[Senate Hearing 115-715]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 115-715
SOUTHEAST EUROPE: STRENGTHENING
DEMOCRACY AND COUNTERING
MALIGN FOREIGN INFLUENCE
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND
REGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 14, 2017
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web:
http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
38-365 PDF WASHINGTON : 2019
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
BOB CORKER, Tennessee, Chairman
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
MARCO RUBIO, Florida ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
CORY GARDNER, Colorado TOM UDALL, New Mexico
TODD, YOUNG, Indiana CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming TIM KAINE, Virginia
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
RAND PAUL, Kentucky CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey
Todd Womack, Staff Director
Jessica Lewis, Democratic Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND REGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION
RON JOHNSON, Chairman, Wisconsin
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
RAND PAUL, Kentucky JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Johnson, Hon. Ron, U.S. Senator from Wisconsin................... 1
Murphy, Hon. Christopher, U.S. Senator from Connecticut.......... 2
Wilson, Damon, Executive Vice President, Atlantic Council,
Washington, DC................................................. 4
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Ruge, Dr. Majda, Fellow, Foreign Policy Institute; School of
Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University,
Washington, DC................................................. 9
Prepared statement........................................... 10
Bajrovic, Ivana Cvetkovic, Associate Director for Europe,
National Endowment for Democracy, Washington, DC............... 17
Prepared statement........................................... 19
Yee, Hoyt Brian, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European
and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC. 31
Prepared statement........................................... 33
(iii)
SOUTHEAST EUROPE: STRENGTHENING
DEMOCRACY AND COUNTERING
MALIGN FOREIGN INFLUENCE
----------
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 14, 2017
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Europe and
Regional Security Cooperation,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:00 p.m. in
Room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Ron Johnson,
chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Johnson [presiding], Murphy, and Shaheen.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RON JOHNSON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN
Senator Johnson. Good afternoon. This hearing titled
Southeast Europe: Promoting Democracy and Countering Malign
Foreign Influence'' of the Senate Foreign Relations
Subcommittee on Europe and Regional Security Cooperation is
called to order. Good afternoon and welcome.
The Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Europe and
Regional Security is meeting today to examine the threats, the
problems, and the progress being made in Southeast Europe. We
will hear from both the administration and outside experts on
U.S. interests and policy options in the region.
I was in Europe about 2 weeks ago where I had the
opportunity to meet with European leaders, including officials
from Romania, Croatia, Montenegro, Bosnia, and others. Their
message was consistent. U.S. leadership is needed in Southeast
Europe. When the U.S. withdraws, the power vacuum is filled by
countries with malign intent.
While in Europe, I had the pleasure of visiting Montenegro
to meet with their prime minister, defense minister, and others
to discuss their decision to join NATO and the issues facing
their country. It is a beautiful country with great potential.
Actually a little off script here, one of my suggestions to
their government was they really need a ministry of marketing.
Unbelievable potential that needs to be taken advantage of.
And yet, just last week, court proceedings began involving
an October 2016 attempt to overthrow Montenegro's pro-West
government and assassinate the prime minister. After extensive
investigation, Montenegro's special prosecutor brought an
indictment against the individuals believed responsible.
According to that indictment, a high-level official of the
Russian main intelligence directorate instigated the plot,
which was to be carried out by Serbian nationalists.
Thankfully, the coup was foiled, but this should serve as a
stark example of the seriousness of the Russian threat in the
region.
Last week on June 5th, Montenegro, undeterred, deposited
its instrument of accession to NATO officially to become the
29th member of the Alliance. This was an important milestone
for both Montenegro and NATO, and it sends a clear message that
NATO's doors remain open for those wishing to join and willing
to make the required reforms.
It is also an opportune moment for the U.S. to recommit
itself to the stability and prosperity of Southeast Europe. The
United States and our European allies played a crucial role in
crafting the post-Yugoslavia map. But U.S. engagement in the
region is not what it once was. In recent years, Europe has
taken the lead in the region promoting political and economic
reforms through the incentive of EU membership.
Unfortunately, successive crises have created fissures in
the European Project and led some EU members to balk at further
expansion. The resulting political vacuum in Southeast Europe
has led to some backsliding on institutional reforms and
created an opening for destructive foreign influence, namely
destabilizing Russia, disinformation, and propaganda, and
radical Islamists from the Middle East.
Ultimately U.S. policy in Southeast Europe must be shaped
by our vital national interests. The wars of the 20th century
made clear the importance of a peaceful and prosperous Europe
to U.S. security and economic prosperity. Those conflicts are
similarly clear about the perils of ignoring political and
ethnic tensions in the Balkans. We all want to see a Europe
free, whole, and at peace.
This hearing aims to refocus U.S. attention on this
important region, to examine our long-term aims, the means
required to achieve them, and the threats that could frustrate
them.
I would like to thank our witnesses for joining us today. I
look forward to the testimony.
And I would like to turn it over to my distinguished
ranking member, Senator Murphy, for his opening remarks.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHRIS MURPHY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Senator Johnson. I
want to thank you and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
for convening this hearing to consider current challenges in
Southeast Europe because, frankly, this is a region that
deserves much more of our attention from both sides of the
aisle.
I think of it in this way. I think three of the greatest
challenges that U.S. foreign policy faces come to a head inside
the Balkans. First, the challenge of covert and overt Russian
influence that undermines support for Western institutions and
further degrades democratic governance. Second, the persistent
scourge of corruption that is holding back economic progress
and destabilizing governments throughout the region. And third,
the rising radicalization of Muslim youth and a relatively
large number out of this region who have traveled to Syria to
fight with ISIS.
The good news, though, is that every single one of these
problems that confronts the region that will be the subject of
our hearing today is solvable if we just apply a bit more
effort and are willing to devote some new resources to the
region. As a recent example, a concerted U.S.-led effort to
address the foreign fighter issue has led to every country in
the region passing legislation to criminalize the participation
of their citizens in foreign wars.
But in the absence of clear U.S. and EU policies, internal
vulnerabilities are being exposed and external actors from
outside the region, namely Russia, are exerting influence to
destabilize the region. Russia's presence is increasingly felt,
and every single leader from the region that comes to talk to
us--this is what they want to talk about. They want to talk
about Russia's increased focus on the region.
This is happening at a time that the United States, quite
frankly, is simply not showing up in the way that we once were.
There is great concern in the region about the massive
withdrawal of the United States from the Balkans and from the
Western Balkans. Not having an assistant secretary for the
region makes our efforts in the region very difficult. We will
hear from Hoyt Yee on our second panel. He does great work, but
he cannot do it alone.
Democratic progress has stalled in many of these countries,
and their citizens, are still grappling with corruption, high
unemployment, and the lack of opportunity. There is now a real
fear that renewed nationalism and ethnic tension could throw
back parts of this region into crisis. And this is not
something that we should take for granted. Right? We have all
celebrated the relative degree of stability that has come to
that region since the time in which this Congress was obsessed
with conflict there. But there is a real danger of renewed
physical violence in the region between the coup attempt in
Montenegro, organized violence in the Macedonian parliament,
increased radicalization, as I mentioned, of ethnic Albanian
youth, and Dodik's national agenda in Republika Srpska. The
region is a potential tinderbox that could ignite over any
number of simmering conflicts. Understanding the domestic and
international drivers of these conflicts is crucial to
determining how they can be addressed.
So the United States should step up our engagement in the
region, and we should have a discussion today to understand how
we can better assist our many partners, our increasing allies,
now with the accession of Montenegro to NATO, with the
challenges that they face.
And I look forward to our first and second panel today
discussing all of these issues with you.
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Senator Murphy.
Our first witness is Mr. Damon Wilson. Mr. Wilson is
Executive Vice President of the Atlantic Council. I am not
reading my script.
Before I introduce our witnesses, I would like to note that
our panel order has flipped due to a scheduling conflict. This
is not a new precedent. You can expect administration panels to
be first in future hearings. We are grateful for the
administration Deputy Assistant Secretary Yee's flexibility
being able to testify later this afternoon.
Now I will introduce Mr. Damon Wilson. Mr. Wilson is
Executive Vice President of the Atlantic Council. He has served
as both Senior Director for European Affairs and Senior
Director for Central, Eastern, and Northern European Affairs on
the National Security Council, and was Deputy Director of the
private office of the NATO Secretary, assisting Lord George
Robertson. Mr. Wilson?
STATEMENT OF DAMON WILSON, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, ATLANTIC
COUNCIL, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Senator
Murphy. Thank you for this opportunity.
And I want to start by thanking you in particular your
leadership on Southeast Europe and particularly the Senate's
role in acting decisively to ratify the protocols of accession
welcoming Montenegro as our newest ally. That is some good
news.
The Western Balkans were supposed to be a problem solved.
Or at least a problem that the Americans could hand off to the
Europeans, so the saying went. But sadly, as you have laid out,
that is not the case.
Witness October 16th last year in Podgorica. On that
election day, Montenegro's authorities disrupted a plan by
Russian-backed Serbian nationalists to enter parliament dressed
as security officers and to open fire on opposition supporters.
The plan was to assassinate the prime minister and declare the
election invalid or orchestrate the Russian-financed opposition
taking power.
As you mentioned, Montenegro's independent special
prosecutor has now identified two Russian military intelligence
officers as masterminds. These two individuals fled Serbia 10
days after the failed coup attempt to return to Moscow just as
Nikolai Patrushev, former head of the Russian Federal Security
Service and current head of Russia's Security Council, arrived
in Belgrade.
Contrast that spy-like novel story with October 2001 in
Moscow when a then nervous President Trajkovski of Macedonia
visited Russia to inform President Putin that his nation would
pursue NATO membership in earnest. And Putin brushed it off,
replying, ``Macedonia is not Ukraine.''
Putin's ambivalence about a Balkan nation pursuing NATO
membership more than 15 years ago and the Kremlin's willingness
to back a coup attempt last October underscores how much the
geopolitical situation has changed.
As Washington turns its attention elsewhere, the EU
strategy has given way to bureaucratic process increasingly
detached from political vision. The consensus in the region
about its future has frayed. Short-term political costs of
reforms at home seem to outweigh the ambiguity of long-term
benefits, and we see that stagnation actually is giving way
potentially to backsliding. It is this lack of a North Star
that has opened a tempting new front for the Kremlin's efforts
to rewrite the rules of the post-Cold War era.
So my central message is that a little bit of effort in
this region pays great dividends. Alternatively, American
ambivalence today may engender a crisis tomorrow, which in turn
would demand a far greater degree of American engagement than
would have been required to avoid a crisis in the first place.
So, of course, there is no bright future in the region
without EU leadership. However, the United States retains a
special authority given its central role in ending the fighting
and stabilizing the region.
Moscow's objectives are simply to disrupt the region's
integration into NATO-EU. We have seen it finance a campaign to
turn public opinion against NATO in Montenegro, to destabilize
Bosnia's central government, to intervene cynically in
Macedonia's contested elections, nudging that country to the
brink of conflict, and to operating intelligence services in
Serbia without hinder bolstered by the presence of a
humanitarian base. Moscow seized a low-cost opportunity because
of a strategic vacuum.
For the United States, we have learned that regional
conflict in the area can lead to great power conflict. The left
unaddressed radicalization of Muslim populations can fuel a
foreign fighter population flow. The unmitigated population
flows through the region into EU states can pose a challenge to
our security for countries that have a visa waiver program on
their borders. And the instability in Southeast Europe risks
depriving the United States of a strategic partner in the EU.
So, therefore, it is a time for us to engage with a bit
more of coherent strategy, first, by establishing a sense of
clarity in our common goal that results of reform at home mean
that all Balkan states can be a part of a secure, prosperous
transatlantic community, clarity of vision.
Second, to ensure that we make Montenegro's membership a
success, the short term.
And third, that we should think about committing an
enduring U.S. security presence in the region. A permanent
military presence as part of a NATO force in Kosovo could serve
as a deterrent force and guarantor in the region.
And fourth, we should consider the historic rapprochement
with Serbia as part of this process.
We also have an opportunity to foster reconciliation and
reform in Macedonia, lead efforts to resolve the name dispute
and pave its way, its entry into NATO.
But I think one of the most important things is that we
take a bet on the people of the region. Our objective is not
simply stability. We should avoid reinforcing cozy political
patronage networks often run by national forces. Working with
our EU partners, we should pursue a concerted effort to provide
opportunities for youth and entrepreneurs to thrive and use our
leverage to create public-private partnership opportunities
within these countries.
So our priority is to put an end to drift. A small show of
commitment now will shore up an order painstakingly put
together in response to the bloodletting of the 1990s. These
measures will help grow an independent constituency for a
democratic prosperous future across the region. Locals need to
be reassured that new ethnic hostilities are not around the
corner and that borders are not about to be redrawn under their
feet. And in the same vein, Russia must be made to understand
that there is no easy path for it to sow chaos in the region.
I believe now with your leadership the U.S. Senate has a
unique opportunity to help drive a renewed American strategy
towards the region, and we welcome the opportunity to support
those efforts.
[Mr. Wilson's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Damon M. Wilson
The Western Balkans were supposed to be a problem solved. Or at
least a problem the Americans could hand off to the Europeans to finish
the job of completing Europe. Sadly, that is not the case.
We can celebrate the fact that since the Yugoslav succession wars
have ended, Slovenia and then Croatia earned both NATO and European
Union membership, and Albania and now Montenegro have joined them in
NATO. Recent developments however underscore the fragility of our
investments in the region nearly 22 years after the Dayton Peace
Accords, 18 years after the Kosovo air campaign, and 16 years after the
Ohrid Accords stabilized Macedonia ending the last violent conflict in
a bloodied region.
Over the past decade as Washington turned its attention elsewhere,
and European Union (EU) strategy gave way to a bureaucratic process
increasingly detached from political vision, the consensus in the
region about its future has frayed. To those in the region, EU
membership is a distant prospect, if viable and desirable at all. The
short-term costs of reforms at home, including risking the forfeiture
of patronage networks, outweigh the ambiguity of long-term benefits.
Stagnation is giving way to backsliding.
This dynamic is exacerbated by the uncertainties at the heart of
Europe and the transatlantic relationship itself. When there is trouble
in our core transatlantic community, its periphery is vulnerable to
centrifugal forces.
This lack of a North Star has opened a tempting new front for the
Kremlin's efforts to rewrite the rules of the post-Cold War era.
Witness October 16, 2016 in Podgorica. On that election day,
Montenegro's authorities disrupted a plan by Russian-backed Serbian
nationalists to enter parliament dressed as Montenegrin security
officers and then open fire on opposition supporters who they had
orchestrated would gather outside parliament. The plan was to
assassinate the Prime Minster, and declare the election invalid or
orchestrate the Russian-financed opposition taking power.
This is not a plot line from a fictional spy novel. Montenegro's
independent special prosecutor Milivoje Katnic has identified two
Russian military intelligence officers, Eduard Sismakov and Vladimir
Popov, as masterminds. These two individuals fled Serbia ten days after
the failed coup attempt to return to Moscow just as Nikolai Patrushev,
former head of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) and current
head of Russia's Security Council, arrived in Belgrade.
This story, which Western authorities and open source information
validate, illustrates the brazenness with which Russia is willing to
operate in a region it once considered no longer core to its strategic
interests.
Contrast this with October 2001 in Moscow. Then-President Boris
Trajkovski of Macedonia was visiting Russia with the aim of informing
President Putin that, having achieved peace in Macedonia, the nation
would now pursue in earnest membership in NATO and the EU. According to
Macedonians present, this was President Trajkovski's principal message,
making him nervous about the encounter. But Putin replied, ``Macedonia
is not Ukraine,'' making it clear that Macedonia's pursuit of NATO
membership did not concern him.
