[Senate Hearing 115-669]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 115-669
PRIORITIES AND CHALLENGES IN
THE U.S.-TURKEY RELATIONSHIP
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 6, 2017
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
BOB CORKER, Tennessee, Chairman
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
MARCO RUBIO, Florida ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
CORY GARDNER, Colorado TOM UDALL, New Mexico
TODD, YOUNG, Indiana CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming TIM KAINE, Virginia
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
RAND PAUL, Kentucky CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey
Todd Womack, Staff Director
Jessica Lewis, Democratic Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator from Tennessee.................... 1
Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., U.S. Senator from Maryland............. 2
Cook, Dr. Steven A., Eni Enrico Mattei Senior Fellow for Middle
East and Africa Studies, Council on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC................................................. 4
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Responses to Additional Questions from Senator Menendez...... 31
Sloat, Dr. Armanda, Fellow for Democracy in Hard Places
Initiative, Harvard Kennedy School, Cambridge, MA.............. 9
Prepared statement........................................... 11
Responses to Additional Questions from Senator Menendez...... 31
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Letter Submitted by Amnesty International........................ 33
(iii)
PRIORITIES AND CHALLENGES IN THE
U.S.-TURKEY RELATIONSHIP
----------
SEPTEMBER 6, 2017
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:30 a.m. in
Room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Bob Corker,
chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Corker [presiding], Risch, Gardner,
Young, Cardin, Coons, Murphy, Kaine, Markey, and Merkley.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE
The Chairman. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee will
come to order.
We thank our witnesses for being here.
Since serving beside the United States in the Korean War
and then joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in
1952, Turkey has proven itself to be a strong ally and
important partner to the United States.
We continue to see positive day-to-day cooperation on
security issues in and around the Republic of Turkey.
Yet, our relationship has not always been as productive as
we in the United States might like. For example, in 2003, the
Turkish Government refused to allow the United States military
to operate from a NATO base in Incirlik, Turkey.
In the last year, many of us in America have grown
increasingly concerned about our partnership with Turkey. After
the failed coup, the Turkish Government arrested tens of
thousands of people, instituted a state of emergency that keeps
dissidents in legal limbo, and otherwise cracked down on the
free press.
Innocent Americans also have been caught up in these
repressive acts, including Andrew Brunson, a well-regarded
American pastor who has been imprisoned in Turkey for 334 days.
His continued mistreatment speaks volumes and raises serious
questions about whether or not it is safe to live in or even
visit Turkey.
I have repeatedly raised Mr. Brunson's case with top
officials in both the Obama and Trump administrations and
joined Ranking Member Cardin on February 15 in making a direct
request to President Erdogan that Mr. Brunson be released and
allowed to return to the United States.
Erdogan has not only domestically acted against
journalists, opposition leaders, and innocent Americans, he has
rebuffed his allies internationally. Last month, Turkey agreed
to give Russia $2.5 billion in return for surface-to-air
missiles that are incompatible with NATO's systems.
These developments require that the United States work to
preserve our important relationship with Turkey while
reassessing ways to address differences that threaten close
ties between our countries.
In that spirit, I look forward to hearing from our
witnesses about the challenges we face with Turkey and how we
can improve this important relationship.
I want to thank you again for being here. And I want to
thank our ranking member for the way that he works with me on
this committee, for his service, and I hope he had a good
recess. We look forward to your comments.
STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND
Senator Cardin. Mr. Chairman, I missed you during the last
5 weeks. So it is good to be back. It is good to see you. You
were telling me about the Rotary Club speech you gave.
The Chairman. I actually was not telling you about it. You
were asking me about it. And I think it is time to move on to
our witnesses. [Laughter.]
Senator Cardin. But it is good to be back. I was just going
to comment that it has been an active period in regards to
world events that impact our committee. We know today we will
get an all-members classified briefing on North Korea and
Afghanistan, and they are going to be very important issues
that we have to take up during the fall, particularly the
current situation in North Korea.
We understand the limit of a military option, and I think
the President's comments have made it even more challenging for
us to use diplomacy in the manner that could bring about a
change in behavior in North Korea.
And then, just yesterday, I was reading the comments of
Ambassador Haley as it relates to Iran, which may very well
require this committee to get more engaged in Iran.
We have a very busy agenda. And I want to thank you for
holding this hearing on Turkey because I agree with you. Turkey
is a critically important partner of the United States. It is a
country that we look upon to help us in our counterterrorism
activities. It is a NATO partner. We have an important
relationship with Turkey in regards to our efforts of defeating
ISIS to ending the war in Syria, dealing with refugee outflows
from the Middle East, pushing back on Iran, strengthening NATO,
addressing Russia's activities in Europe, not to mention our
economic partnerships between the United States and Turkey. So
we need Turkey working with us not against us.
There have been some very troubling developments. I first
mention Turkey's leader's repressive activities and human
rights abuses. There has been a state of emergency since last
year, the failed coup. And the United States strongly opposes
the coup. We believe democratic countries do change in
governments through the ballot not through military activities.
But since that failed coup, we have seen the leadership of
Turkey take actions that are very troubling: seizure of private
assets, the dismissal of thousands of civil servants, the
detaining of tens of thousands in pretrial detention. Mr.
Chairman, you mentioned the ongoing detention of Pastor Andrew
Brunson and two Amnesty International staff. That is
outrageous. I would ask consent that the statement from Amnesty
International be made part of our record.
The Chairman. Without objection.
[The material submitted by Amnesty International is located
at the end of this hearing transcript.]
Senator Cardin. Turkey is a democracy, and yet when you
look at how they have recently conducted their constitutional
referendum, it does not meet the standards of a democratic
country. It was not a free and fair referendum.
We have concerns. The people of Turkey deserve leaders who
will protect their democratic institutions.
Another troubling development is reports of the Turkish
Government considering the purchase of the S-400 missile
interceptor batteries from Russia. If that goes forward, it
seems like that is a possible violation of section 231 of the
Russian-Iran-North Korea sanctions bill.
There are a lot of issues that I think we need to take up,
and I appreciate very much that we have two very, very
distinguished witnesses, and we welcome both of you to the
committee. I do point out it is unfortunate that we cannot have
a government panel, an administration panel, here because,
quite frankly, the people who would normally be sitting at this
dais from the administration have not yet been nominated or
confirmed by the United States Senate.
Ambassador Bass, our distinguished ambassador, is now
heading to Afghanistan or at least he has been nominated to
Afghanistan. We need a confirmed ambassador in Turkey as part
of our strategy for the issues that we are going to be talking
about today.
So, Mr. Chairman, I am very happy we have two very
distinguished witnesses, but I am disappointed we do not have
the people in the administration who can appear before this
committee.
The Chairman. Well, thank you, and I appreciate you
working with me and other committee members, when we do get
nominations, to move them out as quickly as possible. And I was
glad that we were able to get a large number of them confirmed
before this last recess.
Our first witness today is Dr. Steven A. Cook, the Eni
Enrico Mattei Senior Fellow for Middle East and Africa Studies
at the Council on Foreign Relations. Our second witness is Dr.
Amanda Sloat, Fellow at the Democracy in Hard Places Initiative
at Harvard University. We want to thank you both for being here
in spite of the fact that you might not be here if we had
administration witnesses. We look forward to your expert
testimony. We appreciate your service in this way.
And if each of you would take about 5 minutes to summarize,
we would appreciate it, and then, as you know, we will be
asking questions. But if you would begin in the order
introduced, I would appreciate it.
STATEMENT OF DR. STEVEN A. COOK, ENI ENRICO MATTEI SENIOR
FELLOW FOR MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA STUDIES, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Cook. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Ranking
Member Cardin for the opportunity to appear before you today to
discuss priorities and challenges in the U.S.-Turkey
relationship.
Changes in Turkey, the United States, and global politics
since the end of the Cold War require a reevaluation of the
U.S.-Turkey relationship. As the President of the Council on
Foreign Relations, Richard Haass, recently asserted, ``Turkey
may be an ally, but it is not a partner.''
In the 15 years since the ruling Justice and Development
Party, known by its acronym AKP, came to power, it has provided
stability of a single-party government, and with that, Turks
have benefited from new economic opportunities, infrastructure
development, and improved access to health care.
There has been considerable political regression, though. A
little more than a decade since Turkey began membership
negotiations to join the European Union, it looks less like a
European democracy and more like an elected autocracy.
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's opponents have been routinely
subjected to coercion, intimidation, and violence. Since the
failed coup in July 2016, more than 200,000 people have been
detained, arrested, or fired from their jobs. Approximately 130
news outlets have been shuttered. Foreign journalists and
international and Turkish human rights professionals have also
been arrested. The ripple effect of this crackdown goes well
beyond those directly caught up in the purge, affecting entire
families and ruining the future prospects of many more.
The deepening of authoritarianism in Turkey has had grave
consequences for ideals that Americans hold dear, including
freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, freedom of the
press, and respect for human rights. It also has costs to the
bilateral relationship between the United States and Turkey.
President Erdogan's populism, nationalism, and authoritarianism
often manifests in hostility towards the United States and
results in policy choices that are at odds with American
interests and goals.
The list of American concerns is extensive, including the
potential Turkish purchase of Russia's S-400 air defense
system, government threats to rescind American access to
Incirlik Air Base, promises of military operations against the
PKK, a terrorist organization but in Iraq challenging Iraqi
sovereignty, potentially weakening Prime Minister Haider al-
Abadi, warming of relations between Ankara and Tehran, Turkey's
determination throughout much of the spring and early summer to
complicate American efforts to destroy the self-styled Islamic
State in Syria and its serious stronghold Raqqa because of the
American alliance with the People's Protection Units, known as
the YPG.
Now, the Turks do have a legitimate argument about the YPG
and its ties to terrorism, but Ankara played an important role
pushing the United States towards cooperation with this group
when the Turks refused to cooperate with the United States in
the fight against the Islamic State.
Washington's military ties with the YPG are also propelling
Turkey's relations with Tehran and Moscow.
The final source of tension is the venomous anti-American
discourse that Turkish officials and media outlets have
employed since the summer of 2016, as well as the treatment of
Americans both inside and outside of Turkey. The Government and
government-friendly media have placed blame for the coup on,
among others, U.S. Central Command's General Joseph Votel, the
CIA, American officers serving at Incirlik, a professor at
Lehigh University named Henri J. Barkey, and your colleague,
Senator Charles Schumer. All of them have been accused of
working with Fethullah Gulen, the Pennsylvania-based cleric who
the Turkish Government accuses of being behind the coup.
There are also at least 15 U.S. citizens who have been
jailed in Turkey. Most of them are being held in pretrial
detention. Of those, American consular officials in Turkey have
been denied access to five of them. The abuse of Americans in
Turkey, which has compelled experts like myself to avoid
visiting the country, has taken place alongside violence or
threats of violence against Americans in the United States.
