[Senate Hearing 115-625]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 115-625
INSERT TITLE HERETHE FUTURE OF ZIMBABWE
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA AND
GLOBAL HEALTH POLICY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 12, 2017
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
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__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
BOB CORKER, Tennessee, Chairman
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
MARCO RUBIO, Florida BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
CORY GARDNER, Colorado TOM UDALL, New Mexico
TODD, YOUNG, Indiana CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming TIM KAINE, Virginia
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
RAND PAUL, Kentucky CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA AND GLOBAL HEALTH POLICY
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona, Chairman
TODD YOUNG, Indiana CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia TOM UDALL, New Mexico
RAND PAUL, Kentucky JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
Todd Womack, Staff Director
Jessica Lewis, Democratic Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Flake, Hon. Jeff, U.S. Senator from Arizona...................... 1
Booker, Hon. Cory A., U.S. Senator from New Jersey............... 2
Coons, Hon. Christopher A., U.S. Senator from Delaware........... 3
Sullivan, Hon. Stephanie, Acting Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs, U.S. Department Of State,
Washington, DC................................................. 4
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted to
Hon. Stephanie Sullivan by Senator Bob Corker.............. 36
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted to
Hon. Stephanie Sullivan by Senator Jeff Flake.............. 38
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted to
Hon. Stephanie Sullivan by Senator Cory A. Booker.......... 38
Godwin, Peter, author and journalist, New York, NY............... 14
Prepared statement........................................... 15
Biti, Tendai, former Finance Minister and opposition leader,
Harare, Zimbabwe............................................... 17
Prepared statement........................................... 19
Mavhinga, Dewa, Southern Africa Director, Human Rights Watch,
Johannesburg, South Africa..................................... 21
Prepared statement........................................... 24
(iii)
THE FUTURE OF ZIMBABWE
----------
TUESDAY, DECEMBER 12, 2017
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health Policy,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:08 p.m. in
Room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jeff Flake,
chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Flake [presiding], Young, Booker, Coons,
and Udall.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF FLAKE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ARIZONA
Senator Flake. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health will come to order.
History was made in Zimbabwe last month when Robert
Mugabe's nearly 4 decades-long rule over Zimbabwe came to an
abrupt end. Initially deposed by the military and placed under
house arrest, Mugabe refused to resign. His Zanu-PF Party
removed Mugabe as its leader and replaced him with Emmerson
Mnangagwa. Now, days later, Mugabe resigned just after
parliament began impeachment proceedings and Mnangagwa was
sworn in as Zimbabwe's new president on November 24th.
News of Mugabe's resignation prompted celebrations in the
streets of Harare and even among Zimbabweans living outside the
country, all of whom hoped that Zimbabwe's days of living under
a strongman were over.
Those of us who watch Zimbabwe closely are also hopeful
that this marks a turning point for the country that has
suffered complete economic devastation under a dictator who
stifled dissent and trampled basic human rights. Zimbabwe has a
new president, but the critical questions of whether the new
government reflects material change from Mugabe's decades of
rule and what path Zimbabwe is likely to take under President
Mnangagwa--these are things still left unsettled.
President Mnangagwa is not unknown to us. Until his
dismissal as First Vice President last month, he had been
closely allied with President Mugabe since Mugabe's rise to
power. He stands accused of orchestrating a string of massacres
in the early 1980s to consolidate Mugabe's power, leaving as
many as 20,000 people dead in Matabeleland. His cabinet picks
have disappointed many who were hoping for a new coalition
government. His selections included military leaders who
participated in the military takeover and holdovers from the
Mugabe regime, but nobody representing the opposition.
There has been much speculation on what policy changes
Mnangagwa might take given the dire state of Zimbabwe's failing
economy and the critical steps needed to repair it.
Today the subcommittee will hear testimony from four
distinguished experts on Zimbabwe. Each brings a unique
background and a wealth of experience with them. I thank each
of you for your time and sharing your expertise with us. I know
that each of you have rearranged your schedules to travel to
Washington for this hearing, and on behalf of the committee, I
thank you for it.
Let me just say as a personal note I lived in Zimbabwe for
a time in the early 1980s at a time there was great hope for
this new democracy. And that hope faded sometime in the 1990s,
and it has become a nightmare for so many Zimbabweans living
there and their families abroad. I hope that this marks a
turning point, and what this hearing is really about is to find
out what policies we should adopt here in the United States
Congress to ensure, as much as we can, to nudge at least
Zimbabwe toward a democratic future.
So thank you for being here, and I will turn the time over
to Senator Booker.
STATEMENT OF HON. CORY A. BOOKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Booker. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Did you say you lived there in the 1950s? [Laughter.]
Senator Flake. 1980s.
Senator Booker. 1980s, okay.
I want to thank Chairman Flake for holding this timely
hearing. It is something I am really grateful for. This is
truly a historic time in Zimbabwe and a pivotal moment in the
United States' bilateral relationship with Zimbabwe.
For decades, Congress has played a key role in the U.S.-
Zimbabwe bilateral relationship, most notably through the
Zimbabwe Democracy and Recovery Act, or ZDERA, passed in 2001
which aimed to address persistent human rights violations and
governance challenges by prohibiting U.S. support for
multilateral and bilateral debt relief and credit for
Zimbabwe's government.
Much of the world, including the people of Zimbabwe, were
optimistic last month after President Mugabe was ousted from
power, closing nearly 40 years of authoritarian rule. It is the
hope of many, including myself, the transition from President
Mugabe to President Emmerson Mnangagwa has represented a
renewed opportunity for democracy, transparency and
accountability for the government and, most importantly, for
all the people of Zimbabwe.
However, I am concerned that despite the promises made by
President Mnangagwa to rooting out corruption, to having free
and fair elections, and to overseeing an inclusive government,
there is simply not yet enough proof that this regime will be
any different than the one before. We know that President
Mnangagwa has announced a cabinet stacked with former close
associates and military officials. In addition to them being
involved in past atrocities, many cabinet members also have
serious corruption allegations against them. This raises
questions about the government's commitment to a new
democratic, renewed path forward in Zimbabwe. And although
President Mnangagwa promised an inclusive and representative
democracy for all Zimbabweans, the opposition remains left out
of the government, seeing an ominous sign about the prospect
for real change for the country.
The new Government of Zimbabwe and the international
community must address the yet unanswered calls for justice and
accountability for the victims of past horrific atrocities
reportedly committed by members of the now new government.
Perpetrators of the brutal cleansing of political opposition in
Matabeleland region in the 1980s in which 20,000 people were
killed still have not been held accountable after all of these
years. Thousands of Zimbabweans still live with the physical
and psychological wounds of this violence.
As we examine the future of Zimbabwe, one benchmark on the
horizon is this August's elections. Free, fair, and credible
elections that are transparent, free from intimidation and in
which the opposition is allowed to organize, campaign, and
safely run their candidates must be the signal the U.S. and the
international community needs to lift some of the barriers to
bilateral and mutual aid. This benchmark may, in fact,
determine whether Zimbabwe is ready to capitalize on this
historic moment.
I thank our witnesses for being here. And again, as
Chairman Flake said, you all have crisscrossed the globe,
changed travel plans to be here to provide your very
thoughtful, insightful testimony. I am grateful for you. Thank
you.
Senator Flake. Thank you, Senator Booker.
Senator Coons, would you like to say something? Senator
Coons and I traveled to Zimbabwe almost 2 years ago.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER A. COONS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE
Senator Coons. Thank you, Chairman Flake and Ranking Member
Booker. I will never forget our memorable afternoon tea with
former President Mugabe. And I think many have waited and
wondered when the day would come when Zimbabwe would have new
leadership.
As the chair and ranking have framed I think very well, the
question now is what will the new government of Zimbabwe do.
Will they take the steps needed in order to earn the trust of
the world community? Can we find ways to support movement
towards real democracy and a truly open society or not?
I am very eager to hear from our two panels of witnesses
today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for a chance to participate in the
hearing.
Senator Flake. Thank you.
We will now turn to our witnesses. On the first panel, we
will hear from Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State Stephanie Sullivan of the State Department's Bureau of
African Affairs. She will provide the administration's
evaluation of recent events and the path forward to our
bilateral relations with Zimbabwe.
On the second panel, we will hear from Peter Godwin, Tendai
Biti, and Dewa Mavhinga.
We know that Peter Godwin, obviously an award-winning
journalist, best selling author, has written a series of
memoirs about his native Zimbabwe where he was born and raised.
I particularly enjoyed those memoirs.
Tendai Biti, obviously a former finance minister for
Zimbabwe, current opposition leader, and Dewa Mavhinga, an
activist with the Human Rights Watch.
With that, I recognize Ms. Sullivan.
STATEMENT OF HON. STEPHANIE SULLIVAN, ACTING PRINCIPAL DEPUTY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Sullivan. Chairman Flake, Ranking Member Booker,
and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for the
invitation to testify today on Zimbabwe.
The historic turn of events featuring Robert Mugabe's
resignation offers an extraordinary opportunity for Zimbabwe to
set itself on a new path. Today I provide this testimony to
discuss our bilateral relationship, the events leading to the
transition, and a U.S. position on future engagement.
Looking back over the past two decades, the U.S.
relationship with the Zimbabwean Government has been tense. The
government's repeated violations of its citizens' rights, its
catastrophic economic mismanagement, and widespread corruption
were obstacles, making it difficult to engage effectively to
address Zimbabwe's challenges. Deeply flawed elections in 2008
and 2013 further entrenched political divides in the country,
diverting attention from much needed reform.
Nevertheless, the United States has maintained a strong
relationship with the Zimbabwean people. Since Zimbabwe's
independence in 1980, we have provided significant development
assistance in the areas of health, food security, education,
and economic opportunity for citizens. Today, our assistance
builds resilience by helping millions of Zimbabwe's people
battle HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, food insecurity,
malnutrition, landmines, and human trafficking. Additionally,
civil society programs bolster civic participation to advance
democracy, human rights, and governance. These programs are
critical in enabling Zimbabweans to hold their government
accountable. None of our foreign assistance involves direct
funding to the Government of Zimbabwe.
Over the last 2 years, the competing factions within the
ruling party, the African National Union-Patriotic Front, Zanu-
PF, engaged in a bitter and public power struggle aimed at
determining President Mugabe's successor. Grace Mugabe's rise
in power unsettled others in the party who derived their
legitimacy from their ties to Zimbabwe's independence struggle.
These dynamics led to then-Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa's
dismissal on November 6th. Military actions, purportedly in
defense of President Mugabe, the party, and war veterans,
followed.
Over the next several days, the world watched as hundreds
of thousands of Zimbabweans marched in the streets and
parliamentary impeachment proceedings began. Mugabe resigned on
November 21st, ending his 37 years of rule.
The rapid turn of events appears to have unified the people
of Zimbabwe around a sense of hope and possibility for the
future. The change in government also offers an opportunity for
reform that could allow the United States to reengage in ways
we have not recently been able to do. In support of the people,
we will expect to see genuine economic and political reform,
including free and fair elections in 2018 in accordance with
Zimbabwe's constitution.
U.S. engagement with newly inaugurated President Mnangagwa
and his administration must be based on demonstrated behavior
not merely rhetorical intentions. President Mnangagwa has a
window of opportunity to demonstrate his commitment to a
democratic, just, healthy, and prosperous Zimbabwe. Our policy
of reengagement will focus on constitutional democracy, free
and fair elections, respect for human rights and the rule of
law, and an improved trade and investment climate, among other
issues. The country has a strong civil society and an
experienced political opposition whose voices must count in
charting a path forward.
The military needs to return to its barracks and state
institutions should be demilitarized. Perpetrators of abuses
against civilians should be held accountable regardless of
party affiliation. The government must engage in hard economic
reforms, including addressing budget deficits, reforming the
Indigenization Act, and reducing corruption. We will want to
see improved protection of fundamental freedoms, a freer media,
and a truth and reconciliation process. The people of Zimbabwe
deserve these reforms and many more.
We welcome President Mnangagwa's statement of intent to
carry out economic reforms made during his inauguration speech,
and we are assessing the budget released last week. We believe
critical political reforms deserve equal attention and cannot
wait. In particular, elections must be free, fair, credible,
and inclusive, allowing Zimbabweans to choose their own
leaders. Everyone in Zimbabwe should enjoy the right to
peaceful assembly without undue interference and to voice their
opinions and their vote without fear.
We are working closely with international partners in
Harare and our respective capitals. Similarly, the State
Department will continue to consult with Congress, the White
House, and other agencies on our policies regarding Zimbabwe.
If President Mnangagwa wants improved diplomatic relations and
access to international assistance and cooperation,
particularly with the United States, his government must first
implement reforms.
The United States stands ready to help the government and
people of Zimbabwe to achieve these goals. U.S. private sector
members are eager for improvements in the business climate that
will encourage them to invest and trade. They see promise in
agriculture, tourism, energy, and mining. People-to-people
exchanges are important as well. We will continue using our
vibrant exchange programs to foster a better understanding of
the United States amongst Zimbabwe's future leaders and vice
versa. We will continue to encourage Zimbabwe's highly educated
populace to study in the United States. And we will strengthen
internal networks that build professional savvy and
entrepreneurial skills.
We believe in a stable, peaceful, prosperous, and
democratic Zimbabwe that reflects the will of its people and
provides for their needs.
Thank you very much, and I welcome the opportunity to
answer the committee's questions.
[Ambassador Sullivan's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Stephanie Sullivan
Chairman Flake, Ranking Member Booker, and distinguished members of
the committee, thank you for the invitation to testify today on
Zimbabwe.
The historic turn of events, featuring Robert Mugabe's resignation,
offers an extraordinary opportunity for Zimbabwe to set itself on a new
path. Today, I provide this testimony to discuss our bilateral
relationship, the events leading to the transition, and the U.S.
position on future engagement.