The contrast between Putin's ambivalence about a Balkan nation
pursuing NATO membership more than 15 years ago and the Kremlin's
willingness to back a coup attempt last October to derail Montenegro's
path to NATO underscores how much the geopolitical situation has
changed.
No doubt today the European Union is the major player in the
region, committing far more resources, tools, human capital, and
political attention to the region. For this, Americans should be
grateful. There will be no bright future for Southeast Europe without
EU leadership. However, the United States retains a special authority
given how central its moral voice and hard power were to ending the
fighting and stabilizing the region.
My central message is that continued American ambivalence today may
engender a crisis tomorrow, which in turn would demand a far greater
degree of American engagement than would be required to avoid any
crisis in the first place.
Don't get me wrong; professional American diplomats continue to
play a central role in resolving regional problems. In fact, Deputy
Assistant Secretary (DAS) of State Hoyt Yee who will testify today,
along with our ambassadors on the ground, have been central to recent
political breakthroughs in Kosovo, Albania, and Macedonia. Montenegro
would not have entered NATO this month without the unrelenting efforts
of Ambassadors and DAS-level officials over the past few years.
But that is not enough.
We need to give our frontline diplomats a bit of backup, given
Russian mischief-making can easily exacerbate Balkan vulnerabilities
and escalate into full-blown wild fires. After all, Moscow is not
aiming to build anything in the region. Rather Moscow's objectives only
require that it disrupt the region's integration into NATO and the EU.
This environment has fostered a sense of backsliding. And yet in
the most Russia-friendly populations support for Europe remains strong.
Even as the EU's fortunes have declined, Serbs opt 48 percent to 35
percent in favor of Serbia joining the EU. In past years, the margin of
support for EU membership has been as large as 40 points in favor.
Similarly, the economic center of gravity for the region is clearly
the EU. In Serbia, which has the largest proportion of trade with
Russia, only 9.6 percent of its imports are from Russia compared to
62.5 percent from the EU. Serbia exports only 5.4 percent of exports to
Russia compared to 65.8 percent to EU. These figures are even more
lopsided in favor of the EU in the cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Macedonia, and Montenegro, according to figures from the European
Commission and UNCTAD.
Yet Russia maintains strategic leverage through concerted
disinformation and influence campaigns, and its ability to play the
energy card. Bosnia and Macedonia consume 100 percent of their gas from
Russian sources; the figure is 80 percent in Serbia, according to the
International Energy Agency.
Indeed, Russia has used its leverage to advance its interests in
the region. Russia has financed a campaign to turn public opinion
against NATO in Montenegro, and Russian resources helped turn a fringe
anti-NATO, pro-Moscow party into the leading opposition party. Russia
has financed Milorad Dodik giving him the means to destabilize Bosnia's
central government and advance the independence of Republika Srpska. In
Macedonia, Russia cynically came to the defense of former Prime
Minister Nikola Gruevski in the wake of a massive wiretap scandal and
contested elections, nudging the ethnically divided nation to the brink
of conflict.
Russian intelligence services have been operating without restraint
in Serbia, going so far as to plan the attempted coup in Montenegro
last fall from Serbian territory and without the knowledge of Serbia's
elected officials. Russia's influence is bolstered by the presence of a
``humanitarian center'' rapid response base in southern Serbia, poised
to threaten Kosovo and Macedonia. Even overwhelmingly pro-American
Kosovo has been subjected to an onslaught of fake news and inflammatory
antics aimed at stirring tensions between Albanians and ethnic Serbs in
Kosovo's north.
Russia has gone on offense as it sensed that the United States was
all but withdrawing from the field. Moscow saw a low-cost opportunity
because of this strategic vacuum. But before considering how to counter
these disruptive and dangerous tactics, it is critical to understand
why it is in U.S. interests to care in the first place.
Even the casual observer of European history understands that the
continent's great power conflicts started with smaller conflicts,
frequently in the Balkans, which metastasized, drawing in outside
powers. Russia is stoking the flames of this historic pattern.
The dog that has not barked is the radicalization of the Muslim
populations of the region. Yet it could become a serious security
threat. These populations remain deeply pro-American, but over time,
U.S. disengagement and lack of opportunities at home could accelerate
radicalization and grow the foreign fighters pipeline, sending
disenchanted recruits into the civil wars of the Middle East with the
potential to return home as security liabilities.
The Balkans have also been one of the leading routes for migrants
and refugees to leave North Africa and the Middle East and enter
Europe. The massive refugee flows have strained local security capacity
and social services. Unmitigated population flows into European Union
states which participate in the Visa Waiver Program pose threats to
U.S. security. We therefore have a strong interest in helping these
nations secure their borders, and properly regulate refugee and
migration flows.
Finally, the Western Balkans remain the unfinished business of a
Europe whole and free. This concept has been at the heart of U.S.
strategy toward Europe, precisely because a whole, free Europe removes
the continent as a conceivable future battleground and maximizes the
likelihood that the United States will have the kind of capable,
coherent partner we need to address global challenges. Instability in
Europe's Southeast could deprive the United States of a strategic
partner on facing challenges further afield.
Therefore, the United States should first help re-establish a
clear, common vision for the region. Our message should be that as a
result of reforms at home, all Balkan states can ultimately be part of
a secure and prosperous transatlantic community. The United States
needs to join with the European Union to re-establish clarity in our
common goal at the political level.
Second, in the near-term, we must work to make Montenegro's NATO
membership a success. This means working closely with our newest ally
on a common security agenda, but also to help it accelerate domestic
reforms, bolster the rule of law, advance its EU negotiations, and help
foster a loyal opposition that takes its seats in parliament. With
presidential elections in 2018, the Russians will look to leverage
their success in creating the Democratic Front as an obstructionist
political force by promoting an antiNATO candidate for president.
Third, the United States should commit to an enduring U.S. security
presence in the region. Specifically, the United States should shift
away from a mentality of progressively decreasing its security
obligations to KFOR to help sustain peace in Kosovo to viewing our
security presence in Kosovo as a stabilizing force and guarantor for
the region. Much like the deployment of U.S. and other NATO forces in
Poland and other eastern flank allies serves as a deterrent to Russia,
a permanent U.S. military presence as part of a NATO force at Camp
Bondsteel in Kosovo could serve as a deterrent force in the Western
Balkans, a rapid reaction force as need, and provide a regional
capacity-building capability.
Fourth, any move to transform our security presence in the region
should be coupled if not preceded by an effort to pursue an historic
rapprochement with Serbia. Serbian politicians hedge between an
assertive, unappealing Russia and an ambivalent, but appealing West.
The legacy of the 1999 NATO air campaign shapes public perceptions. We
should both compete for Serbia and its people, as well as make clear
that hedging is a dangerous course. To do this, the United States would
need to develop and pursue a consistent effort in concert with key
European allies.
Fifth, the United States should assume a more prominent role in
fostering reconciliation and reform in Macedonia in the wake of the
most recent government formation, and in doing so become a leading
stakeholder in resolving the name dispute with Greece. Restoring
confidence in the central government, improving interethnic relations,
and creating an investment environment attractive to Western investors
would complement our efforts to restore the viability of Macedonia's
NATO membership and ensure the long-term security and prosperity of the
region.
Sixth, we need to take a bet on the people of the region,
particularly the next generation and an independent, entrepreneurial
class. We need to make it clear that our objective is not simply
stability. Therefore, U.S. policy must avoid reinforcing cozy,
political patronage networks often run by nationalist forces like an
organized crime racket. Working with our European Union partners, we
should pursue a concerted effort to provide opportunities for youth and
entrepreneurs to thrive outside traditional patronage networks, and use
our leverage to create opportunities for them within their countries.
Much like the United States has used public-private partnerships and
modest public financing to attract larger numbers of students from
Latin America to study in the United States, we should do the same in
this region.
These measures will help diminish nefarious Russian influence in
the region, begin to tip Serbia into the European camp, and grow an
independent constituency for a democratic, prosperous future across the
region.
Once these measures take hold, the United States could join its
European partners in considering more fundamental measures to ensure a
unified Bosnia. Reopening Dayton would require a level of political,
diplomatic, and security engagement which neither the United States nor
the EU are yet prepared to provide however. We need momentum first
before we tackle head on this complex task, and we need forces inside
Bosnia to lead the charge.
In the coming years, the priority of the United States must be to
firmly put an end to the drift. A relatively small show of commitment
now will shore up an order painstakingly put together in response to
the bloodletting of the 1990s. Locals need to be reassured that new
ethnic hostilities are not around the corner, and that borders are not
about to be redrawn right under their feet. In the same vein, Russia
must be made to understand that there is no easy path for them to sow
chaos in the region.
I have come to these conclusions through our work at the Atlantic
Council, which over the past year has sent delegations to nearly all
the countries in the region as part of our effort to help forge a
renewed U.S. strategy with and for the region. In the coming months,
the Council intends to consult on and share its findings, and help
galvanize a renewed push for reform at home and integration as desired
into our transatlantic community.
Many members of this committee have visited Southeast Europe, and
met with national political leaders, members of civil society, and
entrepreneurs. This committee has a strong track record of spotlighting
American interests in the region. I believe the U.S. Senate has a
unique opportunity to help drive a renewed American strategy toward the
region, and we welcome the opportunity to support those efforts.
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Wilson.
Our next witness is Dr. Majda Ruge. I know I am supposed to
roll that ``R'' but I am just not capable of doing so. Dr. Ruge
is a fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute at Johns Hopkins
University School of Advanced International Studies. Previously
she was a research fellow at the Gulf Research Centre and
worked as an advisor for the Delegation of the European
Commission and the OSCE mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Dr.
Ruge?
STATEMENT OF DR. MAJDA RUGE, FELLOW, FOREIGN POLICY INSTITUTE;
SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, JOHNS HOPKINS
UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Ruge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished Ranking
Member Murphy. It is a real honor to be here.
I was asked to talk about the radicalization among Muslims
in the Balkans. I have covered the issue in more detail in my
written testimony, and what I would like to do now is zoom out
a bit and look at the context in which this radicalization is
happening.
So what is the big picture? We see that radicalization is
currently confined to a tiny minority of Muslims in the
Balkans, the vast majority of whom are moderate and European in
outlook. In Bosnia, the overwhelming majority of Muslims oppose
ISIS and support the United States. In Kosovo, in certain
places you will see more U.S. and NATO flags than Kosovo ones.
And in Montenegro, it is thanks to votes of the 20 percent of
the Muslim population that we have a pro-NATO government in
place.
We also see that a small fraction of Muslims have
radicalized by adopting a very rigid interpretation of Islam
and non-pluralistic views that are inconsistent with local
traditions. While this is a significant societal problem, a
majority of those radicalized are nonviolent.
Finally, we see a violent fraction of those already
radicalized departing to Syria or Iraq and plotting attacks at
home. The foreign fighter trend has been worrying, yet less
turbulent than the Franco-Belgian phenomena: an average Bosnian
Muslim is five times less likely to volunteer to be a foreign
fighter than is an average Belgian Muslim.
The threat should not be downplayed as even a single person
can implement a devastating attack. However, we need to
acknowledge the vast majority of moderate Muslims in the region
who represent a key constituency for detecting threats and
preventing further radicalization.
Now, I would like to single out a few structural issues
which foster radicalization in the Balkans and which need to be
urgently addressed in order to stop this problem from
spreading.
One, the autocratic rulers who siphon off public funds,
cripple the economy, and leave populations disillusioned and
susceptible to extremist ideologies. We should remember that
groups promoting radical ideologies fill not just spiritual
gaps but also gaps in health, social services, and education.
Secondly, the use of nationalism and fear-mongering by
these same rulers to divert from their shortcomings in
governance, which deepens divisions in society. If you look at
ISIS propaganda videos that are targeting Balkans, the
victimhood of Muslims in ethnic cleansing campaigns in the
1990s is at the center of their message. The continued denial
of war crimes and the celebration of war criminals reinforces
this perception of victimhood and directly helps the jihadi
recruitment drive.
And third, the very institutions that were built up with
U.S. and EU assistance to protect the society from criminal
threats and terrorism are being actively undermined by the same
autocratic leaders who see them as threats to their own power.
Just to give you an example, for the past 10 years, Bosnian
Serb leader Milorad Dodik has been undermining all national law
enforcement agencies set up by the U.S. and the EU, partly to
fight terrorism.
For instance, in the beginning of the last year, he has
banned SIPA, the Bosnian version of the FBI, from accessing RS
territory. This is like the Governor of Georgia banning FBI
from his State. It is only due to international pressure that
he was forced to back off.
Much of this dynamic has developed since the U.S. has
disengaged from the region. Left unchecked, the prospect of
state failure, at least in one of the Balkan states cannot be
ruled out. And this would massively fuel radicalization among
Muslim populations. So this is certainly not the time for the
U.S. to disengage further. And the type of engagement that is
mostly needed is political and requires only a modest
investment of time and attention.
In conclusion, to strengthen the resilience against further
radicalization in the Balkans, the U.S.should pursue a two-
pronged approach. One, help contain the further spread of
radical ideas. Here we need to identify all extremist
ideologies as a key driver for radicalization and mobilization
to violence. While Islamist ideologies act as pull factors,
extremism by non-Muslims definitely act as push.
Second, continue to counter politically motivated
challenges to democratic institutions in the Balkans. Macedonia
was just pulled back from the brink of conflict in large part
due to U.S. diplomatic pressure to form a new democratic
government. And this shows that even limited U.S. engagement
can pay dividends.
[Dr. Ruge's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Majda Ruge
introduction: defining the problem in a historical and political
context
Radicalization is understood as a process by which an individual or
group comes to adopt increasingly extreme political, social, or
religious ideas that reject or undermine the status quo in a society in
terms of existing ideas, norms and practices. By this definition, what
is considered quite normal in one society can be considered radical in
another. Dress code and legal restrictions for women in Saudi Arabia
would be a symbol of radicalization in Balkan societies, where
traditionally European legal and dress codes apply. Radicalization
therefore can take different forms, is not always violent, and does not
necessarily serve a particular political goal. In the Balkans it has
manifested itself in a diverse array of conservative Islamic movements,
usually referred to as Salafis, that are far from being a homogenous
group in their orientation or aims. While the majority of these groups
are non-violent, several are considered a potential security threat by
government agencies and some of them have members turned foreign
fighters in Syria and Iraq or have plotted terrorist attacks at home.
Radicalization of Muslims in the Balkans has to be understood
within the context of the recent history of armed conflicts in the
1990s, which opened a window for outside proselytizing influences on
Muslim communities. It did so in two ways. First, the inflow of the
foreign Mujahideen from the battlefields of Afghanistan introduced
various ideologies initially foreign to the Balkans, a trend that
continued in the post-conflict era through foreign (or foreign-
educated) clerics, NGOs and Internet-based platforms. Secondly, the
extreme form of violence used against Muslims during the conflicts of
the 1990s, including the campaigns of ethnic cleansing and genocide,
have colored the postwar perceptions of the Muslim population, in some
cases creating a fertile ground for the recruitment into radical
beliefs and practice of Islam. While all ethnic groups suffered losses,
Muslim communities in Bosnia and Kosovo were disproportionally affected
by campaigns of ethnic cleansing, with the highest numbers of civilian
casualties.\1\ Given that the majority of Muslims in the prewar era
were not deeply religious, the notion that ``their lack of true belief
was to blame for ethnic cleansing and genocide'' is often used by
radical clerics to strengthen their recruitment narrative in the
Balkans.
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\1\ In Bosnia, 64,000 Muslims were killed, out of which 33,000 were
civilians). The Srebrenica genocide, in which over 7,000 Muslim men and
boys were killed and about 20,000 more expelled from the area, was the
worst episode of mass murder in post-WWII European history. Over 600
mosques were destroyed in Bosnia between 1992-1995.
