and come out the other side a
stronger, more capable Navy/Marine Corps team.
Make no mistake, we are not waiting 60 days or 90 days to
make adjustments. The CNO will address a list of actions the
Seventh Fleet is taking immediately to address the situation at
hand, ranging from ship-to-ship materiel inspections to the
activation of AIS [Automatic Identification System] radar
identifications while we're trafficking specific areas. We are
not lying idle, and I can tell you, ladies and gentlemen, we
are committed.
I appreciate the opportunity to work with you on the
remedial solutions and to find our way forward.
Thank you, and I'll forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Spencer follows:]
Prepared Statement by Secretary Richard V. Spencer
Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished members of
the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today
to discuss the current state of the Department of the Navy. The issues
of safety and training and their impact on readiness are of vital
importance to the security of our Nation, and are at the forefront of
every decision we make.
As you are well aware, the USS Fitzgerald and USS John S. McCain
were recently involved in two separate collisions that resulted in the
loss of 17 U.S. sailors. These sailors served with honor and pride and
we, as a Service, a Department, and a Nation, deeply mourn this great
loss, alongside their families. These sailors will not be forgotten,
and our Navy stands in solidarity in support of these families and
crewmembers. These sailors were not just Navy crewmen but sons,
brothers, husbands, fiances, uncles, and friends. The stories from
surviving members' actions taken to save these ships are a direct
testament to the heroism and dedication of our sailors. I appear before
you today committed to understanding exactly what happened, why it
happened, and how we prevent it from happening in the future. Most
important is what we learn from these tragic events. You have my pledge
that I will work diligently and tirelessly to examine, listen, and put
in place the appropriate adjustments in operations and policy to
reestablish a culture of safety and training across our Fleet, a
commitment that I know is fully and equally shared by Admiral
Richardson and the rest of the Navy leadership.
The Navy has had an increase in surface fleet incidents within the
past eight months that has resulted in significant loss of life and
injury. Three of the ships involved--the USS Fitzgerald (DDG 62) and
USS John S. McCain (DDG 56), and the USS Antietam (CG 54), which ran
aground in on shoals just outside the Yokosuka Naval Base, were
homeported in Yokosuka, Japan. Additionally, during this same time
period, there was the collision between USS Lake Champlain (CG 57) and
a South Korean fishing vessel. As we mourn the loss of our sailors, we
must look forward, learn, and improve upon the ways we operate. As
Secretary of the Navy, I am responsible for ensuring we find out how
and why this happened and put the necessary controls and procedures in
place to prevent this in the future.
Make no mistake; we have a problem. Investigations have been
initiated. We have completed a commander stand down to start the
discussions addressing items of concern and points of friction.
Additionally, both the Service and the Department have started reviews.
We have taken immediate steps through the start of these investigations
and reviews to examine root causes in order to address systemic issues.
While the formal investigations into each event are underway, the
CNO and I have called for two additional reviews. Admiral Philip
Davidson, Commander of Fleet Forces Command, is leading a 60-day
Comprehensive Review. This Comprehensive Review will examine individual
training and professional development, unit level training and
operational performance, development and certification of deployed
operational and mission standards, deployed operational employment and
risk management, material readiness, and utility of current navigation
equipment and combat systems, and will include recommendations on
corrective actions.
In addition to the Comprehensive Review, I have commissioned a
Strategic Readiness Review, assembling a team of outside experts with a
deep knowledge of operational and organizational risk management. This
group will look at longer term trends and bring their expertise to my
review of the recommendations that result from the Comprehensive
Review's efforts. Additionally, the team will review appropriate
accountability mechanisms across the Department of the Navy, identify
any deficiencies, and offer recommendations to reduce the potential for
such tragic events in the future. Together, these reviews will provide
the appropriate depth, criticality, and completeness demanded and
deserved by our Nation and service members in the wake of recent
trends. It will provide the construct from which we will learn and make
course corrections for the way forward.
While theories about causal factors for the recent events abound, I
believe it is in the best interest of the Service and the Nation to
resist the temptation to jump to conclusions, speculate on causes,
continue to assess responsibility, and articulate solutions until we
have completed all investigations and reviews. Our investigations and
reviews will be fact-based, informed by experts, and supported by
evidence and data. It is our obligation to ensure the highest integrity
of these investigations and reviews, and we will protect the process at
all costs. That includes the responsibility to be fully transparent
about that process, transparency to which the Department and I are
committed. When the investigations and reviews are complete, I look
forward to sharing their results with you and the American people.
As we examine the systemic issues associated with these tragic
incidents, we look to Congress to assist us in our path forward. Once I
have received and reviewed the recommendations made by the review
teams, I will act to the limits of my authority to change processes,
acquire any needed capabilities, and protect our people. We will
address any cultural shifts that might be called for, so we may chart a
path that ensures we operate and train in an environment that is based
upon a culture of safety.
All of these efforts rest on a foundation of sufficient and
predictable funding to sustain our readiness. As I stated in my
confirmation hearing, the Navy-Marine Corps team, their families, and
their civilian teammates have never failed our Nation, and they never
will. However, I believe that we are failing them through such actions
as the Budget Control Act and repeated continuing resolutions. This
imbalance must be rectified.
I appear before you today with a plan, as well as with a sense of
urgency, to renew a culture focused on safety and training across the
Fleet. I commit to you that we will not just look forward, but will
lean forward to take the lessons from these terrible events and
incorporate them into the operations of this enterprise. I appreciate
the opportunity to share our efforts and continue to work together to
find ways to support our Navy, and I look forward to your questions.
Chairman McCain. Admiral Richardson.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL JOHN M. RICHARDSON, USN, CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS
Admiral Richardson. Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed,
and distinguished members of the committee, I also want to
thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to
discuss the recent U.S. Navy incidents at sea.
To begin with, I also want to express my deep condolences
to the families of the 17 sailors who served their country with
honor and distinction and lost their lives in USS Fitzgerald
and USS John S. McCain. In both of these tragic incidents, our
sailors acted heroically to save their ships as they combated
flooding and the loss of critical systems. Care and support to
these families, the families of our sailors, is our top
priority. I've committed to them that we will learn everything
we can from these tragic events to prevent another accident. As
you pointed out, sir, many of the family members are here
today. We will always stand with you.
What we do is inherently dangerous, but it is leadership
responsibility to ensure we provide the right training and
oversight to keep our teams safe and effective. We are taking
immediate corrective actions to ensure we meet the training and
materiel readiness standard to prevent another mishap.
We are not stopping with immediate actions. In addition to
the investigations into the specific incidents on Fitzgerald
and McCain, we're conducting, as the Secretary pointed out, a
comprehensive review, which will turn over every stone to
examine for more systemic problems. This review will complement
the Secretary's strategic review.
I've testified several times about the triple whammy, the
corrosive confluence of high operational tempo, inadequate
budgets, and budget uncertainty. The funding approved in fiscal
year 2017 is being used to plug our most urgent readiness holes
in the fleet, and our 2018 request sustains that progress.
While we have prioritized maintenance and readiness dollars,
full recovery will not happen overnight; it will take years
with stable and adequate resources.
But, make no mistake, sir, while these factors do exert a
negative force on the challenges we face, at the core this
issue is about leadership, especially command. Our first
dollar, our first molecule of effort, our first team must go to
safety. Safety is first. No matter what the situation, those
charged with command must achieve and maintain a standard that
ensures their teams are trained and ready to safely and
effectively conduct assigned operations. We must remain
vigilant to meeting this standard, fighting against every
pressure to erode it.
Our commanders must meet the absolute standard to develop
safe and effective teams. If we cannot meet the standard, we do
not deploy until we do. We must establish a command climate
that supports honest reporting.
Senator, these incidents demand our full attention. We must
provide our sailors the necessary resources and training to
execute their assigned missions. I am accountable for the safe
and effective operations of our Navy, and we will fix this. I
own this problem. I'm confident that our Navy will identify the
root causes, and correct them, and that it will be better in
the end.
Again, thank you for the opportunity to be here, and I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Richardson follows:]
Prepared Statement by Admiral John M. Richardson
Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished members of
the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today
to discuss the recent U.S. Navy incidents at sea. To begin, I want to
express my deep condolences to the families of the 17 sailors who
served their country with honor and distinction and lost their lives in
USS Fitzgerald and USS John S. McCain. In both of these tragic
incidents our sailors acted heroically to save their ships as they
combatted flooding and the loss of critical systems. Care and support
to the families of these sailors is our top priority. I have committed
to them that we will learn everything we can from these tragic events
to prevent another accident. We will always stand with these families.
What we do is inherently dangerous. It is a leadership
responsibility to ensure we provide the right oversight and training to
keep our team at their operational peak. We are taking immediate
actions to prevent another mishap.
I directed a pause across the Navy, both ashore and
afloat, to review our fundamentals to ensure safe and effective
operations, and to correct any areas that require immediate attention.
This pause has been completed, with commanders incorporating deliberate
processes in their operations to better manage risk.
We have commenced Readiness for Sea Assessments (RFSA)
for all ships assigned to Japan, to inspect and assess watchstander
proficiency and material readiness to ensure ships are able to safely
navigate, communicate and operate. Immediate remediation will be
conducted for ships found deficient, and they will not be assigned for
operational tasking until they are certified to be ready.
We have taken measures to ensure our sailors get
sufficient sleep in all shipboard routines to address fatigue concerns.
All material problems involving ship control have been
given increased priority for repair.
To ensure Seventh Fleet ships are properly certified, the
Pacific Fleet Commander is standing up Naval Surface Group Western
Pacific (NSGWP) to consolidate authorities to oversee the training and
certification of forward-deployed ships based in Japan.
We have commenced a review of certifications of each
ship, to include developing a plan for each to regain currency and
proficiency across all certification areas. All waivers for ships whose
certification has expired will now be approved by the Pacific Fleet
Commander.
We have increased focus across the force on open
communication and thorough debriefing and assessment of operations and
evolutions through instilling the practice of ``Plan, Brief, Execute,
Debrief'' across commands. Other cultural changes include increasing
unit-level operational pauses, increasing access to lessons learned,
and encouraging time for repercussion-free self-assessments.
In addition to these actions, the pause yielded results across all
communities to promote a renewed focus on safety, communication and
professionalism in the execution of ``routine'' operations. Leaders at
every level addressed fighting against over-confidence, inattention,
and complacency through emphasis on adherence to procedures and on
applying sound operational risk management procedures. We will continue
to enhance our safety culture in which each sailor is empowered to act
to control hazards before they become a mishap.
We are not stopping there. In addition to the investigations into
the specific incidents on USS Fitzgerald and USS John S. McCain, the
Vice Chief of Naval Operations directed a Comprehensive Review to
examine for more systemic problems. Led by Admiral Phil Davidson,
Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command, this effort will review
individual training and professional development, to include
seamanship, navigation, voyage planning, leader development and all
aspects of tactical training. The review will also address unit level
and operational performance, to include oversight and risk management
at all levels of the chain of command. The development and
certification of deployed operational and mission standards--force
generation--will be reviewed, with an emphasis on Forward Deployed
Naval Forces. It will also include a review of the material readiness
of our ships, and the systems required to operate them, to include
navigation, propulsion, steering, combat systems and material
availability. The review team includes experts from within the Navy and
outside experts from other services, academia, and the civilian sector.
This approach will help ensure we don't have any blind spots as we look
hard at every aspect of our operations. We will be transparent with the
results of these reviews and our actions.
I have testified several times about the ``triple whammy''--the
corrosive confluence of high operational tempo constrained funding
levels, and budget uncertainty. Although warfighting capabilities of
ships have dramatically increased in the last century, the size and
scope of U.S. responsibilities around the world have also increased,
and the Navy is feeling the strains of consistently high operational
tempo. Added to this challenge, eight years of continuing resolutions
and the Budget Control Act have impacted the ability to plan and
schedule training, ship maintenance, and modernization. With the $2.8
billion in funding approved in fiscal year 2017, we are plugging the
most urgent readiness holes in the fleet. Our fiscal year 2018 request
sustains the readiness progress, increases end strength, modernizes our
current platforms, and purchases future platforms and capabilities
needed to sustain the advantage over our adversaries. While we have
prioritized our maintenance and readiness dollars, the positive effects
of funding will not remove this deficit overnight; it will take time
with stable resources to sustain the upward trend.
While these factors exert a negative force on the challenges we
face, make no mistake: at the core, this issue is about command. No
matter what the situation, those charged with command must hold the
standard that ensures our forces are trained and certified to safely
and effectively conduct assigned operations. We must remain vigilant to
meeting this standard, fighting against every pressure to erode it. We
must look at our ``can do'' culture and ensure it is also a culture
that promotes a clear-eyed view of safety and readiness.
We have been subject to:
budget pressures to ``do more with less''
operational pressures to put busy forces on station more
quickly and more often
schedule pressures to make adjustments to training and
maintenance plans.
None of these can excuse our commanders from adherence to the
absolute standard to develop safe and effective teams. And when we fall
short of the ideal, we must make a thoughtful assessment of the
results, and where necessary put mitigations in place. If the situation
becomes untenable and we cannot meet the standard, we must not deploy
until we're ready. It is the diligence and leadership of our commanding
officers at every level that will implement the changes needed to
ensure our Navy remains the world's most capable Navy.
These incidents demand our full attention to provide our sailors
the necessary resources and training to execute their assigned
missions. I own this problem. I am accountable for the safe and
effective operations of our Navy, and we will fix this. I am confident
that our Navy will identify the root causes and correct them, and that
we'll be better in the end. I look forward to your questions.
Chairman McCain. Mr. Pendleton.
STATEMENT OF JOHN H. PENDLETON, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE FORCE
STRUCTURE AND READINESS ISSUES, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE
Mr. Pendleton. Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed,
members of the committee, thank you for having me here today to
summarize GAO's work on Navy readiness.
Mr. Chairman, I don't know what caused the tragic recent
accidents, but I do know, from my work, that the Navy's caught
between an unrelenting operational demand and a limited supply
of ships. At this point, I'm skeptical that the Navy will be
able to make significant readiness gains unless the demands on
them are decreased. Even with increased funding going forward,
my assessment agrees with the Navy, that it will take several
years to rebuild training, manning, and maintenance,
foundations of readiness that have become shaky over time.
Our work has also revealed significant management issues
that the Navy must confront. In a 2015 report, we found that
the ships based in Japan had such aggressive deployment
schedules that they did not have dedicated training periods,
like ships in the United States do. In fact, we were told that
the ships based overseas were so busy that they had to train on
the margins. When I asked what that meant, it was explained to
me that it meant that they had to squeeze in training when they
could.
The assumption, I think, was that the Seventh Fleet,
because it was perpetually in motion, it was ready. I think the
Navy has now realized that this conventional wisdom was, in
fact, likely faulty. We recommended at the time, back in 2015,
that the Navy revise deployment schedules to create dedicated
training time, and also, more broadly, assess the risk
associated with increased reliance on overseas basing of ships.
DOD [Department of Defense] and the Navy agreed with us, at
least on the paper, but they've taken little action since to
implement our recommendations.
The Navy has other even more broad management challenges
that it must address, like ship manning. A Navy internal study
found that sailors were often working over 100 hours a week,
back in 2014, and it concluded that this was unsustainable and
potentially contributing to a poor safety culture. We
recommended, in brief, that the Navy assess how much work it
actually takes to run a ship, and use that to size the crew.
Maintenance is also taking longer and costing more. Ship
deployments have often been extended. This causes ships to have
more problems when they're brought in for maintenance.
Shipyards have struggled to keep pace, for a number of reasons.
Over the past few years, the lost operational days that's been
created by the maintenance overruns have cost the Navy the
equivalent of the presence of almost three surface ships per
year. That, in turn, strains the remaining fleet, and it's an
unsustainable, vicious cycle.
As you know, the Navy's not alone in its readiness
challenges. That's why GAO recommended--and this committee has
supported, the need for the development of department-wide
readiness rebuilding plan that explicitly balances resources
with demands, and is transparent about how long it will take to
rebuild readiness, and what it will cost. I suggest you
continue to insist that the Department provide you that plan.
Over the past 3 years, GAO has made 14 recommendations in
all to the Department of Defense to help guide the Navy and the
services toward improved readiness. As the Navy and DOD develop
a roadmap, going forward, I sincerely hope they consider our
recommendations to help guide them.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for having me here today, and I'm
happy to take any questions you have.
Chairman McCain. Thank you, Mr. Pendleton. I appreciate
it--your testimony, but more importantly, I thank you for the
important work that you do, which is incredibly important to
this committee.
Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson, surface force
readiness has degraded over the last 10 years. Surface chain of
command has become complicated on the waterfront. There's a
blurring of lines of authority and accountability. The growing
backlog of off-ship repair requirements, a large, deep
maintenance requirement that has not been adequately identified
or resourced. The effort to derive efficiencies has overtaken
our culture of effectiveness. The materiel condition of the
surface force is well below acceptable levels to support
reliable sustained operations at sea and preserve ships to
their full service life expectancy. Ships home-ported overseas
have limited training and maintenance, which results in
difficulty keeping crews trained and ships maintained. Some
ships home-ported overseas have had consistently deferred
maintenance, resulting in long-term degraded materiel
condition. Without a sustainable operational schedule and
comprehensive risk assessment for ships home-ported overseas,
it will be difficult for the Navy to identify and mitigate
risks. I could go on.
Mr. Secretary, do you agree that these statements ring true
today?
Mr. Spencer. I do, Senator.
Chairman McCain. I agree with you. Unfortunately, these are
findings from the Navy and GAO reports from 2010 to 2015. Many
of the issues we're discussing today have been known to Navy
leaders for years. How do we explain that, Admiral?
Admiral Richardson. Senator, there is no explanation to
reconcile those two observations. While clearly there is much
more to be done, and these observations, you know, point to
those--and I commend the work of Mr. Pendleton and the GAO, as
well, to providing such sound recommendations--there has been,
also, a--an effort to address those observations. We've not
been sitting idle. While it's--clearly been insufficient to
close the readiness and effectiveness gap, we have been making
steady investments to respond to the indications that we've got
in training and manpower and in maintenance. We'll remain
committed to closing that gap, as well, and reconciling the
difference between supply and demand.
Chairman McCain. Well, I can't continue this much further
without asking your assessment of the effect of sequestration
on your ability to address these conditions that I've cited,
which come from GAO and the Navy itself. What effect does
sequestration--for example, we're now facing the same collision
coming up with--as of 1 October--what effect does sequestration
have in affecting these recommendations and situations, as
described by the GAO and the Navy itself?
Mr. Secretary?
Mr. Spencer. Senator, the impact of sequestration and
continuing resolutions is deleterious. It's an impact on the
Navy that is stunning. Having been asked to come and run a
business--i.e., the Navy--as CEO of the Navy on the man, equip,
train, and supply side of the equation, it's very disturbing.
Just looking, today, to give you a feel, Senator, with the CR
[continuing resolution] that's coming up, starting October 1,
going through December 8th, the fleet will mitigate
approximately $200 million of O&M shortfall over the next 69
days.
Chairman McCain. That's operation and maintenance.
Mr. Spencer. That is correct, I'm sorry.
Chairman McCain. Okay, go ahead.
Mr. Spencer. It's a tentative number. It's still in work.
But, that's where we think it's coming from. The fleet will
minimize the impact by incrementally funding or shortening
periods of contracts, where possible. This will cause a
degradation in the quality of work. The fleet will also delay
consumables and phased replacement materiel, purchasing for
ships, and this will impact, again, the quality and service and
the operation of the ships. We have to do management of the
funds resources we have. This is not solely a funds issue, but
you asked about CR and the effects of sequestration. We are
living them. They are untenable.
Chairman McCain. Admiral?
Admiral Richardson. Sir, if I could add to that. The
effects of sequestration and continuing resolutions makes
everything harder. Everything. As we face the continuing
resolution before us now, in addition to what the Secretary
said, we will be considering deferring or slipping 11 more ship
maintenance availabilities. There are dozens of new projects
that we won't be able to get started on. These are things that
had--start to address some of these conditions that we've got.
Over the past 9 years now, as we review the data, the
number of efficiency studies, effectiveness studies--they all
result in a constant pressure to do more with less. It rarely
results in an increase.
Having said that, sir, I maintain that this is an issue of
command, and that, if you only give us one ship, it's our
obligation to operate that ship safely and effectively. I do
not--while that makes it harder, that is not--in no way an
excuse for the performance that led to these four incidents.
Chairman McCain. Mr. Pendleton, do you have anything?
Mr. Pendleton. Yes. We heard about the impact of budget
everywhere when we do our work. It's hard to pin it down
exactly. There are examples in our reports of depot maintenance
being deferred and furloughs, and postponed deployments, and
ship fuel problems. I think it's a cumulative disruption, at
this point. I think--what we judged, back last year, was, we
are where we are and the Department, not just the Navy, needs a
plan for going forward, in part to be able to articulate what's
real and reasonable, going forward, sir.
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
I'm very proud of the vote of confidence in Senate approval
of the Defense Authorization Act, which was overwhelming and a
source of pride to me, that all 27 members of this committee
agreed on the legislation that was just approved
overwhelmingly. I have to point out, there was an effort, by an
amendment by Senator Cotton, to try to rectify this
sequestration issue to some degree. I will not name
individuals, but it was blocked from even being considered for
a vote. That, to me, is--well, it's disgraceful.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Richardson, you continue to come back, and I think
approximately, to the issue of command, even though we all
understand the fiscal and procedural and resource constraints
that Navy has faced. But, the issue of command is played out
in--not theoretically, but very practically. That's when a
commander says, ``I can't do this, because my ships is not
ready.'' Have you, in your capacity, indicated to COCOMs
[combatant commands] that you can't provide ships because not
ready--has commanders of individual ships said, ``I can't''--to
the fleet--''I can't move, because my ships is not ready''?