Looking back over the last two decades, the U.S. relationship with
the Zimbabwean Government has been tense. The Government's repeated
violations of its citizens' human rights, its catastrophic economic
mismanagement, and widespread corruption were obstacles, making it
difficult to engage effectively to address Zimbabwe's challenges.
Deeply flawed elections in 2008 and 2013 further entrenched political
divides in the country, diverting attention from much-needed reform.
Despite a tense bilateral relationship with the Government of
Zimbabwe, the United States has maintained a strong relationship with
the Zimbabwean people. Since Zimbabwe's independence in 1980, we have
provided significant development assistance in the areas of health,
food security, education, and economic opportunity for citizens. Today,
our assistance builds resilience by helping millions of Zimbabwe's
people battle HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, food insecurity,
malnutrition, landmines, and human trafficking. Additionally, civil
society programs bolster civic participation to advance democracy,
human rights, and governance. These programs are critical in enabling
Zimbabweans to hold their government accountable. None of our foreign
assistance involves direct funding to the Government of Zimbabwe.
Over the last two years, competing factions within the ruling
party--the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF)--
engaged in a bitter and public power struggle aimed at determining
President Mugabe's successor. Grace Mugabe's rise in power unsettled
others in the party who derived legitimacy from their ties to
Zimbabwe's independence struggles. These dynamics led to then-Vice
President Emmerson Mnangagwa's dismissal on November 6 and military
actions purportedly in defense of President Mugabe, the party, and war
veterans shortly after.
Over the next several days, the world watched as hundreds of
thousands of Zimbabweans marched in the streets and parliamentary
impeachment proceedings began. Mugabe resigned on November 21, ending
his 37 years of rule.
The rapid turn of events appears to have unified the people of
Zimbabwe around a sense of hope and possibility for the future. The
change in government also offers an opportunity for reform that could
allow the United States to re-engage in ways we have not recently been
able to do. In support of the people, we will expect economic and
political reform, including free and fair elections in 2018 according
to Zimbabwe's constitution.
U.S. engagement with newly-inaugurated President Mnangagwa and his
administration must be based on demonstrated behavior, not rhetorical
intentions. President Mnangagwa has a window of opportunity to
demonstrate his commitment to a democratic, just, healthy, and
prosperous Zimbabwe. Our policy of re-engagement will focus on
constitutional democracy, free and fair elections, respect for human
rights and the rule of law, and an improved trade and investment
climate, among other issues. The country has a strong civil society and
experienced political opposition, and their voices must count in
charting a path forward.
We must judge the new administration on its current and future
actions. Along the way, there will be many actions that we will need to
assess, as we look to re-engage. We will need to see free and fair
elections. The military needs to return to its barracks and state
institutions should be demilitarized. Perpetrators of abuses against
civilians should be held accountable regardless of party affiliation.
The Government must engage in hard economic reforms, including
addressing budget deficits, reforming the Indigenization Act, and
reducing corruption. We will want to see improved protection of
fundamental freedoms, a freer media, and a truth and reconciliation
process. The people of Zimbabwe deserve these reforms, and many more.
We welcome President Mnangagwa's statement of intent to carry out
economic reforms during his inauguration speech, and we are assessing
the budget that was released last week. We believe critical political
reforms deserve equal attention and cannot wait. In particular,
elections must be free, fair, credible, and inclusive, allowing
Zimbabweans to choose their own leaders. Everyone in Zimbabwe should
enjoy the rights to peaceful assembly without undue interference and to
voice their opinions--and their vote--without fear.
We are working closely with international partners in Harare and in
our respective capitals. Similarly, the State Department will continue
to consult with Congress, the White House, and other agencies on our
policies with respect to Zimbabwe. If President Mnangagwa wants
improved diplomatic relations and access to international assistance
and cooperation, particularly from the United States, it is our
position that his government must first implement reforms.
The United States stands ready to help the Government and the
people of Zimbabwe to achieve their goals. U.S. private sector members
are eager for improvements in the business climate that will encourage
them to invest and trade. They see promise in agriculture, tourism,
energy, and mining. People-to-people exchanges are important connectors
as well. We will continue utilizing our robust and vibrant exchange
programs to foster a better understanding of the United States amongst
Zimbabwe's future leaders, and vice versa. We will continue to
encourage Zimbabwe's highly educated populace to study in the United
States. We will strengthen internal networks that build professional
savvy and entrepreneurial skills.
We believe in a stable, peaceful, and democratic Zimbabwe that
reflects the will of its people and provides for their needs.
Thank you very much. I welcome the opportunity to answer the
committee's questions.
Senator Flake. Thank you, Ms. Sullivan.
Let me start out. You mentioned that our relationship with
the new president and the new government will be based on
reforms that they have undertaken and on behavior and not just
rhetoric. What do you make of the moves so far with regard to
assembling a new government and cabinet?
Ambassador Sullivan. As the committee has pointed out, the
government is composed of many people who were previously in
the government. So it is a bit disappointing to see a lack of
opposition members, although it is not 100 percent clear that
opposition members were ready to participate in the current
government. We will look to engage with the government to
continue to press for actual implementation of some of these
rhetorical signs of improvement in both the economic and
political sphere.
Senator Flake. Taking a step back, the Zimbabwe military
went to great lengths to try to explain that this was not a
coup, but rather a military realignment or some type of
realignment. What are we calling it as far as the State
Department goes?
Ambassador Sullivan. Clearly there was military involvement
in events that led up to the resignation of President Mugabe.
We have not labeled it a coup. This is a very technical term
that our lawyers and others are looking at at the moment.
Normally if it is determined a coup, it would trigger a cutoff
of direct assistance to the government. At the moment, we have
no direct financial assistance to the Government of Zimbabwe.
Senator Flake. Usually it is a pretty good rule of thumb
that when somebody dressed in fatigues who has just taken over
the broadcast facilities gives a statement, that is usually
what it feels like.
With regard to the changes that need to be made, we have an
outsized influence, obviously, at the IMF, World Bank. What do
we plan to do with regard to--there will be efforts made by
some outside governments and organizations to relieve some of
the sanctions and to free up money or funding in the coming
months. What will be our position?
Ambassador Sullivan. While we are engaging with the new
government with an open mind, it is not enough to say it is a
new government, so therefore none of the sanctions or
restrictions that were previously in place should apply. We
will continue to look for signs of actual implementation, for
example, the election that is coming up. There are months and
months of preparation that need to lead up to that, and we
would be interested to see an openness or an invitation to send
outside observers potentially as part of a group that might be
led by an eminent African. And these are things that would need
to happen fairly soon and could give some indication of the
intentions beyond the nice speeches.
Senator Flake. Do we have any documents yet or timelines
that we have put forward or perhaps that we can look at that
the opposition leaders or others have stated that need to
happen in terms of by this date, voter rolls need to be
complete; by this date, such and such has to come down? Is
there anything that has been put together in that regard yet?
Ambassador Sullivan. We have not seen an actual timeline
leading up to the elections. There was encouraging news that
the period for voter registration has been extended into
February. We are looking at what a lot of members of civil
society have put forth as requests or demands for the new
government vis-a-vis actual democratic steps, and we are
working very closely with our likeminded partners and trying to
remain in sync with them both in Washington and Harare and
other capitals.
Senator Flake. Thank you.
Senator Booker?
Senator Booker. I am going to allow Senator Coons to go
first.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Senator Booker. Thank you,
Chairman Flake.
And thank you, Ambassador Sullivan. It is great to have an
opportunity to talk with you and to the next panel about the
transition underway in Zimbabwe and what the future might hold.
As Senator Flake referenced, we met with former President
Mugabe in February, 2016, and like many, I was very pleased to
see him go after 37 brutal years. But I think it is critical
that the people of Zimbabwe not see one dictator replaced by
another. And so I, for one, am reluctant to see us take any
steps to lighten or relieve sanctions or other international
restrictions on loans or partnership until we see, as you
suggested in your testimony, concrete steps by the
administration of Emmerson Mnangagwa and any successors.
So walk me through three things, if you would. What are the
key milestones for us to watch for to get a sense of Emmerson
Mnangagwa's capacity and willingness to enter significant
reforms?
Ambassador Sullivan. Thank you, Senator.
As far as governance goes and respect for human rights, we
would like to see immediate implementation of freedom of
expression that has been lacking for decades in Zimbabwe,
freedom of assembly. We are looking also for a free and
responsible media, including social media, the preparations for
the elections, as I mentioned, anticorruption. I believe they
have given a 90-day window for people to return ill-gotten
gains as an amnesty. Will that happen? Will corruption be
pursued in an impartial way, in an apolitical way? How will
things progress in terms of rule of law and due process? Those
are on the governance side.
On the economic side, the country is crumbling under
crushing debt. We also have a very low doing-business
environment there that is a deterrent. So we would like to see
an improved investment climate. Since investors vote with their
feet, they are watching very closely because there are
potential opportunities there. But investors want to be able to
repatriate their earnings. Again, the rule of law and a level
playing field will be very important in the economic sphere as
well.
In addition, in the security sector, we would like to see
the security sector earn the trust of the citizens, and that
would include police reforms.
Senator Coons. I was struck that the budget request for
this year for Zimbabwe, if I understood correctly, dropped
almost $60 million from the previous year and included no
requests for democracy and governance programs. It is my
expectation that there might be some reprogramming request or
some increased willingness to partner with the robust civil
society and free press that you referenced.
What sort of role do you imagine that USAID and the State
Department should play in the run-up to free and fair elections
if we are genuinely making progress?
Ambassador Sullivan. All of our influence is not
necessarily tied up with the dollar figure. But to address that
point, we do have some flexibility with some regional funds
that we could target if we saw an opportunity that looked
viable there. I think that our diplomats have a wonderful
opportunity to use the bully pulpit, to coordinate with
likeminded international partners, and also to continue
engaging with civil society organizations with whom we may not
be currently giving assistance but with whom we have cultivated
relationships over the years because fundamentally this will be
about the people of Zimbabwe and we want to support their
aspirations for a country that can reach its full potential.
Senator Coons. Last question. So China has long had an
active role in Zimbabwe during the liberation struggle until
now. What do you see as their influence in Zimbabwe compared to
the United States? What do you see as their trajectory in
Zimbabwe? And what do you think are their interests or their
priorities compared to ours? I agree with you that this is
essentially up to the people of Zimbabwe, and the actions that
will determine their future will be taken by Zimbabweans. But
it seems to me that this is a moment for the United States to
show principled leadership, active engagement and interest. But
I am wondering what another major influencer in this country
has in mind for their short-term agenda as well.
Ambassador Sullivan. Well, as throughout the continent,
China is very interested in resource acquisition and, in their
interactions with the various host governments, has taken a
very hands-off approach in terms of what they might consider
undue influence or foreign interference. So we do not expect
there will be any change in terms of China's approach, but I
think we have a window for the United States to engage in a way
we have not been able to engage that will involve U.S.
businesses, which of course are private and we cannot compel
them to engage the way others perhaps have an opportunity with
the state-owned enterprises to engage.
Senator Coons. Well, thank you, Ambassador Sullivan.
Thank you, Chairman Flake.
I think you will see significant and sustained interest
from members of this subcommittee and other committees of the
Congress as we try and encourage and support a movement towards
a genuinely open and democratic society in Zimbabwe.
Thank you.
Senator Flake. Thank you, Senator Coons.
Senator Udall?
Senator Udall. Thank you, Chairman Flake, and thank you for
holding this important hearing. We really appreciate you being
here.
On November 17, 2017, the Department of the Interior
published its determination that Zimbabwe was sufficiently
stable to allow for the illegal importation of elephant
trophies into the United States. This announcement was based on
ratification of a new conservation plan in Zimbabwe in 2016. In
the opinion, the trophy hunting adds to the overall
conservation of the species.
The announcement, however, coincided with the coup of
former President Robert Mugabe and a transfer of power to his
Vice President, underscoring the great instability in the
region. Because of these events, the President tweeted that he
would put the policy on hold, which I appreciate very much.
Wildlife trafficking decimates iconic species while funding
global terror organizations. The chairman of this committee and
I have worked hard to stem the tide of poaching and illegal
wildlife trafficking across the globe, and I am proud of our
bipartisan work in the last Congress to provide agencies and
international institutions the funding and tools necessary to
stymie and interdict wildlife trafficking. But I worry that the
current administration's findings for the elephant and the lion
will undermine that progress.
Do you believe that Zimbabwe has adequate institutional
controls to properly manage wildlife?
Ambassador Sullivan. That decision is currently being
reviewed at the Fish and Wildlife Service in the Department of
the Interior.
As far as the stability or not at the moment, we are taking
very much a wait-and-see approach, but we are not sitting on
our hands, staying home. We are engaging actively with members
of the new government, with civil society, with other
influential actors on the ground. So I think the answer to that
would be it is too early to say what the level of stability is.
Senator Udall. And do you believe that in this period of
upheaval, the government can regulate hunting of iconic
species, including lions and elephants, in a manner that will
prevent illegal wildlife trafficking?
Ambassador Sullivan. While there has been upheaval, there
also seems to be a great deal of continuity, if you look at the
cabinet that is currently in place. So at this point, again, I
would say that we are going in with our eyes wide open and this
remains an area that we look at in terms of U.S. policy and
also what it might mean to the Zimbabwean ecotourism industry.
And they are looking for diversification of the economy. They
have an opportunity to increase the 50,000 or so American
tourists who go there. So we are just going to have to wait and
see regarding their ability to manage. And this might be part
of security sector reforms that we could potentially look at.
Senator Udall. Thank you for that answer. Media reports
indicate that Zimbabwe's electoral commission chairperson,
Justice Rita Makarau, resigned abruptly on Friday without any
rationale. The press is speculating that she was pressured to
resign, and opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai said that
Makarau's resignation had opened a can of worms.
What do you know about her successor and whether the change
in leadership of the commission will make credible elections
next year more or less likely?
Ambassador Sullivan. Senator, I would like to take that
question back and respond for the record.
Senator Udall. That would be good.
