[Senate Hearing 115-666]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 115-666
MANAGING SECURITY ASSISTANCE
TO SUPPORT FOREIGN POLICY
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 26, 2017
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web:
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___________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
37-504 PDF WASHINGTON : 2019
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
BOB CORKER, Tennessee, Chairman
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
MARCO RUBIO, Florida ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
CORY GARDNER, Colorado TOM UDALL, New Mexico
TODD, YOUNG, Indiana CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming TIM KAINE, Virginia
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
RAND PAUL, Kentucky CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey
Todd Womack, Staff Director
Jessica Lewis, Democratic Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator from Tennessee.................... 1
Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., U.S. Senator from Maryland............. 2
Kaidanow, Hon. Tina S., Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
Political-Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State,
Washington, DC................................................. 4
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Harvey, Thomas H. III, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities, Office of the Secretary of
Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC............ 12
Prepared statement........................................... 13
Hooper, Lieutenant General Charles, USA, Director, Defense
Security Cooperation Agency, Washington, DC.................... 15
Prepared statement........................................... 17
Additional Material Sumitted for the Record
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted to
Thomas H. Harvey and General Charles Hooper by Members of the
Committee
Questions Submitted by Senator Corker........................ 39
Questions Submitted by Senator Cardin........................ 40
Questions Submitted by Senator Menendez...................... 44
Questions Submitted by Senator Young......................... 47
Questions Submitted by Senator Portman....................... 47
(iii)
MANAGING SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO SUPPORT FOREIGN POLICY
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SEPTEMBER 26, 2017
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:32 a.m. in
Room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Bob Corker,
chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Corker [presiding], Rubio, Johnson,
Flake, Gardner, Young, Barrasso, Isakson, Portman, Cardin,
Udall, Murphy, Kaine, Markey, Merkley, and Booker.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE
The Chairman. The Foreign Relations Committee will come to
order.
If it is not objectionable to members, I think we will
begin the hearing and, as soon as we have a quorum, go ahead
and try to pass out the nominees that are before us.
We thank our witnesses for being here. We thank Ambassador
Kaidanow, Acting Assistant Secretary Harvey, and General Hooper
for joining us today.
This is the committee's second hearing on security
assistance in just over a year, but it is an issue that has
been raised during many of our other meetings. This kind of
assistance is an investment in our own security. We help
ourselves by helping other nations police their own
neighborhoods. Which nations we help and how we help them are
crucial foreign policy decisions.
Since the 1960s, the law provides that the Secretary of
State, under the direction of the President, has the
responsibility for the continuous supervision and general
direction of economic assistance, military assistance, and
training programs. We need to be clear on that because our
security demands that we work across agency lines to develop
coherent security assistance programs that serve our interests
and those of our partners.
While the Defense Department has long played an important
role in this area, since 9/11 that role has grown enormously in
size and scope. We cannot tackle the real challenges if we are
fighting turf wars within other bureaucracies. And while
teamwork is necessary, it is not enough.
We need clear goals and a way to keep track of how we are
doing. Between State and DOD, we are spending about $18 billion
a year on security sector assistance. As General Hooper said
the other day, this is not a pickup game. We need
professionals.
Last year, Congress consolidated many of the narrow and
overlapping authorities on the defense side, and it has given
the Defense Department more flexible and global train and equip
authority. I was pleased that the measure signed into law
requires the concurrence of the Secretary of State for these
activities and encourages both departments to jointly develop
and plan such programs.
I would like to hear from our OSD and State witnesses on
the question of concurrence versus coordination as it pertains
to security cooperation activities already in progress such as
the counter-ISIS train and equip.
At the State Department, significant security assistance
roles are held by four different functional bureaus, each with
their own budget, plus all of the regional bureaus. And these
bureaus report down through four different secretaries, making
it difficult to see who is in charge. Under this current
organizational structure, I have concerns about the
Department's ability to manage its own programs while also
reviewing and shaping DOD efforts. I hope the redesign plan
will address this matter, and any insight our witnesses could
share to that process will be greatly appreciated.
We have made some progress since we last gathered on this
topic, and I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on how
the State Department and the Department of Defense will
continue their efforts to make these important programs work as
well as possible.
With that, I ask our distinguished ranking member, my
friend, if he would like to make introductory comments.
STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN CARDIN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND
Senator Cardin. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I really do
believe this is one of our most important hearings we have had
this year, and I thank you very much for doing this because we
all understand that we are talking about our national security.
The U.S. law mandates that the Secretary of State supervise
and oversee all foreign assistance that service that U.S.
foreign policy. All military and security-related assistance to
foreign governments and personnel, including military-to-
military programs, are part of the U.S. foreign assistance and
must serve U.S. foreign policy.
The Department of Defense has been expanding its security
assistance activities by leaps and bounds over the last 16
years. Most of these activities to build foreign countries'
defense capabilities are necessary and important. We
acknowledge that.
My chief concern, however, is that DOD is setting up an
essentially parallel security assistance structure without
sufficient State Department oversight, input, and coordination.
Combine this with the current administration's profoundly
unwise proposal to slash the Department of State's budget,
oblique reorganization efforts, and increasing loss of
experienced personnel, and one could easily see a scenario in
which the Department of Defense could become the dominant
source of U.S. security assistance. This shift from State to
DOD could not only result in dueling foreign policies, it could
also send a fundamental message that the United States
considers security relationships over all other U.S. foreign
policy objectives or concerns, including human rights or good
governance.
Last year's National Defense Authorization Act expanded the
ability of the Department of State to be involved in the actual
formation of DOD assistance projects in addition to requiring
the Department's concurrence in their executions. Congress sent
a clear message that DOD and State must work more closely on
security assistance projects earlier in the process and to a
far greater extent than previously. It was good to see this. We
saw that the members of both the Armed Services and Foreign
Relations Committee understood the importance of this
coordination and the lead from the Department of State, and the
National Defense Authorization Act in fact did carry that out.
I hope we will hear today that we are doing better
coordination and cooperation between the two departments and
that it has been greatly increased. And from what I have heard
just from the conversations, there is reason to believe that
that cooperation exists.
I also have deep concerns about various aspects of our
security assistance, especially how arms sales are used to
support our foreign policy. For example, I am concerned about
the previously proposed arms sales to our increasingly
problematic NATO ally Turkey. I opposed the sale of semi-
automatic pistols to the Erdogan bodyguard force, the same
force that viciously beat peaceful protesters in Washington,
D.C. I am pleased that the sale was effectively canceled last
week, although I remain perplexed that given the gruesome
videos of the incident, it took 4 months for the administration
to cancel the sale.
More recently, Turkey purchased the Russian anti-aircraft
system, despite warnings from the U.S. and other NATO
countries. I believe this is sanctionable under the new Russia
sanctions act, and I have asked the Secretary of State to
review this. I would be interested to hear what, if any,
reviews of the U.S.-Turkey security relationships are underway,
including assistance and arms sales.
I look forward to discussing our security relationship with
Nigeria. I supported a close and supportive security
relationship to defeat Boko Haram, provided that the Nigerian
forces we support are in compliance with the Leahy laws and
broader human rights standards. We have yet to see any
accountability from Nigeria for the December 2015 Zaria
massacre by government forces or for the apparently accidental
air bombing this January of the Rann refugee camp, in which
over 200 people were killed.
First and foremost, the U.S. should prioritize assisting
the Nigerian military with the necessary training, including
human rights training, improved intelligence and targeting
capabilities and the ability to conduct an integrated military
operation to combat the Boko Haram threat.
Given the Rann incident, I do not see how we can be
confident that the precision-guided munitions and new aircraft
provided to the Nigerian military will not be involved in
future accidental civilian casualties. I encourage the State
and Defense Departments to formulate a comprehensive strategy
to address the core weaknesses in the Nigerian military so that
we may better assist them in their fight against Boko Haram. I
hope you can provide me--the witnesses--with assurances that
such strategy is underway.
I would also like to hear details how U.S. security
assistance is being used to support U.S. foreign policy and
security objectives in the Middle East, including the
resolution of the current internal GCC dispute, and to promote
the political resolution of the Yemen conflict. I applaud the
leadership of our chairman on that issue.
Finally, I understand that the Department of State wants to
move lethal small arms and light weapons off the U.S. munitions
list to the Department of Commerce, an action that will
effectively remove these sales from congressional oversight. I
am deeply concerned about that. The proposal includes semi-
automatic pistols, assault weapons, and even military sniper
rifles. As you know, I raised concerns about two proposed small
arms sales over the last year: the sale of pistols to the
Turkish bodyguards and 27,000 assault rifles to the Philippine
national police, which continues to summarily execute its own
civilians. If these weapons go to Commerce, the Congress and
this committee will lose all oversight. Had this proposal been
done earlier, both of these sales could have gone through.
I, along with Senators Feinstein and Leahy, recently sent a
letter to the Secretary of State opposing this unwise move. I
also proposed an amendment to the NDAA to maintain
congressional oversight and disapproval, and I may pursue this
measure in other legislative vehicles.
So, Mr. Chairman, I think we have a lot to talk about
today. It's certainly one of the principal responsibilities of
this committee, and I look forward to hearing from our
witnesses.
The Chairman. Well, thank you for those comments.
You see us looking around. We are looking for an eleventh
Senator. Okay. It is my understanding one Senator is in the
back and he will step in. So if we could, I would like to
adjourn the hearing briefly and start the business meeting and
hopefully move out--actually we have our eleventh here.
[Recess.]
The Chairman. We will now move to the hearing.
Our first witness is Acting Assistant Secretary for
Political and Military Affairs, Tina Kaidanow, from the State
Department. We thank you for being back before us and look
forward to your testimony.
Our second witness is Mr. Todd Harvey, Acting Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities in
the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
Our third witness is General Charles Hooper, Director of
the Defense Security Cooperation Agency.
I want to thank all of you for being here. If you could
summarize your testimony in about 5 minutes, without objection,
your written testimony will be entered into the record. And if
you would just begin in the order introduced, we appreciate it.
Again, thank you.
STATEMENT OF HON. TINA S. KAIDANOW, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
BUREAU OF POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Kaidanow. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman,
Ranking Member Cardin, distinguished members of the committee,
it is my honor and privilege to come before the committee today
to discuss the processes and the methods through which the U.S.
Government provides security sector assistance to our partners
overseas.
I am particularly grateful to be joined in this discussion
by my colleagues and my friends, Acting Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities Todd Harvey and
Lieutenant General Hooper from the Defense Security Cooperation
Agency.
The security assistance effort is a U.S. government-wide
endeavor. As such, the Department of State interacts
collaboratively each and every day with the Department of
Defense in order to formulate and implement critical aspects of
our assistance policy. We also work together with you, the U.S.
Congress, and notably with the members and the staff of this
august committee.
Security assistance is, in the end, a tool of foreign
policy, and the committee's oversight of that assistance is
both welcomed and deeply appreciated by the State Department as
an essential element of effective foreign policymaking.
Finally, although not part of our U.S. Government apparatus
per se, we work exceptionally closely with our foreign partners
with whom we cultivate a critical set of relationships and
whose growing military and defense capability matters from the
standpoint of achieving vital U.S. national security
objectives, whether encountering terrorism, deterring
aggression by our mutual adversaries overseas, or pushing back
against other emergent threats.
Though it is now some years ago, President Reagan's 1982
National Security Strategy made the clear and very compelling
case that security assistance programs are one of the most
cost-effective means that we have of enhancing the security of
the United States. Those words, I would argue, are as true
today as they were back in 1982, although the statutes and the
processes through which American security assistance is carried
out have changed significantly since that time.
Since 2001, in particular, we have seen a reorientation of
U.S. security towards addressing specific threats, often
construed in a largely military-related construct. For example,
funds and authorities have been aimed at helping our allies and
friends address security challenges in Eastern Europe, in North
Africa in the Maghreb, in the South China Sea, and elsewhere.
But at its core, security assistance is and must remain an
element of our larger foreign policy. It should be regarded as
an important, but by no means exclusive, tool in our toolkit of
measures as we think about the proper balance of goals and
objectives in any country or region of the world.
Given the unquestioned relationship between security
assistance and foreign policy, the Department of State must
continue to play a crucial role in the provision and the
coordination of such assistance across the U.S. Government.
State works, I hope, diligently to ensure that all security
sector assistance strategically advances our foreign policy
objectives, that it advances U.S. goals in light of broader
diplomatic and defense relationships, that everything the many
and varied entities of the U.S. Government are doing in the
foreign security sector advances a single, coherent strategy,
that any investments we make in foreign security forces advance
both security and political purposes, that such efforts take
into account the political balance between civil and military
institutions in the recipient country, that they are based on
mutual enduring interests between our countries, and that they
do not cause long-term unintended effects in the country or in
the region.
That is certainly the case as we go about the business of
implementing the State Department's Title 22 authorities. It is
equally the case, however, as we fulfill the State Department's
congressionally mandated roles of coordination, concurrence,
and joint planning and development with regard to the Title 10
authorities that fall under the purview of the Department of
Defense. That includes signally, as the chairman mentioned, the
new section 333 authority that was mandated by the fiscal year
2017 NDAA. Section 333 stipulates specifically in legislation
that assistance should not only be provided with the
concurrence of the Secretary of State, but also be jointly
formulated by the two departments.
While we had certainly made some strides in that direction
previously with the cooperation of our DOD colleagues, section
333 marks a significant step forward from where we have been
before. I believe this is a trend that will become even more
critical in a time of resource challenges, but it makes sense
from any standpoint as we seek to ensure the greatest
efficiency and effectiveness possible for our U.S. security
assistance, in essence, to get the greatest bang for our
assistance buck.
There is no question that this is both where the Secretary
of State and the Secretary of Defense want us to go. Indeed, at
the direction of our two secretaries, we have now established a
new State-DOD security sector assistance steering committee to
oversee an intensification of enhanced joint planning. I co-
chair this committee, together with Todd here to my right, and
the committee is now engaged in developing a process for fiscal
year 2018 military assistance planning that will enable State
and DOD to validate our security assistance requirements, in
keeping with our administration's priorities, to look carefully
at how best to optimize DOD's section 333 military assistance
and State FMF resources towards that end, to leverage each
department's expertise and authorities, and to reinforce our
respective requests to the Congress.
In the longer term, we hope to strategically integrate
State and DOD planning and resourcing processes for an even
wider range of security assistance efforts, including by
synchronizing our budget requests and rationalizing and
refining the use of each department's authorities.
I want to thank you again for taking up this absolutely
essential issue and finding the time today to address it
thoughtfully.
I cannot stress enough how appreciative I am for the
tremendous partnership and the good will of the two gentlemen
sitting beside me here today, as well as many of your staff who
so patiently worked through these very complex issues together
with us.
I ask that my written statement, as you said, be accepted
for the record, and I very much look forward to your questions.
[Ambassador Kaidanow's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Tina S. Kaidanow
Mr. Chairman, Senator Cardin, and members of the committee, thank
you for the opportunity to be here today.
Security assistance is a vital, integral component of our
national security strategy . . . Security assistance programs
are a most cost-effective means of enhancing the security of
the United States.
President Ronald Reagan
These words, from President Reagan's 1982 National Security
Strategy, are as true today as they were then, although the statutes
and processes through which American security assistance is programmed
and managed have changed significantly since that time. Since 2001 in
particular, we have seen a re-orientation of security assistance,
greatly driven by the emergence of the global threat from terrorism,
towards the purpose of achieving military ends. Yet at its core--as
directed by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,\1\ the Arms Export
Control Act and, indeed, by the annual State and Foreign Operations
appropriations acts, including the most recent FY 2017 Consolidated
Appropriations Act\2\ --foreign assistance, including security
assistance, is a tool of foreign policy that may be very effectively
used in the context of the consideration of the long term interests of
the United States, among them relationship building, regional power
balancing, interoperability, and the promotion of professionalism in
the armed forces of partner nations. Given the relationship between
security assistance and foreign policy, the Department of State must
play a crucial role in the provision, direction, supervision and
coordination of this assistance and all similar assistance across the
U.S. Government.
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\1\ 22 U.S.C. 2382(c): Under the direction of the President, the
Secretary of State shall be responsible for the continuous supervision
and general direction of economic assistance, military assistance, and
military education and training programs, including but not limited to
determining whether there shall be a military assistance (including
civic action) or a military education and training program for a
country and the value thereof, to the end that such programs are
effectively integrated both at home and abroad and the foreign policy
of the United States is best served thereby. For Foreign Military
Financing, loans and cooperative programs, there is also a similar
provision at 22 USC 2752.
\2\ P.L. 115-31, FY 2017 Consolidated Appropriations Act, Section
7056(a): Under the direction of the President, the Secretary of State
shall be responsible for the continuous supervision and general
direction of economic assistance, law enforcement and justice sector
assistance, military assistance, and military education and training
programs, including but not limited to determining whether there shall
be a military assistance (including civic action) or a military
education and training program for a country and the value thereof, to
the end that such programs are effectively integrated both at home and
abroad and the foreign policy of the United States is best served
thereby.
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Security assistance is a powerful tool that the United States can
use to strengthen our alliances and partnerships around the world and
mitigate threats that require a collective response: terrorism,
organized crime, restraints on the freedom of navigation, and other
challenges to our national security. U.S. security assistance supports
regional stability in the face of terrorist threats, in particular the
threat posed by ISIS and other organizations such as Al-Qaeda, Boko
Haram, and al-Shabaab. Our assistance reassures allies and partners and
provides the means for them to counter destabilizing and malign
activities of violent extremist groups in a regional context. It also
strengthens security relationships in a manner that bolsters regional
and global security, increases U.S. influence, secures access and legal
protections to facilitate deployment of U.S. forces, improves
interoperability between U.S. and coalition partners, advantageously
shapes partners' capabilities to support strategic priorities, and
promotes the U.S. defense industrial base as the first and best option
for states that are procuring defense articles. Our security assistance
helps build security sector institutional capacity to ensure the long-
term sustainability, effectiveness, professionalism, and resilience of
partner and ally nations, and it promotes post-conflict stability to
enhance partners' internal security and reduce threats to U.S. and
partner interests.
