[Senate Hearing 115-664]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 115-664
THE FUTURE OF IRAQ'S MINORITIES:
WHAT IS NEXT AFTER ISIS ?
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE, TRANSNATIONAL
CRIME, CIVILIAN SECURITY,
DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS,
AND GLOBAL WOMEN'S ISSUES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 4, 2017
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web:
http://www.govinfo.gov
___________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
37-486 PDF WASHINGTON : 2019
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
BOB CORKER, Tennessee, Chairman
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
MARCO RUBIO, Florida ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
CORY GARDNER, Colorado TOM UDALL, New Mexico
TODD, YOUNG, Indiana CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming TIM KAINE, Virginia
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
RAND PAUL, Kentucky CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey
SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE, TRANSNATIONAL
CRIME, CIVILIAN SECURITY, DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS,
AND GLOBAL WOMEN'S ISSUES
MARCO RUBIO, Florida, Chairman
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona TOM UDALL, New Mexico
CORY GARDNER, Colorado JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia TIM KAINE, Virginia
Todd Womack, Staff Director
Jessica Lewis, Democratic Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Rubio, Hon. Marco, U.S. Senator from Florida..................... 1
Kaine, Hon. Tim, U.S. Senator from Virginia...................... 3
Wolf, Frank R., Distinguished Senior Fellow, 21st Century
Wilberforce Initiative, Falls Church, VA....................... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Natali, Denise Ph.D., Director, Center for Strategic Research,
Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense
University, Washington, DC..................................... 9
Prepared statement........................................... 11
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Northern Iraq 2017, by Hon. Frank R. Wolf Distinguished Senior
Fellow, 21st Century Wilberforce Initiative.................... 27
(iii)
THE FUTURE OF IRAQ'S MINORITIES:
WHAT IS NEXT AFTER ISIS ?
----------
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 4, 2017
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Transnational Crime,
Civilian Security, Democracy, Human Rights, and Global
Women's Issues,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:35 a.m. in
Room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Marco Rubio
presiding.
Present: Senators Rubio [presiding], Kaine, and Shaheen.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARCO RUBIO,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator Rubio. Good morning. Now we are back in a hearing
of the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Transnational Crime,
Civilian Security, Democracy, Human Rights, and Global Women's
Issues.
If you guys are coming to the hearing, you need to sit
down. Thank you. It feels like I am at home here. ``Close the
door. We're working over here.'' [Laughter.]
Senator Rubio. Anyway, the title of the hearing is, ``The
Future of Iraq's Minorities: What Is Next After ISIS?''
So we will have one panel testifying here today, and the
panel features, of course, former Congressman Frank Wolf, who
was just part of our previous nomination hearing as well, where
he introduced the President's nominee to be the Ambassador at
Large for International Religious Freedom. He is a
distinguished senior fellow at the 21st Century Wilberforce
Initiative. And Ms. Denise Natali, who is the director of the
Center for Strategic Research at the Institute for National
Strategic Studies at the National Defense University.
Both of them have long and distinguished careers, and we
are fortunate to have the benefit of their expertise and
testimony here today.
The hearing is especially timely, not only because we have
a new administration that is still working through and
formulating its Iraq policy, but also because, for some of the
communities in Iraq that are in question and are being
impacted, for them, the hour is late, and their continued
presence in the lands they have inhabited since antiquity
literally hangs in the balance.
Three years ago, ISIS began a brutal campaign in northern
Iraq, a campaign against Christians, Yazidis, Shia Muslims, and
other smaller religious minorities, ruthlessly murdering
innocent men and women and children, and destroying communities
that have been there for millennia.
The images of these vulnerable communities fleeing for
their lives sent shockwaves around the world. During the ISIS
seize of Mount Sinjar, tens of thousands of Yazidis were
trapped without food or water, and the Islamic State massacred
and kidnapped and enslaved members of this community. Girls
were separated by eye color and sold as sex slaves to ISIS
fighters based on their preference.
Similarly, in Iraq, their ancient Christian community was
and is under assault. Fifty thousand fled Mosul to the Nineveh
plains as ISIS advanced eastward. Days after the Sinjar
massacre, ISIS seized Qaraqosh, which is the city in Iraq with
the second largest population of Christians, and thousands more
were displaced. Death, kidnapping, and forced conversions
ensued.
Places of worship and holy sites that had been there for
centuries were defaced. They were bombed, looted, destroyed,
including the 1,400-year-old monastery of Saint Elijah.
It was clear that the bloody campaign targeting ethnic and
religious minorities amounted to genocide, and the Obama
administration and now the Trump administration have rightfully
declared it as such. While these designations are significant--
quite frankly, even historic, and clearly justified--the fact
is that the words alone are cold comfort to these communities
whose lives have been upended, places of worship destroyed, and
their communities and families ripped apart.
One of the issues that prompted this hearing is the seeming
disconnect between the millions of dollars in U.S. humanitarian
assistance to Iraq and the inability of these communities
targeted with genocide to adequately access this aid. Clear
congressional directives over multiple years have gone
unheeded, unimplemented, and, frankly, ignored.
There has been an overreliance, beginning during the
previous administration and seemingly continuing apace today
under the new administration, on the United Nations'
development fund to administer U.S. assistance. This U.N.
agency has shown little interest in following congressional
appropriations language, and our own U.S. Government agencies
have not demanded that accountability.
So I am heartened that Administrator Mark Green himself, a
former Member of Congress, is now at the helm of USAID. I know
that he is personally invested in addressing this issue.
Despite divisions within Iraq's religious minority
communities, I was encouraged to learn of the creation of the
Nineveh Reconstruction Committee, a formal ecumenical
partnership between the three largest Christian churches in
Iraq--the Chaldean Catholic Church, the Syriac Catholic Church,
and the Syriac Orthodox Church. Representing the overwhelming
majority of Christians that remain in Iraq, this was an
important step.
As we discuss the plight of Iraq's religious minority
communities, we also must look at the broader context of Iraq's
minorities, particularly the Kurdish people living in Iraqi
Kurdistan. Once again, all eyes were on Iraq last week as the
Kurdistan Regional Government pressed forward with their
nonbinding referendum for independence from Iraq, despite broad
international calls for delay, including from the highest
levels of the U.S. Government.
I was among those urging a delay for many reasons, not the
least of which was my concern about how the already vulnerable
religious minorities, especially those residing in the
contested areas, would fare in such a scenario.
Following the referendum, the tensions are predictably
high. At this time, the U.S. is not supportive of a unilateral
referendum by the KRG. However, we must urge restraint from
both sides and work with both sides to de-escalate tensions
between Baghdad and Erbil, as well as with Iran and Turkey. Any
violence or further escalation from any party will only deepen
the problem.
I am concerned about news reports that Iranian and Turkish
militaries are engaged in provocative military exercises near
the Kurdish regions in Iraq, and that the central government in
Baghdad is taking retaliatory and even discriminatory action
against the KRG and Kurdish members of parliament.
The KRG are important partners in the fight against ISIS,
and we, along with our partners, including Iraq's central
government, must maintain our focus on defeating ISIS.
In the interim, we should support KRG requests for
mediation with the Government of Iraq and create space for them
to present its views.
In the coming weeks and months, the U.S. must be forward-
leaning in our Iraq strategy in the hopes of preserving the
communities that have been a part of the fabric of Iraq for
centuries. Their continued existence, and even their
flourishing, is not simply a moral imperative given the grave
injustices that they have suffered. It is also a key strategic
and national security priority because they are key to any
future pluralistic Iraq that respects religious freedom.
Often, we consider patience a virtue. But the time for
patience on this issue has passed. Urgency must now animate us
moving forward.
The U.S. should implement timely and targeted assistance to
the Christians, Yazidis, and other minority internally
displaced persons targeted by ISIS so that they are able to
return to their homes.
I look forward to the recommendations from our witnesses in
this regard. You have experience that will contribute greatly
to this discussion.
Senator Kaine?
STATEMENT OF HON. TIM KAINE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Just briefly, we have great witnesses here on an important
topic. We cannot take for granted the continuing battle against
ISIS. The progress has been very, very strong since August 2014
when President Obama decided that they were a significant
enough threat that we should take action against them. And our
military leadership, working in tandem with the coalition, has
done really good work on the battlefield, and more remains to
be done.
However, as the ISIS pressure has been reduced in some
parts of the country, other pressures come to light, pressures
that might have been temporarily sidelined as everybody focused
on the battle against ISIS. I have been in Erbil and dealt with
the issues that the chair was talking about, tensions between
Erbil and Baghdad, and dealt with a Chaldean Catholic Church in
Kurdistan and church leaders there, and see significant
tensions ahead. We need to get ahead of them rather than just
be in a responsive posture.