Admiral Richardson. Senator, as I've testified before, and
you know very well, we don't meet more than 50 percent of the
combatant commanders' demands, as it is, at least from a force-
structure standpoint and--a combination of that is due to
readiness. There have been times, where I've spoken with my
subordinate commanders, where there is just insufficient time
to get a force trained and certified to meet a deployment date
when we have to go back to the combatant commander and say,
``You're going to have to wait.''
Senator Reed. With respect to the issue of command, when
those tough calls are made by the commander, does that result
in any kind of either formal or informal disparagement of the
commander; that's----
Admiral Richardson. If I could go down and give that
commander a handshake and a medal, I would do that. This is
exactly the type of honesty and transparency that we need to
run a Navy that's safe and effective.
Senator Reed. In the process, going forward, not only will
you be attempting, I think, to analyze the issues, come up with
resources, but also continue to stress the idea of commanders
having the ultimate responsibility to determine the worthiness
of their ship.
Admiral Richardson. That'll be the absolute center of
gravity of our effort, sir.
Senator Reed. The--Mr. Pendleton and his colleagues have
done some excellent work, and they point out that the
certifications of a significant number of ships, particularly
in the Pacific, are not adequate. Can you tell us what that
certification means? Is that a good indication of the
capability of the ship, or is that not?
Admiral Richardson. This is an indication that we use, sir.
This is our indication. It's either a good indication or it's a
meaningless indication. I'd like to think that those
certifications mean something. It--while Mr. Pendleton's report
gets to some ratios--and I'll leave it to him to get to that
math--I agree with his conclusion that, over the last 2 years,
the number of certifications on our ships, particularly in the
forward-deployed naval force in Japan, has dropped
precipitously. That deserves our full attention. It should have
been brought to our attention more urgently before now.
Senator Reed. With respect to deployed forces, there seems
to be a distinction between deployed forces and stateside
forces, in terms of lots of things--repairs, refitting,
resources, training. That is going to be a focus, I presume, of
you and the Secretary's inquiries about what's the--why the
disparity?
Admiral Richardson. It certainly will be a focus of the
comprehensive review, to take a look at the way we generate and
certify readiness, compare it to the forces in the United
States, the rotational forces that leave--deploy and come back,
versus those forward-deployed forces that remain at a higher
state of readiness in theater.
Senator Reed. Admiral Richardson, over the last several
years, the Navy--not the Navy alone, but all the military
services--have attempted to quote/unquote ``streamline
training,'' make it more effective because of deployment
schedules, because of the availability of personnel. Do you
think that, in any way, contributed to the--these accidents,
that these young people were, you know, hustled through, if you
will, and not--without the same kind of opportunities that
predecessors might have had to learn their jobs?
Admiral Richardson. Sir, I'll tell you that it's too early
to say if these had a specific impact on those incidents. Those
investigations are still in progress. But, we are looking
specifically at that. You know, what is the climate with
respect to the priority of training and certification, and does
it always get given lower priority to operations and the need
to go out and execute the mission? As Mr. Pendleton and the
Secretary have hinted, that, when maintenance periods run long,
that further pressurizes our operational time. Training gets--
you know, is there a pattern to consistently box out training,
particularly the training on the fundamentals? That's
absolutely a focus of the investigations.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, gentlemen.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I chair the Readiness Subcommittee, and on February 8th, we
had a readiness hearing. Admiral Moran was at that hearing.
Now, keep in mind, that was February the 8th, and, of the four
incidents we're talking about, all except the one on January
31st were since that hearing that we had, Secretary Spencer, at
the readiness hearing. In fact, I look at your situation, that
you've now been on the job for, what, 5 weeks, 6 weeks. I'll
bet you wonder sometimes what you've gotten into. But, it's a
tough, tough situation, and you're the kind of person that can
try something new. I'm----
But, at this hearing, Moran testified that the Navy could
only meet about 40 percent of its demand from the regional
combatant commanders. We've heard the reaffirmation of that,
which has been going on for a long time. We also heard the Navy
is the smallest it's been in 99 years. He went on to say,
``It's become clear to me that the Navy's overall readiness has
reached its lowest level in many years. That is all due to the
inconsistent, insufficient funding that does not match the
demand for Navy forces due to global threat situations.'' So,
we hear over and over again that the Navy is taking on more,
and with less.
So, Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson, if the Navy
is focused on ensuring the foreign deployed ships are ready,
and recent history is our example, what shape would the rest of
the fleet be, in terms of readiness? What shape are the rest of
the non-forward-deployed in? How would you characterize that?
Admiral Richardson?
Admiral Richardson. Sir, it has been our consistent
priority to resource those forces that are forward deployed and
that are going to deploy, and that the surge force, as we call
them, those forces that are here in the continental United
States that may be the next to deploy or they may be called to
respond in a crisis to reinforce the forward-deployed forces,
those are the ones that remain less ready than we need them to,
to respond in the way that they need to.
This is where you do a lot of that basic training, right?
The one thing that's unforgivable in these situations is time.
You just cannot get back the time.
Senator Inhofe. Yeah.
Admiral Richardson. So, the flying hours don't--you can't
catch up, right? That time is gone. The steaming hours, all of
those things that don't happen in basic training, it's very
hard to recapture that, just in terms of developing the level
of experience and sophistication.
Senator Inhofe. Okay. You've caused for--called for a
comprehensive review and an operational pause. When did the
operational pause start?
Admiral Richardson. The operational pause started pretty
much immediately after the collision of John S. McCain.
Senator Inhofe. Yeah. I know that the comprehensive review
is still underway. Can you talk about anything that, perhaps
during this pause, you might--any observations----
Admiral Richardson. Senator, thank you. I did direct that
operational pause, because, at that point, I needed to elevate
this to a Navy-wide perspective so that, both the shore and
afloat, we took some time to stop, take a break, and review our
fundamentals to ensure that we are operating safely and
effectively, and to correct any areas that required immediate
attention.
In addition to that pause, the Seventh Fleet conducted a
standdown to address navigation and seamanship basics. As a
result of that, we've made a number of corrections--immediate
actions, if you will. All--first of all, all waivers for
certifications, the certification process has been elevated now
to the four-star level at the Pacific Fleet commander. We are
reviewing every single ship, ship by ship, to evaluate their
materiel and operational readiness. That is being done both
administratively to make sure that our certification process--
--
Senator Inhofe. Yeah.
Admiral Richardson,--is good, and also with physical
visits.
Senator Inhofe. Yeah.
Admiral Richardson. The--we have also convinced a
readiness-for-sea inspection on all of those ships, to inspect
and assess watch-standard proficiency and materiel readiness.
Senator Inhofe. So, that pause has aided you in your
comprehensive review.
Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir. I mean, I have a list that I
could go on and on, in terms of immediate actions, but we are
not waiting for these longer-term comprehensive reviews to
complete; we're taking that action now to ensure a margin of--
--
Senator Inhofe. Yeah.
Admiral Richardson,--safety for----
Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much. Mr. Pendleton, your
candid and, I think, alarming assessment of the whole situation
is not a surprise. As you look over all the forewarned things
that--I think the Chairman said in his opening statement, said,
``We were warned,'' and I think we were. It does boil down to--
I think it does--resources, and a lot of it--I think you would
probably agree with that.
This is what I'd like to ask you to do. I have 14 things in
the defense authorization bill that we just passed yesterday,
and, assuming that we're able to keep these things in there,
recognizing we have a conference to go, and other--
appropriations and all that--I'd like to have you look at these
14 things, look at the problems that we're trying to address in
this particular hearing, and give us your evaluation as to how
these--any of these 14 things might resolve the problem in the
long term and the short term. All right?
Mr. Pendleton. We'll be happy to do that and provide it for
the record.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for being here today.
Cybersecurity, as we all know, is a growing concern as we
become more reliant on electronic means for communication, for
storage of data, for operation and day-to-day systems, and also
for navigation and control systems. I understand that
cyberexperts from the Tenth Fleet were sent out to Singapore to
investigate electronic data onboard the USS John McCain to see
if any cyberintrusions had taken place, and that Admiral Moran
stated, last week, that future accident investigations will
include cyber investigations to ensure that there's been no
tampering.
Can you tell me--I guess this is for you, Admiral
Richardson--what are we doing proactively to ensure the
security of our navigation systems and our electronic systems?
Admiral Richardson. Senator, just as you said, we did send
an investigation team out to the John S. McCain to take a look
at that. I got a report, an update on that, just this morning,
and still no evidence of any kind of intrusion or tampering
yet. We're continuing to investigate.
The Navy has been on a steady path to continue to harden
ourselves to be prepared for operations in combat in the
cyberdomain. That starts, first and foremost, like everything,
with people and organizations. We've been steadily bringing in
and training cyberexperts into our team. We stood up that Tenth
Fleet as a response to that. We have technical authority at
the--at SPAWAR [Space and Naval Systems Command], out in San
Diego, and we've got an information warfare-type commander,
just like all the other services, down in Hampton Roads,
Virginia. We believe that we're organized properly. Those
organizations are becoming manned, billets are being filled,
and the training is being done.
We are doing a combination of things. Many of these
measures require physical standards so that our systems are
hardened against intrusion. We are certainly baking those in to
new systems that we are bringing onboard. We are looking at
hardening those legacy systems that we already own, to the
greatest degree possible. A very fast-moving problem, a very
dynamic problem. I'm not saying we're there yet, but we're
giving it very high priority and resources.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. I'm glad to hear that.
Obviously, that's another area where resources are very
important.
Senator McCain has talked about the problems of
sequestration, which everyone on this committee knows very
well. But, I wonder if you could talk, in detail, about the
impact of continuing resolutions, budget cycle after budget
cycle, and how they affect maintenance and training plans for
ships, and are forward-deployed ships affected more than ships
stateside, is there any correlation there?
Admiral Richardson. Ma'am, as I said, we will prioritize
our resources to those forces that are forward deployed and
that will deploy forward. We will not leave those teams short
of resources.
Having said that, the uncertainty that--well, actually--to
not get a budget on time has become, actually, certain. We're
certain that we're not going to get a budget in the first
quarter.
Senator Shaheen. Which is a sad commentary----
Admiral Richardson. Which is----
Senator Shaheen.--on the budget situation.
Admiral Richardson. Behaviors have adapted. We don't put
anything in--important in the first quarter of the year. We
have to compete three out of four quarters of the game.
In addition to just to that fact, what happens is, you have
to double your contracting. Right? You have to right a tiny
little contract for the length of the continuing resolution,
and then you have to write another one for the rest of the
year. As you know, nothing new can start. We try not to
schedule anything new in that first quarter.
The maintenance and training, those are the hardest things.
As those--as the uncertainty, you know, injects itself, it is
always that the things on the bubble are maintenance periods,
particularly surface-ship maintenance periods. It is, you know,
how many steaming hours am I going to get? How many flying
hours am I going to get? $150-million-per-month shortfall, how
do I manage that? These are the effects of continuing
resolutions.
Mr. Spencer. Senator, can I add to that context, if I----
Senator Shaheen. Please.
Mr. Spencer.--if I may?
One of the things that you heard me testify, when I was
first here for confirmation, was, we really have to get our
hands on industrial science, which the most primary fundamental
of that is the line of sight to your resources. As I'm out
there speaking to our suppliers and our contractors, who are
more than willing to work on our behalf, they cannot run their
businesses when they don't have line of sight to commitment.
That is critical.
Senator Shaheen. Certainly, that's something that I've
heard from suppliers in New Hampshire, as well.
Thank you all.
Chairman McCain. Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. Admiral Richardson, Mr. Pendleton said he
doesn't know what caused these accidents. After the two reports
come out, do you think we'll have a better idea and Mr.
Pendleton will be----
Admiral Richardson. We'll be crystal clear on that, sir.
Senator Wicker. Okay. When can we expect these reports?
Admiral Richardson. The comprehensive review, I put a 60-
day tether on that. That's----
Senator Wicker. Sixty days from today?
Admiral Richardson. Sixty-day--it should complete in mid
October--mid to late October.
Senator Wicker. Okay.
Admiral Richardson. Secretary's strategic review will
complete, nominally, 30 days after that. I do want to
emphasize, that's an aggressive timeline. I want to get these
answers now, but I also want to get these answers right. We'll
evaluate to make sure that we're doing a complete assessment,
and not just rushing to a partial assessment.
Senator Wicker. Okay. Now, you mentioned leadership, and
particularly at the command level. Can you shed any more light
on the two officers who were fired last week? The Navy
mentioned a loss of confidence in their ability to command. Are
you able to be more specific to the committee at this point
about those two individuals?
Admiral Richardson. Sir, if I could, I'd like to defer
until the investigations are done, and then we can come forward
with a full----
Senator Wicker. Okay. But--well, can you say, were those
two individuals onboard either of those ships?
Admiral Richardson. The two--the commodore and the strike-
group commander were not onboard the ships.
Senator Wicker. They were not aboard the ships.
Admiral Richardson. No, sir.
Senator Wicker. Okay. Well, now let--and certainly, the
Chairman is correct, and witnesses are correct, about
sequestration. My commendation to Senator Cotton for trying to
solve this issue. I want to be his teammate on that. It's way
past time that we address this issue.
We have a modernization issue, and we have the more
immediate readiness issue. I think they're both tied together.
Let me ask you--just continue with you, Admiral Richardson. We
have a requirement for 355 ships in our fleet today, is that
correct?
Admiral Richardson. Sir, several studies--Navy studies,
outside-the-Navy studies--have pointed to a fleet size around
355-360 ships.
Senator Wicker. You support that, do you not, Secretary
Spencer?
Mr. Spencer. Yes, I do.
Senator Wicker. Admiral, it's a fact that we're now asking
276 ships to answer the requirement that the--that a minimum of
355 ships would take.
Admiral Richardson. This is the math behind the fact that
we can only source about 40 percent of the world demand right
now.
Senator Wicker. To the extent we're asking fewer ships to
do the--a larger amount of work--to the extent that we've--that
we reduced our fleet size by 20 percent since 9/11, it is a
fact that the Navy is busier than ever, and that's got to
affect readiness, as well as the longer-term modernization
issue. Is that not correct?
Admiral Richardson. Sir, we are maintaining essentially the
same level of forward presence with that 20 percent--smaller
fleet. That has resulted in some exceedingly long deployment
lengths, as Chairman McCain pointed out. We've corrected that
back down to about 7 months as a sustainable length. But, our
ships have been run hard. They are spending more time in
maintenance, and that pressurizes the operational time.
Having said that, again, I'd bring it back to the
fundamental importance of command here, to monitor the
readiness of your ships, your aircraft, your submarines, and to
report when those----
Senator Wicker. Well, I appreciate your acknowledgment of
that.
Let's just talk a little about training. Let me toss out
the idea of incorporating more virtual training, simulator-
based training, into the curriculum for deployed sailors. Are
you considering incorporating more of this high-tech, high-
fidelity--and simulators into regular training as a way to
address that issue?
Admiral Richardson. Sir, we've been on that path for some
time. I'd love to take you around and show you some of the
advanced simulators that we use, both ashore and at sea, to
keep our skills----
Senator Wicker. So, we're where we need to be on that?
Admiral Richardson. Well, we can always do more, and I will
tell you that the technology is allowing us to get more and
more realistic in the scenarios that we present to our sailors,
and we're adopting that technology as fast as we can.
Senator Wicker. Finally, what about this issue of sleep
deprivation? There have been some New York Times articles, and
other publications, about pervasive sleep deprivation among
sailors, particularly surface warfare officers standing watch.
Do you think that's likely to be one of the reasons that we
eventually get down to on this issue?
Admiral Richardson. Sir, we're investigating that specific
claim very, very closely. Many parts of our Navy have already
mandated a 24-hour circadian rhythm watchstanding rotation, you
know, to ensure that everybody gets sleep inside their natural
circadian rhythm. Admiral Rowden, the--commander of Surface
Forces, just recently issued--while it was recommended before,
he now said it'll be mandatory. But, we're diving into that
deeply.
Senator Wicker. Well, we await your further information,
and thank you for your leadership.
Chairman McCain. Admiral, is it true that some of our
sailors are working 100-hour weeks?
Admiral Richardson. Sir, I'll not deny that. The sailors
are working very hard. We have been doing some workday type
studies. We've got some, particularly in the DDGs [Guided
Missile Destroyer], the cruisers, the Arleigh Burke-class
destroyers, and we're starting to respond to that by
supplementing the crews.
Chairman McCain. Okay. But, I'd just point out, if we know
that somebody's working a 100-hour workweek, I'm not sure we
need a study.
Senator Hirono.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Richardson, you just said something really
interesting, just now, that it is the responsibility of the
commander to monitor the readiness of their ships to--readiness
to deploy. So, are you saying that, if a commander says that
his ship--his or her ship is not ready, will that result in
nondeployment of that ship?
Admiral Richardson. If we're aware that a ship is not
certified and ready to deploy, that ship should not deploy.
Senator Hirono. You're going to take that commander's
assessment of it. Is that how it works in the chain of command?
Admiral Richardson. There's also his immediate superior in
command. There are several layers of people that are monitoring
this. We don't put it all on the commanding officer of the
ship.
Senator Hirono. But, I think that's what you meant when you
said that you would have to also change the culture? Because
already you're only able to meet 40 percent of the combatant
commander's request, so the culture issue is probably that
everyone wants to meet the demands for deployment, and so the
culture needs to be changed. That's safety first. Is that what
you meant when you said culture?
Admiral Richardson. We completely agree with you, ma'am. We
have a can-do culture. That's what we do. Nobody wants to raise
their hand and say ``I can't do the mission,'' but it's
absolutely essential that, when those are the facts, we enable
that report.
Senator Hirono. So, now you're going to institute a can-do-
with-safety-first culture.
Admiral Richardson. Exactly.
Senator Hirono. The Optimized Fleet Response Plan, the new
fleet deployment and maintenance model, appears to be falling
short. It leaves no margin for error and extended deployments.
Maintenance backlogs and missed training evolutions appear to
have become the norm and commonplace. While it is too early to
identify the exact causes of the accidents, developing a more
flexible and realistic plan should increase the ability to
train and conduct maintenance, and lead to fewer accidents.
Admiral Richardson, is the Navy looking to update the plan,
and how does the Navy intend to address this issue?
Admiral Richardson. Ma'am, just to be very specific, the
Optimized Fleet Response Plan (OFRP), is that plan by which we
prepare--maintain and prepare and certify for deployment those
forces based here in the United States. That is a flexible
plan. There have been many times where I've had discussions
with Admiral Davidson or Admiral Swift that we needed to
accommodate a delay in maintenance. We extend the training
period, and, if necessary, we deploy late. So, you can only
compress it so much.
Senator Hirono. So, you're making a distinction that OFRP
is for those ships that are on the mainland, where the problem
or many of the concerns arise with the forward-deployed ships.
Is there an OFRP plan that doesn't leave much room for
exigencies----
Admiral Richardson. This is the observation----
Senator Hirono.--with regard to----
Admiral Richardson,--Mr. Pendleton and the GAO, that
these--the way by which we generate and certify readiness in
the forward-deployed naval forces is a bit different. We expect
them to maintain an overall higher level of readiness, and so,
they don't get as deep as of--maintenance out there. They get
more continuous types of maintenance so that they can stay
overall ready.
But, where we run into trouble is when the pyramid gets
inverted. The first thing we should be doing is maintaining
safe and effective certifications. Only with those done, and
the maintenance properly done, can we expect to deploy
effectively and execute the mission. What we're seeing is that,
particularly for the forward-deployed force in Japan, that
pyramid became inverted, mission became first, at the expense
of the----
Senator Hirono. So, what are you planning to change that
situation?
Admiral Richardson. So, this is the absolute specific focus
of the comprehensive review, to dissect that and make
adjustments.
Senator Hirono. You noted in your testimony--and this may
be a question that you can only respond to for the record,
because I am running out of time--in your testimony, you said
that the Navy's subjected to budget pressures, to do more with
less, operational pressures to put busy forces on station more
quickly and more often, and schedule pressures to make
adjustments to training and maintenance plans. You also noted
that none of these can excuse the commanders from doing what
they're supposed to do. But, of the three pressures you that
identified in your testimony, which do you have the most
control over? Budget pressure, operational pressure, schedule
pressure--which do you have the most control over?
Admiral Richardson. I would say the two that we have
greater control over are operational and schedule pressure.
Senator Hirono. So, I would be interested to know what
you're doing with your control and operational and schedule
pressures to address these concerns that have been raised in
this hearing.
Admiral Richardson. Yes, ma'am.
[The information referred to follows:]
Admiral Richardson. The Optimized Fleet Response Plan
(OFRP) is the Navy's primary tool to manage operational and
schedule pressures for Continental United States (CONUS) and
Hawaii-based ships. OFRP provides certain entitlements for
depot maintenance, training, and certification in every cycle.
To reassess these entitlements and identify areas for
improvement, we are conducting comprehensive ``Ready for Sea''
assessments to determine the material and operational readiness
for all Japan-based ships. We are developing a force generation
model for ships based in Japan that addresses the increasing
operational requirements, preserves sufficient maintenance and
training time, and improves certification accomplishment. We
have permanently established Naval Surface Group Western
Pacific as an administrative headquarters responsible for
maintaining, training, and certifying Japan-based ships,
focusing on these responsibilities for operational commanders.
Senator Hirono. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Cotton.
Senator Cotton. Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony
today.
My deepest condolences go to the family members and the
fellow sailors of the men and women who were killed on both the
Fitzgerald and McCain.
It's hard to imagine, no matter what your investigations
ultimately prove, that at least some part of the fault will not
lie with Congress and the steady erosion of budgetary support
that we have provided the United States Navy and the entire
military.