But security assistance is also a tool that inherently implicates
every aspect of our foreign policy--whether because of the sensitivity
of the partner, questions of regional balance, or the type of
assistance, as well as the program's overall impact on bilateral and
regional goals and relationships. It is, therefore, a tool that we must
use in conjunction with the other key pillar of foreign policy:
diplomacy.
State works diligently to ensure that all security sector
assistance--whether it be the provision of major munitions in Iraq or
Lebanon, border security programs in Eastern Europe, maritime capacity
building in Vietnam, or military justice programs in Mexico--
strategically targets and advances our foreign policy objectives in the
country at issue and accounts for the broader regional and global
context. It is our job to ensure that our security assistance aligns
with and advances U.S. goals in light of the broader diplomatic and
defense relationship, and that everything the many and varied entities
of the U.S. Government are doing in foreign security sectors advances a
single, coherent strategy.
The Department must work to ensure that any investments we make in
foreign security forces advance both political and security purposes;
that they account for the political balance between civil and military
institutions in the recipient country; that they are based on mutual,
enduring interests between our countries; and that they do not cause
long-term unintended effects in the country or region.
This is an important role, and one we take very seriously. This is
the case whether we are talking about our own Title 22 assistance
authorities such as Foreign Military Financing (FMF), Peacekeeping
Operations (PKO), Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related
programs (NADR), International Military Education and Training (IMET),
or International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE) accounts and
authorities. It is equally the case as we fulfill the Department's
Congressionally-mandated role of concurrence, and joint planning and
development, as well as coordination, with Department of Defense (Title
10) authorities, such as the new section 333 mandated by the FY 2017
NDAA, or the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, the Maritime
Security Initiative, the Counter-ISIS Train and Equip authority, and
others.
Over recent years, the United States has provided more than $15
billion in security sector assistance per year. The amount of security
sector assistance has nearly tripled since 2001, driven in large part
by expanded authorities and appropriations for DoD to build the
capacity of foreign security forces in support of ongoing
counterterrorism and Coalition operations. Whereas State managed more
than 80 percent of the U.S. Government's security sector assistance
before 2001, we now manage roughly 50 percent. This has made it all the
more important that we work closely with our partners at DoD to ensure
a unified approach.
Promoting an Integrated State-DoD Approach
Secretary Tillerson and Secretary Mattis have committed our
departments to work more closely together to optimize the full range of
security sector assistance resources, in order to achieve the best
possible outcomes for U.S. national security and the American taxpayer.
We have established a new State-DoD Security Sector Assistance (SSA)
Steering Committee to oversee more enhanced joint planning.
Congress has aided this effort by ensuring that DoD's new section
333 authority is structured in a way that promotes State and DoD's
collaboration. Specifically, section 333 stipulates that assistance
programs should be jointly formulated by the two departments and
provided with the concurrence of the Secretary of State. Working with
DoD, we are establishing the appropriate structures and processes to
meet these requirements efficiently and effectively.
In the past, State has sought a division of labor between State and
DoD programming whereby DoD largely limits its activities to assistance
in support of ongoing operations and efforts related to U.S. force
readiness, and State takes responsibility for all other capacity
building efforts as part of its broader foreign assistance
responsibilities. The new section 333 authority--and its focus on
longer-term capacity building--indicates that Congress supports a
broader direction. With this in mind, we are working with DoD to
determine how we can best marshal our respective resources to achieve
our common national goals.
The legislated ``concurrence'' role of State in Chapter 16 of Title
10 (DoD) authorities, is the most robust statutory device for ensuring
input into DoD programs (while other means of input, such as a
``coordination'' or ``consultation'' role, being less robust in this
context).
Concurrence: Where an authority requires the ``concurrence of the
Secretary of State,'' State's practice is to have the Secretary
or other designated senior official approve the relevant
activities prior to their being undertaken. In recent practice,
this entails a signed memorandum or letter to DoD stating the
principal's concurrence on each activity or set of activities.
Joint Formulation--Now Joint Planning and Development: Section 333,
DoD's new, comprehensive train and equip authority, replaced
its longstanding successor authorities, section 1206 (later
section 2282), but similarly requires that a much broader range
of capacity building programs be ``jointly planned and
developed'' with State, in addition to State's concurrence.
This is similar to the longstanding requirement since 2006, in
section 1206, the predecessor authority, which provided that
programs under that authority be jointly formulated, and
concurred in. State concurrence is an essential safeguard and
could be exercised at various stages of program development to
ensure that the departments are collaborating appropriately at
the working level. Joint formulation--now joint planning and
development--is often what actually produces an effective
whole-of-government approach. By working together through a
combination of formal and informal processes throughout the
entire life-cycle of a program, we can direct our collective
resources strategically, leveraging each other's strengths and
expertise, and align our activities abroad to support a
coherent strategy.
Done properly, joint planning and development requires
collaborative processes throughout the planning, budgeting,
implementation, and monitoring and evaluation processes. It must
involve relevant stakeholders in the field and at headquarters, as only
headquarters can provide the appropriate regional, global, and
technical perspectives. These processes must also be tailored to each
program or authority to most efficiently and expediently achieve the
appropriate level of State oversight. The Department of State is
committed to getting these processes right. We greatly appreciate your
attention to these details. With your support, State will maintain a
legislated role promoting complementarity and unity of effort in all
U.S. foreign assistance, including that managed by other agencies.
Conducting the necessary review and providing concurrence on DoD's
security sector assistance is no small task. Since March 2017, my
Bureau, Political-Military Affairs (PM), has coordinated State
concurrence for nearly 350 projects in 9 separate review actions under
DoD's section 333 authority, with other regional and functional State
bureaus to include INL and CT, as appropriate. The requests for section
333 concurrence have mostly been comprised of counter-narcotics
activities and counterterrorism activities, both of which were
previously executed under DoD's predecessor authorities, some of which
lacked the State concurrence requirement. These however represent only
a fraction of the full breadth of programs that DoD will be
implementing under the section 333 authority. Additionally, State
reviewed and provided policy and prioritization feedback on initial FY
2018 proposal concepts during a series of DoD regional strategy reviews
in July 2018.
In addition, in June 2017 alone, PM coordinated State concurrence
on over 1,100 regional center activities expected to be undertaken with
non-military counterparts, non-governmental organizations, and
international organizations.
Until these processes are more fully fleshed out, the Department's
coordination efforts include:
Reviewing projects to identify items of concern for State
stakeholders, e.g., political, policy and/or programmatic
concerns;
Determining whether any State legal restrictions prohibit or limit
the assistance;
Verifying that the host nation has an appropriate mechanism to
provide relevant assurances, such as through an end-use
assurance agreement for assistance being provided under section
333 and/or other DoD authorities; and if not, and facilitating
the establishment of such mechanism, if necessary;
Gathering financial data from PM, INL, CT, ISN, and appropriate
regional bureaus for DoD's Congressional notifications, which
must report certain foreign assistance provided to the host
country during the three previous fiscal years; and,
Addressing questions and/or areas of concern posed by State
functional and regional bureaus with DoD.
As State and DoD take steps to establish a more comprehensive joint
planning and development process, we hope this will include a
collaborative approach to issuing strategic guidance, developing
priorities, and conducting rigorous reviews of each program proposal to
properly assess program viability, risks, and chances for success;
potential third order effects for the country and region; expected
political impact; and the extent of synchronization with other U.S.
Government and third country efforts. We appreciate DoD's intent to
develop a process that permits this.
To this end, as previously indicated, Secretaries Tillerson and
Mattis have directed the establishment of a State-DoD SSA Steering
Committee. This Committee is overseeing ongoing discussions that I co-
chair with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and
Capabilities.
As an immediate priority, the Committee is working to develop an
immediate process for Fiscal Year 2018 security sector assistance
planning that will permit State and DoD to validate security assistance
requirements for countries that directly support this Administration's
top priorities, optimize section 333 military assistance and FMF
resources to effectively advance national security objectives, leverage
each Department's expertise and authorities, and reinforce our
respective requests to Congress. In the longer term, the intentis to
strategically integrate State and DoD planning and resourcing processes
for a wider range of SSA resources, including by synchronizing budget
requests and rationalizing and refining the use of SSA authorities.
Within the State Department, multiple offices have significant
roles to play in the planning, development, execution, and oversight of
security sector assistance. These include:
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM): PM directs FMF, IMET,
and PKO--meaning that it develops policy parameters for project
proposals developed by DoD personnel at U.S. embassies abroad;
works with DoD stakeholders to develop capability requirements;
establishes priorities; determines budget trade-offs; and
oversees DoD execution of the programs. It also manages State's
role in DoD security cooperation, including by managing the
joint planning and development process and exercising the
Secretary's delegated authority to concur on a number of DoD
programs. The FY 2017 NDAA requires State to identify a lead
program coordinator for section 333, and the Secretary has
designated the PM Assistant Secretary to assume that role.
Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources (F): F oversees
security sector assistance implementation and policy
coordination for the Department of State and leads related
interagency processes. F is also responsible for technical
support and oversight of all SSA-related budget formulation,
coordination on strategic planning, assessment, program design,
partner selection procedures, performance management,
monitoring and evaluation. F also exercises State's authority
to concur on 333 programs, based on recommendations from PM.
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL): INL
manages State's INCLE funding and provides policy oversight and
input and ultimately foreign policy direction on DoD counter-
narcotics activities, counter-transnational organized crime,
and assistance to civilian security sector entities such as law
enforcement and criminal justice sector institutions.
Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN): ISN
manages some NADR programs such as the Export Control and
Related Border Security (EXBS) program and provides input on
DoD-led Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) programs.
Bureau of Counterterrorism (CT): CT manages some NADR programs,
notably the Department's share of the Counterterrorism
Partnerships Fund, and provides input on DoD programs,
including CWMD programs.
Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS): DS implements some NADR
programs including Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA), and
provides input on DoD counterterrorism programs. Through ATA's
NADR and Special Program for Embassy Augmentation and Response
(SPEAR) programs, DS coordinates State-DoD collaboration on
bilateral/ multilateral training and exercises. ATA law
enforcement integration into the U.S. Special Operations
Command Africa Flintlock exercise is a proven example of how to
successfully promote interoperability between civilian and
military security forces.
State Department Regional Bureaus: Regional Bureaus provide input
on programs and priorities across the spectrum of State and DoD
security assistance programs in which State has a role in
formulation or concurrence.
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL): As with the
Regional Bureaus, DRL provides input by identifying the risks
of human rights abuses and violations by partner forces in
programs and priorities across the spectrum of State assistance
and DoD assistance for which State has a concurring role. DRL
leads the human rights vetting process (``Leahy vetting'').
Office of the Legal Adviser (L): In addition to its role as relates
to State Department (Title 22) assistance, L also reviews all
DoD section 333, 331, and other Title 10 proposals in which
State has a concurrence or coordination role, including to help
identify, where applicable, any relevant foreign assistance
restrictions.
Office of Legislative Affairs (H): With other bureaus, H monitors
and preliminarily assesses new legislative developments in the
SSA realm, on a real time basis, to stay on top of that process
and to mitigate adverse impact undermining institutional
equities of the Secretary in order to help preserve the
Secretary's lead responsibility for the supervision and
direction of such assistance.
With this structure laid out, let me walk you through how our
security assistance is programmed, comparing the Department's role in a
Title 22 assistance authority, that of Foreign Military Financing, with
our role in a Title 10 authority like section 333:
Both section 333 and FMF programming begin with strategic guidance
to the field; Security Cooperation Offices (SCOs) and Combatant
Commands (COCOMS) then develop proposals in accordance with that
guidance. It is State's hope that in the future this strategic guidance
will be joint, covering both programs.
Further, both section 333 and FMF rely on interagency forums to
validate concepts and/or detailed proposals. For example, for FMF,
following the submission of SCOs proposals, COCOMs recommended regional
recommendations, and embassies' Mission Resource Requests, PM convenes
annual security assistance roundtables to discuss country- and region-
specific objectives, priorities, and associated capabilities and
requirements. Participants include the regional bureaus, INL, CT, DRL,
combatant commands, OSD, Joint Staff, and the Defense Security
Cooperation Agency (DSCA). Based on these discussions, PM and the
regional bureaus develop recommended programs and allocations to be
included in the Congressional Budget Justification. It is State's
desire that in the future these FMF roundtables will be combined,
covering both State and DoD equities authorities and programs.
Once a proposal is approved, and in State's case, the money becomes
available, FMF requires justification to Congress; also all section 333
programming requires congressional notification. Both FMF and section
333 programs rely on the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, which
the DSCA manages. Once the notification is complete, section 333
implementation can begin immediately, as it does not require the
affirmative buy-in of the recipient. SFMF, however, requires the host
nation recipient to sign a Letter of Offer and Agreement (LOA) with the
U.S. Government, typically with DSCA, in which the recipient agrees to
the purchase and numerous other provisions, including retransfer and
end-use restrictions.
Aside from this question of host nation participation in the FMF
process, subsequent execution of both funding streams is similar.
Improving Outcomes and Efficiency of our Security Assistance
As we work to enhance our collaboration with DoD, we are also
looking at how we can most effectively utilize security assistance. In
that vein, we are considering changes to the way we do business--for
example, by building in more accountability and cost-sharing and other
co-investment strategies.
The Fiscal Year 2018 budget request, for instance, proposes
transitioning some of our FMF from grant assistance to loans. FMF loans
will provide an opportunity for the U.S. Government to both promote
U.S. industry and build key partners' defense capabilities, while
minimizing the burden on U.S. taxpayers. Department of State planning
for a partial transition from FMF grants to loans is focused on
fulfilling core foreign policy and national security needs, maximizing
our budgetary outcomes, and working with foreign recipients to maintain
key security partnerships. To the extent that past grant FMF recipients
are willing and able to continue expanding or sustaining their U.S.-
origin defense capabilities through FMF loans instead of grants, the
United States will be able to reduce the amount of foreign assistance
needed for these purposes. Partners may have the opportunity to borrow
more than they received in the past in grant assistance, allowing
recipients to purchase more American-made defense equipment and
services. The Department is in the process of conducting loan
feasibility reviews on a country-by-country basis, considering each
country's importance to U.S. national security, national budget,
expected ability to fulfill the terms of a loan agreement, and
likelihood of interest. The Department will keep the Committee informed
of its progress in this effort.
We are also working to ensure that the assistance we do have is
spent efficiently and with positive effect. Through Department-specific
policy and evaluation requirements mandated by Congress, the Department
of State has continued to prioritize and develop monitoring and
evaluation (M&E) across sectors. State has been and remains a leader
among U.S. Government agencies on developing and implementing M&E for
the security assistance. M&E of these security assistance programs
provides unique challenges in terms of the content of the programs,
diversity of stakeholders, significant external factors, and highly
challenging implementation environments.
Through the early evaluation work of the PKO-funded Global
Peacekeeping Operations Initiative (GPOI) and followed by other State
programs, the Department has developed a range of frameworks, tools,
and best practices widely recognized as promoting effective programs,
improving future plans, and, ultimately, informing our policy. While
the programs cited cover a broad range of activities serving an array
of foreign policy objectives, the Department continuously seeks to
ensure consistency when possible. Ensuring that our efforts are
complementary with DoD's nascent assessment, monitoring, and evaluation
effort is a central concern for our military assistance programs.
Conclusion
I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today on the key
topic of security assistance. In all of our assistance, I believe the
Department of State has three critical partners: our colleagues in the
Department of Defense, with whom we are working continuously to
implement our role in assistance; our foreign partners, with whom we
work every day to build capacity, increase interoperability, and
develop relationships; and, you, the U.S. Congress. Security assistance
is, in the end, a tool of foreign policy, and the committee's oversight
of that assistance is welcomed by the Department as an essential
element of effective policy-making.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Harvey?
STATEMENT OF THOMAS H. HARVEY III, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE FOR STRATEGY, PLANS, AND CAPABILITIES, OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON,
DC
Mr. Harvey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cardin,
distinguished members of the committee. I appreciate the
opportunity to appear before you here today with my colleagues
from the State Department and Defense Security Cooperation
Agency.
As you underscored at the outset, the Department of Defense
conducts a broad range of security assistance activities
globally. DoD authorities and resources in the security
assistance sphere have expanded to meet new and evolving
security challenges over the past 10 to 15 years, certainly
since the first DoD train and equip authority, the original
section 1206, was passed by Congress in 2005.
Even as DoD's direct involvement in the security assistance
arena has increased, the Defense Department has sought to work
closely with our State Department counterparts to identify,
formulate, and implement partner security capacity building
programs. The Department of Defense strongly endorses and
supports the State Department's leading role in not only
setting the administration's course on foreign policy, but
defining the shape and purpose of our U.S. foreign assistance
efforts, including security assistance initiatives.
No official outside the State Department has been a
stronger proponent for reinforcing State's primacy in
performing these roles and having added resources to execute
them than Secretary of Defense Mattis. He recognizes, more than
most, that success in addressing the Nation's threats requires
an integrated team effort where DoD's and State's resource
allocation processes are tightly linked and mutually
reinforcing.
Most DoD security assistance programs are bounded by
statutory obligations to jointly develop and plan their
activities in conjunction with the State Department and to
secure Secretary of State concurrence before implementing them.