[The information requested had not been received when this
hearing went to press.]
Senator Udall. Thank you very much.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Flake. Thank you.
Senator Booker?
Senator Booker. Thank you so much.
So I am just trying to understand the administration's
position given things that are going on right now. You have
talked about a lot of reforms, that we are looking and waiting
for reforms on this coming election and how important that is,
a desire potentially to send election observers. You talked
about reforms in government, talked about reforms in the mining
industry.
Could you just tell me a little bit more about what
leverage you think we have to ensure that we can see--let us
start with free and fair elections--to see that those elections
happen. Is there any ways that you think we have to further
leverage that or something that Congress could be doing?
Ambassador Sullivan. I will take the latter part of that
question first, if I may.
We certainly welcome engagement of Congress and travel to
the region, letters, engagement, and we will continue to work
with you on the way forward.
As far as the leverage, I think we see in place a new
government that is eager to have a sense of legitimacy that the
predecessor government lacked despite the fact that it is a lot
of the same people. Again, it offers an opportunity that we
would like to try to work with and induce in a positive
direction.
The country is having a severe economic crisis and that is
another point of leverage that without the reforms, there will
not be good things happening on the economic front.
And then finally, we are very tightly latched up with our
likeminded counterparts in country and having ongoing
discussions with them about the preparations for the elections.
Senator Booker. So can I interrupt you there?
Ambassador Sullivan. Sure.
Senator Booker. Because there have been reports that the
British Government may consider extending a bridge loan to
Zimbabwe in order to clear unpaid arrears and open up funding
from the IMF and World Bank. Has the British Government given
you an indication that they plan to do this?
Ambassador Sullivan. We do not have any direct knowledge of
that. We have seen some similar reporting. Acting Assistant
Secretary Don Yamamoto was just in London this week. I am
positive that Zimbabwe came up in the conversations. As far as
I know, that specific angle did not come up, and we remain in a
very united approach to this.
Senator Booker. Okay. Great.
The accountability for atrocities, which is I think
something that--I am sure you agree--is of profound importance.
Tens of thousands have been killed in numerous, unfortunately,
raids and operations and massacres. Church groups have
documented an alarming record of government-sponsored
atrocities before the 2008 elections. We see the State
Department said in 2000 that Mnangagwa was widely feared and
despised throughout the country--that is the State Department's
words--and could be an even more repressive leader than Mugabe.
And so I understand that you are sort of having a wait-and-
see and see if we can have inducements. But clearly when it
comes to accountability for atrocities, if there seems to be so
much compelling evidence that this is someone that participated
in this, how do you level that with our policies towards this
new administration?
Ambassador Sullivan. Well, one of the things we will be
looking for is for the people and the Government of Zimbabwe to
organize some sort of a truth and reconciliation process so
that they can work through these traumas of the past.
As far as President Mnangagwa, he remains under U.S.
sanctions. And again, this is the government that is in front
of us right now, and we are going to try to work to engage
positively. He, in his inauguration speech, really wanted
people to look forward and forget about the past. We are not
going to forget about the past. We are going to keep that in
mind as we deal with him and other members of the government,
but again, not just appeal to their better natures but try to
help the government and the people of Zimbabwe move forward
beyond this very, very dismal past track record of human
rights.
Senator Booker. Just, you know, be candid with me, if you
can, to expect a government led by someone who participated and
was responsible for horrific violations, horrific human rights
atrocities, to expect there to be a real truth and
reconciliation coming from a government led by someone who has
a record that from our own State Department seems to be so
horrific--should we really be expecting there to be a real
truth and reconciliation process?
Ambassador Sullivan. Well, we certainly do not believe this
will be a spontaneous course of action without a great deal of
pressure and discussion, and it is not just the United States.
It is also, as I mentioned earlier, the likeminded partners and
a very active civil society. There were so many people out in
the streets celebrating the prospect of a new Zimbabwe. They
have high expectations, and we think in some ways maybe not
dramatically yet but the lines have moved and the kinds of
oppression that people felt obliged to withstand in the
predecessor regime--I think that it has been a bit of a game
changer despite the fact that it is a lot of the same people
who are running the show at this point.
Senator Booker. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Senator Flake. Thank you, Ambassador Sullivan, for your
testimony. We will now turn to our other panel and give them a
few minutes. We will recess for just 2 minutes while the new
panel comes. I appreciate the answers you have given today.
Ambassador Sullivan. Thank you.
[Recess.]
Senator Flake. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health will now come back to
order.
The subcommittee has just heard testimony from Principal
Deputy Assistant Sullivan representing the administration's
view. Now we will hear from the second panel, each of whom has
deep personal experience with Zimbabwe. In this group, we have
an award winning journalist, a former government minister, and
an NGO activist. All have raised their voices in opposition to
Robert Mugabe and the Zimbabwean Government using different
platforms. All have deep roots in Zimbabwe. Two of the
witnesses were in Zimbabwe during the military takeover. One is
a former constitutional lawyer. Two have been human rights
attorneys. All have strong personal interests, obviously, in
Zimbabwe's future and are using their unique talents to raise
awareness of the issues and to change lives in Zimbabwe.
First we will turn to Peter Godwin, award winning
journalist, best selling author, documentary filmmaker. He has
written extensively about his own experiences growing up in
Zimbabwe and of human rights abuses committed under Mugabe's
leadership with the support of the new President, Emmerson
Mnangagwa.
Tendai Biti is currently a key opposition leader in
Zimbabwe. He served as Zimbabwe's minister of finance from 2009
to 2013 as part of the Government of National Unity. He was a
secretary-general of the Movement for Democratic Change and is
now president of the People's Democratic Party. As a former
finance minister, Mr. Biti is uniquely poised to address
economic and corruption issues in Zimbabwe.
Last but not least, Dewa Mavhinga is Southern Africa
Director of the Africa Division of Human Rights Watch. In 2012,
he co-founded the Zimbabwe Democracy Institute, a public policy
research think tank in Harare. Mr. Mavhinga was also in
Zimbabwe during the military takeover, updating a wide audience
via Twitter on the events there.
With that, we will recognize Mr. Godwin.
STATEMENT OF PETER GODWIN, AUTHOR AND
JOURNALIST, NEW YORK, NY
Mr. Godwin. Thank you, Chairman Flake, Ranking Member
Booker, and other members. Thank you for inviting us and for
being interested in Zimbabwe in a world where I am sure you
have many other things to distract you right now.
Just before dawn on November the 14th, General Sibusiso
Moyo of the Zimbabwe National Army went onto state television
to announce that Robert Mugabe was under house arrest. Mugabe's
37-year reign--he was Zimbabwe's only leader since independence
in 1980--was over. Zimbabweans soon poured out onto the streets
to celebrate.
Mugabe had been unseated by an internal faction fight
within his ruling Zanu-PF party. It was not primarily
ideological or even ethnic. It was essentially a family feud on
steroids, and it pitted old against young. His wife Grace, who
made a bid to succeed him, is 41 years his junior, too young to
have fought in the liberation war, hitherto a sine qua non for
leadership of most southern African liberation parties. Her
attempt to create a dynastic succession, a la Evita Peron,
Imelda Marcos, or Madam Mao, proved premature.
Over his 37 years in power, Mugabe had hollowed out Zanu-
PF, reducing it to a personality cult by getting rid of anyone
who challenged his authority.
But Grace overreached when she persuaded her increasingly
enfeebled husband to fire his Vice President Emmerson
Mnangagwa, her main rival. This was too much for the military
leadership who had close ties to Mnangagwa as he had held
defense and intelligence portfolios for much of his ministerial
career.
I think you can expect Mnangagwa to be strongly in hock to
the military who, after all, elevated him to the presidency. In
the end, this was a continuity coup to protect the power of the
party's old guard.
General Moyo, who announced the coup, is the new foreign
minister, the country's official interlocutor with the world.
Air Marshal Perrance Shiri is promoted to the cabinet too. He
was the officer commanding 5th Brigade at the time of the
Matabeleland massacres in the early 1980s. And it is speculated
that General Constantino Chiwenga, head of the Zimbabwe
National Army and architect of the coup, may be named Vice
President. Even if not, he will continue to be the power behind
the throne, the king-maker.
The veterans of the liberation war for independence are
once again ascendant too. Their leader, Chris Mutsvangwa, has
been named as special advisor to the new president.
And what are we to make of the new president? You should
expect Mnangagwa to entice his own people and the world with a
reformist stance. He will try to rebrand the party, presenting
it as Zanu-PF 2.0, Zanu-PF lite, non-ideological, technocratic,
managerial, open for business, safe once more for foreign
investors. He has already mentioned a partial return of land to
some white commercial farmers. He has embraced the rhetoric of
anticorruption, offering a 3-month amnesty window to return
ill-gotten gains.
But these promises do not stand up to scrutiny.
What, for example, of his own corruption and that of many
of the new cabinet--8 of the 22 are on the U.S. sanctions
list--joined by bonds of massively corrupt self-enrichment and
repressive political violence? For them to put distance between
who they now purport to be and their nearly four-decade record
in office is preposterous. And for Zimbabweans, as well as the
international community, to believe this is to fall for a Zanu-
PF confidence trick, a survival bait and switch.
Zanu-PF has long been a vampiric entity, sucking the blood
from the nation. Mnangagwa is 75 years old. He is most unlikely
to undergo a benign metamorphosis. He has been at the very
center of Zanu-PF's repressive security web, until recently
Mugabe's trusted consiglieri. He headed the feared Central
Intelligence Organization, the CIO, at the time of the
Matabeleland massacres, during which upwards of 20,000
civilians were killed. And he rolled out the terrible reprisal
campaign during the post-2008 election violence when thousands
of opposition supporters were badly tortured and more than 200
killed. All of these and more besides were carried out by this
same political party, kleptocratic, violent, repressive.
What are the alternatives for Zimbabweans in the 2018
elections? You have before you today a senior member of the
main opposition party, the MDC, so I will defer to him to
summarize his own party's current status.
However, opposition fragmentation is enormously beneficial
to Zanu-PF, allowing it a real possibility of winning at the
polls even if opposition parties attract more votes overall.
For the opposition, it is, therefore, imperative to unify or at
least broker electoral pacts. It is also crucial that the
elections are free and fair and perceived as such by the
electorate. Zanu-PF has a long precedent of electoral foul
play.
If this is to be avoided in 2018, external monitoring will
be essential. It is quite inadequate for observers to parachute
into Zimbabwe shortly before the poll. There must be a
persistent presence on the ground long, long before that, as
registration procedures need to be scrutinized.
In conclusion, if we reward Mnangagwa's ``same as it ever
was'' Zanu-PF for its internal coup, for example, by
prematurely dropping individual sanctions, we would help cement
the culture of impunity that already infects Zimbabwe, where
the perpetrators never face the consequences of their actions
and where real freedom and reform remain elusive.
Thank you.
[Mr. Godwin'prepared statemenmt follows:]
Prepared Statement of Peter Godwin.
zimbabwe's future--the state of governance
after military intervention
Just before dawn on November 14th, General Sibusiso Moyo of the
Zimbabwe National Army went onto state television to announce that
Robert Mugabe, was under house arrest. His 37-year reign, Zimbabwe's
only leader since independence in 1980, was over. Zimababweans soon
poured out into the streets to celebrate.
Mugabe had been unseated by internal faction fighting within his
ruling Zanu-PF party. It wasn't primarily ideological or ethnic, it was
a family feud on steroids, it pitted old against young. His wife Grace
made a bid to succeed him. Forty-one years his junior--she was too
young to have fought in the liberation war, hitherto a sine qua non for
leadership of southern African liberation parties. Her attempt to
create a dynastic succession, a la Evita Peron, Imelda Marcos (with
whom she shared a penchant for shoes, favoring Ferragamo because her
feet were ``too narrow for anything else''), or Madam Mao, proved
premature, and it triggered her husband's political demise.
Over those years Mugabe had hollowed out Zanu-PF, reducing it to a
personality cult by getting rid of anyone who challenged his authority,
until he was attended only by fawning party punkah wallahs, fanning his
ego, prancing around in ludicrous regalia bearing his image, as though
he were a religion.
Ultimately Grace over-reached when she persuaded her increasingly
enfeebled husband to fire vice president Emmerson Mnangagwa, her main
rival. This was too much for the military leadership who had close ties
to Mnangagwa, as he held defense and intelligence portfolios for much
of his ministerial career.
I think you can expect Mnangagwa to be strongly in hock to the
military who, after all, elevated him to the presidency. In the end,
this was a ``continuity coup,'' to protect the power of the party's old
guard.
General Sibusiso Moyo, who announced the coup, is the new foreign
minister, the country's official interlocutor with the world. Air
Marshal Perrance Shiri is elevated to the cabinet too. He was the
officer commanding 5th Brigade at the time of the Matabeleland
massacres, in the early 1980s. And it's speculated that General
Constantino Chiwenga, head of the Zimbabwe National Army, and architect
of the coup, may be named vice president. Even if not, he will continue
to be the power behind the throne, the king-maker.
The veterans of the Liberation war for independence are once again
ascendant too. Their leader, Chris Mutsvangwa, has been named as
special advisor to the new president. Last time the war vets made their
weight felt, Mugabe had to buy them off with ex gratia payments.
Unbudgeted for, these payments cascaded through the economy resulting
in the highest hyper-inflation the world has ever seen. By the end the
Zimbabwe dollar was almost halving in value every 24 hours.
What are we to make of the new President? You should expect
Mnangagwa to entice his own people and the world with a ``reformist
stance.'' He will try to rebrand the party, presenting it as Zanu-PF
2.0, Zanu-PF-lite, non-ideological, technocratic, managerial, open for
business, safe once more for foreign investors. He has already
mentioned a partial return of land to some white commercial farmers, he
has embraced the rhetoric of anti-corruption, offering a three-month
amnesty window to return ill-gotten gains.
But these promises don't stand up to scrutiny.