We have heard again this morning, from both sides of our
aisle, complaints about the Budget Control Act of 2011, and
specifically the automatic spending cuts known as
sequestration. Well, we had a perfect chance to finally end
those over the last week on the floor of the Senate. I offered
an amendment, as Chairman McCain said, that would have
eliminated those automatic spending cuts, not only on defense,
but on domestic spending, as well. It's no secret that I think
many of those domestic programs could tighten their belt a
little bit, but I knew that we needed a bipartisan solution.
I think every member of this committee has called for that
at one point or another, to include every Democrat, but we
didn't even have a vote on the amendment, because Chuck
Schumer, the Democratic leader, wanted more to leverage in
budget negotiations later this year, and the Democrats in his
caucus went along with him. So, their complaints about
sequestration fall somewhat on deaf ears.
Now, they will say that our amendment didn't also address
the so-called mandatory sequester. But, let me point out,
first, that that doesn't affect a single dime of benefits to
Social Security or Medicare or veterans benefits, and,
moreover, virtually every one of them has voted at least twice
to extend the automatic sequester into the future, when they
did not seem that troubled by it. Politics prevailed here.
Now, let me turn to the state of your sailors' training.
Admiral Richardson, in the GAO report there are indications
that, in the forward-deployed naval forces, you have sailors
who have not achieved mission-critical certifications on things
like seamanship, air warfare, ballistic missile defense,
cryptography, electronic warfare, intelligent strike warfare,
cruise missile tactical qualification, naval surface fire
support, surface warfare, undersea warfare, and visual board,
search, and seizure. Without trying to assess whether these
failures--or these lack of certifications were behind the
incidents with the Fitzgerald and the McCain, I assume that's
something that you seek to address rapidly.
Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir, absolutely.
Senator Cotton. To help the layman understand, these
certifications would be akin, in the Army or the Marine Corps,
to basic rifle qualifications. Is that right?
Admiral Richardson. Senator, some of them are, so there's
sort of a--two tiers to those certifications that you just
described. Depending upon which one you named, it would break
out into--some are just fundamental ship handling, navigation,
safety, you know, how to operate your ship safely at sea, the
fundamentals, if you will, and then some of them are much more
higher-end, sophisticated warfighting requirements.
Senator Cotton. Are--the Navy is obviously a forward-
deployed force that is always operating, even if it's not in an
active zone of conflict; whereas, the Marine Corps or the Army
deploys to places like Iraq and Afghanistan and then trains at
places like Camp Lejeune and Fort Campbell. Are these
certifications things that can occur onboard, or do they have
to be off of a deployment cycle and occur back at their bases?
Admiral Richardson. They can occur within that--
particularly the--for the forward-deployed naval forces, they
can occur in the course of maintaining yourself operational.
You just have to dedicate the time to do the training and get
the team onboard to do the certification.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
We've also spoken some about discipline and accountability
for officers, to include some petty officers who were found at
fault. What is the status, if any, of potential awards of
medals for those sailors who saved the lives of their fellow
sailors?
Admiral Richardson. Sir, I'll have to get back to you on
the specifics, but, you're right, there was definitely heroic
acts on both of those. I can get that back to you. It's
certainly our intent to recognize heroism where it was seen.
[The information referred to follows:]
Admiral Richardson. Results of the investigative process
will determine those sailors to be nominated for awards as a
result of their heroic actions. This will take some time to
complete. Anticipate that several sailors would be nominated
for the Navy/Marine Corps Achievement medal.
Senator Cotton. I hope so. You know, as you state in your
written testimony, what the Navy does is inherently dangerous.
I'd say that of all the Armed Forces, even when they're not in
an active conflict in places like Iraq and Afghanistan.
Certainly, great heroism was displayed.
One final question I want to ask the Secretary and the
Chief. In studying the causes of these incidents, what steps,
if any, has the Navy and the intelligence community taken to
rule out the possibility of a deliberate act of a hostile
power?
Mr. Spencer. Senator, it's all underway in the reports,
what we call the ongoing reports, the technical reports that
are going on right now. You heard the CNO speak earlier that
Admiral Tighe and her group in the Tenth Fleet, on the cyber
side, are doing their reviews there. Intelligence is also
looking at it. So, it is being discussed.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
Anything to add, Admiral Richardson?
Admiral Richardson. No, sir. Absolutely no stone unturned.
We're looking at everything.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
Senator Reed [presiding]. On behalf of Chairman McCain, let
me recognize Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thanks, to the witnesses.
Before we begin on the topic, I want to just comment on
Senator Cotton's discussion about his amendment. I supported
the amendment and was looking forward to voting for it. Others
in my caucus felt the same way. You have a reason to be
concerned. The only thing I would add to your concern is, there
were a whole lot of amendments that the Democrats wanted to
offer, and they were all cut off, too. So, you didn't get a
vote--your not getting a vote was not because of people
necessarily wanting to avoid the issue; it was wanting to have
a robust amendment process. If everybody else's amendments were
going to get kicked out, sadly, yours did, as well. I regret
that it was.
Let me now focus on this topic. I want to acknowledge the
sacrifice of the sailors who lost their lives in these
instances. This is why we're here, and this is why we need
answers. Particularly, those families from Virginia: Dakota
Rigsby, Gary Rehm, Timothy Eckels, and Charles Finley, who were
either from Virginia or had been stationed in Virginia. We need
to acknowledge them.
Admiral Richardson, I talked to you yesterday about the
seriousness of this investigation--the two investigations. I
was Governor of Virginia when there was a horrible violent
incident at Virginia Tech, and 32 people were killed by a
deranged young guy who killed them. I went to Virginia Tech the
day after the tragedy. I was told by the president of the
university that they would empanel a panel to review what
happened, and I said, ``No, you're not going to empanel a
panel. I'm going to put together a panel. I'm going to make
sure the panel has experts who have no connection with Virginia
Tech and who have no connection with any of those who were
injured or wounded, and I'm going to ask them to tell me
everything that went wrong and everything we can do to fix
it.'' I was advised, by lawyers connected with the State,
``Don't do that. It will give people a roadmap to bring a
lawsuit. It will open up all kinds of pain for the State if
you're candid and unsparing.'' I said, ``I don't care about the
lawsuit. People died. The only thing that we can do, sadly, is
try to learn everything we can from what caused them to die so
that we can reduce the chance that that happens to anybody
else. So, we're going to get every answer, and we're going to
be transparent and public about every answer, and then we're
going to fix everything we can.''
That's what we expect from the two investigations that are
being done. They will be unsparing, they will get every answer,
they will be transparent about every answer, and then we will
work together with you to make sure we fix anything that needs
to be done.
You've been asked questions about training. I was on a
radio program this morning, just coincidentally, in Hampton
Roads, mentioned this hearing, and, over the course of a 5-
minute interview, the host said, ``I just got a text from a
sailor saying that training on seamanship is lax.'' By the end
of the interview, said, ``I've gotten five more texts basically
saying similar things.'' I think this has been affected,
certainly, by sequester and the reasons that we've discussed,
but I want to ask about something else, and ask whether this is
going to be part of the scope of the investigation.
My understanding was that, in 2003, the Navy changed the
surface warfare officer basic training course. It was a 6-month
classroom instruction, and they changed it to a strictly
computer-based syllabus. More recently, they returned to a
class-based syllabus that was only a 9-week course. Is that
correct?
Admiral Richardson. Sir, that is correct. Back in 2003, we
stood down the Surface Warfare Officer School, at the division
officer--the beginning level. We thought we could achieve the
aim and train surface warfare officers, junior officers, with a
computer-based approach combined with on-the-job training at
sea. We found that that was woefully inadequate, have
reversed--come out of that. It was sort of a two-step process
to come out of it, but now our junior officers and surface
warfare pipeline do begin with a basic division officer course
which is 8 weeks long. It stresses fundamentals. It spends a
tremendous amount of time on seamanship and navigation, lots of
simulators, as Senator Wicker pointed out. About midway through
their division officer tour, or between their two junior
officer tours, there's an additional 8 weeks of more advanced
training, still at the basic level, focused at the junior
officer. But, those are--those have been put in place--the
first one was put in place in 2012, second one in 2014.
Senator Kaine. I don't want to, obviously, predetermine
what the results of the investigation will be, but I just want
to make sure. Is the scope of that initial training--you know,
6 months, to online, to 8 or 9 or 12 weeks--is the scope of
initial training going to be part of the investigation that's
being done?
Admiral Richardson. Specifically called out in the
comprehensive review----
Senator Kaine. All right.
Admiral Richardson,--to look at individual training and
professional development.
Senator Kaine. If I could, one last question. There is a
blog forum that is used for discussion, often by surface war--
surface ship officers. It's called Commander Salamander. There
was a notable blog entry, a resignation letter--an anonymous
resignation letter that just came to my attention late last
night. It was published in November 2008, and here is a portion
of the letter, ``The problem of checking the boxes, vice
actually being a capable Navy, exists everywhere. Lessons
learned and codifications of best practices have led the Navy
to being a force focused on the checklist as the end state,
vice actually capability. As one example,'' comma, ``Afloat
Training Group, ATG, does not care that a ship has a method to
ensure safe navigation.''
I would like to provide that as a--as an exhibit to my
question and, again, just ask if early warnings like this will,
in fact, be part of the scope of the investigation that is
being conducted.
[The information referred to follows:]
Admiral Richardson. Senator, no stone unturned. We will
look at every indication we have and address that.
Admiral Richardson. Senator, no stone unturned. We'll look
at every indication we have, and address that.
Senator Kaine. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
For the benefit of all that are here, we have a vote
ongoing, and that is why my colleagues have left. They are
going to vote, and they will return.
With that, let me seize the opportunity to begin a second
round, which hopefully will have only one questioner. But----
Admiral Richardson, I know the Navy has put together the
Optimized Fleet Response Plan. That's the idealized way to
schedule ships and to inform crews and to synchronize training.
But, when it impacts against the reality of delays in many
different ways, it doesn't seem to work. Are you looking, in
this review, at that Optimized Fleet Response Plan and how
useful it is today, or how it might be altered or changed?
Admiral Richardson. Sir, we are. But, I would say that, I
think the Optimized Fleet Response Plan has been somehow
misunderstood to be a rigid, unresponsive thing. It's actually
very fluid, and it's a--it's just a process by which we
generate forces for deployment. For instance, if a maintenance
period, let's say for the carrier, goes long, you know, the
rest of the process will be adapted to accommodate that delay.
If more training is required to get through the basic phase,
we'll adjust. This is not a one-size-fits-all, ``This is what
we do, and nothing else.'' It's actually a pretty fluid plan.
It tries to get the maintenance done, get the manning onboard
early in the process, so those people that we train are
actually the ones that we're going to deploy with. There's a
sort of a crawl-walk-run approach to training. All that is
adaptive to the circumstances on the ground.
I just wanted to try and make that impression----
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Admiral Richardson.--that there is room for flexibility
within the OFRP to accommodate for change.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Mr. Pendleton. Senator Reed, can I add something?
Senator Reed. Mr. Pendleton, yes, please, and then I'll
recognize Senator Ernst.
Mr. Pendleton. Yeah. So, we looked at the Optimized Fleet
Response Plan, and we looked at the Navy's plan for readiness
rebuilding, and everything the Admiral said is--about it is
true. There's really two things I'd want to leave with you.
One, the Navy's plan for readiness recovery is predicated on
the Optimized Fleet Response Plan, which is four words for
``schedule.'' That's because that's what it is. Staying on
time, that they--they're able to do that, and that's difficult
when you have delays, or whatever.
The forward-deployed naval forces in Japan, part of the
reason we made the recommendation that we made is, we didn't
see a similar plan like that for those ships over there. There
was not dedicated training time. There were not the things that
we thought would be needed to be--create a sustainable
situation.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Admiral Richardson. Sir, if I could.
Senator Reed. Yes, sir.
Admiral Richardson. Mr. Pendleton has it exactly right, and
so, if you look at the plan for forward-deployed naval forces,
there is a dedicated time.
Senator Reed. Right.
Admiral Richardson. That's the plan. But, the GAO,
rightfully, looked at execution data.
Senator Reed. Yeah.
Admiral Richardson. It's hard to determine adherence to
that plan, because we just kind of prioritize getting out and
executing the mission. The thing that would fall off is the
dedicated training.
Senator Reed. Thank you. Thank you both, gentlemen.
Senator Ernst, please.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here today.
First, as well as a number of my colleagues has done, I
want to express my sincerest condolences to the families of
those that lost sailors in these very, very tragic incidents.
My thoughts and prayers will continue to be with you through
this difficult time.
Secretary Spencer, Admiral Richardson, and Mr. Pendleton,
thank you for being here today. These are difficult topics that
we're discussing, and I hope that we're able to really shed
some light on what's going on, and truly do get to the bottom
of this so it doesn't happen again.
Mr. Pendleton, I want to follow up about the 100 hours per
week, as Senator McCain had asked earlier. The GAO report found
that sailors were working more than 100 per week, leaving them
little time for rest. I know we have that can-do attitude.
Admiral, you have stated that already. I know many even of our
operators in the Army, they want to fulfill a mission, they're
not going to say no. But, it's obvious that this is detrimental
to our readiness. Can you talk about how that excessive
workload has the ability to not only impact morale,
recruitment, and retention, but also then the safety and well-
being of the other sailors on those vessels?
Admiral Richardson. I'll start, ma'am, and let Mr.
Pendleton pile on.
There's no doubt that overworking a team, particularly over
time, has an absolutely corrosive effect. We actually have
specialists in this area, Dr. Nita Shattuck, at the Naval
Postgraduate School, who has pointed out, in very clear terms,
the need for getting sufficient sleep and getting rest in a--
you know, a 24-hour rhythm to get the most effectiveness out of
that sleep. If we go beyond that, there are measurable
degradations in your decisionmaking and in your performance. We
need to make sure that we adjust back. Surface forces just
recently mandating, now, that they do their at-sea rotations
consistent with these, you know, rest principles.
But, to the GAO's point, we also need to make sure that our
in-port workload is examined. As I said, we just did this for
the destroyers, and found that, while there are no extra skills
that are required, the capacity in port sometimes exceeds our
at-sea manning models, and so, we're making adjustments.
Senator Ernst. Thank you. Thank you, Admiral.
Mr. Pendleton. So, everything the Admiral said, I think's
very honest and reflects the situation out there. One thing I
would mention to the committee is that, under the current
criteria the Navy uses, that they expect the sailors to
actually work 81 hours a week--70 hours on duty, and then 11
hours for the other things. So, it's a pretty grueling schedule
programmed right in. I think what's happened, it's--this has
snuck on them a little bit over time. It's the--because it
takes more work to keep the ship running, and so, they end up
with folks working 15--over 15 hours a day, on average.
I don't have a lot of specific work. I'm citing a Navy
study. But, some of the folks sitting behind me, and they work
with me, have done literally dozens of focus groups. I don't
think that they didn't hear this in any single one. Everyone
talked about the lack of sleep and the impact on them, and some
of them said they wished for 100-hour week. So, I think it's
pretty tough out there.
Senator Ernst. It is tough out there. One thing I would
emphasize, though, that that is a commander's responsibility,
is to make sure that they are able to react when the time calls
for it. You know, as a lowly company commander running
transportation operations, in combat operations we're only
required 4 hours of sleep for our soldiers that are driving
trucks. Of course, every one of them would say, ``I can go 24
hours a day,'' but we know, as commanders, that you can't keep
pushing our soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen to the limit
and expect them to operate efficiently and safely.
Mr. Spencer. If I may, Senator, I'd be remiss if I didn't
jump in here and address an issue that, when you hear about our
studies, we're going to be coming back to you all to ask for
some relief in certain areas. The secretariat, my office, the
CNO, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps are reviewing
instructions to make sure that we are focused on readiness and
lethality, going forward. Those instructions that do not
support readiness and lethality are going to be questioned and/
or asked to be reviewed by you all. It's what I call ``the
rucksack issue.'' The best intentions of the world are handed
down by folks to say, ``Can you add this? Can you add this?''
Well, no one's taking anything out of the rucksack. That's what
we need to address right now, and that's what's going on.
Senator Ernst. Absolutely. As my adjutant general in Iowa
always said, it's ``assume prudent risk.'' That's what we want
to enable our commanders to do, is assume that prudent risk.
However, sometimes it's not prudent, and we should reject that.
So, thank you very much, gentlemen.
Senator Reed. On behalf of Chairman McCain, Senator Warren,
please.
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to say to all of our Navy families who have lost
loved ones, thank you for being here today. We grieve with you,
and we owe you an explanation of what happened. I know our
leadership feels the same way.
Admiral Richardson, in the last year, the Navy has had four
incidents involving the loss of life or injury. In three of the
four, the ships involved were home-ported overseas. In fact,
all in the same port, in Japan. GAO found that the Navy counts
ships home-ported overseas as being in, quote, ``permanent
deployment status'' resulting in fewer training hours for
sailors. In fact, in 2015, GAO found there were no dedicated
training periods at all for ships home-ported in Japan. The
Navy concurred with the GAO's recommendations, and reported
that it had developed revised operational schedules. But, as
recently as August--that's 2 years after the report, August of
this year--Pacific Fleet officials told GAO that the revised
schedules were, quote, ``still under review.''
Now, Admiral Richardson, 2 years is a long time. So, what's
the holdup here?
Admiral Richardson. No, there's no excuse for that. We're
investigating how that gap opened up. There's nothing
defensible I can say for that.
Senator Warren. Okay. I assume we're going to find a way to
close this----
Admiral Richardson. We are.
Senator Warren.--quickly now?
Admiral Richardson. Absolutely.
Senator Warren. So, let me just keep asking, though, about
where things have gone wrong. At the time of their respective
incidents, did the crews of the Fitzgerald and the Antietam and
the McCain have up-to-date warfare certifications?
Admiral Richardson. Ma'am, many of them did not.
Senator Warren. Of the three, do you know how many had up-
to-date----
Admiral Richardson. Well----
Senator Warren.--certifications?
Admiral Richardson.--I can get you the exact number.
There's a number of different certifications. I'll provide that
exact number for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
Admiral Richardson. As of August 1st, the USS Fitzgerald
held 7 of 12 Tier 1 certifications, to include navigation, and
held no Tier 2 certification; USS Antietam held 7 of 12 Tier 1
certifications including navigation, and 1 of 9 Tier 2
certifications; and USS John S. McCain held 11 of 12 Tier 1
certifications, to include navigation, and 4 of 10 Tier 2
certifications.
Admiral Richardson. But, all three of them, because it was
pervasive in the forward-deployed naval forces----
Senator Warren. Do you know, offhand, what percentage of
our overseas home-ported fleet currently has expired warfare
certifications?
Admiral Richardson. Just about every ship has some element
of their certification expired. That can be managed. If it's
one thing and--an advanced warfare mission, for instance, they
just don't assign them to that mission. Where it becomes
troublesome is that--if it becomes too many areas, and
particularly in those areas that are directly related to safe
and effective operation, the fundamentals.
Senator Warren. Right.
Admiral Richardson. That's when it becomes of great
concern.
Senator Warren. So, it--the GAO reported, just last month,
that 37 percent of cruisers and destroyers home-ported in Japan
had expired certifications in 2017. Does that sound about right
to you?
Admiral Richardson. I'll leave it to Mr. Pendleton to do
the math, but that does sound about right.
Senator Warren. Okay. So, let me just ask, Admiral
Richardson, do you believe it's irresponsible to allow our
sailors to deploy repeatedly on cruises without the training
they need to ensure the safety of the ship and its crew?
Admiral Richardson. Yeah, what had happened in those areas,
ma'am, is that when the team out there was conscious that these
certifications were expiring, and it's a bit like your driver's
license expiring, it may not necessarily mean that you don't
know how to drive anymore; it's just--you know, there's--that
expire. However, we do need to recognize that those
certifications mean something.
Senator Warren. Yes.
Admiral Richardson. They need to go back and recertify.
What had happened instead is that they would do an evaluation,
just like I discussed, and said, ``Okay, well, the
certification is expired. We're not going to get a time to get
onboard and do the certification for some time, and so we'll do
a discussion or an administrative review to extend that.'' That
was called a risk mitigation plan. That became pretty
pervasive. It was this, kind of, boiling-frog scenario that,
over time, over the last 2 years, really, became acute.
To answer your question yes/no, yes, it is irresponsible.
But, I just wanted to give you a sense for how that came about.
Senator Warren. I appreciate that. What I'm hearing you say
is that you're conducting a thorough review. This is not going
to happen in the future.
Admiral Richardson. We'll get this right.
Senator Warren. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain [presiding]. Senator Rounds.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, let me begin, as many of my colleagues have, in
offering condolences to the family/friends of those who have
lost their lives and those who have been injured. It's
difficult to put ourselves into your shoes. I just simply offer
to you that, while we can't take away the pain that you feel,
we'll most certainly keep you and your loved ones in our
thoughts and in our prayers. It also means that, as this
committee, we feel a real responsibility to try to share what
happened, and not only that, but why.
I think both Senator Ernst and Senator Warren have hit on
something here which is very important, which is, we talk about
the manpower and the number of hours that these soldiers have
been serving, and whether or not they've actually been able to
do the training and so forth. Seems to be a consensus growing
that we needed to have more resources available to do more
training, to do the retraining, to allow these individuals to
operate at as close to a peak efficiency as possible. That
takes money, and it takes resources.
My question, to begin with, would be to Mr. Pendleton. Does
the Navy have the ability to shift resources, if they were to
be available, from programs involving modernization to
readiness?
Mr. Pendleton. That would be tough, there's a lot of
fungibility within the operations and maintenance accounts.
That's not my specialty. There's limits on the modernization. I
probably should get the Admiral or someone to commend on that.
I mean----
Senator Rounds. That would be fine.