And I think the witnesses today have good recommendations
for analysis of the situation. But even better, we do a lot of
diagnosis up here, and sometimes we are short on the
prescription. But I think the witnesses are not just going to
give us a good diagnosis. I have read their written testimony,
and I think they are going to offer us some prescription as
well, which is important.
I appreciate you being here.
Senator Rubio. Thank you. With that, I guess, the Honorable
Frank Wolf, we again welcome you to the microphone for the
second time this morning. On this very important topic, you
have a long history of contribution. I know you traveled to the
region recently, and we thank you for being here, and we look
forward to your testimony.
STATEMENT OF FRANK R. WOLF, DISTINGUISHED SENIOR FELLOW, 21ST
CENTURY WILBERFORCE INITIATIVE, FALLS CHURCH, VA
Mr. Wolf. Thank you, Chairman Rubio and Senator Kaine and
Senator Shaheen. I appreciate the hearing very, very much.
After a week visiting Bartella, Qaraqosh, Duhok, Erbil,
Mosul, Nimrud, Mount Sinjar, and Sinjar City in August, and
talking with individuals from the various communities, I am sad
to say that if bold action--bold action--is not taken by the
end of the year, I believe a tipping point will be reached, and
we will see the end of Christianity in Iraq in a few short
years, and a loss of religious and ethnic diversity throughout
the region, a loss that will not be regained and could result
in further destabilization, violent extremism, and terrorism
across the Middle East.
In other words, ISIS will have been victorious in their
genocidal rampage, unless concrete action is taken.
Iraq is a land rich with biblical history. Abraham was born
there. Daniel lived and died there. And many events of the
Bible took place in Iraq. And yet, we have already seen the
Christian population drop from 1.5 million to now 250,000 or
less, some even say 150,000, over the course of the past 14
years.
This exodus continues with additional families leaving
every day in search of physical security, economic security,
and education.
Having spent the past 3 years as internally displaced
people, IDPs, many Christian families are at a crossroads,
having to decide whether or not they should return to their
newly liberated villages or just leave Iraq forever. Despite
their best efforts, many believe that they can stay only if
bold action is taken by the United States and other
international partners to ensure their security.
While I went expecting to hear further reports about
security concerns related to ISIS, I was surprised to find that
most individuals I spoke with were concerned about the various
military factions controlling their towns and villages, in
particular, the Hashd al-Shaabi, also known as the Popular
Mobilization Forces, or the PMF.
The Hashd-al Shaabi militia, which is backed by Iran, and
other militia groups are filling the vacuum left post-
liberation.
This is part of the Iranian goal of creating a land-bridge
from Iran through Iraq to Syria to reach a port in the
Mediterranean.
We went through checkpoint after checkpoint after
checkpoint. It was not the Peshmerga. It was not the Iraq
military. It was this militia group.
Such a land-bridge will allow Iran to move fighters,
weapons, and supplies to aid Hezbollah and other terrorist
groups. This will be a direct threat to Israel, a direct threat
to the United States military, as well as others in the West.
Literally, they will be able to get in a van in Tehran,
drive from Tehran through Iraq, through Syria, to a port in the
Mediterranean.
Among the Yazidi community, we heard many of the same
concerns. Sinjar is a prime example of the complications the
minority communities on the ground continue to face.
Considered a contested territory by the central government
and the Kurdistan Regional Government, Sinjar has been
liberated from ISIS since the fall of 2015. However, it is
currently controlled by multiple different militia groups.
We saw very few who have returned. A house here, and then
nobody for blocks. Then another house here, then nobody for
blocks.
Due to this, few families have been able to return, and few
aid groups work in the area due to the potentially volatile
situation, after having been the victims of genocide and with
3,000 of their women and girls still in captivity.
Yesterday, there was a hearing on the House side. There was
a Yazidi woman there who testified. She said she saw the person
who did it--and I will not go into what he did to her--living
in a refugee camp, maybe funded by the U.N., maybe funded by
the United States.
So this ISIS guy got room and board, basically. And the
Yazidi community is just pretty much forgotten about. And there
is no counseling service for these young girls and women who
have been held by ISIS over the years.
One of the Yazidi religious leaders we met with stated,
``We just want to be able to live.'' Unfortunately, to a large
extent, U.S. Government assistance has not been forthcoming to
Iraq's Christian and Yazidi communities, even though the
President, the Vice President, Congress, and the Secretary of
State have declared them victims of genocide.
Many of the displaced Christians, for example, have had to
seek the mainstay of their aid from private charitable sources
on a piecemeal basis over the last 3 years. This is becoming
more difficult as many individuals who give to humanitarian
organizations are facing donor-fatigue.
It is imperative that the United States help the Christians
and Yazidis to return to their hometowns. As a U.N. official
aptly stated in a recent meeting, ``The religious minorities
need unique solutions.'' What works to return Sunni Muslims to
Mosul will not work to return religious minorities to contested
areas.
Since 2014, Congress has had over 40 different hearings
related to ISIS, including seven specifically on the topic of
religious minorities, and required the State Department and
U.S. Agency for International Development to spend some funds
on assistance specifically for genocide survivors from
religious and ethnic minorities.
Congressional resolve, and the force of law, must be
matched by administration action.
Some recommendations.
Now that the military battle with ISIS is largely over, our
government needs fresh eyes. We need fresh eyes on the target
to bring some people, almost like the Baker-Hamilton commission
did to Iraq before, fresh eyes not only to see with regard to
current policies, but victims of genocide, war crimes, but also
because of the critical national security interests in the
region.
If the Iranians get a corridor to the Mediterranean, there
are going to be some serious problems. We have a vested
interest because we lost 4,000 Americans who gave their lives,
and we spent over $2 trillion of taxpayer money.
Secondly, a presidential decision directive or a
presidential memorandum should be issued directing the State
Department and USAID to immediately address the needs of
communities identified by Secretary Tillerson as having been
targeted by genocide. This would address both humanitarian aid
for those living as IDPs and refugees, and stabilization
assistance for those returning to those areas.
Thirdly, a post should be established by the White House
for an interagency coordinator to guarantee that the needs of
these communities are adequately addressed to ensure their
safety and preservation consistent with United States foreign
policy.
When President Bush appointed Senator John Danforth, who I
think used to serve on this committee, to be the envoy to work
on similar issues in Sudan, the announcement was made in the
White House Rose Garden. It was the day before 9/11, with
Senator Danforth standing between President Bush and Secretary
of State Colin Powell. This sent a powerful message to the
world and to the suffering people of Sudan.
So I recommend the same level of announcement for the
person to fill this position. It will be held at the White
House with President Trump and Secretary Tillerson, and will
send a message that America is engaged. And the Christians and
Yazidis and those who have suffered genocide would know that it
is not just words. We really have someone to really work on
this.
Now, when groups come into town, do they go to USAID? Do
they go to the State Department? Do they get to the DOD? There
will be one place to go, and I think this is very important.
Lastly, Congress should immediately pass H.R. 390, the
bipartisan Iraq and Syria Genocide Emergency Relief and
Accountability Act, authored by Chairman Chris Smith and
coauthored by Congresswoman Anna Eshoo. It gives explicit
authorization for the State Department and USAID to identify
the assistance needs of genocide survivors from religious and
ethnic minority communities, and provide funding to entities,
including faith-based entities, effectively providing them with
aid on the ground.
This is essential, because some within the State Department
and USAID have claimed they lack the authority to deliberately
help religious and ethnic communities, even if they are
genocide victims and will become extinct without assistance.
Although there is nothing in U.S. law preventing them from
helping genocide-surviving communities, the authorization will
help ensure the aid actually flows to the victims.
The House passed H.R. 390 on June 6, and the Senate Foreign
Relations passed it on September 19. Hopefully, the Senate will
pass the bill quickly so it can be sent back to the House and
then to the President for signing.
Also, it deals with dealing with those who have committed
criminal activities. We remember, after Nazi Germany, many of
the Nazis embedded themselves, went to America, went to
different countries. We funded an office at the Justice
Department to track them down.
In Rwanda, the same thing. Rwandans who were involved in
genocide spread. You could not find them. You had to track them
down.
The same thing in Srebrenica. You had Serbs and Croats who
were involved in genocide with regard to the Bosnians, and we
had to track them down.
These ISIS people are going to begin to spread and move and
go around. Frankly, I think we need what Mr. Smith's bill does.