What can the United States do about this?
American officials have relied too much on private
diplomacy and more honey than vinegar in public to encourage
the Turkish Government to support our goals and adhere to their
own principles. It has not worked. There is no guarantee that
the application of public pressure on Turkey will alter its
behavior for the better. The opposite may well occur, but it is
a superior policy option than sanctioning Turkish actions
through silence.
Toward that end, there is an opportunity for the United
States, especially the Congress, to make Turkey aware of
Washington's displeasure with its democratic backsliding, its
treatment of Americans, and a foreign policy that is at
variance with the interests and goals of the United States.
It can do this by, first, instructing the Government
Accountability Office to conduct a study of the value of the
U.S.-Turkey relationship and make the results of that study
public; request that the Department of Defense study the costs
and modalities of leaving Incirlik Air Base or shifting some of
its operations to facilities in the area and making results of
that study public; third, require that the State Department
review its travel advisory to Turkey; fourth, restrict Turkey's
participation in big-ticket, high-tech weapons development and
procurement; and finally, publicly demand that Turkish
officials refrain from their ongoing efforts to politicize the
American judicial process in demanding the extradition of
Fethullah Gulen and the end of the coming trial against Iranian
Turkish businessman, Reza Zarrab.
There is a chance that none of these demands will work, but
it will at least put Turkish officials on notice that the
United States will not sit idly by as Turkey undermines its
policies and threatens its officials and citizens.
Thank you very much.
[Dr. Cook's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Steven A. Cook
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you and the
Ranking Member for the invitation to appear before you to discuss the
priorities and challenges in the U.S.-Turkey relationship.
Since the 1950s, successive American presidents have recognized
Turkey as a critical ally. Even before the country became a member of
the North Atlantic Alliance in 1952, Ankara dispatched forces to fight
alongside Americans during the Korean War. Throughout the Cold War,
close American-Turkish security cooperation played an important role
containing of the Soviet Union. There were difficulties throughout the
decades of partnership, including the 1964 Johnson Letter, Turkey's
invasion of Cyprus in 1974, the American arms embargo in response, and
regular diplomatic and political skirmishes over recognition of the
Armenian Genocide. The overarching threat that the Soviet Union posed
to both countries, however, ensured that these crises, problems, and
irritants never disrupted the strategic relationship. It is this
history that continues to frame the way in which Turkey is understood
in policy debates, but it is outdated. Changes in Turkey, the United
States, and global politics since the end of the Cold War require a re-
evaluation of the U.S.-Turkey relationship. American policymakers are
hard-pressed to make the case that bilateral ties reflect
The Council on Foreign Relations takes no institutional positions
on policy issues and has no affiliation with the U.S. Government. All
statements of fact and expressions of opinion contained herein are the
sole responsibility of the author. ``strategic relations'' or a ``model
partnership.'' As the president of the Council on Foreign Relations,
Richard Haass, recently asserted, ``Turkey may be an ally, but it is
not a partner.''
After 1991 and the end of the Cold War, American and Turkish
policymakers maintained close strategic ties as they searched for a new
rationale for the relationship. For some analysts, there was reason to
believe that Turkey could be as important an ally in the post-Cold War
world as it had been during the showdown with the Soviet Union. In the
following decades, Turkey was alternately held out among foreign policy
analysts as a guide for the newly independent Turkic states of Central
Asia whose citizens share cultural and linguistic affinities with
Turks, a driver of security and peace in the Middle East, and,
recently, a ``model'' for Arab countries seeking to build more
prosperous and democratic societies. None of these projects proved
successful because they overestimated Turkey's capacities,
underestimated the historical legacies of the Ottoman domination of the
Middle East, and misread Turkish domestic politics and the worldview of
the country's current leadership.
This November it will be fifteen years since the ruling Justice and
Development Party (known by its Turkish acronym, AKP) came to power,
launching a period of political stability, economic growth, and
supposedly--as some, myself included, believed--liberal democratic
reform. The AKP's electoral successes have produced the stability of
single-party government, and with that Turks have benefitted from new
economic opportunities, infrastructure development, and improved access
to healthcare. There has been considerable political regression,
though. A little more than a decade since Turkey began membership
negotiations to join the European Union (EU), it looks less like a
European democracy than an elected autocracy. President Recep Tayyip
Erdogan has overseen a process in which the country's political
institutions have been greatly weakened or re-engineered in the service
of his parochial political interests and a transformative national
agenda.
The deepening of authoritarianism in Turkey and the development of
a cult of personality around Erdogan has had grave consequences for
ideals that Americans hold dear, including freedom of expression,
freedom of assembly, freedom of the press, and respect for human
rights. Even so, it is important to note that Erdogan is hardly a tin-
pot dictator. He is an extraordinarily adept politician who, for his
core constituency, has ushered in a more open, inclusive, and
democratic politics.
This moment of empowerment stands in stark contrast to the
experiences of Erdogan's opponents. They have been routinely subjected
to coercion, intimidation, and violence. Since the failed coup d'etat
of July 2016, more than 200,000 people have been detained, arrested, or
fired from their jobs. Approximately 130 news outlets have ben
shuttered. Included among those arrested have been foreign journalists
as well as international and Turkish human rights professionals.
Academics who called upon Turkish security forces to avoid civilian
casualties in the conflict with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)--a
terrorist organization--were summarily dismissed from their posts or
arrested. Many of those in legal trouble have little recourse because
they are accused of being members of ``FETO,'' the Fethullahist Terror
Organization, which the Government alleges was behind the failed coup.
Defense lawyers have been reluctant to take on these cases out of fear
they themselves will be accused of the same. The ripple effects of this
crackdown go well beyond those directly caught up in the purge,
affecting entire families and ruining their future prospects. The
widespread detentions, arrests, and sackings since July 2016 are not
actually a new development, they are merely an acceleration of a purge
that has been underway since 2014.
The troubling situation in Turkey is not just a matter of domestic
politics, however. It has costs for the bilateral relationship between
the United States and Turkey. Erdogan's populism, nationalism, and
authoritarianism often manifests itself in hostility toward the United
States and results in policy choices that are at odds with American
interests and goals. There is little reason to believe that this
situation will change. As noted above, the bilateral relationship
encountered turbulence in the past, but the United States and Turkey
overcame these differences because of the dangers the Soviet Union
posed to the security of both. There is no longer a common threat or
big project that both countries share. At an abstract level, Washington
and Ankara share an interest in fighting terrorism, but they each
accuse the other of working with terrorists in Syria.
The list of American concerns about Turkish policies and behavior
is rather extensive. They include the potential purchase of the Russian
S-400 air defense system; threats to rescind American access to
Incirlik airbase, from which the United States conducts operation
against the self-declared Islamic State and where it stores ninety
nuclear weapons as a symbol of the American commitment to Turkish
security; and promises of military operations against the PKK in Iraq,
challenging Iraqi sovereignty and potentially weakening Prime Minister
Haider al-Abadi. In August, the chief of staff of Iran's armed forces
traveled to Ankara for security talks in the first such visit of its
kind since the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Turkey and Iran have
overlapping and conflicting interests in a variety of areas in Syria
and Iraq as well as on border security and Kurdish separatism. It thus
makes sense for them to seek dialogue, but Turkey's current outreach
follows a pattern in which Turkish officials have sought to use their
ties with Tehran as a way of alleviating pressure when they have run
into trouble with Washington. Turkey's thaw with Iran sows mistrust
between Ankara and countries in the Persian Gulf. This only weakens the
Trump administration's efforts to build a unified front against Tehran.
Then there is Turkey's determination to, at least, complicate
American efforts to destroy the Islamic State in its Syrian stronghold,
Raqqa. The Turks are deeply opposed to the U.S. alliance with the
People's Protection Units (YPG) in Syria against the Islamic State.
Ankara rightly considers this group to be inextricably linked to the
PKK. More than any other issue, the U.S. relationship with the YPG
through the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) has driven tension in
American-Turkish ties. The Turks do have a legitimate argument about
the YPG and its ties to terrorism, but Ankara played an important role
pushing the United States and this Syrian Kurdish group together when,
in the summer of 2014, the Turkish Government rejected American
entreaties to fight the Islamic State together. Secretary of Defense
James Mattis has sought to reassure the Turkish Government that
weaponry provided to the SDF will be strictly controlled and that the
United States will not allow the YPG and its political wing, the
Democratic Union Party, from establishing an autonomous or independent
entity along a strip of territory that the Kurds call ``Rojava,''
adjacent to Turkey's southern border. There is no indication that
Turkey's leaders believe these assurances.
Washington's military ties to the YPG are also propelling Turkey's
relations with Tehran and Moscow. Turkey and Iran--both with large
Kurdish populations--have a common interest in suppressing Kurdish
nationalism and separatism. When it comes to Russia, much has been made
of Erdogan's alleged admiration of Russian President Vladimir Putin and
the rise of so-called ``Eurasianists'' within Turkey's officer corps
who are anti-American and anti-Western. Those factors may very well be
part of the explanation, but Russia's place as the powerbroker in Syria
and Erdogan's concerns over Kurdish gains there have compelled him to
go to Moscow in an effort to secure Turkish interests in the Syrian
conflict.
The final sources of tension are the venomous anti-American
discourse that Turkish officials and media outlets representing the
Government have employed since the summer of 2016 as well as the
treatment of Americans both inside and outside of Turkey. Turkey's
leaders have long played on the reservoir of antiAmericanism within
Turkish society to their political advantage, but Erdogan oversaw an
unprecedented attack on the United States after last summer's failed
coup. The Government and government-friendly media engaged in blood-
curdling rhetoric that placed blame for the coup on, among others, U.S.
Central Command's General Joseph Votel, the CIA, American officers
serving at Incirlik, a professor at Lehigh University named Henri J.
Barkey, and Senator Charles Schumer (D-NY). After the coup attempt, the
Turks arrested Pastor Andrew Brunson, who has been living in Turkey for
twenty-three years, and a NASA scientist of Turkish origin who is an
American citizen named Serkan Golge. There are also at least a thirteen
other U.S. citizens in pre-trial detention in Turkey. Of those,
American consular officials in Turkey have been denied access to five
of them. The Turks have also arrested a long-serving foreign service
national who was an employee at the U.S. consulate in Adana. With the
exception of one American who was jailed before the coup, all are
facing charges related to terrorism.
In Turkey today, ``terrorism'' is a catch-all charge that can be
used against peaceful opponents of the Government, followers of
Fethullah Gulen--the Pennsylvania-based cleric who once was a partner
of Erdogan and is now accused of masterminding last year's failed
putsch--or supporters of the PKK. The latter two are plausible, but
there is also another possibility: the Americans being held in Turkey
are bargaining chips to secure the extradition of Gulen and an end to
the federal case against a Turkish-Iranian businessman named Reza
Zarrab. The latter issue is particularly important to Erdogan because
Zarrab was instrumental in busting sanctions on Iran, using gold
traders in Istanbul and Turkey's state-owned Halkbank in the process.