The Department of Defense recognizes the importance, even the
essential imperative, of conducting business in this way. In
our government, no department has the luxury of pursuing
uncoordinated efforts, especially given finite resources and
growing threats. While it may not have always been so, I would
venture to say that, currently, all DoD's security assistance
programs are shaped and approved at some level, and often at
multiple levels, by the State Department, from the country team
to the regional function bureaus at main State, to the
Secretary himself.
One factor to keep in mind, as we consider the U.S.
security assistance enterprise, DoD should not replicate the
functions of the State Department and vice versa. While some
overlap in authorities and resources provides useful
flexibility in tackling difficult security threats, the two
departments cannot and should not seek to recreate or mirror
each other's security assistance programs exactly. DoD and the
State Department can work toward the same objectives and ends
but contribute to those ends through different ways or lines of
effort that reflect their distinct histories, missions, and
capabilities.
Many of DoD activities have grown out of pressing
operational needs identified by commanders on the ground, which
complement but differ from the broader political and diplomatic
imperatives that often have formed the State Department
security assistance activities. Those distinctions have
admittedly blurred in the margins over the years but can still
be seen in the underlying rationale for core programs for each
department.
In the past 2 years, DoD has worked closely with its
oversight committees to reform the way we approach security
assistance by consolidating authorities, combining resources,
pursuing workforce reform, and improving evaluation efforts.
Why is this important? Because it infuses DoD efforts with
greater discipline, helping guard against mission creep, and
giving us the tools to identify and jettison ineffectual
projects as soon as possible. These efforts also allow DoD to
speak with a more unified voice in collaborating with the State
Department so that we can assure that DoD's security assistance
actors adhere to guidance resulting from collective decisions
made at senior levels of the two departments.
As Ambassador Kaidanow indicated, a tangible marker of the
commitment to work even more closely together is represented by
Secretary Mattis and Secretary Tillerson's decision and
direction that the two departments form and regularly convene a
security sector assistance steering committee that sets
security assistance priorities in this field and synchronizes
our investments to ensure that we do not duplicate efforts on
one hand, nor inadvertently create gaps or seams between our
programs on the other.
Finally, I would simply reiterate that DoD is committed to
working productively and harmoniously with the State Department
in this space. DoD has no desire nor intent to supplant State
because we recognize that the multi-dimensional challenges we
face where security, governance, stabilization, and development
all intermingle require the full and integrated efforts of both
departments if we are to succeed in achieving our security
goals globally.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I stand by for your questions.
[Mr. Harvey's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Todd Harvey
Thank you Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, members of the
committee. I am pleased to be here today to share my thoughts on the
integrated effort between the State Department and Department of
Defense Security Sector Assistance (SSA) initiatives.
Building partnerships, supporting allies, and protecting national
interests are essential elements of U.S. foreign policy and national
security. Over the past 15 years, as DoD has increasingly sought to
operationalize partnerships to focus on achieving mutual security
objectives, Congress has granted the Department a number of Title 10
authorities subject to different regional, functional, or financial
constraints. DoD has worked closely with the State Department to ensure
that DoD and State programs are complementary and mutually reinforcing.
While there is always room for improvement, both Secretaries have
committed to synchronizing their two Departments' efforts to ensure the
highest collective return on the investment of resources in the
security cooperation (SC) arena.
Importance of SSA Objectives on DoD Policy
Speaking at the Shangri-La Dialogue this past June, Secretary
Mattis emphasized that one of the Department's highest priorities is to
empower countries to be even stronger contributors to their own peace
and prosperity. When used effectively, SC tools emphasize the
importance of enabling partners to address shared security challenges
while enhancing the interoperability of allies and partners with the
U.S. joint force.
After 9/11, Congress granted incremental expansions of conditions-
based authorities in an effort to allow DoD to be more responsive to
emerging global threats, while addressing longer-term global and
regional shared security challenges. The unintended consequence was the
creation of a patchwork of authorities which complicated management,
application and oversight of those engagements. To remedy this
challenge, the Congress enacted sweeping reforms to consolidate and
restructure SC in the 2017 NDAA, allowing DoD to prioritize, address a
broader range of contingencies, and achieve more strategic results. The
NDAA permanently codifies a number of SC authorities, including
consolidation of several train and equip authorities to better reflect
real world situations; a requirement to assess, monitor, and evaluate
the results of SC efforts; and consolidation of policy oversight and
resource allocation under the authority of a single official at the
Under Secretary level or below to enable prioritization and trade-offs.
Finally, it offers an opportunity to consolidate SC program management
within the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA,) to "eliminate
distortions, lack of coordination, and duplication of effort in the
current architecture arising from narrowly focused program management
offices," per the joint explanatory statement accompanying the NDAA.
DoD Implementation of Title 10 Authorities
Policy is working with DoD Components to implement reforms along
multiple lines of effort including Oversight and Resource Allocation;
Workforce Development; Planning and AM&E; International Sales; and
Organizational Alignment. The Deputy Secretary of Defense designated
the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) as the single oversight
authority to unify SC policy oversight. Policy is in the process of
issuing program guidance for the consolidated train-and-equip authority
that provides clearer objectives to Geographic Combatant Commanders--a
framework through which the Department may better consider trade-offs,
both cross-regionally and cross-functionally. This streamlining will
help DoD speak with one voice in coordinating its efforts with State
Department.
The NDAA requires that, starting with the President's Budget for
FY19, the Department set forth a comprehensive SC budget display that
identifies and explains all SC funding and provide regular spending
updates. The provision will enhance Congressional oversight of DoD SC
programs and activities, including those of the Military Departments.
Realizing many of the benefits described above rests on DoD's
ability to undertake workforce reform. A better-trained SC workforce
will improve planning and application of authorities, which will drive
new ways to engage partners to achieve more impactful results.
Workforce development will benefit both Title 22 and Title 10 programs
and enhance cooperation with State Department. To address the
assessment, monitoring evaluation (AM&E) requirements in the NDAA, DoD
is working to establish a consistent approach to AM&E to ensure SC
initiatives are deliberately planned and executed and achieve strategic
objectives. Assessment, monitoring, and evaluation of security
cooperation programs will foster accurate and transparent reporting on
the outcomes and sustainability of security cooperation, improve
returns on DoD security cooperation investment, and identify and
disseminate best practices and lessons learned to inform decisions on
security cooperation policy, plans, programs, and resources.
We're working to implement the NDAA requirement that train-and-
equip programs include appropriate human rights training and
institutional capacity building. DoD intends to meet this requirement
through our defense institution building programs, which promote
establishment of defense institutions that are effective, accountable,
and transparent.
State-DoD SSA Steering Committee
This past spring, Secretary Tillerson and Secretary Mattis
established an Assistant Secretary-level State-DoD SSA Steering
Committee to oversee a collaborative planning process, identifying top
national security priorities and synchronizing investments to maximize
results.
The committee's long-term goal is to integrate planning and
resourcing processes for a wide range of SSA programs, including by
ensuring State and DoD's budget requests are complementary, and
rationalizing and refining the use of SSA authorities. To that end, the
Steering Committee will also oversee State and DoD inputs into the
President's Quadrennial Review of SSA required by the FY 2017 NDAA.
For FY 2018, State and DoD developed a planning process that will
facilitate joint validation of requirements to address the
administration's top priorities. It will also inform DoD's planning and
prioritization of Section 333 and related train-and-equip authorities.
This process will enhance our ability to effectively advance national
security objectives, leverage each Department's expertise and
authorities, and reinforce our respective requests to Congress.
Conclusion
Effective SC depends on a close and collaborative relationship
between the Departments of State and Defense, to mutually strengthen
our partners and allies, build security globally, and respond to
threats that require collective effort.
I look forward to your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Lieutenant General?
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHARLES HOOPER, USA, DIRECTOR,
DEFENSE SECURITY COOPERATION AGENCY, WASHINGTON, DC
General Hooper. Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, and
distinguished members of the committee, I am pleased to be here
today to share my thoughts on the role of the Defense Security
Cooperation Agency, or DSCA, in the management, execution, and
reform of security cooperation.
As you know, security cooperation includes a wide range of
activities such as transfers of defense articles and services,
military-to-military exercises, ministerial advising, and train
and equip programs using both Title 10 and Title 22 authorities
to deliver a full spectrum of capabilities to our partners.
DSCA has traditionally focused on the execution of Title 22
authorized programs such as foreign military sales, or FMS,
funded by partner nations themselves and foreign military
financing, funded by the Department of State. As a result of
the legislative mandates in the fiscal year 2017 National
Defense Authorization Act, however, DSCA is now responsible for
implementing broader supervision of Title 10 security
cooperation programs that are funded and executed by the
Department of Defense such as train and equip, humanitarian
assistance, and defense institution building, to name but a
few.
DSCA plays a critical role in the nexus of diplomacy,
policy, and program execution working closely with our
counterparts throughout DoD, in particular OSD policy, and also
working with the interagency and especially with the Department
of State colleagues in Ambassador Kaidanow's bureau and, of
course, the Members of Congress and their staffs. In this role,
we aim to align and integrate policy and operational
requirements to provide innovative security cooperation
solutions that benefit both our foreign partners and the United
States.
As Ambassador Kaidanow and Mr. Harvey have noted, our
programs build relationships that directly support U.S.
security interests, develop allied and partner military
capabilities, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and
contingency access. It is important to note, though, this
access is not just geographical. It is an opportunity to build
personal relationships which underpin our national security and
foreign policy.
One of my main focus areas at DSCA is to ensure we continue
to cultivate effective and transparent relationships not only
between our Defense and State counterparts, but with partner
nations, private industry, and other influencers throughout the
security cooperation process.
Over the past few years, in close collaboration with OSD
policy and the State Department, DSCA has begun to implement a
robust set of initiatives addressing security cooperation
challenges, in particular those associated with foreign
military sales. Today, our partners are expecting more
deliveries on accelerated timelines, and international
competition in the defense trade is increasing. The majority of
FMS cases are shepherded through the process relatively
quickly. A small number, however, may take more time as the
interagency and Congress engage in a deliberate review to
ensure that the necessary statutory and policy criteria are
met.
Despite this, the United States remains the global security
cooperation partner of choice. We deliver not only the most
effective defensive systems to our partners, but we also ensure
a total package approach that includes the provision of
training, maintenance, sustainment to achieve a full spectrum
capability.
While improvements to the FMS process are necessary, they
are not sufficient to make sure that we best utilize all of the
security cooperation tools at our disposal. The fiscal year
2017 NDAA put forth a number of significant reforms to enhance
flexibility, transparency, oversight, and management of
programs and resources, professionalized the security
cooperation workforce, and improved the alignment of security
cooperation activities with defensive strategies. Together with
the FMS improvement initiatives, these new authorities provide
us with a unique opportunity to transform security cooperation
into a more strategic U.S. national security tool.
Work on these reforms is well underway, and we must
continue to harmonize our efforts across DoD, as well as the
interagency. We must allow for open dialogue respecting all
perspectives, while at the same time taking advantage of the
momentum we have to achieve the reform mandates in a timely
manner.
For the last 70 years, security cooperation has been the
pillar of U.S. foreign policy. We must not, however, rest on
our laurels. Today, the convergence of congressional mandates
with the Department's emphasis on strengthening our partners is
a call to action. We must seize this opportunity to fortify our
status as the security cooperation partner of choice.
Thank you.
[General Hooper's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Lieutenant General Charles W. Hooper, USA
Thank you Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, and members of
the committee. I am pleased to be here today to share my thoughts on
the role of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) in the
management, execution, and reform of Security Cooperation (SC).
The mission of DSCA is to lead the SC community--including DSCA
headquarters and its subcomponents, the Implementing Agencies in the
Military Departments, and the Security Cooperation Offices in over 140
U.S. embassies--in developing and executing innovative solutions that
support mutual U.S. and foreign partner interests. Our programs build
relationships that directly support U.S. security interests, develop
allied and partner military capabilities, and provide U.S. forces with
peacetime and contingency access. The Agency performs this mission by
cultivating effective, efficient, and transparent relationships with SC
stakeholders including the Department of State (DoS), the U.S.
Congress, partner nations, industry, and other influencers throughout
SC processes. Security Cooperation is a key tool of U.S. foreign policy
and national security. The Departments of Defense and State share
responsibility for achieving the SC mission.
SC in Context
SC includes a wide range of activities--such as transfers of
defense articles and services, military-to-military exercises,
ministerial advising, and train-and-equip programs--using both Title 10
and Title 22 U.S. Code authorities to deliver a full-spectrum of
capabilities to our partners. Within that SC framework, DSCA
traditionally implemented several programs under Title 10 authorities,
such as Train and Equip, Humanitarian Assistance, and Defense
Institution Building programs. In addition, DSCA administers Title 22
authorized programs overseen by the DoS, such as the Foreign Military
Sales (FMS) and the Foreign Military Financing (FMF).
DSCA has traditionally focused on the execution of FMS, to include
providing oversight for over 10,000 FMS and FMF Administrative-funded
personnel across the SC community. As a result of the legislative
mandates to reform SC in the Fiscal Year 2017 National Defense
Authorization Act (FY 2017 NDAA), DSCA is charged by Section 382(b) of
Title 10 with the execution and administration of all SC programs and
activities of the Department involving the provision of defense
articles, military training and other defense related services by
grant, loan, cash sale or lease. DSCA now has additional duties to
execute and administer military to military engagements, training with
foreign forces, support operations, capacity building, and some
educational and training activities to include the support for other
departments and agencies of the U.S. Government that advance DoD SC
objectives. I will highlight the Department's efforts to make both
Title 10 and Title 22 authorities a more effective tool of our foreign
policy and national security.
FMS Process Improvements
The SC community has worked to develop, analyze, and assess FMS
planning, resourcing, and execution. Together with stakeholders across
the interagency, in particular DoS, DSCA has begun to implement a
robust set of initiatives aimed at addressing SC challenges, in
particular those associated with FMS.
A key tool to support our foreign policy objectives, FMS can help
to shape the international environment, develop interoperability with
partners, improve access, and build strategic, operational, and
personal partnerships. All FMS transactions, consistent with the
provisions of the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, are intended to
ensure that 1) each sale is of mutual benefit to both the U.S. and the
partner, 2) the technology will be protected, and 3) the transfer is
consistent with core U.S. values.
The majority of FMS cases are shepherded through the process
relatively quickly. A small number, however, may take more time as the
interagency and Congress engage in a deliberate review to ensure that
the necessary statutory and policy criteria are met. Despite this, the
volume of cases processed has in fact grown from a three-year average
value of $12.5 billion in Fiscal Year (FY) 2005 to $36 billion in 2016.
In FY 2016 alone, DSCA executed 1,700 new FMS cases along with
approximately 4,000 modifications or amendments to existing sales.
Today, our partners are expecting more deliveries on accelerated
timelines at the same time that international competition in defense
trade is increasing. Despite this, the United States remains the global
SC partner of choice. We deliver not only the most effective defense
systems to our partners, but we also ensure a ``Total Package''
approach that includes the provision of training, maintenance, and
sustainment, to achieve full spectrum capability. That being said,
there is always room for improvement. Initiatives underway, championed
by DSCA, support five distinct elements of the FMS process:
Partner Nation. The Geographic Combatant Commands are working with
partners and allies to more clearly define their requirements
up-front. This will accelerate the technology transfer and
contracting decisions necessary to more rapidly deliver defense
articles and services down the line.
Case Development. DSCA is partnering with the Military Departments
to streamline and improve the development of FMS cases to
identify best practices that will result in greater efficiency,
transparency, and improved resource allocation.
Technology Security. DSCA is working with the technology security
community to explore new approaches to provide more protection
and safeguards for U.S. defense technology while benefiting
industry and partner nations.
Foreign Policy. Under the guidance of the Department of State, DSCA
is working with interagency stakeholders early in the FMS
process to flag potential concerns, such as regional stability
and human rights issues, to help manage partner nation
expectations and ensure arms transfer deliberations are well-
informed and consistent with statutory authorities.
Acquisition. DSCA, the Military Departments, and the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics office are looking at ways to protect manpower within
the DoD acquisition community, train acquisition professionals
who use the DoD acquisition process to support FMS, and develop
creative contracting strategies that support both FMS and
domestic purchases.
These FMS-focused initiatives, which are now incorporated within
the broader SC reform, are designed to produce a system that supports
mutual U.S. and foreign partner goals.
FY 2017 NDAA
While improvements to the FMS process are necessary, they are not
sufficient to make certain that we best utilize all of the tools at our
disposal to address the multitude of SC challenges.
Over more than 15 years of persistent conflict, the Department's
Title 10 authorized SC programs have grown and the international
environment for defense arms trade has evolved. In the past, the
Department was forced to navigate a patchwork of more than 100 discrete
Title 10 authorities, many of which were narrowly-constrained by region
or function.
To address these challenges, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Security Cooperation has focused on improving the planning,
prioritization, and synchronization of Title 10 programs. These efforts
have effectively postured the SC community to address the significant
reforms laid out in the FY 2017 NDAA.The FY 2017 NDAA identified SC as
a core DoD mission by establishing a new chapter of Title 10. This new
SC chapter is meant to enhance flexibility, transparency, oversight,
and management of programs and resources; professionalize the SC
workforce; and improve the alignment of SC activities with defense
strategy. These new authorities provide DoD a unique opportunity to
transform SC into a more strategic U.S. national security tool.
Specifically, the FY 2017 NDAA:
consolidates policy oversight and resource allocation within the
Office of the Secretary of Defense and consolidates execution
and administration of Title 10 Security Cooperation programs
within DSCA;
requires the DoD to provide a consolidated budget justification and
establish an Assessment, Monitoring and Evaluation (AM&E)
framework to allow a more rigorous, data-driven assessment of
program effectiveness; and
mandates the DoD establish a SC workforce development program to
ensure that the SC professionals all over the world have the
appropriate training, education and experience to execute the
mission.