Admiral Richardson. Senator, a programming shift of that
type would probably require us to come back to Congress with an
above-threshold reprogramming request, and that would need to
be adjudicated to make that happen, it's not easy.
Senator Rounds. The reason why I ask is that it seems to me
that we're almost--it's almost like squeezing a balloon, in
some cases. When we start talking about moving resources, even
if we could move them, we're still talking about the limited
resources brought about by sequestration and limited budgets
that all of our Armed Forces are suffering with right now. If
we take a look at the readiness side and the modernization
side, we've got, just within the Navy itself, some of the best
examples that we are going to continue to remind you of, our
three nuclear-powered submarines that are sitting at dock, as
opposed to being in depot, because we don't either have the
depot space or the dollars in order to actually get them back
up and operational. Billions of dollars in assets that are not
at the ready. In fact, they're not even dive certified. You've
got over 60 percent of your F/A-18s that need maintenance or
that simply aren't operational at any given time.
So, this is a case of, even if we could move resources
around, we have limited resources available throughout the
different plans, not for upgrades, but just for maintaining the
additional equipment, let alone coming back in and trying to
find the additional manpower dollars so that we've got
individuals who are on deployment that actually have the time
to be trained, as well, in a perfect operating system.
Just curious whether or not--it is sequestration which is
causing a lot of this, but I'd like each of you to please
respond, if we could. Just how much of this problem that we've
now seen is caused by a failure to properly fund the military
in the first place with regards to not only modernization, but
readiness, as well?
Mr. Spencer. Senator, I'd like to dive in first, here. I
want to carry on your analogy. It's not a balloon. Or, if it's
a balloon, it's a balloon that is so pressurized, there's no
movement. You squeeze it, it pops. That is the extent that I'd
see it, coming at it from a business point of view. The funding
balance-to-asset allocation here is way out of whack, and we
have to get that back on track. There's other things we have to
do, but, if we're addressing the financial resource side right
now, there has to be some adjustments, because the balloon is
at exploding pressure.
Senator Rounds. Admiral Richardson?
Admiral Richardson. Sir, I think the Secretary
characterized that completely accurately. There's not a lot of
room to maneuver. You're really robbing Peter to pay Paul, as
you pointed out, and when I think of what the navy the Nation
needs, it's naval power, which is, yes, readiness, safety,
effectiveness, first and foremost; it includes modernization,
and it includes, you know, procurement, to make sure that we
stay relevant into the future.
Senator Rounds. You took my ending quote away, Admiral.
That's exactly the way that I was seeing this. But, I--let me
end with this.
To the families that are out there, I know that our focus
right now is on the leadership within the Navy and the
commanders in the Navy and what they want to do about it. This
goes deeper than that. This is a case of where the
United States Congress has to provide the adequate funding
to take care of these young men and women who put themselves in
harm's way every single day. We will not forget that.
Thank you, gentlemen.
Thank you, sir.
Chairman McCain. Senator Peters.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, to our witnesses here today.
Chairman McCain. I just wanted to recognize that the Master
Chief Petty Office of the Navy is here, also, Chief Giordano.
Thank you for your leadership. Thank you for being here.
Senator Peters.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Again, thank you, to our witnesses, for testifying on this
very important issue.
I want to add my condolences to all of the families who
lost loved ones in these very tragic accidents, as well. One of
those sailors, who is from Michigan, Electronics Technician
Third Class Kenneth Aaron Smith, our prayers and thoughts are
with him, with his family, as all of the sailors who lost their
lives.
Director Pendleton, I certainly appreciate your report and
your testimony here today. I just have kind of a
straightforward question, just to get some clarity as to
priorities that we need to be thinking about, in order to avoid
more of these incidents in the future. Just a question, if you
traded places with either of the gentlemen who are sitting next
to you, the Chief of Naval Operations or the Secretary of the
Navy, in your mind what would be the first steps that you would
take?
Mr. Pendleton. You know, I think our recommendations lay
out a pretty good roadmap. We thought about this a lot, back in
2015. Specific to forward-deployed naval forces, I think you've
got to make time for them to train. You've got to make space in
the schedule for them to actually train and get those
certifications. Those are--the trends and that's what's
concerning.
The second--which I think the Navy's doing both these
things now--is, you need to assess whether or not increasing
reliance on overseas-based ships is the best call, because that
comes at cost, and some of them may be hidden.
So, those would be the two things that I would focus on,
specific to the Navy.
Senator Peters. You mentioned, in your opening testimony,
about a plan, the readiness plan, that we need to continue to
demand that. Would you please elaborate on those comments?
Mr. Pendleton. So, in--last year, in 2016, we looked at the
readiness rebuilding plans of all the military services,
including the Navy, as well as how the Department of Defense
was overseeing it. We came away with the conclusion, not to put
too fine a point on it, that they didn't have a comprehensive
plan for how they were going to go forward. There was a lot of
recognition of the problem, a lot of priority being assigned to
it, but what we couldn't see was, if you put money in, how much
readiness were you going to get out? There was also the
question of how you were going to manage the demands.
So, what we suggested, hopefully was practical: What are
your goals? In some cases, the goals weren't clear to us. You
know, how are you--what are you--how much are you going to be
able to get next year and the year after? What's it going to
cost? How long is it going to take? Those kinds of things.
Because our concern was, we would look up in 5 years and be in
the same situation.
Senator Peters. The concern that was expressed by Senator
Ernst and I last year--in fact, we sent a letter to Secretary
Mabus--concerned with individuals and the Navy's dependence on
electronic devices for navigation. I know we don't know the
reason for these incidents and the accidents, but sometimes
over-reliance on electronics can lead to some problems. When
you think about the warfare of the future, a conflict in a
space, we could have--GPS systems could be compromised,
communications systems could be compromised. All sorts of
issues could be related to that. There is a sense that we need
to make sure that we're training our sailors in good old-
fashioned seamanship, which means navigating the old-fashioned
way, with charts and other types of navigational aids that were
done before electronics, and make sure that there are eyeballs
out to the sea at all times, not just relying on the
electronics.
Secretary Spencer and Admiral, if you could comment on how
are we ensuring that our sailors continue to have their
seamanship abilities and not relying on electronics?
Particularly, my understanding is that ships with certified
electronic navigation systems are not even required to have
charts onboard. Is that something that we're looking at?
Mr. Spencer. Senator, it's a great question. I was
heartened, the other day when I was down at the Naval Academy
and Admiral Carter did what he should do in his command to put
the arm on me to find some more money for the Academy, but he
was talking specifically about the training that goes on with
the yard boats, I believe--YPs, boats, where they actually--
midshipmen go out and actually practice shipmanship in the
reality, along with celestial navigation. We need to fund these
things on a continual basis. It's easy to say, ``These are
things of the past. Why can't we kick them to the curb?'' But,
you bring up some very salient points about what happens when
we're denied access to certain technologies.
That being said, I certainly don't want to shortchange the
advances that we get from technology. Being a pilot, we're now
bringing iPads into cockpits, and doing away with paper charts.
There are risks there, but I believe what--the FAA has even
come to the conclusion is, the technology benefits outweigh the
risks.
Admiral Richardson. Sir, if I could just pile onto that, it
is really about reliability. If we are going to shift to an
electronic-based system, part of that reliability is making
sure that the operators understand the underlying principles of
that display that they're getting, and they are ready to
question the validity of that display when they--things don't
look right. To understand whether it looks right or not, you've
got to have the fundamental training in relative motion,
navigation, et cetera. It's extremely important to make sure
that we've got that in place. As the Secretary pointed out,
we're instilling that at the Naval Academy. It'll be part of
our comprehensive review, to make sure that we're continuing
that in the Officer and Enlisted Development Programs.
Senator Peters. Thank you, gentlemen. Appreciate it.
Chairman McCain. Senator Tillis.
Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here.
To the family members, friends, and fellow sailors, I offer
my condolences.
Admiral Richardson, Senator Cotton mentioned something I
think's very important. He said you're going through the
investigation to get into the root causes of the incidents
we're discussing today. But, he made a very important point
that I doubt seriously gets covered--and, Director Pendleton,
this may be something for you, as well--and that's really
actions or inaction by Congress that are some of the root
causes to these problems. Does that ever really weigh into any
of the investigations? In other words, you may find out that
decisions were made that actually led up to the circumstances
that happened on that ship, but it could have been something
that could have been avoided if funding--if we had done our job
right. Does that ever weigh into any of these investigations,
or is that something that the GOA--GAO would ever look at?
Mr. Pendleton. Probably not, in a microsense like that, but
I will say that I think the way that plays out, actually, is in
making choices of short-term versus long-term plans. If you
look in our statement that we provided for the record, we show
the Navy's plans to build ships kind of goes that way, and its
personnel plan goes that way.
Senator Tillis. Right.
Mr. Pendleton. That's a straight out-year budget-projection
problem, right?
Senator Tillis. Yeah.
Mr. Pendleton. You're trying to figure out how to squeeze a
lot of military into a can that's not quite as big as they'd
like it to be, and so, you see these kind of mismatches happen.
On the micro, not so much. It's usually hard to assess that
out on it.
Senator Tillis. Well, I think what we have to do is maybe
take it up a notch and look at trend. Because the trends you're
talking about, in terms of personnel and investments and ships
and naval capabilities, are a direct result of what we either
do or do not do up here. I think, sooner or later, we've got to
start demonstrating that some of--Admiral Richardson's always
here to say he's going to get the job done, but, at some point,
because that balloon bursts, you simply can't get the job done.
Admiral Richardson? I do have some other questions that I'd
like to get to fairly quickly.
Admiral Richardson. Sir, the--our investigations really
concentrate on what is within our span of control. We get the
resources that you give us, and it's our responsibility, and
the responsibility of command, to take those resources, operate
safe and effectively.
Senator Tillis. I expected the answer to that, at the level
you're dealing with, with the incident, but we really have to
get Congress to be more aware of how our actions or inactions
are a root cause to some of these problems.
I want to ask some questions--we're going to submit
several, probably, questions for the record, in my capacity as
the Personnel Subcommittee Chair, but I want to go back, maybe,
and ask the question--you know, being a captain--for a cruiser
or a destroyer, I think is a relatively complex job. Would you
agree with that, Admiral Richardson?
Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir.
Senator Tillis. Now--I think that Chair McCain mentioned
his concern with, maybe we're getting more breadth and not
enough depth as we're training up men and women to fill these
roles. One question that I have, If you have the average
length--assignment length for a CO [commanding officer] on each
of these ships to be 1.8 years, and a commander to be 18
months, are we kind of tightening the length of time that we're
actually giving these people an opportunity to get that depth
of experience before they're put in a command role? Do you
think that that's an okay thing, or something that we should
look at?
Admiral Richardson. Well, we need to make sure that we've
got an adequate sea time, right? Really, time on the ship,
operating, not only in command, but throughout their career, so
that, by the time they get to command, they've got the
experience and training required to have those instincts that
will serve them so well in command. That pipeline is a part of
this comprehensive review.
To be honest, sir, we look at that constantly. It's not
like we're waking up, you know, from a long sleep, here. But,
we need to give it a fresh look as part of the comprehensive
review.
Senator Tillis. But, if you've got an XO [executive
officer] and a CO on the same ship, and sequential assignments,
and then you've overlapping some of that, how does that help?
Admiral Richardson. I'm not sure it does. So, this is a
question that--a specific question that I have. This XO/CO
fleet-up plan that we put in place for the surface Navy, I want
to make sure we examine that closely.
Senator Tillis. One other quick question. As I said, I've
got a number that I'm going to submit for the record--but, do
we have a surface warfare community retention problem?
Admiral Richardson. There's nothing really that's been
brought to my attention for the community, writ large. The
exception would be nuclear-trained surface officers. That's a
community under particular pressure that we watch very closely.
Senator Tillis. It looked like the Center for Naval
Analysis suggested that the demand may be outweighing the
supply, so I was just trying to get to the root cause of why
that is and whether or not retention was a part of it.
My time is expired. We'll submit a number of questions for
the record.
Thank you.
Mr. Spencer. Mr. Chairman, could I provide one more answer?
Would that be possible?
Senator, addressing your question about staffing on the
bridge, et cetera, and career advancement, one of the things
you're going to see coming out of my study is exactly that.
We're going to look at DOPMA [Defense Officer Personnel
Management Act], we're going to look at joint service, we're
going to look at any and all aspects, at the higher level, and
that addresses exactly what you're talking about.
Chairman McCain. Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I--while in no way denigrating all the discussion that
we've had today about staffing and training and adequacy and
hours of work--I think all those are contributors, but I'm
surprised--I want to turn to an entirely different subject.
Every boat in the Gulf of Maine has a radar on it that tells us
when there's another boat within a mile or 2 miles or 5 miles.
An alarm goes off that shows up on your GPS. How in the world
does a billion-dollar destroyer not know that there's a
freighter closing in on it? I don't understand how this could
possibly happen. I've talked to Maine lobstermen. They're
scratching their heads. They can tell when there's a flock of
seagulls off their bow.
Admiral Richardson. Sir, got the same questions. It's very
hard to understand, with the sophisticated systems onboard
these warships, that we let a ship get in that close, to the
point of collision, and so, that is a direct----
Senator King. Not ``a ship.'' Three ships. Three of these
were collision with----
Admiral Richardson. Right.
Senator King.--with merchant vessels.
Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir.
Senator King. I mean, can you give me an answer,
specifically? Aren't there radar systems----
Admiral Richardson. There are.
Senator King.--on these ships----
Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir.
Senator King.--that would detect anything within the range?
Admiral Richardson. The primary--There's a primary and a
backup radar that should detect those ships. There are systems
that can alert you at a particular range, and so, we have to
find out what happened.
Senator King. Is there a black box on these ships, like
there is on an aircraft, so we can determine what the sequence
of events was?
Admiral Richardson. We'll get to the sequence of events,
yes, sir.
Senator King. The second question is, Don't we have sailors
on the bridge with binoculars----
Admiral Richardson. We do.
Senator King.--anymore?
Admiral Richardson. It a requirement to have lookouts, and
we have lookouts on the watch team on the bridge.
Senator King. Is there--and the other question is about the
radar of these ships that ran into us. Is there some technology
that they couldn't see us? Are these--are we using a stealth
technology that--anything you can answer in an open setting?
Admiral Richardson. Sure. I mean, it's--wouldn't surprise
anybody, I think, that we design our warships to have a lower
radar cross-section. I mean, it's, in some, designed to be very
low. Right? So, the--that degree of stealth makes us more
effective, from a warfighting standpoint. But, that also
imposes a burden, if you will, on the crew of that ship to
understand that they are low-observable and that they may not
be as easily seen as something that is as large as a destroyer.
It'll have a radar cross-section of a ship that's much smaller.
Senator King. Or if they're not in a conflict situation, to
emit some kind of signal to a--to another----
Admiral Richardson. That's been an immediate action, is
that there is this Automatic Identification System, AIS, that
the Secretary mentioned. We had, I think, a distorted
perception of operational security that, if we kept that system
secure--off in our--on our warships. One of the immediate
actions following these incidents is that, particularly in
heavily trafficked areas----
Senator King. In trafficked areas, like----
Admiral Richardson.--we're just going to turn it on.
Senator King.--like Japan.
Admiral Richardson. Then you can--right, you can look
outside and see the ship, and so, it's not an operational
security----
Senator King. So, you can't report to us today any results
of the investigation into what happened with the
nonperformance----
Admiral Richardson. Those----
Senator King.--of the radar system.
Admiral Richardson. Those specifics are forthcoming.
Senator King. Forthcoming soon?
Admiral Richardson. As soon as the investigations are
complete, yes, sir.
Senator King. All right.
Let me turn from this subject, for a moment, to
maintenance. I think the testimony from our friend from the GAO
was that the maintenance capacity is not adequate, and that,
therefore, we have ships that are in port too long, and that
puts a strain on the ships that are left at sea. Is that
accurate?
Admiral Richardson. I think Mr. Pendleton painted that
exact picture. The words he used were ``vicious cycle,'' and I
would agree. That's a good characteristic of that.
Senator King. Because these ships are expensive, as you
know, and anytime you have a capital object that's that
expensive, Secretary Spencer, you know from your business
experience, you want it operated. Do we need to be talking
about increasing the capacity of the maintenance yards to cut
down on that time off the ocean, if you will?
Admiral Richardson. I'll go first. I think that there's no
doubt that we could use the increased maintenance capacity.
Right now, we are leveraging every ounce of capacity, I think,
across the Nation, both public and private, to execute the
maintenance that we need----
Senator King. But, if we're doing--if we're executing on
every ounce of capacity, and it's not adequate, sounds to me
like we need more capacity.
Admiral Richardson. We need more, yes, sir.
Senator King. Is that in the plans anywhere? Is that in any
submissions of budgetary priorities in the future?
Admiral Richardson. One of the other reports that Mr.
Pendleton just recently issued was a report on our shipyards,
and so, how to increase the capacity through modernizing our
shipyards. We work closely with the private sector to have
these discussions all the time, in terms of: How do we increase
that capacity, so, it's something that has our attention, yes,
sir.
Senator King. One final question on the technology. I would
urge that a standard practice ought to be for these locational
radar, that keep an eye on what's in the vicinity, that if
there--(a) there should be an alarm, which I'm sure there is,
and (b) it should ring in the captain's quarters if anything
comes within whatever the set distance is. It's really
unacceptable, in this day and age, with the technology that we
have, to have something like this happen, regardless of the
wider issues.
Admiral Richardson. Now----
Senator King. This is just unacceptable, from a--just a
modern seamanship point of view, it seems to me.
Admiral Richardson. Sir, I agree with you 100 percent.
That's why I'm fighting the tendency to characterize this--I
mean, certainly there are tearing-down forces that are broader.
We've discussed many of those today. But, this will go to, you
know, proper operation of your equipment, fundamentals of
watchstanding. Those are the things that we have to look at.
Senator King. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed [presiding]. On behalf of the Chairman, let me
recognize Senator Donnelly.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to join my colleagues in expressing my deepest
condolences to the family and friends of the sailors we have
lost in these incidents. We are grateful for the service,
saddened by the loss. Extraordinary people.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for convening this hearing. Both
our military leadership and Congress have roles to play to
ensure this doesn't happen again.
Admiral, I just want to follow up on my colleague Senator
King's questions. You mentioned that we'll get to the sequence
of events and find out what happened. Do you have a timeframe
for that? Because we saw a number of incidents, and the goal
is, we want to do it faster right, but the faster we get the
facts as to what happened, the better the opportunity is to not
have it happen again.
Admiral Richardson. Right. Senator, we're taking sort of a
response along two timescales, if you will, sir, so we want to
get the full investigation done with alacrity. We are doing
that, and so, this fall, you know, timeframe, we'll get those
complete. But, we're not waiting for those things to be done to
act. There are a number of tactical immediate actions. I
mentioned the Automatic Identification System. We're going to
turn that on so that we're much more visible to other ships.
Mandating that we perform both manual and electronic tracking
of all other vessels that will come within 2-\1/2\ miles. We've
got mandated commanding officer review and approval of the
watchbills, the watchteams that will be doing that. So, there's
a number of actions, my point being, that we are doing now to
enhance the things that Senator King and you are talking about.
Senator Donnelly. How many radar systems do you have on at
a time? Are there----
Admiral Richardson. There are----
Senator Donnelly.--are there backups for----
Admiral Richardson. For navigation and safety, two radar
systems, a primary and a backup. Then there may be a third
commercial radar that we use sometimes.
Senator Donnelly. Were they working at the time of these
incidents, on both ships?
Admiral Richardson. Sir, I don't have those details, so
we'll get to that.
Senator Donnelly. Mr. Pendleton, in your statement, you
identify a number of recommendations from past GAO reviews that
the Navy has not yet implemented. Which do you consider the
most urgent of those?
Mr. Pendleton. I think--with respect to the forward-
deployed naval forces, I think carving out dedicated training
time for them is going to be very important. So, that's
probably my number-one. When you look broader than that and
begin to give a urgent, not necessarily since it needs to be
done today, but the Navy needs to determine how many people it
really needs and put on the ships, because 100-hour workweeks
are not sustainable. So, those would be the two I identify for
you.
Longer-term, I think the shipyards are going to be a real
issue. We just issued the report that was mentioned. There
needs to be a capital investment plan on the shipyards. We're
going to run out of drydock space, and it's going to be hard to
get out of this vicious cycle, sir.
Senator Donnelly. Secretary Spencer, what do you look at as
the most urgent things to implement right now?
Mr. Spencer. I concur with training, but, when I put on my
title 10 hat, I--we have to gear up on infrastructure. If we
look at the maintenance cycles that we have here, if I'm not
mistaken, Mr. Pendleton, our bill is $4.2 billion.
Mr. Pendleton. I think it's actually $4.86, a little
higher.
Mr. Spencer. $4.86 billion to get our yards back in shape.
We're going to have to do something to move that ball down the
road.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
Admiral, as has been mentioned, 100-hour workweeks are
unsustainable. I know you have personal experience from your
deployments that you've had. What are we doing right now to
change that paradigm of 100-hour workweeks and helping those
individuals who are shouldering that burden right now, who are
out in the field doing the very, very best they can to keep our
Nation safe?
Admiral Richardson. So, now all--the surface force, the
submarine force, and the aviators all have mandatory sleep
requirements now in place. The surface force just recently made
that mandatory. It was recommended before. So, that will--you
know, that will mandate that at sea, and those watch rotations,
that we get sufficient sleep and get out of this cycle.
The other thing is this--there is a cultural factor here,
where, you're more dedicated, if you can go to the extra mile
and stay awake. That's like pulling an all-nighter in college.
I have two daughters in college, and, it's too common there as
well. It's a combination of education and culture change to
make sure that people are seeking this rest.