What, for example, of his own corruption, and that of many of his
new cabinet--8 of the 22 are on U.S. sanctions list--joined by bonds of
massively corrupt self-enrichment, and repressive political violence?
For them to put distance between who they now purport to be, and their
nearly four-decade record in office, is preposterous. And for
Zimbabweans both within the country and in the diaspora, as well as the
international community, to believe this, is to fall for a Zanu-PF
confidence trick, a survival bait-and-switch.
Zanu-PF has long been a vampiric entity, sucking the blood from the
nation. Mnangagawa is 75 years-old. He is most unlikely undergo a
benign metamorphosis. He has been at the very center of Zanu-PF's
repressive security web, until recently Mugabe's trusted consiglieri.
He headed the feared Central Intelligence Organization, the CIO, at the
time of the Matableland massacre, during which upwards of 20,000
civilians were killed. And he rolled out the terrible reprisal campaign
during the post-election violence of 2008, when thousands of opposition
supporters were badly tortured and more than 200 killed. All of these
and more besides, were carried out by this same political party,
kleptocratic, violent, repressive.
What are the alternatives for Zimbabweans in the 2018 elections?
You have before you today a senior member of the main opposition party,
the MDC, so I will defer to him to summarize his own party's current
status. However, in general, Zimbabwe's opposition is more divided than
ever before. There are currently more than twenty separate parties, ten
of them significant. And within the MDC, there are some tensions as its
founding leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, has been seriously ill, and there
is some pressure on him to stand down.
This opposition fragmentation is enormously beneficial to Zanu-PF,
allowing them a real possibility of winning at the polls even if
opposition parties attract more votes between themselves. For the
opposition it is, therefore, imperative to unify or at least broker
alliances or electoral pacts. It's also crucial that the elections are
free and fair, and perceived as such by the electorate. Zanu-PF has a
long precedent of electoral foul play.
If this is to be avoided in 2018, external monitoring will be
essential. It is quite inadequate for observers to parachute into
Zimbabwe shortly before the poll (recent approval of the Kenya
elections tell a cautionary tale in this regard.) There needs to be a
persistent presence on the ground long, long before that, as
registration procedures need to be scrutinized.
In conclusion, if we reward Mnangagwa's ``same as it ever was''
Zanu-PF for its internal coup, for example, by prematurely dropping
individual sanctions, we would help cement the culture of impunity that
already infects Zimbabwe, where the perpetrators never face the
consequences of their actions, and where real freedom and reform remain
elusive.
Senator Flake. Thank you, Mr. Godwin.
Mr. Biti?
STATEMENT OF TENDAI BITI, FORMER FINANCE MINISTER AND
OPPOSITION LEADER, HARARE, ZIMBABWE
Mr. Biti. Thank you, Chairman Flake, Ranking Member Booker,
and other members of the subcommittee. I come here with my
colleagues from the opposition alliance known as the MDC
alliance. I travel with the Ona Rapor and Nelson Chamisa and
Mr. Jocob Ngarivhume. We thank you for inviting us to this
great center of American democracy.
The 14th of November 2017 began a series of major life-
changing events in Zimbabwe that will forever redefine the
political and constitutional landscape of our country.
On that day, military tanks invaded the streets of the
capital, Harare, and in the early hours of the 15th, the
military captured Zimbabwe's broadcasting houses and made it
clear implicitly that the executive was no longer in control.
On 18th November, hundreds of thousands of Zimbabweans
marched alongside military personnel in the streets of Harare
and Bulawayo and demanded the resignation of President Mugabe.
On 21 November, in the middle of impeachment proceedings in
parliament, President Mugabe quietly, if not inelegantly,
announced his resignation.
With President Mugabe's departure, Zimbabwe now faces an
uncertain future, but one which presents real opportunities for
reconstructing, rebuilding, and refabricating a new Zimbabwean
story and a new Zimbabwean society.
Without a doubt, the 37 years of President Mugabe's rule
were a sad story of capture, coercion, corruption, poverty, and
de-legitimization. Zimbabweans lived in fear under a system
that paid no respect to their rights and a system that saw
continuous impoverishment and suffering, loss of livelihoods
amongst ordinary citizens.
President Mugabe presided over one of the most autocratic
African regimes that stood head and shoulders with the likes of
current dictators like Obiang in Equatorial Guinea, Biya in
Cameroon, Isaias Afewerki in Eritrea, al-Bashir in Sudan, and
Yoweri Museveni in Uganda.
What we now need as a country is a genuine break from a
tortured past and not a continuation of the old order. The new
Zimbabwe, which the majority of people that marched on the 18th
of November, 2017 crave for has to be founded on the values and
principles of constitutionalism, the rule of law, a just and
prosperous society. And in the new Zimbabwe, every citizen must
be free to pursue life, liberty, and happiness.
And we contend, Mr. Chairman, that our country is in the
middle of a transition, a transition from a very unhappy regime
for 37 years of the torture and pain that I have described
above. But like any transition, it can be a captured
transition. It can be a derailed transition. It can be a
hijacked transition. That is not what the thousands and
thousands of people who marched on the 18th of November, 2017
are seeking for. Those people who marched in Harare, in
Bulawayo, in New York, in Cape Town, in Johannesburg are
looking for a fresh start, a genuine transition to a new
Zimbabwean society.
But what is the precondition to move to this genuine
transition? In our view, the starting point must be a return to
true legitimacy, constitutionalism, and the rule of law. The
road map to legitimacy is the fundamental precondition to the
establishment of a sustainable, just, and free Zimbabwe. This
road map must be anchored on clear benchmarks.
These include, number one, the immediate restoration of
constitutionalism, the rule of law, and legitimate civilian
rule. The military must be demobilized from the streets.
Number two and very importantly, the implementation of
genuine electoral reforms to ensure that the election of July-
August 2018 is free, fair, credible, and legitimate. Those
electoral reforms must include, number one, the preparation of
a brand new biometric voters' roll to which all political
parties sign onto and agree to.
Number two, agreement on an independent electoral
management body, particularly in the post-math of the
resignation of the ZEC chairperson, Justice Rita Makarau.
Number three--and this is very important--the introduction
of a diaspora vote. Zimbabwe has more than 4 million of its
citizens that are in the diaspora. And in terms of section 67
of our constitution, they have the right to vote and that right
to vote must be respected.
Number four, the introduction of international observation
and poll monitors, who must come into Zimbabwe months before
the election as opposed to the current practice where a few
African observers come into Zimbabwe a few days before the
election and they enjoy the fine hospitalities at the few
remaining fine hotels in Zimbabwe.
Number five, we consider that there must be a defined role
of the UN and its agencies in our electoral process. There must
be full access to the media. There must be a safe environment
for campaigning and voting, which is free from intimidation.
And naturally there must be a repeal of the notorious Public
Order and Security Act, the Access to Information and
Protection Act, AIPPA.
Number three, there must be political and institutional
reforms, which include aligning the country's laws with the
2013 constitution, and in particular actualizing the provisions
dealing with devolution and the land question.
Number four, there must be a modicum of economic reforms
that focus on macroeconomic stability, growing a shared
economy, and addressing the huge challenge of unemployment and
under-development.
Number five--and this is very key--given the levels of
intolerance, the destruction of the social fabric of our
country, we contend that there must be the restoration of the
social contract, including the renewal and rebirth of a new
Zimbabwe that shuns corruption and promotes national healing
and reconciliation.
The above road map must be guaranteed and underwritten by
the international community. In this regard, the role of the
African Union and the United Nations will be critical.
It will also be important for us as the opposition to give
the people of Zimbabwe a genuine chance. It is important that
we continue with the path of unity that we have demonstrated
and are demonstrating back at home and that we put on the table
programs that will address the fundamental challenges facing
our people. And I am glad to say, Mr. Chairman, that this is
exactly what we are doing.
We also contend that the new authorities must show some
signs of a commitment to real transformation other than
cosmetic statements on the economy. The real danger is that
they will pursue a Beijing model, in the respect of which there
are nominal improvements on the economy while political space
is closed and democracy is muzzled. It is, therefore, important
that the new authorities show signs of commitment to real
change.
They could, for instance, begin by openly acknowledging and
apologizing for the major human rights abuses of the past 4
decades, in particular, Gukurahundi, the cleanup operation
known by the moniker Operation Murambatsvina, and the vicious
2008 election violence in the respect of which thousands of
opposition and ordinary citizens were victimized.
They could, for instance, order an inquiry into the
disappearance of human rights activists, including Patrick
Nabanyama and Itai Dzamara.
They could, for instance, mollify many Zimbabweans by
ordering a judicial inquiry into Zimbabwe's missing diamond
revenues, estimated to be around $15 billion.
Mr. Chairman, we have lost a lot of time in Zimbabwe
fighting amongst ourselves. One hopes that the fresh beam of
light that we saw on 18 November 2017 becomes a permanent
bright shining star that shows us the path forward. Zimbabweans
must fix our own country and repair the wounds of the past. But
we cannot do this alone.
As Zimbabwe begins this quest for transformation, it shall
need the support of the international community, including the
United States and Congress in particular, at this critical
stage.
We know that this struggle has been long and difficult, but
we are confident that we will complete what we in the Movement
for Democratic Change alliance started in 1999 when we formed
the MDC.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[Mr. Biti's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Tendai Biti
zimbabwe at the crossroads: a chance for a new beginning
Thank you, Chairman Flake, Ranking Member Booker, and other members
of the subcommittee. We thank you for inviting us to this great center
of American democracy.
The 14th of November 2017 began a series major life changing events
in Zimbabwe that will forever redefine the political and constitutional
landscape of the country.
On that day, military tanks invaded the streets of the capital,
Harare, and other major cities in the country. In the early hours of
the 15th, the military appeared on Zimbabwe's sole national television
and implicitly made it clear that the executive was no longer in
control.
On 18th November, hundreds of thousands of Zimbabweans marched
alongside military personnel in the streets of Harare and Bulawayo and
demanded the resignation of President Mugabe. On 21 November in the
middle of impeachment proceedings in parliament, President Mugabe
quietly, if not in-elegantly, announced his resignation.
With President Mugabe's departure, Zimbabwe now faces an uncertain
future, but one which presents real opportunities for reconstructing,
rebuilding and re-fabricating a new Zimbabwean story, and a new
Zimbabwean society.
Without a doubt, the 37 years of President Mugabe's rule were a sad
story of capture, coercion, corruption, poverty and de-legitimization.
Zimbabweans lived in fear under a system that paid no respect to their
rights and a system that saw continuous impoverishment and suffering,
loss of livelihoods amongst ordinary citizens.
President Mugabe presided over one of the most autocratic African
regimes that stood head and shoulders with the likes of current
dictators like Obiang in Equatorial Guinea, Biya in Cameroon, Afewerki
in Eritrea, al-Bashir in Sudan, and Museveni in Uganda.
Let's be clear: the events in Zimbabwe described above were an
illegal and illegitimate transfer of power from one faction of the
ruling party to another.
However, this was not the first time that the military in Zimbabwe
and the so-called "securocrats" have subverted constitutional order in
a way that merely entrenched un-democratic rule.
For instance, on the eve of the presidential election in March 2002
the top army generals of Zimbabwe led by then commander of the Zimbabwe
Defense Forces Major-General Zvinavashe issued a public statement in
which it was announced that they would never salute a leader who did
not have liberation war credentials. An obvious position meant to
target Morgan Tsvangirai, the leader of the democratic opposition.
In June 2008, pursuant to a victory of the MDC in the March 2008
election the military staged a pre-emptive military coup that literally
prevented political opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai and the MDC
from taking over, installing President Mugabe as president of the
republic.
November 2017 now represents a third occasion of a revolt against
the constitution, but this time, marked with the popular removal of an
unpopular president.
Despite the illegalities of the November 2017 processes, Zimbabwe
now has the obligation of ensuring that there's a major shift and
fundamental departure from a past of division, attrition and fear.
Zimbabwe needs a genuine break from its tortured past, not a
continuation of the old order. The new Zimbabwe, to be established now,
need to be founded on the values and principles of constitutionalism,
the rule of law, a just and prosperous society. In the new Zimbabwe,
every citizen must be free to pursue life, liberty, and happiness.
The starting point must be a return to true legitimacy,
constitutionalism, and the rule of law. The roadmap to legitimacy is
the fundamental precondition to the establishment of a sustainable,
just, and free Zimbabwe. This roadmap must be anchored on clear
benchmarks. These include:
1. The immediate restoration of constitutionalism, the rule of law,
and legitimate civilian rule. The military must be demobilized
from the streets.
2. Implementation of genuine electoral reforms to ensure that the
election in July-August 2018 is free, fair, credible, and
legitimate. Those electoral reforms, including: the preparation
of a brand new biometric voters' roll to which all political
parties sign onto; agreement on an independent electoral
management body; the introduction of a diaspora vote;
international observation and poll monitors; defined role of
the UN and its agencies; full access to media; and a safe
environment for campaigning and voting free from intimidation.
3. Political and institutional reforms, which include aligning the
country's laws with the 2013 constitution, and in particular
actualizing the provisions dealing with devolution and the land
question.
4. Major economic reforms that focus on restoring livelihoods, growing
a shared economy and addressing the huge challenge of
unemployment and under-development.
5. Restoring the social contract, including the renewal and rebirth of
a new Zimbabwe that shuns corruption and promotes national
healing and reconciliation.
The above road map must be guaranteed and underwritten by the
international community. In this regard, the role of the African Union
and the United Nations will be critical.
The new authorities must show some signs of a commitment to real
transformation other than cosmetic statements on the economy.
The real danger is that they will pursue a Beijing model, in the
respect of which there are nominal improvements on the economy while
political space is closed and democracy is muzzled.
It is therefore important that the new authorities show signs of
commitment to real change.
They could, for instance, begin by openly acknowledging and
apologizing for the major human rights abuses of the past four decades,
in particular the massacres in Matabeleland known as Gukurahundi, the
illegal and inhumane urban land clearances of Operation Murambatsvina,
and the vicious 2008 post election violence against the opposition and
ordinary citizens.