Zarrab is also believed to have knowledge of corruption at the highest
levels of the Turkish Government.
The abuse of Americans in Turkey, which has compelled experts like
myself to avoid visiting the country, has taken place alongside
violence or threats of violence against Americans in the United States.
Recently, fifteen members of Erdogan's security detail were indicted
for beating up peaceful protesters outside the Turkish ambassador's
residence last May. This is a repeat of the melee that Erdogan's
security team precipitated outside the Brookings Institution in March
2016 and at the United Nations in 2011. In addition, Turkish diplomats
have sought to create a hostile environment for those who research and
write about Turkey. The embassy in Washington routinely sends staff to
take video of public events addressing Turkish politics. The embassy's
justice counselor once accosted me in an elevator after an event at the
Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars because he did not
like something that I said. After exiting the building, he chased me
down the street yelling at me. Turkey's consul general in Chicago used
a clip of Professor Barkey and me laughing during an event and posted
it on Twitter claiming that we were laughing about the 249 people who
were killed during the failed coup. Given the political atmosphere in
Turkey, what the consul general did was nothing less than an incitement
to violence. This is all part of an effort to undermine the ability of
American scholars and journalists to work in Turkey.
What can the United States do about the deteriorating situation in
Turkey and the Ankara's problematic foreign policy? American
policymakers must understand that they have little means to influence
Turkey if they continue to define the relationship in the same terms as
it was during the Cold War. The United States and Turkey have a long
history, but past strategic ties hardly qualify as justification for
the same in the present or future. Turkey remains important to the
United States but less because it can be helpful and more because of
the trouble Ankara can cause.
It is often prudent to approach differences with other countries
through private diplomacy and offering more ``honey than vinegar'' in
public. The records from the Barack Obama and George W. Bush
administrations also indicate, however, that that remonstrating with
Turkish officials in private and publicly praising them has little, if
any, effect on the policies that Ankara pursues at home and abroad.
There is, of course, no guarantee that the application of public
pressure on Turkey will alter its behavior for the better--the opposite
may well occur--but it is a superior policy option than sanctioning
Turkish actions through silence.
The political, economic, and diplomatic pressure that Russia
brought to bear on Turkey after Turkish warplanes shot down a Russian
bomber in November 2015 is instructive. In time, Erdogan was compelled
to issue an apology and pursue a conciliatory approach to Moscow. I am
not advocating a similarly thuggish approach to Turkey, a long-standing
ally, but rather offering a case in which Turkey's leader responded
positively to public censure. Toward that end, there is an opportunity
for the United States, especially Congress, to make Turkey aware of
Washington's displeasure with its democratic backsliding, its treatment
of Americans, and a foreign policy that is at variance with the
interests and goals of the United States. It can do this by:
instructing the Government Accountability Office to conduct a study
of the value of the U.S.-Turkey relationship;
requesting that the Department of Defense study the costs and
modalities of leaving Incirlik airbase or shifting some of its
operations to other facilities in the area; and making the
results of this study public.
requiring that the State Department review its travel advisory to
Turkey;
restricting Turkey's participation in big-ticket, high-tech weapons
development and procurement; and
publicly demanding that Turkish officials refrain from their
ongoing efforts to politicize the American judicial process.
There are fears within the policy community that Turkey has become
unmoored from the West. Those fears are warranted, but not entirely
accurate. Ankara is and will continue to be a member of NATO, but it is
not a partner in the Atlantic Alliance; Turkey is linked to Europe
through trade flows, investment, and financial institutions, but it
does not desire to be part of the West broadly defined by liberal
norms, principles, and ideals. There is no doubt that large numbers of
Turks are untroubled by this change. Ahmet Davutoglu--who served as
both prime minister and foreign minister--has written that Western
institutions are alien to predominantly Muslim societies like Turkey.
There are also large numbers who want to remain within the ambit of the
West. Above both groups is Erdogan, who is determined to undo the
institutions and values of the republic--itself never a democracy--and
replace them with a moralizing, religious (but not theocratic), and
authoritarian political order. Whether Erdogan is successful or not,
Turkish politics and society have changed dramatically since the 1950s,
as has American politics and society, and consequently the United
States must re-evaluate its relationship with Turkey.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Dr. Sloat?
STATEMENT OF DR. ARMANDA SLOAT, FELLOW FOR DEMOCRACY IN HARD
PLACES INITIATIVE, HARVARD KENNEDY SCHOOL, CAMBRIDGE, MA
Dr. Sloat. Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin,
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
invitation to discuss recent developments in Turkey and the
implications for our bilateral relationship.
With the chairman's permission, I would like to submit my
full testimony for the record and summarize key points now.
The Chairman. Without objection. Thank you.
Dr. Sloat. To state my bottom line up front, Turkey is
undoubtedly a complicated and challenging NATO ally. However,
it remains strategically important to the United States. Its
government, as well as its people, require our continued
engagement.
A year after the attempted coup, Turkish society remains
deeply traumatized by the aftermath of July 15, 2016, as well
as regional risks to the country's security. There is little
Western anchor given tense relations with the United States and
the European Union. Gulenists and separatist Kurds are seen as
existential threats. And amidst an indefinite state of
emergency, dissent is limited, press freedom has been
curtailed, the opposition remains fractured, and the economy is
weakening.
Many Turks were initially supportive of the Government's
response to the coup attempt, which was neither expected nor
desired. There was frustration with the perceived delay by the
West in condemning the coup, and there remains consternation
that the alleged coup plotter, Muslim cleric Fethullah Gulen,
lives in self-imposed exile in Pennsylvania.
Unfortunately, actions by the Turkish Government are
weakening the democracy it purports to protect. Initial efforts
to arrest suspected coup plotters and affiliated Gulenists have
morphed into an apparent witch hunt against all political
opponents, leaving a vulnerable state apparatus and a paranoid
society. The elastic definition of terrorism alters the bounds
of what is politically permissible while the state of emergency
has had a chilling effect on public dissent.
The domestic situation is unlikely to improve in the near
future. Turkish citizens voted last April on whether to provide
sweeping powers to the president. The results reflected a stark
division in society. Official figures showed 48 percent of
voters opposed the reforms. Yet, this number could be even
higher as the OSCE cited a restrictive campaign framework and
there were widespread allegations of fraud.
As preparations for parliamentary and presidential
elections are underway for 2019, Turkish civil society, I would
argue, remains bowed but unbroken. This was seen most visibly
in July when hundreds of thousands of Turks rallied for justice
in Istanbul, the largest public protest since Gezi Park in
2013.
In addition to domestic challenges, Turkey sits in a
turbulent neighborhood. It has been particularly affected by
the civil war and battle against the Islamic State in Syria.
These conflicts flooded Turkey with over 3 million refugees,
created complex dynamics with Russia and Iran, contributed to
major terrorist attacks, and further complicated relations with
the PKK, a U.S.-designated Kurdish terrorist organization.
Different priorities in Syria have contributed to tension
in U.S.-Turkey relations. The most contentious debates have
concerned local forces and the question of with whom to partner
in the fight against ISIS. Turkey vehemently objects to U.S.
cooperation with the Syrian Kurdish group known as the YPG,
given the group's links to the PKK, as well as their
aspirations to create an autonomous region in northern Syria.
This Gordian knot will remain a bilateral sticking point as
thorny decisions remain about security and governance
arrangements in post-ISIS Syria.
Despite these challenges, it would be a mistake to curb
relations significantly with Turkey. It remains an important
bridge between Europe and the Middle East. There is utility in
continued efforts to keep Turkey anchored in a Euro-Atlantic
community based on shared values even though Turkey does not
always live up to those values. There are also real risks from
a failed relationship, including setbacks to U.S. efforts to
fight the Islamic State, a weakened ability to stem refugee
flows into Europe, and the degradation of one of the region's
most successful economies. Furthermore, Turkey's foreign policy
orientation matters to the West. If the EU and U.S. abandon
Turkey, Ankara will seek partners elsewhere, as demonstrated by
its recent interactions with Russia and Iran.
As a starting point, the U.S. needs to take seriously
Turkish security concerns. On Gulen, the U.S. Government has
made clear his extradition is a matter for the courts, but
officials should continue seeking ways to help bring those
responsible to justice.
Relatedly, the U.S. and Turkey should continue their high-
level dialogue on Syria and the Kurds. The U.S. should continue
pressing for the resumption of peace talks with the PKK,
reiterating its opposition to the YPG's broader territorial
aspirations, and working with Turkey and regional partners to
develop a long-term political strategy for Syria.
Finally, rule of law must remain on the bilateral agenda.
Public rebuke is not always the most effective way to motivate
political change, especially in a country quick to anti-
American sentiment. Yet, those in Turkish society who value
democracy are seeking moral support. Most critically, senior
American officials must stress the importance of human rights
and good governance in private conversations with their Turkish
counterparts.
Relatedly, the U.S. should expand people-to-people ties,
including reinvigorated efforts to enhance our trade relations.
In closing, the only beneficiaries of significantly
curtailed ties between the U.S. and Turkey are those who do not
want the country facing West. Continued engagement, including
honest discussion with the Government about our differences,
plus expanded outreach to business and civil society, remains
the only way forward.
Thank you.
[Dr. Sloat's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Amanda Sloat
Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, distinguished members of
the committee, thank you for the invitation to discuss recent
developments in Turkey and the implications for our bilateral
relationship. Although Turkey can be a complicated and challenging NATO
ally, it remains strategically important to the United States and
requires our continued engagement.
A year after the attempted coup, Turkish society remains deeply
traumatized by the events of July 15, 2016 and its aftermath as well as
regional risks to the country's peace and security. There is little
western anchor given tense relations with the United States and the
European Union. Gulenists and separatist Kurds are seen as existential
threats. Amidst an indefinite state of emergency, dissent is limited,
press freedom has been curtailed, the opposition remains fractured, and
the economy is weakening.
Many Turks were initially supportive of the Government's response
to the coup attempt, which was neither expected nor desired. There was
frustration with the perceived delay in western condemnation of the
putsch amidst presumed ambivalence about the desirability of ousting
the president. There remains consternation that the man accused of
fomenting the coup, Muslim cleric Fetullah Gulen, is living in self-
imposed exile in Pennsylvania. While Ankara has given the U.S.
Government boxes of documents, it has yet to provide sufficient
evidence to persuade a judge of probable cause that would warrant
extradition.
Unfortunately, actions by the Turkish Government have begun to
weaken the democracy that it purports to protect. Initial efforts to
arrest suspected coup plotters and affiliated Gulenists have morphed
into an apparent witch-hunt against all political opponents. Recent
reports note at least 150,000 people sacked from government and
academia, 50,000 or more jailed for alleged collusion, as well as over
150 journalists behind bars. When I visited Turkey this summer for the
first time since the putsch attempt, the climate of anxiety was
palpable. There is a vulnerable state apparatus and a paranoid society.