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radicalization: trends and issues
Generally speaking, we can distinguish between two forms of
radicalization taking place among Muslim communities in the Balkans:
Non-violent radicalization, which some scholars refer to as
``radicalization of belief and behavior.'' \2\ Since the Balkan
wars in the 1990s, a small percentage of Muslims in the region
have, via external influences, adopted a very conservative and
rigid interpretation and practice of Islam often seen in Salafi
tradition, built on denial of local traditions and practices,
and contradicting local laws on family, gender equality and
education.\3\ Although most of the ``converts'' in this
category are non-violent, the spread of the Salafi ideology
introduces additional tensions in the already fragile and
socially divided societies of the Western Balkans. Furthermore,
the groups spreading the ideology are anti-pluralist in their
orientation and often promote a very rigid and uncompromising
Muslim identity, based on transnational rather than local
allegiances. Combined with other push factors, this disconnect
from local identity and traditions may play a determinant role
in motivating foreign fighters to Iraq and Syria.
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\2\ Edina Becirevic. Salafism vs. Moderate Islam: A Rhetorical
Fight for the Hearts and the Minds of Bosnian Muslims. Atlantic
Initiative, 2016.
\3\ Ibid.
Radicalization linked to violence has been observed among a small
fraction of the population, whether through participation in
terrorist attacks at home or abroad, or as combatants in Syria
and Iraq. In the Bosnian context, at least 1/3 of foreign
fighters had prior criminal backgrounds, and represent about 1
percent of those already considered radicalized.\4\ While one
should not underestimate the threat emanating from violent
extremists, it is important to keep in mind that these groups
represent a small percentage of the total Muslim population.
There are approx. 6.4 million Muslims spread around the
territory of Bosnia (approx. 1.9 million), Kosovo (approx. 1.7
million), Albania (approx. 1.7 million) Macedonia (approx.
809,000) and Serbia (approx. 229,000). It is estimated that
between 800-1000 individuals from these six states have gone to
Syria and Iraq between 2012-2016. This represents approximately
0.015 percent of the total Muslim population of the countries
covered. If we compare foreign fighters as a percentage of the
total Muslim population rather than per capita of the entire
population, then the Muslim population in the Balkans produces
a smaller percentage of foreign fighters (0.011 percent-0.018
percent) than, for example, France (0.04 percent). In
comparison to Belgium, an average Bosnian Muslim is 4.7 times
less likely to become a foreign fighter than is an average
Belgian Muslim.\5\
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\4\ ISIS propaganda in the Balkans has targeted criminal
individuals with tailor-made messages promising redemption from their
sins.
\5\ Vlado Azinovic, Ed. ``Between Salvation and Terror:
Radicalization and the Foreign Fighter Phenomenon in the Western
Balkans." Atlantic Initiative, 05/25/2017.
Yet as even a small number of well-organized individuals can
implement a devastating attack, the risk of terrorism in the Balkans
should not be underestimated. Given the loss of ISIS territory in Syria
as well as more effective monitoring by local security agencies, no
departures to Syria and Iraq from the region have been documented in
2016.\6\ Instead, the ISIS propaganda arm has called on its Balkan
followers to carry out attacks at home--a reason for more vigilance.
Regional experts expect no foreign fighters to return to the Balkans
from those still remaining in Syria.\7\
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\6\ Ibid.
\7\ Ibid.
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To date, security agencies in the region have been able to contain
the threat relatively well, taking into account the general weakness of
state institutions in the region. A number of planned terrorist attacks
were thwarted; a number of returnees from Syria and Iraq were arrested
and charged and many more were prevented from leaving in the first
place.\8\ Each country in the region has adopted a counterterrorism
strategy, criminalized the recruitment and participation in conflicts
abroad, and issued sentencing guidelines, which range from 5 to 15
years of imprisonment, and in the case of Kosovo, potential loss of
citizenship.\9\ In Bosnia, 42 individuals have been sentenced so far to
150 combined years for acts of terrorism, recruitment of foreign
fighters and departure to Syria.\10\
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\8\ Ibid.
\9\ For a detailed discussion of Balkan countries' counterterrorism
strategies and approaches see Vlado Azinovic, Ed. ``Between Salvation
and Terror: Radicalization and the Foreign Fighter Phenomenon in the
Western Balkans.'' Atlantic Initiative, 05/25/2017
\10\ https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/za-terorizam-u-bih-do-danas-
optuzene-42-osobe-izreceno-ukupno-150-godinazatvora/170524029
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push and pull factors
Several sociological and political phenomena have combined in the
post-conflict period to compound the problem of radicalization. These
include both ``push'' and ``pull'' factors. The first category
occurring within the Balkans includes the postwar trauma, mistrust and
prejudices among ethnic groups, broken and dysfunctional families, and
mental health issues. As important are political and economic push
factors, most notably unaccountable and corrupt governments, general
lack of economic prospects and high youth unemployment. Combined, these
factors have yielded significant segments of the population lacking any
positive vision about their future and disillusioned with their
political (and sometimes religious) leaders, whom they view as
politically and morally corrupt. The external pull factors of radical
ideology, proselytized by foreign or domestic clerics, NGOs, charities
and radical internet platforms, are likely to be more effective among
these segments of the population.
While there is no single explanation behind the trend of violent
radicalization, regional experts have identified some patterns, such as
preexisting criminal backgrounds, links to extremist Diaspora groups in
the EU, unemployment, family problems, and mental health issues.\11\
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\11\ Ibid.
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An important push factor in the Balkans is extremism and fear
mongering by non-Muslim groups. Given the recent history in the
Balkans, denial of war crimes, celebration of war criminals, and
occasional incidents of violence will reinforce fears among Muslims
that the experience of the 1990s may be repeated.\12\ Besides radical
nationalist groups who engage in military parades and commitacts of
violence, there is also a proclivity of authoritarian politicians to
use nationalism to distract from their failures in governance, further
deepening the divisions in society and fueling the process of
radicalization. It is precisely such perceptions that facilitate
jihadist recruitment, as ISIS propaganda targeting the Balkans places
the victimhood of Muslims in the 1990s at the center of their campaign.
Similarly, some non-violent Salafis build their Muslim followings by
pointing to continuing dangers of Serb aggression that will not
disappear until Bosnian Muslims embrace ``true Islam.''
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\12\ The provocative acts which celebrate war criminals or acts of
violence include opening of a student center named after Radovan
Karadzic by the RS leader Milorad Dodik, parades by ``Cetnik''
batallions in Visegrad where about 3,000 Muslims were killed by Serb
paramilitary brigades, and attacks on the ceremony of laying the
groundstone for the reconstruction of a Ferhadija Mosque in Banja Luka.
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Therefore, all extremist ideologies, whether Salafism, Jihadism,
political manipulation of nationalism, and non-Muslim extremism, drive
radicalization and can mobilize to violence. While ``Islamist''
ideologies act as a pull factors, the continued extremism by non-
Muslims against Muslims operates as a push factor.
structural problems and future trends
1. Authoritarian nationalist rule as the single most important domestic
driver of future radicalization
Several structural issues, which foster radicalization in the
Balkans need to be urgently addressed to keep this problem from
spreading. Domestically, most of these issues can be traced back to one
core problem: unaccountable rule by nationalist authoritarian leaders.
While this problem is present in all states of Western Balkans, in
states divided by ethnic lines it creates a particularly dangerous mix
of authoritarianism and nationalism, as unaccountable rulers exploit
nationalist discourse to cover up their failures in governance. This
produces two mutually reinforcing trends unfolding in parallel:
deepening of societal divisions and weakening of democratic
institutions. Several examples of how the authoritarian elites increase
the prospects of radicalization and cripple the capacity of government
institutions to deal with the problem are worth highlighting:
1. Autocratic rulers siphon off public funds, cripple the economy and
leave populations disillusioned and susceptible to extremist
ideologies. Given that groups promoting radical ideologies fill
not just spiritual gaps, but also gaps in health, social
services and education, these groups are more likely to gain
foothold in societies with weak economies and inadequate
medical and social services.
2. The very institutions that are meant to be responsive to society
and protect it from criminal and terrorist threats are those
being actively undermined by authoritarian leaders, who see
them as threats to their own power. The law enforcement
institutions in Bosnia were built up through considerable U.S.
and EU investment of political capital and funds, in part to
fight terrorism in the aftermath of September 11, 2001.\13\
These agencies have so far been effective in containing the
terrorist threats. However, as they also have jurisdiction over
corruption and crime, they have been the object of attacks in
places like the Republika Srpska, given several corruption
investigations against its political leader Milorad Dodik. The
attacks on law enforcement institutions can be seen in the
context of a decade long campaign to undo reforms that were
built up since 1996 with EU and U.S. assistance, giving the
extremely weak BiH government under Dayton a small number of
additional competencies.
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\13\ Key institutions in Bosnia include the State Investigation and
Protection Agency with jurisdiction to investigate terrorism, the BiH
Prosecutors Office and the BiH Court with jurisdiction to prosecute and
adjudicate such cases.
3. In Macedonia, the authoritarian leaders prevent reconciliation by
manipulating societal divisions in order to distract from
failures in governance. In parallel, they engage in relentless
branding of the opposition as national traitors. While the
nationalisms promoted by VMRO-DMPNE leadership in Macedonia and
Milorad Dodik in Bosnia are quite different (one is state
centric, the other secessionist), in both cases Albanians or
Bosniaks (predominantly Muslim groups) are often used to create
the image of an enemy, a strategy feeding Muslim victimhood
perceptions that may yield dangerous consequences. The recent
attack on the Macedonian parliament is a case in point, where
an organized mob was let into the parliament by VMRO MPs,
attacking members of the opposition and the leader of an
Albanian party, who barely survived his injuries. In Bosnia,
denial of war crimes, glorification of war criminals feed the
Bosniak victim complex. In Serbia, 2017 presidential election
campaign has been loaded with Kosovo-related provocative
rhetoric and actions, the train- turned-nationalistic billboard
being only one example. Furthermore, Bosniak and Albanian
nationalisms tend to be reactive, sometimes misusing the
narrative of victimhood and in the latter case, promoting the
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idea of greater Albania.
4. Finally, the authoritarian leaders actively undermine EU
membership, currently the only external stabilizing factor in
the region. Nationalist parties in several states in the region
have a long record of blocking EU-related reforms, dismissing
EU integration as only one possible path among others and
opposing the NATO membership. Macedonia has just managed to
form a new democratic government, in large part due to U.S.
diplomatic pressure. While the new government has immediately
set the EU and NATO agenda as its priority, they will have to
surmount a number of challenges, including the politicized
administration and judiciary they have inherited from 11 years
of authoritarian rule.
Therefore the greatest threat to U.S. interests is the
continuation of radical politics embraced by corrupt
politicians in the Balkans who employ divisive nationalist
rhetoric to weaken the rule of law, state functionality and
fragile agreements brokered under the tutelage of the U.S. and
the EU. Given these trends, the threat that urgently needs to
be addressed is the prospect of state failure in Bosnia, and
possibly renewed violence in the Balkans. This would no doubt
fuel radicalization among Muslim populations on a much more
serious scale.
2. Foreign Influences: Saudi Arabia and Gulf
There are many media reports regarding the influence of Middle East
based religious institutions and charities spreading a conservative and
rigid interpretation of Islam in the Balkans and promoting social norms
which run counter to local legislation and tradition. In these reports,
the Gulf States, in particular Saudi Arabia, have in the past been
singled out as key actors, financing new mosques, educating clerics who
are then sent back to promote the Saudi version of Islam, and
supporting NGOs and humanitarian organizations addressing social needs
while spreading the faith. There is much anecdotal evidence of Gulf
money being used to encourage Balkan Muslim communities to convert,
leading to radicalization of belief and behavior.\14\ It is not easy to
establish the exact extent to which Gulf States (rather than individual
nationals of those states) have engaged in such activities in the past
decade, particularly after 2001. Saudi Arabia has rejected such claims
repeatedly. More recently, Riyadh has underlined its determination to
work with the U.S. Government in fighting both terrorism and violent
extremism. The Saudis can point to a number of deradicalization and
counterterrorism measures that have been initiated by the Saudi
government over the last decade. These provide a sense on how Saudi
Arabia and other Gulf states can be engaged more constructively in
working against religious radicalism in the Balkans. The following
initiatives are worth highlighting:
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\14\ Edina Becirevic. Salafism vs. Moderate Islam: A Rhetorical
Fight for the Hearts and the Minds of Bosnian Muslims. Atlantic
Initiative, 2016.
In 2014, a number of anti-terror laws were passed, listing several
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organizations and groups as terrorist organizations
Support for and joining jihadist organizations has been
criminalized, and the authorities have cracked down on
individuals supporting ISIS and AQ, be it financially,
ideologically (in particular online support) or preparing to
join jihadist groups. The number of convictions for such
offenses have gone up.
Creation of a Media Centre in the Royal Court including the Digital
Extremism Observatory (DEO) which monitors online content and
utilizes sophisticated software to engage in real time analysis
of Jihadist social media content.
Creation of the Global Center for Combatting Extremist Ideology
which was opened during the visit of President Trump to Riyadh
in May which has partly incorporated the DEO structure.
Creation of a Center for Ideological Warfare at the Saudi Ministry
of Defense
Establishment of the Islamic Military Alliance to Fight Terrorism
(IMAFT) along with a multinational CT Center at the Alliance's
HQ in Riyadh.
Critics of these efforts assert that these new developments lack
substance and are part of a strategic communication campaign designed
to highlight Saudi efforts while blaming other countries in the region
for supporting radical groups. Taking the Saudis and other Gulf states
at their word could open space for concrete initiatives to counter a)
radical rhetoric of imams or individuals b) abandon efforts to
proselytize an Islam incompatible with local traditions c) assist with
digital counter- radicalization initiatives.
policy recommendations
If we define U.S. interests as creating conditions that will
strengthen resilience against radicalization in the Balkans, then these
should be pursued through a two-pronged approach.
First, the U.S. is well advised to invest political and diplomatic
capital to counter politically motivated challenges to state
structures, democratic institutions, and civil society.
Second, it should assist where it can to contain the further spread
of radical ideas, including those promoted by extremists belonging to
other national groups.
Some detailed ideas are outlined below:
1. Countering politically motivated challenges to state structures and
democratic institutions requires U.S. and EU political
engagement and the willingness to sanction political
provocations against the state and radical rhetoric against
other ethnic groups, civil society and opposition parties.
Here, the U.S. policy should not be to support individual
actors, but defending democratic principles and institutions
regardless of the party in power. Cooperation and coordination
with the EU and its leading member states is of critical
importance.
Macedonia was--in part due to U.S. engagement--pulled back
from the brink of the conflict, mobilized across ethnic
lines and regained its democracy. The U.S. should support
all initiatives aiming to reestablish rule of law in
Macedonia. Furthermore, fast invitation to Macedonia to
join NATO will have a calming effect on the region and
boost the efforts of the new reform government.
In Bosnia, the U.S. and EU should maintain strong focus on
consolidating state (national) structures in context of EU
integration and encourage the EU, IMF and World Bank to do
the same. They should also address the post-war
manipulation of nationalism and inter-communal fears in a
more direct manner. Politicians should be called out for
their behavior (named and shamed). Credible threat of
sanctions can sometimes be more useful than sanctions
themselves.
Support retention of High Representative and EUFOR until
significant improvement in functioning of state
institutions and political rhetoric aimed at
reconciliation.
The success of U.S. (or EU) policy objectives will depend
on the strategies through which the available tools are
used and the skills of the personalities appointed in key
positions (for instance, various Special Representatives).