Comprehensive SC Reform Implementation
Together with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy, the Joint Staff, and the DoS, DSCA has developed an operational
approach with four focus areas to implement SC reform mandated by the
FY 2017 NDAA and to incorporate the Title 22 initiatives already
underway. These focus areas, with the broad participation and support
of the interagency, are designed to advance innovative policies and
processes to address the following issues:
Governance and Oversight to oversee SC efforts and ensure
compliance with legislative and policy requirements;
Policy Guidance to develop and issue policy to provide overarching
direction for implementation of SC activities;
Execution to define and implement changes to SC capabilities and
operations; and
Enabling Functions to perform operations required to support the
execution activities.
Work on SC reform is well underway to meet current challenges and
the requirements set forth in the FY 2017 NDAA.
Conclusion
Now more than ever, policy makers use SC as a critical tool to
achieve our defense and foreign policy objectives. With reduced U.S.
force structure and finite resources in a dynamic, rapidly evolving
environment, it has become increasingly important to optimize allies'
and partners' contributions to their own security and, by extension,
U.S. security. The language in the FY 2017 NDAA provides the mandate to
realize much needed reform to SC.
For the last 70 years Security Cooperation has been a pillar of
U.S. foreign policy. We must not, however, rest on our laurels. Today,
the convergence of Congressional mandates with the Department's
emphasis on strengthening our partners is a call to action. We must
seize this opportunity to fortify our status as the Security
Cooperation partner of choice.
I welcome the Foreign Relations Committees' continued support and
oversight of these ongoing initiatives. Distinguished committee
members, I want to thank you again for the opportunity to appear before
you today, and I look forward to your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you all for your testimony.
With that, I will turn to Senator Cardin to begin
questions.
Senator Cardin. Well, again, thank you for being here.
Thank you for your service. And it is certainly encouraging to
hear your conversations about how the collaborative process is
working.
I want to focus, if I might, on how you are using
collaborative efforts and programming to deal with advancing
human rights. The Congress, at times, put conditionalities on
our security assistance programs. We are pretty specific as to
what we expect before the release of funds. But can you tell me
specifically where your strategies are in using our security
assistance to make specific advancements in human rights in the
countries which we are partnering with?
Ambassador Kaidanow. Senator, I think the way I would
approach that is by saying--and again, I cannot stress this
enough from my vantage point, having done this particular job
for now almost a year and a half. The reason that I feel so
strongly about the role of the State Department--I think my
colleagues would agree, although I do not want to speak for
them--is for precisely the reason you just outlined because, as
I indicated in my opening remarks, we need to bring a holistic
view of all of our foreign policy objectives into a discussion
of any potential arms sale that we are about to make. The way
we do that is, generally speaking anyway, through the State
Department. That is our writ. That is our mandate.
I believe strongly--and I think my colleagues at Defense
would say the same that, even they know very clearly that we
must integrate human rights and those concerns into our
consideration of these sales simply because it is not just the
impact they will have in the recipient country, it is a
function of, again, do we want to see the same threats emerge,
for example, with regard to countering violent extremism or
countering terrorism. You do not want to see the same problems
emerge over and over again as a function of the various systems
that we----
Senator Cardin. Well, we are dealing with a lot of
countries. Can you give me some specific examples of where we
have specific strategies to advance human rights?
Ambassador Kaidanow. I think in almost any country that we
are talking about--you raised several in your opening remarks--
with all of those countries, we are very alert to how the
specifics of the arms sales that we contemplate----
Senator Cardin. So what are we doing in Nigeria concerning
the Nigerian forces in the way that they conduct their campaign
for civilian losses?
Ambassador Kaidanow. Without commenting on the specific
sale itself, because we have not yet gone through the process
of notification, I would say we are contemplating the full
range of effects that we might have, again, if we pursue that
sale. I believe strongly that we have had a very robust
conversation with the Nigerian Government on the importance of
human rights, observing human rights, and specifically in the
area of concern in northeastern Nigeria. I think you have heard
from the highest level of the State Department--and I can only
reiterate it here--our commitment to keep doing that, to
continue to have that dialogue, and it will be, as I said,
featured very strongly----
Senator Cardin. I think the sale has been noticed. I could
be wrong, but I think it has.
What I am finding what works is when you have specific
standards you expect them to comply with. It does not have to
be announced. It does not have to be broadcast, but you have to
have ways of judging progress. I have not seen that.
So I am going to ask if you would reply in writing to me--
--
Ambassador Kaidanow. Absolutely.
Senator Cardin [continuing]. As to the strategies in the
countries that we are dealing with, what are our objectives and
the discussions that are taking place. If it has to be done in
a classified setting, I am more than happy to do it in a
classified setting. But I am concerned that I do not see that
commitment as definitively as I want--I understand the overall
issues--but as definitively as I think we need to make it.
Certainly Nigeria is a country of major concern and interest.
Mr. Harvey. Senator, could I add that from a Defense
Department standpoint, as part of our NDAA reforms, we did
have, for the first time, provisions in our train and equip
programs that we have to incorporate human rights training for
any of the forces that we actually train aground, which is a
significant shift for us, not just lip service, but it has to
be real training so they understand the importance of abiding
by human rights standards.
Senator Cardin. I appreciate that. There are many specific
examples I hope that we will be able to share.
I want to get to one--you all mentioned section 333 and
compliance with that directive from Congress. That is a minimum
standard. I would hope that there is a closer relationship than
just complying with the congressional mandate. Tell us what
type of cooperation are we seeing in the State Department with
the Department of Defense on issues such as Ukraine security
assistance or the special operations counterterrorism or
irregular warfare activities. Do we have that same type of
close consultation and input from the State Department?
Mr. Harvey. Senator, yes, we do. I mean, at multiple
levels, from the working level up to the principals in the
White House, we do have the regular and active exchanges to
ensure that we have a common understanding of what the
challenge is and help develop common solutions for how we
approach those. So I would say that level of interaction has
been sort of instituted, if you will, beyond just what has been
mandated from Congress.
Ambassador Kaidanow. I can only echo that. I think we have
exceptionally close cooperation, especially on the issues that
you mentioned. There is no daylight really between the two
departments on those things.
Senator Cardin. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Isakson?
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
For Senator Cardin's reference, in Africa, through the
Millennium Challenge, we have used conditions on human rights
and labor law as conditions on qualifying for participation in
the MCC very effectively. So your question on this is important
because it should be the same thing for security and defense as
well. And when you make those conditions, it makes the host
country a part of the decision.
Ms. Kaidanow, section 333 of NDAA--I should know this. You
referred to it. I did not. So did General Hooper a minute ago.
Was that a byproduct or brought about because of what happened
in Benghazi?
Ambassador Kaidanow. No, sir. I think that the genesis of
it--and again, I cannot speak to what those that put it
together actually were aiming to accomplish, although I have to
say that we very much stand behind it. We think it is a great
effort.
The idea, I think, was to try and do what we all know has
to be done now, and that is the State Department has a wide
swath of funds and authorities available to it to accomplish
certain things in the security arena. The Defense Department
increasingly now also. In fact, we have roughly the same amount
of money under management depending on how you look at it. That
is an enormous sort of charge to us, if you will, to ensure
that we are doing whole-of-government work. We cannot be doing
State Department efforts and DoD efforts. It does not work that
way. Our partners do not look at it that way, nor should they.
We should be aiming to have an approach that--not just 333.
I mean, our hope, again as I said, is to broaden this, and
in fact, in practice we do it for other authorities. But the
idea is to bring forward a process that identifies our
priorities right at the outset, which we are doing right now in
the steering committee that we discussed, for a whole range of
priority countries, decide what makes sense for us, whether
with regard to State authorities and funds or with DoD
authorities and funds, and how do we ensure that those are
complementary so that we are not working at cross purposes, we
are not duplicating effort, we are not doing anything, and that
we are providing what we need to both for our partners but
primarily for U.S. national security interests. That is the
idea.
Senator Isakson. In your testimony, you said State should
not only see that DoD concurs but is part of the formulation of
the game plan. Is that correct?
Ambassador Kaidanow. Yes. First of all, we believe State
concurrence is really an essential element because it gives us
that visibility and that ability to say, at the end of the day,
that critical foreign policy aspects like human rights are
being adequately addressed.
But I think even more than that what we want is to ensure,
as we are doing with 333, that we are starting all the way at
the beginning because if, you know, at the end of the day, a
program comes to us that DoD has already formulated and they
have gone through a long process and it is very arduous and it
is not easy to do, and the combatant commanders have had their
say, if they come to us at the end of all of that and we do not
have a full understanding of how they got there in the first
place, there may be unintended consequences. There could be
things that happen that, again, from a budgetary standpoint
there will be implications down the road for the State
Department. To us, it seems as though the more productive way
to be doing this, again, is to be looking at the outset at how
do we bring all this together.
So 333 is, if you will, sort of the most robust effort we
have undertaken at something this important. And I would argue
it is that important. But, of course, again my colleague at DoD
can speak to it as well.
Mr. Harvey. Senator, I would agree with everything
Ambassador Kaidanow said. It only makes sense to have both the
State Department and DoD involved at the front end of
development of any project because it is too late if we wait to
throw it over the transom because we may be far afield from
what the foreign policy direction would be from the State
Department. So their involvement at the ground level is
absolutely essential.
Just to answer your question on the origin of 333,
essentially before 333, we had a multiple number of authorities
related to individual strands of activity in train and equip,
counter WMD, counterterrorism, counternarcotics, border
control. What we recognize in the real world is those problems
do not come in sort of stovepipe fashion. They overlap in many
ways. And so what we did, with the help of our oversight
committees, is create an authority that can address all those
in combination as a collective whole, as they appear in the
real world.
Senator Isakson. The reason I brought up the Benghazi
situation--and that is a sad chapter for all of us, and I am
not trying to revisit a sad chapter. But I want to make sure we
do not have a second chapter sometime in the future. And when
you talk about coordination and planning, do you feel like at
DoD and at the Department of State that we are in a better
position today for the security of our embassies across the
world and have plans ready so that we can get backup help to
our ambassadors, should they need it?
Ambassador Kaidanow. Obviously, I am not the responsible
individual at the State Department, but I will tell you, I
mean, I feel more confident, and certainly I believe that our
Department's highest leadership would tell you that this is a
huge priority for them. The Secretary starts every meeting that
he convenes with upper level management in the State Department
by talking about security issues.
Senator Isakson. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Kaine?
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
And thank you to the witnesses. Your written testimony and
the questions of my colleagues have been helpful on this issue
of trying to figure out how to streamline, consolidate, make
what we do in security assistance more effective.
I want to ask a real practical question about a concern I
have right now. The results are not yet in on the referendum
that was held in Kurdistan yesterday in northern Iraq about the
nonbinding referendum around independence, but the likely
results are going to be a very strong support expressed in that
referendum.
The security assistance we currently provide to the Kurds
is sizable and it is routed through the Baghdad government. I
think it is probably maybe about $2.2 billion in the last two
appropriations, which are combined to Iraq for security
assistance that can be used by the central government, the
tribal leaders, or Kurdistan.
How might--as we are contemplating how to do security
assistance, we have to deal with our own internal challenges,
but also a situation like the Kurds, who have been good
partners. That is going to create a potential challenge. How
are State and Defense contemplating this if Baghdad reacts
negatively to the referendum result and tries to block or slow
down assistance passing through Baghdad to Erbil? The Kurds
have been huge partners of ours in the anti-ISIS battle. Can
you talk a little bit about DoD and State Department
perspectives on that referendum and how that might affect
security assistance in the region? And that is the only
question I am going to have. So now I will just let you all
tackle that one.
Ambassador Kaidanow. Thank you, Senator. It is funny
because I ran into my colleague, Brett McGurk, in the parking
garage just as I was coming over here, who is by far better
positioned to answer some of those specific questions that you
just asked.
Look, I think we have made clear that we find it
unfortunate that the Kurdish authorities have chosen at this
moment to undertake this particular referendum. We regard the
authorities in Baghdad as being--and we regard the integrity of
Iraq as being quite important.
I will defer probably the questions on what the implication
of some of the security assistance issues may be until we see
what the outcome of all this is. Clearly we are having a
conversation. We are always having that conversation from the
policy vantage point not just on that specific issue, but I
will say more broadly on Iraq issues writ-large. Just this past
week, I was dealing with another issue on tanks and so forth,
which I will not get into in this setting, but we are happy to
brief you on those things too.
You know, look, these are big issues. The Government of
Iraq--we feel it is incredibly to support them in any way we
can. That said, there are going to be issues related to what
they can afford, what the sustainability of some of that
assistance down the road is going to be, how they apportion it,
what the implications of the referendum and some of the
associated other political issues may be. There are lots of
questions associated with all of this. So rather than get into
the minutiae of all that, I think we would be happy to give you
a more full briefing if you ask for it. We would be more than
pleased.
Senator Kaine. Thank you.
How about from the DoD perspective?
Mr. Harvey. I think, Senator, I echo everything that
Ambassador Kaidanow said. I would say our near-term focus is
and has to remain on the counter-ISIS challenge. And so
minimizing the complications and distractions from that central
focus I think is our priority now from a DoD standpoint, and we
can get you greater detail on sort of the implications of the
vote in Kurdistan after this session, sir.
Senator Kaine. Do you believe the pendency of the
referendum--could you see a need to the degree to which the
pendency of the referendum tangibly harmed the anti-ISIS fight?
Mr. Harvey. Theoretically, but I think we are working
collectively as a U.S. Government to ensure that all the
primary actors on the ground sort of stay focused on that
primary challenge. So we will do everything we can to prevent
that, and I have confidence we will be able to do that.
Senator Kaine. General Hooper, do you have anything to add
on this issue?
General Hooper. No, sir.
Senator Kaine. Okay. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chair. I cede the rest of my time.
Senator Gardner [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
Senator Young?
Senator Young. Thank you.
Ambassador Kaidanow, I want to ask you a number of
questions about the legal authorities that inform your office's
work, your work and circumscribed as well.
So to begin here, according to the Department of State's
website, in addition to undertaking a legal review of each of
the proposed arms transfer deals that comes before your office
and third party transfers, the Political-Military Affairs
Bureau also applies the conventional arms transfer policy laid
out in Presidential Policy Directive 27. Is that correct?
Ambassador Kaidanow. Yes.
Senator Young. So that policy has presumably been applied
to arms transfers to Saudi Arabia. Is that correct?
Ambassador Kaidanow. Yes.
Senator Young. That policy requires the administration to
take into account a number of criteria. Correct?
Ambassador Kaidanow. Absolutely.
Senator Young. So I have those criteria in front of me
right here. One of the criterion is that State, among other
things, must take into account the, quote, human rights record
of the recipient. Agreed?
Ambassador Kaidanow. Absolutely.
Senator Young. Another criterion of this policy is you say,
in effect, that State must consider, quote, the likelihood that
the recipient would use the arms to commit human rights abuses
or serious violations of international humanitarian law or
identify the United States with human rights abuses or serious
violations of international humanitarian law. Agreed?
Ambassador Kaidanow. Yes.
Senator Young. I will also note that section 502(b), which
you are likely familiar with, of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 limits security assistance to a country which engages in a
consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally
recognized human rights unless the President certifies in
writing to the Speaker of the House, to the chairman of this
committee, and others that extraordinary circumstances exist.
Ambassador, has such a certification been submitted to this
Congress to transfer arms to Saudi Arabia?
Ambassador Kaidanow. Well, again, it depends on, I guess,
what we are talking about and what time frame and so forth. In
the past, of course, we have made arms transfers to Saudi
Arabia.
Senator Young. I am talking about the arms transfers that
have occurred in recent months during this Congress from the
United States of America to Saudi Arabia.
Ambassador Kaidanow. In the past, yes, we have made some
of those transfers.
Senator Young. Including this most recent arms transfer. It
is a yes or no question.
Ambassador Kaidanow. Yes, sir.
Senator Young. All right. Thank you.
So as Acting Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Political
and Military Affairs responsible for implementing this policy,
State has gone ahead, as you said, and consistent with the
conventional arms transfer policy, as well as section 502(b),
which I have invoked, what is State's assessment regarding
Saudi Arabia's actions in Yemen? That is, has Saudi Arabia used
U.S. weapons in Yemen to commit human rights abuses or serious
violations of international humanitarian law? Yes or no?
Ambassador Kaidanow. Senator, we have had a chance in the
past to come before the committee and the members of the staff
to talk about some of this, not all of which I can discuss in
this setting. But you asked the question, and I will tell you
we have expressed concerns to the Saudi Government and we have
had the conversation with them on many of these issues. And
indeed, we are trying to address them as we contemplate any
sales to Saudi Arabia.
Senator Young. So you are in charge of the office that is
supposed to take into account under our laws these criteria. I
know it is a multifactor test, as the lawyers say. You balance
the various factors against one another. So it is not a binary
test. So it is possible that there were human rights
violations, violations of internationally respected human
rights law. And you are not foreclosing that possibility here
today. Is that correct?
Ambassador Kaidanow. I think what I am saying is that we
have had that conversation with the Saudis and we have had the
conversation----
Senator Young. Are you foreclosing it?
Ambassador Kaidanow. Are we foreclosing----
Senator Young. Are you foreclosing the possibility that
human rights violations have occurred?
Ambassador Kaidanow. No. In fact, I think the Saudis
themselves have indicated that in the past that they have done
some things that they find problematic and that they are trying
to address some of those issues.
Senator Young. Okay.