The state of emergency has had a chilling effect on public opposition,
as it allows individuals to be held in pre-trial detention for 30 days
without charge. The Government's elastic definition of ``terrorism''
alters the bounds of what is politically permissible; this has narrowed
space for dissent, shrunk press freedom, and diminished confidence in
state institutions. Americans (as well as Europeans) are getting caught
in this web, as evidenced by the imprisonment of pastor Andrew Brunson
on hollow terrorism accusations.
The domestic situation is unlikely to improve in the near future.
Against the backdrop of the failed coup, Turkish citizens went to the
polls last April to determine whether to provide sweeping new powers to
the president. While official results claimed 51 percent of voters
supported the reforms, the OSCE cited a ``restrictive'' campaign
framework and there were widespread allegations of fraud. Recep Tayyip
Erdogan, who just began his fourth year as president, is now focused on
preparations for parliamentary and presidential elections in 2019. He
recently acknowledged these elections will be ``difficult,'' presumably
as he recognizes disenchantment among his base given excessive post-
coup purges, economic challenges (as pocketbook politics affect his
middle class supporters), and claims of government corruption.
Meanwhile, opposition parties have struggled to provide an effective
counterweight. The pro-Kurdish People's Democratic Party (HDP) is
particularly hamstrung, as its leader Selahattin Demirtas, 13 MPs, and
dozens of elected mayors are imprisoned on spurious terrorism charges.
Despite these challenges, Turkish civil society is not dead. The
country is deeply divided between supporters and opponents of Erdogan,
as evidenced by the 48 percent of the electorate (at a minimum) who
voted against the constitutional changes. In June, the Government--led
by the conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP)--withdrew a
proposal to allow developers to build industrial facilities in olive
groves following public opposition. This is a small but not
insignificant legislative victory. Later that month, Kemal
Kilicdaroglu--leader of the social democratic People's Republic Party
(CHP)--led a 280-mile ``march for justice'' from Ankara to Istanbul to
protest arrests (including of a CHP MP) as part of the post-coup
crackdown. Hundreds of thousands of protesters joined his rally in
Istanbul, the largest public demonstration since the Gezi Park protests
of 2013. While not a mass uprising, it demonstrated Turks' continued
willingness to demand justice and government accountability.
In addition to domestic challenges, Turkey sits in a turbulent
neighborhood. It has been particularly affected by the civil war and
battle against the Islamic State (ISIS) in Syria. These conflicts
flooded Turkey with over 3 million refugees, created complex dynamics
with Russia and Iran, contributed to several large terrorist attacks,
and further complicated engagement with the PKK (the Kurdistan Worker's
Party, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization that has fought the
Turkish state for decades).
Different priorities in Syria have contributed to tension in U.S.-
Turkey relations. Erdogan initially focused on the removal of Syrian
President Bashar Al-Assad, which resulted in lax enforcement of border
controls despite American and European calls to stop flows of foreign
fighters. The U.S. was reluctant to engage in the civil war, but took
aggressive action to counter the Islamic State. Turkey initially felt
less threatened by the rise of ISIS, a view that changed after an
attack by an Islamic State suicide bomber in southern Turkey in July
2015. Weeks later Ankara opened Incirlik airbase to U.S. and coalition
forces conducting counter-ISIS missions.US special operators sought
ground forces with whom to partner. They found a faction of Syrian
Kurds, the YPG (the People's Protection Units), to be the most
organized and militarily effective fighters. They provided logistical
and air support to help the YPG take territory from ISIS. Turkey
vehemently objected given the YPG's links to the PKK. Their fears
aren't unfounded: in 2016 alone, the PKK conducted multiple mass-
casualty attacks in Ankara and Istanbul that killed far more Turks than
did ISIS attacks. Syria-related conflict also contributed to the
breakdown of Turkey's 36-month ceasefire with the PKK.
Amidst protracted and ultimately unsuccessful U.S.-Turkey
negotiations about the viability of alternative Sunni forces, Turkey's
top priority became preventing the YPG from achieving its political
objective: the connection of three northern Syrian cantons into a
single autonomous region, which Ankara feared could result in an
independence bid or be used as a staging area for attacks on Turkey.
This bilateral dispute came to a head in June 2017, when American
officials informed Ankara on the eve of President Erdogan's visit to
Washington that the U.S. had decided to arm the YPG for the battle
against ISIS in Raqqa. While Erdogan begrudgingly accepted the
decision, Turkey signaled its readiness to protect its redlines days
later by firing on YPG forces allegedly targeting Turkish-backed
opposition fighters. This Gordian knot will remain a sticking point in
U.S.-Turkey relations, as thorny decisions remain about security and
governance arrangements in post-ISIS Syria.
Given the precipitous decline in Turkey's rule of law and the
complicated diplomacy often required to reach agreement on shared
challenges, it may appear tempting to walk away from the relationship.
The European Union has begun its own debate, with the European
Parliament calling to freeze accession talks, Enlargement Commissioner
Johannes Hahn recommending a ``new approach,'' and German Chancellor
Angela Merkel threatening not to update the Turkey/EU custom union.
While now is an appropriate moment to assess and recalibrate, it
would be a mistake to curtail relations with Turkey. It remains an
important bridge between Europe and the Middle East. There is utility
in continued efforts to keep Turkey anchored in a Euro-Atlantic
community based on shared values, even if Ankara doesn't always live up
to those values. There are also real risks from a failed relationship,
including setbacks to U.S. efforts to fight the Islamic State (as well
as future radical groups that grow in unstable environments), a
weakened ability to stem refugee flows into Europe, and the degradation
of one of the region's most successful economies. Furthermore, Turkey's
foreign policy orientation matters to the west. If the EU and U.S.
abandon Turkey, Ankara will seek partners elsewhere--as demonstrated by
its recent interactions with Russia and Iran.
As a starting point, Washington needs to take seriously Turkish
security concerns. While the U.S. cannot give Turkey everything it
demands, sustained discussion of its perceived threats builds trust and
provides reassurance. On Gulen, the U.S. Government has made clear that
his extradition is a matter for the courts. However, U.S. officials
should continue engaging with Turkish counterparts to demonstrate the
sincerity with which they are reviewing evidence and seek ways to help
bring those responsible to justice. That said, Turkey should not employ
judicial blackmail by detaining American citizens in the hopes of using
them as leverage in their claims.
Similarly, the U.S. and Turkey should continue their high-level
dialogue on Syria and Kurdish issues. The late August trip by Defense
Secretary James Mattis was a helpful visit by all accounts. Reports
suggest he promised transparency in U.S. cooperation with the YPG, as
well as further assistance in Turkey's fight against the PKK. More
broadly, reconciliation between Turkey and the PKK is the only solution
to this overarching regional problem. Washington should continue
pressing Ankara to resume peace talks, offering American support as
desired. In addition, the U.S. should work with Turkey and other
regional allies to develop a long-term political strategy for Syria; it
will be particularly important to understand Turkish plans with Russia
and Iran. The U.S. should make clear to the YPG its opposition to
Syrian Kurdish independence, as well as the need for the group to cut
operational ties with the PKK, fulfill its long-ignored promise to
withdraw east of the Euphrates River (i.e., not connect the cantons),
allow displaced Sunni civilians to return home, and govern in an
inclusive manner. In return, Ankara will need to accept some YPG
participation in discussions about Syria's political future and the
movement of Kurdish civilians between cantons.
Beyond Syria, there are numerous regional issues where the U.S. and
Turkey share common interests and can work together. Both countries
have concerns about the planned independence referendum in Iraqi
Kurdistan later this month, and they will need to manage the potential
fall-out if it proceeds. Both have a vested interest in seeing a
resolution to the dispute between Qatar and its Gulf neighbors. As the
U.S. considers sending more troops to Afghanistan, it is worth
remembering Turkey is the only NATO country that increased its troop
presence following the Alliance's 2015 transition from a combat to a
support mission. Within the Mediterranean, Turkey has the potential to
become a regional energy hub and remains a critical player in resolving
the Cyprus conflict.
Finally, rule of law must remain on the bilateral agenda. Although
public rebuke isn't always the most effective way to motivate political
change (especially in a country quick to anti-American sentiment),
Turkish citizens who value good governance are looking for moral
support. More critically, senior American officials must stress the
importance of rule of law in private conversations with Turkish
interlocutors. Reports suggest President Trump did not raise such
concerns during his Oval Office meeting with President Erdogan, which
gives the unfortunate signal the U.S. no longer cares about the state
of Turkish democracy.
Furthermore, efforts should be made to expand the breadth of U.S.-
Turkey relations. It is unhelpful to personalize bilateral ties in
interactions between leaders, while there are limits to a relationship
rooted primarily in military cooperation. There is scope to expand
people to people ties, which would encourage the half of Turkish
society that fears being abandoned by its long-time friends. In
particular, the U.S. should reinvigorate efforts to expand trade. This
would benefit U.S. companies eager to invest in the Turkish market. It
could also motivate reforms to help stabilize the Turkish economy; for
example, the indefinite state of emergency remains a significant drag
on foreign investment.
In closing, there are strains in our bilateral relationship,
divergent views on some important issues, and serious concerns about
Ankara's commitment to rule of law and human rights. At the same time,
the only people who benefit from the U.S. curbing ties significantly
are those who don't want Turkey facing west. Continued engagement--
including honest discussion with the Government and expanded outreach
to business and civil society--remains the only way forward.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Cardin?
Senator Cardin. Dr. Sloat, I agree with your conclusion. So
let us talk about one of the most sensitive issues, and that is
the YPG and our campaign in Syria and Raqqa which, as I
understand it, there was considerable outreach by the United
States to Turkey as to the importance of using the YPG as the
only viable way that we could get the necessary ground support
in order to deal with the campaign in Syria. Do you believe
there was a different way to handle this?
Dr. Sloat. Thank you for the question.
I should note I served in the Obama administration for 3
years as the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Turkey up until a
year ago. So I was directly involved in large numbers of those
conversations.
I think there was a history of differing priorities between
the United States and Turkey with the Turks prioritizing from
the beginning the removal of Assad, but the U.S. choosing not
to get involved in the civil war in Syria but instead focusing
on the campaign against ISIS. And that was part of what
complicated discussions between the U.S. and Turkey on how to
respond.
I would argue that there were decisions that the Obama
administration could have made several years prior to
potentially support additional Sunni Arab forces. I believe we
are in a position now where we have fairly limited options to
the YPG, but I do not believe that was necessarily where we
needed to end up.
Senator Cardin. You think there were other options for
ground support effectively dealing with the Raqqa campaign
other than doing it with the YPG?
Dr. Sloat. For the Raqqa campaign, I believe the YPG was
likely the main option that we had.