As the EU contemplates closing EUSR missions in several
Balkan states, it is of utmost importance to communicate
that instead of closing these missions, Brussels should
devote more attention and resources to appoint
personalities with a vision, strategy and skills to
negotiate and communicate political messages that back up
the EU agenda.
Insist on and support better cooperation between law
enforcement agencies at all levels of government with state
in coordinating role. Ensure that functioning institutions
and agencies remain in place and that challenges to these
institutions do not go unsanctioned.
Keep the three international judges on the BiH
Constitutional Court.
2. Containing the spread of radical ideology requires acknowledging
and engaging the large majority of moderate Muslims in the
region.\15\ Building a counter-ideological narrative is crucial
to prevent further spread of radical ideology. Rooting Bosnian
Muslims in their local customs and traditions can strengthen
resilience against external influences, such as Salafism.
Moderate imams in Kosovo teach schoolchildren how to anticipate
and build a counter-narrative to the arguments extremists may
use to entice them. Similar projects should be encouraged
elsewhere in the Balkans, constructively engaging local
religious leaders and counter terrorism experts. Here, one
should keep in mind that there are certain areas where America
is not the best ``frontline'' messenger. An American touch to
anti-extremism counter-narrative may in some cases be
counterproductive.
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\15\ The EU is already entering into cooperation with the Islamic
Community in Bosnia to work on deradicalization.
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Some ideas of additional measures are listed below.
Encourage Islamic Communities in the region to open up to
more liberal interpretations of Islam, promote moderate
Imams and avoid entering competition with Salafi influences
by becoming more conservative.
The reinvigorated relationship of the U.S. with Saudi
Arabia could be used to encourage the GCC governments to
undertake several steps in countering any radicalizing
influences. In particular, encourage the Saudis and other
Gulf states to launch concrete initiatives to counter a)
radical rhetoric of imams or individuals b) abandon efforts
to proselytize an Islam incompatible with local traditions
c) assist with digital counter-radicalization initiatives.
About half a million Americans are of Bosnian origin.
Plenty of IT businesses are run by first generation Bosnian
Americans, who are also present on the Bosnian market.
These businesses could be incentivized to get engaged in
digital initiatives similar to Jigsaw, the Google owned
tech incubator that developed programs targeting
individuals watching online ISIS propaganda and placing
links to Arabic and English language video clips which
would counter such propaganda. These included testimonials
from former extremists, imams denouncing ISIS's corruption,
ultimately dissuading them from responding to the group's
calls for violence. Combining the IT expertise of these
businesses, their knowledge of the language, and access to
moderate Imams in the region could produce a version of
such software which could target the populations in the
Balkans more effectively than many conferences and
workshops that western funds are currently being spent on.
Support community programs where imams and psychologists
could be the first to answer voluntary hotlines to be used
family members of those radicalized. In the U.S., in over
fifty percent of the cases the family knew that their
family member was radicalizing. While they will often not
make a call to a security agency, they might call a hotline
that provides rapid intervention by a psychologist or an
Imam, to talk to their children.
Draw on lessons learned in the U.S. from projects such as
Cure Violence to the field of preventing violent
radicalization. Many foreign fighters return disillusioned
by what they have seen, these individuals can and should be
used to prevent future radicalization.
Tables
Source [Tables 1, 2, and 3]: Vlado Azinovic, Ed. ``Between
Salvation and Terror: Radicalization and the Foreign Fighter Phenomenon
in the Western Balkans.'' Atlantic Initiative, 05/25/2017
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Johnson. Thank you Dr. Ruge.
Our final witness is Ms. Ivana Bajrovic. Ms. Bajrovic is a
senior program officer at the National Endowment for Democracy
overseeing the democracy assistance program in Southeast
Europe. Prior to joining NED, Ms. Bajrovic trained U.S.
soldiers deploying to the Balkans and supported the NATO
peacekeeping mission to Bosnia. Ms. Bajrovic?
STATEMENT OF IVANA CVETKOVIC BAJROVIC, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR FOR
EUROPE, NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY, WASHINGTON, D.C.
Ms. Bajrovic. Thank you, Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member
Murphy, for this opportunity to address you today and discuss
the challenges facing Southeast Europe and how to best respond
to them. And on behalf of the National Endowment for Democracy,
I would like to thank you for ongoing support and commitment to
the region.
I would like to maybe outline some of the democratic
declines that you have already sketched out, as did my
distinguished colleagues here, and that have been characterized
by weak and compromised institutions, autocratic strongmen,
growing media capture, lingering ethnic grievances, and
worsening regional relations. All of these conditions
unfortunately open a lot of space for external actors to misuse
them and exert their influence.
Russia, in particular, is exploiting these weaknesses in an
effort to gain greater geopolitical influence, and, even though
other authoritarian actors are standing in the wings, I would
single out Russia as the most concerning external threat,
having expanded its influence to a greater degree here in
Southeast Europe, the region that we are discussing today, and
more than anywhere else in Europe, save for Ukraine.
Mr. Wilson has already outlined some examples of how far
this reach and how extensive this reach is, but I would just
like to point out this June 4th article in ``The Guardian''
which was penned by several NED grantees and alleges that
Russia has carried out a decade-long campaign to, ``spread
propaganda and stroke discord in the region with the goal to
create a strip of militarily neutral countries that would
include Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, and
Serbia.''
Montenegro's successful bid last week presents a major blow
to this plan, and just how big of a blow I think is best
illustrated by the Russian Foreign Ministry's tweet in response
to the announcement that Montenegro has become a NATO member
state, which says that Montenegro's anti-Russian hysteria and
hostile policy--in response to it, Russia, ``reserves the right
to take reciprocal measures.''
I draw your attention to this tweet because such brazen
language emboldens illiberal elements and extremist radicals in
the region to attack those advancing and defending democratic
principles, including civil society groups and media supported
by the Endowment.
I will give you one example. In January this year, the
Youth Initiative for Human Rights, one of the leading pro-
democracy groups in the region and a longtime NED grantee, was
attacked by a gang of six men who labeled the group's activists
traitors and foreign mercenaries. It will turn out later that
at least two of these assailants are identified as being
affiliated with a pro-Russian nationalist group and had fought
in eastern Ukraine.
Other activists, human rights defenders, and journalists
have also come under heavy attack for their work in promoting
democracy and fundamental freedoms in their countries,
including the grantees I mentioned have contributed to ``The
Guardian'' article. It is precisely this type of groundbreaking
investigative work that they are doing that strengthens
democracy in the region and presents the best defense against
disinformation and malign foreign influence.
Mr. Chairman, as both of my colleagues have mentioned, any
extended political crisis, economic downturn, or foreign
meddling could easily push the region towards instability and
even renewed conflict. The best case scenario we can hope for
at this time, without greater Western attention, is the
preservation of an illiberal status quo with increasingly
autocratic leaders who continue to weaken democratic
institutions, restrict media freedoms, and worsen ethnic
tensions, while offering the international community short-term
deliverables in the name of maintaining stability.
For far too long, stability has been the principal goal of
Western policy in the post-conflict Balkans, and lowering the
bar on democratic progress has weakened the transformational
power of the EU and we need to recognize that. Together with EU
disengagement, this has left a vacuum that other external
players are eager to exploit.
Therefore, Western governments need to recognize the
urgency of the situation and the potential costs of the crisis
the region might be facing. They should press for real
democratic progress, which is the key to regional security and
long-term stability.
In my written testimony, I have provided a more extensive
list of recommendations. Here I would like to focus on just
three, those that are particularly focused on strengthening
democracy through the support of civil society, the type of
groups that NED is working with.
One, challenge undemocratic practices and trends especially
in direct communications with the region's leaders. Those who
are fighting for democracy can and do suffer when the West is
inconsistent and does not provide political support for the
work that they do. They deserve our solidarity and the
unwavering support of the American people, for they defend not
only their own fundamental values but also ours.
Two, adopt a more pluralistic approach to promoting reform
by reaching out to a diversified group of political, civic, and
media actors. Self-proclaimed ethnic leaders and factors of
stability should not be allowed to monopolize and manipulate
important reform processes. We should recognize those pro-
democratic opposition leaders, civil society activists, and
independent journalists for the contributions they are making.
And here I would like to make a personal appeal that when you
visit the region, you really make sure, if it is possible, to
find some time to meet with some of the brave individuals who
are doing this excellent work.
And third, continue to provide democracy support to civil
society organizations, independent media, and moderate
political parties. And this does not necessarily require
increased assistance, but what it does ask for is a
rededication to the values that will help to achieve meaningful
democratic progress.
Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Murphy, let me conclude by
just noting that as a Bosnia native and a person who was
personally affected by the war in the 1990s, I have a special
appreciation for the bipartisan support in Congress which
helped to end the conflicts in the 1990s. Reinvigorating this
support for the region's full democratic progress would leave
absolutely no room for interpretation regarding American
values--or misinterpretation, rather--and therefore no space
for dangerous alternatives that are advocated from the East.
Thank you very much. I look forward to your questions.
[Ms. Bajrovic's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ivana Cvetkovic Bajrovic
Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Murphy, distinguished members of
the subcommittee:
Thank you very much for holding this timely and important hearing
on the challenges facing Southeast Europe. I welcome the opportunity to
speak to you today on how to best respond to them. And on behalf of the
National Endowment for Democracy (NED), I would like to thank you for
your ongoing support and commitment to the region.
With Congressional funding, NED has supported democratic
development in Southeast Europe since the early 1990s, providing
steadfast support to civil society organizations in their efforts to
address difficult post-communist and post-conflict challenges, and
advance the region's democratic transition and Euro-Atlantic
integration. Today, we work with over 80 civil society and media
organizations across the region, from Croatia to Albania.
Thanks in great part to international support, the Western Balkans
have made notable progress, especially during the first decade
following the U.S.-led intervention to end the war in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The last ten years, however, have witnessed a democratic
decline across the region. Despite the region's proximity to the
European Union, and some noteworthy progress towards accession, the
countries of the Western Balkans have moved away from democratic
consolidation. The current situation--characterized by weak and
compromised institutions, autocratic strongmen, growing media capture,
lingering ethnic grievances, and worsening regional relations--is
increasingly perilous.
Russia is exploiting these weaknesses in an effort to gain greater
geopolitical influence. The Kremlin seeks to weaken democratic
transitions in the region, curtail Euro-Atlantic integration, and
undermine NATO and the EU. Other authoritarian actors with interests in
the region--Iran, the Gulf States, and China--stand in the wings,
though their political influence currently is marginal. Turkey is an
exception: like Russia, it also is using a mix of investment, media
influence, and direct support to like-minded political forces to
increase its authority.
Still, Russia remains the single most concerning external threat in
the region, having expanded its influence to a greater degree there
than anywhere else in Europe, save Ukraine. It currently operates a so-
called ``humanitarian center'' in southern Serbia, near the border with
Kosovo; and there are rumors that it plans to establish another in the
north. Russia may have been involved in the attempted overthrow of the
government in Montenegro last year. It recently began including Serbian
children in paramilitary camps for youth, which include weapons
training.
Just how far Russia's meddling in the region goes is best captured
by the June 4 article in The Guardian, which was penned by several NED
grantees. Based on leaked intelligence documents, the article alleges
that Russia has carried out a decade-long campaign to ``spread
propaganda and stroke discord'' in the region with the goal to ``create
a strip of militarily neutral countries'' that would include Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia.
Montenegro's successful NATO bid last week presents a major blow to
this plan: immediately following the announcement of the transatlantic
Alliance's new member state, the Russian Foreign Ministry's tweeted
that, in response to Montenegro's ``anti-Russian hysteria'' and
``hostile policy,'' Russia ``reserves the right to take reciprocal
measures.''
Such brazen language emboldens illiberal elements and extremist
radicals in the region to attack those advancing and defending
democratic principles, including civil society groups and media
supported by the Endowment.
In January this year, the Youth Initiative for Human Rights
(YIHR)--one of the leading prodemocracy groups in the region and a
long-time NED grantee--was attacked by a gang of six men, who plastered
the group's Belgrade offices with messages of hate that labeled the
group's activists ``traitors'' and ``foreign mercenaries.'' At least
two of the assailants were identified as being affiliated with a pro-
Russian nationalist group and had fought in the Russia-fomented war in
eastern Ukraine. This attack was preceded by a relentless campaign in
the government-controlled media that portrayed the YIHR as a U.S.-
funded group and smeared its leader, Anita Mitic.
Unfortunately, Anita is only one of the many brave individuals who
have come under heavy attack for their work in promoting democracy and
fundamental freedoms in their countries. Civic activists, human rights
defenders, and journalists--including the NED grantees who contributed
to The Guardian article--are being singled out as ``foreign agents,''
threatened, and even physically attacked.
One of them, Stevan Dojcinovic, is editor-in-chief at Belgrade's
Crime and Corruption Reporting Network (KRIK) and a winner of the
Global Shining Light Award for Investigative Journalism. Stevan is
regularly vilified in the pro-government media and denounced for
instigating instability with assistance from the West. Yet, it is
precisely the type of groundbreaking investigative work which Stevan
and his colleagues are doing that strengthens democracy and presents
the best defense against disinformation and other malign foreign
influence.
The ill-advised and dangerous approach by nationalist governments
and their proxies not only threatens the activists themselves, but also
damages real democracy and, consequently, any lasting stability in
these countries. For without strong rule of law, fully transparent and
accountable governments, guaranteed fundamental freedoms, and
unrestricted political and civic participation, both the security of
the region and the stability of Europe and transatlantic relationship
will remain at risk.
Homegrown extremist groups are capitalizing on some of the same
weaknesses as external actors, especially endemic corruption and a lack
of economic prospects. While the number of foreign fighters recruited
in the Balkans to fight in Syria and Iraq seems to have plateaued, any
extended political crisis, economic downturn, or foreign meddling could
easily push the region towards renewed radicalization and even
conflict.
This, of course, is the worst case scenario. The large-scale,
protracted warfare that the region witnessed in the 1990s is unlikely.
However, even an isolated, short-term, or small-scale conflict is
likely to spill across borders in region still riddled with post-war
grievances.
Without greater Western attention, the best case scenario one could
hope for is the preservation of an illiberal status quo, with
increasingly autocratic leaders who continue to weaken democratic
institutions, restrict media freedoms, and worsen ethnic tensions,
while offering the international community short-term deliverables in
the name of ``maintaining stability''.
For far too long, ``stability'' has been the principal goal of
Western policy in the post-conflict Balkans. Lowering the bar on
democratic progress has weakened the transformational power of EU
integration and accession. Looking the other way when alleged aspirants
skirt difficult reforms and water down democratic institutions has only
served to delegitimize the EU in the eyes of frustrated citizens across
the Balkans. Together with U.S. disengagement, this policy of
acquiescence has left a vacuum that other external players are eager to
exploit.
Mr. Chairman, Western governments need to recognize the urgency of
the situation and the potential costs of the crisis the region is
facing. They should press for real democratic progress, which is the
real key to regional security, long-term stability, and countering
malign foreign influence. This can be done in several cost-effective
ways:
Demonstrate a strong and consistent dedication to democratic
principles:
Challenge undemocratic practices and trends in progress
reports, public appearances and statements, and in direct
communications with the region's leaders. Remember that
those who are fighting for democracy can and do suffer from
the West's inconsistency and lack of political support.
They deserve our solidarity and the unwavering support of
theAmerican people, for they defend not only their own, but
also our, fundamental values.