Lastly, there is still time, but the hour I believe--and I
may be wrong. I may be wrong. I think the time is about to run
out.
We cannot allow ISIS to be successful in their genocide. We
are aiding these people not because they are Christians, not
because they are Yazidis, not because they are Shia Turkmen. We
are aiding them because they were subject to genocide, and the
word ``genocide'' carried a powerful message.
So they are waiting, and many are just waiting and waiting.
So I think there is time, but if we do not do something by the
end of the year, I think we will reach a tipping point, and I
think it will be over.
[Mr. Wolf's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared statement of Hon. Frank R. Wolf
To begin I would like to thank Chairman Rubio and Senator Kaine for
holding this hearing today.
After a week visiting Bartella, Qaraqosh, Duhok, Erbil, Mosul,
Nimrud, Mt. Sinjar, and Sinjar City in August and talking with
individuals from the various communities, I am sad to say that if bold
action is not taken by the end of the year, I believe a tipping point
will be reached and we will see the end of Christianity in Iraq in a
few short years and a loss of religious and ethnic diversity throughout
the region--a loss which will not be regained and could result in
further destabilization, violent extremism and terrorism across the
Middle East. In other words, ISIS will have been victorious in their
genocidal rampage unless concrete action is taken.
Iraq is a land rich with Biblical history. Abraham was born there,
Daniel lived and died there and many events of the Bible took place in
Iraq. And yet, we have already seen the Christian population drop from
1.5 million to 250,000, or less, over the course of the past 14 years.
This exodus continues with additional families leaving every day in
search of physical security, economic security and education. Having
spent the past three years as Internally Displaced People (IDP's), many
Christian families are at a crossroads, having to decide whether or not
they should return to their newly liberated villages or leave Iraq
forever. Despite their best efforts, many believe that they can stay
only if bold action is taken by the US and other international partners
to ensure their future security.
While I went expecting to hear further reports about security
concerns related to ISIS, I was surprised to find that most individuals
I spoke with were concerned about the various military factions
controlling their towns and villages--in particular the Hashd al-Shaabi
(also known as the Popular Mobilization Forces or PMF). The Hashd-al
Shaabi militia, which is backed by Iran, and other militia groups are
filling the vacuum left post-liberation. This is part of the Iranian
goal of creating a land-bridge from Iran, through Iraq to Syria to
reach a port on the Mediterranean.
Such a land-bridge will allow Iran to move fighters, weapons and
supplies to aid Hezbollah and other terrorist groups. This will be a
direct threat to Israel and the United States military as well as
others in the West.
Among the Yazidi community we heard many of the same concerns.
Sinjar is a prime example of the complications the minority communities
on the ground continue to face. Considered a contested territory by the
Central Government and the Kurdistan Regional Government, Sinjar has
been liberated from ISIS since the fall of 2015, however, it is
currently controlled by multiple different militia groups. Due to this,
few families have been able to return and few aid groups work in the
area due to the potentially volatile situation. After having been the
victims of genocide and with 3,000 of their women and girls still in
captivity, one of the Yazidi religious leaders we met with stated, ``We
just want to be able to live.''
Unfortunately, to a large extent, U.S. Government assistance has
not been forthcoming to Iraq's Christian and Yezidi communities even
though the President, Vice President, Congress and Secretary of State
have declared them victims of genocide. Many of the displaced
Christians, for example, have had to seek the mainstay of their aid
from private charitable sources on a piecemeal basis for over three
years. This is becoming increasingly difficult as many individuals who
give to humanitarian organizations are facing donor-fatigue.
It is imperative that the United States help the Christians and
Yazidis to return to their home towns. As a U.N. official aptly stated
in a recent meeting, ``the religious minorities need unique
solutions.'' What works to return Sunni Muslims to Mosul will not work
to return religious minorities to contested territories.
Since 2014, Congress has had well over 40 different hearings
related to ISIS, including at least 7 specifically on the topic of the
religious minorities and required the State Department and U.S. Agency
for International Development to spend some funds on assistance
specifically for genocide survivors from religious and ethnic
minorities. Congressional resolve, and the force of law, must be
matched by administration action.
In closing I would like to provide a few recommendations:
1. Now that the military battle with ISIS is largely over, our
government needs "fresh eyes" in Iraq with regard to our
current policies, not only for the victims of genocide, war
crimes and crimes against humanity, but also because of the
critical national security interests in the region. Failure to
act soon may result in chaos and violence in the region yet
again. The United States has a vested interest in promoting
peace and stability in a region where over 4,000 Americans gave
their lives and $2 trillion dollars of taxpayer money was spent
in the past 13 years. A high-level group of individuals with
expertise in the region should be brought together to do an
assessment of the current situation and make recommendations
for our policy going forward.
2. A Presidential Decision Directive or Presidential Memorandum should
be issued directing the State Department and USAID to
immediately address the needs to communities identified by
Secretary Tillerson as having been targeted for genocide. This
would address both humanitarian aid for those living as IDP's
and refugees and stabilization assistance for those returning
to the areas seized from them by ISIS.
3. A post should be established by the White House for an inter-agency
coordinator to guarantee that the needs of these communities
are adequately addressed to ensure their safety and
preservation consistent with United States foreign policy. When
President Bush appointed Senator John Danforth to be the Envoy
to work on similar issues in Sudan, the announcement was made
in the White House Rose Garden with Sen. Danforth standing
between President Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell.
This sent a powerful message to the world and the suffering
people of Sudan. I recommend the same level of announcement for
the person who will fill this position. It should be held at
the White House with President Trump and Secretary Tillerson.
This will send a message that America is engaged. The
Christians and Yazidis have faced genocide and for the longest
time the United States and the West has offered little more
than words.
4. Congress should immediately pass H.R. 390, the bipartisan Iraq and
Syria Genocide Emergency Relief and Accountability Act,
authored by Chairman Chris Smith and coauthored by
Congresswoman Anna Eshoo. It gives explicit authorization for
the State Department and USAID to identify the assistance needs
of genocide survivors from religious and ethnic minority
communities and provide funding to entities--including faith-
based entities--effectively providing them with aid on-the-
ground. This is essential, because some within the State
Department and USAID have claimed they lack the authority to
deliberately help religious and ethnic communities, even if
they are genocide victims and will become extinct without
assistance. Although there is nothing in U.S. law preventing
them from helping genocide-surviving communities, the
authorization will help ensure the aid actually flows to the
victims. The House passed H.R. 390 on June 6 and Senate Foreign
Relations Committee passed it on September 19. The Senate
should pass the bill quickly so it can be sent back to the
House and then the President for signing.
There is still time, but the hour is late and we are about to run
out of time. We cannot allow ISIS to be successful in their genocide.
Senator Rubio. Thank you for that.
Dr. Natali?
STATEMENT OF DENISE NATALI, PH.D., DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR
STRATEGIC RESEARCH, INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES,
NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Natali. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member,
distinguished members of the committee, for the opportunity to
testify on the future of Iraq's minorities.
I would like to note that these are my personal views and
not those of the United States Government, the Department of
Defense, or the National Defense University.
I would like to talk about where I see the vulnerabilities
of the minorities, much of this based on my 25 years working in
and out of the north. I just came back 2 weeks ago from the
north as well as Baghdad, speaking to a host of folks.
Much of this, in my view, after ISIS, is rooted in the
larger political framework of Iraqi politics, and, of course,
as you indicated, the differences within these religious
minority groups. In addition to Yazidi and Christian, as was
indicated, there are Turkmen, Armenians, Circassians, Jews,
Kaka'is, Shabaks, Faily Kurds. Many of these groups are all
living in northern Iraq.
In addition to their shared persecuted beliefs for
religion, these groups also have overlapping ethnicity,
language, and geography. Some Yazidis who are living in one
part of Northern Iraq are divided and emphasize the fact that
they are not Sunni Kurdish. they differentiate themselves from
Sunni Muslim Kurds, as they will say.
Within the Assyrian community, and there was a fantastic
document that just came out called, ``Erasing Assyrians,'' they
now emphasize that they are an ethnic group that is in the
process of being extinguished alongside the fact the Kurdistan
Regional Government controls Nineveh.
My point is, these groups are divided between their support
for the Iraqi Government, their support for the Kurdistan
Regional Government, and many, many who just want to be left
alone and live autonomously.
The biggest threat, in my view, after ISIS, is the fact
that these minority groups are caught in the political
crossfire, and they are being used as cannon fodder for
everybody else's contestations.