Senator Cardin. From what we have been briefed on, and our
own information, I think the United States--the coalition
forces--had very few other options. The question is was there a
better way of handling this with Turkey. And as I understand,
we have invested a great deal of time in working with Turkey to
explain the military options that we had.
Dr. Cook, thank you for your four suggestions. I think they
are all ones that we should very much be considering.
I want to get to military procurement specifically because
it is an interesting proposal you have in regards to
restricting arm sales to Turkey, which is something that this
committee gets engaged with. But it looks like Turkey is
looking towards Russia, as I said in my opening comment, with
the S-400 missile interceptor. It also appears that could very
well violate the recent statute passed by Congress on sanctions
against Russia.
We would expect a NATO partner to work with us in our
efforts to change behavior in Russia as it relates to European
security. That is not the case right now with Turkey.
Do you believe that the United States should be in a
position to tell Turkey that if they proceed with this, that it
may very well cause action in America dealing with our sanction
authority?
Dr. Cook. Thank you for the question, Senator.
Absolutely. I think we should make it abundantly clear and
not just privately but publicly to the Turks that if they move
forward with the S-400, there will be consequences for them.
Their relationship with Russia is built on two separate
issues. The first is the United States is not a diplomatic or
political player in Syria, and for the Turks to ensure their
interests in a post-war Syria, they have to deal with the main
powerbroker there and that is the Russians.
Second, the Turks tend to try to play the Russians or the
Iranians against the United States. Every time they get into
trouble, Turkish officials show up in Tehran or they make
noises about weapons procurement, whether it is from the
Chinese or the Russians. Publically, We have yet to make it
abundantly clear to the Turkish Government that there will be
consequences in terms of future weapons procurement and other
types of relations should they move forward and violate these
sanctions.
As I said, there is no guarantee that this will work. At
the same time, the kind of private engagement that the Obama
administration and the Trump administration have pursued
clearly has not gotten the Turkish Government's attention.
Now, one point, if you allow me, on the question of the
YPG. There was another option to the YPG. It was called the
Turkish armed forces. However, as my colleague, Dr. Sloat,
pointed out, the Turks had other priorities when it came to the
confrontation with the Assad regime. They prioritized that over
the Islamic State. And to some extent, the Turks had conflicts
of interests with the Islamic State because the Islamic State
was battling Kurds in northern Syria. So it strikes me there
was an option, but the Turks took it off the table by refusing
to work with us in the fight against the Islamic State.
Senator Cardin. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I have another question, but I will wait
until the second round.
The Chairman. Senator Merkley?
Senator Merkley. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate that the State Department and the
administration have been actively engaged in supporting
specific NGOs that have been shut down by the Turkish
Government. That being said, this administration has said
shockingly little publicly about the closing of civil society.
Through 2012 to 2014, the Department of State funded
international NGOs to conduct humanitarian work in the context
where there was no governance, no U.N., no International
Committee of the Red Cross, or typical systems of protections.
And these NGOs really stepped up. They provided massive levels
of assistance to millions of extremely vulnerable people. Yet,
when policies of the Turkish Government changed, these NGOs
were left exposed and pretty much on their own, leaving
millions of Syrians at risk and underserved.
What suggestions would you have for us and for the
administration to ensure the protection of the civil society
space and stop any further autocratic sliding in Turkey?
Can you all explain why you think the Government in Turkey
is cracking down on civil society and will long-term harm
result if it continues and what the resulting legacy of Erdogan
would be?
Dr. Sloat. Thank you for the question.
As I understood your question, one part of it was talking
about the work of civil society organizations with refugees.
And we have had a large number of American organizations who
have been working on the ground in Turkey to support Syrian
refugees with Turkey hosting upwards of 3 million of them. A
number of them have had challenges over the years in terms of
registration----
Senator Merkley. And also extensive work inside Syria based
out of Turkey.
Dr. Sloat. Right. And Mercy Corps, unfortunately, is one of
the organizations that has been kicked out of Turkey in what to
me seems like Turkey cutting off its nose to spite its face,
since given the significant demand that refugees have, there is
a significant need for these organizations to continue their
work.
I think the broader crackdown across the board in civil
society in Turkey is extremely unfortunate. Some of this is
being done within the guise of countering terrorism, and the
Turkish Government's definition of terrorism seems to be
constantly expanding from those who were supporting Kurdish
separatists, those who were focusing on Gulen, and now anybody,
more broadly, who is seen as opposing the Government.
I would argue that the United States needs to continue
engaging publicly in terms of expressing our support. That is
an important thing that Congress can do. It is also something
the administration should be doing. I think the State
Department has been coming out with some statements in recent
months expressing condemnation of the arrest of Amnesty
International and others. I think it would be helpful to see
more coming from the White House. I also think there needs to
be more private diplomacy. Reports have suggested that
President Trump did not raise any of these issues in his
bilateral meeting with President Erdogan, and that is
unfortunate. We need to have our leaders at the highest level
expressing their disapproval of these domestic actions in
Turkey.
Senator Merkley. Thank you.
Dr. Cook?
Dr. Cook. Thank you.
I essentially agree with the thrust of Dr. Sloat's
arguments. It strikes me that, as long as the Turkish
Government continues to expand its definition of terrorism,
civil society organizations, opponents of the Government,
journalists, and academics will all be vulnerable to arrest and
being held in pretrial detention endlessly; human rights will
continue to deterioriate.
As I pointed out both in my written testimony and my
summary of my written testimony, it is important for the United
States to publicly stand for its own values and the values that
the Turkish Government purportedly seeks to uphold, as well, in
signaling to the Turkish Government that this is unacceptable
from the perspective of the United States and that there will
be consequences along a range of issues for the Turkish
Government as long as they continue to violate human rights in
such an egregious way.
Senator Merkley. Well, thank you, both of you. And I think
it is incredibly important that our executive branch and our
President's team does flag these issues of profound impact on
hundreds of thousands of folks who have been cut off from basic
nutrition during extraordinarily difficult circumstances.
There are signs that the Erdogan Government influenced the
results of the April referendum, and despite the State
Department noting discrepancies in voting, our President
congratulated him on his election success. It is troubling that
a NATO ally may have tampered with election results to allow
its president to consolidate power. How significant was
President Trump's positive response to the election results,
and do you believe Trump's business conflicts of interest had
an impact?
Dr. Cook. Thank you, Senator.
I cannot speak to the President's business interests in
Turkey. I just do not know enough about it.
What I will say is it strikes me that there was a theory
behind the idea of calling President Erdogan and congratulating
him on the referendum, which there have been many questions
about. The idea was to bring President Erdogan along so that
the Turks would not complicate our operations in conjunction
with the YPG against the Islamic State stronghold in Raqqa.
What I think decision-makers at the White House did not count
on was that President Erdogan would pocket that phone call from
the President of the United States and continue to pursue a
policy that complicates our efforts in Syria.
Senator Merkley. Thank you.
Anything else you would like to add?
Dr. Sloat. I would just add that the phone call, I think,
was unfortunate in the sense that it legitimized a referendum
that a large number of international organizations, including
the OSCE, had expressed concerns about. Turkey had a fairly
recent history of relatively free and fair elections. This
referendum certainly was not free or fair in the sense that it
was being conducted under the state of emergency, and a lot of
the concerns that observers have raised certainly have called
into question the fairness of it as well.
Senator Merkley. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Gardner?
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to our two witnesses today.
I am struck by a couple of things in your testimony today
and your comments and statements you have made. In one
statement, Mr. Cook, you stated that ``the deepening of
authoritarianism in Turkey and the development of a cult of
personality has had grave consequences for ideals that
Americans hold dear, including freedom of expression, freedom
of assembly, freedom of the press, and respect for human
rights.'' Talking about hardly being a model partnership,
considerable political regression, populism, nationalism,
authoritarianism often manifests itself in hostility toward the
U.S., results in policy choices that are at odds with American
interests and goals, complicating our effort to fight
terrorism, sources of tensions, a venomous anti-American
discourse. It is pretty tough stuff in a relationship that is
very critical and important.
You also, toward the end of your statement, say ``there are
fears within the policy community that Turkey has become
unmoored from the West. Those fears are warranted but not
entirely accurate.''
So how do we address the challenges we have that you lay
out very clearly in the statement and get to a point where they
are not entirely accurate, indeed, we can carry forward in a
meaningful, better relationship when it comes to terrorism,
when it comes to other interests in the region and the
leadership that we need from a NATO member nation.
Dr. Cook. Well, Senator, thank you for the question. They
are difficult questions, and there are ones that I think all of
us in the Turkey-watching community wrestle with all the time.
And that is, how do we anchor Turkey to the West and reaffirm
our commitment to Turkey's security and carry on with the
transatlantic relationship with Turkey as a firm partner, while
the Turks are undertaking actions that undermine our efforts
and the efforts of the West and violate human rights and, as I
said in my testimony, the ideals that Americans hold dear?
My conclusion is two things. First, there is actually
little that will compel the Turks to change the course of their
foreign policy and their domestic politics if we continue to
define the relationship the way in which we have defined it
over the course of the last 60 years.
Senator Gardner. A model partnership.
Dr. Cook. As a model partnership, as a strategic
partnership. Certainly the Turks were critical partners in the
Cold War, fought with American soldiers in the Korean conflict.
There were crises and problems during that period, but they
were overcome by the overarching threat that the Soviet Union
presented. There is no overarching threat or big project that
the two countries work on together. One could say in the
abstract that both countries are opposed and want to work
together to counter terrorism. Yet, the Turks accuse the United
States of working with terrorists, and the United States
accuses Turkey of working with terrorists.
So we have to reevaluate and see this country as a
different country. It is a country with differing interests.
Its geography dictates that it pursues policies that are in
conflict, at times, with the United States. But there is
something to salvage from the relationship. As Dr. Sloat
pointed out, Turkey is in a critically important location. If
you draw lines out from the Turkish capital Ankara, the country
literally sits at the center of many of our most pressing
foreign policy issues.
That is why I have come to the conclusion that to continue
to allow the Turks to give us assurances in private while then
going out in public and contradicting what they have assured us
is no longer the way to go, that we should demand public
accountability for the Turks. I remind you, I cannot remember a
time that this Government or any Turkish Government has
defended the strategic relationship with the United States in
the same way that policymakers here in the United States have.
The purpose of my recommendations is to get the Turks to
understand that continuing to provide those assurances without
upholding them will have consequences. It is only through that,
it strikes me, that we will potentially effect a change in
Turkey's behavior both at home and abroad.
Senator Gardner. And how should we expect this relationship
now, between Turkey and Russia, to change the way we view
Turkey as a NATO participant?
Dr. Cook. Well, certainly there is reason to be concerned
about the Turkish relationship with Russia. Much has been made
about President Erdogan's apparent admiration for Russian
President Vladimir Putin. Much has also been made about the
apparent rise of Eurasianists within the Turkish officer corps.