Adopt a more pluralistic approach to promoting reform
processes, and empower reformers by reaching out to a
broader, more diversified group of political, civic, and
media actors. Self-proclaimed ethnic leaders and ``factors
of stability'' should not be allowed to monopolize and
manipulate important reform processes. Pro-democratic
opposition leaders, as well as civil society activists and
independent journalists, should be recognized and
encouraged for the contributions they are making,
especially in important reform processes such as the
security sector reform in Serbia or constitutional reform
in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Insist on regional cooperation and a constructive approach
to outstanding issues, especially by countries which are
already EU and NATO members. Civil society groups are
leading the way in regional cooperation on sensitive but
essential issues like transitional justice; governments
should be encouraged to do the same. One important effort
is an initiative by over 2,000 organizations and
individuals to create the world's first regional truth and
fact-finding commission--RECOM--an initiative that NED has
been supporting since its 2008 launch. With the process of
creating the intergovernmental body stalled by politicking,
the NGO coalition has redoubled its effort to gather
citizens' signatures in support of RECOM, collecting over
600,000 to date.
Continue to provide democracy support to civil society
organizations, independent media, and moderate political
parties. This does not necessarily require increased
assistance, but rather a rededication to the values that
will help to achieve meaningful democratic progress.
Rebuild conditionality:
Offer incentives, where possible, such as through the NATO
accession process and supporting countries' EU progress. As
NED grantee Center for Euro-Atlantic Studies argues in its
upcoming report, ``NATO can and should be the leading actor
of a sustained and comprehensive process of the region's
stabilization and democratization.'' Montenegro's NATO
membership is an important signal--not just to external
actors--that the region is safely anchored with the West.
It also provides an incentive to others--especially
ordinary citizens--to support sometimes painful reform
processes for the benefits that integration can bring,
including security and prosperity.
Engage European partners to use ``sticks'' such as cuts in
financial assistance or sanctions. U.S. sanctions on
Bosnian Serb nationalist leader Milorad Dodik for
obstructing the implementation of the 1995 Dayton Peace
Accords had an immediate effect of tampering down his
secessionist rhetoric. Similar mechanisms can ensure that
those who endanger stability and breach fundamental rights
and norms should not and cannot benefit from U.S. or EU
assistance and cooperation.
Boost diplomatic engagement:
Forge a common policy for the region with the EU, and
provide the necessary political and technical support to
international partners. It is often said that the Balkans
are a ``European problem.'' However, the U.S. still
possesses important interests and unrivaled credibility in
the region, and should endeavor to help its European
partners to formulate a coherent strategy with the
political will needed to see through indispensable reforms.
o Provide the Balkan portfolio a higher priority in the new
U.S. administration as an area of heightened strategic
importance. Increased attention to the region tends to have
an immediate effect on the ground. This was recently
demonstrated by Deputy Assistant Secretary Hoyt Yee's visit
to Macedonia, which resulted in the country's president
softening his stance on the formation of a new opposition-
led government, thereby possibly paving the way for
resolving a prolonged political crisis.
Reinvigorate bipartisan support, which helped to end the
conflicts of the 1990s, for the region's full democratic
progress. Such support leaves no room for interpretation
regarding American values and, thus, no space for
considering dangerous ``alternatives'' advocated from the
East.
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Ms. Bajrovic.
Let me start with you being a Bosnian native, and I will
ask all three witnesses the same question. You have kind of
laid out the current state of play, the current reality. I
would like to kind of go back--and maybe you can go back
further if you would like to--but really from the signing of
the Dayton Accords. Can you lay out the history of what
happened? Where was the engagement? When did the engagement by
both America and Europe start waning? What brought us to the
current situation? Ms. Bajrovic?
Ms. Bajrovic. I can begin. I think there is no doubt that
in the first 10 years following the signing of the Dayton Peace
Accords, we have seen progress. The Dayton Peace Accords,
inherently in its structure, provides some constraints for a
full democratic progress in countries like Bosnia and
Herzegovina because they really encourage ethno-politics and
not the real pluralism and accountability of the kind that we
would like to see in consolidated democracies.
But that being said, things were looking fairly good until
probably about, I would say, mid-2000s. And where we definitely
noticed a downward spiral is from 2008. And this is where we
also noticed a significant U.S. disengagement. Somebody had
previously alluded to--I think it was Ranking Member Murphy--
this was due to the fact and the recognition that things were
fairly stable and that it could be turned over to the European
Union because the Balkans has often been seen as the European
problem, and by virtue of being in the EU's back yard, it was
fairly safe to assume that the anchoring of the region would
provide a cure in itself, so to say.
And that has proven not to be the case. I hate to sound as
a EU skeptic, but in part I personally believe that this was
due to the EU's misguided approach in using conditionality that
has worked in Central Europe but has been gambled away for the
sake of stability that I mentioned in countries like Bosnia
because I think being afraid of any instability and renewed
conflict in the Balkans has led primarily EU, but to some
extent the U.S. as well, to favor stability over real
democratic progress over the last decade. And this is when we
really see things backsliding.
Senator Johnson. Dr. Ruge, would you like to add to that?
Dr. Ruge. I will answer this question both as a native and
someone who wrote a Ph.D. thesis on this question.
Engagement of the U.S. was there from the start. U.S. is a
member of the Peace Implementation Council.
I would say that the strongest influence that the U.S.,
together with EU, has exerted in Bosnia was between 2002 and
2006, which is when we see a period of best coordination and
cooperation between various actors, U.S., EU, and the High
Representative, who was back then Lord Ashton. This is the time
when in Bosnia the largest numbers of EU reforms have been
adopted by politicians in parliament that normally had
obstructed even smaller measures. This is a time when Republika
Srpska had actually come out with a report on Srbenica, when
Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks had supported reforms at the
national level, building up a huge number of institutions in
rule of law and law enforcement.
From 2006 on, a new High Representative has arrived, and a
new policy was announced very loudly and that was a policy that
Bosnians would take over and the EU agenda would take care of
the reforms. And from then on, there was much less direct
confrontation of obstruction. The U.S. has outsourced Balkans
to the Europeans, and due to the lack of political presence and
political--or reacting to obstruction, for the past 10 years,
the authoritarian politicians have been testing their limits
and obstructing a step further each time.
Senator Johnson. Mr. Wilson?
Mr. Wilson. I will just add to that. My career began as a
student working with refugee projects in the region and seeing
the direct connection between--the relationship between U.S.
leadership or engagement and what happens on the ground. And I
think we have had three markers in the Balkans where each time
we have wanted to hand over the baton and we failed.
First, post-1989, I think you remember Secretary Baker's
famous ``we do not have a dog in this fight.'' Post-1989, the
sense that now where we were, that this is Europe's moment,
could be handed over to Europe. And we saw what led to the
succession wars in Yugoslavia. We were very reluctant to get
involved. We got involved through the Alliance in Bosnia, later
Kosovo.
I think the second era of wanting to hand back over a
little bit was around about 2005, as my colleagues mentioned.
This was really driven by the pressures the U.S. military was
facing in coalition operations, Iraq, Afghanistan, increasingly
Iraq, and where it was clear that Secretary Rumsfeld set the
debate and the terms each time NATO ministers met. What is the
next step of drawdown in our forces? And on the other side of
the equation, what is the next step in the drawdown in our
assistance? That was the paradigm, how we draw down.
Understandable reasons, things at play, but there were
consequences to that as the region saw the EU increasingly in a
security role being handed the ball.
And then in 2008, where we did succeed at the Bucharest
Summit to welcome Albania and Croatia, not Macedonia into the
Alliance, but it was a marker because the Alliance failed in
this strategy on what to do with Europe's east. And this was
again a beginning of an opening where sort of the overall
strategy of how we complete a Europe whole and free.
Essentially the U.S. stepped back in Bucharest, handed the
baton to the EU, and we have seen the Russians use and leverage
that moment--the Georgia war followed, but obviously, I think
this is connected--and opening a strategic vacuum that it could
exploit.
So we have had three moments, three markers where I think
the United States has explicitly sort of handed off. And I
think it drives home the message that clearly the EU is a big
player in the Balkans. It does not work without EU resources,
political capital, vision. But the United States has a special
role here, and it is the partnership of U.S. leadership in
terms of vision with the EU, a common vision which has been
eroded as being credible, a strategy that backs it up, and the
tools the United States can bring on a security side to match
the EU.
Senator Johnson. So let us talk about specifically those
tools, that cooperation, that coordination, not necessarily a
whole lot of relative investment, but it is really diplomatic
engagement. Right? It is being kind of the big dog on the block
and doing everything we can to pressure anti-corruption
efforts. I mean, just describe those. I do not want to put
words in your mouth. But talk about what we actually did.
Obviously, we are $20 trillion in debt. Money is an issue. But
if it is diplomatic efforts, that is far more feasible. I guess
we will start with the same order and then I will turn it over
to Senator Murphy.
Ms. Bajrovic. It sounds good. I would definitely agree with
you that diplomatic engagement is just as important as the
resources. I think one can definitely cannot go without the
other.
If I started giving you examples of when U.S. engagement
made a difference, we could be here almost all day. I mean,
certainly starting from the 1995 intervention, the 1999
intervention.
Most recently, I really would like to actually commend
Deputy Secretary Hoyt Yee's reinvigoration of engagement in the
region and his frequent visits there. And I think somebody had
mentioned earlier that his visit in Macedonia really almost
immediately resulted in our country's presence and taking a
stance on the formation of the new government, and this could
be paving the way of resolving this very prolonged crisis in
Macedonia. And I think seeing more of such engagement from the
U.S. side is going to be absolutely necessary.
There are other examples, more recent examples, if you will
allow me to focus on those. For example, the U.S. sanctions on
the Bosnian Serb nationalist leader, Milorad Dodik, that Dr.
Ruge had already mentioned, for obstructing the implementation
of the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords had an immediate effect on
tampering down his secessionist rhetoric.
And I think that similar mechanisms should be encouraged on
behalf of the United States to be used by our European
colleagues because they were not reciprocated on the European
side, and they should have been. I think that they would have
had much greater effect if there was more coordination and
agreement with our European colleagues on using such
instruments or other targeted measures that do not have to be
personal sanctions but could ensure that those who endanger
stability and breach fundamental rights and norms should not
and cannot benefit from either the U.S. or the EU assistance.
Those would be just some of the examples of U.S. leadership
that I could see.
Senator Johnson. Thank you.
Dr. Ruge?
Dr. Ruge. Thank you, Senator.
When we talk about tools, I guess we have to think about
tools for what, and there are two issues here. One issue is
countering obstruction and countering political behavior which
undermines everything that the U.S. and the EU have helped to
achieve in the Balkans. These tools are mostly political. There
are all different sorts of sticks and carrots. And threat of
sanctions behind the closed doors has, in my experience, proven
to be more effective than sometimes sanctions themselves.
Senator Johnson. What are the best sanctions to threaten?
Travel to the leaders?
Dr. Ruge. Personal wealth, personal and informal
opportunity structures. And this is something that has been
done from 2002 to 2006 extensively.
Senator Johnson. So really targeting the leaders, not the
population.
Dr. Ruge. Not the population. Targeting leaders, targeting
their informal networks, which are very often linked to war
criminals and organized crime, targeting their informal
financial and enterprise networks. So targeting their
interests.
In terms of political tools, obviously there are carrots
and sticks, and the U.S. should rely more heavily on the
international financial institutions. IMF has a huge role in
the Balkans. So does World Bank. EU as well. And so one of the
things that we have seen in this time period was also better
coordination of conditionalities, better coordination of what
these conditionalities are used to back up. And I have provided
some of the recommendations in my written testimony on that.
Then the tools for a different sort of objective, which is
long-term, is obviously rule of law. How do you kind of
transition from just sanctioning corrupt leaders to actually
building up states that are based on respect of rule of law?
And as a friend of mine from the U.S. Institute of Peace
reminded me recently by quoting Gordon Brown, the problem with
rule of law is the first 400 years.
However, what is good news I think is that we are dealing
with countries with relatively small populations. Some of the
countries have populations that are smaller than Walmart
employees. And we are dealing with countries that have
tradition and experience and legal systems that existed before
and they do not require as much, I would say, effort as in
certain places around the world. And there I think both, again,
EU programs have been very valuable.AID has done a lot on
building up the rule of law, and I think it is good to rely on
these agencies.
Senator Johnson. Mr. Wilson?
Mr. Wilson. Senator, if I may, I think the premise of your
question is right, that this is not really just about more
money, resources certainly from our side. And I would say four
quick things.
One is that we have lost the North Star. What is the
clarity of our goal? I mean, if you are sitting the region, the
Balkans, you look and you see uncertainty about the future of
the European Union itself and you see the United States having
a debate about its own commitment to NATO. So I think we begin
with the clarity of our goal, that as reforms succeed in this
region, that we will welcome these countries as part of the
transatlantic community, period, and to help reestablish that
sense of North Star.
Second, the security presence, which is where the U.S.
comes into play, and it is almost as much perception as
reality. If we simply stated, Secretary Mattis stated that our
presence at Camp Bondsteel was not just a part of KFOR and part
of the perspective on how we maintain peace in Kosovo, but just
like our deployment of enhanced forward deployment in Europe's
east, that our presence there was actually part of an enduring
presence to project stability, provide guaranty for the region,
I think that immediately would send a signal, a calming signal,
in the region.
Third, it is balancing this no free pass for the current
leaders that we are not just invested in their stability with
the reality of still competing for these countries and their
leaders. In many respects, a leader like President Vucic of
Serbia--he knows where his bread is buttered. Five percent of
their exports go to Russia; 66 percent to the EU. That is an
inevitable future. And yet, it is Putin that lavishes him with
praise and banquets, and we send in our ambassador to tell him
what he is doing wrong. I think there is an ability for some of
these leaders, some of them who have a populist bent, to
compete with their people and with them.
And the final point is the private sector. One of the most
powerful things that I have watched at a micro level has been
the entry of players like Uber into the market in the Balkans,
a dramatically disruptive private sector force that provides
jobs outside of patronage networks and provides opportunities.
While Uber may be involved in corporate leadership controversy
here, the issue of how you stimulate an entrepreneurship for
folks to actually make their own futures rather than depend on
patronage networks is something that we could lend a hand in.
Senator Johnson. Just to underscore that point, I was in
Montenegro. I guess a survey provided by one of the private
sector guys I was talking to said that 50 percent of
Montenegrin youth wanted to be employed by the government,
which is not exactly a real entrepreneurial spirit.
Senator Murphy?
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Those
are fantastic questions to set the stage here. Let me key off
of the direction that Mr. Wilson took this and maybe run the
question back down the panel.
So I completely buy into the idea that a big piece of the
story line here is a withdrawal of American leadership. You
have all plotted that case very clearly and talked a little bit
about the tools. But it is insufficient as a complete
explanation. I think Mr. Wilson started to give us the other
pieces of this.
So if you are looking at the key time period of 2002, as
Ms. Ruge put it, to 2007 or 2005, whenever it is, there were a
couple of other things that were happening at that point too.
The world economy in about 2007-2008 starts to fall apart, and
people start questioning the future of Europe and its ability
to deal with its problems and the period after Dayton. That is
sort of the golden moment in many ways for Europe. Everybody
sees this as a path. They are watching the Polish economic
renaissance explode. Everybody wants in on a piece of that. At
that time period you are talking about, people's faith in
Europe starts to wane, faith in it starts to pull apart. And
Russia is back on the scene. All of a sudden, there is another
suitor again. In the years after Dayton, as you are making lots
of progress, Russia is weak. Russia is not interested in being
involved in the way they are today in other people's affairs.
Today they are.
I think Mr. Wilson was starting to talk about this, but
just I would love to have the two of you talk about those other
two components, which is that ultimately if Europe is not
confident about their future direction, can U.S. leadership or
U.S. reengagement make up for that fact? I mean, I can argue
that the primary driver of all of that reform was a belief that
they were going to be a big future part of Europe. If they do
not believe that, then it is not clear that the U.S. can make
up for it.
And two, inside the President's budget is massive cuts in
the programs that we use to counter Russian propaganda and the
money that we use to counter Russian energy influence. If we
are not providing real answers for Balkan nations with respect
to Russian interference, are we going to get anywhere?