The biggest problem, as you have indicated, is the issue of
the disputed territories. I do not think enough attention is
being given to the fact that most of the territories of the
minority groups are in northern Iraq. They regard this
territory as their ancestral lands. The Iraqi Government and
the Kurdistan Regional Government regard it as disputed and
their own. They [the minorities] are not strong enough to
defend themselves, so, again, they are being put in this
crossfire.
In addition, there is the proliferation of militia all
across Iraq.
Not to be an academic nitpick, but of these Hashd al-Shaabi
(or Popular Mobilization Forces), 80 percent are with the Iraqi
Government. Between 10 and 30 percent are backed by Iran. Thus,
there is a significant group that is official. They are
integrated with the Iraqi Government. In fact, some Yazidis and
Assyrians are also working with these Popular Mobilization
Forces.
So we need to be careful about making these kind of
generalizations about all the Hashd al-Shaabi when certain
groups are in certain localities and some are coordinating with
other minority groups.
When I was back in Iraq in March, there was violence that
broke out in Sinjar, and that violence affected the Yazidis, as
the Honorable Frank Wolf said. But the violence was between two
Kurdish groups. So we have to be careful, again, when we are
looking at who is fighting whom, and how Yazidis, Assyrians,
and everybody else is caught in the crossfire.
I will make a couple points about the Kurdish referendum. I
think it has actually exacerbated tensions and threats to these
minority communities, not because people are directly targeting
them with gunfire but, because it t has enhanced divisions
between Baghdad and Erbil, and between Arabs and Kurds. The
outcome is going to prevent some of these groups--the
internally displaced populations, from going back to their
territories.
So there are regional threats. There are threats from the
militias taking advantage of this instability. And the minority
groups have very weak security forces themselves to protect
themselves.
So what do we do?
My recommendation is that we have to look at the underlying
political issues. If you do not handle the political issues,
then the minority groups are still going to be caught in the
crossfire. This situation is highly localized. It is complex.
And it is tied to the cohesion of the Iraqi state.
I would suggest three recommendations.
One is to support minority group rights in conjunction with
the Iraqi Constitution. There is a Constitution that exists. We
should enhance decentralization and self-protection within the
existing Iraqi structure.
There is also a need for developing a security and
political architecture to which should include training
minority police. Local police in every community across Iraq,
by the way, every Sunni Arab community I talked to as well, and
every Kurdish locality, needs and wants local protection,
because they do not trust people outside their communities. I
think the Assyrians and Yazidis are the most affected, because
they have been the most neglected.
Third, the U.S. should reinforce a sovereign civil state
and Iraqi institutions. This last trip 2 weeks ago was very
insightful in the fact that when I was in Baghdad, I spoke to
Sunni Arab tribal sheikhs, minorities, and others, and I
perceived some kind of cautious optimism. Many told me that
Iraqis want a civil state.
This trend is fighting against sectarianism. There are
groups that are coming together at a local level. They are
having cultural exchanges, educational exchanges.
And this is very good momentum. It is a moment. There is a
very strong movement of Iraqi nationalism right now. There is
great pride in the counterterrorism forces that, by the way,
the United States trained. This is a great success.
And nearly every Iraqi I spoke to, even Sunni Arab tribal
sheikhs who are criticizing the Iraqi Government, said that
they trust these people [counter terrorism forces]. So this is
a moment and I think that we should build upon the movement
toward a civil state. Grand Ayatollah Sistani is calling for
this.
We also should move away from using ethno-sectarian
language--Sunni, Shia, Kurd--that most Iraqis do not want to
use. We are creating it. We are enforcing it. And they are
trying to move away from it.
My final point is, because so much of this is rooted in the
disputed territories, we should mediate key issues regarding
these areas. We have leverage. We should help broker local
power and revenue-sharing agreements not only between Baghdad
and Erbil but between the local communities. We should use our
leverage. We have it.
Thank you.
[Dr. Natali's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Denise Natali
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, and distinguished members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the future
of Iraq's minorities after the defeat of the Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria (ISIS). I would like to note that these views represent my own
and not those of the United States government, the Department of
Defense, or the National Defense University.
The prospects for Iraq's most vulnerable minorities after ISIS are
tied to the larger framework of Iraqi politics and minority group
dynamics. They will likely be affected by post-ISIS stabilization
challenges. These challenges include, but are not limited to ethno-
sectarianism, disputes between the Iraqi government and the Kurdistan
Regional Government (KRG), and the proliferation of militias.
Iraq's minorities are not monolithic. They represent about ten
percent of the Iraqi population and include Assyrians, Yezidis,
Mandaeans (Sabians), Turcoman, Armenians, Circassians, Jews, Kaka'is,
Shabaks, and Faily Kurds. Most of these groups live in northern Iraq;
the Ninawah Plains, Kirkuk, Sinjar and other localities. Although these
territories have become politicized as `disputed areas'--lands claimed
by the Iraqi government and the KRG--they are regarded by Assyrians and
Yezidis as ancestral lands. Since the breakdown of the Iraqi state and
emergence of sectarian conflict in 2003, the most vulnerable non-Muslim
minorities have been the Christians (Assyrians/Chaldeans/Syriac and
Armenians) and Yezidis. According to a report by Minority Rights Group
International, from 2005-2014 the Yezidi population decreased from
700,000 to approximately 500,000. Christian populations also fled
Baghdad during this period, with about fifteen percent remaining.
Threats against Christians and Yezidis increased significantly
after the ISIS onslaught in June 2014. Reports indicate that about
9,900 Yezidis were killed or captured by ISIS while 6,800 others were
kidnapped, with over a third still missing. Thousands of Yezidis also
escaped to Syria, Jordan and other states, adding to refugee strains.
By 2016 Christian populations declined from about 1.4 million to about
300,000. At present, most Christians and Yezidis in Iraq are living as
internally displaced persons (IDPs) in camps inside the Kurdistan
Region, with smaller numbers in central or southern Iraq.
Despite a shared persecution for their religious beliefs, Iraq's
minorities are fractured. Successive Iraqi governments attempted to
exploit religious differences between Christian denominations, and
these differences persist today. Religion also overlaps with ethnicity,
language, and geography within and across groups. Some Yezidis
emphasize their Zoroastrian roots and differentiate themselves from
``Sunni Kurdish Muslims,'' while affiliating more closely with secular
groups. Others, however, regard their Yezidi identity as being
ethnically Kurdish first. These differences often overlap with
political affiliations. Yezidis living in northern Ninawah and in Dohuk
province support the KRG while others, mainly in Sinjar and southern
Ninawah, back the Iraqi government. Still others are independent and
seek their own autonomous region. The Yezidis are also isolated by
their own traditions--to include a caste-like system that restricts
marriages within the Yezidi community. Similarly, Assyrians regard
themselves as a distinct ethnic group with their own language that is
in danger of extinction, a sentiment that has grown alongside increased
KRG control of Ninewah. Assyrians are also divided between supporters
of Baghdad and Erbil, and independents.
After ISIS: Vulnerabilities and Opportunities
The liberation of former ISIS safe-havens has provided some
reprieve for minorities and encouraged the return of IDPs. According to
the International Organization for Migration, by September 2017 about
2.2 million of about 3.2 million IDPs had returned to their homes. The
vast majority of these IDPs are Sunni Arabs, and about 20,000 of
200,000 Assyrians from the Ninawah Plains. Some Yezidis have returned
to northern Ninawa but not to Sinjar, which according to local groups,
remains ``a ghost town'' since its liberation three years ago. What
prevents a more robust return of Christians and Yezidi IDPs?
The main obstruction to IDP return is ongoing security threats and
lack of services. Some localities remain dangerous; public buildings
and homes are destroyed and/or filled with improvised explosive devices
(IEDs). Reconstruction support is also lacking. Another reason is a
deep sense of mistrust and vulnerability. Yezidis and Christians
victimized by ISIS distrust government authorities in Baghdad and
Erbil, as well as some Sunni Muslim groups--Arabs and Kurds. Most
Yezidis from Sinjar blame Peshmerga from Masoud Barzani's Kurdistan
Democratic Party (KDP) for disarming and abandoning them during the
ISIS onslaught, which led to the mass atrocities against them. Post-
liberation security arrangements have exacerbated their sense of fear
and mistrust. One Yezidi man from Sinjar told me that former ISIS
militants and members from some Sunni Kurdish and Sunni Arab tribes
made deals with the KDP to help stabilize the border area. He affirmed
that ``they shaved their beards and are now walking around Dohuk,
Sinjar and other areas.'' Those Yezidis who do not support the KDP have
been obstructed from returning to Sinjar by KRG Peshmerga.