These are people who would like to explore developing their
relations with Russia more and turning away from the United
States and the West.
But there are limits to the Russian-Turkish relationship.
First, the Turks do not trust the Russians, and they have no
reason to trust the Russians. They have gone to Moscow
primarily because the United States is no longer a factor in
the Syrian conflict, and in order to ensure their interests,
they need to deal with the Russians.
This question of purchasing defense equipment from Russia
is something that the Turks have sought to do not just from
Russia but from the Chinese. It is an effort on their part to
try to put the United States and the West on notice.
There is also a concerted effort within Turkey to develop
their own defense industrial base, and they often require
technology offsets that will help them develop that defense
industrial offset. It is unclear to me that this deal will go
through.
And then, finally, there is the question of Turkey's
economic ties to the West. The United States is not a major
player in the Turkish economy. All of our major companies are
there, but really the trade and investment flows are between
Turkey and Europe. And that, if anything, anchors Turkey to the
West.
So it does not keep me up at night--the idea of Turkey
drawing closer to the Russians and literally turning from the
West. But I think that we will not be able to restrain their
behavior unless we take a firm stand on what they have done in
Syria, what they are doing at home, what their relations with
the Russians do in fact look like.
Senator Gardner. Dr. Sloat, thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Murphy?
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for being here.
In August, we read reports about a clash inside Syria
between U.S. forces and Turkish-aligned forces. This comes on
the heels of reports from earlier this year about military
clashes between the United States and Iranian-allied forces
inside Syria. This seems to be the consequence of a fairly
rapid and often unannounced buildup of U.S. forces inside
Syria.
Some people talk about the fight for Raqqa as if it is the
beginning and the end of the conflicts with ISIS. And yet, what
we know is that that conflict is just going to morph into one
that shifts geographically to the Euphrates River valley, other
places throughout Syria.
Can you both talk about what the future potential conflicts
are between U.S. forces or forces that the U.S. is directly
aligned with and Turkish-based forces in and around Raqqa and
as the fight moves to other places? How have we been successful
or unsuccessful in efforts to deconflict with those forces that
the Turks are supplying and funding, and what are the risks
going forward?
Dr. Sloat. Thank you, Senator. I think you are absolutely
right that it is a very messy patchwork at the moment in Syria.
The U.S. and Kurds are largely controlling the area east of the
Euphrates; the Syrian regime, with Russia and Iran, controlling
the center; Turkish-backed forces on the northern border. And
then Jordan and Russia have created a fairly successful
deconfliction zone in the southwest. So you are absolutely
right. The focus at the moment has been on Raqqa, but once
Raqqa has concluded, people are going to be looking toward Deir
ez-Zor. They are going to be looking down south of the
Euphrates River and then, also, what is happening on the
Syrian-Iraqi border.
The U.S., thus far, has been partnering with the YPG in
that northern area out of what I believe has been military
expedience in terms of their priority of clearing ISIS from
that territory. The YPG initially did not want to go to Raqqa
because it is outside their main area of interest in terms of
the northern cantons that they have been looking to connect.
And so there are going to be questions about whether or not the
YPG are willing to continue pushing south of Raqqa.
The broader question that then needs to be addressed is
what are going to be the security arrangements there. Who is
the hold force, particularly in these predominantly Sunni-Arab
towns? And what are going to be the governance arrangements in
those areas?
And so I think this is going to be a particularly
complicated battle space. It is going to be a contentious issue
between the U.S. and Turkey, and I think all of the forces
operating in this very congested battle space are going to
continue to have the potential for conflict with each other
because of the different competing alliances, not only between
Turkey and the U.S., but also what some of these Kurdish and
other forces are looking to achieve politically on the ground.
Senator Murphy. Before I ask Dr. Cook to comment, that is
because as we move further south, there is still the potential
that we will be relying on the YPG or Kurdish-aligned forces.
Are there new potential conflicts as we look to new partners as
we move out of Raqqa and into parts south?
Dr. Sloat. I think there is a question of who is going to
be the force that is going to move on Deir ez-Zor, whether that
force is going to get there before the regime and the Iranian-
Russian-backed regime gets there, whether the YPG push down
that far south. And it is also not clear to me that we have
established who the hold force is going to be in Raqqa and
beyond. And so, I think this is going to continue to be a live
question.
Ideally we would be able to find some Sunni-Arab forces
that we can work with as a partner force in this area, both to
diversify the friends that we have on the ground and also to be
working with a group of fighters that represents a broader
swath of the Syrian population than the YPG necessarily does.
Senator Murphy. Dr. Cook?
Dr. Cook. Thank you, Senator.
Just a few things to add in response to your initial
question. Just sitting here, while I was listening to Dr. Sloat
respond to you, I came up with at least six or seven different
combinations of groups that will fight each other, are going to
fight each other, or are fighting each other or could
potentially fight with each other once Raqqa is liberated.
The one thing I do have to add is that, whatever assurances
that the United States gets from any of these groups about what
they will and will not do once Raqqa is liberated, we should
discount immediately, not the Turks, not the SDF, not the YPG,
not the FSA who in August was firing on American forces, not
any of these groups because we have a particular view of what
should happen in Syria, and we have made common cause with
groups that have a different view, but because they want our
assistance, they are willing to tell us that they share our
views. But once Raqqa is liberated, once Deir ez-Zor is likely
to be liberated by government forces after the liberation of
the garrison and the neighborhoods around it, I think all bets
are off. I would expect that the YPG will want to move forward
and try to bring together the independent cantons and create a
territorially contiguous area which will draw the Turks further
into the conflict in Syria. You are quite right that the
liberation of Raqqa is certainly not the end game in Syria, and
we will be dealing with this messy, at best, patchwork of
different forces fighting each other for quite some time.
Senator Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Risch?
Senator Risch. Mr. Cook, in your testimony, you referenced
denying Turkey access to high-tech weapons programs and
development. Do you share the same sentiment when it comes to
lower-tech arms, more conventional arms?
Dr. Cook. Thank you, sir.
I certainly believe that our commitment to Turkish security
should remain and that Turkey should be able to defend itself.
It lives in a very difficult and tough neighborhood.
However, my concern in suggesting that the Turks should be
denied access to those weapons development is that it is almost
a reward for Turkey's bad behavior, for its pursuing policies
that undermine our own goals and interests, and for its--I
would not even call it democratic backsliding. I would call it
deepening authoritarianism in Turkey. What I am not calling for
in my testimony is for a breach in relations between the two
countries.
Senator Risch. I get that. But why would the same argument
not apply to low-tech?
Dr. Cook. As I said, making Turkey a partner in the
development and deployment of the F-35 is a reward for bad
behavior, whereas providing them with other weaponry that can
help them defend themselves strike me as two different things.
Senator Risch. Thank you.
Regarding Turkey joining the EU, could you talk a little
bit about Turkey's ability to do that, how you see that?
Dr. Cook. Turkey technically remains a candidate for
European Union membership. The European Commission offered
Turkey an invitation to begin those negotiations in, I believe
it was March 2005. Shortly after those negotiations began, a
number of European countries essentially put those talks on
hold. The reasons for that have to do with everything
concerning Europe and Europe's inability to figure out what the
European Union is, whether it is a geographic entity
coterminous with predominantly Christian countries or whether
the EU is a club of countries that have come together based on
common ideals and principles related to democracy and freedom.
If it is the former, certainly Turkey, a country that is
99.8 percent Muslim, will never be able to join the European
Union. If it is the latter, at least in the abstract Turkey can
become a member of the European Union. But under current
conditions, the deepening authoritarianism in Turkey, the grave
violations of human rights, by all measures the rigged
referendum of last April, Turkey does not meet any of the
political criteria to join the European Union.
Senator Risch. Dr. Sloat, do you have a comment?
Dr. Sloat. I think there is a debate going on within the
European Union similar to the one that we are having here
within the United States in terms of having a lot of concern
about the domestic trends in Turkey but also recognizing the
necessity of partnering with Turkey on some shared regional
challenges and for the EU, to an even greater extent, the
degree of economic cooperation that you have between the two
countries. The EU also has a further interest in partnership
with Turkey, which is Turkish assistance in managing the
significant refugee flows coming out of Syria and heading into
Europe.
Recently, the European Parliament has called to suspend
accession talks with the Turks, and certainly relations between
Turkey and some EU countries, particularly Germany, are at
about the lowest point now that they have been. So I think a
lot of people have been waiting to see what happens in the
German elections, if Chancellor Merkel gets reelected, to see
whether or not Turkey is able to move forward in terms of some
of those accession talks.
Merkel has been making pretty significant noise about
wanting to stop discussions about upgrading the Turkey-EU
Customs Union, which is something the Turks have long wanted to
do, and has expressed concern in recent days about moving
forward with accession talks. There is an argument to be made
to keep Turkey on that path because it binds it within a
framework of values and rules that it needs to continue to
aspire to. But certainly relations between the two sides are
particularly tense right now.
Senator Risch. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Kaine?
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
And thanks to the witnesses. Your written testimony is
great, and I just really want to ask about one issue that I
think we are grappling with here, and that is the strong
relationship we have had with the Kurds in both northern Syria
and northern Iraq. There is a Kurdish referendum in northern
Iraq scheduled, I guess, for the end of this month. The
administration has taken a very strong and clear position of
requesting that that referendum be delayed on the theory that
it could be very destabilizing right now.
The Turkish Government, Erdogan, has had a pretty strong
degree, historically, of support for the Barzani Government in
Erbil, but my understanding is that the Turks are very opposed
to this referendum.
Talk to us a little bit about that tradition of support for
the Barzani Government but why Turkey is opposed to the
referendum and what might be consequences of it if it goes
forward.
Dr. Cook. Thank you very much, Senator Kaine.
It was an extraordinary turnaround for Turkey. During the
invasion of Iraq in 2003, it was the external power most likely
to invade because of Kurdish nationalism in northern Iraq to
some years later, 4 or 5 years later, establishing close ties
with Masoud Barzani's KDP, the dominant party in the Kurdistan
regional government, to the extent that more than 1,500 Turkish
companies invested in the KRG. In Erbil, the capital of the
KRG, it almost looks like a Turkish city in a lot of ways--and
that there was a calculation on the part of the KDP, less so in
the other major political group within the KRG, the PUK, but
there was a calculation within the KDP that good relations
between the KDP and President Erdogan's Justice and Development
Party would reduce Turkish neuralgia over KRG independence and
that the KDP would work against the PKK, this terrorist
organization that has been battling the Turkish state since
1984, which accrued to the KDP's domestic political advantage
anyway, since its rivals were supporting the PKK.
And even after the Islamic State overran Mosul in 2014,
some Turkish officials even publicly stated that they did not
have too much of a problem with the idea of an independent KRG
because, given Iraq's problems, perhaps the KRG would be a
buffer to the chaos that was enveloping Iraq. By and large that
sentiment is no longer expressed publicly because of the return
of the fight with the PKK in 2015 that has killed almost 3,000
people.