Those two questions to both of you and then maybe Mr.
Wilson can finish it up.
Ms. Bajrovic. Let me first start just by noting that in
Bosnia--the number that Chairman Johnson mentions in Montenegro
was 50 percent. In Bosnia, it is 70 percent of youth who
consider government employment the only employment.
This question, Senator Murphy, on plan B is something that
we at NED ask ourselves quite a bit. We have also framed a lot
of the assistance that we have been providing to the region for
the past 20 years in EU terms because it is a very useful tool.
It is the one that touches both the leaders and the citizens
themselves. And for a number of reasons, some of which have
been outlined, the pull effect of the EU is definitely waning.
Part of it was this, as I was mentioning, gambled
conditionality. Part of it is the ailments of the EU itself,
both economic and political. The third one, which I think is a
very important one, is these are a series of important signals
that place in doubt the EU's readiness to accept these
countries as full members. And then finally, the fourth
question and the one that is an elephant in the room is the
future of EU itself and does it exist X number of years from
now.
And so it is becoming increasingly more difficult to incur
democratic assistance and democratic processes from this region
even though, yes, this is the most logical and natural thing to
do because, as I was mentioning earlier, the Southeast European
region is right there in the EU's back yard.
If I had the answer to this big question, I would gladly
offer it. But I think for lack of a better one, I would turn to
NATO and I think a very important signal that the Montenegrin
membership has sent. Our grantee from Belgrade, Center for
Euro-Atlantic Studies, someone that I also know the Atlantic
Council very closely works with, argues in their upcoming
report that because of all of these issues with the EU that I
just mentioned, NATO can--and I am quoting this--NATO can and
should be the leading actor of a sustained and comprehensive
process of the region's stabilization and democratization.
There are tools there. There is a potential there, not to
replace the EU accession process, for sure, but certainly to
supplement it and potentially--it will send an important signal
and not just to external actors, for example, as NATO
membership has done, that the region is safely anchored in the
West for as long as the EU accession process itself has
stalled, but it also provides incentives to citizens because it
demonstrates to them what some of these integration processes--
what kind of benefits they come with. And in this case it is
certainly a security prospect when it comes to Montenegro.
On the second part, on the Russian propaganda, I think that
the tackling of the malign foreign influence in this particular
case of Russia and strengthening democracy have to go hand in
hand because I think as all three of us have outlined, it is
really these democratic weaknesses and backsliding that have
opened up the space for malign foreign influence because strong
rule of law, complete accountability, and transparency--all of
these are tools that are going to provide the groundwork for
institutions. I mean, the most important thing here is to
strengthen the institutions that would provide adequate
responses.
I am very well aware of the assistance that is now in the
works to particularly target this Russian disinformation, and I
understand you were crucial in passing this legislation. And I
want to thank you for that. At NED we have used some assistance
that was provided to us by the Congress last year to
strategically tackle this problem of what we call the defending
the integrity of information space. And I could probably go at
length in what types of programs these include.
I have to say that the Southeast Europe region, in terms of
responses to these malign foreign influences and
disinformation, are lagging behind a little bit in comparison
to their counterparts in Central Europe and the Baltic States.
But there is a lot to be learned, and I think that in the
months to come, we will see more work being done on this in our
region.
Senator Murphy. Did you have any thoughts on this?
Dr. Ruge. I have to say this is the question that I ask
myself a lot as well. I can just add to the number of issues
that you have just named by adding Brexit as one further
complicating factor for the EU policy in the Balkans.
The time period that I was talking about was also the time
period when one discussed EU as a non-actor, not able to act
unified on foreign policy. And it was always a couple of
driving EU states, UK having played a particular role in that
time period together with the backing of the U.S. and NATO.
I think what we can say is that given these additional
challenges at an international level, it is even more important
to look at comparative advantages that Europe and the U.S.
have. If we are talking about U.S. slashing the budget of these
sorts of assistances, EU is continuing to support the
institutions in the rule of law sector, and perhaps that should
be outsourced to the EU. But the U.S. political engagement has
always been the most important and determining factor even
during the time period I was talking about. And that, again,
regardless of what we have described or maybe because of all of
these factors, is becoming even more important now.
Senator Murphy. Mr. Wilson, let me ask you to pick up on
two of these points as part of developing this answer. Part of
the solution here can be the United States providing real
support for the continuity of the European experiment. We spent
a lot of time on this subcommittee over the last 4 years
talking about a U.S.-EU trade agreement that would have
increased the attraction of the remaining part of the EU and
increased the attraction of joining it. So there are things
that the United States can do. You mentioned making a clear
argument that NATO is maybe one of the easiest things, but
there are other pieces of U.S. foreign policy that could add to
the attraction and the cohesiveness of the EU.
And then on an ancillary point, I know you said it is not
all about funding, but here are the numbers in the President's
budget. He targets this region for specific pain. You can only
read it as intentional. So here is the governance funding cuts.
Albania gets an 89 percent cut; Bosnia, in crisis as we speak,
a 40 percent cut; Bulgaria, a 75 percent cut; Croatia, 60
percent cut; Kosovo, 48; Macedonia, 40; Montenegro, 34; Serbia,
31.
I know it is not all about funding, but if you are an
ambassador or assistant secretary walking around the region in
2018 trying to get people to listen to you, and your government
just cut 60 percent of the money that you have to fund these
efforts, it is a little bit hard to pull water out of a stone.
So talk about those two pieces.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Senator Murphy.
A couple points on this. Absolutely it is an expression of
further disengagement if we were to go through with budget cuts
of that scale. That would, I think, directly harm our interests
of what we are trying to achieve in this region. And I think if
they were to stand in that form, that would cause problems for
U.S. influence in the region in support of our own interests.
We are not here to make the case that there needs to be a
massive new political commitment, a massive new sort of
security, political, diplomatic, and financial commitments. Our
case is that with a little bit of effort here, we can go a long
way in protecting our interests. We just cannot leave it simply
to excellent ambassadors. We need to give them a little bit of
backup. And so there is a unique opportunity to use what we
have to make an impact, I would say, in the western Balkans.
The big picture is if the EU is no longer attractive or no
longer committed to the idea of its future expansion, it is no
longer the driver for the transformation you need in the
region.
I think it is important for us to go back again to our
role. It was always, as we have discussed, U.S. strategy. And
we have just celebrated the 70th anniversary of the Marshall
Plan. The brilliance of the Marshall Plan was not the money,
although that was relevant. The brilliance of the Marshall Plan
was an American strategy that incentivized in order to get
American taxpayers' money, these countries had to work
together, cooperate economically because we wanted them to not
fight each other again so that we would not have to come back.
Their security meant we would not come back, our security.
Their prosperity meant they were buying American goods, our
prosperity.
This is at stake right now. Is the United States going to
be a driver of European integration? We should have a concerted
effort between Washington and Berlin that is sending a clear
message to the Western Balkans, not an ambivalent one. And that
is lacking right now. I think that is one of the formidable
challenges that we have to get right on the messaging of U.S.
support for an integration process that is in our interest to
see the Western Balkans be part of that narrative.
The last thing I would say is that you mentioned the TTIP
issue. I am reassured that TTIP had not formally had a stake
driven through their heart. We certainly need to get through
German elections. But I would make the case that as we think
about a deal focused on American jobs, growth, prosperity,
given the extent of trade investment, supply chain, they are
doing well with the European Union, which is a bilateral deal,
after all. It is profoundly in our interests. But in this
region, if we would negotiate it in such a way that we say we
are negotiating some kind of new name trade deal, regulatory
deal with Europe, premised on the fact that those countries in
Europe with which the EU has these deep and comprehensive free
trade agreements, that we are negotiating it such that they
would be part of it. And so with the stroke of that negotiating
tactic, we are making our negotiations with Europe about
including both the Western Balkans and countries like Ukraine,
Georgia in our trade strategy.
Senator Johnson. Let me just kind of close out this panel
and make a couple comments.
First of all, we do have co-equal branches, and we are
supposed to have the power of the purse. And this is one fiscal
conservative. The reason I am holding this hearing is to point
out this unique moment in time. This is no time to abandon
Southeastern Europe. Let us not be pennywise and pound foolish.
I mean, that is kind of the whole purpose.
But also, my guess is there may be citizens of these
nations watching this hearing. And I want to give them that
assurance as well. The reason I went to the Brussels Forum, the
reason I went to GLOBESET, the reason I went to Montenegro was
to underscore the support--and I would say it is bipartisan
support. Look what we did in Ukraine, the fact that we had
bipartisan delegations going to Ukraine to provide the kind of
support we did unanimously for Ukraine. We do understand in
Congress here how important our relationship with Europe is.
You know, from my standpoint, I am all for free and fair trade,
and we have worked together in terms of certainly promoting
TTIP as well.
So I want to thank the witnesses for your testimony, for
your support of the region. And I certainly want to assure the
region that they do have a great deal of support in Congress
for not only the funding but I think the leadership and the
reengagement to do everything we can to provide what I would
consider the three pillars--help them provide the three pillars
of economic progress. And it is security, and it is both
national and defense security, but also security from the
standpoint of lack of corruption and the rule of law. And then
everything we can to try and provide the example of
entrepreneurial spirit so you have a lower percentage of young
people in those nations that actually want to get involved in
companies like Uber, the real things that drive an economy. And
then capital. The only way you are going to have capital
flowing to the West is if, for example, American companies
realize there is not corruption, we can follow the law, and you
can actually make those investments and realize there is going
to be some certainty there.
So, again, this hearing is really all about, first of all,
understanding what the issue is, what the problems are, what we
need to do in terms of reengagement, but also hopefully to
signal to Southeast Europe you got support. We want to
reengage, and we know that it is important that we do reengage.
So with that, I want to thank the witnesses, and we will
call our final witness on our next panel.
Well, it looks like our next panel of one is seated and all
supplied up. So I want to welcome Mr. Hoyt Yee. Mr. Yee is the
Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs at
the Department of State. Mr. Yee is a career member of the
Senior Foreign Service and has served as the Deputy Chief of
Mission at the U.S. embassy in Croatia, Counsel General in--you
can say that name of the city in Greece--and Principal Officer
in Montenegro, amongst other assignments. Mr. Yee, welcome.
STATEMENT OF HOYT BRIAN YEE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU
OF EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Yee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me begin by just expressing, on behalf of my colleagues
at the State Department, our sympathies, our best wishes to
your colleagues who were injured in the incident in Alexandria
this morning. Our hearts go out to the members and also the law
enforcement officials who were injured, and we wish them a
speedy recovery.
Thank you much for inviting me to appear before you today
to discuss the challenges we see in the Western Balkans and our
strategy for mitigating them.
The region is facing its most serious challenges since the
1990s which, left unchecked, could have grave consequences for
the Western Balkans, wider Europe, and the United States.
The Western Balkans face a number of threats. Fragile
institutions, shortcomings in the rule of law, and unfree media
have facilitated endemic corruption. This corruption endangers
these young democracies and opens pathways for destabilizing
actors, including violent extremists, organized criminal
groups, and countries seeking to exert malign influence. We
believe much more needs to be done to mitigate these dangerous
vulnerabilities.
Internal problems such as systemic corruption have opened
the door to external threats such as Russia, which is intent on
thwarting efforts by countries in the region to pursue a Euro-
Atlantic path. Moscow exploits the region's heavy dependence on
Russian gas and hydrocarbons, endemic corruption, feeble rule
of law, a weak media sector, and unresolved political or
territorial disputes to pressure governments and political
parties and discourage Western-oriented reform.
Compounding the external threat posed by Russia is the
potential growth of violent extremism. According to open source
reporting, 750 to perhaps as many as 950 foreign fighters have
traveled from the region to Syria and Iraq since 2012. While
the number of departing foreign terrorist fighters has
significantly declined, it is clear that the Balkans remain a
focus for ISIS recruitment efforts.
These continued challenges are formidable, but we have been
active in helping the countries of the region confront them. We
are taking steps to shore up rule of law and stamp out
corruption by assisting our partners to accelerate their needed
reforms. With our assistance, Albania is implementing wide-
ranging judicial reforms. Montenegro is cracking down on
corruption, and Serbia is closing loopholes that allow for
public graft.
Across the Balkans, we are working to spur economic growth
with programs aimed at integrating and harmonizing regional
markets and increasing access to capital. We are also urging
political leaders and criminal justice institutions to show the
will and courage to aggressively investigate, prosecute, and
punish corrupt actors and the organized crime groups they
protect.
At the same time, we have developed a full-spectrum
approach to push back against Russian malign influence. To
combat Russia's aggressive propaganda machine, we are
amplifying our messages, correcting false narratives, and
supporting independent media and investigative journalists.
To make the region more independent, we are promoting
projects such as the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline, the KrK Island
liquid natural gas terminal, and the Bulgaria-Serbia
Interconnector. Through these projects, we will help enable
Balkan countries to import gas from multiple sources, limiting
an important source of Russian influence. Additionally, we are
using our military assistance programs to build up the human
capital of militaries of the region and offering options that
allow these countries to move away from over-dependence on
Russian military equipment.
We are also working to counter the spread of violent
extremism and end ISIS' influence in the Western Balkans. As
Secretary Tillerson has said, ISIS is not more powerful than we
are when we stand together. Our partners recognize this, which
is why every country in the region has joined the Defeat-ISIS
Coalition, criminalized foreign terrorist fighting, and
established dedicated counterterrorism units. Due to these
efforts and in part because of our capacity building
assistance, the flow of foreign terrorist fighters to Syria and
Iraq has significantly decreased over the past 2 years. As we
continue to strengthen our law enforcement relationships, our
partners are also arresting foreign terrorist fighters and
breaking up ISIS plots in the region.
In conclusion, creating stability and progress in the
Western Balkans is not an impossible task. With our and
Europe's active engagement, over the past month, we have seen
some real successes as Montenegro has joined NATO with the help
of the Senate, of course, Macedonian leaders have come together
to form a new government, the Albanian opposition agreed to end
its boycott and participate in elections on June 25, and Serbia
is on track to open two new EU accession chapters this month.
However, we also know there is much work to be done.
A stable, prosperous Western Balkans that is integrated
into Europe and serves as a strong partner on counterterrorism
will help make America more safe, provide opportunities for
U.S. businesses, and ensure peace in the region. To accomplish
this goal, the countries of the Western Balkans need to commit
themselves to the deep reforms needed to join Euro-Atlantic
institutions and resist foreign malign influence, terrorism,
and other external threats.
Thank you very much.
[Mr. Yee's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hoyt Yee
Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Murphy, and members of the
committee, thank you for inviting me to appear before you today to
discuss the challenges that we see in the Western Balkans and our
strategy for mitigating them. I would like to express my sincere
gratitude to the Senate and this committee for your interest in the
Western Balkans, where the United States is focused on seeing through
our shared vision of a Europe that is whole, free, and at peace.
We have a long history of good relations with the countries of the
Western Balkans. Each country in the region is a member of the Defeat-
ISIS Coalition, a strong partner on counter-terrorism, and a reliable
counterpart in efforts to limit the spread of violent extremism.
However, the region is facing its most serious challenges since the
1990s, as countries confront both external and internal threats that,
left unchecked, could have serious consequences for the Western
Balkans, Europe, and the United States.
Challenges
The Western Balkans faces a number of threats, as internal
weaknesses have led to external vulnerabilities. Fragile institutions,
shortcomings in the rule of law, poor governance, and unfree media have
facilitated endemic corruption that taints nearly every aspect of
society. This endangers these young democracies and opens pathways for
potentially destabilizing actors - including violent extremists,
organized criminal groups, and countries exerting malign influence,
like Russia.