IDP return is also inhibited by the presence of various militia
groups that have proliferated since 2014 and which control checkpoints
and influence local activities. These militias are tied to the Iraqi
government, KRG, or Iran (and to a lesser extent, Turkey). In Mosul,
Iranian-backed militias are recruiting Sunni Arabs through salaries,
food provisions, and security--services which until now, are not
offered by the Iraqi government. In the Christian town of Bartella,
recently liberated from ISIS, there is a new Imam Khomeini primary
school with flags of Iran. Although these militias and institutions are
not targeting Christians and Yezidis directly, they are feeding local
power struggles, sectarianism, and the risk of conflict.
Minority groups are caught in the political cross-fire between
Baghdad and Erbil and have become cannon fodder for everyone else's
contestations. A key tension involves unresolved claims to disputed
territories and their resources, the vast majority of which have fallen
under the de-facto control of the KRG, but which remain
administratively and legally under Baghdad's authority. The KRG has
expended important resources on some Christian and Yezidi populations
as part of its larger aim to annex the territories into a future
Kurdish state or expanded Kurdistan Region. In two Christian towns in
Ninewah, the provincial council, which is largely controlled by the
KDP, recently replaced mayors with a KDP-Christian party affiliate.
These dynamics have further divided and weakened Christian groups
politically. While many Assyrians regard these actions as the
``Kurdification'' of the Ninewah plain and seek greater autonomy under
Baghdad's authority, others support the KRG and the largess it has
offered to local officials.
In some areas, political tensions have turned to violence since the
liberation of ISIS safe havens, further inhibiting IDP return. Sinjar
is a case in point. During my visit to Iraq in March 2017, armed
conflict broke out in Sinjar between Syrian Kurdish forces tied to the
KDP and Yezidi affiliates of the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK)--which
has expanded its influence in northern Iraq and disputed areas. The
conflict also involved Turkey's bombing of PKK bases in Sinjar and
Syria and resulted in the deaths of 11 people, including KRG Peshmerga
forces. Since then, some Yezidis have defected from PKK groups and
joined the Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) under the auspices of the
Iraqi government. Still others affiliate with KRG Peshmerga.
There are small pockets of opportunities for post-ISIS
stabilization that could potentially reduce minority group
vulnerabilities. I just returned from another research trip to Iraq two
weeks ago. I spoke with diverse groups and officials in northern Iraq
and Baghdad, including Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi, members of
the Iraqi parliament, Sunni Arab tribal sheikhs, provincial
representatives, civil society leaders, members of the business
community, and teachers and students. Most expressed ``cautious
optimism'' about Iraq's future. Their optimism is tied to an important
political trend; efforts to create a civil state and diminish ethno-
sectarianism.
This trend is rooted in a strong sense of Iraqi nationalism that
has revived since the ISIS onslaught, and demands for political reforms
and citizens' rights (Of the 150 entities registered for the 2018 Iraqi
parliamentary elections, 76 have the word civil or civilian in their
title). Iraqis also largely support al-Abadi, a political moderate,
although worry about Iranian influences, including former Prime
Minister Nuri al-Maliki. All--including Sunni Arabs and critics of
Baghdad--expressed high respect and trust for Iraq's Counter Terrorism
Forces (CTF). Iraqis are also tired of war. They are attempting to
build trust across communities through local leaders and educational
and cultural exchanges within and across governorates.
Still, ethno-sectarianism persists, particularly among the
political classes. Powerful blocs in the Iraqi parliament may have
changed their names, but many remain committed to supporting distinct
religious and ethnic constituencies; Sunni Arab, Shi'a Arab, and Kurds.
Regional states also continue to back particular leaders or proxy
forces that promote sectarian agendas.
The Kurdish referendum has aggravated challenges to post ISIS
stabilization.\1\ It has deepened tensions between Baghdad and Erbil,
enhanced ethnic divisions between Arabs and Kurds, and instigated
militia groups seeking to assure Iraq's territorial integrity. The
referendum has raised the ire of the Iraqi parliament--Sunni and Shi'a
Arabs alike--and placed al-Abadi in the position of having to more
forcefully assert Iraqi sovereignty and push back the KRG's unilateral
actions. The Iraqi government, alongside the governments of Iran and
Turkey, have reacted with a series of economic, political, and security
measures that aim to assert Iraqi sovereignty. They have threatened to
use military force to enter and control the disputed territories
directly, or through militias. The potential for armed conflict that
will destabilize the Ninewah Plains and Kirkuk and its minority
populations is significant. Although minorities have developed their
own local forces, they are tied to Baghdad and Erbil and are likely to
become further entrenched in the political cross-fire.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ It is important to note that the referendum results are not
representative of minorities and non-Kurdish populations in the
disputed territories. A large percentage of Christians and Yezidis
remain as IDPs and did not vote. Many also reported being threatened by
Kurdish authorities to vote ``Yes.'' Similarly, most Arabs and Turkmen
are displaced, oppose the referendum, and did not vote.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recommendations: Protecting Minorities in a Post-ISIS Iraq
Even after ISIS is defeated militarily, minorities will remain
vulnerable to political instability in the disputed territories. This
vulnerability is complex, highly localized, and tied to the cohesion of
the Iraqi state. The challenge will be to create conditions that keep
minorities out of the cross-fire between Baghdad and Erbil, minimize
regional interventions, allow IDPs to return to their homes, and assure
some form of local autonomy and self-protection.
It is in the U.S. interest to assure the stability of Iraq after
ISIS is defeated so that minority communities remain in Iraq and their
homelands. U.S. policy should be based on a nuanced understanding of
minority groups that addresses their distinctions and role in the
larger Iraqi political arena. The U.S. should:
Support local minority rights in conjunction with the Iraqi
constitution. Efforts to stabilize Iraq after ISIS and
ascertain minority group rights should be made within the
framework of the existing Iraqi constitution. The U.S. should
support a political and security architecture that allows
people within localities to administer and secure their own
areas. All assistance should be conducted in cooperation with
the Iraqi government and based on enhancing local
decentralization and self-protection of minority groups. This
effort can include training local minority police as part of
Iraqi security forces and helping to integrate minority group
PMUs into official state institutions, to include provincial
structures and the KRG as part of a unified Iraqi state.
Reinforce a sovereign, civil state and Iraqi institutions. The U.S.
should take advantage of current trends in Iraq that support a
civil state and end sectarianism. It should continue to support
Iraq's state institutions through clear and consistent
messaging that affirms Iraqi sovereignty and territorial
integrity. The U.S. should also address Iraqis and its sub-
state entities as territorial units and refrain from using
ethno-sectarian narratives (``Sunni, Shi'a and Kurds'').
Mediate disputed territories. The U.S. should help mediate tensions
between Baghdad and Erbil, to include control over territories
and energy resources in the disputed areas. The U.S should also
assist in brokering local power and revenue sharing agreements
between the Iraqi government, KRG, and provincial councils.
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
Are you ready, Senator?
Senator Kaine. Yes. I am going to defer to Senator Shaheen
first, since you and I know that we will be staying.
Senator Rubio. We will be.
Senator Shaheen?
Senator Shaheen. I want to start, Mr. Wolf, I guess from
looking at your report after you came back from your trip. Can
you comment on the different options to establish security in
the area? Because clearly, one of the biggest impediments for
people going back is the lack of security.
Who can they depend on for security? The Iraqi Government?
Are there remnants of police officers from their communities
who can take over? What is the option there for security?
Mr. Wolf. In every meeting, you are right, Senator,
security came up in every meeting. The definition of security
was different depending on who you were talking to.
They do not want the 82nd-Airborne. They are not asking for
American soldiers.
Senator Shaheen. Sure.
Mr. Wolf. But they would like, they believe, a base, an
American base, a Western base, where you have American NATO
forces training, as Dr. Natali said. They would like to see
some presence of the West there.
Others are asking that there be some--there was the Levin
amendment passed by this committee or by Armed Services years
ago that provided--it is law--provided for the training of some
of the National Guard. I do not want to call militia, the NPU.
There are different groups. Train them for human rights,
religious freedom, basically a police department or basically a
National Guard. There are a number of options out there.
Many do not trust some of the more organized groups,
without getting into controversy. The Yazidis were up on Mount
Sinjar, and they were told to give their weapons away by some
people in the Peshmerga. They gave them away. The next morning,
they woke up--the lady yesterday who testified has lost 19
people in her family.
So there is a certain mistrust. One, they would like to see
a presence of the United States. And I think it does make sense
to have some base there. We have a base in South Korea. We have
been there for years. We still have military in Germany. To
have a NATO base, to have some base there--we have a base in
South Korea. We have been there for years. We still have
military in Germany.