I think, broadly speaking, the Turks can accommodate an
independent KRG, but while this battle is going on with the
PKK. While there is terrorism in the streets in Turkey, they do
not believe that this is a very good idea.
The question remains, however, should the KRG go forward
with its referendum--and I have been assured by officials from
the KRG that it will go forward. I have also been told that
they will not immediately seek an exit from Iraq--what options
do the Turks have. They are certainly not going to invade the
KRG, but they can, given their extensive investment in the KRG,
certainly do a significant amount of economic damage to a part
of Iraq that desires to be independent but does not really have
an economy that can support it.
Senator Kaine. Dr. Sloat, anything to add to that?
Dr. Sloat. I would just add two additional points. One is
the domestic concern for Erdogan is that the leader of the
large nationalist party in Turkey, the MHP, has said that the
Kurdish referendum should be viewed as a cause for war in
Turkey. So I think Erdogan is also trying to balance his
domestic considerations in terms of all of the things that Dr.
Cook outlined in terms of some of the pragmatic approaches to
regional politics with needing to shore up his nationalist
base, especially in advance of these elections in 2019.
The second issue is the more geopolitical issue, which is
his concern about what the Syrian Kurds are looking to do in
northern Syria. There is also a concern that if you have an
independence referendum and the KRG establishes an independent
state essentially that it sets a precedent in the region, and
it would be much easier for the Syrian Kurds to do the same
thing there. That would be particularly anathema to the Turks
because you have got two different factions of Kurds at play
there, and the ones with the YPG that are affiliated with the
PKK are seen as a much greater existential security threat to
Turkey than the ones that Barzani is leading in the KRG.
Senator Kaine. Thank you for that.
I just want to clarify one thing because I want to make
sure I have stated this administration's position correctly.
They have been pretty blunt in stating and asking us to take
the position that the timing of the referendum is very
unhelpful. They have not told us that they oppose the
referendum; they oppose Kurds being on a path towards self-
determination. They just think the timing is not helpful. And I
did not want to misstate what their position is.
Thank you for sharing the Turkish perspective on it. I
think it is a really important issue.
The Chairman. Senator Coons?
Senator Coons. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, thank you for
holding this hearing.
And to Dr. Sloat and Dr. Cook, thank you for your testimony
today on this complex and troubled relationship.
As has been spoken about, as you have testified to, Turkey
has detained more than a dozen U.S. citizens since the July
2016 attempted coup, including a resident of Wilmington,
Delaware, my hometown. And they have cracked down on human
rights and on press organizations.
Why do you believe they are arresting such a significant
number of American citizens? And my core question: what unused
levers of influence might we have to push human rights, freedom
of speech, and rule of law in Turkey in a positive direction in
the months and years ahead? Dr. Sloat, if you would start.
Dr. Sloat. My sense is two things are happening on the
first part of your question, Senator.
First, I think some of these Americans are just
unfortunately getting caught up in the broader sweep of what is
happening in Turkey in terms of going after everyone who is
being perceived in some way as supporting the Kurds, supporting
the Gulenists, or supporting civil society organizations.
Germany, for example, is having the same problem with several
of its citizens being swept up in that.
Second, and I think it is particularly unfortunate, there
is a sense that Turkey may be engaging in what I would call
judicial blackmail. Others are calling it diplomatic hostage
taking in terms of recognizing the significance of these
individuals to the U.S. Government and determining that they
perhaps have higher value to the U.S. than the Turks
necessarily saw. So the Turks that end up using this as a
negotiating point in their conversations with us and other
allies where we point out that these individuals are wrongly
imprisoned and should be freed, Turkey says it is a case for
the judicial system the same way as when they ask us to release
Gulen or Reza Zarrab, we tell them that this is a matter for
the judicial system.
In terms of how we respond to this, my understanding is
that the administration, certainly in the case of Pastor
Brunson and others, has raised the issue at the level of
President Trump, of Secretary Tillerson. I think we need to
continue making the case to the Turks on the need to release
these American citizens who are being wrongly held. And
secondly, we need to not let them engage in this form of
judicial blackmail by using these people as bargaining chips to
try and resolve some of their court cases through extrajudicial
or other means but continue to hold firm to the judicial
process we have here.
Senator Coons. Dr. Cook?
Dr. Cook. Thank you very much for the question.
In my written testimony and my oral summary, I referenced
the Turkish officials politicizing the judicial process. This
issue is what I am getting at. Dr. Sloat was very diplomatic,
reflective of someone who has spent time at the State
Department. I have not, so I do not feel the need to be as
diplomatic.
Essentially these Americans who are being held are more
than bargaining chips. Some might even call them hostages.
It is of crucial political importance for the Turks to make
some headway in the extradition of Fethullah Gulen, the
Pennsylvania-based cleric in exile who has been accused of
masterminding the failed coup last July.
And more importantly to President Erdogan is the case of
Reza Zarrab, an Iranian Turkish businessman who will go on
trial in New York in the coming months accused of busting
sanctions on Iran. Mr. Zarrab apparently is aware of Turkish
Government officials at the highest level, their involvement in
this and corruption around them, which is why this has become
so important for President Erdogan to the point where he raised
it with President Obama.
Senator Coons. If I might cut you off, I have got about a
minute and a half left. I would like to ask you, just briefly,
help me with a bigger question. Going forward, we have seen
just a fundamental shift in U.S.-Turkey relations and the
relations in Turkey and the EU and in NATO. What are the
factors that ought to underpin, that could credibly underpin,
the U.S.-Turkey relationship in this century going forward
given where we are today. If you could both just give me a
brief answer.
Dr. Cook. Very quickly, it strikes me that the ideas that
formed our understanding of the U.S.-Turkey relationship are
based on the previous half century and are no longer valid, and
that we should look at the relationship purely in transactional
terms.
Dr. Sloat. I would cite three things.
The first is shared security concerns. Because of where
Turkey is geographically, in order to resolve a lot of problems
within the region, we need some degree of Turkish cooperation,
if not acquiescence and partnership, to go forward.
Second, I think our economic relationship has long been
under-developed. There have been continued efforts to try and
strengthen that, and I think that is an area where we can do
that. It is not only good for U.S. businesses, but it also can
force Turkey to make necessary reforms that will improve
stability and other mechanisms there.
And third, I think it is fundamentally important that we
continue to support the people in civil society. If you look at
the referendum results, at least 48 percent, if not more, of
the country is opposed to what is happening in Turkey; and I
think it is important that we not abandon our friends there who
are looking to maintain a more democratic trajectory in Turkey,
counter to what is currently happening.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Dr. Sloat. Thank you, Dr. Cook. I
appreciate your testimony, both of you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Markey?
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Cook, can you give us your assessment of the prospects
for Turkey's democratic institutions?
Dr. Cook. Thank you very much for the question, Senator
Markey.
Turkey was never much of a democracy to begin with. It did
have the trappings of a democracy. At best, we could call it a
semi-authoritarian system. Throughout, there have been free and
fair elections and a dizzying array of coalition governments
that are reflective of parliamentary democracies.
All that being said, the democratic institutions, political
institutions of Turkey have either been hollowed out or they
have been engineered in a way to advance the parochial
political interests of President Erdogan or his broadly
transformative national vision. The best example of that is the
referendum that was held last April that changed 18 articles of
the Turkish constitution that altered Turkey from a hybrid
presidential parliamentary system to a purely presidential
system, which will allegedly take place after the elections in
2019, but we already see the effects of it today.
What this means is essentially President Erdogan has taken
advantage of these democratic political institutions to advance
authoritarian politics in Turkey. So the prospects for Turkey's
democratic institutions and the nature of institutions
themselves have difficulties to change them over a long period
of time, which suggests that Turkey's immediate and midterm
future is likely to be authoritarian.
Senator Markey. So hundreds of thousands of people who have
lost their jobs, the 100,000 people who were detained, the
50,000 arrests, all of this subsequent to the April 16
constitutional referendum, are an indication of how this
consolidation of power has only further deteriorated the
democratic institutions.
Dr. Cook. Two points of clarification, sir.
First, the purge, the widespread crackdown that you
referred to, actually accelerated after the failed coup in July
2016. But it is a crackdown that has been going on at least for
the two-and-half years before that failed takeover.
Senator Markey. So let me then go to, if I can, the Gulen
question because on that night of the, quote/unquote, coup,
that is all we heard from the Turkish leadership was Gulen,
Gulen, Gulen and Pennsylvania. And everyone in America was
scratching their heads saying there was a revolution that began
in Pennsylvania that is about to take over Turkey.
So maybe you could, dr. Sloat, give us some information
about what you think are the State Department views and actions
that may be taken to ensure that Mr. Gulen, who has lived in
the United States since 1999, is not subject to an extradition
based upon his political positions rather than any actions that
can be attributed to him or his followers.
Dr. Sloat. Thank you for the question, but I would like to
clarify. While I worked for the State Department in the past, I
am not working for the State Department now. So I do not want
to be representing the State Department.
Senator Markey. I appreciate that. How do you like
Cambridge?
Dr. Sloat. You know, Turkey is much more interesting to
watch from the outside than to----
Senator Markey. No. I am saying I know you are up in
Boston. You are up in Cambridge.
Dr. Sloat. Yes. It's a beautiful city.
I think there is a recognition that----
Senator Markey. Which is just the State Department in
waiting for both parties, or it has been until this
administration.
Dr. Sloat. Fair enough.
I believe that the State Department, the Justice
Department, the law enforcement agencies within the U.S.
Government generally are taking very seriously Turkey's
concerns about Gulen and about the followers of Gulen. And I
think the fact that there is fairly widespread agreement across
all political parties within Turkey about what is seen as
Gulen's malign influence on society says something.
The State Department and Justice Department lawyers last
fall met with Turkish officials who handed over large amounts
of evidence about what they alleged was Gulen's complicity
within the coup. As I understand it, there are continued
conversations happening between U.S. officials and Turkish
officials. Within extradition proceedings, we need to have
sufficient evidence that a federal judge can determine probable
cause to determine extradition which, as I understand it, the
Turks have not yet provided to us. But there continue to be
ongoing conversations, and I believe a commitment by the U.S.
Government to help address Turkey's security concerns and do
whatever is necessary to bring those responsible to justice.
Senator Markey. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Cardin?
Senator Cardin. Dr. Sloat, I want to follow up on the human
rights issues with your experience as a former person in the
State Department. We have had problems with Turkey for a long
time on human rights. I remember one time within the OSCE, the
Helsinki Commission, we had testimony from one of the
opposition figures in Turkey as a result of the testimony
before our commission. That individual was indicted for
treason.
So Turkey has a long history of concerns within complying
with its OSCE commitments. It is a democratic country, but it
is tending towards a one-party state. It has committed very
serious violations of human rights. Pastor Brunson's detention
is wrong, and if he is being held as a hostage, it even is more
problematic as far as U.S. relations are concerned.