They could for instance order an inquiry into the disappearance of
human rights activists, including Patrick Nabanyama and Itai Dzamara,
who has been missing since March 2015.
Authorities could for instance mollify many Zimbabweans by ordering
a judicial inquiry into Zimbabwe's missing diamond revenues, estimated
to be around $15 billion.
We have lost a lot of time in Zimbabwe, fighting amongst ourselves.
One hopes that the fresh beam of light that we saw on 18 November 2017
becomes a permanent bright shining star that shows us the path forward.
Zimbabweans must fix our own country and repair the wounds of the past.
But we can't do this alone.
As Zimbabwe begins this quest for transformation, it will need the
support of the international community, including the United States and
Congress in particular, at this crucial stage.
We ask the international community and the U.S. to keep us in your
hearts. Do not allow our country to be forgotten in our battle against
tyranny and poverty and for democracy and human rights. Our election
requires active support and oversight from the international community,
including our American friends.
Further, once we show signs of an irrevocable and irreversible
trajectory towards legitimacy, democracy, and the rule of law, we shall
require your full support as we re-engage key international
institutions.
We know that this struggle has been long and difficult. But we are
confident that we will complete what we started in 1999 when we formed
the Movement for Democratic Change with the aspiration of establishing
a truly democratic, just, and free Zimbabwe.
Thank you. Zikomo.
Senator Flake. Thank you.
Mr. Mavhinga?
STATEMENT OF DEWA MAVHINGA, SOUTHERN AFRICA DIRECTOR, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, JOHANNESBURG, SOUTH AFRICA
Mr. Mavhinga. Thank you, Chairman Flake, Ranking Member
Booker, and other members of the subcommittee, for giving me
the opportunity to testify on behalf of Human Rights Watch at
this hearing on Zimbabwe.
Mr. Chairman, my testimony will first lay out the human
rights situation in Zimbabwe since the military takeover and
then highlight key recommendations to the U.S. Government for
action to press the interim Zimbabwean Government to ensure a
rights-respecting environment leading to democratic, credible,
transparent, and peaceful elections and political stability
thereafter.
Following the military takeover, Robert Mugabe resigned as
president on November 21 and on November 24, was replaced by
his former deputy, Emmerson Mnangagwa, who has his own long
record of human rights violations. In his inaugural speech,
Mnangagwa confirmed that elections will take place in 2018 as
scheduled but did not address critical issues, notably security
sector, media, electoral reforms necessary to ensure credible,
free, and fair elections.
As reports of abuses by the military since the takeover
began to emerge, the excitement and euphoria that many
Zimbabweans greeted the end of Mugabe's rule quickly fizzled
out to be replaced by uneasiness and uncertainty. Allegations
are rife that between November 14 and 24, the army arrested and
detained a number of Mugabe's associates without providing
information about the arrests or places and conditions of
detention. Since the military takeover, soldiers have not
returned to the barracks, but instead are now involved in
policing on the streets. This is the same military that has
been credibly implicated in rights violations against the
general population during the Mugabe years.
On November 24, High Court Judge George Chiweshe ruled that
the military intervention that led to Mugabe's ouster was
lawful under Zimbabwe's constitution. Whatever the merits of
the ruling, the judgment could embolden the military to carry
out further incursions in Zimbabwe's political or electoral
affairs in the future. The highly partisan stance of Zimbabwe's
military leadership, particularly without meaningful security
sector reforms, significantly reduces the chances that free,
fair, and credible elections can be held.
There is an urgent need ahead of the elections for
Zimbabwe's Constitutional Court to review Judge Chiweshe's
ruling and ensure that members of the security forces observe
strict political neutrality. Failure to ensure a professional,
independent, and nonpartisan role of the security forces may
make it difficult to deliver elections needed to put Zimbabwe
on a democratic, rights-respecting track.
Following the military takeover, the leadership of the
Southern African Development Community, SADC, called on all
stakeholders in Zimbabwe to peacefully resolve the nation's
political challenges. SADC leaders also welcomed Mugabe's
decision to resign, pledging to support the 2018 elections.
While the African Union initially condemned the military
takeover, the regional body later welcomed Mugabe's
resignation.
The AU and SADC have yet, however, to address the need for
the new administration to design a road map for democratic
elections and the political neutrality and noninterference of
the security forces in civilian and electoral affairs of the
country.
In early December, the European Union Ambassador to
Zimbabwe, Phillipe van Damme, said the EU will not provide
significant new funding to Zimbabwe until the country holds
free, fair, and credible elections.
Human Rights Watch is of the view that full reengagement
with the Zimbabwean Government should be based on a firm
commitment from the interim administration in Harare that they
will institute measures that will ensure tangible and long
overdue democratic and electoral reforms. A key benchmark for
increased U.S. Government engagement should be an independent
assessment of the environment in which the 2018 elections are
conducted and the transfer of power to an elected civilian
government. It is important now that the military leadership
publicly announce its commitment to credible, free, and fair
elections and that it respects the outcome of the elections.
Mnangagwa's government should be encouraged through public
statements to demonstrate commitment to accountability, justice
for human rights abuses, and respect for the rule of law in
Zimbabwe. We believe that Mnangagwa's recent calls to let
bygones be bygones should not extend to serious human rights
violations since 1980, many of which implicate the military,
like the period from 1982 to 1987 when the 5th Brigade army
unit carried out widespread human rights abuses, including the
torture and unlawful killing of an estimated 20,000 people,
military abuses in 2008 elections, as well as the abuses in the
Marange diamond fields in the east of the country.
Currently, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, which is
charged with overseeing the 2018 elections, is dominated by
partisan state intelligence and military officials. Electoral
reforms should start with making the Zimbabwe Electoral
Commission independent and professional. The commission is
compiling a new voters' register. Unlike countries like
Botswana or Mozambique, which guaranteed the diaspora vote,
Zimbabwe does not provide or implement the diaspora vote unless
in diplomatic missions.
The Mnangagwa government should also take steps to amend or
repeal repressive laws that exist and that had been used under
the Mugabe government.
Our key recommendations to the U.S. Government include that
the U.S. Government should maintain the existing policy towards
Zimbabwe until the military removes itself from politics and
the 2018 elections are legitimately assessed to be peaceful,
transparent, free, and fair and that power is smoothly
transmitted to the newly elected government.
Press, through public statements and support to
nongovernmental organizations in Zimbabwe for the
accountability and justice for past serious abuses and respect
for the rule of law.
Urge the Trump administration to make Zimbabwe's transition
a priority in the region and to work closely with the SADC to
press Zimbabwe's political leadership to ensure the political
neutrality of the security forces, impartially investigate and
appropriately prosecute alleged abuses by the military, and
provide for the timely and sufficient deployment of domestic
and SADC-led international observers to promote credible, free,
and fair elections in Zimbabwe.
We also urge the U.S. administration to provide direct
financial and technical support to the government that comes to
power through credible, free, and fair elections and that is
committed to strengthening democratic state institutions that
promote the rule of law, good governance, and human rights.
Mr. Chairman, my sincere thanks once again for the
opportunity to address this subcommittee. And I am happy to
respond to any questions that the committee might have. Thank
you.
[Mr. Mavhinga's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dewa Mavhinga
zimbabwe after the military takeover: prospects for
credible elections and human rights reforms
Introduction
Thank you, Chairman Flake, Ranking Member Booker, and other members
of this subcommittee for giving me the opportunity to testify on behalf
of Human Rights Watch at this hearing on Zimbabwe. I would like to
request that my statement in its entirety be submitted for the record.
My name is Dewa Mavhinga. I am Southern Africa director in the
Africa Division of Human Rights Watch where I lead, among other duties,
our human rights investigation work on Zimbabwe. I frequently travel to
Zimbabwe and last month I was in Harare when the military takeover
occurred on November 15, 2017. I have met with leaders of the main
political parties, private media, and key civil society groups to
assess human rights conditions since the military takeover and ahead of
national elections scheduled for 2018. A Zimbabwean national myself, I
maintain daily contact with local activists, and religious and business
leaders in the country who regularly update me on the situation there.
Mr. Chairman, my testimony will first lay out the human rights
situation in Zimbabwe since the military takeover of government
functions on November 15, and then highlight key recommendations to the
U.S. Government for action to press the new Zimbabwean Government to
ensure a rights-respecting environment leading to democratic, credible,
transparent and peaceful elections and political stability thereafter.
I. Current Human Rights Situation
The Military Takeover and Mugabe Ouster
Following the military takeover, Robert Mugabe resigned as
president on November 21 after 37 years of authoritarian rule marred by
countless serious human rights violations. On November 24, Mugabe was
replaced by his former deputy, Emmerson Mnangagwa, who has his own long
record of rights violations. In his inaugural speech, Mnangagwa
confirmed that elections will take place by August 2018 as scheduled,
but he did not address critical issues, notably the security sector,
media, and electoral reforms necessary to ensure credible, free, and
fair elections. There has been no indication that the Mnangagwa
administration intends to ensure the independence and enhance the
professionalism of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC).
As reports of abuses by the military since the takeover began to
emerge, the excitement and euphoria that many Zimbabweans greeted the
end of Mugabe's rule quickly fizzled out to be replaced by uneasiness
and uncertainty. Allegations are rife that between November 14 and 24,
the army arrested and detained a number of Mugabe's associates without
providing information about the arrests, or places and conditions of
detention. Since the military takeover, soldiers have not returned to
the barracks, but instead are now involved in policing the streets.
This is the same military that has been credibly implicated in rights
violations against the general population during the Mugabe years.
Mugabe openly encouraged partisanship of the military as a tool for
maintaining his grip on power. The new president, Mnangagwa, assumed
office with military backing, and appointed two army generals to
cabinet, Air Marshal Perence Shiri, and Maj. Gen. Sibusiso Moyo. This
raised concerns about Mnangagwa's independence from the armed forces,
suggests further entrenchment of the military in civilian affairs.
Legalization of Military Involvement in National Politics
On November 24, High Court Judge George Chiweshe ruled that the
military intervention that led to Mugabe's ouster was lawful under
Zimbabwe's constitution. Whatever the merits of the ruling, the
judgment could embolden the military to carry out further incursions in
Zimbabwe's political or electoral affairs in the future. The highly
partisan stance of Zimbabwe's military leadership, particularly without
meaningful security sector reforms, significantly reduce the chances
that free, fair and credible elections can be held.
The military has a long history of partisanship with the ruling
party, ZANU-PF, interfering in the nation's political and electoral
affairs in ways that adversely affected the ability of citizens to vote
freely. The partisanship of the security forces' leadership has
translated into abuses by these forces against civil society activists,
journalists, and members and supporters of the opposition political
party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC).
There is an urgent need, ahead of the elections, for Zimbabwe's
Constitutional Court to review Judge Chiweshe's ruling, and ensure that
members of the security forces observe strict political neutrality.
Failure to ensure a professional, independent and non-partisan role for
the security forces may make it difficult to deliver the elections
needed to put Zimbabwe on a democratic and rights-respecting track.
Zimbabwe's Re-engagement with the International Community
Following the military takeover, the leadership of the Southern
African Development Community (SADC) called on all stakeholders in
Zimbabwe to peacefully resolve the nation's political challenges. SADC
leaders also welcomed Mugabe's decision to resign, pledging to support
the 2018 elections.
While the African Union initially condemned the military takeover,
the regional body later welcomed Mugabe's resignation. The AU said it
recognized that the Zimbabwean people have expressed their will that
there should be a peaceful transfer of power and Mugabe's decision to
resign paved the way for a transition process, owned and led by the
people of Zimbabwe.
The AU and SADC have yet, however, to address the need for the new
administration to design a roadmap for democratic elections and the
political neutrality and non-interference of the security forces in
civilian and electoral affairs of the country.
In early December, the European Union ambassador to Zimbabwe,
Phillipe van Damme, said the EU will not provide significant new
funding to Zimbabwe until the country holds free, fair, and credible
elections.
Human Rights Watch is of the view that full re-engagement with the
Zimbabwean Government should be based on a firm commitment from the
interim administration in Harare that they will institute measures that
will ensure tangible and long overdue democratic and electoral reforms.
A key benchmark for increased U.S. Government engagement should be an
independent assessment of the environment in which the 2018 elections
are conducted and the transfer of power to an elected civilian
government. It is important now that the military leadership publicly
announce its commitment to credible, free and fair elections and that
it respects the outcome of the elections.
Accountability and Justice for Past Abuses
Mnangagwa's Government should be encouraged through public
statements to demonstrate commitment to accountability, justice for
human rights abuses, and respect for the rule of law in Zimbabwe. We
believe that Mnangagwa's recent calls to ``let bygones be bygones''
should not extend to serious human rights violations since 1980, many
of which implicate the military. The first post-independence overt
military involvement in Zimbabwe's political affairs was during the
period from 1982 to 1987 when the Government deployed a section of the
army, the Fifth Brigade, ostensibly to quell a military mutiny in the
Midlands and Matabeleland provinces. The Fifth Brigade carried out
widespread abuses including torture and unlawful killing of an
estimated 20,000 people. In 1988 the Government granted amnesty to all
those involved in human rights violations committed between 1982 and
1987.
The military has also interfered in the nation's political and
electoral affairs in ways that adversely affected the ability of
Zimbabwean citizens to vote freely, particularly during the 2008
elections when the army engaged in numerous systematic abuses including
political violence, torture, and arson targeting political opponents.
That violence resulted in the killing of more than 200 people, the
beating and torture of 5,000 more, and the displacement of about 36,000
people. ZANU-PF-affiliated military leaders who were implicated in the
violence and abuses were never held to account. The military's
historical record should not go unnoticed as Zimbabwe prepares for
another election.
