[Senate Hearing 115-448, Part 4]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S.Hrg. 115-448, Pt. 4
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2018 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
S. 1519
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2018 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
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PART 4
AIRLAND
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MARCH 22, 29, 2017
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
38-241 PDF WASHINGTON : 2019
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Chairman
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma, Chairman JACK REED, Rhode Island
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi BILL NELSON, Florida
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
TOM COTTON, Arkansas JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
JONI ERNST, Iowa RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina JOE DONNELLY, Indiana
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia TIM KAINE, Virginia
TED CRUZ, Texas ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
BEN SASSE, Nebraska ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
LUTHER STRANGE, Alabama GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
Christian D. Brose, Staff Director
Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
_________________________________________________________________
Subcommittee on Airland
TOM COTTON, Arkansas, Chairman ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina JOE DONNELLY, Indiana
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
TED CRUZ, Texas GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
BEN SASSE, Nebraska
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
_________________________________________________________________
March 22, 2017
Page
Army Modernization............................................... 1
Anderson, Lieutenant General Joseph, USA, Deputy Chief of Staff, 4
G-3/5/7, United States Army.
Murray, Lieutenant General John M., USA, Deputy Chief of Staff, 12
G-8, United States Army.
Dyess, Major General Robert W. Jr., USA, Acting Director, Army 12
Capabilities Integration Center.
Marion, Brigadier General (Promotable) Robert L., USA, Deputy of 13
Acquisition and Systems Management, Office of the Assistant
Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and
Technology.
Questions for the Record......................................... 33
March 29, 2017
Air Force Modernization.......................................... 45
Harris, Lieutenant General Jerry D., Jr., USAF, Deputy Chief of 47
Staff for Strategic Plans, Programs and Requirements,
Headquarters, United States Air Force; Accompanied by
Lieutenant General Arnold W. Bunch, Jr., USAF, Military Deputy,
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for
Acquisition; and Lieutenant General Mark C. Nowland, USAF,
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Headquarters, United
States Air Force.
Questions for the Record......................................... 83
(iii)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2018 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
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WEDNESDAY, MARCH 22, 2017
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Airland,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
ARMY MODERNIZATION
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:31 p.m. in
Room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Tom Cotton
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Subcommittee Members present: Senators Cotton, Wicker,
Cruz, King, and Donnelly.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR TOM COTTON
Senator Cotton. The hearing will come to order.
Today we are going to discuss how to prepare our Army for
the battlefield of the future or what we might call Army
modernization.
Even though our Army is second to none, our rivals are
catching up. Russia and China have made big gains in the last
15 years. We are falling behind in long-range artillery,
integrated air defense, cyber warfare. The list goes on. If we
again face a major conflict with a great power, this capability
gap can put our troops' lives at risk. Just weeks ago, the Vice
Chief of Staff told Congress that the Army is, quote,
outranged, outgunned, and outdated. You can understand why.
For years, we pulled the Army in two different directions.
On the one hand, we have increased our commitments overseas,
which require more troops, but on the other, we have cut
defense spending dramatically. As a result, the Army leadership
has had no choice but to focus primarily on short-term
readiness, that is, the war they are fighting right now, not
future conflict.
But we must prepare for the future to protect our national
security and do right by tomorrow's soldiers. That is why with
this hearing, we want to focus on some basic questions. Who is
leading the modernization effort? What do they think of the
potential for emerging technologies? How do they think
combatant commanders can make use of them? This is a lot of
ground to cover, so I will give just three examples.
First, active protection systems. We bought different
models from different suppliers, and now we are trying to
figure out how to adapt them for Abrams, Bradleys, and
Strykers. Where are we on this? How long will it take to deploy
these systems across the force? How might this technology
change future combat vehicle design?
Second, the Distributed Common Ground System-Army (DCGS-A).
We have poured billions of dollars into this program for over a
decade, and yet it is still not ready for battle use. According
to one report, even under laboratory conditions, soldiers and
commanders, quote, did not consider it to be very helpful. End
quote. Last year's NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act]
directed the Army to seek a commercial solution for this
problem. There are many domestic companies that might provide
one. What is the current plan?
Third, the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T).
We are on track to spend $14 billion on this program, and yet
there are still many problems with it. We need to know can it
actually provide secure communications on a contested
battlefield. Could enemy forces use its electronic signature to
detect Army units? Are there any commercial solutions we can
use to improve the program?
Finally, we need to look at how the Army is organized.
Should we reorganize the Army to make sure it stays focused on
modernization? How do we ensure a united effort throughout the
organization? Who will supply the vision that will underpin it?
Should this be a responsibility of a command or a staff element
in the headquarters of the Department of the Army? These are
all pressing questions, but regardless of the ways and the
means, it is clear the Army must modernize for a warfighting
future that is different from the past and develop a strategy
to give it purpose and direction.
To explore these and other topics, I welcome our
distinguished witnesses: Lieutenant General Joseph Anderson,
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans, and Training;
Lieutenant General John Murray, Deputy Chief of Staff for Army
Programs; Major General Robert Dyess, Acting Director of the
Army Capabilities Integration Center; and Brigadier General
Promotable Robert Marion, Army Deputy Acquisition and Systems
Management. Thank you all for your service to our country. I
look forward to your testimony and our hearing.
Senator King?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ANGUS S. KING, JR.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Before I begin my remarks, I want to welcome to the
audience in our hearing Mr. Ted Jordan and his students from
Cape Elizabeth High School in Maine, one of the great classroom
teachers I have ever known. We are awfully glad to have you
here, Mr. Jordan.
Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for holding today's
hearing. I would also like to welcome all of our witnesses this
afternoon. Thank you for your testimony and particularly for
your service to our country.
Last week, this subcommittee held a very informative
hearing on the future of warfare. It will come as no surprise
to our witnesses that the previous panel underscored that our
military must be prepared for conflict across the full spectrum
of operations. In the near term, our forces will remain engaged
in counterterrorism and stability operations, but we also must
be ready for high-end conflict with near-peer competitors such
as China and Russia.
Likewise, U.S. forces will contend with anti-access/area
denial threats, as well as hybrid warfare tactics, and given
the proliferation of advanced technology and weapons around the
globe, it is highly likely that our military will confront
advanced Russian and Chinese arms on the battlefield even if we
do not face their forces directly.
The pointed language in your written statement that our
Army is rapidly reaching a point where we will be outgunned,
outranged, and outdated--by the way, that was reminiscent of
Hamilton. I think in Hamilton, General Washington said we are
outgunned, outmanned, and outplanned. Very close. Outgunned,
outranged, and outdated when compared to our most capable
potential adversaries. This deserves attention and action on
our part to ensure that modernization efforts effectively
address this challenge.
Finally, we must also acknowledge that our adversaries are
capable of causing great harm to our country without directly
engaging our forces in combat. As I stated last week, Russia
has achieved extraordinary success in undermining Western
democratic values and destabilizing its neighbors during the
last several years, in many cases without firing a shot. As you
know, the intelligence community concluded that Russia actively
interfered in our recent presidential election, and they appear
to be using some of these same tactics right now in France and
Germany.
It is clear, therefore, that our strategy for countering
the Russian influence, as well as other countries that adopt
similar tactics, has to include more than a military response.
While today's hearing is not explicitly about the future of
warfare, the testimony from our witnesses regarding the Army's
modernization strategy does signal how the Army is preparing
for warfare in the future. Resources are never unlimited, and
the Army must make investments based on near-term risks, as
well as future threats, to procure new weapons, upgrade
existing platforms, and fund research and development accounts.
Furthermore, due to the spending caps mandated by the
Budget Control Act, the Army has had to make very tough
resource allocation choices. The Army has prioritized
rebuilding full spectrum readiness and maintaining end strength
levels, which puts a strain on fully funding modernization and
procurement accounts. We must ensure that our troops are
trained and ready for today's fights while also ensuring our
modernization strategy supports the Army's ability to fight
future battles against advanced adversaries.
Last year, a Center for Strategic and International Studies
report illustrated how the Army's current modernization
challenge is exacerbated by two trends. First, the Army is
relying upon weapon systems initially fielded in the 1980s,
such as the Abrams main battle tank and the Bradley fighting
vehicle. Secondly, the Army has a mixed record of developing
new acquisition programs to replace these weapon systems
resulting in truncated or canceled programs and the loss of
billions of dollars.
Therefore, as this committee considers funding the Army
modernization efforts, we must ensure that resources are
devoted to programs that will enable our soldiers to prevail in
future fights.
I would like our witnesses today to address how Army
procurement accounts have been adversely impacted by the
reduction in funding over the past several years and if these
actions have added substantial cost and risk to modernization
programs.
In addition, I hope we can discuss actions the Army is
taking to ensure program requirements are realistic so we can
prevent future programs from being canceled due to cost growth,
requirements creep, and schedule delay. As we consider
increasing Army end strength and restoring readiness, we cannot
afford for our future modernization programs to meet the fate
of recent Army programs that were canceled such as the future
combat systems, the Comanche helicopter, and the Crusader
artillery system.
Finally, we must remember that resources are never
unlimited, as I mentioned. Increasing defense spending at the
expense of other core elements of national power will not
guarantee a more effective fighting force. The administration
has not yet released their final 2018 budget request, but they
published a budget document detailing top line funding for the
Department of Defense. According to this document, the Army
will focus on rebuilding readiness and reversing the reductions
in end strength levels. But both efforts have implications for
Army modernization.
In addition, the administration has submitted a $30 billion
supplemental request for the Department of Defense for this
year, of which $8.3 billion is set aside for Army requirements.
Increased funding will help America rebuild readiness and
begin the long-term effort to modernize the force. However, I
am concerned that the administration has also proposed dramatic
cuts to the Department of State, USAID, and other agencies. In
my view and that of virtually every witness who has recently
appeared before the Armed Services Committee, that approach is
shortsighted and would risk seriously compromising our national
security.
It is my hope that we can responsibly increase the defense
budget while ensuring the other critical elements of national
power are also adequately funded. As we plan the future force
structure of the Army, we must remain mindful that end
strength, readiness, and modernization are deeply intertwined
and adjustments to each should be carefully synchronized and
calibrated to ensure our Army is guaranteed to never face a
fair fight even against our most capable adversaries.
Again, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing,
and I look forward to hearing from our witnesses.
Senator Cotton. Thank you, Senator King.
General Anderson?
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOSEPH ANDERSON, USA, DEPUTY
CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3/5/7, UNITED STATES ARMY
Lieutenant General Anderson. Thanks, Chairman Cotton,
Ranking Member King, distinguished members of the subcommittee.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify on the state of your
U.S. Army.
I appreciate your support and demonstrated commitment to
our Army and look forward to discussing Army modernization with
you today.
My experience has allowed me to witness significant,
lasting detrimental effects to Army readiness and modernization
caused by sequestration and continuing resolutions. The abrupt
implementation of fiscal year 2013 sequestration significantly
impacted every aspect of our Army, from training to readiness
through delayed modernization, sequestration compelled the Army
to take drastic measures. Continuing resolutions compound
resourcing solutions and greatly affect the Army's ability to
generate readiness and execute its modernization strategy.
Our competitors have studied our doctrine, made revisions
to their own, and are rapidly modernizing their militaries. We
now face the prospect of fighting in complex anti-access/area
denial environments against threats equipped to overmatch
several of our current capabilities. This strategic environment
requires a trained and ready Army that has both the capacity
and capability to meet current and future challenges and
prevail against a full range of military activities.
Today the Army remains globally engaged with over 185,000
trained and ready soldiers helping combatant commanders shape
today's security environment. The operation tempo required to
meet current and emergent demand consumes readiness as fast as
we can supply it. This places the Army's ability to meet
wartime contingency requirements at high risk.
Resourcing NDAA 2017 end strength authorizations is
absolutely necessary to bridge gaps within our current
formations and is the first step required to meet readiness
objectives. The Army will mitigate some manning shortfalls by
optimizing its available resources to maximize total force
readiness, filling the holes in current formations, and
strengthening our armored brigade combat teams. Additional end
strength increases will build greater quantities of critical
unit types and develop crucial capabilities in long-range fires
and air missile defense formations required to adequately
prepare for major contingencies.
Readiness does remain our number one priority I think as
you very well know. We must stand ready at a moment's notice to
defend the U.S. and its interests. With your assistance, the
Army will continue to resource the best trained, best equipped,
and best led fighting force in the world.
We thank you for the steadfast support of our outstanding
men and women in uniform, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Lieutenant General Murray,
Lieutenant General Anderson, Major General Dyess, and Brigadier
General Marion follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement by Lieutenant General John M. Murray,
Lieutenant General Joseph Anderson, Major General Robert M. Dyess, Jr.
and Brigadier General Robert L. Marion
introduction
Chairman Cotton, Ranking Member King, distinguished Members of the
Senate Subcommittee on Airland, thank you for your continued support
and demonstrated commitment to our soldiers, Army civilians, families,
and veterans. On behalf of our Acting Army Secretary, the Honorable
Robert Speer, and our Chief of Staff, General Mark Milley, we thank you
for the opportunity to appear before you today and look forward to our
discussion.
Army modernization today stands at a precipice due to a combination
of strategic, technological, and budgetary trends that threaten to
place our Army at a disadvantage not only against advanced adversaries,
but also against a broad range of other potential threats and enemies.
In early 2016 the National Commission on the Future of the Army
observed that reductions in Army modernization were elevating risk to
the Joint Force. That military risk has already manifested itself: our
Army is rapidly reaching a point where we will be outgunned, outranged,
and outdated when compared to our most capable potential adversaries.
Continued failure to fund modernization will leave the U.S. with a 20th
Century Army unsuited to handle the geostrategic environment of the
21st Century. Moreover, deferred modernization costs merely place
today's burden on tomorrow's Army. Given these realities, maximizing
the utility of the modernization efforts after an era of uncertain and
limited budgets is critical for the future of the Army.
the urgency of modernization
To protect the homeland, foster security abroad, and win wars Army
forces must have the capabilities, capacity, and readiness to
accomplish assigned missions as part of the Joint Force. In short, Army
forces must have overmatch. Army forces that possess overmatch enable
the other services, create options for Joint Force commanders, give
weight to diplomacy, and expand policy choice. Overmatch also
constrains adversaries; if our potential adversaries cannot hope to
hold ground, dominate populations, or control resources, then they
cannot achieve their policy objectives. The U.S. has enjoyed the
benefits of tactical overmatch for so long that some now take its
benefits for granted and underestimate the effort required to maintain
it.
Legacy platforms that have provided the foundation of U.S. Army
tactical overmatch for decades are near the limits of what can be
achieved through further upgrades and are at risk of becoming obsolete.
Moreover, the U.S. must be mindful that adversaries may no longer be
convinced that the U.S. Army is capable of denying them victory on the
battlefield. Perceiving they can achieve their objectives within an
acceptable timeframe and cost, adversaries will attempt to present the
U.S. with a fait accompli. But, capable ground forces that prevail in
close combat are a powerful deterrent and enable Joint Force freedom of
action. To keep pace with potential adversaries and wisely invest in
the opportunities presented by new technologies, the U.S. Army must
undertake an innovative, ambitious modernization effort.
the strategic environment
Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Army as part of the
integrated Joint Force has deterred conflict and supported allies and
partners in Europe and Asia, supported civil authorities within the
United States, and fought two prolonged wars in Iraq and Afghanistan--
both of which remain ongoing. Today, the world is a more dangerous
place than at any time since the end of the Cold War and the global
security environment continues to remain volatile, uncertain, and
complex. With increasingly aggressive actions by several rising and
resurgent powers and disruptive regional actors, the risk of conflict
is rising. Revisionist powers, Russia and China, continue their
attempts to diminish United States influence while Iran and North
Korea's provocative and bellicose actions increasingly destabilize
their regions of the world. Violent Extremist Organizations, such as
ISIS, pose potential threats to U.S. national security interests.
Combined, those challenges represent a broad range of operations for
which our Army must be prepared. At home or abroad, our Nation expects
a ready Army with sufficient capabilities and capacity that is capable
of defending the homeland or deploying rapidly in the event of
unforeseen conflicts.
Russia's attempts to erode our alliances through aggressive,
militarized competition are increasing the potential for miscalculation
and the risk of conflict in Europe and beyond. As evidenced by their
interventions in Ukraine and Syria, to achieve its policy objectives,
Russia will continue to employ conventional and unconventional military
forces while operating under the threshold of a decisive U.S. or allied
response. Russia's conventional capabilities are formidable and, in
many areas, superior to ours and those of our allies and partners. We
must be able to penetrate and operate within highly defended
environments, possibly at the leading edge of a Joint Force to control
the air, sea, space, and cyberspace domains. In addition, through an
intensive modernization effort, Moscow is developing a significant
capability advantage in several specific military areas.
Rising tensions and the actions of regional actors are increasing
the risk of conflict in Asia. China's militarization of extralegal
territorial claims further strains international relations in the South
China Sea while their modernization programs to develop capabilities
that project power within the air, maritime, space, and cyberspace
domains increasingly alarm the nations of the Pacific-Rim. China is
also developing offensive cyber capabilities and an ability to jam the
electromagnetic spectrum capabilities that impacts U.S. communications
and Assured Positioning, Navigation, and Timing, severely limiting what
was once a significant differential advantage for U.S. forces. Current
trends in Chinese weapons production will enable the Chinese to conduct
a range of military operations well beyond its borders.
Despite increasingly constrained financial resources, the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) continues to prioritize
expansion of its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. The DPRK also
possesses cyber and chemical-biological warfare capabilities while
maintaining an aging, but large and capable conventional force that has
the ability to mass long-range fires on targets throughout the region,
particularly Seoul. As the DPRK continues to threaten attacks on the
United States and our allies and the DPRK leadership faces mounting
economic and political pressures, the United States must maintain its
deterrent force on the peninsula and be prepared to deploy substantial
ground, air, and maritime forces as part of a coalition alongside
Republic of Korea forces in defense of the peninsula and region.
Iran's involvement in the Syrian, Iraqi, and Yemeni conflicts
continues to deepen while their nuclear aspirations, cybersecurity
threat, sophisticated ballistic missile program and links to Hezbollah
threatens regional security and continues to destabilize the Middle
East. Moreover, with the signing of the Russian-Iranian Military
Cooperation Agreement, and the lifting of economic sanctions, it is
likely that Iran will accelerate its military modernization thereby
posing a greater threat to United States interests and allies in the
Middle East.
Threats to national security are also increasing from non-state
actors. ISIS, AQIM (al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb), Boko Haram, and
other extremist organizations threaten stability throughout the world.
ISIS inspired, planned, and resourced attacks from Iraq to Lebanon,
Turkey, Paris, Libya, Brussels, and even the homeland indicate that
terrorist organizations that control territory, populations, and
resources must be contained and eliminated.
As these examples demonstrate state, non-state, and hybrid threats
are increasingly capable and continue to narrow U.S. competitive
advantages not only on land, but also in all domains. The complexity of
future armed conflict requires an Army capable of conducting missions
at home and in foreign lands. Our Army must maintain readiness for
today and invest in modernization to ensure readiness for tomorrow in
order to maintain overmatch against elusive and increasingly capable
enemies.
The global security environment, increasingly characterized by
instability and a growing range of threats, demands an Army that must
be organized and ready for an expanding diverse and complex range of
missions. While the threats and missions we face today will endure well
into the future, they will be overshadowed by emerging peer
competition. More than ever, this environment will require trained and
ready Army formations possessing both the capacity and capability to
meet current and future challenges. We must modernize to ensure that
our capabilities remain relevant against constantly evolving threats.
modernizing the force
Challenges to Army modernization have been building over the course
of nearly two decades. Adjusting for inflation, the Army has nearly
half of the funding for modernization and equipment that it had just 8
years ago. Declining budgets drive difficult choices; we have faced
these choices over many budget cycles.
The budget issue has been further complicated by 15 years of focus
on counterinsurgency and counterterrorism as the Army addressed current
needs in Afghanistan and Iraq. This was the right thing to do, but it
required tradeoffs. The Army, fully aware of these tradeoffs, made the
right choices to support our soldiers for the missions and threats we
faced at that time. This kind of approach led to the fielding of Mine
Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles, increasing the number of UH-60s
for Air Medical Evacuation, significantly better Personal Protective
Equipment, and rapid fielding of theater-specific equipment for our
soldiers.
In terms of procurement, we are essentially relying on the same
platforms that we have had since the 1980s--the Big 5, consisting of
the Abrams Main Battle Tank, Bradley Fighting Vehicle, Apache Attack
Helicopter, Blackhawk Utility Helicopter, and Patriot Missile System.
The Army developed these systems to provide a credible deterrent during
the Cold War. Given the current level of funding, we will continue to
rely on all five platforms into the 2030s and beyond.
Meanwhile, our enemies have not been idle. The overmatch your Army
has enjoyed for the last 70 years is at risk. Our adversaries have
observed the way we fight and have developed capabilities and tactics
to counter our strengths and exploit our vulnerabilities. Some of these
new capabilities and tactics have already been demonstrated in combat.
Fiscal constraints have forced the Army to accept risk in starting
new developmental programs in order to prioritize incremental upgrades
of existing systems that can be in the hands of soldiers quickly. Over
the last 15 years, the Army has not modernized for full spectrum
warfare thereby risking the loss of current and future overmatch in
every domain: land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace.
Our soldiers must be able to prevail against the full range of
potential threats, including near-peers in highly lethal combined arms
maneuver; hybrid warfare; and determined, unconventional insurgents.
This has become increasingly difficult, as our adversaries modernize at
a rapid pace, while reduced funding has reduced the Army's
modernization to a pace that jeopardizes our overmatch. Stretching
procurement timelines has allowed us to focus on current readiness and
keep production lines and key programs active, at the cost of increased
risk versus our most capable adversaries.
prioritizing capability gaps
This year, the Army conducted the inaugural Strategic Portfolio
Analysis Review (SPAR), which enables Army senior leaders to make
informed resource decisions within a larger strategic framework. The
SPAR prioritizes limited modernization resources, weighed against risks
and critical capability gaps, in order to balance near-term readiness
requirements against long-term force development aspirations. As part
of the SPAR we modeled and tested our 780-plus programs against a
scenario with a near-peer adversary. This analysis resulted in the
prioritization Army capabilities into four bins:
1. Critical Capability that provides a decisive advantage in which
we should increase investment
2. Critical Capability that we should sustain at current levels of
investment
3. Important Capability, but one from which we can divert
resources
4. Still important, but we should divest in order to free up
resources for the other categories.
SPAR has validated a number of critical capability gaps in key
program areas. These gaps are Army modernization priorities that we
must pursue in order to maintain and, eventually, regain overmatch to
credibly deter and defeat near-peer adversaries.
Air and Missile Defense (AMD). We lack the capability and
capacity to meet the AMD demands of the combatant commanders to cover
key fixed sites and provide effective AMD protection of the maneuvering
forces.
Long-range Fires. The Army lacks capability and capacity
to provide immediately responsive, effective surface-to-surface fires
at ranges beyond 40 kilometers (km) for Cannon Artillery, beyond 84 km
for Rocket Artillery, and 300 km for missiles; this gap is partially
due to the aging Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) inventory.
Munitions. The Army anticipates significant increases to
ammunition requirements based on emerging peer and near-peer threats
and increased demand in Iraq and Afghanistan. We are evaluating the
need to both grow capacity in some of our Government-owned and
Contractor-operated ammunition plants and to broaden commercial
capacity in order to meet the increased requirements for preferred
munitions.
Mobility, Lethality and Protection of Brigade Combat
Teams. Our Armored, Infantry, and Stryker Brigade Combat Teams are
deficient in the appropriate combination of mobility, lethality, and
protection required to achieve overmatch during joint and combined arms
operations.
Active Protection Systems (APS) - Air and Ground. The
proliferation of advanced man portable air defense systems
significantly threaten Army Aviation in operational environments. On
the ground, our combat vehicles lack the ability to effectively detect,
track, divert, disrupt, neutralize, or destroy incoming direct and
indirect fire munitions.
Assured Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT). The
commercial and Military Global Positioning Systems (GPS) are
susceptible to threat disruption (jamming) and spoofing (mimicking
friendly forces).
Electronic Warfare (EW). The Army is unable to conduct
Electronic Attack and EW Support against near-peer adversaries.
Cyber (Offensive and Defensive). We lack sufficient
tools, platforms, and architectures to conduct Offensive Cyber
Operations in the constantly changing, complex Cyber Domain. The Army
also lacks sufficient Defensive Cyber infrastructure and tools to
support Mission Command in all scenarios.
Assured Communications. Current communications systems
are vulnerable to near-peer threat detection, disruption/denial, and
exploitation.
Vertical Lift. The Army's increased requirements for
aircraft survivability, safety, and Mission Command have reduced fleet
payload and range capacity. This limits mobility and increases risk to
ground forces.
resourcing modernization
With respect to the budget, the Army has three main categories
within the topline that it can adjust: Manpower, Readiness, and
Modernization. Of these three, Readiness is our top priority. We are
also committed to maintaining force structure. Any adjustments to these
three categories are zero sum; there must always be a ``bill payer''
for every increase. Inflation and increasing to personnel costs put
increasing pressure on the Modernization portion of the budget.
Given this set of priorities, the Fiscal Year 2017 (FY17)
President's Budget request allocated about 60 percent of the Army's
topline to manpower. This is a must-pay bill. Readiness will consume
approximately 24 percent of our budget; as the number one priority, the
Army will not choose to reduce this allocation. This leaves roughly 16
percent for Modernization.
Ideally, we would always have the most modern equipment, but this
would require painful tradeoffs with Manpower and Readiness. We would
like to do all three, but large Modernization investments at the wrong
time could lead to a force that is too small or a force that we cannot
afford to keep ready. Maintaining balance across Manpower, Readiness,
and Modernization is key to preventing a hollow force. Without
sustained, long term, and predictable funding, we cannot effectively
plan and execute a balanced Army program.
Given the fiscal pressures, the Army has focused constrained
resources on equipping for the near term at the expense of preparing
for the future. The Army is accepting risk in starting new programs in
order to prioritize incremental upgrades of existing systems that can
be in the hands of soldiers more quickly. Our current equipment
modernization strategy has been structured to:
Protect Science and Technology to field capabilities to the force
in the 2030s. We will prioritize Science and Technology efforts to
develop new military capabilities to deter and defeat potential
adversaries in the next fight. We are implementing a strategic approach
to modernization that includes an awareness of existing and potential
gaps; an understanding of emerging threats; knowledge of state-of-the-
art commercial, academic, and Government research; and an understanding
of competing needs for limited resources.
Sustain Incremental Upgrades. We have prioritized capabilities that
have the greatest impact against a near-peer threat and can be in
soldiers' hands in the next 10 years. We are focused on improving the
M1 Abrams Tank, M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle, and Stryker Families of
Vehicles, as well as Paladin, Improved Turbine Engine Program, and the
Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System. We are also improving the Apache,
Black Hawk, and Chinook helicopter fleets, as well as our Unmanned
Aircraft Systems.
Take Risk in New Development. The Army is making modest
developmental investments based on critical operational requirements
and capability shortfalls. Fiscal realities have led to the delay or
discontinuance of new systems. Key investments that remain in the next
generation of ground vehicle capabilities include the Armored Multi-
Purpose Vehicle and the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, a critical
program for the Army and the U.S. Marine Corps.
The Army will begin new developmental programs only if required to
close an extremely high risk gap. We will attempt to accelerate Air and
Missile Defense, Long Range Fires, Mobile Protected Fire Power, Active
Protection Systems (Air and Ground), Assured Positioning, Navigation,
and Timing, Electronic Warfare, and Cyber offensive and defensive
capabilities.
Go Slow, Keep Options Open. We have, and will continue to, slow
down procurement to keep production lines open and warm for when
funding becomes available.
Reset and Sustain. The Army is returning equipment to the required
level of combat capability; it remains central to both regenerating and
maintaining equipment near-term readiness for ongoing operations and
potential contingencies.
Divest. We are identifying equipment and systems that are excess,
obsolete, or no longer required to reduce and eliminate the associated
sustainment costs. For example, we are divesting the aging M113 armored
personnel carriers and legacy radios. Additionally, the Army's Mine
Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles divestiture will eliminate a large
portion of the fleet through Foreign Military Sales (FMS), distribution
to other agencies, and demilitarization of older, battle-worn, excess
vehicles. The Army also continues to divest its aging TH-67 training
helicopters, as well as the OH-58A/C Kiowa, OH-58D Kiowa Warrior, and
UH-60A Black Hawk fleets.
the defense industrial base
The constrained resources in the Army's modernization account
continue to present significant challenges for the Defense Industrial
Base (DIB), especially for companies that cannot leverage commercial
sales and for small companies that must diversify quickly to remain
viable. When developing our equipment modernization strategy, we
carefully assess risk across all portfolios to ensure balanced
development of new capabilities, incremental upgrades to existing
systems, and protection of critical capabilities in the commercial and
organic elements of the DIB.
The Army remains concerned about the preservation of key skills and
capabilities in the engineering and manufacturing bases for our
original equipment manufacturers and their key supplier bases.
Collaboration with our industrial base partners early in the process
helps to reduce risk. Efforts such as the Army Manufacturing Technology
Program provide affordable and timely manufacturing solutions that
assist our industry partners to address manufacturing and producibility
risks. Also, the Army supports efforts to develop FMS and Direct
Commercial Sales to ensure sustainment of critical production lines in
the DIB.
The Army continually assesses risk in the Industrial Base across
all Army portfolios. Fragility and Criticality (FaC) assessments
identify the fragile and critical portions of sectors within the DIB to
facilitate the identification of risk mitigation strategies. FaC
assessments provide Army program offices: 1) the ability to identify
how potential reductions in funding could affect suppliers that provide
the products, skills, and services needed to maintain readiness, and 2)
information to support investment decisions to mitigate supplier risk.