To have a NATO base where you would train their National
Guard just to defend their villages, not to be a point of the
spear against anybody. But security was the number one issue.
Every different time it came up--security, security, security.
Senator Shaheen. You talked about the Iranian presence
there. It has been pointed out to me that, in Syria, for
example, that many of the fighters for Hezbollah and the
Iranians who are in Syria are moving their families there and
actually settling, taking over lands that were originally owned
by the Syrians. Are you seeing evidence of that in Iraq as
well, either of you?
Mr. Wolf. Yes, we are. The Iranians are funding a certain
group, Shia, not those who have been persecuted, but Shia, to
come in and buy the home of Christians.
If you are a Christian man and family, do you stay? Do you
go? Your one daughter is 17, another is 15. Do you go or do you
not? Are you going to get security?
So they are selling. So what the Iranians are doing are
putting people in there to buy properties, and they are buying
them here, here, through the Nineveh plains.
Thirdly, they are afraid that Tehran will run this. We have
seen reports of this guy Soleimani, the Quds there.
So, yes, the Iranians have a concerted effort to dominate
that region for a certain portion to create a land-bridge, or
some people call it a crescent, that will literally go all the
way into Syria and into the Mediterranean. But, yes, there is a
formal effort.
One thing both governments, both the Kurds and Iraqis,
could do is put a moratorium on selling property for at least a
period of time. But there is a concerted effort by the Iranians
to buy up property so they will have people there.
Senator Shaheen. Dr. Natali, in your opinion, what is the
balance that should be struck in many of these communities
between those who want to return to the communities, those who
want to be resettled elsewhere in Iraq, those who want to leave
Iraq? Should that be up to the individual folks to make that
determination? And how can we help make that happen?
Dr. Natali. Thank you, Senator.
And I would like to answer the question about Iran, since
you asked both.
Senator Shaheen. Sure. That would be great.
Dr. Natali. Most of these people would like to return, as
the Honorable Frank Wolf said, if the security was there. They
are caught between Baghdad that does not have the resources and
is focused on ISIS and, let's be frank, the Kurdistan Regional
Government, which according to many, has co-opted,taken care of
some, and as many Assyrians would say, Kurdified the Nineveh
plains.
So we have to be very careful about taking sides between
these two. The vast majority [of minorities] would like to go
back and have control and some form of autonomy. That is
something new.
Before ISIS came, by the way, there was a motion in the
Iraqi parliament that aimed to create a new governorate for the
Assyrians, for the minorities. And then ISIS came.
There are some discussions going on in Iraq to allocate
within the existing provincial structures--we are not talking
about breaking up states--special territorial administrative
autonomy to these groups.
So yes, part of the solution is the security. I absolutely
agree. But we should be careful about which militias we are
saying really represent these minorities. Many militias are
saying right now they represent or they do not represent their
communities. I think we should be careful about getting too
involved in these contestations..
The second part is reconstruction. The donations or the
contributions from donor countries to reconstruct Iraq, are
minuscule, and the NGO communities are not engaging to the
extent that they can because of security.
There are those two elements right there. But I go back to
my point. This effort should be conducted within the framework
of the Iraqi state. If we start getting involved in territorial
engineering, then we are, in my view, fueling some of these
conflicts.
I would like to make some points, if I may, about the
Iranian element, because I think this is important. I did go,
this last trip, I go regularly back to the region, to look at
the extent of Iranian influences, in addition to the
referendum.
We should be nuanced about this issue. Yes there is
increasing Iranian influence to fill power vacuums through
particular militia. In regard to this issue, I spoke to
officials in the Iraqi Government to include Iraqi Prime
Minister Haidar al-Abadi, and others. .
There are two main Iranian-backed Hashi Shaabi groups the
AAH and Hezb Kata'ib (some also include Badr Brigades). These
groups represent as low as 10 percent or as much as 30 percent
of all Hashi Shaabi. They are referred to as the disciplined
and the undisciplined.
As long as ISIS is there, Iraqi officials indicate that
they cannot get rid of them the militias because they are not
threatening their lives like ISIS. So these groups will like
remain there for some time.
Are they gaining influence in some areas? Yes, they are. I
will give you an example.
In Mosul, and this was told to me by several leading Arab
sheikhs that I spoke to, they are recruiting local populations
through salaries and food baskets. And some people are joining.
One tribal sheikh told me that he was very worried. ``I am
losing my people. not to the regular Hashd al-Shaabi, but to
the Iranian-backed ones.'' So that is a concern.
, Iran is also extending influence in minority areas. In a
Christian town called Bartella, there is actually a new Imam
Khomeini elementary school, and they are flying an Iranian flag
there.
Are they directly targeting the Christians? No. Are they
going to enhance sectarian tensions? Yes.
The third point is that even though Prime Minister Abadi,
who I think is someone that we should continue to support--he
is a moderate--.has done remarkable things in bringing Iraqis
together., all of this can be used to enhance his challenger,
former Prime Minister Maliki, including the referendum. That is
where Iranian-backed groups are going to try to get their
influence as well.
So they are there, but I think we should be careful about
saying all of it is Iranian-focused.
My final point is, there is a long border between Iran and
Iraq. The Kurds have a long border with Iran. I lived there for
many years. When the Iranians shut the border, you are doomed.
There is a lot of influence between the Kurdish region and
Iran commercially. You cannot say that you are going to
completely remove Iranian influence. It is the nefarious,
undisciplined militia that I think we need to hone in on. That
is the 10 percent to 30 percent of the militias.
Finally, we should mindful about how much Iranian militia
influence can emerge because of the need for services. If a
militia can provide services in Iraqi localities, people will
join them, because everybody is human. They want electricity.
They want food. And they want salaries.
So not to go off on a tangent, but that is where I see the
influences that we should be concerned about.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
Senator Kaine?
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
This is very helpful testimony. It is the treatment of
minorities, but it is also big picture: What should our Iraq
policy be? Obviously, they connect so strongly.
And when minorities get treated poorly, as was the case
after 2011, a lot of the reason that ISIS was able to run wild
and get a lot of territory is that the Sunni parts of Iraq felt
like they had sort of been abandoned by the central government,
and they were not necessarily immediately going to join up and
fight against ISIS with a government they did not trust.
So creating a government that has the trust of minority
groups is really important not just for the safety of the
minority groups to avoid genocide but for the future of the
country.
There was an article last week in Foreign Policy, ``An
Ominous Future for Kurdistan's Minorities.'' I just want to
read a portion and just get you both to comment on this, if you
think this is sort of an accurate statement.
``The issue of the disputed territories, and who will
ultimately govern them, also throws the fate of Iraq's myriad
religious and ethnic minorities into question. These groups,
like the Yazidis, Turkmen, Christians, and the Shabak, have
been persecuted by ISIS in the disputed territories, and are
now forced to choose which government--Iraq or the KRG--they
deem less oppressive. `The competition between the central
government and the KRG over the loyalty of minority groups in
the Ninevah plain is one of the main drivers of conflict there,
from Saddam's time onward.' ''
If that is the case, if there is this competition between
the central government and the KRG, and we are dealing with
both of them, providing aid through Baghdad that goes to the
KRG, what role should we be playing in trying to reduce this
tug-of-war and these minority groups sort of being forced to
choose which government they will be aligned with?
Dr. Natali. I agree with that Foreign Policy analysis. I
would say, ``Yes, and.'' ``And'' because of the political and
security vacuums, because there are also militias and sub-state
groups that they are also involved in.
For example, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) groups in
Syria have made their way to Sinjar. Some people are now also
forced to choose between Baghdad, Erbil, and other groups in
these areas. That is one part.
Another part is responsibility for current threats to
minorities. I don't blame Baghdad and the Kurdistan region
equally. Because most of the territories of minorities are in
northern Iraq, and because the Kurdistan Regional Government
has taken de facto control of these areas, for minority groups
the threat is different. For Baghdad, it is because the Iraqi
government is not giving enough attention to minorities. For
the Kurdistan region, it is because Kurdish authorities are
trying to control them.
-It is important to note that historically, Assyrians did
not make claims th they were being erased ethnically. They were
working with the Iraqi Government. Some of he bigger supporters
of the Iraqi Government were the Christians. It was only after
2003 and then 2011 that Assyrians started to emphasize the
Kurdification of the Ninewa Plains.
I would say, back to keeping the Iraqi state whole, that
any support to minorities should go through the Iraqi
Government to existing provincial councils.