Countries across the region score poorly on Transparency
International's corruption perceptions index, ranging from a low of 36,
in the case of Kosovo, to a high of 49, in the case of Croatia - out of
100. The OECD average is 68. Macedonia is perhaps the best example of
how weak institutions can breed corruption-in Macedonia's case,
political corruption resulted in a 2015 wiretapping scandal that was
the genesis of a two-year long political crisis. Bosnia provides
another example. Nationalist leaders in Republika Srpska have tried to
exploit weak state-level institutions in order to advance divisive
policies that could lead to a return to violence. Bosniak and Bosnian-
Croat leaders often exhibit similarly provocative or unhelpful
behavior. We believe Bosnia-Herzegovina needs much more political and
economic reform to mitigate this dangerous vulnerability.
Internal problems in the Western Balkans open the door to external
threats, such as Russia, which is intent on thwarting efforts by
countries in the region to pursue their Euro-Atlantic path. A
particular concern is Russian malign influence, or RMI, in Europe - the
covert or semi-covert support for political parties, the use of front
groups, and low-profile investments meant to build political influence
non-transparently - all under an umbrella of propaganda and
disinformation. Some of this is straight from the old Soviet playbook,
but updated for the digital age, and taking full advantage of new
technologies. RMI is a key part of Moscow's efforts in the Balkans,
alongside more conventional diplomatic tools.
Moscow exploits the region's heavy dependence on Russian gas,
endemic corruption and feeble rule of law, a weak media sector, cyber-
security vulnerabilities, ongoing reliance on Russian-spec military
equipment, ethnic differences and unresolved political or territorial
disputes to pressure governments and political parties and discourage
Western-oriented reform. Unfortunately, Russia seems less interested in
promoting economic development and good governance in the Western
Balkans than in holding back or weakening a region still in a
precarious state following years of strife.
Compounding the external threat posed by Russian meddling in the
region, the Western Balkans faces the challenge of dealing with the
potential growth of violent extremism. According to open source
reporting, 750 to perhaps as many as 950 foreign fighters, mostly from
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia, have traveled
from the region to Syria and Iraq since 2012. While the number of
departing foreign terrorist fighters has significantly decreased over
the last two years, it is clear that the Balkans remains a focus for
ISIS recruitment efforts. ISIS, which, as President Trump has said,
represents one of the "most vicious and aggressive" threats we face,
has implemented a propaganda campaign in the region and has encouraged
those who cannot travel to Syria and Iraq to carry out attacks in their
home countries or Western Europe.
The governments of the region are often not fully equipped to deal
with this challenge on their own. For example, law enforcement and
border security officials, intelligence experts, and prosecutors
struggle to work together to identify and disrupt ISIS and terrorist
plotting. Borders in the region remain porous, and the transit of
foreign fighters both north to Western Europe and south to Iraq and
Syria continues to pose a significant vulnerability to our security
interests in the region, wider Europe, and to the homeland. Several
countries lack the cyber expertise to analyze seized electronics and
monitor online activities. Once terrorists are put in prison, many
countries lack the training and resources needed to rehabilitate them
and prevent the spread of radicalization to violence. It is also
critical to identify vulnerable populations and directly address the
root-causes of extremist ideologies. Finally, many countries also lack
capacity to counter and prevent terrorist messaging, or to identify
vulnerable individuals and intervene in recruitment process.
Addressing Internal Challenges
These continued challenges are formidable, but we have been active
in helping the countries of the region to confront them. Perhaps most
importantly, we are taking steps to shore up rule of law and stamp out
corruption in the region by pressing our partners to accelerate needed
reforms and providing targeted assistance. For example, with our
assistance, Albania is implementing wide-ranging judicial reforms that
will dramatically strengthen the rule of law and reduce wide-spread
corruption. Montenegro's new Office of the Special Prosecutor has
cracked down on corruption within the government, bringing charges
against nine senior officials and opening investigations against
several dozen more. In Serbia, a USAID program has helped streamline
business inspections and automate the building permit process, a reform
that was partially responsible for Serbia moving up 44 spots in the
World Bank's Ease of Doing Business survey over the past two years, to
number 47 in the world. We are urging political leaders and
criminaljustice institutions to show the will and courage to far more
aggressively investigate, prosecute, and punish corrupt actors and the
organized crime groups they protect.
Across the Balkans, we are working to spur economic growth by
improving the business climate. We are fostering communication between
the business community and the government, leading to improved
regulatory systems, decreased red tape, and a more level playing field
for foreign investors. We are also helping the countries of the western
Balkans to develop more competitive economies through both regional and
bilateral assistance. Our assistance is aimed at integrating and
harmonizing regional markets, with a special focus on bolstering
linkages with the EU. This will increase private sector competitiveness
by targeting key regional value chains, such as IT, tourism, and
agribusiness, and improve financial sector stability and growth,
notably by expanding capital market integration and increasing access
to capital for small- and medium-sized enterprises.
We are also pushing the region to make the needed reforms that will
transform their countries into stable, prosperous societies. In
Montenegro, we worked with the government to help it make the reforms
needed to join NATO. Though Bosnia's political institutions are still
deeply dysfunctional, we are working with leaders there and with some
of our European partners to encourage much-needed political reforms
before the 2018 election. And we have been a strong backer of the EU-
led Serbia-Kosovo Dialogue, with the goal of normalizing and advancing
each country's progress on their respective European paths.
Mitigating Russian Malign Influence
We have developed a full-spectrum approach to push back against
Russian malign influence. To combat Russia's wide-spread propaganda
machine, we are amplifying our messages, correcting false statements,
and supporting independent media and investigative journalists. .
In order to make the countries of the region more independent, we
are supporting projects and promoting policies focused on energy
security and diversity. Currently, the Western Balkans is almost
entirely dependent on Russia for natural gas. This dominance of the
natural gas market leaves the region vulnerable to exploitation.
Without alternate energy sources and a more diversified energy
infrastructure, Russia will continue to hold this powerful lever. By
supporting projects such as the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline, the Krk Island
Liquid Natural Gas terminal, and the Bulgaria-Serbia Interconnector, we
will help enable Balkan countries to import gas from multiple sources,
limiting an important source of Russian influence. Taking full
advantage of these investments will require regulatory reforms and the
construction of regional interconnectors. This will completely
transform the market, allowing countries to import gas efficiently from
a variety of sources. Our support toward greater economic integration
with Europe helps strengthen the relationship of Western Balkan
countries with the West and limits Russia's ability to manipulate them
through economic levers. Strengthening the financial sector, improving
regulation and supervision, and increasing the adherence to
international standards builds resilience and improves access to
finance, thus minimizing weaknesses Russia can exploit . We are also
using our military assistance programs to counteract Russian influence
by building up the human capital of militaries of the region and
offering options that allow countries to move away from over-dependence
on Russian military equipment.
Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism
We are also working to counter the spread of violent extremism and
end ISIS's influence in the Western Balkans. The countries of the
region recognize, as Secretary Tillerson has said, that "ISIS is not
more powerful than we are when we stand together." That is why every
country in the Western Balkans has joined the Defeat-ISIS Coalition.
Each has also criminalized foreign terrorist fighting, developed or is
in the process of developing national countering violent extremism
strategies, and established dedicated counterterrorism units. As a
result of these efforts, and, in part, because of our capacity building
assistance, the flow of foreign terrorist fighters to Syria and Iraq
has significantly decreased over the past two years. As we continue to
strengthen our law enforcement relationships, our partners are also
arresting foreign terrorist fighters and breaking up ISIS plots in the
region.
We appreciate Congress' continued support in providing resources
for these programs, which enhance our national security interests, and
help our partners to address today's evolving transnational threats.
This is a long-term project with no "one-size fits all" strategy.
However, we are committed to the task, and expect to see continued
progress in this area.
Conclusion
It is clear that the countries in the Western Balkans face serious
challenges. However, creating stability and progress in the region is
not an impossible task. In fact, with our and Europe's active
engagement, over the past month Montenegro has joined NATO, Macedonian
leaders have come together to form a new government, the Albanian
opposition agreed to end its boycott and participate in elections on
June 25, and Serbia is on track to open two new EU accession chapters
this month. Yet, we also understand that there is much work to be done.
A stable, prosperous Western Balkans that is integrated into Europe
and a strong partner on counter-terrorism will help make America more
safe, provide opportunities for U.S. businesses, and ensure peace in
the region. To accomplish this goal, the countries of the region need
to commit themselves to the deep reforms needed to make their societies
a success. But we also need to help them make the necessary reforms and
push back against foreign malign influence, terrorism, and other
external threats. Our goals in the Balkans are ambitious, but we are
committed to seeing the region integrated into the European family of
democratic, prosperous nations and partnered with the United States in
advancing our common interests.
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Secretary Yee.
When I was in the region, all the meetings I have been
taking here in Washington, D.C., the theme is very consistent.
We really are at a moment in time here because of the lack of
engagement or the reduced engagement, they really are
concerned. These countries are concerned that you could be at a
tipping point here.
I know you were just in the region. Are you hearing the
exact same thing? Is this something the State Department
recognizes? Is it something the Secretary and the President
recognize that we have a moment in time? We cannot allow
Southeast Europe, the Balkans to slip into the wrong category.
Mr. Yee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for that question.
Yes, we do hear the same thing, and I hear the same. When I
was in the region recently, the countries of the Western
Balkans are very eager for more engagement from America, more
from the European Union. They believe very strongly in the need
for additional help in terms of assistance but also political
support for what they are trying to achieve, which is reform in
the majority of the countries and also progress towards
reaching integration with the European Union and NATO.
As the Secretary mentioned yesterday in his testimony, he
is aware of a need for engagement in the Baltics and in the
Balkans particularly with relation to Russian malign influence.
But in general, the State Department is committed, remains
committed to helping the Balkans move forward on the goals that
he has set forward and we are supporting.
Senator Johnson. Traveling in the region, obviously I was
concerned about the foreign fighters and influence of ISIS. I
was actually comforted by--I do not want to minimize the
problem, but it was not as great a concern to those countries.
They really think they have it pretty well under control. Do
you share that assessment?
Mr. Yee. I believe that most of the countries of the
Western Balkans still need significant assistance from the
West, particularly the European Union and the United States.
One example is in the area of foreign terrorist fighters where
the region has been successful in reducing the number over the
last couple of years. But what I tell interlocutors in the
governments in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, for example, is
that it is no time to be complacent. The problem, the origins,
the sources of violent extremism and therefore the possibility
of foreign terrorist fighters still exist and need to be
addressed. So I think while there is some room for not
celebrating but I think recognizing the progress made, it is no
time to be complacent. We need to continue to be vigilant, but
also active in strengthening the institutions which will push
back against violent extremism, against Russian malign
influence, against other actors who are acting against what the
countries of the region in the Western Balkans are trying to
achieve.
Senator Johnson. I think probably the best way to counter
violent extremism in any of its forms is through economic
opportunity. When I was in Montenegro--I do not believe you
were here when I said it--a private survey showed that 50
percent of young Montenegrins want to work for the government.
We had a witness, Ms. Bajrovic, who said that in her home
country, Bosnia, the percentage is 70 percent. To a guy from
the private sector, an entrepreneur myself, that is shocking.
It is actually kind of depressing, and it does, to a certain
extent, point to the lure of what Russia's propaganda is all
about. They promise falsely some sense of security.
Can you speak to me? What can we possibly do to help really
change that dynamic?
Mr. Yee. Well, Mr. Chairman, I agree the wish of the youth
of the countries in the Western Balkans for working in the
public sector, for the government in particular, is not
sustainable economically. The governments simply cannot have
the kind of public administrations and state-run enterprises
that would be able to sustain that many young people. And it
also, of course, retards innovation and entrepreneurism, which
is necessary to improve the economies.
I think the types of remedies, the types of alternatives
that need to be explored are in opening up the economies to the
kinds of open markets and economic policies that we see in
Central Europe and Western Europe where it is possible to start
a business without being politically connected or having to pay
a bribe, where young people can get jobs based on merit not on
affiliation with a particular party. And that is,
unfortunately, the prevalent basis for getting employment in
many of the countries of the Western Balkans. It is political
connections or affiliation.
So once the standards that the EU requires and NATO, to a
certain extent, also requires for open democratic-based
economies and systems of governance, there can be greater
opportunity. So I think we need to continue the kind of
assistance we are providing to open up the markets, to bring
Western standards whether it is judiciary--as you know as a
business person, it is absolutely essential for businesses to
know they can have legal redress. In many countries of the
Western Balkans, it is very difficult. So the level of foreign
investment, while slowly increasing, is not increasing fast
enough to create jobs for the young people who are now seeking
jobs in the public sector. So if we can attract more foreign
investment, that will address a large part of the problem.
Senator Johnson. To what extent does the State Department
sponsor things like trade missions, but also just mentoring
opportunities? In Montenegro, for example, they produce cheese.
And I have actually talked to some cheese producers, some
retired executives who say you want a really nice couple months
in a beautiful country mentoring young potential entrepreneurs
and basically conveying your analogy of what it takes to start
a business. Is the State Department engaged in any of those
types of activities at all?
Mr. Yee. Yes, Mr. Chairman. The State Department and the
Commerce Department are both very interested in attracting
potential American businesses to do either direct investments
or ventures with countries in the Western Balkans.
However, I would say we always inject a note of caution
when we speak to American businesses because in many cases, the
environment, the conditions for foreign investment are not up
to the standards that we feel comfortable promoting. So, quite
frankly, in some of the countries, our emphasis now is not in
attracting American companies, but in working with the
governments to improve the conditions, whether it is rule of
law, independent judiciary, law enforcement, just basic
regulation or lack thereof that is necessary for companies to
succeed.
In some countries, there is a great deal of foreign
investment. In Serbia, recently a large investment. In Bosnia-
Herzegovina, there are some slow increases in interest from
American companies. But these tend to be some of the more
adventuresome or risk non-averse companies. We would like to
see the conditions improve so we can attract companies from
Wisconsin and other States that may be able to do some good
business in places like the Balkans.
Senator Johnson. I completely agree with you. The first
step is you have to make a country an attractive place for
investing their risk capital.
Senator Murphy?
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Good to see you, Mr. Secretary.
There is a total disconnect between the case you are making
and the array of challenges that need increased resources in
the budget that has been submitted. Before you got here, I laid
out the cuts that target the Balkans that would effectively
shut down the State Department's non-consular operations. I do
not imagine you support those cuts, and I think they are dead
on arrival. So it is not necessarily worth spending time asking
you about it. I would just make the point.
Let me ask you about the trend lines you are seeing in
Russian interest in the region. I think I have met with a
representative of every country in the region. And when they
come to my office, they want to talk about one story line,
which is rapid U.S. disengagement from the region. You are
doing yeoman's work, but they are worried that we are sending a
signal with these budget cuts with our lack of support for
NATO, with our criticism of our EU allies that we are not
interested in the region any longer, and a response by the
Russians to jump in. In every single country, they have very
concrete examples of places in which the Russians just in the
last 6 months--in the last 8 months are much more involved in
message development, in support for opposition groups than they
were even last year. And they were involved at a very pretty
fevered pitch the last year.
Are you seeing increased Russian involvement in media, in
political activities in many of these countries? Have you seen
a difference this year compared to last year? What is the trend
line?
Mr. Yee. Thank you, Senator Murphy, for the question.
The answer is yes. We do see increasing Russian interest
and activity in the Western Balkans. The most obvious example--
I am not sure if other witnesses mentioned it--was in
Montenegro where October 16th, the election day in Montenegro,
was severely marred by an attempt, which was foiled, by Russian
or Russian-supported actors who tried to undermine the
elections and probably undermine the government, if not
actually overthrow the government or even assassinate the prime
minister.