The Army also continually assesses the health of the organic
industrial base (OIB), including our depots, arsenals, ammunition
plants, munitions centers, and Government-owned Contractor-operated
plants. The Army maintains critical skill sets in our OIB by
identifying workload to preserve capabilities, exploring FMS
opportunities, and encouraging our OIB facilities to partner with
commercial firms and other Department of Defense organizations, such as
the Defense Logistics Agency, to meet future requirements. We continue
to modernize our OIB infrastructure, as needed, to support readiness.
opportunities to `turn the tide'
Given the complex range of threats, the Army has a very short
window to improve capability and capacity. By design, the Army drawdown
was deliberately designed to reverse course and expand if necessary.
Additionally, Army modernization, during the past several years of
constrained funding and austerity maintained its resilience by:
Protecting the defense industrial base by keeping
production lines warm
Protecting modernization options by investing in the next
generation of incremental improvements, emphasizing low risk and cost
efficient improvements
We have sustained many programs that could be accelerated if
needed. The Army is prepared to accelerate delivery of fires
capability, armor formation upgrades, aviation fleet modernization,
enhanced air and missile defense, ammunition and missiles for emerging
wartime requirements, lethality upgrades for Stryker vehicles, assured
communications, soldier lethality and protection and finally,
electronic warfare. The Army is at an historical inflection point; we
are postured to pivot rapidly if directed to do so.
capacity
The modernization priorities described above are critical to
maintain overmatch against increasingly capable enemies. However,
modernization alone is not enough. The Army requires ready forces that
not only possess modern capabilities, but also the capacity to
translate military objectives into enduring political outcomes. Army
capacity is critical to deter enemies; reassure allies; surge forces to
contingencies; control territory; secure populations overseas and in
the homeland; and regenerate combat power. At current levels of
readiness, modernization and manning, the Army risks being unable to
achieve the objectives of the Defense Strategy. Ultimately, a modern
and ready Army with sufficient capabilities and capacity creates
synergy that enables the Joint Force to translate military objectives
into enduring political outcomes.
The Army continues to meet current demands, but doing so
significantly degrades our ability to meet the Defense Planning
Guidance to deter conflict, and if deterrence fails, defeat an
adversary in one theater and deny the objectives of another, all while
defending the homeland and conducting counterterrorism operations
worldwide. Today, the Army is globally engaged with approximately
185,000 soldiers supporting Combatant Commanders in 140 countries.
These soldiers conduct combat operations, deter aggression, and assure
our Allies and partners. In Afghanistan, the Army continues to engage
the enemy as we work with Allies and partners to train, advise, and
assist Afghan National Security Forces. In Iraq, we continue to build
partner capacity to fight ISIS. Throughout Africa and the Americas, we
partner to prevent conflict and shape the security environment. In the
Pacific, more than 105,000 soldiers remain committed; approximately
20,000 stand ready in the Republic of Korea. In Europe and Asia, Army
forces also reassure our Allies and deter aggression.
An Active Army which currently stands at just over 467,000 was
drawing down from a wartime high of 570,000 (1,133,000 Total Force) to
450,000 personnel (980,000 Total Force) and reducing from 45 to 30 BCTs
(56 Total Force). A 980,000 Total Force places the Army at risk of
being unable to execute the defense strategy. The fiscal year 2017
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) authorized an Active Army
end strength of 476,000, which is 16,000 personnel more than the 2017
budget request. The NDAA also authorized an Army National Guard end
strength increase of 8,000 personnel to 343,000 and an increase of
4,000 to 199,000 for the Army Reserves, for a Total Force of 1,018,000.
Any authorized personnel increases such as these must come with
appropriations to be of value. This authorization is a down payment on
reducing the risk the Army is carrying, particularly in improving
readiness shortfalls due to personnel fill. However, if sequestration-
level cuts are imposed in fiscal year 2018 and beyond, all components
of the Army would be immediately impacted, with Active Army end
strength rapidly falling to 420,000, the Army National Guard drawing
down to 315,000, and the Army Reserves reducing to 185,000. Those
reductions would increase the military risk the Army faces.
Insufficient capacity in ready land forces limits the options the
President, Secretary of Defense, and combatant commanders have to
respond to and resolve crises. Moreover, once we are cut it is
difficult to regenerate Army forces rapidly. Growing the Army is
difficult, costly and takes time due to a lack of manpower, the
sophisticated nature of weapons and equipment, the importance of
training teams on collective tasks, and the need for those teams to
have experienced leaders.
in conclusion
We sincerely appreciate the opportunity to address the challenges
the Army faces in maintaining readiness and modernizing its force. We
are also grateful for Congress's efforts to stem the continued decrease
in force structure; we are already making progress in regrowing the
Army in accordance with the NDAA-prescribed end strength. We must also
ensure the force is equipped and modernized for full spectrum conflict.
The security challenges of tomorrow will be met with the equipment we
develop, modernize, and procure today. Resource reductions and
insufficient force modernization will place the Army's ability to
overmatch its opponents at risk because our adversaries will continue
to invest in technology to counter or evade U.S. strengths and exploit
vulnerabilities.
We can assure you that the Army's senior leaders are working hard
to address current challenges and the needs of the Army both now and in
the future. We are doing so with a commitment to be good stewards of
our Nation's resources while meeting the readiness, equipping, and
modernization needs of our soldiers.
Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of this Subcommittee, we
sincerely appreciate your steadfast and strong support of the
outstanding men and women in uniform, our Army civilians, and their
families.
Senator Cotton. General Murray?
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOHN M. MURRAY, USA, DEPUTY
CHIEF OF STAFF, G-8, UNITED STATES ARMY
Lieutenant General Murray. Chairman Cotton, Ranking Member
King, distinguished members of the Subcommittee on Airland. On
behalf of our Acting Secretary, the Honorable Robert Speer, and
our Chief of Staff, General Mark Milley, I pretty much look
forward to discussing Army modernization with you today.
Today the Army has roughly half the funding for
modernization and equipping the force it had just 8 years ago.
We have focused our resources on generating and maintaining the
best trained and equipped forces that resources would allow.
We now find ourselves in a situation where our most capable
enemies are closing quickly. Senator, as you mentioned, we are
losing overmatch in every domain, land, air, maritime, space,
and cyberspace. In the words of General Allen during his most
recent testimony, Senator, once again as you mentioned, we find
ourselves outgunned, outranged, and outdated in some very
critical war fighting capabilities.
The Army's current modernization strategy is to upgrade
today's equipment, focusing limited modernization dollars on
the equipment that will have the greatest impact against near-
peer threats and can quickly be in the hands of our soldiers.
For the last 10 years, we have focused on the immediate,
providing the equipment necessary for our soldiers to fight in
Iraq and Afghanistan along with incremental upgrades to
existing combat platforms. That strategy forced us to defer the
development of new combat capabilities. We have now reached a
point in time where we can longer afford to do one or the
other. We must find a way to do both, improve the equipment we
have and begin investment into next generation capabilities.
Near-term security challenges will be met with the
equipment we have today, and it must be improved to ensure our
current soldiers have the best that we can provide. Tomorrow's
security challenges will be met with the equipment we develop
and procure over the next several years, and we owe our future
soldiers the equipment they will need to fight and win on some
very complex battlefields.
We urge Congress to provide fiscal stability, funding that
is sustained, long-term, and predictable so we can maintain our
current warfighting readiness while simultaneously beginning to
build a more modern and capable force for the future.
I would like to thank you and the entire committee for your
unwavering support of our soldiers, our Army civilians, and our
families. Thank you very much, and I look forward to your
questions.
Senator Cotton. General Dyess?
STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL ROBERT W. DYESS, JR., USA, ACTING
DIRECTOR, ARMY CAPABILITIES INTEGRATION CENTER
Major General Dyess. Chairman Cotton, Ranking Member King,
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to speak with you about the urgent need to invest
in Army modernization.
To develop the Army, we must think clearly about the future
of armed conflict. This requires a consideration of threats,
enemies, and adversaries, our missions, consideration of trends
in technology development, and historical observations to
anticipate the changing character of war and how that will
evolve to affect tomorrow's battlefields.
Based on these factors, we envision a future environment
that is characterized by increased competition amongst peer
states that aim to challenge the post-World War II security
order. Future forces of the Army will likely confront the
advanced militaries of peer states with advanced and
sophisticated capabilities, as well as elusive, yet capable
non-state actors that employ unconventional and hybrid
strategies that threaten U.S. security and vital interests.
There is an urgent need to modernize existing equipment and
undertake developmental programs to replace the workhorses that
have provided overmatch and served our Nation so well. We must
do both.
To operate in this emerging environment, Army forces must
innovate and develop new ideas to fight in and across all five
domains, air, sea, land, space, and cyberspace. To address
future challenges, the Army and the Marine Corps began the
development of a multi-domain battle concept. This concept
involves combined arms, to include not only capability of the
physical domains, but also cyberspace, the electromagnetic
spectrum, the information environment, and the cognitive
dimension of warfare by accounting for the changing character
of war. When complete, this multi-domain battle will enable
land forces operating as part of a joint force to create
windows of opportunity and advantage, restore capability
balance, and build resilient formations.
To mitigate mounting military risk and operate as part of
the joint force in the future, the Army must undertake
innovative and ambitious modernization efforts. There is an
urgent need right now. Preparing for war is expensive, but the
price of losing is far greater. Our Army and our Nation
requires your continued support. It is time to renew the
commitment to sustaining the U.S. Army's tactical overmatch.
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members, thank you for the
opportunity to speak with you today, and I look forward to your
questions.
Senator Cotton. General Marion?
STATEMENT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL (PROMOTABLE) ROBERT L. MARION,
USA, DEPUTY OF ACQUISITION AND SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT, OFFICE OF
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY FOR ACQUISITION, LOGISTICS
AND TECHNOLOGY
Brigadier General Marion. Chairman Cotton, Ranking Member
King, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee on Airland,
thank you for the invitation to meet with you today and discuss
Army equipment modernization.
Mr. Chairman, Army modernization is the primary means by
which we provide our soldiers with cutting-edge technologies
and the latest in systems capabilities to empower, unburden,
and protect them. In a global security environment that is
increasingly uncertain and complex, the threats and challenges
of tomorrow will be overcome with the equipment we develop,
modernize, and procure today.
Stable funding and continuity of effort take on increased
importance in the world of acquisition. Starting and stopping
programs based on available funding prevents momentum in
research and lengthens the timelines for discovery and
innovation. Operating under continuing resolutions and the
pressures of sequestration increase risk in our procurement
programs and cause delays in getting necessary equipment into
the hands of our soldiers. Declining budgets drive difficult
choices. Sustained, long-term, and predictable funding is
essential for the Army to build and sustain current readiness
and a more modern capable force.
In the current environment, we are focused on five things:
protecting science and technology investments, selectively
investing in new capabilities, incrementally modernizing
existing systems, resetting and sustaining equipment, and
divesting excess systems.
Equipping is a critical component to readiness. We cannot
put our soldiers at risk by not providing them with the right
equipment at the right time at the right place to accomplish
their assigned missions.
Finally, limited resources in the Army's modernization
account continue to present significant challenges for the
defense industrial base, especially for companies that cannot
leverage commercial sales and for small companies that must
diversify to quickly remain viable. When developing our
equipment modernization strategy, we carefully assess risk
across all portfolios to ensure balanced development of new
capabilities, incremental upgrades to existing systems, and the
protection of critical capabilities in the commercial and
organic industrial base.
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee,
thank you for your steadfast and strong support of the
outstanding men and women of the United States Army, our
civilians, and their families.
This concludes my opening remarks, Mr. Chairman. I look
forward to your questions.
Senator Cotton. Thank you all, gentlemen.
I think one consistent theme of all four statements we have
heard here today from four Generals and two Senators is that
Congress has done no small part to hamstring the Army over the
last 5 years due to the Budget Control Act and sequestration
and the stop and start nature of our appropriations process.
Just maybe if we can start down the line with General
Anderson and going down the line. As Senator King said, the
budget submitted last week focuses primarily on end strength
and on readiness. Does it cause you concern that the budget
this time around again seems to skimp on modernization?
Lieutenant General Anderson. I think, Senator, that
modernization will keep being the bill payer. So it allows us
to maintain that $1.018 million baseline that we are trying to
achieve here based on the NDAA. It does enhance some of the
readiness capabilities we have and some of that is going to
fill the hole from the readiness side. Getting formations back
up to about 100 percent is a good thing, and it buys back some
of the capabilities that we were about to lose and it buys us a
couple other capabilities like shore ad and fires battalions.
But above and beyond that, we are kind of status quo in terms
of improvement.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
General Murray?
Lieutenant General Murray. Senator, just for clarification,
you are talking about the 2018 budget?
Senator Cotton. Yes.
Lieutenant General Murray. I agree with General Anderson.
We make a pretty significant dent in 2017 with the $30 billion
that OSD asked for the Army. Senator King, you mentioned this.
It is actually about $4.5 billion goes directly towards
modernization of equipment and investment in the future. But
once again, 2018 basically sustains mostly the force structure
the NDAA gave us.
Senator Cotton. General Dyess?
Major General Dyess. Senator Cotton, the organization that
I am in looks at the future. We are really looking at 2025 to
2040. We are really close to that. As we developed the 1923
POM, we will be very close to that, having that force by the
time that POM comes to fruition. So I am concerned that we are
moving in a way that takes us to a more modern force in which
we both modernize existing equipment and develop those
replacements for those workhorses that were fielded in the
1980s that Senator King mentioned earlier.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
General Marion?
Brigadier General Marion. Sir, I concur with my colleagues,
especially the remark General Murray made about forgoing long-
term development of systems for the incremental upgrades that
we have to afford today, we have to pay for today, to ensure we
have near-term readiness. So some of those incremental
modernization activities that we have continued to carry on
with those platforms--I think of Blackhawk as an example--we
are going to be at a point where we cannot continue to
incrementally modernize them anymore. From an affordability
standpoint, we have got to get to a point where we can make a
leap ahead in technology and a leap ahead in the other systems
just like in Blackhawk.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
As we think about the long term, General Dyess, you said in
your testimony you cannot modernize effectively without the
future of armed conflict. You are talking about the window of
2025 to 2040. As you look ahead to the future of armed
conflict, what are the main capability gaps in the Army right
now that concern you for the future?
Major General Dyess. Thank you, Senator.
In this way, we are very in line with what the Chief has
established as his priorities based on both high fidelity
modeling, as well as what we have seen in our Russian new
generation warfare study. We have seen primarily that we have a
need for a mobile, short-range air defense. We have a need for
long-range precision fires. We have combat vehicles, active
protection, as you mentioned before, assured communications,
position navigation and timing. All of those things are
consistent with what we see that we need to work on now but
also will take us into the future.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
General Murray, as you think about those capability gaps,
has the Army published a strategy to address those gaps and how
we are going to get to the end state that we need?
Lieutenant General Murray. Before I get to that, Senator,
the one thing I would add is munitions, which we talked about
yesterday. There is a critical shortage.
Your answer specifically is not yet. So we have published
modernization strategies for the last few years. It has been
very much resource-constrained. So it talks about incremental
upgrades to the current systems, investing in new development
only when we absolutely have to like the AMPV [Armored Multi
Purpose Vehicle] for the 113 replacement. General Dyess down at
ARCIC is working on a strategy that gets after a parallel path.
I am also working on a short piece for the Chief that is in his
hands right now for him to approve and we hope to have over
with the 2018 budget if not before.
Senator Cotton. Thank you all, gentlemen.
Senator King?
Senator King. When I was governor, I had an adjutant
general, and he taught me the term ``after action review.'' I
am wondering what the Army has done in the way of an after
action review of the disastrous results of modernization
efforts prior to today, over $20 billion spent, no new fighting
capability. What lessons have we learned and how can we take
advantage of those lessons to not repeat the problems that
plagued the Army modernization efforts 20 years ago?
Major General Dyess. Senator, I will start. The last one
that you mentioned as far as time in the recent was the FCS
program, which was 2008-2009 time frame. I think that in the
interim period of time, we have had less money, but we worked
on the requirements I think very hard in order to have a
requirements process that develops equipment that we can
afford. My organization inside of TRADOC [Training and Doctrin
Command] works with General Murray's organization inside of the
G-8 requirements and resources, and we work with Bob's
organization inside the acquisition community in order to not
reach too far, stabilize our requirements, and then work
towards achieving them.
Senator King. Eighty percent solutions instead of 100
percent.
Major General Dyess. Sir, absolutely.
Senator King. General?
Brigadier General Marion. Sir, one of the very specific
things--and by the way, that after action term is something
that we have done just exactly on those programs that you
mentioned to try to get at the question that you asked. How do
we get better in the future? That is the key thing.
So when we look at from an acquisition standpoint, we
mature technologies to a point, and then we integrate them,
build them into a system, and then we test them, and then we
buy them in procurement. Each program is different.
Senator King. Where did it break down?
Brigadier General Marion. Exactly, sir. So each program is
different, but one common theme--there are actually two common
themes that we have seen. One is we have gotten to that point
where we believe the technology was mature enough to begin to
integrate into a final end item and then build it and test it,
but the technology was not as mature at the component and sub-
component level. It was not as mature as we thought, or in some
cases we knew the risk of moving, but we wanted to develop that
capability and deliver it as soon as possible. So we went
forward into the integration phase, the build phase, and the
test phase too soon.
Senator King. Well, that is exactly the experience of the
Air Force and to some extent the Navy of doing R&D while you
are building. It makes it more expensive, and you are not sure
what you are going to get at the end. It sounds like that is a
common thread.
Brigadier General Marion. That is exactly correct, sir. I
will give you an example with JLTV [Joint-Light Tacticle
Vehicle] on how we learned our lesson.
So we only went past that phase where we were integrating
technologies once we knew that those technologies were
sufficiently mature at the component and sub-component level
before we integrated them into an entire vehicle and before we
took it to test and before we made our procurement decision.
Now we are into a low-rate initial production, an LRIP [Long
Range Precision Fires], phase on JLTV where we got to an 80
percent solution and we went forward with a procurement
decision, and we believe that is the way to focus our
activities in the future.
Senator King. Now, has the Army made institutional
structural changes to deal with these issues? Because I do not
want this knowledge and memory to retire with you guys and then
we have to learn the lessons all over again.
Brigadier General Marion. So, sir, the second point is once
you get to that point and you are ready to build and integrate
and test, then the institution has to be very disciplined about
how we allow changes to occur. We cannot allow design changes
to occur because of changes in funding, changes in
requirements, the technology does not mature. We have to be
very disciplined about that. We have instituted processes that
originate with the Chief of the Staff of the Army. Once we lock
a requirement, he is the authority. So we have instituted this
Army Requirements Oversight Council where once the Chief locks
a requirement, that is the requirement.
Senator King. I think that is very important that we do not
forget those lessons, that they are embedded somehow in the
formal process and in the structure.
One of the things that we are talking about in the Air
Force and in the Navy is--of course, it takes a while to
procure and develop a new weapon system. It is going to be
obsolete the day it is launched. We know that. It is just like
buying a computer. But the key is, it seems to me, building
these things in a modular way that can be upgraded,
particularly with software and those kinds of things, so that
you do not have to build a whole frame all over again. Is that
something that you are looking at?
Brigadier General Marion. Yes, sir. That is exactly what we
are looking at.
Lieutenant General Murray. I think a lot of the things you
pointed out, Senator, have driven us almost to the incremental
upgrade approach because we actually do pretty well in
incrementally upgrading systems. So the big five you mentioned
in your opening statement, the tank and the Bradley
specifically, are not the same tank and Bradley that rolled off
the production lines in the 1980s.
Senator King. The frame may be the same.
Lieutenant General Murray. The frame may be the same, but
they are significantly more capable. With the next upgrade we
are looking at, they will be significantly even more capable.
So we have kind of focused on that with limited new
developments, as I mentioned.
One of the new development items that we are looking at--it
kind of gets to some of your points I think--is mobile
protected fire power. So for lack of a better term, it is a
lightweight tank for at least our airborne forces and
potentially all of our IBCTs [Infantry Brigade Combat Teams].
So we are doing this process significantly different. So this
is not something the Army is trying to start from a clean sheet
of paper with the build. So we have gone to industry, looking
for non-developmental systems, in other words something that
currently exists or a chasse and a turret that can be put
together so it is all in existence. So it is not brand new
technology. It gets back to your what is good enough quickly
comment.
The Chief has been involved with that, along with the other
four-stars, in personally approving every requirement we put
against that vehicle. He sat down with industry for 6 hours,
and the Vice followed up with another 4 hours in 1 day for
industry to come back and talk to him about what was tough
about the requirements that we laid out, what were the trades
he would need to consider. Then we will lock the requirements
within 8 months of actually saying this was an Army
requirement. Then as General Marion said, anything that changes
will have to go back to the Chief for changes. We are after a
good enough quickly to get capability in the hands of our
soldiers.
Senator King. The first requirement would be that the
requirements be expressed in no more than 10 pages. Just pick a
number.
In any case, thank you, Mr. Chairman. We will have more
questions.
Senator Cotton. Senator Donnelly?
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Generals, I would like to commend all of you and your staff
for the time, the energy, and effort you have put into two
important Army fleet readiness programs: the Army National
Guard HUMVEE modernization program and the HUMVEE ambulance
modernization program. Even after JLTV is fully fielded,
HUMVEEs are going to make up the majority of the Army's
tactical wheeled fleet until at least 2030.
Meanwhile, with each passing day, the HUMVEE fleet is
aging. The average age of HUMVEE ambulances is now 28 years,
more than a decade beyond the expected useful life. According
to the Army's own assessment, these vehicles are in urgent need
of either recapitalization or replacement. This is a perfect
example of an area where modernization and readiness needs
converge.
Congress has provided significant support to HUMVEE
modernization efforts and the model public-private partnerships
between Army depots and industry that do the work.
I know we are mostly talking about the fiscal year 2017 and
2018 budgets today, but I want to jump ahead 1 year. This
committee has urged the Army to expedite planning and funding
in fiscal year 2019 for a long-term program of record on HUMVEE
modernization. This is for whoever wants to take a shot at it.
When do you think we can expect to see a comprehensive
modernization plan with an associated program of record?
Lieutenant General Murray. I will start with that, Senator,
and thank you. You mentioned this. So the help that this
committee and really the Congress as a whole has given
specifically to the Guard and Reserve in terms of HUMVEE
recapitalization, specifically the ambulance piece, has been
exceptionally helpful.
We believe we have a decision point on HUMVEEs at large in
2018 and it really comes down to what you said in your
comments, that we are going to have to make a decision on
either we are going to have to buy more JLTVs to replace
HUMVEEs or we are going to have to start recapping the HUMVEE
fleet we have. It is about a 50/50 mix, as you know, between
the total requirement between JLTV and the HUMVEE.
So the average age of the HUMVEE fleet right now is about 9
and a half years. We try to maintain less than 15 years. So we
are in good shape for another couple years in terms of the age
of the HUMVEE fleet. But we think the decision point is in 2018
whether or not we have to fund a HUMVEE recapitalization or we
have to purchase more JLTVs to replace the HUMVEE fleet.
Then the ambulances. I mean, we are looking very hard at
the purchase of the A-3 vehicle to get after some of the issues
you are talking about.
Senator Donnelly. Can one of you elaborate on the Army's
stated desire to not only grow and modernize its armored force
but also to accelerate modernization of the Army's combat
vehicles? What combat vehicle programs are you talking about
modernizing?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, I will start with the
armored capability. So against the war plans we are planning
against we are short. So the Chief made a decision here about 6
months ago to convert 15. There are nine ABCTs [Armored Brigade
Combat Teams] in the active component. There are five in the
Guard. He had a decision to convert one IBCT, a light brigade,
to an armored brigade. He has just decided to go with another
one. That is trying to enhance the capability so we can support
the war plans to meet the requirements.
Lieutenant General Murray. In terms of the modernization
piece you asked about, so it is really across the entire fleet.
So Abrams tank--we start this September in terms of an upgrade
from the B-2 to the B-3, the latest generation Abrams tank. On
the Bradley, we start this year on an upgrade from the A-3 to
an A-4. The Stryker you are familiar with. With a lot of help
from Congress, the lethality package that we will field to the
second SER is actually ahead of schedule in 2018, and then the
Paladin PIM [Paladin Integrated Management] program when we go
from the A-6 version of the Paladin to the A-7 version.
Senator Donnelly. That ties in a little bit to my next
question which is how do your current plans for incremental
modernization of vehicles like the Abrams tank and the Bradley
fighting vehicle that date back to the Cold War--how does that
mesh with your projected requirements, particularly given the
changing dynamics we are seeing almost on a daily basis in
Europe?
Lieutenant General Murray. So it really gets down to--and
General Dyess can talk more about this--is the Chief is firmly
convinced that there is a very real chance we will see a change
in the character of war in the next 10 or 15 years. What you
have kind of highlighted is the fundamental issue that we have
is maintaining readiness for today so our soldiers have the
best capability we can provide them, and we have programs to do
that today, and finding the money to invest for 2025, 2030, for
instance.
Right now, if you look at how we invest in next generation
vehicles, given the resources we have for modernization, is I
have got to finish upgrading a vehicle. Let us just take the
tank, for instance. So I got to finish upgrading the tank
before I can free up enough resources to start procuring next
generation--I can do some of the development--before I can
really starting buying in a big way.
Based upon the resources we have got, we have stretched out
procurement and modernization production lines to a point of
almost being silly. So to upgrade an ABCT with what I just laid
out, it takes 3 years. One ABCT, 3 years. So to do five of
them, that is 15 years. So what you find is, given the
resources we have, we never finish the upgrade because in 15
years, there will be another upgrade available that we are
going to have to invest money it.
So that is why I say we have got to start looking at the
development, and we have. I mean, there is work going on at
Fort Benning right now on the next generation combat vehicle.
So the limited money it takes to start developing requirements
and do some early prototyping--we can do that.
Where we run into problems is I can never afford to buy it
until we finish the upgrade we got. That is where predictable
funding, even if it is less than ideal, predictable, so I can
kind of look year to year to year to figure out when we can do
that would be very helpful.
Major General Dyess. Senator, in a couple weeks, we are
going to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the U.S. entry
into the war to end all wars. We did not seek that war. It
sought us. The Army ordered 4,400 tanks on the entry of war for
delivery a year later in 1918. Now, production did not start on
those tanks until June of 1918, and they delivered 300 tanks to
the United States forces in Europe.
We have had tanks in development since that time, since
1917. We have no future tank in development at this time. We
are working to start, as General Murray mentioned, a next
generation combat vehicle, which will be a Bradley replacement,
starting at Benning, just a nascent program with small amounts
of money. But this is the part about the big five, and then
what is the next generation and how are we going to replace
them? Modernizing existing, keeping readiness, but also moving
into modernization of all those programs that we counted on so
much across the years.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
Senator Cotton. Senator Sullivan?
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for your testimony and your service.
A number of us worked on the NDAA last year to increase the
Army's end strength. What are the numbers that you are looking
at right now in terms of your assumptions on planning going
forward, and what do you think the optimal number would be from
an end strength standpoint?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Hi, Senator. Good to see you.
Senator Sullivan. You too, General.
Lieutenant General Anderson. Growing that 1.013 is the
sweet spot, Senator Sullivan. What did I say? $1.018 million is
the sweet spot. That is the 476 in the active to 343 in the
Guard and the 199 in the Reserves. The priorities are to get to
those numbers. It is then to fill--I spoke earlier about trying
get our units back manned up to 100 percent, sir. So we are
hovering about 95 and the non-available is down in the 80s.
Then we are trying to buy back some more combat capabilities
that were scheduled to go away. Then we are trying to buy some
other capabilities, light fires and air defense, shore enablers
that we need from the European plan.
Senator Sullivan. Just following up on the previous
testimony, when you look at the Air Force, they are always
talking about fifth gen in terms of fighters. Right? So F-35's,
F-22's, and obviously those have been developed to take on a
fifth gen adversary, China or Russia, in their development.
So are you saying that in terms of the main weapon system
for the Army, the Abrams tank--we do not have any kind of next
gen battle tank that we have envisioned or planning or working
on? What is the Army's equivalent of the F-35? Maybe that is
not a great analogy because that did not come off so well. But
I think now the capability in terms of what that aircraft and
the F-22's are able to do is pretty darned impressive. Is there
an Army analog in terms of a big, kind of a next gen platform
that we need and that we know the Russians and the Chinese are
developing similar advances in technology in main battle
systems?
Lieutenant General Murray. There are those out there that
will disagree with me. I think for the very near term I think
the Abrams is still towards the top of its class in terms of
combat systems, in terms of tanks.
Senator Sullivan. Towards the top, General?
Lieutenant General Murray. I think we have parity. I think
there is parity out there. I do not think we have overmatch.
Senator Sullivan. We do not want a fair fight.
Lieutenant General Murray. I would agree with you, Senator.
Now, General Dyess mentioned next generation combat vehicle
development going on at Benning. That is the start of it. But
the problem we have is it is just not the tank. So the infantry
carrier, the next generation combat vehicle. We have got to
figure out what comes after Patriot, Avenger, THAAD [Terminal
High Altitude Air Defense] in terms of layered air defense
systems. We have begun some work on FVLs. As you know, that is
a program that is progressing for our aviation fleet. The
replacement for the 113 is starting to go into low-rate
production. That is AMPV. You mentioned this--and the F-35 is
no exception--it is time. So it is time. So it is really a
balancing of resources, risk, and time so you deliver the right
solution.
One of the problems we have with heavy armor right now is
this next upgrade of the Abrams will, once again, increase the
weight. We are just about reaching the limits of what we can do
with the Abrams. So it is time for us to start looking at next
generation tech.