Senator Donnelly. The last thing I want to ask is, as you
do these investigations, very often, as I know you're aware of,
the people who know the best as to how to fix it are the ones
who are on the front line and who are right there on the ships
or in the submarines. I want to know what we're doing to make
sure we incorporate their ideas in how we move forward.
Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir. It started with the
operational pause. In my message for that, I mandated that
those be small groups of sailors on the deck plate. Focus
groups, I think, are the most effective way that I have seen to
get after those types of concerns. It beats a poll or a survey
or anything like that, and that'll be a fundamental part of our
way going forward.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
On behalf of Chairman McCain, Senator Sullivan, please.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here, and your testimony.
I also want to offer my condolences to the families. You
know, this is just completely unacceptable, period. No debate
about that. I don't think anyone's debating that. But, you
know, when the men and women of our military do what less than
1 percent of Americans do in this country, which is raise your
right hand to support and defend the Constitution and keep us
safe, we've got do a better job, all of us--the Navy, the
Marines, the Army, the Congress. It's unacceptable.
So, Admiral, I want you to know, I'm having a hard time
with the--this issue, put us on the bridge of a modern Navy
ship, and talk about the redundancies--the radar, the GPS's,
the physical watch. What--I mean, I know you're investigating
this, but what does that look like? Aren't we the most advanced
navy in the history of the world? And how are these,
redundancies, in terms of basic seamanship in collisions at
sea, breaking down, in your view? It's not just one, you know,
sailor on the watch. There is a whole host of other things that
would make sure we avoid these kind of collisions. What, in
your experience--first, what does that look like? What, in your
experience, do you think is going wrong, where--obviously
there's a series of failures here in these collisions, not just
one. What does that look like? How can we better understand it?
Admiral Richardson. Right. Sir, my experience is, just as
yours, that these catastrophes really result from the
accumulation of a number of small errors that build up and line
up eventually to create a sequence that results in a incident
of this magnitude.
To put you on the bridge of a modern destroyer, a watch
team will be on the order of ten people. About four of those
will be officers--the officer of the deck, the junior officer
of the deck, officer of the watch, conning officer. There will
be two lookouts, there will be a quartermaster. There's plenty
of people involved in the seamanship and navigation on the
bridge. They're supported by a team in the Combat Information
Center, which is also looking at electronic displays. They
don't have windows, but they're backing them up.
With respect to the technology that this--the equipment for
all of those critical systems--navigation, steering,
propulsion--we have a primary and a backup system for every one
of those. So, GPS is backed up by inertial navigators. We have
a primary and a backup radar. For the rudders--we have two
rudders, and each of those rudders has a primary and a backup
hydraulic cylinder. There's a lot of redundancy built into
these systems, because they are so fundamental to safety.
Now you get a sense--and it goes back to Senator Donnelly's
question and Senator King's point, which is, how could all of
that break down so catastrophically to result in a collision of
this magnitude. That's why we have to do the thorough
investigation.
Senator Sullivan. Let me ask another question. You know, it
comes to readiness, it comes to training. One of the things, in
my relatively short time here in the Senate, that I've been
concerned about with regard to military readiness is that this
committee, this Congress, well-intentioned, puts additional
training requirements--additional training requirements,
additional things that you need to address, because we told
you. To be honest, most of those don't relate to combat
readiness, most of them don't relate to basic MOS [Military
Occupational Specialty], whether it's a surface warfare officer
or a marine infantry officer and his, you know, duty to close
with and destroy the enemy of our Nation. How much of your
training do you believe is being mandated by the Congress that
takes you away from your basic MOS training? If there are
issues with that, we would certainly like to know about it.
Mr. Spencer. Senator, let me address that for you.
Senator Sullivan. Do you think it's a problem?
Mr. Spencer. It definitely is a problem. Not only will you
hear from my report group as to any actions done at the Senate
level or need to be adjusted here in this chamber or other
chambers, you are going to hear from them. We're going to
address DOPMA, we're going to address the Inouye amendment,
we're going to address how joint chiefs task. We have given
this committee an infinite rein literally to address
everything. At the operational level, the secretariat, the
OPNAV, the CMC [Commandant of the Marine Corps] are all going
through their instructions, going, What are we focused on?
We're focused on readiness and lethality. What do all our
instructions support? If we find instructions that are not
focusing us on those two items, we're going to bring them to
your attention if you have control of them. If we have control
of them, we're going to try to adjust this. It's the--it's as I
said earlier, the rucksack issue. All the best-intentioned in
the world, put a rock in to do a training on smoking cessation,
put a rock in to do other sorts of training. No one's taking a
rock out, and the rucksack's getting pretty damn heavy.
Senator Sullivan. Well, I couldn't agree more.
Admiral, I'm assuming you would agree with that. But, I
implore you to bring those issues back to us, because we're--
there's only so many hours in the day, and the mission of the
Navy--you know what that mission is. We need to make sure our
sailors are trained in the best way possible. This rucksack
issue you're talking about--as a reservist, myself--in the
Reserves, it's even worse, because there's less time in a year
to train. So, please bring those back.
Again, my condolences to the families here. We need to fix
this. I know you're committed to doing it. It's going to be an
all-hands-on-deck effort. But, we cannot--cannot afford to lose
any more of our Nation's finest in training accidents.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
On behalf of the Chairman, Senator Blumenthal, please.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Thank you all for being here today on a very difficult
subject, especially for any of us from Connecticut. We lost two
brave, courageous men, one on the Fitzgerald, the other on the
McCain. I'd like to pay tribute to Electronics Technician
Second Class Dustin Doyon and Sonar Technician Third Class Ngoc
Truong Huynh, both from Connecticut. Their families mourn them,
and all of us in Connecticut are struck by the sadness and
grief of their passing and their courage in joining in devoting
their lives to the defense of our Nation. We really owe them an
investigation that's not only thorough and comprehensive, but
also as prompt as possible.
I am struck by a number of the questions and answers that
have been elicited so far, in dealing with this intensely human
tragedy in such an abstract way, which maybe makes it easier to
address. But, I think most Americans find these crashes
incomprehensible.
So, let me begin by asking you, Admiral, Is there any
indication, so far, that there was equipment failure on either
the Fitzgerald or the McCain?
Admiral Richardson. Sir, we're taking a look at all of
that. That'll be part of the investigation. It's premature to
say conclusively whether that contributed. But, it's not only
the operating status of the equipment, but how it was operated.
Was it being operated properly, in accordance with the
procedures? You know, all of these things will be part of the
result of that investigative look.
Sir, I do also have to comment on how absolutely human this
is to us. Every one of those sailors is like a son to me, and
the opportunity to be with their families when they see them
come back in these coffins makes it intensely human. We're
going to get after this.
Senator Blumenthal. By the way, I did not mean to imply
that anybody on this panel, and particularly you, Admiral, who
has devoted your life to the Navy and service and sacrifice,
would feel anything but the most intense pain and grief as a
result. Having a son who has served in the Navy, another in the
Marine Corps, I know that, as a dad, I felt proud of the fact,
not only that they were serving, but that they were surrounded
by people who really cared for them. They were the best-trained
and the most dedicated of any military force in the history of
the world. Human error, as you've just pointed out, even with
the best equipment, may result in failure to operate the
equipment properly, which comes back to training.
I have been told that since 2006, the Navy doubled the
number of ships home-ported overseas to 20, obviously to
increase its forward presence and reduce crisis response time.
But, training was eliminated on these forward-deployed
platforms. As a result, the number of expired certifications
increased fivefold, from 7 percent to 37 percent, between 2015
and 2017. Are those numbers accurate? I don't know whether
they've been raised here before.
Mr. Pendleton. Yeah, you're--most of that's coming from our
work. The increase in overseas-based ships, I think, went from
20 to 40, which was about 7 percent of the Navy to 14 percent
of the Navy. The certification numbers that you described, that
is from 2015 January until mid this year. If you imagine--the
11 ships that are based in Japan, we looked at all the
certification areas, 22 of them. When we looked at that in
2015--imagine a bunch of little squares--7 percent of those
were red. When we came back, in preparation for this hearing,
37 percent of them were expired. Some of them, 2 years or more,
and so, that was a trend that we alerted the Navy to and that
we put in our updated work. For the most part, you have it
right, but just wanted to make sure the specifics were----
With respect to training, what we said is, they didn't have
dedicated training time, unlike the ships--based in the United
States. So, before a ship deploys from the United States, it
has a train-up period. The folks overseas were pretty much just
almost always deployed. Is that fair?
Senator Blumenthal. In terms of what--those numbers mean,
37 percent of those certifications were expired?
Mr. Pendleton. Yeah.
Senator Blumenthal. That means that----
Mr. Pendleton. That means----
Senator Blumenthal. Go ahead.
Mr. Pendleton. Sorry. There's a----
Senator Blumenthal. What does it mean?
Mr. Pendleton.--periodicity to this. Every couple of years,
or less, you have to be certified that you can do things: drive
a ship, work your coms, everything--and in warfare areas, as
well. So, that means that they had missed that certification
time.
Senator Blumenthal. Right. It doesn't necessarily mean that
they were not competent to perform duties that they were doing,
but it does reflect on the kind of training that was----
Mr. Pendleton. The trend was of concern, as I think the
Admiral has mentioned, as well.
Admiral Richardson. I would just articulate that if that
certification has meaning, then we've got to do the damn
certification. We can't just walk by it and try and talk our
way out, that, ``Hey, we're still proficient, even though the
certs expired.'' That's just not an acceptable way to do
business.
Senator Blumenthal. Well, not acceptable, I agree. Thirty-
seven percent--and going from 7 percent to 37 percent in just 2
years is pretty staggering.
Admiral Richardson. Egregious.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
Chairman McCain [presiding]. Senator Sullivan wants to have
another----
Senator Sullivan. Just two----
Chairman McCain.--question.
Senator Sullivan.--two quick ones, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
very much.
It was really a followup to Senator Blumenthal's question,
which was the home port versus--the overseas-ported versus,
kind of, CONUS [Continental United States] home-ported ship.
The statistics that were just read, I think, are pretty
striking. Admiral and Mr. Secretary, I know you're going to be
looking at the specifics of these accidents and what
specifically happened, but I think if you could also help
address, kind of, the strategic elements--Is there something
that we should be looking at that makes the overseas-ported--
ships that are based overseas, going through different
training, different deployment cycles--if you can help address
that issue, too, because it does seem like that's something
that might be an element of this challenge. Do you agree with
that?
Mr. Spencer. Yes, Senator. Two things that have,
regrettably, come out of this, as far as I'm concerned. Mr.
Pendleton hit on metrics. I'm a true believer in metrics. We
have to know what we're measuring and what we're looking at.
This is a prime example of, can we get ourselves a dashboard
that is very easy for, quote/unquote, ``management'' to look at
the dashboard and have the appropriate indicators on there at
any one time? This is what we need to do. We don't need to
actually be having our hands and fingers into what's going on
there. We have to have the first indicators on when to react
and say, ``Uh-oh, trending in the wrong position, let's
address.''
If you look at the study that I have asked to be stood up,
we are addressing the overall root causes of what's going on.
The CNO is looking at tactical causes. We are going to be
looking at root causes. We've asked people from BP [British
Petroleum] North America to join us. They lived through the
Deepwater Horizon tragedy and came out the other side with a
very strong plan. We called the Maritime Academy and said,
``Who is your poster child for maritime safety who's had an
issue?'' They said, ``Speak to Crowley Marine. They had a bit
of a rash. They have a great program now, called Road to
Zero.'' Called Tom Crowley. He said, ``You're on it.''
We looked at other situations that were out there. We
called the Mayo Clinic. The Mayo Clinic has done 7 years of
studies looking at high-pressure, team-oriented places. What
they were looking at were operating rooms, where you had
professionals--seven different teams of professionals, doing a
lung transplant over a 7-hour period, and they degraded the
whole thing, started over again, and said, ``How do we build
this for optimum outcome?'' It came to such human behavior
aspects as the anesthesiologist can go, ``Need a minute here.
Everyone stop. I need to stabilize something,'' and had input
and control into a situation of pressure and intensity that had
one leader, but they had to actually culturally realign how
they communicate with everyone.
These are the kind of insights and people we're going to
have working on our level to really see if we can have--we will
have a plan to do corrective action.
Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you.
Admiral Richardson. Sir, if I could pile on.
There is a real benefit to having ships forward deployed.
Senator Sullivan. Oh, I couldn't agree more. Don't get me--
--
Admiral Richardson. We need to----
Senator Sullivan.--wrong. I think it's actually critical
that we have ships forward deployed.
Admiral Richardson. For a number of reasons, that you're
aware of. What we do need to do when we forward deploy ships,
though, to Mr. Pendleton's point, is, we need to have a
comprehensive understanding of what it takes to sustain that
forward-deployed force from a maintenance, training,
infrastructure standpoint, people, you know, the whole thing.
Senator Sullivan. Yes. That's just what I'm requesting you
take a look at that issue, as well.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Well, let me just add. Admiral, I
appreciate everything you're saying, but it doesn't take a
study of RAND or Mayo when you're making people work 100 hours
a week. Okay? It doesn't take any study. I don't have to ask
RAND to look at it. I think I know what 100 hours a week does
to people over time. That's been standard procedure for a long
time. What are--why not declare a stop to--a halt to it right
now? Right now. They should not be working 100 hours a week.
So, I appreciate all our plans and all our remedies, but there
are some of them that are just common sense, that don't require
a study.
I think the men and women who are serving in the Navy would
like to see some immediate action taken. Seven-month
deployments are a long time. Up til now, there have been times
where those deployments have been a lot longer than that. Who
is looking out for them? Who's asking them to stay in?
I appreciate all the studies you've ordered, and all the
assessments and all that. There are some that, all you have to
do is use common sense and make some changes that would,
obviously, relieve some of the strain. When somebody's working
100 hours a week over a period of time, they're going to make
mistakes. Any manager can tell you that.
Mr. Secretary, I'm glad you have all these plans. I'm glad
you're going to make changes. I'm glad you've got RAND and
whoever the hell else it is that's studying it. There are some
aspects of what we're subjecting the men and women who are
serving, especially in the overseas deployment ports, that you
could change--you could make the change tomorrow. What we would
like to see is some significant changes. Fire a few people,
that's fine. But, I'm not sure it relieves that individual
who's still working 100 hours a week. One of the reasons why
that person is working 100 hours a week, obviously, is because
the enormous burden that have been placed on them, not only to
do their job, but also a lot of additional requirements that,
every time there's been a problem, ``Well, let's give another
lecture, let's have another training session, let's have
another test.''
Again, I appreciate what you're saying, I appreciate what
you're doing, but, I'd also like to see some immediate
commonsense actions taken that--any manager, any leader will
tell you that if you work somebody over 100 hours a week,
you're not going to get an efficient output. There's many other
aspects that are--of that are doing. If you deploy--if you keep
deploying ships more than 7 months a year, you're not going to
keep good people in the Navy. You're just not. They prefer a
better life.
Finally, speak truth to power. One of the reasons why you
are having to impose these burdens and the extended deployments
and the lack of readiness is because of sequestration. When you
don't know from--as you mentioned, when you don't know in
September what you're going to be doing in October, that's not
right, and it's not fair. So Admiral Richardson, I'd like to
thank you for your very frank and candid comments on that issue
before this committee.
I'd just like to finally say there are additional family
members who are here, and I would recognized a group of them at
the beginning, but I'd also like to thank them again, those who
were not here at the beginning of the hearing. We thank you for
your family's service and sacrifice. They will always be
remembered. Your presence here renews and invigorates this
committee's commitment to making sure that every single life of
every single member of the United States Navy will be given the
utmost protection and the utmost care and concern, and not
allow situations to evolve that then make it likely that their
lives are in greater danger.
I thank the witnesses.
Ask Senator Reed if he has any additional comments.
Senator Reed. Mr. Chairman, I would simply join you in
expressing profound condolences to the families, and also a
profound commitment on behalf of the Congress and, I know, the
Secretary and the CNO, to take the steps necessary to protect
our men and women who wear the uniform of the United States.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:21 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator James Inhofe
senate ndaa navy provisions
1. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Pendleton, during my questioning in the
hearing, I
referenced 14 specific additions to the Navy budget, and asked that you
assess what they will do to alleviate Navy readiness concerns in both
the short and the long term. Please assess the overall impact to Navy
readiness for the following provisions:
A. $1.4 billion for procuring 10 F-35C fighters, which is $800
million and 6 aircraft more than the administration's request
B. $25 billion for shipbuilding to fund 13 ships, which is $5
billion and 5 ships more than the administration's request
C. $5.5 billion for Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, which is
$1.9 billion more than the administration's request, including funds
for 1 additional destroyer and $300 million for multiyear economic
order quantity procurement.
D. $3.1 billion for Virginia-class submarine advance
procurement, which is $1.2 billion more than the administration's
request, including $750 million for multiyear economic order quantity
procurement and $450 million for either a third fiscal year 2020
Virginia-class submarine or initiatives to expand the submarine
industrial base
E. $1 billion and incremental funding authority for either 1
amphibious ship replacement (LX(R)) or 1 amphibious transport dock
(LPD-30), which is in addition to the administration's request.
F. $661 million for 1 expeditionary sea base (ESB), which is in
addition to the administration's request.
G. $250 million for 1 cable ship, which is in addition to the
administration's request.
H. $509 million for 8 ship-to-shore connectors (SSCs), which is
$297 million and 5 SSCs more than the administration's request.
I. $30 million for preliminary design of a smaller aircraft
carrier, which is in addition to the administration's request.
J. $1.9 billion for procuring 24 F/A-18 Super Hornets, which is
$739 million and 10 aircraft more than the administration's request.
K. $2.3 billion for procuring 13 P-8A Poseidon aircraft, which
$1.0 billion and 6 aircraft more than the administration's request.
L. Authorization for multiyear contract authority and advance
procurement for up to 13 Virginia-class submarines.
M. Authorization for multiyear contract authority and advance
procurement for up to 15 Arleigh Burke-class destroyers.
N. Codification that at least a 355-ship Navy with the optimal
mix of ships is official U.S. policy
Mr. Pendleton. GAO has not assessed the specific readiness
implications of the listed additions to the Navy's budget. Our recent
and pending reports include observations and recommendations that
suggest that buying additional surface combatants, amphibious ships,
support vessels, and submarines could expand the current fleet size and
potentially improve readiness by relieving some operational tempo
pressure. To achieve sustained readiness gains, these investments have
to be balanced with the Navy taking action to overcome challenges
related to adequately manning, operating, and maintaining the current
fleet. \1\ Without improved management, any force structure additions
will likely experience similar readiness challenges as the current
fleet.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ For an overview of these challenges, see GAO, Navy Readiness:
Actions Needed to Address Persistent Maintenance, Training, and Other
Challenges Affecting the Fleet, GAO-17-809T (Washington, DC: Sept. 19,
2017) and GAO, Navy Readiness: Actions Needed to Address Persistent
Maintenance, Training, and Other Challenges Facing the Fleet, GAO-17-
798T (Washington, DC: Sept. 7, 2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Moreover, the Navy is unlikely to achieve its desired outcomes
without improvements in the performance of individual shipbuilding
programs. Within the shipbuilding portfolio, cost growth has
contributed to the Navy buying ships at a lower rate than called for in
its 30-year shipbuilding plans. Shipbuilding programs, such as the
Ford-class aircraft carrier (CVN 78), San Antonio-class amphibious
transport dock (LPD 17) and Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), progressed with
unexecutable business cases in which ship construction began prior to
demonstrating key knowledge, resulting in costly, time-consuming, and
out-of-sequence work during construction and undesired capability
tradeoffs. \2\ The success of additional force structure and future
programs, such as a smaller aircraft carrier, will depend on the
execution of realistic business cases that balance desired requirements
with available resources. The Navy's future readiness will also depend
on the decisions it makes to mitigate the consequences of unexecutable
business cases for its recent shipbuilding programs. For example, the
Navy continues to acquire Littoral Combat Ships, which will represent a
substantial portion of the Navy's fleet for decades to come. However,
it is critical that the capabilities and sustainment of these ships--
for which we have previously reported significant concerns--are
sufficiently accounted for when making decisions on the future of the
fleet. \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ See GAO, Navy Shipbuilding: Policy Changes Needed to Improve
the Post-Delivery Process and Ship Quality, GAO-17-418 (Washington, DC:
July 13, 2017) and GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected
Weapons Programs, GAO-16-329SP (Washington, DC: Mar. 31, 2016).
\3\ See, for example, GAO, Littoral Combat Ship and Frigate:
Congress Faced with Critical Acquisition Decisions, GAO-17-262T
(Washington, DC: Dec. 1, 2016), GAO, Littoral Combat Ship: Need to
Address Fundamental Weaknesses in LCS and Frigate Acquisition
Strategies, GAO-16-356 (Washington, DC: June 9, 2016), and GAO,
Littoral Combat Ship: Deployment of USS Freedom Revealed Risks in
Implementing Operational Concepts and Uncertain Costs, GAO-14-447
(Washington, DC: July 8, 2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Further, the condition of newly constructed ships when they are
delivered to the fleet has compromised fleet readiness. In our July
2017 report, we reviewed six ships of different classes valued at $6.3
billion and found that they were delivered to the Navy with varying
degrees of incomplete work and quality problems. \4\ Although the Navy
resolved many defects after delivery, as the table below shows, quality
problems persisted and work was incomplete when the Navy turned over
the selected ships to the operational fleet.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ GAO, Navy Shipbuilding: Policy Changes Needed to Improve the
Post-Delivery Process and Ship Quality, GAO-17-418 (Washington, DC:
July 13, 2017).