I would not suggest going through the Kurdistan Regional
Government but through provincial councils and localities.
This is a different mechanism than saying give support and
aid to Baghdad, then to the Kurdistan Regional Government, and
then to the provinces and minorities.
Senator Kaine. Congressman Wolf?
Mr. Wolf. I agree with the statement, whoever wrote that.
We talk to parents and young people. They just want
security for their families.
Again, the Christian population has dropped from 1.5
million in 2003 down to 250,000, some say 150,000. I mean, if
you have young kids, this is your last year you are going to
stay. You are not going to wait. You are living in a tent.
We went into one tent. There was a man who was a technician
in a hospital in Mosul. And his mother and father were lying on
the floor. He said, ``I have to get out of here. I have to get
out."
So they are waiting to see what we do. That is why, one, I
think we need fresh eyes. I am not criticizing the previous,
but it is just to see. Things change.
Secondly, I think you need one person who has the
responsibility. I do not know if either of you know Senator
Danforth. I think John Danforth did an incredible job. It was
not a full-time job. I think he continued to live out in St.
Louis for that period of time. But one person who was the point
of contact.
What he was able to do, working with Colin Powell, he could
get to the President, get to Secretary Powell. He was able to
bring that north-south peace agreement for a new South Sudan.
I think you need one person who has the support of the
President, the support of Secretary Tillerson, the support of
both of you, to give that authority. Because I do not think
there is any one simple answer, you do this, you do that, it
all works out.
But they want to see some progress. And if they do not see
progress, I think they are going to leave. I had one Catholic
priest say, ``Help us to stay. But if you are not going to help
us to stay, help us to leave."
And lastly, I believe--I am very pessimistic. I believe the
Iranians will move in so fast. Nasrallah, the people who are
involved with the Marine barracks--I remember Dan Coats and I
went to the Marine barracks when they were blown up. Those
people will have the aid and the support coming directly. They
will be able to literally get in a van and stop for coffee
halfway there, and with weapons and fighters and materials to
aid Hezbollah, which will be a threat.
We know what they did to the Marine barracks. It will be a
threat to Israel, but a threat to the entire West.
So I think it is an issue of helping the Christians and the
Yazidis and the Turkmen. Also, it is making sure that the
Iranians do not come in.
Senator Shaheen asked a good question. If they control that
area and buy up that property, it will never be reversed,
certainly not in our lifetime.
Senator Kaine. Let me just say one other thing before the
chair, and that is, your last recommendation dealt with H.R.
390. And as you pointed out in your testimony, that came
through this committee. I think it came through unanimously. We
worked on some amendments, and it is on the floor, so it is in
a slightly different form than it came through the House.
But we were just conversing. We do not see any challenges,
so hopefully we can try to U.C. it, or do something to move it.
It only came onto the committee--I mean, came onto the floor.
It came out of committee about 10 days ago.
But I appreciate your encouragement of that. I think that
is a very strong bill.
Senator Rubio. A procedural update. Our understanding is
there is--I have never heard this term before--an informational
hold.
Senator Kaine. Somebody wants information before they vote?
That is so shocking.
[Laughter.]
Senator Rubio. Well, anyway, hopefully, we will be able to
work through that. Then we will have to work out the
differences between the two. But we are hopeful.
There are some differences between the House the Senate
versions, so that makes it a little bit different than some of
the other things we have done on this territory, because we
have had to figure out a process for working out those
differences. But hopefully, that will happen.
Dr. Natali, I wanted to ask you first just about, because
you have talked about how the situation with the Kurds has
exacerbated difficulties, the broader difficulties in the
region. I know this kind of steps a little bit out of the lane
of this hearing, but I think it is directly related to it, and
that is whether the appropriate role of the United States at
this point is to try to get both sides to sort of lower the
tension and the rhetoric, not to do anything that provokes the
other side to have to act or save face.
In essence, is it not in the best interests of the United
States, viewing that issue holistically, and I think in the
best interest of the parties involved, to make the following
argument to both sides, and that is: We are not asking
Kurdistans or Barzani or anybody to abandon their desires for
independence. What we are asking them to do is to take steps to
lower the sort of temperature, the rhetoric, because there are
still some issues that need to be worked through.
And the flip side would be, of course, to ask the
Government in Baghdad to take some steps that would in no way
be used against them to argue that they have somehow caved,
but, by the same token, show a desire to be open to dialogue on
this topic in the future. But right now, sort of in the
interim, try to lower the temperature as well, because there
are still so many other issues at play.
In fact, the tension between these two is being used in
many ways by other actors in the region to sort of look for
strategic advantage.
Do you think there is an openness on both sides to that? Is
there openness to that on both sides? Or are they backing
themselves into a corner from which they can only fight their
way out of?
Dr. Natali. Thank you, Senator Rubio. I agree with you on
that.
First and foremost, overall, we should be trying--and we
have leverage--to defuse the tensions..
That effort is going on behind the scenes. There is what is
going on in the newspaper, and there is what is going on
internally.
To your question, ``Yes, and.'' I THINK we have to be
careful about the way that we deal with the Kurds as well. Yes
they are absolutely important partners, and they have provided
invaluable Peshmerga support. But if we are emphasizing the
territorial integrity of the Iraqi state and enhancing Iraqi
state institutions, then ``coddling'' Kurds does not support
that aim either.
I think negotiations between Baghdad and Erbil will occur.
But we are not using our leverage sufficiently with the Kurds.
We have been very clear about the referendum. And I agree with
your statements. But we should emphasize to Kurdish officials
that they also need to go down to Baghdad and negotiate.
In my discussions with some Kurdish officials the week
before the referendum, some told me, ``This is great. Now at
least we have your attention. There was a lot of pressure not
to have it [referendum] done. BUT NOW WE are back. You cannot
forget about us now."
Yes there was an honest desire to have the referendum. But
there were many people who did not want to conduct it. They
know they have to negotiate with Baghdad.
So yes, we should encourage our Kurdish partners to
compromise because we are providing them with military support.
My question is, how are we going to use our leverage to
encourage that negotiation? Many Kurds said to me before the
referendum, ``You aren't going to do anything. You need us too
much.''
They also said ``we are too important for you. If anything
happens to us you will come and save us.''
Another problem is that the Prime Minister--who is very
moderate--is being pressured by most by the people, Arabs and
other Iraqis, Sunni and Shia, who are reacting to the
referendum.
Again, I think our role is to mediate with the Kurds, and
we should be very careful. We should continue that partnership,
but should not overly enable the Kurds to the point where their
leaders think they do not have to cut a deal with Baghdad. And
I do not think that we have worked that part out quite well.
Senator Rubio. The only addition I would make to that is my
feeling is that the Government of Kurdistan would probably be
open to a number of measures, joint patrols of certain
crossings, perhaps increased revenue flow back to Baghdad, so
long as they are not asked to completely abandon or feel like
they somehow have foreclosed the ability for a dialogue in the
future about their status.
I think the potential irritant that no one has counted on
is the capability of Iranian-controlled militia groups to act
unilaterally----
Dr. Natali. That is right.
Senator Rubio [continuing]. Against a border crossing or
territorial space in order to trigger a conflict that the view
would be beneficial to their desire to have control over the
region and over those oil-producing places, in particular.
So that is an actor that is probably even outside of
Abadi's control, and a part of this dangerous game in the
region. So it is something that bears watching because there
are, in the context of this hearing, a significant number of
religious minorities who have sought and received refuge within
the Kurdish areas who will be directly impacted, if this thing
heads in a bad direction. So that is why it is related to the
topic we are discussing here today.
Dr. Natali. I agree with you. I agree with that point. I
just want to make one more caveat, and that is, be careful with
our Kurdish partners. And this has been, again, written in the
documents by the Assyrian Federation of Europe. Many Assyrian
think that they are being erased by some of the Kurdish
authorities as well.
Again, Baghdad's fault is that they are not paying enough
attention. Some of the Kurdish region's fault is that they have
confiscated lands of the Assyrians. The lands were not just
confiscated by Iranians. They were confiscated by the Kurdistan
Regional Government as well, and this is documented.
So we should encourage our partners to watch this behavior.
If we ignore it and we turn our eye, then it will continue.
Good partners and good friends should tell their friends not to
do things that are undermining the minorities as well.
Senator Rubio. Mr. Wolf, you may have alluded to this in
your statement, and I may have missed it, and I apologize. But
when you were there in your recent trip, did you visit with
U.N. officials during your trip?
Mr. Wolf. Yes, I did.