Ambassador, thank you for indulging all these questions.
On June 28 at my direction, my staff asked the Department
of State for an advisory legal opinion with respect to Saudi
Arabia's refusal to permit the delivery of cranes to Hodeidah,
the major port in Yemen. We think that that may very well
constitute a violation of customary international humanitarian
law rule 55. That is the international legal provision that
prohibits denying lifesaving food or medicine into an area in
furtherance of war aims.
And so on September 18, almost 3 months later, my office
was notified that State was not able to provide me with that
advisory legal opinion. Can you explain why State has not
provided me that legal opinion or anyone on this committee to
my knowledge?
Ambassador Kaidanow. I am sorry, Senator. I do not have
the exact, precise rationale for why that was not provided to
you in a timely way. I will have to go back and ask and bring
that answer to you.
Senator Young. Okay. Thank you for your indulgence. I will
just note that I will be submitting a question for the record
related to the excess defense articles provisions and the
transfer of HUMVEEs.
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Senator Young.
Senator Murphy?
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for being here today.
Let me follow up on the questions from Senator Young
because I share all of his concerns. Yemen currently is
arguably the worst humanitarian catastrophe in the world today,
an epidemic of both famine and cholera that the country has
never seen before. And let me maybe take the conversation out
of the weeds a little bit and ask a simple question to either
you, Ms. Kaidanow, or you, Mr. Harvey.
What clear, explainable, definable concessions have we
extracted from the Saudis with respect to the conduct of this
war inside Yemen since the announcement or in coordination with
the announcement, of the biggest arms sale to Saudi Arabia
celebrated by the very high profile visit of President Trump to
Riyadh earlier this year?
Nothing has seemed to have changed there. The humanitarian
catastrophe gets worse every single month. It does not get
better. Senator Young and I have asked this very simple thing
of the Saudis, to let these cranes that the U.S. taxpayers paid
for be delivered to Hodeidah in order to more efficiently move
humanitarian relief into the country. None of that has been
addressed.
So what specific concessions have we gotten from the Saudis
with respect to the conduct of the war in Yemen as a result of
the massive military aid, and what role has State or Department
of Defense played in that?
Ambassador Kaidanow. Well, first of all, let me just again
emphasize that I think we are deeply committed to ensuring that
the Saudis understand the importance. And the Saudis themselves
have said they understand the importance of complying with the
Law on Armed Conflict. It is essential and they----
Senator Murphy. Who cares what they say?
Ambassador Kaidanow. Understood.
I think our judgment has been that engaging with them and
providing them the means to actually effectuate some of that is
the best way to go.
Senator Murphy. So specific examples.
Ambassador Kaidanow. You may recall that one of the
largest pieces and one of the first things that we moved
towards notification after the announcement of the arms sale
that you mentioned was a $750 million training case to the
Saudi armed forces. And that training case involved a large
component that was training specifically on the Law of Armed
Conflict. So it was not as though all we gave them was the
means to pursue the conflict itself. We are trying to give them
an understanding of how do you do that because it is not so
much about the weapons per se as it is the way you implement
and utilize the weapons. My colleagues at Defense can probably
speak more to that than I can.
And in fact, we have had a group of trainers that have now
gone on the ground for the first part of this training case
that we notified to try and get that process underway.
So we are very alive to it. The Saudis are alive to it. I
recognize that the proof is in the pudding, that they are going
to have to show that those actions comport with what they say.
That is what we are committed to doing with them.
Senator Murphy. I share Senator Young's concerns here. I
think that our policy in Yemen has been an epic failure, and I
understand the Saudis spend a lot of money coming up here and
making promises about how they are going to change the conduct
of this war. They have not. And they have refused to do very
simple things that could alleviate the horror that exists in
Yemen today. And we as a country--these are my words, not
anyone else's--are complicit in many of the worst things that
are happening there.
Let me ask you a broader question. So right now, as you
mentioned, the capacity is split between DoD and State, moving
from a time at the beginning of the 2000s when about 80 percent
of this aid came through the Department of State. Just explain
to us why this capacity still needs to be split. Every military
conflict that we are involved in overseas has a political root
at the bottom of it. This is not the 1800s when armies march
against each other and there is a peace treaty. There is a
political problem at the bottom of all of these military
conflicts.
So now that we are sort of in the process of winding down
the two biggest conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, why would we
not just return this capacity to the State Department? Why
would we not go back to 80 percent of this capacity in the
State Department? Why split it half and half with Defense and
State?
Ambassador Kaidanow. Well, again, I think my colleague
addressed some of this in his opening remarks.
I mean, I think the judgment has been--I cannot speak to
what Congress' intention was, but I think the idea was because
there are specific train and equip type issues, operational
issues, and the flexibility and the speed with which a lot of
this is necessary to deploy made it extant and because the
nature of some of these threats seems to be, I think, both
emergent and urgent and also dealt with, at least in part,
through military means.
Our argument has been, along the lines of what you just
said, that it all has a political component. And therefore, as
we progress down this road, even if that money is allocated or
those authorities are allocated to DoD, the State Department
should retain an essential role at least of concurrence and,
again, arguably from our vantage point and as Todd has
indicated, the earlier, the better in that process frankly from
a joint formulation standpoint and joint development
standpoint. It makes sense for all the reasons that you
articulated, and particularly understanding your concerns on
Saudi Arabia, and on any issue, it makes sense for the State
Department to be at the outset of that process. You can bring
those concerns to the State Department. We will be responsive.
It is a holistic effort. It should be a holistic effort.
There are some things DoD does better than we do, and there are
some things that we do better, I would argue. And there are
different purposes oftentimes for those fundings. FMF is
designed to accomplish addressing long-term capability gaps on
the part of our military partners overseas. Some of the
authorities that DoD has are far more targeted. They need to be
moved out the door quicker. They are not set up necessarily for
long-term development of capability building.
We need to, though, think about all of that as we plan
forward. You cannot just do the one or the other. You need to
understand that entire array of authorities and then try and
bring them together and particularly if we are going to face
increasing resource challenges, which I think we probably will.
So that is, I think, the rationale for doing it in a way
that is respectful of DoD's abilities, respectful of our
particular expertise, but also brings it together in a way that
makes sense for all of us and for you, I hope.
Senator Murphy. Thank you.
Senator Gardner. Senator Rubio?
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
I want to focus a little bit on the international narcotics
and law enforcement funding. In particular, we have seen this
extraordinary rise in the production of coca, cocaine, in
Colombia, and we know that is going to be transited here
primarily through a land bridge through Central America but
potentially through air routes, as well as through the
Caribbean region. And at the heart of the challenges facing El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras in particular is the role
that these transnational groups play on the ground, and each
has struggled in its own way to confront it. I am most
familiar, of the three, with the Honduran efforts.
And obviously, I also look at the Colombian model of
assistance over the years as something that people have pointed
to as a model of success. And in fact, in many ways, the
Colombians have become force multipliers for us. They are now
on the ground in those countries in Central America providing
assistance, although there is some concern about some recent
decisions they have made with their own program vis-a-vis the
peace process there that some attribute to the rise in cocaine
production.
So my first question is just an analysis of where we are in
terms of how that overlays with our policies in the region
because ultimately one of the, I think, most compelling
arguments is that the U.S. southern border does not really
begin on the Mexican border. It starts much sooner than that in
places like Guatemala and the like.
So three quick opportunities here to discuss. Number one,
how would you assess the progress of those programs and where
they stand today? Obviously, each country has different
challenges in Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador.
Number two, do we believe that the capacity, even the
increased capacity of these nations is quickly going to be
overwhelmed by the massive amount of cocaine that needs to be
moved over the next number of years?
And number three, the potential to partner with the Mexican
Government, who has their own concerns about instability just
south of them, and how those three things play out and the
interplay between the assistance we provide and our foreign
policy aims for the region.
I know that is a three-part question, but they are all
interrelated.
Ambassador Kaidanow. Well, I will take a quick stab at
giving you an answer, although again I would have to just defer
to some of my colleagues who deal both with international
narcotics and law enforcement and also with the western
hemisphere affairs.
But I do think we are making progress. I recognize the
challenges that you have outlined. And I would also say, again,
as we look at the entire array of countries that we are
assisting, we are looking at all the foreign policy elements,
and that involves human rights issues, other kinds of issues,
governance issues, and so forth. But I do think with regard to
the international narcotics effort, we are making some
progress. This is another area where I would argue, again, we
have authorities and funding. DoD has authority and funding. It
only makes sense for us to be, again, bringing those efforts
together. Section 333 actually addressed some of those
authorities, not all of them but some of them. And that is
another, I think, set of issues that we are now sitting down at
a table trying to look at in terms of what we can do and what
DoD can do, identify again some priority elements within our
strategy to try and make sure that the resources, the proper
resources, are addressed in those directions.
By the way, you mentioned Colombia. Just to say, I mean,
one of the things that I think is under-appreciated sometimes
is that we not only do security assistance writ-large, what we
do is stabilization. And in support of the peace process, for
example, in Colombia, the State Department is very active in
terms of demining and removal of unexploded ordnance in some of
the areas where the peace process has indicated they need that
help. And we did a fair amount together with the Norwegian
Government to put in place a donor effort that will lend itself
to that. So we are actually looking not just at the security
assistance per se in terms of aiding the relevant forces on the
ground, it is also in support of a larger effort at
stabilization that will then create an environment, we hope, in
which these things will not reproduce themselves.
Senator Rubio. I guess the only follow-up I would have on
that is one of the issues we run into, as we discuss these
programs on an annual basis, is in many of these nations still
the military becomes the default law enforcement organism as
opposed to traditional law enforcement for a variety of
different reasons.
And how would you assess where we stand in terms of
capacity building for their own justice system, in essence the
training and equipping of police officers and other law
enforcement officials, their court system, their systems of
justice? How does that generally play out in the broader--
everything from prisons to prosecutors to defense attorneys for
that matter? How do those things interplay and what do we do to
assist in that regard?
Ambassador Kaidanow. I cannot agree with you more. I think
my INL colleague, Ambassador Bill Brownfield, would argue the
same thing. I mean, this has to be a longer-term approach, and
it cannot be simply military-focused. We must do what we can to
build rule of law throughout the countries of concern.
I think we are making some progress, I will tell you, but
it is not uniform. And I think we are going to have to work
harder with them together in partnership. It is a long-term
problem, and we are not there yet, that is for sure. But we
recognize the importance of everything you just said.
Mr. Harvey. Senator, excuse me. Part of that equation is
also working with our defense ministry counterparts in these
countries to understand the proper role of the military in a
government and society led by civilians. So helping them
understand sort of their proper subordination, if you will, to
civilian leadership is part of that equation that DoD has
programs that are dedicated to.
Senator Gardner. Senator Booker?
Senator Booker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Kaidanow, could I just start with something that was a
bit of a surprise--the announcement that Chad has been included
in the administration's travel ban? And you mentioned Chad in
your testimony. The White House itself stated that Chad is--and
I quote--an important, valuable counterterrorism partner of the
United States. And the State Department itself in its report
stated that the Chad Government continues to prioritize
counterterrorism efforts at the highest level. You know Chad's
role in AFRICOM. They are incredibly involved in
counterterrorism efforts in the region. You talk about
Flintlock in your testimony. It supports French-U.S. military
deployments in the region. It has been critical in efforts
against Boko Haram. Chadian troops played a major role in
countering Al Qaeda's operations in Mali. They deploy over
1,000--I think about 1,400--troops.
And so I guess the specific questions I have is this
designation just seems arbitrary to me. And if we have concerns
about weak border security and screening capacity, clearly
other countries facing similar challenges, Mali, Central
African Republic, Niger, Nigeria--why are they not on the
travel ban? And then Sudan--clearly we have some significant
issues. So I am hoping you can shed some light on this for me,
and I am really curious if the State Department and the DoD
have input into this decision.
And then finally--and again, this is just press reports
from this morning about the whiplash that Chad leaders like the
president are having who are so influential and such critical
partners. Does this really in some ways undermine our
multilateral efforts that have been so productive against Al
Qaeda and Boko Haram?
Ambassador Kaidanow. Senator, I would be happy to take the
question. I will be honest with you and tell you that I cannot
give you a full rationale sitting here this morning, at least
not in this setting. But we would be happy to give you, I
think, more of the thinking on that.
I will say, though, that as you indicated in your remarks,
we do think of Chad as an important partner for us on CT
efforts in a variety of ways. It is certainly my hope that none
of that will change. We are looking to, I think, be cooperative
with Chad, and whatever requirements they can provide for us in
order to ameliorate or to address some of these issues, I am
quite confident they will work with us in order to try and do.
Senator Booker. So to the chairman and ranking member, you
know, I have a lot of frustration when I hear responses that we
will get back to you.
Senator Paul and I wrote a letter to Secretary Tillerson in
June expressing our deep disappointment about the
administration's decision to proceed with the sale of arms,
specifically the A-29 attack aircraft to the Nigerian
Government. We requested a briefing as well about the sale to
help understand how this determination was made. We cited in
that letter a lot of detail, a lack of progress from
authorities in Abuja, about the government's investigation into
the December 2015 alleged massacre by soldiers of over 300
Shiite Muslims. You mentioned this, Senator Cardin, in your
remarks. I mean, it is disturbing what we are seeing. We cited
the incomplete investigation into the January 2017 attack on an
IDP camp in Rann by the Nigerian air force, killed over, again,
200 refugees, as well as the lack of progress in our fair
investigation into the 2014 killings by the Nigerian security
forces of over 600 mostly unarmed detainees, including
children.
We wrote--Senator Paul and I wrote--that there continues to
be additional allegations of corruption, abuse, misconduct
throughout the Nigerian military. We asked in our letter that
the State Department reconsider the decision to sell A-29's to
Nigeria until some kind of reforms are put in place.
And so I have sort of heard this before, whether it is the
questions are asked--bipartisan questions asked by my
colleagues about what is going on in Yemen. I have not been
assured that any of the reforms or safeguards are being put
into place before these sales are made.
And so I understand that there are new reports now of
military equipment granted by the United States, from MRAP
vehicles provided for use against Boko Haram that are being
used in the southeast and apparently to intimidate people
agitating for independence.
And so I really appreciate the seeming willingness to be
cooperative, but we have a role to play. And I have growing
frustrations. I know I am new on this committee. I am damned
near sitting in the audience here so far on the end. But this
is absolutely unacceptable for our role in accordance with the
Constitution.
And so I do not understand. I cannot even get a briefing on
this issue, whether it is in this context or another. I am just
looking for someone to give me actually information because
according to the Constitution, the administration cannot
continue to engage in these kind of activities without our
authorization. And as Senator Murphy said, we are complicit in
some of the most horrific things that are going on on the
planet earth right now by regimes who are not acting in any way
in accordance with our values as a country or our interests for
our national security. And you even alluded to the fact that we
could be creating, when it comes to terrorism, the very problem
we claim to be trying to end.
And so this is absolutely unacceptable to me that we allow
representative after representative to come before this
committee and make promises that we are going to get
information or we are going to have hearings and we get nothing
in return. And I am frankly fed up. And the consequences of the
lack of information right now is horrific what is going on in
Sudan, what is going on in Yemen, what is going on in Nigeria.
It is horrific what is going on to people who are craving
freedom and looking to the United States.
And so I just want to register my absolute frustration. And
the responses here--no disrespect--are unacceptable when we get
talk and not even a meeting, not even a briefing that is of any
substance and answers the questions from the United States
Senators on both sides of the aisle.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cardin. Mr. Chairman, if I might, I just want to
share Senator Booker's frustration. As ranking member, I have
had to exercise my authority to call the Secretary of State to
get some of this information, when I should be getting it from
the people who are directly involved in making these policies.
I have had less than satisfactory assurances in regards to
commitments that I thought were previously made in regards to
arms sales of countries.
So I would just urge our panelists who have the direct
responsibility, if you believe that the legislative branch of
government is part of this process, you need to do a much more
effective job in communications but, more importantly, living
up to the broad statements that you are making with specific
progress and goals that we are achieving to prevent these types
of complicities in human rights violations of other countries.
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Senator Cardin. I think, again,
it just brings us back to the point of effectively managing a
multibillion effort, making sure it is organized and managed
properly. So thank you.
Senator Merkley?
Senator Merkley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador, as Secretary Tillerson reorganizes the State
Department, can you confirm for the committee that there are no
plans to move the security assistance oversight function of the
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs to the Department of
Defense?
Ambassador Kaidanow. Senator, not that I am aware of. But
that is not to say--I mean, I do not have the full array of
understandings that you are looking for, I think, with regard
to what the final output of that redesign process will be. I
believe the Deputy Secretary actually will be coming up to the
Hill on the House side, I believe in the next day or so, to be
talking about some of that.
But, I mean, the State Department regards that role as an
essential one, as we have described today, and I believe, as
far as I can tell anyway, that the upper levels of the State
Department, including the Secretary and Deputy Secretary, still
feel that way.
Senator Merkley. Thank you.
The administration has indicated it plans to provide lethal
military assistance to the Government of Ukraine. And there is
a variety of views as to whether that assistance either enables
the Government of Ukraine to more effectively oppose the forces
occupying the eastern portion of the nation or whether it
triggers a Russian response at a higher level leading to
greater bloodshed and greater support for the forces that
oppose the Government of Ukraine. What is your view of this?
Ambassador Kaidanow. Well, again, it is an active
discussion, as you indicated. I think the policy has yet to be
fully decided. It is something that our two departments are
engaged in discussing right this minute together with the White
House. And before the White House and the President make their
decisions on this, I would hesitate to take a position. But I
think, again, there are considerations that you have outlined
and there are others as well that we have to look at in the
entirety of these decisions. They are important decisions.