What I worry about is there is nothing on the near horizon
that indicates a fundamental breakthrough in technology where
we can come up with a lighter tank. I think we would be
mistaken to build another 75-ton tank as long as protection
requirements are where they are. So we are not waiting on that
technology. Let us go back to your point, Senator, we need to
be very careful about what technologies we count on when we go
down this path so we do not end up with another program that
cannot deliver.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
I have two more quick questions. Now that we have deployed
with the European Reassurance Initiative, it is a very kind of
different kind of deployment than we have been doing, say, in
Iraq and Afghanistan. Are we seeing capabilities, now that we
are on the ground there, that we need to kind of refine or get
back the muscle memory? That is kind of big Army deployments,
looking across the plains of Europe, serious potential
adversary. How are we thinking about that?
Lieutenant General Anderson. I will start and Mike can
follow up, sir.
That is what we kind of knew before we got there. So with
the brigade brought, obviously, enhanced armor, but the issue
has become again the long-range precision fires and that gap
that we have been trying to fill here for quite a while in all
things air missile defense. The way we are getting around that
is with our NATO partners just like the Romanians that are
going to send a battery to join our EFP formations starting
here next month. So through the synergy of NATO, we will build
some of those capabilities, but again, the issue becomes the
longer-term plans to enhance those capabilities.
Major General Dyess. I would like to add on that probably
training and leader development may be the thing that is the
best investment at least in the short term because we have not
exercised the muscle memory of full spectrum operations. We are
starting that in our combat training centers. What we are
seeing is that the colonels and higher have exercised that
before, but below that, lieutenant colonels and below have not
exercised in that and have, rightfully so, spent their
resources to protect soldiers? lives, take soldiers to combat,
bring them back in the last 15 years.
Senator Sullivan. Well, I am out of time. General Anderson,
I would not end a hearing without mentioning the 425 and the
appreciation we have had for you guys reevaluating that. I want
to make sure you do keep in your training continued focus on
the cold weather ops in the Arctic. I mean, if the North
Korea--the balloon goes up there, we are going to need soldiers
who know how to operate in extreme temperatures in a
mountainous terrain. That unit is doing a great job in those
kind of environments. Thank you.
Senator Cotton. Cold weather mountainous training in the
Ozark Mountains of Arkansas, which I strongly support.
[Laughter.]
Senator Cotton. General Murray, you said that the Abrams is
near the top and at parity. Whose tracked vehicles are near the
top with the Abrams?
Lieutenant General Murray. I think the Israelis, the
Merkava, would be one. I would say that the T-90 is probably
pretty close. I mean, people talk about the Armada tank, and it
is still in my mind not completely fielded. Probably the
British tank is pretty close. I would not say that we have the
world class tank that we had for many, many years. I will be
the optimist and say that we are at parity with a lot of
different nations.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
Senator Peters?
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here and your testimony.
Thank you for your service.
As we are talking about kind of the future of warfare and
new systems that are being developed, I am from Michigan and we
are in the process right now of a transformation of the auto
industry in ways as every bit as big as when the first car came
off of the assembly line with Henry Ford, and that is in self-
driving autonomous vehicles, which is happening much quicker
than I think anyone anticipated, especially with Ford Motors
announcement of having a production self-driving car by 2021,
just a few short years from now, but certainly many vehicles
before that.
At the President's address, my guest was Dr. Paul Rogers
who is Director of TARDAC [Tank Automotive Research Development
and Engineering Center], the Army's tank automotive research
and development facility, which I know you know very well. They
are doing some incredibly innovative work in autonomy and
looking at how that might change how we fight wars. Certainly
from a logistics standpoint, given the fact--my understanding
is--we had more casualties in logistics in Iraq than in combat
because it is pretty dangerous to drive a fuel truck and other
types of vehicles with mines and attacks along that route.
I just want to kind of get a sense from you as to where do
you see autonomy self-driving in either combat vehicles,
logistics vehicles. Are we able to build some partnerships with
the auto industry and work with some of the incredible
engineering talent we have in the greater Detroit area where I
see both the Department of Defense and the private sector
working in ways that could be very transformative, kind of get
your vision of where you see autonomy when it comes to land
combat vehicles and logistics vehicles.
Lieutenant General Murray. Thank you, Senator.
As you know, we already do this in the air, so the man-to-
man teaming concept. We are looking at something very similar.
So in terms of concepts, robotic wingmen for ground systems.
You have potentially a manned combat system paired with one or
more unmanned system in the future. We fundamentally think that
at some point in time as we progress, that we should never send
a soldier into the most dangerous thing that soldiers do, for
instance, breaching obstacles, first man into a room, you know,
if you are clearing a building, et cetera, et cetera.
There are two specific programs I am sure Dr. Rogers has
talked to you about. The one TARDAC is working on right now is
called leader-follower technology. That is one leader vehicle
up to seven follower vehicles. It is a little bit more
complicated than what is going on in the civilian industry
right now because we are talking off-road, cross-terrain. So it
is a little bit more difficult than I-75 in Michigan, in my
home State.
Then the other piece we are working on is ESMAT. It is a
mule which we have had forever. It is an equipment carrier that
is fully automated to follow an infantry squad. It can carry up
to 1,000 pounds of ammunition, water, their rucksacks, their
batteries. It recharges batteries. So we working that. We have
take both of these to AROC.
The problem I have got right now is the cost. You tied in
the auto industry. So when we looked at the ESMAT going online
and found that for what we think we need to pay for, what we
are being told it is going to cost us to develop, et cetera, et
cetera, I could buy a brand new Mercedes for a lot cheaper than
I could buy basically just a four-wheel cart that is going to
carry 1,000 pounds of equipment, which does not seem reasonable
to me.
So we are going back and we are working more closely with
industry. We are working with some partners, DIUx [Defense
Innovation Unit experimental]. We are working with some other
partners to find out how we can do this faster and how we can
do this cheaper because if it is just one, I can afford it. If
I am going to put one of these in every infantry squad across
the entire regular Army, the National Guard, it is going to be
billions of dollars we would end up spending on this. So I have
got to figure out how to get the price point down.
Major General Dyess. Senator, I sponsored a RAND study
about 4 years ago, and one of the biggest obstacles to fielding
robotic capability in formations is trust and culture. I think
the tipping point is going to be the sergeant 1st class, the E-
7. As soon as he can adopt that in, I think that will be the
tipping point for us.
Now, that does not mean that we will back away from ground
robots. I think it is going to be part of our future. We just
got the approved robotics autonomous systems strategy from the
Vice Chief of Staff, and we are starting to work that and
publicize that now. So I think robotics are going to be part of
our future. Obviously, air is already there. Ground I think
will be in the future as well. But I think we have to overcome
a trust and culture.
Senator Peters. Yes, certainly. I think that is in the
civilian sector as well. Folks who like to drive automobiles to
be able to sit back and let that automobile drive you and your
family down the highway will take some time to get to that
point. So certainly it is the same in a combat situation.
But actually, General Murray, I was up in Michigan Tech who
I know is working with TARDAC and with others to take these
vehicles through a forest situation which is much more
complicated than the I-75 drive with gulleys and the like. But
I am pretty impressed with the work that is being done. It has
happening very quickly. As far as the cost element, obviously,
the civilian world has to worry about that too to make these
production ready and probably initially will be in fleets like
the Ubers and Lyfts and others. But as they produce more, those
costs will go down and I am sure will be working hand in glove
with you as well to make sure that happens with your vehicles.
But thank you. Thank you for the comment.
Senator Cotton. Senator Warren?
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
So for thousands of years, human beings have been fighting
wars, and for thousands of years, there has been one constant
and that is how much stuff can a person carry. That just has
not changed. Today we can put gear in the hands of a soldier
that would have been undreamed of even a decade ago. But every
time we do that, we load that soldier down, and that means less
mobility, getting tired faster.
I want to focus on that part when we are talking about
equipment, and that is I am really interested in the research
that is going on now that makes what a soldier does both more
effective but also lighter, more manageable, how much stuff
they are carrying around.
I am interested in this because I have had a chance to go
multiple times now to the Natick Soldier Systems Center in
Natick, Massachusetts. It is this incredible facility that is
doing this cutting-edge work on fabrics, for example. It is
amazing stuff. Lightweight fabrics now that can monitor a
soldier's vital signs, batteries that can generate power from
soldier's own movements, lightweight helmets that are both more
comfortable and more bulletproof than in the past.
So I just wanted to ask a question--I thought I would start
with you, General Marion, but I want anybody to weigh in on
this that has some ideas--about speaking to one or two areas in
personnel equipment that you think right now show the most
promise or areas where you think the greatest need is in terms
of development and testing.
Brigadier General Marion. Well, thank you, ma'am.
I think the single area that I would talk to most is
lightweight body armor. The research, development, and
engineering was done at Natick labs. So what we have been able
to find through testing recently is that we had the same level
or greater protection for up to 26 percent less weight. That is
weight that we cannot off board to a mule or something else.
That is protecting a soldier. So water, food, things like that,
we can, but we do not want to do that with body armor.
So some other things that we have done----
Senator Warren. Can I say before you leave body armor--I
just want to get a little pitch in here too because for the
first time I have seen a body armor that is different for women
than for men and how much more comfortable that is and how much
more effective that is.
Brigadier General Marion. Yes, ma'am. The vest that the
soldier wears that these armored plates go into--those vests
are now being designed from the smallest stature soldier we
have, the 5th percentile female, up to the largest stature
soldier we have, the 95th percentile male. So we have a variety
of sizes of vests. Because of that, we can size the plates
appropriately so a soldier does not have to carry a larger
plate than they should be. So I think we are making all the
movements in the right directions, and the testing is going
well for those specific lightweight body armor components.
By the way, we just awarded yesterday a contract for that
lightweight Army combat helmet that you just referenced. So we
are on the right track there too.
Senator Warren. Good. Anything more? I think I may have
distracted you. Were you about to go to another one? So we are
on body armor. Right? Good.
Anybody else want to add anything? General Anderson?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Ma'am, it has been a problem
since I was a lieutenant. So the issue becomes again--and it
goes back to what Bob is talking about. There are certain
things besides PPE [Personal Protective Equipment]. So as we
watched over all these years when we went to Iraq back in 2003
as all this stuff kept getting added to us like a Christmas
tree, side plates, groin plates, neck plates. All of a sudden,
you are becoming a robot.
So we will keep working what Bob just described. I think
all of us as we keep working--your basic combat level. Like you
said, yes, you have to have the PPE because it protects you,
but when it comes to your life support, obviously, your weapon,
your night vision devices, your communications equipment, all
the efforts we have done in terms of power, you talk about
things that can take vital statistics, but batteries,
munitions, all those types of things over the years have all
come down.
But the bottom line is, you know, just being the corps
commander at Bragg, we are still throwing guys out of airplanes
with 135-140-pound rucksacks coming out of an airplane. So that
is not good. That is too bulky. That is too onerous. When they
try to get out of that airplane, they cannot get out of the
airplane when you throw on things like a parachute.
So we have got to keep working all the parts of your
fighting load above and beyond your personal protective
equipment, and that is just going to have to be--you know,
Natick has been doing that for a long time, but that is
everything from aluminum type magazines to now the new plastic
type. So many different examples, but we have to keep working
on that effort.
Senator Warren. Anything more anybody want to add?
Lieutenant General Murray. I would just say the integrated
head, neck, face protection--I think you asked for probably the
most promising, the ability to really monitor the vital signs
of a soldier, because we cannot do that right now. So a soldier
goes out for heat injury. The first time you find out he is
going out for heat injury is when he falls flat on his face. So
the ability to monitor vital signs so you can get a little of a
warning. I think those would be the two most promising.
Senator Warren. I have seen some of this stuff in
development. Just amazing what it looks like they are going to
be able to do on this.
Anything more that you want to add?
It is very helpful because I realize what we are trying to
do here is we are trying to solve for two variables at the same
time. We want greater effectiveness, but we also want greater
safety. We want to maximize both of them, and I realize
sometimes there are tradeoffs.
Lieutenant General Anderson. Soldier effectiveness is what
you are talking about. At the end of the day, that soldier has
to be able to walk quite a few kilometers with that load and be
able to get the job done when he gets there. If we do not give
him the kit to be effective--but he has got to be able to get
there.
Senator Warren. I have one other question I want to ask you
about. Last week, we had a panel of experts who told this
subcommittee that our adversaries are improving their cyber and
electronic warfare capabilities. They are developing the
ability to disrupt our communications systems. So that is the
other part I want to ask about, about what plans the Army
currently has to make sure that communications networks are
resilient and they will be able to remain both operational and
secure in adverse conditions. Could you say something about
that?
Major General Dyess. I will just start, ma'am.
Senator Warren. Please.
Major General Dyess. So as we look at the future of a
multi-domain battle, we think that we are going to be contested
in all those domains, space, cyber space, for example,
electromagnetic spectrum, et cetera. That is going to be
increasingly lethal. It will be increasingly complex with the
urban environment. But we are going to have to operate
degraded. So I think we are putting that in our concept work so
that will help give us a point of direction to travel in. So it
is going to inform the people who make requirements and inform
the people who do the doctrine and organization and training
and leader development building for requirements. So that is
one thing we are putting in to define the operational
requirement. That is going to be a tenet of a future
battlefield for sure.
Lieutenant General Murray. So that near term, in the
future, ma'am, so it will not come as a surprise to anybody
that our adversaries have the ability to do cyber attacks. The
EW [Electronic Warfare System] piece, the ability to affect our
system right now, that is not a future capability. They have
that right now. So we are getting after that several ways.
So in terms of a defensive standpoint, so assured P&T, the
ability to use GPS [Global Positioning System] signals is very,
very important to us. We are working about five different lines
of effort to make sure we can guarantee that our systems can
continue to rely upon----
Senator Warren. So this is about resilience and about----
Lieutenant General Murray. It is resilience.
Senator Warren.--duplication in effect. So if they knock
out one way to do it, we are right back on line with a second
or a third or a fourth.
Lieutenant General Murray. We are looking at little things
like the atomic clock. So if we lose GPS, the atomic clock has
the ability to provide the same type of timing that GPS does.
We are also looking at in terms of--so a COMSEC
[Communications Security] modernization piece of it so to make
sure we can have the secure communications.
There is also a big training piece of this that we have not
really worried about this for the last 15 years. So how do you
operate in that type of environment?
We are also looking at offensive capabilities so we do not
have a radiation-seeking warhead right now. So we are looking
at development of a radiation-seeking warhead and the ability
to identify where that jamming is coming from in terms of EW
and be able to address that through an offensive role too.
Senator Warren. Good.
Major General Dyess. One other thing is experimentation. We
need to be able to experiment with these things. At Fort Bliss,
White Sands, we own the entire electromagnetic spectrum. So
there are some capabilities that we are going to find on the
future battlefield that we are not going to be able to
replicate at home stations or even at our CTCs [Combat Training
Centers] because it is on the flight path into LAX. We cannot
turn it on.
Senator Warren. You cannot do that in Boston.
Major General Dyess. Exactly. So simulations I think is
going to be important. So brigade commanders and division
commanders understand the capability. But to be able to now
experiment--I always thought it was not right to attack a
brigade combat team with cyber at a national level and not have
a national defense capability out there. So the last year, we
sent out a defense capability. They identified a machine that
was attacking the network, isolated it. The brigade commander
wanted that machine back in the fight because that is part of
his combat power. We were not able to do that 2 years ago, but
last year we were able to do it. You have to be able to
experiment with this.
Senator Warren. I appreciate the point you make about
hardware and about training and just how people conceive of the
problem. Good.
Anything more?
Lieutenant General Anderson. So you know, ma'am, we do do
two EW cyber rotations at the National Training Center per
year. The goal is to be able to do that every rotation. But
those are massive focused. It takes a lot of enablers to come
out there and do that. But how you try to operationalize cyber,
EW because most commanders do not understand it and do not have
the capabilities like Bo is talking about. So those are
phenomenal opportunities to have them perform in a degraded
environment.
But the bottom line boils down to how are you able to go
from digital to analog. Mike is talking about GPS. You have got
to be able to land nav the old-fashioned way, read a map. You
got to be able to track a battle the old-fashioned way on an
acetate map. That is the way we move forward. Places like
Muscatatuck in southern Indiana have actual cyber. It is
actually cyber facility where you can shut off power grids and
you can shut off water. You can pick locks inside of a prison,
et cetera. That is the way commanders can learn.
But, Senator King, the sad thing about your AAR comment is
what Bo was talking about. We do have the facilities at White
Sands but the problem we have at NIE, our network integration
exercise, and our experimentation stuff--the problem was
because of the demand on forces. We did learn back around 2009-
2010 it was worth having a direct dedicated unit to do testing.
Well, the reality of the demand I was explaining to you
earlier--we cannot afford to keep that armored brigade team at
Fort Bliss to do that anymore. So we have to train rotational
units to come back to do the testing. But we did learn how to
fix it. But the reality of the world, based on particularly
Russia, caused us to have to go heel to toe in Europe, and
there goes that test brigade.
Senator Warren. Thank you very much. I recognize we cannot
be effective, we cannot be safe if we cannot communicate when
we have got people out in the field and the importance of the
R&D [Research & Development] on resilience but also the
importance of training. I appreciate the work you are doing.
Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cotton. I would like to return to some of the
questions I raised in my opening statement.
Does the Army need a modernization command, unity of
effort, agility to stay ahead of the threat and innovation?
General Anderson, do you want to take swipe at that?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Sir, it is something we talk
about all the time. It is what TRADOC is all about, Senator. I
think that is why it exists. When you look at what the centers
of excellence are doing as subsets of TRADOC, I think the
problem has become--a lot of those have become stovepiped
entities. I think the issue becomes the integration--and Bo and
I were just talking about that today about how you have the
operators. You have the TCMs and the operators. Who is figuring
out what the requirement is? But I do not think a modernization
command is the answer. I think within TRADOC we have between
what CAC [Combined Arms Center] does, what ARCIC does, and the
center of excellence does. I think the issue is how do you get
better collaboration between them and then between the
operational force.
Senator Cotton. General Murray?
Lieutenant General Murray. Sir, I am with General Anderson
on this primarily. When we have looked at this in the past--and
I have thought about it extensively--I would be fearful that
you would lose focus on what soldiers need right now and you
would become almost solely focused. So it would be almost a
change 100 percent of the problem we have right now. We would
be worried about 2035, 2040, and then we would find ourselves
short in the near term because that was always my dilemma is if
you got requirements being built in this modernization command,
who is doing the work that ARCIC [Army Capabilities Integration
Center] is doing right now in terms of looking at right now. I
am not saying it could not work. I am not convinced of what the
problem is we would actually fix with standing up a new
command.
Senator Cotton. General Dyess?
Major General Dyess. I think what General Murray said is on
problem statement and problem identification is important. We
have identified 20 first-order problems, the solutions to which
would make the Army better. Those are the Army warfighting
challenge. You keep it out of the stovepipes. You put the Army
warfighting challenge--number one is develop situational
understanding. Now, that is not a Huachuca intel problem and
that is not a Fort Benning maneuver problem. It is not a Fort
Sill fires problem. It is everybody's piece of the solution. So
that is how we are trying to address it, Senator, is put the
warfighting challenge on the table and then develop cross-
cutting solutions to answer that.
Senator Cotton. General Marion, I think I would like turn
to you to DCGS-A as I raised in my opening statement, billions
of dollars. The NDAA in fiscal year 2017 directed the Army to
start seeking a commercial solution, and that was the
compromise softer, weaker version of the provision. Where do we
stand on DCGS-A?
Brigadier General Marion. Yes, sir. In the Army, we are
clear on the path ahead on DCGS-A. In the fiscal year 2017
NDAA, section 113 referenced using commercial, off-the-shelf
products, the prescription for firm fixed-price contracts, and
timelines directly to initial operational capabilities and full
operational capabilities. So we are exactly tracking the intent
of section 113 and also section 220, the specific reference to
post-increment one activities and the requirement to
restructure the program and also use of COTS as well.
So our Chief of Staff is intimately involved in what we are
doing to restructure the program. We are clear on the
requirements from both sections of the NDAA, and the Chief has
taken several briefings and is coming to a decision point on
how we are going to move forward on restructuring DCGS-A to
meet the requirements and also the provisions of the NDAA.
Senator Cotton. Is that at every echelon level?
Brigadier General Marion. Yes, sir. That is battalion and
below at the tactical echelons. Section 220 says everything
beyond increment one.
Lieutenant General Murray. Senator, I think you are
tracking what we are doing at battalion and below almost right
now. So we have gone out to industry with basically just a list
of requirements--they are not the approved requirements for the
solution--and invited industry to come in with what they have
commercial, off-the-shelf that they think can meet the
requirements.
Very soon here then this month, beginning of next month,
they will show up. About nine, I think, vendors will show up at
Fort Huachuca, and we will take them through a series of tests
using real soldiers, both officers, warrant officers, and
enlisted, each vendor individually just to prove out what they
said they can meet in terms of the requirements. Then we will
kind of figure out really what I think is--the real intent of
prototyping is what the exact requirements are we need in the
future and whether or not there are civilian solutions or off-
the-shelf solutions out there that can meet the requirements.
If there are not, do we need to change the requirements before
we go after a developmental program.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
Senator King?
Senator King. I am a great believer that structure is
policy. If you have a messy structure, you end up with a messy
policy. I keep coming back to how is the procurement process
structured. Just a few thoughts.
One question. When you are setting requirements, are
construction engineers or representatives of the industrial
base involved in defining the requirements?
Lieutenant General Murray. Well, industry is involved, yes,
sir. So what we are trying to do right now----
Senator King. I am just wondering if there is somebody at
the table who says that is impossible or----
Lieutenant General Murray. In the past, the answer would be
no. So what we are driving right now is when a requirement gets
written at Fort Benning, Georgia, it is more than just somebody
understands--so it is our S&T folks. They understand TRL
levels, the technology readiness levels, associated with what
we are talking about. It is the acquisition people. So they
understand the acquisition process. As we write the
requirements, it is the testers. So they understand as you
write requirements, the testing requirements, so we do write a
requirement that is going to take 2 years to test----
Senator King. So the answer to my question is yes.
Practicality and buildability is part of the requirements
process.
Lieutenant General Murray. Yes, sir.
Senator King. You mentioned several times off-the-shelf.
You also mentioned or one of you mentioned in your testimony
other good tanks. The Israelis I think you mentioned, the
British. I understand there is not necessarily a tank but a
fighting vehicle the Germans make called the PUMA. What about
buying the design and building them here? I mean, why do we
have to reinvent and do all of our own if there is a really
good top-range vehicle out there that meets our needs? That
would be another way to accelerate this process instead of
going through 5 years of design and requirements. If the
Israeli tank or the German tank is 80 or 90 percent of what we
want--I do think it should be built here, but it could be
licensed and built here. What about that as an option?
Lieutenant General Murray. We have looked at it not
necessarily in the tank. I will talk about the PUMA. So, for
instance, we have got some munitions gaps, and we went to the
Germans in this case and looked at specifically their
munitions. It came down to a capacity issue, and it came down
to the cost was exorbitant in terms of what the munition would
cost primarily because of the capacity. It was a cold
production line. Then applied it to the PUMA.
Specifically the PUMA, I think we do not understand yet,
sir, what the requirement is for the combat vehicle. So as you
move to this fundamental change in the character of the war,
one thing that General Milley is convinced is that we will
absolutely be fighting in dense urban areas. So as we looked at
the mobile protected fire power platform, one of the key things
that is driving him is how wide is it, how tall is it, how long
is it. If you look at the PUMA, specifically the PUMA is wider,
taller, and longer than our current infantry fighting vehicle.
We are trying to go the other direction. That is just one
example.
For the MPF [Mobile Protected Firepower], we did have
foreign competitors, foreign manufacturers come in and bid--or
not bid yet, but present proposals for MPF.
If we go through the requirements process and there is a
foreign manufacturer that can produce inside the United States,
we will be absolutely thrilled to get them into the
competition.
Senator King. A couple of other points. At our hearing last
week, we had testimony that Silicon Valley basically will not
deal with the Pentagon, too cumbersome, too long, too
aggravating. That is a real problem. I mean, if our most
creative, innovative sector of our whole economy says I just do
not want to deal with this procurement system, it seems to me
that in itself is something that should make us rethink it or
meet with them. What is the problem so we can try to try to
improve it? We cannot afford to lose that level of creativity
and inventiveness because our systems are so slow and
cumbersome and burdensome. I just commend that to you. I would
suggest a summit meeting in San Jose about what are the issues
and how do we improve this program.
I am worried about the industrial base and the length of
time these things take. There is a danger to the industrial
base. This one is partially on us because of this herky-jerky
budget process that we have. You cannot predict. It seems to me
the budget process that we have hurts modernization probably
more than any other area because you cannot----
Lieutenant General Anderson. Installations too, sir.
Senator King. Is that true?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Installations too. So if
installations are going to be a power projection base, which
they are, but you are going to have crumbling taxiways,
runways, ranges, simulators, et cetera, it is pretty
comparable.
But on DIUx, we did order a team out there in 2015. We went
to them, sir. So, obviously, you are right. Tough coming to us,
but we are just one subset of the Pentagon. So we did establish
a liaison team there, started with three with a goal to grow to
about 10. The issue is again how do they help us sort through
and see things through on software, cyber, autonomous systems,
artificial intelligence, et cetera.
Senator King. But I would also add to that list of items
the process itself as it relates to their ability to interact
with the Pentagon.
Lieutenant General Anderson. No argument. We need to figure
that out. But a bridge to that solution was to at least get
embedded with them so we did not lose the opportunity.
Senator King. Another opportunity--and I hate to raise the
word ``joint'' because it does not have a very good history in
military procurement. But if you are doing body armor, for
example, should you not be working with the Marines on that
project? The same thing with the fighting vehicle. I know there
were efforts on a joint fighting vehicle. But to the extent
that that can be done without it ballooning the requirements
and ending up with a vehicle that will not work, I hope that
that is still part of the picture.
Lieutenant General Murray. It is, Senator. So we do have a
quarterly Army-Marine Corps board to focus. That is when we
talk mostly about multi-domain battle, so you know, a concept.
But most of those boards are joint development. So JLTV is a
joint program. In terms of small arms ammunition, we are
working with the Marine Corps. In terms of future vertical
lift, Cape Set 3, we are working with the Marine Corps. So we
work very, very closely. Body armor is another one. We
discussed about specifically the female body armor about 6
months ago. So we do, about every 3 months, get together, and
those types of conversations normally drive the agenda.
Senator King. Good. Well, we are really just beginning the
discussion here. But my time has expired. But I want to thank
you and urge you to maintain contact with the committee and
with us as we work toward the new National Defense
Authorization Act to try to capture what you need, other than
regular funding. I understand that is important, but other
areas of reform, structural reform, whatever we can do to try
to accelerate this process because I do not want to face an
adversary and have somebody say, well, we would have been ready
but we could not work together or whatever the barriers were.
We have got to get this right. Thank you very much, gentlemen.
Senator Cotton. Thank you all, gentlemen, for your
testimony today and your many years of service to the country.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:48 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
active protection systems
1. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Anderson, Lieutenant General
Murray, and Major General Dyess, last year, Congress approved a
reprogramming request ``to rapidly acquire Active Protection Systems
(APS) for the Stryker and Bradley systems to defeat or mitigate threats
to survivability.''
You highlighted the importance of APS in your testimony last week
to the House Armed Services Committee, and I agree that we need to move
with a sense of urgency to field technologically mature APS
technologies, including solutions that are available today from our
international partners. Please provide an update on the expedited Non-
Developmental Item (``NDI'') effort for APS, including the results of
recent tests of various systems. What is the timeline for the Army's
plan for the rest of this year with respect to the NDI? What can we
expect in the fiscal year 2018 budget regarding plans following the
completion of the NDI, in terms of timing, budgetary requirements, and
number of systems? Is there an urgent operational need for APS? What is
the Army doing to ease integration of the systems onto each of the
combat vehicle platforms; especially given the constraints of size,
weight, power, and cooling (``SWaP-C''), for lighter-weight vehicles?
Lieutenant General Anderson, Lieutenant General Murray, and Major
General Dyess. The APS NDI efforts for Abrams, Bradley and Stryker are
on independent timelines for installation and characterization. Abrams
installation is complete and began automotive characterization and
ballistic testing in March 2017. Automotive characterization assesses
operational impacts to the vehicle platform with the APS installed.
This assessment includes determining impacts of conducting daily crew
level tasks, degradation of fire control performance and general
interoperability. There have been no issues identified during the
automotive characterization. Ballistic testing assesses the vendor
claims for ability to defeat specific threats. Of the 18 scenarios
executed as of May 11, 2017, there were no issues directly related to
the APS system. Abrams characterization is scheduled to complete
September 2017. Bradley and Stryker platforms are currently completing
APS installation efforts with automotive and ballistic characterization
scheduled to begin for both platforms in July 2017 and completing in
December 2017. At the completion of characterization for each platform,
the Army will make a decision whether or not to proceed with
procurement/urgent fielding. A decision to proceed would require
additional testing to assess safety, suitability and effectiveness to
support urgent fielding. The Army has requested $83.8 million
(Research, Development, Test and Evaluation) to support this testing.
Depending on the extent of additional testing, procurement of APS
systems for Abrams could begin late fiscal year 2018 (FY18). The Army
has requested $168.7 million (Weapons and Track and Combat Vehicles) in
the fiscal year 2018 budget to procure up to 87 APS sets for Abrams,
with countermeasures and spares, and approximately 35 APS sets and
countermeasures for Bradley. Procurement of APS systems for Stryker and
the remainder for Bradley is anticipated in fiscal year 2019. The Army
approved a Directed Requirement in October 2016 that ``validates the
operational need and serves as the directed requirement to field an
initial NDI APS capability rapidly to the United States Army Europe,''
contingent upon success of the installation and characterization
efforts and guidance from the Army Requirements Oversight Council
(AROC). Vehicle Protection Suite is the planned Army program of record
that will address ease of APS integration and size, weight, power, and
cooling constraints relative to combat vehicle platforms and lighter
weight vehicles.
munitions 155mm in fiscal year 2018 budget
2. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Murray, in your testimony you
flagged the Army's anticipated need for ``significant increases to
ammunition requirements based on emerging peer and near-peer threats.''