Senator Rubio. So did they indicate to you that they had
received guidance from the State Department or USAID regarding
how U.S. assistance dollars were to be handled and spent?
Mr. Wolf. No, they did not. The woman who runs the U.N.
program is an American from Texas, a very, very capable person.
She came up and briefed us, and I think was doing a very good
job. But she did not get into that.
Many of the Christians will not go into the U.N.-run camps,
because they are afraid. Just the young lady yesterday who said
she saw, and I think she can better explain than I can, she saw
the man who did terrible things to her living in a camp.
So the Christian community is afraid to go into the camps.
And many of the Yazidis are also afraid to go in.
But overall, I think the U.N. has done some very good
things. It just has not gotten down to the Christians and the
Yazidis and some of the religious minorities.
Senator Rubio. Just that fact that you point to right
there, is it your view or did you raise that? Was it raised in
front of you to the U.N. officials while you were there, that a
lot of the people who need this aid cannot get it because they
are afraid to come to where you are because of some of the
people around here?
Mr. Wolf. Yes.
Senator Rubio. And their response was?
Mr. Wolf. There really was not a response. I mean, it has
been common knowledge that if a Christian family is going to go
into a camp, in the next tent, is the brother an ISIS
supporter?
You are just not going to go there. Many of the Christians
who have left have gone north. They are in Erbil. They are in
different camps. They are in old shopping malls. Others have
moved into Turkey. Others have moved into Lebanon.
Many would want to come back. It is a beautiful country.
The northern part of Iraq is magnificent. The biblical history
there, when we were there, we went to Nahum's tomb, Old
Testament. The history is so rich. And they love their country.
And, I might say, they are really a people of strong faith.
But they are not going to go into those camps. They are
just not going to go in.
And most of our money has been going in to the U.N. It is
now time for Mark Green to take some of that and give it to the
Yazidis. Let's have a counseling program for the Yazidi women
and girls. Let's bring in IJM, or let's bring in different
psychological people to give counseling.
We met with the leader of the Yazidi community, Baba
Sheikh. They need help, when they rescue these people. What do
these women do? So they need help.
But also, let's give it to the Christian community.
Bartella, Qaraqosh, when they come back, the water system, help
them with their houses.
They feel, and I think if you talk to the Knights of
Columbus and some of the others--and let me say, the Knights of
Columbus have done an incredible job. Another group,
Samaritan's Purse, has done an incredible job. I was with a
Catholic nun, Sister Diana. She says Samaritan's Purse. I asked
Samaritan's Purse, they say Knights of Columbus. I mean, it is
the most ecumenical group over there. They love each other.
Work it through Samaritan's Purse. Work it through Knights
of Columbus. Work it through World Vision. Work it through
them.
But the Christian community, not for any overt meanness,
but has been neglected. And now that ISIS has pretty much, not
totally, pretty much been defeated, this is the time to aid the
Christian community, the Yazidi community, including counseling
for these young girls.
As of this moment, they told us there were 3,000 girls
still being held.
Senator Rubio. But the best way to describe the situation,
then, is that there is no ill will here. There is no bad faith.
The United States Congress has appropriated and directed that
American taxpayer funding be directed to assist religious
minorities, including Yazidi and Christian communities. The
money has been sent to the U.N. in order to do that.
The U.N. would say the money is here. It is available. They
can come receive aid. But they do not come for the reasons you
have outlined.
And as a result, our intent is not being carried out, and
it does not seem like the U.N. officials feel as if they are
under any sort of directive to do anything other than to say it
is available, but not go any further than that, in terms of
asking why people are not utilizing it or why they are not
coming.
Mr. Wolf. I think you summed it up. I would like to see
some of our money go to Samaritan's Purse, to World Vision, to
Knights of Columbus.
Senator Rubio. In essence, to organizations that are going
out to those in need, as opposed to waiting for them to come.
Mr. Wolf. Right. Samaritan's Purse runs a hospital in
Mosul, just outside Mosul, that I visited. All they treat are
Muslims. Give it to Samaritan's Purse. Give it to Sister Diana.
Give it to the Knights of Columbus. The Knights of Columbus,
they are rebuilding villages.
So I am not saying that we take everything that goes to the
U.N., but refunnel some of that money and give it to groups--
not who are new who say, ``I will go in if you give it to
me''--who are already there.
Samaritan's Purse has been there for a couple years.
Knights of Columbus has been there for a couple years. Sister
Diana of the Dominican Sisters are from there.
Give some money to them so they can help their own
community, not because they are Christians, but because they
have been subject to genocide. Give it to some of the Yazidi
groups, not because they are Yazidis, but because they have
been subject to genocide.
So divert some of the money that is going to the U.N. and
give it to some of these groups.
Senator Rubio. So then my last question is, your suggestion
of a special coordinator would be someone who would sort of
oversee this process and make sure that some of these steps are
taken?
And I am not against the notion of a special coordinator,
but I guess my question is, is it also something that USAID
under our current structure could also take it upon themselves
to drive these funds in that direction? But you just feel that
it will not happen, given all the other things USAID is facing.
Mr. Wolf. I think there is a resistance in government to do
this. And secondly, it is not only AID, Senator. You need
someone at the State Department who is not AID. You need
somebody who can talk to General Mattis at the Department of
Defense.
I mean, I think the model really was Senator Danforth. He
was able to go anywhere in the government to deal with the
problem. There were some security problems. The government was
aiding the Lord's Resistance Army. He was able to go
everywhere.
So this person has to have the ability not only to deal
with AID, the State Department, the Department of Defense,
Homeland Security, CIA, everybody.
Also, a citizen who used to show her on his cell phone
pictures of his wife and children back in the United States.
Where is Abdul Ameriki? Well, let's track him down. Let's do
fingerprints.
Why have we not brought cases against those who beheaded
the American citizens, the four American citizens? Track them
down. Bring them to justice.
My committee, we funded the International Criminal Court.
We funded Crane to come after Sierra Leone, Charles Taylor.
They are all in jail now. It took a lot of effort.
The same thing should be done to bring justice, because if
these people are not brought to justice, many will embed in.
Do you remember the story 5 or 10 years ago? You find a
former worker at a General Motors plant was a Nazi. They embed
in. They come over.
Let's find those people. Bring them to justice, the
International Criminal Court, bring them here.
So I think this person has to be bigger than just dealing
with Mark Green at AID.
Senator Rubio. Got it.
Senator Kaine?
Senator Kaine. Just one last point in response to,
Congressman Wolf, your point about there may be a better way to
spin this aid, there is a bill that I think has now been
introduced. The main sponsors are Senators Corker and Coons,
and I am on as a cosponsor. It is to basically study donations
to multilateral organizations to achieve ends versus direct
either bilateral or unilateral, including to NGOs.
And I cosponsored. I am a fan of multilateral aid. I like
it. But I am really agnostic, at the end of the day. I just
want it to do the job for which it is intended.
And it is a fairly large study, but this may be the kind of
example that we could use in a study like that. Okay, let's see
the dollars that we are putting in, how effective are they
going through a multilateral channel and accomplishing
antigenocide or relief for displaced persons? And we can
compare it to more direct or bilateral solutions.
I think it is the bill that could give us some opportunity.
This is an example that we could look at. So I appreciate you
bringing that up.
Senator Rubio. It is an important point, because what I
hear you describe, Mr. Wolf, is, basically, a whole-of-
government coordinator that can bring to bear the different
agencies and tools available to the United States Government in
a coordinated fashion not just to deliver aid and relief, but
also reconstruction, assistance with governance and justice,
bringing people to justice, in particular, this horrifying case
that you outlined of the U.S. citizen. And if that individual
is still alive, they should be brought to justice. Even if they
are not, their name and circumstances should be known to the
American people.
Do you have anything further?
We have gone beyond our allotted time. I thank you both for
being so patient because of our hearings and the vote and the
like. This was an important hearing, as you can tell by the
attendance and the interest. I am glad you were able to shine
light on it.
More importantly, you were both able to provide us with
specific public policy recommendations. Often, we have these
hearings, and we hear a lot about the problems and some vague
notions. You both have been pretty specific, which is very
helpful in terms of our work here and what to advocate for,
what we need to be pushing for.
So we thank you both for that.
The record for this hearing is going to remain open for the
next 48 hours.
Senator Rubio. Again, I want to thank both of you for your
patience, your time, and your work on this topic. It is a lot
of hard work. Your dedication to it is very critical. Again,
thank you.
With that, this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:35 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Submitted for the Record by Hon. Frank R. Wolf Distinguished Senior
Fellow, 21st Century Wilberforce Initiative
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