And by the way, just to reference what Senator Booker and
the ranking member said, at any moment if you wish for a
briefing on any particular issue, I am happy to provide it. I
think the State Department is committed to that, as are my
colleagues at DoD. And on Ukraine, I could offer the same. But
I think in this setting it is a little hard to get into all of
the back and forth.
I would say, again, that we believe strongly that the
Ukrainians are important partners, friends of ours, and we want
to be sure that their defense is adequately taken care of.
Senator Merkley. I will just say my experience has been
extremely frustrating with the Department of State, and when
you say they are committed, those are, at this point, empty
words.
One of the things that occurred recently--this committee
considered a bill related to the West Bank, and we were
promised a briefing from the Department of State over basically
the types of projects that were being undertaken both through
nonprofits and through the Palestinian Authority. And the
briefing was a complete fiasco. No information provided despite
the fact the committee was in the middle of wrestling with how
to sustain productive activities on the West Bank while sending
a very strong message to the PA about their horrific policy of
rewarding the families of those who commit acts of terrorism. I
mean, that is just an example. And my committee members, I
think, could each cite some other examples.
So it is important to follow up the philosophy you just
expressed with actual action.
Turning back to the Ukraine--and, Mr. Harvey, the President
of Ukraine has called for U.N. peacekeepers to be in eastern
Ukraine. Is the United States supportive of that request?
Mr. Harvey. Senator, I will have to take that question. I
am not in a position to answer that right now.
Senator Merkley. Is there any sense for any of the three of
you that that request changes the dynamic in terms of whether
we provide military assistance to the Ukraine Government?
Ambassador Kaidanow. I think, Senator, we are looking at
the entire array of issues with regard to Ukraine. What we are
hoping to see is fulfillment of the Minsk requirements. We are
looking to be supportive of that process. As you know, we now
have a special envoy appointed by the State Department, Kurt
Volker, who is out there doing his level best, I think, to try
and engage with his Russian counterparts and with others on
these very topics. It is an issue of real concern and great
interest to our Secretary, and so with regard to the policy
overall, I can assure you of that. And as we contemplate
whatever we will do with regard to security assistance, it will
fit into that larger picture.
Senator Merkley. What are the forms of lethal military
assistance that would best serve our goals of supporting the
Ukrainian Government while not provoking, if you will, Russian
escalation?
Ambassador Kaidanow. I think that is the open question. I
mean, that is what we are trying to grapple with.
Senator Merkley. That is the question. That is why I am
asking it.
Ambassador Kaidanow. No. I understand. We are looking at
the various options, and I think what we are trying to decide
again is what will serve the political purposes most
adequately. I do not have an answer for you now because there
is no actual decision.
Senator Merkley. Lieutenant General Hooper, would you like
to comment on that?
General Hooper. Senator, that is fundamentally a policy
question, and I would defer to my colleagues to respond to
that.
Senator Merkley. Well, it is a policy question in which
military insights are certainly very relevant. I am sure the
military side is very engaged in that, and so what are your
insights?
General Hooper. As we do with each and every case where we
assess what our partners might need and what might be
appropriate, we would follow the process we always do and which
we have articulated from the very beginning, which is to
collaborate in a transparent fashion in order to determine what
is best appropriate and what will best address both our
security objectives and the overall policy objectives.
Senator Merkley. Mr. Harvey, when are we going to get a
detailed proposal of what best fulfills the administration's
plans to provide lethal military support to the Government of
Ukraine?
Mr. Harvey. I think as Ambassador Kaidanow had indicated,
Senator, that is an issue that is being debated at senior
levels of the administration.
Senator Merkley. While that is being debated, when are we
on the committee going to get insights from you all since we
are not hearing any today?
Mr. Harvey. I think as we are close to making a decision I
think would be the appropriate time to come over and give you
an update on what----
Senator Merkley. Any sense of the timing on that?
Mr. Harvey. I am sorry?
Senator Merkley. Any sense of the timing on that?
Mr. Harvey. I do not have that for you right now.
Senator Merkley. Thank you.
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Senator Merkley.
And I will make my question quick here. Just a question on
the Philippines. Could you describe to me--the appropriate
witness describe to me--the assistance the United States is
currently providing to the Philippines?
Ambassador Kaidanow. We are providing an array. Actually I
should probably defer to my DoD colleagues on this because they
can give you a broader swath of kind of what we are doing.
But just in a general sense, again we believe strongly and
I think Secretary Mattis--again, not to speak for my
colleagues--and Secretary Tillerson believe that we should be
supporting the Philippine Government with regard to the
insurgency that they are now facing in a very, very sensitive
and important place in the Philippines.
And I think, at the end of the day, we are doing what we
can, again, to give them not just military support--and I want
to make sure that everybody understands this--we are also
looking at ways to do stabilization so that once they are able
to, we hope, defeat the insurgents, they will have the means to
also give the population there some prospect of greater
prosperity and greater peace and prosperity, I should say,
which will allow then, again, the situation to calm down over
the long term. We are looking at a whole variety of things.
Senator Gardner. Have we sent additional assistance to the
Philippines recently in terms of military assistance?
General Hooper. We are currently sending assistance to the
Philippines, and the objective of that in support of our
policies is to not only increase the lethality and capabilities
of the Philippine military but also their ability to stabilize
the situation and also assisting them in institution building
so that their troops can not only stabilize the situation but
ensure that the violence ceases and that civil authority and
civil stability is allowed to flourish.
Senator Gardner. And have they made additional requests for
assistance regarding ISIS or related groups in Mindanao?
Mr. Harvey. We are in discussions with the Filipino
Government in that regard. Obviously the challenge in Marawi is
not limited to that particular location. So we have concerns
about it spreading beyond that particular engagement right now.
And so we are discussing how we might best address it through
additional assistance.
Senator Gardner. Are those discussions coming from requests
from the Philippines or did we proactively seek those?
Mr. Harvey. I think you could say it is probably initiating
from both sides of the recognition that it would be useful for
us to cooperate in that regard.
Senator Gardner. Thank you.
Senator Cardin. Can I just ask one quick question?
Senator Gardner. Yes, please, Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Just one point. I understand the policy on
congressional review and disapproval and the law. Do you all
believe that it is helpful in furthering the goals for the
congressional review and disapproval process?
Ambassador Kaidanow. Absolutely. We are incredibly, as I
said in the opening remarks, appreciative of the congressional
role, and I think it is an essential oversight function that
you have clearly made your views known today. And we respect
that and we look to it as a guideline for how we do some of our
work.
Senator Cardin. Mr. Harvey?
Mr. Harvey. I would concur completely with what Ambassador
Kaidanow said. It is an essential part of our policymaking to
have the inputs.
Senator Cardin. General?
General Hooper. It is absolutely an essential part of our
policy process.
Senator Cardin [presiding]. I was hoping to hear that from
you because our questions here are well intended, and we feel
very passionately about the values of this country and using
every opportunity we have to advance those values. And that is
why you hear the passion from the members of this committee,
and that is why it is important that the close relationship
between the State Department and Defense be maintained. And
that is, I think, the reason behind the National Defense
Authorization Act amendment.
So explain to me why you would think of taking away from
Congress the ability to deal with small arms, including the
type of weapons that are used by snipers, particularly when
there have been two highly visible small arms sales, one that
was withdrawn by the administration as it relates to Turkey,
the other which involves the Philippines and their
extrajudicial killings of their civilian population and their
drug policy? Why would you think that would be helpful to take
away congressional review? Or maybe you do not think it is
helpful.
Ambassador Kaidanow. Senator, you are referencing, I
think, the question of whether we transfer responsibility from
State to Commerce for a specific category or several categories
of weapons. And this is part of a larger effort that we have
undertaken over the last, oh, 5, 6 years.
Senator Cardin. But do these arms not affect the policy
considerations we are talking about here, particularly the
message we are sending?
Ambassador Kaidanow. So I would say a couple of things.
First of all, these rules have yet to be fully published, and
they will be, I hope, at some point. And then there will be
plenty of time for further commentary.
But I will say our belief strongly is that military-grade
weapons will continue to be a function of State Department
oversight. What will be at least contemplated for transfer over
to Commerce would be the kinds of weapons that are readily
available, you know, again, at any retail outlet here in the
United States. And so the notion that the State Department
should be regulating their export overseas strikes us as not
hewing to the specific purpose that the State Department is
supposed to accomplish with its authority.
Senator Cardin. So if that is true, why did we labor over
the Turkish sale and cancel it?
Ambassador Kaidanow. So I would say a couple of things.
First of all, again, the assumption that items will
transfer over to the Commerce Department does not mean that
there will be no process for actually evaluating those sales.
Senator Cardin. But that evaluation will not include
Congress.
Ambassador Kaidanow. No. What I would say is that Commerce
regularly comes to the State Department to ask our opinion on
sales of that nature.
Senator Cardin. But they do not come to Congress.
Ambassador Kaidanow. You come to us, though.
Senator Cardin. But if Commerce is making the decision,
this committee loses all oversight; that is, human rights and
other considerations are gone if you do not have congressional
review. Commerce does not review that. Yes, they may consult
with you, but you are taking us out of the equation. And all
three of you said congressional review is important.
Ambassador Kaidanow. Well, again, we believe strongly that
the most important, most sensitive weapons, the ones that you
would concern yourself with on a regular basis, again military-
grade weapons--that is the kind of thing where the State
Department should continue to exercise its controls. Other
kinds of weapons--it just seems as though--again, what we are
doing is we are dispersing the State Department's effort over a
number of different licensing arrangements where in theory we
could be focusing on the kinds of things that we all know need
to be--as a sensitive set of technologies need to be more
appropriately regulated.
Senator Cardin. And I would just remind you that the people
of this country probably have focused more on what happened in
Washington, D.C. against peaceful protesters and the
extrajudicial killings in the Philippines. They are probably
more knowledgeable about that than many of the other issues we
have been talking about today. And they look to their elected
officials to represent their views. If we are going to have a
cooperative relationship, it appears to me this is a direct
affront to congressional input that you all thought was
important.
Ambassador Kaidanow. Again, Senator, we are happy to talk
to you more, I think, about the categories of weapons that we
are discussing and what the appropriate dividing line among
those weapons are. But our strong feeling is that we want the
State Department to do what we believe those regulations were
intended to do, which is focus on highly sensitive technologies
where either our commercial edge or our troops will be
endangered overseas through the spread of those weapons.
Senator Cardin. And sniper weapons do not fall into that
category?
Ambassador Kaidanow. Again, we can talk a little bit more
in a different setting about the specifics of each of those
weapons, but I believe, you know, we have looked closely at the
kinds of things we are proposing. And again, this is all still
in that stage. And we are happy to talk to you more about it.
Senator Cardin. Well, I am glad to hear that because I
could be wrong about that. I am reading press accounts, not
consultation with Congress, as to these decisions being made. I
certainly have not been privy to any direct opportunity. I have
expressed myself pretty clearly about this, but I have not seen
any attempt to get the input of Members of Congress on this
policy change. And considering that there are two very highly
visible sales that are involved here, it does look like an end
run around Congress.
Ambassador Kaidanow. We would welcome the chance to give
you a further briefing on this--you and your staff--at any
moment that you want.
Senator Cardin. Thank you.
On behalf of Chairman Corker and on behalf of myself, I
thank all of the witnesses today for their testimony here
today.
The record will remain open till the close of business on
Monday so that members can submit questions for the record. We
would ask our witnesses to promptly respond to those questions
for the record.
And with that, the hearing stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:00 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted to Thomas H.
Harvey and General Charles Hooper by Senator Bob Corker
State Department Concurrence
Question. Do you believe that State Department joint development
and concurrence, as described in 10 USC 333, improves Title 10 security
cooperation authorities by providing a broader foreign policy context
for your efforts?
Answer [Harvey]. Yes; the Defense Department supports the
Department of State's leading role in not only setting the
administration's course on foreign policy, but defining the shape and
purpose of U.S. foreign assistance efforts. No official outside the
State Department has been a stronger proponent for reinforcing State's
primacy in performing these roles, and having adequate resources to
execute them, than the Secretary of Defense. Secretary Mattis
recognizes that success in addressing the nation's threats requires an
integrated effort, where DoD's and State's resource allocation
processes are tightly linked and mutually reinforcing.
Question. Should concurrence of the Secretary of State be the
standard practice for Title 10 security cooperation activities? What
should be the exceptions, if any?
Answer [Harvey]. Security cooperation encompasses many activities
that primarily benefit U.S. forces, much of which requires coordination
at various levels with the State Department through routine interagency
processes. In cases where strong interagency coordination exists--
either under the auspices of the Chief of Mission or through the
National Security Council (NSC) staff--additional and affirmative
concurrence by a cabinet-level official may be redundant and a source
of delay. In many cases, DoD authorities to train and equip partner
nation forces have grown out of pressing operational demands identified
by commanders on the ground that complement, but differ from, the
broader political and diplomatic imperatives that inform State
Department security assistance activities. Although some overlap in
authorities and resources provides useful flexibility in tackling
difficult security threats, the two Departments cannot and should not
seek to recreate or mirror each other's security assistance programs.
Question. Do you believe the requirement for Secretary of State
concurrence slows down implementation of DoD assistance or interferes
with operational priorities?
Answer [Hooper]. No. Our colleagues at the State Department provide
a critical and deliberate review of proposed assistance activities. The
State Department helps ensure DoD's proposals support the broad range
of U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives. DSCA has an
excellent working relationship with the State Department based on open
communication and frequent dialogue. We support timely State Department
concurrence and will continue to work with our teammates in DoD and the
State Department to streamline our processes. We all share a desire to
advance our Departments' mutual commitment to closer synchronization
without adversely affecting operational momentum on the ground or
slowing support to the warfighter.
Answer [Harvey]. DoD works closely with State Department
counterparts to ensure that our efforts overseas support our diplomatic
and national security objectives. However, not every scenario requires
the high bar of concurrence. Requiring concurrence in certain cases
would likely duplicate other, ongoing coordination mechanisms at the
country-team level or through routine NSC staff coordination processes.
There is further interagency collaboration (i.e., ``coordination'' or
``consultation'') that occurs at various levels within both departments
that occurs as a matter of routine and helps facilitate an effective
implementation process.
Role of Geographic Combatant Commands
Question. What is the role of the geographic combatant commands in
developing and coordinating security sector assistance programs, both
regionally and in individual countries? Is there adequate communication
between the COCOMs, embassies, DSCA, and PM? How are the priorities of
COCOMs adjudicated if they conflict with regional or country security
assistance strategies?
Answer [Hooper]. The Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) play an
essential role in developing and coordinating security sector
assistance (SSA) programs. GCCs develop SSA programs that support both
their Theater Campaign Plans (TCP) and the interests of our interagency
and foreign partners. In doing so, they coordinate extensively with
U.S. Embassies in-country, the Service components, and our foreign
partners. The GCCs serve as both a catalyst and clearinghouse to
facilitate requirements. With the expansion and elevated role of SSA in
shaping Theater program development, the GCCs require additional
dedicated staff to support efforts of integrating security cooperation
(SC) across the competitive space, contingency planning, and Theater
Campaign Planning. DSCA's Integrated Regional Team matrixed structure
is specifically aligned with the regional GCCs and is DSCA's key
organizational conduit for daily interaction with the GCCs. An example
of regular, deliberate communications among GCCs, DSCA, the State
Department, the Military Departments, OSD Policy, and other key
stakeholders is the DSCA-led, monthly GCC Focus meetings. These
meetings are a forum to report on GCC priority programs and facilitate
interagency collaboration, thereby increasing visibility and
transparency in identifying program challenges and opportunities.
Answer [Harvey]. The Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC) use
security cooperation to develop operationally viable partnerships that
will either avoid the need to commit U.S. forces or assist U.S. forces
and the United States in achieving our national security objectives.
This past spring, Secretary Tillerson and Secretary Mattis established
an Assistant Secretary-level State-DoD Security Sector Assistance (SSA)
Steering Committee to oversee a collaborative planning process that
will identify top national security priorities and synchronize
investments to maximize results. The SSA Committee's objective is to
integrate planning and resourcing processes for a wide range of SSA
programs. DoD is likewise revising security cooperation planning
processes as a result of the reforms contained in the National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 to provide better
oversight of expenditures of taxpayer dollars and ensure that our
efforts are more closely targeted and prioritized globally in accord
with U.S. national security objectives. We are working with the GCCs to
enhance their role as stakeholders for security cooperation activities
and ensure they are working to integrate all available security
cooperation tools within their AORs.
Assistance and Foreign Military
Question. What is the impact of having to funnel Title 10
assistance through the same implementation pipelines as FMS?
Answer [Hooper]. Title 10 assistance relies on the same
implementation ``pipelines'' (including use of the contracting
workforce) as FMS, but the impact is minimal given the relatively small
number of Title 10 cases compared to the higher volume of FMS cases.
There are great efficiencies in sharing case development and
contracting processes, as doing so often allows the U.S. Government to
leverage existing contract vehicles and administrative personnel in the
implementing agencies, which can lower both overhead and procurement
costs and improve overall system responsiveness (i.e., delivery
timelines). To minimize the overall impact of the combined volume of
Title 10 and FMS cases on the workforce, DSCA and the implementing
agencies balance the workload through sequenced program implementation.
Of note, recent statutory changes provide that Title 10 Security
Cooperation funds are available for obligation for up to two years,
which enables further deconfliction in the acquisition processes.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted to Thomas H.