In October 2008, soldiers killed more than 200 people and committed
other serious human rights abuses in Chiadzwa, a village in Marange
district, eastern Zimbabwe, and violently seized control of the
district's diamond fields. Human Rights Watch investigations showed
that between 2008 and 2014 the Government rotated army brigades into
Marange to ensure that different brigades had an opportunity to benefit
from the diamond trade. Soldiers harassed and threatened miners and
other civilians into forming syndicates so that the soldiers could
control diamond mining and trade in Marange.
Independence of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission
Currently, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission's secretariat - which
is charged with overseeing the 2018 election process - is dominated by
partisan state intelligence and military officials. Electoral reforms
should start with making the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission independent
and professional. The commission is compiling a new voters' register.
Unlike countries like Botswana or Mozambique that guarantee the
diaspora vote, there is no provision for Zimbabwean citizens in the
diaspora to vote from outside the country, unless in diplomatic
missions. In early December, the chairperson of the Zimbabwe Electoral
Commission, Justice Rita Makarau, resigned from her post without
stating reasons. Mnangagwa will replace Makarau with a former judge or
a person qualified to be a judge. A key part of Zimbabwe's election
credibility rests on ensuring that the chairperson is replaced by
someone known to be independent, impartial, non-partisan and with the
capacity to deliver a democratic election. If Makarau is replaced by a
person aligned to the military, and lacking in independence and
professionalism, a credible election will not be possible.
Restrictions on Rights to Freedom of Expression, Association, and
Assembly
The Mnangagwa Government should also take steps to amend or repeal
repressive laws such as the Access to Information and Protection of
Privacy Act (AIPPA), the Public Order and Security Act (POSA), and the
Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act. These laws were used under
Mugabe to severely curtail basic rights through vague defamation
clauses and draconian penalties. Partisan policing and prosecution has
worsened the impact of the repressive provisions in the AIPPA and POSA
laws. Failure to repeal or significantly revise these laws and to
develop mechanisms to address the partisan conduct of the police leaves
little chance of the full enjoyment of rights to freedom of association
and peaceful assembly prior to and during the coming elections.
II. Key Recommendations to the U.S. Government
Historically, the U.S. Government has shown a strong interest in
promoting respect for the rule of law, good governance and human rights
in Africa. The Trump administration has yet to demonstrate leadership
on human rights issues in Africa so it is more important than ever that
Congress promotes human rights as a core pillar of U.S. foreign policy.
To that end, Congress should support the people of Zimbabwe by calling
on the Mnangagwa Government to set and implement a clear roadmap for
democratic elections.
Specifically, Human Rights Watch urges Congress to:
1. Maintain existing U.S. policy toward Zimbabwe until the military
removes itself from politics and the 2018 elections are
legitimately assessed to be peaceful, transparent, free and
fair and that power is smoothly transmitted to the newly
elected government.
2. Press, through public statements and support to nongovernmental
organizations in Zimbabwe, for accountability and justice for
past serious abuses and respect for the rule of law.
3. Urge the Trump administration to make Zimbabwe's transition a
priority in the region and to work closely with SADC to press
Zimbabwe's political leadership to:
ensure the political neutrality of the security forces;
impartially investigate and appropriately prosecute alleged abuses
by military personnel;
provide for the timely and sufficient deployment of domestic and
SADC-led international election observers to Zimbabwe to
promote credible, free and fair elections, and maintain such
monitors for a suitable period after the elections to deter
violence and intimidation; and
ensure the repeal or amendment of repressive sections of the
Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act, the Public Order
and Security Act, and the Access to Information and Protection
of Privacy Act.
4. Withhold direct financial and technical support to the Government
until a government comes to power through credible, free and
fair elections that is committed to strengthening democratic
state institutions and promoting the rule of law, good
governance, and human rights.
Mr. Chairman, my sincere thanks once again for the opportunity to
address this subcommittee. I am happy to respond to any questions you
or your colleagues may have.
Senator Flake. Thank you. Thank you all for your testimony.
I will start with questioning. Mr. Godwin, Mnangagwa has
made a few changes that are an appeal to populism I guess. He
has gotten rid of the big motorcade that the president traveled
around in. Will this work? Is he a charismatic leader, and how
will the celebrations in the streets--should they be
interpreted as we are glad that Mugabe is going or we are glad
Mnangagwa is coming back?
Mr. Godwin. I think the great tragedy of the jubilation
that you saw, as Tendai Biti was referring to, not just in
Harare and other places in Zimbabwe, but in cities around the
world where there is a considerable Zimbabwean diaspora, is
that what those celebrations showed primarily or almost
exclusively was a huge relief that Mugabe had gone after 37
years, that you had this kind of cold hand of stasis on the
nation. It had no other leader. I felt like it was almost
coming out of some kind of Stockholm syndrome where you had
been chained to the radiator in the basement and everybody just
came out into the light blinking and were enormously relieved.
And I felt bad at the time for being curmudgeonly and
saying this is going to be misinterpreted as a vote of
confidence in Mnangagwa. People were jumping on the tanks and
saying ``this is great.'' And the iconography of it all--
outsiders could be forgiven for interpreting it as though it
had been a people's revolution. And it was not. I mean, the
people were bystanders. We were spectators. People showed their
huge relief at Mugabe's departure. But these were not
celebrations in favor of Mnangagwa or even the army, although
people in the short term were grateful that the army had been
the crowbar that got Mugabe out. And these messages got mixed
in those very early days. And I think to some extent we were
all caught up in the relief of the moment when you have been
under one authoritarian figure for that long.
And it is my enormous regret now that we did not hold back
and for the regional institutions, in particular for the AU and
for SADC and for South Africa and for the international
community to withhold any kind of recognition and whatever till
some of the things we have all been talking about were achieved
because that was our moment of greatest leverage.
Now in many respects--I mean, I cop to being pessimistic
here--it is my view that we have gone back to the status quo
ante.
Now, it is possible that Mnangagwa, who, if I am not
mistaken, on at least two occasions was unable to win his own
constituency, was not a charismatic leader, was a back-room
person, kept a very low profile. But we are already seeing him
wrap himself in the regalia of the personality cult. We were
just looking earlier at the new fabric that is being produced
with his image on it and giving himself doctorates and one
thing and another. And you see people rushing to where power
is. So I do not think that we can hope that somehow in his lack
of charisma originally, that there will be some room for
maneuver there. I doubt it.
My problem with all of this is that if you look at the
history of southern Africa, in every single country in southern
Africa that has fought an anti-colonial liberation war where
that liberation party then comes into power, not one single one
of those parties has ever lost power. So you have still got
FRELIMO in Mozambique, the MPLA in Angola, SWAPO in Namibia,
ANC in South Africa, and Zanu-PF in Zimbabwe. And having been
in the liberation war has such a strong validation for a
political party that it is extremely difficult for them to be
eased aside in a general democratic way, a bit like Castro in
Cuba or something. Opposition parties find it very difficult to
get that same validity. I think that you will see very quickly
that Mnangagwa will secure his position both as a head of Zanu-
PF and as president of the country.
Senator Flake. Thank you.
Mr. Biti, Zimbabwe's economic recovery will require
resolving about a $10 billion debt. When should the
international community restart debt relief discussions and the
lending process? What are the benchmarks? When should this
happen?
Mr. Biti. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think on one of the issues that the country needs to
address is self-evidently the issue of a collapsed economy, an
economy in the respect of which 95 percent of our people are
not employed, an economy in the respect of which since 2012 we
have been on a downward spiral, an economy in the respect of
which our current account is totally skewered, our capital
account is totally skewered, and there is no livelihoods for
people. People are suffering. So the economy needs to be
addressed and addressed as a matter of urgency.
But it is quite clear that one of the major stumbling
blocks around the economy is the issue, number one, of domestic
debt. We have a crippling domestic debt and a budget deficit
that is, in fact, over 15 percent of total expenditure. They
propose to reduce that to a mere 4 percent, but this is going
to be a challenge.
There is no question that we have to walk the talk as a
country. There is no question that the benchmark key or the key
precondition is how we conduct the 2018 election. The 2018
election is going to be a major test on whether or not we can
move away from the past 37 years of corruption, capture, and
coercion into a new order, into a new Zimbabwe.
So a lot will depend on the next election. If we are able
to deliver as a country a free, fair, legitimate election in
the respect of which everyone accepts the results thereof and
the provisions of the constitution spelled out in section 2 of
our constitution, the founding values of the constitution that
deal with power transfer are respected and there is genuine
power transfer in Zimbabwe, then quite clearly there is an
obligation on the international community to assist us in
resolving particularly the debt question where we have to
engage the World Bank, the IMF, the African Development Bank,
and the Paris Club of lenders.
Senator Flake. Thank you.
Senator Booker?
Senator Booker. So I just have to say that I am not--you
know, the testimony that you all prepared and the testimony
that you all gave does not make me that optimistic about the
2018 elections. Mr. Biti, you said in your testimony, in your
oral testimony, even just the military--still their presence in
the streets right now, that they have not demilitarized in the
streets is somewhat concerning to me. The massive amounts of
corruption that I have read about and that you all have written
about and spoken about, the perversion of the mining industry
that is going on right now, the self-dealing, the protectionism
of a government that may have changed its principal figure but
really has not changed the players, many of them who are under
United States sanction already.
And I guess my frustration with this is I do not believe we
have an administration through the State Department focused on
not to mention Zimbabwe, but other crises in Africa from the
DRC to South Sudan. I just do not believe our administration is
prioritizing this amidst a true crisis.
And I guess there is obviously an appeal to keep our
sanction regime in place. The Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic
Recovery Act passed in 2001 to keep it in place. But I am just
not feeling if that is enough in terms of trying to create--do
everything we can as the United States of America and, as Mr.
Biti told me, this is one of the guiding light democracies--
that we are really engaging enough.
And I guess what I am looking for from the panelists--and
really I benefit from having a chairman of this committee who
is very engaged, very focused. I guess what I am hoping is that
you might inform us on additional actions we could be taking to
help bring about the long list of reforms. Mr. Biti, you laid
out the Congressional Research Service, which we had laid out.
I mean, everybody is laying out what needs to happen and the
kind of reforms, economic reforms, military reforms,
constitutional reforms, election reforms. I mean, I am seeing
what the pathway is and the benchmarks, but I am not going to
leave here today feeling that confident that this is something
that we are going to be able to achieve given what is going on.
Now, you all have been incredibly generous to come to the
United States, to come here changing some significant plans to
come here. But I wonder if you could be more directive to a
junior Senator in the United States of America that if you were
where we were, what would you be pushing the State Department
to do, what would be you using our position to really change
what--I am sorry--I just do not have confidence that 2018 is
going to bring about the kind of reforms. I do not have
confidence that the very people that committed atrocities are
going to somehow create a process by which there can be
accountability for those atrocities.
And I worry about the people of Zimbabwe right now who are
suffering an economy that is in very bad shape, unemployment
rates that are extraordinarily high. This is a humanitarian
crisis going on, and really it is a crisis stimulated by a
governance crisis because Zimbabwe is a country of great
wealth, great competitive advantage, great opportunities. And
the block towards the kind of reforms that could have Zimbabwe
thriving, a nation that used to be one of the region's bread
baskets--I mean, there is so much greatness in Zimbabwe. But I
really see that the obstacle is governance.
So I guess this is just a plea to the panelists. Maybe you
can go one at a time, and my time will be expired. But to give
me some direction, to give this committee of committed
bipartisan folks--the people you saw from Senator Young,
obviously Senator Flake, Senator Coons feel a passionate love
of Zimbabwe and a concern for the people. I would love it if
maybe we could just one at a time to give me some direction
over this next year to maybe ramp up American influence to
bring about more robust democratic institutions. Maybe we can
start Mr. Mavhinga.
Mr. Mavhinga. Thank you so much.
For us at Human Rights Watch, the key really is to
acknowledge that what we have now is not the normal, is not
something that should be accepted in the sense of having the
military on the streets, and therefore, the U.S. administration
could strongly push the Southern African Development Community
and the African Union and other players to insist on a road map
for democratic elections and to then say, as my colleagues have
said, that a key benchmark really to review relations is an
independent assessment of the environment in which the 2018
elections are held. And this includes domestic and
international observers to elections having full access to the
country, to all parts of the country without interference. And
this would also include ensuring that watching closely the
replacement of the chairperson of the Zimbabwe Electoral
Commission, who has just resigned--that person who replaces is
someone who is known to be independent, impartial, nonpartisan,
and with the capacity to deliver a democratic election. So a
strong focus on a democratic election ahead of every engagement
would be key moving forward. Thank you.
Senator Booker. Thank you.
And I just want to say I did not mean my criticism was of
the State Department. We had a wonderful witness, Ms. Sullivan,
who was here before--dedicated people in the State Department
who have been focused on this issue. I really mean
administrative prioritization in terms of reflected in their
budget, reflected in many of the vacancies that we are seeing
around Africa. I am sorry, Mr. Biti. I just want to make sure
that my comments were not misinterpreted to the extraordinary
public servant we had in the first panel.
Mr. Biti? And at some point, Mr. Biti, in your response
could you say my name again because the way you say Booker, it
is just really--[Laughter.]
Senator Booker. I can get over how wonderful that is. I
need to record that.
Senator Flake. That is what I am calling him.
Mr. Biti. Well, look, I think your conclusions might lead
to the position of pessimism. But we as Zimbabweans are hopeful
that we will go to destination a new Zimbabwe.
Zimbabwe is not the first country that is difficult, that
the international community has had to deal with and is dealing
with. You have got hopeless places like Somalia, like South
Sudan, Eritrea, the Democratic Republic of Congo. But when you
look at Zimbabwe, there are certain drivers of change. We are
in a genuine transition that is not just restricted or limited
to the fact that a President Mugabe is normal. There are
certain drivers of change that make genuine transformation
inevitable, whether it is next year or it is 5 years from now.
There are genuine drivers of change.
Number one is the economy. People are suffering. People are
excluded. People are de-legitimized. It cannot go on as the
status quo right now. It cannot be business as usual where you
have 95 percent of your people unemployed, where you have 82
percent of your people surviving on less than U.S. 35 cents a
day. Something has to give. So the new authorities and every
one of us know that there must be change and huge change.