The Committee also heard testimony from Combatant Commanders last year
about the operational challenges they will face with the implementation
of the policy restricting the use of cluster munitions, and the
resulting shortfall in availability of critical weapon systems. The
President's fiscal year 2018 budget blueprint describes the need to
address ``pressing shortfalls, such as insufficient stocks of critical
munitions.'' The DOD fiscal year 2017 supplemental also requests a
total of $1.1 billion for ammunition needs, across multiple theaters.
For example the request adds $2.2 million for 155-mm rounds and $135
million for extended-range M982 Excalibur rounds. Are those amounts
sufficient to meet the ``significant increases'' in requirements? What
legislative resources do you need, if any, to acquire capabilities
that: (a) meet commanders' operational requirements; (b) keep
unexploded ordnance to a minimum; and (c) do so in a rapid, cost-
effective manner?
Lieutenant General Murray. No, those amounts are not sufficient. We
project significant increases to ammunition requirements based on
emerging peer and near-peer threats and increased demand in Iraq and
Afghanistan--of which projected resources fall short. There are two
primary issues we must address in order to meet commanders' current and
future operational requirements. First, the Army is at risk if we
should enter into sustained combat operations. While suitable
substitutes exist to fill some shortages, there are no substitutes for
ballistic missile defense or air to ground missiles. The munitions
industrial base can sustain what the Army has requested up to this
point. However in the event of a surge, it could take over two years to
activate a production line for a ``new start''. We need to grow
capacity in some of our Government-owned and Contractor-operated
ammunition plants and to broaden commercial capacity in order to meet
the increased requirements for preferred munitions. The second area of
concern is the implementation of DOD cluster munitions policy which
will go into effect January 1, 2019. The policy will limit the use of
some of the Army's most effective weapons to support commanders'
operational requirements. Denying essential terrain to our enemies will
always be essential to ground combat, so reconsidering the cluster
munitions policy has merit. If the policy remains in effect, the Army
must continue to pursue advanced technology that is not currently ready
and extremely expensive.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
army pilot training and fleet modernization:
3. Senator Wicker. Lieutenant General Anderson, Lieutenant General
Murray, and Major General Dyess, under the Aviation Restructure
Initiative (ARI), the Army has leveraged its fleet of UH-72A Lakotas to
modernize and enhance its pilot training capability at Ft. Rucker, AL,
to create a safer, efficient and more relevant training environment. To
date, over 140 Lakotas trainers have been delivered to Ft. Rucker, AL,
with a current fielding objective of 8204 aircraft. Could you provide a
general update on the status of the Army's pilot training capability
modernization, to include observations from the initial pilot training
classes on your new platform and curriculum?
Lieutenant General Anderson, Lieutenant General Murray, and Major
General Dyess. The initial assessment of the Lakota helicopter's
performance in support of pilot training at Fort Rucker has been good
in terms of positive skill transfer for trainees in preparation for
follow-on training in the Army's advanced airframes. With fielding
underway, we are still evaluating impacts in terms of durability and
other performance aspects. Students are adapting well to the Lakota.
Based on evaluation of five student classes utilizing the Lakota for
Initial Entry Rotary Wing (IERW) training in fiscal year 2016, and six
student classes to date in fiscal year 2017, we assess positive
outcomes in the form of increased trainee proficiency earlier in the
training curriculum, which enables greater focus on tactical navigation
and night vision goggle training previously withheld until students
progressed to advanced track airframes. Additionally, we assess that
the positive skill transfer from digital modern cockpit instrumentation
and dual-engine performance contributes to reductions in training time
required for students to demonstrate basic proficiency in the Army's
advanced track airframes after transitioning from Lakota-supported
IERW.
4. Senator Wicker. Lieutenant General Anderson, Lieutenant General
Murray, Major General Dyess, and Brigadier General Marion, I am
concerned that Army leadership does not recognize the urgency of the
situation surrounding the inability for the Army to execute a contract
for additional UH-72A Lakota helicopters, given a contract has not been
executed for the UH-72A Lakota helicopters funded in fiscal year 2016
appropriations. The failure to contract for additional Lakota
helicopters will delay the transformation of the Army's pilot training
capability and force the Army to continue flying its antiquated
training aircraft. In addition, further delay in contracting for
additional Lakotas will cause significant industrial impacts, to
include a projected production gap at the manufacturer that threatens
the stability of the UH-72A industrial capability. Additionally, delays
in contracting is impacting the high performing production workforce
and threatens to break a program that has sustained an on-time, on-
budget and on-quality record for the entirety of the program.
The fiscal year 2017 appropriations bill that passed the House and
will be passed by the Senate in the coming weeks includes funding for
additional Lakota helicopters for other missions, as well as for the
training fleet at Ft. Rucker, with explicit guidance as to how the
funding is to be directed so that there is no confusion regarding
Congressional intent.
Provide this committee with your plan for executing the projected
fiscal year 2017 funding and the existing fiscal year 2016 funding for
the Lakota program.
Lieutenant General Anderson, Lieutenant General Murray, Major
General Dyess, and Brigadier General Marion. Army leadership is
actively tracking the status of the UH-72A Lakota Lawsuit and potential
implications to the industrial base and the Army Training Aircraft. The
Army is fully aware of the Congressional Language that designated $187
million for 28 UH-72A Lakota aircraft in fiscal year 2017 (FY17)
Appropriations Bill. The Army is prepared to obligate the fiscal year
2017 appropriation as quickly as possible following a favorable court
ruling.
5. Senator Wicker. Lieutenant General Anderson, Lieutenant General
Murray, Major General Dyess, and Brigadier General Marion, describe the
impacts to your ARI schedule, pilot training, fleet modernization and
production delays that will result from the Army's inability to procure
additional UH-72A helicopters for the training fleet at Ft. Rucker.
Lieutenant General Anderson, Lieutenant General Murray, Major
General Dyess, and Brigadier General Marion. If the Army is unable to
procure additional UH-72As for the training fleet, The U.S. Army
Aviation Center of Excellence (USAACE) will sustain a split fleet (UH-
72A and TH-67s) for Initial Entry Rotary Wing (IERW) Common Core
(flight school) for longer than originally scheduled. This will result
in USAACE having to resource personnel, facilities, simulation, and
training plans for multiple tracks that were not planned nor
programmed. Currently, there is insufficient room to sustain two
different IERW simulators under the Contractor Owned/Contractor
Operated (COCO) Flight School Simulation contract. USAACE would also
have to execute a course redesign which would affect common core and
advanced track (AH-64, UH-60, CH-47) hours and instruction.
6. Senator Wicker. Lieutenant General Anderson, Lieutenant General
Murray, Major General Dyess, and Brigadier General Marion, are you
considering a harvest of Army National Guard Lakotas to meet your
training requirement should you be unable to procure additional
aircraft for this requirement from the manufacturer?
Lieutenant General Anderson, Lieutenant General Murray, Major
General Dyess, and Brigadier General Marion. The Army has not
considered any options that harvest UH-72A Lakota helicopters from the
Army National Guard.
7. Senator Wicker. Lieutenant General Anderson, Lieutenant General
Murray, Major General Dyess, and Brigadier General Marion, will you
commit to making the UH-72A Lakota contracting problem and production
stabilization a high priority for the Army, and do all in your power to
expedite the contracting actions required to obligate the fiscal year
2017 appropriation?
Lieutenant General Anderson, Lieutenant General Murray, Major
General Dyess, and Brigadier General Marion. Yes, the Army considers
procurement of UH-72A Lakota a high priority. The Army is prepared to
obligate the fiscal year 2017 appropriation as quickly as possible
following a favorable court ruling.
tupelo, mississippi apache company consolidation:
8. Senator Wicker. Lieutenant General Anderson, Lieutenant General
Murray, Major General Dyess, and Brigadier General Marion, I am deeply
concerned that the Commission on the Future of the Army and the Army's
Aviation Restructure Initiative (ARI) have proposed moving the Tupelo,
Mississippi Apache Company to Texas. This consolidation would seem to
indicate an overall reduction in readiness of this Apache Battallion,
and the retraining of pilots and support elements along with the move
itself would increase overall costs.
Can you explain how this portion of the ARI yields fiscal savings?
Lieutenant General Anderson, Lieutenant General Murray, Major
General Dyess, and Brigadier General Marion. The National Commission on
the Future of the Army (NCFA) recommended that 4 AH-64 Apache
helicopter battalions remain in the Army National Guard (ARNG)
outfitted with 18 aircraft each. The Army, along with the National
Guard Bureau (NGB) and Adjutants General (TAG) from the individual
States, is conducting a collaborative and inclusive process to examine
the merits of the NCFA's recommendation and how best to implement it.
The Army will determine the locations of the remaining 72 ARNG AH-64s
in a manner that maximizes readiness in order to provide the best
possible capability to our combatant commanders while incorporating the
recommendation of the National Guard on how best to achieve those aims.
9. Senator Wicker. Lieutenant General Anderson, Lieutenant General
Murray, Major General Dyess, and Brigadier General Marion, what are
your plans for the Mississippi Guardsmen that cannot relocate?
Lieutenant General Anderson, Lieutenant General Murray, Major
General Dyess, and Brigadier General Marion. No decision on Army
National Guard (ARNG) AH-64 stationing has been made. Should the AH-64s
currently located in Tupelo, MS, be relocated then the ARNG would
implement an aviation rebalancing effort for the loss of AH-64
capability, supplemental to force structure actions related to the
Aviation Restructure Initiative. The extent to which a State that loses
AH-64 capability and in turn gains off-setting capability is dependent
on the final AH-64 stationing decision and aircraft allocation. Any
Guardsmen assigned to a lost AH-64 unit will likely have potential
reassignment options to other aviation units in the State, which may or
may not require retraining.
10. Senator Wicker. Lieutenant General Anderson, Lieutenant General
Murray, Major General Dyess, and Brigadier General Marion, what are the
Army's short and long term strategies for ANG force laydown?
Lieutenant General Anderson, Lieutenant General Murray, Major
General Dyess, and Brigadier General Marion. The Army National Guard
(ARNG) has completed most of the force structure changes implemented by
the Army's end-to-end Aviation Restructure Initiative (ARI). The
National Commission on the Future of the Army (NCFA) February 2016
report to Congress recommended the Army modify ARI by retaining AH-64
Apaches in the ARNG. The Army is reviewing the recommendations of the
National Commission on the Future of the Army in conjunction with the
National Guard Bureau (NGB) and Adjutants General (TAG) from the
individual States. NCFA recommendation #57 calls for retaining four
Attack Battalions and resourcing two fewer UH-60 Assault Battalions
than programmed in the ARNG under ARI. This modification of ARI will
result in 24 total Apache Battalions with 20 in the Regular Army (same
as under ARI) and 4 in the ARNG (compared to zero under ARI). The ARNG
battalions would be equipped with 18 aircraft each.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
budgetary priorities
11. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Anderson and Lieutenant
General Murray, your joint statement highlights that the clear priority
for limited Army budgetary resources has been for immediate readiness
to meet current requirements. With ongoing operations showing no real
signs of slowing down, how do we change direction to modernize to face
future threats?
Lieutenant General Anderson and Lieutenant General Murray. Today's
fiscal environment impedes the Army's ability to achieve both a high
state of readiness and modernize the force to a level that would allow
a technological over-match against potential adversaries in the
quantities required to meet war plan demands. The effects of the Budget
Control Act (BCA) and continuing resolutions hamper and delay critical
programs; prevent us from reprogramming money to make smart choices
with limited funds; and stop new starts to fill current and emerging
requirements. Most significantly, the Army cannot meet the 2012 Defense
Strategy at projected BCA funding levels. Moreover, it will take 5-8
years to recover from a fiscal year 2018 imposed sequestration funding
level which further reduces buying power, disrupts modernization plans,
and reduces the Army's capability advantage over near-peer, high end
competitors. A return to sequestration in fiscal year 2018 will reduce
modernization another 20 percent. At that funding level the Army would
need to stop Abrams and Bradley modernization, stop Stryker Lethality
upgrades, stop Active Protection Systems development, and slow down
aircraft survivability programs. The industrial base is postured to
ramp up in many cases to help the Army modernize its existing
equipment. We have sustained many programs that can easily be
accelerated if resources become available. The Army is prepared to
accelerate delivery of enhanced air and missile defense, long range
fires, armor formation upgrades, aviation fleet modernization,
ammunition and missiles for emerging wartime requirements, lethality
upgrades for Stryker vehicles, assured communications, Soldier
lethality and protection and finally, electronic warfare.
12. Senator Inhofe. Major General Dyess and Brigadier General (P)
Marion, unfortunately, several high-profile recent Army modernization
programs like Crusader and Future Combat System have wasted billions
and produced little of value. What have we learned from those failures
and how are we working to ensure we do not repeat past mistakes?
Major General Dyess and Brigadier General Marion. The Army is
committed to successful execution of our modernization efforts and
learning from cancelled programs. Stable requirements, adequate
resources, and realistic acquisition strategies and timelines are key
to program success. New programs such as the Armored Multi-Purpose
Vehicle and the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle have conducted trade
studies, tiering and prioritization early in the acquisition process to
ensure affordable, achievable, and realistic programs. Additionally, a
key tenet to successful modernization programs is developing and
qualifying component-level technologies before integrating them at the
system-level. A robust Technology Maturation phase prior to
Manufacturing Development, Integration and Test is critical to success
in production, and ultimately fielding to our Army formations. The Army
will continue to assess requirement feasibility and stability, current
and emerging threats, available resources, and technology capability
and maturity beginning early and throughout program lifecycles in order
to deliver needed capability to our warfighters while being efficient
stewards of taxpayer dollars.
current state of army procurement
13. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Anderson and Lieutenant
General Murray, in your joint statement you mentioned that the Army is
``essentially relying on the same platforms that we have had since the
1980s--the Big 5.'' Are these platforms--even when heavily modified--
capable of giving us the kind of technological overmatch to which we
are accustomed?
Lieutenant General Anderson and Lieutenant General Murray. Yes, for
now. However, we face the very real possibility of losing our
qualitative overmatch. Our priority has been to focus limited
modernization funding on capabilities that have the greatest effect
against near-peer threats and can be in the hands of Soldiers in the
next 10 years. We are challenged in that those upgrades will only go so
far. We must have sufficient funding to improve today's equipment while
at the same time invest in the development of future capabilities.
14. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Anderson and Lieutenant
General Murray, is our reliance on these five platforms impacting our
modernization efforts and future national security?
Lieutenant General Anderson and Lieutenant General Murray. The
reality is that these proven and capable platforms will be with the
Army for the foreseeable future. Limits in funding for modernization of
future systems and the speed of technological advances will cause us to
continue to rely on all five platforms into the 2030s and beyond. The
overmatch the Army has possessed for the last 70 years is at risk. Our
adversaries have observed the way we fight and have developed
capabilities and tactics to counter our strengths and exploit our
vulnerabilities. Some of these new capabilities and tactics have
already been demonstrated in combat. Our soldiers must be able to
prevail against the full range of potential threats, including near-
peers in highly lethal combined arms maneuver; hybrid warfare; and
determined, unconventional insurgents. This has become increasingly
difficult, as our adversaries modernize at a rapid pace, while reduced
funding has reduced the Army's modernization to a pace that jeopardizes
our overmatch.
15. Senator Inhofe. Major General Dyess and Brigadier General (P)
Marion, do we currently have the budget, flexibility and procurement
processes in place to expand beyond these five platforms?
Major General Dyess and Brigadier General Marion. The constrained
fiscal environment is the primary factor that limits our ability to
expand beyond the Big 5. Within limited modernization funding, our
priority is closing the greatest near-term capability gaps first. We
need to improve capacity and capability shortfalls in air and missile
defense; long range fires; munitions; lethality, protection, and
tactical mobility of our Brigade Combat Teams; and active protection
systems. We also need to address capability gaps in assured
positioning, navigation, and timing; electronic warfare; cyber; assured
comminutions and aviation protection. If resources were available we
would simultaneously begin to invest in the development of the combat
systems we will need in the future - 2030 and beyond. We would also
work to increase our capacity to leverage commercial technologies for
rapid integration into our formations.
16. Senator Inhofe. Major General Dyess and Brigadier General (P)
Marion, you also wrote, ``Stretching procurement timelines has allowed
us to focus on current readiness and keep production lines and key
programs active, at the cost of increased risk versus our most capable
adversaries.'' By stretching procurement timelines to procure the
minimum number of weapon systems to keep a production line open, are we
decreasing efficiency and increasing procurement cost--essentially
buying less for more money?
Major General Dyess and Brigadier General Marion. To support the
Army's focus on current readiness in a constrained fiscal environment,
the Army is stretching procurement timelines and keeping production
lines and key programs active. In some circumstances, production output
has been reduced to the minimum sustaining rate. However, at levels
above the minimum sustaining rate, the Army cannot fully realize the
economies of scale necessary to maximize potential buying power at
current funding levels. Inefficiencies arise when the Army cannot
synchronize production rates across multiple programs to support
fieldings. For example, the Chief of Staff of the Army's goal is to
modernize one Armored Brigade Combat Team per year. With multiple
systems on different production time lines, the Army is challenged to
synchronize schedules if additional funds are not available to adjust
production rates. Additional funding does increase efficiencies and can
reduce procurement costs when economies of scales are available.
threats to our army's superiority:
17. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Anderson and Lieutenant
General Murray, in your joint statement for the record, you warned
that, ``The overmatch your Army has enjoyed for the last 70 years is at
risk.'' You further cautioned that, ``Given the complex range of
threats, the Army has a very short window to improve capability and
capacity.'' If we continue with our current modernization trajectory,
how soon do we risk losing our overmatch?
Lieutenant General Anderson and Lieutenant General Murray. The Army
is already overmatched in several key areas. We have current, critical
capability gaps in long-range precision fires; air, missile, rocket,
and unmanned aerial systems defense; combat vehicle protection; and
electronic warfare. Combined, these gaps threaten the Army's ability to
fight into and win inside complex, contested environments against peer
adversaries. Technologies to fill these gaps have already been
demonstrated. With additional funding, the Army can quickly field them,
making a meaningful down payment on the capabilities needed to deter
potential militarily peer adversaries and, if necessary, defeat them.
At the same time, our adversaries are continuing to modernize beyond
what these minimum measures can address. The Army needs sustained
research and development funding to not only stay ahead of our
adversaries but to regain the dominance demonstrated in 1990 during
Desert Storm. With sustained science and technology funding, the Army
will transition emerging, cutting-edge technologies to fielded
capabilities over the next ten years-- five years to demonstrate the
technologies, and five more to produce them at scale. If we do not
begin investing in emerging science and technology now, we will be
unprepared for our next war, one that will likely be fundamentally
different from previous conflicts. The early battles of World Wars I
and II show the tragic consequences of such a failure-- the loss of
countless American lives and the potential displacement of the United
States by a rising power.
18. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Anderson, what is the single
most important thing we can do to improve our capability and capacity
to address our current range of threats?
Lieutenant General Anderson. The most important measure the nation
could take to reduce risk and allow the Army to accumulate readiness,
capacity, and modernization improvements is to provide sustained,
predictable funding in the base budget.
19. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Anderson, your written
statement note that some of our adversaries have developed capabilities
and tactics to counter our strengths and exploit our weaknesses. You
said some of these have been demonstrated in combat. Can you elaborate
on specific tactics and capabilities to which you refer?
Lieutenant General Anderson. The Army's dominance in Desert Storm
was underpinned by decades of sustained modernization, leading to
decisive technological advantages in precision fires; major combat
systems; position, navigation, and timing via the Global Positioning
System; and networking. Unfortunately, our potential adversaries took
note of our success. Since, they have made investments to undermine
these strengths and exploit our perceived dependencies on them. The
investments these potential adversaries have made include anti-access,
area-denial technologies that challenge the Army's ability to project
forces into a theater. Once in theater, we are outranged and outgunned,
facing fires, air defense, and electronic warfare systems that
overmatch our own. At the same time, the Army can no longer count on
our previous advantages in position, navigation, and timing and
networking, as our adversaries can now threaten the domains these
capabilities require.
20. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Anderson, continuing from
Question 9 above, which such tactic or capability worries you the most?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Our potential adversaries' anti-
access, area-denial; fires; air defense; electronic warfare; cyber; and
space capabilities are all concerning. Combined with capacity and
modernization shortfalls, they place the Army at high military risk.
Though the Army's most critical capability gaps are in fires and air
defense, we must tackle these issues holistically to reduce risk.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Ted Cruz
cancelled army programs reportedly wasted $30 billion in the last
decade
21. Senator Cruz. Lieutenant General Anderson and Lieutenant
General Murray, citing your prepared remarks, you stated, ``the budget
issue has been further complicated by 15 years of focus on
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism as the Army addressed current
needs in Afghanistan and Iraq.'' I would undoubtedly agree that there
have been tough choices within the Armed Services and that budget
restrictions are negatively affecting the Defense Department. However,
I would also like to reference a 2016 report from the Center for
Strategic and International Studies that lists almost $30 billion in
Army Programs that were cancelled or diverted after a Program of Record
was established. Trying to strike the balance between modernization and
readiness of the force has been an unfortunate burden that senior
Service leaders have been forced to carry for a number of years.
However, as Congress considers a nearly $30 billion fiscal year 2017
supplemental defense amendment in the coming months, how are we assured
that this funding will support Army Modernization Programs that will
achieve their required deliverable?
Lieutenant General Anderson and Lieutenant General Murray. The
acquisition reforms included in recent National Defense Authorization
Acts (NDAA) are a good start towards improving the acquisition process.
As the Army's principal customer who represents the Soldier, the Army
Chief of Staff (CSA) has greater involvement in `Big A' acquisition--a
combination of resourcing, requirements and acquisition. In the CSA's
response to Section 808 of the fiscal year 2016 NDAA, he addressed
actions being taken or will be taken to streamline `Big A' acquisition.
These include a reorganization of Army Staff functions to improve
requirement generation; workforce professional development initiatives;
process changes focused on delivering responsive materiel solutions;
budget actions to improve long range programming; efforts to introduce
prototyping earlier to reduce programmatic risk; and actions designed
to lower life cycle sustainment costs. For instance, over the last
year, the CSA has improved the responsiveness of the requirements
process by reinvigorating the Army Requirement Oversight Council
(AROC)--he now approves all requirements and has earlier visibility on
``cost/schedule/performance'' trades required to define feasible,
affordable requirements. He has also consolidated and streamlined the
requirements and resourcing processes under a single authority. He has
expanded AROC advisors to include key stakeholders such as the
Commanders of Forces Command, Army Materiel Command, Training and
Doctrine Command, Army Cyber Command, Research Development and
Engineering Command and Army Test and Evaluation Command. This action
ensures the operational environment informs the AROC. In the 12 months
prior to re-energizing the AROC we approved 19 requirements documents.
In the last 12 months since re-energizing the AROC, we approved 47
requirements documents. This last year, the Army has also conducted the
inaugural Strategic Portfolio Analysis Review (SPAR). The SPAR combined
the previous Long-Range Investment Review and the Capabilities
Portfolio Review into a fiscally informed construct. The SPAR reviews
capabilities over a 30-year period, evaluates each program's relative
worth, assesses our strategic priorities, and identifies investment and
divestment opportunities. The assessment has had far-reaching
implications to the Army's overall resourcing strategy and provides in-
depth analysis the Army leadership needs to make difficult requirements
decisions within a constrained resource environment. Beyond new NDAA
authorities, we also use industry days, the Association of the United
States Army, vendor engagements with Program Executives and Managers,
and Science and Technology basic research funded proposals as venues
that keep the Army `Big A' acquisition community abreast of what
industry can provide and where it is with technology and new products.
Based on what is in the realm of possible, the opportunity to
incorporate the state-of-the-art into individual equipment is assessed
annually by Army Headquarters during the SPAR and Program Objective
Memorandum processes. The variance between a threshold and objective
requirement is such that we spin in the technology when required and
ready based on available funding. To accelerate the testing and user
evaluation, if required, we leverage the Soldier Enhancement Program
and Rapid Equipping Force authorities. Requirements and solution
developers also work closely with the Headquarters staff to integrate
warfighter inputs throughout a programs development and we insert
spiral developments as available.
south korean rotational units and armored modernization
22. Senator Cruz. Lieutenant General Anderson and Lieutenant
General Murray, this week my staff received a briefing on the Army's
fiscal year 2017 Budget Amendment request. During that briefing, a
member of your staff discussed the Army's Infantry BCT that will soon
begin its transition to an Armored BCT. It appears that the new ABCT
will be equipped using prepositioned stocks that are currently
stationed in South Korea and utilized by rotational units. Can you
further expand upon the reasons why the pre-positioned stock must be
relocated from a forward-deployed location supporting rotational units
to outfit an ABCT that will be stationed in the U.S.?
Lieutenant General Anderson and Lieutenant General Murray. The Army
maintains two Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) equipment sets in
South Korea. One set is part of the Army's Prepositioned Stocks (APS)-4
and is reserved for war time use only. The second set is part of the
Korea Enduring Equipment Set (KEES), which the Army maintains in Korea
for use by rotational forces, as a convenience. When they deploy to
Korea for nine-month tours, rotational forces train hard on this
equipment. Due to their ``fight tonight'' posture, we have been unable
to take this equipment offline for depot-level maintenance. Over the
last few years, the Army's maintenance costs have risen to over $25
million per year, which is well above average, to maintain the
rotational brigade's operational readiness. As the Army seeks to
rebalance its force structure to better meet the demands of the Defense
Strategy, we need to increase our ABCT capacity. Unfortunately, we do
not have sufficient, excess combat equipment to convert an Infantry BCT
into an ABCT, and purchasing new equipment is both cost and time
prohibitive ($4 billion and five years). Our most cost-effective option
was to remove the armor equipment from the KEES, fielding it to what
will become the Army's 16th ABCT by fiscal year 2019, while leaving the
set in APS-4 intact. In order to maintain our ABCT presence in Korea
and meet the Joint Force commander's requirements, the Army will
continue ABCT deployments to the peninsula. Beginning in 2018,
rotational ABCTs will deploy with their organic equipment. This will
maintain our ``fight tonight'' capability in Korea while also helping
the Army rebuild its force projection and deployment skills. Loading
and moving an ABCT around the world is a challenging task, which we
need more training, and these upcoming rotations will help improve our
Army's ability to project force and increase the overall readiness of
our Army.
23. Senator Cruz. Lieutenant General Anderson and Lieutenant
General Murray, 1st Cavalry's 1st ABCT from Fort Hood just returned
home from a highly successful deployment to South Korea under the
existing rotation model. What are the operational and readiness impacts
for future units that rotate through South Korea if the pre-positioned
equipment returns stateside?
Lieutenant General Anderson and Lieutenant General Murray. From the
operational perspective of United States Forces Korea (USFK), United
States Pacific Command and our South Korea allies, the Army will
continue providing a trained and ready ABCT on nine-month rotations to
South Korea. The Army will also continue to maintain a complete ABCT
set in APS-4, for war time use only. From a readiness perspective, the
Army will deploy ABCTs with their organic equipment, which will enable
us to exercise the entire force projection infrastructure, from the
unit's installation in the United States through the rail and sealift
movement to Korea. This process will also allow us and our South Korean
allies to exercise the transportation and force flow infrastructure in
Korea, rather than waiting until a crisis erupts. Combined, these
activities will improve our Army's ability to project force and
increase our overall readiness.
24. Senator Cruz. Lieutenant General Anderson and Lieutenant
General Murray, furthermore, does this serve as an example of where
sacrificing armored modernization programs, as a result of either
budget caps or a failure of the program of record to meet the Army's
needs, has directly impacted future Army readiness and, as a result,
our ability to project power?
Lieutenant General Anderson and Lieutenant General Murray. Use of
the Korea Enduring Equipment Set (KEES) has not harmed future Army
readiness or power projection. With congressional support, the Army is
increasing the number of Armored Brigade Combat Teams (ABCTs) through
converting two Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs) to ABCTs in order
to better meet the needs of the defense strategy. Future increases in
ABCT capacity beyond the current conversions will require combat
equipment that demands additional funding and time ($4 billion and five
years). Continual use of KEES by rotational ABCTs has made maintaining
equipment readiness of the set challenging and expensive. Due to the
continuous demand for forces on station, the equipment is not taken
off-line for depot-level maintenance. Once the ABCT conversion is
complete, the former KEES will receive the same cyclic care as other
ABCT sets increasing the average equipment readiness of the Army. ABCT
rotations using organic equipment will build readiness and exercise
power projection. These rotations mimic the requirements of a wartime
deployment. They fully exercise force projection nodes from home
station to the location required by the combatant commander. This
improves the unit's speed of assembly and develops ``muscle memory''
for future deployments as well as for the supporting units and
infrastructure necessary to facilitate force flow in an emergency.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
plans for small unit support vehicle (sus-v) and joint all-terrain all-
weather support vehicle (jaasv)
25. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Anderson, Lieutenant
General Murray, Major General Dyess, and Brigadier General Marion, in
order to maneuver in cold weather, austere environments, Army forces
rely on the Small Unit Support Vehicle (SUS-V)--a system that was built
in the early 1980s. What is the Army's plan to keep these vehicles
maintained, which is becoming increasingly difficult due to the SUS-V
no longer being a program of record?
Lieutenant General Anderson, Lieutenant General Murray, Major
General Dyess, and Brigadier General Marion. In 2012, the Army
determined there is no short or long-term operational warfighting
requirement to continue ownership and sustainment of the Small Unit
Support Vehicle. The U.S. Army has divested all SUS-Vs; however, the
U.S. Army Alaska and Army National Guard are using unit funds to
sustain the remaining SUS-Vs locally.
26. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Anderson, Lieutenant
General Murray, Major General Dyess, Brigadier General Marion, what is
the plan to support the much-needed replacement to the SUS-V, the Joint
All-terrain All-Weather Support Vehicle (JAASV)? This newly-listed
requirement is a critical capability needed by both the Army and
Marines to navigate the austere environments in which our other
vehicles are unable.
Lieutenant General Anderson, Lieutenant General Murray, Major
General Dyess, and Brigadier General Marion. The Army does not have a
validated requirement for a Joint All-terrain All-Weather Support
vehicle. The JAASV is not an official/enduring Army requirement and
there is no capability document. The U. S. Army has divested all SUS-
Vs; however, the U.S. Army Alaska and Army National Guard are using
funds to sustain the remaining SUS-Vs locally.
advanced integrated air-land battle training
27. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Anderson and Major General
Dyess, to properly prepare for a near-peer conflict, joint training is
a key part of readiness. The DOD has several joint integrated exercises
that stress contested Air and Naval scenarios, such as Valiant Shield
and Northern Edge. However, there are no, or very few such large scale
Army and Air Force exercises. Are the Army and Air Force discussing
large-scale Joint Air and Ground combat exercises that improve our
joint readiness for a contested Air-Land battle campaign?
Lieutenant General Anderson and Major General Dyess. Readiness of
joint formations to fight large-scale contested Air-Land battle
campaigns is primarily the responsibility of combatant commanders and
accomplished through joint exercises, like Valiant Shield and Northern
Edge. The Army ensures forces provided to combatant commanders can
seamlessly integrate with the U.S. Air Force and are trained during
U.S. Army Combat Training Center (CTC) rotations for decisive action in
unified land operations. Maneuver CTCs integrate Air Force aircraft and
controllers into Army Brigade Combat Team rotations at the tactical
level. The Mission Command Training Program integrates joint fires and
joint intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance into Warfighter
Exercises conducted for Army Division and Corps Headquarters.
28. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Anderson, Lieutenant
General Murray, Major General Dyess, and Brigadier General Marion, the
JPARC in Alaska is the largest joint overland training area in the U.S.
with airspace the size of Florida and ground maneuver space the size of
Delaware. What are your plans to use this ideal location for the
advanced integrated training needed to best counter high-end and near-
peer threats?
Lieutenant General Anderson, Lieutenant General Murray, Major
General Dyess, and Brigadier General Marion. The Army, specifically,
U.S. Army Pacific, plans to continue using the JPARC at the current
rate to conduct the ARCTIC ANVIL training exercise on a bi-annual
basis. Arctic Anvil is a live, virtual, constructive, Brigade Combat
Team (BCT) home station training exercise designed to prepare a BCT for
a rotation to a Combat Training Center (CTC). Arctic Anvil is conducted
by the Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Training Capability
(JPMRC), which consists of a professionally trained operations group
capable of providing standardized, instrumented, external evaluations.
These exercises build, maintain, and extend BCT readiness using trained
observer/coach/trainers, a live near-peer opposing force, and fully
instrumented after-action reviews. The Army, Air Force, and Marine
Corps are integrated in training exercises in Alaska that use JPARC.
The most recent is Northern Edge where those services utilized Forts
Wainwright, Greeley, the Yukon Training Area, Donnelly Training Area,
Eielson AFB, and Elmendorf AFB. Marine Corps units used Donnelly
Training area to fire the GMLRS round of the MRLS during Northern Edge
and continued to train post-exercise. The Air Force conducts Exercise
Distant Frontier (DF) and Red Flag-Alaska (RF-A), where U.S. and
coalition air forces are integrated with ground forces. The facilities
and infrastructure within the JPARC can enable scenarios and training
goals supporting advanced integrated training countering high-end and
near-peer threats. The Air Force proposes to expand the existing
vertical and horizontal airspace structure needed to better accommodate
low-altitude threat and multi-axis aircraft training mission
requirements during JPARC training exercises. The Army is responsible
for the management of the ground and airspace within the JPARC to
support the year-round training readiness of its assigned forces, to
include those in our AR 5-9 area of responsibilities. There is no joint
ground management staff, therefore all joint multiservice, and
coalition training efforts in the JPARC are coordinated by the Army
workforce.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
national commission versus aviation restructuring initiative
29. Senator Blumenthal. Brigadier General Marion, when the Army was
forced to balance budgetary constraints with the need to support
continued deployments and replace aging aircraft, the Aviation
Restructuring Initiative (ARI) was developed to economize the force
while maintaining capability and utility by rebalancing aircraft
between the Active and Reserve components. Yet recommendations issued
by the National Commission on the Future of the Army over a year ago
differ from ARI, particularly for Black Hawks. ARI advocates for four
Black Hawk battalions to be added to the National Guard, while the
Commission recommends only two as a cost saving mechanism to offset
other changes it recommends. You and I discussed this issue in my
office several months back. Where does the Army stand on reconciling
these strategies and how will this impact Black Hawks? What is the
optimal number of battalions required to meet the National Guard
mission?
Brigadier General Marion. The Army is still reviewing its decisions
regarding the reconciliation and implementation of the Aviation
Restructuring Initiative and the National Commission on the Future of
the Army. The National Guard Mission will be fully supported.
marines united
30. Senator Blumenthal. Lieutenant General Anderson, the Marines
United scandal involved a private Facebook page originally intended as
a suicide prevention page and used by 30,000 active duty and veteran
Marines, as well as civilians. A private page within the Facebook group
provided access to a Google drive that contained naked and exploitive
pictures of women, including Marines. These photos were often
accompanied by obscene and misogynistic commentary, as well as their
personal information such as name, rank, and place of work. An NCIS
investigation is ongoing. Although this incident involved the Marine
Corps, I believe we would be naive to think this event is isolated to
the Marine Corps and could not occur in the Army. The Army has training
and policies providing guidance for online behavior. Do you believe the
current training and policies are sufficient to address cyber
harassment? What is the Army doing to proactively identify any possible
websites of concern and protect its soldiers from cyber bullying? Are
there programs and resources available?
Lieutenant General Anderson. The Army's current training policies
have been recently updated to reflect real work scenarios and vignettes
to not only make training realistic, but to ensure all policies are
written in a way that supports and protects the rights of the Soldier.
Soldiers are trained on the appropriate conduct during Initial Entry
Training and on an annual, recurring basis thereafter. The training
approaches the problem from the perspective of Army values and respect
for others. This training includes discussion points and vignettes with
respect to electronic communications and online conduct. These
discussion points and vignettes have been incorporated into
institutional, command, and unit training packages for Equal
Opportunity (EO), Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO), Treatment of
Persons, Sexual Harassment/Sexual Assault Response and Prevention
(SHARP), and Cyber Awareness, among others. This training is for
enlisted and officer personnel, pre-command courses for command teams
from company through brigade level, and functional courses that train
recruiters and initial military cadre, such as drill sergeants and
Advanced Individual Training leaders. From a policy perspective, the
Army published interim guidance regarding online conduct in July 2015,
and reissued in 2017, to supplement the existing policy concerning the
treatment of persons. The policy advises the Army personnel that online
misconduct is punitive, and online misconduct, to include harassment,
hazing, bullying, stalking, discrimination, and retaliation is
inconsistent with our Army values and negatively impacts command
climate and readiness. The Army is very serious and deliberate about
combatting cyber bullying and raising awareness to combat it, through
both policy and training means. The Army considers cyber bulling to be
a form of fratricide, as the G-1 himself describes it. Soldiers know to
immediately report websites of concern to their chain of command.
black hawk modernization
31. Senator Blumenthal. Brigadier General Marion, the FYDP projects
that for fiscal year 2018, the Army is planning to seek 60 Black Hawks.
Do you believe your fiscal year 2018 request will remain at this level?
What is the ideal number you would procure?
Brigadier General Marion. The submitted fiscal year 2018 budget
includes 48 Black Hawks. We have structured the Black Hawk Multi-Year
contract with options to accommodate additional aircraft if there is
continued strong support for additional Black Hawks.
32. Senator Blumenthal. Brigadier General Marion, what efforts are
you taking to ensure a strong and reliable multi-year procurement
strategy for the UH-60 million in order to give our warfighters much
needed capabilities, while also ensuring a stable industrial base?
Brigadier General Marion. The Army continues to support multi-year
contracts for Black Hawk because of the cost savings they provide and
the stability they provide to the industrial base. The Army has worked
proactively with its government stakeholders and the industrial base to
document requirements, request legislative authority and allocate
funding for another multi-year contract. The Army fully intends to
support its ninth multi-year Blackhawk contract for fiscal year (FY)
2017 to fiscal year 2021.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2018 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 29, 2017
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Airland,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
AIR FORCE MODERNIZATION
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:30 p.m. in
Room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Tom Cotton
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Cotton, Tillis,
Sullivan, King, Blumenthal, Warren, and Peters.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR TOM COTTON
Senator Cotton. The hearing will come to order.
Today we'll be discussing the future of our Air Force, what
shortfalls we need to fix, what capabilities we need to
develop. As we all know, Congress has a tendency to think in
one-year increments, a handicap our rivals are only too happy
to exploit.
So I consider this hearing our opportunity to take the long
view. We'll get an update on the problems we heard about last
year, like the shortage in fighter pilots and in crew members
for remotely piloted aircraft. We'll also talk in more depth
about how to keep our technological edge over the next 10
years.
The truth is, we've been losing ground for years. As
Lieutenant General Stephen Hoog noted a little over two years
ago, at the beginning of Desert Storm we had 134 combat
squadrons. By 9/11, we were down to 88. Today, we're at 55. In
fact, he argued, if we were to conduct Operation Desert Storm
today, we would have to ``completely strip out Asia or strip
out Europe, and we'd still be short of the combat power we had
in Desert Storm.'' And that was a relatively small conflict
against one country in one region.
We all know how we got here. The last administration made
severe cuts to the Defense budget, which Congress did far too
little to oppose, and since then the threats to our national
security have multiplied, whether it's the Islamic State,
Russia, China, North Korea, or Iran.
At the very moment when the dangers to our country are
increasing, the Air Force's capacity, readiness, and
capabilities are decreasing. But now we have a new
administration that recognizes this dire situation. The
President has promised to build a military that far outpaces
our rivals. The question we want to discuss today is how do we
do that?
I will be particularly interested to hear from our
witnesses how the Air Force plans to modernize its forces as
part of the larger effort to rebuild our military. A strong Air
Force is key to our joint war fighting capability. We have to
be able to deploy and support forces anywhere on the globe, and
to do that we need a sufficient strategic and operational
reserve, national mobilization capability, and robust defense
industrial base.
What we do this year will determine how we fare over the
next 10 years. The stakes are high, and I know all of us here
take them very seriously.
I look forward to hearing our witnesses' testimony. All
three of them come from the Air Force's headquarters at the
Pentagon: Lieutenant General Mark Nowland, Deputy Chief of
Staff for Operations; Lieutenant General Arnold Bunch, Military
Deputy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Air Force for
Acquisitions; and Lieutenant General Jerry Harris, Deputy Chief
of Staff for Strategic Plans, Programs and Requirements.
Gentlemen, thank you all for appearing today. Thank you for
your many decades of distinguished service to our country in
uniform.
Senator King?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ANGUS KING
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to extend a welcome and thank you to each of our
witnesses for appearing before the subcommittee today. I look
forward to hearing your testimony and discussing these
important issues.
Last week the subcommittee heard from the Army witnesses
about the challenges that the Army has in its modernization.
Following our first hearing two weeks ago on all armed warfare
in the 21st century, it's clear that both our ground and air
forces need to reestablish the capabilities required to
dominate--I emphasize dominate--near-peer adversaries across
the full spectrum of military operations.
Today I'm looking forward to hearing from our Air Force
witnesses about the challenges and opportunities they face in
modernizing the Air Force. I'm especially interested in hearing
from the witnesses how the Air Force plans to manage its
multiple modernization programs in ways that deliver the
capabilities our war fighters need to defeat our most capable
adversaries on a timely basis--I want to emphasize on a timely
basis--while protecting our taxpayers' dollars. Often, in
acquisition matters, timeliness as well as dollars are
important considerations.
Too many defensive acquisition programs over-promise and
under-deliver on cost and schedule, and we must do better if
we're going to effectively modernize our fighter, bomber,
aerial refueling and other fleets to the levels required to
meet our future requirements.
Our witnesses this afternoon face huge challenges as they
strive to balance the need to support ongoing operations and
sustain readiness with the need to modernize and keep the
technological edge so critical to successful military
operations. Resources are never unlimited, and the Air Force
must make investments based on near-term risks as well as
future threats to procure new weapons, upgrade existing
platforms, and fund research and development accounts.
Our Air Force will bear the brunt of dealing with the anti-
access, aerial denial threats that our Armed Forces may and
likely will face in the future. These challenges are made
particularly difficult by the spending caps imposed by the
Budget Control Act. These caps were relieved somewhat for
fiscal year 2016 and 2017 in the bipartisan Budget Act of 2015,
but the caps again take effect in 2018 and are not
automatically nullified by making cuts in non-defense
discretionary programs.
Every year we are challenged to make decisions balancing a
number of competing demands for resources, including resources
for current operation and investment in future modernization.
In the absence of specific budget proposals, however, we will
be assessing overall plans and programs regarding current and
future aviation programs. There are a number of other issues
that we need to discuss, but in the interest of time I will
stop here and wait for our discussion.
Again, I want to thank our witnesses; and thank you, Mr.
Chairman, for calling this hearing.
Senator Cotton. General Nowland?
Lieutenant General Harris. Sir, may I start?
Senator Cotton. You may, General Harris.
Lieutenant General Harris. Yes.
Senator Cotton. Did you draw the short straw this morning?
Lieutenant General Harris. I did, sir.
Senator Cotton. Okay. Sorry to hear that.
Lieutenant General Harris. It's because I'm younger.
They're more experienced.
Senator Cotton. You have the most hair.
[Laughter.]
Lieutenant General Harris. I'm not sure.
[Laughter.]
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JERRY D. HARRIS, JR., USAF,
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR STRATEGIC PLANS, PROGRAMS AND
REQUIREMENTS, HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE;
ACCOMPANIED BY LIEUTENANT GENERAL ARNOLD W. BUNCH, JR., USAF,
MILITARY DEPUTY, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR
FORCE FOR ACQUISITION; AND LIEUTENANT GENERAL MARK C. NOWLAND,
USAF, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS, HEADQUARTERS,
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Lieutenant General Harris. Sir, thank you for having us
here today to continue our discussion on Air Force
modernization.
To the several members of the committee who have served in
our Armed Forces before, a special thank you for continuing to
serve this great nation.
First, we would like to enter our written statement into
the record.
Senator Cotton. So entered.
Lieutenant General Harris. Your United States Air Force is
always there. We're providing global vigilance, global reach,
and global power. The demand for our service has never been
higher, even though we are 38 percent smaller, already noted,
than we were in 1991.
We've been continuously deployed across the globe, and our
adversary has been watching and copying us, learning from us
every day, year in and year out. The world is changing, and our
adversaries are catching us faster than we predicted. To ensure
we keep the advantage across the entire spectrum of warfare, we
must modernize our nuclear forces, our conventional forces, and
the projection of those forces in air, space, and cyber
domains.
We're increasing our fighter and tanker procurement to
modernize the force, and soon we'll be producing the B-21 to
modernize our long-range strike fleet.
We are also in the early stages of replacing a portion of
our training aircraft, which will enable shorter training
timelines and better-trained air crew.
We are also modernizing some of our older aircraft,
extending their durability, and providing increased capability
to kill and survive in combat.
We're making progress with the space fence, protected
SATCOM [satellite communications], and our Joint Space
Operation Center.
Our number-one asset is our airmen, and we continue to grow
them. Venues such as this give us the opportunity to highlight
our efforts, and we appreciate the opportunity to partner with
the subcommittee. Thank you.
[The prepared joint statement of Lieutenant General Harris,
Lieutenant General Bunch and Lieutenant General Nowland
follows:]
Prepared Statement by Lt. Gen. Jerry ``JD'' Harris Jr., USAF, Lt. Gen.
Arnold W. Bunch, Jr., USAF and Lt. Gen. Mark C. Nowland, USAF
introduction
Chairman Cotton, Ranking Member King and distinguished members of
the Airland Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to provide an
update on the United States Air Force Modernization programs and Force
Structure. Today's demand for Air Force capabilities continues to grow
as airmen provide America with unmatched Global Vigilance, Global Reach
and Global Power. We are supporting combatant commander requirements in
response to growing challenges from Russia, China, North Korea and
Iran, in addition to the ever present counterterrorism mission in the
Middle East and around the world. While our forces have been heavily
engaged in deterring or addressing these operational challenges, our
adversaries have taken the opportunity to invest in and advance their
own capabilities. To address ever narrowing capabilities gaps, we need
your support in the form of increased, steady and predictable
appropriations. With this support, the Air Force can invest in critical
capabilities and modernization programs while sustaining capacity and
recovering readiness to ensure the joint force can deter, deny and
decisively defeat any enemy that threatens the United States or our
national interests.
operations update
ALWAYS THERE Your Air Force relentlessly provides Global
Vigilance, Global Reach, and Global Power for the nation . . . we're
always in demand . . . and we're always there. Our airmen continue to
provide two legs of the nuclear triad and resource 75 percent of the
Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) framework, made
possible, in part, through one of the 12 satellite constellations our
space operators command and control every day. Beyond NC3, those
constellations provide other critical capabilities such as worldwide
secure communications, global positional awareness, global missile
warning, and a battlefield situational awareness architecture for our
joint warfighters.
Your Air Force has been globally engaged for the last 26 years in
combat operations. Though our end strength has decreased 38 percent
since 1991, we have experienced significant growth across several
mission areas. Our airmen provide joint forces with Global Vigilance
using real-time multi-domain platforms and sensors integrated across
our global intelligence and command and control (C2) networks to find,
fix, and finish a range of hostile targets simultaneously across the
globe. Without fail, the Air Force performs 60 combat lines of
persistent attack & reconnaissance missions with remotely piloted
aircraft (RPA) every day . . . they serve as the unblinking eye to
support combatant commanders and joint warfighters and give us a
competitive advantage. Through our Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, we provide warfighters over 6,000
intelligence products per day used to identify enemy targets and
trigger 70 percent of Special Operations Forces (SOF) assaults on
violent extremist organizations.
Additionally, the Air Force has conducted 4,000 cyber missions
against more than 100,000 targets, disrupting adversaries and enabling
over 200 High Value Individual kill/capture missions. In securing our
networks and digital infrastructure, 2016 saw Air Force cyber operators
block more than 1.3 billion malicious connections--an average of more
than 40 per second.
Nearly every three minutes a mobility aircraft departs on a
mission, providing . . . and access, projecting power through a network
of airfields in 23 countries and 77 locations, while providing critical
aerial refueling capability. In 2016, our aeromedical professionals
evacuated over 5,700 patients and provided emergency medical care
resulting in a 98 percent survival rate. Your Air Force provides
unrelenting ability to maneuver, sustain, and recover personnel and
assets . . . at home, abroad, and with our allies and partners.
With fighters, bombers, RPAs, and Intercontinental Ballistic
Missiles (ICBMs), the Air Force provides conventional and nuclear
Global Power that can strike an enemy on short notice anywhere in the
world. In Iraq and Syria, the Air Force has led 65 percent of the more
than 17,000 coalition airstrikes since 2014, delivering decisive
firepower supporting joint, special operations and coalition ground
forces to defeat and degrade ISIS and regain critical territory.
Stitched together, the fabric of our Air Force weaves multi-domain
effects and provides U.S. servicemen and women the blanket of
protection and the ability to power project America's full range of
combat capabilities. Make no mistake, your Air Force is always there.
READINESS IN A CHANGING WORLD However, being ``always there''
comes at a cost to our airmen, equipment, and infrastructure, and we
are now at a decision point. Sustained global commitments and recent
funding cuts have affected capacity and capability for a full-spectrum
fight against a near-peer adversary. In 2013, sequestration forced hard
decisions that sacrificed the readiness and size of the Total Force in
order to ensure our technological superiority against future
adversaries. In the fiscal year 2016 and fiscal year 2017 budgets, we
made the necessary adjustments to balance near-term readiness with
future modernization, but due to continuous combat operations, reduced
manpower, an aging fleet, and inconsistent funding our readiness has
suffered.
In a world of increasing threats, stronger adversaries and a
persistent war against violent extremism, there is a greater disparity
between commitments and the resources necessary to achieve our national
security objectives. Instead of rebuilding readiness for near-peer
conflicts, your Air Force is globally engaged in operations against
lesser-equipped, but still highly lethal and adaptive enemies. Airmen
serve at home and abroad to underpin joint force success, but it comes
at the expense of full-spectrum readiness.
The first step to regain full-spectrum readiness is to rebuild our
Operational Training Infrastructure. This includes not only live,
virtual and constructive environments, but also the ranges and space
necessary to train against high-end threat systems in a multi-domain
environment. Once established, our 4th and 5th generation fighter units
need relief from current tasking against low-end adversaries in order
to train for emerging threats. We prioritized this initiative by
creating a directorate on the Air Staff dedicated solely to this
monumental effort. We took the first step. However, the complexity of
linking all of the systems needed for tomorrow's fight and
deconflicting training requires both manpower and finances.
Your Air Force needs permanent relief from BCA, increased funding,
flexible execution authority, and manpower to recover full-spectrum
readiness. We will continue to do all we can to innovate, transform,
and improve how we maximize our resources. We need your help in
providing stability with the ability to modernize our capabilities, at
the pace required to fight and win against any emerging threat.
PEOPLE Airmen are our greatest resource and our Air Force needs to
increase end strength to meet national security requirements. Manpower
shortfalls in key areas remain the number one issue limiting readiness
and is our top priority as we rebuild squadrons across the Air Force.
At the start of 2016, our end strength stood at 311,000 Active Duty
airmen, down from more than 500,000 during Desert Storm--a 38 percent
decrease. Though we appreciate your support to build the force up to
about 321,000 in 2017, we will still be stretched to meet national
security requirements.
To improve readiness and attain manning levels matching our mission
requirements, we are considering an increase to our Active Duty, Guard,
and Reserve end strength and will work with the Secretary of Defense to
develop the FY 2018 President's Budget to address personnel shortages.
Our Total Force model (incorporating our Active Duty, Guard, Reserve,
civilians, and our contracted capabilities) not only recognizes the
value of an integrated team, but helps guarantee today's and tomorrow's
capability. We will develop plans to address shortfalls in a number of
key areas, including critical career fields such as aircraft
maintenance, pilots, NC3, intelligence, cyber, and battlefield airmen.
We face an aircrew shortage crisis across all disciplines. The Air
Force has the world's finest aircrew who enable an incomparable duality
of global mobility and combat lethality. In the aircraft maintenance
field, we were short approximately 3,400 aircraft maintainers at the
close of 2016. Because of this shortage, we cannot generate the sorties
needed for our aircrews. As airlines continue hiring at unprecedented
rates, they draw away our experienced pilots. Without a healthy pool of
pilots, we risk the ability to provide airpower to the nation.
Pilots are strategic national assets and the pilot crisis extends
beyond the Air Force and military. It is a national problem which
requires senior-level attention in Congress, the Commercial Industry,
and the DOD. To address this national challenge, since 2014 the 'Air
Force -Airline Collaboration', formally known as the National Pilot
Sourcing Forum has increased efforts to effectively utilize and train
an adequate number of pilots to meet our nation's pilot demand signal.
However, pilot retention has declined for five straight years.
Today the Air Force has a rated manpower shortfall of approximately
1,550 pilots across the Total Force. This shortfall is most pronounced
in our regular Air Force fighter community which is short more than 950
pilots. We are grateful for your support to increase the pilot bonus,
and we will continue to ensure our retention programs are appropriately
sized and utilized. Your Air Force will utilize the new Fiscal Year
2017 NDAA Aviation Bonus authority ($35,000 per year maximum) and
implement a tiered-model using a directed business case model to
identify areas of greatest need.
Retaining our pilot force goes beyond financial incentives . . . it
is about culture. Your Air Force is implementing many non-monetary
efforts to reinvent the culture and improve the quality of life and
quality of service for our airmen. We have reduced additional duties
and superfluous training courses, as well as hired contractors in
fighter squadrons to perform burdensome administrative tasks, enabling
our pilots to focus on their primary duty: flying. We have also
increased the transparency of the assignment process and increased
flexibility to promote family stability. Your Air Force is exploring
opportunities to reduce deployment burdens by enabling more Air Reserve
Component volunteers for 179/365-day deployments. We must show our
airmen that we are creating a culture that reminds them they serve in
something bigger than themselves . . . defending America.
In addition to retaining our talented personnel, the Air Force must
also increase pilot production and absorption while reducing
requirements. The increased end-strength provided in the Fiscal Year
2017 NDAA will allow us to maximize the training pipeline and fill out
under-manned units, which are vital to our recovery. Our fighter pilot
production targets have increased 15 percent (to 335 Total Force
pilots) per year while we surge the number of new aircraft maintainers
by more than 1,500 per year to better man flying squadrons and
reestablish sortie generation rates with a completion target of 3-5
years. However, other options beyond manpower increases exist to season
our young pilots while accelerating readiness recovery.
The Air Force's plan to conduct an experimentation campaign this
summer directed at the Air Force's light attack capabilities may
provide opportunities to create a ``high/low'' mix for combatting low-
end threats in more permissive environments. During this
experimentation campaign, we will gather information before working
with Congress to determine what we can afford for the future. This
approach could provide more cockpits to absorb and season a greater
quantity of fighter pilots and provide 4th and 5th generation aircraft
the required training time to prepare for high-end threats and the
operational tempo relief to extend their service life.
force structure and modernization
FIGHTERS Five years ago during a period of severe fiscal
constraints, the Air Force rebalanced our fighter force structure using
analysis which showed the Air Force could decrease fighter force
structure by approximately 100 aircraft if we were willing to accept
higher risk. This resulted in the current fighter inventory of
approximately 1,000 primary mission aircraft and slightly more than
1,950 total aircraft. This inventory complies with Fiscal Year 2016
NDAA language on the limitation on retirement of Air Force Fighter
Aircraft; however, with today's sustained operational demand for
rotational fighter presence, our current 55 combat-coded fighter
squadrons do not allow for enough time at home station to train pilots
and maintain aircraft to achieve the full spectrum readiness necessary
to meet the requirements set forth in the Defense Planning Guidance.
We need to regrow our current fighter force to a minimum of 60
combat fighter squadrons and 2,100 fighter aircraft across our Active,
Guard, and Reserve components. This
balance will evolve as we procure more F-35 aircraft and develop
Penetrating Counterair (PCA) from a 4th/5th generation mix to a 5th/6th
generation mix.
The Air Force's major modernization focus today is the F-35A, which
is the centerpiece of our future fighter precision attack capability.
Its missions will include Air Interdiction, Offensive and Defensive
Counter Air, Close Air Support, Strategic Attack, Suppression of Enemy
Air Defenses, Armed Reconnaissance and Combat Search and Rescue, as
well as serving as a dual capable aircraft for the U.S. and partner
nations. To fill capability and capacity shortfalls, the Air Force
needs to increase F-35A procurement to a minimum of 60 aircraft per
year as quickly as possible. This must be carefully balanced with the
required follow-on modernization effort for the F-35A.
The F-35's follow-on modernization effort centers on the Block 4
upgrade, which is geared toward meeting the estimated threat in the
2025 timeframe and beyond. We cannot emphasize enough how important it
is that we fully fund Block 4 to prevent delaying required capabilities
for American and Coalition warfighters, including integration of
additional weapons and upgrades to the electronic warfare system, data
link systems, and radar. Once Block 4 upgrade is complete and ready to
be fielded we will examine acceleration of the F-35A program to the
maximum affordable procurement rate to meet projected 5th Generation
requirements.
The F-22, currently the only U.S. fighter capable of operating in
highly contested environments is also an integral piece of the Air
Force's force structure modernization plan. Its stealth, super cruise,
integrated avionics and sensors combine to deliver the Raptor's unique
capability. We plan to retain the F-22 until the 2060 timeframe,
meaning a sustained effort is required to counter advancing threats
that specifically target its capabilities.
As our adversary capabilities advance, PCA will play a significant
role in targeting and engaging future threats and is critical as a node
in the larger network, providing data from its sensors to enable
employment using either stand-off or stand-in weapons. This capability
will provide the survivability, lethality and maintainability to meet
emerging worldwide threats across the spectrum of conflict and will be
the cornerstone of the Air Force shift from 4th/5th generation to a
5th/6th generation fleet.
In addition to pursuing new capabilities and modernizing fifth
generation fighters, the Air Force also seeks to extend the service
life and modernize critical capabilities of key fourth generation
aircraft. Doing so will help maintain Service capacity and readiness to
meet the needs of today's counterterrorism fight while ramping up the
F-35 production line and developing PCA.
The legacy service life extension program (SLEP) will extend the F-
16 airframe structural service life from the current 8,000 hours to
12,000+ hours, adding fifteen to twenty years of service for selected
F-16s. To ensure the F-16's lethality and prominence in low-end
conflicts, we are pursuing an active electronically scanned array
(AESA) radar upgrade that offers advanced capabilities and improved
reliability and maintainability. We are also upgrading the mission
computer, display generator, electronic warfare components, and the
ALQ-131 self-protection jamming pod, known as the Pod Upgrade Program
(PUP) that enables advanced technology jamming techniques.
Along with the F-16, the Air Force expects the F-15E to be an
integral part through at least 2040 and we are pursuing a new
electronic warfare self-protection suite, the Eagle Passive/Active
Warning Survivability System (EPAWSS) for the Strike Eagle fleet.