Harvey and General Charles Hooper by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin
State Concurrence on DoD Projects
Question. Various NDAAs specify the minimum level of interaction
with the Department of State and the Secretary of State, such as
coordination or concurrence on various DoD security assistance
projects. But that is the minimum; DoD can certainly exceed that level,
correct? If the Secretary of Defense wants to make sure that the
Secretary of State has concurrence on ALL security assistance-related
programs, such as the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, or the
provision of funds to foreign persons and governments in support of
Special Operations counterterrorism and irregular warfare activities,
he can do that, can't he? Why shouldn't he do that?
Answer [Harvey]. DoD requires that all components work closely with
their State Department counterparts to ensure that DoD efforts
worldwide support the broader diplomatic and national security
objectives of the United States. DoD currently exceeds the minimum
levels of coordination and interaction required by law, ranging from
coordination at the country-team level to routine, established NSC
staff processes for the programs you mentioned. We do not believe that
every DoD security cooperation authority requires the high bar of
formal Secretary of State ``concurrence,'' especially when appropriate
interagency ``coordination'' or ``consultation'' is already achieved at
various levels within both departments through other mechanisms.
Question. One of the rationales for arms sales to problematic
countries is that it provides the U.S. with leverage and therefore
influence. We recently saw such an instance with the withdrawal of the
1600 Sig Sauer semi-automatic pistols to the Turkish Presidential
Guard. Unfortunately, such action is not the norm. Can you provide us
other instances in which the U.S. has leveraged security assistance to
curtail bad behavior? Does the administration take into account a
country's human rights behavior before considering providing security
assistance?
Answer [Harvey]. A country's human rights record is certainly an
important factor the administration takes into account when considering
the provision of security assistance. However, in most cases, U.S.
security assistance is not of such a scale that threatening to withdraw
it would reverse the policies or actions of other sovereign nations. In
many cases, walking away from a security relationship over human rights
or other concerns would simply remove the professionalizing influence
that the U.S. military frequently exercises over partner militaries.
U.S. security assistance is a key tool to incentivize other nations to
work with us toward shared security objectives, and it does provide
access to make the case for human rights with key leaders around the
globe, but it largely does not provide us with a veto over the choices
partner nations make with respect to their own domestic governance.
Human Rights
Question. While security assistance allows the U.S. to provide
critical aid to our allies and partners around the globe, it must also
be used to facilitate the growth of human rights, civil institutions,
and good governance. What is DoD doing to ensure that human rights is
taken into consideration when granting security assistance? How is DoD
leveraging security assistance to ensure that our partners are
upholding human rights and not using this assistance to damage human
rights within their respective countries? Can you provide us instances
or examples of the United States using this leverage to promote human
rights? What mechanisms are in place to identify certain risks that
security assistance poses to the goals of promoting human rights,
democracy, and civil institutions? How do we mitigate these risks in
the short term? In the long term?
Answer [Harvey]. DoD takes very seriously the need to encourage
partner countries to prevent violations of human rights and to hold
their security forces accountable for such violations; to strengthen
compliance with the law of armed conflict and respect for civilian
control over the military; to establish military justice systems and
other mechanisms for accountability; and to prevent the use of child
soldiers. DoD understands the importance of engagement with partner
governments on these issues. DoD routinely provides a variety of human
rights training to foreign security forces under several different
authorities. The Combatant Commands also incorporate human rights
training for foreign security forces in all joint operations and
exercises. Commanders ensure that all operational and intelligence
engagements with foreign security forces, and any engagements that
involve ethical, political, military, legal, or human rights
implications, contain a human rights component focusing on the
responsibility of military and security forces to protect human rights.
Building Partner Capacity
Question. Have DoD efforts to ``build partner capacity''
demonstrated substantial and lasting gains by recipient countries? In
which countries, and by what standards does DoD assess such gains?
Answer [Harvey]. Colombia provides an excellent case study of how
the results of partner-nation political will and commitment, coupled
with full U.S. interagency and congressional support, address shared
transnational challenges. In January 2016, the Department issued its
first policy on assessment, monitoring, and evaluation (AM&E) of
security cooperation (DoD Instruction 5132.14, ``Assessment,
Monitoring, and Evaluation Policy for the Security Cooperation
Enterprise,'' January 13, 2017). We are working to implement that
policy, in coordination with State Department, USAID, and other
stakeholders based on best practices. This AM&E framework will not only
provide the Congress and taxpayers a better return on investment, but
allow DoD to consider how to most effectively apply limited resources
against our greatest strategic priorities.
NATO Members with Russian Equipment
Question. The new Russian Sanctions Act, by levying sanctions
legislation Russia's defense industrial sector, has the potential to
impact eastern NATO members that still rely on Russian equipment and on
Russia for parts and component. Does the administration have a plan to
help these countries transition away from Russian equipment? Has DoD
considered offering loans or leases, in addition to FMF grants, to
these countries to support their acquisition of U.S. higher-end
systems?
Answer [Harvey]. DoD considers all available tools when assessing
how to meet individual partner-nation equipping needs. All of our
Security Assistance/Security Cooperation activities focus on building
interoperability with the United States and NATO and encourage our
partners to procure U.S. and NATO interoperable systems as they seek to
replace Russian equipment. The sanctions only compound the need to
support our Allies in moving to replace Russian military equipment with
U.S. and NATO interoperable systems.
Security Assistance to Afghanistan
Question. Our security assistance for Afghanistan runs primarily
through the Department of Defense. The Obama administration began a
process in 2013 which would have transitioned this assistance from DoD
to State, as U.S. forces were scheduled to draw down from the country.
With the reversal in the Obama policy as well as a new South Asia
strategy by the Trump administration, I understand that this process
was stopped. Where does this discussion stand? Is it the Trump
administration vision that security assistance in Afghanistan will
continue to sit with the Defense Department? What do we lose in terms
of policy coherence by having the Defense Department administer
security assistance with little role or input by the State Department?
Answer [Harvey]. DoD has no near-term plans to transition security
assistance to Afghanistan from DoD's Afghanistan Security Forces Fund
(ASFF) to Department of State authorities. DoD's ASFF provided more
than $4.2 billion in fiscal year (FY) 2017 to support the Afghanistan
National and Defense Security Forces (ANDSF). The FY 2018 ASFF
appropriation is more than $4.3 billion. The ASFF accounts for nearly
80 percent of the Afghanistan's total defense budget and is uniquely
designed to address ANDSF needs, including police costs, salaries and
incentive pay, fuel, infrastructure, and other operational support. We
assess that ASFF remains the most appropriate funding source to support
the ANDSF based on the magnitude of current defense requirements in
Afghanistan. In addition, we assess that securing adequate funding in
the Department of State budget to support ANDSF requirements could
result in costly tradeoffs in the State Department's security
assistance and civilian assistance accounts and other administration
priorities. The Department of State has the authority to concur or not
concur in all ASFF programs to ensure that activities are consistent
with U.S. foreign policy.
Excess Defense Articles
Question. One method of providing security assistance is through
the provision of Excess Defense Articles (EDA). It is unclear, however,
how rational the system of EDA is; how EDA is prioritized by country,
by those countries' needs, and by equipment available. What
improvements do you think need to be made to the EDA program?
Answer [Harvey]. The EDA program aligns available excess equipment
with a country request based on the country's requirements. If demand
(requirements) exceeds the available quantity of equipment, an
interagency meeting is convened with representatives from the Defense
Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), the State Department (PM/RSAT), the
Joint Staff (J-5), and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy to determine the priority for allocation of such equipment based
on U.S. foreign policy goals, U.S. national interests, and the
potential for sustainability and supportability of the planned
recipient country. In terms of improvements, an amendment to Section
516(f)(1) of the FAA to increase the $7 million original acquisition
dollar-value threshold for the congressional notification requirement
and remove the significant military-equipment requirement from the
notification requirement (or place a minimum dollar threshold on it)
would significantly streamline the processing of many small-scale
items. The result of the current threshold is that 85 percent of all
EDA requests must be notified. For example, if a single armored wrecker
is included with a request for 50 non-armored wheeled vehicles and the
total original acquisition value is $3 million, we must present a 30-
day notification before authorizing the transfer.
Lease Authorities for Excess Naval Vessels
Question. The provision of excess naval vessels is a powerful and
important foreign policy tool; as such, for vessels of 3,000 tons
displacement, an act of Congress is required for the sale or grant of
such vessels to foreign recipients. Unfortunately, this process has
been handicapped by the selection of recipient countries, many of which
are, at best, problematic partners to the United States, or are
unreliable partners and sources of instability and threats to U.S.
interests. The Navy could, however, provide such vessels on a longterm
lease basis, with the added benefit of the retention of U.S. title
giving the U.S. authority in determining that these vessels are used in
ways supportive of U.S. foreign and security interests. Are Title 10
lease authorities sufficient to conclude such leases? What policy
impediments exist for such a program?
Answer [Harvey]. Title 10 leases (10 U.S.C. 2667) are not
appropriate for leases to a foreign government as Section 61 of the
Arms Export Control Act explicitly states that DoD may not use 10
U.S.C. 2667 to lease any defense articles to a foreign government or
international organization. Furthermore, 10 U.S.C. 7307 requires
legislation to dispose of vessels over 3,000 tons displacement,
including by lease. If legislation were enacted to allow for vessel
leases, the leases would occur through the authority outlined in
Chapter 6 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2976), which limits
any lease to a term of five years. The cost of refurbishment to sail-
worthiness, training, support, and sustainment (estimated at $85-$100
million for a sale with three years of sustainment), may be too cost
prohibitive for any partner to consider without a permanent transfer,
especially since Title 22 leases may be revoked at any time with
limited notice.
Security Cooperation Officer Perspective
Question. You bring a unique perspective the job of Director of
DSCA, in that you have served as a Security Cooperation Officer in the
field. Understanding that you have just assumed your new position,
could you share your observations of the benefits and problems of US
security assistance as a former SCO, and how those insights might be
used to improve the provision of security assistance, particularly the
FMS process?
Answer [Hooper]. Security Cooperation is a pillar of U.S. foreign
policy. DSCA's security cooperation programs strengthen bilateral
relationships between the United States and its foreign partners by
enhancing military-to-military cooperation, enabling greater
interoperability, contributing to shared security goals through the
development of partner capabilities, and providing U.S. forces with
peacetime and contingency access. Security cooperation also provides
key opportunities to build personal relationships that underpin our
national security and foreign policy. DSCA has identified five key
challenges to expediting the FMS process: The first challenge is
working with partners to define requirements. DSCA needs to work
closely with partners to identify capabilities for specific mission
sets. The second challenge is non-standard, non-program-of-record
requests. Although these items may be an appropriate fit to meet
partner capability needs and to support our industrial base, the
process to meet these acquisitions is often time consuming. The third
challenge is increased demand by our foreign partners for transfer of
advanced technology. This demand amplifies the need for U.S. defense
systems to be designed with exportability in mind. The fourth challenge
is balancing the complexities of politics and foreign policy as they
relate to security cooperation programs. The final challenge is
supporting our defense industrial base's ability to fulfill
requirements identified by foreign partners. DSCA is examining these
five challenges in conjunction with others in the U.S. Government and
with industry and international stakeholders, as appropriate, to
determine how to address these issues and make our efforts more
efficient, effective, agile, and responsive.
Improving Foreign Government Procurement Processes
Question. One of the reasons for delays in the FMS process is that
client countries often have only a vague idea of what capability they
want to buy; months can be expended in working with the various parts
of a foreign government to better define what specific weapon
capabilities they need and can afford, as well as what we are likely to
consent to provide. Are there better ways to improve this process?
Should the US provide more professional training of foreign acquisition
officials in order to have a more productive relationship in the
procurement process?
Answer [Hooper]. In conjunction with Geographic Combatant Commands'
(GCC) staff and U.S. Embassy Security Cooperation Officers (SCOs) in-
country, DSCA works with partner nations, upon their request, to inform
development and refinement of their requirements early in their
acquisition process. To improve this process, DoD is taking steps to
use existing tools more effectively. Such tools include Expeditionary
Requirements Generation Teams (ERGT), which deploy subject matter
experts to augment GCC staff and SCOs in support of security
cooperation planning and development, Ministry of Defense Advisor
(MoDA) teams, and subject matter expert exchanges. In addition, as part
of the security cooperation workforce reform, DSCA is taking steps to
ensure the community is properly trained to assist partners in
requirements development. DoD also offers numerous training
opportunities for foreign partners in traditional classroom
environments, such as the Defense Acquisition University and the
Defense Institute of Security Cooperation Studies. The curriculum
offered in these schoolhouses assists foreign acquisition professionals
in understanding planning and resource processes, requirements
generation, budgeting, acquisition, and sustainment.
Expanded Leasing Ability
Question. FMS and FMF are both effective US programs to build
partner countries' military capabilities. However, both are often
limited by funds available, both country funds and US grant assistance,
as well as production timelines. Should the US expand its ability to
lease equipment to partner countries, either to supplement the FMS and
FMF process, or to provide an interim capability while their FMS
purchases are being produced?
Answer [Hooper]. Chapter 6 of the Arms Export Control Act provides
the authority to lease defense articles already in DoD stocks if there
are compelling foreign policy and national security reasons to provide
the articles via lease rather than by a sale. The lease is subject to a
determination that the articles will not be needed for public use
during the lease period. It is not uncommon for the United States to
lease an interim capability to a foreign partner in advance of the
delivery of an item being purchased through FMS. Currently, DoD does
not have the authority to lease defense articles not already in DoD
stocks, or to repurpose articles in DoD stocks that are intended for
public use. DSCA is exploring whether an expanded lease authority would
be an effective supplement to existing security cooperation
authorities.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted to Thomas H.
Harvey and General Charles Hooper by Senator Robert Menendez
Ukraine
Question. The Ukraine Assistance Initiative permits the Secretary
of Defense to provide up to $300 million in FY2016 and $350 million in
FY 2017 for security assistance and intelligence support, including
training, equipment, logistics support, supplies and services to
military and other security forces of Ukraine. How do you plan to
support Ukrainian forces who continue to face Russian aggression and
occupation?
Answer [Hooper]. DCSA, in coordination with the U.S. European
Command, the Department of State, and other U.S. departments and
agencies, provides significant defensive capabilities to the
Ukrainians. We continue to collate and finalize proposals from the
subcommittees of the Multinational Joint Commission (MJC) to support
Ukraine in Fiscal Year 2018. Some items include counter-artillery/
mortar radars, armored vehicles, night-vision devices, optics, personal
protective equipment, thermal imagers, ambulances, medical equipment
and medical training, emergency response and casualty triage equipment,
counter-Russian propaganda training and equipment, airport beacons,
radars, and airfield equipment to bring Staro-Konstantinov to the
standards of an ``all-weather'' airbase, maritime sonar systems, dive
gear, and underwater vehicles. Furthermore, we assist in the
development of institutions for the Ukrainian Armed Forces, such as
military police training, forensics training, counterterrorism
training, and special forces individual combat training. The National
Guard assists in training Ukrainian National Guard brigades battalions
forward deployed. In addition, we are assisting in developing a
stronger Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) corps, including by providing a
training academy to further the education of future NCO leaders. The
MJC will continue to evaluate and prioritize the Ukrainian capability
gaps to ensure we provide the most effective equipment and training
necessary to deter aggressive Russian actions.
Answer [Harvey]. DoD will continue to leverage the Ukraine Security
Assistance Initiative (USAI) as a means of training and equipping
Ukrainian forces.
Lebanon
Question. The administration's budget proposed slashing FMF to
Lebanon. Do you see value in continuing to support the Lebanese Armed
Forces? Are you concerned about increasing Hezbollah presence within
the forces? What implications will this have for U.S. national
security, security of our allies, and overall regional stability?
Answer [Hooper]. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) is a unifying
entity within Lebanon and a valuable investment that advances U.S.
interests in the region. The LAF has served as a bulwark against
Lebanese Hizballah (LH) influence, defeated ISIS along the Syrian
border, safeguarded Lebanon's borders, and maintained security within
Lebanon. The LAF continues to uphold its independence from party
politics,. The LAF serves as a counterbalance to LH influence, which
challenges LH's efforts to improve its legitimacy within the country. A
more capable LAF would allow Lebanon to exercise greater sovereignty
throughout the nation.
Answer [Harvey]. DoD is exploring ways to support the Lebanese
Armed Forces (LAF) in a manner consistent with our approach to shared
security challenges in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility.
A reduction of Foreign Military Financing (FMF) funding available for
Lebanon would require a ``relook'' of U.S. activities. Secretaries
Tillerson and Mattis established a Security Sector Assistance (SSA)
Steering Committee to review such cases and programs where a reduction
in one account or another might impact broader U.S. national security
interests.
Bahrain
Question. Last year, owing to serious concerns about human rights
conditions in the country, the United States restricted the sale of
weapons to Bahrain. This administration seems to have abandoned that
policy. Have you seen an improvement in the human rights situation in
Bahrain? Do you believe it is in the national security interest of the
United States to continue using available levers to promote human
rights?
Answer [Hooper]. The United States continues to monitor the
situation and urge the Government of Bahrain to continue to build an
inclusive society that promotes human rights and political
opportunities for all parties. Promoting human rights improves
stability within partner nations throughout the world, which is
directly linked to the national security interests of the United
States. The United States relies on all instruments of national power,
including diplomatic, information, military, and economic, to change
the behavior of a partner country to promote human rights.
Answer [Harvey]. Over the last year, we have noted new and
continued restrictions on the existence and operation of political
societies; restrictions on free expression, assembly, and association;
and lack of due process in the legal system. We have repeatedly voiced
concern about these and other issues and urged the Government of
Bahrain, at the highest levels, to reinvigorate its reform program,
make the political system more inclusive, and rebuild trust between the
government and citizens. We will continue to urge the Government of
Bahrain to take steps to ensure inclusive elections in 2018 and to
advance reform efforts for the benefit of Bahrain's longterm security
and our mutual interests in regional stability. Enhancing our security
cooperation with Bahrain does not diminish the enduring emphasis we
place on human-rights issues.