Table: Number of Quality Problems or Defects at the Beginning and End of the Post-Delivery Period across Six
Selected Ships
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
At the time the Navy
At delivery provided the ship to the
fleet
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Significant construction deficiencies....................... 363 45
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Systems not meeting minimal functional standard............. 139 54
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Significant deficiencies in mission-essential equipment..... N/A\a\ 53
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: GAO analysis of Navy documents and data. GAO-17-418
\a\ This information is not evaluated at delivery.
Moreover, fleet officials reported varying levels of concern with
the overall quality and completeness of the ships, such as with
unreliable equipment or a need for more intense maintenance than
expected. Such issues contributed to a maintenance backlog at the start
of the ships' service lives and put pressure on already constrained
maintenance funding.
While we have not specifically examined the effect of additional F-
35 procurements on Navy readiness, our preliminary work on F-35
sustainment across DOD indicates that accelerating procurements without
addressing key sustainment challenges could result in further degraded
readiness. Our preliminary findings, expected to be issued in a final
report in late-October, show that DOD is currently sustaining over 250
F-35s and plans to triple the number of F-35s by 2021, but is facing
sustainment challenges that are affecting warfighter readiness. For
example, DOD's capabilities to repair F-35 parts at military depots are
six years behind schedule, which has resulted in average part repair
times of 172 days--twice the program's objective. In addition, spare
parts shortages are degrading current F-35 readiness. From January
through August 7, 2017, F-35 aircraft were unable to fly about 22
percent of the time due to parts shortages. These challenges are
largely the result of sustainment plans that do not fully include key
requirements or timely and sufficient funding. Our preliminary findings
also show that DOD faces a funding shortage of approximately $1.5
billion between fiscal years 2018 and 2023 for F-35 sustainment.
Procurement decisions can also significantly affect sustainment
outcomes. Accelerating purchases of F-35 aircraft without addressing
key sustainment challenges would create more demand on the already-
strained F-35 sustainment enterprise and puts the services at risk of
purchasing aircraft that they are not ready to sustain.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Thom Tillis
dopma and fleet up
2. Senator Tillis. Admiral Richardson, in 2008, the Navy instituted
a program called ``Fleet Up,'' which means that officers serve as the
XO and CO on the same ship in sequential assignments. The Center for
Naval Analyses assessed the Fleet Up program and said the need for such
a program ``began with a substantial gap between control-grade
inventory and control-grade manning requirements.'' Does this mean the
Navy wasn't creating enough XO and CO opportunities to promote enough
Commanders and Captains? If yes, why not?
Admiral Richardson. No, it does not mean that we weren't creating
enough executive officer and commanding officer opportunities to
promote enough officers to the ranks of commander and captain. At the
time of Fleet Up implementation, there was a concern within the Surface
Warfare Community regarding future promotion opportunity to captain.
There was, and continues to be, a delta between authorized billets and
available inventory of those promoted to captain, but, as a whole, Navy
promotes the best and fully qualified officers to each pay grade within
control grade limits imposed by the Defense Officer Personnel
Management Act (DOPMA). While promotion to captain was an initial
driver for the Fleet Up study, it quickly became apparent to the
Surface Force leadership that a readiness benefit might also be derived
from Fleet Up. Under the legacy model, there was a commanding officer
or executive officer relief every calendar year due to completion of
prescribed tour lengths, typically 19-22 months for commanding officer
and 12-14 months for executive officer. Fleet Up reduced that turnover
rate, thereby increasing command stability for a longer period of time.
The increase in command leadership stability and the perceived
readiness benefits became the principal driver in the decision to
continue Fleet Up. The Comprehensive Review (CR) of recent surface
force incidents looked holistically at the surface warfare officer
career path. The CR has made several recommendations that we will use
to evaluate possible career path modifications.
3. Senator Tillis. Admiral Richardson, in its report, CNA stated
that the gaps were the result of general shortage of officers in
control grades, but also due to ``shortages in career-enhancing
positions associated with high-probabilities of promotion selection.''
Is the proliferation of career broadening and staff assignments
contributing to the growth of requirements for control-grade officers,
particularly in post-command commanders?
Admiral Richardson. In reviewing the data over the last fifteen
years, there was no substantial increase in the number of career
broadening and staff assignments for Unrestricted Line control grade
officers. That said, changes in force structure and requirements
continue to challenge Navy's ability to meet its goal of one-hundred
percent of inventory in the control grades. Specifically, as fiscal
constraints limit Navy's ability to build new platforms as well as
maintain the current number of operational units thereby increasing the
number of post-command commanders (PCCs), the ability to produce PCCs
is limited. Because PCCs typically gain a wealth of expertise and
experience having served in billets inside and outside of their
community, they are highly desired for service in the most challenging
assignments that require a wide range of capabilities. The ability to
produce PCCs is constrained by a finite number of billets with command
opportunity, therefore PCCs are detailed to the most critical billets
where their expertise and experience is used for the greatest benefit
to the Navy.
4. Senator Tillis. Admiral Richardson, Fleet Up is essentially the
same model used in Navy flying units. Did the Navy adequately consider
the cultural differences between flying units and the surface warfare
community prior to implementing Fleet Up?
Admiral Richardson. Yes, we did consider cultural differences
between aviation and surface warfare communities prior to implementing
Fleet Up. We assessed the equities, as well as the pros and cons of the
Fleet Up model, in the context of how it would impact the surface Navy.
Specifically, we analyzed the effects of longevity during a given tour
for both officer and ship. A 2014 Center for Naval Analyses study
maintains that `` . . . ships with longer-serving commanding officers
had better material readiness,'' and that tenure as executive officer
would encourage the officer to take a longer view of policies put in
place. While developing and implementing the Fleet Up model in the
surface force, we made adjustments to the program informed by lessons
learned provided through fleet feedback. The Comprehensive Review (CR)
of recent surface force incidents looked holistically at the surface
warfare officer career path. The CR has made several recommendations
that we will use to evaluate possible career path modifications.
5. Senator Tillis. Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson,
according to the report, the due-course career path for a surface
warfare officer is ``a series of sea and shore assignments designed to
provide the experiences needed to progress from Ensign to Captain in
the Navy's closed, up-or-out personnel system.'' Does the ``up-or-out''
system force the Navy to rush the development of officers in certain
technical specialties?
Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson. The up-or-out system does
not force us to rush development of officers in certain technical
specialties. Surface Warfare Officers are afforded two division officer
tours to permit them to hone their skills, while preparing them to
screen for their next career milestone--department head afloat.
Officers also complete two department head afloat tours--and
potentially post-department head at-sea tours--before screening for
executive officer/commanding officer. Over the past decade, average sea
time has increased by approximately five months for all officers who
command ships, primarily due to the executive officer tour-length
increasing from 13 months, prior to implementation of Fleet Up, to 18
months currently. The career path is designed to develop professional
mariners and warfighters at sea. Performance in at-sea milestone tours
is the most important factor in whether or not an officer screens for
the next milestone. In between milestone tours, officers develop
specialties vital to the programmatic and business side of the Navy,
including financial management, operations analysis, manpower and
education, strategy and planning, etc. The Comprehensive Review (CR) of
recent surface force incidents looked holistically at the surface
warfare officer career path. The CR has made several recommendations
that we will use to evaluate possible career path modifications.
6. Senator Tillis. Admiral Richardson, the Center for Naval
Analyses stated that one possible negative result of the Fleet Up
program is ``tour start dates shifting to the right and command-
screened officers are waiting to start their command assignments.''
This has in fact occurred and we're now seeing large sea gaps of 5
years or more in Fleet Up Destroyer captains. Do you believe the Fleet
Up program has created a situation where surface warfare officers are
spending too much time away from the waterfront?
Admiral Richardson. In 2005, the surface community designed and
approved the executive officer/commanding officer Fleet Up program,
cognizant of the time officers would spend between their department
head and executive officer assignments. When Fleet Up was implemented,
by design, the notional time between department head tours and the
start of the executive officer tour was 5.5 years. Since that time, the
community has tracked and managed the average time between the end of
second department head tour and the start of the executive officer tour
to ensure the program has been maintained as designed and also to not
disadvantage officers by having them away from the waterfront longer.
The surface community constantly manages and adjusts officers' career-
timing to meet their career needs, and the needs of the community based
on the billets available on ships at sea. On the most recently approved
Fleet Up slate, the average time between department head and executive
officer tours was 5.38 years, while the average time throughout the
tenure of the Fleet Up program has been 5.6 years. The Comprehensive
Review (CR) of recent surface force incidents looked holistically at
the surface warfare officer career path. The CR has made several
recommendations that we will use to evaluate possible career path
modifications.
7. Senator Tillis. Admiral Richardson, could this lead to a loss of
proficiency among the surface warfare community in the XO/CO ranks?
Admiral Richardson. Unnecessary risk is unacceptable. For each
expired certification, risk was managed through development of a Risk
Assessment and Mitigation Plan (RAMP) that was approved by either the
ship's Immediate Superior in Command (ISIC) or Commander, Naval Surface
Forces Pacific (CNSP). The existing RAMP process, however, was biased
towards operations and did not appropriately mitigate and balance the
risk created by the high pace of operations (force employment) with
force generation periodic training and certification requirements in
the case of the Forward Deployed Naval Forces in Japan (FDNF-J). To
correct this imbalance, Commander U.S. Pacific Fleet cancelled all
RAMPS, elevated RAMP approval from the ISIC/CNSP to his level, and
directed the conduct of comprehensive readiness-for-sea assessments for
every FDNF-J ship. ADM Swift has taken immediate corrective action
which informed both the follow-on comprehensive and strategic reviews.
8. Senator Tillis. Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson, do
some of the requirements of DOPMA and other laws reduce your ability to
flexibly manage your surface warfare officer population, especially
when it comes to building sufficient levels of technical expertise?
Secretary Spencer. Yes. Some statutes, including a number of those
included in DOPMA, limit our ability to efficiently and effectively
manage the officer corps. Notwithstanding such constraints, we have
promulgated policies and manpower management strategies that provide
surface warfare officers, and the entire officer corps, with sufficient
levels of technical expertise and experience throughout their careers.
While DOPMA provides a frame work to create a preeminent fighting
force, it is over 35 years old. Our future success in competing for the
best and brightest talent in America led us to embark on an effort to
transform our human resources system to offer increased choice,
flexibility, opportunity, and transparency. Congress has helped this
effort by enacting a number of amendments to DOPMA and other personnel
authorities, which has begun to move us in the right direction. We
continue to evaluate the statutes under which we operate. We look
forward to continuing the dialogue across DOD, and with the Congress,
in a review of DOPMA/ROPMA and the pursuit of new or enhanced
authorities that will meet the unique needs of each branch and
component of the Armed Forces, while helping to sustain our position as
the preeminent and most lethal fighting force in history.
Admiral Richardson. Yes. Congress has already been, and continues
to be, of great help in our efforts to thoroughly reevaluate DOPMA, and
other personnel laws, in order to ensure we have the tools to
effectively and efficiently manage the officer corps in a manner that
enhances warfighting readiness. The Comprehensive Review of Recent
Surface Forces Incidents specifically recommended an evaluation of the
Surface Warfare Career Path, with particular emphasis on length of
tours and currency of time at sea, which could identify a need for
additional changes to DOPMA. As the need for additional changes are
identified, we look forward to continuing the dialogue across DoD, and
with the Congress, in pursuit of new or enhanced authorities that will
meet the unique needs of each branch and component of the Armed Forces,
while helping to sustain our position as the preeminent and most lethal
fighting force in history.
9. Senator Tillis. Secretary Spencer, does Congress need to help
you and the other military services by reevaluating DOPMA and other
related personnel laws in order to ensure our officers are managed in a
way that allows them to focus on warfighting and gain sufficient levels
of skill and experience?
Secretary Spencer. Yes. Congress has already been, and continues to
be, of great help in our efforts to thoroughly reevaluate DOPMA, and
other personnel laws, in order to ensure we have the tools to
effectively and efficiently manage the officer corps in a manner that
enhances warfighting readiness. The Comprehensive Review of Recent
Surface Forces Incidents specifically recommended an evaluation of the
Surface Warfare Career Path, with particular emphasis on length of
tours and currency of time at sea, which could identify a need for
additional changes to DOPMA. As the need for additional changes are
identified, we look forward to continuing the dialogue across DOD, and
with the Congress, in pursuit of new or enhanced authorities that will
meet the unique needs of each branch and component of the Armed Forces,
while helping to sustain our position as the preeminent and most lethal
fighting force in history.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator David Perdue
impact of budget uncertainty, budget control act caps, and continuing
resolutions
10. Senator Perdue. Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson, can
we meet our national security commitments if we do not address these
serious issues of fixing the financial situation and improving
budgetary certainty for the Navy?
Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson. No. There is a mismatch
between the growing mission set that is emerging from the security
environment and the sustainable level of naval power that we can
generate with the funding available. This risk manifests in readiness
and global force management. In recent years, the Navy has only been
able to meet 40-45 percent of COCOM demand for naval forces. The
Comprehensive Review underscores the imbalance between the number of
ships in the Navy today and the increasing number of operational
missions assigned to them. The Navy can supply a finite amount of
forces for operations from the combined force of ships operating from
CONUS and based abroad; this finite supply is based both on the size of
the force as well as the readiness funding available to man, train,
equip and sustain that force. Headquarters are working to manage the
imbalance. U.S. Navy ships homeported in the continental United States
balance maintenance, training and availability for operations
(deployments and/or surge); the Pacific Fleet is re-examining its
ability to maintain this balance for ships based in Japan as well.
Under the Budget Control Act of 2011 and extended Continuing
Resolutions, the ability to supply forces to the full demand is--and
will remain--limited.
11. Senator Perdue. Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson, how
does budget uncertainty, CRs and caps impact your ability to plan and
spend wisely?
Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson. Budget uncertainty,
continuing resolutions (CR), and sequestration-level funding caps add
disruption, inefficiency and delays to our planning and execution of
funding--delays that are becoming increasingly costly as we fall
further and further behind the pace of available technology. We believe
the past nine CR's have cost the Navy about $4 billion, not including
opportunity cost or lesser imposed upon the industrial base. CR's limit
our ability to supply forces to meet the growing demand of national
security missions and impact the readiness of our forces and their
equipment at a time when security threats are extraordinarily high. The
longer the CR, the greater the consequences for our force. Budget
uncertainty, CRs, and sequestration caps lead to deferred ship
availabilities that disrupt maintenance and training schedules, and
result in growth and new work in subsequent availabilities, increased
costs, and inefficiency from sub-optimized work schedules--we cannot
buy back lost time. They also can cause shipyards to lay-off employees
and create future bills to the Navy due to unnecessary churn in the
port-loading of our shipyards. Within our shipbuilding accounts, the
impacts cause delays and churn for our already-besieged shipyards,
requiring wasted time and effort to make adjustments and can result in
new ships delivering late, and in turn current ships needing to operate
longer, at great effort and expense. CRs also result in getting less
for our dollar. We do not have authority to enter into new multi-year
procurement contracts that allow us to negotiate lower unit costs. We
pay higher prices for short-length services contracts. And we will have
to spend more on overhead to write and review those agreements.
accepting risk
12. Senator Perdue. Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson, the
GAO found that 37 percent of certifications for cruiser and destroyer
crews based in Japan had expired--a fivefold increase since the GAO's
May 2015 report. That's a fivefold increase on a previously identified
problem in only two years. How much risk does the Navy believe is
acceptable with regard to these outstanding GAO recommendations?
Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson. Unnecessary risk is
unacceptable. For each expired certification, risk was managed through
development of a Risk Assessment and Mitigation Plan (RAMP) that was
approved by either the ship's Immediate Superior in Command (ISIC) or
Commander, Naval Surface Forces Pacific (CNSP). The existing RAMP
process, however, was biased towards operations and did not
appropriately mitigate and balance the risk created by the high pace of
operations (force employment) with force generation periodic training
and certification requirements in the case of the Forward Deployed
Naval Forces in Japan (FDNF-J). To correct this imbalance, Commander
U.S. Pacific Fleet cancelled all RAMPS, elevated RAMP approval from the
ISIC/CNSP to his level, and directed the conduct of comprehensive
readiness-for-sea assessments for every FDNF-J ship. ADM Swift has
taken immediate corrective action which informed both the follow-on
comprehensive and strategic reviews.
navy--example of broader defense problem
13. Senator Perdue. Mr. Pendleton, throughout your work over the
past 6 years, are you seeing any trends of systemic issues across
services?
Mr. Pendleton. Our work has shown that readiness challenges persist
across a number of areas including, but not limited to, the Navy. In
June 2017, we issued a report highlighting five key mission challenges
facing the Department of Defense (DOD). \5\ In that report, we noted
that the United States faces an extremely challenging national security
environment at the same time that it is grappling with addressing an
unsustainable long-term fiscal path caused by a structural imbalance
between revenue and spending, with DOD accounting for approximately
half of the federal government's discretionary spending. Within this
environment, DOD is working to both rebuild the readiness of its forces
and modernize to meet future threats while facing constrained budgets.
Each of the military services today are generally smaller and less
combat ready than they have been in many years, and, according to DOD,
each military service has been forced to cut critical needs in areas
such as training, maintenance, and modernization due to budgetary
constraints.
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\5\ This included a detailed discussion of our priority
recommendations to DOD. Since August 2015, we have identified priority
recommendations in letters to the Secretary of Defense--recommendations
that we have made to DOD that we believe the department should give a
high priority to addressing. See GAO, Department of Defense: Actions
Needed to Address Five Key Mission Challenges, GAO-17-369 (Washington,
DC: June 13, 2017). As of June 2017, 78 priority recommendations
remained open.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In September 2016, we reported specifically on factors that affect
reported readiness levels, DOD's efforts to manage the impact of
deployments on readiness, and DOD's implementation and oversight of
department-wide readiness rebuilding efforts. \6\ We found that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ GAO, Military Readiness: DOD's Readiness Rebuilding Efforts May
Be at Risk without a Comprehensive Plan, GAO-16-841 (Washington, DC:
Sept. 7, 2016).
The military services have reported persistently low
readiness levels, which they have attributed to emerging and continued
demands on their forces, reduced force structure, and increased
frequency and length of deployments. For example, the Air Force
experienced a 58 percent decrease in the number of fighter and bomber
squadrons from 1991 to 2015 while maintaining a persistent level of
demand from the combatant commands for the use of its forces. In
addition, the Navy has experienced an 18 percent decrease in its fleet
of ships since 1998 and an increase in demand, resulting in the
deployment lengths for many ships increasing from 7 months to a less
sustainable 9 months.
DOD officials have indicated that overall demand has been
decreasing since 2013, but the department has reported that the ability
to rebuild capability and capacity is hindered by continued demand for
some forces. To mitigate the impact of continued deployments on
readiness, the Joint Staff has focused on balancing the distribution of
forces for high-priority missions with the need to rebuild the
readiness of the force. Efforts include revising major plans to better
reflect what the current and planned force is expected to achieve and
improving the management of DOD's process for sourcing global demands
by, among other things, balancing the supply of forces with the minimum
required to meet global demands. However, it is too soon to tell what
impact implementation of these initiatives will have on DOD's readiness
recovery efforts because the department is still working to complete
implementation.
DOD has stated that readiness rebuilding is a priority,
but implementation and oversight of department-wide readiness
rebuilding efforts have not fully included key elements of sound
planning, putting the rebuilding efforts at risk. Key elements of sound
planning for results-oriented outcomes include a mission statement
supported by long-term goals, strategies for achieving the goals,
metrics, and an evaluation plan to determine the appropriateness of the
goals and effectiveness of implemented strategies. In 2014, DOD tasked
the military services to develop plans for rebuilding readiness. Each
service developed a plan based on the force elements that were
experiencing a high pace of deployments or facing challenges in
achieving readiness recovery. In 2015, the services reported their
readiness rebuilding plans to DOD, which identified readiness goals and
timeframes for achieving them, but these goals were incomplete and some
of the timeframes have been extended. We found that the services have
also not defined comprehensive strategies, with the resources required
for achieving the identified goals, nor have they fully assessed the
effect of external factors such as maintenance and training on
readiness rebuilding goals. Moreover, the services have not fully
established metrics that the department can use to oversee readiness
rebuilding efforts and evaluate progress towards achieving the
identified goals. Without DOD incorporating key elements of sound
planning into recovery efforts, and amid competing priorities that the
department must balance, successful implementation of readiness
recovery plans may be at risk.
14. Senator Perdue. Mr. Pendleton, in your view, do the problems
you found in your recent reviews of the Navy incidents and the state of
its shipyards, speak to a broader issue or problem within the
Department of Defense?
Mr. Pendleton. As we noted in our written statements, the Navy
continues to face challenges with manning, training, and maintaining
its existing fleet. In order to address these readiness problems, the
Navy will need to implement GAO's recommendations--particularly in the
areas of assessing the risks associated with overseas basing,
reassessing sailor workload and the factors used to size ship crews,
managing investments to modernize and improve the efficiency of the
naval shipyards, and applying sound planning and sustained management
attention to its readiness rebuilding efforts.
With respect to rebuilding readiness efforts, each of the military
services and the Department has more work to do. We recommended in 2016
that DOD and the services establish comprehensive readiness goals,
strategies for implementing them, and associated metrics that can be
used to evaluate whether readiness recovery efforts are achieving
intended outcomes. \7\ DOD generally concurred with our recommendations
and, in November 2016, issued limited guidance to the military services
on rebuilding readiness; it has also started to design a framework to
guide the military services in achieving readiness recovery but has not
yet implemented our recommendations. For example, the Navy has since
extended its time frame for readiness recovery to at least 2021, but it
still has not developed specific benchmarks or interim goals for
tracking and reporting on readiness recovery. Navy officials cited
several challenges to rebuilding readiness, chief among them the
continued high demand for its forces, the unpredictability of funding,
and the current difficulty with beginning and completing ship
maintenance on time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ GAO, Military Readiness: DOD's Readiness Rebuilding Efforts May
Be at Risk without a Comprehensive Plan, GAO-16-841 (Washington, DC:
Sept. 7, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Continued congressional oversight will be needed to ensure that the
Navy demonstrates progress in addressing its maintenance, training, and
other challenges and that DOD and the other military services address
our recommendations.
readiness--time constraints
15. Senator Perdue. Admiral Richardson, these four incidents that
occurred over the past 8 months led to unscheduled repairs and salvage
times that took or will take these ships offline for a total of up to 3
years, and will cost more than half a billion dollars. What's the
impact of unscheduled and lengthy repairs having on our ops tempo of
the rest of the Navy fleet?