The military intervention in November has created huge
demand, huge expectations, and the honeymoon period has been
very short. People want delivery. People want action. So
everyone in Zimbabwe, the civic society, the opposition, and
the new authorities--they all understand that we have to
deliver something on the table for suffering in Zimbabwe. That
is a driver of change.
Number two is the youth. 69 percent of our people are below
the age of 35. We are producing about 500,000 graduates every
year, but we cannot give them jobs. By 2045, our population
would have doubled in Zimbabwe. The economy is not growing
sufficiently to absorb the population bulge. So that one is a
driver of change.
You have an opposition that is reorganizing that is coming
us together. You have seen us here as a team. That is an
important driver of change.
So I have absolutely no doubt in my mind that there will be
some change. The people that came out in the streets of
Zimbabwe, including in places like New York here, like South
Africa, and Cape Town. They were sending a message they were
ready for change. They are demanding change. And the majority
of people who are in those marches were millennials, young
people who want genuine transformation in their country.
So the United States Congress must continue to do what it
has done very well in the past: number one, interface with our
people. The United States remains the biggest donor, the
biggest supplier of overseas development assistance in
Zimbabwe. You are very active in our health sector, for
instance. You used to call it humanitarian plus, plus. That
support must continue because it is interfacing with our
people.
The support for the democratic processes, which you have
been known for for so many years, must continue. Engagement
with our government on these key issues we have discussed is
very key. I think everyone must know that there is a reward for
good behavior. There is a reward for constitutionalism. There
is a reward for international engagement.
So right now is a great opportunity for interfacing, for
saying to Zimbabwe, you have a great opportunity. Do not miss
this opportunity. Notwithstanding that it might appear so
gloomy, it might appear so desperately pessimistic, the bottom
line is that we have got an opportunity and we do not intend to
squander this opportunity.
Senator Booker. Thank you, Mr. Biti, and thank you for your
just courage in general as part of the opposition.
Mr. Godwin, will you take me home?
Mr. Godwin. I completely understand your frustration, and
we share it too. This has gone on for an awfully long time. We
have lost a whole generation to this situation. And sometimes I
think we are stuck in this sterile binary. And Zimbabweans are
a very hopeful people and we are easy to peddle hope to. We
have low expectations and they are often dashed.
Sometimes one is tempted to indulge in a period of blue-sky
thinking to say we have had these sanctions, these
individualized sanctions in place for however long, and they
have made no effect whatsoever. In fact, what they have done to
some extent, critics will say, is provided Zanu-PF with a very
convenient excuse. For every time the economy is bad, they say,
oh, it is sanctions, it is sanctions, it is not us, blame
America, blame the EU, whatever. And it shields them from the
consequences of their own mismanagement.
Bear in mind that Zimbabwe, as far as I understand it, is
if not the, one of the fastest shrinking economies in the
history of peacetime failure of economies. You have to look far
and wide to find a self-inflicted failed state spiral that does
not involve war. It is purely incompetence and corruption and
patronage.
On that subject, there are two other things. And I am not
necessarily recommending these, but if one is casting around
for alternatives because clearly what we have been doing has
not been working, one of the things to do is to do what they
did in Lancaster House, which is that you bring together a huge
pot of money. You basically put all the things that you would--
and it is not necessarily new money, but you bring the
international community together, all the donors, all the
bilateral aid, et cetera, et cetera. And you hold this thing
out and you coordinate it, and you say if you do these certain
things, if you meet these certain benchmarks, whatever, we will
unlock this thing. And they look at this glittering pile of
goodies and they think, my God, you know, everybody gets
excited about it, whatever. And you turn it around. At the same
time as you have that carrot, you have a stick where you say
and if you do not, then we are going to ratchet things up, and
you kind of just basically make it even starker--their
alternatives.
I think that the other thing--and I am sort of almost even
hesitant to even mention this--is that you flip the sanctions
that you have got now. I mean, I am not sure technically if it
would be called sort of reverse sunset clause where you say, I
will tell you what we will do. You have got this new
government, whatever. We will give you the benefit of the doubt
for 6 months or say until the next elections. We are going to
drop all sanctions and whatever, but they will automatically go
back on if you do not meet these benchmarks, the benchmarks
that we have all been talking about, the ones that there is
pretty wide agreement on in civic society. And that way you
take away the excuse of sanctions and whatever. You put it back
and you flip it. That would be a way to prioritize the carrot
over the stick and mix it up and see if it works. I mean, my
personal opinion is I do not think it would, but sometimes that
can be unlocked.
My worry with Zimbabwe is that in the way that it has
changed and the way this whole calculation has changed is that
Zimbabweans are a very, very--they have a lot of initiative.
They are able to make a plan. They are enormously adaptable.
And there are so many of the best Zimbabweans fleeing the
country all the time into the diaspora. A lot of the leadership
echelon, a lot of people who should be at home doing stuff are
going away. And what they do ironically is they assist Zimbabwe
in surviving because the country exists on their remittances.
Zimbabwe has a huge remittance economy. It is like the
Philippines or Pakistan or Egypt. And the more people who go
out, the more that they actually send money back and they keep
the government going.
So, I mean, those are some of the thoughts I think that one
might entertain. I mean, Lancaster House--they did it in a
peace conference. They pulled everybody together and said what
should we do. And that would be one way to look at it.
Senator Booker. Thank you very much, sir.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Flake. Thank you.
I have a few more questions if that is okay.
Senator Booker. Yes, please.
Senator Flake. Mr. Godwin, you had quite a unique
perspective during the 1980s, during the Matabeleland massacre.
As a lawyer at that time, what do you suppose the response will
be for those who want to hold people accountable? What are we
likely to hear from the president who was then the chief of
intelligence at that point? What are we likely to hear?
Mr. Godwin. What I am always astonished by--and I was a
young reporter down there on the ground when that happened. It
was the first big story of mine. And for me the Matabeleland
massacres were Zanu-PF's original sin. When I saw what that was
and what it consisted of, it was something where--I, along with
so many people, had gone back to Zimbabwe after 1980, and this
was going to be this big, new progressive experiment--and I
never recovered from it, and I do not think the country ever
fully recovered from it. I think we lost our moral core and we
lost the whole sort of hopeful thing that everybody had up
until that point.
What I am consistently surprised and amazed by is actually
how generous of spirit the victims and the families of the
victims are. In my view--and I do not speak for these people.
These people have their own voices. In talking to them, my
takeaway is that they are incredibly reasonable. And what they
really want is acknowledgement. They want acknowledgement of
what has happened. They want an inquiry. They want this thing
to not be swept under the carpet all the time. And for a
government, for any government, it is actually a concession you
can make that does not cost you that much. I mean, now that it
is actually really quite a long time ago--they have gone a
little bit--once, you know, they said a ``moment of madness.''
Well, there is a slight problem with it being a ``moment of
madness,'' when it took 4 years, 5 years, depending on how you
calculate it. So it was not a moment of madness.
And the other problem is that two of the people who were
most intimately involved in the Matabeleland massacres are now
more senior than ever before. So in a sense the more direct
perpetrators, the most direct perpetrators, especially Perrance
Shiri, who commanded the troops in the field who were doing
this, is now in the cabinet. So, in a perfect world, I think
that really has to be dealt with, and the country cannot move
on really. The culture of impunity we were talking about
before--it really starts with the Matabeleland massacres, and
then it goes on through all these other things.
Zanu-PF has been rewarded. Every time it has used violence
for political ends, it has worked. If you just look at it on a
cause-and-effect basis, it has worked for them. And they have
not had to pay a price for it. And if that goes on, it becomes
completely irrational for them to stop. Why would they stop? It
works every time.
Senator Flake. Thank you.
Mr. Biti, it was mentioned in your testimony and others
that you need the diaspora to be able to vote, and that is part
of the constitution right now. And there are about 4 million
Zimbabweans living abroad, which would represent a sizeable
chunk if they were able to vote. How much resistance do you
think you will get from the government to make good on the
constitutional protections there? Because one would assume that
a good chunk of those outside of the country might see things
differently than the ruling party.
Mr. Biti. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The constitution is very clear in section 67 that every
citizen has a right to participate in the political affairs of
one's own country, and they have got the right to make a
political decision, including the right to vote. This provision
in the constitution we took from the South African constitution
where there is a judgment that says the diaspora has a right to
vote. So we are insisting that we cannot disenfranchise the
millions of Zimbabweans that are in the diaspora.
In the past, there has been serious resistance by the
government, by the authorities against the enfranchising people
in the diaspora. The major argument and the major understated
premise has been that people in the diaspora are deemed to be
opposition, but that is neither here nor there. We have to
empower and enfranchise Zimbabweans abroad.
There have also been excuses around the costs associated
with this exercise. But if you look at the models used by other
African countries, including South Africa, including
Mozambique, for instance, to name two examples, voting centers
are simply set up at embassies. So the citizen would have to
travel. In the case of the United States of America, one
travels to Washington, D.C. One could travel to New York. So
logistics cannot be an excuse for denying the right of people
to vote.
But what is key in all the benchmarks we have spoken of,
all the reforms we have spoken of--it is important that they
are time-bound. It is important that they are timelined. It is
important that these reforms are smart so that they are
meaningful and substantive.
And it is important that the United States engages, that
there is incentive and reward for any effort towards good
behavior. But it is also important to speak out against
transgressions and noncompliance.
And I rested my point that we are at a critical juncture
where important decisions can be made for our country. And
indeed, it will be a very sad day if the excitement, the joy,
the jubilation, the exhilaration that we saw on the 18th of
November, 2017 is a hijacked one, is a captured one, is a lost
one. We have a duty as Zimbabwean leaders to ensure that we
will fulfill the expectation that was expressed in the streets
on the 18th of November 2017.
Senator Flake. Thank you.
Mr. Mavhinga, how free is the media now in Zimbabwe, I
should say prior to the coup and now after what changes have
been promised, if any? What needs to happen with regard to a
free and independent media?
Mr. Mavhinga. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
When the military takeover occurred on November 15, the day
before on November 14, Human Rights Watch was in Harare to
speak out on the abuses around the media, particularly police
abuses. The arrests of a number of journalists, police
harassment, detentions of journalists was rife.
Since the military takeover, the soldiers have particularly
focused on what they call cybersecurity threats and say that
social media now constitutes the highest national security
threat to the authorities in Zimbabwe. So there is a danger now
of shrinking space, and the soldiers have issued a number of
warnings to those that are on social media and they have been
increasing attacks on social media from those that are
supportive of the authorities in Zimbabwe.
What needs to happen now to open up the space for the media
is to ensure that there are critical reforms, a repeal or
amendment as appropriate of such laws as the Public Order and
Security Act, the Access to Information and Protection of
Privacy Act, and also to ensure that policing is impartial, is
independent, is professional because partisan policing was also
part of one of the reasons why there was this targeting of
members of the media.
One of the activists who disappeared in March 2015, Itai
Dzamara, was himself a freelance journalist. Recently also an
American citizen, Martha O'Donovan, was picked up and locked up
and charged with seeking to subvert a constitutional government
simply because of a Tweet. So this kind of trajectory has not
gone away because the infrastructure, in terms of the laws in
place, remain. So there is an urgent need as we prepare for
2018 elections to look at legislative reforms that would open
up the media space and ensure that there is a full
implementation of the 2013 constitution which guarantees media
freedoms but which are not enjoyed by citizens because of the
laws that exist that are not in line with the 2013
constitution.
Thank you.
Senator Flake. Thank you.
Do you have any further questions, Senator Booker?
Senator Booker. No, sir. Just hoping that we can keep the
lines of communications open as things are unfolding especially
into the coming year.
Senator Flake. Well, thank you. I want to say thanks to all
of the panelists again for rearranging your schedule and travel
times. It is very much appreciated, and we will certainly call
on you again, if we can, in terms of assistance to us as we
formulate policy where we can be helpful.
I appreciate the interest in this subcommittee. I
appreciate the partnership that we have. As Senator Booker
said, this is not a partisan issue, our response to Zimbabwe
and our hope that we can have a brighter and more democratic
future.
So thank you. And with the thanks of the committee, this
hearing stands adjourned.
I should mention the hearing record will remain open until
tomorrow. If you have any responses to give for members, if you
could do it so promptly, we would appreciate it. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 3:48 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted to
Hon. Stephanie Sullivan by Senator Bob Corker
Question 1. Zimbabwe has had a long political, security, and
economic relationship with North Korea. Please describe the parameters
of that relationship and its role today.
Answer. We understand that Zimbabwe maintains longstanding
political and trade relations with the DPRK, dating back to the days of
Zimbabwe's liberation struggle. Nevertheless, Zimbabwe has been
cooperative with U.N. Security Council Resolutions on the DPRK and has
signaled its intention to fulfill those resolutions in their entirety.
The Department stands ready to discuss specifics on DPRK-Zimbabwe
relations in greater detail in a classified setting.
Question 2. How will the U.S. address the North Korea-Zimbabwe
bilateral relationship as it makes policy decisions relative to the
changes in government in Zimbabwe?
Answer. We continue to take action multilaterally and unilaterally
to disrupt funding and resources the North Korean regime uses to
support its unlawful nuclear and ballistic missile programs. The State
Department is pressing countries around the world, including Zimbabwe,
for action to pressure the DPRK politically, diplomatically, and
economically. We are seeing unprecedented levels of cooperation from
the international community resulting in stronger sanctions, increased
diplomatic isolation of North Korea, expulsion of North Korean workers
and diplomats, and cutting DPRK trade relationships.
Question 3. What expectations will there be of the Government of
Zimbabwe prior to any positive U.S. diplomatic actions?
Answer. U.S. engagement with President Mnangagwa's administration
must be based on demonstrated behavior, not rhetorical intentions. The
Zimbabwean Government should enact overdue political and economic
reforms to achieve a more stable, prosperous, and democratic future for
the people of Zimbabwe.