So how do we focus on being a voice for a large percentage
of the Turkish people who look at the United States as one of
their important allies for returning democracy and human rights
to Turkey? How do we reinforce that considering the serious
challenges we have in our relationship?
Dr. Sloat. Thank you for the question.
I think you are right about the trend in recent years, and
you are also right about our obligation to continue supporting
the 50-plus percent of Turkish society that wants to see the
country continue going in a democratic direction.
I would disagree a little bit with Dr. Cook's
characterization that certainly the Obama administration had
been quiet on human rights, as I think it was something that
was stated publicly as well as privately. And I think that is
important.
The challenge in Turkey is that the country tends toward
anti-Americanism already. There is a tendency to look for
external bogeymen and others to blame for things. And so
sometimes extensive and excessive public statements can end up
backfiring within Turkey because they can get manipulated
internally as external enemies.
That said, I think it is very important both for the
Congress, for the administration, to continue making public
statements of support for those supporting democracy within
Turkey. I think it is important, when senior officials travel
to Turkey, to continue meeting with those who are fighting for
democracy, and I think it also needs to remain a significant
part of our bilateral agenda with Turkey. I think there is a
risk that we end up getting so focused on some of these shared
security concerns that some of these rule of law things can
drift off the agenda, and I think that is a significant
mistake.
Senator Cardin. That is my concern. Obviously, the urgency
of dealing with the security issues, terrorism, our military-
to-military--those issues become dominant in our debate, and we
sort of do not put the proper attention on the deterioration of
human rights.
Yes, I agree with you. I think our key diplomats need to be
very visible on human rights issues, including meeting with
those that are advocating for the return of human rights in
Turkey. The challenge is how do we be even more visible in that
support. What else can we do to underscore the importance to
the relationship between Turkey and the United States that
democratic institutions be restored and human rights respected?
Dr. Sloat. I think while we need to continue the
government-to-government dialogue on a lot of our shared
security concerns, there also needs to be an effort to try and
broaden the scope of our engagement with Turkey. And it is
complicated, but I think that is where more people-to-people
ties can play a part.
And I would also argue that is where trying to strengthen
and deepen our bilateral trade agenda would come in because
there is a way of being able to use economic engagement to
motivate some reforms. The state of emergency, for example, is
one of the biggest drags on foreign direct investment in Turkey
right now because people do not have confidence that their
property is not going to be seized, that cases are going to be
litigated fairly within court. So the economics can not only be
beneficial to American business, but it can also be another
direction at getting at the importance of some of these rule-
of-law issues.
Senator Cardin. Dr. Cook, do you have any suggestions in
regards to advancing human rights?
Dr. Cook. I do, sir.
If I may, let me just respond to a number of the comments
that Dr. Sloat made. I certainly believe that we should be
supporting our friends in Turkey, but I suspect that that group
is a lot smaller than we suspect. There is a vast reservoir of
anti-Americanism in Turkey. That includes people who are
involved in civil society and other types of activist activity.
In addition, I think that the broader public, given the
narrative of the summer of 2016's failed coup d'etat, that a
Pennsylvania-based cleric with the support of the American
Government was somehow involved in the failed effort has
narrowed your average Turk's view of the United States.
In addition, I think that the private diplomacy that we
conduct and whatever public criticism we have leveled against
the Government of Turkey in the past--the effect has been the
same. So I am not sure why we are reluctant to continue public
criticism and, in fact, turn up the public criticism. At the
very least--at the very least--we can be true to our values and
perhaps we will get the Turkish Government's attention by being
public in our censure of their human rights record.
I also want to point out that the deterioration of human
rights in Turkey also has a profound impact on our own
security. The widespread purges in Turkey have had a
significant effect on the capacity of Turkish security forces,
the Turkish armed forces, which is the second largest military
in NATO after that of the United States, having a very hard
time in its operations in Syria. It is a question whether
Turkey actually can be that military partner in part because so
many officers have been purged from the armed forces.
Finally, I want to add that it strikes me that it is
important for the United States to publicly engage with Turkish
officials and the Turkish public about the importance of human
rights, about the importance of democratic institutions. I do
not, unfortunately, believe that that is going to effect a
significant change in the trajectory of Turkish politics if
only because President Erdogan seems single-mindedly determined
to undertake this transformation of Turkish politics, and the
only way that he thinks that he can do it is by accumulating
and consolidating personal power.
Senator Cardin. I thank both of our witnesses. Thank you
very much.
The Chairman. Thank you both. You have been outstanding
witnesses. I think the Turkish relationship has been thoroughly
examined today, but there will be additional written questions,
especially from people who were not here. So we would like to
keep the record open until the close of business Monday. I know
that both of you have day jobs, but to the extent you could
answer the questions fairly promptly, we would appreciate it.
Again, thank you for offering your expertise today and helping
us as we think through this difficult relationship.
And with that, the meeting is adjourned. Thank you so much.
[Whereupon, at 11:40 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted to
Dr. Steven A. Cook by Senator Robert Menendez
The U.S.-Turkey relationship over the past couple of years
has suffered numerous challenges over the past couple years,
largely underlined by an extreme erosion of human rights and
alarming decline of democratic values under President Erdogan's
leadership.
While Turkey remains a NATO ally and a necessary partner in
supporting Syrian refugees and other priorities in the region,
it is critical that we continue to stress the importance of
democratic institution and human rights that will ultimately
help promote stability and security in Turkey and in the
region.
Question 1. What implications has the ``purge'' since last summer's
attempted coup had on:
Domestic institutions in Turkey, particularly the judicial system
and police?
Answer. The purge, which accelerated after the failed coup of July
2016, has hollowed out the national police force and the judiciary.
President Erdogan and his supporters allege that the police and the
judicial branch were hives of Gulenist activity and the Government has
thus set out to replace police officers and judges with people who are
loyal to the ruling Justice and Development Party. The result has been
the further deterioration of legal norms and principles-like due
process-that have contributed to the deepening of authoritarianism in
Turkey.
International institutions including Turkish delegations to NATO
and the U.N.?
Answer. Many of the Turkish officers that staffed NATO were purged.
This has had serious consequences for the ability of the Turks to work
with NATO. Newly assigned officers to NATO commands lack the experience
and linguistic proficiency to operate effectively within alliance
structures. In addition, the lack of trust between the Government of
Turkey and NATO has carried over to the Turkish personnel now assigned
to staff NATO commands.
The Turkish diplomatic corps has been transformed into an arm of
the Justice and Development Party, which has overseen a ``de-
professionalization'' of Turkey's representatives abroad including at
the U.N.
Question 2. How do you assess the Trump administration's response
to Turkish security guards violently assaulting peaceful protestors in
Sheridan Circle in Washington, D.C. in May of this year during
President Erdogan's visit? Do you believe the administration has taken
the appropriate steps to fully condemn this assault on American values
and fundamental freedoms of free speech and assembly?
Answer. The Trump administration initially approached the assault
with diplomatic skill, allowing the Metropolitan Police Department and
the US Attorney to investigate the incident while condemning the
violence from the podium at the State Department. This applied pressure
on the Turks and gave the administration room for diplomatic maneuver.
Yet after the Turks repeatedly lied about the incident, besmirched the
Secret Service, and evidence emerged that President Erdogan may have
ordered his team to take part in the melee, a more forceful response
from the Trump administration was required.
It is important to note that the incident on Sheridan Circle is
part of a pattern. President Erdogan's security team has a history of
precipitating/engaging in fights with people both in Turkey and abroad.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted to
Dr. Amanda Sloat by Senator Robert Menendez
The U.S.-Turkey relationship over the past couple of years
has suffered numerous challenges over the past couple years,
largely underlined by an extreme erosion of human rights and
alarming decline of democratic values under President Erdogan's
leadership.
While Turkey remains a NATO ally and a necessary partner in
supporting Syrian refugees and other priorities in the region,
it is critical that we continue to stress the importance of
democratic institution and human rights that will ultimately
help promote stability and security in Turkey and in the
region.
Question 1. What implications has the ``purge'' since last summer's
attempted coup had on:
Domestic institutions in Turkey, particularly the judicial system
and police?
International institutions including Turkish delegations to NATO
and the U.N.?
Answer. While it is understandable the Turkish Government wants to
bring to justice those responsible for plotting against the state and
prevent similar events in the future, the purges have been excessively
broad and not enabled sufficient redress. Their expansive nature has
undoubtedly affected the institutional knowledge and effectiveness of
institutions across the country, with a May 2017 Amnesty International
report describing the impact on the public sector and lives of those
dismissed. Press reports indicate over 4,000 judges and prosecutors, a
quarter of the total, have been removed. Reports suggest 13,000 police
were suspended from their positions in the months after the coup
attempt, with over 2,000 more removed before the one-year anniversary.
Turkey fired some senior military staff serving at NATO headquarters
and European command centers. There have also been purges in the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but I do not have information on how these
dismissals have affected the composition of U.N. or other delegations.
Question 2. How do you assess the Trump administration's response
to Turkish security guards violently assaulting peaceful protestors in
Sheridan Circle in Washington, D.C. in May of this year during
President Erdogan's visit? Do you believe the administration has taken
the appropriate steps to fully condemn this assault on American values
and fundamental freedoms of free speech and assembly?
Answer. The State Department released a statement condemning the
violence and stressing the importance of free speech, and Under
Secretary of State Tom Shannon summoned the Turkish Ambassador. In
addition, the State Department has been working with Washington DC
police and Secret Service to identify and hold accountable those
individuals involved. It was disappointing the White House failed to
address events that occurred immediately after President Trump's
meeting with President Erdogan, which reportedly did not include
discussion of human rights and rule of law. It is important for the
Trump administration to raise both publicly and privately its
expectation that the Turkish Government adhere to democratic
principles.
Cyprus
Question 3. What implications does Erdogan's narrow victory in the
referendum have on the ongoing negotiations of the Cyprus question?
Answer. The negotiation process is currently stalled, as U.N.
Secretary General Antonio Guterres concluded the latest round in Crans-
Montana in July 2017 after the parties failed to reach agreement. U.N.
Special Envoy Espen Barth Eide has left his position. While there had
been hopes for the development of a positive EU-Turkey agenda--to
include Cyprus--after the German elections later this month, the
current tensions between Ankara and Berlin diminish that prospect.
Question 4. Do you believe that Erdogan will be willing to agree to
a withdrawal of Turkish troops from Cyprus?
Answer. Reports on the negotiations at Crans-Montana, Switzerland
suggest Turkey expressed willingness as part of a settlement agreement
to reduce its troop presence (currently estimated at 30,000-40,000) to
the level of the 1960 Treaty of Alliance, which allowed 650 Turkish
troops. The longevity of the troop presence was not resolved in the
negotiations.
__________
Letter Submitted by Amnesty International
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