Admiral Richardson. The loss of capacity due to these incidents
will have an impact on operational tempo (OPTEMPO) in the short term.
The Navy intends to meet its fiscal year (FY) 2018 global presence
commitments and is adjusting schedules to do so. This involves surging
a ship to the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility for its
second deployment within the 36 month Optimized Fleet Response Plan
(OFRP) cycle. This additional deployment will exceed an OPTEMPO of our
service deploy to dwell (D2D) goal of 2:1, but will not violate
Secretary of Defense's 1:1 D2D limit. This deployment demonstrates the
flexibility of the OFRP force generation model. Beyond fiscal year
2018, the Navy will adjust its force offerings to reflect ship
availability while the damaged ships are repaired.
16. Senator Perdue. Admiral Richardson, will this have a domino
effect on the rest of the fleet?
Admiral Richardson. I would not characterize this as a domino
effect. These incidents will not have an impact on the large majority
of other warships. However, in a small number of cases, we will adjust
deployment dates, locations, or both. This involves surging a ship to
the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility for its second
deployment within the 36 month Optimized Fleet Response Plan (OFRP)
cycle. This additional deployment will exceed an OPTEMPO of our service
deploy to dwell (D2D) goal of 2:1, but will not violate Secretary of
Defense's 1:1 D2D limit. This deployment demonstrates the flexibility
of the OFRP force generation model.
homeporting in u.s. v. abroad
17. Senator Perdue. Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson--can
you give us the benefit of homeporting overseas? Especially from a
posture and alliance reassurance perspective?
Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson. Credible combat power
will remain postured in the Western Pacific and the Arabian Gulf/Indian
Ocean to protect our vital interests, assure our allies and partners of
our continuing commitment to regional security, and deter and dissuade
potential adversaries and peer competitors. Homeporting ships overseas
allows us to provide Geographic Combatant Commanders more presence with
fewer ships, and this combat power can be selectively repositioned
faster than forces homeported in the United States to meet
contingencies that may arise elsewhere. Additionally, these forces are
sized and postured to fulfill the following strategic imperatives:
Limit regional conflict with forward deployed and decisive maritime
power, deter a major power war, and win our Nation's wars. By being
forward deployed and engaged in mutually beneficial relationships with
regional and global partners, maritime forces are better equipped to
promote frameworks that enhance security due to their ability to
respond faster and remain on station longer. When natural or manmade
disasters strike, our maritime forces provide humanitarian assistance
and relief, joining with interagency and non-government partners. By
participating routinely and predictably in cooperative activities,
maritime forces are postured to support other joint or combined forces
to mitigate and localize disruptions.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Claire McCaskill
training certifications
18. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson,
prior to the Fitzgerald and McCain incidents:
A. What was the waiver process for expired training certifications
for the 7th Fleet? What was the minimum level a waiver could be
approved? For the rest of the Navy?
Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson. There is no certification
waiver process for the Naval Surface Force, nor for ships in Seventh
Fleet. Certifications are either current or expired. Unique to Forward
Deployed Naval Forces (FDNF), expired certifications were managed
through a Risk Assessment and Mitigation Plan (RAMP) process that was
approved by either the ship's Immediate Superior in Command (ISIC) or
Commander, Naval Surface Forces Pacific (CNSP). RAMPs did not grant
certification waivers, but documented a timeline to achieve
certification status at a later date. Following the collisions of
Fitzgerald and McCain, all RAMPS were cancelled and RAMP approval was
elevated to the level of Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet. Additionally,
ADM Swift directed the conduct of Readiness-for-Sea assessments to
review the training and material status of each ship to conduct
underway operations. It is important to note that in the OFRP force
generation model every ship will have expired certifications that are
in the process of being reset as they progress from the Maintenance
Phase through the Advanced Phase. Certifications are completed before
deployment. As a hard and fast policy, Operational Commanders do not
deploy ships with expired Certifications.
B. At what level were ship training certification statuses reported
to?
Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson. Warfare Certifications
are reported to both the numbered fleet commanders (either Commander,
Seventh Fleet or Commander, Third Fleet) and to Type Commanders.
C. Were ship training certification statuses regularly reported to
and known by senior Navy leadership at the Secretarial and CNO level?
If not, why not?
Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson. Following the Fitzgerald
and McCain incidents, COMPACFLT raised Risk Assessment and Mitigation
Plan (RAMP) approval authority for a 7th Fleet ship with expired
certifications to his level. This RAMP process is unique to 7th Fleet.
There is no corresponding process for the rest of the Navy.
19. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson,
following the Fitzgerald and McCain incidents:
A. Who is the waiver approval authority for a ship that has expired
training certifications for 7th Fleet? Who is the waiver approval
authority for the rest of the Navy? If it is not the Secretarial or CNO
level, why not?
Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson. Following the Fitzgerald
and McCain incidents, COMPACFLT raised Risk Assessment and Mitigation
Plan (RAMP) approval authority for a 7th Fleet ship with expired
certifications to his level. This RAMP process is unique to 7th Fleet.
There is no corresponding process for the rest of the Navy.
B. What is the current status of training certifications for the
7th Fleet? What is the current status of training certifications for
our other forward deployed fleets and ships?
Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson. Currently, 7th Fleet has
four ships not undergoing maintenance availabilities and operational.
One ship is executing a focused training and certification schedule and
not available for operational tasking until she completes the required
certifications. The other three ships are in various stages of
completing their warfare certifications. One ship has been cleared and
certified for limited, single mission tasking while the others have
completed a majority of their certifications and are in the final
stages of completing the remainder. COMPACFLT has not approved any
certification waivers under the new readiness generation model, and
ships will only be assigned missions in areas in which they are
certified to operate.
C. What is the current status of training certifications for CONUS
based ships?
Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson. Ships from CONUS are
certified in all warfare areas prior to deployment to the standards
delineated in COMNAVSURFPAC/COMNAVSURFLANT readiness policy (e.g.,
Surface Force Readiness Manual (SFRM) and Surface Force Exercise Manual
(SFEM)). Certifications do not expire during deployment for operations
and remain valid until the next maintenance period.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie Hirono
assessment of current readiness
20. Senator Hirono. Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson.
Increases in operational tempo coupled with the limited number of ships
and sailors likely lead to more deployments of longer duration which
can result in decreased maintenance periods and reduced training time
available for crews. Although the investigations have not been
completed, it seems clear that these could be contributing factors for
the various incidents. What is your assessment of readiness for our
deployed naval forces? What are the trends in readiness since
sequestration with the additional impacts of CR's and what is needed to
remedy the situation?
Secretary Spencer. What is your assessment of readiness for our
deployed naval forces? All rotational naval forces deploy manned,
trained, and equipped to effectively execute assigned tasking within
required mission areas. Over the course of a deployment, assigned
tasking specific to an area of responsibility (AOR) may be limited to a
few mission areas, resulting in reduced opportunities to train and
maintain proficiency within all other mission areas. Forward deployed
naval forces (FDNF) may execute multiple deployments that focus on
tasking within specific mission areas at the expense of extensive
training in all mission areas. What are the trends in readiness since
sequestration with the additional impacts of CR's and what is needed to
remedy the situation? The impact of successive CRs on Navy readiness
has been evident since 2009 in the form of degraded performance in our
ship and aircraft depot maintenance facilities, deferred or truncated
ship maintenance and modernization, underinvestment in both ship and
aviation spare parts, underinvestment in training ranges as well as
ordnance and manning shortfalls. Sequestration in 2013 exacerbated
these readiness trends. While, in most years the Navy has received end
of year funding to close urgent gaps created by the annual CRs, the
unstable and unpredictable nature of this funding had a negative effect
on numerous readiness enablers, directly resulting in truncated
training periods to accommodate maintenance delays. These truncated
training periods disrupted the professional development and quality of
life of our sailors. Additionally, reduced training time and the
absence of sufficient training ordnance significantly reduced
opportunities for additional warfighting proficiency in training to the
high end fight. What is needed to remedy the situation? Stable,
predictable funding of the Navy readiness requirements as identified in
the Navy's annual budget request.
Admiral Richardson. There is no certification waiver process for
the Naval Surface Force, nor for ships in Seventh Fleet. Certifications
are either current or expired. Unique to Forward Deployed Naval Forces
(FDNF), expired certifications were managed through a Risk Assessment
and Mitigation Plan (RAMP) process that was approved by either the
ship's Immediate Superior in Command (ISIC) or Commander, Naval Surface
Forces Pacific (CNSP). RAMPs did not grant certification waivers, but
documented a timeline to achieve certification status at a later date.
Following the collisions of Fitzgerald and McCain, all RAMPS were
cancelled and RAMP approval was elevated to the level of Commander,
U.S. Pacific Fleet. Additionally, ADM Swift directed the conduct of
Readiness-for-Sea assessments to review the training and material
status of each ship to conduct underway operations. It is important to
note that in the OFRP force generation model every ship will have
expired certifications that are in the process of being reset as they
progress from the Maintenance Phase through the Advanced Phase.
Certifications are completed before deployment. As a hard and fast
policy, Operational Commanders do not deploy ships with expired
Certifications.
Warfare Certifications are reported to both the numbered fleet
commanders (either Commander, Seventh Fleet or Commander, Third Fleet)
and to Type Commanders.
swo training
21. Senator Hirono. Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson. How
has the training provided to Surface Warfare Officers (SWO's been
modified over the past couple of decades? Do they have more time
learning the basics, less? How has the amount of actual ship driving
training time changed over the years? Are there changes to this type of
training for SWO's in process or planned for the future independent of
the recently started reviews?
Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson. How has the training
provided to Surface Warfare Officers (SWOs) been modified over the past
couple of decades? Before 2003, Division Officers received 16 weeks of
instructor-led classroom instruction before reporting to their assigned
ship. From 2003 to 2008, classroom instruction ceased with Division
Officers completing Computer Based Training (CBT) modules after
reporting to their ship. Both training models leveraged ship Personnel
Qualification Standards (PQS) and on-the-job (OJT) training to qualify
underway Junior Officers of the Deck (JOOD) and Officers of the Deck
(OOD) as well as learn Division Officer duties. In 2008, Navy restored
3 weeks of classroom instruction for officers prior to reporting to
their first ship. Training was increased again in 2012 and 2014 to what
is now a 9-week Basic Division Officer Course (BDOC) for all
prospective Division Officers. In 2014 an Advanced Division Officer
Course (ADOC) (now 5 weeks) was established. Combined, this BDOC and
ADOC 14-week training track makes substantial use of high-fidelity
simulators, hands-on navigation labs, and instructor-led learning that
exceeds training provided to past officers but still relies on ship PQS
and OJT to train and qualify officers to stand underway JOOD and OOD
watches and learn Division Officer duties. The results of Comprehensive
Review (CR) will change SWO training. In addition to the above
training, Navy is working to implement CR recommendations.
Recommendations that affect SWO training include: evaluating the SWO
career path from accession to major command including the scope and
timing of formal training; improving seamanship, navigation and
Operational Risk Management (ORM) individual skills training; upgrading
current simulators to improve seamanship and navigation team training
and certifications to include assessments in high shipping density,
emergency and in extremis environments; providing additional
fundamentals training for officers who qualified SWO without initial
classroom training; and creating an objective, standardized assessment
program to periodically assess individual seamanship and navigation
skills over the course of a Surface Warfare Officer's career. Do they
have more time learning the basics, less? Today, there is less time
learning the basics (currently 14-weeks instead of 16-weeks prior to
2003). However, prior investments in simulators and other technologies
enable faster learning. Implementation of the the CR recommendations
will increase the length of training and will include additional
investments in simulators and underway assessments enabling officers to
learn the basics, develop the requisite Mariner skills to safely and
effectively handle their ships and demonstrate the ability to do so in
challenging and emergent circumstances. How has the amount of actual
ship driving training time changed over the years? Division Officer
tour lengths were increased in 1995, affording those officers more ship
driving opportunities. There is a general consensus, however, that ship
driving opportunities have decreased due to a declining number of
ships, less dedicated at-sea training time, and a larger pool of
officers competing for time on the bridge. The CR made several
recommendations associated with officer training, qualifications, tour
lengths, the tracking of watch standing proficiency and the means of
continually assessing that proficiency throughout an officer's career.
Example recommendations related to more driving time include:
establishing a single, longer division officer tour as the standard,
with allowances for specific billet requirements and emphasis in the
first division officer tour on building proficiency, especially in
seamanship and navigation; establishing policy to define, maintain, and
re-establish SWO JOOD and OOD currency; and evaluating the use of Yard
Patrol craft in all officer accession programs. Implementation of the
CR recommendations will result in a measurable improvement in the
quality of ship driving time. When combined with training and
documented and demonstrated proficiency at key milestones, these
recommendations will improve the mariner skills of all SWOs. Are there
changes to this type of training for SWOs in process or planned for the
future independent of the recently started reviews? Yes, Navy was
already planning for future training improvements independent of the
Comprehensive Review (CR). Examples include: (1) providing Radar
Navigation Team Training along with continued updates to shiphandling
models and harbors, (2) expanding Voyage Management System training,
(3) increasing celestial navigation and visual communications
proficiency, and (4) providing additional heavy weather mooring and
anchoring training. Now that the CR has been completed, all in-process
training and future training revisions will be reassessed in accordance
with its recommendations. While some of the CR recommendations can be
made immediately, others will take time as they are dependent on
significant simulator and facilities upgrades and additional
instructors and assessors at the schoolhouse, waterfront and at-sea,
all of which are being or will be implemented.
national defense in pacom aor
22. Senator Hirono. Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson. The
PACOM AOR has four of the five major threats to national security and
North Korea continues to challenge international security through
continued missile defense. With two Aegis ships involved in recent
mishaps, is the Navy adequately postured to support the missile defense
missions in the region? How will you fill the void especially with
recent North Korean actions? What impact does this have on our
relationship with allies in the region? Have you sensed concern on
their part?
Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson. The U.S. Navy is
inherently flexible and has several options to cover missions after the
temporary loss of an operational asset. Seventh Fleet continues to meet
current mission tasking in the Indo-Asia Pacific area of operations. If
the work load were to exceed 7th Fleet capacity alone, 3rd Fleet ships
that transit through or deploy to the 7th Fleet Area of Operations can
provide support. If necessary, the potential always exists that U.S.
Navy assets could be redeployed to the region from other parts of the
globe. As an example, this month, the guided-missile cruiser USS
Monterey (CG 61), which was in a surge status, was tasked to deploy
from Norfolk Naval Station to the U.S. 5th Fleet and U.S. 6th Fleet
areas of operations. This will enable the USS O'Kane (DDG 77),
previously scheduled for CENTCOM deployment, to serve in the U.S. 7th
Fleet area of operation.
Our routine presence reassures allies and enhances security and
stability for all regional countries.
decisions on training
23. Senator Hirono. Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson. GAO
report (17-798T) revealed that there were no dedicated training periods
built into the operational schedules of the cruisers and destroyers
based in Japan and that the Navy used a ``train on the margins''
approach meaning crews trained while underway or in the limited time
between underway periods; however, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff testified before this committee that ``the United States military
will not compromise training or equipping of any troops going into
harm's way.'' Whose decision was it to not include training into
operational schedules? Was there an operational risk management
evaluation done on reducing and essentially eliminating training for
core competencies? If so, how was it determined that the Navy should
accept this level of risk or at least mitigate it?
Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson. The previous Forward
Deployed Naval Forces (FDNF) model was biased towards operations and,
due to FDNF ships' operational tempo (OPTEMPO) and continuous tasking
in support of national objectives, did not include periodic dedicated
training windows. Training was accomplished in stride with operational
tasking on a 24 month cycle. Following the McCain and Fitzgerald
incidents, COMPACFLT established the Naval Surface Group Western
Pacific (NSGWP) who will report directly to him in the near term,
responsible for overseeing the training and certification of FDNF-J
ships. This new organization is implementing a new FDNF force
generation model with a dedicated training and certification period
following maintenance availabilities, and will certify ships ``ready
for tasking'' before they are deployed by operational commanders. NSGWP
will provide a clear separation between force generation (training and
maintenance) and force employment (operations). Although there may be
three different periodicities / cycle length (e.g., CONUS 36 month,
Japan 24 months, and Rota 32 months,) for training, every unit adheres
to the same training and certification standards that are delineated in
COMNAVSURFPAC/ COMNAVSURFLANT readiness policy (e.g., Surface Force
Readiness Manual (SFRM) and Surface Force Exercise Manual (SFEM)). FDNF
ships not certified in specific mission areas are not tasked in that
area. PACFLT has not approved any waivers under the new readiness
generation model. Ships will only be assigned missions in areas in
which they are certified to operate.
108 hour work week
24. Senator Hirono. Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson. GAO
report (17-798T) states that sailors were sometimes on duty for 108
hours during a one week period, exceeding their weekly on-duty
allocation of 81 hours. This on-duty time included 90 hours of
productive work. If the sailors worked for 7 days a week this would
mean that each sailor was working over 15 hours a day every day of the
week. How does something like this occur over an extended period of
time? Before any study is complete, what is the Navy doing to ensure
that this does not occur on a regular basis?
Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson. We are taking a hard look
as to how to empower our Commanding Officers to better-manage the
workday of the crew within a repeatable, sustainable, and predictable
framework. The Naval Surface Forces staff has already reviewed
instructions to determine what can be removed or minimized to reduce
administrative burdens on the fleet. Additionally, Commander, Naval
Surface Forces, Vice Adm. Rowden, has mandated the implementation of
circadian rhythm shipboard watch rotations and daily routines by
December 20, 2017. Circadian rhythm cycles provide our sailors with a
predictable watch rotation and protected sleep periods that recognize
the human circadian rhythm. It should be emphasized that the
utilization of both circadian rhythm watch bills and complimentary
shipboard routines are required to successfully manage fatigue. Many
ships in the Fleet are already on a circadian rhythm cycle that allows
for more rest between watches and enables a predictable and repeatable
work/watch cycle.
pressures on the service
25. Senator Hirono. Admiral Richardson, in your testimony you
identified that three pressures impact the Navy's readiness; those
include: budget pressures, operational pressures, and schedule
pressures. You additionally testified that the Navy has control over
operational pressures and schedule pressures. How can you use the
control that you have over operational pressures and schedule pressures
to make improvements to readiness?
Admiral Richardson. The Optimized Fleet Response Plan (OFRP) is the
Navy's primary tool to manage operational and schedule pressures for
Continental United States (CONUS) and Hawaii-based ships. OFRP provides
certain entitlements for depot maintenance, training, and certification
in every cycle. To reassess these entitlements and identify areas for
improvement, we are conducting comprehensive ``Ready for Sea''
assessments to determine the material and operational readiness for all
Japan-based ships. We are developing a force generation model for ships
based in Japan that addresses the increasing operational requirements,
preserves sufficient maintenance and training time, and improves
certification accomplishment. We have permanently established Naval
Surface Group Western Pacific as an administrative headquarters
responsible for maintaining, training, and certifying Japan-based
ships, focusing on these responsibilities for operational commanders.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
inspections and certification
26. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Richardson, in January 2015, the GAO
found that 7 percent of the warfare readiness certifications for
cruiser and destroyer crews homeported in Japan had expired. Fast-
forward to today, that number has jumped to 37 percent. Is the reason
for that spike in expired certifications a failure to pass actual
inspections OR is it because the Navy is simply not conducting
inspections as often as it should?
Admiral Richardson. The previous Forward Deployed Naval Forces
(FDNF) model was biased towards operations and, due to FDNF ships'
operational tempo (OPTEMPO) and continuous tasking in support of
national objectives, did not include periodic dedicated training
windows in which certifications could be completed. Training was
accomplished in stride with operational tasking on a 24 month cycle.
For each expired certification, risk was managed through development of
a Risk Assessment and Mitigation Plan (RAMP) that was approved by
either the ship's Immediate Superior in Command (ISIC) or Commander,
Naval Surface Forces Pacific (CNSP). Because of OPTEMPO the process did
not appropriately mitigate and balance the risk created by the high
pace of operations (force employment) with force generation periodic
training and certification requirements in the case of the Forward
Deployed Naval Forces in Japan (FDNF-J). To correct this imbalance,
Commander U.S. Pacific Fleet cancelled all RAMPS, elevated RAMP
approval from the ISIC/CNSP to his level, and directed the conduct of
comprehensive readiness-for-sea assessments for every FDNF-J ship. ADM
Swift has taken immediate corrective action which informed both the
follow-on comprehensive and strategic.
27. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Richardson, if the answer is the
latter, what specifically is preventing these inspections from
occurring?
Admiral Richardson. The previous Forward Deployed Naval Forces
(FDNF) model was biased towards operations and, due to FDNF ships'
operational tempo (OPTEMPO) and continuous tasking in support of
national objectives, did not include periodic dedicated training
windows. Training was accomplished in stride with operational tasking
on a 24 month cycle. Following the McCain and Fitzgerald incidents,
COMPACFLT established the Naval Surface Group Western Pacific (NSGWP)
who will report directly to him in the near term, responsible for
overseeing the training and certification of FDNF-J ships. This new
organization is implementing a new FDNF force generation model with a
dedicated training and certification period following maintenance
availabilities, and will certify ships ``ready for tasking'' before
they are deployed by operational commanders.
28. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Richardson, since January 2015, how
many certification waivers were issued for cruiser and destroyer crews
homeported in Japan?
Admiral Richardson. There is no certification waiver process for
the Naval Surface Force, including for ships in Seventh Fleet.
Certifications are either current or expired. Unique to Forward
Deployed Naval Forces (FDNF), expired certifications were managed
through a Risk Assessment and Mitigation Plan (RAMP) process that was
approved by either the ship's Immediate Superior in Command (ISIC) or
Commander, Naval Surface Forces Pacific (CNSP). RAMPs did not grant
certification waivers, but documented a timeline to achieve
certification status at a later date. Since January 2015, 45 RAMPs were
approved for cruisers and destroyers homeported in Japan.
29. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Richardson, has the Navy determined
the certification and waiver percentages for ships operating in COCOMS
outside of PACOM, and if so, what are those percentages?
Admiral Richardson. Certifications are never waived. Rather, if a
certification is anticipated to expire, the ship is required to submit
a ``Risk Assessment and Mitigation Plan'' (RAMP) to document this
expiration, propose mitigating actions, and submit a plan for future
certification. RAMP plans are approved by the Operational Commander.
Below is a summary of all non-Forward Deployed Naval Forces (FDNF)
certifications as of October 2017:
Atlantic:
a. Overall number of ships: 47 ships
b. Certificates expired: 199 mission areas expired
101--Expired Due to Maintenance Phase
88--Basic Phase
10--Advanced/Integrated Phases
0--Sustainment/Deployment Phases
c. Percent Expired: 21.5 percent expired
Pacific:
a. Overall number of ships: 49 ships (excluding LCS)
b. Certificates expired: 330 mission areas expired
258--Expired Due to Maintenance Phase
47--Basic Phase
24--Advanced/Integrated Phases
1--Sustainment/Deployment Phases
c. Percent expired: 31.3 percent expired
There is a critical point on this data that must be well understood
before going forward. Without additional context, the percentage of
expired certifications is misleading. All CONUS and Hawaii-based ships
have their Certifications expire--by design--upon entering the
Maintenance Phase. This deliberate reset of Certifications is to ensure
a constant reevaluation of training per 36-month cycle--otherwise known
as the Optimized Fleet Response Plan (OFRP). So while the numbers above
are technically correct, the contextualized answer is stated below:
Only one deployed ship from CONUS and Hawaii has an expired
Certification; that is 1 Cert out of 2112 (96 ships times 22 Certs) As
a hard and fast policy, Operational Commanders do not deploy ships with
expired Certifications. All of the expired Certifications listed above
on ships in the Advance/Integrated Phase still have time to complete
this training, and we track each individual ship and their road to
Certifications at the Flag Officer level. All of the Expired due to
Maintenance Phase numbers listed above are a direct result of the
resetting of Certifications when the ships are in the Maintenance
Phase.
108 hour work week
30. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson, the
Navy's finding that some sailors are on-duty as many as 108 hours a
week is deeply concerning. If you do the math, that amount of work
leaves barely enough hours to rest and recover, let alone sleep.
Without a reasonable amount of rest and recovery time, performance and
concentration can suffer, thus increasing the chances for a mistake. In
light of the recent mishaps, do you believe the Navy's manpower
requirements are still current, analytically based, and are meeting the
needs of the existing and future surface fleet?
Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson. In 2014, Navy Personnel,
Research, Science and Technology (NPRST), a former element of the
Bureau of Naval Personnel, conducted an analysis of the Navy Standard
Workweek, the planning factor used to convert work hours into manpower
requirements during the Fleet Manpower Requirements Determination
process. The preliminary data in the study was rejected due to lack of
analytic rigor and small sample size. In May 2017, to ensure the
analytical accuracy of Manpower Requirements Determination planning
factors, my deputy for manpower, personnel, training and education,
requested an independent analysis of the Navy Availability Factor to be
conducted this fiscal year. The study will determine if the current
components of the Navy Availability Factor remain appropriately defined
to reflect the categories of time associated with the afloat-workweek.
The Comprehensive Review of Recent Surface Force Incidents highlighted
that a recent analysis of the Navy Standard Workweek identified the
fact that typical on-duty hours exceeded the planning threshold factor.
If the current components are not appropriately defined, the study will
recommend revised time allowances to ensure our manpower model reflects
the most current factors, and to improve the quality of manpower
requirements for the current and future surface fleet. The
Comprehensive Review also noted that we recently completed a related
study on inport workload on DDG-51 class ships, which targeted 12
guided missile destroyers (DDGs) across five stateside homeports. The
study captured current inport work and revealed that, overall, inport
workload is less than at-sea for most ratings, although 10 ratings do
have more work inport than while at sea. We are working to incorporate
these inport requirements into updated afloat Ship Manpower Documents.
We are also expanding our analysis to evaluate our Forward Deployed
Naval Forces ships, those homeported overseas, and refining the inport
model for use in future studies. It is ultimately each commander's
responsibility to ensure their crew is well-trained and rested. Many
variables, including emergent schedule changes, equipment malfunctions,
and real-world events, impact the number of hours sailors work and
rest. We must, at every level of decision-making, be cognizant of the
potential risks associated with executing a workweek that exceeds
standard workweek parameters and reasonable expectations of what we
should require of our sailors.
31. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson, if
not, what will you change from a manpower requirements standpoint in
order to meet the needs of the existing and future surface fleet, and
what resources and/or authorities do you need from congress?
Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson. In 2014, Navy Personnel,
Research, Science and Technology (NPRST), a former element of the
Bureau of Naval Personnel, conducted an analysis of the Navy Standard
Workweek, the planning factor used to convert work hours into manpower
requirements during Fleet Manpower Requirements Determination. The
preliminary data in the study was rejected due to lack of analytic
rigor and small sample size. In May 2017, to ensure the analytical
accuracy of Manpower Requirements Determination planning factors, my
deputy for manpower, personnel, training and education, requested an
independent analysis of the Navy Availability Factor to be conducted
this fiscal year. The study will determine if the current components of
the Navy Availability Factor remain appropriately defined to reflect
the categories of time associated with the afloat-workweek. As
reflected in the Comprehensive Review of Recent Surface Force Incidents
a recent analysis of the Navy Standard Workweek identified the fact
that typical on-duty hours exceeded the planning threshold factor. If
the current components are not appropriately defined, the study will
recommend revised time allowances to ensure our manpower model reflects
the most current factors, and to improve the quality of manpower
requirements for the current and future surface fleet. The
Comprehensive Review also noted that we recently completed a related
study on inport workload on DDG-51 class ships, which targeted 12
guided missile destroyers (DDGs) across five stateside homeports. The
study captured current inport work and revealed that, overall, inport
workload is less than at-sea for most ratings, although 10 ratings do
have more work inport than while at sea. We are working to incorporate
these inport requirements into updated afloat Ship Manpower Documents.
We are also expanding our analysis to evaluate our Forward Deployed
Naval Forces ships, those homeported overseas, and refining the inport
model for use in future studies. Based on the results of our reviews,
we will assess the sufficiency of current resources, and will request
assistance from Congress if additional resources or new authorities are
needed.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
workweek standards
32. Senator Warren. Admiral Richardson, GAO has reported that the
Navy uses a workweek standard that ``does not reflect the actual time
sailors spend working,'' including their responsibilities while in
port. In fact, the Navy's own study in 2014 found that sailors were on
duty 108 hours a week, reducing the time available for rest. The Navy
study found that could encourage a ``poor safety culture.'' Do you
agree with the conclusions of the Navy's study?
Admiral Richardson. In 2014, Navy Personnel, Research, Science and
Technology (NPRST) conducted an analysis of the Navy Standard Workweek
that provided preliminary findings that some sailors reported they were
working over 100 hours a week. Due to the lack of analytic rigor, small
sample size, and incomplete nature of the study Navy deferred any
policy decision. In May 2017, Navy initiated a request for a more
rigorous and fully independent study of the Navy's workweek policy. The
Comprehensive Review of Recent Surface Force Incidents highlighted that
a recent analysis of the Navy Standard Workweek identified the fact
that typical on-duty hours exceeded the planning threshold factor. If
the current components are not appropriately defined, the study will
recommend revised time allowances to ensure our manpower model reflects
the most current factors, and to improve the quality of manpower
requirements for the current and future surface fleet. The
Comprehensive Review also noted that we recently completed a study of
inport workload on DDG-51 class ships, which targeted 12 guided missile
destroyers (DDGs) across five stateside homeports. We are working to
incorporate these inport requirements into updated afloat Ship Manpower
Documents. We are also expanding our analysis to evaluate our Forward
Deployed Naval Forces ships, those homeported overseas, and refining
the inport model for use in future studies. It is ultimately each
commander's responsibility to ensure their crew is well trained and
rested. Many variables including emergent schedule changes, equipment
malfunctions, and real-world events impact the number of hours sailors
work and rest. We must, at every level of decision making, be cognizant
of the potential risks associated with executing a workweek that
exceeds standard workweek parameters and reasonable expectations of
what we should require of our sailors.
33. Senator Warren. Admiral Richardson, what changes or process
improvements has the Navy made to address this issue and limit the
hours worked by sailors while deployed or in port?
Admiral Richardson. The array of changes and improvements necessary
will be informed by the Comprehensive Readiness Review and Secretary of
the Navy Strategic Review. Among the changes and process improvements
that will ultimately be put in place, we identified the need for a
comprehensive fatigue and endurance management policy, and to implement
fatigue recovery standards and codifying a circadian ship and watch
rotation routine for surface ships. In May 2017, to ensure the
analytical accuracy of Manpower Requirements Determination planning
factors, my deputy for manpower, personnel, training and education,
requested an independent analysis of the Navy Availability Factor to be
conducted this fiscal year. The study will determine if the current
components of the Navy Availability Factor remain appropriately defined
to reflect the categories of time associated with the afloat-workweek.
The Comprehensive Review of Recent Surface Force Incidents highlights
that a recent analysis of the Navy Standard Workweek identified the
fact that typical on-duty hours exceeded the planning threshold factor.
If the current components are not appropriately defined, the study will
recommend revised time allowances to ensure our manpower model reflects
the most current factors, and to improve the quality of manpower
requirements for the current and future surface fleet. The
Comprehensive Review also noted that we recently completed a related
study on inport workload on DDG-51 class ships, which targeted 12
guided missile destroyers (DDGs) across five stateside homeports. The
study captured current inport work and revealed that, overall, inport
workload is less than at-sea for most ratings, although 10 ratings do
have more work inport than while at sea. We are working to incorporate
these inport requirements into updated afloat Ship Manpower Documents.
We are also expanding our analysis to evaluate our Forward Deployed
Naval Forces ships, those homeported overseas, and refining the inport
model for use in future studies.
forward deployed naval forces readiness
34. Senator Warren. Admiral Richardson, Vice CNO Admiral Moran
recently testified to the House Armed Services Committee that he
wrongly assumed that ``our Forward Deployed Naval Force in Japan was
the most proficient, well-trained, most experienced force we had,
because they're operating all the time.'' Did you share this
assumption?
Admiral Richardson. It is natural to assume that there is a
correlation between time spent operating at sea and level of
proficiency. Sea time should equal proficiency, especially in basic
maritime skills such as seamanship and navigation. The recent incidents
in the Western Pacific were the result of a failure of leadership. The
commands failed to create a culture that prioritized training,
qualifications, and flawless execution of the basics of seamanship. At
the Fleet level, units were not given the required and necessary time
to do dedicated training. In an effort to immediately improve in this
area, Navy is establishing Naval Surface Group Western Pacific as an
administrative headquarters responsible for maintaining, training, and
certifying Japan-based ships, focusing on these responsibilities for
operational commanders.
35. Senator Warren. Admiral Richardson, do you think this
assumption was shared so widely by Navy leadership that it was baked
into official planning?
Admiral Richardson. It is the responsibility of the fleet commander
to ensure assigned forces are trained and ready to execute all
missions, across the full spectrum of operations, for which they are
designed. This stopped happening in Seventh Fleet.
training certifications
36. Senator Warren. Admiral Richardson, you noted in testimony that
there are a variety of certifications that Navy ships undergo. In
response to one of my questions, you testified that ``just about every
ship has some element of their certification expired.'' Please provide
for the record the list of certifications required for the four ships
involved in accidents in 2017, and of those, which were expired at the
time of the incident.
Admiral Richardson. The following certifications were required for
each of the four ships, with the exception of BMD for USS Lake
Champlain and USS Antietam. These two ships do not conduct the BMD
mission:
3M--Maintenance and Material Management
AT--Anti-Terrorism
COMMS--Communications
EXPSAF--Explosive Safety
FSO-M--Fleet Support Operations Medical
MOB-A--Mobility Aviation
MOB-D--Mobility Damage Control
MOB-E--Mobility Engineering
MOB-N--Mobility Navigation
MOB-S--Mobility Seamanship
SAR--Search and Rescue
SUPPLY--Supply
AW--Air Warfare
BMD--Ballistic Missile Defense
CRY--Cryptology
EW--Electronic Warfare
INT--Intelligence
SW--Surface Warfare
STW--Strike Warfare
VBSS--Visit, Board, Search and Seizure
CMTQ--Cruise Missile Tactical Qualification
NSFS--Naval Surface Fire Support
USW--Undersea Warfare The following certifications were
required for each of the four ships, with the exception of BMD for USS
Lake Champlain and USS Antietam. These two ships do not conduct the BMD
mission:
3M--Maintenance and Material Management
AT--Anti-Terrorism
COMMS--Communications
EXPSAF--Explosive Safety
FSO-M--Fleet Support Operations Medical
MOB-A--Mobility Aviation
MOB-D--Mobility Damage Control
MOB-E--Mobility Engineering
MOB-N--Mobility Navigation
MOB-S--Mobility Seamanship
SAR--Search and Rescue
SUPPLY--Supply
AW--Air Warfare
BMD--Ballistic Missile Defense
CRY--Cryptology
EW--Electronic Warfare
INT--Intelligence
SW--Surface Warfare
STW--Strike Warfare
VBSS--Visit, Board, Search and Seizure
CMTQ--Cruise Missile Tactical Qualification
NSFS--Naval Surface Fire Support
USW--Undersea Warfare The four ships involved in
accidents in 2017 exceeded re-certification periodicity in the
following mission areas at the time of their respective incidents. USS
Lake Champlain: CRY, EW, USW--All certification exercises
satisfactorily completed for above mission areas. Certifications were
held in a probationary status until manning deficiencies, due to the
required number of personnel having the requisite schools, were met.
USS Fitzgerald: At the time of the collision expired certifications
included: COMMS, MOB-A, MOB-E, MOB-S, SUPPLY, AW, BMD, CRY, EW, INTEL,
CMTQ, NSFS, SW, USW, VBSS. USS McCain: At the time of the collision
expired certifications included: 3M, AT, FSO-M, SAR, AW, CMTQ, NSFS,
SW, USW, VBSS. USS Antietam: At the time of the collision expired
certifications included: COMMS, MOB-A, MOB-D, MOB-E, MOB-S, SUPPLY, AW,
CRY, EW, INTEL, SW, USW, 3M, VBSS.
organizational culture
37. Senator Warren. Admiral Richardson, in response to a question
from Senator Reed about individual ship captains standing up and saying
``I can't move because my ship's not ready,'' you testified that you'd
``give that commander a handshake and a medal. That's exactly the type
of honesty and transparency that we need to run a navy that's safe and
effective.'' What actions does the Navy intend to take to begin
changing the organizational culture so that it promotes and encourages
officers to speak up when they see deficiencies in readiness?
Admiral Richardson. Going forward the Navy will develop and
formalize ``firebreaks'' into our force generation and employment
systems to guard against a slide in these standards. Our culture, from
the most junior sailor to the most senior Commander, must value
achieving and maintaining high operational and warfighting standards of
performance and these standards must be embedded in our equipment,
individuals, teams and fleets. Most significantly, these standards must
include and account for the human factors in individual and team
performance. Ongoing and immediate actions are focused on immediate
upgrades and training on navigation fundamentals, assessment of
operational demands and available resources and associated schedule
revisions, baseline readiness assessments of all Seventh Fleet cruisers
and destroyers, consolidation of authority and accountability for
readiness in lines of authority, implementation of circadian watch
rhythms and baseline assessment of all watch bills and baselining the
force generation model in the FDNF Japan.
organizational design and process
38. Senator Warren. Admiral Richardson, who holds unit commanders,
those homeported in the U.S. and overseas, accountable for readiness
deficiencies throughout the training and deployment cycle?
Admiral Richardson. CONUS-based ships operating under the Optimized
Fleet Response Plan report readiness via squadron commanders to the
Type Commander. Type Commanders (Commander Naval Surface Force Pacific,
Commander Naval Air Force Pacific, etc) execute the Man/Train/Equip
responsibilities under Title 10. For FDNF-J, USPACFLT has established
the Naval Surface Group Western Pacific (NSGWP) who will report
directly to Commander, USPACFLT in the near term. NSGWP is responsible
for overseeing the training and certification of FDNF-J ships. This new
organization will certify ships ``ready for tasking'' before they are
deployed by operational commanders. NSGWP will provide a clear
separation between force generation (training and maintenance) and
force employment (operations).
39. Senator Warren. Admiral Richardson, who is accountable within
the Navy for providing the resources to improve readiness when
deficiencies are identified?
Admiral Richardson. I am ultimately accountable for the safe and
effective operations of our Navy, and I am therefore responsible for
prioritizing readiness dollars. With the $2.8B in funding approved in
Fiscal Year 2017, we are plugging the most urgent readiness holes in
the fleet. Our Fiscal Year 2018 request sustains the readiness
progress, increases end strength, modernizes our current platforms, and
purchases future platforms and capabilities needed to sustain the
advantage over our adversaries. While we have prioritized our
maintenance and readiness dollars, the positive effects of increased
readiness funding will not remove this deficit overnight; it will take
time with stable resources to sustain the upward trend.
40. Senator Warren. Admiral Richardson, when a ship is behind its
planned readiness, what is the Navy's process to meet the Global Force
Management Allocation Plan and who are the decision making authorities
in that process?
Admiral Richardson. Ship readiness and progression through the
Optimized Fleet Response Plan (O-FRP) leading to Global Force
Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP) deployments are continually tracked
and monitored by Type Commanders (Basic Phase), Operational (Carrier
Strike Group/Amphibious Ready Group) Commanders (Integrated Phase) and
the Fleet Commanders (CUSFF and CPF). When a unit is behind in
projected readiness progression multiple options are reviewed, to
include providing additional training resources, equipment, funding or
manning to regain readiness profile. If a unit continues to lag behind
projected readiness and will not achieve deployment certification
standards on schedule, the Fleet Commander reviews options ranging from
delaying or cancelling of the GFMAP deployment, extension of on-station
ships until the unit in question can achieve appropriate readiness, or
assigning other ships to meet the GFMAP presence requirement. I approve
and forward the Fleet Commander's recommendation to the Joint Staff for
CJCS and SecDef approval via the Secretary of Defense Orders Book
(SDOB) process.
41. Senator Warren. Admiral Richardson, who is the ultimate
decision maker within the Navy when a ship should be delayed or non-
deployed and how is that decision communicated to the Joint Staff and
Combatant Commanders?
Admiral Richardson. We are taking a hard look as to how to empower
our Commanding Officers to better-manage the workday of the crew within
a repeatable, sustainable, and predictable framework. The Naval Surface
Forces staff has already reviewed instructions to determine what can be
removed or minimized to reduce administrative burdens on the fleet.
Additionally, Commander, Naval Surface Forces, Vice Adm. Rowden, has
mandated the implementation of circadian rhythm shipboard watch
rotations and daily routines by December 20, 2017. Circadian rhythm
cycles provide our sailors with a predictable watch rotation and
protected sleep periods that recognize the human circadian rhythm. It
should be emphasized that the utilization of both circadian rhythm
watch bills and complimentary shipboard routines are required to
successfully manage fatigue. Many ships in the Fleet are already on a
circadian rhythm cycle that allows for more rest between watches and
enables a predictable and repeatable work/watch cycle.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
modeling and simulation
42. Senator Nelson. Admiral Richardson, one possible contributor to
these incidents is training. Other services and other communities
within the Navy utilize high-fidelity simulators for training and
maintaining proficiency. This is one area where the Littoral Combat
Ship program excels. The integrated simulator allows for realistic
advanced training for the bridge and combat teams. The immersive
virtual environment allows high-fidelity training for specific watch
stations. While nothing can fully replace the weight of hands-on
operation, I believe these technologies can help provide better-trained
and more proficient sailors. Are you looking to leverage the simulators
and training models developed for the LCS program throughout the rest
of the fleet?
Admiral Richardson. Simulators are critical to our training
strategy. Beginning in 2003, and continuing through today, the Surface
Navy has invested in the use of simulation for shiphandling and
navigation skills at learning sites such as Surface Warfare Officer
School (SWOS) and in all Fleet Concentration Areas (FCA). Navy
stakeholders assess the capabilities of these simulators against new
requirements semi-annually. LCS-specific simulators and models have
been assessed but not leveraged for other ship training due to their
LCS-specific solutions not reflecting the characteristics of other
platforms. However, based on the results of the Comprehensive Review,
Navy is upgrading the Navigation Seamanship Shiphandling Trainers
(NSST) currently in all FCAs with integrated navigation systems, radar
and casualty control team training capability enabling Combat
Information Center (CIC) personnel to train with bridge watchstanders
on equipment that accurately emulates ship systems. This effort will
also be leveraged to improve simulators for individual training at SWOS
and other learning sites.
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