Our policy of re-engagement will focus on constitutional democracy,
free and fair elections, respect for human rights and the rule of law,
improved trade and investment climate, macroeconomic reform, and
professionalization of state-run media. Whatever short-term
arrangements the Government may establish, the path forward must lead
to free, fair, and inclusive elections, in which the people of Zimbabwe
choose their own leaders.
Question 4. The role of freedom of the press as an important pillar
of democratic governance has been a distant component of Zimbabwe's
recent leadership. The necessity of an independent judiciary is another
pillar of effective, inclusive and impartial governance. What
opportunities does the U.S. have to help or continue to build the
capacity of the free press?
Answer. The United States supports the protection of all
fundamental freedoms, such as freedom of expression, including for
members of the press. Journalists, social media activists, human rights
defenders, and civil society must be able to operate freely, without
government censorship, intimidation, or interference, and all parties
should have equal access to use of state media.
One way the Zimbabwean Government can encourage media freedom is
through reviewing and aligning laws to the 2013 Constitution, including
by granting licenses to independent broadcast and print media outlets.
Also, the Government can repeal or significantly reform laws and draft
legislation that restrict media freedoms, including the Public Order
and Security Act , the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy
Act, and the draft Computer Crime and Cyber Crime Bill.
Immediately after the change in government, we were pleased to
engage Zimbabwe's state-run media, featuring two in-depth interviews
with Ambassador Thomas--something that would not have happened under
Mugabe's rule. Given this window, we are exploring opportunities to
build the professionalism and integrity of state-run media.
Question 5. What role has [Broadcasting Board of Governors/Voice
of America] BBG/VOA played in the past and in recent weeks? Is the BBG/
VOA programming seen as of good value and will it be sustained?
Answer. BBG/VOA extensively covered the historic series of events
in Zimbabwe that led to the end of Mugabe's rule. VOA expanded its
programming to capture live broadcasts of ZANU-PF's expulsion of Robert
and Grace Mugabe and Mnangagwa's return to Zimbabwe. The recent turn of
events dramatically increased VOA's website traffic and activity on its
social media platforms. VOA consistently receives positive feedback
from its listeners for its objective and independent reporting.
Question 6. What opportunity is there for the U.S. to improve
institutional elements or support components in the rule of law sector
that would strengthen a more independent judiciary? Is it a priority at
this time? If not, when would it be?
Answer. We have long called for and continue to call for respect
for the rule of law as a principle for our re-engagement with the
Zimbabwean Government. This includes holding the state accountable for
addressing human rights violations, to include excessive use of force
by police, abductions, and torture of activists. An independent
judiciary that ends impunity for all politically connected persons, of
any party or political persuasion, from court rulings is a vital
component to a strong rule of law. The United States will also continue
to encourage a fully operational and independent Zimbabwe Human Rights
Commission and National Peace and Reconciliation Commission, in line
with the 2013 Constitution and enabling the fulfilment of their
mandates.
Question 7. What resources are available and what mechanisms exist
to implement assistance in furthering good governance in Zimbabwe?
Answer. The U.S. Department of State and USAID have several funding
mechanisms for interventions to strengthen good governance around the
globe. The United States cannot fund Government of Zimbabwe
institutions directly, but can work through a range of national and
international non-governmental organizations to provide targeted,
critical support in the lead up to and following elections, and to
compel the Government of Zimbabwe to act justly and transparently as
its new institutions take up their work.
Question 8. Humanitarian assistance and investments in health have
been a significant part of U.S. engagement in recent years. What
resources might be made available if the political situation evolves
positively in Zimbabwe?
Answer. USAID has a small Feed the Future crops and livestock
program that enables smallholder farmers to treat farming as a
business. Agricultural commercialization among these farmers for FY
2017 had sales for livestock and crops of over $1.8 million and $5.99
million, respectively.
The Mission's entrepreneurship training program trained 22,000
youth and young women over the last two years, who earned $31 million.
The Feed the Future program has been scaled back, and the
entrepreneurship program is coming to an end, but if the situation
evolves positively in Zimbabwe, the Mission could scale up these
programs and capitalize on successes to date.
Question 9. How important is Zimbabwe to the U.S. relative to our
interests in the sub-region of southern Africa?
Answer. U.S. interests in Zimbabwe have existed since before the
country's independence in 1980. We believe strongly that a stable
Zimbabwe means stability for all of southern Africa. We remain
committed to the well-being of Zimbabweans through our health, food
security, anti-trafficking, and democracy and governance programs.
Question 10. Economics appears to be the most pressing component of
the Government of Zimbabwe's needs and while often ignored in the past,
to the detriment of the country and the large majority of its
population, it is the key element of international leverage. How will
the U.S. approach those international financial efforts, over which it
has some influence, to relieve Zimbabwe's Government of any of the
economic burden they have created for themselves?
Answer. The United States is concerned that Zimbabwe's economy is
experiencing stagnant growth, declining per capita incomes, and rising
government spending financed by central bank borrowing and debt
issuance, which crowds out the private sector and undermines the
banking sector.
We have urged the Zimbabwean Government to take steps, including
revising the indigenization policy, improving the investment climate
for foreign and domestic investors, addressing the Government's
unsustainable wage bill, and improving its expenditure controls.
We continue to oppose any new international financial institution
(IFI) lending to Zimbabwe, unless it addresses the basic human needs of
the poor. We also oppose any use of IFI resources to clear Zimbabwe's
remaining IFI arrears--or to pay back an external creditor. The U.S.
position is informed by both policy and legislation. Looking ahead, our
approach will be guided by the actions of the Mnangagwa Government and
consultation with Congress and non-governmental stakeholders. Genuine
political and economic reforms would enable the United States to
support the use of IFI resources and possible debt relief for Zimbabwe.
Question 11. What criteria will be used by the USG to determine
what if any influence it will bring to bear on economic relief or other
financial burden for Zimbabwe?
Answer. We must see meaningful political and economic reforms
before we can support new lending by international financial
institutions. We have urged the Zimbabwean Government to take steps,
including revising the indigenization policy, improving the investment
climate for foreign and domestic investors, addressing the Government's
unsustainable wage bill, and improving its expenditure controls.
Zimbabwe's economy is in the hands of Zimbabweans. Transparent and
predictable pro-growth policies are essential to attracting business
and investors. We will review our policies in response to actions by
the Government.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted to
Hon. Stephanie Sullivan by Senator Jeff Flake
Question 1. Martha O'Donovan is an American citizen who was
arrested in Zimbabwe in early November and charged with "undermining
the authority of or insulting the president" because of some tweets the
Mugabe regime accused her of posting. A handful of cases involving
baseless charges against political opponents to the Mugabe regime have
been dropped since President Mnangagwa was sworn in. However, Ms.
O'Donovan's remains unresolved.
What is your understanding of why the charges against Ms. O'Donovan
have not yet been dropped? How has the change of leadership in
Zimbabwe impacted the State Department's efforts to help Ms.
O'Donovan?
Answer. We are aware of the case of the U.S. citizen and are
providing consular assistance at her request. Due to privacy
considerations, we cannot go into detail.
When U.S. citizens are detained abroad, U.S. Embassy officials seek
to aid them with all appropriate consular assistance.
As for the other cases mentioned, we are pleased to see the charges
dropped. We consider that to have been a small but positive step in the
right direction and a possible indication of the new government's
approach to such matters. We hope that approach may be replicated in
similar cases.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted to
Hon. Stephanie Sullivan by Senator Cory A. Booker
Question 1. Martha O`Donovan, a U.S. citizen and New Jersey
resident, was detained on November 3, 2017 for allegedly sending a
Tweet in which she called former Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe ``a
selfish & sick man,'' an assertion which she denies. According to
reports, she has been charged with subversion and attempting to
overthrow the government, a crime which carries a sentence of up to 20
years in prison. At the time, O`Donovan was working for Magamba TV,
which describes itself as ``Zimbabwe's leading producer of cutting
edge, political satire and comedy shows.' Her detention and prosecution
raise serious questions over Zimbabwe's commitment to freedom of
expression.
Notably High Court Judge Clement Phiri said there was ``patent
absence of facts'' in the state's case against her when he released her
on bail last month. In addition, Amnesty International has called for
the charges against O`Donovan to be dropped.
What steps has the U.S. Embassy in Harare taken to provide consular
assistance to Ms. O`Donovan and secure her release?
Answer. We are aware of the case of the U.S. citizen and are
providing consular assistance at her request. Due to privacy
considerations, we cannot go into the details of our assistance.
It is our policy to urge the Government of Zimbabwe to ensure the
protection of human rights and fundamentals freedoms, including the
freedom of expression, which is enshrined in the country's 2013
constitution.
Question 2. Has the embassy or State Department seen new
opportunities to secure her freedom since the installation of President
Mnangagwa?
Answer. We are aware of this case and are providing all appropriate
consular assistance.
Question 3. We have seen through the Kenyan and Liberian elections
that violence and disruption can ensue, particularly when there are
allegations of irregularities in the electronic systems and the
electoral commission lacks appropriate capabilities. What are the State
Department or USAID's plans to help Zimbabwe ensure that elections will
be free, fair, and credible?
Answer. We are working closely with Zimbabwean civil society and
our like-minded partners in Harare and in our respective capitals to
encourage the Zimbabwean government to undertake reforms, including
laying the groundwork for free, fair, and credible elections. Should
the Government of Zimbabwe take real steps to implement electoral
reforms, we will be able to do more. The steps we need to see from the
Government of Zimbabwe include: ensuring the independence of the
Zimbabwe Electoral Commission; allowing all eligible citizens the
opportunity to register and vote; discontinuing state sponsored
violence; allowing international observers; and guaranteeing that all
political parties have equal opportunities to campaign, including
access to state media. We will continue to engage with all of
Zimbabwe's political actors, including the opposition, recognizing that
opposition parties and leaders have suffered a range of abuses over
many years at the hands of the ruling party that retains power. Free,
fair, and inclusive elections should allow the people of Zimbabwe to
choose their own leaders freely. We will continue to support Zimbabwe's
transition to democracy.
Question 4. Do you believe that State and USAID have the resources
to be able to assist Zimbabwe with their elections?
Answer. Our programs are flexibly designed to respond to
opportunities and minimize risks. USAID's Democracy, Rights and
Governance Office is providing funding to civil society for election-
related programs. For example, USAID-funded civil society groups are
conducting effective outreach that has encouraged tens of thousands of
citizens to register to vote.
Question 5. What is the State Department prepared to do if it finds
that the elections in Zimbabwe were not fair, peaceful or credible?
Answer. At this point, we do not want to pre-judge an outcome. We
would like to offer President Mnangagwa and his government an
opportunity to implement political reforms, including a credible
electoral process. However, some recent actions have caused us concern,
such as a prominent chief's pledge that all traditional leaders will
support the ruling party and a presidential advisor's declaration that
the military will campaign for the ruling party. Moreover, the ruling
party's new commissar was involved in state-sponsored violence against
the opposition during the 2008 elections. These circumstances place us
under no illusion of how challenging it will be for Zimbabwe to conduct
task free and fair elections.
The future of Zimbabwe must be determined and established by the
people of Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwean government should enact overdue
political and economic reforms to achieve a more stable, prosperous,
and democratic future for the people of Zimbabwe. We will not be able
to change the nature of our engagement without an electoral process,
including voter registration, which is credible and transparent, and
consistent with Zimbabwe's regional commitments under the SADC
Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections.Whatever
short-term arrangements the government may establish, the path forward
must lead to free, fair, and inclusive elections, in which the people
of Zimbabwe choose their own leaders. We will continue to support
Zimbabwe's transition to democracy.
Question 6. The Kenyan and Liberian election also demonstrated the
frustration that countries can experience with international observer
missions. What are the lessons learned from those experiences and how
are those lessons going to be incorporated into future election
observation missions?
Answer 6. Information sharing and coordination among election
observation missions on electoral and security preparations enabled
international observer teams collectively to observe more places around
the country, limiting duplication and gaps as much as possible. Early
preparations, regular meetings of various missions, and an integrated
command center were also key to successful observation efforts. Key
lessons learned include the importance of Mission Front Office
leadership, centralized observation mission planning, practical
scenario-based training for observers on processes and equipment, and
planning for unusual election scenarios, such as Kenya's repeat
election and Liberia's delayed runoff election. Taking into
consideration these best practices would benefit future observation
missions.
Question 7. In Zimbabwe, one of the most highly mine-impacted
countries in the world, the Conventional Weapons Destruction (CWD)
program supports landmine clearance, victim assistance and risk
education on the border with Mozambique, where hundreds of communities
have lived with the legacy of more than 1.6 million mines for over
three decades. These mines continue to kill and maim people and
livestock, and block access to houses, schools, health clinics,
farmland and water sources, affecting hundreds of thousands of people
along the border.
The State Department-funded demining program in Zimbabwe is one of
the only assistance programs in the country, and employs over 400
people from border communities to work clearing minefields. The program
provides uncontroversial assistance to the people of Zimbabwe that
cannot be subverted by the government. However, the FY 18 Congressional
Budget Justification reduces funding to $1 million, and would result in
a sizeable reduction in the workforce to the extent that the program
will likely no longer be viable.
How would you characterize the effectiveness of U.S. foreign
assistance with regard to Zimbabwean landmine clearance?
Answer. Since 1998, the United States has invested more than $15.6
million in the removal and safe disposition of landmines and unexploded
ordnance in Zimbabwe for the return of land for agricultural use.
Through the work of our implementing partners, U.S. government
funds have supported landmine clearance, mine risk education, and
survivor assistance. U.S. assistance towards landmine clearance has
saved many lives and is making a difference in Zimbabwean communities.
Question 8. How would the FY 18 CBJ funding level, if enacted,
impact landmine clearance operations in Zimbabwe?
Answer. Continued landmine clearance assistance would save
thousands of lives exposed to one of the most landmine-contaminated
areas in the world.
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