The Air Force will not be able to rely solely on our current
programs and capabilities to ensure readiness to fight the most
advanced threats in the future. To that end, we are aggressively
pursuing a path toward strategic agility in our capability development.
We have reinvigorated development planning (DP) at the enterprise level
to build-in agility and formulate truly innovative strategic choices
for capability development. Core Development Planning functions
include: formulating and evaluating viable future concepts, defining
operational trade space, identifying technology shortfalls and Science
and Technology needs, and assisting the operations community in
refining requirements.
To oversee and direct capability development of the highest
priority operational challenges and opportunities, the Air Force
established the 3-star Capability Development Council (CDC), chaired by
the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, as well as stood up the
Strategic Development Planning and Experimentation (SDPE) office to
plan, manage, and execute warfighting experimentation campaigns.
Experimentation provides the ability to rapidly explore a wide range of
innovative materiel and non-materiel solution options. To further these
efforts, the Air Force programmed resources starting in fiscal year
2017 to conduct concept-driven experimentation campaigns, including
funds for prototyping, live and virtual simulations; developing a cadre
of expertise, along with the tools to conduct experimentation
campaigns.
The Light Attack Experimentation Campaign informs planning and
strategic choices in this critical area. The Air Force is experimenting
with potential off-the-shelf aircraft to determine industry's
capability, capacity, and interest to provide cost-effective innovative
solutions with low procurement, operating and sustainment costs. Since
the deployment demand is not expected to decrease, the Air Force must
meet capability demands in permissive environments while building and
maintaining readiness to meet emerging threats in more contested
environments.
Aligning capability, capacity and cost with conflict is key to
meeting Air Force commitments to combatant commanders and effectively
using taxpayer resources. Assessing the viability of low operating
cost, light attack platforms has the potential to reduce operating
costs while still meeting combatant commander needs.
The Air Force recently released an Invitation to Participate to
industry for a live-fly experiment with off-the-shelf aircraft that may
meet an Air Force need for a low-cost capability that is supportable
and sustainable. Planned for later this year, this live-fly experiment
will assess the capabilities of these off-the-shelf light attack
aircraft, which will be flown by Air Force personnel in scenarios
designed to highlight aspects of various combat missions, such as close
air support, armed reconnaissance, combat search & rescue and strike
control and reconnaissance. The experiment will also include the
employment of weapons commonly used by other fighter/attack aircraft to
demonstrate the capabilities of light attack aircraft for traditional
counter-land missions. Results from this experimentation campaign will
be used to inform future experimental companies, requirements and
possibly investment decisions. The evaluation of off-the-shelf
candidates is not yet a program and there is no plan for what happens
after the experiment.
MUNITIONS There is an ever growing demand for the effects airpower
brings to the joint force. Within our fiscal boundaries, we have sought
to balance the requirement for current munitions with the need to
advance capabilities in the same manner we have with our aircraft force
structure. However, sustained combat operations, BCA limitations, and
support for our coalition partners have negatively impacted these
efforts. Absent sustained and increased funding, munition stockpiles
will continue to decrease as well as negatively impact readiness and
our ability to meet national security objectives in the future.
Sustained combat operations and support for our coalition partners
are reducing munitions inventories faster than our ability to procure.
Historically, munitions funding has been reduced to pay other critical
service bills. To resolve this issue, we need increased and sustained
funding to send a more consistent demand signal to our industrial base.
With the dispensation provided to us by the Congressional Defense
Committees, we were able to ulitize the Overseas Contingency Operations
funding to replenish the munitions with high combat expenditures to
date. Additionally, Overseas Contingency Operations funding while
important, is only a means of replenishing what is used in
contingencies and generally results in replenishment 2-4 years after
the munitions are expended.
We are currently using legacy munitions on our 5th generation fleet
which negates the full advantage these platforms can provide.
Investments into programs such as the Small Advanced Capabilities
Missile (SACM) and the Stand in Attack Weapon (SiAW) are crucial to
realizing the full potential of our next generation of aircraft. The
SACM is a smaller, affordable air to air weapon that is required to
increase magazine depth and maximize utility of a PCA capability. SiAW
is an air-to-surface weapon designed to hold at risk the surface
elements that make up the A2AD environment and will be integrated on F-
35, B-21 and other future platforms like PCA. With your continued help
the USAF must continue to invest in and develop advanced munition
capabilities such as these to ensure future air superiority for the
Joint Force.
BOMBERS As with the fighter force, the total bomber inventory has
also been significantly reduced. To provide perspective, in 1991 we had
290 aircraft available within the bomber fleet versus 156 B-1s, B-52s,
and B-2s today. The current number is insufficient to meet Defense
Planning Guidance and nuclear guidance while sustaining current
operational demands and maintaining sufficient training and readiness
capacity.
A key modernization effort that will provide warfighters the
capability to operate in tomorrow's high-end threat environment is the
development of the B-21 Raider. The B-21 will provide the President
with the ability to hold targets at risk around the globe while denying
sanctuary to our adversaries. In addition to its conventional
capabilities, the B-21 will support the nuclear triad providing an
advanced and flexible deterrent capability with the ability to
penetrate modern air defenses. Agile acquisition processes have been
built into the B-21 development and procurement efforts, ensuring we
deliver system capabilities for the best value, while integrating open
architecture standards for ease of upgrade to future technology
requirements.
The Air Force remains committed to B-21 affordability, with the
average procurement cost of $564 million in base year 2016 dollars. We
require a fleet size that will ensure sustained dominance well into
this century and intend to procure a minimum of 100 B-21s. Procuring at
least 100 B-21s will also reduce lifecycle ownership costs. Further, we
are continuing to study the right size of the total future bomber
force. Deterrence and demonstrated combat capability remain vital
instruments of power, especially as our enemies are committed to
denying our attacks from the air. Only 12 percent of our current bomber
fleet is survivable in such an environment. Therefore, the B-21 remains
an absolute national defense priority and we are grateful for your
continued support of this critical program going forward.
Equally important to developing advanced capabilities is the Air
Force's commitment to modernize the legacy bomber fleet. The 19
remaining B-2 aircraft, currently the only low-observable, Anti-Access/
Area Denial asset capable of penetrating advanced enemy defensive
systems, are approaching 30 years of service and require engine,
avionic, communications and defensive systems upgrades to maintain
viability in the face of advancing enemy capabilities.
Similarly, the 62 remaining B-1s have been in service for nearly 35
years and are receiving upgrades to their avionics and flight systems.
These upgrades will ensure the B-1's viability into the mid-to-late
2030s. Lastly, the B-52H is programmed to at least 2050, putting the
remaining fleet of 76 at nearly 100 years of service. To sustain this
venerable capability there are a number of modernization efforts
currently in work: replacement radar, new engines, improved/integrated
avionics, defensive and weapons management, and communication upgrades.
In conjunction with the upgrades to the bomber fleet, the Air Force
is looking to update the Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) inventory
with the Long Range Stand Off (LRSO) program.
SPACE We view our national security as inextricably dependent upon
space-enabled capabilities. Meanwhile, potential adversaries are
investing heavily in technologies designed to exploit this dependency
in order to diminish the national security advantages which stem from
space capabilities. We must expect that an adversary associated with
any military conflict will likely seek to attack space systems, to
include offensive action in and through space; perhaps even before
kinetic activities take place on land, sea, or in air.
Additional investment is required to build robust and resilient
architectures while implementing the Space Enterprise Vision (SEV),
which looks to invest smartly in the highest payoff capabilities that
enhance space domain mission assurance. The Air Force will continue
development of GPS III satellites that will provide enhanced, higher-
power, and jam-resistant position, navigation, and timing for joint
warfighters. This GPS warfighting advantage will be reliant upon a Next
Generation Operational Control System (OCX) to provide enhanced
cybersecurity, precision, reliability and integrity.
Similarly, the Air Force provides robust worldwide satellite
communications (SATCOM) to joint warfighters and must continue efforts
to enhance current protected SATCOM systems such as the Advanced
Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellites while addressing current and
future threats by providing resiliency and advanced defensive
capabilities in architectures like the addition of Protected Anti-Jam
Tactical SATCOM. Our future Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS)
satellites must also modernize into systems capable of responding
quickly to threats while maintaining our edge in strategic missile
warning and launch detection to our fielded forces and the homeland.
Investment in space-based assets is crucial to our ability to
maintain space-enabled capabilities, but investment in space assets
alone is insufficient. The nation must also invest in advanced Space
Situational Awareness (SSA) and C2 capabilities, which will allow for
rapid understanding of threats and decision-making to defend assets. As
an example, the Air Force is investing in the Space Fence program to
provide surveillance of small objects and satellites, allowing early
detection of threats. Investment in additional ground-based sensors
like the Space Surveillance Telescope and radars, as well as space-
based sensors, will provide the necessary indications and warning of
adversary actions on-orbit. Bottom line, we must gain the ability to
acquire much more precise and robust data regarding activities on-
orbit, which also drives a C2 requirement to synthesize data and make
decisions.
The Air Force has made an initial investment in building the Joint
Interagency Combined Space Operations Center (JICSpOC) which is
designed to ensure the national security space enterprise meets and
outpaces advances in space threats. To act on information provided by
SSA architecture, JICSpOC will provide resilient, responsive, and
interoperable C2 capabilities to provide the ability to respond once a
threat is known.
Additionally, the Air Force is investing in C2 tools such as Joint
Space Operations Center (JSpOC) Mission System (JMS), which will
provide modernized hardware and software solutions to better synthesize
the increased volume of SSA data. Improved SSA data coupled with a
mission-ready JICSpOC ensures future implementation of SEV principles
to their greatest degree of survivability in a war that extends into
space, ultimately supporting joint warfighters across land, air and sea
to maintain the operational advantage.
Historically, the Air Force has funded space programs in order to
simply maintain an operational advantage, with no concern for
resiliency and survivability because the threat of combat extending
into space was not mature. The threat environment is now changed.
Therefore, considerable increase in investment of SEV-enabling
architectures, SSA and Space C2 are necessary if our joint warfighters
are expected to operate with the traditional advantages our space
systems provide.
CYBER The Air Force continues to build its contribution to joint
cyber mission forces by developing the next generation cyber warrior,
adding manpower for offensive and defensive cyber operations, and
equipping them with the right capabilities to ensure effective
operations. The Air Force plans to shift from a 20th century network-
centric infrastructure to a 21st century data-centric infrastructure.
This transition will enable power projection through information
integration and reallocate critical Information Technology manpower
towards emerging cyber warfighting missions.
The ability to effectively operate in cyberspace is vital to
deliver airpower and conduct the Air Force's core missions. We must
field and sustain cyber resilient capabilities that provide mission
assurance against savvy and constantly evolving adversaries. In
response to Congressional direction and our internal vision of the
need, the Air Force has initiated a multi-pronged approach to provide
assurance, resilience, affordability, and empowerment to enable the Air
Force's assured cyber advantage to ensure our ability to fly, flight,
and win in air, space, and cyberspace.
Signed in November 2015, our Air Force Cyber Campaign Plan (CCP)
has two goals: 1) to ``bake in'' cyber resiliency in new weapon systems
and 2) mitigate critical vulnerabilities in fielded weapon systems. It
consists of seven Lines Of Action (LOAs) which are designed to be the
``engine'' behind increasing the cyber resiliency of all Air Force new
and legacy weapon systems. The CCP addresses the first goal by
integrating cyber resiliency into the system engineering processes to
`bake in' resiliency before systems are fielded. It also
institutionalizes adaptable subsystem architectures for enterprise
technology baselines and business processes, when designing and
building new weapon systems. Concurrently, the plan addresses the
second goal by pursuing top down and bottom up methodologies to finding
and mitigating mission `critical' cyber vulnerabilities. Other LOAs
address other important CCP support activities, including cyber
workforce development, creation of a cross-cutting common security
environment, and the development of counter cyber intelligence
capability. We are committed to building out the Air Force's
contributions to USCYBERCOM's Cyber Mission Forces (CMF) to support the
Nation and the Department of Defense's Joint Information Environment
(JIE) framework.
MULTI-DOMAIN COMMAND AND CONTROL (MDC2) An MDC2 capability
generates effects that present the adversary with multiple dilemmas at
an operational tempo that cannot be matched. The Air Force is focused
on creating feasible investment options throughout its BMC2 portfolio
that drive towards the attainment of an advanced MDC2 capability for
the joint force. For example, multiple AWACS modernization activities
are underway with the most notable being the upgrade to the Block 40/45
mission system which is the foundation for all future AWACS capability
improvements. Additionally, the Air Force is in the midst of
accomplishing activities for a follow-on airborne battle management
command and control capability, the Airborne Battle Management and
Surveillance (ABMS), which is currently provided by the E-3/AWACS
fleet. The ABMS system is envisioned to be an evolutionary leap in
capability intended to achieve IOC prior to the end of AWACS projected
service life in 2035.
The E-8C Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS)
executes Battle Management and Surveillance of air-to-ground
operations, an integral piece to today's fight. Our JSTARS
recapitalization strategy integrates mature sensor, communications and
battle management technologies on a business class aircraft; the
results should reduce life cycle cost while increasing operational
availability and mission system capability. We seek to balance mission
capability, risk and cost, and will look for opportunities to
accelerate the recapitalization as the program progresses.
summary
The demand for air, space, and cyber power is growing and our Chief
is committed to ensuring that America's airmen are resourced and
trained to fight alongside the Army, Navy, Marines and Coast Guard to
meet national security obligations. The Air Force seeks to balance risk
across capacity, capability, and readiness to maintain an advantage,
however persistently unstable budgets and fiscal constraints have
driven us to postpone several key modernization efforts. These delays
created a rapid approaching modernization bow wave that includes
programs critical to meet our capacity and capability requirements
across all mission areas.
The delays have also opened an opportunity to our competitors to
close gaps and negate our traditional advantages. Although we are
grateful for the recent fiscal relief, we still face uncertainty.
Sustainable funding across multiple fiscal year defense plans is
critical to ensure we can meet today's demand for capability and
capacity without sacrificing modernization for tomorrow's high-end
fight against a full array of potential adversaries.
As critical members of the joint team, the USAF operates in a vast
array of domains and prevails in every level of conflict. However, we
must remain focused on delivering Global Vigilance, Global Reach and
Global Power, through our core missions of Air Superiority, Space
Superiority, Global Strike, Rapid Global Mobility, ISR, and C2 to
continue to provide our nation with security it enjoys. We look forward
to working closely with the committee to ensure the ability to deliver
combat air power for America when and where we are needed.
Senator Cotton. General Bunch?
Lieutenant General Bunch. Sir, for the three of us, that
one statement. We look forward to answering your questions.
Thank you, Senator Cotton, Senator King, for the opportunity to
be here today.
Senator Cotton. Thank you. I appreciate it.
So, as we know, the Department of Defense, like all
departments, is operating under a continuing resolution until
April 28th. The situation is far from ideal. There is a
potential, though, for a full-year continuing resolution for
all of fiscal year 2017. That would be far more damaging to our
military services because of ongoing budget disagreements
within the Congress.
Can I ask each of our witnesses to give examples from their
respective areas of the damaging effects a full-year budget
under a continuing resolution might have, General Nowland, from
an operations and readiness perspective; General Bunch, for
program acquisition; and General Harris, for long-term strategy
effects?
General Nowland?
Lieutenant General Nowland. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the
opportunity. A continuing resolution would devastate the
readiness that we're trying to regenerate. Basically, in air,
space, and cyber, it would have operational effects as we are
working to regain our readiness. We would prioritize to make
sure that we continue to do the deployed mission, but those
other units who are not either deployed or preparing to deploy,
they would suffer readiness realities because they would
basically have to stop flying in the air domain. The other
missions in space and cyber would continue, but training
opportunities would be lost.
Lieutenant General Bunch. Mr. Chairman, in the acquisition
community, a year-long continuing resolution would be
devastating for the efforts that we're trying to do to
modernize our Air Force. In the critical area of nuclear
programs, we would require as many as 17 anomalies if we could
afford to do that within our existing programs to keep these
critical upgrades to the B-2, the B-52, Minuteman, and our NC3
[Nuclear Command Control Communications] capabilities on track.
It would also impact 60 Air Force acquisition new starts
that we had planned across the spectrum, and we would end up
needing another anomaly to cover the B-21 program, which is off
to a good start at this point.
It would impact us in missile and ammunition procurement.
It would impact us in our modernizations to aircraft and our
procurement to include Compass Call. It would impact us in
missile procurement. It would impact us in space procurement
with our beyond-line-of-sight terminals and our evolved
expendable launch vehicle programs, intended to assure that we
have mission assurance in space. And it will result in a stop
work issued against the GPS OCX program, just to name a few.
Senator Cotton. You mentioned the B-21. What about two
other of your largest procurement programs, the F-35 and the
KC-46A?
Lieutenant General Bunch. So the F-35 right now, I do not
have an anomaly that we're listing as one we would need at this
stage, sir. On the KC-46, we provided an anomaly, and we were
able to go award lot three already under the continuing
resolution to keep the production program on track at the price
bands that we had negotiated with Boeing when we awarded the
contract.
Senator Cotton. You mentioned a lot of anomalies. How would
you end up prioritizing and balancing those?
Lieutenant General Bunch. Sir, that's why I said if we
could afford to do that. What we would have to do is work with
the remainder of the team and look at where those
modernizations are for the longer-term plan that Joe Harris
talks about and determine which areas we could take risks in or
which areas we could not take risks in.
Senator Cotton. General Harris?
Lieutenant General Harris. Thank you, Chairman. That's a
great question. We appreciate the opportunity to address it.
A continuing resolution, to be honest, would be something
that our adversaries haven't been able to do to your Air Force,
and that's going to be ground us, which, as you said, we're
trying to avoid. With the current hole that we would be in,
it's about $600 million in our flying hour program alone.
That's 120,000 flight hours, and your Air Force goes through
that in a month-and-a-half. So it would be the last month-and-
a-half the entire Air Force would have to stop flying, but
because we can't do that, it would start affecting units almost
immediately, forcing their grounding, and that turns around our
readiness program.
The airmen that we talked about are the most important to
us and our chief, number-one effort. We'd have to defer all
those bonus payments that we were setting up to cover to retain
them, which means we're going to be training more and creating
a bigger hole in our future programs.
Senator King. I want to push down a little bit on the
effects of a continuing resolution. I agree with you that it's
no way to govern, and we shouldn't be even thinking about a
further continuing resolution for the rest of the year.
However, basically it means that you have the same amount
of money that you had last year. Why is it that it creates such
a problem? For example, General Harris, you just said you'd
have to ground the squadrons for two months at the end of the
year. You didn't have to ground them last year. I'm unclear as
to why it would have that effect.
Lieutenant General Harris. Sir, that's a great question. We
are actually flying more this year, trying to improve our
readiness status. So we had been at that since 1 October based
on the signals and messaging we've had from both Congress and
OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense]. So we're flying at a
rate greater than last year, trying to reverse our readiness
trends and have more airmen prepared to fight the high-end
conflict, not just today's fight. So we're ahead of last year's
curve significantly, trying to get these airmen up to speed.
Senator King. So basically what you're saying is if you
don't have additional funding over and above what you had for
last year, you'd run out of money and that's why you'd have to
ground those squadrons.
Lieutenant General Harris. That's exactly right, sir.
Senator King. General Bunch, the same question. Why such a
drastic effect if indeed you're having the same amount? This is
what my taxpayers in Maine would say: They're getting the money
that they got last year; why would there be such a drastic
effect on various programs?
Lieutenant General Bunch. Yes, sir. So, some of these
programs--for example, OCX [Operational Control System]--if you
recall, we had to plus up the budget to get the program back on
track. That's a program where we're going to be spending more
money this year than we were before, so that's an example of
that.
On our weapons procurement, one of the things that we've
seen is the desire and the continued utilization of precision
weapons to minimize collateral damage and dependence on those,
and that demand signal has gone up, and we have tried to
respond to that by trying to increase the production of joint
direct attack munitions, small diameter bomb, Hellfire, and
advanced precision kill weapons system. All of those were on a
ramp to plus back up so that we can rebuild our stockpiles and
match what we're utilizing in the fight today.
Senator King. Isn't that what OCO [overseas contingency
operations] was all about?
Lieutenant General Bunch. So the problem--it is, sir. But
the problem with OCO traditionally, last year you allowed us to
take some OCO dollars and predict what our utilization would be
so that we could procure weapons. That's not traditionally how
we've been able to do that. So that helped us. The problem with
OCO is it's years before I can get to the point that I fill
back up those stockpiles.
What we're trying to do is send a steady signal with stable
funding and a demand signal to the industrial base so that they
keep the production levels up at what we need, not only for us
but also for our partners, and also for foreign military sales
and for other activities as we fight around the world.
Senator King. So part of the problem with a continuing
resolution is predictability and maintaining your acquisitions
and maintaining the industrial base.
Lieutenant General Bunch. Sir, the way that we describe, I
describe, particularly in the weapons area, is for many years
we've been full up on the throttle and full back on the
throttle, and what we've got to do is set a stable throttle and
continue to keep stable funding to send that signal to industry
so that industry is willing to make the investments so that
they can support what we need to procure.
Senator King. I hesitate to speculate how a jet airplane
would fly if Congress was in the driver's seat, the pilot's
seat.
In your prepared testimony, one of the most, I thought,
troubling pieces--and this is returning to the longer-term
issue--is manpower shortfalls, particularly pilots and
maintainers. This appears to be a serious, ongoing problem, and
particularly in the next few years I understand there are a
great number of retirements in the commercial side, and you're
seeing a loss of people.
How do we cope with the shortfall in pilots, and also
maintainers?
Lieutenant General Bunch. Senator King, that's a fantastic
question. Our Air Force and our chief has directed that we take
this on head-on. The answer is we're going to need a little bit
of help from everybody, work with industry, work with Congress,
but what we can control we're taking on right now. The first
thing we need to do, sir, is we're working on our requirements.
So we have a rated staff allocation plan, which is as you
look at your United States Air Force, not every pilot is
flying. Some pilots are doing staff duty, some pilots are doing
training duties----
Senator King. Wouldn't pilots rather be flying?
Lieutenant General Bunch. Yes, sir, they would, but not for
their entire career because we need pilots in staff positions
so that we can make good decisions about future acquisition,
about future con ops, about command and control. So we have a
myriad of duties.
Our young pilots, your first 11 years of your career
essentially, sir, is built around building technical
capability. So that's really where the vast majority of our
pilots, our young pilots, are. As you become older, we need
less older pilots, but we need to use them to train our Air
Force and to operate our Air Force. But we basically have cut
our staff, so we're looking at requirements.
The second thing we do is we're increasing production. We
are pushing up our production to the maximum capacity that we
can, and in particular with fighter pilots we're going to try
to produce 335 total force fighter pilots per year, and we're
going to produce those continually for the next five to seven
years. We need to just produce those pilots to fill in gaps.
As we do that, we will also create mobility pilots, but we
also have a responsibility to build coalition and international
pilots. So we're going to maximize our production while
balancing our training requirements.
Senator King. My time has expired, but we're going to get
back to this. I want to follow up on how we're going to do the
retention. I think that's very important. And also recruit and
retain people who are maintaining, because you can have pilots,
but if the planes aren't ready, that's a problem too.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Senator Cotton. Senator Tillis?
Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here and for your service.
The question I want to focus a little bit on, the
continuing resolution and the effect that it may have. But
before I do, I've got a couple of baseline questions.
How many squadrons do we currently have that are at their
highest level of certification or readiness?
Lieutenant General Harris. Sir, it's not many. It's less
than half that are in what we would call Level 1 or Level 2
readiness.
Senator Tillis. How many are at Level 1?
Lieutenant General Harris. Three, maybe four.
Senator Tillis. I think it's four. And that's a total of
how many squadrons?
Lieutenant General Harris. Fifty-five.
Senator Tillis. And the number of pilots that you all would
like to have versus how many you need, how far behind are we?
Lieutenant General Harris. Sir, we are probably 700 to
1,000 in the Air Force alone; and, as we're talking about,
we're increasing our production now. The bonus increase that
Congress has given us will help us retain more of those mid-
level pilots, but we don't think it's enough. Although we'll
never keep up with airline salaries, currently between us and
the Navy are producing about 2,200 pilots a year. This past
year that we're finishing now, airlines are hiring 4,000. We're
only producing 2,200.
Lieutenant General Nowland. Sir, we're 1,555 total force
pilots behind today.
Senator Tillis. Okay, it's even worse than I thought.
Now, with that sort of as a baseline, I don't think you all
would put that as something you're really happy with and that's
in the best interests of the national security, or really, for
that matter, the morale of the Air Force. Let's say that some
people around here are going to declare victory and high-five
if we get a continuing resolution passed for 12 months that
has, let's say, even the numbers that we talked about here in
terms of increased spending. How do those numbers change at all
over the next 24 months? Do they get better, worse, or stay the
same?
Lieutenant General Harris. Sir, they'll get worse. First
off, we won't be able to close out 2017 at our end strength
that we're looking for of 321,000. We'll fall short of that
number, and that will just compound as we go forward. The chief
and secretary are trying to grow the number of airmen we need--
maintainers, ops, flyers, those that are working across the
spectrum. Right now, we just don't have enough doing the
mission.
Senator Tillis. If passing the CR [continuing resolution]
was what many people think here would be a success, I don't
think anybody in uniform would think it was a success,
particularly those who are worried about our readiness and our
capability and our ability to project power.
Lieutenant Bunch? Or General Bunch. I'm sorry.
Lieutenant General Bunch. I was one once, sir. I was a
lieutenant.
Senator Tillis. A little younger.
Lieutenant General Bunch. A day or two ago, sir, and still
loving it. It would be devastating for us----
Senator Tillis. Devastating.
General Bunch.--if we take a continuing resolution
throughout the year. We'll be at $2.8 billion short. We will
have to find a way to fund within five months.
Senator Tillis. My next question relates to the sad reality
that that may be the best that we can expect. I hope we can get
more, but that may be the best we can expect.
What advice would you give to us in terms of other things
we could do that could remove some of the hurdles or allow you
to be more productive with the money that you have if we're
constrained by money? I don't want to be. I think that we need
to place a priority on the challenges that you have and all the
other branches have. But what other things should we be looking
at that you haven't heard any movement on that could
potentially increase your flexibility, reduce burdens, reduce
inefficiencies to at least help bend the curve on what is
otherwise just an undeniable downward trend?
Lieutenant General Harris. Senator, that's not an easy task
to come up with. We do have some new starts that we are trying
to get through authorizing those with the money would help,
allowing us to move money, if necessary, left and right to
cover some of these shortfalls. I think we're already doing
that, and we have good support from Congress. But not having a
stable budget from year to year really impacts my ability to
work on my 5-, 10-, and 20-year plans.
Senator Tillis. No doubt about it. I mean, we can sit here,
and we beat you all until you bleed, we beat you for bleeding,
for cost overruns on certain projects, but we create the
structural inefficiencies that cause that to happen. You can't
make a long-term supply chain optimization outcome happen
unless you have a long-term spending horizon to plan it on.
General Bunch, you were going to say something?
Lieutenant General Bunch. Yes. I would just say, sir, that
Congress has been very helpful with us when we've come in on
critical acquisition programs, to give us the anomalies, and we
appreciate that support. But if we go for the year long, and I
talked about the number of nuclear anomalies we would need and
the number of new starts, all that is out of balance with what
limited amount of money we've got, and we've got to make
trades, and we have to work on all of these together, and that
would be very challenging to do.
Senator Tillis. In my remaining time I don't expect an
answer, but we would like to hear back from you specific things
so that we can ease the burden. If we're going to get to a
point to where the CR is all we can get, please give us
feedback on things that we can go nail down that at least make
you managing in this fiscally tight time more efficient. It
shouldn't be the solution, but at least it provides some relief
that we're not really talking enough about now.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Senator Cotton. General Nowland, you said you have a
shortfall of 1,555 total force pilots today?
Lieutenant General Nowland. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cotton. What's your shortfall of fighter pilots
today?
Lieutenant General Nowland. Sir, today, as of today, we're
950 fighter pilots short across the total force.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
Senator Sullivan?
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And gentlemen, thank you for testifying today and your
service, appreciate it very much.
I wanted to talk about another shortfall that we were
trying to get some more focus on. In NDAA last year, I
sponsored a provision that asked for a report on the F-35
maintainer shortage, and I think that was due a couple of weeks
ago. I know you're busy, so maybe we can see that relatively
soon, or maybe it's already completed.
But the point of the amendment was actually to be helpful,
to try to get your ideas on how we actually close that gap. My
one question--that language was based on the end strength of
321,000. I think General Goldfein talked about end strength of
350,000. What does that do to the maintainer shortage, and will
you be explaining that kind of increase on end strength and
what we need to do to address the maintainer shortage in the
report?
Lieutenant General Harris. Senator Sullivan, I'll start
with that. Thank you. Sorry if we're late on the report. We'll
work on that.
Senator Sullivan. We know you've got a lot going on. And
like I said, that was not a smack-you-down provision. That's a
provision trying to help.
Lieutenant General Harris. Understand.
Senator Sullivan. Because it's an important issue.
Lieutenant General Harris. What we're looking at doing,
when the chief talks about closing out this year at 321,000,
that includes growth in our maintainers. We are over-assessing
from our current need of what we need of new recruits, because
it takes us so long to train. We recognize that we've got to
bring them in somewhere. So we're bringing in more than 1,000
now than we had planned in the long-range plans and picking
that up. So we will get healthy over time, but it will become
an experience issue for a while. We won't have too many 3
level, and 5 and 7 level.
As we grow to 350,000, that will help the chief right-size
all of our squadrons. Right now, it's about 80 percent manned
across any squadron. We're trying to work on the ops and
maintenance first to get at the combat capability, but we
certainly need the support so that we have the quality of life
that takes care of all the airmen that are flying to make sure
we can retain them when they're at mid-level career and they
get those other choices that are out there.