Egypt
Question. Last year, the GAO issued a report recommending increased
end use monitoring of security equipment transferred to Egyptian
security forces. What steps are you taking to improve monitoring,
particularly in the Sinai? The same report indicated that the USG
completed ``some, but not all human rights vetting required by State
policy before providing training or equipment to Egyptian security
forces.'' What steps are you taking to ensure that the United States is
complying will all applicable human rights vetting? How do you assess
our national security gains in this context?
Answer [Hooper]. With regard to the recommendations made in the GAO
report, those that relate to end-use monitoring are focused on direct
commercial sales (DCS), which for compliance reporting fall under the
State Department's Blue Lantern program. Those that relate to human
rights are focused on the State Department's vetting process and
State's INVEST system. In both of these cases, we defer to our
colleagues at the State Department. With regard to Egypt and the
``efense Department's Golden Sentry end-use monitoring program,
inventory reports of items transferred to Egypt and designated as
``enhanced'' reflect that 100 percent of those items have been
accounted for as of August 2017. These reports are inclusive of all
enhanced items located throughout Egypt, including those located in the
Sinai.
Answer [Harvey]. The United States and Egypt have a mutual interest
in countering terrorism, particularly in the Sinai, and U.S. security
assistance is a tool to strengthen the Egyptian Armed Forces'
counterterrorism capacity. To help ensure that U.S.-origin equipment is
deployed more effectively in accordance with U.S. legal requirements,
the 2016 GAO report made five recommendations to the Department of
State. The Department of State has subsequently worked with U.S.
Embassy Cairo and, specifically, the Office of Military Cooperation
(OMC)-Cairo to improve equipment vetting. The Government of Egypt has
responded to senior Department of State and Department of Defense
requests for greater access to the Sinai by approving official travel
to the Multinational Force and Observers facilities, Egyptian Second
Field Army Headquarters, and development projects near the Suez Canal.
The Departments of State and Defense are seeking further access to
areas of operational significance in the Sinai to understand better the
ISIS threat and Egypt's use of U.S.-origin equipment in Sinai
counterterrorism operations. U.S. military-to-military cooperation with
Egypt is critical to achieve shared security interests and an important
conduit to message the importance of respect for human rights. The
Departments of State and Defense strictly enforce policies and
practices on appropriate end-use of U.S.-origin defense articles and
training to ensure compliance with human rights standards. OMC-Cairo
now maintains paper copies of International Vetting and Security
Tracking (INVEST) approvals for a five-year period and waits for INVEST
approval before issuing travel orders or providing funding for Egyptian
forces' participation in U.S.-funded training.
Colombia
Question. We have seen an alarming rise in coca production in
Colombia over the past year. We have made tremendous investments into
supporting Colombian security services in fighting narcotrafficking and
combatting criminal networks. In fact, our joint efforts have been so
successful that Colombia's security services now train other partner
forces throughout the region. Combatting international criminal
networks surely requires cooperation from allies. Earlier this month
the President said he ``seriously considered'' decertifying Colombia as
a partner in the war against drugs because of this alarming rise. What
implications would that have on our security assistance and cooperation
with Colombia? Would such a decertification ultimately hamper the
ability of the United States to collaborate with Colombian security
forces with whom we work on combatting narcotraffickers?
Answer [Harvey]. Colombia is an excellent case study where partner
nation commitment, together with full U.S. support, can achieve lasting
results. The rise of coca production is alarming, and we will work
closely with the State Department and the Congress to assess the impact
the decision to decertify would have on our ability to partner with
Colombia.
Answer [Hooper]. U.S. security assistance is restricted for
countries determined by the President to be Major Drug Transit or Major
Illicit Drug Producing that have ``failed demonstrably'' to take
certain counternarcotics efforts. U.S.-Colombia cooperation is strong,
and Colombia remains a critical partner in the region. It has been a
tremendous friend on U.S. initiatives inside and outside of its
borders. A ``failed demonstrably'' designation has the potential to
undermine this relationship at large. Without a national security
waiver, it would be more difficult for the United States to engage with
and support Colombian security forces. This is especially true
regarding U.S. support of Colombian efforts to implement the peace
accord and manage its internal security, two goals that are consistent
with the whole-of-government approach the United States promotes for
Colombia's counterdrug efforts. Absent a waiver, a ``failed
demonstrably'' designation would restrict U.S. capacity to provide
security assistance to Colombia. Over the last five years, Colombia has
received an average of $28.6 million in Foreign Military Financing
(FMF) grants per year and an average of $1.4 million in International
Military Education and Training (IMET) funds per year. FMF has
supported the UH-60 Blackhawk and fixed-wing aircraft, secure
communications, maritime and riverine interdiction vessels, and a wide
range of programs for the ground forces. All of these programs were
instrumental for Colombia's battle with the FARC. Halting our support
would have a significant impact on the Colombian military's ability to
address the ongoing trafficking threat and post-accord security-
consolidation efforts that aim to extend the reach of the Colombian
Government. IMET courses focus on institutionalizing respect for human
rights and the rule of law and enhancing the leadership and technical
ability to protect national territory and maritime borders against
transnational threats. IMET courses include professional military
education courses, language training, technical training, and enlisted
and officer development courses.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted to Thomas H.
Harvey and General Charles Hooper by Senator Todd Young
Question. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
Reconstruction (SIGAR) released their report on September 21 entitled,
``Reconstructing the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces:
Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan.'' This report
addresses how the Department of State, Department of Defense, and
others developed and executed security assistance programs in
Afghanistan. The report notes that the U.S. ``devoted over $70 billion
(60 percent) of its Afghanistan reconstruction funds to building the
ANDSF through 2016, and continues to commit over $4 billion per year to
that effort''--yet major problems persist. The SIGAR report features 12
key findings, 11 lessons, and a number of recommendations, including
recommendations for State and DoD. In light of this tremendous taxpayer
investment and the national security interests at stake, I am
interested to hear your response to the report and its recommendations.
Have you reviewed this report, and do you have any specific reactions
you would like to share with this committee?
Answer [Harvey]. OSD (Policy) worked closely with SIGAR on this
report, which incorporates many of DoD's insights gained from
conducting policy oversight of the effort to develop and sustain the
Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). As part of the
President's new South Asia Strategy, DoD is already applying some of
SIGAR's key Afghanistan-specific lessons learned and recommendations,
such as expanding the train, advise, and assist (TAA) mission down to
the tactical level; looking at ways to improve selection and training
of advisors before they deploy; and increasing advisory capacity in
Afghan National Army (ANA) military academies and training centers. In
addition, the new strategy continues to place a premium on on-going
efforts to protect U.S. taxpayers' investment in the ANDSF that are
consistent with other SIGAR recommendations, such as improving ANDSF
oversight and accountability systems and improving technical oversight
of U.S. contracts for maintenance support to ANDSF equipment.
Answer [Hooper]. I have reviewed the findings, lessons, and
recommendations in the report and DSCA has addressed the areas under
our purview. I want to thank SIGAR for its comprehensive and insightful
work. As the Director of DSCA, I am heavily invested in the success of
the security cooperation mission in Afghanistan and I am committed to
improving our support continuously. The successful execution of
Afghanistan Security Forces Fund program remains a significant
priority. Further, the DSCA Ministry of Defense Advisor (MoDA) team
works closely and consistently with the Resolute Support Mission
Headquarters to review and update the MoDA training. DSCA constantly
reviews the program of instruction in general, and the training
vignettes in particular, for relevance to current operational
conditions and mission requirements.
Question. Have you reviewed the transcript from the July 18, 2017
Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing entitled, ``Four Famines:
Root Causes and Multilateral Action Plan''? If not, please do so.
Answer [Harvey]. Yes, I have reviewed the transcript. I agree that
the welfare of the 20 million people facing starvation in these four
countries is of utmost concern and importance. DoD follows these
developments closely. With our interagency partners, the international
community, and the host nations, we are working to address the root
causes of these crises in order to improve the challenging
circumstances for these populations.
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Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted to Thomas H.
Harvey and General Charles Hooper by Senator Rob Portman
Value of Security Cooperation to the U.S. Military and Defense-
Industrial Base
Question. There has been much discussion about the impact of human
rights consideration on U.S. security assistance--and rightly so--but I
also think it's important to publicly discuss the value to the U.S.
military in developing close military-to-military relationships with
strategic partners around the world. From an operational planning
perspective, what is the benefit of having regional partners trained
and equipped according to U.S. standards?
Answer [Hopper]. When partners are trained and equipped according
to U.S. standards, they become more interoperable with U.S. forces.
During contingencies, interoperable partners are more effective in
coordinating actions with U.S. forces and, where necessary, have the
capability to share equipment and ammunition during battle. Finally,
partners who are trained and equipped to U.S. standards are often
postured for long-term cooperative relationships with the United
States, seek a steady rhythm of military-to-military engagements with
the United States, and apply national funds to purchase U.S. equipment
and spare parts, which facilitates a healthier U.S. defense industrial
base.
Answer [Harvey]. DoD maintains generational relationships through
our defense partnerships with countries globally. Because of these
relationships and our global posture and presence, no other country,
department or agency has the same ability to influence positively other
partner nation security forces. Interoperability is key to the success
of U.S. warfighters and the ability of the United States to deter, or
prevail if necessary, in conflict. DoD carefully considers
interoperability with our allies and partners when planning security
cooperation investments and developing our own forces.
Question. There has been much discussion about the impact of human
rights consideration on U.S. security assistance--and rightly so--but I
also think it's important to publicly discuss the value to the U.S.
military in developing close military-to-military relationships with
strategic partners around the world. How do increased interoperability
and shared tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) between the U.S.
and regional partners impact DoD assessments about the costs and
requirements of responding to contingencies around the world?
Answer [Hooper]. Today's complex security environment often
requires a long-term approach with the military operating as part of a
comprehensive, whole-of-government effort, which includes international
partners, to facilitate unified action. Synchronizing our military
actions with the many stakeholders, both interagency and multinational,
is key to addressing threats initiated by adversaries to challenge
regional and global security. In an era of inclusiveness with
multinational partners, the United States benefits when international
partners share perspectives and support, and when the United States
reciprocates. Best practices include sharing plans; tactics,
techniques, and procedures (TTP); and capabilities. Shared TTPs are
most beneficial when the United States is operating with partners with
similar equipment. When the equipment is U.S.-origin, the benefits are
multifaceted. From a fiscal perspective, selling services and
capabilities through FMS contributes to U.S. DoD program stability,
while reducing the cost of research and development and long-term
sustainment for the international partner. FMS relationships are
reinforced with interactions spanning several years, and often decades,
as military teams train and exercise together and the defense equipment
is sustained and upgraded in tandem with the United States. FMS can
therefore lead to unit cost reductions in DoD's domestic procurements.
This can be realized in the form of cost sharing through cooperative
development and cost savings as a result of economies of scale.
Answer [Harvey]. DoD maintains generational relationships through
our defense partnerships with countries globally. Because of these
relationships and our global posture and presence, no other country,
department or agency has the same ability to influence positively other
partner nation security forces. Interoperability is key to the success
of U.S. warfighters and the ability of the United States to deter, or
prevail if necessary, in conflict. DoD carefully considers
interoperability with our allies and partners when planning security
cooperation investments and developing our own forces.
Question. There has been much discussion about the impact of human
rights consideration on U.S. security assistance--and rightly so--but I
also think it's important to publicly discuss the value to the U.S.
military in developing close military-to-military relationships with
strategic partners around the world. Can you please talk about the role
Foreign Military Sales can play in sustaining critical U.S. defense-
industrial base capabilities, especially during gaps in production
cycles for DoD contracts?
Answer [Hooper]. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) play a critical role
in supporting U.S. defense-industrial base capabilities. A specific
example can be found in examining the recent history of the Boeing F/A-
18E/F Super Hornet and E/A-18G Growler production line. As of 2015,
Boeing planned to close down the Super Hornet's St. Louis production
line by 2017 after fulfilling an order of 15 Super Hornet fighter
aircraft for the U.S. Navy. At that time, the Navy was addressing how
it would contend with the projected strike-fighter shortfall it would
face in the 2020s, but had not made any commitments for further
purchases. With fatigue issues affecting the heavily deployed current
F/A-18 fleet, and delays in fielding the carrier-capable F-35C, the
Navy needed options to ensure that it could sustain its robust strike-
fighter capability, but Boeing would not maintain a production line
solely for a small-scale aircraft buy. At that time, Australia was the
only international Super Hornet FMS customer. However, Kuwait soon
expressed interest in the Super Hornet as a replacement for its aging
legacy F/A-18 C/D fleet. With the anticipation of a new FMS order,
industry was presented the opportunity to extend the production line
and demonstrate the capability to fulfill potential sales. This
extension presented additional options for the U.S. Navy to sustain and
enhance its fleet of currently fielded strike-fighter and electronic
aircraft. The bridge that FMS for Kuwait and other potential customers
has provided for the F/A-18 E/F production line has made the F/A-18 E/F
a viable option to satisfy future U.S. DoD and international fighter
aircraft requirements. Had the production line closed this year, as
projected, after fulfilling the original U.S. DoD program requirements,
Boeing would have had to divest significant strike-fighter intellectual
and industrial capital, which would take years and significant
investment to regenerate. Instead, in addition to new aircraft
deliveries, upgrades to increase range, improve weapons and sensor
capabilities, and lower detectability can now be offered to current and
future partners. Additionally, further production and development of
the F/A-18 E/F, for both the U.S. Navy and FMS, ensure that the U.S.
fighter industrial base continues to be diversified beyond a single
manufacturer or platform and realizes the cost-benefit of economies of
scale by increasing number of sales.
Answer [Harvey]. Foreign Military Sales programs and all DoD
security cooperation ultimately benefit the U.S. taxpayer--whether by
supporting the defense industrial base or by ensuring the continued
safety and security of the homeland by sharing the responsibility for
pursuing global security by, with, and through our allies and partners.
Lessons Learned from Ukraine Security Assistance Efforts
Question. General Hooper, in your statement you correctly noted the
ongoing challenges DSCA (Defense Security Cooperation Agency) faces in
shortening the delivery timeline for security assistance provided
through Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases. Because the previous
administration chose to restrict the type of assistance that could be
provided to Ukraine using expedited Executive authorities, a lot of the
U.S. military assistance had to be provided through statutory
authorities like the Foreign Military Sales (FMS). The silver lining to
this was that the inefficiencies in the FMS process were much easier to
see. I'm interested in your thoughts on what additional authorities or
mechanisms you think would helpful in streamlining this process--not
just in Ukraine but around the world. There are a number of special
financing mechanisms designed to help expedite funding to implement FMS
cases such as the Special Defense Acquisition Fund, Third Party
Financing, and others. Can you comment on the usefulness of these
authorities? Are there any other particular mechanisms you find
especially helpful? Are there any additional authorities you think
would be helpful?
Answer [Hooper]. The Special Defense Acquisition Fund (SDAF) is an
important security-cooperation authority since it remains the only
authority available to the administration to purchase defense articles
and services in anticipation of their future transfer. The SDAF results
in faster deliveries once FMS agreements are signed, and it helps to
enhance U.S. force readiness by reducing the need to divert assets from
U.S. forces when urgent foreign needs arise. Since the SDAF was
recapitalized in 2012, the Department of Defense, with Department of
State concurrence, has used it to purchase more than $700 million worth
of defense articles and services, which have been transferred to more
than 45 countries worldwide, including Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon,
Ukraine, and Tunisia. On average, the articles and services purchased
by the fund were delivered to partner nations six to twelve months
faster than would have otherwise been possible. Without question, the
SDAF has proven to be a useful security-cooperation authority. In 2017,
however, section 114(c)(3) of title 10, U.S. Code, was amended to
require that the Department of Defense purchase $500 million worth of
precision-guided munitions each fiscal year before buying any other
defense articles or services. Because DoD is only able to execute about
$350 million in new buys each year, this law has precluded DoD from
using the SDAF to purchase any defense articles or services other than
precision-guided munitions. The administration is requesting that the
law be amended in FY 2018 to allow DoD to use the SDAF to purchase
other defense articles and services that may be required by our
international partners in an expedited manner. Regarding additional
authorities, at this time we believe we have sufficient authorities to
provide assistance of the type discussed here.
Question. General Hooper, in your statement you correctly noted the
ongoing challenges DSCA (Defense Security Cooperation Agency) faces in
shortening the delivery timeline for security assistance provided
through Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases. Because the previous
administration chose to restrict the type of assistance that could be
provided to Ukraine using expedited Executive authorities, a lot of the
U.S. military assistance had to be provided through statutory
authorities like the Foreign Military Sales (FMS). The silver lining to
this was that the inefficiencies in the FMS process were much easier to
see. I'm interested in your thoughts on what additional authorities or
mechanisms you think would helpful in streamlining this process--not
just in Ukraine but around the world. Would providing multi-year
obligation authority standard in Congressional authorizations and
appropriations for security assistance activities be helpful?
Answer [Hooper]. Yes, making multi-year obligation authority
standard in congressional authorizations and appropriations for
security assistance activities would be very helpful. DSCA greatly
appreciates the Committee's efforts and willingness to provide cross-
fiscal year obligation authority. Building partner capacity and
capabilities is a multi-year effort involving pre- and post-equipment
delivery training that can stretch up to four years from the first
obligation of funds. Providing enhanced multi-year obligation authority
would increase the return on taxpayer investment by helping DoD better
sequence activities in a dynamic environment.
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[all]