This is, I think, consistent with where we have seen Russia
trying to interfere in elections around the world, around
Europe, including our own country. It is consistent with
Russia's attempts to prevent countries of the Western Balkans
from joining NATO, from integrating further with the Euro-
Atlantic institutions. We are seeing through rhetoric, through
misinformation, through the media supported by Russian attempts
to spread the kind of ideology or policies that are directed
against NATO, directed against the West. And I think all the
countries that are striving to join EU and NATO are aware of
this. It is not something that anyone is protected from or
cloistered from.
So we are working together with the countries of the
Western Balkans to address the malign influence from Russia.
This is a wide-spectrum approach to addressing the false
narratives, addressing the lies that are being spread by
Russian or pro-Russian media, addressing the kinds of attempts
with direct attempts to influence the governments through
either bribery or other means.
We have to be present, as you said, Senator. Our diplomats,
our ambassadors and their staffs need to be present with
meetings with all the members of the government, but also the
opposition. We need to be present in the media. We need to be
providing advice, best practices, which we are doing.
So I think the trend is concerning. I do not think we are
necessarily losing because I think the Russians are also
finding that countries are resilient. Montenegro was able to
resist with assistance from its partners, its friends, and now
allies. Other countries where Russia is attempting--Macedonia,
for example, I think is a country that was facing a very
difficult situation only a few weeks ago, but the political
parties made the right decision I think with a lot of help from
us and from the European Union, reached an agreement to form a
new government.
Senator Murphy. Let me turn to the question of
radicalization for a moment from a very widely read ``New York
Times'' article from last year. That article made the case that
Saudi Arabia and other conservative Gulf States, ``use an
obscure labyrinth network of donations from charities, private
individuals, and government ministries to fund extremist
clerics and associations in the Balkans.'' Frequent visitors to
the Balkans will tell you that just visually you can see a
change in the type of Islam that is being practiced as more and
more women, for instance, are walking around the streets
wearing head covering.
Do you share the concern about funds flowing from the Gulf
into the Balkans? Do you share a concern about the story line
that connects the Wahabi influence inside the region to the
increased radicalization and flow of foreign fighters out of
the region?
Mr. Yee. Senator, yes, I am concerned by the presence of
funding of representatives from countries in the Gulf who
appear to be supporting their religious schools or actors with
extremist ideologies. I think it is important for us to be
vigilant to see what actual effects this achieves. As I
mentioned, we have to monitor the level of foreign fighters,
which currently is on the decline and at a low level, but with
the number of actors, influences from countries that have a
more radical or extremist ideology, we can expect that there
will be some challenges.
What is important I think on the positive side is that
governments, whether it is Bosnia-Herzegovina or Kosovo or
Albania, are aware of the risks that extremism places on them,
on their societies, and they are working with us, with European
partners as well, to try to mitigate these influences.
I would mention that in Bosnia-Herzegovina where I was last
week, many of the interlocutors I spoke to made the distinction
between a rise in a kind of middle class tourism from Gulf
States that visit Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is a country they feel
comfortable in. They are investing in real estate. They come
for vacation. They are not necessarily engaged in any kind of
extremism. So there are, I think, some benign trends as well
that we need to distinguish from the extremists.
Senator Murphy. Just one last quick question on a specific
issue. Should we be concerned--this is in Serbia--about the
Russian-funded humanitarian base in Nis, Serbia? Is this a
humanitarian base or is this a military base that the Russians
now have inside Serbia?
Mr. Yee. Senator Murphy, yes, I am concerned by this so-
called humanitarian center not so much what it is now but what
it might become if it receives what Russia has been asking from
Serbia, which is some kind of special status, protected
diplomatic status, or other immunity.
We do not believe that Russia has good intentions from our
standpoint in our context which is trying to help the Balkans
move closer to its goal of integration with Europe. We believe
Russia is trying to prevent that path, progress on that path.
So the creation of some kind of center in Nis, very close to
the border with Kosovo where we still have over 600 U.S.
troops--there is a large, over 4,000 NATO-led peacekeeping
force--would not be a positive development, especially if
individuals or the facility itself had special immunity. We
believe it is important--we have shared this with the
Government of Serbia--for Serbia to be in full control of its
territory and facilities on its territory. If it allows Russia
to create some kind of special center for espionage or other
nefarious activities, it will lose control over part of its
territory.
Senator Murphy. I hope all of our friends in the region
understand that it is in Russia's interest to see conflict in
that region, to test alliances, to test NATO, to test America
and Europe's commitment to that region. That ultimately is not
in our interest or not in our partners' interest there, but it
unfortunately is in Russia's interest.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Johnson. Senator Shaheen?
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
you and Ranking Member Murphy for holding the hearing today. I
am sorry I was not able to get to the first panel because of a
conflict, but I very much appreciate your being here, Mr. Yee,
and your personal commitment to the Western Balkans and
everything that you have done to address what is happening
there.
I think you were probably very humble about your role in
the recent political stalemate in Macedonia. I understand that
you personally helped to bring about a peaceful resolution. And
I wonder if you could give us a sense of how the crisis there
was ultimately resolved and whether there are lessons for
future situations in Macedonia that we can apply both there and
other countries in the Western Balkans.
Mr. Yee. Thank you for that question, Senator Shaheen, and
your kind words.
I think there are some lessons that we can draw from the
Macedonia experience, and I think the lessons begin from the
beginning of the political crisis in that country back over 2
years ago, early 2015, when the revelations through leaked
wiretaps came out of widespread apparent government corruption.
I think one of the first lessons is one of the most serious
and prevalent problems in the Western Balkans is lack of strong
rule of law and systemic corruption. And that needs to be
addressed because it prevents so many other things from
developing.
Secondly, I think the lesson that we can draw is how the
crisis was resolved. It was done in very close partnership
between the European Union and the United States in helping the
parties reach an agreement on how to move forward. And this was
the July 2015 Przino Accord which the four major parties agreed
as a way forward of how to get out of the crisis, how to hold
accountable the persons implicated in the wiretapping scandal,
and also how to hold elections to create a new government. It
was a cooperative approach with the international community,
the stakeholders who had the most to lose or to gain, and the
parties themselves, including the party that was in power
during the scandal's beginning.
I think the transatlantic link, the cooperation between
both sides of the Atlantic was critical, and that is an
important lesson I think that applies everywhere. Where the
U.S. and Europe are together, we usually do pretty well in
handling problems. When we are not together, we have problems.
Thirdly, I think the lesson I think we can draw from the
Macedonia experience is that accountability is something that
is lacking, unfortunately, and needs to be more prominent in
our approach and I think the approach of the Western Balkan
governments. And that is to say that not enough times where
people who are committing crimes, whether it is corruption or
otherwise, or governments and leaders who are not meeting their
commitments to the international community, are not held
responsible.
And I think this is very important, and this addresses
somewhat our approach, a new approach, what I believe our new
approach should be in the Balkans is in ensuring that if
leaders are violating the law or they are not meeting their
commitments, whether it is the Dayton Accords or the Ohrid
Agreement in Macedonia, that there will be consequences. And I
think we made that clear, both the Europeans and we did, that
we would not accept crisis lasting forever, that if leaders
were going to obstruct the agreement, whether the conclusion of
the agreement or the implementation, they would be held
accountable. And that was very important in reaching I think
what ended up being a good outcome.
And lastly, I think the lesson that we can draw from that
experience is the importance of standards. We, as you probably
know, Senator, were faced with a difficult situation last year
when the Macedonians wanted to have elections. They organized
elections for April of last year that did not, in the
international community's view, meet the standards necessary to
say they were credible. And there were many voices saying just
let them have the elections anyway. It is important to have the
elections. And the United States and Europe insisted that the
conditions be sufficiently credible so that we could afterwards
say they were credible elections.
The government backed down and postponed the elections
until June. And in June, again the same problem because of
still a lack of transparency, problems with voters lists, other
issues with the elections. Conditions were not sufficient, and
the international community held its ground and said the
standards are not there yet.
So one of the lessons I think we have drawn is--and
eventually, of course, in December we had elections that have
produced now what is a government, which was formed again with
the help of the European Union and the United States, that it
was worth waiting until the conditions were met.
And as we help countries to resolve their political
difficulties, get closer to NATO or the European Union, it is
important that we continue to hold them accountable to
standards. It is important they make the reforms necessary,
they solve the problems that we all know exist so that they
will, in the end, be ready to integrate with the West.
Senator Shaheen. Well, and one of the places where we are
trying to hold people accountable is in the Republika Srpska
where the Treasury Department imposed sanctions on Dodik for
defying Bosnian law and obstructing the Dayton Accords.
Can you talk about or do we know--I know that his
leadership in the Republika Srpska has been an issue for a very
long time in terms of trying sometimes to inflame ethnic
tensions and talking about separating Srpska from the rest of
Bosnia-Herzegovina. But are there others encouraging him at
this point to be even more strident in his efforts to do that?
Mr. Yee. Thank you, Senator.
I think one of the major encouragers of the president of
the Republika Srpska is Russia. I think Russia, along the lines
I mentioned earlier about trying to prevent countries from
integrating further with the West, with NATO, the European
Union, would like to see a situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina in
which the country cannot move forward. I do not know whether
Russia would actually like to see Republika Srpska secede from
Bosnia-Herzegovina because that would probably be a violent,
disruptive, highly destabilizing event. But I think it is in
Russia's interest to see the country stagnate and to remain
more or less where it is right now, which is not moving very
quickly towards the European Union or NATO.
But the politicians have to take responsibility. They are
being encouraged by some outside factors, but I think leaders
of the Republika Srpska, of the federation in Bosnia-
Herzegovina do have it within their power, within their
authority, within their capabilities to make the reforms
necessary to get to the next stage of European Union
membership. And I think one of the sad facts in Bosnia-
Herzegovina is that many of the leaders, not all of them, but
many of the leaders do not actually want to join the European
Union because that would mean, unfortunately, for them an end
to their way of doing business, of staying in power. So,
unfortunately, Bosnia-Herzegovina is a bit of a captured state
in the hands of corrupt politicians who do not want to give up
power. And what we will need to do I think, so the situation
does not drag on forever, is to hold accountable the leadership
to work even more closely with the European Union in applying
standards, to ensure that the reforms are done, that we are
providing sufficient assistance because that is essential, but
that it is used in the right way.
And one of the highlights, I would say, one of the positive
developments we have seen in Bosnia-Herzegovina is that the
International Monetary Fund, with our strong support, has
insisted that the Bosnian-Herzegovinan leadership make certain
reforms before the country receives the next tranche of
assistance. So for the last several months now, Bosnia has not
received the tranche of IMF assistance because it has not been
able to agree on the reforms. This is how, I think, we can get
results if we have conditionality, if we hold the leadership
accountable.
Senator Shaheen. Are you going to do another round, Mr.
Chairman? Can I continue to ask a few more questions?
Senator Johnson. Go ahead.
Senator Shaheen. What role has Serbia played with the
Republika Srpska in terms of what is currently happening there?
Mr. Yee. Well, Prime Minister Vucic, who was recently
elected to be President--Prime Minister Vucic did intervene and
express both publicly and privately to the President of
Republika Srpska that it was not in Serbia's interest. Serbia
did not want to see a referendum, an illegal referendum, that
Republika Srpska did hold last September. It was a referendum
that was illegal because it was against a constitutional court
ruling directly, blatantly in violation of the constitutional
court. But the leadership of Republika Srpska went ahead
anyway.
So I think we had assistance support from Prime Minister
Vucic to try to deter this act from occurring, and I believe it
is based on interests. It is certainly not in Serbia's interest
to see a breakaway state and a weak Bosnia-Herzegovina as
Serbia is trying to join the European Union to attract tourism,
to attract foreign investment.
Senator Shaheen. But that kind of effort to help with what
is going on there is helpful. Would you not agree? I remember
being in Croatia as they were finishing their accession to the
EU, and they were talking about ways in which they were trying
to help some of their neighbors as they were looking at the
challenges they were facing with accession efforts. And I got a
very strong sense from others that I visited with at the time
that that was very helpful to have countries in the region
trying to support each other.
Mr. Yee. Thank you, Senator.
Absolutely the countries of the region and Serbia
especially I would say, as the largest country in the region,
need to play a constructive role in trying to mend fences with
neighbors, resolve bilateral differences, whether it is over
war crimes or with Kosovo, for example, resolving the status or
the normalization, as we call it, between the two countries. It
is vital that Serbia be firmly on the path towards European
Union membership, closer integration with the West, looking
forward not backwards. We understand it will always have ties,
historical, cultural ties, with Russia, but that should not
preclude it from moving in the direction of where already by
nature of its trade, all of its commerce, foreign direct
investment coming from Europe, not from Russia, a difference of
an order of magnitude more is with Europe. Clearly Serbia's
future is in Europe.
It is in our interest for Serbia not only to integrate with
Europe but also to help resolve problems with neighbors.
Already with Montenegro now--it separated with Montenegro in
2006 with Montenegro becoming independent. Croatia now is a
member of the European Union, in a position to help Serbia we
hope, as you mentioned, get closer to meeting the standards
necessary. And in particular, I want to emphasize how important
it is for Serbia to continue its work with Pristina, with
Kosovo to find a way to normalize relations so the two
countries can both move forward on their accession paths to the
European Union.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you very much. I certainly
agree with that.
And I agree with the views expressed by Senator Murphy that
continued American leadership in the Western Balkans is very
important and support for what the countries there are trying
to do and that it is not beneficial in those efforts for us to
be looking at a budget that would cut dramatically our support
for those efforts.
One of the pieces of legislation that I have proposed with
Senator Wicker is establishing an enterprise fund in Bosnia to
help leverage our funding to promote private investment. Do you
think that this is an effort that is helpful as we look at how
we can contribute to other economic activity in some of the
countries in the region?
Mr. Yee. Thank you, Senator, for asking that and also for
supporting this initiative.
We believe that Bosnia-Herzegovina desperately needs
assistance in developing a stronger economy based on a private
sector as opposed to the public sector. And any initiative,
including the one that you mentioned, Senator, would be
welcomed.
What is particularly important is, as I mentioned earlier,
that Bosnia-Herzegovina understand that regardless of how much
assistance we are able to provide, whether EU or U.S., if they
do not have the conditions, if there is not a functioning
judiciary--the judiciary is highly flawed now--if there is not
bureaucratic regulation that permits businesses to open or for
businesses to function normally, if there is not support from
the government for businesses to function normally, if there
are 13 or 12 ministries for every important function in the
state, it will be extremely difficult to attract enterprises.
So we welcome this initiative, Senator, and at the same
time, we urge you to continue interactions with leaders from
Bosnia-Herzegovina and other countries of the region to remind
them that if they build the conditions, our businesses will
come.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you very much again for your
commitment, for your testimony today.
And, Mr. Chair and Senator Murphy, thank you both for
holding this hearing. I think it is very important and it is
important for us to continue to stay engaged in the region.
Senator Johnson. I agree, Senator Shaheen. And I appreciate
you being so supportive of us holding this hearing.
Secretary Yee, thank you for your testimony. Thank you for
acknowledging at the onset the event that is beyond disturbing
at the practice field today. I was remiss in not doing so. I
opened up my hearing in Homeland Security earlier today
acknowledging it, offering our prayers to Congressman Scalise
and the aide and staff member, as well as the two members of
the Capitol Police who are part of his security detail. It is
probably not a bad way to close this thing out, an area of
completely non-partisan support. What law enforcement
officials, what government officials do for us is so incredibly
important. So we thank you for their service. We thank the
Capitol Police and the heroism that truly saved lives today.
So, again, thank you so much for that.
The hearing record will remain open for 48 hours until
Friday, June 16th, at 6:00 p.m. for the submission of
statements and questions for the record.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:40 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
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