Senator Sullivan. And more broadly speaking, how are we
looking on the F-35 production, the cost, the deployment?
Obviously, the President was talking about this for some time,
and I think General Mattis or a senior Air Force official took
that over. Are we seeing cost reductions and the deployment
schedules on schedule right now?
Lieutenant General Bunch. Sir, let me start with that, and
then I'll let these two gentlemen jump in.
We are seeing General Bogdan driving cost savings into the
program through his efforts with Lockheed Martin. We are seeing
it come down, the price curve, the way that we want it to. It's
at or better than what General Bogdan had been trying to drive
to, to show us what we were doing.
So one of the things we're asking for is please keep
driving that cost down and----
Senator Sullivan. And I think it's helpful to have the
President of the United States raising that and pushing on
that, too.
Lieutenant General Bunch. Sir, we love anybody that's
putting pressure on us to try to save money. We're all good
with that.
Senator Sullivan. That's your ultimate leverage.
Lieutenant General Bunch. Yes, sir. So we are seeing that.
The message we have given out is we need to see those costs
continue to come down. We want to see the sustainment costs
continue to come down, and we want to continue to----
Senator Sullivan. Is that process impacting the schedule of
deployments, or no? I mean, it's a different place.
Lieutenant General Bunch. So right now we haven't deployed.
We have done Red Flag, and I'll let these gentlemen talk to
that. But right now we're staying on track with the production
the way we want it, the fielding the way we want it and
intended, and the schedule is moving forward with the
completion of the 3-F testing. So we're moving in that
direction, and I'll pass it over to General Nowland and General
Harris to address the Red Flag and how the jet is performing.
Senator Sullivan. So there's no right movement? Aren't the
Marines getting a new IwoKuni and Bravos?
Lieutenant General Nowland. Senator Sullivan, the Marines
have moved them to IwoKuni. Our first operational squadron
initial operational capability is at Hill Air Force Base. They
recently deployed the Red Flag and had a very successful Red
Flag. We are next going to take them and they're going to go to
Europe on a theater security package and work through initial
operational capability, working towards full operational
capability as we work to develop the capability of the system,
the network, how do we bring it all together and how do we
deploy with the two increased combat capability.
Senator Sullivan. Okay.
Lieutenant General Harris. And, sir, the pilots that are
flying this airplane, the Red Flag, love it. They step down out
of the cockpit and they tell stories of the kill ratios that
are phenomenal. Those that have flown Red Flag in now fifth gen
and fourth gen wonder why they ever did it in a fourth gen
airplane.
Lieutenant General Bunch. Sir, what I've told people is we
look at the F-35 program and we had some developmental things
that we worked through, and we had challenges that General
Bogdan and his team have worked through with Lockheed Martin
and with everybody. Probably we have semi-annual meetings with
all the international partners, and it was about three ago that
the conversation wasn't about the development; the conversation
was predominantly focused on when we're going to start
deploying and how we're going to support down range.
To me, that was a shift in the program that we are moving
forward. The platform has crossed a hurdle and we're really
getting to where we're looking to employ the asset.
Senator Sullivan. Good.
Mr. Chairman, I have a few more questions, but I'll defer
to whatever your role is here.
Senator Cotton. You can ask one.
Senator Sullivan. It will be a multi-part one question.
[Laughter.]
Senator Cotton. Well played.
Senator Sullivan. Let me ask you, you talk about the fifth
gen and the Red Flag. One of the things I like to do is take
military members who aren't in the Air Force, other senior
leaders, and try to get some of my colleagues up to Eielson to
see the Red Flag Alaska exercises and J-Park. And every time I
go there, which is frequently, the superlatives that are talked
about with regard to the J-Park training--which I think the
airspace is about the size of Florida, so a little bit bigger
than what we've got down in the lower 48, actually a lot
bigger, and we're expanding it right now, as you know--is that
one of the issues that keeps coming out is that you talked
about readiness at the outset of your testimony and the
importance of ranges.
My understanding is that when you're talking about fifth
gen air-to-air training, because the standoff ranges are
increasingly much further with the fifth gen aircraft, that the
ranges need to be increasingly large, or the airspace needs to
be bigger. We have that at J-Park, which I think I'd like your
opinion on whether, as General Welch said prior to his leaving,
that that was the best range on the Planet Earth.
But if you agree with that, what are the suggestions to
increase readiness? Although it is a remarkable place for air-
to-air combat, I'd ask the question that the last Red Flag
evolution they did they had close to 90 aircraft up night
fighting and getting refueled, and it was remarkable--not the
notional aircraft, the real aircraft.
What are your suggestions that we need to do to improve J-
Park, and do you agree with oncoming fifth gen, that that is
not only the crown jewel of air-to-air training in the U.S.
military but it's going to be increasingly important as we move
to F-35s and F-22s?
And what do we do about the aggressor squadron? We had a
great aggressor squadron in Alaska. The F-16s are very good.
But at the fifth gen level, are we going to need to bring in F-
22s to be aggressors at a certain point?
So that's my multi-part question. And I'll also ask about
where are we on KC-46 spacing. There was NDAA language last
year that laid out particular principles that the Congress
wanted you to look at, and I just would like an update on that.
That's one question, by the way.
[Laughter.]
Lieutenant General Nowland. Sir, I think you might get
multiple answers.
Senator Sullivan. Well, if the Chairman would allow it, I
think that would be great.
Lieutenant General Nowland. Senator Sullivan, as the
director of operations, I can tell you J-Park is critical
towards the future. Airspace and the range size that you talk
about is absolutely--you're spot on, we need greater distances.
But our chief has just directed a new initiative that's called
Operational Training Infrastructure. We used to talk about
live, virtual, constructive, but what we have determined, it's
much bigger than just live, virtual, constructive. It's the
whole system that goes into it.
So part of the F-35 and F-22 fifth generation platforms are
so smart that threat replication becomes very, very important,
and you can't do it necessarily. You have to have some very
high-fidelity simulation. So in A-3, director of operations, we
are standing up a new division with a general officer that will
be looking at how----
Senator Sullivan. You put your pilots here and the trainers
if they get a kill?
[Laughter.]
Lieutenant General Nowland. Every day we come to work
thinking about do we do training better and how do we maximize
our investments in training to include our Nellis ranges, to
include J-Park, our training infrastructure, how do we man our
aggressor squadrons, how do we train in our aggressor
squadrons, what is the future of our adversary air squadrons,
how do we get adversary air while not reducing readiness of
blue forces.
So your question is spot on. We are thinking every day
about it because we know that fifth generation training is
different than training of fourth generation.
Senator Sullivan. You can integrate the fifth gen physical
air-to-air with some of the notional. Isn't that correct?
Lieutenant General Harris. Sir, we're working on that.
That's part of our upgrade that we're looking for follow-on.
Right now we're concentrating on combat capability for the F-
35, but we are working through several programs to bring that
training in because, as you're aware, the J-Park, I've been
lost in it as a former Blue Fox pilot back in the 1990s. It is
a massive air space, yet these threats are partially reliant on
threat density and being able to put multiple threats
overlapping on top of each other. That's what we meant to kick
the door in with our fifth gen aircraft, and we continue to
work on that.
That's not easy to do. J-Park is a jewel. It's not a
backyard range that we have, but where we base our F-35s with
two squadrons at Eielson, in addition to what we've got at
Elmendorf with the F-22s, we need to continue to work on that,
but we have to balance it. Are we buying more threats to train
against versus combat capability in the aircraft that we're
trying to do? That's always a balance that we work through on a
daily basis.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
Lieutenant General Bunch. I love what they said. We're
trying to do this holistically to make sure we're on the right
path to inquire what we need to be able to support the live,
virtual, constructive and what we're trying to do for the
future. There's not only a range aspect of this, but there's
also a security aspect of this as to what you can do virtually
and what you can really do in the open air that we have to
balance as well, sir. And I, unfortunately, do not have the KC-
46 basing thing with me, so I'll have to take that one for the
record, sir. But I'll get you an answer back.
Senator Sullivan. Okay. Great. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
General Nowland, I want to return to this question about
fighter pilot shortfalls. I'm not trying to sharp-shoot the
number. I'm just trying to get a handle on them. Whatever they
are, I think the upshot of those numbers is not good.
Last year your predecessor, General Raymond, testified the
Air Force was short 511 fighter pilots. That was expected to
grow to 834 by 2022, in part because of the higher than
expected hiring by private airlines last year, though you
finished 2016 short over 700 pilots. I understand that
Congresswoman Wilson in her questions for the record submitted
for tomorrow's hearing has said they will be short 800 fighter
pilots, but you say it's 950 fighter pilots short today?
Lieutenant General Nowland. My numbers are total force. So
it depends on how you look at the numbers, but we'll make sure
we square with----
Senator Cotton. And that's total force fighter pilots.
Lieutenant General Harris. Nine-hundred-fifty total force
fighter pilots.
Lieutenant General Nowland. Total force fighter pilots.
Lieutenant General Harris. Active, Guard, and Reserve.
Senator Cotton. So might the discrepancy be counting Guard
and Reserve, along with Active?
Lieutenant General Nowland. Quite possibly, sir, because
our 55 fighter squadrons include our Guard and Reserve. They
are not in addition to that. And as we look at our
requirements, we stack nearly 50 squadrons on top of each other
to get through the defense planning guidance that we have now
for some of our larger conflicts, and that's when we need 55
healthy and ready squadrons, then look at growth to make sure
that we can meet our needs.
Senator Cotton. Whatever the number is, and I'm pleased to
get it to us broken down along those dimensions, would you
agree with my first statement that the upshot number is not
good for the health of the Air Force and for the security of
our nation?
Lieutenant General Nowland. Mr. Chairman, absolutely. We
can show you that the number has gotten worse over time and is
increasing. Now, we are very hopeful, under retention, our
third line, that the extra money that Congress allocated to us
and the plan that we're coming back with, with a pilot bonus,
with a tiered system, a business model system that allows us to
give multiple options, will be part of the solution. But it's
not money alone that's going to keep pilots in. It's also
partially got to do with culture of the squadrons and getting
pilots back to their primary duty.
One of the primary irritants for pilots is additional
duties, and our chief has taken actions to eliminate additional
duties. We put five additional personnel into 24 fighter
squadrons to help with the additional duties as we look at----
Senator Cotton. Could you give the committee some examples
of additional duties?
Lieutenant General Nowland. Yes, sir. For example, we put
people in that will help them do the scheduling duty that
requires you to do that every day; help with reporting,
reporting functions, whether that be OPRs, ZPRs, administrative
type of work that needs to be done in a squadron. The things
that take a squadron, a fighter pilot away from flying, being
an officer--remember, we're all officers first, so professional
officership comes first. But then replacing those duties that
detract him from not preparing for his next sortie. So we're
looking at areas such as that.
Senator Cotton. Okay. The committee last year increased the
cap for bonuses from $25,000 to $35,000. Do you anticipate a
request that you'll be increasing the cap further?
Lieutenant General Harris. Sir, we would request that.
We're finding almost a one-to-one ratio. So with the $35,000
bonus, that is an increase, and that's good. After two decades,
we have not changed it, but we're actually hoping for higher.
At $50,000, we may get up to 50 percent retention. So we will
tier that based on where we have our biggest needs, and right
now that is in the fighter pilot community.
Senator Cotton. At what phase in one's career would one
receive that bonus?
Lieutenant General Harris. At the end of your pilot
training commitment. So it is around that 11- to 12-year point,
and then the option is for five years or to keep you out to 20
years. We have several options to get at different lifestyles
to retain as many of the pilots as we can.
Senator Cotton. So perhaps a $50,000 bonus for a five-year
commitment, or more?
Lieutenant General Nowland. Essentially, the RAND study
said $48,000 a year. The problem is----
Senator Cotton. I'm sorry. Is it a year?
Lieutenant General Nowland. A RAND study said--yes, sir--a
$48,000 bonus is what they were recommending, and that was
based on a number of 3,500. The problem is the airlines are
hiring more than that. In 2022, we have data that shows that 58
percent of American Airlines pilots are going to be eligible
for retirement.
So as we look to the future, this problem is not going
away. That's why it's production, retention, requirements, and
then as we think about this as a national problem, if you think
it cost us $11 million to create an F-22 pilot, and you lose
him at the peak of his proficiency, it's a loss to the nation
of a big investment.
Senator Cotton. My time is up on this round. I will just
say that our committee staff has traveled and conducted sensing
sessions with some pilots in Europe and in the Middle East, and
I think there's a strong non-monetary component to it as well.
One of those components is the operational tempo. The Air Force
has been heavily deployed in those theaters now for 27 years.
Obviously, there's a self-reinforcing aspect to it as well as
the pilot shortage grows shorter and the up tempo becomes even
greater. So I think that's something that both the Air Force
and this committee needs to consider as well, as important as
those monetary bonuses are.
Senator Peters?
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I thank all three of you for being here. I appreciate
your testimony here today.
My question centers around the A-10 aircraft. In Michigan,
our Air National Guard flies A-10s and has been doing that very
successfully, but we are also now on the short list of five
potential sites for deployment for the F-35, which we hope will
have a successful outcome as that process moves forward.
But if you could talk a little bit about how you see this
transition as we move away from A-10s, what will be some of the
sequencing and timelines for that, as well as new F-35
squadrons coming in, perhaps taking some of these positions.
How do you see that unfolding?
Lieutenant General Harris. Senator Peters, that's a great
question. First off, what I'd like to say is we are living with
the NDAA requirements right now on the A-10s, and we are
waiting for the comparison testing to be complete before we
make decisions on the final outcome. But at this time we are
not asking for additional upgrades with the A-10. It is an
awesome airplane, and I would venture to say it is the best CAS
[close air support] airplane that we have.
But where I think we have not done well in telling our
story with the F-35 is that as it moves in, as we are holding
at 55 squadrons, things have to fall off the bottom, and it's
going to be our older fighters that we have not upgraded. A-10s
may be some of that, F-16s, F-15s. We're buying roughly two
squadrons a year. When we look at the 60 range that we're
aiming for, by the time we put some in training, some in test,
and continue to grow the efforts that we need. So that's the
pace that we're looking at, and we are working a few years
ahead because of the MILCON required to support the F-35 and
the capabilities that it brings to any fight. A lot of that
involves the higher classification and the security
requirements on ramps, those types of things that we have to
upgrade.
Senator Peters. Right. Thank you.
Your testimony also mentions the space domain and that we
need reliable access to space, including jam-resistant position
navigation and timing. My understanding is that our adversaries
have been investing a great deal in their space capability,
something that we have to be concerned about.
What do you believe are the most important investments that
we need to make now in space to support those vital missions?
What should we be doing here in Congress to help you achieve
that important mission?
Lieutenant General Bunch. Sir, I think we've outlined in
our budgets that we put in, we put those in the highest
priority. I believe we're giving you what we believe we need
for the future. I will tell you right now, we're very focused
on developing the new launch capability to get us off the RD-
180 and to move the pads so that we can have two domestically
produced, commercially viable providers of launch services to
meet all of our NSS [National Security Space] requirements. So
those programs, we've been doing other transaction authority
investments with public-private partnerships with industry for
the last few years that we're trying to expand out now to go to
launch service agreements.
Also, we need to keep the OCX program on track because we
need that to have a stronger encrypted M-code GPS signal for
what we're going to do for those activities.
The last thing that our chief is very focused on, and I'm
not going into a whole lot more details about specific
programs, is we need to normalize how we're doing our space
business. We need to treat it like an operational domain. We
need to treat it like the air domain. We need to set the
requirements. We need to make sure we've got con ops for how we
would operate and do things. We have to do all those things
beforehand. We need to streamline the acquisition. That's in my
swim lane. We need to partner better with the NRO [National
Reconnaissance Office]. We need to make sure we're moving out
and using the operationally responsive space authorities that
we have. We need to look at doing RCO [Rapid Capabilities
Office]-like activities in the space domain, which is another
area that we're focused on right now.
So we have a big focus in the space area to be more
responsive to what we're trying to do because we know that's a
critical domain and a critical area that we do our business in.
Senator Peters. Thank you.
Senator Cotton. Senator Warren?
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Harris, last week the House Armed Services
Committee held a hearing on Air Force readiness, and during
that hearing your colleague, Major General West, seemed to
indicate that the Air Force might be prepared to retire the F-
15C and D in the next year or two. Is that right? Does the Air
Force propose retiring the F-15? And how is the Air Force going
to replace that capability?
Lieutenant General Harris. Ma'am, thank you. It's an
opportunity for us to tell the story. That's pre-decisional. We
have not decided, and throughout we continue to deploy the F-
15C/D fleet. It's an air superiority fighter for us with
somewhat limited capabilities from a fourth gen perspective
compared to an F-22, but we are not replacing it at this time.
It is something that we're looking at as we continue to bring
in more fifth gen capability, what assets do we push out at the
bottom of that chain.
Senator Warren. All right. So let me ask you, then, if it's
pre-decisional, has the Air Force done the analysis to
demonstrate that purchasing new F-16s instead of servicing the
F-15s will provide the same level of capabilities and actually
save the taxpayer money?
Lieutenant General Harris. We are doing that analysis. I
don't know how that is going to turn out from a cost
perspective, but I think it's going to be fairly balanced. So I
look forward to providing that when we get that information
completed.
Senator Warren. And I'll take it you'll get that resolved
before you make any decisions?
Lieutenant General Harris. We will, and certainly that's
part of it, but we also have to look at the operational
capabilities and what a fifth gen fighter, although it is a
multi-role fighter in the F-35, brings to this fight as a
family of systems. It far out-classes anything in our fourth
gen.
Senator Warren. I understand that, and actually I've got
some questions about that. But what I really want to focus on
is what we're doing in the next year or two, at a time when
we're hearing about readiness difficulties with the Air Force.
I also want to ask, you know that more than 60 percent of
our F-15s belong to the Air National Guard. So what I'd like to
have here today is your commitment that the Air Force will
consult with the Air Guard and specifically with the Adjutants
General in states with the Air Guard F-15 wings before any
decisions are made.
Lieutenant General Harris. Ma'am, they're part of my team
on the plan process. So they're involved with us every day. At
that testimony, seated next to General West was General Rice,
the Air National Guard commander. So they're involved with----
Senator Warren. I know General Rice well. Good.
General Harris.--and we'll continue to work with them.
Senator Warren. All right. I just want to make sure we're
going to do that.
Given its cost, I realize that we may not be able to
procure the F-35 in the numbers the Air Force has planned until
2045. So I'm also not convinced that the F-16 is fully capable
of replacing the F-15 in meeting the air-to-air mission. So I
just want to raise the point, because it seems to me that
retiring hundreds of aircraft at a time when the Air Force is
in need of additional capability may not make a lot of sense
here, and I just want to make sure you're looking very
carefully at the proposal. I know we'll have questions as this
emerges.
Lieutenant General Harris. Yes, ma'am, we're looking at
that, and what our chief is trying to drive to is to maintain
us at 55 fighter squadrons, including our Guard and Reserve in
that number, and making them healthy with what we have.
Senator Warren. Okay. I also want to, if I can get it in
quickly here, I want to ask you about the nuclear command and
control network, the NC3 system that connects our President to
our field forces in case of emergency. As you know, the system
is absolutely essential to provide early warning, to
communicate critical information in a nuclear crisis. If NC3
doesn't work, the rest of our nuclear triad becomes essentially
useless here.
The current NC3 system is old. General Hyten recently said
that NC3 was his highest priority for nuclear recapitalization,
and he said, and I'm going to quote him here, ``Any delay,
deferment, or cancellation of NC3 modernization will create a
capability gap potentially degrading the President's ability to
respond appropriately to a strategic threat.''
So I just want to ask, General Bunch, is NC3 the highest
priority for the Air Force as well?
Lieutenant General Bunch. Ma'am, we have multiple
priorities.
Senator Warren. I know.
Lieutenant General Bunch. NC3 is a priority that we have
within the Air Force. We named Air Force Global Strike Command
and General Rand as the lead for the NC3 effort. So we named a
four-star and a MAGCOM [major commands] as the lead. We aligned
NC3 efforts under a program executive officer up at Hanscom
right now, and we designated someone. We did not have that
before. He's designated to look over all those programs. We've
aligned that into the nuclear weapons center, which we've stood
up now and we've restructured so that it's really only focused
on the sustainment and the modernization of our nuclear
inventory.
So we, the Air Force, have made a big commitment to
prioritizing that. I will not tell you that we have it 100
percent straight today. I will tell you that there are a lot of
small efforts that are in a lot of different POs that don't
have a whole lot of manpower. Our team met with the A-10 and
pulled in all the program executive officers who have those
assets, and pulled in the Global Strike Command and other
expertise to get us on a path to make sure that we are focused
on that and delivering those capabilities which are so critical
to our ability to keep the nuclear deterrent viable.
Senator Warren. Good. I appreciate that.
I have additional questions, but I'll just ask them in a
QFR. I just want to say I think this is an absolutely critical
program, and it's important for us to keep an eye on it. So,
thank you, General.
Lieutenant General Bunch. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Warren. Thank you.
Senator Cotton. Senator Blumenthal?
Senator Blumenthal. Thanks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have a couple of simple numbers questions which you may
have answered; I apologize if you have, but I would like to
hear the answers.
What is the ideal procurement number for fiscal year 2018
on the F-35 for you? What do you want on the F-35 for fiscal
year 2018?
Lieutenant General Bunch. Sir, I'd like to get to 60 F-35A
models for the U.S. Air Force.
Senator Blumenthal. Okay. And I think there's been some
testimony about the number of--and by the way, I'm not a
business guy, and I'm not a military professional, but common
sense tells me if you order enough of them, the price comes
down with scale, and I've heard that from the company. So if
you confirm it, I'll believe it's true.
Lieutenant General Bunch. Sir, what we've asked and what
I've given in our dialogues and the message I've carried from
our chief is we want to go to 60. We need to see the price
continue to come down on the curve so that we can continue to
procure those, and we need the operations and sustainment
effort that we need so that we can operate and maintain those
the same way. That is what General Bogdan's team is working.
They understand where we want to go, and I'm comfortable that
as we've gone through the buys over the years we are moshing
down the curve and we are coming down to a lower rate, and
that's where we want Lockheed Martin to stay.
Senator Blumenthal. And Lockheed Martin and Pratt and all
the contractors involved have begun a war on costs. In fact,
they began it some time ago, maybe years ago, and they have
continued that war to drive down costs, but scale is very
important to that effort.
Lieutenant General Bunch. It is, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
I know there's been some talk about the number, the
shortages of pilots--how many are you down from the number that
you need? I've heard different numbers--800, 900. Maybe it's--
--
Lieutenant General Nowland. Senator Blumenthal, the number
changes every day. But as of today, we are 1,555 total force
pilots short of our requirements.
Senator Blumenthal. Fifteen hundred and fifty-five.
Lieutenant General Nowland. Yes, sir, 1,555.
Senator Blumenthal. And what is the number from which you
are short?
Lieutenant General Nowland. Sir, our total number of pilots
is approximately 20,300. That's approximately what our total
requirements are for pilots.
And I'm sorry, Chairman Cotton, I gave you 1,550 because I
didn't have my glasses on. I apologize.
Senator Blumenthal. And of those 1,555--again, I apologize,
because my terminology probably won't be as exact, as official
as it should be. What number of those are fighter pilots?
Lieutenant General Nowland. Sir, we are 950 fighter pilots
short today.
Senator Blumenthal. That would square with what I've heard.
And out of what number is that?
Lieutenant General Nowland. Sir, I'll get you the exact
number. I don't want to give you a wrong number. I've got it
right down here, but I don't have total number of fighter
pilots broken out. I have it broken out by the services, so I
can get it to you.
Senator Blumenthal. If you could, I would appreciate it.
Lieutenant General Nowland. Yes, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. And again, I don't mean to make too
much of this numbers stuff, but one theory that has been
advanced to me about how to keep and maybe even attract more
skilled pilots is this idea of readiness, giving them time,
basically time to train, because they need, so it's been
described to me, time in the air to be proficient. And if they
don't get that time, they feel they're not proficient, and it's
a real deterrent to stay in the Air Force. So it makes the
offers they may receive from the private world all the more
attractive.
So readiness is a key to keeping and attracting skilled
pilots. Is that over-simplistic, or is it relevant?
Lieutenant General Nowland. Senator Blumenthal, no, you are
exactly right. It's a combination, a series of things. Chairman
Cotton already mentioned it also, personnel tempo. Deploying
down-range is one thing, but then when you come home, flying
and then being home--I have a story of an F-22 pilot, a major
who was in Alaska, sir. He had been there for seven years. He
went to weapons school. He was at the peak of his game. He came
home one day and his wife put her hand on his shoulder and
said, honey, I love you, but you've got to get out of the Air
Force. And he said why? Because in the last five years you've
been home 10 months.
So that's an extreme case. Now, the good news is he went to
the Reserves and he's still serving with the Air Force. But
personnel tempo is part of it. When you're a very small Air
Force and you're a very small F-22 fleet, you're constantly in
demand. So we're looking at how we get personnel tempo under
control.
There's deployment to dwell, but there's also personnel
tempo. Building white space is super important.
Lieutenant General Harris. May I add to that also?
Senator Blumenthal. Yes, absolutely. Thank you. With the
Chair's permission.
Lieutenant General Harris. Sir, you're exactly right.
Quality of life is a part of this. The pilots came in, they
intended to fly and they like to fly. So one of the chief's
number-one items is to fix our squadrons and right-sizing them.
So we are putting administrative support back into the
squadrons. Over the last two decades as we've been getting
smaller, we've been cutting as much of the tail as we can, and
we realize we did too much. The flying squadrons are so small,
they had no support.
So after a full day of flying or an exercise that they were
deployed to, they had to come home and do a significant amount
of paperwork that could be done by many people, not just the
flyers. So we're looking at a lot of those tasks, if you want
to call them additional duties, whether it's keeping the areas
that we work in that are highly classified open and having
somebody to do that, rather than requiring an aviator to do
that, we're getting at a lot of those tasks.
So the quality of life will continue to rise. So as we get
them home, that 10-month/5-year vignette, that's just not all
combat operations. It's a significant portion of that, but it's
all the other training they're doing off-station that we're
trying to free up back at home.
Senator Blumenthal. And if I could ask just one more
question, please? In terms of continuing proficiency, the
administrative duties, personnel tempo, when someone comes home
they want to stay proficient, ready, are they getting enough
time actually in the air flying?
Lieutenant General Nowland. Sir, it varies by weapon
system. But the answer is we are working to increase weapon
system sustainment. This is where our maintainers come in. We
have a minimum number of sorties per month that we need to fly
pilots to consider them mission ready, and we are driving our
maintenance to try to increase our utilization rate so we can
fly pilots more, because that minimum number should be the
floor, not the ceiling. We want to be above that number to
increase our readiness, and we are driving towards a
utilization rate, with additional maintainers and more weapons
systems sustainment funding, which we've done. We're moving in
that direction. The trends are going in the right direction,
but we're not where we want to be right now.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. Thank you all very, very
much for your service and for being so forthcoming today.
And thanks to the Chair.
Senator Cotton. Senator King?
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We've talked a lot about retention. I'd just note, General,
you made the point that whatever the bonus is, it's a lot less
than $11 million, which is the cheapest training, the training
you don't have to do because you've got somebody who is already
trained. So I think that's got to be part of our calculus as we
talk about this.
Again, talking a bit about the shortage, I understand that
there is an excess of pilots on the mobility side, and I was
wondering if there was any effort or plans or thought being
given to shifting pilots from mobility over to where you are
facing the shortages.
Lieutenant General Nowland. Senator King, that's a great
question. The mobility excess pilots we have moved into our
training architecture. So as we looked at our overall
operational training infrastructure, it also deals with manning
our T-38s, T-6 squadrons, and UPT [undergraduate pilot
training]. And as we became shorter on fighter pilots, we took
fighter pilots out of the training infrastructure and moved
them into unique fighter pilot jobs. So mobility pilots have
moved into that training function.
We have a very small number, but we have moved some
mobility pilots who went through T-38s into a fighter cockpit.
But that's a very small number because a specialized UPT, the
vast majority of our pilots who have gone through T-1 training
go into the mobility world, and they've not formed T-38s.
Senator King. Are bonuses being paid to mobility pilots
even though there's an excess?
Lieutenant General Nowland. Well, there's not really--it
depends on what you mean by excess. We're still short of our
overall pilot numbers, and we're still taking risk in our
training infrastructure, and the mobility pilots are also going
to be short like fighter pilots here. Air Mobility Command
tells us by 2020 we will start to lose them.
Our pilot retention, our pilot numbers are based upon a 65
percent take rate. Unfortunately, our mobility pilots are not
at that rate. They're below 65 percent. But we've been living
off of over-producing mobility pilots in years 7, 8, 9, 10.
Senator King. You had an excess but the excess is being
worked down, is what you're saying.
Lieutenant General Nowland. We are using all of our pilots
to the maximum extent capability. It's just we filled our
mobility pilots; they're filling other functions. So I think
we're saying the same thing. Over time, our mobility excess
that is allowing us to do our training function will degrade
and will be gone, and then we'll have to figure out how we're
going to fill our training cockpits.
Senator King. Let me talk about a related, not the same but
a related issue, and that's UAV [unmanned aerial vehicle]
pilots. My understanding is that we're now in a world of using
enlisted personnel as UAV pilots, at least with the Global
Hawk. What about Predators and Reapers? How is that working?
Have you found any diminution of quality using enlisted people
in these slots? Because we were stressing out the regular
pilots, as I understand it. Has that change been implemented,
and to what extent has it been successful?
Lieutenant General Nowland. Senator King, this is a
fabulous question. I love this question. Our RPA [remotely
piloted aircraft] pilots, we are moving enlisted pilots into
our RQ4 community, because what we found is that in our RQ4
community it's very similar to what we did in space, the way
we're operating. They have not arrived there yet, sir. They're
going through the training pipeline right now. So our first
batch is going through the pipeline. We now have the next
batch. We just had our second batch of enlisted pilots who have
been selected and now are starting down the track to be
enlisted RPA pilots.
Our MQ1s and MQ9s--our MQ1 fleet we're going to retire. Our
MQ9 is going to be essentially our new platform. We don't have
the enlisted aviators in MQ9s right now, sir.
Senator King. What's the MQ9?
Lieutenant General Nowland. The MQ9, it is the Reaper.
Senator King. That's the Reaper, okay.
Lieutenant General Nowland. Yes, sir. We have the Predator,
which is the MQ1, which we are eliminating, and the MQ9, the
Reaper.
Senator King. So you have no enlisted people in the Reaper
program. Are you planning to move in that direction?
Lieutenant General Nowland. We have enlisted people in the
Reaper program, sir. They're just not pilots. We have a pilot,
we have a sensor operator, and they are a team, and they work
side by side.
Senator King. Will you have enlisted pilots in the Reaper
program?
Lieutenant General Nowland. At this time, Senator, what
we're doing is we are looking and evaluating. As we go down
this road, we're going to evaluate all options in the future.
But the first thing is we need to get our enlisted aviators
into the RQ4 and see how they go.
Right now, our training pipeline is pretty much set. This
year we're going to train over 300 RPA operators. Whether
they're an officer or enlisted, you still have to train 300 RPA
pilots. So there really is no advantage one way or the other
right now. We've got time to make this decision down the road,
sir.
Senator King. I commend--again, we've got to think very
creatively about how we fill this shortfall, and if the
enlisted people can do this job effectively, that's another
resource that at least being able to reallocate trained fighter
pilots into fighters.
The B-21, are the requirements for the B-21 locked down, no
more good ideas?
Lieutenant General Bunch. Yes, sir. We locked the
requirements down before we went into--General Welch did.
Before General Welch, we continue to keep them under General
Goldfein. General Goldfein has made it crystal clear to the two
of us that he is the chief requirements officer for the Air
Force, and if we want to change anything in those requirements,
particularly in the KPP, key performance parameter, he needs to
know about it and he needs to approve it.
Our intent all along has been to keep those locked down so
that we would not increase costs. We could control. One of the
things that I talk about, I believe one of the key things we
did on the program was we put cost as a key performance
parameter for what we wanted, and I viewed that as serving as
an appetite suppressant. It caused everyone not to try to add
additional things. It caused everybody to use what we had, and
we built it in a way that we can increase its capability over
time because of the open modular system that we designed as the
backbone for the platform.
Senator King. And as you know, we have an interesting
contract, which I think is a creative solution to the risk
problem of 70 percent fixed, 30 percent cost plus. But that 30
percent could explode if we start redesigning the platform in
the middle of the construction process.
Lieutenant General Bunch. It's been a key factor for us,
sir, that we're looking at. There are a couple of things we
didn't want to get into the B-2. We rewrote the requirements
after we awarded the contract and we redesigned the platform.
We don't want to go there. That's why holding the requirements
so stable is so critical to us.
Senator King. I like hearing you say we don't want to go
there. I'd rather have you say we will not go.
Lieutenant General Bunch. No. I apologize, sir. We're not
going there.
Senator King. Thank you.
Lieutenant General Bunch. We're not going there.
Senator King. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Senator Cotton. I want to return to Senator King's
questions about RPAs, and I want to ascend above the enlisted
question for a moment. We'll return to that, though.
Last year, Secretary James recommended an RPA get well plan
that included over 140 specific actions. General Nowland, how
many of those actions have been completed, and when will they
all be completed?
Lieutenant General Nowland. We call that the cultural
process improvement program. The exact numbers, I'll have to
consult or get back to you; I don't know. The most important
part of it, though, was the deployment to dwell and the crew
ratios, Mr. Chairman, and we've reached over a 10.1 crew ratio.
We've had a series of initiatives.
In my previous job I was the 12th Air Force Commander, so I
was intimately familiar with this. We've had a series of
initiatives to try to normalize what we call life at Creech Air
Force Base in Northwest Las Vegas, and those initiatives have
gone through. The morale at Creech is good because we now have
the crew ratios where we are driving to what we call a deploy
to dwell, so that the pilots will actually have time to come
out of combat sorties and go into training sorties. This is so
important for us, because we are learning that our MQ9s are
force multipliers.
One vignette. On the most sophisticated sortie we do at the
weapons school, which is weapon school integration, they always
have an exercise where they have personnel recovery of a downed
airman. The RPA, the MQ9 crew, when it operates in that role,
is a perfect, perfect example of how you integrate all the
information in and then get it to Sandy-1, who is the A-10 that
is doing the actual job of rescuing the pilot, because they can
have situational awareness, coordinate all activities.
So we're learning that there's multiple functions for these
weapons systems as we move forward. The exact number, sir, on
CPIP [Culture Process Improvement Program], I will get back to
you, but we are progressing in a very good fashion.
Senator Cotton. General Harris, did you have an answer to
that question?
Lieutenant General Harris. Not to the number. We closed out
on the 140, but we are more than halfway through that program.
Last time I left the dance at Air Combat Command, we were
executing that, so we will get back to you on that.
Senator Cotton. That's fine. Just please get it to us for
the record.
How are we doing on pilot production for the MQ1 and MQ9 as
a whole, putting aside the question of the division of labor,
or the potential division of labor between officer and
enlisted?
Lieutenant General Nowland. Yes, sir. For Fiscal Year 2016,
MQ1 and MQ9, we produced 252. We forecasted 271. So we were a
little short of what we wanted to do. But we also did foreign
military sales with 35, and we hit all 35 of those pilots as we
moved forward.
The 271, the reason we were a little short had to do with a
little bit of weather. It also had to do with some maintenance
and student proficiency, and that's pretty normal as you're
going through to meet your productions. As we forecast to the
future, in 2017, we're expecting to produce 346 MQ1 and MQ9,
although we have closed our MQ1 RTU now. We are moving
exclusively to MQ9.
Senator Cotton. Three-hundred and forty-six you said?
Lieutenant General Nowland. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cotton. Does that meet the standard we need for a
healthy force in the RPA community?
Lieutenant General Nowland. Yes, Mr. Chairman. We've got a
very good number now on where we're moving forward. We are
driving to a 14-to-1 crew ratio, which will really enable us to
start training, and that's part of the CPIP. We also are
looking forward to opening another wing at Shaw Air Force Base
as we grow the capability. So that will enable us to do the
transition as we move over and manage our force.
Senator Cotton. Two years ago in the NDAA, the committee
authorized bonuses of up to $35,000 for these pilots. My
understanding is that the bonus was at $25,000 for some time,
but it recently may have gone to $35,000. Is that correct?
Lieutenant General Harris. Yes, it has. We expect to start
paying that out this year. It's the initial air crew that are
now coming up being bonus eligible. So to this point it hasn't
mattered. They're still on that first commitment that they
haven't been eligible for it. We expect it to help.
But, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to explain. We will look at how
these people are being retained, because some of the
contractors that we're currently competing with are paying
upwards of $40,000 a month for these RP operators to come off
of Active Duty and to go fly other missions associated with
what they're doing. So again, we will never, even with our RPA
team, compete with the prices that are available on the
commercial market, but getting back to that quality of life,
opening a new base at Shaw, the mission accomplishment, the
sense of being a part of the team is everything that we're
putting into the CPIP program to retain these fantastic
aviators.
Senator Cotton. Finally, to return to Senator King's
specific question about enlisted personnel and tie a bow on it
exactly, in the Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA we directed Air Force to
transition a significant number of those pilots to enlisted
personnel by fiscal year 2020, and to Guard and Reserve by
fiscal year 2023. Will you complete that transition and
compliance with the Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA?
Lieutenant General Harris. Yes, sir. We are on track to
meet that. That was specific to the Global Hawk, the RQ4, and
we think we are on track at this time. So the first students,
as you heard, are graduating this year and will start rolling
through the mission. We will continue in that process, and as
we learn more about how the enlisted team are doing in this, we
will then take that information and consider do we move that
into the next RPA platform, maybe an MQ9.
But again, they're employed differently, so that is a value
judgment we'll have to look at as we understand how well these
airmen are doing, and right now in the training they're doing
outstanding.
Senator Cotton. So you take it as an open question at this
point whether we should have enlisted personnel in the future
acting as pilots for MQ9s, to be considered in the future based
in light of the evidence we'll acquire during the transition
for the Global Hawk?
Lieutenant General Harris. Yes, sir.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
Senator King?
Senator King. Just one follow-up on the B-21. Whatever we
build will be obsolete the day it comes off the line, and
therefore I hope that the design takes that into account and
will allow modular replacement upgrades, software, in some
cases hardware, so that the platform itself can be maintained
but that its capabilities can be modernized as technology
develops. Is that the design concept, General?
Lieutenant General Bunch. Sir, that was a fundamental
design concept. We went with the open mission systems
architecture for the software so that everything would have an
interface and we could advance technology as it evolved or we
could make changes as adversaries evolved. We also designed the
aircraft with additional power, electrical air conditioning in
space in key areas that we may need to utilize so that we can
grow the platform for the future.
Senator King. So if you have to add one cable, there's a
place for it.
Lieutenant General Bunch. If we need to add something, sir,
we've got areas that we can do that. If we need to change out a
component, if it ties into the open system architecture, we can
do that. We can do it and keep competition in the platform for
the life of the platform, and we can do it in a more efficient
manner because we won't have to test as much, and I personally
believe it will increase our cyber security as we go through
that process.
Senator King. Excellent. I hope that you'll keep in touch
with the committee on that project as it moves forward. I think
it's one of the most important that we have, that the Air Force
and the government is undertaking, and I hope we can have a
continuing dialogue on that.
Lieutenant General Bunch. Sir, we welcome that. We are
committed to complete transparency with the appropriately
cleared individuals on all the defense committees. We have been
working with the defense committees for four years before we
awarded the contract so that everyone knew what we were trying
to do, and we're balancing all other transmissions to the
public and what we can communicate against the security and the
risks involved so that we can be as transparent as possible
with the American public as well.
Senator King. But you feel at this point the contract and
the development is on track?
Lieutenant General Bunch. Sir, I get monthly updates. We've
done our initial baseline review. We've completed the
preliminary design review. We're going into detailed design
review. The contractor is hiring people at the appropriate
level to get the work done, and we're tracking what they're
doing. Everything right now indicates to me that we haven't
slipped anything.
Senator King. Gentlemen, thank you very much for your
testimony. It's been very illuminating, and we look forward to
working with you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cotton. Let me ask maybe a broader philosophical
question about the B-21, but also especially what we've learned
over the last 25 years.
General Bunch, do you think, from a development
perspective, it's best to develop prototypes and have a fly-
before-you-buy methodology for large and complex systems like
these aircraft?
Lieutenant General Bunch. It depends, in my experience, on
how you set up the prototype project to go. I believe the best
thing we can do, and I think the B-21 is an example of this,
whether you build an exact prototype, I think a robust tech
maturation and risk reduction phase is critical. If you recall,
in that program we invested in the B-21 program with multiple
contractors for quite a few years before we awarded a contract
so that they could develop the technologies, mature those
technologies. We were more informed buyers, and we had
everything almost up to the preliminary design review before we
awarded the contract. That cost us money up-front to be able to
do it, but it also made the technology much more mature and
made it much better for us to do.
There are areas, though, that we can prototype and we can
go procure straight out of that. That's an area we're trying to
do with some of our experimentation campaigns to see what the
art of the possible is there, and the Congress has been very
willing to give us rapid prototyping and rapid filling
authorities that we will employ in those opportunities where
that arises.
Senator Cotton. Developmental planning experimentation
prototyping used to be resident in the Air Force's systems
command, which was disbanded 25 years ago. Since then we've had
struggles with programs like the B-2, the F-22, the C-17, the
F-35. Do you think it's a coincidence that that command was
disbanded and we've had these struggles since then, or is it a
cause?
Lieutenant General Bunch. Sir, I wouldn't tie it directly
to the way that we reorganized to go to Air Force materiel
command from systems command or logistics command. What I will
say, we the Air Force, we let that developmental planning skill
atrophy. That's something that our chief, General Welch, and
Secretary James viewed as something we needed to get refocused
on, and they believe we need to do more experimentation and
more of that type of prototyping activity to see what
technology can do so that we can respond more rapidly.
I believe they made a real strong commitment to that when
they started budgeting $100 million a year into the budget so
that we could have it for experimentation and for developmental
planning. They stood up an office that's in Air Force materiel
command that leads those efforts for us.
So I believe our stepping away and letting that atrophy as
we looked at capabilities and technology hurt us more than a
reorg. We're refocused on that, and we're invested in those
areas to see what technology can do so that we make wise
investments.
Senator Cotton. So an atrophy of skill sets more so than a
reorganization?
Lieutenant General Bunch. That is my view, sir. I believe
it was an atrophy of skill sets and a loss of, a lack of
importance placed on that as we moved forward, and we needed to
refocus on those efforts.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
General Nowland, I want to speak about force structure,
capacity. I mentioned in my opening statement General Hoog's
remarks from 2014 about Air Force capacity. In response to this
situation, in the NDAA a couple of years ago we directed the
Air Force maintain a minimum inventory of 1,900 total fighter
aircraft and 1,100 combat coded fighters. Do those numbers
enable the Air Force to meet combatant commanders' demands and
execute our national defense strategy today?
Lieutenant General Nowland. Mr. Chairman, that's a
fantastic question. If you were to think about our 55 fighter
squadrons, the seven years of declining budgets have caused
cracks within those. So we are working on our chief's number-
one priority of strengthening the squadrons. By strengthening
the squadrons, we see fantastic results. I just returned from
Jordan, where we have an F-15E squadron that is doing fantastic
work. It's about to drop its 5,000th bomb in the war against
Isis, because it has all its manning and it has the weapon
system support.
So when we strengthen all of them, and if we could
strengthen all of our squadrons to be at the maximum capacity,
we can absolutely execute the national defense strategy, but we
would be very tight if you think about the changes that have
happened with our adversary. That's why the Air Force would
like to grow to 60 fighter squadrons, and we would also like to
build some attack squadrons in the future.
But in the end, Mr. Chairman, we can execute the strategy.
But to be perfectly honest, it will be great airmen that will
make it happen, and we'll do it on the back of our airmen.
Senator Cotton. So Congress did so with an intent to stem
further divestment in combat air power, and sometimes Congress
can act as a blunt instrument, not a fine scalpel. So given
that intent, can you tell us what the Air Force's actual
requirement today is for total fighter aircraft and for total
combat coded aircraft?
General Harris, you look like you'd like to answer.
Lieutenant General Harris. I would. As part of the
requirements, sir, one of the things we're looking at is we
think the 1,900 number is a bare minimum at the floor. We think
it's probably closer to 2,100, a little above that for our
fighter aircraft so that we can maintain probably 60 squadrons.
We don't want to grow to 60 now and still have a broken force
or a force that is not as ready as it can be. We want to fix
the 55 we have. We are not planning to go below the 1,900. We
are struggling with the way the budget is rolling out to us to
maintain that in the long term, but we do understand the task
of the NDAA. We do not intend to go below the 1,900. We will
keep our 55 squadrons. We will grow them healthy if we are able
to get a stable, predictable budget that comes to us and
continue to improve along that line.
Lieutenant General Bunch. It's a complicated answer.
Senator Cotton. A simple question, complicated answer
maybe?
Lieutenant General Bunch. Fifty-five fighter squadrons. We
would like to have 24 aircraft per squadron, and that's
probably our most efficient use of those airplanes. Fifty-five
times 24 is not 1,900. It is slightly above that number. Where
we believe we have some of that change is some of our aircraft,
our squadrons are manned at 18 airplanes per squadron. So
that's what drives some of these changes----
Senator Cotton. Is that a concession to budgetary
necessity?
Lieutenant General Bunch. It really is. If we were
unconstrained, we would have every squadron with 24 combat
coded airplanes, plus a couple of backup or BAI spares, which
is common in each one of these units, so if you lose an
airplane you have it available already maintained and ready to
go, employed on a daily basis.
Senator Cotton. Okay. General Bunch, I need to ask about
the UH1 November helicopter replacement program. There's a
little bit of history here. Last year you submitted an out-of-
cycle request to Chairman McCain for authorization to use
provisions of the Economy Act of 1932 to purchase UH-60 Mike
Model helicopters on the Army's contract. These aircraft would
be replacements for our aging November model helicopters used
for the ICBM missile fields security and other utility missions
as determined by the commander of STRATCOM [Strategic Command].
The committee agreed, and we passed that request and
authorization in the Senate version of the NDAA. Afterwards,
the Air Force reversed that decision and decided to proceed
with the full and open competition, and then after receiving
responses from potential offerors on the draft request for
proposals, the Air Force determined none of the offerors,
including the 60 Mike Model, met the requirements for the
program.
What was the reason the Air Force rescinded the request for
authorization to use the provisions of the Economy Act when
your own business case analysis showed that the course of
action met the requirement and provided the best value for the
taxpayer?
Lieutenant General Bunch. Sir, the Department made a
decision based on the amount of money that we were going to
move into the year that we needed to----
Senator Cotton. The Department of Air Force or the
Department of Defense?
Lieutenant General Bunch. The Department of Defense made a
decision based on the amount of money we were going to need to
move into those areas, and we were going on a full and open
competition from that point forward.
Senator Cotton. Have requirements changed from the time the
decision was made to use the Economy Act until the draft RFP
[request for proposal] was opened for full and open?
Lieutenant General Bunch. Sir, let me take that. I don't
believe we changed the requirements from that point forward. We
did not.
Senator Cotton. General Harris----
Lieutenant General Bunch. We did not. He's the requirements
guy, and I'm the----
Senator Cotton. You're shaking your heads. Can you answer
for the record?
Lieutenant General Harris. The requirements did not change.
Yes, sir.
Senator Cotton. Okay.
General Nowland, I understand that the commander of
STRATCOM has rescinded the request for forces to provide
additional security since mitigation measures have been in
place to satisfy his security concerns. Do these mitigation
measures now supplant entirely the need to recapitalize----
Lieutenant General Bunch. They do not, sir. They do not
change the need to replace the UH1.
Lieutenant General Nowland. Sir, I'll pitch in also, Mr.
Chairman. What they've done is they've done tactic techniques
and procedures and had airmen that have been able to. It does
not replace the need to replace the airplane. The requirements
are still valid. It's just that the airmen have figured out a
way to meet the requirements, but it's a band-aid type of
solution. We need new aircraft for that mission set.
Lieutenant General Bunch. Chairman Cotton, our nuclear
arsenal remains secure, and we're able to execute the mission,
but we still need the recap. We still need to get those in.
We're doing a draft RFP in April. We will do the final RFP this
summer. We'll award a contract next year. We plan to field
helicopters in the 2020 to 2021 timeframe, sir, depending on
what the winner comes in with.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
I have one final question about the budget, which will
probably tie a bow on it. My first question, the constraints of
a CR in the short term. This is going to be facing the long
term, General Harris. You have many large, long-term
procurement programs over the next decade. We touched on some
of those but not all of them, nuclear enterprise modernization,
F-35A, KC-46A, the B-21, JSTARS, the TXT-38 replacement, the
Presidential aircraft replacement, and now there's growing
discussion of a penetrating counter-air and associated
capability required to outpace our strategic competitors in the
realm of air superiority.
I think it's safe to say that these represent hundreds of
billions of dollars required to recapitalize and modernize the
Air Force and remain ahead of our near-peer competitors. Have
you received indications from the new administration that the
Air Force budget modernization program will support all of
these modernization programs?
Lieutenant General Harris. Yes, sir, we have. We continue
to ensure that those modernization programs, which are large,
continue to fit into the budget and the planning cycle that we
have. So that's the work that my team does on a day-in and day-
out basis. We're doing as much as we can in parallel to solve
as many problems as we can, and then we will also continue to
modernize the current fleets and assets to make sure that we
can sustain the capacity that we have and not drop below any of
the requirements over the long term.
So it is part parallel, part serial to get at what you're
rightly pointing out are some of the concerns we have with the
large budget of the future. The best thing we can get out of
Congress is a stable budget that predicts, allows us to have a
good prediction of where we will be in the future, and then we
can right-size our acquisition and our approach to that to make
sure we're getting the best value we can.
Senator Cotton. General Bunch, General Nowland, do you have
anything to add to General Harris' answer?
Lieutenant General Bunch. I do not, sir.
Lieutenant General Nowland. Mr. Chairman, the modernization
byway that we face is critical, and Congress and working with
everyone, it's critical to our operators to give our airmen the
best chance of success. We are also thinking about how do we
out-think our enemy. It's multi-domain operations. We need to
think about how we operate in space, cyber, air domain, land,
maritime domain, and bring joint effects to the battlefield.
I know we focus on all the money and how we're doing it,
but what we're really going to do is enable our airmen to think
multi-domain of how we can defeat our enemy who has watched us
for 26 years and is working to defeat us. So we're going to
out-think our enemy while we simultaneously, with your help,
reestablish and renew our weapons systems.
Senator Cotton. General Bunch?
Lieutenant General Bunch. Chairman Cotton, what I want to
stress is our role as the acquisition, we have to do that
efficiently and effectively to maximize the use of those
dollars to get that capability, and our most important
treasure, our airmen, America's sons and daughters, that were
entrusted to provide that equipment and have a decided
advantage on the battlefield, which, as you've talked about
earlier, we do not have as much as we did before. That has
atrophied away, and we need to continue to go after that.
That's our commitment in the acquisition community to do that
each and every day.
Senator Cotton. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you very much
for your time and your views. This has been a very wide-ranging
and informative hearing. We appreciate your service to our
country, and on behalf of all the airmen you represent, thank
you for their service as well.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:02 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
compass call
1. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Bunch and Lieutenant General
Harris, where does the Air Force stand in moving out on its plan for
re-hosting Compass Call? Can the process be accelerated?
Lieutenant General Bunch. The Air Force is ready to begin the
COMPASS CALL re-host; however, it is one of the many new start programs
the Air Force cannot begin due to the Continuing Resolution (CR). The
Air Force will move out on the COMPASS CALL re-host plan following the
enactment of the Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2017. The Air Force
is weighing options to accelerate the COMPASS CALL re-host program
against fiscal constraints & production capacity.
Lieutenant General Harris. The Air Force is poised to begin the
COMPASS CALL re-host; however, it is one of the many new start programs
that the Air Force cannot begin due to the current Continuing
Resolution (CR). The COMPASS CALL re-host is currently on the Chief of
Staff's Unfunded Priority List and the Air Force plans to quickly move
out on the COMPASS CALL re-host plan once an Appropriations Act for
Fiscal Year 2017 is passed.
jstars recap
2. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Bunch, given the operational
demand for these platforms and the cost of keeping the legacy airframes
flying, assuming Congress provides the resources, can you assure me the
Air Force will make a decision and move this program forward by making
a contract award in fiscal year 2017?
Lieutenant General Bunch. Currently, the Air Force does not plan to
award the JSTARS Recap Engineering and Manufacturing (EMD) contract in
fiscal year 2017. EMD source selection began on 2 March 2017. Any
source selection timeline is speculative at this point because source
selection is a data driven event, but source selection will likely span
well into fiscal year 2018.
3. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Bunch, is JSTARS recap
vulnerable to delay should Congress fail to pass a Defense
Appropriations bill for fiscal year 2017?
Lieutenant General Bunch. Yes, failure to pass the fiscal year 2017
Defense Appropriations bill will affect the JSATRS Recap Radar Risk
Reduction effort and put Initial Operational Capability in fiscal year
2024 at risk.
4. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Bunch, could the Air Force
accelerate the program once the winning bid is determined?
Lieutenant General Bunch. The JSTARS Recap program is paced by the
selected vendor's proposed schedule and funding. If there are
opportunities to accelerate, the Air Force will brief the Congressional
Defense Committees as directed in the fiscal year 2017 NDAA.
5. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Bunch and Lieutenant General
Harris, do you agree that JSTARS Recap is a top modernization priority
and that further delay has a negative impact on COCOM requirements?
Lieutenant General Bunch. Yes, the Air Force is committed to
accelerating IOC/FOC. However, until establishment of the program
baseline with the selected contractor at Milestone B, the Air Force
will focus on setting the conditions necessary to accelerate if
opportunities become available. Shortly after the EMD contract award,
the Air Force will provide a report outlining accelerated schedules and
funding profiles.
Lieutenant General Harris. Yes. Multi-Domain Command and Control
(MDC2) is the Chief of Staff of the Air Force's third focus area and
critical for future operations. The Air Force remain committed to
JSTARS Recap, which is currently under source selection as of 2 March.
Contract award, scheduled for fiscal year 2018, will identify any
potential acceleration options.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
adversary air to air and surface to air capability
6. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Bunch, Lieutenant General
Nowland, Lieutenant General Harris, we never want a fair fight with
adversary, let alone a fight were we are potentially outranged.
Reported advances in very long range air-to-air missiles, and surface-
to-air missiles from Russia and China threaten to do just that. What
technologies should we focus on for success of our 5th Generation and
4th Gen aircraft (including High Value Airborne Assets) in this
environment?
Lieutenant General Bunch. The U.S. Air Force is currently
performing research on advanced capabilities Air-to-Air missiles for
future demonstration, including work on sensors, fusing, warhead and
propulsion. Our research goals include: high loadout and sortie
effectiveness for potential future engagements and High Energy Density
Propulsion for longer range in smaller volume. Our efforts in directed
energy weapons (DEWs) may provide an improved capability by damaging/
destroying the seeker components at longer ranges and with greater
capacity.
Lieutenant General Nowland and Lieutenant General Harris. The Air
Force chartered the Air Superiority 2030 Enterprise Capability
Collaboration Team (ECCT) to provide a holistic approach to develop
capability options to enable joint force Air Superiority in the highly
contested environment of 2030 and beyond. Advances to long range air-
to-air missiles and surface-to-air missiles are a part of this
environment that we describe as Anti-Access Area Denial (A2AD). The Air
Superiority 2030 ECCT determined that there is no single capability or
technology that provides a ``silver bullet'' solution. Rather, to
achieve Air Superiority against the threats you describe and the A2AD
environment we need to develop a family of capabilities that operate in
and across air, space, and cyberspace domains. This family must include
both stand-off and stand-in forces, integrated and networked to achieve
mission effects. Additionally, the speed of capability development and
fielding will be critical to retain the U.S. advantage in the air.
awacs radar modernization
7. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Bunch, Lieutenant General
Nowland, Lieutenant General Harris, the Air Force continues to upgrade
legacy assets with sensor enhancements, such as AESA radars for F-15s
and F-16s. What is the plan to upgrade AWACS sensor capability, which
has not been upgraded since the completion of the Radar System
Improvement Program (RSIP) in December of 2000?
Lieutenant General Bunch. The AWACS sensor suite is anchored by the
S Band Radar, but it also relies on a Passive Detection System (PDS)
and an Identification Friend or Foe (IFF)/Selective Identification
Feature (SIF) system. In the near term, the USAF is upgrading the S
Band RSIP radar through the Electronic Protection program, which adds
an adjunct processor to increase performance in an electronic attack
environment. The Next Generation Identification Friend or Foe (NGIFF)
program also widens the IFF/SIF capability by including Modes 5 and S.
Furthermore, the Combat ID program upgrades the existing capability to
provide a persistent Airborne Moving Target Indication Battle
Management Command & Control (AMTI BMC2) combat ID in support of the
kill chain. Finally, the PDS is reinforced by the enhanced computer
processing provided by the Block 40/45 program.
Lieutenant General Nowland and Lieutenant General Harris. Air Force
has begun the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
(JCIDS) process for the air-to-air Battle Management Command and
Control (BMC2) mission area. We completed a Capability Based Assessment
(CBA) in fiscal year 2016 (FY16) and are developing the Initial
Capabilities Document (ICD) for Advanced Battle Management and
Surveillance (ABMS). ABMS will be a revolutionary leap, not a recap,
driven by evolving threat and operational environments. The Air Force
will make a decision on the way-forward in fiscal year 2020, based on
the outcome of an Analysis of Alternatives (AOA).
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Donnelly
strategic missiles--commonality and collaboration
8. Senator Donnelly. Lieutenant General Harris, the Air Force is
undertaking a tremendous effort to both sustain and modernize its
strategic missile systems, including the Minuteman III programed depot
maintenance effort and the development of the Ground Based Strategic
Deterrent as the next generation intercontinental ballistic missile. As
we look ahead, nuclear sustainment, life extension and modernization
efforts will require the Defense Department to manage a significant--
though I believe necessary--degree of cost and risk across multiple
programs. General Harris, is the Air Force committed to working with
the Navy to enhance commonality across U.S. strategic missile systems
when such an approach will reduce cost and risk?
Lieutenant General Harris. Yes, the Air Force remains committed to
pursuing smart strategic missile commonality not only with the Navy,
but with mission partners in related areas such a ballistic missile
defense, space launch, command and control, and cyber resilient
software. In March 2016, a Joint Air Force/Navy team completed an
assessment of potential opportunities for commonality between the
Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) and Trident missile programs.
The findings of this study were subsequently incorporated into the GBSD
acquisition strategy. The Air Force will continue to work with the Navy
and others to lower GBSD program costs and risks while meeting
operational and schedule requirements.
9. Senator Joe Donnelly. Lieutenant General Harris, is the Air
Force committed to maximize the sharing of information, best practices
and services with the Navy to reduce cost and risk and avoid the
duplication of effort as we undertake major Triad modernization
programs over the next several decades?
Lieutenant General Harris. Yes, the Air Force is committed to
making technologies and processes developed for GBSD available to the
Navy and Department of Defense mission partners to inform other Triad
modernization programs.
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